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BOSTOISI
PUBLIC
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le Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2070

January 1983

Cover:

Waving goodbye as he boards Air Force
One, President Reagan departs White
House enroute Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, and Honduras.

(White House photo by Mary Anne
Fackelman)

Department of State

bulletin

Volume 83 / Number 2070 / January 1983

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on cuiTent
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretan,' of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March .31.
1987.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
of the Department (IK State Bulletin as the source
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402 Price: 12 issues plus annual index— $21.00
(domestic) $26.25 (foreign) Single copy— $3.75
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(domestic) $3. 15 (foreign)

CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 President Reagan Visits Latin America {President

Reagan, Secretary Shultz. Statements, Remarks, Toasts,

Press Briefings, Radio Address, U.S. -El Salvador Joint Communique)

The President

28 East- West Trade Relations and

tiie Soviet Pipeline Sanctions

29 International Free Trade

30 News Conference of November 1 1

(Excerpts)

The Vice President

Visit to Africa and Bermuda
(Statements, Remarks, Toasts,
U.S. -Nigeria Joint Communi-
que)

Vice President Bush Attends
Caribbean Conference

The Secretary

54 News Conference of November 18

Europe

58 Death of Soviet President

Brezhnev (White House State-
ment, Vice President Bush,
President Reagan, Secretary
Shultz)

62 American Role in NATO

(Lawrence S. Eagleburger)

65 Visit of Italian Prime Minister

Spadolini (President Reagan,
Giovanni Spadolini)

66 Visit of West German Chancellor

Kohl (U.S.-F.R.G. Joint Com-
munique)
68 Second Anniversary of Solidarity
(President Reagan)

International Law

70 Act of State Doctrine: Foreign

Expropriations (Davis R. Robin-
son)

Middle East

Search for Peace and Stability in
the Middle East (Kenneth W.
Dam)

Securing a Peaceful Future for
Lebanon (Kenneth W. Dam)

Nuclear Policy

75 Nuclear Energy: Opportunities
and Problems
(Richard T. Kennedy)

United Nations

78 Call for Soviet Withdrawal From
Afghanistan (Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, Text of Resolution)

Western Hemisphere

81 World Peace and the Situation in

Central America and the Carib-
bean (President Reagan)

Treaties

82 Current Actions

Chronology

84 November 1982

Press Releases

86 Department of State

Publications

86 Department of State

"This will be a journey for the cause of democracy and peace.

President Reagan arrives at Brasilia International Airport and is greeted bv Brazilian
President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo. Secretary Shultz, left, looks on.

»Bnuary1983

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

President Reagan
Visits Latin America

President Reagan departed Washington, D.C.,
November 30, 1982, for a trip to Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Honduras. He returned to the United
States on December U-

Following are statements, remarks, toasts, and
press briefings made by the President and Secretary
Shultz, who accompanied him, during this trip, as
well as the text of the U.S. -El Salvador joint com-
munique. ^

President Reagan's Statement to the People of Brazil,
November 26, 1982

Last May, I had the honor of welcoming President [Brazilian President Joao
Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo] and Mrs. Figueiredo to the United States. Our
discussions taught me how much our two countries have in common and how impor-
tant it is that we understand each other well. I also learned how easy it is for
Americans and Brazilians to talk as friends.

I am delighted to have President Figueiredo's invitation to return his visit and
have made a special effort to learn more about Brazil, its people, their heritage, and
their aspirations. In the course of my readings and conversations, I have noticed
many similarities between our two countries and their people.

• We are both nations of immigrants; yet, we have successfully capitalized on
the cultural, religious, and racial diversities of our peoples.

• We are both committed to peaceful resolution of global and hemispheric con-
flict; yet, we both understand the need for strong and vigilant armed services.

• We are both in positions of economic leadership on our respective continents;
at the same time, we are major trading partners. The winds of economic crisis have
buffeted our nations over the past few years — inflation, energy shortages, high in-
terest rates — and we are still struggling to gain ground and prosper in these tur-
bulent times.

Both Brazil and the United States have demonstrated, during this same month
of November, that democracy is the world's best hope for peaceful change and
progress.

While I am President Figueiredo's guest in your country, my colleagues and I
expect to spend many hours in close consultations with distinguished Brazilians. We
will discuss how our two governments can best support each other's efforts to meet
the economic, social, cultural, and political aspirations of our people — and how we
can best strengthen the future security of our countries, our hemisphere, and our
world.

Broadcast on Brazilian television (text from White House press release of Nov. 29, 1982).

WASHINGTON, D.C.

President Reagan's
Departure Remarks

White House
Nov. 30, 19822

Today we embark on an important
journey to visit our friends in the South,
in Latin America. This will be an impor-
tant visit, not only for the United States
but for others, too. As friends and
neighbors of the New World, we have a
vital stake in each other's economies,
security, and general well-being. This is
true for Central America, the Carib-
bean, and for the entire hemisphere.

This will be a working visit. I will be
meeting with six presidents, and I
believe we have a lot to learn from one
another. We certainly have a lot to
discuss: the steps we all need to take to
get our domestic economies back on the
path to growth, to reduce the threats to
peace and security, and to promote the
continued development of democracy.
This will be a journey for the cause of
democracy and peace.

The four countries I am visiting
have all had elections in the past year.
There is a strong democratic tide run-
ning in the Americas. It's important that
democratic leaders maintain a dialogue
with one another and that our actions
foster the ideals of democracy in a
climate of peace.

I have long held that one of the
highest priorities of this Administration
would be to improve our relations with
our neighbors in this extraordinary
hemisphere. We are, as you know, most
fortunate, for this half of the globe is
the source and repository of many of
mankind's noblest dreams. Our Carib-
bean Basin initiative is a reflection of
our commitment to sustaining those
moral visions, or noble visions. And
when our neighbors are in trouble, their
troubles inevitably become ours.

I am pleased that the Congress ap-
proved the aid portion of my CBI re-
quest in September. I also attach impor-
tance to the critical foreign assistance

package for fiscal year 1983, which is
currently before the Congress.

But we need more than just an injec-
tion of critically needed funds. We need
the long-term incentives encompassed in
the trade and tax provisions of the CBI
legislation. In my meeting with the
Republican leadership this morning, I
underlined the importance that I attach
to enactment as soon as possible of the
trade and tax portions of the CBI, and
they agreed.

I have spoken with Dan Rosten-
kowski. Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, who recently
traveled to the Caribbean at our request.
He saw first-hand the positive impact
that the CBI would have on the
economies and the societies of this area,
and he, too, promised to help during the
final days of this session.

Our trip is an opportimity to
demonstrate first-hand our concern for
our neighbors. Whether our nations be
of the North or the South, we can work
together as partners to pursue the
dreams we share. We will strengthen
the democratic bond, stimulate new
growth and opportunity, and promote
the sacred cause of peace. That's the
purpose of the journey.

BRAZIL

President Reagan's
Arrival Remarks

Brasilia
Nov. 30, 19823

I am delighted to be here in Brazil— to
have the opportunity to see this city
which is famous the world over as an ex-
pression of Brazil's confidence in its
destiny. I look forward to strengthening
my friendship with President Figueiredo
so warmly begun in May, and to con-
tinue the discussions we began in
Washington.

We're here on a working visit. In ad-
dition to Secretary of State Shultz, I
have with me Treasiu-y Secretary
[Donald T.] Regan, our Trade
Representative, Ambassador [William

E.] Brock, and other leaders of our
Government. We are prepared to discusi '
a wide range of subjects.

I also look forward to learning first
hand about this giant country and the i
contrast between this city and Sao
Paulo, which is so well known the world'
over as an industrial and metropolitan
wonder.

Our societies are similar in that we '
both have a frontier tradition, an open-
ness and vision for greatness. The roots'
of our nations are also similar. We are '
both melting pots— nations that succeed-
ed in giving their citizens, no matter
what their origins, an opportunity to '
share with their initiative, hard work,
and intelligence in the vision of
freedom — freedom to worship and to
work in dignity for a better life.

You, in Brazil, have great dreams
and a vast nation blessed with enormous
resources in which to fulfill them. Here,
in Brasilia, we see dramatic proof of the
spirit of a people with unlimited drive,
determination, and confidence in their
future.

We all know of the strong and
steady advance of Brazil both
domestically and internationally. Your
November 15 elections demonstrated
Brazil's confidence in itself and its
stability in freedom. Similarly, the
management of the Brazilian economy
through times of economic difficulty
around the world inspires us all that our
present problems can be overcome.

And while we may have areas of
disagreement, we also have a great deal
in common. I am sure our talks will be
fruitful and prove beneficial to both our
countries.

On behalf of the people of the
United States I bring you our good
wishes and friendship. President
Figueiredo, thank you for welcoming
me. I already feel at home.

Itinerary

November 30— Depart Washington, D.C.
November 30-December 2— Brasilia, Brazil
December 2 — Sao Paulo, Brazil
December 2-3 — Brasilia, Brazil
December 3 — Bogota, Colombia
December 3-4 — San Jose, Costa Rica
December 4 — San Pedro Sula, Honduras
December 4 — Arrive Washington, D.C. ■

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

'resident Reagan's
Response to Questions
jubmitted by Latin
j^merican Newspapers

:eleased Nov. 30, 1982^

I. The power of the democratic idea
nd economic progress allowed the
Vest to win the battle for the hearts
nd minds of people almost every-
where and helped them resist
otalitarian ideologies. But. isn't there
n implicit threat to those gains in the
resent economic crisis and, therefore,
0 the strategic interests of the United
Itates, even in the hemisphere?

A. There is no question that today's
:lobal economic crisis is a severe
hallenge to democracies everywhere.
)uring an economic downturn, competi-
ion among labor, business, and govern-
nent becomes more intense, and the
elationships can become strained. This,
n part, is the reason why I proposed
ast February, in cooperation with other
ionor nations in the hemisphere, an am-
)itious program to increase aid and
simulate trade and investment in the
Caribbean Basin. It is also why the
Jnited States has worked closely with
he international community to assist
■ountries which are facing more serious
'inancial difficulties during the current
worldwide recession.

The situation in El Salvador is a
good example of the tension and in-
stability that can develop. There, leftist
guerrilla forces have undermined the
economic infrastructure in order to
spread dissatisfaction and opposition to
the democratically elected government.
El Salvador also shows, however, that
even in a profoundly divided society,
democratic institutions can rise above
economic or political crisis to meet the
challenge with a national consensus.
Other nations, in Central America and
South America, are finding that the
consensus-building inherent in a
democracy offers a firm foundation for
■responding to economic and other crises.
So, although economic difficulties test
our democratic ideals, I believe that re-
cent events, such as the elections in

Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Colom-
bia, Honduras, and Mexico, show that
our democracies will emerge not only
secure, but stronger. That Brazil has
just conducted a landmark election dur-
ing a period of severe economic prob-
lems is a clear indication that democracy
cannot only be maintained but advanced
even during times of economic difficulty.

Q. The United States is trying to
reduce its contributions to the World
Bank [International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, IBRD]
and the Inter-American Development
Bank (lADB) while refusing to in-
crease the lending resources of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) in
the proportion desired by developing
nations. In light of these initiatives,
what expectations can Third-World
countries have in relation to U.S. par-
ticipation in the North-South
dialogue?

A. Your initial statement is inac-
curate. We support an adequate increase
in IMF quotas and a substantial
replenishment of the Inter-American
Development Bank. Moreover, I am
committed to working with leaders of
Third-World countries to address their
real development problems in a
pragmatic, concrete manner.

The world community's most impor-
tant contribution to growth in develop-
ing countries is through trade. Last
year, the United States alone provided
more than $68 billion to the non-OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] developing world in payment
for goods imported from developing
countries. That is twice as much as
LDCs [less developed countries] received
in official development assistance from
all sources.

We are committed to fostering an
international trade system which will
continue to provide a powerful engine of
growth. For example, in last week's
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] meeting in Geneva, we pro-
posed a round of North-South trade
talks that would help increase trade be-
tween developed and developing coun-
tries.

We recognize, however, that conces-
sional assistance also plays an important
role in development, particularly for
least developed countries. In a period
when concessional financing is scarce.

those limited resources should be con-
centrated on the world's poorest, least
credit-worthy countries.

Q. What concrete results can we
now see from CBI (Caribbean
Basin initiative)? What are the
possibilities that the Congress will not
support the initiative fully? If the ac-
cess to the North American market
contemplated as part of the as yet
unapproved CBI is not approved soon,
would your government be disposed to
establish some kind of bilateral ar-
rangement with the Carribbean Basin
countries?

A. The Caribbean Basin initiative is
an integrated program of emergency
financial aid, trade preferences, and in-
vestment incentives. It will help
revitalize the economies of the Carib-
bean Basin by stimulating greater in-
vestment, production, and exports in the
region. That will create jobs and give
people tangible hopes for a better
economic future within stable,
democratic institutions. As you know,
the U.S. Congress, in September, ap-
proved the emergency aid portion of the
initiative, and those funds are now being
disbursed. The trade and investment
portions of the initiative will be con-
sidered by the Congress in the next few
days. We have been working closely
with the leadership in both Houses to
see that the full legislative program of
the CBI is completed before Christmas.

We will continue to seek a multi-
lateral and regional approach, rather
than isolated bilateral arrangements. I
strongly believe that the cooperation of
other countries— both as donors and as
participants in the program— strength-
ens and increases the effectiveness of
any individual country's efforts.

Q. The Falkland/Malvinas Islands
conflict damaged relations between
the United States and Latin America.
How can hemispheric unity be
achieved, and how will your trip bet-
ter inter-American relations?

A. We, in the New World, are very
important to each other. Our mutual
dependence — our interdependence —
shows up in almost every statistic con-
cerning hemispheric trade, capital flows,
communications, and other forms of
human interaction. Much of the world's
growth potential is here in our
hemisphere. I know public attention is

January 1983

focused on alleviating the global reces-
sion. That is only natural. But we must
focus on how to create the conditions for
renewed, long-term growth. Perhaps the
most encouraging trend at work in the
hemisphere is the movement toward de-
mocracy. We firmly support this trend,
and through my trip, I hope to make
that support clear and widely known.
We must recognize that the inter-
American system has served us well.
True, it was unable to prevent the tragic
outbreak of war earlier this year. But
let's not forget that — thanks in large
measure to the inter- American sys-
tem— Latin America devotes less than
1.4% of its gross national product to
military expenditures. What is called for
now is not new institutions but a re-
newed commitment to making the sys-
tem's emphasis on the rule of law and
the peaceful resolution of disputes work
better. That calls for political will. The
United States is firmly committed to do
its part in this endeavor. My visit to
your countries will emphasize that com-
mitment.

Q. In recent years, several
democracies have been restored in
Latin America: Peru, BraziL Ecuador,
Bolivia, and Honduras. What impor-
tance does your government give to
these democracies in contrast to
military regimes in the hemisphere?
What impact do you believe your Ad-
ministration's human rights policy had
on these developments?

A. The United States places great
importance on the development of stable
democratic institutions in our
hemisphere. In addition to the special
bond which the shared value of
democracy brings to our relationship
with another nation, there are certain
practical elements in democratic systems
which also deepen and strengthen our
ties. Democracies tend to be more
stable, because they represent a broader
spectrum of national opinion. Democ-
racies tend to be more peace loving,
because they must consult with their
citizens regarding major foreign policy
questions. Democracies tend to have
more policy continuity because of their
broad-based support. And lastly, when
we deal with a democratic government,
we know it speaks for its sovereign peo-
ple as a whole, not just for an isolated

sector. I believe that U.S. promotion of
human rights and support for democracy
in the Western Hemisphere reinforce
each other. History shows us that the
most effective guarantee of human
rights lies in the creation and strength-
ening of open democratic institutions of
government. But, we in the United
States can only influence; we cannot
determine.

I believe that the growth of democ-
racy we have seen in recent years shows
the power of the democratic idea, from
the unity and stability it brings to a na-
tion, to the dignity and legitimacy it
bestows on a government.

Q. It is evident that Cuba threat-
ens both Central America and the
Caribbean. Have you thought of an ef-
fective way to eliminate the root of
this Cuban subversion?

A. You are quite right that Cuba, by
its support for armed violence and
subversion against its neighbors, is, in-
deed, a threat to the peace of the
Americas. But more impoi-tantly, with
its economy in a shambles, with tens of
thousands of mercenaries in Africa, and
with its extreme dependence on Soviet
largesse merely to hold its head above
water, Cuba has become more and more
a Soviet satellite and a willing conduit
for advancing aggressive Communism.
Were it not for the Soviet Union, which
gives massive aid in the form of arms
and money — $3 to $4 billion this year
alone — Cuba could not afford to do what
it is doing. Om- response has been
threefold:

First, we are working with the
other states of the region to help the ac-
tual and potential victims of Soviet-
abetted, Cuban-inspired attacks in the
region. This includes, as its most impor-
tant element, help to strengthen their
economies through bilateral and
multilateral programs, including the
Caribbean Basin initiative, which is key
to the success of this joint effort. Where
necessary, we also provide security
assistance;

Second, we hold the Soviet Union
ultimately responsible for much of its
client's behavior; and

Third, we maintain and have
strengthened economic measures de-
signed to increase greatly the costs to

Cuba and its Soviet paymasters of their
interventions in other countries.

Q. In the past, the United States
permitted the Soviet Union to achieve
strategic parity. You now appear to
believe that only an American threat
to regain superiority will cause the
Kremlin to accept your plan to mutual
ly reduce nuclear arms. However, this
position has not produced results at
the negotiating table. In fact, it ap-
pears to be exacerbating the arms
race, with the resulting waste by the
superpowers of resources that would
be better utilized in the fight for
development. In light of the change oi
guard in the Kremlin, isn't this the
moment to revitalize detente and
abandon the rhetoric of confrontation

A. The United States is not seeking
strategic superiority. I am convinced
that the preservation of peace requires
that we follow two parallel paths —
deterrence and seeking significant arms
reductions to equal and verifiable levels.
These are the only paths that offer any
real hope for enduring peace. I want to
stress that the present disparity in
forces brought about by the massive
Soviet buildup of the 1970's has been
very detrimental to international peace
and stability.

I believe our strategy for peace wil:
succeed. Although the United States ha
always led the effort for arms limita-
tions and reductions, never before have
we proposed such a comprehensive pro-
gram of nuclear arms control. What we
are saying to the Soviet Union is this:
We will modernize our military in order
to keep the balance for peace, but
wouldn't it be better if we both simply
reduced our arsenals to a much lower
level?

We have stressed from the outset
that we want a constructive relationship
with the Soviet Union, based on mutual
restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity.
UTifortunately, Soviet-backed aggression
in recent years — such as Afghanistan,
Poland, and Kampuchea — has violated
these principles. But we remain ready tc
respond positively to constructive Soviet
actions.

Q. Brazil is experiencing the
gravest economic and financial crisis
of the last 20 years. Naturally, Brazil
looks to the United States, the richest

Department of State Bulletlr

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

nation in the world, for support. What
types of specific assistance can your
administration provide Brazil, direct-
ly, in the terms of credit and loans,
and indirectly, in its attempts to
restore the confidence of private
banks in the country and to increase
the resources of multilateral lending
institutions?

A. The United States continues to
be a strong supporter and the largest
contributor to the World Bank, the
lADB, and the IMF. We believe these
institutions have key roles to fill in to-
day's world and provide important
resources, both financial and technical.
While we believe IMF resources are suf-
ficient to handle current problems, we
are working with other members of the
IMF to insure that adequate resources
will also be available in the future. We
hope that agreement on a new quota in-
crease will come soon and that our sug-
gestion for a special borrowing facility
to meet possible extraordinary demands
will be accepted.

Brazil can be proud of its well-
established reputation for meeting its
obligations in a responsible manner and
for facing problems with skill, energy,
and pragmatism. We have every reason
to believe Brazil will continue to take
whatever measures it finds necessary to
deal with its problems, including any
economic adjustments that may be need-
ed to assure sound growth and develop-
ment. This, in turn, gives lenders con-
fidence in Brazil's creditworthi-
ness—confidence that I share. We
believe Brazil will have adequate access
to private international financial
markets.

Q. Brazil condemns foreign in-
terference in Central America, sym-
pathizes with Nicaragua (Brazil has
given Nicaragua some economic
assistance), condemned Zionism as a
form of racism in the United Nations,
and was the first country to recognize
officially Angola in spite of the Soviet
and Cuban roles in Angola's in-
dependence. Given the self-proclaimed
Western inclinations of Brazil, do the
fruits of its foreign policy of "non-
automatic alliances" surprise you? Is
there a risk that Brazil's foreign
policy will place both nations on a col-
lision course? During your visit to

Brazil will you call for a new align-
ment between Brazil and the United

States?

A. Your question suggests that the
foreign policies of Brazil and the United
States are in direct conflict. I do not ac-
cept that suggestion. In our discussions
last May, President Figueiredo and I
found that there are many more points
of convergence in our foreign policies
than there are points of divergence.
That is not surprising since both coun-
tries are based on a similar value
system; have similar origins and
histories; and are dedicated to peace,
prosperity, freedom, and justice. As for
the points of divergence, we live in a
large and complex world with many dif-
ficult problems and situations, and it
would be totally unrealistic to expect
any two free and independent nations to
hold identical views on all of them. You
only find that automatic Identity of view-
point within the Soviet bloc, and I cer-
tainly would not like to see that
replicated anyplace in the world.

No, I do not intend to propose a new
alignment between Brazil and the
United States. I am interested in
strengthening the bilateral relationship,
in reviewing areas where there have
been problems, and in exploring new
possibilities for bilateral cooperation.
This is important to me, and I think it is
important to President Figueiredo, not
in the context of a new alignment, but
as reaffirmation of the longstanding
friendship between Brazil and the
United States and our common commit-
ment to the peace and progress of the
hemisphere and the world.

Q. President Figueiredo stated,
during a recent speech at the United
Nations, that "the economic policies of
the great powers are destroying
wealth without replacing it." The
American Government in particular,
has been accused of adopting econom-
ically repressive policies, ignoring the
pernicious effects on the rest of the
world. The United States, according
to critics, is exporting recession and
unemployment today in the same way
that it exported inflation in the past.
Was your government somewhat in-
sensitive regarding the negative reper-
cussions of U.S. ecomonic policies
abroad?

A. I know that slow economic
growth in the United States is having

serious impact on other economies, and I
wish we could have avoided this painful
transition period for all of us. The con-
tinuation of past U.S. economic policies
and the continued lack of control over
U.S. inflation would have led to disaster
not only for the United States, but for
the whole world economy. We are seeing
the beginnings of recovery in our coun-
try—inflation has fallen dramatically, in-
terest rates also are dropping fast, and
there are encouraging signs of investor
confidence, for example, in the stock
market and in construction. What we
are aiming for is a revival of steady
economic growth with price stability. I
want to lay the foundation for a long
period of U.S. growth not subject to ex-
aggerated ups and down which have
caused so much pain around the world in
the past. I think we are on the right
road, and that the U.S. economy will
once again provide a significant stimulus
to production and employment around
the world.

Q. President [Colombian President
Belisario] Betancur has said that the
United States is treating Latin Ameri-
ca as "America's backyard." How do
you respond to that?

A. While there may have been some
basis in the past for the concern that the
United States did not focus sufficiently
on its relations with the hemisphere, I
think it is clear that my administration
has devoted considerable attention to
our hemisphere relations, as evidenced
in the Caribbean Basin initiative, which
we and Colombia support, and my cur-
rent trip, which underlines the impor-
tance of our hemispheric neighbors for
the United States.

Q. Beyond doubt, one of the most
important problems between Colombia
and the United States is drug traffick-
ing. And, certainly, there have been
some important advances such as the
recent "Operation Swordfish." Never-
theless, for those who are in the
know, drug trafficking is produced
not only by the sellers but also by the
buyers, which, in this case, are the
U.S. citizens themselves. What
policies have been instituted to fight
against the immense consumption of
drugs in your country?

A. On October 5, I endorsed our
new Federal strategy which is designed

January 1983

to mobilize all our forces to stop the
flow of illegal drugs into the United
States, and to prevent drug abuse,
especially among our youth. This is a
bold, confident plan, which simul-
taneously attacks organized criminal
trafficking in drugs; international pro-
duction and exporting of illicit narcotics;
and seeks to reduce demand for drugs.

I have charged two Cabinet-level
councils with responsibility for domestic
enforcement and international narcotics
control, and for overseeing health-
related drug programs. The South
Florida Task Force on Crime made sig-
nificant inroads on narcotics trafficking,
and we have announced plans to create
similar task forces in other regions. My
staff and interagency teams are coor-
dinating a nationwide prevention ef-
fort— with a strong assist from my wife
Nancy — that involves government,
health institutions, business, educational
institutions, the media, other private
sector interests, and importantly,
parents, and parent groups.

I have described drug abuse as one
of the gravest problems facing us inter-
nally. We must undertake vigorous
policies and programs at home and over-
seas where the major drugs are pro-
duced. In that context, I am pleased to
be able to say that we have been
cooperating very actively with the Gov-
ernment of Colombia. For several years
we have been engaged in cooperative ef-
forts to help improve the enforcement
and interdiction efforts within Colombia
against cocaine, marijuana, and other
drugs. We have seen some good results.
We hope, in the future, that we can
work together to expand this coopera-
tion on supply control. Such cooperation,
together with progress on the demand
side against drug abuse in the United
States, is the only way to effect a per-
manent improvement in the situation.
My Administration has committed more
than $900 million per year to this effort,
the majority of these funds being spent
on reducing drug abuse within the
United States.

Q. What is the Reagan Ad-
ministration's reaction to President
Betancur's intention to join the
NonaligTied Movement?

A. Colombia is a sovereign nation
with whom we have excellent relations.

and it would not be appropriate for me
to express an opinion about its relations
with others.

Q. Many Costa Ricans believe that
the present economic and security
crises in Costa Rica and the area en-
danger our democratic system. What
is your Administration prepared to do
to avoid the destruction of Costa
Rican democracy?

A. There are few countries in the
region which have a better understand-
ing of the economic and security
challenges facing Central America and
the Caribbean today than your own. In
his speech to the Conference on Free
Elections in Washington, D.C., Presi-
dent [Costa Rican President Luis Alber-
to] Monge said that in your February 7
elections, the Costa Rican people con-
firmed their faith in democracy as the
means of resolving your country's
economic problems. I share that faith in
the democratic process and agree that
economic health is key to a secure future
for the entire Caribbean Basin. While
congressional approval of the $350
million supplemental appropriations ad-
dresses some of the more immediate
concerns, I think we must be equally
concerned about the medium- and long-
term issues addressed by the trade and
investment portions of my own govern-
ment's Caribbean Basin initiative. This is
a major policy priority for my Ad-
ministration, and we are actively work-
ing with Congress to enact those re-
maining parts of the CBI legislation in
the congressional session now underway
in Washington.

President Monge's leadership in the
recent San Jose conference represented
both a growing consensus among the
democratic countries of the region as to
the conditions necessary for peace, and
a commitment among us all to find the
means for reducing those tensions. Dur-
ing the past year we have seen free elec-
tions and orderly changes of government
in Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
the Dominican Republic, and Colom-
bia— all signatories of the San Jose final
act. The challenges are real, but so is
our commitment to succeed.

Q. In less than 6 months. Presi-
dent Monge has met with you twice in
Washington. Now you will meet with
him in San Jose. This level of contact

is higher than usual in traditional
relations between Costa Rica and the
majority of Latin American countries,
and the United States. What is the
reason for these close contacts?

A. We cannot afford to forget that
only a few years ago, Costa Rica, long
an historical model for democratic
government in the hemisphere, was also
virtually alone. In just the last year, six
of the countries that participated in the
recent San Jose conference conducted
free elections and witnessed an orderly
change of government. Democratic
government has taken the initiative in
addressing the economic, social, and
political challenges facing the region.
This will be my third meeting with
President Monge, and it reflects both
the common values which we bring to
the issues and a recognition that the
democratic process, itself, offers a bet-
ter alternative than the historic and
simplistic choices of the extremes of a
violent right or a violent left.

Q. We know that the North
American Congress has passed strict
legislation with regard to sending
U.S. troops outside the country;
however, the President has the power
to send troops for 30 days. In the
event of Nicaraguan aggression
against Honduras, could our country
depend on the concrete assistance of
the United States?

A. The obstacles to peace in Central
America stand clearly exposed as the
countries of the region grapple with
severe economic challenges, demand for
social justice and reform, strains on
public services, and violence frequently
born out of the extremist solutions.
Your own country has been in the
forefront in having proposed construc-
tive solutions to resolve these tensions.
Economically, we have collaborated on
both the immediate and longer term
solutions, and I am optimistic that my
Administration's Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative will receive congressional action
shortly to address the pressing re-
quirements in the trade and investment
areas. Politically, the recent San Jose
conference final act reflected your coun-
try's diplomatic initiatives aimed at
reducing the likelihood of further
military conflict in the region. As one of
the eight democratic governments which

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

signed that final act, the United States
supports the growing regional consensus
on those conditions necessary for peace
n the region. As you know, the level of
U.S. economic and military assistance to
Honduras has risen significantly over
the past year in response to our shared
concerns in Central America and, I
think, represents a clear indication of
our support for your country's demo-
cratic efforts to surmount these
problems.

Q. Our country, a friend and an
ally of the United States, has wit-
nessed with surprise the imposition of
sugar quotas. What was the reason
that Honduras was given a substan-
tially smaller quota than the quotas of
countries that are openly hostile to
Washington?

A. As I have explained before, the
drop in world sugar prices and the con-
gressional reaction to this development
left us no choice but to impose tem-
porary sugar import quotas to protect
our domestic producers. Quota allocation
is based on an average of a country's ex-
ports to the United States from
1975— the date when the previous U.S.
sugar program expired— through 1981,
excluding each country's high and low
performance years. The Honduran allo-
cation was determined by this non-
discriminatory formula, which we are
applying across the board to all coun-
tries in accordance with our interna-
tional trade obligations.

Secretary Shultz's
Press Briefing

Brasilia
Dec. 1, 1982^

President Figueiredo, Mrs. Figueiredo
and the other Brazilian Ministers whom
we have been meeting with and who
have been our hosts this morning and at
luncheon are wonderful hosts. We have
had a warm, friendly, gracious recep-
tion, and we appreciate it.

I might say that the nature of the
visit in which we had a series of formal
meetings and then an informal, lengthy
luncheon proved to be particularly good

because we had an opportunity, sitting
around the table and talking informally,
to explore all kinds of topics in a gen-
uinely fruitful way.

In terms of the meetings themselves
and specific things that may come out of
them are concerned, the two Presidents
did ask the Brazilian Foreign Minister
and me to coordinate a series of
ministerial-level working groups that,
basically, pick up work that is now going
on and, in addition, perhaps, will start
some additional work. But the working
groups will range over the following sub-
jects.

First, economic problems which in-
clude the areas of finance and trade and
all matters of that kind that have to do
with the financial and trading systems.

Second, a number of issues and dif-
ficulties, in which our two countries'
legislations having to do with nuclear
issues, need to be worked on; we will
have a working group that addresses
itself to those issues.

Third, there is in existence — and
there will be developed some more
under this arrangement — cooperative
relationships between Brazil and the
United States in various areas of tech-
nology— science and technology, includ-
ing the space area. There are things that
they do that are helpful to us and vice
versa, and we want to develop this.

Finally, we will explore possible
relationships in the area of industrial
military fields of cooperation. We will
put some working groups into the field
on these subjects. Some things have
been taking place in these areas already.
The two Foreign Ministries have been
tasked by the Presidents to ride herd on
this process and not think of it as an
ongoing thing, but, rather, to see what
we can see in these areas and then
report back at some fairly prompt, but
yet, unnamed date on what we conclude
from these studies.

That, in general, is the sort of thing
we talked about, and the tone and at-
mosphere have been exceedingly cordial
and pleasant, and I know that we have
all appreciated it.

Q. Did the subject of Cuba come
up? And what was said about it if it
did?

A. It did not come up.

Q. Did anything in these discus-
sions you held today produce any im-
mediate relief for Brazil's financial
problems?

A. I think the situation, as I under-
stand it, is that Brazil has involved itself
with the IMF and that process is under
way. And as I think the President men-
tioned, there was worked out, and there
have been discussions going back, I
think, to the time of the World Bank-
IMF meetings in Toronto — that was
around Labor Day — of various financial
problems. The United States has, as it
does with many countries, extended in
the swap area, what you might call a
bridging loan — that was finalized last
week sometime — that will help Brazil
bridge between that time and whenever
the IMF negotiations result in
something.

So, there was that, but I would put
it in the range of normal swap ar-
rangements that are not totally common
but are — certainly occur in many cases
among countries in the international
financial field.

Q. — of cooperation between the
two countries —

A. The question as I understand it
was, what new areas of cooperation do I
expect in the area of foreign policy? Was
that the question?

Q. As the result of these meetings.

A. First of all, our meetings aren't
complete in the sense that I will go to
the Foreign Ministry after I am through
here; we will have some further discus-
sions there. But fundamentally, Brazil
has a foreign policy. We have one. We
talk about issues and see where we can
work effectively together, as in the case
of the GATT Ministerial meeting last
week. We did not try to identify any
particular joint initiative of any kind.

Q. One of the purposes, you said,
was to ease the strain over the
Falkland Islands dispute between the
United States and—

A. No, I didn't say that. You fellows
have been writing that all the time, but I
didn't say that.

Q. What was said about the
Falkland Islands business — about that
strain — and what was done or said to
try to restore good relations?

A. We have good relations. We
don't have to restore good relations. The

January 1983

Falkland Islands dispute really did not
come up as a matter of dispute, and I
think that the situation there now is that
we have had two votes on the sub-
ject— one in the United Nations and one
in the Organization of American States
— in which we and the other countries of
the Americas supported the idea of
negotiations to settle a dispute. That is
where the matter rests.

Q. Could you be a little more
specific about the military ar-
rangements, cooperation, and produc-
tion? Is there any more in the military
area than military and industrial pro-
duction?

A. No, there is nothing more to be
said on that other than that it is a deal
of potential fruitful interaction, and it is
something that will be explored by the
working group. There are various possi-
ble things that one would explore in that
regard — technological, production, and
training things. So, there is a range of
possible matters that the military people
will presumably discuss. But I think this
is sort of something they will have to
develop, and they will have to decide
what it is they want to talk about. I am
not trying to specify in any way any par-
ticular agenda.

Q. Is there any talk about the pro-
duction under U.S. licensing of
military equipment?

A. We did not discuss specifics such
as that. When this working group
assembles itself and sets out its agenda,
it will decide whether that is the subject
that it wishes to discuss.

Q. Are you looking for more sup-
port from Brazil for U.S. foreign
policy, specifically, with regard to
Central America?

A. Of course, we take all the sup-
port we can get for our policies, based
on people's feeling that what we are do-
ing is right and deserves to be sup-
ported. But we did not come here seek-
ing particular support for any specific
thing. Rather, the President came here
to express his firm belief in the impor-
tance of Brazil and other countries in
this region to the United States, to ex-
plore issues of mutual interest and to
share ideas about them, to promote the
ongoing work and start some new work
that will be mutually beneficial.

Q. Was anything discussed a great
deal toward policy of the United
States in that area?

A. When you say that, let me hedge
all my answers by saying that I was not
in all the meetings between Presidents
Reagan and Figueiredo, but I don't
believe that it was specifically addressed
and talked about as a particular agenda
item. That does not mean that, obvious-
ly, we are not very interested in it. And
as the course of this visit goes on, we
may want to discuss it. I am sure that
Brazilians are just as interested in it as
we are.

Q. You said it was a fruitful
meeting but really all you told us
about it is that you agreed to set up
working groups. What was fruitful?
What did you discuss? What came off?

A. The answer is, first of all, that
setting up working groups on important
subjects with a thrust behind them from
the President to get really at these sub-
jects and think them over and come
back with a report is quite a significant
thing.

This is not something that emerged
out of nowhere but, rather, picks up
some very important ongoing work in
the economic area. There have been a
lot of discussions in the nuclear area.
There is a meeting, in December, in the
science and technology field. We want to
gather these things together a little bit,
give them a shove and, among other
things, see them as a contributor to, and
an expression of the links that we have
with Brazil and the important relation-
ship that exists between our two coun-
tries.

Q. Did they bring up the Caribbean
Basin? There were many stories in the
South American papers about the Mar-
shall Plan that might come forth. Was
there anything like that discussed?

A. There was no mention of stories
in the press of any kind, not that
anybody does not read the newspapers.
But as far as the Caribbean Basin initia-
tive is concerned, certainly one of the
purposes of the President's trip is to
underline the importance of that initia-
tive. It is being actively considered, and
we are very encouraged by the response
of key congressional people on both
sides of the aisle as they come into the
special session in Washington, that there

will be action on the Caribbean Basin
initiative. We have from the Chairman
of the [House] Ways and Means Com-
mittee that he is going to markup on ''
both the trade and the tax aspects of it. '
We are very encouraged by that. The
President's trip and the stopover — not '
only here but, perhaps, especially in I

Colombia, which is a donor nation and a
Caribbean nation, as well as South
American and the Central American
countries — serve to underline that point.

Q. Though the Brazilians agree
that the GATT talks in Geneva last
weekend do include services under the
GATT discussions, have you found any
evidence that the Brazilians are will-
ing to make some concessions on what
people in the United States feel is a
protectionist attitude on services?

A. I don't want to try to speak for
Brazilians; the Brazilians, of course, will
speak for themselves. But I would say,
as a general proposition, that the issue
of a study group in the field of services,
which was agreed to in the GATT
meetings, was something that was
discussed a great deal. We talked about
it a lot, and the Brazilians did; many
other countries did. A considerable
amount of the discussion is caused by
the fact that "services" is a huge word,
and it covers everything from ranking
and insurance to engineering, and so on.
It covers a wide array of things. I think
that some countries are more concerned
than others about other aspects of what
we call services. So, that kind of sorting
out was necessary. I am sure the study
underway under GATT will have to
define a little bit more precisely what it
is within the field of services that is be-
ing addressed.

In my opinion, this is a very impor-
tant area to address in the field of trade
because what we call "services" are get-
ting to be a larger and larger fraction of
trade. If you want to see trade covered
by rules of the game, as seems to me is
highly desirable, then you would want to
explore extending those rules to areas
that are, in a sense, not now covered.

Q. Are we willing to send more
troops to Lebanon?

A. The President has said that he
wants to see Lebanon emerge as a coun-
try that can take care of itself and rule
itself. He wants to see the foreign
forces, all the foreign forces, removed
from Lebanon. We are part of the

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

iiltinational force there now, and we
■e willing to consider now. We are will-
ig to consider proposals that may come
ong as part of a plan for bringing
lose things about. The Government of
ebanon has stated that additions to the
mltinational force are desirable. 1 am
ire that the President will consider

lat.
Of course, we will want to consider

in its relationship to a plan for ac-
jmplishing all of the things that are

anted to be accomplished there. At this
oint, nothing explicit of that kind has
ome to the President. And I would say
eyond that, that there would not be any
ommitment before consultations with
he Congress had taken place. Certainly,
he President is willing to consider addi-
ions if that will be helpful in this proc-
ss. And in terms of when a U.S. com-
nitment would be made, we have to see

specific proposition. We have to con-
ult with the Congress.

Q. What sort of conditions would
ve want to see agreed to before we
vould make a commitment?

A. We would want to see, no doubt,
he structure of some sort of program
hat is going to achieve the goals that
ve and others seek. And then see how
he multinational and the U.S. part in it
'its into that program. That is the ob-
ect— not just to have a lot of people
!here. And you can see, in a general
way, the sorts of things that might be
ione. There have already been some
potential missions identified, but there is
not, yet, an overall plan to fit into. This
IS something that will be emerging.

Q. What about consultations with
other governments like France and
Italy? Are they going on?

A. Yes. We are constantly in con-
.-lultation with the Governments of
France and Italy who are partners with
us in the multinational force. Part of the
agreement on going in is an agreement
for close consultation as we consider it
is, also, possible that other countries
may wish to contribute to the forces
there. But at the same time, I think it
all is contingent on developing some sort
of a program, because people do not
want to send forces in without knowing
what for.

Q. In the 1960s, there used to be a
joint U.S.-Brazilian military commis-
sion that was very effective and

January 1983

presented a message to the world of
unity between the two largest coun-
tries in the hemisphere. When the
human rights issue came about, that
was abrogated. The American general
was sent home. What are the pros-
pects for restoration of the joint
U.S.-Brazilian military commission as
it was in the middle 1960s?

A. I think the question of what sort
of a relationship is desirable from the
standpoint of both countries is the sort
of thing that this working group, as it
shapes itself, will address. I cannot
answer the question in advance. It is
something for them to work out, and
then to consult within their countries.
And we will just have to see where that
goes.

Q. Is the United States interested
in restoration?

A. The President has agreed to the
establishment of the working group, and
so has the President of Brazil. That is a
pretty good expression of interest. But
interest in what is the thing that this
group will have to address. I cannot say
at this time precisely what it will be.

Q. You said that the United States
finalized bridging loans to Brazil last
week. Is this the U.S. Government to
which you were referring? And, if not,
if it is the private banks, then what
would be the U.S. Government's role
in guaranteeing or backing the private
loans to Brazil?

A. It does not have anything to do
with guaranteeing private loans. It is
part of the broad, swap-line financing
that is characteristic of the world of in-
ternational finance. It is strictly a
governmental thing and is bridging be-
tween when it was agreed to and when
the IMF arrangement that Brazil is
starting with the IMF are completed.

Q. Do you think that you can
resolve conflicting legislation on
nuclear issues? Could you clarify that?

A. We have legislation that places
restrictions on the shipment of various
nuclear technology, fuel, and so on,
depending upon the circumstances and
the safeguarding. Brazil, of course, is a
country that is developing its nuclear
program, and we have to see how these
things fit together. As of now, it has
been difficult, but we will make an effort
to see what we can see.

President Reagan's
Dinner Toast

Brasilia
Dec. 1, 1982'!

President Figueiredo, thank you for
your cordial welcome. There is an old
saying in Brazil that says: "The United
States is a very big country, but Brazil
is colossal." Flying for hours in a jet air-
craft gives one a sense of just how colos-
sal Brazil is. In fact, the only thing
larger than Brazil is the heart and good
will of the Brazilian people. You and all
Brazilians have said bern oiwdo— wel-
come, and we do feel welcome and at
home.

I'm told that 77 years ago the Baron
of Rio Branco, that great Brazilian
diplomat, in referring to the arrival of
one of Secretary Shultz's predecessors,
Elihu Root, is supposed to have said:
"His eyes may not be dazzled by our
small material progress, but his
American philosophy will surely be
pleased to note the new phenomena in
the Brazilian nation: activity, energy,
and hope." I can assure you that my
American philosophy is still very much
in tune with Brazil's phenomenal activi-
ty, energy, and hope. I must also admit
tiiat my eyes are dazzled by the progress
of the Brazilian nation.

Clearly, the postwar period, the time
when relationships were still determined
by the monumental events of the Second
World War, is over. Old patterns are
giving way to new relationships. Eco-
nomic and political power once concen-
trated in the hands of a few is being
spread, as it should, among many na-
tions. This is a result, not of redistribu-
tion, but the creation of vast new
wealth, generated by modern tech-
nology, creative enterprise, and hard
work.

President Figueiredo, you capsulized
it well at the United Nations when you
said: "The extraordinary release of pro-
ductive forces on a worldwide scale in
the post-war period wrought within a
few decades the intricate patterns of a
different world, a complex and unstable
world, but also a diversified and promis-
ing one." I was very much impressed by

the depth of analysis and the strength of
conviction of your speech at the United
Nations.

Today, I renew my pledge to main-
tain with you the closest of consultation.
Friendship does not mean total agree-
ment; instead, it suggests shared values,
ideals, mutual respect, and trust. This is
certainly true of the Brazilian and
American peoples. I know, it is true of
you and me as individuals. Our coun-
tries, as friends, and we, as leaders of
these great nations, will work together
to overcome the challenges we face to
our prosperity and freedom.

Recently, our economies have been
hard hit by recession, something ex-
perienced in most of the world. In the
United States, as you're doing here in
Brazil, we're taking the painful steps
necessary to overcome the economic
crisis that threatens our people. Self-
discipline is necessary; so, too, is mutual
accommodation. Borrowers must move
to restrict their deficits. But it is just as
important that lenders not withhold new
funds from countries which adopt effec-
tive stabilization plans. Lenders and bor-
rowers must remember that each has an
enormous stake in the other's success.

Toward that end, we believe that
economic relationships among the
trading nations of the world must rest
on three main pillars.

First, a spirit of cooperation. Our
economies are so clearly intertwined
that our best hope for growth is to act
in concert and not in isolation. Nothing
is more destructive than unilateral deci-
sions by individual countries to cut back
trade or financial flows. We cannot
prescribe what the private sector should
do. But our aim should be government
and private relations that can be relied
upon.

Second, a spirit of fairness. In to-
day's climate there is powerful tempta-
tion for countries to take action at the

Presidents Reagan and Figueiredo ex-
change dinner toasts at the Palacio do
Itamarty.

expense of their neighbors. We have
seen, in the past, the damage that can
do.

Finally, there must be a spirit of
commitment — commitment to stable
economic growth shared by nations
around the globe.

The debt problems facing many na-
tions today are imposing, and we must
act together to insure that we have the
tools to deal with them. The resources
of the IMF are one of the most impor-
tant of these tools. To assure the ade-
quacy of the IMF resources, the United
States has proposed that in addition to
an increase in the IMF quotas, there
should also be a special borrowing ar-
rangement to meet the demands that

may be placed on the IMF. Where coun
tries need assistance as they seek IMF
funding, those able to do so must act to
provide bridging funds. We also need
trading rules that reflect the enormous
changes in world trade that have oc-
curred since GATT was established 35
years ago. The meeting which has just
ended in Geneva was a useful step aloii!
the road, but we still have a long way t
go.

Many countries will need to pass
through a painful period while making
necessary adjustments in the years
ahead, and we must work closely
together during this transition. We will
work with you to help the internationals
system evolve so as to bring a brighten
economic day to all our people. At time
it's too easy to be lured into the trap of
seeing only the problems, pitfalls, and
vulnerabilities of the journey. This is
especially true in a period of economic
crisis.

President Figueiredo, the United
States is overcoming its crisis, and I
want you and all Brazilians to know th;
we're confident that Brazil will sur- '
mount its current difficulties. There's ail
old saying here that "Nothing stops '
Brazil." Nothing will stop Brazil.

We're confident because we know
the character of your people. Our
citizens came from the same mold. We
are nations of immigrants. Our national
soul was honored in the frontier, by peo
pie with the courage to leave the
familiar and face the unknown. This is
the heritage of your land and mine. The
people who came here wanted to better
their lives and the lives of their children
The frontier of the New World didn't of
fer streets paved with gold. It offered
opportunity and the spirit of freedom.
Today, freedom-loving people around th-
world are tremendously encouraged by
your stable transition back to
democracy.

History proves that the freer a peo-
ple become, the more their creative
energies are unleased. You touched on
this last year when you outlined your
commitment to representative govern-
ment. "Democracy," you said, "is none
other than a system in which every in-
dividual has the chance to play a highly
responsible and active role on the stage
of national politics, rather than the role
of a mere passive spectator." Last

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Latin America

lonth about 50 million of your coun-
rymen became political activists instead
f spectators. Your legislative and
■ubernatorial elections demonstrated the
igor and vitality of the democratic ideal
■1 this hemisphere. We salute you, Presi-
ient Figueiredo, for your strong leader-
hip in opening this new frontier, or
hapter, I should say, in your country's
listory, and we salute your fellow coun-
rymen as well. From all accounts, your
•lections were much more than political
■ontests, they were a celebration of
reedom.

What we strive for is a hemisphere
vhere the future is determined not by
)ullets, but by ballots— a hemisphere of
■ountries at peace with themselves, one
mother, and with the world. The peace
fie've known has been a precious asset
'or the Americas. Instead of allocating a
rreat share of their resources on
Tiilitary spending, the developing coun-
ties of this hemisphere have invested in
the future. This has been no accident.
From the Pan American Union to
the treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the^
Organization of American States, this
hemisphere has been in the forefront of
multilateral, international cooperation.
No other region of the world can match
our record. I cannot forget that when
last we met the hemisphere faced a
crisis in the South Atlantic and your
country was a voice of moderation and
reason. We both found to be unaccep-
table the first use of military force to
resolve that dispute. Underlining our
support of this principle, the United
States recently joined with Brazil and
other countries of the hemisphere in call-
ing upon Great Britain and Argentina to
negotiate their differences. As your
speech before the United Nations sug-
gested, Brazil's concern for peace ex-
tends far beyond this hemisphere,
especially in an age when the weapons
of destruction threaten all mankind.

Let me assure you tonight, and all
of our friends in this hemisphere, the
United States is absolutely determined
to maintain peace and bring the nuclear
arms race under control. Here, again,
our hemisphere has an exemplary record
through the nuclear-freeze zones defined
by the 1967 treaty of Tlatelolco, we have

already demonstrated the kind of prog-
ress that can be achieved in this vital
area of arms control.

Brazil can take great pride that it's a
country with a long border touching
more nations than any other in this
hemisphere, and, yet, you remain at
peace with your neighbors. This is a gift
from a former generation of Brazilians,
such as the Baron of Rio Branco who,
with vision, hard work and a spirit of
fairness and compromise, resolved dif-
ficult problems. Together, we should
strive to pass on that same gift to future
generations in our hemisphere.

But just as threatening as conven-
tional armies or nuclear weapons are
counterfeit revolutionaries who under-
mine legitimate governments and
destroy sources of economic progress;
insurgents who are, at great expense,
armed by the surrogate of a far away
power — a power that espouses a
philosophy alien to the Americas, whose
goal is the destabilization of our govern-
ments and our economies. This is ag-
gression, pure and simple.

When President Dwight Eisenhower
visited the city in 1960, even before it
was consecrated as your capital, he
stressed the commitment of the United
States to the charter of the Organization
of American States and the mutual as-
sistance treaty of Rio de Janeiro. Today,
I reaffirm that commitment and that
pledge. We stand firmly with the other
responsible nations of the Americas in
opposing those who, with violence and
force of arms, try to undermine
economic progress and political stability.

The government among the Ameri-
can states, of course, is as much moral
as it is legal. A great Brazilian
statesman, Joaquim Nabuco, understood
this when, at the turn of the century, he
noted: "Our alliance is ... a completely
peaceful one, which shines outside of the
American orbit only to let the rest of the
world know that it can be called the
hemisphere of peace." Those words
reflect the goal of the United States, a
hemisphere of peace.

Tonight, I want to share with you a
dream I have about the Americas.

Joaquim Nabuco must have had a
similar dream when he called for us to
be a vanguard of civilization. It is a vi-
sion of two great land masses rich in op-
portunity and resources, populated by
people from every part of the world,
every race, and background; living
together, trading together in peace and
freedom; people who share a desire for
liberty and a respect for the rights of
others; a people who know that with in-
genuity and enterprise no obstacle is too
great; people who share a belief in those
fundamental values of God, family, and
justice that give meaning to our ex-
istence.

What is so remarkable is that this
dream is within the grasp of this genera-
tion. We have a hemisphere composed of
600 million hardy souls. We have the
resources and the know how. Just as im-
portant, we have a wellspring of good-
will between us that waits to be tapped.
With faith, commitment, common sense,
and strength of character, we can meet
the challenges to our peace and pros-
perity. No one should be disheartened by
the dark night of problems that sur-
round us. There is a beautiful sunrise
coming and when it does, as Nabuco
said, we can shine as an example to the
rest of the world. We can and will be a
hemisphere of peace, of prosperity, and
of freedom.

I was deeply moved not only by the
unique gesture you made today in offer-
ing a delightful lunch and meeting, but,
also, the warmth and hospitality that
you have shown to me and my Cabinet
officers. President Figueiredo, all of
you, it has been an honor to be with you
this evening. Please accept on behalf of
the American people our warmest
wishes of friendship, admiration, and
respect.

And now, would you join me in a
toast to President Figueiredo, to the
people of Bogota— that is where I am
going— to the people of Brazil, and to
the dream of democracy and peace here
in the Western Hemisphere.

Janiiarw 1Qft'^

President Reagan's
Remarks to
U.S. and Brazilian
Leaders

Sao Paulo
Dec. 2, 1982'

Governor [Jose Maria] Marin, obrigado.
Thank you very much. I have looked for-
ward to this day. It is an honor to speak
to men and women of enterprise here in
Sao Paulo. This city was built by in-
novative and hard work in a spirit of
confidence and hope.

I bear heartfelt wishes of friendship
from your neighbors to the North who,
like you, are Americans, citizens of this
new world. Like you, they yearn deeply
for peace, share your love for democ-
racy, and your commitment to build a
future of progress and opportunity. On
their behalf, to all of you, I say estamos
como Brasil. E nao mudamos. We are
with you Brazil. We will not waiver.

We look to Brazil with the admira-
tion and respect that is due a great na-
tion. One of your renowned writers,
Monteiro Lobato, lived in our country in
the 1920s and 1930s. While there, he
wrote a book called, "America," in which
he said, "The Brazilian considers his
country the marvel of marvels, but with
one single defect, that is it not known
well abroad." If he were writing today,
he could still say Brazil is the marvel of
marvels, but he would have to admit
that your reputation has caught up with
your achievements.

We hear it said, in a world wracked
by political tensions, recession, poverty,
energy shocks, debt, high interest rates,
and inflation, that there is little hope for
a new era of lasting growth and pros-
perity. I would never minimize the prob-
lems we face, or the urgent need to deal
effectively with them. I will talk about
them in a moment. But you know I just
have to say that I have been around for
quite a few years now. I keep being
reminded of that. I have lived through
world wars and economic depression,
and what has impressed me even more
than those terrible crises is mankind's
unending courage to bounce back, to
struggle, to find new cures, and novel

Arriving in Sao Paulo, President Reagan is greeted by Governor Jose Maria Marin at the
Governor's Palace— Palacio dos Bendeirantes.

solutions. To all those doom-criers — and
they are worldwide — we have a
message. The hope of the world lives
here in the New World, where tomorrow
is being built today by brave pioneers
like yourselves, people who believe in
each other and who will never lose their
faith in the future.

In that remarkable speech that
President Figueiredo gave to the United
Nations, he expressed his confidence in
the world community's capacity for
renewal. He said of Brazil, "we have
made considerable efforts toward
economic development, with promising
results which fill with hope not only the
people of Brazil, but also all peoples
yearning to attain standards of living
compatible with human dignity and
modern development. I share his con-
fidence. May I also share with you today

a dream that I've long had? A dream of
strengthening our relations with Brazil
and with all our neighbors here in the
Western Hemisphere. On this shrinking
planet, the drive for renewal, economic
progress, and the leadership for world
peace must increasingly come from the
New World. Here, we are blessed with
great abundance: resources, technology,
and, most important, the spirit of
freedom — a spirit that harnesses our
energies to pursue a greater good.
There is, in the world today, a
counterfeit revolution, a revolution of
territorial conquest, a revolution of coer-
cion and thought control, where states
rule behind the barrel of a gun and erect
barbwire walls, not to keep enemies out
but to keep their own people in. The real
revolution lives in principles that took
root here in the New World. The first

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FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

principle says that mankind will not be
ruled, in Thomas Jefferson's words, "by
a favored few." The second is a pledge
to every man, woman, and child: No
matter what your background, no mat-
ter how low your station in life, there
must be no limit on your ability to reach
for the stars, to go as far as your God-
given talents will take you.

Trust the people; believe every
human being is capable of greatness,
capable of self-government. This is the
soul of our revolution, the soul of
democracy and freedom. It's the New
World's gift to the Old. Only when peo-
ple are free to worship, create, and
build, only when they are given a per-
sonal stake in deciding their destiny, and
benefiting from their own risks— only
then do societies become dynamic, pros-
perous, progressive, and free.

In terms of geography, Brazil is of
the South and the United States the
North. But in terms of historical ties
and fundamental values, we are nations
of the West and the New World. And
we are among the few nations which ex-
ercise worldwide influence and respon-
sibility. As Americans from the North or
South, whether we are leaders in
government or private industry, we
must work harder to break down bar-
riers to opportunity for our people. We
must marshal every possible asset for
growth. We must insist on sound
economic policies at home and more
open trading and financial systems
around the world.

The great republics of South and
North America and the Caribbean have
virtually unlimited potential for
economic development and human fulfill-
ment. We have a combined population of
more than 600 million people. Our con-
tinents and islands boast vast reservoirs
of food and raw materials. The markets
of the Americas have produced high
standards of living. We offer hope to op-
pressed and impoverished people. We
are nations of immigrants. Our re-
sources have made the New World a
magnet for migration from all con-
tinents. But it has been the vision, the
enterprise, the skill, and the hard work
of our people that has created our
wealth and well-being.

The developing countries of this
hemisphere have achieved a record of
soaring growth over the last genera-

tion— growth in savings, investment
work, and resources; growth from open
world markets for trade and finance;
growth from private initiative, risk, and
reward— the cornerstone of both
economic and political freedom. When
we, in the States, look at Brazil we see
the success of an economy that grew
four-fold in 20 years, doubling per capita
income; the promise of tomorrow in
Brazil's youth— with one-half your
population under 21, and becoming bet-
ter educated every year; a confident
response to the challenge of the
1980s— diversifying your economy and
exports with new markets and technolo-
gies; leadership and vision in daring
projects like Itaipu— which will be the
largest hydroelectric dam in the world;
and a strong energy substitution drive,
including the alcohol fuel program which
is to power more than half your
automobiles by 1985. We, also, see
Brazil's modern pioneers exploring a
frontier as challenging as the Amazon:
Space. Today, I would like to propose an
idea to you— to have a Brazilian
astronaut train with ours so that Brazil
and the United States can one day par-
ticipate in a shuttle launch together as
partners in Space. [Applause.]

Last night, I told President
Figueiredo that the United States has
confidence that Brazil will overcome its
difficulties just as the United States will
overcome its own. But we face serious
problems. Your economy has been in
recession, and so has ours. In the next
decade, we must both provide millions of
jobs for our people. By taking the
necessary steps now, our countries can
lead the world toward a new era of
growth, but this time, growth without
the albatross of runaway inflation and
interest rates.

Three things are essential for full
world recovery and development. We
must each move to correct our domestic,
economic, and financial problems. We
must protect the integrity of the world's
trading and financial systems. And we
must work together to help the interna-
tional system evolve and better assure
our mutual prosperity.

First, the most important contribu-
tion that any country can make is to get
its own economic and financial house in
order. Many countries, including our
own, did not do so. Somewhere along
the way, the leaders of the United

States forgot how the American growth
miracle was created. We substituted
government spending for investment to
spur productivity, a bulging bureaucracy
for private innovation and job creation,
transfers of wealth for the creation of
wealth, rewards for risktaking and hard
work, and government subsidies and
over-regulation for discipline and com-
petition from the magic of the market-
place.

For the United States, the way back
has been hard. When my Administration
took over, we faced record interest rates
and inflation and the highest peacetime
tax burden in our history. Our recovery
program is designed to help us make a
long overdue transition to an invest-
ment-powered, noninflationary economy
that will put the United States back on
the cutting edge of growth. We have cut
the growth of Federal spending by near-
ly two-thirds, and soon we will have
reduced personal income tax rates by
25%— well more than that, total tax
rates. We have cut the top rate of tax
on interest and dividend income; in-
troduced strong, new incentives for sav-
ings; encouraged capital formation by
permitting more rapid depreciation of
plant and equipment; and aggressively
pursued deregulation of markets in
energy, transportation, and finance.

Many of these reforms have been in
place for barely a year. Much more re-
mains to be done. You can't wipe away
decades of sin with 1 year of penance.
But confidence is returning to the
United States. We believe recovery is in
sight. Inflation and interest rates have
been brought down dramatically. Real
wages are increasing for the first time
in 3 years. Productivity is up sharply.
Venture capital in small business— the
best source of job creation and techno-
logical innovation— is near a record. The
personal savings rate is at a 6-year high.
Our equity markets have made an
historic advance on recordbreaking
volume. And our bedrock industry, hous-
ing, has begun to rebound. We are also
seeing signs of strength in auto sales.

We believe the door is now opening
to a lasting, broadbased economic expan-
sion over the next several years. As the
world's largest single market, a pros-
perous, growing U.S. economy will mean
increased trading opportunities for our
friends in the developing world. Brazil is

Janiiaru IQR.T

preparing to take advantage of these op-
portunities. Your country has been mak-
ing the difficult reforms needed to
renew expansion.

Second, all of us are trying to work
our way free from this tenacious reces-
sion. But we can always make a bad
situation worse by damaging those
powerful engines of growth — the world's
trading and financial systems.

Over the last 20 years, Brazil has ex-
ported an expanding range of industrial
and agricultural products, while develop-
ing its own raw material resources.
Your role in the international trading
system is now indispensable. Your
potential is enormous. There are some in
the industrial world who view your suc-
cess with apprehension. They fear being
overwhelmed by your competition. They
fear that one sector after another will be
deindustrialized and redeployed to the
developing world. Likewise, there are
some in the developing world who at-
tribute persistent poverty to industrial
powers, whom they accuse of exploita-
tion.

I can't accept either argument. One
need only look at the U.S. exports to the
developing countries of this hemis-
phere— which have increased six-fold in
a decade, the same as imports — to see
that new competition brings new oppor-
tunities. With so many out of work — in
my country, yours, and others — protec-
tionism has become an ugly spectre
stalking the world. One danger is protec-
tion against imports, erecting barriers to
shut out the competitive goods and serv-
ices of others in one's own market.
Another danger is protection of exports,
using artificial supports to gain com-
petitive advantage for one's own goods
and services in the markets of others.
The aim of these actions may be to pro-
tect jobs, but the practical result, as we
know from historical experience, is the
destruction of jobs. Protectionism in-
duces more protectionism and this leads
only to economic contraction and, even-
tually, dangerous instability.

"Third, our crisis today is not be-
tween North and South, but between
universal aspirations for growth and the
longest worldwide recession in postwar
history.

But let us also acknowledge another
fundamental fact of economic life: This
recession has had a particularly painful

impact on developing countries. They
have suffered declining demand in world
markets and falling access to financial
markets. This greatly complicates our
collective recovery. So, if it is inevitable
that borrowers must move to restrict
their deficits, it's equally important that
countries like Brazil that adopt effective
stabilization plans be assured of con-
tinued financing. Lenders and borrowers
must remember that each has an enor-
mous stake in the other's success.

I concur with your President that we
need solidarity and understanding. Last
February I spoke before the OAS in
Washington. I pledged that our Ad-
ministration would seek a new relation-
ship with the nations of the Caribbean,
and Central and South America. I said
that we would approach our neighbors
not as someone with still another plan,
but as a friend, pure and simple — one
who seeks their ideas and suggestions
on how we could become better neigh-
bors. And this is what we've done in
Brasilia. We discussed our problems,
compared notes, and sought solutions.
Let me repeat: We want to go forward
with you to help the international
system evolve in ways that better assure
our mutual prosperity, and we will go
forward.

To handle the liquidity crisis, we
have agreed that the IMF resources
should be increased. We have also pro-
posed a special borrowing arrangement
to make sure that the IMF will have
adequate funds to carry out its function.
The leading developing nations should
all enter the world trading system as full
partners. Then they can share more fair-
ly in the gains from trade and, at the
same time, assure more fully the obliga-
tions of the trading system. All we ask
is that we examine together the mutual
trading gains that can be achieved
through reciprocal action. I have enor-
mous confidence in the methods that
have brought unprecedented benefits in
the past.

• We must improve the mechanisms
for the settlement of trade disputes to
take economic quarrels out of the
political arena and base resolution of
conflicts on criteria we all respect.

• We must complete unfinished
business — trade in agriculture which has
resisted liberalization in the post-war
years, and agreed rules on safeguards in
the event of injury that provide for
transparency and equity.

• We must look forward to the
emerging challenges of the 1980s, such
as trade in high technology products and
processes — processes; then, to devise
rules will insure we do not impede the
growth potential of the technological
revolution.

Finally, let us remember that just as
progress is impossible without peace,
economic growth is a crucial pillar of
peace, beckoning with brighter horizons
all who dream of a better life.

To deter aggression the United
States must and will remain militarily
strong. When I met with His Holiness
Pope John Paul II, I gave him the
pledge of the American people to do
everything possible for peace and arms
reduction. For the sake of the children
of the world, we're working to reduce
the number and destructive potential of
nuclear weapons. We're working to end
the deadlock between Israel and her
Arab neighbors, and we're working, as
you are, to preserve the peace in this
hemisphere.

Wlien Pope John Paul visited here in
1980, he said to young Brazilians, "Only
love can build." From the moment we
arrived in this land of spectacular beauty
and unbounded energy, we have been
touched by the special warmth of the
Brazilian people.

We've come to know the heart of
Brazil. We will say goodby knowing her
heart is strong; her heart is true; her
heart is good. Brazil will build. You will
grow. And by your side will be the
United States — your partner in the New
World, a partner for progress, a partner
for peace. Estamos como Brasil. E nao
ynudamos.

President Reagan's
Departure Statement

Brasilia
Dec. 3, 19828

I leave Brazil impressed and rein-
vigorated. I have felt the warmth and
energy of the Brazilian people and their
dedication to peace and freedom.
My meetings with President
Figueiredo and his ministers were suc-
cessful in spirit and substance. We con-

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

iucted serious discussions about the in-
ternational systems of trade and finance
ind the difficulties both our countries
face in this period of slow economic
growth around the world. We discussed
the importance of trade and free
markets to bring lasting growth. For my
part, I've gained a deeper understanding
of Brazil's perspectives.

President Figueiredo and I resolved
to find mutually acceptable solutions to
those areas where we have differences,
and to remain open to possibilities for
new cooperation, especially in the areas
of scientific and military industry. I
leave confident that Brazil, like the
United States, has the skill and deter-
mination to work its way up to renewed
growth and prosperity. When I arrived
here I reminded President Figueiredo of
the old saying, "Nothing stops Brazil,"
and now I know it's true.

We considered the threats to peace
in the hemisphere and in the world, the
dangers of a nuclear arms race, the
crisis in the Middle East, and prospects
in southern Africa. I confirmed our in-
tention to maintain a strong defense as
the best assurance of peace for us and
our friends.

I made clear to President Figueiredo
our desire to continue close consulta-
tions with him. Of course, there are
issues on which we have differences. But
our mutual interest in cooperation is in-
finitely stronger. I hope that my visit
has helped— in the same way that Presi-
dent Figueiredo's visit did— to improve
an already warm relationship.

On behalf of our entire delegation, I
want to thank you and all the Brazilian
people for the wonderful hospitality you
showed us. Since I hope this meeting
will not be our last, let us not say [in-
audible] Adeus, but Ate Logo. We go
with the spirit of your friendship tucked
close to our hearts.

Secretary Shultz's
Press Briefing

Enroute Colombia
Dec. 3, 1982^

We are coming to Colombia because this
is an important country to the United
States and the interests of the United
States. There are an underlying set of
things that make that so.

First, Colombia is a country with a
democratic government and a tradition
of democracy. This is a value that we
share and that we think is of tremen-
dous importance everywhere, but, par-
ticularly, we are seeking to emphasize
this point throughout our hemisphere.

Second, we are concerned for peace
in our hemisphere. Our hemisphere, over
the decades, has been the most peaceful
in the world, and we seek to keep it that
way. We know that there is turmoil in
Central America right now, which, with
Colombia— surrounds the Caribbean
Basin. And we are doing everything we
can to support the democratic countries
to help them in their ability to counter
the threats to their stability. We believe
that Colombia, as a Caribbean country,
has a similar interest. Therefore, we
want to discuss that interest.

Third, we have a great interest in,
and stake in the economic development
of this area. Colombia is one of the
donor countries, along with ourselves, in
the Caribbean Basin initiative. We think
that economic development is a key to
stability. And it is a key, obviously, to a
better life for peace in the region. That
is what the Caribbean Basin initiative is
all about.

One of the aspects of the Caribbean
Basin initiative involves trade. And, in
fact, the approach of this initiative is
one that has a certain amount of aid in-
volved in it. There is, flowing to the
Caribbean Basin, on the order of $1
billion a year, all things taken together
now in all forms of aid. But there is a
certain element of that in it. But, even
more, we are seeking to emphasize the
importance of trade and investment in
this whole process.

I know that Colombia— as we are,
as everybody is— we are all concerned

about the importance of economic ex-
pansion and about the threats to protec-
tion of markets that accompany poor
economic conditions. We have been
fighting that battle, and I feel sure that
we will hear a lot about the dangers of
protectionism when we are here. We
agree on that. We want to discuss that
subject and what strategies we may
mutually pursue toward it.

These are things that represent
values that we have in common that are,
you might say, part of the reality why it
is that, over a period of years, the rela-
tionships between Colombia and the
United States have been good ones.

We also share a problem, on dif-
ferent ends of it, that is very important
to us and to Colombia, namely, the prob-
lem of drugs— the flow, from Colombia
to the United States, of a large amount
of drugs. There are all sorts of elements
to it. One can say they would not come
to the United States if people in the
United States didn't buy them; that is
part of the problem. There is the— all of
the things having to do with interdiction
of this flow, and then, of course, there is
the origination point. This is a problem
that we have and which we will want to
discuss along with the issues of
democracy, peace, trade — both in the
Caribbean area, generally, and with
respect to Colombia. I might say we
have a pretty healthy amount of trade
between the United States and Colom-
bia.

Q. Are there— so Colombia and the
United States have slightly different
views about the nature of the violence
in Central America? When Colombia
signed on with the Costa Rican con-
ference in October, some say that that
was under the previous —
that initiative was made by the
previous president. This new presi-
dent is less of a known quantity to the
United States in that he may have
some differences in views. Is that one
of the things you want to explore?

A. He may very well have some dif-
ferent views, and it may very well be
that as this visit unfolds it will have
more rough spots in it than we would
like. On the other hand, we have these
points in common. We have problems to

January 1983

talk about, and the way to deal with im-
portant problems in an area that is of
significance to you is to go there and
talk about them.

Q. (Inaudible)— I mean what— we
have the feeling on this ride to Colom-
bia that something has shaped up that
is almost confrontational. Are we off
base on that?

A. I suppose that depends upon
your definition of confrontational, but
there may be some differences of view.
That remains to be seen. At any rate the
way in which we will approach it is to
state our views and to discuss them and
to lay the groundwork for a strong rela-
tionship between our countries.

Q. What is the main difference? I
mean what has cropped up? Is it Cen-
tral America and the turbulence or is
it trade and protectionism?

A. We are not there yet, and I am
not sure just what there may be.

Q. Are you worried that you are
going to have a relatively hostile toast
or a somewhat negative toast by the
Colombian president? Have you gotten
some indication?

A. There are indications that we try
to get from our Ambassador working
there, and they are provided with think-
ing that we have. We are trying to com-
pose this visit, and have for some time,
so that it will be a constructive one. I
am saying that constructive does not
necessarily mean that everything goes in
apple-pie order, but, rather, that you
bring to the surface whatever they are
and grapple with them. I don't want to
make a statement about what may be
the most difficult issues for us to
discuss.

Q. What about the big demonstra-
tions that are spreading there? What
is the cause of those?

A. I don't want to speculate on
problems within their country.

Q. [President] Betancur has said
that the United States considers Latin
America its backyard patio and that it
does not have a real Latin American
policy. There are all kinds of reports
that it is feeling warmer toward Cuba
than since it cut off relations and that
it is feeling warmer toward Nicaragua
and is thinking about joining the

nonallied nations. Clearly, this shows
a lot of differences in U.S. policies.
How does the Administration feel
about this? How are you going to try
to rectify that? Do you want to bring
Colombia back into the U.S. fold?
What are your objectives on that?

A. I don't think it is a question of
the U.S. fold. It is a question of putting
forward to them what their thoughts are
about how our inter-American system
can be improved. The inter- American
system is something we all have a big
stake in — of discussing these and other
issues with them so that they under-
stand our thinking; we understand
theirs.

Q. Will it be with the premise that
it is moving closer to Cuba and
Nicaragua and is against— contrary to
our policy at the moment?

A. I am not making any particular
premises. They have made a number of
statements of the kind that you have
quoted, and they have moved in the
direction of the nonaligned movement.
Those are things that— some things we
will have something to say about.

Q. We will say something about
that?

A. We will discuss these issues with
them. But, of course, they are a
sovereign country as we are. They will
decide for themselves, of course, what
they want to do. We will be here to
discuss all of these issues with them.

Q. What about their policy in seek-
ing amnesty for — or offering amnesty
to at least one of the insurgent
groups? Does the United States look
with favor on that sort of thing, or do
we feel that these insurgents are part
of the overall pattern that you and the
President have outlined in the past as
plaguing Central America.

A. As Ambassador [Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Thomas 0.] Enders brought out, they
have been plagued with terrorism in Co-
lombia for quite some time. Their effort
to do something about it through the of-
fer of amnesty seems like a constructive
thing to do, and it is something they are
managing. I wish them the best of suc-
cess. If you look at the material in the
San Jose conference report which Co-
lombia signed, you see that the demo-
cratic nations that went there called

upon all of the countries of the region to
seek pluralism, to try to bring dis-
cordant elements in their society into
the democratic process, in the legitimate
governmental process, and this, it seems
to me, you can take as an expression of
that on the part of Colombia.

Q. Do we have any sign that Presi-
dent Bentancur is still on board on
that conference? I mean, have they
sent any signals suggesting that they
now have some misgivings about join-
ing it? t

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Explicit in this invitation, did
we ask Colombia— did we invite
ourselves, basically, or did we want to
go to Colombia? It sounds like we're
not so welcome.

A. I think we're welcomed enough.
We raised the question with the Colom- '
bian Government, and they responded.
We had some difficulties with precisely
what the arrangements should be — just
working out the mechanics of it. But I
don't think anything beyond that.

Q. What are we going to do about
drugs, specifically? Is there a great
difference of opinion in trying to stop
it. or do they object to us intruding in-
to their own country's affairs? What
are we asking them to do with drugs?

A. There are various ways in trying
to contend with the production of drugs,
and some of them are more comprehen-
sive than others. We'll want to talk
about these and explore the attitude of
the new government to them. I don't
want to say, there's one, two, three,
four, and five, and we're going to push
for four. But, rather, to say there is a
general subject here, and we'll want to
explore it.

Q. Is there any difference of view,
do you think, in this area —

A. This remains to be seen how
much difference of view there is.

Q. You don't know how they feel
about this problem?

A. We know that they share our
concern about the whole drug scene, and
it's a question of what means people are
willing to use and how effective you
evaluate those means to be.

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

Q. Don't drugs contribute substan-
ally to their economy?

A. Yes and no. That is, there is an
i nount of money that is .paid for the
■ugs, obviously, but that also helps to
I ipport an element in the society that is
'ten not very constructive, to put it
ildly— just as the drug trade in the
nited States has connected with it an
ement in our society that we don't par-
:ularly admire.

Q. Are there any precooked
jreements this time around?

Q. Colombian astronaut?
.aughter]

A. No Colombian astronaut.

Q. [Inaudible.]

A. There will be a toast which
—on both sides is, in a sense, a
jbstantive statement, and there will be
)me—

Q. [Inaudible.]

A. It isn't— the toasts are not just
lice to have you, and I'm glad to be
ere," but, rather, an effort to say
jmething substantive. At least, I know
■e've been working on the President's
last, and he has to state things that he
links are important here. I assume that
ley will do the same.

Q. Will you be making any specific
roposals to them in any of these
reas you've outlined?

A. There is ongoing discussion in
hose areas, and I don't think there's
nything that is in the nature of a
recooked deal or a statement of some
ind that —

Q. [Inaudible.]

A. No.

Q. Is the Saudi Foreign Minister
neeting with the Soviets today or
ibout to?

A. The Saudi Foreign Minister is a
iiember of the Arab League delegation
hat is being led by King Hussein, and
hey decided at the Fez summit that
hey would have a delegation visit each
;ountry which is a permanent member
3f the U.N. Security Council. That's
what they're doing. They have a delega-
tion that's going around visiting at
the— they think of it as they did when
they came to the United States. They
think of it as an Arab League delegation
as distinct from this country or that
country.

January 1983

Q. Are they meeting with [General
Secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union Yuriy] Andropov, or
are they meeting with the Soviet
leaders? Is that correct?

A. Just who they meet with and
what that schedule is, I don't have right
in my hand, but we can find out about
that.

Q. Do you find it disturbing that
the Saudis and the people in the Mid-
dle East who have been anti-Soviet
are now meeting with them? Does that
bother us at all?

A. The Arab League group, which
includes countries that have had close
relationships with the Soviet
Union — such as Syria— all came
together and formed a common agree-
ment. They feel— I think it's fair to say
they feel quite good about the fact that
they did have an agreement to which
they all subscribed. They wanted to talk
about this agreement and what their
ideas are to a representative group of
some countries. I suppose the countries
that were close to the Soviet Union
thought that the group ought to go
there just as those who had other ideas
thought they should come to other coun-
tries. And the U.N. Security Council
permanent member, I think, probably
have a pretty clever way of getting at
that.

Q. [Inaudible] that meeting, give
us a fast capsule about what the
meeting tonight will be on the
Salvador— with the Salvadorans?

A. Why don't we try to do that on
the leg between Colombia and El
Salvador? We'll get back to you on that.

Q. Some of us have to write early
stories. Can you give us one line about
what he's going to say. For instance, I
had heard from the El Salvador Am-
bassador to the United States that [El
Salvador's President Alvaro] Magana

is expecting an admonition on human
rights. Will that happen?

A. Why don't we do that on the next
flight?

Q. It's just so late at that hour for
monitoring newspapers.

A. On the subject of human rights,
which is obviously an important one, we
have the general policy that we talk
about it, care about it, work on the sub-
ject. We believe that it is more effective
to do that privately and directly to the
extent possible.

That means that, if I talk about it to
you, we are not doing it that way. We
have a number of subjects to talk about.
They run across the board of the capaci-
ty of the government and our encour-
agement of it to provide secure and
stable conditions in the country; contain
the insurgency; our joint interest,
economic development, which depends
upon getting stability; our interest in the
maintenance of their democratic regime;
and the relationship of democracy to the
way people are treated; and, too, what
are generally called human rights con-
cerns. We will talk across the board
about these things, but I do not want to
spotlight any particular matter.

Q. I understand why in the
diplomatic world it would be better to
do these things privately. But, still,
you need some support domestically in
the United States to continue getting
Congress to give aid. Would it not be
good from the Administration's point
of view to have the United States
know that the President is going to
try to prod him on the issue a bit?

A. We will come to the Congress
with a report as part of the process of
the Congress' continuing to go along
with the support for El Salvador and
other countries. There will be a formal
report, and it will take up the question
of human rights. There will be, as has
been the case in past reports,
statements about all of the difficult sub-
jects that come up. They will be done as
carefully as we can possibly do them and
as accurately as we can. I think the time
for us to comment is when we make that
report.

COLOMBIA

President Reagan's
Luncheon Toast

Bogota

Dec. 3, 1982^"

Reverend Clergy, President Betancur,
I'm happy to be in Santa Fe de
Bogota — the Athens of America. I ap-
preciate this opportunity to reaffirm the
close and longstanding ties between our
peoples.

Since 1824, when a U.S. Represent-
ative, Richard Anderson, became the
first foreign diplomat to be formally ac-
credited here after independence, my
country has followed with admiration
the development of your constitutional
tradition.

Colombia's great independence
leader, General Francisco de Paula San-
tander, is celebrated today not so much
for being the great warrior he was, but
as the "Man of Laws." He declared, "If
the sword gave us independence, the law
will give us liberty." You are a man of
law and liberty. Your first statement as
President-elect of your country carried
on the profound tradition of law and
liberty in Colombia. "I aspire," you said,
"to a happy and open democracy in
which citizens who wish to be represent-
ative must win that right in a frank con-
test with the broad participation of the
new generations, a contest in which
merit, quality of service, and proven
honesty will be the best attributes for
receiving popular support."

We all know that the democratic
path is never easy. But it's a path
toward which the peoples of this
hemisphere are increasingly turning.
Democracies are better able to reconcile
their internal differences without
violence. They're also neighbors in whom
we can have confidence.

As I said in my very encouraging
visit to Brazil, I did not come to visit
with any preconceived plan that we
wished to impose. I came here to listen
and to learn — to ask how we could be of
greater help in promoting peace and
progress in the Americas. It has long

been my dream that the more than 600
million people of the Americas could
represent an enormous force for good in
the world. Just think how much we
could achieve if there were accord be-
tween us. In that spirit, let me say how
much I appreciate your frankness here
today. I know you were speaking from
the heart. And I can assure you that we
were listening closely.

One of the great traditions of
democratic nations, as you know so well,
is that leaders can speak candidly to one
another and accept the other's thoughts
in the constructive spirit in which
they're offered. You have spoken frank-
ly. Now, let me do the same. Ours is a
region in which powerful bonds unite

countries and people. It is also a region
in which primarily, perhaps because we
expect so much from each other, power-
ful misunderstandings can arise. When
people — above all, these people who
exercise responsibility and must make
decisions — do not know each other,
potential for misunderstanding is par-
ticularly great. That's why I'm here,
coming as a friend and neighbor, asking
what are our problems and differences
and how can they be overcome.

Our neighbors in Central America
are in turmoil. They are threatened by a
devastating economic crisis and by local
insurgencies supported by outside coun-
tries which do not wish to see the
republics of America succeed. The ques-

President Reagan's Statement to the People of Colombia^

November 26, 1982

At President [Belisario] Betancur's kind invitation, I will soon be visiting your na-
tion. I am looking forward to this visit very much. There is much I hope to learn
and see in your beautiful country.

Our two countries have a great deal in common. We share a similar history, a
similar form of government, and similar aspirations. We agree on many values and
objectives. Both of our nations seek peace in the hemisphere, peace in the world, thi
growth of our economies, and the well-being of our people. We also share some
problems such as the impact of illicit narcotics on our societies.

We do not agree on every issue, but this is natural. Diversity is one of the great
strengths of democratic societies. Democracy only requires that we work together ti
understand each other, that we listen to each other, and that we address our dif-
ferences seriously with mutual respect. I promise to do that.

The peace of the hemisphere and the strengths of the intra- American system ar
key issues for both of us. The United States is firmly committed to peace and securi
ty in your region. I take this commitment very seriously. When the peace of a
democratic state is threatened, we are concerned. When that country is a close
neighbor, we are doubly concerned.

Security can be threatened by military actions. But security is also threatened
by economic distress. The Caribbean Basin initiatives will address the underljring
economic and social problems that are retarding the development of the Caribbean
Basin states. We, in the United States, warmly welcome Colombia's decision to par-
ticipate in this initiative, and we greatly value your desire to contribute to the
economic development and the strengthening of democratic values in the region.

We are impressed by your nation's success in maintaining a vigorous economy,
even in a period of global recession. North Americans share your dedication to hard
work, competition, and the creation of new wealth.

We, in the United States, respect and admire Colombia's strong commitment to
democracy. Equally important, we respect Colombia's firm commitment to the rule
of law as the guiding principle of international relations.

Our two countries, working together, can achieve a great deal for our
hemisphere. This is what brings me to Colombia. I look forward to meeting many of
you personally and seeing your beautiful country. I bring with me the best wishes of
my own people to you, our neighbors to the south.

Broadcast on Colombian television (text from White House press release of Nov. 29, 1982.

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

1 ,.

tion is how can we help? I look forward
to hearing your views this afternoon.
But don't we already have a good begin-
ning in the conclusions democratic states
of the region reached in San Jose last
October 4th? They called for all the
states of Central America, on a basis of
reciprocity and verification, to renounce
the importation of heavy offensive
weapons that could be used to attack a
neighbor; to cause the withdrawal of
all— and I repeat, all— foreign military
advisers; to end support for terrorists
and subversion against neighbors; to
begin internal reconciliation enabling
dissidents to participate again in public
life within established institutions; to
create democratic institutions and hold
open public elections to decide who
should exercise power. Of these, the last
is the most significant. For we all know
that democracies are far less likely than
other regimes to abuse their own people
and to make war on their neighbors.

What can we do to overcome the
economic crisis in the Caribbean regime?
Our nations are partners in the Carib-
bean Basin initiative, a bold attempt to
address the underlying economic and
social needs of our neighbors. It made a
great impression in the United States
when your country announced that it
would join with Canada, Mexico,
Venezuela, and the United States in this
enterprise. It reassured us to see Colom-
bia, long a pillar of the Andean com-
munity, extend its hand to Central
America and the Caribbean. Through
hard work, sound financial management,
and a commitment to an open and com-
petitive economy, Colombia is an exam-
ple for others.

The United States has already in-
creased its assistance to the Caribbean
area, bringing it to nearly $1 billion per
year. But we must provide these small
and promising countries an opportunity
to earn their own way. That is the pur-
pose of the one-way free trade proposal
that I have made. This proposal is now
under active consideration by our Con-
gress, and I hope for early action.

In cooperating to help others, we
should be careful not to neglect coopera-
tion to benefit our own societies. Could
we not do more to mobilize resources
and encourage efforts by public-private
institutions, universities, institutes.

President Belisario Betancur Cuartos greets President Reagan at Bogota's Eldorado
Airport.

voluntary agencies, and businesses to in-
crease their cooperation for develop-
ment? Many scientific, educational, and
other institutions in the United States
and in Colombia have had close working
relationships in the past. We must
strengthen and renew such ties and pro-
mote new links to accelerate the pace
and quality of research and development
on the most pressing problems in this
hemisphere.

The recession that we suffer from is
global. It affects the advanced countries.
Millions are out of work in my coun-
try— even greater numbers in Europe.
But it is true that the recession has af-
fected the developing countries most of
all — not so much Colombia, which is for-
tunate to continue to grow— but your

January 1983

neighbors. None of us can find our way
back to prosperity without self-discipline
at home. The example of Colombia
shows how prosperity can be achieved
by domestic savings and investment.

But prosperity will escape us if we
permit those great engines of
growth — world trade and world
finance — to be impaired. And here
again, we must act to make sure that
the IMF has the funds necessary to
finance needed stabilization programs.
Early agreement must, and I am confi-
dent will, be reached on substantially ex-
panded quotas.

The United States has also proposed
that special arrangements to borrow be
made to enable the fund to be sure to
fulfill its mission. The individual coun-
tries that can do so should provide

bridging financing tx) countries needing
time to work out effective stabilization
prog^rams. And private lenders must not
withhold new funds from countries that
do so. For lenders and borrowers each
have a great stake in each other's suc-
cess.

For the longer term, we must pro-
ceed with the replenishment of the
lADB. We believe that an agreement is
reachable on a replenishment that will
permit continued high growth in the
bank's activities. Equally important is to
prevent an upsurge in protectionism in
all our countries. We can only do this if
we all do it together. That was the
meaning of the GATT meeting in
Geneva.

With unemployment in all our coun-
tries, the temptation is to use restric-
tions for export incentives to protect
jobs.' Experience shows that way is self-
defeating and will lead only to less trade
and less jobs. I am pledged to do all in
my power to prevent arbitrary restric-
tions of trade.

Colombia has long been a powerful
supporter of the inter- American system.
With few exceptions, the system has
kept the peace. As new nations of the
Caribbean join the system and as other
American countries like Colombia grow
in economic weight and worldwide in-
fluence, our institutions will be infused
with new life. Our own relations with
each other reflect the maturity of our
partnership. We do not agree on every
issue, not even on the remedies of some
of the problems we share. But we've
established a dialogue based on mututal
respect, our shared religious heritage,
and our common legacy.

In the trade field we have vastly ex-
panded to our mutual benefit the goods
and services we exchange. Earlier, you
had a trade surplus. Now, with the price
of coffee low, we do. We both have
legislation governing trade that we each
are bound to respect. Within that
framework, though, there is much we
can do to assure mutual accommodation
without imposing protectionist devices. I
will work with you to find those oppor-
tunities.

Our cooperation in the area of nar-
cotics control certainly reflects the same
spirit. We recognize that the use and
production of illegal drugs is a threat to

the social fabric of both countries. Prog-
ress that either of us makes will assist
the other.

Colombia and the United States
worked together to establish the fun-
damental principles of this hemisphere. I
am here today to further the spirit of
cooperation begun by President
Roosevelt in 1934, and continued by
President Kennedy in 1961. I come con-
vinced that our cooperation for freedom
and development is more vital than ever
to progress and security in the
Hemisphere.

You and I know what can be ac-
complished with the will to keep going
until the job is done. We both come from
working families, poorer than most in

material things, but rich in spirit and op-|l
timism. Those values taught us when we
were young — God, family, and hard
work — and this did well by us as in-
dividuals. And they will do well by our I
two countries. It is my deep conviction
that the tide of history is with the '

Americas — and especially with coun-
tries, such as ours — which believe in the ,
dignity of man and the freedom of the j
individual.

I propose a toast to you and to the
people of Colombia. May the values that '
bind us, the friendships and dreams we
share, be preserved by us, the people of ,
the New World, as an eternal, sacred |
trust. [Applause] j

President Reagan's Statement to the People of Costa Rica,

December 3, 1982

I am happy to accept President Monge's invitation to see Costa Rica. I know your
country has long been a model for peace, democracy, and economic progress in the
Western Hemisphere.

Last month. President Monge spoke at the Conference on Free Elections in
Washington about democracy. He made all of us who are committed to freedom
very proud. Democracy, he said, has no universal formulas, like those of totalitarian
philosophies. Its strength is that it allows free people to find their own solutions. As
free people, we are not compelled to accept the one candidate offered to us by a
small group claiming exclusive knowledge of the destiny for an entire nation. We,
the voters — free citizens — make this decision.

Today, the countries of Central America face enormous challenges: economic
recession, social injustice, and the cynical efforts of outside powers to impose
nondemocratic systems of government on them. But I am confident we have the will
and the ability to overcome these challenges.

The most promising formula for peace and security for the nations of Central
America was proposed at the meeting of democratic nations in San Jose in early Oc-
tober. It offers terms for a peace that can be verified without fear of violation. It
stresses the importance to peace of democratic institutions. I am convinced, as I
believe most of you are, that democracies find it easier to live in peace with each
other.

In facing the economic challenges, the countries of this hemisphere have begun a
cooperative effort to address the pressing needs of the Caribbean Basin. Part of the
United States' contribution to this effort — $350 million in emergency economic
assistance — is already in place. I am asking the Congress to give priority considera-
tion to the other main features of our program — open access to our markets for the
products of the Caribbean and Central America, and incentives for American invest-
ment in the region. I believe we all have a crucial stake in this venture. Democracy,
and even our independence as free nations, are vulnerable to economic recession. By
cooperating together, we can offer real hope for sustained growth to our peoples.

I have met with President Monge twice. From these meetings I know we share
the conviction that it's through freedom and democracy that economic progress and
social justice have their best chance to work. I look forward to visiting San Jose and
to having the opportunity for further discussions with your President.

Text from White House press release.

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

COSTA RICA

U.S.-El Salvador
Joint Communique

San Jose
Dec. 3, 1982"

On December 3, 1982 in the City of San Jose,
Costa Rica, the Presidents of El Salvador,
Dr. Alvaro Magana, and of the United States
of America, Mr. Ronald Reagan, met and had
a cordial exchange of views about subjects of
mutual interest.

President Reagan praised the bravery of
the Salvadoran people and their belief in
democratic ideals as manifested in the recent
elections and in the Salvadoran decision to
hold Presidential elections no later than
March 1984. He expressed appreciation for
efforts of the Salvadoran Government to
reduce the number of deaths caused by
violence, despite the opposition of an-
tidemocratic forces. He also indicated his
satisfaction with the continuation of the land
reform program.

The Salvadoran leader pointed out the
desire of his government for peaceful
development and full observation of human
rights. He noted the creation of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights and the formation of a
peace commission charged with proposing a
practical plan for the participation of all
citizens and political movements in the
democratic process.

President Magana suggested that as im-
portant as the efforts that each country
makes internally to correct its structural
economic problems is an international
economic situation which encourages full
development of that country's human and
natural resources. In this regard, he praised
the U.S. Caribbean Basin initiative and ex-
pressed the hope that the trade and invest-
ment provisions would be approved quickly
by the U.S. Congress.

President Reagan referred to the interest
of the American people and government in
cooperating with the Salvadoran Government
in its internal efforts. He stressed his concern
about the prosecution of those implicated in
the murder of American citizens in El
Salvador and asked for unstinting efforts to
prosecute those responsible for the deaths
of the American churchwomen and the
AFL-CIO consultants and the disappearance
of other American citizens.

Both leaders also examined the situation
in Central America and expressed concern
for the increase of tensions in the area. They

Having been greeted by President Alberto
Luis Monge at San Jose's Juan Santamaria
International Airport. President Reagan
proceeds to Hotel Cariani where he holds a
bilateral meeting with El Salvador's Presi-
dent Alvaro Magana. After the meeting,
they issue a joint communique.

rejected the use of force in the resolution of
bilateral conflicts, interference in the internal
affairs of other countries, and the violent im-
position of alien ideologies and systems re-
jected by democratic societies. President
Magana emphasized the need for all countries
to reject the principle of self-determination as
exercised by the Salvadoran people in the
elections of March 28. He noted that this
principle is fundamental to the peaceful co-
existence of peoples. Both leaders reaffirmed
their commitment to the principles of the
final act of the October 4 San Jose con-
ference of democratic nations — principles
which, in their opinion, represent the best
hope for peace in Central America.

The two leaders agreed to maintain direct
contact in order to further high levels of
bilateral cooperation.

Given in San Jose, Costa Rica, December
3, 1982.

President Reagan's
Remarks

San Jose
Dec. 4, 1982>2

Mr. President, and you ladies and
gentlemen, I thank you for your
gracious welcome. From the school
children who greeted me at the airport
last night to you distinguished leaders
gathered in this beautiful hall, the peo-
ple of Costa Rica have extended to our
party openhearted and generous hos-
pitality. I know you're world-famous for
this, but I feel so very much at home
here. I hope that ours is a special bond.

I'm especially grateful for the oppor-
tunity to renew the personal dialogue
with President [President Luis Alberto]
Monge, a distinguished statesman com-
mitted to the democratic ideals I share.
Americans and Costa Ricans — we are all
of the New World. Our people live the
peaceful revolution of democracy —
secure under the rule of law and pros-
pering through economic freedom. But
there are outsiders who would exploit
otir rich, new world by undermming the
democratic systems that make us free.

We, of this hemisphere, must stand
together so that we can continue to im-
prove the quality of life for our people.
We must be strong enough, our people
prosperous enough, and our democracy
stable enough to remain independent, at
peace, and free.

There are many who speak of
democracy and pluralism and of their
respect for the rule of law. But as a
Costa Rican President of the last cen-
tury, Jose Joaquin Rodriquez said, "I am
not impressed by hearing proclamations
of great principles. What I admire is the
men who know how to put them into
practice."

Costa Rica is a proud example of a
free people practicing the principles of
democracy. And you have done so in
good times and in bad, when it was
easier and when it required great
courage. Your commitment to freedom
was evident last February when, as
every 4 years, you elected a new govern-
ment. In October, you led the region's
democracies toward recognition of prin-
ciples for a lasting, humane peace in
Central America. And just last month,

January 1983

President Monge spoke eloquently in
Washington about democracy and of the
commitment of all democratic nations of
the region to an elections institute, an
advisory body to assist other countries
in developing the practice of democracy
and which will be a specialized branch of
the Inter-American Institute of Human
Rights in San Jose.

Costa Rica's foundation of democ-
racy and law, as President Monge said
in Washington, is your guarantee of
peace. He put it this way: "Violence, war
and guerrillas lose their support when
the people enjoy free elections and when
their vote is respected." James Fenimore
Cooper, an American writer of our fron-
tier, said much the same when he sug-
gested that "the man who can right
himself by a vote will seldom resort to a
musket."

President Monge and I have met
three times this year, and I've learned
from him and from the record of this
country the depth of Costa Rica's dedica-
tion to the founding principles of
Western civilization. And I've learned of
the significant progress toward
democracy elsewhere in Central
America. Today, Central America faces
renewed challenges to its self-
determination as agents of unrest seek
to impose new forms of the imperialism
and tyranny that we threw off so many
years ago. These counterfeit revolutions
also threaten the prosperity that is the
legacy of peace in this beautiful land.
The future challenges our imagination,
but the roots and law and democracy
and our inter-American system provide
the answers we seek.

In your efforts to bring new oppor-
tunity, stability, and peace to the region,
the Costa Rican people can be very sure
you will have the steadfast support of
the people of the United States. The
only real root to peace, to lasting peace,
is the well-chartered course of Costa
Rica— commitment to democracy, rejec-
tion of extremism and the force of arms,
and respect for human rights and the
rule of law. It also includes reliance on
international law such as the Rio treaty,
essential to your national defense and
fundamental to our common security.

Our new bilateral extradition treaty
is indicative of our joint commitment to
the rule of law. What we strive for is a
hemisphere where the future is deter-
mined not by bullets but by ballots, a

Presidents Reagan and Monge shake hands following the signing of the U.S.-Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty at the National Theater.

hemisphere of countries at peace with
themselves and one another and at
peace with the world. The peace we've
known has been a precious asset for the
Americas.

Instead of allocating a great share of
their resources on military spending, the
developing countries of this hemisphere
have invested in the future. This has
been no accident. From the Pan
American Union to the treaty of Rio de
Janeiro and the Organization of
American States, this hemisphere has
been on the forefront of multilateral, in-
ternational cooperation. No region of the
world can match our record. These are

not mere words. We have and will con-
tinue to practice what we proclaim. The
United States will continue to support
the new democratic institutions in Hon-
duras and the developing democratic
processes of El Salvador. Any nation
destabilizing its neighbors by protecting
guerrillas and exporting violence should
forfeit close and fruitful relations with
the people of the United States of Amer-
ica and with any people who truly love
peace and freedom.

The October 4 meeting of
democratic nations here in San Jose
showed us anew the way toward peace
and stability. We applaud the Costa
Rican Government for that initiative and

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

for its continued leadership in this
reponal democratic effort. We join you
willingly. Democratic states have a
unique role in the moral history of the
world because our governments are ac-
countable to the governed and are less
likely to abuse their own citizens or to
attack their neighbors.

The principles of the San Jose final
Act provide a reciprocal, just, and
verifiable basis for peace. I call on all
states in this region to join in this proc-
ess of genuine, peaceful reconciliation.
In that same spirit, we must also work
together to solve the serious economic
problems jeopardizing social, political
progress.

Central America recorded impres-
sive economic growth in the 1960s and
during much of the 1970s. This was par-
ticularly true in Costa Rica where hard
work and neighborly cooperation in the
Central American common market paid
major dividends. Now those gains are
threatened here in Costa Rica and, in-
deed, throughout the hemisphere. In
order to overcome recession, we must
lay the foundations in each of our na-
tional economies for noninflationary,
sustained growth. To do this we will
need the kind of commitment and deter-
mination Costa Rica is showing. Self-
discipline is necessary, too. So, too, is
mutual accommodation. Borrowers must
move to restrict their deficits, but it is
just as important that lenders not
withhold new funds from countries
which adopt effective stabilization plans.
Lenders and borrowers must remember
that each has an enormous stake in the
other's success.

Similarly, the integrity of the world
trading system must be preserved, so it
can serve once again as the great engine
of growth. Closed markets must be care-
fully opened. Open markets must be
shielded from protectionism. Our chal-
lenge is to make our trading and finan-
cial relationships remain a source of
prosperity and strength and not become
a source of discord and disagreement.
The debt problems facing many nations
today are imposing, and we must act
together to insure that we have the tools
to deal with them. The resources of the
IMF are one of the most important of
these tools. To assure the adequacy of
the IMF resources, the United States
has proposed that in addition to an in-
crease in the IMF quotas there should

also be a special borrowing arrangement
to meet the demands that may be placed
on the IMF where countries need
assistance as they seek IMF funding.
Those able to do so must act to provide
bridging funds.

With regard to the Caribbean area,
the U.S. Congress already has approved
the first stage of our strengthened com-
mitment to economic recovery, a supple-
ment to our vigorous economic
assistance effort in the Caribbean Basin,
bringing to nearly $1 billion the total aid
for fiscal year 1982. Our request to the
Congress for future aid to the region
will also reflect this new high priority.
But the other elements of the program
are even more crucial. Investment incen-
tives and duty-free access for most of
your products will encourage increased
production and stimulate more jobs.

This Caribbean initiative is not a
charity program. We will grow and pros-
per together to the direct benefit of the
workers and enterprises in both of our
countries. As I speak here, our Congress
has reconvened in Washington, and the
trade and investment portions of the ini-
tiative are high on their agenda. From
the heart of Costa Rica's remarkable
democracy, I appeal directly to the
legislative leaders of my country to act
quickly and responsibly on this most im-
portant legislation. Together, we can at-
tack the social and economic injustices
which lead to dissatisfaction and support
for radical solutions. And, just as Colom-
bia has already joined the original
Nassau four, I call on other developed
countries — all of them — to contribute to
our efforts.

Earlier this year in Washington,
there was an exhibit of pre-Columbian
art from Costa Rica. The title of the
show was, "Between Continents — Be-
tween Seas." This was fitting. But Costa
Rica and Central America, as a whole,
are now caught between something
else — a struggle of ideas between the
violence of false revolutionaries and the
reaction of false conservatives. You will
always be between continents and seas.
But to live peacefully and democratically
will require the continued courage and
commitment of all the Americas.

I am confident that, together, we
will achieve in practice the goals that we
have together proclaimed — a Central
America where not just some, but all
countries are democracies — where in-
stitutions are based on free and regular
elections in an atmosphere of political
reconciliation within each state; a Cen-
tral America returned to the path of
substantial economic and social develop-
ment; a Central America at peace with
itself and the world; a halt to foreign
support for terrorist and subversive
elements working toward the violent
overthrow of other governments; an end
to arms trafficking, the importation of
heavy weapons, and the buildup of
armaments and forces beyond that re-
quired for legitimate defense — and
under fully verifiable and reciprocal con-
ditions, the withdrawal of all — I repeat,
all — foreign military and security ad-
visers and troops from Central America.
In sum, a Central America that lives by
the principle of nonintervention, where
disputes are settled peacefully, and
where respect for human rights and the
fundamental freedoms of speech,
assembly, and religion are as alive and
well as they are in the Republic of Costa
Rica.

My government will give you and
your neighbors the full support of the
United States. Our commitment to the
Rio treaty and to the principle of collec-
tive security will remain a basic tenet of
our policy. Together, we will work
toward the economic growth and oppor-
tunity that can only be achieved by free
men and women. We will promote the
democracy that is the foundation of our
freedom and stand together to assure
the security of our peoples, their govern-
ments, and our way of life. In this way,
the land between the continents and be-
tween the seas will achieve the vision of
another President of Costa Rica. Juan
Mora dreamed that this land be "content
in peace . . . and its children cut one
more ear of corn each day, and cry one
tear less."

Thank you very much and Dios les
bendiga and Dios bendiga a Costa Rica.
[Applause] God bless you, and God bless
Costa Rica.

January 1983

President Reagan's
Radio Address
to the Nation

San Jose
Dec. 4, 198213

I am speaking to you today from San
Jose, Costa Rica. Later this evening, I
will return to Washington having visited
with six neighboring heads of state. Our
delegation has seen, firsthand, the vitali-
ty and potential of our New World
neighbors. We have also heard and
discussed their needs and aspirations
and how they affect our own vital na-
tional interests.

U.S. interests require that we sup-
port our fellow Americans with a
hemispheric policy which:

• Preserves and promotes
democratic institutions;

• Advances and encourages free
market economies; and

• Provides the security essential for
these systems to develop and flourish.

In our discussions during these last
4 days, I pledge our continued commit-
ment to work as friends and neighbors
with the other nations of this Western
Hemisphere. We will stand firmly with
them to achieve the promise of economic
progress and political stability that is the
legacy of peace in the Americas.

Through cooperation, together we
can protect ourselves from counterfeit
revolutionaries who seek to destroy
growth and impose totalitarianism on
people who love freedom. Let us
remember something very important: If
our neighbors, particularly our nearest
neighbors in the Caribbean Basin, are in
trouble — then their troubles inevitably
become ours, unless we work together
to solve them.

Right now, their difficulties are not
entirely of their own making. World
prices for their traditional products —
sugar, bananas, bauxite, and coffee —
have been declining sharply for several
years. At the same time, the prices for
their essential imports, particularly
petrolemn, have remained high. This
worldwide recession, the longest and
most severe in postwar history, has hit

their economies with all the fury of the
tropical storms they are exposed to each
year.

We cannot afford to ignore these
difficulties. Our ties with the countries
of the Caribbean Basin are very close.
One-half of our trade passes through
this area. Prolonged social and economic
disruption would cause an exodus of
desperate people seeking refuge where
so many others have already found
it — in the United States. The interests
of Caribbean Basin countries are our in-
terests; their security is our security.

The difficulties in the Caribbean
Basin may seem overwhelming, but just
as tropical storms give way to sunshine
and calmer seas, economic despair will
give way to optimism if people have the
prospect to build a better life in
freedom. Our support for democratic in-
stitutions is already helping. U.S.
assistance to help these countries defend
themselves from outside-supported sub-
version is likewise showing signs of
progress. Our Caribbean Basin initiative,
designed to provide economic opportuni-
ty by stimulating investment and trade,
offers the hope of economic progress
which anchors democracy and freedom.

In September, the U.S. Congress ap-
proved funds for emergency balance-of-
payments assistance as the first step in
this initiative. I also attach great impor-
tance to the 1983 fiscal year package of
foreign assistance.

But our goal is not a temporary
boost from foreign aid. Our goal is to
help our neighbors strengthen
democratic institutions and free
economies that stand on their own. We
need long-term incentives to expand pro-
duction and create new jobs. The trade
and investment portions of our Carib-
bean Basin initiative legislation are
designed to accomplish this.

I have proposed that we offer our
neighbors the opportunity to trade with
us freely, by eliminating trade barriers
for most products for 12 years, and by
providing tax incentives for U.S. invest-
ment in their economies. With our
markets beckoning, the inducement to
expand existing enterprises and invest
in new ventures will increase. This will
create growth and jobs, both for Carib-
bean countries and for the United

States. Trade is the path to new prog-
ress for everyone. All developing coun-
tries, including ours, succeeded by ex-
panded free enterprise at home and by
increasing their trade with other coun-
tries.

By helping them, we help ourselves.
As their economies grow, we will have
new markets for our exports. The faster
their standards of living rise, the more
jobs will be created in the United States.
The impact on our own domestic in-
dustries of more goods coming from the
Caribbean will be minimal, since the
quantity of imports from these small
countries will not be great. Moreover,
our industries and our jobs will have
safeguards to protect them from disrup-
tion.

Since taking office, I have held
numerous discussions with Caribbean
Basin leaders. They have assured me
that their Caribbean Basin initiative will
provide more fuel for their private
economies to be engines for lasting
growth. They, too, have faith that
private enterprise can flourish with the
magic of the marketplace. This initia-
tive, I am pleased to say, is only part of
a wider undertaking in the Caribbean
Basin. Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and '
Venezuela have joined us with im- '

pressive initiatives of their own. I am t
asking the Congress only that we in the i'
United States do our part by doing what
we can do best — create economic oppor
tunity.

The leaders of the Congress have
promised to give the Caribbean Basin
initiative urgent consideration during
the current session. The initiative has
already received substantial bipartisan -
support. I urge all members of the Con- ■
gress to look carefully at the benefits
which the Caribbean Basin initiative will '
bring to our neighbors, and to us. Final
passage this year is top priority.

I will be leaving tonight to return to
Washington. I cannot close without say-
ing how impressed I have been with the
leaders I have met here in the nations of
South and Central America and the peo-
ple. I believe we have created bonds
which will serve to bring the nations and
peoples of the Americas into a closer ac-
cord. These two great continents joined
by the countries of Central America can
be the hope of the world.

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

President Reagan's
Luncheon Toast

San Jose
Dec. 4, 1982^^

First, on behalf of those who are with
me today from our country, let me
thank you and the people of Costa Rica
for your hospitality.

Last month in Washington President
Monge warned against the arrogance of
any leader who believes that his own
political formulation is perfect. And as
our fellow citizens often let us know,
none of us is perfect. But the basic value
of the democratic societies that we
represent are far more perfect than
those of any other form of government.
Our dedication to freedom, a respect for
human rights, our adherence to the rule
of law are far superior to the
totalitarian rule that others would im-
pose in the name of the false revolu-
tions. Theirs are hollow promises and
empty rhetoric.

We celebrate, today, our commit-
ment to freedom and to peaceful
political reconciliation. I particularly
want to reaffirm to all of you the pledge
my Administration has made to the
economic well-being and security of the
peoples of Central America and the
Caribbean. We know that political prin-
ciples and collective security are not
served by unstable economies.

Our Caribbean Basin initiative offers
a realistic foundation on which to build
increased trade between our coun-
tries— trade that will benefit all our
citizens.

This evening I am returning to
Washington where I still continue to
press for quick congressional action on
the important trade and investment pro-
visions of the initiative.

In that spirit of mutual commitment
may we rise now in a toast to President
Monge, to Costa Rica, and to liberty.

The President is met by Honduran Presi-
dent Roberto Suazo at San Pedro Sula Air-
port, Armando Escalon Air Force Base.

HONDURAS

President Reagan's
Remarks

San Pedro Sula
Dec. 4, 198215

President Suazo and I have just com-
pleted a very useful exchange of ideas
on the full range of bilateral issues and
regional problems that confront our two
democracies. In this, our second meeting

this year, we have continued the close
consultation that we began in Washing-
ton last July. This has given our
dialogue continuity and enabled us to
analyze these problems in greater detail.

I have expressed my
Administration's support and my
nation's admiration for President
Suazo's efforts to insure, for the Hon-
duran people, the benefits of a
democratic government elected on the
principles of the rule of law. President
Suazo has made it clear to me that there
will be no retreat from that noble princi-
ple.

We are in agreement that we must
work together to oppose those who seek
to disrupt the promise of economic prog-
ress and political stability that is the
legacy of peace in the Americas. My Ad-
ministration is convinced that through
cooperation and solidarity, our govern-
ments can protect our democratic in-
stitutions and free-market economic
systems from the counterfeit revolu-
tionaries, who seek to destroy growth
and impose totalitarianism on free peo-
ple.

We will cooperate in every way we
can with Honduras and the other
democratic governments of Central
America to further our common objec-
tives.

It's a pleasure to be here, and our
only regret is that it has to be such a
very short visit. But, again, we're
grateful to the President, the people of
Honduras for giving us this opportunity
to visit with them. [Applause]

January 1983

President Reagan's Statement to the People of Honduras,

December 4, 1982

President [Roberto] Suazo has been gracious in inviting me to visit your country,
and I am anxiously looking forward to it. Early this summer, we were honored to
have your President visit Washington, and I am happy we have this early opportuni-
ty to continue our talks.

He told me then of the pride of the Honduran people in their democratic
achievement, of their desire for peace with their neighbors, and of the measures you
are taking to revive your economy. These are all goals we share with you. Both of
our countries are concerned by the economic problems and the threat to peace the
countries in Central America face.

Honduras has been a leader in Central America. You have put forward concrete
proposals for a comprehensive peace throughout your region. Your transition to
democracy answered those who argue that freedom is a luxury that struggling coun-
tries cannot afford. And you have proved that a freely elected government has the
will and determination to take the actions needed to put your economy on a sound
course.

The Honduran people have won the admiration of my fellow countrymen, and
the peace proposals your President presented to the OAS last March are ones which
we, in the United States, support fully. They were incorporated in the final act of
the eight democratic countries that met in San Jose in October. They are reasonable
and attainable for all parties, and I hope they will lead to peace in Central America.

Honduras has also played a prominent role in the Central American democratic
community which is dedicated to freedom, economic development, and the security
of each nation against aggression in any form by one neighbor against another.
These are goals which can be achieved, and it is with this hope that I will come to
Honduras to meet with President Suazo. We have common aspirations and values. I
am sure we will be able to strengthen the cooperation between our two nations and
our people. I will bring with me the best wishes and friendship of the American
people.

Text from White House press release. I

President Reagan's
Remarks Following
Meeting With
Guatemalan President
Jose Rios Montt

San Pedro Sula
Dec. 4, 1982'«

President Rios Montt and I have just
had a useful exchange of ideas on the
problems of the region and on our
bilateral relations.

Our conversation today has done
much to improve the climate of relations
between our two governments. I know

that President Rios Montt is a man of
great personal integrity and commit-
ment. His country is confronting a
brutal challenge from guerrillas armed
and supported by others outside
Guatemala.

I have assured the President that
the United States is committed to sup-
porting his efforts to restore democracy
and to address the root causes of this
violent insurgency. I know he wants to
improve the quality of life for all
Guatemalans and to promote social
justice. My Administration will do all it
can to support his progressive efforts.

We have heard a great presentation,
and as I said on the first day of my visit
far south of here in Brasilia, people from
my country — government officials of my
country in the past have come to South

and Central America to various coun-
tries proposing plans and ideas on their
own. I know they were sincere, and, yet,
I think there was a certain insensitivity
connected with what they were doing. I
said, from the first day, and until this,
our last stop on this visit, that we came
here to ask, not tell. We have come here
to find out and to learn what we can
about the possible differences between
us and the possible answers to those dif-
ferences. We know a great deal about
the problems confronting Guatemala.
We're going home and do our best to see
if we can't be helpful now in finding
some answers to the problems.

Secretary Shultz's
Press Briefing

San Pedro Sula
Dec. 4, 1982"

President Reagan's trip to South
America and Central America, now con-
cluded, is part of the diplomacy of the
New World. He has been to Canada,
met with Prime Minister Trudeau some
seven times. He has met several times
with the just outgoing President of Mex-
ico and recently with the incoming and
has addressed the OAS. And this is part
of that unfolding process.

While in Honduras, President Reagan
holds a bilateral meeting with Guatemalan
President Jose Rios Montt.

Department of State Bulletin '

FEATURE

Visit

Latin America

The trip has been marked through-
out by, on the one hand, close and cor-
iial personal relationships between the
President and his counterparts from
^tart to finish and a considerable
amount and, of course, a wide variety of
substantive discussions at each stop. The
overall themes have remained as we en-
visaged them to begin with.

First, is the emphasis on democracy
m our hemisphere. If you think of it,
coming down from Canada on through
to the tip of South America, by now
some 90% of the people live under condi-
tions where elected governments, in one
way or another, are their governments.
The first point that we have emphasized
and talked about and sought to drama-
tize is the importance of democracy in
our hemisphere.

Second, is the importance of peace
and stability. It's self-important but also
is an essential condition for economic
development. Questions having to do
with trade and aid and incentives of one
kind or another have to fit into the pat-
tern of the creation of stable conditions.
Of course, that problem is much more
prominent and upfront here in Central
America than it has been in the other
two stops.

Q. Earlier today General Rios
Montt issued a statement talking
about a process that would supposedly
lead to free elections in Guatemala.
Did this issue— was this issue dis-
cussed with the President? And what
was said about it? And is there any
kind of a timetable for those elec-
tions?

A. The situation in Guatemala was
described to us by President Rios Montt
in a lot of detail with maps and informa-
tion. He left us with some booklets.
With regard to the election, he said that
there would be the establishment of a
constitutional convention or assembly,
and that March 23d would be the date
on which that would be identified —
precisely what that meant, I am not too
sure. At any rate, presumably, on March
23d, some significant step toward a con-
stitutional assembly will be taken. But
that is really a question that you should
ask him, not me.

Q. Will the United States resume
military sales to Guatemala?

A. That is a question that remains
to be decided. Of course, it is worth
noting that the Congress in the Carib-
bean Basin initiative did include $10
million for Guatemala. Basically, the
discussion that we had with President
Rios Montt was one that started with
the invitation from President Reagan as
he has described here just a moment ago
to listen. With that invitation. President
Rios Montt did a lot of describing the
situation— including the more proper
way of putting this March 23d
thing— the publication of the law— is
what is looked for at that point.

Q. Are you, or is Secretary Regan,
going to follow up this trip with
statements to financial institutions
about your confidence in the area?

A. Of course, as far as financial
matters are concerned. On the one hand,
there is one program of assistance that
is being debated and voted on in the
Congress right now, and that will deter-
mine to a certain extent the parameters
of what we could do in that regard. That
will, also, affect things like the World
Bank— and in the context of South
America— the lADB, which is very
much on everyone's mind. As far as
private creditors are concerned, they
make their own decisions. The bridging
loan was announced with Brazil, and
that is designed to, on the one hand,
help Brazil and, on the other, to be an
expression of confidence and support
that we have in the Brazilian economy.

Q. President Suazo, in his state-
ment, referred to a peace initiative. Is
that the warning of his initiative with
Nicaragua? Did he give the President
a report on the status of any talks that
he has undertaken with Nicaragua to
ease the border dispute?

A. The peace initiative he referred
to, I believe, was the six-point program

that became part of the San Jose con-
ference calling for various actions which
you are familiar with.

Q. I just want to know if you
could confirm or deny whether the
United States is providing training for
anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans from
Honduras?

A. The United States is not in
Nicaragua in any training capacity.
There are people in Nicaragua apparent-
ly who don't like what is going on there,
but that is not anything that we are
training them for.

'Other documentation for this trip can be
found in the Weekly Compilations of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 6 and 13, and
press releases 364, 365, and 367.

^Text from White House press release.

'Made upon arrival at Brasilia Interna-
tional Airport (text from White House press
release).

■•From Brasil: Journal do Brasil and 0
Estado de Sao Paulo; from Colombia: El
Espectador. El Mundo, and El Colombiano;
from Honduras: La Prensa; and from Costa
Rica: La Nacion (text from White House
press release).

"^Made at the Hotel Nacional (press
release 361 of Dec. 3, 1982).

«Made at the Palacio do Itamaraty (text
from White House press release). ,

'Made at the Governor's Palace (text
from WTiite House press release).

^Text from White House press release.

^Made aboard Air Force One enroute
Bogota, Colombia (press release 363 of
Dec. 6, 1982).

'"Made at Casa de Narino (text from
White House press release).

"Issued following bilateral meeting with
El Salvador's President Alvaro Magana.

"Made at the National Theater (text
from White House press release).

''Made at Casa Presidencial (text from
WTiite House press release).

"Made at Casa Presidencial (text from
White House press release).

"^Made following a bilateral meeting with
Honduran President Roberto Suazo (text
from White House press release).

"^Made at La Mesa International Airport
(text from White House press release).

"Made at La Mesa International Airport
(press release 366 of Dec. 7, 1982). ■

January 1983

THE PRESIDENT

East-West Trade Relations and
the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions

President Reagan's radio address to
the nation on November 13, 1982. ^

During the campaign 2 years ago, I
spoke of the need for the United States
to restore the balance in our relationship
with the Soviet Union. For too many
years we had stood still while the
Soviets increased their military strength
and expanded their influence from
Afghanistan to Ethiopia and beyond. I
expressed a belief, which you seemed to
share, that it was time for the United
States to chart a new course. Since
then, we've embarked upon a building of
our defense forces in order to
strengthen our security and, in turn, to
strengthen the prospects for peace. We
still have a long way to go. But the fact
that we've started on a new course has
enabled us to propose the most com-
prehensive set of proposals for arms
reduction and control in more than a
quarter of a century. It's always been
my belief that if the Soviets knew we
were serious about maintaining our
security, they might be more willing to
negotiate seriously at the bargaining
table.

In the near future, I will be speaking
to you in more detail about this matter
of arms control and, more importantly,
arms reductions. But right now I have
something in the nature of news I'd like
to bring you.

The balance between the United
States and the Soviet Union cannot be
measured in weapons and bombers
alone. To a large degree, the strength of
each nation is also based on economic
strength. Unfortunately, the West's
economic relations with the U.S.S.R.
have not always served the national
security goals of the alliance.

The Soviet Union faces serious
economic problems. But we— and I
mean all of the nations of the free
world— have helped the Soviets avoid
some hard economic choices by pro-
viding preferential terms of trade, by
allowing them to acquire militarily rele-
vant technology, and by providing them
a market for their energy resources,

even though this creates an excessive
dependence on them. By giving such
preferential treatment, we've added to
our own problems— creating a situation
where we have to spend more money on
our defense to keep up with Soviet
capabilities which we helped create.

Since taking office, I have empha-
sized to our allies the importance of our
economic as well as our political rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union. In July
of 1981 at the economic summit meeting
in Ottawa, Canada, I expressed to the
heads of state of the other major
Western countries and Japan my belief
that we could not continue conducting
business as we had. I suggested that we
forge a new set of rules for economic
relations with the Soviet Union which
wouJd put our security concerns fore-
most. I wasn't sucessful at that time in
getting agreement on a common policy.

Then, in December of 1981, the
Polish Government, at Soviet instiga-
tion, imposed martial law on the Polish
people and outlawed the Solidarity
union. This action showed graphically
that our hopes for moderation in Soviet
behavior were not likely to be fulfilled.

In response to that action, I imposed
an embargo on selected oil and gas
equipment to demonstrate our strong
opposition to such actions and to
penalize this sector of the Soviet
economy which relies heavily on high
technology, much of it from the United
States. In June of this year I extended
our embargo to include not only U.S.
companies and their products but sub-
sidiaries of U.S. companies abroad and
on foreign licensees of U.S. companies.

It's no secret that our allies don't
agree with this action. We stepped up
our consultations with them in an effort
to forge an enduring, realistic, and
security-minded economic policy toward
the Soviet Union. These consultations
have gone on over a period of months.
I'm pleased today to announce that
the industrialized democracies have this
morning reached substantial agreement
on a plan of action. The understanding
we've reached demonstrates that the
Western alliance is fundamentally united
and intends to give consideration to

strategic issues when making decisions
on trade with the U.S.S.R.

As a result, we have agreed not to
engage in trade arrangements which
contribute to the military or strategic
advantage of the U.S.S.R. or serve to
aid preferentially the heavily militarized
Soviet economy. In putting these prin-
ciples into practice, we wOl give priority
attention to trade in high technology
products, including those used in oil and
gas production. We will also undertake
an urgent study of Western energy
alternatives, as well as the question of
dependence on energy imports from the
Soviet Union.

In addition, we've agreed on the
following immediate actions.

First, each partner has affirmed
that no new contracts for the purchase
of Soviet natural gas will be signed or
approved during the course of our study
of alternative Western sources of
energy.

Second, we and our partners will
strengthen controls on the transfer of
strategic items to the Soviet Union.

Third, we will establish without
delay procedures for monitoring finan-
cial relations with the Soviet Union and
will work to harmonize our export credit
policies.

The understanding we and our part-
ners have reached and the actions we
are taking reflect our mutual determina-
tion to overcome differences and
strengthen our cohesion. I believe this
new agreement is a victory for all the
allies. It puts in place a much needed
policy in the economic area to comple-
ment our policies in the security area.

As I mentioned a moment ago, the
United States imposed sanctions against
the Soviet Union in order to
demonstrate that their policies of op-
pression would entail substantial costs.
Now that we've achieved an agreement
with our allies which provides for
stronger and more effective measures,
there is no further need for these sanc-
tions, and I am lifting them today.

The process of restoring a proper
balance in relations with the Soviet
Union is not ended. It will take time to

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

make up for the losses incurred in past
years. But acting together, we and our
allies are making major progress. And
I'm happy to say the prospects for peace
are brighter.

I have just returned to the White
House from the Soviet Embassy, where
I signed the book of condolence for
President Brezhnev. New leaders are

coming to power in the Soviet Union. If
they act in a responsible fashion, they
will meet a ready and positive response
in the West.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 22, 1982,
which also carries an informal question-and-
answer session with reporters following the
address. ■

International Free Trade

President Reagan's radio address to
the nation broadcast from Camp David,
Maryland, on November 20, 1982.'^

I've talked to you on a number of occa-
sions about the economic problems and
opportunities our nation faces. Well, as
you've probably heard on news reports,
America's problems are not unique.
Other nations face very severe economic
difficulties. In fact, both developed and
developing countries alike have been in
the grip of the longest worldwide reces-
sion in postwar history. And that's bad
news for all of us. When other countries
don't grow, they buy less from us, and
we see fewer jobs created at home.
When we don't grow, we buy less from
them, which weakens their economies
and, of course, their ability to buy from
us. It's a vicious cycle.

You can understand the danger of
worldwide recession when you realize
how much is at stake. Exports account
for over 5 million jobs in the United
States. Two out of every 5 acres planted
by American farmers produce crops for
exports. But because of their recessions,
other countries are buying fewer
American farm products than last year.
Our farmers are hurting — and they're
just one group.

So we are trying to turn this situa-
tion around. We're reminding the world
that, yes, we all have serious problems.
But our economic system — based on in-
dividual freedom, private initiative, and
free trade— has produced more human
progress than any other in history. It is
in all of our interests to preserve it, pro-
tect it, and strengthen it.

We are reminding our trading part-
ners that preserving individual freedom
and restoring prosperity also requires

free and fair trade in the marketplace.
The United States took the lead after
World War II in creating an interna-
tional trading and financial system that
limited government's ability to disrupt
free trade across borders. We did this
because history had taught us an impor-
tant lesson: Free trade serves the cause
of economic progress, and it serves the
cause of world peace.

When governments get too involved
in trade, economic costs increase and
political disputes multiply. Peace is
threatened. In the 1930s, the world ex-
perienced an ugly specter— protec-
tionism and trade wars and, eventually,
real wars and unprecedented suffering
and loss of life.

There are some who seem to believe
that we should run up the American flag
in defense of our markets. They would
embrace protectionism again and in-
sulate our markets from world competi-
tion. The last time the United States
tried that, there was enormous economic
distress in the world. World trade fell by
60% and young Americans soon followed
the American flag into World War II.

I'm old enough and, hopefully, wise
enough not to forget the lessons of those
unhappy years. The world must never
live through such a nightmare again.
We're in the same boat with our trading
partners. If one partner shoots a hole in
the boat, does it make sense for the
other one to shoot another hole in the
boat? Some say, yes, and call that get-
ting tough. Well, I call it stupid. We
shouldn't be shooting holes; we should

be working together to plug them up.
We must strengthen the boat of free
markets and fair trade so it can lead the
world to economic recovery and greater
political stability.

And here's how we're working to do
that: We insist on sound domestic
policies at home that bring down infla-
tion, and we look to others for no less in
their own economies. The International
Monetary Fund — the institution that
deals with world financial issues — seeks
to encourage its member countries to
follow sound domestic policies and avoid
government restrictions on international
trade and investment to foster economic
development and raise their people's
standard of living.

We remind other countries that as
the United States helps to lead the
world out of this recession, they will
benefit as we buy more goods from
them. This will enable them to grow and
buy more goods from us. And that will
mean more jobs all around. That is the
way of free markets and free trade. We
must resist protectionism because it can
only lead to fewer jobs for them and
fewer jobs for us.

In just 4 days, the trade ministers of
virtually all the free world countries will
meet in Geneva, Switzerland. They will
seek ways to surmount challenges to the
integrity of our international economic
system. We were instrumental in con-
vening this international meeting
because we believe strongly that our
trading system is at a crossroads. Either
free world countries go forward and sus-
tain the drive toward more open
markets or they risk sliding back toward
the mistakes of the 1930s and succumb-
ing to the evils of more and more
government intervention. And this is
really no choice at all.

The United States will reject protec-
tionist and defeatist proposals. Instead,
we will set new goals and lay out a pro-
gram for limiting government interven-
tion in world markets. We will lead with
a clear sense of our own commercial in-
terests and a quiet determination to de-
fend these interests. We will take ac-
tions at home and abroad which enhance
the ability of U.S. industries to compete
in international trade.

January 1983

THE PRESIDENT

Let no one misunderstand us. We're
generous and farsighted in our goals,
and we intend to use our full power to
achieve these goals. We seek to plug the
holes in the boat of free markets and
free trade and get it moving again in the
direction of prosperity. And no one
should mistake our determination to use
our full power and influence to prevent
others from destroying the boat and
sinking us all.

That's how the United States is
working in the world on behalf of
freedom, economic prosperity, and
peace.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of ^Iov. 29, 1982.

News Conference of November 11
(Excerpts)

Before taking your questions, I want to
share with you just briefly my reflec-
tions on the important events that we've
witnessed today.

From Moscow, we've learned of the
death of President Brezhnev, a man who
played a major role in world affairs for
more than two decades. Here in the
White House, I met with Phil Habib
[Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Special
Representative for the Middle East]
about our plans to help bring peace to
the Middle East, where the opportunity
for progress has been fundamentally im-
proved by recent developments in that
region. And also today, the space shuttle
was successfully launched. Once again,
we will expand mankind's opportunities
for enriching the human experience
through peaceful exploration of the
universe.

Those events could have a critical
impact on our future — future we face
with confidence and resolve. If there is a
lesson for us, it is that we, as a free peo-
ple, must always be prepared for
change, so that when it comes we're
ready to meet new challenges and op-
portunities. Our system of government
is unique and best able to adapt to
change and move forward without
disruption or break in continuity of pur-
pose.

I want to underscore my intention to
continue working to improve our rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union. Our two
nations bear a tremendous responsibility
for peace in a dangerous time — a
responsibility that we don't take lightly.
Earlier this year, we put forth serious
and far-reaching proposals to reduce the
levels of nuclear and conventional
forces. I want to reconfirm that we will
continue to pursue every avenue for
progress in this effort. But we shouldn't
delude ourselves. Peace is a product of
strength, not of weakness — of facing
reality and not believing in false hopes.

Today we honor American veter-
ans— men and women who, by their
courage and dedication, protected our
freedom and independence. In the wake
of events in the Soviet Union, we remaii
hopeful for a better relation. Conscious
of our national interest and determined
to remain a free people, I can think of
no better day than Veterans Day to
rededicate ourselves to peace and to do
things necessary to maintain the peace
and to preserve our freedom.

Q. Who will be leading the U.S. I
delegation to Leonid Breznev's I

funeral? If you won't be going, how
come? And also aside from your per-
sonal hopes for peace, do you have
reason to believe that the next coming
months might see the new Soviet
leadership flexing its muscle a bit and
a period of increased tension coming
about?

A. Answering the last part first, no,
I don't anticipate that as they make this
transition. We certainly can hope that
there won't be anything of the kind.

But with regard to the service,
we've had no direct, official word yet on
anything, although we are in com-
munication directly with them. It was
just a plain case of looking at schedules
and my own schedule calling for visits
here by a head of state next week, and
it was felt that it would be better for
George [Vice President Bush] to head
that delegation. But it will be an ap-
propriate and a very distinguished
delegation.

Q. It will be the Vice President
then who will be heading the delega-
tion?

A. This is what we're considering
now. No final decisions have been made,
because, as I say, we're waiting to hear
some word about the services.

Q. If there is a period of tension,
how would you respond?

A. We've had periods of tension
before. And I think you just — you can't

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

ruess that in advance or what the
inswer would be, except that I think we
-nust remember that our goal is and will
'emain a search for peace, and we would
;ry to find the best way to achieve that.
And, incidentally, I believe that we can
continue that search without my attend-
ance at the services.

Q. The Polish Government an-
nounced that they're about to free
Lech Walesa. And as you've men-
tioned, Mr. Brezhnev is dead, and a
new Soviet leadership is coming into
power. Is there any thought in your
mind that this would be a good time
for you to take some big step, even a
symbolic step that would lead to the
lessening of tensions between East
and West? And are you thinking of
taking any initiatives that would give
the world a signal that you would like
that to come about?

A. We have been trying to do that
in the area of quiet diplomacy, tried in
the summit conference, tried in the
NATO conference, of various things. We
are prepared and ready — and they know
that— about trying to have a better rela-
tion. But it's going to require some ac-
tion, not just words. For 10 years
detente was based on words from them
1 and not any deeds to back those words
up. We need some action that they — it
takes two to tango— that they want to
tango, also.

Q. But are you willing to take the
first step at this stage, at this junc-
ture?

A. There are some people who have
said I took the first step with lifting the
grain embargo. Have we gotten
anything for it.

Q. A number of Republicans, not
just those who want to return to
policies of the past, have suggested
that in the spending cuts that are
necessary in this next budget, that it
would be good if the Pentagon also
participated in this. And some have
even said that in the long run the
defense budget would be better if the

economy is healthier. Have you ruled
out the possibility that you would
modify in any way your call for an in-
creased defense budget, maybe just
for this 1 year, when the economy is
not what you'd like it to be?

A. It isn't the kind of a budget that
you can do it for just 1 year. There are
weapons systems and so forth, things
that have to go on down the line. You
don't just call up a supplier and get a
delivery on what it is you want to buy,
or call him and say, send it next month.
You've got to remember that a great
share of the defense budget is for
humanity. It is for the men and women
in the Armed Forces, the pay scale that
is now approaching some reasonable
level.

But we're looking at everything, and
we're not prepared to give any indica-
tions yet of what we're looking at. I
would have to say that, yes, we're look-
ing, if there are savings that can be
made without delaying or setting back
what we think is the improvement we
must have if we're going to close that
window of vulnerability that we in-
herited. We can't do that. The first and
primary function of the Federal Govern-
ment is the national security.

Q. Israel continues to ignore your
call for a freeze of settlements of the
West Bank. How damaging is Israel's
ignoring of that freeze to the peace
process, and what are you prepared to
do about it?

A. Prime Minister Begin is coming
here, and I'm sure that he and I will
have some talks on that, as well as other
subjects. We do think it is a hindrance
to what we're trying to accomplish in
the peace movement.

Obviously, the solution to the Middle
East must be what we outlined earlier,
and that is to bring the Arab States and
leaders and the Israelis together at a
negotiating table to resolve the dif-
ferences between them. And that begins
with their recognizing Israel's right to
exist as a nation. I am still optimistic,
and that's why Phil Habib is going back
there.

Q. Are you prepared to do more
than just talk with Prime Minister
Begin? Are you prepared to consider
any sanctions to force a change in
Israeli policy?

A. I don't think that it would be
good diplomacy to be threatening or
anything, and I don't believe that's
necessary. I think all of us realize that
peace is the ultimate goal there.

Q. You like to describe yourself as
an optimist, a man who sees oppor-
tunities instead of problems. And in
that light I'd like to hear what you
think are the opportunities that the
United States now has with the death
of President Brezhnev?

A. I don't think that the death of
President Brezhnev is a factor in
this— of what opportunities we might
have.

I have felt for a long time that we
have an opportunity, because while the
entire world, including the Soviet Union
and ourselves, is involved in a deep
recession and deep economic prob-
lems—all of us — it would seem to me
that out of those troubles, that might be
a time when, in a cooperative sense, we
could find out that we'll all be far better
off if we decide to get along with each
other, instead of one pursuing an ag-
gressive policy and the other one
resisting that and so forth.

I am optimistic that — and would
have been without his death today — con-
tinue to be optimistic that we can get
together.

Q. You've said recently that you
believe a number of sincere Americans
who support a nuclear arms freeze are
being manipulated by those who want
the weakening of America. Could you
elaborate on this for us? Do you have
any evidence of foreign involvement in
the U.S. peace movement?

A. Yes, there is plenty of evidence.
It's been published by some of your
fraternity. There was no question but
that the Soviet Union saw an advantage
in a peace movement buUt around the
idea of a nuclear freeze, since they are
out ahead. And I want to emphasize
again that the overwhelming majority of
the people involved in that, I am sure,
are sincere and well intentioned and, as

January 1983

THE PRESIDENT

a matter of fact, are saying the same
thing I'm saying. And that is, we must
have a reduction of those nuclear
weapons, and that's what we're trying to
negotiate now in Geneva. But to put the
freeze first and then beheve that we
have not weakened our case for getting
a reduction, when the other side is so
far ahead, doesn't make sense.

Yes, there has been in the organiza-
tion of some of the big demonstrations,
the one in New York and so forth, there
is no question about foreign agents that
were sent to help instigate and help
create and keep such a movement going.

Q. Is that the extent of the in-
volvement as you know it, or has there
been money involved, or are there
other ways that the Soviet involve-
ment has manifested itself?

, A. I can't go beyond what I've done
because I don't discuss intelligence mat-
ters, and that's what I would be getting
into.

Q. Evidence mounts that key
weapons in your $400-billion weapons
procurement buildup are in trouble.
Navy testers say that the F-18, on
which you'd spend $40 billion, is too
heavy for its major mission. Your
closest military science adviser says
the latest basing plan for the MX
won't fool the Soviets. The Pershing
missile, on which NATO defense
would depend, literally can't get off
the ground. The antitank weapon the
Army wants to buy seems to be inef-
fective against modern Soviet tanks.
The Maverick missile can't find its
targets. [Laughter]

I wonder whether in light of all
these failures you have any reason to
wonder whether a $400 billion arms
buildup is money well spent.

A. It isn't $400 billion in any single
year that I know of. That's exag-
gerating. I've read the same articles,
also, and having access to information
closer to the source, I don't believe those
things about the weaponry.

Obviously, in any new weapons
system, there are problems and there
are bugs that have to be worked out.
But I have faith in our technology and

the level of that technology, and I know
that we have been markedly increasing
our defensive capabilities with what
we're doing. And as I say, some of my
sources I can't reveal.

Q. As you may recall, last June in
Berlin you talked about the danger of
accidental nuclear war and put for-
ward the idea that this might be a
new initiative that the Administration
could consider in the arms control
field. I wonder whether in your plan-
ning for next year you have some arms
control initiatives in the works.

A. All of these things are in the
works, and that's why we have three
teams negotiating— one on the matter of
conventional arms, one on the matter of
strategic missiles, and the other on the
matter of the INF [Intermediate-range
Nuclear Force], the zero option that I
announced a year ago. But I tell you
what I'd rather ask you to do and wait
for is, in the very near future, I am
going to be speaking in a major address
on that entire subject.

Q. You said in September that you
could not determine how long Ameri-
can Marines would remain in Lebanon.
But since that was 6 weeks ago, don't
you think it's time to give the
American public an indication of how
long theyll be there?

A. I wish I could. This is one of the
reasons why Phil Habib is going back
over there, take charge of what's going
on.

The plan as proposed is one that re-
quires, of course, the ability of the new
administration in Lebanon to stabilize
and to be able to take charge of its own
borders. This calls for, as quickly as
possible, also, the removal of all foreign
forces from the soil. And that's why our
multinational force is there.

I can't give you a close-out date on
that, but I can tell you that we're trying
to push as fast as we can on the two
things that must happen. And that is the
ability of the Lebanese Government to
heal the wounds and bring their people
together and have control. But, also, it
hinges on getting the three foreign fac-
tions—the PLO, the Syrians, and the

Israelis— out of Lebanon. And we are
pushing on that as fast as we can.

Q. Is there any reason to believe
the troops might be home for Christ-
mas?

A. I just can't speculate on that. I
can't tell you. But I do know this: We
think our plan is working. Whether it's
working as fast as we'd like or not re-
mains to be seen.

I think the important thing is that
that force, that multinational force is
there in the name of helping bring about
peace. I think the most important thing
is to see that the job is done, and I
believe they understand that.

Q. Is it possible that the United
States might cut back on aid to Israel
in direct proportion to the cost to that
country of establishing new settle-
ments on the West Bank, all this as a
means of achieving the freeze that
you're seeking?

A. To answer that question one way
or another, I don't think would be
helpful in the situation that we're in to-
day, where we have made so much prog-
ress in the Arab States, the unusual, the
unique thing of the representatives of
the Arab League being here to meet
with me as they were just some days
ago; the need now for Israel to, itself,
recognize that they, too, must play a
part in making it possible for negotia-
tions; the part that must be played and
recognized and that one of President
Gemayel's problems now is reconciling
Muslim groups within his own country. I
don't think to start talking about
whether I should or should not make
threats of some kind or other is going to
be fruitful at all.

Q. [Inaudible]— got a request here
for some factual information. Is it
true that the Begin government now is
spending about a $100 million a year
to subsidize settlements on the West
Bank?

A. I don't know that figure. I image
I could find that out very easily.

Q. In 2 weeks the United States
will celebrate Thanksgiving. Given the
passing of Brezhnev, inevitably, there
are comparisons between the two
systems. Could you take just a minute

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT

to tell Americans why at this time
they especially should be thankful for
their blessings and give a comparison
of the two systems?

A. Yes, because I think the com-
parison is so obvious, and you don't even
have to use our own country. Turn to
some of the newer and the developing
countries, and those that have chosen
our way — the free way, free trade,
democracy— are so far ahead in stand-
ard of living and the happiness of their
people than the others that have chosen
the other, the controlled, the authori-
tarian way— and I think here is — Lin-
coln said it then, and it's truer even to-
day, this is the last best hope of man on
Earth.

We are freer than any other people;
we have achieved more than any other
people. If you looked around this
room — I thought the other day, when
we had all those representatives from all

over the world, all of those represen-
tatives in this room, who were here to
look at our election, to learn how they
could spread the word about that kind of
freedom in their own countries and in
other countries in their own conti-
nents— I thought that we could have a
meeting of Americans in this room. The
ethnic heritage of the Americans in this
room would be as diverse, and there
would be as many represented as there
were in those hundreds of people who
have come from foreign lands here to-
day. There we all live together proudly
as Americans, in spite of that difference
in birth. There just isn't any comparison
with what we have and what we have to
be thankful for.

Q. Are you close to an agreement
with West European countries on an
East- West trade policy that will
enable you to lift the sanctions on the
Soviet natural gas pipeline?

A. We are in negotiations and have
been for some time on the East- West
matter with our Allies. And we are, at
last, making what I think is sizable prog-
ress.

I have nothing to announce as to
any definition of that at the moment,
but we've made progress. We started
this long before there were sanctions.
We started at Ottawa last year. We
tried again in Europe in the two
meetings there — in the summit
meetings. We have continued. We had a
team negotiating over there. We finally
put the sanctions into effect. But we're
discussing that relationship — or that
arrangement with our partners without
the sanctions plajring any part of it.

Our decision on the sanctions will be
based on when we feel they've served
their purpose and when we feel that
there could be a better situation without
them.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of November 15, 1982. ■

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Vice President Bush

Visits
Africa and Bermuda

Vice President Bush departed Washington, D.C.,
November 10, 1982, to visit Cape Verde, Senegal,
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Zaire, and Ber-
muda. (On November U-15, he headed the U.S. delega-
tion to the funeral of Soviet President Leonid I.
Brezhnev in Moscow; see page 58). He returned to the
United States on November 2U.

Following are the Vice President's statements,
remarks, and toasts made during this trip, as well as
the text of the U.S. -Nigeria joint com,munique.'^

As a native New Englander, I am
well aware of the depth of the "Cape
Verde-American" connection. For more
than two centuries, the people of these
islands have forged their link in the
great chain of American history. It is
stirring to know that we've been able to
maintain these bonds over such a long
period.

This past summer the schooner
Emestina set sail from the port of
Mindelo. After a passage to America
sailed by thousands of Cape Verdeans
over the years, it arrived in New
England, where it is now berthed as a
permanent reminder of their rich con-
tribution to our own national heritage.
We will treasure the Emestina as a
symbol of lasting ties between our
peoples.

Finally, as we traverse the vast Con-
tinent of Africa in the coming weeks, I
look forward to learning firsthand of
Africa's problems and attitudes. We've
made a good start in our brief but
rewarding visit to Cape Verde. We do
not say farewell, but rather thank you
and ate logo.

CAPE VERDE

Departure Statement

Sal

Nov. 10, 1982

On behalf of my wife Barbara and the
entire delegation, let me express our
gratitude for that warm reception which
President and Mrs. Pereira and all of
you have offered us today.

I'm especially glad to have had this
unique opportunity to exchange views
with President Pereira on a wide range
of bilateral and world topics. President
Reagan asked me to come to Africa as
his personal representative in order to
gain firsthand impressions and to ex-
plain the policies of the Reagan Ad-
ministration. The President also asked
me to listen closely to Africa's leaders

and to report to him on their deepest
concerns.

We are aware of the record of Cape
Verde since independence in building a
better life for its people, in spite of the
handicaps of persistent drought and lack
of natural resources. I want to say that
the United States will continue as a
steady partner in your tireless efforts to
bring about a better quality of life.

Let me add, too, that in pledging
our continued assistance, we must
understand that available resources are
not likely to be as plentiful as they have
been in the past. We must recognize
that government efforts in and of
themselves are insufficient. We must tap
other sectors. Any nation's principal
resource is its people. In this. Cape
Verde is handsomely endowed. The
spirit of private initiative, the en-
trepreneurial spirit, is a crucial element
in contributing to sustained economic
development and has already yielded
success stories throughout the develop-
ing world.

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

SENEGAL

Dinner Toast

Dakar

Nov. 11, 19822

It is a privilege, as the representative of
a nation profound in its belief in liberty
and human dignity, to begin my visit to
the African Continent in a country that
has so clearly and so consistently
demonstrated the same beliefs. When
liberty and law rule, citizens can rejoice;
leaders can be well pleased with their
stewardship.

Relations between the Republic of
Senegal and the United States have
almost certainly never been warmer or
closer than they are now. Ninety-nine
years ago, the United States established
a consulate on the Island of Goree; in
1960 we opened our embassy. For more
than 20 years, we have worked together
to make sure our relationship would be
mutually beneficial. Our efforts have
been crowned by success— especially, I
would like to think, since January 1981.
The two Administrations which took of-
fice then— yours under the leadership of
President Diouf and ours under the
leadership of President Reagan— have
raised our bilateral relations to a par-
ticularly privileged level. In this respect,
we can especially be pleased with our
work.

Our increasingly close cooperation
reflects many of the common ideals and
aspirations of our two societies and
peoples. We share a fundamental com-
mitment to the peaceful solution of con-
flicts and to the rule of law. We both af-
firm unshakable attachment to our
democratic institutions, to human rights,
and to the inalienable liberty of all men
and all women.

Opposite page— Top: Signing ceremony
for PL-480.

Bottom: Vice President Bush holds a

bilateral meeting with President
Aristides Pereira.

This close collaboration also reflects,
I think, the personal philosophies of the
leaders of our two governments. Neither
President Diouf nor President Reagan
believe in magic solutions to difficult
problems. They have affirmed as leaders
the simple propositions that progress
can only be achieved through sacrifice,
hard work, and common sense. Your
daily actions show how true the
Senegalese proverb is that "man is the
best cure for his own ills." As our
philosopher. President Thomas Jeffer-
son, asked: "How can great results be
obtained except by great efforts?" You
have our pledge that the United States
is committed to seek an end to the ills
which assail us all, to advance justice
and dignity throughout the world.
Criticism is directed every day at the
United States. But I ask our friends to
consider this: Has any great power in
human history so consistently used its
great power for purposes so benign? I
think not.

President Reagan's Administration
will make no easy promises which it can-
not keep. We will not posture for the
sake of easy good will. And we will not
direct gratuitous criticisms at others.
We have demonstrated clearly that we
will honor F.H.A.A. and improve on our
commitments to our traditional friends
in Africa and elsewhere.

I would like to thank you and your
government for the welcome extended
to us here. Senegal is a country that
smiles on the stranger. This friendship

comes ultimately from the heart of a
people, and it is found in great abun-
dance in Senegal. An American is at
home where hard work and human
dignity are respected. An American is at
home where liberty and justice prevail.
For these reasons, especially, an
American is at home in Senegal.

In this spirit, let me ask you to join
me in a toast to Presidents Abdou Diouf
and Ronald Reagan and to the spirit of
collaboration, to the spirit of friendship
which prevails between the Senegalese
and American peoples.

NIGERIA

Remarks before the
Nigeria-U.S.
Business Council

Lagos

Nov. 13, 1982

Thank you very much. Chief Lawson
[Adeyemi 0. Lawson, chairman of the
Nigeria section of the Nigeria-U.S.
Business Council], for that exceptionally
warm welcome and let me say to you,
sir, and to the members of the Nigerian
Section of the Nigeria-U.S. Business
Council, and to the representatives of

The Vice President meets with Prime Minister Habib Thiam.

fWhite House photos by Cynthia John

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

American firms here and other guests,
ladies and gentlemen, let me just say
how very pleased I am to be here. This
is, Chief Lawson, a return to Nigeria for
me. I was here on a very unofficial visit,
although I was then Ambassador to the
United Nations, about 10 years ago, and
so I am delighted to be back here.

Yesterday, Ambassador Pickering
[U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria] had some
guests out at the embassy for a recep-
tion, and there I had the opportunity to
see some of the people with whom I
worked years ago. I must say that, I ex-
pect I speak for every American here,
the minute I stepped off that airplane, I
could feel the warm hospitality of not
only the Nigerian Government but of the

Cape Verde— A Profile

Geography

Area: 1,557 sq. mi. (slightly larger than

Rhode Island). Capital: Praia (pop. 39,000).

People

Population: 300,000

Ethnic Groups: Creole (71%), African (28%),
European (1%). Religions: Roman Catholic
(65%), animist (35%). Languages: Por-
tuguese (official), Crioulo.

Government

Type: Republic. Independence: July 5, 1975.
Constitution: Draft under revision. -
Branches: Executive— President (head of
state), Prime Minister (head of government),
Council of Ministers. Legislative— National
Assembly. Judicial— National Council of
Justice, lower courts. Political Party:
African Party for the Independence of Cape
Verde (PAICV).

Economy

GNP: $57 million (1979 est.). Per Capita In-
come: $200 (1979).

Natural Resources: Salt, siliceous rock,
minerals. Agricultural Products: Bananas,
com, sugarcane, coffee. Industries: Fish and
fish products, salt, siliceous rock: Trade
(1979): Exports— $1 million: fish, bananas,
salt, coffee. Imports— $22.6 million:
petroleum, com, rice, sugar. Major Trading
Partners— Portugual, European Com-
munities.

Taken from the Background Notes (May
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

people. You just have a wonderful way
of making people feel at home. Chief
Lawson, and your introduction did
nothing but add to that perception.

I look around the room and I see
some — I will not comment on the
Nigerians present, but I feel privileged
to make a comment or two about the
Americans present probably all grum-
bling about how the hell does the Vice
President show up on a Saturday morn-
ing. Well, that's the only way I could
work it but do not be militant, do not
throw any rolls at me; I promise to be
mercifully brief. But this did seem like a
fortuitous occasion, at least, for me to
have an opportunity to visit with those
in the private sector and the schedule
was tight, indeed. I have been asked by
President Reagan to represent us —
Americans I am now speaking to —
tomorrow just as the Vice President of
Nigeria— Vice President Ekwueme—
has been asked by President Shagari to
represent Nigeria — I will be represent-
ing the United States, standing there in
icy cold, in Red Square on Monday, so I
have to cut this visit a little bit short
and fly to Moscow.

But as I told our Nigerian friends
yesterday, this will not deter me from
finishing what, for us at least, is an im-
portant trip to Africa. I'll go to Moscow,
then fly to Frankfurt, and on down to
Zimbabwe and continue our African
tour. I cite this only because we believe
that our developing— and they are still
developing— friendly— and they are
friendly — relationships with Africa are

important, and sometimes we get a rap
and maybe its fair at times, I don't
know, of disregarding or of not paying
proper attention to Africa. If this visit
does nothing else, I hope it does show
the keen interest that we have in rela-
tionships between, in this instance,
Nigeria, in other instances other coun-
tries that mean so much to us on this
continent.

Chief Lawson referred to my back-
ground in the oil business, and I had not
intended to dwell on that or mention it,
but I am very proud of it, as a matter of
fact. Politically, at home some consider
business to be a liability rather than an
asset. I happen to look at it as just the
other way around and I think that, and I
know everybody here agrees and the
Chief certainly does and so I will not
dwell on it, but I remember my early
days in business.

I see Jay Anderson here from Texas ;
and a few others that are familiar look-
ing faces and I was early on the off-
shore drilling business. Indeed our com-
pany pioneered the construction of the
first laterno self-elevating rig. We built
it; we were too dumb to know that it
might have problems so our company
took a chance on it when no other coun-
try would and it turned out to be one of
the foremost designs for drilling off-
shore.

I don't know whether they have any
off Nigeria right now, but anyway it was
a very interesting and pioneering risk-
taking time. And I emphasize that
because many of you here are involved

Vice President Bush meets with President Abdou Diouf.

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

in risk-taking, and just as we Americans
consider that important to profit by tak-
ing risks, I know that Nigerians too
share that risk-taking venturesome
spirit. And we have much in common
through that, so I for one am not the
least anything but proud of the fact that
I worked for a living, made a payroll,
took risks, and, indeed, I must say, that
if I hadn't done that I expect I wouldn't
be standing here as Vice President of
the United States, so business is impor-
tant.

Senegal— A Profile

Geography

Area: 76,000 sq. mi. (about the size of South

Dakota). Capital: Dakar.

People

Population: 5.6 million. Ethnic Groups:

Wolof (36%), Fulani (17.5%), Serer (16.5%),
Toucouleur (9%), Diola (9%), Mandingo
(6.5%), other African (4.5%), other (1%).
Religions; Muslim (75%), Christian (5%),
traditional (20%). Languages; French (of-
ficial), Wolof, Pulaar, Diola, Mandingo.

Government

Type: Republic. Independence: April 4, 1960.
Constitution: March 3, 1963. Branches: Ex-
ecutive—? resident (chief of state). Prime
Minister (head of government), cabinet.
Legislative— lOO-memher unicameral Na-
tional Assembly. Judicial — Supreme Court.
Political Parties: Socialist Party (PS),
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), National
Democratic Assembly (RND), Senegalese
Republican Movement (MRS). African In-
dependence Party (PAl), People's Democratic
Movement (MPD).

Economy

GDP: $2.2 billion (1980). Per Capita GNP:
$330. Natural Resources: Fish, phosphate.
Agricultural Products: Peanuts, millet,
sorghum, manioc, rice, cotton. Industries:
Fishing, agricultural product processing, light
manufacturing, mining. Trade (1979): Ex-
ports—$426 million; peanuts and peanut
products, phosphate rock, canned fish. Im-
ports—$713 million; food, consumer goods,
machinery, transport equipment. Major
Trading Partners— France, EC (other than
France), U.S., Japan.

Taken from the Background Notes (Dec.
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor; Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

As I told Vice President Ekwueme,
who met me last evening at the airport,
in renewing a friendship that started a
year ago, I really am pleased to be here
in Lagos. The dynamism of the
Nigerians, lest you have any doubt, is
very well known in the United States. I
am happy to be back here having
another chance to experience it for
myself although it's too quick, too fast
an opportunity, no chance to see the
ventures that many of my American
friends, colleagues here are involved in.
I wish that we had more time to actually
do that kind of thing.

Nigeria is important to the United
States, let's say that right out at the
beginning of this talk. We want the
United States to be of equal importance
to Nigeria, and if the number of
Nigerian students in the United States is
any guide whatsoever— they are the sec-
ond largest group of foreign students in
the United States this year— then I'd
say the chances of that happening are
extremely good.

Those young people will come home
with a good understanding of how
Nigeria and the United States can do
business together. They may come home
with some other crazy ideas you'll have
to knock out of them, but nevertheless
they better come home with a— if
they're like my kids, they may need a lit-
tle parental guidance, but nevertheless
they will come home, I think, with an
appreciation of the diversity of our coun-
try in which that respect and feeling for
what the free enterprise system has ac-
complished in the United States. And I
think that they will feel that doing
business together is a good, a positive
thing for the people of this country just
as we feel that strongly about Nigeria
itself.

I'm told that there are over 300
American companies working in Nigeria
today. And Americans are here because
they feel that good prospects are here.
You know how our system works; we
know how your system works. And
altruistic and generous as we may feel
about the friendship and the warmth,
business people are here because they
think there are good prospects. We
might as well lay that right out there,
and that is the way it ought to be.

I'll get back to that in a moment, but
first let me share with you some of the
recent news from the United States.
Some of you may have been gone for a
while. One month ago today, the Presi-
dent told the American people America
is recovery bound. And the indicators
show that this recovery is going at last.
And the signs are there and for the
most part they are very, very positive
signs. I don't believe that this recovery,
slow and cautious though it may be at
first, will be another flash in the pan.
You've probably been waiting a long
time, longer than we Americans are
used to, to hear those words of modest
encouragement.

You may also be tempted, coming as
I do, from the hustling, just finished, in-
cessant travel around— I think I have
been in 29 States since Labor Day, since
around the end of the first week of
September. You may also, and under-
standably so, be tempted to look on
those comments as partisan rhetoric.
The election campaign, thank God it's
over, at least for 2 years; the next one
will be fired up January 1, I expect.

But— and I have fun comparing the
elections talking to our friends yester-
day, the President of the Senate here in
Nigeria— the similarities are just in-
escapable about the politics. But what
I've said is no campaign rhetoric, and I
haven't come all this way to beat the op-
position party over the head; I could do
that right there in the United States.

I won't say we don't have problems;
we do. We have enormous problems.
But perhaps the worst of them — all
right, but just let me put it this way, the
worst of them clearly in the United
States is what for us is an unacceptable
level of unemployment— a lot of human
suffering going with that, we're con-
cerned about it.

But we faced extraordinary cata-
strophic problems with the potential for
even worse unemployment when we
came into office. When we took office in
January 1981, inflation— runaway infla-
tion—catastrophically high interest
rates, taxes, and an incessant growth of
government spending.

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

We started by pushing through a tax
cut, and we brought down income tax
rates by 25% the third year of that in-
dividual tax cut going into effect this
coming spring. We worked to slash
government regulations. Now in front of
a business audience, an audience this is
aimed at, maybe there is a lesson in it
for Nigerians, I don't know enough
about your business, but for Americans
we've worked to cut back on the excess
of government regulations. And we've
been reasonably successful.

I'm chairman of the President's Task
Force on Regulatory Reform, and
business people here know that they
have been burdened excessively by
regulation. We're not antiregulation.
We're going to protect the safety of the
working place, we're going to fulfill our
responsibilities to the environment, but
we feel that there was a go-go decade of
far too much regulation just for the sake
of regulation. We estimate now that just
based on administrative regulatory
reform, action taken without the Con-
gress—any legislation needed— we have
saved over the next 10 years $70 billion
of money that will be able to go into jobs
or unemployment or risk-taking or
whatever.

We know, however, that as I stand
here, that we are just starting but that
growth of regulation has been cut by
nearly two-thirds. Inflation reached a
peak of 12.4% in 1980—12.4% for the
United States of America, extraordinari-
ly high. It's now dropped to 5.1% and I
will readily concede that it's still too
high for our country. Indeed it adversely
impacts on Nigeria itself, a rate that
high, but there has been a dramatic im-
provement in less than 2 years.

Interest rates had climbed in the
United States, a prime rate of interest,
an economy that interacts and has an
adverse effect if things are bad on the
entire world economy. Interest rates had
climbed to 21% on the prime rate of in-
terest in January, the month that Presi-
dent Reagan and I took the oath of of-
fice. And they've come down. There's
good news in this for American
business, and there's good news in this
for Nigerian business because there is
an interaction in world economies, of
course.

Nigeria— A Profile

Geography

Area: 356,700 sq. mi. (about the size of
California, Nevada, and Arizona). Capital:
Lagos (pop. est. 4-5 million).

People

Population: 80-100 million. Ethnic Groups:

250 tribal groups: Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and
Yoruba are the largest. Religions: Muslim,
Christian, indigenous African beliefs, others.
Languages: English (official), Hausa, Ibo,
Yoruba, others.

Government

Type: Federal republic. Independence: Oct.
1. 1960. Constitution: Oct. 1, 1979. Branch-
es: Executive — Elected president and vice
president. Legislative — bicameral National
Assembly. Judicial — federal Supreme Court,
lower courts. Political Parties: Great
Nigeria People's Party, National Party of
Nigeria, Nigeria People's Party, People's
Redemption Party, Unity Party of Nigeria,
Nigeria Advance Party.

Economy

GDP: $77 billion (1980 est.). Per Capita
GDP: $750 (1980). Natural Resources:

Petroluem, tin, columbite, iron ore. coal,
limestone, lead, zinc. Agricultural Products:

Cocoa, rubber, palm oil, yams, cassava,
sorghum, millet, corn, rice, livestock, ground-
nuts, cotton. Industries: Cotton, rubber, tex-
tiles, cement, food products, footwear, metal
products, lumber, beer, detergents, car
assembly. Trade (1980): Exports— $26.7
billion: petroleum (96%), columbite, cocoa,
rubber. Imports— $15.S billion: machinery
and transport equipment, foodstuffs,
manufactured goods. Major Trading Part-
ners—\].S.. EC.

Taken from the Background Notes (Aug.
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

They've now dropped to 12% and I
can tell you here that we confidently ex-
pect those interest rates, that prime
rate, to continue to drop. That's bring-
ing down with it mortgage rates, and
already we're seeing a stimulation of
some of our fundamental industries like
increasing car sales and a significant in-
crease in housing.

As President Reagan has said, we've
been on a decade-long roller coaster
ride, mostly because our government,
under Republicans and Democrats, let's
face it, have tried quick fixes on the
economy — quick fixes that might have
momentarily worked but didn't have any
long-term effect. We're determined to
stay with the fundamentals of the
economic program and to get our
economy back on an even keel. And in
so doing, we think this will have the
most beneficial effect on the other
economies in the world.

We know the effort is going to take
a long time, and I wish I could give you
a prediction of a quick total robust
recovery; I can't do that. But it's going
to take a long time, and it won't be easy
because the pressiu-e is on, for those of
you who haven't been in the States for a
long while, for the quick fix, to tiu-n
around and go to a quick, easy answer
that might have political viability, might
be acceptable politically, that would have
adverse effect in terms of the economy
long run.

We are facing, in spite of the fact
that we have cut that growth of spend-
ing, astronomical budget deficits due to
built-in spending increases. We went
through a period, in the United States,
in the late 1960s or the 1970s when we
just figured that we would start a pro-
gram at a million dollars, it would be 10
the next year, it would be 100 the next,
and the following it would be 300 and
nobody would worry about our ability to
pay. And now we're waking up and find-
ing that with those built-in spending in-
creases, somebody has to pay. And it is
the American taxpayer and, indeed,
we're concerned about the size of this
budget.

We're convinced that the policies are
going to bring back a vigorous economy,
as I said, but we know that we can act

The Vice President meets with President
Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

as a primary engine over the world
economy. I feel from my talks last night,
visiting with several of you here, that
Nigerians share those hopes because of
our engine with our tremendous GNP. If
our engine begins to run smoothly again,
it is going to need what Nigeria pro-
duces, certainly oil, and if you can sell
us as much of your oil as you did in
1980, then that Nigerian economy
should recover and recover promptly.
And that, of course, would make it
possible, and I might add— and I'll put
in a little plug here— for you to buy
more American goods. We're interested
in that, and I don't mind being a
salesman here today.

