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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTOISI 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 







Departntent 



-m of state -m-m j ^ 

buUetm 



le Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2070 



January 1983 







Cover: 

Waving goodbye as he boards Air Force 
One, President Reagan departs White 
House enroute Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, and Honduras. 

(White House photo by Mary Anne 
Fackelman) 



Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 83 / Number 2070 / January 1983 



I 

i 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on cuiTent 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretan,' of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March .31. 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department (IK State Bulletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 Price: 12 issues plus annual index— $21.00 
(domestic) $26.25 (foreign) Single copy— $3.75 
(domestic) $4.70 (foreign) Index, single copy — $2. 
(domestic) $3. 15 (foreign) 



CONTENTS 



FEATURE 



1 President Reagan Visits Latin America {President 

Reagan, Secretary Shultz. Statements, Remarks, Toasts, 

Press Briefings, Radio Address, U.S. -El Salvador Joint Communique) 



The President 

28 East- West Trade Relations and 

tiie Soviet Pipeline Sanctions 

29 International Free Trade 

30 News Conference of November 1 1 

(Excerpts) 

The Vice President 



34 



52 



Visit to Africa and Bermuda 
(Statements, Remarks, Toasts, 
U.S. -Nigeria Joint Communi- 
que) 

Vice President Bush Attends 
Caribbean Conference 



The Secretary 

54 News Conference of November 18 

Europe 

58 Death of Soviet President 

Brezhnev (White House State- 
ment, Vice President Bush, 
President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz) 

62 American Role in NATO 

(Lawrence S. Eagleburger) 

65 Visit of Italian Prime Minister 

Spadolini (President Reagan, 
Giovanni Spadolini) 

66 Visit of West German Chancellor 

Kohl (U.S.-F.R.G. Joint Com- 
munique) 
68 Second Anniversary of Solidarity 
(President Reagan) 



International Law 

70 Act of State Doctrine: Foreign 

Expropriations (Davis R. Robin- 
son) 

Middle East 



71 



73 



Search for Peace and Stability in 
the Middle East (Kenneth W. 
Dam) 

Securing a Peaceful Future for 
Lebanon (Kenneth W. Dam) 



Nuclear Policy 

75 Nuclear Energy: Opportunities 
and Problems 
(Richard T. Kennedy) 

United Nations 

78 Call for Soviet Withdrawal From 
Afghanistan (Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick, Text of Resolution) 

Western Hemisphere 

81 World Peace and the Situation in 

Central America and the Carib- 
bean (President Reagan) 

Treaties 

82 Current Actions 

Chronology 

84 November 1982 



Press Releases 

86 Department of State 



Publications 

86 Department of State 



"This will be a journey for the cause of democracy and peace. 



I 




President Reagan arrives at Brasilia International Airport and is greeted bv Brazilian 
President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo. Secretary Shultz, left, looks on. 



»Bnuary1983 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



President Reagan 
Visits Latin America 



President Reagan departed Washington, D.C., 
November 30, 1982, for a trip to Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, and Honduras. He returned to the United 
States on December U- 

Following are statements, remarks, toasts, and 
press briefings made by the President and Secretary 
Shultz, who accompanied him, during this trip, as 
well as the text of the U.S. -El Salvador joint com- 
munique. ^ 



President Reagan's Statement to the People of Brazil, 
November 26, 1982 



Last May, I had the honor of welcoming President [Brazilian President Joao 
Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo] and Mrs. Figueiredo to the United States. Our 
discussions taught me how much our two countries have in common and how impor- 
tant it is that we understand each other well. I also learned how easy it is for 
Americans and Brazilians to talk as friends. 

I am delighted to have President Figueiredo's invitation to return his visit and 
have made a special effort to learn more about Brazil, its people, their heritage, and 
their aspirations. In the course of my readings and conversations, I have noticed 
many similarities between our two countries and their people. 

• We are both nations of immigrants; yet, we have successfully capitalized on 
the cultural, religious, and racial diversities of our peoples. 

• We are both committed to peaceful resolution of global and hemispheric con- 
flict; yet, we both understand the need for strong and vigilant armed services. 

• We are both in positions of economic leadership on our respective continents; 
at the same time, we are major trading partners. The winds of economic crisis have 
buffeted our nations over the past few years — inflation, energy shortages, high in- 
terest rates — and we are still struggling to gain ground and prosper in these tur- 
bulent times. 

Both Brazil and the United States have demonstrated, during this same month 
of November, that democracy is the world's best hope for peaceful change and 
progress. 

While I am President Figueiredo's guest in your country, my colleagues and I 
expect to spend many hours in close consultations with distinguished Brazilians. We 
will discuss how our two governments can best support each other's efforts to meet 
the economic, social, cultural, and political aspirations of our people — and how we 
can best strengthen the future security of our countries, our hemisphere, and our 
world. 



Broadcast on Brazilian television (text from White House press release of Nov. 29, 1982). 



WASHINGTON, D.C. 

President Reagan's 
Departure Remarks 



White House 
Nov. 30, 19822 

Today we embark on an important 
journey to visit our friends in the South, 
in Latin America. This will be an impor- 
tant visit, not only for the United States 
but for others, too. As friends and 
neighbors of the New World, we have a 
vital stake in each other's economies, 
security, and general well-being. This is 
true for Central America, the Carib- 
bean, and for the entire hemisphere. 

This will be a working visit. I will be 
meeting with six presidents, and I 
believe we have a lot to learn from one 
another. We certainly have a lot to 
discuss: the steps we all need to take to 
get our domestic economies back on the 
path to growth, to reduce the threats to 
peace and security, and to promote the 
continued development of democracy. 
This will be a journey for the cause of 
democracy and peace. 

The four countries I am visiting 
have all had elections in the past year. 
There is a strong democratic tide run- 
ning in the Americas. It's important that 
democratic leaders maintain a dialogue 
with one another and that our actions 
foster the ideals of democracy in a 
climate of peace. 

I have long held that one of the 
highest priorities of this Administration 
would be to improve our relations with 
our neighbors in this extraordinary 
hemisphere. We are, as you know, most 
fortunate, for this half of the globe is 
the source and repository of many of 
mankind's noblest dreams. Our Carib- 
bean Basin initiative is a reflection of 
our commitment to sustaining those 
moral visions, or noble visions. And 
when our neighbors are in trouble, their 
troubles inevitably become ours. 

I am pleased that the Congress ap- 
proved the aid portion of my CBI re- 
quest in September. I also attach impor- 
tance to the critical foreign assistance 



package for fiscal year 1983, which is 
currently before the Congress. 

But we need more than just an injec- 
tion of critically needed funds. We need 
the long-term incentives encompassed in 
the trade and tax provisions of the CBI 
legislation. In my meeting with the 
Republican leadership this morning, I 
underlined the importance that I attach 
to enactment as soon as possible of the 
trade and tax portions of the CBI, and 
they agreed. 

I have spoken with Dan Rosten- 
kowski. Chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, who recently 
traveled to the Caribbean at our request. 
He saw first-hand the positive impact 
that the CBI would have on the 
economies and the societies of this area, 
and he, too, promised to help during the 
final days of this session. 

Our trip is an opportimity to 
demonstrate first-hand our concern for 
our neighbors. Whether our nations be 
of the North or the South, we can work 
together as partners to pursue the 
dreams we share. We will strengthen 
the democratic bond, stimulate new 
growth and opportunity, and promote 
the sacred cause of peace. That's the 
purpose of the journey. 



BRAZIL 



President Reagan's 
Arrival Remarks 



Brasilia 
Nov. 30, 19823 

I am delighted to be here in Brazil— to 
have the opportunity to see this city 
which is famous the world over as an ex- 
pression of Brazil's confidence in its 
destiny. I look forward to strengthening 
my friendship with President Figueiredo 
so warmly begun in May, and to con- 
tinue the discussions we began in 
Washington. 

We're here on a working visit. In ad- 
dition to Secretary of State Shultz, I 
have with me Treasiu-y Secretary 
[Donald T.] Regan, our Trade 
Representative, Ambassador [William 



E.] Brock, and other leaders of our 
Government. We are prepared to discusi ' 
a wide range of subjects. 

I also look forward to learning first 
hand about this giant country and the i 
contrast between this city and Sao 
Paulo, which is so well known the world' 
over as an industrial and metropolitan 
wonder. 

Our societies are similar in that we ' 
both have a frontier tradition, an open- 
ness and vision for greatness. The roots' 
of our nations are also similar. We are ' 
both melting pots— nations that succeed- 
ed in giving their citizens, no matter 
what their origins, an opportunity to ' 
share with their initiative, hard work, 
and intelligence in the vision of 
freedom — freedom to worship and to 
work in dignity for a better life. 

You, in Brazil, have great dreams 
and a vast nation blessed with enormous 
resources in which to fulfill them. Here, 
in Brasilia, we see dramatic proof of the 
spirit of a people with unlimited drive, 
determination, and confidence in their 
future. 

We all know of the strong and 
steady advance of Brazil both 
domestically and internationally. Your 
November 15 elections demonstrated 
Brazil's confidence in itself and its 
stability in freedom. Similarly, the 
management of the Brazilian economy 
through times of economic difficulty 
around the world inspires us all that our 
present problems can be overcome. 

And while we may have areas of 
disagreement, we also have a great deal 
in common. I am sure our talks will be 
fruitful and prove beneficial to both our 
countries. 

On behalf of the people of the 
United States I bring you our good 
wishes and friendship. President 
Figueiredo, thank you for welcoming 
me. I already feel at home. 



Itinerary 



November 30— Depart Washington, D.C. 
November 30-December 2— Brasilia, Brazil 
December 2 — Sao Paulo, Brazil 
December 2-3 — Brasilia, Brazil 
December 3 — Bogota, Colombia 
December 3-4 — San Jose, Costa Rica 
December 4 — San Pedro Sula, Honduras 
December 4 — Arrive Washington, D.C. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



'resident Reagan's 
Response to Questions 
jubmitted by Latin 
j^merican Newspapers 



:eleased Nov. 30, 1982^ 

I. The power of the democratic idea 
nd economic progress allowed the 
Vest to win the battle for the hearts 
nd minds of people almost every- 
where and helped them resist 
otalitarian ideologies. But. isn't there 
n implicit threat to those gains in the 
resent economic crisis and, therefore, 
the strategic interests of the United 
Itates, even in the hemisphere? 

A. There is no question that today's 
:lobal economic crisis is a severe 
hallenge to democracies everywhere. 
)uring an economic downturn, competi- 
ion among labor, business, and govern- 
nent becomes more intense, and the 
elationships can become strained. This, 
n part, is the reason why I proposed 
ast February, in cooperation with other 
ionor nations in the hemisphere, an am- 
)itious program to increase aid and 
simulate trade and investment in the 
Caribbean Basin. It is also why the 
Jnited States has worked closely with 
he international community to assist 
■ountries which are facing more serious 
'inancial difficulties during the current 
worldwide recession. 

The situation in El Salvador is a 
good example of the tension and in- 
stability that can develop. There, leftist 
guerrilla forces have undermined the 
economic infrastructure in order to 
spread dissatisfaction and opposition to 
the democratically elected government. 
El Salvador also shows, however, that 
even in a profoundly divided society, 
democratic institutions can rise above 
economic or political crisis to meet the 
challenge with a national consensus. 
Other nations, in Central America and 
South America, are finding that the 
consensus-building inherent in a 
democracy offers a firm foundation for 
■responding to economic and other crises. 
So, although economic difficulties test 
our democratic ideals, I believe that re- 
cent events, such as the elections in 



Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Colom- 
bia, Honduras, and Mexico, show that 
our democracies will emerge not only 
secure, but stronger. That Brazil has 
just conducted a landmark election dur- 
ing a period of severe economic prob- 
lems is a clear indication that democracy 
cannot only be maintained but advanced 
even during times of economic difficulty. 

Q. The United States is trying to 
reduce its contributions to the World 
Bank [International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development, IBRD] 
and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (lADB) while refusing to in- 
crease the lending resources of the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
the proportion desired by developing 
nations. In light of these initiatives, 
what expectations can Third-World 
countries have in relation to U.S. par- 
ticipation in the North-South 
dialogue? 

A. Your initial statement is inac- 
curate. We support an adequate increase 
in IMF quotas and a substantial 
replenishment of the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Moreover, I am 
committed to working with leaders of 
Third-World countries to address their 
real development problems in a 
pragmatic, concrete manner. 

The world community's most impor- 
tant contribution to growth in develop- 
ing countries is through trade. Last 
year, the United States alone provided 
more than $68 billion to the non-OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] developing world in payment 
for goods imported from developing 
countries. That is twice as much as 
LDCs [less developed countries] received 
in official development assistance from 
all sources. 

We are committed to fostering an 
international trade system which will 
continue to provide a powerful engine of 
growth. For example, in last week's 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] meeting in Geneva, we pro- 
posed a round of North-South trade 
talks that would help increase trade be- 
tween developed and developing coun- 
tries. 

We recognize, however, that conces- 
sional assistance also plays an important 
role in development, particularly for 
least developed countries. In a period 
when concessional financing is scarce. 



those limited resources should be con- 
centrated on the world's poorest, least 
credit-worthy countries. 

Q. What concrete results can we 
now see from CBI (Caribbean 
Basin initiative)? What are the 
possibilities that the Congress will not 
support the initiative fully? If the ac- 
cess to the North American market 
contemplated as part of the as yet 
unapproved CBI is not approved soon, 
would your government be disposed to 
establish some kind of bilateral ar- 
rangement with the Carribbean Basin 
countries? 

A. The Caribbean Basin initiative is 
an integrated program of emergency 
financial aid, trade preferences, and in- 
vestment incentives. It will help 
revitalize the economies of the Carib- 
bean Basin by stimulating greater in- 
vestment, production, and exports in the 
region. That will create jobs and give 
people tangible hopes for a better 
economic future within stable, 
democratic institutions. As you know, 
the U.S. Congress, in September, ap- 
proved the emergency aid portion of the 
initiative, and those funds are now being 
disbursed. The trade and investment 
portions of the initiative will be con- 
sidered by the Congress in the next few 
days. We have been working closely 
with the leadership in both Houses to 
see that the full legislative program of 
the CBI is completed before Christmas. 

We will continue to seek a multi- 
lateral and regional approach, rather 
than isolated bilateral arrangements. I 
strongly believe that the cooperation of 
other countries— both as donors and as 
participants in the program— strength- 
ens and increases the effectiveness of 
any individual country's efforts. 

Q. The Falkland/Malvinas Islands 
conflict damaged relations between 
the United States and Latin America. 
How can hemispheric unity be 
achieved, and how will your trip bet- 
ter inter-American relations? 

A. We, in the New World, are very 
important to each other. Our mutual 
dependence — our interdependence — 
shows up in almost every statistic con- 
cerning hemispheric trade, capital flows, 
communications, and other forms of 
human interaction. Much of the world's 
growth potential is here in our 
hemisphere. I know public attention is 



January 1983 



focused on alleviating the global reces- 
sion. That is only natural. But we must 
focus on how to create the conditions for 
renewed, long-term growth. Perhaps the 
most encouraging trend at work in the 
hemisphere is the movement toward de- 
mocracy. We firmly support this trend, 
and through my trip, I hope to make 
that support clear and widely known. 
We must recognize that the inter- 
American system has served us well. 
True, it was unable to prevent the tragic 
outbreak of war earlier this year. But 
let's not forget that — thanks in large 
measure to the inter- American sys- 
tem — Latin America devotes less than 
1.4% of its gross national product to 
military expenditures. What is called for 
now is not new institutions but a re- 
newed commitment to making the sys- 
tem's emphasis on the rule of law and 
the peaceful resolution of disputes work 
better. That calls for political will. The 
United States is firmly committed to do 
its part in this endeavor. My visit to 
your countries will emphasize that com- 
mitment. 

Q. In recent years, several 
democracies have been restored in 
Latin America: Peru, BraziL Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and Honduras. What impor- 
tance does your government give to 
these democracies in contrast to 
military regimes in the hemisphere? 
What impact do you believe your Ad- 
ministration's human rights policy had 
on these developments? 

A. The United States places great 
importance on the development of stable 
democratic institutions in our 
hemisphere. In addition to the special 
bond which the shared value of 
democracy brings to our relationship 
with another nation, there are certain 
practical elements in democratic systems 
which also deepen and strengthen our 
ties. Democracies tend to be more 
stable, because they represent a broader 
spectrum of national opinion. Democ- 
racies tend to be more peace loving, 
because they must consult with their 
citizens regarding major foreign policy 
questions. Democracies tend to have 
more policy continuity because of their 
broad-based support. And lastly, when 
we deal with a democratic government, 
we know it speaks for its sovereign peo- 
ple as a whole, not just for an isolated 



sector. I believe that U.S. promotion of 
human rights and support for democracy 
in the Western Hemisphere reinforce 
each other. History shows us that the 
most effective guarantee of human 
rights lies in the creation and strength- 
ening of open democratic institutions of 
government. But, we in the United 
States can only influence; we cannot 
determine. 

I believe that the growth of democ- 
racy we have seen in recent years shows 
the power of the democratic idea, from 
the unity and stability it brings to a na- 
tion, to the dignity and legitimacy it 
bestows on a government. 

Q. It is evident that Cuba threat- 
ens both Central America and the 
Caribbean. Have you thought of an ef- 
fective way to eliminate the root of 
this Cuban subversion? 

A. You are quite right that Cuba, by 
its support for armed violence and 
subversion against its neighbors, is, in- 
deed, a threat to the peace of the 
Americas. But more impoi-tantly, with 
its economy in a shambles, with tens of 
thousands of mercenaries in Africa, and 
with its extreme dependence on Soviet 
largesse merely to hold its head above 
water, Cuba has become more and more 
a Soviet satellite and a willing conduit 
for advancing aggressive Communism. 
Were it not for the Soviet Union, which 
gives massive aid in the form of arms 
and money — $3 to $4 billion this year 
alone — Cuba could not afford to do what 
it is doing. Om- response has been 
threefold: 

First, we are working with the 
other states of the region to help the ac- 
tual and potential victims of Soviet- 
abetted, Cuban-inspired attacks in the 
region. This includes, as its most impor- 
tant element, help to strengthen their 
economies through bilateral and 
multilateral programs, including the 
Caribbean Basin initiative, which is key 
to the success of this joint effort. Where 
necessary, we also provide security 
assistance; 

Second, we hold the Soviet Union 
ultimately responsible for much of its 
client's behavior; and 

Third, we maintain and have 
strengthened economic measures de- 
signed to increase greatly the costs to 



Cuba and its Soviet paymasters of their 
interventions in other countries. 

Q. In the past, the United States 
permitted the Soviet Union to achieve 
strategic parity. You now appear to 
believe that only an American threat 
to regain superiority will cause the 
Kremlin to accept your plan to mutual 
ly reduce nuclear arms. However, this 
position has not produced results at 
the negotiating table. In fact, it ap- 
pears to be exacerbating the arms 
race, with the resulting waste by the 
superpowers of resources that would 
be better utilized in the fight for 
development. In light of the change oi 
guard in the Kremlin, isn't this the 
moment to revitalize detente and 
abandon the rhetoric of confrontation 

A. The United States is not seeking 
strategic superiority. I am convinced 
that the preservation of peace requires 
that we follow two parallel paths — 
deterrence and seeking significant arms 
reductions to equal and verifiable levels. 
These are the only paths that offer any 
real hope for enduring peace. I want to 
stress that the present disparity in 
forces brought about by the massive 
Soviet buildup of the 1970's has been 
very detrimental to international peace 
and stability. 

I believe our strategy for peace wil: 
succeed. Although the United States ha 
always led the effort for arms limita- 
tions and reductions, never before have 
we proposed such a comprehensive pro- 
gram of nuclear arms control. What we 
are saying to the Soviet Union is this: 
We will modernize our military in order 
to keep the balance for peace, but 
wouldn't it be better if we both simply 
reduced our arsenals to a much lower 
level? 

We have stressed from the outset 
that we want a constructive relationship 
with the Soviet Union, based on mutual 
restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity. 
UTifortunately, Soviet-backed aggression 
in recent years — such as Afghanistan, 
Poland, and Kampuchea — has violated 
these principles. But we remain ready tc 
respond positively to constructive Soviet 
actions. 

Q. Brazil is experiencing the 
gravest economic and financial crisis 
of the last 20 years. Naturally, Brazil 
looks to the United States, the richest 



Department of State Bulletlr 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



nation in the world, for support. What 
types of specific assistance can your 
administration provide Brazil, direct- 
ly, in the terms of credit and loans, 
and indirectly, in its attempts to 
restore the confidence of private 
banks in the country and to increase 
the resources of multilateral lending 
institutions? 

A. The United States continues to 
be a strong supporter and the largest 
contributor to the World Bank, the 
lADB, and the IMF. We believe these 
institutions have key roles to fill in to- 
day's world and provide important 
resources, both financial and technical. 
While we believe IMF resources are suf- 
ficient to handle current problems, we 
are working with other members of the 
IMF to insure that adequate resources 
will also be available in the future. We 
hope that agreement on a new quota in- 
crease will come soon and that our sug- 
gestion for a special borrowing facility 
to meet possible extraordinary demands 
will be accepted. 

Brazil can be proud of its well- 
established reputation for meeting its 
obligations in a responsible manner and 
for facing problems with skill, energy, 
and pragmatism. We have every reason 
to believe Brazil will continue to take 
whatever measures it finds necessary to 
deal with its problems, including any 
economic adjustments that may be need- 
ed to assure sound growth and develop- 
ment. This, in turn, gives lenders con- 
fidence in Brazil's creditworthi- 
ness—confidence that I share. We 
believe Brazil will have adequate access 
to private international financial 
markets. 

Q. Brazil condemns foreign in- 
terference in Central America, sym- 
pathizes with Nicaragua (Brazil has 
given Nicaragua some economic 
assistance), condemned Zionism as a 
form of racism in the United Nations, 
and was the first country to recognize 
officially Angola in spite of the Soviet 
and Cuban roles in Angola's in- 
dependence. Given the self-proclaimed 
Western inclinations of Brazil, do the 
fruits of its foreign policy of "non- 
automatic alliances" surprise you? Is 
there a risk that Brazil's foreign 
policy will place both nations on a col- 
lision course? During your visit to 



Brazil will you call for a new align- 
ment between Brazil and the United 

States? 

A. Your question suggests that the 
foreign policies of Brazil and the United 
States are in direct conflict. I do not ac- 
cept that suggestion. In our discussions 
last May, President Figueiredo and I 
found that there are many more points 
of convergence in our foreign policies 
than there are points of divergence. 
That is not surprising since both coun- 
tries are based on a similar value 
system; have similar origins and 
histories; and are dedicated to peace, 
prosperity, freedom, and justice. As for 
the points of divergence, we live in a 
large and complex world with many dif- 
ficult problems and situations, and it 
would be totally unrealistic to expect 
any two free and independent nations to 
hold identical views on all of them. You 
only find that automatic Identity of view- 
point within the Soviet bloc, and I cer- 
tainly would not like to see that 
replicated anyplace in the world. 

No, I do not intend to propose a new 
alignment between Brazil and the 
United States. I am interested in 
strengthening the bilateral relationship, 
in reviewing areas where there have 
been problems, and in exploring new 
possibilities for bilateral cooperation. 
This is important to me, and I think it is 
important to President Figueiredo, not 
in the context of a new alignment, but 
as reaffirmation of the longstanding 
friendship between Brazil and the 
United States and our common commit- 
ment to the peace and progress of the 
hemisphere and the world. 

Q. President Figueiredo stated, 
during a recent speech at the United 
Nations, that "the economic policies of 
the great powers are destroying 
wealth without replacing it." The 
American Government in particular, 
has been accused of adopting econom- 
ically repressive policies, ignoring the 
pernicious effects on the rest of the 
world. The United States, according 
to critics, is exporting recession and 
unemployment today in the same way 
that it exported inflation in the past. 
Was your government somewhat in- 
sensitive regarding the negative reper- 
cussions of U.S. ecomonic policies 
abroad? 

A. I know that slow economic 
growth in the United States is having 



serious impact on other economies, and I 
wish we could have avoided this painful 
transition period for all of us. The con- 
tinuation of past U.S. economic policies 
and the continued lack of control over 
U.S. inflation would have led to disaster 
not only for the United States, but for 
the whole world economy. We are seeing 
the beginnings of recovery in our coun- 
try—inflation has fallen dramatically, in- 
terest rates also are dropping fast, and 
there are encouraging signs of investor 
confidence, for example, in the stock 
market and in construction. What we 
are aiming for is a revival of steady 
economic growth with price stability. I 
want to lay the foundation for a long 
period of U.S. growth not subject to ex- 
aggerated ups and down which have 
caused so much pain around the world in 
the past. I think we are on the right 
road, and that the U.S. economy will 
once again provide a significant stimulus 
to production and employment around 
the world. 

Q. President [Colombian President 
Belisario] Betancur has said that the 
United States is treating Latin Ameri- 
ca as "America's backyard." How do 
you respond to that? 

A. While there may have been some 
basis in the past for the concern that the 
United States did not focus sufficiently 
on its relations with the hemisphere, I 
think it is clear that my administration 
has devoted considerable attention to 
our hemisphere relations, as evidenced 
in the Caribbean Basin initiative, which 
we and Colombia support, and my cur- 
rent trip, which underlines the impor- 
tance of our hemispheric neighbors for 
the United States. 

Q. Beyond doubt, one of the most 
important problems between Colombia 
and the United States is drug traffick- 
ing. And, certainly, there have been 
some important advances such as the 
recent "Operation Swordfish." Never- 
theless, for those who are in the 
know, drug trafficking is produced 
not only by the sellers but also by the 
buyers, which, in this case, are the 
U.S. citizens themselves. What 
policies have been instituted to fight 
against the immense consumption of 
drugs in your country? 

A. On October 5, I endorsed our 
new Federal strategy which is designed 



January 1983 



to mobilize all our forces to stop the 
flow of illegal drugs into the United 
States, and to prevent drug abuse, 
especially among our youth. This is a 
bold, confident plan, which simul- 
taneously attacks organized criminal 
trafficking in drugs; international pro- 
duction and exporting of illicit narcotics; 
and seeks to reduce demand for drugs. 

I have charged two Cabinet-level 
councils with responsibility for domestic 
enforcement and international narcotics 
control, and for overseeing health- 
related drug programs. The South 
Florida Task Force on Crime made sig- 
nificant inroads on narcotics trafficking, 
and we have announced plans to create 
similar task forces in other regions. My 
staff and interagency teams are coor- 
dinating a nationwide prevention ef- 
fort — with a strong assist from my wife 
Nancy — that involves government, 
health institutions, business, educational 
institutions, the media, other private 
sector interests, and importantly, 
parents, and parent groups. 

I have described drug abuse as one 
of the gravest problems facing us inter- 
nally. We must undertake vigorous 
policies and programs at home and over- 
seas where the major drugs are pro- 
duced. In that context, I am pleased to 
be able to say that we have been 
cooperating very actively with the Gov- 
ernment of Colombia. For several years 
we have been engaged in cooperative ef- 
forts to help improve the enforcement 
and interdiction efforts within Colombia 
against cocaine, marijuana, and other 
drugs. We have seen some good results. 
We hope, in the future, that we can 
work together to expand this coopera- 
tion on supply control. Such cooperation, 
together with progress on the demand 
side against drug abuse in the United 
States, is the only way to effect a per- 
manent improvement in the situation. 
My Administration has committed more 
than $900 million per year to this effort, 
the majority of these funds being spent 
on reducing drug abuse within the 
United States. 

Q. What is the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's reaction to President 
Betancur's intention to join the 
NonaligTied Movement? 

A. Colombia is a sovereign nation 
with whom we have excellent relations. 



and it would not be appropriate for me 
to express an opinion about its relations 
with others. 

Q. Many Costa Ricans believe that 
the present economic and security 
crises in Costa Rica and the area en- 
danger our democratic system. What 
is your Administration prepared to do 
to avoid the destruction of Costa 
Rican democracy? 

A. There are few countries in the 
region which have a better understand- 
ing of the economic and security 
challenges facing Central America and 
the Caribbean today than your own. In 
his speech to the Conference on Free 
Elections in Washington, D.C., Presi- 
dent [Costa Rican President Luis Alber- 
to] Monge said that in your February 7 
elections, the Costa Rican people con- 
firmed their faith in democracy as the 
means of resolving your country's 
economic problems. I share that faith in 
the democratic process and agree that 
economic health is key to a secure future 
for the entire Caribbean Basin. While 
congressional approval of the $350 
million supplemental appropriations ad- 
dresses some of the more immediate 
concerns, I think we must be equally 
concerned about the medium- and long- 
term issues addressed by the trade and 
investment portions of my own govern- 
ment's Caribbean Basin initiative. This is 
a major policy priority for my Ad- 
ministration, and we are actively work- 
ing with Congress to enact those re- 
maining parts of the CBI legislation in 
the congressional session now underway 
in Washington. 

President Monge's leadership in the 
recent San Jose conference represented 
both a growing consensus among the 
democratic countries of the region as to 
the conditions necessary for peace, and 
a commitment among us all to find the 
means for reducing those tensions. Dur- 
ing the past year we have seen free elec- 
tions and orderly changes of government 
in Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
the Dominican Republic, and Colom- 
bia — all signatories of the San Jose final 
act. The challenges are real, but so is 
our commitment to succeed. 

Q. In less than 6 months. Presi- 
dent Monge has met with you twice in 
Washington. Now you will meet with 
him in San Jose. This level of contact 



is higher than usual in traditional 
relations between Costa Rica and the 
majority of Latin American countries, 
and the United States. What is the 
reason for these close contacts? 

A. We cannot afford to forget that 
only a few years ago, Costa Rica, long 
an historical model for democratic 
government in the hemisphere, was also 
virtually alone. In just the last year, six 
of the countries that participated in the 
recent San Jose conference conducted 
free elections and witnessed an orderly 
change of government. Democratic 
government has taken the initiative in 
addressing the economic, social, and 
political challenges facing the region. 
This will be my third meeting with 
President Monge, and it reflects both 
the common values which we bring to 
the issues and a recognition that the 
democratic process, itself, offers a bet- 
ter alternative than the historic and 
simplistic choices of the extremes of a 
violent right or a violent left. 

Q. We know that the North 
American Congress has passed strict 
legislation with regard to sending 
U.S. troops outside the country; 
however, the President has the power 
to send troops for 30 days. In the 
event of Nicaraguan aggression 
against Honduras, could our country 
depend on the concrete assistance of 
the United States? 

A. The obstacles to peace in Central 
America stand clearly exposed as the 
countries of the region grapple with 
severe economic challenges, demand for 
social justice and reform, strains on 
public services, and violence frequently 
born out of the extremist solutions. 
Your own country has been in the 
forefront in having proposed construc- 
tive solutions to resolve these tensions. 
Economically, we have collaborated on 
both the immediate and longer term 
solutions, and I am optimistic that my 
Administration's Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative will receive congressional action 
shortly to address the pressing re- 
quirements in the trade and investment 
areas. Politically, the recent San Jose 
conference final act reflected your coun- 
try's diplomatic initiatives aimed at 
reducing the likelihood of further 
military conflict in the region. As one of 
the eight democratic governments which 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



signed that final act, the United States 
supports the growing regional consensus 
on those conditions necessary for peace 
n the region. As you know, the level of 
U.S. economic and military assistance to 
Honduras has risen significantly over 
the past year in response to our shared 
concerns in Central America and, I 
think, represents a clear indication of 
our support for your country's demo- 
cratic efforts to surmount these 
problems. 

Q. Our country, a friend and an 
ally of the United States, has wit- 
nessed with surprise the imposition of 
sugar quotas. What was the reason 
that Honduras was given a substan- 
tially smaller quota than the quotas of 
countries that are openly hostile to 
Washington? 

A. As I have explained before, the 
drop in world sugar prices and the con- 
gressional reaction to this development 
left us no choice but to impose tem- 
porary sugar import quotas to protect 
our domestic producers. Quota allocation 
is based on an average of a country's ex- 
ports to the United States from 
1975— the date when the previous U.S. 
sugar program expired— through 1981, 
excluding each country's high and low 
performance years. The Honduran allo- 
cation was determined by this non- 
discriminatory formula, which we are 
applying across the board to all coun- 
tries in accordance with our interna- 
tional trade obligations. 



Secretary Shultz's 
Press Briefing 



Brasilia 
Dec. 1, 1982^ 

President Figueiredo, Mrs. Figueiredo 
and the other Brazilian Ministers whom 
we have been meeting with and who 
have been our hosts this morning and at 
luncheon are wonderful hosts. We have 
had a warm, friendly, gracious recep- 
tion, and we appreciate it. 

I might say that the nature of the 
visit in which we had a series of formal 
meetings and then an informal, lengthy 
luncheon proved to be particularly good 



because we had an opportunity, sitting 
around the table and talking informally, 
to explore all kinds of topics in a gen- 
uinely fruitful way. 

In terms of the meetings themselves 
and specific things that may come out of 
them are concerned, the two Presidents 
did ask the Brazilian Foreign Minister 
and me to coordinate a series of 
ministerial-level working groups that, 
basically, pick up work that is now going 
on and, in addition, perhaps, will start 
some additional work. But the working 
groups will range over the following sub- 
jects. 

First, economic problems which in- 
clude the areas of finance and trade and 
all matters of that kind that have to do 
with the financial and trading systems. 

Second, a number of issues and dif- 
ficulties, in which our two countries' 
legislations having to do with nuclear 
issues, need to be worked on; we will 
have a working group that addresses 
itself to those issues. 

Third, there is in existence — and 
there will be developed some more 
under this arrangement — cooperative 
relationships between Brazil and the 
United States in various areas of tech- 
nology — science and technology, includ- 
ing the space area. There are things that 
they do that are helpful to us and vice 
versa, and we want to develop this. 

Finally, we will explore possible 
relationships in the area of industrial 
military fields of cooperation. We will 
put some working groups into the field 
on these subjects. Some things have 
been taking place in these areas already. 
The two Foreign Ministries have been 
tasked by the Presidents to ride herd on 
this process and not think of it as an 
ongoing thing, but, rather, to see what 
we can see in these areas and then 
report back at some fairly prompt, but 
yet, unnamed date on what we conclude 
from these studies. 

That, in general, is the sort of thing 
we talked about, and the tone and at- 
mosphere have been exceedingly cordial 
and pleasant, and I know that we have 
all appreciated it. 

Q. Did the subject of Cuba come 
up? And what was said about it if it 
did? 

A. It did not come up. 



Q. Did anything in these discus- 
sions you held today produce any im- 
mediate relief for Brazil's financial 
problems? 

A. I think the situation, as I under- 
stand it, is that Brazil has involved itself 
with the IMF and that process is under 
way. And as I think the President men- 
tioned, there was worked out, and there 
have been discussions going back, I 
think, to the time of the World Bank- 
IMF meetings in Toronto — that was 
around Labor Day — of various financial 
problems. The United States has, as it 
does with many countries, extended in 
the swap area, what you might call a 
bridging loan — that was finalized last 
week sometime — that will help Brazil 
bridge between that time and whenever 
the IMF negotiations result in 
something. 

So, there was that, but I would put 
it in the range of normal swap ar- 
rangements that are not totally common 
but are — certainly occur in many cases 
among countries in the international 
financial field. 

Q. — of cooperation between the 
two countries — 

A. The question as I understand it 
was, what new areas of cooperation do I 
expect in the area of foreign policy? Was 
that the question? 

Q. As the result of these meetings. 

A. First of all, our meetings aren't 
complete in the sense that I will go to 
the Foreign Ministry after I am through 
here; we will have some further discus- 
sions there. But fundamentally, Brazil 
has a foreign policy. We have one. We 
talk about issues and see where we can 
work effectively together, as in the case 
of the GATT Ministerial meeting last 
week. We did not try to identify any 
particular joint initiative of any kind. 

Q. One of the purposes, you said, 
was to ease the strain over the 
Falkland Islands dispute between the 
United States and— 

A. No, I didn't say that. You fellows 
have been writing that all the time, but I 
didn't say that. 

Q. What was said about the 
Falkland Islands business — about that 
strain — and what was done or said to 
try to restore good relations? 

A. We have good relations. We 
don't have to restore good relations. The 



January 1983 



Falkland Islands dispute really did not 
come up as a matter of dispute, and I 
think that the situation there now is that 
we have had two votes on the sub- 
ject — one in the United Nations and one 
in the Organization of American States 
— in which we and the other countries of 
the Americas supported the idea of 
negotiations to settle a dispute. That is 
where the matter rests. 

Q. Could you be a little more 
specific about the military ar- 
rangements, cooperation, and produc- 
tion? Is there any more in the military 
area than military and industrial pro- 
duction? 

A. No, there is nothing more to be 
said on that other than that it is a deal 
of potential fruitful interaction, and it is 
something that will be explored by the 
working group. There are various possi- 
ble things that one would explore in that 
regard — technological, production, and 
training things. So, there is a range of 
possible matters that the military people 
will presumably discuss. But I think this 
is sort of something they will have to 
develop, and they will have to decide 
what it is they want to talk about. I am 
not trying to specify in any way any par- 
ticular agenda. 

Q. Is there any talk about the pro- 
duction under U.S. licensing of 
military equipment? 

A. We did not discuss specifics such 
as that. When this working group 
assembles itself and sets out its agenda, 
it will decide whether that is the subject 
that it wishes to discuss. 

Q. Are you looking for more sup- 
port from Brazil for U.S. foreign 
policy, specifically, with regard to 
Central America? 

A. Of course, we take all the sup- 
port we can get for our policies, based 
on people's feeling that what we are do- 
ing is right and deserves to be sup- 
ported. But we did not come here seek- 
ing particular support for any specific 
thing. Rather, the President came here 
to express his firm belief in the impor- 
tance of Brazil and other countries in 
this region to the United States, to ex- 
plore issues of mutual interest and to 
share ideas about them, to promote the 
ongoing work and start some new work 
that will be mutually beneficial. 



Q. Was anything discussed a great 
deal toward policy of the United 
States in that area? 

A. When you say that, let me hedge 
all my answers by saying that I was not 
in all the meetings between Presidents 
Reagan and Figueiredo, but I don't 
believe that it was specifically addressed 
and talked about as a particular agenda 
item. That does not mean that, obvious- 
ly, we are not very interested in it. And 
as the course of this visit goes on, we 
may want to discuss it. I am sure that 
Brazilians are just as interested in it as 
we are. 

Q. You said it was a fruitful 
meeting but really all you told us 
about it is that you agreed to set up 
working groups. What was fruitful? 
What did you discuss? What came off? 

A. The answer is, first of all, that 
setting up working groups on important 
subjects with a thrust behind them from 
the President to get really at these sub- 
jects and think them over and come 
back with a report is quite a significant 
thing. 

This is not something that emerged 
out of nowhere but, rather, picks up 
some very important ongoing work in 
the economic area. There have been a 
lot of discussions in the nuclear area. 
There is a meeting, in December, in the 
science and technology field. We want to 
gather these things together a little bit, 
give them a shove and, among other 
things, see them as a contributor to, and 
an expression of the links that we have 
with Brazil and the important relation- 
ship that exists between our two coun- 
tries. 

Q. Did they bring up the Caribbean 
Basin? There were many stories in the 
South American papers about the Mar- 
shall Plan that might come forth. Was 
there anything like that discussed? 

A. There was no mention of stories 
in the press of any kind, not that 
anybody does not read the newspapers. 
But as far as the Caribbean Basin initia- 
tive is concerned, certainly one of the 
purposes of the President's trip is to 
underline the importance of that initia- 
tive. It is being actively considered, and 
we are very encouraged by the response 
of key congressional people on both 
sides of the aisle as they come into the 
special session in Washington, that there 



will be action on the Caribbean Basin 
initiative. We have from the Chairman 
of the [House] Ways and Means Com- 
mittee that he is going to markup on '' 
both the trade and the tax aspects of it. ' 
We are very encouraged by that. The 
President's trip and the stopover — not ' 
only here but, perhaps, especially in I 

Colombia, which is a donor nation and a 
Caribbean nation, as well as South 
American and the Central American 
countries — serve to underline that point. 

Q. Though the Brazilians agree 
that the GATT talks in Geneva last 
weekend do include services under the 
GATT discussions, have you found any 
evidence that the Brazilians are will- 
ing to make some concessions on what 
people in the United States feel is a 
protectionist attitude on services? 

A. I don't want to try to speak for 
Brazilians; the Brazilians, of course, will 
speak for themselves. But I would say, 
as a general proposition, that the issue 
of a study group in the field of services, 
which was agreed to in the GATT 
meetings, was something that was 
discussed a great deal. We talked about 
it a lot, and the Brazilians did; many 
other countries did. A considerable 
amount of the discussion is caused by 
the fact that "services" is a huge word, 
and it covers everything from ranking 
and insurance to engineering, and so on. 
It covers a wide array of things. I think 
that some countries are more concerned 
than others about other aspects of what 
we call services. So, that kind of sorting 
out was necessary. I am sure the study 
underway under GATT will have to 
define a little bit more precisely what it 
is within the field of services that is be- 
ing addressed. 

In my opinion, this is a very impor- 
tant area to address in the field of trade 
because what we call "services" are get- 
ting to be a larger and larger fraction of 
trade. If you want to see trade covered 
by rules of the game, as seems to me is 
highly desirable, then you would want to 
explore extending those rules to areas 
that are, in a sense, not now covered. 

Q. Are we willing to send more 
troops to Lebanon? 

A. The President has said that he 
wants to see Lebanon emerge as a coun- 
try that can take care of itself and rule 
itself. He wants to see the foreign 
forces, all the foreign forces, removed 
from Lebanon. We are part of the 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



iiltinational force there now, and we 
■e willing to consider now. We are will- 
ig to consider proposals that may come 
ong as part of a plan for bringing 
lose things about. The Government of 
ebanon has stated that additions to the 
mltinational force are desirable. 1 am 
ire that the President will consider 

lat. 
Of course, we will want to consider 

in its relationship to a plan for ac- 
jmplishing all of the things that are 

anted to be accomplished there. At this 
oint, nothing explicit of that kind has 
ome to the President. And I would say 
eyond that, that there would not be any 
ommitment before consultations with 
he Congress had taken place. Certainly, 
he President is willing to consider addi- 
ions if that will be helpful in this proc- 
ss. And in terms of when a U.S. com- 
nitment would be made, we have to see 

specific proposition. We have to con- 
ult with the Congress. 

Q. What sort of conditions would 
ve want to see agreed to before we 
vould make a commitment? 

A. We would want to see, no doubt, 
he structure of some sort of program 
hat is going to achieve the goals that 
ve and others seek. And then see how 
he multinational and the U.S. part in it 
'its into that program. That is the ob- 
ect— not just to have a lot of people 
!here. And you can see, in a general 
way, the sorts of things that might be 
ione. There have already been some 
potential missions identified, but there is 
not, yet, an overall plan to fit into. This 
IS something that will be emerging. 



Q. What about consultations with 
other governments like France and 
Italy? Are they going on? 

A. Yes. We are constantly in con- 
.-lultation with the Governments of 
France and Italy who are partners with 
us in the multinational force. Part of the 
agreement on going in is an agreement 
for close consultation as we consider it 
is, also, possible that other countries 
may wish to contribute to the forces 
there. But at the same time, I think it 
all is contingent on developing some sort 
of a program, because people do not 
want to send forces in without knowing 
what for. 

Q. In the 1960s, there used to be a 
joint U.S.-Brazilian military commis- 
sion that was very effective and 



January 1983 



presented a message to the world of 
unity between the two largest coun- 
tries in the hemisphere. When the 
human rights issue came about, that 
was abrogated. The American general 
was sent home. What are the pros- 
pects for restoration of the joint 
U.S.-Brazilian military commission as 
it was in the middle 1960s? 

A. I think the question of what sort 
of a relationship is desirable from the 
standpoint of both countries is the sort 
of thing that this working group, as it 
shapes itself, will address. I cannot 
answer the question in advance. It is 
something for them to work out, and 
then to consult within their countries. 
And we will just have to see where that 
goes. 

Q. Is the United States interested 
in restoration? 

A. The President has agreed to the 
establishment of the working group, and 
so has the President of Brazil. That is a 
pretty good expression of interest. But 
interest in what is the thing that this 
group will have to address. I cannot say 
at this time precisely what it will be. 

Q. You said that the United States 
finalized bridging loans to Brazil last 
week. Is this the U.S. Government to 
which you were referring? And, if not, 
if it is the private banks, then what 
would be the U.S. Government's role 
in guaranteeing or backing the private 
loans to Brazil? 

A. It does not have anything to do 
with guaranteeing private loans. It is 
part of the broad, swap-line financing 
that is characteristic of the world of in- 
ternational finance. It is strictly a 
governmental thing and is bridging be- 
tween when it was agreed to and when 
the IMF arrangement that Brazil is 
starting with the IMF are completed. 

Q. Do you think that you can 
resolve conflicting legislation on 
nuclear issues? Could you clarify that? 

A. We have legislation that places 
restrictions on the shipment of various 
nuclear technology, fuel, and so on, 
depending upon the circumstances and 
the safeguarding. Brazil, of course, is a 
country that is developing its nuclear 
program, and we have to see how these 
things fit together. As of now, it has 
been difficult, but we will make an effort 
to see what we can see. 



President Reagan's 
Dinner Toast 



Brasilia 
Dec. 1, 1982'! 

President Figueiredo, thank you for 
your cordial welcome. There is an old 
saying in Brazil that says: "The United 
States is a very big country, but Brazil 
is colossal." Flying for hours in a jet air- 
craft gives one a sense of just how colos- 
sal Brazil is. In fact, the only thing 
larger than Brazil is the heart and good 
will of the Brazilian people. You and all 
Brazilians have said bern oiwdo— wel- 
come, and we do feel welcome and at 
home. 

I'm told that 77 years ago the Baron 
of Rio Branco, that great Brazilian 
diplomat, in referring to the arrival of 
one of Secretary Shultz's predecessors, 
Elihu Root, is supposed to have said: 
"His eyes may not be dazzled by our 
small material progress, but his 
American philosophy will surely be 
pleased to note the new phenomena in 
the Brazilian nation: activity, energy, 
and hope." I can assure you that my 
American philosophy is still very much 
in tune with Brazil's phenomenal activi- 
ty, energy, and hope. I must also admit 
tiiat my eyes are dazzled by the progress 
of the Brazilian nation. 

Clearly, the postwar period, the time 
when relationships were still determined 
by the monumental events of the Second 
World War, is over. Old patterns are 
giving way to new relationships. Eco- 
nomic and political power once concen- 
trated in the hands of a few is being 
spread, as it should, among many na- 
tions. This is a result, not of redistribu- 
tion, but the creation of vast new 
wealth, generated by modern tech- 
nology, creative enterprise, and hard 
work. 

President Figueiredo, you capsulized 
it well at the United Nations when you 
said: "The extraordinary release of pro- 
ductive forces on a worldwide scale in 
the post-war period wrought within a 
few decades the intricate patterns of a 
different world, a complex and unstable 
world, but also a diversified and promis- 
ing one." I was very much impressed by 



the depth of analysis and the strength of 
conviction of your speech at the United 
Nations. 

Today, I renew my pledge to main- 
tain with you the closest of consultation. 
Friendship does not mean total agree- 
ment; instead, it suggests shared values, 
ideals, mutual respect, and trust. This is 
certainly true of the Brazilian and 
American peoples. I know, it is true of 
you and me as individuals. Our coun- 
tries, as friends, and we, as leaders of 
these great nations, will work together 
to overcome the challenges we face to 
our prosperity and freedom. 

Recently, our economies have been 
hard hit by recession, something ex- 
perienced in most of the world. In the 
United States, as you're doing here in 
Brazil, we're taking the painful steps 
necessary to overcome the economic 
crisis that threatens our people. Self- 
discipline is necessary; so, too, is mutual 
accommodation. Borrowers must move 
to restrict their deficits. But it is just as 
important that lenders not withhold new 
funds from countries which adopt effec- 
tive stabilization plans. Lenders and bor- 
rowers must remember that each has an 
enormous stake in the other's success. 

Similarly, the integrity of the world 
trading system must be preserved, so it 
can serve once again as the great engine 
of growth. Closed markets must be care- 
fully opened. Open markets must be 
shielded from protectionism. Our chal- 
lenge is to make our trading and finan- 
cial relationships remain a source of 
prosperity and strength, not become a 
source of discord and disagreement. 

Toward that end, we believe that 
economic relationships among the 
trading nations of the world must rest 
on three main pillars. 

First, a spirit of cooperation. Our 
economies are so clearly intertwined 
that our best hope for growth is to act 
in concert and not in isolation. Nothing 
is more destructive than unilateral deci- 
sions by individual countries to cut back 
trade or financial flows. We cannot 
prescribe what the private sector should 
do. But our aim should be government 
and private relations that can be relied 
upon. 

Second, a spirit of fairness. In to- 
day's climate there is powerful tempta- 
tion for countries to take action at the 




Presidents Reagan and Figueiredo ex- 
change dinner toasts at the Palacio do 
Itamarty. 



expense of their neighbors. We have 
seen, in the past, the damage that can 
do. 

Finally, there must be a spirit of 
commitment — commitment to stable 
economic growth shared by nations 
around the globe. 

The debt problems facing many na- 
tions today are imposing, and we must 
act together to insure that we have the 
tools to deal with them. The resources 
of the IMF are one of the most impor- 
tant of these tools. To assure the ade- 
quacy of the IMF resources, the United 
States has proposed that in addition to 
an increase in the IMF quotas, there 
should also be a special borrowing ar- 
rangement to meet the demands that 



may be placed on the IMF. Where coun 
tries need assistance as they seek IMF 
funding, those able to do so must act to 
provide bridging funds. We also need 
trading rules that reflect the enormous 
changes in world trade that have oc- 
curred since GATT was established 35 
years ago. The meeting which has just 
ended in Geneva was a useful step aloii! 
the road, but we still have a long way t 
go. 

Many countries will need to pass 
through a painful period while making 
necessary adjustments in the years 
ahead, and we must work closely 
together during this transition. We will 
work with you to help the internationals 
system evolve so as to bring a brighten 
economic day to all our people. At time 
it's too easy to be lured into the trap of 
seeing only the problems, pitfalls, and 
vulnerabilities of the journey. This is 
especially true in a period of economic 
crisis. 

President Figueiredo, the United 
States is overcoming its crisis, and I 
want you and all Brazilians to know th; 
we're confident that Brazil will sur- ' 
mount its current difficulties. There's ail 
old saying here that "Nothing stops ' 
Brazil." Nothing will stop Brazil. 

We're confident because we know 
the character of your people. Our 
citizens came from the same mold. We 
are nations of immigrants. Our national 
soul was honored in the frontier, by peo 
pie with the courage to leave the 
familiar and face the unknown. This is 
the heritage of your land and mine. The 
people who came here wanted to better 
their lives and the lives of their children 
The frontier of the New World didn't of 
fer streets paved with gold. It offered 
opportunity and the spirit of freedom. 
Today, freedom-loving people around th- 
world are tremendously encouraged by 
your stable transition back to 
democracy. 

History proves that the freer a peo- 
ple become, the more their creative 
energies are unleased. You touched on 
this last year when you outlined your 
commitment to representative govern- 
ment. "Democracy," you said, "is none 
other than a system in which every in- 
dividual has the chance to play a highly 
responsible and active role on the stage 
of national politics, rather than the role 
of a mere passive spectator." Last 



10 



Department of State Bulletir 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



lonth about 50 million of your coun- 
rymen became political activists instead 
f spectators. Your legislative and 
■ubernatorial elections demonstrated the 
igor and vitality of the democratic ideal 
■1 this hemisphere. We salute you, Presi- 
ient Figueiredo, for your strong leader- 
hip in opening this new frontier, or 
hapter, I should say, in your country's 
listory, and we salute your fellow coun- 
rymen as well. From all accounts, your 
•lections were much more than political 
■ontests, they were a celebration of 
reedom. 

What we strive for is a hemisphere 
vhere the future is determined not by 
)ullets, but by ballots— a hemisphere of 
■ountries at peace with themselves, one 
mother, and with the world. The peace 
fie've known has been a precious asset 
'or the Americas. Instead of allocating a 
rreat share of their resources on 
Tiilitary spending, the developing coun- 
ties of this hemisphere have invested in 
the future. This has been no accident. 
From the Pan American Union to 
the treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the^ 
Organization of American States, this 
hemisphere has been in the forefront of 
multilateral, international cooperation. 
No other region of the world can match 
our record. I cannot forget that when 
last we met the hemisphere faced a 
crisis in the South Atlantic and your 
country was a voice of moderation and 
reason. We both found to be unaccep- 
table the first use of military force to 
resolve that dispute. Underlining our 
support of this principle, the United 
States recently joined with Brazil and 
other countries of the hemisphere in call- 
ing upon Great Britain and Argentina to 
negotiate their differences. As your 
speech before the United Nations sug- 
gested, Brazil's concern for peace ex- 
tends far beyond this hemisphere, 
especially in an age when the weapons 
of destruction threaten all mankind. 

Let me assure you tonight, and all 
of our friends in this hemisphere, the 
United States is absolutely determined 
to maintain peace and bring the nuclear 
arms race under control. Here, again, 
our hemisphere has an exemplary record 
through the nuclear-freeze zones defined 
by the 1967 treaty of Tlatelolco, we have 



already demonstrated the kind of prog- 
ress that can be achieved in this vital 
area of arms control. 

Brazil can take great pride that it's a 
country with a long border touching 
more nations than any other in this 
hemisphere, and, yet, you remain at 
peace with your neighbors. This is a gift 
from a former generation of Brazilians, 
such as the Baron of Rio Branco who, 
with vision, hard work and a spirit of 
fairness and compromise, resolved dif- 
ficult problems. Together, we should 
strive to pass on that same gift to future 
generations in our hemisphere. 

But just as threatening as conven- 
tional armies or nuclear weapons are 
counterfeit revolutionaries who under- 
mine legitimate governments and 
destroy sources of economic progress; 
insurgents who are, at great expense, 
armed by the surrogate of a far away 
power — a power that espouses a 
philosophy alien to the Americas, whose 
goal is the destabilization of our govern- 
ments and our economies. This is ag- 
gression, pure and simple. 

When President Dwight Eisenhower 
visited the city in 1960, even before it 
was consecrated as your capital, he 
stressed the commitment of the United 
States to the charter of the Organization 
of American States and the mutual as- 
sistance treaty of Rio de Janeiro. Today, 
I reaffirm that commitment and that 
pledge. We stand firmly with the other 
responsible nations of the Americas in 
opposing those who, with violence and 
force of arms, try to undermine 
economic progress and political stability. 

The government among the Ameri- 
can states, of course, is as much moral 
as it is legal. A great Brazilian 
statesman, Joaquim Nabuco, understood 
this when, at the turn of the century, he 
noted: "Our alliance is ... a completely 
peaceful one, which shines outside of the 
American orbit only to let the rest of the 
world know that it can be called the 
hemisphere of peace." Those words 
reflect the goal of the United States, a 
hemisphere of peace. 

Tonight, I want to share with you a 
dream I have about the Americas. 



Joaquim Nabuco must have had a 
similar dream when he called for us to 
be a vanguard of civilization. It is a vi- 
sion of two great land masses rich in op- 
portunity and resources, populated by 
people from every part of the world, 
every race, and background; living 
together, trading together in peace and 
freedom; people who share a desire for 
liberty and a respect for the rights of 
others; a people who know that with in- 
genuity and enterprise no obstacle is too 
great; people who share a belief in those 
fundamental values of God, family, and 
justice that give meaning to our ex- 
istence. 

What is so remarkable is that this 
dream is within the grasp of this genera- 
tion. We have a hemisphere composed of 
600 million hardy souls. We have the 
resources and the know how. Just as im- 
portant, we have a wellspring of good- 
will between us that waits to be tapped. 
With faith, commitment, common sense, 
and strength of character, we can meet 
the challenges to our peace and pros- 
perity. No one should be disheartened by 
the dark night of problems that sur- 
round us. There is a beautiful sunrise 
coming and when it does, as Nabuco 
said, we can shine as an example to the 
rest of the world. We can and will be a 
hemisphere of peace, of prosperity, and 
of freedom. 

I was deeply moved not only by the 
unique gesture you made today in offer- 
ing a delightful lunch and meeting, but, 
also, the warmth and hospitality that 
you have shown to me and my Cabinet 
officers. President Figueiredo, all of 
you, it has been an honor to be with you 
this evening. Please accept on behalf of 
the American people our warmest 
wishes of friendship, admiration, and 
respect. 

And now, would you join me in a 
toast to President Figueiredo, to the 
people of Bogota— that is where I am 
going— to the people of Brazil, and to 
the dream of democracy and peace here 
in the Western Hemisphere. 



Janiiarw 1Qft'^ 



11 



President Reagan's 
Remarks to 
U.S. and Brazilian 
Leaders 



Sao Paulo 
Dec. 2, 1982' 

Governor [Jose Maria] Marin, obrigado. 
Thank you very much. I have looked for- 
ward to this day. It is an honor to speak 
to men and women of enterprise here in 
Sao Paulo. This city was built by in- 
novative and hard work in a spirit of 
confidence and hope. 

I bear heartfelt wishes of friendship 
from your neighbors to the North who, 
like you, are Americans, citizens of this 
new world. Like you, they yearn deeply 
for peace, share your love for democ- 
racy, and your commitment to build a 
future of progress and opportunity. On 
their behalf, to all of you, I say estamos 
como Brasil. E nao mudamos. We are 
with you Brazil. We will not waiver. 

We look to Brazil with the admira- 
tion and respect that is due a great na- 
tion. One of your renowned writers, 
Monteiro Lobato, lived in our country in 
the 1920s and 1930s. While there, he 
wrote a book called, "America," in which 
he said, "The Brazilian considers his 
country the marvel of marvels, but with 
one single defect, that is it not known 
well abroad." If he were writing today, 
he could still say Brazil is the marvel of 
marvels, but he would have to admit 
that your reputation has caught up with 
your achievements. 

We hear it said, in a world wracked 
by political tensions, recession, poverty, 
energy shocks, debt, high interest rates, 
and inflation, that there is little hope for 
a new era of lasting growth and pros- 
perity. I would never minimize the prob- 
lems we face, or the urgent need to deal 
effectively with them. I will talk about 
them in a moment. But you know I just 
have to say that I have been around for 
quite a few years now. I keep being 
reminded of that. I have lived through 
world wars and economic depression, 
and what has impressed me even more 
than those terrible crises is mankind's 
unending courage to bounce back, to 
struggle, to find new cures, and novel 




Arriving in Sao Paulo, President Reagan is greeted by Governor Jose Maria Marin at the 
Governor's Palace— Palacio dos Bendeirantes. 



solutions. To all those doom-criers — and 
they are worldwide — we have a 
message. The hope of the world lives 
here in the New World, where tomorrow 
is being built today by brave pioneers 
like yourselves, people who believe in 
each other and who will never lose their 
faith in the future. 

In that remarkable speech that 
President Figueiredo gave to the United 
Nations, he expressed his confidence in 
the world community's capacity for 
renewal. He said of Brazil, "we have 
made considerable efforts toward 
economic development, with promising 
results which fill with hope not only the 
people of Brazil, but also all peoples 
yearning to attain standards of living 
compatible with human dignity and 
modern development. I share his con- 
fidence. May I also share with you today 



a dream that I've long had? A dream of 
strengthening our relations with Brazil 
and with all our neighbors here in the 
Western Hemisphere. On this shrinking 
planet, the drive for renewal, economic 
progress, and the leadership for world 
peace must increasingly come from the 
New World. Here, we are blessed with 
great abundance: resources, technology, 
and, most important, the spirit of 
freedom — a spirit that harnesses our 
energies to pursue a greater good. 
There is, in the world today, a 
counterfeit revolution, a revolution of 
territorial conquest, a revolution of coer- 
cion and thought control, where states 
rule behind the barrel of a gun and erect 
barbwire walls, not to keep enemies out 
but to keep their own people in. The real 
revolution lives in principles that took 
root here in the New World. The first 



12 



Department of State Bulletii 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



principle says that mankind will not be 
ruled, in Thomas Jefferson's words, "by 
a favored few." The second is a pledge 
to every man, woman, and child: No 
matter what your background, no mat- 
ter how low your station in life, there 
must be no limit on your ability to reach 
for the stars, to go as far as your God- 
given talents will take you. 

Trust the people; believe every 
human being is capable of greatness, 
capable of self-government. This is the 
soul of our revolution, the soul of 
democracy and freedom. It's the New 
World's gift to the Old. Only when peo- 
ple are free to worship, create, and 
build, only when they are given a per- 
sonal stake in deciding their destiny, and 
benefiting from their own risks— only 
then do societies become dynamic, pros- 
perous, progressive, and free. 

In terms of geography, Brazil is of 
the South and the United States the 
North. But in terms of historical ties 
and fundamental values, we are nations 
of the West and the New World. And 
we are among the few nations which ex- 
ercise worldwide influence and respon- 
sibility. As Americans from the North or 
South, whether we are leaders in 
government or private industry, we 
must work harder to break down bar- 
riers to opportunity for our people. We 
must marshal every possible asset for 
growth. We must insist on sound 
economic policies at home and more 
open trading and financial systems 
around the world. 

The great republics of South and 
North America and the Caribbean have 
virtually unlimited potential for 
economic development and human fulfill- 
ment. We have a combined population of 
more than 600 million people. Our con- 
tinents and islands boast vast reservoirs 
of food and raw materials. The markets 
of the Americas have produced high 
standards of living. We offer hope to op- 
pressed and impoverished people. We 
are nations of immigrants. Our re- 
sources have made the New World a 
magnet for migration from all con- 
tinents. But it has been the vision, the 
enterprise, the skill, and the hard work 
of our people that has created our 
wealth and well-being. 

The developing countries of this 
hemisphere have achieved a record of 
soaring growth over the last genera- 



tion — growth in savings, investment 
work, and resources; growth from open 
world markets for trade and finance; 
growth from private initiative, risk, and 
reward— the cornerstone of both 
economic and political freedom. When 
we, in the States, look at Brazil we see 
the success of an economy that grew 
four-fold in 20 years, doubling per capita 
income; the promise of tomorrow in 
Brazil's youth— with one-half your 
population under 21, and becoming bet- 
ter educated every year; a confident 
response to the challenge of the 
1980s— diversifying your economy and 
exports with new markets and technolo- 
gies; leadership and vision in daring 
projects like Itaipu— which will be the 
largest hydroelectric dam in the world; 
and a strong energy substitution drive, 
including the alcohol fuel program which 
is to power more than half your 
automobiles by 1985. We, also, see 
Brazil's modern pioneers exploring a 
frontier as challenging as the Amazon: 
Space. Today, I would like to propose an 
idea to you— to have a Brazilian 
astronaut train with ours so that Brazil 
and the United States can one day par- 
ticipate in a shuttle launch together as 
partners in Space. [Applause.] 

Last night, I told President 
Figueiredo that the United States has 
confidence that Brazil will overcome its 
difficulties just as the United States will 
overcome its own. But we face serious 
problems. Your economy has been in 
recession, and so has ours. In the next 
decade, we must both provide millions of 
jobs for our people. By taking the 
necessary steps now, our countries can 
lead the world toward a new era of 
growth, but this time, growth without 
the albatross of runaway inflation and 
interest rates. 

Three things are essential for full 
world recovery and development. We 
must each move to correct our domestic, 
economic, and financial problems. We 
must protect the integrity of the world's 
trading and financial systems. And we 
must work together to help the interna- 
tional system evolve and better assure 
our mutual prosperity. 

First, the most important contribu- 
tion that any country can make is to get 
its own economic and financial house in 
order. Many countries, including our 
own, did not do so. Somewhere along 
the way, the leaders of the United 



States forgot how the American growth 
miracle was created. We substituted 
government spending for investment to 
spur productivity, a bulging bureaucracy 
for private innovation and job creation, 
transfers of wealth for the creation of 
wealth, rewards for risktaking and hard 
work, and government subsidies and 
over-regulation for discipline and com- 
petition from the magic of the market- 
place. 

For the United States, the way back 
has been hard. When my Administration 
took over, we faced record interest rates 
and inflation and the highest peacetime 
tax burden in our history. Our recovery 
program is designed to help us make a 
long overdue transition to an invest- 
ment-powered, noninflationary economy 
that will put the United States back on 
the cutting edge of growth. We have cut 
the growth of Federal spending by near- 
ly two-thirds, and soon we will have 
reduced personal income tax rates by 
25%— well more than that, total tax 
rates. We have cut the top rate of tax 
on interest and dividend income; in- 
troduced strong, new incentives for sav- 
ings; encouraged capital formation by 
permitting more rapid depreciation of 
plant and equipment; and aggressively 
pursued deregulation of markets in 
energy, transportation, and finance. 

Many of these reforms have been in 
place for barely a year. Much more re- 
mains to be done. You can't wipe away 
decades of sin with 1 year of penance. 
But confidence is returning to the 
United States. We believe recovery is in 
sight. Inflation and interest rates have 
been brought down dramatically. Real 
wages are increasing for the first time 
in 3 years. Productivity is up sharply. 
Venture capital in small business— the 
best source of job creation and techno- 
logical innovation— is near a record. The 
personal savings rate is at a 6-year high. 
Our equity markets have made an 
historic advance on recordbreaking 
volume. And our bedrock industry, hous- 
ing, has begun to rebound. We are also 
seeing signs of strength in auto sales. 

We believe the door is now opening 
to a lasting, broadbased economic expan- 
sion over the next several years. As the 
world's largest single market, a pros- 
perous, growing U.S. economy will mean 
increased trading opportunities for our 
friends in the developing world. Brazil is 



Janiiaru IQR.T 



13 



preparing to take advantage of these op- 
portunities. Your country has been mak- 
ing the difficult reforms needed to 
renew expansion. 

Second, all of us are trying to work 
our way free from this tenacious reces- 
sion. But we can always make a bad 
situation worse by damaging those 
powerful engines of growth — the world's 
trading and financial systems. 

Over the last 20 years, Brazil has ex- 
ported an expanding range of industrial 
and agricultural products, while develop- 
ing its own raw material resources. 
Your role in the international trading 
system is now indispensable. Your 
potential is enormous. There are some in 
the industrial world who view your suc- 
cess with apprehension. They fear being 
overwhelmed by your competition. They 
fear that one sector after another will be 
deindustrialized and redeployed to the 
developing world. Likewise, there are 
some in the developing world who at- 
tribute persistent poverty to industrial 
powers, whom they accuse of exploita- 
tion. 

I can't accept either argument. One 
need only look at the U.S. exports to the 
developing countries of this hemis- 
phere — which have increased six-fold in 
a decade, the same as imports — to see 
that new competition brings new oppor- 
tunities. With so many out of work — in 
my country, yours, and others — protec- 
tionism has become an ugly spectre 
stalking the world. One danger is protec- 
tion against imports, erecting barriers to 
shut out the competitive goods and serv- 
ices of others in one's own market. 
Another danger is protection of exports, 
using artificial supports to gain com- 
petitive advantage for one's own goods 
and services in the markets of others. 
The aim of these actions may be to pro- 
tect jobs, but the practical result, as we 
know from historical experience, is the 
destruction of jobs. Protectionism in- 
duces more protectionism and this leads 
only to economic contraction and, even- 
tually, dangerous instability. 

"Third, our crisis today is not be- 
tween North and South, but between 
universal aspirations for growth and the 
longest worldwide recession in postwar 
history. 

But let us also acknowledge another 
fundamental fact of economic life: This 
recession has had a particularly painful 



impact on developing countries. They 
have suffered declining demand in world 
markets and falling access to financial 
markets. This greatly complicates our 
collective recovery. So, if it is inevitable 
that borrowers must move to restrict 
their deficits, it's equally important that 
countries like Brazil that adopt effective 
stabilization plans be assured of con- 
tinued financing. Lenders and borrowers 
must remember that each has an enor- 
mous stake in the other's success. 

I concur with your President that we 
need solidarity and understanding. Last 
February I spoke before the OAS in 
Washington. I pledged that our Ad- 
ministration would seek a new relation- 
ship with the nations of the Caribbean, 
and Central and South America. I said 
that we would approach our neighbors 
not as someone with still another plan, 
but as a friend, pure and simple — one 
who seeks their ideas and suggestions 
on how we could become better neigh- 
bors. And this is what we've done in 
Brasilia. We discussed our problems, 
compared notes, and sought solutions. 
Let me repeat: We want to go forward 
with you to help the international 
system evolve in ways that better assure 
our mutual prosperity, and we will go 
forward. 

To handle the liquidity crisis, we 
have agreed that the IMF resources 
should be increased. We have also pro- 
posed a special borrowing arrangement 
to make sure that the IMF will have 
adequate funds to carry out its function. 
The leading developing nations should 
all enter the world trading system as full 
partners. Then they can share more fair- 
ly in the gains from trade and, at the 
same time, assure more fully the obliga- 
tions of the trading system. All we ask 
is that we examine together the mutual 
trading gains that can be achieved 
through reciprocal action. I have enor- 
mous confidence in the methods that 
have brought unprecedented benefits in 
the past. 

• We must improve the mechanisms 
for the settlement of trade disputes to 
take economic quarrels out of the 
political arena and base resolution of 
conflicts on criteria we all respect. 

• We must complete unfinished 
business — trade in agriculture which has 
resisted liberalization in the post-war 
years, and agreed rules on safeguards in 
the event of injury that provide for 
transparency and equity. 



• We must look forward to the 
emerging challenges of the 1980s, such 
as trade in high technology products and 
processes — processes; then, to devise 
rules will insure we do not impede the 
growth potential of the technological 
revolution. 

Finally, let us remember that just as 
progress is impossible without peace, 
economic growth is a crucial pillar of 
peace, beckoning with brighter horizons 
all who dream of a better life. 

To deter aggression the United 
States must and will remain militarily 
strong. When I met with His Holiness 
Pope John Paul II, I gave him the 
pledge of the American people to do 
everything possible for peace and arms 
reduction. For the sake of the children 
of the world, we're working to reduce 
the number and destructive potential of 
nuclear weapons. We're working to end 
the deadlock between Israel and her 
Arab neighbors, and we're working, as 
you are, to preserve the peace in this 
hemisphere. 

Wlien Pope John Paul visited here in 
1980, he said to young Brazilians, "Only 
love can build." From the moment we 
arrived in this land of spectacular beauty 
and unbounded energy, we have been 
touched by the special warmth of the 
Brazilian people. 

We've come to know the heart of 
Brazil. We will say goodby knowing her 
heart is strong; her heart is true; her 
heart is good. Brazil will build. You will 
grow. And by your side will be the 
United States — your partner in the New 
World, a partner for progress, a partner 
for peace. Estamos como Brasil. E nao 
ynudamos. 



President Reagan's 
Departure Statement 



I 



Brasilia 
Dec. 3, 19828 



I leave Brazil impressed and rein- 
vigorated. I have felt the warmth and 
energy of the Brazilian people and their 
dedication to peace and freedom. 
My meetings with President 
Figueiredo and his ministers were suc- 
cessful in spirit and substance. We con- 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



iucted serious discussions about the in- 
ternational systems of trade and finance 
ind the difficulties both our countries 
face in this period of slow economic 
growth around the world. We discussed 
the importance of trade and free 
markets to bring lasting growth. For my 
part, I've gained a deeper understanding 
of Brazil's perspectives. 

President Figueiredo and I resolved 
to find mutually acceptable solutions to 
those areas where we have differences, 
and to remain open to possibilities for 
new cooperation, especially in the areas 
of scientific and military industry. I 
leave confident that Brazil, like the 
United States, has the skill and deter- 
mination to work its way up to renewed 
growth and prosperity. When I arrived 
here I reminded President Figueiredo of 
the old saying, "Nothing stops Brazil," 
and now I know it's true. 

We considered the threats to peace 
in the hemisphere and in the world, the 
dangers of a nuclear arms race, the 
crisis in the Middle East, and prospects 
in southern Africa. I confirmed our in- 
tention to maintain a strong defense as 
the best assurance of peace for us and 
our friends. 

I made clear to President Figueiredo 
our desire to continue close consulta- 
tions with him. Of course, there are 
issues on which we have differences. But 
our mutual interest in cooperation is in- 
finitely stronger. I hope that my visit 
has helped— in the same way that Presi- 
dent Figueiredo's visit did— to improve 
an already warm relationship. 

On behalf of our entire delegation, I 
want to thank you and all the Brazilian 
people for the wonderful hospitality you 
showed us. Since I hope this meeting 
will not be our last, let us not say [in- 
audible] Adeus, but Ate Logo. We go 
with the spirit of your friendship tucked 
close to our hearts. 



Secretary Shultz's 
Press Briefing 



Enroute Colombia 
Dec. 3, 1982^ 

We are coming to Colombia because this 
is an important country to the United 
States and the interests of the United 
States. There are an underlying set of 
things that make that so. 

First, Colombia is a country with a 
democratic government and a tradition 
of democracy. This is a value that we 
share and that we think is of tremen- 
dous importance everywhere, but, par- 
ticularly, we are seeking to emphasize 
this point throughout our hemisphere. 

Second, we are concerned for peace 
in our hemisphere. Our hemisphere, over 
the decades, has been the most peaceful 
in the world, and we seek to keep it that 
way. We know that there is turmoil in 
Central America right now, which, with 
Colombia— surrounds the Caribbean 
Basin. And we are doing everything we 
can to support the democratic countries 
to help them in their ability to counter 
the threats to their stability. We believe 
that Colombia, as a Caribbean country, 
has a similar interest. Therefore, we 
want to discuss that interest. 

Third, we have a great interest in, 
and stake in the economic development 
of this area. Colombia is one of the 
donor countries, along with ourselves, in 
the Caribbean Basin initiative. We think 
that economic development is a key to 
stability. And it is a key, obviously, to a 
better life for peace in the region. That 
is what the Caribbean Basin initiative is 
all about. 

One of the aspects of the Caribbean 
Basin initiative involves trade. And, in 
fact, the approach of this initiative is 
one that has a certain amount of aid in- 
volved in it. There is, flowing to the 
Caribbean Basin, on the order of $1 
billion a year, all things taken together 
now in all forms of aid. But there is a 
certain element of that in it. But, even 
more, we are seeking to emphasize the 
importance of trade and investment in 
this whole process. 

I know that Colombia— as we are, 
as everybody is— we are all concerned 



about the importance of economic ex- 
pansion and about the threats to protec- 
tion of markets that accompany poor 
economic conditions. We have been 
fighting that battle, and I feel sure that 
we will hear a lot about the dangers of 
protectionism when we are here. We 
agree on that. We want to discuss that 
subject and what strategies we may 
mutually pursue toward it. 

These are things that represent 
values that we have in common that are, 
you might say, part of the reality why it 
is that, over a period of years, the rela- 
tionships between Colombia and the 
United States have been good ones. 

We also share a problem, on dif- 
ferent ends of it, that is very important 
to us and to Colombia, namely, the prob- 
lem of drugs— the flow, from Colombia 
to the United States, of a large amount 
of drugs. There are all sorts of elements 
to it. One can say they would not come 
to the United States if people in the 
United States didn't buy them; that is 
part of the problem. There is the— all of 
the things having to do with interdiction 
of this flow, and then, of course, there is 
the origination point. This is a problem 
that we have and which we will want to 
discuss along with the issues of 
democracy, peace, trade — both in the 
Caribbean area, generally, and with 
respect to Colombia. I might say we 
have a pretty healthy amount of trade 
between the United States and Colom- 
bia. 

Q. Are there— so Colombia and the 
United States have slightly different 
views about the nature of the violence 
in Central America? When Colombia 
signed on with the Costa Rican con- 
ference in October, some say that that 
was under the previous — 
that initiative was made by the 
previous president. This new presi- 
dent is less of a known quantity to the 
United States in that he may have 
some differences in views. Is that one 
of the things you want to explore? 

A. He may very well have some dif- 
ferent views, and it may very well be 
that as this visit unfolds it will have 
more rough spots in it than we would 
like. On the other hand, we have these 
points in common. We have problems to 



January 1983 



15 



talk about, and the way to deal with im- 
portant problems in an area that is of 
significance to you is to go there and 
talk about them. 

Q. (Inaudible)— I mean what— we 
have the feeling on this ride to Colom- 
bia that something has shaped up that 
is almost confrontational. Are we off 
base on that? 

A. I suppose that depends upon 
your definition of confrontational, but 
there may be some differences of view. 
That remains to be seen. At any rate the 
way in which we will approach it is to 
state our views and to discuss them and 
to lay the groundwork for a strong rela- 
tionship between our countries. 

Q. What is the main difference? I 
mean what has cropped up? Is it Cen- 
tral America and the turbulence or is 
it trade and protectionism? 

A. We are not there yet, and I am 
not sure just what there may be. 

Q. Are you worried that you are 
going to have a relatively hostile toast 
or a somewhat negative toast by the 
Colombian president? Have you gotten 
some indication? 

A. There are indications that we try 
to get from our Ambassador working 
there, and they are provided with think- 
ing that we have. We are trying to com- 
pose this visit, and have for some time, 
so that it will be a constructive one. I 
am saying that constructive does not 
necessarily mean that everything goes in 
apple-pie order, but, rather, that you 
bring to the surface whatever they are 
and grapple with them. I don't want to 
make a statement about what may be 
the most difficult issues for us to 
discuss. 

Q. What about the big demonstra- 
tions that are spreading there? What 
is the cause of those? 

A. I don't want to speculate on 
problems within their country. 

Q. [President] Betancur has said 
that the United States considers Latin 
America its backyard patio and that it 
does not have a real Latin American 
policy. There are all kinds of reports 
that it is feeling warmer toward Cuba 
than since it cut off relations and that 
it is feeling warmer toward Nicaragua 
and is thinking about joining the 



nonallied nations. Clearly, this shows 
a lot of differences in U.S. policies. 
How does the Administration feel 
about this? How are you going to try 
to rectify that? Do you want to bring 
Colombia back into the U.S. fold? 
What are your objectives on that? 

A. I don't think it is a question of 
the U.S. fold. It is a question of putting 
forward to them what their thoughts are 
about how our inter-American system 
can be improved. The inter- American 
system is something we all have a big 
stake in — of discussing these and other 
issues with them so that they under- 
stand our thinking; we understand 
theirs. 

Q. Will it be with the premise that 
it is moving closer to Cuba and 
Nicaragua and is against— contrary to 
our policy at the moment? 

A. I am not making any particular 
premises. They have made a number of 
statements of the kind that you have 
quoted, and they have moved in the 
direction of the nonaligned movement. 
Those are things that— some things we 
will have something to say about. 

Q. We will say something about 
that? 

A. We will discuss these issues with 
them. But, of course, they are a 
sovereign country as we are. They will 
decide for themselves, of course, what 
they want to do. We will be here to 
discuss all of these issues with them. 

Q. What about their policy in seek- 
ing amnesty for — or offering amnesty 
to at least one of the insurgent 
groups? Does the United States look 
with favor on that sort of thing, or do 
we feel that these insurgents are part 
of the overall pattern that you and the 
President have outlined in the past as 
plaguing Central America. 

A. As Ambassador [Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 
Thomas 0.] Enders brought out, they 
have been plagued with terrorism in Co- 
lombia for quite some time. Their effort 
to do something about it through the of- 
fer of amnesty seems like a constructive 
thing to do, and it is something they are 
managing. I wish them the best of suc- 
cess. If you look at the material in the 
San Jose conference report which Co- 
lombia signed, you see that the demo- 
cratic nations that went there called 



upon all of the countries of the region to 
seek pluralism, to try to bring dis- 
cordant elements in their society into 
the democratic process, in the legitimate 
governmental process, and this, it seems 
to me, you can take as an expression of 
that on the part of Colombia. 

Q. Do we have any sign that Presi- 
dent Bentancur is still on board on 
that conference? I mean, have they 
sent any signals suggesting that they 
now have some misgivings about join- 
ing it? t 

A. Not that I know of. 

j] 

Q. Explicit in this invitation, did 
we ask Colombia— did we invite 
ourselves, basically, or did we want to 
go to Colombia? It sounds like we're 
not so welcome. 

A. I think we're welcomed enough. 
We raised the question with the Colom- ' 
bian Government, and they responded. 
We had some difficulties with precisely 
what the arrangements should be — just 
working out the mechanics of it. But I 
don't think anything beyond that. 

Q. What are we going to do about 
drugs, specifically? Is there a great 
difference of opinion in trying to stop 
it. or do they object to us intruding in- 
to their own country's affairs? What 
are we asking them to do with drugs? 

A. There are various ways in trying 
to contend with the production of drugs, 
and some of them are more comprehen- 
sive than others. We'll want to talk 
about these and explore the attitude of 
the new government to them. I don't 
want to say, there's one, two, three, 
four, and five, and we're going to push 
for four. But, rather, to say there is a 
general subject here, and we'll want to 
explore it. 

Q. Is there any difference of view, 
do you think, in this area — 

A. This remains to be seen how 
much difference of view there is. 

Q. You don't know how they feel 
about this problem? 

A. We know that they share our 
concern about the whole drug scene, and 
it's a question of what means people are 
willing to use and how effective you 
evaluate those means to be. 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



Q. Don't drugs contribute substan- 
ally to their economy? 

A. Yes and no. That is, there is an 
i nount of money that is .paid for the 
■ugs, obviously, but that also helps to 
I ipport an element in the society that is 
'ten not very constructive, to put it 
ildly— just as the drug trade in the 
nited States has connected with it an 
ement in our society that we don't par- 
:ularly admire. 

Q. Are there any precooked 
jreements this time around? 

Q. Colombian astronaut? 
.aughter] 

A. No Colombian astronaut. 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

A. There will be a toast which 
—on both sides is, in a sense, a 
jbstantive statement, and there will be 
)me— 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

A. It isn't— the toasts are not just 
lice to have you, and I'm glad to be 
ere," but, rather, an effort to say 
jmething substantive. At least, I know 
■e've been working on the President's 
last, and he has to state things that he 
links are important here. I assume that 
ley will do the same. 

Q. Will you be making any specific 
roposals to them in any of these 
reas you've outlined? 

A. There is ongoing discussion in 
hose areas, and I don't think there's 
nything that is in the nature of a 
recooked deal or a statement of some 
ind that — 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

A. No. 

Q. Is the Saudi Foreign Minister 
neeting with the Soviets today or 
ibout to? 

A. The Saudi Foreign Minister is a 
iiember of the Arab League delegation 
hat is being led by King Hussein, and 
hey decided at the Fez summit that 
hey would have a delegation visit each 
;ountry which is a permanent member 
3f the U.N. Security Council. That's 
what they're doing. They have a delega- 
tion that's going around visiting at 
the— they think of it as they did when 
they came to the United States. They 
think of it as an Arab League delegation 
as distinct from this country or that 
country. 



January 1983 



Q. Are they meeting with [General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union Yuriy] Andropov, or 
are they meeting with the Soviet 
leaders? Is that correct? 

A. Just who they meet with and 
what that schedule is, I don't have right 
in my hand, but we can find out about 
that. 

Q. Do you find it disturbing that 
the Saudis and the people in the Mid- 
dle East who have been anti-Soviet 
are now meeting with them? Does that 
bother us at all? 

A. The Arab League group, which 
includes countries that have had close 
relationships with the Soviet 
Union — such as Syria— all came 
together and formed a common agree- 
ment. They feel— I think it's fair to say 
they feel quite good about the fact that 
they did have an agreement to which 
they all subscribed. They wanted to talk 
about this agreement and what their 
ideas are to a representative group of 
some countries. I suppose the countries 
that were close to the Soviet Union 
thought that the group ought to go 
there just as those who had other ideas 
thought they should come to other coun- 
tries. And the U.N. Security Council 
permanent member, I think, probably 
have a pretty clever way of getting at 
that. 

Q. [Inaudible] that meeting, give 
us a fast capsule about what the 
meeting tonight will be on the 
Salvador— with the Salvadorans? 

A. Why don't we try to do that on 
the leg between Colombia and El 
Salvador? We'll get back to you on that. 

Q. Some of us have to write early 
stories. Can you give us one line about 
what he's going to say. For instance, I 
had heard from the El Salvador Am- 
bassador to the United States that [El 
Salvador's President Alvaro] Magana 



is expecting an admonition on human 
rights. Will that happen? 

A. Why don't we do that on the next 
flight? 

Q. It's just so late at that hour for 
monitoring newspapers. 

A. On the subject of human rights, 
which is obviously an important one, we 
have the general policy that we talk 
about it, care about it, work on the sub- 
ject. We believe that it is more effective 
to do that privately and directly to the 
extent possible. 

That means that, if I talk about it to 
you, we are not doing it that way. We 
have a number of subjects to talk about. 
They run across the board of the capaci- 
ty of the government and our encour- 
agement of it to provide secure and 
stable conditions in the country; contain 
the insurgency; our joint interest, 
economic development, which depends 
upon getting stability; our interest in the 
maintenance of their democratic regime; 
and the relationship of democracy to the 
way people are treated; and, too, what 
are generally called human rights con- 
cerns. We will talk across the board 
about these things, but I do not want to 
spotlight any particular matter. 

Q. I understand why in the 
diplomatic world it would be better to 
do these things privately. But, still, 
you need some support domestically in 
the United States to continue getting 
Congress to give aid. Would it not be 
good from the Administration's point 
of view to have the United States 
know that the President is going to 
try to prod him on the issue a bit? 

A. We will come to the Congress 
with a report as part of the process of 
the Congress' continuing to go along 
with the support for El Salvador and 
other countries. There will be a formal 
report, and it will take up the question 
of human rights. There will be, as has 
been the case in past reports, 
statements about all of the difficult sub- 
jects that come up. They will be done as 
carefully as we can possibly do them and 
as accurately as we can. I think the time 
for us to comment is when we make that 
report. 



17 



COLOMBIA 



President Reagan's 
Luncheon Toast 

Bogota 

Dec. 3, 1982^" 



Reverend Clergy, President Betancur, 
I'm happy to be in Santa Fe de 
Bogota — the Athens of America. I ap- 
preciate this opportunity to reaffirm the 
close and longstanding ties between our 
peoples. 

Since 1824, when a U.S. Represent- 
ative, Richard Anderson, became the 
first foreign diplomat to be formally ac- 
credited here after independence, my 
country has followed with admiration 
the development of your constitutional 
tradition. 

Colombia's great independence 
leader, General Francisco de Paula San- 
tander, is celebrated today not so much 
for being the great warrior he was, but 
as the "Man of Laws." He declared, "If 
the sword gave us independence, the law 
will give us liberty." You are a man of 
law and liberty. Your first statement as 
President-elect of your country carried 
on the profound tradition of law and 
liberty in Colombia. "I aspire," you said, 
"to a happy and open democracy in 
which citizens who wish to be represent- 
ative must win that right in a frank con- 
test with the broad participation of the 
new generations, a contest in which 
merit, quality of service, and proven 
honesty will be the best attributes for 
receiving popular support." 

We all know that the democratic 
path is never easy. But it's a path 
toward which the peoples of this 
hemisphere are increasingly turning. 
Democracies are better able to reconcile 
their internal differences without 
violence. They're also neighbors in whom 
we can have confidence. 

As I said in my very encouraging 
visit to Brazil, I did not come to visit 
with any preconceived plan that we 
wished to impose. I came here to listen 
and to learn — to ask how we could be of 
greater help in promoting peace and 
progress in the Americas. It has long 



18 



been my dream that the more than 600 
million people of the Americas could 
represent an enormous force for good in 
the world. Just think how much we 
could achieve if there were accord be- 
tween us. In that spirit, let me say how 
much I appreciate your frankness here 
today. I know you were speaking from 
the heart. And I can assure you that we 
were listening closely. 

One of the great traditions of 
democratic nations, as you know so well, 
is that leaders can speak candidly to one 
another and accept the other's thoughts 
in the constructive spirit in which 
they're offered. You have spoken frank- 
ly. Now, let me do the same. Ours is a 
region in which powerful bonds unite 



countries and people. It is also a region 
in which primarily, perhaps because we 
expect so much from each other, power- 
ful misunderstandings can arise. When 
people — above all, these people who 
exercise responsibility and must make 
decisions — do not know each other, 
potential for misunderstanding is par- 
ticularly great. That's why I'm here, 
coming as a friend and neighbor, asking 
what are our problems and differences 
and how can they be overcome. 

Our neighbors in Central America 
are in turmoil. They are threatened by a 
devastating economic crisis and by local 
insurgencies supported by outside coun- 
tries which do not wish to see the 
republics of America succeed. The ques- 



President Reagan's Statement to the People of Colombia^ 

November 26, 1982 



At President [Belisario] Betancur's kind invitation, I will soon be visiting your na- 
tion. I am looking forward to this visit very much. There is much I hope to learn 
and see in your beautiful country. 

Our two countries have a great deal in common. We share a similar history, a 
similar form of government, and similar aspirations. We agree on many values and 
objectives. Both of our nations seek peace in the hemisphere, peace in the world, thi 
growth of our economies, and the well-being of our people. We also share some 
problems such as the impact of illicit narcotics on our societies. 

We do not agree on every issue, but this is natural. Diversity is one of the great 
strengths of democratic societies. Democracy only requires that we work together ti 
understand each other, that we listen to each other, and that we address our dif- 
ferences seriously with mutual respect. I promise to do that. 

The peace of the hemisphere and the strengths of the intra- American system ar 
key issues for both of us. The United States is firmly committed to peace and securi 
ty in your region. I take this commitment very seriously. When the peace of a 
democratic state is threatened, we are concerned. When that country is a close 
neighbor, we are doubly concerned. 

Security can be threatened by military actions. But security is also threatened 
by economic distress. The Caribbean Basin initiatives will address the underljring 
economic and social problems that are retarding the development of the Caribbean 
Basin states. We, in the United States, warmly welcome Colombia's decision to par- 
ticipate in this initiative, and we greatly value your desire to contribute to the 
economic development and the strengthening of democratic values in the region. 

We are impressed by your nation's success in maintaining a vigorous economy, 
even in a period of global recession. North Americans share your dedication to hard 
work, competition, and the creation of new wealth. 

We, in the United States, respect and admire Colombia's strong commitment to 
democracy. Equally important, we respect Colombia's firm commitment to the rule 
of law as the guiding principle of international relations. 

Our two countries, working together, can achieve a great deal for our 
hemisphere. This is what brings me to Colombia. I look forward to meeting many of 
you personally and seeing your beautiful country. I bring with me the best wishes of 
my own people to you, our neighbors to the south. 



Broadcast on Colombian television (text from White House press release of Nov. 29, 1982. 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



1 ,. 



tion is how can we help? I look forward 
to hearing your views this afternoon. 
But don't we already have a good begin- 
ning in the conclusions democratic states 
of the region reached in San Jose last 
October 4th? They called for all the 
states of Central America, on a basis of 
reciprocity and verification, to renounce 
the importation of heavy offensive 
weapons that could be used to attack a 
neighbor; to cause the withdrawal of 
all— and I repeat, all— foreign military 
advisers; to end support for terrorists 
and subversion against neighbors; to 
begin internal reconciliation enabling 
dissidents to participate again in public 
life within established institutions; to 
create democratic institutions and hold 
open public elections to decide who 
should exercise power. Of these, the last 
is the most significant. For we all know 
that democracies are far less likely than 
other regimes to abuse their own people 
and to make war on their neighbors. 

What can we do to overcome the 
economic crisis in the Caribbean regime? 
Our nations are partners in the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative, a bold attempt to 
address the underlying economic and 
social needs of our neighbors. It made a 
great impression in the United States 
when your country announced that it 
would join with Canada, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and the United States in this 
enterprise. It reassured us to see Colom- 
bia, long a pillar of the Andean com- 
munity, extend its hand to Central 
America and the Caribbean. Through 
hard work, sound financial management, 
and a commitment to an open and com- 
petitive economy, Colombia is an exam- 
ple for others. 

The United States has already in- 
creased its assistance to the Caribbean 
area, bringing it to nearly $1 billion per 
year. But we must provide these small 
and promising countries an opportunity 
to earn their own way. That is the pur- 
pose of the one-way free trade proposal 
that I have made. This proposal is now 
under active consideration by our Con- 
gress, and I hope for early action. 

In cooperating to help others, we 
should be careful not to neglect coopera- 
tion to benefit our own societies. Could 
we not do more to mobilize resources 
and encourage efforts by public-private 
institutions, universities, institutes. 




President Belisario Betancur Cuartos greets President Reagan at Bogota's Eldorado 
Airport. 



voluntary agencies, and businesses to in- 
crease their cooperation for develop- 
ment? Many scientific, educational, and 
other institutions in the United States 
and in Colombia have had close working 
relationships in the past. We must 
strengthen and renew such ties and pro- 
mote new links to accelerate the pace 
and quality of research and development 
on the most pressing problems in this 
hemisphere. 

The recession that we suffer from is 
global. It affects the advanced countries. 
Millions are out of work in my coun- 
try — even greater numbers in Europe. 
But it is true that the recession has af- 
fected the developing countries most of 
all — not so much Colombia, which is for- 
tunate to continue to grow— but your 



January 1983 



neighbors. None of us can find our way 
back to prosperity without self-discipline 
at home. The example of Colombia 
shows how prosperity can be achieved 
by domestic savings and investment. 

But prosperity will escape us if we 
permit those great engines of 
growth — world trade and world 
finance — to be impaired. And here 
again, we must act to make sure that 
the IMF has the funds necessary to 
finance needed stabilization programs. 
Early agreement must, and I am confi- 
dent will, be reached on substantially ex- 
panded quotas. 

The United States has also proposed 
that special arrangements to borrow be 
made to enable the fund to be sure to 
fulfill its mission. The individual coun- 
tries that can do so should provide 



19 



bridging financing tx) countries needing 
time to work out effective stabilization 
prog^rams. And private lenders must not 
withhold new funds from countries that 
do so. For lenders and borrowers each 
have a great stake in each other's suc- 
cess. 

For the longer term, we must pro- 
ceed with the replenishment of the 
lADB. We believe that an agreement is 
reachable on a replenishment that will 
permit continued high growth in the 
bank's activities. Equally important is to 
prevent an upsurge in protectionism in 
all our countries. We can only do this if 
we all do it together. That was the 
meaning of the GATT meeting in 
Geneva. 

With unemployment in all our coun- 
tries, the temptation is to use restric- 
tions for export incentives to protect 
jobs.' Experience shows that way is self- 
defeating and will lead only to less trade 
and less jobs. I am pledged to do all in 
my power to prevent arbitrary restric- 
tions of trade. 

Colombia has long been a powerful 
supporter of the inter- American system. 
With few exceptions, the system has 
kept the peace. As new nations of the 
Caribbean join the system and as other 
American countries like Colombia grow 
in economic weight and worldwide in- 
fluence, our institutions will be infused 
with new life. Our own relations with 
each other reflect the maturity of our 
partnership. We do not agree on every 
issue, not even on the remedies of some 
of the problems we share. But we've 
established a dialogue based on mututal 
respect, our shared religious heritage, 
and our common legacy. 

In the trade field we have vastly ex- 
panded to our mutual benefit the goods 
and services we exchange. Earlier, you 
had a trade surplus. Now, with the price 
of coffee low, we do. We both have 
legislation governing trade that we each 
are bound to respect. Within that 
framework, though, there is much we 
can do to assure mutual accommodation 
without imposing protectionist devices. I 
will work with you to find those oppor- 
tunities. 

Our cooperation in the area of nar- 
cotics control certainly reflects the same 
spirit. We recognize that the use and 
production of illegal drugs is a threat to 



the social fabric of both countries. Prog- 
ress that either of us makes will assist 
the other. 

Colombia and the United States 
worked together to establish the fun- 
damental principles of this hemisphere. I 
am here today to further the spirit of 
cooperation begun by President 
Roosevelt in 1934, and continued by 
President Kennedy in 1961. I come con- 
vinced that our cooperation for freedom 
and development is more vital than ever 
to progress and security in the 
Hemisphere. 

You and I know what can be ac- 
complished with the will to keep going 
until the job is done. We both come from 
working families, poorer than most in 



material things, but rich in spirit and op-|l 
timism. Those values taught us when we 
were young — God, family, and hard 
work — and this did well by us as in- 
dividuals. And they will do well by our I 
two countries. It is my deep conviction 
that the tide of history is with the ' 

Americas — and especially with coun- 
tries, such as ours — which believe in the , 
dignity of man and the freedom of the j 
individual. 

I propose a toast to you and to the 
people of Colombia. May the values that ' 
bind us, the friendships and dreams we 
share, be preserved by us, the people of , 
the New World, as an eternal, sacred | 
trust. [Applause] j 



President Reagan's Statement to the People of Costa Rica, 

December 3, 1982 

I am happy to accept President Monge's invitation to see Costa Rica. I know your 
country has long been a model for peace, democracy, and economic progress in the 
Western Hemisphere. 

Last month. President Monge spoke at the Conference on Free Elections in 
Washington about democracy. He made all of us who are committed to freedom 
very proud. Democracy, he said, has no universal formulas, like those of totalitarian 
philosophies. Its strength is that it allows free people to find their own solutions. As 
free people, we are not compelled to accept the one candidate offered to us by a 
small group claiming exclusive knowledge of the destiny for an entire nation. We, 
the voters — free citizens — make this decision. 

Today, the countries of Central America face enormous challenges: economic 
recession, social injustice, and the cynical efforts of outside powers to impose 
nondemocratic systems of government on them. But I am confident we have the will 
and the ability to overcome these challenges. 

The most promising formula for peace and security for the nations of Central 
America was proposed at the meeting of democratic nations in San Jose in early Oc- 
tober. It offers terms for a peace that can be verified without fear of violation. It 
stresses the importance to peace of democratic institutions. I am convinced, as I 
believe most of you are, that democracies find it easier to live in peace with each 
other. 

In facing the economic challenges, the countries of this hemisphere have begun a 
cooperative effort to address the pressing needs of the Caribbean Basin. Part of the 
United States' contribution to this effort — $350 million in emergency economic 
assistance — is already in place. I am asking the Congress to give priority considera- 
tion to the other main features of our program — open access to our markets for the 
products of the Caribbean and Central America, and incentives for American invest- 
ment in the region. I believe we all have a crucial stake in this venture. Democracy, 
and even our independence as free nations, are vulnerable to economic recession. By 
cooperating together, we can offer real hope for sustained growth to our peoples. 

I have met with President Monge twice. From these meetings I know we share 
the conviction that it's through freedom and democracy that economic progress and 
social justice have their best chance to work. I look forward to visiting San Jose and 
to having the opportunity for further discussions with your President. 



Text from White House press release. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



COSTA RICA 



U.S.-El Salvador 
Joint Communique 



San Jose 
Dec. 3, 1982" 

On December 3, 1982 in the City of San Jose, 
Costa Rica, the Presidents of El Salvador, 
Dr. Alvaro Magana, and of the United States 
of America, Mr. Ronald Reagan, met and had 
a cordial exchange of views about subjects of 
mutual interest. 

President Reagan praised the bravery of 
the Salvadoran people and their belief in 
democratic ideals as manifested in the recent 
elections and in the Salvadoran decision to 
hold Presidential elections no later than 
March 1984. He expressed appreciation for 
efforts of the Salvadoran Government to 
reduce the number of deaths caused by 
violence, despite the opposition of an- 
tidemocratic forces. He also indicated his 
satisfaction with the continuation of the land 
reform program. 

The Salvadoran leader pointed out the 
desire of his government for peaceful 
development and full observation of human 
rights. He noted the creation of the Commis- 
sion on Human Rights and the formation of a 
peace commission charged with proposing a 
practical plan for the participation of all 
citizens and political movements in the 
democratic process. 

President Magana suggested that as im- 
portant as the efforts that each country 
makes internally to correct its structural 
economic problems is an international 
economic situation which encourages full 
development of that country's human and 
natural resources. In this regard, he praised 
the U.S. Caribbean Basin initiative and ex- 
pressed the hope that the trade and invest- 
ment provisions would be approved quickly 
by the U.S. Congress. 

President Reagan referred to the interest 
of the American people and government in 
cooperating with the Salvadoran Government 
in its internal efforts. He stressed his concern 
about the prosecution of those implicated in 
the murder of American citizens in El 
Salvador and asked for unstinting efforts to 
prosecute those responsible for the deaths 
of the American churchwomen and the 
AFL-CIO consultants and the disappearance 
of other American citizens. 

Both leaders also examined the situation 
in Central America and expressed concern 
for the increase of tensions in the area. They 




Having been greeted by President Alberto 
Luis Monge at San Jose's Juan Santamaria 
International Airport. President Reagan 
proceeds to Hotel Cariani where he holds a 
bilateral meeting with El Salvador's Presi- 
dent Alvaro Magana. After the meeting, 
they issue a joint communique. 



rejected the use of force in the resolution of 
bilateral conflicts, interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries, and the violent im- 
position of alien ideologies and systems re- 
jected by democratic societies. President 
Magana emphasized the need for all countries 
to reject the principle of self-determination as 
exercised by the Salvadoran people in the 
elections of March 28. He noted that this 
principle is fundamental to the peaceful co- 
existence of peoples. Both leaders reaffirmed 
their commitment to the principles of the 
final act of the October 4 San Jose con- 
ference of democratic nations — principles 
which, in their opinion, represent the best 
hope for peace in Central America. 

The two leaders agreed to maintain direct 
contact in order to further high levels of 
bilateral cooperation. 

Given in San Jose, Costa Rica, December 
3, 1982. 



President Reagan's 
Remarks 



San Jose 
Dec. 4, 1982>2 

Mr. President, and you ladies and 
gentlemen, I thank you for your 
gracious welcome. From the school 
children who greeted me at the airport 
last night to you distinguished leaders 
gathered in this beautiful hall, the peo- 
ple of Costa Rica have extended to our 
party openhearted and generous hos- 
pitality. I know you're world-famous for 
this, but I feel so very much at home 
here. I hope that ours is a special bond. 

I'm especially grateful for the oppor- 
tunity to renew the personal dialogue 
with President [President Luis Alberto] 
Monge, a distinguished statesman com- 
mitted to the democratic ideals I share. 
Americans and Costa Ricans — we are all 
of the New World. Our people live the 
peaceful revolution of democracy — 
secure under the rule of law and pros- 
pering through economic freedom. But 
there are outsiders who would exploit 
otir rich, new world by undermming the 
democratic systems that make us free. 

We, of this hemisphere, must stand 
together so that we can continue to im- 
prove the quality of life for our people. 
We must be strong enough, our people 
prosperous enough, and our democracy 
stable enough to remain independent, at 
peace, and free. 

There are many who speak of 
democracy and pluralism and of their 
respect for the rule of law. But as a 
Costa Rican President of the last cen- 
tury, Jose Joaquin Rodriquez said, "I am 
not impressed by hearing proclamations 
of great principles. What I admire is the 
men who know how to put them into 
practice." 

Costa Rica is a proud example of a 
free people practicing the principles of 
democracy. And you have done so in 
good times and in bad, when it was 
easier and when it required great 
courage. Your commitment to freedom 
was evident last February when, as 
every 4 years, you elected a new govern- 
ment. In October, you led the region's 
democracies toward recognition of prin- 
ciples for a lasting, humane peace in 
Central America. And just last month, 



January 1983 



21 



President Monge spoke eloquently in 
Washington about democracy and of the 
commitment of all democratic nations of 
the region to an elections institute, an 
advisory body to assist other countries 
in developing the practice of democracy 
and which will be a specialized branch of 
the Inter-American Institute of Human 
Rights in San Jose. 

Costa Rica's foundation of democ- 
racy and law, as President Monge said 
in Washington, is your guarantee of 
peace. He put it this way: "Violence, war 
and guerrillas lose their support when 
the people enjoy free elections and when 
their vote is respected." James Fenimore 
Cooper, an American writer of our fron- 
tier, said much the same when he sug- 
gested that "the man who can right 
himself by a vote will seldom resort to a 
musket." 

President Monge and I have met 
three times this year, and I've learned 
from him and from the record of this 
country the depth of Costa Rica's dedica- 
tion to the founding principles of 
Western civilization. And I've learned of 
the significant progress toward 
democracy elsewhere in Central 
America. Today, Central America faces 
renewed challenges to its self- 
determination as agents of unrest seek 
to impose new forms of the imperialism 
and tyranny that we threw off so many 
years ago. These counterfeit revolutions 
also threaten the prosperity that is the 
legacy of peace in this beautiful land. 
The future challenges our imagination, 
but the roots and law and democracy 
and our inter-American system provide 
the answers we seek. 

In your efforts to bring new oppor- 
tunity, stability, and peace to the region, 
the Costa Rican people can be very sure 
you will have the steadfast support of 
the people of the United States. The 
only real root to peace, to lasting peace, 
is the well-chartered course of Costa 
Rica— commitment to democracy, rejec- 
tion of extremism and the force of arms, 
and respect for human rights and the 
rule of law. It also includes reliance on 
international law such as the Rio treaty, 
essential to your national defense and 
fundamental to our common security. 

Our new bilateral extradition treaty 
is indicative of our joint commitment to 
the rule of law. What we strive for is a 
hemisphere where the future is deter- 
mined not by bullets but by ballots, a 



22 




Presidents Reagan and Monge shake hands following the signing of the U.S.-Costa Rican 
Extradition Treaty at the National Theater. 



hemisphere of countries at peace with 
themselves and one another and at 
peace with the world. The peace we've 
known has been a precious asset for the 
Americas. 

Instead of allocating a great share of 
their resources on military spending, the 
developing countries of this hemisphere 
have invested in the future. This has 
been no accident. From the Pan 
American Union to the treaty of Rio de 
Janeiro and the Organization of 
American States, this hemisphere has 
been on the forefront of multilateral, in- 
ternational cooperation. No region of the 
world can match our record. These are 



not mere words. We have and will con- 
tinue to practice what we proclaim. The 
United States will continue to support 
the new democratic institutions in Hon- 
duras and the developing democratic 
processes of El Salvador. Any nation 
destabilizing its neighbors by protecting 
guerrillas and exporting violence should 
forfeit close and fruitful relations with 
the people of the United States of Amer- 
ica and with any people who truly love 
peace and freedom. 

The October 4 meeting of 
democratic nations here in San Jose 
showed us anew the way toward peace 
and stability. We applaud the Costa 
Rican Government for that initiative and 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



for its continued leadership in this 
reponal democratic effort. We join you 
willingly. Democratic states have a 
unique role in the moral history of the 
world because our governments are ac- 
countable to the governed and are less 
likely to abuse their own citizens or to 
attack their neighbors. 

The principles of the San Jose final 
Act provide a reciprocal, just, and 
verifiable basis for peace. I call on all 
states in this region to join in this proc- 
ess of genuine, peaceful reconciliation. 
In that same spirit, we must also work 
together to solve the serious economic 
problems jeopardizing social, political 
progress. 

Central America recorded impres- 
sive economic growth in the 1960s and 
during much of the 1970s. This was par- 
ticularly true in Costa Rica where hard 
work and neighborly cooperation in the 
Central American common market paid 
major dividends. Now those gains are 
threatened here in Costa Rica and, in- 
deed, throughout the hemisphere. In 
order to overcome recession, we must 
lay the foundations in each of our na- 
tional economies for noninflationary, 
sustained growth. To do this we will 
need the kind of commitment and deter- 
mination Costa Rica is showing. Self- 
discipline is necessary, too. So, too, is 
mutual accommodation. Borrowers must 
move to restrict their deficits, but it is 
just as important that lenders not 
withhold new funds from countries 
which adopt effective stabilization plans. 
Lenders and borrowers must remember 
that each has an enormous stake in the 
other's success. 

Similarly, the integrity of the world 
trading system must be preserved, so it 
can serve once again as the great engine 
of growth. Closed markets must be care- 
fully opened. Open markets must be 
shielded from protectionism. Our chal- 
lenge is to make our trading and finan- 
cial relationships remain a source of 
prosperity and strength and not become 
a source of discord and disagreement. 
The debt problems facing many nations 
today are imposing, and we must act 
together to insure that we have the tools 
to deal with them. The resources of the 
IMF are one of the most important of 
these tools. To assure the adequacy of 
the IMF resources, the United States 
has proposed that in addition to an in- 
crease in the IMF quotas there should 



also be a special borrowing arrangement 
to meet the demands that may be placed 
on the IMF where countries need 
assistance as they seek IMF funding. 
Those able to do so must act to provide 
bridging funds. 

