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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign PoH;e¥;fVolume 84/Nunnber 2082 




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Cover: 

President Reagan 
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bulletin 



Volume 84 / Number 2082 / January 1984 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

A.s.sistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department, llse of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610 
published monthly (plus annual index) by the 
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage paid 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Drpartme.nt ok State Bulletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.Si 
Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 
20402 



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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 



3 
20 



President Reagan Visits Japan and the Republic of Korea 
(President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, Remarks, Joint 
Statements, Toasts, Addresses, Radio Address, and 
Interviews) 

Japan — A Profile 

Republic of Korea— A Profile 



The Secretary 



32 Promoting Peace in the Middle 

East 
35 News Conference of December 5 



Africa 



38 



44 



Reagan Administration's Africa 
Policy: A Progress Report 
{Chester A. Crocker) 

Visit of Sudanese President 
Nimeiri (Gaafar Muhammad 
Nimeiri, President Reagan) 



Arms Control 

45 Paradox, Problems, and Promise 
of Arms Control {Kenneth L. 
Adelman) 

48 Soviets Suspend INF Negotia- 

tions {Paul H. Nitze, President 
Reagan) 

49 The CDE and European Security 

in the 1980s {Gerhard Mally) 



Europe 



52 



53 



54 



Developments in Cyprus 

(Richard N. Haass, Department 

Statement) 
50th Anniversary of U.S. -Soviet 

Relations (President Reagan, 

Exchange of Letters) 
U.S. Sanctions Against Poland 

{White House Statement) 



Human Rights 



55 



59 B 



Human Rights Situation in South 
America {Elliott Abrams. 
James H. Michel) 
ill of Rights Day; Human 
Rights Day and Week, 1983 
(Proclamation) 



International Law 



60 



69 



Treaty Protection of Foreign In- 
vestment (Davis R. Robinson) 

A Critique of the Restatement 
Revision (Davis R. Robinson) 



Middle East 

69 Situation in Lebanon (White 

House Statement) 

Narcotics 

70 Marijuana Production and Con- 

trol Abroad (Dominick L. 
DiCarlo) 

South Asia 

73 Afghanistan: 4 Years of Occupa- 
tion 



Western Hemisphere 

80 The Caribbean Basin Initiative 
and Central America 
(Kenneth W. Dam) 

83 The Political Economy of the 

Caribbean Basin (Kenneth W. 
Dam) 

84 CBI Recipients Designated 

(Letter to the Congress) 

85 Nicaragua (Secretary Shultz's 

Letter to the Congress) 

87 Need for Rule of Law in Central 

America (James H. Michel) 

88 President Opposes El Salvador 

Certification Legislation (White 
House Statement) 

Treaties 

90 Current Actions 

Chronology 

92 November 1983 

Press Releases 

94 Department of State 

Index 



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but those talks demonstrated that 
despite the 5,000 miles of ocean betweer 
us and the difference in our geography, 
history, and culture, Japan and America 
share the same deeply held values. 

Both our nations are democracies 
founded on the sacredness of the in- 
dividual. We both believe that every per- 
son deserves to be listened to, so we 
give all of our citizens a voice in govern- 
ment. And we both hold that every man 
and woman has certain inalienable 
rights, so we enshrine these rights in 
law. 

As the American educator Robert 
Hutchins wrote "Democracy is the only 
form of government that is founded on 
the dignity of man — not the dignity of 
some men, or rich men, or educated 
men . . . but on all men." Democratic 
freedoms, we both know, make a nation 
not only noble but dynamic. Individuals 
in democracies can give full scope to 



their energies and talents, conducting 
experiments, exchanging knowledge, 
and making breakthrough after 
breakthrough. 

In just the past few decades, men 
and women acting in freedom have 
markedly improved the health and living 
standards of the whole human race. In- 
novations in fertilizers, farm machinery, 
and land use made in democracies have 
increased agricultural output across the 
world. 

Medical advances made in democ- 
racies, from the discovery of penicillin to 
the identification of vitamins, means 
that people everywhere on Earth live 
longer than ever before. And electronics 
breakthroughs made in democracies 
have produced a telecommunications 
network that links nations around the 
globe. Of course, Japan has been leading 
the way in one of those— electronics. 
And I can't resist telling you that we 




An exchange of toasts between Prime Minister and Mrs. Nakasone and President and 
Mrs. Reagan at luncheon held in Banquet Hall of Prime Minister's official residence. 



Americans who have traditionally prided 
ourselves in being the first with the 
most have now met our competition. 
[Laughter] I understand that in a single 
Tokyo store, one can find 205 varieties 
of stereo headphones and 100 different 
television models. 

Today it's the democracies — 
especially Japan and America— that are 
leading a high-tech revolution that prom 
ises to change life on Earth even more 
profoundly than did the industrial 
revolution of a century ago. This revolu- 
tion ranges from electron microscopes 
that can inspect molecules to satellites 
that are probing the dark infinities of 
space. It's a revolution that's making in- 
dustries vastly more efficient, putting 
the world's great literature, film, and 
music at families' fingertips, and produc 
ing medical breakthroughs that are help 
ing many of the blind see and many of 
the handicapped to walk. 

State-controlled economies, by con- 
trast, just haven't been able to keep up. 
Before Korea was divided, its industrial 
center was in the north. Today the 
Republic of Korea outproduces North 
Korea by 3 to 1. In Europe the per 
capita income of West Germany is more 
than twice that of East Germany. As wt 
both know, the true division in the work 
today is not between east and west, but 
between progress and stagnation, be- 
tween freedom and oppression, between 
hope and despair. 

Looking back on his long career, one 
of Japan's foremost leaders, Yukio 
Ozaki, said, "For the happiness of one 
nation we should endeavor toward the 
enhancement of the happiness of the en- 
tire world." Both Japan and America 
share this view, and we both know that 
the happiness of the world depends on 
liberty. 

As a man who has worked tirelessly 
to defend and promote human freedom, 
you have led a career of long and varied 
service to your country. You first won a 
seat in the Diet in 1947; since 1959 
\()u've held five Cabinet posts; and toda; 
you lead your nation. With gratitude for 
your efforts, on behalf of the American 
people, I salute you. 

And please join me in a toast to His 
Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of 
Japan. 



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FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



nyof 



Joint Statements, 
Nov. 10, 1983^ 

Prime Minister Nakasone 

For the people and Government of 
Japan, as well as for my wife and 
myself, it is, indeed, a great pleasure to 
welcome the President of the United 
States of America and Mrs. Reagan as 
state guests. 