That brings me to my next sub-
ject— the prospects for American
business here in Nigeria. I said a few
minutes ago that there are some 300
American companies working here. That
doesn't include firms that only sell prod-
ucts through trading companies. Most of
the 300 are small firms, the backbone of
American business. They are not listed
on the stock exchanges, but they do a
terribly important amount of business.
I'll not single people out here, but I
will single out Jay Anderson, a friend of
mine. He and his brother, Everett, are
rice farmers in the tremendous city of
Eagle Lake, Texas— I'm sure everybody
has heard of it and if you haven't it's
also working in East Bernard, Texas!
But Jay and his brother have formed a
venture in Kwara State with the Isa
Brothers— Gembery and K.K.— and the
National Grains Production Company.
They're building an integrated rice,
maize, and general farming complex. In
6 years, they plan to produce two crops
a year of rice and corn earning an
estimated $450 million gross for the
project.

That's what I call farming, and that
is the sort of small town — Eagle Lake,
East Bernard— expertise that
Americans can bring to joint venture
partners in Nigeria. And I can tell you
all one thing about Jay Anderson— I
don't want to embarrass him; I'll bet
there's not a guy, not a farmer, not a
worker, not a whatever pay a worker on
that farm works, he's not going to get
his hands any dirtier or work harder
than Jay Anderson. And we Americans
should bring that kind of willingness to
roll up our own sleeves and get the job
done with us.

I single out Jay and Everett,
possibly because they're from Texas
which is my home State, but as long as
I'm on that kick, I might mention
another Texas company — Anderson
Systems International — working in part-
nership with Textron of Arlington,
Virginia. They have agreed to set up
and operate prefabricated, concrete
structure plants in Nigeria.

The first plant is going to be right
here in the capital city, and I'm told the
Federal Ministry of Housing has called
the Anderson system the most ap-
propriate for Nigeria that they've ever
seen. And I have a feeling that that's
good for Nigeria. And certainly they
wouldn't be doing it if they didn't feel
that it was good for the United States.

Several other larger companies have
also signed contracts in recent
weeks — Foster Wheeler, Pullman-
Kellogg, Global and Heckels, and I could
mention others. But the point is clear,
and I feel that I'm preaching to the
choir, both the Nigerian side and the
American side, or you wouldn't be sit-
ting here on a Saturday morning.

But the point is clear, Americans
mean business. And having said that, I
might as well say that many Americans
who want to do business with Nigerians
tell me that at times, and I hope I am
not going to be too frank here, that at
times they find the market somewhat
difficult. Now you know as well as I that
Americans are not soft; we feel that we
can compete vigorously, effectively, if
we're given an equal chance, and we're
ready to meet the challenges here
because we think the future looks good.
And we know that money is tight in
Nigeria just as it's tight everywhere else
in the world. Things may not be easy
just now but everyone with whom I have
talked says that Nigeria is still the
market with the best prospects in black
Africa for the long term. We'd like to
compete and cooperate in that market
because we think that that's one of the
best ways to make strong, lasting rela-
tionships between countries.

So this Saturday morning, I'd like to
give a challenge to our Nigerian friends:
Give us a chance to compete on an equal
footing without competitors. Get your
government to tell us, if you will, where

and how we can best compete and let's
not waste projects. One of our problems
is that we don't get a chance to bid on
some projects. And if we did, couldn't
Nigeria give us a fair opportunity to
work some of those sectors? I think this
is reasonable considering that we buy an
awful lot of oil, but we're not asking for
something that we don't fight for or
earn. We all know that one-sided trade
is unhealthy.

Let me challenge you to give Am-
bassador Pickering details of six projects
where you are willing to give our firms
the first crack at making the best bid; if
we don't get the best bid in there, we
don't expect a thing, but give us that
shot. And there already exists a couple
of organizations created to help busi-
nessmen get together.

One of them is the Nigeria-U.S
Business Council headed here by Chief
Lawson. I do want to thank the Chief
and the other council members for their
warm hospitality. Without them, I
wouldn't have been able to meet with
you and I do consider this as important
as any meeting I'm going to have in
Africa because, as I said at the outset,
we feel strongly about the private sector
that drives the engine right here in
Nigeria.

I have high hopes for this business
council, and I have personally endorsed
it several times in the past. I continue to
wish you success in your efforts to in-
crease trade and commerce between our
two countries. Let me assure you that
you'll be heard with sympathetic ears
whenever you want to consult us.

Another organization of much longer
standing is the Nigerian- American
Chamber of Commerce. All of you in
Nigeria can join, and I'm sure the Chief
would welcome you all as members. The
chamber has a counterpart in New
York, as well as several chapters in
other cities in Nigeria. Ambassador
Pickering told me this morning that he
had been encouraged by some of the
chamber's recent initiatives. I wish the
Chief and all the other members of the
chamber every success in their efforts to
bring together Nigerian and American
businessmen in enterprises that should
benefit us all.

For our part, in the government, the
Administration has recently cooperated

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

with Congress to produce a new major
piece of legislation which should bring
many more American products and
firms to Nigeria. It's called the Export
Trading Company Act. I don't know how
familiar any of you are with it, but it
allows American banks, holding com-
panies, and others to invest up to 5%
and loan up to 10% of their capital and
surplus to an export trading company.

We think that this legislation will
become a vital international sales tool
enabling the business community to in-
crease exports and provide — there was
an estimate by Chase Econometric — of
between 300,000 and 600,000 jobs in the
United States associated with this and
thus strengthening our own economy. I
urged with representatives of the
American banks here to see to it that
their parent banks form such companies
to deal with some of the top Nigerian
traders who are here with us this morn-
ing.

But we're not stopping there. In the
past couple of weeks, as we've prepared
for this trip, we've looked hard for other
ways to help American businesses in
Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. We
looked at the record and realized that
whOe America is still Nigeria's largest
trading partner when two-way trade is
considered, we've slipped from second
place to fifth place, and we can do better
than that. We in the Administration are
determined to do everything possible to
assure fair trade with all of our trading
partners in order to allow you to com-
pete in free and fair markets on an
equal footing.

And, finally, I want to remind you
all that while I have to leave Nigeria
early tomorrow to continue this journey,
I leave here one of our most respected
ambassadors, Ambassador Pickering,
whom I have known over the years and
one who is deeply interested in and in-
volved in the affairs I've mentioned. I
know that some business people have
had complaints over the years. Perhaps
you might cite me as one who complain-
ed that some embassies were less than
oriented to the economic responsibilities
of the embassy — to the private sector
response. But I can tell you that under
Ambassador Pickering, that it is not
true here.

We have somebody who understands
the importance of the private sector. I
know that the ambassador has a first-
rate staff here at this embassy, and they
do stand ready to assist in business mat-
ters in any way they can; not to butt in,
not to push into that private sector one-
on-one, Nigerian versus U.S. business,
working hand-in-hand but to facilitate,
to speed up, to help, to advise. And so, I
would urge that you make use of them,
a good many of them are here among
you this morning.

Before I sit down, I want to say that
I have been looking forward to coming
back here for a long, long time. Having
come, I only wish that we had more
time together. I did have a good chat
last night with Vice President Ekwueme
and an excellent meeting with President
Shagari as well. And we had much to
discuss as good friends do.

I look forward to the remainder of
this stay. I promise you that when I
come back that we will schedule the
meeting at some time other than Satur-
day morning.

I am grateful to our Nigerian friends
for this hospitality and let me end this
way; I'm also grateful to the risk-taking,
profit-oriented, competitive American
businessmen who are with us today. You
have our full support.

U.S. -Nigeria
Joint Communique

Lagos

Nov. 13, 1982

Joint communique issued during the official ,
visit to the Federal Republic of Nigeria of
Mr. George Bush, Vice President of the
United States of America, Friday 12th to j
Sunday 14th November, 1982. The Vice I

President of the United States of America, '
Mr. George Bush, accompanied by Mrs. Bush 1
and a delegation of high ranking government
officials, paid an official visit to the Federal
Republic of Nigeria from November 12 to 14, '
1982. at the invitation of his Nigerian
counterpart. Dr. Alex Ifeanyichukwu
Ekwueme. Vice President Bush had the
honour to pay courtesy calls on His Excellen-
cy Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, and on the
Honorable Dr. Joseph Wayas, President of
the Senate.

Official talks were held between the
visiting Vice President and his host accom-
panied by his delegation. During these talks,
which were characterized by cordiality and
understanding, the two Vice Presidents ex- i
changed information on global, political, |

cultural, economic and social developments. j
They examined various aspects of the present |
state of their bilateral relations and means of i

Vice Presidents Bush and Alex Ekwueme sign joint communique.

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

urther developing and strengthening them,
rhey also exchanged views on the world situ-
ition and their respective countries' position
in a number of international issues, including
lome now before the 37th' session of the
Jnited Nations General Assembly. The two
/ice Presidents agreed on a number of areas
vhere Nigeria and the United States can
f/ork together to foster world peace and
jrosperity. They affirmed their continued
mpport for the United Nations and endorsed
ts collective efforts to achieve world peace.
The two Vice Presidents welcomed the steps
jeing taken to effect a lasting, durable and
lUSt peace in the Middle East, in conformity
with Security Council resolutions.

South Africa and Namibia: As to the
future of southern Africa, the two Vice
Presidents agreed that it is of vital impor-
tance to work urgently for the achievement
of peace and regional security in southern
Africa. The two Vice Presidents reaffirmed
the opposition of their governments and na-
tions to apartheid and racial discrimination.
As regards Namibia, the two sides reaffirmed
their conviction of the necessity for rapid
decolonisation and independence for Namibia
on the basis of recognized democratic prin-
ciples and the will of the majority of the peo-
ple. They agreed that an internationally ac-
ceptable independence for Namibia under the
terms of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 435 remains an objective of
highest priority for both governments. The
work of the five-nation Western contact
group and of Nigeria and the front-line
African states to secure Namibia independ-
ence was again strongly endorsed and it was
agreed that close consultations between the
two governments, and other members of both
groups, would continue. Vice President Bush
reviewed his government's parallel efforts to
insure the timely withdrawal of all foreign
farces from the area, and it was agreed that
the matter should continue to be the subject
of bilateral discussions between the United
States and the Governments of Angola and
South Africa. Vice President Ekwueme reaf-
firmed his government's position that the
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola
must not be a condition for movement
towards Namibia's independence. Vice Presi-
dent Bush indicated the United States objec-
tive is parallel and consistent with the securi-
ty interests of all parties.

OAU and Other African Issues; Vice
President Bush noted his government's
strong support for the Organization of
African Unity, and commended the organiza-
tion's efforts to secure peace and foster
African development. The two Vice

Presidents reaffirmed their governments'
views on the need for a cease-fire and an
early referendum in the Western Sahara in
conformity with resolutions passed at the
Organization of African Unity summit
meeting in Nairobi in June, 1981. The two
Vice Presidents expressed satisfaction at ef-
forts to secure reconciliation and their na-
tional unity in Chad and pledged the support
of their governments in assisting the Govern-
ment of Chad.

Economic Relations: The two leaders
discussed plans for the seventh round of
bilateral talks to be held under the aegis of
Vice President Ekwueme in Lagos in
February, 1983. These talks will include
cooperation in the areas of agriculture,
energy, science and technology, health, trade
and investment and education. The Vice
Presidents agreed that they look forward to
continuing close contact on the joint economic
bilaterals and that each will play host to the
meetings in the future which take place in his
own capital city.

Vice Presidents Ekwueme and Bush ex-
pressed satisfaction over the inaugural
meeting of the Nigeria-U.S. Business Council
in September, 1982 as a concrete and effec-
tive measure to implement earlier bilateral
discussions. They also took note of the con-
crete results achieved by the United States-
Nigeria Joint Agricultural Consultative Com-
mittee (JACC), which has contributed signifi-
cantly to increased cooperation between the
United States and Nigeria in support of ex-
panding Nigerian agricultural production, as
well as to increase sale of American
agricultural products. They noted that the
United States Agency for International
Development has signed a contract to provide
for increased staff support to the Joint
Agricultural Consultative Committee.

The two leaders also exchanged views on
the current state of the world economy. Mr.
Bush highlighted the steps being taken by the
United States to reduce inflation and lower
interest rates in order to set the stage for
long-term real growth of the American
economy. Dr. Ekwueme highlighted the
measures recently taken by the Federal Gov-
ernment of Nigeria to adjust economic activi-
ty to expected levels of oil income.

Commercial and Agriculture: The

United States side expressed its determina-
tion to continue to work to increased trade
with Nigeria despite the current problems in
the economies of both countries. Using the
full range of available facilities such as the
Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, the new export
trading company legislation and with a max-
imum role played by the private sector. The
Nigerian side welcomed this determination
and for its part confirmed the recent opening
of a Nigerian Trade and Investment Center
in New York and its plans to open another
one in Chicago before the end of 1982.

Note was taken of new United States De-
partment of Agriculture credit programs
which may become available for Nigeria.
These would provide direct credit blended
with export credit guarantees which would
effectively reduce the overall cost of credit.

Democracy and Human Rights: Vice
President Bush expressed the strong admira-
tion of his country and its peace for Nigeria's
deeply held commitment to democracy and
human rights. The deep appreciation of the
United States Government was expressed for
the participation of President Shagari's per-
sonal representative as a keynote speaker at
the recently held Washington conference on
free elections.

Travel and Exchanges: Both sides
viewed with satisfaction the tradition of fruit-
ful exchanges between citizens of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria and the United States.
Both sides reviewed the United States' deci-
sion of July 15, 1982, to issue multiple entry
visas valid during four years to most
categories of Nigerian non-immigrant visa ap-
plicants. Ways were discussed to reduce to
the minimum extent possible the remaining
procedural barriers in documenting persons
for travel between the Federal Republic of
Nigeria and the United States and to work
towards reciprocity in visa issuance pro-
cedures.

The two Vice Presidents expressed their
very deep satisfaction at the useful contacts
which were made during this visit and hoped
that they would form the basis of future
development in their already cordial bilateral
relations.

The Vice President of the United States
of America, Mr. George Bush, expressed his
gratitude and pleasure to his host, Dr. Alex

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Ekwueme, for the hospitality and warm
reception accorded to him and his delegation.
During the talks Mr. George Bush, Vice
President of the United States of America
was accompanied by:

1) The Hon. Mr. Thomas R. Pickering, United
States Ambassador to Nigeria;

2) Admiral Daniel Murphy, Chief of Staff to
the Vice President;

3) The Hon. Mr. Chester Crocker, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs;

4) The Hon. Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs;

5) Mr. Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security Affairs;

6) Mr. Frederick Wettering, Senior Staff
Director for African Affairs of the National
Security Council.

Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme, Vice President of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, was accom-
panied by:

1) Hon. P.O. Bolokor, Minister of State
Ministry of External Affairs;

2) Hon. Ademola Thomas, Minister of State
Ministry of National Planning;

3) Hon. Dr. J.S. Odama, Special Adviser to
the President on Economic Affairs;

4) Dr. C.C. Mbadinuju, Special Assistant to
the Vice President;

5) Ambassador G. Dove-Edwin, Director-
General for Regional Affairs, Ministry of Ex-
ternal Affairs;

6) H.E. Ambassador A.Y. Eke, Nigerian Am-
bassador to the United States of America;

7) Mr. D.A. Akoh, Permanent Secretary in
the Office of the Vice President;

8) Ambassador A.G. Gobir, Director, Ameri-
cas and Caribbean Department, Ministry of
External Affairs;

9) Mr. Fola Olateru-Olagbegi, Counsel to the
Vice President and other high-ranking of-
ficials.

Done in Lagos this 13th Day of
November, 1982.

Mr. George Bush, Vice President of
the United States of America.

Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme, Vice President
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

ZIMBABWE

Dinner Toast

Harare

Nov. 16, 19823

Thirty-one hours ago in Moscow, I dis-
cussed my mission to Africa with Presi-
dent Zia of Pakistan. When I mentioned
Prime Minister Mugabe, President Zia
made reference to something with which
informed men and informed women
everywhere on Earth agree. Therefore,
I want to acknowledge that I stand in
the presence of a genuine statesman —
the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert
Mugabe. His stature in the world is well-
established, highly respected, and it will
be, I'm confident, more formidable in the
years to come.

You know very well that some
greeted the birth of this new nation with
grim doubts. Some wondered whether a
revolutionary movement could govern,
and others pointed to the gulf of mis-
trust and hatred engendered by years of
war. You faced multiple challenges.

• How to develop peacefully in a
region full of polarized conflicts.

• How to retain and build upon one
of Africa's strongest and most diversi-
fied free market economies while also
spreading its benefits to the majority of
the population.

• How to retain the confidence,
skills, and loyalty of white Zimbabweans
while responding to the aspirations of
those who fought and voted for you.

It is not my job as your guest, nor
would I be presumptuous enough, to
issue a report card on your leadership
and your new nation. You have faced
awesome challenges, some overcome,
and some still on your agenda. I do want
to say on behalf of the Reagan Adminis-
tration that we support — we strongly
support — the policy of reconciliation to
which you have committed yourself —
just as we support the constitutional
agreements reached at Lancaster House.
We believe Zimbabwe represents a noble
experiment in the midst of a strife-torn
region. It also represents an effort to
put aside the past and begin the work of
healing. We have supported your coun-

try because its success is consistent with
U.S. principles and U.S. interests. I will
report to President Reagan that Zim-
babwe continues to deserve our support,
because America is committed to back-
ing peaceful change, economic develop-
ment, and is committed to the rule of
law.

I am proud that my country has
played a part in Zimbabwe's young life.
You might recall that when your country
gained independence, the United States
was one of the first to open an embassy
in this city. You have pressed for Nami-
bian settlement with both urgency and

Zimbabwe— A Profile

Geography

Area: 151,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than

Montana). Capital: Harare (pop. 650,000).

People

Population: 10.5 million (Oct. 1982 est.).
Ethnic Groups: Shona (77%), Ndelele (19%),
white (3%), less than 1% coloureds (mixed
race) and Asians. Religions: Part Christian,
part traditional faiths (50%), Christian (25%),
traditional (24%), some Muslim. Languages:
English (official), Shona, Sindebele.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Independ-
ence: Apr. 18, 1980. Constitution: Dec. 21,
1979. Branches: Executive — president, prime
minister (head of government).
Legislative — bicameral Parliament.
Judicial — High Court divided between
general and appellate divisions. Political
Parties: Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU-PF), Zimbabwe African People's
Union (PF-ZAPU), United African National
Council (UANC), Republican Front.

Economy

GNP: $5.8 billion (Dec. 1981). Per Capita In-
come: $13,480 (whites); $314-655 (African).
Natural Resources: Chrome, coal, asbestos,
copper, nickel, gold, iron ore, vanadium.
Agricultural Products: Tobacco, corn,
sorghum, wheat, sugar, cotton, cattle. In-
dustries: Mining, manufacturing. Trade Ex-
ports—$937 million (1981): agricultural prod-
ucts, especially tobacco, cotton, and corn, and
minerals. Imports— $1.34 billion: finished
manufactured goods and equipment,
petroluem, transport equipment. Major
Trading Partners — South Africa, U.S.,
Japan, U.K., F.R.G., France.

Taken from the Back-ground Notes (Oct.
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

Departnnent of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

skill. Just as important, Zimbabwe itself
provides a model on which efforts to
free Namibia could succeed. Compromise
and dedication will once again win
through.

As you know, since first taking of-
fice. President Reagan and his Adminis-
tration have labored for a Namibian set-
tlement. We have spared no effort. We
have worked with the Western contact
group, with the frontline states, with
SWAPO [South West Africa People's
Organization], and with the Government
of South Africa. Assistant Secretary [for
African Affairs Chester A.] Crocker,
here with us tonight, has spent more
time on this than on any other African
matter.

We intend to serve as a disinter-
ested and honest broker — disinterested
in the sense of not prejudicing our abili-
ty to serve in that intermediary role.
The United States possesses neither
troops nor proxies in the region. We
have no colonial interests, nor do we
have military ambitions. On the con-
trary, the sole American interests in
South Africa are the interests of all men
in all places — freedom and peace. Our
efforts follow distinguished precedents.
American labors helped build peace be-
tween Israel and Egypt. British efforts,
of course, helped lead to your own inde-
pendence. So today we labor on, with
Zimbabwe and other nations, to clear
the region of all foreign troops so that
Namibia might be free.

A top priority in our diplomacy is
southern Africa, where the choices be-
tween regional strife on one hand and
regional cooperation on the other hand
are stark. The inescapable need for
peaceful change is challenged by a
climate of fear, distrust, foreign inter-
vention, and cross-border violence. The
United States is committed to the search
for constructive change in southern
Africa.

The United States wants an end to
South Africa's occupation of Namibia.
At the same time, the United States
wants an end to Angola's suffering and
to the dangerous cycle of violence in the
region.

Our number one strategic objective
in Africa is to help establish a frame-
work of restraint — a framework that
discourages outside intervention in Afri-
can conflicts while it encourages
negotiated solutions and constructive
change.

A moment ago I mentioned our
journey to Moscow. No doubt you have
all seen photographs of President Brezh-
nev's funeral. The image that struck me
the most— one that I will never forget —
was the magnificent and stately display
of Soviet soldiers. As I watched those
young men, I could not help noting that
they were about the same age as our
own four sons, and I felt again what I
have often felt since taking up this of-
fice— a sudden, sharp sense of the re-
sponsibility that lies on those who lead
nations. I know that you share that deep
sense of responsibility that lies on those
who lead nations. I know that you will
continue to exercise your responsibility
for the good of this exciting new vibrant
nation and in the interests of peace.

Finally, I want to thank all of our
hosts for their extraordinary kindness
and their extraordinary patience, par-
ticularly in light of the schedule changes
because of our trip to Moscow. And I
think all of you should join with me in
thanking Mrs. Mugabe and all others
who have done such a marvelous job in
arranging this wonderful dinner.

Ladies and gentlemen, please raise
your glasses and join me in a toast to
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and to
the Republic of Zimbabwe and to its con-
tinued development and health.

ZAMBIA

Luncheon Toast

Lusaka

Nov. 18, 1982^

Today Mrs. Bush will visit Council
House number 394 in Chilenje. It is a
humble building. Several decades ago
the son of a poor preacher was raised
there. In those days Zambia was not
ruled by its own people but by those in a
foreign capital, thousands of miles away.
The preacher's son, Kenneth Kaunda,
grew up to work with the people of
Zambia to change that.

For 18 years now, Zambians have
governed Zambia. Your political institu-
tions demonstrate your commitment to
human freedom and dignity. You prac-
tice democracy. As I moved about
Lusaka today, I could not fail to notice
that you are preparing for the 1983 elec-
tions. In 1983, as in the past elections,
this nation will acknowledge that the
Government of Zambia is responsible to
the Zambian people.

You believe in a sturdy and inde-

Left: The Vice President meets with
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe.

Below: Arrival ceremony with Deputy
Prime Minister Simon Muzenda.

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

pendent judiciary. Like my own country,
Zambia possesses a written constitution
and extensive legal codes. Zambia
adheres to the rule not of individual men
but of the law.

In Zambia's 18 years of independ-
ence, your national life has grown
vigorous. Two points especially strike
me; first, the value you place on a free
press. Just a few weeks ago, when he
dedicated your new mass media com-
plex, President Kaunda restated
Zambia's commitment to an unfettered
but responsible press. A free press con-
tributes to a sense of national identity,
to honesty in government, and to the
impartial administration of the law. You
in Zambia know that.

Second, I have been impressed by
this nation's stunning success in educa-
tion. Like Americans, Zambians have
possessed a reverence for learning. In
Zambia those entrusted with power have
realized that they need not fear edu-
cated citizens but rather welcome an in-
formed electorate as a source of national
strength and political well-being. As
President Kaunda has said: "Any nation
or people which does not value trained
intelligence is doomed."

Vice President Bush exchanges toasts with
President Kenneth Kaunda.

When this nation achieved independ-
ence, it contained fewer than 100 univer-
sity graduates. Today Zambia boasts a
fine national university, teacher-training,
and technical institutions, and several
thousand new graduates each year. I call
that success.

I am proud that my country has
played a part in this nation's life. You
might recall that when Zambia achieved
independence, the United States was
one of the first to establish a resident
embassy here. From the first we offered
not only friendship but cultural ex-
changes and, still more important, tech-
nical and economic aid. The relative mix
of our programs has changed over the
years to meet your needs. In recent
years, our economic assistance program
in Zambia — one of the largest in
Africa — has reflected the importance
both our governments place on the
growing of food. Food aid, commodity
imports, and help with your planning,
research, and marketing have all repre-
sented aspects of our program.

Zambia's leaders have candidly
stated that the economic mess that beset
us all has sharply curtailed the resources
you can dedicate to this country's devel-
opment. My country is willing to provide
special economic assistance. At the same
time, however, we believe that expanded
private investment in Zambia is
necessary to strengthen this country's
economy. But President Reagan is cut-
ting inflation and providing incentives
that will spur private investment and
lead to sustained growth. The best way
Americans can help the world economy
is by strengthening our own.

The United States supports Zambia
because doing so accords with American
principles and American interests. Yet
our friendship represents not only
shared interests but. as all warm friend-
ships must, common experiences. Both
the United States and Zambia have
gathered languages, customs, and races
into one nation. Your rallying cry — "One
Zambia, one nation" — expresses the
same sentiment as our own national
motto, E pluribus unum, out of many,
one." For two centuries the United
States has represented a model for
other nations. Now for nearly two
decades, Zambia has done the same.

Zambia's example possesses par-
ticular importance for southern Africa.
President Kaunda has worked long and
selflessly as a leader of the front-line
states to bring independence to Namibia.
Since first taking office in 1981, Presi-
dent Reagan and his Administration
have done the same. As I stated in Zim-
babwe, we have spared no effort. We
have worked with the Western Contract
Group, with the front-line states, with
SWAPO, and with the Government of
South Africa. Assistant Secretary
Crocker has spent more time on this

Zambia— A Profile

Geography

Area: 290,585 sq. mi. (slightly larger than

Texas). Capital: Lusaka (pop. 538,469).

People

Population: 5.7 million (1980 census). Ethnic
Groups: Mostly Bantu tribal groups.
Religions: Christian, indigenous beliefs.
Languages: English (official), about 70 local
languages and dialects.

)
Government

Type: Republic. Independence: Oct. 24,
1964. Constitution: 1973. Branches: Ex-
ecutwe — president (chief of state), central
committee of party, cabinet. Legislative — uni-
cameral National Assembly.
Judicial — Supreme Court. Political Party:
United National Independence Party (UNIP).

Economy

GDP: $1.4 billion (1979). Per Capita Income:
$258 (1970 prices). Natural Resources: Cop-
per, cobalt, zinc, lead, coal emeralds, gold,
silver, uranium, excellent hydroelectric
power, fertile land. Agricultural Products:
Corn, tobacco, cotton, soybeans, groundnuts,
sugarcane, horticultural products. Industries:
Transport, construction, foodstuffs,
beverages, chemicals, textiles, fertilizer.
Trade (1979): Exports— $1.2 billion: copper,
zinc, lead, cobalt, gold, silver, tobacco,
forestry products. Imports — $648 million:
manufactured goods, machinery, transport
equipment, foodstuffs. Major Trading Part-
ners— Japan, South Africa, France, U.K.,
Saudi Arabia, U.S., F.R.G., Italy, Bahrain.

Taken from the Background Notes (May
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs. Department of State. Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

han on any other African matter. As I
ave made clear in Senegal, Nigeria,
nd Zimbabwe, the United States seeks
0 serve as a disinterested and honest
iroker. We possess neither troops nor
)roxies in the region. We have neither
olonial interests nor military ambitions,
nstead, the sole American interests in
Africa are the interests of all men in all
)laces— freedom and peace. We follow
listinguished precedents. American ef-
orts helped build peace between Israel
ind Egypt. British work helped lead to
'Jmbabwe's independence. As we work,
'OUT Honor, we take realism as our
vatchword. As President Kaunda has
vritten, we must avoid "both cynical
)essimism and facile optimism and
iiscover some hard realisms." We will
abor on until all foreign troops
withdraw from southern Africa so
Mamibia might be free.

Two weeks ago, I was enjoying the
iutumn in Washington with my family,
rhree days ago, I stood in the chill
A'inter wind in Moscow. As I watched a
stately display of Russian soldiers, I
■ouldn't help thinking that many of them
A'ere the same age as our four sons. To-
day I am in a city of flame trees and
jacarandas, experiencing a beautiful
African summer. Again in Zambia I
nave noticed many young men the same
ige as our sons.

Seasons change. Languages differ.
But the dreams in the hearts of young
men and women remain the same. They
are dreams of careers pursued in
freedom and prosperity. They are
dreams of families raised in peace.
Through the wisdom and labors of Ken-
neth Kaunda and many present today, in
Zambia those dreams can come true.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join
me in toasting President Kaunda, the
Secretary General, and the Republic of
Zambia.

KENYA

Remarks Before the
Kenya Chamber
of Commerce

Nairobi
Nov. 19. 1982

You do the United States a great honor
in receiving me this evening. I bring you
the greetings of the President of the
United States and of millions of my
fellow citizens who are sincerely in-
terested in America's longstanding
friendship with the Continent and people
of Africa. I bring also special greetings
to President Daniel arap Moi and to all
Kenyans. Your country is an old friend
of the United States and is dear to us
all.

The past 10 days have been impor-
tant to me. President Reagan asked me
to carry our message of friendship and
deep commitment to a true partnership
with the nations of Africa. We are
determined to work with the leaders of
this continent in the quest for peace and
progress. My visit has been particularly
satisfying. It has permitted us to see old
friends and make new ones.

I have exchanged views with some
of Africa's most impressive leaders. I
have had an opportunity to see and feel
firsthand the diversity of this beautiful
continent and to sense its great promise.
In several days I will be able to share
with President Reagan and my fellow
Americans the thinking of Africa's
leaders on the major issues important
to us.

It should come as no surprise to you
that President Reagan thought that it
was especially important for me to visit
Kenya. Since Kenya's independence,
close ties have bound our two countries
and peoples. Your nation has been ad-
mired in the United States for its
political and economic record.

We share important values— demo-
cratically elected governments, civilian
rule, freedom of press and religion, a
multiracial society, and an economy
guided by the principles of free enter-
prise. Kenya has been a strong advocate

for peace in the world. Your country
and its distinguished president have led
the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
during a year in which Africa faced
many problems. Because Kenya has
served this year as spokesman for
Africa's aspirations, I am especially
pleased to speak from the city of Nairobi
to all the people of Africa. I particularly
wish to speak about the hopes and
values which grew up during Africa's
struggle for independence and which will
guide Africa as it faces the future. Chief
among these values is the desire for
freedom— freedom of nations from out-
side pressures and freedom of people
within nations. That desire gave birth to
the OAU, thanks to the recognition
that— without regional cooperation— the
peace, progress, and independence of
Africa would not be maintained. Such
cooperation is not an easy goal given the
great variety of peoples, circumstances,
and cultures in Africa. This tremendous
diversity, coupled with the harsh impact
of today's global economic recession,
underscores more than ever the impor-
tance of African regional cooperation for
common purposes.

There is no justification for despair
about Africa's future. Despite trials and
setbacks, the history of Africa since the
independence era has included signifi-
cant progress, especially in the develop-
ment of human resources. Education,
talent, and energy— such as that
represented by this very audience-
prove that Africa has the capacity to
make good the promise of its enormous
potential in spite of the many problems
it faces. Thanks to the abilities and
values which men and women, like
ourselves, bring to the everyday task of
national development, Africa can enter
its third decade of independence with
confidence in the future.

Because we believe that Africa has
the capacity and will to be master of its
destiny, President Reagan has over the
past 20 months worked to forge a new
and mature partnership with the nations
and people of Africa. We speak of a
partnership that begins with mutual
respect. We speak of a partnership that
includes honest discussions. We speak of
a partnership which recognizes that each
nation must do its part if the goals we
share are to be achieved. Partnership is

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

a two-way street based on shared goals,
common principles, and mutual in-
terests.

These principles have guided our
Administration's policies toward Africa.
The time is ripe for the sort of candid
dialogue I have been privileged to ex-
perience on this trip. And I have learned
a lot. A top priority in our diplomacy is
southern Africa, where the choices be-
tween regional strife and regional
cooperation are stark. The inescapable
need for peaceful change is challenged
by a climate of fear, distrust, foreign in-
tervention, and cross-border violence.

Search for Constructive Change in
Southern Africa

The United States is committed to the
search for constructive change in
southern Africa. In cooperation with our
allies and in direct response to the will
of Africa's leaders, the United States
has engaged its influence and resources
in the effort to bring Namibia to in-
dependence. We are determined to help
turn the sad tide of growing conflict and
tension in southern Africa. We are fully
committed to work for a settlement that
will enhance regional security and
assure Namibia's early independence on
terms acceptable to its people, Africa,
and the world at large.

Let me state again, we are fully
committed to an independent Nambia.
I can assure you that significant prog-
ress has been made. A year ago the set-
tlement effort was relaunched with
vigor. Since then, the United States and
its Western contact group partners have
worked closely and intensively with all
parties. This past July agreement was
reached on the principles which will
guide Nambia's constituent assembly.
Since then, substantial progress has
been made on remaining issues concern-
ing the implementation of Security
Council Resolution 435. We are close to
agreement on implementation of the
U.N. plan. Remaining issues can be
resolved.

From the outset of this Administra-
tion's engagement in the peace process,
we have emphasized that there are vital-
ly important issues arising from the
situation in Angola which must be
resolved if Namibia's independence is to
be achieved. For 7 years Angola has

Kenya— A Profile

Geography

Area: 224,960 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than

Texas). Capital: Nairobi (pop. 959,000).

People

Population: 17.5 million (1981 est.). Ethnic
Groups: Kikuyu (21%), Luhya (14%), Luo
(13%), Kalenjin (11%), Kamba (11%), Kisii
(6%), Meru (5%), Asian, European, Arab.
Religions: Indigenous beliefs (26%), Protes-
tant (38%), Roman Catholic (28%), Muslim
(6%). Languages: English, Swahili, and many
tribal languages.

Government

Type: Republic. Independence: Dec. 12,
1963. Constitution: 1963. Branches: Ex-
ecutive—president (chief of state, head of
government, commander in chief of armed
forces). Legislative — unicameral 158-member
National Assembly. Judicial— High Court,
various lower courts. Political Party: Kenya
African National Union (KANU).

Economy

GDP (1981 current prices): $3.2 billion. Per
Capita Income: $196 (1981). Natural
Resources: Wildlife, land. Agricultural

Products: Com, wheat, rice, sugarcane, cof-
fee, tea, sisal, pineapples, pyrethrum, meat
and meat products, hides, skins. Industries:
Petroleum products, cement, beer. Trade Ex-
ports— $1.04 billion: coffee, petroleum prod-
ucts, tea, hides and skins, meat and meat
products, cement, pyrethrum, sisal, soda ash,
wattle extract, pineapples. Imports— $1.9
billion: crude petroleum, machinery, vehicles,
iron and steel, paper and paper products,
pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, textiles. Major
Trading Partners— EC, U.S., Canada, Zam-
bia, Iran, Japan, Australia, India, China.

Taken from the Background Not£s (Sept.
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State, Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

been engulfed in war, its terrority in-
vaded, its progress toward a better
economic future stalled. Thousands of
Cuban troops remain in Angola.
Wouldn't Angola and the region itself be
better off with all foreign forces out of
that country — South African forces and
Cuban forces?

The history of foreign conquest in
Africa is replete with examples of armed

foreigners who came with the professed
purpose of helping others but who
stayed in order to help themselves. The
withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola
in a parallel framework with South
Africa's departure from Namibia is the
key to the settlement we all desire. In
the final analysis, it is also the surest
way to guarantee Angola's long-term
security and independence. The United
States wants the earliest possible in-
dependence for Namibia. At the same
time, the United States wants an end to
Angola's suffering and to the dangerous
cycle of violence in the region. My
government is not ashamed to state the
U.S. interest in seeing an end to the
presence of Cuban forces in Angola.
Their introduction 7 years ago tore the
fabric of reciprocal restraint between
the United States and the Soviet Union
in the developing world. Such restraint
is vital if African regional security and
the global balance are to be maintained.

We recognize there will be no agree-
ment unless all the parties know that
their security is protected. We also
recognize there will be no settlement
unless each party is prepared to make
the concessions necessary. If the
challenge is accepted, we believe peace
can be achieved and a brighter future
for southern Africa can begin. The
substantial progress already made is
based on a diplomatic partnership of
equals in which all parties share
burdens. That partnership remains vital
in our continuing efforts for peace. In
the search for that peace, the United
States seeks constructive relations with
all the states of southern Africa. We are
building bridges of communication to
each nation in the region, including
South Africa.

However, we will not ignore or
disguise our strong belief in the impor-
tance of justice and equality before the
law. Apartheid is wrong. It is legally en-
trenched racism— inimical to the funda-
mental ideals of the United States.
America's history and America's future
can only be understood in terms of our
commitment to a multiracial democracy
in which all citizens participate and from
which all benefit. The rule of law, the
principles of consent and participation
in the political process, and the right

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

he Vice President meets with President Daniel Arap Moi.

f every human being to citizenship
•hich reflects these principles are to
jiiericans a sacred trust. We will not
etray this trust.

Nor can we escape reality: If there
; to be security in southern Africa,
iouth Africa must be involved in shap-
ig it. If there is to be constructive
hange in South Africa, South Africans
f all races— not foreigners— must be the
ines who shape the pattern of that
hange. The United States is working
or constructive change in ways that
lenefit all South Africans. Our actions
natch our words, as our deepening in-
'olvement in expanding educational,
iocial, and economic opportunities for
ilack South Africans demonstrates. We
ilso believe there is a relationship be-
.ween the security of southern Africa
ind the pace of peaceful change within
South Africa. We do not believe that
armed conflict must be the road to
justice, and we doubt that it can be the
road to lasting freedom and well-being.

Support for Human Rights and
Regional Stability

The United States believes that it can be
helpful in advancing the frontier of
freedom and observance of human
rights, not only in southern Africa but in
Africa as a whole. Without respect for
human rights, there is a great risk that
Africa's enormous human potential will
be wasted. Fear and intimidation keep
people from working to achieve their
aspirations, from contributing to the
common good, and from pursuing the
democratic principles and ideals that are
denied for too many in the world today.
Narrowing political participation by
their citizens can be highly counter-
productive. African nations that have
devised their own national democratic
institutions broaden public participation
in government, protect the integrity of
the individual, and expand the frontier
of economic freedom for the ultimate
good of all.

In Kenya respect for individual
rights is written in your constitution.
Democratic institutions that embody the
democratic process have been estab-
lished. They are an essential framework

January 1983

for lasting stability. Experience in
Africa and elsewhere clearly
demonstrates that the abuse of power,
the suppression of diversity, and the
denial of individual rights only leads to
instability and a loss of confidence at
home and abroad. My visit to Africa has
shown me encouraging examples of
African nations that are building their
own institutions to broaden political par-
ticipation and advance the frontier of
freedom. We realize, however, that na-
tions cannot reap the benefits of in-
dividual freedom in an environment of
insecurity. We attach high importance to
strengthening Africa's security and are
prepared to be Africa's partner in
building the necessary conditions for
security.

We have no interest in an East- West
confrontation in Africa; such a con-
frontation increases the threat to world
peace. The goal of the United States in
Africa is to help establish a framework
for restraint and broad rules of conduct
which discourage the use of outside
force in African conflicts and encourage
peaceful settlement of conflicts in the
region. In this area our goal is con-
sistent with the goals enshrined in the
Charter of the Organization of 'African
Unity.

At the same time, the United States
is deeply sensitive to the threats which
individual nations and the regions of this
continent face and probably will continue
to face. Internal stability, often fueled
by outside interference, and longstand-
ing border and ethnic disputes tax heavi-
ly the resources of African governments.
The United States has no mandate to
act as a policeman in Africa, and it
seeks no such role. But neither do we
believe that the sovereignty of African
nations will be preserved if the West is
unable or unwilling to respond to the
legitimate defense needs of its friends in
Africa. The United States intends to be
a reliable partner both in working with
our friends on a long-term basis to meet
these needs and in responding to their
urgent requirements in emergency situa-
tions. We have done so in the past; we
are doing so today. Let there be no
doubt about our determination and
capability to do so in the future.

At the same time, our overall con-
cern, including the concern that guides
our military assistance, is to dissuade

THE VICE PRESIDENT

countries from undertaking military
solutions and to encourage negotiated
settlements of differences between
them. We believe negotiated solutions
are possible for even the most difficult
and longstanding disputes on the conti-
nent. We are ready to lend whatever
support we can to those efforts in Africa
and to give them the highest priority. In
this view, we believe that Africa's
capacity for collective security deserves
our help. We will, when asked, support
multinational peacekeeping forces that
Africa creates in its own defense. The
record of the United States in support of
the OAU peacekeeping role in Chad is
the most recent illustration of the impor-
tance we attach to regional security. We
want African nations to be able to de-
fend their interests and resolve their
problems without foreign intervention.

Response to Economic Crisis

Real security, and with it the confidence
that can enhance prospects for peace,
cannot be achieved without sustained
economic growth. During my travels, I
have seen Africa's most serious eco-
nomic crisis in more than 40 years.
Because African countries are often
dependent on one or two export com-
modities— and because they have bor-
rowed heavily to spur growth and meet
the costs of higher oil prices — they have
been vulnerable to commodity fluctua-
tions, high interest rates, and to the im-
pact of world recession. There has been
a long, slow decline in per capita food
production, population has increased
rapidly, and balanced growth has not oc-
curred. Many nations have experimented
with subsidies, centralized economic
direction, and extensive public owner-
ship of industry and commerce. Those
strategies have proved costly.

The present state of the global
economy is not of Africa's making. In
the world economic system, the United
States has a special responsibility not
only to put its own house in order but to
help rekindle growth in other lands. We
are deeply committed to that task, and
to achieve it the American people are
making real sacrifices. We are confident
that when we are successful Africa will
benefit quickly and significantly.

At the most fundamental level, we
will remain concerned about those im-

Vice President Bush tours a Del Monte plant at Kenya Canners.

periled by strife and starvation. We
have taken the lead both in mobilizing
international relief efforts to help
African refugees and in providing
emergency assistance. In the past 2
years the United States has provided
Africa $187 million for such programs.
But we are equally concerned about the
underlying problems which produce
refugees and other forms of human
misery.

As we all look at these problems, we
can see that the next few years in Africa
will be critical. The current economic
situation is forcing austerity on all
African nations. It points to the need for
ree.xamination of economic strategies
and national economic policies. It would
be a mistake to view this period as only
a temporary phenomenon and to believe
that as the world recession begins to
ease, Africa will be able to resume an
easy path of gi-owth and diversity. On
the contrary, in the current situation
many fundamental decisions must be
made about the future of African
development, about the priorities of
agriculture and other sectors, and about
the degree of sacrifice that should be
demanded of the various elements of the
population. How these decisions are
made will affect the future of African
development for decades to come.

We in the United States admit that
there are serious differences among ex-
perts over the best path to development |li
We believe that there should be a full
exchange among all those involved in
African development. We must reach a
common agreement regarding the kindsji
of programs which must be developed,
financed, and mobilized. Discipline and
self-reliance are necessary. Courageous
leadership is necessary. Now is the time
for fresh thinking, an eschewing of old
ideologies that have not passed the test
of experience.

We are prepared to help give
African governments the wherewithal
and the international political and finan-
cial backing to take the steps where
necessary to restructure their econ-
omies.

During the past 2 years, a growing
number of African countries have ap-
plied to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) for assistance in meeting
immediate balance-of-payments crises.
This has led to difficult adjustments in
exchange rates, budgets, and other
aspects of economic policy.

Recognizing the fundamental nature
of the development crisis, we have en-
couraged a more comprehensive ap-
proach by both donors and multilateral

THE VICE PRESIDENT

agencies in Africa. We have urged that
reform be supported with short-term
foreign exchange and development
assistance adequate to fuel the recovery
process. We are fully aware of the im-
portance of debt in this equation. Where
countries are making serious efforts to
restructure their economies, relief from
heavy debt must be part of the foreign
exchange program. For our part, we are
committed to participating in the dif-
ficult process of recovery.

The United States, despite the fact
that its resources are under special
strain in this time of economic adversity,
still remains committed to Africa's
stabilization and growth. Our bilateral
economic aid for all of Africa now totals
approximately $800 million a year and
extends to 46 countries throughout
Africa. It encompasses a variety of pro-
grams, including fast-disbursing balance-
of-payments support, food aid, and
development assistance. Including the
U.S. contribution to multilateral pro-
grams, our total economic aid to sub-
Saharan Africa is in excess of $1.4
billion annually. Of the multilateral por-
tion, the largest share by far— almost
$300 million per year— goes to the soft
loan programs of the World Bank's In-
ternational Development Association.

The Reagan Administration has
placed a new emphasis on the role of
private enterprise in development. In
Africa, as elsewhere, we define "private
sector" broadly to include small
businesses and farmers, as well as large
corporations. Our aid planners are seek-
ing new ways to help develop market in-
stitutions and more effective incentives
for farmers. Wherever possible, we are
encouraging mutually beneficial partner-
ships between large and small American
companies and their African counter-
parts. The recent enactment of export

trading legislation supported by Presi-
dent Reagan will make it possible for
small and medium-size U.S. firms to
pool expenses and thereby play a more
active economic role in Africa.

The economic task that you and we
face is enormous. But it is far from im-
possible if we all work together in a wise
and understanding partnership. The
exact nature of that cooperation will be
as varied as the countries of Africa, but
it will have some common elements. We,
the industrialized countries, must help
Africans manage their debt burden so
that private credit, which is so essential
to growth, can resume and increase. We
must support successful economic
policies at both the national and regional
levels. We must seek greater coordina-
tion among Africa's friends who wish to
finance development. The importance of
Africa's economic future demands that
we do no less.

As we all look to the future and
decide how Africa and the United States
can work together, the agenda of issues
we face is long. It includes essential
issues of security, peacemaking, human
rights, and economic progress. It calls
for advancing the frontiers of freedom.

The United States is a friend which
respects your potential and shares your
commitment to maintaining the hard-
won prize of freedom. With respect to
that freedom, our nations are equals
which must be prepared to work to-
gether, making sacrifices and taking
tough decisions at the same time. Each
of us has a share of the burden to carry;
each has a contribution to make. All
have a better future to gain. This is the
meaning of a true partnership.

ZAIRE

Luncheon Toast

Kinshasa
Nov. 22. 1982^

I am delighted to be here in Zaire. Let
me thank you first, Mr. President, and
the Zairian people for the warmth of
your welcome and for the hospitality and
generosity for which Zaire is so justly
famous.

My visit to Zaire is only one symbol
of the long and close relationship which
our two nations have enjoyed over the
past 22 years. It is a relationship of
mutual respect and confidence. And, as
such, we believe it to be one which is
solid and lasting.

As two nations which are friends,
two peoples who have come to know
each other in so many ways over the
years, we have stood side by side in
times of difficulty. We have enjoyed
cooperative relations in many areas.

The United States is proujd to have
been able to assist this great and impor-
tant nation of Africa in various ways.
We have played a significant role in in-
suring Zaire's security and stability since
shortly after your independence. We are
continuing our efforts in this respect to-
day.

We will continue to assist in the
development of the substantial resources
to stimulate the agricultural potential of
this country and to improve the health
services of the population. American
private industry has invested in Zaire
and in so doing has created jobs and
helped develop the industrial sector.

Our cultural and educational ex-
changes have encircled both our coun-
tries as Americans have become more
aware of and knowledgeable about
Zaire, and Zairians have been able to
benefit from the best aspects of our
culture and society. I note with satisfac-
tion that in the last generation literally
thousands of Zairian citizens have
studied in the United States and re-
turned to Zaire to work for the better-
ment of their country.

As thousands of Zairians have gone
to the United States and returned here

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Arrival ceremony at the People's Palace with President Mobuto Sese Seko.

to work in Zaire, thousands of our
citizens have Hved and worked in Zaire
as members of the Peace Corps. The
Peace Corps program here is one of the
largest in the world and one of the most
effective means of strengthening the
bonds between the United States and
Zaire.

The bonds which unite us are deep
and multifaceted, and I assure you that
we in the United States, from President
Reagan on dov*m, wish and, indeed, ex-
pect that these close ties and relations
will continue and increase between our
two Presidents, between our two
governments, and, most importantly,
between our two peoples. We want to be
a partner in your national effort to
develop the enormous human and
natural resources that are Zaire's for the
benefit of all Zairians.

This is my second visit to Zaire, and

it is certainly not my first encounter
with Zairians from many walks of life
whom I have met. I have come to ap-
preciate the dynamism that is so
characteristic of Zaire and Zairians and
to respect your dedication to fairness
and reason in international fora.

I have come to admire, Mr. Presi-
dent, your personal courage and leader-
ship in Africa; most recently, for exam-
ple, by seeking a peaceful solution to the
problems in Chad; in reestablishing rela-
tions with Israel and in hosting a most
successful and well-organized Franco-
American summit, bringing together a
large number of African leaders in the
spirit of dialogue and cooperation which
is Africa's — and the world's — greatest
hope for peace.

I, therefore, ask you to raise your
glasses to the continued health and
welfare of President Mobutu and of
President Reagan and to the continued
excellent relations between our two
governments and our two great peoples.

Zaire— A Profile

Geography
Area: 905.063 sq. mi. (about the size of the
U.S. east of the Mississippi River). Capital:
Kinshasa (pop. 3 million).

People

Population: 27.1 million (1980 est.). Ethnic
Groups: Bantu tribes (80%), more than 200
African tribal groups in all. Religions:
Roman Catholic and Protestant (50%), Kim-
banguist, other syncretic sects, traditional
religions. Languages: French, Lingala,
Swahili and Kingwana, Kikongo, Tshiiuba.

Government

Type: Republic with strong presidential
authority. Independence: June 30, 1960.
Constitution: June 24, 1967 (amended Aug.
15, 1974; revised 1978). Branches: The
Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR)
is the sole legal political institution; its com-
ponent organs include the Office of the Party
President, a Central Committee, the Political
Bureau, the Party Congress (meeting every 5
yrs.). the Executive Council (Council of
Ministers), the unicameral Legislative Coun-
cil, and the Judicial Council. The President of
the Party is automatically President of Zaire.

Economy

GDP (1978, constant 1970 prices): $1.9

billion. Per Capita Income: $128 (1977).
Natural Resources: Copper, cobalt, zinc, in-
dustrial and gem diamonds, manganese, tin,
gold, columbium-tantalum, rare metals, baux-
ite, iron, coal, 13% of the world's hydroelec-
tric potential. Agricultural Products: Cof-
fee, palm oil, rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa,
manioc, bananas, plantains, corn, rice,
vegetables, fruits, sugar. Industries: Proc-
essed and unprocessed minerals, consumer
products (textiles, footwear, and cigarettes),
processed foods and beverages, cement.
Trade: Exports— $1.9 billion (1979): cobalt,
copper, diamonds, gold, coffee, manganese,
wood. Imports — $1.5 billion (1979): crude
petroleum and petroleum products, food, tex-
tiles, heavy equipment. Major Trading Part-
ners — Belgium, Luxembourg, France, U.S.,
U.K., F.R.G.

Taken from the Background Notes (July
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams.

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

BERMUDA

Arrival Statement

Hamilton
Nov. 23, 1982

We are delighted to be here in Bermuda
where the beauty of the islands is ex-
ceeded only by the hospitality of the peo-
ple. I look forward to my meetings
tomorrow with the government's leaders
to discuss matters of mutual interest
and concern.

Bermuda and the United States have
enjoyed a long and friendly relationship.
This association dates from the earliest
Colonies in Virginia and the original
habitation of this strategic island.
Because of the geographic proximity of
our shores, we have had regular and
continuous contact between our citizens.
These contacts have been at every social
level, including economic, political,
educational, and commercial.

The United States looks forward to
continued good relations with Bermuda.
You have been so hospitable to all
Americans, whether they be military,
business, or vacation visitors.

We also understand the adverse im-
pact our economic problems have had on

Bermuda— A Profile

Vice President Bush meets with Premier
John Swan.

the economy of Bermuda. We are striv-
ing to correct these problems and reduce
the hardship to our own people, as well
as our good neighbors and friends like
Bermuda.

I bring warm greetings to the people
of Bermuda from President and Mrs.
Reagan. And, on behalf of all the
American people, I wish to express our
friendship and regard to all Bermudians.

'Texts from the Vice President's Office of
the Press Secretary.

^Made at a dinner hosted by Prime
Minister Habib Thiam.

'Made at a dinner hosted by Prime
Minister Robert G. Mugabe.

■•Made at a luncheon hosted by the
Secretary General of the Central Committee
of the United National Independence Party,
Humphrey Mulemba.

•^Made at a luncheon hosted by President
Mobutu. ■

Geography
Area: 20.6 sq.
1,517).

mi. Capital: Hamilton (pop.

People

Population: 54,893 (1980 census). Ethnic
Groups: Black (61%), white (39%). Religions:
Anglican (37%), other Protestant (19%),
Roman Catholic (14%), others including Black
Muslim (30%). Language: English.

Government

Type: Parliamentary British Colony with in-
ternal self-government since 1620. Constitu-
tion: June 8, 1968; amended 1979. Branches:
Executive — Queen Elizabeth II (chief of state
represented by a governor). Legislative — bi-
cameral assembly. Judicial — Supreme Court.
Political Parties: United Bermuda Party
(UBP), Progressive Labor Party (PLP).

Economy

GDP: $596 million (FY 1979-80). Per Capita

GDP: $10,900. Natural Resources:

Limestone (used primarily for concrete
blocks). Agricultural Products: Semitropical
produce, dairy products, flowers. Industries:
Tourism, finance, structural concrete prod-
ucts, paints, perfumes, furniture. Tijade
(1979): Exports— %S0 million: mostly reex-
ports of drugs and bunker fuel. Im-
ports— $234 million: fuel, foodstuffs,
machinery. Major Trading Partners — U.S.,
U.K., Canada.

Taken from the Background Notes (Feb.
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

Itinerary

November 10-
November 10-
November 10-
November 12-
(November 14
November 16-
November 18
November 19-
November 21
November 23
November 23
November 24

-Depart Washington, D.C.
-Sal, Cape Verde
12— Dakar, Senegal
13— Lagos, Nigeria
-15— Moscow, U.S.S.R.)
18— Harare, Zimbabwe
19 — Lusaka, Zambia
21 — Nairobi, Kenya
23 — Kinshasa, Zaire
-Sal, Cape Verde
24 — Hamilton, Bermuda
-Arrive Washington, D.C.

January 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Vice President Bush Attends
Caribbean Conference

Vice President Bush attended the
sixth annual conference on the Caribbean
and met with leaders of the Caribbean
Basin countries in Miami on Decem-
ber 5, 1982. Following is his address
before that conference.

First of all, I want to say how glad I am
to see so many friends gathered
together for this sixth annual conference
on the Caribbean. I want to express my
own thanks, as well as the appreciation
of the President and the entire Adminis-
tration, for the efforts of Caribbean-
Central American Action, the Coalition,
and for all of your individual efforts on
behalf of the President's Caribbean
Basin initiative.

It's gratifying to see so many
leaders from among our Caribbean
neighbors gathered together and par-
ticipating in this conference. I have had
the great pleasure to meet with many
Caribbean leaders in Washing-
ton—Prime Minister Seaga, Prime
Minister Compton, President Jorge
Blanco, Prime Minister Price, and Vice
President Fait. And now this conference
has provided an opportunity to renew
some of these acquaintances as well as
to meet other leaders — Prime Minister
Pindling, Prime Minister Adams, and
Prime Minister Charles— for the first
time.

My conversations during the first 2
years of this Administration with these
and other leaders from the Caribbean
Basin countries have been greatly en-
couraging. I've also been deeply im-
pressed with their commitment and hard
work in strengthening democracy in the
region, in striving for a better way of
life for their people. You deserve our
respect, our admiration, and our con-
gratulations.

In all of my meetings with Carib-
bean leaders, one consistent theme has
always stood out— and that is the
urgent need for help in relieving the dif-
ficult economic circumstances that
Caribbean Basin countries face. Every
single leader from this region that I
have met has emphasized the urgent
need for the United States to complete
action on the Caribbean Basin initiative.

I have passed these appeals along to the
President. I know that he has received
similar messages from the region's
leaders.

Incidentally, the President and I
aren't the only ones who've been im-
pressed. At our request. Congressman
Dan Rostenkowski traveled to the
region, met with the leaders, saw first-
hand the impact the Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative will have on the people of this
area. He came back a believer and prom-
ised his support for this legislation. And
we appreciate it.

So let me assure you that not only
the President and I but all the members
of this Administration are fully im-
pressed with the urgency of getting all
of the Caribbean Basin initiative legisla-
tion passed in Congress. I know this
because the President said so quite
plainly— in his speech in Bogota, Colom-
bia, Friday and again just yesterday in
San Jose, Costa Rica and in his national
radio broadcast to the American people.

We are pleased the Congress has
provided the $350 million in emergency
supplemental financial assistance that
we requested for the Caribbean Basin
initiative for this year. This aid is now

$10 million— as well as with the eastern
Caribbean for $20 million. The passage
last September of this element of the
program was very important and very
welcome since it was the one element of
the Caribbean Basin initiative of
greatest immediate need. The private
sector in the Caribbean Basin was being
strangled by the lack of foreign ex-
change for raw materials and spare
parts. This aid will allow small- and
medium-sized businesses to resume pro-
duction, cutting into the horrendous un-
employment rates of many of these
countries.

Still, this emergency aid program is
only a partial solution. It has to be com-
plemented by long-term incentives. The
one-way free trade area and investment
portions of the program will provide the
needed long-term incentives for new in-
vestment to promote self-sustaining
growth. We need to enact these
elements of the Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative if we are to consolidate and
build on the short-term help we have
given so far. And that's why I've come
to talk to you tonight.

I want you to know that the Presi-
dent and I and every member of this
Administration will do everything in our

We want to see democratic nations with strong
economies, nations able to stand on their feet, able
to provide productive outlets for the talents of their
people, able to resist outside interference which
takes advantage of poverty and unemployment to
create unrest.

being disbursed, helping countries cope
with their short-term, balance-of-pay-
ments problems. We have already signed
agreements with four countries— El
Salvador for $75 million, Jamaica for
$50 million, the Dominican Republic for
$41 million, and Honduras for $35
million. We are moving quickly to com-
plete agreements with four other coun-
tries—Costa Rica for $70 million and
Belize, Guatemala, and Haiti each for

power to make sure that Congress
enacts the remainder of the Caribbean
Basin initiative legislation in this term.
That's a pretty strong statement. And
time is short. Obstacles still remain. But
the Presidency is not without resources.
And let me say this: In the event we are
not successful, and time runs out in this
short special session, we'll be coming

(

Department of State Bulletin

THE VICE PRESIDENT

ick to the new Congress next year to
et this legislation through.

Those who don't feel so strongly
30ut his initiative as you do could well
sk, why do we want this legislation so
adiy? Is it just to be philanthropic— just
) promote economic development that
■ill benefit our neighboring countries?

That's a part— but just a part— of
16 answer. 'True, the many Caribbean
■aders with whom I have met with over
16 last 2 years have impressed on me
ow much this initiative will benefit
leir peoples. I have heard a great deal
bout the plight the countries of the
;aribbean Basin face, caught between
16 rising prices of oil and needed im-
orts and dwindling prices for most of
tieir exports. I know about the balance-
f-payments problems, about the credit
ranches that these conditions pro-
uce— problems that translate directly
nd harshly into unemployment and
overty.

In some Caribbean countries, these
nemployment rates approach a horren-
ous 40%. The ambitions of these
?aders are to create jobs for their
leople— not just unskilled jobs in tradi-
ional occupations but modern, produc-
ive, industrial jobs: jobs in export in-
!ustries that contribute to economic
growth, jobs that offer a better future.

There are things that we want for
lur neighbors. We want to see demo-
ratic nations with strong economies,
lations able to stand on their own feet,
ible to provide productive outlets for the
alents of their people, able to resist out-
ide interference which takes advantage
if poverty and unemployment to create
inrest.

Those are the kinds of economies
hat we, and you, want to see in the
Caribbean. This is quite a contrast to the
ilternative, if, indeed, what the Cubans
lave managed to accomplish in more
han 20 years can even be called an
ilternative.

When we look at Cuba and at what
IS happening in Nicaragua and Grenada,
what do we see? We see economically
weak, militarized, repressive countries;
expensive, semicolonial dependen-
cies—dependencies like Cuba that cost
their Soviet sponsors $9 million per
day -dependencies severely tied — on a
very short leash— to their Soviet spon-
sor and useful principally for creating
mischief among their neighbors in the
region.

The combined gross national product
of all of the countries of the Caribbean

Basin totals less than 2% of our gross
national product. Our imports from the
Caribbean Basin are less than 4% of our
total imports. It is hard to image that,
given these disparities, even the spec-
tacular economic growth that we wish
on our Caribbean neighbors would im-
pair our own economic welfare.
But let's face it. It would be
unrealistic to say that we're supporting
the Caribbean Basin initiative so strong-
ly solely out of an altruistic impulse. The
Caribbean initiative is good for us too.
Our partners in this initiative — Mexico,
Venezuela, Canada, and Colombia— rec-
ognize that the Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative serves their interests as well. I
think this fact has been too often
overlooked in all the pulling and hauling
over the exclusion of this product or
that from the free trade area legislation

Fifty percent of our
trade passes through the
Caribbean. . . . The
United States has no
small interest in insur-
ing that the governments
in this region are stable
and democratic.

or in the dickering over this or that pro-
vision of the investment incentive legis-
lation. But my hope is that when our op-
ponents in Congress carefully analyze
how substantially the Caribbean Basin
initiative benefits the United States,
they'll move swiftly to join the growing
bipartisan support for this legislation.

Think for a minute what these bene-
fits are. The United States has an in-
terest in seeing stable democratic
governments among its neigh-
bors—governments which gain their
legitimacy by providing an outlet for dif-
fering political beliefs, as opposed to dic-
tatorships. Fifty percent of our trade
passes through the Caribbean— through
strategic straits and passageways among
these island nations and through the
Panama Canal. The United States has

no small interest in insuring that the
governments in this region are stable
and democratic.

The United States also has an in-
terest in potential Caribbean Basin
markets for American exports — exports
which can only be purchased if our
neighbors' economies are strong. In
these times of increasing com-
petitiveness among the world's trading
nations, our interest in economically
viable markets in the Caribbean Basin
could not be greater. The Caribbean
Basin initiative will help create the kind
of economic expansion in the region that
will provide larger markets close to
home for our industries.

We want to maintain a favorable
climate for foreign investment in the
Caribbean region— not merely to protect
the existing U.S. investment there but
to encourage new investment oppor-
tunities in stable, democratic, free,
market-oriented countries close to our
shores. The Caribbean Basin initiative
will not only provide direct incentives
for this investment but encourage
follow-on investment.

Another U.S. interest— and one with
particular relevance for me as head of
the President's Task Force in South
Florida— is the problem of curtailing
narcotics production and shipment
through the Caribbean. We hope that
our efforts to encourage stable^ pros-
perous economies in the Caribbean
region through the Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative may dampen the economic incen-
tives for the production and export of
narcotics to the United States and may
encourage greater cooperation in
fighting drug traffic.

Finally, the United States has an in-
terest in alleviating large-scale migration
in the Caribbean region. This is a prob-
lem that seized my attention in connec-
tion with the South Florida Task Force.
I note that a conference on this is being
held in conjunction with this meeting.
We would prefer, Caribbean Basin
leaders would prefer, and you would
prefer to see the people of this region
productively employed in their own
domestic economies rather than being
forced to these opportunities in other
countries. The Caribbean Basin initiative
will, in fact, create those same oppor-
tunities at home.

I think that all these are powerful
reasons for the Congress to move for-
ward on the Caribbean Basin initiative

January 1983

THE SECRETARY

legislation. All the more so in view of
the fact that the legislation contains
carefully balanced safeguards which pro-
tect those key U.S. commercial interests
that might be affected by this initiative.

In closing, let me briefly mention
one other aspect of the Caribbean Basin
initiative that I think is of transcendent
international importance; namely, its im-
pact on the world trading system.

The United States and other major
trading countries of the world just con-
cluded last week the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] minis-
terial meeting in Geneva. Although some
progress was made, the meeting, for the
most part, treated the world to the spec-
tacle of a major bloc of trading nations
struggling to preserve, rather than
remove, existing impediments to the
free flow of goods and services. The
United States believes strongly that free
trade is the key to prosperity. We
believe that protection destroys oppor-
tunities. Other countries may be content
to talk about the virtues of free trade
while doing little to actually improve it.
But the United States is willing to put
its commitment to free trade in action
through the one-way free trade area
proposal of the Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative. The success of our free trade
area proposal will dramatically prove the
foUowring truth: that free trade is in-
dispensable to world prosperity.

By now I'm pretty sure you know
that I didn't come all the way to Miami
to convince a group like you that we
need the Caribbean Basin initiative. But
I've said what I've said for a reason: to
send a message to the Congress. It's
perhaps an irony of a Vice President's
life that if I give a speech in Washing-
ton, chances are it's not going to get
much ink. Generally, I find that the fur-
ther I travel from Washington, the more
coverage I get. That being the case,
probably I should have flown to Tierra
del Fuego and given this speech there.

We still face obstacles with this
legislation. We need this legislation. And
to that end, we need your support,
which we have always had in the past.
So I'm confident, and encouraged, that
we'll have it now when it's so especially
vital. ■

News Conference of
November 18

Secretary Shultz held a news con-
ference at the Department of State on
November 18. 1982.^

Q. Now that there is a new leader-
ship in the Soviet Union and you have
met with the new leader, Yuriy An-
dropov, can you tell us what oppor-
tunities exist for improved U.S. -Soviet
relations and discuss our strategy for
dealing with Moscow in the post-
Brezhnev era?

A. First, it's important to emphasize
that we have had a policy with respect
to the Soviet Union. That policy is in
place and will continue in place. The
policy is, first, to be realistic about what
is going on both in terms of military
capacity, its use, the human rights
aspects of the situation, and other
things. Second, to be fully alert to the
importance of our own strength and the
strength of our alliance in the face of
Soviet behavior. Third, to be willing,
always, to work on problems and to try
to work them out and to solve problems.
The United States has always been in
the forefront as part of the solution in
the many problems that we have around
the world. And we know, finally, that if
problems can be solved, there are oppor-
tunities for a better world.

The President, with the emergence
of new leadership in the Soviet Union,
has made a number of statements em-
phasizing the third point in that set of
points. But we have to remember that
the whole set of points are there. We
stand ready to solve problems, work on
them, but we also continue to be
realistic, to regard the things that repre-
sent solutions of problems — not to be
simply rhetoric — but to be deeds. That
will be our posture.

Q. What would you regard as a
meaningful signal from the new
leadership in the Kremlin — a mean-
ingful signal in the direction of easing
relations?

A. I hear this word "signal" all the
time. It goes from little things that af-
fect the way you're treated, and I might
say that the Vice President and I, and
Ambassador [U.S. Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Authur A.] Hartman were
treated with great courtesy throughout

our visit to the Soviet Union. People sai
that's a signal, and perhaps it is. But tl
things that we are really looking for, i
after all the signaling has taken place, :i
the substance of change in behavior on
important matters. i

Now, we are engaged in an active i
negotiation for arms reduction in i

Geneva and in Vienna. We are engaged
with our European Allies, the Soviet
Union, and others, in active discussionsi
in Madrid. Those are two settings, or :
three settings, where discussions are '
going on right now and where we woul
welcome movement.

Those are, in a sense, the things
that we want to see happen. Signals ar^
fine, and indications that people are
ready to sit down and talk seriously ar
fine. We have given those signals our-
selves. As we move ahead, we will look
for substantive responses.

Q. Would you expect to see withii
the foreseeable future another — are i
you talking about meetings and sittir'
down, would you expect to see any '
kind of summit meeting? '

A. The President has always been
ready for a summit meeting if there is I
something worthwhile to be accom- j
plished by the meeting. A meeting for I
the sake of a meeting doesn't really gel)
you a lot. There does have to be a pros*
pect of some genuine, positive result. I
That has been the President's position, I
and it remains so now. '

Q. Could you specifically outline
what steps the United States expects
the Soviet Union to take in the forun
you just mentioned or elsewhere j
before improved relations can occur j
and what specific steps the United ,
States is prepared to take to improve'
relations. j

A. As far as the details of steps ar.
concerned, we'll conduct our negotia- j
tions in those fora rather than this waj.)
But, obviously, if you are engaged in a.
negotiation, the process of give-and-tal^'
is something that you look for and
sense. We would be looking for those
signs and that kind of movement, but '
don't want to try to specify any explicii"
point.

Q. A number of Soviet spokesmerj
this past week have argued that the

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

ted States is using trade as a
tical weapon. Do you believe that
United States has been doing this;
rou believe that the United States
i trade as part of a larger political
ure, and can you see trade possibly
ig divorced from politics?
A. We must think of our relation-
s with the Soviet Union— all of their
ensions, and while they aren't linked
ny kind of tight way, certainly, they
related to each other. We have made
, point. The pipeline sanctions, in a
, made that point — the political
ension of an economic relationship,
ur discussions with our friends in
ope and Japan, we have also been
king with them on that very point to
if we can develop — and I believe we
and we are well on our way to
ig so — a better sense of strategy for
economic relationships with the
let Union and its satellites.
That doesn't mean that all trade is
lect to this kind of examination, but
ertain critical categories and aspects,
believe that it must be.

Q. This month you're going with
sident Reagan to an area full of
incial problems and crises. I was
idering what you had in mind that
Id alleviate the situation of those
ntries once you have left them?
A. That area of South America and
tral America is not only full of prob-
s like most places in the world are,
it is full of opportunities, full of peo-
and it is our neighborhood. I'm sure
; what the President will want to
erline and support, as he travels
)ugh those countries, is the support
give to the idea of democracy, of
;ly elected governments, our support
economic development. As you
w, we have been trying to be helpful
have been helpful in some of these
incial difficulties, and, of course, in
area of peace and secmity in which
have been working very hard.
I think it is notable that our
nisphere, as compared with other
ts of the world, has been peaceful
sr a long period of time, and that's
m a very important and helpful factor
he development of the United States
1 in the development of other coun-
!S in our hemisphere. It is something
y important and very worthwhile
ich we want to continue to support.

Q. Very few American officials
' ^e had a chance to meet the new
' net leader, Mr. Andropov, as you

have. There are stories that he likes
American food, American music.
Chubby Checker records, that he
speaks English; can you g^ive us a lit-
tle bit of your reaction to the man?
[Laughter]

A. There were Soviet soft drinks
and Soviet food on the table where we
sat. If he likes another kind of food, I
can't say anything about that. There was
no evidence of the things that you men-
tioned in the course of the meeting that
we had.

What impact he will have as a leader
of the Soviet peoples is something that,
of course, we are very interested in and
watching, and that remains to be seen.

Q. How did he strike you? Did he
strike you as a man who had taken
charge?

A. Yes.

Q. At your last press conference,
you referred to your high regard for
Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary
of State. I'm wondering if this has
been at all changed.

A. I haven't changed my mind.

Q. There have been some revela-
tions coming out in the Italian courts
that have been reported all over the
Italian press quoting Aldo Moro's
closest friend, Mr. Guerzoni, who has
stated that before the abduction and
assassination of Mr. Moro, Henry
Kissinger directly threatened him, and
that Mr. Moro was in fear for his safe-
ty because of those threats from
Kissinger.

A. I don't have any comment on
what you've just said except to reaffirm
that I consider Henry Kissinger one of
our great Americans, a man of tremen-
dous intellect and understanding. I feel
privileged to call him a friend, and he
has been unstinting in his willingness to
be helpful to me, has come in and has
talked to me, free with his ideas and ad-
vice. I'm grateful to him for that.

Q. To what degree is economic aid
to Israel linked to the settlements
policy of the Government of Israel?

A. There hasn't been any link made.
We have been very clear from the begin-
ning that we think the settlements and
the expansion of them are not construc-
tive at all, not a contribution to the
peace process. The President has been
very clear in opposing them, just as
some of the conditions on the West
Bank are certainly not a constructive
contribution to the peace process.

I suppose I speak about it, in part,
because I am fundamentally a university
man, and the idea of asking people who
come to teach and work in a university
setting, which is, after all, a setting
where we expect to have freedom of
thought and to encourage freedom of
thought, signing oaths is just not the
way to go about it. Those are some
things that are going on that we think
are just not constructive.

Q. Will you counsel the President
to trim the growth of defense spend-
ing as a way to ease some of your
diplomatic problems with both the
Europeans and the Soviet Union?

A. Certainly not. It is essential that
we maintain the strength of our defense
posture. That, of course, means that we
need to examine the defense budget. It
doesn't need to have unnecessary spend-
ing and all of that, but it is essential
that we maintain the strength in our
defense posture that the President has
put there.

Q. Could you give us some assess-
ment of the recent diplomatic contacts
between the Soviet Union and China?

A. These developments have been
taking place. We've been watching them
and reading about them. I'm not privy to
them, of course — don't know just what
is taking place.

I do know some of the concerns the
Chinese have. They are concerned about
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and
have said so; they are concerned about
the behavior of the Soviet proxy states
Vietnam and Kampuchea. So, if through
their discussions they can persuade the
Soviet Union to get out of Afghanistan
and, in effect, get out of Kampuchea, so
much the better.

Q. In an earlier question, you
seemed to hold out some hope that at
some point a summit might be
arrangeable. Were you suggesting that
now — just to tie it down — it is
premature?

A. The discussion of a summit has
kind of emerged out of thin air, as far as
I can see. There has been no direct
discussion with the Soviet Union repre-
sentatives that I know of. It didn't come
up in my discussion with Mr. [Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko in
New York, whenever that was, a couple
of months or so ago; and it didn't come
up in the meeting the Vice President
had with Mr. Andropov.

That doesn't rule it out; it doesn't
rule it in. It is exactly where I said it
was. If there is something constructive

iiuary 1983

THE SECRETARY

and positive to be accomplished, the
President is always willing, but he is not
looking for a trip or a meeting for the
sake of a trip or a meeting.

Q. Does that same criterion apply
to your own meetings with Mr.
Gromoyko, and do you have any such
meetings planned in the near future?

A. We don't have a meeting planned
in the near future, but it is always con-
ceivable that one might take place.

Q. Do you see the possibility that
freer trade with the United States
might be an inducement to the Soviet
Union to behave in a way that you
would like them to, as previous admin-
istrations have offered?

A. I don't think it is worthwhile to
think of things on a kind of a one-for-
one basis like that. You have to think of
the whole relationship, which is compli-
cated and interrelated, and there are
many important dimensions to it. We
can all spell out what those are, and the
potential of trade is one of them, but
only one.

Q. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union seem to be exchanging
what you might describe as con-
ciliatory "mood music," each side
waiting for the other to take specific
steps. How long can just the mood
music last?

A. We'll have to see what takes
place. I was at the funeral, standing on
Red Square for 2V2 hours, watching
what was taking place. Of course, there
is the "mood music" that everybody
seems to have focused on, namely the
statements that the President has made
and like statements made on the other
side.

There was other "mood music." It
was quite startling. I don't know how
many of you watched the funeral on
television, but after the body of Mr.
Brezhnev was put in the ground and the
members of the Politburo came up on
top of the structure where they stand, it
was as though somebody threw a switch,
and suddently martial music and a long
march-by of troops. That was "mood
music," too, I thought.

There are all of these dimensions,
and we must remember the military
strength that they have, and remember
not to, in any way, allow what you,
perhaps, properly call "mood music" to
delude us or take us away from our own
convictions that we must do what is
necessary for our own defense.

Q. In your discussions, what
discussion was there of the Reagan

Administration proposals for Middle
East peace? Was there any discussion
at all of Soviet Jewish emigration?

A. I don't want to discuss the inter-
nal content of the discussion the Vice
President and the Secretary-General of
the Soviet Union had.

Was the topic raised at all?

A. I said I don't want to discuss the
content of the discussion. These topics
have been discussed a lot in other fora,
and generally speaking, we always raise,
particularly, the human rights concerns
in any discussion that we have with a
Soviet official. I don't want to say more
than that.

Q. A moment ago, you expressed
special concern about the professors
on the West Bank who have been
asked to sign a pledge against the
FLO or leave. Do you have any
realistic expectation that the United
States, in consultation with Israel,
can bring about a reversal of that ac-
tion?

A. We should speak unequivocally
about it, and people in the intellectual
community particularly who have been
through this — you remember, we had
the episode of the loyalty oath, maybe
some of you are too young to remember
those days, but I remember them —
ought to speak up, including people in
universities in Israel. It's the same prob-
lem. It's a problem of freedom —
freedom of thought.

Q. There are some reports coming
out of the Middle East now that the
PLO is looking for mutual recognition
with Israel and for the United States
to accept a role for the PLO in the
peace process, either independent or
within an Arab delegation. Do you
think the mutual recognition is a step
forward from the PLO? And will the
United States support a PLO seat in
the negotiation process?

A. The U.S. position has been made
clear many times by President Reagan
in his recent press statement and also in
direct private discussions with many
people, and it remains the same. The
United States will not have direct dis-
cussions with leaders of the PLO until
they recognize the right of Israel to ex-
ist and recognize U.N. Security Council
resolutions as the basis for negotiations.
As far as Israel's attitude toward the
PLO is concerned, I'm not speaking for
Israel Israel speaks for itself.

Q. I wonder if you could give us
your assessment of the current efforts

to get foreign forces out of Lebanon
and let us know if it's any longer
realistic to expect that this could be
accomplished before the end of this
year?

A. We continue to work and want,
to see the prompt withdrawal of all
foreign forces. 'The process of discussii,
and trying to work out an operational
plan has been getting a lot of attentior,
It's worked at. It is not going quite as 1
fast as we would like but, nevertheless
there has been a great deal of discussi-
there, and that sort of the state of pla
has been pretty well mapped out.

We continue to press for, as rapid!
as possible, removal of all foreign fore ,
from Lebanon consistent with the eme
gence of Lebanon as a country that ca
take control of itself, and can do that •
the basis of a reconciliation of the
various religious groups there and
become a country again with an abilitj'
to rule itself. Those are the things tha
we continue to work for, and I suppos
just have to say, "It ain't easy," but
we're working at it.

Q. Isn't it your impression that i:
of the problems is the Israeli desire >
have a political component to the
resolution of the problem. What is t
American position on that?

A. Originally, there was the idea c
a peace treaty. Our position on that is '
that the peace treaties between Israel
and her neighbors, we think, are very
desirable. That's what the peace proce
is all about.

On the other hand, the peace trea
to mean anything, has to be undertak(
voluntarily by a country that's had a
chance to form itself and develop a co
sensus within the country that that is
what it wants to do. Our position is th,
it is quite premature to be pressing
Lebanon for such a treaty or for thing
that are equivalent, or the near
equivalent, of such a treaty; that it's jit
not a realistic position.

Having said that, I'll go back to m
original statement that, in our opinions
state of peace and normal relationship
among all of the countries in the Middi
East is a very desirable thing; and, asi
said, that's what the peace process is 3
about.

Q. How much input are you havij
in determining the President's
domestic economic policy, and are ya
urging him to change that policy in
any way?

Department of State Bulle 1

THE SECRETARY

A. I have been present at a number
he discussions of the budget, and
se, of course, have been focusing on
at the dimensions of the budget prob-
1 are and what kind of actions can be
en to deal with that problem.

All of that said in the context of
at it is we're trying to achieve, both
;he long-term structurally and in the
irer term, in terms of the economy,
idously, what we want and what the
isident wants — has wanted, continues
want — is an economy that will have
,1 expansion with inflation remaining
ler control, and with the right kind of
)portion of savings and investment so
■t we can see productivity advance.
tat is our policy, and I support it.

Q. Did you recommend to the
isident that he move the— is it your
nion that he should move the tax
rease to January?

A. I don't comment on my advice to
President. What he decides to do
)ut this whole economic package, he
1 think over, and when he's ready to
lounce his decision, he'll announce it,
1 I'll support him.

Q. In your discussion earlier of
lat specific steps the Soviets could
;e, you discussed the two arms con-
il negotiations in Geneva, the
JFR [mutual and balanced force
luctions] talks in Vienna, and the
CE [Conference on Security and
operation in Europe] Conference in
idrid. You didn't mention the
ponal issues which, in the past,
ii've put on your kind of hope list.

A. They're on my list of things that
're concerned about. It's my concern
;. But we don't have any talks going
with them about Afghanistan, for ex-
iple. We don't have any direct talks
ing on other than the conversations
it we have had with their leadership,
t there's no sort of negotiation as in
5 case of Geneva. That's why I didn't
jntion that.

Q. But would a Soviet withdrawal
some consequence from Afghanistan
a— I hate to use the word "sig-
1"— but at least a sign that they're
terested in a better relationship?
A. It would be a fact, and a fact
at would be a piece of constructive
havior. If things like that occur, if you
id them up, they would add up to op-
irtunities for much improved relation-
ips.

Q. If the Soviets were to reduce
eir troops along the Chinese fron-
iT, would you regard that as a
igative or a positive step?

A. That's a matter for the Chinese
and the Russians to discuss, and I don't
have any comment on that.

Q. You met last week with the
Egyptian Foreign Minister. How do
you see the deterioration of the rela-
tions between Egypt and Israel, and
what is the United States doing to
change this situation?

A. The relationship between Israel
and Egypt, we think, could stand im-
provement. I think there are some signs
that that may be possible, particularly if
that can be put in the context of prog-
ress on other aspects of Middle East
development, such as the emergence of
a plan for the evacuation of foreign
forces from Lebanon and movement in
the peace process.

Q. When Khamal Hassan Ali
talked to reporters last week, he said
he thought the settlements problem on
the West Bank was now looming so
large that it was inhibiting some of
the moderate Arab nations from join-
ing the peace process. Is that also
your view?

A. It is a major stumbling block,
without a doubt, and, as I said earlier, I
don't think it is constructive in any ef-
fort to move the peace process along.
However, I do sense from my discus-
sions with people from all the countries
involved that the peace process is very
much alive, and that there is a general
recognition in the Middle East that
peace is of vital importance.

It's clear to everybody. And
somehow or another when there is such
an important goal that people seek,
want, and believe in, that in one way or
another, if we keep after it, we will find
a way to get there. But, as I said
earlier, it's not easy.

Q. You talk often about getting
people to sit down at the same table.
Are you any closer to that? The Jor-
danians, for example?

A. How close is close? I would say
we're working at it, and there's been a
great deal of movement on the part of
the Arab community on this subject, as
was illustrated — or not illustrated, but
was on display in the visit of King
Hassan and the Prime Ministers that ac-
companied him. That is genuine prog-
ress.

Q. Do you expect that France will
soon become a party to the allied
agreement on East- West trade that's
being worked out? What steps remain
to be taken to accomplish that?

A. The thing for us to do right now
is to stop arguing about whether or not
we have an agreement and start carry-
ing it out.

Q. Could you address again, in a
formal way, the suggestion you made
to the OAS [Organization of American
States] yesterday that all the foreign
military advisers in all of Central
America and that those countries
agree not to import major offensive
weapons?

A. Certainly. My talk yesterday was
not the first time that set of ideas has
been floated out by the United States,
and it has been getting increasing
amounts of discussion. It's a very good
position. It has a lot of appeal, and we
keep talking about it. But it's one
avenue; there are others to developing a
greater sense of stability in Central
America. Obviously, if we're going to
have the economic development and the
sense of personal security and humanity
that we seek, then we want to see much
more stability in that area than now ex-
ists, and that's what we have been work-
ing at.

Q. Is it your intention for this
news conference to end, leaving us
with the impression that the U.S.
position is that the Soviets will have
to make the first substantive move
before there can be a real change in
U.S. -Soviet relations?

A. We look for changes in behavior
or indications of a willingness to discuss
them. We have said we're willing to do
so. If you look at the problems that are
before us, on the whole, they're prob-
lems that they have created, and so a
willingness to be less creative is what is
called for here. But we're ready to get in
and discuss and try to work things out
in a careful, thoughtful way.

Q. Do you expect to conclude any
agreements with Foreign Minister
(Pieter Willem] Botha when you meet
with him next week? And do you have
any assessments to make on any
changes in South African society?

A. No. I don't have any comment on
that meeting. Obviously, we are looking
at the South African situation as such,
but also the problems involved in bring-
ing about independence for Namibia and
exploring the attitudes and views of
South Africa on various dimensions of
that. That problem is one that we have
worked on very hard, and we want to
continue pursuing it in every possible
way that we can.

'Press release 351.

Jnuary 1983

EUROPE

Death of Soviet
President Brezhnev

Following are a White House state-
ment issued on the death of Soviet Presi-
dent Leonid I. Brezhnev; President
Reagan's and Secretary Shultz's letters of
condolences to Vasiliy VcLsil'yevich, First
Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and
to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko,
respectively; arrival and departure
statements made in Moscow by Vice
President Bush who headed the U.S.
delegation to the memorial ceremonies;
and a news conference given by Secretary
Shultz who accompanied the Vice Presi-
dent.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
NOV. 11, 19822

The President is expressing his personal
condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First
Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on
the death of Soviet President Brezhnev.
A high-level delegation will represent
the United States at the memorial
ceremonies in Moscow.

As leader of the Soviet Union for
nearly two decades, President Brezhnev
was one of the world's most important
figures. President Brezhnev played a
very significant role in the shaping of
U.S. -Soviet relations during his
Presidency.

President Reagan is conveying to
the Soviet Government the strong desire
of the United States to continue to work
for an improved relationship with the
Soviet Union and to maintain an active
dialogue between our societies on all im-
portant issues. The President looks for-
ward to a constructive relationship with
the new leadership of the Soviet Union.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER,
NOV. 11, 19821

Please accept my condolences on the death of
President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. President
Brezhnev was one of the world's most impor-
tant figures for nearly two decades. May I
ask you to convey our sympathies to the
President's family.

I would also like to convey through you
to the Soviet Government and people the
strong desire of the United States to work
toward an improved relationship with the

Soviet Union. I look forward to conducting
relations with the new leadership in the
Soviet Union with the aim of expanding the
areas where our two nations can cooperate to
mutual advantage.
Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

SECRETARY SHULTZ'S LETTER,
NOV. 11, 19822

Please accept my condolences on the death of
President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. I can ap-
preciate your sense of loss at the death of a
colleague who played such a leading role in
your nation and in relations between our two
nations. We hope to continue efforts to im-
prove these relations in the future, and I look
forward to working with you toward this end.
Sincerely yours,

George Shultz

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S
ARRIVAL STATEMENT,
NOV. 14, 1982

On behalf of the President of the United
States, I wish to express the con-
dolences of the American people to the
Soviet people on the death of President
Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. We wish to con-
vey our deep sympathies to the late
President's family.

Leonid Brezhnev was the leader of
the Soviet Union for nearly two decades.
He was a strong man, a fierce fighter
for his deeply held convictions. Now, the
enormous burdens and responsibilities of
leadership will be passed on to others
who will navigate the Soviet Union's
ship of state in the years to come.

I have led this American delegation
to Moscow on this solemn occasion to
symbolize my nation's regard for the
Soviet people at this moment of loss and
to signify the desire of the United States
to continue to work for positive relations
between our two countries.

It is in this spirit of seriousness and
hope that we have come to Moscow. We
have come to declare to the Soviet
leaders, to the Soviet people, and to the
world, that the United States is devoted
to the pursuit of peace and a reduction
of global tensions. We seek a world of
greater harmony, not only between the

two great superpowers, but for all na-
tions. It is our fervent hope that today's
massive expenditures for arms can be
reduced and that the world's standard of
living, especially for the impoverished,
can be greatly improved.

In all of this we are realistic. Fears,
suspicions, and distrust must be replaced
by hope, by trust, by mutual coopera-
tion. 'The barriers that now divide na-
tions and regions can be dismantled and
discarded. To accomplish these lofty
goals we must look to strong men and
women. Men and women of courage, pa-
tience, and perseverance. Fortunately,
they are human characteristics that can
and must be brought to the fore.

This spirit of hope, which I men-
tioned before, is with us all. As we pay
our respects to a renowned leader, let us
also take this occasion to give serious
thought to the great and positive oppor-
tunities that are before us all.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S
DEPARTURE STATEMENT,
NOV. 15, 19823

We leave Moscow tonight having ex-
pressed to the peoples of the Soviet
Union the condolences of the American
people and President Reagan on the
death of President Leonid Il'ich
Brezhnev. I conveyed those same con-
dolences and our personal respects to
Mrs. Brezhnev last evening.

I want to thank both Soviet and
U.S. officials for all their efforts, kind-
ness, and hospitality on our behalf dur-
ing this national period of mourning.

This afternoon. Secretary Shultz,
Ambassador [Arthur A.] Hartman, and I
met with General Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, Yuriy Andropov,
and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.
At the meeting, the Soviets expressed
appreciation for our presence and our
expression of condolences. The meeting
was frank, cordial, and substantive. It
gave both sides the opportunity to ex-
change views on the state of their rela-
tions.

When I arrived yesterday, I said
that we had come "in a spirit of serious-
ness and hope," to "declare to the Soviet
leaders, to the Soviet people and to the
world, that the United States is devoted
to the pursuit of peace and a reduction
of global tensions." We reaffirm, today,
the spirit of President Reagan's letter of
November 11, to First Deputy Chairman

Department of State Bulletin

ice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, and Ambassador Hartman.

luznetsov, in which he wrote: "I would
i<e to convey through you to the Soviet
Government and people the strong
esire of the United States to work
oward an improved relationship with
he Soviet Union." This is our purpose
.nd our policy.

As we leave Moscow, we are well
ware of the difficult problems that con-
ront us. The challenges, while enor-
nous, are far from insurmountable. The
lew leaders of the Soviet Union know
hat the United States, based on its
strength and the continuity of its policy,
s ready, as President Reagan stated, to
•onduct relations "with the aim of ex-
Janding the areas where our two na-
ions can cooperate to mutual advan-
age."

Human rights, arms reductions,
peaceful solutions to regional problems,
n short, peace and freedom for all na-
;ions are the goals we seek. It is to
;hese goals that we must dedicate

ourselves, and the achievements of these
aims is the challenge our two great na-
tions face.

This is the message we brought to
the Soviet people and their leaders. We
are hopeful that the Soviet leaders ap-
proach our common responsibilities in
the same spirit. We, in the United
States, will do our part to achieve the
kind of constructive relations that can,
indeed, move the world toward peace
and prosperity.

SECRETARY SHULTZ'S
NEWS CONFERENCE,
NOV. 15. 1982*

Q. What should be understood by
the high level of American representa-
tion at Mr. Brezhnev's funeral? Should
it be taken in context with other
events such as the end of the pipeline
sanctions and Mr. Reagan's message
to the effect that he would like to see

an improvement in relations after the
transition period in the Soviet Union?
What does your visit and Mr. Bush's
visit here sig^nify? Is it a signal?

A. Exactly what the President said.
It is an expression, on the one hand, of
our respect for a human being and con-
dolences being expressed to President
Brezhnev and the peoples of the Soviet
Union. It is also an expression — also like
the President said — that if constructive
behavior emerges on the part of the
Soviet Union, the United States is
prepared to respond and is prepared for
a more constructive relationship than
we've had in past years.

Q. The Soviets have in one form or
another been publicizing a rather long
list of grievances as regards U.S.
foreign policy even before October 27
but certainly since President
Brezhnev's October 27 speech — are
you bringing any sort of message from
the U.S. Government, the President of

January 1983

EUROPE

the United States, that there is room
for conciliation, negotiation, change
on both sides?

A. I can't really imagine why
anyone would have grievances against
our policies and our foreign policies.
They are constructive. Our efforts are
for problem-solving all around the world.
We must, of course, maintain our
strength — our strength in our defense
capabilities, the strength of our
economy, our will power. These are
things which are present and at the
same time, as we have demonstrated, all
over the world, we have a constructive
point of view — we are part of the solu-
tion, not part of the problem, and our
message here is the same.

Q. How would you characterize
Yuriy Andropov? I am wondering
what this Administration thinks about
him, personally, as a man.

A. I don't think it's useful for me to
speculate about the nature of various
Soviet personalities, including Mr. An-
dropov. I've never met him, so I think
it's better to let that emerge.

Q. What do you feel are the
possibilities for an improvement in
U.S. -Soviet relations now that there is
a change of leadership?

A. There is the same possibility that
there has been. U.S. policy has been
clear; it has not changed. It is a policy of
realism, of strength, of willingness to
work on problems together and the ex-
pectation if that can be done successful-
ly, everyone will be better off as a
result. 'That's been our policy. That is
our policy, and we want to make it clear
to the new Soviet leadership that that
remains in place.

Q. Have you been offered any
high-ranking meetings while you are
here?

A. We have just arrived, and in my
brief meeting with Ambassador Dobryin
in Washington, when I went to the
Soviet Embassy to sign the book of con-
dolences, we talked briefly about it. I
simply said I would be here, the Vice
President would — I wasn't sure of his
precise schedule at the time — and that if
it were possible to see people in the
Soviet leadership we would like to do
that. But we can also understand that it
is a busy time and it might not be possi-
ble, so as of right now I know of no ap-
pointments.

Q. I believe your predecessor.
Secretary Haig, referred to the Carter
grain embargo as a blunder, and some

people now refer to the pipeline sanc-
tions as blunder. Will you please com-
ment on that?

A. I would only comment without
connecting the two that we now have
the basis for a broader strategic ap-
proach to our economic relationships
with the Soviet Union and the emer-
gence of a substantial agreement with
our allies — one that has provided the oc-
casion for the lifting of those sanctions.
The sanctions, calling attention to the
problem, have registered the President's
very strong feeling that the events in
Poland, in particular, are events that we
must register ourselves beyond just talk-
ing about them, and at this point we are
very pleased. Our allies have joined us;
we have joined with them; it is a mutual
thing to develop a broad economic
strategy here.

Q. I wonder if I could ask you a
question here which goes, it seems to
me, to the heart of the relationship
with this country. For about 21
months the Reagan Administration
has done a variety of things,
specifically, in the field of
security — increasing the budget and
so forth— to what the Soviets regard
as tremendous proportions. They have
been waiting for some time, and now
they have cranked themselves up just
before Mr. Brezhnev died to start to
reciprocate?

Do you think that you and Mr.
Bush, by coming here, have something
concrete to tell these people? That
something can be done to stop this
vicious circle, or is there anything else
you can say on this particular matter?

A. Obviously, something can be
done to moderate behavior all around. I
would say, first of all, your account of
the sequence of things is not the way I
see it — quite the reverse. The steady,
relentless buildup of Soviet military
capacity has in effect forced the United
States, after quite a period of not
pushing its defense establishment for-
ward powerfully, to look to our defenses
and our strength; I might say that I
believe everybody knows that we have
it. We have a tremendous economy, a
very productive economy, so we are able
to do that and sustain that. It is not a
question of us suddenly increasing our
efforts in this regard and the Soviets
deciding that they better do so also. It is
quite the reverse. Their efforts have
been very strong and sustained. We

have had to raise our sights, we will con
tinue to do so, and we will maintain the
strength of our defenses. Now, I
presume that everyone, not only
ourselves, but our allies would prefer a
world in which we do not have to spend
so much of our efforts on purely militan
means. And if so, we are ready to work
at that, as is evidenced by the
President's arms reduction proposal.

Q. A top American diplomatic
source said that we must try to be as
forthcoming as possible with the
Soviets now. Could you elaborate on
that, other than what that means?

A. The Ambassador is here, and we
will let him elaborate.

Ambassador Hartman. This is a col
laborative operation here. We are talk-
ing to a new leadership here, and we ar^
reiterating our position. It is very clear
to the new leadership.

Secretary Shultz. I don't think the
message is complicated. That is what
makes it a good message. It is simple.
And it is that we are realists. We will
stay that way; we are strong, we will
stay that way; we are constructive, we '
are ready to solve problems; we will con-
tinue ready to do so, ready to respond,
and if that takes place then the world
can be better for everyone.

Q. That means your happening to
be here is not necessarily to carry a
new message but to restate a standing
message from the United States. You
are not bringing anything new in the
way of proposals from the Administra-
tion for easing the situation between
us.

A. I think our basic policy is clear.
We have sought to make it clear. The
President has and we have emphasized,
particularly right now, our readiness to
work for a more constructive relation-
ship than the one we have had in the re-
cent past. You might say that is point
three in the four-point list that I gave.
All four points are there, I only sought
to put a little emphasis on number three

Q. Could you bring us up to date
on the status of the two negotiations
going on in Geneva on arms limita-
tions issues.

A. I don't know that there is too
much to be said there. They are going
on. They are going on in a businesslike
manner. The people who are conducting
the negotiations are professionals-
skillful people. We know that our
negotiators are such, and they tell me
that their estimate of the Soviet

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

gotiators is that they are professional,
'mpetent people who are businesslike
their approach, so the negotiations
e going on. I don't think that I want
characterize them further.

Q. I think the real question is do
iU see any progress in these talks, or
e they just at a stage where both
des are just exchanging positions
ithout any give occuring on either
de?

A. I think there is an intensive ex-
lange of positions which I suppose in
6 process of explaining tends to
;velop them in more richness and
;tail, so that's where I will leave that.

Q. Can you explain the quid pro
•10 from the lifting of the pipeline
motions? Apart from promising to
ake studies on East-West trade, it's
Dt exactly clear what concrete com-
litments the West Europeans have
iken in response to our lifting the
mctions.

A. We haven't conducted our discus-
ons with the Europeans along that line
t all. We haven't discussed these mat-
;rs with the foreign ministers going
ack to the 37th U.N. [General
ssembly] Session when I started with
lem. And while they were talking with
le about it, and at the La Sapiniere
leeting of the NATO Foreign
linisters — our efforts were to find the
asis for a common strategic under-
tanding of how we would conduct our
conomic relationships with the Soviet
Inion.

The general idea is that we're not
joking for a trade war; however, we
re looking to focus on certain aspects
f trade and finance— aspects of trade
hat are related to the military capability
if the Soviet Union, to the strategic
losture of the Soviet Union, and in view
if the huge expenditures that we and
lur allies are undertaking for our
lefense. The only reason we're under-
taking them is that the level of defense
'ffort in the Soviet Union is so great. In
/iew of that, it makes no sense to sub-
ddize the Soviet economy. So, based on
hose principles, we will work together
:o develop a strategy in the meantime.
The COCOM [Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Security Export Con-
trols] list is being examined and
strengthened, and a stronger adminis-
trative capacity is being connected to it.
An intensive study of energy alter-
natives will be undertaken.

In the meantime, in [inaudible]

Government involved have undertaken
not to have any additional purchases of
Soviet gas while people look around and
reflect and see what the alternatives
are. The agreement at Versailles to ex-
amine the flows of trade and finance will
be implemented in an administrative
capacity. There is renewed emphasis on
working out export credit arrangements.

So, there are a whole series of
things that are involved. Some are in
the nature of immediate action; some
are in the nature of a work program. In
the long long run, well, of course, you
cannot say what a work program will
produce. It is always possible that it
won't produce anything. My own esti-
mate is that the effort to find a better
strategic posture is likely to be a very
productive and worthwhile effort in the
long run.

Q. Does the change in leadership
in the Soviet Union increase in any
way your view of the possibility of a
summit meeting?

A. Our attitude toward a summit
meeting remains as being in favor of one
if it is well prepared so that it is possible
to imagine that something constructive
might come out of it. The same would
hold now with a new Soviet leadership.
We will just have to see but, in principle,
the President is willing to have such a
meeting but only if it can be a construc-
tive one and have a constructive out-
come.

Q. A recent Soviet speech seems to
say that the way to peace is through
military might.

A. Soviet military might has been
increasing. That is a description of their
policy. We can speak about our own
policy which is to be strong, to develop
our strength, to see that it is based
solidly on a very strong and productive
economy. And, at the same time to say
beyond that, if you want to try to work
toward a world that is less tense, that
has more constructive possibilities in it,
that includes the possibilities of reduc-
tions in armaments, we are prepared to
do so.

Q. Is it present U.S. policy to en-
courage American trade with the
Soviets, and will you please comment
on the visit this week of hundreds of
American businessmen to Moscow?

A. The fact that the U.S. delegation
coming to Moscow— as large as it is
and, I might say, as distinguished as it

is — there are some very important and
strong business leaders included in that
delegation — is an indication of the fun-
damental interest and goodwill of the
American people. In a sense, that com-
plements the message that President
Reagan enunciated in his various
statements which have been quoted
here — that we are ready to work with
the Soviet Union if the circumstances
are right.

The fact of the matter is that the
circumstances have not been --ight; they
have not been conducive to the eruption
of trade, particularly, but along the lines
of the answers to various questions
here, if the circumstances change, the
fact that so many high-level businessmen
are coming suggests the interest and the
potential for a response. When people
come here, that is not trade, that is an
exhibition of a willingness to trade. For
an actual trade to take place, it requires
a lot more. I might say that there is an
interesting closing of the circle here. I
believe that the last time I was in
Moscow in 1973 — almost 10 years
ago — that was the meeting at which the
first American business group met with
the governmental counterparts to start
this process. That is still in existence,
although it has been on a very slow
track in recent years.

Q. When you speak of these cir-
cumstances, what exactly do you have
in mind? Can you just speculate?

A. We have expressed our concerns
in various ways. There are a variety of
human rights concerns that the Presi-
dent and the American people generally
feel very strong about. We really do
care a lot about human beings in the
United States. There are regional issues
of various dimensions; there is arms con-
trol; there is a variety of things through
which progress conceivably could be
made, and progress has to change the
atmosphere.

Q. I was wondering if in the last 2
or 3 days if the Soviet leadership has
done or said anything that will make
you hope for an improvement in rela-
tions between the two countries. Is
there any sign at all?

A. It is really too early in the
emergence of a new leadership to be try-
ing to read the tea leaves that way.
They are in the process of getting
organized. We will see what comes for-
ward. In the meantime, we will try to
express our own viewpoint; the presi-
dent has. And supplementing and com-
menting his view, there is the fact that

January 1983

EUROPE

the Vice President has broken off from a
very important trip to Africa, to which
he will return, and he will complete all
of the visits. Nevertheless, he broke off
from that visit to come here — all as an
expression of the importance that the
United States attaches to the Soviet
Union and to our relationship with the
Soviet Union.

Q. Can we perhaps meet with you
again before you leave Moscow?

A. It depends upon the schedule.
Everything hangs on the schedule. We
have some meetings tomorrow morning.
I do not know, I cannot speak for the
Vice President's schedule. I do not
know, precisely, when he will return. So,
there is a lot of uncertainty, but if there
is anything to say as a result of
whatever happens here, we will certainly
want to get you together and tell you
what it is. I have always been taught by
John Hughes, "If you have any news, do
not sit on it." Chances are it is very
unlikely that we will have any news. But
if we do, we will see that you get it.

Q. Did you say who these meetings
are with tomorrow morning?

A. They are not with Soviet of-
ficials. Mr. Pym [British Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs Francis] has gotten in touch with
me, and I hope I can get together with
him. He has made the request and Mr.
[West German Vice Chancellor Hans-
Dietrich] Genscher of the Federal
Republic of Germany has also requested
that I talk with him. As you know, Mr.
Kohl [West German Chancellor Helmut]
is in Washington, so, I suppose since we
are not in Washington, we had better
have our own meeting to see what we
think, and there may be some others.

Q. Will you be trying to meet with
the Chinese before you leave?

A. I do not have any scheduled
meetings, and I doubt that it is possible.
We checked schedules.

American Role in NATO

•Texts from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 15, 1982.

^Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman John Hughes.

'White House press releases.

*Made at Spaso House, Moscow. Press
release 349. ■

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Statevtent before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on November SO,
1982. Ambassador Eagleburger is Under
Secretary for Political Affairs. '

I welcome the opportunity to testify to-
day on the American role in NATO. Too
often in foreign policy, as elsewhere, we
take the most important things for
granted. Too rarely do we examine the
foundations of our security and our role
in the world. This is an important time
for the United States to examine and
state clearly our policies toward Euro-
pean security.

• We are now almost 2 years into
the Reagan Administration.

• In the Soviet Union, a new leader-
ship has just taken up the reins of
power. While it is unlikely that Mr. An-
dropov [Yuriy V. Andropov, General
Secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union] and his associates will
veer far from existing Soviet policies,
they are undoubtedly now studying the
opportunities and constraints they face.
They are sizing up our resolve and
steadiness and, in particular, our ability
to maintain a unified Western alliance.

• In Europe, we and our allies are
succeeding in putting behind us conten-
tious questions regarding the Siberian
gas pipeline and are about to start an ef-
fort to shape a coordinated Western ap-
proach to East- West economic relations
for the rest of this decade.

Against this backdrop we are now
hearing voices in this country calling for
a scaling down of the American role in
NATO. Most disturbingly, we are facing
specific proposals in the Senate and the
House which would, among other things,
reduce the level of U.S. forces in Europe
and interfere with our ability to meet
our commitment to modernize NATO's
nuclear forces.

When such views surfaced in the
past, the national commitment to a
strong Atlantic alliance prevailed. Hav-
ing fought two wars to defeat aggres-
sion in Europe, the American people
know that our interests cannot be in-
sulated from events across the Atlantic.
We decided after the second of those
wars— as we should decide again
now— that alliance with the other
Western democracies is vital to our na-
tion's security and prosperity. If we

have learned anything from the history
of this century it is that we cannot
retreat to a fortress America nor safel
disengage from European affairs.

Europe has become more, not lessJ'
important for us over the three decade'
since the alliance was formed. The Euj*
pean and North American economies s\
now so tightly knit together that neithS
can grow without the other. The allied '
countries are our main export market.
American direct investment in Europe
an important positive factor in our
balance of payments and contributes
heavily to the profitability of America)
business.

The United States and Western
Europe are more than simply trading
and political partners, however. Our
security is unalterably linked with thei
Western Europe is quite literally our
first line of defense. It is the center of
our global competition with the Soviet
Union and by far the most alluring ob
ject of Soviet ambitions.

NATO's strength and cohesion ha\
protected Western freedom and
democracy and kept Europe peaceful t
over three decades, despite a menacing
Soviet military presence. If we some-
times forget that our European allies
stand face to face with Soxaet tanks ai
with Eastern totalitarianism, if the
Soviet challenge sometimes seems dis-
tant to us, it is because NATO has bee
effective.

In recent years, Soviet military
might has grown more rapidly than
ever. Soviet foreign policy has become
more assertive and aggressive. The in^
sion and occupation of Afghanistan is
Moscow's first attempt since the end o
the Second World War to expand by
force the area under its direct control.
The assault on the people of Poland
shows that the Soviet leaders will not
permit free institutions in countries
where it has military dominion.

The new leadership in Moscow fac^
basic choices about the Soviet role in t;
world. If they see an America drawing
inward, a demoralized Western allianc'
and our European partners in doubt
about the U.S. commitment, their ince
tive to act with greater restraint will 1
diminished.

The need for a strong Atlantic
alliance based on unity of purpose and
steady American leadership has never
been more critical.

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

josed Senate Legislation

Reagan Administration is par-
arly concerned; therefore, by the
pect of legislation that would cast
)t on the steadiness of the U.S. com-
nent to NATO. The current Senate
nse appropriations bill, which con-
5 provisions to cut back American
icipation in NATO defense pro-
ns, would, if passed, signal a broad
, retreat from its responsibilities and
sadership.

Passage of this legislation would be
ndamental departure from the
Drical bipartisan postwar U.S. ap-
ich to national security. Never has
American role in the defense of
;tern Europe been reduced through
slation. Never has the United States
ced away from its NATO com-
ments. And never have the elected
•esentatives of the American people
'd not to stand by our allies and back
)ur defense commitments. Are we
ly ready now to take such a fateful
)? Do we really want to greet the
■ Soviet leadership with a sharp
iation from the policies that have so
.■essfully preserved Western security
American leadership in Europe?
The provisions that have been in-
,ed in the Senate version of the pro-
ed appropriations act that would be
it damaging are:

• The reduction by 18,900 troops of
American force planned for the end
iscal year 1983;

• The elimination of funds to pro-

e heavy equipment for prestocking at
) sites provided by Belgium and the
sherlands;

• The elimination of the American
■tion of the funding for 93,000 Ger-
n reservists who will support our

ts in wartime under the host nation
iport program;

• Cuts in funding for the ground-
nched cruise missile, which would
ce us to stretch our deployment
ledules; and

• Restrictions on transatlantic
'ense cooperation and trade.

Let me emphasize one point right
['ay. This Administration, like the Con-
'ess, is seriously concerned about the
dget. We recognize that a sound
3nomy is the necessary foundation for
iuccessful foreign policy. But the pro-
;ions I have just outlined have almost
thing to do with budgetary austerity,
le total saving contemplated by these
ti-NATO proposals before the Senate

is about $150 million, which is less than
one-tenth of 1% of the total defense
budget.

If the political consequences of these
measures were as insignificant as the
budgetary savings, I would not be here
today. But the impact of these measures
on our security would be out of all pro-
portion to their budgetary significance.

Burdensharing Within NATO

I am aware that this legislation reflects
a concern about the fairness of the dis-
tribution of defense burdens within the
alliance. Like you, we want the allies to
do more for the common defense. And it
is true that U.S. defense spending is
now growing faster than that of the
allies. But let me remind you that we in
the United States neglected military pro-
grams for nearly a generation and that
only today are we repairing the
resulting gaps in our forces. We must
sprint now because we went so slowly
for so many years.

In contrast, the allies have kept up a
strikingly steady pace. During the
1970s, their defense spending rose at a
rate of 2% per year in real terms. Our
defense spending declined in real terms
by 1% per year during the same period.
If we had matched the allied growth
rate during the 1970s we would not need
to accelerate now. Conversely, had the
allies failed to maintain their steady ef-
fort in those years— had their defense

Effects on U.S. Security

After all the arguments and counter-
arguments about burdensharing have
been heard, we must, at the end of the
day, ask ourselves one basic question:
Will the United States be more or less
secure if these provisions are enacted? I
believe the answer is clearly "less
secure." Let me outline the effects I
foresee.

First, the American commitment to
NATO would be placed in doubt. I do
not see how the advocates of this legisla-
tion could dispute this or argue that
causing doubts about our commitment
would advance our interests. Nothing
could weaken the alliance more than the
perception in Europe that the United
States is not determined to preserve
European security. Our allies would take
little comfort in the fact that the amount
of money involved is small. They would
see passage of these cuts as a statement
of U.S. intentions; they would interpret
it as the beginning of a more general
American retreat from Europe.

The Soviet would undoubtedly try to
exploit the inevitable doubts and fears of
the Europeans. Dividing us from our
allies and pushing us out of Europe are,
of course, central goals of Soviet foreign
policy. The Administration has, as you
know, recently made progress in healing
divisions and rebuilding consensus and
confidence in the alliance. This legisla-
tion could undo what has been achieved.

Nothing could weaken the alliance more than the
perception in Europe that the United States is not
determined to preserve European security.

spending decisions been dominated by
considerations of what some here in the
United States now call "equity" rather
than need— the alliance would not be as
secure as it is today.

In any case, it would be a tragic
mistake to allow concerns about burden-
sharing to prevent us from doing what
is necessary for our own security.
Following that policy would allow those
whose defense performance is weakest
to set the standard. We are fortunate
that the allies did not adopt such an at-
titude during a time of less-than-
adequate U.S. performance.

Second, reductions, especially reduc-
tions in the number of American troops
in Europe, would send the worst possi-
ble signal to European publics about the
importance of a strong defense. NATO
and U.S. leaders have been warning
Europeans that the Soviet threat is
gi'owing. Reducing American forces or
abandoning planned improvements
would make those warnings sound
hollow and undermine European public
and parliamentary support for defense
expenditures.

Proponents of this legislation may
claim that our doing less would jolt our
allies into doing more. 1 see no basis for
such wishful thinking. U.S. cuts would

Tiuary 1983

EUROPE

have the opposite effect. If we do less,
the Europeans will do less, and we will
all be less secure.

Third, these cuts, while small in
dollar amounts, would hit priority, cost-
effective programs especially hard. The
proposed troop cuts could leave our com-
bat forces undermanned or force the
withdrawal of other essential units.
Reductions in funding for prepositioning
combat equipment and our share of the
host nation support agreement would
compound the difficulties and costs of
wartime deployment.

We are constantly striving to make
our dollars buy more fighting strength.
These programs enhance our combat
capacity by improving what is some-
times called our "teeth-to-tail" ratio. The
proposed cuts would, therefore, reverse
a major effort to improve our forces' ef-
fectiveness, while saving very little
money. Moreover, they would not simply
penalize our allies but our own forces by
denying them the means to carry out
their rapid reinforcement mission.

Fourth, these cuts would damage
the very programs in which allied per-
formance has been especially good. The
Europeans have joined the host nation
support and prepositioning programs
with the clear and correct understanding
that we would match or supplement
them. If we now back down on our side
of the bargain, we will not only lose the
benefits of these programs but will
undermine our credibility for the
development of any future cooperative
efforts.

In 1978 at a summit meeting in
Washington, alliance leaders agreed to a
long-term program providing, among
other things, for rapid U.S. wartime re-
inforcement of Europe. Since then, our
allies have fulfilled their commitment.
For example, Belgium and the Nether-
lands, both small and flensely populated
countries, have gone to considerable ef-
fort and expense to obtain the land re-
quired to store prepositioned U.S. equip-
ment. The Federal Republic of Germany
has allocated half the funds for 93,000
additional German reservists to support
U.S. deployments. The proposed ap-
propriations bill would threaten both of

these programs. Is this a sensible way to
respond when the allies have done just
what we proposed they do?

If restrictions on our contributions
to the long-term defense program stand,
the entire program will atrophy. We will
turn a notable success into failure. We
will cancel out much of what we and the
allies have already achieved— and paid
for.

Last June in Bonn, President
Reagan and his allied counterparts com-
mitted themselves in a special summit
charter to specific plans for improving
NATO's conventional capabilities. This
charter called for the achievement of de-
manding force goals and identified
priority programs. I cannot now
guarantee that this charter will be im-
plemented in every detail, though we
will work to that end. But I can say with
absolute confidence that if these cuts are
legislated that charter will not be trans-
lated into concrete improvements.

Let me restate unequivocally our
agreement that the allies need to do
more. This Administration has made
that clear at every opportunity, here and
abroad, and is working to produce a
greater allied contribution to our com-
mon defense effort.

Our attempts to foster better coor-
dination of U.S. and European defense
spending and to have our allies take
greater responsibility for our common
defense are bearing fruit. But only if we
ourselves keep the commitments that we
have made can we count on the allies to
improve their performance.

Finally, a legislated, unilateral U.S.
pullback from our military commitments
to NATO would damage prospects for
arms control. Unilateral U.S. troop with-
drawals would remove any incentive for
the Soviets to agree to mutual reduc-
tions that would lower the threat and
ease the military confrontation in the
heart of Europe. At the MBFR [mutual
and balanced force reductions] talks in
Vienna we are seeking to negotiate the
new Western draft treaty put forward
by the President last spring. That treaty
would correct the present imbalance be-
tween Soviet and Western forces in Cen-
tral Europe through significant, verifi-
able reductions to equal levels.

A cut in funding for the gi'ound-
launched cruise missile and the deletion

of funds for the deployment of the Pe
shing II missile, which has been votec
the House, would dash our hopes for
negotiated solution to the problem po :
by the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-ran
nuclear missiles. In the INF [inter- i
mediate-range nuclear forces] talks inj
Geneva, we have proposed a treaty tl||
would ban this whole class of Soviet i\
U.S. intermediate-range nuclear
missiles. But only if we and our allies
show that we are resolved to deploy
U.S. missiles in Europe can we get tl
Soviets to negotiate seriously.

The advocates of this legislation (
it to us all to explain how it would he
arms control and thus contribute to
reduction of the threat. Is there any
evidence that unilateral limits and cu
can have anything other than a destr
five effect on negotiated arms contro
Should we not be more concerned abi
reducing the threat than about rediu- i
our ability to counter it? :

Conclusion

Let me conclude with a few basic poi
The Atlantic alliance has provided we
for Western security for 30 years. Th
alliance is built upon the forces that
and our allies have deployed in Europ
and the conviction that the LInited
States is fully committed to the defen
of Europe. When those forces and th;
conviction are strong, deterrence in
Europe is sturdy and we are secure. '
weaken them at our peril. The world
be dangerous enough in this decade. I
not in our interest to tamper with Nol
Atlantic security. '

1 The complete transcript of the heari l
will be published by the committee and wil
be available from the Superintendent of '
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of
fice. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bulla'

EUROPE

sit of Italian Prime Minister Spadolini

^rime Minister Giovanni Spadolini
ily made an official working visit to
hington, D.C.. November 2-1,, 1982.
^wing are remarks made by Presi-
Reagan and Prime Minister
Mini after their meeting on
miber 3.

lident Reagan

le Minister Spadolini and I have had
)st productive and harmonious
ission today covering a wide range
aportant issues. Our discussions con-
ed the wide-ranging accord that
ts between our two countries on
;ers affecting world peace, Western
larity, and international economic
leration. And this is only fitting as
/een allies as close as the United
es and Italy.

On the key issues of East-West
e, Prime Minister Spadolini and I
!e that the United States, Italy, and
other allies must pursue discussions
;d at establishing a broad transatlan-
onsensus. Our trade and financial
tions with the Soviet Union must
• into account the nature of the
iet conduct toward its neighbors.
Prime Minister shared with me
)f's special perspective in this regard.
We discussed the current situation
le Middle East, where our two coun-
3 are working closely both to
rantee the peace which prevails in
Sinai and to assist the Government
..ebanon in securing withdrawal of all
dgn forces and restoring its full
lority throughout the territory. The
Tie Minister stated a readiness in
iciple to support the expansion of
y's contribution to the multinational
;e in the context of broadening the
;e's mandate and its composition. I
it to take this occasion to extend my
sonal appreciation to the Prime
lister for his vigorous and construc-
! contributions that Italy is making to
promotion of peace and stability in
t critical region.

We also discussed the importance of
aerospace industry in strengthening
technological capability of the West,
1 we've agreed to instruct the ap-
ipriate authorities in our respective
rernments to facilitate cooperation in
3 sector. In this connection, the Prime

Minister and I agree that our govern-
ments would establish working groups
to explore the means of future coopera-
tion between our two nations.

During our discussion of Western
security issues, I expressed appreciation
to the Prime Minister for Italy's in-
dispensable contribution to the
December 1979 NATO decision on the
intermediate-range nuclear forces. I
reaffirm to him my commitment to pur-
sue vigorously negotiations leading to
the elimination of such forces by both
sides and to the deep reduction in
strategic nuclear forces as well.

I'd like to close on a personal note.
This was my fourth meeting with the
Prime Minister, and my admiration and
respect for him has grown with each en-
counter. The United States has no bet-
ter friend in the world than Italy, and
the West has no more erudite and distin-
guished a leader than my friend, Giovan-
ni Spadolini. After our meetings in
Europe, it was a great pleasure for me
to receive him here at home, and I look
forward to seeing him once again when
he returns to the United States for the
economic summit that will be held in
Williamsburg next spring.

Prime Minister Spadolini

I have come today to see President
Reagan, together with Foreign Minister
[Emilio] Colombo, not only in behalf of
Italy but also as the interpreter of the
concerns and common feelings of West-
ern Europe— that Europe that finds
itself in the values of freedom and
tolerance and of respect of man for
man, which are part and parcel of the
Atlantic community.

I have told President Reagan about
the absolute need to find a global
strategy in the economic and trade rela-
tions with the Eastern countries. The
misunderstandings of the last months
must be replaced by a new partnership
on a basis of equal dignity and a mutual
understanding based on the agreements

of Versailles and on which the Italian
contribution was determined.

As Italians, we feel that in con-
sistency with the approach adopted at
Versailles, the Western World must find
and define a common approach based on
a greater strictness of an economic
nature in its relations with the Eastern
world and based on and inspired by the
following four points:

First, no undue gift to the Soviet
Union as far as credits are concerned;
[second], greater strictness in the
transfer of technologies to the Soviet
Union; third, implementation of a securi-
ty net within the Western system so as
to reduce the dependence on the ^Soviet
Union concerning raw materials and
energy products; fourth, the contracts
that have already been signed by Euro-
pean countries concerning the pipeline
must be honored, so as not to prejudge
the credibility as far as the trade of the
Western World is concerned.

But I think that, amongst these four
points, we also feel that it is indispen-
sable to have a prejudicial position that
would affect, in a legitimate manner, the
past or that would create obstacles for
the future.

Following the first meetings that I
have had here in Washington, the
United States has made a further step
forward toward the solution of this
problem through a formula which will be
presented this evening to the Am-
bassadors of the countries concerned.
And within this perspective, and aware
of the need of the lifting of sanctions as
a consequence of the new agreement,

nuary 1983

EUROPE

Italy will continue to commit itself to
find a conclusion and a solution, so as to
have a global agreement — a solution
which I think is very near.

I will also present this same position
in Paris in the very close meeting that I
will have with President [Francois] Mit-
terrand. The political solidarity between
Europe and the United States that we
want to defend at all costs also implies
the overcoming of these conflicts which
are not necessary and that we are hav-
ing because of the Soviet Union.

Italy is and will always be coherent
to the principles that have been inspir-
ing, for more than 30 years, its foreign
policy, and which are based on the
strengthening of the bonds with its part-
ners of the Western World and first and
foremost, with the United States, which
is the essential premise to start, once
again, and on the basis of a guaranteed
security, the East- West dialog, which is
undergoing new tensions today which
torment us and concern us very much. I
am thinking in particular of the situation
in Poland and in Afghanistan. This is
why, in spite of the international dif-
ficulties— and I think that because of
these difficulties — we are convinced
more than ever about the fact that we
should pursue in the negotiations under-
going in Geneva for a balanced control
and reduction of armaments.

I have reaffirmed to President
Reagan the conviction that Italy has:
that to find peace in the world it is
necessary to also act for the develop-
ment of a policy which would favor the
dialog between the North and the South
on our planet. And I am referring in
particular to the difficult areas of the
Mediterranean. And it is in this frame-
work that I am thinking of satisfaction
of the joint action of our two coun-
tries— first, in the Sinai, and today, in
Beirut, an action that we want to
strengthen in agreements between our
two governments and that in the next
days will find a further development

with the parallel decisions which will in-
crease our presence in Lebanon, always
with the aim of giving to that torn coun-
try a condition of true independence and
stability.

Within the framework of bilateral
collaboration, which is developing in all
fields from the economic to the cultural,
and within the framework of our col-
laboration, also, in the fight against ter-
rorism and against narcotics, I have told
President Reagan about the Italian deci-
sion which will have to be now defined
in the competent fora, to buy from the
American industry 30^ McDonnell-
Douglas DC9 80 aircraft.

I have also conveyed to President
Reagan the warm greetings of the Presi-
dent of the Italian Republic, Mr. Sandro
Pertini, seeing with satisfaction that in
the last 2 years Italy has confirmed its
role amongst the most industrialized
countries of the Western World. And
this is why I've been able to come here
expressing the voice of an Italy which is
determined to respect its international
commitments and to, therefore, begin
working from the strengthening of
defense in the Atlantic Alliance; to
struggle, therefore, against economic
difficulties which are common to the
whole Western industrialized world. And
we are doing this in a very strict and
steadfast manner.

All Europeans know how much they
owe to the United States that twice has
given back freedom to our continent.
And I, therefore, have been interpreter
of these feelings to my friend. President
Ronald Reagan, a man that I admire
very much for his loyalty, dedication to
individual freedoms of the whole world.

'Made on the South Lawn of the WTiite
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 8, 1982.)

^Prime Minister Spadolini spoke in
Italian, and his remarks were translated by
an interpreter. In the original translation, the
interpreter said three aircraft. She corrected
the error at the conclusion of her translation
of the Prime Minister's remarks. ■

Visit of
West German
Chancellor Kohl

Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West G
many made an official visit to
Washington, D.C., November 14-16,
1982, to meet with President Reagan c
other high-ranking Administration of
ficials. Following is the full text of the
joint communique issued following
Chancellor Kohl's meeting with the Pr
dent on November 15.^

During the visit of the Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Ko
he and President Reagan held detailed tal
in Washington on current political and
economic issues on November 15, 1982. T
Chancellor is also meeting with Secretary
State Shultz, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, Secretary of the Treasury
Regan, high-ranking Administration offici ,
and leading members of the Senate.

The discussions attested to the depth ;
the breadth of German-American friendsh
The United States and the Federal Repub
of Germany are partners as well as friend
sharing common ideals, human and demo-
cratic values. In today's uncertain world, ti
commitment has become more important
than ever. Our shared values form the un-
shakeable foundation for our joint efforts
maintain the freedom and prosperity of th
Western world.

The discussions were based on a deter
mination to work together as closely as pc
ble to meet the challenges of the closing
decades of the twentieth century. These
challenges are as critical as those which fa (
the great statesmen who founded our part
nership more than three decades ago. Dur ;
the past thirty years the Atlantic partnersf
has been successful in guaranteeing to our
peoples more freedom, security and pros-
perity than at any time in history. The Pre
dent and the Chancellor reaffirmed during
their discussions their common view on th^
central role played by the Atlantic Alliancir
the foreign policies of their respective
governments.

A major reason for success of the Atla
tic Alliance has been the close relationship
which has developed between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Genua ■
German-American ties are deeper than .-^inii
calculations of national interest. After \\' >\
War II and after the destruction caused l)y
in Germany, these ties originated from the
generous humanitarian aid and the politics
support which the United States granted t
the German people and their young denioc
racy. German-American relations are base^
on a close affection among our two people:

Department of State Buiiei

EUROPE

familial ties between Americans and Ger-
is. Ours is a relationship based on mutual
port and open discussions between equal
;ners.

During the discussions it was agreed that
1 level consultations between the United
tes and the Federal Republic of Germany
be continued during a visit to Bonn by
retary of State Shultz in early December.
An example of the close ties between our

nations are the more than fifty million
ericans of German descent. German
ericans have provided major contributions
very aspect of American life and form

of the foundations of American society.

President and the Chancellor anticipated
1 pleasure the joint celebration in 1983 of
Tricentennial of German immigration to
United States. President Reagan an-
nced today the formation of a Presidential
imemoration of this important event,
mcellor Kohl described plans for celebra-
18 in the Federal Republic of Germany.
'.y stressed that the Tricentennial should
i joint celebration among the peoples of
ir two nations and reaffirmed the inten-
1 of President Reagan and President
■stens to meet in the United States in
ober, 1983, to highlight the American
;bration.

The wider the understanding of the com-
nality of the issues facing the United
tes and the Federal Republic of Germany,

stronger our partnership will become.
• this reason. President Reagan and
mcellor Kohl were pleased to reaffirm
ir support for the initiatives to broaden
5. -German contacts and to set up a
Itilateral youth exchange among Western
ustrialized democracies. The purpose is to
;s on to the younger generations in our na-
is the sense of partnership which the older
leration feels so deeply.

The President and the Chancellor reaf-
med the Alliance's overall concept for suc-
isfully safeguarding peace in Europe as
ibodied in the declaration made by the
ads of state and government of the Atlan-

Alliance in Bonn on June 10, 1982. As
■essed in that declaration, they agreed that
accordance with current NATO defense
ins, and within the context of NATO
•ategy and its triad of forces, they will con-
lue to strengthen NATO's defense posture,
th special regard to conventional forces.
The Alliance has demonstrated that it
rves the cause of peace and freedom. Even

difficult situations, it has been able to do

because its members have acted in a spirit

solidarity. The Alliance does not threaten
lyone. Nor does it aspire to superiority, but

the interests of peace it cannot accept in-
riority either. Its aim is, as before, to pre-
!nt any war and safeguard peace and
eedom. None of the weapons of the Alliance
ill ever be used except in response to at-

The Chancellor paid tribute to the crucial

)ntribution that the United States renders
1 the joint security of the Alliance through
le indispensable presence of American

troops in Europe. The President and the
Chancellor agreed that a unilateral reduction
of American troops would have a destabiliz-
ing effect and, at the same time, would
undermine efforts for negotiated force reduc-
tions.

The President expressed his great ap-
preciation for the significant and uninter-
rupted German contribution to the common
defense. In particular, he paid tribute to the
German-American agreement of April 15,
1982 on Wartime Host Nation Support,
which entails considerable additional expend-
iture by the Federal Republic of Germany
and the United States of America for com-
mon defense.

The President and the Chancellor
stressed the need for close, comprehensive,
and timely consultations to strengthen the
Alliance's cohesion and its capacity to act.
They attached particular importance to
German-American cooperation. They hoped
that informal meetings of the foreign
ministers of the Alliance would be continued.

The President welcomed the resolve of
the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany to strengthen European unification.
The President and the Chancellor paid tribute
to the important role of the European Com-
munity and all its member states for
economic and political stability in Europe and
the world. The development of a united
Europe will strengthen cooperation between
Europe and the United States and, hence,
also reinforce the Alliance.

The President and the Chancellor paid
tribute to the close agreement and coopera-
tion between the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the Three Powers in all matters
relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole.
They concurred in the view that the preser-
vation of trouble-free conditions in and
around Berlin was an essential element of
East- West relations and of the international
situation as a whole.

The President reaffirmed American sup-
port for the political aim of the Federal

Republic of Germany to work for a state of
peace in Europe in which the German nation
will regain its unity through self-
determination.

A major subject discussed during the
meetings was relations with the Soviet
Union. The values and goals of the Soviet
Union do not correspond to our own. The
USSR restricts freedom on its own territory
and in countries under its influence, and has
shown that it is ready to use force or the
threat of force to achieve its foreign policy
aims. Security of Western societies requires
constant attention to the military threat
posed by the USSR. The Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America
gear their policies in East- West relations to
the concept of renunciation of force, human
rights, and the right of nations to self deter-
mination.

The President and the Chancellor called
upon the Soviet Union to comply with inter-
nationally recognized rules of conduct. This
required respect for the principles enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations and in
the Helsinki Final Act as well as a world-
wide policy of moderation and restraint.
In this spirit, the President and the
Chancellor underlined their desire to improve
relations with the Soviet Union. They are
ready to conduct relations with the new
leadership in Moscow with the aim of extend-
ing areas of cooperation to their mutual
benefit if Soviet conduct makes that possible.
It is especially important at present for the
West to approach the Soviet Union with a
clear, steadfast and coherent attitude which
combines the defense of its own interests
with the readiness to pursue constrjuctive
relations, dialogue, and cooperation with the
leadership of the Soviet Union.

In this regard, the President and the
Chancellor greeted with satisfaction the re-
cent Eigreement on measures leading to a
broader consensus on East- West economic
relations. They attached the greatest impor-
tance to a common approach to this issue.
Close consultation and cooperation on East-
West economic issues is as vital to Western
interests as is the traditional cooperation on
political and security questions.

It is the purpose of our common efforts
that trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe should be conducted on the basis of a
balance of mutual advantages. While noting
the important part which our economic rela-
tions with the Warsaw Pact countries can
play in the development of a stable East-
West relationship, the President and the
Chancellor agreed that those relations should
be approached in a prudent and diversified
manner, consistent with our political and
security interests.

The Chancellor expressed his appreciation
for the lifting of the embargo on oil and gas
technology and equipment, which he con-
sidered as evidence of successful efforts on
the part of all concerned for improved coor-
dination of Western policy in the economic
field.

The President and the Chancellor agreed
that developments in Poland, which continued

anuary 1983

EUROPE

to cause great concern, had an adverse effect
on efforts to promote security and coopera-
tion in Europe. They drew attention once
more to the Soviet Union's responsibility for
the events in Poland. They called upon the
Polish leadership to lift martial law in
Poland, to release all detainees, to reverse
the ban on the trade union Solidarity and,
through serious dialogue with the Church and
appointed workers' representatives, to seek
national consensus which is the only way to
lead Poland out of its present crisis, free
from any external interference. They hoped
that the release of Lech Walesa will promote
these objectives. The President and the
Chancellor welcomed the numerous initiatives
for humanitarian aid for the Polish people.
They agreed that this aid should be stepped
up wherever possible.

The President and the Chancellor agreed
on the importance of the CSCE process ini-
tiated by the Helsinki Final Act and ad-
vocated that it be continued. It is a long-term
process which has been gravely affected by
events in Poland. It can prove successful only
if the participating countries observe the
principles and provisions of the Final Act in
their entirety. They expressed support for
the new proposals, responsive to events in
Poland and the USSR, put forward by the
West in the resumed Madrid session, as
reasonable and essential elements of a bal-
anced outcome.

The President and the Chancellor agreed
that the CSCE review conference, which was
resumed in Madrid on November 9, 1982,
should agree on a substantive and balanced
final document which leads to progress in the
important humanitarian field of East-West
relations and contains a precise mandate for
a Conference on Disarmament in Europe
(CDE), envisaging militarily significant con-
fidence and security building measures cover-
ing the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to
the Urals.

The President and the Chancellor noted
that arms control and disarmament as well as
defense and deterrence were integral parts of
NATO's security policy. They agreed that
significant progress towards reduction of the
levels of nuclear and conventional forces
through balanced and verifiable agreements
would be an important contribution to the
reduction of international tensions. The inces-
sant unilateral increase in Soviet armaments
in recent years has threatened the security
and made even more urgent the need to
establish a balance of forces between East
and West. The goal of the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany remains to
achieve a stable balance of both nuclear and
conventional forces at the lowest possible
level.

The President and the Chancellor recalled
the comprehensive program of arms control
proposals put forward by the United States
on the basis of close consultation and adopted
by the entire Alliance at the Bonn Summit on
June 10, 1982. They stressed their common
belief that this program provides the best
hope for true reductions in arsenal of both in-
termediate and intercontinental strategic

weapons. They rejected the proposals to
freeze existing levels of nuclear weapons, or
for one-sided reductions by the West, as in-
adequate for substantive arms control and as
harmful to the security of the Atlantic
Alliance.

They noted also that the Soviet Union
had in recent years refused to reciprocate the
unilateral restraint in this field by the United
States. They expressed the strong judgment
that true reductions in nuclear armaments
would be possible only when the Soviet Union
is convinced of the determination of the West
to maintain its defenses at the level
necessary to meet the threat posed by
massive increases in Soviet nuclear forces.

In this connection they attached par-
ticular importance to negotiations on reduc-
tions of strategic arms and of intermediate
range nuclear forces now underway between
the United States and the Soviet Union in
Geneva. President Reagan reaffirmed his
determination to do his utmost to achieve
true reductions in nuclear armaments
through balanced and verifiable agreements.
The President and the Chancellor pointed out
that negotiations in Geneva are serious and
substantial. At the same time they expressed
concern at the refusal of the Soviet Union to
take into account legitimate Western security
concerns.

In conformity with their policy for activ
ly safeguarding peace through firmness and,
negotiation, the President and the Chancelk
reaffirmed their commitment to both parts (
the NATO dual-track decision of Decem- i
ber 12, 1979, consisting of a program of INJ
modernization and an offer to the Soviet
Union of arms control negotiations on INF.
An important aspect of Western security
policy remains the common determination t(,
deploy modernization longer-range INF
missiles in Europe beginning at the end of
1983 if negotiations on this subject now
underway in Geneva do not result in a con-
crete agreement making deployment un-
necessary.

The President and the Chancellor noted
that the decision to deploy the systems in
Europe was based on a unaminous finding t
members of the Atlantic Alliance that in-
creases in Soviet weapons, in particular in-
troduction of SS-20 missiles, had endanger(
the security of Western Europe and thus of
the entire Alliance. They stressed that the
complete elimination of Soviet and United
States land-based, longer-range INF missile
as proposed by the United States, would be
an equitable and fair result and would be a
substantial contribution to serious arms con
trol. They called upon the Soviet Union to
negotiate seriously toward this end. The
Chancellor restated his full confidence in th«

Second Anniversary of Solidarity

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
NOV. 10, 1982'

Today marks the second anniversary of
an important milestone in mankind's
age-long struggle for freedom. In
November 1980, for the first time since
1917, a Communist government was
compelled to grant formal recognition to
a free trade union, Solidarity. This un-
precedented step was brought about by
a nonviolent revolution of millions of
Polish workers who could no longer
tolerate coercion and mismanagement.

Many hoped that this event would
open a new chapter in the evolution of
Communist regimes; that it demon-
strated they have finally recognized
there are limits to the use of force
against one's own people; and that
cooperation is preferable to repression.
Unfortunately, as we now know, the of-
ficial recognition of Solidarity 2 years
ago was merely a tactical move to gain
time on the part of the panic-stricken
Communist authorities.

The Polish Government, working
hand in glove with Moscow, persistently
refused to implement the terms of the

November 10, 1980 accords. Instead, it
did everything it could to discredit the
union by a campaign of slander and
provocation. The campaign failed to
achieve its objectives. Finally, in
desperation and under intense Soviet
pressure, Poland's authorities moved toi
liquidate Solidarity, which ideal of
worker self-determination jeopardized a
Communist regimes.

It is said by declaring war on its
own people, the Polish Government has
destroyed Solidarity. This is not so. On«
can imprison protesters, club and
disperse demonstrators with tear gas oi
water cannons, but the specter remains
Never again will the self-appointed
representatives of the workers be able
to pretend that they represent anyone
but themselves.

Our hearts go out to the brave
Polish people. By struggling for freedor
and social justice against overwhelming
odds, they fight for a cause all humanit
shares with them.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 15, 1982.

Department of State Bulletii

EUROPE

I rican negotiating effort in Geneva and

1 Dmed the close and continuous process of
jltations within the Alliance,
^resident Reagan described the ideas

I id his Berhn initiative of Juije 10, 1982
.n agreement between the United States

I Lhe Soviet Union on measures to help
i the danger that accident or miscalcula-
could lead to a nuclear exchange be-
n East and West. He stated that the
ed States was preparing proposals for
iar confidence building measures which
d be presented by American represent-
's at the Geneva negotiations. The
ncellor and the President expressed their
' that the Soviet Union would join with
United States in progressing rapidly to
greement on such measures. They also
ain committed to halting the spread of
ear weapons through the pursuit of
rous non-proliferation policies.
The President and the Chancellor
srscored their undiminished interest in
itantial reduction in conventional forces in
ral Europe. They recalled the new draft
ty which the Western participants had
rented at the Vienna negotiations on
ual and balanced force reductions. This
)osal provides an excellent foundation for
.lanced agreement on reduction of conven-
al forces in Europe. The President and
Chancellor called upon Warsaw Pact par-
>ants to react positively.
They stated that agreement on a com-
lensive and fully verifiable ban on
Tiical weapons in the Geneva Committee
iisarmament remained a prime objective
neir policies.

They also attached great importance to
rts in the United Nations to secure
isparency by promoting military openness,
fication, and wider availability of informa-
on defense spending.

The President and the Chancellor were in
complete agreement on the requirement for
special attention to Alliance needs on the
Southern Flank. They emphasized in this con-
nection their resolve to support the Turkish
Government in its efforts to lead Turkey
back to democracy.

The President and the Chancellor ex-
pressed confidence that our free societies
would overcome the current difficult
economic situation. They attached paramount
importance to restoring the conditions for
sustained growth through higher in-
vestments, in order to reduce unemployment
and to maintain price stability.

The economic policies of industrial na-
tions must be closely coordinated. Each coun-
try must bear in mind the effects that its
political and economic measures will have on
other countries. These factors will also have
an important effect on the Economic Summit
to be held in Williamsburg at the invitation of
the United States. Both sides reaffirmed the
importance of conducting the discussions at
this summit on the basis of openness, trust,
and informality.

The President and the Chancellor dis-
cussed the dangers posed by rising protec-
tionism to world trade and the economic well
being of nations. They reaffirmed their com-
mitment to the multilateral trading system,
looking forward to a successful GATT
Ministerial meeting in Geneva this month.

The President and the Chancellor agreed
that it is imperative to respect and promote
the independence of the countries of the
Third World and that genuine nonalignment
is an important element of stability and world
peace. The President and the Chancellor reaf-
firmed their readiness to continue to
cooperate with Third World countries on the
basis of equal partnership.

The continuing Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan is a strain on international rela-
tions. The President and the Chancellor

deplored the fact that the Soviet Union con-
tinued to defy international opinion and ig-
nored United Nations resolutions calling for
the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan, as well as the right to self-
determination for Afghanistan and restora-
tion of its non-aligned status. Afghanistan re-
mains an acid test of Soviet readiness to
respect the independence, autonomy, and
genuine non-alignment of Third World coun-
tries and to exercise restraint in its interna-
tional behavior.

The Chancellor welcomed President
Reagan's proposal of September 1, 1982 as a
realistic attempt to promote the peace proc-
ess in the Middle East. They agreed that
negotiations between Israel and its neighbors
in the framework of UN resolutions 242 and
338 offer the best opportunity for peaceful
resolution of disputes in that area. The
United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany, together with its partners in Euro-
pean Political Cooperation, will, as before,
seek to ensure that the American and Euro-
pean efforts for a comprehensive, just, and
lasting peace in the Middle East, on the basis
of existing achievements, are complementary
to each other. They called for early with-
drawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
They continued to urge that the sovereignty
and unity of Lebanon be restored and ex-
pressed their support for the reconstruction
of Lebanon.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 22, 1982,
which also carries remarks at the arrival
ceremony, remarks following the meeting
with the President, and dinner toaste made
by the President and Chancellor Kohl at a
private dinner hosted by the President, all on
Nov. 15. ■

inuary 1983

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Act of State Doctrine:
Foreign Expropriations

The following letter was written by
Department of State Legal Adviser Davis
R. Robinson to Solicitor General Rex E.
Lee for submission to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in the case of
Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. the
Provisional Military Government of
Socialist Ethiopia. Th£ letter sets forth
the Department's practice regarding the
issuance of letters commenting on the
potential effect on U.S. foreign relations
of litigation in U.S. courts challenging
the legality of foreign acis of expropria-
tion. The letter addresses this question
only with respect to cases in which a
treaty supplies the applicable legal stand-
ard for judging the international legality
of the foreign act, the situation presented
in the particular case before the court.

November 19, 1982

The Honorable Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Solicitor General:
The Department of State has requested that
the views of the United States be submitted
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in a case styled Kalamazoo
Spice Extraction Co. v. The Provisional
Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia.
This case involves an appeal from a decision
by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan in which the
District Court abstained from ruling on the
merits of the suit because of the Act of State
Doctrine. Two aspects of the decision are of
concern to the Department of State — the
Court's characterization of the Treaty of Ami-
ty and Economic Relations between the
United States and Ethiopia as being too
"general . . . and susceptible of multiple inter-
pretation" to constitute an agreed legal
standard capable of judicial application, and
the significance attached by the Court to the

absence of a "Bernstein letter" from this
Department stating that adjudication would
not be harmful to the conduct of foreign rela-
tions.

We have worked closely with the Depart-
ment of Justice in the preparation of a brief
to convey to the Court of Appeals the views
of the Executive Branch as amicus curiae on
these two issues of special concern. The brief
sets forth the reasons why the treaty pro-
vides a precise, administerable and, by agree-
ment, governing rule of law. The brief also
sets forth, partially in reliance upon this let-
ter, why the courts should not infer from the
silence of the Department of State that ad-
judication in this case would be harmful to
the foreign policy of the United States. Since
the latter issue involves the inferences to be
drawn by the courts generally from actions of
this Department, I wish to make clear the
practice that we intend to follow in cases like
this.

As expressed in Banco Nacional de Cuba
V Sabbatino. 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the
presumption that the courts should abstain
from considering the expropriatory acts of
foreign states appears to have reflected two
major concerns of the Supreme Court. The
first was that articulation by United States
courts of an applicable international law
standard for compensation would pose special
difficulties, including a perceived risk of con-
flict with the Executive Branch's assertion of
a governing legal standard in the conduct of
foreign relations. The second of the Court's
principal concerns was that adjudication could
complicate the conduct of bilateral relations
with the expropriating state — for example,
by frustrating ongoing claims settlement
negotiations between the two governments.

Where, as in the present case, there is an
applicable treaty standard, the first of these
concerns falls away. The second con-
cern— potential interference with ongoing
claims negotiations or other foreign relations
interests — does not, in our view, warrant
automatic abstention by the courts on Act of

State grounds. As Legal Adviser Monroe
Leigh wrote to the Solicitor General conce ■
ing foreign expropriations in 1975: (

In general this Department's experiei
provides little support for a presumption
that adjudication of acts of foreign state i
accordance with relevant principles of in •
national law would embarrass the condU'
of foreign policy. [Letter of November 2 j
1975, reprinted at Appendix I to Alfred ,,
Dunhill of London. Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.!]
682, 706 (1976).] '

The experience of the past seven years ha
reinforced this conclusion. Accordingly, wi
believe that a broad, inflexible rule of absl j
tion in expropriation cases is not necessar i
safeguard our foreign policy interests. Wl" ,
as in this case, there is a controlling legal
standard for compensation, we believe tha
the presumption should be that adjudicatic
would not be inconsistent with foreign pol
interests under the Act of State Doctrine.

If, however, the Department of State
determines in a given case that judicial
abstention is necessary for foreign policy
reasons, it will request the Department of
Justice to communicate that determinatioi
the appropriate court. Such a communicat
could be either in response to an inquiry f i
a court concerned about the foreign policy
implications of the case before it or on the
initiative of the Executive Branch. (Privat
litigants and foreign governments frequen
bring cases to the attention of the Depart-
ment of State which they believe raise Act
State concerns.) If we indicate that adjudi(
tion would be consistent with foreign polic
interests of the United States, we trust th
the court will give appropriate weight to o
views. As a general rule, however, where
there is a controlling legal standard for co
pensation we would not plan to inform the
courts of the absence of foreign policy objfl
tives to adjudication of expropriation claim
Therefore, we would anticipate that silence
on the part of the Executive in such cases
would not be relied upon as a basis for
judicial abstention under the Act of State
Doctrine.

Sincerely,

Davis R. Robinsoi

Departnnent of State Bulle

IDDLE EAST

^arch for Peace and Stability in the Middle East

(enneth W. Dam

Stdtement before the Senate Foreign
tiiins Committee on December 1,
. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of

an honor for me to appear before
committee today to discuss our ef-
i to bring peace and stability to the
lie East. As you know, these efforts
Ive a resolution on the conflict in
inon and the search for comprehen-
peace in the Middle East.
Our government is approaching
e two problems on separate tracks,
there is an obvious relationship be-
3n them. That relationship is sym-
;ed by the President's appointment
.mbassador Philip Habib as his
:ial Representative with a new man-
' involving both Lebanon and the
ider peace process. These endeavors
a matter of high national priority. In
absence of substantial progress
ard peace in Lebanon and in the
on as a whole, we can anticipate con-
ed unrest in the Middle East threat-
ig U.S. and Western interests and
angering the security of Israel.
The task is complicated, and our
)onsibility is great. Of all the powers
jrnal to the region, only the United
;es has the credibility to deal with
issues in a fair and equitable man-
Our reputation for dealing honestly
pragmatically with regional conflicts
n asset of great importance; we can-
afford to squander it.
Let me now turn to a more detailed
■ussion of the current status of our
)rts first in Lebanon and then with
ard to the Middle East peace
cess.

)anon

ritical test for American diplomacy is
jebanon. Our objective is straightfor-
•d. We seek to restore Lebanese
ereignty and to insure Israeli securi-
These are not separate objectives. A
3le, sovereign Lebanon and a secure
lel are two sides of the same coin.
! threat to Israel does not come from
Lebanese people but from foreign
:es that have usurped Lebanese
ereignty and are still camped on
)anese soU. It follows that a peaceful
)anon, free of all foreign forces and
ereign over all its territory, will

make a major contribution to Israeli
security. To achieve this objective, we
and the responsible international com-
munity support a three-part strategy in
Lebanon:

First, withdrawal forth viith of all
foreign forces from Lebanon;

Second, restoration of Lebanese
Government sovereignty and strengthen-
ing of the Lebanese Armed Forces; and

Third, reestablishment of a
Lebanese national consensus and
reconstruction of the Lebanese economy.

This strategy in support of the
Lebanese Government is designed to
achieve peace and security for both
Lebanon and Israel. The withdrawal of
all foreign forces will remove a threat to
Israel's border. Restoring Lebanon's
sovereignty and strength, and rebuilding
its economy, will prevent that threat
from returning. The United States is
moving now to implement all three parts
of this strategy.

America's diplomatic energy is
focused on bringing about the immediate
withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign
forces — Israeli, Syrian, and PLO. To
succeed, we must meet the legitimate in-
terests of each of the parties through
practical security arrangements. Three
sets of negotiations will be involved:
negotiations between Lebanon and
Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and
between Lebanon and the PLO.

It is a fact that none of these talks
has begun. The Israeli-Lebanese negotia-
tions could provide a stimulus for the
others, but they have been stalled by
debate over the level and location of the
talks. Last week President Gemayel pro-
posed a compromise solution on the
diplomatic level of these negotiations.
The Israeli Cabinet recently adopted
that solution, but it remained firm in its
insistence that talks take place in Beirut
and Jerusalem.

The current Israeli position is un-
acceptable to the Lebanese Government.
The success and stability of that govern-
ment depends on the support of those
within Lebanon and throughout the
Arab world for whom the status of
Jerusalem remains a critical issue. The
United States acknowledges the impor-
tance of Jerusalem to Israel and to all
Arab states. But insistence on a
Jerusalem venue should not be made an

obstacle to the start of talks on the
withdrawal of external forces from
Lebanon.

The present situation is clearly in-
tolerable. Syrian, PLO, and Israeli
fofces remain poised in the field. The
continued occupation of Lebanon by
foreign forces — forces that imperil
Lebanese sovereignty and threaten
Israeli security — is dangerous and
should be unacceptable to the parties.
President Reagan is determined to see
the parties get the disputes out of the
trenches and onto the table. Wrangling
over procedures must end, and substan-
tive negotiations must begin.

Once the withdrawal of foreign
forces from Lebanon begins, a vacuum
may be left that could endanger
Lebanese sovereignty and Israeli securi-
ty. The Lebanese Armed Forces will not
be able immediately to fill that vacuum,
although we and our allies will be work-
ing to rebuild those forces. Consequent-
ly, it may be necessary for the United
States to consider joining with other na-
tions in an expanded multinational force
(MNF). Indeed, the Lebanese Govern-
ment has recently made such a request.
An expanded MNF would bolster the
parties' confidence in security ar-
rangements that will facilitate the
withdrawal of foreign forces fi>om
Lebanon.

We will, of course, consult closely
with the members of this committee in
addressing the question of U.S. par-
ticipation in an expanded MNF. It is too
early at this time to specify the details
of any international peacekeeping force
in Lebanon.

A fully sovereign Lebanon and a
secure Israel, however, cannot be
achieved through military measures
alone. The once dynamic economy of
Lebanon must be restored. Therefore,
we may have to return to the new Con-
gress with a supplemental request for
the funds necessary to enable the United
States to play an appropriate role in the
reconstruction of Lebanon. Only a
healthy Lebanese economy and a thriv-
ing private sector can provide the pros-
perity that is an essential adjunct to our
security and economic assistance.

Using available military credits and
Lebanon's own funds, we have started a
crash military assistance program to
help the Lebanese Army assert its
authority throughout the country and

luary 1983

MIDDLE EAST

thereby enable the MNF to depart. We
envisage the need for some additional
funding and, as our estimates are
developed, may wish to seek foreign
military sales and international military
educational training funds in a sup-
plemental request.

Middle East Peace Process

Let me now turn to the status of the
Middle East peace process. The Presi-
dent's historic initiative of September 1
is designed to bring about a just and
lasting peace that will satisfy the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian peo-
ple and, at the same time, assure the
security of Israel. To achieve these ends,
the initiative seeks to broaden the circle
of peace through the participation of
Jordan and Palestinian representation
consistent with the Camp David frame-
work.

Before reviewing the current status
of the President's initiative, I should like
to comment on two key aspects.

First, the September 1 initiative is
not a "plan" or blueprint to be imposed
on the parties. Rather, the President has
put forward a balanced set of positions
that the United States is prepared to
support in the course of negotiations.
We have pointed out that we cannot
guarantee the outcome of the negoti-
ating process on any specific issue. The
negotiations, if they are to be successful,
must be free to move in productive
directions that cannot be foreseen in ad-
vance. It has been made clear to all par-
ties involved that these are our positions
and that we stand firmly behind them.
Should the parties agree on positions at
variance with our proposals, however,
we will not blindly stand our ground.

Second, the President's positions
regarding the final status of the West
Bank and Gaza have generated much in-
terest and commentary. This is under-
standable since the future of those ter-
ritories is of keen interest to Palestini-
ans and Israelis alike. It is for this
reason that the President felt it
necessary to state that the United
States would support neither an in-
dependent Palestinian state nor Israeli

sovereignty or control over the West
Bank and Gaza.

It is important to note, however,
that when negotiations resume the next
item on the agenda will not be the
ultimate status of the territories but the
transitional arrangements to be
established in the West Bank and Gaza
for a 5-year period. Only after that
transitional period has begun, can
negotiations be undertaken on the final
status of the territories.

What, then, is the status of the
President's initiative? We have had a
highly constructive visit by a delegation
representing the Arab League, and we
have seen positive movement in the
direction the President has outlined.
King Hussein has publicly stated his
willingness to discuss the proposals, and
a serious dialogue between Jordan and

confident that the Israeli Government
will not refuse to negotiate.

I am optimistic that the Presiden'
initiative will soon lead to a resumpti'
of negotiations with broadened partic
tion. My optimism is based on my coi
viction that the President's initiative
provides the best means to move tow
a peace that will meet the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people and a
the same time assure the security wh
Israel so avidly seeks and so richly
deserves.

Israeli-Egyptian Relations

There is important unfinished busine:
with regard to the Israeli-Egyptian
Peace Treaty. The Taba border area
tween Israel and Egypt remains con-
tested. It is now time to resolve this
issue according to the provisions of t

Egypt has been publicly supportive of the
President's initiative. The Israeli Government
. . . has been and remains highly critical of some
aspects of the President's proposals. These pro-
posals, however, continue to receive intense atten-
tion in Israel by the government and the public
alike.

the PLO is continuing. We remain hope-
ful that this activity will lead to an early
move to the negotiating table by Jordan
with the support of other key Arab par-
ties.

Egypt has been publicly supportive
of the President's initiative. The Israeli
Government, as you are aware, has been
and remains highly critical of some
aspects of the President's proposals.
Those proposals, however, continue to
receive intense attention in Israel by the
government and the public alike. And if
King Hussein comes to the table, we are

Treaty, just as it is now time to plac«
the various elements of the broader
peace process on a firm foundation.
Americans can take pride in our
policy toward the Middle East. It is i
policy which has been developed in C(
sultation with this committee and otl
members of Congress. We welcome t
continuing consultation; it strengther
our policy and contributes to an
American consensus.

'The complete transcript of the hearii
will be published by the committee and w
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 0
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bull

MIDDLE EAST

ecuring a Peaceful
uture for Lebanon

Kenneth W. Dam

Address before the Chicago Latv
lib. Chicago, Illinois, on December 2,
92. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of
%te.^

im delighted to be home in Chicago
d to see so many of my old friends.
lis distinguished club promotes a vi-
(n of law and stability that contrasts
arply with the turbulent international
ena with which George Shultz and I
ist deal.

Those of you who are involved in the
N know that sound laws require a mix-
re of idealism, strength, and prag-
itism. So, too, does a sound foreign
Key. By drawing on America's
'ength and the pragmatism of its peo-
3 and, above all, our ideals, President
;agan has reasserted U.S. leadership
world affairs. Today we can be proud
at American initiatives are the best
ipe for progress on the great issues of
X day from Middle East peace to arms
ntrol to the Caribbean Basin.

A short time ago, the President
arged me with responsibility for coor-
nating our work in Washington on one
ch issue, the future of Lebanon. Some
mericans may wonder why we are con-
rned about such a small country so far
ray. Others may ask why U.S. troops
e in Lebanon and how long they must
ay. Americans are right to ask these
lestions; so tonight let me address
em in turn: Why is America involved
Lebanon? What are our goals? And
hat must we do to secure a peaceful
ture for Lebanon?

The desolation in Beirut today belies
5 past role as the Paris of the Arab
orld. The occupation of Lebanon by
reign forces contradicts its deep tradi-
3n of democracy and sovereignty. Our
smay at the resulting division of the
)untry is deepened by the promise of
hat might have been and by the
lowledge that Lebanon's future was
igulfed by its neighbors' disputes.

The Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and
)67 brought thousands of embittered

Palestinian refugees into Lebanon,
straining the social fabric of the country.
In 1970, these Palestinians were joined
by large numbers of Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) fighters that had
been expelled from Jordan. Lebanon
became an armed camp. Civil war broke
out in 1975 among PLO, Christian, and
Muslim forces. Syrian troops entered
and remained under an Arab League
mandate to maintain order. But order
was not restored. PLO fighters harassed
northern Israel; Israeli defense forces
retaliated; Syrian and Christian forces
clashed. Lebanese civilians— and
Lebanese sovereignty— were caught in
the crossfire. And a nation's agony
became an international crisis.

This was the situation the Reagan
Administration faced in the spring of
1981, when Ambassador Philip Habib
[President's special emissary to the Mid-
dle East], at the President's direction,
negotiated a cease-fire in southern
Lebanon. Last spring, however,
destabilizing forces prevailed, and the
cease-fire disintegrated. Israel then sent
its forces into Lebanon in order, in the

The desolation in
Beirut today belies its
past role as the Paris of
the Arab world. The oc-
cupation of Lebanon by
foreign forces contra-
dicts its deep tradition
of democracy and
sovereignty.

words of the Israeli Cabinet, "to place all
the civilian population of the Galilee
beyond the range of the terrorist fire
from Lebanon." The fighting advanced
to the threshold of Beirut, and Am-
bassador Habib was called on again. The
peaceful departure of PLO forces from
Beirut last August was a tribute to his
efforts and to the multinational force
that stood guard over the evacuation.
Indeed, those who complain about a lack
of cooperation among the Western

democracies should note how American,
French, and Italian troops stood
together to assist the Lebanese. Those
soldiers were truly soldiers of peace.

But triumph was followed by
tragedy. In quick succession, Lebanon's
newly elected President, Bashir
Gemayel, was assassinated, and Pales-
tinians were slaughtered in their camps.

Why Are We Involved?

This is a sad history. The Lebanese
sought peace and found destruction;
they sought freedom and found occupa-
tion. This led Lebanon's new president,
Amin Gemayel, to plead before the
United Nations, "We have had enough,
enough of bloodshed, enough of destruc-
tion, enough of dislocation and despair."

In October our nation once again
sent Marines to Lebanon in response to
Gemayel's request and the plight of his
people. Together with French and
Italian forces, those Marines are there
to assist the Lebanese Government in
restoring peace. In meeting this moral
obligation, they reaffirm what President
Reagan has termed our "irreversible
commitment to the territorial integrity
of friendly states" and our "traditional
humanitarian concerns" for those who
suffer injustice.

Our commitment to Lebanon, how-
ever, is consistent not only with our
sense of morality, but also with our na-
tional interest. Peace— the solution to
Lebanon's suffering— is also the solution
to our strategic and diplomatic concerns
in the Middle East.

The future of Lebanon is linked
strategically to the entire Middle East
region. Located at the vital eastern end
of the Mediterranean, bounded by the
oil-rich nations of Africa and Asia, that
region lies in the shadow of vast Soviet
military power. To the extent that
Lebanon is a flashpoint for regional con-
flict, it is also a potential source of inter-
national conflict. Promoting stability in
Lebanon and the Middle East is thus
vital to our security and that of other in-
dustrial democracies.

Diplomatically, the United States
plays a central role in the Middle East
because Israel and the Arab states
recognize that America is the only credi-
ble catalyst for a wider peace. We must,

anuary 1983

MIDDLE EAST

however, demonstrate our ability to sus-
tain this role by resolving the Lebanese
crisis. Such a resolution would con-
tribute to the long-term security of
Israel and to the momentum for a com-
prehensive peace created by the Presi-
dent's historic initiative of September 1.
There should be no mistaking the fact
that there are others, whose interests
are inimical to ours, who are prepared
to exploit our failure to resolve these
issues.

These are the concerns— moral,
strategic, and diplomatic— that underlie
our policy in Lebanon and that led to the
presence of U.S. Marines in Beirut.
What, then, is the objective of that
policy and the mission of those troops?

Objective

Our objective is straightforward. We
seek to restore Lebanese sovereignty
and insure Israeli security. These are
not separate objectives. A stable,
sovereign Lebanon and a secure Israel
are two sides of the same coin. The
threat to Israel does not come from the
Lebanese people but from foreign forces
that have usurped Lebanese sovereignty
and are still camped on Lebanese soil. It
follows that a peaceful Lebanon, free of
all foreign forces and sovereign over all
its territory, will make a major contribu-
tion to Israeli security. To achieve this
objective, we and the responsible inter-
national community support a three-part
strategy in Lebanon:

First, withdrawal forthwith of all
foreign forces from Lebanon;

Second, restoration of Lebanese
Government sovereignty and strengthen-
ing of the Lebanese Armed Forces; and

Third, reestablishment of a
Lebanese national consensus and
reconstruction of the Lebanese economy.

What Are We Doing To
Implement Our Strategy?

Withdrawal of Foreign Forces.

America's diplomatic energy is focused
now on bringing about the immediate
withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign
forces— Israeli, Syrian, and PLO. To
succeed, we must meet the legitimate in-
terests of each of the parties through
practical security arrangements. Three
sets of negotiations will be involved:
negotiations between Lebanon and
Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and
between Lebanon and the PLO.

The United States will participate
directly at the table in the first set of
negotiations between Lebanon and
Israel. In these talks we will seek securi-
ty arrangements that will permit Israel
to withdraw its forces with the
knowledge that southern Lebanon will
never again be used to launch assaults
on Israeli citizens.

Israel also desires establishment of
normal relations with Lebanon as a way
of safeguarding the peace. This is an im-
portant goal. But progress toward more
normal relations must be approached
carefully lest it undermine Lebanon's
credentials in the Arab world. Moreover,
ill-timed or forced normalization may ac-
tually threaten Israel's security if it
should lead to the breakdown of the
Lebanese national consensus, thereby
inviting the return of hostile forces.

The second set of negotiations— be-
tween Lebanon and Syria— is designed
to achieve Syrian troop withdrawal. The
Syrians, citing their 1975 Arab League
mandate to maintain order in Lebanon,
have said they will not withdraw unless
Israeli forces are also withdrawn.
Although we will not be directly in-
volved in these talks. Ambassador Habib
will play a role with interested parties.
We expect that agreement for
withdrawal of Israeli forces will also
lead to Syrian agreement to withdraw.