With regard to the Caribbean area, 
the U.S. Congress already has approved 
the first stage of our strengthened com- 
mitment to economic recovery, a supple- 
ment to our vigorous economic 
assistance effort in the Caribbean Basin, 
bringing to nearly $1 billion the total aid 
for fiscal year 1982. Our request to the 
Congress for future aid to the region 
will also reflect this new high priority. 
But the other elements of the program 
are even more crucial. Investment incen- 
tives and duty-free access for most of 
your products will encourage increased 
production and stimulate more jobs. 

This Caribbean initiative is not a 
charity program. We will grow and pros- 
per together to the direct benefit of the 
workers and enterprises in both of our 
countries. As I speak here, our Congress 
has reconvened in Washington, and the 
trade and investment portions of the ini- 
tiative are high on their agenda. From 
the heart of Costa Rica's remarkable 
democracy, I appeal directly to the 
legislative leaders of my country to act 
quickly and responsibly on this most im- 
portant legislation. Together, we can at- 
tack the social and economic injustices 
which lead to dissatisfaction and support 
for radical solutions. And, just as Colom- 
bia has already joined the original 
Nassau four, I call on other developed 
countries — all of them — to contribute to 
our efforts. 

Earlier this year in Washington, 
there was an exhibit of pre-Columbian 
art from Costa Rica. The title of the 
show was, "Between Continents — Be- 
tween Seas." This was fitting. But Costa 
Rica and Central America, as a whole, 
are now caught between something 
else — a struggle of ideas between the 
violence of false revolutionaries and the 
reaction of false conservatives. You will 
always be between continents and seas. 
But to live peacefully and democratically 
will require the continued courage and 
commitment of all the Americas. 



I am confident that, together, we 
will achieve in practice the goals that we 
have together proclaimed — a Central 
America where not just some, but all 
countries are democracies — where in- 
stitutions are based on free and regular 
elections in an atmosphere of political 
reconciliation within each state; a Cen- 
tral America returned to the path of 
substantial economic and social develop- 
ment; a Central America at peace with 
itself and the world; a halt to foreign 
support for terrorist and subversive 
elements working toward the violent 
overthrow of other governments; an end 
to arms trafficking, the importation of 
heavy weapons, and the buildup of 
armaments and forces beyond that re- 
quired for legitimate defense — and 
under fully verifiable and reciprocal con- 
ditions, the withdrawal of all — I repeat, 
all — foreign military and security ad- 
visers and troops from Central America. 
In sum, a Central America that lives by 
the principle of nonintervention, where 
disputes are settled peacefully, and 
where respect for human rights and the 
fundamental freedoms of speech, 
assembly, and religion are as alive and 
well as they are in the Republic of Costa 
Rica. 

My government will give you and 
your neighbors the full support of the 
United States. Our commitment to the 
Rio treaty and to the principle of collec- 
tive security will remain a basic tenet of 
our policy. Together, we will work 
toward the economic growth and oppor- 
tunity that can only be achieved by free 
men and women. We will promote the 
democracy that is the foundation of our 
freedom and stand together to assure 
the security of our peoples, their govern- 
ments, and our way of life. In this way, 
the land between the continents and be- 
tween the seas will achieve the vision of 
another President of Costa Rica. Juan 
Mora dreamed that this land be "content 
in peace . . . and its children cut one 
more ear of corn each day, and cry one 
tear less." 

Thank you very much and Dios les 
bendiga and Dios bendiga a Costa Rica. 
[Applause] God bless you, and God bless 
Costa Rica. 



January 1983 



23 



President Reagan's 
Radio Address 
to the Nation 



San Jose 
Dec. 4, 198213 

I am speaking to you today from San 
Jose, Costa Rica. Later this evening, I 
will return to Washington having visited 
with six neighboring heads of state. Our 
delegation has seen, firsthand, the vitali- 
ty and potential of our New World 
neighbors. We have also heard and 
discussed their needs and aspirations 
and how they affect our own vital na- 
tional interests. 

U.S. interests require that we sup- 
port our fellow Americans with a 
hemispheric policy which: 

• Preserves and promotes 
democratic institutions; 

• Advances and encourages free 
market economies; and 

• Provides the security essential for 
these systems to develop and flourish. 

In our discussions during these last 
4 days, I pledge our continued commit- 
ment to work as friends and neighbors 
with the other nations of this Western 
Hemisphere. We will stand firmly with 
them to achieve the promise of economic 
progress and political stability that is the 
legacy of peace in the Americas. 

Through cooperation, together we 
can protect ourselves from counterfeit 
revolutionaries who seek to destroy 
growth and impose totalitarianism on 
people who love freedom. Let us 
remember something very important: If 
our neighbors, particularly our nearest 
neighbors in the Caribbean Basin, are in 
trouble — then their troubles inevitably 
become ours, unless we work together 
to solve them. 

Right now, their difficulties are not 
entirely of their own making. World 
prices for their traditional products — 
sugar, bananas, bauxite, and coffee — 
have been declining sharply for several 
years. At the same time, the prices for 
their essential imports, particularly 
petrolemn, have remained high. This 
worldwide recession, the longest and 
most severe in postwar history, has hit 



their economies with all the fury of the 
tropical storms they are exposed to each 
year. 

We cannot afford to ignore these 
difficulties. Our ties with the countries 
of the Caribbean Basin are very close. 
One-half of our trade passes through 
this area. Prolonged social and economic 
disruption would cause an exodus of 
desperate people seeking refuge where 
so many others have already found 
it — in the United States. The interests 
of Caribbean Basin countries are our in- 
terests; their security is our security. 

The difficulties in the Caribbean 
Basin may seem overwhelming, but just 
as tropical storms give way to sunshine 
and calmer seas, economic despair will 
give way to optimism if people have the 
prospect to build a better life in 
freedom. Our support for democratic in- 
stitutions is already helping. U.S. 
assistance to help these countries defend 
themselves from outside-supported sub- 
version is likewise showing signs of 
progress. Our Caribbean Basin initiative, 
designed to provide economic opportuni- 
ty by stimulating investment and trade, 
offers the hope of economic progress 
which anchors democracy and freedom. 

In September, the U.S. Congress ap- 
proved funds for emergency balance-of- 
payments assistance as the first step in 
this initiative. I also attach great impor- 
tance to the 1983 fiscal year package of 
foreign assistance. 

But our goal is not a temporary 
boost from foreign aid. Our goal is to 
help our neighbors strengthen 
democratic institutions and free 
economies that stand on their own. We 
need long-term incentives to expand pro- 
duction and create new jobs. The trade 
and investment portions of our Carib- 
bean Basin initiative legislation are 
designed to accomplish this. 

I have proposed that we offer our 
neighbors the opportunity to trade with 
us freely, by eliminating trade barriers 
for most products for 12 years, and by 
providing tax incentives for U.S. invest- 
ment in their economies. With our 
markets beckoning, the inducement to 
expand existing enterprises and invest 
in new ventures will increase. This will 
create growth and jobs, both for Carib- 
bean countries and for the United 



States. Trade is the path to new prog- 
ress for everyone. All developing coun- 
tries, including ours, succeeded by ex- 
panded free enterprise at home and by 
increasing their trade with other coun- 
tries. 

By helping them, we help ourselves. 
As their economies grow, we will have 
new markets for our exports. The faster 
their standards of living rise, the more 
jobs will be created in the United States. 
The impact on our own domestic in- 
dustries of more goods coming from the 
Caribbean will be minimal, since the 
quantity of imports from these small 
countries will not be great. Moreover, 
our industries and our jobs will have 
safeguards to protect them from disrup- 
tion. 

Since taking office, I have held 
numerous discussions with Caribbean 
Basin leaders. They have assured me 
that their Caribbean Basin initiative will 
provide more fuel for their private 
economies to be engines for lasting 
growth. They, too, have faith that 
private enterprise can flourish with the 
magic of the marketplace. This initia- 
tive, I am pleased to say, is only part of 
a wider undertaking in the Caribbean 
Basin. Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and ' 
Venezuela have joined us with im- ' 

pressive initiatives of their own. I am t 
asking the Congress only that we in the i' 
United States do our part by doing what 
we can do best — create economic oppor 
tunity. 

The leaders of the Congress have 
promised to give the Caribbean Basin 
initiative urgent consideration during 
the current session. The initiative has 
already received substantial bipartisan - 
support. I urge all members of the Con- ■ 
gress to look carefully at the benefits 
which the Caribbean Basin initiative will ' 
bring to our neighbors, and to us. Final 
passage this year is top priority. 

I will be leaving tonight to return to 
Washington. I cannot close without say- 
ing how impressed I have been with the 
leaders I have met here in the nations of 
South and Central America and the peo- 
ple. I believe we have created bonds 
which will serve to bring the nations and 
peoples of the Americas into a closer ac- 
cord. These two great continents joined 
by the countries of Central America can 
be the hope of the world. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



President Reagan's 
Luncheon Toast 



San Jose 
Dec. 4, 1982^^ 

First, on behalf of those who are with 
me today from our country, let me 
thank you and the people of Costa Rica 
for your hospitality. 

Last month in Washington President 
Monge warned against the arrogance of 
any leader who believes that his own 
political formulation is perfect. And as 
our fellow citizens often let us know, 
none of us is perfect. But the basic value 
of the democratic societies that we 
represent are far more perfect than 
those of any other form of government. 
Our dedication to freedom, a respect for 
human rights, our adherence to the rule 
of law are far superior to the 
totalitarian rule that others would im- 
pose in the name of the false revolu- 
tions. Theirs are hollow promises and 
empty rhetoric. 

We celebrate, today, our commit- 
ment to freedom and to peaceful 
political reconciliation. I particularly 
want to reaffirm to all of you the pledge 
my Administration has made to the 
economic well-being and security of the 
peoples of Central America and the 
Caribbean. We know that political prin- 
ciples and collective security are not 
served by unstable economies. 

Our Caribbean Basin initiative offers 
a realistic foundation on which to build 
increased trade between our coun- 
tries — trade that will benefit all our 
citizens. 

This evening I am returning to 
Washington where I still continue to 
press for quick congressional action on 
the important trade and investment pro- 
visions of the initiative. 

In that spirit of mutual commitment 
may we rise now in a toast to President 
Monge, to Costa Rica, and to liberty. 




The President is met by Honduran Presi- 
dent Roberto Suazo at San Pedro Sula Air- 
port, Armando Escalon Air Force Base. 



HONDURAS 

President Reagan's 
Remarks 



San Pedro Sula 
Dec. 4, 198215 

President Suazo and I have just com- 
pleted a very useful exchange of ideas 
on the full range of bilateral issues and 
regional problems that confront our two 
democracies. In this, our second meeting 



this year, we have continued the close 
consultation that we began in Washing- 
ton last July. This has given our 
dialogue continuity and enabled us to 
analyze these problems in greater detail. 

I have expressed my 
Administration's support and my 
nation's admiration for President 
Suazo's efforts to insure, for the Hon- 
duran people, the benefits of a 
democratic government elected on the 
principles of the rule of law. President 
Suazo has made it clear to me that there 
will be no retreat from that noble princi- 
ple. 

We are in agreement that we must 
work together to oppose those who seek 
to disrupt the promise of economic prog- 
ress and political stability that is the 
legacy of peace in the Americas. My Ad- 
ministration is convinced that through 
cooperation and solidarity, our govern- 
ments can protect our democratic in- 
stitutions and free-market economic 
systems from the counterfeit revolu- 
tionaries, who seek to destroy growth 
and impose totalitarianism on free peo- 
ple. 

We will cooperate in every way we 
can with Honduras and the other 
democratic governments of Central 
America to further our common objec- 
tives. 

It's a pleasure to be here, and our 
only regret is that it has to be such a 
very short visit. But, again, we're 
grateful to the President, the people of 
Honduras for giving us this opportunity 
to visit with them. [Applause] 



January 1983 



25 



President Reagan's Statement to the People of Honduras, 

December 4, 1982 



President [Roberto] Suazo has been gracious in inviting me to visit your country, 
and I am anxiously looking forward to it. Early this summer, we were honored to 
have your President visit Washington, and I am happy we have this early opportuni- 
ty to continue our talks. 

He told me then of the pride of the Honduran people in their democratic 
achievement, of their desire for peace with their neighbors, and of the measures you 
are taking to revive your economy. These are all goals we share with you. Both of 
our countries are concerned by the economic problems and the threat to peace the 
countries in Central America face. 

Honduras has been a leader in Central America. You have put forward concrete 
proposals for a comprehensive peace throughout your region. Your transition to 
democracy answered those who argue that freedom is a luxury that struggling coun- 
tries cannot afford. And you have proved that a freely elected government has the 
will and determination to take the actions needed to put your economy on a sound 
course. 

The Honduran people have won the admiration of my fellow countrymen, and 
the peace proposals your President presented to the OAS last March are ones which 
we, in the United States, support fully. They were incorporated in the final act of 
the eight democratic countries that met in San Jose in October. They are reasonable 
and attainable for all parties, and I hope they will lead to peace in Central America. 

Honduras has also played a prominent role in the Central American democratic 
community which is dedicated to freedom, economic development, and the security 
of each nation against aggression in any form by one neighbor against another. 
These are goals which can be achieved, and it is with this hope that I will come to 
Honduras to meet with President Suazo. We have common aspirations and values. I 
am sure we will be able to strengthen the cooperation between our two nations and 
our people. I will bring with me the best wishes and friendship of the American 
people. 



Text from White House press release. I 



President Reagan's 
Remarks Following 
Meeting With 
Guatemalan President 
Jose Rios Montt 



San Pedro Sula 
Dec. 4, 1982'« 

President Rios Montt and I have just 
had a useful exchange of ideas on the 
problems of the region and on our 
bilateral relations. 

Our conversation today has done 
much to improve the climate of relations 
between our two governments. I know 



that President Rios Montt is a man of 
great personal integrity and commit- 
ment. His country is confronting a 
brutal challenge from guerrillas armed 
and supported by others outside 
Guatemala. 

I have assured the President that 
the United States is committed to sup- 
porting his efforts to restore democracy 
and to address the root causes of this 
violent insurgency. I know he wants to 
improve the quality of life for all 
Guatemalans and to promote social 
justice. My Administration will do all it 
can to support his progressive efforts. 

We have heard a great presentation, 
and as I said on the first day of my visit 
far south of here in Brasilia, people from 
my country — government officials of my 
country in the past have come to South 



and Central America to various coun- 
tries proposing plans and ideas on their 
own. I know they were sincere, and, yet, 
I think there was a certain insensitivity 
connected with what they were doing. I 
said, from the first day, and until this, 
our last stop on this visit, that we came 
here to ask, not tell. We have come here 
to find out and to learn what we can 
about the possible differences between 
us and the possible answers to those dif- 
ferences. We know a great deal about 
the problems confronting Guatemala. 
We're going home and do our best to see 
if we can't be helpful now in finding 
some answers to the problems. 



Secretary Shultz's 
Press Briefing 



San Pedro Sula 
Dec. 4, 1982" 

President Reagan's trip to South 
America and Central America, now con- 
cluded, is part of the diplomacy of the 
New World. He has been to Canada, 
met with Prime Minister Trudeau some 
seven times. He has met several times 
with the just outgoing President of Mex- 
ico and recently with the incoming and 
has addressed the OAS. And this is part 
of that unfolding process. 




While in Honduras, President Reagan 
holds a bilateral meeting with Guatemalan 
President Jose Rios Montt. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin ' 



FEATURE 

Visit 

to 

Latin America 



The trip has been marked through- 
out by, on the one hand, close and cor- 
iial personal relationships between the 
President and his counterparts from 
^tart to finish and a considerable 
amount and, of course, a wide variety of 
substantive discussions at each stop. The 
overall themes have remained as we en- 
visaged them to begin with. 

First, is the emphasis on democracy 
m our hemisphere. If you think of it, 
coming down from Canada on through 
to the tip of South America, by now 
some 90% of the people live under condi- 
tions where elected governments, in one 
way or another, are their governments. 
The first point that we have emphasized 
and talked about and sought to drama- 
tize is the importance of democracy in 
our hemisphere. 

Second, is the importance of peace 
and stability. It's self-important but also 
is an essential condition for economic 
development. Questions having to do 
with trade and aid and incentives of one 
kind or another have to fit into the pat- 
tern of the creation of stable conditions. 
Of course, that problem is much more 
prominent and upfront here in Central 
America than it has been in the other 
two stops. 

Q. Earlier today General Rios 
Montt issued a statement talking 
about a process that would supposedly 
lead to free elections in Guatemala. 
Did this issue— was this issue dis- 
cussed with the President? And what 
was said about it? And is there any 
kind of a timetable for those elec- 
tions? 

A. The situation in Guatemala was 
described to us by President Rios Montt 
in a lot of detail with maps and informa- 
tion. He left us with some booklets. 
With regard to the election, he said that 
there would be the establishment of a 
constitutional convention or assembly, 
and that March 23d would be the date 
on which that would be identified — 
precisely what that meant, I am not too 
sure. At any rate, presumably, on March 
23d, some significant step toward a con- 
stitutional assembly will be taken. But 
that is really a question that you should 
ask him, not me. 



Q. Will the United States resume 
military sales to Guatemala? 

A. That is a question that remains 
to be decided. Of course, it is worth 
noting that the Congress in the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative did include $10 
million for Guatemala. Basically, the 
discussion that we had with President 
Rios Montt was one that started with 
the invitation from President Reagan as 
he has described here just a moment ago 
to listen. With that invitation. President 
Rios Montt did a lot of describing the 
situation— including the more proper 
way of putting this March 23d 
thing— the publication of the law— is 
what is looked for at that point. 

Q. Are you, or is Secretary Regan, 
going to follow up this trip with 
statements to financial institutions 
about your confidence in the area? 

A. Of course, as far as financial 
matters are concerned. On the one hand, 
there is one program of assistance that 
is being debated and voted on in the 
Congress right now, and that will deter- 
mine to a certain extent the parameters 
of what we could do in that regard. That 
will, also, affect things like the World 
Bank— and in the context of South 
America— the lADB, which is very 
much on everyone's mind. As far as 
private creditors are concerned, they 
make their own decisions. The bridging 
loan was announced with Brazil, and 
that is designed to, on the one hand, 
help Brazil and, on the other, to be an 
expression of confidence and support 
that we have in the Brazilian economy. 

Q. President Suazo, in his state- 
ment, referred to a peace initiative. Is 
that the warning of his initiative with 
Nicaragua? Did he give the President 
a report on the status of any talks that 
he has undertaken with Nicaragua to 
ease the border dispute? 

A. The peace initiative he referred 
to, I believe, was the six-point program 



that became part of the San Jose con- 
ference calling for various actions which 
you are familiar with. 

Q. I just want to know if you 
could confirm or deny whether the 
United States is providing training for 
anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans from 
Honduras? 

A. The United States is not in 
Nicaragua in any training capacity. 
There are people in Nicaragua apparent- 
ly who don't like what is going on there, 
but that is not anything that we are 
training them for. 



'Other documentation for this trip can be 
found in the Weekly Compilations of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 6 and 13, and 
press releases 364, 365, and 367. 

^Text from White House press release. 

'Made upon arrival at Brasilia Interna- 
tional Airport (text from White House press 
release). 

■•From Brasil: Journal do Brasil and 
Estado de Sao Paulo; from Colombia: El 
Espectador. El Mundo, and El Colombiano; 
from Honduras: La Prensa; and from Costa 
Rica: La Nacion (text from White House 
press release). 

"^Made at the Hotel Nacional (press 
release 361 of Dec. 3, 1982). 

«Made at the Palacio do Itamaraty (text 
from White House press release). , 

'Made at the Governor's Palace (text 
from WTiite House press release). 

^Text from White House press release. 

^Made aboard Air Force One enroute 
Bogota, Colombia (press release 363 of 
Dec. 6, 1982). 

'"Made at Casa de Narino (text from 
White House press release). 

"Issued following bilateral meeting with 
El Salvador's President Alvaro Magana. 

"Made at the National Theater (text 
from White House press release). 

''Made at Casa Presidencial (text from 
WTiite House press release). 

"Made at Casa Presidencial (text from 
White House press release). 

"^Made following a bilateral meeting with 
Honduran President Roberto Suazo (text 
from White House press release). 

"^Made at La Mesa International Airport 
(text from White House press release). 

"Made at La Mesa International Airport 
(press release 366 of Dec. 7, 1982). ■ 



January 1983 



27 



THE PRESIDENT 



East-West Trade Relations and 
the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation on November 13, 1982. ^ 

During the campaign 2 years ago, I 
spoke of the need for the United States 
to restore the balance in our relationship 
with the Soviet Union. For too many 
years we had stood still while the 
Soviets increased their military strength 
and expanded their influence from 
Afghanistan to Ethiopia and beyond. I 
expressed a belief, which you seemed to 
share, that it was time for the United 
States to chart a new course. Since 
then, we've embarked upon a building of 
our defense forces in order to 
strengthen our security and, in turn, to 
strengthen the prospects for peace. We 
still have a long way to go. But the fact 
that we've started on a new course has 
enabled us to propose the most com- 
prehensive set of proposals for arms 
reduction and control in more than a 
quarter of a century. It's always been 
my belief that if the Soviets knew we 
were serious about maintaining our 
security, they might be more willing to 
negotiate seriously at the bargaining 
table. 

In the near future, I will be speaking 
to you in more detail about this matter 
of arms control and, more importantly, 
arms reductions. But right now I have 
something in the nature of news I'd like 
to bring you. 

The balance between the United 
States and the Soviet Union cannot be 
measured in weapons and bombers 
alone. To a large degree, the strength of 
each nation is also based on economic 
strength. Unfortunately, the West's 
economic relations with the U.S.S.R. 
have not always served the national 
security goals of the alliance. 

The Soviet Union faces serious 
economic problems. But we— and I 
mean all of the nations of the free 
world— have helped the Soviets avoid 
some hard economic choices by pro- 
viding preferential terms of trade, by 
allowing them to acquire militarily rele- 
vant technology, and by providing them 
a market for their energy resources, 



even though this creates an excessive 
dependence on them. By giving such 
preferential treatment, we've added to 
our own problems— creating a situation 
where we have to spend more money on 
our defense to keep up with Soviet 
capabilities which we helped create. 

Since taking office, I have empha- 
sized to our allies the importance of our 
economic as well as our political rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. In July 
of 1981 at the economic summit meeting 
in Ottawa, Canada, I expressed to the 
heads of state of the other major 
Western countries and Japan my belief 
that we could not continue conducting 
business as we had. I suggested that we 
forge a new set of rules for economic 
relations with the Soviet Union which 
wouJd put our security concerns fore- 
most. I wasn't sucessful at that time in 
getting agreement on a common policy. 

Then, in December of 1981, the 
Polish Government, at Soviet instiga- 
tion, imposed martial law on the Polish 
people and outlawed the Solidarity 
union. This action showed graphically 
that our hopes for moderation in Soviet 
behavior were not likely to be fulfilled. 

In response to that action, I imposed 
an embargo on selected oil and gas 
equipment to demonstrate our strong 
opposition to such actions and to 
penalize this sector of the Soviet 
economy which relies heavily on high 
technology, much of it from the United 
States. In June of this year I extended 
our embargo to include not only U.S. 
companies and their products but sub- 
sidiaries of U.S. companies abroad and 
on foreign licensees of U.S. companies. 

It's no secret that our allies don't 
agree with this action. We stepped up 
our consultations with them in an effort 
to forge an enduring, realistic, and 
security-minded economic policy toward 
the Soviet Union. These consultations 
have gone on over a period of months. 
I'm pleased today to announce that 
the industrialized democracies have this 
morning reached substantial agreement 
on a plan of action. The understanding 
we've reached demonstrates that the 
Western alliance is fundamentally united 
and intends to give consideration to 



strategic issues when making decisions 
on trade with the U.S.S.R. 

As a result, we have agreed not to 
engage in trade arrangements which 
contribute to the military or strategic 
advantage of the U.S.S.R. or serve to 
aid preferentially the heavily militarized 
Soviet economy. In putting these prin- 
ciples into practice, we wOl give priority 
attention to trade in high technology 
products, including those used in oil and 
gas production. We will also undertake 
an urgent study of Western energy 
alternatives, as well as the question of 
dependence on energy imports from the 
Soviet Union. 

In addition, we've agreed on the 
following immediate actions. 

First, each partner has affirmed 
that no new contracts for the purchase 
of Soviet natural gas will be signed or 
approved during the course of our study 
of alternative Western sources of 
energy. 

Second, we and our partners will 
strengthen controls on the transfer of 
strategic items to the Soviet Union. 

Third, we will establish without 
delay procedures for monitoring finan- 
cial relations with the Soviet Union and 
will work to harmonize our export credit 
policies. 

The understanding we and our part- 
ners have reached and the actions we 
are taking reflect our mutual determina- 
tion to overcome differences and 
strengthen our cohesion. I believe this 
new agreement is a victory for all the 
allies. It puts in place a much needed 
policy in the economic area to comple- 
ment our policies in the security area. 

As I mentioned a moment ago, the 
United States imposed sanctions against 
the Soviet Union in order to 
demonstrate that their policies of op- 
pression would entail substantial costs. 
Now that we've achieved an agreement 
with our allies which provides for 
stronger and more effective measures, 
there is no further need for these sanc- 
tions, and I am lifting them today. 

The process of restoring a proper 
balance in relations with the Soviet 
Union is not ended. It will take time to 



1 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



make up for the losses incurred in past 
years. But acting together, we and our 
allies are making major progress. And 
I'm happy to say the prospects for peace 
are brighter. 

I have just returned to the White 
House from the Soviet Embassy, where 
I signed the book of condolence for 
President Brezhnev. New leaders are 



coming to power in the Soviet Union. If 
they act in a responsible fashion, they 
will meet a ready and positive response 
in the West. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 22, 1982, 
which also carries an informal question-and- 
answer session with reporters following the 
address. ■ 



International Free Trade 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation broadcast from Camp David, 
Maryland, on November 20, 1982.'^ 

I've talked to you on a number of occa- 
sions about the economic problems and 
opportunities our nation faces. Well, as 
you've probably heard on news reports, 
America's problems are not unique. 
Other nations face very severe economic 
difficulties. In fact, both developed and 
developing countries alike have been in 
the grip of the longest worldwide reces- 
sion in postwar history. And that's bad 
news for all of us. When other countries 
don't grow, they buy less from us, and 
we see fewer jobs created at home. 
When we don't grow, we buy less from 
them, which weakens their economies 
and, of course, their ability to buy from 
us. It's a vicious cycle. 

You can understand the danger of 
worldwide recession when you realize 
how much is at stake. Exports account 
for over 5 million jobs in the United 
States. Two out of every 5 acres planted 
by American farmers produce crops for 
exports. But because of their recessions, 
other countries are buying fewer 
American farm products than last year. 
Our farmers are hurting — and they're 
just one group. 

So we are trying to turn this situa- 
tion around. We're reminding the world 
that, yes, we all have serious problems. 
But our economic system — based on in- 
dividual freedom, private initiative, and 
free trade— has produced more human 
progress than any other in history. It is 
in all of our interests to preserve it, pro- 
tect it, and strengthen it. 

We are reminding our trading part- 
ners that preserving individual freedom 
and restoring prosperity also requires 



free and fair trade in the marketplace. 
The United States took the lead after 
World War II in creating an interna- 
tional trading and financial system that 
limited government's ability to disrupt 
free trade across borders. We did this 
because history had taught us an impor- 
tant lesson: Free trade serves the cause 
of economic progress, and it serves the 
cause of world peace. 

When governments get too involved 
in trade, economic costs increase and 
political disputes multiply. Peace is 
threatened. In the 1930s, the world ex- 
perienced an ugly specter— protec- 
tionism and trade wars and, eventually, 
real wars and unprecedented suffering 
and loss of life. 

There are some who seem to believe 
that we should run up the American flag 
in defense of our markets. They would 
embrace protectionism again and in- 
sulate our markets from world competi- 
tion. The last time the United States 
tried that, there was enormous economic 
distress in the world. World trade fell by 
60% and young Americans soon followed 
the American flag into World War II. 

I'm old enough and, hopefully, wise 
enough not to forget the lessons of those 
unhappy years. The world must never 
live through such a nightmare again. 
We're in the same boat with our trading 
partners. If one partner shoots a hole in 
the boat, does it make sense for the 
other one to shoot another hole in the 
boat? Some say, yes, and call that get- 
ting tough. Well, I call it stupid. We 
shouldn't be shooting holes; we should 



be working together to plug them up. 
We must strengthen the boat of free 
markets and fair trade so it can lead the 
world to economic recovery and greater 
political stability. 

And here's how we're working to do 
that: We insist on sound domestic 
policies at home that bring down infla- 
tion, and we look to others for no less in 
their own economies. The International 
Monetary Fund — the institution that 
deals with world financial issues — seeks 
to encourage its member countries to 
follow sound domestic policies and avoid 
government restrictions on international 
trade and investment to foster economic 
development and raise their people's 
standard of living. 

We remind other countries that as 
the United States helps to lead the 
world out of this recession, they will 
benefit as we buy more goods from 
them. This will enable them to grow and 
buy more goods from us. And that will 
mean more jobs all around. That is the 
way of free markets and free trade. We 
must resist protectionism because it can 
only lead to fewer jobs for them and 
fewer jobs for us. 

In just 4 days, the trade ministers of 
virtually all the free world countries will 
meet in Geneva, Switzerland. They will 
seek ways to surmount challenges to the 
integrity of our international economic 
system. We were instrumental in con- 
vening this international meeting 
because we believe strongly that our 
trading system is at a crossroads. Either 
free world countries go forward and sus- 
tain the drive toward more open 
markets or they risk sliding back toward 
the mistakes of the 1930s and succumb- 
ing to the evils of more and more 
government intervention. And this is 
really no choice at all. 

The United States will reject protec- 
tionist and defeatist proposals. Instead, 
we will set new goals and lay out a pro- 
gram for limiting government interven- 
tion in world markets. We will lead with 
a clear sense of our own commercial in- 
terests and a quiet determination to de- 
fend these interests. We will take ac- 
tions at home and abroad which enhance 
the ability of U.S. industries to compete 
in international trade. 



January 1983 



29 



THE PRESIDENT 



Let no one misunderstand us. We're 
generous and farsighted in our goals, 
and we intend to use our full power to 
achieve these goals. We seek to plug the 
holes in the boat of free markets and 
free trade and get it moving again in the 
direction of prosperity. And no one 
should mistake our determination to use 
our full power and influence to prevent 
others from destroying the boat and 
sinking us all. 

That's how the United States is 
working in the world on behalf of 
freedom, economic prosperity, and 
peace. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of ^Iov. 29, 1982. 



News Conference of November 11 
(Excerpts) 



Before taking your questions, I want to 
share with you just briefly my reflec- 
tions on the important events that we've 
witnessed today. 

From Moscow, we've learned of the 
death of President Brezhnev, a man who 
played a major role in world affairs for 
more than two decades. Here in the 
White House, I met with Phil Habib 
[Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Special 
Representative for the Middle East] 
about our plans to help bring peace to 
the Middle East, where the opportunity 
for progress has been fundamentally im- 
proved by recent developments in that 
region. And also today, the space shuttle 
was successfully launched. Once again, 
we will expand mankind's opportunities 
for enriching the human experience 
through peaceful exploration of the 
universe. 

Those events could have a critical 
impact on our future — future we face 
with confidence and resolve. If there is a 
lesson for us, it is that we, as a free peo- 
ple, must always be prepared for 
change, so that when it comes we're 
ready to meet new challenges and op- 
portunities. Our system of government 
is unique and best able to adapt to 
change and move forward without 
disruption or break in continuity of pur- 
pose. 

I want to underscore my intention to 
continue working to improve our rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. Our two 
nations bear a tremendous responsibility 
for peace in a dangerous time — a 
responsibility that we don't take lightly. 
Earlier this year, we put forth serious 
and far-reaching proposals to reduce the 
levels of nuclear and conventional 
forces. I want to reconfirm that we will 
continue to pursue every avenue for 
progress in this effort. But we shouldn't 
delude ourselves. Peace is a product of 
strength, not of weakness — of facing 
reality and not believing in false hopes. 



Today we honor American veter- 
ans — men and women who, by their 
courage and dedication, protected our 
freedom and independence. In the wake 
of events in the Soviet Union, we remaii 
hopeful for a better relation. Conscious 
of our national interest and determined 
to remain a free people, I can think of 
no better day than Veterans Day to 
rededicate ourselves to peace and to do 
things necessary to maintain the peace 
and to preserve our freedom. 

Q. Who will be leading the U.S. I 
delegation to Leonid Breznev's I 

funeral? If you won't be going, how 
come? And also aside from your per- 
sonal hopes for peace, do you have 
reason to believe that the next coming 
months might see the new Soviet 
leadership flexing its muscle a bit and 
a period of increased tension coming 
about? 

A. Answering the last part first, no, 
I don't anticipate that as they make this 
transition. We certainly can hope that 
there won't be anything of the kind. 

But with regard to the service, 
we've had no direct, official word yet on 
anything, although we are in com- 
munication directly with them. It was 
just a plain case of looking at schedules 
and my own schedule calling for visits 
here by a head of state next week, and 
it was felt that it would be better for 
George [Vice President Bush] to head 
that delegation. But it will be an ap- 
propriate and a very distinguished 
delegation. 

Q. It will be the Vice President 
then who will be heading the delega- 
tion? 

A. This is what we're considering 
now. No final decisions have been made, 
because, as I say, we're waiting to hear 
some word about the services. 

Q. If there is a period of tension, 
how would you respond? 

A. We've had periods of tension 
before. And I think you just — you can't 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



ruess that in advance or what the 
inswer would be, except that I think we 
-nust remember that our goal is and will 
'emain a search for peace, and we would 
;ry to find the best way to achieve that. 
And, incidentally, I believe that we can 
continue that search without my attend- 
ance at the services. 

Q. The Polish Government an- 
nounced that they're about to free 
Lech Walesa. And as you've men- 
tioned, Mr. Brezhnev is dead, and a 
new Soviet leadership is coming into 
power. Is there any thought in your 
mind that this would be a good time 
for you to take some big step, even a 
symbolic step that would lead to the 
lessening of tensions between East 
and West? And are you thinking of 
taking any initiatives that would give 
the world a signal that you would like 
that to come about? 

A. We have been trying to do that 
in the area of quiet diplomacy, tried in 
the summit conference, tried in the 
NATO conference, of various things. We 
are prepared and ready — and they know 
that— about trying to have a better rela- 
tion. But it's going to require some ac- 
tion, not just words. For 10 years 
detente was based on words from them 
1 and not any deeds to back those words 
up. We need some action that they — it 
takes two to tango— that they want to 
tango, also. 

Q. But are you willing to take the 
first step at this stage, at this junc- 
ture? 

A. There are some people who have 
said I took the first step with lifting the 
grain embargo. Have we gotten 
anything for it. 

Q. A number of Republicans, not 
just those who want to return to 
policies of the past, have suggested 
that in the spending cuts that are 
necessary in this next budget, that it 
would be good if the Pentagon also 
participated in this. And some have 
even said that in the long run the 
defense budget would be better if the 



economy is healthier. Have you ruled 
out the possibility that you would 
modify in any way your call for an in- 
creased defense budget, maybe just 
for this 1 year, when the economy is 
not what you'd like it to be? 

A. It isn't the kind of a budget that 
you can do it for just 1 year. There are 
weapons systems and so forth, things 
that have to go on down the line. You 
don't just call up a supplier and get a 
delivery on what it is you want to buy, 
or call him and say, send it next month. 
You've got to remember that a great 
share of the defense budget is for 
humanity. It is for the men and women 
in the Armed Forces, the pay scale that 
is now approaching some reasonable 
level. 

But we're looking at everything, and 
we're not prepared to give any indica- 
tions yet of what we're looking at. I 
would have to say that, yes, we're look- 
ing, if there are savings that can be 
made without delaying or setting back 
what we think is the improvement we 
must have if we're going to close that 
window of vulnerability that we in- 
herited. We can't do that. The first and 
primary function of the Federal Govern- 
ment is the national security. 

Q. Israel continues to ignore your 
call for a freeze of settlements of the 
West Bank. How damaging is Israel's 
ignoring of that freeze to the peace 
process, and what are you prepared to 
do about it? 

A. Prime Minister Begin is coming 
here, and I'm sure that he and I will 
have some talks on that, as well as other 
subjects. We do think it is a hindrance 
to what we're trying to accomplish in 
the peace movement. 

Obviously, the solution to the Middle 
East must be what we outlined earlier, 
and that is to bring the Arab States and 
leaders and the Israelis together at a 
negotiating table to resolve the dif- 
ferences between them. And that begins 
with their recognizing Israel's right to 
exist as a nation. I am still optimistic, 
and that's why Phil Habib is going back 
there. 



Q. Are you prepared to do more 
than just talk with Prime Minister 
Begin? Are you prepared to consider 
any sanctions to force a change in 
Israeli policy? 

A. I don't think that it would be 
good diplomacy to be threatening or 
anything, and I don't believe that's 
necessary. I think all of us realize that 
peace is the ultimate goal there. 

Q. You like to describe yourself as 
an optimist, a man who sees oppor- 
tunities instead of problems. And in 
that light I'd like to hear what you 
think are the opportunities that the 
United States now has with the death 
of President Brezhnev? 

A. I don't think that the death of 
President Brezhnev is a factor in 
this— of what opportunities we might 
have. 

I have felt for a long time that we 
have an opportunity, because while the 
entire world, including the Soviet Union 
and ourselves, is involved in a deep 
recession and deep economic prob- 
lems—all of us — it would seem to me 
that out of those troubles, that might be 
a time when, in a cooperative sense, we 
could find out that we'll all be far better 
off if we decide to get along with each 
other, instead of one pursuing an ag- 
gressive policy and the other one 
resisting that and so forth. 

I am optimistic that — and would 
have been without his death today — con- 
tinue to be optimistic that we can get 
together. 

Q. You've said recently that you 
believe a number of sincere Americans 
who support a nuclear arms freeze are 
being manipulated by those who want 
the weakening of America. Could you 
elaborate on this for us? Do you have 
any evidence of foreign involvement in 
the U.S. peace movement? 

A. Yes, there is plenty of evidence. 
It's been published by some of your 
fraternity. There was no question but 
that the Soviet Union saw an advantage 
in a peace movement buUt around the 
idea of a nuclear freeze, since they are 
out ahead. And I want to emphasize 
again that the overwhelming majority of 
the people involved in that, I am sure, 
are sincere and well intentioned and, as 



January 1983 



31 



THE PRESIDENT 



a matter of fact, are saying the same 
thing I'm saying. And that is, we must 
have a reduction of those nuclear 
weapons, and that's what we're trying to 
negotiate now in Geneva. But to put the 
freeze first and then beheve that we 
have not weakened our case for getting 
a reduction, when the other side is so 
far ahead, doesn't make sense. 

Yes, there has been in the organiza- 
tion of some of the big demonstrations, 
the one in New York and so forth, there 
is no question about foreign agents that 
were sent to help instigate and help 
create and keep such a movement going. 

Q. Is that the extent of the in- 
volvement as you know it, or has there 
been money involved, or are there 
other ways that the Soviet involve- 
ment has manifested itself? 

, A. I can't go beyond what I've done 
because I don't discuss intelligence mat- 
ters, and that's what I would be getting 
into. 

Q. Evidence mounts that key 
weapons in your $400-billion weapons 
procurement buildup are in trouble. 
Navy testers say that the F-18, on 
which you'd spend $40 billion, is too 
heavy for its major mission. Your 
closest military science adviser says 
the latest basing plan for the MX 
won't fool the Soviets. The Pershing 
missile, on which NATO defense 
would depend, literally can't get off 
the ground. The antitank weapon the 
Army wants to buy seems to be inef- 
fective against modern Soviet tanks. 
The Maverick missile can't find its 
targets. [Laughter] 

I wonder whether in light of all 
these failures you have any reason to 
wonder whether a $400 billion arms 
buildup is money well spent. 

A. It isn't $400 billion in any single 
year that I know of. That's exag- 
gerating. I've read the same articles, 
also, and having access to information 
closer to the source, I don't believe those 
things about the weaponry. 

Obviously, in any new weapons 
system, there are problems and there 
are bugs that have to be worked out. 
But I have faith in our technology and 



the level of that technology, and I know 
that we have been markedly increasing 
our defensive capabilities with what 
we're doing. And as I say, some of my 
sources I can't reveal. 

Q. As you may recall, last June in 
Berlin you talked about the danger of 
accidental nuclear war and put for- 
ward the idea that this might be a 
new initiative that the Administration 
could consider in the arms control 
field. I wonder whether in your plan- 
ning for next year you have some arms 
control initiatives in the works. 

A. All of these things are in the 
works, and that's why we have three 
teams negotiating— one on the matter of 
conventional arms, one on the matter of 
strategic missiles, and the other on the 
matter of the INF [Intermediate-range 
Nuclear Force], the zero option that I 
announced a year ago. But I tell you 
what I'd rather ask you to do and wait 
for is, in the very near future, I am 
going to be speaking in a major address 
on that entire subject. 

Q. You said in September that you 
could not determine how long Ameri- 
can Marines would remain in Lebanon. 
But since that was 6 weeks ago, don't 
you think it's time to give the 
American public an indication of how 
long theyll be there? 

A. I wish I could. This is one of the 
reasons why Phil Habib is going back 
over there, take charge of what's going 
on. 

The plan as proposed is one that re- 
quires, of course, the ability of the new 
administration in Lebanon to stabilize 
and to be able to take charge of its own 
borders. This calls for, as quickly as 
possible, also, the removal of all foreign 
forces from the soil. And that's why our 
multinational force is there. 

I can't give you a close-out date on 
that, but I can tell you that we're trying 
to push as fast as we can on the two 
things that must happen. And that is the 
ability of the Lebanese Government to 
heal the wounds and bring their people 
together and have control. But, also, it 
hinges on getting the three foreign fac- 
tions—the PLO, the Syrians, and the 



Israelis— out of Lebanon. And we are 
pushing on that as fast as we can. 

Q. Is there any reason to believe 
the troops might be home for Christ- 
mas? 

A. I just can't speculate on that. I 
can't tell you. But I do know this: We 
think our plan is working. Whether it's 
working as fast as we'd like or not re- 
mains to be seen. 

I think the important thing is that 
that force, that multinational force is 
there in the name of helping bring about 
peace. I think the most important thing 
is to see that the job is done, and I 
believe they understand that. 

Q. Is it possible that the United 
States might cut back on aid to Israel 
in direct proportion to the cost to that 
country of establishing new settle- 
ments on the West Bank, all this as a 
means of achieving the freeze that 
you're seeking? 

A. To answer that question one way 
or another, I don't think would be 
helpful in the situation that we're in to- 
day, where we have made so much prog- 
ress in the Arab States, the unusual, the 
unique thing of the representatives of 
the Arab League being here to meet 
with me as they were just some days 
ago; the need now for Israel to, itself, 
recognize that they, too, must play a 
part in making it possible for negotia- 
tions; the part that must be played and 
recognized and that one of President 
Gemayel's problems now is reconciling 
Muslim groups within his own country. I 
don't think to start talking about 
whether I should or should not make 
threats of some kind or other is going to 
be fruitful at all. 

Q. [Inaudible]— got a request here 
for some factual information. Is it 
true that the Begin government now is 
spending about a $100 million a year 
to subsidize settlements on the West 
Bank? 

A. I don't know that figure. I image 
I could find that out very easily. 

Q. In 2 weeks the United States 
will celebrate Thanksgiving. Given the 
passing of Brezhnev, inevitably, there 
are comparisons between the two 
systems. Could you take just a minute 



32 



I 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



to tell Americans why at this time 
they especially should be thankful for 
their blessings and give a comparison 
of the two systems? 

A. Yes, because I think the com- 
parison is so obvious, and you don't even 
have to use our own country. Turn to 
some of the newer and the developing 
countries, and those that have chosen 
our way — the free way, free trade, 
democracy— are so far ahead in stand- 
ard of living and the happiness of their 
people than the others that have chosen 
the other, the controlled, the authori- 
tarian way— and I think here is — Lin- 
coln said it then, and it's truer even to- 
day, this is the last best hope of man on 
Earth. 

We are freer than any other people; 
we have achieved more than any other 
people. If you looked around this 
room — I thought the other day, when 
we had all those representatives from all 



over the world, all of those represen- 
tatives in this room, who were here to 
look at our election, to learn how they 
could spread the word about that kind of 
freedom in their own countries and in 
other countries in their own conti- 
nents — I thought that we could have a 
meeting of Americans in this room. The 
ethnic heritage of the Americans in this 
room would be as diverse, and there 
would be as many represented as there 
were in those hundreds of people who 
have come from foreign lands here to- 
day. There we all live together proudly 
as Americans, in spite of that difference 
in birth. There just isn't any comparison 
with what we have and what we have to 
be thankful for. 

Q. Are you close to an agreement 
with West European countries on an 
East- West trade policy that will 
enable you to lift the sanctions on the 
Soviet natural gas pipeline? 



A. We are in negotiations and have 
been for some time on the East- West 
matter with our Allies. And we are, at 
last, making what I think is sizable prog- 
ress. 

I have nothing to announce as to 
any definition of that at the moment, 
but we've made progress. We started 
this long before there were sanctions. 
We started at Ottawa last year. We 
tried again in Europe in the two 
meetings there — in the summit 
meetings. We have continued. We had a 
team negotiating over there. We finally 
put the sanctions into effect. But we're 
discussing that relationship — or that 
arrangement with our partners without 
the sanctions plajring any part of it. 

Our decision on the sanctions will be 
based on when we feel they've served 
their purpose and when we feel that 
there could be a better situation without 
them. 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of November 15, 1982. ■ 



January 1983 



33 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President Bush 

Visits 
Africa and Bermuda 



Vice President Bush departed Washington, D.C., 
November 10, 1982, to visit Cape Verde, Senegal, 
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Zaire, and Ber- 
muda. (On November U-15, he headed the U.S. delega- 
tion to the funeral of Soviet President Leonid I. 
Brezhnev in Moscow; see page 58). He returned to the 
United States on November 2U. 

Following are the Vice President's statements, 
remarks, and toasts made during this trip, as well as 
the text of the U.S. -Nigeria joint com,munique.'^ 



As a native New Englander, I am 
well aware of the depth of the "Cape 
Verde-American" connection. For more 
than two centuries, the people of these 
islands have forged their link in the 
great chain of American history. It is 
stirring to know that we've been able to 
maintain these bonds over such a long 
period. 

This past summer the schooner 
Emestina set sail from the port of 
Mindelo. After a passage to America 
sailed by thousands of Cape Verdeans 
over the years, it arrived in New 
England, where it is now berthed as a 
permanent reminder of their rich con- 
tribution to our own national heritage. 
We will treasure the Emestina as a 
symbol of lasting ties between our 
peoples. 

Finally, as we traverse the vast Con- 
tinent of Africa in the coming weeks, I 
look forward to learning firsthand of 
Africa's problems and attitudes. We've 
made a good start in our brief but 
rewarding visit to Cape Verde. We do 
not say farewell, but rather thank you 
and ate logo. 



CAPE VERDE 



Departure Statement 



Sal 

Nov. 10, 1982 

On behalf of my wife Barbara and the 
entire delegation, let me express our 
gratitude for that warm reception which 
President and Mrs. Pereira and all of 
you have offered us today. 

I'm especially glad to have had this 
unique opportunity to exchange views 
with President Pereira on a wide range 
of bilateral and world topics. President 
Reagan asked me to come to Africa as 
his personal representative in order to 
gain firsthand impressions and to ex- 
plain the policies of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration. The President also asked 
me to listen closely to Africa's leaders 



and to report to him on their deepest 
concerns. 

We are aware of the record of Cape 
Verde since independence in building a 
better life for its people, in spite of the 
handicaps of persistent drought and lack 
of natural resources. I want to say that 
the United States will continue as a 
steady partner in your tireless efforts to 
bring about a better quality of life. 

Let me add, too, that in pledging 
our continued assistance, we must 
understand that available resources are 
not likely to be as plentiful as they have 
been in the past. We must recognize 
that government efforts in and of 
themselves are insufficient. We must tap 
other sectors. Any nation's principal 
resource is its people. In this. Cape 
Verde is handsomely endowed. The 
spirit of private initiative, the en- 
trepreneurial spirit, is a crucial element 
in contributing to sustained economic 
development and has already yielded 
success stories throughout the develop- 
ing world. 




34 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



SENEGAL 



Dinner Toast 



Dakar 

Nov. 11, 19822 

It is a privilege, as the representative of 
a nation profound in its belief in liberty 
and human dignity, to begin my visit to 
the African Continent in a country that 
has so clearly and so consistently 
demonstrated the same beliefs. When 
liberty and law rule, citizens can rejoice; 
leaders can be well pleased with their 
stewardship. 

Relations between the Republic of 
Senegal and the United States have 
almost certainly never been warmer or 
closer than they are now. Ninety-nine 
years ago, the United States established 
a consulate on the Island of Goree; in 
1960 we opened our embassy. For more 
than 20 years, we have worked together 
to make sure our relationship would be 
mutually beneficial. Our efforts have 
been crowned by success— especially, I 
would like to think, since January 1981. 
The two Administrations which took of- 
fice then— yours under the leadership of 
President Diouf and ours under the 
leadership of President Reagan— have 
raised our bilateral relations to a par- 
ticularly privileged level. In this respect, 
we can especially be pleased with our 
work. 

Our increasingly close cooperation 
reflects many of the common ideals and 
aspirations of our two societies and 
peoples. We share a fundamental com- 
mitment to the peaceful solution of con- 
flicts and to the rule of law. We both af- 
firm unshakable attachment to our 
democratic institutions, to human rights, 
and to the inalienable liberty of all men 
and all women. 



Opposite page— Top: Signing ceremony 
for PL-480. 

Bottom: Vice President Bush holds a 

bilateral meeting with President 
Aristides Pereira. 



This close collaboration also reflects, 
I think, the personal philosophies of the 
leaders of our two governments. Neither 
President Diouf nor President Reagan 
believe in magic solutions to difficult 
problems. They have affirmed as leaders 
the simple propositions that progress 
can only be achieved through sacrifice, 
hard work, and common sense. Your 
daily actions show how true the 
Senegalese proverb is that "man is the 
best cure for his own ills." As our 
philosopher. President Thomas Jeffer- 
son, asked: "How can great results be 
obtained except by great efforts?" You 
have our pledge that the United States 
is committed to seek an end to the ills 
which assail us all, to advance justice 
and dignity throughout the world. 
Criticism is directed every day at the 
United States. But I ask our friends to 
consider this: Has any great power in 
human history so consistently used its 
great power for purposes so benign? I 
think not. 

President Reagan's Administration 
will make no easy promises which it can- 
not keep. We will not posture for the 
sake of easy good will. And we will not 
direct gratuitous criticisms at others. 
We have demonstrated clearly that we 
will honor F.H.A.A. and improve on our 
commitments to our traditional friends 
in Africa and elsewhere. 

I would like to thank you and your 
government for the welcome extended 
to us here. Senegal is a country that 
smiles on the stranger. This friendship 



comes ultimately from the heart of a 
people, and it is found in great abun- 
dance in Senegal. An American is at 
home where hard work and human 
dignity are respected. An American is at 
home where liberty and justice prevail. 
For these reasons, especially, an 
American is at home in Senegal. 

In this spirit, let me ask you to join 
me in a toast to Presidents Abdou Diouf 
and Ronald Reagan and to the spirit of 
collaboration, to the spirit of friendship 
which prevails between the Senegalese 
and American peoples. 



NIGERIA 

Remarks before the 
Nigeria-U.S. 
Business Council 



Lagos 

Nov. 13, 1982 

Thank you very much. Chief Lawson 
[Adeyemi 0. Lawson, chairman of the 
Nigeria section of the Nigeria-U.S. 
Business Council], for that exceptionally 
warm welcome and let me say to you, 
sir, and to the members of the Nigerian 
Section of the Nigeria-U.S. Business 
Council, and to the representatives of 





The Vice President meets with Prime Minister Habib Thiam. 



fWhite House photos by Cynthia John 



January 1983 



35 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



American firms here and other guests, 
ladies and gentlemen, let me just say 
how very pleased I am to be here. This 
is, Chief Lawson, a return to Nigeria for 
me. I was here on a very unofficial visit, 
although I was then Ambassador to the 
United Nations, about 10 years ago, and 
so I am delighted to be back here. 

Yesterday, Ambassador Pickering 
[U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria] had some 
guests out at the embassy for a recep- 
tion, and there I had the opportunity to 
see some of the people with whom I 
worked years ago. I must say that, I ex- 
pect I speak for every American here, 
the minute I stepped off that airplane, I 
could feel the warm hospitality of not 
only the Nigerian Government but of the 



Cape Verde— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 1,557 sq. mi. (slightly larger than 

Rhode Island). Capital: Praia (pop. 39,000). 

People 

Population: 300,000 

Ethnic Groups: Creole (71%), African (28%), 
European (1%). Religions: Roman Catholic 
(65%), animist (35%). Languages: Por- 
tuguese (official), Crioulo. 

Government 

Type: Republic. Independence: July 5, 1975. 
Constitution: Draft under revision. - 
Branches: Executive— President (head of 
state), Prime Minister (head of government), 
Council of Ministers. Legislative— National 
Assembly. Judicial— National Council of 
Justice, lower courts. Political Party: 
African Party for the Independence of Cape 
Verde (PAICV). 

Economy 

GNP: $57 million (1979 est.). Per Capita In- 
come: $200 (1979). 

Natural Resources: Salt, siliceous rock, 
minerals. Agricultural Products: Bananas, 
com, sugarcane, coffee. Industries: Fish and 
fish products, salt, siliceous rock: Trade 
(1979): Exports— $1 million: fish, bananas, 
salt, coffee. Imports— $22.6 million: 
petroleum, com, rice, sugar. Major Trading 
Partners— Portugual, European Com- 
munities. 



Taken from the Background Notes (May 
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



people. You just have a wonderful way 
of making people feel at home. Chief 
Lawson, and your introduction did 
nothing but add to that perception. 

I look around the room and I see 
some — I will not comment on the 
Nigerians present, but I feel privileged 
to make a comment or two about the 
Americans present probably all grum- 
bling about how the hell does the Vice 
President show up on a Saturday morn- 
ing. Well, that's the only way I could 
work it but do not be militant, do not 
throw any rolls at me; I promise to be 
mercifully brief. But this did seem like a 
fortuitous occasion, at least, for me to 
have an opportunity to visit with those 
in the private sector and the schedule 
was tight, indeed. I have been asked by 
President Reagan to represent us — 
Americans I am now speaking to — 
tomorrow just as the Vice President of 
Nigeria— Vice President Ekwueme— 
has been asked by President Shagari to 
represent Nigeria — I will be represent- 
ing the United States, standing there in 
icy cold, in Red Square on Monday, so I 
have to cut this visit a little bit short 
and fly to Moscow. 

But as I told our Nigerian friends 
yesterday, this will not deter me from 
finishing what, for us at least, is an im- 
portant trip to Africa. I'll go to Moscow, 
then fly to Frankfurt, and on down to 
Zimbabwe and continue our African 
tour. I cite this only because we believe 
that our developing— and they are still 
developing— friendly— and they are 
friendly — relationships with Africa are 



important, and sometimes we get a rap 
and maybe its fair at times, I don't 
know, of disregarding or of not paying 
proper attention to Africa. If this visit 
does nothing else, I hope it does show 
the keen interest that we have in rela- 
tionships between, in this instance, 
Nigeria, in other instances other coun- 
tries that mean so much to us on this 
continent. 

Chief Lawson referred to my back- 
ground in the oil business, and I had not 
intended to dwell on that or mention it, 
but I am very proud of it, as a matter of 
fact. Politically, at home some consider 
business to be a liability rather than an 
asset. I happen to look at it as just the 
other way around and I think that, and I 
know everybody here agrees and the 
Chief certainly does and so I will not 
dwell on it, but I remember my early 
days in business. 

I see Jay Anderson here from Texas ; 
and a few others that are familiar look- 
ing faces and I was early on the off- 
shore drilling business. Indeed our com- 
pany pioneered the construction of the 
first laterno self-elevating rig. We built 
it; we were too dumb to know that it 
might have problems so our company 
took a chance on it when no other coun- 
try would and it turned out to be one of 
the foremost designs for drilling off- 
shore. 

I don't know whether they have any 
off Nigeria right now, but anyway it was 
a very interesting and pioneering risk- 
taking time. And I emphasize that 
because many of you here are involved 







Vice President Bush meets with President Abdou Diouf. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



in risk-taking, and just as we Americans 
consider that important to profit by tak- 
ing risks, I know that Nigerians too 
share that risk-taking venturesome 
spirit. And we have much in common 
through that, so I for one am not the 
least anything but proud of the fact that 
I worked for a living, made a payroll, 
took risks, and, indeed, I must say, that 
if I hadn't done that I expect I wouldn't 
be standing here as Vice President of 
the United States, so business is impor- 
tant. 



Senegal— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 76,000 sq. mi. (about the size of South 

Dakota). Capital: Dakar. 

People 

Population: 5.6 million. Ethnic Groups: 

Wolof (36%), Fulani (17.5%), Serer (16.5%), 
Toucouleur (9%), Diola (9%), Mandingo 
(6.5%), other African (4.5%), other (1%). 
Religions; Muslim (75%), Christian (5%), 
traditional (20%). Languages; French (of- 
ficial), Wolof, Pulaar, Diola, Mandingo. 

Government 

Type: Republic. Independence: April 4, 1960. 
Constitution: March 3, 1963. Branches: Ex- 
ecutive— ? resident (chief of state). Prime 
Minister (head of government), cabinet. 
Legislative— lOO-memher unicameral Na- 
tional Assembly. Judicial — Supreme Court. 
Political Parties: Socialist Party (PS), 
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), National 
Democratic Assembly (RND), Senegalese 
Republican Movement (MRS). African In- 
dependence Party (PAl), People's Democratic 
Movement (MPD). 

Economy 

GDP: $2.2 billion (1980). Per Capita GNP: 
$330. Natural Resources: Fish, phosphate. 
Agricultural Products: Peanuts, millet, 
sorghum, manioc, rice, cotton. Industries: 
Fishing, agricultural product processing, light 
manufacturing, mining. Trade (1979): Ex- 
ports— $426 million; peanuts and peanut 
products, phosphate rock, canned fish. Im- 
ports— $713 million; food, consumer goods, 
machinery, transport equipment. Major 
Trading Partners— France, EC (other than 
France), U.S., Japan. 



Taken from the Background Notes (Dec. 
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor; Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



As I told Vice President Ekwueme, 
who met me last evening at the airport, 
in renewing a friendship that started a 
year ago, I really am pleased to be here 
in Lagos. The dynamism of the 
Nigerians, lest you have any doubt, is 
very well known in the United States. I 
am happy to be back here having 
another chance to experience it for 
myself although it's too quick, too fast 
an opportunity, no chance to see the 
ventures that many of my American 
friends, colleagues here are involved in. 
I wish that we had more time to actually 
do that kind of thing. 

Nigeria is important to the United 
States, let's say that right out at the 
beginning of this talk. We want the 
United States to be of equal importance 
to Nigeria, and if the number of 
Nigerian students in the United States is 
any guide whatsoever— they are the sec- 
ond largest group of foreign students in 
the United States this year— then I'd 
say the chances of that happening are 
extremely good. 

Those young people will come home 
with a good understanding of how 
Nigeria and the United States can do 
business together. They may come home 
with some other crazy ideas you'll have 
to knock out of them, but nevertheless 
they better come home with a— if 
they're like my kids, they may need a lit- 
tle parental guidance, but nevertheless 
they will come home, I think, with an 
appreciation of the diversity of our coun- 
try in which that respect and feeling for 
what the free enterprise system has ac- 
complished in the United States. And I 
think that they will feel that doing 
business together is a good, a positive 
thing for the people of this country just 
as we feel that strongly about Nigeria 
itself. 

I'm told that there are over 300 
American companies working in Nigeria 
today. And Americans are here because 
they feel that good prospects are here. 
You know how our system works; we 
know how your system works. And 
altruistic and generous as we may feel 
about the friendship and the warmth, 
business people are here because they 
think there are good prospects. We 
might as well lay that right out there, 
and that is the way it ought to be. 



I'll get back to that in a moment, but 
first let me share with you some of the 
recent news from the United States. 
Some of you may have been gone for a 
while. One month ago today, the Presi- 
dent told the American people America 
is recovery bound. And the indicators 
show that this recovery is going at last. 
And the signs are there and for the 
most part they are very, very positive 
signs. I don't believe that this recovery, 
slow and cautious though it may be at 
first, will be another flash in the pan. 
You've probably been waiting a long 
time, longer than we Americans are 
used to, to hear those words of modest 
encouragement. 

You may also be tempted, coming as 
I do, from the hustling, just finished, in- 
cessant travel around— I think I have 
been in 29 States since Labor Day, since 
around the end of the first week of 
September. You may also, and under- 
standably so, be tempted to look on 
those comments as partisan rhetoric. 
The election campaign, thank God it's 
over, at least for 2 years; the next one 
will be fired up January 1, I expect. 

But— and I have fun comparing the 
elections talking to our friends yester- 
day, the President of the Senate here in 
Nigeria— the similarities are just in- 
escapable about the politics. But what 
I've said is no campaign rhetoric, and I 
haven't come all this way to beat the op- 
position party over the head; I could do 
that right there in the United States. 

I won't say we don't have problems; 
we do. We have enormous problems. 
But perhaps the worst of them — all 
right, but just let me put it this way, the 
worst of them clearly in the United 
States is what for us is an unacceptable 
level of unemployment— a lot of human 
suffering going with that, we're con- 
cerned about it. 

But we faced extraordinary cata- 
strophic problems with the potential for 
even worse unemployment when we 
came into office. When we took office in 
January 1981, inflation— runaway infla- 
tion— catastrophically high interest 
rates, taxes, and an incessant growth of 
government spending. 



January 1983 



37 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



We started by pushing through a tax 
cut, and we brought down income tax 
rates by 25% the third year of that in- 
dividual tax cut going into effect this 
coming spring. We worked to slash 
government regulations. Now in front of 
a business audience, an audience this is 
aimed at, maybe there is a lesson in it 
for Nigerians, I don't know enough 
about your business, but for Americans 
we've worked to cut back on the excess 
of government regulations. And we've 
been reasonably successful. 

I'm chairman of the President's Task 
Force on Regulatory Reform, and 
business people here know that they 
have been burdened excessively by 
regulation. We're not antiregulation. 
We're going to protect the safety of the 
working place, we're going to fulfill our 
responsibilities to the environment, but 
we feel that there was a go-go decade of 
far too much regulation just for the sake 
of regulation. We estimate now that just 
based on administrative regulatory 
reform, action taken without the Con- 
gress—any legislation needed— we have 
saved over the next 10 years $70 billion 
of money that will be able to go into jobs 
or unemployment or risk-taking or 
whatever. 

We know, however, that as I stand 
here, that we are just starting but that 
growth of regulation has been cut by 
nearly two-thirds. Inflation reached a 
peak of 12.4% in 1980—12.4% for the 
United States of America, extraordinari- 
ly high. It's now dropped to 5.1% and I 
will readily concede that it's still too 
high for our country. Indeed it adversely 
impacts on Nigeria itself, a rate that 
high, but there has been a dramatic im- 
provement in less than 2 years. 

Interest rates had climbed in the 
United States, a prime rate of interest, 
an economy that interacts and has an 
adverse effect if things are bad on the 
entire world economy. Interest rates had 
climbed to 21% on the prime rate of in- 
terest in January, the month that Presi- 
dent Reagan and I took the oath of of- 
fice. And they've come down. There's 
good news in this for American 
business, and there's good news in this 
for Nigerian business because there is 
an interaction in world economies, of 
course. 



Nigeria— A Profile 

Geography 

Area: 356,700 sq. mi. (about the size of 
California, Nevada, and Arizona). Capital: 
Lagos (pop. est. 4-5 million). 

People 

Population: 80-100 million. Ethnic Groups: 

250 tribal groups: Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and 
Yoruba are the largest. Religions: Muslim, 
Christian, indigenous African beliefs, others. 
Languages: English (official), Hausa, Ibo, 
Yoruba, others. 

Government 

Type: Federal republic. Independence: Oct. 
1. 1960. Constitution: Oct. 1, 1979. Branch- 
es: Executive — Elected president and vice 
president. Legislative — bicameral National 
Assembly. Judicial — federal Supreme Court, 
lower courts. Political Parties: Great 
Nigeria People's Party, National Party of 
Nigeria, Nigeria People's Party, People's 
Redemption Party, Unity Party of Nigeria, 
Nigeria Advance Party. 

Economy 

GDP: $77 billion (1980 est.). Per Capita 
GDP: $750 (1980). Natural Resources: 

Petroluem, tin, columbite, iron ore. coal, 
limestone, lead, zinc. Agricultural Products: 

Cocoa, rubber, palm oil, yams, cassava, 
sorghum, millet, corn, rice, livestock, ground- 
nuts, cotton. Industries: Cotton, rubber, tex- 
tiles, cement, food products, footwear, metal 
products, lumber, beer, detergents, car 
assembly. Trade (1980): Exports— $26.7 
billion: petroleum (96%), columbite, cocoa, 
rubber. Imports— $15.S billion: machinery 
and transport equipment, foodstuffs, 
manufactured goods. Major Trading Part- 
ners— \].S.. EC. 



Taken from the Background Notes (Aug. 
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 




They've now dropped to 12% and I 
can tell you here that we confidently ex- 
pect those interest rates, that prime 
rate, to continue to drop. That's bring- 
ing down with it mortgage rates, and 
already we're seeing a stimulation of 
some of our fundamental industries like 
increasing car sales and a significant in- 
crease in housing. 

As President Reagan has said, we've 
been on a decade-long roller coaster 
ride, mostly because our government, 
under Republicans and Democrats, let's 
face it, have tried quick fixes on the 
economy — quick fixes that might have 
momentarily worked but didn't have any 
long-term effect. We're determined to 
stay with the fundamentals of the 
economic program and to get our 
economy back on an even keel. And in 
so doing, we think this will have the 
most beneficial effect on the other 
economies in the world. 

We know the effort is going to take 
a long time, and I wish I could give you 
a prediction of a quick total robust 
recovery; I can't do that. But it's going 
to take a long time, and it won't be easy 
because the pressiu-e is on, for those of 
you who haven't been in the States for a 
long while, for the quick fix, to tiu-n 
around and go to a quick, easy answer 
that might have political viability, might 
be acceptable politically, that would have 
adverse effect in terms of the economy 
long run. 

We are facing, in spite of the fact 
that we have cut that growth of spend- 
ing, astronomical budget deficits due to 
built-in spending increases. We went 
through a period, in the United States, 
in the late 1960s or the 1970s when we 
just figured that we would start a pro- 
gram at a million dollars, it would be 10 
the next year, it would be 100 the next, 
and the following it would be 300 and 
nobody would worry about our ability to 
pay. And now we're waking up and find- 
ing that with those built-in spending in- 
creases, somebody has to pay. And it is 
the American taxpayer and, indeed, 
we're concerned about the size of this 
budget. 

We're convinced that the policies are 
going to bring back a vigorous economy, 
as I said, but we know that we can act 



The Vice President meets with President 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



as a primary engine over the world 
economy. I feel from my talks last night, 
visiting with several of you here, that 
Nigerians share those hopes because of 
our engine with our tremendous GNP. If 
our engine begins to run smoothly again, 
it is going to need what Nigeria pro- 
duces, certainly oil, and if you can sell 
us as much of your oil as you did in 
1980, then that Nigerian economy 
should recover and recover promptly. 
And that, of course, would make it 
possible, and I might add— and I'll put 
in a little plug here— for you to buy 
more American goods. We're interested 
in that, and I don't mind being a 
salesman here today. 

That brings me to my next sub- 
ject — the prospects for American 
business here in Nigeria. I said a few 
minutes ago that there are some 300 
American companies working here. That 
doesn't include firms that only sell prod- 
ucts through trading companies. Most of 
the 300 are small firms, the backbone of 
American business. They are not listed 
on the stock exchanges, but they do a 
terribly important amount of business. 
I'll not single people out here, but I 
will single out Jay Anderson, a friend of 
mine. He and his brother, Everett, are 
rice farmers in the tremendous city of 
Eagle Lake, Texas— I'm sure everybody 
has heard of it and if you haven't it's 
also working in East Bernard, Texas! 
But Jay and his brother have formed a 
venture in Kwara State with the Isa 
Brothers— Gembery and K.K.— and the 
National Grains Production Company. 
They're building an integrated rice, 
maize, and general farming complex. In 
6 years, they plan to produce two crops 
a year of rice and corn earning an 
estimated $450 million gross for the 
project. 

That's what I call farming, and that 
is the sort of small town — Eagle Lake, 
East Bernard— expertise that 
Americans can bring to joint venture 
partners in Nigeria. And I can tell you 
all one thing about Jay Anderson— I 
don't want to embarrass him; I'll bet 
there's not a guy, not a farmer, not a 
worker, not a whatever pay a worker on 
that farm works, he's not going to get 
his hands any dirtier or work harder 
than Jay Anderson. And we Americans 
should bring that kind of willingness to 
roll up our own sleeves and get the job 
done with us. 



I single out Jay and Everett, 
possibly because they're from Texas 
which is my home State, but as long as 
I'm on that kick, I might mention 
another Texas company — Anderson 
Systems International — working in part- 
nership with Textron of Arlington, 
Virginia. They have agreed to set up 
and operate prefabricated, concrete 
structure plants in Nigeria. 

The first plant is going to be right 
here in the capital city, and I'm told the 
Federal Ministry of Housing has called 
the Anderson system the most ap- 
propriate for Nigeria that they've ever 
seen. And I have a feeling that that's 
good for Nigeria. And certainly they 
wouldn't be doing it if they didn't feel 
that it was good for the United States. 

Several other larger companies have 
also signed contracts in recent 
weeks — Foster Wheeler, Pullman- 
Kellogg, Global and Heckels, and I could 
mention others. But the point is clear, 
and I feel that I'm preaching to the 
choir, both the Nigerian side and the 
American side, or you wouldn't be sit- 
ting here on a Saturday morning. 

But the point is clear, Americans 
mean business. And having said that, I 
might as well say that many Americans 
who want to do business with Nigerians 
tell me that at times, and I hope I am 
not going to be too frank here, that at 
times they find the market somewhat 
difficult. Now you know as well as I that 
Americans are not soft; we feel that we 
can compete vigorously, effectively, if 
we're given an equal chance, and we're 
ready to meet the challenges here 
because we think the future looks good. 
And we know that money is tight in 
Nigeria just as it's tight everywhere else 
in the world. Things may not be easy 
just now but everyone with whom I have 
talked says that Nigeria is still the 
market with the best prospects in black 
Africa for the long term. We'd like to 
compete and cooperate in that market 
because we think that that's one of the 
best ways to make strong, lasting rela- 
tionships between countries. 

So this Saturday morning, I'd like to 
give a challenge to our Nigerian friends: 
Give us a chance to compete on an equal 
footing without competitors. Get your 
government to tell us, if you will, where 



and how we can best compete and let's 
not waste projects. One of our problems 
is that we don't get a chance to bid on 
some projects. And if we did, couldn't 
Nigeria give us a fair opportunity to 
work some of those sectors? I think this 
is reasonable considering that we buy an 
awful lot of oil, but we're not asking for 
something that we don't fight for or 
earn. We all know that one-sided trade 
is unhealthy. 

Let me challenge you to give Am- 
bassador Pickering details of six projects 
where you are willing to give our firms 
the first crack at making the best bid; if 
we don't get the best bid in there, we 
don't expect a thing, but give us that 
shot. And there already exists a couple 
of organizations created to help busi- 
nessmen get together. 

One of them is the Nigeria-U.S 
Business Council headed here by Chief 
Lawson. I do want to thank the Chief 
and the other council members for their 
warm hospitality. Without them, I 
wouldn't have been able to meet with 
you and I do consider this as important 
as any meeting I'm going to have in 
Africa because, as I said at the outset, 
we feel strongly about the private sector 
that drives the engine right here in 
Nigeria. 

I have high hopes for this business 
council, and I have personally endorsed 
it several times in the past. I continue to 
wish you success in your efforts to in- 
crease trade and commerce between our 
two countries. Let me assure you that 
you'll be heard with sympathetic ears 
whenever you want to consult us. 

Another organization of much longer 
standing is the Nigerian- American 
Chamber of Commerce. All of you in 
Nigeria can join, and I'm sure the Chief 
would welcome you all as members. The 
chamber has a counterpart in New 
York, as well as several chapters in 
other cities in Nigeria. Ambassador 
Pickering told me this morning that he 
had been encouraged by some of the 
chamber's recent initiatives. I wish the 
Chief and all the other members of the 
chamber every success in their efforts to 
bring together Nigerian and American 
businessmen in enterprises that should 
benefit us all. 

For our part, in the government, the 
Administration has recently cooperated 



January 1983 



39 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



with Congress to produce a new major 
piece of legislation which should bring 
many more American products and 
firms to Nigeria. It's called the Export 
Trading Company Act. I don't know how 
familiar any of you are with it, but it 
allows American banks, holding com- 
panies, and others to invest up to 5% 
and loan up to 10% of their capital and 
surplus to an export trading company. 

We think that this legislation will 
become a vital international sales tool 
enabling the business community to in- 
crease exports and provide — there was 
an estimate by Chase Econometric — of 
between 300,000 and 600,000 jobs in the 
United States associated with this and 
thus strengthening our own economy. I 
urged with representatives of the 
American banks here to see to it that 
their parent banks form such companies 
to deal with some of the top Nigerian 
traders who are here with us this morn- 
ing. 

But we're not stopping there. In the 
past couple of weeks, as we've prepared 
for this trip, we've looked hard for other 
ways to help American businesses in 
Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. We 
looked at the record and realized that 
whOe America is still Nigeria's largest 
trading partner when two-way trade is 
considered, we've slipped from second 
place to fifth place, and we can do better 
than that. We in the Administration are 
determined to do everything possible to 
assure fair trade with all of our trading 
partners in order to allow you to com- 
pete in free and fair markets on an 
equal footing. 

And, finally, I want to remind you 
all that while I have to leave Nigeria 
early tomorrow to continue this journey, 
I leave here one of our most respected 
ambassadors, Ambassador Pickering, 
whom I have known over the years and 
one who is deeply interested in and in- 
volved in the affairs I've mentioned. I 
know that some business people have 
had complaints over the years. Perhaps 
you might cite me as one who complain- 
ed that some embassies were less than 
oriented to the economic responsibilities 
of the embassy — to the private sector 
response. But I can tell you that under 
Ambassador Pickering, that it is not 
true here. 



We have somebody who understands 
the importance of the private sector. I 
know that the ambassador has a first- 
rate staff here at this embassy, and they 
do stand ready to assist in business mat- 
ters in any way they can; not to butt in, 
not to push into that private sector one- 
on-one, Nigerian versus U.S. business, 
working hand-in-hand but to facilitate, 
to speed up, to help, to advise. And so, I 
would urge that you make use of them, 
a good many of them are here among 
you this morning. 

Before I sit down, I want to say that 
I have been looking forward to coming 
back here for a long, long time. Having 
come, I only wish that we had more 
time together. I did have a good chat 
last night with Vice President Ekwueme 
and an excellent meeting with President 
Shagari as well. And we had much to 
discuss as good friends do. 

I look forward to the remainder of 
this stay. I promise you that when I 
come back that we will schedule the 
meeting at some time other than Satur- 
day morning. 

I am grateful to our Nigerian friends 
for this hospitality and let me end this 
way; I'm also grateful to the risk-taking, 
profit-oriented, competitive American 
businessmen who are with us today. You 
have our full support. 



U.S. -Nigeria 
Joint Communique 



Lagos 

Nov. 13, 1982 



Joint communique issued during the official , 
visit to the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 
Mr. George Bush, Vice President of the 
United States of America, Friday 12th to j 
Sunday 14th November, 1982. The Vice I 

President of the United States of America, ' 
Mr. George Bush, accompanied by Mrs. Bush 1 
and a delegation of high ranking government 
officials, paid an official visit to the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria from November 12 to 14, ' 
1982. at the invitation of his Nigerian 
counterpart. Dr. Alex Ifeanyichukwu 
Ekwueme. Vice President Bush had the 
honour to pay courtesy calls on His Excellen- 
cy Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, and on the 
Honorable Dr. Joseph Wayas, President of 
the Senate. 

Official talks were held between the 
visiting Vice President and his host accom- 
panied by his delegation. During these talks, 
which were characterized by cordiality and 
understanding, the two Vice Presidents ex- i 
changed information on global, political, | 

cultural, economic and social developments. j 
They examined various aspects of the present | 
state of their bilateral relations and means of i 




Vice Presidents Bush and Alex Ekwueme sign joint communique. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



urther developing and strengthening them, 
rhey also exchanged views on the world situ- 
ition and their respective countries' position 
in a number of international issues, including 
lome now before the 37th' session of the 
Jnited Nations General Assembly. The two 
/ice Presidents agreed on a number of areas 
vhere Nigeria and the United States can 
f/ork together to foster world peace and 
jrosperity. They affirmed their continued 
mpport for the United Nations and endorsed 
ts collective efforts to achieve world peace. 
The two Vice Presidents welcomed the steps 
jeing taken to effect a lasting, durable and 
lUSt peace in the Middle East, in conformity 
with Security Council resolutions. 

South Africa and Namibia: As to the 
future of southern Africa, the two Vice 
Presidents agreed that it is of vital impor- 
tance to work urgently for the achievement 
of peace and regional security in southern 
Africa. The two Vice Presidents reaffirmed 
the opposition of their governments and na- 
tions to apartheid and racial discrimination. 
As regards Namibia, the two sides reaffirmed 
their conviction of the necessity for rapid 
decolonisation and independence for Namibia 
on the basis of recognized democratic prin- 
ciples and the will of the majority of the peo- 
ple. They agreed that an internationally ac- 
ceptable independence for Namibia under the 
terms of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 435 remains an objective of 
highest priority for both governments. The 
work of the five-nation Western contact 
group and of Nigeria and the front-line 
African states to secure Namibia independ- 
ence was again strongly endorsed and it was 
agreed that close consultations between the 
two governments, and other members of both 
groups, would continue. Vice President Bush 
reviewed his government's parallel efforts to 
insure the timely withdrawal of all foreign 
farces from the area, and it was agreed that 
the matter should continue to be the subject 
of bilateral discussions between the United 
States and the Governments of Angola and 
South Africa. Vice President Ekwueme reaf- 
firmed his government's position that the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola 
must not be a condition for movement 
towards Namibia's independence. Vice Presi- 
dent Bush indicated the United States objec- 
tive is parallel and consistent with the securi- 
ty interests of all parties. 

OAU and Other African Issues; Vice 
President Bush noted his government's 
strong support for the Organization of 
African Unity, and commended the organiza- 
tion's efforts to secure peace and foster 
African development. The two Vice 



Presidents reaffirmed their governments' 
views on the need for a cease-fire and an 
early referendum in the Western Sahara in 
conformity with resolutions passed at the 
Organization of African Unity summit 
meeting in Nairobi in June, 1981. The two 
Vice Presidents expressed satisfaction at ef- 
forts to secure reconciliation and their na- 
tional unity in Chad and pledged the support 
of their governments in assisting the Govern- 
ment of Chad. 

Economic Relations: The two leaders 
discussed plans for the seventh round of 
bilateral talks to be held under the aegis of 
Vice President Ekwueme in Lagos in 
February, 1983. These talks will include 
cooperation in the areas of agriculture, 
energy, science and technology, health, trade 
and investment and education. The Vice 
Presidents agreed that they look forward to 
continuing close contact on the joint economic 
bilaterals and that each will play host to the 
meetings in the future which take place in his 
own capital city. 

Vice Presidents Ekwueme and Bush ex- 
pressed satisfaction over the inaugural 
meeting of the Nigeria-U.S. Business Council 
in September, 1982 as a concrete and effec- 
tive measure to implement earlier bilateral 
discussions. They also took note of the con- 
crete results achieved by the United States- 
Nigeria Joint Agricultural Consultative Com- 
mittee (JACC), which has contributed signifi- 
cantly to increased cooperation between the 
United States and Nigeria in support of ex- 
panding Nigerian agricultural production, as 
well as to increase sale of American 
agricultural products. They noted that the 
United States Agency for International 
Development has signed a contract to provide 
for increased staff support to the Joint 
Agricultural Consultative Committee. 

The two leaders also exchanged views on 
the current state of the world economy. Mr. 
Bush highlighted the steps being taken by the 
United States to reduce inflation and lower 
interest rates in order to set the stage for 
long-term real growth of the American 
economy. Dr. Ekwueme highlighted the 
measures recently taken by the Federal Gov- 
ernment of Nigeria to adjust economic activi- 
ty to expected levels of oil income. 



Commercial and Agriculture: The 

United States side expressed its determina- 
tion to continue to work to increased trade 
with Nigeria despite the current problems in 
the economies of both countries. Using the 
full range of available facilities such as the 
Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, the new export 
trading company legislation and with a max- 
imum role played by the private sector. The 
Nigerian side welcomed this determination 
and for its part confirmed the recent opening 
of a Nigerian Trade and Investment Center 
in New York and its plans to open another 
one in Chicago before the end of 1982. 

Note was taken of new United States De- 
partment of Agriculture credit programs 
which may become available for Nigeria. 
These would provide direct credit blended 
with export credit guarantees which would 
effectively reduce the overall cost of credit. 

Democracy and Human Rights: Vice 
President Bush expressed the strong admira- 
tion of his country and its peace for Nigeria's 
deeply held commitment to democracy and 
human rights. The deep appreciation of the 
United States Government was expressed for 
the participation of President Shagari's per- 
sonal representative as a keynote speaker at 
the recently held Washington conference on 
free elections. 

Travel and Exchanges: Both sides 
viewed with satisfaction the tradition of fruit- 
ful exchanges between citizens of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and the United States. 
Both sides reviewed the United States' deci- 
sion of July 15, 1982, to issue multiple entry 
visas valid during four years to most 
categories of Nigerian non-immigrant visa ap- 
plicants. Ways were discussed to reduce to 
the minimum extent possible the remaining 
procedural barriers in documenting persons 
for travel between the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and the United States and to work 
towards reciprocity in visa issuance pro- 
cedures. 

The two Vice Presidents expressed their 
very deep satisfaction at the useful contacts 
which were made during this visit and hoped 
that they would form the basis of future 
development in their already cordial bilateral 
relations. 

The Vice President of the United States 
of America, Mr. George Bush, expressed his 
gratitude and pleasure to his host, Dr. Alex 



January 1983 



41 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Ekwueme, for the hospitality and warm 
reception accorded to him and his delegation. 
During the talks Mr. George Bush, Vice 
President of the United States of America 
was accompanied by: 

1) The Hon. Mr. Thomas R. Pickering, United 
States Ambassador to Nigeria; 

2) Admiral Daniel Murphy, Chief of Staff to 
the Vice President; 

3) The Hon. Mr. Chester Crocker, Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs; 

4) The Hon. Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs; 

5) Mr. Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice 
President for National Security Affairs; 

6) Mr. Frederick Wettering, Senior Staff 
Director for African Affairs of the National 
Security Council. 

Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme, Vice President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, was accom- 
panied by: 

1) Hon. P.O. Bolokor, Minister of State 
Ministry of External Affairs; 

2) Hon. Ademola Thomas, Minister of State 
Ministry of National Planning; 

3) Hon. Dr. J.S. Odama, Special Adviser to 
the President on Economic Affairs; 

4) Dr. C.C. Mbadinuju, Special Assistant to 
the Vice President; 

5) Ambassador G. Dove-Edwin, Director- 
General for Regional Affairs, Ministry of Ex- 
ternal Affairs; 

6) H.E. Ambassador A.Y. Eke, Nigerian Am- 
bassador to the United States of America; 

7) Mr. D.A. Akoh, Permanent Secretary in 
the Office of the Vice President; 

8) Ambassador A.G. Gobir, Director, Ameri- 
cas and Caribbean Department, Ministry of 
External Affairs; 

9) Mr. Fola Olateru-Olagbegi, Counsel to the 
Vice President and other high-ranking of- 
ficials. 

Done in Lagos this 13th Day of 
November, 1982. 

Mr. George Bush, Vice President of 
the United States of America. 

Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme, Vice President 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 



ZIMBABWE 



Dinner Toast 



Harare 

Nov. 16, 19823 

Thirty-one hours ago in Moscow, I dis- 
cussed my mission to Africa with Presi- 
dent Zia of Pakistan. When I mentioned 
Prime Minister Mugabe, President Zia 
made reference to something with which 
informed men and informed women 
everywhere on Earth agree. Therefore, 
I want to acknowledge that I stand in 
the presence of a genuine statesman — 
the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert 
Mugabe. His stature in the world is well- 
established, highly respected, and it will 
be, I'm confident, more formidable in the 
years to come. 

You know very well that some 
greeted the birth of this new nation with 
grim doubts. Some wondered whether a 
revolutionary movement could govern, 
and others pointed to the gulf of mis- 
trust and hatred engendered by years of 
war. You faced multiple challenges. 

• How to develop peacefully in a 
region full of polarized conflicts. 

• How to retain and build upon one 
of Africa's strongest and most diversi- 
fied free market economies while also 
spreading its benefits to the majority of 
the population. 

• How to retain the confidence, 
skills, and loyalty of white Zimbabweans 
while responding to the aspirations of 
those who fought and voted for you. 

It is not my job as your guest, nor 
would I be presumptuous enough, to 
issue a report card on your leadership 
and your new nation. You have faced 
awesome challenges, some overcome, 
and some still on your agenda. I do want 
to say on behalf of the Reagan Adminis- 
tration that we support — we strongly 
support — the policy of reconciliation to 
which you have committed yourself — 
just as we support the constitutional 
agreements reached at Lancaster House. 
We believe Zimbabwe represents a noble 
experiment in the midst of a strife-torn 
region. It also represents an effort to 
put aside the past and begin the work of 
healing. We have supported your coun- 



try because its success is consistent with 
U.S. principles and U.S. interests. I will 
report to President Reagan that Zim- 
babwe continues to deserve our support, 
because America is committed to back- 
ing peaceful change, economic develop- 
ment, and is committed to the rule of 
law. 

I am proud that my country has 
played a part in Zimbabwe's young life. 
You might recall that when your country 
gained independence, the United States 
was one of the first to open an embassy 
in this city. You have pressed for Nami- 
bian settlement with both urgency and 



Zimbabwe— A Profile 

Geography 

Area: 151,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than 

Montana). Capital: Harare (pop. 650,000). 

People 

Population: 10.5 million (Oct. 1982 est.). 
Ethnic Groups: Shona (77%), Ndelele (19%), 
white (3%), less than 1% coloureds (mixed 
race) and Asians. Religions: Part Christian, 
part traditional faiths (50%), Christian (25%), 
traditional (24%), some Muslim. Languages: 
English (official), Shona, Sindebele. 

Government 

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Independ- 
ence: Apr. 18, 1980. Constitution: Dec. 21, 
1979. Branches: Executive — president, prime 
minister (head of government). 
Legislative — bicameral Parliament. 
Judicial — High Court divided between 
general and appellate divisions. Political 
Parties: Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU-PF), Zimbabwe African People's 
Union (PF-ZAPU), United African National 
Council (UANC), Republican Front. 

Economy 

GNP: $5.8 billion (Dec. 1981). Per Capita In- 
come: $13,480 (whites); $314-655 (African). 
Natural Resources: Chrome, coal, asbestos, 
copper, nickel, gold, iron ore, vanadium. 
Agricultural Products: Tobacco, corn, 
sorghum, wheat, sugar, cotton, cattle. In- 
dustries: Mining, manufacturing. Trade Ex- 
ports— $937 million (1981): agricultural prod- 
ucts, especially tobacco, cotton, and corn, and 
minerals. Imports— $1.34 billion: finished 
manufactured goods and equipment, 
petroluem, transport equipment. Major 
Trading Partners — South Africa, U.S., 
Japan, U.K., F.R.G., France. 



42 



Taken from the Back-ground Notes (Oct. 
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



skill. Just as important, Zimbabwe itself 
provides a model on which efforts to 
free Namibia could succeed. Compromise 
and dedication will once again win 
through. 

As you know, since first taking of- 
fice. President Reagan and his Adminis- 
tration have labored for a Namibian set- 
tlement. We have spared no effort. We 
have worked with the Western contact 
group, with the frontline states, with 
SWAPO [South West Africa People's 
Organization], and with the Government 
of South Africa. Assistant Secretary [for 
African Affairs Chester A.] Crocker, 
here with us tonight, has spent more 
time on this than on any other African 
matter. 

We intend to serve as a disinter- 
ested and honest broker — disinterested 
in the sense of not prejudicing our abili- 
ty to serve in that intermediary role. 
The United States possesses neither 
troops nor proxies in the region. We 
have no colonial interests, nor do we 
have military ambitions. On the con- 
trary, the sole American interests in 
South Africa are the interests of all men 
in all places — freedom and peace. Our 
efforts follow distinguished precedents. 
American labors helped build peace be- 
tween Israel and Egypt. British efforts, 
of course, helped lead to your own inde- 
pendence. So today we labor on, with 
Zimbabwe and other nations, to clear 
the region of all foreign troops so that 
Namibia might be free. 

A top priority in our diplomacy is 
southern Africa, where the choices be- 
tween regional strife on one hand and 
regional cooperation on the other hand 
are stark. The inescapable need for 
peaceful change is challenged by a 
climate of fear, distrust, foreign inter- 
vention, and cross-border violence. The 
United States is committed to the search 
for constructive change in southern 
Africa. 

The United States wants an end to 
South Africa's occupation of Namibia. 
At the same time, the United States 
wants an end to Angola's suffering and 
to the dangerous cycle of violence in the 
region. 

Our number one strategic objective 
in Africa is to help establish a frame- 
work of restraint — a framework that 
discourages outside intervention in Afri- 
can conflicts while it encourages 
negotiated solutions and constructive 
change. 



A moment ago I mentioned our 
journey to Moscow. No doubt you have 
all seen photographs of President Brezh- 
nev's funeral. The image that struck me 
the most— one that I will never forget — 
was the magnificent and stately display 
of Soviet soldiers. As I watched those 
young men, I could not help noting that 
they were about the same age as our 
own four sons, and I felt again what I 
have often felt since taking up this of- 
fice — a sudden, sharp sense of the re- 
sponsibility that lies on those who lead 
nations. I know that you share that deep 
sense of responsibility that lies on those 
who lead nations. I know that you will 
continue to exercise your responsibility 
for the good of this exciting new vibrant 
nation and in the interests of peace. 

Finally, I want to thank all of our 
hosts for their extraordinary kindness 
and their extraordinary patience, par- 
ticularly in light of the schedule changes 
because of our trip to Moscow. And I 
think all of you should join with me in 
thanking Mrs. Mugabe and all others 
who have done such a marvelous job in 
arranging this wonderful dinner. 

Ladies and gentlemen, please raise 
your glasses and join me in a toast to 
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and to 
the Republic of Zimbabwe and to its con- 
tinued development and health. 




ZAMBIA 



Luncheon Toast 

Lusaka 

Nov. 18, 1982^ 

Today Mrs. Bush will visit Council 
House number 394 in Chilenje. It is a 
humble building. Several decades ago 
the son of a poor preacher was raised 
there. In those days Zambia was not 
ruled by its own people but by those in a 
foreign capital, thousands of miles away. 
The preacher's son, Kenneth Kaunda, 
grew up to work with the people of 
Zambia to change that. 

For 18 years now, Zambians have 
governed Zambia. Your political institu- 
tions demonstrate your commitment to 
human freedom and dignity. You prac- 
tice democracy. As I moved about 
Lusaka today, I could not fail to notice 
that you are preparing for the 1983 elec- 
tions. In 1983, as in the past elections, 
this nation will acknowledge that the 
Government of Zambia is responsible to 
the Zambian people. 

You believe in a sturdy and inde- 



Left: The Vice President meets with 
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. 



Below: Arrival ceremony with Deputy 
Prime Minister Simon Muzenda. 




January 1983 



43 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



1 






pendent judiciary. Like my own country, 
Zambia possesses a written constitution 
and extensive legal codes. Zambia 
adheres to the rule not of individual men 
but of the law. 

In Zambia's 18 years of independ- 
ence, your national life has grown 
vigorous. Two points especially strike 
me; first, the value you place on a free 
press. Just a few weeks ago, when he 
dedicated your new mass media com- 
plex, President Kaunda restated 
Zambia's commitment to an unfettered 
but responsible press. A free press con- 
tributes to a sense of national identity, 
to honesty in government, and to the 
impartial administration of the law. You 
in Zambia know that. 

Second, I have been impressed by 
this nation's stunning success in educa- 
tion. Like Americans, Zambians have 
possessed a reverence for learning. In 
Zambia those entrusted with power have 
realized that they need not fear edu- 
cated citizens but rather welcome an in- 
formed electorate as a source of national 
strength and political well-being. As 
President Kaunda has said: "Any nation 
or people which does not value trained 
intelligence is doomed." 




Vice President Bush exchanges toasts with 
President Kenneth Kaunda. 



When this nation achieved independ- 
ence, it contained fewer than 100 univer- 
sity graduates. Today Zambia boasts a 
fine national university, teacher-training, 
and technical institutions, and several 
thousand new graduates each year. I call 
that success. 

I am proud that my country has 
played a part in this nation's life. You 
might recall that when Zambia achieved 
independence, the United States was 
one of the first to establish a resident 
embassy here. From the first we offered 
not only friendship but cultural ex- 
changes and, still more important, tech- 
nical and economic aid. The relative mix 
of our programs has changed over the 
years to meet your needs. In recent 
years, our economic assistance program 
in Zambia — one of the largest in 
Africa — has reflected the importance 
both our governments place on the 
growing of food. Food aid, commodity 
imports, and help with your planning, 
research, and marketing have all repre- 
sented aspects of our program. 

Zambia's leaders have candidly 
stated that the economic mess that beset 
us all has sharply curtailed the resources 
you can dedicate to this country's devel- 
opment. My country is willing to provide 
special economic assistance. At the same 
time, however, we believe that expanded 
private investment in Zambia is 
necessary to strengthen this country's 
economy. But President Reagan is cut- 
ting inflation and providing incentives 
that will spur private investment and 
lead to sustained growth. The best way 
Americans can help the world economy 
is by strengthening our own. 

The United States supports Zambia 
because doing so accords with American 
principles and American interests. Yet 
our friendship represents not only 
shared interests but. as all warm friend- 
ships must, common experiences. Both 
the United States and Zambia have 
gathered languages, customs, and races 
into one nation. Your rallying cry — "One 
Zambia, one nation" — expresses the 
same sentiment as our own national 
motto, E pluribus unum, out of many, 
one." For two centuries the United 
States has represented a model for 
other nations. Now for nearly two 
decades, Zambia has done the same. 



Zambia's example possesses par- 
ticular importance for southern Africa. 
President Kaunda has worked long and 
selflessly as a leader of the front-line 
states to bring independence to Namibia. 
Since first taking office in 1981, Presi- 
dent Reagan and his Administration 
have done the same. As I stated in Zim- 
babwe, we have spared no effort. We 
have worked with the Western Contract 
Group, with the front-line states, with 
SWAPO, and with the Government of 
South Africa. Assistant Secretary 
Crocker has spent more time on this 



Zambia— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 290,585 sq. mi. (slightly larger than 

Texas). Capital: Lusaka (pop. 538,469). 

People 

Population: 5.7 million (1980 census). Ethnic 
Groups: Mostly Bantu tribal groups. 
Religions: Christian, indigenous beliefs. 
Languages: English (official), about 70 local 
languages and dialects. 

) 
Government 

Type: Republic. Independence: Oct. 24, 
1964. Constitution: 1973. Branches: Ex- 
ecutwe — president (chief of state), central 
committee of party, cabinet. Legislative — uni- 
cameral National Assembly. 
Judicial — Supreme Court. Political Party: 
United National Independence Party (UNIP). 

Economy 

GDP: $1.4 billion (1979). Per Capita Income: 
$258 (1970 prices). Natural Resources: Cop- 
per, cobalt, zinc, lead, coal emeralds, gold, 
silver, uranium, excellent hydroelectric 
power, fertile land. Agricultural Products: 
Corn, tobacco, cotton, soybeans, groundnuts, 
sugarcane, horticultural products. Industries: 
Transport, construction, foodstuffs, 
beverages, chemicals, textiles, fertilizer. 
Trade (1979): Exports— $1.2 billion: copper, 
zinc, lead, cobalt, gold, silver, tobacco, 
forestry products. Imports — $648 million: 
manufactured goods, machinery, transport 
equipment, foodstuffs. Major Trading Part- 
ners — Japan, South Africa, France, U.K., 
Saudi Arabia, U.S., F.R.G., Italy, Bahrain. 



Taken from the Background Notes (May 
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs. Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



han on any other African matter. As I 
ave made clear in Senegal, Nigeria, 
nd Zimbabwe, the United States seeks 
serve as a disinterested and honest 
iroker. We possess neither troops nor 
)roxies in the region. We have neither 
olonial interests nor military ambitions, 
nstead, the sole American interests in 
Africa are the interests of all men in all 
)laces— freedom and peace. We follow 
listinguished precedents. American ef- 
orts helped build peace between Israel 
ind Egypt. British work helped lead to 
'Jmbabwe's independence. As we work, 
'OUT Honor, we take realism as our 
vatchword. As President Kaunda has 
vritten, we must avoid "both cynical 
)essimism and facile optimism and 
iiscover some hard realisms." We will 
abor on until all foreign troops 
withdraw from southern Africa so 
Mamibia might be free. 

Two weeks ago, I was enjoying the 
iutumn in Washington with my family, 
rhree days ago, I stood in the chill 
A'inter wind in Moscow. As I watched a 
stately display of Russian soldiers, I 
■ouldn't help thinking that many of them 
A'ere the same age as our four sons. To- 
day I am in a city of flame trees and 
jacarandas, experiencing a beautiful 
African summer. Again in Zambia I 
nave noticed many young men the same 
ige as our sons. 

Seasons change. Languages differ. 
But the dreams in the hearts of young 
men and women remain the same. They 
are dreams of careers pursued in 
freedom and prosperity. They are 
dreams of families raised in peace. 
Through the wisdom and labors of Ken- 
neth Kaunda and many present today, in 
Zambia those dreams can come true. 

Ladies and gentlemen, please join 
me in toasting President Kaunda, the 
Secretary General, and the Republic of 
Zambia. 



KENYA 

Remarks Before the 
Kenya Chamber 
of Commerce 



Nairobi 
Nov. 19. 1982 

You do the United States a great honor 
in receiving me this evening. I bring you 
the greetings of the President of the 
United States and of millions of my 
fellow citizens who are sincerely in- 
terested in America's longstanding 
friendship with the Continent and people 
of Africa. I bring also special greetings 
to President Daniel arap Moi and to all 
Kenyans. Your country is an old friend 
of the United States and is dear to us 
all. 

The past 10 days have been impor- 
tant to me. President Reagan asked me 
to carry our message of friendship and 
deep commitment to a true partnership 
with the nations of Africa. We are 
determined to work with the leaders of 
this continent in the quest for peace and 
progress. My visit has been particularly 
satisfying. It has permitted us to see old 
friends and make new ones. 

I have exchanged views with some 
of Africa's most impressive leaders. I 
have had an opportunity to see and feel 
firsthand the diversity of this beautiful 
continent and to sense its great promise. 
In several days I will be able to share 
with President Reagan and my fellow 
Americans the thinking of Africa's 
leaders on the major issues important 
to us. 

It should come as no surprise to you 
that President Reagan thought that it 
was especially important for me to visit 
Kenya. Since Kenya's independence, 
close ties have bound our two countries 
and peoples. Your nation has been ad- 
mired in the United States for its 
political and economic record. 

We share important values— demo- 
cratically elected governments, civilian 
rule, freedom of press and religion, a 
multiracial society, and an economy 
guided by the principles of free enter- 
prise. Kenya has been a strong advocate 



for peace in the world. Your country 
and its distinguished president have led 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
during a year in which Africa faced 
many problems. Because Kenya has 
served this year as spokesman for 
Africa's aspirations, I am especially 
pleased to speak from the city of Nairobi 
to all the people of Africa. I particularly 
wish to speak about the hopes and 
values which grew up during Africa's 
struggle for independence and which will 
guide Africa as it faces the future. Chief 
among these values is the desire for 
freedom— freedom of nations from out- 
side pressures and freedom of people 
within nations. That desire gave birth to 
the OAU, thanks to the recognition 
that— without regional cooperation— the 
peace, progress, and independence of 
Africa would not be maintained. Such 
cooperation is not an easy goal given the 
great variety of peoples, circumstances, 
and cultures in Africa. This tremendous 
diversity, coupled with the harsh impact 
of today's global economic recession, 
underscores more than ever the impor- 
tance of African regional cooperation for 
common purposes. 

There is no justification for despair 
about Africa's future. Despite trials and 
setbacks, the history of Africa since the 
independence era has included signifi- 
cant progress, especially in the develop- 
ment of human resources. Education, 
talent, and energy— such as that 
represented by this very audience- 
prove that Africa has the capacity to 
make good the promise of its enormous 
potential in spite of the many problems 
it faces. Thanks to the abilities and 
values which men and women, like 
ourselves, bring to the everyday task of 
national development, Africa can enter 
its third decade of independence with 
confidence in the future. 

Because we believe that Africa has 
the capacity and will to be master of its 
destiny, President Reagan has over the 
past 20 months worked to forge a new 
and mature partnership with the nations 
and people of Africa. We speak of a 
partnership that begins with mutual 
respect. We speak of a partnership that 
includes honest discussions. We speak of 
a partnership which recognizes that each 
nation must do its part if the goals we 
share are to be achieved. Partnership is 



January 1983 



45 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



a two-way street based on shared goals, 
common principles, and mutual in- 
terests. 

These principles have guided our 
Administration's policies toward Africa. 
The time is ripe for the sort of candid 
dialogue I have been privileged to ex- 
perience on this trip. And I have learned 
a lot. A top priority in our diplomacy is 
southern Africa, where the choices be- 
tween regional strife and regional 
cooperation are stark. The inescapable 
need for peaceful change is challenged 
by a climate of fear, distrust, foreign in- 
tervention, and cross-border violence. 

Search for Constructive Change in 
Southern Africa 

The United States is committed to the 
search for constructive change in 
southern Africa. In cooperation with our 
allies and in direct response to the will 
of Africa's leaders, the United States 
has engaged its influence and resources 
in the effort to bring Namibia to in- 
dependence. We are determined to help 
turn the sad tide of growing conflict and 
tension in southern Africa. We are fully 
committed to work for a settlement that 
will enhance regional security and 
assure Namibia's early independence on 
terms acceptable to its people, Africa, 
and the world at large. 

Let me state again, we are fully 
committed to an independent Nambia. 
I can assure you that significant prog- 
ress has been made. A year ago the set- 
tlement effort was relaunched with 
vigor. Since then, the United States and 
its Western contact group partners have 
worked closely and intensively with all 
parties. This past July agreement was 
reached on the principles which will 
guide Nambia's constituent assembly. 
Since then, substantial progress has 
been made on remaining issues concern- 
ing the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 435. We are close to 
agreement on implementation of the 
U.N. plan. Remaining issues can be 
resolved. 

From the outset of this Administra- 
tion's engagement in the peace process, 
we have emphasized that there are vital- 
ly important issues arising from the 
situation in Angola which must be 
resolved if Namibia's independence is to 
be achieved. For 7 years Angola has 



46 



Kenya— A Profile 

Geography 

Area: 224,960 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than 

Texas). Capital: Nairobi (pop. 959,000). 

People 

Population: 17.5 million (1981 est.). Ethnic 
Groups: Kikuyu (21%), Luhya (14%), Luo 
(13%), Kalenjin (11%), Kamba (11%), Kisii 
(6%), Meru (5%), Asian, European, Arab. 
Religions: Indigenous beliefs (26%), Protes- 
tant (38%), Roman Catholic (28%), Muslim 
(6%). Languages: English, Swahili, and many 
tribal languages. 

Government 

Type: Republic. Independence: Dec. 12, 
1963. Constitution: 1963. Branches: Ex- 
ecutive—president (chief of state, head of 
government, commander in chief of armed 
forces). Legislative — unicameral 158-member 
National Assembly. Judicial— High Court, 
various lower courts. Political Party: Kenya 
African National Union (KANU). 

Economy 

GDP (1981 current prices): $3.2 billion. Per 
Capita Income: $196 (1981). Natural 
Resources: Wildlife, land. Agricultural 

Products: Com, wheat, rice, sugarcane, cof- 
fee, tea, sisal, pineapples, pyrethrum, meat 
and meat products, hides, skins. Industries: 
Petroleum products, cement, beer. Trade Ex- 
ports — $1.04 billion: coffee, petroleum prod- 
ucts, tea, hides and skins, meat and meat 
products, cement, pyrethrum, sisal, soda ash, 
wattle extract, pineapples. Imports— $1.9 
billion: crude petroleum, machinery, vehicles, 
iron and steel, paper and paper products, 
pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, textiles. Major 
Trading Partners— EC, U.S., Canada, Zam- 
bia, Iran, Japan, Australia, India, China. 



Taken from the Background Not£s (Sept. 
1982), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State, Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



been engulfed in war, its terrority in- 
vaded, its progress toward a better 
economic future stalled. Thousands of 
Cuban troops remain in Angola. 
Wouldn't Angola and the region itself be 
better off with all foreign forces out of 
that country — South African forces and 
Cuban forces? 

The history of foreign conquest in 
Africa is replete with examples of armed 



foreigners who came with the professed 
purpose of helping others but who 
stayed in order to help themselves. The 
withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola 
in a parallel framework with South 
Africa's departure from Namibia is the 
key to the settlement we all desire. In 
the final analysis, it is also the surest 
way to guarantee Angola's long-term 
security and independence. The United 
States wants the earliest possible in- 
dependence for Namibia. At the same 
time, the United States wants an end to 
Angola's suffering and to the dangerous 
cycle of violence in the region. My 
government is not ashamed to state the 
U.S. interest in seeing an end to the 
presence of Cuban forces in Angola. 
Their introduction 7 years ago tore the 
fabric of reciprocal restraint between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the developing world. Such restraint 
is vital if African regional security and 
the global balance are to be maintained. 

We recognize there will be no agree- 
ment unless all the parties know that 
their security is protected. We also 
recognize there will be no settlement 
unless each party is prepared to make 
the concessions necessary. If the 
challenge is accepted, we believe peace 
can be achieved and a brighter future 
for southern Africa can begin. The 
substantial progress already made is 
based on a diplomatic partnership of 
equals in which all parties share 
burdens. That partnership remains vital 
in our continuing efforts for peace. In 
the search for that peace, the United 
States seeks constructive relations with 
all the states of southern Africa. We are 
building bridges of communication to 
each nation in the region, including 
South Africa. 

However, we will not ignore or 
disguise our strong belief in the impor- 
tance of justice and equality before the 
law. Apartheid is wrong. It is legally en- 
trenched racism— inimical to the funda- 
mental ideals of the United States. 
America's history and America's future 
can only be understood in terms of our 
commitment to a multiracial democracy 
in which all citizens participate and from 
which all benefit. The rule of law, the 
principles of consent and participation 
in the political process, and the right 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




he Vice President meets with President Daniel Arap Moi. 



f every human being to citizenship 
•hich reflects these principles are to 
jiiericans a sacred trust. We will not 
etray this trust. 

Nor can we escape reality: If there 
; to be security in southern Africa, 
iouth Africa must be involved in shap- 
ig it. If there is to be constructive 
hange in South Africa, South Africans 
f all races— not foreigners— must be the 
ines who shape the pattern of that 
hange. The United States is working 
or constructive change in ways that 
lenefit all South Africans. Our actions 
natch our words, as our deepening in- 
'olvement in expanding educational, 
iocial, and economic opportunities for 
ilack South Africans demonstrates. We 
ilso believe there is a relationship be- 
.ween the security of southern Africa 
ind the pace of peaceful change within 
South Africa. We do not believe that 
armed conflict must be the road to 
justice, and we doubt that it can be the 
road to lasting freedom and well-being. 



Support for Human Rights and 
Regional Stability 

The United States believes that it can be 
helpful in advancing the frontier of 
freedom and observance of human 
rights, not only in southern Africa but in 
Africa as a whole. Without respect for 
human rights, there is a great risk that 
Africa's enormous human potential will 
be wasted. Fear and intimidation keep 
people from working to achieve their 
aspirations, from contributing to the 
common good, and from pursuing the 
democratic principles and ideals that are 
denied for too many in the world today. 
Narrowing political participation by 
their citizens can be highly counter- 
productive. African nations that have 
devised their own national democratic 
institutions broaden public participation 
in government, protect the integrity of 
the individual, and expand the frontier 
of economic freedom for the ultimate 
good of all. 