Yesterday and today, the President 
and I had very productive meetings 
covering a wide range of subjects. 
Through these meetings, we recon- 
firmed the importance for Japan and the 
United States, two countries sharing the 
common ideas and values of freedom 
and democracy of promoting further 
cooperation toward peace and prosperity 
of the world. 

The President has a clear recogni- 
tion of the importance of the Asian and 
the Pacific region. His present visit to 
Japan and the Republic of Korea and his 
planned visit to China next year amply 
testify to this fact, together with his 
visit to the countries in Southeast Asia, 
which I am sure will be rescheduled in 
the future. The economic dynamism in 
the Asian and the Pacific region is one 
of the central elements in the expansion 
of the world economy. Thus, the Presi- 
dent and I are in full agreement that we 
should continue to make efforts for the 
further development of the Asian and 
the Pacific region. 

I issued on November 1 the Tokyo 
statement jointly with Chancellor 
[Helmut] Kohl of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in line with the spirit of the 
political statement adopted at the 
Williamsburg summit in May [1983] 
declaring that we should maintain the 
unity and solidarity among the Western 
countries in our joint endeavor in pur- 
suit of freedom, peace, and stability of 
the prosperity of the world economy, 
and of the development in the Third 
World. 

As I know the recent events of in- 
creasing tension in the East- West rela- 
tions, as well as frequent occurrences of 
regional disputes and violence in various 
parts of the world, I am worried that 



January 1984 



the peace in the world could be gravely 
threatened if such trends continue and 
amplify themselves. Under such cir- 
cumstances, I firmly believe that the 
countries of the world should renew 
their resolve for the maintenance of 
freedom, peace, and stability; for the 
revitalization of the world economy; and 
for the prosperity of the peoples of the 
world. 

I further believe that the rational 
dialogues and negotiations should be 



conducted to solve such international 
conflicts and disputes, and that the par- 
ties concerned should spare no effort in 
taking step-by-step measures or gradual 
approach in pursuit of ultimate goals, 
and should carry on steady and realistic 
endeavors. This I consider is particularly 
pertinent to the arms control negotia- 
tions. 

The Western countries should stand 
firmly in unity and solidarity for 
freedom and peace and should not 



Japan— A Profile 



People 

Noun and adjective: Japanese. Population 

(1982): 118.450,000. Annual growth rate: 
0.8%. Ethnic gfroups: Japanese; Korean 0.6' 
Religions: Shintoism and Buddhism; Chris- 
tian 0.8%. Language: Japanese. Literacy: 
99%. Life expectancy — Males 73 yrs., 
females 78 yrs. Work force (55.3 million, 
1979): Agriculture — 11%. Trade, manufac- 
turing, mining, and construction — 34%. 
Services— i8%. Government — 5%. 



Geography 

Area: 381,945 sq. km. (147,470 sq. mi.); 
slighty smaller than California. Cities: 
Capital — Tokyo. Other cities — Sapporo, 
Kyoto, Osaka. Terrain: Rugged, mountainous 
islands. Climate: Varies from subtropical to 
temperate. 

Government 

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Constitu- 
tion: May 3, 1947. 

Branches: Executive — prime minister 
(head of government). Legislative — bicameral 
Diet (House of Representatives and House of 
Councilors). Judicial — Civil law system with 
Anglo-American influence. 

Subdivisions: 47 prefectures. 

Political parties: Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Komeito 
(Clean Government Party), Japan Communist 
Party (JCP), Suffrage: Universal over age 
20. 



Economy 

GNP (1982): $1,046 trillion. Real growth 



rate: 2.5% 1982, 4.0% 1972-82. Per capita 
GNP (1982): $8,836. 

Natural resources: Negligible mineral 
resources, fish. 

Agriculture: Rice, vegetables, fruits, 
milk, meat, silk. 

Industries: Machinery and equipment, 
metals and metal products, textiles, autos, 
chemicals, electrical and electronic equip- 
ment. 

Trade (1981): Exports— $152 billion: 
machinery and equipment, metals and metal 
products, textiles. Major markets — US 25%, 
EC 12.4%, Southeast Asia 22.6%, communist 
countries 6.0%. Imports — $143.2 billion: 
fossil fuels, metal ore, raw materials, 
foodstuffs, machinery and equipment. Major 
suppliers— VS 17.5%, EC 6.0%, Southeast 
Asia 22.0%, communist countries 5.4%. 

Fiscal year: April 1-Mareh 31. 

Official exchange rate (April 1983, 
floating): About 235 yen = US$1. 

Total official development assistance: 
$4.5 billion (budget 1982 = 0.34% of GNP). 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and its specialized agencies, such as In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), Interna- 
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), General Agree- 
ment on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT), and In- 
ternational Labour Organization; Interna- 
tional Energy Agency (lEA); Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD); INTELSAT. 

Taken from the Background Notes (special 
updated edition for Presidential visit) 
November 1983, published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Joanne Reppert Reams . ■ 



hesitate to bear any hardships in 
upholding this cause. All these points 
are included in the Tokyo statement. It 
is, indeed, truly significant, that you 
have fully endorsed this statement in 
our meeting. 

The President and I had exchanges 
of views on East-West relations with 
emphasis on the question of arms con- 
trol and on the situation in such areas as 
Asia, the Middle East, and Central 
America. 

With regard to the INF [intermedi- 
ate-range nuclear forces] negotiations in 
particular, it was reconfirmed that the 
negotiations should not be conducted at 
the sacrifice of the Asian region, but 
should be conducted on a global basis, 
taking the Asian security into considera- 
tion. 

With respect to the recent bombing 
in Burma, the very act of terrorism, we 
agreed that it should be strongly con- 
demned as an inexcusable conduct in 
challenge of world peace and order and 
that continued efforts must be made to 
bring about lasting peace and stability 
on the Korean Peninsula. 

On the Middle East, I expressed my 
deep appreciation for the role played by 
the multinational forces for stabilizing 
the situation in Lebanon. 

The Japan-U.S. security arrange- 
ments are the foundation of the peace 
and security of Japan and the Far East. 
I wish to express that Japan will con- 
tinue her efforts toward further 
strengthening the credibility of the 
Japan-U.S. security arrangements. With 
respect to the improvement of our 
defense capability, I wish to continue to 
make further efforts along the lines of 
the joint communique of May 1981. 

As to the international economy, the 
President and I reconfirmed — in line 
with the declaration of the Williamsburg 
summit — the importance of obtaining 
sustained noninflationary growth of the 
world economy, of rolling back protec- 
tionism, and of lowering the prevailing 
high interest rates. We consider them 
important, together with extending 
financial cooperation, in order to 
alleviate the plight of the developing 
countries, which are suffering from ac- 
cumulated debts. 