We will not be involved in the third
set of negotiations— between Lebanon
and the PLO— because it is U.S. policy
not to "recognize or negotiate with the
PLO so long as the PLO does not
recognize Israel's right to exist and does
not accept UN Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 238." We will, however,
make our views known through friendly
governments. As in the case of the
withdrawal of PLO fighters from Beirut,
the United States is prepared to provide
its good offices in bringing about the
withdrawal and resettlement of the PLO
forces still in Lebanon. Such withdrawal

will be facilitated if Palestinian civilians
in Lebanon feel secure. The Lebanese
Government must provide such security
To this end, we will help strengthen
Lebanese Government authority and thi
Lebanese Armed Forces.

It is a fact that none of these talks
has begun. The Israeli-Lebanese negotii
tions could provide a stimulus for the
others, but they have been stalled by
debate over the level and location of thi
talks. Last week President Gemayel pr<
posed a compromise solution on the
diplomatic level of these negotiations.
The Israeli Cabinet recently adopted
that solution but remained firm in its ir
sistence that talks take place in Beirut
and Jerusalem.

The current Israeli position is unac
ceptable to the Lebanese Government.
The success and stability of that goveri
ment depend on the support of those
within Lebanon and throughout the
Arab world for whom the status of
Jerusalem remains a crucial issue. The
United States acknowledges the impor-
tance of Jerusalem to Israel and to all
Arab states. But insistence on a
Jerusalem venue should not be made ai
obstacle to negotiations on the with-
drawal of external forces from Lebanoi

The present situation is clearly in-
tolerable. Syrian, PLO, and Israeli
forces remain poised in the field. The
continued occupation of Lebanon by
foreign forces — forces that imperil
Lebanese sovereignty and threaten
Israeli security— is dangerous and shou
be unacceptable to the parties. The tasl
is to get the dispute out of the trenchei
and onto the table. Wrangling over pro
cedures must end, and substantive
negotiations must begin.

Restoring Lebanese Sovereignty
and Strengthening Their Armed
Forces. The withdrawal of foreign
forces from Lebanon could leave an in-
ternal vacuum. To prevent the reinfiltr
tion of those who would threaten
Lebanon or Israel or both, withdrawals
must be accompanied by steps to resto:
Lebanese Government sovereignty and
strengthen the Lebanese Armed Force

The United States will join the inte
national community in this effort. We
have offered to help provide equipment
and training to the Lebanese Armed
Forces for four brigades by February
and seven brigades thereafter. It is oui
judgment that this force structure will
be sufficient to maintain internal secur
ty and protect Lebanese sovereignty.

Department of State Bulleti

NUCLEAR POLICY

While the Lebanese Armed Forces
being strengthened, the interna-
lai community will have to help main-
1 stability. An expanded multinational
:e, including U.S. participation and
litional national contingents, may well
necessary. Indeed, we have already
eived such a request from the
lanese Government.
As in the case of the present U.S.,
mch, and Italian troops, any ex-
ided multinational force would bolster
parties' confidence in security ar-
igements that will facilitate the
hdrawal of foreign forces. The
Danese Armed Forces will continue to
ivide internal security, and the U.N.
ernational Force in Lebanon
•vJIFIL) should retain its crucial
icekeeping role. As the effectiveness
the Lebanese Armed Forces in-
ases, the tasks of the multinational
ce will decrease, permitting a phased
.hdrawal.

Economic Reconstruction and Na-
nal Reconciliation. Lebanese sov
!ignty and Israeli security, however,
mot be achieved by military measures
ne. The economy of Lebanon has
;n shattered. To bring about a peace
it is not merely the absence of
hting but the well-being of the people,
;hdrawal of foreign forces must be
ipled with an effort to reconstruct the
banese economy. The challenge seems
.ggering. But all that is needed is a
riod of political tranquility and some
Ip in rebuilding Lebanon's roads,
.ter system, and schools. The
banese people— with their en-
■preneurial skill, spirit, and
iilience— can take care of the rest
^mselves.

i It is impossible to cite an exact
hire for total reconstruction costs. The
! S. Government, however, stands
jady to cooperate with the efforts of
e Lebanese and the international com-
anity. Since June we have made
ailable $82 million in emergency relief
,d rehabilitation funds. We are plan-
ng to authorize another $30 million to
larantee housing and services for the
lorest communities. This money is an
vestment in stability. It indicates
merican support for Lebanese national
^conciliation and strengthens Lebanon's
:ntral government.

Further aid should come from Arab
id Western donors, including the
orld Bank. Indeed, the World Bank is
ready taking an active role in assess-
g priorities for all potential donors and

willing to coordinate the matching of

donor resources and Lebanese needs. It
sent a reconnaissance team to Lebanon,
and its report should be available by
January 1983.

Conclusion

The challenge of rebuilding a peaceful
Lebanon, free of all foreign forces and
sovereign over all its territory, is a
daunting one. But the President is deter-
mined not to allow the opportunity for
peace to slip away and the spark of war
to be ignited again.

The objective of our Lebanon policy
is, I repeat, a fully sovereign Lebanon
and a secure Israel. We pursue this ob-
jective because it is both right and in our
national interest. We have seen that our
responsibilities did not end with the
mere cessation of hostilities. America

alone has the power and credibility, and
hence the duty, to help bring to Lebanon
a stable and lasting peace that answers
the basic security needs of Lebanon's
neighbors. After all, Lebanon seeks and
deserves what America already has,
even though we may not always ap-
preciate our blessings.

The sovereignty of the Lebanese
Government must extend to the borders
of the state. We have a name for that:
We call it freedom. The opportunities of
the Lebanese people must be made com-
mensurate with their aspirations, and
we have a name for that: We call it
democracy. And the lives of their
children must be made secure and full of
hope. We have a name for that: We call
it peace.

iPress release 362 of Dec. 6, 1982. I

Nuclear Energy:
Opportunities and Problems

by Richard T. Kennedy

Address before the American In-
dustrial Forum and the American
Nuclear Society in Washington, D.C., on
November 17, 1982. Ambassador Ken-
nedy is Under Secretary for Management
and U.S. permanent representative to the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).

Forty years ago, in December 1942, in a
laboratory under the stands at Alonzo
Stagg Stadium in Chicago, an interna-
tional team of engineers and scientists
created the first sustained and con-
trolled nuclear chain reaction. Their suc-
cess that night changed the world for all
time. And it brought to the world some
of its most awesome opportunities and
some of its gravest problems. Their
work opened many doors and afforded
opportunities for good things— to light
our cities, to power our factories, to
diagnose and cure the illnesses of man-
kind. But their work also made possible
the manufacture of nuclear explosives
and brought problems we still are wrest-
ling with today. And that is what I want
to talk about tonight— the opportunities
and the problems we have before us and
what they may mean for the future of
the nuclear industry, the people of the
world, and ultimately the future of life
on our planet.

From the dawn of this new age,
U.S. policy has had two fundamental ob-
jectives. From the first, we have tried to
prevent the further spread of nuclear
weapons. At the same time, we have
continuously sought to make the peace-
ful benefits of nuclear energy ->-the most
astounding technology of the age— avail-
able for all mankind. Those twin goals
are enumerated in the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and they are enshrined in the
Nonproliferation Treaty. They are not
mutually exclusive; indeed, they are
compatible and complementary. Those
goals are the goals of the Reagan Ad-
ministration today.

Some have alleged that this Admini-
stration does not have a nonproliferation
policy. Nothing could be further from
the truth. President Reagan articulated
in clear, unmistakable terms in July
1981 the policy of this Administration— a
policy which has been pursued ever
since. But let me emphasize that the
policy of this Administration is not a
radical departure from that of the past.

In historic terms, the dual goals we
profess today were the bases of the
Atoms for Peace program which Presi-
dent Eisenhower announced in his
December 1953 address to the U.N.
General Assembly. That program was
undertaken at a time when we possessed
a virtual monopoly on peaceful nuclear
technology. But we believed then, as we

'inuary 1983

NUCLEAR POLICY

still believe, that the benefits of the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy should
be available for all the peoples of the
world. It also has been true from the
outset that all must share in the commit-
ment and the burden to assure against
its potential problems. Thus, we sought
in the Atoms for Peace program to
create an international regime that
could, in an orderly way, begin to deal
not only with the opportunities of
nuclear energy but with its problems as
well.

Nonproliferation Position

We do not believe that nuclear power

necessarily means nuclear bombs.
Rather our position is founded on the
notion that the peaceful use of nuclear
power does not, per se, present a pro-
liferation risk. This is the bargain im-
plicit in the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty— that nations which renounce the
idea of nuclear weapons can and should
enjoy the benefits of nuclear power. I
regret that this relationship has been
widely misinterpreted and misunder-
stood. Some allege that this implies
nuclear commerce conducted without
regard to its potential problems and
dangers. They would argue that thus
our policy is critically flawed. Perhaps
this misunderstanding arises because the
thesis is not a simple one; perhaps be-
cause we have not explained our position
well enough. Whatever the reason, I
repeat, this is a misunderstanding of our
objectives and of our policy.

Our strong commitment to the goal
of preventing further proliferation rests
on the very valid— I think indisputable-
notion that the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional nations could
eventually mean the end of world order
as we know it. The spread of nuclear
weapons endangers not only American
security interests, it is equally threaten-
ing to the security and well-being of
every country on Earth— a fact which
they should understand.

To realize our nonproliferation objec-
tives, as President Reagan has made
clear, we are working to inliibit the
spread of sensitive technologies,
facilities, or material, particularly where
there is a danger of proliferation. We
also are working with other suppliers to
strengthen the international rules of
nuclear trade. These steps are important
elements in our policy, but it would be a
mistake to think that the policy could
rest on export controls alone. They can
buy time. But we must use that time
wisely to get at the causes and not sim-
ply the symptoms of proliferation.

There are many countries today— es-
pecially the highly developed industrial
nations— which could produce nuclear
explosives if they chose to do so. But
they do not for a number of diverse
reasons. Their security does not require
it, their perceived political interests do
not warrant it, or their domestic politi-
cal opinion will not accept it. The basic
causes of proliferation, in other words,
are not present.

Yet, we cannot be blind to the fact
that there are serious proliferation risks
in several regions of the world. Where
there is such a risk, this Administration
is trying to get at the root causes which
might impel a nation to embark on a
weapons program. We seek to improve
regional stability and to lessen tensions
and security concerns. We must try to
convince those who might be bent on
such a course that acquisition of nuclear
weaponry will not promote their securi-
ty. For the plain truth is the opposite:
The further spread of nuclear weapons
will not enhance anyone's security. In-
stead, it will promote instability and
rivalry, and it could lead to tragic mis-
calculations for all.

Where animosities are old and stub-
born, the lessening of regional tensions
is an exceedingly difficult task. But, we
must use the tools we have— political,
diplomatic, security— to assuage old pas-
sions, to reduce those tensions, and to
foster a stable order.

The Nonproliferation Treaty and the
Latin American treaty of Tlatelolco are
critical instruments in the attack on the
causes of proliferation— 116 non-nuclear-
weapons states today adhere to the Non-
proliferation Treaty and 22 countries
have embraced Tlatelolco. Thus, an over-
whelming majority of nations in the
world accept the idea that renouncing
nuclear explosives is entirely compatible
with and, indeed, essential to their
secui'ity. We can and will continue our
strenuous efforts to achieve universal
adherence to the Nonproliferation Trea-
ty and full implementation of Tlatelolco.

To achieve our nonproliferation
goals, we must also maintain a position
as a leading and reliable nuclear ex-
porter. For only from this position can
we expect to influence international
standards and norms in a way consistent
with our own nonproliferation goals.

We reject the unilateral approach of
yesteryear because, in a word, times
have changed. America can no longer
call the shots by itself. We no longer
possess a monopoly on nuclear technolo-
gy. Common sense tells us that we must

take this fact into account as we fashio
our policies. We must view the world a
it is; not as it once was; not as we wou
like it to be in our imaginings. This
realistic view will, I suggest, better hel
us to achieve our nonproliferation goal;
It follows then that we are seeking
to insure that our domestic nuclear in-
dustry can compete on a fair and
equitable basis with the nuclear in-
dustries of other supplier nations. But
this must be a cooperative effort. For i
refusal to recognize the existence of
very real proliferation risks and the sa(
rifice of nonproliferation goals in the
pursuit of commercial and economic
advantage cannot be the policy of any
responsible state.

Support for the IAEA

As we recognized both the opportunitie
and the problems of nuclear energy, w(
also saw the need 25 years ago for an
agency which could address both. Since
its beginnings, we have vigorously sup-
ported and relied heavily on the Intern;
tional Atomic Energy Agency. For mot
of these 25 years the IAEA worked
quietly and effectively.

But as with many such institutions,
its growth and development have not
come without some pain, some dissi-
dence. Unfortunately, political concerns
which motivate nations, and which ofte
excite great passions and rhetorical
flourish, intrude. So it has been in re-
cent years in Vienna. Increasingly,
political concerns, which we and many
others believe to be extraneous to the
mission and purposes of the agency,
began to corrode the atmosphere of its
deliberations. Pressures mounted last
year, but sensible heads prevailed and
accommodations were found.

Unfortunately, at the agency's
general conference last September, a
majority of member states violated the
statute and illegally rejected the crederl
tials of another member state. The U.S
delegation withdrew from the confer-
ence, as it was pledged to do, and we
began a serious, thorough assessment (
the nature and extent of our participa-
tion in the agency. I cannot tell you
tonight what the outcome of the re-
assessment will be, but I can share wit!
you some thoughts about how the prob-
lem looks to us.

Let us recall why the IAEA came t
be. As its statute makes clear, the ager
cy has two equally important goals:

First, to encourage the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy so as to realize

Department of State Bulletii

NUCLEAR POLICY

technology's enormous potential

fits mankind; and

second, to provide effective interna-

1 safeguards against the misuse of

echnology.

Cach of these missions is vital,
ther they give the institution its
sophical underpinnings. The
ber states are pledged to accept
support each of these missions. But
igency cannot achieve its dual goals
traneous political issues divert at-
on from its legitimate tasks,
rate controversy and confrontation,
sap its effectiveness. Nor can the
cy function effectively if its
bers are willing to violate its
ite, as when they illegally rejected a
,ber state's credentials. That is why
re so concerned about what has
happening in Vienna culminating in
;vents of this past September.
The agency, after all, is the sum of
lembership. It is a democratic in-
tion, governed by democratic prin-
s. If the members do not support
, abide by the principles in its statute,
ey are unwilling to rededicate them-
l ;s to those principles, the institution
' inexorably decline.
vVe have strongly supported the
icy from its earliest beginnings. We
inue to hope that it can live up to
1 promise of its founding, bringing the
I 'fits of the peaceful atom to the
I d under an effective safeguards
Tie. To make that possible— and so
5sure that its next 25 years can be
•uitful as the first 25— a renewed
cation to that goal by all of its
ibers is essential. If, on the con-
y, the trend toward heightened ex-
eous political debate cannot be re-
ed, the IAEA's future may be bleak,
lirhe stakes are considerable. Effec-
i international safeguards are an im-
ant component of the international
jroliferation regime. The IAEA's
nical assistance program helps a
ving number of countries. And inter-
onal nuclear commerce, as we under-
.d it today, depends in no small
isure on the success of this agency. I
i.n this in real terms but also in terms
tie perceptions of the political
lorities around the world. If the
ncy is seen to be weak, divided, and
mstant; if its actions are seen to be
insistent with its statute, then ques-
is inevitably will arise about the
nay's ability to carry out its
*-k— about our ability to prevent the
r use of this powerful force. From that
3 e forward, more efforts will be
1 oted to restraining commerce, more

issues of reliability will arise, and it will
be all the more difficult to realize the
atom's peaceful benefits. The efforts of
nearly three decades will be jeopardized.

In the final analysis, it really comes
down to the attitude of the member
states. We have reached a critical turn-
ing point in the history of the IAEA.
The members must now decide which
course the agency will pursue. For our
part, we want to see the IAEA rein-
vigorated and refocused on the prin-
ciples on which it was founded.

Our objective is now, as it always
has been, an independent agency in
which the international community can
continue to repose its confidence, an
agency that can be relied upon to carry
out faithfully the purposes enumerated
in its statute. Achieving that requires a
change in the attitudes of many
members. And it requires a commitment
from all members, not just a few, to the
fundamental principles on which the in-
stitution was created. That is a tall
order, but one which we believe can be
achieved. That is our objective.

which have solemnly renounced nuclear
weaponry by adhering to the Non-
proliferation Treaty. Striking that
balance, I am optimistic. I believe that
there is still a solid basis for hope. I do
not believe that a world with many more
nuclear powers is inevitable. That notion,
in my view, is the counsel of despair.
Widespread nuclear proliferation is
avoidable. But to accomplish that goal
requires skill, common sense, and care-
ful diplomacy; and hard work, I might
add.

It is not, as I'm sure you will agree,
a simple issue. It is not, and should not
be, a partisan issue. It does not lend
itself to speedy solutions in neat little
packages. The solutions we seek cannot
be reduced to catchy slogans. Achieving
our nonproliferation goals requires pa-
tience and sober, deliberate action. It re-
quires cooperation with our friends and
allies, firmness with our adversaries. It
requires support for sensible long-term
goals and policies of our government by
industry and public alike even where
there may be some short-term seeming

Twenty years ago, many . . . seriously anticipated
a world with 25 to 30 nuclear-weapons states by
the beginning of the 1980s . . . today there are only
five . . . and India has carried out a so-called
peaceful nuclear explosion. Against that, there are
116 states . . . which have solemnly renounced
nuclear weaponry by adhering to the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty.

Future Prospects

What about the future? Is there a basis^
for optimism? I say emphatically: "Yes."
Twenty years ago, many academics and
even some policymakers seriously an-
ticipated a world with 25 to 30 nuclear-
weapons states by the beginning of the
1980s. Although technical capabilities
have slowly spread, those gloomy fore-
casts, thank heaven, have not come to
pass.

Instead, today there are only fivei
declared nuclear-weapons states, and In-
dia has carried out a so-called peaceful
nuclear explosion. Against that, there
are 116 states, as I mentioned earlier,

disadvantage or setback. We must stand
together in this effort for there are no
quick fixes or short-term palliatives.
What we do today will have its effects
for decades to come.

As we are committed to see the
fulfillment of the promise of nuclear
energy, so too are we committed to
assuring that the essential safeguards
and nonproliferation controls are in
place. But our objectives cannot be
achieved by fiat or by unilateral action
on our part alone. Only through the
shared commitment and cooperative ef-
forts of nations working together can
we succeed. But succeed we must.

' Of these, the United States, United
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. are parties to the
Nonproliferation Treaty. ■

!uary 1983

UNITED NATIONS

Call for Soviet Withdrawal
From Afghanistan

Following are a statement by Am-
bassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. per-
manent representative to the United Na-
tions, in the U.N. General Assembly on
November 2A. 1982, and the text of a
General Assembly resolution adopted on
November 29, 1982.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S

STATEMENT,

NOV. 24, 1982'

Once again the issue of Afghanistan is
before the General Assembly. Once
again, in what is by now a familiar exer-
cise, one representative after another
will come before this body to decry the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
continuing and increasingly brutal at-
tempt to subjugate the Afghan people.
And once again we will consider, and
hopefully adopt by another overwhelm-
ing majority, a resolution calling for the
withdrawal of the Soviet occupation
force, respect for Afghanistan's right of
self-determination, restoration of
Afghan independence and nonalignment,
and the return of the Afghan refugees
to their homes in safety and honor.

The familiarity of this exercise must
not be allowed to detract in any way
from its extraordinary significance. Of
all the issues before this assembly, none
has more far-reaching implications than
the issue of Afghanistan. The aggression
committed by the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan and its proxies elsewhere
has had and continues to have a great
impact upon the climate and course of
East- West relations. Such aggression
ominously affects the entire fabric of in-
ternational relations and the future of
the state system based upon respect for
the principles of territorial integrity, na-
tional independence, and political
sovereignty. These actions bear directly
upon the capacity of states, especially
those most vulnerable, to retain their
unique identities and to fulfill their
aspirations in peace and security.

The Afghan people are fighting for
their own survival, but their struggle
has a much broader meaning. If a small,
relatively defenseless, nonaligned coun-
try like Afghanistan is allowed to be in-
vaded, brutalized, and subjugated, what
other similarly vulnerable country can
feel secure? If the fiercely independent

and incredibly courageous people of
Afghanistan are uprooted, economically
ravaged, culturally annihilated, and
eventually subdued, the survival of other
peoples— even those equally resilient-
will be endangered.

The effort to subjugate the Afghan
people and to impose upon them a form
of alien and totalitarian rule has been
marked by a degree of violence against
the population that is exceeded in the re-
cent past only by the terrible tragedy in
Kampuchea. The crimes against the
Afghan people have taken place far
from the eye of world publicity, behind a
tight curtain of totalitarian disinforma-
tion and thought control. Still, the story
of the brutality has come out— as it
often does in such situations— from
refugee accounts and from reports of
journalists and doctors who have ven-
tured into the country.

One measure of the extent of the
violence inflicted upon the Afghan peo-
ple is the number of refugees uprooted
from their homes and forced to flee to
neighboring countries. When the illegiti-
mate regime of Babrak Karmal was in-
stalled as a result of the Soviet invasion,
the number of refugees in Pakistan had
already reached 400,000. These refugees
had fled the reign of terror unleashed
against Afghanistan by the earlier Com-
munist regimes of Taraki and Amin.
Babrak promised an end to the methods
of terror used by his predecessors. But
in less than 3 years of his rule, the
number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan
and Iran has increased nearly tenfold to
over 3 million, almost one-quarter of the
estimated 1978 population of Afghani-
stan. This is the largest single refugee
mass in the world for any one national
group.

Even these figures fail to convey the
full extent of the dislocation and suffer-
ing of Afghanistan, since there have
been many hundreds of thousands of in-
ternal refugees who have fled from the
rural areas where the fighting has been
most intense. The depopulation of the
countryside, it appears, has been the
deliberate goal of Soviet scorched-earth
policies in rural areas controlled by the
resistance. As a result of the fighting in
these provinces, many farmers have
been unable to gather their crops and
there is a danger this winter of famine.

The Soviet Offensive

The last General Assembly called upoi
the Soviet Union to withdraw its forc(
from Afghanistan. Far from respectiji
the decision of the assembly, the Sovii
over the past year have augmented tli
forces in Afghanistan to approximate!
105,000, and they have conducted the
most ruthless, wide-ranging, and sys-
tematic offensive of the entire war. T
heightened aggressiveness of the Sovi
forces became evident in January whe
the Soviets bombarded, shelled, and o
cupied the resistance stronghold of Q;
dahar, Afghanistan's second largest ci
located some 250 miles southeast of
Kabul. The brutal action in Qandahar,
which resulted in high civilian casualti
was repeated 2 months later in Herat
and Mazar-e Sharif and later in the
spring against the northeastern town
Tashkurghan. In the early summer th
town of Aq Gozar in the far northwes
was rendered unfit for human habitat
by systematic air and tank strikes.

As brutal as these attacks have
been, the main thrust of the Soviet of
fensive took place closer to Kabul in t
spring and summer of this year. The
principal targets were villages in the
Panjsher and Logar valleys and the
Shomali region, and districts near
Kabul, particularly the mountain towr
Paghman located only 12 miles north-
west of the capital. These attacks hav
been marked by indiscriminate bomba
ments of villages resulting in thousani
of civilian casualties, many of them
women and children. Survivors also
relate that Soviet troops, frustrated ir
their search for resistance fighters, ha
committed numerous acts of terrorisn
against civilians.

In Qandahar, for example, accoun:
of rape and plunder by Soviet troops
following last January's bombing
shocked and alienated even the most£
thusiastic apologists of the Babrak
regime. According to eyewitness repoi
from the Shomali region, in one villagi
all males over the age of 10 were shot
the presence of their female relatives.
The Swedish journalist Borje Almquisi
who visited the Lowgar Province in Ji
and August, has described similar in-
cidents in that area, as indeed such in-
cidents have been reported from all ov
Afghanistan. According to Almquist,
women, children, and old men were, i
dragged into the street and executed, ]
while civilians with their hands tied
behind their backs were used instead c
sand sacks for protection in street fig!

Departnnent of State Bulle

UNITED NATIONS

also reported the burning of
ts, the poisoning of food and
ig water, and the plundering of
and shops.

e Soviets also continue to use
-sonnel "butterfly bombs" and
rapped objects— such as toys,
;te packs, and pens— in gross
)n of an international convention
ing such weapons, which they
'Ives signed in 1981. Earlier this
team of French doctors, which
turned from as far inland as the
1 highlands of Hazarajat, charged
,e Soviets scatter such mines over
villages, and mountain paths,
I heavy casualties among inhabi-
especially among children who are
St wary. "We have treated many
n whose hands and feet are blown
such mines," said Dr. Claude
-et, a member of the French
111 team. He also revealed that the
( 5, fearing that the French doctors
speak about what they had seen,
yed their hospitals in an attempt
e them out of the country,
obytrap mines are not the only
ed weapons used by the Soviets
t the people of Afghanistan. They
le to use chemical weapons in
)n of both the Geneva Protocol of
nd the 1972 Biological Weapons
■ition which they, along with 110
■ountries, have ratified. Earlier
ar the United States listed 47
I chemical attacks in Afghanistan.
\ legan as early as 6 months before
j 'asion and have resulted in over
ieaths. These attacks have con-
. Just last September a Soviet
■ captured by the resistance,
ly Sakharov, said that he knew of
:ypes of chemical agents used by
viets in Afghanistan. His testi-
about the effects of one of them, a
ilarly deadly agent which he called
h," corresponds closely to reports
to the U.N. experts team by doc-
orking with refugees in Pakistan,
actors noted that on several occa-
ifter attacks on villages, "bodies
iickly decomposed, and limbs
'parated from each other when
;d." Sakharov also described a
cal attack on resistance fighters in
the Soviet soldiers had been
id to use gasmasks. [On November
'82, Secretary of State Shultz
ed Special Report No. 104,
nical Warfare in Southeast Asia
ighanistan: An Update," which
ins new information regarding the
t Union's continued use of illegal

chemical and biological weapons in
Afghanistan, as well as in Laos and
Kampuchea.]

Afghan Resistance

Nothing more clearly demonstrates the
courage and resilience of the Afghan
freedom fighters, or the Afghan people's
universal hatred of the Soviet occupa-
tion, than the fact that the resistance
forces remain intact and active through-
out the country despite the massive
violence that the Soviets have used
against them. In the Panjsher and in
Paghman, for example, the Soviets were
able to establish footholds as the mu-
jahidin melted into the hills. But as soon
as the main invading force withdrew,
the resistance overran the newly estab-
lished government outposts and re-
gained control of these positions.
Similarly, savage bombardments in the
Shomali temporarily drove the mu-
jahidin back from the main roads but in
no way broke their organization. Even
in the devastated city of Qandahar the
freedom fighters have been able to
mount operations against the occupying
forces, the most notable being a spec-
tacular jailbreak and freeing of prisoners
last August. Destroyed Soviet tanks and
transport vehicles litter the roadsides
throughout Afghanistan, testimony to
the Soviets' continuing inability to estab-
lish security in the countryside or con-
trol over the population.

The most glaring and revealing
failure of the Soviets has been their in-
ability to build the various branches of
their puppet regime's armed forces into
effective units that could take over the
brunt of the fighting. To date it appears
that no progress has been made in this
key area. Recent measures to overcome
the critical manpower shortage in the
Afghan Army— including the toughest
draft decree yet issued, indiscriminate
arrests and beatings of those resisting
conscription, and incentive payscales for
recruits almost equal to sub-Cabinet
salaries— have been fruitless. As a con-
sequence, press gangs have returned to
the streets of Kabul and provincial
cities, and young men have been forcibly
conscripted in house-to-house searches.
The futility of these various measures
was demonstrated during the summer
fighting when large-scale defections, sur-
renders, and desertions by Afghan
soldiers led to a net loss of military per-
sonnel.

The failure of the Soviets to break
the resistance by military means and the

self-evident fact that the Soviet ag-
gressors and their Afghan proxies are
rejected by the Afghan people have not
caused the Soviets to relent in their
desire ultimately to subjugate the coun-
try. Instead, they show every sign of
pursuing a long-term strategy, looking
on the one hand to the gradual wearing
down of the resistance through attrition
and on the other hand to the military,
economic, and social integration of
Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere.

The Soviets have already taken sig-
nificant steps in this direction. They
have consolidated their military, trans-
port, and communications infrastruc-
ture, including the expansion of existing
air fields and the completion of the
bridge across the Amu Darya River.
They have tightened their grip on the
strategic Wakhan corridor, which rests
on Pakistan's northernmost border and
links Afghanistan with China, and they
have tied Afghanistan's economy tightly
to those of the Soviet bloc through a
proliferation of economic and trade
agreements.

Perhaps most significant is the
Soviet effort to reshape Afghan culture
and to replace the decimated intellectual
and middle classes with a new elite
trained in the Soviet mold. Thousands of
Afghans, including even children be-
tween the ages of 6 and 9, are being
trained in the Soviet Union and other
bloc countries, while the Afghan educa-
tional system itself is being restructured
along Soviet lines. The Sovietization of
Kabul University is made evident by the
presence of Soviet advisers at all levels
of administration and instruction and in
the preference given to party activists in
admissions. The curriculum of Afghani-
stan's primary education system has
been redrawn to promote indoctrination
in Marxist-Leninist ideology and to pre-
pare young Afghans for further study in
the Soviet Union.

It is in light of these policies— and
the continuing escalating, savage Soviet
military involvement— that we must
view Moscow's repeated claim that the
Great Saur Revolution of April 1978 is
"irreversible." But what, one may legiti-
mately ask, gives the Soviet Union the
right "to insist that the violent overthrow
of a nonaligned government constitutes
an "irreversible" revolution? According
to what tenet of international law, on
the basis of which article of the U.N.
Charter, do they base their position?
One would think that it is the Afghan
people, and only the Afghan people, who

ary1983

UNITED NATIONS

have the right to determine whether the
events of 1978 are or are not "irrever-
sible."

In fact, the Afghan people made
their decision long ago. They rejected a
revolution the chief accomplishment of
which before the Soviet invasion was the
arrest, torture, and execution of tens of
thousands of Muslim clerics, teachers,
civil servants, doctors, and engineers.
They rejected a revolution the cruelty
and sadistic violence of which are best
symbolized by the mass burial pits out-
side Pol-e Charkhi prison and the
massacre at Kerala. They rejected a
revolution which systematically
assaulted Islam and Afghan nationhood
and turned their proud country over to
its predatory northern neighbor.

They expressed this rejection in the
form of a spontaneous, countr.ywide re-
sistance movement. By invading
Afghanistan in order to crush this re-
sistance and maintain in power a hated,
Marxist regime, Moscow took a momen-
tous step which signaled the expanding
scope of its political and territorial ambi-
tions. In effect, for the first time it was
claiming the right to apply the Brezhnev
Doctrine to a previously nonaligned.
Third World country.

International Rejection of
Soviet Occupation

The world has not permitted this act of
expansion and aggression to go un-
challenged. It has rejected the claim ad-
vanced by Soviet propaganda that it is
providing "fraternal assistance" to
Afghanistan with its "limited military
contingent." These words ominously
echo assurances which were given to
Afghanistan itself GO years ago when it
protested the entry of Soviet troops into
two of its neighbors, the independent
Muslim states of Khiva and Bokhara.
Let me quote from a letter which the
Soviet Ambassador in Kabul sent to the
Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
February 20, 1922:

Concerning the question of the independ-
ent status of Khiva and Bokhara, this has
been provided for in the treaty agreed to and
signed by the two governments of Russia and
Afghanistan. The Government which I repre-
sent has always recognized and respected the
independence of the two Governments of
Khiva and Bokhara. The presence of a limited
contingent of troops belonging to my Govern-
ment is due to temporary requirements ex-
pressed and made known to us by tlie
Bokharan Government. This arrangement has
been agreed to with the provision that when-
ever the Bokharan Government so requests,

not a single Russian soldier will remain on
Bokharan soil. The extension of our friendly
assistance in no w-ay constitutes an inter-
ference against the independence of the
sovereign State of Bokhara.

Today, 60 years later, the Soviet
Union provides the same justification
and the same assurances with respect to
its invasion of Afghanistan. It is u.seful.

therefore, to reflect upon the ultimat
fate of Khiva and Bokhara. Two yeai
after the Soviet Ambassador gave hi;
assurances to the Government of
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union annex
Khiva and Bokhara. Their languages.
Turkish and Persian were abolished ;
replaced by pseudolanguages fabrical
by Soviet linguists. These languages,

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A/37/37,
NOVEMBER 29, 1982'

The General Assembly.

Having considered the item entitled "The
situation in Afghanistan and its implications
for international peace and security".

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14
January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980
and 36/34 of 18 November 1981, adopted at
the sixth emergency special session, the
thirty-fifth session and the thirty-sixth ses-
sion, respectively,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and the
obHgation of all States to refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial in
tegrity and political independence of any
State,"

Reaffirming further the inalienable right
of all peoples to determine their own form of
government and to choose their own eco-
nomic, political and scjcial system free from
outside intervention, subversion, coercion or
constraint of any kind whatsoever.

Gravely concerned at the continuing
foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in
contravention of the above principles, and its
serious implications for international peace
and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the in-
ternational community over the continued
and serious sufferings of the Afghan people
and over the magnitude of social and eco-
nomic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran
by the presence on their soil of millions of
Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase
in their numbers.

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a
political solution of the grave situation in
respect of .Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the Secre-
tary-General,-

Recognizing the importance of the initia-
tives of the Organization of the Islamic (Con-
ference and the efforts of the Movement of
Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution
of the situation in respcft of Afghanistan,

1 . Reiterates that the preservation of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political in-
dependence and nonaligned character of
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solu-
tion of the problem;

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan peo-
ple to determine their own form of govern-
ment and to choose their economic, political

and social system free from outside inter
tion, subversion, coercion or con.straint o)
kind whatsoever;

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawa
the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. Calls upon all parties concerned to
work for the urgent achievement of a
political solution, in accordance with the
visions of the present resolution, and the
creation of the necessary conditions whic
would enable the Afghan refugees to reti
voluntarily to their homes in safety and
honour;

5. Renews its appeal to all States and
tional and international organizations to (
tinue to extend humanitarian relief
assistance, with a view to alleviating the
hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co-
ordination with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees;

6. Expresses its appreciation and sup
for the efforts and constructive steps tak
by the Secretary-General in the search to
solution to the problem;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to •
tinue these efforts with a view to promot
a political solution, in accordance with th(
provisions of the present resolution, and i
exploration of securing appropriate
guarantees for non-use of force, or threat
use of force, against the political in-
dependence, sovereigTity, territorial mteg
and security of all neighbouring States, o.
the basis of mutual guarantees and strict
non-interference in each other's internal £
fairs and with full regard for the principli
the Charter of the United Nations;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to 1
Member States and the Security Council i
currently informed of the progress towari
the implementation of the present resolut
and to submit to Member States a report
the situation at the earliest appropriate oi
portunity;

9. Decides to include in the provisiona
agenda of its thirty-eighth session the itei
entitled "The situation in Afghanistan am
implications for international peace and
security".

'Adopted by a vote of 114 to 21 (13
abstentions and" 9 absent or not voting). I

Department of Stale Bull!

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

)ek and Tadzhik, were mere dialects
Turkish and Persian but were tran-
ibed into Latin and later Cyrillic
ipt. Mosques were closed or changed
) museums and Koranic education
3 abolished. The surviving members
;he local factions the Soviets had sup-
ted with their invasion were executed
charges of "bourgeois nationalist
iationism" and replaced by young
eaucrats trained in new Soviet
ools.

Is history repeating itself today in

case of Afghanistan? If we are to
ge from Soviet actions to date, it is
■d not to conclude that they intend
t history shall repeat itself, if not
ough the formal annexation of
rhanistan, then through its de facto
orption into the Soviet empire. And
his is allowed to happen, can anyone
reasonably assured that this will be

end of the process, that there are

future Khivas and Bokharas and
jhanistans that await a similar fate?

It is not, therefore, simply moral
isiderations and human solidarity that
c us to the fate of the Afghan people,
stake in their struggle is respect for

principles of the U.N. Charter; the
nciples of the non-use of force; and
pect for the territorial integrity, na-
lal independence, and political
■ereignty of states. Without this
pect, world politics would succumb to
irchy and domination by the most
hless, expansionist predator.

We cannot— we must not— permit
3 to happen. The Soviet leaders un-
jbtedly believed when they launched
ir invasion of Afghanistan that they
lid deal with the international reac-
n by waiting patiently for the world's
rage to subside. The General
sembly can take great credit for
istrating this strategy. Passage of
le has not served the aggressor. In-
ed, the adoption of resolutions on
ghanistan by increasingly large ma-
ities over the last 3 years shows that
' world's outrage is growing.

We now have an opportunity to reaf-
m once again our commitment to the
eration of Afghanistan. In so doing,

can help remind those in the Kremlin
10 ordered the Soviet invasion that
eir strategy has failed. We cannot af-
d, either as individual states with our
n security concerns, or as a world
ganization dedicated to maintaining
)rld peace, for the Soviet leaders to
ve any doubts on this score.

The resolution before us today offers

honorable course for ending the
:'ghanistan crisis. Its objective is a

peaceful, negotiated settlement leading
to the withdrawal of Soviet forces; the
restoration of Afghan self-determina-
tion, independence, and nonalignment;
and the return of the refugees to their
homeland. By adopting this resolution,
the U.N. General Assembly will be im-
pressing on the Soviets the necessity to
negotiate an end to their misadventure.
Hopefully, this will speed the day when
real negotiations on a settlement can
begin.

In this context, the United States
wishes to express its appreciation to
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar for
his effort to probe the opportunities for
a settlement whicli would implement the
General Assembly resolutions. We sup-
port these efforts and urge the Soviets
to cooperate with them. We also recog-
nize, as the Secretary General said in his
report to the General Assembly this
year, that "time is of the essence." If the
Soviets truly tlesire to negotiate, they

must come forward quickly or the rest
of the world will be forced to conclude
that they have no serious interest in
reaching a settlement.

The alternative to a negotiated set-
tlement is a continuation of the conflict,
with far-reaching and long-lasting conse-
quences for world peace. The Afghan
people, unbowed and unbroken despite
repeated and relentless hammer blows,
have shown that they will not submit to
aggression— not now and not ever. They
have proved themselves to be a strong,
proud, heroic people. With our support
and solidarity, they shall also once again
become a sovereign and independent
people, permitted, as President Harry
Truman once said, to work out their
own destiny in their own way. This is all
that they seek. It is all that we, the
member states of the United Nations,
seek for them.

^U.S.U.N. press release 146.

World Peace and the Situation in
Central America and the Caribbean

Folloiving is an exchange of letters,
released on November 5, between Presi-
dent Reagan and prominent Venezuelan
citizens regarding the threats to world
pea.ce and the cu7-rent situation in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean.^

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER

[Dear .

I have read carefully the letter recently
addressed to me from numerous Venezuelan
intellectuals, political leaders, and other per-
sons in public life regarding the threats to
world peace and the current situation in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean.

The people and government of the United
States of America share these concerns.

The major objective of my administration,
as of every other other American administra-
tion since World War II. is to prevent nuclear
war. Twice in my lifetime, I liave seen the
world plunge into wars costing millions of
lives. Living through those experiences has
convinced me that America's highest mission
is to encourage the world along the path of
peace, and to ensure that our country and all
those who share our aspirations of peace and
freedom can live in security.

Since taking office, I have sought prac-
tical measures to reduce the risk of such a
war, and to limit the destructive potential
and costly competition in nuclear arsenals.
Last year I wrote to President Brezhnev

urging him to join me in this effort and pro-
posing that we begin negotiations to reduce
nuclear weapons and to strengthen peace.

Last November, I offered to begin discus-
sions with the Soviet Union to find a way to
eliminate land-based intermediate-range
nuclear missile systems. We are now
negotiating in Geneva with the USSR on this
proposal, which calls on the Soviet LInion to
dismantle the more than 600 such systems it
has in place, in exchange for which the U.S.
and our allies would agree not to install
similar systems in Europe.

In May, I proposed a far-reaching ap-
proach to nuclear arms control — a phased
reduction in strategic weapons beginning
with those that are most dangerous and
destabilizing, the warheads on ballistic
missiles and especially those on intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles. In a second phase, we
will seek even further reductions in the
destructive potential of nuclear forces. We
are now negotiating with the Soviet Union in
Geneva on these very proposals.

These negotiaticjns, and others which are
in progress or which we will be proposing,
provide a historic opportunity for us to rein-
force the framework of peace and reduce the
risk of war. With the support of our friends
and allies, we will do everything in our power
to achieve that goal.

There are two fundamental causes of the
conflict in Central America: economic, social
and political under-development and the
violent exploitation of that under-
development by Cuba, Nicaragua and the

TREATIES

Soviet Union. To bring about peace in the
region, we think both causes have to be ad-
dressed.

Together with Venezuela. Colombia, Mex-
ico and Canada we are attempting to promote
economic development in Central America
and the Caribbean through the Caribbean
Basin Initiative. No regional objective has a
higher priority than passage of this legisla-
tion to provide trade and investment incen-
tives to economic development. Our Congress
has already approved provision of $350
million in emergency supplemental funds and
these are being disbursed to recipient govern-
ments.

The development of democratic institu-
tions to complement economic growth is a
parallel objective to which we are equally
committed. We have supported and have
been encouraged by the striking trend toward
democracy in Central America and the Carib-
bean. Honduras and El Salvador have held
free and fair elections in the last year, as did
traditionally democratic Costa Rica and Co-
lombia. Venezuelan democracy in our judg-
ment continues to provide a worthy model
compelling in its vibrancy. The trend toward
democracy elsewhere in the hemisphere — we
applaud the return of Bolivia to democratic
rule — has our full support.

We are also seeking to support demo-
cratic political development by directing
resources to the development of core skills of
democracy. This week, for example, we are
hosting a Conference on Free Elections to
which democratic representatives from all
over the world have been invited.

Our diplomacy has supported the efforts
of countries in the region to lesson tensions
threatening peace. We participated in the
conference Costa Rica convened on October 4
to coordinate efforts for regional peace and
democracy. We hope this conference will con-
tribute to defusing tensions in the region.

I believe many Venezuelans share our
concern in this regard. The initiative of your
President, together with President Lopez
Portillo of Mexico, was a constructive step in
the same direction. We believe the regional
effort begun at the San Jose conference will
advance the cause of peace we both support.

As we direct efforts toward economic and
political developments we cannot ignore the
legitimate security needs of countries
threatened by external support of internal in-
surgency. The United States is supplying
modest amounts of military equipment and
training to the governments of El Salvador
and Honduras. Around 85 percent of our aid
to these countries, however, is economic.

The commitment to democracy, self-
sustaining economic development and non-
intervention which we share does not,
however characterize the action of Nicaragua,
Cuba and the Soviet Union. Subsidized by the
Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua have per-
sistently provided aid to insurgency in El
Salvador. Both Costa Rica and Honduras
have been victimized by Nicaraguan-
supported terrorist attacks. Nicaragua has
developed its military potential entirely out

of proportion to its objective defense needs.
The root cause of so much concern in the
region, however, is Cuba's military buildup,
which has resulted in resources which could
be better allocated to economic development
being directed to arms procurement.

Our two peoples, who have sacrificed
blood and energy to obtain, safeguard, and
nourish democracy, know well the importance
of freedom and the right of free choice.
Venezuelans and Americans alike share a
mutual desire for peace and freedom in not
only this region of the world but throughout
the globe. By continuing our efforts, we can
together advance the cause of peace.

VENEZUELAN CITIZENS' LETTER

Dear Mr. President:

Reflecting the sentiments of ample sec-
tors of the people of Venezuela, we would
like to express to you our deep concern over
the growing threat of another world con-
flagration which, if it does occur, would bring
with it the destruction of all mankind,
eliminating all chances for anyone to be the
winner.

Within the realm of this concern, the
situation now in Central America and the
Caribbean strikes us, as Latin Americans, as
being rife with serious threats that could
eventually endanger world peace. For this
reason, we are opposed to any type of in-
terventionism that threatens the self-
determination of the people of this region and
impedes their progress as well as popular and
democratic development.

These are the reasons that bring us to
ask you, in virtue of the important position
you hold, to act diligently and decidedly
against the threat of another world war and
thus save mankind, provide perspectives for a
world free of tension, and allow everyone to
walk the certain path of peace and social
progress.

'The letter to the President was dated
September 20, 1982, delivered to the
American Embassy in Caracas on October 15,
1982, and released by the Office of the Press
Secretary on November 5, together with the
President's response of that date (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Nov. 8, 1982). ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Measures relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Brussels
June 2-13, 1964. Entered into force July 2'
1966 for ni-I through HI-VI, HI-IX and
ni-X; Sept. 1, 1966 for III-XI; Dec. 28, 19
for ni-VH. (TIAS 6058).
Notification of approval for III-VIII: Japan
Nov. 1, 1982.

Measures relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Santiago
Nov. 18, 1966. Entered into force Oct. 30,
1968 for IV-20 through IV-28.
Notification of approval for IV 1-9 inclusiv
Japan, Nov. 1, 1982.

Measures relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Paris Note
29, 1968. Entered into force May 26, 1972
for V-1 through V-4 and V-9; July 31, 19";
for V-7 and V-8. TIAS 7692.
Notification of approval of V-5 and V-6:'
Japan, Nov. 1, 1982.

Recommendations relating to the furtheran
of the principles and objectives of the Anta
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Tokyo
Oct. 30, 1970. Entered into force Oct. io,
1973 for VI 1-7 and 11-15. TIAS 7796.
Notification of approval for VI-8, 9, and IC
Japan, Nov. 1, 1982.

Recommendations relating to the furtheran
of the principles and objectives of the Anta
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Well-
ington Nov. 10, 1972. Entered into force M
29, 1975 for VII-1 through VII-3, and VIL
through VII-8. TIAS 8500.
Notification of approval for VII-5:' Japan,
Nov. 1, 1982.

Recommendations relating to the furtheran
of the principles and objectives of the Anta
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo Jui
20, 1975. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1978
for VIII 6-8 and 10-14; Sept. 1, 1980 for
VIII 3-4.

Notification of approval for VIII-1, 2, 5, an
9;» Japan, Nov. 1, 1982

Recommendations relating to the furtheran

of the principles and objectives of the Anta

tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Buenoi

Aires July 7, 198 P.

Notification of approval: Argentina, Sept. 3

1982.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Dor

Department of State Bullet

TREATIES

mtreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into

Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

ication deposited: India, Nov. 12, 1982.

ention on the suppression of unlawful
-e of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec.
370. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971.
7192.
ication deposited: India, Nov. 12, 1982.

ision of the international coffee agree-
. 1976 (TIAS 8683). Done at London

25, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 1,

TIAS 10439.
rtances deposited: Angola, Sept. 10,

Austria, Benin, Sept. 13, 1982; Bohvia,

29, 1982; Cameroon, Canada, France,
, Honduras, Italy, Malawi, New

nd,^ Norway, Thailand, Yugoslavia,

30, 1982; Cyprus, Peru, Sept. 28, 1982;
nican Republic, India, Sept. 7, 1982;

n, Indonesia, Sept. 3, 1982; Guinea,
14, 1982; Japan, Liberia, Portugal,
27, 1982; Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Sept.
382; Netherlands, Aug. 30, 1982';
may, Aug. 27, 1982; Philippines, Aug.
382; Sweden, Sept. 21, 1982;
.erland, Sept. 24, 1982; Tanzania, Sept.
S2; Trinidad and Tobago, Sept. 20, 1982;
, Aug. 6, 1982.

ications of provisional application
;ited: Belgium, Denmark, European
omic Community, F.R.G., Greece,
id, Luxembourg, Sierra Leone,
.pore, U.K.," Sept. 30, 1982; Central
an Republic, Venezuela, Sept. 17, 1982;
. Rica, Sept. 16, 1982; Finland, Sept. 28,
Nigeria, Sept. 13, 1982; Togo, Aug. 16,

nodities — Common Fund

ement establishing the Common Fund

ommodities, with schedules. Done at

va June 27, 1980.'

ications deposited: Benin, Oct. 25, 1982;

a Leone, Oct. 7, 1982; Switzerland, Aug.

982.^

oval deposited: France, Sept. 17, 1982.

ervation

ention on international trade in en-
ered species of wild fauna and flora,
appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS

ication deposited: Sudan, Oct. 26, 1982.

ndment to the convention of Mar. 3,
on international trade in endangered
es of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249).
)ted at Bonn June 22, 1979.'
ptances deposited: Jordan, Sept. 15,
Nepal, Oct. 21, 1982; Peru, Oct. 6,
South Africa, Oct. 1, 1982.

cms convention on the international
sport of goods under cover of TIR
ets, with annexes. Done at Geneva

14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20,

for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.

Accessions deposited: Afghanistan, Sept. 23,

1982;6 Chile, Oct. 6, 1982.

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom,

Oct. 8, 1982.'

Fisheries

Convention for the conservation of salmon in
the North Atlantic Ocean. Open for signature
at Reykjavik Mar. 2 to Aug. 31, 1982.'
Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 16, 1982.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial
and extrajudicial documents in civil or com-
mercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15,
1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969.
TIAS 6638.
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia,

Sept. 23, 1981.«

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the International Mari-
time Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490,
8606, 10374). Adopted at London Nov. 17,
1977.1

Acceptances deposited: Cuba, Oct. 26, 1982;
Czechoslovakia, Nov. 17, 1982.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the International Mari-
time Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 8606,
10374). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.'
Acceptances deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 7, 1982;
Czechoslovakia, Nov. 17, 1982; Nepal,
Nov. 1, 1982.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of
all forms of racial discrimination. Done at
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969.'
Accession deposited: Namibia, Nov. 11, 1982.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean
floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11,
1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972.
TIAS 7337.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Nov. 11,

1982.

Tonnage

International convention on tonnage measure-
ment of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at
London June 23, 1969. Entered into force
July 18, 1982.
Senate advice and consent to acceptance:

Sept. 30, 1982.i'>

Instrument of acceptance signed by President:

Oct. 25, 1982."'

Acceptance deposited: U.S., Nov. 10, 1982. ><>

Enters into force for U.S.: Feb. 10, 1983.

Trade

U.N. convention on contracts for the interna-
tional sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11,
1980.'

Approval deposited: France, Aug. 6, 1982.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Done at
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.'
Signatures: Jamaica, Israel, Nov. 1, 1982;
Mozambique, Nov. 10, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Malta, Nov. 4, 1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibition or restrictions on
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively in-
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with
annexed protocols. Adopted at Geneva
Oct. 10, 1980.'

Signature: Laos, Nov. 2, 1982.
Ratification and acceptances deposited:
Bulgaria, Oct. 15, 1982.

Whaling

Amendments to the schedule to the interna-
tional convention for the regulation of whal-
ing 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Brighton
July 19-24, 1982. Enters into force 90 days
after notification by the International Whal-
ing Commission to the contracting govern-
ments, unless any contracting government
presents an objection.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
tion, as amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534).
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976.'
Acceptances deposited: Togo, Oct. 18, 1982:
U.A.E., Oct. 7, 1982; U.S., Nov. 11, 1982;
Zimbabwe, Oct. 13, 1982.

World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11,
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950.
TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Swaziland, Nov. 2, 1982.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement amending the agreement of
Sept. 22, 1977 (TIAS 8978) relating to air
transport services. Effected by exchange of
notes at Buenos Aires Mar. 11, 1981. En-
tered into force Mar. 11, 1981. TIAS 10440.

Australia

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat
imports from Australia during calendar year
1982. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Oct. 18 and 21, 1982. Entered
into force Oct. 21, 1982.

Brazil

Agreement on cooperation in the field of con-
trol of illicit traffic of drugs, with annex. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Brasilia
Sept. 29, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 29,
1982.

E'dary 1983

CHRONOLOGY

Canada

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat
imports from Canada during calendar year
1982. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Sept. 23 and 28, 1982. Entered
into force Sept. 28, 1982.

Chile

Memorandum of understanding for scientific
cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at
Reston and Santiago Aug. 2 and 26, 1982.
Entered into force Aug. 26, 1982.

Colombia

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bogota July 1 and Aug. 11, 1982.
Entered into force Aug. 11, 1982; effective
July 1, 1982.

Egypt

Project grant agreement for Safaga Grain
Silos Complex. Signed at Cairo Sept. 25,
1982. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1982.
Project grant agreement for production
credit. Signed at Cairo Sept. 25, 1982.
Entered into force Sept. 25, 1982.

Agreement extending the memorandum of
understanding of Oct. 21, 1979 relating to
the production in Egypt of U.S. -designed
defense equipment. Signed at Washington
Oct. 21, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 21,
1982.

El Salvador

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 15, 1982,
with memorandum of understanding. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at San Salvador
Sept. 1, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 7,
1982.

Israel

Agreement relating to privileges and im-
munities for U.S. military members and
civilian observers of the Multinational Force
and Observers on leave in Israel. Effected by
exchange of notes at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv
Sept. 28 and Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force
Oct. 1, 1982.

Italy

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters. Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Enters
into force upon the exchange of instruments
of ratification.

Supplementary protocol to the treaty on ex-
tradition of Jan. 18, 1973 (TIAS 8052).
Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Enters into
force upon exchange of instruments of
ratification.

New Zealand

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat
imports from New Zealand during calendar
year 1982. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Sept. 28 and 29, 1982. Entered
into force Sept. 29, 1982.

Panama

Agreement authorizing the U.S. to construct
a custodian's house in the Corozal Cemetery.
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama
Sept. 29 and 30, 1982. Entered into force
Sept. 29, 1982.

Agreement concerning creation of a prepara-
tory committee to study alternatives to the
Panama Canal. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Sept. 30, 1982. Entered
into force Sept. 30, 1982.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreements of
Aug. 23 and 30, 1979, Aug. 12 and 22, 1980,
and Aug. 19 and 20, 1981 (TIAS 9584, 9847,
10236), concerning the grant of defense ar-
ticles and services under the miltary assist-
ance program. Effected by exchange of notes
at Manila Aug. 16 and Sept. 30, 1982.
Entered into force Sept. 30, 1982.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement of
Mar. 19, 1960 (TIAS 4444), as amended, for
financing certain educational exchange pro-
grams. Effected by exchange of letters at
Lisbon July 6, Aug. 16, and Sept. 3, 1982.
Entered into force Sept. 3, 1982.

Romania

Agreement amending the agreement of
Sept. 3 and Nov. 3, 1980, as amended (TIAS
9911), relating to trade in wool and manmade
fiber textiles and textile products. Effected
by exchange of letters at Washington Nov. 2
and 3, 1982. Entered into force Nov. 3, 1982.

Saudi Arabia

Extension of the project agreement of
Oct. 30, 1977 (TIAS 9077) for cooperation in
the field of solar energy. Signed at Washing-
ton Oct. 8, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 8,
1982.

Senegal

Agreement for scientific and technical
cooperation. Signed at Dakar Sept. 30, 1980.
Entered into force Aug. 17, 1982. TIAS
10441.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar
Aug. 26, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 25,
1982.

Spain

International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Madrid
Oct. 18, 1982. Enters into force on the date
mutually agreed upon by the administrations.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Mar. 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107). Signed at Colom-
bo Oct. 29, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 29,
1982.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of
Oct. 4, 1978, as amended and extended
(TIAS 9215, 9462, 9717, 10368), relating.,
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber i
tiles and textile products. Effected by ex-i
change of letters at Bangkok Sept. 30 anij
Oct. 25, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 25,,
1982.

Treaty on cooperation in the execution of
penal sentences. Signed at Bangkok Oct.
1982. Enters into force on the date on v/l'
instruments of ratification are exchanged '

Turkey

Agreement amending the agreement of P '
15 and 31, 1979, as amended (TIAS 9588'
10144), concerning the grant of defense ;
tides and services under the military assi '
ance program. Effected by exchange of r '
at Ankara Aug. 13, and Sept. 24, 1982.
Entered into force Sept. 24, 1982.

'Not in force. J

^Applicable to the Cook Islands and 9

^For the Kingdom in Europe. J

■"Applicable to the Bailiwicks of Gueni
and Jersey.

■^With declaration.

•^With reservation.

'Applicable to the Bailiwicks of Gueri!
and Jersey, (5ibraltar, and the Isle of Ma:

''With declaration(s) and designation(.'

'Not in force for the U.S.

'"With understanding. ■

November 1982

November 1

At Lebanese President Gemayel's request
President Reagan authorizes the U.S. Ma
contingent to join with the other national
tingents to the MNF [multinational force]
limited patrols in East Beirut.

November 2

Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini
makes an official working visit to Washin
ton, D.C., November 2-4, 1982.

November 3

Speaking for the five Western countries i
volved in the U.N. -sponsored negotiations
bringing Namibia to independence— Brita
Canada, France, West Germany, and the
U.S.— vice chairman of the U.S. delegatio
Kalmann Schaefer, states that they will
welcome the admission of that territory t(
the International Telecommunications Uni
(ITU) only "after it becomes independent.
Schaefer goes on to say that such action
would be contrary to the ITU convention
could possibly upset the ongoing "delicate
negotiations" on Namibian independence.
ITU conference, nevertheless, admits
Namibia as represented by the U.N. Cour
for Namibia.

Department of State Bull*

CHRONOLOGY

mber 4

jsentative from 34 nations attend the
■rence on Free Elections held in
ington, D.C., November 4-6, 1982, to
ie exchange designed to foster the
opment of an effective program to
d democracy and democratic institu-

y a vote of 90-12 with 52 abstentions.
General Assembly adopts Resolution
irging the U.K. and Argentina to
le negotiations aimed at seeking a
fill solution to the sovereignty dispute
;he Falkland Islands.

mber 5

;ponse to reports — Conference Report
7-891 with accompanying H.R. 6956 —

directed the Secretary of State to
take an investigation of allegations that
i labor is being used and human rights
ed in the construction of the trans-
an gas pipeline, the State Department
ts to the Congress an updated packet of
nation on the issue. The report includes
xt of the Department's September 22
nent, an historical summary of Soviet
I labor questions before the Interna-

Labor Organization, a new study en-
"The Soviet Forced-Labor System,"
lentation from the August 1982 hear-
eld by the International Society for
n Rights, a summary of publicly an-
ed actions taken by other governments
itemational labor bodies, and maps and
ics of the pipeline network and of
; forced-labor camps.

nber 6

22 years in office, Cameroon President
dou Ahidjo resigns. He is succeeded by
Minister Paul Biya.

nber 7

• Volta Government of Col. Saye Zerbo
rthrown in a coup.

Tiber 8

European Community (EC) semiannual
evel consultations are held November
982, at State Department. Under
tary for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis
the U.S. team. The delegations ex-
e views on the global economic outlook,
jcoming GATT [General Agreement on
s and Trade] ministerial meeting,
dtural and other trade concerns. East-
economic relations, and energy issues,
resident Reagan informs the Congress
le has sent a notice to the Federal
ter stating that because the "internal
ion in Iran remains uncertain, the war
!en Iran and Iraq continues, and the
t Union still occupies Afghanistan," the
lal emergency with respect to Iran will
lue in effect beyond the November 14,
expiration date. The national emergen-
,s declared November 14, 1979, by
T President Jimmy Carter.

November 9

Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev dies.

Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, recessed March 1982 as a result of
the martial law situation in Poland,
reconvenes in Madrid.

November 10

Vice President Bush makes an official visit to
Africa November 10-24, 1982. The Vice
President makes a brief stop in Cape Verde
and proceeds to Senegal and Nigeria. At this
point, the Vice President's schedule is inter-
rupted and he departs Nigeria to travel to
Moscow to head the U.S. delegation to the
funeral of Soviet President Brezhnev. Follow-
ing the funeral, the Vice President resumes
his trip to Africa traveling to Zambia, Kenya,
Zaire, again to Cape Verde, and to Bermuda.

Second anniversary of the formal
registration in Poland of Solidarity as a legal-
ly recognized free trade union.

November 11

Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Kamal Hassan AJi visits
Washington, D.C., November 11-13, 1982, to
consult with President Reagan, Secretary
Shultz, and other U.S. officials on the peace
process and recent developments in Lebanon
and other issues of bilateral concern.

November 12

The Central Committee of the Communist
Party unanimously elects Yuriy V. Andropov
as General Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. Mr. Andropov succeeds
President Brezhnev.

Polish military government releases labor
leader Lech Walesa after an 11-month deten-
tion.

November 13

U.S. lifts trade sanctions it imposed on
American and other companies participating
in the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western
Europe because this country and its key allies
reach "substantial agreement" on overall eco-
nomic strategy toward the Soviet bloc.

Italian Prime Minister Spadolini
resigns — the second time in 3 days. The
Prime Minister's first resignation was refused
by President Pertini who ordered Spadolini
to submit the issue to the Parliament. The
Parliament agrees that the cabinet could not
be salvaged, and Pertini announces he will
open consultations on November 15 to
designate a new cabinet.

November 14

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl makes
an official working visit to Washington, D.C.,
November 14-16, 1982.

November 15

Funeral of Soviet President Brezhnev is held
in Moscow's Red Square. U.S. is represented
by Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz,
and Ambassador Hartman.

For the first time in 17 years, Brazilians

vote in the first free municipal, legislative,
and gubernatorial election.

Secretary Shultz heads U.S. delegation to
the 12th regular session of the General
Assembly meeting of the Organization of
American States held in Washington, D.C.,
November 15-20. On November 18, the
General Committee approves a draft resolu-
tion expressing support for U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 37/9 of November 4 and
calling for negotiations on the sovereignty
dispute over the Falkland Islands.

November 18

North Atlantic Assembly overwhelmingly
adopts a resolution condemning the continued
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and calling
on members of the NATO alliance "to con-
tinue to support the right of the Afghan peo-
ple to self-determination and sovereignty."

November 20

Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense
Minister Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu
Ghazala visits the U.S. November 20-27.
Discussions with the Secretary, Defense
Secretary Weinberger, and others deal with
U.S. military assistance to Egypt, the peace
process, and other issues.

November 22

The following newly appointed Ambassadors
present their credentials to President
Reagan: U Kyee Myint of Burma; Simon In-
sonere of Rwanda; Mocktar Georges
Abdoulaye-Mbingt of Gabon; Joseph Diatta of
Niger; Kasem S. Kasemsri of Thailand; and
Ah Mlahaili of Comoros.

In an address to the nation. President
Reagan announces a plan for peace through
deterrence and arms reduction. A special let-
ter sent by the President to Soviet leadership
proposes negotiating measures to lessen the
risk of accidental nuclear war and misunder-
standing thus strengthening mutual con-
fidence between both countries. The pro-
posals include:

• Advance notification of all U.S. and
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile test
firing;

• Advance notification of major military
exercises;

• Broad-range exchange of basic data
about nuclear forces; and

• Improvement of the existing "Hotline"
system.

The President, citing the continuing
Soviet military buildup, also announces his
decision to proceed with the deployment of
the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic
missile) — MX, stating that U.S. military
strength deters aggression. He goes on to
state that "unless we demonstrate the will to
rebuild our strength, the Soviets will have lit-
tle incentive to negotiate."

November 24

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

iary1983

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

Ministerial meeting is held in Geneva
November 24-28, 1982.

In Brazil, results of the November 15
election show opposition parties — Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party and the
Democratic Labor Party of Leonel
Brizola — carrying a majority of the votes
leading the Social Democratic Party of Gen.
Joao Baptista Figueiredo.

November 26

Japan elects Yasuhiro Nakasone as its new
Prime Minister. He succeeds Prime Minister
Suzuki.

November 29

State Department releases second report on
the continuing use of chemical and toxin
weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan
to the U.N. and the Congress.

By a vote of 114-21 (13 abstentions) the
U.N. General Assembly adopts Resolution
37/37 on the situation in Afghanistan. Nearly
identical to last year's resolution, it urges the
return of the independence and nonaligned
character of Afghanistan, reaffirms the
Afghan right of self-determination, calls for
the immediate withdrawal of the foreign
troops, and the return of the refugees with
safety and honor.

By a vote of 71-18 (30 abstentions) the
U.N. General Assembly adopts a resolution
calling on the Secretary General to in-
vestigate the illegal use of chemical weapons
in warfare.

November 30

In Geneva, U.S. -Soviet negotiations aimed at
a reduction of intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) in Europe adjourns until
January 27, 1983.

President Reagan makes an official work-
ing visit to Latin America November
30-December 4 to hold bilaterals with heads
of state. The President visits Brazil Nov.
30-Dec. 3; Colombia Dec. 3; Costa Rica Dec.
3-4; and Honduras Dec. 4. While in Costa
Rica, the President meets with Salvadoran
President AJvaro Magana and with Guate-
malan President Brig. Gen. Jose Rios Montt
while in Honduras. The President is accom-
panied by Secretaries Shultz and Regan, U.S.
Trade Representative Brock, and other
Senior White House aides. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*339 11/1 Program for the official visit
of Italian Prime Minister
Giovanni Spadolini, Nov.
2-4.

*340 10/26 James Blane sworn in as
Ambassador to Rwanda
(biographic data).

•341 11/2 Conference on the Carib-
bean, Miami, Dec. 5-7.

•342 11/2 Shultz; remarks at the U.N.
Day Concert, Oct. 30.

*343 11/3 William Alexander Hewitt
sworn in as Ambassador
to Jamaica, Oct. 25 (bio-
graphic data).
344 11/4 Shultz: address at Confer-
ence on Free Elections.

*345 11/9 U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph
and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CCITT),
study group A, Nov. 23.

*346 11/9 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommit-
tee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on bulk chemicals,
Nov. 29.

*347 11/9 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on stability, load lines, and
safety of fishing vessels,
Nov. 30.

•348 11/12 Program for the official visit
of F.R.G. Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, Nov. 14-16.

349 11/15 Shultz: news conference,

Moscow.

350 11/17 Shultz: address before Or-

ganization of American
States General Assembly.

351 11/18 Shultz news conference.

352 [not issued)

•353 11/23 Availability of Department
of State records, 1950-54,
for research.

•354 11/23 SCC, SOLAS, committee on
ocean dumping, Dec. 14.

•355 11/23 Advisory Committee on Pri-
vate International Law,
study group on trusts,
Dec. 17.

•356 12/2 Mrs. Shultz and Assistant
Secretary Newell to par-
ticipate in opening of In-
ternationa! Children's
Festival benefiting the
U.S. Committee for
UNICEF.

•357 11/29 Department submits Report
to Congress on Chemical
Warfare in Afghanistan,
Laos, and Kampuchea.

*358 11/30 U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), study group
CMIT, Dec. 21.

•Not printed in the Bulletin.

Department of State

Free, single copies of the follovnng Depai'
ment of State publications are available f n
the Public Information Service, Bureau o
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan I

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Ar
Control, address to the nation and letti t
the Congress, November 22, 1982 (Curn
Policy #435).

Secretary Shultz

Reflections Among Neighbors, address b u
the Organization of American States
General Assembly, November 17, 1982
(Current Policy #432).

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan: An Update, report to the di
gress and member states of the Unitec *a
tions, November 1982 (Special Report
#104). I,

Africa

Background Notes on Zimbabwe (Octobe
1982).

Arms Control

Freezing Chances for Peace, Counselor
Buckley, Commonwealth Club of Califcl
San Francisco, October 27, 1982 (Curr t
Policy #428).

East Asia

Background Notes on Macau (October lil)

Europe

Background Notes on Sweden (October 82

General

Atlas on Foreign Relations Machinery,
August 1982 (Bulletin Reprint).

Oceans

Law of the Sea (GIST, November 1982).

Population

Population Growth and the Policy of Nal
Coordinator of Population Affairs
Benedick, Bangladesh Institute of Stragi
Studies, Dacca, October 5, 1982 (Currc
Policy #429).

Refugees

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY
1982, Acting Secretary Dam and U.S.
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Dough,
Senate Judiciary Committee, Septembt2!
1982; President Reagan's memorandun
October 11, 1982 (Current Policy #427

Western Hemisphere

Caribbean Basin Initiative (GIST, Novener

1982).
Background Notes on the Bahamas (Octisr

1982).
Background Notes on Colombia (Noveml"

1982).
Background Notes on Costa Rica (Novercf

1982). ■

Department of State BuMif

«|)EX

Eiuary 1983

( ume 83, No. 2070

f inistan. Call for Soviet Withdrawal
■cm Afghanistan (Kirkpatrick, text of
solution) 78

1 1. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and
;rmuda (statements, remarks, toasts,
.S.-Nigeria joint communique) 34

1 Control

n ar Energy: Opportunities and Problems
ennedy) 75

s lent Reagan's News Conference of
3vember 11 (excerpts) 30

1 uda. Vice President Bush Visits Africa

I id Bermuda (statements, remarks,
asts, U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) .34

I ,1. President Reagan Visits Latin
merica (statements, remarks, toasts,
■ess briefings, radio address. U.S. -El
ilvador joint communique) 1

( Verde. Vice President Bush Visits Africa
id Bermuda (statements, remarks,
asts, U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) .34

1 ibia. President Reagan Visits Latin
merica (statements, remarks, toasts,
■ess briefings, radio address, U.S. -El
ilvador joint communique) 1

; ress

( ican Role in NATO (Eagleburger) .... 62

I h for Peace and Stability in the Middle
ast (Dam) 71

1 Rica. President Reagan Visits Latin

' merica (statements, remarks, toasts,

' -ess briefings, radio address, U.S. -El
ilvador joint communqiue) 1

I 9mics

• ' State Doctrine: Foreign Expropriations
lobinson) 70

) lational Free Trade (Reagan) 29

: President Bush Attends Caribbean Con-
rence .52

1 1. Search for Peace and Stability in the
iddle East (Dam) 71

1 pe. Secretary Shultz's News Conference
November 18 54

i any, Federal Republic of. Visit of West
erman Chancellor Kohl (joint communi-
ie) 66

I uras. President Reagan Visits Latin
merica (statements, remarks, toasts,
ress briefings, radio address, U.S. -El
alvador joint communique) 1

International Law. Act of State Doctrine:
Foreign Expropriations (Robinson) .... 70

Israel. Search for Peace and Stability in the
Middle East (Dam) 71

Italy. Visit of Italian Prime Minister Spadolini
(Reagan, Spadolini) 65

Kenya. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts,
U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) 34

Latin America and the Caribbean

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of
November 18 54

President Reagan Visits Latin America (state-
ments, remarks, toasts, press briefings,
radio address, U.S. -El Salvador joint com-
munique) 1

Vice President Bush Attends Caribbean
Conference 52

World Peace and the Situation in Central
America and the Caribbean (exchange of
letters) 81

Lebanon

Search for Peace and Stability in the Middle
East (Dam) 71

Securing a Peaceful Future for Lebanon
(Dam) 73

Middle East

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of
November 18 54

President Reagan's News Conference of
November 11 (excerpts) 30

Nigeria. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts,
U.S. -Nigeria joint communique) 34

North Atlantic "Treaty Organization

American Role in NATO (Eagleburger) .... 62

Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl (joint
communique) 66

Nuclear Energy. Nuclear Energy: Oppor-
tunities and Problems (Kennedy) 75

Poland. Second Anniversary of Solidarity
(Reagan) 68

Presidential Documents

Death of Soviet President Brezhnev (White
House statement. Bush, Shultz) 58

East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet
Pipeline Sanctions 28

International Free Trade 29

President Reagan's News Conference of
November 1 1 (excerpts) 30

Second Anniversary of Solidarity 68

Visit of Italian Prime Minister Spadolini
(Spadolini) 65

Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl (joint
communique) 66

World Peace and the Situation in Central
America and the Caribbean (exchange of
letters) 81

Press Releases. Department of State 86

Publications. Department of State 86

Security Assistance. American Role in
NATO (Eagleburger) 62

Senegal. Vice President Bush Visits Africa
and Bermuda (statements, remarks,
toasts, U.S. -Nigeria joint communique) .34

Trade

East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet
Pipeline Sanctions (Reagan) 28

International Free Trade (Reagan) 29

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of
November 18 54

Treaties

Current Actions 82

U.S.S.R.

Call for Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) 78

Death of Soviet President Brezhnev (White
House statement. Bush, Reagan,
Shultz) 58

East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet
Pipeline Sanctions (Reagan) 28

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of
November 18 54

President Reagan's News Conference of
November 11 (excerpts) 30

Second Anniversary of Solidarity (Reagan) . 68

United Nations. Call for Soviet Withdrawal
From Afghanistan (Kirkpatrick, text of
resolution) 78

Venezuela. World Peace and the Situation in
Central America and the Caribbean (ex-
change of letters) 81

Zaire. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts,
U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) 34

Zambia. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts,
U.S. -Nigeria joint communique) 34

Zimbabwe. Vice President Bush Visits Africa
and Bermuda (statements, remarks,
toasts, U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) .34

Name Index

Bush, Vice President 34, 52, 58

Dam, Kenneth W 71, 73

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 63

Kennedy, Richard T 75

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 78

Reagan, President . 1, 28, 29, 30, 58, 65, 68, 81

Robinson, Davis R 70

Shultz, Secretary 1, 54, 58

Spadolini, Giovanni 65

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nvpartmvnt
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-m of stntv -m-m > ^

bulletin

he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / VOjlume 83 / Number 2071

I I iviAR i 2 1983 I I

Visits

Portugal / 40

Jordan / 43

Pakistan / 65

Narcotics / 44

■f-i

^"^

February 1983

'.. V

Depnrtmvni of Sinte

bulletin

Volume 83 / Number 2071 / February 1983

Cover:

Prime Minister Balsemao (Portugal)
Dominick L. DiCarlo
King Hussein I (Jordan)
President Zia (Pakistan)

The Secretao' of State has determined that the
publication of thi.=; periodical i.< necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March ;il,
1987.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
of the Department of State Bii.leti.n' as the source
will be appreciated. The Biu.i.etin is inde.xed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

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Assistant Editor

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CONTENTS

e President

U.S. Relations With the Soviet

Union
News Conference of January 5

(Excerpts)

ms Control

Production of the MX Missile
(President Reagan, White House
Statement, Letter to the Congress)

U.S.- Soviet Negotiations on INF
Reductions (White House State-
ment)

St Asia

Assessment of U.S. Relations With
China (John H. Holdridge)

Balancing Strategic Interests and
Human Rights in Asia (Thomas
P. Shoesmith)

ergy

Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(Message to the Congress)

rope

Secretary Visits Europe; Attends
North Atlantic Council
(Statements, News Conferences,
Toasts, NATO Communique)

Economic Health of the Western
Alliance (Arthur F. Bums)

Visit of Portugal's Prime Minister
(President Reagan, Francisco
Pinto Balsemao)

11th Report on Cyprus (Message
to the Congress)

Day of Prayer for Poland (Procla-
mation)

Human Rights

Western Hemisphere

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights
Day and Week, 1982 (Proclama-
tion)

Human Rights Policy (Department
Statement)

Middle East

43 Visit of Jordan's King (King

Hussein I, President Reagaii)

Narcotics

44 U.S International Narcotics Con-
trol in Southeast Asia
(Dominick L. DiCarlo)

Pacific

52 U.S.-Palau Plebiscite

South Asia

53 Afghanistan: 3 Years of Occu-

pation (Eliza Van Hollen)

62 Afghanistan (Lawrence S.

Eaglehurger)

63 Balancing Strategic Interests and

Human Rights in South Asia
(Daind T. Schnei.der)

64 Anniversary of the Soviet

Invasion of Afghanistan (Presi-
dent Reagan)

65 Visit of Pakistan's President

(President Reagayi, Mohammad
Zia-ul-Haq, Arrival Ceremony,
Dinner Toasts)
67 Pakistan— A Profile

United Nations

69 UNISPACE 82 Held in Vienna
(James M. Beggs, President
Reagan, General Assembly
Resolution, U.S. Delegation)

Dealing With the Reality of Cuba
(Thomas 0. Enders)

Programs Underway for the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (J.
William Middendorf, IP)

U.S. to Sell Aircraft Spare Parts
to Guatemala (Department An-
nouncement)

Treaties

84 Current Actions

Chronology

86 December 1982

Press Releases

87 Department of State

Publications

88 Department of State

88 Foreign Relations Volume
Released

Index

■"""3^1983

THE PRESIDENT

U.S. Relations

With the
Soviet Union

by President Reagan

Radio broadcast

to the nation

from Camp David,

January 8, 1983^

My fellow Americans, today I'd like to
share with you some thoughts on one of
the most important aspects of America's
role in the world — our relations with the
Soviet Union. Keeping the peace for
both countries, for that matter for all
mankind, depends on our wise and
steady management of this relationship.

As you know, a new leader has to
come to power in Moscow. There has
been much speculation about whether
this change could mean a chance to
reduce tensions and solve some of the
problems between us. No one hopes
more than I do that the future will bring
improvement in our relations with the
Soviets and an era of genuine stability.

What could be more important than
reducing the danger of confrontation, in-
creasing the prospects for enduring
peace, lowering nuclear arsenals, reliev-
ing human suffering in Afghanistan and
Kampuchea and elsewhere? With your
support, this Administration has em-
barked on an effort to restore our na-
tion's strength, credibility, and clarity of
purpose in the world.

Our aim has been to insure that
America has the will and the means to
deter conflict and to defend the interest

of freedom. We've done this for one
reason and one reason only — because a
strong, respected America is the surest
way to preserve the peace and prevent
conflict.

In this effort, we must learn from
history. We all experienced the soaring
hopes and then plunging disappointment
of the 1970s, when the Soviet response
to our unilateral restraint was to ac-
celerate their military buildup, to foment
violence in the developing world, to in-
vade neighboring Afghanistan, and to
support the repression of Poland.

The lesson is inescapable. If there
are to be better mutual relations, they
must result from moderation in Soviet
conduct, not just our own good inten-
tions.

In recent days, some encouraging
words have come out of Moscow. Clearly
the Soviets want to appear more respon-
sive and reasonable. But moderate
words are convincing only when they're
matched by moderate behavior.

Now, we must see whether they're
genuinely interested in reducing existing
tensions. We and our democratic part-
ners eagerly await any serious actions
and proposals the Soviets may offer and
stand ready to discuss with them serious

THE PRESIDENT

proposals which can genuinely advance
the cause of peace. We do not insist that
the Soviet Union abandon its standing
as a superpower or its legitimate na-
tional interests.

In fact, we hope that the new
leadership in Moscow will come to
realize that Soviet interests would be im-
proved by ending the bloodshed in
Afghanistan, by showing restraint in the
Middle East, by permitting reform and
thus promoting stability in Poland, by
ending their unequaled military buildup
as we have proposed, by reducing the
most dangerous nuclear arms to much
lower and equal levels.

We stand ready to work toward
solutions to all outstanding problems.
This doesn't mean that we should
neglect our own defenses; that would
undercut our ability to maintain peace
and jeopardize whatever chance we may
have for changing Soviet conduct. But it
does mean that we're always ready to sit
down with the Soviets to discuss prac-
tical steps that could resolve problems
and lead to a more durable and genuine
improvement in East- West relations.

Next month, Soviet and American
negotiators will resume talks in Geneva
on strategic and intermediate-range
nuclear forces. We've proposed drastic
cuts in those threatening intermediate-
range forces. The Soviets have respond-
ed in both negotiations with proposals of
their own. So, a serious foundation for
progress has been laid. America will
negotiate energetically and in good faith
to achieve early agreements providing
for reduced and equal levels of forces.
The Soviet leadership must understand
that the way to reduce the nuclear
threat is by negotiating in the same
sincere spirit and not by trying to sow
division between the American people
and our NATO partners. That kind of
negative tactic is certain to fail and can
only delay real progress.

A cornerstone of our approach to
relations with the Soviet Union is close
consultation with our allies on common
political and security issues. In this
spirit, I've asked Vice President Bush to
travel to Europe. Beginning at the end
of this month, he will visit the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, France, and
Great Britain, and at the Vatican he will
meet with Pope John Paul II. In
Switzerland the Vice President will meet
with the negotiating teams for the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks — which

we call START— and the intermediate-
range nuclear forces arms control talks
we call INF and will attend a meeting of
the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva.

The Vice President's visit to these
close friends and allies and his discus-
sions at the Vatican and in Geneva
underscore our fundamental commit-
ment to peace and security in Europe
and to genuine arms reductions.

So, the new year begins with reasc
for all of us to hope that if we continu
to act firmly and wisely, 1983 can be a
time of peaceful progress for America
for our allies, for the people of the
U.S.S.R., and for the entire world.

Until next week, thanks for listen-
ing, and God bless you.

'Text from White House press release.

News Conference of January 5
(Excerpts)

You're trying to get me into the details
that I've said there are no decisions that
have been made. I will look at every-
thing. But let me also say something
about the concern on the defense spend-
ing.

I don't question the fact that the
people are concerned because they have
been receiving, through much of the
media, a constant drumbeat that some-
how there is a needless extravagance
and that we're overboard on this par-
ticular subject. On the chart you will
find that in constant dollars the defense
budget is just about the same as it's
been all the way back to 1962. You will
also find that as a percentage of gross
national product, it is smaller than it
was in the Eisenhower and Kennedy
years.

We repeatedly see the figure over a
5-year period of $1.5 trillion or $1.6
trillion. We're still spending more than
$2 trillion in that 5 years on the social
programs.

The thing about defense, also, that I
think should be pointed out is that in
February of 1981, when we presented
the 5-year plan to try and refurbish our
mOitary because it was in desperate
straits, we certainly could not claim that
we were meeting the first priority of
government, which is to protect the na-
tional security, to provide the national
security. But from that time— since that
time, we have cut our original program
by $41 billion and have done this by
reason of inflation coming down, which
lowered the cost of some things— fuel
and so forth, by improved management
procedures and improved procurement.
We're still looking at that and have just

had a team of — a task force of outside
volunteers, all skilled and knowledgeal
in business, who have been reviewing
and examining the whole Defense
Department. Their recommendations
will be coming to us shortly. So, if it c
be cut, it will be cut. But the priority
must be not if it means reducing our
ability below the level at which we caii
declare ourselves safe.

Q. I can't imagine that you are
satisfied with the progress of the M
die East initiative that you announc(
last summer. The Israelis are still ir
Lebanon, the Syrians are still in
Lebanon, the fighting is still going i
in Tripoli, and I'd like to know whai
you are doing to speed things up,
especially at the State Department?

A. We're calling back Mr. Habib
[Ambassador Philip C. Habib,
President's special emissary to the Mi(
die East] from his vacation. He is goii
to join Ambassador Draper [Morris
Draper, special negotiator for Lebano:
Ambassador Habib wOl be there now.
is not unexpected to us. We would ha'
liked to have this whole thing move
faster, but in view of the situation, no
only in Lebanon but the whole Middle
East, we never had any illusions that
this could be done overnight, and the
negotiations are underway now that w
lead to the removal of the foreign
forces.

You said that the fighting was stil
going on in Tripoli. I think it just
started recently, and it is a tragedy th
that is taking place. But that, again, ii
why we want the outside forces out sc

Department of State Bullet:

THE PRESIDENT

he new Government of Lebanon
agin to keep order itself and
lish its sovereignty.

. There have been a number of
•aches to the West recently by the
t Union. Today, the Warsaw Pact
tsed a nonaggression pact with
3. And 2 weeks ago, as you
, Mr. [General Secretary of the
•al Committee of the Communist

of the Soviet Union Yuriy] An-
»v raised the idea of a summit
you. What is the reaction to

new developments?

. This is something, I think, cer-

to be considered if that is what he
posing — a nonaggression pact. But
"egard to a summit, I am, in princi-
1 favor of that. I proposed meeting
;rezhnev in New York at the time
' U.N. Disarmanent Confer-
-beheving that he would be there,
hen, we know now, I am sure, why
lid not make that trip. And so we
)t.

ut I think that a summit is some-
that requires some planning. I do
link you just say: Let's get
ler, sit around the table, and then
what do we talk about? I think you
;o plan. You have to know and
e that you can accomplish some-

When we can be sure of that, I

welcome a simimit just as I
med his suggestion about continu-
e talks on the reducing of arms.

. What about today's proposal for
aggression pact between NATO
le Warsaw Pact?

. I think this is something that has
appened. And this is something
TOuld require consultation with all
allies in NATO.

, There have been many allega-
that the Bulgarian intelligence
e was behind the attempt to
sinate the Pope and that the
t intelligence service — the
-may have ordered the whole
What do you believe? Do you
e the Russians and the Bul-
ls were behind it?
, I know that the Italians are in-
ating, and in view of their pro-
;s and their handling of the
al Dozier case, I have great con-
e in their abilities. But as long as
re investigating, I don't think it

would be proper for me to make a com-
ment on this, because I would have no
information except the same things that
all of us know about this.

Q. If it turns out that the
Bulgarians and the Russians were
behind it, what impact would that
have on Soviet-American relations?

A. I think that it certainly would
have an effect. I think it would have an
effect worldwide, and I'd meet that
problem when we got to it.

Q. As you know, concern has
arisen in the financial community over
the large debts accumulated by some
developing nations— $300 billion in
Latin America alone. Do you see any
danger to the banking system as a
result of these large debts, and what
steps is your Administration taking to
deal with this problem?

A. Of course, there's a risk. I think
it's a touchy financial situation world-
wide just as this recession is worldwide.
We have been taking a number of steps
with regard to the international
monetary funds that are available for
bailouts and so forth— increased the con-
tributions to those. We have taken
unilateral action with some of our
neighbors, as you know, to tide them
over and help. And a niunber of coun-
tries, as a result, are engaging in
austerity programs.

I'm inclined to believe that we're go-
ing to come through this all right. If
there was widespread default, there
would, of course, be some very severe
financial problems.

Q. Without getting into details, do
you agree with Senator [Paul] Laxalt
that there are ways to stretch out
defense buildup — the defense buildup
over the next 6 or 7 years — without
hurting national security?

A. We have looked at such things,
and we will continue to look. As I say,
we are looking at everything. One of the
problems, a stretch-out sounds as if it
might not be too serious, but you have
to remember, we don't have the military-
industrial complex that we once had
when President Eisenhower spoke about
it. Assembly lines have to be put
together and started up again to meet
the demand for the weapons systems.

You can't say to someone who has
gone into business purely to provide us
with what we have ordered, you can't
suddenly say to him: Well, now, every-
body go home and wait a while, we're

going to— we're not going to take these
things. If there can be a stretch-out that
does not shut down your— part of your
industry. But again, in defense, the big-
gest portion of the spending is not
weapons systems. Seventy-five percent
of the defense budget is payroll for the
troops, readiness, and maintenance.
Only a fourth of the budget has to do
with weapons systems.

Q. Do you think a stretch-out is
possible? Or perhaps you prefer the
freeze ideas on both defense and
nondefense that are now being pro-
posed?

A. Here I thought I explained it all
at the very beginning, and you keep on
asking those questions. All of those
things we will look at.

Q. Jack Anderson said the other
day on a program where he was inter-
viewed by the 700 Club that we have
service representatives from Defense
contractors in the field still working
with the troops on complicated
defense weapons that the troops are
too ignorant and too unable to
operate. He said that the Israelis take
our planes and take off all of that ex-
pensive electronic gadgetry — which
our military contractors put on these
planes, which are not necessary, and
which, he said, add to the great cost
of these weapons. The Israelis take
these off of their planes and learn to
fly them effectively and better than
any planes ever flown. Would you look
into that?

A. First of all, I do not think it is
true. But I, also, think that Israelis have
proven that those planes must be pretty
good. On the other hand, with regard to
our troops, it would be very strange if
we are faced with such ignorance,
because the truth of the matter is now
that our voluntary military that 2 years
ago we were being told was a failure
and could never succeed— I am proud to
say— now has an intelligence level that
is higher than in any Army in our past
history — even including the draft. We,
also, have the highest percentage of high
school graduates in that military force
than we have ever had before. We have
the highest retention rate and the
highest re-enlistment rate. And we have

ary 1983

ARMS CONTROL

got a military that has got an espnt de
corps that should make every one of us
proud of them.

Q. It is true that a lot of those
high school graduates, don't forget,
are women. There are more women
high school graduates than men.
[Laughter.] But I want to point out to
you that what he said — it was not de-
nouncing the intelligence of the men.
It was just saying that these weapons
are too complicated for anyone to use
in battlefield conditions. And,
therefore, they have many, many fac-
tory representatives who have to go to
war with the troops.

A. I have to say that there is only
one criteria. And that is, if we are going
to ask an American young man or
woman— but I do not think we will put
the young women in those combat front
ranks.

Q. We are ready. [Laughter]

A. I will tell them they have got one
volunteer already. But, if we are going
to put those young men out there, they
are entitled to have every technological
aid that can insure that they can do the
job and that will protect their lives.

Text from White House press release (com-
plete text may be found m the Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 10,
1983). ■

Production of the MX
Missile

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 2, 19821

Today's vote in favor of the Peacekeeper
missile system by the House Appropria-
tions Committee is a vote for a stronger,
more secure America. I applaud the
judgment of the members of the commit-
tee, and I urge the full House to show
similar wisdom by approving the com-
mittee position.

This program is essential to the
ability of the United States to maintain
a credible deterrent on land, in the air,
and on the sea. Moving forward on
schedule will also greatly increase the
prospects for a meaningful strategic
arms reduction agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
DEC. 6, 19822

On November 22, I informed you of my
MX basing decision and underlined the
absolute necessity of modernizing the
Triad so that we can restore the
strategic balance and maintain effective
deterrence. Of equal importance, we
must move forward with the MX to have
any hope of achieving meaningful prog-
ress at the arms negotiations in Geneva.
History shows that unilateral restraints
by the United States have not led to
arms reduction by our adversaries.

Having sought the counsel of my
predecessors, the views of Congressional
leaders, and the advice of America's best
technical and scientific minds, I am con-
vinced that Peacekeeper is the right
missile and that now is the right time. I,
therefore, urge you to support the MX
program— as approved by the Ap-
propriations Committee — when the
House considers my fiscal year 1983
defense budget request this week. The
Appropriations Committee language per-
mits us to continue work on the MX and
to protect an initial operational capabili-
ty in 1986, while providing Congress
with additional time to conduct a
thorough review of my basing plan. This
strikes me as a reasonable approach as
we work together toward the common
goal of maintaining peace.

On a related matter, the Appropria-
tions Committee has already significant-
ly cut my fiscal year 1983 defense

budget request. Any further reductions
in my request would deal a serious set-
back to our overall defense buildup and
would have adverse foreign policy cons
quences. In particular, I urge you not t
support an across-the-board reduction
appropriations for defense.

Let us thus join together in rebuilc
ing America's defense posture, in
enhancing our deterrence posture, and
in enriching the prospects for mean-
ingful arms reductions.

Ronald Reag

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
DEC. 7. 1982^

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov's
remarks are a clear effort to influence
the American political process. He faillj
to mention that the Soviet Union has
already deployed 808 SS-18 ICBMs [i
tercontinental ballistic missiles], whicl
are larger and heavier than the MX, i
300 SS-19 ICBM's, which are roughly
equivalent to the MX in size. All are
capable of destroying hardened targetl
in the United States.

The Soviets have failed to mentioi
openly that they already have the firsi
of their next generation of ICBM's in
flight testing. This testing began prioj
to the President's decision on the
Peacekeeper. While we have openly e;
plained the purpose and the charac-
teristics of the Peacekeeper, the Sovi*
have yet to provide any information o
the purpose and capabilities of their n
missile.

For the Soviets now to cast the W
in the role of another excuse to build
more missiles makes no sense when tl
United States is trying to redress the'
balance which the Soviet Union has
upset.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 7, 1982^

Today's vote by the House of Represe
tatives was a grave mistake. Unless
reversed in coming days, it will serioi
set back our efforts to protect the na-
tion's security and can handcuff our
negotiators at the arms table. |

I had hoped that most of the
Members in the House had awakenedf
the threat facing the United States.
That hope was apparently unfounded ?
majority chose to go sleepwalking int
the future.

The facts on the Peacekeeper mis^
are clear and straightforward. For 31

Department of State Build

ARMS CONTROL

ears, we have kept world peace because
'6 have been adequately protected on
md, sea, and air. We maintain the
largin of safety. But in recent years, a
ital part of that defense — our land-
ased missile system — has become in-
'easingly obsolete. The United States
asn't built a new land-based missile
/stem in 15 years. The Soviets are now
I their fifth generation of new missiles,
s a result, the window of vulnerability
IS opened for the United States— a
indow the Peacekeeper is designed to
ose.

Unless we act soon, the Soviets can
)t only discount our land defenses but
ley can also concentrate their new
isearch on depleting us at sea and in
e air.

And of great importance, we should
low from experience that the Soviets
ill not negotiate with us when we
sarm ourselves. Why should they
igotiate seriously when we give up
sapons systems voluntarily, asking
'thing of them in return? It would be
igically ironic if this of all days—
icember 7th— once again marked a
ne when America was unprepared to
ep the peace.

Fortunately, there is still time to
verse this grievous error. Soon the
;ue will be taken up by the U.S.
nate. If it succeeds there, a con-
■ence of the House and Senate can be
nvened, and the production program
n be saved. Then we can engage in a
iger debate on the best way to house
3 missile.

In the meantime, I plan to do
srything I can to take this case to the
intry. Jefferson said the American
3ple, if given the facts, would never
ike a mistake. I will present those
:ts and urge our citizens everywhere
join in trying to restore America's
.rgin of safety.

ESIDENT'S STATEMENT,

IC. 10, 1982^

1st wanted to say a word about the
)ortance of the defense issue in the
sing days of this congressional ses-
n.

It's vital that we in government
nonstrate to friends and potential
s alike that the United States is
ermined to remain a credible force
peace in the world. There are several
ical decisions now facing the Senate,
uding their votes on the B-1 and a '
3nd carrier. But none is more critical
n their vote on the production of the
icekeeper missile.

Frankly I was disturbed by the
debate in the House earlier this week
because of the confusion over what the
vote meant. The key vote in the House
and now in the Senate is over money for
the production of the missile, not for the
basing mode. And I believe it's absolute-
ly essential to a strong, secure defense
that we vote now on funds for that
missile. Then next year, as we have
more time, I'd welcome a vigorous
debate on the best way to base the
missile.

I agree that more time is needed
before we achieve a consensus in Con-
gress on the basing mode, but the need
for the missile itself has long been ap-
parent. Both Presidents Ford and
Carter before me have vigorously
argued that the country needs this new
system. Later today I am meeting with
our arms negotiator, Ed Rowney, and
I'm sure that his message will be the
same as in the past— a vote against MX
production today is a vote against arms
control tomorrow.

I also think it's fair to mention a
couple of headlines that I came across
earlier this week after the House voted.
One said, "Soviets Voice Satisfaction on
MX Rejection." The other read, "Soviets
Cheer House for Rejecting MX Missile
Appropriation." Well, if the Soviets are
so pleased, perhaps we should be a little
more concerned.

I can tell you that I'm vitally con-
cerned about this matter, and I urge the
Senate to stand together and assure
adequate funds for the Peacekeeper.

PRESIDENT'S RADIO
ADDRESS TO THE NATION,
DEC. 11, 1982«

A few weeks ago, I talked with you
about our quest for peace— for a secure
world in which our children and our
children's children can grow up without
fear, enjoying the blessings of peace and
freedom. As President, my first duty is
to do everything in my power to achieve
these goals.

Two of the keys to preserving the
peace are deterrence and arms reduc-
tion. One of these keys has worked
perfectly for 37 years. Since the end of
World War II, we've prevented the out-
break of a new global war by a national
policy of deterrence. To do that meant
maintaining our defense forces so that
any enemy knew in advance that an at-
tack on us or our allies would bring
disaster, not victory, to the attacker.
Now, when a potential enemy knows

that by starting a war he'll lose more
than he hopes to gain, he just won't
start a war in the first place. That's
what deterrence is all about.

A key feature of this policy has been
to maintain strong strategic forces. Our
triad, as it's called— our three-legged
plan of land-based missiles, sea-based
missiles, and manned bombers — makes
clear to any aggressor that if he attacks
us, we will still have the strength to
strike back, the ability to retaliate.
That's because no potential attacker has
the strength to knock out all three legs
of our defense triad at the same time.

If we only had two parts to this
force, then preserving the peace would
be more difficult. Potential attackers
might even come to believe they could
launch and win a nuclear war. We must
never let this happen. That's why last
year I ordered all three legs of our
strategic forces to be modernized.

There's no question about the need
for modernizing them. Today all three
are made up mainly of weapons we
developed more than 10 years
ago— more than 20 years ago in the case
of our bombers. Sooner or later older
systems become ineffective and vulner-
able. Our most pressing problem today
is that the Soviet Union, because of its
massive buildup of nuclear weapons,
could destroy virtually all of our land-
based missiles in a single nuclear attack.
If we do nothing to correct that situa-
tion, we will have weakened the chances
for peace. This is why we need the new
MX Peacekeeper missile — to help
restore our strategic deterrent and
literally to keep the peace.

The Peacekeeper is a modern
missile, and it is survivable. I agree with
my scientific and military advisers that
the closely spaced basing plan we pro-
posed will work. Congress had orderd us
to submit a basing proposal for the MX
by December 1st, which we did. How-
ever, we're prepared to review this mat-
ter with the Congress in the new year.

The basing mode is not an issue.
There's plenty of time to decide on that.
What we need now is a clear, positive
vote on the missile itself, to go forward
on production of the missile. Why?
Because we're negotiating with the
Soviet Union at Geneva to reduce sub-
stantially nuclear arsenals on both
sides— the other key to protecting the
peace in the nuclear age. These are
tough negotiations, but our team is
hanging in there. However, if we just
cancel the Peacekeeper, the MX— if we
say we won't deploy it — we remove a
major incentive for the Soviets to stay
at the table and agree to reductions.

ruary 1983

ARMS CONTROL

Look at it from their perspective. If
we're willing to cancel a weapons system
without getting something in return,
why should they offer to eliminate or
reduce weapons that give them an ad-
vantage over us?

In 1977 my predecessor sent his
Secretary of State to Moscow with a
proposal that the Soviets reduce the
number of their heavy SS-18 missiles.
At the time, we had nothing comparable
to the SS-18 and no new missile to
deploy. The result was what you'd ex-
pect. The Soviets refused to even con-
sider the proposal. I can't believe the
American people want to make that mis-
take a second time. The stakes are just
too high.

Without the Peacekeeper, we
weaken our ability to deter war, and we
may lose a valuable opportunity to
achieve a treaty to reduce nuclear
weapons on both sides. With it, we make
progress on both paths to peace. On
both counts, there's no doubt that we
need it.

In the weeks ahead, we'll continue to
bring the facts to you, the American
people, and your representatives on this
vital issue. We've already done it in
hearings before the Senate. I only wish
the House had given us the opportunity
to do the same before it voted last Tues-
day to cut funds for the Peacekeeper
missile. It's hard to make a good deci-
sion before you've heard the facts. And
in my opinion, the House of Representa-
tives voted without really considering
the facts.

As we present our case for the
Peacekeeper missile to you, I hope you'll
keep in mind that by continuing to main-
tain our ability to deter attack, we make
it less likely that the horror of nuclear
war will ever occur. And by keeping our
defenses credible, we offer the Soviet
Union a realistic incentive to reduce ten-
sions and to agree to significant and
verifiable arms reductions.

These are vital objectives. But I
can't achieve them witout the support of
the American people and the U.S. Con-
gress. To protect the peace, we must
provide the funds necessary to offset the
enormous Soviet military buildup and
restore a military balance, particularly in
nuclear weapons. And to achieve the
arms reductions we want, we must give
the Soviets the incentive to negotiate.
We must go to the bargaining table in a
position of strength, not weakness.

My fellow Americans, with your con-
tinued support for a strong defense and
for the Peacekeeper missile — but only
with your support — we can achieve both
of these crucial goals.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 14. 1982^

This morning I met with a group of
leading Republican and Democratic
Senators to discuss the future of the MX
Peacekeeper missile. And I'm pleased to
report that we've reached a bipartisan
agreement that we hope will preserve
funding for the missile and enable us to
continue the restoration of America's
defense capabilities.

In recent days, it's become apparent
that many Members of Congress agree
with my assessment that production of
the Peacekeeper is in the national
security interests of the United States.
At the same time, however, they want
to take a closer look at the question of
how to base the missile. The agreement
we've reached today is a reasonable
balancing of those interests.

All of us who met today pledged
that in the next few days we'll work
with others in the Senate and with
Members of the House to secure full
congressional assent to this plan.

In closing, let me reaffirm my very
strong view that the United States
needs to move forward with an effective
land-based missile, one that will not only
enhance the prospects for a secure
America but will also strengthen the
hand of our negotiators at the arms con-
ference and the arms control talks in
Geneva.

The world in which we live is uncer-
tain at best. And we must be fully
prepared in order to protect our in-
terests and defend the cause of peace.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 17. 19828

The action taken early this morning by
the Senate with regard to the MX
missile program is both welcome and
wise. It expresses solid understanding
and support for the need to modernize
the land-based leg of the triad. As the
Senate recognizes, it is only through this
triad approach that we can hope to
preserve an effective deterrent and go
forward with negotiations toward real
arms reductions.

Beyond that, the Senate was also ex-
pressing some rather serious concerns
which I take very much to heart.
Foremost among these was uncertainty
with respect to the approach for basing
the missile. This concern is reasonable
since the survivability of this system
must be assured, and an effective basing

plan plays the central role. This ex-
tremely complex problem deserves veri
careful and deliberate consideration, aii
I am pleased that this will be allowed t
take place early in the new Congress.

Between now and the time the fina
decision must be taken next spring, it i
essential that every Member of Congre
and, indeed, as many as possible of the
American people gain a full appreciatic
of alternative solutions to this problem
Toward that end I pledge to the Con-
gress and to all Americans the most e?
haustive, renewed analysis possible of
every apparent option. To assist in this
effort, I am today announcing my inte
tion to appoint a bipartisan commissioi
comprised of senior officials from
previous Administrations as well as
technical experts. I will ask the
members to work with the Departmen
of Defense and join together in a bipa
tisan effort to forge a consensus as to
the plan which will best assure the na-
tional security interests of our country
in the years ahead.

The contributions of this panel of
distinguished Americans will be ex-
tremely important. In addition, I pled}'
to the Congress the fullest possible co
dination of the work of this commissic
with Senators and Members. It is esse
tial that if we are to reach our commo
goals within the time required by last
night's vote, the Congress play a cent)
role in shaping this, the most importa
strategic modernization decision of the
postwar period. Again, I would like tc
express my appreciation for the respo
sible position taken by the Senate and
ask that this wisdom be reflected in tl
House, as together we join in this imi:'
tant undertaking.

2Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13.

3Read to news correspondents by Depii
Press Secretary Larry Speakes (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 13).

i^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, which
also contains a brief exchange with news c-
respondents.

^Broadcast from Camp David, Marylai
(text from Weekly Compilation of Preside)
tial Documents of Dec. 20).

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 20, which
also contains a brief exchange with news c
respondents.

sText from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 20. ■

Department of State Bulii f

EAST ASIA

■S.-Soviet

legotiations

n INF Reductions

HITE HOUSE STATEMENT,

;C. 16, 1982'

you know, the United States has pro-
sed the total ehmination of U.S. and
/iet landbased, longer range INF
;erniediate-range nuclear force]
isiles— the zero-zero solution. As you
3 know from Soviet public
tements, the Soviets have proposed
t after 5 years, the U.S.S.R. and
TO reduce to a ceiling of 300
jdium-range" nuclear missiles and air-
ft located in or "intended for use in"
rope, to include British and French
:es. This longstanding position, which
asically unchanged, would allow them
naintain their monopoly over the
ted States in longer range INF
siles, especially their mobile, triple-
•head SS-20 missiles in Europe and
Asian U.S.S.R. The number of
loyed SS-20s currently stands at 333
ichers.

A missile subceiling, as mentioned in
?nt press accounts, would at most re-
•e the reduction of some of these
ily mobile systems in or "intended
use in" Europe, while requiring us to
2el entirely our deployments of
shing II and ground-launched cruise
siles planned to begin in December
3. This would leave the Soviets with
ibstantial monopoly over the West in
;-range, land-based INF systems,
Jd not constrain the overall levels of
iet systems, would draw into the
ieral negotiations the nuclear forces
ther countries, and is patently inade-
te as a solution to the INF issue,
e it would not eliminate the political
military threat to the alliance posed
>oviet longer range INF missiles.
We will continue the negotiations on
rious basis. During these negotia-
s, we and the Soviets have elabo-
d our positions in both formal and
rmal contacts. We will continue to
ly the Soviet position, and it will be
'Hg the things we will be discussing
n the next round begins on January

We have kept our allies fully in-
formed about negotiations as they have
occurred. We and they have reaffirmed
in three recent NATO meetings at the
foreign minister or defense minister
level that the zero-zero solution remains
the best arms control result, since it
would eliminate the systems of greatest
concern to both sides. The President and

his Administration are fully convinced of
the reasonableness of this carefully
developed proposal. Nothing could be
fairer to all concerned.

'Made to news correspondents by Deputy
Press Secretary Larry Speakes (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 20, 1982). ■

Assessment of U.S. Relations
With China

by John H. Holdridge

Address before the National Council
on U.S.-China Relations. New York, on
December 13, 1982. Ambassador
Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

I have been one of those fortunate
enough during much of my professional
career to be able to share in the high
points and cope with the low points as
the course of our relations with China
dramatically shifted course. And during
the past 2 years with the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, which maintains operational
responsibility for our China policy, I
have been intimately involved with the
continued evolution of this policy.

At this juncture— and we are at a
juncture, in terms of U.S.-China rela-
tions—it is gratifying to have this occa-
sion to look back and take stock: to see
what hurdles we've already surmounted,
to assess whether we are on the course,
and to plot the direction and challenges
that still line the track ahead.

Policy Framework

In the early days of this Administration,
then-Secretary Haig sketched the broad
outlines of the China policy-to-be in an
interview published in Time magazine.
Following the direction set by President
Reagan, Haig stated that we would con-
tinue efforts to expand our relations
with the People's Republic of China. The
Secretary characterized this relationship
and its development as "a fundamental
strategic reality and a strategic im-
perative. ... of overriding importance to
international stability and world peace."
We would adhere to the communiques
associated with U.S.-China normaliza-
tion, he said, and we would maintain

unofficial relations with the people of
Taiwan. He made clear then— as did I
and others in the Administration from
the President on down— that we would
seek to restore dignity to the conduct of
these people-to-people relations with
Taiwan, but that we would observe the
agreements regarding the nature of
these relations contained in the U.S.-
China Joint Communique on normaliza-
tion and embodied in our domestic law.

In June 1981, Secretary Haig visited
China, the first such visit by a Secretary
of State since 1977. Haig used the occa-
sion to inform the Chinese of President
Reagan's conviction that U.S. policy
toward China should reflect the friendly
and cooperative nature of our relation-"
ship and of the Administration's plans to
translate that into practical and mean-
ingful terms in the form of a three-
pronged initiative designed to give teeth
to the relationship.

First, the President would issue a
directive substantially increasing the
level of technology to be routinely ap-
proved for sale to China, reflecting our
intent to treat China as a friendly, non-
allied state.

Second, the President would sus-
pend the prohibition on arms sales to
China embodied in our arms control
legislation, permitting the consideration
on a case-by-case basis of requests to ex-
port munitions list articles to China, a
procedure we follow with all friendly
countries.

Third, the President would propose
to Congress that it amend those laws
that treated China in the same manner
as the Soviet Union and its satellites, to
make clear that we do not consider
China a potential adversary and to
remove legal impediments "to our further
cooperation.

<Jary1983

EAST ASIA

The Administration has registered
significant progress in implementing this
policy on all three counts.

Issue of U.S Arms Sales to Taiwan

This is the framework from which we
began nearly 2 years ago to manage and
direct the course of the immensely im-
portant U.S. -China relationship. It was
gradually discovered, however, that a
keystone in the foundation had never
been set in place. We faced, we learned,
the threat of collapse of the entire struc-
ture unless we could devise a way of in-
serting and devising a proper fit for that
keystone. I am referring, of course, to
the issue of arms sales to Taiwan and
the continuing U.S. -China discussions on
this issue which culminated in the
August 17 joint communique.

The arms sales issue was one deeply
rooted in history, touching on the most
basic principles and the deepest sen-
sitivities of both the Chinese and
ourselves. For that reason, previous
U.S. Administrations and the Chinese
had largely skirted the issue as we
worked our way respectively toward
normalization. The Chinese, however,
had always reserved the right to raise
the issue, and in the fall of 1981, we
found we could sidestep it no longer.

I need not review in detail the
10-month-long negotiating process or
period leading up to the issuance of our
August 17 joint communique. It was an
especially difficult and sensitive time for
both sides. The sentiment in this country
on not "abandoning" Taiwan is well
known, and the Chinese, for their part,
have repeatedly made reference to the
feelings of China's "1 billion people." The
utility of the communique is that it has
provided both the Chinese and ourselves
with a means of handling the problem in
a way that allows us to continue, and
hopefully advance, our bilateral relations
without compromising important prin-
ciples on either side. On the basis of
policy statements enunciated by both
governments in the communique, I
believe that we have found that good fit
that will firm up the foundation and
allow for the development of a sound
and solid relationship in the period
ahead. In essence, the communique
establishes a formula whereby the
Chinese state that they will strive for a
peaceful solution to the Taiwan question,
and we accordingly state that under
those circumstances we will gradually
reduce the level of our arms sales to
Taiwan. This position of ours is entirely

consistent with the Taiwan Relations
Act, which predicates U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan on our judgment of Taiwan's
military needs.

Relations Since the Communique

Since the communique, both of us have
been taking a brief respite these past
few months, turning our attention to
pressing domestic concerns. We have
had an election campaign; the Chinese
have had their 12th Party Congress in
September and a National People's Con-
gress in December; and other interna-
tional trouble spots and relations have
demanded concern. During this period,
however, there has been an unfortunate
tendency for rhetoric to dominate the
headlines, perhaps with domestic consti-
tuencies in mind. Moreover, reflecting
the fact that the communique process
was painful and difficult, a certain un-
comfortable aftertaste was left behind.
In this same period, the Chinese have
been widening their options somewhat,
developing an independent foreign policy
line which stresses identification with
the Third World and even resuming a
dialogue with Moscow. This alignment
with the Third World is not a new
policy— we have watched it evolve for at
least 2 years, as witness the speeches by
China's representatives in the U.N.
General Assembly— but it has received
even greater emphasis lately. The Sino-
Soviet dialogue is a more recent
development.

The period of respite is ending.
Secretary Shultz will be visiting Beijing
in the not-too-distant future for what we
hope will be serious, constructive, and
wide-ranging talks with the Chinese
leadership. It is time now to drop the
rhetoric. We must get on with the prac-
tical action and statesmanship necessary
to advance the relationship for the
benefit of both our peoples.

Good relations with China have
served our interests well over the past
decade. I need not attempt to convince
this audience of the benefits which have
accrued, both strategic and otherwise.
China's 1 billion people are entering the
mainstream of the international eco-
nomic system. The volume and value of
bilateral trade between our two coun-
tries has grown tremendously in the
past few years. China is now our 14th
largest trading partner and 5th largest
market for agricultural products. And
China, with its extraordinarly rich
cultural tradition and so much to con-
tribute, has moved out of its former
isolation, much to our and the world's
benefit. More than 9,000 Chinese

students are now enrolled at U.S. educ
tional institutions. More than 500 Amei
cans study in China each year, and ten:
of thousands more are availing them-
selves of the opportunity for an incom-
parable travel experience. The reciproc
benefits to China as it embarks on its
ambitious program of modernization ai
incalculable.

The strategic element has always
been fundamental to the development (
our relations as well. President Reagai
as recently as August, has said that:

Building a strong and lasting relationsh
with China has been an important foreign
policy goal of four consecutive administra-
tions. Such a relationship is vital to our Ion
term national security interests and con-
tributes to stability in East Asia. It is in th
national interest of the United States that
this important strategic relationship be ad-
vanced.

In addition, however, we have sine
normalization maintained that China's
concentration on economic normalizati
is beneficial to world peace, and we w
to assist in this modernization process

Our perceptions of many of the
world's more troublesome problems ar
in close tandem. We endorse the
Chinese view that the Soviets need to
prove with deeds, not words, their
desire to make progress toward a pea"
ful solution of the problems they have
done so much to create and aggravate _
The Chinese have undertaken a series :
negotiations with the Soviets and havi
specifically aimed at progress on the
issues of Soviet troop reductions on t\
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borde ,
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
and a halt to Soviet support for the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea
Both sides must overcome a bitter
legacy of military confrontation if the;
are to reduce tensions. It is too early
speculate on prospects. In general. \vt
would welcome developments that wo i
reduce regional and global tensions. V
would also welcome genuine— not simv
cosmetic— reductions in Soviet armed
forces that threaten neighboring state
The Chinese, however, should be unde
no illusions as they proceed with thesi
talks, and they must be well aware of
the continuing Soviet deployment of a
vanced weaponry, including SS-20s ai
Backfire bombers, east of the Urals.

Besides shared views on Afghani-
stan and Kampuchea, our views rema
close in international issues ranging
from U.S. -Japan defense arrangemen
to U.S. deployments in the Indian
Ocean, U.S. missile deployments in
Europe, and the need for a strong
NATO.

Department of State Bulk"

EAST ASIA

In areas where we have at times dif-
■red— the Middle East, southern Africa,
id Third World issues— we have in the
ist been able to conduct a constructive
alogue, and my hope is that we will be
)le to continue so in the future. We
ill, in addition, work to live up to our
irt of the understandings expressed in
e August 17 communique, as we will
;pect the same of the Chinese.

We have not— indeed, we could
)t— ignore some of the more simplistic
etoric that has been emanating from
jijing of late. To put it bluntly, we take
ception to Chinese references to us as
egemonists" and expect better from
e Chinese than being lumped together
th the Soviets as the cause of all the
)rld's ills. Given the complexity of in-
-national issues which confront us to-
y, a "Xiu Shou Panguan" [to stand off
the side— literally, with arms folded
d hands in the sleeves] approach will

longer do. We know, on the basis of
r past dialogue with Chinese leaders,
It they are fully at home with more
jhisticated and constructive analyses.

Secretary Shultz prepares for his
it to China, I am confident that we
1 realize a successful return to the
;d of active, serious, constructive,
tesmanlike dialogue that is necessary

our two important nations to con-
:t in the interest of regional and
bal peace.

At the same time, we cannot afford
overlook the differences between us.
3h side will be closely watching the
er's performance under the
i^ust 17 communique, which we on

side, of course, intend to honor fully,
na, for its part, will be looking for us
provide more in the way of tech-
3gy transfer and support of its
nomic modernization. There has been
le disappointment on this score,
haps generated by unrealistic expec-
ons.

! Future

n upbeat on the future of U.S. -China
•tions. The very fact that we were
i to overcome the obstacles on the
1 to the communique is an excellent
cation of how highly each side values
relationship. The momentum is now
ding for renewed progress. Secre-
' Shultz's visit will provide a needed
t of adrenalin. It will be preceded by
mportant session of the U.S. -China"
it Economic Commission opening to-
in Washington under the chairman-
' of Treasury Secretary Regan and
nded on China's part by Finance

Minister Wang Bingqian. We are looking
forward to other exchanges of high-level
visits. In short, the wheels have already
begun to turn and we're heading out of
the station moving off in the right direc-
tion again.

With the foundation now hopefully
well repaired and proceeding on the
basis of equality, mutual benefit, and
mutual trust, our two nations which
have so much to learn from and so much
to offer each other are ready to rechart
the course of their relations. I believe
we are on our way to making 1983 a
good year for U.S. -China relations.

In closing, if I may, I would like to
look at one brief moment in the past and
then ahead to the coming decades. Just
over a decade ago in the Great Hall of
the People, welcoming President NLxon
to China, the late Premier Zhou Enlai

stated to the world that "the Chinese
people are a great people, and the
American people are a great people."
These were simple words, but they had
a great impact on me as he called upon
the two nations to bring to an end a
long and bitter period of estrangement.
As we look to the future, we must
recognize that the world has grown even
smaller in the 10 years since, and the
challenges facing both nations, in terms
of meeting our peoples' needs and safe-
guarding the security of our planet, are
greater than ever. With cooperation,
hard work, and a sense of vision, the
United States and the People's Republic
of China can accomplish much as they
face these challenges. Together we can
make a profound contribution to the
region and the world as we pursue the
overall goal of world peace. ■

Balancing Strategic Interests
and Human Rights in Asia

by Thomas P. Shoesmith

Statement before the Subcommittees
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on
Human Rights and International
Organizations of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee on December 9. 1982.
Mr. Shoesmith is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs. '

I am pleased to be here today to testify
at the conclusion of your series of hear-
ings on balancing U.S. strategic in-
terests and human rights in Asia.

Let me begin by reemphasizing what
Assistant Secretary Holdridge said in
his testimony before these same two
subcomittees just 1 year ago: Human
rights is an integral element of this Ad-
ministration's foreign policy to be con-
sidered along with— not against— other
factors. In following this policy direc-
tion, we in the East Asia and Pacific
Bureau and in our embassies abroad
view human rights improvements as a
goal to be pursued in tandem with our
security, political, economic, and com-
mercial interests. A strong human rights
policy strengthens our overall foreign
policy by distinguishing us from our
adversaries and by making it clear that
American interests are based on
American values and beliefs.

One cannot define U.S. strategic in-
terests without touching on all of those

elements of policy I have just men-
tioned. In its broadest terms, our prin-
cipal strategic interest is deterring the
increasingly assertive Soviet presence in
East Asia and the Indian Ocean. This
can best be achieved by supporting
growth and stability in the region
through the variety of security, political,
economic, and commercial programs we
pursue. The contrast between the
dynamic free market economies in East
Asia and the seriously ailing Communist
economies has been among our greatest
strengths in the area. The success of
free market economies has been and
should continue to be a bulwark against
Communist penetration of the region.

We have additional strategic objec-
tives of maintaining access to vital raw
materials for which the region is a
significant source, protecting key
sealanes of communication in the region
and those that link East Asia to the In-
dian Ocean and the Middle East, and
enhancing stability of friendly govern-
ments of the area so that they may also
act in ways that further our common
global security and other interests.

In this latter context, we believe
that stable, self-confident governments,
based on popular consent and support,
will be more inclined to undertake ac-
tions which will improve the human
rights situation and the humanitarian
services in their countries. We likewise
believe that human rights abuses under-
mine governmental legitimacy and may

ruary 1983

EAST ASIA

thereby become a destabilizing factor
tending to vitiate other components of
our strategy to foster peace, prosperity,
and stability.

Our strategic interests in the various
individual countries you have cited can
be seen in the larger overall context.
Our security concern in Korea is for the
preservation of peace and stability in
Northeast Asia — which in turn has a
profound and direct bearing on the
security and prosperity of the United
States. In fact the security of the entire
North Pacific would be seriously im-
paired if the balance of forces on the
Korean Peninsula were upset. Korean
domestic and foreign policies continue to
be influenced by the real threat from the
North, and for the great majority of
Koreans national security remains a
preeminent concern.

Our bases in the Philippines are
essential not only for protecting East
Asian sealanes and demonstrating our
continued concern for peace and security
in the region but also for projecting U.S.
power into the Indian Ocean.

And finally, the decade of
U.S.-P.R.C. reapproachment has
demonstrably enhanced our own security
and that of our friends and allies in
Asia. The very fact that we no longer
have to structure forces against China
has given us greater flexibility in
meeting challenges in the Indian Ocean
and Persian Gulf and in protecting the
sealanes in the region.

Human Rights Interests

As I have already indicated, we do not
believe a line should be — or can
be — drawn between human rights in-
terests and strategic interests. On the
one hand, we cannot be indifferent to
the adverse effects on our strategic in-
terests of a pattern of persistent and
gross violations of human rights within a
country with which we are allied or
whose cooperation we seek in pursuit of
such interests. On the other hand, we
must be concerned to exercise such in-
fluence as we can bring to bear in
preventing or redressing human rights
abuses in such a way as to maintain an
effective working relationship with the
government concerned. Without such a
relationship, we will be unable to pursue
either our strategic interests or our
human rights concerns.

Perhaps the manner in which we
have attempted to follow this balanced
approach will be clear in discussing some
of the specific questions you have raised
in your letter.

I do not believe that quiet diplomacy
can be fairly described as "silent
diplomacy." While we prefer to rely on
diplomatic channels where relationships
with the government permit serious
discussion of human rights problems, we
do not shy away from speaking out
when that approach can be most effec-
tive. Our human rights reports, which
are widely read, attempt to describe the
human rights situations of countries in
Asia in an accurate and objective man-
ner. They constitute the
Administration's assessment of the
human rights record of nearly every
government in the world.

Regardless of whether a government
is popular or unpopular, it is often the
case that our efforts to work together
with a particular government in other
areas can give rise to resentment by op-
position groups against the United
States. The fact that our bilateral rela-
tions are necessarily conducted with the
government concerned, however, is not
indicative of support for all the domestic
or foreign policies of that government.
Further we also have contacts and dis-
cussions with groups or individuals in
the country who do not agree with every
aspect of that government's policy. We
try to make it a point to keep in touch
with responsible opposition leaders and
groups in order to listen to their points
of view and explain our policies. Our am-
bassadors and their staffs engage in this
kind of activity on a regular basis.

One particular example in this
regard was the Vice President's
breakfast with some 50 opposition
figures during his visit to Korea. The
Vice President also spoke to the Na-
tional Assembly and emphasized the
benefits of a strong parliament. In our
relations with friendly governments, we
try to promote respect for human rights
by emphasizing the value of popular par-
ticipation in government and of develop-
ing stable democratic institutions and by
discussing specific human rights prob-
lems in regular diplomatic channels.

We do not feel it is useful to list suc-
cesses and disappointments of any Ad-
ministration in the human rights field
since this contradicts the purpose of
quiet diplomacy. A major drawback, of
course, is that relying on traditional
diplomacy to advance our human rights
interests is not as visible as public
diplomacy, but we believe the former is
generally more effective, particularly
when we have good relations with a par-
ticular government. Either to condemn
or to take credit publicly would under-
mine our ability to use our influence to

promote general progress on human
rights and to deal with specific cases. 1
addition to the human rights reports, \
do make public statements during the
year designed to complement our diplc
matic channel. A careful mix of the tw
approaches is necessary.

A discussion of four specific ex-
amples in Asia — the People's Republic :
China, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan-
will serve to highlight our approach to
human rights.

People's Republic of China

We have friendly relations with the
P.R.C., but this does not mean that w
condone the abridgement of human
rights in that country. There are con-
siderable human rights problems in
China as will be pointed out in our an
nual human rights country report. It
should be pointed out, however, that i
contrast to the U.S.S.R., China is not
tempting to undermine democratic
regimes and the development of plura
ism and democratic institutions in oth i
countries.

The Government of China is neith ,
as brutal toward its own citizens or as
threatening to its neighbors as either
North Korea or Vietnam. It has repu-
diated many aspects of the Soviet mc I
that previously guided its political,
economic, and social life. It is beginni'
to institute a functioning legal system
and is attempting to set up institutior
which share political power. The high ,
centralized political structure still im-
poses significant restrictions on in-
dividual rights and freedom and toler i
ates no fundamental criticism of the
Communist Party or the Socialist
system, but the trend continues to be
toward a somewhat more open societ;

Current trends in China toward
greater personal liberty are also men
promising than those in its Communis
neighbors. We believe the close assoc
tion which China has sought with its
non-Communist neigbors and industrir
ized states will strengthen this trend.
For example, over 100,000 Americans
visit in China each year, and 9,000
Chinese are students in the United
States. Such contacts, so different frd
those of China's Communist neighbori
will inevitably be a leavening effect oi
Chinese development.

Korea I

The human rights situation in the
Republic of Korea is mixed. The Konn
constitution, in effect since late 1980,
expresses the aspirations of the peop

Department of State BullfO

ENERGY

r a political sysem which is responsive
the popular will and guarantees basic
man rights. In fact, the government
s liberalized rules on a broad range of
itters, including travel abroad, univer-
y admissions, and the lifting of the na-
inal curfew. And, while power is heavi-
centralized in the executive, the Na-
inal Assembly is showing increasing
fns of asserting its traditional role as a
"um for responsible and, at times,
tical oversight of the government.

At the same time, however, strong
/ and order measures, enacted prior
the lifting of martial law in January
il, sharply limit political activity and
ablish strict government control over
! press, public assembly and demon-
ations, and labor organizations. And,
ile a number of prisoners have been
ed or had their sentences reduced by
!sidential amnesty during the course
the year, we estimated that some
)-450 persons remain in prison for
itical reasons.

We believe that an atmosphere in
ich human rights are respected will
p build a consensus that will assure
bility in the longer term and con-
mte to the achievement of Korea's

potential for political, economic, and
tural development.

ilippines

have a continuing dialogue with the
lippines on human rights issues
Dugh diplomatic channels. We con-
led this dialogue during the state
t of President Marcos. We believe
t the United States can maintain our
itegic and security interests with the
lippines at the same time we pursue
nan rights issues.

' In recent years, there were some im-
vements in civil and political rights in
! Philippines. Martial law was formal-
lifted in January 1981. Although the
I sident retains in reserve most of his
i'"tial law powers, he has used them
jringly.
Restrictions on the press and public
ambly were eased, but the govern-
■ It's most recent action in closing the
'-■ ling opposition newspaper and jailing
; writers is a matter for concern.
' ikes are no longer banned but are

subject in some cases to compulsory ar-
bitration. Habeas corpus has been partly
restored, and the number of those
termed "political detainees" has declined.
In May 1982, elections for barangay of-
ficials (the lowest administrative unit)
were held for the first time in a decade.
Parliamentary elections are slated for
1984.

Abuses by some members of the
military, mainly in insurgency areas, are
a continuing problem. There have been
some allegations of physical abuse and
summary executions. Some prisoners
have been held for long periods while
legal processes drag on without end. We
have discussed these problems with the
Philippine Government.

Taiwan

Administration officials and American
Institute in Taiwan employees take ad-
vantage of numerous opportunities to
express to Taiwan representatives the
view that restrictions on legitimate
political activities and violations of
human rights undercut support for
Taiwan in government, academic, and
other groups in the United States.

In Taiwan publication and public ex-
pression of oppositionist sentiment have
become gradually freer in the aftermath
of the trial and conviction of the Kaoh-
siung defendants. Nevertheless, there
continue to be strict limits to what is ac-
ceptable. Although individuals may run
for elective office, coordinated opposi-
tion activity is restricted, and the
authorities apparently remain deter-
mined to prevent the formation of an op-
position political party. The activities of
outspoken oppositionists are monitored,
both in Taiwan and, apparently, abroad.

We welcome the support you and
your committee have given to efforts to
improve human rights conditions in East
Asia and the Pacific. Your interest has
helped stimulate, I believe, many
governments in this region toward prac-
tices which promote both personal liber-
ty and security for their societies as a
whole.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Strategic
Petroleum Reserve

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
DEC. 1, 19821

This is to advise the Congress that pur-
suant to Section 160(c)(lXB) of the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(Public Law 94-163) as amended by Sec-
tion 4(a) of the Energy Emergency
Preparedness Act of 1982 (Public Law
97-229), I find it would not be in the na-
tional interest to fill the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve at the rate of
300,000 barrels per day during Fiscal
Year 1983.

When my Administration took office
22 months ago, one of my first actions
was to direct a rapid acceleration of the
pace of oil acquisition for the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve. As a result, the fill
rate during Fiscal Year 1981 averaged
over 290 thousand barrels per day. The
fill rate for Fiscal Year 1982 averaged
215 thousand barrels per day. This con-
trasts sharply with the average fill rate
of less than 77 thousand barrels per day
achieved during the four years of the
prior Administration. Of the 288 million
barrels now in the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve, 178 million barrels, or 61 per-
cent, were added during my Administra-
tion.

This Administration has also entered
into long-term purchase commitments
that will give greater assurance of main-
taining our fill rate objectives over the
coming year while lowering the cost of
building the reserve.

Another major policy action in-
stituted at the start of this Administra-
tion— immediate decontrol of the
domestic oil market — has also con-
tributed greatly to our energy security
by reducing oil imports and stimulating
domestic production. In the 22 months
of my Administration, oil imports have
declined dramatically. Our dependence
on imports from OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] sources
is now only 51 percent of the 1980 level.

As a result of rapidly implementing
these policy actions to enhance our

■'fuary 1983

EUROPE

energy security, the oil on hand today in
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would
provide 130 days of complete replace-
ment for OPEC imports in the event of
an embargo. That is nearly six times the
level of protection our nation averaged
in 1980.

The commitment of this Administra-
tion to building and maintaining an ade-
quate Strategic Petroleum Reserve is
clearly demonstrated by the record of
accomplishment. But we are equally
committed to carrying out this program
in the most efficient, cost-effective man-
ner. The fill rate at which we plan to
operate during 1983 reflects a careful
balance between these two objectives.
To operate at the 300,000 barrel-per-day
rate would require extensive use of tem-
porary storage facilities, which would
significantly increase the cost of the pro-
gram for very limited incremental
benefit.

I must also note that increasing our
fill rate objective to 300,000 barrels per
day in Fiscal Year 1983 would force ad-
ditional expenditures of over $1 billion.
In the current economic climate, I
believe that this additional expenditure
would be harmful to growth and job
creation because of the increased
Treasury borrowing it would necessitate.
Compliance with the increased fill rate
would thus be inappropriate due to
economic conditions affecting the
general welfare.

Ronald Reagan

Secretary Visits Europe;
Attends North Atlantic Council

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, 1982.

Secretary Shultz departed
Washington, D.C.. December 6, 1982, to
visit Bonn (December 7-8). Brussels
(December 8-11). The Hague (Decem-
ber 11), Rome (December 11-U). Paris
(December lJf-15). Madrid (Decem-
ber 15-16), and London (December
16-18). He returned to Washington on
December 18.

Following are news conferences,
statements, and toasts he made on
various occasions during the trip, as
well as the final communique issued at
the conclusioyi of the regular semiannual
session of the North Atlantic Council
ministerial meeting in Brussels. ^

NEWS CONFERENCE,

BONN,

DEC. 7, 19822

Many words can be used to describe the
relationship between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United
States — partnership, alliance, strength,
steadfastness, hospitality. I have ex-
perienced all of those words here in my
discussions with Foreign Minister
Genscher. Those words have character-
ized the outstanding visit of Chancellor
Kohl to Washington some 3 weeks ago,
and they have been historically descrip-
tive of the relationship between these
two countries. I have come here with
that spirit very much in mind, both for
the purpose of the meeting here and the
discussion of things that interest the two
countries and also as a prelude to the
meetings of the NATO foreign ministers
that we might consult a little bit about
those meetings.

We have discussed a very wide
range of particular issues having to do
with the NATO-type issues, the two-
track decision and the mutual reaffirma-
tion of the importance of that decision
and all of its implications. We have
discussed East- West economic relations
and our determination to proceed with
the program that we set out as a result
of discussions in New York, Washing-
ton, La Sapiniere, and elsewhere. We
discussed Central America, South
America, and our interests there and
many other matters of mutual interest.

We know in the end what we all
seek is reduction of armaments. We

know that we have to be strong if we
truly can contemplate that as being a
possibility of reality. We want a world
peace, and we also know that we are
having these discussions against the
background of economic difficulties.
We were joined by Mr. Lambsdorff
[Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Economics
Minister] for some discussion of those
matters and I hope that some good cai
come forward on that part as well.

Q. Would you be prepared to cor
ment on the statement by Soviet
Minister of Defense Ustinov, who
asserted that, in case of MX station-
ing according to current plans, the
Soviets would feel compelled to sta-
tion a similar weapon, a comparable
weapon, and that the stationing of
these weapons would represent a
gross violation of the SALT II agrei
ment?

A. The problem is to the contrary.
The Soviets have been developing sue!
missiles and putting them into place. I
the same problem as in the intermedia -
range missile issue. The issue for us is
to match this strength. We are deter-
mined to modernize our position. At tl
same time, the President has put for-
ward very strong suggestions for the
reduction of armaments, and these an
being negotiated in Geneva. But in tht
meantime, in this as in other areas, wi
must maintain and develop our streng ,
not only for its own sake but as the
basis for any reality in the negotiation

Q. Does that violate the SALT II
agreement?

A. We don't believe so.

Q. Over the weekend the heads i
state of the European Community gn
what they called a signal of Copen-
hagen, suggesting to the Soviet Unii
that it should take positive steps
toward the West, and the West wou
then react in turn positively. How d<
you assess such a possibility?

A. I don't have any way of assessi;
the likelihood that the Soviet Union w^
decide to do the things that are
necessary to improve the relationships
between themselves and the United
States and our European friends. The
position that we have had is, I think,
quite similar to that expressed i

Departnnent of State Bullet

EUROPE

ere— that we must be realistic about
that's going on. We must maintain our
trength. We must be ready to
egotiate, and if in these negotiations
re find a constructive response, then
le negotiations have some chance to
ucceed.

I might say also that we are very
Dnscious in the United States of a wide
ariety of destabilizing activities that
3em to have their origin in many cases
1 the Soviet Union. I have just been
•aveling through South and Central
merica, and here we see the effects of
rmaments flowing into democratic
jgimes and destabilizing them. And we
an't regard this as a contribution to
3ace in the world. So there is lots of
)om for improvement.

I would agree with the statement
lat you quoted from the European
3ads of state that we will welcome any
ibstantive moves from the Soviet
nion in directions that can lead to
ore stable and constructive relation-
lips around the world.

Q. May I ask you to be somewhat
ore detailed or more explicit regard-
\g your statement that the Soviets
id already developed and stationed
ich weapons?

A. They have, as the President
;veloped in his address on the MX sub-
ct, a formidable arsenal in place, and it
this continuous buildup of Soviet
eaponry that much of our response is
rected to.

Q. In connection with the lifting
' the sanctions against the gas pipe-
[le deal, it was said one of the condi-
9ns was to reach an understanding
id agreement on a common trade and
onomic policy vis-a-vis the countries
Eastern Europe. Could you tell us
»w much progress has been made in
sveloping a common strategy vis-a-
s the countries of Eastern Europe.

A. First, I have to disconnect the
lestion because the question implied
at the discussions of our East- West
onomic strategy were conducted as a
rt of negotiation vis-a-vis the pipeline
>ue. In actuality, as Mr. Genscher will
ar out since he and his representatives
3re a very instrumental part in the
lole thing, we all agreed that the
neral question of East- West economic
lationships deserved to be addressed
th urgency and with a different spirit
an in the past. And so we moved for-
ird on that. The President's decision
is that the prospect for moving for-
ird on these alternative means was
omising enough and strong enough so

that he could, in effect, switch from the
pipeline sanctions to this approach.

As far as the ingredients to this
strategy are concerned, they are in dif-
ferent stages, and I'll try to run down
where we stand on them.

First, perhaps the most fundamental
step that was proposed is a broad East-
West study of economic relationships
based on certain principles that have
been set out. We are now in the process
of trying to formulate just how to go
about the undertaking of that study. But
I think people are broadly and complete-
ly committed to doing it. One of the
things that Mr. Genscher and I touched
on in our discussions this afternoon was
mutual agreement to move forward with
that. We have some ideas about it. I
hope during the course of my trip to
Europe, we'll be able to firm up just how
we are going to do the study.

Second, on the question of credits;
there has been, of course, considerable
discussion of this within the framework
of OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development], and that
will proceed.

'Third, there is the question of
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Security Export Controls].
That has been moving forward in a very
satisfactory way with a considerable
political impulse to do so.

Fourth, there is the question of
other high technology, in particular oil
and gas equipment. We have to for-
mulate how to get at that. It is similar
in terms of the kind of analytical and ad-
ministrative skills needed for COCOM.
In one way or another, I think, we will
see it drift in that direction, but still
there has to be the right setting.

And finally, the same can be said for
the broad energy study that needs to be
undertaken, particularly looking at alter-
native sources of supply and estimating
the demand.

In general, I think. Minister
Genscher and I agree that the more we
can use existing forums to work out
these matters, the better we are going
to be. I look forward to discussing all of
this with my European colleagues dur-
ing this trip.

Q. Do you believe that only the
military experts could decide which
kind of high technology is militarily
important?

A. Obviously, the essential skills are
in part military and in part sort of scien-
tific engineering skills that are required
in either case.

Q. Did you also discuss with Mr.
Genscher the Middle East problem,
and how do you see the situation at
the moment? The fact that you re-
ceived two Palestinian mayors the
other day, does that mean that you are
ready — the United States would now
be ready — to recognize the PLC
[Palestine Liberation Organization]?

A. The answer to the last part of
the question is that the conditions under
which we will talk to the PLO have been
set up very clearly, repeatedly, and re-
main unchanged.

But I'll repeat them again if you
wish; namely, that when they recognize
the right of Israel to exist and U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 as the basis for peace in the Middle
East. We are ready to talk to the PLO.
Until then we aren't. The two mayors
that I met were not representatives of
the PLO. They were former mayors of
West Bank communities who had been
ejected for reasons that we didn't find
persuasive. I didn't answer the question
about the Middle East but you were only
giving me the PLO needle, and we'll let
it go at that.

Q. There were indications this
morning that the Federal Government
had gained the impression during con-
tacts and talks in the course of the
Brezhnev funeral rites that the Soviets
might be considering pulling out of
Afghanistan or had the desire to do
so. Could you comment on that?

A. The range of our discussions so
far — and remember I am just in the
middle of this visit here — is very wide.
As a matter of fact, we did touch on
Afghanistan and many other issues.
Whether there is a potential movement
on the part of the Soviet Union or not
remains to be seen. And I think that
there are so many signals this way, that
way, and every other way that we need
to go out of the signals business and
look for substance. We'll be very in-
terested to see if any substance
develops.

Q. I have another question con-
cerning East-West trade. Who in your
opinion would be best suited to for-
mulate this common policy of the
West? And who is going to draft this
study once agreement has been
reached on what should be said in the
study?

A. There are many possible ways of
going about it. The interested countries
as such will have to do a great deal of
the work as distinct from an interna-
tional staff. Nevertheless, our bias, as I

■bruary 1983

EUROPE

said earlier, is toward lodging all of
these studies to the extent possible in
some existing international institution,
and we'll benefit from the experience
and the staffs of those institutions. It
has not yet been decided precisely where
to put this. I hope that as my visit to
Europe unfolds and I have a chance to
talk to people, we'll gradually formulate
our agreement on that point.

Q. I suppose there is a certain
timetable on consultations in connec-
tion with this joint East- West eco-
nomic strategy. What is this timetable
like?

A. The timetable varies according to
the subject matter of the different items
that I mentioned. Some represent ac-
tions that can be put in place, or im-
prove on what is in place already, and
some represent studies that need to be
accomplished. I don't see that any of
these studies need to take forever. So I
think, without trying to put deadlines on
things, we ought to be thinking in terms
of months. But I don't want to put some
deadline down because that often causes
artificial uncertainties.

Q. There is information that mar-
tial law in Poland may be lifted and
that all the detainees would be re-
leased. Would that change your posi-
tion— the position of the United
States of America— vis-a-vis Poland?

A. It wouldn't change it. What has
changed over a period of years is what
the Polish Government has done to its
people. And if the Polish Government
changes the way it behaves toward its
people, that will be welcome news. We
will await any developments and when
we read the accounts of them we want
to examine carefully what the reality is.
We hope that the reality will gradually
emerge as something better for the
Polish people than they have been sub-
jected to for the last year or so.

Q. I wonder if we could please
seek a clarification of your reply
earlier about the Soviets having a new
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
missile].

A. No, I didn't say brand new. I was
referring to what the President
developed in his television address hav-
ing to do with the MX decision. He
developed the buildup of a Soviet
weaponry and juxtaposed that against
what had been going on as far as the
United States is concerned and thereby
the necessity for us to modernize and
develop our own weaponry.

Q. Is that the same area of [inaudi-
ble] destabilization activities within
the United States?

A. I didn't say anything about
destabilizing within the United States. I
talked about Central America.

DINNER TOAST.

BONN,

DEC. 7, 19823

Foreign Minister Genscher, my friend,
my host, my colleague in the world of
foreign affairs; I might say that I am
senior to you in that you have just been
reappointed foreign minister, but I am
very junior to you in so many respects
that the opportunity to be here at the
start of my visit to Europe and talk with
you and the Chancellor and President
Carstens, not only about our relation-
ships together as two countries but also
about our alliance, is of great impor-
tance to me. But I would like to first say
how grateful I am to you and Mrs.
Genscher and distinguished guests here
for joining us and in extending this
wonderful warmth and hospitality that is
so clear here this evening and has been
clear to me throughout the day as I have
had the privilege of talks with members
of your government. That warmth and
hospitality is very important to us.

I might say also that the discussions
that we have had have been very pro-
ductive, full of content, as your very
gracious toast suggests. We have
covered an awful lot of ground in a com-
prehensive way and in a probing way. I
suppose that is just what is appropriate
for two countries that have as many
things that pull us together as our coun-
tries do. There are a million — or
perhaps a little more — Americans on
your soil. For the most part, they are
military people and their families. We
think they are here on a mission of
peace. We think they are here in the in-
terests of the United States and in your
interests, our shared interests. And that
is the way we look at it, and that is the
faith that we will keep.

I have heard that on the order of
25% of the residents of the United
States— the citizens of the United
States— in one way or another can trace
their roots to Germany. Now I don't
know about a figure like that, and I
hestitate to use a number of that kind in
the presence of my teacher and the
great Arthur Burns [U.S. Ambassador
to West Germany] because Arthur is a

stickler for numbers. Whenever you use
a number in Arthur's presence, he will ,
come around later and say to me,
"George, where did you get that
number?" But I have the perfect answer
on this occasion. I'll say, "Arthur, you
gave it to me."

But I might say it is a measure of
the respect and friendship that we have,
and that President Reagan has, that we
are able to persuade and able to send
you such a distinguished person as
Arthur Burns and Helen Burns. I feel
very strongly about this personally
because I have had the privilege of
working with and for Arthur for a great
many years. And I know there is no per-
son in the United States who stands
taller and is more respected. He is more ,
than an Ambassador here; he is a very
distinguished American and a very dis-
tinguished citizen of the world. So when
I have a number from Arthur I know
that I am in very safe hands.

I said that our discussions have been
comprehensive and productive, as is sug-
gested by the wide range of topics that
were brought up in your own remarks
here this evening, Mr. Minister. And I
don't want to try to review them here in
any detail, but it is quite clear that they
have to do with our alliance, where you
and I are going as ministers to the
NATO ministerial meeting.

I think it is very well for us all to
keep in our minds that this alliance has
been and remains today one of the
greatest alliances in history. It is an
alliance for peace. There has been no
war in Europe while this alliance has
been in being although there have been
tensions. There have been incidents or
whatever you may want to call them all
over the world, much bloodshed all over
the world; but I think, in very con-
siderable part due to the alliance, that
has not been true here. So it is some-
thing that we prize and we work on and ,
we develop together. We have, as we all ;
recognize, the dual-track decision, which:
you and the Chancellor affirmed very
positively to me today, as the most re-
cent expression of the things that we
share together and recognize as impor- '
tant. I

Outside this sphere of the alliance i
and the concerns that go with it, of i
course, we have our economic relation-
ships to think about. And it was, I think,!
significant to notice in your remarks
that you brought forward both the im- i
portance of an economic strategy in our
East- West relationships which we are
together determined to work out to our
mutual benefit and also what we share

Department of State Bulletir'

EUROPE

e importance of the trading com-
ity around the world.
Ve had a meeting in the GATT
eral Agreement on Tariffs and
e] here recently, and how it should
'aluated I suppose depends on your
, of view. There is gag on rating
:s going around these days. I was
i by a reporter as we were winding
jr South American trip with the
dent recently, on a scale of one to
low would you rate the trip? Of
;e, I immediately said "eleven." But
•theless it is important to recognize
with all of the difficulties we face in
conomies and in the world economy
were positive assertions of the im-
nce of open trade, and at least the
ining of a sensitivity to the
gence of that great miscellany now
1 "services," but which I predict will
!r or later be called such words as
dng" and "insurance" and
neering," and so on, the real parts
s word. There is a recognition of
lew and emerging and very impor-
ispect of trade and the necessity
jaling with it. So that is a positive
mt.

t any rate, the point is that as we
2d on this matter of the greatest
ilty, I know that we found that the
sentatives of your country and
found much in common, perhaps
of all found a philosophic base in
ion which made it possible for us to
fruitfully together,
inally, I could practically pick up
ead and welcome your own com-
; about the truly significant base of
ilationship and that has to do with
dues that we share. The human
3, the democratic values that sus-
s and sustain our alliance and
us, as we look perhaps at other
of the world, recognize what a
deal we really have in having a
ion of freedom and a sort of prog-
i.nd a sense of humanity that
cterizes your world here and mine
United States.

gain I am most grateful to you for
'arm and hospitable greeting and
more for what it stands for — the
jth of our relationship, the content
the ability to talk and discuss,
views on important issues. These
rs are of tremendous significance
and benefit to me and my job,
more of great significance to my
rymen and to President Reagan,
las asked me to express to this
ring, as I did to Chancellor Kohl,
Ty best wishes.

In that spirit, I would like to ask you
to join me in a toast to my host and
hostess, Minister and Mrs. Genscher,
and to the continued friendship and well-
being of our countries and their relation-
ship to each other.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT,

BRUSSELS,

DEC. 8, 1982"

I'm delighted to have a chance to come
to this city which contains so many im-
portant things. I'll be here to visit
leaders of the Government of Belgium,
to confer with my colleagues in the
North Atlantic alliance, and to meet
with leaders of the European Communi-
ty on economic matters.

I think this must be put down as a
special time of problems and oppor-
tunities. We all know of both. Certainly
in the field of tensions in the world,
there are many that we must reckon
with. And the North Atlantic alliance
has proven to be the world's most
durable and effective alliance. It is an
alliance for peace, and we want to keep
it that way. We know that there is a
very large military buildup on the part
of the Soviet Union and that it takes
strength to meet strength. At the same
time, in keeping with the dual-track
decision, we must always examine both
sides of the coin. And as we have
strength, we also have the strength to
negotiate. And we will, of course, be
talking about both of these matters in
the meeting of the North Atlantic
alliance.

I look forward to calling on Prime
Minister Martens and Foreign Minister
Tindemans and to renewing my
acquaintance with them and discussing
important matters here in Belgium.

I might say that years ago when I
was Dean at the University of Chicago
and thinking of ways to internationalize
our curriculum, I came to Belgium and
worked out a program that was quite
successful in collaboration with the
University of Louvain. So I know a little
bit about Belgium beyond just what I'm
meeting on here today.

Finally, at the end of my stay here, I
will be meeting with Gaston Thorn
[President of the European Community
Commission], a friend of many years,
and his colleagues to talk about some of
the economic issues — and I believe op-
portunities— that we face. Certainly, it
seems to me, we need to keep in our
sights right now that the world needs
economic expansion. And in addition to

discussions of the particular issues that
we intend to scrap about, we need also
to think about ways in which we can
work together effectively to see our
economies expand.

I'd like to make one comment about
an event that took place in Washington
yesterday, namely the vote in the House
of Representatives on the basing mode
of the MX missile. This, as the President
has said, is a disappointing vote, and we
think a mistaken one. In view of the fact
that we think it is mistaken, of course, I
am sure that the President will be seek-
ing to turn it around, not only in the
Senate but in working with American
people to be sure that they understand
fully the implications and the importance
of the deployment of the MX missile.

I should emphasize that long-range,
land-based missiles are now in place on
American soil and what we are talking
about here is a modernization of that
weapon system and a shift in the basing
mode. In the end, I feel confident that it
will go forward. Nevertheless, it certain-
ly is the case that the vote in the House
is a disappointing one.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
COMMUNIQUE,
BRUSSELS,
DEC. 10. 1982

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
session in Brussels on 9th and 10th December
1982 and agreed as follows:

1. The Atlantic Alliance, based on the
ideals and value of democracy, has through
its strength and cohesion succeeded in
preserving peace and independence for the
free and equal members of this partnership.
On this solid foundation, the Heads of State
and Government reaffirmed at their meeting
in Bonn on 10th June 1982 the Alliance's
policy of a strong defence and of East- West
dialogue. Moreover, they set forth their pro-
gramme for peace in freedom, emphasizing
their resolve to develop substantial and
balanced East-West relations aimed at gen-
uine detente based on the effective applica-
tion of the principles and provisions of the
United Nations Charter and the Helsinki
Final Act.

2. The Allies will maintain a firm,
realistic and constructive attitude towards
the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual ac-
ceptance of the principles of restraint and
responsibility in the conduct of international
affairs. The desire to improve relations with
the member states of the Warsaw Pact and
to extend areas of co-operation to their
mutual benefit.

The Allies look to the Soviet leadership
for tangible evidence that it shares their
readiness to act in this spirit. They expect

ary 1983

EUROPE

the Soviet Union to honour its obHgations
and to show respect for the sovereignty and
independence of other states. In face of the
continuing and massive Soviet arms build-up,
the legitimate security concerns of the Allies
remain and must be recognized. But the
Allies are open to all opportunities for
dialogue, will welcome any positive move to
reduce tension and desire, if Soviet attitudes
allow, to co-operate in re-building interna-
tional trust.

3. The violations in Poland of the
Helsinki Final Act and of the conventions of
the International Labour Organization, in
particular by the banning and dissolution of
trade unions including Solidarity, continue to
cause the gravest concern.

The Allies call upon the Polish authorities
to abide by their commitment to work for na-
tional reconciliation. Recalling their declara-
tion of nth January 1982, * the criteria of
which are far from being fulfilled, the Allies
have noted the recent release of a number of
detainees and continue to follow closely
developments in Poland, including possible
relaxation of military rule. They emphasize
that in this regard the actions of the Polish
authorities will be judged by their practical
effects. The Allies consider that the improve-
ment of relations with Poland depends on the
extent to which the PoUsh Government gives
effect to its declared intention to establish
civil rights and to continue the process of
reform. Freedom of association and the
rights of workers to have trade unions of
their own choice should not be denied to the
Polish people. The dialogue with all sections
of Polish society must be resumed. The Allies
call on all countries to respect Poland's fun-
damental right to choose its own social and
political structures.

4. In violation of the United Nations
Charter and despite repeated calls from the
General Assembly, the Islamic Conference
and other international bodies, the Soviet
Union continues its military occupation of
Afghanistan in the face of determined
resistance by the Afghan people. The Allies
call upon the Soviet Union to accept a
political solution which would bring an end to
the suffering of the Afghan people and allow
the return to their homeland of over 3 million
refugees who have been forced into exile.
This solution must be based on the
withdrawal of Soviet Forces and respect for
the independence and sovereignty of
Afghanistan which would thereby be enabled
to exercise its right of self-determination and
to return to a position of genuine non-
alignment.

5. In unremitting pursuit of its military
build-up, which has long passed the level re-
quired for defence, the Soviet Union is in-
creasing its superiority in conventional arms
and expanding its naval power. It is
simultaneously strengthening its nuclear
capability, particularly through the deploy-
ment of intermediate-range missiles. As
stated in their Bonn Declaration, the Alhes
are left no choice but to maintain an effective
military deterrent adequate to meet their

legitimate security concerns in a changing
situation. It therefore remains essential for
the Allies to preserve the security of the
North Atlantic area by means of conventional
and nuclear forces adequate to deter aggres-
sion and intimidation. To that end they agree
to continue their efforts towards greater co-
operation in armaments and, in particular, to
take full advantage of emerging technologies
and to continue action in the appropriate fora
restricting Warsaw Pact access to Western
militarily-relevant technologies.

The presence of North American forces
on the European Continent and the United
States strategic nuclear commitment to
Europe are essential to Allied security.
Equally important are the maintenance and
continued improvement of the defence
capabilities of the European members of the
Alliance.

6. Arms control and disarmament
together with deterrence and defence are in-
tegral parts of Alliance security policy and
important means of promoting international
stability and peace.

Firmly committed to progress over arms
control and disarmament, the Allies have ini-
tiated a comprehensive series of proposals for
militarily significant, equitable and verifiable
agreements, which are designed to lead to a
balance of forces at lowest possible levels.
They seek from the Soviet Union a construc-
tive and serious approach in current negotia-
tions.

7. In the Strategic Arms Reductions
Talks (START), the Allies fully support the
efforts of the United States to negotiate with
the Soviet Union significant reductions in
United States and Soviet strategic forces em-
phasizing the most destabilizing systems in
the first phase of the negotiations. The Allies
urge the Soviet Union to contribute in a con-
crete way to speedy progress in these impor-
tant negotiations.

8. The Allies underline the importance of
both parts of the decision of 12th December
1979 which provided for a limited moderniza-
tion of United States intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF) combined with a parallel
offer of negotiations on United States and
Soviet weapons of this kind. This decision,
which was prompted, in particular, by the
deployment of SS-20 missiles, led to the cur-
rent INF talks in Geneva within the
framework of negotiations on strategic arms
reductions.

The Allies fully support the United States
efforts to enhance security through the total
elimination of all existing and planned Soviet
and United States longer-range land-based
INF missiles. The United States proposal was
developed in close consultation within the
Alliance among the member countries con-
cerned. The Ministers of these countries
welcomed the continuing United States com-
mitment to serious negotiations, and to con-
sider carefully with these Allies any serious
Soviet proposal.

Ministers reiterated that, in the absence
of concrete results, INF deployments would
begin according to schedule at the end of
1983.'

9. The AUies welcomed the recent pre
posals by President Reagan for new confi
dence-building measures in the nuclear fit
between the United States and the Soviet I
Union intended to enhance stabihty.

10. The Allies participating in the mi ;
and balanced force reduction (MBFR) tall i
Vienna are confident that the comprehen; i
approach embodied in the draft treaty te;
presented by Western negotiators has gi\ i
new momentum to the negotiators. This
Western initiative is aimed at achieving r 1
progress towards substantial reductions c
ground forces, leading to parity in combii S
ground and air force manpower at equal ■
lective levels in Central Europe. Westerr
participants in the negotiations call upon <
East to respond adequately to the need f
prior agreement on data for current Wai \
Pact force levels and to agree to effectiv
associated measures for verification and
confidence-building.

11. The Allies also attach great imp(
tance to efforts in the United Nations to
secure improved verification procedures,
wider availability of information on defei i
spending and other measures likely to
enhance transparency and thus build con
fidence.

12. The Allies are gravely concernec
about strong evidence of continued use c
chemical weapons in South-East Asia an'
Afghanistan in violation of international '
including Soviet involvement in the use t
such weapons.'

They stress the need for progress in i
Committee on Disarmament towards a C' ■
vention on the prohibition of developmer
production and stockpiling of chemical
weapons and on their destruction, with a
propriate provisions for verification inch i
on-site inspection.

13. At the Madrid CSCE [Conferenc :
Security and Cooperation in Europe] foil '
up meeting the Allies have deplored infr ;
ment of the principles and provisions of :
Final Act. They noted in this respect ths ;
situation in Poland remained a source of i
cern. The Allies are continuing their effc i
to arrive at a substantial and balanced ci ■
eluding document and they regard the di?
submitted by the neutral and non-aligne(
states in December 1981 as a good basis >
negotiations. They have introduced a nui )
of amendments to bring it up-to-date wit
realities in Europe and to call for progre'
human rights, free trade unions and free'
movement of people, ideas and informatii
To facilitate a positive outcome in Madri
the Allies urge the Soviet Union and oth
Warsaw Pact states to abide by the prinb
and provisions of the Final Act.

As part of a substantial and balance(fc
eluding document, the Allies reaffirm tU
support for a Conference on Confidence i
Security Building Measures and Disarms!'
in Europe on the basis of a precise manct
to negotiate in a first phase militarily sifi
cant, politically binding and verifiable co
fidence and security building measures S.
plicable to the whole of Europe, from th'
Atlantic to the Urals.

Department of State Bui t

EUROPE

They will also strive to achieve significant
gress in the important humanitarian
ects of East- West relations.

14. Economic recovery in the West is
>ntial both for Allied defence efforts and
social stability and progress. The Allies
'firmed the need for effective co-operation
terally and in the appropriate fora

ards this end, including programmes in
oing with Article 2 of the North Atlantic
aty which are intended to benefit the
lomies of the less favoured partners.

15. The Allies recognize that mutually
intageous trade with the East on com-
cially sound terms contribute to construe-
East- West relations. At the same time,

' agree that bilateral economic and trade
tions with the Soviet Union and Eastern
ope must also be consistent with their
id security concerns which include the
dance of contributing to Soviet military
ngth. Studies are underway or will soon
ndertaken on several aspects of East-
t economic relations and Ministers will
iider these issues again, on the basis of
e studies, at their next meeting.*

16. The strict observance and full im-
lentation of the Quadripartite Agreement
-d September 1971 and the maintenance

1 undisturbed situation in and around
in remain essential elements in East-
t relations. The Allies welcome the ef-
. of the Federal Republic of Germany to
igthen the economy of the city in par-
ar by ensuring long-term employment
pacts.
Recalling their Rome statement of 5th

1981, the Allies express the hope that
;ontinuation of the dialogue between the
!ral Republic of Germany and the Ger-

Democratic Republic will contribute to
strengthening of peace in Europe and will
I direct benefits for Berlin and the Ger-

people in both states.

[1. Peaceful progress world-wide is a

to which the Allies remain committed.
' consider that genuine non-align-
:— an important element of international
e and stability— contributes to this goal,
)es the aid which the Allies give bilateral-
id multilaterally to the development of
i World countries. They reaffirm their
iness to co-operate with Third World
tries on a basis of equal partnership. The
s call upon all states to make an effec-
contribution to the struggle against
r-development and to refrain from ex-
ing those nations' economic and social
lems for political gain,
"he Allies recognize that certain events
de the treaty area may affect their com-
interests as members of the Alliance,
d consultation on such events will be
1 on the recognition of those common in-
its. Those Allies in a position to do so
respond to requests by sovereign nations
le security and independence are
itened. It is in the interest of the
nee as a whole to ensure that sufficient
aiiity remains in the treaty area to main-
deterrence and defence.

18. The Allies again strongly condemn
the crime of terrorism, which is a menace to
democratic institutions and the conduct of
normal international relations. They appeal to
all governments to examine the possibilities
of increased co-operative efforts to stamp out
this scourge.

19. The Alliance's efficiency in pursuing
its policies depends upon continued cohesion
and solidarity taking into account the natural
diversity of its sovereign member states.
Recognizing in this connection the value of
their informal meeting in Canada, Ministers
agreed that similar meetings couid usefully
be held in the future.

20. The spring 1983 meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session
will be held in Paris on 9th-10th June.

Note: The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Spain has informed the Council of the
Spanish Government's purpose regarding the
Alliance and reserved his Government's posi-
tion on the present communique.

NEWS CONFERENCE,

BRUSSELS,

DEC. 10, 1982"

During these last 2 days of meetings, I
have felt very much as though I am
among allies, that I am part of an
alliance that is strong, that is deter-
mined, that stands for peace, that has
contributed to peace, and intends to con-
tinue to do so. It's been a very warm
and supportive and reassuring meeting
in every vi'ay. The communique speaks
really for the meeting very well, and I
can't do better than to read a few items
from it.

On East-West relations, the com-
munique says: ". . . firm, realistic and
constructive attitude towards the Soviet
Union on the basis of mutual acceptance
of the principles of restraint and respon-
sibility. . . ." On defense, the communi-
que says in view of the continued Soviet
military buildup ". . . the Allies are left
no choice but to maintain an effective
military deterrent adequate to meet
their legitimate security concerns in a
changing situation. It therefore remains
essential for the Allies to preserve the
security of the North Atlantic area by
means of conventional and nuclear
forces adequate to deter aggression and
intimidation." On arms control, the com-
munique says: "The Allies underline the
importance of both parts of the decision

of 12th December 1979 The Allies

fully support the United States efforts
to enhance security through the total
elimination of all existing and planned
Soviet and United States longer-range
land-based INF missiles"— in other
words the zero-zero option. "Ministers

reiterated that, in the absence of con-
crete results, INF deployments would
begin according to schedule at the end
of 1983." On chemical weapons: "The
Allies are gravely concerned about
strong evidence of continued use of
chemical weapons in South-East Asia
and Afghanistan in violation of interna-
tional law, including Soviet involvement
in the use of such weapons." These are
pieces here and there from the com-
munique. It's a lengthy document and
well worth your reading as soon as it's
available to you.

Q. Did the MX decision cast any
shadow over the proceedings here?

A. Not particularly. There were
questions about it, and I reported on the
parliamentary situation in the United
States and on the President's determina-
tion to move ahead. As a matter of fact,
in the appropriations process, some $2.5
billion was appropriated for the con-
tinued work on the MX missile.

Q. Could I ask you whether you
have any comment to make on this
morning's report that the U.S. Ad-
ministration is considering moving its
military command center from Stutt-
gart to Britain over the coming years?

A. There is no truth to that. The
command center remains where it is to-
day. As I understand it, if there should
be a war, command would shift to the
NATO command centers, and what ad-
ministrative rearrangements there might
be in such a contingency would have to
be worked out. But as far as command
center presence and so forth is con-
cerned, it remains as is.

Q. You discussed the Middle East.
Can you give us a short account about
the situation now there? And the pros-
pects of a breakthrough on the basis
of President Reagan's proposals of the
first of September, and if there is any
change of heart on your part regard-
ing the [inaudible]?

A. There is no change of heart
regarding that hope. And there is no let-
up in activity. And, of course, we con-
tinue to work hard with patience and
continuity. In a sense, there are, you
might say, three parts to that part of
the Middle East equation. I'm leaving
out the Iran and Iraq part of the pic-
ture.

There is, first of all, what we refer
to as the Mideast basic peace process in-
volving the Palestinian issues and so on.
We continue to work hard on that. We
expect King Hussein to visit the Presi-
dent in Washington on the 21st of

uary 1983

EUROPE

December. We consider that to be an
important meeting. It continues to be
our desire to create a situation where
the right people will come to the
bargaining table and start, of course,
first of all on the interim arrangements
and then on when final status ar-
rangements have been determined. It's
obviously going to be a long process, but
it's one in which we want to see things
move and continue to work on it.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, a
second part of this— Philip Habib and
Maury Draper have been back in Wash-
ington [Ambassador Habib, special
representative of the President to the
Middle East; Ambassador Draper,
special negotiator for Lebanon]. They
had a lengthy meeting with the Presi-
dent yesterday, and I understand that
Phi! and Maury will be going back out
shortly with additional ideas. I think it's
more appropriate for those ideas to
come from them and from Washington.

In addition, of course, there is the
very important matter of relationships
between Israel and Egypt which have
been at the heart of the Camp David
process, and we continue to try to be as
helpful as we can in the maintenance
and development of that fundamental
relationship. So basically, in answer to
your question, there is a strong continu-
ity of effort and interest in bringing
about a peaceful situation throughout
the Middle East.

Q. In the discussions of how the
alliance would approach or consider
dealing with the new Soviet govern-
ment, were there suggestions as to
how this could be done? Or whether
or not— was there interest on the part
of the Europeans in a summit meeting
with Mr. Reagan and Mr. Andropov at
some future time?