In Kenya respect for individual 
rights is written in your constitution. 
Democratic institutions that embody the 
democratic process have been estab- 
lished. They are an essential framework 



January 1983 



for lasting stability. Experience in 
Africa and elsewhere clearly 
demonstrates that the abuse of power, 
the suppression of diversity, and the 
denial of individual rights only leads to 
instability and a loss of confidence at 
home and abroad. My visit to Africa has 
shown me encouraging examples of 
African nations that are building their 
own institutions to broaden political par- 
ticipation and advance the frontier of 
freedom. We realize, however, that na- 
tions cannot reap the benefits of in- 
dividual freedom in an environment of 
insecurity. We attach high importance to 
strengthening Africa's security and are 
prepared to be Africa's partner in 
building the necessary conditions for 
security. 

We have no interest in an East- West 
confrontation in Africa; such a con- 
frontation increases the threat to world 
peace. The goal of the United States in 
Africa is to help establish a framework 
for restraint and broad rules of conduct 
which discourage the use of outside 
force in African conflicts and encourage 
peaceful settlement of conflicts in the 
region. In this area our goal is con- 
sistent with the goals enshrined in the 
Charter of the Organization of 'African 
Unity. 

At the same time, the United States 
is deeply sensitive to the threats which 
individual nations and the regions of this 
continent face and probably will continue 
to face. Internal stability, often fueled 
by outside interference, and longstand- 
ing border and ethnic disputes tax heavi- 
ly the resources of African governments. 
The United States has no mandate to 
act as a policeman in Africa, and it 
seeks no such role. But neither do we 
believe that the sovereignty of African 
nations will be preserved if the West is 
unable or unwilling to respond to the 
legitimate defense needs of its friends in 
Africa. The United States intends to be 
a reliable partner both in working with 
our friends on a long-term basis to meet 
these needs and in responding to their 
urgent requirements in emergency situa- 
tions. We have done so in the past; we 
are doing so today. Let there be no 
doubt about our determination and 
capability to do so in the future. 

At the same time, our overall con- 
cern, including the concern that guides 
our military assistance, is to dissuade 



47 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



countries from undertaking military 
solutions and to encourage negotiated 
settlements of differences between 
them. We believe negotiated solutions 
are possible for even the most difficult 
and longstanding disputes on the conti- 
nent. We are ready to lend whatever 
support we can to those efforts in Africa 
and to give them the highest priority. In 
this view, we believe that Africa's 
capacity for collective security deserves 
our help. We will, when asked, support 
multinational peacekeeping forces that 
Africa creates in its own defense. The 
record of the United States in support of 
the OAU peacekeeping role in Chad is 
the most recent illustration of the impor- 
tance we attach to regional security. We 
want African nations to be able to de- 
fend their interests and resolve their 
problems without foreign intervention. 

Response to Economic Crisis 

Real security, and with it the confidence 
that can enhance prospects for peace, 
cannot be achieved without sustained 
economic growth. During my travels, I 
have seen Africa's most serious eco- 
nomic crisis in more than 40 years. 
Because African countries are often 
dependent on one or two export com- 
modities — and because they have bor- 
rowed heavily to spur growth and meet 
the costs of higher oil prices — they have 
been vulnerable to commodity fluctua- 
tions, high interest rates, and to the im- 
pact of world recession. There has been 
a long, slow decline in per capita food 
production, population has increased 
rapidly, and balanced growth has not oc- 
curred. Many nations have experimented 
with subsidies, centralized economic 
direction, and extensive public owner- 
ship of industry and commerce. Those 
strategies have proved costly. 

The present state of the global 
economy is not of Africa's making. In 
the world economic system, the United 
States has a special responsibility not 
only to put its own house in order but to 
help rekindle growth in other lands. We 
are deeply committed to that task, and 
to achieve it the American people are 
making real sacrifices. We are confident 
that when we are successful Africa will 
benefit quickly and significantly. 

At the most fundamental level, we 
will remain concerned about those im- 



48 




Vice President Bush tours a Del Monte plant at Kenya Canners. 



periled by strife and starvation. We 
have taken the lead both in mobilizing 
international relief efforts to help 
African refugees and in providing 
emergency assistance. In the past 2 
years the United States has provided 
Africa $187 million for such programs. 
But we are equally concerned about the 
underlying problems which produce 
refugees and other forms of human 
misery. 

As we all look at these problems, we 
can see that the next few years in Africa 
will be critical. The current economic 
situation is forcing austerity on all 
African nations. It points to the need for 
ree.xamination of economic strategies 
and national economic policies. It would 
be a mistake to view this period as only 
a temporary phenomenon and to believe 
that as the world recession begins to 
ease, Africa will be able to resume an 
easy path of gi-owth and diversity. On 
the contrary, in the current situation 
many fundamental decisions must be 
made about the future of African 
development, about the priorities of 
agriculture and other sectors, and about 
the degree of sacrifice that should be 
demanded of the various elements of the 
population. How these decisions are 
made will affect the future of African 
development for decades to come. 



We in the United States admit that 
there are serious differences among ex- 
perts over the best path to development |li 
We believe that there should be a full 
exchange among all those involved in 
African development. We must reach a 
common agreement regarding the kindsji 
of programs which must be developed, 
financed, and mobilized. Discipline and 
self-reliance are necessary. Courageous 
leadership is necessary. Now is the time 
for fresh thinking, an eschewing of old 
ideologies that have not passed the test 
of experience. 

We are prepared to help give 
African governments the wherewithal 
and the international political and finan- 
cial backing to take the steps where 
necessary to restructure their econ- 
omies. 

During the past 2 years, a growing 
number of African countries have ap- 
plied to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for assistance in meeting 
immediate balance-of-payments crises. 
This has led to difficult adjustments in 
exchange rates, budgets, and other 
aspects of economic policy. 

Recognizing the fundamental nature 
of the development crisis, we have en- 
couraged a more comprehensive ap- 
proach by both donors and multilateral 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



agencies in Africa. We have urged that 
reform be supported with short-term 
foreign exchange and development 
assistance adequate to fuel the recovery 
process. We are fully aware of the im- 
portance of debt in this equation. Where 
countries are making serious efforts to 
restructure their economies, relief from 
heavy debt must be part of the foreign 
exchange program. For our part, we are 
committed to participating in the dif- 
ficult process of recovery. 

The United States, despite the fact 
that its resources are under special 
strain in this time of economic adversity, 
still remains committed to Africa's 
stabilization and growth. Our bilateral 
economic aid for all of Africa now totals 
approximately $800 million a year and 
extends to 46 countries throughout 
Africa. It encompasses a variety of pro- 
grams, including fast-disbursing balance- 
of-payments support, food aid, and 
development assistance. Including the 
U.S. contribution to multilateral pro- 
grams, our total economic aid to sub- 
Saharan Africa is in excess of $1.4 
billion annually. Of the multilateral por- 
tion, the largest share by far— almost 
$300 million per year— goes to the soft 
loan programs of the World Bank's In- 
ternational Development Association. 

The Reagan Administration has 
placed a new emphasis on the role of 
private enterprise in development. In 
Africa, as elsewhere, we define "private 
sector" broadly to include small 
businesses and farmers, as well as large 
corporations. Our aid planners are seek- 
ing new ways to help develop market in- 
stitutions and more effective incentives 
for farmers. Wherever possible, we are 
encouraging mutually beneficial partner- 
ships between large and small American 
companies and their African counter- 
parts. The recent enactment of export 



trading legislation supported by Presi- 
dent Reagan will make it possible for 
small and medium-size U.S. firms to 
pool expenses and thereby play a more 
active economic role in Africa. 

The economic task that you and we 
face is enormous. But it is far from im- 
possible if we all work together in a wise 
and understanding partnership. The 
exact nature of that cooperation will be 
as varied as the countries of Africa, but 
it will have some common elements. We, 
the industrialized countries, must help 
Africans manage their debt burden so 
that private credit, which is so essential 
to growth, can resume and increase. We 
must support successful economic 
policies at both the national and regional 
levels. We must seek greater coordina- 
tion among Africa's friends who wish to 
finance development. The importance of 
Africa's economic future demands that 
we do no less. 

As we all look to the future and 
decide how Africa and the United States 
can work together, the agenda of issues 
we face is long. It includes essential 
issues of security, peacemaking, human 
rights, and economic progress. It calls 
for advancing the frontiers of freedom. 

The United States is a friend which 
respects your potential and shares your 
commitment to maintaining the hard- 
won prize of freedom. With respect to 
that freedom, our nations are equals 
which must be prepared to work to- 
gether, making sacrifices and taking 
tough decisions at the same time. Each 
of us has a share of the burden to carry; 
each has a contribution to make. All 
have a better future to gain. This is the 
meaning of a true partnership. 



ZAIRE 



Luncheon Toast 



Kinshasa 
Nov. 22. 1982^ 

I am delighted to be here in Zaire. Let 
me thank you first, Mr. President, and 
the Zairian people for the warmth of 
your welcome and for the hospitality and 
generosity for which Zaire is so justly 
famous. 

My visit to Zaire is only one symbol 
of the long and close relationship which 
our two nations have enjoyed over the 
past 22 years. It is a relationship of 
mutual respect and confidence. And, as 
such, we believe it to be one which is 
solid and lasting. 

As two nations which are friends, 
two peoples who have come to know 
each other in so many ways over the 
years, we have stood side by side in 
times of difficulty. We have enjoyed 
cooperative relations in many areas. 

The United States is proujd to have 
been able to assist this great and impor- 
tant nation of Africa in various ways. 
We have played a significant role in in- 
suring Zaire's security and stability since 
shortly after your independence. We are 
continuing our efforts in this respect to- 
day. 

We will continue to assist in the 
development of the substantial resources 
to stimulate the agricultural potential of 
this country and to improve the health 
services of the population. American 
private industry has invested in Zaire 
and in so doing has created jobs and 
helped develop the industrial sector. 

Our cultural and educational ex- 
changes have encircled both our coun- 
tries as Americans have become more 
aware of and knowledgeable about 
Zaire, and Zairians have been able to 
benefit from the best aspects of our 
culture and society. I note with satisfac- 
tion that in the last generation literally 
thousands of Zairian citizens have 
studied in the United States and re- 
turned to Zaire to work for the better- 
ment of their country. 

As thousands of Zairians have gone 
to the United States and returned here 



January 1983 



49 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




Arrival ceremony at the People's Palace with President Mobuto Sese Seko. 



to work in Zaire, thousands of our 
citizens have Hved and worked in Zaire 
as members of the Peace Corps. The 
Peace Corps program here is one of the 
largest in the world and one of the most 
effective means of strengthening the 
bonds between the United States and 
Zaire. 

The bonds which unite us are deep 
and multifaceted, and I assure you that 
we in the United States, from President 
Reagan on dov*m, wish and, indeed, ex- 
pect that these close ties and relations 
will continue and increase between our 
two Presidents, between our two 
governments, and, most importantly, 
between our two peoples. We want to be 
a partner in your national effort to 
develop the enormous human and 
natural resources that are Zaire's for the 
benefit of all Zairians. 

This is my second visit to Zaire, and 



it is certainly not my first encounter 
with Zairians from many walks of life 
whom I have met. I have come to ap- 
preciate the dynamism that is so 
characteristic of Zaire and Zairians and 
to respect your dedication to fairness 
and reason in international fora. 

I have come to admire, Mr. Presi- 
dent, your personal courage and leader- 
ship in Africa; most recently, for exam- 
ple, by seeking a peaceful solution to the 
problems in Chad; in reestablishing rela- 
tions with Israel and in hosting a most 
successful and well-organized Franco- 
American summit, bringing together a 
large number of African leaders in the 
spirit of dialogue and cooperation which 
is Africa's — and the world's — greatest 
hope for peace. 

I, therefore, ask you to raise your 
glasses to the continued health and 
welfare of President Mobutu and of 
President Reagan and to the continued 
excellent relations between our two 
governments and our two great peoples. 



Zaire— A Profile 



i 



Geography 
Area: 905.063 sq. mi. (about the size of the 
U.S. east of the Mississippi River). Capital: 
Kinshasa (pop. 3 million). 

People 

Population: 27.1 million (1980 est.). Ethnic 
Groups: Bantu tribes (80%), more than 200 
African tribal groups in all. Religions: 
Roman Catholic and Protestant (50%), Kim- 
banguist, other syncretic sects, traditional 
religions. Languages: French, Lingala, 
Swahili and Kingwana, Kikongo, Tshiiuba. 

Government 

Type: Republic with strong presidential 
authority. Independence: June 30, 1960. 
Constitution: June 24, 1967 (amended Aug. 
15, 1974; revised 1978). Branches: The 
Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) 
is the sole legal political institution; its com- 
ponent organs include the Office of the Party 
President, a Central Committee, the Political 
Bureau, the Party Congress (meeting every 5 
yrs.). the Executive Council (Council of 
Ministers), the unicameral Legislative Coun- 
cil, and the Judicial Council. The President of 
the Party is automatically President of Zaire. 

Economy 

GDP (1978, constant 1970 prices): $1.9 

billion. Per Capita Income: $128 (1977). 
Natural Resources: Copper, cobalt, zinc, in- 
dustrial and gem diamonds, manganese, tin, 
gold, columbium-tantalum, rare metals, baux- 
ite, iron, coal, 13% of the world's hydroelec- 
tric potential. Agricultural Products: Cof- 
fee, palm oil, rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa, 
manioc, bananas, plantains, corn, rice, 
vegetables, fruits, sugar. Industries: Proc- 
essed and unprocessed minerals, consumer 
products (textiles, footwear, and cigarettes), 
processed foods and beverages, cement. 
Trade: Exports— $1.9 billion (1979): cobalt, 
copper, diamonds, gold, coffee, manganese, 
wood. Imports — $1.5 billion (1979): crude 
petroleum and petroleum products, food, tex- 
tiles, heavy equipment. Major Trading Part- 
ners — Belgium, Luxembourg, France, U.S., 
U.K., F.R.G. 



Taken from the Background Notes (July 
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



BERMUDA 



Arrival Statement 



Hamilton 
Nov. 23, 1982 

We are delighted to be here in Bermuda 
where the beauty of the islands is ex- 
ceeded only by the hospitality of the peo- 
ple. I look forward to my meetings 
tomorrow with the government's leaders 
to discuss matters of mutual interest 
and concern. 

Bermuda and the United States have 
enjoyed a long and friendly relationship. 
This association dates from the earliest 
Colonies in Virginia and the original 
habitation of this strategic island. 
Because of the geographic proximity of 
our shores, we have had regular and 
continuous contact between our citizens. 
These contacts have been at every social 
level, including economic, political, 
educational, and commercial. 

The United States looks forward to 
continued good relations with Bermuda. 
You have been so hospitable to all 
Americans, whether they be military, 
business, or vacation visitors. 

We also understand the adverse im- 
pact our economic problems have had on 




Bermuda— A Profile 



Vice President Bush meets with Premier 
John Swan. 

the economy of Bermuda. We are striv- 
ing to correct these problems and reduce 
the hardship to our own people, as well 
as our good neighbors and friends like 
Bermuda. 

I bring warm greetings to the people 
of Bermuda from President and Mrs. 
Reagan. And, on behalf of all the 
American people, I wish to express our 
friendship and regard to all Bermudians. 



'Texts from the Vice President's Office of 
the Press Secretary. 

^Made at a dinner hosted by Prime 
Minister Habib Thiam. 

'Made at a dinner hosted by Prime 
Minister Robert G. Mugabe. 

■•Made at a luncheon hosted by the 
Secretary General of the Central Committee 
of the United National Independence Party, 
Humphrey Mulemba. 

•^Made at a luncheon hosted by President 
Mobutu. ■ 



Geography 
Area: 20.6 sq. 
1,517). 



mi. Capital: Hamilton (pop. 



People 

Population: 54,893 (1980 census). Ethnic 
Groups: Black (61%), white (39%). Religions: 
Anglican (37%), other Protestant (19%), 
Roman Catholic (14%), others including Black 
Muslim (30%). Language: English. 

Government 

Type: Parliamentary British Colony with in- 
ternal self-government since 1620. Constitu- 
tion: June 8, 1968; amended 1979. Branches: 
Executive — Queen Elizabeth II (chief of state 
represented by a governor). Legislative — bi- 
cameral assembly. Judicial — Supreme Court. 
Political Parties: United Bermuda Party 
(UBP), Progressive Labor Party (PLP). 

Economy 

GDP: $596 million (FY 1979-80). Per Capita 

GDP: $10,900. Natural Resources: 

Limestone (used primarily for concrete 
blocks). Agricultural Products: Semitropical 
produce, dairy products, flowers. Industries: 
Tourism, finance, structural concrete prod- 
ucts, paints, perfumes, furniture. Tijade 
(1979): Exports— %S0 million: mostly reex- 
ports of drugs and bunker fuel. Im- 
ports — $234 million: fuel, foodstuffs, 
machinery. Major Trading Partners — U.S., 
U.K., Canada. 



Taken from the Background Notes (Feb. 
1981), published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



Itinerary 



November 10- 
November 10- 
November 10- 
November 12- 
(November 14 
November 16- 
November 18 
November 19- 
November 21 
November 23 
November 23 
November 24 



-Depart Washington, D.C. 
-Sal, Cape Verde 
12— Dakar, Senegal 
13— Lagos, Nigeria 
-15— Moscow, U.S.S.R.) 
18— Harare, Zimbabwe 
19 — Lusaka, Zambia 
21 — Nairobi, Kenya 
23 — Kinshasa, Zaire 
-Sal, Cape Verde 
24 — Hamilton, Bermuda 
-Arrive Washington, D.C. 



January 1983 



51 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President Bush Attends 
Caribbean Conference 



Vice President Bush attended the 
sixth annual conference on the Caribbean 
and met with leaders of the Caribbean 
Basin countries in Miami on Decem- 
ber 5, 1982. Following is his address 
before that conference. 

First of all, I want to say how glad I am 
to see so many friends gathered 
together for this sixth annual conference 
on the Caribbean. I want to express my 
own thanks, as well as the appreciation 
of the President and the entire Adminis- 
tration, for the efforts of Caribbean- 
Central American Action, the Coalition, 
and for all of your individual efforts on 
behalf of the President's Caribbean 
Basin initiative. 

It's gratifying to see so many 
leaders from among our Caribbean 
neighbors gathered together and par- 
ticipating in this conference. I have had 
the great pleasure to meet with many 
Caribbean leaders in Washing- 
ton—Prime Minister Seaga, Prime 
Minister Compton, President Jorge 
Blanco, Prime Minister Price, and Vice 
President Fait. And now this conference 
has provided an opportunity to renew 
some of these acquaintances as well as 
to meet other leaders — Prime Minister 
Pindling, Prime Minister Adams, and 
Prime Minister Charles— for the first 
time. 

My conversations during the first 2 
years of this Administration with these 
and other leaders from the Caribbean 
Basin countries have been greatly en- 
couraging. I've also been deeply im- 
pressed with their commitment and hard 
work in strengthening democracy in the 
region, in striving for a better way of 
life for their people. You deserve our 
respect, our admiration, and our con- 
gratulations. 

In all of my meetings with Carib- 
bean leaders, one consistent theme has 
always stood out— and that is the 
urgent need for help in relieving the dif- 
ficult economic circumstances that 
Caribbean Basin countries face. Every 
single leader from this region that I 
have met has emphasized the urgent 
need for the United States to complete 
action on the Caribbean Basin initiative. 



I have passed these appeals along to the 
President. I know that he has received 
similar messages from the region's 
leaders. 

Incidentally, the President and I 
aren't the only ones who've been im- 
pressed. At our request. Congressman 
Dan Rostenkowski traveled to the 
region, met with the leaders, saw first- 
hand the impact the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative will have on the people of this 
area. He came back a believer and prom- 
ised his support for this legislation. And 
we appreciate it. 

So let me assure you that not only 
the President and I but all the members 
of this Administration are fully im- 
pressed with the urgency of getting all 
of the Caribbean Basin initiative legisla- 
tion passed in Congress. I know this 
because the President said so quite 
plainly— in his speech in Bogota, Colom- 
bia, Friday and again just yesterday in 
San Jose, Costa Rica and in his national 
radio broadcast to the American people. 

We are pleased the Congress has 
provided the $350 million in emergency 
supplemental financial assistance that 
we requested for the Caribbean Basin 
initiative for this year. This aid is now 



$10 million— as well as with the eastern 
Caribbean for $20 million. The passage 
last September of this element of the 
program was very important and very 
welcome since it was the one element of 
the Caribbean Basin initiative of 
greatest immediate need. The private 
sector in the Caribbean Basin was being 
strangled by the lack of foreign ex- 
change for raw materials and spare 
parts. This aid will allow small- and 
medium-sized businesses to resume pro- 
duction, cutting into the horrendous un- 
employment rates of many of these 
countries. 

Still, this emergency aid program is 
only a partial solution. It has to be com- 
plemented by long-term incentives. The 
one-way free trade area and investment 
portions of the program will provide the 
needed long-term incentives for new in- 
vestment to promote self-sustaining 
growth. We need to enact these 
elements of the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative if we are to consolidate and 
build on the short-term help we have 
given so far. And that's why I've come 
to talk to you tonight. 

I want you to know that the Presi- 
dent and I and every member of this 
Administration will do everything in our 



I 



We want to see democratic nations with strong 
economies, nations able to stand on their feet, able 
to provide productive outlets for the talents of their 
people, able to resist outside interference which 
takes advantage of poverty and unemployment to 
create unrest. 



being disbursed, helping countries cope 
with their short-term, balance-of-pay- 
ments problems. We have already signed 
agreements with four countries— El 
Salvador for $75 million, Jamaica for 
$50 million, the Dominican Republic for 
$41 million, and Honduras for $35 
million. We are moving quickly to com- 
plete agreements with four other coun- 
tries—Costa Rica for $70 million and 
Belize, Guatemala, and Haiti each for 



power to make sure that Congress 
enacts the remainder of the Caribbean 
Basin initiative legislation in this term. 
That's a pretty strong statement. And 
time is short. Obstacles still remain. But 
the Presidency is not without resources. 
And let me say this: In the event we are 
not successful, and time runs out in this 
short special session, we'll be coming 



( 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



ick to the new Congress next year to 
et this legislation through. 

Those who don't feel so strongly 
30ut his initiative as you do could well 
sk, why do we want this legislation so 
adiy? Is it just to be philanthropic— just 
) promote economic development that 
■ill benefit our neighboring countries? 

That's a part— but just a part— of 
16 answer. 'True, the many Caribbean 
■aders with whom I have met with over 
16 last 2 years have impressed on me 
ow much this initiative will benefit 
leir peoples. I have heard a great deal 
bout the plight the countries of the 
;aribbean Basin face, caught between 
16 rising prices of oil and needed im- 
orts and dwindling prices for most of 
tieir exports. I know about the balance- 
f-payments problems, about the credit 
ranches that these conditions pro- 
uce— problems that translate directly 
nd harshly into unemployment and 
overty. 

In some Caribbean countries, these 
nemployment rates approach a horren- 
ous 40%. The ambitions of these 
?aders are to create jobs for their 
leople— not just unskilled jobs in tradi- 
ional occupations but modern, produc- 
ive, industrial jobs: jobs in export in- 
!ustries that contribute to economic 
growth, jobs that offer a better future. 

There are things that we want for 
lur neighbors. We want to see demo- 
ratic nations with strong economies, 
lations able to stand on their own feet, 
ible to provide productive outlets for the 
alents of their people, able to resist out- 
ide interference which takes advantage 
if poverty and unemployment to create 
inrest. 

Those are the kinds of economies 
hat we, and you, want to see in the 
Caribbean. This is quite a contrast to the 
ilternative, if, indeed, what the Cubans 
lave managed to accomplish in more 
han 20 years can even be called an 
ilternative. 

When we look at Cuba and at what 
IS happening in Nicaragua and Grenada, 
what do we see? We see economically 
weak, militarized, repressive countries; 
expensive, semicolonial dependen- 
cies—dependencies like Cuba that cost 
their Soviet sponsors $9 million per 
day -dependencies severely tied — on a 
very short leash— to their Soviet spon- 
sor and useful principally for creating 
mischief among their neighbors in the 
region. 

The combined gross national product 
of all of the countries of the Caribbean 



Basin totals less than 2% of our gross 
national product. Our imports from the 
Caribbean Basin are less than 4% of our 
total imports. It is hard to image that, 
given these disparities, even the spec- 
tacular economic growth that we wish 
on our Caribbean neighbors would im- 
pair our own economic welfare. 
But let's face it. It would be 
unrealistic to say that we're supporting 
the Caribbean Basin initiative so strong- 
ly solely out of an altruistic impulse. The 
Caribbean initiative is good for us too. 
Our partners in this initiative — Mexico, 
Venezuela, Canada, and Colombia— rec- 
ognize that the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative serves their interests as well. I 
think this fact has been too often 
overlooked in all the pulling and hauling 
over the exclusion of this product or 
that from the free trade area legislation 



Fifty percent of our 
trade passes through the 
Caribbean. . . . The 
United States has no 
small interest in insur- 
ing that the governments 
in this region are stable 
and democratic. 



or in the dickering over this or that pro- 
vision of the investment incentive legis- 
lation. But my hope is that when our op- 
ponents in Congress carefully analyze 
how substantially the Caribbean Basin 
initiative benefits the United States, 
they'll move swiftly to join the growing 
bipartisan support for this legislation. 

Think for a minute what these bene- 
fits are. The United States has an in- 
terest in seeing stable democratic 
governments among its neigh- 
bors—governments which gain their 
legitimacy by providing an outlet for dif- 
fering political beliefs, as opposed to dic- 
tatorships. Fifty percent of our trade 
passes through the Caribbean— through 
strategic straits and passageways among 
these island nations and through the 
Panama Canal. The United States has 



no small interest in insuring that the 
governments in this region are stable 
and democratic. 

The United States also has an in- 
terest in potential Caribbean Basin 
markets for American exports — exports 
which can only be purchased if our 
neighbors' economies are strong. In 
these times of increasing com- 
petitiveness among the world's trading 
nations, our interest in economically 
viable markets in the Caribbean Basin 
could not be greater. The Caribbean 
Basin initiative will help create the kind 
of economic expansion in the region that 
will provide larger markets close to 
home for our industries. 

We want to maintain a favorable 
climate for foreign investment in the 
Caribbean region— not merely to protect 
the existing U.S. investment there but 
to encourage new investment oppor- 
tunities in stable, democratic, free, 
market-oriented countries close to our 
shores. The Caribbean Basin initiative 
will not only provide direct incentives 
for this investment but encourage 
follow-on investment. 

Another U.S. interest— and one with 
particular relevance for me as head of 
the President's Task Force in South 
Florida— is the problem of curtailing 
narcotics production and shipment 
through the Caribbean. We hope that 
our efforts to encourage stable^ pros- 
perous economies in the Caribbean 
region through the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative may dampen the economic incen- 
tives for the production and export of 
narcotics to the United States and may 
encourage greater cooperation in 
fighting drug traffic. 

Finally, the United States has an in- 
terest in alleviating large-scale migration 
in the Caribbean region. This is a prob- 
lem that seized my attention in connec- 
tion with the South Florida Task Force. 
I note that a conference on this is being 
held in conjunction with this meeting. 
We would prefer, Caribbean Basin 
leaders would prefer, and you would 
prefer to see the people of this region 
productively employed in their own 
domestic economies rather than being 
forced to these opportunities in other 
countries. The Caribbean Basin initiative 
will, in fact, create those same oppor- 
tunities at home. 

I think that all these are powerful 
reasons for the Congress to move for- 
ward on the Caribbean Basin initiative 



January 1983 



53 



THE SECRETARY 



legislation. All the more so in view of 
the fact that the legislation contains 
carefully balanced safeguards which pro- 
tect those key U.S. commercial interests 
that might be affected by this initiative. 

In closing, let me briefly mention 
one other aspect of the Caribbean Basin 
initiative that I think is of transcendent 
international importance; namely, its im- 
pact on the world trading system. 

The United States and other major 
trading countries of the world just con- 
cluded last week the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] minis- 
terial meeting in Geneva. Although some 
progress was made, the meeting, for the 
most part, treated the world to the spec- 
tacle of a major bloc of trading nations 
struggling to preserve, rather than 
remove, existing impediments to the 
free flow of goods and services. The 
United States believes strongly that free 
trade is the key to prosperity. We 
believe that protection destroys oppor- 
tunities. Other countries may be content 
to talk about the virtues of free trade 
while doing little to actually improve it. 
But the United States is willing to put 
its commitment to free trade in action 
through the one-way free trade area 
proposal of the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative. The success of our free trade 
area proposal will dramatically prove the 
foUowring truth: that free trade is in- 
dispensable to world prosperity. 

By now I'm pretty sure you know 
that I didn't come all the way to Miami 
to convince a group like you that we 
need the Caribbean Basin initiative. But 
I've said what I've said for a reason: to 
send a message to the Congress. It's 
perhaps an irony of a Vice President's 
life that if I give a speech in Washing- 
ton, chances are it's not going to get 
much ink. Generally, I find that the fur- 
ther I travel from Washington, the more 
coverage I get. That being the case, 
probably I should have flown to Tierra 
del Fuego and given this speech there. 

We still face obstacles with this 
legislation. We need this legislation. And 
to that end, we need your support, 
which we have always had in the past. 
So I'm confident, and encouraged, that 
we'll have it now when it's so especially 
vital. ■ 



News Conference of 
November 18 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the Department of State on 
November 18. 1982.^ 

Q. Now that there is a new leader- 
ship in the Soviet Union and you have 
met with the new leader, Yuriy An- 
dropov, can you tell us what oppor- 
tunities exist for improved U.S. -Soviet 
relations and discuss our strategy for 
dealing with Moscow in the post- 
Brezhnev era? 

A. First, it's important to emphasize 
that we have had a policy with respect 
to the Soviet Union. That policy is in 
place and will continue in place. The 
policy is, first, to be realistic about what 
is going on both in terms of military 
capacity, its use, the human rights 
aspects of the situation, and other 
things. Second, to be fully alert to the 
importance of our own strength and the 
strength of our alliance in the face of 
Soviet behavior. Third, to be willing, 
always, to work on problems and to try 
to work them out and to solve problems. 
The United States has always been in 
the forefront as part of the solution in 
the many problems that we have around 
the world. And we know, finally, that if 
problems can be solved, there are oppor- 
tunities for a better world. 

The President, with the emergence 
of new leadership in the Soviet Union, 
has made a number of statements em- 
phasizing the third point in that set of 
points. But we have to remember that 
the whole set of points are there. We 
stand ready to solve problems, work on 
them, but we also continue to be 
realistic, to regard the things that repre- 
sent solutions of problems — not to be 
simply rhetoric — but to be deeds. That 
will be our posture. 

Q. What would you regard as a 
meaningful signal from the new 
leadership in the Kremlin — a mean- 
ingful signal in the direction of easing 
relations? 

A. I hear this word "signal" all the 
time. It goes from little things that af- 
fect the way you're treated, and I might 
say that the Vice President and I, and 
Ambassador [U.S. Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union Authur A.] Hartman were 
treated with great courtesy throughout 



our visit to the Soviet Union. People sai 
that's a signal, and perhaps it is. But tl 
things that we are really looking for, i 
after all the signaling has taken place, :i 
the substance of change in behavior on 
important matters. i 

Now, we are engaged in an active i 
negotiation for arms reduction in i 

Geneva and in Vienna. We are engaged 
with our European Allies, the Soviet 
Union, and others, in active discussionsi 
in Madrid. Those are two settings, or : 
three settings, where discussions are ' 
going on right now and where we woul 
welcome movement. 

Those are, in a sense, the things 
that we want to see happen. Signals ar^ 
fine, and indications that people are 
ready to sit down and talk seriously ar 
fine. We have given those signals our- 
selves. As we move ahead, we will look 
for substantive responses. 

Q. Would you expect to see withii 
the foreseeable future another — are i 
you talking about meetings and sittir' 
down, would you expect to see any ' 
kind of summit meeting? ' 

A. The President has always been 
ready for a summit meeting if there is I 
something worthwhile to be accom- j 
plished by the meeting. A meeting for I 
the sake of a meeting doesn't really gel) 
you a lot. There does have to be a pros* 
pect of some genuine, positive result. I 
That has been the President's position, I 
and it remains so now. ' 

Q. Could you specifically outline 
what steps the United States expects 
the Soviet Union to take in the forun 
you just mentioned or elsewhere j 
before improved relations can occur j 
and what specific steps the United , 
States is prepared to take to improve' 
relations. j 

A. As far as the details of steps ar. 
concerned, we'll conduct our negotia- j 
tions in those fora rather than this waj.) 
But, obviously, if you are engaged in a. 
negotiation, the process of give-and-tal^' 
is something that you look for and 
sense. We would be looking for those 
signs and that kind of movement, but ' 
don't want to try to specify any explicii" 
point. 

Q. A number of Soviet spokesmerj 
this past week have argued that the 



54 



Department of State Bulleti 



THE SECRETARY 



ted States is using trade as a 
tical weapon. Do you believe that 
United States has been doing this; 
rou believe that the United States 
i trade as part of a larger political 
ure, and can you see trade possibly 
ig divorced from politics? 
A. We must think of our relation- 
s with the Soviet Union— all of their 
ensions, and while they aren't linked 
ny kind of tight way, certainly, they 
related to each other. We have made 
, point. The pipeline sanctions, in a 
, made that point — the political 
ension of an economic relationship, 
ur discussions with our friends in 
ope and Japan, we have also been 
king with them on that very point to 
if we can develop — and I believe we 
and we are well on our way to 
ig so — a better sense of strategy for 
economic relationships with the 
let Union and its satellites. 
That doesn't mean that all trade is 
lect to this kind of examination, but 
ertain critical categories and aspects, 
believe that it must be. 

Q. This month you're going with 
sident Reagan to an area full of 
incial problems and crises. I was 
idering what you had in mind that 
Id alleviate the situation of those 
ntries once you have left them? 
A. That area of South America and 
tral America is not only full of prob- 
s like most places in the world are, 
it is full of opportunities, full of peo- 
and it is our neighborhood. I'm sure 
; what the President will want to 
erline and support, as he travels 
)ugh those countries, is the support 
give to the idea of democracy, of 
;ly elected governments, our support 
economic development. As you 
w, we have been trying to be helpful 
have been helpful in some of these 
incial difficulties, and, of course, in 
area of peace and secmity in which 
have been working very hard. 
I think it is notable that our 
nisphere, as compared with other 
ts of the world, has been peaceful 
sr a long period of time, and that's 
m a very important and helpful factor 
he development of the United States 
1 in the development of other coun- 
!S in our hemisphere. It is something 
y important and very worthwhile 
ich we want to continue to support. 

Q. Very few American officials 
' ^e had a chance to meet the new 
' net leader, Mr. Andropov, as you 



have. There are stories that he likes 
American food, American music. 
Chubby Checker records, that he 
speaks English; can you g^ive us a lit- 
tle bit of your reaction to the man? 
[Laughter] 

A. There were Soviet soft drinks 
and Soviet food on the table where we 
sat. If he likes another kind of food, I 
can't say anything about that. There was 
no evidence of the things that you men- 
tioned in the course of the meeting that 
we had. 

What impact he will have as a leader 
of the Soviet peoples is something that, 
of course, we are very interested in and 
watching, and that remains to be seen. 

Q. How did he strike you? Did he 
strike you as a man who had taken 
charge? 

A. Yes. 

Q. At your last press conference, 
you referred to your high regard for 
Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary 
of State. I'm wondering if this has 
been at all changed. 

A. I haven't changed my mind. 

Q. There have been some revela- 
tions coming out in the Italian courts 
that have been reported all over the 
Italian press quoting Aldo Moro's 
closest friend, Mr. Guerzoni, who has 
stated that before the abduction and 
assassination of Mr. Moro, Henry 
Kissinger directly threatened him, and 
that Mr. Moro was in fear for his safe- 
ty because of those threats from 
Kissinger. 

A. I don't have any comment on 
what you've just said except to reaffirm 
that I consider Henry Kissinger one of 
our great Americans, a man of tremen- 
dous intellect and understanding. I feel 
privileged to call him a friend, and he 
has been unstinting in his willingness to 
be helpful to me, has come in and has 
talked to me, free with his ideas and ad- 
vice. I'm grateful to him for that. 

Q. To what degree is economic aid 
to Israel linked to the settlements 
policy of the Government of Israel? 

A. There hasn't been any link made. 
We have been very clear from the begin- 
ning that we think the settlements and 
the expansion of them are not construc- 
tive at all, not a contribution to the 
peace process. The President has been 
very clear in opposing them, just as 
some of the conditions on the West 
Bank are certainly not a constructive 
contribution to the peace process. 



I suppose I speak about it, in part, 
because I am fundamentally a university 
man, and the idea of asking people who 
come to teach and work in a university 
setting, which is, after all, a setting 
where we expect to have freedom of 
thought and to encourage freedom of 
thought, signing oaths is just not the 
way to go about it. Those are some 
things that are going on that we think 
are just not constructive. 

Q. Will you counsel the President 
to trim the growth of defense spend- 
ing as a way to ease some of your 
diplomatic problems with both the 
Europeans and the Soviet Union? 

A. Certainly not. It is essential that 
we maintain the strength of our defense 
posture. That, of course, means that we 
need to examine the defense budget. It 
doesn't need to have unnecessary spend- 
ing and all of that, but it is essential 
that we maintain the strength in our 
defense posture that the President has 
put there. 

Q. Could you give us some assess- 
ment of the recent diplomatic contacts 
between the Soviet Union and China? 

A. These developments have been 
taking place. We've been watching them 
and reading about them. I'm not privy to 
them, of course — don't know just what 
is taking place. 

I do know some of the concerns the 
Chinese have. They are concerned about 
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and 
have said so; they are concerned about 
the behavior of the Soviet proxy states 
Vietnam and Kampuchea. So, if through 
their discussions they can persuade the 
Soviet Union to get out of Afghanistan 
and, in effect, get out of Kampuchea, so 
much the better. 

Q. In an earlier question, you 
seemed to hold out some hope that at 
some point a summit might be 
arrangeable. Were you suggesting that 
now — just to tie it down — it is 
premature? 

A. The discussion of a summit has 
kind of emerged out of thin air, as far as 
I can see. There has been no direct 
discussion with the Soviet Union repre- 
sentatives that I know of. It didn't come 
up in my discussion with Mr. [Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko in 
New York, whenever that was, a couple 
of months or so ago; and it didn't come 
up in the meeting the Vice President 
had with Mr. Andropov. 

That doesn't rule it out; it doesn't 
rule it in. It is exactly where I said it 
was. If there is something constructive 



iiuary 1983 



55 



THE SECRETARY 



and positive to be accomplished, the 
President is always willing, but he is not 
looking for a trip or a meeting for the 
sake of a trip or a meeting. 

Q. Does that same criterion apply 
to your own meetings with Mr. 
Gromoyko, and do you have any such 
meetings planned in the near future? 

A. We don't have a meeting planned 
in the near future, but it is always con- 
ceivable that one might take place. 

Q. Do you see the possibility that 
freer trade with the United States 
might be an inducement to the Soviet 
Union to behave in a way that you 
would like them to, as previous admin- 
istrations have offered? 

A. I don't think it is worthwhile to 
think of things on a kind of a one-for- 
one basis like that. You have to think of 
the whole relationship, which is compli- 
cated and interrelated, and there are 
many important dimensions to it. We 
can all spell out what those are, and the 
potential of trade is one of them, but 
only one. 

Q. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union seem to be exchanging 
what you might describe as con- 
ciliatory "mood music," each side 
waiting for the other to take specific 
steps. How long can just the mood 
music last? 

A. We'll have to see what takes 
place. I was at the funeral, standing on 
Red Square for 2V2 hours, watching 
what was taking place. Of course, there 
is the "mood music" that everybody 
seems to have focused on, namely the 
statements that the President has made 
and like statements made on the other 
side. 

There was other "mood music." It 
was quite startling. I don't know how 
many of you watched the funeral on 
television, but after the body of Mr. 
Brezhnev was put in the ground and the 
members of the Politburo came up on 
top of the structure where they stand, it 
was as though somebody threw a switch, 
and suddently martial music and a long 
march-by of troops. That was "mood 
music," too, I thought. 

There are all of these dimensions, 
and we must remember the military 
strength that they have, and remember 
not to, in any way, allow what you, 
perhaps, properly call "mood music" to 
delude us or take us away from our own 
convictions that we must do what is 
necessary for our own defense. 

Q. In your discussions, what 
discussion was there of the Reagan 



Administration proposals for Middle 
East peace? Was there any discussion 
at all of Soviet Jewish emigration? 

A. I don't want to discuss the inter- 
nal content of the discussion the Vice 
President and the Secretary-General of 
the Soviet Union had. 

Was the topic raised at all? 

A. I said I don't want to discuss the 
content of the discussion. These topics 
have been discussed a lot in other fora, 
and generally speaking, we always raise, 
particularly, the human rights concerns 
in any discussion that we have with a 
Soviet official. I don't want to say more 
than that. 

Q. A moment ago, you expressed 
special concern about the professors 
on the West Bank who have been 
asked to sign a pledge against the 
FLO or leave. Do you have any 
realistic expectation that the United 
States, in consultation with Israel, 
can bring about a reversal of that ac- 
tion? 

A. We should speak unequivocally 
about it, and people in the intellectual 
community particularly who have been 
through this — you remember, we had 
the episode of the loyalty oath, maybe 
some of you are too young to remember 
those days, but I remember them — 
ought to speak up, including people in 
universities in Israel. It's the same prob- 
lem. It's a problem of freedom — 
freedom of thought. 

Q. There are some reports coming 
out of the Middle East now that the 
PLO is looking for mutual recognition 
with Israel and for the United States 
to accept a role for the PLO in the 
peace process, either independent or 
within an Arab delegation. Do you 
think the mutual recognition is a step 
forward from the PLO? And will the 
United States support a PLO seat in 
the negotiation process? 

A. The U.S. position has been made 
clear many times by President Reagan 
in his recent press statement and also in 
direct private discussions with many 
people, and it remains the same. The 
United States will not have direct dis- 
cussions with leaders of the PLO until 
they recognize the right of Israel to ex- 
ist and recognize U.N. Security Council 
resolutions as the basis for negotiations. 
As far as Israel's attitude toward the 
PLO is concerned, I'm not speaking for 
Israel Israel speaks for itself. 

Q. I wonder if you could give us 
your assessment of the current efforts 



to get foreign forces out of Lebanon 
and let us know if it's any longer 
realistic to expect that this could be 
accomplished before the end of this 
year? 

A. We continue to work and want, 
to see the prompt withdrawal of all 
foreign forces. 'The process of discussii, 
and trying to work out an operational 
plan has been getting a lot of attentior, 
It's worked at. It is not going quite as 1 
fast as we would like but, nevertheless 
there has been a great deal of discussi- 
there, and that sort of the state of pla 
has been pretty well mapped out. 

We continue to press for, as rapid! 
as possible, removal of all foreign fore , 
from Lebanon consistent with the eme 
gence of Lebanon as a country that ca 
take control of itself, and can do that • 
the basis of a reconciliation of the 
various religious groups there and 
become a country again with an abilitj' 
to rule itself. Those are the things tha 
we continue to work for, and I suppos 
just have to say, "It ain't easy," but 
we're working at it. 

Q. Isn't it your impression that i: 
of the problems is the Israeli desire > 
have a political component to the 
resolution of the problem. What is t 
American position on that? 

A. Originally, there was the idea c 
a peace treaty. Our position on that is ' 
that the peace treaties between Israel 
and her neighbors, we think, are very 
desirable. That's what the peace proce 
is all about. 

On the other hand, the peace trea 
to mean anything, has to be undertak( 
voluntarily by a country that's had a 
chance to form itself and develop a co 
sensus within the country that that is 
what it wants to do. Our position is th, 
it is quite premature to be pressing 
Lebanon for such a treaty or for thing 
that are equivalent, or the near 
equivalent, of such a treaty; that it's jit 
not a realistic position. 

Having said that, I'll go back to m 
original statement that, in our opinions 
state of peace and normal relationship 
among all of the countries in the Middi 
East is a very desirable thing; and, asi 
said, that's what the peace process is 3 
about. 

Q. How much input are you havij 
in determining the President's 
domestic economic policy, and are ya 
urging him to change that policy in 
any way? 



56 



Department of State Bulle 1 



THE SECRETARY 



A. I have been present at a number 
he discussions of the budget, and 
se, of course, have been focusing on 
at the dimensions of the budget prob- 
1 are and what kind of actions can be 
en to deal with that problem. 

All of that said in the context of 
at it is we're trying to achieve, both 
;he long-term structurally and in the 
irer term, in terms of the economy, 
idously, what we want and what the 
isident wants — has wanted, continues 
want — is an economy that will have 
,1 expansion with inflation remaining 
ler control, and with the right kind of 
)portion of savings and investment so 
■t we can see productivity advance. 
tat is our policy, and I support it. 

Q. Did you recommend to the 
isident that he move the— is it your 
nion that he should move the tax 
rease to January? 

A. I don't comment on my advice to 
President. What he decides to do 
)ut this whole economic package, he 
1 think over, and when he's ready to 
lounce his decision, he'll announce it, 
1 I'll support him. 

Q. In your discussion earlier of 
lat specific steps the Soviets could 
;e, you discussed the two arms con- 
il negotiations in Geneva, the 
JFR [mutual and balanced force 
luctions] talks in Vienna, and the 
CE [Conference on Security and 
operation in Europe] Conference in 
idrid. You didn't mention the 
ponal issues which, in the past, 
ii've put on your kind of hope list. 

A. They're on my list of things that 
're concerned about. It's my concern 
;. But we don't have any talks going 
with them about Afghanistan, for ex- 
iple. We don't have any direct talks 
ing on other than the conversations 
it we have had with their leadership, 
t there's no sort of negotiation as in 
5 case of Geneva. That's why I didn't 
jntion that. 

Q. But would a Soviet withdrawal 
some consequence from Afghanistan 
a— I hate to use the word "sig- 
1"— but at least a sign that they're 
terested in a better relationship? 
A. It would be a fact, and a fact 
at would be a piece of constructive 
havior. If things like that occur, if you 
id them up, they would add up to op- 
irtunities for much improved relation- 
ips. 

Q. If the Soviets were to reduce 
eir troops along the Chinese fron- 
iT, would you regard that as a 
igative or a positive step? 



A. That's a matter for the Chinese 
and the Russians to discuss, and I don't 
have any comment on that. 

Q. You met last week with the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister. How do 
you see the deterioration of the rela- 
tions between Egypt and Israel, and 
what is the United States doing to 
change this situation? 

A. The relationship between Israel 
and Egypt, we think, could stand im- 
provement. I think there are some signs 
that that may be possible, particularly if 
that can be put in the context of prog- 
ress on other aspects of Middle East 
development, such as the emergence of 
a plan for the evacuation of foreign 
forces from Lebanon and movement in 
the peace process. 

Q. When Khamal Hassan Ali 
talked to reporters last week, he said 
he thought the settlements problem on 
the West Bank was now looming so 
large that it was inhibiting some of 
the moderate Arab nations from join- 
ing the peace process. Is that also 
your view? 

A. It is a major stumbling block, 
without a doubt, and, as I said earlier, I 
don't think it is constructive in any ef- 
fort to move the peace process along. 
However, I do sense from my discus- 
sions with people from all the countries 
involved that the peace process is very 
much alive, and that there is a general 
recognition in the Middle East that 
peace is of vital importance. 

It's clear to everybody. And 
somehow or another when there is such 
an important goal that people seek, 
want, and believe in, that in one way or 
another, if we keep after it, we will find 
a way to get there. But, as I said 
earlier, it's not easy. 

Q. You talk often about getting 
people to sit down at the same table. 
Are you any closer to that? The Jor- 
danians, for example? 

A. How close is close? I would say 
we're working at it, and there's been a 
great deal of movement on the part of 
the Arab community on this subject, as 
was illustrated — or not illustrated, but 
was on display in the visit of King 
Hassan and the Prime Ministers that ac- 
companied him. That is genuine prog- 
ress. 

Q. Do you expect that France will 
soon become a party to the allied 
agreement on East- West trade that's 
being worked out? What steps remain 
to be taken to accomplish that? 



A. The thing for us to do right now 
is to stop arguing about whether or not 
we have an agreement and start carry- 
ing it out. 

Q. Could you address again, in a 
formal way, the suggestion you made 
to the OAS [Organization of American 
States] yesterday that all the foreign 
military advisers in all of Central 
America and that those countries 
agree not to import major offensive 
weapons? 

A. Certainly. My talk yesterday was 
not the first time that set of ideas has 
been floated out by the United States, 
and it has been getting increasing 
amounts of discussion. It's a very good 
position. It has a lot of appeal, and we 
keep talking about it. But it's one 
avenue; there are others to developing a 
greater sense of stability in Central 
America. Obviously, if we're going to 
have the economic development and the 
sense of personal security and humanity 
that we seek, then we want to see much 
more stability in that area than now ex- 
ists, and that's what we have been work- 
ing at. 

Q. Is it your intention for this 
news conference to end, leaving us 
with the impression that the U.S. 
position is that the Soviets will have 
to make the first substantive move 
before there can be a real change in 
U.S. -Soviet relations? 

A. We look for changes in behavior 
or indications of a willingness to discuss 
them. We have said we're willing to do 
so. If you look at the problems that are 
before us, on the whole, they're prob- 
lems that they have created, and so a 
willingness to be less creative is what is 
called for here. But we're ready to get in 
and discuss and try to work things out 
in a careful, thoughtful way. 

Q. Do you expect to conclude any 
agreements with Foreign Minister 
(Pieter Willem] Botha when you meet 
with him next week? And do you have 
any assessments to make on any 
changes in South African society? 

A. No. I don't have any comment on 
that meeting. Obviously, we are looking 
at the South African situation as such, 
but also the problems involved in bring- 
ing about independence for Namibia and 
exploring the attitudes and views of 
South Africa on various dimensions of 
that. That problem is one that we have 
worked on very hard, and we want to 
continue pursuing it in every possible 
way that we can. 



'Press release 351. 



Jnuary 1983 



57 



EUROPE 



Death of Soviet 
President Brezhnev 



Following are a White House state- 
ment issued on the death of Soviet Presi- 
dent Leonid I. Brezhnev; President 
Reagan's and Secretary Shultz's letters of 
condolences to Vasiliy VcLsil'yevich, First 
Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and 
to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, 
respectively; arrival and departure 
statements made in Moscow by Vice 
President Bush who headed the U.S. 
delegation to the memorial ceremonies; 
and a news conference given by Secretary 
Shultz who accompanied the Vice Presi- 
dent. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 11, 19822 

The President is expressing his personal 
condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First 
Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on 
the death of Soviet President Brezhnev. 
A high-level delegation will represent 
the United States at the memorial 
ceremonies in Moscow. 

As leader of the Soviet Union for 
nearly two decades, President Brezhnev 
was one of the world's most important 
figures. President Brezhnev played a 
very significant role in the shaping of 
U.S. -Soviet relations during his 
Presidency. 

President Reagan is conveying to 
the Soviet Government the strong desire 
of the United States to continue to work 
for an improved relationship with the 
Soviet Union and to maintain an active 
dialogue between our societies on all im- 
portant issues. The President looks for- 
ward to a constructive relationship with 
the new leadership of the Soviet Union. 



PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER, 
NOV. 11, 19821 

Please accept my condolences on the death of 
President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. President 
Brezhnev was one of the world's most impor- 
tant figures for nearly two decades. May I 
ask you to convey our sympathies to the 
President's family. 

I would also like to convey through you 
to the Soviet Government and people the 
strong desire of the United States to work 
toward an improved relationship with the 



Soviet Union. I look forward to conducting 
relations with the new leadership in the 
Soviet Union with the aim of expanding the 
areas where our two nations can cooperate to 
mutual advantage. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



SECRETARY SHULTZ'S LETTER, 
NOV. 11, 19822 

Please accept my condolences on the death of 
President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. I can ap- 
preciate your sense of loss at the death of a 
colleague who played such a leading role in 
your nation and in relations between our two 
nations. We hope to continue efforts to im- 
prove these relations in the future, and I look 
forward to working with you toward this end. 
Sincerely yours, 

George Shultz 



VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S 
ARRIVAL STATEMENT, 
NOV. 14, 1982 

On behalf of the President of the United 
States, I wish to express the con- 
dolences of the American people to the 
Soviet people on the death of President 
Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. We wish to con- 
vey our deep sympathies to the late 
President's family. 

Leonid Brezhnev was the leader of 
the Soviet Union for nearly two decades. 
He was a strong man, a fierce fighter 
for his deeply held convictions. Now, the 
enormous burdens and responsibilities of 
leadership will be passed on to others 
who will navigate the Soviet Union's 
ship of state in the years to come. 

I have led this American delegation 
to Moscow on this solemn occasion to 
symbolize my nation's regard for the 
Soviet people at this moment of loss and 
to signify the desire of the United States 
to continue to work for positive relations 
between our two countries. 

It is in this spirit of seriousness and 
hope that we have come to Moscow. We 
have come to declare to the Soviet 
leaders, to the Soviet people, and to the 
world, that the United States is devoted 
to the pursuit of peace and a reduction 
of global tensions. We seek a world of 
greater harmony, not only between the 



two great superpowers, but for all na- 
tions. It is our fervent hope that today's 
massive expenditures for arms can be 
reduced and that the world's standard of 
living, especially for the impoverished, 
can be greatly improved. 

In all of this we are realistic. Fears, 
suspicions, and distrust must be replaced 
by hope, by trust, by mutual coopera- 
tion. 'The barriers that now divide na- 
tions and regions can be dismantled and 
discarded. To accomplish these lofty 
goals we must look to strong men and 
women. Men and women of courage, pa- 
tience, and perseverance. Fortunately, 
they are human characteristics that can 
and must be brought to the fore. 

This spirit of hope, which I men- 
tioned before, is with us all. As we pay 
our respects to a renowned leader, let us 
also take this occasion to give serious 
thought to the great and positive oppor- 
tunities that are before us all. 



VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S 
DEPARTURE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 15, 19823 

We leave Moscow tonight having ex- 
pressed to the peoples of the Soviet 
Union the condolences of the American 
people and President Reagan on the 
death of President Leonid Il'ich 
Brezhnev. I conveyed those same con- 
dolences and our personal respects to 
Mrs. Brezhnev last evening. 

I want to thank both Soviet and 
U.S. officials for all their efforts, kind- 
ness, and hospitality on our behalf dur- 
ing this national period of mourning. 

This afternoon. Secretary Shultz, 
Ambassador [Arthur A.] Hartman, and I 
met with General Secretary of the Cen- 
tral Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, Yuriy Andropov, 
and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. 
At the meeting, the Soviets expressed 
appreciation for our presence and our 
expression of condolences. The meeting 
was frank, cordial, and substantive. It 
gave both sides the opportunity to ex- 
change views on the state of their rela- 
tions. 

When I arrived yesterday, I said 
that we had come "in a spirit of serious- 
ness and hope," to "declare to the Soviet 
leaders, to the Soviet people and to the 
world, that the United States is devoted 
to the pursuit of peace and a reduction 
of global tensions." We reaffirm, today, 
the spirit of President Reagan's letter of 
November 11, to First Deputy Chairman 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 




ice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, and Ambassador Hartman. 



luznetsov, in which he wrote: "I would 
i<e to convey through you to the Soviet 
Government and people the strong 
esire of the United States to work 
oward an improved relationship with 
he Soviet Union." This is our purpose 
.nd our policy. 

As we leave Moscow, we are well 
ware of the difficult problems that con- 
ront us. The challenges, while enor- 
nous, are far from insurmountable. The 
lew leaders of the Soviet Union know 
hat the United States, based on its 
strength and the continuity of its policy, 
s ready, as President Reagan stated, to 
•onduct relations "with the aim of ex- 
Janding the areas where our two na- 
ions can cooperate to mutual advan- 
age." 

Human rights, arms reductions, 
peaceful solutions to regional problems, 
n short, peace and freedom for all na- 
;ions are the goals we seek. It is to 
;hese goals that we must dedicate 



ourselves, and the achievements of these 
aims is the challenge our two great na- 
tions face. 

This is the message we brought to 
the Soviet people and their leaders. We 
are hopeful that the Soviet leaders ap- 
proach our common responsibilities in 
the same spirit. We, in the United 
States, will do our part to achieve the 
kind of constructive relations that can, 
indeed, move the world toward peace 
and prosperity. 



SECRETARY SHULTZ'S 
NEWS CONFERENCE, 
NOV. 15. 1982* 

Q. What should be understood by 
the high level of American representa- 
tion at Mr. Brezhnev's funeral? Should 
it be taken in context with other 
events such as the end of the pipeline 
sanctions and Mr. Reagan's message 
to the effect that he would like to see 



an improvement in relations after the 
transition period in the Soviet Union? 
What does your visit and Mr. Bush's 
visit here sig^nify? Is it a signal? 

A. Exactly what the President said. 
It is an expression, on the one hand, of 
our respect for a human being and con- 
dolences being expressed to President 
Brezhnev and the peoples of the Soviet 
Union. It is also an expression — also like 
the President said — that if constructive 
behavior emerges on the part of the 
Soviet Union, the United States is 
prepared to respond and is prepared for 
a more constructive relationship than 
we've had in past years. 

Q. The Soviets have in one form or 
another been publicizing a rather long 
list of grievances as regards U.S. 
foreign policy even before October 27 
but certainly since President 
Brezhnev's October 27 speech — are 
you bringing any sort of message from 
the U.S. Government, the President of 



January 1983 



59 



EUROPE 



the United States, that there is room 
for conciliation, negotiation, change 
on both sides? 

A. I can't really imagine why 
anyone would have grievances against 
our policies and our foreign policies. 
They are constructive. Our efforts are 
for problem-solving all around the world. 
We must, of course, maintain our 
strength — our strength in our defense 
capabilities, the strength of our 
economy, our will power. These are 
things which are present and at the 
same time, as we have demonstrated, all 
over the world, we have a constructive 
point of view — we are part of the solu- 
tion, not part of the problem, and our 
message here is the same. 

Q. How would you characterize 
Yuriy Andropov? I am wondering 
what this Administration thinks about 
him, personally, as a man. 

A. I don't think it's useful for me to 
speculate about the nature of various 
Soviet personalities, including Mr. An- 
dropov. I've never met him, so I think 
it's better to let that emerge. 

Q. What do you feel are the 
possibilities for an improvement in 
U.S. -Soviet relations now that there is 
a change of leadership? 

A. There is the same possibility that 
there has been. U.S. policy has been 
clear; it has not changed. It is a policy of 
realism, of strength, of willingness to 
work on problems together and the ex- 
pectation if that can be done successful- 
ly, everyone will be better off as a 
result. 'That's been our policy. That is 
our policy, and we want to make it clear 
to the new Soviet leadership that that 
remains in place. 

Q. Have you been offered any 
high-ranking meetings while you are 
here? 

A. We have just arrived, and in my 
brief meeting with Ambassador Dobryin 
in Washington, when I went to the 
Soviet Embassy to sign the book of con- 
dolences, we talked briefly about it. I 
simply said I would be here, the Vice 
President would — I wasn't sure of his 
precise schedule at the time — and that if 
it were possible to see people in the 
Soviet leadership we would like to do 
that. But we can also understand that it 
is a busy time and it might not be possi- 
ble, so as of right now I know of no ap- 
pointments. 

Q. I believe your predecessor. 
Secretary Haig, referred to the Carter 
grain embargo as a blunder, and some 



people now refer to the pipeline sanc- 
tions as blunder. Will you please com- 
ment on that? 

A. I would only comment without 
connecting the two that we now have 
the basis for a broader strategic ap- 
proach to our economic relationships 
with the Soviet Union and the emer- 
gence of a substantial agreement with 
our allies — one that has provided the oc- 
casion for the lifting of those sanctions. 
The sanctions, calling attention to the 
problem, have registered the President's 
very strong feeling that the events in 
Poland, in particular, are events that we 
must register ourselves beyond just talk- 
ing about them, and at this point we are 
very pleased. Our allies have joined us; 
we have joined with them; it is a mutual 
thing to develop a broad economic 
strategy here. 

Q. I wonder if I could ask you a 
question here which goes, it seems to 
me, to the heart of the relationship 
with this country. For about 21 
months the Reagan Administration 
has done a variety of things, 
specifically, in the field of 
security — increasing the budget and 
so forth— to what the Soviets regard 
as tremendous proportions. They have 
been waiting for some time, and now 
they have cranked themselves up just 
before Mr. Brezhnev died to start to 
reciprocate? 

Do you think that you and Mr. 
Bush, by coming here, have something 
concrete to tell these people? That 
something can be done to stop this 
vicious circle, or is there anything else 
you can say on this particular matter? 

A. Obviously, something can be 
done to moderate behavior all around. I 
would say, first of all, your account of 
the sequence of things is not the way I 
see it — quite the reverse. The steady, 
relentless buildup of Soviet military 
capacity has in effect forced the United 
States, after quite a period of not 
pushing its defense establishment for- 
ward powerfully, to look to our defenses 
and our strength; I might say that I 
believe everybody knows that we have 
it. We have a tremendous economy, a 
very productive economy, so we are able 
to do that and sustain that. It is not a 
question of us suddenly increasing our 
efforts in this regard and the Soviets 
deciding that they better do so also. It is 
quite the reverse. Their efforts have 
been very strong and sustained. We 



have had to raise our sights, we will con 
tinue to do so, and we will maintain the 
strength of our defenses. Now, I 
presume that everyone, not only 
ourselves, but our allies would prefer a 
world in which we do not have to spend 
so much of our efforts on purely militan 
means. And if so, we are ready to work 
at that, as is evidenced by the 
President's arms reduction proposal. 

Q. A top American diplomatic 
source said that we must try to be as 
forthcoming as possible with the 
Soviets now. Could you elaborate on 
that, other than what that means? 

A. The Ambassador is here, and we 
will let him elaborate. 

Ambassador Hartman. This is a col 
laborative operation here. We are talk- 
ing to a new leadership here, and we ar^ 
reiterating our position. It is very clear 
to the new leadership. 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think the 
message is complicated. That is what 
makes it a good message. It is simple. 
And it is that we are realists. We will 
stay that way; we are strong, we will 
stay that way; we are constructive, we ' 
are ready to solve problems; we will con- 
tinue ready to do so, ready to respond, 
and if that takes place then the world 
can be better for everyone. 

Q. That means your happening to 
be here is not necessarily to carry a 
new message but to restate a standing 
message from the United States. You 
are not bringing anything new in the 
way of proposals from the Administra- 
tion for easing the situation between 
us. 

A. I think our basic policy is clear. 
We have sought to make it clear. The 
President has and we have emphasized, 
particularly right now, our readiness to 
work for a more constructive relation- 
ship than the one we have had in the re- 
cent past. You might say that is point 
three in the four-point list that I gave. 
All four points are there, I only sought 
to put a little emphasis on number three 

Q. Could you bring us up to date 
on the status of the two negotiations 
going on in Geneva on arms limita- 
tions issues. 

A. I don't know that there is too 
much to be said there. They are going 
on. They are going on in a businesslike 
manner. The people who are conducting 
the negotiations are professionals- 
skillful people. We know that our 
negotiators are such, and they tell me 
that their estimate of the Soviet 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



gotiators is that they are professional, 
'mpetent people who are businesslike 
their approach, so the negotiations 
e going on. I don't think that I want 
characterize them further. 

Q. I think the real question is do 
iU see any progress in these talks, or 
e they just at a stage where both 
des are just exchanging positions 
ithout any give occuring on either 
de? 

A. I think there is an intensive ex- 
lange of positions which I suppose in 
6 process of explaining tends to 
;velop them in more richness and 
;tail, so that's where I will leave that. 

Q. Can you explain the quid pro 
•10 from the lifting of the pipeline 
motions? Apart from promising to 
ake studies on East-West trade, it's 
Dt exactly clear what concrete com- 
litments the West Europeans have 
iken in response to our lifting the 
mctions. 

A. We haven't conducted our discus- 
ons with the Europeans along that line 
t all. We haven't discussed these mat- 
;rs with the foreign ministers going 
ack to the 37th U.N. [General 
ssembly] Session when I started with 
lem. And while they were talking with 
le about it, and at the La Sapiniere 
leeting of the NATO Foreign 
linisters — our efforts were to find the 
asis for a common strategic under- 
tanding of how we would conduct our 
conomic relationships with the Soviet 
Inion. 

The general idea is that we're not 
joking for a trade war; however, we 
re looking to focus on certain aspects 
f trade and finance— aspects of trade 
hat are related to the military capability 
if the Soviet Union, to the strategic 
losture of the Soviet Union, and in view 
if the huge expenditures that we and 
lur allies are undertaking for our 
lefense. The only reason we're under- 
taking them is that the level of defense 
'ffort in the Soviet Union is so great. In 
/iew of that, it makes no sense to sub- 
ddize the Soviet economy. So, based on 
hose principles, we will work together 
:o develop a strategy in the meantime. 
The COCOM [Coordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Security Export Con- 
trols] list is being examined and 
strengthened, and a stronger adminis- 
trative capacity is being connected to it. 
An intensive study of energy alter- 
natives will be undertaken. 

In the meantime, in [inaudible] 



Government involved have undertaken 
not to have any additional purchases of 
Soviet gas while people look around and 
reflect and see what the alternatives 
are. The agreement at Versailles to ex- 
amine the flows of trade and finance will 
be implemented in an administrative 
capacity. There is renewed emphasis on 
working out export credit arrangements. 

So, there are a whole series of 
things that are involved. Some are in 
the nature of immediate action; some 
are in the nature of a work program. In 
the long long run, well, of course, you 
cannot say what a work program will 
produce. It is always possible that it 
won't produce anything. My own esti- 
mate is that the effort to find a better 
strategic posture is likely to be a very 
productive and worthwhile effort in the 
long run. 

Q. Does the change in leadership 
in the Soviet Union increase in any 
way your view of the possibility of a 
summit meeting? 

A. Our attitude toward a summit 
meeting remains as being in favor of one 
if it is well prepared so that it is possible 
to imagine that something constructive 
might come out of it. The same would 
hold now with a new Soviet leadership. 
We will just have to see but, in principle, 
the President is willing to have such a 
meeting but only if it can be a construc- 
tive one and have a constructive out- 
come. 

Q. A recent Soviet speech seems to 
say that the way to peace is through 
military might. 

A. Soviet military might has been 
increasing. That is a description of their 
policy. We can speak about our own 
policy which is to be strong, to develop 
our strength, to see that it is based 
solidly on a very strong and productive 
economy. And, at the same time to say 
beyond that, if you want to try to work 
toward a world that is less tense, that 
has more constructive possibilities in it, 
that includes the possibilities of reduc- 
tions in armaments, we are prepared to 
do so. 

Q. Is it present U.S. policy to en- 
courage American trade with the 
Soviets, and will you please comment 
on the visit this week of hundreds of 
American businessmen to Moscow? 

A. The fact that the U.S. delegation 
coming to Moscow— as large as it is 
and, I might say, as distinguished as it 



is — there are some very important and 
strong business leaders included in that 
delegation — is an indication of the fun- 
damental interest and goodwill of the 
American people. In a sense, that com- 
plements the message that President 
Reagan enunciated in his various 
statements which have been quoted 
here — that we are ready to work with 
the Soviet Union if the circumstances 
are right. 

The fact of the matter is that the 
circumstances have not been --ight; they 
have not been conducive to the eruption 
of trade, particularly, but along the lines 
of the answers to various questions 
here, if the circumstances change, the 
fact that so many high-level businessmen 
are coming suggests the interest and the 
potential for a response. When people 
come here, that is not trade, that is an 
exhibition of a willingness to trade. For 
an actual trade to take place, it requires 
a lot more. I might say that there is an 
interesting closing of the circle here. I 
believe that the last time I was in 
Moscow in 1973 — almost 10 years 
ago — that was the meeting at which the 
first American business group met with 
the governmental counterparts to start 
this process. That is still in existence, 
although it has been on a very slow 
track in recent years. 

Q. When you speak of these cir- 
cumstances, what exactly do you have 
in mind? Can you just speculate? 

A. We have expressed our concerns 
in various ways. There are a variety of 
human rights concerns that the Presi- 
dent and the American people generally 
feel very strong about. We really do 
care a lot about human beings in the 
United States. There are regional issues 
of various dimensions; there is arms con- 
trol; there is a variety of things through 
which progress conceivably could be 
made, and progress has to change the 
atmosphere. 

Q. I was wondering if in the last 2 
or 3 days if the Soviet leadership has 
done or said anything that will make 
you hope for an improvement in rela- 
tions between the two countries. Is 
there any sign at all? 

A. It is really too early in the 
emergence of a new leadership to be try- 
ing to read the tea leaves that way. 
They are in the process of getting 
organized. We will see what comes for- 
ward. In the meantime, we will try to 
express our own viewpoint; the presi- 
dent has. And supplementing and com- 
menting his view, there is the fact that 



January 1983 



61 



EUROPE 



the Vice President has broken off from a 
very important trip to Africa, to which 
he will return, and he will complete all 
of the visits. Nevertheless, he broke off 
from that visit to come here — all as an 
expression of the importance that the 
United States attaches to the Soviet 
Union and to our relationship with the 
Soviet Union. 

Q. Can we perhaps meet with you 
again before you leave Moscow? 

A. It depends upon the schedule. 
Everything hangs on the schedule. We 
have some meetings tomorrow morning. 
I do not know, I cannot speak for the 
Vice President's schedule. I do not 
know, precisely, when he will return. So, 
there is a lot of uncertainty, but if there 
is anything to say as a result of 
whatever happens here, we will certainly 
want to get you together and tell you 
what it is. I have always been taught by 
John Hughes, "If you have any news, do 
not sit on it." Chances are it is very 
unlikely that we will have any news. But 
if we do, we will see that you get it. 

Q. Did you say who these meetings 
are with tomorrow morning? 

A. They are not with Soviet of- 
ficials. Mr. Pym [British Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs Francis] has gotten in touch with 
me, and I hope I can get together with 
him. He has made the request and Mr. 
[West German Vice Chancellor Hans- 
Dietrich] Genscher of the Federal 
Republic of Germany has also requested 
that I talk with him. As you know, Mr. 
Kohl [West German Chancellor Helmut] 
is in Washington, so, I suppose since we 
are not in Washington, we had better 
have our own meeting to see what we 
think, and there may be some others. 

Q. Will you be trying to meet with 
the Chinese before you leave? 

A. I do not have any scheduled 
meetings, and I doubt that it is possible. 
We checked schedules. 



American Role in NATO 



•Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 15, 1982. 

^Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman John Hughes. 

'White House press releases. 

*Made at Spaso House, Moscow. Press 
release 349. ■ 



by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Statevtent before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on November SO, 
1982. Ambassador Eagleburger is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. ' 

I welcome the opportunity to testify to- 
day on the American role in NATO. Too 
often in foreign policy, as elsewhere, we 
take the most important things for 
granted. Too rarely do we examine the 
foundations of our security and our role 
in the world. This is an important time 
for the United States to examine and 
state clearly our policies toward Euro- 
pean security. 

• We are now almost 2 years into 
the Reagan Administration. 

• In the Soviet Union, a new leader- 
ship has just taken up the reins of 
power. While it is unlikely that Mr. An- 
dropov [Yuriy V. Andropov, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union] and his associates will 
veer far from existing Soviet policies, 
they are undoubtedly now studying the 
opportunities and constraints they face. 
They are sizing up our resolve and 
steadiness and, in particular, our ability 
to maintain a unified Western alliance. 

• In Europe, we and our allies are 
succeeding in putting behind us conten- 
tious questions regarding the Siberian 
gas pipeline and are about to start an ef- 
fort to shape a coordinated Western ap- 
proach to East- West economic relations 
for the rest of this decade. 

Against this backdrop we are now 
hearing voices in this country calling for 
a scaling down of the American role in 
NATO. Most disturbingly, we are facing 
specific proposals in the Senate and the 
House which would, among other things, 
reduce the level of U.S. forces in Europe 
and interfere with our ability to meet 
our commitment to modernize NATO's 
nuclear forces. 

When such views surfaced in the 
past, the national commitment to a 
strong Atlantic alliance prevailed. Hav- 
ing fought two wars to defeat aggres- 
sion in Europe, the American people 
know that our interests cannot be in- 
sulated from events across the Atlantic. 
We decided after the second of those 
wars— as we should decide again 
now— that alliance with the other 
Western democracies is vital to our na- 
tion's security and prosperity. If we 



have learned anything from the history 
of this century it is that we cannot 
retreat to a fortress America nor safel 
disengage from European affairs. 

Europe has become more, not lessJ' 
important for us over the three decade' 
since the alliance was formed. The Euj* 
pean and North American economies s\ 
now so tightly knit together that neithS 
can grow without the other. The allied ' 
countries are our main export market. 
American direct investment in Europe 
an important positive factor in our 
balance of payments and contributes 
heavily to the profitability of America) 
business. 

The United States and Western 
Europe are more than simply trading 
and political partners, however. Our 
security is unalterably linked with thei 
Western Europe is quite literally our 
first line of defense. It is the center of 
our global competition with the Soviet 
Union and by far the most alluring ob 
ject of Soviet ambitions. 

NATO's strength and cohesion ha\ 
protected Western freedom and 
democracy and kept Europe peaceful t 
over three decades, despite a menacing 
Soviet military presence. If we some- 
times forget that our European allies 
stand face to face with Soxaet tanks ai 
with Eastern totalitarianism, if the 
Soviet challenge sometimes seems dis- 
tant to us, it is because NATO has bee 
effective. 

In recent years, Soviet military 
might has grown more rapidly than 
ever. Soviet foreign policy has become 
more assertive and aggressive. The in^ 
sion and occupation of Afghanistan is 
Moscow's first attempt since the end o 
the Second World War to expand by 
force the area under its direct control. 
The assault on the people of Poland 
shows that the Soviet leaders will not 
permit free institutions in countries 
where it has military dominion. 

The new leadership in Moscow fac^ 
basic choices about the Soviet role in t; 
world. If they see an America drawing 
inward, a demoralized Western allianc' 
and our European partners in doubt 
about the U.S. commitment, their ince 
tive to act with greater restraint will 1 
diminished. 

The need for a strong Atlantic 
alliance based on unity of purpose and 
steady American leadership has never 
been more critical. 



62 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



josed Senate Legislation 

Reagan Administration is par- 
arly concerned; therefore, by the 
pect of legislation that would cast 
)t on the steadiness of the U.S. com- 
nent to NATO. The current Senate 
nse appropriations bill, which con- 
5 provisions to cut back American 
icipation in NATO defense pro- 
ns, would, if passed, signal a broad 
, retreat from its responsibilities and 
sadership. 

Passage of this legislation would be 
ndamental departure from the 
Drical bipartisan postwar U.S. ap- 
ich to national security. Never has 
American role in the defense of 
;tern Europe been reduced through 
slation. Never has the United States 
ced away from its NATO com- 
ments. And never have the elected 
•esentatives of the American people 
'd not to stand by our allies and back 
)ur defense commitments. Are we 
ly ready now to take such a fateful 
)? Do we really want to greet the 
■ Soviet leadership with a sharp 
iation from the policies that have so 
.■essfully preserved Western security 
American leadership in Europe? 
The provisions that have been in- 
,ed in the Senate version of the pro- 
ed appropriations act that would be 
it damaging are: 

• The reduction by 18,900 troops of 
American force planned for the end 
iscal year 1983; 

• The elimination of funds to pro- 

e heavy equipment for prestocking at 
) sites provided by Belgium and the 
sherlands; 

• The elimination of the American 
■tion of the funding for 93,000 Ger- 
n reservists who will support our 

ts in wartime under the host nation 
iport program; 

• Cuts in funding for the ground- 
nched cruise missile, which would 
ce us to stretch our deployment 
ledules; and 

• Restrictions on transatlantic 
'ense cooperation and trade. 

Let me emphasize one point right 
['ay. This Administration, like the Con- 
'ess, is seriously concerned about the 
dget. We recognize that a sound 
3nomy is the necessary foundation for 
iuccessful foreign policy. But the pro- 
;ions I have just outlined have almost 
thing to do with budgetary austerity, 
le total saving contemplated by these 
ti-NATO proposals before the Senate 



is about $150 million, which is less than 
one-tenth of 1% of the total defense 
budget. 

If the political consequences of these 
measures were as insignificant as the 
budgetary savings, I would not be here 
today. But the impact of these measures 
on our security would be out of all pro- 
portion to their budgetary significance. 

Burdensharing Within NATO 

I am aware that this legislation reflects 
a concern about the fairness of the dis- 
tribution of defense burdens within the 
alliance. Like you, we want the allies to 
do more for the common defense. And it 
is true that U.S. defense spending is 
now growing faster than that of the 
allies. But let me remind you that we in 
the United States neglected military pro- 
grams for nearly a generation and that 
only today are we repairing the 
resulting gaps in our forces. We must 
sprint now because we went so slowly 
for so many years. 

In contrast, the allies have kept up a 
strikingly steady pace. During the 
1970s, their defense spending rose at a 
rate of 2% per year in real terms. Our 
defense spending declined in real terms 
by 1% per year during the same period. 
If we had matched the allied growth 
rate during the 1970s we would not need 
to accelerate now. Conversely, had the 
allies failed to maintain their steady ef- 
fort in those years— had their defense 



Effects on U.S. Security 

After all the arguments and counter- 
arguments about burdensharing have 
been heard, we must, at the end of the 
day, ask ourselves one basic question: 
Will the United States be more or less 
secure if these provisions are enacted? I 
believe the answer is clearly "less 
secure." Let me outline the effects I 
foresee. 

First, the American commitment to 
NATO would be placed in doubt. I do 
not see how the advocates of this legisla- 
tion could dispute this or argue that 
causing doubts about our commitment 
would advance our interests. Nothing 
could weaken the alliance more than the 
perception in Europe that the United 
States is not determined to preserve 
European security. Our allies would take 
little comfort in the fact that the amount 
of money involved is small. They would 
see passage of these cuts as a statement 
of U.S. intentions; they would interpret 
it as the beginning of a more general 
American retreat from Europe. 

The Soviet would undoubtedly try to 
exploit the inevitable doubts and fears of 
the Europeans. Dividing us from our 
allies and pushing us out of Europe are, 
of course, central goals of Soviet foreign 
policy. The Administration has, as you 
know, recently made progress in healing 
divisions and rebuilding consensus and 
confidence in the alliance. This legisla- 
tion could undo what has been achieved. 



Nothing could weaken the alliance more than the 
perception in Europe that the United States is not 
determined to preserve European security. 



spending decisions been dominated by 
considerations of what some here in the 
United States now call "equity" rather 
than need— the alliance would not be as 
secure as it is today. 

In any case, it would be a tragic 
mistake to allow concerns about burden- 
sharing to prevent us from doing what 
is necessary for our own security. 
Following that policy would allow those 
whose defense performance is weakest 
to set the standard. We are fortunate 
that the allies did not adopt such an at- 
titude during a time of less-than- 
adequate U.S. performance. 



Second, reductions, especially reduc- 
tions in the number of American troops 
in Europe, would send the worst possi- 
ble signal to European publics about the 
importance of a strong defense. NATO 
and U.S. leaders have been warning 
Europeans that the Soviet threat is 
gi'owing. Reducing American forces or 
abandoning planned improvements 
would make those warnings sound 
hollow and undermine European public 
and parliamentary support for defense 
expenditures. 

Proponents of this legislation may 
claim that our doing less would jolt our 
allies into doing more. 1 see no basis for 
such wishful thinking. U.S. cuts would 



Tiuary 1983 



63 



EUROPE 



have the opposite effect. If we do less, 
the Europeans will do less, and we will 
all be less secure. 

Third, these cuts, while small in 
dollar amounts, would hit priority, cost- 
effective programs especially hard. The 
proposed troop cuts could leave our com- 
bat forces undermanned or force the 
withdrawal of other essential units. 
Reductions in funding for prepositioning 
combat equipment and our share of the 
host nation support agreement would 
compound the difficulties and costs of 
wartime deployment. 

We are constantly striving to make 
our dollars buy more fighting strength. 
These programs enhance our combat 
capacity by improving what is some- 
times called our "teeth-to-tail" ratio. The 
proposed cuts would, therefore, reverse 
a major effort to improve our forces' ef- 
fectiveness, while saving very little 
money. Moreover, they would not simply 
penalize our allies but our own forces by 
denying them the means to carry out 
their rapid reinforcement mission. 

Fourth, these cuts would damage 
the very programs in which allied per- 
formance has been especially good. The 
Europeans have joined the host nation 
support and prepositioning programs 
with the clear and correct understanding 
that we would match or supplement 
them. If we now back down on our side 
of the bargain, we will not only lose the 
benefits of these programs but will 
undermine our credibility for the 
development of any future cooperative 
efforts. 

In 1978 at a summit meeting in 
Washington, alliance leaders agreed to a 
long-term program providing, among 
other things, for rapid U.S. wartime re- 
inforcement of Europe. Since then, our 
allies have fulfilled their commitment. 
For example, Belgium and the Nether- 
lands, both small and flensely populated 
countries, have gone to considerable ef- 
fort and expense to obtain the land re- 
quired to store prepositioned U.S. equip- 
ment. The Federal Republic of Germany 
has allocated half the funds for 93,000 
additional German reservists to support 
U.S. deployments. The proposed ap- 
propriations bill would threaten both of 



these programs. Is this a sensible way to 
respond when the allies have done just 
what we proposed they do? 

If restrictions on our contributions 
to the long-term defense program stand, 
the entire program will atrophy. We will 
turn a notable success into failure. We 
will cancel out much of what we and the 
allies have already achieved— and paid 
for. 

Last June in Bonn, President 
Reagan and his allied counterparts com- 
mitted themselves in a special summit 
charter to specific plans for improving 
NATO's conventional capabilities. This 
charter called for the achievement of de- 
manding force goals and identified 
priority programs. I cannot now 
guarantee that this charter will be im- 
plemented in every detail, though we 
will work to that end. But I can say with 
absolute confidence that if these cuts are 
legislated that charter will not be trans- 
lated into concrete improvements. 

Let me restate unequivocally our 
agreement that the allies need to do 
more. This Administration has made 
that clear at every opportunity, here and 
abroad, and is working to produce a 
greater allied contribution to our com- 
mon defense effort. 

Our attempts to foster better coor- 
dination of U.S. and European defense 
spending and to have our allies take 
greater responsibility for our common 
defense are bearing fruit. But only if we 
ourselves keep the commitments that we 
have made can we count on the allies to 
improve their performance. 

Finally, a legislated, unilateral U.S. 
pullback from our military commitments 
to NATO would damage prospects for 
arms control. Unilateral U.S. troop with- 
drawals would remove any incentive for 
the Soviets to agree to mutual reduc- 
tions that would lower the threat and 
ease the military confrontation in the 
heart of Europe. At the MBFR [mutual 
and balanced force reductions] talks in 
Vienna we are seeking to negotiate the 
new Western draft treaty put forward 
by the President last spring. That treaty 
would correct the present imbalance be- 
tween Soviet and Western forces in Cen- 
tral Europe through significant, verifi- 
able reductions to equal levels. 

A cut in funding for the gi'ound- 
launched cruise missile and the deletion 



of funds for the deployment of the Pe 
shing II missile, which has been votec 
the House, would dash our hopes for 
negotiated solution to the problem po : 
by the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-ran 
nuclear missiles. In the INF [inter- i 
mediate-range nuclear forces] talks inj 
Geneva, we have proposed a treaty tl|| 
would ban this whole class of Soviet i\ 
U.S. intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles. But only if we and our allies 
show that we are resolved to deploy 
U.S. missiles in Europe can we get tl 
Soviets to negotiate seriously. 

The advocates of this legislation ( 
it to us all to explain how it would he 
arms control and thus contribute to 
reduction of the threat. Is there any 
evidence that unilateral limits and cu 
can have anything other than a destr 
five effect on negotiated arms contro 
Should we not be more concerned abi 
reducing the threat than about rediu- i 
our ability to counter it? : 



Conclusion 

Let me conclude with a few basic poi 
The Atlantic alliance has provided we 
for Western security for 30 years. Th 
alliance is built upon the forces that 
and our allies have deployed in Europ 
and the conviction that the LInited 
States is fully committed to the defen 
of Europe. When those forces and th; 
conviction are strong, deterrence in 
Europe is sturdy and we are secure. ' 
weaken them at our peril. The world 
be dangerous enough in this decade. I 
not in our interest to tamper with Nol 
Atlantic security. ' 



1 The complete transcript of the heari l 
will be published by the committee and wil 
be available from the Superintendent of ' 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of 
fice. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



64 



Department of State Bulla' 



EUROPE 



sit of Italian Prime Minister Spadolini 



^rime Minister Giovanni Spadolini 
ily made an official working visit to 
hington, D.C.. November 2-1,, 1982. 
^wing are remarks made by Presi- 
Reagan and Prime Minister 
Mini after their meeting on 
miber 3. 

lident Reagan 

le Minister Spadolini and I have had 
)st productive and harmonious 
ission today covering a wide range 
aportant issues. Our discussions con- 
ed the wide-ranging accord that 
ts between our two countries on 
;ers affecting world peace, Western 
larity, and international economic 
leration. And this is only fitting as 
/een allies as close as the United 
es and Italy. 

On the key issues of East-West 
e, Prime Minister Spadolini and I 
!e that the United States, Italy, and 
other allies must pursue discussions 
;d at establishing a broad transatlan- 
onsensus. Our trade and financial 
tions with the Soviet Union must 
• into account the nature of the 
iet conduct toward its neighbors. 
Prime Minister shared with me 
)f's special perspective in this regard. 
We discussed the current situation 
le Middle East, where our two coun- 
3 are working closely both to 
rantee the peace which prevails in 
Sinai and to assist the Government 
..ebanon in securing withdrawal of all 
dgn forces and restoring its full 
lority throughout the territory. The 
Tie Minister stated a readiness in 
iciple to support the expansion of 
y's contribution to the multinational 
;e in the context of broadening the 
;e's mandate and its composition. I 
it to take this occasion to extend my 
sonal appreciation to the Prime 
lister for his vigorous and construc- 
! contributions that Italy is making to 
promotion of peace and stability in 
t critical region. 

We also discussed the importance of 
aerospace industry in strengthening 
technological capability of the West, 
1 we've agreed to instruct the ap- 
ipriate authorities in our respective 
rernments to facilitate cooperation in 
3 sector. In this connection, the Prime 



Minister and I agree that our govern- 
ments would establish working groups 
to explore the means of future coopera- 
tion between our two nations. 

During our discussion of Western 
security issues, I expressed appreciation 
to the Prime Minister for Italy's in- 
dispensable contribution to the 
December 1979 NATO decision on the 
intermediate-range nuclear forces. I 
reaffirm to him my commitment to pur- 
sue vigorously negotiations leading to 
the elimination of such forces by both 
sides and to the deep reduction in 
strategic nuclear forces as well. 

I'd like to close on a personal note. 
This was my fourth meeting with the 
Prime Minister, and my admiration and 
respect for him has grown with each en- 
counter. The United States has no bet- 
ter friend in the world than Italy, and 
the West has no more erudite and distin- 
guished a leader than my friend, Giovan- 
ni Spadolini. After our meetings in 
Europe, it was a great pleasure for me 
to receive him here at home, and I look 
forward to seeing him once again when 
he returns to the United States for the 
economic summit that will be held in 
Williamsburg next spring. 



Prime Minister Spadolini 

I have come today to see President 
Reagan, together with Foreign Minister 
[Emilio] Colombo, not only in behalf of 
Italy but also as the interpreter of the 
concerns and common feelings of West- 
ern Europe— that Europe that finds 
itself in the values of freedom and 
tolerance and of respect of man for 
man, which are part and parcel of the 
Atlantic community. 

I have told President Reagan about 
the absolute need to find a global 
strategy in the economic and trade rela- 
tions with the Eastern countries. The 
misunderstandings of the last months 
must be replaced by a new partnership 
on a basis of equal dignity and a mutual 
understanding based on the agreements 




of Versailles and on which the Italian 
contribution was determined. 

As Italians, we feel that in con- 
sistency with the approach adopted at 
Versailles, the Western World must find 
and define a common approach based on 
a greater strictness of an economic 
nature in its relations with the Eastern 
world and based on and inspired by the 
following four points: 

First, no undue gift to the Soviet 
Union as far as credits are concerned; 
[second], greater strictness in the 
transfer of technologies to the Soviet 
Union; third, implementation of a securi- 
ty net within the Western system so as 
to reduce the dependence on the ^Soviet 
Union concerning raw materials and 
energy products; fourth, the contracts 
that have already been signed by Euro- 
pean countries concerning the pipeline 
must be honored, so as not to prejudge 
the credibility as far as the trade of the 
Western World is concerned. 

But I think that, amongst these four 
points, we also feel that it is indispen- 
sable to have a prejudicial position that 
would affect, in a legitimate manner, the 
past or that would create obstacles for 
the future. 

Following the first meetings that I 
have had here in Washington, the 
United States has made a further step 
forward toward the solution of this 
problem through a formula which will be 
presented this evening to the Am- 
bassadors of the countries concerned. 
And within this perspective, and aware 
of the need of the lifting of sanctions as 
a consequence of the new agreement, 



nuary 1983 



65 



EUROPE 



Italy will continue to commit itself to 
find a conclusion and a solution, so as to 
have a global agreement — a solution 
which I think is very near. 

I will also present this same position 
in Paris in the very close meeting that I 
will have with President [Francois] Mit- 
terrand. The political solidarity between 
Europe and the United States that we 
want to defend at all costs also implies 
the overcoming of these conflicts which 
are not necessary and that we are hav- 
ing because of the Soviet Union. 

Italy is and will always be coherent 
to the principles that have been inspir- 
ing, for more than 30 years, its foreign 
policy, and which are based on the 
strengthening of the bonds with its part- 
ners of the Western World and first and 
foremost, with the United States, which 
is the essential premise to start, once 
again, and on the basis of a guaranteed 
security, the East- West dialog, which is 
undergoing new tensions today which 
torment us and concern us very much. I 
am thinking in particular of the situation 
in Poland and in Afghanistan. This is 
why, in spite of the international dif- 
ficulties — and I think that because of 
these difficulties — we are convinced 
more than ever about the fact that we 
should pursue in the negotiations under- 
going in Geneva for a balanced control 
and reduction of armaments. 

I have reaffirmed to President 
Reagan the conviction that Italy has: 
that to find peace in the world it is 
necessary to also act for the develop- 
ment of a policy which would favor the 
dialog between the North and the South 
on our planet. And I am referring in 
particular to the difficult areas of the 
Mediterranean. And it is in this frame- 
work that I am thinking of satisfaction 
of the joint action of our two coun- 
tries — first, in the Sinai, and today, in 
Beirut, an action that we want to 
strengthen in agreements between our 
two governments and that in the next 
days will find a further development 



with the parallel decisions which will in- 
crease our presence in Lebanon, always 
with the aim of giving to that torn coun- 
try a condition of true independence and 
stability. 

Within the framework of bilateral 
collaboration, which is developing in all 
fields from the economic to the cultural, 
and within the framework of our col- 
laboration, also, in the fight against ter- 
rorism and against narcotics, I have told 
President Reagan about the Italian deci- 
sion which will have to be now defined 
in the competent fora, to buy from the 
American industry 30^ McDonnell- 
Douglas DC9 80 aircraft. 

I have also conveyed to President 
Reagan the warm greetings of the Presi- 
dent of the Italian Republic, Mr. Sandro 
Pertini, seeing with satisfaction that in 
the last 2 years Italy has confirmed its 
role amongst the most industrialized 
countries of the Western World. And 
this is why I've been able to come here 
expressing the voice of an Italy which is 
determined to respect its international 
commitments and to, therefore, begin 
working from the strengthening of 
defense in the Atlantic Alliance; to 
struggle, therefore, against economic 
difficulties which are common to the 
whole Western industrialized world. And 
we are doing this in a very strict and 
steadfast manner. 

All Europeans know how much they 
owe to the United States that twice has 
given back freedom to our continent. 
And I, therefore, have been interpreter 
of these feelings to my friend. President 
Ronald Reagan, a man that I admire 
very much for his loyalty, dedication to 
individual freedoms of the whole world. 



'Made on the South Lawn of the WTiite 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 8, 1982.) 

^Prime Minister Spadolini spoke in 
Italian, and his remarks were translated by 
an interpreter. In the original translation, the 
interpreter said three aircraft. She corrected 
the error at the conclusion of her translation 
of the Prime Minister's remarks. ■ 



Visit of 
West German 
Chancellor Kohl 



Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West G 
many made an official visit to 
Washington, D.C., November 14-16, 
1982, to meet with President Reagan c 
other high-ranking Administration of 
ficials. Following is the full text of the 
joint communique issued following 
Chancellor Kohl's meeting with the Pr 
dent on November 15.^ 

During the visit of the Chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Ko 
he and President Reagan held detailed tal 
in Washington on current political and 
economic issues on November 15, 1982. T 
Chancellor is also meeting with Secretary 
State Shultz, Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger, Secretary of the Treasury 
Regan, high-ranking Administration offici , 
and leading members of the Senate. 

The discussions attested to the depth ; 
the breadth of German-American friendsh 
The United States and the Federal Repub 
of Germany are partners as well as friend 
sharing common ideals, human and demo- 
cratic values. In today's uncertain world, ti 
commitment has become more important 
than ever. Our shared values form the un- 
shakeable foundation for our joint efforts 
maintain the freedom and prosperity of th 
Western world. 

The discussions were based on a deter 
mination to work together as closely as pc 
ble to meet the challenges of the closing 
decades of the twentieth century. These 
challenges are as critical as those which fa ( 
the great statesmen who founded our part 
nership more than three decades ago. Dur ; 
the past thirty years the Atlantic partnersf 
has been successful in guaranteeing to our 
peoples more freedom, security and pros- 
perity than at any time in history. The Pre 
dent and the Chancellor reaffirmed during 
their discussions their common view on th^ 
central role played by the Atlantic Alliancir 
the foreign policies of their respective 
governments. 

A major reason for success of the Atla 
tic Alliance has been the close relationship 
which has developed between the United 
States and the Federal Republic of Genua ■ 
German-American ties are deeper than .-^inii 
calculations of national interest. After \\' >\ 
War II and after the destruction caused l)y 
in Germany, these ties originated from the 
generous humanitarian aid and the politics 
support which the United States granted t 
the German people and their young denioc 
racy. German-American relations are base^ 
on a close affection among our two people: 



66 



Department of State Buiiei 



EUROPE 



familial ties between Americans and Ger- 
is. Ours is a relationship based on mutual 
port and open discussions between equal 
;ners. 

During the discussions it was agreed that 
1 level consultations between the United 
tes and the Federal Republic of Germany 
be continued during a visit to Bonn by 
retary of State Shultz in early December. 
An example of the close ties between our 

nations are the more than fifty million 
ericans of German descent. German 
ericans have provided major contributions 
very aspect of American life and form 

of the foundations of American society. 

President and the Chancellor anticipated 
1 pleasure the joint celebration in 1983 of 
Tricentennial of German immigration to 
United States. President Reagan an- 
nced today the formation of a Presidential 
imemoration of this important event, 
mcellor Kohl described plans for celebra- 
18 in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
'.y stressed that the Tricentennial should 
i joint celebration among the peoples of 
ir two nations and reaffirmed the inten- 
1 of President Reagan and President 
■stens to meet in the United States in 
ober, 1983, to highlight the American 
;bration. 

The wider the understanding of the com- 
nality of the issues facing the United 
tes and the Federal Republic of Germany, 

stronger our partnership will become. 
• this reason. President Reagan and 
mcellor Kohl were pleased to reaffirm 
ir support for the initiatives to broaden 
5. -German contacts and to set up a 
Itilateral youth exchange among Western 
ustrialized democracies. The purpose is to 
;s on to the younger generations in our na- 
is the sense of partnership which the older 
leration feels so deeply. 

The President and the Chancellor reaf- 
med the Alliance's overall concept for suc- 
isfully safeguarding peace in Europe as 
ibodied in the declaration made by the 
ads of state and government of the Atlan- 

Alliance in Bonn on June 10, 1982. As 
■essed in that declaration, they agreed that 
accordance with current NATO defense 
ins, and within the context of NATO 
•ategy and its triad of forces, they will con- 
lue to strengthen NATO's defense posture, 
th special regard to conventional forces. 
The Alliance has demonstrated that it 
rves the cause of peace and freedom. Even 

difficult situations, it has been able to do 

because its members have acted in a spirit 

solidarity. The Alliance does not threaten 
lyone. Nor does it aspire to superiority, but 

the interests of peace it cannot accept in- 
riority either. Its aim is, as before, to pre- 
!nt any war and safeguard peace and 
eedom. None of the weapons of the Alliance 
ill ever be used except in response to at- 

The Chancellor paid tribute to the crucial 

)ntribution that the United States renders 
1 the joint security of the Alliance through 
le indispensable presence of American 



troops in Europe. The President and the 
Chancellor agreed that a unilateral reduction 
of American troops would have a destabiliz- 
ing effect and, at the same time, would 
undermine efforts for negotiated force reduc- 
tions. 

The President expressed his great ap- 
preciation for the significant and uninter- 
rupted German contribution to the common 
defense. In particular, he paid tribute to the 
German-American agreement of April 15, 
1982 on Wartime Host Nation Support, 
which entails considerable additional expend- 
iture by the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United States of America for com- 
mon defense. 




The President and the Chancellor 
stressed the need for close, comprehensive, 
and timely consultations to strengthen the 
Alliance's cohesion and its capacity to act. 
They attached particular importance to 
German-American cooperation. They hoped 
that informal meetings of the foreign 
ministers of the Alliance would be continued. 

The President welcomed the resolve of 
the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to strengthen European unification. 
The President and the Chancellor paid tribute 
to the important role of the European Com- 
munity and all its member states for 
economic and political stability in Europe and 
the world. The development of a united 
Europe will strengthen cooperation between 
Europe and the United States and, hence, 
also reinforce the Alliance. 

The President and the Chancellor paid 
tribute to the close agreement and coopera- 
tion between the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many and the Three Powers in all matters 
relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole. 
They concurred in the view that the preser- 
vation of trouble-free conditions in and 
around Berlin was an essential element of 
East- West relations and of the international 
situation as a whole. 

The President reaffirmed American sup- 
port for the political aim of the Federal 



Republic of Germany to work for a state of 
peace in Europe in which the German nation 
will regain its unity through self- 
determination. 

A major subject discussed during the 
meetings was relations with the Soviet 
Union. The values and goals of the Soviet 
Union do not correspond to our own. The 
USSR restricts freedom on its own territory 
and in countries under its influence, and has 
shown that it is ready to use force or the 
threat of force to achieve its foreign policy 
aims. Security of Western societies requires 
constant attention to the military threat 
posed by the USSR. The Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United States of America 
gear their policies in East- West relations to 
the concept of renunciation of force, human 
rights, and the right of nations to self deter- 
mination. 

The President and the Chancellor called 
upon the Soviet Union to comply with inter- 
nationally recognized rules of conduct. This 
required respect for the principles enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations and in 
the Helsinki Final Act as well as a world- 
wide policy of moderation and restraint. 
In this spirit, the President and the 
Chancellor underlined their desire to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union. They are 
ready to conduct relations with the new 
leadership in Moscow with the aim of extend- 
ing areas of cooperation to their mutual 
benefit if Soviet conduct makes that possible. 
It is especially important at present for the 
West to approach the Soviet Union with a 
clear, steadfast and coherent attitude which 
combines the defense of its own interests 
with the readiness to pursue constrjuctive 
relations, dialogue, and cooperation with the 
leadership of the Soviet Union. 

In this regard, the President and the 
Chancellor greeted with satisfaction the re- 
cent Eigreement on measures leading to a 
broader consensus on East- West economic 
relations. They attached the greatest impor- 
tance to a common approach to this issue. 
Close consultation and cooperation on East- 
West economic issues is as vital to Western 
interests as is the traditional cooperation on 
political and security questions. 

It is the purpose of our common efforts 
that trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe should be conducted on the basis of a 
balance of mutual advantages. While noting 
the important part which our economic rela- 
tions with the Warsaw Pact countries can 
play in the development of a stable East- 
West relationship, the President and the 
Chancellor agreed that those relations should 
be approached in a prudent and diversified 
manner, consistent with our political and 
security interests. 

The Chancellor expressed his appreciation 
for the lifting of the embargo on oil and gas 
technology and equipment, which he con- 
sidered as evidence of successful efforts on 
the part of all concerned for improved coor- 
dination of Western policy in the economic 
field. 

The President and the Chancellor agreed 
that developments in Poland, which continued 



anuary 1983 



67 



EUROPE 



to cause great concern, had an adverse effect 
on efforts to promote security and coopera- 
tion in Europe. They drew attention once 
more to the Soviet Union's responsibility for 
the events in Poland. They called upon the 
Polish leadership to lift martial law in 
Poland, to release all detainees, to reverse 
the ban on the trade union Solidarity and, 
through serious dialogue with the Church and 
appointed workers' representatives, to seek 
national consensus which is the only way to 
lead Poland out of its present crisis, free 
from any external interference. They hoped 
that the release of Lech Walesa will promote 
these objectives. The President and the 
Chancellor welcomed the numerous initiatives 
for humanitarian aid for the Polish people. 
They agreed that this aid should be stepped 
up wherever possible. 

The President and the Chancellor agreed 
on the importance of the CSCE process ini- 
tiated by the Helsinki Final Act and ad- 
vocated that it be continued. It is a long-term 
process which has been gravely affected by 
events in Poland. It can prove successful only 
if the participating countries observe the 
principles and provisions of the Final Act in 
their entirety. They expressed support for 
the new proposals, responsive to events in 
Poland and the USSR, put forward by the 
West in the resumed Madrid session, as 
reasonable and essential elements of a bal- 
anced outcome. 

The President and the Chancellor agreed 
that the CSCE review conference, which was 
resumed in Madrid on November 9, 1982, 
should agree on a substantive and balanced 
final document which leads to progress in the 
important humanitarian field of East-West 
relations and contains a precise mandate for 
a Conference on Disarmament in Europe 
(CDE), envisaging militarily significant con- 
fidence and security building measures cover- 
ing the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to 
the Urals. 

The President and the Chancellor noted 
that arms control and disarmament as well as 
defense and deterrence were integral parts of 
NATO's security policy. They agreed that 
significant progress towards reduction of the 
levels of nuclear and conventional forces 
through balanced and verifiable agreements 
would be an important contribution to the 
reduction of international tensions. The inces- 
sant unilateral increase in Soviet armaments 
in recent years has threatened the security 
and made even more urgent the need to 
establish a balance of forces between East 
and West. The goal of the United States and 
the Federal Republic of Germany remains to 
achieve a stable balance of both nuclear and 
conventional forces at the lowest possible 
level. 

The President and the Chancellor recalled 
the comprehensive program of arms control 
proposals put forward by the United States 
on the basis of close consultation and adopted 
by the entire Alliance at the Bonn Summit on 
June 10, 1982. They stressed their common 
belief that this program provides the best 
hope for true reductions in arsenal of both in- 
termediate and intercontinental strategic 



weapons. They rejected the proposals to 
freeze existing levels of nuclear weapons, or 
for one-sided reductions by the West, as in- 
adequate for substantive arms control and as 
harmful to the security of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 

They noted also that the Soviet Union 
had in recent years refused to reciprocate the 
unilateral restraint in this field by the United 
States. They expressed the strong judgment 
that true reductions in nuclear armaments 
would be possible only when the Soviet Union 
is convinced of the determination of the West 
to maintain its defenses at the level 
necessary to meet the threat posed by 
massive increases in Soviet nuclear forces. 

In this connection they attached par- 
ticular importance to negotiations on reduc- 
tions of strategic arms and of intermediate 
range nuclear forces now underway between 
the United States and the Soviet Union in 
Geneva. President Reagan reaffirmed his 
determination to do his utmost to achieve 
true reductions in nuclear armaments 
through balanced and verifiable agreements. 
The President and the Chancellor pointed out 
that negotiations in Geneva are serious and 
substantial. At the same time they expressed 
concern at the refusal of the Soviet Union to 
take into account legitimate Western security 
concerns. 



In conformity with their policy for activ 
ly safeguarding peace through firmness and, 
negotiation, the President and the Chancelk 
reaffirmed their commitment to both parts ( 
the NATO dual-track decision of Decem- i 
ber 12, 1979, consisting of a program of INJ 
modernization and an offer to the Soviet 
Union of arms control negotiations on INF. 
An important aspect of Western security 
policy remains the common determination t(, 
deploy modernization longer-range INF 
missiles in Europe beginning at the end of 
1983 if negotiations on this subject now 
underway in Geneva do not result in a con- 
crete agreement making deployment un- 
necessary. 

The President and the Chancellor noted 
that the decision to deploy the systems in 
Europe was based on a unaminous finding t 
members of the Atlantic Alliance that in- 
creases in Soviet weapons, in particular in- 
troduction of SS-20 missiles, had endanger( 
the security of Western Europe and thus of 
the entire Alliance. They stressed that the 
complete elimination of Soviet and United 
States land-based, longer-range INF missile 
as proposed by the United States, would be 
an equitable and fair result and would be a 
substantial contribution to serious arms con 
trol. They called upon the Soviet Union to 
negotiate seriously toward this end. The 
Chancellor restated his full confidence in th« 



Second Anniversary of Solidarity 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 10, 1982' 

Today marks the second anniversary of 
an important milestone in mankind's 
age-long struggle for freedom. In 
November 1980, for the first time since 
1917, a Communist government was 
compelled to grant formal recognition to 
a free trade union, Solidarity. This un- 
precedented step was brought about by 
a nonviolent revolution of millions of 
Polish workers who could no longer 
tolerate coercion and mismanagement. 

Many hoped that this event would 
open a new chapter in the evolution of 
Communist regimes; that it demon- 
strated they have finally recognized 
there are limits to the use of force 
against one's own people; and that 
cooperation is preferable to repression. 
Unfortunately, as we now know, the of- 
ficial recognition of Solidarity 2 years 
ago was merely a tactical move to gain 
time on the part of the panic-stricken 
Communist authorities. 

The Polish Government, working 
hand in glove with Moscow, persistently 
refused to implement the terms of the 



November 10, 1980 accords. Instead, it 
did everything it could to discredit the 
union by a campaign of slander and 
provocation. The campaign failed to 
achieve its objectives. Finally, in 
desperation and under intense Soviet 
pressure, Poland's authorities moved toi 
liquidate Solidarity, which ideal of 
worker self-determination jeopardized a 
Communist regimes. 

It is said by declaring war on its 
own people, the Polish Government has 
destroyed Solidarity. This is not so. On« 
can imprison protesters, club and 
disperse demonstrators with tear gas oi 
water cannons, but the specter remains 
Never again will the self-appointed 
representatives of the workers be able 
to pretend that they represent anyone 
but themselves. 

Our hearts go out to the brave 
Polish people. By struggling for freedor 
and social justice against overwhelming 
odds, they fight for a cause all humanit 
shares with them. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 15, 1982. 



68 



Department of State Bulletii 



EUROPE 



I rican negotiating effort in Geneva and 

1 Dmed the close and continuous process of 
jltations within the Alliance, 
^resident Reagan described the ideas 

I id his Berhn initiative of Juije 10, 1982 
.n agreement between the United States 

I Lhe Soviet Union on measures to help 
i the danger that accident or miscalcula- 
could lead to a nuclear exchange be- 
n East and West. He stated that the 
ed States was preparing proposals for 
iar confidence building measures which 
d be presented by American represent- 
's at the Geneva negotiations. The 
ncellor and the President expressed their 
' that the Soviet Union would join with 
United States in progressing rapidly to 
greement on such measures. They also 
ain committed to halting the spread of 
ear weapons through the pursuit of 
rous non-proliferation policies. 
The President and the Chancellor 
srscored their undiminished interest in 
itantial reduction in conventional forces in 
ral Europe. They recalled the new draft 
ty which the Western participants had 
rented at the Vienna negotiations on 
ual and balanced force reductions. This 
)osal provides an excellent foundation for 
.lanced agreement on reduction of conven- 
al forces in Europe. The President and 
Chancellor called upon Warsaw Pact par- 
>ants to react positively. 
They stated that agreement on a com- 
lensive and fully verifiable ban on 
Tiical weapons in the Geneva Committee 
iisarmament remained a prime objective 
neir policies. 