With regard to bilateral economic 



issues, we acknowledge the achieve- 
ments made thus far and agree to con- 
tinue our efforts for the solution of the 
remaining issues. In this context, I 
highly appreciated the pledge by the 
President to combat protectionism in the 
United States. 

The President and I are in full 
agreement on the importance of the yen- 
dollar issue. We have agreed on 
establishing consultative fora on ex- 
change rate issues and investment. In 
this connection, I asked for continued 
U.S. efforts to lower U.S. interest rates. 

The President and I have also under- 
scored the importance of greater two- 
way investment flows between our two 
countries, and I expressed my concern 
that the unitary method of taxation is 
becoming a serious impediment to the 
Japanese investment in the United 
States. I stressed the importance of pro- 
moting the preparations of a new round 
of multilateral trade negotiations in 
order to consolidate the free trading 
system and to inject renewed confidence 
in the world economy. I am very glad 
that the President has strongly sup- 
ported my view. We intend to call on 
other countries to join in our efforts. 

In the present international situa- 
tion, you are shouldering enormous 
global responsibilities. I will, on my part, 
make as much contribution as possible to 
the peace and prosperity of the world. 

President Reagan 

On behalf of the American people and 
our government, I would like to thank 
His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, 
Prime Minister [Yasuhiro] Nakasone, 
and the Government and people of 
Japan for the generous and warm recep- 
tion that you have extended to my wife, 
Nancy, myself, and my staff during our 
trip to your country. 

Prime Minister Nakasone [and I], as 
you've been told, have just completed 2 
days of very productive discussions on a 
wide range of bilateral issues and global 
affairs. As leaders of two great Pacific 
nations, we're guardians of a strong, 
rich, and diverse relationship. Japan and 
America are bound by shared values of 
freedom, democracy, and peace. We're 
committed to greater future cooperation 
across a broad spectrum of political. 



economic, security, educational, cultural, 
and scientific affairs. 

I have come as a friend of Japan 
seeking to strengthen our partnership 
for peace, prosperity, and progress. I 
will leave Japan confident that our part- 
nership is stronger than before and con- 
fident that we're giving birth to a new 
era in Japanese- American relations. We 
have agreed to move forward with an 
agenda for progress by drawing upon 
the great well of talent, drive, deter- 
mination, and creativity of our free 
peoples. We welcome Japan's more 
assertive role as a fellow trustee of 
peace and progress in international 
economic and political affairs. 

We have discussed global issues, and 
we hold many similar views on oppor- 
tunities for cooperation. The principles 
that Prime Minister Nakasone has enun- 
ciated as the Tokyo statement are prin 



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ciples that I fully endorse. Together we ■PJ' 
have no greater responsibility than to 
make our world a safer place. 

There are serious threats to peace 
on the Korean Peninsula, in the Middle 
East, in the Caribbean, and over the 
Northwestern Pacific. Also, the attitude 
on the part of our adversary at the 
negotiating table on arms talks is at 
odds with the will of the world to reduce 
the weapons of war and build a more 
stable peace. 

I conveyed to the Prime Minister my 
satisfaction that our mutual security 
relationship is proceeding smoothly. 
Japan is host to 45,000 American 
troops, and our bases in Japan, made 
possible by the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, are essential 
not only to the defense of Japan but also 
contribute to peace and prosperity in the 
Far East. As for Japan's defense ef- 
forts, the United States remains con- 
vinced that the most important contribu- 
tion Japan can make toward the peace 
and security in Asia is for Japan to pro- 
vide for its own defense and share more 
of the burden of our mutual defense ef- 
fort. 

During our discussions on arms con- 
trol, I assured Prime Minister Nakasone 
that we seek global reductions in the 
Soviet's intermediate-range SS-20's to 
the lowest level possible. The United 
States will take no action in the in- 
termediate nuclear forces negotiations 



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FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



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that adversely affects the security of 
Asia. We agreed on the urgency of 
achieving consensus on comprehensive 
international safeguards to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weaponry. 

Prime Minister Nakasone and I 
discussed Japan and America's compel- 
ling international economic respon- 
sibilities as spelled out at the 
Williamsburg summit. Together we must 
aress for continuing liberalization of the 
nternational trade and financial system, 
?ight protectionism, promote economic 
development without inflation by en- 
:ouraging the growth of free enterprise 
;hroughout the world, and share the 
obligation of assisting developing coun- 
tries, including those facing severe debt 
oroblems. We also agreed to enhance 
iioordination in foreign assistance. 

Trade issues figure prominently in 
■;he Japan-U.S. relationship. There's no 
dmple, overnight solution to our trade 
problems, but we have agreed to exert 
)ur best and continued efforts to solve 
chese issues. We welcome recent actions 
oy your government to reduce trade bar- 
riers, and I've emphasized the impor- 
tance of further measures to open the 
Japanese market to trade and invest- 
ment. 

I didn't come to negotiate specific 
trade issues, but I did indicate certain 
issues of immediate importance to us. 
Because of both their trade and con- 
sumer significance, for example, we're 
seeking reductions in Japan's tarriffs on 
certain products in which the United 
States is highly competitive. Japanese 
quotas on agricultural products are a 
cause for concern. In return, the United 
States must combat protectionism in our 
country, and I have given the Prime 
Minister my pledge to do so. 

Progress in Japan-U.S. trade issues 
can foster greater trade liberalization ef- 
forts worldwide, such as the Prime 
Minister's call for a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, which I 
heartily endorse. 

I expressed confidence that the 
United States can be a reliable long- 
term supplier of energy, particularly 
:oal, to Japan. And I was pleased that 
Prime Minister Nakasone shared this 
dew. Expanded energy trade will mean 
more jobs for Americans and greater 
security for both our countries. 



January 1984 



With the approval of Prime Minister 
Nakasone and myself, a joint press 
statement is being released today by 
Finance Minister [Noboru] Takeshita 
and Treasury Secretary Reagan — 
[Donald T.] Regan — [laughter]— I tried 
to get him to pronounce it the other 
way — on the yen-dollar issue and other 
financial and economic issues of mutual 
interest. We agree that the com- 
mitments and steps outlined in that 
statement will further strengthen 
economic relations between the United 
States and Japan. 

We have noted the importance of 
the yen-dollar exchange rate, of free and 
open capital markets in each country. 
We stress the need for closer economic 
consultations between the two govern- 
ments. A ministerial-level working group 
is being set up to monitor each side's 
progress in carrying out the agreed- 
upon actions to improve the yen-dollar 
exchange rate. 

Our mutual commitment toward 



specific steps to achieve open capital 
markets will allow the yen to reflect 
more fully Japan's underlying political 
stability and economic strength as the 
second largest economy in the free 
world. In addition, we've agreed to in- 
struct our economic sub-Cabinet 
members to form a committee to pro- 
mote mutual investments. 