A. I think the discussion was very
realistic and thoughtful. Of course, we
are all interested in seeing the develop-
ment of more constructive relationships
based on a different pattern of behavior.
In this, our position as an alliance is
about the same as we have stated in the
United States. We have to be realistic
about what is taking place. We have to
maintain our strength, as the communi-
que brings out very clearly. We are
ready for a dialogue but whether or not
something emerges remains to be seen.

Q. Have you discussed any other
options beside zero-zero option? For
example, what you were talking about
with the Social Democratic leaders in
Bonn.

A. I didn't have any discussion of
other options in the meeting. There was
strong support, as the communique says,
for the zero-zero option, for the elimina-
tion of this whole category of weapons
from European soil. So that is our posi-
tion, that is where our emphasis is, and
that's what we talked about.

Q. In recent days you have ex-
plained to reporters and to your NATO
colleagues that MX vote in the House.
The Danish delegate here has ex-
plained the vote in his legislature, and
in Norway by just one vote they
avoided the same kind of vote as the
vote in Denmark. What I am wonder-
ing is doesn't all of that taken
together somewhat, from the Soviet
point of view, detract from the unity
that you're trying to show here?

A. Not at all. I think that if that in-
terpretation is placed on those votes, it's
a great mistake. The whole spirit of this
meeting has been one of unity and deter-
mination and a recognition of what the
realities are. And I am sure that those
realities are recognized in all the coun-
tries represented in this alliance.

Q. Have you worked out the ar-
rangements now for carrying out the
various studies called for in the agree-
ment on policy toward the Soviet
Union in the economic field, and what
are they?

A. 'The communique says: ". . . eco-
nomic and trade relations with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must
be consistent with [the Allies] broad
security concerns which include the
avoidance of contributing to Soviet
military strength." I expect to see the
following activities take place. And this,
I think, everybody subscribes to.

First of all, we have strong activity
going on now in COCOM.

Second, on high technology of
military significance, but perhaps of
somewhat less direct significance, in-
cluding oil and gas technology, we will
ask our COCOM people to examine that
area and give us advice on what should
be included.

Third, on the matter of credits,
there is an existing activity in the
OECD, which has been going on, and we
will seek to give that an additional
political impulse to examine the relation-
ship of credit to the basic objective
which I mentioned. In terms of energy
alternatives and the examination of
them, that I expect we will try to get
going in the OECD by mutual agree-
ment, and no doubt they will benefit in
the OECD from the lAE's [International

Energy Agency] material. I suppose
shouldn't be telling you this, I should
telling the OECD. Maybe they will ti;
their constituent governments down
doing these things. But I doubt it. B\
at any rate, the energy alternatives
study will take place in that setting.

Q. What will be the NATO role
any, in this review?

A. I'm trying to think. Just talki
off the top of my head here, I may h
omitted something. I have a feeling '.
did.

Q. Is there an overall East- We;
strategic study?

A. We have to think about how
pull these different elements togethf
and we haven't figured out the answ
to how to do that as yet.

Q. Will there be a NATO role i
this review?

A. The NATO role— let me just
you from the communique, because
there is a definite interest in the sut
This is, of course, a subject that the
NATO ministers discussed in La
Sapiniere and so they are quite in-
terested in following up. I read you ]
of it, I'll read a little bit more: "The
Allies recognize that mutually advan
tageous trade with the East on comi
cially sound terms contributes to cor
structive East- West relations. At th(
same time, they agree that bilateral
economic and trade relations with th
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe n'
also be consistent with their broad
security concerns which include the
avoidance of contributing to Soviet
military strength. Studies are under
or will soon be undertaken on seven
aspects of East- West economic relat
and Ministers will consider these issi
again, on the basis of these studies,
their next meeting." In other words,
expect to see some push in getting t
studies completed, and we'll be looki
for a report on their progress when
meet the next time.

Q. Do you have any fear or did
detect any concern in your talks h<
with the other ministers about the
possibility that the strains that exi
between the United States and the
European Community in the tradir
in the agricultural field at the pre;
time may spill over into the securi;
area and affect the unity of NATO

A. There are always problems ii
relations between partners, and I th
the important thing to recognize is t
despite a fair number of such proble
they have not spilled over.

Department of State Buh

EUROPE

This meeting was a strong meeting
and a determined meeting — a meeting
Df unity and strength. Now we've had a
number of issues that people have said
would do what you just mentioned. But
we have managed to compose our dif-
ferences about steel. We managed to
:ompose our differences about East-
West economic relationships, and that
las dealt with the pipeline and not con-
nected negotiations. But at any rate,
that aspect of the matter is not in the
Dicture.

The differences of view between the
Europeans, the United States, and, for
that matter, other countries about pro-
duction and trade and agriculture have
Deen around for a long time, and they
ire around today. I plan to spend time
with some of my Cabinet colleagues and
the leaders of the EC 10 later on today
ind no doubt the subject of agricultural
trade will come up. But it's a problem.
We'll work at it. And if it can't be
[•esolved in its own terms, it will not spill
3ver and undermine our alliance, I'm
sure.

Q. You are shortly going to
Madrid where the new Socialist
government is engaged in a broad
reassessment of its partnership with
VATO. And I suppose you are bring-
ing some ideas and some suggestions
t»oth in this context and also concern-
ing their assessment of the Spanish-
fVmerican treaty. Could you tell us
what are you going to suggest in this
ind other fields?

A. The Spanish Government is a
lew government, of course, and so I
ion't think it's appropriate to press on
:hem a whole lot of particulars. It's a
meeting in which I hope to get ac-
:}uainted and to discuss matters of some
mutual interest.

As far as Spain's membership in
MATO is concerned, of course, that's a
iecision for the Spanish to make, but I
certainly hope that they decide positively
;o remain in NATO. I think they have a
lonstructive contribution to make, and it
will be helpful to Spain as well as the
lUiance members.

Q. In your discussion with the
)ther ministers, did the subject of the
domestic problems that the Europeans
might have in deploying missiles next
rear come up and how do you assess
those problems?

A. Of course, everyone is acutely
conscious of the importance of deploy-
ment and of the reality of that; and the
relationship of that, no doubt, to the at-
mosphere of negotiations in Geneva. At

the same time, the reality of good con-
duct of those negotiations in Geneva has
an important bearing on people's at-
titudes about deployment. It's an inter-
related proposition, as it says in the
communique. We had a number of in-
stances of people in the face of questions
of one kind or another standing up and
facing up to them, and it turns out that
in the end, you win, when you explain
and show what deployment is about,
why it's important to the security of
Europe and the United States and, for
that matter, why it's important to the
negotiations that it proceed.

Of course, there is a constant prob-
lem of informing public opinion and of
persuading people that the course we're
on is the right course. I think there is
one dramatic piece of evidence that
needs to be kept in our minds all the
time and that is that NATO, on the
facts, has been an alliance for peace.
There has been no war in Europe during
the period of NATO's existence, and I
am sure that the existence of the
alliance and its strength has a major
responsibility for that fact.

Q. You said earlier there were no
plans to move the command center
from Stuttgart to Britain, but I
wonder if there are plans for building
an additional command center in Brit-
ain to provide extra redundancy in
that system?

A. No, I don't think so. I think
there's a misunderstanding here, and I
don't want to comment on it in too much
detail. But as I understand it, you're
talking about certain elements of ad-
ministration. Command is where it is
now, and if there should be a war — God
forbid — command would go directly to
the NATO command structure.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE,

BRUSSELS,

DEC. 10, 198210

EC President Thorn. Let me first tell
you that we had the pleasure, my col-
leagues from the Commission and my-
self, to welcome this afternoon Secre-
tary of State Shultz, his colleagues from
the American Administration —
[Treasury Secretary] Mr. Donald Regan,
[Agriculture Secretary] Mr. John Block,
[Commerce Secretary] Mr. Malcolm
Baldrige, and [U.S. Trade Representa-
tive] Mr. Bill Brock. We had a real ex-
change of views covering, I believe, all
topical issues.

We thought that the timing of this
meeting and discussion of these prob-
lems was particularly appropriate. First,
because we find ourselves in a very
delicate political and economic situa-
tion— the most difficult economic situa-
tion we've known since the end of the
war — and particularly because, in this
context, the United States and the Com-
munity, which account for approximately
one-third of world trade, have specific
responsibilities and particular interests
in coordinating their goals.

I will tell you that the exchanges
were frank and straightforward, but
they were so mainly because we did not
talk about the past and difficulties that
we may have encountered. But right
away we turned to the problems at
hand, and we tried to define some
strategies and to seek a few points
where it is in our interest to cooperate
together in the future, and even in the
very near future. It is of no interest to
anyone, nor does it benefit anyone, to
talk about the past; but it is absolutely
imperative that we take action and that
action replace words; that we emphasize
our common interests and that we try to
face them. It is in this spirit that we
have tackled the following topics which I
will only mention, allowing Mr. Shultz to
add the introductory remarks that he
wishes.

We have discussed trade matters,
i.e., essentially the GATT and what is
known as its follow-up. Then, of course,
we discussed agricultural problems; we
discussed East- West relations, and then
talked about the economic and financial
situation such as we assess it on both
sides of the Atlantic. These are the four
main topics that have been brought up
until now, excluding what might be dis-
cussed tonight during dinner.

Secretary Shultz. I think that is a
good statement of the general scope of
our discussion.

Q. I address my question to the
Agfricultural Secretary, Mr. Block. I'll
skip the diplomatic niceties and ask
roughly, if I may, whether the two
sides were able to work out a com-
promise on the agriculture issues, or
will there be an agricultural trade
war?

Secretary Block. First of all, there
will not be an agricultural trade war. I
don't think we should talk about trade
wars. We need to solve problems. My
appraisal of the outcome is that there
have been some concrete actions agreed
to; there is a joint appreciation that the
internal farm program policies can have
an impact on international trade and

•ebruary 1983

EUROPE

they can have occasionally a destructive
impact on international trade. The Euro-
pean Community appreciates the need to
harmonize internal prices and the world
peace. It was agreed— and this is more
important— that we sit down and, in
specific terms, review what can be done
to solve our trade frictions, what can be
done within the maneuvering room that
the Community has. And we're going to
do that with a timeframe with the first
meetings early in January, continuing if
necessary with a report back and review
sometime in March. And I think I said
that correctly.

Q. Can Mr. Regan illustrate his
views on the reform of the interna-
tional monetary system?

Secretary Regan: I discussed just
briefly at the meeting some of the
thoughts that I have that there is a need
for a better structure in the interna-
tional monetary system to handle many
of these problems that crop up very
quickly, that are very serious and need
many different organizations for their
solution. I offered no specific antidotes
for these problems. I would say that
what I am trying to do more than
anything else is to encourage discussion
of these items because I don't think
there is anyone who has the best solu-
tion or the only solution. I think there
can be many solutions, but the more we
discuss them within various types of
organizations, I think, the quicker the
chance will be that we can solve some of
these problems rather than going in for
ad hoc solutions.

Q. Mr. Block has referred to the
Europeans accepting at least in part
that their internal farm policies can
have a disruptive effect on world
trade. In which areas of internal EEC
farm policy is the disruptive effect on
world trade evident in your view?
What are the concrete actions agreed
to and referred to by Secretary Block?
And if I could ask a brief question to
Secretary Regan, are you more wor-
ried now than you were 6 months ago
about the danger of a world banking
crisis?

Secretary Regan. I'm less worried
at this moment than I was 6 months
ago. You will recall that in this period of
time we have successfully handled
several countries that are large debtors
by renegotiating their loans, by tem-
porarily bridging loans, government-to-
government, or through the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements, and as a result
these nations are now on International
Monetary Fund programs. The more

that happens and the more successful
we are, the less dangers there are and
the less threats there are to the interna-
tional banking system.

President Thorn. As for the ques-
tion addressed to me, and for which I
am thankful to him inasmuch as it will
perhaps give me the chance to detail our
views on that matter.

What I think was said and what I
would like to confirm as far as I am con-
cerned is that we thought we should
definitely avoid upheavals in the world
market in regard to agriculture and that
we both said that we definitely wanted
to take steps to avoid that, each of us in
the context of his own policy. To that
purpose, we said that we should keep in
mind, as much on the American side as
on the European side, that when faced
with decisions in agricultural matters,
we must prevent decisions from having
these negative effects which we would
like to avoid — also and notably as
regards certain subsidies which could be
granted and how far one could go, all
the while respecting the policies of both
partners. We, therefore, said that we
would have the most extensive ex-
changes of views possible with our col-
laborators, as of January, on actions
that we might be led to take when mak-
ing the inventory of specific issues.

This is not a reevaluation of our
policy but rather a matter of seeing
what concrete examples of problems
there are in Europe and the United
States, and then let us attack them im-
mediately as of January. We will see in
March, as my American colleague said,
how advanced these studies will be; to
what level, or if we have achieved some
results. We also have examined some ex-
amples from the American side; our in-
terlocutors have explained, for example,
the measures that the President of the
United States proposed last night— on
the American side — to deal with that
problem.

On our side, we have brought up, for
instance, the measures that we have
taken regarding products such as sugar,
as well as those to reduce surpluses; and
it is this analysis that we intend to pur-
sue as soon as possible, which is to say
after the holiday season.

Q. Mr. Block, you just talked
about respecting the space of
maneuver of the European Communi-
ty. Does it mean that the United
States has not [inaudible] the common
agricultural policy as it is, meaning,
for instance, subsidies for exports,
and secondly, when you say there will

not be a trade war on agriculture,
mean that you are not going to dump
any food in a short time on the world
market?

Secretary Block. In response to the
first question, we do not and have not
quarreled with the common agricultural
policy. Our quarrel has been with the
spillover of that policy into the interna-
tional markets, and it is our contention
that it has created problems for us and
other trading countries. The effort that
the European Community intends to
make, and we intend to review with
them how they can accomplish it, is to
bring their internal prices, or see inter-
nal prices and world prices more in har-
mony, or when they come close together
or together, once this happens, it is a
fact that export subsidies— but this
would cause it to happen, and I think it
is an appropriate approach. And the
question of my statement that there
would be no trade war — and I don't ex-
pect a trade war, trade wars would be
bad for everyone concerned, that is a
fact. It is also a fact that we did not
give up. We did not agree that we woulc
necessarily withhold any actions to com-
pete on a favorable basis with the Euro-
pean Community in the export market.

Q. I would like to know if you
have any commitments regarding agri-
culture and an eventual modification
of the policy followed until now. Can
we speak of a commitment, and, if so
which one? And then a question to Mr
Block. It seems totally illusory to
imagine that European prices could
match world prices. In which case,
what conclusion do you draw?

President Thorn. Regarding the
first part, I thought I had answered it
by saying, twice, that naturally the cap
was not negotiable. I believe you all
heard that against and over the cap, but
that we were both anxious to respect
each other's policy, but that it's time to
establish a list of concrete problems as
quickly as possible and then to discuss
them together at the beginning of next
year. No negotiation commitment, and
no commitment to a result, has been
taken at this stage and cannot be taken
since we are only now initiating discus-
sions.

Secretary Block. In answer to your
question, you suggest that, in view of
the circumstances, it's illusory to expect
the common agricultural prices to har-
monize with the world prices. I don't ac-
cept that necessarily. I don't think that
the European Community accepts that,
and that is what we are going to sit

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

wn and look to when we have our
actings in January to see how that can
Tie about.

Q. This is to both Mr. Block and
•. Dalsager [Paul Dalsager (Den-
irk), EC Commissioner for
jiculture]. Was there any discus-
in here or has there been any discus-
■n about cooperation in world
ricultural marketing of major com-
'dities to help you get over short-
m surpluses?

Secretary Block. We didn't talk in
cil'ic terms about cooperation. I guess
an't know what you mean specifically
cooperation in marketing these com-
dities. Yet we did talk about looking
;he impact of the markets, of the ex-
ts, of the problems we both face. So
tainly in that respect, we're looking
;ooperation. I'm a little concerned
en you say cooperation. If you're talk-
about market sharing, and we really
not going to go out and divide up
markets if that's what you're sug-
ting, but we are going to cooperate
ether to find solutions to some of the
blems that we have the best we can
way.

Mr. Dalsager. Yes, but the answer
already been given in detail on what
do with different products in detail
it has been overall discussion where
have decided to go into a further dis-
5ion after the new year to start to
i up all the problems.

Q. Mr. Shultz, you were Treasury
retary when the Bretton Woods
tem finally was pulled apart. Now
ounds to me as though the new Ad-
listration is — I don't say looking
a new Bretton Woods but at any
!— changing very dramatically its
V about the need for international
peration and linkage of monetary,
le, and financial banking measures,
question for you is whether your
erience in those 10 years has af-
ed your view on how to go about
se things and whether you support
i approach now? And the question
Mr. Regan is what has led to this
nge in the Administration's ap-
ach?

Secretary Shultz. As for me, I try
aarn as I go along, but yet I don't
ndon my old ideas. I'll let Secretary
:an handle where the outlook is.
Secretary Regan. The opinions that
pressed earlier this week are my
1. This is not necessarily an Adminis-
ion position. I have not changed my
lion that there is a need for handling

problems in the international communi-
ty. What I am suggesting is that our ex-
perience of the last few months certainly
has led us to a realization, by those of us
who have had to deal with these on a
daily and sometimes hourly basis, has
led us to the conclusion that there might
be a better way to handle this. Each
case as it has come up now has been
handled in a different fashion. I am sug-
gesting that not only those of us who
have been engaged in this type of
endeavor but also those who have been
observing us do it might have sugges-
tions as to a better way to handle this.
Now I am not suggesting that we
should have some type of international
rescue agency, because I think that
banks have a right to be the victims of
their own folly if, indeed, they have been
foolish. And on the other hand, I think
that every nation that has been prof-
ligate should not be rescued by the inter-
national community. But I think that
when there are emergencies that there
should be some type of apparatus to deal
with that emergency in a better fashion
than we're currently doing it.

Q. You did mention in your brief-
ing or your informal meeting earlier
this week the possibility of some kind
of international federal reserve sys-
tem. How do you see that possibility,
and how does this fit into the picture
of your plans?

Secretary Regan. I would like to
correct an impression you have. I did
not call for an international federal
reserve; I asked a rhetorical question:
What is the bank of last resort behind
the Eurodollar mechanism? Here is a
market with many hundreds of billions
of dollars in it if not a trillion dollars,
yet as far as I know there is no bank of
last resort. I asked that as a rhetorical
question without any answer, nor did I
suggest that there be a federal reserve
for that at the same time. What I was
suggesting was that in the international
markets, change is coming about and
coming about very quickly. Domestically
in the United States, we're finding new
fashions in finance almost every day.
This is coming into the international
markets also, and as things change in
the financial markets and in the
monetary system, I'm suggesting there
is also a need for institutions to modern-
ize and to stay up with these changes.

Q. I understood you to say that
you do not want to have a trade war,
but I don't understand what you said
about dumping butter. Is that some-
thing you are still considering, or have
you decided not to do that now?

Secretary Block. We did not agree
at this meeting today to withhold actions
on the part of the United States or to
take actions. We didn't specify what we
would do. We leave that open. There's
no decision on that at this time.

Q. President Thorn has brought up
the reciprocal efforts to try to
dissipate the agricultural difficulties
between the United States and the
Community. But I have only heard Mr.
Block speak of the efforts that were
contemplated on the European side to
bring domestic prices closer in line
with world prices. I would like to
know what efforts the Americans
themselves are contemplating to
reduce these differences. Would there
be an end to blank credits, the lifting
of sugar import quotas, a self-limita-
tion on corn gluten feed, etc.?

Secretary Block. I think it's impor-
tant that countries around the world be
responsible at a time when we have
large volumes of crops. The United
States today has one-half of the world's
supply of grains. The major effort was
just announced yesterday by the Presi-
dent, and what he announced was that
we will be going forward with a pay-
ment-in-kind program where we will
make grain available to farmers if they
will cut their production. We will take
grain out of government stocks, give it
to farmers if they will cut their produc-
tion of that grain. This will reduce the
stocks in the United States and yet keep
plenty available for export to countries
that are needing the grain.

Furthermore, we are taking the
steps to work with Congress to freeze
our target prices later on, because high
supports encourage excessive produc-
tion. They distort the demand of the
country.

Secondly, in the area of dairy, in 2
years we have frozen prices, and, in-
deed, this year we have cut the price of
dairy — to the dairymen— by one dollar
per hundredweight, which is about an
8% cut. That's a cut, an absolute cut in
money to the farmer. Furthermore, we
have instituted policies this year to ex-
pand our storage. Of course, I have ex-
plained all the storage of grain we have.
We have enormous stocks of grain, and
we have lots of storage, and the govern-
ment has helped to store it. We have
tremendous stocks of dairy products.

These are the efforts we are making
to try and cope with the situation that
we all face in agriculture. These are
large stocks overhanging the markets.
And in the United States, certainly

'uary 1983

EUROPE

anyway, where the price fluctuates with
the worid market, it's a serious problem
for us because prices are very low.

Q. What were the talks about
East-West trade about? What agree-
ments or at least consensus has been
reached here? Was it only about pro-
cedural questions or was it also about
details for the forthcoming negotia-
tion in international bodies?

Secretary Baldrige. We discussed
the initiatives that have already been
started, and some of the cases on the
agreements reached in November on
East- West trade— credit and financial
arrangements— some of that work has
already been done in the OECD, alter-
nate energy sources. There'll be studies
on that; how we integrate overall
economic policy between the West and
the East. The EC has participated
where it has been appropriate in the
past. They have told us they will par-
ticipate where it's appropriate in the
future. For example, in COCOM, that's
not an EC kind of initiative. We're doing
that through other sources: the tighten-
ing of COCOM at the top, the more
technical and sophisticated potential ex-
ports, and the loosening at the bottom
of the kind of exports that aren't really
that strategically important.

Q. Regarding the alliance. I gather
this afternoon you mentioned that one
of your hopes was that the dispute in
agriculture would not spill over and
undermine the alliance. I wonder if
you could expand a bit on the dimen-
sion and the importance of this agree-
ment that we seem to be moving
toward in agriculture as it affects the
alliance on one hand and how it
relates to the East-West issue, or
issues. Are they likely to emerge as
contentious an issue and. if so. how
do you plan to deal with that in the
coming weeks in the transatlantic
relationship?

Secretary Shultz. I don't see that
these issues affect the alliance. The
alliance is strong, and it has its own
bases. The discussions we've had here
and elsewhere on East-West trade seem
to be moving in a positive direction. And
you've heard the report of the discus-
sions we had this afternoon in the field
of agriculture, which have not solved the
problems, but they've set us on the road
to trying to do so. So I think the thing
adds up to a great big plus.

Q. A lot of the issues you've been
discussing here today relate in some
way or other to the problems of mone-
tary instability and high interest

rates. The view on this side of the
Atlantic is that you and the President
have been very slow to wake up to
your international responsibilities
through tolerating an excessive budg-
et deficit and perhaps a rather dubious
monetary and fiscal mix. Have you any
reassuring words to offer today about
your efforts to reduce the budget
deficit, and. in particular, have you
anything reassuring to say about the
future of American interest rates?

Secretary Regan. I deny that either
one of us has been asleep. As far as the
international situation is concerned, you
will recall at the time of Ottawa, at Ver-
sailles, and again at Cancun, we were
asked by the summit participants to do
various things. I think we carried that
out pretty well. We were asked to get
inflation down in the United States.
That was the number one problem that
we had to address as an Administration.
Inflation was causing all kinds of inter-
national problems for our trading part-
ners, for our allies, and the like. I sub-
mit that we have done rather well with
inflation. It was 12V2% when we came
in. This year it looks like it's going to
run somewhere in the neighborhood of
just below 5%.

We were asked later to get our in-
terest rates down, that high interest
rates were the cause of the problem
worldwide. When we took over, interest
rates— prime rate at least— in the
United States were running somewhere
in the neighborhood of 21V2%. Current-
ly, it's at 11 1/2% and, hopefully, on its
way down further. So I think that we've
done rather well there.

The next complaint was that we had
too strong a dollar. First of all it was a
weak dollar in 1980. That was causing
problems. We strengthened the dollar.
And now the complaint is that the dollar
is too strong, and would we mind
weakening the dollar. I submit that over
the past couple of months, the dollar has
been weaker and perhaps will get even
weaker as time goes on.

I think that we have been living up
to our international responsibilities
rather well when you look at the record.
As far as whether or not we— I don't
like to use the word "locomotive"— but
at least can we be the leader in getting
the nations of the world back on the
recovery path from the current reces-
sion that all of us are wallowing in, I
would say that we should have— and
this I told to the participants this after-
noon—a good year next year with real

growth in the United States of some-
where from 3% to 4% and that we were
hopeful that 1984 would be an even bet-
ter year. If that proves to be the corred
scenario, then we think that our trading,
partners will benefit from the recovery '
in the United States.

NEWS CONFERENCE, '

AMSTERDAM, '

DEC. 11, 198211 '

First, I had the great privilege of a '
meeting with the Queen. I came away
with the knowledge that she is not only '■
charming but also very knowledgeable
and interesting; at once regal and very
human. So it was a great privilege for .
me and I appreciate it.

Second, I had the chance to meet
the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Minister, Defense Minister, and others
in the government. We had an intensivi
and wide range of topics that we
discussed from East- West economic rel^
tions, NATO affairs, INF deployments,
Central American questions. Middle
East, and others. It was quite a wide
ranging discussion. It was interesting
and useful for me to hear the viewpoint
that were presented. I hope that just at'
they made a dent on me, perhaps I
made a dent on them. But anyway it
was a very worthwhile visit.

Q. Can you tell us if you received
any assurances from the Dutch of-
ficials you met with as to the eventua
deployment of medium-range nuclear
missiles here in the Netherlands if th
Geneva talks are not successful?

A. Of course, in the NATO com-
munique that was issued yesterday, the
statement was made that all of the
NATO partners agree if there is no
agreement at Geneva there will be the
deployments. The Dutch, as well as
others, made that statement, and the
same comment was volunteered today.

Q. So there has never been any
definite admission that the deploy- '
ment would take place here in the 1
Netherlands? It has been a very |

divisive issue here. Was there any
commitment as to deployment here '
within this country?

A. I understand that the prepara-
tions for deployment go forward, but
you should ask the Dutch authorities
about that. The NATO statement with
the participation of the Dutch in it, and
the complete agreement of everybody, '.^
a matter of common sense understand-
ing. If you need to deploy these weapoi

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

r the sake of common defense in the
st place, and in the second place if you
not deploy them and don't show that
u are truly willing to do so, then there
no negotiation in Geneva possible,
lat's just a matter of common sense.

Q. I understand you have had a
ort pleasant visit. Were there any
ints where you had different points
view — you and the Dutch people
u talked with?

A. Not really. We didn't have any
ijor arguments. I suppose if there is
y difference of view it may be about
Tie aspects of Central America. At the
Tie time, I don't know, had I stayed
re for another 3 days and we really
g in and looked at all the facts, that
■ would wind up with a difference of
:wpoint. I think we all support
mocratic principles.

We all support the importance of
man values. We all support the impor-
ice of economic development and the
.ferment of people's lives. In Central
lerica, we perhaps are a little bit
ser to it, and we do see the threat in-
ved to democratic values, to human
hts, from armaments coming basically
m the Soviet Union through Cuba
i Nicaragua to guerrillas in demo-
tic countries. I think that from what-
!r direction you take it, whether it is

impact on investment, whether it is
uman rights proposition, whether it is
roblem. I would say that when you
< about human rights, guerrilla activi-
that tries to prevent people from
ing, as in El Salvador, is a deep
irivation of human rights. I think that
d of activity, as well as others, should
recognized. I think we all recognize
.t there are very few places in the
rid that you can hold up and say, this
lerfect. 'The question is whether it is
ting better. We think that there are
imples of things getting better,
Tough there are problems without a
ibt.

Q. Did the Dutch Minister share
ar view that Nicaragua is used as a
nsit country for weapons to the
errillas in El Salvador?

A. We talked about it. I think that
s not correct for me to come here and
rt telling you what the Dutch Foreign
nister thinks. You have him here.
'11 tell you what he thinks. I can only
I you what I think.

Q. Could I please finish just one
estion because of technical prob-
ns? There might have been a slight

difference in your meaning and ours
on nuclear weapons— is that right — to
put it mildly?

A. No, I don't think so. Who wants
nuclear weapons? The question is when
you have an adversary that has them
and has them installed and has them
pointing at you, in our own self-defense
you better take note of that. We think,
first of all, be realistic about the world
that you are in. Second of all, be strong
enough to defend yourself. Third, of
course, be willing to talk and negotiate
and discuss and agree to things if the
other party is willing to do so. That is
the stance we have in Geneva.

Q. If we go down a little further
south from Central America, did you
discuss the developments in Suriname?

A. Only a little bit. I think it is an
emerging situation but clearly it's a hor-
ror. We will find out more about it, but
it is clear that there is a terrible act
down here.

Q. Your Administration has a
representation there. Do they have any
indication that there are foreign activ-
ities also in Suriname?

A. I don't want to comment in any
detail. You probably know more about it
than I do. I am told that there is a very
large population here who is from Suri-
name and that there is hardly a family
in Suriname who doesn't have a member
of their family resident here. So you are
very close to that situation here. At any
rate, this is a breaking story, and I am
horrified by what has happened. I do not
want to make a lot of loose statements
about it before I really have had a
chance to dig into it.

Q. Talking about the Middle East,
would you describe the present situa-
tion as a deadlock as far as the
American performance is concerned?

A. No, I wouldn't describe it that
way. It certainly has not moved as
rapidly as we would like to see it and I
think most people would like to see it.
But there has been a lot of motion and
activity on the Mideast peace process
since the President's speech. We are
looking forward to King Hussein's visit
in Washington as an event of great im-
portance and at the same time in
Lebanon where we are having a hard
time getting people talking about the
withdrawal of foreign forces. We do
have some additional thoughts. Phil
Habib and Morris Draper met with the
President and Ken Dam, the Acting
Secretary, yesterday, I think, in
Washington at some length. They will be
returning to the Middle East and

perhaps we will have some thoughts that
can move the situation along.

So there is not as much settled as
we would like, but there is motion. We
continue to work on it. These problems
have been around a while, and we recog-
nize that to get anywhere, we have to be
willing to keep working at it and to have
patience — to have a kind of patient im-
patience, I suppose, is the way to put it,
if we are going to succeed, and we do.

Q. You didn't talk about the position
of the PLO.

A. No I didn't. As far as the PLO is
concerned, as far as I know, they still
have in their constitution that they want
to extinguish Israel. We are willing to
talk with them if they will stand up and
say they recognize the right of Israel to
exist and that Resolution 242 and 338
are a basis for peace in the Middle East.
The United States will talk to them
under those circumstances. I'm not
speaking for Israel.

As far as the peace process is con-
cerned, clearly for King Hussein to
negotiate successfully, there must be
Palestinian representation in the
negotiation. That is recognized in the
Camp David accords and it is explicit in
the Camp David accords. So there will
have to be some Palestinian representa-
tion found, and it remains to be seen
where that will come from.

Q. About the American head-
quarters in Europe, can you give us
some background about the decision
of the U.S. Pentagon about the
replacement of the headquarters from
Germany to Great Britain?

A. That is not correct. The com-
mand of the U.S. Forces in Germany re-
mains there. If in the unlikely and un-
wanted event that there should be a
war, then the command of those forces
would, according to the plan, be residing
in NATO. As I understand what is tak-
ing place, there is a contingent adminis-
trative and planning office being
established that would be activated in
the event of war. The command of the
troops remains where it is. If there were
wartime-type activities, the command of
those troops would go to NATO.

Q. Has this new decision to do
with a change in American strategy?

A. No, I don't think it is a new deci-
sion. There isn't any new decision. The
command structure of the troops re-
mains as it is.

Q. The Pentagon has voted some
million dollars for a (inaudible] to
England.

aruary 1983

EUROPE

A. I was going to make a remark
about a million dollars in the Pentagon
budget. If we had to have an explana-
tion for every million dollars we would
be here all night [laughter].

Q. We have gone through a period
of growing tensions between Europe
and the United States [inaudible]. Do
you think these tensions have lessened
during these last couple of weeks or
months?

A. So far in this trip I have been to
Germany, to Belgium, and here. I have
met with the foreign ministers of the
NATO countries and their staffs and
with the European Commission. I have
found everywhere constructive feeling,
and I felt at the end of the NATO
meeting that I was very much in the
presence of allies and in an alliance — an
allliance for peace, an alliance that
recognizes the importance of strength
and purposefulness. I didn't sense all of
the spirit that I read about.

As far as the meeting with the
European Commission is concerned, I
think it was a very frank and straight-
forward meeting. Our principal dif-
ferences were in the field of farm ex-
ports. We discussed those problems
directly and set up a method of tackling
them. Whether they will be successfully
tackled by the process that has been set
in train remains to be seen. What we
have decided to try to do is identify
operational things that can be done to
lessen the problems and try, in the proc-
ess, to forego philosophic arguments
about whether the cap is a good ar-
rangement or whether U.S. foreign
policy is a good arrangement — get away
from philosophic arguments and start
talking about operational matters.

Q. Could you tell us what your
perception is of the effect that the
current situation of flux in the
Kremlin has on allied cohesion?

A. I had not noticed any particular
situation of flux in the Kremlin. You had
a leader die. A new leader has taken his
place. The new leader has part of the
old leadership and has expressed himself
as very much in favor of continuity.
Maybe there will be some new policies
and a more constructive approach. That
remains to be seen.

Q. Would you favor that the Dutch
continue the participation in the
UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon] forces in Lebanon?

A. Yes of course, I recognize that
there are problems. It will be desirable if
by the time the renewal question comes

up— I think around the 19th of Janu-
ary— that there will be a plan of some
kind, or a course of action identified, by
which foreign forces will get out of
Lebanon and, in that event, a definite
mission defined for UNIFIL. I know
that it tries people's patience now to be
there without having this course of ac-
tion identified.

We appreciate, I think the world ap-
preciates, the willingness of the Dutch to
continue to be a part of UNIFIL. It is
important to have those forces there. I
think everyone who has looked at the
situation recognizes that there needs to
be armed forces to supplement those of
Lebanon when all the foreign forces
withdraw. It is not the easiest thing in
the world to get a peacekeeping force in
being. If there is one there, we would
hope it would stay there. It would be
quite useful and helpful to Lebanon as a
country.

Q. You want the Jordanian King
to enter the peace process. What can
you offer him in return?

A. Peace. Now listen, peace is the
most important thing. Peace with some
justice of course. As the United States
works its problems around the world,
we are trying, and I know you are try-
ing, to find those policies that treat peo-
ple properly and with justice; but also
will bring about peace. Peace is a very
important ingredient everywhere, and I
would say particularly against the
background of the events of Lebanon
and Beirut, which can explode any-
where. Some assurance of peace must be
very valuable to everyone.

Q. But does this mean that you are
convinced of political cooperation of
your friends in Israel?

A. I think that Israel, like other
countries in that region, values peace
tremendously and responds to that in-
centive.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE,

ROME,

DEC. 13, 198212

Secretary Shultz. In keeping with the
courtesy extended to me and my party
throughout this visit, the foreign
minister has invited me to make the first
statement, and I think what I might say
is simply that in the series of meetings I
have had here with Prime Minister
Fanfani, with President Pertini, and
with my friends Foreign Minister Co-
lombo, it has been a very worthwhile
and enlightening day for me.

I know that you would prefer to askj
questions than have me give lectures so
I will simply let it go at that except for
one incident in the discussion with
Prime Minister Fanfani. I told him that
Mr. Colombo was the first foreign
minister to call on me and that he had
taken me under his wing and given me
some instructions. I said that he had
also told me the tricks of the trade, and
Mr. Fanfani thought about that for a
minute and said, "I hope he didn't tell
you all of them."

Foreign Minister Colombo. First c
all, I would like to take this opportunitj
to once again convey words of welcome
and greeting on my own behalf and on
behalf of the Italian Government to
Secretary of State Shultz. I would also
like to say that this day of talks has
been a very intense and a very fruitful
one. I could add at this point fruitful as
always in all the talks that I have had
the pleasure of having with Secretary c
State Shultz since he came into office.
Our talks have covered a wide range of
problems starting with East- West rela-
tions, especially in view of the recent
evolution of our policy vis-a-vis the
Eastern countries. We have exchanged
our views on the Polish situation; we
have discussed the INF and the START
negotiations; we have discussed the Mi(
die East, both Lebanon and the genera
negotiations as a whole; we have had
discussions on international terrorism
and also a discussion on bilateral prob-
lems, a discussion which we will be abl<
to continue this evening.

Q. My question is in regard to
Poland; the announcement by Genera
Jaruzelski. Does the United States at
this point regard those announcemen
as cosmetic?

Secretary Shultz. I think the
general answer is that we are looking
closely at what has been said, that we
are consulting with our allies, but in a
preliminary way. What we have seen sc
far are some words but nothing of
substance has actually been done. But
we will continue to observe the situatio
and consult— it is hard to say at this
point. We do not see that there is
anything that substantial as to cause us
to think a major change has taken plac'
There may have been some developmer
during the day of which I am not awan
because I have been in one meeting
after another, but I think that the
minister and I discussed this, and we
basically see this the same way.

Q. With respect to your conversa-
tions on the antiterrorism problems,

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

ould you tell us how much concern
here is in your country with respect
0 the investigation of the assassina-
ion attempt on the Pope and links or
ttempts to link it to Bulgarians?

Foreign Minister Colombo. We are
jllowing with great concern the evolu-
lon of this situation. The data that we

0 have at the moment is not complete
nd not everything has been confirmed.
Ve will give a political assessment when
11 the necessary data has been collected
nd, most of all, confirmed. Of course,

'6 consider the situation to be a very
3rious one, and if the data that will be
Dllected will correspond to what is
ssumed at the moment, Italy will
?flect very seriously on the conclusions
) be drawn. And just as today we have
iscussed this problem with Secretary
hultz, so in the same manner, if this
ata is confirmed and also if this data is
n a broader basis than what it is at the
loment, we will also inform and speak
oout this to our NATO allies.

Q. What can you tell us from your
isit with the Pope; what his feeling

1 about what's happening in Poland;
ow does he feel about events there
ow?

Secretary Shultz. I don't think it is
Dpropriate for me to comment on
lings that the Pope may have told me
jout Poland beyond saying that he is
jviously following the matter very
osely, and we did talk about it. I did
lise with Cardinal Casaroli — I asked
m what he thought about it and he
lid, "Well, you must talk with our resi-
;nt expert." So certainly His Holiness'
, ews are ones we all are very interested
1 , but I don't think it is appropriate for
e to quote him.

Q. You mentioned that, on the sub-
ct of the Bulgarian investigation,
)u were going to consult with your
ATO allies. Does that suggest that
)u think there might be a link with
le Soviet Union?

Foreign Minister Colombo. First of
1, this information would only take
ace if the data collected would prove
lis information to be necessary, and
^cond, what you say is not necessarily
) because if there is one problem that
Dncerns one of the countries of the
'arsaw Pact, therefore, we would
scuss this at NATO as we have always
scussed this type of thing: that is a col-
boration within NATO to fight against
rrorism. If I may express myself free-
, I don't feel that you can draw the
inclusions in the direction you seem to
i going.

Q. Today in your talks with
various representatives of the Italian
Government, have you also discussed
the problem of an eventual crisis in
the Persian Gulf and what the Italian
contribution could be to such a crisis,
bearing in mind that this crisis in the
Persian Gulf would be a threat for the
security of NATO?

Secretary Shultz. We discussed
Middle East developments — Lebanon,
West Bank-Gaza issues, and matters of
that kind. We did not discuss the gulf
area as such, so I can't say that we had
any discussions on that point.

I would add more generally, how-
ever, that I did say to each of the Italian
Government officials I talked to that the
contributions of Italy to peace in the
world, to constructive behavior, for ex-
ample in the Sinai, for example in the
multinational force in Lebanon, in its
determination to deploy the INF
weapons, to support the negotiations in
Geneva, and in many, many respects all
the way through, Italy has been a great
friend and ally, and we welcome this
behavior on the part of Italy very warm-
ly and applaud it.

Q. If evidence were to bear out
some of the speculation concerning
the Bulgarian connection, what im-
plications would you derive from this
with regard to the future of the East-
West dialogue?

Secretary Shultz. I don't think it is
well to speculate excessively on this, and
I would only echo what Foreign Minister
Colombo has just said; that it is a
serious investigation with important im-
plications and we'll await the develop-
ments of the investigation. The Govern-
ment of Italy has said that it will keep
us informed. We'll rest at that.

Q. Was the question of the
Siberian gas pipeline addressed in the
course of the discussions? Could you
give us an indication as to whether, in
the event that evidence were to throw
further conclusive light on the
Bulgarian connection, would this tend
to slow matters down also with
regard to the issue of the Siberian
pipeline?

Secretary Shultz. We didn't discuss
that subject. We did, however, discuss
the subject of East- West economic rela-
tionships and the desirability of finding
together a firm strategy for conducting
those relationships and a method of con-
sulting about that strategy. Those of you
who were at the NATO ministerial
meeting remember that we did agree
there to energize the OECD and

COCOM and in various respects
stimulate a variety of studies and ac-
tivities. Minister Colombo and I, in our
discussion, agreed that it would be
desirable to have some overall strategic
umbrella, you might say, over these in-
dividual activities. And, in one way or
another, we are both determined to find
our way to the answer of how to con-
struct that; we haven't got the answer
yet.

Foreign Minister Colombo. I con-
firm that we have not discussed the
problem of the Siberian pipeline, and I
confirm that we have discussed an East-
West strategy, especially the problem of
security for the Western world which in-
cludes also economic behavior and con-
duct vis-a-vis Eastern countries. This
coordination will take place in studies
that are going to be carried out in the
appropriation fora such as OECD and
COCOM. Then, once these studies are
made, there will be coordination which
will bring about a coordinated policy.

Q. Can you give us any details on
your meeting with [Egyptian] Presi-
dent Mubarak; if you talked about an
eventual formula toward retiring
foreign troops from Lebanon?

Secretary Shultz. My meeting with
President Mubarak was brief. We con-
centrated on his coming visit to
Washington. Beyond that, however, ob-
viously he and we are both vitally in-
terested in developments in Lebanon
and in the Middle East peace process
generally. We discussed those and
shared ideas about them and shared an
impatience to see the situation get mov-
ing. I think he welcomes the return of
Phil Habib and Morris Draper to the
area.

DINNER TOAST.

ROME,

DEC. 13, 198213

Mr. Minister: I am delighted to respond
to your kind words and even more
delighted to be here with you today in
Rome. You were the first of my col-
leagues with whom I met upon becoming
Secretary of State. I remember still
your wise counsel and warm support.
We began then a memorable acquain-
tanceship, which has since grown to a
true friendship.

It is thus with particular pleasure
that I today return your visit and pay
my own first visit, as Secretary of State,
to a nation and to a city which stands at
the center of the Western world. Geo-
graphically, historically, spirtually, all

3bruary 1983

EUROPE

roads lead to Rome. This is as true to-
day as it was 2,000 years ago. As this
city was the center of the ancient world,
and classical Rome and Renaissance
Italy are central to our common civiliza-
tion, so when visiting St. Peter's yester-
day, I was reminded that Rome remains
at the center of the spiritual life for
much of mankind.

Italy also remains at the heart of
Europe and at the strategic center of
the Mediterranean. Touching the spine
of Europe on the north, acting as a
bridge toward Africa and the Middle
East, Italy has also become a pivotal
force in political and economic relations
between East and West.

Italy has, thus, played a leading role
in the creation of a more united Europe,
a process the United States continues to
support strongly. The cooperation be-
tween our two countries in Lebanon is
but the latest evidence of the construc-
tive role which Italy, as a great Mediter-
ranean as well as great European
power, is playing throughout that
region. In recent months, Italy has made
a critically important contribution to the
evolution of a more coherent Western
strategy toward economic relations with
the East. As a country vital to the
trading system of the West, yet with a
keen perception of the East, Italy will
continue to offer valuable counsel and
collaboration as we develop that
strategy.

The greatest challenge before us to-
day, as you and I discussed with our
NATO colleagues in Brussels last week,
is the protection of the values which our
Western nations share. We must under-
stand the vitality and wealth of these
values — freedom, democracy, respect
for the individual — and how terribly
vulnerable they are in this world. Pro-
tection means strength, not only military
strength but strength of conviction and
strength of purpose. It is from this posi-
tion that we are able to tell our adver-
saries that the West is prepared to
negotiate differences on the basis of
mutual restraint and responsible interna-
tional behavior.

To preserve our strength requires
resolution and imagination. No Western
nation has displayed these qualities more
boldy and wisely than Italy.

I ask you all, therefore, to drink to
this friendship between our two coun-
tries which is displayed wherever in the
world Western interests are at stake. It
is a friendship America has learned to
value. It is friendship upon which the
Western world depends.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE.

PARIS,

DEC. 14, 1982'^

Q. We are frankly a little puzzled as
to why, at the last moment, this in-
vitation has been extended to us. We
have the suspicion that on the basis of
the Secretary's news conference today,
and because there have been reports
of a lot of negative vibrations insofar
as relations between the United States
and France are concerned, we have
been summoned here to give you both
an opportunity to correct that impres-
sion.

Secretary Shultz. When I arrived
here, Claude suggested that there were
a few French journalists around that he
would like to invite for a little discussion
after dinner. And I said that would be
very agreeable with me but there were a
number of extraordinarily talented jour-
nalists traveling around, and that I
thought that in all fairness to them they
should be invited too. He said, of course,
so we called up and invited them. I can't
imagine why we get all these negative
vibes. But I think it may be since my
news conference came in a sense in the
middle of the day, although I think that
the most important meeting I had which
was of course with President Mitterrand
had taken place. We can bring out a few
more things here so you might ask
another question.

Q. Could you be more specific in
these studies? You refer to OECD and
COCOM. Has it been expanded in any
way? Are you any closer to the um-
brella approach you were talking
about earlier on this trip?

Secretary Shultz. Let me say ex-
actly where all these matters stand.
There is a series of activities or studies
that are underway or about to get
underway that are specific to different
subjects and I'll identify them.

First, and I think perhaps the most
important, is the effort within COCOM
to strengthen it in all of its various
dimensions. And there is a group that
has been working on that with greater
intensity now for a few months.

Second, we agreed that there are
other types of high technology, including
possibly in oil and gas technology which
may, while not being directly military in
their application, nevertheless have a
relationship to security issues because of
their strategic nature. And we agree
that our people engaged in the COCOM
exercise should also examine this class

of technology and give us their advice
and move on and do whatever we think
is appropriate in that area.

Third, there was called for at Ver-
sailles the establishment of a way of j
keeping track of the financial and trade I
flows between the Soviet bloc and the
West just as a matter of information so
that we had a better information base
for any activity, and this we hope to get
going in the OECD as had been agreed.
We should get that off the ground
promptly. We will energize the OECD o
request the OECD to do that.

Fourth, there is agreement that we
should conduct a study about energy
alternatives in Europe, but not only in
Europe but for the United States and
Japan. We are looking at supply and de
mand to see just where we stand and
where we might go and what would
make sense and what would constitute
in an East- West sense any potential
problem or threat to us and how to dea
with it. So that study will be gotten off
the ground and our intention — this was
agreed to in NATO, for example — is to
ask the OECD to undertake this effort,
and they may properly want to use in-
formation or resources in the IE A or it
also the case that the governments havi
all done an extensive amount of work o
this subject. The EC Commission has
done a lot of work on this so it will be
readily possible to put this together.

And finally, we agreed that in view
of the fact that we are all spending a Ic
of money and resources — we can argue
enough about whether it is enough or
not, but in any case — on our defense ef
fort and that we are doing this princips
ly for the reason that the Soviet Union
is putting so much effort into this field
and that constitutes a threat to us, thai
under those circumstances, we shouldn'
make, in a sense, gifts of resources to
them. Now we will energize the group
that studies this general subject in the
OECD to tackle it, recognizing that the
subject is an exceedingly complicated
one. It has lots of angles to it. It is by
no means enough to say that we would
agree on some rate of interest to
charge. That is the tip of the iceberg yc
might say. So this is a subject that is
very complicated, and it deserves a lot
of attention and study.

All those things we have discussed
before, and we have discussed them to-
day. While no one can be sure where w
come out on them, we go into them in
good faith and seeing them as related t
the basic security concerns that we |l
have. rl

Finally, we have talked before in

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

arious fora, including in the NATO
leeting and various NATO meetings,
Dout the importance of adequate con-
iltation and coordination among
wereign countries about their overall
Djectives and strategies in this area of
ast-West trade insofar as security con-
;rns are related to it. And we agree
lat it is desirable to make such an ef-
irt. It is desirable to have an effective
ittern of consultation and that con-
iltation among sovereign countries will
ork better if we have some set of ob-
ctives against which to hold our discus-
ons and have some understood way or
ittern in which the consultations are
jing to take place. Because we all
;cognize that there is lots of conversa-
on, but how purposeful — that is the
sue. This is designed to make it more
arposeful.

In our conversations today we talked
)0ut various possible ways to ac-
)mp]ish this objective and places to put
and I think it is fair to say, Claude,
lat it was our general view — certainly
resident Mitterrand seemed to feel that
lis was the best view — in the light of
,e fact that what we are talking about
;re is essentially a security-type issue
at the best place to conduct this study
probably in NATO. And we will have
consult with our allies, of course, and
;velop the more precise contours of
hat this study would be. But we have
jreed that we will raise this together
id see if NATO would not be the vehi-
e for the conduct of this study.

I think we have to recognize as
iell — and here it is a little difficult to
' range anything these days because
)U have to describe it constantly before
is all arranged. But in order for this
be effective, you have to find a way
, associate Japan in the effort. And so
e will be in touch with the Japanese
id we will be in touch with our allies
id we will see if there is some way we
.n accomplish that and there are
irious possibilities. But at any rate
ose are the objectives we have in
ind. And I think they are good objec-
/es and that the pattern that was iden-
ried in our discussions, particularly
ith President Mitterrand, ought to be
lite workable.

Foreign Minister Cheysson. A
imber of studies are in course. They
ill be expedited. Other studies are
;eded. Instructions will be given by
'ery government to its delegation in
le appropriate body in order that it
lould be started immediately. George
lultz gave the list of such studies.

One point which we noted and which

we have not recalled now. is that we
happen to have a number of political
meetings where policy matters could be
considered at the end of May and the
beginning of June — OECD ministerial
meeting, Williamsburg summit of the in-
dustrialized countries, and finally the
Atlantic Council meeting in Paris. So we
think that governments should be in
possession of the first conclusions of all
these studies before that set of meetings
in order that they can then discuss be-
tween them.

Conclusions of the studies will be
sent to each government. Some of them
will bear on matters which concern
security and this will fall under the con-
straints of NATO, COCOM, or what.
Other conclusions will be sent to govern-
ments which will use them within their
own policies but seeing, of course, that
such policies be for each government
coherent and compatible with the securi-
ty concerns that fall under a number of
bodies.

Where can consultations take place
then between the governments on the
matters that concern security? NATO,
but for one point, which is that Japan is
not a member of NATO and cannot be
associated with NATO. That is a diffi-
culty. On the matters that fall outside
the main security concerns, we shall
have to consult when there is an occa-
sion; when there is a political meeting at
the very top or at ministerial level. This
is not to deny in any manner anything
that George has said but to add a few
points and particularly the fact that we
have noted this convergence of meetings
at the end of May and beginning of
June.

Q. What will the study in NATO
be about? Will it be to pull them all
together? Or will it be on military
spending?

Secretary Shultz. It is as I would
see it to set out our objectives as we
seem to get some way of collaborating
more effectively on East- West trade and
financial arrangements; to set out our
objectives as they relate to security, our
strategy. What that entails is to have
some criteria and to examine a variety
of fields— some of which are already
identified in the ongoing studies but may
benefit from looking at them in their
relationship to each other so that we
have a kind of strategic effort here
against which to look at individual
events that come along and broad pro-
posals that may come along.

Q. Is this the institutional frame-
work in which the organic or global
study of East-West trade will be car-
ried out?

Secretary Shultz. I would prefer
not to use words like "organic" or
"global." They seem to be words that are
difficult, but I would just say that it is
an effort to identify by strategic objec-
tives to see what we are trying to ac-
complish, to separate that from things
that we are not trying to accomplish
here. After all this has to do with
security-related things, and most trade
with the Soviet bloc does not have
directly to do with security things so it's
not going to do everything. We are just
looking at certain things, and we need a
strategy to help us coordinate ourselves
with respect to that.

Foreig^n Minister Cheysson. There
is one thing which has been forgotten by
both of us which is not that important,
but still, the economic committee or the
economic secretariat of NATO has
undertaken a number of studies over the
last few years, and we have requested
them to carry on such studies. They
bear on the economic situation in the
Eastern bloc. And this would be part of
the data and information that would be
needed and used by every one of our
governments.

On the main point, 1 agree with
what George Shultz said. NATO is a
proper place to consider, to coordinate
action for any matter, including eco-
nomic subjects, insofar as they concern
security. The only difficulty there is that
Japan is not a member of NATO, and
we will have to find a way to see that
the Japanese also take their share of
responsibility. After all, they are pro-
tected by our security system, although
they are not in NATO. They are in-
directly protected by the very existence
of NATO in its zone of competence so
they must be associated some way with
the conclusions that will be drawn that
concerns security. Because I repeat
NATO is competent for us only as far as
it concerns security.

Q. If it succeeds, won't the result
of this study be to slow down East-
West exchanges?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. As far

as we are concerned, we agree with
these restrictions in trade with the East
if their effect is to reenforce the military
potential of trade in the East. Insofar as
it concerns security, one more point; but
if we consider the evolution of ex-
changes in the past 2 years, we see that
they decreased very rapidly with the ex-
ception of trade with the United States,

-bruary 1983

EUROPE

and they have decreased with Western
Europe for reasons which have nothing
to do with security but only due to the
lack of monetary credibility of the
Eastern bloc.

Secretary Shultz. I would add one
point on this question of "if you have
some procedure doesn't that slow every-
thing down?" It does introduce an ele-
ment of consultation. However, I think
it is likely that the consultation will be
fruitful and in the end make the whole
process more decisive and with a
greater sense of unity behind it. And I
would say beyond that that one of the
things that we seek in the COCOM proc-
ess is to strengthen its administrative
capacity a bit so that it is possible for
things to be handled more decisively and
expeditiously rather than just sort of
drag on forever as they had tended to
do sometimes as I understand it.

Foreign Minister Cheysson. We
agree completely with that.

Q. First, what is your view about
the future flow of credits to the
Soviet Union? Secondly, what is your
view about future purchases of natural
gas from the Soviet Union?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. With
regard to the flow of credits, there has
been no progress in our discussions since
Versailles. In other words, we are exact-
ly where we were when we left Ver-
sailles.

This being said, I'm afraid that since
Versailles, we noted that the flow of
credits was keeping on the decline for
the reasons I have already said. Banks
are less tempted to open credits to
Eastern Europe just now than they
were 6 months ago, and they were less
tempted 6 months ago than they were
12 months ago. When you see the state
of the balance of payments of Hungary,
of Poland, of Romania, and even of the
Soviet Union, banks are less inclined to
open credits. We should not forget that
most of the credits which have been
opened to support trade to the Soviet
Union and to their partners have been
private banking credits. The flow of
credits has been on the decline and still
is.

With regard to gas, we consider that
no one has any right to impose any con-
straints to any one of our countries with
regard to our supplies of energy. We are
quite ready to answer questions, to ex-
plain why and how we limit the
dependence resulting from gas pur-
chases, but we feel free to buy gas or to
buy any other form of energy from

wherever we find it fit. Dependence in
the case of France. We consider that our
present contracts with the Soviet Union
represent a very limited dependence in
proportion to our total energy sup-
ply— 5% in toto — this being covered,
compensated by the constraints that
have been imposed on some of our
buyers of gas in France itself, i.e., that
they can shift from gas to fuel any time
the gas supply will be cut. But this is
our problem — our domestic problem, our
own policy. What we have said and what
we are ready to state again is that it is
not our intention to open any new
negotiation for gas purchases from the
Soviet Union for the time being. But
this is our decision; it could be amended
if we thought it proper. We don't see
why we would enter into such negotia-
tions in the months and even years to
come. But, again, this is a decision that
we have taken which is our own uni-
lateral decision. It doesn't result from
any commitment to any one.

Q. Is 5% a self-imposed ceiling?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. It's a
kind of proportion which we found
reasonable. It goes a little beyond that.
I'm not going to enter into technicalities.
But the number of industries that can
undertake to shift from gas to fuel over-
night, if need be, is limited.

Q. Isn't it the thought, for exam-
ple, that France will increase its gas
imports from the Soviet Union only to
the extent that it reduces other energy
imports from the Soviet Union?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. As you
know we did import over the last few
years, I think it was 1.5 million tons of
crude oil from the Soviet Union, and it
has always been the intention of the
French administration, even before we
came to office, that this would pro-
gressively be cut. All the more, as it is
not sure that the Soviets would be in a
position to provide oil in a few years
from now. Half the total of our supplies
from hydrocarbons — oil plus gas — com-
ing from the Soviet Union is, in fact,
limited to 5%. I told you in addition this
5% is quite reasonable due to technical
constraints.

Q. You have spoken of 1983 as the
most difficult year since the war.
Have you discussed this today? Do you
feel any better?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. Oh cer-
tainly not. Despite my great pleasure to
meet my friend, George Shultz, he has
not relieved my concerns about 1983. I
don't think I put it that way to the

Secretary of State in the course of the
day so I have to tell him that the two
reasons why I consider 1983 will be the
most difficult year we have known sinci
World War II is: (1) when the Decembe
1979 two-fold decision of NATO will
have to be implemented which means
either the negotiations in Geneva will
succeed or the missiles should be in-
stalled. This is the first reason why it
will be a very difficult year. There is lit
tie doubt that the Soviets will have tha
very much in mind and will make everj
effort to try and prevent this installatic
of Pershings and cruise missiles. Will
you be ready to pay for that noninstall;
tion by a success in the negotiations in
Geneva? This is our hope, but, if not, v.
repeated it in Brussels in the last few i
days, then the missiles must be installe
as provided for.

The second reason is that I conside
and I am not the only one, that the
world economic situation has come to ii :
worse possible situation. Purchasing
power, facilities for investment, the
market is being reduced in all parts of
the world, especially in the Third Worl( :
which after all was a support for the
recovery which took place after the firs
oil crisis. We do not see where the ligh'
can come from. Therefore, we consider
1983 will be extremely difficult in
economic terms. Have we reached the ,
threshold beyond which unemployment
might become an explosive subject? No '
one knows. We hope not. But the
growth of unemployment is still going.
1983 will be, in the economic field, the
most difficult year we have known unti
then.

Q. How committed is the French
Government to President Reagan's
zero option? Have you discussed the
possibility of a compromise with the
Secretary?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. I can
answer the first part of the question.
The second I leave it to George. The
first part of the question — we are not i
that negotiation. We rely completely or
our American friends to try to achieve
success there. We support their position
Their position is option zero. We suppo:
option zero. Of course, if we think of '
possible developments, we can't exclude
that in the course of the negotiation,
there might be slight changes. But a
position taken in that negotiation is op-i
tion zero — we support that position.
Now was it discussed between the Pres'
dent and Mr. Shultz, I don't know. We '■
did not discuss it together.

Q. Do you believe that the Soviet!
can or should have the right to

Department of State Bulleti

EUROPE

igotiate on the basis of the French
• British nuclear capability?
Foreign Minister Cheysson. We

ive never accepted that our own
iclear potential be taken into account,
nd we haven't changed our mind.

Secretary Shultz. We didn't discuss
ly alternatives to the zero option. I
ink the name Kraft was mentioned
ice. Our position is that the zero-zero
iproach is the best approach. It's very
■sirable to eliminate entirely that class
missiles from the European soil, and
3 think that is a good position. And I
in't have any further comments beyond
lat I made this afternoon on alter-
ttive proposals.

Q. Is there any chance the Soviets
luld accept option zero?

Secretary Shultz. Certainly. It's a
lod, sensible option. It has many at-
ibutes such as, in addition to the ob-
Dus merit of eliminating a very
reatening form of weaponry, that it is
sier than any other option you can
ink of to verify, keep track of, so it
.s a lot of attributes and there is a
■nuine interest in reductions. This is
rtainly a reduction. I think it's worth
ntinuing to advocate it.

Q. Returning to the studies— the
cisions based on the studies will be
ide by the individual governments,
that correct? Secondly, at Ver-
illes, a pledge was made that no
ivernment would undertake com-
itments that would undercut other
ivernments. Does that pledge still
.Id?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. On
ur first question, no, it is not correct
say that decisions will be entirely left
the individual governments when
curity is concerned. Insofar as it con-
rns security, we, and I understand
ery other ally in the Altantic alliance,
cept the restraints resulting from the
eaty of Washington and from the
3COM arrangements which are all the
ne being energized, being put up to
.te. Yes, your interpretation is correct
len the decisions bear on matters
[|iich do not concern security. They
l|3u!d consider that every government is
jge of its choice and decision. Still, even
such cases, we think it's the duty of
•ery government to see that such deci-
3ns that they take in their sovereign
jht be compatible with the undertak-
gs, with the commitments into which
ey have entered under the security ar-
.ngements. We can't have a policy in
■rtain fields which would be completely
compatible with the commitments
ider NATO.

Q. If differences arise among the
allies over whether a particular action
affects security, who will resolve that
difference?

Foreign Minister Cheysson.
Dialogue is the answer. We are not go-
ing to set up a court to decide that
George Shultz is right when he says that
potatoes are a strategic product because
staff soliders in tanks eat potatoes, and
if I say to the contrary, you see. We are
not going to set up a court between us.

Q. Suppose the French enter a
study group. Is there a commitment at
the outset that each government will
respect the outcome? Don't you leave
plenty of room for escape in the im-
plementation?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. I leave
it to George Shultz to answer for the
United States. As far as we are con-
cerned, I'd say that when it falls under
COCOM, if a conclusion is reached in
COCOM unanimously, this is the ruling
in COCOM, then it is binding. If a con-
clusion is reached in a study group in
OECD, normally, it is not binding, but
the governments can turn it into some-
thing binding. That is exactly what hap-
pened with the "consensus." At the time
when the so-called consensus was con-
sidered in committees, in meetings in
OECD, OECD had no right to decide.
The consensus then had to be adopted
by all governments, which it was. It was
automatically adopted because it had
been recommended by a study group.
When in COCOM, if the governments
sitting in COCOM decide that such a
product should be added to the list, then
it becomes binding. That's what hap-
pened on a number of exports of tech-
nologies and what happened during the
last few years.

Q. Do you have a sense of what
percentage of decisions fall under
COCOM and what under OECD?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. Oh no.

No idea.

Secretary Shultz. Relatively speak-
ing, I think it's fair to say that if you
take total trade and then you say what
proportion of that would be classified as
having a security component to it, that
the proportion would be probably
relatively small. But, of course, to a
degree, this is to some extent prejudg-
ing what results may emerge from the
considerations that will be undertaken
here. But I think in answer to your
question that a government — certainly
the U.S. Government— that started on a
study saying whatever the outcome of
the majority vote in the study may be,

we'll be committed by it, governments
don't go about it that way. They under-
take, in good faith, to work on a subject
together and when a consensus is
reached, a general opinion is reached. If
a government then undertakes as its
policy to do thus and so with respect to
that outcome, it will stick by it and be
faithful to its commitments.

Q. Mr. Cheysson has made clear
where France stands on credits and
energy. What is the direction of your
thinking on flows of credit and
energy? What would you like to see
the studies accomplish?

Secretary Shultz. The object, as I
see it, is to avoid giving them the means
to build up their defense capabilities.
Because of what the Soviet Union is do-
ing, it makes no sense for us to give
them resources. When you say how do
you avoid that, what constitutes giving
of resources — I'm trying to stay away
from the word "subsidize" because I find
it is a word that has very special mean-
ings, but in the United States it is the
kind of word I would use, but I'm not
using it here because it has its own
meaning here. But, to express the idea
generally, now if that's what you are
trying to do to avoid that, then you are
undertaking something that is quite
complicated, and I think there is a
tendency and our French friends have
brought this out to say all right, we've
agreed on an interest rate, that's the
policy.

If you think about it at all carefully,
and if you have been involved in
business deals, you recognize that that's
one part of the price. There are many
other dimensions. It's a complicated sub-
ject, and, so at least as I see it, we will
energize this study to confront the true
complexity of this issue and try to disen-
tangle it, and I don't know what the
answer is at the start of the study. I do
know that it is a doggone difficult sub-
ject, having struggled with it myself,
both as a bidder on major items and as a
government person before this in the
Treasury struggling with the credit issue
on such.

But I think the way in which this is
being conceived of as broader than just
an interest rate is the right way to con-
ceive of it. It's a more accurate way. It
makes contact with the subject. So that's
about what I can say on it.

On the general subject of energy, I
don't have anything to add to what
Claude has already said. I think it is
generally the case just as he said France
does not have an intention of signing

bruary 1983

EUROPE

new gas contracts right now. That's its
own decision made for good and suffi-
cient reasons. My impression is that it is
also the case among other countries.

In the meantime, however, we will
make a comprehensive examination of
alternative supplies and what demands
may be and what makes sense and how
the kind of hedges that Claude has
described, of capacity to switch from
one fuel to another can be built into the
system. We will have to see what out-
come we get from that. Whether or not
Norwegian gas plays a part in this, I
don't know the answer to that. If I knew
the answer, we wouldn't have to make
the study. But it is certainly a major
potential source, so it's one of the
things, I presume, will get a lot of atten-
tion by the people conducting the study.

Foreigfn Minister Cheysson. You
used a word a little earlier, an expres-
sion, which I think is very important in
the relations between allies — good faith
and I'll take this problem of energy.

For the time being, we do not con-
sider that we need more gas than we
have contracted for. Maybe, if there
were a relance, new economic growth,
that tomorrow we would need more
energy imports. Then I think it is more
useful that as a result of the study in
OECD, as a result of our direct con-
tacts, we should tell our partners: look
we, the Germans, British, Italians, any
one of us, needs that additional amount
of equivalent oil supply. Where are we
going to find it? And then I suppose that
in good faith we can together discuss
where that energy can come from. We
will see what we can do on the domestic
plane, and, as you know, the French
have been pretty good at that with the
development of their nuclear production.
What we can't do with our domestic
facilities, and what we have to import
and we'll see where it has to come from
and in what form. It may result by that
time that if there is good faith that we
find a better solution than importing
more gas, than importing more energy
from the Soviet Union. This will be seen
at the time, and if it is seen in good
faith, I'm quite sure that it will result in-
to a contract, into an additional supply
that will be considered as reasonable by
everyone. But you can't say in advance.

Secretary Shultz. Recognizing that
it is understandable that the questions
here tonight would concentrate on East-
West economic matters, I'd like to stress
again that the relationship between
France and the United States covers a
wide array of subjects and geographical

concerns that we have in common. And
that, as we discuss all of these things,
our relationship is deepened and
strengthened. And this East- West
economic matter is an aspect of it. But
there are many others, and they are
very important. We have touched on a
few tonight, but not many.

I just wanted to make that remark
so that the full context of these discus-
sions is seen. And I do think on the
East-West economic matters now we
have a good understanding, and we will
be able to proceed in one way or another
and collaborate in good faith as Claude
says.

Q. What is the true value of a
study group which reaches conclusions
but leaves loopholes to governments to
say "it's not for me?"

Foreigfn Minister Cheysson. This is
the rule of the game. We're all allies but
none of us can dictate to the others.
And we certainly do not accept a
machinery that would be in a position to
make decisions superseding those of na-
tional governments unless it comes
under security matters which fall within
the purview of NATO or within the con-
straints accepted under COCOM.

Q. But the Secretary has indicated
that security represents a very small
percentage of these decisions.

Foreign Minister Cheysson. It isn't
a question of percentage. We haven't
touched agricultural products. They
represent a very large part of the pres-
ent trade. As a matter of fact, it is the
United States which now has a very
large trade with the Soviet Union to sell
agricultural products for something like
90% of your total exports. It is a ques-
tion of dealing with those products, with
those technologies which may
strengthen the military potential of the
Eastern bloc. There we accept the
restraints. For the rest we exchange
views.

Secretary Shultz. You wouldn't ac-
cept going into a study of something and
say going in before I know anything
about what's going to come out of it,
bind my sovereign nation; no country
would do that. However, when you get
to the end of the study, and if it is
generally agreed that here is something
that is desirable, individual countries
may decide in their security interests,
yes, we want to make a mutual under-
taking to act in such and such a way.
And that's what you get out of examin-
ing the situation and seeing where you
want to go.

Q. It's still not clear to me
whether France is ready to participate |
in this effort to establish an East-
West trade strategy.

Secretary Shultz. If it isn't clear to
you by now, it's never going to be clear
to you. How many times does he have to ,
say it?

Q. How are you going to explain
these studies to the Soviets? Won't
they take offense?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. If they
take offense, it's their affair.

STATEMENT AT CSCE,

MADRID,

DEC. 16, 1982»5

I am delighted to be here this morning
at the site of the CSCE [Conference on '
Security and Cooperation in Europe]
review meeting, so ably hosted by the
Government and people of Spain.

As you know, I have just met with
Ambassador Kampelman [head of the
U.S. delegation] and his NATO col-
leagues. I was greatly impressed by
their spirit of cooperation and their
dedication to strengthening the CSCE
process. Through our mutual efforts to
insure that the promise of the Helsinki
Final Act is fulfilled in practical ways, j
we are advancing a process that can .
reduce divisions and improve the human
condition in Europe.

Unfortunately, not all of the 35
signatory states have taken the com
mitments we freely entered into at
Helsinki with equal seriousness. In
Afghanistan, in Poland, and in the
Soviet Union, the obligations undertaken
in 1975 are being flouted, with grave
cost to human life and human dignity.

For the Helsinki Final Act to be a
living document, it must be honored by
deeds, not just words. This does not
mean that we expect the Eastern coun-
tries to be like us; but we do expect a
sincere effort to abide by commitments
freely made— to refrain from the use of
threat of force, to honor the right of
peoples to self-determination, to respect
the dignity and fundamental human
rights of individuals at home and
abroad.

Events in Poland over the past year'
strike at the heart of the CSCE process'
It was for that reason that Western
foreign ministers came to Madrid last
February to stand up for the people of
Poland and in defense of the Helsinki
Final Act. As free nations, we cannot

Department of State Bulletii

EUROPE

•n our backs on the Polish people's
uggle to realize the promise of
ilsinki.

We want the Madrid meeting to
engthen CSCE. We seek agreement
a full concluding document which
iuld embody balanced progress on
man rights and security issues, in-
ding the mandate for a European
purity conference. But failure to honor
isting CSCE undertakings is an
stacle to such an outcome. Therefore,

have jointly sponsored new proposals
ich address these failures. Our pro-
sals — on such issues as labor rights,
edom of religion, and Helsinki
mitors — extend the provisions of the
lal Act and make the requirements

compliance unmistakably clear.

In making these proposals, we re-
in mindful that the Helsinki process
nore than mere words. The actions of
/ernments are what determine
ether that process will flourish or
her away. Here today, I can tell you
.t the United States pledges to sup-
•t and promote the standards of
Isinki vigilantly. No state which seeks
■ goals of peace and stability in
rope can fail to do the same.

WS CONFERENCE,

iDRID,

C. 16, 198216

isident Reagan asked that I come to
lin as one means of expressing his
iport and the support of the U.S.
/ernment for the democratic values
[evident in the last Spanish election,
my visit here with each person that 1
ike with, the support for those values
3 manifest. It also came through very
Dngly to me the respect and affection
Afhich the king is held and the realiza-
1 of the strong role that he has
yed personally in the development
i maintenance of these values. So in
of these respects, it has been a very
rthwhile and interesting visit for me.
yond the substantive matters that we
cussed in various meetings, the Presi-
ht did also authorize me to invite the
;|me minister to visit Washington, and
;': prime minister has authorized me to
i' that he is delighted to accept. And
I would expect that a working visit by
; • prime minister to Washington would
::e place some time in June or
t -reabouts.

Q. Yesterday the kind of change
[•. Gonzalez's government wants to

introduce in the present agreement
just to make acceptable to the Con-
gress here.

A. I think you are asking about the
bases agreement, were you not?

We did discuss that in all of my
meetings, and I think it is fair to say
that on each side we don't see any major
impediment to fairly prompt ratification
of a bases agreement.

Q. Did you get the impression that
Spain will eventually remain in
NATO?

A. This, of course, is a decision for
Spain to make. The Spanish officials I
met with did express their sense of
loyalty to the principles involved. I know
that they intend to study this matter
seriously. For our part in the United
States, we think that it would be good
for Spain to join the alliance, and we
think it is good for the alliance to have
Spain as a member. But the question, of
course, is an open one and the govern-
ment I am sure will be studying it, and
we will await their decision.

Q. What role can Felipe Gonzalez
play in Central America?

A. We did discuss the subject of
Central America and South America,
and I discovered in the course of that
discussion that the prime minister is a
very knowledgeable and thoughtful per-
son about the problems and develop-
ments in that region. And I feel sure
that we will find ways of working
together as two governments on the
issues involved.

I suppose the fundamental thing,
again, is support for democratic values
and for a just economic kind of develop-
ment in the region are things that will
tie us together. And we talked about, as
an example, the San Jose principles that
were first introduced by Honduras and
adopted in the San Jose conference a
couple of months ago, as being, as we
see it at any rate, fundamental to
developments in that region. These prin-
ciples include: not having offensive
weapons in the region, banning and get-
ting rid of all foreign and military ad-
visers, not shipping arms across country
borders, seeing the development of
democratic principles for government,
working for the reconciliation of various
groups that are at issue with the govern-
ment, and principles of this kind. And I
think if we can find general support for
these principles, we are on our way to a
capacity to work effectively together.

Q. Could you see the possibility to
celebrate a top meeting about Central
America— something like the Helsinki

accords, but to be celebrated in Cen-
tral America to defend the human
rights and to arrange the whole situa-
tion of that continent?

A. I think the objective of gaining
universal respect for human rights is a
very important one and to a very con-
siderable degree that is exactly what the
San Jose conference on freedom and
democracy that I mentioned is trying to
bring out. And we have been supporting
the democracies of that region in their
effort to bring these principles forward
and gain support for them. We believe
in the United States in these principles,
and we think the more people who are
willing to come and subscribe to them
and support them, as they apply in Cen-
tral America right now, the better.

Q. Have you dealt with the ques-
tion of cooperation and assistance
from the United States in the modern-
ization of the Spanish Armed Forces?
Have you dealt with the possibility
within the bilateral framework that
the U.S. Government might ask the
Congress for increased appropriations,
and within this same context, has
anything been said about the possibil-
ity of furnishing F-18s to the air force
or the navy?

A. Not all of those subjects came up,
but in one way or another, the F-18 was
referred to in a conversation I had with
the Defense Minister, and I know that's
being considered here. Of course, the
question of modernization of armed
forces is a question closely related to the
full entry of Spain into NATO. And that
is one of the advantages that would
come about as a result of such an entry.
So that subject was only discussed very
tangentially to the extent we discussed
the NATO issue.

Q. I would like to ask whether the
U.S. Government ever saw with any
displeasure the coming to power of
the Socialists in Spain and second, you
said that there was no important
obstacle to the ratification of the
U.S. -Spain agreement in the Cortes.
Does this mean that there would be no
dismantlement of any base in Spain?

A. First, I have to congratulate the
questioner. Upon hearing that that was
the last question, she managed to get in
two.

On the first question, we, of course,
support democracy and democratic
values. The outcome of the democratic
process in any country is the business of

F!:iruary 1983

EUROPE

the country, and we don't interfere in
that kind of decision. That is a decision
for the country to make.

As to the second question, my com-
ment would suggest that there are cer-
tain inferences that need to be taken
care of, in particular, I think in ratifying
the treaty as it now stands. The Govern-
ment of Spain would not want the im-
plication to be drawn, since the treaty
refers to NATO, the ratification made a
presumption about their decision with
regard to NATO. I think that this con-
cern is one that can be dealt with and,
beyond that, I think that at least so far
as I can see in our discussions, we
should be able to proceed. But, at any
rate, this is a matter that will be
negotiated out and the ambassador will
play a strong role in that. I did not feel
that there was anything that looked like
a strong impediment, and neither did
the officials of the Spanish Government
with whom I talked.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE,

LONDON.

DEC. 17, 1982

Secretary Pym. I've had the pleasure of
welcoming Secretary Shultz in London.
Any visit by a U.S. Secretary of State is
important and is always welcome to
Britain. It's particularly so in this case
because in 6 months, Mr. Shultz has
made a major mark upon the world. I
have met him many times, and he's cer-
tainly put his stamp on U.S. foreign
policy.

We've had a very useful and in-
teresting talk. I am very glad that he ar-
ranged his European visit in such a way
that he concludes it here in London. We
have discussed this morning East- West
relations, including the change of leader-
ship in the Soviet Union, including the
arms control talks and the CSCE talks
in Madrid, and also the economic aspect.
We've also talked about the NATO
alliance and defense issues and par-
ticularly the issues that face the alliance
in 1983. We also had a discussion on the
world economy. This is, of course,
primarily a matter for Western leaders
and finance ministers, but as foreign
ministers, we are inevitably involved in
many discussions on the world economy
which bears on how we do our business.
We exchanged our views about that and
look forward to the next economic sum-
mit in May.

We also exchanged views on the
situation in the Middle East where, of
course, the United States is playing a

leading role. We are giving every sup-
port to the beginning of the peacemak-
ing process based on the Reagan plan
which we regard as an opportunity that
is absolutely vital and must not be
missed.

We had a brief discussion about
Namibia and also about Central
America. They were, certainly for me
and for us, extremely useful talks, and I
feel that we have advanced our under-
standing on many matters.

We are always in very close
touch— I think the United States and
Britain have always been like that — and
Mr. Shultz and I have certainly always
kept in very close touch, and we are cer-
tainly going to do that in the future. So
thank you for coming, and thank you for
taking part in these discussions.

Secretary Shultz. As always when
you've made a statement describing
something, you leave little else for me. I
think your description is accurate and
comprehensive. I don't have anything to
add to it except to say that I am very
pleased to have a chance to be here and
talk with you, and this evening with
Mrs. Thatcher and your colleagues.

It is a little bit like coming home to
me because London is where I started
out as Secretary of State-designate. This
is where President Reagan gave me the
news that my life was going to change,
so it's kind of fun to come back here and
see London again in this perspective.

Q. You said that you had discussed
defense issues and NATO issues.
Could I ask you about the issue of the
cruise and Pershing missiles which
may be deployed in this country later
or next year? Is your government
prepared to allow an element of joint
control over the operation of those
missiles, and if not, why not?

Secretary Shultz. Of course, Mr.
Pym briefed me on the discussions that
you've had here in this country on that
issue, and we agreed that the ar-
rangements for a joint decisionmaking
that have been going on here for some
20 years and have covered U.S. nuclear
systems in the United Kingdom work
well. The December 1979 decision was
taken by the alliance as a whole, and so
all INF issues continue to be discussed
in the alliance, and we had discussed in
the NATO ministerial meeting and in
bilateral discussions, but nevertheless
within the context of the alliance, all
manner of issues. Now, of course, Mr.
Pym and I will be in touch on this issue
and a full range of issues— and there
are very many, particularly in the year
1983— and talk about them continuously.

But as I said, from all that I can hear
and sense the way in which this has
been handled has worked well, but I'll
leave it up to Mr. Pym.

Secretary Pym. No, I agree with
that. It certainly has worked well for
over 20 years now.

Q. I think the demand being made
in some quarters here, and I think the
foreign secretary himself has said it
would be highly desirable to have
some kind of joint key arrangement,
or duel key arrangement as it's called
some actual decision that has to be
taken by both governments before
those missiles could be fired.

Secretary Shultz. I don't think tha
image accurately describes any ar-
rangements that have literally been in
place in the past. But there has been a
wide variety of arrangements, and they
vary by countries. I think that we have
to look upon this as an alliance matter
and discuss it on that basis and not get
into further detail about right at this
point.

Q. The President has given an in-
terview that has just been published
that is being portrayed as bringing
new pressure, heavy pressure, on
Israel in connection with withdrawal
from Lebanon. Can you amplify on
that aspect of the reported interview,
and can you tell us after your talks
with Mr. Pym whether the United
States can do anything beyond what i
is already doing to bring about the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Lebanon?

Secretary Shultz. That is one of oi
objectives— to help bring about the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Lebanon. That's not the only objective.

It's also our objective to help the
Lebanese, the Government of Lebanon,
develop itself and take control of its
country and develop its own armed
forces so that they can be effective
throughout the country and reconstrud
Lebanon both in terms of the relation-
ships among the confessional groups ar*
in the physical arrangements of Lebam
into the vibrant and thriving country
that it once was.

Now as far as the steps that we an
taking in Lebanon are concerned, as yc
know, Phil Habib and Maury Draper ar
back in the Middle East. They met witl
Prime Minister Begin yesterday; they
are in Beirut today, and I think that
they are in the process of conducting
this renewed effort on our part. I woul
leave any commentary or coloration of
that to them.

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

Q. What about the President's in-
erview and the way that it's being
ortrayed as new and heavy pressure
n Israel? Could you amplify on that?

Secretary Shultz. I think there is
learly pressure being felt by everybody
3 bring this result about. I had the
riviiege of talking again with the
'oreign Minister of Lebanon, and he
ertainly feels — as do others in
,ebanon — that not only do we want to
ave this result, but it is a matter of
rgency to bring it about speedily so
lat on the one hand the foreign forces
on't get unduly dug in, and on the
ther that the emerging capacity of the
rovernment of Lebanon to exert its
uthority can continue to be realized.

Q. To what extent do you
ecognize that in these talks about
.ebanon the Israelis want them to be
luch more than talks about just
withdrawal but the real direct
olitical negotiations leading to a new
ilationship between Lebanon and
irael?

Secretary Shultz. We read and we
5ten so we realize that there are broad
jjectives involved, and there are also
3finite realities involved about the im-
irtance of an atmosphere that allows
lese confessional groups to come
igether and for Lebanon to construct
self as a country. And, of course,
iyond that you have to say what does
mean to have a new kind of relation-
lip with a country until that country
is been able to form itself and get
>me coherence and have a capacity for
iciding what it wants to do. But I
ould say more generally that the objec-
ve of a peaceful situation between
;rael and its neighbors is one that we,
I ' course, are doing everything we can
1 1 help bring about, not only with
' aspect to Lebanon but with respect to
1 of its neighbors in the Middle East,
aving peace with justice and reason-
jle conditions is the objective, just as it
in the efforts that the United States
id our allies are making in other parts
' the world. That's what we are stand-
ig for — peace and justice.

Q. Obviously in the weeks leading
p to your coming here, the peace
lovements have played an important
art in your country and in this coun-
ty and in Western Europe. How im-
ortant a part did that kind of public
isquiet about nuclear questions — how
nportant was that at your talks to-
ay?

Secretary Shultz. Everyone, I
aink, shares the hope that we can
Dmehow construct a world that is at

peace, that has an increasing element of
justice in it, and which allows people to
live without an overhang of fear that's
generated by awesome weapons. There's
no difference of opinion about that. We
all share that view.

The question is, what do you do
about it? Because, unfortunately, we are
not the only people around the world
who have awesome weapons. We are
seeking to reduce the level of these
weapons. We are seeking to restrict the
matter of their use. We are seeking to
solve problems regionally around the
world. Arms control is not the only
thing that you have to do; you have to
remove the reasons why people would
want armaments. And everywhere you
turn, I think I'm fairly stating it, the
United States is on the side of the solu-
tion, not on the side of the problem, and
so that is our objective.

We listen to people in our own coun-
try and elsewhere, and it's been very
useful for me in coming here and else-
where in Europe and talking not only
with my counterparts but many other
people. I've gone out of my way to try
to see people not in the government as
well as people in the government to get
a feeling for how people view things. We
understand the fears that people have,
but we also understand that when you
are confronted with a strong aggressor,
the worse thing that you can do is let
your own defenses decline and let fear
lead you into appeasement. That is a
key, and I feel on this trip in discussions
certainly here and elsewhere — every-
where without any exception — a great
sense of reassurance in the depth of
understanding, the subtleties of under-
standing, and the sense of determina-
tion, unity, and cohesion that I felt in
our alliance.

Q. Do you feel that the peace
movements constitute a threat to the
U.S. policy or NATO?

Secretary Shultz. They ought to
present a reminder of the strength of
conviction behind what we all presum-
ably want, namely the kind of peace that
has justice and right in it.

Q. According to reports coming
from Jerusalem, the Israeli Defense
Minister claimed yesterday to have
achieved a major breakthrough in the
talks with Lebanon. You met yester-
day with the Lebanese Foreign
Minister. Do you share this view?

Secretary Shultz. We didn't have
any information about that statement
that Mr. Sharon made, and I don't have
any comment about it except to say that
any genuine breakthrough, however

derived, that will bring about a with-
drawal of all foreign forces from Leba-
non and contribute to the reconstruction
of Lebanon is something that we will
welcome.

Q. You said that the arrangements
for the last 20 years had worked well
over control of nuclear weapons which
has been the single American control
here. But surely in the 1950s, there
was the joint U.S. and British control
over Thor missiles in this country.
Why are you not prepared to allow a
return to that system?

Secretary Shultz. As I understand
it, there have been a variety of ar-
rangements and what has happened is,
bilaterally and now of course, we have
to consider this as an alliance matter as
well as a bilateral matter. We keep con-
fronting new situations, and I think the
answer that I've given may be inter-
preted as meaning that somehow we've
been able to work these problems out
and the result has worked well in
everybody's eyes. We feel that the ar-
rangements that were made in 1979,
those were mutually agreed, and we are
proceeding on that basis. But we're con-
stantly talking not only about this but a
variety of other issues as we move along
in this process.

Q. Under what conditions would
you ask the United States for joint
control over the firing of these
weapons?

Secretary Pym. The arrangements
which Mr. Shultz has referred to are, in
fact, joint decisionmaking. That has been
the basis of our arrangement for the last
20 years, and those are the arrange-
ments to which Mr. Shultz has referred.
I've talked to him about the views that
were expressed in the House of Com-
mons and elsewhere, and he's quite right
that these are matters that have been
decided by the alliance and are con-
sidered in that context, as well as
bilaterally.

Q. When you were nominated, you
were explained as a highly educated
Soviet expert. I am interested, are you
going to change a policy toward the
Soviet Union, because they are expect-
ing so? A lot has been written about
that possibility — that the relations
between the Soviet Union and the
United States are going to be better
than during Nixon.

Secretary Shultz. The policy of the
United States toward the Soviet
Union — and I believe that broadly

-bruary 1983

EUROPE

speaking it's the same policy that the
North Atlantic alliance has toward the
Soviet Union as I see it — consists of
four parts.

First, that we must be realistic in
our appraisal of what is taking place.
The worst thing in the world you can do
is allow wishful thinking to lead you into
failure to realistically appraise what is
taking place, so realism is the first
point.

The second point is that in the face
of the buildup and the level of Soviet
strength and the demonstrated willing-
ness to use it, as for example in the in-
vasion of Afghanistan, tell you that to
be successful you must be strong. To de-
fend your own values and to defend
peace and to defend liberty and free-
dom, you must be strong.

Third, in the kind of world we live
in, with the awesomeness of the threats
particularly that have been mentioned
here earlier, we're all aware of, we must
also be willing to be ready to solve prob-
lems and to work constructively for bet-
ter relationships and for solutions to
problems, and we are. We have negotia-
tions taking place now as is well known
in Geneva and Vienna and elsewhere. So
we're ready to solve problems.

Fourth, that we do so in the belief
that if these problems can get on their
way to solution and a more constructive
relationship emerges, we can all have a
better world with less fear and many
other better attributes. Now with new
leadership of the Soviet Union we, and I
think our allies, have all sought to
underline the third point so that they
wouldn't miss that it's there. But we
should not allow ourselves because of
our interest and desire for peace and for
freedom and for constructive dialogue to
lose sight of the importance of being
realistic and being strong. Those are the
keys to peace and freedom.

Q. At the end of your tour of
Europe, do you now reckon that you
have a clear policy umbrella governing
relations with the Soviet Union and
its allies, particularly on the economic
front?

Secretary Shultz. I think we have
long had, and continue to have, a very
good strategy umbrella, if you want to
call it that, in the form of the NATO
alliance and it is strong, it is unified, it
has cohesion, and, I think at least as I
felt, as I said before, a lot of
reassurance on that point. We have been
struggling together to find a better
sense of strategy — set of objectives — on
the security aspects of East- West trade

and financial flows. And I do think now
we have going, or propose to go, for-
ward with a pretty unified view, a
general unified view — the studies and
the activities that we feel are the
necessary ones to construct that
strategy.

We think that one of the great
benefits of getting an overall strategy
identified is that we will minimize the
problems that may be caused by
misunderstandings which often go under
the label of you didn't consult enough or
we didn't consult with each other. We all
know that there is an immense amount
of conversation — there's no lack of
that — and at least I feel what we need is
some sort of overall set of objectives and
strategy, then when we consult with
each other, we have some standards
against which to talk, and our consulta-
tion can be more purposeful and, there-
fore, more fruitful. I think we have got
that identified now and will start in on
constructing that study.

Q. If you have one overriding ob-
jective for 1983. what would that be?

Secretary Shultz. If you want to
speak about it in broad terms, I think
we are looking for peace with justice
and prosperity. We haven't had any
commentary here about the economic
situation but I think we want to see the
world economy expand and see progress
in that sense. Those are our main objec-
tives.

Q. Could you possibly be trying to
help Prime Minister Regain with your
recent attacks on Israel? If not, what
is the public pressure in aim of?

Secretary Shultz. I have made no
attacks on Israel, and I have made no
comments designed to help or hinder or
in any way be a part of the internal
political flow of events and opinion in
Israel. That is strictly for Israel to
determine. I have not hestitated to say
when I think something is wrong or that
something is right.

Now when it appears to me that the
requiring of university professors to sign
special oaths, otherwise dismissed, came
to my attention, I said I thought that
was wrong, and I do think it's wrong.

I've also commented on the dismissal of
mayors from the West Bank. It also was
the case when moves were made to deny
Israel credentials to the United Nations
that in the United States, and I was
pleased to speak for the President on
this. We said that if the United Nations
votes to do that, we will withdraw. We
support Israel. So I think that we, I cer-
tainly and the President certainly, sup-
port Israel, the security of Israel, the
purposefulness, the idea, and the ideal o
Israel. I've been there; I know many
people there, but that doesn't mean that
no matter what Israel does or says,
we're going to applaud it. I think we
have to say if they do something we
think isn't right. Maybe we're good
enough friends to be able to say so.

Q. As a result of these talks this
morning, has the situation in regard
to control of the cruise missiles
changed from what it was 2 nights
ago when you were questioned about
it in Parliament, and if not, is it likel;
to change in the future as a result of
these conversations?

Secretary Pym. No, it hasn't
changed. As Secretary Shultz said, we
discussed this point, and I told him the
views that were expressed in our debate
the day before yesterday. And the fact
of the matter is that the decision we
took in 1979 was taken by the alliance
and included these joint decision ar-
rangements with the United States that
had existed before. But anyway we
discussed that aspect but we discussed
many other aspects of INF [intermedi-
ate-range nuclear forces] and so there ii
no change in the situation. Is it likely tc
change? There is no particular likelihooi
of any change. As I say, we exchanged
views about it but the position remains
as it was.

Q. If I understood correctly, the I
readout of the meeting yesterday witlfl
the Lebanese Foreign Minister, he ex
pressed concern that continued Israel
presence in Lebanon, in effect, was
leading to annexation of part of
Lebanon. Do you share that concern?
Is there a real possibility?

Secretary Shultz. I didn't make the
comment so I don't know where your
readout comes from. I only made the ,
comment about the sense of urgency, ■;!
but I do think it must be a matter of
concern, and I am not referring to the

Department of State Bullet!

EUROPE

neeting I had with the foreign minister
;hat you have foreign troops in your
country and they stay there and they
;tay there longer and they stay there
onger and when they stay they get
embedded and they have developed an
nfrastructure and so on. So this is one
)f the reasons why I think there is an
irgency to getting the foreign forces
)ut. Not just the Israeli forces; the
sraeli forces are the most recent en-
,rants. The PLO has been there for
luite a long time, established a state
vithin a state, and was very disruptive
)f the ability of Lebanon to operate as a
country, and the Syrians have been
here for a long time. So it's all foreign
brces that we are seeking to get out of
,he country.

Economic Health of the
Western Alliance

'Press releases relating to this trip not
irinted here are Nos. 384 of Dec. 15, 1982,
;91 of Dec. 16, and 403 of Dec. 28.

2Press release 371 of Dec. 8.

sPress release 372 of Dec. 9.

*Press release 373 of Dec. 9.

^The Greek delegation recalled its posi-
ion on various aspects of this declaration
ariginal in text].

^Greece reserves its position on these two
laragraphs [original in text].

'Greece has expressed its views on this
entence which were recorded in the record
f the meeting [original in text].

^Greece recalled its position on various
spects of this paragraph [original in text].

'Press release 375 of Dec. 14.

'"Press release 376 of Dec. 14.

"Press release 377 of Dec. 13.

Impress release 383 of Dec. 14.

"Press release 385 of Dec. 15.

'^Press release 399 of Dec. 21.

'^Press release 392.

'"Press release 402 of Dec. 27. ■

by Arthur F. Burns

Address before the Deutche Atlan-
tische Gesellschaft, in Bonn, Federal
Republic of Germany, on December 9.
1982. Mr. Bums is the U.S. Ambassador
to the Federal Republic of Germany.

I wish to thank the Deutsche Atlantische
Gesellschaft. for the opportunity to ad-
dress your members and friends this
evening. Since its establishment a
quarter of a century ago, your society
has faithfully supported the fundamental
objectives of the North Atlantic alliance.
You have never wavered in your devo-
tion to peace or in your efforts to
espouse the principles of individual free-
dom and democracy that constitute the
moral foundation of NATO. In so doing,
you have earned the gratitude of
enlightened citizens of both your country
and mine.

My purpose this evening, beyond ex-
pressing appreciation of your contribu-
tion to preserving international peace
and freedom, is to discuss some of the
economic issues that have recently been
troubling the Western alliance. Eco-
nomic factors inevitably have a signifi-
cant impact on political attitudes that
prevail in our respective countries, and
they, in turn, can be decisive for the
military effectiveness of the alliance. In
view of the immense role of the United
States in world affairs, I shall concen-
trate on the economic relations between
the United States and its European
allies. That these relations have been
rather strained of late is a matter of
common knowledge. That is reason
enough for trying to see the American-
European relationship in a sound per-
spective. Beyond that, it is vital to our
alliance to consider how well its eco-
nomic underpinnings are being main-
tained and protected.

Since the end of 1979, both the
United States and Western Europe have
been experiencing considerable economic
sluggishness or actual recession. That
Western economies are vastly stronger
than the economies of the Soviet bloc is
a matter of considerable importance, but

this can hardly justify complacency on
our part. What needs to concern us is
the state of our own economic health-
how best to preserve and improve it. My
first task this evening, therefore, is to
examine briefly the sources of recent
difficulties in the West.

The oil price shocks of 1973 and
1978 have certainly contributed to our
economic problems. So too have other
developments in the international
marketplace, particularly the increasing
challenge of Japan to some of our key
industries as well as the new competi-
tion for a variety of Western manufac-
tures from the more advanced of the
developing nations. These external in-
fluences, however, have been less im-
portant for Western economies than dif-
ficulties of our own making.

During the early decades of the post-
war period, the fiscal and monetary
policies of Western democracies were
highly successful in maintaining
reasonably full employment and in im-
proving social conditions. These very
successes tempted governments during
the 1970s to respond to the never-ending
public pressures for governmental bene-
fits by risking large budget deficits and
easy money in the hope of expanding
social welfare programs still further as
well as attending to new environmental
concerns. But by attempting to extract
more and more goods and services from
our economies without adding corre-
spondingly to our willingness to work
and save, we in the West inevitably
released the destructive forces of infla-
tion.

Under these conditions, it should not
be surprising that tensions over eco-
nomic issues have at times seriously
tested the harmony that has generally
characterized the political relations be-
tween the United States and its Euro-
pean allies. When our individual econo-
mies are booming, there is little
pressure on governments from their
business or agricultural communities to
protest or counteract activities being
pursued in other countries. Such pres-
sures tend to mount, however, in times
of economic adversity. Difficulties that
would be passed over under prosperous
conditions then take on some import-
ance—occasionally even a large import-
ance. Gentle voices of spokesmen of eco-
nomic interests are then apt to become
loud and strident, and even the

■ebruary 1983

EUROPE

customary composure of academicians
and high government officials tends to
suffer. Human nature being what it is,
that has been the usual experience of
mankind, and we have not escaped it
this time.

U.S. Monetary Policy

There is, first of all, the issue of
American interest rates. There can be
no dispute over the fact that these rates
have been extraordinarily high in recent
years. Nor can it be denied that they
served to attract funds to the United
States from other parts of the world,
that this movement of funds tended to
raise interest rates in some European
countries, and that business investment
suffered to some degree as a conse-
quence. If European complaints had
stopped at this point, no one could
reasonably quarrel; but many Euro-
peans, including prominent government
officials, at times went further and
either stated or implied that American
interest rates were responsible for the
economic troubles in their countries.
That line of thinking overlooked the fact
that high American interest rates could
not be responsible simultaneously for the
still higher interest rates in France and

curbing the growth of money supplies. It
is, of course, true that the high interest
rates were in large part a result of our
restrictive monetary policy. That does
not mean, however, that we sought high
interest rates.

On the contrary, the immediate ef-
fects of the restrictive monetary policy
on interest rates and economic activity
were by no means welcome, but this
policy did achieve its fundamental pur-
pose of curbing inflation in the United
States. Since 1979, when the consumer
price level rose more than 13%, the rate
of inflation has moved steadily lower. By
coming down to less than 5% this year,
the inflation rate in the United States is
now one of the lowest in the world.

The success of monetary policy in
subduing inflation eventually made it
possible for American interest rates to
move to lower levels— partly through the
inner workings of the marketplace and
partly through adjustments of policy.
The slowing of inflation encouraged the
authorities to reduce monetary
restraints, and the deepening of reces-
sion impelled them to do so. Economic
conditions in the United States were, of
course, primarily responsible for the
consequent decline of interest rates, but
our monetary authorities were also

Economic conditions in the United States were,
of course, primarily responsible for the consequent
decline of interest rates, but our monetary
authorities were also mindful of the benefits that
the lower rates could bring to Europe.

the drastically lower interest rates in
Japan. Needless to say, factors in-
digenous to individual countries— among
them, the propensity of the public to
save and the state of governmental
budgets— always exercise some influence
on interest rates.

Much of European criticism of
American interest rates also stemmed
from a misunderstanding of American
policy objectives. Seeking to end the
havoc wrought by inflation, our authori-
ties proceeded on a principle that has
been tested across the centuries— name-
ly, that stoppage of inflation requires

mindful of the benefits that the lower
rates could bring to Europe. Since last
year, when the rate that commercial
banks charge their prime borrowers
reached 21.5%, the prime rate has fallen
to 11.5%. Open-market, short-term rates
have been cut in half. Long-term rates
on corporate bonds and home mortgages
declined less, but they too have fallen
materially. The greater part of these in-
terest rate adjustments has occurred
since June, and European rates followed
American rates downward— although
not to the same degree. As these finan-
cial developments unfolded, Europeans
joined Americans in wishing that in-
terest rates would move even lower, but
what had previously been a significant

source of friction within the alliance vir- '
tually ceased being troublesome. j

Another recent irritant to some
members of the alliance was the stand
taken by the American Government on
intervention in foreign exchange |

markets. The effectiveness of such ,

maneuvers in stabilizing foreign curren- '^
cies had long been a subject of serious ,
debate among financial experts, in- ^

eluding central bankers. Nevertheless, ,
governments of leading countries kept |
intervening with some frequency during .
the 1970s in the hope of smoothing out '.
some of the short-run fluctuations in the
exchange market. Being critical of these ,
policies, the Reagan Administration an- '
nounced soon after it came into power
that, in its judgment, foreign currencies ,
are best left to the free market and thai |
it would, therefore, refrain from inter- ,
vening except under highly exceptional ,
circumstances. Not a few financiers and
government officials welcomed this deci
sion, and even some who questioned it
were more concerned with the political '.
consequences of nonintervention than ',
with its intrinsic economic merits. Then ^
were, nevertheless, some determined
European critics of the new American
policy, and they made their influence
felt— most notably at the summit
meeting held last June at Versailles. ]

While Americans held to their basic
position at that meeting, they did pro- |
pose that a committee of international
experts study the results of past ex-
perience with intervention. By agreeing
to such a study, all participants tacitly
admitted the possibility that some of
their views on intervention might need
to be revised. Since then, the United
States has gone further in the direction
favored by its critics by actually inter-
vening several times— albeit on a modes,
scale— in the market. There is reason fo
hoping that the foreign exchange study
now under way may further contribute
to narrowing the differences between
the United States and some of its allies.^
And if goodwill should be aided by good
fortune, so that both interest rates and ,
inflation kept coming down in our
respective countries, the fluctuations of,
exchange rates would, of themselves,
narrow and thus reduce both the im- ,
pulse to intervene and the inclination to.
fret over the issue.

Economic Relations With the U.S.S.E

A far more serious conflict between the
United States and its allies was stirred
by the decision of several European

Department of State Bulleti

EUROPE

untries to support the construction of
Siberian natural gas pipeline. This con-
ct reached a climax when the Ameri-
n Government, feeling morally out-
ged over the Soviet Union's role in
ppressing the newly won freedoms of
e Polish people, proceeded to forbid
ipments by American firms of
iterials and equipment needed to build
e pipeline. This prohibition was later
tended to European subsidiaries and
ensees of American firms. These ac-
ms led to acrimonious charges and
bates, and some political observers on
th sides of the Atlantic felt that
nerican reaction to the crisis in Poland
ly have given rise to a crisis of the
iance.

That danger, fortunately, was sur-
)unted. Not only was damage to the
iance kept down, but the pipeline con-
iversy actually helped to steer
estern thinking about foreign policy
to a sounder track.

In the course of pondering the sanc-
ns imposed against the Soviet Union,
3 American Government undertook a
/iew of Western economic relations
th the Soviet Union in the hope of
veloping a policy that, unlike the pipe-
e sanctions, could prove of lasting
nefit to the alliance. It soon became
ar that this would require more
iolute dealing with elements of in-
lerence in Western foreign policy,
e reasoning that led to this conclusion
s straightforward. On the one hand,
iTO countries were devoting, year
er year, vast resources to our com-
in defense against the Soviet threat,
nultaneously, however, partly through
vate banks and partly through
vfernment agencies, we in the West
Dt lending during the past decade vast
; Tis of money to the Soviet Union and

satellites. At times, this was even be-
; done at subsidized interest rates. In
I w of the high priority that the Soviet
1 lion assigns to its military establish-
: 'nt, the financial resources that the
I ist so liberally put at the disposal of
:? Soviets thus indirectly helped to
■ engthen their already formidable
: litary establishment. To make matters
irse, the Soviet Union continued to
t ce advantage of the weaknesses in our
: itrols on the export of militarily
I ated products and technology.

These considerations were per-
: tently pressed by the American
[ vernment on its allies during the past

year. For a time, they were resisted by
European governments, partly because
of displeasure over the pipeline sanc-
tions, partly also because of concern that
the American initiative could lead to an
East- West trade war. But as the
American Government made clear that
its basic aim was simply to steer
Western policy onto a path that was
more consistent with allied security in-
terests, controversy and recrimination
gradually yielded to quiet voices of
reason.

On November 13, President Reagan
was able to announce that agreement
had been reached on the need to con-
sider allied security issues when making
trade arrangements with the Soviet
Union. More specifically, the United
States and its partners agreed:

First, that new contracts for Soviet
natural gas would not be undertaken
during the course of an urgent study of
alternative sources of energy;

Second, that existing controls on
the transfer of strategic items to the
Soviets will be strengthened;

Third, that procedures for monitor-
ing financial relations with the Soviets
will be promptly established; and

Fourth, that the allies will work to
harmonize their export credit policies.

In the eyes of the American Govern-
ment, these measures will promote allied
interests more effectively than the pipe-
line sanctions. The President, therefore,
concluded his statement by announcing
their removal. Long and difficult
negotiations on ways of carrying out the
agreed measures are undoubtedly still
ahead of us, but the pipeline crisis as
such has fortunately come to an end.

Defense Burdensharing

In other areas of economic policy— par-
ticularly defense burdensharing and
trade issues— the United States con-
tinues to have major differences with its
European partners. Difficulties of this
type have troubled the alliance almost
from its beginning; and, in one form or
another, they are likely to remain
troublesome in the years ahead. Even
here, however, we have generally
managed to work out our problems, and
we have had some limited successes dur-
ing the past year that are noteworthy.

The distribution of defense burdens
among allies inevitably raises difficult
questions of equity. Many Americans,

especially Members of Congress, have
long felt that the United States is bear-
ing an excessive part of the heavy costs
of the alliance. In view of the financial
stringency that has developed in my
country, such criticisms of Europe have
recently intensified. Our NATO partners
usually respond by reminding us that
their spending on defense rose steadily
during the 1970s while real American
spending kept falling off. That is entire-
ly true, but it does not tell the whole
story. Official statistics indicate that
defense spending reached 7.9% of the
gross domestic product in the United
States during 1970. The highest corre-
sponding figure for each of our major
allies fell short of 5% in that year. While
the defense outlays of the United States
decreased during the 1970s, this gap has
never been closed. Confronted with
these facts, European governments are
inclined to observe that monetary
figures fail to capture all costs involved
in the defense area, particularly the con-
scription of soldiers that exists in most
of their countries. Such remonstrances,
however, are not always accepted by
Americans, as the lively discussions that
have been resounding in our congres-
sional halls indicate.

Whatever the merits of ongoing
debates among members of the alliance,
the Reagan Administration recognizes
that some of the military proposals now
before Congress would seriously weaken
the alliance. Not only that, they would
also encourage the Russians to remain
unyielding in the vital arms control
negotiations now under way in Geneva.
Those dangers have not escaped the at-
tention of European leaders. In fact,
many Europeans have long shared the
widespread American belief that Europe
is not doing enough for its own or for
the common defense. Financial stringen-
cy is nowadays no less a problem in
Europe than in the United States. In
spite of that, the German Government
has recently taken steps that should help
Americans to see the problem of defense
burdensharing in a better perspective.
Several months ago the Federal
Republic of Germany signed a treaty
with the United States under which it
agreed to commit 90,000 reservists in
support of American combat forces in
the event of war. More recently,
Minister Manfred Woerner announced
that the new German budget provides a
significant additional contribution for
constructing vital NATO military

FiOruary1983

EUROPE

facilities in Europe. These measures had
long been urged by Americans on the
German Government. The fact that they
liave been adopted at a difficult time
should certainly help to quiet American
concerns.

International Trade

Differences between the United States
and its allies over international trade
issues also have a long and checkered
history. From the end of World War II
through the 1970s, the broad trend of
Western policy has been toward increas-
ing liberalization of international trade
and investment, and there can be little
doubt that this trend contributed enor-
mously to the prosperity of the West
and other parts of the world. While the
United States led the world toward an
open trading system and unrestricted
foreign investment, this policy— except
for agriculture— was generally supported
in Europe, particularly in the Federal
Republic of Germany. Unfortunately,
but not surprisingly, the deep recession
of recent times has by now stirred up
strong protectionist sentiment in many
European countries and also in the
United States.

The Reagan Administration has
stoutly resisted congressional moves
toward protectionism— thus far with
considerable although incomplete suc-
cess. During the recent ministerial
meeting of the parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
United States fought especially hard for
an unequivocal commitment by the
world's trade ministers to phase out ex-
isting measures restricting international
trade and to refrain from taking new
restrictive measures. The debates over
this principle and on specific trade issues
were protracted and at times bitter, but,
at the end, American initiatives brought
only modest results. Assuming profes-
sorial garb, Mr. [William E.] Brock, the
American trade representative, judged
the result as deserving hardly more than
a grade of "C"— an assessment that few
informed observers have questioned.

From an American viewpoint, the
most disappointing aspect of this
meeting was the failure to convince the
European Economic Community to
modify some aspects of its agricultural
policy. For many years the Community

has maintained farm prices above the
world level. Surpluses therefore
developed, and in order to move them
into world markets the Community sub-
sidized their export. As long as this
policy was confined to protecting farm
sales within the Community, the United
States accepted it— although not without
protest. But once the subsidization led to
large exports to third-country markets,
a more serious problem arose for
American farmers and agricultural ex-
porters of other countries. With farm in-
comes in the United States currently at
their lowest level since the 1930s,
American protests against the Com-
munity's agricultural policy have become

The Reagan Admini-
stration has stoutly re-
sisted congressional
moves toward protec-
tionism— thus far with
considerable although
incomplete success.

increasingly insistent. The Community,
however, has refused to budge, main-
taining, among other things, that the
issue of its subsidies had already been
settled in earlier negotiations.

This and other arguments of the
Community have not softened American
attitudes; and unless this agricultural
controversy is soon settled, there is a
serious possibility that the Congress will
pass retaliatory legislation next year.
This would be so damaging for both the
United States and Europe that I con-
tinue to believe that some mutual accom-
modation will be worked out.

Such a result, indeed, was achieved
in connection with another trade dispute
that for a time resisted every attempt at
resolution. For many years the world
steel industry has suffered from excess
capacity and, as so often happens under
such conditions, various countries— in-
cluding some in Europe— made export
subsidies available to their steel pro-
ducers. As a consequence, large quan-
tities of steel produced with the benefit
of government subsidies have penetrated
the American market in recent years.
American steel manufacturers, who do

not receive subsidies, sought to limit thi
vexing competition. They took advan-
tage of a law that enables an industry t
veto certain governmental efforts to
work out trade arrangements with othe
countries. Despite this formidable
obstacle, the American Government
finally reached an agreement with the
European Commission that imposes
moderate quotas on exports of various
steel products to the United States.

To me, as to other confirmed free
traders, this agreement has brought lit-
tle joy. However, the practical choice
that both Americans and Europeans
faced in this instance was not between
protectionism and free trade, but rathe
between degrees and kinds of protec-
tionism. If the negotiations on steel
quotas had failed, existing American la
would have required prompt imposition
of punitive duties on steel imports.
Worse still, it seemed likely that in tha
event the Congress would legislate still
more drastic protectionist measures. Tl
negotiated settlement cleai ly violated
the salutary principle of free trade, but
it also forestalled more serious conse-
quences. To this extent, it is not only a
tolerable arrangement, but one that ha:
served to reduce political tensions be-
tween the United States and its allies.

Economic Outlook

The conclusion that I feel can justly be
drawn from my review of the recent
steel and other economic disputes withi
the alliance is reassuring. To be sure,
there have been excesses of political
rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic
and, occasionally, misguided actions as
well. Nevertheless, the United States
and its European allies have succeeded
in working out— or at least in muting—
most of their troublesome differences
over economic issues. Our ability to ac-
complish this mutual accommodation
under difficult conditions demonstrates
that the moral, political, and security ir
terests that unite us are strong enough
to overcome even divisive economic
issues. That, at any rate, has proved tc
be the case thus far, and from that we
can surely draw encouragement for the
future.

We must temper, however, any fee
ing of optimism that international
economic conditions will improve so
much in the near future that they will 1
unlikely to cause or intensify political

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

trains within the alliance. It is by now
/idely recognized that the weakness of
he international economy during the
ast 3 years is the aftermath of the in-
iationary pressures released during the
970s. It is not so clearly understood,
owever, that our recent economic diffi-
ulties reflect more than the normal
icissitudes of the business cycle. They
eflect also a certain loss of business
ynamism— that is, a gradual weakening
f the underlying forces of economic
rowth in the Western world.

Liberal fiscal and monetary policies
ad served us well over a long genera-
on in fostering full employment and
nproving the social environment. They
light have continued to work beneficial-
' if they had not been carried to excess,
ut, unfortunately, traditional rules of
nancial prudence were thrown to the
inds. As a result, our Western
:onomies have become so highly sen-
tive to the dangers of inflation that
oeral financial policies can no longer be
)unted on to perform their earlier con-
.ructive function.

Of late, government and business
linking in the Western world has
icused on creating an environment that
more conducive to business innovation
id private capital investment than it
is been in recent years. Responsible
aders in our respective countries fre-
lently emphasize not only the need to
"actice moderation in the monetary
•ea, but also the need to bring about
)me reduction from the high levels that
3th government spending and taxes
ive reached relative to the size of our
!spective national incomes. Even
ranee, which moved for a while in
lother direction, has recently adopted a
ither restrictive monetary policy,
3sides announcing the intention to
^strain further expansion of budgetary
jficits. With earlier economic policies
3w in general disrepute in the West,
id the newer policies not yet fully
'sted, deep concern about the economic
itlook has spread during the past year
* two in the United States as well as
iroughout Western Europe.

Such pessimism can be overdone. In
le United States, at least, the aggre-
ate output of the economy has re-
,iained virtually unchanged during the
ast 6 months or so, and there are now
umerous indications that the ground-
ork for recovery has been laid. As

noted earlier, both inflation and interest
rates have come down sharply. Stock
and bond prices have risen dramatically,
thereby adding hundreds of billions of
dollars to the net worth of individuals
and business entities. Of late, consumer
spending for goods and services has in-
creased modestly. Residential construc-
tion has been moving upward again this
year; home sales have recently revived;
and the financial condition of mortgage-
lending institutions has improved. The
upward climb of wages has slowed
materially; industrial productivity has
recently perked up; and corporate
profits have begun to increase. These
improvements have been offset thus far

throughout the West must now realize
that their lending policies, both at home
and abroad, were excessively liberal dur-
ing the 1970s. They will consequently be
more cautious lenders— perhaps ex-
cessively cautious lenders— in the years
immediately ahead.

Third, many of the less developed
countries— not only Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina, which lately have figured so
heavily in the press— are at present
unable to make timely payments of the
interest or principal that is due on their
overextended indebtedness.

These financial difficulties constitute
a grave, but I believe still manageable.

Responsible leaders in our respective countries
frequently emphasize not only the need to practice
moderation in the monetary area, but also the need
to bring about some reduction from the high levels
that both government spending and taxes have
reached relative to the size of our respective na-
tional incomes.

by sharp deterioration of merchandise
exports and business investment in new
plants and equipment. Nevertheless, it
seems likely that a gradual recovery of
aggregate production and employment
will get under way in the United States
within the next few months.

With the possible exception of Great
Britain, the immediate outlook for
Europe is less favorable, in large part
because of the greater rigidity of its
labor markets. But it is reasonable to
expect that any improvement in the
American economy also will be felt
before too many months pass in
Western Europe.

Unemployment, nevertheless, will
remain high in the West for an uncom-
fortable period, since the pace of
recovery is likely to be slow in the pres-
ent instance. There are compelling
reasons for this gradualness.

First, there are as yet hardly any
signs that contracts for business con-
struction or orders for business equip-
ment have begun to increase either in
the United States or in Western Europe.

Second, most of the larger banks

danger to the international banking
system. Under the best of circum-
stances, however, great austerity will
need to be practiced in many of the less
developed countries, and their reduced
imports will inevitably restrict the pace
of Western economic recovery over the
next 2 or 3 years, if not longer.

If my assessment of the economic
outlook is anywhere near the mark,
political tensions on account of economic
difficulties may well continue to trouble
the alliance. To make progress on eco-
nomic issues in the years immediately
ahead, it is particularly important that
every country avoid "beggar-thy-
neighbor" policies. We cannot afford to
think in terms of winners and losers
when it comes to solving our common
problems. It is essential, therefore, that
member countries of the alliance
mobilize the vast economic and political
statesmanship that is at their disposal.
Cooperation among economic ministries,
finance ministries, central banks, private

?bruary 1983

EUROPE

commercial banks, and international
financial agencies, which has not always
been close, must become very much
closer. The heads of Western govern-
ments, who thus far have been reason-
ably successful in controlling the disease
of protectionism, must work still more
earnestly toward this vital objective.
Meetings among members of the foreign
policy and defense establishments of the
alliance must occur still more frequently
and become more thorough, as well as
more timely, so that misunderstandings
among their governments are kept to a
minimum.

These, ladies and gentlemen, are the
paths to confidence in the security and
prosperity of the industrial democracies
that are joined in the brotherhood of the
Atlantic alliance. ■

Visit of Portugal's Prime IVIinister

Prime Minister Francisco Pinto
Balsemao of the Republic of Portugal
made an official visit to Washington,
D.C., December H-15. 1982. to meet with
President Reagan and other government
officials.

Following are remarks made by
President Reagan and Prime Minister
Balsemao following their meeting on
December 15.^

President Reagan

Prime Minister Balsemao and I first met
last June at the NATO summit in Bonn.
This, however, has been our first oppor-
tunity to talk at length, and we've had a
lot to discuss. Our exchange was excep-
tionally useful and harmonious. After
these discussions it's now even more
clear why our two countries have been
such hard-and-fast allies for so many
years.

The relationship between Portugal
and the United States is one of common
values, mutual respect, and broad
cooperation. In our meeting and the
working lunch which followed, we
covered a broad range of international
topics and found substantial agreement.

Among other subjects, we discussed
our defense cooperation, which goes
back many years. We're now in the proc-
ess of negotiating a new security
cooperation agreement to broaden and
strengthen our collaboration on our com-
mon defense objectives.

Portugal and the United States
share a common responsibility for the
defense of the West. And our security

relationship is important to both coun-
tries, as well as to the NATO alliance.
The prime minister has explained to me
the various military modernization needs
of his country, and I have reaffirmed the
U.S. commitment to help Portugal to
meet these goals.

We also discussed the economic
assistance which the United States has
provided to Portugal over the years.
This continuing assistance is an impor-
tant expression of our desire to befriend
and help the Portuguese people. We
agreed that the current negotiations on
the security cooperation agreement
should lead to an early and mutually
satisfactory conclusion.

We also discussed each country's ini-
tiatives in southern Africa and the
unique perspective that Portugal brings
to these issues, especially in view of its
historic ties with Angola and Mozam-
bique. The prime minister and his
government have been most generous in
sharing with us some valuable insights
drawn from their extensive experience
in the area. We shall continue to consult
our Portuguese friends in the future.

Finally, and perhaps above all, as
one democratic leader to another, I've
expressed to the prime minister my per-
sonal admiration and that of all
Americans for the continued progress of
democracy in Portugal. The Portuguese
experience has shown how, given a
chance, people will choose freedom. Tha
the progress worked so well in Portugal
is a tribute to the Portuguese people
with their love of freedom, their high
ideals, and high civic and political
responsibility.

We're delighted with their success,
and we certainly are proud to continue
calling them friends and very happy to
welcome the prime minister here today.

Prime Minister Balsemao

I'm thankful to President Reagan for tht
invitation he addressed to me to come tc
Washington, providing a timely oppor-
tunity to discuss bilateral relations be-
tween Portugal and the United States
and to exchange views on international
items and matters of mutual interest.

Department of State Bulletir i

EUROPE

The summary of our talks was bril-
iantly given by the President, and so
his allows me to concentrate only on
ome of the points which were raised.

First, I would like to fully endorse
he President's assessment of our rela-
ionship and of the principles on which it
3 based. It is not by sheer coincidence
hat a sound friendship between Por-
ugal and the United States has existed
or 200 years. And it is still showing a
ynamic vitality, as we all know and as
his visit demonstrates. We in Portugal
)ok forward to working in close
ooperation with the United States and
Dr that effort we count very much on
he strong Portuguese-American com-
lunity living and working here in the
Inited States.

Our interests and concern about the
volution of the situation in southern
tfrica has led us to express our view-
oint that peace and stability in that
rea can be achieved only through
alanced economic development and
jspect for the security of all countries
Dncerned. I was also very interested in
earing the President's assessment of
is recent trip to South America and in
icchanging views on this region, which

is also of particular interest for Por-
tugal.

I had the opportunity to fully brief
the President on the recent political
evolution of the situation in Portugal, on
our economic situation, also, and on the
development of our negotiations to join
the European Economic Community. In
the present political stability of my coun-
try, opens new perspectives for more
cooperation and more constructive
cooperation with the United States and
with the free world.

We also discussed in detail our
security cooperation regarding which we
have been engaged in extensive negotia-
tions. These talks have now reached an
important stage as we have just begun
to renegotiate the Azores agreement.
Portugal is a reliable partner which
wants to fully assume its responsibilities
in security terms, expects within this
context a clear understanding from its
American alliance.

'Made to reporters assembled at the
South Portico of the White House (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 20, 1982). ■

11th Report on Cyprus

[ESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
fOV. 30, 1982'

1 accordance with the provisions of Public
aw 9.5-384, I am submitting the following
!port on progress made during the past 60
ays toward reaching a negotiated settlement
f the Cyprus problem.

Intercommunal negotiations resumed on
ovember 9 following a one and one-half
lonth recess and continue to focus on
irious elements of the U.N. Secretary
eneral's evaluation document. The two par-
es remain committed to these
.N. -sponsored talks and to working for
rogress in this forum. We continue to
elieve that it represents the most fruitful
lurse for negotiating progress. The parties
re engaged in a genuine dialogue which has
lade it possible for each side to define its
ositions.

On October 6, Secretary Shultz and
ypriot President Kyprianou met in New
ork during the United Nations General
-ssembly and exchanged views on efforts to
;ach a settlement to the Cyprus problem. In

addition, Mr. Christian A. Chapman, a senior
Foreign Service Officer newly appointed by
the Secretary of State as U.S. Special Cyprus
Coordinator, traveled in early November to
Cyprus where he met with President
Kyprianou, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash,
the intercommunal negotiators, and U.N.
Special Representative Gobbi. Mr. Chapman
will coordinate our support for the efforts of
the Secretary General and Ambassador
Gobbi.

I wish once again to affirm my commit-
ment, and that of this Administration, to the
search for a just and lasting solution to the
problems of the people of Cyprus.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Day of Prayer for Poland

A PROCLAMATION'

December 13 will mark one year since the
Polish military authorities, under intense
Soviet pressure, put an end to Poland's ex-
periment in peaceful change. During this
year, the military authorities, employing
force, have intimidated and ultimately
dissolved the free trade unions with which
the Polish Government had signed solemn ac-
cords but a short time before. Thus, a gen-
uine labor movement was suppressed by a
government of generals who claim to repre-
sent the working class. Their victory, such as
it is, can only be a seeming one. The brave
people of Poland have learned during a cen-
tury and a half of foreign occupation to main-
tain their national spirit and to resist
succumbing to coercion. We are not deceived
for an instant that the silence which has now
descended on expressions of free opinion in
Poland reflects in any way the actual state of
mind of the Polish people. The censored press
and media do not speak on their behalf.
Solidarity may be technically outlawed but its
ideals of free trade unionism and nonviolent
change will never be destroyed.

This weekend offers Americans a special
opportunity to honor the Polish people and to
demonstrate our support for their struggle
for the right to determine their destiny
without interference by dictatorships, sup-
ported and incited from the outside.

'Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby designate December 12, 1982, as A
Day of Prayer for Poland and Solidarity With
the Polish People.

I invite the people of the United States to
observe this day by offering prayers for the
people of Poland and by participating in ap-
propriate ceremonies and activities to
demonstrate our continuing support for their
aspirations for greater freedom.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this 10th day of December, in
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-two, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred
and seventh.

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, 1982). ■

'No. 5004 of Dec. 10, 1982 (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 13). ■

ibruary 1983

HUMAN RIGHTS

Bill of Rights Day,
Human Rights Day
and Week, 1982

A PROCLAMATION!

On December 15, 1791, our Founding
Fathers celebrated the ratification of the first
ten Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States— a Bill of Rights which from
that moment forward helped shape a nation
unique in the annals of history. The Bill of
Rights became the formal and legal expres-
sion of our liberties and of the principles, em-
bodied in the Declaration of Independence,

The Founding Fathers derived their prin-
ciples of limited government from a belief in
natural law, that is, the concept that our
Creator had ordained a framework for socie-
ty griving great importance to individual
freedom, expression, and responsibility. They
held that each person had certain natural
rights bestowed on him by God. As Jefferson
put it, "The God who gave us life gave us
liberty."

It is with glad hearts and thankful minds
that on Bill of Rights Day we recognize and
honor this great gift of liberty bequeathed to
posterity by the Founding Fathers.

One hundred and fifty-seven years later,
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. By jointly celebrating this anniver-
sary with Bill of Rights Day, we acknowledge
the necessary link between human rights and
constitutional democracy. As stated in the
Universal Declaration, we must staunchly
pursue our conviction that freedom is not the
sole prerogative of the fortunate few, but the
inalienable and universal right of all human
beings. Throughout history and from all parts
of the globe, man's instinctive desire for
freedom and true self-determination have
surfaced again and again. Democracy has
provided the best and most enduring expres-

sion of man's search for individual rights.

We can point to many nations in the
world where there is real progress toward
the development of democratic institutions.
The people of some of those countries have
fully demonstrated their commitment to
democratic principles by participating in elec-
tions under difficult and even life-threatening
circumstances. Such displays of courage can
only inspire confidence in the future of
democracy for all people.

But in December of 1982 our satisfaction
in the progress toward human rights is
darkened by our realization that one year
ago, on December 13, 1981, the Polish
military government took steps to extinguish
the flames of liberty ignited by Solidarity. As
that totalitarian regime moved to crush
Solidarity, it laid siege to the dreams and
aspirations of a whole people reaching out for
freedom, independence, and essential human
dignity. The tragedy of the iron suppression
of the Polish people transcends the borders of
that land and reaches into the hearts of all of
us who care for the rights and well-being of
people everywhere.

On these important anniversaries let us
remember the great and abiding love of
freedom that dwells perpetually within the
heart of mankind. And let us also hope and
pray that the blessings of liberty will one day
be shared. by all people.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1982, as
Human Rights Day and December 15, 1982,
as Bill of Rights Day, and call on all
Americans to observe the week beginning
December 10, 1982, as Human Rights Week.

In Witness Whereof, 1 hereunto set my
hand this 10th day of December, in the year
of our Lord nineteen hundred and eight-two,
and of the Independence of the United States
of America the two hundred and seventh.

Ronald Reagan

'No. 5003 of Dec. 10, 1982 (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 13). ■

IHuman Rights
Policy

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
DEC. 10, 1982'

This Administration has begun to imple
ment a program of positive human
rights policy, which complements the
essentially reactive approaches which
are being made regarding specific
abuses. The President's initiative on
democracy is a manifestation of this
positive track of human rights poHcy.
The U.S. Government recognizes that
human rights conditions are best in
democracies and that democracy is the
only guarantee of human rights over thi
long haul. We believe it is essential to
support the development of democracy
by encotiraging the proponents of
democracy and by helping to build the
infrastructure of democracy in
nondemocratic countries.

The Administration's human rights
policy is characterized by a sense of
realism, a sense of the possible. While
the possible may not appear as laudablei
as the desirable, that is, while what we
can in reality accomplish in himian
rights may not appear to be very much
in comparison with what we would like
to do, we are continually making
government-to-government efforts to
promote human rights. This includes fn
quent approaches to governments in
countries which have human rights pro!
lems of major interest to human rights
groups.

We avoid public rhetoric whenever
we think diplomacy will accomplish
more, while rhetoric would damage our
ability to attain concrete results. We
seek to maintain a productive working
relationship with friendly governments
in order to be more effective on human
rights issues in private. ■

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

Department of State Bulletii

MIDDLE EAST

\f\s\\ of Jordan's
King

His Majesty King Hussein I of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an
■)fficial working visit to Washington,
D.C., December 18-23, 1982, to meet with
President Reagan and other government
ifficials.

Following are remarks made by
'^resident Reagan and King Hussein
ifter their meetings on December 21 and
13.^

DEC. 21. 1982

President Reagan

Dne of the nicest customs in the Middle
3ast is the traditional greeting, "Peace
le upon you." King Hussein's visit with
IS comes at a time of the year when
;houghts of peace are very much in our
ninds. And in our meeting today, His
Vlajesty and I have had a chance to reaf-
'irm personally the continuing friendship
)etween our two countries and to share
vith each other our hopes and dreams
ibout our common goals of a just and
asting peace in the Middle East.

As trusting friends, we've spoken to
)ne another as we always do — with can-
lor and good will. And I told the king of
ny personal commitment to see peace in
he Middle East become a true and
asting reality and of my equally deep
commitment to the proposals that we
nade September 1st to Israel, to the
Palestinians, and to the Arab states.

I also expressed America's gratitude
;o the king for his own important ac-
;ions in support of our initiative over
;hese past few months. His Majesty elo-
quently described his vision of peace and
•eviewed for us what he's been doing to
lelp give peace a chance to take root,
jarticularly his efforts to encourage the
Palestinians to join him in efforts to
:ake bold steps toward peace.

Together, we've also shared our
;houghts on what remains and must be
lone by each and all of us to give life to
:his common goal. We share a sense of
irgency to succeed at this commitment.
3ur discussion today has led to further
meetings between our staffs over the
next 2 days, and I look forward to
meeting with the king again before he
leaves Washington.

King Hussein

I thank you for the warmth of your
welcome, for the privilege and pleasure I
and my colleagues have had of meeting
with you and with our friends, and for
the opportunity to discuss many prob-
lems of mutual concern and interest and
many challenges that lie before us.

We look forward to continuing our
discussions in the coming days, and this
is an opportunity for me to reaffirm a
long-life commitment for the establish-
ment of a just and durable peace in the
Middle East. May we hope and pray that
we will succeed in making a contribution
for a better futiu-e for generations to
come in our part of the world and for
the cause of world peace.

We'll continue to do our utmost, and
we value very much, indeed, the at-
mosphere of friendship, honesty, and
candor that has characterized our rela-
tions and particularly the friendship that
exists between us. I thank you very,
very much, indeed, for your many kind-
nesses and for the privilege and pleasure
of being with you and with our friends.

DEC. 23, 1982

President Reagan

We've had extremely— and productive
talks, and I think we've made significant
progress toward peace. We have ini-
tiated a dialogue from which we should
not consider turning back.

Much work remains to be done, and
the road ahead is tough. But it's the
right road, and I remain optimistic that
direct negotiations for a just resolution
of the Palestinian problem in the context
of a real and enduring peace is within
our reach.

Your visit has served as a reminder
that the bonds of friendship that link
Jordan and the United States are as
strong as ever. And I am gratified as
well by the warmth and goodwill which
characterizes our personal relationship.

I hope we can build on these bases
in the weeks and months ahead to
achieve the objective— enduring
peace— which we and our people so fully
share.

1 wish you a safe trip and look for-
ward to our next meeting.

King Hussein

I thank you once again for the privilege
and pleasure I've had, together with my
party from Jordan, of meeting you and

being with our friends at this very im-
portant historical point in time in terms
of our common hopes, in terms of the
future of the area I come from and the
future of generations to come.

To the skeptics, I would like to say
that it has been, in my view, a very suc-
cessful visit. I believe that we have an
understanding of each other's views bet-
ter than at any time in the past.

I can also seek to advise our friends
that Jordan has been committed for the
cause of establishing a just and durable
peace. It has been our record since 1967.
This was reemphasized by the first sum-
mit, representing the view and the con-
sensus -of the entire Arab world. And I
hope that I've been able, on this visit, to
assure you and our friends of our deter-
mination to do all in our power for the
establishment of a just and durable
peace in the Middle East.

We will go back to our area. We will
be in close contact over the coming
period with our brethren there. There is
much that we will take back with us.
And we hope to be in touch again — I
hope to have the privilege and pleasure
of being with you before too long.

Rest assured of our commitment to
the cause of future generations, their
rights to live in peace and security in
our entire area. I hope that we can con-
tribute our share for a better, safer,
more stable life for generations to come
in the Middle East.

Thank you so much for your many
kindnesses and your warm welcome.
And may I also wish you a very Merry
Christmas and a very Happy New Year.

'Texts from White House press
releases. ■

'ebruary 1983

NARCOTICS

U.S. International Narcotics
Control Policy

in Southeast Asia

by Dominick L. DiCarlo

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Crime of the Hoicse Judiciary Com-
mittee on December U, 1982. Mr.
DiCarlo is Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Narcotics Matters. '

The international narcotics control policy
of the U.S. Government, endorsed by
the President and the Secretary of
State, is expressed in the recently
released Federal strategy. This policy
contains four basic elements:

• The major narcotics producer na-
tions are all signatories to the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, under
which each country has responsibility for
controlling the cultivation, production,
and trafficking in narcotics.

• The international community
should assist those nations which need
help in controlling production and
distribution of illicit substances.

• Crop control, which can be
achieved through government bans,
chemical or manual eradication at the
source, or controlled reductions to
legitimate quotas, is the most effective,
efficient, and economical means of
reducing the availability of opium, co-
caine, cannabis, and their derivatives.
Our corollary policy for the psychotropic
drugs, which are controlled by a
separate international convention, is to
seek limits on imports and exports and
to curtail illicit diversion.

• Narcotics-related economic
assistance, by the U.S. Government or
international organizations, should be
conditioned on concurrent agreements
on the control of narcotics production.

When implementing these policies,
there are a number of considerations
which affect and influence our program
strategy for each country and world-
wide. The principle considerations, all of
which are relevant to our strategy for
Southeast Asia, are:

• While there have been notable
achievements in crop control and inter-
diction efforts, these successes, in recent
years, have been marginal in terms of
reducing worldwide availability of
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.

• Interdiction efforts, which include
arrests, seizures of drugs in transit, and
capturing of financial assets are not ade-
quate in terms of worldwide impact,
given current levels of production and
profitability.

• Comprehensive crop control pro-
grams are not now politically negotiable
or operationally feasible in every pro-
ducer country.

• Both producer and transit nations
are increasingly impacted by domestic
drug abuse problems — as are the major
industrialized, consumer nations — fac-
tors which present improved oppor-
tunities for both control agreements and
increased international support.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Production

Opium and heroin are the target drugs
for both U.S. and foreign government
control activities in Southeast Asia. Two
successive droughts significantly lowered
Southeast Asian production from its
estimated levels of 550-660 metric tons
per year to an estimated 180 metric tons
in 1979 and 210 metric tons in 1980,
resulting in steep price increases for
opium at the farm gate and the displace-
ment of Southeast Asian heroin in both
European and American markets.

However, we estimate that, with ex-
cellent growing conditions in the
1980-81 and 1981-82 crop years, Golden
Triangle production may have reached
record harvests of 600 to 700 tons.

The changing market profile for
Southeast Asian heroin is shown in the
following chart.

These data, when fitted with reports
from other growing sectors, especially
Mexico and Southwest Asia, underscore
critical points about the U.S. heroin
market.

In the years following the peak im-
portation of 7.5 tons of heroin in 1975,
the United States experienced a decline
in heroin imports, due in part to declin-
ing demand and concurrent with the sue
cessful Mexican opium poppy eradicatioi
program and to the drought in South-
east Asia. These latter supply factors
altered the profile of U.S. imports. In
1979, Southwest Asia surpassed
Southeast Asia as the prime source of
U.S. heroin and has, subsequently,
dominated the U.S. market. Total im-
ports of heroin from all sources have
stabilized at approximately 4.5 tons of
heroin per year. While drought, low
prices, and a government ban on cultiva
tion sharply reduced Pakistani produc-
tion in 1980, 1981, and 1982, there is
still a considerable stockpile from a 197!
Pakistani harvest of 700-800 tons and a
continuing flow of opium from Afghan-
istan.

Thus, with this current increased
Southeast Asian availability, there is, at
least, the possibility of increased impor-
tation from all three sectors — including
Mexico — where cultivation has reported
ly expanded. There are indications that
traffickers connected with Southeast
Asian producers are attempting to re-
capture markets in the United States
and Europe, while expanding markets ii
Southeast Asia, and seeking new
markets in Australia and New Zealand.
At present, an estimated 10% of heroin
imported into the United States orig-
inates in the Golden Triangle; the
prediction is that this figure will in-
crease to 15% in 1983. Southeast Asian
heroin dominates the Canadian market,
and its availability there is increasing.

Lessons can be inferred from these
data.

First, despite some expansion in
crop control and increased interdiction

Production of 1976-82 Metric Tons of Opium*

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

Burma

Thailand

Laos

400
50
60

300
45
50

325

70
50

125

17
40

160
12
40

500-600
50
40-60

500-600
60-70**
50

Total

510

395

445

182

212

590-710

610-720

•Year to year comparisons of estimates may be useful in identifying trends,
data reflect ongoing refinements of estimating methodologies.

"The Thai production estimates for 1979-82 were based on a comprehensive
survey, rather than on an estimative methodology.

but these
• aerial

Department of State Bulleti

NARCOTICS

efforts, the U.S. heroin market remains
vulnerable to changes in production
levels and distribution patterns— which,
like the droughts in the two Asian areas,
are more influential at present on that
market than our enforcement efforts.

Second, to achieve our ultimate ob-
jective of reducing heroin imports into
the United States, international narcotic
control activities must be directed com-
prehensively and simultaneously at all
three of the major opium-producing
areas.

Third, greater emphasis must be
placed on crop control, given the limita-
tions on interdiction and other enforce-
ment efforts to cope with production at
these levels.

Fourth, given political and economic
realities, we must recognize that control
of production in Southeast Asia will not
be easily or quickly achieved.

Growing Areas

Opium is grown in northern Thailand,
the Shan State of eastern Burma and
the Kachin State of northeastern Bur-
ma, and western Laos— the area known
as the Golden Triangle. The United
States has had limited information about
Laotian narcotics activity since the for-
mation of the Socialist Government, and,
except as specifically noted, the
references to the Golden Triangle in the
ensuing discussions pertain to Burma
and Thailand.

The opium growing areas of all
three countries of the Golden Triangle
are largely remote, trackless, and
rugged, inhabited by ethnically distinc-
tive tribal people — hill tribes which have
grown opium for decades as their major
cash crop. These hill tribes people —
Shan, Kachin, Karen, Lisu, and Lahu,
among others — have historically prac-
ticed a "slash and burn" method of
agriculture which exhausts the soil and
destroys the natural erosion control of
trees and plants so that much of the
area is no longer arable. In addition to
providing a guaranteed, although labor
intensive, cash crop, opium has
historically satisfied their medicinal re-
quirements.

In Thailand the principal opium
growing areas are in Chiang Mai,
Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, and Nan
Provinces, with lesser amounts grown in
adjacent northern provinces. The
Burmese area of intensive cultivation
spans a region of mountains and jungle
encompassing most of the Shan Plateau
running from the eastern Kachin State
along the China border down nearly 600
miles into the Kayah State, with the

most intensive area of cultivation east of
the Salween River and north of
Kengtung. This area has traditionally
provided a stable, cheap, and plentiful
supply of opium for the international
market.

Trafficking Organizations

Trafficking in opium in the Golden
Triangle is controlled by various
ethnically based insurgent, revolu-
tionary, and warlord groups. The
Burmese Communist Party (BCP), the
Shan United Army (SUA), the Lahu Na-
tional Liberation Army, and others have
turned increasingly to narcotics produc-
tion and trafficking to finance their ac-
tivities. Several of these groups control
the refining of opium into heroin.

Warlord armies control the majority
of the narcotics trafficking in the Golden
Triangle and the refining in the Thai-
Burma border area. Most of these
groups masquerade as ethnic insurgents.

were forced out of Burma in 1961.
These groups, which are currently
estimated to have 2,500-3,000 men in
arms, are the remnants and descendants
of nationalist Chinese groups which
retreated into Burma and Thailand from
1948-19.52. In 1972, the United States
supported a Thai Government effort to
remove the CIF from the narcotics
trade. In exchange for the CIF's prom-
ise in 1972 to refrain from further in-
volvement in narcotics, the Thai Govern-
ment provided financial assistance and
permission for legal residence in
Thailand. Subsequently, it has become
clear that, while some CIF narcotics ac-
tivity may have been reduced, the CIF
has not ended its involvement as prom-
ised.

In 1972 and 1973, warlord leader Lo
Hsing Han made a major attempt to
supplant the CIF, in alliance with other
insurgent and warlord groups, including
the Shan State Army. Lo's effort to con-
trol the narcotics trade was aborted

At present, an estimated 10% of heroin im-
ported into the United States originates in the
Golden Triangle; [northern Thailand, the Shan
State of eastern Burma and the Kachin State of
northeastern Burma, and western Laos] the predic-
tion is that this figure will increase to 15% in 1983.

are well-armed, and are organized along
military lines. The soldiers may be Shan,
Aka, Lahu, or Lisu; most of the leaders
are Chinese, Sino-Thai, or Sino-
Burmese. Many have a history of in-
volvement with the Kuomintang miUtary
units, some with ties reaching back to
World War II. In Burma, several of
these units were Kha Kwe Yei, the so-
called Burmese militia units deputized by
Rangoon in 1967 to fight the Burmese
Communist Party. All of these groups
were officially outlawed by 1973. Today,
their activities cover a broad range of il-
legal enterprises ranging from narcotics
trafficking and refining to smuggling
consumer goods into Burma. Over the
past decade, the most significant traf-
ficking groups have been the Chinese Ir-
regular Forces (CIF) and the SUA.

From the early 1950s to about 1975,
most of the Golden Triangle narcotics
trafficking was controlled by the 3d and
5th Chinese Irregular Forces, which
were headquartered in Thailand at Tam
Ngop and Mae Salong, after their bases

with his arrest in 1973 by the Thai
Government and extradition to Burma
for trial and imprisonment. In 1975, the
first of the Burmese Government's
"Mohein" military operations seized the
most important of the CIF's narcotics
refineries and stockpiles, dealing a
serious blow to CIF domination of the
narcotics trade.

Burmese Government military
operations during the 1973-1977 period
also brought an end to the immense
mule caravans that formerly transported
opium south out of Burma and across
mountainous ridges into Thailand. To
avoid increasingly vigorous Burmese at-
tacks and to reduce the chance of detec-
tion, traffickers began using smaller
caravans and resorting to human car-
riers.

Warlord Chang Chi-Fu — or, Khun
Sa — took advantage of the disruptions
caused by these Burmese antinarcotics
measures against other larger and
established trafficking groups, and after

February 1983

NARCOTICS

1975 expanded his narcotics operations.
Described as a rebellious former
Burmese militia commander, Chang Chi-
Fu was under Burmese confinement
from 1969-1975, when he escaped. By
1978 and 1979, Chang Chi-Fu and the
SUA had secured control of about two-
thirds of Golden Triangle heroin produc-
tion. Headquartered in the Thai border
town of Ban Hin Taek, Chang built up
an extensive network of contacts in
Thailand as security against attacks by
the Thai Government. He also attempted
to develop a propaganda image as a
popular Burmese ethnic insurgent leader
and an image as a security bulwark for
Thailand against advances by the
Burmese Communist Party. These ef-
forts were far more successful in the
west than in Burma.

Chang occasionally provided soldiers
to the Thai military for counterinsurgen-
cy operations. Chang, who has period-
ically entered into extensive business ar-
rangements with the Burmese Com-
munist Party, is now a prime target for
the antinarcotics actions of the Rangoon
and Bangkok Governments.

In February 1980, the Burmese
Government, which outlawed the
3,500-man SUA Army in 1971, attacked
SUA narcotics refineries in the Lao Lo
Chai area. Over the border, the Royal
Thai Government, after several less ef-
fective measures against Chang, offered
the equivalent of a $25,000 reward for
his arrest and then increased efforts to
insure Thai control over the area around
Ban Hin Taek. These efforts culminated
in the January 21, 1982 assault by Thai
border patrol police and the Thai Air
Force on Ban Hin Taek.

This military operation resulted in
the destruction of SUA barracks and
Chang's home, and in the capture of
significant amounts of military and com-
munications equipment, arms, and muni-
tions. While large quantities of opium or
heroin were not seized, there was some
disruption of the last stages of the
opium harvest in the Chang Rai area
and some interruption of refinery opera-
tions. While the raid succeeded in driv-
ing most of the SUA out of Thailand,
Chang Chi-Fu was not captured.

However, the raid, the loss of
life — 16-17 Thai police and a greater
number of the SUA— and the resultant
publicity have apparently raised the con-
sciousness of the Thai Government and
public to the dangers of allowing nar-
cotics traffickers to control significant
portions of Thai territory. When the
SUA attempted to reestablish itself in
Thailand, the Thai responded with a sec-
ond military action in May, which again

sent Chang Chi-Fu's forces across the
border into Burma. A third, extensive
assault involving Tahan Prahan ir-
regulars, the border patrol police, and
the Air Force occurred in October and
November. It resulted in destruction of
the SUA's third headquarters in less
than a year, destruction of a refinery,
and seizure of some opiates as well as
lab equipment.

We expect continued pressure by
both the Thai and the Burmese against
the SUA. The Thai Government has
assured the United States that it will
continue to pursue Chang and prevent
his establishing an army again in
another area of Thailand.

At the same time, the Thai have
targeted other warlord groups and
heroin traffickers, such as the Shan
United Revolutionary Army and the 3d
and 5th CIFs, and we expect the Thai
and Burmese Governments to continue
their pressure, particularly against other
trafficking groups which may attempt to
replace the SUA. The Burmese Govern-
ment is keeping a close watch on Lo
Hsing Han, freed in a 1980 amnesty, to
prevent his reinvolvement with nar-
cotics.

An important factor in the current
assessment is the full-scale move by the
Burmese Communist Party into nar-
cotics after 1978-79. Narcotics traffick-
ing by BCP elements prior to 1978 ap-
pears to have been the work of in-
dividuals without explicit approval by
the party leadership. However, in 1978
and 1979, the BCP appeared to have
begun compensating for a sharp reduc-
tion, if not elimination, of Chinese
assistance by resorting to party-
sponsored and centrally directed cultiva-
tion of and trading in opium — including
association with the SUA. Today, the
BCP has an estimated armed strength
of 10,000-12,000 men— with a 30,000
man militia as well — and controls large
areas of Burma, particularly in the Shan
Plateau, which are centers of opium pop-
py cultivation. The BCP has moved
closer to the Thai-Burmese border
recently and has involved itself more
directly in the refining and trafficking of
opium and heroin, as well as cultivation.

The anticipation is that the BCP will
attempt to expand its narcotics opera-
tions and profits at the expense of other
groups. This has brought it into direct
conflict with the SUA, in what has
historically been a constantly shifting
pattern of alliances, betrayals, and
realignments among trafficking groups.

In addition to the narcotics traffick-
ing by warlord, revolutionary, and in-
surgent groups, there are a number of

smaller syndicates, and independents,
who from time to time are involved in
trafficking or refining or both. Often,
they pay a percentage fee to one of the
major trafficking groups for refining
facilities or protection.

Refining

Narcotics refining in the Golden
Triangle occurs primarily in Burma.
Many of the refineries are located a few
kilometers of the Thai border, allowing
ready movement of the facilities and
their products into Thailand as the need
arises.

An understanding of the nature and
character of this refining process is as
important to assessing the difficulties of
controlling Southeast Asian production
as is the understanding of the traffick-
ing system and the principal traffickers.
The typical refinery is located in rough
terrain dominated by jungle-covered
ridges, near small streams. The equip-
ment is easily dismantled and fairly
primitive; enameled pots or copper vats,
strainers and filters, pans, trays, and a
simple heating source, usually a
charcoal-fueled stove. The chemicals,
particularly acetic anhydride, are
primarily supplied illegally through
Thailand or Malaysia. The heroin
chemists are generally ethnic Chinese
who reside at the refineries.

The laboratories refine the morphine
base — pit'zu — into either heroin number
3 — smoking variety — or heroin number
4, which is 95% pure and suitable for in-
travenous injections. The raw opium,
particularly from Burma, is reduced to
morphine base very close to the poppy
fields for convenience of travel, since the
process reduces the opium by a factor of
10 to 1.

Recently, a refined form of heroin
base — a step between pit'zu and heroin 3
or 4 — has been discovered by narcotics
agents, especially in Hong Kong. This
heroin base is particularly prized by the
professional narcotics trafficker because
it can be refined by a relatively simple
process into heroin 3 or 4.

Distribution

The vast majority of the narcotics mov-
ing out of the Golden Triangle continues
to cross the Thai-Burma frontier, which
remains the primary site of the region's
heroin refineries, but, today, trafficking
is often accomplished by truck or river-
boat. While most Golden Triangle nar-
cotics are transported out of Burma's

Department of State Bulletin

NARCOTICS

Shan State and across Thailand to reach
the outside world, new routes have also
been developed along the Burmese
Tenassirim coast to Malaysia, or south
through central Burma to the Andaman
Sea, and then to Malaysia and Sing-
apore. Because of its long seacoast, ex-
tensive river system, and large numbers
of fishing boats, it is quite difficult to
control narcotics traffic in, around, and
through Thailand.

Many syndicates or combinations of
syndicates and individuals control the in-
ternational trafficking. Big-time traf-
fickers usually are well-connected and
successful in avoiding arrest. Hong
Kong, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and
Singapore, as well as Bangkok, provide
way stations for international narcotics
traffic and banking facilities for
"laundering" the enormous amounts of
money generated by the narcotics trade.
Procedurally, established trafficking
groups control the refining operations,
while groups of financiers pool their
resources to purchase a quantity of
heroin from a refinery. They then locate
a courier to carry the narcotics to a
point of debarkation and additional
couriers are found to smuggle the ship-
ment to the country of destination. In
addition to these organizations, there
are casual overseas purchasers, fre-
quently addicts, who come to Thailand
to make a purchase and attempt to
smuggle it out of Thailand.

Major international airports remain
the preferred departure areas for traf-
fickers, although Customs seizures
significantly increase the risks. In an ef-
fort to deceive Customs officials,
couriers are taking circuitous routes,
which include the People's Republic of
China.

Social, Political, and Economic
Factors

While the patterns of narcotics produc-
tion and trafficking have modernized
since the mid-1970s, when opium
caravans transversed Burma and
Thailand almost without interruption,
there have also been important changes
in the impact this production and traf-
ficking have had on governments,
economies, and indigenous popula-
tions— social, political, and economic im-
pact that, to some still undetermined
degree, represent new motivations for
increased narcotics control activities.

One of the most significant factors
affecting the attitudes of some Thai and
Burmese leaders toward narcotics is the

recognition that their own people have
developed serious addiction problems.
While opium consumption and addiction
have been traditional and generally
tolerated, addicts are no longer
relegated to opium dens in "China
Town" or in the hill tribes; there are
now large heroin-using populations, in-
cluding young, primarily urban, addicts.

The Thai Government estimates its
heroin addict population at 300,000-
500,000 people, out of a population of 48
million. In addition, marijuana is readily
available throughout the country, and
there are increasing reports of misuse of
tranquilizers, barbiturates, am-
phetamines, and morphine. It is
estimated there are over 100,000 opiate
addicts in Burma which reports 32,000
registered opiate addicts. Malaysia, a
major consumer of Golden Triangle nar-
cotics, has from 100,000-300,000 heroin
addicts out of a population of 14 million;
69,000 of these addicts are registered.
These heroin addict populations are pro-
portionately higher than that of the
United States, which has an estimated
450,000 addicts out of a population of
230 million people.

The fact that much of the Golden
Triangle's narcotics production is con-
sumed within the region has important
implications for the Burmese and Thai
Governments as well as our own. It
creates a significant hidden economy
which evades taxation, frustrates eco-
nomic policies, and distorts economic ac-
tivities. The funds derived from this
local consumption provide a resource

disincentives for a stable national policy
and economy and discourages positive
action against other criminal activities
often linked to narcotics.

Cities in Asia, like Bangkok, Kuala
Lumpur, and some areas of Hong Kong,
have serious crime problems, and, while
a direct connection between addiction
and street crime is not always easy to
substantiate, narcotics activities are
often interconnected with other criminal
activities such as prostitution and
gambling.

Regional Strategy

The Department believes that a multi-
faceted approach is essential to achiev-
ing our narcotics reduction objectives in
Southeast Asia.

Our narcotics control strategy for
the Southeast Asian region is to
stimulate governments to take effective
action against illicit drug production and
major trafficking that will achieve the
objective of reducing the availability of
Southeast Asian narcotics in the United
States.

Diplomatically, we impress upon
governments in this region — and all
other regions — their national responsi-
bilities under treaties to control illicit
narcotic cultivation, production, and
trafficking. We recognize that some
governments need assistance in fulfilling
these obligations, and we provide bi-
lateral assistance for crop control and
interdiction programs on a country-
specific and regional basis, as well as

Narcotics refining and trafficking feed on cor-
ruption and encourage it. The corruption of public
officials provides disincentives for a stable na-
tional policy and economy and discourages positive
action against other criminal activities often linked
to narcotics.

and financial base independent of the
large profits from the overseas trade,
and finances insurgencies and terrorism.

The growing domestic addict popula-
tions add immeasurably to internal social
and health care problems, and debilitates
users, many of whom are youths. The
welfare costs are also significant.

Narcotics refining and trafficking
feed on corruption and encourage it. The
corruption of public officials provides

support through multilateral U.N. pro-
grams. This assistance not only en-
courages governments in the region to
undertake programs but is critically im-
portant to the success of those ini-
tiatives.

The United States recognizes that
crop control can impact on local
economies in producing countries, which
are generally underdeveloped and re-
source-poor, and we, therefore, provide

February 1983

NARCOTICS

or stimulate income replacement proj-
ects where appropriate.

The United States also provides
technical assistance for demand reduc-
tion programs, and, through funding for
training by the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) and U.S. Customs,
we provide training to foreign law en-
forcement personnel.

While our regional strategy is heavi-
ly focused on Thailand and Burma, the
Bureau also supports program initiatives
to other countries through our East
Asian regional project.

Our Bureau of International Nar-
cotics Matters (INM) has budgeted
$7,700,000 for programs in East Asia in
FY 1983. Expenditures totaled
$9,257,000 in FY 1982. The higher FY
1982 figure chiefly represents a one-time
replacement of aircraft for the Burmese
program.

In the balance of our testimony, we
provide details — on a country-by-country
basis — on host country programs in crop
control, interdiction, and demand reduc-
tion, as well as data on the assistance
provided by United States agencies, in-
ternational organizations, and other
foreign governments. These country
reports include our assessments of the
effectiveness of these efforts, the prob-
lems encountered, and prospects for
future effectiveness.

coca, methaqualone, cannabis, am-
phetamines, or chemicals for conversion
or refining of opium. There is some licit
production of barbiturate pills or cap-
sules from imported powder.

The primary goal of the United
States is to assist the Royal Thai
Government in reducing as rapidly as
possible the amount of opiates produced
in and transmitted through Thailand.

Social, Economic, and Political
Environment. Although opium has
historically been an economic and
sociological fact of life in Thailand, inter-
national trafficking of finished narcotics
from Thailand — and other countries in
Southeast Asia — began in the 1960s in
large part as a result of the buildup of
U.S. military forces in Indochina. U.S.
military personnel in Thailand and Viet-
nam provided a ready market for No. 4
injectable heroin, while No. 3 smoking
heroin was being produced for local con-
sumption and for shipment to newly ex-
panded markets in Europe. Although
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Southeast Asia from 1973-1975 caused a
temporary curtailment of the No. 4
heroin market, a replacement market
made up of the indigenous populations in
Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia
developed rapidly, as did new markets in
Europe and the United States.

Thai officials historically were relaxed about
narcotics grown, refined, transported through, or
shipped from their country since there was little
perceived narcotics problem among ethnic Thai . . .
however, in the 10 years since the withdrawal of
U.S. forces, a serious local drug abuse problem has
developed, and concern has increased.

COUNTRY REPORTS

Thailand

Thailand is a grower of opium, a pro-
ducer of refined opiates, and the major
country of transshipment for Southeast
Asian heroin. It also has a large addict
population.

The U.S. Government's drug effort
in Thailand focuses on opiates — opium,
morphine base, and heroin — although
cannabis is also grown in Thailand.
There is no licit production of opium.

Thai officials historically were re-
laxed about narcotics grown, refined,
transported through, or shipped from
their country since there was little
perceived narcotics problem among
ethnic Thai. Opium smoking — primarily
limited to the Chinese in the cities and
hill tribes in the countryside — was
banned by the King in the early 1960s,
but the extensive sales of 90% pure
heroin to American military in Thailand
did not arouse major official Thai con-
cern. However, in the 10 years since the
withdrawal of U.S. forces, a serious

local drug abuse problem has developed,
and concern has increased.

The narcotics problem in Thailand
has not been given the highest priority
by the Thai Government. Problems of in-
ternal security, refugees, relations with
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the
economy are of more immediate concern
to both the Thai Government and the
public. On the other hand, the govern-
ment does devote considerable amounts
of funding and manpower to antinar-
cotics efforts. Unfortunately, the results
have not always been consistent with the
amounts of time, money, and manpower
expended.

Efforts at Drug Control to Date.

The U.S. objective of reducing the pro-
duction in and transshipment through
Thailand of opium and heroin can be
achieved by thorough, efficient, and ef-
fective Thai enforcement of the ban on
opium growing, supported by interdic-
tion and other law enforcement pro-
grams, alternative crop substitution,
treatment rehabilitation, and prevention
education. An immediate goal of the
United States is to assist in the develop-
ment of Thai institutional capabilities to
deal with the narcotics problem. Nar-
cotics control assistance since FY 1972
has amounted to some $23 million; INM
has budgeted $2,475,000 for Thailand in
FY 1983.

Law Enforcement. The Thai na-
tional police has been the primary nar-
cotics suppression body in Thailand.
Police Gen. Pow Sarasin, Secretary
General of the Office of Narcotics Con-
trol Board (ONCB), and his deputy. Gen.
Chavalit Yodmani, are the key officials
coordinating narcotics control policy and
programs. Since 1973 special police nar-
cotics suppression centers have had
units in Chiang Mai, Bangkok, and Haad
Yai. In addition, the Bangkok Metropoli-
tan Narcotics Unit is a specialized unit
in the capital. The Thai border patrol
police have traditionally conducted nar-
cotics operations, primarily in the north
along the Thai-Burma and Thai-Lao
borders. Royal Thai Customs has special
units at international embarkation-
debarkation points.

The United States has provided both
equipment and training to Thai law en-
forcement entities. Thai Customs nar-
cotics units increased from 7 to 84
members in the last few years. Customs
and DEA training in methods of nar-
cotics interdiction, investigation tech-
niques, and teaching methodology is
geared toward assisting the Thai

Department of State Bulletin

NARCOTICS

enforcement agencies to become self-
sufficient in narcotic law enforcement.

The Thai Government realized in
early 1982 that its ad hoc efforts to sup-
press the heroin trafficking groups
based in Thailand and operating along
the Thai-Burma border needed to be
placed on a continuous basis. The
department, by reprogramming funds
available almost entirely within the Thai
program budget, was able to respond to
a Royal Thai Army request for material
and operational support of five to six
companies, which would provide sus-
tained suppression of these trafficking
groups. Begun last June, this force has
now been trained and is deployed in the
most contested area of the Thai-Burma
border. The results of these activities
and expectations of ongoing action were
detailed earlier. Reprogrammed FY
1983 funds bring the total budget for
this project to $2.1 million for 1 year
ending May 1983.

There has been a recent decline in
the availability of precursor chemicals
such as acetic anhydride used to refine
opium into heroin, as a result of Thai en-
forcement of a "chemical free zone" in
northern Thailand. The amount of acetic
anhydride reaching the northwest
border refineries by traditional routes
has dropped significantly, while prices
have increased, and some refining ac-
tivities have apparently moved to both
sides of the Thai-Malaysia border.

U.S. collaborative programs in nar-
cotics production control, demand reduc-
tion, and enforcement are largely pro-
grammed with the ONCB which is the
coordinating agency on narcotics mat-
ters, working through the Department
of Technical and Economic Cooperation
(DTEC), the agency designed to repre-
sent the Thai Government in matters
relating to grant assistance programs
with donor countries.

Crop Substitution Eradication.

Thai Government crop substitution ef-
forts have been carried out for over 15
years, originating with the "King's Proj-
ect," in Chiang Mai Province. Eight
years ago, the U.N. Fund for Drug
Abuse Control (UNFDAC) became in-
volved in the programs. Our objective is
' to support the UNFDAC efforts and a
U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) rural development proj-
ect in the Mae Chaem watershed area.
For many opium farmers in the hill
tribes of northern Thailand, opium has
been the principal and sometimes only
cash crop. Rice production in many
areas is insufficient to meet subsistence

February 1983

requirements. While there has been
some limited success with such new
crops as potatoes, beans, and coffee,
new crops have not "caught on" suffi-
ciently either in interest or market value
to be a disincentive to poppy cultivation.
Although the programs have been suc-
cessful in introducing new crops to
limited numbers of farmers, they have,
thus far, had very limited success in
reducing the numbers of acres planted
with opium poppies, since the Thai
Government has yet to take effective ac-
tion in enforcement of its opium grow-
ing ban. We now have a commitment
from the Thai to develop, by early 1983,
a comprehensive opium eradication
strategy. Without adequate enforcement
of the ban — including destruction of
opium fields — opium will continue to be
grown by the hill tribes because it is a
guaranteed, remunerative cash crop
with returns that have increased
significantly over the years.

A promising recent development has
been the voluntary surrender of opium
stockpiles and a pledge by a few hill
tribe villages to abandon cultivation in
return for specific transitional assist-
ance. We have undertaken to support
Thai civil-military authorities in two
such cases and are seeking a firm com-
mitment on a third case.

Demand Reduction. Demand reduc-
tion programs in Thailand include
prevention, treatment, and rehabilita-
tion. The Thai Government actively sup-
ports demand reduction, as demon-
strated by a relatively high level of
cooperation and coordination between
the Bangkok Metropolitan Health
Department, the ONCB, and the
Ministry of Health. The overall project
goal is to reduce the demand for nar-
cotics in Thailand, prevent further
spread of drug abuse to rural areas, and
stimulate increased cooperation with law
enforcement agencies through increased
public and official awareness of the
social impact of addiction.

The U.S. program provides training,
technical assistance, and a modest
amount of equipment for treatment and
prevention. This project agreement on
prevention, which emphasizes increasing
Thai awareness of its drug abuse prob-
lems and preventive education by the
schools and media, is to continue the
program through FY 1984.

Other Government Agencies. The

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
has been funding crop substitution, re-
search, and extension activities in
Thailand since 1973. This program is

funded at $500,000 in 1981 and 1982.
The program objective is to identify
viable alternative agricultural cropping
systems to replace income from opium
poppy production. The USAID Mae
Chaem project of rural development in
an opium growing watershed was signed
in August 1980 to raise the standard of
living of the hill tribe people in the area.
The initial U.S. contribution was $4.2
million, but a total U.S. contribution of
$10 million is anticipated over a 7-year
period. The Thai Government has
agreed to provide $11 million as its con-
tribution to the agreement to control
opium poppy cultivation in the project
area. The U.S. Information Agency sup-
ports U.S. narcotics control objectives
through a modest information program
on prevention and by dissemination of
policy and program information.