They also attached great importance to 
rts in the United Nations to secure 
isparency by promoting military openness, 
fication, and wider availability of informa- 
on defense spending. 



The President and the Chancellor were in 
complete agreement on the requirement for 
special attention to Alliance needs on the 
Southern Flank. They emphasized in this con- 
nection their resolve to support the Turkish 
Government in its efforts to lead Turkey 
back to democracy. 

The President and the Chancellor ex- 
pressed confidence that our free societies 
would overcome the current difficult 
economic situation. They attached paramount 
importance to restoring the conditions for 
sustained growth through higher in- 
vestments, in order to reduce unemployment 
and to maintain price stability. 

The economic policies of industrial na- 
tions must be closely coordinated. Each coun- 
try must bear in mind the effects that its 
political and economic measures will have on 
other countries. These factors will also have 
an important effect on the Economic Summit 
to be held in Williamsburg at the invitation of 
the United States. Both sides reaffirmed the 
importance of conducting the discussions at 
this summit on the basis of openness, trust, 
and informality. 

The President and the Chancellor dis- 
cussed the dangers posed by rising protec- 
tionism to world trade and the economic well 
being of nations. They reaffirmed their com- 
mitment to the multilateral trading system, 
looking forward to a successful GATT 
Ministerial meeting in Geneva this month. 

The President and the Chancellor agreed 
that it is imperative to respect and promote 
the independence of the countries of the 
Third World and that genuine nonalignment 
is an important element of stability and world 
peace. The President and the Chancellor reaf- 
firmed their readiness to continue to 
cooperate with Third World countries on the 
basis of equal partnership. 

The continuing Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan is a strain on international rela- 
tions. The President and the Chancellor 



deplored the fact that the Soviet Union con- 
tinued to defy international opinion and ig- 
nored United Nations resolutions calling for 
the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan, as well as the right to self- 
determination for Afghanistan and restora- 
tion of its non-aligned status. Afghanistan re- 
mains an acid test of Soviet readiness to 
respect the independence, autonomy, and 
genuine non-alignment of Third World coun- 
tries and to exercise restraint in its interna- 
tional behavior. 

The Chancellor welcomed President 
Reagan's proposal of September 1, 1982 as a 
realistic attempt to promote the peace proc- 
ess in the Middle East. They agreed that 
negotiations between Israel and its neighbors 
in the framework of UN resolutions 242 and 
338 offer the best opportunity for peaceful 
resolution of disputes in that area. The 
United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, together with its partners in Euro- 
pean Political Cooperation, will, as before, 
seek to ensure that the American and Euro- 
pean efforts for a comprehensive, just, and 
lasting peace in the Middle East, on the basis 
of existing achievements, are complementary 
to each other. They called for early with- 
drawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. 
They continued to urge that the sovereignty 
and unity of Lebanon be restored and ex- 
pressed their support for the reconstruction 
of Lebanon. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 22, 1982, 
which also carries remarks at the arrival 
ceremony, remarks following the meeting 
with the President, and dinner toaste made 
by the President and Chancellor Kohl at a 
private dinner hosted by the President, all on 
Nov. 15. ■ 



inuary 1983 



69 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



Act of State Doctrine: 
Foreign Expropriations 



The following letter was written by 
Department of State Legal Adviser Davis 
R. Robinson to Solicitor General Rex E. 
Lee for submission to the Court of Ap- 
peals for the Sixth Circuit in the case of 
Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. the 
Provisional Military Government of 
Socialist Ethiopia. Th£ letter sets forth 
the Department's practice regarding the 
issuance of letters commenting on the 
potential effect on U.S. foreign relations 
of litigation in U.S. courts challenging 
the legality of foreign acis of expropria- 
tion. The letter addresses this question 
only with respect to cases in which a 
treaty supplies the applicable legal stand- 
ard for judging the international legality 
of the foreign act, the situation presented 
in the particular case before the court. 

November 19, 1982 

The Honorable Rex E. Lee 
Solicitor General of the United States 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530 

Dear Mr. Solicitor General: 
The Department of State has requested that 
the views of the United States be submitted 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in a case styled Kalamazoo 
Spice Extraction Co. v. The Provisional 
Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia. 
This case involves an appeal from a decision 
by the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Michigan in which the 
District Court abstained from ruling on the 
merits of the suit because of the Act of State 
Doctrine. Two aspects of the decision are of 
concern to the Department of State — the 
Court's characterization of the Treaty of Ami- 
ty and Economic Relations between the 
United States and Ethiopia as being too 
"general . . . and susceptible of multiple inter- 
pretation" to constitute an agreed legal 
standard capable of judicial application, and 
the significance attached by the Court to the 



absence of a "Bernstein letter" from this 
Department stating that adjudication would 
not be harmful to the conduct of foreign rela- 
tions. 

We have worked closely with the Depart- 
ment of Justice in the preparation of a brief 
to convey to the Court of Appeals the views 
of the Executive Branch as amicus curiae on 
these two issues of special concern. The brief 
sets forth the reasons why the treaty pro- 
vides a precise, administerable and, by agree- 
ment, governing rule of law. The brief also 
sets forth, partially in reliance upon this let- 
ter, why the courts should not infer from the 
silence of the Department of State that ad- 
judication in this case would be harmful to 
the foreign policy of the United States. Since 
the latter issue involves the inferences to be 
drawn by the courts generally from actions of 
this Department, I wish to make clear the 
practice that we intend to follow in cases like 
this. 

As expressed in Banco Nacional de Cuba 
V Sabbatino. 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the 
presumption that the courts should abstain 
from considering the expropriatory acts of 
foreign states appears to have reflected two 
major concerns of the Supreme Court. The 
first was that articulation by United States 
courts of an applicable international law 
standard for compensation would pose special 
difficulties, including a perceived risk of con- 
flict with the Executive Branch's assertion of 
a governing legal standard in the conduct of 
foreign relations. The second of the Court's 
principal concerns was that adjudication could 
complicate the conduct of bilateral relations 
with the expropriating state — for example, 
by frustrating ongoing claims settlement 
negotiations between the two governments. 

Where, as in the present case, there is an 
applicable treaty standard, the first of these 
concerns falls away. The second con- 
cern — potential interference with ongoing 
claims negotiations or other foreign relations 
interests — does not, in our view, warrant 
automatic abstention by the courts on Act of 



State grounds. As Legal Adviser Monroe 
Leigh wrote to the Solicitor General conce ■ 
ing foreign expropriations in 1975: ( 

In general this Department's experiei 
provides little support for a presumption 
that adjudication of acts of foreign state i 
accordance with relevant principles of in • 
national law would embarrass the condU' 
of foreign policy. [Letter of November 2 j 
1975, reprinted at Appendix I to Alfred ,, 
Dunhill of London. Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.!] 
682, 706 (1976).] ' 

The experience of the past seven years ha 
reinforced this conclusion. Accordingly, wi 
believe that a broad, inflexible rule of absl j 
tion in expropriation cases is not necessar i 
safeguard our foreign policy interests. Wl" , 
as in this case, there is a controlling legal 
standard for compensation, we believe tha 
the presumption should be that adjudicatic 
would not be inconsistent with foreign pol 
interests under the Act of State Doctrine. 

If, however, the Department of State 
determines in a given case that judicial 
abstention is necessary for foreign policy 
reasons, it will request the Department of 
Justice to communicate that determinatioi 
the appropriate court. Such a communicat 
could be either in response to an inquiry f i 
a court concerned about the foreign policy 
implications of the case before it or on the 
initiative of the Executive Branch. (Privat 
litigants and foreign governments frequen 
bring cases to the attention of the Depart- 
ment of State which they believe raise Act 
State concerns.) If we indicate that adjudi( 
tion would be consistent with foreign polic 
interests of the United States, we trust th 
the court will give appropriate weight to o 
views. As a general rule, however, where 
there is a controlling legal standard for co 
pensation we would not plan to inform the 
courts of the absence of foreign policy objfl 
tives to adjudication of expropriation claim 
Therefore, we would anticipate that silence 
on the part of the Executive in such cases 
would not be relied upon as a basis for 
judicial abstention under the Act of State 
Doctrine. 

Sincerely, 

Davis R. Robinsoi 



70 



Departnnent of State Bulle 



IDDLE EAST 



^arch for Peace and Stability in the Middle East 



(enneth W. Dam 

Stdtement before the Senate Foreign 
tiiins Committee on December 1, 
. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of 



an honor for me to appear before 
committee today to discuss our ef- 
i to bring peace and stability to the 
lie East. As you know, these efforts 
Ive a resolution on the conflict in 
inon and the search for comprehen- 
peace in the Middle East. 
Our government is approaching 
e two problems on separate tracks, 
there is an obvious relationship be- 
3n them. That relationship is sym- 
;ed by the President's appointment 
.mbassador Philip Habib as his 
:ial Representative with a new man- 
' involving both Lebanon and the 
ider peace process. These endeavors 
a matter of high national priority. In 
absence of substantial progress 
ard peace in Lebanon and in the 
on as a whole, we can anticipate con- 
ed unrest in the Middle East threat- 
ig U.S. and Western interests and 
angering the security of Israel. 
The task is complicated, and our 
)onsibility is great. Of all the powers 
jrnal to the region, only the United 
;es has the credibility to deal with 
issues in a fair and equitable man- 
Our reputation for dealing honestly 
pragmatically with regional conflicts 
n asset of great importance; we can- 
afford to squander it. 
Let me now turn to a more detailed 
■ussion of the current status of our 
)rts first in Lebanon and then with 
ard to the Middle East peace 
cess. 



)anon 

ritical test for American diplomacy is 
jebanon. Our objective is straightfor- 
•d. We seek to restore Lebanese 
ereignty and to insure Israeli securi- 
These are not separate objectives. A 
3le, sovereign Lebanon and a secure 
lel are two sides of the same coin. 
! threat to Israel does not come from 
Lebanese people but from foreign 
:es that have usurped Lebanese 
ereignty and are still camped on 
)anese soU. It follows that a peaceful 
)anon, free of all foreign forces and 
ereign over all its territory, will 



make a major contribution to Israeli 
security. To achieve this objective, we 
and the responsible international com- 
munity support a three-part strategy in 
Lebanon: 

First, withdrawal forth viith of all 
foreign forces from Lebanon; 

Second, restoration of Lebanese 
Government sovereignty and strengthen- 
ing of the Lebanese Armed Forces; and 

Third, reestablishment of a 
Lebanese national consensus and 
reconstruction of the Lebanese economy. 

This strategy in support of the 
Lebanese Government is designed to 
achieve peace and security for both 
Lebanon and Israel. The withdrawal of 
all foreign forces will remove a threat to 
Israel's border. Restoring Lebanon's 
sovereignty and strength, and rebuilding 
its economy, will prevent that threat 
from returning. The United States is 
moving now to implement all three parts 
of this strategy. 

America's diplomatic energy is 
focused on bringing about the immediate 
withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign 
forces — Israeli, Syrian, and PLO. To 
succeed, we must meet the legitimate in- 
terests of each of the parties through 
practical security arrangements. Three 
sets of negotiations will be involved: 
negotiations between Lebanon and 
Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and 
between Lebanon and the PLO. 

It is a fact that none of these talks 
has begun. The Israeli-Lebanese negotia- 
tions could provide a stimulus for the 
others, but they have been stalled by 
debate over the level and location of the 
talks. Last week President Gemayel pro- 
posed a compromise solution on the 
diplomatic level of these negotiations. 
The Israeli Cabinet recently adopted 
that solution, but it remained firm in its 
insistence that talks take place in Beirut 
and Jerusalem. 

The current Israeli position is un- 
acceptable to the Lebanese Government. 
The success and stability of that govern- 
ment depends on the support of those 
within Lebanon and throughout the 
Arab world for whom the status of 
Jerusalem remains a critical issue. The 
United States acknowledges the impor- 
tance of Jerusalem to Israel and to all 
Arab states. But insistence on a 
Jerusalem venue should not be made an 



obstacle to the start of talks on the 
withdrawal of external forces from 
Lebanon. 

The present situation is clearly in- 
tolerable. Syrian, PLO, and Israeli 
fofces remain poised in the field. The 
continued occupation of Lebanon by 
foreign forces — forces that imperil 
Lebanese sovereignty and threaten 
Israeli security — is dangerous and 
should be unacceptable to the parties. 
President Reagan is determined to see 
the parties get the disputes out of the 
trenches and onto the table. Wrangling 
over procedures must end, and substan- 
tive negotiations must begin. 

Once the withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Lebanon begins, a vacuum 
may be left that could endanger 
Lebanese sovereignty and Israeli securi- 
ty. The Lebanese Armed Forces will not 
be able immediately to fill that vacuum, 
although we and our allies will be work- 
ing to rebuild those forces. Consequent- 
ly, it may be necessary for the United 
States to consider joining with other na- 
tions in an expanded multinational force 
(MNF). Indeed, the Lebanese Govern- 
ment has recently made such a request. 
An expanded MNF would bolster the 
parties' confidence in security ar- 
rangements that will facilitate the 
withdrawal of foreign forces fi>om 
Lebanon. 

We will, of course, consult closely 
with the members of this committee in 
addressing the question of U.S. par- 
ticipation in an expanded MNF. It is too 
early at this time to specify the details 
of any international peacekeeping force 
in Lebanon. 

A fully sovereign Lebanon and a 
secure Israel, however, cannot be 
achieved through military measures 
alone. The once dynamic economy of 
Lebanon must be restored. Therefore, 
we may have to return to the new Con- 
gress with a supplemental request for 
the funds necessary to enable the United 
States to play an appropriate role in the 
reconstruction of Lebanon. Only a 
healthy Lebanese economy and a thriv- 
ing private sector can provide the pros- 
perity that is an essential adjunct to our 
security and economic assistance. 

Using available military credits and 
Lebanon's own funds, we have started a 
crash military assistance program to 
help the Lebanese Army assert its 
authority throughout the country and 



luary 1983 



71 



MIDDLE EAST 



thereby enable the MNF to depart. We 
envisage the need for some additional 
funding and, as our estimates are 
developed, may wish to seek foreign 
military sales and international military 
educational training funds in a sup- 
plemental request. 

Middle East Peace Process 

Let me now turn to the status of the 
Middle East peace process. The Presi- 
dent's historic initiative of September 1 
is designed to bring about a just and 
lasting peace that will satisfy the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian peo- 
ple and, at the same time, assure the 
security of Israel. To achieve these ends, 
the initiative seeks to broaden the circle 
of peace through the participation of 
Jordan and Palestinian representation 
consistent with the Camp David frame- 
work. 

Before reviewing the current status 
of the President's initiative, I should like 
to comment on two key aspects. 

First, the September 1 initiative is 
not a "plan" or blueprint to be imposed 
on the parties. Rather, the President has 
put forward a balanced set of positions 
that the United States is prepared to 
support in the course of negotiations. 
We have pointed out that we cannot 
guarantee the outcome of the negoti- 
ating process on any specific issue. The 
negotiations, if they are to be successful, 
must be free to move in productive 
directions that cannot be foreseen in ad- 
vance. It has been made clear to all par- 
ties involved that these are our positions 
and that we stand firmly behind them. 
Should the parties agree on positions at 
variance with our proposals, however, 
we will not blindly stand our ground. 

Second, the President's positions 
regarding the final status of the West 
Bank and Gaza have generated much in- 
terest and commentary. This is under- 
standable since the future of those ter- 
ritories is of keen interest to Palestini- 
ans and Israelis alike. It is for this 
reason that the President felt it 
necessary to state that the United 
States would support neither an in- 
dependent Palestinian state nor Israeli 



sovereignty or control over the West 
Bank and Gaza. 

It is important to note, however, 
that when negotiations resume the next 
item on the agenda will not be the 
ultimate status of the territories but the 
transitional arrangements to be 
established in the West Bank and Gaza 
for a 5-year period. Only after that 
transitional period has begun, can 
negotiations be undertaken on the final 
status of the territories. 

What, then, is the status of the 
President's initiative? We have had a 
highly constructive visit by a delegation 
representing the Arab League, and we 
have seen positive movement in the 
direction the President has outlined. 
King Hussein has publicly stated his 
willingness to discuss the proposals, and 
a serious dialogue between Jordan and 



confident that the Israeli Government 
will not refuse to negotiate. 

I am optimistic that the Presiden' 
initiative will soon lead to a resumpti' 
of negotiations with broadened partic 
tion. My optimism is based on my coi 
viction that the President's initiative 
provides the best means to move tow 
a peace that will meet the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people and a 
the same time assure the security wh 
Israel so avidly seeks and so richly 
deserves. 

Israeli-Egyptian Relations 

There is important unfinished busine: 
with regard to the Israeli-Egyptian 
Peace Treaty. The Taba border area 
tween Israel and Egypt remains con- 
tested. It is now time to resolve this 
issue according to the provisions of t 



Egypt has been publicly supportive of the 
President's initiative. The Israeli Government 
. . . has been and remains highly critical of some 
aspects of the President's proposals. These pro- 
posals, however, continue to receive intense atten- 
tion in Israel by the government and the public 
alike. 



the PLO is continuing. We remain hope- 
ful that this activity will lead to an early 
move to the negotiating table by Jordan 
with the support of other key Arab par- 
ties. 

Egypt has been publicly supportive 
of the President's initiative. The Israeli 
Government, as you are aware, has been 
and remains highly critical of some 
aspects of the President's proposals. 
Those proposals, however, continue to 
receive intense attention in Israel by the 
government and the public alike. And if 
King Hussein comes to the table, we are 



Treaty, just as it is now time to plac« 
the various elements of the broader 
peace process on a firm foundation. 
Americans can take pride in our 
policy toward the Middle East. It is i 
policy which has been developed in C( 
sultation with this committee and otl 
members of Congress. We welcome t 
continuing consultation; it strengther 
our policy and contributes to an 
American consensus. 



'The complete transcript of the hearii 
will be published by the committee and w 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



72 



Department of State Bull 



MIDDLE EAST 



ecuring a Peaceful 
uture for Lebanon 



Kenneth W. Dam 

Address before the Chicago Latv 
lib. Chicago, Illinois, on December 2, 
92. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of 
%te.^ 

im delighted to be home in Chicago 
d to see so many of my old friends. 
lis distinguished club promotes a vi- 
(n of law and stability that contrasts 
arply with the turbulent international 
ena with which George Shultz and I 
ist deal. 

Those of you who are involved in the 
N know that sound laws require a mix- 
re of idealism, strength, and prag- 
itism. So, too, does a sound foreign 
Key. By drawing on America's 
'ength and the pragmatism of its peo- 
3 and, above all, our ideals, President 
;agan has reasserted U.S. leadership 
world affairs. Today we can be proud 
at American initiatives are the best 
ipe for progress on the great issues of 
X day from Middle East peace to arms 
ntrol to the Caribbean Basin. 

A short time ago, the President 
arged me with responsibility for coor- 
nating our work in Washington on one 
ch issue, the future of Lebanon. Some 
mericans may wonder why we are con- 
rned about such a small country so far 
ray. Others may ask why U.S. troops 
e in Lebanon and how long they must 
ay. Americans are right to ask these 
lestions; so tonight let me address 
em in turn: Why is America involved 
Lebanon? What are our goals? And 
hat must we do to secure a peaceful 
ture for Lebanon? 

The desolation in Beirut today belies 
5 past role as the Paris of the Arab 
orld. The occupation of Lebanon by 
reign forces contradicts its deep tradi- 
3n of democracy and sovereignty. Our 
smay at the resulting division of the 
)untry is deepened by the promise of 
hat might have been and by the 
lowledge that Lebanon's future was 
igulfed by its neighbors' disputes. 

The Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 
)67 brought thousands of embittered 



Palestinian refugees into Lebanon, 
straining the social fabric of the country. 
In 1970, these Palestinians were joined 
by large numbers of Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) fighters that had 
been expelled from Jordan. Lebanon 
became an armed camp. Civil war broke 
out in 1975 among PLO, Christian, and 
Muslim forces. Syrian troops entered 
and remained under an Arab League 
mandate to maintain order. But order 
was not restored. PLO fighters harassed 
northern Israel; Israeli defense forces 
retaliated; Syrian and Christian forces 
clashed. Lebanese civilians— and 
Lebanese sovereignty— were caught in 
the crossfire. And a nation's agony 
became an international crisis. 

This was the situation the Reagan 
Administration faced in the spring of 
1981, when Ambassador Philip Habib 
[President's special emissary to the Mid- 
dle East], at the President's direction, 
negotiated a cease-fire in southern 
Lebanon. Last spring, however, 
destabilizing forces prevailed, and the 
cease-fire disintegrated. Israel then sent 
its forces into Lebanon in order, in the 



The desolation in 
Beirut today belies its 
past role as the Paris of 
the Arab world. The oc- 
cupation of Lebanon by 
foreign forces contra- 
dicts its deep tradition 
of democracy and 
sovereignty. 



words of the Israeli Cabinet, "to place all 
the civilian population of the Galilee 
beyond the range of the terrorist fire 
from Lebanon." The fighting advanced 
to the threshold of Beirut, and Am- 
bassador Habib was called on again. The 
peaceful departure of PLO forces from 
Beirut last August was a tribute to his 
efforts and to the multinational force 
that stood guard over the evacuation. 
Indeed, those who complain about a lack 
of cooperation among the Western 



democracies should note how American, 
French, and Italian troops stood 
together to assist the Lebanese. Those 
soldiers were truly soldiers of peace. 

But triumph was followed by 
tragedy. In quick succession, Lebanon's 
newly elected President, Bashir 
Gemayel, was assassinated, and Pales- 
tinians were slaughtered in their camps. 

Why Are We Involved? 

This is a sad history. The Lebanese 
sought peace and found destruction; 
they sought freedom and found occupa- 
tion. This led Lebanon's new president, 
Amin Gemayel, to plead before the 
United Nations, "We have had enough, 
enough of bloodshed, enough of destruc- 
tion, enough of dislocation and despair." 

In October our nation once again 
sent Marines to Lebanon in response to 
Gemayel's request and the plight of his 
people. Together with French and 
Italian forces, those Marines are there 
to assist the Lebanese Government in 
restoring peace. In meeting this moral 
obligation, they reaffirm what President 
Reagan has termed our "irreversible 
commitment to the territorial integrity 
of friendly states" and our "traditional 
humanitarian concerns" for those who 
suffer injustice. 

Our commitment to Lebanon, how- 
ever, is consistent not only with our 
sense of morality, but also with our na- 
tional interest. Peace— the solution to 
Lebanon's suffering— is also the solution 
to our strategic and diplomatic concerns 
in the Middle East. 

The future of Lebanon is linked 
strategically to the entire Middle East 
region. Located at the vital eastern end 
of the Mediterranean, bounded by the 
oil-rich nations of Africa and Asia, that 
region lies in the shadow of vast Soviet 
military power. To the extent that 
Lebanon is a flashpoint for regional con- 
flict, it is also a potential source of inter- 
national conflict. Promoting stability in 
Lebanon and the Middle East is thus 
vital to our security and that of other in- 
dustrial democracies. 

Diplomatically, the United States 
plays a central role in the Middle East 
because Israel and the Arab states 
recognize that America is the only credi- 
ble catalyst for a wider peace. We must, 



anuary 1983 



73 



MIDDLE EAST 






however, demonstrate our ability to sus- 
tain this role by resolving the Lebanese 
crisis. Such a resolution would con- 
tribute to the long-term security of 
Israel and to the momentum for a com- 
prehensive peace created by the Presi- 
dent's historic initiative of September 1. 
There should be no mistaking the fact 
that there are others, whose interests 
are inimical to ours, who are prepared 
to exploit our failure to resolve these 
issues. 

These are the concerns— moral, 
strategic, and diplomatic— that underlie 
our policy in Lebanon and that led to the 
presence of U.S. Marines in Beirut. 
What, then, is the objective of that 
policy and the mission of those troops? 

Objective 

Our objective is straightforward. We 
seek to restore Lebanese sovereignty 
and insure Israeli security. These are 
not separate objectives. A stable, 
sovereign Lebanon and a secure Israel 
are two sides of the same coin. The 
threat to Israel does not come from the 
Lebanese people but from foreign forces 
that have usurped Lebanese sovereignty 
and are still camped on Lebanese soil. It 
follows that a peaceful Lebanon, free of 
all foreign forces and sovereign over all 
its territory, will make a major contribu- 
tion to Israeli security. To achieve this 
objective, we and the responsible inter- 
national community support a three-part 
strategy in Lebanon: 

First, withdrawal forthwith of all 
foreign forces from Lebanon; 

Second, restoration of Lebanese 
Government sovereignty and strengthen- 
ing of the Lebanese Armed Forces; and 

Third, reestablishment of a 
Lebanese national consensus and 
reconstruction of the Lebanese economy. 

This strategy in support of the 
Lebanese Government is designed to 
achieve peace and security for both 
Lebanon and Israel. The withdrawal of 
all foreign forces will remove a threat to 
Israel's border. Restoring Lebanon's 
sovereignty and strength, and rebuilding 
its economy, will prevent that threat 
from returning. The United States is 
moving now to implement all three parts 
of this stategy. Let me address each of 
those efforts in detail. 



What Are We Doing To 
Implement Our Strategy? 

Withdrawal of Foreign Forces. 

America's diplomatic energy is focused 
now on bringing about the immediate 
withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign 
forces— Israeli, Syrian, and PLO. To 
succeed, we must meet the legitimate in- 
terests of each of the parties through 
practical security arrangements. Three 
sets of negotiations will be involved: 
negotiations between Lebanon and 
Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and 
between Lebanon and the PLO. 

The United States will participate 
directly at the table in the first set of 
negotiations between Lebanon and 
Israel. In these talks we will seek securi- 
ty arrangements that will permit Israel 
to withdraw its forces with the 
knowledge that southern Lebanon will 
never again be used to launch assaults 
on Israeli citizens. 

Israel also desires establishment of 
normal relations with Lebanon as a way 
of safeguarding the peace. This is an im- 
portant goal. But progress toward more 
normal relations must be approached 
carefully lest it undermine Lebanon's 
credentials in the Arab world. Moreover, 
ill-timed or forced normalization may ac- 
tually threaten Israel's security if it 
should lead to the breakdown of the 
Lebanese national consensus, thereby 
inviting the return of hostile forces. 

The second set of negotiations— be- 
tween Lebanon and Syria— is designed 
to achieve Syrian troop withdrawal. The 
Syrians, citing their 1975 Arab League 
mandate to maintain order in Lebanon, 
have said they will not withdraw unless 
Israeli forces are also withdrawn. 
Although we will not be directly in- 
volved in these talks. Ambassador Habib 
will play a role with interested parties. 
We expect that agreement for 
withdrawal of Israeli forces will also 
lead to Syrian agreement to withdraw. 

We will not be involved in the third 
set of negotiations— between Lebanon 
and the PLO— because it is U.S. policy 
not to "recognize or negotiate with the 
PLO so long as the PLO does not 
recognize Israel's right to exist and does 
not accept UN Security Council Resolu- 
tions 242 and 238." We will, however, 
make our views known through friendly 
governments. As in the case of the 
withdrawal of PLO fighters from Beirut, 
the United States is prepared to provide 
its good offices in bringing about the 
withdrawal and resettlement of the PLO 
forces still in Lebanon. Such withdrawal 



will be facilitated if Palestinian civilians 
in Lebanon feel secure. The Lebanese 
Government must provide such security 
To this end, we will help strengthen 
Lebanese Government authority and thi 
Lebanese Armed Forces. 

It is a fact that none of these talks 
has begun. The Israeli-Lebanese negotii 
tions could provide a stimulus for the 
others, but they have been stalled by 
debate over the level and location of thi 
talks. Last week President Gemayel pr< 
posed a compromise solution on the 
diplomatic level of these negotiations. 
The Israeli Cabinet recently adopted 
that solution but remained firm in its ir 
sistence that talks take place in Beirut 
and Jerusalem. 

The current Israeli position is unac 
ceptable to the Lebanese Government. 
The success and stability of that goveri 
ment depend on the support of those 
within Lebanon and throughout the 
Arab world for whom the status of 
Jerusalem remains a crucial issue. The 
United States acknowledges the impor- 
tance of Jerusalem to Israel and to all 
Arab states. But insistence on a 
Jerusalem venue should not be made ai 
obstacle to negotiations on the with- 
drawal of external forces from Lebanoi 

The present situation is clearly in- 
tolerable. Syrian, PLO, and Israeli 
forces remain poised in the field. The 
continued occupation of Lebanon by 
foreign forces — forces that imperil 
Lebanese sovereignty and threaten 
Israeli security— is dangerous and shou 
be unacceptable to the parties. The tasl 
is to get the dispute out of the trenchei 
and onto the table. Wrangling over pro 
cedures must end, and substantive 
negotiations must begin. 

Restoring Lebanese Sovereignty 
and Strengthening Their Armed 
Forces. The withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Lebanon could leave an in- 
ternal vacuum. To prevent the reinfiltr 
tion of those who would threaten 
Lebanon or Israel or both, withdrawals 
must be accompanied by steps to resto: 
Lebanese Government sovereignty and 
strengthen the Lebanese Armed Force 

The United States will join the inte 
national community in this effort. We 
have offered to help provide equipment 
and training to the Lebanese Armed 
Forces for four brigades by February 
and seven brigades thereafter. It is oui 
judgment that this force structure will 
be sufficient to maintain internal secur 
ty and protect Lebanese sovereignty. 



74 



Department of State Bulleti 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



While the Lebanese Armed Forces 
being strengthened, the interna- 
lai community will have to help main- 
1 stability. An expanded multinational 
:e, including U.S. participation and 
litional national contingents, may well 
necessary. Indeed, we have already 
eived such a request from the 
lanese Government. 
As in the case of the present U.S., 
mch, and Italian troops, any ex- 
ided multinational force would bolster 
parties' confidence in security ar- 
igements that will facilitate the 
hdrawal of foreign forces. The 
Danese Armed Forces will continue to 
ivide internal security, and the U.N. 
ernational Force in Lebanon 
•vJIFIL) should retain its crucial 
icekeeping role. As the effectiveness 
the Lebanese Armed Forces in- 
ases, the tasks of the multinational 
ce will decrease, permitting a phased 
.hdrawal. 

Economic Reconstruction and Na- 
nal Reconciliation. Lebanese sov 
!ignty and Israeli security, however, 
mot be achieved by military measures 
ne. The economy of Lebanon has 
;n shattered. To bring about a peace 
it is not merely the absence of 
hting but the well-being of the people, 
;hdrawal of foreign forces must be 
ipled with an effort to reconstruct the 
banese economy. The challenge seems 
.ggering. But all that is needed is a 
riod of political tranquility and some 
Ip in rebuilding Lebanon's roads, 
.ter system, and schools. The 
banese people— with their en- 
■preneurial skill, spirit, and 
iilience— can take care of the rest 
^mselves. 

i It is impossible to cite an exact 
hire for total reconstruction costs. The 
! S. Government, however, stands 
jady to cooperate with the efforts of 
e Lebanese and the international com- 
anity. Since June we have made 
ailable $82 million in emergency relief 
,d rehabilitation funds. We are plan- 
ng to authorize another $30 million to 
larantee housing and services for the 
lorest communities. This money is an 
vestment in stability. It indicates 
merican support for Lebanese national 
^conciliation and strengthens Lebanon's 
:ntral government. 

Further aid should come from Arab 
id Western donors, including the 
orld Bank. Indeed, the World Bank is 
ready taking an active role in assess- 
g priorities for all potential donors and 

willing to coordinate the matching of 



donor resources and Lebanese needs. It 
sent a reconnaissance team to Lebanon, 
and its report should be available by 
January 1983. 

Conclusion 

The challenge of rebuilding a peaceful 
Lebanon, free of all foreign forces and 
sovereign over all its territory, is a 
daunting one. But the President is deter- 
mined not to allow the opportunity for 
peace to slip away and the spark of war 
to be ignited again. 

The objective of our Lebanon policy 
is, I repeat, a fully sovereign Lebanon 
and a secure Israel. We pursue this ob- 
jective because it is both right and in our 
national interest. We have seen that our 
responsibilities did not end with the 
mere cessation of hostilities. America 



alone has the power and credibility, and 
hence the duty, to help bring to Lebanon 
a stable and lasting peace that answers 
the basic security needs of Lebanon's 
neighbors. After all, Lebanon seeks and 
deserves what America already has, 
even though we may not always ap- 
preciate our blessings. 

The sovereignty of the Lebanese 
Government must extend to the borders 
of the state. We have a name for that: 
We call it freedom. The opportunities of 
the Lebanese people must be made com- 
mensurate with their aspirations, and 
we have a name for that: We call it 
democracy. And the lives of their 
children must be made secure and full of 
hope. We have a name for that: We call 
it peace. 



iPress release 362 of Dec. 6, 1982. I 



Nuclear Energy: 
Opportunities and Problems 



by Richard T. Kennedy 

Address before the American In- 
dustrial Forum and the American 
Nuclear Society in Washington, D.C., on 
November 17, 1982. Ambassador Ken- 
nedy is Under Secretary for Management 
and U.S. permanent representative to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). 

Forty years ago, in December 1942, in a 
laboratory under the stands at Alonzo 
Stagg Stadium in Chicago, an interna- 
tional team of engineers and scientists 
created the first sustained and con- 
trolled nuclear chain reaction. Their suc- 
cess that night changed the world for all 
time. And it brought to the world some 
of its most awesome opportunities and 
some of its gravest problems. Their 
work opened many doors and afforded 
opportunities for good things— to light 
our cities, to power our factories, to 
diagnose and cure the illnesses of man- 
kind. But their work also made possible 
the manufacture of nuclear explosives 
and brought problems we still are wrest- 
ling with today. And that is what I want 
to talk about tonight— the opportunities 
and the problems we have before us and 
what they may mean for the future of 
the nuclear industry, the people of the 
world, and ultimately the future of life 
on our planet. 



From the dawn of this new age, 
U.S. policy has had two fundamental ob- 
jectives. From the first, we have tried to 
prevent the further spread of nuclear 
weapons. At the same time, we have 
continuously sought to make the peace- 
ful benefits of nuclear energy ->-the most 
astounding technology of the age— avail- 
able for all mankind. Those twin goals 
are enumerated in the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), and they are enshrined in the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. They are not 
mutually exclusive; indeed, they are 
compatible and complementary. Those 
goals are the goals of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration today. 

Some have alleged that this Admini- 
stration does not have a nonproliferation 
policy. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. President Reagan articulated 
in clear, unmistakable terms in July 
1981 the policy of this Administration— a 
policy which has been pursued ever 
since. But let me emphasize that the 
policy of this Administration is not a 
radical departure from that of the past. 

In historic terms, the dual goals we 
profess today were the bases of the 
Atoms for Peace program which Presi- 
dent Eisenhower announced in his 
December 1953 address to the U.N. 
General Assembly. That program was 
undertaken at a time when we possessed 
a virtual monopoly on peaceful nuclear 
technology. But we believed then, as we 



'inuary 1983 



75 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



still believe, that the benefits of the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy should 
be available for all the peoples of the 
world. It also has been true from the 
outset that all must share in the commit- 
ment and the burden to assure against 
its potential problems. Thus, we sought 
in the Atoms for Peace program to 
create an international regime that 
could, in an orderly way, begin to deal 
not only with the opportunities of 
nuclear energy but with its problems as 
well. 

Nonproliferation Position 

We do not believe that nuclear power 

necessarily means nuclear bombs. 
Rather our position is founded on the 
notion that the peaceful use of nuclear 
power does not, per se, present a pro- 
liferation risk. This is the bargain im- 
plicit in the nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty— that nations which renounce the 
idea of nuclear weapons can and should 
enjoy the benefits of nuclear power. I 
regret that this relationship has been 
widely misinterpreted and misunder- 
stood. Some allege that this implies 
nuclear commerce conducted without 
regard to its potential problems and 
dangers. They would argue that thus 
our policy is critically flawed. Perhaps 
this misunderstanding arises because the 
thesis is not a simple one; perhaps be- 
cause we have not explained our position 
well enough. Whatever the reason, I 
repeat, this is a misunderstanding of our 
objectives and of our policy. 

Our strong commitment to the goal 
of preventing further proliferation rests 
on the very valid— I think indisputable- 
notion that the spread of nuclear 
weapons to additional nations could 
eventually mean the end of world order 
as we know it. The spread of nuclear 
weapons endangers not only American 
security interests, it is equally threaten- 
ing to the security and well-being of 
every country on Earth— a fact which 
they should understand. 

To realize our nonproliferation objec- 
tives, as President Reagan has made 
clear, we are working to inliibit the 
spread of sensitive technologies, 
facilities, or material, particularly where 
there is a danger of proliferation. We 
also are working with other suppliers to 
strengthen the international rules of 
nuclear trade. These steps are important 
elements in our policy, but it would be a 
mistake to think that the policy could 
rest on export controls alone. They can 
buy time. But we must use that time 
wisely to get at the causes and not sim- 
ply the symptoms of proliferation. 



There are many countries today— es- 
pecially the highly developed industrial 
nations— which could produce nuclear 
explosives if they chose to do so. But 
they do not for a number of diverse 
reasons. Their security does not require 
it, their perceived political interests do 
not warrant it, or their domestic politi- 
cal opinion will not accept it. The basic 
causes of proliferation, in other words, 
are not present. 

Yet, we cannot be blind to the fact 
that there are serious proliferation risks 
in several regions of the world. Where 
there is such a risk, this Administration 
is trying to get at the root causes which 
might impel a nation to embark on a 
weapons program. We seek to improve 
regional stability and to lessen tensions 
and security concerns. We must try to 
convince those who might be bent on 
such a course that acquisition of nuclear 
weaponry will not promote their securi- 
ty. For the plain truth is the opposite: 
The further spread of nuclear weapons 
will not enhance anyone's security. In- 
stead, it will promote instability and 
rivalry, and it could lead to tragic mis- 
calculations for all. 

Where animosities are old and stub- 
born, the lessening of regional tensions 
is an exceedingly difficult task. But, we 
must use the tools we have— political, 
diplomatic, security— to assuage old pas- 
sions, to reduce those tensions, and to 
foster a stable order. 

The Nonproliferation Treaty and the 
Latin American treaty of Tlatelolco are 
critical instruments in the attack on the 
causes of proliferation— 116 non-nuclear- 
weapons states today adhere to the Non- 
proliferation Treaty and 22 countries 
have embraced Tlatelolco. Thus, an over- 
whelming majority of nations in the 
world accept the idea that renouncing 
nuclear explosives is entirely compatible 
with and, indeed, essential to their 
secui'ity. We can and will continue our 
strenuous efforts to achieve universal 
adherence to the Nonproliferation Trea- 
ty and full implementation of Tlatelolco. 

To achieve our nonproliferation 
goals, we must also maintain a position 
as a leading and reliable nuclear ex- 
porter. For only from this position can 
we expect to influence international 
standards and norms in a way consistent 
with our own nonproliferation goals. 

We reject the unilateral approach of 
yesteryear because, in a word, times 
have changed. America can no longer 
call the shots by itself. We no longer 
possess a monopoly on nuclear technolo- 
gy. Common sense tells us that we must 



take this fact into account as we fashio 
our policies. We must view the world a 
it is; not as it once was; not as we wou 
like it to be in our imaginings. This 
realistic view will, I suggest, better hel 
us to achieve our nonproliferation goal; 
It follows then that we are seeking 
to insure that our domestic nuclear in- 
dustry can compete on a fair and 
equitable basis with the nuclear in- 
dustries of other supplier nations. But 
this must be a cooperative effort. For i 
refusal to recognize the existence of 
very real proliferation risks and the sa( 
rifice of nonproliferation goals in the 
pursuit of commercial and economic 
advantage cannot be the policy of any 
responsible state. 

Support for the IAEA 

As we recognized both the opportunitie 
and the problems of nuclear energy, w( 
also saw the need 25 years ago for an 
agency which could address both. Since 
its beginnings, we have vigorously sup- 
ported and relied heavily on the Intern; 
tional Atomic Energy Agency. For mot 
of these 25 years the IAEA worked 
quietly and effectively. 

But as with many such institutions, 
its growth and development have not 
come without some pain, some dissi- 
dence. Unfortunately, political concerns 
which motivate nations, and which ofte 
excite great passions and rhetorical 
flourish, intrude. So it has been in re- 
cent years in Vienna. Increasingly, 
political concerns, which we and many 
others believe to be extraneous to the 
mission and purposes of the agency, 
began to corrode the atmosphere of its 
deliberations. Pressures mounted last 
year, but sensible heads prevailed and 
accommodations were found. 

Unfortunately, at the agency's 
general conference last September, a 
majority of member states violated the 
statute and illegally rejected the crederl 
tials of another member state. The U.S 
delegation withdrew from the confer- 
ence, as it was pledged to do, and we 
began a serious, thorough assessment ( 
the nature and extent of our participa- 
tion in the agency. I cannot tell you 
tonight what the outcome of the re- 
assessment will be, but I can share wit! 
you some thoughts about how the prob- 
lem looks to us. 

Let us recall why the IAEA came t 
be. As its statute makes clear, the ager 
cy has two equally important goals: 

First, to encourage the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy so as to realize 



76 



Department of State Bulletii 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



technology's enormous potential 

fits mankind; and 

second, to provide effective interna- 

1 safeguards against the misuse of 

echnology. 

Cach of these missions is vital, 
ther they give the institution its 
sophical underpinnings. The 
ber states are pledged to accept 
support each of these missions. But 
igency cannot achieve its dual goals 
traneous political issues divert at- 
on from its legitimate tasks, 
rate controversy and confrontation, 
sap its effectiveness. Nor can the 
cy function effectively if its 
bers are willing to violate its 
ite, as when they illegally rejected a 
,ber state's credentials. That is why 
re so concerned about what has 
happening in Vienna culminating in 
;vents of this past September. 
The agency, after all, is the sum of 
lembership. It is a democratic in- 
tion, governed by democratic prin- 
s. If the members do not support 
, abide by the principles in its statute, 
ey are unwilling to rededicate them- 
l ;s to those principles, the institution 
' inexorably decline. 
vVe have strongly supported the 
icy from its earliest beginnings. We 
inue to hope that it can live up to 
1 promise of its founding, bringing the 
I 'fits of the peaceful atom to the 
I d under an effective safeguards 
Tie. To make that possible— and so 
5sure that its next 25 years can be 
•uitful as the first 25— a renewed 
cation to that goal by all of its 
ibers is essential. If, on the con- 
y, the trend toward heightened ex- 
eous political debate cannot be re- 
ed, the IAEA's future may be bleak, 
lirhe stakes are considerable. Effec- 
i international safeguards are an im- 
ant component of the international 
jroliferation regime. The IAEA's 
nical assistance program helps a 
ving number of countries. And inter- 
onal nuclear commerce, as we under- 
.d it today, depends in no small 
isure on the success of this agency. I 
i.n this in real terms but also in terms 
tie perceptions of the political 
lorities around the world. If the 
ncy is seen to be weak, divided, and 
mstant; if its actions are seen to be 
insistent with its statute, then ques- 
is inevitably will arise about the 
nay's ability to carry out its 
*-k— about our ability to prevent the 
r use of this powerful force. From that 
3 e forward, more efforts will be 
1 oted to restraining commerce, more 



issues of reliability will arise, and it will 
be all the more difficult to realize the 
atom's peaceful benefits. The efforts of 
nearly three decades will be jeopardized. 

In the final analysis, it really comes 
down to the attitude of the member 
states. We have reached a critical turn- 
ing point in the history of the IAEA. 
The members must now decide which 
course the agency will pursue. For our 
part, we want to see the IAEA rein- 
vigorated and refocused on the prin- 
ciples on which it was founded. 

Our objective is now, as it always 
has been, an independent agency in 
which the international community can 
continue to repose its confidence, an 
agency that can be relied upon to carry 
out faithfully the purposes enumerated 
in its statute. Achieving that requires a 
change in the attitudes of many 
members. And it requires a commitment 
from all members, not just a few, to the 
fundamental principles on which the in- 
stitution was created. That is a tall 
order, but one which we believe can be 
achieved. That is our objective. 



which have solemnly renounced nuclear 
weaponry by adhering to the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. Striking that 
balance, I am optimistic. I believe that 
there is still a solid basis for hope. I do 
not believe that a world with many more 
nuclear powers is inevitable. That notion, 
in my view, is the counsel of despair. 
Widespread nuclear proliferation is 
avoidable. But to accomplish that goal 
requires skill, common sense, and care- 
ful diplomacy; and hard work, I might 
add. 

It is not, as I'm sure you will agree, 
a simple issue. It is not, and should not 
be, a partisan issue. It does not lend 
itself to speedy solutions in neat little 
packages. The solutions we seek cannot 
be reduced to catchy slogans. Achieving 
our nonproliferation goals requires pa- 
tience and sober, deliberate action. It re- 
quires cooperation with our friends and 
allies, firmness with our adversaries. It 
requires support for sensible long-term 
goals and policies of our government by 
industry and public alike even where 
there may be some short-term seeming 



Twenty years ago, many . . . seriously anticipated 
a world with 25 to 30 nuclear-weapons states by 
the beginning of the 1980s . . . today there are only 
five . . . and India has carried out a so-called 
peaceful nuclear explosion. Against that, there are 
116 states . . . which have solemnly renounced 
nuclear weaponry by adhering to the Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty. 



Future Prospects 

What about the future? Is there a basis^ 
for optimism? I say emphatically: "Yes." 
Twenty years ago, many academics and 
even some policymakers seriously an- 
ticipated a world with 25 to 30 nuclear- 
weapons states by the beginning of the 
1980s. Although technical capabilities 
have slowly spread, those gloomy fore- 
casts, thank heaven, have not come to 
pass. 

Instead, today there are only fivei 
declared nuclear-weapons states, and In- 
dia has carried out a so-called peaceful 
nuclear explosion. Against that, there 
are 116 states, as I mentioned earlier, 



disadvantage or setback. We must stand 
together in this effort for there are no 
quick fixes or short-term palliatives. 
What we do today will have its effects 
for decades to come. 

As we are committed to see the 
fulfillment of the promise of nuclear 
energy, so too are we committed to 
assuring that the essential safeguards 
and nonproliferation controls are in 
place. But our objectives cannot be 
achieved by fiat or by unilateral action 
on our part alone. Only through the 
shared commitment and cooperative ef- 
forts of nations working together can 
we succeed. But succeed we must. 



' Of these, the United States, United 
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. are parties to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. ■ 



!uary 1983 



77 



UNITED NATIONS 



Call for Soviet Withdrawal 
From Afghanistan 



Following are a statement by Am- 
bassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. per- 
manent representative to the United Na- 
tions, in the U.N. General Assembly on 
November 2A. 1982, and the text of a 
General Assembly resolution adopted on 
November 29, 1982. 



AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S 

STATEMENT, 

NOV. 24, 1982' 

Once again the issue of Afghanistan is 
before the General Assembly. Once 
again, in what is by now a familiar exer- 
cise, one representative after another 
will come before this body to decry the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
continuing and increasingly brutal at- 
tempt to subjugate the Afghan people. 
And once again we will consider, and 
hopefully adopt by another overwhelm- 
ing majority, a resolution calling for the 
withdrawal of the Soviet occupation 
force, respect for Afghanistan's right of 
self-determination, restoration of 
Afghan independence and nonalignment, 
and the return of the Afghan refugees 
to their homes in safety and honor. 

The familiarity of this exercise must 
not be allowed to detract in any way 
from its extraordinary significance. Of 
all the issues before this assembly, none 
has more far-reaching implications than 
the issue of Afghanistan. The aggression 
committed by the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan and its proxies elsewhere 
has had and continues to have a great 
impact upon the climate and course of 
East- West relations. Such aggression 
ominously affects the entire fabric of in- 
ternational relations and the future of 
the state system based upon respect for 
the principles of territorial integrity, na- 
tional independence, and political 
sovereignty. These actions bear directly 
upon the capacity of states, especially 
those most vulnerable, to retain their 
unique identities and to fulfill their 
aspirations in peace and security. 

The Afghan people are fighting for 
their own survival, but their struggle 
has a much broader meaning. If a small, 
relatively defenseless, nonaligned coun- 
try like Afghanistan is allowed to be in- 
vaded, brutalized, and subjugated, what 
other similarly vulnerable country can 
feel secure? If the fiercely independent 



and incredibly courageous people of 
Afghanistan are uprooted, economically 
ravaged, culturally annihilated, and 
eventually subdued, the survival of other 
peoples— even those equally resilient- 
will be endangered. 

The effort to subjugate the Afghan 
people and to impose upon them a form 
of alien and totalitarian rule has been 
marked by a degree of violence against 
the population that is exceeded in the re- 
cent past only by the terrible tragedy in 
Kampuchea. The crimes against the 
Afghan people have taken place far 
from the eye of world publicity, behind a 
tight curtain of totalitarian disinforma- 
tion and thought control. Still, the story 
of the brutality has come out— as it 
often does in such situations— from 
refugee accounts and from reports of 
journalists and doctors who have ven- 
tured into the country. 

One measure of the extent of the 
violence inflicted upon the Afghan peo- 
ple is the number of refugees uprooted 
from their homes and forced to flee to 
neighboring countries. When the illegiti- 
mate regime of Babrak Karmal was in- 
stalled as a result of the Soviet invasion, 
the number of refugees in Pakistan had 
already reached 400,000. These refugees 
had fled the reign of terror unleashed 
against Afghanistan by the earlier Com- 
munist regimes of Taraki and Amin. 
Babrak promised an end to the methods 
of terror used by his predecessors. But 
in less than 3 years of his rule, the 
number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
and Iran has increased nearly tenfold to 
over 3 million, almost one-quarter of the 
estimated 1978 population of Afghani- 
stan. This is the largest single refugee 
mass in the world for any one national 
group. 

Even these figures fail to convey the 
full extent of the dislocation and suffer- 
ing of Afghanistan, since there have 
been many hundreds of thousands of in- 
ternal refugees who have fled from the 
rural areas where the fighting has been 
most intense. The depopulation of the 
countryside, it appears, has been the 
deliberate goal of Soviet scorched-earth 
policies in rural areas controlled by the 
resistance. As a result of the fighting in 
these provinces, many farmers have 
been unable to gather their crops and 
there is a danger this winter of famine. 



The Soviet Offensive 

The last General Assembly called upoi 
the Soviet Union to withdraw its forc( 
from Afghanistan. Far from respectiji 
the decision of the assembly, the Sovii 
over the past year have augmented tli 
forces in Afghanistan to approximate! 
105,000, and they have conducted the 
most ruthless, wide-ranging, and sys- 
tematic offensive of the entire war. T 
heightened aggressiveness of the Sovi 
forces became evident in January whe 
the Soviets bombarded, shelled, and o 
cupied the resistance stronghold of Q; 
dahar, Afghanistan's second largest ci 
located some 250 miles southeast of 
Kabul. The brutal action in Qandahar, 
which resulted in high civilian casualti 
was repeated 2 months later in Herat 
and Mazar-e Sharif and later in the 
spring against the northeastern town 
Tashkurghan. In the early summer th 
town of Aq Gozar in the far northwes 
was rendered unfit for human habitat 
by systematic air and tank strikes. 

As brutal as these attacks have 
been, the main thrust of the Soviet of 
fensive took place closer to Kabul in t 
spring and summer of this year. The 
principal targets were villages in the 
Panjsher and Logar valleys and the 
Shomali region, and districts near 
Kabul, particularly the mountain towr 
Paghman located only 12 miles north- 
west of the capital. These attacks hav 
been marked by indiscriminate bomba 
ments of villages resulting in thousani 
of civilian casualties, many of them 
women and children. Survivors also 
relate that Soviet troops, frustrated ir 
their search for resistance fighters, ha 
committed numerous acts of terrorisn 
against civilians. 

In Qandahar, for example, accoun: 
of rape and plunder by Soviet troops 
following last January's bombing 
shocked and alienated even the most£ 
thusiastic apologists of the Babrak 
regime. According to eyewitness repoi 
from the Shomali region, in one villagi 
all males over the age of 10 were shot 
the presence of their female relatives. 
The Swedish journalist Borje Almquisi 
who visited the Lowgar Province in Ji 
and August, has described similar in- 
cidents in that area, as indeed such in- 
cidents have been reported from all ov 
Afghanistan. According to Almquist, 
women, children, and old men were, i 
dragged into the street and executed, ] 
while civilians with their hands tied 
behind their backs were used instead c 
sand sacks for protection in street fig! 



78 



Departnnent of State Bulle 



UNITED NATIONS 



also reported the burning of 
ts, the poisoning of food and 
ig water, and the plundering of 
and shops. 

e Soviets also continue to use 
-sonnel "butterfly bombs" and 
rapped objects— such as toys, 
;te packs, and pens— in gross 
)n of an international convention 
ing such weapons, which they 
'Ives signed in 1981. Earlier this 
team of French doctors, which 
turned from as far inland as the 
1 highlands of Hazarajat, charged 
,e Soviets scatter such mines over 
villages, and mountain paths, 
I heavy casualties among inhabi- 
especially among children who are 
St wary. "We have treated many 
n whose hands and feet are blown 
such mines," said Dr. Claude 
-et, a member of the French 
111 team. He also revealed that the 
( 5, fearing that the French doctors 
speak about what they had seen, 
yed their hospitals in an attempt 
e them out of the country, 
obytrap mines are not the only 
ed weapons used by the Soviets 
t the people of Afghanistan. They 
le to use chemical weapons in 
)n of both the Geneva Protocol of 
nd the 1972 Biological Weapons 
■ition which they, along with 110 
■ountries, have ratified. Earlier 
ar the United States listed 47 
I chemical attacks in Afghanistan. 
\ legan as early as 6 months before 
j 'asion and have resulted in over 
ieaths. These attacks have con- 
. Just last September a Soviet 
■ captured by the resistance, 
ly Sakharov, said that he knew of 
:ypes of chemical agents used by 
viets in Afghanistan. His testi- 
about the effects of one of them, a 
ilarly deadly agent which he called 
h," corresponds closely to reports 
to the U.N. experts team by doc- 
orking with refugees in Pakistan, 
actors noted that on several occa- 
ifter attacks on villages, "bodies 
iickly decomposed, and limbs 
'parated from each other when 
;d." Sakharov also described a 
cal attack on resistance fighters in 
the Soviet soldiers had been 
id to use gasmasks. [On November 
'82, Secretary of State Shultz 
ed Special Report No. 104, 
nical Warfare in Southeast Asia 
ighanistan: An Update," which 
ins new information regarding the 
t Union's continued use of illegal 



chemical and biological weapons in 
Afghanistan, as well as in Laos and 
Kampuchea.] 

Afghan Resistance 

Nothing more clearly demonstrates the 
courage and resilience of the Afghan 
freedom fighters, or the Afghan people's 
universal hatred of the Soviet occupa- 
tion, than the fact that the resistance 
forces remain intact and active through- 
out the country despite the massive 
violence that the Soviets have used 
against them. In the Panjsher and in 
Paghman, for example, the Soviets were 
able to establish footholds as the mu- 
jahidin melted into the hills. But as soon 
as the main invading force withdrew, 
the resistance overran the newly estab- 
lished government outposts and re- 
gained control of these positions. 
Similarly, savage bombardments in the 
Shomali temporarily drove the mu- 
jahidin back from the main roads but in 
no way broke their organization. Even 
in the devastated city of Qandahar the 
freedom fighters have been able to 
mount operations against the occupying 
forces, the most notable being a spec- 
tacular jailbreak and freeing of prisoners 
last August. Destroyed Soviet tanks and 
transport vehicles litter the roadsides 
throughout Afghanistan, testimony to 
the Soviets' continuing inability to estab- 
lish security in the countryside or con- 
trol over the population. 

The most glaring and revealing 
failure of the Soviets has been their in- 
ability to build the various branches of 
their puppet regime's armed forces into 
effective units that could take over the 
brunt of the fighting. To date it appears 
that no progress has been made in this 
key area. Recent measures to overcome 
the critical manpower shortage in the 
Afghan Army— including the toughest 
draft decree yet issued, indiscriminate 
arrests and beatings of those resisting 
conscription, and incentive payscales for 
recruits almost equal to sub-Cabinet 
salaries— have been fruitless. As a con- 
sequence, press gangs have returned to 
the streets of Kabul and provincial 
cities, and young men have been forcibly 
conscripted in house-to-house searches. 
The futility of these various measures 
was demonstrated during the summer 
fighting when large-scale defections, sur- 
renders, and desertions by Afghan 
soldiers led to a net loss of military per- 
sonnel. 

The failure of the Soviets to break 
the resistance by military means and the 



self-evident fact that the Soviet ag- 
gressors and their Afghan proxies are 
rejected by the Afghan people have not 
caused the Soviets to relent in their 
desire ultimately to subjugate the coun- 
try. Instead, they show every sign of 
pursuing a long-term strategy, looking 
on the one hand to the gradual wearing 
down of the resistance through attrition 
and on the other hand to the military, 
economic, and social integration of 
Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere. 

The Soviets have already taken sig- 
nificant steps in this direction. They 
have consolidated their military, trans- 
port, and communications infrastruc- 
ture, including the expansion of existing 
air fields and the completion of the 
bridge across the Amu Darya River. 
They have tightened their grip on the 
strategic Wakhan corridor, which rests 
on Pakistan's northernmost border and 
links Afghanistan with China, and they 
have tied Afghanistan's economy tightly 
to those of the Soviet bloc through a 
proliferation of economic and trade 
agreements. 

Perhaps most significant is the 
Soviet effort to reshape Afghan culture 
and to replace the decimated intellectual 
and middle classes with a new elite 
trained in the Soviet mold. Thousands of 
Afghans, including even children be- 
tween the ages of 6 and 9, are being 
trained in the Soviet Union and other 
bloc countries, while the Afghan educa- 
tional system itself is being restructured 
along Soviet lines. The Sovietization of 
Kabul University is made evident by the 
presence of Soviet advisers at all levels 
of administration and instruction and in 
the preference given to party activists in 
admissions. The curriculum of Afghani- 
stan's primary education system has 
been redrawn to promote indoctrination 
in Marxist-Leninist ideology and to pre- 
pare young Afghans for further study in 
the Soviet Union. 

It is in light of these policies— and 
the continuing escalating, savage Soviet 
military involvement— that we must 
view Moscow's repeated claim that the 
Great Saur Revolution of April 1978 is 
"irreversible." But what, one may legiti- 
mately ask, gives the Soviet Union the 
right "to insist that the violent overthrow 
of a nonaligned government constitutes 
an "irreversible" revolution? According 
to what tenet of international law, on 
the basis of which article of the U.N. 
Charter, do they base their position? 
One would think that it is the Afghan 
people, and only the Afghan people, who 



ary1983 



79 



UNITED NATIONS 



have the right to determine whether the 
events of 1978 are or are not "irrever- 
sible." 

In fact, the Afghan people made 
their decision long ago. They rejected a 
revolution the chief accomplishment of 
which before the Soviet invasion was the 
arrest, torture, and execution of tens of 
thousands of Muslim clerics, teachers, 
civil servants, doctors, and engineers. 
They rejected a revolution the cruelty 
and sadistic violence of which are best 
symbolized by the mass burial pits out- 
side Pol-e Charkhi prison and the 
massacre at Kerala. They rejected a 
revolution which systematically 
assaulted Islam and Afghan nationhood 
and turned their proud country over to 
its predatory northern neighbor. 

They expressed this rejection in the 
form of a spontaneous, countr.ywide re- 
sistance movement. By invading 
Afghanistan in order to crush this re- 
sistance and maintain in power a hated, 
Marxist regime, Moscow took a momen- 
tous step which signaled the expanding 
scope of its political and territorial ambi- 
tions. In effect, for the first time it was 
claiming the right to apply the Brezhnev 
Doctrine to a previously nonaligned. 
Third World country. 

International Rejection of 
Soviet Occupation 

The world has not permitted this act of 
expansion and aggression to go un- 
challenged. It has rejected the claim ad- 
vanced by Soviet propaganda that it is 
providing "fraternal assistance" to 
Afghanistan with its "limited military 
contingent." These words ominously 
echo assurances which were given to 
Afghanistan itself GO years ago when it 
protested the entry of Soviet troops into 
two of its neighbors, the independent 
Muslim states of Khiva and Bokhara. 
Let me quote from a letter which the 
Soviet Ambassador in Kabul sent to the 
Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
February 20, 1922: 

Concerning the question of the independ- 
ent status of Khiva and Bokhara, this has 
been provided for in the treaty agreed to and 
signed by the two governments of Russia and 
Afghanistan. The Government which I repre- 
sent has always recognized and respected the 
independence of the two Governments of 
Khiva and Bokhara. The presence of a limited 
contingent of troops belonging to my Govern- 
ment is due to temporary requirements ex- 
pressed and made known to us by tlie 
Bokharan Government. This arrangement has 
been agreed to with the provision that when- 
ever the Bokharan Government so requests, 



not a single Russian soldier will remain on 
Bokharan soil. The extension of our friendly 
assistance in no w-ay constitutes an inter- 
ference against the independence of the 
sovereign State of Bokhara. 

Today, 60 years later, the Soviet 
Union provides the same justification 
and the same assurances with respect to 
its invasion of Afghanistan. It is u.seful. 



therefore, to reflect upon the ultimat 
fate of Khiva and Bokhara. Two yeai 
after the Soviet Ambassador gave hi; 
assurances to the Government of 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union annex 
Khiva and Bokhara. Their languages. 
Turkish and Persian were abolished ; 
replaced by pseudolanguages fabrical 
by Soviet linguists. These languages, 



U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A/37/37, 
NOVEMBER 29, 1982' 



The General Assembly. 

Having considered the item entitled "The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications 
for international peace and security". 

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 
January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980 
and 36/34 of 18 November 1981, adopted at 
the sixth emergency special session, the 
thirty-fifth session and the thirty-sixth ses- 
sion, respectively, 

Reaffirming the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
obHgation of all States to refrain in their in- 
ternational relations from the threat or use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial in 
tegrity and political independence of any 
State," 

Reaffirming further the inalienable right 
of all peoples to determine their own form of 
government and to choose their own eco- 
nomic, political and scjcial system free from 
outside intervention, subversion, coercion or 
constraint of any kind whatsoever. 

Gravely concerned at the continuing 
foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in 
contravention of the above principles, and its 
serious implications for international peace 
and security, 

Noting the increasing concern of the in- 
ternational community over the continued 
and serious sufferings of the Afghan people 
and over the magnitude of social and eco- 
nomic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran 
by the presence on their soil of millions of 
Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase 
in their numbers. 

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a 
political solution of the grave situation in 
respect of .Afghanistan, 

Taking note of the report of the Secre- 
tary -General,- 

Recognizing the importance of the initia- 
tives of the Organization of the Islamic (Con- 
ference and the efforts of the Movement of 
Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution 
of the situation in respcft of Afghanistan, 

1 . Reiterates that the preservation of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political in- 
dependence and nonaligned character of 
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solu- 
tion of the problem; 

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan peo- 
ple to determine their own form of govern- 
ment and to choose their economic, political 



and social system free from outside inter 
tion, subversion, coercion or con.straint o) 
kind whatsoever; 

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawa 
the foreign troops from Afghanistan; 

4. Calls upon all parties concerned to 
work for the urgent achievement of a 
political solution, in accordance with the 
visions of the present resolution, and the 
creation of the necessary conditions whic 
would enable the Afghan refugees to reti 
voluntarily to their homes in safety and 
honour; 

5. Renews its appeal to all States and 
tional and international organizations to ( 
tinue to extend humanitarian relief 
assistance, with a view to alleviating the 
hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co- 
ordination with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees; 

6. Expresses its appreciation and sup 
for the efforts and constructive steps tak 
by the Secretary-General in the search to 
solution to the problem; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to • 
tinue these efforts with a view to promot 
a political solution, in accordance with th( 
provisions of the present resolution, and i 
exploration of securing appropriate 
guarantees for non-use of force, or threat 
use of force, against the political in- 
dependence, sovereigTity, territorial mteg 
and security of all neighbouring States, o. 
the basis of mutual guarantees and strict 
non-interference in each other's internal £ 
fairs and with full regard for the principli 
the Charter of the United Nations; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to 1 
Member States and the Security Council i 
currently informed of the progress towari 
the implementation of the present resolut 
and to submit to Member States a report 
the situation at the earliest appropriate oi 
portunity; 

9. Decides to include in the provisiona 
agenda of its thirty-eighth session the itei 
entitled "The situation in Afghanistan am 
implications for international peace and 
security". 



< 



'Adopted by a vote of 114 to 21 (13 
abstentions and" 9 absent or not voting). I 



80 



Department of Stale Bull! 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



)ek and Tadzhik, were mere dialects 
Turkish and Persian but were tran- 
ibed into Latin and later Cyrillic 
ipt. Mosques were closed or changed 
) museums and Koranic education 
3 abolished. The surviving members 
;he local factions the Soviets had sup- 
ted with their invasion were executed 
charges of "bourgeois nationalist 
iationism" and replaced by young 
eaucrats trained in new Soviet 
ools. 

Is history repeating itself today in 

case of Afghanistan? If we are to 
ge from Soviet actions to date, it is 
■d not to conclude that they intend 
t history shall repeat itself, if not 
ough the formal annexation of 
rhanistan, then through its de facto 
orption into the Soviet empire. And 
his is allowed to happen, can anyone 
reasonably assured that this will be 

end of the process, that there are 

future Khivas and Bokharas and 
jhanistans that await a similar fate? 

It is not, therefore, simply moral 
isiderations and human solidarity that 
c us to the fate of the Afghan people, 
stake in their struggle is respect for 

principles of the U.N. Charter; the 
nciples of the non-use of force; and 
pect for the territorial integrity, na- 
lal independence, and political 
■ereignty of states. Without this 
pect, world politics would succumb to 
irchy and domination by the most 
hless, expansionist predator. 

We cannot— we must not— permit 
3 to happen. The Soviet leaders un- 
jbtedly believed when they launched 
ir invasion of Afghanistan that they 
lid deal with the international reac- 
n by waiting patiently for the world's 
rage to subside. The General 
sembly can take great credit for 
istrating this strategy. Passage of 
le has not served the aggressor. In- 
ed, the adoption of resolutions on 
ghanistan by increasingly large ma- 
ities over the last 3 years shows that 
' world's outrage is growing. 

We now have an opportunity to reaf- 
m once again our commitment to the 
eration of Afghanistan. In so doing, 

can help remind those in the Kremlin 
10 ordered the Soviet invasion that 
eir strategy has failed. We cannot af- 
d, either as individual states with our 
n security concerns, or as a world 
ganization dedicated to maintaining 
)rld peace, for the Soviet leaders to 
ve any doubts on this score. 

The resolution before us today offers 

honorable course for ending the 
:'ghanistan crisis. Its objective is a 



peaceful, negotiated settlement leading 
to the withdrawal of Soviet forces; the 
restoration of Afghan self-determina- 
tion, independence, and nonalignment; 
and the return of the refugees to their 
homeland. By adopting this resolution, 
the U.N. General Assembly will be im- 
pressing on the Soviets the necessity to 
negotiate an end to their misadventure. 
Hopefully, this will speed the day when 
real negotiations on a settlement can 
begin. 

In this context, the United States 
wishes to express its appreciation to 
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar for 
his effort to probe the opportunities for 
a settlement whicli would implement the 
General Assembly resolutions. We sup- 
port these efforts and urge the Soviets 
to cooperate with them. We also recog- 
nize, as the Secretary General said in his 
report to the General Assembly this 
year, that "time is of the essence." If the 
Soviets truly tlesire to negotiate, they 



must come forward quickly or the rest 
of the world will be forced to conclude 
that they have no serious interest in 
reaching a settlement. 

The alternative to a negotiated set- 
tlement is a continuation of the conflict, 
with far-reaching and long-lasting conse- 
quences for world peace. The Afghan 
people, unbowed and unbroken despite 
repeated and relentless hammer blows, 
have shown that they will not submit to 
aggression— not now and not ever. They 
have proved themselves to be a strong, 
proud, heroic people. With our support 
and solidarity, they shall also once again 
become a sovereign and independent 
people, permitted, as President Harry 
Truman once said, to work out their 
own destiny in their own way. This is all 
that they seek. It is all that we, the 
member states of the United Nations, 
seek for them. 



^U.S.U.N. press release 146. 



World Peace and the Situation in 
Central America and the Caribbean 



Folloiving is an exchange of letters, 
released on November 5, between Presi- 
dent Reagan and prominent Venezuelan 
citizens regarding the threats to world 
pea.ce and the cu7-rent situation in Cen- 
tral America and the Caribbean.^ 



PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER 



[Dear . 



:] 



I have read carefully the letter recently 
addressed to me from numerous Venezuelan 
intellectuals, political leaders, and other per- 
sons in public life regarding the threats to 
world peace and the current situation in Cen- 
tral America and the Caribbean. 

The people and government of the United 
States of America share these concerns. 

The major objective of my administration, 
as of every other other American administra- 
tion since World War II. is to prevent nuclear 
war. Twice in my lifetime, I liave seen the 
world plunge into wars costing millions of 
lives. Living through those experiences has 
convinced me that America's highest mission 
is to encourage the world along the path of 
peace, and to ensure that our country and all 
those who share our aspirations of peace and 
freedom can live in security. 

Since taking office, I have sought prac- 
tical measures to reduce the risk of such a 
war, and to limit the destructive potential 
and costly competition in nuclear arsenals. 
Last year I wrote to President Brezhnev 



urging him to join me in this effort and pro- 
posing that we begin negotiations to reduce 
nuclear weapons and to strengthen peace. 

Last November, I offered to begin discus- 
sions with the Soviet Union to find a way to 
eliminate land-based intermediate-range 
nuclear missile systems. We are now 
negotiating in Geneva with the USSR on this 
proposal, which calls on the Soviet LInion to 
dismantle the more than 600 such systems it 
has in place, in exchange for which the U.S. 
and our allies would agree not to install 
similar systems in Europe. 

In May, I proposed a far-reaching ap- 
proach to nuclear arms control — a phased 
reduction in strategic weapons beginning 
with those that are most dangerous and 
destabilizing, the warheads on ballistic 
missiles and especially those on intercontinen- 
tal ballistic missiles. In a second phase, we 
will seek even further reductions in the 
destructive potential of nuclear forces. We 
are now negotiating with the Soviet Union in 
Geneva on these very proposals. 

These negotiaticjns, and others which are 
in progress or which we will be proposing, 
provide a historic opportunity for us to rein- 
force the framework of peace and reduce the 
risk of war. With the support of our friends 
and allies, we will do everything in our power 
to achieve that goal. 

There are two fundamental causes of the 
conflict in Central America: economic, social 
and political under-development and the 
violent exploitation of that under- 
development by Cuba, Nicaragua and the 



81 



TREATIES 



Soviet Union. To bring about peace in the 
region, we think both causes have to be ad- 
dressed. 

Together with Venezuela. Colombia, Mex- 
ico and Canada we are attempting to promote 
economic development in Central America 
and the Caribbean through the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative. No regional objective has a 
higher priority than passage of this legisla- 
tion to provide trade and investment incen- 
tives to economic development. Our Congress 
has already approved provision of $350 
million in emergency supplemental funds and 
these are being disbursed to recipient govern- 
ments. 

The development of democratic institu- 
tions to complement economic growth is a 
parallel objective to which we are equally 
committed. We have supported and have 
been encouraged by the striking trend toward 
democracy in Central America and the Carib- 
bean. Honduras and El Salvador have held 
free and fair elections in the last year, as did 
traditionally democratic Costa Rica and Co- 
lombia. Venezuelan democracy in our judg- 
ment continues to provide a worthy model 
compelling in its vibrancy. The trend toward 
democracy elsewhere in the hemisphere — we 
applaud the return of Bolivia to democratic 
rule — has our full support. 

We are also seeking to support demo- 
cratic political development by directing 
resources to the development of core skills of 
democracy. This week, for example, we are 
hosting a Conference on Free Elections to 
which democratic representatives from all 
over the world have been invited. 

Our diplomacy has supported the efforts 
of countries in the region to lesson tensions 
threatening peace. We participated in the 
conference Costa Rica convened on October 4 
to coordinate efforts for regional peace and 
democracy. We hope this conference will con- 
tribute to defusing tensions in the region. 

I believe many Venezuelans share our 
concern in this regard. The initiative of your 
President, together with President Lopez 
Portillo of Mexico, was a constructive step in 
the same direction. We believe the regional 
effort begun at the San Jose conference will 
advance the cause of peace we both support. 

As we direct efforts toward economic and 
political developments we cannot ignore the 
legitimate security needs of countries 
threatened by external support of internal in- 
surgency. The United States is supplying 
modest amounts of military equipment and 
training to the governments of El Salvador 
and Honduras. Around 85 percent of our aid 
to these countries, however, is economic. 

The commitment to democracy, self- 
sustaining economic development and non- 
intervention which we share does not, 
however characterize the action of Nicaragua, 
Cuba and the Soviet Union. Subsidized by the 
Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua have per- 
sistently provided aid to insurgency in El 
Salvador. Both Costa Rica and Honduras 
have been victimized by Nicaraguan- 
supported terrorist attacks. Nicaragua has 
developed its military potential entirely out 



of proportion to its objective defense needs. 
The root cause of so much concern in the 
region, however, is Cuba's military buildup, 
which has resulted in resources which could 
be better allocated to economic development 
being directed to arms procurement. 

Our two peoples, who have sacrificed 
blood and energy to obtain, safeguard, and 
nourish democracy, know well the importance 
of freedom and the right of free choice. 
Venezuelans and Americans alike share a 
mutual desire for peace and freedom in not 
only this region of the world but throughout 
the globe. By continuing our efforts, we can 
together advance the cause of peace. 



VENEZUELAN CITIZENS' LETTER 

Dear Mr. President: 

Reflecting the sentiments of ample sec- 
tors of the people of Venezuela, we would 
like to express to you our deep concern over 
the growing threat of another world con- 
flagration which, if it does occur, would bring 
with it the destruction of all mankind, 
eliminating all chances for anyone to be the 
winner. 

Within the realm of this concern, the 
situation now in Central America and the 
Caribbean strikes us, as Latin Americans, as 
being rife with serious threats that could 
eventually endanger world peace. For this 
reason, we are opposed to any type of in- 
terventionism that threatens the self- 
determination of the people of this region and 
impedes their progress as well as popular and 
democratic development. 

These are the reasons that bring us to 
ask you, in virtue of the important position 
you hold, to act diligently and decidedly 
against the threat of another world war and 
thus save mankind, provide perspectives for a 
world free of tension, and allow everyone to 
walk the certain path of peace and social 
progress. 



'The letter to the President was dated 
September 20, 1982, delivered to the 
American Embassy in Caracas on October 15, 
1982, and released by the Office of the Press 
Secretary on November 5, together with the 
President's response of that date (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Nov. 8, 1982). ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Brussels 
June 2-13, 1964. Entered into force July 2' 
1966 for ni-I through HI-VI, HI-IX and 
ni-X; Sept. 1, 1966 for III-XI; Dec. 28, 19 
for ni-VH. (TIAS 6058). 
Notification of approval for III-VIII: Japan 
Nov. 1, 1982. 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Santiago 
Nov. 18, 1966. Entered into force Oct. 30, 
1968 for IV-20 through IV-28. 
Notification of approval for IV 1-9 inclusiv 
Japan, Nov. 1, 1982. 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Paris Note 
29, 1968. Entered into force May 26, 1972 
for V-1 through V-4 and V-9; July 31, 19"; 
for V-7 and V-8. TIAS 7692. 
Notification of approval of V-5 and V-6 :' 
Japan, Nov. 1, 1982. 

Recommendations relating to the furtheran 
of the principles and objectives of the Anta 
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Tokyo 
Oct. 30, 1970. Entered into force Oct. io, 
1973 for VI 1-7 and 11-15. TIAS 7796. 
Notification of approval for VI-8, 9, and IC 
Japan, Nov. 1, 1982. 

Recommendations relating to the furtheran 
of the principles and objectives of the Anta 
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Well- 
ington Nov. 10, 1972. Entered into force M 
29, 1975 for VII-1 through VII-3, and VIL 
through VII-8. TIAS 8500. 
Notification of approval for VII-5: ' Japan, 
Nov. 1, 1982. 

Recommendations relating to the furtheran 
of the principles and objectives of the Anta 
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo Jui 
20, 1975. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1978 
for VIII 6-8 and 10-14; Sept. 1, 1980 for 
VIII 3-4. 

Notification of approval for VIII-1, 2, 5, an 
9;» Japan, Nov. 1, 1982 

Recommendations relating to the furtheran 

of the principles and objectives of the Anta 

tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Buenoi 

Aires July 7, 198 P. 

Notification of approval: Argentina, Sept. 3 

1982. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Dor 



82 



Department of State Bullet 



TREATIES 



mtreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into 

Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 

ication deposited: India, Nov. 12, 1982. 

ention on the suppression of unlawful 
-e of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 
370. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. 
7192. 
ication deposited: India, Nov. 12, 1982. 



ision of the international coffee agree- 
. 1976 (TIAS 8683). Done at London 

25, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 1, 

TIAS 10439. 
rtances deposited: Angola, Sept. 10, 

Austria, Benin, Sept. 13, 1982; Bohvia, 

29, 1982; Cameroon, Canada, France, 
, Honduras, Italy, Malawi, New 

nd,^ Norway, Thailand, Yugoslavia, 

30, 1982; Cyprus, Peru, Sept. 28, 1982; 
nican Republic, India, Sept. 7, 1982; 

n, Indonesia, Sept. 3, 1982; Guinea, 
14, 1982; Japan, Liberia, Portugal, 
27, 1982; Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Sept. 
382; Netherlands, Aug. 30, 1982'; 
may, Aug. 27, 1982; Philippines, Aug. 
382; Sweden, Sept. 21, 1982; 
.erland, Sept. 24, 1982; Tanzania, Sept. 
S2; Trinidad and Tobago, Sept. 20, 1982; 
, Aug. 6, 1982. 

ications of provisional application 
;ited: Belgium, Denmark, European 
omic Community, F.R.G., Greece, 
id, Luxembourg, Sierra Leone, 
.pore, U.K.," Sept. 30, 1982; Central 
an Republic, Venezuela, Sept. 17, 1982; 
. Rica, Sept. 16, 1982; Finland, Sept. 28, 
Nigeria, Sept. 13, 1982; Togo, Aug. 16, 



nodities — Common Fund 

ement establishing the Common Fund 

ommodities, with schedules. Done at 

va June 27, 1980.' 

ications deposited: Benin, Oct. 25, 1982; 

a Leone, Oct. 7, 1982; Switzerland, Aug. 

982.^ 

oval deposited: France, Sept. 17, 1982. 

ervation 

ention on international trade in en- 
ered species of wild fauna and flora, 
appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 
Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 

ication deposited: Sudan, Oct. 26, 1982. 

ndment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
on international trade in endangered 
es of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). 
)ted at Bonn June 22, 1979.' 
ptances deposited: Jordan, Sept. 15, 
Nepal, Oct. 21, 1982; Peru, Oct. 6, 
South Africa, Oct. 1, 1982. 



cms convention on the international 
sport of goods under cover of TIR 
ets, with annexes. Done at Geneva 

14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 

for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982. 



Accessions deposited: Afghanistan, Sept. 23, 

1982;6 Chile, Oct. 6, 1982. 

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, 

Oct. 8, 1982.' 

Fisheries 

Convention for the conservation of salmon in 
the North Atlantic Ocean. Open for signature 
at Reykjavik Mar. 2 to Aug. 31, 1982.' 
Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 16, 1982. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial 
and extrajudicial documents in civil or com- 
mercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 
1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. 
TIAS 6638. 
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, 

Sept. 23, 1981.« 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International Mari- 
time Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606, 10374). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 
1977.1 

Acceptances deposited: Cuba, Oct. 26, 1982; 
Czechoslovakia, Nov. 17, 1982. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International Mari- 
time Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 8606, 
10374). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.' 
Acceptances deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 7, 1982; 
Czechoslovakia, Nov. 17, 1982; Nepal, 
Nov. 1, 1982. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 
all forms of racial discrimination. Done at 
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969.' 
Accession deposited: Namibia, Nov. 11, 1982. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement 
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean 
floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at 
Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 
1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. 
TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Nov. 11, 

1982. 

Tonnage 

International convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at 
London June 23, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1982. 
Senate advice and consent to acceptance: 

Sept. 30, 1982.i'> 

Instrument of acceptance signed by President: 

Oct. 25, 1982."' 

Acceptance deposited: U.S., Nov. 10, 1982. ><> 

Enters into force for U.S.: Feb. 10, 1983. 

Trade 

U.N. convention on contracts for the interna- 
tional sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 
1980.' 



Approval deposited: France, Aug. 6, 1982. 

U.N. Industrial Development Organization 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 
Signatures: Jamaica, Israel, Nov. 1, 1982; 
Mozambique, Nov. 10, 1982. 
Ratification deposited: Malta, Nov. 4, 1982. 

Weapons 

Convention on prohibition or restrictions on 
the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively in- 
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with 
annexed protocols. Adopted at Geneva 
Oct. 10, 1980.' 

Signature: Laos, Nov. 2, 1982. 
Ratification and acceptances deposited: 
Bulgaria, Oct. 15, 1982. 

Whaling 

Amendments to the schedule to the interna- 
tional convention for the regulation of whal- 
ing 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Brighton 
July 19-24, 1982. Enters into force 90 days 
after notification by the International Whal- 
ing Commission to the contracting govern- 
ments, unless any contracting government 
presents an objection. 

World Health Organization 

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Constitution of the World Health Organiza- 
tion, as amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). 
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976.' 
Acceptances deposited: Togo, Oct. 18, 1982: 
U.A.E., Oct. 7, 1982; U.S., Nov. 11, 1982; 
Zimbabwe, Oct. 13, 1982. 

World Meteorological Organization 

Convention of the World Meteorological 
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. 
TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Swaziland, Nov. 2, 1982. 



BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Sept. 22, 1977 (TIAS 8978) relating to air 
transport services. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Buenos Aires Mar. 11, 1981. En- 
tered into force Mar. 11, 1981. TIAS 10440. 

Australia 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Australia during calendar year 
1982. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Oct. 18 and 21, 1982. Entered 
into force Oct. 21, 1982. 

Brazil 

Agreement on cooperation in the field of con- 
trol of illicit traffic of drugs, with annex. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Brasilia 
Sept. 29, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 29, 
1982. 



E'dary 1983 



83 



CHRONOLOGY 



Canada 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Canada during calendar year 
1982. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Sept. 23 and 28, 1982. Entered 
into force Sept. 28, 1982. 

Chile 

Memorandum of understanding for scientific 
cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at 
Reston and Santiago Aug. 2 and 26, 1982. 
Entered into force Aug. 26, 1982. 

Colombia 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bogota July 1 and Aug. 11, 1982. 
Entered into force Aug. 11, 1982; effective 
July 1, 1982. 

Egypt 

Project grant agreement for Safaga Grain 
Silos Complex. Signed at Cairo Sept. 25, 
1982. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1982. 
Project grant agreement for production 
credit. Signed at Cairo Sept. 25, 1982. 
Entered into force Sept. 25, 1982. 

Agreement extending the memorandum of 
understanding of Oct. 21, 1979 relating to 
the production in Egypt of U.S. -designed 
defense equipment. Signed at Washington 
Oct. 21, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 21, 
1982. 

El Salvador 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 15, 1982, 
with memorandum of understanding. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at San Salvador 
Sept. 1, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 7, 
1982. 

Israel 

Agreement relating to privileges and im- 
munities for U.S. military members and 
civilian observers of the Multinational Force 
and Observers on leave in Israel. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 
Sept. 28 and Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force 
Oct. 1, 1982. 

Italy 

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat- 
ters. Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Enters 
into force upon the exchange of instruments 
of ratification. 

Supplementary protocol to the treaty on ex- 
tradition of Jan. 18, 1973 (TIAS 8052). 
Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Enters into 
force upon exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from New Zealand during calendar 
year 1982. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Sept. 28 and 29, 1982. Entered 
into force Sept. 29, 1982. 



Panama 

Agreement authorizing the U.S. to construct 
a custodian's house in the Corozal Cemetery. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama 
Sept. 29 and 30, 1982. Entered into force 
Sept. 29, 1982. 

Agreement concerning creation of a prepara- 
tory committee to study alternatives to the 
Panama Canal. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Sept. 30, 1982. Entered 
into force Sept. 30, 1982. 

Philippines 

Agreement amending the agreements of 
Aug. 23 and 30, 1979, Aug. 12 and 22, 1980, 
and Aug. 19 and 20, 1981 (TIAS 9584, 9847, 
10236), concerning the grant of defense ar- 
ticles and services under the miltary assist- 
ance program. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Manila Aug. 16 and Sept. 30, 1982. 
Entered into force Sept. 30, 1982. 

Portugal 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 19, 1960 (TIAS 4444), as amended, for 
financing certain educational exchange pro- 
grams. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Lisbon July 6, Aug. 16, and Sept. 3, 1982. 
Entered into force Sept. 3, 1982. 

Romania 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Sept. 3 and Nov. 3, 1980, as amended (TIAS 
9911), relating to trade in wool and manmade 
fiber textiles and textile products. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Washington Nov. 2 
and 3, 1982. Entered into force Nov. 3, 1982. 

Saudi Arabia 

Extension of the project agreement of 
Oct. 30, 1977 (TIAS 9077) for cooperation in 
the field of solar energy. Signed at Washing- 
ton Oct. 8, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 8, 
1982. 

Senegal 

Agreement for scientific and technical 
cooperation. Signed at Dakar Sept. 30, 1980. 
Entered into force Aug. 17, 1982. TIAS 
10441. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its 
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar 
Aug. 26, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 25, 
1982. 

Spain 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Madrid 
Oct. 18, 1982. Enters into force on the date 
mutually agreed upon by the administrations. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Mar. 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107). Signed at Colom- 
bo Oct. 29, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 29, 
1982. 



Thailand 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Oct. 4, 1978, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 9215, 9462, 9717, 10368), relating., 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber i 
tiles and textile products. Effected by ex-i 
change of letters at Bangkok Sept. 30 anij 
Oct. 25, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 25,, 
1982. 

Treaty on cooperation in the execution of 
penal sentences. Signed at Bangkok Oct. 
1982. Enters into force on the date on v/l' 
instruments of ratification are exchanged ' 

Turkey 

Agreement amending the agreement of P ' 
15 and 31, 1979, as amended (TIAS 9588' 
10144), concerning the grant of defense ; 
tides and services under the military assi ' 
ance program. Effected by exchange of r ' 
at Ankara Aug. 13, and Sept. 24, 1982. 
Entered into force Sept. 24, 1982. 



'Not in force. J 

^Applicable to the Cook Islands and 9 

^For the Kingdom in Europe. J 

■"Applicable to the Bailiwicks of Gueni 
and Jersey. 

■^With declaration. 

•^With reservation. 

'Applicable to the Bailiwicks of Gueri! 
and Jersey, (5ibraltar, and the Isle of Ma: 

''With declaration(s) and designation(.' 

'Not in force for the U.S. 

'"With understanding. ■ 



November 1982 



November 1 

At Lebanese President Gemayel's request 
President Reagan authorizes the U.S. Ma 
contingent to join with the other national 
tingents to the MNF [multinational force] 
limited patrols in East Beirut. 

November 2 

Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini 
makes an official working visit to Washin 
ton, D.C., November 2-4, 1982. 

November 3 

Speaking for the five Western countries i 
volved in the U.N. -sponsored negotiations 
bringing Namibia to independence— Brita 
Canada, France, West Germany, and the 
U.S.— vice chairman of the U.S. delegatio 
Kalmann Schaefer, states that they will 
welcome the admission of that territory t( 
the International Telecommunications Uni 
(ITU) only "after it becomes independent. 
Schaefer goes on to say that such action 
would be contrary to the ITU convention 
could possibly upset the ongoing "delicate 
negotiations" on Namibian independence. 
ITU conference, nevertheless, admits 
Namibia as represented by the U.N. Cour 
for Namibia. 



I 



84 



Department of State Bull* 



CHRONOLOGY 



mber 4 

jsentative from 34 nations attend the 
■rence on Free Elections held in 
ington, D.C., November 4-6, 1982, to 
ie exchange designed to foster the 
opment of an effective program to 
d democracy and democratic institu- 

y a vote of 90-12 with 52 abstentions. 
General Assembly adopts Resolution 
irging the U.K. and Argentina to 
le negotiations aimed at seeking a 
fill solution to the sovereignty dispute 
;he Falkland Islands. 

mber 5 

;ponse to reports — Conference Report 
7-891 with accompanying H.R. 6956 — 

directed the Secretary of State to 
take an investigation of allegations that 
i labor is being used and human rights 
ed in the construction of the trans- 
an gas pipeline, the State Department 
ts to the Congress an updated packet of 
nation on the issue. The report includes 
xt of the Department's September 22 
nent, an historical summary of Soviet 
I labor questions before the Interna- 

Labor Organization, a new study en- 
"The Soviet Forced-Labor System," 
lentation from the August 1982 hear- 
eld by the International Society for 
n Rights, a summary of publicly an- 
ed actions taken by other governments 
itemational labor bodies, and maps and 
ics of the pipeline network and of 
; forced-labor camps. 

nber 6 

22 years in office, Cameroon President 
dou Ahidjo resigns. He is succeeded by 
Minister Paul Biya. 

nber 7 

• Volta Government of Col. Saye Zerbo 
rthrown in a coup. 

Tiber 8 

European Community (EC) semiannual 
evel consultations are held November 
982, at State Department. Under 
tary for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis 
the U.S. team. The delegations ex- 
e views on the global economic outlook, 
jcoming GATT [General Agreement on 
s and Trade] ministerial meeting, 
dtural and other trade concerns. East- 
economic relations, and energy issues, 
resident Reagan informs the Congress 
le has sent a notice to the Federal 
ter stating that because the "internal 
ion in Iran remains uncertain, the war 
!en Iran and Iraq continues, and the 
t Union still occupies Afghanistan," the 
lal emergency with respect to Iran will 
lue in effect beyond the November 14, 
expiration date. The national emergen- 
,s declared November 14, 1979, by 
T President Jimmy Carter. 



November 9 

Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev dies. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, recessed March 1982 as a result of 
the martial law situation in Poland, 
reconvenes in Madrid. 

November 10 

Vice President Bush makes an official visit to 
Africa November 10-24, 1982. The Vice 
President makes a brief stop in Cape Verde 
and proceeds to Senegal and Nigeria. At this 
point, the Vice President's schedule is inter- 
rupted and he departs Nigeria to travel to 
Moscow to head the U.S. delegation to the 
funeral of Soviet President Brezhnev. Follow- 
ing the funeral, the Vice President resumes 
his trip to Africa traveling to Zambia, Kenya, 
Zaire, again to Cape Verde, and to Bermuda. 

Second anniversary of the formal 
registration in Poland of Solidarity as a legal- 
ly recognized free trade union. 

November 11 

Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Kamal Hassan AJi visits 
Washington, D.C., November 11-13, 1982, to 
consult with President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz, and other U.S. officials on the peace 
process and recent developments in Lebanon 
and other issues of bilateral concern. 

November 12 

The Central Committee of the Communist 
Party unanimously elects Yuriy V. Andropov 
as General Secretary of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. Mr. Andropov succeeds 
President Brezhnev. 

Polish military government releases labor 
leader Lech Walesa after an 11-month deten- 
tion. 

November 13 

U.S. lifts trade sanctions it imposed on 
American and other companies participating 
in the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western 
Europe because this country and its key allies 
reach "substantial agreement" on overall eco- 
nomic strategy toward the Soviet bloc. 

Italian Prime Minister Spadolini 
resigns — the second time in 3 days. The 
Prime Minister's first resignation was refused 
by President Pertini who ordered Spadolini 
to submit the issue to the Parliament. The 
Parliament agrees that the cabinet could not 
be salvaged, and Pertini announces he will 
open consultations on November 15 to 
designate a new cabinet. 

November 14 

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl makes 
an official working visit to Washington, D.C., 
November 14-16, 1982. 

November 15 

Funeral of Soviet President Brezhnev is held 
in Moscow's Red Square. U.S. is represented 
by Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, 
and Ambassador Hartman. 

For the first time in 17 years, Brazilians 



vote in the first free municipal, legislative, 
and gubernatorial election. 

Secretary Shultz heads U.S. delegation to 
the 12th regular session of the General 
Assembly meeting of the Organization of 
American States held in Washington, D.C., 
November 15-20. On November 18, the 
General Committee approves a draft resolu- 
tion expressing support for U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 37/9 of November 4 and 
calling for negotiations on the sovereignty 
dispute over the Falkland Islands. 

November 18 

North Atlantic Assembly overwhelmingly 
adopts a resolution condemning the continued 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and calling 
on members of the NATO alliance "to con- 
tinue to support the right of the Afghan peo- 
ple to self-determination and sovereignty." 

November 20 

Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense 
Minister Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu 
Ghazala visits the U.S. November 20-27. 
Discussions with the Secretary, Defense 
Secretary Weinberger, and others deal with 
U.S. military assistance to Egypt, the peace 
process, and other issues. 

November 22 

The following newly appointed Ambassadors 
present their credentials to President 
Reagan: U Kyee Myint of Burma; Simon In- 
sonere of Rwanda; Mocktar Georges 
Abdoulaye-Mbingt of Gabon; Joseph Diatta of 
Niger; Kasem S. Kasemsri of Thailand; and 
Ah Mlahaili of Comoros. 

In an address to the nation. President 
Reagan announces a plan for peace through 
deterrence and arms reduction. A special let- 
ter sent by the President to Soviet leadership 
proposes negotiating measures to lessen the 
risk of accidental nuclear war and misunder- 
standing thus strengthening mutual con- 
fidence between both countries. The pro- 
posals include: 

• Advance notification of all U.S. and 
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile test 
firing; 

• Advance notification of major military 
exercises; 

• Broad-range exchange of basic data 
about nuclear forces; and 

• Improvement of the existing "Hotline" 
system. 

The President, citing the continuing 
Soviet military buildup, also announces his 
decision to proceed with the deployment of 
the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic 
missile) — MX, stating that U.S. military 
strength deters aggression. He goes on to 
state that "unless we demonstrate the will to 
rebuild our strength, the Soviets will have lit- 
tle incentive to negotiate." 

November 24 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 



iary1983 



85 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Ministerial meeting is held in Geneva 
November 24-28, 1982. 

In Brazil, results of the November 15 
election show opposition parties — Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party and the 
Democratic Labor Party of Leonel 
Brizola — carrying a majority of the votes 
leading the Social Democratic Party of Gen. 
Joao Baptista Figueiredo. 

November 26 

Japan elects Yasuhiro Nakasone as its new 
Prime Minister. He succeeds Prime Minister 
Suzuki. 

November 29 

State Department releases second report on 
the continuing use of chemical and toxin 
weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan 
to the U.N. and the Congress. 

By a vote of 114-21 (13 abstentions) the 
U.N. General Assembly adopts Resolution 
37/37 on the situation in Afghanistan. Nearly 
identical to last year's resolution, it urges the 
return of the independence and nonaligned 
character of Afghanistan, reaffirms the 
Afghan right of self-determination, calls for 
the immediate withdrawal of the foreign 
troops, and the return of the refugees with 
safety and honor. 

By a vote of 71-18 (30 abstentions) the 
U.N. General Assembly adopts a resolution 
calling on the Secretary General to in- 
vestigate the illegal use of chemical weapons 
in warfare. 

November 30 

In Geneva, U.S. -Soviet negotiations aimed at 
a reduction of intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF) in Europe adjourns until 
January 27, 1983. 

President Reagan makes an official work- 
ing visit to Latin America November 
30-December 4 to hold bilaterals with heads 
of state. The President visits Brazil Nov. 
30-Dec. 3; Colombia Dec. 3; Costa Rica Dec. 
3-4; and Honduras Dec. 4. While in Costa 
Rica, the President meets with Salvadoran 
President AJvaro Magana and with Guate- 
malan President Brig. Gen. Jose Rios Montt 
while in Honduras. The President is accom- 
panied by Secretaries Shultz and Regan, U.S. 
Trade Representative Brock, and other 
Senior White House aides. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*339 11/1 Program for the official visit 
of Italian Prime Minister 
Giovanni Spadolini, Nov. 
2-4. 

*340 10/26 James Blane sworn in as 
Ambassador to Rwanda 
(biographic data). 



•341 11/2 Conference on the Carib- 
bean, Miami, Dec. 5-7. 

•342 11/2 Shultz; remarks at the U.N. 
Day Concert, Oct. 30. 

*343 11/3 William Alexander Hewitt 
sworn in as Ambassador 
to Jamaica, Oct. 25 (bio- 
graphic data). 
344 11/4 Shultz: address at Confer- 
ence on Free Elections. 

*345 11/9 U.S. Organization for the 
International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), 
study group A, Nov. 23. 

*346 11/9 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on bulk chemicals, 
Nov. 29. 

*347 11/9 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on stability, load lines, and 
safety of fishing vessels, 
Nov. 30. 

•348 11/12 Program for the official visit 
of F.R.G. Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, Nov. 14-16. 

349 11/15 Shultz: news conference, 

Moscow. 

350 11/17 Shultz: address before Or- 

ganization of American 
States General Assembly. 

351 11/18 Shultz news conference. 

352 [not issued) 

•353 11/23 Availability of Department 
of State records, 1950-54, 
for research. 

•354 11/23 SCC, SOLAS, committee on 
ocean dumping, Dec. 14. 

•355 11/23 Advisory Committee on Pri- 
vate International Law, 
study group on trusts, 
Dec. 17. 

•356 12/2 Mrs. Shultz and Assistant 
Secretary Newell to par- 
ticipate in opening of In- 
ternationa! Children's 
Festival benefiting the 
U.S. Committee for 
UNICEF. 

•357 11/29 Department submits Report 
to Congress on Chemical 
Warfare in Afghanistan, 
Laos, and Kampuchea. 

*358 11/30 U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), study group 
CMIT, Dec. 21. 



•Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 



Free, single copies of the follovnng Depai' 
ment of State publications are available f n 
the Public Information Service, Bureau o 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan I 

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Ar 
Control, address to the nation and letti t 
the Congress, November 22, 1982 (Curn 
Policy #435). 

Secretary Shultz 

Reflections Among Neighbors, address b u 
the Organization of American States 
General Assembly, November 17, 1982 
(Current Policy #432). 

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and 
Afghanistan: An Update, report to the di 
gress and member states of the Unitec *a 
tions, November 1982 (Special Report 
#104). I, 

Africa 

Background Notes on Zimbabwe (Octobe 
1982). 

Arms Control 

Freezing Chances for Peace, Counselor 
Buckley, Commonwealth Club of Califcl 
San Francisco, October 27, 1982 (Curr t 
Policy #428). 

East Asia 

Background Notes on Macau (October lil) 

Europe 

Background Notes on Sweden (October 82 

General 

Atlas on Foreign Relations Machinery, 
August 1982 (Bulletin Reprint). 

Oceans 

Law of the Sea (GIST, November 1982). 

Population 

Population Growth and the Policy of Nal 
Coordinator of Population Affairs 
Benedick, Bangladesh Institute of Stragi 
Studies, Dacca, October 5, 1982 (Currc 
Policy #429). 



I 



Refugees 

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 
1982, Acting Secretary Dam and U.S. 
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Dough, 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Septembt2! 
1982; President Reagan's memorandun 
October 11, 1982 (Current Policy #427 

Western Hemisphere 

Caribbean Basin Initiative (GIST, Novener 

1982). 
Background Notes on the Bahamas (Octisr 

1982). 
Background Notes on Colombia (Noveml" 

1982). 
Background Notes on Costa Rica (Novercf 

1982). ■ 



86 



Department of State BuMif 



«|)EX 



Eiuary 1983 

( ume 83, No. 2070 



f inistan. Call for Soviet Withdrawal 
■cm Afghanistan (Kirkpatrick, text of 
solution) 78 

1 1. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and 
;rmuda (statements, remarks, toasts, 
.S.-Nigeria joint communique) 34 

1 Control 

n ar Energy: Opportunities and Problems 
ennedy) 75 

s lent Reagan's News Conference of 
3vember 11 (excerpts) 30 

1 uda. Vice President Bush Visits Africa 

I id Bermuda (statements, remarks, 
asts, U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) .34 

I ,1. President Reagan Visits Latin 
merica (statements, remarks, toasts, 
■ess briefings, radio address. U.S. -El 
ilvador joint communique) 1 

( Verde. Vice President Bush Visits Africa 
id Bermuda (statements, remarks, 
asts, U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) .34 

1 ibia. President Reagan Visits Latin 
merica (statements, remarks, toasts, 
■ess briefings, radio address, U.S. -El 
ilvador joint communique) 1 

; ress 

( ican Role in NATO (Eagleburger) .... 62 

I h for Peace and Stability in the Middle 
ast (Dam) 71 

1 Rica. President Reagan Visits Latin 

' merica (statements, remarks, toasts, 

' -ess briefings, radio address, U.S. -El 
ilvador joint communqiue) 1 

I 9mics 

• ' State Doctrine: Foreign Expropriations 
lobinson) 70 

) lational Free Trade (Reagan) 29 

: President Bush Attends Caribbean Con- 
rence .52 

1 1. Search for Peace and Stability in the 
iddle East (Dam) 71 

1 pe. Secretary Shultz's News Conference 
November 18 54 

i any, Federal Republic of. Visit of West 
erman Chancellor Kohl (joint communi- 
ie) 66 

I uras. President Reagan Visits Latin 
merica (statements, remarks, toasts, 
ress briefings, radio address, U.S. -El 
alvador joint communique) 1 



International Law. Act of State Doctrine: 
Foreign Expropriations (Robinson) .... 70 

Israel. Search for Peace and Stability in the 
Middle East (Dam) 71 

Italy. Visit of Italian Prime Minister Spadolini 
(Reagan, Spadolini) 65 

Kenya. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and 
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts, 
U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) 34 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 
November 18 54 

President Reagan Visits Latin America (state- 
ments, remarks, toasts, press briefings, 
radio address, U.S. -El Salvador joint com- 
munique) 1 

Vice President Bush Attends Caribbean 
Conference 52 

World Peace and the Situation in Central 
America and the Caribbean (exchange of 
letters) 81 

Lebanon 

Search for Peace and Stability in the Middle 
East (Dam) 71 

Securing a Peaceful Future for Lebanon 
(Dam) 73 

Middle East 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 
November 18 54 

President Reagan's News Conference of 
November 11 (excerpts) 30 

Nigeria. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and 
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts, 
U.S. -Nigeria joint communique) 34 

North Atlantic "Treaty Organization 

American Role in NATO (Eagleburger) .... 62 

Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl (joint 
communique) 66 

Nuclear Energy. Nuclear Energy: Oppor- 
tunities and Problems (Kennedy) 75 

Poland. Second Anniversary of Solidarity 
(Reagan) 68 

Presidential Documents 

Death of Soviet President Brezhnev (White 
House statement. Bush, Shultz) 58 

East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet 
Pipeline Sanctions 28 

International Free Trade 29 

President Reagan's News Conference of 
November 1 1 (excerpts) 30 

Second Anniversary of Solidarity 68 

Visit of Italian Prime Minister Spadolini 
(Spadolini) 65 

Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl (joint 
communique) 66 

World Peace and the Situation in Central 
America and the Caribbean (exchange of 
letters) 81 

Press Releases. Department of State 86 

Publications. Department of State 86 



Security Assistance. American Role in 
NATO (Eagleburger) 62 

Senegal. Vice President Bush Visits Africa 
and Bermuda (statements, remarks, 
toasts, U.S. -Nigeria joint communique) .34 

Trade 

East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet 
Pipeline Sanctions (Reagan) 28 

International Free Trade (Reagan) 29 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 
November 18 54 

Treaties 

Current Actions 82 

U.S.S.R. 

Call for Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan 
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) 78 

Death of Soviet President Brezhnev (White 
House statement. Bush, Reagan, 
Shultz) 58 

East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet 
Pipeline Sanctions (Reagan) 28 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 
November 18 54 

President Reagan's News Conference of 
November 11 (excerpts) 30 

Second Anniversary of Solidarity (Reagan) . 68 

United Nations. Call for Soviet Withdrawal 
From Afghanistan (Kirkpatrick, text of 
resolution) 78 

Venezuela. World Peace and the Situation in 
Central America and the Caribbean (ex- 
change of letters) 81 

Zaire. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and 
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts, 
U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) 34 

Zambia. Vice President Bush Visits Africa and 
Bermuda (statements, remarks, toasts, 
U.S. -Nigeria joint communique) 34 

Zimbabwe. Vice President Bush Visits Africa 
and Bermuda (statements, remarks, 
toasts, U.S.-Nigeria joint communique) .34 

Name Index 

Bush, Vice President 34, 52, 58 

Dam, Kenneth W 71, 73 

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 63 

Kennedy, Richard T 75 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 78 

Reagan, President . 1, 28, 29, 30, 58, 65, 68, 81 

Robinson, Davis R 70 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 54, 58 

Spadolini, Giovanni 65 



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1.3; 



nvpartmvnt 
of Stntv 



-m of stntv -m-m > ^ 

bulletin 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / VOjlume 83 / Number 2071 




I I iviAR i 2 1983 I I 







Visits 

Portugal / 40 

Jordan / 43 

Pakistan / 65 

Narcotics / 44 



^ 



■f-i 



^"^ 



February 1983 






'.. V 




/ 



Depnrtmvni of Sinte 

bulletin 



Volume 83 / Number 2071 / February 1983 



Cover: 

Prime Minister Balsemao (Portugal) 
Dominick L. DiCarlo 
King Hussein I (Jordan) 
President Zia (Pakistan) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on cuiTent 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



The Secretao' of State has determined that the 
publication of thi.=; periodical i.< necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March ;il, 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of State Bii.leti.n' as the source 
will be appreciated. The Biu.i.etin is inde.xed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



?"or sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
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(domestic) $3. 15 (foreign) 



J 



CONTENTS 



e President 

U.S. Relations With the Soviet 

Union 
News Conference of January 5 

(Excerpts) 

ms Control 

Production of the MX Missile 
(President Reagan, White House 
Statement, Letter to the Congress) 

U.S.- Soviet Negotiations on INF 
Reductions (White House State- 
ment) 

St Asia 

Assessment of U.S. Relations With 
China (John H. Holdridge) 

Balancing Strategic Interests and 
Human Rights in Asia (Thomas 
P. Shoesmith) 



ergy 

Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
(Message to the Congress) 

rope 

Secretary Visits Europe; Attends 
North Atlantic Council 
(Statements, News Conferences, 
Toasts, NATO Communique) 

Economic Health of the Western 
Alliance (Arthur F. Bums) 

Visit of Portugal's Prime Minister 
(President Reagan, Francisco 
Pinto Balsemao) 

11th Report on Cyprus (Message 
to the Congress) 

Day of Prayer for Poland (Procla- 
mation) 



Human Rights 



Western Hemisphere 



42 



42 



Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights 
Day and Week, 1982 (Proclama- 
tion) 

Human Rights Policy (Department 
Statement) 



73 



79 



82 



Middle East 

43 Visit of Jordan's King (King 

Hussein I, President Reagaii) 



Narcotics 

44 U.S International Narcotics Con- 
trol in Southeast Asia 
(Dominick L. DiCarlo) 

Pacific 

52 U.S.-Palau Plebiscite 

South Asia 

53 Afghanistan: 3 Years of Occu- 

pation (Eliza Van Hollen) 

62 Afghanistan (Lawrence S. 

Eaglehurger) 

63 Balancing Strategic Interests and 

Human Rights in South Asia 
(Daind T. Schnei.der) 

64 Anniversary of the Soviet 

Invasion of Afghanistan (Presi- 
dent Reagan) 

65 Visit of Pakistan's President 

(President Reagayi, Mohammad 
Zia-ul-Haq, Arrival Ceremony, 
Dinner Toasts) 
67 Pakistan— A Profile 

United Nations 

69 UNISPACE 82 Held in Vienna 
(James M. Beggs, President 
Reagan, General Assembly 
Resolution, U.S. Delegation) 



Dealing With the Reality of Cuba 
(Thomas 0. Enders) 

Programs Underway for the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (J. 
William Middendorf, IP) 

U.S. to Sell Aircraft Spare Parts 
to Guatemala (Department An- 
nouncement) 



Treaties 

84 Current Actions 

Chronology 

86 December 1982 

Press Releases 

87 Department of State 

Publications 

88 Department of State 

88 Foreign Relations Volume 
Released 

Index 





■"""3^1983 



THE PRESIDENT 



U.S. Relations 

With the 
Soviet Union 



by President Reagan 



Radio broadcast 

to the nation 

from Camp David, 

January 8, 1983^ 



My fellow Americans, today I'd like to 
share with you some thoughts on one of 
the most important aspects of America's 
role in the world — our relations with the 
Soviet Union. Keeping the peace for 
both countries, for that matter for all 
mankind, depends on our wise and 
steady management of this relationship. 