Progress must come one step at a 
time, but Japan and America have 
begun taking those steps together. I've 
been heartened that beginning with our 
first meeting last January, continuing 
with the Williamsburg summit, and now 
again during our visit this week, Prime 
Minister Nakasone and I have agreed 
that our two great democracies share 
special responsibilities to each other and 
to the world. Let us continue to go for- 
ward, building on our progress step by 
step. We must set milestones to monitor 
the success of our agenda for progress 
and to assure the followthrough that is 
essential. I will be discussing this matter 



U.S. Ambassador to Japan 



Michael J. Mansfield was born in New York 
City on March 16, 1903; since childhood, 
however, his home has been Montana. He 
enlisted in the Navy at age 14 and subse- 
quently enlisted in the Army and Marines. 
He worked as a miner and mining engineer in 
Montana (1922-30), then attended the Mon- 
tana School of Mines and the University of 
Montana, where he received A.B. and M.A. 
degrees. He was professor of Latin American 
and Far Eastern History at the University of 
Montana (1933-43). 

Ambassador Mansfield began his political 
career in 1943 when he was elected to the 
House of Representatives. He served in the 
House until 1952. He was then elected to the 
Senate where he served continuously until his 
retirement in 1977. In the Senate, he was 
Assistant Majority Leader (1957-61) and Ma- 
jority Leader (1961-77). He was also a 
member of the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions, where he was Chairman of the Subcom- 
mittee on Far Eastern Affairs. 

Outside the Congress, Ambassador 
Mansfield has played an active role in inter- 
national affairs. In 1944 he went to China as 
a representative of the President. He was the 
U.S. delegate to the Ninth Inter-American 




Conference in Colombia in 1948; attended the 
Sbcth UN Assembly in Paris in 1951 and 
1952; and was the U.S. delegate to the 
Southeast Asia Conference in Manila in 1954. 

On assignments for the President in 
1962, 1965, and 1969, he visited the West In- 
dies, Southeast Asia, and Europe. In 1972 
the Ambassador returned to China at the in- 
vitation of Chou En-Lai. He also visited that 
country in 1974 and 1976 as a guest of the 
Chinese Government. He was appointed Am- 
bassador to Japan on April 22, 1977. ■ 



m 



in more detail with the Prime Minister 
tomorrow. 

This visit has strengthened the 
bonds of friendship between our two 
great nations. We are now better 
prepared to work together as partners 
to build a more peaceful and prosperous 
future at home and throughout the 
world. We know what needs to be done; 
we know how it must be done. Let us 
have the faith to believe in each other, 
the courage to get on with the job, and 
the determination to see it through. 



President Reagan's Remarks 
at Reception for 
American and Japanese 
Businessmen, 
Nov. 10, 1983* 

I don't usually go around in these 
clothes, but I'm dining with His Imperial 
Majesty tonight. [Laughter] But I'm 
delighted to have this chance to meet 
with such a distinguished group of 
Japanese and American leaders. 

Before I go any further, may I ex- 
tend my early birthday greeting to 
someone who couldn't be here, my good 
friend and your distinguished former 
Prime Minister, Mr. Nobazuki Kishi, 
who in just 3 days turns 88. 

This gathering marks the way that 
we Americans and Japanese rely on 
each other for our prosperity. Japan and 
America are separated by thousands of 
miles of ocean, different languages, and 
different cultures, yet in our robust 
trade — everything from food to com- 
puters — we've found a way to help each 
other create abundance. 

In 1967, my first year as Governor 
of California, trade between our two 
countries amounted to $5.7 billion, and I 
remember how much importance even 
then my fellow Governors and I placed 
on trade with Japan. By 1974, my last 
year as Governor, the figure had shot up 
to $23 billion. And this year it's expected 
that Japan will account for a tenth of all 
America's exports, more than any other 
nation overseas; that America will buy a 
quarter of all Japanese exports; and the 
total trade between our two nations will 
surpass $60 billion. 



Our vigorous trade has given us a 
chance to learn from one another, and it 
is in large part because of that trade 
that today our nations are leading a 
technological revolution that promises to 
change life even more profoundly than 
did the Industrial Revolution of a cen- 
tury ago. 

All of us want to keep Japanese- 
American business healthy and expand- 
ing. And that means we must continue 
to promote not just trade but free trade. 
To the Japanese here tonight, let me 
say, "Congratulations." Many in this 
room played a key role over the past 
three-and-a-half decades in making 
Japan an economic miracle. Your im- 
agination, energy, and determination 
have made this nation one of the most 
prosperous on Earth and focused 
economic growth throughout the Pacific 
Basin. 

Now that Japan has become a giant 
in the world economy, your nation 
shares the responsibility for keeping the 
economy strong. In recent years, Japan 
has begun to open its markets to more 
goods and services from abroad. Prime 
Minister Nakasone has continued these 
positive actions, and we appreciate all 
your efforts. 

America does have trade problems 
with Japan, and we seek the cooperation 
of your government so we can solve 
them together. We must work for lower 
barriers on both sides of the Pacific. 
And we hope to see your capital 
markets open to more foreign participa- 
tion. This will help establish a greater 
international role for the yen and would 
contribute to an improvement in the im- 
balance between our two currencies. 

As leaders of Japanese business, you 
can help make certain that Japan leads 
in the drive for greater free trade to 
strengthen the international economy. 
The well-being of both our nations will 
depend, to a large extent, on your ef- 
forts. 

I've heard — as leaders of Japanese 
business, you can make certain that 
Japan leads in the drive for greater free 
trade to strengthen the international 
economy. The well-being of both our na- 
tions will depend, to a large extent, on 
your efforts. I've heard about the 
private efforts of Japanese businessmen 
to establish a permanent home for the 



America- Japan Society of Tokyo and 
other organizations dedicated to expand- 
ing cultural exchanges and good will be- 
tween our two countries. And I hope 
these efforts succeed. 

To the Americans here tonight, let 
me say simply, "Keep up the good 
work." You're pioneers, showing that 
although doing business here is hard 
work, the rewards are worth it. More 
and more, Japan is proving a fruitful 
market for American goods and serv- 
ices. Your fine example will encourage 
other American businesses to follow you 
here and expand Japanese-American 
trade still further. 

And in January, you'll be pleased to 
hear the Department of Commerce is 
sending a high-level delegation of 
American business people, led by 
Richard McElheny, Assistant Commerce 
Secretary for Trade Development, and 
Jim Jenkins, my Deputy Counsellor at 
the White House, on a special trade mis 
sion to Japan. 