International Organizations and
Other Countries. As noted, the U.N.
Fund for Drug Abuse Control has an ac-
tive pilot crop substitution program
which has received logistical and agri-
cultural resource support from the
USDA and State Department narcotics
program in Thailand. The U.N. contribu-
tion is $2.4 million for 5 years matched
by $1,235,800 in Thai funds. UNFDAC
recently evaluated this project and ex-
tended it for 2 years, with gceater Thai
involvement. UNFDAC is implementing
several programs for treatment,
rehabilitation, prevention, and research
projected at almost $2 million with $9
million matching Thai funding over a
4-year period. This program would build
upon U.S. programs in demand reduc-
tion.

The Colombo Plan spends $10,000
annually, primarily in training and con-
ferences. The Thai contribute $5,000 per
year to the plan.

The Federal Republic of Germany
has initiated a crop substitution project
in northern Thailand with the orienta-
tion phase cost of almost $90,000 to be
matched by a Thai Government contribu-
tion of almost $73,000.

An $80 million World Bank rural
development project in northern
Thailand will include several opium
growing areas but has not yet been
implemented.

Canada has provided $200,000 for
narcotic related projects in health and
crop substitution and training. The
United Kingdom has provided some
commodities, a coffee expert, and
$50,000 each year to Thai law enforce-
ment. New Zealand, P^rance, and Japan
provide funds for educational grants and

NARCOTICS

other crop substitution programs. In re-
cent discussions, we have encouraged
the Japanese to provide assistance to ad-
vance narcotics control.

Other U.S. Assistance. In FY 1982,
the United States contributed $79
million to Thailand for military
assistance programs, $27 million for
development assistance, $5 million in
economic support funds (ESF), and $2
million for U.S. Peace Corps activities.

Prospects for the Future. Although
the U.S. narcotics assistance program
has been active in Thailand for some
time, success, particularly in terms of
controlling the "choke points" of entry of
refined heroin from Burma, has not
been in keeping with the amount of
funds expended. Recent military and
police actions against the SUA represent
a major breakthrough, demonstrating a
determined Thai commitment to sup-
press the heroin trafficking organiza-
tions on the Thai-Burma border. We are
assured of continued, expanded suppres-
sion efforts. However, there has been
limited success in interdiction. The
United States is hopeful that many Thai
will increasingly understand the impor-
tance of controlling opium production,
refining, and heroin trafficking — for
their own social and economic well-being
and to overcome the international
notoriety of being the primary conduit
for illicit drugs in East Asia.

Thus, while we applaud the govern-
ment's military actions against the SUA,
and look forward to the opium control
strategy promised for early 1983, we are
disappointed that the Thai have thus far
failed to enforce the opium poppy ban
effectively, even in areas which have
benefited from the U.N. crop substitu-
tion program.

Burma

Burma is the primary opium growing
area in Southeast Asia. The U.S. objec-
tive is to reduce the flow of Burmese
opium and heroin into the international
and U.S. markets. Our bilateral program
of assistance is very important to the
Burmese; the dangers both of domestic
narcotics abuse and international nar-
cotics traffic are well understood by the
highest officials of the Socialist Republic
of the Union of Burma and throughout
most elements of Burmese society.

Burma is committed to eliminating
domestic drug abuse, reducing opium
production, and destroying organizations
which grow and traffic in narcotics. The

Burmese have developed programs in-
volving military and paramilitary opera-
tions in narcotics source areas against
narcotics caravans and refugees, as well
as route interdiction, law enforcement,
treatment, rehabilitation, crop substitu-
tion and destruction, education, and
propaganda programs.

Social, Economic, and Political
Environment. For the Burmese Govern-
ment, illicit narcotics pose a combination
of social, political, and security prob-
lems— all interrelated.

The social problem of narcotics in
Burma is both historical and modern.
Opium usage and addiction in Burma are
not a recent phenomena. The hill tribe
growers of the area historically have
consumed the opium for medicinal pur-
poses as well as for general addiction. In
1942, when the British evacuated Burma
in the face of the advancing Japanese
Army, there were 50,000 registered
opium addicts.

The increasing world focus on the
role played by Burma's opium crop in in-
ternational trafficking has led to concern
by the government over its international
image. In 1974 Burma passed a strict
narcotics and dangerous drug law. Since
then, antidrug efforts have been given a
high priority by the government and the
general population. The Burmese en-
forcement agencies and courts enforce
narcotics laws vigorously and generally
impose severe sentences on convicted of-
fenders. Sentences of 5 years' imprison-
ment for illegal narcotics usage are not
uncommon. Convicted peddlers and traf-
fickers inevitably receive long prison
sentences, with 10 years generally the
minimum. On December 15, 1980, the
Burmese Government issued an order
establishing rewards for seizures of nar-
cotics and other contraband. This
reward system may increase the amount
of narcotics seized in Burma.

Burma's narcotics problem is inter-
twined with the insurgency problem.
Since independence in 1948, the
Rangoon Government has been plagued
by rebellious groups seeking national
power — Burmese Communist Par-
ty— and by ethnic minorities seeking
autonomy for their regions — the Shan,
Kachin, and Lahu insurgency groups, to
name a few. To these groups have been
added several powerful armed bands of
narcotics traffickers, usually ethnic
Chinese, at least in leadership. As
previously noted, these groups are
heavily dependent upon the opium trade
for their income, arms purchases, and
other activities.

A significant reduction in opium pro-
duction and trading would affect some
areas of Burma more than others. The
economy in the eastern Shan State ap-
pears to be heavily dependent upon
opium revenues. For some hill tribes,
opium in the past has been an acceptable
and valued cash crop. The recent pro-
hibition against opium growing and the
subsequent Burmese eradication pro-
grams have taken away some disposable
income from growers, but the majority
of growers were rarely dependent upon
opium for their total livelihood.

Efforts at Drug Control to Date.

U.S. assistance has been significant in
supporting Burmese antinarcotics ef-
forts—some $47 million over the last 10
years. INM has budgeted $5 million for
Burma in FY 1983.

American-Burmese cooperation
against illicit narcotics began with a
June 1974 bilateral agreement, effected
by an exchange of notes between the
American Ambassador and the head of
the Burmese People's Police. Under the
terms of this agreement, and subsequent
amendments, and the current project
agreement, the United States provides
Burma with helicopters, fixed-wing air-
craft, communications equipment, and
associated training and equipment-
maintenance support. The bulk of our
current budget is dedicated to aircraft
maintenance contracts for previously
supplied equipment. Additionally, to
assist the Burmese Government in
developing replacement means of income
for former opium growers, the United
States has provided limited assistance in
development of alternative agriculture
and livestock projects. Our crop
substitution program has included
special beekeeping and swine-poultry
training at Ohio State University for 20
Burmese students.

Burmese Programs. Narcotics in
Burma is a multifaceted problem and the
country has developed an integrated
strategy for dealing with it. The
Burmese Central Committee for Drug
Abuse Control (CCDAC), chaired by the
Minister of Home and Religious Affairs,
consists of eight deputy ministers from
other concerned government ministries.
Responsibilities of the CCDAC are na-
tionwide and include all aspects of the
government effort, including enforce-
ment, crop-income substitution, and
treatment-rehabilitation.

• Enforcement— A basic part of the
Burmese enforcement strategy focuses
upon interdicting narcotics caravans and
destroying refineries and base camps

Department of State Bulletin

NARCOTICS

operated by trafficking groups. Burmese
police and military personnel have been
active both in major operations against
the BCP narcotics activities and the pop-
py eradication programs.

• Crop Substitution-Eradication —
The Burmese Government estimates
that it eradicated more than 10,000
acres of opium poppy in the 1981-82
season that could have produced as
much as 40,000-45,000 kilograms of
opium. While this represents about eight
percent of the total acreage under poppy
cultivation in Burma, it almost doubled
the previous year's destruction.

A Burmese crop substitution pro-
gram supported by UNFDAC is making
progress in distributing coffee and tea
plants, seeds for spices and medicinal
herbs, and improved livestock to
farmers in areas in which opium was
formerly grown. The CCDAC is estab-
lishing a multisectoral livestock, horti-
cultural, and demonstration center at
Pekhon in the southern Shan State. The
purpose of this center will be to provide
training and to demonstrate viable crop
substitution and livestock production.
The International Narcotics Matters pro-
gram has provided bees, quail, and
related equipment and training to sup-
port pilot programs for crop substitu-
tion. However, the full impact of these
programs on opium production must
await more hospitable conditions in
poppy-producing areas.

• Treatment, rehabilitation, train-
ing, and information— The Burmese
Ministries of Health and Social Welfare

j have responsibility for addict treatment
and rehabilitation programs, respective-
ly. Treatment centers have been estab-
lished in each of the major urban centers
with addict population problems. Larger
hospitals have treatment wards; district
and township hospitals have a basic
capability for treating addiction. Reha-
bilitation centers have been established
in Kengtung, Namla, Rangoon, Man-
dalay, and Lashio. Both treatment and
rehabilitation centers have been im-
proved and expanded by UNFDAC.

The Burmese Government conducts
a continuous program of narcotics infor-
mation through the government-
controlled news media, in schools,
posters, and public and party indoctrina-
tion sessions.

Other Programs. As indicated,
UNFDAC has several programs in Bur-
ma. Between 1976 and early 1981,
UNFDAC assisted Burma through fi-
nancing a large multisectional drug
abuse control program involving ac-
tivities in law enforcement, crop and in-

come substitution, education, health, and
vocational rehabilitation at a total cost
of $5,571,000 over the 5-year period.
Phase two of this program was agreed
upon in June 1981 for 5 years at a cost
of $5,042,000. Development aid funds
for this program have been provided by
the Government of Norway.

Other U.S. Assistance. The United
States resumed economic assistance to
Burma in 1980 after an absence of 15
years. The AID-Burma funding level has
increased from initial amounts of $2
million in FY 1980 and $3 million in FY

1981 to $7.5 million in FY 1982, assist-
ance concentrated in agricultural and
public health projects. Additionally, the
United States provided $150,000 in FY

1982 for military training under our
security assistance program.

Prospects for the Future. When
considering the future of narcotics sup-
pression in Burma, one must remember
that it is essentially a Burmese program,
not an American one. The ultimate suc-
cess or failure of the program — used in
the broadest sense of the term — will de-
pend upon Burmese efforts prompted by
Burmese perceptions of national
priorities.

for the job at hand. Politically, our
narcotics cooperation has fostered a
unique — for neutralist-isolationist Bur-
ma— bilateral relationship in which our
assistance relates to a sensitive Burmese
domestic issue. U.S. assistance supports
the narcotics control objective which is
consistent with Burma's objective of
securing its territory. By any measure,
the number of acres of opium crop de-
stroyed and amount of opiates seized is
significant. In addition, the continuing
Burmese efforts in fields not directly
supported by U.S. assistance are a
measure of their commitment to the
overall goals of narcotics control.

Nevertheless, the narcotics program
in Burma must be viewed as an integral
part of the Golden Triangle narcotics
phenomena. As long as Burmese war-
lords, insurgents, and bandits know that
they can enjoy even temporary safe
haven in Thailand and Burma, the Thai
and Burmese police and military actions
and threats will be limited in their effec-
tiveness. Greater Burmese-Thai coopera-
tion and coordination is an essential
long-term goal. In the last analysis,
however, real progress in Burma will de-
pend on greater Burmese authority in
the poppy growing areas.

When considering the future of narcotics sup-
pression in Burma, one must remember that it is
essentially a Burmese program, not an American
one. The ultimate success or failure of the pro-
gram . . . will depend upon Burmese efforts
prompted by Burmese perceptions of national
priorities.

The United States has assisted and
cooperated with the Burmese by pro-
viding some needed enforcement
equipment — i.e., the purchase of and
maintenance funding for telecommunica-
tions equipment, a small fleet of heli-
copters and fixed-wing aircraft— and
modest support for Burmese pilot pro-
grams for crop substitution in opium
growing areas. In addition, the United
States has provided training for
Burmese officials with responsibilities
for customs and narcotics enforcement.

Our programs have helped sharpen
the Burmese focus on their narcotics
problems and our material assistance
and training have given them the tools

OTHER EAST ASIAN PROGRAMS

INM supports other program activity in
East Asia through its East Asian
regional budget and through funding
and other support for the Colombo Plan
project.

A specific goal of the Bureau's East
Asian regional activity is to support pro-
grams among Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) members which
are designed to impede illicit narcotics
production, processing, trafficking, and
consumption. The INM regional pro-
gram includes law enforcement, preven-
tion education, and technical assistance

February 1983

PACIFIC

in treatment and rehabilitation. The
Bureau has budgeted $225,000 for its
regional projects in FY 1983.

For example, in Malaysia, which is
both a major narcotics consumer as well
as an important transshipment center,
the Bureau has just concluded a tech-
nical assistance program which devel-
oped a drug counseling and rehabilita-
tion program within the Malaysian
prison system and assisted in the
development of a national strategy on
drug control and an after-care program.

Similarly, in Indonesia, where our
objective is to assist that government in
preventing the country from becoming
either an alternative opium-growing
area or a major transshipment point, the
Bureau's agreement is to provide com-
modities, training, and personnel ex-
changes— at an estimated cost of
$50,000 through 1984— to stimulate the
Indonesian Government to take more
comprehensive actions on its own ini-
tiative, in both supply reduction as well
as demand reduction.

CONCLUSION

The specific commitments and actions
which we seek on a country-by-country
basis are integral to the success of our
Southeast Asian strategy. However, the
United States is also seeking greater
cooperation within the region and
believes that such internal cooperation is
also essential to achieving narcotics con-
trol objectives in Southeast Asia.

In this regard, we are supporting
ASEAN, and we are encouraging
regional and bilateral contacts, which we
believe should include Burma and Hong
Kong.

Throughout the region, we are seek-
ing wider adoption of precursor chemical
controls, as well as agreements on
seizures of financial assets, and on legal
cooperation.

The United States cannot, in the
final analysis, control opium production
in Southeast Asia. We can only facilitate
the achievement of control by the pro-
ducing and transit nations. We are
employing, therefore, a strategy that
not only provides these governments
with the capacity to act but encourages
and sustains them in the will to act.

Nor can we succeed with just a
bilateral effort. As cultivation and refin-
ing sites multiply and the number of

trafficking organizations and routes ex-
pand, in keeping with worldwide de-
mand, the conclusion is inescapable that,
more than ever, ultimate success
depends on achieving comprehensive,
simultaneous control in the many key
growing areas. The United States is ac-
tively enlisting the participation of other
victim and donor nations. We are en-
couraging greater contributions to

bilateral and multilateral control proj-
ects. We are attempting to interna-
tionalize the response to a global prob-
lem.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Palau Plebiscite

The Governments of the United States
and of the Republic of Palau have an-
nounced the holding of a plebiscite in
Palau on Tuesday, January 11, 1983.
The plebiscite will be an act of self-
determination by the people of Palau
regarding their future political status
and is a step toward termination of the
last remaining U.N. trusteeship.

In the plebiscite, the voters of Palau
will be asked whether they approve or
disapprove a compact of free association
and a number of agreements subsidiary
to it, all of which were signed by
representatives of the two govern-
ments—Ambassador Fred M. Zeder,
Personal Representative of the Presi-
dent of the United States for Microne-
sian Status Negotiations, and Lazarus
E. Salii, Ambassador for Status
Negotiations and Trade Relations of the
Republic of Palau— in Washington on
August 26, 1982.

The United States has requested a
special session of the U.N. Trusteeship
Council later this month at which it will
ask the CouncO to organize an interna-
tional observer mission to witness the
final stages of a public education pro-
gram now underway in Palau and the
voting in the plebescite itself. The educa-
tion program in Palau is being con-
ducted by a committee under the chair-

manship of Palau Vice President and
Minister of State Alfonso R. Oiterong.

The United States and Palau agreed
in the compact to call the plebiscite
jointly, and an announcement of the
date is being made simultaneously in
Koror, Palau's capital, by Haruo I.
Remeliik, President of the Republic.
Procedures for the conduct of the
, plebiscite are established in Palau Public
Law No. 1-43 enacted by the Republic's
Olbiil Era Kelulau — national legislature.

Voters will also be asked in the
plebiscite to indicate their preference
between alternative forms of political
status — a relationship with the United
States closer than that of free associa-
tion, or independence — in the event the
compact does not achieve majority ap-
proval. The result on this second ques-
tion would then constitute guidance to
the two governments for further
negotiations.

Signature of the compact and its
related agreements in August repre-
sented the completion of more than a
decade of negotiations. U.N. observation
of the plebiscite is among several
governing principles for free association
adopted by the negotiators in a meeting
at Hilo, Hawaii, in April 1978.

Press release 359 of Dec. 1, 1982.

Department of State Bulletin

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan:

3 Years of Occupat

ion

The following paper was written by
Eliza Van Holleri of the Bureau of In-
telligence and Research in December
1982. It is a sequel to three reports on
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
published in the Bulletin in March
1981, October 1981. and March 1982.

Overview

Early in 1982, the Babrak Karmal
regime and its Soviet sponsors re-
doubled their assault on the Afghan re-
sistance movement hoping to achieve a
turning point in the 3-year battle. In
March, Babrak declared that the time
had come to "take the revolutionary
struggle to the provinces, districts, and
villages." At the end of the year, how-
ever, there is little to show for their
pains. Military, political, and economic
gains continue to elude those who would
impose a dictatorial Communist regime
on the people of Afghanistan.

The Soviets increased their troop
strength to about 105,000 and greatly
intensified their military operations in
1982 but generally failed to discourage
the resistance forces (the mujahidin) or
to drive them from their strongholds. In-
deed, mujahidin activity has increased
dramatically inside Kabul itself in recent
months in spite of intense Soviet
military activity on all sides of the
capital. Soviet inability to rebuild the
Afghan Army into a loyal and effective
force against the resistance continues to
be a prime cause of military weakness.

Over the past year, the ruling People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) had hoped to cure itself of in-
ternecine fighting between its Khalq and
Parcham factions and become the pre-
eminent guiding force in Afghanistan.
Instead, in the wake of a party confer-
ence in March (the first since the PDPA
came to power in April 1978), the politi-
cal infighting became even more bitter.
Many influential Khalqis are under
suspicion of either sympathizing with or
collaborating with the resistance. Rejec-
tion of the party by the populace re-
mains almost universal.

At the end of 1981, the PDPA's
seventh plenum called for a nationality
and tribal policy to appeal to local tribal
and ethnic aspirations and win support
for the regime. Despite occasional gains,
a year later it has become clear that

tribes that once appeared susceptible to
various regime blandishments are once
more participating in the fihad— the holy
war— against Babrak Karmal.

The government had pinned its
hopes on a modified land and water re-
form program as the catalyst for in-
creasing agricultural production in 1982
and winning support from the peasants.
Enterprises disabled by the m^ijahidin
were to be reactivated. And Prime
Minister Keshtmand claimed 63 new
projects were to go into operation with
Soviet aid. But the continuing strength
of the resistance movement, which domi-
nates 75%-80% of the country, has
foiled the economic planners.

At the end of 1982, the resistance
movement in many areas appears to be
militarily stronger and better organized
than at the beginning of the year. Co-
ordination and cooperation between
fighting groups inside the country have
generally improved, while Afghan exiles
have stepped up efforts to foster greater
unity in the resistance as a whole.

Cordovez will soon resume his efforts to
widen what he perceives to be the area
of agreement between the parties. The
success or failure of the U.N. negotia-
tions ultimately will depend on Soviet
agreement to withdraw troops from
Afghanistan. The United States sup-
ports the efforts of the U.N. mission to
negotiate a political solution consistent
with the principles expressed in the
U.N. resolution on Afghanistan.

If the new Soviet leadership chooses
to pursue the present course of military
activity, which is designed to wear down
the Afghan people, it will continue to
confront almost universal opposition.
The November 1982 U.N. vote of 114-21
was another impressive demonstration
of strong international feeling on this
subject.

The plight of more than 2.7 million
Afghan refugees in Pakistan continues
to focus international attention on the
Afghan tragedy. Moreover, increasing
media coverage is making the world
community more knowledgeable about
Soviet conduct in Afghanistan. Recent
new evidence about the Soviet use of
chemical warfare in Afghanistan has re-
ceived worldwide publicity. The second
session of the Bertrand Russell People's
Tribunal on Afghanistan met in Paris

Despite occasional gains . . . it has become clear
that tribes that once appeared susceptible to
various regime blandishments are once more par-
ticipating in the jihad— f/ie holy war— against
Babrak Karmal.

Nevertheless, the political weakness of
the resistance movement remains. Dis-
ruptive fighting between some bands in-
side Afghanistan continues. Exile
leaders based in Peshawar, Pakistan,
are split into two competitive alliances.
Furthermore, there is a large gulf be-
tween formerly prominent leaders now
in exile and some of the Peshawar-based
organizations on the one hand, and some
of the mujahidin fighting in Afghani-
stan, on the other.

The U.N. mission to promote a
political solution to the Afghan crisis has
made progress on procedural issues. The
U.N. -sponsored indirect talks in Geneva
in June began to deal with substance,
but the critical phase of the negotiations
lies ahead. U.N. representative Diego

December 16-20 and heard testimony
concerning the increasing number of
atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers
against Afghan villagers. Thus there has
been no diminution of profound interna-
tional concern over the individual and
collective suffering now being endured
by the Afghan people.

Soviet Military
Offensive Intensified

At the end of 1981, the Soviets
significantly stepped up their military
operations and increased their troop
strength. Both developments appeared
to follow from the protracted visit to
Afghanistan in late 1981 of a high-level

February 1983

SOUTH ASIA

Soviet military delegation led by First
Deputy Defense Minister Marshal
Sokolov.'

The initial increment of 5,000 troops
in December was followed by several
thousand more in January. The total
number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
is now estimated at 105,000. In addition,
about 30,000 men on the Soviet side of
the border serve in a rear-guard capaci-
ty; some of these are periodically in-
volved directly in operations in the
northern areas. The U.S.S.R. thus has a
force of about 135,000 committed to the
Afghan war.

Soviet military operations through-
out 1982 have been more massive and
more elaborate than in 1981; they ap-
pear designed not only to eradicate mu-
jahidin strongholds but also to intimi-
date civilian supporters of the freedom
fighters. The previous political strategy
of wooing the population to support the
regime's National Fatherland Front had
been unsuccessful; by the end of last
year the vmjahidin were clearly expand-
ing the territory under their influence.
In 1982, Soviet firepower has been used
much more indiscriminately as the
Soviet and Afghan Armed Forces have
sought to reestablish the regime's
authority in key areas.

The big winter offensives against
Qandahar in the south and in Parvan
Province north of Kabul revealed
Moscow's revised military strategy.
These drives, which were followed by
similarly harsh operations against many
villages and towns throughout the coun-
try, inflicted heavy casualties on civilians
and occasionally on the mujahidin. More
often, however, the freedom fighters
have managed to withdraw with their
force relatively intact and to return to
the area as soon as the Soviets have left.

Civilian populations near strategic
targets have suffered the most. For ex-
ample, the towns in the Shomali area
immediately north of Kabul have been
bombed heavily throughout the year.
Mujahidin in this area are a threat to
Kabul itself and to the important
Bagram airbase as well as to traffic
moving along the main supply route
from Kabul to the Soviet border. Many
other strategically important areas in
both eastern and western Afghanistan
have been subjected to repeated aerial
attack, but none has been hit with the
same frequency and intensity as those
near the capital.

Moscow probably will try to re-
frain from large-scale counterattacks on

the mujahidin inside Kabul. Although
they have on occasion bombarded resist-
ance-controlled quarters of two other
cities, Qandahar and Herat, the presence
of a large community of foreign
observers may inhibit them in Kabul.
But the State Information Service
(KHAD— the secret police), which is run
by the Soviet KGB, appears to have in-
creased its activities in Kabul in recent
months in response to mujahidin activi-
ty in the city. Recent emigrants have
described a growing police-state atmos-
phere in the capital.

The Soviets also appear to be con-
centrating their military efforts in areas
which are economically important and
which are essentially under mujahidin
control. These include fertile agricultural
regions and the sites of industrial enter-
prises that have been disabled by the
guerrillas in districts surrounding the
major cities — Kabul, Qandahar. Herat,
Jalalabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

Other Soviet military activity during
the past year apparently has been in-
tended to discourage movement across
the Pakistani and Iranian borders; it
does not appear to have succeeded.
Soviet forces also have been engaged in
equally unfruitful efforts to suppress the
resistance in the northern provinces
along the Soviet border.

Panjsher and Paghman Operations

The most important Soviet military ob-
jective in 1982 was to reestablish the
regime's authority in the Panjsher
Valley, 60 miles north of Kabul, and to
destroy Ahmad Shah Mahsud's mu-
jahidin organization in this area.
Another important priority was to drive
the mujahidin out of Paghman, a moun-
tain retreat only 12 miles from the
capital. Both the Panjsher Valley and
Paghman have become strategically im-
portant mujahidin strongholds as well
as symbols of mujahidin success.

During the summer, the Soviets
launched two major attacks on the Panj-
sher. The campaigns have been referred
to as Panjsher V and Panjsher VI, high-
lighting the growing number of Soviet
efforts to take the valley.

Panjsher V, which began in mid-May
and lasted about 6 weeks, stands out as
the biggest Soviet military operation of
the war to date. Although an unusually
large combined force — about 12,000-
15,000 men— established base camps
about one-fourth of the way up the
75-mile valley, the offensive failed to in-
flict noticeable damage on the 5,000-man

mujahidin force under Mahsud's com-
mand. The operation, however, was very
costly for the Soviet and Afghan troops
in terms of casualties and lost materiel.
Mahsud's men were particularly effec-
tive against heliborne troops, who had
landed on numerous hilltops.

Claims by the regime in late June
that the Panjsher had been "liberated"
were premature. By late August, mu-
jahidin pressure on the newly estab-
lished garrisons forced the Soviets to
mount another major offensive into the
valley. This time they conducted exten-
sive operations against villages in the
Panjsher River's many lateral valleys.
Once again the invaders suffered heavy
casualties, lost large quantities of
materiel, failed to establish a presence
beyond the already garrisoned town of
Rokha, and did not significantly hurt the
mujahidin. Following the retreat of this
second invading force in mid-September,
the mujahidin resumed their harass-
ment of the remaining garrisons. Defec-
tions from the Afghan forces climbed
again, as they had earlier in the sum-
mer. As of late fall, Soviet planes con-
tinued to bomb the valley, and a new
Soviet operation before the end of the
year was likely.

The Soviets seem determined to
eliminate the Panjsher as a symbol of
the resistance; thus they may try to
keep a garrison in the lower valley
throughout the winter. This would be a
difficult operation; the post at Rokha
already is partially dependent on re-
supply by air. The mujahidin in the
Panjsher downed several helicopters
during the summer operations; garrisons
isolated by winter snows are even more
vulnerable. On the other hand, the mu-
jahidin themselves are more vulnerable
during the winter because they cannot
retreat to their mountain hideouts.

During the Panjsher operations this
year, the Soviets tried to cut off the
valley by blocking entrance points, but
these efforts failed. There were
numerous reports, for instance, that
during the protracted offensive in May
and June, Mahsud received assistance
from other resistance commanders.

Soviet offensives in the Panjsher
have inflicted great suffering on the
civilian population as Moscow has sough
to erode popular support for the muja-
hidin. Many homes, and indeed entire
villages, have been destroyed by the con-
stant bombardments. In October, for the
first time, Panjsheri refugees began to
arrive in northern Pakistan.

Severe food shortages in the
Panjsher can be expected this winter.

Department of State Bulletin

SOUTH ASIA

The fighting in early summer destroyed
most of the wheat crop by depriving it
of irrigation during a critical period.
Some crops, however, have been
harvested in the upper reaches of the
valley, and some food can be purchased
from neighboring districts. Mahsud has
issued an appeal for international
assistance to avert a major disaster.

The situation in Paghman, only 12
miles from Kabul, is similar. The
Paghman district is a less tightly knit
economic and social unit and has no
charismatic leader, but the several mu-
jahidin groups active in the area
cooperate with each other. The ability of
the mujahidin to control the town of
Paghman most of the time has made it
an important symbol of the resistance.
Furthermore, 7nujahidin who con-
gregate in the Paghman hills have
operated effectively in Kabul itself.

After several efforts during the
spring to open the road to Paghman, the
Soviets mounted an extensive two-
pronged operation against the area. The
mujahidin were forced to retreat to the
surrounding mountains. In late July,
Babrak announced that this mountain
recreation spot was once more open to
the public.

But the regime's claims to have paci-
fied Paghman were hollow. The m7i-
jahidin were soon overrunning army
outposts, and heavy bombardments of
the Paghman area, including the town's
central bazaar in the summer, failed to
halt resistance activity. Soviet and
regime forces attacked Paghman again
in October and November, but the army
garrison there remains in jeopardy.

Soviet Casualties and Morale. Be-
cause of the shift to larger scale opera-
tions in 1982, Soviet casualties began to
rise. To keep casualties low, the Soviets
made heavy use of air bombardments
and forced Afghan military units to
spearhead the ground attacks.

The new spate of casualties may be
causing morale problems for the Soviets.
In November, Krasnaya Zvezda carried
an unusual, only slightly veiled, refer-
ence to Soviet casualties, indicating a
need to acknowledge the sacrifices made
by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In an
interview with a Krasnaya Zvezda corre-
spondent, a member of Afghanistan's
Politburo claimed that Soviet soldiers
had now won the trust of the Afghan
people, but he added that it had been
won "at a great price." He went on to
thank "the Soviet servicemen for their
courage, selflessness and genuine inter-
nationalism." This admission went
beyond the candid statement in
Krasnaya Zvezda last February that life

for the Soviet troops in Afghanistan "is
hard . . . sometimes very, very hard."
The November statement may have been
spurred by the large death toll of Soviet
soldiers from asphyxiation following an
accident in the Salang tunnel on
November 3.

Accounts of indiscipline, drug usage,
and black marketeering — including the
sale of weapons and ammunition — are
numerous. Throughout the Soviet oc-
cupation, there have been periodic re-
ports of defections to the mujahidin by
Soviet minority troops, particularly the
Tadzhiks who have important cultural
and ethnic links with Afghan Tadzhiks.
These defections seem to have increased
during 1982.

Soviet commanders in Afghanistan
are under heavy pressure from Moscow

To keep [their] casualties
low, the Soviets made
heavy use of air bom-
bardments and forced
Afghan military units to
spearhead the ground
attacks.

to produce results against an enemy that
frequently outfights and outwits them
and that enjoys the support of the vast
majority of Afghans. 'Thus when the
Soviets fail to track down the m?^-
jahidin, they turn on civilians in frustra-
tion and rage. The Swedish journalist
Borje Almquist has described in detail
crimes perpetrated by Soviet soldiers
against Afghan citizens in Lowgar Prov-
ince, which he visited during the sum-
mer. The Bertrand Russel Tribunal has
publicized similar evidence of Soviet
brutality.

Chemical Warfare. The Soviets
have continued to employ lethal chemical
weapons against the mujahidin in 1982.
These weapons have been used selec-
tively— generally against guerrillas in
relatively inaccessible locations. For ex-
ample, chemical agents have been used
against mujahidin positions in caves and
mujahidin hiding in underground water-
ways. Analysis of two Soviet gas masks
recently acquired from Afghanistan con-
firms earlier suspicions that the Soviets
are using the deadly trichothecene myco-

toxins ("yellow rain") in Afghanistan. In
November, the Department of State
issued an updated report on chemical
and biological weapons employed by the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Laos, and
Kampuchea (Bulletin of December
1982). This document details the new
evidence compiled on this subject during
1982.

Soviet POWs. In the spring of 1982,
after lengthy negotiations, Moscow
agreed to let the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) take charge
of Soviet prisoners of war captured by
the mujahidin. The first three prisoners
to change hands under this arrangement
arrived in Switzerland in June. Four
more have followed, the latest transfer
having taken place in November. As
part of the agreement, an ICRC team
was allowed to go to Kabul in late
August to visit prisoners and "carry out
humanitarian assistance" on their behalf.
The team, however, was unexpectedly
obliged to leave Kabul in October, and
the scope of the ICRC's role inside
Afghanistan is still being negotiated.

Moscow was slow to conclude this
arrangement, presumably because it in-
volved recognizing the mujahidin as a
negotiating entity and also because it
was a formal admission that Soviet
soldiers were actually fighting in
Afghanistan. The present agreement
was reached after the mujahidin re-
vealed that they had executed a prom-
inent Soviet adviser, E. M. Okrimyuk.
The freedom fighters held Okrimyuk
prisoner for several months, hoping to
exchange him for mujahidin prisoners
held by the Kabul regime.

The Afghan Army

A major obstacle to Soviet military suc-
cess against the mujahidin is Moscow's
continuing inability to rebuild the
Afghan Army. Not only is there a per-
sistent shortage of recruits, but the
loyalty of the officer corps remains in
serious doubt.

Within the officer corps, Parchami
loyalists are in a minority. They are out-
numbered by disillusioned and alienated
nonparty careerists and by Khalqis who
bear a grudge against the dominant Par-
chamis. The elections preceding the na-
tional party conference in March con-
firmed the numerical edge which the
Khalqis hold over the Parchamis among
the officers.

Moscow hopes that increasing num-
bers of officers who have been trained
recently in the Soviet Union will help
create a more loyal force. The Soviets
also may expect that the sons of party

February 1983

SOUTH ASIA

members now being rushed through of-
ficer training courses in Kabul will be
more reliable. But the long list of
Afghan officers who have defected in-
cludes many who received training in
the Soviet Union.

Moscow also counted on General Ab-

the lack of cooperation between the ar-
my and other security organizations.
Babrak ascribed these problems to in-
adequate political indoctrination in the
army and, by implication, to party fac-
tionalism. He stated that "unity . . . and
the solidarity of party ranks in the army

Soviet commanders in Afghanistan are under
heavy pressure from Moscow to produce results
against an enemy that frequently outfights and
outwits them and that enjoys the support of the
vast majority of Afghans.

dul Qader, who was acting Minister of
Defense during most of 1982 and of-
ficially appointed as minister in
September, to narrow the division in the
military establishment between Klialqis
and Parchamis. Qader has ties with both
factions and has been described as more
of a "nationalist" than a party man. Yet
his appointment in place of General Rafi,
who was an ardent Parchami. has not
generated much support from nonparty
and Khalqi officers.

On the contrary, there are many
signs that officers in the Afghan Army
continue to collaborate with the mu-
jahidin. Large number of Khalq officers
were arrested in Jalalabad in March and
in Ghazni Province in April, suggesting
extensive plotting against the regime.
Following the Panjsher campaign in ear-
ly summer, reports circulated that
several high-ranking officers had been
arrested for collaborating with Mahsud.
And in late September, General Wodud,
commander of the Central Corps, was
found shot to death in his office. He may
have been killed either by the Parchamis
or by enraged Soviets on suspicion of
collusion with the nnijahi.din. Through-
out the year, Afghan commanders have
had their assignments shifted fre-
quently— as if their Soviet overseers
were trying to forestall the development
of sympathetic ties between com-
manders and local mujahidin.

In a speech to the armed forces
guidance and administration leadership
cadre on August 12, Babrak Karmal was
highly critical of the army's perfor-
mance. He singled out irresponsibility
with weapons (perhaps prompted by the
large loss of materiel to the mujahidin
in the Panjsher), the ineffectiveness of
some combat units, the failure of of-
ficers to lead and inspire their men, and

was of vital and national importance."

The shortage of Afghan troops may
be even more significant for Kabul than
the shortage of reliable officers. The
regime has been unable to build an army
of more than 30,000-40,000 men; it
loses about 10,000 men annually through
desertions and 5,000 through casualties.
The year 1982 began with an urgent
need to replace some 20,000 men who
were released from service in December
1981 after completion of their extended
tours. Extensive sweep operations were
held throughout the country to obtain
replacements. Those caught in the
dragnet included many persons with
valid claims to exemption. Similar
sweeps were conducted in the spring
and early summer but with little success.

In late July, the regime again re-
vised the draft law. The tour of duty for
regular recruits was extended by 6
months to 3 years. Reservists who had
been inducted following the September
1981 mobilization had their present
tours extended from 1 to 2 years, and
another large class of reservists became
eligible for active duty when the age
ceiling was raised from 35 to 39.

The reaction in the armed forces
was predictable: a perceptible increase
in desertions. Indeed, the draft law
changes appeared to have the immediate
effect of causing a net loss of army per-
sonnel despite the sweep operations. To
counter this hemorrhaging, the regime
announced higher pay for soldiers and
noncommissioned officers during their
third year of duty.

In October, in a further indication of
the troop shortage, the regime decided
to violate traditional custom by drafting
men from the Shinwari, Mohmand, and

Jaji tribes who inhabit areas adjacent to
Pakistan. The decision also may have
reflected the regime's awareness that
these tribes were not preventing cross-
border traffic in their area — the quid
pro quo for the draft exemption. But
when the tribesmen staged a large
demonstration in Kabul in early
November in protest to the draft, the
government reversed its decision.

Rumors of a government plan to
create a civil defense corps of boys (ages
16-18) and older men (ages 40-45) to
perform guard duty have greatly
alarmed the populace. Younger boys
(ages 10-15) are to receive military
training at school to prepare them for
such responsibilities. As much of the
police force is tied down with guard du-
ty, the civil defense plan would free
police for combat. Many of the 16-18
year-olds already have been conscripted
even though they are under the legal
draft age of 19. The plan allegedly is to
go into effect in March 1983.

Consolidation of All
Security Organizations

Morale and disciplinary problems have
afflicted other security organs — the
Defense of the Revolution (DOR) militia,
the police, and the secret police. The
DOR militia is supposed to be a force of
selected party loyalists, but its members
are often young, opportunistic, and easi-
ly demoralized; they have a poor record
of performance under stress. There is
also much bickering among the different
services, including fighting between the
police and the KHAD in Kabul.

The Soviets and the regime recog-
nize the advantage of imposing more
centralized control on the security ap-
paratus. The "action program," adopted
at the party conference in March, called
for establishing a "unified single defense
system of . . . armed forces, frontier
forces, security organs, groups of
defenders of revolution and volunteer
groups of tribes." It also called for "tight
party control over the . . . activities of
this system as a whole."

The plan to consolidate all security
forces under centralized party direction
has run into political and bureaucratic
resistance. In speeches to KHAD per-
sonnel in May, to army cadres in
August, and to the police in October,
Babrak Karmal criticized all the services
for their lack of cooperation. His com-
plaints, however, are unlikely to have
much effect. For example the top Khalqi
leader, Gulabzoi, who as Minister of the
Interior controls the police, probably

Department of State Bulletin

SOUTH ASIA

sees the consolidation as a Parcham
move to undermine his position; indeed,
there are signs that Gulabzoi is continu-
ing to try to build the police into a
parallel "army" under his control.

Problems in the Party

The first national conference of the Peo-
ple's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) took place in "mid-March 1982.
In addition, three Central Committee
plenums were held — the eighth in March
to prepare for the national conference,
the ninth in July, and the tenth in
December. The first three meetings re-
vealed that the fundamental conflicts be-
tween the Khalq and Parcham factions
of the party are as serious as ever.

The conference sponsors probably
hoped that the conference would estab-
lish the dominance of the Parcham wing
and thus would further legitimize
Babrak's leadership. The two main items
on the agenda — changes in the party
constitution and an action program to
give the party a sense of direction — both
seem to have been designed to reduce
Khalq influence.

The Khalq leadership, however,
turned the two-stage process of electing
delegates to the conference into a con-
test punctuated by fistfights and shoot-
outs, instead of accepting elections
rigged in favor of Parcham candidates.
The results confirmed that in spite of
repeated purges of lower and middle-
level Khalqis, the latter still outnumber
their rivals — at least among full-tledged
members eligible to participate in the
election process.

The effect of the preconference elec-
tions was to exacerbate Khalq-Parcham
feuding. Babrak's speech to the con-
ference referred repeatedly to the "fac-
tionalism" problem, highlighting his con-
cern about what he referred to as "this
old disease." Babrak stated that "when
unity is weakened, the party faces weak-
ness and defeat, even its existence faces
danger." He denounced anarchism, lack
of discipline, alien ideology, hostility
toward new party members, and the
related sins of nepotism, localism,
tribalism, and ethnicity in forming party
cadres.

During much of 1981 and particular-
ly in early 1982, in the weeks im-
mediately preceding the conference, the
Parcham leadership engaged in an inten-
sive drive to recruit new members. The
purpose was twofold: to legitimize the
party's claim to governing Afghanistan
by giving it a larger membership and to
neutralize the influence of the Khalqis.

By the time of the conference, a
combination of coercion and enticements
had netted the party enough new re-
cruits to enable it for the first time to
announce a membership figure: 62,000.
At the ninth plenum in July, Babrak
claimed that the number had increased
to 70,000. Many observers estimate the
membership at'about 35,000-40,000.

About half of the members are in
the armed forces. In August, Babrak
said that there were 20,000 members in
the army and that "the army party
organization forms the greatest part of
the PDPA." This figure would include
members in the officer corps, which is
predominantly Khalqi, and new
members among conscripts — a captive
group that has provided the Parchamis
with a large portion of their new re-
cruits. Many of these persons defect
from the party at the same time they
defect from the army. (Even if the par-
ty's figure of about 62,000 members is
correct, they would constitute only 4%
of Afghanistan's population, estimated
at about 15 million before the Soviet in-
vasion.)

In what appears to be a thinly veiled
effort to isolate the Khalqis in the ex-
panded party, the Parcham leadership
announced at the conference a change of
rules to authorize a more rapid influx in-
to the party of workers and peasants by
shortening the probationary period.
Rules also have been changed to relax
sponsorship requirements.

Relaxing the rules is likely to cause
problems for the party leadership.
Babrak and others have indicated that
new members have not carried out their
party duties satisfactorily. At the con-
ference in March, one leader noted that
nearly half the party was composed of
young people (18 is the age of eligibility),
and he complained of their lack of
"political maturity."

The other main item on the con-
ference agenda was to adopt a compre-
hensive "action plan" to galvanize
members to promote party objectives.
Babrak Karmal's speech implied that the
right to be carried on the membership
rolls would depend on a member's active
participation in the defense of the
revolution — in combat and in the high
priority area of revitalizing the economy.

The Parchamis may have viewed the
more strict criteria for membership as a
way to purge the Khalqis. But Soviet ad-
visers, who probably drafted the docu-
ment, evidently saw it as a means of
coercing the Khalqis to cooperate.
Moscow has always been concerned

about antagonizing the Khalqis because
of their strength in the military; for that
reason, a major purge is unlikely.

The ninth central committee plenum
of the party was convened in July
without advance notice. At the time of
the meeting, rumors of coup plots and of
connivance between the Khalqis and the
resistance were rife. Though the plenum
ostensibly dealt with the need for party
workers to get out among the people to
sell the revolution, the gathering ap-
parently focused on security problems
and the continuing struggle between the
Khalqis and the Parchamis. The crisis
probably was ignited by the unsatisfac-
tory outcome of the fifth Panjsher cam-
paign and perhaps of other military of-
fensives. High-level personnel changes
were anticipated, including the removal
of Khalq leader Gulabzoi from his posi-
tion as Minister of Interior, but the most
significant dismissal was that of General
Gul Aqa, the Parcham political com-
missar in the Ministry of Defense who
was held responsible for dispatching
hundreds of volunteer party workers to
their deaths in the Panjsher. Apparently
a large proportion of the "volunteers"
were Khalqis anxious to remain in the
good graces of the Soviets by taking an
active part in the war effort.

Divisions within Babrak's own Par-
cham faction remain. Relations between
Babrak and Prime Minister Sultan All
Keshtmand are cool. Keshtmand is am-
bitious and would like to step into
Babrak's shoes as Moscow's favorite. As
a former Minister of Planning who re-
tains special responsibilities for the
economy, Keshtmand is pushing hard
for improvements in economic conditions
to impress his Soviet mentors.

The ninth party plenum's directive
to party members to work among the
"masses" is the latest in a series of ef-
forts to broaden the party's base. During
1981, the regime pursued this goal
through the creation in June of an um-
brella organization— the National
Fatherland Front (NFF). Subsequent
publicity has created the impression of a
steadily growing organization that is
opening up new provincial and district
councils throughout the country. The an-
niversary of the front's founding was
marked by a second plenum in Kabul in
June 1982. The regime invokes the NFF
when it wants to imply national support
for such issues as a recent NFF-
sponsored peace campaign. But the
front is generally considered a facade; it
has failed to achieve its purpose of
mobilizing popular support for the
regime.

February 1983

SOUTH ASIA

Problems in the Economy

Both Kabul and Moscow publicly claim
that Afghanistan has made considerable
economic and social progress in spite of
"interference" by the forces of "im-
perialism." In their own speeches, how-
ever, Afghan officials have expressed
great concern over the continuing eco-
nomic deterioration. For example,
Babrak emphasized to the PDPA con-
ference in March and again to the party
plenum in July that "the economic front
bears no less importance than the battle-
front." Babrak continually stresses that
the breakdown of the Afghan economy
is a political problem that party
members should solve. The regime is
hoping to use improved economic condi-
tions to generate popular support for
the government, but the economy cannot
be revived while so much of the country-
side is under mujahidin control.

Afghanistan's economy rests pri-
marily on agriculture. Over four-fifths of
the population lives in rural areas.
Reasonably good weather over the last
few years has left the farmers in some
areas not much worse off than they
were before the Soviet invasion. Agri-
cultural production, however, has fallen
sharply. About 3 million Afghans (one-
fifth of the population) have fled the
country, most coming from rural areas
and taking about 3 million animals with
them. In areas of heavy fighting, in-
cluding many of Afghanistan's most fer-
tile valleys, crops have been destroyed
or lost through lack of irrigation and
cultivation. In the areas controlled by

towns and villages that have been heavi-
ly bombarded by the Soviets. The
population of Kabul has more than
doubled since before the war to about
1.8 million. Although the authorities
have tried to introduce price controls,
recent emigrants report that basic com-
modities are in very short supply and
that prices have skyrocketed.

In his campaign to win the support
of the peasants, Babrak has outlined a
program of land reform. The main in-
novation in this plan— as compared to
the program applied by the Taraki
regime in 1979 that stimulated the early
growth of the resistance movement— is
to accompany redistribution of land with
the water rights needed to irrigate it. In
conjunction with this program, Afghan
and Soviet planners are seeking to
restore damaged irrigation systems in
11 provinces.

The 'mujahidin have resisted these
efforts. Preliminary phases of a pilot
project in Deh Sabz district (adjacent to
Kabul) have provoked strong opposition.
There is little likelihood, therefore, that
this project will be carried out, despite
predictions of Babrak and his prime
minister that agricultural production
would rise as much as 3.1% for the
Afghan calendar year (March 1982-
March 1983).

The situation is no better in Afghan-
istan's small industrial sector. Emigra-
tion has seriously reduced the work
force (both skilled and nonskilled), the
transportation network is in disarray,
and the mujahidin have shut down

As a result of the decline in agricultural produc-
tion and problems of distribution, the Soviet Union
has had to supply food and other commodities to
meet the basic needs of the cities, notably Kabul.

the mujahidin, what is produced is not
shipped to urban markets, although this
year military forces have appropriated
harvested crops for the regime. As a
result of the decline in agricultural pro-
duction and problems of distribution, the
Soviet Union has had to supply food and
other commodities to meet the basic
needs of the cities, notably Kabul.

Kabul's food problem this year has
been greatly exacerbated by a large in-
flux of refugees fleeing from nearby

many factories and virtually all develop-
ment projects. At the party conference
in March, Babrak listed government
enterprises that have been disabled by
the resistance, including "the cement
factory in Herat, the textile mills in
Herat and Qandahar, sugar factories
and irrigation establishments." He
stressed the importance of putting these
plants back in operation, but there is no
indication as of late fall that this has
happened.

At the same conference. Prime

Minister Keshtmand outlined an am-
bitious program of economic growth. He
predicted a general increase in produc-
tion of 6.3% with industrial growth of
10.3%, during the period from March
1982 to March 1983. These projections
were predicated on 63 new projects to
be carried out mostly with Soviet aid.
The plan was based on the assumption
that the more aggressive military
strategy for 1982 would neutralize the
mujahidin and reestablish the regime's
authority in the provinces.

It was clear by late August that the
military strategy was not working and
that economic objectives were not being
achieved. Keshtmand admitted to the
Council of Ministers that performance
during the first quarter of the year
(March 21 -June 21) was unsatisfactory.
He indicated particular concern about
shortcomings in the development of fuel
resources, electricity, and minerals and
raw materials. In particular, he men-
tioned the importance of increasing coal
production as well as expanding oil and
gas works, of getting started on the
Aynak copper mine project in Lowgar
Province, and of assuring adequate elec-
tricity for Kabul. Babrak's mid-year
report to the Council of Ministers on Oc-
tober 3 indicated similar concern over
these particular areas of the economy.

The stress on improving key sectors
of the economy has been accompanied
by high-level personnel shifts. Last
spring, Prime Minister Keshtmand relin-
quished the planning portfolio to Dr.
Khalil Ahmad Abawi, a professional
planner. Keshtmand, however, retains
special responsibilities in the economic
sphere. The Ministry of Power and Irri-
gation was split in May into two entities,
presumably a reflection of the import-
ance attached to these areas. The
former Deputy Minister of Agriculture
and Land Reform, Abdul Chafer Lakan-
wal, was elevated to the post of
minister.

Afghanistan's natural gas industry is
the only sector of the economy that
functions more or less normally. Almost
all of the gas produced from fields
located near the Soviet border and
developed by the U.S.S.R. in the early
1960s is exported to the U.S.S.R. The
nominal price increases negotiated since
the occupation are all that keeps
Afghanistan's economic statistics from
being worse than they are. Part of the
earnings from sales of natural gas is
applied to repayments on the outstand-
ing debt to the Soviet Union; the re-
mainder is registered as credits in the
barter accounting system for trade be-
tween the two countries. In this way,

Department of State Bulletin

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan derives no hard currency
benefit from its major export.

The Afghan economy continues to be
tied tightly to that of the Soviet Union.
An agreement signed in April 1981
called for trebling trade between the
two countries during 1981-1985, as com-
pared to the previous 5 years. Afghani-
stan's development plans are worked out
by Soviet advisers; the emphasis on the
development of fuel and mineral re-
sources appears to have been dictated by
Soviet requirements.

In mid-November, Babrak, speaking
to a World Peace Council conference in
Kabul on socioeconomic development, re-
viewed development achievements in
Afghanistan. Most of the projects he
listed are far behind schedule or at a
standstill. The two that have been com-
pleted are conspicuous for their import-
ance to Moscow: a new bridge linking
the two countries over the Amu Darya
River that was rushed to completion in
May, a year ahead of schedule; and a
satellite communication and television
receiving system, inaugurated in late
February. This system gives Moscow an
mportant communications link and the
ipportunity to project its political propa-
ganda into Afghanistan.

Nationality and Tribal Policy

Both Kabul and Moscow attach particu-
ar importance to the regime's nationali-
y and tribal policy. This policy, imple-
mented by Minister of Nationalities and
Tribal Affairs Sulaiman Laeq, tries to
;xploit ethnic and tribal self-interest to
vin support from Afghanistan's diverse
)eoples. The seventh party plenum in
December 1981 issued a special message
;o the tribes, and during the past year
;he regime has continued to try to ex-
iloit tribal sensibilities.

An important element in the
•egime's strategy is the effort to win
)ver the tribes through cash, weapons,
md privileges. These tactics appeared to
3e having some success at various times
n 1982. Certain tribes seemed to lose
;heir enthusiasm for the resistance and
were said to have agreed to arrange-
ments by which they would be exempted
from the draft in return for guarding
the border.

In most cases, however, tribal
icceptance of regime blandishments has
oroved to be temporary and tactical.
Tribes in Paktia Province near the
Pakistani border rebelled twice during
the year to turn back Soviet and Afghan
forces that were trying to close off ac-
cess to Pakistan. Likewise, tribes in
Konar Province, adjoining Pakistan,

resumed armed resistance after alleged-
ly having been neutralized by the
regime. More recently, the regime pro-
voked demonstrations when it tried to
draft men who belonged to the border
tribes in Paktia and Nangarhar Prov-

The Resistance Movement

Resistance forces in Afghanistan demon-
strated in 1982 that they could absorb
hard blows by the Soviets and intensify
their own operations. Most resistance
organizations have survived this year's
tough battles despite losses. For exam-
ple, a respected commander was killed
in the Paghman area in the spring. More
recently, a young leader from the
southern outskirts of Kabul was killed
while leading an attack on a military
garrison inside Kabul. In Lowgar Prov-
ince, Soviet forces inflicted a heavy blow
during the summer on resistance forces
already weakened by friction among the
mujahidin. In spite of some setbacks.

attacked convoys on all major routes to
procure weapons, ammunition, food, and
other supplies. The freedom fighters
also have kept up their attacks on other
targets such as government and party
offices and installations in urban and
district centers, including police posts
and military garrisons.

The mujahidin have shown im-
proved capabilities this year against
Soviet combat aircraft, including Mi-24
helicopter gunships, and airbases, and
against targets inside Kabul. The Soviet
military headquarters, the Soviet Em-
bassy, and the Kabul airport have all
been hit by heavy mujahidin fire.
Recently the guerrillas have exploded
bombs in party offices and hangouts of
the secret police in the center of Kabul.

Resistance operations in the Panj-
sher Valley, Paghman, and Kabul have
received the most publicity, but freedom
fighters also continue to engage Soviet
and Afghan forces throughout the coun-
try. In Qandahar and Herat, for exam-

Mujahidin periodically cross into the Soviet Union
on raiding parties and also receive assistance (and
sometimes recruits) from their ethnic cousins
across the river.

observers have concluded that the resist-
ance is stronger at the end of the year
than it was at the beginning.

Early 1982 was a difficult period
that revealed the vulnerability of the
resistance during winter months when
the mujahidin have less mobility. Access
to mountain trails for escape routes and
to mountain redoubts for sanctuary is
cut off by heavy winter snows. The mu-
jahidin, for instance, suffered serious
setbacks in Qandahar in the south in
January and in Parvan Province, north
of Kabul, where Soviet and regime
forces trapped many freedom fighters
and their supporters in an encircling
operation in February. Nevertheless, the
guerrillas continued harassing opera-
tions throughout the country during the
winter. In January, a mujahidin gunner
in Paktia Province downed a Soviet heli-
copter in which Lt. Gen. Shkidchenko
was a passenger. Shkidchenko's death
was reported in the Soviet press without
reference to the circumstances.

Resistance activities picked up in the
spring. Mujahidin renewed their harass-
ment of the highways. They regularly

pie, the resistance continues to be effec-
tive in spite of repeated Soviet military
campaigns. Indeed, mujahidin are once
again operating inside Qandahar city
from which the Soviets had forced them
out last January.

The mujahidin are active in the
northern provinces adjoining the
U.S.S.R., despite the deployment of ad-
ditional Soviet forces in this area. In-
deed, mujahidin periodically cross into
the Soviet Union on raiding parties and
also receive assistance (and sometimes
recruits) from their ethnic cousins across
the river. When Babrak went to the
Soviet Union in mid-May for the opening
of the new bridge linking Termez, on the
Soviet side, with Hairatan, there was no
large public ceremony on the Afghan
side; security conditions precluded such
festivities.

The effectiveness of the parallel
government run by the resistance varies
from region to region. In the Panjsher
Valley, Ahmad Shah Mahsud has
mobilized virtually the entire population
of 100,000 for the resistance struggle. In

"ebruary 1983

SOUTH ASIA

some ethnically homogeneous areas—
notably the Hazarajat and Nuristan—
autonomous governments have been
formed, although these governments
have been weakened by internal dissen-
sion.

The resistance remains a collection
of numerous separate movements. But
cooperation between various elements
has increased considerably in 1982. In
the areas around major towns and cities,
operations frequently are combined ven-
tures involving several groups. Further-
more, such groups now cooperate in
operational planning and in the procure-
ment and sharing of weapons.

In Peshawar, the six major exile
organizations have formed two alliances.
In the field, cooperation cuts across
alliance lines. In some places, local
leaders have abandoned their Peshawar
affiliations and have united under a local
commander.

Nevertheless, in spite of improved
unity, clashes occur periodically between
rival bands. These battles occasionally
have caused fairly heavy casualties and
have led to disillusionment among the
population of the localities where they
occur. Friction among mujahidin
groups, for example, has seriously weak-
ened the resistance effort in Lowgar
Province. The fighting stems from com-
petition between groups to establish
their authority over a given area, but
there are increasing signs that the bat-
tles sometimes have been provoked by
Soviet or regime agents.

In this situation, progress toward
consolidating the resistance movement
has been uneven. But the judgment of
observers who have visited mujahidin
groups in Afghanistan during the past
year is that many are becoming better
organized and are cooperating more ef-
fectively with one another.

Prominent Afghans in exile have
stepped up their search for ways to
overcome political divisions in the resist-
ance movement and to bridge the gulf
between themselves and the mujahidin.
Former Prime Minister Youssuf has
been active in this effort as has Abdul
Rahman Pazhwak, a former Afghan
diplomat who once served as President
of the U.N. General Assembly. Pazhwak
arrived in New Delhi from Kabul in late
March and announced his intention to
try to promote a government-in-exile.
Before such a government can be estab-
lished, however, serious conflicts within
the resistance must be resolved and

difficult questions of leadership — in-
cluding whether former King Zaher will
have a role — must be answered.

The Afghan Refugees

In the period since the April 1978 Marx-
ist coup in Kabul triggered the flow of
refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan,
more than 2.7 million people have
registered with the Pakistani
authorities. This figure emerges from
the reenumeration of the refugee
population conducted by the Pakistan
Government in 1982.

Refugees continue to enter Pakistan
at a steady pace. The numbers have
declined, probably reflecting the fact
that many villagers close to Pakistan be-
came refugees in the early stages of the
war, while resistance leaders farther
away from the border have urged the
local population to stay in their villages.
Also, victims of the war in the interior
have moved to Kabul and other cities. In
October, however, authorities in
Pakistan noted a rise in refugees arriv-
ing in Pakistan, including people coming
for the first time from the Panjsher
Valley.

The international refugee relief pro-
gram, sponsored by the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
implemented by the Government of
Pakistan, has been remarkably suc-
cessful. Islamic communality and cross-
border kinship in the tribal areas of
Pakistan where most of the refugees are
located have contributed to the welcome
that Pakistan has extended to its
Afghan guests.

In fiscal year 1982, the United
States contributed over $105 million in
support of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
This figure includes about $70 million
worth of food aid given through the
World Food Program (WFP), a U.N.
agency, and about $27 million donated
through the UNHCR. The U.S. donation
constitutes one-third of the total
UNHCR budget and about 60% of the
international food contribution. The
balance of the U.S. contribution goes to
several voluntary agencies.

In spite of the large international
contribution, the Government of Paki-
stan bears the brunt of the relief effort.
It pays a cash allowance to refugees and
pays the costs of administering the relief
program and providing transport for
relief supplies. Furthermore, Pakistan
has suffered environmental damage ow-
ing to the refugees' need for firewood
and for grazing for their 3 million
animals.

Despite some incidents, relations be-
tween the refugees and the local Paki-
stani population have been generally
smooth. Nevertheless, the larger the
refugee population becomes and the
longer it remains, the greater the likeli-
hood of friction. Although this prospect
puts pressure on Pakistan to negotiate a
political solution. President Zia has in-
dicated that Pakistan would accommo-
date many more refugees if necessary.

The refugee population in Iran is
estimated at between 500,000 and 1
million. Over 4,000 refugees of Turkic
origin were resettled from Pakistan to
Turkey in 1982, including a tribe of
Kirghiz nomads from the Wakhan cor-
ridor. About 4,000 Afghan refugees
were admitted to the United States dur-
ing fiscal year 1982.

Long-Term Soviet Prospects

The most urgent Soviet priority in
Afghanistan during 1982 has been the
pursuit of its military objectives:
eliminating the mujahidin forces and
keeping the Afghan people from sup-
porting the resistance. But Moscow also
pursues a long-range policy of stimulat-
ing a more favorable political climate for
itself and its proteges. A key element of
this policy is the development of loyal
cadres of young people through
Sovietization of the Afghan educational
system and extensive educational and
training programs for Afghans in the
Soviet Union.

Estimates of the number of Afghans
currently studying in the U.S.S.R. vary
from 6,000 to 10,000. This program,
however, does not always achieve its
purposes. Afghan students have en-
countered hostility from Soviet citizens
angered by the loss of Soviet lives in
Afghanistan. Some students have
clashed with Soviet police.

Last summer, as in the two pre-
ceding years, a large number of Afghan
children (1,200 in 1982) went to summer
camp in the Soviet Union. Parents have
complained about political indoctrination
courses at these camps and also about
Soviet and regime efforts to use children
as informers.

Moscow is creating an infrastructure
of Soviet-style institutions in Afghani-
stan on which it counts to mold the peo-
ple in the Soviet image. The Soviets
hope that key organizations, such as the
National Fatherland Front, gradually
will take root.

The regime's nationality and tribal
policy also is part of Moscow's long-term

Department of State Bulletin

SOUTH ASIA

strategy. And Babrak's major effort to
coopt religious leaders undoubtedly
reflects Soviet direction.

The Afghan people have seen
through these strategies and have large-
ly resisted Soviet efforts to win their
support through gifts of food and con-
sumer goods. Over the longer term,
however, growing hardship and suffer-
ing in Afghanistan could make the popu-
lation more susceptible to Soviet bland-
ishments, pressure, and propaganda.

Moscow continues to pursue its long-
term objective of wearing down interna-
tional resistance to the Babrak regime.
A central element in this effort is to
build up Babrak's international image
and to strengthen ties between his
regime and other receptive govern-
ments, primarily countries of Eastern
Europe. In late May 1982, Babrak
visited East Berlin and signed a Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation with the
German Democratic Republic. In early
October, he went to Hungary and signed
a similar treaty. These visits followed
trips to Bulgaria (December 1981),
Czechoslovakia (June 1981), and Moscow
(October 1980). The Soviets clearly hope
that by keeping Babrak on the world
stage, they can eventually persuade the
international community to accept him
as a legitimate head of government.

Regime officials, with Soviet assist-
ance, have made great efforts to develop
relations with the nonaligned world.
Foreign Minister Dost has been actively
seeking friends in the Middle East and
South Asia but without signal success.
In India, whose criticism of the Soviet
invasion has been restrained, his ap-
proaches have produced mixed results.
India agreed to revive a joint Indian-
Afghan commission on economic, tech-
nical, and commercial relations, and in
May signed a protocol envisaging a
modest program of trade and technical
assistance. Subsequently Mrs. Gandhi
became more outspoken about the need
for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan and made a statement to
this effect at her press conference in
Moscow in September.

The international community, how-
ever, through a fourth overwhelming
vote in the United Nations (114-21), has
demonstrated once again that it rejects
the Babrak government's claim to legiti-
macy. The U.N. resolution calls for the
immediate withdrawal of foreign troops
from Afghanistan and a peaceful solu-
tion based on the principles of sovereign-
ty, nonalignment, and self-determina-
tion, as well as for the creation of condi-
tions in Afghanistan that would enable

the refugees to return with safety and
honor. The resolution also requests the
Secretary General to continue his efforts
to promote a political solution in accor-
dance with the resolution and to explore
the possibility of securing appropriate
guarantees of noninterference in
neighboring states. The size of the vote
in favor of this resolution is impressive
evidence of continuing international con-
cern.

Indeed, the spotlight on Afghanistan
grows brighter each year. The number
of journalists and photographers who
have traveled inside Afghanistan with
the mujahidin has increased, as has
coverage in the international press and
on television. Such events as the
Florence Colloquium on Afghanistan and
international observances of Afghanistan
Day, both in March 1982, and the Ber-
trand Russell Tribunal meeting in Paris
in December 1982 all serve to emphasize
the importance of the issue. Never-
theless, the international publicity is
periodic, while the suffering of the
Afghan people is constant. The
discrepancy between the magnitude of
the tragedy and the international atten-
tion it receives works very much to
Moscow's advantage.

Prospects For a Political Solution

Indirect talks on Afghanistan in Geneva
in June 1982 drew international atten-
tion to the U.N. effort to seek a
negotiated solution. The U.N. mission
was originally mandated in November
1980 by the General Assembly and was
launched in 1981 under the aegis of
Secretary General Waldheim and his
"personal representative" for
Afghanistan, Perez de Cuellar.

In early August 1981, during his se-
cond trip to South Asia to deal with this
problem, Perez de Cuellar won two con-
cessions from the Soviets and the
Babrak regime: The United Nations
would play an active role in negotiations
concerning Afghanistan; and Kabul
would engage in negotiations with Paki-
stan and Iran together, rather than in-
sisting on dealing bilaterally with each
one. The latter point is important to
Pakistan because, by pursuing a political
solution in tandem with Iran, Pakistan
will be in conformity with the resolution
of the Islamic Conference in May 1980.

Kabul's concessions, which were pro-
cedural only, were embodied in the

Afghan proposals of August 1981; these,
in other respects, were a repetition of
its original proposals of May 14, 1980.
The May 14 proposals in essence stated
that Babrak's regime must be recognized
as a legitimate government and that the
Soviet troops will leave Afghanistan
when what Kabul calls "outside inter-
ference" (the resistance) stops. The
May 14 proposals also call for interna-
tional guarantees for such a settlement.

The U.N. mission was temporarily
interrupted when Waldheim was re-
placed by Perez de Cuellar in late 1981.
In February 1982, Perez de Cuellar,
following a formula devised by Wald-
heim, appointed Diego Cordovez, U.N.
Undersecretary for Special Political Af-
fairs, as his "personal representative"
for Afghanistan.

By mid-April 1982, Cordovez was
shuttling between Kabul and Islamabad,
visiting each twice, prior to a stop in
Tehran. Shortly after his return to New
York, the United Nations announced on
April 21 that both the Pakistanis and
the Babrak regime had agreed to hold
indirect talks in Geneva in June. Iran
would not participate directly, but
agreed to be kept informed and thus to
be associated with the talks. The an-
nouncement also stated that the involved
parties had agreed to discuss the follow-
ing issues: "the withdrawal of foreign
troops, non-interference in the internal
affairs of states, international guaran-
tees of non-interference and the volun-
tary return of the refugees to their
homes."

The Geneva talks lasted from
June 15 to June 24. The Iranians made
it clear that they were not participating
because the "real representatives of
Afghanistan," i.e., the mujahidin, were
not represented. Spokesmen for the
Afghan resistance movement protested
the talks for the same reason. The
Soviets did not participate but sent high-
level experts in Afghan affairs to
Geneva.

Following the conclusion of the
Geneva discussions, the United Nations,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan all issued
positive statements and indicated that
there was a measure of flexibility in the
negotiating positions of both sides. At a
press conference on June 25, Diego Cor-
dovez referred to "certain important
political concessions."

He disclosed that he had kept a writ-
ten record of the "understandings" that

February 1983

SOUTH ASIA

he believed had been reached and that
he would be working from these "texts"
in subsequent discussions with the in-
volved parties. Cordovez emphasized
that the talks had moved beyond pro-
cedural questions to specific discussions
on the basic substantive matters and
stated that "we concluded a kind of
package of understanding."

Although he did not discuss
specifics, he said in response to ques-
tions that a beginning had been made to
work out arrangements to hold discus-
sions with Afghan refugees concerning
the terms for their return and that the
question of self-determination had been
"touched on." These could be important
developments because they relate ulti-
mately to the difficult problem of con-
stituting a government acceptable to
both Moscow and the mujahidin.

The central issue of the negotiations,
however, is whether the U.S.S.R. is
seriously interested at this stage in
negotiating a withdrawal of its troops
from Afghanistan. The "flexibility"
reportedly demonstrated by the Kabul/
Moscow side at Geneva has yet to be put
to the test. But it should become ap-
parent rather soon whether Moscow's
support of the U.N. process is genuine
or tactical. Cordovez will resume his
negotiating mission in January 1983
with another trip to South Asia, and he
will attempt to pin down the specific
details of the comprehensive settlement
he envisages.

The United States seeks the total
withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan through a negotiated settle-
ment, which will also provide for other
essential requirements spelled out in
four U.N. resolutions on Afghanistan:
the self-determination of the Afghan
people, the independent and nonaligned
status of Afghanistan, and the return of
the refugees with safety and honor. The
United States supports U.N. efforts to
achieve these goals.

iSee Bulletin of March 1982, p. 19.

Afghanistan

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Statement made to the press on
December 22, 1982. Ambassador
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for
Political Affairs.

Three years after the Soviet invasion,
the struggle for freedom in Afghanistan
continues. The military situation can
best be described as a stalemate. The
augmentation of Soviet forces to
105,000 and a greatly intensified Soviet
offensive during the past spring and
summer have produced only very limited
gains, if any. After 3 years of increas-
ingly harsh and destructive occupa-
tion— and even with the use of chemical
warfare— the Soviet Union has not been
able to accomplish what it set out to
do — strengthen the Marxist /Communist
government in Kabul and eliminate the
resistance.

This is due to the incredible spirit,
courage, and tenacity of the Afghan peo-
ple; they deserve the admiration and
support of free people everywhere. I
don't know of another example in the
world today where a small and ill-
equipped people has stood up to the
might of a tremendous military power
with such effectiveness.

As you know, this Administration
views the Soviet invasion and continuing
occupation of Afghanistan in a broad
strategic context. It is an example of
Soviet willingness to use its growing
military might beyond its borders and in
ways that threaten American interests,
the interests of the West in an area of
great strategic importance, the interests
of the Islamic world, and the interests of
the subcontinent.

For these reasons we believe it is ab-
solutely essential that Soviet aggression
in Afghanistan be checked. The world
must not forget Afghanistan. In the
U.N. General Assembly, under
Pakistan's leadership, another resolution
on the Afghanistan situation was passed
by an overwhelming majority at the end
of November. In other meetings, such as
the Islamic Conference, resolutions call-
ing for Soviet withdrawal remain agen-
da items of the greatest importance. In
Moscow, Afghanistan was a major item
of discussion with the new Soviet leader-
ship following President Brezhnev's

funeral. In Washington, a few days ago,
President Reagan and President Zia of
Pakistan had a searching discussion on
Afghanistan. I might add that U.S. and
Pakistan policies remain close and com-
patible. In brief, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan remains an issue of primary
world importance, just as it should be.

The position of the U.S. Government
in regard to Afghanistan is clear. We
seek the total withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan in the context
of a negotiated settlement, which will
also provide for the self-determination of
the Afghan people, the independent and
nonaligned status of Afghanistan, and
the return of the refugees with safety
and honor. These elements of a settle-
ment have been spelled out in four U.N.
General Assembly resolutions.

In order to achieve a negotiated set-
tlement, we, like Pakistan, feel every
reasonable avenue must be explored.
Thus we support the efforts of the U.N.
Secretary General's personal representa-
tive, Diego Cordovez, as he prepares to
continue his indirect talks in the region
in January. We understand Mr. Cor-
dovez will carry with him a draft or
outline of a possible framework for a
settlement. We have not seen it, and,
therefore, I cannot comment on what he
will be suggesting as the basis for
discussion. We have said we will support
the U.N. process as long as it is consist-
ent with the U.N. General Assembly
resolutions on Afghanistan and does not
tend to legitimize the Babrak Karmal
regime.

Since the leadership change in
Moscow, there has been a great deal of
press speculation and comment on the
possibility of Soviet flexibility toward a
negotiated solution in Afghanistan. Thus
far we have had no meaningful indica-
tions of Soviet intentions. We would
welcome signs of Soviet willingness to
work seriously for a negotiated settle-
ment that will return Afghanistan to the
Afghans. ■

Department of State BulletiJ

SOUTH ASIA

Balancing Strategic Interests
and Human Rights in South Asia

by David T. Schneider

Statement before the Subcommittees
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on
Human Rights and International Orga-
nizations of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on December 9, 1982. Mr.
Schneider is Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs. ^

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
testify on the problem we face in balanc-
ing our strategic interests and human
rights concerns in the countries of South
Asia— Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Our objective is to promote and pro-
tect human rights — not against our
strategic interests but in conjunction
with them. This Administration believes
that in the long run, American human
rights concerns and strategic interests
point generally in the same direction.
The development of stable democratic
institutions, greater tolerance for free
speech, popular participation in govern-
ment, and respect for fundamental
human rights will lead to enhanced
stability and prospects for peace.

In South Asia, our strategic in-
terests focus on deterring Soviet expan-
sionism in a region whose geographic
proximity to the Persian Gulf and the
sealanes leading to it have highlighted
its importance to us. To this end, we
cooperate in various ways — whether
through diplomatic dialogue or security
assistance— to promote the security of
the region. Concurrently we support
economic growth and political stability
aimed at fostering strong and independ-
ent South Asian nations which can ac-
cord basic human rights to their citizens.
South Asian countries are among the
very poorest in the world, making all the
more critical the interrelationship of our
security, developmental, and human
rights goals.

President Reagan has committed the
United States to make a greater effort
internationally to assist the development
of democracy. The President believes
that support for the growth of
democracy should be an important
dimension of the foreign relations of the
United States and other democratic na-
tions. There is no single model that is
applicable to all countries. However,
democracies— no matter what

shape— are built upon a set of basic
principles which we believe are valid in
most societies and, where followed, have
resulted in nations with relatively stable
political and economic systems flexible
enough to meet a complex, changing in-
ternational environment and respect for
human rights.

While each country must find its
own way toward representative institu-
tions, we have fostered an understand-
ing of democratic values and processes
in South Asia in a variety of ways, in-
cluding our development programs and
information and visitor exchange. We
have quietly used our diplomacy to en-
courage broader participation in govern-
ment. We are now exploring the possi-
bilities for specific activities to help
enhance representative systems in India,
Sri Lanka, and Nepal and to promote
such systems in the other nations of
South Asia.

A discussion of specific countries in
South Asia will serve to highlight our
approach to promoting both U.S.
strategic interests and human rights.

India

India is a key nation in a region of the
world important to U.S. strategic in-
terests. It is the largest nation in South
Asia in terms of its population,
economy, and military strength. India
has a remarkable record of over three
decades of democratic rule — seven
general elections; five peaceful changes
of national government. Indian
democracy has endured almost to the
point at which the world takes it for
granted. In fact, the Administration at-
taches great importance to maintaining
constructive relations with India and has
sought ways to expand its dialogue with
India and to work together more closely.
The visit of Prime Minister Gandhi here
this summer and the solid progress
made on the initiatives announced at
that time demonstrate the interest on
both sides in seeking a better under-
standing and finding ways to strengthen
the already extensive ongoing ties. As a
part of this process, the Indo-U.S. Joint
Commission — with its subcommissions
on science and technology, economics
and commerce, agriculture, and educa-
tion and culture — have been revitalized.
As a result of a decision at the time of

Mrs. Gandhi's visit, our political dialogue
has been intensified by the recent visit
to India for bilateral talks of Under
Secretary [for Political Affairs Lawrence
S.] Eagleburger. The Government of
India has issued a special invitation to
Secretary Shultz to visit New Delhi.

In particular, we see good scope for
enhanced cooperation in the economic,
commercial, and scientific areas. We are
encouraging U.S. firms to take advan-
tage of new opportunities in India which
are the result of the improved business
climate there. American companies can
thereby contribute their unique talents
and technology to assisting India's
development efforts through private
sector-to-private sector collaboration.
The President's science adviser led a
senior group to India last month to lay
the groundwork for enhanced joint
cooperation in certain specialized fields
of science. We recently invited a group
of Indian parliamentarians, including the
speaker, to observe the congressional
elections.

Since India won independence in
1947, the United States has admired its
vigorous democratic process and has
been the major foreign contributor to
Indian economic development. Our two
countries have worked closely in bring-
ing about remarkable success in Indian
agriculture. Over the years, there has
been extensive interaction between our
nations, including the education of tens
of thousands of Indians in American uni-
versities. We also have a modest mili-
tary cooperation program with India-
some cash sales of equipment and train-
ing of a few military officers —
which supports our security and
democracy objectives. The issue of
civilian supremacy over the military does
not arise in India, which stands as a
model throughout the world for its
scrupulous adherence to the principle of
civilian control.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is strategically located astride
the major ocean trade routes of the
Indian Ocean and offers access for U.S.
Navy vessels. Our substantial economic
development program, training for
military students, and active political
dialogue serve to demonstrate strong
U.S. support for this strategic and
democratic country. Since independence
Sri Lanka has had a history of free elec-
tions and active popular participation.
Sri Lanka's current government also
favors a market-oriented, free enterprise

February 1983

SOUTH ASIA

economic approach. In addition to help-
ing fund two of the three lead projects
in Sri Lanka's development strategy, we
are encouraging U.S. firms to consider
investing in the country's free trade
zone.

Nepal

Nepal forms an important buffer be-
tween India and China. U.S. interests
center on its strategic location and on
our consequent interest in orderly
economic development and the evolution
of stable political institutions which pro-
vide for public participation in govern-
ment. While Nepal's constitution
specifies that the king is the sole source
of authority for all government institu-
tions, the country has recently made
dramatic progress toward its own sort
of representative institutions. By
referendum Nepal chose the partyless
panchayat form of representation, and
the country has now launched its own
experiment in participatory government.
Accompanying this has been a trend
toward broader enjoyment of a wide
range of human rights.

Our commitment to assist Nepal's
economic development goes back to 1951
when the country ended its self-imposed
isolation. We also provide training in the
United States for two Nepali military of-
ficers, exposing them to American at-
titudes toward the role of the military in
society.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh was born in conflict in 1971,
a time when political turmoil threatened
the security and stability of the entire
subcontinent. In the decade since in-
dependence, the country has suffered
from severe political and economic dif-
ficulties. Events during the past year
have returned this struggling country to
military rule. We have welcomed and en-
couraged the stated intention of the
present government to return the coun-
try to civilian rule. Economic develop-
ment and political stability are inex-
tricably linked in Bangladesh, and we
view a return to representative govern-
ment as a key element of political stabili-
ty. Our assistance program has evolved
from emergency relief to long-term
development, which we hope can foster
stability and encourage civilian represen-
tative rule. Our military training pro-
gram ($22.5,0(10) exposes Bangladeshi of-
ficers to American democratic values
and is important to our policies in that
country because of the influential role
the military plays in government.

Pakistan

I would now like to turn to Pakistan, the
country most directly threatened by re-
cent aggressive Soviet moves in the
region and of critical importance in
regard to U.S. strategic interests in the

Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area and to
our goal of stability in South and South-
west Asia.

In 1981 the United States reached
agreement with Pakistan, subject to an-
nual appropriation by the Congress, to

Anniversary of the Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 26, 1982'

At this holiday season when most
Americans are warmed and comforted
by their family relationships and the
blessings of this country, it is hard for
us to realize that far away in a remote
and mountainous land a valiant people is
putting up a fight for freedom that af-
fects us all. No matter how far removed
from our daily lives, Afghanistan is a
struggle we must not forget.

Afghanistan is important to the
world, because the Afghan people are
resisting Soviet imperialism. Three
years ago on December 27, 1979, the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and
installed a new Communist leader to
head the Marxist regime that had taken
power in 1978. For the first time since
the immediate aftermath of World War
II, the Soviets used a large-scale
military force outside their borders and
Eastern Europe to try to impose their
will. If this aggression should succeed, it
will have dangerous impact on the safety
of free men everywhere.

Three years after the invasion, the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is not
a success. Even with the augmentation
of their forces to close to 105,000 men
this year, the Soviets, with the puppet
Karmal regime, have not been able to
control the countryside or secure many
cities. They have failed to rebuild the
Communist-controlled Afghan Army and
to create an effective government.

This is due to the spirit and will of
the majority of the Afghan people, and
to the mujahidin, the freedom-fighters,
who continue to resist the Soviet in-
vaders. In the face of repeated offensive
campaigns during the spring and sum-
mer of 1982, the mujahidin were able to
drop back and then regain their posi-
tions once the Soviet forces had with-
drawn. Their forces and their will re-
main intact.

We must recognize that the human

costs of this struggle are immense. With
the more intense fighting in 1982,
casualties on both sides rose, and the
civilian population suffered more than
ever before. Crops and fields were
destroyed by the Soviets, trying to deny
to the mujahidin the support of the loca
population. Homes, and even entire
villages, were leveled. We have convinc-
ing proof chemical weapons have been
used by the Soviets against the Afghans
The refugee population has continued to
grow, both in Pakistan and in Afghan-
istan, as peasants flee the destruction of
war. It is a sad but inspiring story.

The United States does not intend t(
forget these brave people and their
struggle. We have said repeatedly that
we support a negotiated settlement for
Afghanistan predicated on the complete
withdrawal of Soviet troops. We joined
the vast majority of the world commu-
nity at the LTnited Nations again in
November in support of a resolution call
ing for a settlement along these lines.
Just a few weeks ago, during his visit tc
the United States, I discussed with i

President Zia of Pakistan the need for a
solution to the Afghanistan problem. Wf
are both committed to a negotiated set-
tlement that will return Afghanistan to
the ranks of independent, nonaligned na
tions.

We in the United States sincerely
hope that the new leadership of the
Soviet Union will take advantage of the
opportunities the new year will no doubi
offer to achieve a solution for Afghani-
stan. The American people do not want
to see the suffering and deprivation of
the Afghan people continue, but we will
not grow weary or abandon them and
their cause of freedom.

It is our hope for 1983 that a free,
independent Afghan nation will again
find its place in the world community.
We will not cease to support Afghan ef-
forts to that end.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 3, 1983.

Department of State Bulleti

SOUTH ASIA

Drovide $3.2 billion in foreign military
;ales credits and economic assistance
3ver a period of 6 years. We take this
iction in support of Pakistan's strong,
Drincipled stand against the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan and its leading role
n international efforts to induce with-
irawal of Soviet forces from Afghani-
stan. Our assistance programs are in-
ended both to help Pakistan modernize
ts military forces and to promote inter-
lal stability through economic develop-
nent. Our security commitment is a ma-
or element in assuring that Pakistan
vill be able to sustain its stand against
50viet aggression and thereby protect
dtal U.S. strategic interests in this
Tucial region.

During its 35 years of independence,
'akistan has sought effective govern-
nent through a variety of regimes. This
listory has been influenced by a number
if factors. Throughout its history,
'akistan has been preoccupied with a
earch for its national identity and, in
larticular, a definition of the position of
slam in its national character. In addi-
ion the social, political, economic,
egional, and ethnic differences which
haracterize Pakistan's diverse society
ave frequently led to political turmoil,
'akistan's human rights problem derives
rom this difficult experience.

We believe it important that our
olicies toward Pakistan take into ac-
I ount these causes of instability as well
I s our national security interests in the
rea. Within this context, we have
ought to encourage the evolution of
epresentative government in accord-
nce with the view that such institutions
/ould help Pakistan to deal with the
onflicting pressures it faces. Never-
heless we recognize Pakistan's right to
ry to evolve its own forms which take
ito account its traditions and problems.
Ve also recognize that, while there are
ndeniably human rights problems, in
lany ways this regime is moderate in
omparison to some of the previous
nes.

We have, of course, discussed these
uman rights issues with the Pakistani
jadership and will continue to do so.
Yhile our dialogue on human rights, for
he most part, has been a private one,
ur ambassador in Pakistan has also
ought to gain public understanding of
ur support for more representative
orms of government.

Another factor which we believe our
lolicies must take into consideration is
ur interest in the human rights situa-
ion in the region as a whole. Here, of
ourse, I refer to Afghanistan. It has

been with great economic and political
sacrifice and no little strain that
Pakistan has welcomed into its territory
almost 3 million Afghan refugees who
have been forced to seek temporary
asylum from the Soviet assault on their
freedom and independence. The
phenomenon of masses of refugees flee-
ing from political oppression is a com-
mon one in the contemporary world. No
nation, however, has shown greater
hospitality and tolerance to such a flow
than Pakistan. Further, despite the
threat to Pakistan itself, the Pakistanis
have bravely offered their support in in-
ternational fora around the world to the
Afghan freedom fighters and the con-
cept of a free and independent Afghan-
istan. Pakistani support is important to
the reestablishment of human rights in
Afghanistan, a major U.S. cause.

Our security assistance to Pakistan

is not extended in support of any par-
ticular government in power. It is aid to
Pakistan as a nation. We believe the
Pakistani people understand it in this
light and support our policies.

I have sought to review briefly how
we seek to take into account both our
strategic interests and our human rights
concerns in the South Asian region. I
believe we can take pride in the
achievements of the countries located
there. Their record, whether in the
development of democratic government
or in the support to an oppressed
neighboring people, is deserving of our
support, and it has our support.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, tl.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Visit of Pakistan's President

President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan made a
state visit to the United States Decem-
ber 6-U, 1982. While in Washington,
D.C. December 6-9, he met with Presi-
dent Reagan and other government of-
ficials.

Following are the remarks made by
Presidents Reagan and Zia at the ar-
rival ceremony and their exchange of
dinner toasts, both on December 7.^

ARRIVAL CEREMONY,
DEC. 7, 19822

President Reagan

It's a great pleasure for Nancy and me
to welcome you to Washington today.
Your visit to the United States this
week both symbolizes and strengthens
the close ties which exist between our
two countries.

As you arrive here, the world, and
your region in particular, are passing
through a critical phase. We confront
serious challenges that by choice and
necessity will draw our peoples ever
closer. It's vital that those nations com-
mitted to peace and progress work
diligently together to achieve those
goals.

One of Pakistan's founding fathers,
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, visited
Washington in 1950. And speaking

before the U.S. Senate, he described our
continuing challenge. He said, "This is
the century of great awakenings in all
parts of the globe. And it depends en-
tirely on the leaders of the world
whether mankind will awaken to the
horrors of darkness or to a glorious
dawn." His words ring true even now.

Pakistan today stands in the front
rank of the nations shouldering a great
responsibility for mankind. Your
courageous and compassionate role in
giving shelter to millions of Afghan
refugees is well known to the American
people and will long be remembered.
We're proud to stand with you, helping
to provide for these tragic victims of ag-
gression, while, at the same time, seek-
ing a peaceful resolution of the circum-
stances which brought them to your
country.

We also applaud your efforts and
those of the Indian Government to
reconcile your differences. The steps you
take today to deter these relations will
bring incalculable benefit to all the peo-
ple of the subcontinent and will be
memorialized in improvement of their
lives.

Similarly, Pakistan's positive
response to peace efforts in the Middle
East have contributed to our confidence
that our two countries can work
together for peace and stability. After
many years of disappointment, there is
growing recognition in the Middle Elast

ebruary 1983

SOUTH ASIA

that a continuation of violence can only
breed a worsening conflict. This cycle
must be broken. We're gratified to know
that we can count on Pakistan's coopera-
tion in confronting these perplexing
problems.

We believe that the program of
economic and security assistance on
which we embarked last year will con-
tribute to the tranquility and progress of
the entire region, and it's our hope that
reinvigoration of the relationship be-
tween our two countries will enable
Pakistan to maintain its courageous
stand on behalf of peace and amity of
nations.

The U.S. -Pakistani friendship, which
stretches back over 30 years, has been
tested by time and change. It has en-
dured, and, because of the substantial
agreement between us on the great
issues of peace, development, and securi-
ty, it grows stronger daily.

Underlying our ties, however, is
something which is even more critical in
an enduring relationship and that is the
warmth and understanding that exist
between the people of our countries.
This friendship is based on the mutual
warmth and affection which have devel-
oped between our people, something
which no government can mandate and
which is, indeed, a cherished possession.

When you leave us and leave the
United States next week, we want you
to return home secure in the knowledge
that the American people support close
ties with Pakistan and look forward to
expanding them in the coming years.
We hope the friendship and hospitality
that you receive during your stay will
underline our good will and the per-
manence of our bond.

President Zia

In the name of Allah, the beneficient,
the merciful. Praise be to Allah, Lord of
the Worlds, and blessing and peace be
upon the seal of the last of the prophets.

May I thank you most sincerely for
your very kind words of welcome, for
the warmth with which we have been
received, and the generous hospitality
that has already been extended to me,
my wife, and the members of my delega-
tion since we arrived in your great coun-
try.

I am no stranger to the United
States. I've had the honor of coming
here a few times before. But each time I

have felt that it was a new experience
for me. Perhaps this is because of the
perpetual freshness, the vibrant
dynamism, and the ceaseless, forward
movement which characterize this great
nation of yours.

My visit this time is not just one of
discovery or rediscovery. I take it as a
visit of great importance for renewal
and reaffirmation: renewal of a friend-
ship that has to us many ups and downs
and reaffirmation of those shared values
and perceptions on which our relation-
ship is based. I, therefore, look forward
to the strengthening of our ties as the
years go by.

West and southwest Asia, from the
eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan,
is today in ferment. Armed aggression,
military intervention, conflicts, disregard
for universally accepted principles of in-
ternational conduct have all combined to
present a serious challenge to the securi-
ty of the countries of this region. This in
turn threatens to undermine the whole
structure of the international relations
upon which the peace of the world
ultimately rests.

Pakistan's continued commitment to
the principle of nonalignment and to the

objectives of the Islamic Conference are
the fundamental postulates of its foreign
policy. Pakistan is endeavoring to con-
tribute effectively to the peace and
stability of a troubled and turbulent
region. But we cannot ourselves long re-
main immune from the dangers around
us, nor have we, in fact, escaped their
consequences.

The responsibility for providing
refuge and a safe haven for nearly 3
million fleeing the repression in
Afghanistan has been shouldered by our
people as a humanitarian duty in the
spirit of Islamic brotherhood. Never-
theless, the burdens are there, especially
for a developing country like Pakistan.

But at the same time I must em-
phasize that we have borne these
burdens ungrudgingly, and we will con-
tinue to do so, eyishaUah. We are con-
scious of the security implications of the
great developments across our border.
The qualitative change brought about by
these developments and their impact on
the entire region have evoked a re-
sponse from the United States, which
we appreciate.

It was as a result of our common
concern that our two governments
decided on a program to enhance
Pakistan's potential to withstand exter-
nal forces of disruption and continue to
play a stabilizing role in the region.

It's our consistent endeavor to find
equitable and humane solutions to the
conflicts in our region. This task can
only be accomplished through negotia-
tions and mutual accommodation within
the framework of the principles and
resolutions of the United Nations. It
must also inevitably entail the proper
regard for the individual and collective
dignity of the peoples involved.

In this endeavor, we have been for-
tunate to have your understanding.
What is more, I claim that we have your
friendship as well — a friendship mature
enough to withstand differences of opin-
ion and mirrored by the very candor and
sincerity of our mutual exchanges. For
all this, we're indeed very grateful to
you.

I have come here to deepen and
strengthen this friendship. I'm looking
forward to our talks later this morning.
And I have no doubt that they will lead
us to this goal and that our respective
efforts on behalf of peace and stability
in our region and in the world in

Department of State Bulletir

SOUTH ASIA

general, enshallah, shall bear fruit. In-
deed, borrowing your own words, it will
be in the fitness of the things for me to
conclude by saying, that you and I have
a rendezvous with destiny.

DINNER TOASTS.
DEC. 7, 1982

President Reagan

President Zia, Begum Zia, distinguished
guests, it's an honor for me to welcome
you to the White House this evening.

Our talks this morning underlined
again the strong links between our coun-
tries. We find ourselves even more fre-
quently in agreement on our goals and
objectives. And we, for example, ap-
plaud your deep commitment to peaceful
progress in the Middle East and South
Asia, a resolve which bolsters our hopes
and the hopes of millions.

In the last few years, in particular,
your country has come to the forefront
of the struggle to construct a framework
for peace in your region, an undertaking
which includes your strenuous efforts to
bring peaceful resolution to the crisis in
Afghanistan — a resolution which will
enable the millions of refugees currently
seeking shelter in Pakistan to go home
in peace and honor. Further, you've
worked to insure that progress con-
tinues toward improving the relationship
between Pakistan and India. And in all
these efforts the United States has sup-
ported your objectives and will applaud
your success.

A great intellectual forefather of
Pakistan, Muhammed Iqbal, once said
that, "The secret of life is in the
seeking." Today the people of the United
States and Pakistan are seeking the
same goals. Your commitment to peace
and progress in South Asia and the Mid-
dle East has reinforced our commitment
to Pakistan. We want to assure you and
the people of your country that we will
not waver in this commitment.

Our relationship is deep and long-
standing. It stretches back to Pakistan's
first days of independence. It stretches
forward as far as we can see. It's based
on mutual interest, yes, but also on
shared visions and goals in the world
around us. It is based, as well, on the

fact that the people of both our coun-
tries sincerely value the good relations
and the affinity between us.

Our people already work together in
significant ways through educational ex-
changes, tourism, economic cooperation,
and through bonds of family and friend-
ship. We have cooperative programs in
science and technology and in agri-
culture, and we hope to explore with the
Government of Pakistan various ways of
enhancing cooperation.

Differences may come between our
nations or have come between our na-

Pakistan— A Profile

Geography

Area: 310,527 sq. mi., excluding Jammu and
Kashmir which are in dispute with India
(about the size of Calif.). Capital: Islamabad
(pop. 250,000). Other Cities: Karachi (3.5
million), Lahore (2.1 million).

People

Population: 81.5 million (1980). Annual
Growth Rate: 3%. Ethnic Groups: Punjabi,
Sindhi, Pushtan (Pathan), Baluchi. Religions:
Muslim (97%), small minorities of Christians,
Hindu, and others. Languages: Urdu (of-
ficial), English, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu,
Baluchi. Literacy: 24%.

Government

Type: Martial law regime established in 1977.

Independence: Aug. 14, 1947. Branches: Ex-

ecutive — Chief Martial Law Administrator
(President), cabinet. Legislative — Senate and
National Assembly. Judicial — Military
courts, provincial high courts. Supreme
Court. Chief Martial Law Administrator ap-
points ministers and judges. Political Par-
ties: Political parties were suspended in
1977, following the imposition of martial law.
Some political activity was subsequently
allowed. In Oct. 1979, general elections
scheduled for Nov. were postponed, and
political party activity was banned. Political
Subdivisions: 4 provinces, tribal areas,
federal capital.

Economy

GNP: $23 billion (FY 1980). Annual Growth
Rate: 6.4% (1978-80). Per Capita Income:
$289. Natural Resources: Land, extensive
natural gas, limited petroleum, poor quality
coal, iron ore. Agriculture: Wheat, cotton,
rice. Industries: Cotton textiles, food proc-
essing, tobacco, engineering, chemicals, na-
tural gas. Trade (FY 1980): Exports— $2.3
billion: rice, raw cotton, yarn, textiles, light
manufactured products. Imports — $4.8
billion: capital goods, raw materials, crude
oil, consumer items. Major Trading Part-
ners—Fa.r East, EC, Middle East, U.S. ■

tions in the past, but they've proven to
be transitory while the ties which bind
us together grow stronger year by year.
As we welcome you here tonight as the
representative of your country and its
people, we can say with confidence that
those ties will continue to grow stronger
and that the good will which exists be-
tween our two countries will prove to be
both true and lasting.

And, Mr. President, I propose a
toast to you, to the people of Pakistan,
and to the friendship that binds our na-
tions together.

President Zia

In the name of Allah, the beneficient,
the merciful, we praise Him and we
send blessings on His honored messen-
ger.

After hearing such an eloquent
speech from — Mr. President, from you,
and having had such a sumptuous — so
well presented in such a fine company —
a meal that I will perhaps cherish for
many years to come, I see very little
that I can add to what you have very
kindly said. But still my wife and I, as
well as the members of my delegation,
are most grateful to you for the honor
you have done us in hosting this delight-
ful banquet for us tonight. I have been
deeply touched by the sentiments of
your friendship that you have expressed
toward me and my country, which are
most warmly reciprocated.

The people of Pakistan are deeply
committed to molding their lives and
building their institutions in keeping
with the dictates of Islam. Islam ordains
upon — follows a belief in the equality
and universal brotherhood of mankind.
It was the dedication of your Founding
Fathers to similar ideals that created
this great republic, the United States of
America.

Your country has been called the
melting pot of people from all over the
world. This is a trait we share with you,
though, perhaps, on a very smaller
scale. Let me, therefore, take you back
to Pakistan, if I can.

Herein lies the Indus Valley, which
is the heartland of Pakistan. This valley
has been a veritable thoroughfare
throughout history. Untold millions,
representing all the major races of the

February

1983

SOUTH ASIA

Eurasian mass, have made their way
through our mountain passes to settle in
or to pass through the Indus Valley.
They came in all guises. They came as
conquering hordes, as defeated or
wandering tribes, as mystics and mis-
sionaries, as saints and sultans, and
even as tourists and traders, both an-
cient and modern. And 35 years ago,
many millions of Muslims of the South
Asian subcontinent came together to
help build a dream called Pakistan.

Thus we are, indeed, the heirs to a
rich and a varied if also somewhat tur-
bulent historical heritage. But by the
same token, we are a vigorous people
with an innate feel for the movements of
history.

And unfortunately, a new and
menacing turbulence has arisen in our
region. More than a fifth of the entire
population of Afghanistan has been com-
pelled to seek shelter in Pakistan as a
result of the armed intervention in that
country by a foreign power. We are
bending our effort to resolve this tragic
situation through a peaceful political set-
tlement, in accordance with the prin-
ciples enunciated by the international
community. The latest manifestation of
this was the resolution of Afghanistan
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly,
once again with the overwhelming sup-
port of the member states.

There are other turbulences in our
region. The war between Iran and Iraq
and the suffering recently visited upon
the Lebanese and Palestinian people
continue to cause us profound concern
and anguish.

The situation calls for difficult yet
courageous decisions. The most impor-
tant of these is to find a just and a
durable solution to the Palestinian prob-
lem, in accordance with the national
rights of the Palestinian people. If I may
be permitted to recall my words, it is for
the first time that Arabs have put up a

unified plan for the solution of the
Palestine problem. To the best of my
knowledge, it is for the first time that
the President of the United States of
America has put up a very comprehen-
sive plan with some very positive
elements in this.

Knowing your humane qualities,
knowing you as a man of God, knowing
you as a man of peace, I urge you not to
leave this opportunity that is coming
your way. I request you to be yourself,
to find the rest of you and take this bold
step, because history will then remem-
ber you not only as Reagan of the
United States of America but Reagan
the Peacemaker, the Reagan who solved
practically an insolvable problem. We in
Pakistan wish you to take this initiative,
and we wish you all the best. And we
will pray for your success.

Earlier today in our personal discus-
sion and in the talks including our col-
leagues, I had an opportunity to discuss
these and other issues with you. I'm
deeply gratified by the manner in which
you made clear your continuing and
deep-felt interest in the welfare and
prosperity of the people of Pakistan and
your support for what we are doing for
the sake of stability in our region.

In turn, I would like to assure you of
our confidence that with your acknowl-
edged qualities of human understanding
and with the high principled tradition of
your country behind you, the United
States will keep faith with its friends
and well-wishers.

Allow me to thank you also for what

you have said, for what you have said
about the continued relationship be-
tween Pakistan and the United States of
America. We cherish this union of part-
ners— though unequal partners— but as
two sovereign states comprising of peo-
ple who love each other, comprising of
people who have love and regard for
humanity, comprising of people who love
peace. And, as you said about the
United States of America, that if the
country has been created, God must
have ordained this to be a country of
peace.

Spread this America to areas other
than the United States of America. Let
America be the torchbearer of peace,
peace not only on the American conti-
nent but peace in Afghanistan, peace in
Vietnam, peace in Somalia, and above
all, peace in Palestine. We wish you all
the best in your endeavors. And you will
never find Pakistan faltering. We'll be
there right behind you to give you the
helping hand, if we can, at the moment
that you wish us to do so.

With these words, may I request
you, ladies and gentlemen, to join me in
a toast to the health and happiness of
President Reagan and his charming
wife, Mrs. Nancy Reagan, the continued
progress and prosperity of the people of
the United States, the establishment of
peace, stability, and justice throughout
the world. To the health and happiness
of all friends who are present here
tonight. And, finally, a continuing
friendship between Pakistan and the
United States of America.

iTexts from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, 1982.

^Held on the South Lawn of the White
House where President Zia was accorded a
formal welcome with full military honors. ■

Department of State Bulletin

NITED NATIONS

NISPACE 82 Held in Vienna

The Second U.N. Conference on the
ploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
ice (UNISPACE 82) was held August
U, 1982, in Vienna and attended by
iresentatives from 94 countries.

Following are a statement by Am-
■.sador James M. Beggs, head of the
?. delegation; the text of a U.N.
neral Assembly resolution; a state-
nt by President Reagan broadcast over
sed-circuit television at the opening
sion of the conference; and a list of the
5. delegation.

IBASSADOR BEGGS'

ATEMENT,

IG. 10, 1982

enty-five years into the space age,
1 14 years after our first U.N. con-
ence on outer space, we again meet
Vienna to consider where we stand
1 where we are going in the peaceful
!S of outer space. The last 25 years
re been characterized by extraor-
ary achievement in space-based ac-
ties, not only by the United States
. by a growing number of countries
oughout the world. Indeed, in a
bal sense, it is no exaggeration to say
t we are on the verge of becoming a
ice-faring civilization.

The last several decades also have
■n characterized by U.S. leadership in
ice science and applications, frequent-
exercised in broad cooperation with
intries throughout the world. To date.

United States has entered into over
00 agreements with over 100 coun-
ts to share the benefits and adventure
auter space. At the outset of this con-
ence, I want to state categorically
.t the United States intends to remain
' leader in the peaceful uses of outer
ice and to continue its active and
;n program of international coopera-
n.

In this I speak for President
agan, who is a strong supporter of
' U.S. space program and its applica-
n to bettering our life here on Earth.

In order to assess where we are and
ere we should be going in space
ence and applications, it is construc-
e to reflect on where we have been,
len this conference last met in 1968,
're were essentially two significant
ice powers, with a few other coun-
ts who aspired to space programs,
e United States was in the process of
npleting its dramatic Apollo project.

Twelve Americans walked the surface of
the Moon during that program and were
brought safely back to Earth. In the
course of this program and in the Skylab
program that followed, we established
the ability of man to function for ex-
tended periods in space and vastly in-
creased our scientific knowledge. Since
then, there have been additional impor-
tant achievements by the United States
and by a growing number of other coun-
tries in the exploration and peaceful
uses of outer space.

In the United States, we have com-
pleted the testing of the space shuttle
and plan to put it into operational serv-
ice later this year. The shuttle will give
us routine, reliable, and cost-effective
transportation into space and will con-
tinue to open new and broader areas for
international cooperation in the future.
We have explored many of the planets
in our solar system and probably will
have visited all except distant Pluto by

the end of the decade. We have built and
flown communications, weather naviga-
tion, and remote sensing satellites that
bring untold benefits to all the peoples
of the Earth.

Since we last assembled in Vienna,
there have been three particular trends
which, taken together, are of special
relevance to this conference. Because
they will continue, they should be kept
in mind as we chart our future course.

• The advance of technology has
been rapid and has shown no signs of
slowing. Looking back over the short
period we have been in space, the rate
of progress in amassing scientific
knowledge and in applying space tech-
nology has been truly astonishing. Con-
sider, for example, the tiny space cap-
sule in which the first American
astronaut, John Glenn, orbited the
Earth. Compare it to the space shuttle,
launched only two decades later, which
is a marvel of sophisticated engineering
and promises to be America's primary
space transportation system for the
balance of this century. The conclusion

President Reagan's Statement

Thirteen years ago, two American
astronauts— Neil Armstrong and Edwin
Aldrin — became the first human beings
to set foot on the Moon. There they
planted a plaque inscribed with these
words: "We came in peace for all
mankind." That plaque stands today on
the lunar surface to symbolize the spirit
of the U.S. space program, now and in
the future.

We are proud of our achievements
in exploring the reaches of space. In
only a quarter of a century, we have
amassed new knowledge of our solar
system, of the stars, of the universe,
and of our own fragile world. We are
learning how we came to be and what
the future may hold for our planet and
all who dwell here. The countless bene-
fits of our space program have flowed to
all the peoples of the world. Communica-
tion satellites link distant parts of the
globe. Remote sensing from space of the
Earth's atmosphere and surface is help-
ing people harness global resources for
the benefit of all. And weather satellites
are providing us worldwide with impor-
tant information enabling us to better
predict and adapt to the environmental
forces which shape our lives.

From the very beginning of the U.S.

space program, we have emphasized in-
ternational cooperation. I am extremely
proud that most of our major space proj-
ects have been carried out with the par-
ticipation of other nations. Indeed, inter-
national cooperation is woven into the
basic fabric and structure of our civil
space program.

This Second U.N. Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space provides
leaders from around the globe with an
unprecedented opportunity to chart a
course for greater cooperation among
nations in exploring mankind's last and
endless frontier.

All of us, as the poet Archibald
MacLeish so eloquently described us, are
"riders on the Earth together, brothers
on that bright loveliness in the eternal
cold."

Let us resolve to work together to
insure that the benefits of space con-
tinue to contribute to a bright and
peaceful future on Earth. And let us
also chart new pathways to the stars to
serve as avenues of peaceful exploration
and adventure for our generation and
for generations to come.

I wish you a successful and produc-
tive conference. Thank you and God
bless you all. ■

bruary 1983

UNITED NATIONS

is inescapable that progress in outer
space technology has been dramatic.

• There are many more nations with
space programs today. Scientific, com-
mercial, and technical incentives have
led an increasing number of countries to
invest their resources in one aspect or
another of space technology and applica-
tions. These space programs range from
large, very complex enterprises to more
modest but nevertheless significant ef-
forts. The United States welcomes this

development, the knowledge it gener-
ates, and the stimulus it provides to ex-
cel in what is still a bright new frontier
of human endeavor.

• There is a growing emphasis on
relating space activity to our needs here
on Earth. Innovators in the private sec-
tor are incorporating space-related
capabilities into countless areas of
human activity.

Looking ahead, we can fully expect

U.S. Delegation to UNISPACE 82

Representative

James M. Beggs, Administrator, NASA

Alternate Representatives

John R. Bolton, Assistant Administrator for

Program and Policy Coordination, AID
Anthony J. Calio, Deputy Administrator,

NASA
Joseph Charyk, President, Chief Executive

Officer, Communications Satellite Corp.
Mrs. William P. Clark, Washington, D.C.
Gerald B. Helman, special coordinator for

UNISPACE, Department of State
Charles Z. Wick, Director, USIA

Advisers

Burt Edelson. Associate Administrator for
Space Science and Applications, NASA

Dr. Anna Fisher, astronaut, NASA

Riccardo Giacconi, Space Telescope Science
Institute

Col. Henry Hartsfield (USAF), astronaut,
NASA

Neil Hosenball, General Counsel. NASA

Donald Jansky, Associate Administrator,
National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration, Department of
Commerce

S. Ahmed Meer, Office of Advanced Tech-
nology, Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
national Environment and Scientific
Affairs, Department of State

Capt. Edward J. Melanson, Jr. (USN),
Assistant Director, Space Policy, Depart-
ment of Defense

Kenneth S. Pedersen, Director, International
Affairs Division, NASA

Col. Gilbert Rye (USAF), National Security
Council

David Small, Office of the Legal Adviser,
Department of State

Brig. Gen. John H. Storrie (USAF), Head-
quarters, U.S. Air Force

Norman Terrell, Acting Assistant Director
for Nuclear and Weapons Control, ACDA

Private Sector Advisers

Robert Anderson, Chairman of the Board,
Chief Executive Officer, Rockwell Inter-
national Corp. (Pittsburgh)

James V. Carroll III, Attorney at Law
(Washington, D.C.)

Vincent N. Cook, President, Federal Systems
Division, IBM

Robert A. Duffy, President, Charles Stark
Draper Laboratories (Cambridge)

Robin Fairbairn, Attorney at Law (Paso
Robles. Calif.)

Edward R. Finch, Jr., Attorney at Law
(New York City)

Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., President, Chief
Executive Officer, Grumman Corp.
(Bethpage, New York)

John M. Geer (Sacramento)

Henrj- E. Hockeimer, President, Ford Aero-
space and Communications Corp. (Detroit)

Charles A. Schmidt, Division Vice President
and General Manager, RCA, Astro
Electronics (Princeton)

Senior Adviser

Hans Mark, Deputy Administrator, NASA

Congressional Advisers

George E. Brown, Jr. (D.-Calif.). U.S.

House of Representatives
William Carney (R.-N.Y.), U.S. House of

Representatives
Ronnie G. Felippo (D.-Ala.), U.S. House of

Representatives
Daniel K. Akaka (D.-Haw.), U.S. House of

Representatives
Wayne R. Grisham (R.-Calif.), U.S. House of

Representatives

Congressional Staff Advisers

Radford Byerly, Jr., Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives

J. Jeffrey Irons, Subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications, U.S. House of
Representatives ■

these trends to continue. It is clear the:
that among the priority tasks in our
agenda of future activities are those
which will help us better to understand
our own Earth, aid in the development
of national economies, and assist in the
broader sharing of technological skills.
The United States stands ready to do i
share to achieve these objectives.

Toward a Better Understanding
of Earth

Venturing into outer space provides
perspectives not only on other worlds;
helps us better perceive, understand,
and deal with conditions affecting life
here on Earth. It is clear to the Unite(
States, for example, that increased
scientific understanding of environmer
tal problems and improved methods in
forecasting are needed if we are to
enhance our ability to address issues
relating to overall global habitability it
an effective and efficient manner. We
live on a planet characterized by chanf
and it has been demonstrated that
space-based observations are of in-
estimable value in measuring changes
which affect the Earth. The United
States today conducts a number of
space-based activities directed toward
this end, and we note that other gover
ments and international institutions ha
also undertaken important efforts in tl
regard.

We believe it is important to begir
to think in larger terms with respect t
global conditions. Specifically, we envi
sion continued long-term research ef-
forts with international cooperation to
expand further the base of data and
knowledge from which sound decisions
can be made with respect to the envir(
ment. By better organized efforts, we
can vastly improve the validity and
reliability of available information as
well as provide more systematic bases
for evaluating and responding in long-
term global change. Outer space tech-
nology will be a more valuable tool in
focusing attention on those trends whi
influence our Earth's habitability.

The United States will be discussir
a global habitability concept with othei
governments and international institu-
tions here at the conference and in the
months ahead. We would like to deter
mine whether a more effective, coop-
erative, long-term effort is feasible on
global basis. My government believes
such a cooperative undertaking could
benefit all countries of the world,
developed and developing.

Departnnent of State Bulle

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A/37/90,
DEC. 10, 1982^

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolution 33/16 of 10
November 1978. 34/67 of 5 December 1979,
35/15 of 3 November 1980 and 36/36 of 18
November 1981 concerning the convening as
well as the preparation of the Second United
Nations Conference on the Exploration and
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which was
held in Vienna from 9 to 21 August 1982,

Reaffirming the importance of interna-
tional co-operation in the exploration and
peaceful uses of outer space.

Reaffirming the importance of interna-
tional co-operation in developing the rule of
law for the advancement and preservation of
the exploration and peaceful uses of outer
space.

Gravely concerned with the extension of
an arms race into outer space,

Aware of the need to increase the
benefits of space technology and its applica-
tions and to contribute to orderly growth of
space activities favourable to the socio-
economic advancement of mankind, in par-
ticular the peoples of developing countries.

Taking into account new developments in
space science and technology which are being
projected and envisaged in the coming decade
as well as the new applications emerging
therefrom and their potential benefits and
possible implications for national development
and international co-operation.

Conscious of the need to increase the
awareness of the general public with regard
to space technology and its applications.

Desiring to enhance the effectiveness of
the co-ordinating role of the United Nations,
which is eminently suited to bring about in-
creased international co-operation and assist-
ance to the developing countries in the field
of exploration and peaceful uses of outer
space,

Ex-pressing its satisfaction with the suc-
cessful preparation of the Conference
through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space as preparatory committee and
its Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee as
advisory committee, as well as through the
Conference secretariat.

Taking note of the report of the Second
United Nations Conference on the Explora-
tion and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,

1. Expresses its appreciation and thanks
to the Government and people of Austria for
the excellent facilities and generous hospital-
ity provided for the Conference;

2. Endorses the recommendations per-
taining to international co-operation in the
exploration and peaceful uses of outer space,
as contained in the report of the Conference:

3. Invites all Governments to take effec-
tive action for the implementation of the
recommendations of the Conference:

4. Invites all Member States, in par-
ticular those with major space capabilities, to
contribute actively to the goal of preventing
an arms race in outer space, as an essential
condition for the promotion of international
co-operation in the exploration and uses of
outer space for peaceful purposes:

5. Requests all organs, organizations and
bodies of the United Nations system and
other intergovernmental organizations, which
are working in the field of outer space or
space-related matters, to co-operate in the
implementation of the recommendations of
the Conference:

6. Takes note of the recommendations of
the Conference regarding study projects and
invites all specialized agencies and other in-
tergovernmental organizations concerned to
contribute within their field of competence to
the elaboration of these studies:

7. Decides, upon the recommendations of
the Conference, that the United Nations Pro-
gramme on Space Applications should be
directed towards the following objectives:

(a) Promotion of greater exchange of ac-
tual experiences with specific applications;

(6) Promotion of greater co-operation in
space science and technology between
developed and developing countries as well as
among developing countries;

(c) Development of a fellowship pro-
gramme for in-depth training of space
technologies and applications specialists, with
the help of Member States and relevant inter-
national organizations; establisnment and
regular up-dating of lists containing available
fellowships in all States and relevant interna-
tional organizations:

id) Organization of regular seminars on
advanced space applications and new system
developments for managers and leaders of
space application and technology development
activities as well as seminars for users in
specific applications for durations as ap-
propriate;

(e) Stimulation of the growth of in-
digenous nuclei and an autonomous techno-

logical base, to the extent possible, in space
technology in developing countries with the
co-operation of other United Nations agencies
and / or Member States or members of the
specialized agencies;

if) Dissemination — through panel
meetings, seminars, etc. — of information on
new and advanced technology and applica-
tions, with emphasis on their relevance and
implications for developing countries:

ig) Provision or arrangements for provi-
sion of technical advisory services on space
applications projects, upon request by
Member States or any of the specialized
agencies;

8. Decides to establish an International
Space Information Service, initially consisting
of a directory of sources of information and
data services to provide direction upon re-
quest to accessible data banks and informa-
tion sources;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to
strengthen the Outer Space Affairs Division
with an appropriate augmentation of
technical personnel and decides, upon the
recommendation of the Conference, that all
new or expanded activities contained in this
resolution are to be funded mainly through
voluntary contributions of States in money or
in kind, as well as through the rearrange-
ment of priorities within the United Nations
next regular budget;

10. Appeals to all Governments to make
voluntary contributions, either in money or in
kind, towards carrying out the recommenda-
tions of the Conference;

11. Approves the recommendations of the
Conference regarding the establishment and
strengthening of regional mechanisms of co-
operation and their promotion and creation
through the United Nations system;

12. Emphasizes the need for close co-
operation between all United Nations bodies
engaging in space or space-related activities,
as well as the desirability of close co-
operation with international funding agencies
and subsidiary bodies, such as UNDP;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to
assure the availability and appropriate
dissemination of the report of the Con-
ference;

14. Further requests the Secretary-
General to report to its thirty-eighth session
on the implementation of this resolution.

'Adopted without a vote.

In addition to gaining better long-
term understanding of the Earth's en-
vironment, the perspective of outer
space can help all countries — and par-
ticularly developing countries — to better

anticipate and cope with natural dis-
asters. To this end, we propose two
projects for consideration.

• We suggest that the U.N. Outer
Space Division sponsor a working group
on disaster assistance communications to
examine the possibility of establishing a

global emergency space communications
system for disaster situations.

• To learn how best to bring space
technology to bear in coping with
natural disasters, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) will
sponsor a 5-day conference in the spring

February 1983

UNITED NATIONS

of 1984 in Washington. The conference
would examine current operational
systems, regional systems being
developed, and future technologies ap-
plicable to developing a global disaster
monitoring and early warning network.

Finally, in order to encourage a bet-
ter understanding of the Earth, the
United States is also making available to
participants in UNISPACE a special
LANDSAT index of the best available
images collected over the past 10 years
by LANDSAT 1, 2, and 3. The indexes
are referenced to the new worldwide
reference system maps developed by the
U.S. Geological Survey. The data
available through the LANDSAT pro-
gram is accessible to every country and
is indispensable to understanding and
employing earth resources for the
benefit of mankind.

Assistance in the Development
of Economies

There has been a good deal written and
spoken about the promise of space
technology for national economic
development. It is often too easy to give
the imagination free play and to ignore
the fact that in applying space tech-
nology three concepts are fundamental
and essential — establishing priorities,
allocating scarce resources, and applying
the discipline of careful administration.
Outer space technology has great prom-
ise. And, in its application, much can be
done in cooperation with other govern-
ments and with the private sector. The
process of technology application is not,
however, cost-free and should be beg^n
only after deliberate decisions on the
part of governments. The United States

is prepared to assist in this process
through several programs which have
proven successful.

• The United States, through AID's
rural satellite program, has begun work
with developing countries to advance the
use of satellite communications for
development. We are carrying out pilot
programs in rural telephone and audio-
conferencing, providing training, under-
taking research and development, and
providing information and advice. To
share the results of this effort more
widely with others, the United States
will hold an international conference on
rural satellite communications in 1985.

• The United States will shortly
begin field testing a combined low-cost
satellite ground station and photovoltaic
power system, optimized for developing
country use. The results and technical
data of this test will be widely available
through aid's rural satellite program.
This effort is a product of cooperation in
research and development between the
U.S. Government and industry. Its ob-
jective is to lower the cost to developing
countries of Earth stations and to pro-
vide a reliable renewable source for
them.

I invite the conference to view the
U.S. -sponsored demonstrations of this
technology in the Seiten Galerie and the
Heldenplatz.

Sharing Technological Skills

Integral to the success of any of these
programs is the spread of the skills
necessary to conduct them. The draft
report of this conference quite rightly
emphasizes the need to expand training
programs, particularly for technicians
and scientists from developing countries.
The United States shares this convic-
tion. Within the context of the work of
UNISPACE, and through projects asso-
ciated with the forthcoming Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union-
sponsored World Communications Year,

the United States will continue to con-
tribute substantially to training pro-
grams and will explore ways of enhanc-
ing their quality and availability. My
delegation welcomes the views of others
on all of the proposals I have made. We
will be prepared to elaborate on these
and other ideas in committee and in the
scheduled poster sessions.

It is unusual in conferences such as
UNISPACE to project dramatic future
activities and programs. And, I am con-
fident that future developments in outer
space will be every bit as dramatic as
those which have occurred since 1968. I
say this because I believe we have the
human resources, the imagination, the
technical capability, and the determina-
tion to accelerate the pace of develop-
ment in the peaceful uses of outer space.

Space has been aptly named the
endless frontier, and looking ahead over
the next quarter century and beyond,
the potential of exploring and exploiting
the space environment for the common
good is as limitless as the void of space
itself.

I am confident the human family will
fulfill that potential. New challenges,
new adventure, the resources of new
worlds are within our reach. It is up to
us to grasp them.

The urge to know the unknown is
basic to the pioneering spirit that means
so much to the world. That urge is alive
and well and will continue to thrive so
long as man wants to know. And there
is much for us to know.

As T.S. Eliot once wrote: "We shall
never cease from exploration and the
end of all our exploring will be to arrive
at where we started and to know the
place for the first time."

In that never-ending quest, the
United States pledges to work, in
cooperation with all nations, to bring
peace and prosperity to our generation
and to future generations inhabiting this
planet. ■

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Dealing With the
Reality of Cuba

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittees
on hiter-American Affairs and Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
December U. 1982. Ambassador Enders
is Assistant SecretaTy for Inter-
American Affairs.'^

In your invitation to appear before the
two subcommittees you asked for an
assessment of Cuba's role in the world
and of our relationship to it.

Cuban Policy

There is nothing quite like it. Cuba is at
once a would-be foreign policy giant
ceaselessly projecting political-military
influence far beyond its borders and an
economic dwarf which for years has
shown itself incapable of providing
material progress for its own people.

More than 70,000 Cubans, both
civilians and members of the armed
forces, are abroad on various "inter-
nationalist" missions, most of them mili-
tary. They are stationed from the Carib-
bean and Central America to southern
and central Africa, to both sides of the
Red Sea, and even Asia. Over the last 2
years, Cuba has been engaged in an
arms buildup unprecedented since 1962.

Cuban domestic policy has mean-
while registered a general failure.
Organized in the familiar Soviet com-
mand model, the economy receives
growing Soviet assistance in grants, sub-
sidized sales of oil, and purchases of
sugar at high prices. Yet although
Soviet economic aid alone is now equiva-
lent to more than one-quarter of Cuba's
gross national product, per capita in-
come in Cuba has been stagnant and is
falling steadily relative to much of Latin
America. Even the much-acclaimed in-
itial improvements in social and health
services have lost luster with the
passage of time. Infant mortality and
life expectancy already met high stand-
ards in 1959; under Castro, they have
improved less than in many other devel-
oping countries. For almost a quarter
century, social mobility has been capped
by the permanence of a self-perpetuat-
ing elite more rigid than any traditional
oligarchy.

This configuration of domestic
stagnation and foreign ambition is the
legacy of a generation of struggle to ex-
port the revolution. For its first 10
years in power the new Communist
government in Havana tried to replicate
its revolution elsewhere in Latin Ameri-
ca. Virtually every country was affected.
In Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala,
Peru, and Bolivia guerrilla /oeos (exter-
nally supported rural insurgencies) ac-
tually flourished briefly. One by one,
however, these Cuban-assisted insurrec-
tions were defeated, and following the
death of Che Guevara on a Bolivian
hillside in 1967, Cuba stopped trying in
Latin America— for a while.

Instead it concentrated on Africa,
where weaker, less legitimate govern-
ments offered better opportunities. Cuba
had maintained extensive contacts and
some military missions in Africa since
the early 1960s. By the mid-1970s,
Cuban troops were fighting in Angola to
assure the supremacy of the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) over its rivals. The stage had
been set for the appearance of Cuban
troops under Soviet command in
Ethiopia.

In 1978 Cuba turned once again to
Latin America. Central America— where
high economic growth had not been
matched by political change and where
repressive, narrowly based military
governments clung to power— seemed
ripe for revolution. Cuba's intervention
helped tip the scale against the Somoza
government in Nicaragua. El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia
were targeted as follow-ons. In each
case, Cuba attempted to weld together
disparate local revolutionary factions in-
to a unity, provided training in Cuba,
and supplied— or arranged for the sup-
ply of— arms to attack the existing
government. Over the last 3 years,
traces on individual weapons and
analysis of other guerrilla materiel and
documents have revealed a pattern
that— to use the words of the Septem-
ber 22, 1982, staff report by the Sub-
committee on Oversight and Evaluation
of the House Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence— "showed Cuba, with
Nicaraguan participation, to be heavily
involved in the coordination, control and
movement" of a substantial amount of
arms and other supplies obtained from
Communist countries.

U.S. Response

Throughout most of this period our re-
sponse has been to help the intended vic-
tims of the export of revolution to de-
fend themselves. In the 1960s this policy
was entirely successful. The more recent
campaign in Latin America opened with
a success for Cuba — the triumph of San-
dinistas in Managua. But, provided we
remain willing to help threatened coun-
tries in Central America, there will be
no more.

At the same time we have sought to
complicate the already difficult task of
running a command economy in Cuba by
withholding the trade and credit of
Cuba's natural market, the United
States. It is not clear whether Socialist
Cuba ever had much growth potential.
Our embargo has made sure that the
cost to the U.S.S.R. of preventing per
capita income from falling has increased
steadily.

Finally, we have kept Cuba at arm's
length and have thus denied it the
legitimacy — and consequently access to
other governments in the hemisphere —
normal relations with us would confer.

These have been the basic elements
of our policy generally, and they are
now. But a major effort was made in
1975-80, under two Administrations, to
develop an alternative. During these
years we attempted to moderate Cuba's
behavior by talks aimed at progressive
normalization of our relations. The
theory was that an isolated Cuba had no
stake in the international community
and thus had no reason to exercise
restraint.

This bipartisan effort failed. Not
only did it not induce Cuba to moderate
its behavior, arguably it resulted in, or
at least was followed by, even bolder,
more aggressive action by Castro.

Let me review the record. In 1975,
we made our first secret contacts, sug-
gesting the exploration of ways to
remove tension and hostility. Late in
that year the Cubans sent troops into
Angola. In 1977 we again started talk-
ing seriously to the Cubans, this time
much more ambitiously, saying we
wanted to create conditions in which the
legacy of the past — the embargo and the
political tension — could be overcome. In
very high-level secret talks, our
negotiators explored a series of steps
with the eventual goal of removal of the
embargo and full diplomatic relations in
return for curbs on Cuban activities
regarding Puerto Rico and a gradual
withdrawal of the more than 20,000

February 1983

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Cuban troops from Angola. After all,
the civil war was over. While we talked,
Cuba went into Ethiopia.

Conversations continued. In
mid-1978, Cuba launched upon a new ag-
gressive strategy' in Central America,
uniting violent factions first in
Nicaragua, then El Salvador, then
Guatemala, committing them to the
destruction of their established govern-
ments.

Talks went on. In 1980, Castro
turned the desire of many of his coun-
trymen to flee Cuba into a hostile act
against the United States — the Mariel
boatlift.

This record suggests that Cuba be-
lieves that a process of negotiation with
the United States is in its interest. Dur-
ing those years, Cuban representatives
repeatedly argued that the United
States must take no action to help
governments in Central America be-
cause that would undercut the negotia-
tions. In other words, the process was
intended to restrain us, but it didn't
restrain them.

And the process could be, and was
used, to maintain Cuban access to other
countries in the hemisphere. After all,
Havana argued to Latin American
governments, the United States is talk-
ing to us; you should cut your own deal
with us now while you can.

Cuba's desire to recreate the proc-
ess, if not the results, of negotiations

were told, yes, Cuba wants to talk with
the United States. But in each case we
were told that what could be talked
about was our bilateral agenda — migra-
tion, tourism, intelligence overflights,
the embargo, diplomatic relations, Guan-
tanamo. Puerto Rico and the third-
country agenda — Cuba's aggressive ac-
tions in Central America and Africa —
were not negotiable. We must, we were
told, learn to accept "social change," but
Cuba could not compromise on its com-
mitment to fraternal national liberation
organizations. In other words, Cuba
would receive concessions, not give
them.

It is noteworthy that Cuba did not
choose to carry on these discussions
through existing channels but used as
the medium persons outside government
who had no knowledge of previous or
current exchanges when it launched its
campaign of signals in behalf of "negoti-
ations" a month later. We concluded
that, once again, Castro did not wish to
talk seriously but did wish to strike an
apparently conciliatory posture. I would
not exclude testing the Cubans again at
some point on the possibilities of discus-
sions. But the record — and the current
posture — give little encouragement.

There are those who say we should
go beyond past negotiating approaches,
with the explicit or implicit trade of nor-
malization with the United States in
return for Cuban restraint in third coun-

. . . Soviet military and economic assistance per-
mits the Cuban leaders to go on indulging their
taste for war and revolution long after they would
otherwise have had to come to terms with their
failures.

was evident again this spring when a
campaign of signals was launched involv-
ing private U.S. citizens who were told
Cuba was anxious to discuss "settle-
ments" in Central America as well as
other differences between the United
States and Cuba.

I have been asked, why didn't the
United States respond to these signals?
Couldn't it have been an opportunity to
seek a new direction in Cuban-American
affairs? The answer is this: We had in-
deed taken the initiative to sound out
Cuba's interests and intentions at a very
high level, first in November 1981 and
again in March 1982. In each case we

tries. We should drop third-country
demands, these experts say, and nor-
malize our bilateral relations. The
magnetism of American society and
economy would then in the long run
prove irresistable. We should do away
with economic measures that limit
bilateral trade and financial transac-
tions, renew diplomatic relations, and
welcome Cuba back to the Organization
of American States (assuming that Cuba
was willing to return and that other
states would accept its return).
On the record, at least, Castro

would welcome any opportunity to take
advantage of relaxed economic relations
with the United States. And he might be
more cooperative on some bilateral
issues, at lease at the outset. But history
also makes unmistakably clear that
Castro would not tolerate any loosening
of state control inside Cuba, and that he
would continue and perhaps even inten-
sify the activities which threaten to
undermine our national security and that
of our friends. And that is precisely the
problem with this approach: It would ad-
dress neither the basic inequities of the
Cuban system nor the fundamental
orientation of Cuban foreign policy,
which is to encourage armed revolution
elsewhere along the lines which it took
in Cuba.

Others, more ambitious still, want to
try to wean Cuba away from the So\'iet
Union. Even assuming that Castro was
of a mind to alter his allegiance to the
U.S.S.R. — something Castro has always
denied vehemently, most recently on
December 11 — the price would be more
than we could pay. The Soviet Union's
annual economic assistance now ap-
proaches the equivalent of $4 billion. We
might have a little difficulty in per-
suading the Congress to replace even a
part of that remarkable largesse. More-
over, there is little prospect that Castro
himself would forsake Soviet military
assistance, which enables Cuba to play
its chosen role as a nerve center, train-
ing ground, and arsenal for revolution in
the Third World. In effect, Soviet mili-
tary and economic assistance permits
the Cuban leaders to go on indulging
their taste for war and revolution long
after they would otherwise have had to
come to terms with their failures.

If negotiation, unilateral normaliza-
tion, and weaning away won't work,
what remains is shoring up threatened
friends, complicating economic manage-
ment, withholding legitimacy. This Ad-
ministration has steadfastly helped our
friends defend themselves from Cuban
interference and has tightened our eco-
nomic countermeasures, particularly
those designed to deny Cuba the hard
currency that Castro uses to help pay
for armed violence and terrorism.

The Cuban People

And we must not forget the people of
Cuba. The most eloquent testimony to
their continued resistance is the flight of
more than 10% of Cuba's population
since Castro came to power. Not even
the effort by the Cuban Government to

Departnnent of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

nish the image of those fleeing Cuba
forcibly expelling common criminals
1 the mentally ill during the 1980
riel boatlift can diminish the heroism
1 tenancity of the Cuban people. Over
) decades of communism have not
dicated the traditional Cuban love of
■rty and tolerance for diversity which
lart of the hemisphere's common
stern heritage.

We intend to underscore our deep
imitment to the Cuban people by re-
nding to their own wish to know the
th by increasing the dissemination of
iilar, objective, factual news about
3a. We hope Radio Marti will begin
broadcasts next year. As Jose Marti
1: "Witnessing a crime in silence is
ivalent to committing it." Nothing il-
;rates Castro's genuine fear of
fiestic opinion more than the hysteri-
denunciations by Cuban authorities
)lans for Radio Marti.

In the end, two qualities are needed
lealing with Cuba: vigilance and pa-
ice. Vigilance, because this is an ex-
jrdinarily aggressive state and now a
vily armed one. Patience, because it
not last forever. While Castro has
n probing Latin America and Africa
new revolutionary opportunities,
er developing countries have outper-
ned Cuba economically and socially.

the worst is still to come. The big
wth impulse over the past generation

been the expanding Soviet subsidy.
I one believes that a stagnant
I .S.R. will be willing or able to in-
I ise the subsidy in the future as rapid-
' s in the past. So Cuba will fall fur-
:* and further behind, become less
I less relevant to other countries,
re and more marginal to the new
'■Id. At some point — for all the op-
iBsion they suffer — the Cuban people
f find a way to repudiate a leadership
■t thinks that all they need is the
l"y earned by "internationalists" op-
issing other peoples, and not their
n well-being and freedom.

iNEX 1: ASSESSMENTS

!)a in Central America
1 1 the Caribbean

ha. supports armed insurrection in
feral countries of the hemisphere,
'n while it seeks to reestablish formal
liiomatic relations with others. In some
ies Castro follows a "double track,"
i-ivating governments while maintain-
r ties with armed revolutionaries in
1 same country.

Cuba assigns particular priority to
the armed path in the Caribbean Basin.
Long the only Marxist-Leninist state in
the region, Cuba now sees the turmoil in
Central America and the emergence of a
Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua
and a radical authoritarian regime on
the island of Grenada as a promise of
more Communist countries to come.

The key short-range priority for
Cuba is to consolidate the regimes in
Nicaragua and Grenada as focal points

a preponderant influence in the San-
dinista government. Cuban activities are
particularly notable in the internal
security and militarization of Nicaragua,
supplying both equipment and extensive
training operations within Nicaragua.

In El Salvador, Cuba claims that the
guerrilla forces of El Salvador— which it
has coordinated, supplied, and trained-
are capable of winning by force of arms
but are seeking a negotiated settlement
in order to spare hves. The Cubans con-

While Castro has been probing Latin America and
Africa for new revolutionary opportunities, other
developing countries have outperformed Cuba
economically and socially.

for future revolutionary strife in the
region. A related objective is to sustain
the revolutionary struggle in El Salva-
dor in the hope that the configuration of
forces will turn more favorable to the
Communists. Further along are Guate-
mala, Honduras, and others. No state in
the hemisphere is immune from the
"revolutionary" process, not even the
most democratic. Costa Rica and Colom-
bia both face Cuban-sponsored subver-
sion. And Castro is certainly seeking to
exploit the current unrest in Suriname.

Believing that "objective conditions"
were finally right for armed revolution,
Cuba began redirecting its efforts back
to the Caribbean Basin in 1978. Cuba
united and trained guerrillas in the
region and mounted a major propaganda
campaign to discredit targeted govern-
ments, reduce U.S. resolve, and get
European and Latin American allies to
disengage. Emphasis was initially placed
on bolstering Marxist-Leninist elements
in Nicaragua and thereafter on El Salva-
dor. The Cubans dramatically increased
the flow of arms to Nicaragua, many of
which later passed to Salvadoran guer-
rillas.

Today, some 400 Cubans are at-
tempting to turn Grenada into a major
outpost of Marxist influence in the
eastern Caribbean. Cuban advisers are
present in every Grenadan ministry,
working on political indocrination, eco-
nomic projects, and military facilities
and training camps.

In Nicaragua, some 8,000 Cuban
military and civilian advisers, tech-
nicians, and other personnel have gained

tinue to train Honduran insurgents, to
supply arms to those in Guatemala, and
to unite the left in Central America
while promoting ties to outside terrorist
groups and radical states.

Occasional Cuban private pledges
not to interfere in the internal affairs of
other countries have never stood the
test of time and appear designed to
deceive. The alleged Cuban readiness to
negotiate an accommodation with the
United States is calculated to ease
pressures on the guerrillas in El
Salvador and on the Sandinistas by
redirecting world attention to so-called
"political" options that would facilitate
their military strategies. Cuban miltary
training and arms shipments have con-
tinued unabated even as Havana calls
for peaceful settlement.

At the April 26-28, 1982, Com-
munist theoretical conference in
Havana— a forum to give direction to
leftist organizations in the hemisphere-
Cuban leaders made clear they will not
sacrifice revolutionary goals for the sake
of normalization with the United States.
Alternate Politburo member Jesus Mon-
tane asserted that Cuba will never
negotiate on revolution nor on the right
of people to carry it out. Another Cuban
leader argued at that forum that
Nicaragua and Grenada showed the
validity of the Cuban armed road to
power, and the conference as a whole
reiterated that "objective conditions"
were appropriate for armed struggle in
Guatemala and El Salvador.

■Vruary 1983

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Cuba in Africa

Cuba's objectives in Africa are to
capitalize on general African opposition
to the Republic of South Africa to com-
pete with the United States on a
favorable ideological battlefield while
enhancing Cuba's stature and promoting
the establishment of pro-Soviet, pro-
Cuban regimes in the region. The em-
phasis in Africa is part of Cuba's effort
to become an actor on the world stage
and reduce its diplomatic isolation.
Cuban activities in the region are based
in part on Cuba's revolutionary interna-
tionalist ideology but also serve Soviet
interests.

Cuban troops have been engaged in
Angola since 1975, when they entered at
the request of the MPLA, which was in-
volved in fighting two Western-
supported movements for control of
Angola. They have since become em-
broiled in a civil war in Angola between
the MPLA and the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), although the MPLA and the
Cubans claim that Cuban forces are in
Angola solely to defend against the
threat of South African attack.

Since mid-1981 the United States
has endeavored to negotiate with the
MPLA government in Luanda the with-
drawal of Cuban combat forces from
Angola in parallel with the withdrawal
of South African forces from Namibia.
This withdrawal would take place during
phase III of the Namibia settlement
process, as U.N. Security Council
Resolution 435 is implemented to give
Namibia independence.

The United States is negotiating
directly with the MPLA and the other
African parties involved. Although the
Cuban Government has publicly commit-
ted itself to withdrawing its forces from
Angola if and when the MPLA asks it to
do so, it has in fact strongly opposed
such a withdrawal.

Aside from the 20,000-25,000
soldiers and 5,000 civilian personnel
which it maintains in Angola, Cuba has
11,000-13,000 military personnel and
600 civilian advisers and technicians in
Ethiopia, where Cuban troops entered in
1977.

In addition, there are contingents of
Cuban military and civilian advisers in
more than a dozen other African coun-
tries engaged in a wide variety of
military training, security services, and
economic and technical assistance. The
total number of Cubans in Africa is be-
lieved to be between 40,000-48,000.

Cubans in State and
Federal Detention Facilities

Location of Facilities

Number of
Cubans

Detained

Federal

U.S. Prison, Atlanta, Georgia

LI 70

Federal Correction Institution

Lexington, Kentucky

Federal Correction Institution

Alderson. West Virginia

Federal Correction Institution

Springfield, Missouri

Federal Correction Institution

La Tuna, Texas

Krome INS Service Processing

Center. Miami, Florida

St. Elizabeth's INS/U.S. Public

Health Service Processing

Center, Washington, D.C.

Total

1,295

State*

New York

200

California

100

Pennsylvania

Wisconsin

100

Florida

800

Michigan

Total

1,260

'Estimates

Earnings of civilian advisers paid by
some host governments have become an
important source of hard currency for
Cuba.

Although Cuba now maintains ties
with 36 of the 46 sub-Saharan African
states, Cuban diplomatic successes have
been muted over the past few years by
Cuba's advocacy of Soviet positions
within the nonaligned movement and the
growing perception that Cuba is staying
on in Angola and Ethiopia in deference
to Soviet objectives and in disregard of
local and regional needs. Nevertheless,
Cuba will probably continue to seek
targets of opportunity in Africa.

Cuba and the U.S.S.R.

Cuba is a Soviet surrogate, heavily
dependent on Soviet assistance to avoid
economic collapse and obliged to support
Soviet foreign policy. It is ironic that
Cuba was granted membership — let
alone leadership — in the nonaligned
movement. Cuba is one of the most

aligned states in the world, far more
committed to the Soviet Union and its
policies than some members of the Wa
saw Pact.

Castro is an effective Soviet agent
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle
East. Moscow prefers to work in the
background in Central America and els
where, providing financial, logistical,
and arms support for liberation move-
ments and helping to pay for Cuban
troops in Africa.

The Soviet economic assistance pre
gram to Cuba — which is now ap-
proaching $4 billion per year, equivalei
to over one-quarter of Cuba's gross na
tional product — accounts for over half
the U.S.S.R.'s global economic assist-
ance program. Without it, the Cuban
economy would be prostrate; but
without the Cuban rifleman or machin.
gunner, the Soviet capacity to project
power in the Third World would be coi
siderably reduced.

Since the overthrow of Somoza in
1979, armed struggle in Latin Americ;
has played a greater role in both Sovie
and Cuban policy. Unlike the 1960s,
Havana appears to have the full blessr
of Moscow in its interventionist ac-
tivities, with the Soviets now
acknowledging that under certain cone
tions rebel groups can more effectivelj
serve as the revolutionary vanguard
than local Communist parties.

Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba in
1981 surged to 66,000 tons, the highes
levels since 1962; they have continued
approximately that pace in 1982. More
significant Soviet weapons delivered
since 1975 include approximately 150 j
fighters— a considerable number of the
are MiG-21s and MiG-23/FLOGGERS
AN-26 troop/cargo transports, Foxtro
submarines, a Koni-class frigate, T-62
tanks, MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters, Os
class guided-missile attack boats, mine
sweepers, and Turya-class hydrofoil
torpedo boats. The Soviets also have a
active military role in Cuba itself. The
Soviet Union maintains a 2,600-man
combat brigade, some 2,000 military a.<
visers, 6,000-8,000 civilian advisers, ai
a major telecommunications and intelli
gence facility that monitors wide spec-
trums of U.S. civilian and military tele
communications and conducts periodic
air and naval visits directed against th
United States and NATO.

It is noteworthy, however, that thi
U.S.S.R. has consistently refused to g.
Cuba the ultimate guarantee of a secu
ty commitment.

Department of State Bulla

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

he Cuban Economy

he Cuban economy today is character-
ed by increasing dependence on sugar,
/ severe rationing of basic necessities,
id by a shortage of decent housing,
ood is in short supply, especially cof-
16, rice, beans, beef— the staples of the
aditional Cuban diet. The quality of
»ds is low. Crowds line up hours in
ivance of the opening of stores so as to
> in line to purchase what scarce com-
odities are available. Few jobs are to
) had, and Cuba must export its labor
irplus abroad as "internationalists."

When Castro came to power, Cuba
as competitive in the world market-
ace and was one of the most pros-
!rous countries in Latin America. To-
ly few would take Cuba's economy as a
odel for development. The exodus of
ousands of Cubans from Mariel in
i80 demonstrated how weak is the
legiance of Cubans to their govern-
ent.

Aside from the destruction of the
n\ liberties of the Cuban citizen,
istro's most glaring domestic failure is
e state of the Cuban economy. After
■arly a quarter century of Communist
le in Cuba, the economy is saved from
llapse only by massive economic assist-
ce from the U.S.S.R. Whether the
iviets can, over time, increase or even
lintain the almost $4 billion a year
ey now give Cuba in economic assist-
ce is a key question. In spite of the
jh amount of Soviet aid, Cuba has had
turn to the West for help. In 1982 it
ked Western creditors for a mora-
rium on payment of principal on well
er $1 billion worth of medium- and
ig-term debt.

Why has Cuba progressed so little in
years? In their plea for financial re-
ess from the West, the Cubans blamed
e U.S. embargo, the sugar policy of
s European Economic Community,
d the low price of sugar for their
itress. It was, however, the decision of
e Cuban Government itself to reorient
trade from West to East under
istro and to concentrate on the pro-
ction of sugar to an even greater ex-
nt than in the pre-Communist period,
lese decisions— together with the eco-
mic misallocations, inefficiencies, and
iste endemic to communism— have
used Cuba's economic problems. More-
er, Castro's bias against making even
e modest amount of economic read-
stment and reform, which was carried
t at an earlier period in Eastern
irope, has exacerbated the situation
d condemned the Cuban people to
arcity and rationing. In support of its

request for debt rescheduling with the
West, Cuba has offered no changes in
economic model; instead, Cuban officials
suggest international belt tightening and
less trade with the West.

Prospects for the Cuban economy
are unfavorable. Cuba aims primarily at
the production of still more sugar— de-
spite its low world price and the bad
long-range prospects for sucrose on the
world market— because the Soviet Union
is willing to pay a higher price in soft,
nonconvertible currency. A rise in the
world price of sugar would ease Cuba's
balance-of-payments distress; even
should this occur, however, it could not
touch the underlying economic problems
for which no fundamental relief is in
sight. As Fidel Castro has now said on
more than one occasion, Cuba can look
forward only to further sacrifices.

Political Stability

Order in Cuba rests on power, not con-
sent, and the Castro regime has demon-
strated that it has both the power and
the will to employ power ruthlessly.
Public dissent is unthinkable, and even
conspicuous lack of assent may be cause
for scrutiny by the watchful committees
for the defense of the revolution.

Despite the severe penalties in-
volved—loss of job, loss of ration card,
risk of mob reprisals— at least 200,000
Cubans have dared to ask for exit per-
mits. Behind them probably stand 1-2
million more who would leave if the op-
portunity were to present itself but who
hesitate to bring down upon themselves
the displeasure of the regime. How
many more Cubans are deeply dissatis-
fied with their lot in Castro's Cuba but
who would refuse to leave their native
soil is impossible to measure.

It is clear, however, that several
problems are causing increasing internal
stress. Popular discontent derives partly
from longstanding problems;

• A weak economy increasingly
dependent on sugar exports and Soviet
aid;

• A totalitarian regime with a
privileged elite unable to motivate the
population; and

• A heavy commitment of resources
for foreign involvement that pays few
domestic dividends obvious to the Cuban
people.

Some of Castro's most serious policy
errors have in recent years compounded
these problems. For example, the deci-
sion to allow thousands of exiles to visit

the island during 1979 in an effort to ac-
quire hard-currency revenues had a
powerful destabilizing effect. In the
aftermath of their visits, crime, worker
absenteeism, and other forms of discon-
tent rose sharply. Popular dissatisfaction
deepened when the Cuban leadership
demanded greater sacrifice and effort
while issuing warnings that economic
and social progress would not occur
before the end of the century. The depth
of this malaise became abundantly clear
with the events leading up to the Mariel
boatlift.

But perhaps more important than
these factors is a time bomb that is
already haunting Castro— the existence
of a critical generation gap. In numerous
speeches over the past few years, he has
addressed the discontent of the younger
generations and has at times seemed
obsessed with the dilemma of how to in-
culcate the youth with the revolutionary
ideals of his own generation. The prob-
lem can only worsen over time: About
50% of the population is under 25 and
has no memory of the struggle against
Batista; 60% of those who fled to the
United States at the time of the Mariel
boatlift were under the age of 30.

Vast numbers of young people will
enter the labor force this decade— a
generation that is highly educated by
Third World standards and received
favored treatment during its schooling.
Upon graduation, they have to face the
harsh realities of an anemic economy
with insufficient job opportunities, a
housing shortage, and a spartan life-
style. Moreover, a number of those who
served overseas— some for two or three
tours— have caused problems upon find-
ing that expected rewards and per-
quisites did not materialize after they
returned home.

To alleviate these pressures, Castro
has sent increasing numbers of military
and civilian personnel overseas. But this
solution is only partial and temporary.
To the extent that the economy remains,
weak and opportunities for additional
foreign involvement fail to materialize,
the Cuban polity will experience growing
strains.

There is, nonetheless, only a small
probability that organized opposition to
the Castro regime will appear in the
near future. The powerful and effective
security forces, as well as neighborhood
watchdog committees for the defense of
the revolution, are a great deterrent to
open opposition. There is no independent
institution— such as the Catholic Church

bruary 1983

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

in Poland— to serve as a focal point for
the dissatisfied. As a result, many of the
discontented are resigned to await op-
portunities for the safer avenue of
escape via emigration to the United
States.

Thus, while there is no apparent
danger to Castro's position, he seems
destined to preside over an increasingly
alienated population that will find little
motivation in exhortations for additional
sacrifice. If past patterns hold, Castro
will seek to counter these internal prob-
lems by looking for victories abroad-
most likely in pressing the revolutionary
struggle in Central America— and con-
tinue to use the United States as a
scapegoat for his troubles.

ANNEX 2: PRISONER AND
REFUGEE ISSUES

Americans in Cuban Prisons

Twenty-four Americans are currently
known to be incarcerated in Cuba. Five
are Cuban-Americans to whom the
Cuban Government refuses to allow any
consular access. There may be others,
but we are unaware of them. Of the re-
maining 19, most are charged with il-
legal entry (defined by Cuban law simply
as entry into Cuban territory without
prior authorization) and/or possession or
trafficking in narcotics. One American is
charged with child molesting, one with
swindling, and another with currency
violations. All are incarcerated in the
Combinado del Este Prison except four
women, including two minors, who are
held in the Nuevo Amanecer Prison in
Havana.

Most arrests of American citizens
occur when they inadvertently enter
Cuban territorial waters or air space. In
these instances they are detained by
Cuban authorities and charged with il-
legal entry. In 1981 and 1982, at least
25 American citizens who accidentally
strayed into Cuban territory were brief-
ly detained while the Cubans investi-
gated the incidents. They were then
released. During the same period, 32
other Americans who inadvertently
entered Cuban territory were arrested

and subjected to prolonged detention
when the Cubans allegedly found
evidence of drug trafficking. Some have
since been released.

The Cuban Government has one of
the poorest records, even among Com-
munist countries, with regard to
notification of arrest and consular access
to American citizens. Notification ranges
from several days to several months
after arrest. Access is permitted only
under strictly controlled conditions.

Dual nationals are a special problem.
In the past, Cuban authorities have re-
fused with only one exception to provide
U.S. consular officers access to dual na-
tional Cuban-Americans because Cubans
regard them as having only Cuban na-
tionality, despite U.S. naturalization.

Unless it has grounds to believe that
there has been a gross miscarriage of
justice, the U.S. Government does not
seek the release of American prisoners
accused or convicted of violation of
foreign law. It does seek for them fair
and humane treatment, at least equiva-
lent to that received by locals accused of
comparable crimes. The purpose of our
visits is to insure that the prisoners
receive adequate food, shelter, and
clothing and that they are not subjected
to harsh treatment. We see to it that
they receive medical treatment when
necessary. The U.S. interests section in
Havana also facilitates monthly family
visits. It sees to the delivery of mail and
of food packages (25 pounds per month),
as well as vitamins and other dietary
supplements.

The Cuban Government releases
prisoners from time to time without
regard to their time of detention or of
sentencing, regardless of the type of
crime alleged to have been committed.
These prisoner releases have character-
istically been to Members of Congress or
others who have expressed special in-
terest in them.

The Mariel Boatlift

Your final question concerned whether
Fidel Castro would be willing to accept
back the criminal element which he in-
cluded in the Mariel boatlift of 1980.
There is no good evidence to support
such conjecture. It was, after all, he who
caused the problem. The repatriation of
the Mariel excludables remains part of
our agenda. Talks on migration issues
were held in 1980-81 by the previous
Administration. These talks sought to
restore and expand our programs for
legal admission of Cuban immigrants
and political prisoners as well as Cuban
agreement to accept the return of in-
dividuals excluded from the United
States. Unfortunately, they foundered
on Cuban insistence on a case-by-case
veto over those individuals to be re-
turned, in circumstances which indicatec
that Cuba intended to use the veto ex-
tensively to preclude the return of most
of the excludables. Both under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act and unde
international law, we believe it is critica
to return to his or her home country an;
foreigner found excludable under U.S.
law. Since then, when migration issues
have come up, Cuba has given us no in-
dication that it has changed its stand on
the veto. We cannot be put in the posi-
tion of accepting the Cuban veto; it
would be tantamount to surrendering
our sovereign right to control our own
immigration policy.

Right now these individuals con-
stitute a heavy burden for our society.
Of the 4,000-5,000 that arrived and
under law are excludable from the
United States, 2,555 are still in Federal
and State facilities. The cost of main-
taining them is hard to calculate, but thi
figure $10,000 per person per annum
would not be an overestimate.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Programs Underway for the
[Caribbean Basin Initiative

y J. William Middendorf II

Address before the Committee for 806
nd 807^ in Washington, D.C., on
November 8, 1982. Ambassador Midden-
orfis U.S. permanent representative to
le Organization of American States
US).

have deeply appreciated the work
'hich this committee has done on behalf
f maintaining an open market in the
Fnited States for Latin America and for
ther developing countries. This is a dif-
cult time in which to be a free trader,
here is always a great temptation to
sstrain imports in an effort to protect
merican jobs and American production,
hat temptation is particularly strong in
mes of economic difficulties. But that
;mptation, as we all know, is a terrible
lusion, which ends by costing the U.S.
Mnomy far more in terms of jobs, pro-
jctivity, and international competitive-
ess than we gain.

I am also grateful for the support
hich this committee has given to the
resident's Caribbean Basin initiative,
ike open market policies in general, the
ade and investment proposals in the
aribbean Basin initiative appear to
any critics to involve considerable
)sts. We have tried to make clear to
le Congress and to the public that the
ng-term benefits of strong and
Aiamic economies in the Caribbean
asin are far greater to the U.S.
■-onomy than any short-term costs. I
;lieve that that message is becoming
earer and better understood, and I am
jjtimistic that the Congress will take
jie action necessary this month or early
I December to pass the two remaining
)rtions of the initiative — namely the
le-way free trade area and the invest-
ent incentive.

For my main theme tonight, how-
ler, I would like to turn to a somewhat
ore heartening subject than the
lallenge of fighting protectionism. I
ould like to talk about a part of the
aribbean Basin initiative which has re-
eved very little public attention but
hich nevertheless is functioning effec-
vely already. Most discussions of the
itiative focus only on the legislation
hich we have presented to the Con-
-ess. But there is a range of activities
ready underway in this Administration

that began under authority in existing
legislation. I would like to briefly discuss
these programs with you. None of these
programs is of dramatic or startling
scope. None of them will turn the
economies of the region around single-
handedly. However, taken as a whole
there is already a significant impact
derived from the initiative in supporting
the efforts of the Caribbean Basin coun-
tries themselves.

This portion of the initiative under
prior legislation involves activities by
every interested agency of the U.S.
Government. It derives from a strong
commitment by the President and his in-
dividual Cabinet officials to devote as
many resources as possible to strength-
ening each agency's programs in the
Caribbean Basin region. Given the extra-
ordinarily difficult budgetary constraints
that all government agencies face these
days, the scope of the programs which I
am about to describe would not have
been possible without the personal com-
mitments of top Cabinet-level officials
within this Administration.

Agriculture

The first sector that I would like to
discuss is agriculture. Agriculture still
forms the basis of most of this region's
economies, but output has been growing
slowly recently and per capita food pro-
duction in many countries has been de-
clining. A high proportion of land is idle
or badly used. Services to the agri-
cultural sector are deficient. In general
agriculture is viewed by many as an un-
promising and backward occupation.
There is thus a great need not only for
expansion of production but also a
thoroughgoing modernization. Despite
the very significant programs which we
have had in the region for years through
the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID) program, much re-
mains to be done. A revitalization of the
agricultural sector is crucial to meet the
food needs of the region's growing
population, as well as to increase export
earnings.

To an important extent, many of
these problems can be traced to inap-
propriate government policies that pro-
vided inadequate incentives to pro-
ducers. I will address this policy issue
later. Technical assistance is also crucial

to improved performance, and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) has
put together a substantial program in
this area.

First, USDA is promoting an in-
creased regional understanding of U.S.
agricultural health and sanitary regula-
tions. This includes providing technical
assistance for inspection procedures, for
the operation of fumigation facilities,
and for training in enforcing health and
sanitary regulations.

Second, USDA is offering technical
assistance to the Caribbean Basin coun-
tries to better gear their agricultural
production to the standards of the world
market. This involves assistance on how
to achieve acceptable quality standards,
procedures for proper labeling and test-
ing, and techniques for minimizing losses
during distribution and storage.

Third, USDA is strengthening agri-
cultural research and technology
transfer through institutions within the
Caribbean Basin area and at existing
facilities in the United States. Par-
ticularly important in this regard is the
enhancement of the Mayaguez Institute
for Tropical Agriculture in Puerto Rico.

Fourth, USDA has begun to play an
important role in facilitating the involve-
ment of U.S. agribusiness in the Carib-
bean Basin countries. A recently estab-
lished Agribusiness Promotion Council
will advise USDA on particular pro-
grams to insure that projects are ap-
propriately designed for the individual
conditions of the Caribbean Basin coun-
tries.

Fifth, USDA will assist govern-
ments on the management and conserva-
tion of forest, soil, and water resources.

Sixth, USDA is ready to provide
technical assistance to Caribbean Basin
governments or private institutions to
develop or improve crop credit insurance
schemes. This will help to stimulate
farmers to use more modern technology
and increase productivity.

Seventh, USDA is establishing an
agricultural information center for U.S.
business. This would provide a single
source for U.S. traders and investors, as
well as for Caribbean Basin exporters to
obtain necessary market information
and opportunities for agricultural invest-
ment.

Another very interesting effort in
the agricultural field is being made by
the Peace Corps. Peace Corps volun-
teers are sometimes uniquely placed to
see what people with fancier titles or of-
fices might miss. The Peace Corps is
modifying some of its programs and

sbruary 1983

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

training to help volunteers analyze both
the opportunities and the problems re-
garding the modernization and expan-
sion of small-scale agricultural business.
The Peace Corps has already begun to
train some volunteers to perform pre-
feasibility studies and help develop
business and marketing plans primarily
in, but not limited to, agribusiness.

Interestingly, the Peace Corps train-
ing initiatives pick up another of Presi-
dent Reagan's themes — private sector
involvement. The training of volunteers
to assist in developing better business
planning is also underway through
private groups and increased coopera-
tion with AID and other governmental
organizations.

Industry

Let me turn now to the industrial area.
Industrial modernization has been one of
the top priorities of countries in this
region for years. The share of manufac-
turing in gross domestic product is still
low — under 20% in most countries. All
of these countries offer small internal
markets, and most firms in the region
are small and inexperienced in — perhaps
fearful of — operating in larger foreign
markets. There is a significant lack of
such crucial management skills as
marketing, quality control, and financial
management. And yet the region also
has very significant assets. Most coun-
tries, especially in the English-speaking
Caribbean, have a high level of social
services with a generally well-educated
healthy labor force.

The basic infrastructure in most
countries is at least adequate, although
there are significant maintenance prob-
lems and considerable need for improve-
ment. Above all, most of these countries
have leadership which realizes the need
for providing an appropriate policy en-
vironment and incentives to the private
sector. It certainly is a clear policy
priority to encourage industrial growth
as indispensable to absorb the high
levels of unemployment in the region
and to generate production for exports
to turn the balance-of-payments crisis
around. New investments both by local
business and by foreign investors is
clearly recognized as a critical need to
regenerate and expand the productive
base in these countries.

The Department of Commerce in
March opened its Caribbean Basin
Business Information Center to provide
comprehensive economic information to

U.S. business representatives interested
in dealing in the Caribbean Basin. The
response of the U.S. business communi-
ty has been dramatic; literally thousands
of companies have asked for guidance on
trade and investment opportunities.
Commerce experts are prepared to brief
U.S. business on the policies and prac-
tices of Caribbean Basin countries and
provide practical advice to resolve
specific problems facing U.S. business
representatives. The center has
developed a wide network of contacts in
the Caribbean Basin in both the govern-
ment and private sectors and is thus
well placed to arrange appropriate con-
tacts for individual U.S. investors and
business representatives. Commerce also
serves as a clearinghouse for referring
companies to other specialized U.S.
Government programs focusing on
business development in the Caribbean
Basin. The center also works with local
Department of Commerce district offices
throughout the United States in arrang-
ing seminars on business opportunities
in the Caribbean Basin area. The first of
these regional seminars will be held
November 12 in New Orleans. It will in-
clude a comprehensive group of U.S.
Government experts and representatives
from Caribbean Basin companies. The
center thus offers a single location for
comprehensive and efficient services to
U.S. business representatives to find out
how to sell their products in the Carib-
bean Basin, how to invest in that area,
and how to buy from the region.

Investment

Related to the Department of Com-
merce's work in improving the informa-
tion flow to U.S. business is the wider
governmental effort to help countries in
the area improve their investment
climate. Several agencies of the U.S.
Government, led by the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, have
developed a worldwide program of
bilateral investment treaties. I see this
as an important and highly visible way
to improve the investment climate in
developing countries. The countries of
the Caribbean Basin have expressed par-
ticularly keen interest in the program,
and we have recently concluded an
agreement with Panama. This treaty is
designed to provide a clear set of rights
and obligations of the host government,
of the foreign investor, and of the U.S.
Government. The U.S. Government has

developed a prototype or model treaty
containing the following key elements:

• Provisions concerning entry and
duration of investment;

• Treatment for established U.S. in-
vestors which is no less favorable than
that given domestic investors and other
foreign investors;

• Prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation in the event of nationaliza
tion;

• Unrestricted repatriation and
other transfers of assets; and

• Dispute settlement provisions.

I find it particularly interesting that
several European governments have
already in place a set of similar arrange
ments and are interested in expanding
this network. We may, therefore, be on
the threshold of a major clarification of
the way in which foreign investors are
expected to operate. The treaty prograr
insures that the concerns of all parties
are fully taken into account. I, therefon
believe that the investment regime
which results from the treaty program
will be a lasting one.

To date we have signed two agree-
ments with Egypt and Panama. So we
have a lot of work ahead of us before
my hopes for this program are fully
realized. However, the advantages that
flow from improved and stable invest-
ment climates are increasingly recog-
nized by developing countries. There is
growing interest in this program, and
we are ready to discuss it with any in-
terested country.

OPIC Programs. One of the key

agencies in supporting U.S. private ac-
tivities in developing countries has been
the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (OPIC). OPIC is very
significantly increasing its activities in
the Caribbean Basin. Its programs offei
insurance to U.S. investors operating in
developing countries to cover political
risks— expropriation, war, and inconver
tibility. This is the core of OPIC's ac-
tivities and an important incentive for
investment in the region. In fiscal yearsi
(FY) 1981 and 1982, 47 new projects in-
the Caribbean Basin were insured by i
OPIC for a total of $361 million of new
project investment.

A smaller but increasingly importar,
function of OPIC has been finance, in-
cluding direct loans to small and
medium-sized joint ventures. In FY 198
and 1982, OPIC supported 18 projects i
the Caribbean Basin for a total of $149
million of new project financing. In FY

Department of State Bullet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

)82, OPIC also supported 16 invest-
ent feasibility studies in eight Carib-
?an Basin countries.

Together these OPIC programs
•present more than a doubling of what
PIC was doing in FY 1980. And I ex-
!ct that these activities will continue to
crease in the coming years.

OPIC has also been particularly ac-
re in organizing investment missions to
is region. The missions which OPIC
i to Jamaica and Haiti in late 1981
are highly successful. Another mission
planned for the eastern Caribbean
ea this month, in addition to followup
sits to Jamaica and Haiti. A particular-
innovative and exciting program is
e investment "telemission." Two weeks
0 OPIC and AID cosponsored such a
ssion for the Caribbean area. The mis-
)n brought together, by use of satellite
evision links, business and govern-
?nt representatives from several cities
the United States with their counter-
rts in the English-speaking Caribbean,
liti, and the Dominican Republic. The
suiting lively discussion of investment
d trade opportunities and problems
Dmises to result in some interesting
d significant new investment flows.

Finally, OPIC is making a major ef-
•t to reach out into the business com-
mity rather than just respond to in-
iries coming into its office. OPIC has
tituted a number of procedures to im-
)ve the information flow to U.S.
iinesses about its programs and the
oortunities in the Caribbean Basin.