As you know, a new leader has to 
come to power in Moscow. There has 
been much speculation about whether 
this change could mean a chance to 
reduce tensions and solve some of the 
problems between us. No one hopes 
more than I do that the future will bring 
improvement in our relations with the 
Soviets and an era of genuine stability. 

What could be more important than 
reducing the danger of confrontation, in- 
creasing the prospects for enduring 
peace, lowering nuclear arsenals, reliev- 
ing human suffering in Afghanistan and 
Kampuchea and elsewhere? With your 
support, this Administration has em- 
barked on an effort to restore our na- 
tion's strength, credibility, and clarity of 
purpose in the world. 

Our aim has been to insure that 
America has the will and the means to 
deter conflict and to defend the interest 



of freedom. We've done this for one 
reason and one reason only — because a 
strong, respected America is the surest 
way to preserve the peace and prevent 
conflict. 

In this effort, we must learn from 
history. We all experienced the soaring 
hopes and then plunging disappointment 
of the 1970s, when the Soviet response 
to our unilateral restraint was to ac- 
celerate their military buildup, to foment 
violence in the developing world, to in- 
vade neighboring Afghanistan, and to 
support the repression of Poland. 

The lesson is inescapable. If there 
are to be better mutual relations, they 
must result from moderation in Soviet 
conduct, not just our own good inten- 
tions. 

In recent days, some encouraging 
words have come out of Moscow. Clearly 
the Soviets want to appear more respon- 
sive and reasonable. But moderate 
words are convincing only when they're 
matched by moderate behavior. 

Now, we must see whether they're 
genuinely interested in reducing existing 
tensions. We and our democratic part- 
ners eagerly await any serious actions 
and proposals the Soviets may offer and 
stand ready to discuss with them serious 



THE PRESIDENT 



proposals which can genuinely advance 
the cause of peace. We do not insist that 
the Soviet Union abandon its standing 
as a superpower or its legitimate na- 
tional interests. 

In fact, we hope that the new 
leadership in Moscow will come to 
realize that Soviet interests would be im- 
proved by ending the bloodshed in 
Afghanistan, by showing restraint in the 
Middle East, by permitting reform and 
thus promoting stability in Poland, by 
ending their unequaled military buildup 
as we have proposed, by reducing the 
most dangerous nuclear arms to much 
lower and equal levels. 

We stand ready to work toward 
solutions to all outstanding problems. 
This doesn't mean that we should 
neglect our own defenses; that would 
undercut our ability to maintain peace 
and jeopardize whatever chance we may 
have for changing Soviet conduct. But it 
does mean that we're always ready to sit 
down with the Soviets to discuss prac- 
tical steps that could resolve problems 
and lead to a more durable and genuine 
improvement in East- West relations. 

Next month, Soviet and American 
negotiators will resume talks in Geneva 
on strategic and intermediate-range 
nuclear forces. We've proposed drastic 
cuts in those threatening intermediate- 
range forces. The Soviets have respond- 
ed in both negotiations with proposals of 
their own. So, a serious foundation for 
progress has been laid. America will 
negotiate energetically and in good faith 
to achieve early agreements providing 
for reduced and equal levels of forces. 
The Soviet leadership must understand 
that the way to reduce the nuclear 
threat is by negotiating in the same 
sincere spirit and not by trying to sow 
division between the American people 
and our NATO partners. That kind of 
negative tactic is certain to fail and can 
only delay real progress. 

A cornerstone of our approach to 
relations with the Soviet Union is close 
consultation with our allies on common 
political and security issues. In this 
spirit, I've asked Vice President Bush to 
travel to Europe. Beginning at the end 
of this month, he will visit the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, France, and 
Great Britain, and at the Vatican he will 
meet with Pope John Paul II. In 
Switzerland the Vice President will meet 
with the negotiating teams for the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks — which 



we call START— and the intermediate- 
range nuclear forces arms control talks 
we call INF and will attend a meeting of 
the Committee on Disarmament in 
Geneva. 

The Vice President's visit to these 
close friends and allies and his discus- 
sions at the Vatican and in Geneva 
underscore our fundamental commit- 
ment to peace and security in Europe 
and to genuine arms reductions. 



So, the new year begins with reasc 
for all of us to hope that if we continu 
to act firmly and wisely, 1983 can be a 
time of peaceful progress for America 
for our allies, for the people of the 
U.S.S.R., and for the entire world. 

Until next week, thanks for listen- 
ing, and God bless you. 



'Text from White House press release. 



News Conference of January 5 
(Excerpts) 



You're trying to get me into the details 
that I've said there are no decisions that 
have been made. I will look at every- 
thing. But let me also say something 
about the concern on the defense spend- 
ing. 

I don't question the fact that the 
people are concerned because they have 
been receiving, through much of the 
media, a constant drumbeat that some- 
how there is a needless extravagance 
and that we're overboard on this par- 
ticular subject. On the chart you will 
find that in constant dollars the defense 
budget is just about the same as it's 
been all the way back to 1962. You will 
also find that as a percentage of gross 
national product, it is smaller than it 
was in the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
years. 

We repeatedly see the figure over a 
5-year period of $1.5 trillion or $1.6 
trillion. We're still spending more than 
$2 trillion in that 5 years on the social 
programs. 

The thing about defense, also, that I 
think should be pointed out is that in 
February of 1981, when we presented 
the 5-year plan to try and refurbish our 
mOitary because it was in desperate 
straits, we certainly could not claim that 
we were meeting the first priority of 
government, which is to protect the na- 
tional security, to provide the national 
security. But from that time— since that 
time, we have cut our original program 
by $41 billion and have done this by 
reason of inflation coming down, which 
lowered the cost of some things— fuel 
and so forth, by improved management 
procedures and improved procurement. 
We're still looking at that and have just 



had a team of — a task force of outside 
volunteers, all skilled and knowledgeal 
in business, who have been reviewing 
and examining the whole Defense 
Department. Their recommendations 
will be coming to us shortly. So, if it c 
be cut, it will be cut. But the priority 
must be not if it means reducing our 
ability below the level at which we caii 
declare ourselves safe. 

Q. I can't imagine that you are 
satisfied with the progress of the M 
die East initiative that you announc( 
last summer. The Israelis are still ir 
Lebanon, the Syrians are still in 
Lebanon, the fighting is still going i 
in Tripoli, and I'd like to know whai 
you are doing to speed things up, 
especially at the State Department? 

A. We're calling back Mr. Habib 
[Ambassador Philip C. Habib, 
President's special emissary to the Mi( 
die East] from his vacation. He is goii 
to join Ambassador Draper [Morris 
Draper, special negotiator for Lebano: 
Ambassador Habib wOl be there now. 
is not unexpected to us. We would ha' 
liked to have this whole thing move 
faster, but in view of the situation, no 
only in Lebanon but the whole Middle 
East, we never had any illusions that 
this could be done overnight, and the 
negotiations are underway now that w 
lead to the removal of the foreign 
forces. 

You said that the fighting was stil 
going on in Tripoli. I think it just 
started recently, and it is a tragedy th 
that is taking place. But that, again, ii 
why we want the outside forces out sc 



Department of State Bullet: 



THE PRESIDENT 



he new Government of Lebanon 
agin to keep order itself and 
lish its sovereignty. 

. There have been a number of 
•aches to the West recently by the 
t Union. Today, the Warsaw Pact 
tsed a nonaggression pact with 
3. And 2 weeks ago, as you 
, Mr. [General Secretary of the 
•al Committee of the Communist 

of the Soviet Union Yuriy] An- 
»v raised the idea of a summit 
you. What is the reaction to 

new developments? 

. This is something, I think, cer- 

to be considered if that is what he 
posing — a nonaggression pact. But 
"egard to a summit, I am, in princi- 
1 favor of that. I proposed meeting 
;rezhnev in New York at the time 
' U.N. Disarmanent Confer- 
-beheving that he would be there, 
hen, we know now, I am sure, why 
lid not make that trip. And so we 
)t. 

ut I think that a summit is some- 
that requires some planning. I do 
link you just say: Let's get 
ler, sit around the table, and then 
what do we talk about? I think you 
;o plan. You have to know and 
e that you can accomplish some- 

When we can be sure of that, I 

welcome a simimit just as I 
med his suggestion about continu- 
e talks on the reducing of arms. 

. What about today's proposal for 
aggression pact between NATO 
le Warsaw Pact? 

. I think this is something that has 
appened. And this is something 
TOuld require consultation with all 
allies in NATO. 

, There have been many allega- 
that the Bulgarian intelligence 
e was behind the attempt to 
sinate the Pope and that the 
t intelligence service — the 
-may have ordered the whole 
What do you believe? Do you 
e the Russians and the Bul- 
ls were behind it? 
, I know that the Italians are in- 
ating, and in view of their pro- 
;s and their handling of the 
al Dozier case, I have great con- 
e in their abilities. But as long as 
re investigating, I don't think it 



would be proper for me to make a com- 
ment on this, because I would have no 
information except the same things that 
all of us know about this. 

Q. If it turns out that the 
Bulgarians and the Russians were 
behind it, what impact would that 
have on Soviet-American relations? 

A. I think that it certainly would 
have an effect. I think it would have an 
effect worldwide, and I'd meet that 
problem when we got to it. 

Q. As you know, concern has 
arisen in the financial community over 
the large debts accumulated by some 
developing nations— $300 billion in 
Latin America alone. Do you see any 
danger to the banking system as a 
result of these large debts, and what 
steps is your Administration taking to 
deal with this problem? 

A. Of course, there's a risk. I think 
it's a touchy financial situation world- 
wide just as this recession is worldwide. 
We have been taking a number of steps 
with regard to the international 
monetary funds that are available for 
bailouts and so forth— increased the con- 
tributions to those. We have taken 
unilateral action with some of our 
neighbors, as you know, to tide them 
over and help. And a niunber of coun- 
tries, as a result, are engaging in 
austerity programs. 

I'm inclined to believe that we're go- 
ing to come through this all right. If 
there was widespread default, there 
would, of course, be some very severe 
financial problems. 

Q. Without getting into details, do 
you agree with Senator [Paul] Laxalt 
that there are ways to stretch out 
defense buildup — the defense buildup 
over the next 6 or 7 years — without 
hurting national security? 

A. We have looked at such things, 
and we will continue to look. As I say, 
we are looking at everything. One of the 
problems, a stretch-out sounds as if it 
might not be too serious, but you have 
to remember, we don't have the military- 
industrial complex that we once had 
when President Eisenhower spoke about 
it. Assembly lines have to be put 
together and started up again to meet 
the demand for the weapons systems. 

You can't say to someone who has 
gone into business purely to provide us 
with what we have ordered, you can't 
suddenly say to him: Well, now, every- 
body go home and wait a while, we're 



going to— we're not going to take these 
things. If there can be a stretch-out that 
does not shut down your— part of your 
industry. But again, in defense, the big- 
gest portion of the spending is not 
weapons systems. Seventy-five percent 
of the defense budget is payroll for the 
troops, readiness, and maintenance. 
Only a fourth of the budget has to do 
with weapons systems. 

Q. Do you think a stretch-out is 
possible? Or perhaps you prefer the 
freeze ideas on both defense and 
nondefense that are now being pro- 
posed? 

A. Here I thought I explained it all 
at the very beginning, and you keep on 
asking those questions. All of those 
things we will look at. 

Q. Jack Anderson said the other 
day on a program where he was inter- 
viewed by the 700 Club that we have 
service representatives from Defense 
contractors in the field still working 
with the troops on complicated 
defense weapons that the troops are 
too ignorant and too unable to 
operate. He said that the Israelis take 
our planes and take off all of that ex- 
pensive electronic gadgetry — which 
our military contractors put on these 
planes, which are not necessary, and 
which, he said, add to the great cost 
of these weapons. The Israelis take 
these off of their planes and learn to 
fly them effectively and better than 
any planes ever flown. Would you look 
into that? 

A. First of all, I do not think it is 
true. But I, also, think that Israelis have 
proven that those planes must be pretty 
good. On the other hand, with regard to 
our troops, it would be very strange if 
we are faced with such ignorance, 
because the truth of the matter is now 
that our voluntary military that 2 years 
ago we were being told was a failure 
and could never succeed— I am proud to 
say— now has an intelligence level that 
is higher than in any Army in our past 
history — even including the draft. We, 
also, have the highest percentage of high 
school graduates in that military force 
than we have ever had before. We have 
the highest retention rate and the 
highest re-enlistment rate. And we have 



ary 1983 



ARMS CONTROL 



got a military that has got an espnt de 
corps that should make every one of us 
proud of them. 

Q. It is true that a lot of those 
high school graduates, don't forget, 
are women. There are more women 
high school graduates than men. 
[Laughter.] But I want to point out to 
you that what he said — it was not de- 
nouncing the intelligence of the men. 
It was just saying that these weapons 
are too complicated for anyone to use 
in battlefield conditions. And, 
therefore, they have many, many fac- 
tory representatives who have to go to 
war with the troops. 

A. I have to say that there is only 
one criteria. And that is, if we are going 
to ask an American young man or 
woman— but I do not think we will put 
the young women in those combat front 
ranks. 

Q. We are ready. [Laughter] 

A. I will tell them they have got one 
volunteer already. But, if we are going 
to put those young men out there, they 
are entitled to have every technological 
aid that can insure that they can do the 
job and that will protect their lives. 



Text from White House press release (com- 
plete text may be found m the Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 10, 
1983). ■ 



Production of the MX 
Missile 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 2, 19821 

Today's vote in favor of the Peacekeeper 
missile system by the House Appropria- 
tions Committee is a vote for a stronger, 
more secure America. I applaud the 
judgment of the members of the commit- 
tee, and I urge the full House to show 
similar wisdom by approving the com- 
mittee position. 

This program is essential to the 
ability of the United States to maintain 
a credible deterrent on land, in the air, 
and on the sea. Moving forward on 
schedule will also greatly increase the 
prospects for a meaningful strategic 
arms reduction agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 

PRESIDENT'S LETTER 
TO MEMBERS OF 
THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, 
DEC. 6, 19822 

On November 22, I informed you of my 
MX basing decision and underlined the 
absolute necessity of modernizing the 
Triad so that we can restore the 
strategic balance and maintain effective 
deterrence. Of equal importance, we 
must move forward with the MX to have 
any hope of achieving meaningful prog- 
ress at the arms negotiations in Geneva. 
History shows that unilateral restraints 
by the United States have not led to 
arms reduction by our adversaries. 

Having sought the counsel of my 
predecessors, the views of Congressional 
leaders, and the advice of America's best 
technical and scientific minds, I am con- 
vinced that Peacekeeper is the right 
missile and that now is the right time. I, 
therefore, urge you to support the MX 
program— as approved by the Ap- 
propriations Committee — when the 
House considers my fiscal year 1983 
defense budget request this week. The 
Appropriations Committee language per- 
mits us to continue work on the MX and 
to protect an initial operational capabili- 
ty in 1986, while providing Congress 
with additional time to conduct a 
thorough review of my basing plan. This 
strikes me as a reasonable approach as 
we work together toward the common 
goal of maintaining peace. 

On a related matter, the Appropria- 
tions Committee has already significant- 
ly cut my fiscal year 1983 defense 



budget request. Any further reductions 
in my request would deal a serious set- 
back to our overall defense buildup and 
would have adverse foreign policy cons 
quences. In particular, I urge you not t 
support an across-the-board reduction 
appropriations for defense. 

Let us thus join together in rebuilc 
ing America's defense posture, in 
enhancing our deterrence posture, and 
in enriching the prospects for mean- 
ingful arms reductions. 

Ronald Reag 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 7. 1982^ 

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov's 
remarks are a clear effort to influence 
the American political process. He faillj 
to mention that the Soviet Union has 
already deployed 808 SS-18 ICBMs [i 
tercontinental ballistic missiles], whicl 
are larger and heavier than the MX, i 
300 SS-19 ICBM's, which are roughly 
equivalent to the MX in size. All are 
capable of destroying hardened targetl 
in the United States. 

The Soviets have failed to mentioi 
openly that they already have the firsi 
of their next generation of ICBM's in 
flight testing. This testing began prioj 
to the President's decision on the 
Peacekeeper. While we have openly e; 
plained the purpose and the charac- 
teristics of the Peacekeeper, the Sovi* 
have yet to provide any information o 
the purpose and capabilities of their n 
missile. 

For the Soviets now to cast the W 
in the role of another excuse to build 
more missiles makes no sense when tl 
United States is trying to redress the' 
balance which the Soviet Union has 
upset. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 7, 1982^ 

Today's vote by the House of Represe 
tatives was a grave mistake. Unless 
reversed in coming days, it will serioi 
set back our efforts to protect the na- 
tion's security and can handcuff our 
negotiators at the arms table. | 

I had hoped that most of the 
Members in the House had awakenedf 
the threat facing the United States. 
That hope was apparently unfounded ? 
majority chose to go sleepwalking int 
the future. 

The facts on the Peacekeeper mis^ 
are clear and straightforward. For 31 



I 



Department of State Build 



ARMS CONTROL 



ears, we have kept world peace because 
'6 have been adequately protected on 
md, sea, and air. We maintain the 
largin of safety. But in recent years, a 
ital part of that defense — our land- 
ased missile system — has become in- 
'easingly obsolete. The United States 
asn't built a new land-based missile 
/stem in 15 years. The Soviets are now 
I their fifth generation of new missiles, 
s a result, the window of vulnerability 
IS opened for the United States— a 
indow the Peacekeeper is designed to 
ose. 

Unless we act soon, the Soviets can 
)t only discount our land defenses but 
ley can also concentrate their new 
isearch on depleting us at sea and in 
e air. 

And of great importance, we should 
low from experience that the Soviets 
ill not negotiate with us when we 
sarm ourselves. Why should they 
igotiate seriously when we give up 
sapons systems voluntarily, asking 
'thing of them in return? It would be 
igically ironic if this of all days— 
icember 7th— once again marked a 
ne when America was unprepared to 
ep the peace. 

Fortunately, there is still time to 
verse this grievous error. Soon the 
;ue will be taken up by the U.S. 
nate. If it succeeds there, a con- 
■ence of the House and Senate can be 
nvened, and the production program 
n be saved. Then we can engage in a 
iger debate on the best way to house 
3 missile. 

In the meantime, I plan to do 
srything I can to take this case to the 
intry. Jefferson said the American 
3ple, if given the facts, would never 
ike a mistake. I will present those 
:ts and urge our citizens everywhere 
join in trying to restore America's 
.rgin of safety. 



ESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 

IC. 10, 1982^ 

1st wanted to say a word about the 
)ortance of the defense issue in the 
sing days of this congressional ses- 
n. 

It's vital that we in government 
nonstrate to friends and potential 
s alike that the United States is 
ermined to remain a credible force 
peace in the world. There are several 
ical decisions now facing the Senate, 
uding their votes on the B-1 and a ' 
3nd carrier. But none is more critical 
n their vote on the production of the 
icekeeper missile. 



Frankly I was disturbed by the 
debate in the House earlier this week 
because of the confusion over what the 
vote meant. The key vote in the House 
and now in the Senate is over money for 
the production of the missile, not for the 
basing mode. And I believe it's absolute- 
ly essential to a strong, secure defense 
that we vote now on funds for that 
missile. Then next year, as we have 
more time, I'd welcome a vigorous 
debate on the best way to base the 
missile. 

I agree that more time is needed 
before we achieve a consensus in Con- 
gress on the basing mode, but the need 
for the missile itself has long been ap- 
parent. Both Presidents Ford and 
Carter before me have vigorously 
argued that the country needs this new 
system. Later today I am meeting with 
our arms negotiator, Ed Rowney, and 
I'm sure that his message will be the 
same as in the past— a vote against MX 
production today is a vote against arms 
control tomorrow. 

I also think it's fair to mention a 
couple of headlines that I came across 
earlier this week after the House voted. 
One said, "Soviets Voice Satisfaction on 
MX Rejection." The other read, "Soviets 
Cheer House for Rejecting MX Missile 
Appropriation." Well, if the Soviets are 
so pleased, perhaps we should be a little 
more concerned. 

I can tell you that I'm vitally con- 
cerned about this matter, and I urge the 
Senate to stand together and assure 
adequate funds for the Peacekeeper. 



PRESIDENT'S RADIO 
ADDRESS TO THE NATION, 
DEC. 11, 1982« 

A few weeks ago, I talked with you 
about our quest for peace— for a secure 
world in which our children and our 
children's children can grow up without 
fear, enjoying the blessings of peace and 
freedom. As President, my first duty is 
to do everything in my power to achieve 
these goals. 

Two of the keys to preserving the 
peace are deterrence and arms reduc- 
tion. One of these keys has worked 
perfectly for 37 years. Since the end of 
World War II, we've prevented the out- 
break of a new global war by a national 
policy of deterrence. To do that meant 
maintaining our defense forces so that 
any enemy knew in advance that an at- 
tack on us or our allies would bring 
disaster, not victory, to the attacker. 
Now, when a potential enemy knows 



that by starting a war he'll lose more 
than he hopes to gain, he just won't 
start a war in the first place. That's 
what deterrence is all about. 

A key feature of this policy has been 
to maintain strong strategic forces. Our 
triad, as it's called— our three-legged 
plan of land-based missiles, sea-based 
missiles, and manned bombers — makes 
clear to any aggressor that if he attacks 
us, we will still have the strength to 
strike back, the ability to retaliate. 
That's because no potential attacker has 
the strength to knock out all three legs 
of our defense triad at the same time. 

If we only had two parts to this 
force, then preserving the peace would 
be more difficult. Potential attackers 
might even come to believe they could 
launch and win a nuclear war. We must 
never let this happen. That's why last 
year I ordered all three legs of our 
strategic forces to be modernized. 

There's no question about the need 
for modernizing them. Today all three 
are made up mainly of weapons we 
developed more than 10 years 
ago— more than 20 years ago in the case 
of our bombers. Sooner or later older 
systems become ineffective and vulner- 
able. Our most pressing problem today 
is that the Soviet Union, because of its 
massive buildup of nuclear weapons, 
could destroy virtually all of our land- 
based missiles in a single nuclear attack. 
If we do nothing to correct that situa- 
tion, we will have weakened the chances 
for peace. This is why we need the new 
MX Peacekeeper missile — to help 
restore our strategic deterrent and 
literally to keep the peace. 

The Peacekeeper is a modern 
missile, and it is survivable. I agree with 
my scientific and military advisers that 
the closely spaced basing plan we pro- 
posed will work. Congress had orderd us 
to submit a basing proposal for the MX 
by December 1st, which we did. How- 
ever, we're prepared to review this mat- 
ter with the Congress in the new year. 

The basing mode is not an issue. 
There's plenty of time to decide on that. 
What we need now is a clear, positive 
vote on the missile itself, to go forward 
on production of the missile. Why? 
Because we're negotiating with the 
Soviet Union at Geneva to reduce sub- 
stantially nuclear arsenals on both 
sides— the other key to protecting the 
peace in the nuclear age. These are 
tough negotiations, but our team is 
hanging in there. However, if we just 
cancel the Peacekeeper, the MX— if we 
say we won't deploy it — we remove a 
major incentive for the Soviets to stay 
at the table and agree to reductions. 



ruary 1983 



ARMS CONTROL 



Look at it from their perspective. If 
we're willing to cancel a weapons system 
without getting something in return, 
why should they offer to eliminate or 
reduce weapons that give them an ad- 
vantage over us? 

In 1977 my predecessor sent his 
Secretary of State to Moscow with a 
proposal that the Soviets reduce the 
number of their heavy SS-18 missiles. 
At the time, we had nothing comparable 
to the SS-18 and no new missile to 
deploy. The result was what you'd ex- 
pect. The Soviets refused to even con- 
sider the proposal. I can't believe the 
American people want to make that mis- 
take a second time. The stakes are just 
too high. 

Without the Peacekeeper, we 
weaken our ability to deter war, and we 
may lose a valuable opportunity to 
achieve a treaty to reduce nuclear 
weapons on both sides. With it, we make 
progress on both paths to peace. On 
both counts, there's no doubt that we 
need it. 

In the weeks ahead, we'll continue to 
bring the facts to you, the American 
people, and your representatives on this 
vital issue. We've already done it in 
hearings before the Senate. I only wish 
the House had given us the opportunity 
to do the same before it voted last Tues- 
day to cut funds for the Peacekeeper 
missile. It's hard to make a good deci- 
sion before you've heard the facts. And 
in my opinion, the House of Representa- 
tives voted without really considering 
the facts. 

As we present our case for the 
Peacekeeper missile to you, I hope you'll 
keep in mind that by continuing to main- 
tain our ability to deter attack, we make 
it less likely that the horror of nuclear 
war will ever occur. And by keeping our 
defenses credible, we offer the Soviet 
Union a realistic incentive to reduce ten- 
sions and to agree to significant and 
verifiable arms reductions. 

These are vital objectives. But I 
can't achieve them witout the support of 
the American people and the U.S. Con- 
gress. To protect the peace, we must 
provide the funds necessary to offset the 
enormous Soviet military buildup and 
restore a military balance, particularly in 
nuclear weapons. And to achieve the 
arms reductions we want, we must give 
the Soviets the incentive to negotiate. 
We must go to the bargaining table in a 
position of strength, not weakness. 

My fellow Americans, with your con- 
tinued support for a strong defense and 
for the Peacekeeper missile — but only 
with your support — we can achieve both 
of these crucial goals. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 14. 1982^ 

This morning I met with a group of 
leading Republican and Democratic 
Senators to discuss the future of the MX 
Peacekeeper missile. And I'm pleased to 
report that we've reached a bipartisan 
agreement that we hope will preserve 
funding for the missile and enable us to 
continue the restoration of America's 
defense capabilities. 

In recent days, it's become apparent 
that many Members of Congress agree 
with my assessment that production of 
the Peacekeeper is in the national 
security interests of the United States. 
At the same time, however, they want 
to take a closer look at the question of 
how to base the missile. The agreement 
we've reached today is a reasonable 
balancing of those interests. 

All of us who met today pledged 
that in the next few days we'll work 
with others in the Senate and with 
Members of the House to secure full 
congressional assent to this plan. 

In closing, let me reaffirm my very 
strong view that the United States 
needs to move forward with an effective 
land-based missile, one that will not only 
enhance the prospects for a secure 
America but will also strengthen the 
hand of our negotiators at the arms con- 
ference and the arms control talks in 
Geneva. 

The world in which we live is uncer- 
tain at best. And we must be fully 
prepared in order to protect our in- 
terests and defend the cause of peace. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 17. 19828 

The action taken early this morning by 
the Senate with regard to the MX 
missile program is both welcome and 
wise. It expresses solid understanding 
and support for the need to modernize 
the land-based leg of the triad. As the 
Senate recognizes, it is only through this 
triad approach that we can hope to 
preserve an effective deterrent and go 
forward with negotiations toward real 
arms reductions. 

Beyond that, the Senate was also ex- 
pressing some rather serious concerns 
which I take very much to heart. 
Foremost among these was uncertainty 
with respect to the approach for basing 
the missile. This concern is reasonable 
since the survivability of this system 
must be assured, and an effective basing 



plan plays the central role. This ex- 
tremely complex problem deserves veri 
careful and deliberate consideration, aii 
I am pleased that this will be allowed t 
take place early in the new Congress. 

Between now and the time the fina 
decision must be taken next spring, it i 
essential that every Member of Congre 
and, indeed, as many as possible of the 
American people gain a full appreciatic 
of alternative solutions to this problem 
Toward that end I pledge to the Con- 
gress and to all Americans the most e? 
haustive, renewed analysis possible of 
every apparent option. To assist in this 
effort, I am today announcing my inte 
tion to appoint a bipartisan commissioi 
comprised of senior officials from 
previous Administrations as well as 
technical experts. I will ask the 
members to work with the Departmen 
of Defense and join together in a bipa 
tisan effort to forge a consensus as to 
the plan which will best assure the na- 
tional security interests of our country 
in the years ahead. 

The contributions of this panel of 
distinguished Americans will be ex- 
tremely important. In addition, I pled}' 
to the Congress the fullest possible co 
dination of the work of this commissic 
with Senators and Members. It is esse 
tial that if we are to reach our commo 
goals within the time required by last 
night's vote, the Congress play a cent) 
role in shaping this, the most importa 
strategic modernization decision of the 
postwar period. Again, I would like tc 
express my appreciation for the respo 
sible position taken by the Senate and 
ask that this wisdom be reflected in tl 
House, as together we join in this imi:' 
tant undertaking. 



2Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13. 

3Read to news correspondents by Depii 
Press Secretary Larry Speakes (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 13). 

i^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, which 
also contains a brief exchange with news c- 
respondents. 

^Broadcast from Camp David, Marylai 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Preside) 
tial Documents of Dec. 20). 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 20, which 
also contains a brief exchange with news c 
respondents. 

sText from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 20. ■ 



Department of State Bulii f 



EAST ASIA 



■S.-Soviet 

legotiations 

n INF Reductions 



HITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

;C. 16, 1982' 

you know, the United States has pro- 
sed the total ehmination of U.S. and 
/iet landbased, longer range INF 
;erniediate-range nuclear force] 
isiles— the zero-zero solution. As you 
3 know from Soviet public 
tements, the Soviets have proposed 
t after 5 years, the U.S.S.R. and 
TO reduce to a ceiling of 300 
jdium-range" nuclear missiles and air- 
ft located in or "intended for use in" 
rope, to include British and French 
:es. This longstanding position, which 
asically unchanged, would allow them 
naintain their monopoly over the 
ted States in longer range INF 
siles, especially their mobile, triple- 
•head SS-20 missiles in Europe and 
Asian U.S.S.R. The number of 
loyed SS-20s currently stands at 333 
ichers. 

A missile subceiling, as mentioned in 
?nt press accounts, would at most re- 
•e the reduction of some of these 
ily mobile systems in or "intended 
use in" Europe, while requiring us to 
2el entirely our deployments of 
shing II and ground-launched cruise 
siles planned to begin in December 
3. This would leave the Soviets with 
ibstantial monopoly over the West in 
;-range, land-based INF systems, 
Jd not constrain the overall levels of 
iet systems, would draw into the 
ieral negotiations the nuclear forces 
ther countries, and is patently inade- 
te as a solution to the INF issue, 
e it would not eliminate the political 
military threat to the alliance posed 
>oviet longer range INF missiles. 
We will continue the negotiations on 
rious basis. During these negotia- 
s, we and the Soviets have elabo- 
d our positions in both formal and 
rmal contacts. We will continue to 
ly the Soviet position, and it will be 
'Hg the things we will be discussing 
n the next round begins on January 



We have kept our allies fully in- 
formed about negotiations as they have 
occurred. We and they have reaffirmed 
in three recent NATO meetings at the 
foreign minister or defense minister 
level that the zero-zero solution remains 
the best arms control result, since it 
would eliminate the systems of greatest 
concern to both sides. The President and 



his Administration are fully convinced of 
the reasonableness of this carefully 
developed proposal. Nothing could be 
fairer to all concerned. 



'Made to news correspondents by Deputy 
Press Secretary Larry Speakes (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 20, 1982). ■ 



Assessment of U.S. Relations 
With China 



by John H. Holdridge 

Address before the National Council 
on U.S.-China Relations. New York, on 
December 13, 1982. Ambassador 
Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 



I have been one of those fortunate 
enough during much of my professional 
career to be able to share in the high 
points and cope with the low points as 
the course of our relations with China 
dramatically shifted course. And during 
the past 2 years with the State Depart- 
ment's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, which maintains operational 
responsibility for our China policy, I 
have been intimately involved with the 
continued evolution of this policy. 

At this juncture— and we are at a 
juncture, in terms of U.S.-China rela- 
tions—it is gratifying to have this occa- 
sion to look back and take stock: to see 
what hurdles we've already surmounted, 
to assess whether we are on the course, 
and to plot the direction and challenges 
that still line the track ahead. 

Policy Framework 

In the early days of this Administration, 
then-Secretary Haig sketched the broad 
outlines of the China policy-to-be in an 
interview published in Time magazine. 
Following the direction set by President 
Reagan, Haig stated that we would con- 
tinue efforts to expand our relations 
with the People's Republic of China. The 
Secretary characterized this relationship 
and its development as "a fundamental 
strategic reality and a strategic im- 
perative. ... of overriding importance to 
international stability and world peace." 
We would adhere to the communiques 
associated with U.S.-China normaliza- 
tion, he said, and we would maintain 



unofficial relations with the people of 
Taiwan. He made clear then— as did I 
and others in the Administration from 
the President on down— that we would 
seek to restore dignity to the conduct of 
these people-to-people relations with 
Taiwan, but that we would observe the 
agreements regarding the nature of 
these relations contained in the U.S.- 
China Joint Communique on normaliza- 
tion and embodied in our domestic law. 

In June 1981, Secretary Haig visited 
China, the first such visit by a Secretary 
of State since 1977. Haig used the occa- 
sion to inform the Chinese of President 
Reagan's conviction that U.S. policy 
toward China should reflect the friendly 
and cooperative nature of our relation-" 
ship and of the Administration's plans to 
translate that into practical and mean- 
ingful terms in the form of a three- 
pronged initiative designed to give teeth 
to the relationship. 

First, the President would issue a 
directive substantially increasing the 
level of technology to be routinely ap- 
proved for sale to China, reflecting our 
intent to treat China as a friendly, non- 
allied state. 

Second, the President would sus- 
pend the prohibition on arms sales to 
China embodied in our arms control 
legislation, permitting the consideration 
on a case-by-case basis of requests to ex- 
port munitions list articles to China, a 
procedure we follow with all friendly 
countries. 

Third, the President would propose 
to Congress that it amend those laws 
that treated China in the same manner 
as the Soviet Union and its satellites, to 
make clear that we do not consider 
China a potential adversary and to 
remove legal impediments "to our further 
cooperation. 



<Jary1983 



EAST ASIA 



The Administration has registered 
significant progress in implementing this 
policy on all three counts. 

Issue of U.S Arms Sales to Taiwan 

This is the framework from which we 
began nearly 2 years ago to manage and 
direct the course of the immensely im- 
portant U.S. -China relationship. It was 
gradually discovered, however, that a 
keystone in the foundation had never 
been set in place. We faced, we learned, 
the threat of collapse of the entire struc- 
ture unless we could devise a way of in- 
serting and devising a proper fit for that 
keystone. I am referring, of course, to 
the issue of arms sales to Taiwan and 
the continuing U.S. -China discussions on 
this issue which culminated in the 
August 17 joint communique. 

The arms sales issue was one deeply 
rooted in history, touching on the most 
basic principles and the deepest sen- 
sitivities of both the Chinese and 
ourselves. For that reason, previous 
U.S. Administrations and the Chinese 
had largely skirted the issue as we 
worked our way respectively toward 
normalization. The Chinese, however, 
had always reserved the right to raise 
the issue, and in the fall of 1981, we 
found we could sidestep it no longer. 

I need not review in detail the 
10-month-long negotiating process or 
period leading up to the issuance of our 
August 17 joint communique. It was an 
especially difficult and sensitive time for 
both sides. The sentiment in this country 
on not "abandoning" Taiwan is well 
known, and the Chinese, for their part, 
have repeatedly made reference to the 
feelings of China's "1 billion people." The 
utility of the communique is that it has 
provided both the Chinese and ourselves 
with a means of handling the problem in 
a way that allows us to continue, and 
hopefully advance, our bilateral relations 
without compromising important prin- 
ciples on either side. On the basis of 
policy statements enunciated by both 
governments in the communique, I 
believe that we have found that good fit 
that will firm up the foundation and 
allow for the development of a sound 
and solid relationship in the period 
ahead. In essence, the communique 
establishes a formula whereby the 
Chinese state that they will strive for a 
peaceful solution to the Taiwan question, 
and we accordingly state that under 
those circumstances we will gradually 
reduce the level of our arms sales to 
Taiwan. This position of ours is entirely 



consistent with the Taiwan Relations 
Act, which predicates U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan on our judgment of Taiwan's 
military needs. 

Relations Since the Communique 

Since the communique, both of us have 
been taking a brief respite these past 
few months, turning our attention to 
pressing domestic concerns. We have 
had an election campaign; the Chinese 
have had their 12th Party Congress in 
September and a National People's Con- 
gress in December; and other interna- 
tional trouble spots and relations have 
demanded concern. During this period, 
however, there has been an unfortunate 
tendency for rhetoric to dominate the 
headlines, perhaps with domestic consti- 
tuencies in mind. Moreover, reflecting 
the fact that the communique process 
was painful and difficult, a certain un- 
comfortable aftertaste was left behind. 
In this same period, the Chinese have 
been widening their options somewhat, 
developing an independent foreign policy 
line which stresses identification with 
the Third World and even resuming a 
dialogue with Moscow. This alignment 
with the Third World is not a new 
policy— we have watched it evolve for at 
least 2 years, as witness the speeches by 
China's representatives in the U.N. 
General Assembly— but it has received 
even greater emphasis lately. The Sino- 
Soviet dialogue is a more recent 
development. 

The period of respite is ending. 
Secretary Shultz will be visiting Beijing 
in the not-too-distant future for what we 
hope will be serious, constructive, and 
wide-ranging talks with the Chinese 
leadership. It is time now to drop the 
rhetoric. We must get on with the prac- 
tical action and statesmanship necessary 
to advance the relationship for the 
benefit of both our peoples. 

Good relations with China have 
served our interests well over the past 
decade. I need not attempt to convince 
this audience of the benefits which have 
accrued, both strategic and otherwise. 
China's 1 billion people are entering the 
mainstream of the international eco- 
nomic system. The volume and value of 
bilateral trade between our two coun- 
tries has grown tremendously in the 
past few years. China is now our 14th 
largest trading partner and 5th largest 
market for agricultural products. And 
China, with its extraordinarly rich 
cultural tradition and so much to con- 
tribute, has moved out of its former 
isolation, much to our and the world's 
benefit. More than 9,000 Chinese 



students are now enrolled at U.S. educ 
tional institutions. More than 500 Amei 
cans study in China each year, and ten: 
of thousands more are availing them- 
selves of the opportunity for an incom- 
parable travel experience. The reciproc 
benefits to China as it embarks on its 
ambitious program of modernization ai 
incalculable. 

The strategic element has always 
been fundamental to the development ( 
our relations as well. President Reagai 
as recently as August, has said that: 

Building a strong and lasting relationsh 
with China has been an important foreign 
policy goal of four consecutive administra- 
tions. Such a relationship is vital to our Ion 
term national security interests and con- 
tributes to stability in East Asia. It is in th 
national interest of the United States that 
this important strategic relationship be ad- 
vanced. 

In addition, however, we have sine 
normalization maintained that China's 
concentration on economic normalizati 
is beneficial to world peace, and we w 
to assist in this modernization process 

Our perceptions of many of the 
world's more troublesome problems ar 
in close tandem. We endorse the 
Chinese view that the Soviets need to 
prove with deeds, not words, their 
desire to make progress toward a pea" 
ful solution of the problems they have 
done so much to create and aggravate _ 
The Chinese have undertaken a series : 
negotiations with the Soviets and havi 
specifically aimed at progress on the 
issues of Soviet troop reductions on t\ 
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borde , 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
and a halt to Soviet support for the 
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea 
Both sides must overcome a bitter 
legacy of military confrontation if the; 
are to reduce tensions. It is too early 
speculate on prospects. In general. \vt 
would welcome developments that wo i 
reduce regional and global tensions. V 
would also welcome genuine— not simv 
cosmetic— reductions in Soviet armed 
forces that threaten neighboring state 
The Chinese, however, should be unde 
no illusions as they proceed with thesi 
talks, and they must be well aware of 
the continuing Soviet deployment of a 
vanced weaponry, including SS-20s ai 
Backfire bombers, east of the Urals. 

Besides shared views on Afghani- 
stan and Kampuchea, our views rema 
close in international issues ranging 
from U.S. -Japan defense arrangemen 
to U.S. deployments in the Indian 
Ocean, U.S. missile deployments in 
Europe, and the need for a strong 
NATO. 



Department of State Bulk" 



EAST ASIA 



In areas where we have at times dif- 
■red— the Middle East, southern Africa, 
id Third World issues— we have in the 
ist been able to conduct a constructive 
alogue, and my hope is that we will be 
)le to continue so in the future. We 
ill, in addition, work to live up to our 
irt of the understandings expressed in 
e August 17 communique, as we will 
;pect the same of the Chinese. 

We have not— indeed, we could 
)t— ignore some of the more simplistic 
etoric that has been emanating from 
jijing of late. To put it bluntly, we take 
ception to Chinese references to us as 
egemonists" and expect better from 
e Chinese than being lumped together 
th the Soviets as the cause of all the 
)rld's ills. Given the complexity of in- 
-national issues which confront us to- 
y, a "Xiu Shou Panguan" [to stand off 
the side— literally, with arms folded 
d hands in the sleeves] approach will 

longer do. We know, on the basis of 
r past dialogue with Chinese leaders, 
It they are fully at home with more 
jhisticated and constructive analyses. 

Secretary Shultz prepares for his 
it to China, I am confident that we 
1 realize a successful return to the 
;d of active, serious, constructive, 
tesmanlike dialogue that is necessary 

our two important nations to con- 
:t in the interest of regional and 
bal peace. 

At the same time, we cannot afford 
overlook the differences between us. 
3h side will be closely watching the 
er's performance under the 
i^ust 17 communique, which we on 

side, of course, intend to honor fully, 
na, for its part, will be looking for us 
provide more in the way of tech- 
3gy transfer and support of its 
nomic modernization. There has been 
le disappointment on this score, 
haps generated by unrealistic expec- 
ons. 

! Future 

n upbeat on the future of U.S. -China 
•tions. The very fact that we were 
i to overcome the obstacles on the 
1 to the communique is an excellent 
cation of how highly each side values 
relationship. The momentum is now 
ding for renewed progress. Secre- 
' Shultz's visit will provide a needed 
t of adrenalin. It will be preceded by 
mportant session of the U.S. -China" 
it Economic Commission opening to- 
in Washington under the chairman- 
' of Treasury Secretary Regan and 
nded on China's part by Finance 



Minister Wang Bingqian. We are looking 
forward to other exchanges of high-level 
visits. In short, the wheels have already 
begun to turn and we're heading out of 
the station moving off in the right direc- 
tion again. 

With the foundation now hopefully 
well repaired and proceeding on the 
basis of equality, mutual benefit, and 
mutual trust, our two nations which 
have so much to learn from and so much 
to offer each other are ready to rechart 
the course of their relations. I believe 
we are on our way to making 1983 a 
good year for U.S. -China relations. 

In closing, if I may, I would like to 
look at one brief moment in the past and 
then ahead to the coming decades. Just 
over a decade ago in the Great Hall of 
the People, welcoming President NLxon 
to China, the late Premier Zhou Enlai 



stated to the world that "the Chinese 
people are a great people, and the 
American people are a great people." 
These were simple words, but they had 
a great impact on me as he called upon 
the two nations to bring to an end a 
long and bitter period of estrangement. 
As we look to the future, we must 
recognize that the world has grown even 
smaller in the 10 years since, and the 
challenges facing both nations, in terms 
of meeting our peoples' needs and safe- 
guarding the security of our planet, are 
greater than ever. With cooperation, 
hard work, and a sense of vision, the 
United States and the People's Republic 
of China can accomplish much as they 
face these challenges. Together we can 
make a profound contribution to the 
region and the world as we pursue the 
overall goal of world peace. ■ 



Balancing Strategic Interests 
and Human Rights in Asia 



by Thomas P. Shoesmith 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on 
Human Rights and International 
Organizations of the House Foreign Af- 
fairs Committee on December 9. 1982. 
Mr. Shoesmith is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Af- 
fairs. ' 

I am pleased to be here today to testify 
at the conclusion of your series of hear- 
ings on balancing U.S. strategic in- 
terests and human rights in Asia. 

Let me begin by reemphasizing what 
Assistant Secretary Holdridge said in 
his testimony before these same two 
subcomittees just 1 year ago: Human 
rights is an integral element of this Ad- 
ministration's foreign policy to be con- 
sidered along with— not against— other 
factors. In following this policy direc- 
tion, we in the East Asia and Pacific 
Bureau and in our embassies abroad 
view human rights improvements as a 
goal to be pursued in tandem with our 
security, political, economic, and com- 
mercial interests. A strong human rights 
policy strengthens our overall foreign 
policy by distinguishing us from our 
adversaries and by making it clear that 
American interests are based on 
American values and beliefs. 

One cannot define U.S. strategic in- 
terests without touching on all of those 



elements of policy I have just men- 
tioned. In its broadest terms, our prin- 
cipal strategic interest is deterring the 
increasingly assertive Soviet presence in 
East Asia and the Indian Ocean. This 
can best be achieved by supporting 
growth and stability in the region 
through the variety of security, political, 
economic, and commercial programs we 
pursue. The contrast between the 
dynamic free market economies in East 
Asia and the seriously ailing Communist 
economies has been among our greatest 
strengths in the area. The success of 
free market economies has been and 
should continue to be a bulwark against 
Communist penetration of the region. 

We have additional strategic objec- 
tives of maintaining access to vital raw 
materials for which the region is a 
significant source, protecting key 
sealanes of communication in the region 
and those that link East Asia to the In- 
dian Ocean and the Middle East, and 
enhancing stability of friendly govern- 
ments of the area so that they may also 
act in ways that further our common 
global security and other interests. 

In this latter context, we believe 
that stable, self-confident governments, 
based on popular consent and support, 
will be more inclined to undertake ac- 
tions which will improve the human 
rights situation and the humanitarian 
services in their countries. We likewise 
believe that human rights abuses under- 
mine governmental legitimacy and may 



ruary 1983 



9 



EAST ASIA 



thereby become a destabilizing factor 
tending to vitiate other components of 
our strategy to foster peace, prosperity, 
and stability. 

Our strategic interests in the various 
individual countries you have cited can 
be seen in the larger overall context. 
Our security concern in Korea is for the 
preservation of peace and stability in 
Northeast Asia — which in turn has a 
profound and direct bearing on the 
security and prosperity of the United 
States. In fact the security of the entire 
North Pacific would be seriously im- 
paired if the balance of forces on the 
Korean Peninsula were upset. Korean 
domestic and foreign policies continue to 
be influenced by the real threat from the 
North, and for the great majority of 
Koreans national security remains a 
preeminent concern. 

Our bases in the Philippines are 
essential not only for protecting East 
Asian sealanes and demonstrating our 
continued concern for peace and security 
in the region but also for projecting U.S. 
power into the Indian Ocean. 

And finally, the decade of 
U.S.-P.R.C. reapproachment has 
demonstrably enhanced our own security 
and that of our friends and allies in 
Asia. The very fact that we no longer 
have to structure forces against China 
has given us greater flexibility in 
meeting challenges in the Indian Ocean 
and Persian Gulf and in protecting the 
sealanes in the region. 

Human Rights Interests 

As I have already indicated, we do not 
believe a line should be — or can 
be — drawn between human rights in- 
terests and strategic interests. On the 
one hand, we cannot be indifferent to 
the adverse effects on our strategic in- 
terests of a pattern of persistent and 
gross violations of human rights within a 
country with which we are allied or 
whose cooperation we seek in pursuit of 
such interests. On the other hand, we 
must be concerned to exercise such in- 
fluence as we can bring to bear in 
preventing or redressing human rights 
abuses in such a way as to maintain an 
effective working relationship with the 
government concerned. Without such a 
relationship, we will be unable to pursue 
either our strategic interests or our 
human rights concerns. 

Perhaps the manner in which we 
have attempted to follow this balanced 
approach will be clear in discussing some 
of the specific questions you have raised 
in your letter. 



I do not believe that quiet diplomacy 
can be fairly described as "silent 
diplomacy." While we prefer to rely on 
diplomatic channels where relationships 
with the government permit serious 
discussion of human rights problems, we 
do not shy away from speaking out 
when that approach can be most effec- 
tive. Our human rights reports, which 
are widely read, attempt to describe the 
human rights situations of countries in 
Asia in an accurate and objective man- 
ner. They constitute the 
Administration's assessment of the 
human rights record of nearly every 
government in the world. 

Regardless of whether a government 
is popular or unpopular, it is often the 
case that our efforts to work together 
with a particular government in other 
areas can give rise to resentment by op- 
position groups against the United 
States. The fact that our bilateral rela- 
tions are necessarily conducted with the 
government concerned, however, is not 
indicative of support for all the domestic 
or foreign policies of that government. 
Further we also have contacts and dis- 
cussions with groups or individuals in 
the country who do not agree with every 
aspect of that government's policy. We 
try to make it a point to keep in touch 
with responsible opposition leaders and 
groups in order to listen to their points 
of view and explain our policies. Our am- 
bassadors and their staffs engage in this 
kind of activity on a regular basis. 

One particular example in this 
regard was the Vice President's 
breakfast with some 50 opposition 
figures during his visit to Korea. The 
Vice President also spoke to the Na- 
tional Assembly and emphasized the 
benefits of a strong parliament. In our 
relations with friendly governments, we 
try to promote respect for human rights 
by emphasizing the value of popular par- 
ticipation in government and of develop- 
ing stable democratic institutions and by 
discussing specific human rights prob- 
lems in regular diplomatic channels. 

We do not feel it is useful to list suc- 
cesses and disappointments of any Ad- 
ministration in the human rights field 
since this contradicts the purpose of 
quiet diplomacy. A major drawback, of 
course, is that relying on traditional 
diplomacy to advance our human rights 
interests is not as visible as public 
diplomacy, but we believe the former is 
generally more effective, particularly 
when we have good relations with a par- 
ticular government. Either to condemn 
or to take credit publicly would under- 
mine our ability to use our influence to 



promote general progress on human 
rights and to deal with specific cases. 1 
addition to the human rights reports, \ 
do make public statements during the 
year designed to complement our diplc 
matic channel. A careful mix of the tw 
approaches is necessary. 

A discussion of four specific ex- 
amples in Asia — the People's Republic : 
China, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan- 
will serve to highlight our approach to 
human rights. 

People's Republic of China 

We have friendly relations with the 
P.R.C., but this does not mean that w 
condone the abridgement of human 
rights in that country. There are con- 
siderable human rights problems in 
China as will be pointed out in our an 
nual human rights country report. It 
should be pointed out, however, that i 
contrast to the U.S.S.R., China is not 
tempting to undermine democratic 
regimes and the development of plura 
ism and democratic institutions in oth i 
countries. 

The Government of China is neith , 
as brutal toward its own citizens or as 
threatening to its neighbors as either 
North Korea or Vietnam. It has repu- 
diated many aspects of the Soviet mc I 
that previously guided its political, 
economic, and social life. It is beginni' 
to institute a functioning legal system 
and is attempting to set up institutior 
which share political power. The high , 
centralized political structure still im- 
poses significant restrictions on in- 
dividual rights and freedom and toler i 
ates no fundamental criticism of the 
Communist Party or the Socialist 
system, but the trend continues to be 
toward a somewhat more open societ; 

Current trends in China toward 
greater personal liberty are also men 
promising than those in its Communis 
neighbors. We believe the close assoc 
tion which China has sought with its 
non-Communist neigbors and industrir 
ized states will strengthen this trend. 
For example, over 100,000 Americans 
visit in China each year, and 9,000 
Chinese are students in the United 
States. Such contacts, so different frd 
those of China's Communist neighbori 
will inevitably be a leavening effect oi 
Chinese development. 

Korea I 

The human rights situation in the 
Republic of Korea is mixed. The Konn 
constitution, in effect since late 1980, 
expresses the aspirations of the peop 



10 



Department of State BullfO 



ENERGY 



r a political sysem which is responsive 
the popular will and guarantees basic 
man rights. In fact, the government 
s liberalized rules on a broad range of 
itters, including travel abroad, univer- 
y admissions, and the lifting of the na- 
inal curfew. And, while power is heavi- 
centralized in the executive, the Na- 
inal Assembly is showing increasing 
fns of asserting its traditional role as a 
"um for responsible and, at times, 
tical oversight of the government. 

At the same time, however, strong 
/ and order measures, enacted prior 
the lifting of martial law in January 
il, sharply limit political activity and 
ablish strict government control over 
! press, public assembly and demon- 
ations, and labor organizations. And, 
ile a number of prisoners have been 
ed or had their sentences reduced by 
!sidential amnesty during the course 
the year, we estimated that some 
)-450 persons remain in prison for 
itical reasons. 

We believe that an atmosphere in 
ich human rights are respected will 
p build a consensus that will assure 
bility in the longer term and con- 
mte to the achievement of Korea's 

potential for political, economic, and 
tural development. 

ilippines 

have a continuing dialogue with the 
lippines on human rights issues 
Dugh diplomatic channels. We con- 
led this dialogue during the state 
t of President Marcos. We believe 
t the United States can maintain our 
itegic and security interests with the 
lippines at the same time we pursue 
nan rights issues. 

' In recent years, there were some im- 
vements in civil and political rights in 
! Philippines. Martial law was formal- 
lifted in January 1981. Although the 
I sident retains in reserve most of his 
i'"tial law powers, he has used them 
jringly. 
Restrictions on the press and public 
ambly were eased, but the govern- 
■ It's most recent action in closing the 
'-■ ling opposition newspaper and jailing 
; writers is a matter for concern. 
' ikes are no longer banned but are 



subject in some cases to compulsory ar- 
bitration. Habeas corpus has been partly 
restored, and the number of those 
termed "political detainees" has declined. 
In May 1982, elections for barangay of- 
ficials (the lowest administrative unit) 
were held for the first time in a decade. 
Parliamentary elections are slated for 
1984. 

Abuses by some members of the 
military, mainly in insurgency areas, are 
a continuing problem. There have been 
some allegations of physical abuse and 
summary executions. Some prisoners 
have been held for long periods while 
legal processes drag on without end. We 
have discussed these problems with the 
Philippine Government. 

Taiwan 

Administration officials and American 
Institute in Taiwan employees take ad- 
vantage of numerous opportunities to 
express to Taiwan representatives the 
view that restrictions on legitimate 
political activities and violations of 
human rights undercut support for 
Taiwan in government, academic, and 
other groups in the United States. 

In Taiwan publication and public ex- 
pression of oppositionist sentiment have 
become gradually freer in the aftermath 
of the trial and conviction of the Kaoh- 
siung defendants. Nevertheless, there 
continue to be strict limits to what is ac- 
ceptable. Although individuals may run 
for elective office, coordinated opposi- 
tion activity is restricted, and the 
authorities apparently remain deter- 
mined to prevent the formation of an op- 
position political party. The activities of 
outspoken oppositionists are monitored, 
both in Taiwan and, apparently, abroad. 

We welcome the support you and 
your committee have given to efforts to 
improve human rights conditions in East 
Asia and the Pacific. Your interest has 
helped stimulate, I believe, many 
governments in this region toward prac- 
tices which promote both personal liber- 
ty and security for their societies as a 
whole. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
DEC. 1, 19821 

This is to advise the Congress that pur- 
suant to Section 160(c)(lXB) of the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(Public Law 94-163) as amended by Sec- 
tion 4(a) of the Energy Emergency 
Preparedness Act of 1982 (Public Law 
97-229), I find it would not be in the na- 
tional interest to fill the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve at the rate of 
300,000 barrels per day during Fiscal 
Year 1983. 

When my Administration took office 
22 months ago, one of my first actions 
was to direct a rapid acceleration of the 
pace of oil acquisition for the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve. As a result, the fill 
rate during Fiscal Year 1981 averaged 
over 290 thousand barrels per day. The 
fill rate for Fiscal Year 1982 averaged 
215 thousand barrels per day. This con- 
trasts sharply with the average fill rate 
of less than 77 thousand barrels per day 
achieved during the four years of the 
prior Administration. Of the 288 million 
barrels now in the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve, 178 million barrels, or 61 per- 
cent, were added during my Administra- 
tion. 

This Administration has also entered 
into long-term purchase commitments 
that will give greater assurance of main- 
taining our fill rate objectives over the 
coming year while lowering the cost of 
building the reserve. 

Another major policy action in- 
stituted at the start of this Administra- 
tion — immediate decontrol of the 
domestic oil market — has also con- 
tributed greatly to our energy security 
by reducing oil imports and stimulating 
domestic production. In the 22 months 
of my Administration, oil imports have 
declined dramatically. Our dependence 
on imports from OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] sources 
is now only 51 percent of the 1980 level. 

As a result of rapidly implementing 
these policy actions to enhance our 



■'fuary 1983 



11 



EUROPE 



energy security, the oil on hand today in 
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would 
provide 130 days of complete replace- 
ment for OPEC imports in the event of 
an embargo. That is nearly six times the 
level of protection our nation averaged 
in 1980. 

The commitment of this Administra- 
tion to building and maintaining an ade- 
quate Strategic Petroleum Reserve is 
clearly demonstrated by the record of 
accomplishment. But we are equally 
committed to carrying out this program 
in the most efficient, cost-effective man- 
ner. The fill rate at which we plan to 
operate during 1983 reflects a careful 
balance between these two objectives. 
To operate at the 300,000 barrel-per-day 
rate would require extensive use of tem- 
porary storage facilities, which would 
significantly increase the cost of the pro- 
gram for very limited incremental 
benefit. 

I must also note that increasing our 
fill rate objective to 300,000 barrels per 
day in Fiscal Year 1983 would force ad- 
ditional expenditures of over $1 billion. 
In the current economic climate, I 
believe that this additional expenditure 
would be harmful to growth and job 
creation because of the increased 
Treasury borrowing it would necessitate. 
Compliance with the increased fill rate 
would thus be inappropriate due to 
economic conditions affecting the 
general welfare. 

Ronald Reagan 



Secretary Visits Europe; 
Attends North Atlantic Council 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, 1982. 



Secretary Shultz departed 
Washington, D.C.. December 6, 1982, to 
visit Bonn (December 7-8). Brussels 
(December 8-11). The Hague (Decem- 
ber 11), Rome (December 11-U). Paris 
(December lJf-15). Madrid (Decem- 
ber 15-16), and London (December 
16-18). He returned to Washington on 
December 18. 

Following are news conferences, 
statements, and toasts he made on 
various occasions during the trip, as 
well as the final communique issued at 
the conclusioyi of the regular semiannual 
session of the North Atlantic Council 
ministerial meeting in Brussels. ^ 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BONN, 

DEC. 7, 19822 

Many words can be used to describe the 
relationship between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United 
States — partnership, alliance, strength, 
steadfastness, hospitality. I have ex- 
perienced all of those words here in my 
discussions with Foreign Minister 
Genscher. Those words have character- 
ized the outstanding visit of Chancellor 
Kohl to Washington some 3 weeks ago, 
and they have been historically descrip- 
tive of the relationship between these 
two countries. I have come here with 
that spirit very much in mind, both for 
the purpose of the meeting here and the 
discussion of things that interest the two 
countries and also as a prelude to the 
meetings of the NATO foreign ministers 
that we might consult a little bit about 
those meetings. 

We have discussed a very wide 
range of particular issues having to do 
with the NATO-type issues, the two- 
track decision and the mutual reaffirma- 
tion of the importance of that decision 
and all of its implications. We have 
discussed East- West economic relations 
and our determination to proceed with 
the program that we set out as a result 
of discussions in New York, Washing- 
ton, La Sapiniere, and elsewhere. We 
discussed Central America, South 
America, and our interests there and 
many other matters of mutual interest. 

We know in the end what we all 
seek is reduction of armaments. We 



know that we have to be strong if we 
truly can contemplate that as being a 
possibility of reality. We want a world 
peace, and we also know that we are 
having these discussions against the 
background of economic difficulties. 
We were joined by Mr. Lambsdorff 
[Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Economics 
Minister] for some discussion of those 
matters and I hope that some good cai 
come forward on that part as well. 

Q. Would you be prepared to cor 
ment on the statement by Soviet 
Minister of Defense Ustinov, who 
asserted that, in case of MX station- 
ing according to current plans, the 
Soviets would feel compelled to sta- 
tion a similar weapon, a comparable 
weapon, and that the stationing of 
these weapons would represent a 
gross violation of the SALT II agrei 
ment? 

A. The problem is to the contrary. 
The Soviets have been developing sue! 
missiles and putting them into place. I 
the same problem as in the intermedia - 
range missile issue. The issue for us is 
to match this strength. We are deter- 
mined to modernize our position. At tl 
same time, the President has put for- 
ward very strong suggestions for the 
reduction of armaments, and these an 
being negotiated in Geneva. But in tht 
meantime, in this as in other areas, wi 
must maintain and develop our streng , 
not only for its own sake but as the 
basis for any reality in the negotiation 

Q. Does that violate the SALT II 
agreement? 

A. We don't believe so. 

Q. Over the weekend the heads i 
state of the European Community gn 
what they called a signal of Copen- 
hagen, suggesting to the Soviet Unii 
that it should take positive steps 
toward the West, and the West wou 
then react in turn positively. How d< 
you assess such a possibility? 

A. I don't have any way of assessi; 
the likelihood that the Soviet Union w^ 
decide to do the things that are 
necessary to improve the relationships 
between themselves and the United 
States and our European friends. The 
position that we have had is, I think, 
quite similar to that expressed i 



12 



Departnnent of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



ere— that we must be realistic about 
that's going on. We must maintain our 
trength. We must be ready to 
egotiate, and if in these negotiations 
re find a constructive response, then 
le negotiations have some chance to 
ucceed. 

I might say also that we are very 
Dnscious in the United States of a wide 
ariety of destabilizing activities that 
3em to have their origin in many cases 
1 the Soviet Union. I have just been 
•aveling through South and Central 
merica, and here we see the effects of 
rmaments flowing into democratic 
jgimes and destabilizing them. And we 
an't regard this as a contribution to 
3ace in the world. So there is lots of 
)om for improvement. 

I would agree with the statement 
lat you quoted from the European 
3ads of state that we will welcome any 
ibstantive moves from the Soviet 
nion in directions that can lead to 
ore stable and constructive relation- 
lips around the world. 

Q. May I ask you to be somewhat 
ore detailed or more explicit regard- 
\g your statement that the Soviets 
id already developed and stationed 
ich weapons? 

A. They have, as the President 
;veloped in his address on the MX sub- 
ct, a formidable arsenal in place, and it 
this continuous buildup of Soviet 
eaponry that much of our response is 
rected to. 

Q. In connection with the lifting 
' the sanctions against the gas pipe- 
[le deal, it was said one of the condi- 
9ns was to reach an understanding 
id agreement on a common trade and 
onomic policy vis-a-vis the countries 
Eastern Europe. Could you tell us 
»w much progress has been made in 
sveloping a common strategy vis-a- 
s the countries of Eastern Europe. 

A. First, I have to disconnect the 
lestion because the question implied 
at the discussions of our East- West 
onomic strategy were conducted as a 
rt of negotiation vis-a-vis the pipeline 
>ue. In actuality, as Mr. Genscher will 
ar out since he and his representatives 
3re a very instrumental part in the 
lole thing, we all agreed that the 
neral question of East- West economic 
lationships deserved to be addressed 
th urgency and with a different spirit 
an in the past. And so we moved for- 
ird on that. The President's decision 
is that the prospect for moving for- 
ird on these alternative means was 
omising enough and strong enough so 



that he could, in effect, switch from the 
pipeline sanctions to this approach. 

As far as the ingredients to this 
strategy are concerned, they are in dif- 
ferent stages, and I'll try to run down 
where we stand on them. 

First, perhaps the most fundamental 
step that was proposed is a broad East- 
West study of economic relationships 
based on certain principles that have 
been set out. We are now in the process 
of trying to formulate just how to go 
about the undertaking of that study. But 
I think people are broadly and complete- 
ly committed to doing it. One of the 
things that Mr. Genscher and I touched 
on in our discussions this afternoon was 
mutual agreement to move forward with 
that. We have some ideas about it. I 
hope during the course of my trip to 
Europe, we'll be able to firm up just how 
we are going to do the study. 

Second, on the question of credits; 
there has been, of course, considerable 
discussion of this within the framework 
of OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development], and that 
will proceed. 

'Third, there is the question of 
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Security Export Controls]. 
That has been moving forward in a very 
satisfactory way with a considerable 
political impulse to do so. 

Fourth, there is the question of 
other high technology, in particular oil 
and gas equipment. We have to for- 
mulate how to get at that. It is similar 
in terms of the kind of analytical and ad- 
ministrative skills needed for COCOM. 
In one way or another, I think, we will 
see it drift in that direction, but still 
there has to be the right setting. 

And finally, the same can be said for 
the broad energy study that needs to be 
undertaken, particularly looking at alter- 
native sources of supply and estimating 
the demand. 

In general, I think. Minister 
Genscher and I agree that the more we 
can use existing forums to work out 
these matters, the better we are going 
to be. I look forward to discussing all of 
this with my European colleagues dur- 
ing this trip. 

Q. Do you believe that only the 
military experts could decide which 
kind of high technology is militarily 
important? 

A. Obviously, the essential skills are 
in part military and in part sort of scien- 
tific engineering skills that are required 
in either case. 



Q. Did you also discuss with Mr. 
Genscher the Middle East problem, 
and how do you see the situation at 
the moment? The fact that you re- 
ceived two Palestinian mayors the 
other day, does that mean that you are 
ready — the United States would now 
be ready — to recognize the PLC 
[Palestine Liberation Organization]? 

A. The answer to the last part of 
the question is that the conditions under 
which we will talk to the PLO have been 
set up very clearly, repeatedly, and re- 
main unchanged. 

But I'll repeat them again if you 
wish; namely, that when they recognize 
the right of Israel to exist and U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 as the basis for peace in the Middle 
East. We are ready to talk to the PLO. 
Until then we aren't. The two mayors 
that I met were not representatives of 
the PLO. They were former mayors of 
West Bank communities who had been 
ejected for reasons that we didn't find 
persuasive. I didn't answer the question 
about the Middle East but you were only 
giving me the PLO needle, and we'll let 
it go at that. 

Q. There were indications this 
morning that the Federal Government 
had gained the impression during con- 
tacts and talks in the course of the 
Brezhnev funeral rites that the Soviets 
might be considering pulling out of 
Afghanistan or had the desire to do 
so. Could you comment on that? 

A. The range of our discussions so 
far — and remember I am just in the 
middle of this visit here — is very wide. 
As a matter of fact, we did touch on 
Afghanistan and many other issues. 
Whether there is a potential movement 
on the part of the Soviet Union or not 
remains to be seen. And I think that 
there are so many signals this way, that 
way, and every other way that we need 
to go out of the signals business and 
look for substance. We'll be very in- 
terested to see if any substance 
develops. 

Q. I have another question con- 
cerning East-West trade. Who in your 
opinion would be best suited to for- 
mulate this common policy of the 
West? And who is going to draft this 
study once agreement has been 
reached on what should be said in the 
study? 

A. There are many possible ways of 
going about it. The interested countries 
as such will have to do a great deal of 
the work as distinct from an interna- 
tional staff. Nevertheless, our bias, as I 



■bruary 1983 



13 



EUROPE 



said earlier, is toward lodging all of 
these studies to the extent possible in 
some existing international institution, 
and we'll benefit from the experience 
and the staffs of those institutions. It 
has not yet been decided precisely where 
to put this. I hope that as my visit to 
Europe unfolds and I have a chance to 
talk to people, we'll gradually formulate 
our agreement on that point. 

Q. I suppose there is a certain 
timetable on consultations in connec- 
tion with this joint East- West eco- 
nomic strategy. What is this timetable 
like? 

A. The timetable varies according to 
the subject matter of the different items 
that I mentioned. Some represent ac- 
tions that can be put in place, or im- 
prove on what is in place already, and 
some represent studies that need to be 
accomplished. I don't see that any of 
these studies need to take forever. So I 
think, without trying to put deadlines on 
things, we ought to be thinking in terms 
of months. But I don't want to put some 
deadline down because that often causes 
artificial uncertainties. 

Q. There is information that mar- 
tial law in Poland may be lifted and 
that all the detainees would be re- 
leased. Would that change your posi- 
tion — the position of the United 
States of America— vis-a-vis Poland? 

A. It wouldn't change it. What has 
changed over a period of years is what 
the Polish Government has done to its 
people. And if the Polish Government 
changes the way it behaves toward its 
people, that will be welcome news. We 
will await any developments and when 
we read the accounts of them we want 
to examine carefully what the reality is. 
We hope that the reality will gradually 
emerge as something better for the 
Polish people than they have been sub- 
jected to for the last year or so. 

Q. I wonder if we could please 
seek a clarification of your reply 
earlier about the Soviets having a new 
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 
missile]. 

A. No, I didn't say brand new. I was 
referring to what the President 
developed in his television address hav- 
ing to do with the MX decision. He 
developed the buildup of a Soviet 
weaponry and juxtaposed that against 
what had been going on as far as the 
United States is concerned and thereby 
the necessity for us to modernize and 
develop our own weaponry. 



Q. Is that the same area of [inaudi- 
ble] destabilization activities within 
the United States? 

A. I didn't say anything about 
destabilizing within the United States. I 
talked about Central America. 



DINNER TOAST. 

BONN, 

DEC. 7, 19823 

Foreign Minister Genscher, my friend, 
my host, my colleague in the world of 
foreign affairs; I might say that I am 
senior to you in that you have just been 
reappointed foreign minister, but I am 
very junior to you in so many respects 
that the opportunity to be here at the 
start of my visit to Europe and talk with 
you and the Chancellor and President 
Carstens, not only about our relation- 
ships together as two countries but also 
about our alliance, is of great impor- 
tance to me. But I would like to first say 
how grateful I am to you and Mrs. 
Genscher and distinguished guests here 
for joining us and in extending this 
wonderful warmth and hospitality that is 
so clear here this evening and has been 
clear to me throughout the day as I have 
had the privilege of talks with members 
of your government. That warmth and 
hospitality is very important to us. 

I might say also that the discussions 
that we have had have been very pro- 
ductive, full of content, as your very 
gracious toast suggests. We have 
covered an awful lot of ground in a com- 
prehensive way and in a probing way. I 
suppose that is just what is appropriate 
for two countries that have as many 
things that pull us together as our coun- 
tries do. There are a million — or 
perhaps a little more — Americans on 
your soil. For the most part, they are 
military people and their families. We 
think they are here on a mission of 
peace. We think they are here in the in- 
terests of the United States and in your 
interests, our shared interests. And that 
is the way we look at it, and that is the 
faith that we will keep. 

I have heard that on the order of 
25% of the residents of the United 
States— the citizens of the United 
States— in one way or another can trace 
their roots to Germany. Now I don't 
know about a figure like that, and I 
hestitate to use a number of that kind in 
the presence of my teacher and the 
great Arthur Burns [U.S. Ambassador 
to West Germany] because Arthur is a 



stickler for numbers. Whenever you use 
a number in Arthur's presence, he will , 
come around later and say to me, 
"George, where did you get that 
number?" But I have the perfect answer 
on this occasion. I'll say, "Arthur, you 
gave it to me." 

But I might say it is a measure of 
the respect and friendship that we have, 
and that President Reagan has, that we 
are able to persuade and able to send 
you such a distinguished person as 
Arthur Burns and Helen Burns. I feel 
very strongly about this personally 
because I have had the privilege of 
working with and for Arthur for a great 
many years. And I know there is no per- 
son in the United States who stands 
taller and is more respected. He is more , 
than an Ambassador here; he is a very 
distinguished American and a very dis- 
tinguished citizen of the world. So when 
I have a number from Arthur I know 
that I am in very safe hands. 

I said that our discussions have been 
comprehensive and productive, as is sug- 
gested by the wide range of topics that 
were brought up in your own remarks 
here this evening, Mr. Minister. And I 
don't want to try to review them here in 
any detail, but it is quite clear that they 
have to do with our alliance, where you 
and I are going as ministers to the 
NATO ministerial meeting. 

I think it is very well for us all to 
keep in our minds that this alliance has 
been and remains today one of the 
greatest alliances in history. It is an 
alliance for peace. There has been no 
war in Europe while this alliance has 
been in being although there have been 
tensions. There have been incidents or 
whatever you may want to call them all 
over the world, much bloodshed all over 
the world; but I think, in very con- 
siderable part due to the alliance, that 
has not been true here. So it is some- 
thing that we prize and we work on and , 
we develop together. We have, as we all ; 
recognize, the dual-track decision, which: 
you and the Chancellor affirmed very 
positively to me today, as the most re- 
cent expression of the things that we 
share together and recognize as impor- ' 
tant. I 

Outside this sphere of the alliance i 
and the concerns that go with it, of i 
course, we have our economic relation- 
ships to think about. And it was, I think,! 
significant to notice in your remarks 
that you brought forward both the im- i 
portance of an economic strategy in our 
East- West relationships which we are 
together determined to work out to our 
mutual benefit and also what we share 



14 



Department of State Bulletir' 



I 



EUROPE 



e importance of the trading com- 
ity around the world. 
Ve had a meeting in the GATT 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and 
e] here recently, and how it should 
'aluated I suppose depends on your 
, of view. There is gag on rating 
:s going around these days. I was 
i by a reporter as we were winding 
jr South American trip with the 
dent recently, on a scale of one to 
low would you rate the trip? Of 
;e, I immediately said "eleven." But 
•theless it is important to recognize 
with all of the difficulties we face in 
conomies and in the world economy 
were positive assertions of the im- 
nce of open trade, and at least the 
ining of a sensitivity to the 
gence of that great miscellany now 
1 "services," but which I predict will 
!r or later be called such words as 
dng" and "insurance" and 
neering," and so on, the real parts 
s word. There is a recognition of 
lew and emerging and very impor- 
ispect of trade and the necessity 
jaling with it. So that is a positive 
mt. 

t any rate, the point is that as we 
2d on this matter of the greatest 
ilty, I know that we found that the 
sentatives of your country and 
found much in common, perhaps 
of all found a philosophic base in 
ion which made it possible for us to 
fruitfully together, 
inally, I could practically pick up 
ead and welcome your own com- 
; about the truly significant base of 
ilationship and that has to do with 
dues that we share. The human 
3, the democratic values that sus- 
s and sustain our alliance and 
us, as we look perhaps at other 
of the world, recognize what a 
deal we really have in having a 
ion of freedom and a sort of prog- 
i.nd a sense of humanity that 
cterizes your world here and mine 
United States. 

gain I am most grateful to you for 
'arm and hospitable greeting and 
more for what it stands for — the 
jth of our relationship, the content 
the ability to talk and discuss, 
views on important issues. These 
rs are of tremendous significance 
and benefit to me and my job, 
more of great significance to my 
rymen and to President Reagan, 
las asked me to express to this 
ring, as I did to Chancellor Kohl, 
Ty best wishes. 



In that spirit, I would like to ask you 
to join me in a toast to my host and 
hostess, Minister and Mrs. Genscher, 
and to the continued friendship and well- 
being of our countries and their relation- 
ship to each other. 



ARRIVAL STATEMENT, 

BRUSSELS, 

DEC. 8, 1982" 

I'm delighted to have a chance to come 
to this city which contains so many im- 
portant things. I'll be here to visit 
leaders of the Government of Belgium, 
to confer with my colleagues in the 
North Atlantic alliance, and to meet 
with leaders of the European Communi- 
ty on economic matters. 

I think this must be put down as a 
special time of problems and oppor- 
tunities. We all know of both. Certainly 
in the field of tensions in the world, 
there are many that we must reckon 
with. And the North Atlantic alliance 
has proven to be the world's most 
durable and effective alliance. It is an 
alliance for peace, and we want to keep 
it that way. We know that there is a 
very large military buildup on the part 
of the Soviet Union and that it takes 
strength to meet strength. At the same 
time, in keeping with the dual-track 
decision, we must always examine both 
sides of the coin. And as we have 
strength, we also have the strength to 
negotiate. And we will, of course, be 
talking about both of these matters in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic 
alliance. 

I look forward to calling on Prime 
Minister Martens and Foreign Minister 
Tindemans and to renewing my 
acquaintance with them and discussing 
important matters here in Belgium. 

I might say that years ago when I 
was Dean at the University of Chicago 
and thinking of ways to internationalize 
our curriculum, I came to Belgium and 
worked out a program that was quite 
successful in collaboration with the 
University of Louvain. So I know a little 
bit about Belgium beyond just what I'm 
meeting on here today. 

Finally, at the end of my stay here, I 
will be meeting with Gaston Thorn 
[President of the European Community 
Commission], a friend of many years, 
and his colleagues to talk about some of 
the economic issues — and I believe op- 
portunities — that we face. Certainly, it 
seems to me, we need to keep in our 
sights right now that the world needs 
economic expansion. And in addition to 



discussions of the particular issues that 
we intend to scrap about, we need also 
to think about ways in which we can 
work together effectively to see our 
economies expand. 

I'd like to make one comment about 
an event that took place in Washington 
yesterday, namely the vote in the House 
of Representatives on the basing mode 
of the MX missile. This, as the President 
has said, is a disappointing vote, and we 
think a mistaken one. In view of the fact 
that we think it is mistaken, of course, I 
am sure that the President will be seek- 
ing to turn it around, not only in the 
Senate but in working with American 
people to be sure that they understand 
fully the implications and the importance 
of the deployment of the MX missile. 

I should emphasize that long-range, 
land-based missiles are now in place on 
American soil and what we are talking 
about here is a modernization of that 
weapon system and a shift in the basing 
mode. In the end, I feel confident that it 
will go forward. Nevertheless, it certain- 
ly is the case that the vote in the House 
is a disappointing one. 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 
COMMUNIQUE, 
BRUSSELS, 
DEC. 10. 1982 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
session in Brussels on 9th and 10th December 
1982 and agreed as follows: 

1. The Atlantic Alliance, based on the 
ideals and value of democracy, has through 
its strength and cohesion succeeded in 
preserving peace and independence for the 
free and equal members of this partnership. 
On this solid foundation, the Heads of State 
and Government reaffirmed at their meeting 
in Bonn on 10th June 1982 the Alliance's 
policy of a strong defence and of East- West 
dialogue. Moreover, they set forth their pro- 
gramme for peace in freedom, emphasizing 
their resolve to develop substantial and 
balanced East-West relations aimed at gen- 
uine detente based on the effective applica- 
tion of the principles and provisions of the 
United Nations Charter and the Helsinki 
Final Act. 

2. The Allies will maintain a firm, 
realistic and constructive attitude towards 
the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual ac- 
ceptance of the principles of restraint and 
responsibility in the conduct of international 
affairs. The desire to improve relations with 
the member states of the Warsaw Pact and 
to extend areas of co-operation to their 
mutual benefit. 

The Allies look to the Soviet leadership 
for tangible evidence that it shares their 
readiness to act in this spirit. They expect 



ary 1983 



15 



EUROPE 



the Soviet Union to honour its obHgations 
and to show respect for the sovereignty and 
independence of other states. In face of the 
continuing and massive Soviet arms build-up, 
the legitimate security concerns of the Allies 
remain and must be recognized. But the 
Allies are open to all opportunities for 
dialogue, will welcome any positive move to 
reduce tension and desire, if Soviet attitudes 
allow, to co-operate in re-building interna- 
tional trust. 

3. The violations in Poland of the 
Helsinki Final Act and of the conventions of 
the International Labour Organization, in 
particular by the banning and dissolution of 
trade unions including Solidarity, continue to 
cause the gravest concern. 

The Allies call upon the Polish authorities 
to abide by their commitment to work for na- 
tional reconciliation. Recalling their declara- 
tion of nth January 1982, * the criteria of 
which are far from being fulfilled, the Allies 
have noted the recent release of a number of 
detainees and continue to follow closely 
developments in Poland, including possible 
relaxation of military rule. They emphasize 
that in this regard the actions of the Polish 
authorities will be judged by their practical 
effects. The Allies consider that the improve- 
ment of relations with Poland depends on the 
extent to which the PoUsh Government gives 
effect to its declared intention to establish 
civil rights and to continue the process of 
reform. Freedom of association and the 
rights of workers to have trade unions of 
their own choice should not be denied to the 
Polish people. The dialogue with all sections 
of Polish society must be resumed. The Allies 
call on all countries to respect Poland's fun- 
damental right to choose its own social and 
political structures. 

4. In violation of the United Nations 
Charter and despite repeated calls from the 
General Assembly, the Islamic Conference 
and other international bodies, the Soviet 
Union continues its military occupation of 
Afghanistan in the face of determined 
resistance by the Afghan people. The Allies 
call upon the Soviet Union to accept a 
political solution which would bring an end to 
the suffering of the Afghan people and allow 
the return to their homeland of over 3 million 
refugees who have been forced into exile. 
This solution must be based on the 
withdrawal of Soviet Forces and respect for 
the independence and sovereignty of 
Afghanistan which would thereby be enabled 
to exercise its right of self-determination and 
to return to a position of genuine non- 
alignment. 

5. In unremitting pursuit of its military 
build-up, which has long passed the level re- 
quired for defence, the Soviet Union is in- 
creasing its superiority in conventional arms 
and expanding its naval power. It is 
simultaneously strengthening its nuclear 
capability, particularly through the deploy- 
ment of intermediate-range missiles. As 
stated in their Bonn Declaration, the Alhes 
are left no choice but to maintain an effective 
military deterrent adequate to meet their 



legitimate security concerns in a changing 
situation. It therefore remains essential for 
the Allies to preserve the security of the 
North Atlantic area by means of conventional 
and nuclear forces adequate to deter aggres- 
sion and intimidation. To that end they agree 
to continue their efforts towards greater co- 
operation in armaments and, in particular, to 
take full advantage of emerging technologies 
and to continue action in the appropriate fora 
restricting Warsaw Pact access to Western 
militarily-relevant technologies. 

The presence of North American forces 
on the European Continent and the United 
States strategic nuclear commitment to 
Europe are essential to Allied security. 
Equally important are the maintenance and 
continued improvement of the defence 
capabilities of the European members of the 
Alliance. 

6. Arms control and disarmament 
together with deterrence and defence are in- 
tegral parts of Alliance security policy and 
important means of promoting international 
stability and peace. 

Firmly committed to progress over arms 
control and disarmament, the Allies have ini- 
tiated a comprehensive series of proposals for 
militarily significant, equitable and verifiable 
agreements, which are designed to lead to a 
balance of forces at lowest possible levels. 
They seek from the Soviet Union a construc- 
tive and serious approach in current negotia- 
tions. 

7. In the Strategic Arms Reductions 
Talks (START), the Allies fully support the 
efforts of the United States to negotiate with 
the Soviet Union significant reductions in 
United States and Soviet strategic forces em- 
phasizing the most destabilizing systems in 
the first phase of the negotiations. The Allies 
urge the Soviet Union to contribute in a con- 
crete way to speedy progress in these impor- 
tant negotiations. 

8. The Allies underline the importance of 
both parts of the decision of 12th December 
1979 which provided for a limited moderniza- 
tion of United States intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF) combined with a parallel 
offer of negotiations on United States and 
Soviet weapons of this kind. This decision, 
which was prompted, in particular, by the 
deployment of SS-20 missiles, led to the cur- 
rent INF talks in Geneva within the 
framework of negotiations on strategic arms 
reductions. 

The Allies fully support the United States 
efforts to enhance security through the total 
elimination of all existing and planned Soviet 
and United States longer-range land-based 
INF missiles. The United States proposal was 
developed in close consultation within the 
Alliance among the member countries con- 
cerned. The Ministers of these countries 
welcomed the continuing United States com- 
mitment to serious negotiations, and to con- 
sider carefully with these Allies any serious 
Soviet proposal. 

Ministers reiterated that, in the absence 
of concrete results, INF deployments would 
begin according to schedule at the end of 
1983.' 



9. The AUies welcomed the recent pre 
posals by President Reagan for new confi 
dence-building measures in the nuclear fit 
between the United States and the Soviet I 
Union intended to enhance stabihty. 

10. The Allies participating in the mi ; 
and balanced force reduction (MBFR) tall i 
Vienna are confident that the comprehen; i 
approach embodied in the draft treaty te; 
presented by Western negotiators has gi\ i 
new momentum to the negotiators. This 
Western initiative is aimed at achieving r 1 
progress towards substantial reductions c 
ground forces, leading to parity in combii S 
ground and air force manpower at equal ■ 
lective levels in Central Europe. Westerr 
participants in the negotiations call upon < 
East to respond adequately to the need f 
prior agreement on data for current Wai \ 
Pact force levels and to agree to effectiv 
associated measures for verification and 
confidence-building. 

11. The Allies also attach great imp( 
tance to efforts in the United Nations to 
secure improved verification procedures, 
wider availability of information on defei i 
spending and other measures likely to 
enhance transparency and thus build con 
fidence. 

12. The Allies are gravely concernec 
about strong evidence of continued use c 
chemical weapons in South-East Asia an' 
Afghanistan in violation of international ' 
including Soviet involvement in the use t 
such weapons.' 

They stress the need for progress in i 
Committee on Disarmament towards a C' ■ 
vention on the prohibition of developmer 
production and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons and on their destruction, with a 
propriate provisions for verification inch i 
on-site inspection. 

13. At the Madrid CSCE [Conferenc : 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] foil ' 
up meeting the Allies have deplored infr ; 
ment of the principles and provisions of : 
Final Act. They noted in this respect ths ; 
situation in Poland remained a source of i 
cern. The Allies are continuing their effc i 
to arrive at a substantial and balanced ci ■ 
eluding document and they regard the di? 
submitted by the neutral and non-aligne( 
states in December 1981 as a good basis > 
negotiations. They have introduced a nui ) 
of amendments to bring it up-to-date wit 
realities in Europe and to call for progre' 
human rights, free trade unions and free' 
movement of people, ideas and informatii 
To facilitate a positive outcome in Madri 
the Allies urge the Soviet Union and oth 
Warsaw Pact states to abide by the prinb 
and provisions of the Final Act. 

As part of a substantial and balance(fc 
eluding document, the Allies reaffirm tU 
support for a Conference on Confidence i 
Security Building Measures and Disarms!' 
in Europe on the basis of a precise manct 
to negotiate in a first phase militarily sifi 
cant, politically binding and verifiable co 
fidence and security building measures S. 
plicable to the whole of Europe, from th' 
Atlantic to the Urals. 



16 



Department of State Bui t 



EUROPE 



They will also strive to achieve significant 
gress in the important humanitarian 
ects of East- West relations. 

14. Economic recovery in the West is 
>ntial both for Allied defence efforts and 
social stability and progress. The Allies 
'firmed the need for effective co-operation 
terally and in the appropriate fora 

ards this end, including programmes in 
oing with Article 2 of the North Atlantic 
aty which are intended to benefit the 
lomies of the less favoured partners. 

15. The Allies recognize that mutually 
intageous trade with the East on com- 
cially sound terms contribute to construe- 
East- West relations. At the same time, 

' agree that bilateral economic and trade 
tions with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
ope must also be consistent with their 
id security concerns which include the 
dance of contributing to Soviet military 
ngth. Studies are underway or will soon 
ndertaken on several aspects of East- 
t economic relations and Ministers will 
iider these issues again, on the basis of 
e studies, at their next meeting.* 

16. The strict observance and full im- 
lentation of the Quadripartite Agreement 
-d September 1971 and the maintenance 

1 undisturbed situation in and around 
in remain essential elements in East- 
t relations. The Allies welcome the ef- 
. of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
igthen the economy of the city in par- 
ar by ensuring long-term employment 
pacts. 
Recalling their Rome statement of 5th 

1981, the Allies express the hope that 
;ontinuation of the dialogue between the 
!ral Republic of Germany and the Ger- 

Democratic Republic will contribute to 
strengthening of peace in Europe and will 
I direct benefits for Berlin and the Ger- 

people in both states. 

[1. Peaceful progress world-wide is a 

to which the Allies remain committed. 
' consider that genuine non-align- 
:— an important element of international 
e and stability— contributes to this goal, 
)es the aid which the Allies give bilateral- 
id multilaterally to the development of 
i World countries. They reaffirm their 
iness to co-operate with Third World 
tries on a basis of equal partnership. The 
s call upon all states to make an effec- 
contribution to the struggle against 
r-development and to refrain from ex- 
ing those nations' economic and social 
lems for political gain, 
"he Allies recognize that certain events 
de the treaty area may affect their com- 
interests as members of the Alliance, 
d consultation on such events will be 
1 on the recognition of those common in- 
its. Those Allies in a position to do so 
respond to requests by sovereign nations 
le security and independence are 
itened. It is in the interest of the 
nee as a whole to ensure that sufficient 
aiiity remains in the treaty area to main- 
deterrence and defence. 



18. The Allies again strongly condemn 
the crime of terrorism, which is a menace to 
democratic institutions and the conduct of 
normal international relations. They appeal to 
all governments to examine the possibilities 
of increased co-operative efforts to stamp out 
this scourge. 

19. The Alliance's efficiency in pursuing 
its policies depends upon continued cohesion 
and solidarity taking into account the natural 
diversity of its sovereign member states. 
Recognizing in this connection the value of 
their informal meeting in Canada, Ministers 
agreed that similar meetings couid usefully 
be held in the future. 

20. The spring 1983 meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session 
will be held in Paris on 9th-10th June. 

Note: The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Spain has informed the Council of the 
Spanish Government's purpose regarding the 
Alliance and reserved his Government's posi- 
tion on the present communique. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BRUSSELS, 

DEC. 10, 1982" 

During these last 2 days of meetings, I 
have felt very much as though I am 
among allies, that I am part of an 
alliance that is strong, that is deter- 
mined, that stands for peace, that has 
contributed to peace, and intends to con- 
tinue to do so. It's been a very warm 
and supportive and reassuring meeting 
in every vi'ay. The communique speaks 
really for the meeting very well, and I 
can't do better than to read a few items 
from it. 

On East-West relations, the com- 
munique says: ". . . firm, realistic and 
constructive attitude towards the Soviet 
Union on the basis of mutual acceptance 
of the principles of restraint and respon- 
sibility. . . ." On defense, the communi- 
que says in view of the continued Soviet 
military buildup ". . . the Allies are left 
no choice but to maintain an effective 
military deterrent adequate to meet 
their legitimate security concerns in a 
changing situation. It therefore remains 
essential for the Allies to preserve the 
security of the North Atlantic area by 
means of conventional and nuclear 
forces adequate to deter aggression and 
intimidation." On arms control, the com- 
munique says: "The Allies underline the 
importance of both parts of the decision 

of 12th December 1979 The Allies 

fully support the United States efforts 
to enhance security through the total 
elimination of all existing and planned 
Soviet and United States longer-range 
land-based INF missiles"— in other 
words the zero-zero option. "Ministers 



reiterated that, in the absence of con- 
crete results, INF deployments would 
begin according to schedule at the end 
of 1983." On chemical weapons: "The 
Allies are gravely concerned about 
strong evidence of continued use of 
chemical weapons in South-East Asia 
and Afghanistan in violation of interna- 
tional law, including Soviet involvement 
in the use of such weapons." These are 
pieces here and there from the com- 
munique. It's a lengthy document and 
well worth your reading as soon as it's 
available to you. 

Q. Did the MX decision cast any 
shadow over the proceedings here? 

A. Not particularly. There were 
questions about it, and I reported on the 
parliamentary situation in the United 
States and on the President's determina- 
tion to move ahead. As a matter of fact, 
in the appropriations process, some $2.5 
billion was appropriated for the con- 
tinued work on the MX missile. 

Q. Could I ask you whether you 
have any comment to make on this 
morning's report that the U.S. Ad- 
ministration is considering moving its 
military command center from Stutt- 
gart to Britain over the coming years? 

A. There is no truth to that. The 
command center remains where it is to- 
day. As I understand it, if there should 
be a war, command would shift to the 
NATO command centers, and what ad- 
ministrative rearrangements there might 
be in such a contingency would have to 
be worked out. But as far as command 
center presence and so forth is con- 
cerned, it remains as is. 

Q. You discussed the Middle East. 
Can you give us a short account about 
the situation now there? And the pros- 
pects of a breakthrough on the basis 
of President Reagan's proposals of the 
first of September, and if there is any 
change of heart on your part regard- 
ing the [inaudible]? 

A. There is no change of heart 
regarding that hope. And there is no let- 
up in activity. And, of course, we con- 
tinue to work hard with patience and 
continuity. In a sense, there are, you 
might say, three parts to that part of 
the Middle East equation. I'm leaving 
out the Iran and Iraq part of the pic- 
ture. 

There is, first of all, what we refer 
to as the Mideast basic peace process in- 
volving the Palestinian issues and so on. 
We continue to work hard on that. We 
expect King Hussein to visit the Presi- 
dent in Washington on the 21st of 



uary 1983 



17 



EUROPE 



December. We consider that to be an 
important meeting. It continues to be 
our desire to create a situation where 
the right people will come to the 
bargaining table and start, of course, 
first of all on the interim arrangements 
and then on when final status ar- 
rangements have been determined. It's 
obviously going to be a long process, but 
it's one in which we want to see things 
move and continue to work on it. 

As far as Lebanon is concerned, a 
second part of this— Philip Habib and 
Maury Draper have been back in Wash- 
ington [Ambassador Habib, special 
representative of the President to the 
Middle East; Ambassador Draper, 
special negotiator for Lebanon]. They 
had a lengthy meeting with the Presi- 
dent yesterday, and I understand that 
Phi! and Maury will be going back out 
shortly with additional ideas. I think it's 
more appropriate for those ideas to 
come from them and from Washington. 

In addition, of course, there is the 
very important matter of relationships 
between Israel and Egypt which have 
been at the heart of the Camp David 
process, and we continue to try to be as 
helpful as we can in the maintenance 
and development of that fundamental 
relationship. So basically, in answer to 
your question, there is a strong continu- 
ity of effort and interest in bringing 
about a peaceful situation throughout 
the Middle East. 

Q. In the discussions of how the 
alliance would approach or consider 
dealing with the new Soviet govern- 
ment, were there suggestions as to 
how this could be done? Or whether 
or not— was there interest on the part 
of the Europeans in a summit meeting 
with Mr. Reagan and Mr. Andropov at 
some future time? 

A. I think the discussion was very 
realistic and thoughtful. Of course, we 
are all interested in seeing the develop- 
ment of more constructive relationships 
based on a different pattern of behavior. 
In this, our position as an alliance is 
about the same as we have stated in the 
United States. We have to be realistic 
about what is taking place. We have to 
maintain our strength, as the communi- 
que brings out very clearly. We are 
ready for a dialogue but whether or not 
something emerges remains to be seen. 

Q. Have you discussed any other 
options beside zero-zero option? For 
example, what you were talking about 
with the Social Democratic leaders in 
Bonn. 



A. I didn't have any discussion of 
other options in the meeting. There was 
strong support, as the communique says, 
for the zero-zero option, for the elimina- 
tion of this whole category of weapons 
from European soil. So that is our posi- 
tion, that is where our emphasis is, and 
that's what we talked about. 

Q. In recent days you have ex- 
plained to reporters and to your NATO 
colleagues that MX vote in the House. 
The Danish delegate here has ex- 
plained the vote in his legislature, and 
in Norway by just one vote they 
avoided the same kind of vote as the 
vote in Denmark. What I am wonder- 
ing is doesn't all of that taken 
together somewhat, from the Soviet 
point of view, detract from the unity 
that you're trying to show here? 

A. Not at all. I think that if that in- 
terpretation is placed on those votes, it's 
a great mistake. The whole spirit of this 
meeting has been one of unity and deter- 
mination and a recognition of what the 
realities are. And I am sure that those 
realities are recognized in all the coun- 
tries represented in this alliance. 

Q. Have you worked out the ar- 
rangements now for carrying out the 
various studies called for in the agree- 
ment on policy toward the Soviet 
Union in the economic field, and what 
are they? 

A. 'The communique says: ". . . eco- 
nomic and trade relations with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must 
be consistent with [the Allies] broad 
security concerns which include the 
avoidance of contributing to Soviet 
military strength." I expect to see the 
following activities take place. And this, 
I think, everybody subscribes to. 

First of all, we have strong activity 
going on now in COCOM. 

Second, on high technology of 
military significance, but perhaps of 
somewhat less direct significance, in- 
cluding oil and gas technology, we will 
ask our COCOM people to examine that 
area and give us advice on what should 
be included. 

Third, on the matter of credits, 
there is an existing activity in the 
OECD, which has been going on, and we 
will seek to give that an additional 
political impulse to examine the relation- 
ship of credit to the basic objective 
which I mentioned. In terms of energy 
alternatives and the examination of 
them, that I expect we will try to get 
going in the OECD by mutual agree- 
ment, and no doubt they will benefit in 
the OECD from the lAE's [International 



Energy Agency] material. I suppose 
shouldn't be telling you this, I should 
telling the OECD. Maybe they will ti; 
their constituent governments down 
doing these things. But I doubt it. B\ 
at any rate, the energy alternatives 
study will take place in that setting. 

Q. What will be the NATO role 
any, in this review? 

A. I'm trying to think. Just talki 
off the top of my head here, I may h 
omitted something. I have a feeling '. 
did. 

Q. Is there an overall East- We; 
strategic study? 

A. We have to think about how 
pull these different elements togethf 
and we haven't figured out the answ 
to how to do that as yet. 

Q. Will there be a NATO role i 
this review? 

A. The NATO role— let me just 
you from the communique, because 
there is a definite interest in the sut 
This is, of course, a subject that the 
NATO ministers discussed in La 
Sapiniere and so they are quite in- 
terested in following up. I read you ] 
of it, I'll read a little bit more: "The 
Allies recognize that mutually advan 
tageous trade with the East on comi 
cially sound terms contributes to cor 
structive East- West relations. At th( 
same time, they agree that bilateral 
economic and trade relations with th 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe n' 
also be consistent with their broad 
security concerns which include the 
avoidance of contributing to Soviet 
military strength. Studies are under 
or will soon be undertaken on seven 
aspects of East- West economic relat 
and Ministers will consider these issi 
again, on the basis of these studies, 
their next meeting." In other words, 
expect to see some push in getting t 
studies completed, and we'll be looki 
for a report on their progress when 
meet the next time. 

Q. Do you have any fear or did 
detect any concern in your talks h< 
with the other ministers about the 
possibility that the strains that exi 
between the United States and the 
European Community in the tradir 
in the agricultural field at the pre; 
time may spill over into the securi; 
area and affect the unity of NATO 

A. There are always problems ii 
relations between partners, and I th 
the important thing to recognize is t 
despite a fair number of such proble 
they have not spilled over. 



18 



Department of State Buh 



EUROPE 



This meeting was a strong meeting 
and a determined meeting — a meeting 
Df unity and strength. Now we've had a 
number of issues that people have said 
would do what you just mentioned. But 
we have managed to compose our dif- 
ferences about steel. We managed to 
:ompose our differences about East- 
West economic relationships, and that 
las dealt with the pipeline and not con- 
nected negotiations. But at any rate, 
that aspect of the matter is not in the 
Dicture. 

The differences of view between the 
Europeans, the United States, and, for 
that matter, other countries about pro- 
duction and trade and agriculture have 
Deen around for a long time, and they 
ire around today. I plan to spend time 
with some of my Cabinet colleagues and 
the leaders of the EC 10 later on today 
ind no doubt the subject of agricultural 
trade will come up. But it's a problem. 
We'll work at it. And if it can't be 
[•esolved in its own terms, it will not spill 
3ver and undermine our alliance, I'm 
sure. 

Q. You are shortly going to 
Madrid where the new Socialist 
government is engaged in a broad 
reassessment of its partnership with 
VATO. And I suppose you are bring- 
ing some ideas and some suggestions 
t»oth in this context and also concern- 
ing their assessment of the Spanish- 
fVmerican treaty. Could you tell us 
what are you going to suggest in this 
ind other fields? 

A. The Spanish Government is a 
lew government, of course, and so I 
ion't think it's appropriate to press on 
:hem a whole lot of particulars. It's a 
meeting in which I hope to get ac- 
:}uainted and to discuss matters of some 
mutual interest. 

As far as Spain's membership in 
MATO is concerned, of course, that's a 
iecision for the Spanish to make, but I 
certainly hope that they decide positively 
;o remain in NATO. I think they have a 
lonstructive contribution to make, and it 
will be helpful to Spain as well as the 
lUiance members. 

Q. In your discussion with the 
)ther ministers, did the subject of the 
domestic problems that the Europeans 
might have in deploying missiles next 
rear come up and how do you assess 
those problems? 

A. Of course, everyone is acutely 
conscious of the importance of deploy- 
ment and of the reality of that; and the 
relationship of that, no doubt, to the at- 
mosphere of negotiations in Geneva. At 



the same time, the reality of good con- 
duct of those negotiations in Geneva has 
an important bearing on people's at- 
titudes about deployment. It's an inter- 
related proposition, as it says in the 
communique. We had a number of in- 
stances of people in the face of questions 
of one kind or another standing up and 
facing up to them, and it turns out that 
in the end, you win, when you explain 
and show what deployment is about, 
why it's important to the security of 
Europe and the United States and, for 
that matter, why it's important to the 
negotiations that it proceed. 

Of course, there is a constant prob- 
lem of informing public opinion and of 
persuading people that the course we're 
on is the right course. I think there is 
one dramatic piece of evidence that 
needs to be kept in our minds all the 
time and that is that NATO, on the 
facts, has been an alliance for peace. 
There has been no war in Europe during 
the period of NATO's existence, and I 
am sure that the existence of the 
alliance and its strength has a major 
responsibility for that fact. 

Q. You said earlier there were no 
plans to move the command center 
from Stuttgart to Britain, but I 
wonder if there are plans for building 
an additional command center in Brit- 
ain to provide extra redundancy in 
that system? 

A. No, I don't think so. I think 
there's a misunderstanding here, and I 
don't want to comment on it in too much 
detail. But as I understand it, you're 
talking about certain elements of ad- 
ministration. Command is where it is 
now, and if there should be a war — God 
forbid — command would go directly to 
the NATO command structure. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BRUSSELS, 

DEC. 10, 198210 

EC President Thorn. Let me first tell 
you that we had the pleasure, my col- 
leagues from the Commission and my- 
self, to welcome this afternoon Secre- 
tary of State Shultz, his colleagues from 
the American Administration — 
[Treasury Secretary] Mr. Donald Regan, 
[Agriculture Secretary] Mr. John Block, 
[Commerce Secretary] Mr. Malcolm 
Baldrige, and [U.S. Trade Representa- 
tive] Mr. Bill Brock. We had a real ex- 
change of views covering, I believe, all 
topical issues. 



We thought that the timing of this 
meeting and discussion of these prob- 
lems was particularly appropriate. First, 
because we find ourselves in a very 
delicate political and economic situa- 
tion — the most difficult economic situa- 
tion we've known since the end of the 
war — and particularly because, in this 
context, the United States and the Com- 
munity, which account for approximately 
one-third of world trade, have specific 
responsibilities and particular interests 
in coordinating their goals. 

I will tell you that the exchanges 
were frank and straightforward, but 
they were so mainly because we did not 
talk about the past and difficulties that 
we may have encountered. But right 
away we turned to the problems at 
hand, and we tried to define some 
strategies and to seek a few points 
where it is in our interest to cooperate 
together in the future, and even in the 
very near future. It is of no interest to 
anyone, nor does it benefit anyone, to 
talk about the past; but it is absolutely 
imperative that we take action and that 
action replace words; that we emphasize 
our common interests and that we try to 
face them. It is in this spirit that we 
have tackled the following topics which I 
will only mention, allowing Mr. Shultz to 
add the introductory remarks that he 
wishes. 

We have discussed trade matters, 
i.e., essentially the GATT and what is 
known as its follow-up. Then, of course, 
we discussed agricultural problems; we 
discussed East- West relations, and then 
talked about the economic and financial 
situation such as we assess it on both 
sides of the Atlantic. These are the four 
main topics that have been brought up 
until now, excluding what might be dis- 
cussed tonight during dinner. 

Secretary Shultz. I think that is a 
good statement of the general scope of 
our discussion. 

Q. I address my question to the 
Agfricultural Secretary, Mr. Block. I'll 
skip the diplomatic niceties and ask 
roughly, if I may, whether the two 
sides were able to work out a com- 
promise on the agriculture issues, or 
will there be an agricultural trade 
war? 

Secretary Block. First of all, there 
will not be an agricultural trade war. I 
don't think we should talk about trade 
wars. We need to solve problems. My 
appraisal of the outcome is that there 
have been some concrete actions agreed 
to; there is a joint appreciation that the 
internal farm program policies can have 
an impact on international trade and 



•ebruary 1983 



19 



EUROPE 



they can have occasionally a destructive 
impact on international trade. The Euro- 
pean Community appreciates the need to 
harmonize internal prices and the world 
peace. It was agreed— and this is more 
important— that we sit down and, in 
specific terms, review what can be done 
to solve our trade frictions, what can be 
done within the maneuvering room that 
the Community has. And we're going to 
do that with a timeframe with the first 
meetings early in January, continuing if 
necessary with a report back and review 
sometime in March. And I think I said 
that correctly. 

Q. Can Mr. Regan illustrate his 
views on the reform of the interna- 
tional monetary system? 

Secretary Regan: I discussed just 
briefly at the meeting some of the 
thoughts that I have that there is a need 
for a better structure in the interna- 
tional monetary system to handle many 
of these problems that crop up very 
quickly, that are very serious and need 
many different organizations for their 
solution. I offered no specific antidotes 
for these problems. I would say that 
what I am trying to do more than 
anything else is to encourage discussion 
of these items because I don't think 
there is anyone who has the best solu- 
tion or the only solution. I think there 
can be many solutions, but the more we 
discuss them within various types of 
organizations, I think, the quicker the 
chance will be that we can solve some of 
these problems rather than going in for 
ad hoc solutions. 

Q. Mr. Block has referred to the 
Europeans accepting at least in part 
that their internal farm policies can 
have a disruptive effect on world 
trade. In which areas of internal EEC 
farm policy is the disruptive effect on 
world trade evident in your view? 
What are the concrete actions agreed 
to and referred to by Secretary Block? 
And if I could ask a brief question to 
Secretary Regan, are you more wor- 
ried now than you were 6 months ago 
about the danger of a world banking 
crisis? 

Secretary Regan. I'm less worried 
at this moment than I was 6 months 
ago. You will recall that in this period of 
time we have successfully handled 
several countries that are large debtors 
by renegotiating their loans, by tem- 
porarily bridging loans, government-to- 
government, or through the Bank for In- 
ternational Settlements, and as a result 
these nations are now on International 
Monetary Fund programs. The more 



that happens and the more successful 
we are, the less dangers there are and 
the less threats there are to the interna- 
tional banking system. 

President Thorn. As for the ques- 
tion addressed to me, and for which I 
am thankful to him inasmuch as it will 
perhaps give me the chance to detail our 
views on that matter. 

What I think was said and what I 
would like to confirm as far as I am con- 
cerned is that we thought we should 
definitely avoid upheavals in the world 
market in regard to agriculture and that 
we both said that we definitely wanted 
to take steps to avoid that, each of us in 
the context of his own policy. To that 
purpose, we said that we should keep in 
mind, as much on the American side as 
on the European side, that when faced 
with decisions in agricultural matters, 
we must prevent decisions from having 
these negative effects which we would 
like to avoid — also and notably as 
regards certain subsidies which could be 
granted and how far one could go, all 
the while respecting the policies of both 
partners. We, therefore, said that we 
would have the most extensive ex- 
changes of views possible with our col- 
laborators, as of January, on actions 
that we might be led to take when mak- 
ing the inventory of specific issues. 

This is not a reevaluation of our 
policy but rather a matter of seeing 
what concrete examples of problems 
there are in Europe and the United 
States, and then let us attack them im- 
mediately as of January. We will see in 
March, as my American colleague said, 
how advanced these studies will be; to 
what level, or if we have achieved some 
results. We also have examined some ex- 
amples from the American side; our in- 
terlocutors have explained, for example, 
the measures that the President of the 
United States proposed last night— on 
the American side — to deal with that 
problem. 

On our side, we have brought up, for 
instance, the measures that we have 
taken regarding products such as sugar, 
as well as those to reduce surpluses; and 
it is this analysis that we intend to pur- 
sue as soon as possible, which is to say 
after the holiday season. 

Q. Mr. Block, you just talked 
about respecting the space of 
maneuver of the European Communi- 
ty. Does it mean that the United 
States has not [inaudible] the common 
agricultural policy as it is, meaning, 
for instance, subsidies for exports, 
and secondly, when you say there will 



not be a trade war on agriculture, 
mean that you are not going to dump 
any food in a short time on the world 
market? 