I want you to know that as 
Americans doing business in Japan, you 
have this Administration's full support. 
We're working as hard in Washington as 
you are here to make certain your op- 
portunities in Japan keep growing. 'The 
Tsukuba Exposition will provide an ex- 
cellent opportunity for America to 
demonstrate the latest in technology. I 
hope many of your companies will be 
able to participate and cooperate in this 
exposition with Jim Needham, who's 
directing the U.S. pavilion. 

The message I want to leave with 
everyone here tonight is simple. It's a 
lesson history has taught us again and 
again. Protectionism hurts everyone, bu' 
free trade benefits all. 

I understand that it's a tradition in 
Japan for businessmen to make con- 
tracts final simply by giving their word 
or shaking hands. That kind of transac- 
tion, of course, requires deep mutual 
trust and respect. Neither of our nations 
can open its markets completely in an 
afternoon. But working step by step and 
without delay, we can build that kind of 
mutual trust and respect. 



Department of State Bulletir 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



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Toast at the 
Imperial 
Banquet, 
Nov. 10, 1983' 

You have honored us with a magnificent 
and unforgettable occasion this evening, 
and we express our sincere thanl^s to 
you. 

One hundred and thirty-one years 
ago our ancestors began gradually lay- 
ing the foundation for one of the most 
significant relationships between two 
countries anywhere in the world. When 
our people first met on shores not too 
far from here, we had difficulty 
understanding each other. Few cultures 
and histories could have been more dif- 
ferent than our two were in the 1850s. 

Today, the language of our two 
icountries is still different, but we 
understand and appreciate each other as 
never before. We, in fact, depend on 
each other and benefit beyond calcula- 
tion from our relationship. We're not 
only major trading partners; we're also 
cooperating in a host of international 
and political endeavors to strengthen 
peace and increase prosperity beyond 
our own borders. 

Basic to all our efforts are the close 
and cooperative ties that we've built be- 
tween our people, from young students 
who study in each other's schools and 
universities, to the daily interaction of 
our businessmen, politicians, scientists, 
creative artists, and athletes. The 
multitude of personal and professional 
relationships is like millions of threads 
binding us together with a strength and 
resilience that will not be broken. 

The ties between our people are 
based on common ideals and values. But 
beyond this, our people like and admire 
each other. Americans appreciate the 
energy and hard work of the Japanese. 
And while in the arena of business 
we're, indeed, competitors, we are 
friendly competitors, and we respect one 
another. 

If friendship has meaning, it can be 
found in the genuine feelings and com- 
mitment between our two peoples. As 
the American philospher Emerson 
wrote: "The only way to have a friend is 
to be one." The American people admire 



January 1984 




Banquet Hall of Imperial Palace. President 
Reagan makes remarks and proposes a 
toast to the Emperor and members of the 
Imperial Family, members of the official 
suite, and other guests. 



Japan, its great progress, its people's 
fortitude and dedication, its splendid and 
delicate culture, its increasingly vital 
role in world affairs. 

We admire you. Your Majesty, 
because you symbolize this nation's 
history and traditions and represent the 
dramatic transformation of these 
beautiful islands and stalwart people. 
Your love of country and for Japan's 
democratic institutions, your devotion to 
science, to the search for truth, your 



deep attachment to nature around 
you — these and many other aspects of 
your life and that of your splendid fami- 
ly, give your people strength and unite 
them in their beliefs and ideals. 

Every spring from all over the 
United States, Americans come to their 
capital in Washington, D.C., to view the 
beauty of cherry blossoms. This beauty 
is a gift from Japan. The cherry trees 
were presented to us by the city of 
Tokyo in 1912. 

Last year the Flower Association of 
Japan presented a million flowering 
cherry tree seeds to the people of the 
United States so this beauty could be 
spread throughout our country. In 
January of this year, our National 
Arboretum presented flowering 
dogwood seeds to your country. These 
flowers can serve to remind us of the 
beauty of our friendship. Unlike these 
trees which blossom only once a year, let 
the flower of our friendship be never 
ending. 

Our two countries, beginning their 
relationship in confusion and uncertain- 
ty, now are the closest of friends and 
partners. My visit to your country has 
reaffirmed my confidence in the future 
of our relations. May they ever be as 
close as they are today. 

I ask you to join me in a toast to 
Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor 
and Empress of Japan. 



Address before the 
Japanese Diet, 
Nov. 11, 1983« 

It is with great honor and respect that I 
come before you today, the first 
American President ever to address the 
Japanese Diet. 

I have been in your country only 2 
days, but speaking for my wife, Nancy, 
and myself, may I say you have more 
than made us feel at home. The warmth 
of your welcome has touched our hearts. 
In welcoming us, you pay tribute to the 
more than 230 million Americans whom 
I have the privilege to represent. From 
all of us — all of them to you we reach 
out to say: The bonds of friendship 
which unite us are even greater than the 



...^:n:l,lllimiulimiiUimMi^iiil^^ 




Addressing the Japanese Diet in the Assembly Hall of the House of Representatives, 
National Diet Building. 



ocean which divides us. Nichibei no yuho 
wa eien de.su. [Japanese-American frien- 
ship is forever.] 

It was a dozen years ago on an 
autumn day like this one that I first 
visited Japan, and today, as then, I feel 
energy, initiative, and industry surging 
through your country in a mightly cur- 
rent for progress. And just as before, I 
am struck by a unique gift of the 
Japanese people: You do not build your 
future at the expense of the grace and 
beauty of your past. 

Harmony is a treasured hallmark of 
Japanese civilization, and this has 
always been pleasing to Americans. Har- 
mony requires differences to be joined in 
pursuit of higher ideals, many of which 
we share. When former President 



Ulysses S. Grant visited here in 1878, he 
discovered Japan is a land of enchant- 
ment. 

During his stay, he met with the 
Emperor, and their discussion turned to 
democracy, the pressing issue of the 
day, President Grant observed that 
governments are always more stable and 
nations more prosperous when they tru- 
ly represent their people. 

I am proud to help carry forward 
the century-old tradition, meeting first 
with your Emperor on my arrival and 
now meeting with you a great milestone 
in your history: the 100th session of the 
Diet under the modern Japanese Con- 
stitution. In 6 years you will celebrate 
your 100th anniversary of representative 
government in Japan, just as we will 
celebrate the birth of our own Congress. 
I bring you the best wishes and heartfelt 



greetings from your American counter- 
parts, the Congress of the United 
States. 

One cannot stand in this chamber 
without feeling a part of your proud 
history of nationhood and democracy, 
and the spirit of hope carrying the 
dreams of your free people. Of all the 
strengths we possess, of all the ties that 
bind us, I believe the greatest is our 
dedication to freedom. Japan and 
America stand at the forefront of the 
free nations and free economies in the 
world. 