Export-Import Bank. The Export-
port Bank is also active in this region,
e top management of the Export-
Iport Bank (Eximbank) has enthusi-
-ically supported the Caribbean Basin
tiative and strengthened the focus of
'. bank onto this region. In FY 1981,
55 million in credits, insurance, and
arantees were committed by Exim-
ik to Caribbean Basin purchasers of
3. goods and services. The bank hopes
improve this performance significant-
Dver the next few years, keeping in
nd of course its statutory constraint
operating only where there is
isonable prospect of repayment. The
ik also is expanding its guaranty
' ilities for short-term credits to local
: nmercial banks in credit-worthy
: rkets.

lansportation

■ t me now turn to an area in which
' rk is underway, but in which we have
': yet developed a specific program.

This is the area of transportation. Vir-
tually everyone concerned with the prob-
lems of the Caribbean Basin agrees that
improved accessibility for people and
goods is an extremely important ele-
ment. We have found this to be a par-
ticularly difficult area in which to devise
solutions to the problems we know exist.
To oversimplify the problem somewhat,
it appears that this is one of those
vicious circles. Costs are high in the
Caribbean Basin area partly because
traffic volumes are relatively small and
routes are fragmented, while the high-
cost transport system discourages the
development of more efficient operations
and greater volume. How to break this
vicious circle is still a major unresolved
question, and it is a prominent item on
our future agenda.

As a first step, we are trying to
define more precisely what the problems
and constraints are. In a meeting ar-
ranged by Caribbean/Central American
Action with shippers early this year, we
came to the conclusion that — contrary to
some of our own expectations — capacity
is not a problem, even assuming signifi-
cant growth in trade over the next few
years. The problems in this low-volume/
high-tariff situation appear to be in the
structure of routes, in the operation of
port facilities, and possibly in marketing.
We are planning a similar diagnostic
meeting with the airlines, and we are in
contact with other institutions which
have been working on this issue, in-
cluding, interestingly enough,
CARICOM (the Caribbean Common
Market) and the European Community.
We are also analyzing comments on
transportation problems which AID of-
ficers and others in the field have
reported.

Role of AID

AID has long had important programs
in the basin area. But the overall ap-
proach of our economic assistance policy
toward the region has changed in three
very significant ways.

First, the Caribbean Basin has
clearly become a higher priority in our
global economic assistance program, and
the level of our program to the region
has just about doubled since FY 1980. In
that year (FY 1980), our programs to
the Caribbean Basin added up to $324
million. In FY 1982, our regular pro-
grams amounted to $475 million, to
which we added $350 million in the
special supplemental for a total of $825

million. For FY 1983 we are requesting
about $665 million for the region, and
we are anticipating future programs for
FY 1984 and beyond at roughly that
order of magnitude, although I must
caution that final decisions on those
budgets have not yet been taken.

Second, AID is paying much greater
attention to economic policy issues in its
assistance programs. AID is upgrading
its economic analysis capabilities and is
working to maintain a close dialogue
with basin governments on key policy
issues and to assist them in implement-
ing reforms. Because of their impact on
private sector activity, government
policies in such areas as agricultural
pricing and exchange rates are extreme-
ly important to overall economic
performance.

Third, a very significant change has
been an increased emphasis on private
sector support. This is a broad-based
change, but I would like to cite several
specific and innovative programs as il-
lustrative of our overall efforts. Costa
Rica's Agro-Industrial and Export
Bank— called BANEX for short— is one
striking example. AID's $10 million loan
commitment last year was a crucial fac-
tor in bringing this institution about. It
is new and quite small but surprisingly
successful already. It provides an inte-
grated program of credit, export
management assistance, and export-
oriented banking services for producers
and traders of nontraditional Costa
Rican exports.

Two things about this project are
particularly significant in my mind.
First, this is a privately owned bank in
Costa Rica's state-owned banking
system — conceived, implemented, and
managed by the Costa Rican private sec-
tor. It has shown a degree of innovation,
risk taking, and sound management
which is an important example to the
whole Costa Rican economy — and
perhaps to the region as a whole — about
what the private sector can accomplish
even in very difficult economic circum-
stances. Secondly, the institution is dedi-
cated not just to supporting existing ex-
porters but to developing new non-
traditional export lines — that means
searching out potential export products,
finding markets, establishing distribu-
tion channels, and insuring product
quality standards and reliable delivery
systems. This comprehensive approach
to the problem of export promotion is
another way in which this institution is

Kuary 1983

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

an example to the rest of the Costa
Rican and regional economy.

So as not to take up too much of
your time, let me tick off a few other in-
novative AID projects which are under-
way or in the planning stages and which
are specifically directed at the private
sector:

• A loan to establish the Caribbean
Agricultural Trading Company, an inter-
island marketing project which will
stimulate increased trade and agi-i-
cultural production in the eastern Carib-
bean;

• A loan to establish a new, private-
ly owned development finance company
in Haiti:

• A loan to Jamaica to provide in-
vestment funds for equity and debt
financing for medium-size agroindustrial
and manufacturing enterprises;

• Grants to establish a Caribbean
Basin information network as well as to
support an emerging twin-chamber pro-
gram whereby U.S. Chambers of Com-
merce are linked to business associations
in the basin countries for the purpose of
stimulating trade and investment oppor-
tunities;

• A loan to establish a regional
development bank in the eastern Carib-
bean; and

• Joint OPIC-AID support for a
marketing campaign and investment
missions to increase the awareness of
the U.S. business community about in-
vestment opportunities in the Caribbean.

Role of Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands

Let me say just a few words about the
role of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands within the Caribbean Basin in-
itiative. We all recognize that Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are im-
portant components of the U.S.
presence in the Caribbean area. Clearly
we need to insure that the economic
development of the U.S. possessions is
enhanced by U.S. policy toward the
Caribbean region, and we welcome the
contribution that these possessions are
making to implementation of the Carib-
bean Basin initiative.

The U.S. Government has been in
close consultation with the Governments
of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands about the Caribbean Basin in-
itiative and their role in it. Suggestions
made by these governments have been
taken into account in designing Carib-
bean Basin initiative proposals and
legislation.

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin

Islands will play a major role in tech-
nical assistance, private sector develop-
ment, and transportation within the
Caribbean region. In fact, we see these
areas as a focal point for assistance to
the whole region. Several ways in which
this can occur are as follows:

• Strengthening the Tropical Agri-
cultural Research Center in Mayaguez,
Puerto Rico;

• Funding for an Eastern Caribbean
Center for Educational, Cultural, Tech-
nical, and Scientific Interchange at the
College of the Virgin Islands;

• Use of Puerto Rican and U.S.
Virgin Islands facilities, personnel, and
firms in technical assistance programs
and development projects; and

• Expansion of airports in the U.S.
Virgin Islands and other measures to en-
courage the development of Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands as a transporta-
tion hub for the Caribbean region.

Finally, I am pleased to note that
Puerto Rico is already active in pro-
moting closer links with other Caribbean
Basin countries. Particularly noteworthy
are the broad-ranging programs of tecW
nical cooperation with Jamaica and withj
St. Lucia.

Promoting a Productive
Private Sector

Let me conclude by describing to you a
general interagency effort, led by AID,
to devise an overall strategy in support
of the private sector for each of the
Caribbean Basin countries. The object d
the exercise is to develop concrete planl
to promote a more dynamic and produc
five private sector. Our efforts are
primarily within the U.S. Government,
but we are consulting closely with the
U.S. private sector and with represents*
tives of interested governments and

U.S. to Sell Aircraft
Spare Parts to Guatemala

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT.
JAN. 7. 1983'

After extended consultations with the
Congress and analysis of the situation in
Guatemala, the Department has decided
to permit the cash sale to the Govern-
ment of Guatemala of previously re-
quested spare parts and safety-of-flight
items under the foreign military sales
(FMS) program. This decision has been
communicated to the Government of
Guatemala by our ambassador to that
country.

This decision on specific FMS items
is part of a broader relationship which
includes the disbursement of some $10
million in economic support funds
already made available under that por-
tion of the Caribbean Basin initiative
which passed Congress during the past
session. This assistance addresses the
pressing economic difficulties which the
Government of Guatemala shares with
its other regional neighbors.

The potential sales which could
result from this decision would con-
stitute the first such FMS sales to the
Government of Guatemala since the late
1970s, except for $15,000 in FMS train-
ing. The decision was made in light of
human rights improvements which have
taken place in Guatemala since the Rios

Montt government came to power in
March of 1982.

In this regard, while we want to sei
further progress in Guatemala in pro-
moting respect for human rights, Presi
dent Rios Montt has taken significant
steps in this area. Progress has been
made.

Similarly, we look forward to the
continuing development of the demo-
cratic process. Since Gen. Rios Montt
assumed power on March 23 of last
year, political violence in the cities has
"declined dramatically; recently there ar
indications that the level of violence in
the countryside has declined as well;
villagers have been provided food and
medical supplies along with the means
defend themselves; plans are underway
for the election of a constituent
assembly; the Indian population is in- ^
creasingly participating in the country':
political process; and President Rios
Montt has been attacking corruption
within the government.

The government has declared its
desire to cooperate with the independe
human rights group and U.N. agencies
and has permitted a number of private
groups to visit the country.

iRead to news correspondents by Dep
ment spokesman John Hughes. ■

Department of State Bulle i

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

•ivate sectors of the Caribbean Basin
gion.

The general approach is first to
sess which areas in each country offer
e greatest potential for augmenting
oduction for local consumption and for
;ports and, secondly, to identify con-
raints in moving toward this goal. We
sume that major constraints in most
ses will be such intangibles as manage-
snt experience and marketing know-
'W, particularly in the export sector,
it there are likely to be also some very
ecific problems in the areas of financ-
r and infrastructure. Finally, we also
11 want to identify specific disincen-
'63, including those derived from
vernmental policies.

Out of this assessment of potential
d constraints, we plan to devise a
ig-term strategy to promote a produc-
■e private sector. This would involve
tions by the local business community,
local governments, by U.S. Govern-
;nt agencies, and by the U.S. private
:tor. Some of the devices that might
useful in our joint efforts would be:

• Efficient investment promotion of-
es and missions;

• Seminars, training, and other
man resources development;

• Improved marketing networks;

• Trading companies; and

• Technology transfer programs.

The Need for Increased Efforts

What I have tried to show is that there
is already underway within the U.S.
Government a large, although quiet, ef-
fort to help the people of the Caribbean
Basin turn their countries into dynamic
and productive economies offering tangi-
ble hope for prosperity and political
stability. Much remains to be done. And
there are probably new issues and new
areas that are still out there waiting to
challenge us. But the effort has begun
even while we are still seeking congres-
sional approval for the major trade and
investment incentives embodied in the
legislation.

Obviously our success is dependent
on you, the private sector. We can help
provide information, encourage more ra-
tional economic policies by the Carib-
bean Basin governments, provide some
incentives and assistance through our
various U.S. Government programs and
through the trade and investment pro-
grams which are awaiting congressional
action. But all of this is just support for
what you, the private sector, can do.

There is a growing wave of interest
within the U.S. private sector in the

Caribbean Basin region. Some of the
most impressive people of the U.S.
business community have devoted large
amounts of their high-value time to sup-
porting the initiative and to helping turn
the economies of the Caribbean Basin
around. I need only mention the estab-
lishment of such institutions as the U.S.
Business Committee on Jamaica, Carib-
bean/Central American Action, and the
CBI Coalition. Existing organizations
such as the Council of the Americas, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the
Association of Chambers of Commerce
in Latin Amerca have also been
generous in their support. And I want to
emphasize my gratitude for the efforts
that this committee has made in support
of expanding trade and investment with
the Caribbean Basin and other develop-
ing regions of the world.

I ask you to intensify those efforts. I
think the opportunities are there and
will increase. The payoff— in terms of
promoting the U.S. national interest, as
well as the individual interest of private
business— will be substantial.

'806 and 807 are provisions in the U.S.
tariff schedule which provide that goods
assembled abroad from U.S. -made com-
ponents pay duty only on the value of the
assembly and not on the U.S. components. I

■teruary 1983

TREATIES

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending the agreement of
Sept. 25, 1956, as amended, (TIAS 4048,
5369. 8421, 9673), on the joint financing of
certain air navigation services in Iceland.
Done at Montreal Nov. 3, 1982. Enters into
force on the 60th day after the date on which
instruments of acceptance or accession have
been deposited by all the present parties.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, this protocol,
with the exception of Article 9, shall be ap-
plied provisionally from Jan. 1, 1983.

Protocol amending the agreement of
Sept. 25, 1956, as amended (TIAS 4049,
5369, 8421, 9673) on the joint financing of
certain air navigation services in Greenland
and the Faroe Islands. Done at Montreal
Nov. 3, 1982. Enters into force on the 60th
day after the date on which instruments of
acceptance or accession have been deposited
by all the present parties. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, this protocol, with the excep-
tion of Article 10, shall be applied provi-
sionally from Jan. 1, 1983.
Signatures: Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, F.R.G.,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
U.K., U.S. Nov. 3, 1982.

Editors' Note: The first entry in the October

1982 Bulletin should read:

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text

of the convention on civil aviation (TIAS

1591) with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 30,

1977.'

Signature: Austria,^ Aug. 4, 1982.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund

for Commodities, with schedules. Done at

Geneva June 27, 1980.'

Signature: Ghana, Dec. 1, 1982;

Singapore, Dec. 17, 1982.

Ratification deposited: Guinea, Dec. 9, 1982;

Tunisia, Dec. 15, 1982.

Customs

Customs convention on the international

transport of goods under cover of TIR

carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov.

14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978;

for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Denmark,

F.R.G., Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg,

Dec. 20, 1982.

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Dec. 20,

1982.

Approval deposited: EEC, Dec. 20, 1982.

Education— UNESCO

Convention on the recognition of studies,
diplomas, and degrees concerning higher

education in the states belonging to the
Europe Region. Done at Paris, Dec. 21, 1979.
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982.^
Ratification deposited: Hungary, Sept. 14,
1982.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or
any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques, with annex. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980.
TIAS 9614.
Ratification deposited: Ireland, Dec. 16, 1982.

International Monetary Fund

Articles of agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, formulated at Bretton
Woods Conference July 1-22. 1944. Entered
into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and Acceptance: St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Aug. 31, 1982.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948. as amended, on the International
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.1
Acceptance deposited: Israel, Dec. 15, 1982.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of
phonograms against unauthorized duplication
of their phonograms. Done at Geneva Oct.
29, 1971. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973;
for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification of ratification: Uruguay, Oct. 18,
1982.

Pollution

Convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: Austria, Dec. 16,
1982.

Convention on the prevention of marine
pollution by dumping of wastes and other
matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mex-
ico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29,
1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975.
TIAS 8165.
Accession deposited: Nauru, July 26, 1982.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international

convention for the prevention of pollution

from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17,

1978.

Accessions deposited: Greece, Sept. 23, 1982;

Italy, Oct. 1, 1982.

Enters into force: Oct. 2, 1983 (except for

Annex II to the convention which will not

enter into force until Oct. 2, 1986).

Property — Industrial — Classification

Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for the

purpose of the registration of marks of Juni

15, 1957, as revised (TIAS 7419). Done at

Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force

Feb. 6, 1979.2

Notification of ratification: Italy, Nov. 19,

1982.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Uruguay, Dec. 7, 1982

Operating agreement relating to the Intern;
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organiz
tion (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Administracion Nacional de Tele
comunicaciones, Uruguay, Dec. 7, 1982.

Reciprocal Assistance

Inter-American (Rio) Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance. Done at Rio de Janeiro Sept. 2,

1947. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1948. TIA:

1838.

Signature: Bahamas, Nov. 8, 1982.

Ratification deposited: Bahamas, Nov. 24,

1982.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Enterec
into force Apr. 15. 1982. TIAS 10379.
Notification of withdrawal: Turkey, Nov. 26
1982; effective Nov. 26, 1983.

Sugar

Agreement extending the international sug:
agreement, 1977 (TIAS 9664). Approved by
the International Sugar Council Nov. 20,
1981 and May 21, 1982.
Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1983.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention
with annexes and protocols. Done at Malag;
Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 197i
TIAS 8572.

Ratification deposited: Equatorial Guinea,
Sept. 30, 1982.

Final Acts of the World Administrative Rao
Conference for the planning of the
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3)
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), with an-
nexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.2
Approval deposited: Sweden, Sept. 29, 1982

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punish-
ment of crimes against internationally pro-
tected persons, including diplomatic agents.
Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973.

Department of State Bullet

TREATIES

Intered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Lccession deposited: Korea, Democratic
'eopie's Republic, Dec. 1, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Poland, Dec. 14, 1982.

'onnage

nternational convention on tonnage measure-
lent of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at
,ondon June 23, 1969. Entered into force
uly 18, 1982; for the U.S. enters into force
'eb. 10, 1983.
'roclaimed by the President: Dec. 17, 1982. '

rNESCO

:onstitution of the U.N. Educational, Scien-
fic, and Cultural Organization. Concluded at
,ondon Nov. 16, 1945. Entered into force
(ov. 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
vcceptances deposited: Antigua and Barbuda,
uly 15, 1982; Belize, May 10, 1982; Bhutan,
.pr. 13, 1982.

LN. Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
lent Organization, with annexes. Done at
ienna Apr. 8, 1979.'

Ratifications deposited: Jamaica, Dec. 10,
982; Syrian Arab Republic, Dec. 6, 1982.

i'omen

Convention on the elimination of all forms of
iscrimination against women. Adopted at
lew York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force
ept. 3, 1981.2
■ccession deposited: St. Lucia, Oct. 8, 1982.

.mendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
on, as amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534).
adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th
i^orld Health Assembly.'
Lcceptances deposited: Afghanistan,
ept. 20, 1982; Bolivia, June 16, 1982; Com-
ros, Dec. 13, 1982; Guyana, Sept. 30, 1982;
.uxembourg, June 22, 1982; Qatar, Dec. 7,
982.

imendment to Article 74 of the Constitution

f the World Health Organization, as amend-

d (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). Adopted at

Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 31st World

lealth Assembly.'

Acceptance deposited: Luxembourg, June 22,

982.

Vorld Heritage

'onvention concerning the protection of the
vorld cultural and natural heritage. Done at
'aris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force
)ec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Accession deposited: Holy See, Oct. 7, 1982."

BILATERAL

Argentina

Memorandum of understanding concerning
the operation of the INTELPOST field trial,
with details of implementation. Signed at
Washington Aug. 24 and Oct. 12, 1982 and
Buenos Aires Sept. 16, 1982. Entered into
force Nov. 1, 1982.

Australia

Agreement amending the agreement of
May 9, 1963, as amended, (TIAS 5377, 6527,
8338), relating to the establishment of a U.S.
naval communication station in Australia. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Canberra Nov.
24, 1982. Entered into force Nov. 24, 1982.

Austria

Agreement extending the agreement of
Feb. 25 and Mar. 3, 1977, as extended (TIAS
8686, 10135), on research participation and
technical exchange in the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Loss of Fluid Test
(LOFT) research program. Effected by telex
and letter at Vienna and Washington Mar. 2
and Sept. 9, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 9,
1982; effective Mar. 3, 1982.

Canada

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Mar. 19 and Sept. 20, 1979
(TIAS 9601) concerning support of U.S. ac-
tivities at the Canadian National Research
Council Space Research Facilities. Effected
by exchange of notes at Ottawa Oct. 8 and
Nov. 12, 1982. Entered into force Nov. 12,
1982; effective July 1, 1982.

Costa Rica

Extradition treaty. Signed at San Jose Dec.
4, 1982. Enters into force immediately upon
the exchange of the instruments of ratifica-
tion.

Egypt

First amendment to grant agreement of Dec.
30, 1979 (TIAS 9672) for telecommunications
III. Signed at Cairo Aug. 16, 1982. Entered
into force Aug. 16, 1982.

El Salvador

Air transport agreement, with annexes and
related exchange of letters. Signed at
Washington Apr. 2, 1982.
Entered into force: Nov. 22, 1982.

Finland

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Dec. 1, 1982. Entered into force
Dec. 1, 1982.

Haiti

Agreement extending the agreement of
Aug. 28, 1981, as amended and extended, for

the interdiction of narcotics and trafficking.
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-
Prince Oct. 15 and 22, 1982. Entered into
force Oct. 22, 1982.

Honduras

Loan agreement for the economic recovery
program I. Signed at Tegucigalpa Sept. 24,
1982. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1982.

Indonesia

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Jakarta Oct. 13 and Nov. 9, 1982.
Entered into force Nov. 9, 1982; effective
July 1, 1982.

Israel

International express mail agreement with
detailed regulations. Signed at Washington
and Jerusalem Sept. 8, and Oct. 24, 1982.
Entered into force Jan. 24, 1983.

Italy

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters. Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Enters
into force upon exchange of instruments of
ratification.

Supplementary protocol to the treaty on ex-
tradition signed at Rome Jan. 18, 1973 (TIAS
8052). Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Enters
into force upon the exchange of instruments
of ratification.

Japan

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts
of the U.S. of America, with annexes and
agreed minutes. Signed at Washington
Sept. 10, 1982.
Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1983.

Kenya

Agreement for the sale of agricultural
commodites, relating to the agreement of
Dec. 31, 1980 (TIAS 9969), with minutes of
negotiations. Signed at Nairobi Oct. 29, 1982.
Entered into force Oct. 29, 1982.

Liberia

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Monrovia
Oct. 19, 1982. Entered into force Dec. 22,
1982.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of payments due under P.L. 480
Title I agricultural commodity agreements,
with annexes. Signed at Monrovia Nov. 1,
1982. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1982.

Luxembourg

Memorandum of understanding on reciprocal
defense procurement, with annex. Signed at
Luxembourg Dec. 2, 1982. Entered into force
Dec. 2, 1982.

-ebruary1983

CHRONOLOGY

Mexico

Memorandum of understanding concerning
the furnishing of launch and associated serv-
ices for the MEXSAT project. Signed at Mex-
ico Nov. 18, 1982. Enters into force upon
confirmation by the Government of the U.S.
and the Government of Mexico through an
exchange of diplomatic notes.

Agreement amending the agreement of June
2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to additional
cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico Nov. 8, 1982. Entered into
force Nov. 8, 1982.

New Zealand

Memorandum of understanding on logistic
support. Signed at Washington and Well-
ington May 13 and June 21, 1982. Entered
into force June 21, 1982.

Agreement concerning the establishment of
an astronomical observatory at Blackbirch
Ridge, with memorandum of understandings
and agreed minute. Effected by exchange of
notes at Wellington Nov. 11, 1982. Entered
into force Nov. 11, 1982.

Pakistan

Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial,
Scientific, Technological, Educational, and
Cultural Cooperation. Signed at Washington
Dec. 6, 1982. Entered into force Dec. 6,
1982.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreements of
Aug. 14 and 27, 1979, Aug. 12 and 28, 1980,
and Aug. 24 and 28, 1981 (TIAS 9599, 9846,
10252), concerning the grant of defense
articles and services under the military
assistance program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Lisbon Aug. 16 and Sept. 29, 1982.
Entered into force Sept. 29, 1982.

Romania

Agreement extending the May 21, 1981 pro-
gram of cooperation and exchanges in educa-
tion, cultural, scientific, technological, and
other fields (TIAS 10150). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Bucharest Nov. 18 and 30,
1982. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1982.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda
Mar. 1, 1981 and Oct. 20, 1982. Entered into
force Oct. 20, 1982.

Spain

Memorandum of understanding pertaining to
installation of satellite ground terminal at
Rota, Spain. Signed at Rota Nov. 3, 1982.
Entered into force Nov. 3, 1982.

Switzerland

Agreement in the area of carbide fuel
development, with appendices. Signed at
Bern Nov. 15, 1982. Entered into force
Nov. 15, 1982.

Venezuela

Agreement implementing the air transport
agreement of Aug. 14, 1953, as amended
(TIAS 2813, 3117, 7549, 8433), with related
memoranda. Effected by exchange of notes
at Caracas Oct. 29 and Nov. 9, 1982. Entered
into force Nov. 9, 1982.

'Not in force.

^Not in force for the United States

^With understanding.

'With declaration. ■

December 1982

December 2

Filipe Gonzalez, leader of the Spanish
Socialist Workers Party, is invested Prime
Minister of Spain.

December 3

By a vote of 135-2 (U.S., Turkey) and 8
abstentions, LI.N. General Assembly adopts a
resolution calling on nations to "consider
signing and ratifying" the Law of the Sea
Convention (LOS) and appealing to the
"Governments of all States to refrain from
taking any action" that would undermine the
Convention or defeat its "object and
purpose." The resolution also called for the
financing of the LOS preparatory commission
from the U.N. budget. The President an-
nounced on Dec. 30 that the U.S. would
withhold its pro rata share of the cost of the
funding of the prepcom.

December 6

Pakistani President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq
makes a state visit to the U.S. Dec. 6-14, and
to Washington, D.C., Dec. 6-9, 1982.

Final session of the Law of the Sea Con-
ference is held in Montego Bay, Jamaica,
Dec. 6-10, 1982, for the signing of the final
draft and to open the convention for
signatures. The U.S. previously announced
that it will sign the final draft acknowledging
9 years of participation but will not be

signatory to the convention because of its ob-
jection to the seabed mining provisions. The
convention is signed Dec. 10 by 117 nations.
The U.S. and 46 other nations do not sign.

December 7

Secretary Shultz makes an official working
visit to Europe Dec. 7-19, 1982, to hold high-
level talks with European officials on a wide
range of issues focusing on East-West trade,
U.S. -Soviet relations, arms control, and
U.S. -EC economic relations. The Secretary
visits Bonn Dec. 7-8; Brussels, where he at-
tends the NATO semiannual ministerial
meeting, Dec. 8-11; The Hague, Dec. 11;
Rome Dec. 11-14; Paris Dec. 14-15; Madrid
Dec. 15-16; and London Dec. 16-19.

December 9

U.N. General Assembly adopts three resolu-
tions calling for a comprehensive test ban
(CTB) treaty. The first resolution, adopted by
a vote of 111-1 (U.S.) with 35 abstentions,
urged that steps be taken for early submis-
sion to the General Assembly of a CTB trea-
ty. The resolutions — adopted by a vote of
124-2 (U.S. and U.K.) with 19 abstentions,
and a vote of 115-5 with 25 absten-
tions— urged adherence to a treaty banning
nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and
outer space and requested three original
parties to the treaty to discontinue all test
explosions.

NATO semiannual ministerial meeting is
held in Brussels Dec. 9-10, 1982.

December 10

In light of an "unconfirmed press report" that
25-30 prominent Suriname citizens being
held in government custody were killed
because of a coup attempt, the U.S. reviews
its entire relationship with that country, in-
cluding its aid program. The bodies of many
of those killed were reportedly put on display
in Paramaribo.

December 12

Prime Minister Poul Schluter of Denmark
makes official working visit to Washington,
D.C. Dec. 12-14, 1982.
Solidarity Day.

December 13

U.N. General Assembly adopts two resolu-
tions calling on major powers to freeze out-
put and implacement of nuclear weapons by
votes of 122-16 (U.S.) with 6 abstentions,
and 119-17 (U.S.) with 5 abstentions. U.N.
General Assembly adopts by consensus a
U.S. -sponsored resolution on peace and dis-
armament movements which guarantees the
free flow of information on disarmament

Department of State Bulletin

PRESS RELEASES

sues and the right of peace movements to
rganize in all regions of the world.

lecember 14

urtuguese Prime Minister Francisco Pinto
alsemao makes an official working visit to
/ashington, D.C., Dec. 14-15, 1982.

ecember 15

t the State Department, U.S. -Soviets open
ilateral consultations to discuss efforts to
revent the spread of nuclear weapons Dec.
5-16, 1982. Ambassador Kennedy leads the
.S. delegation, while Ivan Morozov, the
oviet representative to the Board of Cover-
■>TS of the International Atomic Energy
ommission, heads the Soviet delegation.
By unanimous vote, the U.N. Security
ouncil adopts Resolution 527

• Condemning the "apartheid regime of
outh Africa for its premeditated act"
jainst Lesotho;

• Demanding that South Africa pay "full
id adequate compensation" to Lesotho for
images to "life and property";

• Reaffirming Lesotho's "right to receive
id give sanctuary to the victims of apart-
3id";

• Requesting the Secretary General to
)nsult with the Lesotho Government and
.N. agencies to "ensure welfare of refugees"
I Lesotho;

• Requesting "Member States" to
irgently extend all necessary economic
isistance" to Lesotho; and

• Calling upon South Africa to "declare
jblicly" that it will comply with the U.N.
harter and will not commit aggressive acts

ijainst Lesotho directly or through proxies.

ecember 17

aving completed review of the reported kill-
igs of prominent citizens by the Government
I Suriname, the U.S. suspends "assistance
ad military sales" to that country until its
overnment provides "an explanation of re-
ant events and a better sense of the direc-
on" in which it plans to move.

December 18

ordan's King Hussein I makes an official
'orking visit to Washington, D.C., Dec.
8-23, 1983.

•ecember 19

'olish Government formally announces that
lartial law will end in January 1983.

•ecember 21

•oviet General Secretary Yuriy V. Andropov
iscloses Soviet INF proposals to reduce
umber of Soviet missiles in Europe to
umber maintained by the U.K. and France,
■rovided NATO abondons plans to modernize
:s intermediate-range nuclear forces. He also
enews Soviet strategic arms proposals.

NATO rejects Soviet INF proposals on
grounds that it would allow U.S.S.R. to main-
tain present monopoly over U.S. in longer-
range INF missiles and expresses continued
support for U.S. zero-zero proposal, which
would eliminate the entire class of longer-
range INF missiles. France and the U.K., in
particular, reject Soviet attempt to include
their independent forces in explicitly bilateral
LI. S. -Soviet negotiations.

Portuguese Prime Minister Balsemao
resigns.

U.S. Senate rejects Reagan Administra-
tion's plan to set up a Government radio sta-
tion— Radio Marti — to broadcast to Cuba.

December 28

In Khalde, Israel and Lebanon open talks
aimed at withdrawal of all external forces
from Lebanon. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

339 12/1 U.S., Republic of Palau call
plebiscite on Compact of
Free Association, Jan. 11.
*360 12/3 Program for the state visit
of Pakistani President
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq,
Dec. 6-14.

361 12/3 Shultz: press briefing,

Brasilia, Dec. 1.

362 12/6 Dam: address before the

Chicago Law Club,
Chicago, III., Dec. 2.

363 12/6 Shultz: press briefing aboard

Air Force One enroute
Bogota, Colombia, Dec. 3.
•364 12/7 Shultz, Brock: press briefing
aboard Air Force One be-
tween Brasilia and Sao
Paulo, Dec. 2.

365 12/7 Shultz: press briefing aboard

Air Force One en route
San Jose, Costa Rica,
Dec. 3.

366 12/7 Shultz: press briefing, San

Pedro Sula, Honduras,
Dec. 4.

367 12/7 Shultz, Enders: press brief-

ing aboard Air Force One
en route San Jose to San
Pedro Sula, Dec. 4.

*368 12/7 Passport validity doubled to
10 years; fees to rise.

*369 12/ U.S., Colombia sign textile
agreement, July 1 and
Aug. 11.
370 12/9 Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1951:
Volume V, the Near East
and Africa, released.

375

12/14

376

12/14

377

12/13

378

12/13

371 12/8 Shultz: news conference,

Bonn, Dec. 7.

372 12/9 Shultz: toast, Bonn, Dec. 7.

373 12/9 Shultz: arrival statement,

Brussels, Dec. 8.
•374 12/10 Program for the official
working visit of Danish
Prime Minister Poul
Shluter, Dec. 12-14.

Shultz: news conference,
Brussels, Dec. 10.

Shultz, Regan, Block: news
conference, Brussels,
Dec. 10.

Shultz: news conference,
Amsterdam, Dec. 11.

Program for the official visit
of Portuguese Prime
Minister Francisco Pinto
Balsemao, Dec. 14-15.
•379 12/14 U.S. Organization for the
International Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), study group 5,
Jan. 6.
•380 12/14 CCIR, study group 6, Jan. 10

and 11.
•381 12/14 Shipping Coordinating

Committee (SCC), Sub-
committee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on the car-
riage of dangerous goods,
Jan. 11.
•382 12/14 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on containers and cargoes,
Jan. 12.
383 12/14 Shultz, Colombo: news con-
ference, Rome, Dec. 13.
•384 12/15 Shultz: news conference,

Paris, Dec. 14.
385 12/15 Shultz: toast, Rome, Dec. 13.
•386 12/16 Advisory Committee on

Private International Law,
study group on arbitration,
Jan. 28.
*387 12/16 Advisory Committee on

Private International Law,
study group on negotiable
instruments, Jan. 14.

SCC, Committee on Ocean
Dumpings, Jan. 5 and 27.

SCC, SOLAS, working group
on fire protection, Jan. 6.

Edward L. Peck sworn in as
Ambassador to Mauritania
(biographic data).

Shultz: toast, Madrid,
Dec. 15.

Shultz: statement at CSCE,
Madrid, Dec. 16.

Program for the official
working visit of Jordan's
King Hussein, Dec. 18-23
*394 12/17 James B. Pearson and June
T. Dreyer appointed to
Board of Governors to the
East- West Center.

•388

12/16

•389

12/16

•390

12/15

•391

12/16

392

12/16

•393

12/17

'ebruary 1983

PUBLICATIONS

•396

12/21

•397

12/22

398

399

12/21

•400

12/23

*395 12/21 U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph
and Telephone Con-
sultative Committee
(CCITT), modem working
party, study group D.
Jan. 6 and 7.
CCITT, study group A,

Jan. 7 and 18.
Paul D. Wolfowitz sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs (biographic data).
[Not issued]

Shultz, Cheysson: news con-
ference, Paris, Dec. 14.
Robert B. Oakley sworn in as
Ambassador to the
Somalia Democratic
Republic (biographic data).

•401 12/27 John H. Holdridge sworn in
as Ambassador to In-
donesia (biographic data).
402 12/27 Shultz; news conference,
Madrid, Dec. 16.

•403 12/28 Shultz: news conference, en
route Bonn from Andrews
Air Force Base, Dec. 6.

•404 12/28 Shultz: remarks at Christmas
tree lighting ceremony,
Dec. 20.

•405 12/28 Advisory Committee on

International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, Jan. 18.

•406 12/28 Advisory Committee on

International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, Jan. 19.

•407 12/28 sec, SOLAS, panel on bulk
cargoes, Feb. 3.

•Not printed in the Bullletin. ■

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Vice President Bush

A New Partnership with Africa, Kenya
Chamber of Commerce, Nairobi, November
19, 1982 (Current Policy #438).

Secretary Shultz (and others)

Promoting Free Elections, Secretary Shultz,
U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.
Kirkpatrick, Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Abrams, Conference on Free Elections,
State Department, November 4-6, 1982
(Current Policy #433).

Africa

Challenge to Regional Security in Africa: The
U.S. Response, Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs Crocker, Baltimore Council
on Foreign Relations, Baltimore, Md., Oc-
tober 28, 1982 (Current Policy #431).

Background notes on Comoros (December
1982).

Background Notes on The Gambia (Novembei

1982).
Background Notes on Mauritius (December

1982).
Background Notes on Niger (November

1982).
Background Notes on Sudan (November

1982).

Arms Control

World Disarmament Campaign, U.S. Deputy
Permanent Representative to the U.N.
Adelman, Committee I, U.N. General
Assembly, New York, November 4, 1982
(Current Policy #437).

Evolution of the U.S. START Approach,
Assistant Secretary-designate for Europea
Affairs Burt, from NATO Rexnew, Vol. 30,
September 1982 (Current Policy #436).

Nuclear Energy: Opportunities and Problem
Under Secretary for Management Kenned
American Industrial Forum and the
American Nuclear Society, Washington,
D.C, November 17, 1982 (Current Policy
#434).

Nuclear Weapons: What is the Moral
Response? Assistant Secretary for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Abrams,
Chicago World Affairs Council, Septembei
29, 1982 (Current Policy #426).

Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State today released
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1951, Volume V, The Near East and
Africa. The Foreign Relatioyis series has
been published continuously since 1861
as the official record of U.S. foreign
policy. The volume released today is the
fifth of seven volumes covering the year
1951. Three other volumes recording
the years 1952-1954 have also been
released.

The volume presents 1,497 pages of
documentation, most of it previously un-
published and newly declassified, on
U.S. relations with the Near and Middle
East, and with Africa, during the year
1951. The documentation is accompanied
by scholarly aids, including lists of per-
sons, abbreviations, and sources.

The portion of the volume on the
Near and Middle East covers basic U.S.
military and economic policies in the
region; the origins and development of
proposals to establish a Middle East
Command; and U.S. interest in the
development of the petroleum resources
of the area. The section on U.S. rela-
tions with Israel and U.S. interest in

resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute com-
prises the largest single collection of
material in the volume. Other sections
present documentation on bilateral rela
tions with Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Turkey, and Yemen.

The portion of the volume on Afria
covers general U.S. policies toward
Africa and U.S. relations with Ethiopia
the Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Moroc-
co, Tunisia, and the Union of South
Africa.

Foreign Relations, 1951, Volume V,|
was prepared in the Office of the
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Copies of Volume'
V for 1951 (Department of State
publication 9114; GPO Stock No.
044-00-01914-1) may be purchased for
$21.00 (domestic postpaid) from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or
money orders should be made out to th.
Superintendent of Documents.

Press release 370 of Dec. 9, 1982. I

Department of State Bullet

PUBLICATIONS

reneral

resident Reagan's Framework for Peace,
National Security Adviser Clark, City Club
and Chamber of Commerce, San Diego,
California, October 29, 1982 (Current
Policy #430).

[iddle East

ecuring a Peaceful Future for Lebanon,
Deputy Secretary Dam, Chicago Law Club,
Chicago, 111., December 2, 1982 (Current
Policy #439).

outh Asia

fghanistan: Three Years of Occupation,
Eliza van Hollen, Bureau of Intelligence

and Research, December 1982 (Special
Report #106).
Call for Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,
U.N. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. Kirkpatrick, U.N. General Assembly,
November 24, 1982. Text of U.N. General
Assembly Resolution A/37/37, adopted
November 29, 1982 (Current PoUcy #441).

Trade

U.S. Trade Policy (GIST, December 1982).

Western Hemisphere

Dealing with the Reality of Cuba, Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Enders, Subcommittees on Inter-American

Affairs and on International Economic
Policy and Trade, House Foreign Affairs
Committee, December 14, 1982 (Current
Policy #443).

Declaration on Democracy in Central
America, Department statement and sum-
mary, October 5, 1982, and Final Act of
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Countries
Interested in Promotion of Democracy in
Central America and the Caribbean, Oc-
tober 4, 1982 (Bulletin Reprint, December
1982).

Programs Underway for the Caribbean Basin
Initiative, U.S. Permanent Representative
to the OAS Middendorf, Committee for 806
and 807, Washington, D.C., November 8,
1982 (Current Policy #442).

El Salvador (GIST, November 1982). ■

February 1983

DEX

bruary 1983
lume 83, No. 2071

lanistan

lanistan (Eagleburger) 62

lanistan; 3 Years of Occupation (Van

lollen) • • 53

iversary of the Soviet Invasion of Afghan-

stan (Reagan) 64

ncing Strategic Interests and Human

lights in South Asia (Schneider) 63

s Control

•ssment of U.S. Relations With China

Holdridge) "'

ident's News Conference of January 5

Sxcerpts) '''

luction of the MX Missile (Reagan, White
rlouse statement, letter to the Con-
gress) 4

etary Visits Europe; Attends North Atlan-
-.ic Council (statements, news conferences,

;oasts, NATO communique) 12

Relations With the Soviet Union

Reagan) 1

-Soviet Negotiations on INF Reductions

White House statement) 7

I. Balancing Strategic Interests and

Human Rights in Asia (Shoesmith) 9

gladesh. Balancing Strategic Interests
md Human Rights in South Asia

Schneider) 63

ma. U.S. International Narcotics Control

Policy in Southeast Asia (DiCarlo) 44

iness. Programs Underway for the Carib-

oean Basin Initiative (Middendorf) ... .79

>ssment of U.S. Relations With China

Holdridge) 7

incing Strategic Interests and Human

Rights in Asia (Shoesmith) 9

gress

incing Strategic Interests and Human

Rights in Asia (Shoesmith) 9

incing Strategic Interests and Human

Rights in South Asia (Schneider) 63

ling With the Reality of Cuba (Enders) . 73
1 Report on Cyprus (message to the

Congress) 41

Auction of the MX Missile (Reagan, White
House statement, letter to the Congress) 4
itegic Petroleum Reserve (message to the

Congress) 11

. International Narcotics Control Policy in

Southeast Asia (DiCarlo) 44

la. Dealing With the Reality of Cuba

(Enders) 73

irus. 11th Report on Cyprus (message to

the Congress) 41

inomics
lessment of U.S. Relations with China

(Holdridge) 7

'momic Health of the Western Alliance

(Burns) 35

'grams Underway for the Caribbean Basin

Initiative (Middendorf) 79

Iretary Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council (statements, news confer-
ences, toasts, NATO communique) .... 12
!rope. Secretary Visits Europe; Attends
North Atlantic Council (statements, news
conferences, toasts, NATO commu-
nique) 12

atemala. U.S. to Sell Aircraft Spare Parts
to Guatemala (Department announce-
ment) 82

Human Rights

Balancing Strategic Interests and Human

Rights in Asia (Shoesmith) 9

Balancing Strategic Interests and Human

Rights in South Asia (Schneider) 63

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and

Week, 1982 (proclamation) 42

Human Rights Policy (Department state-
ment) 42

Secretary Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council (statements, news confer-
ences, toasts, NATO communique) .... 12
India. Balancing Strategic Interests and
Human Rights in South Asia

(Schneider) 63

Jordan. Visit of Jordan's King (Hussein,

Reagan) 43

Korea. Balancing Strategic Interests and

Human Rights in Asia (Shoesmith) 9

Latin America and the Caribbean
President's News Conference of January 5

(Excerpts) 2

Programs Underway for the Caribbean Basin

Initiative (Middendorf) 79

Secretary Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council (statements, news confer-
ences, toasts, NATO communique) .... 12
Military Affairs
President's News Conference of January 5

(Excerpts) 2

Production of the MX Missile (Reagan, White

House statement, letter to the Congress) 4

U.S. -Soviet Negotiations on INF Reductions

(Wliite House statement) 7

Middle East

President's News Conference of January 5

(Excerpts) 2

Secretary Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council (statements, news confer-
ences, toasts, NATO communique) .... 12
Narcotics. U.S. International Narcotics
Control Policy in Southeast Asia

(DiCarlo) 44

Nepal. Balancing Strateg^ic Interests and
Human Rights in South Asia

(Schneider) 63

Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.S.Palau

Plebiscite 52

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Economic Health of the Western Alliance

(Burns) 35

Secretary Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council (statements, news confer-
ences, toasts, NATO communique) .... 12
Pakistan
Balancing Strategic Interests and Human

Rights in South Asia (Schneider) 63

Pakistan— A Profile 67

Visit of Pakistan's President (arrival cere-
mony, dinner toasts) 65

Palau. U.S.-Palau Plebiscite 52

Petroleum. Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(message to the Congress) 11

Philippines. Balancing Strategic Interests and

Human Rights in Asia (Shoesmith) 9

Poland. Day of Prayer for Poland (proclama-
tion) . .". " 41

Portugal. Visit of Portugal's Prime Minister

(Balsemao. Reagan) 40

Presidential Documents

Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion of

Afghanistan (Reagan) 64

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and

Week, 1982 (proclamation) 42

Day of Prayer for Poland (proclamation) . . .41
11th Report on Cyprus (message to the

Congress) 41

News Conference of January 5 (Excerpts) ... 2

Production of the MX Missile (Reagan, White

House statement, letter to the Congress) 4

Strategic Petroleum Reserve (message to the

Congress) 11

UNISPACE 82 Held in Vienna (Beggs,
Reagan, General Assembly resolution,
U.S. delegation) 69

U.S. Relations With the Soviet Union
(Reagan) 1

Visit of Jordan's King (Hussein, Reagan) . . .43

Visit of Pakistan's President (arrival
ceremony, dinner toasts) 65

Visit of Portugal's Prime Minister (Balsemao,
Reagan) 40

Publications

Department of State 88

Foreign Relations Volume Released 88

Security Assistance

Economic Health of the Western Alliance
(Burns) 35

U.S. to Sell Aircraft Spare Parts to Guatemala
(Department announcement) 82

Space. UNISPACE 82 Held in Vienna (Beggs,
Reagan, General Assembly resolution,
U.S. delegation) 69

Sri Lanka. Balancing Strategic Interests and
Human Rights in South Asia
(Schneider) 63

Thailand. U.S. International Narcotics
Control Policy in Southeast Asia
(DiCario) 44

Trade. Economic Health of the Western
Alliance (Bums) 35

Treaties. Current Actions 84

United Nations. UNISPACE 82 Held in
Vienna (Beggs, Reagan, General Assembly
resolution, U.S. delegation) 69

U.S.S.R.

Afghanistan (Eagleburger) 62

Assessment of U.S. Relations With China
(Holdridge) 7

Economic Health of the Western Alliance
(Burns) 35

President's News Conference of January 5
(Excerpts) 2

Secretary Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council (statements, news con-
ferences, toasts, NATO communique) . . 12

U.S. Relations With the Soviet Union
(Reagan) 1

U.S. -Soviet Negotiations on INF Reductions
(White House statement) 7

Name Index

Baldrige, Malcolm 12

Balsameo, Francisco Pinto 40

Beggs, James M 69

Block, John R 12

Brock, William E 12

Burns, Arthur F 35

Cheysson, Claude 12

Colombo, Emilio 12

Dalsager, Paul 12

DiCario. Dominick L 44

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 62

Enders, Thomas 0 73

Holdridge, John H 7

King Hussein I 43

Middendorf, J. William II 79

Pym, Francis 12

Reagan, President ..1,2, 4, 11, 40, 41, 42, 43,

64. 65, 69

Regan, Donald T 12

Schneider, David T 63

Shoesmith, Thomas P 9

Shultz, Secretary 12

Thorn, Gaston 12

Van Hollen, Eliza 53

Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad 65

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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Departiiipn t

bulletin

ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2072

March 1983

vice President
In Europe / 1

Secretary In
Asia / 40

□n

Departnu»ni of SUtte

bulletin

Volume 82/ Number 2072/ March 1983

Cover:

Vice President Bush at Heathrow Airport,

near London.

(White Hnuse phnto hy Cynthia Johnson)

The Depaf;tment of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Pubhc
Communication in the Bureau of Pubhc
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreig^n policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the Wliite House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
gi'aphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of .State

JOHN HUGHES

.A.-i.sistant St-t-retary for Public Affairs

PAULE. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Kilitorial Duisinn

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March 31.
1987.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
of the Department ok State Bulletin as the source
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Sujierintendent of Documents, I
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402

CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 Vice President Bush Visits Europe {Remarks, News Conferences, Toasts)

The President

Progress in the Quest for Peace

and Deterrence

State of the Union Address

(Excerpt)

Vice President Bush's and

Secretary Shultz'a Trips

Arms Control and Reduction

Caribbean Basin Initiative

The Vice President

Interview on "Face the Nation"

(Excerpts)

The

Secretary

40 Visit to Asia {Remarks, News Con-
ferences, Toasts)

64 Restoring Prosperity to the World
Economy

68 Security and Economic Assistance
for FY 1984

Arms Control

Arms Control Negotiators Hold
News Briefing {Paul H. Nitze,
President Reagan, Edward L.
Rowny)

Commission on Strategic Forces
Established {President Reagan)

Department

79 Project Democracy

East Asia

80 Visit of Japanese Prime Minister

{Yasuhiro Nakasone, President
Reagan)

Europe

81 Review of U.S. Relations With the

Soviet Union (Lawrence S.
Eagleburger)

Middle East

85 Visit of Egyptian President

Mubarak {Hosni Mubarak, Presi-
dent Reagan)

Nuclear Policy

86 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Our
Shared Responsibility {Richard T.
Kennedy)

South Asia

87 President Reagan Meets With

Afghan Freedom Fighters

United Nations

88 U.N. Secretary General Meets

With the President {White
House Statement)

Western Hemisphere

89 Certii"ication of Progress in El

Salvador {Thomas 0. Enders)

Treaties

91 Current Actions

Chronology

93 January 1983

Press Releases

94 Department of State

Index

^ i APRI9I983

'NTS

\ DEPOSITORY

Vice President Bush at the Berlin Wall with Mayor Richard von Weizsaecker and
Chancellor Kohl.

»•«« Photo, by Cy„thia Johnson)

Harch

1983

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

Vice President Bushi
Visits Europe

Vice President Bush departed Washington, D.C.,

January 30, 1983, to visit

Bonn (January 30-31), Berlin (January -February 1),

The Hague (February 1-2), Brussels (February 2-4),

Geneva (February 4-5), Nuremberg (February 5),

Rome and the Vatican (February 5-8),

Paris (February 8-9),

and London (February 9-10). He returned

to Washington on February 10.
Following are the Vice President's remarks,
news conferences, and toasts he made on various
occasions during the trip.'^

Bonn

Arrival Statement,
January 30, 1983

I'm happy that my first stop on this
2- week trip through Europe should be
Germany. President Reagan asked me to
go on this trip in order to consult with
our NATO friends and allies. He be-
lieves, as we all do, that our alliance
represents the best chance for preserv-
ing the peace we have been so successful
in keeping for so many years now.

We are an alliance of free peoples.
We have differences, but in free
societies we welcome debate. Our very
right to speak our minds without fear is
what distinguishes our alliance from the
other alliance on the European Conti-
nent. We can make sure those liberties,
and the peace, survive by remaining
vigilant.

The partnership between the NATO
allies is strong because we recognize

that personal freedom and social justice
are at the heart of human dignity and
tranquility. It is strong, too, because we
know that our security demands an
alliance which is both true to its prin-
ciples and flexible when it comes to ex-
ternal challenge and threats.

It would be hard to arrive in Ger-
many tonight without being aware of the
anniversary that today represents. And
it would be hard not to be reminded of
the terrible experience of war that our
generation has been through. Who
knows better than the German people
the ghastly toll of suffering and devasta-
tion that the wars of this century have
brought? And who knows better than
the German people what effort it took to
rebuild this country?

The American people are proud that
they contributed to that effort through
the Marshall plan, whose 35th anniver-
sary we marked last year. We share
your pride, and we take great satisfac-
tion in your strong democratic institu-
tions and in the remarkable economic
growth and prosperity that you have
achieved in the postwar period.

With Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The relationship between the Unit©
States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is essential if we are to maintain
peace and security as we have for nearlyi
four decades. Our discussions focused on
East-West relations and the negotiations
now taking place in Geneva regarding
intermediate-range nuclear weapons. I
also told Chancellor Kohl of President
Reagan's willingness to explore serious
Soviet proposals. The President is per-
sonally committed to negotiating nuclear
arms reductions. He is also insistent on
equality and verif lability — a position
shared by our friends here.

During our discussions, we also
agreed to stick to the two-track decision
adopted by NATO in 1979. There is no
doubt between us that our strength lies
in unity. And our strength, common pur
pose, and mutual cooperation has been
the greatest deterrent to war and has
preserved the peace in Europe for the
longest period of time in nearly a cen-
tury.

This afternoon we will leave Bonn
and travel to Berlin. I just want to take
this time to thank the leaders of this
great country and the people of this
wonderful city for all their kindness and
hospitality.

For nearly four decades, we and our
NATO allies have kept the peace in
Europe. We have done it by maintaining
our strength and our will to defend our-
selves; by linking U.S. and Europe's
security; by being open to dialogue that
aims to reduce tensions with the East;
and by being committed to genuine arms
reduction. That has been our policy, and
that remains our policy today. That is
why I am confident that my discussions
with our allies will affirm our unity on a
policy that has given us the longest
period of uninterrupted peace in Europe
for more than a century.

In that spirit, let me say to our Ger-
man hosts, and to all the German peo-
ple: ours is a mission to maintain the
peace, and we are pleased that our
journey has brought us here.

Remarks After
Meeting With
Chancellor Kohl.
January 31, 1983

I'm delighted to be here in Bonn. As I
said at the beginning of my journey, the
purpose of my trip was to meet and con-
sult with our allies and friends in
Europe regarding the major issues of
the day and particularly our joint efforts
to reduce the level of nuclear weapons,
not only in Europe, but throughout the
world. Our meeting this morning was
warm, friendly, candid — the way
meetings are between friends.

The relationship between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is based on shared values — our
belief in democratic institutions, faith in
human rights. This year marks the
German-American tricentennial. And, I
am glad to say I have accepted
Chancellor Kohl's kind invitation to
come to Krefeld June 25 as another
symbol of our on-going relations.

Berlin

Remarks at Dinner
Hosted by
Governing Mayor,
January 31, 1983

I passed through Germany some month
ago on my way to a funeral in Moscow,
but this is my first time in Berlin. That
fact alone surprises me, because Berlin
has long been in my consciousness, as it
has been in the consciousness of all
Americans. Twenty years ago, in a
square now called John F. Kennedy
Platz, an American president gave a
speech which is still well remembered.
In his speech he said of those who do
not understand the great issues between
the free world and the Communist
world: "Lass' sie nach Berlin komnnen.'
["Let them come to Berlin."]

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

I am glad that this speech should
nme in the first day of my European
'ip. No other city in Europe could offer
more compelling setting for this dis-
ussion tonight. For Berlin is unique, an
;land of democracy in a threatening
ea. It has survived violent storms,
'hroughout, the character and unbreak-
ble courage of its citizens have inspired
jvers of freedom all over the world.

For nearly four decades now, the
.eople of the Federal Republic of Ger-
iiany and its allies have worked
ogether, with diligence and with pas-
ion, to see that Berlin survived as a
ree city. I spoke a moment ago of the
American consciousness of Berlin. Those
if us who were alive in 1948 and 1949
ecall vividly the struggle for Berlin,
"he memories of Berliners who lived
hrough that period still evoke feelings
hat bind us to each other.

I am thinking of the Berlin worker
vho said, "Early in the morning, when
ve woke up, the first thing we did was

0 listen to see whether the noise of air-
:raft engines could be heard. That gave
IS the certainty that we were not alone,
;hat the whole civilized world took part
n the fight for Berlin's freedom."

I am thinking, too, of another
sanguine Berliner who reflected after it
was all over: "God knows, even the best
alockade is no bargain. But if there must
oe a blockade, then it's better to be
blockaded by the Soviets and fed by the
Americans. Just imagine if it were the
other way around!"

The German and American peoples
have a long and spirited relationship.
Nearly 20% of the American people
trace their origins to this country. This
year will mark the 300th anniversary of
the first German immigrants to
America. I don't expect you to be im-
pressed by that. Three hundred years is
not such a long time to inhabitants of a
city that is almost 750 years old; but for
us it is a very long time indeed.

Tomorrow morning I shall visit the
Berlin Wall, a monument to a great evil.

1 will only be visiting it; but you must
live with it and with all that it does to
the German people. That monstrous wall
helps us all to reflect on what we have
achieved and on how we achieved it. The
alliance on the other side of the wall is
based on domination; ours is based on
cooperation. And it is in that spirit that

1 have come to Europe. I have come in

the pursuit of peace. During the next 10
days I will be meeting with many Euro-
pean leaders. And if my visit to Europe
encourages public debate, I welcome it.
NATO is strong enough to sustain the
most spirited public debate. We do not
shrink from dialogue, because for the
Western democracies, diversity has
always been our source of strength.

And so I have come to Germany
with neither a lecture, nor threats. You
have been subjected to both of these in
recent weeks from those who have ac-
cepted your hospitality; and, as you say,
"Genug ist genug." ["Enough is enough."]
When he arrived in Berlin 20 years ago,
President Kennedy said, ". . . those who
live nearest the adversary, those who
keep the watch at the gate, are always
prouder, more courageous, more alive,
than those who live far to the rear." He
who presumes to instruct Berliners pre-
sumes a great deal indeed.

Those of us who live in the rear— if
any territory in this nuclear age can tru-
ly be called the rear— can learn by
standing in the shadow of the wall.
Equally compelUng is the principle upon
which "our alliance is based. It is there,
for friend and foe to see, in the North
Atlantic Treaty, Article 5— an attack on
one of them shall be considered an at-
tack on all.

NATO's Strategy and Current Myths

NATO's strategy has no more important
goal than that of making this principle
credible. If our linkage to each other is
credible, we can insure deterrence. We
can insure our freedom. And we can in-
sure peace.

But the Soviet Union's unprece-
dented arms buildup of the last 15 years
has threatened to undermine the
credibility of NATO's deterrent. And the
Soviets have attempted to break the
linkage between European and U.S.
security so essential to Article 5. The
Soviet buildup has been relentless and
thorough, conventional and nuclear.
There is no disagreement on that score.
And one of its most dangerous new ele-
ments has been its monopoly on inter-
mediate-range nuclear missiles which
can strike Europe. I am speaking of
weapons which could reach this room in
a few minutes.

If the Soviet Union eventually suc-
ceeded in breaking that linkage— if it
could separate the United States and
our armed forces from the defense of
our allies in Europe— our deterrence
would be undermined, and with it the
peace we have all maintained for nearly
four decades. And that is precisely why
in December of 1979, the nations of
NATO— all the nations of NATO— made
a two-part decision: first, to deploy in
Europe NATO weapons capable of

President Reagan's Letter
To The People of Europe

January 28, 1983

American and Soviet officials have just
resumed negotiations aimed at reaching an
agreement to control intermediate-range
nuclear weapons. We have proposed and will
continue to urge the Soviets to agree to ban
altogether both their intermediate-range
land-based nuclear missile weapons and those
we intend to deploy in response to their
build-up. The Soviet insistence on maintain-
ing a nuclear threat to America's Allies while
denying them the corresponding means to
deter that threat remains the principal
obstacle.

A way must be found to overcome this
obstacle. Just as our Allies can count on the
United States to defend Europe at all cost,
you can count on us to spare no effort to

reach a fair and meaningful agreement that
will reduce the Soviet nuclear threat.

In this spirit, I have asked Vice President
Bush, in the city where East meets West, to
propose to Soviet General Secretary An-
dropov that he and I meet wherever and
whenever he wants in order to sign an agree-
ment banning US and Soviet intermediate-
range land-based nuclear missile weapons
from the face of the Earth.

I make this offer out of a conviction that
such an agreement would serve the interests
of both sides and, most importantly, that the
people of Europe want nothing more. I urge
Mr. Andropov to accept it.

Ronald Reagan

March 1983

deterring an attack by Soviet SS-20s
and other intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF). The second part of the
decision was to enter into negotiations
with the Soviet Union in order to reduce
the level of these weapons on both sides.

(As a footnote to December of 1979,
it is worth remembering that was also
the month the Soviet Union sent tens of
thousands of its troops into Afghanistan,
where over 100,000 of them remain to-
day.)

NATO's decision was the result of
exhaustive consultation. As a conse-
quence, it was the right decision. It was
the right decision then; and it is the
right decision now.

It has also become a controversial
decision. It has become controversial in
part because of certain myths that have
gained currency. Under the light of
reasoning, these myths vanish, because
they are shadows without substance.

• The first myth is that the deploy-
ment of these intermediate nuclear
forces would change NATO's strategy.
Untrue. The exact opposite is the case:
The INF decision is, in fact, essential in
order to maintain the strategy that has
always been a bedrock of NATO — main-
taining linkage between the United
States and its allies that insures deter-
rence.

• The second myth is that this deci-
sion was somehow thrust on an unwill-
ing Europe by the United States. Any-
one who so much as reads newspapers
knows this is absurd. The NATO deci-
sion was a response to widespread con-
cern, especially in Europe, over the
alarming buildup of Soviet INF forces.

• Third, we are asked to believe
that the INF deployments would in-
crease the alliance's reliance on nuclear
weapons. But, in fact, we decided at the
same time to withdraw 1,000 nuclear
warheads from Europe. That withdrawal
has been completed. Thus, even after
deploying the INF forces, there would
still be fewer allied nuclear warheads in
Europe than there were in 1979.

• The fourth, and last, myth is that
these INF deployments would be a step
toward nuclear war-fighting and to war-
fighting confined to Europe alone. But
NATO's policy has always been one of
peace and deterrence, which depends on
balance, not imbalance. As to the notion
that the United States desires to confine
conflict to Europe alone, well, I find this

proposal bitterly ironic. I can do no bet-
ter than to quote from a European
publication, The Economist of London,
from a cover article entitled: "Can So
Many Young People Be Wrong About
the Bomb? Yes, They Can." The article
said: "Nothing more justifiably infuriates
the Americans than the allegation that
they want to put cruise missiles and Per-
shing II missiles into Europe in order to
have a purely European nuclear war.
These missiles were originally pro-
posed—by Europeans— for exactly the
opposite reason." The Economist is right.
Nothing infuriates the President and me
more than the suggestion we are prepar-
ing to fight a nuclear war, because we
are not preparing to fight a nuclear war.
We are preparing to deter war.

It is the very presence of American
forces that provides a guarantee of U.S.
involvement in any attack on Western
Europe. And that goes a long way
toward guaranteeing that the Soviets
will not be encouraged to launch an at-
tack. There are in Europe about 350,000
American military personnel, who, as
part of the NATO security forces, pro-
vide, in President Reagan's words, the
"li\ing" guarantee of our commitment to
the peace and security of Europe. Our
security is indi\'isible from Europe's
security. An attack on you is an attack
on us.

Peace Movements

From time to time I am asked what I
think of the antinuclear peace demon-
strators. I confess I am sometimes
tempted to say, "Which ones do you
mean? The ones here or the ones in the
Lubyanka?" Well, my answer is this: I
have great warmth for anyone who is
for peace. It so happens we, too, are for
peace. I also have the greatest warmth
for anyone who is against nuclear war.
It so happens we, too, are against
nuclear war.

The NATO countries have fought
and paid the price for the framework of
freedoms within which those antinuclear
groups march and demonstrate and
speak their minds. Is there any among
us who is not proud that these voices
can find their fullest ex-pression in our
countries? Is there any among us who
would not welcome, or even thrill to, the
sight of antinuclear demonstrations in

Red Square? Is there any West German
who was not saddened to witness the
swift and ruthless suppression of a
similar movement on the other side of
the wall? Franz Kafka, were he alive,
might have been grimly amused by the
fact that the Eastern regime even out-
lawed the very symbol of their move-
ment: a Soviet statue of a man beating i
sword into a ploughshare.

There have been other movements i
the Warsaw Pact countries. And we re-
member them well. We remember East
Germany in 1953. We remember
Hungary in 1956. We remember Czecho.
Slovakia in 1968. And today our
thoughts are of Poland. Outside of
Europe, the world has seen over 100
armed conflicts and wars since NATO
came into being. Joseph Luns, our
alliance's Secretary General, said,
memorably: "NATO is the real peace
movement."

The Need for Credible
Arms Negotiations

We are always— and especially now-
looking for new ways to preserve what
we have won over the last four decades.
That is why both elem.ents of NATO's
decision on INF are inseparable and
mutually reinforcing. By that I mean
just this: If we are to be credible in our
arms negotiations, the alliance must be
united in its determination to deploy the
INF systems if necessary. Why? Be-
cause otherwise the Soviet Union will
simply have no incentive at all to
negotiate seriously. None whatsoever.

When he came into office. President
Reagan reviewed the INF decision and
endorsed it. Then, in November 1981, b
announced a proposal. The United
States, he said, would seek the complete
elimination of these most destabilizing
and threatening weapons — the land-
based intermediate nuclear missiles.

The Soviet Union, in the meantime,
responded with a thundering "nyet,"
followed by a tremendous public offen-
sive designed to drive a wedge between
the United States and its European
allies. As part of that offensive, Mr.
Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the
Soviet Union, traveled to Germany
recently. He spent a good deal of his
time declaring that the United States is.
as usual, trying to plunge the world intc
nuclear holocaust. I followed Mr.

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

romyko's statements very closely, and
was left wondering whether he re-
inded Germans of the German prov-
•b: "Wenn der Fuchs predigt, schau auf
nne Gaense." ["When the fox preaches,
ok to your geese."]

The Soviets have made proposals of
leir own. They said that the zero-option
-oposal was unacceptable. Then they
lid that even an interim-basing agree-
ent would be unacceptable. One con-
udes that what the Soviets do find ac-
iptable is its own monopoly of nuclear
eapons aimed at the heart of Europe,
aving said that, I think I can safely
redict that the Soviet Union will an-
Dunce tomorrow that it finds me unac-
;p table.

For his part, President Reagan has
lid that the United States will consider
ny and all reasonable Soviet offers at
le negotiating table in Geneva. That is
hat we are doing right now. Ambassa-
or Paul Nitze [head of the U.S. delega-
on to the INF negotiations in Geneva]
. meeting now with his Soviet counter-
art to negotiate a treaty that will main-
lin NATO's security and preserve the
eace.

The United States is a member of a
efensive alliance. And it takes pride in
aving tried, since 1945, to bring about
rms control through negotiations with
le Soviet Union. The very first pro-
osal for international control of atomic
ombs was proposed by President
'ruman at the United Nations. The
iaruch plan, as it was named, called for
he "creation of an international Atomic
jnergy Development Authority" to
/hich all aspects of the development and
ise of atomic energy would have been
ntrusted. The Baruch plan, which called
or on-site inspection of nuclear
acilities, was rejected by the Soviet
Jnion — at a time when the United
States was the only nation possessing
itomic weapons.

Then, in 1955, President Eisenhower
•ailed for an "open skies" policy. He pro-
)0sed that the United States and the
soviet Union immediately exchange
)lueprints of their military establish-
Tients and begin aerial reconnaissance in
)rder to prevent surprise attack and
jegin a comprehensive and effective in-
spection and disarmament system. This,
:oo, was rejected by the Soviet Union.
Other American Presidents made
some progress, however limited. Presi-
dent Kennedy put forward the atmo-
spheric test ban treaty; and President

At the Berlin Wall with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (right) and the Mayor of
Moedlareuth.

\1arch 1983

NLxon was able to negotiate the anti-
ballistic missile treaty and SALT I
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. But
these did not stop the proliferation of in-
creasingly sophisticated nuclear
weapons.

During the past 37 years, we have
been dealing with determined adver-
saries, who know their objective and
who have moved methodically to achieve
it. Their objective — not ours, but
theirs — is clear military force superiori-
ty over the United States and our Euro-
pean allies, intended to break the securi-
ty linkage that has made the NATO
alliance so effective.

Yet, in spite of this, the United
States has pursued a policy of unilateral
nuclear restraint for more than a
decade. As I mentioned earlier, in 1981
alone, the United States withdrew 1,000
nuclear warheads from Western Europe.
I know of no comparable, uncompen-
sated nuclear reduction by the Soviet
Union in the entire postwar period. As a
matter of fact, since the mid-1960s, the
United States has reduced its nuclear
arsenal worldwide by some 8,000 war-
heads.

During the last decade, the United
States did not deploy any new ICBMs
[intercontinental ballistic missiles], or
any new ballistic-missile submarines, or
any new bombers. But over the same
period of time, the Soviet Union de-
ployed an entire new generation of land-
based strategic missiles, including three
multiple-warhead, land-based systems,
as well as three new submarine systems
and a new bomber. In so many words,
the United States has maintained a self-
imposed, decade-long, de facto freeze
during the time the Soviet Union pur-
sued a vigorous military buildup.

On November 2, 1977, Chairman
Brezhnev said: "We do not want to
upset the approximate equilibrium at
present . . . between East and West
and central Europe, or between the
U.S.S.R. and the United States." At that
time the Soviet Union had about a dozen
SS-20S.

But it was that old fox Lenin who
said, "Facts are stubborn things." Since
Mr. Brezhnev made that statement,
Soviet SS-20s have been sprouting like
fields of asparagus, more than 300 in all.
These could not have been put there to
redress some supposed military im-
balance created by the West, because

NATO has no comparable weapons. In-
deed, the first comparable NATO
weapons will only be available for de-
ployment at the end of the year, more
than 6 years after the SS-20s first ap-
peared.

This is why it is very difficult to
believe that the Soviet Union's motives
are, as it says, purely defensive.
Berliners know better than most what it
takes to wrest an acceptable agreement
from the So\iet Union. NATO's deploy-
ments are in the headlines today, but a
decade ago the headlines were about the
negotiations over the very status of
Berlin itself. The So\iet Union had
mounted a public offensive to divide the
allies then, as they have today. But the
West, by negotiating in good faith, by
being creative and flexible, and by re-
maining true to the principles which
have brought us so far, was able to
secure an agreement which preserved
Berlin's vital interests.

The United States \news its presence
in Berlin as an absolutely sacred trust.
Our military forces stand ready to de-
fend the Western sectors from any
threat. We are totally dedicated to the
Quadripartite Agreement, and we will
continue to expect strict observance and
full implementation of all its provisions
in all sectors of Berlin, East and West.
We also support fully the ties between
Berlin and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, because they provide the vital
foundation for the economic prosperity
and for the democracy of the Western
sectors.

So one asks: Is it being intransigent
to follow the same path today in our
negotiations with the Soviet Union that
we followed a decade ago? Or prudent?

We know that many in Europe and
the United States are anxious for a
rapid agreement — for a breakthrough in
our arms negotiations in Geneva. Permit
me, if you will, a personal note. I work
very closely with President Reagan. And
you can take me at my word when I say
that no one is more anxious than he for
a just agreement. And no one is more
determined than he to achieve one.

Basic Objectives

Now permit me to ask this: Should we,
in our eagerness for a rapid agree-
ment—for any agreement, as it were—
lose sight of our basic objectives, bear-
ing in mind these are no less than

security and peace? Such a question
answers itself. No, we must not let our
eagerness for rapid negotiating progress
cause us to lose sight of or compromise
our basic objectives— objectives vital to
achieving an agreement which provides
for the security of Europe.

First, we must reduce the nuclear
threat to Europe to the lowest possible
level. We would fail miserably in our
responsibilities to ourselves and to our
children if we merely legitimized the
already awesome levels of nuclear fire-
power directed by the Soviets against
Europe. We would fail, too, if we ac-
cepted a somewhat lower but still
unimaginably destructive Soviet
monopoly. And that is why we proposed
the complete abolition of intermediate-
range nuclear missiles. Because that is
how to reduce the nuclear threat to the
lowest possible level.

Second, we must bring about a
balanced agreement. It cannot be
acceptable to the West to concede a per-
manent monopoly of nuclear missiles to
the Soviets without allowing NATO to
deploy comparable systems to deter the
threat they represent.

Third, a sound agreement must pre-
clude artful circumvention. It is not
enough merely to permit the Soviets to
withdraw mobile missiles behind some
artificial line, only so they can re-cross
the line on short notice. Nor is it enough
to give the Soviets credit for offering to
eliminate some obsolete and unreliable
missiles— military antiques, really. Let
us all agree that we need more effective
measures than that if we are to reduce
the nuclear threat to Europe.

Fourth, we need an agreement
which can be verified. Even with
sophisticated intelligence capabilities, it
is very difficult to keep track of mobile
missiles. The fact is, it is easier to detect
some missiles when there are supposed
to be none, than it is to detect, say 60
missiles when there are supposed to be
50. That is a crucial point. All the more
so when you cannot rely on your
negotiating partner to be fully forth-
coming in your attempts to verify the
size of his arsenal.

I have spoken tonight at some
length. The complexity of the issues be-
fore us is sometimes overwhelming. The
number of missiles, the number of
launchers, the number of warheads,
their throw-weight, proposal, counter-

Department of State Bulletii

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

proposal, counter-counter-proposal—
these facts and numbers have, I think,
ibscured a much more central and much
:Tiore compelling realization, because we
ire united by needs that supersede
ifnathematics.

I It is hard to avoid the details. But if
lumbers are to inform our consciousness
ind our reasoning, should we not con-
sider, above all, 38? We all know what
;hat represents: The amount of years we
lave lived in the peace and security that
ive together made possible by binding
Durselves to each other. Thirty-eight
/ears— the longest, uninterrupted peace
this continent has known this century.
Then our real mathematical reckoning
ind our most demanding task becomes:
How do we diminish the deadly
numbers, while seeing to it that those
four decades increase?

Departure Statement,
February 1, 1983

First of all, I want to thank my German
losts for their warmth and wonderful
nospitality during our visit to the
Federal Republic of Germany during the
past few days. To the people of this
^'eat country, we express our gratitude
for making us so welcome.

After 2 days in Germany and Berlin,
I am convinced that the U.S. -Germany
bipartnership is as strong as ever and
that our relationship is the bedrock of
the NATO alliance in our pursuit of
peace. We did not come here to lecture
but rather to listen and to consult, and
that's what we have done in a fashion
benefiting and befitting a relationship
such as ours.

In my discussions with government
and political leaders— Chancellor Kohl,
Foreign Minister Genscher, Mayor von
Weizsaecker, the SPD [Social Demo-
cratic Party] chancellor candidate Vogel,
and others — I heard strong support for
maintaining the fundamental cohesion of
the Western alliance. Opinion was
unanimous that such cohesion is essen-
tial if we are to engage in productive
dialogue with the East.

Our President is ready and willing to
engage in such dialogue, and I told
Chancellor Kohl and other leaders that
the United States is pursuing every op-
portunity for an equitable agreement on

intermediate-range nuclear forces. We
believe that the best agreement would
be one that would ban, as President
Reagan said in his open letter to the
people of Europe, this new generation of
nuclear forces, not only from Europe
but from the face of the Earth.

I stressed in my talks here that the
ability to obtain an equitable outcome
will depend on implementing the terms
of the 1979 NATO decision. The United
States and its Western Allies have
shown a common purpose and a deep
and sincere commitment to reducing ten-
sions, lowering the risks of war, and
seeking an agreement that will have
substantial reductions in nuclear
weapons. Chancellor Kohl, whom I just
left, assured me, after talking to almost
all of the nations involved, of solid sup-
port for this position.

I believe that the Soviet leadership
should seize this moment and take this
opportunity to join us, and join our
Western partners, and negotiate an
agreement that achieves the peaceful
aims that we seek. Ours is a moral posi-
tion, and we are unified in our pursuit of
this position.

Finally, in all of my discussions, we
went beyond the technicalities of INF
and arms control to focus on the basic
values, on the democratic institutions
that tie our countries together. All of
this was brought back to me, I gxiess, in
the clearest possible terms, with just
this one brief visit to the Berlin Wall-
very human terms— making me doubly
grateful for the values of freedom that
join this alliance. The U.S.-German part-
nership is one that is bound by common
experiences, common values, common
beliefs. In this 300th year of
U.S. -Germany ties, we are determined
to maintain the peace as we have for the
past 38 years— this is the longest period
of peace in Europe in nearly a century
—and we are dedicated to preserving
peace.

The Hague

Toast,

February 1, 19832

Your Majesty, Princess Margriet: it's a
great pleasure for my wife and me to be
here in the Netherlands and to enjoy
your splendid hospitality once again. I
say once again because the last time we
had dinner together you were our
hostess then as well. It was last year in
Washington, when you came to repre-
sent your people and your country at the
bicentennial celebration of Dutch-
American relations. It was a grand din-
ner. But tonight I have to say. Your
Majesty, that you have outdone yourself.

I also had the privilege during that
visit last year of presiding when Her
Majesty addressed a joint session of the
U.S. Congress. Such sessions, called to
hear a foreign head of state speak, are
very rare in our country. I think that
event showed the enormous importance
we attach to our long friendship with
the Netherlands.

The Netherlands was the first Euro-
pean country to recognize the tlag of our
young, upstart country back in 1776. It
would be hard to find two other coun-
tries anywhere on Earth that can boast
of two centuries of unbroken friendship.

Our friendship is strong because the
ideas it is based on are strong and as
imperishable alliance in 1983 as they
were in 1782. One of these ideas is free-
dom of speech. As Queen Beatrix
reminded us in her addness to the joint
session of Congi-ess last year, the free
discussion of different views is a sign of
the strength of our alliance. For if we
welcome a free and vigorous exchange
of ideas within our countries, we also
welcome such dialogue between our
countries.

This morning in Berlin, I stood
before the wall that separates our
alliance from the one that begins on the
other side, amid barbed wire and land
mines and guard dogs and watchtowers.
As I looked down on that desolate land-
scape, I thought of all we've fought to
preserve and protect, and of all those in
the East — the Sakharovs and the
Shcharanskiys — who pay such a dear
price for exercising the rights which we
take for granted. I hope the day will
never come when we take our alliance
for granted. We face serious challenges.

March 1983

Our adversaries continue unabated
their massive and unprecedented mili-
tary buildup. They persist, too, in their
strenuous efforts to isolate us from one
another. But they will find that we are
not so easily divided, because the past
four decades have shown us that the
peace of Europe is the fruit of our
alliance, not theirs. History is on our
side, not theirs. And they will find that
we in the United States will not simply
abandon our European allies to the
nuclear threat that has cast an ugly
specter over the security of free Europe.

At the same time, the United States
will persist in its efforts to reduce this
threat by negotiating patiently. The
President took one more step last night
in his offer to meet Chairman Andropov
anytime and anywhere to sign a treaty
banning an entire class of nuclear
weapons.

And so I should like to conclude my
toast by referring to a toast Her Majes-
ty made at the White House last year.
On that occasion she said there is in-
finitely more that binds us than
separates us. In that spirit, let me pro-
pose a toast: to Her Majesty the Queen,
to all that binds us, and to the next 200
years of friendship between the Nether-
lands and the United States.

News Conference,
February 2, 1983

First I would be remiss if I didn't ex-
press my thanks and those of our entire
party, for the warmth and hospitality
that Her Majesty, Queen Beatrix, and
you and members of your government
and people have shown us during this all
too brief visit.

I am also pleased to say that after
discussions with you and with Chancellor
Kohl of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, I have learned more than enough
to know that the Western alliance re-
mains strong and remains unified. This
alliance, which stands for, and safe-
guards, our freedom, safeguards demo-
cratic principles, safeguards human
rights, has been responsible for deter-
ring war and keeping the peace for
nearly four decades. This is the longest
peacetime period in Europe in this cen-
tury.

It is an achievement that we can be
proud of. While there have been a hun-
dred wars in other parts of the world,
there have been none in Europe. When I

began this trip, I said that my mission
was to meet with, and consult with, our
allies and to explain our views on the
issues which confront us.

This, we made clear at the outset, is
not a negotiating journey. However. I
will have the opportunity on this trip to
travel to Geneva to meet with the
American and Soviet representatives
who are engaged in serious negotiations
to reduce strategic and intermediate-
range nuclear weapons in Europe and,
indeed, in the world. The talks are of
the utmost importance to our people.

The President will do all that he can
to see that the negotiations succeed. The
United States and its allies are commit-
ted and determined to reduce both
nuclear tensions and the number of
nuclear weapons.

During the past 15 years, the
Western alliance has witnessed an enor-
mous Soviet military build-up. During
the same period of time, the United
States and Western allies have shown,
we believe, restraint in our defense
policies.

As a result of this moderation and a
self-imposed, de facto, nuclear freeze,
which includes the withdrawal of 1,000
nuclear weapons from Europe over the
last 3 years, the Soviet Union presents
an increasing threat, we feel, to
Europe's deterrence. Some say that we
are now attempting to gain superiority
over the Soviet Union; that simply is not
true.

What we are attempting to do is to
achieve a defense posture that maintains
a credible deterrence and in the process
preserves the peace that your people,
and our people, that all peoples crave.
President Reagan has offered proposals
to reduce the nuclear threat and banish
not only from. Europe, but from the face
of the Earth, if you will, a new class of
intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Just yesterday, Soviet General
Secretary Andropov turned down the
President's offer, but I think it is fair to
say and ask the question over and over
again; What is wrong with ridding the
world of an entire class, an entire
generation if you will, of nuclear
missiles?

If the Soviets have another plan that
would seriously address this question,
our President has said that we would
give it serious consideration. Our allies
feel exactly the same way, and so far we

have been offered a policy which allows
one side — in this instance the Soviets —
to keep a monopoly on intermediate-
range nuclear missiles but prevents the
West from deploying any of its own. In
short, one side — in this instance the
Soviets — are talking about an INF
missile monopoly.

The President has extended a peace-
ful proposal that would reduce tensions
not only in Europe but throughout the
world. And the allies have been together
and supportive of this zero option. We
are going to continue to press this posi-
tion, because it is steeped in morality,
and it is one that will maintain the
peace.

The Soviets are engaged in an arms
race, I like to feel that our President
and our allies are engaged in a peace
race.

Our two nations have been close
friends for more than 200 years. We
have stood shoulder-to-shoulder through
both good and bad times. We have
stayed close friends because of our
mutual values, our cultural and defense
and economic ties, and because we have
always dealt honestly and openly with
each other as equal partners. This is a
strong and wonderful relationship. It
means a great deal to the United States
of America. I am confident that we can
look forward to its continuation for the
next 200 years.

Let me thank you for the genuine
nature of these consultations. Too often
the word consult is used in some kind oi
a diplomatic context, but these have
been fruitful, real discussions where we
could speak from the heart, one to the
other. We are grateful.

Q. Mr. Reagan, in his offer to
meet with Andropov, did not move
away from the zero option. Are you
trying to convince the European
leaders that the zero option is a
realistic immediate goal or is it merel]
a bargaining position?

A. I don't think I have to convince
the European leaders that it is a
realistic goal. Indeed, the alliance is
together. We have also made statements
welcoming realistic proposals to obtain
that goal. That is open. The negotiations
have started in Geneva. They are very
serious. That is a point I want to make
here.

Ambassador Nitze is there with the
full confidence and support of the Presi-
dent. In a sense it is a reiteration of a

Department of State Bulletit

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

■ommitment to a moral position ridding
,he world and, indeed, Europe of an en-
ire generation of these intermediate
luclear weapons. That is a goal, and it
s a common goal. As I move around, I
;ense unity on this point. At the same
ime, we have made clear a readiness to
•eceive and talk seriously about pro-
posals in Geneva.

Q. Why was the invitation to a
mmmit under the terms of the Presi-
lent's letter made publicly rather than
jrivately? Is that not something that
las contributed to the impression that
four visit is essentially as a public
'elations measure?

A. I suppose you could say my
/isiting with you people here is public
-elations. I am proud of the U.S. posi-
:ion. I'm proud of the unity of the
illiance, and I think we ought to talk
ibout it. I think we ought to make it
jublic. I think we ought to emphasize
;he common things that join this
illiance. Sometimes we take them for
granted — freedom, free press, freedom
;o dissent. All of these things join the
illiance, and I don't think that can be
-eiterated enough.

Along with this public side of the
vdsit are consultations that will remain
orivate. I for one don't believe that you
:an talk frankly if the other side feels
Dne is going to go charging out and talk-
ing in the press about innermost feel-
ings— on economic matters or on missile
matters or whatever it is.

I think it is fair to say that the visit
is a mix of public presentation of a posi-
tion that we strongly believe in— and if
the President's message yesterday in
Germany was a reiteration of that, so
much the better.

Chancellor Kohl put it pretty well,
however, when he said it was holding
out a hand to Mr. Andropov and holding
out a hand of willingness to meet to do
something worthwhile, ridding Europe,
the world, of a generation of deadly
weapons. We must never let that slip in-
to the background. That is in the fore-
front. We have a sound moral position.

Q. In view of your proposal being
turned down, how far are you pre-
pared to modify it?

A. This is a matter that should be
discussed in negotiations at Geneva. As
I think I said in the beginning, I am not
here to negotiate publicly or privately. I
am here to reiterate the seriousness of

With Prime Minister Lubbers.

March 1983

the United States in consultation with
its allies to negotiate seriously. So it is
very hard for me to spell out a quanti-
tative answer to a very penetrating
question. I just cannot help you on that.

Q. The peace movement here in the
Netherlands said today that you re-
fused to see their delegation and claim
that is contrary to your pledge to
come to Europe to listen.

A. I haven't heard such an allega-
tion, but I tell you, if they took a look at
my schedule, I think they would be
bleeding for me. I think they would feel
sorry for me, because I tell you, I have
never had a more active schedule in my
life. I was complaining to the Prime
Minister I hadn't 3 minutes to wash my
hands, and I'm a cleanly sort of a guy.

There is nothing in terms of unwill-
ingness to meet with any private groups.
We had to turn down other groups; in
this instance, you tell me by the peace
groups. Please let me clarify. Don't read
in some unwillingness to talk, an unwill-
ingness to listen. I take no offense when
I see demonstrators. I can identify with
people's desire to eliminate this scourge
of nuclear concern. And that is what we
think. I think we have a lot to talk to
them about.

My problem is not what was sug-
gested but just simply time. I am
delighted the question was raised and I
had this opportunity to say this. I am
the guy in our Administration who
meets with a wide variety of people, and
I learn from that. I think I understand
their heartbeat and I think our message
to them should be a message of hope.

Q. Is a Soviet agreement to ban
all medium-range nuclear missiles ab-
solutely a condition for a summit
meeting between President Reagan
and Mr. Andropov? Or is it possible
that there might be a summit meeting
in which the two leaders might
discuss other possible options of solv-
ing the nuclear missile question?

A. It is hard to say. You will recall
that it was the President who invited
General Secretary Brezhnev to meet
with him at the United Nations in a get-
acquainted meeting. That did not work
out.

What we were doing, what the
President was saying in his offer to
meet, to sign an agreement, was trying
to focus, refocus the attention and hold
out his hand to Andropov on this subject

of enormous concern to Europe. But I
don't think that would rule in or out a
meeting with a different agenda.

Q. You said there is concern in
Europe. There is concern here among
ordinary people in the Netherlands.
What do you think of those people
who say: "We want to say no to new
NATO nuclear arms because those are
the onlv nuclear arms we can sav no
to"?

A. I would say don't despair. I wish
I had my chart to show you what has
happened in terms of the growth of this
new, deadly generation of weapons. The
U.S. and NATO line is zero, and I
believe there are something like 1,200
SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 warheads. I
would say to them, don't settle for the
status quo. Let's be not only more
idealistic, but let's be more determined
to reduce and eliminate this category of
weapons. Join us in this move for peace.
They shouldn't despair. The only argu-
ment that I have heard against a zero
option is that the Soviet Union doesn't
like it. The West has a moral position.
We have a strong position and these
people ought to be carrying a sign:
"Let's eliminate this generation of
weapons." Don't give up because
Andropov says "nyet." Convince him of
our attitude. And if there is a way to
get there, let's discuss it seriously in
Geneva. That is the message I bring.

Q. Will you be able to convince
the Soviets?

A. We'll sure try, in conjunction
with a solid alliance, because it is the
right position. Sometimes it isn't that
clear, I will readily concede. Sometimes
the position of the United States isn't
that clear, although I happen to be a
strong defender of my country, obvi-
ously.

But this is clear: We ought not to
move away from something that really
does have a moral underpinning. I don't
want to sound like Billy Graham stand-
ing here in this pulpit, but I feel very
strongly about it. If we do nothing else,
I want to get that message out. It is
very important.

Q. What was your message to
Prime Minister Lubbers about the
possible deployment of cruise
missiles?

A. You missed what I was saying.
What I said to Mr. Lubbers in private

will remain private. That is the advan-
tage of consultations. But I think it is
fair to say that I reiterated the impor-
tance of the alliance staying together. In
terms of the details of our conversation,
I really — I'm not doing this just here,
please understand. I did this in Ger-
many; I will be doing it in Belgium. Let
me say to the citizens of the Nether-
lands, he and his ministers laid it right
out there on the line for me. They made
me understand as fully as possible their
positions and how we achieve ends. I
just would ask that you permit me not
to divulge that private conversation.

Q. Could I draw your attention foi-
a moment to the one issue our govern-
ment has previously stated to disagree
on fundamentally with its biggest al-
ly? That is your policy in Central
America. Could you explain why the
continuous stream of refugees seems
to show that human rights are still be-
ing violated there? America has decid-
ed to take up arms deliveries to coun-
tries like Guatemala and El Salvador
again.

A. We didn't have time to dwell on
that; but yes, I would be glad to. You
know in El Salvador, imperfect though
it may be in terms of human rights,
there are certain relative judgments.
Eighty percent of the people went to th(
polls— not cajoled into going to the polls
but voting in free elections that were
deemed free by outside observers.

That is a far better case than, let's
say Vietnam today, where we were. I
remember demonstrations, maybe in thi;
same square here, about the U.S. role ir
Vietnam. I don't want to sound like I'm
lecturing about history, but I don't see
any sights out there about Vietnam to-
day. And what I am thinking is, there
are no elections. In those days, there
were 53 papers in Vietnam. Today there
is one central organ. Vietnam has taken
over Laos. They have taken over Kam-
puchea, and there are no human rights
at all.

So I guess what I am saying is, we
think we are embarked on a position in
El Salvador— not to suggest that it is
perfect, but, to say that support for an
elected government with pressure to
continue to improve in human rights is
better than permitting a country to be
taken over by e.xternally financed forces
with the possibility that you might end
up with a situation devoid of all human

Department of State Bulleti"

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

•ights. Not that it is perfect; improved,
md much more room for improvement,
)f course.

Q. There are all kinds of negotia-
tions. SALT negotiator Paul Warnke
aas stated that if you want to keep on
lolding to a zero option, you might as
ivell have instead of Paul Nitze, a disk
repeating zero option, zero option,
jero option to Geneva. How far do you
intend to do that?

A. Mr. Warnke is entitled to his
views, and that is one of the beautiful
things about the United States. Every
time you come some place to answer a
question, some guy comes up with what
some former official said. Mr. Warnke's
views were considered by the electorate
along with a composite of things at elec-
tion time, and they certainly aren't the
views of the United States.

But I will answer them this way.
When you have a sound moral position,
it never hurts to say it over and over
and over again. And let's hope that
somebody over in the Kremlin is listen-
ing. Let's hope there is a debate going
on over there, and they see a united
alliance saying: "Here we want to get
rid of an entire generation of inter-
mediate nuclear weapons."

I bet you Warnke would agree with
the end. Now if he is saying: "We cannot
do this because Andropov doesn't like
it," well, too bad. Let's keep trying.
Then, also, let's be serious about those
negotiations in Geneva and see if we
cannot find a way there, a serious pro-
posal, that will get us moving.

Q. Do you see any threat to
alliance cohesion from what is re-
ferred to in the European press now
as the Andropov peace initiatives? Do
you see this as a new phenomena?

A. I don't want to be cynical. I real-
ly don't. But I am thinking to myself:
Poland. I am thinking to myself:
Afghanistan. I am thinking to myself:
human rights, Jews, persecuted. I am
thinking to myself: this is the man of
peace? We are glad to hear it. I don't
want to come here in some militant cast,
but I am listening for some real action,
something where there is a real chance
for movement.

I suppose I could say, well, you
know, it is good we are talking peace.
But, there are so many ways to prove it.
There are so many ways to meet us part
of the way on the freedoms that join this

alliance together. I have to concede I am
somewhat less than convinced. But Nitze
is there today, the Soviet negotiators
are there today. Let us try to filter out
the propaganda and get serious in those
negotiations.

Q. Considering that this is an
alliance of democracy, is there any-
thing [inaudible] in the United States
that the Western European public will
swallow the Andropov initiative and
that this may cause a gradual sway or
lean in public opinion away from
NATO policy?

A. You could say there is a concern
everywhere that something will be
swallowed, but I have a fundamental
conviction that what the alliance is
based on is too clear. These values, the
freedom that joins this alliance, those
things are too fundamental for me to be
overly worried. Yet, I do understand the
heartbeat of these kids out here who are
worried about nuclear weapons and that
are worried about, afraid, scared of
them. I bet you my own kids feel that
way.

But how we get there, how we lower
these levels of tensions is something dif-
ferent. I don't worry about the under-
lying fiber of the alliance. I want to see
the alliance stay together. Our President
wants to. I believe I speak in this in-
stance for the Prime Minister; I am sure
that the Dutch want to, the Germans
want to, and the French. It is a prob-
lem, you might say, but it is not. Be-
cause if it gets down to the crunch, I
believe the alliance will be strong, be-
cause it is united by something much
more fundamental than those pressures
that perhaps would be inclined to divide
it.

Q. After your discussions in Ger-
many and here in Holland, did you on
any point change your opinion? And. if
yes, on what point?

A. I think I would say I have a
clearer understanding of the feelings of
the cross-currents that exist in the
public in the various countries, in Ger-
many and here as well. But in terms of
my changing my view or the leaders
with whom I met changing their views
in terms of the alliance staying together
and staying firm, I see no shift in that
at all.

I guess what I learn from these
kinds of consultations is to be more

understanding of the problems and the
pressures on the governments with
whom I am meeting. And I think that is
a good thing for the United States. That
is the finest sense of consultation, and I
will take back any specific ideas that I
get, that come out of this — and there
will be some — to discuss again. Not in
public, but with our President, to see
how we can best be a catalyst ourselves
to achieve the ultimate end that every-
body wants.

Q. How many cruise missiles did
you sell today to our government?

A. The allies' position remains the
same.

Q. Did you talk about reducing the
number of 48 missiles?

A. We talked about an elimination of
an entire generation of weapons. We
talked about a sound, moral position
that would free all of Europe, indeed all
of the world, of an entire generation of
weapons.

There are 1,200 SS-4, SS-5, SS-30
Soviet intermediate nuclear force
weapons stationed, aimed at Europe.
There are zero INF allied weapons. We
talked in great detail about the need to
rid the entire continent from that
generation of weapons.

Q. Is there a possibility that trade
unions can help in this way, in disarm-
ing?

A. I can only speak for the United
States. Our Administration had had dif-
ferences with labor on certain cate-
gories, certain subjects, but I'll tell you
something. In our country — and, again,
the Netherlands speaks for the Nether-
lands—the trade unionists. Lane
Kirkland and others, have been very
realistic and very strong in their support
for the kinds of initiatives that we have
talked about here today. Yes, negotia-
tion but strong in their recognition that
we must not accept at face value — in
this case, Soviet propaganda — and that
we have got to stay with a strong, sound
proposal. Try to get there as best we
can.

Q. Did the present situation in the
former Dutch colony of Suriname have
any place in your discussions? Did you
talk about that?

A. We did not have a chance to. I
think I mentioned it casually. I don't
believe we had the chance to go into it,
as we feel very strongly about it. You

March 1983

know, I must say, when we talk about
human rights here in the questions
asked, I understand about El Salvador
and Guatemala.

But I didn't hear a word about
Suriname. What has happened there, in
terms of the brutal elimination of people
without trial, without anything, the total
violation in the most fundamental sense
of a man's right to be alive, really
deserves the focus of people who share
our values. We just didn't have an op-
portunity to go into it in detail.

Q. You cannot exclude the
possibility that in Geneva there will
come out some agreement at a much
lower level of missiles on both sides.
For example, not 572, but 50 or 100.
Do you think that in that case the
missiles in the Western countries
must be based in the same countries
as are intended now when there are
572?

A. That would be a matter of
negotiation. Any details of negotiation,
any details of how you get to achieve an
objective that would result from negotia-
tions in Geneva, should be decided there,
and, of course, should be decided in the
NATO councils, not by a unilateral state-
ment from me.

Q. Don't you see it as a necessity
that they will be in the same countries
as intended?

A. I would simply say that these
matters must be determined, as other
NATO decisions have been by NATO
and by the negotiators, not by a travel-
ing Vice President.

Q. You are an experienced politi-
cian. Would you agree that Germany is
the Ivnch-pin to this agreement, and
possibly there can be no progress in
the Geneva disarmament talks until
after the March 6 elections?

A. I would agree that Germany is
very, very important. I take your point
on March 6, but I would not like to sug-
gest that there would be any reluctance
to seriously negotiate prior to March 6.
Holding back for one reason or another
just would not work that way in terms
of our negotiators and their stance.

Q. Do you have any comments on
Mr. Andropov's rejection of President
Reagan's plan? Can you tell us if there
will be any new initiatives in the light
of this rejection?

A. I think the real initiative for
peace will and should be at the
negotiating table in Geneva. We have
said we would receive any new proposals
that are serious. We, I think in conjunc-
tion with our allies although welcoming
any talk about peace, have seen short-
comings in the proposals that have been
made.

As you point out properly, Mr.
Andropov has rejected going to sign an
agreement: to do what we think is right,
to eliminate all of these weapons, banish
them from the face of the Earth. But
that should not be interpreted as
anything other than let's go to Geneva.
Let's talk seriously. Let's keep this
alliance together as it is.

I say us, I mean it is a matter of
partners, suggesting something to
others, equal, in mutual respect and
hope that we can be successful in the
negotiations at Geneva. That is our
message and really that is the heartbeat
of this President.

One of the things that I am not sure
people understand is that there is a con-
viction on our part that negotiations
should take place and should be suc-
cessful. If I do nothing else, it gets this
question of the public part of this visit
as well as the consultations. If I do
nothing else, I would like to convince the
people of Europe of the President's
sincerity. I realize I have to do some
convincing. I happen to know that I am
telling the truth. My office is right next
to the President.

I see him alone, I talk to him all the
time. I know how strongly he feels about
this, and I want to get that message
across to people — that we are very, very
serious — in consultation with our allies,
in concert with our allies, an elimination,
if you will, of this generation of
weapons. I want to end where I began:
it is a moral, sensible position, and we
have got to fight hard to make the other
side understand this.

Brussels

Arrival Statement,
February 2, 1983

Let me just say that I feel very welcome
here, the home of our alliance. I've
looked forward very eagerly to this visitl
especially to my talks with His Majesty,
the King; and with you Mr. Prime
Minister — having had such a nice visit
with you when you came to see our
President not so long ago — with Foreign
Minister Tindemans; with Secretary
General Luns, whom I've met on several*
occasions; and certainly also to my talks^
with President Thorn.

This is going to be a very busy and
for us a very exiciting visit. President
Reagan asked me to make this trip in
the best spirit of the NATO alliance. I
came to listen, to consult earnestly, and
to work closely with our friends. That
approach has stood us in good stead in
the past, because when we make deci-
sions we make them together. Unity has
always been and always will be the foun-
dation of NATO.

It was here 3 years ago that we and
our allies made a critical decision to
restore the balance that the Soviet
Union had upset by reserving unto itself
a dangerous monopoly of intermediate-
range, land-based nuclear weapons. We
made this decision together after ex-
haustive consultations, knowing that on-
ly a united and determined NATO would
bring the Soviet Union to the nuclear
bargaining table.

If our unity and our resolve per-
suaded the Soviets to negotiate in the
first place, to lessen our resolve now
would only convince Moscow that we are
not serious allies and that they need not
negotiate in good faith.

NATO's best leverage at the table in
Geneva is our absolute determination to
act as one in protecting ourselves from
this chilling Soviet nuclear threat.

We are trying to eliminate an entire
class, an entire generation of nuclear
weapons. It is a formidable goal, but we
must not give up on this moral goal.

Over the past four decades we've
proven what we can accomplish
together. I can think of no better way to
express it than by quoting NATO
Secretary General Luns, who said that
NATO is the real peace movement.

Department of State Bulletir

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

I'm grateful to be here. I look for-
ward to exchanging views with you and
others, and thank you very much for
this warm reception.

Statement,
February 3, 1983

One sign of the richness of American
relations with Belgium is that we do
have these three Ambassadors here and
our links are based on our common
values, and they include strong economic
and security dimensions.

On both those fronts we had extra-
ordinarily productive meetings today at
NATO and with the European Com-
munity (EC), and, indeed, bilaterally
with the Government of Belgium. The
United States and Belgium, interna-
tional organizations like NATO and the
EC, do face today very severe chal-
lenges. The worldwide recession has af-
flicted all of us, and the relentless Soviet
buildup of military power forces us —
compels us — to look to our common
defense.

But in all my meetings there has
been a spirit of confidence. It has
prevailed. That confidence is based on a
sense of unity and common purpose. The
United States and Belgium, the Euro-
pean Community and NATO are all
working toward the same goal of a
secure and prosperous peace.

We all know that we have the
material and human resources to over-
come our problems and that we will sup-
port each other in the process. That
came through loud and clear today — an
alliance together, people with common
purposes working together to solve dif-
ficult problems.

In NATO we are working together
to meet the Soviet challenge, to main-
tain our security, both through prudent
defense expenditures and also that other
track — diligent effort at arms negotia-
tions. That's our message.

The United States in its relations
with the European Community will work
to maintain the freest possible trade and
to reach compromise where we have dif-
ficulties. We have had difficulties, but
we can talk about it openly and, hopeful-
ly, try to resolve them in the appro-
priate forums.

With Prime Minister Martens.

As we showed last year in resolving
the steel and pipeline issues, we can
reach agreements which serve our joint
interests. Right now, Dr. Feldstein, who
is the chairman of the President's Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers, is visiting with
some of the top officials at the EC
discussing the common economic prob-
lems and the common economic goals.

I leave tomorrow for Geneva where
I'll be meeting with both the American
and the Soviet representatives in two
very important arms negotiations — the
START talks— strategic arms reduc-
tions talks— and the intermediate-range
nuclear force reduction talks — the INF.
I will emphasize in all my meetings the
President's determination to reduce to
the lowest possible level all nuclear
weapons and, in particular, to eliminate
the entire class of land-based nuclear
weapons and intermediate-range.

With the strong support of our
alliance, and with the willingness to talk
with the Soviet Union, we have an ex-
cellent chance of taking giant steps for
peace in these negotiations. We in this
alliance have a moral position, a strong,
sensible, sound position, eliminating an
entire generation of new weapons — INF
— from the face of the Earth. For too
long the Soviet Union has been challeng-
ing us to an arms race, and so I think,
in essence, what we are doing, we're
challenging them to a peace race.

This visit reinforces the unity of the
alliance, the importance of this alliance,
and I just can't tell you what it has
meant for me to have this opportunity.

March 1983

Geneva

Remarks to
U.N. Committee
on Disarmament,
February 4, 1983

No city has done more than Geneva to
advance man's oldest, yet seemingly
most elusive, dream — to live at peace
with his neighbors. This is the city of
Rousseau, who taught us that man is
born both free and good, a concept that
has had the most profound effect upon
my country and many others as well. It
was near here that Voltaire made his
home when his incisive, but often ir-
reverent, mind brought down upon him
the displeasure of his king. After the
calamity of the First World War, the
League of Nations was established and
housed in this very building, in the hope
that here in the free city of Geneva this
embodiment of man's best intentions
might prosper.

Today, the world's hopes for peace
are once again focused on this city. Two
vital bilateral negotiations are underway
here with a single aim: to make signifi-
cant reductions in the nuclear arsenals
of the United States and the Soviet
Union and thereby to strengthen inter-
national stability and to increase the
security of all states. And. in this com-
mittee, multilateral efforts are in train
to deal with other urgent arms control
issues: how to eliminate chemical
weapons from the world's arsenals; how
to effectively verify limitations on
nuclear testing; how to approach the
question of possible further arms control
measures affecting outer space.

My message to you is simple and
unequivocal: The United States will do
all that it can to create a foundation for
enduring world peace through arms con-
trol and through agreements that
enhance international security and
stability. This task is the President's
highest priority, and he has asked me to
tell you that we will pursue sound and
workable arms control initiatives with
the utmost determination. But we will
not hesitate, nor should we. to differ
with approaches which are not sound or
do not hold out the prospect of effective,
verifiable agreements.

What are the prospects for progress
here in Geneva? I would like to set forth
the views of the United States on the

status of our efforts— both bilateral and
multilateral — ^to advance the cause of
peace by reaching agreement on effec-
tive arms control measures.

President Reagan assumed office at
a time of increasing concern among the
American people over the behavior of
the Soviet Union and its allies. In its
foreign policy, as well as in the relent-
less buildup of its military forces, the
Soviet Union has appeared determined
to advance its own interests at the ex-
pense of everyone else's. This determina-
tion was reflected in the invasion of
Afghanistan, in the suppression of
human rights in Poland, in the use of
chemical and toxin weapons in South-
east Asia and Afghanistan in violation of
customary international law and existing
international conventions, and in the
steady accumulation of vast amounts of
modern weaponry far beyond any
reasonable requirements for defense.

Clearly, this behavior required a
revitalization of our own defenses, which
in many measures of military power had
been outstripped. The United States has
undertaken this effort not with a view
toward conquest or intimidation but
rather to maintain our ability to deter
aggression and thus to defend our vital
interests and those of our friends and
allies against threat or coercion. I know
that President Reagan would much
prefer to spend our resources on other
pursuits. But we will do — ^we must
do — ^what is necessary to defend our in-
terests and preserve the peace.

Principles Guiding

U.S. Arms Control Efforts

But providing the means of defense is
only one aspect of insuring one's securi-
ty. The Reagan Administration believes
that arms control measures can be a
vital part of our national security and
that equitable and effective verifiable
arms control agreements can increase
that security. One of the first actions
taken by President Reagan was to
launch the most thorough review of our
arms control policy ever undertaken by
any new Administration. A new ap-
proach to arms control was necessary to
deal with the changed situation in which
the United States found itself as a result
of Soviet actions over a decade. Arms
control had not become less important.
Indeed, effective arms control had, if

anything, become more important, since
the military balance, at all levels, had
become more unstable.

President Reagan announced the
general principles which guide our arms
control efforts in a statement on
November 18, 1981. They are worth re-
peating here.

First, the United States seeks to
reduce substantially the number and
destructive potential of nuclear
weapons, not just to freeze them at higl
levels as has been the case in previous
agreements.

Second, we seek agreements that
will lead to mutual reductions to equal
levels in both sides' forces. An unequal
agreement, like an unequal balance of
forces, can only encourage aggression.

Third, we seek agreements that wil
enhance the security of the United
States and its allies and that will reduce
the risk of war. Arms control is not an
end in itself but a vital means toward in
suring peace and international stability.

Fourth, we will carefully design the
provisions of arms control agreements
and insist on measures to insure that all
parties comply. In other words, we will
insist that agreements must be
verifiable. Otherwise. the parties cannot
have confidence that all are abiding by
the provisions of an agreement. This is
particularly important in the nuclear
area, where we have proposed deep cuts
in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals. It is
also vital to our efforts in this commit-
tee to ban chemical weapons and to
develop effective limitations on nuclear
testing.

Based on these objectives, my
government since then has advanced a
dynamic program of arms control initia-
tives: in our bilateral negotiations with
the Soviet Union, in the work of this
committee, and — together with our
allies — in the negotiations at Vienna on
mutual and balanced force reductions in
Europe. Let me now deal with those
which are of particular interest to the
members of this committee.

U.S. Proposals

The problem of achieving reductions in
the world's nuclear arsenals is our most
important challenge. The United States
has met this challenge by developing
what President Reagan has called the
most comprehensive program of nuclear

Department of State Bulletir

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

•ms control ever proposed by my coun-
y. These proposals are on the
?gotiating table here in Geneva — in the
termediate-range nuclear forces, or
^IF, negotiations and in the START
jks on reducing strategic nuclear
irces.

The point I want to stress here is
lat the U.S. proposals in the START
?gotiations entail deep and significant
its in U.S. and Soviet nuclear
•senals— a 50% cut in our strategic
illistic missiles. In the INF negotia-
Dns, we have proposed the elimination
' an entire class of weapons. The pro-
)sals do so in a way which is balanced
id which reduces the risk of war. This
, after all, what these negotiations are
1 about. Stability and security could be
•eatly enhanced if both sides thus
'duced their arsenals, and it is precise-
because of this that we are proposing
ich major reductions.

In the INF negotiations, there is
Dw on the table a far-reaching U.S.
"oposal which would, at a stroke, ban
1 entire class of U.S. and Soviet longer
mge INF missiles, the systems of
-eatest concern to both sides. The
aviet Union now has over 600 such
issiles with some 1,200 warheads,
hile the United States has none — zero,
nder our proposal, the Soviet Union
ould be required to eliminate all of its
round-launched missiles of this type,
hese missiles — of the type referred to
the West as SS-4, SS-5, and
S-20— are in place now. The United
tates would be required to forgo the
ployment of its roughly comparable
lissiles. As you know, they are sched-
led to be deployed in Europe beginning
lis year under the decision taken by the
ATO alliance.

The United States believes that any
ich agreement on nuclear forces must
e effective and balanced; it must gen-
inely reduce the nuclear threat to both
des; it must enhance stability; and it
mst lessen the risk of conflict. Our pro-
osal meets these criteria. Indeed, it
trikes to the very heart of the problem.

Thus far, the proposals advanced in
lese negotiations by the Soviet Union
ave been designed to leave it with
ignificant advantages, indeed, with a
lonopoly over the United States in
mger range INF missiles. Indeed, the
leas recently advanced by General
ecretary Andropov continue to have
his as their aim. We will, of course.

continue to give the most serious con-
sideration to any constructive Soviet
proposal. Ours is not a take-it-or-leave-it
proposition. However, we think the
Soviet Union must recognize our
legitimate security concerns in these
talks.

We think ours is a moral — a
moral— position. What is wrong with
eliminating from the face of the Earth
an entire class of new, deadly missiles?
The only argument I have heard as to
why we cannot eliminate this whole
generation of INF missiles is that the
Soviet Union opposes it; it simply says,
"We're against it." I simply don't believe,
in this awesome nuclear age, that that's
good enough. So our challenge to the

Soviet leadership is: Come up with a
plan to banish these INF missiles, and
let's consider openly and in frank
dialogue initiatives that will achieve that
moral goal.

As in the case of the negotiations on
intermediate-range missiles, we are em-
phasizing in the START negotiations
real and significant reductions in the
levels of strategic armaments on both
sides, down to equal ceilings. As Presi-
dent Reagan has pointed out, our pro-
posals in these negotiations would
eliminate some 4,700 warheads and
2,250 missiles from the combined
nuclear arsenals of the United States
and the Soviet Union.

We have been encouraged by the
fact that the Soviet Union is negotiating
seriously — we have said that publicly,
and I am very pleased to repeat it again
today — and has accepted the concept of
reduction, although we do not find the
proposal it has tabled sufficient. It fails
to focus on the more destabilizing
elements of strategic forces, ballistic
missiles, and particularly ICBMs, and it
does not go far enough in making the
kind of deep reductions in ballistic
missile forces that we believe to be
necessary. However, we believe that the
approaches provide a basis for negotia-
tion, and we intend to explore avenues
for achieving such reductions and to pur-
sue the negotiations seriously and con-
structively. Indeed, our President, upon
hearing of a proposal by Mr. Andropov,
recognized this seriousness of purpose.
And I think this was appropriate, and
people should understand that.

I will be meeting during my visit
here in Geneva with the U.S. and Soviet
delegations to both these critical
negotiations. My purpose in doing so is
to emphasize the great importance
which the United States— and President
Reagan personally — attaches to a suc-
cessful outcome in both of them. I will
pass on to our negotiators the
President's hope that they will press for-
ward with speed and energy and his
wishes that their efforts will meet with
success. I know that all of you deeply
share this hope.

I will also, as I have in other stops
on this trip of mine, make clear that I
am not a negotiator. The negotiators are
here in Geneva, seriously talking with
their Soviet counterparts now.

Banning Chemical Weapons

Let me now turn to the work directly
before this committee, to which we also
attach the highest importance. The com-
mittee is confronted with numerous im-
portant issues. None has a higher pri-
ority for the United States than the ef-
forts to ban forever an entire and dif-
ferent class of weapons from the world's
arsenals. As President Reagan has
stated, the goal of U.S. policy is to
eliminate the threat of chemical warfare
by achieving a complete and verifiable
ban on chemical weapons.

The nations of the world have
already prohibited the first use of
chemical and biological weapons in the

'larch 1983

Geneva protocol of 1925 and have out-
lawed the possession of biological and
toxin weapons in the 1972 biological and
toxin weapons convention. Like most
other nations at this table, the United
States is a party to these treaties; and,
like most others, we are in full com-
pliance with their provisions. Beyond the
provisions of these treaties, there is an
even broader moral prohibition against
the use of these weapons. President
Franklin Roosevelt perhaps expressed it
best when he said that their use "has
been outlawed by the general opinion of
civilized mankind."

All forms of warfare are terrible.
But these weapons are particularly to be
feared, because of the human suffering
they can inflict. This is why the civilized
world has condemned their use. Sadly,
mankind has, nonetheless, had repeated
demonstrations of the cruelty and horror
wrought by the use of these weapons.
And now, chemical and toxin weapons
are being used in Afghanistan and
Southeast Asia in violation of interna-
tional law and international arms control
agreements. These violations are made
all the worse by the fact that their vic-
tims have neither the means to deter the
attacks against them nor to defend or
protect themselves against these
weapons.

The United States presented con-
clusive evidence to the world community
of the facts surrounding the use of
chemical and toxin weapons. Others
have presented evidence as well. We did
not come to our conclusions seeking con-
frontation or rashly, but only after the
most exhaustive study. The implications
that flow from the use of these weapons
are so serious that many would prefer to
disbelieve or simply to ignore them. But
we have to face the facts.

The world's progress toward more
civilized relations among states has been
doggedly slow and beset at every turn
by fears, ambitions, and rivalries among
the nations. We cannot, therefore, allow
the progress which we have made to be
destroyed. To do so would be to begin a
relentless slide back to a new dark age
of mindless barbarism. This is what is at
stake, and this is what we must prevent.

So what must now be done? The
United States has already called upon
the Soviet Union and its allies to stop
immediately their illegal use of these
weapons. I repeat that call here today.
And I urge the Soviet Union and all

other members of the committee to join
the United States in negotiating a com-
plete and effective and verifiable ban on
the development, production, stockpil-
ing, and transfer of chemical weapons, a
ban that will insure that these horrors
can never occur again.

A complete, effective, and verifiable
ban on chemical weapons is long over-
due. My government, therefore, would
like to see the work of this committee
accelerated and negotiations undertaken
on a treaty to eliminate the threat posed
by chemical weapons.

A number of key issues, of course,
must be resolved if we are to be success-
ful in negotiating such a treaty. In the
coming days, the U.S. delegation will
present to this committee a new docu-
ment containing our detailed views on
the content of a convention we believe
could effectively — more specifically,
verifiably — eliminate the chemical
weapons threat. We undertake this ini-
tiative with the aim of further advancing
the work of the committee and to en-
courage contributions and cooperation
from others as well.

The key to an effective convention —
one that could eliminate the possibiUty
of chemical warfare forever — is the firm
assurance of compliance through effec-
tive verification. This principle is funda-
mental. Effective verification, as the
world's recent experience with the use
of chemical and toxin weapons shows, is
an absolute necessity for any future
agreement. This is why the United
States seeks a level of verification that
will protect civilization, ourselves, our
allies, and, indeed, humanity itself. For
today, the threat of chemical warfare
has increased. And until an effective
agreement can be achieved, the United
States, just as others, must continue to
insure that it can deter the use of
chemical weapons against its citizens
and friends. If we are to expect nations
ever to forgo the ability to deter
chemical warfare, those nations must
have confidence that others who accept
the prohibition cannot circumvent their
obligations and later threaten the peace
with chemical weapons. They must be
certain that they will not be attacked
with such weapons by any state which,
like they have, has foresworn chemical
warfare. In short, for us, the verification
and compliance provisions of a com-
prehensive chemical weapons treaty
must be truly effective.

We know that most of the members
of this committee, like we, are dedicate(
to accomplishing this important task. Ti
do so will require more than our dedica
tion; it will require gi'eater willingness
and flexibility on the part of the Soviet
Union and its allies to work seriously
and constructively on resolving the key
outstanding issues — especially pertain-
ing to the verification and compliance
side. And such issues must be resolved
we are to expect to make genuine pro-
gress. For although some may argue
that progress could be made by concen-
trating on the "easier" issues, or even 1:
drafting treaty texts on them, this
would be a fruitless exercise if the
verification issue cannot be resolved. "W
will not support such a diversion of ef-
fort here.

I urge all members of this committ
to begin negotiations in this session to
resolve the key issues that face us in
this area and to join with us in achievir
a complete and verifiable ban on chemi
cal weapons.

Eliminating the Threat
of Nuclear War

The committee is also faced with a
number of nuclear arms control issues.
The elimination of the threat of nucleai
war is clearly of paramount importanct
to all of us, and the United States fully
accepts its special responsibilities in thi
area. We are recognizing this responsi-
bility in the most effective way we
know — here in Geneva, in good faith,
across the negotiating table from the
Soviet Union.

At the same time, this committee
has its role to play in the area of nucle:
arms control. One of the major issues
before it is that of a comprehensive bai
on nuclear tests. Such a ban remains a
long-term goal of U.S. policy, and we
will continue to work toward its achieve
ment. The work already done in the
committee by the group of scientific ex
perts on developing a worldwide syster-
for monitoring of nuclear explosions hai
been valuable. Moreover, at the sugges
tion of the United States, this committ
formed a working group last year to
study issues of verification and compli-
ance surrounding a nuclear test ban.
Verification is one area, in particular, i
which the United States believes gi-eat(
progress must be made if we are to
make progress toward a ban on nuclea

Department of State Bullet

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

sts. Therefore, we would hope that the
mmittee will continue its work in this
ea this year.

My government believes that the
gotiations in this body on a convention
ban radiological weapons offer the
ospect of a modest but real, genuine
?p forward, a step that could eliminate
potentially very dangerous type of
iapon. We should take it as a cardinal
le of this committee that when there is
e prospect for real progress toward an
reement, we should pursue it to its
nclusion. While there are a number of
;ues yet to be resolved, we believe that
agreement is within the committee's
asp and that we should move ahead
th all due speed to conclude the
gotiations on this treaty.

I should also like to say a word
out further arms control measures af-
2ting outer space. The United States
s been the leader in the peaceful ex-
^ration and use of outer space. We in-
nd to continue this leadership. Some of
8se activities in outer space are im-
rtant to our national security and that
our allies. They help to monitor the
ace, to warn of the threat of war, to
5ure proper command and control of
r armed forces worldwide, to preserve
r deterrent capability, and to assist in
e verification of arms control agree-
jnts. The Limited Test Ban Treaty,
e 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the En-
■onmental Modification Convention,
d the Antiballistic Missile Treaty,
lich is one of the SALT I [Strategic
•ms Limitation Talks] agreements, all
ve important arms control provisions
fecting outer space. Some are now
king whether additional measures
ight be called for and, if so, what kind?
le United States does not have a sim-
e answer to this question, and we are
ntinuing to study this issue. Clearly,
e conditions do not exist which would
ake negotiations appropriate. We are,
iwever, prepared to exchange views
ith other members of this committee,
id believe the committee should ad-
•ess the matter in a more systematic
ay than it has in the past.

Dnclusion

inally, I would like to use this occasion
pay tribute to one among us here to-
ly whose tireless efforts over a life-
me of service were recently recognized
hen he was awarded the Nobel Peace

Prize. Ambassador Garcia Robles'
[Alfonso Garcia Robles, Mexican Am-
bassador to the Committee on Disarma-
ment (CD) and chairman of the CD ad
hoc Working Group on the Comprehen-
sive Program of Disarmament] ac-
complishments are far too numerous for
me to mention, but let me just say that I
assure you, sir, of the full cooperation of
the U.S. delegation in efforts to finish
work on a realistic comprehensive pro-
gram of disarmament.

There is, in closing, one thought
which I would like to leave with this
committee, a thought which underlies
our approach to arms control and to the
issues before this committee. And that is
that the achievement of effective arms
control agreements is difficult work. It
requires dedication, persistence, toler-
ance, a respect for the views of others,
and, above all, a faith that conflict can
be prevented and that solutions, no mat-
ter how difficult, can be found. The most
dangerous view for mankind, particular-
ly in this nuclear age, is that war is in-
evitable. I reject this view entirely,
because such a belief merely increases
the inclination to make it a self-fulfilling

prophecy. Let us rededicate ourselves in
this committee, and in every other
available forum, to the hard and serious
work which is absolutely essential to
prevent war.

Remarks After
Meeting With
U.S. and Soviet
INF and START
Delegations,
February 4, 1983

Let me just say briefly that we have had
very thorough discussions with both
General Rowny's counterparts and Am-
bassador Nitze's counterparts. I had an
opportunity to say to the Soviet delega-
tions that we are very serious about
arms reduction. I asked them to take
the message back to the leadership in
Moscow that we are, on INF, deadly
serious about reaching an agreement,
that we feel our fundamental position is
moral and sound — the idea of ridding
the world of a generation of deadly in-
termediate weapons is something that
our President feels very strongly about.

With the INF negotiators. Soviet side (left to right): Gen. Detinov, deputy head of the
delegation: Ambassador Yuli Kvitsinskiy, head of the delegation; Mr. Palashehenko, in-
terpreter; and Col. Lebedev. U.S. side (left to right): Adm. Daniel Murphy, Chief of Staff
to the Vice President; Dimitri Arensburger, interpreter; Vice President Bush; and (par-
tially hidden) Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation.

arch 1983

And they had an opportunity to explain
their position.

On the strategic arms reductions,
again we had an opportunity to em-
phasize the points that Ambassador
Rowny has made so clearly and with
which our President is obviously totally
in accord, namely the need to address
ourselves to the most destabilizing
systems. We discussed about confidence-
building measures, areas where certainly
we ought to be able to find agreement
with the Soviets — the world is crying
out for some agreement to lower the
levels of danger. And confidence-
building is something that we feel
strongly about. The Soviets replied that
they did, and so hopefully we can make
progress here.

But I think they came in a spirit of
open exchange. We are grateful for
that. We feel that the talks were frank.

and not just in the old diplomatic sense,
very frank. I think from our standpoint,
I think I speak for those who attended
the meeting, we feel it was extra-
ordinarily worthwhile. And if we make
no other point while I'm here in
Geneva — where many discussions are
held on disarmament, on peace, where
we had an opportunity this morning to
present our views to the committee on
disarmament — it is that the United
States is committed, firmly committed,
to arms reductions. It is a priority of our
President. And we think in all three
forums we have made proposals that
merit serious consideration. We come in
an open spirit of negotiation to the
tables of INF and START. We are ably
represented here, and on the Committee
on Disarmament in the same way. So I
think it's been a good day in terms of
projecting our interest in peace.

With the SALT negotiators. Soviet side (left to right): A. A. Obukhdv; Ambas.sador Viktor
Karpov. head of the delegation: and K.G. Osadchiyev. U.S. side (left to right: Adm. Daniel
Murphy, Chief of Staff to the Vice President: Cyril Muromcew, interpreter; Vice Presi-
dent Bush; and Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, head of the U.S. delegation.

Rome

statement at
U.S. Embassy,
February 7, 1983

I just wanted to thank our hosts for
making our visit one of great warmth
and genuine friendship. I have had the
pleasure to meet and hold very produc-
tive talks with President Pertini, Prime
Minister Fanfani, Foreign Minister
Colombo, and other leaders.

We had the great honor of being
received by His Holiness Pope John Pa
II — a man we all love and greatly ad-
mire. His great moral and religious cor
victions, his untiring efforts on behalf c
the poor throughout the world, and his
efforts to advance peace and human
rights serve as an inspiration to us all.

Let me first say that we in the
United States share Italy's commitmen
to combat terrorism. We applaud the j
great work Italy has had in confronting!
this evil. We remain deeply thankful fo
the memorable work of the Italian
Government in the liberation of Genera
Dozier who finally met, under more
pleasant circumstances, with the 14 me
who took part in the rescue operation
that freed him.

Italy is the fifth nation that I have
visited on this seven-country European
trip. Tomorrow we leave for Paris, an(
we leave on a note of optimism. The
alliance is alive, well, strong, and unite
While we are sovereign, independent m
tions, we hold vitally important commo
beliefs. We recognize that our strength
lies in our unity, and we know that our
future is tied to the protection of our
great freedoms and democratic institu-
tions.

Because of its strength and unity,
the NATO alliance has preserved the
peace in Europe for nearly 40 years—
the longest period of peace on this con'
nent for nearly 100 years.

We know that the price of peace
does not come cheap. It is, however, a
price we have all been willing to pay in
order to preserve our liberties, build ot
economies, and raise our living stand-
ards to the highest in the history of thi
world.

Today there is a new threat to the
Western democracies — a threat based
on an unprecedented 15-year Soviet
military buildup. This one-sided Soviet

Department of State Buile!

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

ildup seriously threatens the balance
:ween East and West. Peace in
irope is anchored by military balance,
t imbalance. The leaders of the Italian
vernment and of the other European
vernments I have met with in the last
■ek believe that we should hold fast to
jolicy that will insure the peace for
s and future generations.

More than 3 years ago, the NATO
iance determined, after exhaustive
nsultation, that the Soviet Union's
lentless and unprovoked buildup of
;ermediate-range nuclear missiles had
t Western Europe's security in severe
jpardy. Unanimously, we decided we
ist restore the balance that the Soviet
lion upset. That decision was a
urageous one, and it was the right
e.

President Reagan and the NATO
iders have asked the Soviet leadership
act boldly and responsibly by
nishing once and forever from the
:e of the Earth the land-based
;ermediate-range nuclear missiles it
s aimed at the heart of Europe, in
turn for the cancellation of the
ssiles NATO will begin to deploy this
ar. Simply stated, we are asking Mr.
idropov to take a giant step for peace.

The NATO position is a moral posi-
m. If the Soviet Union doesn't like
■esident Reagan's zero-zero proposal,
en why can't they put forward their
m proposal designed to achieve the
me goal? Our people are waiting for
■eds and actions; they are waiting for a
)viet proposal that will ban forever this
w class of nuclear weapons.

So far, all we've heard is a barrage

threats and "nyets." We have seen a
iblic offensive of words designed to
eaken the alliance, to decouple
estern nation from Western nation, to
eaken us, and to diminish our
!mocracies and our liberties. No one
ition can convince Mr. Andropov alone,
we succed, we will succeed as we have

the past— together, as an alliance,
aly is a vital part of that alliance. It is
great friend and equal partner and a
-ime guarantor of peace, freedom, and
stice in Europe and the entire Mediter-
inean area. We are deeply thankful for
le support of the people and of its
aders.

With Prime Minister Fanfani.

Finally, I will be meeting later this
afternoon with Ambassador Habib
[special representative of the President
to the Middle East] to discuss the situa-
tion in Lebanon— an area of concern for
both the Governments of Italy and the
United States.

Toast,
February 7,

19833

This is my first visit to Italy as Vice
President. I've been very busy since I
arrived in Europe 8 days ago, but
yesterday Barbara and I had a little
time off. We were so glad that occasion
should have come while we were here in
this magnificent city.

May I say, Mr. Prime Minister, how
much our visit here has meant to us? As
I said 2 days ago when I arrived, rela-
tions between the United States and Ita-
ly have never been better than they are
today. Our talk, as well as my talks with
President Pertini and other members of
Italy's leadership, have shown me per-
sonally how deep our commitment to
each other runs; how deeply our friend-
ship and our partnership are rooted. But
I was not surprised to discover this. It's
simply that it was for me a great
pleasure to experience it personally. For

that, you and all the other leaders I met
with have my thanks.

Our friendship and common under-
standing are all the more reassuring in
the face of the challenges we now face.
Certainly, we have found many in the
past. For nearly four decades, Italy, the
United States, and our other NATO
partners have worked hard for peace.
And we've been successful — very suc-
cessful. Together we've brought about
the longest uninterrupted period of
peace this continent has known this cen-
tury.

What decisions we have made, we
have made together. Three years ago,
we decided to protect ourselves against
the profoundly disturbing and utterly
unprovoked Soviet buildup of a new
class of nuclear weapons which are
aimed at the heart of Europe. We decid-
ed to put in place arms we fervently
hope we shall never have to use in order
to insure that the Soviet Union will not
use its arms against us. We also decided
at that time vigorously to pursue arms
reductions. Since then President Reagan
has proposed to banish once and for all
the entire class of these nuclear weapons
from the face of the Earth.

The Soviet Union has, unfortunately,
rejected that proposal. Three days ago
in (Geneva, I told members of the Soviet

rarch 1983

delegation to the arms talks that ours is
not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, that
President Reagan is deeply committed
to arms reductions and determined to
bring about progress at the negotiating
table. I also told them this: If you won't
accept our plan, then let's hear yours.
Up to now all we have heard from
Moscow is a steady succession of
"nyets." It is time we heard something
else, and all the world is waiting to hear
it.

Meanwhile, the support of Italy and
our NATO allies is crucial if we are to
succeed in reaching the agreements we
all want. With that support, great things
are possible. "Freedom," said Garibaldi,
"will not fail those who desire it."

Mr. Prime Minister, 1983 could be a
historical year for Italy, for the United
States, and for all of free Europe. This
could be the year free peoples of the
future will look back on and say, that
was the year the alliance stood together
to insure peace and security for our
generation. That was the year freedom
did not fail those who desired it — for us.

In that spirit, I lift my glass to you,
our generous host, to the friendship of
our people, and to the heritage we share
and will defend together.

Paris

Arrival Statement,
February 8, 1983

I'm very glad to be back in France. My
first visit here as Vice President was 2
years ago, in 1981, just following the
election of President Mitterrand. I'm
anxious to renew our friendship. I also
look forward tremendously to my
meetings with Prime Minister Mauroy,
Foreign Minister Cheysson, and other
members of France's leadership.

President Reagan asked me to ex-
tend personally his greetings to all the
French people. I take great pleasure in
doing that, as well as adding my own.

Our friendship goes back a long
way. In 1981 President Mitterrand came
to the United States to help celebrate an
important, 200-year-old victory we
shared. France and the United States
have won other victories together since
then. Today France, the United States,
our NATOallies, and the rest of the free
world face a great challenge by the
Soviet Union, which has aimed a
devastating and destabilizing part of its
arsenal at the heart of Western
Europe— at the soil on which we're
standing right now.

But I haven't come to sound the
alarm. President Mitterrand has made
France's position eloquently and force-
fully clear: to stand with its allies in our
determination to confront this threat to
the peace we have all worked so hard to
preserve.

At the same time. President Reagan
is absolutely committed to the arms
reduction process. At his request I was
in Geneva last Friday for talks with the
Soviet arms negotiators. At that session,
I reiterated the President's proposal that
the Soviet Union join with NATO in
banishing once and for all this new class
of intermediate-range nuclear weapons.
Once again, they refused. But I told
them, too. that our proposal is not a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition. I said if
you don't like our plan, let's hear yours.

Until we do hear from Moscow that
it will work with us, and not against us,
France, the United States, and our
NATO allies are resolved that we will

With Pope John Paul II.

not stand still while our security is
jeopardized. In the words of a for-
midable French statesman, "It all come
back to this— to win or to lose. To star
still is to begin to lose."

We've got a busy and exciting day
front of us, so let me just say, thank yi
very much, and aliens nous.

Statement,

February 8, 1983 M

F^irst, I want to thank our Ambassado
[Evan G. Galbraith] and his charming
wife for their hospitality. I want to
thank our French hosts for their
warmth and hospitality that they have
already shown to me and to all the rei
of us. It's a great pleasure to be back
here in Paris, to be with friends.

I came to France to consult with (
of the oldest and greatest allies that t
United States has regarding the majoi
issues now facing the Western alliance
was accorded a great deal of time and
personal meeting with President Mitte
rand. We are very grateful for that. I
had good meetings with Foreign
Minister Cheysson, other high govern-
ment officials, and these meetings— all
of them— strongly reinforce what I
found in the five previous nations that
have visited on this trip.

The Western alliance is dedicated t
and united in its efforts to preserve th
peace in Europe by maintaining the
balance of power between East and
West. We are also unified in our effort
to revitalize our economies, reduce
unempk)yment and inflation, and im-
prove the standard of living not only ii
our own countries but throughout the
world.

With me on this trip is Dr. Martin
Feldstein, chairman of the President's
Council of Economic Advisers. Mr.
Feldstein has been of enormous
assistance in conveying to our allies th
the United States expects to show real
economic growth in 1983, which we ho
will provide a backdrop for growth in
the Western European countries and,
deed, in the Third World.

The United States is determined t(
achieve an economic recovery with a k
rate of inflation, so that recovery on
both sides of the Atlantic can be sus-
tained. In addition, we can't emphasizt
enough that the Reagan Administratio
is committed to resist protectionist
measures. I know there are excep-

Department of State Bulle

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

, IS — we have exceptions; others have
; eptions. But our basic policy is to
ijist protectionism. Indeed, we believe
:t free trade is necessary, not only for
I own recovery but recovery through-

the world. We share the deep con-
In of President Mitterrand and other
iers of his government who are deep-
■oncerned by the Soviet threat — a
eat which has resulted from a
ssive 15-year military buildup,
mce, the United States, and the other
es solidly support the NATO decision
December 1979 to protect the
ance's security. While we would
'fer to protect our security interests
eliminating the Soviet Union's land-
;ed intermediate-range nuclear forces
1 cancelling the planned deployment
3ur own comparable systems, we will
ve forward with deployment at the
1 of 1983, in accordance with that
;ision, if necessary. The Soviets have
ered us a plan which locks in the
!sent imbalance — locks in, if you will,
nopoly. They've offered to reduce
•ir land-based intermediate-range
3lear forces, while allowing the United
ites and NATO to have none at all.

Our President has offered the safest
isible plan. It would banish this entire
ss of weapons from the face of the
rth. It's a good plan, a sensible plan,
noral plan, if you will. Sadly the
viets have continued to stonewall on
s peace proposal — a proposal de-
Tied not only to reduce the level of
clear forces in Europe but to reduce
isions between East and West as well.

During my six-nation visit, I have
istantly said that if the Soviets don't
e our plan, then they should come up
th a serious proposal of their own —
e which would bring about the same
aceful goal — elimination of an entire
neration of intermediate-range
lapons.

Our challenge to the Soviet leader-
ip to engage in a peace race has been
swered by rejection and by, regret-
)ly, some unprecedented public offen-
e comments and an offensive itself.

I have said consistently that ours is
t a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. But to
te the Western democracies have yet
see or hear any indication that the
viet Union is willing to budge an inch
)m its position of INF nuclear
)noj)oly. It is time for the new Soviet
iders to act bodly and enter a new age
nuclear arms reductions. And let's
irch together then for peace.

While we await a new signal from
the Soviets, France, the United States,
and other nations of the Western
alliance are going to stand together and
maintain our strength and maintain our
deterrence. Together we have kept the

peace in Europe for nearly 40 years. We
intend to maintain it for future genera-
tions of Europeans and Americans. I am
convinced after these visits that our
resolve will not be broken.

With President Mitterrand.

London

Arrival Statement,
February 9. 1983

It is good to be back in London, my sec-
ond visit as Vice President in the last
year and a half. Britain represents the
final stop in my seven-nation European
tour, but there is no more important one
than this.

I have come to this great nation
buoyed by the knowledge that the
Western alliance is strong and united
and is as determined as ever to protect
our freedoms, our countries, and our
people.

These are difficult times for most
nations of the world. Inflation and

unemployment cripple our economies
and thwart the growth of developing
countries. And today the West is
threatened by an uncalled for and un-
precedented nuclear buildup in the East.

Despite the difficulties of the times,
we have great responsibilities, and we
won't fail to shoulder them. Free men
and women look to our alliance to lead
them out of economic recession and to
provide the deterrence that has insured
the peace. NATO has made possible
nearly 40 years of peace in Europe;
more than 100 wars have raged outside
Europe during that time.

The leaders of the United States,
Great Britain, and other members of the
Western alliance see 1983 as a year of
hope and great opportunity. We see the
beginning of new economic growth —
economic growth sustained by lowering

arch 1983

inflation and shrinking unemployment.
This year can also be a year to
guarantee the peace for future genera-
tions. If we continue to stand shoulder-
to-shoulder, if we are unshaken in our
resolve, we can succeed in reducing both

With Foreign Secretary Pym.

nuclear tensions and nuclear weapons in
Europe.

These are the issues that I'll be
discussing today with Prime Minister
Thatcher, Foreign Secretary' Pym, and
other leaders of this great country.
While our visit will be far too short, as
old friends we'll get a lot accomplished.

Remarks to the
Royal Institute of
International
Affairs,
February 9, 1983

I've looked forward eagerly to the
chance of addressing this distinguished
forum in this magnificent setting. I
come to you a bit weary, having spent
the last 1 1 days in seven countries, but
very much invigorated in spirit.

Once again, I found that the rumors
of the death of our alliance have been
greatly exaggerated. President Reagan,
who asked me to give you his warmest
greetings, sent me to Europe to consult
with, and to listen to, the leadership on
this side of the Atlantic. I welcomed the
chance to bring with me the message
that what challenges we face, we face
together.

What I found in Western Europe
was a group of leaders, united on behalf

of the NATO alliance. And that was the
best possible news for all who desire
peace.

I have not been to Guildhall before,
but I am familiar with its history, with
its repeated trials by fire and blitz, and
with its indomitable spirit. I was also
told about the statesmen who would be
looking down on me as I spoke: Nelson,
Wellington, Pitt, Churchill. Most Ameri-
cans would, I think, be somewhat ner-
vous at the prospect of speaking in such
an imposing setting. Except, of course,
for Henry Kissinger.

But American envoys have often
struck the British as rather self-assured.
As President Reagan reminded the
Parliament when he spoke before it last
year, it was Mr. Churchill who said of
John Foster Dulles he was the only bull
who carried his own china closet with
him. But you were once our age and
have had your share of self-assured
figures. I believe it was one of your
early Henrys who angrily inquired of the
Duke of Dublin whether it was true he
had burned down the local cathedral.
"Yes," replied the Duke, "but only
because I thought the Archbishop was
inside."

My conversations on the continent
and here in Britain have focused on the
two central problems we face today: the
worldwide recession and the Soviet
Union's military buildup. I've suggested
to many I've met that we would do well
to recognize that these problems are, in
part, the consequence of our own suc-
cess.

The economic situation has been, in
large part, due to a retrenchment that
came after a long, sustained period of
economic growth and vitality which
raised living standards to historically un-
paralleled levels. The specific character-
istics of the recession vary from country
to country, of course, but the pattern is
the same: slow or negative growth; high
unemployment; declining productivity;
and budget deficits representing a high
percentage of the domestic product.

I was able to report that the United
States is entering a period of recovery
from the recession. We're anticipating
that this year will see sustained
growth— growth that will last, because
we are not going to allow inflation to be
rekindled.

I agreed very emphatically with
European leaders that in these trying
economic times we mustn't succumb to
protectionist temptations. These would
badly cripple the system of open, inter-
national trade which has been the bed-
rock of our phenomenal postwar eco-
nomic development. We've spent too
much time building bridges suddenly to
start throwing up walls. Our countries
will explore the protectionist issue in
depth at the Williamsburg summit this
May where the focus will be on world-
wide economic expansion. But to returr
to my trip for a moment. Let me, if I
may, share a few impressions with you.

I went, for the first time in my life,
to the Berlin Wall and peered over into
that desolate landscape of barbed wire,
guard dogs, and watchtowers that are
the symbols of that regime. After land-
ing in Nuremberg, I went to a small
town of 250 people on the inner-Germa
border called "Little Berlin" because of
the wall that runs through it. If any-
thing, that wall was an even greater
obscenity than its eponym to the north.

Those who live in the eastern part
this small, agricultural town are looked
down on by tall, concrete watchtowers.
saw the mines, barriers, machineguns-
all of them pointed not west, at NATO,
but east, at their own citizens, who are
denied the most fundamental of human
rights, the right of free movement. So
is that thinking back on the demonstra
tors over whose background noise I
spoke in the Netherlands, I reflect that
am enduringly grateful that these voic(
have found their fullest expression on
this side of the wall.

Recently, I became aware that one
East German antinuclear group was
swiftly suppressed and that even the
symbol of their movement was out-
lawed—a Soviet statue of a man beatin
a sword into a ploughshare. Orwell, thi
shoulds't be living at this hour.

There were anniversaries along thf
way. Our wheels first touched down or
European soil 50 years to the day aftei
Adolf Hitler rose to the chancellorship
of Germany. It was a compelling and ii
mediate reminder of the vulnerability c
weak institutions, and of how devastat
ing are the consequences of their col-
lapse.

On a pleasanter note, this year
marks the tricentennial of German im-

Department of State Bullet

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

ration to the United States. And in
Netherlands, I took part in the final
it of the bicentennial of Dutch-
erican relations. This evening is an
iversary here in Britain: the 50th an-
Tsary of the famous debate at the
3rd Union, when the proposition,
IS house will in no circumstances
t for King and country," carried,
ight at the Oxford Union the propo-
m will be: "This house would not
t for Queen and country." I'm told
general feeling this time around is
the proposition will not carry.

iet Military Buildup

sntioned a moment ago that the two
lenges we face— the worldwide
'ssion and the unprecedented Soviet
tary buildup— should be looked at in
context of success, not failure. What
Soviet Llnion has undertaken should
'iewed against the backdrop of a
5tern strategy of deterrence, both
i'entional and nuclear, that has kept
peace in Europe for 38 years, the
^est such period Europe has known

century.

For over a generation now, we have

d with nuclear weapons. We have

to face enormous challenges and
iplexities stemming from their de-
ictive power. This has not been an
i task for democratic societies, be-
se our people, quite properly, believe
; nuclear weapons should never be
d. Thus for a generation, successive
stern governments have firmly held
; our safety depends on a balance of
•es, not an imbalance. Our strategy',
"efore, has never been one of war-
iting. Our strategy has always been

of war-preventing. And it works.
Since NATO came into being, there
e been well over 100 armed conflicts
side of Western Europe. Determined
t we must never permit war to break

again, we are also determined to
e whatever steps we must to insure it
er does. President Reagan has said,
it we all know to be the case, that
;re are no winners in a nuclear
-—only losers."

That these steps are costly, no one
Dutes. As enlightened Western
nocracies, we would obviously rather
ote the resources to other purposes.

But as enlightened Western democra-
cies, we certainly must see to it that our
security is not hostage to the missiles of
a state whose major postwar foreign
policy achievements can be summed up
with unfortunate concision: East Ger-
many, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Czecho-
slovakia, 1968: Afghanistan, 1979:
Poland, 1981.

Farsighted, responsible leaders and
publics who recognize what is at stake
are supporting the allocation of re-
sources to the deterrent forces that will
prevent the names of more countries
from being added to that sad list.

A former British Air Marshall, Sir
John Slessor, made the argument well
when he said: "It is customary in the
democratic countries to deplore expendi-
tures on armaments as conflicting with
the requirements of the social services.
But there is a tendency to forget that
the most important social service a
government can provide for its people is
to keep them alive and free."

Consistent with our longstanding
consensus on deterrence, the NATO
alliance made a unanimous decision in
December 1979 to respond to the Soviet
military buildup. That buildup has been
thorough and relentless, conventional,
chemical, and nuclear. It has been a
buildup that far exceeds any legitimate
requirement for defense.

Most destabilizing of all aspects of
the buildup have been its deployment of
SS-20 missiles, most of which are aimed
at the heart of Western Europe.

This missile threatens to undermine
the linkage between the American deter-
rent and the defense of our allies here
and on the continent. A Soviet monopoly
of intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF) could thus lead that country to
believe — however mistakenly — that the
United States might not respond to
Soviet nuclear intimidation, or in the
event of an actual attack on its allies
and troops in Western Europe. At a
time of rough U.S. -Soviet parity at the
strategic level, the emergence of a
powerful SS-20 force has given the
Soviets the capability they have long
sought to intimidate Western Europe.

The myth has been put forward that
the American INF deployments would
be a step toward nuclear war-fighting,
and to war-fighting confined to Europe
alone. I can do no better than to quote
from the Economist's cover article en-

titled: "Can so Many Young People be
Wrong About the Bomb? Yes, They
Can." The editorial noted that, "Nothing
more justifiably infuriates the Americans
than the allegation that they want to put
cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles
into Europe in order to have a purely
European nuclear war. These missiles
were originally proposed — by Euro-
peans— for exactly the opposite reason."

The Economist is right. Nothing is
more infuriating than the suggestion we
are preparing to fight a nuclear war, be-
cause we are not preparing to fight a
nuclear war. We are preparing to deter
war.

The very presence of American
forces provides a guarantee of U.S. in-
volvement in any attack on Western
Europe. And that goes a long way
toward guaranteeing that the Soviets
will not be encouraged to launch an at-
tack. There are, in Europe, about
350,000 American military personnel
who, as part of the NATO security
forces, provide, in President Reagan's
words, "the living guarantee" of our
commitment to the peace and security of
Europe. Our security is indivisible from
Europe's. An attack on you is an attack
on us.

NATO's December 1979 decision
had, as we all know, two dimensions, or
tracks. NATO would deploy INF in
Europe, but, at the same time, would
try to bring the Soviet Union to the
negotiating table for the purpose of
making its deployment unnecessary.
This was a flexible decision. To be any
more flexible we'd have had to be in-
vertebrates.

For 3 years now, the alliance has
pursued both tracks. It has done so in
the face of Stakhanovite attempts by the
Soviet Union to overturn it; and despite
the attempts of well-meaning but mis-
taken Westerners who believe that one
track can be pursued without the other.

Andropov Proposal

For a year after we made the decision,
the Soviet Union refused even to come
to the negotiating table, insisting that
we first renounce our plans to deploy
our deterrent forces. When the Soviets
finally realized NATO was resolute, they
agreed to talk. But during the year that

rch 1983

followed, they tried, by what Mrs.
Thatcher calls "bogus counting" to prove
they did not even possess INF superiori-
ty. And now. General Secretary
Andropov has made public a negotiating
proposal which similarly attempts to
overturn the basis of the December 1979
decision.

The Andropov proposal is most in-
teresting. And most paradoxical, for the
following reasons. Ever since the 1979
decision, the Soviets have claimed that a
"balance" of intermediate-range forces
already existed between East and West.
Three years later, after deploying one
SS-20"a week, while NATO deployed
none, they still claim a balance exists.
Some balance.

The effect of Mr. Andropov's pro-
posal is clear: to leave the Soviet Union
with more missiles pointing at Europe
than there were at the end of 1981,
when the negotiations began. His pro-
posal, if accepted, would leave nearly
500 warheads aimed at Western Europe.
It would leave another .300 pointed at
American allies in Asia, Japan, and
South Korea, as well as at the People's
Republic of China. Their missiles are
mobile and easily transportable and
could be moved back west of the Urals
from which position they would once
again be poised to strike at Europe. In a
nutshell, the effect of the Andropov pro-
posal would be to achieve exactly the
Soviet intermediate-range nuclear
superiority which our 1979 decision was
taken in order to prevent.

Soviet proposals are based on the
concept— also implicit in so many of
their public statements— that their
security is more important than the
security of Western Europe. It shouldn't
surprise us that the Soviets take this
view of things. But what is surprising is
that they should expect Western Europe
to concur in it and to demand that the
United States negotiate an accord based
on it.

Now, Mr. Andropov has justified
this one-sided proposal on the grounds
that the Soviet Union must be compen-
sated for the existence of the British
and French strategic nuclear systems.
But as NATO recognized when it made
its 1979 decision, these British and
French systems cannot substitute for
American INF forces stationed in
Europe under NATO deterrent strategy.

British and French forces have no
place in a bilateral negotiation about
land-based, intermediate-range missiles
that were the cause for undertaking
these talks in the first place. In past
arms control negotiations, the Soviet
Union has demanded compensation for
British and French systems, and has ac-
cepted a rebuff from the United States.
As President Reagan said in his recent
State of the Union message, the United
States insists on equality of comparable
weapons as the basis for arms negotia-
tions.

Finally, the Soviets' selective inclu-
sion of British and French systems ig-
nores significant advantages they enjoy
in other categories of nuclear weapons
threatening Western Europe. As we
have said, the Soviets have a monopoly
on intermediate-range missiles. They try
to justify this by saying that there is an
overall "balance" of land-based inter-
mediate-range weapons if all systems,
including nuclear-capable aircraft, are
counted.

This is egregiously false. Any objec-
tive estimate of the overall balance— in-
cluding the ones prepared by the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies
here in London— shows a major Soviet
advantage. So, if the United States were
to accept the Andropov proposal, we
would be codifying an arrangement
whereby the Soviet Union would have a
permanent INF' advantage, even in-
cluding British and French forces.

For all these reasons, the Andropov
proposal is not a reasonable one, be-
cause it ignores the very rationale for
the 1979 NATO decision. U.S. inter-
mediate-range forces are designed to
maintain the vital link between NATO's
conventional forces and the U.S.

strategic deterrent. The purpose of the
Soviet proposals is not to reduce, or
even to limit, British or French forces, |
but to eliminate U.S. INF from Weste
Europe and thus decouple Europe froi
the protection of the U.S. nuclear um-
brella.

U.S. Proposal

What, then, is a reasonable offer in th
field of intermediate-range nuclear
weapons? What should be its objective
The objectives are simple to describe
and in character with all the arms red
tions proposals the United States has
made:

• Reductions to the lowest possib
levels;

• Equal levels of force for the
United States and the Soviet Union,
which means no "bogus counting"; anc

• Verifiability.

President Reagan made a propose
in November 1981, based on these fail
minded straightforward objectives. Ht
proposed that the Soviet Union join w
the United States and banish from the
entire world this new class of nuclear
weapons.

The President's offer was dramati
bold, and straightforward. The only
argimient I have heard against it is th
the Soviet Union doesn't like it and
won't accept it. That would account fc
the issue of threats and nyets we've
been hearing.

But the President's offer isn't a ta
it-or-leave-it proposition. He's ready t(
have Ambassador Nitze explore any
reasonable Soviet offer made at the
negotiating table in Geneva. I was in
Geneva myself a few days ago, and I
made that message clear to the Soviei
delegates personally. That was the
message I read to the people of
Europe— East and West— from Presi
dent Reagan when I spoke in Berlin.

Department of State Bullf

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

Everywhere I went in Europe I was
ked if I'm optimistic about the talks
e had. Yes, I am. One message I'll be
rrying home to the United States is
at despite the differences, what unites
is still far more enduring than what-
er divides us.

Paul Valery said that: "The trouble
th our times is that the future is not
lat it used to be." I admire the phras-
5, but I reject the premise. History
,s handed us a challenge and an oppor-
nity — a chance to rededicate ourselves
a strategy and values that are still
ry much alive. Failure? The possibili-
?s do not exist.

Success in this endeavor will have
nsequences extending even beyond de-
rrence. It will signal to all the world
at an alliance that rises to this
allenge will rise to all challenges to
e peace it holds so dear. It will fulfill
;r highest duties: to ourselves, to the
ture, and to the memory of those four
■ntlemen under whose rather demand-
g gazes I have happily found myself
day.

eparture Statement,
ebruary 10. 1983

has been a pleasure for me and the
embers of my party to have been so
armly welcomed during our stay in
ritain. I want to particularly tharfk
rime Minister Thatcher, Foreign
icretary Pym, and other leaders of this
wernment for their warmth, friend-
lip, and wonderful hospitality that they
ctended to us all. I also valued the
lance to exchange views with the
aders of the opposition parties.

We leave this morning for the
nited States after a nine-city, seven-
ation tour. While we are weary from
jr travels, we return home deeply en-
Juraged. During the past 11 days, I
ave been involved in serious consulta-
on with our Western allies. My belief
1 this alliance and all that it stands
)r — freedom, democratic institutions
nd values, a deep and burning desire to
eter aggression and preserve the peace
-remains as strong today as ever.

During my visit, one issue
ominated both my private talks and
ublic discussions — the nuclear threat
osed by the Soviet Union as a result of
tie deployment of a new class of mobile

With Prime Minister Thatcher.

land-based nuclear missiles. Today the
Soviets hold a monopoly of these
weapons over the NATO alliance. They
have more than 300 triple-warhead
SS-20 missiles while the United States
and the NATO allies have none.

Let me say that based on my con-
sultations with European leaders, there
should be no misunderstanding about
the resolve of the NATO alliance. We
are determined to begin deployment of
NATO's intermediate-range ground
forces at the end of 1983 if negotiations
are not successful. This is not a threat
but a joint reaffirmation of the commit-
ment to the NATO decision of December
1979.

This is a step that will be taken if
necessary, but not by preference. We
have said time and time again that we
do not want to deploy this new class of
weapons, but until the Soviets act
reasonably and responsibly and agree to
eliminate all INF missiles— ours and

theirs — we have no choice but to act
responsibly in order to correct this im-
balance and preserve the peace.

Mr. Andropov has been trying to
convince us that he is a man of peace. If
he is serious, he will match his words
with deeds. Join us in Geneva and
negotiate in earnest — if not our pro-
posal, then one of your own, designed to
achieve the goal that we all seek. Men
and women who seek peace are waiting
for a Soviet answer that finally says yes.

When I return to Washington, I will
be giving the President a full report on
what I have learned from the leaders of
Europe. I am fully confident that he will
continue to stand on principle and do
everything that is necessary to preserve
the peace that we have known for so
long in Europe for this and future
generations.

larch 1983

Washington, D.C.

Arrival Statement.
February 10, 1983

It is great to be back in the United
States after what has been an ex-
hausting but extremely gratifying
journey. I can report that the Western
alliance is strongly united. After con-
sultation and discussion with leaders of
seven of our European allies. I feel con-
fident that the spirit of democracy, the
will to resist aggression, and the desire
to preserve the peace is as vibrant today
as at any time in recent history.

I am convinced that the NATO allies
are determined to go forward with both
tracks of the December 1979 decision, to
negotiate seriously as we are doing right
now in Geneva, but to deploy ground-
based intermediate forces at the end of
this year if the Soviet Union continues
to insist on maintaining its nuclear
monopoly over Western Europe. In this
we are united and firm.

While we have said repeatedly that
we would prefer not to deploy our own
ground-based INF forces if the Soviets
dismantle their own. the United States
and Western Europe have seen nothing
from the other side but an on-going
buildup of Soviet military nuclear forces.
Our allies are committed to President
Reagan's zero-option proposal — one
which would banish from the face of the
Earth an entire class of nuclear
weapons.

To date we have heard nothing from
the Soviets that indicates a willingness
to eliminate these weapons and reduce
global tensions. Europe has been bom-
barded by threats and rhetoric — words
rather than deeds— in an effort to de-
couple us from our Western allies.

I repeatedly told the leaders and the
people of Europe that ours is not a take-
it-or-leave-it proposal. And I consistently
challenged the Soviets to come up with
their own plan that would achieve the
same objective as ours if they didn't like
the proposal offered by the United
States.

During my visit, I held close, con-
fidential discussions. I will be reporting
directly to President Reagan on these
discussions which covered matters of
mutual concern and agreement. His
quest for peace, for nuclear arms reduc-
tions, and bedrock commitment to de-
fending our democratic values are
strongly shared by our friends in
Europe.

News Briefing,
February 11, 1983^

Q. May I just ask you about the zero-
zero option? You say that you brought
back to the President the message
that our allies would like to see
perhaps an interim agreement on the
way to a total ban of those weapons.
Do I take it from the President's
statement today that he is not ruling
out the possibility of reaching some
interim agreement?

A. We had an opportunity to brief
him and, as I said in the press con-
ference yesterday in London, I don't
think he'd ruled anything in or out. He's
just had a chance to digest the views
that we gave him in confidence — re-
ceived in confidence— from the various
leaders. I just don't know what he's go-
ing to do yet. It's too early.

Q. —the statement he gave us and
I guess what I want to know is, it
would be a misinterpretation then to
say that he is insisting on nothing but
the zero-zero option?

A. You've heard him say that zero-
zero option is our position. You've also
heard him say that he would welcome a
serious proposal from the Soviet Union.
Nitze is over there to negotiate and
negotiate seriously, and we hope such a
proposal will be forthcoming.

Q. Do you have any indication
there will be? Have there been any
new sig^ns of serious negotiations?

A. I can't say from the 40 minutes I
spent with Mr. Kvitsinskiy [Y'uri

Kvitsinskiy, head of the Soviet delega-
tion to the INF negotiations] that I got
that direct feeling. But it's worth stay-
ing in there and trying. One thing I
think we dispelled, or hopefully help
dispel, on this trip was the feeling thati
we were not interested in serious
negotiation. And I made very clear we
were. We also happen to have a very
strong moral position banning an entir
generation of these intermediate-nude;
force weapons from the face of the
Earth. And I say that because the
Secretary reminds us that we are deal-
ing globally on some matters, and this
a noble objective. It's an objective that
for awhile the Europeans seemed to
have lost sight of— not our allies in-
cidentally, not the government leaders
because I found the alliance very much
together on this point.

Q. Given our position, even if
there is some flexibility in it, and
given the Soviet position, as we knov
it, is it really realistic to think of an;
arms control this year?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Why?

A. Because I think that we're ther
to seriously negotiate, and I would thii
that the Soviet Union would want to
help lower the level of terror. What pe
pie don't realize is the conviction that
our President has about arms reductio
He also is firmly committed to both
tracks — going forward on the agreed
dates with deplojment but staying the
seriously negotiating. And we think th
Soviets know they have a monopoly at
this moment. We think that there ougl
to be some incentive there for them to
negotiate because the status quo
monopoly for one side and nothing for
the other is unacceptable to the Euro-
peans and certainly unacceptable to th-
United States.

Department of State Bulle

FEATURE
Vice President
in Europe

Q. It's been said recently that this
ministration is losing the propa-
»da war in Europe to the Russians,
lat is your assessment? Are we
ing that propaganda war?

A. No.

Q. And why did you say some
ropeans seem to have lost sight of
• goal?

A. I think there was some feel-
— when zero-option first came out, it
itured the imagination of all govern-
nts and a lot of the peace movement,
an the Soviet Union, of all people,
ne forward with kind of a propaganda
npaign. I hope that our visit and
er things, other statements made by

President in terms of various sub-
ts, but his willingness to be serious
)ut arms reductions, are now back in

forefront. And, so, therefore, I think
,t there is a much better perception of

U.S. seriousness and willingness
er this trip. Maybe that's a little bit of
egotistical assessment, but I believe
,t the press coverage and the summa-
is that I've seen collected from
eign press coverage would bear that
,. That doesn't say we have no prob-
is; there are plenty of problems there.

Q. What would constitute a
•ious offer by Moscow?

A. I don't know but I think we'd
Dw it when we saw it. Remember
at Potter Stuart said about —

Q. Pornography?

A. — pornography, I believe it was?
?'ll know a serious offer when we see
And we've got a very able negotiator
!re. We know an unserious offer when
■ see that.

Q. Do you think they've been
serious so far?

A. Absolutely, and so does every
igle ally that I talked to. Not one felt
'ferently on that point.

Q. What about the possibility of an
interim agreement along the way
before you get to zero-zero?

A. What do you mean, do I —

Q. The allies — the question that
the allies said that they might take
some steps along the way from —

A. We've noted Margaret Thatcher's
statements, we've noted the statements
by Mr. Genscher and others, and
it's — I've brought back to be kept in con-
fidence the innermost feelings of each of
these leaders of the governments and, to
some degree, the opposition leaders with
whom I've met. And that will all be
sorted out now by the Secretary of
State and the President as we consider
the various recommendations, com-
ments, criticisms, suggestions made by
these leaders.

Q. What was the purpose of the
open letter that you delivered in Bonn
from President Reagan when, in fact,
the Soviets had already rejected the
so-called zero-zero?

A. When I got to Europe, and
before, I think we all agreed that there
was some misperception about the Presi-
dent's willingness to meet with the
General Secretary. And I reminded the
people in Europe that it was, indeed,
President Reagan who had suggested
that Brezhnev meet him informally at
the United Nations. I reminded
them— and they needed reminding, I
found out — that it was our President
who talked a couple of times, at least,
about a summit meeting, provided it was
well-prepared, the hopes of the world
not to be elevated only to be dashed by
failure to prepare properly. And this,
saying I will drop everything, go any-
where, anytime to sign an agreement,
puts in focus the morality and the cor-
rectness of the U.S. position on INF.

I realize that some felt that there
was nothing particularly new about it,
but Chancellor Kohn thought it was a
good idea because what he felt is it
showed our President— I believe Mr.
Vogel had something favorable to say
about it. We made it in Germany, so I
cite those two. Along the way, a lot of
people felt this demonstrated the Presi-
dent's willingness to reach out, albeit the
President did define the terms under
which he'd have that meeting.

But you can't look at it all alone.
You've got to look at the willingness
that has been demonstrated. And why
the people of Europe felt that the Presi-
dent was unwilling to meet under any
circumstances anyway, I don't know.
But I think that letter helped lay that to
rest and helped put in focus the position
that we strongly adhere to.

'Texts from the Vice President's Office of
the Press Secretary.

'Made at a dinner hosted by Her Majesty
Queen Beatrix.

'Made at a dinner hosted by Prime
Minister Fanfani.

^Held at the White House. ■

arch 1983

THE PRESIDENT

Progress in the Quest
for Peace and Deterrence

President Reagan's address before the
American Legion on February 22, 1983.^

It is always a special pleasure and honor
to address the national convention of the
Legion. Each meeting is more than a
joyous reunion of old comrades from
days gone by; it is a reminder of those
who cannot be here— those who gave
their last full measure of devotion so
that we and our children could enjoy the
blessings of freedom in peace.

This 23d annual meeting here in
Washington, my second speech to a na-
tional convention of the Legion, is a
suitable occasion for taking stock. Back
in August of 1980, when you gathered in
Boston, I asked for your help and the
help of millions of other Americans to
reverse a dangerous course America had
drifted on for too long. I said then that,
together, it was our duty to begin to
choose a new road— a road to peace built
upon a realistic understanding of our na-
tion's strength and continuing faith in
her values. America has chosen that new
road. And today I'd like to report on the
progress we have made in the past 2
years in our quest for peace and free-
dom in an uncertain world.

I know of no more appropriate
forum than this convention for such a
report. When Dwight Eisenhower ad-
dressed this body in 19.54, he said, "To
help keep America strong— to help keep
her secure— to help guide her on the
true path to peace, there is no group
better qualified than you of the
American Legion."

In recent days I have received re-
ports from four senior members of this
Administration who've returned from
assignments that took them to the far
corners of the globe. Vice President
Bush was warmly received in Europe,
where he helped clear up many miscon-
ceptions about American policy. Secre-
tary of State Shultz undertook an exten-
sive tour of the Far East. Our Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations, Jeane Kirk-
patrick, has returned from a mission to
South and Central America. And my Na-
tional Security Adviser, Bill Clark, re-
ported back from conferences in Europe
with our arms control negotiators, Paul
Nitze and Ed Rowny.

LEGACY OF THE PAST

The reports of all these capable officials
have given us a timely survey of the in-
ternational scene. It's an encouraging
one, marking substantial progress since
that day in August of 1 980 when I asked
for and received your help. The interna-
tional situation then was truly alarming
for all who cared about America and the
cause of peace and freedom. Our coun-
try was the target for countless political
and terrorist attacks all around the
globe. In the view of many of our
friends, we had become an uncertain
ally; in the view of potential adversaries,
we'd become a dubious deterrent to ag-
gression. Our position in the United Na-
tions had eroded to unacceptable levels,
and our strength as a world power ac-
cording to every index— moral, political,
military, economic— had deteriorated to
such an extent that the enemies of
democracy and international order felt
they could take advantage of this weak-
ness. The Soviets sent their Cuban
mercenaries to Angola and Ethiopia,
used chemical weapons against innocent
Laotians and Kampucheans, and invaded
Afghanistan— all with impunity. Perhaps
the most degrading symbol of this
dismal situation was the spectacle of Ira-
nian terrorists seizing American hos-
tages and humiliating them and our
country for more than a year.