Secretary Block. In response to the 
first question, we do not and have not 
quarreled with the common agricultural 
policy. Our quarrel has been with the 
spillover of that policy into the interna- 
tional markets, and it is our contention 
that it has created problems for us and 
other trading countries. The effort that 
the European Community intends to 
make, and we intend to review with 
them how they can accomplish it, is to 
bring their internal prices, or see inter- 
nal prices and world prices more in har- 
mony, or when they come close together 
or together, once this happens, it is a 
fact that export subsidies— but this 
would cause it to happen, and I think it 
is an appropriate approach. And the 
question of my statement that there 
would be no trade war — and I don't ex- 
pect a trade war, trade wars would be 
bad for everyone concerned, that is a 
fact. It is also a fact that we did not 
give up. We did not agree that we woulc 
necessarily withhold any actions to com- 
pete on a favorable basis with the Euro- 
pean Community in the export market. 

Q. I would like to know if you 
have any commitments regarding agri- 
culture and an eventual modification 
of the policy followed until now. Can 
we speak of a commitment, and, if so 
which one? And then a question to Mr 
Block. It seems totally illusory to 
imagine that European prices could 
match world prices. In which case, 
what conclusion do you draw? 

President Thorn. Regarding the 
first part, I thought I had answered it 
by saying, twice, that naturally the cap 
was not negotiable. I believe you all 
heard that against and over the cap, but 
that we were both anxious to respect 
each other's policy, but that it's time to 
establish a list of concrete problems as 
quickly as possible and then to discuss 
them together at the beginning of next 
year. No negotiation commitment, and 
no commitment to a result, has been 
taken at this stage and cannot be taken 
since we are only now initiating discus- 
sions. 

Secretary Block. In answer to your 
question, you suggest that, in view of 
the circumstances, it's illusory to expect 
the common agricultural prices to har- 
monize with the world prices. I don't ac- 
cept that necessarily. I don't think that 
the European Community accepts that, 
and that is what we are going to sit 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



wn and look to when we have our 
actings in January to see how that can 
Tie about. 

Q. This is to both Mr. Block and 
•. Dalsager [Paul Dalsager (Den- 
irk), EC Commissioner for 
jiculture]. Was there any discus- 
in here or has there been any discus- 
■n about cooperation in world 
ricultural marketing of major com- 
'dities to help you get over short- 
m surpluses? 

Secretary Block. We didn't talk in 
cil'ic terms about cooperation. I guess 
an't know what you mean specifically 
cooperation in marketing these com- 
dities. Yet we did talk about looking 
;he impact of the markets, of the ex- 
ts, of the problems we both face. So 
tainly in that respect, we're looking 
;ooperation. I'm a little concerned 
en you say cooperation. If you're talk- 
about market sharing, and we really 
not going to go out and divide up 
markets if that's what you're sug- 
ting, but we are going to cooperate 
ether to find solutions to some of the 
blems that we have the best we can 
way. 

Mr. Dalsager. Yes, but the answer 
already been given in detail on what 
do with different products in detail 
it has been overall discussion where 
have decided to go into a further dis- 
5ion after the new year to start to 
i up all the problems. 

Q. Mr. Shultz, you were Treasury 
retary when the Bretton Woods 
tem finally was pulled apart. Now 
ounds to me as though the new Ad- 
listration is — I don't say looking 
a new Bretton Woods but at any 
!— changing very dramatically its 
V about the need for international 
peration and linkage of monetary, 
le, and financial banking measures, 
question for you is whether your 
erience in those 10 years has af- 
ed your view on how to go about 
se things and whether you support 
i approach now? And the question 
Mr. Regan is what has led to this 
nge in the Administration's ap- 
ach? 

Secretary Shultz. As for me, I try 
aarn as I go along, but yet I don't 
ndon my old ideas. I'll let Secretary 
:an handle where the outlook is. 
Secretary Regan. The opinions that 
pressed earlier this week are my 
1. This is not necessarily an Adminis- 
ion position. I have not changed my 
lion that there is a need for handling 



problems in the international communi- 
ty. What I am suggesting is that our ex- 
perience of the last few months certainly 
has led us to a realization, by those of us 
who have had to deal with these on a 
daily and sometimes hourly basis, has 
led us to the conclusion that there might 
be a better way to handle this. Each 
case as it has come up now has been 
handled in a different fashion. I am sug- 
gesting that not only those of us who 
have been engaged in this type of 
endeavor but also those who have been 
observing us do it might have sugges- 
tions as to a better way to handle this. 
Now I am not suggesting that we 
should have some type of international 
rescue agency, because I think that 
banks have a right to be the victims of 
their own folly if, indeed, they have been 
foolish. And on the other hand, I think 
that every nation that has been prof- 
ligate should not be rescued by the inter- 
national community. But I think that 
when there are emergencies that there 
should be some type of apparatus to deal 
with that emergency in a better fashion 
than we're currently doing it. 

Q. You did mention in your brief- 
ing or your informal meeting earlier 
this week the possibility of some kind 
of international federal reserve sys- 
tem. How do you see that possibility, 
and how does this fit into the picture 
of your plans? 

Secretary Regan. I would like to 
correct an impression you have. I did 
not call for an international federal 
reserve; I asked a rhetorical question: 
What is the bank of last resort behind 
the Eurodollar mechanism? Here is a 
market with many hundreds of billions 
of dollars in it if not a trillion dollars, 
yet as far as I know there is no bank of 
last resort. I asked that as a rhetorical 
question without any answer, nor did I 
suggest that there be a federal reserve 
for that at the same time. What I was 
suggesting was that in the international 
markets, change is coming about and 
coming about very quickly. Domestically 
in the United States, we're finding new 
fashions in finance almost every day. 
This is coming into the international 
markets also, and as things change in 
the financial markets and in the 
monetary system, I'm suggesting there 
is also a need for institutions to modern- 
ize and to stay up with these changes. 

Q. I understood you to say that 
you do not want to have a trade war, 
but I don't understand what you said 
about dumping butter. Is that some- 
thing you are still considering, or have 
you decided not to do that now? 



Secretary Block. We did not agree 
at this meeting today to withhold actions 
on the part of the United States or to 
take actions. We didn't specify what we 
would do. We leave that open. There's 
no decision on that at this time. 

Q. President Thorn has brought up 
the reciprocal efforts to try to 
dissipate the agricultural difficulties 
between the United States and the 
Community. But I have only heard Mr. 
Block speak of the efforts that were 
contemplated on the European side to 
bring domestic prices closer in line 
with world prices. I would like to 
know what efforts the Americans 
themselves are contemplating to 
reduce these differences. Would there 
be an end to blank credits, the lifting 
of sugar import quotas, a self-limita- 
tion on corn gluten feed, etc.? 

Secretary Block. I think it's impor- 
tant that countries around the world be 
responsible at a time when we have 
large volumes of crops. The United 
States today has one-half of the world's 
supply of grains. The major effort was 
just announced yesterday by the Presi- 
dent, and what he announced was that 
we will be going forward with a pay- 
ment-in-kind program where we will 
make grain available to farmers if they 
will cut their production. We will take 
grain out of government stocks, give it 
to farmers if they will cut their produc- 
tion of that grain. This will reduce the 
stocks in the United States and yet keep 
plenty available for export to countries 
that are needing the grain. 

Furthermore, we are taking the 
steps to work with Congress to freeze 
our target prices later on, because high 
supports encourage excessive produc- 
tion. They distort the demand of the 
country. 

Secondly, in the area of dairy, in 2 
years we have frozen prices, and, in- 
deed, this year we have cut the price of 
dairy — to the dairymen— by one dollar 
per hundredweight, which is about an 
8% cut. That's a cut, an absolute cut in 
money to the farmer. Furthermore, we 
have instituted policies this year to ex- 
pand our storage. Of course, I have ex- 
plained all the storage of grain we have. 
We have enormous stocks of grain, and 
we have lots of storage, and the govern- 
ment has helped to store it. We have 
tremendous stocks of dairy products. 

These are the efforts we are making 
to try and cope with the situation that 
we all face in agriculture. These are 
large stocks overhanging the markets. 
And in the United States, certainly 



'uary 1983 



21 



EUROPE 



anyway, where the price fluctuates with 
the worid market, it's a serious problem 
for us because prices are very low. 

Q. What were the talks about 
East-West trade about? What agree- 
ments or at least consensus has been 
reached here? Was it only about pro- 
cedural questions or was it also about 
details for the forthcoming negotia- 
tion in international bodies? 

Secretary Baldrige. We discussed 
the initiatives that have already been 
started, and some of the cases on the 
agreements reached in November on 
East- West trade— credit and financial 
arrangements— some of that work has 
already been done in the OECD, alter- 
nate energy sources. There'll be studies 
on that; how we integrate overall 
economic policy between the West and 
the East. The EC has participated 
where it has been appropriate in the 
past. They have told us they will par- 
ticipate where it's appropriate in the 
future. For example, in COCOM, that's 
not an EC kind of initiative. We're doing 
that through other sources: the tighten- 
ing of COCOM at the top, the more 
technical and sophisticated potential ex- 
ports, and the loosening at the bottom 
of the kind of exports that aren't really 
that strategically important. 

Q. Regarding the alliance. I gather 
this afternoon you mentioned that one 
of your hopes was that the dispute in 
agriculture would not spill over and 
undermine the alliance. I wonder if 
you could expand a bit on the dimen- 
sion and the importance of this agree- 
ment that we seem to be moving 
toward in agriculture as it affects the 
alliance on one hand and how it 
relates to the East-West issue, or 
issues. Are they likely to emerge as 
contentious an issue and. if so. how 
do you plan to deal with that in the 
coming weeks in the transatlantic 
relationship? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't see that 
these issues affect the alliance. The 
alliance is strong, and it has its own 
bases. The discussions we've had here 
and elsewhere on East-West trade seem 
to be moving in a positive direction. And 
you've heard the report of the discus- 
sions we had this afternoon in the field 
of agriculture, which have not solved the 
problems, but they've set us on the road 
to trying to do so. So I think the thing 
adds up to a great big plus. 

Q. A lot of the issues you've been 
discussing here today relate in some 
way or other to the problems of mone- 
tary instability and high interest 



rates. The view on this side of the 
Atlantic is that you and the President 
have been very slow to wake up to 
your international responsibilities 
through tolerating an excessive budg- 
et deficit and perhaps a rather dubious 
monetary and fiscal mix. Have you any 
reassuring words to offer today about 
your efforts to reduce the budget 
deficit, and. in particular, have you 
anything reassuring to say about the 
future of American interest rates? 

Secretary Regan. I deny that either 
one of us has been asleep. As far as the 
international situation is concerned, you 
will recall at the time of Ottawa, at Ver- 
sailles, and again at Cancun, we were 
asked by the summit participants to do 
various things. I think we carried that 
out pretty well. We were asked to get 
inflation down in the United States. 
That was the number one problem that 
we had to address as an Administration. 
Inflation was causing all kinds of inter- 
national problems for our trading part- 
ners, for our allies, and the like. I sub- 
mit that we have done rather well with 
inflation. It was 12V2% when we came 
in. This year it looks like it's going to 
run somewhere in the neighborhood of 
just below 5%. 

We were asked later to get our in- 
terest rates down, that high interest 
rates were the cause of the problem 
worldwide. When we took over, interest 
rates— prime rate at least— in the 
United States were running somewhere 
in the neighborhood of 21V2%. Current- 
ly, it's at 11 1/2% and, hopefully, on its 
way down further. So I think that we've 
done rather well there. 

The next complaint was that we had 
too strong a dollar. First of all it was a 
weak dollar in 1980. That was causing 
problems. We strengthened the dollar. 
And now the complaint is that the dollar 
is too strong, and would we mind 
weakening the dollar. I submit that over 
the past couple of months, the dollar has 
been weaker and perhaps will get even 
weaker as time goes on. 

I think that we have been living up 
to our international responsibilities 
rather well when you look at the record. 
As far as whether or not we— I don't 
like to use the word "locomotive"— but 
at least can we be the leader in getting 
the nations of the world back on the 
recovery path from the current reces- 
sion that all of us are wallowing in, I 
would say that we should have— and 
this I told to the participants this after- 
noon—a good year next year with real 



growth in the United States of some- 
where from 3% to 4% and that we were 
hopeful that 1984 would be an even bet- 
ter year. If that proves to be the corred 
scenario, then we think that our trading, 
partners will benefit from the recovery ' 
in the United States. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, ' 

AMSTERDAM, ' 

DEC. 11, 198211 ' 

First, I had the great privilege of a ' 
meeting with the Queen. I came away 
with the knowledge that she is not only '■ 
charming but also very knowledgeable 
and interesting; at once regal and very 
human. So it was a great privilege for . 
me and I appreciate it. 

Second, I had the chance to meet 
the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Minister, Defense Minister, and others 
in the government. We had an intensivi 
and wide range of topics that we 
discussed from East- West economic rel^ 
tions, NATO affairs, INF deployments, 
Central American questions. Middle 
East, and others. It was quite a wide 
ranging discussion. It was interesting 
and useful for me to hear the viewpoint 
that were presented. I hope that just at' 
they made a dent on me, perhaps I 
made a dent on them. But anyway it 
was a very worthwhile visit. 

Q. Can you tell us if you received 
any assurances from the Dutch of- 
ficials you met with as to the eventua 
deployment of medium-range nuclear 
missiles here in the Netherlands if th 
Geneva talks are not successful? 

A. Of course, in the NATO com- 
munique that was issued yesterday, the 
statement was made that all of the 
NATO partners agree if there is no 
agreement at Geneva there will be the 
deployments. The Dutch, as well as 
others, made that statement, and the 
same comment was volunteered today. 

Q. So there has never been any 
definite admission that the deploy- ' 
ment would take place here in the 1 
Netherlands? It has been a very | 

divisive issue here. Was there any 
commitment as to deployment here ' 
within this country? 

A. I understand that the prepara- 
tions for deployment go forward, but 
you should ask the Dutch authorities 
about that. The NATO statement with 
the participation of the Dutch in it, and 
the complete agreement of everybody, '.^ 
a matter of common sense understand- 
ing. If you need to deploy these weapoi 



22 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



r the sake of common defense in the 
st place, and in the second place if you 
not deploy them and don't show that 
u are truly willing to do so, then there 
no negotiation in Geneva possible, 
lat's just a matter of common sense. 

Q. I understand you have had a 
ort pleasant visit. Were there any 
ints where you had different points 
view — you and the Dutch people 
u talked with? 

A. Not really. We didn't have any 
ijor arguments. I suppose if there is 
y difference of view it may be about 
Tie aspects of Central America. At the 
Tie time, I don't know, had I stayed 
re for another 3 days and we really 
g in and looked at all the facts, that 
■ would wind up with a difference of 
:wpoint. I think we all support 
mocratic principles. 

We all support the importance of 
man values. We all support the impor- 
ice of economic development and the 
.ferment of people's lives. In Central 
lerica, we perhaps are a little bit 
ser to it, and we do see the threat in- 
ved to democratic values, to human 
hts, from armaments coming basically 
m the Soviet Union through Cuba 
i Nicaragua to guerrillas in demo- 
tic countries. I think that from what- 
!r direction you take it, whether it is 

impact on investment, whether it is 
uman rights proposition, whether it is 
roblem. I would say that when you 
< about human rights, guerrilla activi- 
that tries to prevent people from 
ing, as in El Salvador, is a deep 
irivation of human rights. I think that 
d of activity, as well as others, should 
recognized. I think we all recognize 
.t there are very few places in the 
rid that you can hold up and say, this 
lerfect. 'The question is whether it is 
ting better. We think that there are 
imples of things getting better, 
Tough there are problems without a 
ibt. 

Q. Did the Dutch Minister share 
ar view that Nicaragua is used as a 
nsit country for weapons to the 
errillas in El Salvador? 

A. We talked about it. I think that 
s not correct for me to come here and 
rt telling you what the Dutch Foreign 
nister thinks. You have him here. 
'11 tell you what he thinks. I can only 
I you what I think. 

Q. Could I please finish just one 
estion because of technical prob- 
ns? There might have been a slight 



difference in your meaning and ours 
on nuclear weapons— is that right — to 
put it mildly? 

A. No, I don't think so. Who wants 
nuclear weapons? The question is when 
you have an adversary that has them 
and has them installed and has them 
pointing at you, in our own self-defense 
you better take note of that. We think, 
first of all, be realistic about the world 
that you are in. Second of all, be strong 
enough to defend yourself. Third, of 
course, be willing to talk and negotiate 
and discuss and agree to things if the 
other party is willing to do so. That is 
the stance we have in Geneva. 

Q. If we go down a little further 
south from Central America, did you 
discuss the developments in Suriname? 

A. Only a little bit. I think it is an 
emerging situation but clearly it's a hor- 
ror. We will find out more about it, but 
it is clear that there is a terrible act 
down here. 

Q. Your Administration has a 
representation there. Do they have any 
indication that there are foreign activ- 
ities also in Suriname? 

A. I don't want to comment in any 
detail. You probably know more about it 
than I do. I am told that there is a very 
large population here who is from Suri- 
name and that there is hardly a family 
in Suriname who doesn't have a member 
of their family resident here. So you are 
very close to that situation here. At any 
rate, this is a breaking story, and I am 
horrified by what has happened. I do not 
want to make a lot of loose statements 
about it before I really have had a 
chance to dig into it. 

Q. Talking about the Middle East, 
would you describe the present situa- 
tion as a deadlock as far as the 
American performance is concerned? 

A. No, I wouldn't describe it that 
way. It certainly has not moved as 
rapidly as we would like to see it and I 
think most people would like to see it. 
But there has been a lot of motion and 
activity on the Mideast peace process 
since the President's speech. We are 
looking forward to King Hussein's visit 
in Washington as an event of great im- 
portance and at the same time in 
Lebanon where we are having a hard 
time getting people talking about the 
withdrawal of foreign forces. We do 
have some additional thoughts. Phil 
Habib and Morris Draper met with the 
President and Ken Dam, the Acting 
Secretary, yesterday, I think, in 
Washington at some length. They will be 
returning to the Middle East and 



perhaps we will have some thoughts that 
can move the situation along. 

So there is not as much settled as 
we would like, but there is motion. We 
continue to work on it. These problems 
have been around a while, and we recog- 
nize that to get anywhere, we have to be 
willing to keep working at it and to have 
patience — to have a kind of patient im- 
patience, I suppose, is the way to put it, 
if we are going to succeed, and we do. 

Q. You didn't talk about the position 
of the PLO. 

A. No I didn't. As far as the PLO is 
concerned, as far as I know, they still 
have in their constitution that they want 
to extinguish Israel. We are willing to 
talk with them if they will stand up and 
say they recognize the right of Israel to 
exist and that Resolution 242 and 338 
are a basis for peace in the Middle East. 
The United States will talk to them 
under those circumstances. I'm not 
speaking for Israel. 

As far as the peace process is con- 
cerned, clearly for King Hussein to 
negotiate successfully, there must be 
Palestinian representation in the 
negotiation. That is recognized in the 
Camp David accords and it is explicit in 
the Camp David accords. So there will 
have to be some Palestinian representa- 
tion found, and it remains to be seen 
where that will come from. 

Q. About the American head- 
quarters in Europe, can you give us 
some background about the decision 
of the U.S. Pentagon about the 
replacement of the headquarters from 
Germany to Great Britain? 

A. That is not correct. The com- 
mand of the U.S. Forces in Germany re- 
mains there. If in the unlikely and un- 
wanted event that there should be a 
war, then the command of those forces 
would, according to the plan, be residing 
in NATO. As I understand what is tak- 
ing place, there is a contingent adminis- 
trative and planning office being 
established that would be activated in 
the event of war. The command of the 
troops remains where it is. If there were 
wartime-type activities, the command of 
those troops would go to NATO. 

Q. Has this new decision to do 
with a change in American strategy? 

A. No, I don't think it is a new deci- 
sion. There isn't any new decision. The 
command structure of the troops re- 
mains as it is. 

Q. The Pentagon has voted some 
million dollars for a (inaudible] to 
England. 



aruary 1983 



23 



EUROPE 



A. I was going to make a remark 
about a million dollars in the Pentagon 
budget. If we had to have an explana- 
tion for every million dollars we would 
be here all night [laughter]. 

Q. We have gone through a period 
of growing tensions between Europe 
and the United States [inaudible]. Do 
you think these tensions have lessened 
during these last couple of weeks or 
months? 

A. So far in this trip I have been to 
Germany, to Belgium, and here. I have 
met with the foreign ministers of the 
NATO countries and their staffs and 
with the European Commission. I have 
found everywhere constructive feeling, 
and I felt at the end of the NATO 
meeting that I was very much in the 
presence of allies and in an alliance — an 
allliance for peace, an alliance that 
recognizes the importance of strength 
and purposefulness. I didn't sense all of 
the spirit that I read about. 

As far as the meeting with the 
European Commission is concerned, I 
think it was a very frank and straight- 
forward meeting. Our principal dif- 
ferences were in the field of farm ex- 
ports. We discussed those problems 
directly and set up a method of tackling 
them. Whether they will be successfully 
tackled by the process that has been set 
in train remains to be seen. What we 
have decided to try to do is identify 
operational things that can be done to 
lessen the problems and try, in the proc- 
ess, to forego philosophic arguments 
about whether the cap is a good ar- 
rangement or whether U.S. foreign 
policy is a good arrangement — get away 
from philosophic arguments and start 
talking about operational matters. 

Q. Could you tell us what your 
perception is of the effect that the 
current situation of flux in the 
Kremlin has on allied cohesion? 

A. I had not noticed any particular 
situation of flux in the Kremlin. You had 
a leader die. A new leader has taken his 
place. The new leader has part of the 
old leadership and has expressed himself 
as very much in favor of continuity. 
Maybe there will be some new policies 
and a more constructive approach. That 
remains to be seen. 

Q. Would you favor that the Dutch 
continue the participation in the 
UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force in 
Lebanon] forces in Lebanon? 

A. Yes of course, I recognize that 
there are problems. It will be desirable if 
by the time the renewal question comes 



up— I think around the 19th of Janu- 
ary — that there will be a plan of some 
kind, or a course of action identified, by 
which foreign forces will get out of 
Lebanon and, in that event, a definite 
mission defined for UNIFIL. I know 
that it tries people's patience now to be 
there without having this course of ac- 
tion identified. 

We appreciate, I think the world ap- 
preciates, the willingness of the Dutch to 
continue to be a part of UNIFIL. It is 
important to have those forces there. I 
think everyone who has looked at the 
situation recognizes that there needs to 
be armed forces to supplement those of 
Lebanon when all the foreign forces 
withdraw. It is not the easiest thing in 
the world to get a peacekeeping force in 
being. If there is one there, we would 
hope it would stay there. It would be 
quite useful and helpful to Lebanon as a 
country. 

Q. You want the Jordanian King 
to enter the peace process. What can 
you offer him in return? 

A. Peace. Now listen, peace is the 
most important thing. Peace with some 
justice of course. As the United States 
works its problems around the world, 
we are trying, and I know you are try- 
ing, to find those policies that treat peo- 
ple properly and with justice; but also 
will bring about peace. Peace is a very 
important ingredient everywhere, and I 
would say particularly against the 
background of the events of Lebanon 
and Beirut, which can explode any- 
where. Some assurance of peace must be 
very valuable to everyone. 

Q. But does this mean that you are 
convinced of political cooperation of 
your friends in Israel? 

A. I think that Israel, like other 
countries in that region, values peace 
tremendously and responds to that in- 
centive. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 

ROME, 

DEC. 13, 198212 

Secretary Shultz. In keeping with the 
courtesy extended to me and my party 
throughout this visit, the foreign 
minister has invited me to make the first 
statement, and I think what I might say 
is simply that in the series of meetings I 
have had here with Prime Minister 
Fanfani, with President Pertini, and 
with my friends Foreign Minister Co- 
lombo, it has been a very worthwhile 
and enlightening day for me. 



I know that you would prefer to askj 
questions than have me give lectures so 
I will simply let it go at that except for 
one incident in the discussion with 
Prime Minister Fanfani. I told him that 
Mr. Colombo was the first foreign 
minister to call on me and that he had 
taken me under his wing and given me 
some instructions. I said that he had 
also told me the tricks of the trade, and 
Mr. Fanfani thought about that for a 
minute and said, "I hope he didn't tell 
you all of them." 

Foreign Minister Colombo. First c 
all, I would like to take this opportunitj 
to once again convey words of welcome 
and greeting on my own behalf and on 
behalf of the Italian Government to 
Secretary of State Shultz. I would also 
like to say that this day of talks has 
been a very intense and a very fruitful 
one. I could add at this point fruitful as 
always in all the talks that I have had 
the pleasure of having with Secretary c 
State Shultz since he came into office. 
Our talks have covered a wide range of 
problems starting with East- West rela- 
tions, especially in view of the recent 
evolution of our policy vis-a-vis the 
Eastern countries. We have exchanged 
our views on the Polish situation; we 
have discussed the INF and the START 
negotiations; we have discussed the Mi( 
die East, both Lebanon and the genera 
negotiations as a whole; we have had 
discussions on international terrorism 
and also a discussion on bilateral prob- 
lems, a discussion which we will be abl< 
to continue this evening. 

Q. My question is in regard to 
Poland; the announcement by Genera 
Jaruzelski. Does the United States at 
this point regard those announcemen 
as cosmetic? 

Secretary Shultz. I think the 
general answer is that we are looking 
closely at what has been said, that we 
are consulting with our allies, but in a 
preliminary way. What we have seen sc 
far are some words but nothing of 
substance has actually been done. But 
we will continue to observe the situatio 
and consult— it is hard to say at this 
point. We do not see that there is 
anything that substantial as to cause us 
to think a major change has taken plac' 
There may have been some developmer 
during the day of which I am not awan 
because I have been in one meeting 
after another, but I think that the 
minister and I discussed this, and we 
basically see this the same way. 

Q. With respect to your conversa- 
tions on the antiterrorism problems, 



24 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



ould you tell us how much concern 
here is in your country with respect 
the investigation of the assassina- 
ion attempt on the Pope and links or 
ttempts to link it to Bulgarians? 

Foreign Minister Colombo. We are 
jllowing with great concern the evolu- 
lon of this situation. The data that we 

have at the moment is not complete 
nd not everything has been confirmed. 
Ve will give a political assessment when 
11 the necessary data has been collected 
nd, most of all, confirmed. Of course, 

'6 consider the situation to be a very 
3rious one, and if the data that will be 
Dllected will correspond to what is 
ssumed at the moment, Italy will 
?flect very seriously on the conclusions 
) be drawn. And just as today we have 
iscussed this problem with Secretary 
hultz, so in the same manner, if this 
ata is confirmed and also if this data is 
n a broader basis than what it is at the 
loment, we will also inform and speak 
oout this to our NATO allies. 

Q. What can you tell us from your 
isit with the Pope; what his feeling 

1 about what's happening in Poland; 
ow does he feel about events there 
ow? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think it is 
Dpropriate for me to comment on 
lings that the Pope may have told me 
jout Poland beyond saying that he is 
jviously following the matter very 
osely, and we did talk about it. I did 
lise with Cardinal Casaroli — I asked 
m what he thought about it and he 
lid, "Well, you must talk with our resi- 
;nt expert." So certainly His Holiness' 
, ews are ones we all are very interested 
1 , but I don't think it is appropriate for 
e to quote him. 

Q. You mentioned that, on the sub- 
ct of the Bulgarian investigation, 
)u were going to consult with your 
ATO allies. Does that suggest that 
)u think there might be a link with 
le Soviet Union? 

Foreign Minister Colombo. First of 
1, this information would only take 
ace if the data collected would prove 
lis information to be necessary, and 
^cond, what you say is not necessarily 
) because if there is one problem that 
Dncerns one of the countries of the 
'arsaw Pact, therefore, we would 
scuss this at NATO as we have always 
scussed this type of thing: that is a col- 
boration within NATO to fight against 
rrorism. If I may express myself free- 
, I don't feel that you can draw the 
inclusions in the direction you seem to 
i going. 



Q. Today in your talks with 
various representatives of the Italian 
Government, have you also discussed 
the problem of an eventual crisis in 
the Persian Gulf and what the Italian 
contribution could be to such a crisis, 
bearing in mind that this crisis in the 
Persian Gulf would be a threat for the 
security of NATO? 

Secretary Shultz. We discussed 
Middle East developments — Lebanon, 
West Bank-Gaza issues, and matters of 
that kind. We did not discuss the gulf 
area as such, so I can't say that we had 
any discussions on that point. 

I would add more generally, how- 
ever, that I did say to each of the Italian 
Government officials I talked to that the 
contributions of Italy to peace in the 
world, to constructive behavior, for ex- 
ample in the Sinai, for example in the 
multinational force in Lebanon, in its 
determination to deploy the INF 
weapons, to support the negotiations in 
Geneva, and in many, many respects all 
the way through, Italy has been a great 
friend and ally, and we welcome this 
behavior on the part of Italy very warm- 
ly and applaud it. 

Q. If evidence were to bear out 
some of the speculation concerning 
the Bulgarian connection, what im- 
plications would you derive from this 
with regard to the future of the East- 
West dialogue? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think it is 
well to speculate excessively on this, and 
I would only echo what Foreign Minister 
Colombo has just said; that it is a 
serious investigation with important im- 
plications and we'll await the develop- 
ments of the investigation. The Govern- 
ment of Italy has said that it will keep 
us informed. We'll rest at that. 

Q. Was the question of the 
Siberian gas pipeline addressed in the 
course of the discussions? Could you 
give us an indication as to whether, in 
the event that evidence were to throw 
further conclusive light on the 
Bulgarian connection, would this tend 
to slow matters down also with 
regard to the issue of the Siberian 
pipeline? 

Secretary Shultz. We didn't discuss 
that subject. We did, however, discuss 
the subject of East- West economic rela- 
tionships and the desirability of finding 
together a firm strategy for conducting 
those relationships and a method of con- 
sulting about that strategy. Those of you 
who were at the NATO ministerial 
meeting remember that we did agree 
there to energize the OECD and 



COCOM and in various respects 
stimulate a variety of studies and ac- 
tivities. Minister Colombo and I, in our 
discussion, agreed that it would be 
desirable to have some overall strategic 
umbrella, you might say, over these in- 
dividual activities. And, in one way or 
another, we are both determined to find 
our way to the answer of how to con- 
struct that; we haven't got the answer 
yet. 

Foreign Minister Colombo. I con- 
firm that we have not discussed the 
problem of the Siberian pipeline, and I 
confirm that we have discussed an East- 
West strategy, especially the problem of 
security for the Western world which in- 
cludes also economic behavior and con- 
duct vis-a-vis Eastern countries. This 
coordination will take place in studies 
that are going to be carried out in the 
appropriation fora such as OECD and 
COCOM. Then, once these studies are 
made, there will be coordination which 
will bring about a coordinated policy. 

Q. Can you give us any details on 
your meeting with [Egyptian] Presi- 
dent Mubarak; if you talked about an 
eventual formula toward retiring 
foreign troops from Lebanon? 

Secretary Shultz. My meeting with 
President Mubarak was brief. We con- 
centrated on his coming visit to 
Washington. Beyond that, however, ob- 
viously he and we are both vitally in- 
terested in developments in Lebanon 
and in the Middle East peace process 
generally. We discussed those and 
shared ideas about them and shared an 
impatience to see the situation get mov- 
ing. I think he welcomes the return of 
Phil Habib and Morris Draper to the 
area. 



DINNER TOAST. 

ROME, 

DEC. 13, 198213 

Mr. Minister: I am delighted to respond 
to your kind words and even more 
delighted to be here with you today in 
Rome. You were the first of my col- 
leagues with whom I met upon becoming 
Secretary of State. I remember still 
your wise counsel and warm support. 
We began then a memorable acquain- 
tanceship, which has since grown to a 
true friendship. 

It is thus with particular pleasure 
that I today return your visit and pay 
my own first visit, as Secretary of State, 
to a nation and to a city which stands at 
the center of the Western world. Geo- 
graphically, historically, spirtually, all 



3bruary 1983 



25 



EUROPE 



roads lead to Rome. This is as true to- 
day as it was 2,000 years ago. As this 
city was the center of the ancient world, 
and classical Rome and Renaissance 
Italy are central to our common civiliza- 
tion, so when visiting St. Peter's yester- 
day, I was reminded that Rome remains 
at the center of the spiritual life for 
much of mankind. 

Italy also remains at the heart of 
Europe and at the strategic center of 
the Mediterranean. Touching the spine 
of Europe on the north, acting as a 
bridge toward Africa and the Middle 
East, Italy has also become a pivotal 
force in political and economic relations 
between East and West. 

Italy has, thus, played a leading role 
in the creation of a more united Europe, 
a process the United States continues to 
support strongly. The cooperation be- 
tween our two countries in Lebanon is 
but the latest evidence of the construc- 
tive role which Italy, as a great Mediter- 
ranean as well as great European 
power, is playing throughout that 
region. In recent months, Italy has made 
a critically important contribution to the 
evolution of a more coherent Western 
strategy toward economic relations with 
the East. As a country vital to the 
trading system of the West, yet with a 
keen perception of the East, Italy will 
continue to offer valuable counsel and 
collaboration as we develop that 
strategy. 

The greatest challenge before us to- 
day, as you and I discussed with our 
NATO colleagues in Brussels last week, 
is the protection of the values which our 
Western nations share. We must under- 
stand the vitality and wealth of these 
values — freedom, democracy, respect 
for the individual — and how terribly 
vulnerable they are in this world. Pro- 
tection means strength, not only military 
strength but strength of conviction and 
strength of purpose. It is from this posi- 
tion that we are able to tell our adver- 
saries that the West is prepared to 
negotiate differences on the basis of 
mutual restraint and responsible interna- 
tional behavior. 

To preserve our strength requires 
resolution and imagination. No Western 
nation has displayed these qualities more 
boldy and wisely than Italy. 

I ask you all, therefore, to drink to 
this friendship between our two coun- 
tries which is displayed wherever in the 
world Western interests are at stake. It 
is a friendship America has learned to 
value. It is friendship upon which the 
Western world depends. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE. 

PARIS, 

DEC. 14, 1982'^ 

Q. We are frankly a little puzzled as 
to why, at the last moment, this in- 
vitation has been extended to us. We 
have the suspicion that on the basis of 
the Secretary's news conference today, 
and because there have been reports 
of a lot of negative vibrations insofar 
as relations between the United States 
and France are concerned, we have 
been summoned here to give you both 
an opportunity to correct that impres- 
sion. 

Secretary Shultz. When I arrived 
here, Claude suggested that there were 
a few French journalists around that he 
would like to invite for a little discussion 
after dinner. And I said that would be 
very agreeable with me but there were a 
number of extraordinarily talented jour- 
nalists traveling around, and that I 
thought that in all fairness to them they 
should be invited too. He said, of course, 
so we called up and invited them. I can't 
imagine why we get all these negative 
vibes. But I think it may be since my 
news conference came in a sense in the 
middle of the day, although I think that 
the most important meeting I had which 
was of course with President Mitterrand 
had taken place. We can bring out a few 
more things here so you might ask 
another question. 

Q. Could you be more specific in 
these studies? You refer to OECD and 
COCOM. Has it been expanded in any 
way? Are you any closer to the um- 
brella approach you were talking 
about earlier on this trip? 

Secretary Shultz. Let me say ex- 
actly where all these matters stand. 
There is a series of activities or studies 
that are underway or about to get 
underway that are specific to different 
subjects and I'll identify them. 

First, and I think perhaps the most 
important, is the effort within COCOM 
to strengthen it in all of its various 
dimensions. And there is a group that 
has been working on that with greater 
intensity now for a few months. 

Second, we agreed that there are 
other types of high technology, including 
possibly in oil and gas technology which 
may, while not being directly military in 
their application, nevertheless have a 
relationship to security issues because of 
their strategic nature. And we agree 
that our people engaged in the COCOM 
exercise should also examine this class 



of technology and give us their advice 
and move on and do whatever we think 
is appropriate in that area. 

Third, there was called for at Ver- 
sailles the establishment of a way of j 
keeping track of the financial and trade I 
flows between the Soviet bloc and the 
West just as a matter of information so 
that we had a better information base 
for any activity, and this we hope to get 
going in the OECD as had been agreed. 
We should get that off the ground 
promptly. We will energize the OECD o 
request the OECD to do that. 

Fourth, there is agreement that we 
should conduct a study about energy 
alternatives in Europe, but not only in 
Europe but for the United States and 
Japan. We are looking at supply and de 
mand to see just where we stand and 
where we might go and what would 
make sense and what would constitute 
in an East- West sense any potential 
problem or threat to us and how to dea 
with it. So that study will be gotten off 
the ground and our intention — this was 
agreed to in NATO, for example — is to 
ask the OECD to undertake this effort, 
and they may properly want to use in- 
formation or resources in the IE A or it 
also the case that the governments havi 
all done an extensive amount of work o 
this subject. The EC Commission has 
done a lot of work on this so it will be 
readily possible to put this together. 

And finally, we agreed that in view 
of the fact that we are all spending a Ic 
of money and resources — we can argue 
enough about whether it is enough or 
not, but in any case — on our defense ef 
fort and that we are doing this princips 
ly for the reason that the Soviet Union 
is putting so much effort into this field 
and that constitutes a threat to us, thai 
under those circumstances, we shouldn' 
make, in a sense, gifts of resources to 
them. Now we will energize the group 
that studies this general subject in the 
OECD to tackle it, recognizing that the 
subject is an exceedingly complicated 
one. It has lots of angles to it. It is by 
no means enough to say that we would 
agree on some rate of interest to 
charge. That is the tip of the iceberg yc 
might say. So this is a subject that is 
very complicated, and it deserves a lot 
of attention and study. 

All those things we have discussed 
before, and we have discussed them to- 
day. While no one can be sure where w 
come out on them, we go into them in 
good faith and seeing them as related t 
the basic security concerns that we |l 
have. rl 

Finally, we have talked before in 



26 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



arious fora, including in the NATO 
leeting and various NATO meetings, 
Dout the importance of adequate con- 
iltation and coordination among 
wereign countries about their overall 
Djectives and strategies in this area of 
ast-West trade insofar as security con- 
;rns are related to it. And we agree 
lat it is desirable to make such an ef- 
irt. It is desirable to have an effective 
ittern of consultation and that con- 
iltation among sovereign countries will 
ork better if we have some set of ob- 
ctives against which to hold our discus- 
ons and have some understood way or 
ittern in which the consultations are 
jing to take place. Because we all 
;cognize that there is lots of conversa- 
on, but how purposeful — that is the 
sue. This is designed to make it more 
arposeful. 

In our conversations today we talked 
)0ut various possible ways to ac- 
)mp]ish this objective and places to put 
and I think it is fair to say, Claude, 
lat it was our general view — certainly 
resident Mitterrand seemed to feel that 
lis was the best view — in the light of 
,e fact that what we are talking about 
;re is essentially a security-type issue 
at the best place to conduct this study 
probably in NATO. And we will have 
consult with our allies, of course, and 
;velop the more precise contours of 
hat this study would be. But we have 
jreed that we will raise this together 
id see if NATO would not be the vehi- 
e for the conduct of this study. 

I think we have to recognize as 
iell — and here it is a little difficult to 
' range anything these days because 
)U have to describe it constantly before 
is all arranged. But in order for this 
be effective, you have to find a way 
, associate Japan in the effort. And so 
e will be in touch with the Japanese 
id we will be in touch with our allies 
id we will see if there is some way we 
.n accomplish that and there are 
irious possibilities. But at any rate 
ose are the objectives we have in 
ind. And I think they are good objec- 
/es and that the pattern that was iden- 
ried in our discussions, particularly 
ith President Mitterrand, ought to be 
lite workable. 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. A 
imber of studies are in course. They 
ill be expedited. Other studies are 
;eded. Instructions will be given by 
'ery government to its delegation in 
le appropriate body in order that it 
lould be started immediately. George 
lultz gave the list of such studies. 

One point which we noted and which 



we have not recalled now. is that we 
happen to have a number of political 
meetings where policy matters could be 
considered at the end of May and the 
beginning of June — OECD ministerial 
meeting, Williamsburg summit of the in- 
dustrialized countries, and finally the 
Atlantic Council meeting in Paris. So we 
think that governments should be in 
possession of the first conclusions of all 
these studies before that set of meetings 
in order that they can then discuss be- 
tween them. 

Conclusions of the studies will be 
sent to each government. Some of them 
will bear on matters which concern 
security and this will fall under the con- 
straints of NATO, COCOM, or what. 
Other conclusions will be sent to govern- 
ments which will use them within their 
own policies but seeing, of course, that 
such policies be for each government 
coherent and compatible with the securi- 
ty concerns that fall under a number of 
bodies. 

Where can consultations take place 
then between the governments on the 
matters that concern security? NATO, 
but for one point, which is that Japan is 
not a member of NATO and cannot be 
associated with NATO. That is a diffi- 
culty. On the matters that fall outside 
the main security concerns, we shall 
have to consult when there is an occa- 
sion; when there is a political meeting at 
the very top or at ministerial level. This 
is not to deny in any manner anything 
that George has said but to add a few 
points and particularly the fact that we 
have noted this convergence of meetings 
at the end of May and beginning of 
June. 

Q. What will the study in NATO 
be about? Will it be to pull them all 
together? Or will it be on military 
spending? 

Secretary Shultz. It is as I would 
see it to set out our objectives as we 
seem to get some way of collaborating 
more effectively on East- West trade and 
financial arrangements; to set out our 
objectives as they relate to security, our 
strategy. What that entails is to have 
some criteria and to examine a variety 
of fields— some of which are already 
identified in the ongoing studies but may 
benefit from looking at them in their 
relationship to each other so that we 
have a kind of strategic effort here 
against which to look at individual 
events that come along and broad pro- 
posals that may come along. 



Q. Is this the institutional frame- 
work in which the organic or global 
study of East-West trade will be car- 
ried out? 

Secretary Shultz. I would prefer 
not to use words like "organic" or 
"global." They seem to be words that are 
difficult, but I would just say that it is 
an effort to identify by strategic objec- 
tives to see what we are trying to ac- 
complish, to separate that from things 
that we are not trying to accomplish 
here. After all this has to do with 
security-related things, and most trade 
with the Soviet bloc does not have 
directly to do with security things so it's 
not going to do everything. We are just 
looking at certain things, and we need a 
strategy to help us coordinate ourselves 
with respect to that. 

Foreig^n Minister Cheysson. There 
is one thing which has been forgotten by 
both of us which is not that important, 
but still, the economic committee or the 
economic secretariat of NATO has 
undertaken a number of studies over the 
last few years, and we have requested 
them to carry on such studies. They 
bear on the economic situation in the 
Eastern bloc. And this would be part of 
the data and information that would be 
needed and used by every one of our 
governments. 

On the main point, 1 agree with 
what George Shultz said. NATO is a 
proper place to consider, to coordinate 
action for any matter, including eco- 
nomic subjects, insofar as they concern 
security. The only difficulty there is that 
Japan is not a member of NATO, and 
we will have to find a way to see that 
the Japanese also take their share of 
responsibility. After all, they are pro- 
tected by our security system, although 
they are not in NATO. They are in- 
directly protected by the very existence 
of NATO in its zone of competence so 
they must be associated some way with 
the conclusions that will be drawn that 
concerns security. Because I repeat 
NATO is competent for us only as far as 
it concerns security. 

Q. If it succeeds, won't the result 
of this study be to slow down East- 
West exchanges? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. As far 

as we are concerned, we agree with 
these restrictions in trade with the East 
if their effect is to reenforce the military 
potential of trade in the East. Insofar as 
it concerns security, one more point; but 
if we consider the evolution of ex- 
changes in the past 2 years, we see that 
they decreased very rapidly with the ex- 
ception of trade with the United States, 



-bruary 1983 



27 



EUROPE 



and they have decreased with Western 
Europe for reasons which have nothing 
to do with security but only due to the 
lack of monetary credibility of the 
Eastern bloc. 

Secretary Shultz. I would add one 
point on this question of "if you have 
some procedure doesn't that slow every- 
thing down?" It does introduce an ele- 
ment of consultation. However, I think 
it is likely that the consultation will be 
fruitful and in the end make the whole 
process more decisive and with a 
greater sense of unity behind it. And I 
would say beyond that that one of the 
things that we seek in the COCOM proc- 
ess is to strengthen its administrative 
capacity a bit so that it is possible for 
things to be handled more decisively and 
expeditiously rather than just sort of 
drag on forever as they had tended to 
do sometimes as I understand it. 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. We 
agree completely with that. 

Q. First, what is your view about 
the future flow of credits to the 
Soviet Union? Secondly, what is your 
view about future purchases of natural 
gas from the Soviet Union? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. With 
regard to the flow of credits, there has 
been no progress in our discussions since 
Versailles. In other words, we are exact- 
ly where we were when we left Ver- 
sailles. 

This being said, I'm afraid that since 
Versailles, we noted that the flow of 
credits was keeping on the decline for 
the reasons I have already said. Banks 
are less tempted to open credits to 
Eastern Europe just now than they 
were 6 months ago, and they were less 
tempted 6 months ago than they were 
12 months ago. When you see the state 
of the balance of payments of Hungary, 
of Poland, of Romania, and even of the 
Soviet Union, banks are less inclined to 
open credits. We should not forget that 
most of the credits which have been 
opened to support trade to the Soviet 
Union and to their partners have been 
private banking credits. The flow of 
credits has been on the decline and still 
is. 

With regard to gas, we consider that 
no one has any right to impose any con- 
straints to any one of our countries with 
regard to our supplies of energy. We are 
quite ready to answer questions, to ex- 
plain why and how we limit the 
dependence resulting from gas pur- 
chases, but we feel free to buy gas or to 
buy any other form of energy from 



wherever we find it fit. Dependence in 
the case of France. We consider that our 
present contracts with the Soviet Union 
represent a very limited dependence in 
proportion to our total energy sup- 
ply — 5% in toto — this being covered, 
compensated by the constraints that 
have been imposed on some of our 
buyers of gas in France itself, i.e., that 
they can shift from gas to fuel any time 
the gas supply will be cut. But this is 
our problem — our domestic problem, our 
own policy. What we have said and what 
we are ready to state again is that it is 
not our intention to open any new 
negotiation for gas purchases from the 
Soviet Union for the time being. But 
this is our decision; it could be amended 
if we thought it proper. We don't see 
why we would enter into such negotia- 
tions in the months and even years to 
come. But, again, this is a decision that 
we have taken which is our own uni- 
lateral decision. It doesn't result from 
any commitment to any one. 

Q. Is 5% a self-imposed ceiling? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. It's a 
kind of proportion which we found 
reasonable. It goes a little beyond that. 
I'm not going to enter into technicalities. 
But the number of industries that can 
undertake to shift from gas to fuel over- 
night, if need be, is limited. 

Q. Isn't it the thought, for exam- 
ple, that France will increase its gas 
imports from the Soviet Union only to 
the extent that it reduces other energy 
imports from the Soviet Union? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. As you 
know we did import over the last few 
years, I think it was 1.5 million tons of 
crude oil from the Soviet Union, and it 
has always been the intention of the 
French administration, even before we 
came to office, that this would pro- 
gressively be cut. All the more, as it is 
not sure that the Soviets would be in a 
position to provide oil in a few years 
from now. Half the total of our supplies 
from hydrocarbons — oil plus gas — com- 
ing from the Soviet Union is, in fact, 
limited to 5%. I told you in addition this 
5% is quite reasonable due to technical 
constraints. 

Q. You have spoken of 1983 as the 
most difficult year since the war. 
Have you discussed this today? Do you 
feel any better? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. Oh cer- 
tainly not. Despite my great pleasure to 
meet my friend, George Shultz, he has 
not relieved my concerns about 1983. I 
don't think I put it that way to the 



28 



Secretary of State in the course of the 
day so I have to tell him that the two 
reasons why I consider 1983 will be the 
most difficult year we have known sinci 
World War II is: (1) when the Decembe 
1979 two-fold decision of NATO will 
have to be implemented which means 
either the negotiations in Geneva will 
succeed or the missiles should be in- 
stalled. This is the first reason why it 
will be a very difficult year. There is lit 
tie doubt that the Soviets will have tha 
very much in mind and will make everj 
effort to try and prevent this installatic 
of Pershings and cruise missiles. Will 
you be ready to pay for that noninstall; 
tion by a success in the negotiations in 
Geneva? This is our hope, but, if not, v. 
repeated it in Brussels in the last few i 
days, then the missiles must be installe 
as provided for. 

The second reason is that I conside 
and I am not the only one, that the 
world economic situation has come to ii : 
worse possible situation. Purchasing 
power, facilities for investment, the 
market is being reduced in all parts of 
the world, especially in the Third Worl( : 
which after all was a support for the 
recovery which took place after the firs 
oil crisis. We do not see where the ligh' 
can come from. Therefore, we consider 
1983 will be extremely difficult in 
economic terms. Have we reached the , 
threshold beyond which unemployment 
might become an explosive subject? No ' 
one knows. We hope not. But the 
growth of unemployment is still going. 
1983 will be, in the economic field, the 
most difficult year we have known unti 
then. 

Q. How committed is the French 
Government to President Reagan's 
zero option? Have you discussed the 
possibility of a compromise with the 
Secretary? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. I can 
answer the first part of the question. 
The second I leave it to George. The 
first part of the question — we are not i 
that negotiation. We rely completely or 
our American friends to try to achieve 
success there. We support their position 
Their position is option zero. We suppo: 
option zero. Of course, if we think of ' 
possible developments, we can't exclude 
that in the course of the negotiation, 
there might be slight changes. But a 
position taken in that negotiation is op-i 
tion zero — we support that position. 
Now was it discussed between the Pres' 
dent and Mr. Shultz, I don't know. We '■ 
did not discuss it together. 

Q. Do you believe that the Soviet! 
can or should have the right to 






Department of State Bulleti 



EUROPE 



igotiate on the basis of the French 
• British nuclear capability? 
Foreign Minister Cheysson. We 

ive never accepted that our own 
iclear potential be taken into account, 
nd we haven't changed our mind. 

Secretary Shultz. We didn't discuss 
ly alternatives to the zero option. I 
ink the name Kraft was mentioned 
ice. Our position is that the zero-zero 
iproach is the best approach. It's very 
■sirable to eliminate entirely that class 
missiles from the European soil, and 
3 think that is a good position. And I 
in't have any further comments beyond 
lat I made this afternoon on alter- 
ttive proposals. 

Q. Is there any chance the Soviets 
luld accept option zero? 

Secretary Shultz. Certainly. It's a 
lod, sensible option. It has many at- 
ibutes such as, in addition to the ob- 
Dus merit of eliminating a very 
reatening form of weaponry, that it is 
sier than any other option you can 
ink of to verify, keep track of, so it 
.s a lot of attributes and there is a 
■nuine interest in reductions. This is 
rtainly a reduction. I think it's worth 
ntinuing to advocate it. 

Q. Returning to the studies— the 
cisions based on the studies will be 
ide by the individual governments, 
that correct? Secondly, at Ver- 
illes, a pledge was made that no 
ivernment would undertake com- 
itments that would undercut other 
ivernments. Does that pledge still 
.Id? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. On 
ur first question, no, it is not correct 
say that decisions will be entirely left 
the individual governments when 
curity is concerned. Insofar as it con- 
rns security, we, and I understand 
ery other ally in the Altantic alliance, 
cept the restraints resulting from the 
eaty of Washington and from the 
3COM arrangements which are all the 
ne being energized, being put up to 
.te. Yes, your interpretation is correct 
len the decisions bear on matters 
[|iich do not concern security. They 
l|3u!d consider that every government is 
jge of its choice and decision. Still, even 
such cases, we think it's the duty of 
•ery government to see that such deci- 
3ns that they take in their sovereign 
jht be compatible with the undertak- 
gs, with the commitments into which 
ey have entered under the security ar- 
.ngements. We can't have a policy in 
■rtain fields which would be completely 
compatible with the commitments 
ider NATO. 



Q. If differences arise among the 
allies over whether a particular action 
affects security, who will resolve that 
difference? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. 
Dialogue is the answer. We are not go- 
ing to set up a court to decide that 
George Shultz is right when he says that 
potatoes are a strategic product because 
staff soliders in tanks eat potatoes, and 
if I say to the contrary, you see. We are 
not going to set up a court between us. 

Q. Suppose the French enter a 
study group. Is there a commitment at 
the outset that each government will 
respect the outcome? Don't you leave 
plenty of room for escape in the im- 
plementation? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. I leave 
it to George Shultz to answer for the 
United States. As far as we are con- 
cerned, I'd say that when it falls under 
COCOM, if a conclusion is reached in 
COCOM unanimously, this is the ruling 
in COCOM, then it is binding. If a con- 
clusion is reached in a study group in 
OECD, normally, it is not binding, but 
the governments can turn it into some- 
thing binding. That is exactly what hap- 
pened with the "consensus." At the time 
when the so-called consensus was con- 
sidered in committees, in meetings in 
OECD, OECD had no right to decide. 
The consensus then had to be adopted 
by all governments, which it was. It was 
automatically adopted because it had 
been recommended by a study group. 
When in COCOM, if the governments 
sitting in COCOM decide that such a 
product should be added to the list, then 
it becomes binding. That's what hap- 
pened on a number of exports of tech- 
nologies and what happened during the 
last few years. 

Q. Do you have a sense of what 
percentage of decisions fall under 
COCOM and what under OECD? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. Oh no. 

No idea. 

Secretary Shultz. Relatively speak- 
ing, I think it's fair to say that if you 
take total trade and then you say what 
proportion of that would be classified as 
having a security component to it, that 
the proportion would be probably 
relatively small. But, of course, to a 
degree, this is to some extent prejudg- 
ing what results may emerge from the 
considerations that will be undertaken 
here. But I think in answer to your 
question that a government — certainly 
the U.S. Government— that started on a 
study saying whatever the outcome of 
the majority vote in the study may be, 



we'll be committed by it, governments 
don't go about it that way. They under- 
take, in good faith, to work on a subject 
together and when a consensus is 
reached, a general opinion is reached. If 
a government then undertakes as its 
policy to do thus and so with respect to 
that outcome, it will stick by it and be 
faithful to its commitments. 

Q. Mr. Cheysson has made clear 
where France stands on credits and 
energy. What is the direction of your 
thinking on flows of credit and 
energy? What would you like to see 
the studies accomplish? 

Secretary Shultz. The object, as I 
see it, is to avoid giving them the means 
to build up their defense capabilities. 
Because of what the Soviet Union is do- 
ing, it makes no sense for us to give 
them resources. When you say how do 
you avoid that, what constitutes giving 
of resources — I'm trying to stay away 
from the word "subsidize" because I find 
it is a word that has very special mean- 
ings, but in the United States it is the 
kind of word I would use, but I'm not 
using it here because it has its own 
meaning here. But, to express the idea 
generally, now if that's what you are 
trying to do to avoid that, then you are 
undertaking something that is quite 
complicated, and I think there is a 
tendency and our French friends have 
brought this out to say all right, we've 
agreed on an interest rate, that's the 
policy. 

If you think about it at all carefully, 
and if you have been involved in 
business deals, you recognize that that's 
one part of the price. There are many 
other dimensions. It's a complicated sub- 
ject, and, so at least as I see it, we will 
energize this study to confront the true 
complexity of this issue and try to disen- 
tangle it, and I don't know what the 
answer is at the start of the study. I do 
know that it is a doggone difficult sub- 
ject, having struggled with it myself, 
both as a bidder on major items and as a 
government person before this in the 
Treasury struggling with the credit issue 
on such. 

But I think the way in which this is 
being conceived of as broader than just 
an interest rate is the right way to con- 
ceive of it. It's a more accurate way. It 
makes contact with the subject. So that's 
about what I can say on it. 

On the general subject of energy, I 
don't have anything to add to what 
Claude has already said. I think it is 
generally the case just as he said France 
does not have an intention of signing 



bruary 1983 



29 



EUROPE 



new gas contracts right now. That's its 
own decision made for good and suffi- 
cient reasons. My impression is that it is 
also the case among other countries. 

In the meantime, however, we will 
make a comprehensive examination of 
alternative supplies and what demands 
may be and what makes sense and how 
the kind of hedges that Claude has 
described, of capacity to switch from 
one fuel to another can be built into the 
system. We will have to see what out- 
come we get from that. Whether or not 
Norwegian gas plays a part in this, I 
don't know the answer to that. If I knew 
the answer, we wouldn't have to make 
the study. But it is certainly a major 
potential source, so it's one of the 
things, I presume, will get a lot of atten- 
tion by the people conducting the study. 

Foreigfn Minister Cheysson. You 
used a word a little earlier, an expres- 
sion, which I think is very important in 
the relations between allies — good faith 
and I'll take this problem of energy. 

For the time being, we do not con- 
sider that we need more gas than we 
have contracted for. Maybe, if there 
were a relance, new economic growth, 
that tomorrow we would need more 
energy imports. Then I think it is more 
useful that as a result of the study in 
OECD, as a result of our direct con- 
tacts, we should tell our partners: look 
we, the Germans, British, Italians, any 
one of us, needs that additional amount 
of equivalent oil supply. Where are we 
going to find it? And then I suppose that 
in good faith we can together discuss 
where that energy can come from. We 
will see what we can do on the domestic 
plane, and, as you know, the French 
have been pretty good at that with the 
development of their nuclear production. 
What we can't do with our domestic 
facilities, and what we have to import 
and we'll see where it has to come from 
and in what form. It may result by that 
time that if there is good faith that we 
find a better solution than importing 
more gas, than importing more energy 
from the Soviet Union. This will be seen 
at the time, and if it is seen in good 
faith, I'm quite sure that it will result in- 
to a contract, into an additional supply 
that will be considered as reasonable by 
everyone. But you can't say in advance. 

Secretary Shultz. Recognizing that 
it is understandable that the questions 
here tonight would concentrate on East- 
West economic matters, I'd like to stress 
again that the relationship between 
France and the United States covers a 
wide array of subjects and geographical 



30 



concerns that we have in common. And 
that, as we discuss all of these things, 
our relationship is deepened and 
strengthened. And this East- West 
economic matter is an aspect of it. But 
there are many others, and they are 
very important. We have touched on a 
few tonight, but not many. 

I just wanted to make that remark 
so that the full context of these discus- 
sions is seen. And I do think on the 
East-West economic matters now we 
have a good understanding, and we will 
be able to proceed in one way or another 
and collaborate in good faith as Claude 
says. 

Q. What is the true value of a 
study group which reaches conclusions 
but leaves loopholes to governments to 
say "it's not for me?" 

Foreigfn Minister Cheysson. This is 
the rule of the game. We're all allies but 
none of us can dictate to the others. 
And we certainly do not accept a 
machinery that would be in a position to 
make decisions superseding those of na- 
tional governments unless it comes 
under security matters which fall within 
the purview of NATO or within the con- 
straints accepted under COCOM. 

Q. But the Secretary has indicated 
that security represents a very small 
percentage of these decisions. 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. It isn't 
a question of percentage. We haven't 
touched agricultural products. They 
represent a very large part of the pres- 
ent trade. As a matter of fact, it is the 
United States which now has a very 
large trade with the Soviet Union to sell 
agricultural products for something like 
90% of your total exports. It is a ques- 
tion of dealing with those products, with 
those technologies which may 
strengthen the military potential of the 
Eastern bloc. There we accept the 
restraints. For the rest we exchange 
views. 

Secretary Shultz. You wouldn't ac- 
cept going into a study of something and 
say going in before I know anything 
about what's going to come out of it, 
bind my sovereign nation; no country 
would do that. However, when you get 
to the end of the study, and if it is 
generally agreed that here is something 
that is desirable, individual countries 
may decide in their security interests, 
yes, we want to make a mutual under- 
taking to act in such and such a way. 
And that's what you get out of examin- 
ing the situation and seeing where you 
want to go. 



Q. It's still not clear to me 
whether France is ready to participate | 
in this effort to establish an East- 
West trade strategy. 

Secretary Shultz. If it isn't clear to 
you by now, it's never going to be clear 
to you. How many times does he have to , 
say it? 

Q. How are you going to explain 
these studies to the Soviets? Won't 
they take offense? 

Foreign Minister Cheysson. If they 
take offense, it's their affair. 



STATEMENT AT CSCE, 

MADRID, 

DEC. 16, 1982»5 

I am delighted to be here this morning 
at the site of the CSCE [Conference on ' 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
review meeting, so ably hosted by the 
Government and people of Spain. 

As you know, I have just met with 
Ambassador Kampelman [head of the 
U.S. delegation] and his NATO col- 
leagues. I was greatly impressed by 
their spirit of cooperation and their 
dedication to strengthening the CSCE 
process. Through our mutual efforts to 
insure that the promise of the Helsinki 
Final Act is fulfilled in practical ways, j 
we are advancing a process that can . 
reduce divisions and improve the human 
condition in Europe. 

Unfortunately, not all of the 35 
signatory states have taken the com 
mitments we freely entered into at 
Helsinki with equal seriousness. In 
Afghanistan, in Poland, and in the 
Soviet Union, the obligations undertaken 
in 1975 are being flouted, with grave 
cost to human life and human dignity. 

For the Helsinki Final Act to be a 
living document, it must be honored by 
deeds, not just words. This does not 
mean that we expect the Eastern coun- 
tries to be like us; but we do expect a 
sincere effort to abide by commitments 
freely made— to refrain from the use of 
threat of force, to honor the right of 
peoples to self-determination, to respect 
the dignity and fundamental human 
rights of individuals at home and 
abroad. 

Events in Poland over the past year' 
strike at the heart of the CSCE process' 
It was for that reason that Western 
foreign ministers came to Madrid last 
February to stand up for the people of 
Poland and in defense of the Helsinki 
Final Act. As free nations, we cannot 



r' 

f 



Department of State Bulletii 



EUROPE 



•n our backs on the Polish people's 
uggle to realize the promise of 
ilsinki. 

We want the Madrid meeting to 
engthen CSCE. We seek agreement 
a full concluding document which 
iuld embody balanced progress on 
man rights and security issues, in- 
ding the mandate for a European 
purity conference. But failure to honor 
isting CSCE undertakings is an 
stacle to such an outcome. Therefore, 

have jointly sponsored new proposals 
ich address these failures. Our pro- 
sals — on such issues as labor rights, 
edom of religion, and Helsinki 
mitors — extend the provisions of the 
lal Act and make the requirements 

compliance unmistakably clear. 

In making these proposals, we re- 
in mindful that the Helsinki process 
nore than mere words. The actions of 
/ernments are what determine 
ether that process will flourish or 
her away. Here today, I can tell you 
.t the United States pledges to sup- 
•t and promote the standards of 
Isinki vigilantly. No state which seeks 
■ goals of peace and stability in 
rope can fail to do the same. 

WS CONFERENCE, 

iDRID, 

C. 16, 198216 

isident Reagan asked that I come to 
lin as one means of expressing his 
iport and the support of the U.S. 
/ernment for the democratic values 
[evident in the last Spanish election, 
my visit here with each person that 1 
ike with, the support for those values 
3 manifest. It also came through very 
Dngly to me the respect and affection 
Afhich the king is held and the realiza- 
1 of the strong role that he has 
yed personally in the development 
i maintenance of these values. So in 
of these respects, it has been a very 
rthwhile and interesting visit for me. 
yond the substantive matters that we 
cussed in various meetings, the Presi- 
ht did also authorize me to invite the 
;|me minister to visit Washington, and 
;': prime minister has authorized me to 
i' that he is delighted to accept. And 
I would expect that a working visit by 
; • prime minister to Washington would 
::e place some time in June or 
t -reabouts. 

Q. Yesterday the kind of change 
[•. Gonzalez's government wants to 



introduce in the present agreement 
just to make acceptable to the Con- 
gress here. 

A. I think you are asking about the 
bases agreement, were you not? 

We did discuss that in all of my 
meetings, and I think it is fair to say 
that on each side we don't see any major 
impediment to fairly prompt ratification 
of a bases agreement. 

Q. Did you get the impression that 
Spain will eventually remain in 
NATO? 

A. This, of course, is a decision for 
Spain to make. The Spanish officials I 
met with did express their sense of 
loyalty to the principles involved. I know 
that they intend to study this matter 
seriously. For our part in the United 
States, we think that it would be good 
for Spain to join the alliance, and we 
think it is good for the alliance to have 
Spain as a member. But the question, of 
course, is an open one and the govern- 
ment I am sure will be studying it, and 
we will await their decision. 

Q. What role can Felipe Gonzalez 
play in Central America? 

A. We did discuss the subject of 
Central America and South America, 
and I discovered in the course of that 
discussion that the prime minister is a 
very knowledgeable and thoughtful per- 
son about the problems and develop- 
ments in that region. And I feel sure 
that we will find ways of working 
together as two governments on the 
issues involved. 

I suppose the fundamental thing, 
again, is support for democratic values 
and for a just economic kind of develop- 
ment in the region are things that will 
tie us together. And we talked about, as 
an example, the San Jose principles that 
were first introduced by Honduras and 
adopted in the San Jose conference a 
couple of months ago, as being, as we 
see it at any rate, fundamental to 
developments in that region. These prin- 
ciples include: not having offensive 
weapons in the region, banning and get- 
ting rid of all foreign and military ad- 
visers, not shipping arms across country 
borders, seeing the development of 
democratic principles for government, 
working for the reconciliation of various 
groups that are at issue with the govern- 
ment, and principles of this kind. And I 
think if we can find general support for 
these principles, we are on our way to a 
capacity to work effectively together. 

Q. Could you see the possibility to 
celebrate a top meeting about Central 
America— something like the Helsinki 



accords, but to be celebrated in Cen- 
tral America to defend the human 
rights and to arrange the whole situa- 
tion of that continent? 

A. I think the objective of gaining 
universal respect for human rights is a 
very important one and to a very con- 
siderable degree that is exactly what the 
San Jose conference on freedom and 
democracy that I mentioned is trying to 
bring out. And we have been supporting 
the democracies of that region in their 
effort to bring these principles forward 
and gain support for them. We believe 
in the United States in these principles, 
and we think the more people who are 
willing to come and subscribe to them 
and support them, as they apply in Cen- 
tral America right now, the better. 

Q. Have you dealt with the ques- 
tion of cooperation and assistance 
from the United States in the modern- 
ization of the Spanish Armed Forces? 
Have you dealt with the possibility 
within the bilateral framework that 
the U.S. Government might ask the 
Congress for increased appropriations, 
and within this same context, has 
anything been said about the possibil- 
ity of furnishing F-18s to the air force 
or the navy? 

A. Not all of those subjects came up, 
but in one way or another, the F-18 was 
referred to in a conversation I had with 
the Defense Minister, and I know that's 
being considered here. Of course, the 
question of modernization of armed 
forces is a question closely related to the 
full entry of Spain into NATO. And that 
is one of the advantages that would 
come about as a result of such an entry. 
So that subject was only discussed very 
tangentially to the extent we discussed 
the NATO issue. 

Q. I would like to ask whether the 
U.S. Government ever saw with any 
displeasure the coming to power of 
the Socialists in Spain and second, you 
said that there was no important 
obstacle to the ratification of the 
U.S. -Spain agreement in the Cortes. 
Does this mean that there would be no 
dismantlement of any base in Spain? 

A. First, I have to congratulate the 
questioner. Upon hearing that that was 
the last question, she managed to get in 
two. 

On the first question, we, of course, 
support democracy and democratic 
values. The outcome of the democratic 
process in any country is the business of 



F!:iruary 1983 



31 



EUROPE 



the country, and we don't interfere in 
that kind of decision. That is a decision 
for the country to make. 

As to the second question, my com- 
ment would suggest that there are cer- 
tain inferences that need to be taken 
care of, in particular, I think in ratifying 
the treaty as it now stands. The Govern- 
ment of Spain would not want the im- 
plication to be drawn, since the treaty 
refers to NATO, the ratification made a 
presumption about their decision with 
regard to NATO. I think that this con- 
cern is one that can be dealt with and, 
beyond that, I think that at least so far 
as I can see in our discussions, we 
should be able to proceed. But, at any 
rate, this is a matter that will be 
negotiated out and the ambassador will 
play a strong role in that. I did not feel 
that there was anything that looked like 
a strong impediment, and neither did 
the officials of the Spanish Government 
with whom I talked. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 

LONDON. 

DEC. 17, 1982 

Secretary Pym. I've had the pleasure of 
welcoming Secretary Shultz in London. 
Any visit by a U.S. Secretary of State is 
important and is always welcome to 
Britain. It's particularly so in this case 
because in 6 months, Mr. Shultz has 
made a major mark upon the world. I 
have met him many times, and he's cer- 
tainly put his stamp on U.S. foreign 
policy. 

We've had a very useful and in- 
teresting talk. I am very glad that he ar- 
ranged his European visit in such a way 
that he concludes it here in London. We 
have discussed this morning East- West 
relations, including the change of leader- 
ship in the Soviet Union, including the 
arms control talks and the CSCE talks 
in Madrid, and also the economic aspect. 
We've also talked about the NATO 
alliance and defense issues and par- 
ticularly the issues that face the alliance 
in 1983. We also had a discussion on the 
world economy. This is, of course, 
primarily a matter for Western leaders 
and finance ministers, but as foreign 
ministers, we are inevitably involved in 
many discussions on the world economy 
which bears on how we do our business. 
We exchanged our views about that and 
look forward to the next economic sum- 
mit in May. 

We also exchanged views on the 
situation in the Middle East where, of 
course, the United States is playing a 



leading role. We are giving every sup- 
port to the beginning of the peacemak- 
ing process based on the Reagan plan 
which we regard as an opportunity that 
is absolutely vital and must not be 
missed. 

We had a brief discussion about 
Namibia and also about Central 
America. They were, certainly for me 
and for us, extremely useful talks, and I 
feel that we have advanced our under- 
standing on many matters. 

We are always in very close 
touch— I think the United States and 
Britain have always been like that — and 
Mr. Shultz and I have certainly always 
kept in very close touch, and we are cer- 
tainly going to do that in the future. So 
thank you for coming, and thank you for 
taking part in these discussions. 

Secretary Shultz. As always when 
you've made a statement describing 
something, you leave little else for me. I 
think your description is accurate and 
comprehensive. I don't have anything to 
add to it except to say that I am very 
pleased to have a chance to be here and 
talk with you, and this evening with 
Mrs. Thatcher and your colleagues. 

It is a little bit like coming home to 
me because London is where I started 
out as Secretary of State-designate. This 
is where President Reagan gave me the 
news that my life was going to change, 
so it's kind of fun to come back here and 
see London again in this perspective. 

Q. You said that you had discussed 
defense issues and NATO issues. 
Could I ask you about the issue of the 
cruise and Pershing missiles which 
may be deployed in this country later 
or next year? Is your government 
prepared to allow an element of joint 
control over the operation of those 
missiles, and if not, why not? 

Secretary Shultz. Of course, Mr. 
Pym briefed me on the discussions that 
you've had here in this country on that 
issue, and we agreed that the ar- 
rangements for a joint decisionmaking 
that have been going on here for some 
20 years and have covered U.S. nuclear 
systems in the United Kingdom work 
well. The December 1979 decision was 
taken by the alliance as a whole, and so 
all INF issues continue to be discussed 
in the alliance, and we had discussed in 
the NATO ministerial meeting and in 
bilateral discussions, but nevertheless 
within the context of the alliance, all 
manner of issues. Now, of course, Mr. 
Pym and I will be in touch on this issue 
and a full range of issues— and there 
are very many, particularly in the year 
1983— and talk about them continuously. 



But as I said, from all that I can hear 
and sense the way in which this has 
been handled has worked well, but I'll 
leave it up to Mr. Pym. 

Secretary Pym. No, I agree with 
that. It certainly has worked well for 
over 20 years now. 

Q. I think the demand being made 
in some quarters here, and I think the 
foreign secretary himself has said it 
would be highly desirable to have 
some kind of joint key arrangement, 
or duel key arrangement as it's called 
some actual decision that has to be 
taken by both governments before 
those missiles could be fired. 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think tha 
image accurately describes any ar- 
rangements that have literally been in 
place in the past. But there has been a 
wide variety of arrangements, and they 
vary by countries. I think that we have 
to look upon this as an alliance matter 
and discuss it on that basis and not get 
into further detail about right at this 
point. 

Q. The President has given an in- 
terview that has just been published 
that is being portrayed as bringing 
new pressure, heavy pressure, on 
Israel in connection with withdrawal 
from Lebanon. Can you amplify on 
that aspect of the reported interview, 
and can you tell us after your talks 
with Mr. Pym whether the United 
States can do anything beyond what i 
is already doing to bring about the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon? 

Secretary Shultz. That is one of oi 
objectives— to help bring about the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon. That's not the only objective. 

It's also our objective to help the 
Lebanese, the Government of Lebanon, 
develop itself and take control of its 
country and develop its own armed 
forces so that they can be effective 
throughout the country and reconstrud 
Lebanon both in terms of the relation- 
ships among the confessional groups ar* 
in the physical arrangements of Lebam 
into the vibrant and thriving country 
that it once was. 

Now as far as the steps that we an 
taking in Lebanon are concerned, as yc 
know, Phil Habib and Maury Draper ar 
back in the Middle East. They met witl 
Prime Minister Begin yesterday; they 
are in Beirut today, and I think that 
they are in the process of conducting 
this renewed effort on our part. I woul 
leave any commentary or coloration of 
that to them. 



32 



Department of State Bullet 



I 



EUROPE 



Q. What about the President's in- 
erview and the way that it's being 
ortrayed as new and heavy pressure 
n Israel? Could you amplify on that? 

Secretary Shultz. I think there is 
learly pressure being felt by everybody 
3 bring this result about. I had the 
riviiege of talking again with the 
'oreign Minister of Lebanon, and he 
ertainly feels — as do others in 
,ebanon — that not only do we want to 
ave this result, but it is a matter of 
rgency to bring it about speedily so 
lat on the one hand the foreign forces 
on't get unduly dug in, and on the 
ther that the emerging capacity of the 
rovernment of Lebanon to exert its 
uthority can continue to be realized. 

Q. To what extent do you 
ecognize that in these talks about 
.ebanon the Israelis want them to be 
luch more than talks about just 
withdrawal but the real direct 
olitical negotiations leading to a new 
ilationship between Lebanon and 
irael? 

Secretary Shultz. We read and we 
5ten so we realize that there are broad 
jjectives involved, and there are also 
3finite realities involved about the im- 
irtance of an atmosphere that allows 
lese confessional groups to come 
igether and for Lebanon to construct 
self as a country. And, of course, 
iyond that you have to say what does 
mean to have a new kind of relation- 
lip with a country until that country 
is been able to form itself and get 
>me coherence and have a capacity for 
iciding what it wants to do. But I 
ould say more generally that the objec- 
ve of a peaceful situation between 
;rael and its neighbors is one that we, 
I ' course, are doing everything we can 
1 1 help bring about, not only with 
' aspect to Lebanon but with respect to 
1 of its neighbors in the Middle East, 
aving peace with justice and reason- 
jle conditions is the objective, just as it 
in the efforts that the United States 
id our allies are making in other parts 
' the world. That's what we are stand- 
ig for — peace and justice. 

Q. Obviously in the weeks leading 
p to your coming here, the peace 
lovements have played an important 
art in your country and in this coun- 
ty and in Western Europe. How im- 
ortant a part did that kind of public 
isquiet about nuclear questions — how 
nportant was that at your talks to- 
ay? 

Secretary Shultz. Everyone, I 
aink, shares the hope that we can 
Dmehow construct a world that is at 



peace, that has an increasing element of 
justice in it, and which allows people to 
live without an overhang of fear that's 
generated by awesome weapons. There's 
no difference of opinion about that. We 
all share that view. 

The question is, what do you do 
about it? Because, unfortunately, we are 
not the only people around the world 
who have awesome weapons. We are 
seeking to reduce the level of these 
weapons. We are seeking to restrict the 
matter of their use. We are seeking to 
solve problems regionally around the 
world. Arms control is not the only 
thing that you have to do; you have to 
remove the reasons why people would 
want armaments. And everywhere you 
turn, I think I'm fairly stating it, the 
United States is on the side of the solu- 
tion, not on the side of the problem, and 
so that is our objective. 

We listen to people in our own coun- 
try and elsewhere, and it's been very 
useful for me in coming here and else- 
where in Europe and talking not only 
with my counterparts but many other 
people. I've gone out of my way to try 
to see people not in the government as 
well as people in the government to get 
a feeling for how people view things. We 
understand the fears that people have, 
but we also understand that when you 
are confronted with a strong aggressor, 
the worse thing that you can do is let 
your own defenses decline and let fear 
lead you into appeasement. That is a 
key, and I feel on this trip in discussions 
certainly here and elsewhere — every- 
where without any exception — a great 
sense of reassurance in the depth of 
understanding, the subtleties of under- 
standing, and the sense of determina- 
tion, unity, and cohesion that I felt in 
our alliance. 

Q. Do you feel that the peace 
movements constitute a threat to the 
U.S. policy or NATO? 

Secretary Shultz. They ought to 
present a reminder of the strength of 
conviction behind what we all presum- 
ably want, namely the kind of peace that 
has justice and right in it. 

Q. According to reports coming 
from Jerusalem, the Israeli Defense 
Minister claimed yesterday to have 
achieved a major breakthrough in the 
talks with Lebanon. You met yester- 
day with the Lebanese Foreign 
Minister. Do you share this view? 

Secretary Shultz. We didn't have 
any information about that statement 
that Mr. Sharon made, and I don't have 
any comment about it except to say that 
any genuine breakthrough, however 



derived, that will bring about a with- 
drawal of all foreign forces from Leba- 
non and contribute to the reconstruction 
of Lebanon is something that we will 
welcome. 

Q. You said that the arrangements 
for the last 20 years had worked well 
over control of nuclear weapons which 
has been the single American control 
here. But surely in the 1950s, there 
was the joint U.S. and British control 
over Thor missiles in this country. 
Why are you not prepared to allow a 
return to that system? 

Secretary Shultz. As I understand 
it, there have been a variety of ar- 
rangements and what has happened is, 
bilaterally and now of course, we have 
to consider this as an alliance matter as 
well as a bilateral matter. We keep con- 
fronting new situations, and I think the 
answer that I've given may be inter- 
preted as meaning that somehow we've 
been able to work these problems out 
and the result has worked well in 
everybody's eyes. We feel that the ar- 
rangements that were made in 1979, 
those were mutually agreed, and we are 
proceeding on that basis. But we're con- 
stantly talking not only about this but a 
variety of other issues as we move along 
in this process. 

Q. Under what conditions would 
you ask the United States for joint 
control over the firing of these 
weapons? 

Secretary Pym. The arrangements 
which Mr. Shultz has referred to are, in 
fact, joint decisionmaking. That has been 
the basis of our arrangement for the last 
20 years, and those are the arrange- 
ments to which Mr. Shultz has referred. 
I've talked to him about the views that 
were expressed in the House of Com- 
mons and elsewhere, and he's quite right 
that these are matters that have been 
decided by the alliance and are con- 
sidered in that context, as well as 
bilaterally. 

Q. When you were nominated, you 
were explained as a highly educated 
Soviet expert. I am interested, are you 
going to change a policy toward the 
Soviet Union, because they are expect- 
ing so? A lot has been written about 
that possibility — that the relations 
between the Soviet Union and the 
United States are going to be better 
than during Nixon. 

Secretary Shultz. The policy of the 
United States toward the Soviet 
Union — and I believe that broadly 



-bruary 1983 



33 



EUROPE 



speaking it's the same policy that the 
North Atlantic alliance has toward the 
Soviet Union as I see it — consists of 
four parts. 

First, that we must be realistic in 
our appraisal of what is taking place. 
The worst thing in the world you can do 
is allow wishful thinking to lead you into 
failure to realistically appraise what is 
taking place, so realism is the first 
point. 

The second point is that in the face 
of the buildup and the level of Soviet 
strength and the demonstrated willing- 
ness to use it, as for example in the in- 
vasion of Afghanistan, tell you that to 
be successful you must be strong. To de- 
fend your own values and to defend 
peace and to defend liberty and free- 
dom, you must be strong. 

Third, in the kind of world we live 
in, with the awesomeness of the threats 
particularly that have been mentioned 
here earlier, we're all aware of, we must 
also be willing to be ready to solve prob- 
lems and to work constructively for bet- 
ter relationships and for solutions to 
problems, and we are. We have negotia- 
tions taking place now as is well known 
in Geneva and Vienna and elsewhere. So 
we're ready to solve problems. 

Fourth, that we do so in the belief 
that if these problems can get on their 
way to solution and a more constructive 
relationship emerges, we can all have a 
better world with less fear and many 
other better attributes. Now with new 
leadership of the Soviet Union we, and I 
think our allies, have all sought to 
underline the third point so that they 
wouldn't miss that it's there. But we 
should not allow ourselves because of 
our interest and desire for peace and for 
freedom and for constructive dialogue to 
lose sight of the importance of being 
realistic and being strong. Those are the 
keys to peace and freedom. 

Q. At the end of your tour of 
Europe, do you now reckon that you 
have a clear policy umbrella governing 
relations with the Soviet Union and 
its allies, particularly on the economic 
front? 

Secretary Shultz. I think we have 
long had, and continue to have, a very 
good strategy umbrella, if you want to 
call it that, in the form of the NATO 
alliance and it is strong, it is unified, it 
has cohesion, and, I think at least as I 
felt, as I said before, a lot of 
reassurance on that point. We have been 
struggling together to find a better 
sense of strategy — set of objectives — on 
the security aspects of East- West trade 



and financial flows. And I do think now 
we have going, or propose to go, for- 
ward with a pretty unified view, a 
general unified view — the studies and 
the activities that we feel are the 
necessary ones to construct that 
strategy. 

We think that one of the great 
benefits of getting an overall strategy 
identified is that we will minimize the 
problems that may be caused by 
misunderstandings which often go under 
the label of you didn't consult enough or 
we didn't consult with each other. We all 
know that there is an immense amount 
of conversation — there's no lack of 
that — and at least I feel what we need is 
some sort of overall set of objectives and 
strategy, then when we consult with 
each other, we have some standards 
against which to talk, and our consulta- 
tion can be more purposeful and, there- 
fore, more fruitful. I think we have got 
that identified now and will start in on 
constructing that study. 

Q. If you have one overriding ob- 
jective for 1983. what would that be? 

Secretary Shultz. If you want to 
speak about it in broad terms, I think 
we are looking for peace with justice 
and prosperity. We haven't had any 
commentary here about the economic 
situation but I think we want to see the 
world economy expand and see progress 
in that sense. Those are our main objec- 
tives. 

Q. Could you possibly be trying to 
help Prime Minister Regain with your 
recent attacks on Israel? If not, what 
is the public pressure in aim of? 

Secretary Shultz. I have made no 
attacks on Israel, and I have made no 
comments designed to help or hinder or 
in any way be a part of the internal 
political flow of events and opinion in 
Israel. That is strictly for Israel to 
determine. I have not hestitated to say 
when I think something is wrong or that 
something is right. 

Now when it appears to me that the 
requiring of university professors to sign 
special oaths, otherwise dismissed, came 
to my attention, I said I thought that 
was wrong, and I do think it's wrong. 



I've also commented on the dismissal of 
mayors from the West Bank. It also was 
the case when moves were made to deny 
Israel credentials to the United Nations 
that in the United States, and I was 
pleased to speak for the President on 
this. We said that if the United Nations 
votes to do that, we will withdraw. We 
support Israel. So I think that we, I cer- 
tainly and the President certainly, sup- 
port Israel, the security of Israel, the 
purposefulness, the idea, and the ideal o 
Israel. I've been there; I know many 
people there, but that doesn't mean that 
no matter what Israel does or says, 
we're going to applaud it. I think we 
have to say if they do something we 
think isn't right. Maybe we're good 
enough friends to be able to say so. 

Q. As a result of these talks this 
morning, has the situation in regard 
to control of the cruise missiles 
changed from what it was 2 nights 
ago when you were questioned about 
it in Parliament, and if not, is it likel; 
to change in the future as a result of 
these conversations? 

Secretary Pym. No, it hasn't 
changed. As Secretary Shultz said, we 
discussed this point, and I told him the 
views that were expressed in our debate 
the day before yesterday. And the fact 
of the matter is that the decision we 
took in 1979 was taken by the alliance 
and included these joint decision ar- 
rangements with the United States that 
had existed before. But anyway we 
discussed that aspect but we discussed 
many other aspects of INF [intermedi- 
ate-range nuclear forces] and so there ii 
no change in the situation. Is it likely tc 
change? There is no particular likelihooi 
of any change. As I say, we exchanged 
views about it but the position remains 
as it was. 

Q. If I understood correctly, the I 
readout of the meeting yesterday witlfl 
the Lebanese Foreign Minister, he ex 
pressed concern that continued Israel 
presence in Lebanon, in effect, was 
leading to annexation of part of 
Lebanon. Do you share that concern? 
Is there a real possibility? 

Secretary Shultz. I didn't make the 
comment so I don't know where your 
readout comes from. I only made the , 
comment about the sense of urgency, ■;! 
but I do think it must be a matter of 
concern, and I am not referring to the 



34 



Department of State Bullet! 



EUROPE 



neeting I had with the foreign minister 
;hat you have foreign troops in your 
country and they stay there and they 
;tay there longer and they stay there 
onger and when they stay they get 
embedded and they have developed an 
nfrastructure and so on. So this is one 
)f the reasons why I think there is an 
irgency to getting the foreign forces 
)ut. Not just the Israeli forces; the 
sraeli forces are the most recent en- 
,rants. The PLO has been there for 
luite a long time, established a state 
vithin a state, and was very disruptive 
)f the ability of Lebanon to operate as a 
country, and the Syrians have been 
here for a long time. So it's all foreign 
brces that we are seeking to get out of 
,he country. 



Economic Health of the 
Western Alliance 



'Press releases relating to this trip not 
irinted here are Nos. 384 of Dec. 15, 1982, 
;91 of Dec. 16, and 403 of Dec. 28. 

2Press release 371 of Dec. 8. 

sPress release 372 of Dec. 9. 

*Press release 373 of Dec. 9. 

^The Greek delegation recalled its posi- 
ion on various aspects of this declaration 
ariginal in text]. 

^Greece reserves its position on these two 
laragraphs [original in text]. 

'Greece has expressed its views on this 
entence which were recorded in the record 
f the meeting [original in text]. 

^Greece recalled its position on various 
spects of this paragraph [original in text]. 

'Press release 375 of Dec. 14. 

'"Press release 376 of Dec. 14. 

"Press release 377 of Dec. 13. 

Impress release 383 of Dec. 14. 

"Press release 385 of Dec. 15. 

'^Press release 399 of Dec. 21. 

'^Press release 392. 

'"Press release 402 of Dec. 27. ■ 



by Arthur F. Burns 

Address before the Deutche Atlan- 
tische Gesellschaft, in Bonn, Federal 
Republic of Germany, on December 9. 
1982. Mr. Bums is the U.S. Ambassador 
to the Federal Republic of Germany. 



I wish to thank the Deutsche Atlantische 
Gesellschaft. for the opportunity to ad- 
dress your members and friends this 
evening. Since its establishment a 
quarter of a century ago, your society 
has faithfully supported the fundamental 
objectives of the North Atlantic alliance. 
You have never wavered in your devo- 
tion to peace or in your efforts to 
espouse the principles of individual free- 
dom and democracy that constitute the 
moral foundation of NATO. In so doing, 
you have earned the gratitude of 
enlightened citizens of both your country 
and mine. 

My purpose this evening, beyond ex- 
pressing appreciation of your contribu- 
tion to preserving international peace 
and freedom, is to discuss some of the 
economic issues that have recently been 
troubling the Western alliance. Eco- 
nomic factors inevitably have a signifi- 
cant impact on political attitudes that 
prevail in our respective countries, and 
they, in turn, can be decisive for the 
military effectiveness of the alliance. In 
view of the immense role of the United 
States in world affairs, I shall concen- 
trate on the economic relations between 
the United States and its European 
allies. That these relations have been 
rather strained of late is a matter of 
common knowledge. That is reason 
enough for trying to see the American- 
European relationship in a sound per- 
spective. Beyond that, it is vital to our 
alliance to consider how well its eco- 
nomic underpinnings are being main- 
tained and protected. 

Since the end of 1979, both the 
United States and Western Europe have 
been experiencing considerable economic 
sluggishness or actual recession. That 
Western economies are vastly stronger 
than the economies of the Soviet bloc is 
a matter of considerable importance, but 



this can hardly justify complacency on 
our part. What needs to concern us is 
the state of our own economic health- 
how best to preserve and improve it. My 
first task this evening, therefore, is to 
examine briefly the sources of recent 
difficulties in the West. 

The oil price shocks of 1973 and 
1978 have certainly contributed to our 
economic problems. So too have other 
developments in the international 
marketplace, particularly the increasing 
challenge of Japan to some of our key 
industries as well as the new competi- 
tion for a variety of Western manufac- 
tures from the more advanced of the 
developing nations. These external in- 
fluences, however, have been less im- 
portant for Western economies than dif- 
ficulties of our own making. 

During the early decades of the post- 
war period, the fiscal and monetary 
policies of Western democracies were 
highly successful in maintaining 
reasonably full employment and in im- 
proving social conditions. These very 
successes tempted governments during 
the 1970s to respond to the never-ending 
public pressures for governmental bene- 
fits by risking large budget deficits and 
easy money in the hope of expanding 
social welfare programs still further as 
well as attending to new environmental 
concerns. But by attempting to extract 
more and more goods and services from 
our economies without adding corre- 
spondingly to our willingness to work 
and save, we in the West inevitably 
released the destructive forces of infla- 
tion. 

Under these conditions, it should not 
be surprising that tensions over eco- 
nomic issues have at times seriously 
tested the harmony that has generally 
characterized the political relations be- 
tween the United States and its Euro- 
pean allies. When our individual econo- 
mies are booming, there is little 
pressure on governments from their 
business or agricultural communities to 
protest or counteract activities being 
pursued in other countries. Such pres- 
sures tend to mount, however, in times 
of economic adversity. Difficulties that 
would be passed over under prosperous 
conditions then take on some import- 
ance—occasionally even a large import- 
ance. Gentle voices of spokesmen of eco- 
nomic interests are then apt to become 
loud and strident, and even the 



■ebruary 1983 



35 



EUROPE 



customary composure of academicians 
and high government officials tends to 
suffer. Human nature being what it is, 
that has been the usual experience of 
mankind, and we have not escaped it 
this time. 

U.S. Monetary Policy 

There is, first of all, the issue of 
American interest rates. There can be 
no dispute over the fact that these rates 
have been extraordinarily high in recent 
years. Nor can it be denied that they 
served to attract funds to the United 
States from other parts of the world, 
that this movement of funds tended to 
raise interest rates in some European 
countries, and that business investment 
suffered to some degree as a conse- 
quence. If European complaints had 
stopped at this point, no one could 
reasonably quarrel; but many Euro- 
peans, including prominent government 
officials, at times went further and 
either stated or implied that American 
interest rates were responsible for the 
economic troubles in their countries. 
That line of thinking overlooked the fact 
that high American interest rates could 
not be responsible simultaneously for the 
still higher interest rates in France and 



curbing the growth of money supplies. It 
is, of course, true that the high interest 
rates were in large part a result of our 
restrictive monetary policy. That does 
not mean, however, that we sought high 
interest rates. 

On the contrary, the immediate ef- 
fects of the restrictive monetary policy 
on interest rates and economic activity 
were by no means welcome, but this 
policy did achieve its fundamental pur- 
pose of curbing inflation in the United 
States. Since 1979, when the consumer 
price level rose more than 13%, the rate 
of inflation has moved steadily lower. By 
coming down to less than 5% this year, 
the inflation rate in the United States is 
now one of the lowest in the world. 

The success of monetary policy in 
subduing inflation eventually made it 
possible for American interest rates to 
move to lower levels— partly through the 
inner workings of the marketplace and 
partly through adjustments of policy. 
The slowing of inflation encouraged the 
authorities to reduce monetary 
restraints, and the deepening of reces- 
sion impelled them to do so. Economic 
conditions in the United States were, of 
course, primarily responsible for the 
consequent decline of interest rates, but 
our monetary authorities were also 



Economic conditions in the United States were, 
of course, primarily responsible for the consequent 
decline of interest rates, but our monetary 
authorities were also mindful of the benefits that 
the lower rates could bring to Europe. 



the drastically lower interest rates in 
Japan. Needless to say, factors in- 
digenous to individual countries— among 
them, the propensity of the public to 
save and the state of governmental 
budgets— always exercise some influence 
on interest rates. 

Much of European criticism of 
American interest rates also stemmed 
from a misunderstanding of American 
policy objectives. Seeking to end the 
havoc wrought by inflation, our authori- 
ties proceeded on a principle that has 
been tested across the centuries— name- 
ly, that stoppage of inflation requires 



mindful of the benefits that the lower 
rates could bring to Europe. Since last 
year, when the rate that commercial 
banks charge their prime borrowers 
reached 21.5%, the prime rate has fallen 
to 11.5%. Open-market, short-term rates 
have been cut in half. Long-term rates 
on corporate bonds and home mortgages 
declined less, but they too have fallen 
materially. The greater part of these in- 
terest rate adjustments has occurred 
since June, and European rates followed 
American rates downward— although 
not to the same degree. As these finan- 
cial developments unfolded, Europeans 
joined Americans in wishing that in- 
terest rates would move even lower, but 
what had previously been a significant 



source of friction within the alliance vir- ' 
tually ceased being troublesome. j 

Another recent irritant to some 
members of the alliance was the stand 
taken by the American Government on 
intervention in foreign exchange | 

markets. The effectiveness of such , 

maneuvers in stabilizing foreign curren- '^ 
cies had long been a subject of serious , 
debate among financial experts, in- ^ 

eluding central bankers. Nevertheless, , 
governments of leading countries kept | 
intervening with some frequency during . 
the 1970s in the hope of smoothing out '. 
some of the short-run fluctuations in the 
exchange market. Being critical of these , 
policies, the Reagan Administration an- ' 
nounced soon after it came into power 
that, in its judgment, foreign currencies , 
are best left to the free market and thai | 
it would, therefore, refrain from inter- , 
vening except under highly exceptional , 
circumstances. Not a few financiers and 
government officials welcomed this deci 
sion, and even some who questioned it 
were more concerned with the political '. 
consequences of nonintervention than ', 
with its intrinsic economic merits. Then ^ 
were, nevertheless, some determined 
European critics of the new American 
policy, and they made their influence 
felt— most notably at the summit 
meeting held last June at Versailles. ] 

While Americans held to their basic 
position at that meeting, they did pro- | 
pose that a committee of international 
experts study the results of past ex- 
perience with intervention. By agreeing 
to such a study, all participants tacitly 
admitted the possibility that some of 
their views on intervention might need 
to be revised. Since then, the United 
States has gone further in the direction 
favored by its critics by actually inter- 
vening several times— albeit on a modes, 
scale— in the market. There is reason fo 
hoping that the foreign exchange study 
now under way may further contribute 
to narrowing the differences between 
the United States and some of its allies.^ 
And if goodwill should be aided by good 
fortune, so that both interest rates and , 
inflation kept coming down in our 
respective countries, the fluctuations of, 
exchange rates would, of themselves, 
narrow and thus reduce both the im- , 
pulse to intervene and the inclination to. 
fret over the issue. 



Economic Relations With the U.S.S.E 

A far more serious conflict between the 
United States and its allies was stirred 
by the decision of several European 



36 



Department of State Bulleti 



EUROPE 



untries to support the construction of 
Siberian natural gas pipeline. This con- 
ct reached a climax when the Ameri- 
n Government, feeling morally out- 
ged over the Soviet Union's role in 
ppressing the newly won freedoms of 
e Polish people, proceeded to forbid 
ipments by American firms of 
iterials and equipment needed to build 
e pipeline. This prohibition was later 
tended to European subsidiaries and 
ensees of American firms. These ac- 
ms led to acrimonious charges and 
bates, and some political observers on 
th sides of the Atlantic felt that 
nerican reaction to the crisis in Poland 
ly have given rise to a crisis of the 
iance. 

That danger, fortunately, was sur- 
)unted. Not only was damage to the 
iance kept down, but the pipeline con- 
iversy actually helped to steer 
estern thinking about foreign policy 
to a sounder track. 

In the course of pondering the sanc- 
ns imposed against the Soviet Union, 
3 American Government undertook a 
/iew of Western economic relations 
th the Soviet Union in the hope of 
veloping a policy that, unlike the pipe- 
e sanctions, could prove of lasting 
nefit to the alliance. It soon became 
ar that this would require more 
iolute dealing with elements of in- 
lerence in Western foreign policy, 
e reasoning that led to this conclusion 
s straightforward. On the one hand, 
iTO countries were devoting, year 
er year, vast resources to our com- 
in defense against the Soviet threat, 
nultaneously, however, partly through 
vate banks and partly through 
vfernment agencies, we in the West 
Dt lending during the past decade vast 
; Tis of money to the Soviet Union and 

satellites. At times, this was even be- 
; done at subsidized interest rates. In 
I w of the high priority that the Soviet 
1 lion assigns to its military establish- 
: 'nt, the financial resources that the 
I ist so liberally put at the disposal of 
:? Soviets thus indirectly helped to 
■ engthen their already formidable 
: litary establishment. To make matters 
irse, the Soviet Union continued to 
t ce advantage of the weaknesses in our 
: itrols on the export of militarily 
I ated products and technology. 

These considerations were per- 
: tently pressed by the American 
[ vernment on its allies during the past 



year. For a time, they were resisted by 
European governments, partly because 
of displeasure over the pipeline sanc- 
tions, partly also because of concern that 
the American initiative could lead to an 
East- West trade war. But as the 
American Government made clear that 
its basic aim was simply to steer 
Western policy onto a path that was 
more consistent with allied security in- 
terests, controversy and recrimination 
gradually yielded to quiet voices of 
reason. 

On November 13, President Reagan 
was able to announce that agreement 
had been reached on the need to con- 
sider allied security issues when making 
trade arrangements with the Soviet 
Union. More specifically, the United 
States and its partners agreed: 

First, that new contracts for Soviet 
natural gas would not be undertaken 
during the course of an urgent study of 
alternative sources of energy; 

Second, that existing controls on 
the transfer of strategic items to the 
Soviets will be strengthened; 

Third, that procedures for monitor- 
ing financial relations with the Soviets 
will be promptly established; and 

Fourth, that the allies will work to 
harmonize their export credit policies. 

In the eyes of the American Govern- 
ment, these measures will promote allied 
interests more effectively than the pipe- 
line sanctions. The President, therefore, 
concluded his statement by announcing 
their removal. Long and difficult 
negotiations on ways of carrying out the 
agreed measures are undoubtedly still 
ahead of us, but the pipeline crisis as 
such has fortunately come to an end. 

Defense Burdensharing 

In other areas of economic policy— par- 
ticularly defense burdensharing and 
trade issues— the United States con- 
tinues to have major differences with its 
European partners. Difficulties of this 
type have troubled the alliance almost 
from its beginning; and, in one form or 
another, they are likely to remain 
troublesome in the years ahead. Even 
here, however, we have generally 
managed to work out our problems, and 
we have had some limited successes dur- 
ing the past year that are noteworthy. 

The distribution of defense burdens 
among allies inevitably raises difficult 
questions of equity. Many Americans, 



especially Members of Congress, have 
long felt that the United States is bear- 
ing an excessive part of the heavy costs 
of the alliance. In view of the financial 
stringency that has developed in my 
country, such criticisms of Europe have 
recently intensified. Our NATO partners 
usually respond by reminding us that 
their spending on defense rose steadily 
during the 1970s while real American 
spending kept falling off. That is entire- 
ly true, but it does not tell the whole 
story. Official statistics indicate that 
defense spending reached 7.9% of the 
gross domestic product in the United 
States during 1970. The highest corre- 
sponding figure for each of our major 
allies fell short of 5% in that year. While 
the defense outlays of the United States 
decreased during the 1970s, this gap has 
never been closed. Confronted with 
these facts, European governments are 
inclined to observe that monetary 
figures fail to capture all costs involved 
in the defense area, particularly the con- 
scription of soldiers that exists in most 
of their countries. Such remonstrances, 
however, are not always accepted by 
Americans, as the lively discussions that 
have been resounding in our congres- 
sional halls indicate. 

Whatever the merits of ongoing 
debates among members of the alliance, 
the Reagan Administration recognizes 
that some of the military proposals now 
before Congress would seriously weaken 
the alliance. Not only that, they would 
also encourage the Russians to remain 
unyielding in the vital arms control 
negotiations now under way in Geneva. 
Those dangers have not escaped the at- 
tention of European leaders. In fact, 
many Europeans have long shared the 
widespread American belief that Europe 
is not doing enough for its own or for 
the common defense. Financial stringen- 
cy is nowadays no less a problem in 
Europe than in the United States. In 
spite of that, the German Government 
has recently taken steps that should help 
Americans to see the problem of defense 
burdensharing in a better perspective. 
Several months ago the Federal 
Republic of Germany signed a treaty 
with the United States under which it 
agreed to commit 90,000 reservists in 
support of American combat forces in 
the event of war. More recently, 
Minister Manfred Woerner announced 
that the new German budget provides a 
significant additional contribution for 
constructing vital NATO military 



FiOruary1983 



37 



EUROPE 



facilities in Europe. These measures had 
long been urged by Americans on the 
German Government. The fact that they 
liave been adopted at a difficult time 
should certainly help to quiet American 
concerns. 

International Trade 

Differences between the United States 
and its allies over international trade 
issues also have a long and checkered 
history. From the end of World War II 
through the 1970s, the broad trend of 
Western policy has been toward increas- 
ing liberalization of international trade 
and investment, and there can be little 
doubt that this trend contributed enor- 
mously to the prosperity of the West 
and other parts of the world. While the 
United States led the world toward an 
open trading system and unrestricted 
foreign investment, this policy— except 
for agriculture— was generally supported 
in Europe, particularly in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Unfortunately, 
but not surprisingly, the deep recession 
of recent times has by now stirred up 
strong protectionist sentiment in many 
European countries and also in the 
United States. 

The Reagan Administration has 
stoutly resisted congressional moves 
toward protectionism— thus far with 
considerable although incomplete suc- 
cess. During the recent ministerial 
meeting of the parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 
United States fought especially hard for 
an unequivocal commitment by the 
world's trade ministers to phase out ex- 
isting measures restricting international 
trade and to refrain from taking new 
restrictive measures. The debates over 
this principle and on specific trade issues 
were protracted and at times bitter, but, 
at the end, American initiatives brought 
only modest results. Assuming profes- 
sorial garb, Mr. [William E.] Brock, the 
American trade representative, judged 
the result as deserving hardly more than 
a grade of "C"— an assessment that few 
informed observers have questioned. 

From an American viewpoint, the 
most disappointing aspect of this 
meeting was the failure to convince the 
European Economic Community to 
modify some aspects of its agricultural 
policy. For many years the Community 



has maintained farm prices above the 
world level. Surpluses therefore 
developed, and in order to move them 
into world markets the Community sub- 
sidized their export. As long as this 
policy was confined to protecting farm 
sales within the Community, the United 
States accepted it— although not without 
protest. But once the subsidization led to 
large exports to third-country markets, 
a more serious problem arose for 
American farmers and agricultural ex- 
porters of other countries. With farm in- 
comes in the United States currently at 
their lowest level since the 1930s, 
American protests against the Com- 
munity's agricultural policy have become 



The Reagan Admini- 
stration has stoutly re- 
sisted congressional 
moves toward protec- 
tionism — thus far with 
considerable although 
incomplete success. 



increasingly insistent. The Community, 
however, has refused to budge, main- 
taining, among other things, that the 
issue of its subsidies had already been 
settled in earlier negotiations. 

This and other arguments of the 
Community have not softened American 
attitudes; and unless this agricultural 
controversy is soon settled, there is a 
serious possibility that the Congress will 
pass retaliatory legislation next year. 
This would be so damaging for both the 
United States and Europe that I con- 
tinue to believe that some mutual accom- 
modation will be worked out. 

Such a result, indeed, was achieved 
in connection with another trade dispute 
that for a time resisted every attempt at 
resolution. For many years the world 
steel industry has suffered from excess 
capacity and, as so often happens under 
such conditions, various countries— in- 
cluding some in Europe— made export 
subsidies available to their steel pro- 
ducers. As a consequence, large quan- 
tities of steel produced with the benefit 
of government subsidies have penetrated 
the American market in recent years. 
American steel manufacturers, who do 



not receive subsidies, sought to limit thi 
vexing competition. They took advan- 
tage of a law that enables an industry t 
veto certain governmental efforts to 
work out trade arrangements with othe 
countries. Despite this formidable 
obstacle, the American Government 
finally reached an agreement with the 
European Commission that imposes 
moderate quotas on exports of various 
steel products to the United States. 

To me, as to other confirmed free 
traders, this agreement has brought lit- 
tle joy. However, the practical choice 
that both Americans and Europeans 
faced in this instance was not between 
protectionism and free trade, but rathe 
between degrees and kinds of protec- 
tionism. If the negotiations on steel 
quotas had failed, existing American la 
would have required prompt imposition 
of punitive duties on steel imports. 
Worse still, it seemed likely that in tha 
event the Congress would legislate still 
more drastic protectionist measures. Tl 
negotiated settlement cleai ly violated 
the salutary principle of free trade, but 
it also forestalled more serious conse- 
quences. To this extent, it is not only a 
tolerable arrangement, but one that ha: 
served to reduce political tensions be- 
tween the United States and its allies. 



Economic Outlook 

The conclusion that I feel can justly be 
drawn from my review of the recent 
steel and other economic disputes withi 
the alliance is reassuring. To be sure, 
there have been excesses of political 
rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic 
and, occasionally, misguided actions as 
well. Nevertheless, the United States 
and its European allies have succeeded 
in working out— or at least in muting— 
most of their troublesome differences 
over economic issues. Our ability to ac- 
complish this mutual accommodation 
under difficult conditions demonstrates 
that the moral, political, and security ir 
terests that unite us are strong enough 
to overcome even divisive economic 
issues. That, at any rate, has proved tc 
be the case thus far, and from that we 
can surely draw encouragement for the 
future. 

We must temper, however, any fee 
ing of optimism that international 
economic conditions will improve so 
much in the near future that they will 1 
unlikely to cause or intensify political 



38 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



trains within the alliance. It is by now 
/idely recognized that the weakness of 
he international economy during the 
ast 3 years is the aftermath of the in- 
iationary pressures released during the 
970s. It is not so clearly understood, 
owever, that our recent economic diffi- 
ulties reflect more than the normal 
icissitudes of the business cycle. They 
eflect also a certain loss of business 
ynamism— that is, a gradual weakening 
f the underlying forces of economic 
rowth in the Western world. 

Liberal fiscal and monetary policies 
ad served us well over a long genera- 
on in fostering full employment and 
nproving the social environment. They 
light have continued to work beneficial- 
' if they had not been carried to excess, 
ut, unfortunately, traditional rules of 
nancial prudence were thrown to the 
inds. As a result, our Western 
:onomies have become so highly sen- 
tive to the dangers of inflation that 
oeral financial policies can no longer be 
)unted on to perform their earlier con- 
.ructive function. 

Of late, government and business 
linking in the Western world has 
icused on creating an environment that 
more conducive to business innovation 
id private capital investment than it 
is been in recent years. Responsible 
aders in our respective countries fre- 
lently emphasize not only the need to 
"actice moderation in the monetary 
•ea, but also the need to bring about 
)me reduction from the high levels that 
3th government spending and taxes 
ive reached relative to the size of our 
!spective national incomes. Even 
ranee, which moved for a while in 
lother direction, has recently adopted a 
ither restrictive monetary policy, 
3sides announcing the intention to 
^strain further expansion of budgetary 
jficits. With earlier economic policies 
3w in general disrepute in the West, 
id the newer policies not yet fully 
'sted, deep concern about the economic 
itlook has spread during the past year 
* two in the United States as well as 
iroughout Western Europe. 