Yes, we are 5,000 miles apart; yes, 
we are distinctly different in customs, 
language, and tradition; and yes, we are 
often competitors in the world markets. 
But I believe the people represented by 
this proud parliament and by my own 
U.S. Congress are of one heart in their 



J. Wed 
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FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and tlie 
Republic of Korea 



devotion to the principles of our free 
societies. 

I'm talking about principles that 
begin with the sacred worth of human 
life; the cherished place of the family; 
the responsibility of parents and schools 
to be teachers of truth, tolerance, hard 
work, cooperation, and love; and the 
role of our major institutions — govern- 
ment, industry, and labor — to provide 
the opportunities and security — oppor- 
tunities and security free people need to 
Duild and leave behind a better world for 
:heir children and their children's 
children. 

America and Japan are situated far 
apart, but we are united in our belief 
;hat freedom means dedication to the 
iignity, rights, and equality of man. 
5fukichi Fukuzawa, the great Meiji-era 
jducator, said it for you: "Heaven has 
-nade no man higher or no man lower 
:han any other man." 

Our great American hero Abraham 
Lincoln put it in political perspective for 
us: "No man is good enough to govern 
another man without that other's con- 
ent." We both value the right to have a 
government of our own choosing. We 
expect government to serve the people; 
we do not expect the people to serve 
government. 

America and Japan speak with dif- 
ferent tongues, but both converse, wor- 
ship, and work with the language of 
freedom. We defend the right to voice 
our views, to speak words of dissent 
without being afraid, and to seek inner 
ipeace through communion with our God. 

We believe in rewarding initiative, 
savings, and risk-taking. And we en- 
courage those who set their sights on 
the farthest stars and chart new paths 
"to progress through the winds and 
waters of commerce. Others censor and 
stifle their citizens. We trust in freedom 
ito nurture the diversity and creativity 
that enriches us all. I like what your 
ipoet Basho said "Many kinds of plants 
land each one triumphant in its special 
iblossoms." 

Finally, our freedom inspires no fear 
because it poses no threat. We in- 
timidate no one, and we will not be in- 
timidated by anyone. The United States 
(and Japan do not build walls to keep our 
tpeople in. We do not have armies of 



January 1984 



secret police to keep them quiet. We do 
not throw dissidents into so-called men- 
tal hospitals. And we would never cold- 
bloodedly shoot a defenseless airliner out 
of the sky. We share your grief for that 
tragic and needless loss of innocent 
lives. 

Our two countries are far from 
perfect. But in this imperfect and 
dangerous world, the United States and 
Japan represent the deepest aspirations 
of men and women everywhere — to be 
free, to live in peace, and to create and 
renew the wealth of abundance and 
spiritual fulfillment. 

Risking the 

Challenge of Partnership 

I have come to Japan because we have 
an historic opportunity, indeed, an 
historic responsibility. We can become a 
powerful partnership for good, not just 
in our own countries, not just in the 
Pacific region but throughout the world. 
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my 
question is: Do we have the determina- 
tion to meet the challenge of partnership 
and make it happen? My answer is 
without hesitation: Yes, we do, and yes, 
we will. 

For much of our histories, our coun- 
tries looked inward. Those times have 
passed. With our combined economies 
accounting for half the output of the 
free world, we cannot escape our global 
responsibilities. Our industries depend 
on the importation of energy and 
minerals from distant lands. Our pros- 
perity requires a sound international 
financial system and free and open 
trading markets. And our security is in- 
separable from the security of our 
friends and neighbors. 

The simple hope for world peace and 
prosperity will not be enough. Our two 
great nations, working with others, 
must preserve the values and freedoms 
our societies have struggled so hard to 
achieve. Nor should our partnership for 
peace, prosperity, and freedom be con- 
sidered a quest for competing goals. We 
cannot prosper unless we are secure, 
and we cannot be secure unless we are 
free. And we will not succeed in any of 
these endeavors unless Japan and 
America work in harmony. 



Arms Control 

I have come to your country carrying 
the heartfelt desires of America for 
peace. I know our desires are shared by 
Prime Minister Nakasone and all of 
Japan. We are people of peace. We 
understand the terrible trauma of 
human suffering. I have lived through 
four wars in my lifetime. So, I speak not 
just as President of the United States, 
but also as a husband, a father, and as a 
grandfather. I believe there can be only 
one policy for preserving our precious 
civilization in this modern age. A nuclear 
war can never be won and must never 
be fought. 

The only value in possessing nuclear 
weapons is to make sure they can't be 
used ever. I know I speak for people 
everywhere when I say our dream is to 
see the day when nuclear weapons will 
be banished from the face of the Earth. 

Arms control must mean arms 
reductions. America is doing its part. As 
I pledged to the United Nations less 
than 2 months ago, the United States 
will accept any equitable, verifiable 
agreement that stabilizes forces at lower 
levels than currently exist. We want 
significant reductions, and we're willing 
to compromise. 

In the strategic arms reduction talks 
[START], American negotiators con- 
tinue to press the Soviet Union for any 
formula that will achieve these objec- 
tives. In the longer range INF talks, we 
are pursuing the same course, even of- 
fering to eliminate an entire category of 
weapons. I'm very conscious of our 
negotiating responsibility on issues that 
concern the safety and well-being of the 
Japanese people. And let me make one 
thing very plain. We must not and we 
will not accept any agreement that 
transfers the threat of longer range 
nuclear missiles from Europe to Asia. 

Our great frustration has been the 
other side's unwillingness to negotiate in 
good faith. We wanted to cut deep into 
nuclear arsenals, and still do. But 
they're blocking the dramatic reductions 
the world wants. In our good-faith effort 
to move the negotiations forward, we 
have offered new initiatives, provided 
for substantial reductions to equal levels, 






and the lower the level the better. But 
we shall wait. We still wait for the first 
positive response. 

Despite this bleak picture, I will not 
be deterred in my search for a 
breakthrough. The United States will 
never walk away from the negotiating 
table. Peace is too important. Common 
sense demands that we persevere, and 
we will persevere. 

We live in uncertain times. There 
are trials and tests for freedom 
wherever freedom stands. It is as stark 
as the tragedy over the Sea of Japan, 
when 269 innocent people were killed for 
the so-called cause of sacred airspace. It 
is as real as the terrorist attacks last 
month on the Republic of Korea's leader- 
ship in Rangoon and against American 
and French members of the interna- 
tional peacekeeping force in Beirut. And 
yes, it is as telling as the stonewalling of 
our adversaries at the negotiating table, 
and as their crude attempts to intimi- 
date freedom-loving people everywhere. 