How did all this happen? Well, the
answer is: America had simply ceased to
be a leader in the world. This was not
the exclusive fault of any one leader or
party, and it will take a truly bipartisan
effort to make things right again.

For too long, our foreign policy had
been a pattern of reaction to crisis, reac-
tion to the political agendas of others,
reaction to the offensive actions of those
hostile to freedom and democracy. We
were forever competing on territory
picked by our adversaries, with the
issues and timing all chosen by them.
And no one knows better than combat
veterans that once you're on the defen-
sive, you can't go forward. The only
movement left to you is retreat.

Some of our opinion molders had
ceased to believe that we were a force
for good in the world. They were
ashamed that America was wealthy in a
world with so much poverty. They rare-
ly, if ever, explained that America's
wealth came not from exploitation or
mere good luck but from the hard work
of the American people, from risk-takin
by American investors, from the
creativity of American inventors and er
trepreneurs, and a free system of incen
tives.

Too many of our leaders saw the
Soviets as a mirror image of themselve?
If we would simply disarm, the Soviets
would do likewise. They spent all their
time viewing the world the way they
wished it was, not the way it really is.
And that's no way to protect the peace.

Their approach ignored the central
focus of politics— the minds, hearts,
sympathies, fears, hopes, and aspira-
tions not of governments but of people.
The 20th century has witnessed— and
America has led the way in— the rising
participation of all the people in interna
tional politics. Yet, even in this age of
mass communications, too many of our
leaders ignored this critical dimension.

Too many of our policymakers had
lost touch with changing world realities
They failed to realize that to be an effei
five force for peace today, America mu;
successfully appeal to the sympathies o]
the world's people— the global electoral
We can't simply be anti-this and anti-
that. We can't simply react defensively
to the political proposals of others,
sometimes criticizing them, sometimes
accommodating them, without positive
alternative solutions to basic human
problems.

At bottom, they ignored our respon
sibility to work for constructive change,
not simply to try to preserve the status
quo.

Department of State Bullet

THE PRESIDENT

CONSENSUS FOR RENEWED
MERICAN LEADERSHIP

ortunately, the American people
■nsed this dangerous drift, and by 1980
national reawakening was under-
ay— a reawakening that resulted in a
3W sense of responsibility, a new sense
' confidence in America and the univer-
il principles and ideals on which our
ee system is based.

It's not an arrogant demand that
;hers adopt our ways. It's a realistic
?lief in the relative and proven success
' the American experiment. What we
!e in America today, in spite of the
any economic hardships we're facing,
a renewed faith in the rightness of
ir system. That system has never
.iled us. We have failed the system
;ery time we forgot the fundamental
•inciples upon which it was based.

For America to play its proper role
the world, we had to set our own
)use in order. Our first and highest
-iority was to restore a sound economic
ise here at home. We had to put an
id to the inflationary spiral which had
;en scourging this country for years,
•eating misery among those who have
I survive on fixed incomes, destroying
ng-term capital markets, and mort-
iging the future of our children and
'andchildren. Then we had to lay the
lundation for a recovery which would
i based on sustainable growth without
ileashing the inflationary monster
jain on ourselves and the world.

We've achieved our first economic
3al, and we're well embarked on the
'cond. Inflation, which was in double
gits in 1979 and 1980, was only 3.9%
1 1982 and in the last quarter was
3wn to an annualized rate of only 1.1%.

The other essential precondition of a
;rengthened and purposeful foreign
Dlicy was the rebuilding of our founda-
on of our military strength. "To be pre-
ired for war," George Washington
lid, "is . . . the most effectual means of
reserving peace." It's precisely because
e're committed to peace that we have a
loral obligation to insure America's
efense credibility.

Now, I realize that many well-
leaning people deplore the expenditure
f huge sums of money for military pur-
oses at a time of economic hardship.
Similar voices were heard in the 1930s,

when economic conditions were far
worse than anything we're experiencing
today. But the result of heeding those
voices then was a disastrous military im-
balance that tempted the forces of
tyranny and evil and plunged the world
into a ruinous war. Possibly some of you
remember drilling with wooden guns
and doing maneuvers with cardboard
tanks. We must never repeat that ex-
perience.

Now, for two decades, the Soviet
Union has been engaged in building up
the most powerful military forces in all
man's history. During this period, the
United States limited its own military
spending to the point that our invest-
ment in defense actually declined in real
terms while Soviet investment was near-
ly double our own during the decade of
the 1970s. Neither our limiting or
canceling of important weapon systems
nor the efforts of a decade's worth of
arms control agreements and negotia-
tions have stopped or even slowed the
Soviet leadership's pursuit of global mili-
tary superiority.

Well, 2 years ago, we began the
long, tough job of rebuilding America's
defenses after those years of systematic
underfunding and neglect. And today
we're on the verge of putting in place a
defense program adequate to our securi-
ty needs. If we show the resolve to sus-
tain the necessary levels of military
spending — and, with your support and
that of millions of other concerned citi-
zens, we can — we can restore balance
and deterrence, and we can better pro-
tect the peace.

AMERICA'S GOALS FOR THE 1980s

Now, let me address our foreign policy
strategy. Some people have said we
don't have one. One of the first things
this Administration did was what we be-
lieved the American people had demand-
ed of us— namely, to be realistic about
the nature of the world and our adver-
saries and to speak the unadulterated
truth about them. Making excuses for
bad behavior only encourages bullies and
invites aggression.

Pursuing a policy of honesty and
realism toward the Soviets doesn't mean
that productive relations between our
two nations are impossible. What is re-
quired for such relations is restraint and

reciprocity. Restraint must be demon-
strated not only by words but by deeds.
We respect international law and the
independence of other peoples. The
Soviets need only respond in kind.

Restoring Relations With Allies

Fortunately, America is far from alone
in its quest for peaceful, prosperous, and
humane international order. With us
stand our friends and allies, in particu-
lar, the democracies of Europe, of Latin
America, Asia, and the Pacific. With us
in spirit also are millions of people in
Poland and other Soviet-dominated
countries, as well as in the Soviet em-
pire itself. I received a snapshot the
other day that had been smuggled out of
Poland. And I was so proud. It was
smuggled out just for the purpose of
delivering it to me. It was a picture, a
little photograph snapshot of a tiny little
girl and a small boy holding a cardboard
sign on which were printed things in
Polish, and they sent the translation. It
said, "Our father is sitting in prison for
Solidarity." And the look of sorrow, of
pathos on the little girl's face was the
most touching thing you can imagine.

Maintenance of our allied partner-
ships is a key to our foreign policy. The
bedrock of European security remains
the NATO alliance. NATO is not just a
military alliance. It's a voluntary political
community of free men and women
based on shared principles and a com-
mon history. The ties that bind us to our
European allies are not the brittle ties of
expediency or the weighty shackles of
compulsion. They resemble what
Abraham Lincoln called the "mystic
chords of memory" uniting peoples who
share a common vision. So, let there be
no doubt on either side of the Atlantic:
The freedom and independence of
America's allies remain as dear to us as
our own.

The Soviets' fundamental foreign
policy is to break the link that binds us
to our NATO allies. Their growing
nuclear threat to Europe, especially
since the mid-1970s, has a political as
well as a military purpose — the deliber-
ate fostering of a sense of insecurity
among the peoples of Western Europe
and pressure for accommodation to the
Soviet power.

The ultimate Soviet goal in Europe

/larch 1983

THE PRESIDENT

is to force the nations to accommodate
themselves to Soviet interests on Soviet
terms. We should all know just what
those terms are. We need look no fur-
ther than the Berlin Wall and the Iron
Curtain. The truth is something that we
and our NATO allies must not hesitate
to use to counter the slurs and threats
made against us. Speaking the truth was
one of the primary missions accom-
plished by Vice President Bush in his re-
cent European trip. He cleared the air
of misinformation, indeed, of deliberate
falsehoods.

• He reaffirmed America's fun-
damental commitment to peace. We're
not in the business of imperialism, ag-
gression, or conquest. We threaten no
one. Soviet leaders know full well there
is no political constituency in the United
States or anywhere in the West for ag-
gressive military action against them.

• Vice President Bush reaffirmed
our commitment to serious, mutual, and
verifiable arms reductions. Our proposal
is a serious one. And it represents real
arms reductions not merely the ratifica-
tion of existing levels of weaponry on
both sides.

• The Vice President also conveyed
my willingness to meet anytime and any-
where with Mr. Andropov [Yuriy Andro-
pov, General Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union] to
sign an agreement that would eliminate
an entire class of weapons from the face
of the Earth. And that offer still stands.

• Finally, he conveyed our belief
that success in reducing significantly the
strategic arsenals of both sides depends
on continued allied unity and a deter-
mination to face and speak the truth
about the threat confronting us.

I have a deep, personal commitment
to achieving an arms reduction agree-
ment at the negotiations in Geneva on
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).
We and our allies are in full agreement
that the proposal that I have made for
the complete elimination of the entire
class of longer range, land-based INF
missiles remains the best and most
moral outcome. We're negotiating in
good faith in Geneva. And ours is not a
take-it-or-leave-it proposal. Our negotia-
tions in Geneva are premised upon
sound principles, supported by all the
allies after long and careful consultation.
These principles include:

• The only basis on which a fair
agreement can be reached is that of
equality of rights and limits between the
United States and the Soviet Union.

• As a corollary, British and French
strategic systems are, by definition, not
a part of these bilateral negotiations
and, therefore, not to be considered in
them.

• In addition, Soviet proposals —
which have the effect of shifting the
threat from Europe to Asia — cannot be
considered reasonable.

• And finally, as in all areas of arms
control, it will be essential that an INF
agreement be underwritten by effective
measures for verification.

Now, we view these negotiations as
offering the best hope of assuring peace
and stability through the reduction of
INF systems. Toward that end. Ambas-
sador Nitze has been instructed to ex-
plore in Geneva every proposed solution
consistent with the principles to which
the alliance subscribes.

Any discussion of alliances, friends,
and concerns of the United States must
give special attention to Asia. The
U.S. -Japanese relationship remains the
centerpiece of our Asian policy.
Together, the United States and Japan
can make an enormous contribution to
the economic dynamism and technologi-
cal progress needed for economic
growth and development throughout the
world. In Asia itself, we continue to
strengthen our partnership in support of
peace. Prime Minister Nakasone and I
affirmed our commitment to this part-
nership during his recent visit to Wash-
ington. Secretary Shultz's visit to Tokyo
underscored it.

Our relationship with the People's
Republic of China is another important
one, not only for stability and peace in
Asia but around the globe. During his
visit to Beijing, Secretary Shultz had
many hours of frank and useful discus-
sions with Chinese leaders. The most im-
portant thing to emerge from these
talks was that, despite our differences,
it is clear that both sides value this
relationship and are committed to im-
prove it.

As we rebuild our relationship with
China, we will not forget our other
friends in the area. We are committed to
maintaining our relationship with the
people of Taiwan, with whom we have
had a long and honorable association.
Our ties with the Republic of Korea re-
main strong, as troops of our two na-
tions jointly protect that divided land
against threatened aggression from the
north. Incidentally, I must say. Secre-
tary Shultz went up to the dividing line,
the demilitarized zone, and met with our

troops up there, some of whom were
just going out on patrol for the night in
that zone. And he came back with such
glowing stories of the morale and the
esprit de corps of our men there. And
I've heard the same from the European
theater. We need have no concern abou
the will and determination of our sons
around the world who are representing
[inaudible].

I wonder if I could take a second — !
didn't intend to do this, and I've told it
to some other people before. But it's a
letter I received from one of our ambas
sadors in Europe. He had been up in th
East German frontier visiting the Sec-
ond Armored Calvary Regiment. And h
spoke glowingly of them. But in his let-
ter, he said that when he went to his
helicopter, he was followed by a 19-yeai
old trooper who asked him if he though
he could get a message to me. Being ar
ambassador, he allowed as how he couli
The kid stood there and then said, "Mr.
Ambassador, will you tell the President
we're proud to be here, and we ain't
scared of nothing?"

In Southeast Asia, the Association
of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN
as it's called, is cooperating to improve
the economic, cultural, and educational
growth of that region. Our country has
strong mutual ties with ASEAN and its
individual members. And the ANZUS
pact with Australia and New Zealand is
one of the most significant relationships
we have in the world today.

Peacemaking

But in many of the important regions o
the world, active conflicts take innocent
lives, stunt economic growth, and block
social progress. The United States has ;
unique ability and responsibility to worl-
for peace in these regions.

In the Middle East, we're working t
convince the peoples of the area that
lasting peace and security can only com
through direct negotiations, not the use
of armed force. A secure and lasting
peace for Israel and its Arab neigh-
bors— including a resolution of the
Palestinian problem that satisfies that
people's legitimate rights — is a funda-
mental objective of our foreign policy.

We've launched a new initiative de-
signed to accelerate and broaden the
negotiation process begun at Camp
David. That process fulfilled the princi-
ple of exchanging occupied territory for
peace between Israel and Egypt. Today
I repeat my call to the Arab world to ac
cept the reality of Israel, the reality tha
peace and justice are to be gained only

Department of State Bulleti

THE PRESIDENT

•ough direct negotiation. King Hussein
buld be supported in his effort to
: ng together a joint Jordanian-
jestinian team to negotiate the future
the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem.

We also continue to work for the
,al withdrawal of all foreign forces
im Lebanon so that country can once
ain be an independent sovereign state.
i call on Syria, the Palestine Libera-
In Organization, and Israel to
Ithdraw their forces from Lebanon in
' shortest possible time. A continued
i;upation of Lebanon by these forces
1 only serve the interests of those who
iSh to undermine the cause of peace.

This Administration is prepared to
|ce all necessary measures to guaran-
' the security of Israel's northern
rders in the aftermath of complete
thdrawal of the Israeli Army. But
ace can only evolve through freely
gotiated agreements, not solutions
posed by force.

rengthening the International
onomic System

e world is going through a period of
aat economic instability, one that
ses significant dangers to world
•urity. We and our allies must demon-
■ate the political courage to cooperate
undertaking the necessary remedies,
rticularly when these remedies require
ar-term sacrifices. Never has it been
)re true that we will all hang separate-
if we do not hang together.

A key element of our relationship
th countries around the world is the
jnomic link that unites us with trading
rtners. I'll not go into great detail to-
y about the international economic
d trade policies. But one point I want
make is that it is and will be our
licy to oppose protectionism at home
d abroad and to foster the continued
ttern of ever freer trade which has
rved the world so well. And it must
J50 be fair trade.

i'omoting Progress in
ieveloping Countries

I'osely related to the trade and eco-
Dmic component of our foreign policy is
ir relationship with the developing
orld. I'm convinced that the time has
ime for this country and others to ad-
•ess the problems of the developing na-
ons in a more forthright and less
itronizing way. The fact is that
Hssive infusions of foreign aid have
roven not only ineffective in stimulat-

ing economic development in the Third
World; in many cases, they've actually
been counterproductive. That kind of
foreign aid is nothing more than welfare
payments on a global scale and is just as
ineffectual and degrading. Our economic
assistance must be carefully targeted
and must make maximum use of the
energy and efforts of the private sector.
This philosophy is reflected in the Carib-
bean Basin initiative I announced a year
ago. Its goal is to combine trade, aid,
and incentives for investment into a
balanced arrangement that encourages
self-help for the people of the Caribbean
Basin. Again and again, leaders of these
countries have told me that they don't
want a handout, only help to improve
their own lives by their own efforts.

An important part of such help is
exposure to the effective management
practices and economic thinking that
contribute so much to successful devel-
opment in the advanced economies like
our own. There is no more damaging
misconception than the notion that
capitalism is an economic system bene-
fiting only the rich. Economic freedom is
the world's mightiest engine for abund-
ance and social justice. In our own coun-
try, it has created more wealth and
distributed it more widely among our
people than in any other society known
to man. Developing countries need to be
encouraged to experiment with the
growing variety of arrangements for
profit sharing and expanded capital
ownership that can bring economic bet-
terment to their people.

Of course, economic problems are
not the only ones that developing coun-
tries must contend with. The volatile
combination of poverty with social and
political instability makes many of these
countries natural targets for subversion
by the new colonialism of the totalitarian
left. When countries must divert their
scarce resources from economic develop-
ment in order to fight imported terror-
ism or guerrilla warfare, economic prog-
ress is hard to come by. Security assist-
ance, therefore, is an integral part of
our aid policy with respect to Latin
America and the developing world in
general.

We face a special threat in Central
America where our own national securi-
ty is at risk. Central America is too
close to us, and our strategic stake in
the Caribbean sealanes and the Panama
Canal is too great for us to ignore reali-
ty. The specter of Marxist-Leninist con-
trolled governments in Central America
with ideological and political loyalties to
Culia and the Soviet Union poses a

direct challenge to which we must re-
spond. Poverty together with social and
political instability make a volatile com-
bination which the new colonialists of
the totalitarian left are trying to exploit
for their own cynical purposes.

The reaffirmation of democracy in
Costa Rica in their elections of last year,
the transition from military rule to
elected civilian government in Honduras,
and the launching of democracy in El
Salvador with the successful elections
last March prove that we're on the right
course.

Thanks to this progress, Marxist
revolution is no longer seen as the in-
evitable future of Central America.
Democracy with free elections, free
labor unions, freedom of religion, and
respect for the integrity of the individual
is the clear choice of the overwhelming
majority of Central Americans.

But economic reform needs time to
work, and democracy must be nurtured
in countries where it doesn't have long
traditions. We must insure that the
governments of El Salvador and other
Central American countries can defend
themselves against the Marxist guer-
rillas who receive gims, training, and
money through Cuba and Nicaragua.
The United States cannot and will not
allow Marxist terrorism and subversion
to prevail in Central America.

At the same time, we will continue,
through our own efforts and through
supporting efforts by other democracies
of Latin America, to explore all possi-
bilities for reconciliation and peace in
Central America. But let me make it
plain: We will never abandon our
friends, and we will never abandon our
conviction that legitimate political power
can be gained through competition at
the ballot box in free, open, and orderly
elections.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, on her re-
cent trip to Latin America, engaged in
extensive consultations with leaders of
the region and assured them that we
would pursue our common efforts to
foster economic development, assist with
security concerns, and strengthen the
forces of freedom.

Fostering the Global Growth
of Democratic Institutions

Last June, when I addressed the British
Parliament, I outlined the all-embracing
goal of our foreign policy. I observed
that Americans have a positive vision of
the future, of the world— a realistic and
idealistic vision. We want to see a world
that lives in peace and freedom under

arch 1983

THE PRESIDENT

the consent of the governed. So far,
however, we and the other democracies
haven't done a very good job of explain-
ing democracy and free economy to
emerging nations.

Some people argue that any attempt
to do that represents interference in the
affairs of others— an attempt to impose
our way of life. It's nothing of the kind.
Every nation has the right to determine
its own destiny. But to deny that demo-
cratic values any relevance to the devel-
oping world today, or to the millions of
people who are oppressed by Communist
domination, is to reject the universal
significance of the basic timeless credo
that all men are created equal— and that
they're endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights.

People living today in Africa, in
Latin America, in Central Asia, possess
the same inalienable right to choose
their own governors and decide their
own destiny as we do. By wedding the
timeless truths and values Americans
have always cherished to the realities of
today's world, we have forged the begin-
nings of a fundamentally new direction
in American foreign policy— a policy
based on the unashamed, unapologetic
explaining of our own priceless free in-
stitutions and proof that they work and
describing the social and economic prog-
ress they so uniquely foster.

History is not a darkening path
twisting inevitably toward tyranny, as
the forces of totalitarianism would have
us believe. Indeed, the one clear pattern
in world events— a pattern that's grown
with each passing year of this century-
is in the opposite direction. It is the
growing determination of men and
women of all races and conditions to
gain control of their own destinies and
to free themselves from arbitrary
domination. More than any other single
force, this is the driving aspiration that
unites the human family today— the
burning desire to live unhindered in a
world that respects the rights of in-
dividuals and nations. Now, I'll admit
we're wrong when we have to put
barbed wire up to keep our people from
leaving this country.

Nothing makes me prouder of the
country that I serve than the fact that,
once again, America leads the vanguard
of this movement. So, let's turn off and
tune out on those voices which for too
long would have us cringing under the
weight of a guilt complex.

It is America that has proposed the
elimination of an entire class of nuclear
weapons from the face of the Earth,

that has called for a 50% reduction in in-
tercontinental strategic missiles.

It is America that has helped end
the siege of Beinjt and is effectively
working to broaden the Middle East
peace process.

It is America that works closely with
the African front-line states and our
European allies for peace in southern
Africa and that worked tirelessly with
both Britain and Argentina to seek a
peaceful resolution of the conflict in the
South Atlantic.

It is America that encourages the
trend toward democracy in Latin
America and elsewhere in the world and
cooperates with the Muslim countries
and all those who want an end to the
brutal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

It is America that joins with other
free peoples in calling for reconciliation
and an end to oppression in Poland.

And, yes, it is America that leads
the world in contributions to
humanitarian and refugee programs,
and to assistance programs to help the
less fortunate nations of the world.

Isn't it time for us to reaffirm an
undeniable truth that America remains

the greatest force for peace anywhere i
the world today. For all the stress and
strain of recent ordeals, the United
States is still a young nation, a nation
that draws renewed strength not only
from its material abundance and eco-
nomic might but from free ideals that
are as vibrant today as they were mon
than two centuries ago when that smal
but gallant band we call our Founding
Fathers pledged their lives, their for-
tunes, and their sacred honor to win
freedom and independence.

My fellow Legionnaires, the Ameri
can dream lives— not only in the hearts
and minds of our own countrymen but
the hearts and minds of millions of the
world's people in both free and op-
pressed societies who look to us for
leadership. As long as that dream lives
as long as we continue to defend it,
America has a future, and all mankind
has reason to hope.

'Text from White House press release.

State of the Union Address
(Excerpt)

Excerpt from President Reagan's ad-
dress before a joint session of the Con-
gress on January 25, 1983.^

. . . America's leadership in the world
came to us because of our own strength
and because of the values which guide us
as a society; free elections, a free press,
freedom of religious choice, free trade
unions, and, above all, freedom for the
individual and rejection of the arbitrary
power of the state. These values are the
bedrock of our strength. They unite us
in a stewardship of peace and freedom
with our allies and friends in NATO, in
Asia, in Latin America, and elsewhere.
They are also the values which in the re-
cent past some among us had begun to
doubt and view with a cynical eye.

Fortunately, we and our allies hav('
rediscovered the strength of our com-
mon democratic values, and we're appl,
ing them as a cornerstone of a com-
prehensive strategy for peace with
freedom. In London last year, I an-
nounced the commitment of the United
States to developing the infrastructure
of democracy throughout the world. W
intend to pursue this democratic ini-
tiative vigorously. The future belongs
not to governments and ideologies whi(
oppress their peoples but to democratic
systems of self-government which en-
courage individual initiative and
guarantee personal freedom.

But our strategy for peace with
freedom must also be based on
strength — economic strength and
military strength. A strong American
economy is essential to the well-being

Department of State Bullet

THE PRESIDENT

:d security of our friends and allies,
he restoration of a strong, healthy
merican economy has been and re-
ains one of the central pillars of our
ireign policy. The progress I've been
)le to report to you tonight will, I
low, be as warmly welcomed by the
?st of the world as it is by the
merican people.

We must also recognize that our
f/n economic well-being is inextricably
iked to the world economy. We export
/er 20% of our industrial production,
id 40% of our farmland produces for
cport. We will continue to work closely
ith the industrialized democracies of
urope and Japan and with the Interna-
onal Monetary Fund to insure it has
lequate resources to help bring the
orld economy back to strong, noninfla-
onary growth.

As the leader of the West and as a
juntry that has become great and rich
ecause of economic freedom, America
lust be an unrelenting advocate of free
•ade. As some nations are tempted to
irn to protectionism, our strategy can-
ot be to follow them but to lead the
ay toward freer trade. To this end, in
lay of this year America will host an
;onomic summit meeting in Williams-
org, Virginia.

As we begin our third year, we have
ut in place a defense program that
adeems the neglect of the past decade.
/e have developed a realistic military
trategy to deter threats to peace and to
rotect freedom if deterrence fails. Our
rmed forces are finally properly paid;
fter years of neglect are well trained
nd becoming better equipped and sup-
lied. And the American uniform is once
gain worn with pride. Most of the ma-
)r systems needed for modernizing our
efenses are already underway, and we
/ill be addressing one key system, the
IX missile, in consultation with the
Jongress in a few months.

America's foreign policy is once
gain based on bipartisanship, on
ealism, strength, full partnership, in
onsultation with our allies, and con-
tructive negotiation with potential
•dversaries. From the Middle East to
outhern Africa to Geneva, American
liplomats are taking the initiative to

make peace and lower arms levels. We
should be proud of our role as
peacemakers.

In the Middle East last year, the
United States played the major role in
ending the tragic fighting in Lebanon
and negotiated the withdrawal of the
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]
from Beirut.

Last September, I outlined prin-
ciples to carry on the peace process
begun so promisingly at Camp David.
All the people of the Middle East should
know that in the year ahead, we will not
flag in our efforts to build on that foun-
dation to bring them the blessings of
peace.

In Central America and the Carib-
bean Basin, we are likewise engaged in
a partnership for peace, prosperity, and
democracy. Final passage of the remain-
ing portions of our Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative, which passed the House last
year, is one of this Administration's top
legislative priorities for 1983.

The security and economic assist-
ance policies of this Administration in
Latin America and elsewhere are based
on realism and represent a critical in-
vestment in the future of the human
race. This undertaking is a joint respon-
sibility of the executive and legislative
branches, and I'm counting on the
cooperation and statesmanship of the
Congress to help us meet this essential
foreign policy goal.

At the heart of our strategy for
peace is our relationship with the Soviet
Union. The past year saw a change in
Soviet leadership. We're prepared for a
positive change in Soviet-American rela-
tions. But the Soviet Union must show
by deeds as well as words a sincere com-
mitment to respect the rights and
sovereignty of the family of nations.
Responsible members of the world com-
munity do not threaten or invade their
neighbors. And they restrain their allies
from aggression.

For our part, we're vigorously pur-
suing arms reduction negotiations with
the Soviet Union. Supported by our
allies, we've put forward draft agree-
ments proposing significant weapon

reductions to equal and verifiable lower
levels. We insist on an equal balance of
forces. And given the overwhelming
evidence of Soviet violations of interna-
tional treaties concerning chemical and
biological weapons, we also insist that
any agreement we sign can and will be
verifiable.

In the case of intermediate-range
nuclear forces, we have proposed the
complete elimination of the entire class
of land-based missiles. We're also
prepared to carefully explore serious
Soviet proposals. At the same time, let
me emphasize that allied steadfastness
remains a key to achieving arms reduc-
tions.

With firmness and dedication, we'll
continue to negotiate. Deep down, the
Soviets must know it's in their interest
as well as ours to prevent a wasteful
arms race. And once they recognize our
unshakable resolve to maintain adequate
deterrence, they will have every reason
to join us in the search for greater
security and major arms reductions.
When that moment comes — and I'm con-
fident that it will — we will have taken
an important step toward a more peace-
ful future for all the world's people.

A very wise man, Bernard Baruch,
once said that America has never forgot-
ten the nobler things that brought it into
being and that light its path. Our coun-
try is a special place, because we
Americans have always been sustained,
through good times and bad, by a noble
vision — a vision not only of what the
world around us is today but what we as
a free people can make it be tomorrow.

We're realists; we solve our prob-
lems instead of ignoring them, no mat-
ter how loud the chorus of despair
around us. But we're also idealists, for it
was an ideal that brought our ancestors
to these shores from every corner of the
world.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 31, 1983.

^/larch 1983

THE PRESIDENT

Vice President Bush's and
Secretary Shultz's Trips

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
FEB. 11. 19831

It was a pleasure for me today to
welcome home Vice President Bush and
Secretary of State Shultz, who have just
completed important diplomatic missions
in Europe and Asia. Both men accom-
plished their missions with calmness,
competence, and strength and helped to
reaffirm our country's commitment to
peace.

The Vice President and the
Secretary of State briefed me and my
national security advisers today on the
details of their trips. Clearly their
journeys have reinforced American
policy and have set the stage for added
progress in the future in two areas of
the world enormously important to our
country and our people.

Vice President Bush went to Europe
first and foremost to listen. His trip il-
lustrated that NATO— in contrast to the
Warsaw Pact — is a voluntary alliance of
free people based on consultation and
consensus.

The Vice President also carried a
message from me that was simple and
clear.

First, he emphasized that our zero-
zero intermediate-range nuclear forces
proposal is a serious one that would
represent a real breakthrough in arms
control. As such, it contrasts dramat-
ically with the Soviet proposal which
would merely preserve an existing
Soviet advantage that is dangerous to
the West.

Second, he made it clear that our
initiative — which would eliminate an en-
tire category of missiles — is a fair and
moral position.

Third, the Vice President made it
clear that we are willing to explore any
serious Soviet proposal and that I. per-
sonally, am prepared to meet Mr.
Andropov anywhere, anytime to sign an
agreement to eliminate all land-based
intermediate-range nuclear missile
weapons from the face of the Earth.

Finally, the Vice President conveyed
our belief that progress at Geneva
depends now — more critically than
ever — on continued allied unity and the
determination to deploy the missiles re-
quested by our NATO allies if results
cannot be achieved which make this un-
necessary.

I am deeply encouraged by the
report that the Vice President has given
me. We and our allies are as one in
wanting genuine arms control and in our
commitment to the dual-track decision.
The message that the Vice President
carried and the favorable responses he
received reflect a solid expression of
allied unity we can all be proud of.

The trip of the Secretary of State to
Asia was also of great significance,
strengthening our relations with three
countries very important to the people
of the United States — Japan, China, and
Korea. Secretary Shultz's trip to this
very important region of the world was
an extremely successful one. He also
achieved the goals I set for him.

The Secretary reported to me that
he comes back from his trip more con-
vinced than ever that much of the
world's future is tied up with events in
Asia and the Pacific. I fully agree with
this assessment. He emphasized to me
that Asians share our concerns about
the need for significant arms control
measures to insure worldwide peace and
security.

In Japan, building upon my recent
meetings in Washington with Prime
Minister Nakasone, the Secretary reaf-
firmed the stren^h of the U.S. -Japan
alliance structure and the partnership
for peace to which both of our countries

are committed. He followed up on the
discussions we had in Washington on
ways by which Japan can better assum
its appropriate responsibilities in defen
and trade matters.

In his meeting at Beijing with the
Chinese leadership, the Secretary agre
on the need to develop mutual con-
fidence and trust and to continue the
dialogue between our two countries in
order to achieve a strong and enduring
relationship. In this connection, I am
pleased that Premier Zhao has accepte
my invitation to visit the United State;
The time will be agreed on through
diplomatic channels.

In the Republic of Korea, the
Secretary, in his discussion with leadei
of that country and by his visit to
American troops in the demilitarized
zone, made clear the U.S. determinatic
to stand by the Korean people and to
maintain our pledge to defend Korean
independence against outside aggres-
sion.

In Hong Kong the Secretary chain
a conference of U.S. Ambassadors in
East Asia and the Pacific. They dis-
cussed economic and political issues in
the region, particularly pointing to the
strength of our relationships with our
friends and allies there.

'Text from White House press release.

Arms Control and Reduction

Following are excerpts from Presi-
dent Reagan's remarks and a question-
and-answer session he held with
reporters on January H. 1983.^

I have a statement here. But before I
begin, I just want to explain the subject
of this. There has been such disarray,
approaching chaos, in the press corps
with regard to the subject of arms con-
trol that I thought before you unraveled
into complete disorder that maybe we
should straighten out the entire subject.
So, before taking your questions, I'll ex-
press a thought or two which are a mat-
ter of deep conviction for me with
regard to arms control. These concern
what we must do before we can expect

to be successful and then what principl
ought to guide us in our negotiating
strategy.

First, it seems to me that the two
factors essential to success in arms cor
trol are leverage and determination.

With respect to leverage, it's clear
that when I arrived in office, there was
virtually no hope that we could expect
the Soviets to bargain seriously for rea
reductions. After all, they had all the
marbles. We hadn't designed a new
missile in 15 years. We hadn't built a
new submarine in the same period,
although they'd built more than 60. Ou
bombers were older than the pilots whi
flew them.

Department of State Bullet

THE PRESIDENT

Today that's no longer the case,
irking with the Congi-ess, we have, in

past 2 years, succeeded in getting
;horization for a complete moderniza-
1 of the triad of strategic forces with

exception of the MX, which still re-
res congressional action this spring.

point is that now we're in a position
get somewhere, and I'm determined
it we shall.

The other quality I mentioned was
Lermination. Recently I've made a few
Inagement changes so that we'll have
jtreamlined team in place through
|ich we can reach decisions promptly
\i get results in the Geneva talks.
I I want to say something else about
I' strategy toward arms control. It
!>ms to me that if you look back over
' history of the past 15 years of talks,
■tain things emerge. Frankly, some
jngs have worked, and others have
It.

Let me be specific. Some people
ve argued that we ought to try
ilateral disarmament, that we should
I our own systems without getting
ything from them in return in the
pe that our example will lead the
viets to cut theirs. That approach has
an tried on a number of occasions. For
ample, President Carter decided to
t the B-1 bomber, perhaps in the ex-
ctation that the Soviets would cut
ck on their bomber programs. It didn't
)rk. Instead of cutting back, the
viets went steadily ahead with the
.ckfire and another advanced bomber.

On the other hand, some things have
)rked. Most of you recall that in the
,e 1960s President Johnson tried very
rd to engage the Soviets in talks on
tiballistic missile (ABM) systems. At
e time, we had no deployment
inned; in short, no leverage. The
)viets refused to talk. But then the
lited States decided to go ahead with
1 ABM plan, and you know the rest,
hen it became clear that we would go
lead with the deployment, the Soviets
me to the table, and we got a treaty
at still endures today.

The lesson is that they will bargain
hen they have an incentive. And today
at incentive exists, and I'm convinced
at we can make real progress.

It is with this thought in mind that I
id an in-depth meeting yesterday on
ms control with some of my arms con-
ol advisers. Next week I'll be meeting
ith Ambassadors Ed Rowny, [special
presentative for arms control and
sarmament negotiations] and Paul
itze [head of the U.S. delegation to the
termediate-range nuclear forces

negotiations]. We're ready, and I'm con-
fident that with determination we can
succeed.

Keeping in mind our commitment to
the security of Europe and to peace, and
in order to insure the closest possible
coordination with our European allies on
arms reductions and deterrence, I've
asked Vice President Bush to go to
Europe for talks with my European
counterparts. And while he's there, the
Vice President will meet with the Pope,
Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor
Kohl, President Mitterrand, Prime
Minister Fanfani, Prime Minister
Martens, and Prime Minister Lubbers,
as well as with our negotiating teams in
Geneva.

And let there be no doubt: We're
ready. We'll consider every serious pro-
posal, and we have the determination to
succeed in this, the most important
undertaking of our generation.

Q. Do you think that it would be
good to have a summit meeting with
Andropov first, to try to nail down
what they're really proposing now,
what all these new proposals mean?
And are you ready for such a summit?

A. No, I think that since the talks
are supposed to begin early in February,
the first week of February — General
Rowny and Paul Nitze are prepared to
go there — I think that that takes place
first, and we see then what might lead
to, or if there is a need for such a
meeting.

Q. I have a question on one of the
things you mentioned — the subject of
disarray, if I may. There is a percep-
tion that the disarray is here in the
White House, that you have been out
of touch, that you have had to be
dragged back by your staff and friends
on Capitol Hill to make realistic deci-
sions on the budget. There was even a
newspaper column saying that your
Presidency is failing. Will you address
yourself to this perception?

A. Yes. That's why I came in, to
point out to you accurately where the
disarray lies. It's in those stories that
seem to be going around, because they
are not based on fact. And I would sug-
gest that sometimes you get some
unnamed-source information, that any of
us here in the White House would be
willing to help you out by giving you an
answer as to whether that information is
correct or not.

Q. Specifically on the business of
your staff — the stories that your staff
and your friends such as Senator
Laxalt have had to, sort of, drag you
back from an economic game plan that
was failing — was it your decision to
make these turns that we hear about
toward new taxes, toward perhaps a
different approach to cutting the
budget, and to the defense matters?

A. Maybe the problem is that what
we're doing is a little bit new to
Washington. I said from the very begin-
ning that we had a Cabinet-type govern-
ment— as I'd had in Sacramento — that
we had a Cabinet that was chosen for
their ability and their knowledge and not
because they controlled delegates at a
convention or something, and that I
would seek advice and every kind of
viewpoint in arriving at decisions. Now,
we've been doing that. And it's been
working very well. And it is true that I
ask and want to hear differing view-
points on things. But then, I make the
decisions. And this has been working
very well.

And we've had a very heavy agenda
for the last few weeks. We've been
working long hours on a number of
things that are before us here. And, as I
say, we had a very serious and a long
meeting yesterday on this particular
subject.

But now we're getting too far away
from the general subject.

Q. Do you think that by the time
your first term is over — I know what
your hope on it is — but do you really
think that by the time your first term
is over that we will have an arms
reduction treaty with the Soviet
Union?

A. I think it'd be unwise for anyone,
knowing the history of the some 19 at-
tempts by this country to bring about
arms reduction and control with the
Soviet Union in the past, to make a
prediction or put a time limit of any kind
on this. I will say this: We will stay at a
table negotiating as long as there is any
chance at all of securing arms reduction,
because it is the most important problem
facing this generation.

Q. Could you comment on reports
that have circulated in recent days
that sometime after the German elec-
tions, you might explore alternatives
to your zero-zero option and START
negotiations?

A. No, and here you're getting
dangerously into an area that can't be
opened to discussion, which is the tactics
of negotiating and the strategy of
negotiating. If you discuss that openly.

arch 1983

THE PRESIDENT

then there is no strategy, and you've
tied your hands with regard to attaining
anything.

Q. You mentioned in your opening
statement the MX missile. During the
campaign when you ran for office, you
repeatedly ridiculed former President
Carter for his failed efforts to get an
MX basing plan and get the program
going. How has your experience been
any different than his? And how could
you say that your efforts have been
any more successful than his?

A. If you'll forgive me, my criticism
mainly was, 1 was in great disagreement
with his plan, not a failure to get it. I
just did not believe — and from the
counsel and advice that I sought and
was able to get — I did not believe that
such a plan was practical or that it
would in any way result in more security
for the weapons system.

Q. A lot of the criticism — which
you referred to earlier when we talked
about disarray — has centered around
the fact that perhaps you've over-
promised the recovery of the economy.
And much of what's been written in
recent days has centered on that when
they talked of disarray. And you seem
to have changed your positions by be-
ing described in articles as willing to
think about taxes in the out-years if
they're needed to bring down the
deficit. All of that has contributed to
this. Do you think that's unfair?

A. I have and will continue to say
that there are still decisions to be made.
We've made great progress with regard
to the budget plan. I do not believe that
philosophically I have changed at all.
But I'm not prepared to discuss that.
And we now have left this other subject,
and we should get back to it. I am —

Q. I was coming back to this one.
[Laughter]

A. No, I think that, again, this has
been very inaccurate — things that are
only options being presented and in
which there has been no decision. And,
as I say, I've asked for the widest range
of options, and then I suddenly see them
announced — as rumored that I have
made a decision or I have decided on
this or I'm willing to go this way or not.
That is where, as I say, the leaks have
been very inaccurate, and I just don't
think you should place so much con-
fidence in them.

Q. Since the policy on leaks was
announced on Monday, the Secretary
of the Treasury put on record or on

background virtually all of the tax
measures that are being considered
for the new budget. The Secretary of
Defense said on television that there
would be a military and civilian pay
freeze. The details are open. And the
Associate Attorney General revealed
on the record your decision to veto the
crime and one of the wilderness bills.
All in all, it's been a very good week
for leaks and for reporters. Does this
really serve any purpose?

A. The difference is that you were
able to identify every one of those peo-
ple. They didn't come and appear in your
newscast or in print as an "unidentified,
high. White House source."

Q. But that's where the perception
of you seeming to change your stand,
a part of it, comes from.

A. I haven't seen the exact words of
some of those statements, but I would
suggest that maybe they were trying to
explain away the misstatements or the
assumptions that had been made.

Q. In addition to the Secretaries —
Secretary Regan, Secretary
Weinberger, others have spoken
publicly — the Joint Chiefs of Staff
spoke publicly about your defense cuts
and said that they would have pre-
ferred the cuts to be in weapons
systems, not in pay and personnel that
would actually hurt readiness. Doesn't
this contribute to the appearance that
you have backed down on your defense
buildup and on your commitment not
to hurt the readiness?

A. No, there has been, as the
Secretary admitted that there might be,
some slight stretching out of our
readiness preparations. But we have
already achieved great gains in those.
So, it isn't as if we were starting from
scratch on that. But our preference was
not to delay or set back the weapons
buildups that we need in order to close
the window of vulnerability. And at the
same time, may I say that we think with
our arms control talks — we're creating a
window of opportunity here.

But, no, we haven't retreated from
our position on that. I, myself, would
have preferred to not have to make
those. We're facing reality with what
we're going to present in a budget to the
Congress and what we believe can meet
our problems and would be acceptable to
Congress.

'Text from Weekly Compilatiun of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 17, 1983. I

Caribbean Basin
Initiative

President Reagan's remarks to am-
bassadors of member nations of the
Organization of American States (OAS,
at the White House on December 22,
19S2}

I'm delighted to welcome all of you dis
tinguished members from the diplomat
community and the other honored gue;
who are here with us.

I want to report to you today on tl
status of our Caribbean Basin initiativi
This initiative is part of America's con-
tribution to a collective partnership foi
peace, prosperity, and democracy in th
Caribbean and Central America. And,
you know, I recently traveled to South
and Central America. The reception I
received convinced me even more of \k
vital importance to all of us of the well
being, the independence, and the secur
ty of the nations of the Caribbean Bas;
and, indeed, the entire hemisphere.

My conversations with the Presi-
dents of five Caribbean Basin countrie;
were particularly inspirational and
helpful. We face common economic pre
lems of deficits, slow growth, idle
capacity, and high debts, and common
threats of insurgencies supported by
Cuba and other Soviet satellites.

I was impressed most, though, by
the bright prospects for the futui'e.
Great advances were made over the
previous two decades in economic
growth, in developing and diversifying
industrial and agricultural production,
improving health services and educatio
I'm convinced that the hemisphere will
continue this trend of strong growth ai
improvement.

The promise of the New World re-
mains bright. We have great resources
and dynamic peoples. Prosperity
strengthens democracy. Throughout th
hemisphere, democracy is on the move
Nearly all the governments in the Cari
bean Basin are now democracies. Free-
dom and respect for human rights give
the fullest expression to the meaning o
life, and democracy also advances peac
Democracies live easier with each othe;
Freedom is not a source of aggression;
it can't be imposed like totalitarian
philosophies by force and repression.

I found in my talks just recently or
this trip to South America, how few of
us have stopped to think that this

Department of State Bullet

THE VICE PRESIDENT

?misphere and these two great con-
lents linked as they are by Central
nierica have probably known a longer
?riod of peace than almost any other
■ea of the world, and maybe it's
!cause no matter which country we
ime from, our forebears all came here
om someplace else looking for the
ime thing — opportunity and freedom,
nd as we grow closer to each other —
ore neighborly — we can become a
rce for good in the world more than
lyone could dream at this time.

I sought to explain our policies, and
found support for them: to strengthen
e practice of democracy and the
■spect for human rights; to continue
ipport for the San Jose peace process
reduce tensions and conflict in Cen-
al America; to provide limited assist-
ice to help small countries struggling
r democracy to defend themselves
gainst foreign supported insurgents or
rrorists determined to impose their
vn totalitarian ideas; to support the in-
grity of an open and free trading
■stem which is vital to the prosperity of
I the peoples of this hemisphere; to
;lp countries trying to work through
lancial crises and which are adopting
ijustment programs in hard times just
; we're doing.

I'm pleased that we now have
ibstantial agreement on the important
ements of a replenishment of the
iter-American Development Bank. This
eludes an overall lending program of
13 billion, an acceptal)le level of conces-
onary financing, and a new interme-
ate financial facility. And of course the
aribbean Basin initiative is a central
id critical feature of this policy. Its im-
jrtance was underscored by everyone I
let.

I promised that my Administration
ould do its best to gain passage of the
■ee trade and investment proposals in
le initiative in this session of Congress,
ow this is not a "made-in-the-U.S.A."
roduct. We in the Americas have all
jntributed our ideas, our resources,
nd our strong efforts to create this bold
pproach to development, a positive pro-
ram rooted in self-help and a private
litiative through which we and our
eighbors can assist each other.

Let me report on where that effort
bands and what lies ahead. The aid por-
on of the program is an accomplished
ict. The other part, having to do with
rade and investment, is still in the
;gislative process, I'm sorry to say.
lecause of procedural maneuvering by a
mall minority of opponents, it has been

difficult to bring that part of the Carib-
bean Basin initiative legislation to a
tloor vote in the Senate where a clear
majority would have supported passage.

But what I want you to know is that
the Caribbean Basin initiative will not
die. The tremendous efforts that the
leaders of your countries have put into
this bill will not be in vain. It was your
leaders who were most responsible for
capturing the attention of one of this
country's most able legislators, Dan
Rostenkowski. He turned his skills
toward passage of the Caribbean Basin
initiative in this short, lameduck session,
and was able to produce an overwhelm-
ing vote of 260 to 142 in the House of
Representatives. Working together, I'm
sure that we can count on his leadership
again when the session resumes next —
or the new Congress comes in next year.

I know we can also count on the
sti-ong and able support of Senator Dole.
I'm personally determined to see the
Caribbean Basin initiative through. This
initiative is close to my heart. It is my
highest priority. It proposes the right
measures to help our neighbors through
this difficult period. More important, it

can help open the door on to the kind of
future our neighbors have a right to ex-
pect.

The Caribbean Basin initiative will
be among the very first pieces of legisla-
tion that I submit to the 98th Congress
next year. The time is short, the needs
are great, but we'll win this fight,
because there's no acceptable alter-
native. Together we're a tremendous
force for good. We'll show the world
that we conquer fear with faith, that we
overcome poverty through growth, and
that we counter violence with opportuni-
ty and freedom.

And, so saying, that's all that I have
to say, except a thank you to all of you
who have helped so hard in trying to get
this passed through the legislature in
this session. I thank you for your efforts
in the past. I wish I could say that's all
that we have to now do. But I'll just con-
sider that you're going to be just as ac-
tive and working just as hard in the
near future when the holidays are over
and the Congress is back in session.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 27, 1982.

Vice President Interviewed

on ''Face the Nation" (Excerpts)

Vice President Bush was interviewed
on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" on
February 13, 1983. by George Herman,
CBS News; Michael Getler, The
Washington Post; and Robert Pierpoint,
CBS News.

Q. You have been touring through
Europe talking about the question of
negotiating zero-option or reduction in
the intermediate-range nuclear
missiles. Is it your own personal feel-
ing that it can be accomplished, that it
will be accomplished, in time to pre-
vent the deployment of the Pershing II
missiles next December?

A. We are very serious about arms
reductions and about negotiation to
achieve arms reduction. I can't make a
prediction on exactly when it will hap-
pen, but I would say it's a distinct
possibility that it will happen, because
we found the alliance together; we found
them sticking with the two tracks. All I
know is that our negotiator, Mr. Nitze,
is there saying, "Come on, let's see a
good proposal," and, yes, it can happen.

Q. When you talk about a two-
track system, I presume you're talking
about negotiating while continuing to
deploy these new weapons, the Per-
shing lis?

A. Yes.

Q. That extends the time a little
bit. It's going to take what, 2 years to
deploy the Pershing lis? They won't
be fully deployed until sometime in
1985?

A. Yes.

Q. Although this is a serious mat-
ter, let me put it in sort of a — if you
were a betting man, would you bet
that all the Pershing missiles will be
deployed, or do you think that there
would be some agreement before the
process is through?

A. I wouldn't bet one way or
another, but I would say that that
negotiating track, the willingness to stay
at the table as long as it takes to reduce
and hopefully to achieve what we
want — morality and elimination of an

larch 1983

THE VICE PRESIDENT

entire generation of these nuclear
weapons— I believe will be successful in
negotiation. Can't put a time frame on
it, but as I said in Europe, what goes in
can come out.

If we are compelled to deploy
because the Soviets are not as forthcom-
ing as our allies would like to see them,
we will continue to negotiate, but that
deployment date is set, and we are not
going to vacillate and pull away from it.
It is firm and one thing I've found where
the allies were together on that.

Q. Now that you've talked with the
President about the results of your
trip, you've presumably given liim
some judgments of your own. Can you
tell us whether there is likely to be
any new American initiative perhaps
for some intermediate steps to break
the deadlock at the Geneva arms talks,
or whether the Russians must take the
next step?

A. As you know from your inces-
sant travels around Europe, our position
is that they should come forward with a
new and reasonable proposal. We think
the proposal they made— and our allies
totally agree— was unreasonable. But I
have reported in confidence to the Presi-
dent, and he will be making a determina-
tion whether we should do something
different in order to encourage the
Soviets to do what we've asked. But we
are not going to depart from this moral
objective — ridding the world, if you will,
banishing forever an entire generation
of these weapons.

I have had adequate opportunity to
report to him and with the Secretary of
State there, and what the President will
determine on this, I just don't know.

Q. When you were in Geneva, you
met with the Soviet disarmament dele-
gates. Did they give you any reason
for believing that they would, in fact,
ever accept this so-called zero-zero op-
tion?

A. No, they did not. I would be
misleading the public if I said, out of
those conversations, there was reason to
be hopeful. But as you look at the equa-
tion, as you look at the capabilities of
these Pershings and cruise-launch
missiles, those ground-launch cruise
missiles, there is every reason to feel
that the Soviets would want the kinds of
reductions we're talking about, but I did
not get that directly from talking to the
Soviet negotiators.

Q. When you talk about reductions
now, you're not necessarily then going
to stick to this zero-zero option, and

especially if the Soviets have made it
clear to you that they won't accept
that? What is the United States going
to do? Is it going to be stuck on dead
center, or is it going to make a com-
promise proposal?

A. In the first place, in terms of the
proposal of eliminating this entire
generation of weapons, as I went across
Europe and talked to opposition leaders
and talked to government officials,
heads of government in every country, I
never heard one argument against the
zero option, except that the Soviets
don't like it. The Soviets won't do it.
That is not a good enough reason to
depart from an objective that the
alliance shares, that the peace
movements ought to share if they'd put
it into focus— how much better a major
reduction than a freeze, for example.

Maybe there is a way, an inter-
mediate way, to get from here to an ob-
jective that every thinking person, in-
cluding the Soviets, should share, and it
is that the President is considering right
now, bringing home in confidence to
him, suggestions from the world leaders.

Q. When do you think the Presi-
dent might decide whether or not this
country or the Western alliance ought
to do something to encourage the
Soviets to go further than they have?

A. I don't know when he'd decide,
but I can tell you that whatever was
done, if anything, would be done in full
consultation with our allies. A good
thing out of this trip that I've just finish-
ed is that I think the European allies
understand that we were operating in
the true spirit and letter of the word
consultation.

Q. One of the things that the
Europeans, as you know, also are very
concerned about is the question of
whether there will be a summit
meeting between President Reagan
and the Soviet leader, Yuriy
Andropov. Again, since your return,
since your discussions abroad and now
that you have some feeling from the
President about these matters, has
that been advanced at all? Is it any
more likely now that there at some
point is going to be a summit
meeting?

A. I wouldn't say that the trip itself
accelerated or decelerated the need for a
summit, but if I could be permitted just
a couple of seconds. It was President
Reagan who said to Brezhnev: "I'd like
to meet you at the United Nations on a
casual basis." It was President Reagan

who has said he is prepared to go to
well-prepared summits. So, in other
words, we don't lift the hopes of a work
desiring arms reduction only to have
them dashed down because of failure to
prepare.

And, as we said in Germany, which
got the zero option back on focus, "I'll
drop everything. I'll stop anything on-
going, go anywhere, anytime, to sign ar
agreement to eliminate an entire gener;
tion of weapons."

So there are three kinds of guide-
lines, you might say, and each of them
leads to the fact that our President,
under certain conditions, would be will-
ing to meet with Mr. Andropov. Some i
Europe felt he wouldn't do it at all.

Q. If I may play the devil's ad-
vocate for a moment, or the Soviet
Union's advocate in this. Mr.
Andropov has proposed a rather vagui
plan that would allow the Soviets to
keep a number of missiles equivalent
to the missiles — nuclear missiles —
now in France and Great Britain. Tha--
does sound on the surface like a
somewhat reasonable proposal, since
Britain and France are America's
allies. What is your answer to that?

A. Our answer is that the British
and French systems— first, they're
sovereign systems, and we've always
been talking about U.S. -Soviet balance.
Secondly, they're strategic systems, not
intermediate nuclear force systems.
And, thirdly, what would happen if we
did that? We would be decoupling a U.S
guarantee from Europe, pulling our- ,
selves away from our allies by that. |
These objectives are objectives that the
Soviets have understood in the past in
other negotiations, and we are not abou
to count the British and French systems
as we reach for this moral end.

Q. But don't they have a certain
justification in their view by saying
that after all, whether you call them
strategic or intermediate-range
nuclear missiles, whether they're fired
by NATO as a unit, or whether they're
fired by the British and the French,
Moscow is going to be just as vulner-
able, just as many Soviet citizens are
going to be dead?

A. Sure. And when you look at
them in terms of the total deadly
megatonnage of warheads, yes, they
should be counted. They're a fraction —
just a tiny fraction— of the full total.
But somewhere along the line, if one car

Department of State Bulletir

THE VICE PRESIDENT

er finally resolve the whole question of
of nuclear disarmament, yes, they
ould be considered, but they ought not
be injected into the intermediate
clear force discussion when they've
ver been in there before, ought not to
injected as a way to forestall an ob-
;tive that the entire world should
^Icome, getting rid of all of these
?apons.

Q. Did the European leaders that
u spoke to ask you if President
;agan is going to run again? Is that
I their minds? And I ask this
■cause — as a question of whether it's
factor in the Soviet negotiating
rategy in arms control, whether they
ait and see what Reagan does.

A. No, they didn't ask, but I'll bet
lU they were all very interested. We
led on this trip to stay out of Euro-
■an elections— elections in France, the
?ctions in Germany. I hope I was suc-
ssful, and they very tactfully did, in-
■ed, in our consultations stay out of
ly discussion of election politics, but I
ink they're keenly interested in that. It
dn't come up, though.

Q. I've been sort of fascinated by
ime of the— you'll pardon my saying
I— high-flowTi rhetoric in this
lanish an entire generation of
eapons." "Banish from the face of
e Earth an entire class of nuclear
eapons" and so forth. Does that
ean that if a zero-zero option agree-
ent was reached, that any Pershing
issiles which had been built in the
nited States would be dismantled or
istroyed?

A. Sure. If that's the kind of agree-
ent we can reach, absolutely, and so
ould the SS-20s and so would the
3-4s and SS-5s. That leads you to any
ich agreement being verifiable, but ab-
)lutely, that is the President's— and it
high-flown rhetoric, but it's a worthy
iiought in a world that's troubled by
lis frightening nuclear threat. We want
eduction, not a freeze, we want a
ijduction, and if the rhetoric is high-
own, fine, because we're dealing with
lorality here.

Q. I don't see reasonably how you
an separate one class of nuclear
/eapons totally in negotiations from
nother. If you have tactical, if you
ave intermediate, if you have
trategic. they're really all part of the
uestion of the death of the Earth in a
uclear exchange. Are you satisfied

that progress is being made, that the
Russians are seriously interested in
reducing the threat of nuclear death
of Earth?

A. I would think they would be, yes.
I don't see how any country, especially
one that's lost many soldiers, as they
have in various wars, would be disin-
terested in reducing this threat.

Q. Are they showing it?

A. But they are not showing it, and
they are being very iron-willed. Part of
the reason they're not showing it is
because they think they can win a prop-
aganda battle and keep us from doing
that other track— that deployment
track— of the NATO decision. They've
focused on public opinion; they've high-
lighted their positions in terms of in-
jecting themselves into the German elec-
tions, and I think it's going to backfire
on them. But, clearly, if they can have
the statuft quo, where they have 1,200
intermediate nuclear force warheads and
we have zero as an alliance, they would
like that.

Our President and the allies — the
heads of allied governments — are deter-
mined that that monopoly not continue
to exist. And they have a monopoly, and
that's not reasonable, and it's not con-
ducive to peace.

Q. Let me take you from nuclear
weapons to pistols, namely the con-
frontations that we've seen between
American Marines in Lebanon and the
Israeli troops and tanks there. Are
you worried about the possibility of
some kind of clash disturbing the
peace in Lebanon, slowing the process
of getting a withdrawal from that
country?

A. Yes, I'm concerned about it. I'm
not concerned about a clash with
Marines, necessarily, but I think that
event did highlight the need to get on
with the withdrawal of all foreign
forces. That means Syrians, that means
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]
fighters, that means the Israelis from
Lebanon.

Q. What's the problem? What's
holding it up?

A. There have been all kinds of
things holding it up, including at one
point whether a peace treaty between
Lebanon and Israel was a sine qua non,
was necessary to do this, security
guarantees that one side is asking.
There are several specific problems, but
I think there is now a kind of a realiza-
tion that we must have this withdrawal.

And the way we look at it, it's just a
step. We want to see Lebanon be
Lebanon, if you will, reconstituted, free,
controlling its own destinies, free of
foreign force. Then we want to get on
with a solution to the age-old Palestinian
question. Our President put forward a
proposal; he's going to stick with that
proposal.

Q. Philip Habib, the roving am-
bassador, is now back in the Middle
East, and we understand that he has
gone with a plan to let Lebanon be
Lebanon in degrees by sending more
foreign troops into Lebanon, including
more Americans, perhaps doubling the
amount of U.S. Marines there while
the Israelis and the Syrians withdraw.
Is that the case?

A. I won't go into the specifics of
the plans, but I think we would do what
the United States, along with others— it
has to be multilateral, have to have
others cooperating— is necessary to do
in order to cause this separation of
force, in order to help be a catalyst for
getting foreign forces to a withdrawal.
But the specifics, I can't give you those.

Q. Can you just tell us whether
more U.S. Marines are a part of the
plan?

A. No, I can't. I can't give you that,
but I've read the same stories you have
and all I'm saying is we want those
foreign forces out. An environment with
those foreign forces out would be more
benign. I can't say what we will do to
fulfill our part in such a withdrawal.

Q. How concerned are you over
the general direction in which
American-Israeli relations are going
now? The incident between the
Marines and the Israeli troops is
something that I think the American
public has just never seen before,
never been exposed to. It has an edge
of nastiness to it that, I think, con-
cerns a lot of people. Is this getting
out of hand? Where do you see things
going in terms of the overall relation-
ship?

A. I don't see it getting out of hand,
but I share your hypothesis that it's a
matter of great concern. Israel is a
staunch ally. Israel is an ally for cultural
and traditional and strategic reasons.
There have been differences with Israel,
just as we've had differences with Arab
countries.

So I do worry about it, frankly. I
worry about it very much, and I think
the best way to facilitate an improve-
ment of relations would be to have the
kind of withdrawal from Lebanon we've

inarch 1983

THE SECRETARY

been talking about.

Q. Does the Administration think
the changes in the Israeli Government
and the Israeli Cabinet, the change of
portfolio of Defense Minister Sharon,
has any impact?

A. I'm going to fall back on an old
diplomatic — not dodge, but we shouldn't
talk about the internal affairs of Israel.
That wouldn't be proper, how their
Cabinet is made up, and it is a matter
of — it's widely debated, but I just can't
help you on that one.

Q. Do you think that there is a
momentary disarray in the Israeli
Government which could slow things
down — negotiations, for example?

A. I wouldn't think it would slow
down the negotiations, but I just don't
know; I have to reserve on that. I don't
think it will, because I think there is an
urgency now, and I think Mr. Begin sees
it; I know we feel that, and I know that
President Gemayel in Lebanon feels that
way. I hope it wouldn't slow down
negotiations.

Q. Let me take you to another
large, unresolved story, and, namely,
whether you learned anything on your
trip more about the alleged connec-
tions between the Bulgarians and the
attempted assassination of the Pope,
and also a second part of it, which is
purely speculation but it's surfaced
now, and that is that the United
States may be downplaying this
because it essentially would make it
impossible to deal with Mr. Andropov,
who is a former KGB leader.

A. We're not upplaying it or
downplaying it. It's in the courts. The
courts will do their job. We are very in-
terested to see the truth come out on
this matter. It's a matter of conscience.
It's a matter that's shaken the entire
world— these allegations— but we
reserve enough fair play to say that it's
in the magistrates over there, their
hands. They are credible; they will do a
good job, and that's as far as we go.

But the idea that we don't want the
truth to come is absolute hogwash, total.
I didn't get into those discussions.

Q. —the premise that if we did
find something of this sort, it would
make dealing with Mr. Andropov more
difficult?

A. I've got to be candid. I mean, if
your hypothesis is if he personally was
involved, clearly, it would be difficult.
The Holy Father, the Christian head of
a great faith? ■

Secretary Shultz

Asia

Secretary Shultz departed Washington, D.C.,

January 29, 1983, to visit

Tokyo (January 30-February 2),

Beijing (February 2-6), Seoul (February 6-8),

Hong Kong (February 8-10, and Tokyo (February 10)

He returned to Washington on February 10.

Following are the Secretary's remarks,

news conferences, and toasts made on various

occasions during the trip.

En Route
to Tokyo

News Conference
January 30, 1983=

Q. Do you expect to be able to get a
chance to have much of a discussion
with Prime Minister Nakasone given
the situation with the parliament in
session right now?

A. —how the meeting is scheduled,
and I am sure I will, and with Foreign
Minister Abe.

Q. Do you anticipate that talking
with them would have much if any im-
pact on the decision which I under-
stand is being taken this week on the
defense budget?

A. Of course he will take the posi-
tions that he feels are right for Japan on
his defense budget. We will discuss
them, and I will tell him about develop-
ments in the United States. But, of
course, he was there himself very re-
cently, and this is kind of an extension
of that visit.

Q. What are your principal goals
for this visit? What would you like to

talk about? What would you like to
see accomplished?

A. In a broad way, this is part of
our effort to work with our friends in
Asia, and on this trip I will be visiting i
Japan, China, Korea, and Hong Kong.
Later on this year, I will go to the
ASEAN [Association of South East I
Asian Nations] countries foreign '

ministers meeting as an observer, and I
believe also at approximately the same
time, we will have a meeting with the
Australians and New Zealanders in
Washington. So we are very consciouslj
working on our relationships in this par
of the world.

It was interesting to me when I firs
arrived as Secretary of State, we had
Lee Kwan Yew [Prime Minister of
Singapore] there, and subsequently the
heads of state of Indonesia and the
Philippines were there, and the foreign
ministers of other important countries-
Thailand, Malaysia. So there is quite a
lot of activity in our diplomacy toward
Asia.

In response to your question, in a
sense this is the first part of, I would
call it, an "Asian journey." As far as thi:
trip is concerned, obviously our relation-
ships with Japan, China, and Korea are
of central importance to us. And, broad

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

speaking, we seek to develop those
ationships, identify problems, and set
motion and consolidate processes and
ve problems. There may be some
ecific things along the way that a con-
bution can be made to, but I think the
jectives are basically broad ones.

Q. Do you expect to see Prince
hanouk [of Kampuchea] in Beijing?
ould you see him if he's there?

A. If he is there and if it can be
irked out in terms of the scheduling,
rtainly, but we do not have it on the
hedule as of this moment. It will just
.ve to depend. Obviously, I am going
ere to visit with officials of the
=ople's Republic of China, and every-
ing about that will take precedence,
jt if he is there, I would like to see
m.

Q. What do you hope to find out
om the Chinese on this trip? Are
lere some misunderstandings that
)u can clear up on this occasion?

A. There are certain obvious prob-
ms, and then there are certain areas of
■nsion that do not represent issues of
-inciple but nevertheless are difficult. I
ould say something like the textile
igotiati'ons is a difficulty; it is a sort of
-pical trade negotiating difficulty, but it
)es not represent any underlying issue
' principle.

The problems involving Taiwan in-
Dlve basic principles and are somehow
lore difficult. At the same time, I hope
lat we can find a way to regard them
5 being in the background.

Our overall objective is to explore
le common interest and common
round, to put problems in perspective
f that overall common ground, and to
mphasize the common ground and see
' we can put the U.S. -China relationship
n a stable, sound, developing basis.

Q. At this point, do you have any
ndications from the Chinese that sug-
;est they are as eager as we are to
estore the tone and the stability of
lur relationship?

A. I think the fact that I am going
0 China shows that we place great
'alue and importance on our relationship
vith China. The fact that they have in-
/ited me and are ready to receive me, I
hink cordially with very serious
substantive orientation, suggests that
wth sides are very serious about the
/isit. Beyond that we will just have to
see how it goes.

Q. Do you expect to learn
anything from the Chinese about the
talks with the Soviet Union on this
journey?

A. I will be interested in anything
they will care to tell me about it and am
prepared to share our own views of the
evolving Soviet situation with them.

Q. How concerned are you about a
rapprochement between China and the
Soviet Union, or do you think that
that is something that is likely to go
either not very far or very, very
slowly?

A. I do not know. We will have to
see how that goes, and of course, it is
primarily for them and the Soviet Union
to work out and decide on their relation-
ship. There are some elements of, I pre-
sume, great concern to China about
Soviet behavior— for example in
Asia— that are also of great concern to
us. If, as a result of their discussions
with the Russians, Soviet behavior
changes, then I think that is a positive
development, but at any rate I will be
very interested in anything they have to
say about that.

Q. Do you expect to find common
ground with the Chinese on our ef-
forts in arms control with the Rus-
sians?

A. I have no doubt they will be in-
terested in our efforts in arms control,
and, of course, it is clear that they do
not favor an INF [intermediate-range
nuclear force] result that winds up with
a new number of SS-20s moving in
toward Asia. We are against that also,
and it is very much in our minds as we
negotiate in Geneva. So I have no doubt
that they will be interested in that sub-
ject, and I am prepared to discuss that
with them.

Q. Is one of the purposes of your
talking with the Chinese officials at
this point to give the President an
assessment of the new leadership in
the foreign policy area? What do you
expect to find when you meet the new
leaders for the first time?

A. Of course, I will be meeting the
Chinese leaders for the first time
myself, and I look forward to that, and
naturally I will gain some impressions
from them. It is one thing to read what
people say and analyze what they seem
to be doing, and it is another thing to
meet people. I do not want to act as

though I am overwhelmed by the impor-
tance of personal relationships, and yet,
they do have a role when you make an
assessment of the intent and outlook of
people. Of course, we have a continuing
stream of high-level visitors, private
visitors as well as public visitors, to
China and they tell me what their im-
pressions are. So it is not as though we
have no assessments of Chinese leader-
ship; of course we do.

Q. Will you be talking to them
about a possible trip by the President,
let's say within a year? Is that on your
agenda?

A. I think the question of exchanges
of visits in general is a subject that un-
doubtedly will come up, but I am not go-
ing to be explicitly discussing a presiden-
tial trip. I think that would be pre-
mature.

Q. Do you hope to work out a visit
bv Premier Zhao to Washington?

A. He has been invited to Washing-
ton, and I am certain to ask about their
response. I hope that he will be visiting
Washington.

Q. Secretary Haig on his trip to
China said an arrangement had been
made that the Chinese would begin to
think in terms of some American
military equipment and were supposed
to send a delegation to take a look at
it. They never did. Would you expect
them to put some new life into that
particular exercise?

A. I think it is a question of seeing
what can evolve now, and that is one
area where developments might take
place. There are a number of others, so
it is as though I am going to say I want
to promote this, I want to promote that,
I want to promote something else.

On the other hand, we have in-
terests, and they do, and if they are
mutually accommodative and a visit will
help, well certainly, we are prepared to
see that kind of exchange develop. When
you talk about the evolution and
development of a strong and stable and
forward moving relationship, it does not
in the end come out of discussions in a
high-level visit only but also in all follow-
on activity that may result from that in
a variety of fields. So, certainly, this is a
possible area.

Q. Do you include in that the ques-
tion of technology transfer which also
was promised at the time of the Haig
visit? I believe some new regulations
were drawn up, and there has not
been complete follow-through.

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

A. There is no doubt that that is an
important subject in our eyes, and I am
sure that it will be a subject that we will
discuss in some detail.

As I understand the priorities of
China, certainly one that they have em-
phasized in their public statements, and
understandably so, is their desire for
modernizing their economy, and high
technology is an element of such
modernization. I say "an element"
because at least in my observation, as an
economist and as a private businessman
having been involved in lots of projects
in countries that are developing, the
primary thrust of modernization and
development — well certainly, it is not
just high technology. There is a lot else,
and most major projects do not involve a
big element of high technology'. There
are other elements to that process, and I
certainly would want to bring out for
whatever interest there may be.

Q. Do you expect the subject of
nuclear technology to come up during
this visit, either in the context of ex-
changes between the United States
and China, or the question of China's
ratification of the Nonproliferation
Treaty and their alleged activities in
Pakistan?

A. Those are subjects that have got-
ten a lot of attention, and in one way or
another, I'm sure they'll be talked about.

Q. What do you have to say to
them on the subject?

A. I think that, on the one hand, I
believe there is a great deal to be gained
by the use of nuclear technology, prin-
cipally in the form of nuclear power. At
the same time, it seems to be appro-
priate for everybody in the world to be
concerned about nuclear proliferation in
the weapons sense, and it isn't pleasant
to contemplate that kind of technology'
being widely dispersed and the possibili-
ty of it falling into cavalier hands. Aside
from any particular thing, it's a subject
of general importance. We worry about
it obviously. There's an international
agency that worries about it, and, I
think, it's a matter for general concern.
I'm sure the Chinese are equally con-
cerned.

Q. This is not directly on the sub-
ject of this trip, but do you have any
reaction to the developments in El
Salvador vis-a-vis the U.S. policy
toward El Salvador at this point?

A. Implementing our strategy' in El
Salvador and Central America is very

important to us and to those people
there, and it's also difficult. The heart of
the strategy is to find conditions for
economic development to take place so
that the poverty of the region can be
alleviated and people can be better off.
We know that it's difficult for that to
take place when you have guerrilla war-
fare, insurgencies, and a general
upheaval that goes with that. So the
development of military strength and
ability to deal with those insurgencies is
important in El Salvador and in the
other countries. It's a hard problem. We
are dedicated to it and intend to keep
helping our friends in El Salvador and
other countries in the region. You take
two steps forward and one step back
and it seems to be that kind of a
process.

I think in the perspective of a couple
of years, we have made great strides. In
the perspective of shorter periods, you
go back and forth, and I think that the
problems that we've seen recently in
their military organization and govern-
mental problems are genuine difficulties,
but I think they will be overcome all
right.

Q. [Inaudible] thing is taking two
steps forward and one step back, now
is this the one step back?

A. 1 don't want to characterize any
particular individual or development as
forward or back by inference, but it's
certainly better to be arguing and work-
ing on the substance of what you should
be doing than preoccupied over the proc-
ess through which you're going to do it
because your eye is not on the main sub-
ject. That's the point that I was making.

Q. Can you sum up at all where we
stand on the Middle East after having
talked all week —

A. 1 think in the Middle East in the
last couple of months and in the some-
what longer time period, we made a fair
amount of headway, most of it not
generally visible. At the same time, the
visible and important developments that
we work for and hope for and expect
have not taken place as yet.

King Hussein has yet to declare
himself, and we want to see that hap-
pen. We encourage the process of bring-
ing that about in a manner that is King
Hussein's stepping forward. But more
than that, stepping forward with the
right kind of support from the Arab
community so that the outcome of subse-
quent negotiations would have a sort of
broad support and thereby broaden the
acceptance of the peace that we hope
for. All of that takes time, and I think

that considerable strides have been
made, but yet we still look for King
Hussein to step forward. That hasn't
happened yet.

In Lebanon our objectives are clear
and so are the difficulties of attaining
them. At this point there is a pretty
wide gap, I would say, between the cor
ditions that Israel feels it needs in orde
to withdraw and the conditions that
Lebanon feels are consistent with the
emergence of a new Lebanon and as
sovereign and in control of its territorii
and able to govern itself and develop it
relationships in the region. So there an
some big gaps there.

The problems of securing the com-
plete withdrawal of the Syrian and PLi
[Palestine Liberation Organization]
forces we have confronted, in a sense ti
the extent that you can confront them
the moment, that is, the Syrians say
they will withdraw when the Israelis
withdraw. I think we also have good
grounds to believe that the PLO will gc
with the Syrians or will withdraw as th
Syrians withdraw.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. It's for that reason, I guess, tha
it appears as though our efforts are
more directed toward the Israeli-
Lebanon dimensions than they are the
Lebanon-PLO dimension because it
takes a plan for Israeli withdrawal to
provide the acid test of the Syrian statt
ments. So we are in the midst of the
kind of a process, and I wish I could
report that there were breakthroughs i:
the offing. I'm sure there are, but I can
identify them [laughter].

Q. Do you believe the conditions
are such that the Israelis could safely
withdraw now? You say they don't
seem to believe so at this point.

A. What I said was that the condi-
tions that they have put forward are
quite different from the conditions that
the Lebanese seem to be ready to ac-
cept, so there is a gap there that has to
be worked on by both parties. In the
end, of course, people have to be their
own judges of what their security
demands are. But of course, we have
our opinions also, and we're in with
them.

Q. What is your analysis?

A. I believe there is a genuine con-
vergence of views on finding appropriat
security arrangements for southern
Lebanon so that you have a real in-
surance policy that the geographic area
doesn't become the base for attacks on

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

rael. That is accepted as a legitimate
)jective.

So the question is what does it take
do that and how do you do that, and
)t whether it should be done. My own
union is that it can be done, and it
ight to be possible to do it consistent
ith appropriate sovereignty for
ebanon. But I am not able just to write
it the ticket and hand it to people, and
lere is a big difference of view about
hat is necessary.

Beyond that are the issues surround-
g so-called normalization, and that's a
iferent kind of an issue entirely and
as not part of the announced rationale
)r going into Lebanon in the first place
at, nevertheless, is an objective. I
ould say from the U.S. point of view
lat, of course, we believe that the
esirable objective is peace among Israel
nd all of its neighbors.

To that extent, I think the basic
eace process involving not only Israel's
jcurity but the legitimate concerns and
ghts of the Palestinians is, in the
eepest sense, at the heart of the securi-
f issues because if that can be resolved
1 a satisfying way, then the tension of
ne sort of militarily-oriented security
rrangements is much less. This always
ikes me in my thinking back to the
asic Camp David September 1st Presi-
ent's proposal as really the core of the
ssues to be resolved.

Q. There was a time when you
vere saying and when the people in
our Department were saying over and
(ver again that withdrawal of all
breign forces from Lebanon could be
iccomplished very quickly. I take it
rom our comments today that you
vould not make that statement today?

A. I would say it could have been
iccomplished very quickly. It could be
iccomplished very quickly, but it hasn't
jeen accomplished very quickly because
;here have developed some very con-
siderable differences of opinion about
ivhat is necessary in these areas that
I've spoken of.

Q. Given that and the fact that
you say that the disagreements are
very wide, what are the next steps for
the United States? What do we do
tomorrow, next week, and the week
after?

A. We have to constantly appraise
the positions of the parties as we see
them and consider them and try to
figure out ways the objectives —
legitimate objectives— might be met con-

sistent with the needs of the parties. In
any negotiation, you are constantly do-
ing that and that's basically what is go-
ing on. We were interested to listen to
[Egyptian] President Mubarak talk
about the subject. He's very concerned
about it, and I must say has in both his
public and private statements put a
great deal of emphasis on the impor-
tance of bringing about resolutions
promptly. I agree that the situation just
doesn't remain constant. It's a situation
in flux, and there is a great premium on
trying to get things accomplished in a
short space of time.

Q. But how?

A. If you have the answer I'd be
delighted to know. It's obvious that
we're struggling with it, and perhaps
we're getting somewhere. The fact that
people are talking about the problems
and working at them, and in the process
of doing that, assessing what the needs
of each other are which always in any
negotiations you're constantly appraising
and struggling to see if you can find
other ways of meeting the needs that
are mutually satisfactory. That's the
nature of a negotiation.

Q. You said some months ago that
you didn't feel that your presence was
needed there— you personally going to
the Middle East. Do you still feel
strongly about that today?

A. I think there are very able peo-
ple there working with the parties in
these negotiations, and I think we have
an extremely strong team working on
behalf of the United States and on
behalf of getting the issues resolved.
With our ambassadorial group out in the
Middle East, it's an extremely high-
quality group of people; and Maurie
Draper is able, knowledgeable: and Phil
Habib is also as the overall Mideast
negotiator; Dick Fairbanks is involved,
and in Washington a strong group, so
we have a strong and well-coordinated
effort going on. If a time comes when a
trip by me to that region would seem to
be helpful, certainly I'm ready to make
it.

Q. That time has not come?

A. I'm not oriented to trips for the
sake of a trip. I have been looking at my
schedule, and there are plenty of trips, I
can tell you.

Q. I take it from what you have
said you're not one of those who think
the solution is leveling the boom on
Israel?

A. I don't think that forcing people
to do things that they believe is against
their interest produces lasting solutions
to the problems. I don't think it will pro-
duce a lasting solution for Israel to force
Lebanon to do something that Lebanon
feels deeply is not in its interest.

By the same token, I think you ap-
ply that to any important party in a
negotiation, so obviously negotiations
are surrounded by an environment of
pressures and considerations and
arguments. I don't deem that negotia-
tions are abstracted from that, but just
trying to push people around all the
time, I don't think, is the way. You
might get a solution but it wouldn't
necessarily be lasting.

Q. Would some kind of a summit
conference with Prime Minister Begin
and perhaps with the Lebanese Presi-
dent help at this point if the differ-
ences are so wide, so broad?

A. There are all sorts of procedural
things that can be tried. I think you
have to ask yourself: Is there something
inherently wrong with the negotiating
process that exists where there is an in-
ability to communicate or truly under-
stand' or something like that that needs
an impulse from a different direction?
So far as I can see and has been re-
ported to me, there is a good exchange
of views, and the forum that exists for
the negotiation is a perfectly adequate
one. There is also plenty of ability to
communicate at a high level directly and
through Phil Habib. So it isn't as though
somehow there is a stalling-out process
because of a lack of communication. I'm
not saying that high-level meetings
aren't sometimes very useful, but I don't
see the evidence that that's what is
needed now.

Q. The Egyptians, perhaps in-
cluding Mubarak himself, think that
the Israelis are dragging out the
negotiations, stalling, trying to carry
them into the presidential election
campaign —

A. I doubt very much that that's the
case, because I think there are benefits
to everybody involved to having a settle-
ment. After all, people are still getting
killed over in Lebanon, so if you can
save a few lives of your countrymen,
that's got to be important, and so on. So
you hear that statement made. In fact, I
read an interview the other day from
Israeli Defense Minister Sharon in which

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

he more or less explicitly said that. I
don't think underneath it all that that's
true.

Q. The Egyptians were also say-
ing, and other Arabs have suggested,
that there is a very narrow window to
get this accomplished because there is
the fact of creeping annexation or de
facto annexation of the West Bank,
and at a certain point they really won't
be able to negotiate. Do you subscribe
to any part of that, and how much of a
window do you think there is?

A. Obviously, the more land and
resources taken up by settlements, the
less room for maneuver, in one sense. I
think it's worth pointing out that in the
presenting of his proposals, the Presi-
dent was explicit about his view that
Jews should have the right to live on the
West Bank and in Gaza. At the same
time, if there were settlements existing
in a geographic area that it was decided
should be under some jurisidiction other
than Israel's, then whoever lived in
those settlements would live in the
jurisidiction that was there. So in that
sense, to some extent, it reduces the im-
portance a little. Nevertheless I think
there is a great deal of power to the
argument that the longer time runs and
the more extensive the settlements are,
the more difficult it is and more futile it
seems to the Arabs to conduct a negotia-
tion, partly because of the substance,
the so-called facts on the ground that
are created, and partly because it ap-
pears to them to be a message about
what the conceivable outcome of the
negotiation might be.

Q. Let me ask a question on
Japan. The Alaskan oil business, is
that going to come up and the ques-
tion of the value of the dollar vis-a-vis
the value of the yen which some peo-
ple think is the central issue in the
deficit? Will you spend much time on
that issue?

A. I imagine that the energy sub-
ject— I'm sure that will come up, and
Alaskan oil is part of that subject. A
working group is being established to
look at the energy subjects more broad-
ly, including Alaskan oil.

Of course, for oil to go from Alaska
to Japan there would have to be a
cachet or the taking away of the prohibi-
tion, and that would clearly involve a lot
of legislative strategy and negotiation.
The people who are very interested in
that development — particularly the
Alaskans, many of whom wonder why it
should be that oil from 49 States of the

Union should be possible to go anywhere
the owner of the oil wants to send it,
but the oil produced in the most difficult
of circumstances is restricted. But the
Alaskans, certainly the Alaskan
Senators particularly, I know want to
see this subject move forward, and so
we'll be talking about it certainly.

Your other subject was the value of
the dollar and the yen. It's a very impor-
tant subject, and it's a very difficult sub-
ject. It's a difficult subject analytically
and then to the extent that you feel any
degree of confidence in your analysis,
then it's not so easy to know exactly
what to do about it. But certainly the
problem is there, and to me the problem
is well illustrated by the difficulties of
Caterpillar tractor. Here you have a
company— marvelous company — very
well managed, good products, extremely
experienced in international trade — can't
say this is a company that somehow
doesn't know how to operate abroad. It
has been more successful than almost
any other company in the world. It's a
fantastic operation — and with the surge
in the value of the dollar against the
yen, last year it practically knocked
Caterpillar out of traditional third
markets.

I suppose you would say: Well, that
is somehow a reflection of long-term
values, so be it. But in late May, I
remember being in Japan discussing this
issue with Japanese leaders, and the
value was in the neighborhood of 230
yen to the dollar, and most of the people
I talked to seemed to think it ought to
go to 210-200 or something on that
order. Two or three months later, in-
stead of going in that direction it had
gone to around 280, and that just made
the relative prices of the Japanese and
U.S. products totally different. There is
nothing you can do about it as an
American manufacturer or labor force.
But now it's back to 230 again, so that
we have this movement that you can
only call a blip, but it had very severe
consequences. There's something wrong
with that. So we can see the problem.

Analytically why did that happen? If
you understand why it happened, what
do you do about it? I'm not settled in my
own mind that I do understand how that
happened. I have a feeling that the
United States in its currency is seeing a
kind of Switzerland-effect where the
value of the dollar is being affected very
powerfully by financial movements that
are very different from what you would
expect if you were looking purely at
trade matters.

Historically, we have always thoughl"
of these values as reflecting essentially
trade flows, inflation rates, and things ^
of that kind. Interest rates have the ef- '
feet, but I think there is also [inaudible]
yet this quick movement of a very large
magnitude, we've got to figure out a
way to get a hand on that, but I don't
know what that way is. I have some
ideas, but I'm not ready to talk about
that.

Q. Former Secretary Kissinger in
an article in today's or tomorrow's
whatever date this is now, Washing-
ton Post — Sunday anvway — makes
some suggestions about your trip to
China. He says that he believes that
China, on this technology front,
should be considered in the category
of India or Yugoslavia, you know, all
these regulations. Did he make that
recommendation to you, and what do
you think of that idea?

A. First of all, in Secretary
Kissinger's very interesting, thoughtful
article, he says that the Chinese always
believe that nothing takes place by acci-
dent. That being the case, the Chinese
must believe that his article has some of
ficial standing, and it doesn't. I don't
mean by that to suggest that I'm criticiz
ing his article. I'm just saying that it's
his article, and it's an interesting article.

We'll be discussing the technology
transfer issues, and I think that India-
Yugoslavia comparison is a handy short-
hand that people have. At the same
time, I think China is a unique country,
and I don't think of China as part of a
class of countries, but as a country that
is important and needs to be thought of
in its own terms and its own right. So I
wouldn't say that because we treat
Yugoslavia some way, we should treat
China the same way, nor vice versa. The
China dimension deserves careful and
special consideration. Having said that,
I'm sure we'll try to work out a way of
handling technology transfer that ex-
presses the regard in which we hold our
relationship with China.

Department of State Bulletir

THE SECRETARY

okyo

;marks at

iidanren Luncheon,
■bruary 1, 19832

hould say that I particularly wel-
ned the invitation to meet with you,
part because I feel as though I am
ily among friends. I have known
/eral of you. I have done business
th some of you. Of course, the
'idanren is well known for its ac-
ities. I think it is no exaggeration to
/ that through your efforts as a group
d individually in your companies, you
ve rearranged the world landscape in
3 economic sense. Now together the
lited States and Japan, representing a
ird or so of the world's gross national
oduct, have a responsibility for our
'n good and for the good of others to

everything we can to see that the
stem of trade and finance that stood

so well continues to flourish. But
sre are many problems.

Let me make a brief comment first
out the scene in the United States,
d then I'll make a few other comments
out the significance of the trading
stem as I see it.

First, in the foreign policy area, I
ink the fundamentals of the
•esident's policies are very clear, con-
;tent, and constant. You expressed
eir essence already. First of all, let us

realistic about what is taking place
ound the world not only with respect

the Soviet Union but also with
spect to our friends in the developing
■untries. Let us also start by being
alistic with ourselves.

Second, let us recognize that we
ust be strong if we are to be able to
"fend our interests and to help our
lies defend their interests. So the
resident has undertaken a major effort
1 strengthen our defense forces. He
elcomes the attention of each coun-
•y — our allies in Europe, in other parts
? the world, and in Japan — to look to
leir own situation and decide for them-
?lves the level of strength that's con-
stent with their own capacities to de-
;nd their interests and to deter aggres-
on.

That strategy, I believe, is a winning
ne, and it has already changed the
Ituation around the world. Perhaps one

example will serve. Five or six years
ago, a proposal was made to the Soviet
Union that negotiations be undertaken
to reduce strategic armaments. That
proposal was taken seriously. Now,
however, the Soviet Union and the
United States are at the bargaining
table on intermediate-range weapons, on
strategic weapons, on conventional arms
in Vienna, all having to do with reduc-
tions in arms. Of course, this follows
from the President's overall objective of
peace, but a peace with justice, peace
that allows people to undertake their
own economic development as they see
it in their own way.

So that is one strategy, a strategy of
peace through realism, through
strength, and also through the readiness
always to reason and to try to find a
constructive relationship.

Third, I'll talk briefly about economic
matters. Here again there has been put
in place a strategy, I believe. The
strategy confronted the related prob-
lems of high inflation, very high interest
rates, low rates of saving, relatively low
rates of investment, and, thereby, lag-
ging productivity in the American
economy. The President's strategy set
out to do something about those
matters.

We can say at this point that the
rate of inflation has come down dras-
tically, far more rapidly than anyone
thought was possible. Interest rates
have also fallen very sharply, although
they are tending to lag behind the
decline in the rate of inflation because of
the nagging concern about whether in-
flation might come back. But, as people
in the marketplace and in the financial
community become more convinced that
inflation has truly been brought to heel,
then particularly the long-term rates of
interest will also decline.

At the same time, changes have
been made in our tax system which,
when combined with the reduction in in-
flation and the greater availability of
modes of investment, yield market rates
of return. Those things together are
designed to stimulate the rate of sav-
ings, and we are beginning to see that
that strategy is working, and the rate of
savings is starting to increase.

The President introduced a new
budget just yesterday. It shows a larger
deficit than we would like. Nevertheless,
it's true that the bulk of that deficit
would be erased if the economy were to
expand to a high level of operation.

I believe that the American economy

is now starting to expand. That ought to
be happening according to any notion of
what follows from a stimulative
monetary and fiscal policy, and I believe
the statistics show that expansion is now
getting underway. I find that in check-
ing around with friends of mine in the
business community, I say to them:
"Well, anyone can read the statistics,
but you have your hand on the market-
place. You have your hand on what is
going on. How does it feel?" And for
many months during the year 1982, they
told me it feels very cool. But more
recently, in the last month or two, the
word I have been getting is that there
are definite signs of life there, so that
the feel of the marketplace is healthier.

At this point, as expansion takes
place, there have been tremendous cost
savings brought about throughout
American business, and as expansion
takes place, I think we will see costs
kept under control. We'll see productiv-
ity rise, and the stage will be set for a
movement in investment that is a
necessary part of this whole strategy.

Basically, the point that I want to
make here, as in the area of foreign
policy, is that there is a strategy, it has
been thought through, it has been put in
place, and it's a struggle, of course. But
it is beginning to work.

Now let me turn finally to the ques-
tion of our trading system. Certainly, I
don't have to belabor the point with this
group that it's critical for all of us that
this system maintain its health. I would
say, first of all, around the world there
is a widespread view that in many
critical areas, the Japanese market has
not been truly open to competition from
abroad. You've heard that a great deal.
It is not a reference to high tariffs. It's a
reference to nontariff barriers of various
kinds.

Since Japan has been such a success-
ful exporter, this allegation — in which, I
believe there is considerable foundation
and fact — constitutes a major question
of concern, and I have been personally
very glad to see the moves undertaken
by Prime Minister Nakasone. I feel cer-
tain that he means them: to take further
steps in opening up this marketplace. I
believe further steps are necessary.

The thing that has been most strik-
ing to me in talking to him and talking
to people in other ministries, particularly
the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, of course, is the sense that one
feels a commitment to follow through on
these general policy statements. We all
know, as businessmen and as managers,
that a policy stated at the top doesn't

larch 1983

THE SECRETARY

mean much unless you are prepared to
take the managerial steps necessary to
make it operational throughout the com-
pany or throughout the government. So
this commitment to follow through is a
matter of tremendous importance.
I think that the year or so im-
mediately ahead of us is a critical one in
the battle to keep the forces of protec-
tion under control and to maintain a
reasonable openness in the trading
system. We all need to do everything we
can to see that particularly statutory
changes that are very difficult to get rid
of once they get in place don't come
about. Right now, for example, in the
United States, we have unemployment
close to 11%, and it's high in other parts
of the world. The psychology will be
very different a year or so from now if
the expansion that, I think, is getting
underway actually does take place. This
is because it will bring fairly rapid in-
creases in employment, even though, no
doubt, the rate of unemployment will be
rather stubborn. The whole psychology
is mightily affected by what happens to
the opportunities for jobs. When employ-
ment is rising, the American economy is
a tremendous job producer. Once this
starts rolling, it will affect the psycholo-
gy. So we have a tough year ahead of
us, and I believe that together the
United States and Japan must take the
leadership in this great battle to keep
our systems open ones.

News Conference,
February 1, 19833

Q. I would like to ask the Secretary
for his evaluation of our Prime
Minister's recent visit to the United
States. How do the leaders and
members of the U.S. Government,
such as President Reagan himself,
yourself, and Secretary Weinberger
evaluate his visit? We have received
various reports from the United
States, but, if I may, I would like to
hear your evaluation or impression
directly.

A. Prime Minister Nakasone's visit
to the United States was a tremendous
success. He made a strong impression
on the President, the members of the
Cabinet, the Members of Congress, and
all who met him as a very well-informed,
decisive, and strong person. He was ac-
companied by Foreign Minister Abe,
who also was very impressive during his
visit, and we were delighted to see them

and look forward to continuing oppor-
tunities, such as my visit here now, to
continue our discussions and work with
them.

Q. When we look at the budget
message covering fiscal year 1984 and
the defense report issued recently, a
tremendous amount of funds is al-
located to the defense area. Also there
is a matter of collective defense with
European countries. South Korea, and
Japan. Against this background, the
"Team Spirit" military exercise is
starting today. North Korea has
reacted to this by calling for a state-
of-readiness on the part of all its
forces. It is the first time North Korea
has called for a state-of-readiness of
its forces and is treating the stitua-
tion as if war is on the brink of break-
ing out. What sort of comment would
you make to this situation?

The second point concerns the
defense of the sea-lanes by Japan. In
connection with this ramification of
collective defense, we are very much
interested and very much concerned
with the sea-lanes defense matter. In
this connection, to what level and ex-
tent do you think Japan's defense
capabilities should be enhanced to
meet the expectations that Japan faces
from other countries? What do you
think would be a reasonable level of
defense capability on the part of Japan
to discharge its responsibility com-
pared to the present level?

A. With respect to the first ques-
tion, people throughout the world are in-
terested in peace. The United States and
its allies will start no wars. Our efforts
to build up our defense forces are ef-
forts to create the capacity to deter ag-
gression. That is our objective. And if
our opposition can be convinced of that,
perhaps they will even agree with us to
reduce the level of armaments. But we
know that we must have the strength to
defend our interests against aggression
and to work with our allies in doing so
as well. I think that is the basic point,
and it applies whether we are thinking
with respect to the Soviet Union, North
Korea, what is happening in Kampuchea
or throughout the world.

With respect to the second question,
Japan has set for itself the mission of
being responsible for the defense of the
air space of Japan and for the seas
around Japan. And I think that is a very
appropriate mission, given the fact that

Japan is obviously a seafaring nation
and depends upon air and sea traffic an^
movement. It is clear that to fulfill
responsibilities in connection with that
mission, more needs to be done. How
much more remains to be seen. But cer-
tainly a greater effort is necessary. Ara
no one disputes that. The question is,
how rapidly can this mission be taken
up? We applaud the determination that
Prime Minister Nakasone has been ex-
pressing in this regard.

Q. With regard to the possible
transfer of SS-20 missiles from the
Soviet Union's European territory to
the Far East, Japan has expressed ap'
prehensions. I would like to ask
whether you, or in your talks with the
Japanese side jointly, have any plans
of involving China in the discussion o
what to do concerning such Soviet
plans, if they should materialize?

A. The President's proposals being
negotiated in Geneva are for the com-
plete elimination of intermediate-range,
nuclear warhead, land-based missiles, as
the President put it last night, "from th^
face of the Earth." That is not only
within the range of Europe but also
Japan and China. That is the proposal
that the President has put on the table.

I think it should be noted that this
involves not only the question of what t(
do about missiles that might be moved
from the range of Europe but also what
to do about the missiles already
deployed within the range of Japan and
China.

Q. Looking at relations between
Japan and the United States recently,
it seems that trade friction has
become less important since Prime
Minister Nakasone assumed power. Isi
it correct to say that the two countries
decided to solve at least part of the
trade friction problem through ex-
change of military technology or
through an improvement of Japanese
expenditures for defense? What are
the trade problems which are still to
be discussed and which you have been
discussing with Japanese leaders in
these days?

A. There is no trade-off between an
exchange of military technology and the
solution of so-called trade frictions in-
volving access to Japanese markets or
other such things. These are independ-
ent matters.

Of course, we were all pleased — the
President was pleased — at the an-
nouncements that Prime Minister
Nakasone made before he came to the
United States for some additional

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

leasures, particularly measures dealing
/ith the processes through which goods
rom another country get into the
apanese market and for changing those
onditions of inspection and registration
,nd so on. And it has been interesting
nd reassuring to hear also the sense in
I'hich the Japanese in charge have a
:ood sense of the fact that it is not
nough to set a policy. There has to be a
ind of managerial follow-through to
ransform a policy statement into an
'perating reality.

There appears to be a firm grasp of
hat point and, at least expressed to me,
. determination to follow through on it.
'hat will, of course, not be the end of all
hese frictions, but it will be a great
lelp.

I might say beyond the particulars
if whatever trade disputes there are
letween the United States and Japan,
ve share a tremendous stake in main-
aining the general openness of the
vorld trading system. And that the
)penness is under severe attack by
brces of protectionism around the
vorld. I think that it well behooves
lapan and the United States together,
tnd along with other countries, to, in a
;ense, take responsibility for keeping
his system open and healthy, because
ve both have so much to gain as do
)thers around the world.

Q. [There have been] numerous
jublished reports on both sides of the
Pacific that Ambassador Mansfield is
eaving shortly and that the Ad-
ministration intends to replace—
would you care to comment on that?

A. i think Ambassador Mansfield is
3ne of our most distinguished Ameri-
:ans, and we intend to keep him on the
job [laughter]. He looks great. I would
add just a word on that.

Japan is one of the world's most im-
tportant countries. And so, when it
icomes to selecting a person from the
United States to represent us here, we
have to find for ourselves a really
distinguished American. I believe that
we are very fortunate in the United
States to have such a person here in the
person of Mike Mansfield. It's good for
the United States, and I can't help but
feel that the Japanese people also ap-
preciate the high quality that this
wonderful man brings to his work.

Q. When you talk about the
defense of the sea-lanes, the starting
point is the Middle East and the end-
ing point is in Japan, from my point of

view. The United States guarantees
the security of Israel, but the crux of
the issue. I think, is Palestine and the
Palestinian people. And so without
providing a solution to that issue, an
overall solution could not be hoped
for. I would like to ask when the
United States is going to sit at the
table with the PLO.

A. I think the central issue you cor-
rectly state as "finding the conditions in
the Middle East that will, at once,
satisfy the security needs of Israel and
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people." The President on September 1st
proposed a set of ideas which we called
a "fresh start" in working on this proc-
ess. These ideas fall squarely within the
framework of the Camp David accords,
which have produced progress with the
return of the Sinai and peace between
Israel and Egypt. We believe it's essen-
tial to pursue this course, and we are
trying. The President is trying every-
thing that he can to bring about the
discussions that will satisfy the condi-
tions I have mentioned.

As far as the PLO is concerned, the
President has stated very clearly the
conditions under which the U.S. Govern-
ment would talk directly with the PLO.
Remembering that the PLO is an organi-
zation that has in its charter a provision
calling for the extinction of the State of
Israel, we believe it's appropriate, that
before we will hold discussions with the
PLO, they simply renounce that and say
they recognize Israel's right to exist and
the formulas for peace embodied in U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for
proceeding in the Middle East. When
they do that, the U.S. Government will
be ready to sit down and talk with them.

Q. In response to an earlier ques-
tion, you pointed out that the Presi-
dent's proposal in Geneva calls for the
elimination of all of the medium-range
missiles wherever they may be. The
President has also said he would
entertain any serious Soviet offer.
Some months ago the U.S. negotiator,
Mr. Nitze, seriously considered and
talked with his Soviet counterpart
about a proposal that would leave at
least 90 SS-20s in Asia. Were you
able, in your talks here, to tell the
Japanese Government that under no
circumstances would the United
States be willing to make an agree-
ment which leaves medium-range
missiles in Asia? And can you so state
here today?

A. The President has said, first, he
favors and has proposed to the Soviet
Union that all of these weapons, where
ever deployed, be eliminated. That is the
U.S. position.

He has also said we are willing to
listen and talk to them about any
reasonable proposal. If they have a pro-
posal to make as a counter to what the
United States has said, let's hear it; we'll
examine it. So far we haven't heard any
proposal that qualifies under the terms
that I just mentioned. The negotiations
are resuming in Geneva now, and the
place to conduct those negotiations is at
Geneva at the bargaining table.

I would like to just take this public
occasion to express my appreciation to
my hosts here in Japan for the extra-
ordinary warmth and courtesy of the
reception that I, my wife, and my party
have received. Respect for the United
States was shown by the fact that we
were received by the Emperor and in
our discussions with the Prime Minister,
the Foreign Minister — my host — and all
the other people, private and public. The
treatment that I have received has been
cordial and generous, and the approach
to our discussions a very serious and in-
formed one. And I appreciate this spirit
very much.

En Route
to Beijing

News Conference,
February 2, 1983^

Q. Are you going to speak just in
general terms?

A. No, I think general terms is the
appropriate level, and just leave it at
that. I am not here selling arms.

Q. How important is it to the
whole U.S. -China relationship in your
mind to try to establish some sort of a
military sales relationship between the
two countries?

A. I think the relationship has to be
seen as a broad one that in a sense is
responsive to the needs that each coun-
try has both in bilateral and in interna-
tional terms. So as time goes along
needs rise and fall, and we have to be
ready to look at them. That doesn't
mean that everything anybody wants on
either side will necessarilv be accom-

March1983

THE SECRETARY

modated. But I think that is the spirit
we ought to approach this relationship
in.

Q. Are you anticipating any re-
quests to come soon or is there any
reason to believe that—

A. I don't want to try to predict
what they may say or want, but I am
certainly prepared to respond to any-
thing that they want to bring up in this
area. Of course, if it came to particulars,
that is a matter that is best handled by
the various military people.

Q. So you say you are prepared to
respond, prepared to give an indica-
tion that the United States is favor-
ably inclined toward that kind of ex-
change?

A. We are certainly prepared to
discuss what needs they may have
within the framework of earlier discus-
sions, which essentially emphasized
defensive problems and on which
nothing much has happened. So maybe
there isn't anything in anybody's mind,
but if there is why then —

Q. One of the main developments
since Secretary Haig was over here in
June of 1981 is that the Chinese have
now carved out what they have re-
ferred to as an independent foreign
policy. What is the U.S. attitude and
what is yours? What are you prepared
to tell them about our views of the in-
dependent foreign policy that they
have carved out for themselves?

A. I assume any country of the—
well, probably any country but par-
ticularly a country of the size and impor-
tance of China or the United States, will
have an independent foreign policy in
the sense that you have to be guided by
the things that you think are in the in-
terests of your country. I think it is
quite apparent in the kind of world that
we live in that alliances and the iden-
tification of common needs and objec-
tives among countries are an essential
part of an effective foreign policy. So to
that regard, we have alliances and have
identified common interests with a
number of countries, and I assume ob-
viously there are some with respect to
China. I would expect that we would
have some discussion of those things,
but that doesn't compromise anyone's in-
dependence.

Q. Of course, the way the inde-
pendent foreign policy is actually
worked is that they have gone on the

attack more against the United States
in areas that they don't like— the
Third World. Africa, Middle East, and
that sort of thing.

A. In some cases, perhaps in all
cases, what those comments reflect are
a misunderstanding and to the extent
that is so, perhaps my visit can correct
some of those misunderstandings, or at
least we can talk out what our dif-
ferences are.

You mentioned the Middle East. I
am certainly prepared to talk about our
policies, objectives, how we see the Mid-
dle East situtation, and listen to what
they have to say. We can discuss that,
and I can explain some of our percep-
tions of what is going on and so on
around the world.

Q. To what extent do you expect
to find the same or greater level of
anxiety as you found in Japan over the
present deplovment of SS-20s in Asia
and future deployment of them as they
relate to INF talks?

A. As in Japan, I am certainly ready
to discuss the issues involved in our
arms control negotiations. Again, it is
not for me to try to predict what they
are going to bring up or what their con-
cerns are. But I am ready to talk about
our view of the matter and our position
and listen to their views and concerns
whatever they may be. I can't help but
believe that if there are some 99, I
understand, SS-20s that have China
within their range that that isn't a mat-
ter of some concern. But at any rate, it
is for them to express their concerns.

Q. You haven't any indication
going in that they are particularly
worried about some kind of a deal
whereby another hundred might show
up on the eastern side of the Urals?

A. They have not sent me any tele-
gram saying that, no.

Q. Didn't they put out a statement
yesterday saying that there is so much
commotion on the issue, they don't
think there is going to be an agree-
ment anyway? I saw something on the
wire about that.

A. Everyone is free to express their
opinion. In the meantime, the missiles
are there, and whether there is an
agreement or not, at present the mis-
siles are there. If there is no agreement,
we will have some deployments. We con-
tinue to believe that the best arrange-
ment for everybody concerned, including
the Soviet Union, is to eliminate these
weapons.

Q. Do you think the fact that the
President has now said that Mr.
Bush's mission was mainly for propa-
ganda purposes is going to make your
discussions on the SS-20s more dif-
ficult with China?

A. I think you have put that in a
provocative way. We are, both the Vice
President and I, in separate parts of the
world discussing issues of substance and
talking with leaders in the various coun-
tries being visited, and the Vice Presi-
dent is making some public statements.
They are substantive and designed to
tell everybody as clearly as we can what
our positions are and why they are what
they are and to express those. If you
want to call that propaganda, that is
fine, but I think that the public in
Europe and everywhere around the
world is interested in knowing our view-
points.

Q. But, I mean, I didn't call it
that. I believe it was the President
who said that, if I read the wires cor-
rectly.

A. I think my statement still stands.
You are trying to inform the public, and
that is a shorthand way of expressing it,
I suppose.

Q. Is that simply a response to the
Soviet propaganda offensive?

A. No, we have done that right
along. The Vice President's trip actually
had been planned, thought out, quite
some time ago. The drama of the trip
seemed to be enhanced by its immediate
environment. And I think if I may on
that, that obviously the President
recognized as the timing of the trip was
being worked out and so on, that this
was an important mission at a time
when the whole question of arms reduc-
tion negotiations and deployments are
being debated in Europe to have a per-
son of the Vice President's stature as a
person, as well as his official stature, go
over and enter the debate.

Q. The Polish Foreign Minister
put out a statement, whose words I
don't have, but in effect calls on the
United States for improvement in rela-
tions with Poland following the
changes made in December in martial
law. The statement seems to suggest
that he would be interested in at least
opening some exchange on what needs
to be done to restore relations. Do you
see any opportunity for that at this
time, and have you seen enough hap-
pen in Poland to justify a change in
U.S. relations with the government
there?

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

A. We have been evaluating, along
'ith our allies, the developments in
:'oland. Some seem to be a step forward
nd some seem to be a step backward,
3 I think it is rather an ambiguous
uestion whether or not there has been
ny genuine movement. Lech Walesa is
ut of jail but yet he is constrained
learly in a great many ways, so that is
ist an example of something. Obviously
re would like to see progress in Poland
long the lines of the points we and our
Hies have made. If there are oppor-
jnities for those developments to take
lace, we are all for that. And that
/ould mean that our relationship would
e better.

Q. But you haven't seen anything
et, I take it, that would justify a
hange soon in U.S. attitude toward
he Polish Government?

A. No, not that I know of, although
riaybe you have something off the wires
hat I haven't seen.

Q. No, it was a reference to the
'ope's visit that suggested that propa-
ganda—

Q. What about the North Korean
ituation? Some people say that they
lave only done such an alert three
imes in their history and each time it
vas involved with the Pueblo or the
ailing of those two Americans. Any-
lody worried about it?

A. It is something to watch. But I
lon't know of any good reason for it.

Q. Do you think it is provocative
»n their part?

A. Certainly it is provocative on
;heir part. It raises the level of tensions,
)ut I don't know of any reason to expect
;ome particular explosion there.

Q. Would you tell us something
ibout your own experience with China
and Taiwan? I know you have never
Seen to China. You have been to
laiwan on several occasions, I gather,
as a businessman. Have you talked to
the Chinese, either in business or in
your Treasury job or in some other
capacity? What has been your own in-
teraction with China up to now, up
until today?

A. I have met a number of Chinese
officials as they would come through
San Francisco when I [inaudible], and I
met some during the Nixon Administra-
tion when I was in office but never had
the opportunity to go to China. I almost
went a number of times as a private
businessman, but the projects we were
interested in never seemed to be quite

materializing, so in the end I did not go.
But there have been quite a number of
people — some in the financial field, some
in the engineering area that have come
through — that I have talked to. Very,
very able people.

Q. How many times were you in
Taiwan?

A. I do not know exactly. I would
have to —

Q. Just about? A dozen times,
three or four?

A. Probably four times or so. I am
just guessing.

Q. As a businessman?

A. Yes, all together as a business-
man.

Q. Are you concerned that the
Chinese are providing nuclear
weapons data to Pakistan?

A. I do not have any comment to
make about that matter.

Q. Has any nuclear cooperation
been completely ruled out now? It was
at one point being investigated, and I
think Mr. Stoessel [former Under
Secretary for Political Affairs] at one
point talked about their hopes for
nuclear cooperation with the Chinese.
Is that now completely dead?

A. There were some discussions
basically having to do with nuclear
power plants, I believe, and the possible
interests of the Chinese in the American
[inaudible], and it may very well be that
those talks can resume. But we have
regulations that our government ad-
ministers having to do with the condi-
tions under which nuclear technology
can be sold abroad. And so if those
discussions do reemerge, we will need to
sort of focus on the issues brought up by
those regulations.

Q. Have you seen the entire text of
the Bush speech on the Andropov-
Reagan summit? But I was wondering
if there is some implication there that
the President would meet with
Andropov for some element of
negotiation or they would simply meet
to ratify a deal that was negotiated in
Geneva?

A, The statement in the letter— the
open letter— that the President wrote
was confined to a particuar matter,
namely that he would go anywhere to
sign an agreement abolishing
intermediate-range nuclear powered,
nuclear warhead, land-based missiles
from the face of the Earth. That was

what he said. So that is a statement of
what we would be willing to do on that
particular matter. It does not infer or
preclude anything else. It was a highly
specified proposition.

Q. Is there any justification for the
Chinese claim that we have been too
slow to supply technology either [in-
audible] they say that they get
agreements from us or statements
from us that the Commerce Depart-
ment or the Defense Department
slows it all down. Have you been able
to look into that? Do you think maybe
something could be done about it?

A. I have looked into it. The process
of approval is always laborious, I think,
in any government. There has been, in
fact, quite a lot of action, in the sense
that a great many requests have been
approved. And that number has grown.
The level of pending cases has been
declining a little bit lately is my informa-
tion. And there are a number of efforts
underway to address, you might say, the
efficiency of the process through which
requests are made and acted upon, not
only with respect to China but other
countries as well.

It is a difficult matter at best to ad-
minister an export control type of pro-
gram because the more difficult cases
almost, by their nature, tend to be — you
have to handle them case-by-case. They
tend to be things in relatively new areas
so you are constantly looking at the
edges of whatever procedures and
criteria you have set up.

Q. Are you going to give the
Chinese leadership any reassurances
that this new process of looking at the
efficiency is going to produce a little
more for them? Are you going to give
them any more reassurances that there
might be more in the pipeline coming?

A. I am a believer that you have to
be very careful when you make com-
mitments or assurances or whatever you
want to call them. The one commitment
that I want to call attention to is the
commitment to keep our commitment,
and there have been a great many made
as I have studied the history of this rela-
tionship. I think that is about as far as I
would want to go.

The speed with which a given ap-
plication to buy something or other can
be acted upon, I think, would take a
courageous person to make a flat com-
mitment that I can guarantee you that
within X number of weeks, any applica-
tion that is made is going to be acted
upon. Nobody who has observed the dif-
ficulties of these cases would make a

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

statement like that because you cannot
keep it. They are difficult problems.

Q. How do you see the American
strategic relationship with China?
Others in the past have talked about
how China and Japan and the United
States now for the first time have
joined strategic outlooks. There has
been a kind of chill in the relation-
ship, I guess, as China seems to have
altered its posture a bit. I just wonder
how you see our strategic relationship
now.

A. Of course, this is one of the mat-
ters I want to explore in my discussions
in China, and it kind of brings us back
to the first question that was asked. I
suppose another way of putting it is that
I would like to explore and try to iden-
tify the areas where our interests are in
parallel. If that adds up to something
that you would put the word strategic
on, so be it. It may or it may not. But
certainly in the broad interplay of power
and influence around the world, the in-
fluence and impact of China is an impor-
tant one, and we need to understand it
and hope that they can be brought to
understand ours. Where it is possible to
work in a parallel way, I think we will
benefit from that and so will they. That
is the way I would phrase it.

Q. Do you have an overall word to
characterize your attitude toward this
relationship? Would you use the word
realism?

A. Realism is always a good word.
But I think that as I analyze the situa-
tion, realism should lead to activities
that are worthwhile from the standpoint
of both countries. So I think I go well
beyond realism to the implication of the
fact that there are a lot of parallel in-
terests and realism about them will lead
us into Some constructive elements in
our relationship.

Q. Back to the SS-20 question for
a second. The Chinese obviously are
not even a U.S. ally, yet they are very
much affected by what goes on in
Geneva. First of all, have we kept
them abreast of what's been going on
there? Second of all, are you prepared
to give them the same sort of commit-
ment that you gave the Japanese?

A. I am sure that they are generally
aware of what is taking place in Geneva.
As far as our negotiating stance is con-
cerned, the President's proposal is one
that would be helpful in Asia without a
doubt because it calls for the elimination

of the SS-20s that hold eight Asian
countries within their range. I think this
question of our stance in the negotiation
has come up particularly with the
Andropov proposal that seemed to en-
visage moving missiles from the Euro-
pean arena to the Asian arena, and that
is certainly one of the things that is
wrong with that proposal. If it does
anything for Europe, it does it at the ex-
pense of Asia.

Having a global outlook as we do
and must, that is one of the reasons why
that proposal is unacceptable to us. I
think it must be unacceptable to the
Europeans as well because among other
things missiles that can be moved in one
direction can be moved back in the
other. If you are really going to get
anywhere, you have to destroy the
weapons in the first place.

Q. Don't some of the Chinese
nuclear weapons qualify as
intermediate-range inasmuch as they
are pointed at the Soviet Union and
that is about as far as they can go?
Isn't that some of the reason for the
90 odd SS-20S there? Doesn't that ob-
viously become a factor?

A. It may be a factor, but never-
theless I think from our standpoint, we
have to think of Asia as a whole. 1 think
the proposals that the President has
made are very constructive ones.

Beijing

Toast,

February 2, 19835

Foreign Minister Wu, distinguished
guests, thank you for your kind
remarks. On behalf of all the members
of my party, permit me to express my
appreciation for the warm welcome and
the gracious hospitality you have lav-
ished upon us. After a long period of an-
ticipation and preparation, it is a gi-eat
pleasure to be your guests in this
magnificent city and to feel we are
among friends.

Our two great nations are both
known around the world for the enor-
mous wealth of human and material
resources that lie within our borders, for
what we have been able to do with our
own resources and our own efforts, and
for our strong belief in national in-
dependence. But it is also a fact that in

this modern world even the strongest
and most independent nations cannot
live in isolation. I am struck by the
statement of General Secretary Hu
Yaobang in his recent report to your
12th party congress that "China's future
is closely bound up with that of the
world as a whole." "Being interna-
tionalist," he said, "we are deeply aware
that China's interests cannot be fully
realized in separation from the overall
interests of mankind."

President Reagan shares these view
and so do I. Over and over again during
the course of my duties as Secretary of
State. I am daily reminded that the
fates of all nations — rich and poor, larg
and small — are closely linked. The ac-
tions we take often have repercussions
for others. And the behavior of others—
wherever on Earth, wise or foolish,
peaceful or aggressive— cannot but hav(
consequences and implications for us all

The United States and China are
major actors in this complex and inter-
related world. Together your govern-
ment and ours, sharing many parallel in
terests, have great potential for influ-
encing positively the course of world
events. Indeed, it is our mutual respon-
sibility to do all that is in our power to
promote peace and progress.

Over a decade ago, recognizing this
interdependence to which I have re-
ferred, our governments set out to build
a strong and lasting friendship between
our peoples. I am proud to say that I
was a member of the President's
Cabinet at the time of this historic
development. Since then, farsighted and
courageous leaders in both our nations
have steadily broadened and deepened
the relationship. We continue to ap-
preciate and to be guided by that spirit.
Our discussions in the next several days
will reflect past accomplishments, cur-
rent realities, and hopes for the future.
Before I left Washington, President
Reagan asked me to reiterate his strong
personal commitment to the advance-
ment of U.S. -China relations, in the in-
terest of both our peoples and for the
benefit of all mankind. He believes there
is a great need for renewal in the
U.S. -China dialogue — a need for discus-
sion and enhanced mutual understanding
on a host of international and bilateral
matters. There is much to be done to ad-
vance the U.S. -China relationship and to
promote peaceful progress everywhere.
As we assemble to contemplate the
road ahead, we are acutely aware of the
challenges to world peace and prosperity
that lie outside our frontiers.

Department of State BulletlnJ

THE SECRETARY

• The troubled international
economy has thrown new obstacles in
the way of the efforts of all countries to
achieve a more hopeful future, but I am
glad to report that the economy of the
United States is now expanding once
again, a development that will help the
world economy to recover.

• The dangers of nuclear war and
nuclear proliferation concern people
everywhere and must be among the
foremost concerns of their leaders.

• From Kampuchea and Afghan-
istan to Africa and the Middle East,
there are major threats to peace and the
just aspirations of mankind that cannot
be ignored.

The dialogue that we advance here in
Beijing this week on these and other
issues is testimony to the importance of
a strong and lasting U.S.-China relation-
ship in confronting the economic and
strategic challenges that threaten the
well-being of all. But our dialogue is
testimony to bright hopes, as well as
challenges. In recent years, thousands of
students from your country have studied
and are studying at American univer-
sities. Our young people, tourists,
academics, and businessmen are study-
ing, traveling, and investing in China in
ever-increasing numbers. We are
pleased to have a role in the ambitious
course of economic modernization on
which you have embarked. The in-
telligence, skills, and dynamism of both
our peoples, which have already given so
much to the world, offer us infinite
possibilities to learn and benefit from
each other.

The challenges and opportunities are
great. The agenda is full. I look forward
to my talks with you and other Chinese
leaders in the days ahead. As long as
both sides approach these tales in the
serious, constructive, responsible man-
ner which the international situation
merits and which our predecessors have
always brought to the table, our discus-
sions will succeed.

In this spirit, I should like to pro-
pose a toast to your health, Mr.
Minister; to the health of the Chinese
leadership and all those present here
tonight; and to the friendship and
cooperation between the peoples and
governments of our two countries.
Gan^ei.

Remarks to the
American Business
Community,
February 3, 1983«

I welcome and appreciate your introduc-
tion and may not necessarily associate
myself with everything you said. I am
pleased to have a chance to meet with
the American business people here. I
always felt, as a businessman, that my
activities were a good representative of
my country and wanted them to be con-
ducted that way, and I am sure you feel
the same.

I am pleased to see my friend Mike
Birely with whom I worked back in the
good old days when I was a private
businessman in this part of the world.
And I'm also glad to meet some new
friends here.

I understand that I am a pioneer in
the sense of being the first Secretary of
State to address this unofficial American
community in Beijing since normaliza-
tion. But as I was suggesting, you're the
true pioneers. It is so heartening for a
traveling American to see in action this
pioneering spirit for which we as a peo-
ple are justly famous. Perhaps it is our
passion for building, our eagerness to
create that is good and useful. This is a
saga of American development, and it is
also the spirit that finds you in this
fascinating part of the world.

I might just say back in early 1970, I
came first to Asia, to Japan, then to
other parts of Asia at the instruction of
then President Nixon. He told me before
I started that trip that I should get out
and understand Asia, that if you don't
understand Asia, you will not under-
stand the future, and I do believe that a
great deal of the future of the world is
here.

At any rate, it is your work as much
as anyone's that is planting the seeds
and feeding the roots of a vital interna-
tional relationship. It offers so much
potential benefits to America, to China,
to the region, and to the world. You are
here on the ground tloor developing
U.S.-China relations. You are also here
at an exciting stage of China's own in-
ternal development, as China's present
leaders chart a course of modernization
trying to carry the Chinese people into a
more advanced technologically oriented
future. We have much experience to
share with the Chinese; a great deal to
contribute to their modernization ef-
forts.

I want to tell you today that we fully
understand, we fully unhesitatingly sup-
port the Chinese in their ambitious
modernization goals. A stable, secure,
economically healthy China, participat-
ing actively and constructively in the
mainstream of the international
economic system, is in the best interest
of the United States, the East Asian
region, and of world peace.

We have done much in this Ad-
ministration to give substance to our
good intentions. President Reagan has
issued a directive substantially increas-
ing the level of technology to be routine-
ly approved for sale to China, reflecting
our intent to treat China as a friendly,
nonallied state. The President has
suspended the prohibition on arms sales
to China embodied in our arms control
legislation, permitting consideration on a
case-by-case basis. A request to export
munitions list articles to China is the
procedure we follow with all friendly
countries.

The President has launched a proc-
ess with the Congress to amend those
laws that treat China in the same man-
ner as the Soviet Union and its satellites
to make clear that we do not consider
China as an adversary and will remove
legal impediments to this cooperation.

As with any young relationship, we
must expect a certain amount of grow-
ing pains. It is easy to pinpoint trouble
spots. We referred to it here. Trade is
among them. We have heard much in re-
cent weeks of difficult textile negotiation
breakdowns in the negotiating process,
of unilateral quota restrictions, retal-
iatory measures, and so on. Let me not
dismiss their importance out of hand.
But let us neither get so bogged down in
bilateral argimients so as not to see and
understand how far we have come in so
brief a period of time.

China is now the 14th largest
trading partner of the United States;
also the fourth largest market for
American agricultural products. The
very success of the economic and trade
relationship brings with it difficult issues
and problems, but we welcome these
problems because they attest to the
growing complexity of our relations and
interactions. We will resolve them, fairly
and equitably for both sides.

We have already set in place institu-
tions to deal with these increasingly
complex economic relations. In
December the Finance Minister, Wang
Bingqian, led a Chinese delegation to the
third annual U.S.-China joint economic
committee, which was set up at the time
of Chairman Deng Xiaoping's visit to the

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

United States in 1979, to discuss
economic issues of mutual interest to
China and the United States. [Treasury]
Secretary Regan led the U.S. delegation
in a series of meetings that were
positive, constructive, and frank. I might
say beyond that that the Chinese
Finance Minister [inaudible] around
town very well and made a very strong
and positive impression on everyone.

Working groups were devoted to
such areas as investment, and finance,
trade, and tax issues. We raised with
the Chinese such problems of import to
you as the need to identify potential
projects with [inaudible] to complete the
legislative framework needed to protect
investor rights and promote investor
confidence, the need for a patent law,
the need for better working conditions
for U.S. businesses in China, mecha-
nisms for dispute resolutions, and the
need to streamline the approval process
for investment in China. All
bureaucracies need to be streamlined.
It's a constant of life worldwide, let me
tell you. We will continue to give high
priority to these issues of the American
business community.

Secretary of Commerce Baldrige will
be leading the American delegation to
the first session of the joint commission
on commerce and trade to be held here
in Beijing in May. We expect to be able
to announce other official delegations
moving in both directions during the
course of the present year. I need not
tell you that we have steered through
some rough stretches during the past
year in U.S. -China relations. I think
both sides have navigated successfully
and are out in the clear again.

My presence here in Beijing today is
a good indication that both sides
recognize the potential benefits of good
relations and are committed to advanc-
ing them. I am very pleased with the
manner in which our talks with the
Chinese are proceeding this week. They
are serious, constructive, and wide-
ranging. With goodwill, cooperation, and
sense of purpose that both sides bring to
the cause of advancing the relationship,
there is much we can and will ac-
complish. You are fortunate to be here
in the early stages, and at least in my
judgment, the future does well for the
U.S. -China relationship.

I will be glad to respond to your
questions, although as I said to some of
you before lunch, I don't intend to con-
duct my negotiations with the Chinese
through you. There is a tendency on
everyone's part to ask me questions that

I think are more appropriately dealt
with directly. So if I am not totally
responsive always, you'll understand.

Q. What is the potential for
resolution of the Taiwan issue?

A. The communique was signed
with knowledge and good intent. It is
the intention and the responsibility and
the obligation of the U.S. Government to
meet the commitments undertaken in
that communique.

Q. What steps can be taken on
behalf of the U.S. business community
in China to persuade the Chinese to
make equal opportunity for living and
working space available to U.S.
businessmen?

A. This is a problem, one that we
will address. It is true that ar-
rangements for living in the United
States and China are unidentical, so that
we have to struggle. I might say that's a
fact of life we have to struggle with. I
might say on the question of trade and
mutual benefit, it is my understanding
that trade never takes place unless there
is mutual benefit. Why should it?
Nobody will make a trade unless they
are going to benefit by it. And the
reason why trade is so munificent in its
benefits to the world at large is because
it's not a zero sum game; it's always a
plus sum game. Everybody benefits
from trade by definition. I assume that
you are here as representatives of
American businesses because you think
you will benefit from this trade. And if
you didn't think so, you wouldn't be
here.

Q. Can we expect a more liberal
export control system to be introduced
to alleviate this particular barrier?

A. This is a difficult subject — as be-
tween the United States and all of its
trading partners because we do have ex-
port controls, and in the administration
of them here are sometimes difficult
issues of interpretation and that tends to
prolong consideration of certain given
items. On the other hand, my review of
this subject shows me that the number
of applications for export licenses have
grown at a very rapid rate over the last
4 years and that the number of pending
applications in a given year — have in the
last 2 years been falling somewhat.

I recognize that the process of get-
ting an application approved is always
one that the people making the applica-
tion find difficulty with, but, never-
theless, the record is one of an increas-
ing number of applications with a large

number of approvals and of a falling
rate of pending cases. That doesn't
mean that there aren't problems. Some-
times the problems are created by you.
That is, if it is known that here is a I

given piece of technology that can 1

receive approval but that there are
aspects of it that are unlikely to receive
approval, we find occasionally that
businesses will go ahead and [inaudible]
now it falls outside the guidelines, even
make a financial commitment and then
come in and argue, "Gosh, we made this
financial commitment, now you've got to
approve it." Buddy, that's your problem
when you do that. Don't complain to the
government.

On the other hand, we do seek a
fair, proper, and efficient system, within
the constraints of what any properly
operating bureaucratic arrangement can
produce. Obviously, to consider a given
application, there are many points of
\dew, and they have to have their chance
to speak their piece. It isn't necessarily
instantaneous. Whether or not work can
be done in the field of advanced con-
sultation, I don't know. It remains to be
seen. It is always a somewhat touchy
area for government, but that is a possi-
ble way that might space around some
of the difficult areas. Although it may be
better to leave things as they are so that
basically you make an application and
we act on the application after we've got
it. That I think, in many ways, is a safer
proposition, and it may be helpful to be
able to get some informal advice.

Q. Why is it that we cannot get a
license out of the U.S. Government
when the Japanese and West Euro-
pean competition can get an equiva-
lent license in a relatively short time?

A. Maybe they are just better. Why
don't you move to Japan or Western
Europe?

Q. What kinds of steps are being
taken to ameliorate the Chinese reduc-
tion of U.S. grain and other agricul-
tural commodities?

A. Of course, we stand ready to
resume the textile negotiations but
basically we have to represent the U.S.
interests and the Chinese have to repre-
sent their interests as they see them.
And we can discuss problems as we are
doing, and those are the sorts of things
that are being done.

Q. What can we expect in terms of
negotiations or policy change to per-
mit American companies to compete in
the nuclear power generation field?

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

A. The question carries the imphca-
ion, as most of your questions do, that
here is something wrong with the
Jnited States. Our regulations are based
■n a deep concern about the problems of
iroliferation of nuclear-weapons tech-
lology. That is a legitimate problem. So
vfe seek to convince others to also worry
bout the problem of nonproliferation. It
nay be that you will be able to work out
ome appropriate arrangement with the
Chinese in this regard. After all they are
ery knowledgeable about nuclear
echnology to begin with. So I would
ust leave it at that, at the same time
loting to you that the problem of pro-
iferation is a distinct problem. I think
he question suggests in a rather
'avalier fashion that you brush it off; I
lon't brush it off.

Q. Can we expect the U.S.
Government to actively support ex-
)orts of U.S. industrial products and
irge China to import a larger percent-
ige of their capital goods from the
Jnited States to create a better
)alanee?

A. The attitude of your government
oward subsidies for exports is unen-
husiastic. Now having said that, I
■ecognize that subsidies to exports is a
•haracteristic of much trade and to a
certain extent, we have to say that if all
,he world is mad, 'tis folly to be sane.
3ut nevertheless I say to your [inaudi-
)le] restraint on subsidizing exports. It
s nothing more than a form of protec-
;ion. You are protecting your export in-
iustries as distinct from what you nor-
•nally think of as protection of an import
ndustry. It is two sides of the same
2oin.

I believe that one of the most impor-
tant and difficult problems we have in
the world trading system is the tendency
for the forces of protection to rise and
become ascendent, and the demand for
[export subsidies that we see around the
jWorld and from American business and
'agricultural interests is part of that
iprocess. I understand that we have to
jcompete, and it is up to the Government
jof the United States to look realistically
lat what is taking place to try to keep
the situation such that the U.S. firms
and businesses can be competitive on
their merits. But I think that what hap-
pens is a kind of emergence of a gigan-
tic export subsidy world, we all will be
the losers.

That is the basis of my statement,
that while we recognize the reality and,
I think, we will see a greater amount of

funding for the Export-Import Bank you
will see in the President's budget — and
so that's there. The attitude is reluctant,
frankly it is. For good and sufficient and
general reasons that I believe in the long
run are in the best interests of those
businesses that are in the direct trading
business, when you are in international
trade. I suppose it must be so as well
that our consumers, while they may get
a short-term benefit from subsidized ex-
ports from elsewhere, in the long run
will be the losers too if what we see is
more and more protection, which means
less and less trade. Because as I said
earlier, trade has bountiful benefits
because by definition it's mutual and ad-
vantageous.

News Conference,
February 5, 1983'

I came here to contribute what I can to
the building of a stable and enduring
relationship with China. That was the
direction I got from President Reagan
and that is what I tried to carry out. I
found on arriving that this was also the
intent of the Foreign Minister of China
as he said privately and in his toast on
the opening evening.

Within the framework and with
those joint objectives, we have explored
issues around the world. We found some
instances, cases, where we have parallel
views and interests and others where
our views differ. But in all cases, the
discussion was penetrating and worth-
while.

As we reviewed our bilateral rela-
tionship, we realized that much has been
accomplished. If you look at the volume
of trade, the amount of technology ex-
change, the number of students and
other people moving in both directions,
there is a considerable record to look at.

On the other hand, there are issues
of importance that we must manage
with great care. The Taiwan issue was
raised a number of times, and there was
assurance given on each side that the
negotiations on that issue, as for exam-
ple, leading up to the August com-
munique, and in other statements on
that issue that have been part of the
written statements that each side has
agreed on together, that these have
been worked on hard and seriously. And
from the standpoint of the United
States, I assure my counterparts that
we took these undertakings seriously
and intend to live by the commitments
made in the communique. I would say
that this is a characteristic of ours which

cuts across issues, the intention and the
determination to live by our commit-
ment.

With regard to many other bilateral
issues that are sometimes difficult and
contentious in themselves, we seek to
find that atmosphere of mutual trust
and confidence that tends to take a
problem and turn it into something that
is soluble, as distinct from an at-
mosphere of distrust which can make
the same problem very difficult to
resolve because of possible implications
of a lack of good faith. But I believe that
this objective of creating an atmosphere
of mutual trust and confidence is a key
and certainly is something that I intend
and President Reagan intends to work
for.

I appreciate the warmth and the
seriousness with which my hosts have
received me here. And I hope that
whatever accomplishment may result
ultimately from this visit, in the space of
just a few short days, of course, will
reflect that warmth and the seriousness.
I would like to say that a number of
times, when very direct and candid
statements were made to me, my hosts
said that I should remember that candor
was something that could take place
among friends. And I would have to say
that I received a great deal of friendship
during my visit here.

Q. When you left for Beijing, you
said that you hoped that the Taiwan
issue would remain in the background
in these discussions. Tonight you told
us that it was raised a couple of
times. Has that issue remained in the
background and perhaps enabled you
to move on to the other issues, and
perhaps get on the way to solving
some? Or is that an obstacle to solving
the other problem?

A. The Taiwan issue has been, is, a
problem. We discussed it, as I said, and
I think the most important thing I can
say about it is that we have made some
commitments with respect to Taiwan,
and we intend to live by those com-
mitments.

Q. Is the State Department posi-
tion on the Chinese tennis star Hu Na,
who is now seeking political asylum in
the United States, that she would face
a real threat of persecution if she
returned home?

A. That is a case that is handled by
the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Department of Justice.
They are reviewing the case, and I don't

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

know what the outcome of that review
will be. I do believe that in the process
of very large-scale cultural exchanges
with thousands of people moving back
and forth, incidents will arise from time
to time, I'm sure. The question always
is: Is this a sort of individual incident
that has to be given that perspective or
not? And here I think is an illustration
of the importance of an atmosphere of
mutual trust and confidence that sur-
rounds the relationship as a whole.

Q. Why is it that the Chinese are
still not satisfied on the Taiwan issue?
Is it that they do not like the agree-
ment that was signed in August? Can
you give us a better understanding of
what the problem is now?

A. One of the rules that I always
make with myself is that I don't try to
speak for other people. You will have to
ask the Chinese that question. From my
standpoint I can speak for the United
States, and as I have said now, this is
the third time that we have made cer-
tain commitments, not only in the
August communique, but also in the
Shanghai communique and in the com-
munique on normalization, about what
we will do, what we will not do. We will
live by those commitments.

Q. Can you say specifically what it
is the United States will do to
decrease arms sales to Taiwan as
spelled out in the August 17th com-
munique?

A. I did not try to renegotiate that
communique with the Chinese, and I
don't think I want to do it here either.
The communique spells out certain
undertakings, and we will live by them.

Q. Can you talk about the strategic
relationship with China, particularly
in relation to China's efforts to nor-
malize relations with the Soviet
Union? Do we have what you might
call a strateg^ic relationship with the
Chinese any more? Or is it just the
case where this is another country on
which some issues we agree with and
some issues we don't?

A. Of course, China is a country of
great importance. President Reagan
considers it to be a country that we cer-
tainly want to have a strong, stable, and
enduring relationship with. In my discus-
sion here, and in discussions with others
on other occasions, certainly we have
talked about our relationship with the
Soviet Union, the U.S. relationship, the
relationship of China with the Soviet
Union. And that is, of course, something

that both parties are interested in.
There are aspects of Soviet beha\nor
that affect us both and which we have
discussed. So, I suppose if you want to
call that a strategic relationship you can,
but I prefer myself to think of our rela-
tionship as being a stable and enduring
one based on the direct contact between
the United States and China and our in-
terest not only in what the Soviet Union
may or may not do but on many other
matters of bilateral and international
concern.

Q. Did you seek any explanation
from the Chinese on their character-
ization of the United States as super-
power on hegemony along with the
Soviet Union?

A. Again, I will let the Chinese
speak for themselves. From the stand-
point of the United States, we don't
think we are remotely comparable to the
Soviet Union, and we should not be put
in the same bag and characterized as the
same kind of country for a host of
reasons that I need not belabor here.

Q. Why were you so tough on the
American businessmen at the luncheon
when they asked you to be a little
more forceful with the Chinese on
their behalf?

A. I wasn't tough. I was just a little
annoyed and tired. No big deal.

Q. Did you get the sense from the
Chinese that they were on the
threshold of an agreement with the
Soviets on the Kampuchea issues?

A. Again, I think any \iews of the
Chinese about a subject like that, you
have to get directly from them. I think
it is no secret that both we and the
Chinese believe that the Vietnamese
should get out of Kampuchea, and there
should be an opportunity for a
democratic Kampuchea to establish
itself. And we hope that occurs. If, as a
result of discussions between the
Chinese and Soviet Union, something
like that can come about, I think that
would be a plus. I don't want to char-
acterize that because I think it would be
presumptuous of me. It is up to the
Chinese to describe their conversations
with the Soviets on that question.

Q. Is there any way you can say
changes have occurred in the U.S.-
China relationship as a result of this
visit?

A. I hope that the result of this visit
is some contribution to the development
of understanding, of trust, of mutual
confidence between us. That is not

something that comes out of the visit or
what anyone says but emerges as the
result of activities that people under-
take. To some extent I think it is
especially established if you manage to
work through successfully something
that is difficult, as distinct from things
that are relatively easy. And we have
had plenty of difficult things to work
through. My aspiration is to make some
contribution to this emerging relation-
ship, and I hope that may have taken
place.

Q. May I ask you what is now the
policy of the United States regarding
the sale of lethal weapons to China? Is
China interested in buying such
weapons? I am speaking of the ini-
tiative Secretary Haig undertook whei
he was here.

A. The subject of arms sales didn't
arise. And so it was not an issue.

Q. Would you go into more detail
on the military discussions that were
held this afternoon by the subcommit-
tee—

A. I don't think there is any special
detail to go into. They were on more or
less technical matters and undoubtedly
were informative but I don't think — it is
fair to say they were not addressed to
major military issues.

Q. There has been a great deal of
speculation that those discussions
were a prelude to such things as a
visit by Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger. Is there any possibility of
that in the nex-t few months?

A. That remains to be seen. I think
from our standpoint, that is certainly a
possibility. But it depends upon how
much interest there is on each side, in
defense visits back and forth. I can't
give any definite statement about it.

Q. What sort of success did you
have in cutting through difficulties on
the technology transfer issue?

A. That is one of those issues that
is difficult inherently, but on which, as I
have dug into it myself before I came
here, and as I've listened to comments
made here, it seems to me that is one of
those issues where there is a lot of
misunderstanding so that a real effort
just to clear up the misunderstandings
will help. Now there are some inherent
difficulties in any technology transfer
program, when a country — and all coun-
tries have technology that they don't
want to see exported or they want to
see it exported only under definite condi-
tions. We have that policy and other
countries do. And it is always a some-

Departnnent of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

^hat difficult issue not just with respect
D China but with other countries as
reW.

But the main point I think out of an
xamination of the technology transfer
ubject is that there have l3een changes
ver the past 2 or 3 years — the major
ne following Secretary Haig's visit
bout a year and a half ago here. And if
ou look at the statistics on the number
f applications made and the number of
pplications approved, just to take that
ne measure, there has been a very con-
iderable increase. As time goes on, and
s we work at this together, I think
radually that whole subject will come
ito proper perspective. Again it is one
f those subjects where the interpreta-
on of some problem will vary a lot
epending on the sense of mutual trust
nd confidence between the parties
enerally, and at the same time handling
: successfully will be a way in which
-lat mutual trust will develop. There is
kind of interactive process going on
ere.

Q. Is it possible for you to say if
ny of the specific problems between
he United States and China — textiles,
echnology transfer, Taiwan — are any
loser to resolution now than they
/ere before you got here?

A. In the sense that there has been
ny contribution through these discus-
ions, to understanding and mutual trust
nd confidence, then I suppose the
nswer is yes, sort of across the board.
.11 of the subjects were discussed. But I
id not come here to be the textile
egotiator or the technology negotiator
r whatever. I did not aspire to try to
ettle those issues as such.

Q. You have several times re-
erred to the importance of personal
ontact, back and forth between
iaderships. Can you tell us whether it
i now clear that the premier will be
oming to the United States within
he next several months, and could
ou tell us what the other trips are
ow seen as in the offing by high of-
icials of the two governments?

A. I talked about the importance of
eveloping mutual trust and confidence,
nd you interpolated that into meaning
personal visits. And I do think personal
isits can make a contribution, but even
lore of a contribution is made by
ubstantive activities that are mutually
atisfying, so that if, for example, after
iur textile people can meet at some
joint and resolve their differences,
hat's a real contribution, as distinct
rom meetings as such.

I do think that exchanges of people
back and forth can be quite helpful.
Secretary Baldrige, whose jurisdiction
particularly emphasizes matters of trade
and technology transfer, will be here in
May as part of a regularly scheduled
commission meeting. Similarly, the
presidential science adviser. Dr.
Keyworth, will be here in May. And he,
of course, will be able to talk about
technological matters and technical mat-
ters from the standpoint of the genuine
technical content. I think those visits —
they are definitely scheduled — will take
place, and they will be constructive. I
hope to meet the Chinese Foreign
Minister from time to time; and I hope
he will be able to come to the United
States before long, so that we can con-
tinue to develop our own personal rela-
tionship and thereby to be better and
better at talking problems out.

The premier has been invited ex-
plicitly by the President to visit the
United States, and has said that he in-
tends to do so, but pinning down a time
for such a visit is something that has to
be worked through the diplomatic chan-
nels, and there isn't any answer as to
the precise time. We will just have to
wait on that. There is a flow of people
back and forth. I would not be at all sur-
prised to see the volume of it increase.

Q. Were there ever or are there
now ij.S. -equipped listening posts
anywhere in China or any kind of
listening posts with which the United
States has been involved?

A. That's the kind of question I
don't touch with a 10-foot pole.

Q. You spent a good long time this
morning with Deng Xiaoping. Could
you tell us about the conversation and
also how you found him personally in
the 2-3 years since he traveled around
the United States?

A. Personally, of course, he is a
very dynamic, forceful, interesting in-
dividual. I felt privileged to have a
chance to spend that much time with
him. From the standpoint of the content
of our meeting, I would say the point
that emerged to me most forcefully was
just this one that I have been seeking to
emphasize here; namely, the importance
for the future of our relationship of the
development of mutual trust and con-
fidence.

Q. Did the Chinese bring up in
discussions with you the subject of
joint U.S. military exercises with the
South Koreans, and, if so, what was
said?

A. There was a statement made,
not in our major meetings, about it. The
response on our part was that this, of
course, was a training exercise, planned
a long time ago, and about which the
North Koreans had been informed well
in advance. So there is nothing about it
that poses any immediate problem.

Q. Did you discuss the problems
of civilian nuclear cooperation with
China or ask the Chinese about
reports that they are shipping various
nuclear materials to other countries?

A. As far as cooperation on matters
of nuclear power is concerned, that is
something that may emerge. There are
interests on both sides in that. We will
just have to see if that will develop into
something. We, of course, have for a
long time been concerned about prob-
lems of nuclear proliferation, and we
continue to have that point of view. I am
sure that it is widely shared around the
world and here as well. But I don't want
to go into that in any detail.

Q. In your discussions with the
Chinese leaders, did any of them ask
you whether President Reagan will
run in 1984?

A. No.

Toast,

February 5, 19838

For 4 days now, it has been my pleasure
to receive the hospitality for which your
capital is so well known and to engage
in extended discussions, on many issues,
with you and with other distinguished
members of the Chinese leadership. I
will leave tomorrow with the strong
sense that I have made new friendships
here in Beijing and that we have made
important progress in renewing and
enriching the dialogue between our two
governments. I would particularly like to
compliment you on the manner in which
you have conducted the many hours of
talks between us. May I say, sincerely,
that I hope we will have an opportunity
to continue our discussions before long.

Our talks have been constructive and
wide-ranging — as the precarious world
situation demands of talks between
serious, thoughtful international leaders
— and useful, friendly, and frank as I
had anticipated they would be. Our
discussions have covered most of the
world's major trouble spots. I am
pleased that on many important interna-
tional issues, we share common views.
Even on those issues where our ap-

•<arch 1983

THE SECRETARY

proaches differ, we find ourselves
together in our mutual concern for
peace, stability, and respect for the just
aspirations of independent nations
everyAvhere to determine their own
destinies free from outside aggression.

President Reagan sent me to Beijing
to resume a dialogue that has well
served the interests of both our peoples.
We leave tomorrow with a renewed ap-
preciation of the value of the relation-
ship and an enhanced understanding of
our respective positions. We have come
to Beijing also to review the state of our
bilateral relations. Wliile problems do
exist, I leave our discussions more con-
vinced of the real opportunities for
enhanced cooperation between our gov-
ernments, our nations, and peoples in a
host of fields. We depart having set the
stage for renewed advances built on a
stronger foundation of confidence and
mutual trust.

We have launched a process here
this week that merits conscientious
follow-through. When I return, I will
report to the President that, with good
will and vision on both sides, relations
between our two countries will grow and
the benefits will mount for our two
great nations and for the world.

Let us all raise our glasses then in a
toast to your health, Mr. Minister, to the
health of the Chinese leadership, to the
health of all our honored guests present
tonight, and to the continued friendship
and cooperation between the Chinese
and American peoples and Governments.
Happy New Year and Ganbeil

Interview for
Radio Beijing,
February 6. 19839

Q. What do you hope to achieve on
your present visit to China?

A. I have come to China to listen
and try to understand better the
Chinese point of view and policies on
various issues. I also wish to explain
American policies, the goals we hope to
achieve, and to provide some under-
standing of the process and means
through which we are working to obtain
those goals. I think there has been con-
siderable misunderstanding on various
matters of mutual concern, and certainly
there are issues on which our policies do
not coincide with those of the Chinese
Government. However, I believe it is
most important that, even in those areas
in which we disagree, we disagree on
the basis of knowledge and of full under-
standing of each other's position.

Basically, we wish to restore a useful
dialogue with the Chinese leadership and
to use that dialogue to help us in build-
ing a stable and enduring relationship
based on mutual trust and mutual
benefit.

Q. Do you think you've achieved
what you wanted to achieve? In other
words, what do you think of the
results of your talks with Chinese
leaders?

A. I am certainly leaving China with
a much better understanding of the
Chinese position on a host of issues,
both global and bilateral. As you know, I
have had extensive conversations —
something over 8 hours of formal discus-
sions— with Foreign Minister Wu. I also
met with State Councilor Fang Yi,
Finance Minister Wang, Defense
Minister Zhang, and Vice Minister Jia.
Then on Friday, I met with Premier
Zhao and yesterday morning with Chair-
man Deng. These conversations have
been exceedingly frank and candid, as
discussions among friends should be.
The new Chinese Ambassador to the
United States, Zhang Wenjin, took part
in all the meetings, and he will be warm-
ly received in Washington. As I said, I
have a much better appreciation of
Chinese policies, and I hope I have been
able to convey to the Chinese officials
with whom I met a better understanding
of the policies of the United States. This
is, of course, a continuing process, and
we look forward to further exchanges,
both at lower levels and, as you know,
through the invitation to visit the United
States which I have given to Premier
Zhao from President Reagan.

Q. How much importance does the
U.S. Government attach to its rela-
tions with China?

A. President Reagan believes it is
most important that we have good
cooperative relationships with China,
that we are two great countries with
major responsibilities and influence in
the world. I heartily share that belief.
China is a great country. Its actions and
attitudes affect vital U.S. interests and
are a major factor in the search for
world stability, peace, and progress. The
independence, prosperity, and strength
of China are very important to the
United States. In this regard, we have
often expressed our continuing interest
in assisting China in its modernization
efforts. We believe that the basic na-
tional interests of China and the United
States are compatible, although there
are differences in many areas. Certainly,

I have found the areas of agreement ap-
pear to be much greater than the areas
of disagreement.

Q. What does your government
plan to do to improve Sino-U.S. rela-
tions?

A. In many respects, Sino-America:
relations have developed remarkably in
the past few years. The United States i:
now China's third largest trading part-
ner. Science and technological exchange
between us are the largest such pro-
grams in the world today. Some 9,000
Chinese students are studying in the
United States right now, and we an-
ticipate that increasing numbers will be
going to the United States in future
years. Hundreds of American tourists
visit China each year. All of these con-
tribute significantly to the bilateral rela
tionship.

Naturally, in a relationship which is
so large and complex, there are also
problems. Some of these arise from our
differing social and legal systems. In
dealing with China, however, we are no
seeking to change the social or legal
systems of China, but we are seeking
Chinese assistance in helping us to bet-
ter understand these systems. I would
hope that, conversely, we can increase
our efforts to help Chinese officials bet-
ter understand our system and society.
Through better understanding, I believe
we will have closer, more constructive
relations which will become solid and er
during.

Q. And what about yourself? Wha
do you wish to contribute to advanc-
ing the relationship between the two
countries?

A. I regard our relations with Chin
as among the most important for our
government. This is my first visit to
China, and I have learned a great deal
during the past 4 days. I intend to re-
main very closely involved in our on-
going relationship and its development,
as we seek to broaden and deepen our
cooperation and understanding. Having
met and established good working rela-
tions with your foreign ministers and
other Chinese leaders, I am looking for-
ward to continuing the dialogue which I
hope will ensue from this visit. I would
also like to use this opportunity to ex-
press publicly the sincere appreciation o
both my wife and myself for the very
warm reception we have met in Beijing.
This is a trip we will long remember.

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

En Route
to Seoul

*^ews Conference,
February 6, 19831°

^. [Inaudible].

A. I do not have any. You can
iescribe a meeting of top leaders as a
jummit meeting, but I think the fact is
;hat the President has invited the
premier to Washington, suggested some
3road possible times, and the premier
las said — and he said it to you people at
;he press conference with him — that he
m\\ be coming. But we have to find the
;ime, so we will start looking for that,
md that is the fact of the matter.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. The President has been invited
ind that is just starting to be under
■eview, I think we have to take these
",hings one at a time.

Q. [Inaudible]. What do you hope
;o accomplish here? What do you have
n mind for this Korean visit?

A. The principal objective, of course,
s to reaffirm and support our security
irrangements with Korea and also to
)ay my respects to the American troops
vho are stationed here. Beyond that
here are points of encouragement
oward moves in the direction of
iberalization and also some discussion
vith them about economic development
n general. On the whole, they have had
I fairly successful 1982 economically,
particularly compared with other coun-
tries, and at the same time, it is always
in interesting subject to discuss.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. I do not have any specific reac-
3on to that. Certainly, the problem of a
•econciliation of the people of North and
South Korea is an important problem,
ind I think the South Koreans have
nade a number of proposals — some
•ather people-to-people steps and some
3f a more broad institutional nature — to
iee if that cannot be brought about. On
;he whole, the North Koreans have more
Dr less preemptorially rejected these ap-
oroaches. I think that efforts to try to
aring about some sort of better relation-
ship between the peoples of the two
Koreas is positive, but it would be
refreshing if the North Koreans would
show a little give in the situation.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. It is not even in my briefing
papers but if it comes up I am certainly
glad to discuss it with them. But, fun-
damentally we have problems in the tex-
tile industry in the United States that
have led to an effort to bring any in-
creases in import levels in line with in-
creases in the market generally. And
that is broadly the stance that has been
taken in all of the negotiations with the
Chinese. We have been slightly more
forthcoming with them than with others,
but basically everybody has been asked
to reduce the rate of increase in their
shipments.

Q. Would you address the question
of mutual recognition of North and
South Korea by the Soviet Union and
by the United States? You have any
thoughts on that at all? Does it seem
like a good idea, a silly idea or—

A. It is the sort of thing that might
be a symbol of a desire to reconcile
these people. They are all Koreans, and
they have a lot of family ties back and
forth so it is something of a strain to
have this division. That is one version of
so-called cross-recognition, and there are
a lot of other aspects to it. Sometimes
you hear suggestions about recognition
and sometimes it is a matter of trade
relationships and things of that kind, but
what they all add up to is a recognition
of the artificially, from the standpoint of
families and people, of a divided Korea.

Q. How are things going to go or
how do you feel things will go now
with China? Have we sorted out all
the problems of the past few months?
What is your own personal feeling
about how the talks went and what
the future holds?

A. We have identified a lot of prob-
lems but also a lot of progress and ac-
complishment. There are a certain
number of meetings that have been iden-
tified and potential further develop-
ments. And my own opinion is that if we
can maintain the sort of spirit of the
dialogue of the last 4 days, then we will
gradually make headway in resolving the
individual issues. As I commented
yesterday at the press conference, if you
can get issues into the context of a
generally good atmosphere, then you
find ways to solve them. You take the
same issue and put it into a less happy
atmosphere, and it becomes very dif-
ficult to solve. I think the general tone
of things can have some impact.

Q. [Inaudible]. Are you telling the
Chinese the United States has a com-
mitment to live up to the spirit of, or
in terms of, the joint communique, but
also other commitments in the world
such as the enduring commitment to
Taiwan, and it remains a commitment
and the United States keeps its com-
mitments? Is that the general tone?

A. I think it's very important that
our country keeps commitments that are
made. In referring to the various com-
muniques that have dealt with the sub-
ject of Taiwan, I believe I'm correct in
saying that every communique, every
formal statement involving China — the
People's Republic of China — and the
United States has had a reference to
Taiwan in one way or another. We do
understand these commitments; we in-
tend to live by these commitments. That
was the statement that I made.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. No, I think there is a satisfactory
status quo in terms of our foreign
assistance programs that are in effect,
and so on. I am sure there is disappoint-
ment in Korea, as we feel ourselves,
that the foreign military sales levels are
below what the President requested. As
they have come forward in the continu-
ing resolutions, we have sought to
restore the President's levels with a sup-
plemental. Of course, it remains to be
seen whether the supplemental will go in
the Congress, but we will be trying to
get those funds restored. Basically I
think there is a knowledge of our
defense commitments, and I'm going
there to further demonstrate that.

Q. [Inaudible]. Do you expect to
cover any new ground with the South
Korean President?

A. I'll be glad to respond to anything
he chooses to bring up. And, there are a
variety of subjects I think that are in-
teresting subjects to talk about, and I
don't know whether you classify them as
good, bad, or what. But certainly as far
as I'm concerned, there is an open
agenda.

Q. Obviously the human rights
issue is one that always comes up in
Korea and recently taking their most
noted dissident, I guess, out of jail
and throwing him out of the country.
Do you think the situation there is im-
proving? If you do, specifically why?

A. It is improving in the sense that
there have been specific things; you
mentioned the most prominent one. As
to why, I suppose, I think it's a move in

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

the right direction, and people like to
move in the right directions. Perhaps it
is an expression of confidence on the
part of the government but as for their
reason for doing things, I think basically
you have to ask them.

Q. Do you plan to encourage them
to continue moving and speed up their
move in this right direction?

A. We have set out to work at these
things through quiet and nonpublic
diplomacy, and so I don't want to violate
the spirit of that by having discussion of
it.

Q. What can you tell us about your
meetings with the Chinese? You have
had a lot of negotiations and meetings
with people over the years. What was
it like? Did you find any surprises
there? Could we have your general im-
pressions of the meetings?

A. First of all, the people are a
serious people. Meetings were conducted
in a very pleasant way but there was a
minimum of the sort of pleasantries that
go along with a meeting. As soon as the
photo opportunities were ended, they
plunged right into substantive discus-
sions, which I welcomed. I think the peo-
ple were basically well prepared; they
came to talk in a substantive manner.

I did feel that on some issues, their
perception of what the facts are differed
sometimes rather substantially from
what my sense of what the facts are on
a given case. For e.xample, on the pro-
portion of our market occupied by
Chinese textiles [inaudible]. But I found
them to be strong, tough, well-informed
people.

I want to call to your attention that
not everything that we talked about
was, so to speak, a negotiation. There
was a big sort of informational content
to their statements about their views on
different parts of the world and situa-
tions of different countries and also in
our descriptions of what was taking
place. To some extent, it was infor-
mation-sharing and analysis-sharing. It
was interesting to me in talking with dif-
ferent foreign ministers and the people
from different countries to get a sense
of the degree to which the country has a
world view of things as distinct from a
preoccupation with what's going on in
their own country and immediately
around their own country. Certainly it is
true that the Chinese have a world view,
just as we do. They see things in places
that are far removed from China as hav-
ing an impact that is of some signifi-
cance to them. They like to talk about

Africa, the Middle East, and so on; in
that context, that makes it interesting.

Q. Did you get the feeling that
they were less concerned about the
Soviet threat to themselves than they
have been in the past years? Is that a
reason why they're now willing to talk
more normalization with the Rus-
sians?

A. Again, I think that is the sort of
question that you have to ask them
about, how much concerned they are.
They have made a number of comments,
some publicly, during the course of the
visit, and I just refer you to them. It
seems to me, as is true in every country
in some way — some more than others —
they want to see their country develop
and great tensions all around their
borders are not helpful to them. So they
seek to reduce those tensions, and I
think that's an objective that is under-
standable.

Q. There has been considerable
concern among some quarters in the
United States regarding their shift in
attitudes about the Russians and their
place in the Third World. Could you
tell us anything that would indicate
how you came out of these talks and
your own view of the significance for
the United States of what the Chinese
have done within the last year?

A. I felt that their view of the Rus-
sians is very realistic. It remains to be
seen precisely what the content of the
Third World orientation will turn out to
be. But the United States, say over the
post-World War II decades, has been a
champion of economic development of
that world. That has been our stance.
Differences of view arise about what the
right way to bring about economic
development is; they are or may be im-
portant issues and they were probably
aired more directly at Cancun. But I do
think there is an increasing perception
around the world that if you want
development you need to rely on the
enterprise of individual units, you need
to give people some stake in what they
are doing, that markets do help whether
they are organized within a socialistic
type of framework or a pure market
economy. The market idea is very im-
portant. Certainly they use it in China
as far as I can see.

Also any country, fundamentally,
has to rely on itself to provide the real
motive power for development. Now
that, of course, doesn't mean there isn't
a role for aid from outside in technical
terms and in straight, foreign invest-

ment terms. In terms of concessional aid
of various kinds, there is such a role.
But getting the right perspective on
these things can be a point of real
discussion.

I found one of the most attractive
aspects of discussing economic develop-
ment with the Chinese to be their
recognition of these facts and their
determination to develop themselves. It
was said to me a number of times with
the size of China and with the number o
people in China, it's quite clear that the
basic thrust of the development of Chim
has to come from within.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. There have been, for example,

some developments in the way agri-
culture is organized in China, as I
understand it, that give family units a
capacity to work to a degree for them-
selves and to benefit from a strong per-
formance themselves, so that what you
do is related to what you get out of it. I
think that is an example of the sort of
look at the enterprise notion, and the
ability to sell into a market is related to
that. I don't want to be misunderstood.
I'm not saying that the Chinese have
promoted a market economy, but they
use the market idea. I think if you look
around in Socialist economics nowadays,
you find that there is a considerable
amount of experimentation, and always
has been for that matter, with the ques-
tion of how you use the idea of a
market, and can you within the frame-
work of state ownership of main
resources.

Q. I guess what I was trying to
get at was that after hearing them ex-
plain their own ideas about their
foreig^n policy especially, is their
foreign policy now something the
United States tolerates? It is some-
thing we could live with quite com-
fortably? How is the United States go-
ing to relate to a China which has
really taken a kind of new direction
within this last year or so?

A. The discussions that I had about
their foreign policy lead me to believe
that there are many areas of great im-
portance where their interests and the
way they see the problems are quite
parallel to ours. Therefore, it's quite
worthwhile to be talking with them, and
I think that can be fruitful. I came away
with a rather good feeling about that.

We also discussed a variety of areas
where they may have different views,
and they are critical of the United
States sometimes for what we do,

Department of State Bulletir

THE SECRETARY

)metimes for us not doing enough or
lying enough attention to something,
ut I found that discussions with them
I be informed discussions and substan-
ve discussions and serious discussions.
Dt a sort of debating point-type discus-
on at all. I found it to be quite worth-
hile in relating that to the broader
;nse of the interaction of their foreign
alley and ours to be basically encourag-

Q. What's your impressions on
ow they feel about arms control?

A. It did not play a prominent place
1 our discussions. They did not ask a lot
f questions about it, and, on the other
and, when we discuss it, in a sense the
utcome of that discussion was that we
ffered to have Admiral Howe [Jonathan
. Howe, Director, Bureau of Politico-
lilitary Affairs] give a briefing on what
'e were doing. They seemed to be glad
3 have that briefing, and it was a
mgthy and solid discussion. As Admiral
[owe pointed out, they seemed to be
ery well informed about what is going
n, so they follow it.

Q. There were a couple of people
rom the North American desk at din-
er last night between a few of us. On
he subject of the SS-20s, one of them
aid there are a hundred or more there
ow and a few more don't make any
ifference to us. Is that a view that
ou picked up at a higher level [in-
udible]?

A. No, that kind of comment was
ot made to me.

Q. In the past, before the Reagan
Ldministration, almost every time
ve'd go to China there would be
riticism the United States wasn't
ough enough against the Russians or
ve weren't spending enough on
nilitary. In their press they now
eemed to be critical of the United
itates for spending too much on the
nilitary. I just wondered in your
liscussions did you get a recent feei-
ng that the Reagan Administration's
nilitary program was appreciated?

A. I felt that it was and that they
Ivelcomed the strength and determina-
'ion of the United States. I don't hear
jiny criticism whatever along the lines
that you suggested in your question.

Q. You got into the question of
echnology transfer; you talked about
hat quite a bit. What is it that they
ire interested in specifically? Did you
jet a feeling of priority what they
ivant, what they are interested in?

A. The technology transfer issues
have come up in a sense on two levels:
one is with respect to some particular
piece of equipment or area of knowledge
for which an application has been made
and about which there is discussion.
That leads you into such discussion of
criteria and procedures and speed of
consideration and so on. That is what
you might say is an operational level of
discussing the subject.

They also laid a lot of emphasis, and
in many respects the heaviest emphasis,
on the intent and the atmosphere within
which these operational questions were
to be discussed. People made the point
to me a number of times, on this par-
ticular equipment or that particular
equipment, so much the way that you
view us is more important than the way
particular things are handled. It is the
overall sense of atmosphere that is being
displayed here. You sort of go back and
forth between these two levels. That
was the nature of our discussions.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. The whole subject is one that is a
difficult one, inherently. You have
always, particularly these days, a mov-
ing target. The sense that technology is
changing constantly, particularly in the
fields that are of the greatest interest.
You keep having to adapt your criteria
and your judgment to this moving
target. I think it will remain a difficult
issue, but I do think there is a lot of
room for clarification so that it can be
put into a more satisfactory way. I am
not directly answering your COCOM
[Coordinating Committee for Multilater-
al Security Export Controls] question.
Obviously people can make decisions
about things like that but that is an
issue for the government to consider.

npfMjfMMMiMiMMIMMil^

Seoul

Toast,

February 6, 1983"

I visited Korea before, but this is my
first visit as Secretary of State of the
United States of America. Even before
the gracious occasion we are enjoying
this evening, the visit began auspicious-
ly. Our talks this afternoon were very
informative and useful to me, and I look
forward to further consultations with

you, as well as to my meetings with
President Chun and Prime Minister Kim
tomorrow. I thought that perhaps there
was something symbolic in the sort of
spontaneous way, this afternoon, in
which you wound up sitting on the side
of the table with my American col-
leagues and I wound up on the Korean
side. And perhaps what that suggests is
there aren't two sides but only one side
in this partnership.

Our talks will touch on a variety of
themes of vital importance to both the
Republic of Korea and the United States
and to the relationship between us. We'll
exchange views and concerns on the
state of the international economy, on
the diplomatic efforts of our govern-
ments to insure peace and promote in-
ternational understanding, and on our
shared belief in the need for continued
political development. But everything we
discuss, to my mind, will relate to the
central theme of this visit: the reaffirma-
tion of our mutual commitment to the
security and stability of the Korean
Peninsula and of the Northeast Asian
region.

Tomorrow afternoon I will be visit-
ing both Korean and American units in
some of the areas north of Seoul. When
this trip to the forward areas was pro-
posed to me, I readily agreed. I have
seen some of these areas on earlier
visits, and 1 know that an awareness of
the seriousness and immediacy of the
military threat, which comes through so
clearly up there, is basic to any real
understanding of the situation in Korea.
I'll have a chance to refresh my own im-
pressions of the harsh realities of peace
and war which must be faced in this na-
tion every day. More important, I
believe my visit will demonstrate anew
the steadfast commitment of the United
States to the security of the Republic of
Korea.