Such pessimism can be overdone. In 
le United States, at least, the aggre- 
ate output of the economy has re- 
,iained virtually unchanged during the 
ast 6 months or so, and there are now 
umerous indications that the ground- 
ork for recovery has been laid. As 



noted earlier, both inflation and interest 
rates have come down sharply. Stock 
and bond prices have risen dramatically, 
thereby adding hundreds of billions of 
dollars to the net worth of individuals 
and business entities. Of late, consumer 
spending for goods and services has in- 
creased modestly. Residential construc- 
tion has been moving upward again this 
year; home sales have recently revived; 
and the financial condition of mortgage- 
lending institutions has improved. The 
upward climb of wages has slowed 
materially; industrial productivity has 
recently perked up; and corporate 
profits have begun to increase. These 
improvements have been offset thus far 



throughout the West must now realize 
that their lending policies, both at home 
and abroad, were excessively liberal dur- 
ing the 1970s. They will consequently be 
more cautious lenders— perhaps ex- 
cessively cautious lenders— in the years 
immediately ahead. 

Third, many of the less developed 
countries— not only Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina, which lately have figured so 
heavily in the press— are at present 
unable to make timely payments of the 
interest or principal that is due on their 
overextended indebtedness. 

These financial difficulties constitute 
a grave, but I believe still manageable. 



Responsible leaders in our respective countries 
frequently emphasize not only the need to practice 
moderation in the monetary area, but also the need 
to bring about some reduction from the high levels 
that both government spending and taxes have 
reached relative to the size of our respective na- 
tional incomes. 



by sharp deterioration of merchandise 
exports and business investment in new 
plants and equipment. Nevertheless, it 
seems likely that a gradual recovery of 
aggregate production and employment 
will get under way in the United States 
within the next few months. 

With the possible exception of Great 
Britain, the immediate outlook for 
Europe is less favorable, in large part 
because of the greater rigidity of its 
labor markets. But it is reasonable to 
expect that any improvement in the 
American economy also will be felt 
before too many months pass in 
Western Europe. 

Unemployment, nevertheless, will 
remain high in the West for an uncom- 
fortable period, since the pace of 
recovery is likely to be slow in the pres- 
ent instance. There are compelling 
reasons for this gradualness. 

First, there are as yet hardly any 
signs that contracts for business con- 
struction or orders for business equip- 
ment have begun to increase either in 
the United States or in Western Europe. 

Second, most of the larger banks 



danger to the international banking 
system. Under the best of circum- 
stances, however, great austerity will 
need to be practiced in many of the less 
developed countries, and their reduced 
imports will inevitably restrict the pace 
of Western economic recovery over the 
next 2 or 3 years, if not longer. 

If my assessment of the economic 
outlook is anywhere near the mark, 
political tensions on account of economic 
difficulties may well continue to trouble 
the alliance. To make progress on eco- 
nomic issues in the years immediately 
ahead, it is particularly important that 
every country avoid "beggar-thy- 
neighbor" policies. We cannot afford to 
think in terms of winners and losers 
when it comes to solving our common 
problems. It is essential, therefore, that 
member countries of the alliance 
mobilize the vast economic and political 
statesmanship that is at their disposal. 
Cooperation among economic ministries, 
finance ministries, central banks, private 



?bruary 1983 



39 



EUROPE 



commercial banks, and international 
financial agencies, which has not always 
been close, must become very much 
closer. The heads of Western govern- 
ments, who thus far have been reason- 
ably successful in controlling the disease 
of protectionism, must work still more 
earnestly toward this vital objective. 
Meetings among members of the foreign 
policy and defense establishments of the 
alliance must occur still more frequently 
and become more thorough, as well as 
more timely, so that misunderstandings 
among their governments are kept to a 
minimum. 

These, ladies and gentlemen, are the 
paths to confidence in the security and 
prosperity of the industrial democracies 
that are joined in the brotherhood of the 
Atlantic alliance. ■ 



Visit of Portugal's Prime IVIinister 




Prime Minister Francisco Pinto 
Balsemao of the Republic of Portugal 
made an official visit to Washington, 
D.C., December H-15. 1982. to meet with 
President Reagan and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Balsemao following their meeting on 
December 15.^ 

President Reagan 

Prime Minister Balsemao and I first met 
last June at the NATO summit in Bonn. 
This, however, has been our first oppor- 
tunity to talk at length, and we've had a 
lot to discuss. Our exchange was excep- 
tionally useful and harmonious. After 
these discussions it's now even more 
clear why our two countries have been 
such hard-and-fast allies for so many 
years. 

The relationship between Portugal 
and the United States is one of common 
values, mutual respect, and broad 
cooperation. In our meeting and the 
working lunch which followed, we 
covered a broad range of international 
topics and found substantial agreement. 

Among other subjects, we discussed 
our defense cooperation, which goes 
back many years. We're now in the proc- 
ess of negotiating a new security 
cooperation agreement to broaden and 
strengthen our collaboration on our com- 
mon defense objectives. 

Portugal and the United States 
share a common responsibility for the 
defense of the West. And our security 



relationship is important to both coun- 
tries, as well as to the NATO alliance. 
The prime minister has explained to me 
the various military modernization needs 
of his country, and I have reaffirmed the 
U.S. commitment to help Portugal to 
meet these goals. 

We also discussed the economic 
assistance which the United States has 
provided to Portugal over the years. 
This continuing assistance is an impor- 
tant expression of our desire to befriend 
and help the Portuguese people. We 
agreed that the current negotiations on 
the security cooperation agreement 
should lead to an early and mutually 
satisfactory conclusion. 

We also discussed each country's ini- 
tiatives in southern Africa and the 
unique perspective that Portugal brings 
to these issues, especially in view of its 
historic ties with Angola and Mozam- 
bique. The prime minister and his 
government have been most generous in 
sharing with us some valuable insights 
drawn from their extensive experience 
in the area. We shall continue to consult 
our Portuguese friends in the future. 

Finally, and perhaps above all, as 
one democratic leader to another, I've 
expressed to the prime minister my per- 
sonal admiration and that of all 
Americans for the continued progress of 
democracy in Portugal. The Portuguese 
experience has shown how, given a 
chance, people will choose freedom. Tha 
the progress worked so well in Portugal 
is a tribute to the Portuguese people 
with their love of freedom, their high 
ideals, and high civic and political 
responsibility. 

We're delighted with their success, 
and we certainly are proud to continue 
calling them friends and very happy to 
welcome the prime minister here today. 

Prime Minister Balsemao 

I'm thankful to President Reagan for tht 
invitation he addressed to me to come tc 
Washington, providing a timely oppor- 
tunity to discuss bilateral relations be- 
tween Portugal and the United States 
and to exchange views on international 
items and matters of mutual interest. 



40 



Department of State Bulletir i 



EUROPE 



The summary of our talks was bril- 
iantly given by the President, and so 
his allows me to concentrate only on 
ome of the points which were raised. 

First, I would like to fully endorse 
he President's assessment of our rela- 
ionship and of the principles on which it 
3 based. It is not by sheer coincidence 
hat a sound friendship between Por- 
ugal and the United States has existed 
or 200 years. And it is still showing a 
ynamic vitality, as we all know and as 
his visit demonstrates. We in Portugal 
)ok forward to working in close 
ooperation with the United States and 
Dr that effort we count very much on 
he strong Portuguese-American com- 
lunity living and working here in the 
Inited States. 

Our interests and concern about the 
volution of the situation in southern 
tfrica has led us to express our view- 
oint that peace and stability in that 
rea can be achieved only through 
alanced economic development and 
jspect for the security of all countries 
Dncerned. I was also very interested in 
earing the President's assessment of 
is recent trip to South America and in 
icchanging views on this region, which 



is also of particular interest for Por- 
tugal. 

I had the opportunity to fully brief 
the President on the recent political 
evolution of the situation in Portugal, on 
our economic situation, also, and on the 
development of our negotiations to join 
the European Economic Community. In 
the present political stability of my coun- 
try, opens new perspectives for more 
cooperation and more constructive 
cooperation with the United States and 
with the free world. 

We also discussed in detail our 
security cooperation regarding which we 
have been engaged in extensive negotia- 
tions. These talks have now reached an 
important stage as we have just begun 
to renegotiate the Azores agreement. 
Portugal is a reliable partner which 
wants to fully assume its responsibilities 
in security terms, expects within this 
context a clear understanding from its 
American alliance. 



'Made to reporters assembled at the 
South Portico of the White House (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 20, 1982). ■ 



11th Report on Cyprus 



[ESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
fOV. 30, 1982' 

1 accordance with the provisions of Public 
aw 9.5-384, I am submitting the following 
!port on progress made during the past 60 
ays toward reaching a negotiated settlement 
f the Cyprus problem. 

Intercommunal negotiations resumed on 
ovember 9 following a one and one-half 
lonth recess and continue to focus on 
irious elements of the U.N. Secretary 
eneral's evaluation document. The two par- 
es remain committed to these 
.N. -sponsored talks and to working for 
rogress in this forum. We continue to 
elieve that it represents the most fruitful 
lurse for negotiating progress. The parties 
re engaged in a genuine dialogue which has 
lade it possible for each side to define its 
ositions. 

On October 6, Secretary Shultz and 
ypriot President Kyprianou met in New 
ork during the United Nations General 
-ssembly and exchanged views on efforts to 
;ach a settlement to the Cyprus problem. In 



addition, Mr. Christian A. Chapman, a senior 
Foreign Service Officer newly appointed by 
the Secretary of State as U.S. Special Cyprus 
Coordinator, traveled in early November to 
Cyprus where he met with President 
Kyprianou, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, 
the intercommunal negotiators, and U.N. 
Special Representative Gobbi. Mr. Chapman 
will coordinate our support for the efforts of 
the Secretary General and Ambassador 
Gobbi. 

I wish once again to affirm my commit- 
ment, and that of this Administration, to the 
search for a just and lasting solution to the 
problems of the people of Cyprus. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



Day of Prayer for Poland 



A PROCLAMATION' 

December 13 will mark one year since the 
Polish military authorities, under intense 
Soviet pressure, put an end to Poland's ex- 
periment in peaceful change. During this 
year, the military authorities, employing 
force, have intimidated and ultimately 
dissolved the free trade unions with which 
the Polish Government had signed solemn ac- 
cords but a short time before. Thus, a gen- 
uine labor movement was suppressed by a 
government of generals who claim to repre- 
sent the working class. Their victory, such as 
it is, can only be a seeming one. The brave 
people of Poland have learned during a cen- 
tury and a half of foreign occupation to main- 
tain their national spirit and to resist 
succumbing to coercion. We are not deceived 
for an instant that the silence which has now 
descended on expressions of free opinion in 
Poland reflects in any way the actual state of 
mind of the Polish people. The censored press 
and media do not speak on their behalf. 
Solidarity may be technically outlawed but its 
ideals of free trade unionism and nonviolent 
change will never be destroyed. 

This weekend offers Americans a special 
opportunity to honor the Polish people and to 
demonstrate our support for their struggle 
for the right to determine their destiny 
without interference by dictatorships, sup- 
ported and incited from the outside. 

'Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby designate December 12, 1982, as A 
Day of Prayer for Poland and Solidarity With 
the Polish People. 

I invite the people of the United States to 
observe this day by offering prayers for the 
people of Poland and by participating in ap- 
propriate ceremonies and activities to 
demonstrate our continuing support for their 
aspirations for greater freedom. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this 10th day of December, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-two, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and seventh. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair- 
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, 1982). ■ 



'No. 5004 of Dec. 10, 1982 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 13). ■ 



ibruary 1983 



41 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Bill of Rights Day, 
Human Rights Day 
and Week, 1982 



A PROCLAMATION! 

On December 15, 1791, our Founding 
Fathers celebrated the ratification of the first 
ten Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States— a Bill of Rights which from 
that moment forward helped shape a nation 
unique in the annals of history. The Bill of 
Rights became the formal and legal expres- 
sion of our liberties and of the principles, em- 
bodied in the Declaration of Independence, 

The Founding Fathers derived their prin- 
ciples of limited government from a belief in 
natural law, that is, the concept that our 
Creator had ordained a framework for socie- 
ty griving great importance to individual 
freedom, expression, and responsibility. They 
held that each person had certain natural 
rights bestowed on him by God. As Jefferson 
put it, "The God who gave us life gave us 
liberty." 

It is with glad hearts and thankful minds 
that on Bill of Rights Day we recognize and 
honor this great gift of liberty bequeathed to 
posterity by the Founding Fathers. 

One hundred and fifty-seven years later, 
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. By jointly celebrating this anniver- 
sary with Bill of Rights Day, we acknowledge 
the necessary link between human rights and 
constitutional democracy. As stated in the 
Universal Declaration, we must staunchly 
pursue our conviction that freedom is not the 
sole prerogative of the fortunate few, but the 
inalienable and universal right of all human 
beings. Throughout history and from all parts 
of the globe, man's instinctive desire for 
freedom and true self-determination have 
surfaced again and again. Democracy has 
provided the best and most enduring expres- 



sion of man's search for individual rights. 

We can point to many nations in the 
world where there is real progress toward 
the development of democratic institutions. 
The people of some of those countries have 
fully demonstrated their commitment to 
democratic principles by participating in elec- 
tions under difficult and even life-threatening 
circumstances. Such displays of courage can 
only inspire confidence in the future of 
democracy for all people. 

But in December of 1982 our satisfaction 
in the progress toward human rights is 
darkened by our realization that one year 
ago, on December 13, 1981, the Polish 
military government took steps to extinguish 
the flames of liberty ignited by Solidarity. As 
that totalitarian regime moved to crush 
Solidarity, it laid siege to the dreams and 
aspirations of a whole people reaching out for 
freedom, independence, and essential human 
dignity. The tragedy of the iron suppression 
of the Polish people transcends the borders of 
that land and reaches into the hearts of all of 
us who care for the rights and well-being of 
people everywhere. 

On these important anniversaries let us 
remember the great and abiding love of 
freedom that dwells perpetually within the 
heart of mankind. And let us also hope and 
pray that the blessings of liberty will one day 
be shared. by all people. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1982, as 
Human Rights Day and December 15, 1982, 
as Bill of Rights Day, and call on all 
Americans to observe the week beginning 
December 10, 1982, as Human Rights Week. 

In Witness Whereof, 1 hereunto set my 
hand this 10th day of December, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred and eight-two, 
and of the Independence of the United States 
of America the two hundred and seventh. 

Ronald Reagan 



'No. 5003 of Dec. 10, 1982 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 13). ■ 



IHuman Rights 
Policy 



I 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 10, 1982' 

This Administration has begun to imple 
ment a program of positive human 
rights policy, which complements the 
essentially reactive approaches which 
are being made regarding specific 
abuses. The President's initiative on 
democracy is a manifestation of this 
positive track of human rights poHcy. 
The U.S. Government recognizes that 
human rights conditions are best in 
democracies and that democracy is the 
only guarantee of human rights over thi 
long haul. We believe it is essential to 
support the development of democracy 
by encotiraging the proponents of 
democracy and by helping to build the 
infrastructure of democracy in 
nondemocratic countries. 

The Administration's human rights 
policy is characterized by a sense of 
realism, a sense of the possible. While 
the possible may not appear as laudablei 
as the desirable, that is, while what we 
can in reality accomplish in himian 
rights may not appear to be very much 
in comparison with what we would like 
to do, we are continually making 
government-to-government efforts to 
promote human rights. This includes fn 
quent approaches to governments in 
countries which have human rights pro! 
lems of major interest to human rights 
groups. 

We avoid public rhetoric whenever 
we think diplomacy will accomplish 
more, while rhetoric would damage our 
ability to attain concrete results. We 
seek to maintain a productive working 
relationship with friendly governments 
in order to be more effective on human 
rights issues in private. ■ 



'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 



42 



Department of State Bulletii 



MIDDLE EAST 



\f\s\\ of Jordan's 
King 



His Majesty King Hussein I of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an 
■)fficial working visit to Washington, 
D.C., December 18-23, 1982, to meet with 
President Reagan and other government 
ifficials. 

Following are remarks made by 
'^resident Reagan and King Hussein 
ifter their meetings on December 21 and 
13.^ 



DEC. 21. 1982 



President Reagan 

Dne of the nicest customs in the Middle 
3ast is the traditional greeting, "Peace 
le upon you." King Hussein's visit with 
IS comes at a time of the year when 
;houghts of peace are very much in our 
ninds. And in our meeting today, His 
Vlajesty and I have had a chance to reaf- 
'irm personally the continuing friendship 
)etween our two countries and to share 
vith each other our hopes and dreams 
ibout our common goals of a just and 
asting peace in the Middle East. 

As trusting friends, we've spoken to 
)ne another as we always do — with can- 
lor and good will. And I told the king of 
ny personal commitment to see peace in 
he Middle East become a true and 
asting reality and of my equally deep 
commitment to the proposals that we 
nade September 1st to Israel, to the 
Palestinians, and to the Arab states. 

I also expressed America's gratitude 
;o the king for his own important ac- 
;ions in support of our initiative over 
;hese past few months. His Majesty elo- 
quently described his vision of peace and 
•eviewed for us what he's been doing to 
lelp give peace a chance to take root, 
jarticularly his efforts to encourage the 
Palestinians to join him in efforts to 
:ake bold steps toward peace. 

Together, we've also shared our 
;houghts on what remains and must be 
lone by each and all of us to give life to 
:his common goal. We share a sense of 
irgency to succeed at this commitment. 
3ur discussion today has led to further 
meetings between our staffs over the 
next 2 days, and I look forward to 
meeting with the king again before he 
leaves Washington. 



King Hussein 

I thank you for the warmth of your 
welcome, for the privilege and pleasure I 
and my colleagues have had of meeting 
with you and with our friends, and for 
the opportunity to discuss many prob- 
lems of mutual concern and interest and 
many challenges that lie before us. 

We look forward to continuing our 
discussions in the coming days, and this 
is an opportunity for me to reaffirm a 
long-life commitment for the establish- 
ment of a just and durable peace in the 
Middle East. May we hope and pray that 
we will succeed in making a contribution 
for a better futiu-e for generations to 
come in our part of the world and for 
the cause of world peace. 

We'll continue to do our utmost, and 
we value very much, indeed, the at- 
mosphere of friendship, honesty, and 
candor that has characterized our rela- 
tions and particularly the friendship that 
exists between us. I thank you very, 
very much, indeed, for your many kind- 
nesses and for the privilege and pleasure 
of being with you and with our friends. 



DEC. 23, 1982 



President Reagan 

We've had extremely— and productive 
talks, and I think we've made significant 
progress toward peace. We have ini- 
tiated a dialogue from which we should 
not consider turning back. 

Much work remains to be done, and 
the road ahead is tough. But it's the 
right road, and I remain optimistic that 
direct negotiations for a just resolution 
of the Palestinian problem in the context 
of a real and enduring peace is within 
our reach. 

Your visit has served as a reminder 
that the bonds of friendship that link 
Jordan and the United States are as 
strong as ever. And I am gratified as 
well by the warmth and goodwill which 
characterizes our personal relationship. 

I hope we can build on these bases 
in the weeks and months ahead to 
achieve the objective— enduring 
peace— which we and our people so fully 
share. 

1 wish you a safe trip and look for- 
ward to our next meeting. 

King Hussein 

I thank you once again for the privilege 
and pleasure I've had, together with my 
party from Jordan, of meeting you and 




being with our friends at this very im- 
portant historical point in time in terms 
of our common hopes, in terms of the 
future of the area I come from and the 
future of generations to come. 

To the skeptics, I would like to say 
that it has been, in my view, a very suc- 
cessful visit. I believe that we have an 
understanding of each other's views bet- 
ter than at any time in the past. 

I can also seek to advise our friends 
that Jordan has been committed for the 
cause of establishing a just and durable 
peace. It has been our record since 1967. 
This was reemphasized by the first sum- 
mit, representing the view and the con- 
sensus -of the entire Arab world. And I 
hope that I've been able, on this visit, to 
assure you and our friends of our deter- 
mination to do all in our power for the 
establishment of a just and durable 
peace in the Middle East. 

We will go back to our area. We will 
be in close contact over the coming 
period with our brethren there. There is 
much that we will take back with us. 
And we hope to be in touch again — I 
hope to have the privilege and pleasure 
of being with you before too long. 

Rest assured of our commitment to 
the cause of future generations, their 
rights to live in peace and security in 
our entire area. I hope that we can con- 
tribute our share for a better, safer, 
more stable life for generations to come 
in the Middle East. 

Thank you so much for your many 
kindnesses and your warm welcome. 
And may I also wish you a very Merry 
Christmas and a very Happy New Year. 



'Texts from White House press 
releases. ■ 



'ebruary 1983 



43 



NARCOTICS 



U.S. International Narcotics 
Control Policy 

in Southeast Asia 



by Dominick L. DiCarlo 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Crime of the Hoicse Judiciary Com- 
mittee on December U, 1982. Mr. 
DiCarlo is Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
national Narcotics Matters. ' 

The international narcotics control policy 
of the U.S. Government, endorsed by 
the President and the Secretary of 
State, is expressed in the recently 
released Federal strategy. This policy 
contains four basic elements: 

• The major narcotics producer na- 
tions are all signatories to the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, under 
which each country has responsibility for 
controlling the cultivation, production, 
and trafficking in narcotics. 

• The international community 
should assist those nations which need 
help in controlling production and 
distribution of illicit substances. 

• Crop control, which can be 
achieved through government bans, 
chemical or manual eradication at the 
source, or controlled reductions to 
legitimate quotas, is the most effective, 
efficient, and economical means of 
reducing the availability of opium, co- 
caine, cannabis, and their derivatives. 
Our corollary policy for the psychotropic 
drugs, which are controlled by a 
separate international convention, is to 
seek limits on imports and exports and 
to curtail illicit diversion. 

• Narcotics-related economic 
assistance, by the U.S. Government or 
international organizations, should be 
conditioned on concurrent agreements 
on the control of narcotics production. 

When implementing these policies, 
there are a number of considerations 
which affect and influence our program 
strategy for each country and world- 
wide. The principle considerations, all of 
which are relevant to our strategy for 
Southeast Asia, are: 

• While there have been notable 
achievements in crop control and inter- 
diction efforts, these successes, in recent 
years, have been marginal in terms of 
reducing worldwide availability of 
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. 



• Interdiction efforts, which include 
arrests, seizures of drugs in transit, and 
capturing of financial assets are not ade- 
quate in terms of worldwide impact, 
given current levels of production and 
profitability. 

• Comprehensive crop control pro- 
grams are not now politically negotiable 
or operationally feasible in every pro- 
ducer country. 

• Both producer and transit nations 
are increasingly impacted by domestic 
drug abuse problems — as are the major 
industrialized, consumer nations — fac- 
tors which present improved oppor- 
tunities for both control agreements and 
increased international support. 



SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Production 

Opium and heroin are the target drugs 
for both U.S. and foreign government 
control activities in Southeast Asia. Two 
successive droughts significantly lowered 
Southeast Asian production from its 
estimated levels of 550-660 metric tons 
per year to an estimated 180 metric tons 
in 1979 and 210 metric tons in 1980, 
resulting in steep price increases for 
opium at the farm gate and the displace- 
ment of Southeast Asian heroin in both 
European and American markets. 

However, we estimate that, with ex- 
cellent growing conditions in the 
1980-81 and 1981-82 crop years, Golden 
Triangle production may have reached 
record harvests of 600 to 700 tons. 

The changing market profile for 
Southeast Asian heroin is shown in the 
following chart. 



These data, when fitted with reports 
from other growing sectors, especially 
Mexico and Southwest Asia, underscore 
critical points about the U.S. heroin 
market. 

In the years following the peak im- 
portation of 7.5 tons of heroin in 1975, 
the United States experienced a decline 
in heroin imports, due in part to declin- 
ing demand and concurrent with the sue 
cessful Mexican opium poppy eradicatioi 
program and to the drought in South- 
east Asia. These latter supply factors 
altered the profile of U.S. imports. In 
1979, Southwest Asia surpassed 
Southeast Asia as the prime source of 
U.S. heroin and has, subsequently, 
dominated the U.S. market. Total im- 
ports of heroin from all sources have 
stabilized at approximately 4.5 tons of 
heroin per year. While drought, low 
prices, and a government ban on cultiva 
tion sharply reduced Pakistani produc- 
tion in 1980, 1981, and 1982, there is 
still a considerable stockpile from a 197! 
Pakistani harvest of 700-800 tons and a 
continuing flow of opium from Afghan- 
istan. 

Thus, with this current increased 
Southeast Asian availability, there is, at 
least, the possibility of increased impor- 
tation from all three sectors — including 
Mexico — where cultivation has reported 
ly expanded. There are indications that 
traffickers connected with Southeast 
Asian producers are attempting to re- 
capture markets in the United States 
and Europe, while expanding markets ii 
Southeast Asia, and seeking new 
markets in Australia and New Zealand. 
At present, an estimated 10% of heroin 
imported into the United States orig- 
inates in the Golden Triangle; the 
prediction is that this figure will in- 
crease to 15% in 1983. Southeast Asian 
heroin dominates the Canadian market, 
and its availability there is increasing. 

Lessons can be inferred from these 
data. 

First, despite some expansion in 
crop control and increased interdiction 







Production of 1976-82 Metric Tons of Opium* 






1976 


1977 


1978 


1979 


1980 


1981 


1982 


Burma 

Thailand 

Laos 


400 
50 
60 


300 
45 
50 


325 

70 
50 


125 

17 
40 


160 
12 
40 


500-600 
50 
40-60 


500-600 
60-70** 
50 


Total 


510 


395 


445 


182 


212 


590-710 


610-720 


•Year to year comparisons of estimates may be useful in identifying trends, 
data reflect ongoing refinements of estimating methodologies. 

"The Thai production estimates for 1979-82 were based on a comprehensive 
survey, rather than on an estimative methodology. 


but these 
• aerial 



44 



Department of State Bulleti 



NARCOTICS 



efforts, the U.S. heroin market remains 
vulnerable to changes in production 
levels and distribution patterns— which, 
like the droughts in the two Asian areas, 
are more influential at present on that 
market than our enforcement efforts. 

Second, to achieve our ultimate ob- 
jective of reducing heroin imports into 
the United States, international narcotic 
control activities must be directed com- 
prehensively and simultaneously at all 
three of the major opium-producing 
areas. 

Third, greater emphasis must be 
placed on crop control, given the limita- 
tions on interdiction and other enforce- 
ment efforts to cope with production at 
these levels. 

Fourth, given political and economic 
realities, we must recognize that control 
of production in Southeast Asia will not 
be easily or quickly achieved. 

Growing Areas 

Opium is grown in northern Thailand, 
the Shan State of eastern Burma and 
the Kachin State of northeastern Bur- 
ma, and western Laos— the area known 
as the Golden Triangle. The United 
States has had limited information about 
Laotian narcotics activity since the for- 
mation of the Socialist Government, and, 
except as specifically noted, the 
references to the Golden Triangle in the 
ensuing discussions pertain to Burma 
and Thailand. 

The opium growing areas of all 
three countries of the Golden Triangle 
are largely remote, trackless, and 
rugged, inhabited by ethnically distinc- 
tive tribal people — hill tribes which have 
grown opium for decades as their major 
cash crop. These hill tribes people — 
Shan, Kachin, Karen, Lisu, and Lahu, 
among others — have historically prac- 
ticed a "slash and burn" method of 
agriculture which exhausts the soil and 
destroys the natural erosion control of 
trees and plants so that much of the 
area is no longer arable. In addition to 
providing a guaranteed, although labor 
intensive, cash crop, opium has 
historically satisfied their medicinal re- 
quirements. 

In Thailand the principal opium 
growing areas are in Chiang Mai, 
Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, and Nan 
Provinces, with lesser amounts grown in 
adjacent northern provinces. The 
Burmese area of intensive cultivation 
spans a region of mountains and jungle 
encompassing most of the Shan Plateau 
running from the eastern Kachin State 
along the China border down nearly 600 
miles into the Kayah State, with the 



most intensive area of cultivation east of 
the Salween River and north of 
Kengtung. This area has traditionally 
provided a stable, cheap, and plentiful 
supply of opium for the international 
market. 

Trafficking Organizations 

Trafficking in opium in the Golden 
Triangle is controlled by various 
ethnically based insurgent, revolu- 
tionary, and warlord groups. The 
Burmese Communist Party (BCP), the 
Shan United Army (SUA), the Lahu Na- 
tional Liberation Army, and others have 
turned increasingly to narcotics produc- 
tion and trafficking to finance their ac- 
tivities. Several of these groups control 
the refining of opium into heroin. 

Warlord armies control the majority 
of the narcotics trafficking in the Golden 
Triangle and the refining in the Thai- 
Burma border area. Most of these 
groups masquerade as ethnic insurgents. 



were forced out of Burma in 1961. 
These groups, which are currently 
estimated to have 2,500-3,000 men in 
arms, are the remnants and descendants 
of nationalist Chinese groups which 
retreated into Burma and Thailand from 
1948-19.52. In 1972, the United States 
supported a Thai Government effort to 
remove the CIF from the narcotics 
trade. In exchange for the CIF's prom- 
ise in 1972 to refrain from further in- 
volvement in narcotics, the Thai Govern- 
ment provided financial assistance and 
permission for legal residence in 
Thailand. Subsequently, it has become 
clear that, while some CIF narcotics ac- 
tivity may have been reduced, the CIF 
has not ended its involvement as prom- 
ised. 

In 1972 and 1973, warlord leader Lo 
Hsing Han made a major attempt to 
supplant the CIF, in alliance with other 
insurgent and warlord groups, including 
the Shan State Army. Lo's effort to con- 
trol the narcotics trade was aborted 



At present, an estimated 10% of heroin im- 
ported into the United States originates in the 
Golden Triangle; [northern Thailand, the Shan 
State of eastern Burma and the Kachin State of 
northeastern Burma, and western Laos] the predic- 
tion is that this figure will increase to 15% in 1983. 



are well-armed, and are organized along 
military lines. The soldiers may be Shan, 
Aka, Lahu, or Lisu; most of the leaders 
are Chinese, Sino-Thai, or Sino- 
Burmese. Many have a history of in- 
volvement with the Kuomintang miUtary 
units, some with ties reaching back to 
World War II. In Burma, several of 
these units were Kha Kwe Yei, the so- 
called Burmese militia units deputized by 
Rangoon in 1967 to fight the Burmese 
Communist Party. All of these groups 
were officially outlawed by 1973. Today, 
their activities cover a broad range of il- 
legal enterprises ranging from narcotics 
trafficking and refining to smuggling 
consumer goods into Burma. Over the 
past decade, the most significant traf- 
ficking groups have been the Chinese Ir- 
regular Forces (CIF) and the SUA. 

From the early 1950s to about 1975, 
most of the Golden Triangle narcotics 
trafficking was controlled by the 3d and 
5th Chinese Irregular Forces, which 
were headquartered in Thailand at Tam 
Ngop and Mae Salong, after their bases 



with his arrest in 1973 by the Thai 
Government and extradition to Burma 
for trial and imprisonment. In 1975, the 
first of the Burmese Government's 
"Mohein" military operations seized the 
most important of the CIF's narcotics 
refineries and stockpiles, dealing a 
serious blow to CIF domination of the 
narcotics trade. 

Burmese Government military 
operations during the 1973-1977 period 
also brought an end to the immense 
mule caravans that formerly transported 
opium south out of Burma and across 
mountainous ridges into Thailand. To 
avoid increasingly vigorous Burmese at- 
tacks and to reduce the chance of detec- 
tion, traffickers began using smaller 
caravans and resorting to human car- 
riers. 

Warlord Chang Chi-Fu — or, Khun 
Sa — took advantage of the disruptions 
caused by these Burmese antinarcotics 
measures against other larger and 
established trafficking groups, and after 



February 1983 



45 



NARCOTICS 



1975 expanded his narcotics operations. 
Described as a rebellious former 
Burmese militia commander, Chang Chi- 
Fu was under Burmese confinement 
from 1969-1975, when he escaped. By 
1978 and 1979, Chang Chi-Fu and the 
SUA had secured control of about two- 
thirds of Golden Triangle heroin produc- 
tion. Headquartered in the Thai border 
town of Ban Hin Taek, Chang built up 
an extensive network of contacts in 
Thailand as security against attacks by 
the Thai Government. He also attempted 
to develop a propaganda image as a 
popular Burmese ethnic insurgent leader 
and an image as a security bulwark for 
Thailand against advances by the 
Burmese Communist Party. These ef- 
forts were far more successful in the 
west than in Burma. 

Chang occasionally provided soldiers 
to the Thai military for counterinsurgen- 
cy operations. Chang, who has period- 
ically entered into extensive business ar- 
rangements with the Burmese Com- 
munist Party, is now a prime target for 
the antinarcotics actions of the Rangoon 
and Bangkok Governments. 

In February 1980, the Burmese 
Government, which outlawed the 
3,500-man SUA Army in 1971, attacked 
SUA narcotics refineries in the Lao Lo 
Chai area. Over the border, the Royal 
Thai Government, after several less ef- 
fective measures against Chang, offered 
the equivalent of a $25,000 reward for 
his arrest and then increased efforts to 
insure Thai control over the area around 
Ban Hin Taek. These efforts culminated 
in the January 21, 1982 assault by Thai 
border patrol police and the Thai Air 
Force on Ban Hin Taek. 

This military operation resulted in 
the destruction of SUA barracks and 
Chang's home, and in the capture of 
significant amounts of military and com- 
munications equipment, arms, and muni- 
tions. While large quantities of opium or 
heroin were not seized, there was some 
disruption of the last stages of the 
opium harvest in the Chang Rai area 
and some interruption of refinery opera- 
tions. While the raid succeeded in driv- 
ing most of the SUA out of Thailand, 
Chang Chi-Fu was not captured. 

However, the raid, the loss of 
life — 16-17 Thai police and a greater 
number of the SUA— and the resultant 
publicity have apparently raised the con- 
sciousness of the Thai Government and 
public to the dangers of allowing nar- 
cotics traffickers to control significant 
portions of Thai territory. When the 
SUA attempted to reestablish itself in 
Thailand, the Thai responded with a sec- 
ond military action in May, which again 



sent Chang Chi-Fu's forces across the 
border into Burma. A third, extensive 
assault involving Tahan Prahan ir- 
regulars, the border patrol police, and 
the Air Force occurred in October and 
November. It resulted in destruction of 
the SUA's third headquarters in less 
than a year, destruction of a refinery, 
and seizure of some opiates as well as 
lab equipment. 

We expect continued pressure by 
both the Thai and the Burmese against 
the SUA. The Thai Government has 
assured the United States that it will 
continue to pursue Chang and prevent 
his establishing an army again in 
another area of Thailand. 

At the same time, the Thai have 
targeted other warlord groups and 
heroin traffickers, such as the Shan 
United Revolutionary Army and the 3d 
and 5th CIFs, and we expect the Thai 
and Burmese Governments to continue 
their pressure, particularly against other 
trafficking groups which may attempt to 
replace the SUA. The Burmese Govern- 
ment is keeping a close watch on Lo 
Hsing Han, freed in a 1980 amnesty, to 
prevent his reinvolvement with nar- 
cotics. 

An important factor in the current 
assessment is the full-scale move by the 
Burmese Communist Party into nar- 
cotics after 1978-79. Narcotics traffick- 
ing by BCP elements prior to 1978 ap- 
pears to have been the work of in- 
dividuals without explicit approval by 
the party leadership. However, in 1978 
and 1979, the BCP appeared to have 
begun compensating for a sharp reduc- 
tion, if not elimination, of Chinese 
assistance by resorting to party- 
sponsored and centrally directed cultiva- 
tion of and trading in opium — including 
association with the SUA. Today, the 
BCP has an estimated armed strength 
of 10,000-12,000 men— with a 30,000 
man militia as well — and controls large 
areas of Burma, particularly in the Shan 
Plateau, which are centers of opium pop- 
py cultivation. The BCP has moved 
closer to the Thai-Burmese border 
recently and has involved itself more 
directly in the refining and trafficking of 
opium and heroin, as well as cultivation. 

The anticipation is that the BCP will 
attempt to expand its narcotics opera- 
tions and profits at the expense of other 
groups. This has brought it into direct 
conflict with the SUA, in what has 
historically been a constantly shifting 
pattern of alliances, betrayals, and 
realignments among trafficking groups. 

In addition to the narcotics traffick- 
ing by warlord, revolutionary, and in- 
surgent groups, there are a number of 



smaller syndicates, and independents, 
who from time to time are involved in 
trafficking or refining or both. Often, 
they pay a percentage fee to one of the 
major trafficking groups for refining 
facilities or protection. 

Refining 

Narcotics refining in the Golden 
Triangle occurs primarily in Burma. 
Many of the refineries are located a few 
kilometers of the Thai border, allowing 
ready movement of the facilities and 
their products into Thailand as the need 
arises. 

An understanding of the nature and 
character of this refining process is as 
important to assessing the difficulties of 
controlling Southeast Asian production 
as is the understanding of the traffick- 
ing system and the principal traffickers. 
The typical refinery is located in rough 
terrain dominated by jungle-covered 
ridges, near small streams. The equip- 
ment is easily dismantled and fairly 
primitive; enameled pots or copper vats, 
strainers and filters, pans, trays, and a 
simple heating source, usually a 
charcoal-fueled stove. The chemicals, 
particularly acetic anhydride, are 
primarily supplied illegally through 
Thailand or Malaysia. The heroin 
chemists are generally ethnic Chinese 
who reside at the refineries. 

The laboratories refine the morphine 
base — pit'zu — into either heroin number 
3 — smoking variety — or heroin number 
4, which is 95% pure and suitable for in- 
travenous injections. The raw opium, 
particularly from Burma, is reduced to 
morphine base very close to the poppy 
fields for convenience of travel, since the 
process reduces the opium by a factor of 
10 to 1. 

Recently, a refined form of heroin 
base — a step between pit'zu and heroin 3 
or 4 — has been discovered by narcotics 
agents, especially in Hong Kong. This 
heroin base is particularly prized by the 
professional narcotics trafficker because 
it can be refined by a relatively simple 
process into heroin 3 or 4. 

Distribution 

The vast majority of the narcotics mov- 
ing out of the Golden Triangle continues 
to cross the Thai-Burma frontier, which 
remains the primary site of the region's 
heroin refineries, but, today, trafficking 
is often accomplished by truck or river- 
boat. While most Golden Triangle nar- 
cotics are transported out of Burma's 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



NARCOTICS 



Shan State and across Thailand to reach 
the outside world, new routes have also 
been developed along the Burmese 
Tenassirim coast to Malaysia, or south 
through central Burma to the Andaman 
Sea, and then to Malaysia and Sing- 
apore. Because of its long seacoast, ex- 
tensive river system, and large numbers 
of fishing boats, it is quite difficult to 
control narcotics traffic in, around, and 
through Thailand. 

Many syndicates or combinations of 
syndicates and individuals control the in- 
ternational trafficking. Big-time traf- 
fickers usually are well-connected and 
successful in avoiding arrest. Hong 
Kong, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and 
Singapore, as well as Bangkok, provide 
way stations for international narcotics 
traffic and banking facilities for 
"laundering" the enormous amounts of 
money generated by the narcotics trade. 
Procedurally, established trafficking 
groups control the refining operations, 
while groups of financiers pool their 
resources to purchase a quantity of 
heroin from a refinery. They then locate 
a courier to carry the narcotics to a 
point of debarkation and additional 
couriers are found to smuggle the ship- 
ment to the country of destination. In 
addition to these organizations, there 
are casual overseas purchasers, fre- 
quently addicts, who come to Thailand 
to make a purchase and attempt to 
smuggle it out of Thailand. 

Major international airports remain 
the preferred departure areas for traf- 
fickers, although Customs seizures 
significantly increase the risks. In an ef- 
fort to deceive Customs officials, 
couriers are taking circuitous routes, 
which include the People's Republic of 
China. 

Social, Political, and Economic 
Factors 

While the patterns of narcotics produc- 
tion and trafficking have modernized 
since the mid-1970s, when opium 
caravans transversed Burma and 
Thailand almost without interruption, 
there have also been important changes 
in the impact this production and traf- 
ficking have had on governments, 
economies, and indigenous popula- 
tions — social, political, and economic im- 
pact that, to some still undetermined 
degree, represent new motivations for 
increased narcotics control activities. 

One of the most significant factors 
affecting the attitudes of some Thai and 
Burmese leaders toward narcotics is the 



recognition that their own people have 
developed serious addiction problems. 
While opium consumption and addiction 
have been traditional and generally 
tolerated, addicts are no longer 
relegated to opium dens in "China 
Town" or in the hill tribes; there are 
now large heroin-using populations, in- 
cluding young, primarily urban, addicts. 

The Thai Government estimates its 
heroin addict population at 300,000- 
500,000 people, out of a population of 48 
million. In addition, marijuana is readily 
available throughout the country, and 
there are increasing reports of misuse of 
tranquilizers, barbiturates, am- 
phetamines, and morphine. It is 
estimated there are over 100,000 opiate 
addicts in Burma which reports 32,000 
registered opiate addicts. Malaysia, a 
major consumer of Golden Triangle nar- 
cotics, has from 100,000-300,000 heroin 
addicts out of a population of 14 million; 
69,000 of these addicts are registered. 
These heroin addict populations are pro- 
portionately higher than that of the 
United States, which has an estimated 
450,000 addicts out of a population of 
230 million people. 

The fact that much of the Golden 
Triangle's narcotics production is con- 
sumed within the region has important 
implications for the Burmese and Thai 
Governments as well as our own. It 
creates a significant hidden economy 
which evades taxation, frustrates eco- 
nomic policies, and distorts economic ac- 
tivities. The funds derived from this 
local consumption provide a resource 



disincentives for a stable national policy 
and economy and discourages positive 
action against other criminal activities 
often linked to narcotics. 

Cities in Asia, like Bangkok, Kuala 
Lumpur, and some areas of Hong Kong, 
have serious crime problems, and, while 
a direct connection between addiction 
and street crime is not always easy to 
substantiate, narcotics activities are 
often interconnected with other criminal 
activities such as prostitution and 
gambling. 

Regional Strategy 

The Department believes that a multi- 
faceted approach is essential to achiev- 
ing our narcotics reduction objectives in 
Southeast Asia. 

Our narcotics control strategy for 
the Southeast Asian region is to 
stimulate governments to take effective 
action against illicit drug production and 
major trafficking that will achieve the 
objective of reducing the availability of 
Southeast Asian narcotics in the United 
States. 

Diplomatically, we impress upon 
governments in this region — and all 
other regions — their national responsi- 
bilities under treaties to control illicit 
narcotic cultivation, production, and 
trafficking. We recognize that some 
governments need assistance in fulfilling 
these obligations, and we provide bi- 
lateral assistance for crop control and 
interdiction programs on a country- 
specific and regional basis, as well as 



Narcotics refining and trafficking feed on cor- 
ruption and encourage it. The corruption of public 
officials provides disincentives for a stable na- 
tional policy and economy and discourages positive 
action against other criminal activities often linked 
to narcotics. 



and financial base independent of the 
large profits from the overseas trade, 
and finances insurgencies and terrorism. 

The growing domestic addict popula- 
tions add immeasurably to internal social 
and health care problems, and debilitates 
users, many of whom are youths. The 
welfare costs are also significant. 

Narcotics refining and trafficking 
feed on corruption and encourage it. The 
corruption of public officials provides 



support through multilateral U.N. pro- 
grams. This assistance not only en- 
courages governments in the region to 
undertake programs but is critically im- 
portant to the success of those ini- 
tiatives. 

The United States recognizes that 
crop control can impact on local 
economies in producing countries, which 
are generally underdeveloped and re- 
source-poor, and we, therefore, provide 



February 1983 



47 



NARCOTICS 



or stimulate income replacement proj- 
ects where appropriate. 

The United States also provides 
technical assistance for demand reduc- 
tion programs, and, through funding for 
training by the Drug Enforcement Ad- 
ministration (DEA) and U.S. Customs, 
we provide training to foreign law en- 
forcement personnel. 

While our regional strategy is heavi- 
ly focused on Thailand and Burma, the 
Bureau also supports program initiatives 
to other countries through our East 
Asian regional project. 

Our Bureau of International Nar- 
cotics Matters (INM) has budgeted 
$7,700,000 for programs in East Asia in 
FY 1983. Expenditures totaled 
$9,257,000 in FY 1982. The higher FY 
1982 figure chiefly represents a one-time 
replacement of aircraft for the Burmese 
program. 

In the balance of our testimony, we 
provide details — on a country-by-country 
basis — on host country programs in crop 
control, interdiction, and demand reduc- 
tion, as well as data on the assistance 
provided by United States agencies, in- 
ternational organizations, and other 
foreign governments. These country 
reports include our assessments of the 
effectiveness of these efforts, the prob- 
lems encountered, and prospects for 
future effectiveness. 



coca, methaqualone, cannabis, am- 
phetamines, or chemicals for conversion 
or refining of opium. There is some licit 
production of barbiturate pills or cap- 
sules from imported powder. 

The primary goal of the United 
States is to assist the Royal Thai 
Government in reducing as rapidly as 
possible the amount of opiates produced 
in and transmitted through Thailand. 

Social, Economic, and Political 
Environment. Although opium has 
historically been an economic and 
sociological fact of life in Thailand, inter- 
national trafficking of finished narcotics 
from Thailand — and other countries in 
Southeast Asia — began in the 1960s in 
large part as a result of the buildup of 
U.S. military forces in Indochina. U.S. 
military personnel in Thailand and Viet- 
nam provided a ready market for No. 4 
injectable heroin, while No. 3 smoking 
heroin was being produced for local con- 
sumption and for shipment to newly ex- 
panded markets in Europe. Although 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Southeast Asia from 1973-1975 caused a 
temporary curtailment of the No. 4 
heroin market, a replacement market 
made up of the indigenous populations in 
Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia 
developed rapidly, as did new markets in 
Europe and the United States. 



Thai officials historically were relaxed about 
narcotics grown, refined, transported through, or 
shipped from their country since there was little 
perceived narcotics problem among ethnic Thai . . . 
however, in the 10 years since the withdrawal of 
U.S. forces, a serious local drug abuse problem has 
developed, and concern has increased. 



COUNTRY REPORTS 



Thailand 

Thailand is a grower of opium, a pro- 
ducer of refined opiates, and the major 
country of transshipment for Southeast 
Asian heroin. It also has a large addict 
population. 

The U.S. Government's drug effort 
in Thailand focuses on opiates — opium, 
morphine base, and heroin — although 
cannabis is also grown in Thailand. 
There is no licit production of opium. 



Thai officials historically were re- 
laxed about narcotics grown, refined, 
transported through, or shipped from 
their country since there was little 
perceived narcotics problem among 
ethnic Thai. Opium smoking — primarily 
limited to the Chinese in the cities and 
hill tribes in the countryside — was 
banned by the King in the early 1960s, 
but the extensive sales of 90% pure 
heroin to American military in Thailand 
did not arouse major official Thai con- 
cern. However, in the 10 years since the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces, a serious 



local drug abuse problem has developed, 
and concern has increased. 

The narcotics problem in Thailand 
has not been given the highest priority 
by the Thai Government. Problems of in- 
ternal security, refugees, relations with 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the 
economy are of more immediate concern 
to both the Thai Government and the 
public. On the other hand, the govern- 
ment does devote considerable amounts 
of funding and manpower to antinar- 
cotics efforts. Unfortunately, the results 
have not always been consistent with the 
amounts of time, money, and manpower 
expended. 

Efforts at Drug Control to Date. 

The U.S. objective of reducing the pro- 
duction in and transshipment through 
Thailand of opium and heroin can be 
achieved by thorough, efficient, and ef- 
fective Thai enforcement of the ban on 
opium growing, supported by interdic- 
tion and other law enforcement pro- 
grams, alternative crop substitution, 
treatment rehabilitation, and prevention 
education. An immediate goal of the 
United States is to assist in the develop- 
ment of Thai institutional capabilities to 
deal with the narcotics problem. Nar- 
cotics control assistance since FY 1972 
has amounted to some $23 million; INM 
has budgeted $2,475,000 for Thailand in 
FY 1983. 

Law Enforcement. The Thai na- 
tional police has been the primary nar- 
cotics suppression body in Thailand. 
Police Gen. Pow Sarasin, Secretary 
General of the Office of Narcotics Con- 
trol Board (ONCB), and his deputy. Gen. 
Chavalit Yodmani, are the key officials 
coordinating narcotics control policy and 
programs. Since 1973 special police nar- 
cotics suppression centers have had 
units in Chiang Mai, Bangkok, and Haad 
Yai. In addition, the Bangkok Metropoli- 
tan Narcotics Unit is a specialized unit 
in the capital. The Thai border patrol 
police have traditionally conducted nar- 
cotics operations, primarily in the north 
along the Thai-Burma and Thai-Lao 
borders. Royal Thai Customs has special 
units at international embarkation- 
debarkation points. 

The United States has provided both 
equipment and training to Thai law en- 
forcement entities. Thai Customs nar- 
cotics units increased from 7 to 84 
members in the last few years. Customs 
and DEA training in methods of nar- 
cotics interdiction, investigation tech- 
niques, and teaching methodology is 
geared toward assisting the Thai 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



NARCOTICS 



enforcement agencies to become self- 
sufficient in narcotic law enforcement. 

The Thai Government realized in 
early 1982 that its ad hoc efforts to sup- 
press the heroin trafficking groups 
based in Thailand and operating along 
the Thai-Burma border needed to be 
placed on a continuous basis. The 
department, by reprogramming funds 
available almost entirely within the Thai 
program budget, was able to respond to 
a Royal Thai Army request for material 
and operational support of five to six 
companies, which would provide sus- 
tained suppression of these trafficking 
groups. Begun last June, this force has 
now been trained and is deployed in the 
most contested area of the Thai-Burma 
border. The results of these activities 
and expectations of ongoing action were 
detailed earlier. Reprogrammed FY 
1983 funds bring the total budget for 
this project to $2.1 million for 1 year 
ending May 1983. 

There has been a recent decline in 
the availability of precursor chemicals 
such as acetic anhydride used to refine 
opium into heroin, as a result of Thai en- 
forcement of a "chemical free zone" in 
northern Thailand. The amount of acetic 
anhydride reaching the northwest 
border refineries by traditional routes 
has dropped significantly, while prices 
have increased, and some refining ac- 
tivities have apparently moved to both 
sides of the Thai-Malaysia border. 

U.S. collaborative programs in nar- 
cotics production control, demand reduc- 
tion, and enforcement are largely pro- 
grammed with the ONCB which is the 
coordinating agency on narcotics mat- 
ters, working through the Department 
of Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(DTEC), the agency designed to repre- 
sent the Thai Government in matters 
relating to grant assistance programs 
with donor countries. 

Crop Substitution Eradication. 

Thai Government crop substitution ef- 
forts have been carried out for over 15 
years, originating with the "King's Proj- 
ect," in Chiang Mai Province. Eight 
years ago, the U.N. Fund for Drug 
Abuse Control (UNFDAC) became in- 
volved in the programs. Our objective is 
' to support the UNFDAC efforts and a 
U.S. Agency for International Develop- 
ment (USAID) rural development proj- 
ect in the Mae Chaem watershed area. 
For many opium farmers in the hill 
tribes of northern Thailand, opium has 
been the principal and sometimes only 
cash crop. Rice production in many 
areas is insufficient to meet subsistence 



February 1983 



requirements. While there has been 
some limited success with such new 
crops as potatoes, beans, and coffee, 
new crops have not "caught on" suffi- 
ciently either in interest or market value 
to be a disincentive to poppy cultivation. 
Although the programs have been suc- 
cessful in introducing new crops to 
limited numbers of farmers, they have, 
thus far, had very limited success in 
reducing the numbers of acres planted 
with opium poppies, since the Thai 
Government has yet to take effective ac- 
tion in enforcement of its opium grow- 
ing ban. We now have a commitment 
from the Thai to develop, by early 1983, 
a comprehensive opium eradication 
strategy. Without adequate enforcement 
of the ban — including destruction of 
opium fields — opium will continue to be 
grown by the hill tribes because it is a 
guaranteed, remunerative cash crop 
with returns that have increased 
significantly over the years. 

A promising recent development has 
been the voluntary surrender of opium 
stockpiles and a pledge by a few hill 
tribe villages to abandon cultivation in 
return for specific transitional assist- 
ance. We have undertaken to support 
Thai civil-military authorities in two 
such cases and are seeking a firm com- 
mitment on a third case. 

Demand Reduction. Demand reduc- 
tion programs in Thailand include 
prevention, treatment, and rehabilita- 
tion. The Thai Government actively sup- 
ports demand reduction, as demon- 
strated by a relatively high level of 
cooperation and coordination between 
the Bangkok Metropolitan Health 
Department, the ONCB, and the 
Ministry of Health. The overall project 
goal is to reduce the demand for nar- 
cotics in Thailand, prevent further 
spread of drug abuse to rural areas, and 
stimulate increased cooperation with law 
enforcement agencies through increased 
public and official awareness of the 
social impact of addiction. 

The U.S. program provides training, 
technical assistance, and a modest 
amount of equipment for treatment and 
prevention. This project agreement on 
prevention, which emphasizes increasing 
Thai awareness of its drug abuse prob- 
lems and preventive education by the 
schools and media, is to continue the 
program through FY 1984. 

Other Government Agencies. The 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
has been funding crop substitution, re- 
search, and extension activities in 
Thailand since 1973. This program is 



funded at $500,000 in 1981 and 1982. 
The program objective is to identify 
viable alternative agricultural cropping 
systems to replace income from opium 
poppy production. The USAID Mae 
Chaem project of rural development in 
an opium growing watershed was signed 
in August 1980 to raise the standard of 
living of the hill tribe people in the area. 
The initial U.S. contribution was $4.2 
million, but a total U.S. contribution of 
$10 million is anticipated over a 7-year 
period. The Thai Government has 
agreed to provide $11 million as its con- 
tribution to the agreement to control 
opium poppy cultivation in the project 
area. The U.S. Information Agency sup- 
ports U.S. narcotics control objectives 
through a modest information program 
on prevention and by dissemination of 
policy and program information. 

International Organizations and 
Other Countries. As noted, the U.N. 
Fund for Drug Abuse Control has an ac- 
tive pilot crop substitution program 
which has received logistical and agri- 
cultural resource support from the 
USDA and State Department narcotics 
program in Thailand. The U.N. contribu- 
tion is $2.4 million for 5 years matched 
by $1,235,800 in Thai funds. UNFDAC 
recently evaluated this project and ex- 
tended it for 2 years, with gceater Thai 
involvement. UNFDAC is implementing 
several programs for treatment, 
rehabilitation, prevention, and research 
projected at almost $2 million with $9 
million matching Thai funding over a 
4-year period. This program would build 
upon U.S. programs in demand reduc- 
tion. 

The Colombo Plan spends $10,000 
annually, primarily in training and con- 
ferences. The Thai contribute $5,000 per 
year to the plan. 

The Federal Republic of Germany 
has initiated a crop substitution project 
in northern Thailand with the orienta- 
tion phase cost of almost $90,000 to be 
matched by a Thai Government contribu- 
tion of almost $73,000. 

An $80 million World Bank rural 
development project in northern 
Thailand will include several opium 
growing areas but has not yet been 
implemented. 

Canada has provided $200,000 for 
narcotic related projects in health and 
crop substitution and training. The 
United Kingdom has provided some 
commodities, a coffee expert, and 
$50,000 each year to Thai law enforce- 
ment. New Zealand, P^rance, and Japan 
provide funds for educational grants and 



49 



NARCOTICS 



other crop substitution programs. In re- 
cent discussions, we have encouraged 
the Japanese to provide assistance to ad- 
vance narcotics control. 

Other U.S. Assistance. In FY 1982, 
the United States contributed $79 
million to Thailand for military 
assistance programs, $27 million for 
development assistance, $5 million in 
economic support funds (ESF), and $2 
million for U.S. Peace Corps activities. 

Prospects for the Future. Although 
the U.S. narcotics assistance program 
has been active in Thailand for some 
time, success, particularly in terms of 
controlling the "choke points" of entry of 
refined heroin from Burma, has not 
been in keeping with the amount of 
funds expended. Recent military and 
police actions against the SUA represent 
a major breakthrough, demonstrating a 
determined Thai commitment to sup- 
press the heroin trafficking organiza- 
tions on the Thai-Burma border. We are 
assured of continued, expanded suppres- 
sion efforts. However, there has been 
limited success in interdiction. The 
United States is hopeful that many Thai 
will increasingly understand the impor- 
tance of controlling opium production, 
refining, and heroin trafficking — for 
their own social and economic well-being 
and to overcome the international 
notoriety of being the primary conduit 
for illicit drugs in East Asia. 

Thus, while we applaud the govern- 
ment's military actions against the SUA, 
and look forward to the opium control 
strategy promised for early 1983, we are 
disappointed that the Thai have thus far 
failed to enforce the opium poppy ban 
effectively, even in areas which have 
benefited from the U.N. crop substitu- 
tion program. 

Burma 

Burma is the primary opium growing 
area in Southeast Asia. The U.S. objec- 
tive is to reduce the flow of Burmese 
opium and heroin into the international 
and U.S. markets. Our bilateral program 
of assistance is very important to the 
Burmese; the dangers both of domestic 
narcotics abuse and international nar- 
cotics traffic are well understood by the 
highest officials of the Socialist Republic 
of the Union of Burma and throughout 
most elements of Burmese society. 

Burma is committed to eliminating 
domestic drug abuse, reducing opium 
production, and destroying organizations 
which grow and traffic in narcotics. The 



Burmese have developed programs in- 
volving military and paramilitary opera- 
tions in narcotics source areas against 
narcotics caravans and refugees, as well 
as route interdiction, law enforcement, 
treatment, rehabilitation, crop substitu- 
tion and destruction, education, and 
propaganda programs. 

Social, Economic, and Political 
Environment. For the Burmese Govern- 
ment, illicit narcotics pose a combination 
of social, political, and security prob- 
lems — all interrelated. 

The social problem of narcotics in 
Burma is both historical and modern. 
Opium usage and addiction in Burma are 
not a recent phenomena. The hill tribe 
growers of the area historically have 
consumed the opium for medicinal pur- 
poses as well as for general addiction. In 
1942, when the British evacuated Burma 
in the face of the advancing Japanese 
Army, there were 50,000 registered 
opium addicts. 

The increasing world focus on the 
role played by Burma's opium crop in in- 
ternational trafficking has led to concern 
by the government over its international 
image. In 1974 Burma passed a strict 
narcotics and dangerous drug law. Since 
then, antidrug efforts have been given a 
high priority by the government and the 
general population. The Burmese en- 
forcement agencies and courts enforce 
narcotics laws vigorously and generally 
impose severe sentences on convicted of- 
fenders. Sentences of 5 years' imprison- 
ment for illegal narcotics usage are not 
uncommon. Convicted peddlers and traf- 
fickers inevitably receive long prison 
sentences, with 10 years generally the 
minimum. On December 15, 1980, the 
Burmese Government issued an order 
establishing rewards for seizures of nar- 
cotics and other contraband. This 
reward system may increase the amount 
of narcotics seized in Burma. 

Burma's narcotics problem is inter- 
twined with the insurgency problem. 
Since independence in 1948, the 
Rangoon Government has been plagued 
by rebellious groups seeking national 
power — Burmese Communist Par- 
ty — and by ethnic minorities seeking 
autonomy for their regions — the Shan, 
Kachin, and Lahu insurgency groups, to 
name a few. To these groups have been 
added several powerful armed bands of 
narcotics traffickers, usually ethnic 
Chinese, at least in leadership. As 
previously noted, these groups are 
heavily dependent upon the opium trade 
for their income, arms purchases, and 
other activities. 



A significant reduction in opium pro- 
duction and trading would affect some 
areas of Burma more than others. The 
economy in the eastern Shan State ap- 
pears to be heavily dependent upon 
opium revenues. For some hill tribes, 
opium in the past has been an acceptable 
and valued cash crop. The recent pro- 
hibition against opium growing and the 
subsequent Burmese eradication pro- 
grams have taken away some disposable 
income from growers, but the majority 
of growers were rarely dependent upon 
opium for their total livelihood. 

Efforts at Drug Control to Date. 

U.S. assistance has been significant in 
supporting Burmese antinarcotics ef- 
forts—some $47 million over the last 10 
years. INM has budgeted $5 million for 
Burma in FY 1983. 

American-Burmese cooperation 
against illicit narcotics began with a 
June 1974 bilateral agreement, effected 
by an exchange of notes between the 
American Ambassador and the head of 
the Burmese People's Police. Under the 
terms of this agreement, and subsequent 
amendments, and the current project 
agreement, the United States provides 
Burma with helicopters, fixed-wing air- 
craft, communications equipment, and 
associated training and equipment- 
maintenance support. The bulk of our 
current budget is dedicated to aircraft 
maintenance contracts for previously 
supplied equipment. Additionally, to 
assist the Burmese Government in 
developing replacement means of income 
for former opium growers, the United 
States has provided limited assistance in 
development of alternative agriculture 
and livestock projects. Our crop 
substitution program has included 
special beekeeping and swine-poultry 
training at Ohio State University for 20 
Burmese students. 

Burmese Programs. Narcotics in 
Burma is a multifaceted problem and the 
country has developed an integrated 
strategy for dealing with it. The 
Burmese Central Committee for Drug 
Abuse Control (CCDAC), chaired by the 
Minister of Home and Religious Affairs, 
consists of eight deputy ministers from 
other concerned government ministries. 
Responsibilities of the CCDAC are na- 
tionwide and include all aspects of the 
government effort, including enforce- 
ment, crop-income substitution, and 
treatment-rehabilitation. 

• Enforcement— A basic part of the 
Burmese enforcement strategy focuses 
upon interdicting narcotics caravans and 
destroying refineries and base camps 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



NARCOTICS 



operated by trafficking groups. Burmese 
police and military personnel have been 
active both in major operations against 
the BCP narcotics activities and the pop- 
py eradication programs. 

• Crop Substitution-Eradication — 
The Burmese Government estimates 
that it eradicated more than 10,000 
acres of opium poppy in the 1981-82 
season that could have produced as 
much as 40,000-45,000 kilograms of 
opium. While this represents about eight 
percent of the total acreage under poppy 
cultivation in Burma, it almost doubled 
the previous year's destruction. 

A Burmese crop substitution pro- 
gram supported by UNFDAC is making 
progress in distributing coffee and tea 
plants, seeds for spices and medicinal 
herbs, and improved livestock to 
farmers in areas in which opium was 
formerly grown. The CCDAC is estab- 
lishing a multisectoral livestock, horti- 
cultural, and demonstration center at 
Pekhon in the southern Shan State. The 
purpose of this center will be to provide 
training and to demonstrate viable crop 
substitution and livestock production. 
The International Narcotics Matters pro- 
gram has provided bees, quail, and 
related equipment and training to sup- 
port pilot programs for crop substitu- 
tion. However, the full impact of these 
programs on opium production must 
await more hospitable conditions in 
poppy-producing areas. 

• Treatment, rehabilitation, train- 
ing, and information— The Burmese 
Ministries of Health and Social Welfare 

j have responsibility for addict treatment 
and rehabilitation programs, respective- 
ly. Treatment centers have been estab- 
lished in each of the major urban centers 
with addict population problems. Larger 
hospitals have treatment wards; district 
and township hospitals have a basic 
capability for treating addiction. Reha- 
bilitation centers have been established 
in Kengtung, Namla, Rangoon, Man- 
dalay, and Lashio. Both treatment and 
rehabilitation centers have been im- 
proved and expanded by UNFDAC. 

The Burmese Government conducts 
a continuous program of narcotics infor- 
mation through the government- 
controlled news media, in schools, 
posters, and public and party indoctrina- 
tion sessions. 

Other Programs. As indicated, 
UNFDAC has several programs in Bur- 
ma. Between 1976 and early 1981, 
UNFDAC assisted Burma through fi- 
nancing a large multisectional drug 
abuse control program involving ac- 
tivities in law enforcement, crop and in- 



come substitution, education, health, and 
vocational rehabilitation at a total cost 
of $5,571,000 over the 5-year period. 
Phase two of this program was agreed 
upon in June 1981 for 5 years at a cost 
of $5,042,000. Development aid funds 
for this program have been provided by 
the Government of Norway. 

Other U.S. Assistance. The United 
States resumed economic assistance to 
Burma in 1980 after an absence of 15 
years. The AID-Burma funding level has 
increased from initial amounts of $2 
million in FY 1980 and $3 million in FY 

1981 to $7.5 million in FY 1982, assist- 
ance concentrated in agricultural and 
public health projects. Additionally, the 
United States provided $150,000 in FY 

1982 for military training under our 
security assistance program. 

Prospects for the Future. When 
considering the future of narcotics sup- 
pression in Burma, one must remember 
that it is essentially a Burmese program, 
not an American one. The ultimate suc- 
cess or failure of the program — used in 
the broadest sense of the term — will de- 
pend upon Burmese efforts prompted by 
Burmese perceptions of national 
priorities. 



for the job at hand. Politically, our 
narcotics cooperation has fostered a 
unique — for neutralist-isolationist Bur- 
ma — bilateral relationship in which our 
assistance relates to a sensitive Burmese 
domestic issue. U.S. assistance supports 
the narcotics control objective which is 
consistent with Burma's objective of 
securing its territory. By any measure, 
the number of acres of opium crop de- 
stroyed and amount of opiates seized is 
significant. In addition, the continuing 
Burmese efforts in fields not directly 
supported by U.S. assistance are a 
measure of their commitment to the 
overall goals of narcotics control. 

Nevertheless, the narcotics program 
in Burma must be viewed as an integral 
part of the Golden Triangle narcotics 
phenomena. As long as Burmese war- 
lords, insurgents, and bandits know that 
they can enjoy even temporary safe 
haven in Thailand and Burma, the Thai 
and Burmese police and military actions 
and threats will be limited in their effec- 
tiveness. Greater Burmese-Thai coopera- 
tion and coordination is an essential 
long-term goal. In the last analysis, 
however, real progress in Burma will de- 
pend on greater Burmese authority in 
the poppy growing areas. 



When considering the future of narcotics sup- 
pression in Burma, one must remember that it is 
essentially a Burmese program, not an American 
one. The ultimate success or failure of the pro- 
gram . . . will depend upon Burmese efforts 
prompted by Burmese perceptions of national 
priorities. 



The United States has assisted and 
cooperated with the Burmese by pro- 
viding some needed enforcement 
equipment — i.e., the purchase of and 
maintenance funding for telecommunica- 
tions equipment, a small fleet of heli- 
copters and fixed-wing aircraft— and 
modest support for Burmese pilot pro- 
grams for crop substitution in opium 
growing areas. In addition, the United 
States has provided training for 
Burmese officials with responsibilities 
for customs and narcotics enforcement. 

Our programs have helped sharpen 
the Burmese focus on their narcotics 
problems and our material assistance 
and training have given them the tools 



OTHER EAST ASIAN PROGRAMS 

INM supports other program activity in 
East Asia through its East Asian 
regional budget and through funding 
and other support for the Colombo Plan 
project. 

A specific goal of the Bureau's East 
Asian regional activity is to support pro- 
grams among Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) members which 
are designed to impede illicit narcotics 
production, processing, trafficking, and 
consumption. The INM regional pro- 
gram includes law enforcement, preven- 
tion education, and technical assistance 



February 1983 



51 



PACIFIC 



in treatment and rehabilitation. The 
Bureau has budgeted $225,000 for its 
regional projects in FY 1983. 

For example, in Malaysia, which is 
both a major narcotics consumer as well 
as an important transshipment center, 
the Bureau has just concluded a tech- 
nical assistance program which devel- 
oped a drug counseling and rehabilita- 
tion program within the Malaysian 
prison system and assisted in the 
development of a national strategy on 
drug control and an after-care program. 

Similarly, in Indonesia, where our 
objective is to assist that government in 
preventing the country from becoming 
either an alternative opium-growing 
area or a major transshipment point, the 
Bureau's agreement is to provide com- 
modities, training, and personnel ex- 
changes — at an estimated cost of 
$50,000 through 1984— to stimulate the 
Indonesian Government to take more 
comprehensive actions on its own ini- 
tiative, in both supply reduction as well 
as demand reduction. 



CONCLUSION 

The specific commitments and actions 
which we seek on a country-by-country 
basis are integral to the success of our 
Southeast Asian strategy. However, the 
United States is also seeking greater 
cooperation within the region and 
believes that such internal cooperation is 
also essential to achieving narcotics con- 
trol objectives in Southeast Asia. 

In this regard, we are supporting 
ASEAN, and we are encouraging 
regional and bilateral contacts, which we 
believe should include Burma and Hong 
Kong. 

Throughout the region, we are seek- 
ing wider adoption of precursor chemical 
controls, as well as agreements on 
seizures of financial assets, and on legal 
cooperation. 

The United States cannot, in the 
final analysis, control opium production 
in Southeast Asia. We can only facilitate 
the achievement of control by the pro- 
ducing and transit nations. We are 
employing, therefore, a strategy that 
not only provides these governments 
with the capacity to act but encourages 
and sustains them in the will to act. 

Nor can we succeed with just a 
bilateral effort. As cultivation and refin- 
ing sites multiply and the number of 



trafficking organizations and routes ex- 
pand, in keeping with worldwide de- 
mand, the conclusion is inescapable that, 
more than ever, ultimate success 
depends on achieving comprehensive, 
simultaneous control in the many key 
growing areas. The United States is ac- 
tively enlisting the participation of other 
victim and donor nations. We are en- 
couraging greater contributions to 



bilateral and multilateral control proj- 
ects. We are attempting to interna- 
tionalize the response to a global prob- 
lem. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S.-Palau Plebiscite 



The Governments of the United States 
and of the Republic of Palau have an- 
nounced the holding of a plebiscite in 
Palau on Tuesday, January 11, 1983. 
The plebiscite will be an act of self- 
determination by the people of Palau 
regarding their future political status 
and is a step toward termination of the 
last remaining U.N. trusteeship. 

In the plebiscite, the voters of Palau 
will be asked whether they approve or 
disapprove a compact of free association 
and a number of agreements subsidiary 
to it, all of which were signed by 
representatives of the two govern- 
ments—Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, 
Personal Representative of the Presi- 
dent of the United States for Microne- 
sian Status Negotiations, and Lazarus 
E. Salii, Ambassador for Status 
Negotiations and Trade Relations of the 
Republic of Palau— in Washington on 
August 26, 1982. 

The United States has requested a 
special session of the U.N. Trusteeship 
Council later this month at which it will 
ask the CouncO to organize an interna- 
tional observer mission to witness the 
final stages of a public education pro- 
gram now underway in Palau and the 
voting in the plebescite itself. The educa- 
tion program in Palau is being con- 
ducted by a committee under the chair- 



manship of Palau Vice President and 
Minister of State Alfonso R. Oiterong. 

The United States and Palau agreed 
in the compact to call the plebiscite 
jointly, and an announcement of the 
date is being made simultaneously in 
Koror, Palau's capital, by Haruo I. 
Remeliik, President of the Republic. 
Procedures for the conduct of the 
, plebiscite are established in Palau Public 
Law No. 1-43 enacted by the Republic's 
Olbiil Era Kelulau — national legislature. 

Voters will also be asked in the 
plebiscite to indicate their preference 
between alternative forms of political 
status — a relationship with the United 
States closer than that of free associa- 
tion, or independence — in the event the 
compact does not achieve majority ap- 
proval. The result on this second ques- 
tion would then constitute guidance to 
the two governments for further 
negotiations. 

Signature of the compact and its 
related agreements in August repre- 
sented the completion of more than a 
decade of negotiations. U.N. observation 
of the plebiscite is among several 
governing principles for free association 
adopted by the negotiators in a meeting 
at Hilo, Hawaii, in April 1978. 



Press release 359 of Dec. 1, 1982. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



SOUTH ASIA 



Afghanistan: 

3 Years of Occupat 



ion 



The following paper was written by 
Eliza Van Holleri of the Bureau of In- 
telligence and Research in December 
1982. It is a sequel to three reports on 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
published in the Bulletin in March 
1981, October 1981. and March 1982. 

Overview 

Early in 1982, the Babrak Karmal 
regime and its Soviet sponsors re- 
doubled their assault on the Afghan re- 
sistance movement hoping to achieve a 
turning point in the 3-year battle. In 
March, Babrak declared that the time 
had come to "take the revolutionary 
struggle to the provinces, districts, and 
villages." At the end of the year, how- 
ever, there is little to show for their 
pains. Military, political, and economic 
gains continue to elude those who would 
impose a dictatorial Communist regime 
on the people of Afghanistan. 

The Soviets increased their troop 
strength to about 105,000 and greatly 
intensified their military operations in 
1982 but generally failed to discourage 
the resistance forces (the mujahidin) or 
to drive them from their strongholds. In- 
deed, mujahidin activity has increased 
dramatically inside Kabul itself in recent 
months in spite of intense Soviet 
military activity on all sides of the 
capital. Soviet inability to rebuild the 
Afghan Army into a loyal and effective 
force against the resistance continues to 
be a prime cause of military weakness. 

Over the past year, the ruling People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) had hoped to cure itself of in- 
ternecine fighting between its Khalq and 
Parcham factions and become the pre- 
eminent guiding force in Afghanistan. 
Instead, in the wake of a party confer- 
ence in March (the first since the PDPA 
came to power in April 1978), the politi- 
cal infighting became even more bitter. 
Many influential Khalqis are under 
suspicion of either sympathizing with or 
collaborating with the resistance. Rejec- 
tion of the party by the populace re- 
mains almost universal. 

At the end of 1981, the PDPA's 
seventh plenum called for a nationality 
and tribal policy to appeal to local tribal 
and ethnic aspirations and win support 
for the regime. Despite occasional gains, 
a year later it has become clear that 



tribes that once appeared susceptible to 
various regime blandishments are once 
more participating in the fihad— the holy 
war— against Babrak Karmal. 

The government had pinned its 
hopes on a modified land and water re- 
form program as the catalyst for in- 
creasing agricultural production in 1982 
and winning support from the peasants. 
Enterprises disabled by the m^ijahidin 
were to be reactivated. And Prime 
Minister Keshtmand claimed 63 new 
projects were to go into operation with 
Soviet aid. But the continuing strength 
of the resistance movement, which domi- 
nates 75%-80% of the country, has 
foiled the economic planners. 

At the end of 1982, the resistance 
movement in many areas appears to be 
militarily stronger and better organized 
than at the beginning of the year. Co- 
ordination and cooperation between 
fighting groups inside the country have 
generally improved, while Afghan exiles 
have stepped up efforts to foster greater 
unity in the resistance as a whole. 



Cordovez will soon resume his efforts to 
widen what he perceives to be the area 
of agreement between the parties. The 
success or failure of the U.N. negotia- 
tions ultimately will depend on Soviet 
agreement to withdraw troops from 
Afghanistan. The United States sup- 
ports the efforts of the U.N. mission to 
negotiate a political solution consistent 
with the principles expressed in the 
U.N. resolution on Afghanistan. 

If the new Soviet leadership chooses 
to pursue the present course of military 
activity, which is designed to wear down 
the Afghan people, it will continue to 
confront almost universal opposition. 
The November 1982 U.N. vote of 114-21 
was another impressive demonstration 
of strong international feeling on this 
subject. 

The plight of more than 2.7 million 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan continues 
to focus international attention on the 
Afghan tragedy. Moreover, increasing 
media coverage is making the world 
community more knowledgeable about 
Soviet conduct in Afghanistan. Recent 
new evidence about the Soviet use of 
chemical warfare in Afghanistan has re- 
ceived worldwide publicity. The second 
session of the Bertrand Russell People's 
Tribunal on Afghanistan met in Paris 



Despite occasional gains . . . it has become clear 
that tribes that once appeared susceptible to 
various regime blandishments are once more par- 
ticipating in the jihad— f/ie holy war— against 
Babrak Karmal. 



Nevertheless, the political weakness of 
the resistance movement remains. Dis- 
ruptive fighting between some bands in- 
side Afghanistan continues. Exile 
leaders based in Peshawar, Pakistan, 
are split into two competitive alliances. 
Furthermore, there is a large gulf be- 
tween formerly prominent leaders now 
in exile and some of the Peshawar-based 
organizations on the one hand, and some 
of the mujahidin fighting in Afghani- 
stan, on the other. 

The U.N. mission to promote a 
political solution to the Afghan crisis has 
made progress on procedural issues. The 
U.N. -sponsored indirect talks in Geneva 
in June began to deal with substance, 
but the critical phase of the negotiations 
lies ahead. U.N. representative Diego 



December 16-20 and heard testimony 
concerning the increasing number of 
atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers 
against Afghan villagers. Thus there has 
been no diminution of profound interna- 
tional concern over the individual and 
collective suffering now being endured 
by the Afghan people. 

Soviet Military 
Offensive Intensified 

At the end of 1981, the Soviets 
significantly stepped up their military 
operations and increased their troop 
strength. Both developments appeared 
to follow from the protracted visit to 
Afghanistan in late 1981 of a high-level 



February 1983 



53 



SOUTH ASIA 



Soviet military delegation led by First 
Deputy Defense Minister Marshal 
Sokolov.' 

The initial increment of 5,000 troops 
in December was followed by several 
thousand more in January. The total 
number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan 
is now estimated at 105,000. In addition, 
about 30,000 men on the Soviet side of 
the border serve in a rear-guard capaci- 
ty; some of these are periodically in- 
volved directly in operations in the 
northern areas. The U.S.S.R. thus has a 
force of about 135,000 committed to the 
Afghan war. 

Soviet military operations through- 
out 1982 have been more massive and 
more elaborate than in 1981; they ap- 
pear designed not only to eradicate mu- 
jahidin strongholds but also to intimi- 
date civilian supporters of the freedom 
fighters. The previous political strategy 
of wooing the population to support the 
regime's National Fatherland Front had 
been unsuccessful; by the end of last 
year the vmjahidin were clearly expand- 
ing the territory under their influence. 
In 1982, Soviet firepower has been used 
much more indiscriminately as the 
Soviet and Afghan Armed Forces have 
sought to reestablish the regime's 
authority in key areas. 

The big winter offensives against 
Qandahar in the south and in Parvan 
Province north of Kabul revealed 
Moscow's revised military strategy. 
These drives, which were followed by 
similarly harsh operations against many 
villages and towns throughout the coun- 
try, inflicted heavy casualties on civilians 
and occasionally on the mujahidin. More 
often, however, the freedom fighters 
have managed to withdraw with their 
force relatively intact and to return to 
the area as soon as the Soviets have left. 

Civilian populations near strategic 
targets have suffered the most. For ex- 
ample, the towns in the Shomali area 
immediately north of Kabul have been 
bombed heavily throughout the year. 
Mujahidin in this area are a threat to 
Kabul itself and to the important 
Bagram airbase as well as to traffic 
moving along the main supply route 
from Kabul to the Soviet border. Many 
other strategically important areas in 
both eastern and western Afghanistan 
have been subjected to repeated aerial 
attack, but none has been hit with the 
same frequency and intensity as those 
near the capital. 

Moscow probably will try to re- 
frain from large-scale counterattacks on 



the mujahidin inside Kabul. Although 
they have on occasion bombarded resist- 
ance-controlled quarters of two other 
cities, Qandahar and Herat, the presence 
of a large community of foreign 
observers may inhibit them in Kabul. 
But the State Information Service 
(KHAD— the secret police), which is run 
by the Soviet KGB, appears to have in- 
creased its activities in Kabul in recent 
months in response to mujahidin activi- 
ty in the city. Recent emigrants have 
described a growing police-state atmos- 
phere in the capital. 

The Soviets also appear to be con- 
centrating their military efforts in areas 
which are economically important and 
which are essentially under mujahidin 
control. These include fertile agricultural 
regions and the sites of industrial enter- 
prises that have been disabled by the 
guerrillas in districts surrounding the 
major cities — Kabul, Qandahar. Herat, 
Jalalabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif. 

Other Soviet military activity during 
the past year apparently has been in- 
tended to discourage movement across 
the Pakistani and Iranian borders; it 
does not appear to have succeeded. 
Soviet forces also have been engaged in 
equally unfruitful efforts to suppress the 
resistance in the northern provinces 
along the Soviet border. 

Panjsher and Paghman Operations 

The most important Soviet military ob- 
jective in 1982 was to reestablish the 
regime's authority in the Panjsher 
Valley, 60 miles north of Kabul, and to 
destroy Ahmad Shah Mahsud's mu- 
jahidin organization in this area. 
Another important priority was to drive 
the mujahidin out of Paghman, a moun- 
tain retreat only 12 miles from the 
capital. Both the Panjsher Valley and 
Paghman have become strategically im- 
portant mujahidin strongholds as well 
as symbols of mujahidin success. 

During the summer, the Soviets 
launched two major attacks on the Panj- 
sher. The campaigns have been referred 
to as Panjsher V and Panjsher VI, high- 
lighting the growing number of Soviet 
efforts to take the valley. 

Panjsher V, which began in mid-May 
and lasted about 6 weeks, stands out as 
the biggest Soviet military operation of 
the war to date. Although an unusually 
large combined force — about 12,000- 
15,000 men— established base camps 
about one-fourth of the way up the 
75-mile valley, the offensive failed to in- 
flict noticeable damage on the 5,000-man 



mujahidin force under Mahsud's com- 
mand. The operation, however, was very 
costly for the Soviet and Afghan troops 
in terms of casualties and lost materiel. 
Mahsud's men were particularly effec- 
tive against heliborne troops, who had 
landed on numerous hilltops. 

Claims by the regime in late June 
that the Panjsher had been "liberated" 
were premature. By late August, mu- 
jahidin pressure on the newly estab- 
lished garrisons forced the Soviets to 
mount another major offensive into the 
valley. This time they conducted exten- 
sive operations against villages in the 
Panjsher River's many lateral valleys. 
Once again the invaders suffered heavy 
casualties, lost large quantities of 
materiel, failed to establish a presence 
beyond the already garrisoned town of 
Rokha, and did not significantly hurt the 
mujahidin. Following the retreat of this 
second invading force in mid-September, 
the mujahidin resumed their harass- 
ment of the remaining garrisons. Defec- 
tions from the Afghan forces climbed 
again, as they had earlier in the sum- 
mer. As of late fall, Soviet planes con- 
tinued to bomb the valley, and a new 
Soviet operation before the end of the 
year was likely. 

The Soviets seem determined to 
eliminate the Panjsher as a symbol of 
the resistance; thus they may try to 
keep a garrison in the lower valley 
throughout the winter. This would be a 
difficult operation; the post at Rokha 
already is partially dependent on re- 
supply by air. The mujahidin in the 
Panjsher downed several helicopters 
during the summer operations; garrisons 
isolated by winter snows are even more 
vulnerable. On the other hand, the mu- 
jahidin themselves are more vulnerable 
during the winter because they cannot 
retreat to their mountain hideouts. 

During the Panjsher operations this 
year, the Soviets tried to cut off the 
valley by blocking entrance points, but 
these efforts failed. There were 
numerous reports, for instance, that 
during the protracted offensive in May 
and June, Mahsud received assistance 
from other resistance commanders. 

Soviet offensives in the Panjsher 
have inflicted great suffering on the 
civilian population as Moscow has sough 
to erode popular support for the muja- 
hidin. Many homes, and indeed entire 
villages, have been destroyed by the con- 
stant bombardments. In October, for the 
first time, Panjsheri refugees began to 
arrive in northern Pakistan. 

Severe food shortages in the 
Panjsher can be expected this winter. 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



SOUTH ASIA 



The fighting in early summer destroyed 
most of the wheat crop by depriving it 
of irrigation during a critical period. 
Some crops, however, have been 
harvested in the upper reaches of the 
valley, and some food can be purchased 
from neighboring districts. Mahsud has 
issued an appeal for international 
assistance to avert a major disaster. 

The situation in Paghman, only 12 
miles from Kabul, is similar. The 
Paghman district is a less tightly knit 
economic and social unit and has no 
charismatic leader, but the several mu- 
jahidin groups active in the area 
cooperate with each other. The ability of 
the mujahidin to control the town of 
Paghman most of the time has made it 
an important symbol of the resistance. 
Furthermore, 7nujahidin who con- 
gregate in the Paghman hills have 
operated effectively in Kabul itself. 

After several efforts during the 
spring to open the road to Paghman, the 
Soviets mounted an extensive two- 
pronged operation against the area. The 
mujahidin were forced to retreat to the 
surrounding mountains. In late July, 
Babrak announced that this mountain 
recreation spot was once more open to 
the public. 

But the regime's claims to have paci- 
fied Paghman were hollow. The m7i- 
jahidin were soon overrunning army 
outposts, and heavy bombardments of 
the Paghman area, including the town's 
central bazaar in the summer, failed to 
halt resistance activity. Soviet and 
regime forces attacked Paghman again 
in October and November, but the army 
garrison there remains in jeopardy. 

Soviet Casualties and Morale. Be- 
cause of the shift to larger scale opera- 
tions in 1982, Soviet casualties began to 
rise. To keep casualties low, the Soviets 
made heavy use of air bombardments 
and forced Afghan military units to 
spearhead the ground attacks. 

The new spate of casualties may be 
causing morale problems for the Soviets. 
In November, Krasnaya Zvezda carried 
an unusual, only slightly veiled, refer- 
ence to Soviet casualties, indicating a 
need to acknowledge the sacrifices made 
by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In an 
interview with a Krasnaya Zvezda corre- 
spondent, a member of Afghanistan's 
Politburo claimed that Soviet soldiers 
had now won the trust of the Afghan 
people, but he added that it had been 
won "at a great price." He went on to 
thank "the Soviet servicemen for their 
courage, selflessness and genuine inter- 
nationalism." This admission went 
beyond the candid statement in 
Krasnaya Zvezda last February that life 



for the Soviet troops in Afghanistan "is 
hard . . . sometimes very, very hard." 
The November statement may have been 
spurred by the large death toll of Soviet 
soldiers from asphyxiation following an 
accident in the Salang tunnel on 
November 3. 

Accounts of indiscipline, drug usage, 
and black marketeering — including the 
sale of weapons and ammunition — are 
numerous. Throughout the Soviet oc- 
cupation, there have been periodic re- 
ports of defections to the mujahidin by 
Soviet minority troops, particularly the 
Tadzhiks who have important cultural 
and ethnic links with Afghan Tadzhiks. 
These defections seem to have increased 
during 1982. 

Soviet commanders in Afghanistan 
are under heavy pressure from Moscow 



To keep [their] casualties 
low, the Soviets made 
heavy use of air bom- 
bardments and forced 
Afghan military units to 
spearhead the ground 
attacks. 



to produce results against an enemy that 
frequently outfights and outwits them 
and that enjoys the support of the vast 
majority of Afghans. 'Thus when the 
Soviets fail to track down the m?^- 
jahidin, they turn on civilians in frustra- 
tion and rage. The Swedish journalist 
Borje Almquist has described in detail 
crimes perpetrated by Soviet soldiers 
against Afghan citizens in Lowgar Prov- 
ince, which he visited during the sum- 
mer. The Bertrand Russel Tribunal has 
publicized similar evidence of Soviet 
brutality. 

Chemical Warfare. The Soviets 
have continued to employ lethal chemical 
weapons against the mujahidin in 1982. 
These weapons have been used selec- 
tively — generally against guerrillas in 
relatively inaccessible locations. For ex- 
ample, chemical agents have been used 
against mujahidin positions in caves and 
mujahidin hiding in underground water- 
ways. Analysis of two Soviet gas masks 
recently acquired from Afghanistan con- 
firms earlier suspicions that the Soviets 
are using the deadly trichothecene myco- 



toxins ("yellow rain") in Afghanistan. In 
November, the Department of State 
issued an updated report on chemical 
and biological weapons employed by the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Laos, and 
Kampuchea (Bulletin of December 
1982). This document details the new 
evidence compiled on this subject during 
1982. 

Soviet POWs. In the spring of 1982, 
after lengthy negotiations, Moscow 
agreed to let the International Commit- 
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) take charge 
of Soviet prisoners of war captured by 
the mujahidin. The first three prisoners 
to change hands under this arrangement 
arrived in Switzerland in June. Four 
more have followed, the latest transfer 
having taken place in November. As 
part of the agreement, an ICRC team 
was allowed to go to Kabul in late 
August to visit prisoners and "carry out 
humanitarian assistance" on their behalf. 
The team, however, was unexpectedly 
obliged to leave Kabul in October, and 
the scope of the ICRC's role inside 
Afghanistan is still being negotiated. 

Moscow was slow to conclude this 
arrangement, presumably because it in- 
volved recognizing the mujahidin as a 
negotiating entity and also because it 
was a formal admission that Soviet 
soldiers were actually fighting in 
Afghanistan. The present agreement 
was reached after the mujahidin re- 
vealed that they had executed a prom- 
inent Soviet adviser, E. M. Okrimyuk. 
The freedom fighters held Okrimyuk 
prisoner for several months, hoping to 
exchange him for mujahidin prisoners 
held by the Kabul regime. 

The Afghan Army 

A major obstacle to Soviet military suc- 
cess against the mujahidin is Moscow's 
continuing inability to rebuild the 
Afghan Army. Not only is there a per- 
sistent shortage of recruits, but the 
loyalty of the officer corps remains in 
serious doubt. 

Within the officer corps, Parchami 
loyalists are in a minority. They are out- 
numbered by disillusioned and alienated 
nonparty careerists and by Khalqis who 
bear a grudge against the dominant Par- 
chamis. The elections preceding the na- 
tional party conference in March con- 
firmed the numerical edge which the 
Khalqis hold over the Parchamis among 
the officers. 

Moscow hopes that increasing num- 
bers of officers who have been trained 
recently in the Soviet Union will help 
create a more loyal force. The Soviets 
also may expect that the sons of party 



February 1983 



55 



SOUTH ASIA 



members now being rushed through of- 
ficer training courses in Kabul will be 
more reliable. But the long list of 
Afghan officers who have defected in- 
cludes many who received training in 
the Soviet Union. 

Moscow also counted on General Ab- 



the lack of cooperation between the ar- 
my and other security organizations. 
Babrak ascribed these problems to in- 
adequate political indoctrination in the 
army and, by implication, to party fac- 
tionalism. He stated that "unity . . . and 
the solidarity of party ranks in the army 



Soviet commanders in Afghanistan are under 
heavy pressure from Moscow to produce results 
against an enemy that frequently outfights and 
outwits them and that enjoys the support of the 
vast majority of Afghans. 



dul Qader, who was acting Minister of 
Defense during most of 1982 and of- 
ficially appointed as minister in 
September, to narrow the division in the 
military establishment between Klialqis 
and Parchamis. Qader has ties with both 
factions and has been described as more 
of a "nationalist" than a party man. Yet 
his appointment in place of General Rafi, 
who was an ardent Parchami. has not 
generated much support from nonparty 
and Khalqi officers. 

On the contrary, there are many 
signs that officers in the Afghan Army 
continue to collaborate with the mu- 
jahidin. Large number of Khalq officers 
were arrested in Jalalabad in March and 
in Ghazni Province in April, suggesting 
extensive plotting against the regime. 
Following the Panjsher campaign in ear- 
ly summer, reports circulated that 
several high-ranking officers had been 
arrested for collaborating with Mahsud. 
And in late September, General Wodud, 
commander of the Central Corps, was 
found shot to death in his office. He may 
have been killed either by the Parchamis 
or by enraged Soviets on suspicion of 
collusion with the nnijahi.din. Through- 
out the year, Afghan commanders have 
had their assignments shifted fre- 
quently — as if their Soviet overseers 
were trying to forestall the development 
of sympathetic ties between com- 
manders and local mujahidin. 

In a speech to the armed forces 
guidance and administration leadership 
cadre on August 12, Babrak Karmal was 
highly critical of the army's perfor- 
mance. He singled out irresponsibility 
with weapons (perhaps prompted by the 
large loss of materiel to the mujahidin 
in the Panjsher), the ineffectiveness of 
some combat units, the failure of of- 
ficers to lead and inspire their men, and 



was of vital and national importance." 

The shortage of Afghan troops may 
be even more significant for Kabul than 
the shortage of reliable officers. The 
regime has been unable to build an army 
of more than 30,000-40,000 men; it 
loses about 10,000 men annually through 
desertions and 5,000 through casualties. 
The year 1982 began with an urgent 
need to replace some 20,000 men who 
were released from service in December 
1981 after completion of their extended 
tours. Extensive sweep operations were 
held throughout the country to obtain 
replacements. Those caught in the 
dragnet included many persons with 
valid claims to exemption. Similar 
sweeps were conducted in the spring 
and early summer but with little success. 

In late July, the regime again re- 
vised the draft law. The tour of duty for 
regular recruits was extended by 6 
months to 3 years. Reservists who had 
been inducted following the September 
1981 mobilization had their present 
tours extended from 1 to 2 years, and 
another large class of reservists became 
eligible for active duty when the age 
ceiling was raised from 35 to 39. 

The reaction in the armed forces 
was predictable: a perceptible increase 
in desertions. Indeed, the draft law 
changes appeared to have the immediate 
effect of causing a net loss of army per- 
sonnel despite the sweep operations. To 
counter this hemorrhaging, the regime 
announced higher pay for soldiers and 
noncommissioned officers during their 
third year of duty. 

In October, in a further indication of 
the troop shortage, the regime decided 
to violate traditional custom by drafting 
men from the Shinwari, Mohmand, and 



Jaji tribes who inhabit areas adjacent to 
Pakistan. The decision also may have 
reflected the regime's awareness that 
these tribes were not preventing cross- 
border traffic in their area — the quid 
pro quo for the draft exemption. But 
when the tribesmen staged a large 
demonstration in Kabul in early 
November in protest to the draft, the 
government reversed its decision. 

Rumors of a government plan to 
create a civil defense corps of boys (ages 
16-18) and older men (ages 40-45) to 
perform guard duty have greatly 
alarmed the populace. Younger boys 
(ages 10-15) are to receive military 
training at school to prepare them for 
such responsibilities. As much of the 
police force is tied down with guard du- 
ty, the civil defense plan would free 
police for combat. Many of the 16-18 
year-olds already have been conscripted 
even though they are under the legal 
draft age of 19. The plan allegedly is to 
go into effect in March 1983. 

Consolidation of All 
Security Organizations 

Morale and disciplinary problems have 
afflicted other security organs — the 
Defense of the Revolution (DOR) militia, 
the police, and the secret police. The 
DOR militia is supposed to be a force of 
selected party loyalists, but its members 
are often young, opportunistic, and easi- 
ly demoralized; they have a poor record 
of performance under stress. There is 
also much bickering among the different 
services, including fighting between the 
police and the KHAD in Kabul. 

The Soviets and the regime recog- 
nize the advantage of imposing more 
centralized control on the security ap- 
paratus. The "action program," adopted 
at the party conference in March, called 
for establishing a "unified single defense 
system of . . . armed forces, frontier 
forces, security organs, groups of 
defenders of revolution and volunteer 
groups of tribes." It also called for "tight 
party control over the . . . activities of 
this system as a whole." 

The plan to consolidate all security 
forces under centralized party direction 
has run into political and bureaucratic 
resistance. In speeches to KHAD per- 
sonnel in May, to army cadres in 
August, and to the police in October, 
Babrak Karmal criticized all the services 
for their lack of cooperation. His com- 
plaints, however, are unlikely to have 
much effect. For example the top Khalqi 
leader, Gulabzoi, who as Minister of the 
Interior controls the police, probably 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



SOUTH ASIA 



sees the consolidation as a Parcham 
move to undermine his position; indeed, 
there are signs that Gulabzoi is continu- 
ing to try to build the police into a 
parallel "army" under his control. 

Problems in the Party 

The first national conference of the Peo- 
ple's Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) took place in "mid-March 1982. 
In addition, three Central Committee 
plenums were held — the eighth in March 
to prepare for the national conference, 
the ninth in July, and the tenth in 
December. The first three meetings re- 
vealed that the fundamental conflicts be- 
tween the Khalq and Parcham factions 
of the party are as serious as ever. 

The conference sponsors probably 
hoped that the conference would estab- 
lish the dominance of the Parcham wing 
and thus would further legitimize 
Babrak's leadership. The two main items 
on the agenda — changes in the party 
constitution and an action program to 
give the party a sense of direction — both 
seem to have been designed to reduce 
Khalq influence. 

The Khalq leadership, however, 
turned the two-stage process of electing 
delegates to the conference into a con- 
test punctuated by fistfights and shoot- 
outs, instead of accepting elections 
rigged in favor of Parcham candidates. 
The results confirmed that in spite of 
repeated purges of lower and middle- 
level Khalqis, the latter still outnumber 
their rivals — at least among full-tledged 
members eligible to participate in the 
election process. 

The effect of the preconference elec- 
tions was to exacerbate Khalq-Parcham 
feuding. Babrak's speech to the con- 
ference referred repeatedly to the "fac- 
tionalism" problem, highlighting his con- 
cern about what he referred to as "this 
old disease." Babrak stated that "when 
unity is weakened, the party faces weak- 
ness and defeat, even its existence faces 
danger." He denounced anarchism, lack 
of discipline, alien ideology, hostility 
toward new party members, and the 
related sins of nepotism, localism, 
tribalism, and ethnicity in forming party 
cadres. 

During much of 1981 and particular- 
ly in early 1982, in the weeks im- 
mediately preceding the conference, the 
Parcham leadership engaged in an inten- 
sive drive to recruit new members. The 
purpose was twofold: to legitimize the 
party's claim to governing Afghanistan 
by giving it a larger membership and to 
neutralize the influence of the Khalqis. 



By the time of the conference, a 
combination of coercion and enticements 
had netted the party enough new re- 
cruits to enable it for the first time to 
announce a membership figure: 62,000. 
At the ninth plenum in July, Babrak 
claimed that the number had increased 
to 70,000. Many observers estimate the 
membership at'about 35,000-40,000. 

About half of the members are in 
the armed forces. In August, Babrak 
said that there were 20,000 members in 
the army and that "the army party 
organization forms the greatest part of 
the PDPA." This figure would include 
members in the officer corps, which is 
predominantly Khalqi, and new 
members among conscripts — a captive 
group that has provided the Parchamis 
with a large portion of their new re- 
cruits. Many of these persons defect 
from the party at the same time they 
defect from the army. (Even if the par- 
ty's figure of about 62,000 members is 
correct, they would constitute only 4% 
of Afghanistan's population, estimated 
at about 15 million before the Soviet in- 
vasion.) 

In what appears to be a thinly veiled 
effort to isolate the Khalqis in the ex- 
panded party, the Parcham leadership 
announced at the conference a change of 
rules to authorize a more rapid influx in- 
to the party of workers and peasants by 
shortening the probationary period. 
Rules also have been changed to relax 
sponsorship requirements. 

Relaxing the rules is likely to cause 
problems for the party leadership. 
Babrak and others have indicated that 
new members have not carried out their 
party duties satisfactorily. At the con- 
ference in March, one leader noted that 
nearly half the party was composed of 
young people (18 is the age of eligibility), 
and he complained of their lack of 
"political maturity." 

The other main item on the con- 
ference agenda was to adopt a compre- 
hensive "action plan" to galvanize 
members to promote party objectives. 
Babrak Karmal's speech implied that the 
right to be carried on the membership 
rolls would depend on a member's active 
participation in the defense of the 
revolution — in combat and in the high 
priority area of revitalizing the economy. 

The Parchamis may have viewed the 
more strict criteria for membership as a 
way to purge the Khalqis. But Soviet ad- 
visers, who probably drafted the docu- 
ment, evidently saw it as a means of 
coercing the Khalqis to cooperate. 
Moscow has always been concerned 



about antagonizing the Khalqis because 
of their strength in the military; for that 
reason, a major purge is unlikely. 

The ninth central committee plenum 
of the party was convened in July 
without advance notice. At the time of 
the meeting, rumors of coup plots and of 
connivance between the Khalqis and the 
resistance were rife. Though the plenum 
ostensibly dealt with the need for party 
workers to get out among the people to 
sell the revolution, the gathering ap- 
parently focused on security problems 
and the continuing struggle between the 
Khalqis and the Parchamis. The crisis 
probably was ignited by the unsatisfac- 
tory outcome of the fifth Panjsher cam- 
paign and perhaps of other military of- 
fensives. High-level personnel changes 
were anticipated, including the removal 
of Khalq leader Gulabzoi from his posi- 
tion as Minister of Interior, but the most 
significant dismissal was that of General 
Gul Aqa, the Parcham political com- 
missar in the Ministry of Defense who 
was held responsible for dispatching 
hundreds of volunteer party workers to 
their deaths in the Panjsher. Apparently 
a large proportion of the "volunteers" 
were Khalqis anxious to remain in the 
good graces of the Soviets by taking an 
active part in the war effort. 

Divisions within Babrak's own Par- 
cham faction remain. Relations between 
Babrak and Prime Minister Sultan All 
Keshtmand are cool. Keshtmand is am- 
bitious and would like to step into 
Babrak's shoes as Moscow's favorite. As 
a former Minister of Planning who re- 
tains special responsibilities for the 
economy, Keshtmand is pushing hard 
for improvements in economic conditions 
to impress his Soviet mentors. 

The ninth party plenum's directive 
to party members to work among the 
"masses" is the latest in a series of ef- 
forts to broaden the party's base. During 
1981, the regime pursued this goal 
through the creation in June of an um- 
brella organization— the National 
Fatherland Front (NFF). Subsequent 
publicity has created the impression of a 
steadily growing organization that is 
opening up new provincial and district 
councils throughout the country. The an- 
niversary of the front's founding was 
marked by a second plenum in Kabul in 
June 1982. The regime invokes the NFF 
when it wants to imply national support 
for such issues as a recent NFF- 
sponsored peace campaign. But the 
front is generally considered a facade; it 
has failed to achieve its purpose of 
mobilizing popular support for the 
regime. 



February 1983 



57 



SOUTH ASIA 



Problems in the Economy 

Both Kabul and Moscow publicly claim 
that Afghanistan has made considerable 
economic and social progress in spite of 
"interference" by the forces of "im- 
perialism." In their own speeches, how- 
ever, Afghan officials have expressed 
great concern over the continuing eco- 
nomic deterioration. For example, 
Babrak emphasized to the PDPA con- 
ference in March and again to the party 
plenum in July that "the economic front 
bears no less importance than the battle- 
front." Babrak continually stresses that 
the breakdown of the Afghan economy 
is a political problem that party 
members should solve. The regime is 
hoping to use improved economic condi- 
tions to generate popular support for 
the government, but the economy cannot 
be revived while so much of the country- 
side is under mujahidin control. 

Afghanistan's economy rests pri- 
marily on agriculture. Over four-fifths of 
the population lives in rural areas. 
Reasonably good weather over the last 
few years has left the farmers in some 
areas not much worse off than they 
were before the Soviet invasion. Agri- 
cultural production, however, has fallen 
sharply. About 3 million Afghans (one- 
fifth of the population) have fled the 
country, most coming from rural areas 
and taking about 3 million animals with 
them. In areas of heavy fighting, in- 
cluding many of Afghanistan's most fer- 
tile valleys, crops have been destroyed 
or lost through lack of irrigation and 
cultivation. In the areas controlled by 



towns and villages that have been heavi- 
ly bombarded by the Soviets. The 
population of Kabul has more than 
doubled since before the war to about 
1.8 million. Although the authorities 
have tried to introduce price controls, 
recent emigrants report that basic com- 
modities are in very short supply and 
that prices have skyrocketed. 

In his campaign to win the support 
of the peasants, Babrak has outlined a 
program of land reform. The main in- 
novation in this plan— as compared to 
the program applied by the Taraki 
regime in 1979 that stimulated the early 
growth of the resistance movement— is 
to accompany redistribution of land with 
the water rights needed to irrigate it. In 
conjunction with this program, Afghan 
and Soviet planners are seeking to 
restore damaged irrigation systems in 
11 provinces. 

The 'mujahidin have resisted these 
efforts. Preliminary phases of a pilot 
project in Deh Sabz district (adjacent to 
Kabul) have provoked strong opposition. 
There is little likelihood, therefore, that 
this project will be carried out, despite 
predictions of Babrak and his prime 
minister that agricultural production 
would rise as much as 3.1% for the 
Afghan calendar year (March 1982- 
March 1983). 

The situation is no better in Afghan- 
istan's small industrial sector. Emigra- 
tion has seriously reduced the work 
force (both skilled and nonskilled), the 
transportation network is in disarray, 
and the mujahidin have shut down 



As a result of the decline in agricultural produc- 
tion and problems of distribution, the Soviet Union 
has had to supply food and other commodities to 
meet the basic needs of the cities, notably Kabul. 



the mujahidin, what is produced is not 
shipped to urban markets, although this 
year military forces have appropriated 
harvested crops for the regime. As a 
result of the decline in agricultural pro- 
duction and problems of distribution, the 
Soviet Union has had to supply food and 
other commodities to meet the basic 
needs of the cities, notably Kabul. 

Kabul's food problem this year has 
been greatly exacerbated by a large in- 
flux of refugees fleeing from nearby 



many factories and virtually all develop- 
ment projects. At the party conference 
in March, Babrak listed government 
enterprises that have been disabled by 
the resistance, including "the cement 
factory in Herat, the textile mills in 
Herat and Qandahar, sugar factories 
and irrigation establishments." He 
stressed the importance of putting these 
plants back in operation, but there is no 
indication as of late fall that this has 
happened. 

At the same conference. Prime 



Minister Keshtmand outlined an am- 
bitious program of economic growth. He 
predicted a general increase in produc- 
tion of 6.3% with industrial growth of 
10.3%, during the period from March 
1982 to March 1983. These projections 
were predicated on 63 new projects to 
be carried out mostly with Soviet aid. 
The plan was based on the assumption 
that the more aggressive military 
strategy for 1982 would neutralize the 
mujahidin and reestablish the regime's 
authority in the provinces. 

It was clear by late August that the 
military strategy was not working and 
that economic objectives were not being 
achieved. Keshtmand admitted to the 
Council of Ministers that performance 
during the first quarter of the year 
(March 21 -June 21) was unsatisfactory. 
He indicated particular concern about 
shortcomings in the development of fuel 
resources, electricity, and minerals and 
raw materials. In particular, he men- 
tioned the importance of increasing coal 
production as well as expanding oil and 
gas works, of getting started on the 
Aynak copper mine project in Lowgar 
Province, and of assuring adequate elec- 
tricity for Kabul. Babrak's mid-year 
report to the Council of Ministers on Oc- 
tober 3 indicated similar concern over 
these particular areas of the economy. 

The stress on improving key sectors 
of the economy has been accompanied 
by high-level personnel shifts. Last 
spring, Prime Minister Keshtmand relin- 
quished the planning portfolio to Dr. 
Khalil Ahmad Abawi, a professional 
planner. Keshtmand, however, retains 
special responsibilities in the economic 
sphere. The Ministry of Power and Irri- 
gation was split in May into two entities, 
presumably a reflection of the import- 
ance attached to these areas. The 
former Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
and Land Reform, Abdul Chafer Lakan- 
wal, was elevated to the post of 
minister. 

Afghanistan's natural gas industry is 
the only sector of the economy that 
functions more or less normally. Almost 
all of the gas produced from fields 
located near the Soviet border and 
developed by the U.S.S.R. in the early 
1960s is exported to the U.S.S.R. The 
nominal price increases negotiated since 
the occupation are all that keeps 
Afghanistan's economic statistics from 
being worse than they are. Part of the 
earnings from sales of natural gas is 
applied to repayments on the outstand- 
ing debt to the Soviet Union; the re- 
mainder is registered as credits in the 
barter accounting system for trade be- 
tween the two countries. In this way, 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



SOUTH ASIA 



Afghanistan derives no hard currency 
benefit from its major export. 

The Afghan economy continues to be 
tied tightly to that of the Soviet Union. 
An agreement signed in April 1981 
called for trebling trade between the 
two countries during 1981-1985, as com- 
pared to the previous 5 years. Afghani- 
stan's development plans are worked out 
by Soviet advisers; the emphasis on the 
development of fuel and mineral re- 
sources appears to have been dictated by 
Soviet requirements. 

In mid-November, Babrak, speaking 
to a World Peace Council conference in 
Kabul on socioeconomic development, re- 
viewed development achievements in 
Afghanistan. Most of the projects he 
listed are far behind schedule or at a 
standstill. The two that have been com- 
pleted are conspicuous for their import- 
ance to Moscow: a new bridge linking 
the two countries over the Amu Darya 
River that was rushed to completion in 
May, a year ahead of schedule; and a 
satellite communication and television 
receiving system, inaugurated in late 
February. This system gives Moscow an 
mportant communications link and the 
ipportunity to project its political propa- 
ganda into Afghanistan. 

Nationality and Tribal Policy 

Both Kabul and Moscow attach particu- 
ar importance to the regime's nationali- 
y and tribal policy. This policy, imple- 
mented by Minister of Nationalities and 
Tribal Affairs Sulaiman Laeq, tries to 
;xploit ethnic and tribal self-interest to 
vin support from Afghanistan's diverse 
)eoples. The seventh party plenum in 
December 1981 issued a special message 
;o the tribes, and during the past year 
;he regime has continued to try to ex- 
iloit tribal sensibilities. 