These threats to peace and freedom 
underscore the importance of closer 
cooperation among all nations. You have 
an old proverb that says, "A single ar- 
row is easily broken, but not three in a 
bunch." The stronger the dedication of 
Japan, the United States, and our allies 
to peace through strength, the greater 
our contributions to building a more 
secure future will be. The U.S. -Japan 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security must continue to serve us as 
the bedrock of our security relationship. 
Japan will not have to bear the burden 
of defending freedom alone. America is 
your partner. We will bear that burden 
together. 

The defense of freedom should be a 
shared burden. We can afford to defend 
freedom; we cannot afford to lose it. 
The blessings of your economic miracle, 
created with the genius of a talented, 
determined, and dynamic people, can 
only be protected in the safe harbor of 
freedom. 

Economic Growth 

In his book, "In Quest of Peace and 
Freedom," former Prime Minister Sato 
wrote: "in the hundred years since the 
Meiji Restoration, Japan has constantly 



endeavored to catch up and eventually 
overtake the more advanced countries of 
the world." I don't think I'll be making 
headlines when I say, you've not only 
caught up in some cases, you've pulled 
ahead. [Laughter] Here again, our part- 
nership is crucial. But this time, you can 
be teachers. 

To all those who lack faith in the 
human spirit, I have just three words of 
advice: Come to Japan. Come to a coun- 
try whose economic production will soon 
surpass the Soviet Union's, making 
Japan's economy the second largest in 
the entire world. Come to learn from a 
culture that instills in its people a strong 
spirit of cooperation, discipline, and 
striving for excellence; and yes, learn 
from government policies which helped 
create this economic miracle — not so 
much by central planning, as by 
stimulating competition, encouraging ini- 
tiative, and rewarding savings and risk- 
taking. 

Our country has made great strides 
in this direction during the last 3 years. 
We're correcting past mistakes. Hope is 
being reborn. Confidence is returning. 
America's future looks bright again. We 
have turned the corner from overtaxing, 
overspending, record interest rates, high 
inflation, and low growth. The United 
States is beginning the first stage of a 
new industrial renaissance, and we're 
helping pull other nations forward to 
worldwide recovery. 

But some in my country still flinch 
from the need to restrain spending. 
Under the guise of lowering deficits, 
they would turn back to policies of 
higher taxes. They would ignore the 
lesson of Japan. A look at Japan's 
postward history yields two stunning 
conclusions. Among the major in- 
dustrialized countries, your tax burden 
has remained the lowest and your 
growth and saving rates the highest. 
Savers in Japan can exempt very large 
amounts of interest income from taxa- 
tion. Your taxes on so-called unearned 
income — [laughter] — are low. You have 
no capital gains tax on securities for in- 
vestors. And the overwhelming majority 
of your working people face tax rates 
dramatically lower than in the other in- 
dustrial counties, including my own. And 



incentives for everyone — that's the 
secret of strong growth for a shining 
future filled with hope, and oppor- 
tunities and incentives for growth, not 
tax increases — is our policy for America. 
Sometimes I wonder if we shouldn't fur- 
ther our friendship by my sending our 
Congress here and you coming over and 
occupying our Capitol building for a 
while. 

Partnership must be a two-way 
street grounded in mutual trust. Let us 
always be willing to learn from each 
other and cooperate together. We have 
every reason to do so. Our combined 
economies account for almost 35% of the 
world's entire economic output. We are 
the world's two largest overseas trading 
partners. Last year Japan took about 
10% of our total exports, and we bought 
some 25% of yours. Our two-way trade 
will exceed $60 billion in 1983, more 
than double the level of just 7 years ago. 

At the Williamsburg summit last 
May, the leaders of our industrial 
democracies pledged to cooperate in roll- 
ing back protectionism. My personal 
commitment to that goal is based on 
economic principles, old-fashioned com- 
mon sense, and experience. I am old 
enough to remember what eventually 
happened the last time countries pro- 
tected their markets from competition: 
It was a nightmare called the Great 
Depression. And it was worldwide. 
World trade fell at that time by 60%. 
And everyone, workers, farmers, and 
manufacturers, were hurt. 

Let us have the wisdom never to 
repeat that policy. We're in the same 
boat with our trading partners around 
the globe. And if one partner in the boat 
shoots a hole in the boat, it doesn't make 
much sense for the other partner to 
shoot another hole in the boat. Some 
say, yes, and call that getting tough. 
Well, forgive me, but I call it getting 
wet all over. Rather than shoot holes, let 
us work together to plug them up so our 
boat of free markets and free trade and 
fair trade can lead us all to greater 
economic growth and international 
stability. 

I have vigorously opposed quick 
fixes of protectionism in America. Anti- 
competitive legislation like the local con- 
tent rule, which would force our 



Department of State Bulletin 



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oftke 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



domestic manufacturers of cars to use a 
rising share of U.S. labor and 
parts — now, this would be a cruel hoax. 
It would be raising prices without pro- 
tecting jobs. We would buy less from 
you. You would buy less from us. The 
world's economic pie would shrink. 
Retaliation and recrimination would in- 
crease. 

It is not easy for elected officials to 
balance the concerns of constituents 
with the greater interests of the nation, 
but that's what our jobs are all about. 
And we need your help in demonstrating 
free trade to address concerns of my 
own people. Americans believe your 
markets are less open than ours. We 
need your support to lower further the 
barriers that still make it difficult for 
some American products to enter your 
markets easily. Your government's re- 
cent series of actions to reduce trade 
barriers are positive steps in this direc- 
tion. We very much hope this process 
will continue and accelerate. In turn, I 
pledge my support to combat protec- 
tionist measures in my own country. 

If we each give a little, we can all 
igain a lot. As two great and mature 
democracies, let us have the faith to 
believe in each other, to draw on our 
long and good friendship, and to make 
our partnership grow. We are leaders in 
the world economy. We and the other 
industrialized countries share a respon- 
sibility to open up capital and trading 
markets, promote greater investment in 
each other's country, assist developing 
nations, and stop the leakage of military 
technology to an adversary bent on ag- 
igression and domination. 

We believe that the currency of the 
world's second largest free market 
economy should reflect the economic 
■strength and political stability that you 
enjoy. We look forward to the yen play- 
ing a greater role in international finan- 
cial and economic affairs. We welcome 
the recent trend toward a stronger yen. 
And we would welcome Japan's increas- 
ingly active role in global affairs. Your 
leadership in aid to refugees and in 
economic assistance to various countries 
ihas been most important in helping to 
promote greater stability in key regions 



of the world. Your counsel on arms 
reduction initiatives is highly valued by 
us. 