The hostile confrontation between
two parts of a divided nation which has
characterized Korean life for decades is
undeniably a tragedy. It requires an
enormous diversion of resources away
from peaceful purposes — resources that
could be used to provide better lives for
all the Korean people. And it poses a
constant danger. President Chun has
repeatedly demonstrated his desire to
break the deadlock and establish a basis
for dialogue with the north. You your-
self took part in early efforts to bring
that about. He has put forward, without
conditions, a comprehensive program for
the reduction of tensions and the even-
tual reunification of the nation. Unfor-

Vlarch1983

THE SECRETARY

tunately, North Korea has not chosen to
take up this offer. Nevertheless it re-
mains on the table.

One of the great accomplishments of
the South Korean people is that you
have achieved dramatic, almost un-
paralleled economic progress over the
past two decades, despite the very heavy
defense burden you must bear. The
United States will continue to do
everything it can, consistent with our
own budget constraints and global
security responsibilities, to ease the
burden your defense effort imposes. I
am confident that by working together
we can continue to deter aggression and
maintain a shield behind which economic
growth and political development can
flourish and the human spirit prosper.

We applaud the breadth of vision ex-
emplified in President Chun's thoughtful
proposals about Pacific cooperation. In
addition to his visit to the United States
in 1981, President Chun has had highly
successful tours of Africa and the
ASEAN countries— visits which clearly
advance the stature of Korea in the
world. Your political and diplomatic
standing is now more nearly in line with
your widely recognized economic ac-
complishments. As friends and allies of
both Korea and Japan, we were pro-
foundly encouraged by the recent highly
successful efforts to put that vital rela-
tionship on a sound and harmonious
footing. I am confident that you will be
able to build on the foundation laid dur-
ing Prime Minister Nakasone's visit.

The ties between Korea and the
United States are— as I believe every-
one here would agi'ee — both strong and
full of promise for the future. I am
pleased and honored to represent my
country here this evening, at the outset
of what I am confident will be an ex-
cellent year, and a productive second
century, for our relationship.

I propose a toast to the health of
His Excellency, President Chun: to the
friendship of our people; and to the com-
mon commitment to security and to
peace.

News Conference,

February 8, 198312

President Reagan sent me to Korea to
reaffirm and strengthen in every way
possible the strong relationship we have
with Korea and to develop the strength
of our alliance and our capacity to deter
aggression as it's exhibited here on this

peninsula. I've had the opportunity for
many discussions with the foreign
minister not only in the formal meetings
but as we rode ai'ound, with the Presi-
dent and with others here. Beyond that
it is inspiring to visit the forces in the
DMZ to see the quality of our young
Korean and American soldiers and to
see the duties that they are undertaking
there on your behalf. I am grateful for
that opportunity and very glad to be
here. I express to you my thanks for all
of your hospitality as well as your
thoughts.

Q. Our understanding is that you
discussed the cross-recognition prob-
lem of the Korean Peninsula. Would
you elaborate a little more detail
about that now?

A. The question arose, and, of
course, it's part of the recognition that
on this peninsula, there are Korean peo-
ple and there are families that are
located in both North and South. And so
efforts have been made — very creative
and imaginative efforts — by the Govern-
ment of South Korea to see if some pat-
tern of reconciliation can evolve. The
cross-recognition proposal is one among
many efforts to get at that problem. Un-
fortunately, these efforts have basically
been rejected by North Korea although
it may be, as times goes on, that pat-
terns will be found that help to move
this situation along.

Q. Was this question raised during
your visit to Beijing and if it was
raised, what was the reply of the
Chinese leaders?

A. The question of cross-recognition
did not come up during my visit to Bei-
jing.

Q. I understand that the United
States seems to object to South
Korean export of arms. Would you
please explain Washington's position
on this matter?

A. The United States has a variety
of restrictions on itself in connection
with the export of arms. So when
United States technology is involved in
the production of arms by an ally, as in
the case of South Korea, then basically
we think that the restrictions that we
apply to ourselves ought to apply to the
other countries as well. Of course,
sometimes that leads to some differences
of opinion, but that's the fundamental
point involved.

Q. Could you be more specific on
such restrictions?

A. If there is a country to which we
feel it inadvisable to ship arms from the

United States, then we would ask our
friends who have U.S. technology that
we have worked with them on jointly so
that they can develop their own
capacities to observe the same restric-
tions. Otherwise we're not able to en-
force on ourselves a policy that we may
have.

Q. If cross-recognition of the two
Koreas will take place for the United
States and mainland China, and Japan
the United States will sign a peace
treaty with North Korea and will
withdraw its troops — U.S.
troops — from South Korean soil?

A. No, there is no proposal around
that I have heard, other than by the
North Koreans, that U.S. troops be
withdrawn from South Korea. And ther
is no intention of doing so. We stand
with our friends here in South Korea.
We are here to deter aggression, and
we'll be here as long as that's needed.

Q. It means that despite cross-
recognition, the United States never
will sign a peace with North Korea?

A. If North Korea changes its
behavior and there is a reconciliation
with South Korea and a peaceful situa-
tion emerges, of course that's something
else again. But anyone who studies the
situation or goes up and visits in the
DMZ can see that that's a long way
away.

Q. Since we've been here in Seoul,
there's been a commentary published
in Beijing about your visit there. Does
it surprise you, and do you feel that it
somehow reopens or changes some of
the things that you did there?

A. No. I've said what I had to say
about the visit there. And, I think, it
was worthwhile from my standpoint. I
learned a lot. I hope that the things that
I had to say were helpful in expanding
the understanding of the Chinese about
the United States and the Reagan Ad-
ministration. There were lots of prob-
lems there when I arrived, and there an
still problems there. And that's the
situation.

Q. Did you see anything new in
that? I mean have you seen it or did
you analyze this report?

A. I saw a report. I don't know
whether it's the same one you're talking
about, probably is, and I didn't see — and
to some extent people came in with a
sense of commotion about it. I read it,
and I didn't go into orbit about it
[laughter]. After all they weren't
businessmen [laughter].

Department of State Bulletli

THE SECRETARY

Q. When the Chinese leadership
isked you to seek the repeal of the
raiwan Relations Act, how did you
•espond?

A. The Taiwan Relations Act is the
aw of the land in the United States. We
lave negotiated several communiques
vith the Chinese on various occasions,
he most recent being last August. And
hose were very seriously worked on in
■ach case. It's our intention to live by
he commitments in those communiques
vhich we think are perfectly consistent
vith the Taiwan Relations Act.

Q. Is that how you explained it to
he Chinese leadership or did you say
hat it's just not going to be possible
o do that?

A. That is the explanation that I
lave given you and given the same ex-
jlanations here, in Beijing, in Washing-
,on, in public, and in private.

Q. You're nearing the end of this
rip to Asia. Could you give us an
issessment of how you think it's gone,
vhat you've accomplished?

A. I think it's been a very worth-
vhile undertaking from my point of
new. And each of the countries that I've
'isited on this trip has been very cordial,
lospitable. In every case, the discussions
hat I have had have been very serious
md thoughtful, well prepared by them
ind by us. I think it's been quite worth-
vhile.

Q. I understand that you are going
.0 revisit Tokyo on your way back to
he States. Do you have any message
;o carry from the South Korean lead-
;rship to Mr. Nakasone?

A. As I have gone from one country
;o the next and people have asked me
ibout what has taken place, I've given a
■eport, and I have talked to the foreign
minister about my trip as I came here.
i\nd on the way back to Washington, we
will stop in Tokyo, and I'll have a chance
to review with the Japanese there a sort
Df wind-up of the trip. So I've been
reporting in a sense as I have gone
ilong.

Q. As you know starting to take
place "Team Spirit '83"— so if the
Soviets will conduct another large
scale military exercises in the Pacific
or Chinese, North Korean troops
together, that the United States con-
siders threatening the peace in the
Pacific, in your opinion what the

United States will do in case that
North Korea and China will conduct
another large-scale exercise like
"Team Spirit '83"?

A. Exercises are exercises. We are
conducting one ourselves with our
friends in South Korea. We have an-
nounced it. And it's part of our continual
preparation and readiness. And I think
the basic thing that the United States
will do and our allies will do is to main-
tain our strength and try to be sure that
those opposing us understand that we do
have that strength and determination.
And again you can see it expressed very
visibly and in very human term.s in the
faces of the people up manning our
posts in the DMZ.

Hong Kong

News Conference,
February 9, 1983"

Q. Did you have any chance to give
any thought to the report from Israel
on the court of inquiry and what effect
it might have on various negotiations?

A. As far as the report is con-
cerned, it's, of course, an internal mat-
ter for Israel. So I don't have any com-
ment on their internal affairs, other
than to say that it seems to me another
outstanding example of the way a
democracy can conduct itself. To that
extent it seems to me that it deserves a
definite tip of the hat as a model of how
democracy can work.

As far as its impact on the various
matters being negotiated are concerned.
I think all of these questions — the
Lebanon matters, the basic peace proc-
ess, the Middle East peace process mat-
ters, Israeli-Egyptian concerns — are all
matters of great importance. And we in-
tend to keep working away at them, and
I presume the other people— parties to
those negotiations— will as well.

Q. Do you think it might delay
even more the decisions that need to
be made on the withdrawal from
Lebanon, just while the internal thing
is sorted out?

A. I don't think that necessarily
needs to be the case, and people in
governments have to work on more than
one thing at a time. We all do, and I'm
sure the Israelis will.

Q. The issuing of a report is
perhaps an example of democracy, but
if it just stays that way, would you
still feel the same way?

A. Do you mean if they just issue a
report that's put in a file drawer? They
have, I think, first of all — the Govern-
ment of Israel decided to appoint the
commission. The commission has con-
ducted a thorough investigation, issued a
report, and it's been again an interesting
marker on the esteem in which this
process and the commission is held that
there have been no indications on
anyone's part that it would be other
than a thorough investigation, and the
commission members would say what-
ever their conclusions were. Undoubted-
ly that's what happened now. What will
happen next is for Israel to determine.
It's an internal matter, and we'll just
have to see about that.

Q. The Department issued the
human rights report on the day or day
after you left South Korea. We were
told that you told the South Korean
Government — you praised the South
Korean Government — on the progress
it has made on human rights ques-
tions. Did you let them know that this
report was going to be issued which
was critical of the government's —
some of the government's policies
with regard to dissidents — political
dissidents? Did you discuss that ques-
tion at all with them aside from ap-
preciating the progress that they've
made?

A. As I said on an earlier occasion,
we are trying to conduct, to the extent
that we can, our diplomacy in this
regard on a quiet basis, and I don't want
to undermine that approach by discuss-
ing it. The release of that report, I
think — basically, that's the report made
to Congress and then the release of it is
basically a congressional matter. So we
weren't in control of that. I think it is by
now a fairly straightforward effort to
gather information, publish it, and
assess it.

Q. Did you, during the meeting
with chiefs of mission here, produce
any kind of conclusions — any kind of
balance sheet — of how we are doing in
Asia? And did it produce any kind of
concern about Soviet activities in
Asia — the Soviet military buildup on
naval buildup?

A. The discussions were wide rang-
ing. I don't want to specify all of the
topics. You can pretty well identify
them. But to me, it had a very good ef-

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

feet in getting me and others to think
about the Asian dimension of our
foreign policy. And, of course, as you
think about that, you can't help but see
that we do have and must have a world
view, as we think of U.S. interests
around the world. But I found it useful
since I look on this trip as, in a sense,
part of our efforts in Asia — this trip
now, another to the ASEAN meeting in
late June, there will an ANZUS
[Australia, New Zealand, United States
pact] meeting in Washington at about
the same time; the chiefs of mission
meeting was a useful way of trying to
draw these threads together. And there
are a lot of very impressive people in
our embassies around through this part
of the world. There was a great deal of
discussion [inaudible] varying points of
view, so I think all in all it served a use-
ful purpose for me.

Q. Could you describe the Asian
dimension a little more? What mutual
strategic issues or concerns do you
share with China, for example?

A. Of course, we first of all want to
have a strong and enduring relationship
with China as such. It's a major country,
as we are, and so we need to think of it
that way. And here their own modern-
ization program is something of great
interest to us. We support what they are
trying to do. and I think as that suc-
ceeds it will be of general benefit to
stability in this part of the world —
higher standards of living, the market
for our products, and so on.

Beyond that, as we talk about issues
around the world, first of all, there are a
number that are well-known where we
have parallel interests, as in Kampuchea
and Afghanistan, various dimensions of
Soviet behavior.

There are other areas where our
views differed, but it was interesting to
me in talking with the Chinese to see
that they too have a world view, and
they feel comfortable in a sense going
around the world and talking about
things that are taking place in various
countries and seeing the relationship
among them.

It was interesting to me, just to take
another dimension or example, having
traveled to Europe in December and
then talking with the Vice President
about his trip before he left and ex-
changing cables to a certain extent
about our two trips, to see the relation-
ship between them. And you see, for ex-
ample, a relationship in arms control is
discussed and on the one hand, the pre-

occupation in Europe, of course, with
the questions of deployment, zero-zero,
what the Soviets do, and in this part of
the world the dimensions of our negotia-
tions saying that zero-zero goes across
the board, it's a worldwide kind of pro-
posal. And the Russian proposal — the
Andropov proposal — faltered in Europe
because it aspires to continued Soviet
monopoly in Europe, and in this part of
the world it is seen as a further destabil-
ization here, so those are all reasons
why we rejected it in the first place. But
again you see the connections and you
see the worldwide dimensions in what
we are trying to achieve.

Q. Did you get the impression, as
a result of talking to the Asians, that
they would be uncomfortable with any
compromise that could be reached
with the Soviets in which they could
keep a certain number of missiles in
Asia? The Europeans seem to be in-
terested in some compromise that
would reduce the number of the
missiles in Europe and allow us to put
up some, but that would still leave the
Soviets with a rather large force here.
Does that put more burden on you to
try to get the zero option?

A. That certainly reinforces the vir-
tues of the zero option, and that point
was made to me. At the same time, I
don't think here they are trying to sort
of tell us what we should do. They are
very interested in the negotiations, and
we gave thorough briefings at each stop
on what our positions are. I think that
was well received.

Q. Does that "they" include the
Chinese?
A. Yes.

Q. I'm specifically thinking of the
[inaudible] in which arms control was
listed as one the areas of congruence.
Could you expand on precisely what
they were talking about? Was it —

A. I think the SS-20 matter is sort
of in the center of it and symbolizes
their interest and their support for the
positions we have been taking.

Q. Secretary Haig was out in Asia
in June 1981. One of the points he
made at that time regarding Vietnam
was that the United States would con-
tinue every effort to isolate Vietnam
under the present circumstances, as
long as Vietnam basically was in Kam-
puchea. It's a very controversial posi-
tion because people think it is better
to have contact even if you don't make
an arrangement with it.

Have you thought about that ques-
tion of what U.S. policy should be
toward Vietnam? Do you have any
thoughts on that?

A. I think basically Vietnam has
isolated itself by its actions. And Viet-
nam has become isolated in the United
Nations, where there have been very
strong votes; I believe the Kampuchea
resolution attracted more votes this year
than last year. And Vietnam is isolated
economically, and all of this, I think, is
unhelpful to Vietnam, and its behavior is
outside the pale. We oppose what they
are doing, and I don't think that there is
anything to be gained by changing our
stance in that regard. I think Secretary
Haig was right.

Q. On Kampuchea, you said there
are parallel interests with China on
Kampuchea. It seems that China
wants to keep low-level guerrilla war
going there for quite some time as a
drain on Vietnam. Is that a shared ob-
jective with the United States?

A. Of course, the shared objective
basically is to get Vietnam out of Kam-
puchea and to allow there to emerge in
Kampuchea a government that is
responsive to the will of the people of
Kampuchea. And that is a shared objec-
tive. The guerrilla warfare is one way of
making it cost Vietnam to be there, and
it is part of this pressure which, of
course, also has its external dimensions
as I was talking about in response to the
previous question.

Q. In the absence of political ini-
tiatives we support continued military
pressure on Vietnam, is that correct?

A. That is correct, but we have
been exerting our support basically
through the Asian countries as sharing
this objective with China. The Asian
countries have basically been taking the
lead, and we have been supporting
them.

Q. There was a report on televi- ,
sion last night broadcast from the |

United States. It said the Administra-
tion had decided to make some new
aircraft sales to Taiwan. The report
may have been garbled — we heard the
F 104 and then it could have been the
F-4. Can you tell us anything about
this? Is there some new sale planned
on that?

A. No, there is nothing new in that.
There have been some sales. That is an
aircraft that is an old aircraft that's
been in the Taiwan inventory for some
time.

Department of State BulletiH

THE SECRETARY

Q. 104s, is that what they are
liking about?

A. I think so, yes, that is what they
-e referring to. There is nothing about
lat that in any way falls outside of the
:idertakings that we made in the
ugust communique.

Q. One matter we haven't touched
n here and maybe came to your mind
economic matters in Asia. As you
now, this part of the world handles
lore U.S. trade than Europe does,
ome of the countries you passed
irough— Japan, Korea, this place
ght now— have been among the more
ynamic economies of the present-day
orld. Do you have any thoughts
bout the economic trends and the
conomic circumstances that you
)und and its meaning for the United
tates?

A. I think a lot of the future of the
orld is here in Asia, and I've felt that
)r quite a long time. As a government
fficial before and as a businessman, I've
lade many trips to this part of the
orld. It has a very able, hard-working
eople in most of these countries, and
3U certainly can see it here in Hong
ong. I think that the United States
eeds to pay a lot of attention to Asia,
nd the economic dimension, of course,
. one of the reasons that brings me
ere as you suggest.

On the one hand, we have the impor-
mce of opening up markets here, as in
16 Japanese case and in the case of
ther countries, and on the other it is a
aurce of raw materials, it is a source of
oods that come into the United States,
t is a thriving economic community.

Q. Do you see anything the United
itates should do or should not do [in-
udible] with regard to the economy?

A. I think, of course, everybody out
ere asks you what is happening to the
l.S. economy and is expansion getting
!i(lcrway? So that's topic "A," and I've
X grossed myself on that subject.

1 think another subject of terrific im-
lortance to everyone here and in the
Jnited States is the subject of protec-
ion. I think we have to do everything
ve can in the United States to stem the
•ise of protectionist forces, and the peo-
ple here do, too. They have a terrific
;take here in an open trading system.
That means, at least in many of the
•ountries, that it's not enough just to ex-
iress concern about developments in the
'iiited States, but they need to look in
hv mirror and ask what their own
jolicies are and whether or not they

shouldn't do something about them.
We've discussed this a great deal in
Japan.

We worry about, for instance, local
content legislation in the United States.
The Administration is firmly opposed to
such legislation. And it has been raised
with me. But there are countries
here — Korea, for example, has now in
place a form of local content legislation.
I think we need to mutually examine ac-
cess to markets, and I know the more
we are able to say in our Congress that
markets are open or being opened, the
better chance we are going to have of
persuading people that we should exer-
cise great care in this regard in our own
legislation. I think that's an issue of
great importance.

There's been a good bit of discussion
about the debt overhang that many
countries have. I think it's worth noting
that the picture out here is basically a
pretty good one. None of these great
problem cases are here; they're in other
parts of the world, but nevertheless, it's
clearly seen that they can have an effect
because just as we had to have a world
view in our foreign policy, the economy
is basically a world economy system.
There's no other way to think about it.

Q. Could you help us clear up
some confusion about the Zhao Ziyang
visit? You and Zhao, when we were in
Beijing, announced that he had ac-
cepted the invitation and that there
was no date set and I think it fair to
say that both sides let it go at that.
Thereafter, there was an announce-
ment from the White House which,
reading the stories about it, went a
step further then and suggested that
he would come either in June or
September and the details had been
worked out. There followed a state-
ment from the Chinese that no, the
details hadn't been worked out and
that he might come this year or he
might not come this year. What are
the facts in this case and how did it
get out of kilter?

A. I don't know how it got out of
kilter but the facts are these. I delivered
a letter to the premier from the Presi-
dent reiterating the invitation to come
to the United States and suggesting as
an initial possible time either some time
in the month of June or some time in
the month of September. Those were
suggestions. That was received by the
Chinese, and it was stated that there
was an intention to accept the invitation
and that the premier would be coming
and that the details would be "worked
out through diplomatic channels" was

the phrase used. And the details, of
course, include the time, as well as other
matters having to do with the content to
be treated during their visits. So
diplomatic channels are at work on the
subject, but there is no further informa-
tion about when the trip would take
place.

Q. It is certain that there would
be a trip in 1983?

A. There is no reference that I am
aware of to 1983 beyond the references
that I just told you about, namely, there
was an invitation to come, two sug-
gested time periods, and what the
possibility in those time periods is to the
premier, I don't know. And if those
don't suit, we can look at others. We'll
just have to see, as far as the timing is
concerned.

Q. What is the status of President
Reagan possibly going to China?

A. That invitation was extended to
him through me, and I think earlier,
when he and the premier met in Cancun,
if I'm not mistaken. And the President is
interested in that possibility. But there
is no trip planned that's in the making at
this point in time, but he's glad to have
this invitation.

Q. When all of this was taking
place, some unnamed White House of-
ficial was quoted as saying that there
was no way the President was going
to China.

A. I was in a meeting of the
Cabinet, and I'll say this on the record
since the President said was that he was
sort of tired of statements by unnamed
White House or Administration sources,
and if people had something to say, let
them stand up and say it on the record
and then we'll know who said what and
how official it was. So until you tell me
who said that on the record, I don't pay
much attention to it. That's courtesy of
the President; those are his words, so
you see I am on the record.

Q. On the question of Hong Kong,
did you discuss it at all with the
governor or perhaps in the meeting
with the ambassadors or heads of mis-
sion, the future of Hong Kong, or are
you still staying out of that?

A. That's basically for China and
the United Kingdom to work out. And
from our standpoint in the United
States, we have very considerable in-
terests here in Hong Kong. So we, of
course, want to see this question worked
out in a manner that will promote the

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.
But it's basically a question for the
Chinese and the United Kingdom to pur-
sue, and I don't want to make any com-
ment about it beyond what I've just said.

Q. Did you discuss that
[inaudible]?

A. You can't be in Hong Kong and
not have people raise this question. But
it's not a subject that we really can con-
tribute to particularly, and so we just
express our hope that they can work it
out in a manner that continues to serve
this interesting and rather unique com-
munity here.

Q. You expect that to be worked
out?

A. I would think so. You live here,
you have probably a better insight than
I. It's a good thing everybody has going
here and usually people like to keep a
good thing going.

Q. Can you say what other mat-
ters of mutual interest you discussed
with the governor?

A. He was interested in knowing
what's going to happen in the U.S.
economy. Of course, I know what's go-
ing to happen to the U.S. economy, so I
was able to answer that question. He
was interested in my visit to China. At
the same time, I recognize he's one of
the most experienced diplomats in the
world when it comes to China, so I was
interested in hearing what his \iews
were. We talked about subjects like that.

Q. Will you be back in June for
the ASEAN conference?

A. I hope to be; I plan to be.
They've invited me, and so unless
something comes up to prevent me, I'll
be there. As I've said, I've been many
times to various ASEAN countries, and
I look forward to it.

Washington, D.C.

Arrival Statement,
February 10. 1983"

I'm glad to be home. The trip to Japan.
China, the Republic of Korea, and Hong
Kong has been worthwhile.

When I present my wrap-up report
to the President tomorrow, I'll be telling
him that our bonds with such sturdy
allies as Japan and Korea are strong and

that we have a solid basis of common in-
terest on which to build a closer rela-
tionship with China. We got some good,
frank talk from our friends; we gave
some good, frank views back. That was
constructive for all parties.

The trip that President Reagan sent
me on underlines the importance of Asia
in the President's global policy. I saw a
vibrancy and creativity there that con-
vinces me much of the future lies in
Asia. Already we have more trade with
Asia than with any other area of the
world.

This trip also reinforced what we all
know — the fates of nations around the
world are intertwined. No one area of
the world can pull up the drawbridge
and ignore the rest of the globe. What
the nations of Europe decide about
nuclear missiles has a dramatic impact
upon Asia. An improving economy in the
United States sends ripples of reaction
coursing across the world. Decisions on
trade and free markets in Asian lands
influence the actions of legislators in
Washington.

Our interests are spread around the
world, and our policies, therefore,
reflect a world view. As a great power.

we have global responsibilities. We are
encouraging countries that share the
benefits of a peaceful and prosperous
world to assume a greater share of the
responsibility for maintaining that order
This was underscored during the recent
talks in Washington between President
Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister
Nakasone.

The aspirations of people in Asia arc
the same as those of people around the
globe — to live in peace, to have the
promise of prosperity, and the oppor-
tunity for individual growth within a
framework of national independence. I
count this trip a contribution to these
goals on both sides of the Pacific.

31.

•Press release 28 of Jan
^Press release 32 of Feb,
^Press release 33 of Feb,
•■Press release 34 of Feb,
^Press release 35 of Feb,
''Press release 38 of Feb,
'Press release 39 of Feb. 7.
^Press release 43 of Feb. 8.
^Press release 40 of Feb. 7.
'"Press release 42 of Feb. 8.
"Press release 41 of Feb. 8.
'^Press release 45 of Feb. 9.
"Press release 46 of Feb. 10
'"Press release 58 of Feb. 23

1983.

Restoring Prosperity
to the World Economy

by Secretary Shultz

Statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on February 15.
1983.^

I appreciate the opportunity to meet
with you today to discuss the interna-
tional economic system. Restoring pros-
perity and stability in the world
economy is one of the fundamental goals
of the President's foreign policy. Prog-
ress toward that goal reinforces our
other fundamental objectives — safe-
guarding peace and security and expand-
ing the benefits of democracy and free-
dom.

I should like to divide my remarks
on the international economic system in-
to three sections: a discussion of the
U.S. stake in the international economy,
an examination of the antecedents of the

current situation and the challenges it
presents, and, finally, a description of
the actions this Administration is taking
to reinvigorate the world economy.

U.S. Stake in the International
Economic System

This country began as a trading nation.
The legend of the Yankee trader has
faded with time. But no matter how
remote the image, there are still plenty
of Yankee traders among us, and
foreign trade is now more important
than ever to the vitality of our economy.
In 1981, the United States representeii
about 25% of the world gross national
product (GNP). One out of five U.S. j"l.s
depends in some way on trade, and 4(r'n
of our cropland is devoted to production
for exports.

Department of State Bulletli

THE SECRETARY

1 In the last decade, U.S. merchandise
!':ports, as a percent of our GNP, have
mbled from 4% to over 8%. Much of
lis increase is attributable to the grow-
g interdependence of the world's
arket economies in the 1970s. Non-
PEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex-
:)rting Countries] developing nations,
ir example, accounted for roughly 20%
- U.S. exports in 1970. These same na-
ons now account for nearly 30% of
.S. exports— more than either the
uropean Community (EC) or Japan.

On the other side of the trade
dger, the non-OPEC developing coun-
•ies supply about 25% of the goods we
nport foruse by our factories and con-
amers. Since the counterpart to inter-
ependence is dependence, it is not
arprising that the Third World supplies
lore than half the bauxite, tin, and
obalt used in American industry and
irtually all the natural rubber, coffee,
ocQa, and hard fibers used by American
onsumers.

The North-South trade connection is
nportant, but it should not be over-
tated. We should remember that Japan
5 our second largest trading partner
,nd our neighbors— Canada and Mex-
:o— are first and third, respectively.
<Ioreover, in the aggregate, the Euro-
lean Community is our single largest
rading partner. Indeed, in 1982, U.S.
rade with the EC totaled $46 billion as
ompared with $32 billion with Canada.

On the financial side, the United
States has traditionally been a large in-
vestor abroad and, conversely, has at-
racted a great deal of foreign invest-
Tient. In the 1950s and 1960s, returns
)n investment were higher abroad than
it home, and the United States was a
leavy net foreign investor. The counter-
part "to this foreign investment was a
persistent surplus in our merchandise
trade. By the 1970s, the demand for
new capital abroad had decreased as had
the U.S. supply of savings. Thus, the
United States "ceased being a net capital
exporter and usually incurred a deficit in
merchandise trade. This history is de-
scribed in greater and more informative
detail in the "Economic Report of the
President" (pp. 54-55), so I will not
develop it further here.

The United States is also a signifi-
cant factor in international financial in-
stitutions. Our support of the World
Bank and the International Development
Association helps mobilize capital for
vital projects in the developing world. In
addition, we are a major factor in the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
IMF is an instrument of collective ac-

tion. And although we are not a bor-
rower, we still benefit when it supple-
ments global liquidity and provides
members with temporary balance-of-
payments financing.

In sum, whether looked at from the
trade side or the financial side, the U.S.
stake in the international economic
system is significant— significant in
terms of jobs, income, and opportunities.
Specifically, we can infer from this brief
overview that the United States has a
clear stake in the promotion of trade, in
the vitality of the international financial
system, and in economic stability in
developed and developing countries
alike.

Beyond pure economics, however,
we also have a stake that is more
"political" in character: the demonstra-
tion of the strength and viability of
market-oriented economies and the
democratic form of government with
which they are associated. We should

In 1981, the United
States represented about
25% of the world GNP.
One out of five U.S. jobs
depends in some way on
trade, and 40% of our
cropland is devoted to
production for exports.

seize this moment to prove the potential
of the open-market mentality that in-
spired the Yankee traders. In so doing,
however, our own system will be put on
trial. Therefore, if we urge other coun-
tries to adopt market-oriented policies,
we should be sure to adhere to those
policies ourselves.

Current Economic Situation

The world is now coming through a
period of painful decompression from
the severe inflationary surge of the
1970s. That period has left us with
serious problems: high unemployment in
the industrial countries, large public sec-
tor deficits that constrain recovery, and
the heavy debt burden of some develop-
ing nations that now strains the interna-
tional financial system. These problems
had their origin in the decade of the
1970s. An analysis of that period reveals
that they may have a common solu-
tion—economic expansion in the 1980s.

The Legacy of the 1970s. The level
of international debt, which now stands
at nearly $700 billion, increased more
than sevenfold from 1972 to 1982. In the
same 10-year period, debt to private
lenders jumped from 40% to 60% of
outstanding debt of the less developed
countries (LDCs). The conclusion drawn
from these facts by those who wish to
fix blame is that either banks "overlent"
during the 1970s or countries "over-
borrowed."

The truth is that many bad judg-
ments were made. But it is also true
that after the oil price increases of
1973-74, lenders and borrowers acted
on a set of assumptions— buoyant ex-
port growth and low interest rates—
that, though proven false, were thought
reasonable at the time. The recycling of
petrodollars from the OPEC nations to
the non-oil LDCs was highly profitable
for the banks. And since the loans were
in inflation-depressed dollars, the LDCs
assumed that today's loans would be re-
paid with cheaper dollars tomorrow. In
this environment, indebtedness mounted.

It would be wrong, however, to
characterize the legacy of the oil shock
years as a debt problem. Rather, in its
"broadest aspect, it is an income-earning
problem. True, LDCs borrowed a lot in
the 1970s, but our domestic corporations
borrow a lot also. The difference is that
corporations invest in productive capaci-
ty to generate income to repay their
debts. Some LDCs, however, tended to
invest in consumption rather than pro-
duction—borrowing to finance internal
income transfers. This strategy',
although of questionable wisdom, was
tolerable as long as LDC export earn-
ings grew fast enough to service their
debts. That was indeed the case from
1975 to 1979, when LDC exports grew
22% annually, roughly keeping pace
with the 25% annual growth of LDC
debt.

In response to the second oil shock
in 1978-79, however, the major in-
dustrialized nations adopted more re-
strictive monetary policies which slowed
inflation, boosted interest rates, and set
in motion a retrenchment from the eco-
nomic excesses of the 1970s. High in-
terest rates and a strong dollar in-
creased LDC debt service costs. Simul-
taneously, LDC export earnings declined
as the recession reduced demand for,
and slashed prices of, LDC commodities.
Indeed, non-oil commodities prices fell
28% between 1980 and 1982, increasing
debt service ratios and eroding the
terms of trade. As Tanzania's President
Julius Nyerere has put it, to buy a heavy

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

truck in 1981, Tanzania had to produce
10 times as much tobacco, or 4 times as
much cotton, or 3 times as much coffee,
as it took to purchase the same truck
just 5 years earlier.

The problem faced now by Tanzania,
and other high-debt developing coun-
tries, is thus not so much a debt problem
as an income-earning problem: rising
debt service costs consume an ever-
increasing proportion of declining export
earnings. Many LDCs are now under
pressure to increase exports and curb
imports. This comes at a time when the
industrialized countries face rising
unemployment, declining real income,
and deteriorating trade balances. As a
result, the international financial, trade,
and monetary systems are under serious
strain.

The Need for Economic Growth.

The only lasting solution to the income-
earning problem of the LDCs, as well as
the serious problems of the industri-
alized countries, is sustained economic
growth— without renewed inflation. The
key to stimulating that growth lies in
the interdependence, forged in the
1970s, of the world's economies.

Quotas, tariffs, and
other trade barriers
raise costs to us and
deny borrowing coun-
tries the hard currency
earnings needed to serv-
ice their debts and buy
our exports.

Today, for example, the economic

linkage between the industrialized West
and the developing world is tighter than
ever. Indeed, it has been estimated that
if the GNP of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) were to grow by 4% in 1983
rather than the projected 1.8%, the non-
oil developing countries could earn an
additional $15 billion on exports to the
West— a figure equal to 14% of their
estimated 1983 debt service payments.

The industrialized countries are now
poised to lead an expansion of the world
economy. In particular, the United
States is on the road to recovery. It ap-
pears to me personally that the growth
projections in the President's fiscal year

1984 budget will be exceeded. Interest
rates are down; inflation is down; inven-
tories are depleted. In short, the United
States and other industrialized nations
that have reduced inflation are posi-
tioned to play a vital role in world
economic expansion.

The recent drop in oil prices may
also stimulate expansion. Of course, an
oil price decline is not unambiguously
good, for any sudden, unanticipated
change in the world economy causes dis-
ruptions. An oil price decline may, for
example, harm individual countries— es-
pecially net oil-exporting LDCs such as
Mexico and Venezuela.

But assume for the sake of illustra-
tion (as distinct from prediction) a
decline to, say, $20 a barrel (a 40%
drop). It has been estimated that such a
price decline would, in the aggregate,
have the following catalytic impact over
a 2-year period: real growth rates in in-
dustrial countries would increase
1%-1.5% and developing country rates
2%-2.5%; inflation in the United States
and elsewhere would decline 1.5%-2.5%;
the 1983 oil import bill for industrial
countries would drop by $90 billion and
that for LDCs by $9 billion; the OECD
current account balance would swing
from a deficit of $18 billion to a surplus
of $17 billion; simultaneously, LDC ex-
ports would rise 3%, cutting their cur-
rent account deficit by $18 bilhon. A less
significant oil price decline would have
similar positive effects, roughly propor-
tional to the reduction from current
prices.

U.S. Efforts to Promote
Economic Expansion

The salutary effects of world economic
expansion will not come about automati-
cally. The United States, together with
other nations, must work to insure that
the opportunities for growth are seized.
In turn, this means that we must con-
centrate our efforts on four objectives:

• First, insuring sufficient liquidity
in the international financial system;

• Second, preserving open markets;

• Third, improving the international
monetary system; and

• Fourth, insuring political stability
in the developing world.

In working toward each of these ob-
jectives—which I shall address in turn-
cooperation will be essential: cooperation
between the public and private sectors,
between the developed and developing
world, between business and govern-
ment, and between the executive branch
and Congress.

Revitalizing the International
Financial System. The basic elements
for successfully dealing with the liquidity
problems of the high-debt developing
countries are known and in place. The
so-called debt bomb can be defused '

through emergency short-term bridge
financing, leading to adjustment pro-
grams implemented in conjunction with
the IMF and with the cooperation of
commercial banks.

Private banks, however, are now re-
ducing their rate of new lending to the
developing world. Net new bank lending
was flat between the first half of 1981
and the first half of 1982. Estimates for
the second half of 1982 show a precipi-
tous drop in new lending.

Such an abrupt contraction in new
lending obviously would imperil the re-
covery of the debtor countries. More-
over, reduced lending, in the face of in-
creased debt service costs, would also
retard our own recovery by contracting
LDC imports from the West. Indeed, as
Rimmer de Vries [Senior Vice President
of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company]
recently testified, a Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company study estimates that if
capital flows into the LDCs were cut by
$2.5 billion, OECD growth would drop at
least half a percentage point. With
OECD growth in 1983 expected to be
only 1.8%, half of a percentage point
would represent a significant cut in
growth.

The Morgan Guaranty study is hypo-
thetical. But import cuts are already a
reality. A dramatic case in point is Mex-
ico, whose 1982 imports from the Unitec
States dropped 37% from the 1981 level.
Consequently, in the course of a single
year, the U.S. balance of merchandise
trade with Mexico swung from a $3.7
billion surplus to a $4.5 billion deficit.

The international economy is too
vulnerable to this kind of contraction to
permit a continued decline in lending to
the Third World. Private banks have a
collective interest in extending sufficient
new money to permit the developing
countries to service their debts. Western
governments, including our own, have a
similar stake in seeing that the LDCs
have sufficient capital to pay for imports
of goods and services that will enhance
LDC productivity and contribute to
world economic expansion.

The United States stands ready to
do its part in this effort. Where ap-
propriate, we will provide funds, as was
the case with Mexico, through bridge
financing. Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion credits, Export-Import Bank loans,
or swap facilities.

THE SECRETARY

This Administration also will be
eking congressional support for the
pansion of IMF resources. In just con-
ided negotiations, member countries
jeed upon a quota increase of 47.5%.
le U.S. share of this increase will be
iproximately $5.8 billion. I might note
at the quota increase is not a U.S.
idget item, for it represents an ex-
,ange of financial assets — cash in ex-
lange for a drawing right on the IMF.
ore importantly, our quota represents
1 investment in international financial
ell-being. The purpose of the IMF is
)t to pay off old debts but to encourage
)und policies. Indeed, indications are
lat a borrowing country's credit worthl-
ess tends to improve with the success-
il implementation of an IMF program,
id private lending then generally in-
•eases rather than declines. A quota in-
•ease is thus an inherent component of
ly program to encourage world eco-
Dmic growth.

Another component of such a pro-
ram is the expansion of the general ar-
mgements to borrow (GAB). The GAB
as initially established by 10 industri-
lized nations as a backup line of credit
) be drawn upon solely by the 10
jntributing countries. However, late
.st month in Paris, the United States,
)gether with the other nations of the
-roup of Ten, agreed to almost triple
le GAB from $7 billion to $19 billion,
lur share of this expansion is $2.6
ilHon. Unlike the traditional GAB, ac-
ess to this expanded fund will not be
mited to the Group of Ten alone but
/ill be accessible to any country whose
quidity problems threaten the financial
ystem as a whole.

Our share of the IMF quota increase
,nd the GAB expansion totals $8.4
lillion. This is the amount we will be
isking Congress to approve before the
■nd of 1983.

Preserving the Trading System.

But even if sustained bank lending and
ncreased IMF resources prevent a
iharp contraction in LDC liquidity, the
success of our financial efforts will ulti-
nately depend on adjustments in the
;rade accounts of developed and devel-
oping countries alike. Import cuts can
DFovide only so much; export growth
Tiust lead the way in the recovery of the
LDCs. Therefore, we must resist protec-
tionist pressures and seek to preserve
the system of open trade we helped to
build.

The recession and high rates of un-
employment in the West understandably
have increased protectionist pressures.
The 98th Congress will probably con-
front local content legislation, agri-
cultural and other subsidies, and a host
of protectionist proposals directed at
hard-hit sectors such as steel and autos.

These protectionist moves threaten
to impede our own recovery and eco-
nomic expansion generally. Quotas,
tariffs, and other trade barriers raise
costs to us and deny borrowing coun-
tries the hard currency earnings needed
to service their debts and buy our ex-
ports. Conversely, open trade speeds re-
sources to their most productive uses
and creates more jobs than it destroys.

That does not mean, however, that
we should acquiesce in other nations'
trade-distorting practices— especially
those imposed on sectors, such as agri-
culture and services, in which we enjoy a
comparative advantage. Subsidized agri-
cultural exports from the EC, for exam-
ple, have enabled European farmers to
expand their share of third-country
markets at the expense of U.S. farmers.
In response, we recently sold subsidized
wheat flour to Egypt.

Temporary, trade-distorting
measures such as the wheat flour trans-
action can be justified on the ground
that "when all the world is mad, 'tis folly
to be sane." But temporary measures
tend to become permanent, and retalia-
tion has an inherent tendency to
escalate. Constructive negotiations— in
which we meet unreason with reason-
present the only lasting solution to pro-
tectionist problems such as export sub-
sidies.

During 1982 . . . the
strong dollar increased
the price of U.S. exports
and decreased the cost
competitiveness of U.S.
industry. Consequently,
the U.S. trade deficit in
1983 is expected to
widen.

We will, therefore, work within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) to remove barriers to the
export of U.S. services and agricultural
products. In addition, we will work on a
bilateral basis, as I did on my trip to
Japan, to roll back trade barriers. Diffi-

cult but important negotiations with the
EC on agricultural trade subsidies are
now in process. Finally, we will seek
concrete ways of implementing the open
trade pledges made by the major in-
dustrialized countries at the Versailles
summit and the GATT ministerial.

Improving the International Mone-
tary System. Trade is encouraged by
stability in exchange markets— some-
thing we have not had in recent years.
The instability of relative currency
values over the last decade is basically a
reflection of turbulent economic condi-
tions. But several developments have
created recent problems for the trading
position of U.S. producers.

Financial flows, for example, are
having a powerful effect on exchange
rate movements. This presents diffi-
culties from the standpoint of trade.
During 1982, financial flows into the
United States led to the greatest ap-
preciation of the dollar since the begin-
ning of floating rates in 1973. The
strong dollar increased the price of U.S.
exports and decreased the cost com-
petitiveness of U.S. industry. Conse-
quently, the U.S. trade deficit in 1983 is
expected to widen. Moreover, if large
out-year budget deficits are not reduced,
they will consume U.S. national savings
(which already accumulate at the lowest
annual rate in the industrial world). A
shortage of savings would drive up both
real interest rates and the dollar, there-
by further widening our trade deficit.

An additional problem we face in the
international monetary system is the
great volatility in exchange rates. For
example, between May and November of
1982, the yen depreciated from about
230 yen to the dollar to 276, raising the
price of U.S. exports in Japan and in
third-country markets and reducing the
price of Japanese imports in the United
States. By the end of the year, however,
the yen had swung back to its previous
level of 230. The solution to such ex-
cessive exchange rate volatility is not
clear. What is clear, however, is that the
problem warrants close study by the ma-
jor currency countries.

Insuring Political Stability. Final-
ly, even if we succeed in increasing LDC
liquidity, preserving relatively open
trade, and decreasing volatility in the
exchange markets, adjustment for many
developing countries still will be diffi-
cult—in some cases, testing what the
social fabric will bear. Developing coun-
tries have had to accommodate the

Marrh IQR.T

THE SECRETARY

recession in the West and their own
financial problems by cutting imports
and curbing economic growth. Aggre-
gate real LDC growth this year will be
about 1%-1.5%— the lowest since 1950.
African countries have been especially
hard hit because of their dependence on
exports of primary commodities. In-
creasingly desperate, they are tempted
by repressive strategies and radical
panaceas.

LDC austerity can, if excessive, risk
political instability that endangers U.S.
strategic interests. In this hemisphere,
economic difficulties threaten to increase
illegal immigration into the United
States. Economic troubles were a factor
in the recent expulsion of tens of
thousands of Ghanaians from Nigeria.
And economic difficulties in the Sudan
could, for example, threaten the U.S. in-
terest in Middle East stability.

In short, our own strategic interests
dictate the following rule: While LDC
adjustment is necessary, such adjust-
ment must take place within the limits
of the politically possible and with suffi-
cient financial support to maintain
stability and spark renewed growth.

Implications

This analysis has, by necessity, been
quite general. Yet I think its implica-
tions are straightforward. The problems
currently burdening the international
economy — recession, high unemploy-
ment, LDC debt— all have a common
solution: economic expansion. If growth
in the world economy resumes and real
interest rates fall, the debt burden of
even the most heavily indebted countries
will become manageable.

The key to recovery from the debt
problem, however, lies in increased ex-
ports from developing countries. That
increase is, in turn, dependent on an ex-
pansion of our own economy and those
of other industrialized countries.
Economic expansion anywhere can help
everywhere, but not necessarily. For if
we expand, while simultaneously erect-
ing protectionist barriers, neither the
LDCs nor the industrialized countries
will benefit from that mutually reinforc-
ing boost to recovery provided by open
trade. In shutting out goods from the
rest of the world, we will incur not only
the usual costs of protection— higher
prices to consumers and jobs lost in the
export sector— but retard our own
recovery and threaten the world eco-
nomic system as well.

Our challenge, therefore, is to re-
vitalize the international financial
system, preserve and extend the bene-

fits of open trade, improve the monetary
system, and insure political stability in
the developing world. This Administra-
tion is working hard to achieve these
four objectives, all of which contribute
to world economic expansion. Our own
economy will play a leading role in that
expansion. As a result, we have an op-

portunity to demonstrate the continued
viability of our market-oriented econom;
and the democratic institutions it sup-
ports.

'Press release 49. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■

Security and Economic
Assistance for FY 1984

by Secretary Shultz

Statement before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on February 16,
1983.'^

I am pleased to appear before you today
to begin our dialogue on the President's
FY 1984 security and development coop-
eration program. Our security and eco-
nomic assistance programs are essential
instruments of our foreign policy and
are directly linked to the national securi-
ty and economic well-being of the United
States. They must be seen in the context
of our priority effort to reestablish the
fact and the perception among our
friends and allies that we are a reliable
partner — that we have the capacity and
will to build international peace, foster
economic growth, and sustain mutual
security.

Economic Interdependence

In recent years, the countries of the
Third World have increasingly moved to
the front of the stage where these issues
of peace, prosperity, and security are
played out. Economically, the developing
countries as a whole have been growing
more rapidly than the United States and
Europe (but not Japan) for the past 15
years. As they have grown, they have
become increasingly important as
customers and suppliers for ourselves
and other industrial nations.

In 1980, developing countries pur-
chased about 40% of U.S. exports-
more than bought by Western Europe,
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and
China combined. At this juncture, 1 out
of every 20 workers in our manufac-

turing plants and 1 out of every 5 acres
of our farmland produce for Third
World markets.

The current worldwide recession hai
vividly — if painfully — highlighted these
relationships. In the past several years
growth rates in the developing countriei
have dropped from over 5% per year to
around 2%. Partly as a result, our ex-
ports to these countries — which were in
creasing at more than 30% a year in the
late 1970s — have tapered off. The chart
on page 69 shows this rise and decline o
exports. As specific examples, in the
first 8 months of 1982, U.S. exports to
Mexico dropped 26%; to Chile, 59%; and
to Thailand, 25%.

According to estimates, every $1
billion decline in U.S. exports erases
60,000-70,000 U.S. jobs after multiplier
effects are taken into account. In your
districts today, some of the workers in
unemployment lines and some of the
businesses and farms on the auction
block are living, if unwanted, proof that
the well-being of our citizens is linked to
the well-being of citizens in the Third
World.

On the other side of the trade
ledger, the developing countries supply
about 40%-45% of the goods which we
import for our factories and consumers.
Although we are richer in minerals than
most industrial countries, the Third
World supplies more than half the baux-
ite, tin, and cobalt used by U.S. in-
dustry. For about 1 1 other strategic
metals and minerals, the developing
countries supply more than half our im-
ports. For some natural products, such
as rubber, coffee, cocoa, and hard fibers,
the Third World supplies everything we
use.

Department of State Bulletir

THE SECRETARY

Since pictures can sometimes pro-
ide information more easily than
ords, I have included some further
jraphs to illustrate our trade and invest-
iient ties to the Third World (see pp. 74
nd 75).

The intertwining of the European,
apanese, and our own economy with
lose of the Third World is expected to
icrease in the 1980s and 1990s. As the
ecession fades, we can expect the faster
rowing countries — particularly in Asia
ut also in South America— to resume
leir role as growth poles in the world
conomy. They will open new oppor-
anities for our exports and jobs for our
itizens. We have an abiding interest in
astering healthy economic growth in
he less developed countries.

mplications for

J.S. National Security

?eyond the demands of economics, the
"hird World is fundamental to our
ispirations for security and peace. Since
950 most of the major threats to inter-
lational stability, and the chief oppor-
unities for expansion of the Soviet
Jnion's political reach, have come in the
Chird World: Korea in 1950; Dienbien-
)hu in 1954; Suez in 1956; Cuba in 1962;
md more recently Iran, Angola,
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, El Salvador,
md Ethiopia.

A study by the Brookings Institution
las identified no fewer than 185 inci-
ients in developing countries since the
jnd of World War II when U.S. military
forces were used in situations which
threatened our political or economic in-
terests. As you know, 1,200 Marines are
currently on duty in Lebanon helping to
prevent renewed fighting there.

The point is clear. The fault line of
global instability runs strongly across
the continents of the Third World. This
instability is inimical to our security in
many ways. Small incidents can flare in-
to larger conflagrations and potentially
into confrontations between the super-
powers. Korea and Cuba teach this
lesson well.

More subtly, the Soviet Union and
its allies are able to feed on political in-
stability. Some of the most significant
uses by the Soviets of military power
since World War II have been in the
developing world. The Soviet deploy-

U.S. Merchandise Exports to LDCs

(Billions of Current Dollars)

1970 71 '72 73 74 75

•Annual rate based on 18 months.

Source: International Monetary Fund

ment of a deepwater navy, an airlift
capacity, and mobile ground forces have
given them the ability to intervene
quickly when they perceive targets of
opportunity. We cannot ignore this reali-
ty as it challenges our national interests.

Strategically, some of the least
secure Third World countries are
sources of critical raw materials or lie
astride sea lanes which carry our mili-
tary forces and world commerce. The
premier example is the Persian Gulf.
About 32% of the free world's oil sup-
plies originates there. Despite the recent
decline in oil prices and the increased
availability of non-OPEC oil, this region
is vital to the economic and political
security of Europe, Japan, and the
United States. Clearly, it is in our na-
tional interest to assist countries in this
region and thereby help sustain access
to those supplies.

The job of containing the political in-
fluence and military reach of the Soviet
Union also requires that we maintain
military facilities and strengthen in-
digenous defense forces around the
world. The United States cannot defend

its interests by operating out of the
United States and Europe alone. We
need the cooperation of countries in the
Third World, and we must be prepared
to help these key countries achieve their
aspirations for security and economic
growth.

The least desirable method for pre-
serving our strategic interests and insur-
ing stability in the Third World is by us-
ing U.S. forces. The 185 incidents which
I mentioned earlier represent — in
essence — 185 failures to resolve prob-
lems by more measured means. If we
are to avoid incidents in the future, we
need a modest commitment of resources
— exercised consistently over time — to
secure peace and economic well-being in
the developing countries.

President's FY 1984 Program

This is the principal purpose of the
President's fiscal year (FY) 1984 securi-
ty and development cooperation pro-
gram. The program focuses on key
strategic areas and economic problems

March 1983

THE SECRETARY

which pose short- and long-term threats
to the United States.

Our request is for $14.5 billion—
4.6% more in current dollars than our
request last year. Of this, $4.4 billion is
for off-budget repayment guarantees of
loans at interest rates which reflect the
cost of money to the U.S. Treasury.

As the figures below show, about 63%
of our request is for security assistance:
military aid and economic support funds
(ESF) to assist in building the economic
and military capabilities of countries and
regions of strategic importance. Thirty-
seven percent of the total program is for
worldwide economic assistance through
both bilateral and multilateral programs.
Reading across the table, if you add the
ESF — that is, the funds used for eco-
nomic growth in the key security coun-
tries— to the worldwide economic assist-
ance, then the program divides func-
tionally as 53% of the funds used to
spur economic growth, 43% for military
aid, and 4% for refugee assistance and
other uses.

bound to the search for peace in that
region.

After the Middle East, the next
large segment goes for four key areas:

• Funds to strengthen military
capabilities and accelerate economic ac-
tivity in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and
Turkey on the southern flank of NATO;

• Funds for overcoming economic
problems in the Caribbean on our
southern sea routes and helping build
democratic institutions and political
stability in Central America;

• Funds for nations near the critical
oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. We pro-
pose significant economic and military
assistance programs for Pakistan,
Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, and
Kenya; and

• In the key Pacific area, the focus
is on strengthening Korea's self-defense
and assisting the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Thailand.

The balance of the FY 1984 bilateral

Foreign Assistance Requests, FY 1984

(budget authority, $ billions)

Funds Are
Used For:

Security

Assistance

Program

Economic

Assistance

Program

Total

Military Aid*

$6.2

$ 6.2 ( 43%)

Economic Growth

$2.9

$4,8

$ 7.7 ( 53%)

Other**

$0.1

$0,5

$ 0,6 (4%)

Total

$9.2 (63%)

$5.3 (37%)

$14,5 (100%)

• includes $4 4 billion in off-budget repayment guarantees of loans at rates which reflect the cost of
money to the Treasury

■• Other includes refugee assistance, Peace Corps, Narcotics Control, and other small programs
Percentages are rounded

In recent years, we have integrated
all our foreign assistance instruments —
development aid, PL 480, and security
assistance — around discrete objectives.
Our FY 1984 program reflects this
process.

The largest single use of the pro-
posed funds is for the peace and security
process in the Middle East. This sup-
ports principally military and economic
programs in Israel and Egypt. Added to
this is our request for $251 million in
supplemental FY 1983 funds for
Lebanon. I do not need to dwell with
this committee on how important our
assistance funds are to the peace proc-
ess in the Middle East nor how inex-
tricably U.S. political interests are

program deals with a host of critical
situations in the rest of the world: prob-
lems in southern Africa caused by a
combination of apartheid, the drive for
independence in Namibia, and Soviet/
Cuban adventurism; funds for the dis-
tressingly stagnant countries of sub-
Saharan Africa and the overpopulated,
but slowly growing, Indian subcontinent.

These key regional programs are il-
lustrated in the two maps included in
this statement (see pp. 72 and 73). The
worldwide map shows the geographic
focus of our security assistance pro-
gram. The second map shows the key
countries we propose to assist in the
Middle East, NATO, and the Persian
Gulf.

The President's democracy initiative
is an important and related matter. He
has put $65 million dollars in the budget
of the U.S. Information Agency for pro-
grams to help build the infrastructure ol
democracy and to promulgate the
American values of freedom and decen-
cy in the world. Democracy has proved
to be the best guarantee of the whole
range of other human rights. Even
though we must continue to cooperate
with nondemocratic governments to
achieve certain policy objectives, it is
essential that we do what is appropriati
and prudent to encourage democratic
developments over the long haul. It is bj
putting American resources behind a
movement toward democracy that we
realistically fulfill our national traditions

In all our programs in strategic
regions, we aim our economic aid — both
development assistance and economic
support funds — at the key requisites for
growth:

First, rational macroeconomic
policies which provide an environment
for growth by freeing up markets, creat
ing incentives, and encouraging the
private sector;

Second, developing capacities to use
science and technology and build effec-
tive institutions;

Third, investing in agriculture which
is the engine of economic growth in
developing countries and the principal
means for insuring equitable broad-
based development for the majority of
their citizens. We also stress population
and health programs. As you know,
rampant population growth underlies the
Third World's poverty and poses a majoii
long-term threat to political stability and
our planet's resource base.

There is a balance in our develop-
ment assistance between programs
which provide direct economic benefits
to the poor majority and longer term
development of the human and capital
resources needed to overcome conditions
which cause poverty.

Our FY 1984 program also includes
critical funds for the multilateral devel-
opment institutions, particularly for ful-
filling our pledge to the International
Development Association (IDA), the soft
loan window of the World Bank. Our
commitment to share in IDA's
worldwide program — a program which
we reviewed carefully in 1981 and found
to be effective — has been reaffirmed by
the President at the recent meetings of
world leaders in Cancun and Versailles.

Department of State Bulletir

THE SECRETARY

The priority item on the world's
fenda today is restarting noninfla-
onary growth. The United States is
i-ging private U.S. banks to continue a
I'udent flow of capital to less developed
)untries in order to support economic
abilization programs and stimulate
rowth. In this circumstance, it is not
msistent and not credible for our
wernment to continue to delay funds
ir IDA, which is a major source of
rowth capital in low-income countries.
The funds which we are requesting
ir the FY 1984 foreign affairs pro-
rams are modest in relation to our
ireign policy objectives and our need
)r security. The appropriations request

slightly more than 1% of the Federal
udget and some 4% of the defense
adget. Yet the purpose of these funds

to help create conditions in the less
eveloped countries which reduce the
eed for military forces. Cuts in these
rograms would be inimical to our basic
iterests.

Y 1983 Supplemental Request

et me conclude my remarks today by
earkening back to the FY 1983 pro-
ram. The FY 1983 continuing resolu-
on fell 9% — a billion-and-a-quarter
ollars— below our FY 1983 request,
'hree-quarters of the security assistance
jnds were earmarked, meaning that the
hortfall in the unearmarked balance fell
eavily on our strategic interests in
Lorea, Southwest Asia, Central
tmerica, and Africa. No matter how we
lice it, the amount we received is inade-
uate to meet our minimum security re-
uirements abroad. Hence, we are re-
uesting an FY 1983 supplemental —
251 million in new funds for Lebanon
nd $981.5 million to make up shortfalls
n the 1983 program.

Our objective in Lebanon is straight-
orward. We seek to restore Lebanese
■overeignty and insure Israeli security.
?hese objectives are two sides of- the
.ame coin. The threat to Israel does not
:ome from the Lebanese people but
rom foreign forces that have usurped
jebanese sovereignty and are still
;amped on Lebanese soil. It follows that
I peaceful Lebanon, free of all foreign
'orces and sovereign over all its terri-
tory, will make a major contribution to
Israeli security.

We are currently engaged in diplo-
Tiatic efforts seeking the withdrawal of
external military forces and the restora-
tion of Lebanese authority over its terri-
tory. At the same time, it is vital that
the Government of Lebanon— weakened

U.S. Foreign Assistance Request, FY 1984

(Budget Authority)

3,000

2.000

1,000

Economic
Assistance

Glossary

Security Assistance

DA— bilateral development assistance.
ESF — economic support fund (economic

stabilization and development funds for

security assistance countries-
FMS Grants— foreign military sales grants

(forgiven credits for military aid).
FMS Guarantees— foreign military sales

guarantees (off-budget loans for military

aid).
IMET— international military education and

training program

MA — multilateral assistance (multilateral de-
velopment banks and international
organizations)

MAP — military assistance program (grant
military aid).

Misc. — miscellaneous programs sucti as
refugee assistance, Peace Corps, and
otfier small programs

Other— otfier programs sucfi as peace-
keeping operations.

PL 480— Food for Peace.

March 1983

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March 1983

THE SECRETARY

by years of civil strife, the inability to
collect normal governmental revenues,
and the lack of normal governmental
services— be assisted in revitalizing
itself. The financial situation of the
government is precarious. It cannot
move ahead with the reconstruction of
the country without outside assistance.
The United States can and must join
with other nations in that effort. Both
military and economic assistance are
needed.

For the balance of the FY 1983 pro-
gram, the shortfalls and earmarks in the
Continuing Resolution mean that the
1983 levels for unearmarked, military-
sales-guarantee countries are nearly
50% below the request; grant military
assistance (MAP) is 75% below the re-
quest.

Jordan, a potentially critical player
in the peace process, will have its mili-
tary assistance reduced by some 40%.

In Southwest Asia, military sales
guarantees for Pakistan would be cut
below the level needed to pay for mili-
tary equipment already on order.

Grant military assistance for Sudan,
Somalia, and Kenya— strategically
located countries in and around the
Horn of Africa— would be cut by over
60%. Available funding will provide only
for maintenance and spare parts.
Tunisia, which was recently attacked by
Libya, would be cut over 40% in military
sales guarantees and 85% in grant mili-
tary assistance and would not be able to
buy the military equipment it needs to
defend its borders. These amounts need
to be restored.

Turkey, a NATO ally which is put-
ting its economic house in order, would
see its economic support funds reduced
by $100 million. We would fall short of
our OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] pledge
by that amount, with potentially adverse
impact on the pledges of other OECD
partners.

U.S. Direct Investment in LDCs, 1960-81

(Billions of Current Dollars)

76 78 '80

Income and Repatriated Profits from
U.S. Direct Investment in LDCs, 1966-81

(Billions of Current Dollars)

- i

income *

^ Repatriated Profits

1966

'68

'80

Department of State Bullet i

THE SECRETARY

Grant military aid and military sales
uarantees to South Korea and
hailand, with North Korean and Viet-
imese troops on their respective
trders, would be cut by a third.

Smaller programs in Latin America,
frica, and the Caribbean Basin— both
•onomic and military— will be hard hit,
) the detriment of our efforts to pro-
lOte the security and development
ecessary for peaceful resolution of con-
icts. These amounts need to be re-
ored.

F'inally, I must underscore— as I did
irlier— that the commitment to com-
lete the U.S. pledge to IDA is of
milar weight and immediacy. The Con-
fess has stretched out our IDA contri-
utions from the scheduled 3 years to a
lurth. Other donors have expressed ex-
•eme concern at what they see as a uni-
iteral abrogation of a firm U.S. obliga-
on. Nevertheless, they have taken the
xtraordinary step of providing an addi-
onal $2 billion in contributions to help
over the shortfall temporarily. This ae-
on was undertaken with the under-
tanding, reaffirmed by the President at
'ersailles, that the United States would
eek to provide $945 million in 1983 and
p complete its IDA commitments in
i984. Failure by the United States to
leet this adjusted schedule would cause
}ur major allies to question the value of
J.S. commitments.

I have selected only a few examples
i the difficulties we face. Enactment of
he supplemental authorization would
estore these funds and enable us to
neet our commitments and maintain our
redibility as a reliable partner.

As an accounting device, our budget
livides expenditures into domestic and
nternational programs. But— as I
)ointed out at the outset— that is an
irtifice. The U.S. security and economic
issistance program promotes conditions
ibroad which are deeply in our domestic
nterests. I hope you will give both the
1983 supplemental and the proposed
L984 program your full support.

U.S. Merchandise Exports to LDCs by Region, 1982*

'Press release 50. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
Dy the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■

Source: International Monetary Fund

U.S. Merchandise Exports to LDCs by Commodity, 1982*

'Based on a 10-month period.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

March 1983

ARMS CONTROL

Arms Control Negotiators
Hold News Briefing

Folloiving is a neivs briefing held at
the White House on January 21, 1983, by
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, special
representative for arms control and
disarmament negotiations, and Am-
bassador Paul H. Nitze, head of the U.S.
delegation to the intermediate- range
nuclear forces (INF) negotiations.'^ Also
included is President Reagan's statement
of January 21.

Ambassador Rowny. Ambassador Nitze
and I have just met with the President
to discuss the next rounds of our respec-
tive negotiations. The President remains
convinced, and I certainly agree, that we
have a good START position, one which
I'm pleased to continue to pursue with
the Soviets in Geneva at these negotia-
tions.

As you know, the START proposal
is the most bold and imaginative pro-
posal that has been ever proposed in the
strategic arms arena — calls for a full
reduction by 50% of the deployed
ballistic missiles. It's captured the atten-
tion of people here and particularly in
Europe. I've heard no criticism about
this being a good proposal. And it's one
we should all pursue.

We've had an active and busy and
fruitful period of consultations here in
Washington. I expect to return to
Geneva with clear instructions which
will be aimed at the number one goal;
that is to enhance deterrence, to achieve
stability in times of crisis, and, above all,
to reduce the risk of nuclear war. And
all these principles, of course, will help
us move our negotiations forward.

I'm hopeful also that the Soviet
delegation will return to Geneva
prepared to join us in moving toward
these deep reductions in a number of
strategic nuclear weapons. To repeat, as
you know, our proposal calls for reduc-
ing deployed ballistic missiles by a full
one-half and the number of warheads on
these missiles by a third and to reduce
to equal levels — and the principle that
we have throughout is equality, equality,
equality. We don't seek superiority, and
we can't settle for inferiority.

And, of course, with this has to go
hand-in-hand the verifiability of these
proposals at every step of the game.
Therefore, I'm hopeful that the Soviet
delegation will come back prepared to
continue what has been a rather active
and brisk period of negotiations. And

I'm particularly interested that they
have shown positive leanings toward
these confidence-building measures
which will reduce the risk of nuclear
war.

Their statements that they are also
interested in these have encouraged me,
and I'm going to pursue these with all
vigor, parallel with our own START
talks. And, if it's possible to get a
separate agreement on these, even
before we finish START, I think that
anything that we do to reduce the risk
of nuclear war will be welcomed by us,
and I have reason to believe the Soviets
want these also.

Q. Do you still believe there's a
50-50 chance of winning an agreement
this year'/

Ambassador Rowny. I still remain
guardedly optimistic. I like to believe
that we can take them at their word.
After all, they've said that, given good-
will on our side, there can be an agree-
ment. I know we have goodwill on our
side, and we're serious. Therefore, we're
certainly going to strive to do our ut-
most to get an agreement.

Q. Do you go back to Geneva with
anything new in the way of instruc-
tions, any new flexibility in your
negotiating position? And also could
you address the issue whether you see
any linkage between Nitze's thoughts
on medium-range missiles and that be-
ing held hostage in anv sense to vour
thought?

Ambassador Rowny. Let me say,
first of all, that the President in his last
hour or so reiterated the basic prin-
ciples, and, so, I don't look for any ma-
jor shifts or anything that's going to
develop between now and the time we
leave. As you know, there will be a
meeting next week to get the instruc-
tions and final print to dot the i's and
cross the t's.

On this business of flexibility, let me
tell you that one of the things that the
Soviets admire about this President —
and have told me so — is his constancy
and that he doesn't have a proposal and
then shift it. And they respect that and
they say, "We can do business with a
man who knows what he wants and will
stay the course." [Laughter]

Q. Their phrase, not yours?
Ambassador Rowny. Their phrase.

And so look at the fact that they came
to the negotiating table in June after w
had made a proposal which is much
more drastic, much deeper than the
Carter proposal. They came to the
negotiating table. And they have been
responding — first, when we said, "We'll
reduce by 50%," they said, "By 25%." C
course, they are, again, responding in
launchers and not in the ballistic
missiles. The way we do, we have a bet
ter unit of count. We've said, "But it's
the warheads that count." And they
said, "We, too, will reduce the number
of warheads." Of course, they haven't
told us how many. So they see the
value — and, of course, they understand
how the public regards this. And so I
feel that they know that we have a ver
good proposal in the START proposal.

Q. Could you answer the second
part of his question dealing with the
report that the Soviets were somehoV'
linking the L\F talks to the START
talks, that they, if we installed any
missiles in Europe, they would pull
out of the START negotiations?

Ambassador Rowny. I have asked
my counterpart to take a confidentiality
pledge with me that we will not discuss
things that happen at the negotiating
table. So I would rather not answer tha
question head-on because I do think one
you start negotiating in the public, you
lessen the chances of reaching an
agreement —

Q. It's not negotiating in public.
There are stories ever>' day this week
saying they're going to pull out of
START if we deploy the intermediate
range missiles.

Ambassador Rowny. Let me simpi
say that the two negotiations are part c
a seamless web that Paul and I coor-
dinate closely, and we see these as one
continuum in a way. They're all related,
although he has an equal and separate
negotiation to mine. But let me go this
far. Without getting into the confiden-
tiality of what happened at the nego-
tiating table, the Soviets did publicly sa\
that if any forces were deployed in
Europe, that they would have to re-
examine their proposal for reductions.
This is in the public domain.

Q. Do you take that threat seri-
ously?

Ambassador Rowny. It's not a
threat. 1 think it's a statement that they
say. Yes, I take everything they say
seriously, and they have said on the
record, in print, and so I'm not, again,
revealing anything that happened across

Department of State Bulletii

ARMS CONTROL

; negotiating table. I want to make
it clear.

Q. Whv do you say it's not a
•eat?

Ambassador Kowny. They have
id that if any systems are deployed in
iul's area— that is, GLCMs [ground-
jinched cruise missiles] and Per-
ngs_that they cannot reduce. And
u want to characterize it as a threat,
it's your character; I'm just telling you
it's what they said.

Q. Did they also say they would
t talk anymore, negotiate?
Ambassador Rowny. No.

Q. If that's what the President
id, you're going to go ahead and
ploy those missiles on schedule,
lesn't that make your task sort of
eless?

Ambassador Rowny. Put that ques-
.n to Paul. Those forces are not my—

Q. I thought he said a little while

0 about confidence-building
jasures —

1 Ambassador Rowny. Yes.

Q. Are we to understand that you
e closer to some announcement on
e success on that level that may be
connection with the trip of Vice
•esident Bush to Europe?

Ambassador Rowny. No, no, I'm
it trying to imply that. What I'm say-
g is that the President proposed cer-
in confidence-luiilding measures. And
the times when Mr. Andropov has put
it the carrot— like his answers to
ingsbury Smith, he said, "And we can
ove forward in these confidence-
lilding measures." Then when the stick
)peared in the Pmvda article several
lys later, which was very critical of us,
. still was positive about confidence-
lilding measures. He's positive both
ith a carrot and a stick. I have reason

be optimistic— guardedly optimistic—
at we can get an agreement in these
lings because I genuinely think that
ley want to reduce the risk of nuclear
ar as much as we do.

Ambassador Nitze. As Ambassador
,owny has indicated, we've just met
ith the President to discuss the final
reparations for the resumption of the
rms reduction negotiations with the
oviet Union.

I would like to take this opportunity

to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a
meaningful agreement to reduce the
twin threats of war and intimidation
posed by the growing Soviet arsenal of
intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The President has proposed the com-
plete elimination of this dangerous class
of weapons on both the U.S. and the
Soviet side. This solution which would
provide for zero on their side and zero
on our side constitutes the most stable,
durable, and effective blueprint for
peace in Europe, Asia, and the world as
a whole.

I'resident Reagan has instructed me
to be vigorous and probing in my efforts
to reach an agreement which meets the
security requirements of the United
States and of the NATO allies. The
Lhiited States, together with its allies,
has been tireless through diplomacy and
concerted action in seeking a peaceful
relationship with the Soviet Union. But
so long as Soviet proposals continue to
mask a desire for a dangerous military
advantage, so long as Soviet pledges of
peace are accompanied not by coopera-
tion at the negotiating table but by thin-
ly veiled threats against our individual
allies, we in the West must adhere to
both tracks of our policy: first, to seek
fair agreements to reduce the risk of
war and second, to take those steps

necessary to maintain the military
balance which has kept the peace over
.37 years.

I go now to Geneva hopeful that the
Soviets will see the folly of seeking to
divide and intimidate our alliance and
hopeful that an agreement which is fair
and effective can be reached. President
Reagan has expressed his fullest con-
fidence in me as a negotiator and in our
allies as partners. Together we shall
meet this challenge. With cooperation
from the Soviet Union, we may yet
make a major contribution to a lasting
peace.

Q. If the United States plans to go
ahead and deploy GLCMs and Per-
shings, and if the Soviets say they
won't talk if you go ahead and do that,
doesn't that make this all rather a
fruitless exercise?

Ambassador Nitze. I don't think it
does. Because, granted, that the Soviet
Union long ago— when I say long ago, 6
months ago— said that, in the event of
practical steps toward deployment be-
coming evident to the Soviet Union, that
they would then reassess their position.
And when you asked them what they
meant by "reassess their position," they
said that might well include calling off
our talks, calling off the START talks,
taking measures to counteract or every

President Reagan's Statement,
January 21, 1983^

This morning I met with our chief
negotiators for the strategic and in-
termediate nuclear arms control negotia-
tions we are engaged in with the Soviet
Union— Ambassadors Ed Rowny and
Paul Nitze. Vice President Bush,
Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger,
ACDA Director-designee Ken Adelman,
and my national security adviser. Bill
Clark, "also joined the discussion.

Since our negotiators will soon
return to Geneva for the next round of
the negotiations, and since the Vice
President leaves for Europe to review
these and other arms control and securi-
ty matters with our allies, today's
meeting gave us an opportunity to
review the status of the negotiations and
to reaffirm our serious purpose for the
coming round.

Our proposals for massive reduc-
tions in strategic arsenals and for the
elimination of an entire class of nuclear

missiles in the intermediate nuclear
forces deserve the support of all who
seek genuine arms reductions. The com-
ing round of the negotiations is par-
ticularly important because our far-
reaching proposals, combined with our
defense modernization programs, pro-
vide a strong incentive for reaching
agreements on lower levels of forces on
an equitable and verifiable basis.

I am determined to explore every
possibility for equitable agreements to
reduce the arsenals and the risks of war
and to strengthen the foundation for
peace. And I have so instructed our
negotiators. Our entire arms control
team supports this vital goal. We have
no higher priority, and we will spare no
effort where the peace and security of
our nation and of the world are con-
cerned.

^Text from While House press release.

v/larch 1983

ARMS CONTROL

step that we might take so it would be
disadvantageous to the NATO allies and
to ourselves. They did say that. But
subsequent to that, Mr. Brezhnev made
that speech before the 500 generals in
Moscow. And in that speech he said that
practical steps had already been taken,
and they haven't called off the talks.

I do not believe that it is necessarily
an intention of theirs to so do. They do
mention these things that they may well
do in order to bring pressure on us, but
it doesn't necessarily mean that they will
do it.

Q. We've all read a lot in the last
few days about this tentative agree-
ment that you and your Soviet
counterpart reached in the summer
which the Soviets rejected, which was
apparently agreement for an equal
number of warheads or — not equal
number of warheads — equal number
of-

Ambassador Nitze. Launchers.

Q. Why do you think Moscow said
no? What does that tell you about
their negotiating determination?

Ambassador Nitze. It's hard for me
to estimate why the Soviet Union makes
decisions. I've regretted very much that
they made the decision to radically
reject the exploratory package which
Kvitsinskiy [Yuli Kvitsinskiy, head of the
Soviet delegation to the INF negotia-
tions] and I arrived at. It wasn't an
agreement. I made no offer on behalf of
the United States. But Mr. Kvitsinskiy
and I tried to see whether it might be
possible to cut through the Gordian knot
and to arrive at something which might
be worthy of consideration by the two
governments.

The U.S. Government, I think, did
find it worthy of consideration, although
they did not agree with all the details.
But the Soviet Union did not find it so.

Q. You don't see that as necessari-
ly a sig^i that they still believe that
it's, or that they believe very certainly
that it's possible to, through the cam-
paign they're waging, make sure that
the Europeans never agree to deploy
the missiles? In other words, that they
can get what they have and we'll wind
up with nothing?

Ambassador Nitze. I think they
hope that through propaganda they can
make it impossible. I don't think they
can. I don't think they'll succeed in that.

Q. Are you concerned that the
United States is losing the public rela-
tions war in Europe over these
missiles?

Commission on Strategic
Forces Established

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JAN. 3, 1983'

In the 1983 continuing resolution, the
Congress expressed interest in several
aspects of the strategic force moderniza-
tion program, including the basing mode
for the next generation ICBM [intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles]. The legislation
requested a report addressing these con-
cerns not earlier than March 1, 1983. To
help in this congressionally directed ef-
fort, I am today establishing a bipartisan
Commission on Strategic Forces. The
commission will review the strategic
modernization program with particular
focus on our land-based intercontinental
ballistic missile system and basing alter-
natives for that system. An imp(.irtant
part of the commission's work will be to
consider carefully the views of the Con-
gress.

I am pleased to announce that I
have asked the following distinguished
Americans to serve on the commission,
subject to the customary clearances for
such appointments, and they have
agreed to serve.

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, former

Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs, to serve as chairman;
The Honorable Thomas Reed, Special

.■Assistant to the President and former

Secretary of the Air Force, to serve as

vice chairman;
The Honorable Nicholas Brady, former

Senator from New Jersey;
The Honorable Harold Brown, former

Secretary of Defense and Secretary of

the Air Force;'
The Honorable William Clements,

former Governor of Texas and Deputy

Secretary of Defense;
Dr. John Deutch, dean of science at MIT

and former Director of Research at

the Department of Energy;
The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,

former Secretary of State and

Supreme Allied Commander in

Europe;

The Honorable Richard Helms, former
Director of Central Intelligence;

John Lyons, vice president of the
AFL-CIO and chairman of the defen
subcommittee of its executive council

Vice Adm. Levering Smith (USN, Ret;
former Director of Special Projects f
the Navy;

The Honorable James Woolsey, former
Under Secretary of the Navy.

Dr. Marvin Atkins, Director of Of-
fensive and Space Systems in the Offic
of the Secretary of Defense, is to servt
as executive secretary of the commis-
sion.

I have directed the chairman of tht
commission to seek out the views and
assistance of a wide variety of dis-
tinguished authorities in the strategic
field and to consult closely with
Members of Congress throughout the
commission's deliberations.

I cannot overemphasize the impor-
tance of the complex task facing the
commission and how much the success
of this distinguished group hinges on
constructive cooperation among the cor
mission. Congress, the Department of
Defense, other agencies, and outside e>
perts. In undertaking this vital mission
I ask that we all keep the fundamental
objective in view — to preserve an effec
five deterrent while moving forward
with negotiations to reach equitable am
verifiable arms reductions.

[Editors' Note: On February 5, 1983, th
White House announced that President
Reagan had asked William J. Perry to
serve on the commission. Dr. Perry is
senior vice president and managing
director of research of Hambrecht &
Quist, Inc.. of San F^rancisco.]

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 10, 1983.

'Secretary Brown resigned from the con
mission on Jan. 21. ■

Ambassador Nitze. I'm not con-
cerned. I don't think that we are losing
the propaganda war in Europe.

Q. Why not? Why don't you? I
mean, there seems to be a growing

peace movement. Gromyko's remarks
and Andropov's remarks are getting
widespread play in Europe — his
criticism of the U.S. position.

Ambassador Nitze. You look at th
dynamism of the peace movement and

Department of State Bullei

DEPARTMENT

le opposition to deployment prior to
le President's speech 14 months ago.
hat was very great then. As a result of
,16 President's speech 14 months ago,
hat whole trend was checked and
'langed. Granted, in these last few
lonths, as a result of Mr. Andropov's
tatement, there's been a renewed for-
'ard movement. I think now it will be
hecked again by the firmness of Mr.
Iromyko's position in Bonn indicating
bsolutely no movement in their posi-
on.

Q. Have you been told that you can
o back and explore other kinds of
aekages for consideration with your
ounterparts? Have you been given
hat authority?

Ambassador Nitze. I've been given
ot only the authority, but I've been
irected to explore whether there's any
ossibility for a major change in the
loviet position.

Q. That includes changes beyond
nd different from zero-zero?

Ambassador Nitze. I'm authorized
0 explore.

Q. Do you feel that, as you go back
o Geneva, you have the necessary
lexibility to reach an agreement with
he Soviets?

Ambassador Nitze. I shouldn't have
hat. It is only the U.S. Government and
he Soviet Government which are ever
joing to reach an agreement. I have the
lecessary authority to explore with my
Soviet counterpart what give there is in
he Soviet position.

Q. As Ambassador Rowny said,
;his is inextricably wound together. Is
his a situation where you're going to
iucceed and Rowny will succeed or
30th fail?

Ambassador Nitze. Frankly, I think
that the time urgency is really on my
negotiations. I think it's necessary that
vve come to a successful conclusion first.

Q. What date do your negotiations
resume?

Ambassador Nitze. On the 27th of
January.

Q. And the same with START?
Ambassador Nitze. No.

Q. February 2nd?

Q. Are you authorized to offer
something less than zero-zero?
Ambassador Nitze. I'm not

authorized to offer anything. I'm
authorized to explore.

Q. Is there any consideration being
given to separate negotiations on

March 1983

curbing cruise missiles? As you know,
Mr. Rostow [Eugene V. Rostow,
former Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency] said when
they were deployed that the scorpion
would be out of the bottle and we're
deploying them now.

Ambassador Nitze. I don't
remember that remark of Mr. Rostow.

Q. At his confirmation hearings he
said that.

Ambassador Nitze. I see. I wasn't
aware of that. But, in any case, the
question of cruise missiles is an item
which is involved both in the INF
negotiations and in the START negotia-
tions because the Soviet side has put
forward proposals limiting cruise
missiles, submarine-launched cruise
missiles, in both negotiations.

Q. Do you expect to see any
substantive progress before the West
German elections in your talks?

Project Democracy

The Department of State made the
following information available to news
correspondents on February 7, 1983.

President Reagan in his speech to the
British Parliament in June 1982
developed two principal themes.

• The United States should make a
major effort to help "foster the in-
frastructure of democracy" around the
world.

• The United States should engage
more vigorously in a peaceful "competi-
tion of ideas and values" with the Soviet
Union.

The President thus laid the ground-
work for a long-term, positive program
by the United States to advocate the
principles of democracy, support those
people and institutions committed to
democratic development, build and rein-
force bonds based on shared values be-
tween peoples and nations, and counter
the spread of totalitarianism through the
active interchange of ideas and vigorous
democratic institutions . In the process,
the U.S. Government will be taking
steps to help create conditions which will
offer the best protection for human
rights over the long term.

This requires better programs and
new approaches. While the United
States has long recognized the value of
providing military and economic assist-
ance to friends and allies, we have given
too little attention to the political, in-
tellectual, and social infrastructure
necessary to support democratic systems

Ambassador Nitze. I hope for such.

Q. You talk about give in the
Soviet position. Is there any give in
the U.S. position?

Ambassador Nitze. There will be if
the Soviets come forward — well, wait a
minute, let me change that. I'd rather
start from the beginning.

The President's directive to me is to
negotiate seriously, and he made that
clear 14 months ago at the beginning of
these negotiations. But, in order to
negotiate seriously, it requires give on
the Soviet side. And if the Soviet side
gives, then I'm sure we will give serious
consideration to any serious proposals of
theirs.

Q. So we're not absolutely locked
in on zero-zero?

Ambassador Nitze. I won't answer
that question.

'Text from White House press release.

and strengthen bilateral ties.

The bipartisan American Political
Foundation is in the midst of a study to
determine how nongovernmental groups
in the United States can best contribute
to the development of democracy in
other countries. We support that study
and look forward to its conclusions and
recommendations (expected early in
April).

The Administration will be propos-
ing a budget to fund programs designed
to implement the President's objectives.
We will seek $6.5 million for 1984. The
programs will focus on the following five
areas:

• Leadership Training. For those
who are or will likely be serving in
leadership roles in their societies, there
are programs in the United States, their
own countries, and in regional institu-
tions which will cover the theory and
practice of democracy, the skills
necessary to build the institutions of
democracy and to counter nondemo-
cratic forces, the role of the market and
free enterprise, and political and
economic is.sues of current concern.

• Education. Through scholarships,
American studies institutions, English
teaching, book programs, and other
means, we will try to convey a more ac-
curate picture of the character and
values of the United States.

EAST ASIA

• Strengthening the Institutions
of Democracy. A number of programs
will strengthen the role of the basic in-
stitutions of a democratic society —
labor, parties, media, universities,
business, legal/judicial systems, religion,
community action, etc.

• Conveying Ideas and Informa-
tion. Through more active programs of
conferences and meetings, special brief-
ings, dissemination of books and jour-
nals, as well as the full range of train-
ing, education, and exchange programs,
we hope to encourage key people and
organizations in an exchange of ideas
and information as well as to accurately
and widely convey the policy positions of
the United States. Radios, handled
separately in the USIA budget, are the
principal resource in conveying full, ac-
curate information and new ideas and
concepts to many countries in the world:
they need substantially greater funding.

• Development of Personal and In-
stitutional Ties. The democracy and
public diplomacy program is an effort
for all of the United States — private and
public groups and institutions. The
development of closer ties and working
relationships between parties, unions,
businesses, universities, state and local
governments, media, service organiza-
tions, women's, ethnic, and religious
groups, and others and their counter-
parts overseas may prove to be the most
effective means of strengthening
democracy and promoting friendship and
cooperation with other nations.

We intend for this to be a truly
bipartisan effort which expresses
American ideals. We will cooperate
closely with other democracies to pro-
vide the ideas and support to allow the
advocates of democracy to have the op-
timum chance of success. And if they
are to be successful, they must adapt
principles and institutions to the unique
historical, cultural, and social traditions
of their own nations.

The President has decided to strengthen
the organization, planning, and coordina-
tion of the various aspects of public
diplomacy of the U.S. Government.

He has established a special planning
group under the chairmanship of the
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. Membership consists of
the Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, the Director of the U.S. Infor-
mation Agency, the Administrator of the
Agency for International Development,
and the Assistant to the President for
Communications. The special planning
group is responsible for the overall plan-

ning, direction, coordination, and
monitoring of implementation of public
diplomacy activities.

Four interagency standing commit-
tees also have been established and will
report regularly to the Special Planning
Group.

• The International Information
Committee will be chaired by a senior
representative of the U.S. Information
Agency. This committee will be responsi-
ble for planning, coordinating, and im-
plementing international information ac-
tivities in support of U.S. policies and in-
terests.

• The International Political Com-
mittee will be chaired by a senior
representative of the Department of
State. This group will be responsible for
planning, coordinating, and implement-
ing international activities in support of
U.S. policies and interests. For example,
this committee will coordinate the in-
teragency effort to support the growth
of democracy and democratic institu-
tions abroad. It will provide the nexus
for the policymaking and information
functions and will devise and monitor

implementation of broad public
diplomacy strategies for key issues and
interests.

• The International Broadcasting
Committee will be chaired by the Dep-
uty Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs. This committee
will be responsible for the planning and
coordination of international broad-
casting activities sponsored by the U.S.
Government consistent with existing
statutory requirements.

• The Public Affairs Committee
will be cochaired by the Assistant to the
President for Communications and the
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. This group
will be responsible for the planning and
coordinating on a regular basis of U.S.
Government domestic public affairs ac-
tivities relating to foreign policy and na-
tional security issues. This will include
the planning and coordination of major
speeches on national security subjects
and other public appearances by senior
officials and will otherwise coordinate
public affairs efforts to explain major
U.S. foreign policy initiatives. ■

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
of Japan made an official working visit
to Washington, D.C., January 17-20,
1983, to meet with President Reagan and
other government officials. Following are
remas^ks by the President and the Prime
Minister after their meeting on January
19.^

President Reagan

Nancy and I have been very pleased to
have as our guest Prime Minister
Nakasone and his wife and daughter.
These last 2 days have given us the op-
portunity to get to know the Prime
Minister and his family and to establish
the kind of warm personal relationship
that is so vital to nations that are as
close as the United States and Japan.

The Prime Minister's visit so soon
after he assumed office underscores the
significance that we both place on
U.S. -Japanese relations and our role as
leaders of the two industrialist giants of
the free world.

Our consultations were friendly and
covered a wide agenda of very serious
issues, and I am pleased that we have
made some imprint on the first steps in

the area of trade — something of utmost
significance to the economic well-being
of both our peoples — to the economic
health of the Western world, and we are
encouraged by the recent commitments
to further open Japan's markets.

I am aware of the political sensitiv-
ity in Japan to tariff reductions on a
number of products, as well as to the
Prime Minister's decision to conduct a
comprehensive review of their standards
and certification systems. Yet nothing
would better prove to the American peo-
ple the good intentions of our Japanese
trading partners than tangible progress
in revising relevant Japanese certifica-
tion laws and regulations, to remove
obstacles that have currently impaired
some of our manufactured exports to
Japan.

In the area of energy trade between
our two nations, we have agreed to
establish the U.S. -Japan working group
on energy, to actively explore how the
abundant opportunities for energy
cooperation can be transformed into
realities for the benefit of both our coun-
tries.

Department of State Bulletir

EUROPE

During our wide-ranging consulta-
ons, we discussed our intention for ex-
nsive and fruitful cooperation in space,
presented the Prime Minister withi a
aque containing the flags of our two
itions which were flown together on
le first flight of the space shuttle
olumbia. I am pleased to announce to-
ay that I have offered Prime Minister
akasone, and he has accepted, the op-
ortunity for Japanese participation in
ar shuttle program, including an invita-
on for a Japanese specialist to be a
iart of the space lab mission in 1988.
oth the Prime Minister and I look for-
'ard to continuing our efforts together
1 peaceful use of the vast expanses of
pace.

Further, I am encouraged after our
leetings, and also by recent positive ini-
[atives taken by the Prime Minister, the
apanese Government is now willing to
0 more to share in the burden of peace
nd stability. This is a responsibility that
angs heavy on the shoulders of all
eace-lovers, and the Prime Minister has
ssured me that Japan is committed to
icreasingly play its part in this crucial
ndertaking.

My meetings with Prime Minister
Jakasone have been excellent both on a
lersonal and a professional level, and I
.m gratified at the rapport we devel-
oped in this short time. I am confident it
v\\\ be put to good use in the future.

We have taken the first significant
■teps toward resolving the urgent
:hallenges which face our two countries.
Ne can now move forward with our
.983 agenda, which seeks mutually ac-
ceptable answers to questions, especially
n trade, that continue to weigh heavily
m our relationship.

We stand as equal partners in the
vvorld, and I am convinced that no two
lations are more mutually dependent
than the United States and Japan. I
Know the Prime Minister shares this
view. Our partnership is so essential, we
have a strong obligation to our own
peoples, to each other, to insure its con-
tinued vitality.

And, again, we have enjoyed and ap-
preciate this visit by the Prime Minister
and look forward to welcoming him to
our country again for the Williamsburg
summit this spring.

Prime Minister Nakasone

As you may recall, Mr. President, you
were the first foreign leader I greeted
over the telephone when I assumed the
post of Prime Minister of Japan.

Yesterday and today I had frank ex-
changes of views with you. We discussed
issues related to world peace and arms
control and the world economic situation
and our bilateral issues.

It is a great pleasure for me that
our talks have been fruitful, and we
could reconfirm our mutual friendship
and confidence. You are, indeed, a man
of strong conviction, dedicated to peace.
Japan and the United States have the
important relations of alliance, having
broad economic and cultural ties of
mutual reliance across the Pacific, and
are dedicated to the cause of freedom
and democracy.

Solid cooperation between Japan and
the United States is the cornerstone of
peace in Asia, the Pacific, and the
world. We reconfirmed that both Japan
and the United States intend to share
responsibilities in the world appropriate

to both countries. Frictions between our
two countries can be solved by consulta-
tion between us. We are both strong
democracies which can do so.

Finishing my friendly talks with
President Reagan, I am going back to
Japan with satisfaction and confidence. I
should like to express my most sincere
gratitude for the hospitality extended to
myself and my family by President and
Mrs. Reagan, particularly for their kind-
ness in inviting us for a breakfast
meeting this morning.

I have extended my invitation to
President and Mrs. Reagan to visit
Japan, and my wife and I look forward
to welcoming you at a time convenient
to both of us.

Finally, I thank the American people
of all walks of life for their kindness
during my stay.

'Te.xt from White House press release.

Review of U.S. Relations
With the Soviet Union

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Address before the Governing Board
of the World Jewish Congress on
February 1, 1983. Ambassador
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for
Political Affairs.

Leonid Brezhnev is dead, and Yuriy An-
dropov [General Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union]
governs in his place. And for many
Western pundits the way is now open—
if we Americans, they say, but have the
wit and will— to bring about a funda-
mental change in the relationship be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union. I am here tonight to tell you
that— although I might wish it were
so— I do not believe it to be so.

The reality is that while, of course,
personalities are influential in setting
the course the two superpowers will
follow, the divergence of views, history,
and interests is so basic that no one
man— indeed, no group of men— can af-
fect, except at the margins, the funda-
mentally competitive nature of our rela-
tionship.

It is, indeed, nice to know that Mr.
Andropov may like to listen to the music
of Tommy Dorsey, browse through the
novels of Jacqueline Susann, and wear

cuffs on his pants. But he also rose to
the heights through the Communist Par-
ty of the Soviet Union; was Soviet Am-
bassador in Hungary in 1956— a vintage
year in the history of Soviet oppression;
and spent more than 1.5 years as head of
the KGB [Committee for State Security],
which is not widely known for its liberal
predilections.

Even were he to wish it were other-
wise, Mr. Andropov's room for
maneuver is limited. He must govern by
a form of limited consensus, since he is
beholden to the men who chose him for
his post. And, even if he had more scope
to act alone, there is no reason to be-
lieve he would be inclined to make
sweeping changes. He is a product of
the Soviet system. It is a system that
has sheltered his life's work, promoted
and rewarded him, and now given him
supreme power. If he believes in nothing
else, he certainly believes in keeping it
going. In short, the new General Secre-
tary is no doubt a good Communist, but
he is certainly not a revolutionary.

But if the next Russian revolution is
not just around the corner, neither
should we expect that everything in the
Soviet Union will, in the future, be ex-
actly as it has been in the past. The
country, under the General Secretary's
rule, will not be a carefully preserved

March 1983

EUROPE

museum of the Brezhnev years. Histori-
cally, a change of leadership in the
Soviet Union has set in motion social
and political changes that affect more
than just the composition of the Polit-
buro. Long-delayed decisions can at last
be made. New courses, if not radically
new ones, can be charted.

The prospect of some change in
Soviet conduct— indeed, our desire for
change — is one reason why the first few
months of the Andropov regime are an
appropriate time to take stock of where
we stand with the Soviet Union. Cer-
tainly the Soviets are reviewing where
they stand with us. It is appropriate, as
well, because this Administration has
now had responsibility for conducting
American relations with the Soviet
Union for 2 years.

Our policy toward the U.S.S.R.
starts fr(.)m the fact that both of us have
weapons of almost unimaginable de-
structive force. Each of us can do mor-
tal damage to the other in an afternoon.
Our weapons are not the result of failed
judgment or of a military-industrial com-
plex spinning out of control. We arm be-
cause the Soviet Union is armed and ag-
gressive.

The differences between the Soviet
Union and the Western world are deeply
rooted. We have radically different
political values, visions of the proper
social order, and aspirations for the
future of the international system. While
we in the West are fundamentally com-
mitted to individual liberty, to free elec-
tions, the accountability of those who
govern to the governed, to economic
freedom, and to a world order that
fosters those values, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union is just as
fundamentally opposed to all of those
principles.

But even more ominous than these
differences is the Soviet decision to
translate our philosophical rift into a
global, military competition. They have
made us rivals.

We are rivals not because the
Soviets do not respect our interests, but
because they respect only their own. Our
moral commitment to the rule of law, to
peaceful change, and to the safety of the
weak from domination by the strong
compels us to view the Soviets not only
as our rival but as the rival of a humane
world order.

We cannot wish these differences
away. And we will not abandon our
values. In fact, we are determined to ad-
vance them. This Administration
welcomes an open and peaceful competi-
tion between our visions of man's future.
President Reagan has recently launched

a program to promote democratic values
and institutions abroad: it is a program
that has already drawn substantial
Soviet fire, so its potential effectiveness
must worry them.

Our rivalry, then, must continue so
long as our two nations remain true to
the principles upon which they were
founded. I5ut because our arms make
the rivalry so dangerous, we must keep
it within bounds. We and the Soviets
have few common interests. But, so long
as the West remains strong, we do
share one fundamental interest — that of
avoiding war. American policy toward
the Soviet Union must fall between the
impossible and the unacceptable; we
must steer a middle course between the
friendship we cannot have and the war
we must not have.

Requirements for Improved
Bilateral Relations

The aim of this Administration is plain.
We want relations with the Soviets that
are as cordial and cooperative as our
deep differences permit. But such a rela-
tionship has two fundamental re-
quirements.

First, there must be a military
balance. History offers few clear lessons
for those who manage our nation's af-
fairs, but one of them surely is that an
imbalance of military power between
two rivals leads to trouble. Where such
an imbalance exists for long, the
stronger party talks, while the weaker
listens. Soon the stronger makes de-
mands, and the weaker submits.

Over the past decade, America's in-
vestment in defense lagged behind that
of the Soviet Union. During the 1970s,
we spent between 4% and 5% of our
gross national product on defense; the
Soviets spent 12%-14% of theirs. In
that decade, our defense spending
declined in real terms. Theirs increased
by 4%-5% per year. These facts have
clearly affected the course of Soviet con-
duct for much of the past 10 years. We
have, then, little choice but to increase
our defense effort to make up for the
ground we have lost.

Our efforts are designed to assure
equality in the military relationship. We
do not seek an arms race, but we will
not — ^we cannot — accept second best. We
are not trying to spend the Soviet
economy into the ground. Indeed, we
would not mind at all if the Soviets im-
proved their economic condition by
spending less on their military. We arm
for a single purpose: to deter the use of
Soviet arms against us or our allies.

Our effort to maintain a stable
military balance is entirely consistent
with our goal of improved relations with
the Soviet Union. In fact, the one is
clearly necessary for the other— a reality
that some, of late, seem to have for-
gotten. There is great wisdom in the
story of the first-time visitor to
Jerusalem who tells an Israeli he meets
that he is surprised to see so many
weapons in the land of the Bible. "It is
true," the Israeli tells him, "that the Bi-
ble says that on the day of days the lion
shall lie down with the lamb. But," he
continues, "the day of days hasn't come
yet. And even then," he adds, "I'd rather
be the lion than the lamb."

The second fundamental require-
ment for an improved relationship
with the Soviet Union is simply
stated: The Soviet Union must observe
certain basic standards of national
conduct. We do not insist that the
Soviet Union abandon legitimate na-
tional interests or its standing as a
superpower. But what possible legiti-
mate Soviet interest would be threat-
ened were they to live up to standards
that are plainly written into documents
they themselves have signed — ^the Hel-
sinki accords, the U.N. Charter, even
their own constitution? Yet these stand-
ards have been violated time and time
again. The Soviet occupation of Afghani-
stan, the suppression of the popular
desire for reform in Poland, the Viet-
namese imperial control of Kampuchea
at the behest of the Soviet Union, their
Cuban proxy's promotion of instability in
southern Africa and Central America,
the denial of basic human rights to their
own citizens— all these acts demonstrate
that the Soviets have not only failed to
abide by the rules of civilized societies,
they have failed to keep their word.

When the Soviet buildup far exceeds
any legitimate defense requirement;
when they deploy forces in Eastern
Europe, the Far East, and the Indian
Ocean that have no conceivable defen-
sive mission; when they intimidate our
European and Asian allies to try to pre-
vent them from taking measures that
their own unwarranted military initia-
tives have made necessary, it is difficult
to credit the Soviet Government with
peaceful intentions. When the Soviets
threaten Japan with nuclear devastation
on the heels of Prime Minister Naka-
sone's visit here, are they not to be
taken seriously? When elementary
human rights are denied where Commu-
nist governments hold power, when
Anatoli Shcharanskiy is cruelly im-
prisoned instead of being allowed to

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

emigrate and Andrey Sakharov is held
jnder house arrest far from his home
under no formal charge, and when one
af the first acts of the new Soviet
leadership is to threaten the distin-
guished historian Roy Medvedev, we in
the West, for whom human rights are of
paramount importance, must not pre-
tend that more cordial East-West rela-
tions will be easy to achieve.

It is these policies, undertaken by
the So\'iet Union and its allies, that have
poisoned East-West relations. This is the
crucial point that some in the West are
too ready to forget. Our relations have
been bad because Soviet aggression and
provocation have made them bad. When
aggression and provocation cease, rela-
tions will improve.

This has been the message of the
Reagan Administration for the past 2
years. I believe it is getting through.
The Soviets know where we stand. They
understand the principles that underlie
our positions. They understand that we
are committed to our principles and that
we have strength of purpose and have
not lost our will.

I cannot tell you this evening that
we have achieved our goals. As we
meet, surface-to-air missiles are being
deployed to Syria, and Soviet soldiers
are killing Afghan freedom fighters.
Vietnamese forces occupy Kampuchea.
Cubans by the thousands are garrisoned
in Africa, while other Cubans, also in
the thousands, sow subversion in Cen-
tral America. Throughout Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union the fur-
therance of human rights is a popular
aspiration but not government policy. In
sum, a basis does not yet exist for the
long-term relationship with the Soviet
Union that we want, a relationship
marked by restraint and a modicum of
cooperation.

Prospects for the Soviet Leadership

The prospects for such a relationship de-
pend on the course that Soviet foreign
policy takes in the coming months. All
the goodwill and hope in the world on
our side will not remove the obstacles
the Soviets have created. What really
matters is how the Soviet leaders see
their own prospects at home and abroad.
Here some informed speculation is possi-
ble.

The leadership confronts a for-
midable problem: the state of the Soviet
economy. Mr. Andropov has said so,
with a candor that some may have found
refreshing and that was certainly
unusual. The familiar diseases of Com-
munist economies — shortages of goods.

poor quality in those goods that are
available, corruption, a thriving black
market — ^liave worsened. In short, the
iron hand of the central planners stifles
initiative, innovation, and imagination.
The Soviets are suffering, as well, from
the burden of empire: restless na-
tionalities. Eastern European satellites
held in check by force and force alone,
and overextension in the Third World.

Let me not overstate the difficulties
that the Soviets face. The economy is
not about to collapse. The Soviet
Government has a well-developed capaci-
ty for forcing the people it rules to bear
hardships. The Russian people— and the
other peoples of the Soviet empire —
have long experience in adjusting to
deprivation. The regime and the people
have faced far worse times than these
and survived.

There is no sign that their economic
difficulties will force the Soviet leaders
to reduce their military spending. Nor
are their troubles compelling them to
pull back from the military adventures
they have undertaken or sponsored be-
yond their borders.

But they have gone no further. If
they have not withdrawn from Afghani-
stan, they have perpetrated no new
Afghanistans. For this, the economic
squeeze the Soviet leaders must be feel-
ing undoubtedly deserves some credit.
The cost of further adventures is likely
to look forbidding to them. But even
more important, they know they must
reckon with America's clear and steady
determination to defend Western in-
terests. To the degree the Soviets have
become more hesitant about causing new
problems over the last 2 years, our firm-
ness and steadiness deserve some of the
credit.

Arms Control Negotiations

This lesson— that only Western resolve
brings Eastern reasonableness — is
nowhere more valid than in arms control
negotiations. Before NATO decided in
1979 to respond to the alarming growth
in the Soviet nuclear threat to our Euro-
pean allies, the Soviets swore that such
a decision would end all hope for a
negotiated solution. Their purpose was
to derail the decision so that they would
have no need to negotiate. Within
months of NATO's decision to deploy,
the Soviets were at the negotiating
table. Now Moscow insists that if NATO
goes through with its decision to moder-
nize its intermediate-range nuclear
forces, the negotiations will end and the
Soviet nuclear threat will be increased.

Even if this were true, the alliance
cannot but carry out its plans. What is
at stake here goes far beyond the details
of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] imbalance. If NATO, as a result
of Soviet political pressure, were to
abandon a program that is essential to
assure the security of Europe, it would
be the beginning of the end of an effec-
tive Western alliance. If the Soviets
learn that we and our allies lack the will,
in the face of missile rattling, to carry
out difficult decisions commonly arrived
at, then we can look forward to ever
more aggressive behavior each time we
seek to respond to Soviet provocations.

I am convinced that negotiations will
not end when our deployments begin. In-
deed, while we will spare no effort to
get an equitable agreement before we
deploy, it may be that the Soviets will
not negotiate in good faith until we
prove that we will carry out our deci-
sion.

We have made a negotiating pro-
posal that offers the Soviets what they
want: the elimination of our Pershing II
and ground-launched cruise missiles. We
and our partners have made clear what
we must have in return: the elimination
of the Soviet missile threat to which our
deployments are a response. It is a mat-
ter of principle to us— indeed, a matter
of survival — that if there is a threat it
must not go undeterred.

The only adequate deterrent to the
Soviet threat to our European allies is
an American deterrent present in
Europe. Some in Western Europe pro-
fess to see some logic in the Soviet de-
mand that European security be left to
the Europeans, including themselves but
excluding America. If there is one
fundamental truth of the postwar era, it
is that peace and freedom in Europe is
possible only if American power is com-
mitted to offset Soviet power. British
and French power alone cannot meet
this requirement; our allies and the
Soviets alike know this.

The Soviet objective— which is as
evident in their negotiating proposals as
it is in their missile buildup— is to place
the democracies of Western Europe
under a nuclear shadow, to push
America back across the Atlantic, and to
make the Soviet homeland a sanctuary.

The Soviets seek to appear
reasonable and to make us appear un-
reasonable in the hope of cracking
alliance unity and destroying European
resolve. If they stick to this aim, they
will be utterly disappointed. Far better

March 1983

EUROPE

that Yuriy Andropov and his colleagues
quickly come to understand what Leonid
Brezhnev did not: that debate in the
West is a reflection of our unique
strength, not our weakness, and that
when we say we will accept an equal
agreement and nothing less, we mean it.

In the long run, it does not serve
Soviet interests to depend on disorder,
subversion, and tyranny. It is said that
the Soviets take the so-called long view
of politics. The facts suggest that they
do not. Their invasion of Afghanistan
was short sighted; they did not under-
stand that the world would neither
forget nor accept this crime. Their sup-
port for the war against freedom in
Poland is short sighted; they do not
understand that the Polish people will
never accept enslavement. Their repres-
sion of the Soviet Jewish community is
short sighted; they do not understand
2,000 years of Jewish history and the
will to survive. If Yuriy Andropov and
his colleagues would only come to accept
the "long view," they would understand
that no country can prosper if it
depends only on military power; they
would understand that no nation can be
truly great that denies to its citizens the
free practice of their religious and
cultural heritage.

We stand ready to cooperate in ar-
rangements that would reduce the dif-
ferences between us and bring the
Soviets into the family of responsible na-
tions. Ours is not an agenda for humili-
ating the Soviet Union. It is a formula
for more cordial, constructive Soviet-
American relations. Soviet leaders con-
stantly complain that we do not give
them the respect they deserve as a
superpower; but the possession of great
power carries with it special respon-
sibilities, including the obligation to
respect the rights of others, to show
restraint, and to live up to universally
recognized standards of conduct. The
Soviets cannot earn our respect by
amassing and misusing power; they can
earn it by responsible behavior.

Conclusions

What conclusions can be drawn from
this analysis? You may well find reason
for pessimism in my remarks. After all,
my main themes would have been perti-
nent at almost any moment during the
past 35 years. We find ourselves in the
position of the man in the small Jewish
community in Eastern Europe in the
last century whose job it was to sit at
the village gate all day waiting for the
approach of the Messiah. "Isn't your job

boring?" someone asked. "Sure it's bor-
ing," he replied, "but at least the work is
steady."

The work of trying to moderate
Soviet conduct over the last three
decades has been anything but boring. I
wish that it might have been otherwise;
international affairs could use a little
more tedium. But boring or exciting, we
are determined to take the steps
necessary to protect our friends and our-
selves from aggressive Soviet conduct.
We will maintain our alliances, despite
the difficulties that such international
partnerships always involve. We will
sustain the balance of military power,
despite the sacrifices that this imposes
on our citizens and despite Soviet at-
tempts to undermine popular support
for this policy. And we will stand firm
on our principles and steady in our posi-
tion in disputes with the Soviets,
although this taxes our patience and our
national impulse for problem salving.

We are prepared to work with the
Soviets in search of solutions to the
problems between us, though we cannot
ignore the fact that in most cases these
problems are the result of Soviet mis-
conduct. If the Soviets try in earnest to
remove the obstacles to a better rela-
tionship, they will find us ready for rela-
tions of mutual respect, for cooperation
in areas of mutual interest, and for in-
suring that competition remains peaceful
where our interests conflict.

To the extent that the Soviets con-
tinue to act as international outlaws, we
will meet the challenges they present.
The American people are committed to
this course over the long term — not just
for the life of this Administration but
for as long as necessary. Like the job of
standing at the village gate, we will
bring steadiness and perseverance to the
task of leading the West.

Whatever course the Soviet Union
chooses to follow, we will work on our
own and with our friends to build a
world order compatible with our values
and our interests. The U.S.S.R. is, ad-
mittedly, a major player on the world
scene. But we must not be mesmerized
by that fact. There are other issues,
other weighty problems that we can and
will deal with no matter what the
Soviets do.

We will continue our efforts to
revitalize the institutions of international
economic cooperation, to spur recovery
^nd promote domestic and international
economic growth. We will continue our
efforts to resolve dangerous conflicts. I
need not remind this audience of our

deep concern for peace in the Middle
East. That concern is the basis for the
President's September initiative. We art
committed to the security of Israel
within defensible borders; we will work
for a peaceful, united Lebanon and a
just resolution of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. We will continue our global efforts
to make the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes the normal international practice.
We will, as well, remain dedicated to th
protection of human rights throughout
the international community, a goal
which is threaded throughout our entire
foreign policy.

These endeavors will proceed with
or without Soviet cooperation. These ef-
forts must be made whatever the state
of U.S. -Soviet relations. And the more
peaceful, prosperous, and humane the
international community becomes, the
fewer opportunities there will be for
Soviet mischief and the stronger the
pressure on Soviet leaders to moderate
their conduct and eventually accept a
role as a great and responsible nation.

My message tonight is not a
dramatic one. I cannot promise sweep-
ing changes in U.S. -Soviet relations.
There is no basis for such a promise. I
cannot tell you when modest improve-
ments will take place. That is up to the
Soviets. And I must caution you that im
provements, if they do come, are bound
to be modest. We will not see the day o:
days with the So\'iet Union. Our rivalry
will, I fear, outlive all of us in this room
But we can hope, and work, to see daysi
more tranquil, less heavy with menace,
than those of the recent past. ■

Department of State Bulletl

/IIDDLE EAST

/isit of Egyptian President iVIubaralc

President Hosni Mubarak of the
.rab Republic of Egypt made an official
lorking visit to Washington, D.C.,
anuary 26-28, 1983, to meet with Presi-
ent Reagan and other governmental of
'.cials. Following are remarks by the two
'residents after their meeting on
anuary 27}

'resident Reagan

'resident Mubarak and I have just had a
omprehensive and a useful discussion,
irst in my office and then over lunch,
ind, as might be expected given our full
artnership in search for regional peace
nd security, there was broad agree-
lent on the critical issues facing us in
he Middle East and in Africa.

We reviewed the situation in
.ebanon, and I assured President
lubarak of my determination to support
he territorial integrity, the in-
ependence, and the sovereignty of
jebanon to the end. And to that end,
here must be early withdrawal of all
areign forces.

We also discussed the urgent need
0 achieve a comprehensive peace settle-
fient for the Middle East which would
lermit all the states in the region to live
n peace, while meeting the legitimate
ights of the Palestinian people. In that
egard, I thanked President Mubarak
or his support of my September peace
nitiative and promised to work closely
vith him to expand the peace process.

On Africa, I reaffirmed our support
or Egypt's constructive efforts as the
eading African power to promote the
itability and development of African
lountries and institutions.

On the bilateral questions, I
•eiterated the importance of our
economic and military assistance for
Sgypt and assured the President that
)ur assistance will complement his
jconomic policy and development
Driorities.

Specifically, we wish to support the
Driorities of the new Egyptian 5-year
Dlan, with emphasis on the increasing
igricultural and industrial productivity
md the rehabilitation and expansion of
the water and related disposal systems
in Egypt's major urban centers.

In response to President Mubarak's
request for more flexible economic
assistance, our ministries will work
together to find ways and means for
rapidly dispersing such assistance. We
also will explore with the Congress the

March 1983

ways to permit some reprograming of
funds to high priority areas.

President Mubarak's visit, the sec-
ond since he was elected to office, em-
phasizes the special nature of our rela-
tions with Egypt and the importance I
assign his friendship and wise counsel.

Our two countries share a common
dedication to building in the Middle East
something that is peaceful and pros-
perous and secure from outside interven-
tion. The Egyptian-American full part-
nership has accomplished much toward
the realization of that ideal. We will con-
tinue to build on our record of ac-
complishment, and I look forward to
working with our friend, my friend,
President Mubarak, toward that end.

President Mubarak

I was very pleased to meet again with
my friend, President Reagan, and to
pursue our discussions of issues of
mutual concern. As the President just
stated, we had an opportunity to review
the situation in the Middle East with a
view of enhancing the prospects for
peace and stability in that troubled
region.

We focused on the situation in
Lebanon and the negotiations on the
Palestinian question. I welcomed Presi-
dent Reagan's assurances of the U.S.
determination to continue to play the
role of the full partner in the peace proc-
ess. I also welcomed his reaffirmation of
the U.S. commitment to support the ter-
ritorial integrity, independence, and
sovereignty of Lebanon.

The time factor is crucial to the suc-
cess of our endeavors. Top priority must
be given to reaching agreement on the
withdrawal of Israeli forces. Upon
achieving that, other aspects of the
problem would be easier to solve.

We have always seen the necessity
to make meaningful progress toward a

comprehensive settlement. In this
respect, the centrality of the Palestinian
problem in the entire dispute becomes
self-evident. With this in mind, we sup-
ported President Reagan's initiative on
September 1st, 1982. We earnestly hope
that the weeks ahead will witness move-
ment toward the negotiating table by all
the parties concerned.

I am pleased to say that I was en-
couraged by what I heard from King
Hussein of Jordan and the Palestinian
leadership, together with several other
Arab leaders. I believe that a golden op-
portunity exists, and it would be a grave
mistake to miss it.

I also believe that the peace process
would be enforced if the United States
moves further in the direction of sup-
porting the right of the Palestinian peo-
ple to self-determination.

We agreed that the Israeli settle-
ment policy is a serious obstacle to
peace. Therefore, efforts must be ex-
erted to bring about a total freeze of set-
tlement activities.

I discussed with the President cer-
tain aspects of the war between Iran
and Iraq and the need to exert addi-
tional efforts for the purpose of achiev-
ing an immediate termination of
hostilities.

On bilateral matters, we discussed
issues related to economic and to
military cooperation. I expressed to
President Reagan our gratitude to the
American people for their unwavering
suppcjrt. This will enhance our ability to
cope with the economic problems we are
confronting. The United Stiites has
proven it is a real and reliable friend.
We are determined to deepen that
friendship and intensify our cooperation.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
^residential Documents of Jan. 31, 1983.

NUCLEAR POLICY

Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Our Shared Responsibility

by Richard T. Kennedy

Address before the American Nuclear
Society in San Diego on January 25,
1983. Ambassador Kennedy is U.S.
Representative to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
special advi.'ier to the Secretary on non-
proliferation policy and nuclear energy
affairs.

In January 1976 in an appearance before
a Senate committee, David Lilienthal,
the first chairman of the U.S. Atomic
Energj' Commission, gave us his chilling
personal view of nuclear proliferation.
"If a great number of countries come to
have an arsenal of nuclear weapons,"
Lilienthal said, "then I am glad that I
am not a young man and I'm sorry for
my grandchildren."

The prospect of nuclear proliferation
which worried David Lilienthal 7 years
ago is still a cause of grave concern.
How to head off this threat in the years
ahead is one of the most important ques-
tions for the future of world order. This
then is an appropriate time, in a confer-
ence concerned with the technical
aspects of nuclear commerce, to ex-
amine this problem together.

Around the world today, nuclear in-
dustries face a dearth of domestic orders
for new facilities. Thus, there is a
natural tendency by supplier nations to
reach out for foreign orders to support
their domestic industries and to sustain
the infrastructure they have developed
at great expense over so many years.
They want to keep that industry healthy
so that it will be available to meet the
anticipated future domestic demand.
New suppliers also are coming on the
scene, anxious to generate business on
their own.

More is at stake, however, than the
natural and understandable quest for
markets. These conditions may place a
strain on the system of nonproliferation
norms and restraints which the interna-
tional community has put into place in
the last 2.5 years. In that light, then, we
all must share David Lilienthal's con-
cern; more than that, we must do some-
thing about it. That's what I want to
speak about this evening — our shared
responsibility to prevent the spread of
nuclear explosives.

Thirty years ago. President Eisen-
hower took a historic step which, in a

sense, created the worldwide civilian
nuclear industry: He inaugurated the
Atoms for Peace program in 1953. By
this generous act, the United States
volunteered to share the nuclear tech-
nologies it had developed so that they
could benefit all mankind. In the inter-
vening years, American policy has
sought to assure that nations could
benefit from the peaceful application of
nuclear technology' under a system
which prevented the misuse of that tech-
nology. Atoms for peace, not war, has
been our objective. The United States
worked strenuously to establish the In-
ternational Atomic Energy' Agency in
1957 to pursue those same goals and the
same rationale. And we worked to bring
into force the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty seeking those very goals — to
assure the benefits of nuclear technology
and to prevent its misuse. Those twin
and complementary goals are still at the
base of our national policy.

While there has been a broad con-
tinuity with past Administrations on
nonproliferation policy goals, the
Reagan Administration's policy is
neither identical to nor interchangeable
with the policy of former times. There
have been changes — some subtle, some
more obvious.

■We, for instance, have no pangs of
conscience about nuclear power. We
think it is a clean, efficient, and
reasonable way to generate electricity.
As far as we are concerned, it is not a
choice of last resort. We see it instead
as a key element in our domestic energy
future. And we see nuclear-generated
energy as important for the economic
development and energy security of
many nations around the world. For
resource-starved developing countries,
as well, nuclear power will not be a
choice of last resort. Some of the most
prosperous nations on Earth— Japan, for
example, or some of the nations of
Western Europe— have not been blessed
with abundant sources of domestic
energy. There too, nuclear power is
critical to their well-being and energy
security.

We believe strongly that the United
States must be— and must be seen to
be— a predictable and reliable supplier of
nuclear materials and technology. For
only in that event can we reasonably ex-
pect to exert the influence which our
technological experience and competence
could rightly be presumed to yield.

We stand by the idea, too, that,
where the necessary nonproliferation
conditions are met, all nations can and
should enjoy the benefits of nuclear
energy— to power their industry, to
hasten their development, to light their
cities, to contribute to the health and
well-being of their people, to curing and
diagnosing their illnesses. The peaceful
atom can do that if we let it.

There have been other departures by
this Administration from the policies of
our predecessors on questions of how we
set out to accomplish our goals. To the
extent that we have taken a different
course, it is because we are convinced
that in the long run these steps will bet-
ter serve our nonproliferation goals.

Let me be specific. We recognize
that plutonium is an inherently danger-
ous substance. It is a basic element of
nuclear weapons. How to control it is a
very real and substantial challenge for
any nonproliferation regime. Thus, our
policy seeks to inhibit the spread of sen-
sitive technology, facilities, and material,
which could lead to production of
weapons-usable material, particularly
where there is a risk of proliferation.
We do want to restrict the number of
reprocessing plants around the world
and to limit other sensitive fuel cycle ac-
tivities. These are not and should not be
items of general commerce.

At the same time, the leaders of
Japan and of many European countries
believe that plutonium fuel is both
economical and necessary to their long-
term energy security. One approach to
this factual situation would be to con-
duct a series of metaphysical medita-
tions on the nature of the so-called
plutonium economy. We are not doing
that. Instead, we are seeking to work
with Japan and EUR ATOM [European
Atomic Energy Community] to achieve
our shared goals of rigorous standards,
controls, and safeguards for the reproc-
essing and use of plutonium. Working
with them, we also shall insure physical
security for plutonium shipments. At the
root of this more flexible approach is oui
conviction that such nuclear activities
pose no risk of proliferation in Japan
and EURATOM.

There are some nations whose views
on safeguards and nuclear supply, or on
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, dif-
fer from our own. Not every nation in
the world agrees with our policy and all
of its ramifications. We recognize that.
But rather than cutting off contact with
those nations or treating them with
stony silence, we are trying to open a
dialogue with them. If we are to have

Department of State Bulletir

SOUTH ASIA

ny influence, if our views are to be
niiorstood, if there is to be any hope of
laving our \news prevail, we must talk
I'ith one another and try to find ways to
esolve the issues which divide us. As a
:eneral proposition, we favor dialogue
ver confrontation, persuasion over in-
imidation, and common sense over iron
ogma.

So, if our policies and their concrete
pplications on occasion depart from
hose of former times, it is not because
/e are insensitive to the dangers of
uclear proliferation. It is not because
/e are prepared to put commerce ahead
f global security. Rather, the changes
/e are making are based on judgments
bout how best to win the necessary
upport of other countries and to create
he consensus needed to further a sound
onproliferation regime. Only in that
/ay can we put to rest David
yilienthal's fears.

In other areas, continuity is the hall-
lark of our policy. There are standards
3r nuclear commerce and supplier
■uidelines in place today. These are the
ules of the game and, as such, are part
f the technical basis for nuclear com-
lerce. In the future, we expect those
tandards to become even more specific
nd more complete. No list of sensitive
ems can be immutable; over time, it
lust be elaborated as new technologies

develop, new uses for old technologies
are devised.

When that list gets tougher, ex-
porters everywhere should honor it.
Humanity's interest in a stable world
order cannot be jeopardized so that
nuclear suppliers can win contracts or
enhance their competitive position. The
global nonproliferation regime— includ-
ing the principle that the pursuit of
nuclear explosives is inconsistent with
nuclear cooperation for legitimate peace-
ful purposes— cannot be shaded so that
someone can realize a short-term eco-
nomic advantage. On the contrary,
nuclear suppliers in their own self-
interest must work together to produce
a framework of institutions and prac-
tices which minimizes the risk of pro-
liferation. More than that, nuclear sup-
pliers around the world should take the
lead in strengthening the rules of trade
and making sure they are known, under-
stood, and observed.

New nuclear suppliers are entering
upon the scene, joining the advanced in-
dustrial states as sources of material
and expertise. They must be brought to
see that adherence to a regime of care-
fully constructed export restraints and
practices will serve their self-interest
and promote their well-being.

Indeed, all countries have an in-
terest in insuring a sound and rational

framework of nuclear safeguards and
rules. Without such a framework,
nuclear commerce will not be possible
for long and the benefits of the peaceful
atom will be lost.

As I have said on so many occasions
before, both here and abroad, everyone
should know that this Administration
will never sacrifice nonproliferation
goals for commercial gain or economic
advantage. We have set this high stand-
ard for our own conduct, and we believe
it should be the universal norm.

A few weeks ago, I addressed a
group within the State Department at
what we call our "Open Forum." My
theme that day was that nonprolifera-
tion is a fundamental and pervasive ele-
ment in American foreign policy and a
key national security goal. My statement
was: "Nonproliferation is everybody's
business . . . ." To the nuclear suppliers
and representatives of foreign nations in
the audience tonight and to the nuclear
industry generally, I repeat: "Non-
proliferation is your business, too. It is
our shared responsibility."

We, of course, recognize that a
policy of technical denial can't do the job
alone or forever. No one has a monopoly
any longer. Nuclear technology and in-
dustrial expertise are increasingly
widespread.

Why should we even bother then
with trying to strengthen nuclear export

President Reagan Meets With Afghan Freedom Fighters

»n February 2, 1983, President Reagan
let with a group of six Afghan freedom
ighters at the White House to express
I.S. concern and sympathy for these peo-
le because of continuing Soviet occupa-
ion of their country. Left to right: Mir Ne'
latollah Syyed Mortaza, Habib-Ur-Rehman
lashemi, villagers from Lowgar; President
Ceagan; Michael Barry, interpreter; Omar
iabrakzai, judge and g^oup spokesman;
lohammad Suafoor Yousofzai, resistance
eader; Gol Mohammad, villager from
iOwgar; and Farida Ahmadi. a former
nedical student. ■

A'hite House pholu by Michael Evans)

larch 1983

UNITED NATIONS

controls? The answer is simply: Our ef-
forts to create a consensus behind rigor-
ous rules of nuclear trade are aimed at
buying time. And we can buy time; we
can lessen the danger for a time. But,
we must use that time wisely. We must
use it to eliminate or, at least, reduce
the threats, real or imagined, which can
spur countries to seek the bomb. We
must ask the leaders of other countries
that may be toying with the idea of "go-
ing nuclear" to think through the whole
proposition soberly and dispassionately.
They must ask themselves whether "go-
ing nuclear" in the 1980s will truly serve
their national interests or promote their
national security.

We think the answer is clearly "no."
The imagined benefits of such an under-
taking will be illusory. Proliferation
begets proliferation; it is synonymous
with instability and the heightening of
tensions and is destructive of everyone's
security. Here, as in so many cases
where emotions dominate reason, the ac-
tion produces an effect precisely the op-
posite from that which was sought or in-
tended. Nations looking for security by
setting out to acquire nuclear weapons
will find only insecurity. Nor will the ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons guarantee
honor or prestige; on the contrary, it
will breed suspicion and distrust.

For my own part, I am optimistic
that reason will prevail. Twenty years
ago, American policymakers seriously
talked of a world with 25 to 30 nuclear-
weapons states by the 1980s. They were
wrong. Instead of 25 to 30, we have to-
day only 5 declared nuclear states, and
India which conducted what it called "a
peaceful e.\plosion" in 1974. On the
other hand, 116 nations, the vast majori-
ty of the nations on Earth, for their own
reasons and in their own interests, have
become parties to the Nuclear Nonpro-
liferation Treaty of 1968.' That is very
encouraging.

On the negative side, we must
realistically acknowledge that with the
passage of time more countries can
reach the threshold: With time and
money— and a political will to do so—
they could probably produce nuclear
weapons. Our task is to deflect them
from such a self-defeating course. The
proliferation of nuclear weapons is not
inevitable. Preventing it is not impossi-
ble. And to prevent it will benefit every
human being on Earth.

In the final analysis, nonproliferation
has to be everybody's business, every-
body's concern, everybody's priority.
Each of us can help set a tone and can

help lead the way. This is a truly great
responsibility, but it is also a great op-
portunity. The task is formidable, but I
am convinced that we can succeed. This
responsibility that we share demands
our best, our most careful, our most
thoughtful efforts. With those efforts.

we can — we will succeed. For succeed
we must.

'In addition, three declared nuclear-
weapons states (U.S.S.R., United Kingdom,
and United States) have signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. ■

U.N. Secretary General
Meets With the President

On January IJ,, 1983, U.N. Secretary
General Javier Perez de Cuellar y
Guerra met with President Reagan at
the White House. Following is a White
House statement issued at the conclusion
of their meeting.'^

The President was gratified that the
Secretary General was able to accept his
invitation to visit Washington following
the two meetings they had in New York
last year. During their 35 minutes
together, the President and the Sec-
retary General held a most constructive
discussion on a number of international
issues.

The President reaffirmed his Ad-
ministration's support for the United
Nations and his commitment to the prin-
ciples underlying the organizations,
while noting that the United States dif-
fers at times with others on how best to
carry forth the Charter's mandate and
that greater fiscal restraint is needed in
the United Nations. The President had
particular praise for the Secretary
General's superb efforts in seeking a
resolution of the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict last year. Among other subjects
discussed were the Middle East, in-

cluding renewal of UNIFIL's [U.N. In-
terim Force in Lebanon] mandate;
Afghanistan; Kampuchea; Latin
America; and the economic difficulties of
developing countries.

On behalf of the American people,
the President wished the Secretary
General well and pledged our continued
support as he pursues his challenging
task of helping to create a more peaceful
world.

Others in the meeting included the
Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Am-
bassador Kirkpatrick, Judge Clark,
Robert McFarlane, Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organizations
Gregory Newell, and senior NSC staff
member Michael Guhin. Undersecretary
General for Political and General
Assembly Affairs William Btiffum ac-
companied the Secretary General.

Following the meeting with the
President, the Secretary General at-
tended a working lunch hosted by the
Vice President at Blair House and is
having subsequent meetings today with
Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Brock,
and Secretary Regan.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 17, 1983.

■,

Departnnent of State Bulleti

/ESTERN HEMISPHERE

lertification of Prog
1 El Salvador

ress

Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the House Foreign
fairs Committee on February ^, 1983.
nbassador Enders is Assistant
cretary for Inter-American Affairs. '

e Congress has authorized military
sistance to El Salvador because the
rvival of that country is important to
nerican security. The outcome of civil
•ife there can affect the future of the
.narna Canal and of our immediate
ighbor Mexico. And we are mindful
it no less than one-half of our trade
sses through the Caribbean.

The Congress has also conditioned
litary assistance to El Salvador on
riodic certification of progress in
man rights, land reform, and the crea-
■n of democratic institutions.

One could argue about the procedure
opted. Many of us don't feel comfort-
le with having to say it's OK — or not
C — every 180 days with no third
oice. Periodic certifications can
larize opinion here, obscuring a broad
reement that we don't want to see
■ntral America dominated by Marxist-
■ninists but do want to see it reform.
■ they can threaten the morale of our
ends in the area, who fear that aid
iy be suddenly withheld. Or they can
/e an opportunity to the guerrillas,
10 have found that a "certification of-
nsive" is a natural medium for publi-
;ing themselves. And such major fac-
rs as Cuban/Nicaraguan support for
lerrilla forces are left out altogether.

But Congress clearly intended to
ve the Administration in certification a
eans to encourage and insure progress
ward human rights, land reform, and
■mocracy. And no one can argue about
e goals.

• Only through the emergence of
^timate institutions, in which all fac-
)ns can participate, will the civil strife

El Salvador be overcome.

• Only when political violence, in-
uding that of government forces, has
lally been ended, can representative
stitutions be fully effective.

• And only when the process of re-
stributing land, whose ownership was
ice cruelly unequal, has been com-
eted will there be social justice.

Progress

This third certification does not say that
these goals have been achieved. It says
that El Salvador continues to advance
toward them.

The certification says that the land-
to-the-tiller phase of agrarian reform —
whose future was a matter of such con-
cern at the time of the last certifica-
tion— has been vigorously relaunched.
Look at this table (below). No less than
9,638 farmers filed title applications in
the second half of 1982. If you include
family members, that means some
60,000 new beneficiaries of land reform
once the applications are processed.
More than 20% of arable land has been
redistributed since U.S. aid to El
Salvador began 3 years ago.

The certification says that political
violence continues to diminish, although
at a slower rate than at the time of the
second certification. When a group of
reforming officers overturned the old
order in El Salvador in 1979, an explo-
sion of violence by right and left oc-
curred— anarchy really — in which every
man could inform on every other and in
which security forces, vigilantes, and
guerrillas all took justice into their own
hands. This anarchy has gradually
abated, as the government has in-
structed its forces in human rights con-
cerns and extended its range of control.
Look at the chart (see page 90). Political
violence is only a quarter of what it was
2 years ago.

The certification says that the
fragile new democracy that emerged

from the war in the massive turnout of
the March elections has proved resistant
to the manipulation of individuals or
minorities. The country is headed
toward full presidential elections a year
from now on the basis of a new constitu-
tion. Democracy is little by little emerg-
ing.

Problems

Grave problems remain. The judicial
system is not working. Often soldiers
disciplined and turned over to it simply
remain in detention without being prose-
cuted. One alleged participant in the
murder of two American land reform
workers— a man whose probable guilt
was established by a government-ap-
pointed and army- supported commission
of inquiry— was set free by judges in-
timidated or bought. And although two
more are detained and being prosecuted,
yet another is a fugitive. A trial process
has begun for the accused murderers of
four American churchwomen. But all of
us are still waiting for justice to be
done.

Moreover, dissenting views in the
coalition have so far prevented the
government from going forward with
two initiatives that are essential to
moderate the conflict: a serious amnesty
and the peace commission to promote
reconciliation with adversaries.

Process of Building a Consensus

These points bring me to some of the
issues raised in your January 31 letter
inviting me to these hearings. Even
though progress is sometimes madden-
ingly slow— for instance on the promised
peace commission and amnesty— our
judgment of the political situation is that

Phase III Agrarian Reform Status (Decree 207)

Number of farmers who fiave filed title
applications for land (direct beneficiaries)

Total beneficiaries (Estimated at
6 members per family)

Land area affected (acres)

Title petitions filed

Provisional titles issued

Property owners compensated

Amount of compensation paid

Definitive Titles

Reinstallation of evicted beneficiaries

Asol
7/31/82

Asol

12/31/82

Change

29,706

39,344

-1-9,638

178,236

236,064

-^ 57,828

121,100

155.237

-1-34,137

37,235

50,409

-1-13,174

32,349

34,674

-^ 2,325

136

4-123

$614,130

$3,584,199

-1- $2,970,069

251

408

-H57

2,138

2,532

-1-394

arch 1983

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Press Reports of Civilian Deaths Attributable to Political Violence,
October 1 980- December 31 , 1982

900

1980

the center is holding and gradually
expanding. The process of building a
consensus through constant and close
consultations among divergent factions
is an integral part of the way the Salva-
doran political system is now working.

On the military side, the war has
been largely localized over the past year.
The guerrillas periodically mount hit-
and-run attacks. Government forces
then dislodge them. Although neither
side seems able to gain a decisive
military' advantage, guerrilla military ac-
tions are proving unable to prevent the
gradual strengthening of democratic
political processes.

The economy is in trouble. The guer-
rillas have mounted a destructive cam-
paign of economic sabotage in an effort
to sow dissatisfaction and fear among
the Salvadoran people. The world reces-
sion has been especially costly to Central
America and Latin America as a whole.
Investors and lenders shy away from
any business environment as uncertain
as that of El Salvador. Real gross
domestic product has declined by some
25% in 3 years; unemployment now ap-
proaches 40% in many areas of the
country. The decline was slower in 1982
than in the previous 2 years, and there

is hope for a better performance in
1983.

As noted in the certification report,
the government is making a serious ef-
fort to improve the human rights
behavior of government forces. Progress
has been uneven. It has been greatest
with the national police. Other forces
have been less successful, especially
those with highly decentralized struc-
tures which impede close monitoring by
their commanders. Again, I would refer
you to the certification report for more
details.

Also as noted in the certification
report, we continue to be dissatisfied
with the functioning of the Salvadoran
judicial system. Ambassador Hinton's
[Deane R. Hinton, U.S. Ambassador to
El Salvador] October speech before the
American Chamber of Commerce in San
Salvador, the certification report, and
every other major statement of U.S.
policy make clear that this is one of our
highest concerns. Some of the progress
in two U.S. citizen cases has taken place
since the Hinton speech, but, as I noted
earlier, we are still waiting for justice to
be done.

The certification report contains
detailed statistical information on the
progress of the land reform. Statistics

received only yesterday confirm the
great strides made in the land-to-the-
tiller program since the last certifica-
tion. During the month of January
alone, almost 27,000 additional acres
were brought under that program, base
on 8,142 new title petitions from
peasants working the land. Most im-
pressively, and with the broadest im-
plications for the permanence and
stability of the program, in January
738 new final titles were issued to
peasants— almost five times more than
were issued in any previous month and
more than doubling the cumulative tota
of final titles issued by the end of
December. By any standards, phase III
is now advancing rapidly.

We will support renewal of the lane
to-the-tiller program when it comes up
for continuation in March. The prograrr
has already been extended twice, in
1-year increments, since the passage of
the original law. The proportion of ex-
pected beneficiaries who have actually
made application for title remains
dramatically lower in departments of
high guerrilla activity than, for instance
in the four relatively tranquil western
departments. With such large blocks of
potential beneficiaries still waiting, the
agrarian reform must be extended.

With regard to your last question,
human rights abuses in El Salvador are
not rooted in any single cause, much les
in any cause that could be removed
quickly by any particular policy of the
Government of El Salvador. It is not
reasonable to expect that all abuses
could end within 6 months. Nor would i'
be realistic for the United States to
fashion a policy based on such an
assumption.

Over the last 3 years, U.S. assist-
ance has contributed decisively both to
the ability of El Salvador to resist the
attempts of guerrillas with external sup-
port to seize power and to El Salvador's
ability to feduce violence while under-
taking a process of democratic trans-
formation and socioeconomic reform.
Our continued assistance is vital to the
consolidation of these processes.

Some people say: Stop the military
aid to El Salvador, and the killing will
stop. But it wouldn't. Cessation of
military aid would mean only that the
fighting— now concentrated in four
departments, three of them lightly popu
lated— would spread to all frontiers. Anc
the death squads and vigilantes would
once again flourish as the central
government faltered.

Others say: Force the government ■
negotiate with its adversaries, and the

Department of State Bulletir

TREATIES

lling will stop. But it wouldn't. No
atin American government has ever
jreed to negotiate as an equal with its
•med opposition— and survived. Vene-
lela didn't agree to do so in the 1960s,
or did Peru or Brazil. Colombia didn't
lis year. And El Salvador is not pre-
idelista Cuba or pre-Sandinista
icaragua. If we attempt to force the
overnment of El Salvador to negotiate
ith the guerrillas as equals, we risk its
)llapse. And the result could be anar-
ly as left, center, and right all fight for
16 remains.

And should, in either case, the guer-
llas prevail, we know there will be no
jmocracy, no respect for human rights,
) land to the individual tiller.

Regional Approach

power sharing without reference to
jmocratic principles is no solution,
hat is? The answer is inescapable: the
)operative development of political
"ocesses that are democratic and that
"ovide the security as well as the
,eans for reconciliation.
■ And not in El Salvador alone. For
tst as the fighting has become a
;gional problem, the solution must be
!gional as well. And our objective must
i to foster conditions, both political and
lilitary, that will bring lasting peace to
entral America.

Last October, the Government of
osta Rica helped define a set of prin-
ples we believe can help achieve that
oal. Both El Salvador and the United
tates signed the final act of San Jose
3tting forth eight principles, which
ngle out respect for human rights and
le development of democracy and
'hich also include reciprocal measures
) reduce and eliminate military con-
icts. These principles embody four
asic points:

• Taking Central America out of
]ast-West competition, through such
leasures as removal of foreign troops
nd military advisers;

• Defusing tensions among nations
1 Central America by reciprocal and
erifiable agreements on arms imports,
rontier control, and assistance to in-
urgent groups in each other's territory;

• Launching a region-wide demo-
ratic transformation, by insuring that
.11 citizens who organize politically can
lave a voice in determining the future of
heir country; and

• Strengthening the economies, by
eactivating the Central American Com-
non Market and implementing the eco-

nomic initiatives of neighboring coun-
tries, including our own Caribbean Basin
initiative.

Together these four points represent
what we are aiming at in Central
America.

Conclusion

For El Salvador, the fourth certification
period is now starting. I hope that the
message from this hearing will be that:

• We expect land reform to be con-
tinued when the law authorizing it
comes up for renewal this spring;

• If civil justice cannot be made to
work in an emergency, courts of military
justice should be set up and used to
punish those members of the security
forces who are found guilty of abuses;

• The long, hard work of reconcilia-
tion must begin now, with the peace
commission and amnesty;

• We expect the alleged murderers
of our countrywomen and countrymen to
be judged and, if found guilty, punished;
and

• The survival of El Salvador is
important to us, and that we will sup-
port a country which reforms itself to
resist enemies who we know will not
support democracy, or human rights, or
the distribution of land to the farmer
who tills it.

•The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from t'he Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29. 1970.
TIAS 6997.
Accession deposited: New Zealand, Jan. 6,

1983.

Atomic Energy— Uranium

Agreement amending the fourth supply
agreement of Jan. 16, 1980 (TIAS 9767), for
the transfer of enriched uranium for a
research reactor in Yugoslavia. Signed at
Vienna Dec. 14, 15, and 20, 1982. Entered in-
to force Dec. 20, 1982.
Parties: International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy. U.S., Yugoslavia.

Coffee

E.xtension of the international coffee agree-
ment 1976 (TIAS 8683). Done at London

Sept. 25, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 1,
1982. TIAS 10439.

Accessions deposited: Australia, Jan. 5, 1983;
Jamaica, Jan. 21, 1983.

Commodities — Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980. >
Signatures: Jamaica, Jan. 6. 1983; Mozam-
bique, Dec. 21, 1982; Saudi Arabia, Jan. 11,
1983.

Containers

International convention for safe containers
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2,
1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for
the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Accessions deposited: Barbados, Sept. 1,
1982; South Africa, June 25, 1982.
Territorial application: Extended to the Isle
of Man by the U.K. effective June 19, 1982.

Marine Pollution

Ratification deposited: Greece, Aug. 10,
1981.2

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, on the International Maritime
Organization, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.'

Acceptances deposited: Ethiopia, Dec. 8,
1982; Pakistan. Dec. 10, 1982; Portugal,
Dec. 22, 1982; Tunisia, Jan. 5, 1983.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accession deposited: Nauru, June 7, 1982.

Patents — Plant Varieties

International convention for the protection of

new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as

revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.

Entered into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS

10199.

Ratification deposited: Sweden, Dec. 1, 1982.

Pollution

Convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.
Enters into force: Mar. 16. 1983.

Postal

General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force
July 1, 1981. TIAS 9972.
Approval deposited: China, Nov. 25, 1982.

Inarch 1983

TREATIES

Accession deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 11,

1982.

Ratifications deposited: Spain, Oct. 15, 1982;

Syria, Nov. 5, 1982.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks

agreement, with detailed regulations with

final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro

Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1,

1981. TIAS 9973.

Accession deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 11,

1982.

Ratifications deposited: Spain, Oct. 15, 1982;

Syria, Nov. 5, 1982.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at
Washington, Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Jan. 6,
1983.

Operating agreement relating to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Post and Telecommunications
Public Enterprise, Cape Verde, Jan. 6, 1982.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, as ex-
tended. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977.
Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978;
definitely, Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664.
Notification of withdrawal deposited: Sing-
apore, Jan. 4, 1983; effective Jan. 1, 1983.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices and final
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982, except for
(1) arts. 25 and 66 and appendix 43 which
entered into force Jan. 1, 1981 and (2) certain
provisions concerning aeronautical mobile
service which entered into force Feb. 1, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Dec. 21, 1982.3

Terrorism

International convention against the taking of
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: U.K., Dec. 22, 1982.

Trade

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 1. 1982. TIAS 10323.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Nov. 8,
1982.

Agreement on implementation of art. VII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(customs valuation). Done at Geneva Apr. 12,
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981.

Protocol to the agreement on implementation
of art. VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation). Done

at Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force

Jan. 1, 1981.

Acceptance deposited: Australia, Nov. 22,

1982.

Protocol for the accession of Thailand to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva Oct. 21, 1982.
Entered into force: Nov. 20, 1982.

Transportation — Foodstuffs

Agreement on the international carriage of

perishable foodstuffs and on the special

equipment to be used for such carriage

(ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva

Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21,

1976.

Instrument of accession signed by the

President: Jan. 17, 1983.

Accession deposited: U.S., Jan. 20, 1983.

Enters into force for the U.S.: Jan. 20, 1984.

Whaling

Amendments to the schedule to the interna-
tional convention for the regulation of whal-
ing, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Brighton
July 20-25, 1981.

Entered into force: Nov. 10, 1981, except
for certain amendments that entered into
force Feb. 8, 1982, and Mar. 8, 1982.

Amendments to the schedule to the interna-
tional convention for the regulation of whal-
ing, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Brighton
July 19-24, 1982.

Entered into force: Nov. 5, 1982, except for
certain amendments that entered into force
Feb. 3, 1983.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered
into force July 1, 1981; for the U.S. Jan. 12,
1982. TIAS 10350.

Ratifications deposited: Italy, Dec. 31,
1982;< Luxembourg, Dec. 15, 1982.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, 1971, as extend-
ed (TIAS 7144)). Done at Washington
Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1,
1980. TIAS 10015.
Approval deposited: France, Dec. 29, 1982.

1981 protocol for the first extension of the
food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015).
Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered
into force July 1, 1981; for the U.S. Jan. 12,
1982. TIAS 10351.

Ratifications deposited: Italy, Dec. 21, 1982;
LiLxembourg, Dec. 15, 1982.

World Health Organization

Amendments to arts. 24 and 25 of the Con-
stitution of the World Health Organization,
as amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534).
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976, by the
19th World Health Assembly.'
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, Jan. 18,
1983; Monaco, Jan. 13, 1983; Senegal,
Jan. 12, 1983.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Additional protocol to the agreement on
social security signed Feb. 19, 1982. Signed
at Brussels Nov. 23, 1982. Enters into force
on the date of entry into force of the agree-
ment of social security.

Administrative agreement for the implemen-i
tation of the agreement on social security of 1
Feb. 19, 1982. Signed at Brussels Nov. 23,
1982. Enters into force on the date of entry
into force of the agreement on social secu-
rity.

Belize

Parcel post agreement, with details of im-
plementation. Signed at Belize City and
Washington Sept. 14 and 28, 1982. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1983.

Brazil

Cooperative project agreement concerning
the conduct of a joint geophysical and
oceanographic investigation in the South
Atlantic. Signed at Washington and Rio de
Janeiro June 10 and July 14, 1982. Entered
into force July 14, 1982.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Dec. 1, 1971, as amended and extended
(TIAS 722, 8749) relating to a program of
scientific and technological cooperation. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Brasilia
Nov. 29 and 30, 1982. Entered into force
Nov. 30, 1982.

Bulgaria

Program of cultural, educational, scientific,
and technological exchanges for 1983 and
1984. Signed at Sofia Nov. 19, 1982. Entere
into force Nov. 19, 1982; effective Jan. 1,
1983.

Congo

Agreement for the sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Brazzaville Aug. 16,
1982. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1982.

Costa Rica

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Mar. 25, 1982,' with memorandum of under-
standing. Effected by exchange of notes at
San Jose Oct. 30, 1982. Entered into force
Jan. 10, 1983.

Czechoslovakia

Agreement amending and extending the air
transport agreement of Feb. 28, 1969, as
amended and extended (TIAS 6644, 7356,
7881, 8868, 10269). Effected by exchange ol
notes at Washington Dec. 29 and 30, 1982.
Entered into force Dec. 30, 1982.

Egypt

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Signed at Cairo
Nov. 23, 1982. Entered into force Nov. 23,
1982.

Agreement amending the agreement for sail
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 21, 1981

Department of State Bullet

CHRONOLOGY

\S 10328). Effected by exchange of notes
aini Aug. 11, 1982. Entered into force
;. a, 1982.

itemala

■eement extending the cooperative agree-
it of Oct. 22, 1981, (TIAS 10288) to assist
Government of Guatemala in execution of
?radication program of the Mediterranean
t fly (MEDFLY). Signed at Guatemala
. 1, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1982.

nduras

•eements amending the agreement for
•s of agricultural commodities of June 11,
2. Signed at Tegucigalpa Aug. 30 and
:. 3, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 30 and
;. 3, 1982.

ng Kong

-eement amending the agreement of June
1982 (TIAS 10420) relating to trade in
,on, wool, manmade fiber textiles and tex-
products. Effected by exchange of letters
Vashington Nov. 22 and 24, 1982.
ered into force Jan. 1, 1983.

•eement amending the agreement of
r. 8, 1963, (TIAS 5446) for cooperation
cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Ef-
,ed by exchange of notes at New Delhi
r. 30, 1982. Entered into force Nov. 30,
2.

■eement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
5, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
es at Washington Dec. 21, 1982. Entered
I force Dec. 21, 1982; effective Jan. 1,
3.

naica

m agreement for production and employ-
nt to assist Jamaica in its stabilization and
overy efforts. Signed at Kingston Dec. 17,
;2. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1982.

reement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
I manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
s, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
es at Washington Dec. 1, 1982. Entered
3 force Dec. 1, 1982; effective Jan. 1,
i3.

Ibanon

I reement relating to air transport route
I hts. Effected by exchange of notes at
Hshington Dec. 22, 1982. Entered into
Ice Dec. 22, 1982. TIAS 10489.

. jeement extending the cooperative agree-
I'nt of Oct. 22, 1981, (TIAS 10373) relating
I provision of services to assist in eradica-
• n of the Mediterranean fruit fly
I EDFLY). Signed at Mexico Sept. 29, 1982.
itered into force Sept. 29, 1982.

itherlands

'lird supplement to the general arrangement
May 3, 1966, (TIAS 9144) relating to the

cooperative production of the M109 vehicle,
with annex. Signed at The Hague Mar. 2 and
Apr. 14, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 14,
1979.

Norway

Agreement on social security, with final pro-
tocol and administrative agreement. Signed
at Washington Jan. 13, 1983. Enters into
force on the first day of the second month
following the month in which each govern-
ment shall have received from the other
government written notification that it had
complied with all statutory and constitutional
requirements for entry into force.

Peru

Agreement relating to air transport services,
and supplementary exchanges of notes, as
amended (TIAS 1587, 4050, 6080). Signed at
Lima Dec. 27, 1946. Entered into force
Dec. 27, 1946.

Notice of termination by Peru: Nov. 10,
1982; effective Nov. 12, 1983.

Philippines

Administrative arrangements between the
U.S. and the Philippines implementing the
agreement of Jan. 7, 1979, (TIAS 9224) for
the performance of customs, immigration,
and quarantine functions at U.S. facilities at
Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the
Philippines, with annex and exchanges of
notes. Signed at Manila Dec. 8, 1982.
Entered into force Dec. 8, 1982.

Romania

Tunisia

International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Tunis and
Washington Nov. 12, 1982 and Jan. 4, 1983.
Enters into force Apr. 1, 1983.

Turkey

Agreement extending the agreement of
July 8, 1976, as extended (TIAS 8371, 9810,
10200), on procedures for mutual assistance
in the administration of justice in connection
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and
McDonnel Douglas Corporation matters. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Washington
Aug. 7 and Dec. 21. 1982. Entered into force
Dec. 21, 1982; effective July 8, 1982.

United Kingdom

Supplemental arrangement relating to the
agreement of Feb. 25, 1976, (TIAS 8230) con-
cerning a U.S. naval support facility on Diego
Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory.
Signed at Washington Dec. 13, 1982. "Entered
into force Dec. 13, 1982.

Uruguay

Agreement relating to investment guaranties.
Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo
Dec. 15, 1982. Enters into force on the date

of the note by which the Government of
Uruguay communicates to the Government of
the United States that this exchange of notes
has been approved pursuant to its constitu-
tional procedures.

Zaire

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
May 30, 1980. Signed at Kinshasa Nov. 27,
1982. Entered into force Nov. 27, 1982.

'Not in force.

^With reservations.

^With reservations and understandings.

■•With statement. ■

January 1983

January 3

Suriname orders U.S. Deputy Chief of Mis-
sion Richard LaRoche and Public Affairs Of-
ficer Edward Donovan to leave that country
within 14 days, accusing them of "destabiliz-
ing activities."

January 4

U.S. declares Rudy van Bochove, second-
ranking diplomat at the Suriname mission
persona non grata in the U.S. and orders his
departure within 14 days.

Israeli President Yitzhak Navon makes
official working visit to Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 4-7.

January 7

State Department announces that in light of
progress achieved in human rights since the
Rios Montt government came to power, it has
decided to approve Guatemala's long-pending
request for the cash sale of military spare
parts and flight safety items.

January 13

Lebanese and Israeli negotiators agree on a
U.S. proposed compromise agenda for talks
on withdrawal of foreign forces from
Lebanon.

Poland orders expulsion of UPI corre-
spondent Ruth Gruber for allegedly gathering
"intelligence" material, giving her until mid-
night Jan. 15 to leave the country. The State
Department, later, says it "deeply deplores"
the announcement and states that the action
"seems aimed at intimidating other Western
correspondents in Warsaw," and that the
charges against Ms. Gruber "appear to have
been manufactured by Polish security serv-
ices."

January 14

U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cuellar makes an official visit to Washington,
D.C., to meet with President Reagan and
Secretary Shultz.

Peruvian Prime Minister/Foreign
Minister Fernando Schwalb Lopez Aldana
makes official visit to Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 14-21.

«rch 1983

PRESS RELEASE

January 17

Japanese Prime Minister Yasahiro Nai<asone
makes an official worl<ing visit to Washing-
ton, D.C., Jan, 17-20.

January 18

South Africa dissolves the National Assembly
in South West Africa and announces that it
will resume direct rule. The move follows the
resignation of the Council of Ministers — a
multi-racial political front called the
Democratic Turnhalle alliance. The alliance
was initially sponsored by South African
authorities as an alternative to the black na-
tionalist South West Africa People's Orga-
nization (SWAPO), which is seeking in-
dependence for Namibia.

In retaliation for Poland's ouster of War-
saw UPI correspondent, Ruth Gruber, State
Department asks Warsaw to "withdraw"
Stanislaw Glabinski, Washington correspond-
ent for the Polish press agency, by Jan. 20.

By a vote of 13-0 (U.S.S.R. and Poland
abstaining) U.N. Security Council adopts
Resolution 529 extending the "present man-
date of the United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon for a further interim period of six
months."

January 19

New China News Agency carries an an-
nouncement that China will immediately stop
approving contracts of cotton, soybeans, and
chemical fibers from the U.S., and reduce its
planned imports of other U.S. agricultural
products. The move is a symbolic retaliation
against curbs imposed by U.S. textile imports
from China. U.S. regrets actions and
reiterates "its sincere desire to continue ad-
dressing our textile trade problems through a
mutually acceptable agreement."

January 21

In a report to Congress, President Reagan
certifies continued progress in El Salvador
with respect to the criteria required by Con-
gress for continuation of U.S. military aid.

January 25

At Secretary Shultz's invitation, F".R.G.
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
makes an official visit to Washington, D.C..
Jan. 25-26. Mr. Genscher, also acting in his
function as Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the European Community, will
also meet with President Reagan, Vice Presi-
dent Bush, and other senior officials.

January 26

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak makes of-
ficial working visit to Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 26-28.

January 29

Secretary Shultz makes a state visit to East
Asia— Japan, China, and Korea— Jan. 29
through Feb. 10 to become personally ac-
quainted with leaders of these countries and
to conduct a pcsitive dialogue on a wide
range of bilateral and international issues.
The Secretary will visit Japan Jan. 30-
Feb. 2; China Feb. 2-6; and Korea Feb. 6-8;

and will attend a meeting of chiefs of U.S.
diplomatic missions to Asia and the Pacific in
Hong Kong Feb. 8-9. The Secretary returned
to Washington, D.C., Feb. 10.

January 30

Vice President Bush makes a 7-nation official
visit to Europe Jan. 30-Feb. 10 for talks
aimed at consulting with U.S. Allies on a
broad range of issues including arms reduc-
tions. The Vice President's visit includes
stops in F.R.G., the Netherlands. Belgium,
Switzerland (Geneva, where he delivers the
opening speech at the 1983 session of the
Committee on Disarmament), Italy, France,
the U.K., and the Vatican.

January 31

In an open letter read by Vice President
Bush in West Berlin, President Reagan calls
on Soviet General Secretary Yuriy A.
Andropov to meet with him to sign a treaty
banning all intermediate-range, land-based
nuclear missiles. In the message, the Presi-
dent says he would meet with Mr. Andropov
"whenever and wherever he wants" and that
he makes this offer "out of the conviction
that such an agreement would serve the in-
terests of both sides, and, more importantly,
that the people of Europe want nothing
more." ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*1 1/3 Program for the official
working visit of Israeli
President Navon,
Jan. 4-7.

*2 1/4 U.S., Singapore establish

new visa system, Oct. 4
and 8.

*3 1/4 U.S., Romania amend textile

agreement, Nov. 2 and 3.

"4 1/4 U.S., Korea sign textile

agreement, Dec. 1.

*5 1/6 U.S., Philippines sign textile

agreement, Nov. 24.

♦6 1/11 U.S., India sign textile
agreement, Dee. 21.

*7 1/11 U.S., Indonesia sign textile
agreement, Oct. 13 and
Nov. 9.

*8 1/11 Advisory Committee on

International Investment.
Technology, and Develop-
ment, working group on
treatment of investment
and special investment
problems, Jan. 18.

*9 1/11 International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), study
group C, Jan. 20.

• 10 1/11 CCITT, working party of th|
integrated services digitall
network and study group
D, Feb. 3.

•11 1/11 International Radio Con-
sultative Committee '
(CCIR), study group 2,
Feb. 7.

•12 1/14 1983 foreign fishing
allocations.

*13 1/14 Shultz: statement to the
press, Jan. 13.

'14 1/14 Program for the official

working visit of Japanese
Prime Minister Nakasone
Jan. 17-20.

*15 1/19 Advisory Committee on

International Investment
Technology, and Develop
ment, working group on
accounting standards,
Feb. 11.

*16 1/19 Advisory Committee on

International Investment
Technology, and Develop
ment, working group on
transborder data flows,
Feb. 17. :

•17 1/19 U.S., Thailand amend textil
agreement, Sept. 30.

•18 1/19 U.S., Hong Kong amend

textile agreement, Nov. 2 '
and 24.

•19 1/19 U.S.. Romania amend textil
agreement, Nov. 2 and 4.

•20 1/19 U.S., Thailand amend textil j
agreement, Sept. 2 and 1

•21 1/25 Program for the official

working visit of Egyptiar
President Mubarak, Jan.
26-28.

*22 1/26 Shultz: interview on
CBS-TV.

•23 1/27 Shultz: remarks to delegate
attending international
youth exchange meeting,
Jan. 26.

•24 1/28 CCIR, study group 7,
Feb. 18.

•25 1/28 Fine Arts Committee,
Feb. 19.

*26 1/28 Advisory Committee on

International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, working group on
multilateral investment
standards, Feb. 24.

•27 1/28 Shipping Coordinating

Committee (SCC), Sub-
committee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on
radiocommunications,
Apr. 19.
28 1/31 Shultz: news conference en
route to Tokyo, Jan. 30.

•Not printed in the Bulletin. ■

U. S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1983 )8i-il26/107

Department of State Bullet '

DEX

arch 1983

Diume 83, No. 2072

jhanistan. President Reagan Meets With

'Afghan Freedom Fighters 87

lerican Principles. Project Democracy . 79
Tis Control

US Control Negotiators Hold News Briefmg

(Nitze, Reagan, Rowny) 76

ns Control and Reduction (Reagan) .... 34
Timission on Strategic Forces Established

(Reagan) 78

■sident Reagan's State of the Union Address

(excerpt) 32

>gress m the Quest for Peace and Deter-
rence (Reagan) 28

new of U.S. Relations With the Soviet

Union (Eagleburger) 81

■retary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks, news

conferences, toasts) 40

e President Bush's and Secretary Shultz's

Trips (Reagan) 34

■e President Bush Visits Europe (remarks,

news conferences, toasts) 1

■e President Interviewed on "Face the

Nation" (excerpts) 37

ia. Vice President Bush's and Secretary

Shultz's Trips (Reagan) 34

Igium. Vice President Bush Visits Europe

(remarks, news conferences, toasts) .... 1

ina. Secretary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks,

news conferences, toasts) 40

ngress

rtification of Progress in El Salvador

(Enders) 89

■sident Reagan's State of the Union Address

(excerpt) 32

storing Prosperity to the World Economy

(Shultz) 64

■i-ftury and Economic Assistance for FY

l',)S4' (Shultz) 68

partment and Foreign Service. Project

Democracy '''9

veloping Countries

ij,n-ess in the Quest for Peace and Deter-

ri'iice (Reagan) 28

St.. ring Prosperity to the World Economy

(Shultz) 64

onomies

nl.hean Basin Initiative (Reagan) 36

.-i.ifnt Reagan's State of the Union Address

(.xcerpt) 32

..gress m the Quest for Peace and Deter-
rence (Reagan) 28

St.. ring Prosperity to the World Economy

(Shultz) 64

■ ivtary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks, news

. ..iiferences, toasts) 40

;ypt. Visit of Egyptian President Mubarak

'(Mubarak, Reagan) 85

Salvador
•rtification of Progress in El Salvador

(Knders) 89

.r.tary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks, news

I. .Iiferences, toasts) 40

jrope

ce President Bush's and Secretary Shultz's

Trips (Reagan) 34

ce President Interviewed on "Face the

Nation" (excerpts) 37

ireign Aid

inl.hean Basin Initiative (Reagan) 36

■rtification of Progress in El Salvador

(Knders) 89

■lurity and Economic Assistance for FY 1984
(Sliultz) 68

France. Vice President Bush Visits Europe
(remarks, news conferences, toasts) .... 1
Germany. Vice President Bush Visits Europe
(remarks, news conferences, toasts) .... 1
Hong Kong. Secretary Shultz Visits Asia
(remarks, news conferences, toasts) ... 40
Industrialized Democracies. Restoring Pros-
perity to the World Economy (Shultz) . . 64
Information Policy. Project Democracy . . .79
Italy. Vice President Bush Visits Europe
(remarks, news conferences, toasts) .... 1
Japan. Secretary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks,

news conferences, toasts) 40

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister (Nakasone,

Reagan) 80

Korea. Secretary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks,

news conferences, toasts) 40

Latin America and the Caribbean.

Caribbean Basin Initiative (Reagan) 36

President Reagan's State of the tJnion Address

(excerpt) 32

Progress in the Quest for Peace and Defer-
ence (Reagan) 28

Middle East

President Reagan's State of the Union Address

(excerpt) 32

Progress in the Quest for Peace and Deter-
rence (Reagan) 28

Secretary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks, news

conferences, toasts) 40

Vice President Interviewed on "Face the

Nation" (excerpts) 37

Military Affairs. Commission on Strategic

Forces Established (Reagan) 78

Monetary Affairs. Restoring Prosperity to the

World Economy (Shultz) 64

Netherlands. Vice President Bush Visits
Europe (remarks, news conferences,

toasts) 1

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Progress in the Quest for Peace and Deter-
rence (Reagan) 28

Vice President Bush Visits Europe (remarks,

news conferences, toasts) 1

Nuclear Policy. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Our

Shared Responsibility (Kennedy) 86

Poland. Secretary Shultz Visits Asia (remarks,

news conferences, toasts) 40

Presidential Documents

Arms Control Negotiators Hold News Briefing

(Nitze, Reagan, Rowny) 76

Arms Control and Reduction 34

Caribbean Basin Initiative 36

Commission on Strategic Forces Estab-
lished '''8

Progress in the Quest for Peace and Deter-
rence 28

State of the Union Address (excerpt) 32

Vice President Bush's and Secretary Shultz's

Trips 34

Visit of Egyptian President Mubarak

(Mubarak, Reagan) 85

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister (Nakasone,

Reagan) 80

Public Affairs. Project Democracy 79

Security Assistance. Security and Economic

Assistance for FY 1984 (Shultz) 68

Switzerland. Vice President Bush Visits
Europe (remarks, news conferences,

toasts) 1

Trade. Restoring Prosperity to the World
Economy (Shultz) 64

Treaties. Current Actions 91

U.S.S.R.

Arms Control Negotiators Hold News Briefing
(Nitze, Reagan, Rowny) 76

Arms Control and Reduction (Reagan) .... 34

President Reagan's State of the Union Address
(excerpt) 32

Progress in the Quest for Peace and Deter-
rence (Reagan) 28

Review of U.S. Relations With the Soviet
Union (Eagleburger) 81

Vice President Bush Visits Europe (remarks,
news conferences, toasts) 1

United Kingdom. Vice President Bush Visits
Europe (remarks, news conferences,
toasts) 1

United Nations. U.N. Secretary General
Meets With the President (White House
statement) 88

Name Index

Bush, Vice President 1, 37

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 81

Enders, Thomas 0 89

Kennedy, Richard T 86

Mubarak, Hosni 85

Nakasone, Yasuhiro 80

Nitze, Paul H 76

Reagan, President, 28, 32, 34, 36, 76, 78,

80, 85

Rowny, Edward L 76

Shultz, Secretary 40, 64, 68

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