An important element in the 
•egime's strategy is the effort to win 
)ver the tribes through cash, weapons, 
md privileges. These tactics appeared to 
3e having some success at various times 
n 1982. Certain tribes seemed to lose 
;heir enthusiasm for the resistance and 
were said to have agreed to arrange- 
ments by which they would be exempted 
from the draft in return for guarding 
the border. 

In most cases, however, tribal 
icceptance of regime blandishments has 
oroved to be temporary and tactical. 
Tribes in Paktia Province near the 
Pakistani border rebelled twice during 
the year to turn back Soviet and Afghan 
forces that were trying to close off ac- 
cess to Pakistan. Likewise, tribes in 
Konar Province, adjoining Pakistan, 



resumed armed resistance after alleged- 
ly having been neutralized by the 
regime. More recently, the regime pro- 
voked demonstrations when it tried to 
draft men who belonged to the border 
tribes in Paktia and Nangarhar Prov- 



The Resistance Movement 

Resistance forces in Afghanistan demon- 
strated in 1982 that they could absorb 
hard blows by the Soviets and intensify 
their own operations. Most resistance 
organizations have survived this year's 
tough battles despite losses. For exam- 
ple, a respected commander was killed 
in the Paghman area in the spring. More 
recently, a young leader from the 
southern outskirts of Kabul was killed 
while leading an attack on a military 
garrison inside Kabul. In Lowgar Prov- 
ince, Soviet forces inflicted a heavy blow 
during the summer on resistance forces 
already weakened by friction among the 
mujahidin. In spite of some setbacks. 



attacked convoys on all major routes to 
procure weapons, ammunition, food, and 
other supplies. The freedom fighters 
also have kept up their attacks on other 
targets such as government and party 
offices and installations in urban and 
district centers, including police posts 
and military garrisons. 

The mujahidin have shown im- 
proved capabilities this year against 
Soviet combat aircraft, including Mi-24 
helicopter gunships, and airbases, and 
against targets inside Kabul. The Soviet 
military headquarters, the Soviet Em- 
bassy, and the Kabul airport have all 
been hit by heavy mujahidin fire. 
Recently the guerrillas have exploded 
bombs in party offices and hangouts of 
the secret police in the center of Kabul. 

Resistance operations in the Panj- 
sher Valley, Paghman, and Kabul have 
received the most publicity, but freedom 
fighters also continue to engage Soviet 
and Afghan forces throughout the coun- 
try. In Qandahar and Herat, for exam- 



Mujahidin periodically cross into the Soviet Union 
on raiding parties and also receive assistance (and 
sometimes recruits) from their ethnic cousins 
across the river. 



observers have concluded that the resist- 
ance is stronger at the end of the year 
than it was at the beginning. 

Early 1982 was a difficult period 
that revealed the vulnerability of the 
resistance during winter months when 
the mujahidin have less mobility. Access 
to mountain trails for escape routes and 
to mountain redoubts for sanctuary is 
cut off by heavy winter snows. The mu- 
jahidin, for instance, suffered serious 
setbacks in Qandahar in the south in 
January and in Parvan Province, north 
of Kabul, where Soviet and regime 
forces trapped many freedom fighters 
and their supporters in an encircling 
operation in February. Nevertheless, the 
guerrillas continued harassing opera- 
tions throughout the country during the 
winter. In January, a mujahidin gunner 
in Paktia Province downed a Soviet heli- 
copter in which Lt. Gen. Shkidchenko 
was a passenger. Shkidchenko's death 
was reported in the Soviet press without 
reference to the circumstances. 

Resistance activities picked up in the 
spring. Mujahidin renewed their harass- 
ment of the highways. They regularly 



pie, the resistance continues to be effec- 
tive in spite of repeated Soviet military 
campaigns. Indeed, mujahidin are once 
again operating inside Qandahar city 
from which the Soviets had forced them 
out last January. 

The mujahidin are active in the 
northern provinces adjoining the 
U.S.S.R., despite the deployment of ad- 
ditional Soviet forces in this area. In- 
deed, mujahidin periodically cross into 
the Soviet Union on raiding parties and 
also receive assistance (and sometimes 
recruits) from their ethnic cousins across 
the river. When Babrak went to the 
Soviet Union in mid-May for the opening 
of the new bridge linking Termez, on the 
Soviet side, with Hairatan, there was no 
large public ceremony on the Afghan 
side; security conditions precluded such 
festivities. 

The effectiveness of the parallel 
government run by the resistance varies 
from region to region. In the Panjsher 
Valley, Ahmad Shah Mahsud has 
mobilized virtually the entire population 
of 100,000 for the resistance struggle. In 



"ebruary 1983 



59 



SOUTH ASIA 



some ethnically homogeneous areas— 
notably the Hazarajat and Nuristan— 
autonomous governments have been 
formed, although these governments 
have been weakened by internal dissen- 
sion. 

The resistance remains a collection 
of numerous separate movements. But 
cooperation between various elements 
has increased considerably in 1982. In 
the areas around major towns and cities, 
operations frequently are combined ven- 
tures involving several groups. Further- 
more, such groups now cooperate in 
operational planning and in the procure- 
ment and sharing of weapons. 

In Peshawar, the six major exile 
organizations have formed two alliances. 
In the field, cooperation cuts across 
alliance lines. In some places, local 
leaders have abandoned their Peshawar 
affiliations and have united under a local 
commander. 

Nevertheless, in spite of improved 
unity, clashes occur periodically between 
rival bands. These battles occasionally 
have caused fairly heavy casualties and 
have led to disillusionment among the 
population of the localities where they 
occur. Friction among mujahidin 
groups, for example, has seriously weak- 
ened the resistance effort in Lowgar 
Province. The fighting stems from com- 
petition between groups to establish 
their authority over a given area, but 
there are increasing signs that the bat- 
tles sometimes have been provoked by 
Soviet or regime agents. 

In this situation, progress toward 
consolidating the resistance movement 
has been uneven. But the judgment of 
observers who have visited mujahidin 
groups in Afghanistan during the past 
year is that many are becoming better 
organized and are cooperating more ef- 
fectively with one another. 

Prominent Afghans in exile have 
stepped up their search for ways to 
overcome political divisions in the resist- 
ance movement and to bridge the gulf 
between themselves and the mujahidin. 
Former Prime Minister Youssuf has 
been active in this effort as has Abdul 
Rahman Pazhwak, a former Afghan 
diplomat who once served as President 
of the U.N. General Assembly. Pazhwak 
arrived in New Delhi from Kabul in late 
March and announced his intention to 
try to promote a government-in-exile. 
Before such a government can be estab- 
lished, however, serious conflicts within 
the resistance must be resolved and 



difficult questions of leadership — in- 
cluding whether former King Zaher will 
have a role — must be answered. 



The Afghan Refugees 

In the period since the April 1978 Marx- 
ist coup in Kabul triggered the flow of 
refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan, 
more than 2.7 million people have 
registered with the Pakistani 
authorities. This figure emerges from 
the reenumeration of the refugee 
population conducted by the Pakistan 
Government in 1982. 

Refugees continue to enter Pakistan 
at a steady pace. The numbers have 
declined, probably reflecting the fact 
that many villagers close to Pakistan be- 
came refugees in the early stages of the 
war, while resistance leaders farther 
away from the border have urged the 
local population to stay in their villages. 
Also, victims of the war in the interior 
have moved to Kabul and other cities. In 
October, however, authorities in 
Pakistan noted a rise in refugees arriv- 
ing in Pakistan, including people coming 
for the first time from the Panjsher 
Valley. 

The international refugee relief pro- 
gram, sponsored by the U.N. High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
implemented by the Government of 
Pakistan, has been remarkably suc- 
cessful. Islamic communality and cross- 
border kinship in the tribal areas of 
Pakistan where most of the refugees are 
located have contributed to the welcome 
that Pakistan has extended to its 
Afghan guests. 

In fiscal year 1982, the United 
States contributed over $105 million in 
support of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 
This figure includes about $70 million 
worth of food aid given through the 
World Food Program (WFP), a U.N. 
agency, and about $27 million donated 
through the UNHCR. The U.S. donation 
constitutes one-third of the total 
UNHCR budget and about 60% of the 
international food contribution. The 
balance of the U.S. contribution goes to 
several voluntary agencies. 

In spite of the large international 
contribution, the Government of Paki- 
stan bears the brunt of the relief effort. 
It pays a cash allowance to refugees and 
pays the costs of administering the relief 
program and providing transport for 
relief supplies. Furthermore, Pakistan 
has suffered environmental damage ow- 
ing to the refugees' need for firewood 
and for grazing for their 3 million 
animals. 



Despite some incidents, relations be- 
tween the refugees and the local Paki- 
stani population have been generally 
smooth. Nevertheless, the larger the 
refugee population becomes and the 
longer it remains, the greater the likeli- 
hood of friction. Although this prospect 
puts pressure on Pakistan to negotiate a 
political solution. President Zia has in- 
dicated that Pakistan would accommo- 
date many more refugees if necessary. 

The refugee population in Iran is 
estimated at between 500,000 and 1 
million. Over 4,000 refugees of Turkic 
origin were resettled from Pakistan to 
Turkey in 1982, including a tribe of 
Kirghiz nomads from the Wakhan cor- 
ridor. About 4,000 Afghan refugees 
were admitted to the United States dur- 
ing fiscal year 1982. 

Long-Term Soviet Prospects 

The most urgent Soviet priority in 
Afghanistan during 1982 has been the 
pursuit of its military objectives: 
eliminating the mujahidin forces and 
keeping the Afghan people from sup- 
porting the resistance. But Moscow also 
pursues a long-range policy of stimulat- 
ing a more favorable political climate for 
itself and its proteges. A key element of 
this policy is the development of loyal 
cadres of young people through 
Sovietization of the Afghan educational 
system and extensive educational and 
training programs for Afghans in the 
Soviet Union. 

Estimates of the number of Afghans 
currently studying in the U.S.S.R. vary 
from 6,000 to 10,000. This program, 
however, does not always achieve its 
purposes. Afghan students have en- 
countered hostility from Soviet citizens 
angered by the loss of Soviet lives in 
Afghanistan. Some students have 
clashed with Soviet police. 

Last summer, as in the two pre- 
ceding years, a large number of Afghan 
children (1,200 in 1982) went to summer 
camp in the Soviet Union. Parents have 
complained about political indoctrination 
courses at these camps and also about 
Soviet and regime efforts to use children 
as informers. 

Moscow is creating an infrastructure 
of Soviet-style institutions in Afghani- 
stan on which it counts to mold the peo- 
ple in the Soviet image. The Soviets 
hope that key organizations, such as the 
National Fatherland Front, gradually 
will take root. 

The regime's nationality and tribal 
policy also is part of Moscow's long-term 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



SOUTH ASIA 



strategy. And Babrak's major effort to 
coopt religious leaders undoubtedly 
reflects Soviet direction. 

The Afghan people have seen 
through these strategies and have large- 
ly resisted Soviet efforts to win their 
support through gifts of food and con- 
sumer goods. Over the longer term, 
however, growing hardship and suffer- 
ing in Afghanistan could make the popu- 
lation more susceptible to Soviet bland- 
ishments, pressure, and propaganda. 

Moscow continues to pursue its long- 
term objective of wearing down interna- 
tional resistance to the Babrak regime. 
A central element in this effort is to 
build up Babrak's international image 
and to strengthen ties between his 
regime and other receptive govern- 
ments, primarily countries of Eastern 
Europe. In late May 1982, Babrak 
visited East Berlin and signed a Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation with the 
German Democratic Republic. In early 
October, he went to Hungary and signed 
a similar treaty. These visits followed 
trips to Bulgaria (December 1981), 
Czechoslovakia (June 1981), and Moscow 
(October 1980). The Soviets clearly hope 
that by keeping Babrak on the world 
stage, they can eventually persuade the 
international community to accept him 
as a legitimate head of government. 

Regime officials, with Soviet assist- 
ance, have made great efforts to develop 
relations with the nonaligned world. 
Foreign Minister Dost has been actively 
seeking friends in the Middle East and 
South Asia but without signal success. 
In India, whose criticism of the Soviet 
invasion has been restrained, his ap- 
proaches have produced mixed results. 
India agreed to revive a joint Indian- 
Afghan commission on economic, tech- 
nical, and commercial relations, and in 
May signed a protocol envisaging a 
modest program of trade and technical 
assistance. Subsequently Mrs. Gandhi 
became more outspoken about the need 
for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan and made a statement to 
this effect at her press conference in 
Moscow in September. 

The international community, how- 
ever, through a fourth overwhelming 
vote in the United Nations (114-21), has 
demonstrated once again that it rejects 
the Babrak government's claim to legiti- 
macy. The U.N. resolution calls for the 
immediate withdrawal of foreign troops 
from Afghanistan and a peaceful solu- 
tion based on the principles of sovereign- 
ty, nonalignment, and self-determina- 
tion, as well as for the creation of condi- 
tions in Afghanistan that would enable 



the refugees to return with safety and 
honor. The resolution also requests the 
Secretary General to continue his efforts 
to promote a political solution in accor- 
dance with the resolution and to explore 
the possibility of securing appropriate 
guarantees of noninterference in 
neighboring states. The size of the vote 
in favor of this resolution is impressive 
evidence of continuing international con- 
cern. 

Indeed, the spotlight on Afghanistan 
grows brighter each year. The number 
of journalists and photographers who 
have traveled inside Afghanistan with 
the mujahidin has increased, as has 
coverage in the international press and 
on television. Such events as the 
Florence Colloquium on Afghanistan and 
international observances of Afghanistan 
Day, both in March 1982, and the Ber- 
trand Russell Tribunal meeting in Paris 
in December 1982 all serve to emphasize 
the importance of the issue. Never- 
theless, the international publicity is 
periodic, while the suffering of the 
Afghan people is constant. The 
discrepancy between the magnitude of 
the tragedy and the international atten- 
tion it receives works very much to 
Moscow's advantage. 

Prospects For a Political Solution 

Indirect talks on Afghanistan in Geneva 
in June 1982 drew international atten- 
tion to the U.N. effort to seek a 
negotiated solution. The U.N. mission 
was originally mandated in November 
1980 by the General Assembly and was 
launched in 1981 under the aegis of 
Secretary General Waldheim and his 
"personal representative" for 
Afghanistan, Perez de Cuellar. 

In early August 1981, during his se- 
cond trip to South Asia to deal with this 
problem, Perez de Cuellar won two con- 
cessions from the Soviets and the 
Babrak regime: The United Nations 
would play an active role in negotiations 
concerning Afghanistan; and Kabul 
would engage in negotiations with Paki- 
stan and Iran together, rather than in- 
sisting on dealing bilaterally with each 
one. The latter point is important to 
Pakistan because, by pursuing a political 
solution in tandem with Iran, Pakistan 
will be in conformity with the resolution 
of the Islamic Conference in May 1980. 

Kabul's concessions, which were pro- 
cedural only, were embodied in the 



Afghan proposals of August 1981; these, 
in other respects, were a repetition of 
its original proposals of May 14, 1980. 
The May 14 proposals in essence stated 
that Babrak's regime must be recognized 
as a legitimate government and that the 
Soviet troops will leave Afghanistan 
when what Kabul calls "outside inter- 
ference" (the resistance) stops. The 
May 14 proposals also call for interna- 
tional guarantees for such a settlement. 

The U.N. mission was temporarily 
interrupted when Waldheim was re- 
placed by Perez de Cuellar in late 1981. 
In February 1982, Perez de Cuellar, 
following a formula devised by Wald- 
heim, appointed Diego Cordovez, U.N. 
Undersecretary for Special Political Af- 
fairs, as his "personal representative" 
for Afghanistan. 

By mid-April 1982, Cordovez was 
shuttling between Kabul and Islamabad, 
visiting each twice, prior to a stop in 
Tehran. Shortly after his return to New 
York, the United Nations announced on 
April 21 that both the Pakistanis and 
the Babrak regime had agreed to hold 
indirect talks in Geneva in June. Iran 
would not participate directly, but 
agreed to be kept informed and thus to 
be associated with the talks. The an- 
nouncement also stated that the involved 
parties had agreed to discuss the follow- 
ing issues: "the withdrawal of foreign 
troops, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states, international guaran- 
tees of non-interference and the volun- 
tary return of the refugees to their 
homes." 

The Geneva talks lasted from 
June 15 to June 24. The Iranians made 
it clear that they were not participating 
because the "real representatives of 
Afghanistan," i.e., the mujahidin, were 
not represented. Spokesmen for the 
Afghan resistance movement protested 
the talks for the same reason. The 
Soviets did not participate but sent high- 
level experts in Afghan affairs to 
Geneva. 

Following the conclusion of the 
Geneva discussions, the United Nations, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan all issued 
positive statements and indicated that 
there was a measure of flexibility in the 
negotiating positions of both sides. At a 
press conference on June 25, Diego Cor- 
dovez referred to "certain important 
political concessions." 

He disclosed that he had kept a writ- 
ten record of the "understandings" that 



February 1983 



61 



SOUTH ASIA 



he believed had been reached and that 
he would be working from these "texts" 
in subsequent discussions with the in- 
volved parties. Cordovez emphasized 
that the talks had moved beyond pro- 
cedural questions to specific discussions 
on the basic substantive matters and 
stated that "we concluded a kind of 
package of understanding." 

Although he did not discuss 
specifics, he said in response to ques- 
tions that a beginning had been made to 
work out arrangements to hold discus- 
sions with Afghan refugees concerning 
the terms for their return and that the 
question of self-determination had been 
"touched on." These could be important 
developments because they relate ulti- 
mately to the difficult problem of con- 
stituting a government acceptable to 
both Moscow and the mujahidin. 

The central issue of the negotiations, 
however, is whether the U.S.S.R. is 
seriously interested at this stage in 
negotiating a withdrawal of its troops 
from Afghanistan. The "flexibility" 
reportedly demonstrated by the Kabul/ 
Moscow side at Geneva has yet to be put 
to the test. But it should become ap- 
parent rather soon whether Moscow's 
support of the U.N. process is genuine 
or tactical. Cordovez will resume his 
negotiating mission in January 1983 
with another trip to South Asia, and he 
will attempt to pin down the specific 
details of the comprehensive settlement 
he envisages. 

The United States seeks the total 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan through a negotiated settle- 
ment, which will also provide for other 
essential requirements spelled out in 
four U.N. resolutions on Afghanistan: 
the self-determination of the Afghan 
people, the independent and nonaligned 
status of Afghanistan, and the return of 
the refugees with safety and honor. The 
United States supports U.N. efforts to 
achieve these goals. 



iSee Bulletin of March 1982, p. 19. 



Afghanistan 



by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Statement made to the press on 
December 22, 1982. Ambassador 
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. 

Three years after the Soviet invasion, 
the struggle for freedom in Afghanistan 
continues. The military situation can 
best be described as a stalemate. The 
augmentation of Soviet forces to 
105,000 and a greatly intensified Soviet 
offensive during the past spring and 
summer have produced only very limited 
gains, if any. After 3 years of increas- 
ingly harsh and destructive occupa- 
tion — and even with the use of chemical 
warfare— the Soviet Union has not been 
able to accomplish what it set out to 
do — strengthen the Marxist /Communist 
government in Kabul and eliminate the 
resistance. 

This is due to the incredible spirit, 
courage, and tenacity of the Afghan peo- 
ple; they deserve the admiration and 
support of free people everywhere. I 
don't know of another example in the 
world today where a small and ill- 
equipped people has stood up to the 
might of a tremendous military power 
with such effectiveness. 

As you know, this Administration 
views the Soviet invasion and continuing 
occupation of Afghanistan in a broad 
strategic context. It is an example of 
Soviet willingness to use its growing 
military might beyond its borders and in 
ways that threaten American interests, 
the interests of the West in an area of 
great strategic importance, the interests 
of the Islamic world, and the interests of 
the subcontinent. 

For these reasons we believe it is ab- 
solutely essential that Soviet aggression 
in Afghanistan be checked. The world 
must not forget Afghanistan. In the 
U.N. General Assembly, under 
Pakistan's leadership, another resolution 
on the Afghanistan situation was passed 
by an overwhelming majority at the end 
of November. In other meetings, such as 
the Islamic Conference, resolutions call- 
ing for Soviet withdrawal remain agen- 
da items of the greatest importance. In 
Moscow, Afghanistan was a major item 
of discussion with the new Soviet leader- 
ship following President Brezhnev's 



funeral. In Washington, a few days ago, 
President Reagan and President Zia of 
Pakistan had a searching discussion on 
Afghanistan. I might add that U.S. and 
Pakistan policies remain close and com- 
patible. In brief, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan remains an issue of primary 
world importance, just as it should be. 

The position of the U.S. Government 
in regard to Afghanistan is clear. We 
seek the total withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan in the context 
of a negotiated settlement, which will 
also provide for the self-determination of 
the Afghan people, the independent and 
nonaligned status of Afghanistan, and 
the return of the refugees with safety 
and honor. These elements of a settle- 
ment have been spelled out in four U.N. 
General Assembly resolutions. 

In order to achieve a negotiated set- 
tlement, we, like Pakistan, feel every 
reasonable avenue must be explored. 
Thus we support the efforts of the U.N. 
Secretary General's personal representa- 
tive, Diego Cordovez, as he prepares to 
continue his indirect talks in the region 
in January. We understand Mr. Cor- 
dovez will carry with him a draft or 
outline of a possible framework for a 
settlement. We have not seen it, and, 
therefore, I cannot comment on what he 
will be suggesting as the basis for 
discussion. We have said we will support 
the U.N. process as long as it is consist- 
ent with the U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions on Afghanistan and does not 
tend to legitimize the Babrak Karmal 
regime. 

Since the leadership change in 
Moscow, there has been a great deal of 
press speculation and comment on the 
possibility of Soviet flexibility toward a 
negotiated solution in Afghanistan. Thus 
far we have had no meaningful indica- 
tions of Soviet intentions. We would 
welcome signs of Soviet willingness to 
work seriously for a negotiated settle- 
ment that will return Afghanistan to the 
Afghans. ■ 



62 



Department of State BulletiJ 



SOUTH ASIA 



Balancing Strategic Interests 
and Human Rights in South Asia 



by David T. Schneider 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on 
Human Rights and International Orga- 
nizations of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on December 9, 1982. Mr. 
Schneider is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs. ^ 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
testify on the problem we face in balanc- 
ing our strategic interests and human 
rights concerns in the countries of South 
Asia— Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 

Our objective is to promote and pro- 
tect human rights — not against our 
strategic interests but in conjunction 
with them. This Administration believes 
that in the long run, American human 
rights concerns and strategic interests 
point generally in the same direction. 
The development of stable democratic 
institutions, greater tolerance for free 
speech, popular participation in govern- 
ment, and respect for fundamental 
human rights will lead to enhanced 
stability and prospects for peace. 

In South Asia, our strategic in- 
terests focus on deterring Soviet expan- 
sionism in a region whose geographic 
proximity to the Persian Gulf and the 
sealanes leading to it have highlighted 
its importance to us. To this end, we 
cooperate in various ways — whether 
through diplomatic dialogue or security 
assistance— to promote the security of 
the region. Concurrently we support 
economic growth and political stability 
aimed at fostering strong and independ- 
ent South Asian nations which can ac- 
cord basic human rights to their citizens. 
South Asian countries are among the 
very poorest in the world, making all the 
more critical the interrelationship of our 
security, developmental, and human 
rights goals. 

President Reagan has committed the 
United States to make a greater effort 
internationally to assist the development 
of democracy. The President believes 
that support for the growth of 
democracy should be an important 
dimension of the foreign relations of the 
United States and other democratic na- 
tions. There is no single model that is 
applicable to all countries. However, 
democracies— no matter what 



shape— are built upon a set of basic 
principles which we believe are valid in 
most societies and, where followed, have 
resulted in nations with relatively stable 
political and economic systems flexible 
enough to meet a complex, changing in- 
ternational environment and respect for 
human rights. 

While each country must find its 
own way toward representative institu- 
tions, we have fostered an understand- 
ing of democratic values and processes 
in South Asia in a variety of ways, in- 
cluding our development programs and 
information and visitor exchange. We 
have quietly used our diplomacy to en- 
courage broader participation in govern- 
ment. We are now exploring the possi- 
bilities for specific activities to help 
enhance representative systems in India, 
Sri Lanka, and Nepal and to promote 
such systems in the other nations of 
South Asia. 

A discussion of specific countries in 
South Asia will serve to highlight our 
approach to promoting both U.S. 
strategic interests and human rights. 

India 

India is a key nation in a region of the 
world important to U.S. strategic in- 
terests. It is the largest nation in South 
Asia in terms of its population, 
economy, and military strength. India 
has a remarkable record of over three 
decades of democratic rule — seven 
general elections; five peaceful changes 
of national government. Indian 
democracy has endured almost to the 
point at which the world takes it for 
granted. In fact, the Administration at- 
taches great importance to maintaining 
constructive relations with India and has 
sought ways to expand its dialogue with 
India and to work together more closely. 
The visit of Prime Minister Gandhi here 
this summer and the solid progress 
made on the initiatives announced at 
that time demonstrate the interest on 
both sides in seeking a better under- 
standing and finding ways to strengthen 
the already extensive ongoing ties. As a 
part of this process, the Indo-U.S. Joint 
Commission — with its subcommissions 
on science and technology, economics 
and commerce, agriculture, and educa- 
tion and culture — have been revitalized. 
As a result of a decision at the time of 



Mrs. Gandhi's visit, our political dialogue 
has been intensified by the recent visit 
to India for bilateral talks of Under 
Secretary [for Political Affairs Lawrence 
S.] Eagleburger. The Government of 
India has issued a special invitation to 
Secretary Shultz to visit New Delhi. 

In particular, we see good scope for 
enhanced cooperation in the economic, 
commercial, and scientific areas. We are 
encouraging U.S. firms to take advan- 
tage of new opportunities in India which 
are the result of the improved business 
climate there. American companies can 
thereby contribute their unique talents 
and technology to assisting India's 
development efforts through private 
sector-to-private sector collaboration. 
The President's science adviser led a 
senior group to India last month to lay 
the groundwork for enhanced joint 
cooperation in certain specialized fields 
of science. We recently invited a group 
of Indian parliamentarians, including the 
speaker, to observe the congressional 
elections. 

Since India won independence in 
1947, the United States has admired its 
vigorous democratic process and has 
been the major foreign contributor to 
Indian economic development. Our two 
countries have worked closely in bring- 
ing about remarkable success in Indian 
agriculture. Over the years, there has 
been extensive interaction between our 
nations, including the education of tens 
of thousands of Indians in American uni- 
versities. We also have a modest mili- 
tary cooperation program with India- 
some cash sales of equipment and train- 
ing of a few military officers — 
which supports our security and 
democracy objectives. The issue of 
civilian supremacy over the military does 
not arise in India, which stands as a 
model throughout the world for its 
scrupulous adherence to the principle of 
civilian control. 

Sri Lanka 

Sri Lanka is strategically located astride 
the major ocean trade routes of the 
Indian Ocean and offers access for U.S. 
Navy vessels. Our substantial economic 
development program, training for 
military students, and active political 
dialogue serve to demonstrate strong 
U.S. support for this strategic and 
democratic country. Since independence 
Sri Lanka has had a history of free elec- 
tions and active popular participation. 
Sri Lanka's current government also 
favors a market-oriented, free enterprise 



February 1983 



63 



SOUTH ASIA 



economic approach. In addition to help- 
ing fund two of the three lead projects 
in Sri Lanka's development strategy, we 
are encouraging U.S. firms to consider 
investing in the country's free trade 
zone. 

Nepal 

Nepal forms an important buffer be- 
tween India and China. U.S. interests 
center on its strategic location and on 
our consequent interest in orderly 
economic development and the evolution 
of stable political institutions which pro- 
vide for public participation in govern- 
ment. While Nepal's constitution 
specifies that the king is the sole source 
of authority for all government institu- 
tions, the country has recently made 
dramatic progress toward its own sort 
of representative institutions. By 
referendum Nepal chose the partyless 
panchayat form of representation, and 
the country has now launched its own 
experiment in participatory government. 
Accompanying this has been a trend 
toward broader enjoyment of a wide 
range of human rights. 

Our commitment to assist Nepal's 
economic development goes back to 1951 
when the country ended its self-imposed 
isolation. We also provide training in the 
United States for two Nepali military of- 
ficers, exposing them to American at- 
titudes toward the role of the military in 
society. 

Bangladesh 

Bangladesh was born in conflict in 1971, 
a time when political turmoil threatened 
the security and stability of the entire 
subcontinent. In the decade since in- 
dependence, the country has suffered 
from severe political and economic dif- 
ficulties. Events during the past year 
have returned this struggling country to 
military rule. We have welcomed and en- 
couraged the stated intention of the 
present government to return the coun- 
try to civilian rule. Economic develop- 
ment and political stability are inex- 
tricably linked in Bangladesh, and we 
view a return to representative govern- 
ment as a key element of political stabili- 
ty. Our assistance program has evolved 
from emergency relief to long-term 
development, which we hope can foster 
stability and encourage civilian represen- 
tative rule. Our military training pro- 
gram ($22.5,0(10) exposes Bangladeshi of- 
ficers to American democratic values 
and is important to our policies in that 
country because of the influential role 
the military plays in government. 



Pakistan 

I would now like to turn to Pakistan, the 
country most directly threatened by re- 
cent aggressive Soviet moves in the 
region and of critical importance in 
regard to U.S. strategic interests in the 



Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area and to 
our goal of stability in South and South- 
west Asia. 

In 1981 the United States reached 
agreement with Pakistan, subject to an- 
nual appropriation by the Congress, to 



Anniversary of the Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 26, 1982' 

At this holiday season when most 
Americans are warmed and comforted 
by their family relationships and the 
blessings of this country, it is hard for 
us to realize that far away in a remote 
and mountainous land a valiant people is 
putting up a fight for freedom that af- 
fects us all. No matter how far removed 
from our daily lives, Afghanistan is a 
struggle we must not forget. 

Afghanistan is important to the 
world, because the Afghan people are 
resisting Soviet imperialism. Three 
years ago on December 27, 1979, the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and 
installed a new Communist leader to 
head the Marxist regime that had taken 
power in 1978. For the first time since 
the immediate aftermath of World War 
II, the Soviets used a large-scale 
military force outside their borders and 
Eastern Europe to try to impose their 
will. If this aggression should succeed, it 
will have dangerous impact on the safety 
of free men everywhere. 

Three years after the invasion, the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is not 
a success. Even with the augmentation 
of their forces to close to 105,000 men 
this year, the Soviets, with the puppet 
Karmal regime, have not been able to 
control the countryside or secure many 
cities. They have failed to rebuild the 
Communist-controlled Afghan Army and 
to create an effective government. 

This is due to the spirit and will of 
the majority of the Afghan people, and 
to the mujahidin, the freedom-fighters, 
who continue to resist the Soviet in- 
vaders. In the face of repeated offensive 
campaigns during the spring and sum- 
mer of 1982, the mujahidin were able to 
drop back and then regain their posi- 
tions once the Soviet forces had with- 
drawn. Their forces and their will re- 
main intact. 

We must recognize that the human 



costs of this struggle are immense. With 
the more intense fighting in 1982, 
casualties on both sides rose, and the 
civilian population suffered more than 
ever before. Crops and fields were 
destroyed by the Soviets, trying to deny 
to the mujahidin the support of the loca 
population. Homes, and even entire 
villages, were leveled. We have convinc- 
ing proof chemical weapons have been 
used by the Soviets against the Afghans 
The refugee population has continued to 
grow, both in Pakistan and in Afghan- 
istan, as peasants flee the destruction of 
war. It is a sad but inspiring story. 

The United States does not intend t( 
forget these brave people and their 
struggle. We have said repeatedly that 
we support a negotiated settlement for 
Afghanistan predicated on the complete 
withdrawal of Soviet troops. We joined 
the vast majority of the world commu- 
nity at the LTnited Nations again in 
November in support of a resolution call 
ing for a settlement along these lines. 
Just a few weeks ago, during his visit tc 
the United States, I discussed with i 

President Zia of Pakistan the need for a 
solution to the Afghanistan problem. Wf 
are both committed to a negotiated set- 
tlement that will return Afghanistan to 
the ranks of independent, nonaligned na 
tions. 

We in the United States sincerely 
hope that the new leadership of the 
Soviet Union will take advantage of the 
opportunities the new year will no doubi 
offer to achieve a solution for Afghani- 
stan. The American people do not want 
to see the suffering and deprivation of 
the Afghan people continue, but we will 
not grow weary or abandon them and 
their cause of freedom. 

It is our hope for 1983 that a free, 
independent Afghan nation will again 
find its place in the world community. 
We will not cease to support Afghan ef- 
forts to that end. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 3, 1983. 



64 



Department of State Bulleti 



SOUTH ASIA 



Drovide $3.2 billion in foreign military 
;ales credits and economic assistance 
3ver a period of 6 years. We take this 
iction in support of Pakistan's strong, 
Drincipled stand against the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan and its leading role 
n international efforts to induce with- 
irawal of Soviet forces from Afghani- 
stan. Our assistance programs are in- 
ended both to help Pakistan modernize 
ts military forces and to promote inter- 
lal stability through economic develop- 
nent. Our security commitment is a ma- 
or element in assuring that Pakistan 
vill be able to sustain its stand against 
50viet aggression and thereby protect 
dtal U.S. strategic interests in this 
Tucial region. 

During its 35 years of independence, 
'akistan has sought effective govern- 
nent through a variety of regimes. This 
listory has been influenced by a number 
if factors. Throughout its history, 
'akistan has been preoccupied with a 
earch for its national identity and, in 
larticular, a definition of the position of 
slam in its national character. In addi- 
ion the social, political, economic, 
egional, and ethnic differences which 
haracterize Pakistan's diverse society 
ave frequently led to political turmoil, 
'akistan's human rights problem derives 
rom this difficult experience. 

We believe it important that our 
olicies toward Pakistan take into ac- 
I ount these causes of instability as well 
I s our national security interests in the 
rea. Within this context, we have 
ought to encourage the evolution of 
epresentative government in accord- 
nce with the view that such institutions 
/ould help Pakistan to deal with the 
onflicting pressures it faces. Never- 
heless we recognize Pakistan's right to 
ry to evolve its own forms which take 
ito account its traditions and problems. 
Ve also recognize that, while there are 
ndeniably human rights problems, in 
lany ways this regime is moderate in 
omparison to some of the previous 
nes. 

We have, of course, discussed these 
uman rights issues with the Pakistani 
jadership and will continue to do so. 
Yhile our dialogue on human rights, for 
he most part, has been a private one, 
ur ambassador in Pakistan has also 
ought to gain public understanding of 
ur support for more representative 
orms of government. 

Another factor which we believe our 
lolicies must take into consideration is 
ur interest in the human rights situa- 
ion in the region as a whole. Here, of 
ourse, I refer to Afghanistan. It has 



been with great economic and political 
sacrifice and no little strain that 
Pakistan has welcomed into its territory 
almost 3 million Afghan refugees who 
have been forced to seek temporary 
asylum from the Soviet assault on their 
freedom and independence. The 
phenomenon of masses of refugees flee- 
ing from political oppression is a com- 
mon one in the contemporary world. No 
nation, however, has shown greater 
hospitality and tolerance to such a flow 
than Pakistan. Further, despite the 
threat to Pakistan itself, the Pakistanis 
have bravely offered their support in in- 
ternational fora around the world to the 
Afghan freedom fighters and the con- 
cept of a free and independent Afghan- 
istan. Pakistani support is important to 
the reestablishment of human rights in 
Afghanistan, a major U.S. cause. 

Our security assistance to Pakistan 



is not extended in support of any par- 
ticular government in power. It is aid to 
Pakistan as a nation. We believe the 
Pakistani people understand it in this 
light and support our policies. 

I have sought to review briefly how 
we seek to take into account both our 
strategic interests and our human rights 
concerns in the South Asian region. I 
believe we can take pride in the 
achievements of the countries located 
there. Their record, whether in the 
development of democratic government 
or in the support to an oppressed 
neighboring people, is deserving of our 
support, and it has our support. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, tl.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Visit of Pakistan's President 



President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan made a 
state visit to the United States Decem- 
ber 6-U, 1982. While in Washington, 
D.C. December 6-9, he met with Presi- 
dent Reagan and other government of- 
ficials. 

Following are the remarks made by 
Presidents Reagan and Zia at the ar- 
rival ceremony and their exchange of 
dinner toasts, both on December 7.^ 



ARRIVAL CEREMONY, 
DEC. 7, 19822 

President Reagan 

It's a great pleasure for Nancy and me 
to welcome you to Washington today. 
Your visit to the United States this 
week both symbolizes and strengthens 
the close ties which exist between our 
two countries. 

As you arrive here, the world, and 
your region in particular, are passing 
through a critical phase. We confront 
serious challenges that by choice and 
necessity will draw our peoples ever 
closer. It's vital that those nations com- 
mitted to peace and progress work 
diligently together to achieve those 
goals. 

One of Pakistan's founding fathers, 
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, visited 
Washington in 1950. And speaking 



before the U.S. Senate, he described our 
continuing challenge. He said, "This is 
the century of great awakenings in all 
parts of the globe. And it depends en- 
tirely on the leaders of the world 
whether mankind will awaken to the 
horrors of darkness or to a glorious 
dawn." His words ring true even now. 

Pakistan today stands in the front 
rank of the nations shouldering a great 
responsibility for mankind. Your 
courageous and compassionate role in 
giving shelter to millions of Afghan 
refugees is well known to the American 
people and will long be remembered. 
We're proud to stand with you, helping 
to provide for these tragic victims of ag- 
gression, while, at the same time, seek- 
ing a peaceful resolution of the circum- 
stances which brought them to your 
country. 

We also applaud your efforts and 
those of the Indian Government to 
reconcile your differences. The steps you 
take today to deter these relations will 
bring incalculable benefit to all the peo- 
ple of the subcontinent and will be 
memorialized in improvement of their 
lives. 

Similarly, Pakistan's positive 
response to peace efforts in the Middle 
East have contributed to our confidence 
that our two countries can work 
together for peace and stability. After 
many years of disappointment, there is 
growing recognition in the Middle Elast 



ebruary 1983 



65 



SOUTH ASIA 



that a continuation of violence can only 
breed a worsening conflict. This cycle 
must be broken. We're gratified to know 
that we can count on Pakistan's coopera- 
tion in confronting these perplexing 
problems. 

We believe that the program of 
economic and security assistance on 
which we embarked last year will con- 
tribute to the tranquility and progress of 
the entire region, and it's our hope that 
reinvigoration of the relationship be- 
tween our two countries will enable 
Pakistan to maintain its courageous 
stand on behalf of peace and amity of 
nations. 

The U.S. -Pakistani friendship, which 
stretches back over 30 years, has been 
tested by time and change. It has en- 
dured, and, because of the substantial 
agreement between us on the great 
issues of peace, development, and securi- 
ty, it grows stronger daily. 

Underlying our ties, however, is 
something which is even more critical in 
an enduring relationship and that is the 
warmth and understanding that exist 
between the people of our countries. 
This friendship is based on the mutual 
warmth and affection which have devel- 
oped between our people, something 
which no government can mandate and 
which is, indeed, a cherished possession. 

When you leave us and leave the 
United States next week, we want you 
to return home secure in the knowledge 
that the American people support close 
ties with Pakistan and look forward to 
expanding them in the coming years. 
We hope the friendship and hospitality 
that you receive during your stay will 
underline our good will and the per- 
manence of our bond. 

President Zia 

In the name of Allah, the beneficient, 
the merciful. Praise be to Allah, Lord of 
the Worlds, and blessing and peace be 
upon the seal of the last of the prophets. 

May I thank you most sincerely for 
your very kind words of welcome, for 
the warmth with which we have been 
received, and the generous hospitality 
that has already been extended to me, 
my wife, and the members of my delega- 
tion since we arrived in your great coun- 
try. 

I am no stranger to the United 
States. I've had the honor of coming 
here a few times before. But each time I 




have felt that it was a new experience 
for me. Perhaps this is because of the 
perpetual freshness, the vibrant 
dynamism, and the ceaseless, forward 
movement which characterize this great 
nation of yours. 

My visit this time is not just one of 
discovery or rediscovery. I take it as a 
visit of great importance for renewal 
and reaffirmation: renewal of a friend- 
ship that has to us many ups and downs 
and reaffirmation of those shared values 
and perceptions on which our relation- 
ship is based. I, therefore, look forward 
to the strengthening of our ties as the 
years go by. 

West and southwest Asia, from the 
eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan, 
is today in ferment. Armed aggression, 
military intervention, conflicts, disregard 
for universally accepted principles of in- 
ternational conduct have all combined to 
present a serious challenge to the securi- 
ty of the countries of this region. This in 
turn threatens to undermine the whole 
structure of the international relations 
upon which the peace of the world 
ultimately rests. 

Pakistan's continued commitment to 
the principle of nonalignment and to the 



objectives of the Islamic Conference are 
the fundamental postulates of its foreign 
policy. Pakistan is endeavoring to con- 
tribute effectively to the peace and 
stability of a troubled and turbulent 
region. But we cannot ourselves long re- 
main immune from the dangers around 
us, nor have we, in fact, escaped their 
consequences. 

The responsibility for providing 
refuge and a safe haven for nearly 3 
million fleeing the repression in 
Afghanistan has been shouldered by our 
people as a humanitarian duty in the 
spirit of Islamic brotherhood. Never- 
theless, the burdens are there, especially 
for a developing country like Pakistan. 

But at the same time I must em- 
phasize that we have borne these 
burdens ungrudgingly, and we will con- 
tinue to do so, eyishaUah. We are con- 
scious of the security implications of the 
great developments across our border. 
The qualitative change brought about by 
these developments and their impact on 
the entire region have evoked a re- 
sponse from the United States, which 
we appreciate. 

It was as a result of our common 
concern that our two governments 
decided on a program to enhance 
Pakistan's potential to withstand exter- 
nal forces of disruption and continue to 
play a stabilizing role in the region. 

It's our consistent endeavor to find 
equitable and humane solutions to the 
conflicts in our region. This task can 
only be accomplished through negotia- 
tions and mutual accommodation within 
the framework of the principles and 
resolutions of the United Nations. It 
must also inevitably entail the proper 
regard for the individual and collective 
dignity of the peoples involved. 

In this endeavor, we have been for- 
tunate to have your understanding. 
What is more, I claim that we have your 
friendship as well — a friendship mature 
enough to withstand differences of opin- 
ion and mirrored by the very candor and 
sincerity of our mutual exchanges. For 
all this, we're indeed very grateful to 
you. 

I have come here to deepen and 
strengthen this friendship. I'm looking 
forward to our talks later this morning. 
And I have no doubt that they will lead 
us to this goal and that our respective 
efforts on behalf of peace and stability 
in our region and in the world in 



66 



Department of State Bulletir 



SOUTH ASIA 



general, enshallah, shall bear fruit. In- 
deed, borrowing your own words, it will 
be in the fitness of the things for me to 
conclude by saying, that you and I have 
a rendezvous with destiny. 



DINNER TOASTS. 
DEC. 7, 1982 

President Reagan 

President Zia, Begum Zia, distinguished 
guests, it's an honor for me to welcome 
you to the White House this evening. 

Our talks this morning underlined 
again the strong links between our coun- 
tries. We find ourselves even more fre- 
quently in agreement on our goals and 
objectives. And we, for example, ap- 
plaud your deep commitment to peaceful 
progress in the Middle East and South 
Asia, a resolve which bolsters our hopes 
and the hopes of millions. 

In the last few years, in particular, 
your country has come to the forefront 
of the struggle to construct a framework 
for peace in your region, an undertaking 
which includes your strenuous efforts to 
bring peaceful resolution to the crisis in 
Afghanistan — a resolution which will 
enable the millions of refugees currently 
seeking shelter in Pakistan to go home 
in peace and honor. Further, you've 
worked to insure that progress con- 
tinues toward improving the relationship 
between Pakistan and India. And in all 
these efforts the United States has sup- 
ported your objectives and will applaud 
your success. 

A great intellectual forefather of 
Pakistan, Muhammed Iqbal, once said 
that, "The secret of life is in the 
seeking." Today the people of the United 
States and Pakistan are seeking the 
same goals. Your commitment to peace 
and progress in South Asia and the Mid- 
dle East has reinforced our commitment 
to Pakistan. We want to assure you and 
the people of your country that we will 
not waver in this commitment. 

Our relationship is deep and long- 
standing. It stretches back to Pakistan's 
first days of independence. It stretches 
forward as far as we can see. It's based 
on mutual interest, yes, but also on 
shared visions and goals in the world 
around us. It is based, as well, on the 



fact that the people of both our coun- 
tries sincerely value the good relations 
and the affinity between us. 

Our people already work together in 
significant ways through educational ex- 
changes, tourism, economic cooperation, 
and through bonds of family and friend- 
ship. We have cooperative programs in 
science and technology and in agri- 
culture, and we hope to explore with the 
Government of Pakistan various ways of 
enhancing cooperation. 

Differences may come between our 
nations or have come between our na- 



Pakistan— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 310,527 sq. mi., excluding Jammu and 
Kashmir which are in dispute with India 
(about the size of Calif.). Capital: Islamabad 
(pop. 250,000). Other Cities: Karachi (3.5 
million), Lahore (2.1 million). 

People 

Population: 81.5 million (1980). Annual 
Growth Rate: 3%. Ethnic Groups: Punjabi, 
Sindhi, Pushtan (Pathan), Baluchi. Religions: 
Muslim (97%), small minorities of Christians, 
Hindu, and others. Languages: Urdu (of- 
ficial), English, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu, 
Baluchi. Literacy: 24%. 

Government 

Type: Martial law regime established in 1977. 

Independence: Aug. 14, 1947. Branches: Ex- 

ecutive — Chief Martial Law Administrator 
(President), cabinet. Legislative — Senate and 
National Assembly. Judicial — Military 
courts, provincial high courts. Supreme 
Court. Chief Martial Law Administrator ap- 
points ministers and judges. Political Par- 
ties: Political parties were suspended in 
1977, following the imposition of martial law. 
Some political activity was subsequently 
allowed. In Oct. 1979, general elections 
scheduled for Nov. were postponed, and 
political party activity was banned. Political 
Subdivisions: 4 provinces, tribal areas, 
federal capital. 

Economy 

GNP: $23 billion (FY 1980). Annual Growth 
Rate: 6.4% (1978-80). Per Capita Income: 
$289. Natural Resources: Land, extensive 
natural gas, limited petroleum, poor quality 
coal, iron ore. Agriculture: Wheat, cotton, 
rice. Industries: Cotton textiles, food proc- 
essing, tobacco, engineering, chemicals, na- 
tural gas. Trade (FY 1980): Exports— $2.3 
billion: rice, raw cotton, yarn, textiles, light 
manufactured products. Imports — $4.8 
billion: capital goods, raw materials, crude 
oil, consumer items. Major Trading Part- 
ners— Fa.r East, EC, Middle East, U.S. ■ 



tions in the past, but they've proven to 
be transitory while the ties which bind 
us together grow stronger year by year. 
As we welcome you here tonight as the 
representative of your country and its 
people, we can say with confidence that 
those ties will continue to grow stronger 
and that the good will which exists be- 
tween our two countries will prove to be 
both true and lasting. 

And, Mr. President, I propose a 
toast to you, to the people of Pakistan, 
and to the friendship that binds our na- 
tions together. 

President Zia 

In the name of Allah, the beneficient, 
the merciful, we praise Him and we 
send blessings on His honored messen- 
ger. 

After hearing such an eloquent 
speech from — Mr. President, from you, 
and having had such a sumptuous — so 
well presented in such a fine company — 
a meal that I will perhaps cherish for 
many years to come, I see very little 
that I can add to what you have very 
kindly said. But still my wife and I, as 
well as the members of my delegation, 
are most grateful to you for the honor 
you have done us in hosting this delight- 
ful banquet for us tonight. I have been 
deeply touched by the sentiments of 
your friendship that you have expressed 
toward me and my country, which are 
most warmly reciprocated. 

The people of Pakistan are deeply 
committed to molding their lives and 
building their institutions in keeping 
with the dictates of Islam. Islam ordains 
upon — follows a belief in the equality 
and universal brotherhood of mankind. 
It was the dedication of your Founding 
Fathers to similar ideals that created 
this great republic, the United States of 
America. 

Your country has been called the 
melting pot of people from all over the 
world. This is a trait we share with you, 
though, perhaps, on a very smaller 
scale. Let me, therefore, take you back 
to Pakistan, if I can. 

Herein lies the Indus Valley, which 
is the heartland of Pakistan. This valley 
has been a veritable thoroughfare 
throughout history. Untold millions, 
representing all the major races of the 



February 



1983 



67 



SOUTH ASIA 



Eurasian mass, have made their way 
through our mountain passes to settle in 
or to pass through the Indus Valley. 
They came in all guises. They came as 
conquering hordes, as defeated or 
wandering tribes, as mystics and mis- 
sionaries, as saints and sultans, and 
even as tourists and traders, both an- 
cient and modern. And 35 years ago, 
many millions of Muslims of the South 
Asian subcontinent came together to 
help build a dream called Pakistan. 

Thus we are, indeed, the heirs to a 
rich and a varied if also somewhat tur- 
bulent historical heritage. But by the 
same token, we are a vigorous people 
with an innate feel for the movements of 
history. 

And unfortunately, a new and 
menacing turbulence has arisen in our 
region. More than a fifth of the entire 
population of Afghanistan has been com- 
pelled to seek shelter in Pakistan as a 
result of the armed intervention in that 
country by a foreign power. We are 
bending our effort to resolve this tragic 
situation through a peaceful political set- 
tlement, in accordance with the prin- 
ciples enunciated by the international 
community. The latest manifestation of 
this was the resolution of Afghanistan 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 
once again with the overwhelming sup- 
port of the member states. 

There are other turbulences in our 
region. The war between Iran and Iraq 
and the suffering recently visited upon 
the Lebanese and Palestinian people 
continue to cause us profound concern 
and anguish. 

The situation calls for difficult yet 
courageous decisions. The most impor- 
tant of these is to find a just and a 
durable solution to the Palestinian prob- 
lem, in accordance with the national 
rights of the Palestinian people. If I may 
be permitted to recall my words, it is for 
the first time that Arabs have put up a 



unified plan for the solution of the 
Palestine problem. To the best of my 
knowledge, it is for the first time that 
the President of the United States of 
America has put up a very comprehen- 
sive plan with some very positive 
elements in this. 

Knowing your humane qualities, 
knowing you as a man of God, knowing 
you as a man of peace, I urge you not to 
leave this opportunity that is coming 
your way. I request you to be yourself, 
to find the rest of you and take this bold 
step, because history will then remem- 
ber you not only as Reagan of the 
United States of America but Reagan 
the Peacemaker, the Reagan who solved 
practically an insolvable problem. We in 
Pakistan wish you to take this initiative, 
and we wish you all the best. And we 
will pray for your success. 

Earlier today in our personal discus- 
sion and in the talks including our col- 
leagues, I had an opportunity to discuss 
these and other issues with you. I'm 
deeply gratified by the manner in which 
you made clear your continuing and 
deep-felt interest in the welfare and 
prosperity of the people of Pakistan and 
your support for what we are doing for 
the sake of stability in our region. 

In turn, I would like to assure you of 
our confidence that with your acknowl- 
edged qualities of human understanding 
and with the high principled tradition of 
your country behind you, the United 
States will keep faith with its friends 
and well-wishers. 

Allow me to thank you also for what 



you have said, for what you have said 
about the continued relationship be- 
tween Pakistan and the United States of 
America. We cherish this union of part- 
ners — though unequal partners— but as 
two sovereign states comprising of peo- 
ple who love each other, comprising of 
people who have love and regard for 
humanity, comprising of people who love 
peace. And, as you said about the 
United States of America, that if the 
country has been created, God must 
have ordained this to be a country of 
peace. 

Spread this America to areas other 
than the United States of America. Let 
America be the torchbearer of peace, 
peace not only on the American conti- 
nent but peace in Afghanistan, peace in 
Vietnam, peace in Somalia, and above 
all, peace in Palestine. We wish you all 
the best in your endeavors. And you will 
never find Pakistan faltering. We'll be 
there right behind you to give you the 
helping hand, if we can, at the moment 
that you wish us to do so. 

With these words, may I request 
you, ladies and gentlemen, to join me in 
a toast to the health and happiness of 
President Reagan and his charming 
wife, Mrs. Nancy Reagan, the continued 
progress and prosperity of the people of 
the United States, the establishment of 
peace, stability, and justice throughout 
the world. To the health and happiness 
of all friends who are present here 
tonight. And, finally, a continuing 
friendship between Pakistan and the 
United States of America. 



iTexts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 13, 1982. 

^Held on the South Lawn of the White 
House where President Zia was accorded a 
formal welcome with full military honors. ■ 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



NITED NATIONS 



NISPACE 82 Held in Vienna 



The Second U.N. Conference on the 
ploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
ice (UNISPACE 82) was held August 
U, 1982, in Vienna and attended by 
iresentatives from 94 countries. 

Following are a statement by Am- 
■.sador James M. Beggs, head of the 
?. delegation; the text of a U.N. 
neral Assembly resolution; a state- 
nt by President Reagan broadcast over 
sed-circuit television at the opening 
sion of the conference; and a list of the 
5. delegation. 



IBASSADOR BEGGS' 

ATEMENT, 

IG. 10, 1982 

enty-five years into the space age, 
1 14 years after our first U.N. con- 
ence on outer space, we again meet 
Vienna to consider where we stand 
1 where we are going in the peaceful 
!S of outer space. The last 25 years 
re been characterized by extraor- 
ary achievement in space-based ac- 
ties, not only by the United States 
. by a growing number of countries 
oughout the world. Indeed, in a 
bal sense, it is no exaggeration to say 
t we are on the verge of becoming a 
ice-faring civilization. 

The last several decades also have 
■n characterized by U.S. leadership in 
ice science and applications, frequent- 
exercised in broad cooperation with 
intries throughout the world. To date. 

United States has entered into over 
00 agreements with over 100 coun- 
ts to share the benefits and adventure 
auter space. At the outset of this con- 
ence, I want to state categorically 
.t the United States intends to remain 
' leader in the peaceful uses of outer 
ice and to continue its active and 
;n program of international coopera- 
n. 

In this I speak for President 
agan, who is a strong supporter of 
' U.S. space program and its applica- 
n to bettering our life here on Earth. 

In order to assess where we are and 
ere we should be going in space 
ence and applications, it is construc- 
e to reflect on where we have been, 
len this conference last met in 1968, 
're were essentially two significant 
ice powers, with a few other coun- 
ts who aspired to space programs, 
e United States was in the process of 
npleting its dramatic Apollo project. 



Twelve Americans walked the surface of 
the Moon during that program and were 
brought safely back to Earth. In the 
course of this program and in the Skylab 
program that followed, we established 
the ability of man to function for ex- 
tended periods in space and vastly in- 
creased our scientific knowledge. Since 
then, there have been additional impor- 
tant achievements by the United States 
and by a growing number of other coun- 
tries in the exploration and peaceful 
uses of outer space. 

In the United States, we have com- 
pleted the testing of the space shuttle 
and plan to put it into operational serv- 
ice later this year. The shuttle will give 
us routine, reliable, and cost-effective 
transportation into space and will con- 
tinue to open new and broader areas for 
international cooperation in the future. 
We have explored many of the planets 
in our solar system and probably will 
have visited all except distant Pluto by 



the end of the decade. We have built and 
flown communications, weather naviga- 
tion, and remote sensing satellites that 
bring untold benefits to all the peoples 
of the Earth. 

Since we last assembled in Vienna, 
there have been three particular trends 
which, taken together, are of special 
relevance to this conference. Because 
they will continue, they should be kept 
in mind as we chart our future course. 

• The advance of technology has 
been rapid and has shown no signs of 
slowing. Looking back over the short 
period we have been in space, the rate 
of progress in amassing scientific 
knowledge and in applying space tech- 
nology has been truly astonishing. Con- 
sider, for example, the tiny space cap- 
sule in which the first American 
astronaut, John Glenn, orbited the 
Earth. Compare it to the space shuttle, 
launched only two decades later, which 
is a marvel of sophisticated engineering 
and promises to be America's primary 
space transportation system for the 
balance of this century. The conclusion 



President Reagan's Statement 



Thirteen years ago, two American 
astronauts— Neil Armstrong and Edwin 
Aldrin — became the first human beings 
to set foot on the Moon. There they 
planted a plaque inscribed with these 
words: "We came in peace for all 
mankind." That plaque stands today on 
the lunar surface to symbolize the spirit 
of the U.S. space program, now and in 
the future. 

We are proud of our achievements 
in exploring the reaches of space. In 
only a quarter of a century, we have 
amassed new knowledge of our solar 
system, of the stars, of the universe, 
and of our own fragile world. We are 
learning how we came to be and what 
the future may hold for our planet and 
all who dwell here. The countless bene- 
fits of our space program have flowed to 
all the peoples of the world. Communica- 
tion satellites link distant parts of the 
globe. Remote sensing from space of the 
Earth's atmosphere and surface is help- 
ing people harness global resources for 
the benefit of all. And weather satellites 
are providing us worldwide with impor- 
tant information enabling us to better 
predict and adapt to the environmental 
forces which shape our lives. 

From the very beginning of the U.S. 



space program, we have emphasized in- 
ternational cooperation. I am extremely 
proud that most of our major space proj- 
ects have been carried out with the par- 
ticipation of other nations. Indeed, inter- 
national cooperation is woven into the 
basic fabric and structure of our civil 
space program. 

This Second U.N. Conference on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space provides 
leaders from around the globe with an 
unprecedented opportunity to chart a 
course for greater cooperation among 
nations in exploring mankind's last and 
endless frontier. 

All of us, as the poet Archibald 
MacLeish so eloquently described us, are 
"riders on the Earth together, brothers 
on that bright loveliness in the eternal 
cold." 

Let us resolve to work together to 
insure that the benefits of space con- 
tinue to contribute to a bright and 
peaceful future on Earth. And let us 
also chart new pathways to the stars to 
serve as avenues of peaceful exploration 
and adventure for our generation and 
for generations to come. 

I wish you a successful and produc- 
tive conference. Thank you and God 
bless you all. ■ 



bruary 1983 



69 



UNITED NATIONS 



is inescapable that progress in outer 
space technology has been dramatic. 

• There are many more nations with 
space programs today. Scientific, com- 
mercial, and technical incentives have 
led an increasing number of countries to 
invest their resources in one aspect or 
another of space technology and applica- 
tions. These space programs range from 
large, very complex enterprises to more 
modest but nevertheless significant ef- 
forts. The United States welcomes this 



development, the knowledge it gener- 
ates, and the stimulus it provides to ex- 
cel in what is still a bright new frontier 
of human endeavor. 

• There is a growing emphasis on 
relating space activity to our needs here 
on Earth. Innovators in the private sec- 
tor are incorporating space-related 
capabilities into countless areas of 
human activity. 

Looking ahead, we can fully expect 



U.S. Delegation to UNISPACE 82 



Representative 

James M. Beggs, Administrator, NASA 

Alternate Representatives 

John R. Bolton, Assistant Administrator for 

Program and Policy Coordination, AID 
Anthony J. Calio, Deputy Administrator, 

NASA 
Joseph Charyk, President, Chief Executive 

Officer, Communications Satellite Corp. 
Mrs. William P. Clark, Washington, D.C. 
Gerald B. Helman, special coordinator for 

UNISPACE, Department of State 
Charles Z. Wick, Director, USIA 



Advisers 

Burt Edelson. Associate Administrator for 
Space Science and Applications, NASA 

Dr. Anna Fisher, astronaut, NASA 

Riccardo Giacconi, Space Telescope Science 
Institute 

Col. Henry Hartsfield (USAF), astronaut, 
NASA 

Neil Hosenball, General Counsel. NASA 

Donald Jansky, Associate Administrator, 
National Telecommunications and Infor- 
mation Administration, Department of 
Commerce 

S. Ahmed Meer, Office of Advanced Tech- 
nology, Bureau of Oceans and Inter- 
national Environment and Scientific 
Affairs, Department of State 

Capt. Edward J. Melanson, Jr. (USN), 
Assistant Director, Space Policy, Depart- 
ment of Defense 

Kenneth S. Pedersen, Director, International 
Affairs Division, NASA 

Col. Gilbert Rye (USAF), National Security 
Council 

David Small, Office of the Legal Adviser, 
Department of State 

Brig. Gen. John H. Storrie (USAF), Head- 
quarters, U.S. Air Force 

Norman Terrell, Acting Assistant Director 
for Nuclear and Weapons Control, ACDA 



Private Sector Advisers 

Robert Anderson, Chairman of the Board, 
Chief Executive Officer, Rockwell Inter- 
national Corp. (Pittsburgh) 

James V. Carroll III, Attorney at Law 
(Washington, D.C.) 

Vincent N. Cook, President, Federal Systems 
Division, IBM 

Robert A. Duffy, President, Charles Stark 
Draper Laboratories (Cambridge) 

Robin Fairbairn, Attorney at Law (Paso 
Robles. Calif.) 

Edward R. Finch, Jr., Attorney at Law 
(New York City) 

Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., President, Chief 
Executive Officer, Grumman Corp. 
(Bethpage, New York) 

John M. Geer (Sacramento) 

Henrj- E. Hockeimer, President, Ford Aero- 
space and Communications Corp. (Detroit) 

Charles A. Schmidt, Division Vice President 
and General Manager, RCA, Astro 
Electronics (Princeton) 

Senior Adviser 

Hans Mark, Deputy Administrator, NASA 

Congressional Advisers 

George E. Brown, Jr. (D.-Calif.). U.S. 

House of Representatives 
William Carney (R.-N.Y.), U.S. House of 

Representatives 
Ronnie G. Felippo (D.-Ala.), U.S. House of 

Representatives 
Daniel K. Akaka (D.-Haw.), U.S. House of 

Representatives 
Wayne R. Grisham (R.-Calif.), U.S. House of 

Representatives 

Congressional Staff Advisers 

Radford Byerly, Jr., Committee on Science 
and Technology, U.S. House of Repre- 
sentatives 

J. Jeffrey Irons, Subcommittee on Space 
Science and Applications, U.S. House of 
Representatives ■ 



these trends to continue. It is clear the: 
that among the priority tasks in our 
agenda of future activities are those 
which will help us better to understand 
our own Earth, aid in the development 
of national economies, and assist in the 
broader sharing of technological skills. 
The United States stands ready to do i 
share to achieve these objectives. 

Toward a Better Understanding 
of Earth 

Venturing into outer space provides 
perspectives not only on other worlds; 
helps us better perceive, understand, 
and deal with conditions affecting life 
here on Earth. It is clear to the Unite( 
States, for example, that increased 
scientific understanding of environmer 
tal problems and improved methods in 
forecasting are needed if we are to 
enhance our ability to address issues 
relating to overall global habitability it 
an effective and efficient manner. We 
live on a planet characterized by chanf 
and it has been demonstrated that 
space-based observations are of in- 
estimable value in measuring changes 
which affect the Earth. The United 
States today conducts a number of 
space-based activities directed toward 
this end, and we note that other gover 
ments and international institutions ha 
also undertaken important efforts in tl 
regard. 

We believe it is important to begir 
to think in larger terms with respect t 
global conditions. Specifically, we envi 
sion continued long-term research ef- 
forts with international cooperation to 
expand further the base of data and 
knowledge from which sound decisions 
can be made with respect to the envir( 
ment. By better organized efforts, we 
can vastly improve the validity and 
reliability of available information as 
well as provide more systematic bases 
for evaluating and responding in long- 
term global change. Outer space tech- 
nology will be a more valuable tool in 
focusing attention on those trends whi 
influence our Earth's habitability. 

The United States will be discussir 
a global habitability concept with othei 
governments and international institu- 
tions here at the conference and in the 
months ahead. We would like to deter 
mine whether a more effective, coop- 
erative, long-term effort is feasible on 
global basis. My government believes 
such a cooperative undertaking could 
benefit all countries of the world, 
developed and developing. 



70 



Departnnent of State Bulle 



UNITED NATIONS 



GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A/37/90, 
DEC. 10, 1982^ 



The General Assembly. 

Recalling its resolution 33/16 of 10 
November 1978. 34/67 of 5 December 1979, 
35/15 of 3 November 1980 and 36/36 of 18 
November 1981 concerning the convening as 
well as the preparation of the Second United 
Nations Conference on the Exploration and 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which was 
held in Vienna from 9 to 21 August 1982, 

Reaffirming the importance of interna- 
tional co-operation in the exploration and 
peaceful uses of outer space. 

Reaffirming the importance of interna- 
tional co-operation in developing the rule of 
law for the advancement and preservation of 
the exploration and peaceful uses of outer 
space. 

Gravely concerned with the extension of 
an arms race into outer space, 

Aware of the need to increase the 
benefits of space technology and its applica- 
tions and to contribute to orderly growth of 
space activities favourable to the socio- 
economic advancement of mankind, in par- 
ticular the peoples of developing countries. 

Taking into account new developments in 
space science and technology which are being 
projected and envisaged in the coming decade 
as well as the new applications emerging 
therefrom and their potential benefits and 
possible implications for national development 
and international co-operation. 

Conscious of the need to increase the 
awareness of the general public with regard 
to space technology and its applications. 

Desiring to enhance the effectiveness of 
the co-ordinating role of the United Nations, 
which is eminently suited to bring about in- 
creased international co-operation and assist- 
ance to the developing countries in the field 
of exploration and peaceful uses of outer 
space, 

Ex-pressing its satisfaction with the suc- 
cessful preparation of the Conference 
through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space as preparatory committee and 
its Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee as 
advisory committee, as well as through the 
Conference secretariat. 

Taking note of the report of the Second 
United Nations Conference on the Explora- 
tion and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 

1. Expresses its appreciation and thanks 
to the Government and people of Austria for 
the excellent facilities and generous hospital- 
ity provided for the Conference; 



2. Endorses the recommendations per- 
taining to international co-operation in the 
exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, 
as contained in the report of the Conference: 

3. Invites all Governments to take effec- 
tive action for the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Conference: 

4. Invites all Member States, in par- 
ticular those with major space capabilities, to 
contribute actively to the goal of preventing 
an arms race in outer space, as an essential 
condition for the promotion of international 
co-operation in the exploration and uses of 
outer space for peaceful purposes: 

5. Requests all organs, organizations and 
bodies of the United Nations system and 
other intergovernmental organizations, which 
are working in the field of outer space or 
space-related matters, to co-operate in the 
implementation of the recommendations of 
the Conference: 

6. Takes note of the recommendations of 
the Conference regarding study projects and 
invites all specialized agencies and other in- 
tergovernmental organizations concerned to 
contribute within their field of competence to 
the elaboration of these studies: 

7. Decides, upon the recommendations of 
the Conference, that the United Nations Pro- 
gramme on Space Applications should be 
directed towards the following objectives: 

(a) Promotion of greater exchange of ac- 
tual experiences with specific applications; 

(6) Promotion of greater co-operation in 
space science and technology between 
developed and developing countries as well as 
among developing countries; 

(c) Development of a fellowship pro- 
gramme for in-depth training of space 
technologies and applications specialists, with 
the help of Member States and relevant inter- 
national organizations; establisnment and 
regular up-dating of lists containing available 
fellowships in all States and relevant interna- 
tional organizations: 

id) Organization of regular seminars on 
advanced space applications and new system 
developments for managers and leaders of 
space application and technology development 
activities as well as seminars for users in 
specific applications for durations as ap- 
propriate; 

(e) Stimulation of the growth of in- 
digenous nuclei and an autonomous techno- 



logical base, to the extent possible, in space 
technology in developing countries with the 
co-operation of other United Nations agencies 
and / or Member States or members of the 
specialized agencies; 

if) Dissemination — through panel 
meetings, seminars, etc. — of information on 
new and advanced technology and applica- 
tions, with emphasis on their relevance and 
implications for developing countries: 

ig) Provision or arrangements for provi- 
sion of technical advisory services on space 
applications projects, upon request by 
Member States or any of the specialized 
agencies; 

8. Decides to establish an International 
Space Information Service, initially consisting 
of a directory of sources of information and 
data services to provide direction upon re- 
quest to accessible data banks and informa- 
tion sources; 

9. Requests the Secretary-General to 
strengthen the Outer Space Affairs Division 
with an appropriate augmentation of 
technical personnel and decides, upon the 
recommendation of the Conference, that all 
new or expanded activities contained in this 
resolution are to be funded mainly through 
voluntary contributions of States in money or 
in kind, as well as through the rearrange- 
ment of priorities within the United Nations 
next regular budget; 

10. Appeals to all Governments to make 
voluntary contributions, either in money or in 
kind, towards carrying out the recommenda- 
tions of the Conference; 

11. Approves the recommendations of the 
Conference regarding the establishment and 
strengthening of regional mechanisms of co- 
operation and their promotion and creation 
through the United Nations system; 

12. Emphasizes the need for close co- 
operation between all United Nations bodies 
engaging in space or space-related activities, 
as well as the desirability of close co- 
operation with international funding agencies 
and subsidiary bodies, such as UNDP; 

13. Requests the Secretary-General to 
assure the availability and appropriate 
dissemination of the report of the Con- 
ference; 

14. Further requests the Secretary- 
General to report to its thirty-eighth session 
on the implementation of this resolution. 



'Adopted without a vote. 



In addition to gaining better long- 
term understanding of the Earth's en- 
vironment, the perspective of outer 
space can help all countries — and par- 
ticularly developing countries — to better 



anticipate and cope with natural dis- 
asters. To this end, we propose two 
projects for consideration. 

• We suggest that the U.N. Outer 
Space Division sponsor a working group 
on disaster assistance communications to 
examine the possibility of establishing a 



global emergency space communications 
system for disaster situations. 

• To learn how best to bring space 
technology to bear in coping with 
natural disasters, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) will 
sponsor a 5-day conference in the spring 



February 1983 



71 



UNITED NATIONS 



of 1984 in Washington. The conference 
would examine current operational 
systems, regional systems being 
developed, and future technologies ap- 
plicable to developing a global disaster 
monitoring and early warning network. 

Finally, in order to encourage a bet- 
ter understanding of the Earth, the 
United States is also making available to 
participants in UNISPACE a special 
LANDSAT index of the best available 
images collected over the past 10 years 
by LANDSAT 1, 2, and 3. The indexes 
are referenced to the new worldwide 
reference system maps developed by the 
U.S. Geological Survey. The data 
available through the LANDSAT pro- 
gram is accessible to every country and 
is indispensable to understanding and 
employing earth resources for the 
benefit of mankind. 

Assistance in the Development 
of Economies 

There has been a good deal written and 
spoken about the promise of space 
technology for national economic 
development. It is often too easy to give 
the imagination free play and to ignore 
the fact that in applying space tech- 
nology three concepts are fundamental 
and essential — establishing priorities, 
allocating scarce resources, and applying 
the discipline of careful administration. 
Outer space technology has great prom- 
ise. And, in its application, much can be 
done in cooperation with other govern- 
ments and with the private sector. The 
process of technology application is not, 
however, cost-free and should be beg^n 
only after deliberate decisions on the 
part of governments. The United States 



is prepared to assist in this process 
through several programs which have 
proven successful. 

• The United States, through AID's 
rural satellite program, has begun work 
with developing countries to advance the 
use of satellite communications for 
development. We are carrying out pilot 
programs in rural telephone and audio- 
conferencing, providing training, under- 
taking research and development, and 
providing information and advice. To 
share the results of this effort more 
widely with others, the United States 
will hold an international conference on 
rural satellite communications in 1985. 

• The United States will shortly 
begin field testing a combined low-cost 
satellite ground station and photovoltaic 
power system, optimized for developing 
country use. The results and technical 
data of this test will be widely available 
through aid's rural satellite program. 
This effort is a product of cooperation in 
research and development between the 
U.S. Government and industry. Its ob- 
jective is to lower the cost to developing 
countries of Earth stations and to pro- 
vide a reliable renewable source for 
them. 

I invite the conference to view the 
U.S. -sponsored demonstrations of this 
technology in the Seiten Galerie and the 
Heldenplatz. 

Sharing Technological Skills 

Integral to the success of any of these 
programs is the spread of the skills 
necessary to conduct them. The draft 
report of this conference quite rightly 
emphasizes the need to expand training 
programs, particularly for technicians 
and scientists from developing countries. 
The United States shares this convic- 
tion. Within the context of the work of 
UNISPACE, and through projects asso- 
ciated with the forthcoming Interna- 
tional Telecommunication Union- 
sponsored World Communications Year, 



the United States will continue to con- 
tribute substantially to training pro- 
grams and will explore ways of enhanc- 
ing their quality and availability. My 
delegation welcomes the views of others 
on all of the proposals I have made. We 
will be prepared to elaborate on these 
and other ideas in committee and in the 
scheduled poster sessions. 

It is unusual in conferences such as 
UNISPACE to project dramatic future 
activities and programs. And, I am con- 
fident that future developments in outer 
space will be every bit as dramatic as 
those which have occurred since 1968. I 
say this because I believe we have the 
human resources, the imagination, the 
technical capability, and the determina- 
tion to accelerate the pace of develop- 
ment in the peaceful uses of outer space. 

Space has been aptly named the 
endless frontier, and looking ahead over 
the next quarter century and beyond, 
the potential of exploring and exploiting 
the space environment for the common 
good is as limitless as the void of space 
itself. 

I am confident the human family will 
fulfill that potential. New challenges, 
new adventure, the resources of new 
worlds are within our reach. It is up to 
us to grasp them. 

The urge to know the unknown is 
basic to the pioneering spirit that means 
so much to the world. That urge is alive 
and well and will continue to thrive so 
long as man wants to know. And there 
is much for us to know. 

As T.S. Eliot once wrote: "We shall 
never cease from exploration and the 
end of all our exploring will be to arrive 
at where we started and to know the 
place for the first time." 

In that never-ending quest, the 
United States pledges to work, in 
cooperation with all nations, to bring 
peace and prosperity to our generation 
and to future generations inhabiting this 
planet. ■ 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Dealing With the 
Reality of Cuba 



by Thomas O. Enders 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on hiter-American Affairs and Interna- 
tional Economic Policy and Trade of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
December U. 1982. Ambassador Enders 
is Assistant SecretaTy for Inter- 
American Affairs.'^ 

In your invitation to appear before the 
two subcommittees you asked for an 
assessment of Cuba's role in the world 
and of our relationship to it. 

Cuban Policy 

There is nothing quite like it. Cuba is at 
once a would-be foreign policy giant 
ceaselessly projecting political-military 
influence far beyond its borders and an 
economic dwarf which for years has 
shown itself incapable of providing 
material progress for its own people. 

More than 70,000 Cubans, both 
civilians and members of the armed 
forces, are abroad on various "inter- 
nationalist" missions, most of them mili- 
tary. They are stationed from the Carib- 
bean and Central America to southern 
and central Africa, to both sides of the 
Red Sea, and even Asia. Over the last 2 
years, Cuba has been engaged in an 
arms buildup unprecedented since 1962. 

Cuban domestic policy has mean- 
while registered a general failure. 
Organized in the familiar Soviet com- 
mand model, the economy receives 
growing Soviet assistance in grants, sub- 
sidized sales of oil, and purchases of 
sugar at high prices. Yet although 
Soviet economic aid alone is now equiva- 
lent to more than one-quarter of Cuba's 
gross national product, per capita in- 
come in Cuba has been stagnant and is 
falling steadily relative to much of Latin 
America. Even the much-acclaimed in- 
itial improvements in social and health 
services have lost luster with the 
passage of time. Infant mortality and 
life expectancy already met high stand- 
ards in 1959; under Castro, they have 
improved less than in many other devel- 
oping countries. For almost a quarter 
century, social mobility has been capped 
by the permanence of a self-perpetuat- 
ing elite more rigid than any traditional 
oligarchy. 



This configuration of domestic 
stagnation and foreign ambition is the 
legacy of a generation of struggle to ex- 
port the revolution. For its first 10 
years in power the new Communist 
government in Havana tried to replicate 
its revolution elsewhere in Latin Ameri- 
ca. Virtually every country was affected. 
In Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Peru, and Bolivia guerrilla /oeos (exter- 
nally supported rural insurgencies) ac- 
tually flourished briefly. One by one, 
however, these Cuban-assisted insurrec- 
tions were defeated, and following the 
death of Che Guevara on a Bolivian 
hillside in 1967, Cuba stopped trying in 
Latin America— for a while. 

Instead it concentrated on Africa, 
where weaker, less legitimate govern- 
ments offered better opportunities. Cuba 
had maintained extensive contacts and 
some military missions in Africa since 
the early 1960s. By the mid-1970s, 
Cuban troops were fighting in Angola to 
assure the supremacy of the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) over its rivals. The stage had 
been set for the appearance of Cuban 
troops under Soviet command in 
Ethiopia. 

In 1978 Cuba turned once again to 
Latin America. Central America— where 
high economic growth had not been 
matched by political change and where 
repressive, narrowly based military 
governments clung to power— seemed 
ripe for revolution. Cuba's intervention 
helped tip the scale against the Somoza 
government in Nicaragua. El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia 
were targeted as follow-ons. In each 
case, Cuba attempted to weld together 
disparate local revolutionary factions in- 
to a unity, provided training in Cuba, 
and supplied— or arranged for the sup- 
ply of— arms to attack the existing 
government. Over the last 3 years, 
traces on individual weapons and 
analysis of other guerrilla materiel and 
documents have revealed a pattern 
that— to use the words of the Septem- 
ber 22, 1982, staff report by the Sub- 
committee on Oversight and Evaluation 
of the House Permanent Select Commit- 
tee on Intelligence— "showed Cuba, with 
Nicaraguan participation, to be heavily 
involved in the coordination, control and 
movement" of a substantial amount of 
arms and other supplies obtained from 
Communist countries. 



U.S. Response 

Throughout most of this period our re- 
sponse has been to help the intended vic- 
tims of the export of revolution to de- 
fend themselves. In the 1960s this policy 
was entirely successful. The more recent 
campaign in Latin America opened with 
a success for Cuba — the triumph of San- 
dinistas in Managua. But, provided we 
remain willing to help threatened coun- 
tries in Central America, there will be 
no more. 

At the same time we have sought to 
complicate the already difficult task of 
running a command economy in Cuba by 
withholding the trade and credit of 
Cuba's natural market, the United 
States. It is not clear whether Socialist 
Cuba ever had much growth potential. 
Our embargo has made sure that the 
cost to the U.S.S.R. of preventing per 
capita income from falling has increased 
steadily. 

Finally, we have kept Cuba at arm's 
length and have thus denied it the 
legitimacy — and consequently access to 
other governments in the hemisphere — 
normal relations with us would confer. 

These have been the basic elements 
of our policy generally, and they are 
now. But a major effort was made in 
1975-80, under two Administrations, to 
develop an alternative. During these 
years we attempted to moderate Cuba's 
behavior by talks aimed at progressive 
normalization of our relations. The 
theory was that an isolated Cuba had no 
stake in the international community 
and thus had no reason to exercise 
restraint. 

This bipartisan effort failed. Not 
only did it not induce Cuba to moderate 
its behavior, arguably it resulted in, or 
at least was followed by, even bolder, 
more aggressive action by Castro. 

Let me review the record. In 1975, 
we made our first secret contacts, sug- 
gesting the exploration of ways to 
remove tension and hostility. Late in 
that year the Cubans sent troops into 
Angola. In 1977 we again started talk- 
ing seriously to the Cubans, this time 
much more ambitiously, saying we 
wanted to create conditions in which the 
legacy of the past — the embargo and the 
political tension — could be overcome. In 
very high-level secret talks, our 
negotiators explored a series of steps 
with the eventual goal of removal of the 
embargo and full diplomatic relations in 
return for curbs on Cuban activities 
regarding Puerto Rico and a gradual 
withdrawal of the more than 20,000 



February 1983 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Cuban troops from Angola. After all, 
the civil war was over. While we talked, 
Cuba went into Ethiopia. 

Conversations continued. In 
mid-1978, Cuba launched upon a new ag- 
gressive strategy' in Central America, 
uniting violent factions first in 
Nicaragua, then El Salvador, then 
Guatemala, committing them to the 
destruction of their established govern- 
ments. 

Talks went on. In 1980, Castro 
turned the desire of many of his coun- 
trymen to flee Cuba into a hostile act 
against the United States — the Mariel 
boatlift. 

This record suggests that Cuba be- 
lieves that a process of negotiation with 
the United States is in its interest. Dur- 
ing those years, Cuban representatives 
repeatedly argued that the United 
States must take no action to help 
governments in Central America be- 
cause that would undercut the negotia- 
tions. In other words, the process was 
intended to restrain us, but it didn't 
restrain them. 

And the process could be, and was 
used, to maintain Cuban access to other 
countries in the hemisphere. After all, 
Havana argued to Latin American 
governments, the United States is talk- 
ing to us; you should cut your own deal 
with us now while you can. 

Cuba's desire to recreate the proc- 
ess, if not the results, of negotiations 



were told, yes, Cuba wants to talk with 
the United States. But in each case we 
were told that what could be talked 
about was our bilateral agenda — migra- 
tion, tourism, intelligence overflights, 
the embargo, diplomatic relations, Guan- 
tanamo. Puerto Rico and the third- 
country agenda — Cuba's aggressive ac- 
tions in Central America and Africa — 
were not negotiable. We must, we were 
told, learn to accept "social change," but 
Cuba could not compromise on its com- 
mitment to fraternal national liberation 
organizations. In other words, Cuba 
would receive concessions, not give 
them. 

It is noteworthy that Cuba did not 
choose to carry on these discussions 
through existing channels but used as 
the medium persons outside government 
who had no knowledge of previous or 
current exchanges when it launched its 
campaign of signals in behalf of "negoti- 
ations" a month later. We concluded 
that, once again, Castro did not wish to 
talk seriously but did wish to strike an 
apparently conciliatory posture. I would 
not exclude testing the Cubans again at 
some point on the possibilities of discus- 
sions. But the record — and the current 
posture — give little encouragement. 

There are those who say we should 
go beyond past negotiating approaches, 
with the explicit or implicit trade of nor- 
malization with the United States in 
return for Cuban restraint in third coun- 



. . . Soviet military and economic assistance per- 
mits the Cuban leaders to go on indulging their 
taste for war and revolution long after they would 
otherwise have had to come to terms with their 
failures. 



was evident again this spring when a 
campaign of signals was launched involv- 
ing private U.S. citizens who were told 
Cuba was anxious to discuss "settle- 
ments" in Central America as well as 
other differences between the United 
States and Cuba. 

I have been asked, why didn't the 
United States respond to these signals? 
Couldn't it have been an opportunity to 
seek a new direction in Cuban-American 
affairs? The answer is this: We had in- 
deed taken the initiative to sound out 
Cuba's interests and intentions at a very 
high level, first in November 1981 and 
again in March 1982. In each case we 



tries. We should drop third-country 
demands, these experts say, and nor- 
malize our bilateral relations. The 
magnetism of American society and 
economy would then in the long run 
prove irresistable. We should do away 
with economic measures that limit 
bilateral trade and financial transac- 
tions, renew diplomatic relations, and 
welcome Cuba back to the Organization 
of American States (assuming that Cuba 
was willing to return and that other 
states would accept its return). 
On the record, at least, Castro 



would welcome any opportunity to take 
advantage of relaxed economic relations 
with the United States. And he might be 
more cooperative on some bilateral 
issues, at lease at the outset. But history 
also makes unmistakably clear that 
Castro would not tolerate any loosening 
of state control inside Cuba, and that he 
would continue and perhaps even inten- 
sify the activities which threaten to 
undermine our national security and that 
of our friends. And that is precisely the 
problem with this approach: It would ad- 
dress neither the basic inequities of the 
Cuban system nor the fundamental 
orientation of Cuban foreign policy, 
which is to encourage armed revolution 
elsewhere along the lines which it took 
in Cuba. 

Others, more ambitious still, want to 
try to wean Cuba away from the So\'iet 
Union. Even assuming that Castro was 
of a mind to alter his allegiance to the 
U.S.S.R. — something Castro has always 
denied vehemently, most recently on 
December 11 — the price would be more 
than we could pay. The Soviet Union's 
annual economic assistance now ap- 
proaches the equivalent of $4 billion. We 
might have a little difficulty in per- 
suading the Congress to replace even a 
part of that remarkable largesse. More- 
over, there is little prospect that Castro 
himself would forsake Soviet military 
assistance, which enables Cuba to play 
its chosen role as a nerve center, train- 
ing ground, and arsenal for revolution in 
the Third World. In effect, Soviet mili- 
tary and economic assistance permits 
the Cuban leaders to go on indulging 
their taste for war and revolution long 
after they would otherwise have had to 
come to terms with their failures. 

If negotiation, unilateral normaliza- 
tion, and weaning away won't work, 
what remains is shoring up threatened 
friends, complicating economic manage- 
ment, withholding legitimacy. This Ad- 
ministration has steadfastly helped our 
friends defend themselves from Cuban 
interference and has tightened our eco- 
nomic countermeasures, particularly 
those designed to deny Cuba the hard 
currency that Castro uses to help pay 
for armed violence and terrorism. 

The Cuban People 

And we must not forget the people of 
Cuba. The most eloquent testimony to 
their continued resistance is the flight of 
more than 10% of Cuba's population 
since Castro came to power. Not even 
the effort by the Cuban Government to 



74 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



nish the image of those fleeing Cuba 
forcibly expelling common criminals 
1 the mentally ill during the 1980 
riel boatlift can diminish the heroism 
1 tenancity of the Cuban people. Over 
) decades of communism have not 
dicated the traditional Cuban love of 
■rty and tolerance for diversity which 
lart of the hemisphere's common 
stern heritage. 

We intend to underscore our deep 
imitment to the Cuban people by re- 
nding to their own wish to know the 
th by increasing the dissemination of 
iilar, objective, factual news about 
3a. We hope Radio Marti will begin 
broadcasts next year. As Jose Marti 
1: "Witnessing a crime in silence is 
ivalent to committing it." Nothing il- 
;rates Castro's genuine fear of 
fiestic opinion more than the hysteri- 
denunciations by Cuban authorities 
)lans for Radio Marti. 

In the end, two qualities are needed 
lealing with Cuba: vigilance and pa- 
ice. Vigilance, because this is an ex- 
jrdinarily aggressive state and now a 
vily armed one. Patience, because it 
not last forever. While Castro has 
n probing Latin America and Africa 
new revolutionary opportunities, 
er developing countries have outper- 
ned Cuba economically and socially. 

the worst is still to come. The big 
wth impulse over the past generation 

been the expanding Soviet subsidy. 
I one believes that a stagnant 
I .S.R. will be willing or able to in- 
I ise the subsidy in the future as rapid- 
' s in the past. So Cuba will fall fur- 
:* and further behind, become less 
I less relevant to other countries, 
re and more marginal to the new 
'■Id. At some point — for all the op- 
iBsion they suffer — the Cuban people 
f find a way to repudiate a leadership 
■t thinks that all they need is the 
l"y earned by "internationalists" op- 
issing other peoples, and not their 
n well-being and freedom. 



iNEX 1: ASSESSMENTS 

!)a in Central America 
1 1 the Caribbean 

ha. supports armed insurrection in 
feral countries of the hemisphere, 
'n while it seeks to reestablish formal 
liiomatic relations with others. In some 
ies Castro follows a "double track," 
i-ivating governments while maintain- 
r ties with armed revolutionaries in 
1 same country. 



Cuba assigns particular priority to 
the armed path in the Caribbean Basin. 
Long the only Marxist-Leninist state in 
the region, Cuba now sees the turmoil in 
Central America and the emergence of a 
Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua 
and a radical authoritarian regime on 
the island of Grenada as a promise of 
more Communist countries to come. 

The key short-range priority for 
Cuba is to consolidate the regimes in 
Nicaragua and Grenada as focal points 



a preponderant influence in the San- 
dinista government. Cuban activities are 
particularly notable in the internal 
security and militarization of Nicaragua, 
supplying both equipment and extensive 
training operations within Nicaragua. 

In El Salvador, Cuba claims that the 
guerrilla forces of El Salvador— which it 
has coordinated, supplied, and trained- 
are capable of winning by force of arms 
but are seeking a negotiated settlement 
in order to spare hves. The Cubans con- 



While Castro has been probing Latin America and 
Africa for new revolutionary opportunities, other 
developing countries have outperformed Cuba 
economically and socially. 



for future revolutionary strife in the 
region. A related objective is to sustain 
the revolutionary struggle in El Salva- 
dor in the hope that the configuration of 
forces will turn more favorable to the 
Communists. Further along are Guate- 
mala, Honduras, and others. No state in 
the hemisphere is immune from the 
"revolutionary" process, not even the 
most democratic. Costa Rica and Colom- 
bia both face Cuban-sponsored subver- 
sion. And Castro is certainly seeking to 
exploit the current unrest in Suriname. 

Believing that "objective conditions" 
were finally right for armed revolution, 
Cuba began redirecting its efforts back 
to the Caribbean Basin in 1978. Cuba 
united and trained guerrillas in the 
region and mounted a major propaganda 
campaign to discredit targeted govern- 
ments, reduce U.S. resolve, and get 
European and Latin American allies to 
disengage. Emphasis was initially placed 
on bolstering Marxist-Leninist elements 
in Nicaragua and thereafter on El Salva- 
dor. The Cubans dramatically increased 
the flow of arms to Nicaragua, many of 
which later passed to Salvadoran guer- 
rillas. 

Today, some 400 Cubans are at- 
tempting to turn Grenada into a major 
outpost of Marxist influence in the 
eastern Caribbean. Cuban advisers are 
present in every Grenadan ministry, 
working on political indocrination, eco- 
nomic projects, and military facilities 
and training camps. 

In Nicaragua, some 8,000 Cuban 
military and civilian advisers, tech- 
nicians, and other personnel have gained 



tinue to train Honduran insurgents, to 
supply arms to those in Guatemala, and 
to unite the left in Central America 
while promoting ties to outside terrorist 
groups and radical states. 

Occasional Cuban private pledges 
not to interfere in the internal affairs of 
other countries have never stood the 
test of time and appear designed to 
deceive. The alleged Cuban readiness to 
negotiate an accommodation with the 
United States is calculated to ease 
pressures on the guerrillas in El 
Salvador and on the Sandinistas by 
redirecting world attention to so-called 
"political" options that would facilitate 
their military strategies. Cuban miltary 
training and arms shipments have con- 
tinued unabated even as Havana calls 
for peaceful settlement. 

At the April 26-28, 1982, Com- 
munist theoretical conference in 
Havana— a forum to give direction to 
leftist organizations in the hemisphere- 
Cuban leaders made clear they will not 
sacrifice revolutionary goals for the sake 
of normalization with the United States. 
Alternate Politburo member Jesus Mon- 
tane asserted that Cuba will never 
negotiate on revolution nor on the right 
of people to carry it out. Another Cuban 
leader argued at that forum that 
Nicaragua and Grenada showed the 
validity of the Cuban armed road to 
power, and the conference as a whole 
reiterated that "objective conditions" 
were appropriate for armed struggle in 
Guatemala and El Salvador. 



■Vruary 1983 



75 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Cuba in Africa 

Cuba's objectives in Africa are to 
capitalize on general African opposition 
to the Republic of South Africa to com- 
pete with the United States on a 
favorable ideological battlefield while 
enhancing Cuba's stature and promoting 
the establishment of pro-Soviet, pro- 
Cuban regimes in the region. The em- 
phasis in Africa is part of Cuba's effort 
to become an actor on the world stage 
and reduce its diplomatic isolation. 
Cuban activities in the region are based 
in part on Cuba's revolutionary interna- 
tionalist ideology but also serve Soviet 
interests. 

Cuban troops have been engaged in 
Angola since 1975, when they entered at 
the request of the MPLA, which was in- 
volved in fighting two Western- 
supported movements for control of 
Angola. They have since become em- 
broiled in a civil war in Angola between 
the MPLA and the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA), although the MPLA and the 
Cubans claim that Cuban forces are in 
Angola solely to defend against the 
threat of South African attack. 

Since mid-1981 the United States 
has endeavored to negotiate with the 
MPLA government in Luanda the with- 
drawal of Cuban combat forces from 
Angola in parallel with the withdrawal 
of South African forces from Namibia. 
This withdrawal would take place during 
phase III of the Namibia settlement 
process, as U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 435 is implemented to give 
Namibia independence. 

The United States is negotiating 
directly with the MPLA and the other 
African parties involved. Although the 
Cuban Government has publicly commit- 
ted itself to withdrawing its forces from 
Angola if and when the MPLA asks it to 
do so, it has in fact strongly opposed 
such a withdrawal. 

Aside from the 20,000-25,000 
soldiers and 5,000 civilian personnel 
which it maintains in Angola, Cuba has 
11,000-13,000 military personnel and 
600 civilian advisers and technicians in 
Ethiopia, where Cuban troops entered in 
1977. 

In addition, there are contingents of 
Cuban military and civilian advisers in 
more than a dozen other African coun- 
tries engaged in a wide variety of 
military training, security services, and 
economic and technical assistance. The 
total number of Cubans in Africa is be- 
lieved to be between 40,000-48,000. 



Cubans in State and 
Federal Detention Facilities 

Location of Facilities 

Number of 
Cubans 

Detained 



Federal 



U.S. Prison, Atlanta, Georgia 


LI 70 


Federal Correction Institution 




Lexington, Kentucky 


25 


Federal Correction Institution 




Alderson. West Virginia 


2 


Federal Correction Institution 




Springfield, Missouri 


47 


Federal Correction Institution 




La Tuna, Texas 


2 


Krome INS Service Processing 




Center. Miami, Florida 


10 


St. Elizabeth's INS/U.S. Public 




Health Service Processing 




Center, Washington, D.C. 


39 


Total 


1,295 


State* 




New York 


200 


California 


100 


Pennsylvania 


10 


Wisconsin 


100 


Florida 


800 


Michigan 


50 


Total 


1,260 


'Estimates 





Earnings of civilian advisers paid by 
some host governments have become an 
important source of hard currency for 
Cuba. 

Although Cuba now maintains ties 
with 36 of the 46 sub-Saharan African 
states, Cuban diplomatic successes have 
been muted over the past few years by 
Cuba's advocacy of Soviet positions 
within the nonaligned movement and the 
growing perception that Cuba is staying 
on in Angola and Ethiopia in deference 
to Soviet objectives and in disregard of 
local and regional needs. Nevertheless, 
Cuba will probably continue to seek 
targets of opportunity in Africa. 

Cuba and the U.S.S.R. 

Cuba is a Soviet surrogate, heavily 
dependent on Soviet assistance to avoid 
economic collapse and obliged to support 
Soviet foreign policy. It is ironic that 
Cuba was granted membership — let 
alone leadership — in the nonaligned 
movement. Cuba is one of the most 



aligned states in the world, far more 
committed to the Soviet Union and its 
policies than some members of the Wa 
saw Pact. 

Castro is an effective Soviet agent 
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle 
East. Moscow prefers to work in the 
background in Central America and els 
where, providing financial, logistical, 
and arms support for liberation move- 
ments and helping to pay for Cuban 
troops in Africa. 

The Soviet economic assistance pre 
gram to Cuba — which is now ap- 
proaching $4 billion per year, equivalei 
to over one-quarter of Cuba's gross na 
tional product — accounts for over half 
the U.S.S.R.'s global economic assist- 
ance program. Without it, the Cuban 
economy would be prostrate; but 
without the Cuban rifleman or machin. 
gunner, the Soviet capacity to project 
power in the Third World would be coi 
siderably reduced. 

Since the overthrow of Somoza in 
1979, armed struggle in Latin Americ; 
has played a greater role in both Sovie 
and Cuban policy. Unlike the 1960s, 
Havana appears to have the full blessr 
of Moscow in its interventionist ac- 
tivities, with the Soviets now 
acknowledging that under certain cone 
tions rebel groups can more effectivelj 
serve as the revolutionary vanguard 
than local Communist parties. 

Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba in 
1981 surged to 66,000 tons, the highes 
levels since 1962; they have continued 
approximately that pace in 1982. More 
significant Soviet weapons delivered 
since 1975 include approximately 150 j 
fighters— a considerable number of the 
are MiG-21s and MiG-23/FLOGGERS 
AN-26 troop/cargo transports, Foxtro 
submarines, a Koni-class frigate, T-62 
tanks, MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters, Os 
class guided-missile attack boats, mine 
sweepers, and Turya-class hydrofoil 
torpedo boats. The Soviets also have a 
active military role in Cuba itself. The 
Soviet Union maintains a 2,600-man 
combat brigade, some 2,000 military a.< 
visers, 6,000-8,000 civilian advisers, ai 
a major telecommunications and intelli 
gence facility that monitors wide spec- 
trums of U.S. civilian and military tele 
communications and conducts periodic 
air and naval visits directed against th 
United States and NATO. 

It is noteworthy, however, that thi 
U.S.S.R. has consistently refused to g. 
Cuba the ultimate guarantee of a secu 
ty commitment. 



76 



Department of State Bulla 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



he Cuban Economy 

he Cuban economy today is character- 
ed by increasing dependence on sugar, 
/ severe rationing of basic necessities, 
id by a shortage of decent housing, 
ood is in short supply, especially cof- 
16, rice, beans, beef— the staples of the 
aditional Cuban diet. The quality of 
»ds is low. Crowds line up hours in 
ivance of the opening of stores so as to 
> in line to purchase what scarce com- 
odities are available. Few jobs are to 
) had, and Cuba must export its labor 
irplus abroad as "internationalists." 

When Castro came to power, Cuba 
as competitive in the world market- 
ace and was one of the most pros- 
!rous countries in Latin America. To- 
ly few would take Cuba's economy as a 
odel for development. The exodus of 
ousands of Cubans from Mariel in 
i80 demonstrated how weak is the 
legiance of Cubans to their govern- 
ent. 

Aside from the destruction of the 
n\ liberties of the Cuban citizen, 
istro's most glaring domestic failure is 
e state of the Cuban economy. After 
■arly a quarter century of Communist 
le in Cuba, the economy is saved from 
llapse only by massive economic assist- 
ce from the U.S.S.R. Whether the 
iviets can, over time, increase or even 
lintain the almost $4 billion a year 
ey now give Cuba in economic assist- 
ce is a key question. In spite of the 
jh amount of Soviet aid, Cuba has had 
turn to the West for help. In 1982 it 
ked Western creditors for a mora- 
rium on payment of principal on well 
er $1 billion worth of medium- and 
ig-term debt. 

Why has Cuba progressed so little in 
years? In their plea for financial re- 
ess from the West, the Cubans blamed 
e U.S. embargo, the sugar policy of 
s European Economic Community, 
d the low price of sugar for their 
itress. It was, however, the decision of 
e Cuban Government itself to reorient 
trade from West to East under 
istro and to concentrate on the pro- 
ction of sugar to an even greater ex- 
nt than in the pre-Communist period, 
lese decisions— together with the eco- 
mic misallocations, inefficiencies, and 
iste endemic to communism— have 
used Cuba's economic problems. More- 
er, Castro's bias against making even 
e modest amount of economic read- 
stment and reform, which was carried 
t at an earlier period in Eastern 
irope, has exacerbated the situation 
d condemned the Cuban people to 
arcity and rationing. In support of its 



request for debt rescheduling with the 
West, Cuba has offered no changes in 
economic model; instead, Cuban officials 
suggest international belt tightening and 
less trade with the West. 

Prospects for the Cuban economy 
are unfavorable. Cuba aims primarily at 
the production of still more sugar— de- 
spite its low world price and the bad 
long-range prospects for sucrose on the 
world market— because the Soviet Union 
is willing to pay a higher price in soft, 
nonconvertible currency. A rise in the 
world price of sugar would ease Cuba's 
balance-of-payments distress; even 
should this occur, however, it could not 
touch the underlying economic problems 
for which no fundamental relief is in 
sight. As Fidel Castro has now said on 
more than one occasion, Cuba can look 
forward only to further sacrifices. 

Political Stability 

Order in Cuba rests on power, not con- 
sent, and the Castro regime has demon- 
strated that it has both the power and 
the will to employ power ruthlessly. 
Public dissent is unthinkable, and even 
conspicuous lack of assent may be cause 
for scrutiny by the watchful committees 
for the defense of the revolution. 

Despite the severe penalties in- 
volved—loss of job, loss of ration card, 
risk of mob reprisals— at least 200,000 
Cubans have dared to ask for exit per- 
mits. Behind them probably stand 1-2 
million more who would leave if the op- 
portunity were to present itself but who 
hesitate to bring down upon themselves 
the displeasure of the regime. How 
many more Cubans are deeply dissatis- 
fied with their lot in Castro's Cuba but 
who would refuse to leave their native 
soil is impossible to measure. 

It is clear, however, that several 
problems are causing increasing internal 
stress. Popular discontent derives partly 
from longstanding problems; 

• A weak economy increasingly 
dependent on sugar exports and Soviet 
aid; 

• A totalitarian regime with a 
privileged elite unable to motivate the 
population; and 

• A heavy commitment of resources 
for foreign involvement that pays few 
domestic dividends obvious to the Cuban 
people. 

Some of Castro's most serious policy 
errors have in recent years compounded 
these problems. For example, the deci- 
sion to allow thousands of exiles to visit 



the island during 1979 in an effort to ac- 
quire hard-currency revenues had a 
powerful destabilizing effect. In the 
aftermath of their visits, crime, worker 
absenteeism, and other forms of discon- 
tent rose sharply. Popular dissatisfaction 
deepened when the Cuban leadership 
demanded greater sacrifice and effort 
while issuing warnings that economic 
and social progress would not occur 
before the end of the century. The depth 
of this malaise became abundantly clear 
with the events leading up to the Mariel 
boatlift. 

But perhaps more important than 
these factors is a time bomb that is 
already haunting Castro— the existence 
of a critical generation gap. In numerous 
speeches over the past few years, he has 
addressed the discontent of the younger 
generations and has at times seemed 
obsessed with the dilemma of how to in- 
culcate the youth with the revolutionary 
ideals of his own generation. The prob- 
lem can only worsen over time: About 
50% of the population is under 25 and 
has no memory of the struggle against 
Batista; 60% of those who fled to the 
United States at the time of the Mariel 
boatlift were under the age of 30. 

Vast numbers of young people will 
enter the labor force this decade— a 
generation that is highly educated by 
Third World standards and received 
favored treatment during its schooling. 
Upon graduation, they have to face the 
harsh realities of an anemic economy 
with insufficient job opportunities, a 
housing shortage, and a spartan life- 
style. Moreover, a number of those who 
served overseas— some for two or three 
tours— have caused problems upon find- 
ing that expected rewards and per- 
quisites did not materialize after they 
returned home. 

To alleviate these pressures, Castro 
has sent increasing numbers of military 
and civilian personnel overseas. But this 
solution is only partial and temporary. 
To the extent that the economy remains, 
weak and opportunities for additional 
foreign involvement fail to materialize, 
the Cuban polity will experience growing 
strains. 

There is, nonetheless, only a small 
probability that organized opposition to 
the Castro regime will appear in the 
near future. The powerful and effective 
security forces, as well as neighborhood 
watchdog committees for the defense of 
the revolution, are a great deterrent to 
open opposition. There is no independent 
institution— such as the Catholic Church 



bruary 1983 



77 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



in Poland— to serve as a focal point for 
the dissatisfied. As a result, many of the 
discontented are resigned to await op- 
portunities for the safer avenue of 
escape via emigration to the United 
States. 

Thus, while there is no apparent 
danger to Castro's position, he seems 
destined to preside over an increasingly 
alienated population that will find little 
motivation in exhortations for additional 
sacrifice. If past patterns hold, Castro 
will seek to counter these internal prob- 
lems by looking for victories abroad- 
most likely in pressing the revolutionary 
struggle in Central America— and con- 
tinue to use the United States as a 
scapegoat for his troubles. 



ANNEX 2: PRISONER AND 
REFUGEE ISSUES 

Americans in Cuban Prisons 

Twenty-four Americans are currently 
known to be incarcerated in Cuba. Five 
are Cuban-Americans to whom the 
Cuban Government refuses to allow any 
consular access. There may be others, 
but we are unaware of them. Of the re- 
maining 19, most are charged with il- 
legal entry (defined by Cuban law simply 
as entry into Cuban territory without 
prior authorization) and/or possession or 
trafficking in narcotics. One American is 
charged with child molesting, one with 
swindling, and another with currency 
violations. All are incarcerated in the 
Combinado del Este Prison except four 
women, including two minors, who are 
held in the Nuevo Amanecer Prison in 
Havana. 

Most arrests of American citizens 
occur when they inadvertently enter 
Cuban territorial waters or air space. In 
these instances they are detained by 
Cuban authorities and charged with il- 
legal entry. In 1981 and 1982, at least 
25 American citizens who accidentally 
strayed into Cuban territory were brief- 
ly detained while the Cubans investi- 
gated the incidents. They were then 
released. During the same period, 32 
other Americans who inadvertently 
entered Cuban territory were arrested 



and subjected to prolonged detention 
when the Cubans allegedly found 
evidence of drug trafficking. Some have 
since been released. 

The Cuban Government has one of 
the poorest records, even among Com- 
munist countries, with regard to 
notification of arrest and consular access 
to American citizens. Notification ranges 
from several days to several months 
after arrest. Access is permitted only 
under strictly controlled conditions. 

Dual nationals are a special problem. 
In the past, Cuban authorities have re- 
fused with only one exception to provide 
U.S. consular officers access to dual na- 
tional Cuban-Americans because Cubans 
regard them as having only Cuban na- 
tionality, despite U.S. naturalization. 

Unless it has grounds to believe that 
there has been a gross miscarriage of 
justice, the U.S. Government does not 
seek the release of American prisoners 
accused or convicted of violation of 
foreign law. It does seek for them fair 
and humane treatment, at least equiva- 
lent to that received by locals accused of 
comparable crimes. The purpose of our 
visits is to insure that the prisoners 
receive adequate food, shelter, and 
clothing and that they are not subjected 
to harsh treatment. We see to it that 
they receive medical treatment when 
necessary. The U.S. interests section in 
Havana also facilitates monthly family 
visits. It sees to the delivery of mail and 
of food packages (25 pounds per month), 
as well as vitamins and other dietary 
supplements. 

The Cuban Government releases 
prisoners from time to time without 
regard to their time of detention or of 
sentencing, regardless of the type of 
crime alleged to have been committed. 
These prisoner releases have character- 
istically been to Members of Congress or 
others who have expressed special in- 
terest in them. 



The Mariel Boatlift 

Your final question concerned whether 
Fidel Castro would be willing to accept 
back the criminal element which he in- 
cluded in the Mariel boatlift of 1980. 
There is no good evidence to support 
such conjecture. It was, after all, he who 
caused the problem. The repatriation of 
the Mariel excludables remains part of 
our agenda. Talks on migration issues 
were held in 1980-81 by the previous 
Administration. These talks sought to 
restore and expand our programs for 
legal admission of Cuban immigrants 
and political prisoners as well as Cuban 
agreement to accept the return of in- 
dividuals excluded from the United 
States. Unfortunately, they foundered 
on Cuban insistence on a case-by-case 
veto over those individuals to be re- 
turned, in circumstances which indicatec 
that Cuba intended to use the veto ex- 
tensively to preclude the return of most 
of the excludables. Both under the Im- 
migration and Nationality Act and unde 
international law, we believe it is critica 
to return to his or her home country an; 
foreigner found excludable under U.S. 
law. Since then, when migration issues 
have come up, Cuba has given us no in- 
dication that it has changed its stand on 
the veto. We cannot be put in the posi- 
tion of accepting the Cuban veto; it 
would be tantamount to surrendering 
our sovereign right to control our own 
immigration policy. 

Right now these individuals con- 
stitute a heavy burden for our society. 
Of the 4,000-5,000 that arrived and 
under law are excludable from the 
United States, 2,555 are still in Federal 
and State facilities. The cost of main- 
taining them is hard to calculate, but thi 
figure $10,000 per person per annum 
would not be an overestimate. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Programs Underway for the 
[Caribbean Basin Initiative 



y J. William Middendorf II 

Address before the Committee for 806 
nd 807^ in Washington, D.C., on 
November 8, 1982. Ambassador Midden- 
orfis U.S. permanent representative to 
le Organization of American States 
US). 

have deeply appreciated the work 
'hich this committee has done on behalf 
f maintaining an open market in the 
Fnited State