We may have periodic disputes, but 
the real quarrel is not between us. It is 
with those who would impose regimenta- 
tion over freedom, drudgery over 
dynamic initiative, a future of despair 
over the certainty of betterment, and 
the forced feeding of a military Goliath 
over a personal stake in the products 
and progress of tomorrow. 

You and your neighbors are shining 
examples for all who seek rapid develop- 
ment. The Pacific Basin represents the 
most exciting region of economic growth 
in the world today. Your people stretch 
your abilities to the limit, and when an 
entire nation does this, miracles occur. 
Being a Californian I have seen many 
miracles hardworking Japanese have 
brought to our shores. 

In 1865 a young Samurai student, 
Kanaye Nagasawa, left Japan to learn 
what made the West economically 
strong and technologically advanced. 
Ten years later he founded a small 
winery at Santa Rosa, California, called 
the Fountaingrove Round Barn and 
Winery. Soon he became known as the 
grape king of Calfornia. Nagasawa came 
to California to learn and stayed to 
enrich our lives. Both our countries owe 
much to this Japanese warrior-turned 
businessman. 

As the years pass, our contacts con- 
tinue to increase at an astounding rate. 
Today some 13,000 of your best college 
and graduate students are studying in 
America, and increasing numbers of 
U.S. citizens are coming here to learn 
everything they can about Japan. Com- 
panies like Nissan, Kyocera, Sony, and 
Toshiba have brought thousands of jobs 
to America's shores. The State of 
California is planning to build a rapid 
speed train that is adapted from your 



highly successful bullet train. In 1985 
the United States will join Japan in a 
major exhibition of science and 
technology at Tsukuba, another symbol 
of our cooperation. 

For my part, I welcome this new 
Pacific tide. Let it roll peacefully on, 
carrying a two-way flow of people and 
ideas that can break from barriers of 
suspicion and mistrust and build up 
bonds of cooperation and shared op- 
timism. 

Conclusion 

Our two nations may spring from 
separate pasts; we may live at opposite 
sides of the Earth; but we have been 
brought together by our indomitable 
spirit of determination, our love of liber- 
ty, and devotion to progress. We are 
like climbers who begin their ascent 
from opposite ends of the mountain. The 
harder we try, the higher we climb, and 
the closer we come together — until that 
moment we reach the peak and we are 
as one. 

It happened just last month. One 
American and two Japanese groups 
began climbing Mt. Everest — the 
Japanese from the side of Nepal and the 
Americans from the side of Tibet. The 
conditions were so difficult and 
dangerous that before it ended two 
Japanese climbers tragically lost their 
lives. But before that tragedy, those 
brave climbers all met and shook hands 
just under the summit. And then, 
together, they climbed to the top to 
share that magnificent moment of 
triumph. 

Good and dear friends of Japan, if 
those mountaineers could join hands at 
the top of the world, imagine how high 
our combined 350 million citizens can 
climb, if all of us work together as 
powerful partners for the cause of good. 
Together there is nothing that Japan 
and America cannot do. 



Uanuary 1984 



11 



mi^m 




Joint Statement on 
Japan-U.S. Energy 
Cooperation, 
Nov. 11, 1983' 

Prime Minister Nakasone and President 
Reagan share the view that further 
progress be made in energy trade and 
cooperation in oil, natural gas, and coal 
between Japan and the United States as 
outlined in the following Joint Policy 
Statement recommended by the Japan- 
United States Energy Working Group: 

Taking account of the energy pros- 
pects for the entire Pacific Basin, the 
two countries agree that the sound ex- 
pansion of U.S. -Japan energy trade will 
contribute to the further development of 
the close economic and energy security 
relationship which exists between the 
two countries, 

They will continue to discuss and 
find ways of developing this trade for 
the mutual benefit of both countries, 
noting the importance of long-term 
cooperation, the central role of the 
private sector, and the need for a 
balance between economic cost and 
energy security. 

Both countries consider Alaska to be 
a particularly promising area for joint 
development of energy resources. Both 
governments will encourage private sec- 
tor discussions regarding the possi- 
bilities for such development. 

With regard to trade in oil, gas, and 
coal we have agreed on the following 
next steps: 

A. The U.S. and Japan recognize 
that if legislative barriers can be re- 
moved, the U.S. has the potential to ship 
substantial quantities of crude oil to 
Japan, thereby increasing economic in- 
centives for U.S. oil production and 
helping to diversify Japan's energy 
sources. The United States will con- 
tinue to keep under review the removal 
of restrictions on exports of domestic 
crude oil. 

B. The United States and Japan will 
encourage private industry in both coun- 
tries to undertake now the prefeasibility 
or feasibility studies necessary to deter- 
mine the extent to which Alaskan 



natural gas can be jointly developed by 
U.S. and Japanese interests. 

C. The United States and Japan will 
encourage private industry in both coun- 
tries to discuss the possibility of con- 
cluding long-term coal contracts and 
jointly developing mines and transporta- 
tion systems to make American coal 
more competitive in the Japanese 
market. 

D. In this regard, the two countries 
welcome the examinations underway of 
the technical and economic aspects of 
several steam coal projects by private 
companies concerned on both sides. As 
economic recovery proceeds, Japan will 
encourage its industries to consider pur- 
chase of more competitively priced U.S. 
steam coal to meet future demands not 
already covered by existing contracts. 
In addition, Japan will invite the private 
sector concerned to explore the possibili- 
ty of further increasing substitution of 
coal for oil in electrical generation. 

E. With regard to metallurgical 
coal, both sides noted that the depressed 
state of world steel manufacturing had 
reduced demand for traded coal. 
However, in view of the fact that the 
United States has been a major supplier 
to the Japanese market, both sides will 
endeavor to maintain the level of 
Japanese imports of U.S. coal. Japan 
expects that imports of competitively 
priced U.S. metallurgical coal will not 
continue to decline, and will encourage 
its steel industry to increase U.S. coal 
imports when conditions in the industry 
permit. 

F. As a first step toward developing 
U.S. -Japan coal trade, from a mid- to 
long-term prospective, a mission com- 
posed of representatives of major 
Japanese coal users and other ap- 
propriate interests will visit the United 
States to meet with major coal mining 
and transporation interests. The pur- 
pose of this mission will be to explore 
the possibility of expanding coal trade 
between the United States and Japan, 
and the possibility of conducting a major 
study of the opportunities for reducing 
the delivered price in Japan of U.S. coal. 



Interview With Japanese 
National Television, 
Nov. 11, 1983« 

Q. On behalf of all my colleagues pres- 
ent here and of the truly nationwide 
audience, I would like to thank you, 
first of all, for having agreed to do 
this interview. I understand that you 
have prepared a statement for the 
Japanese people that perhaps you 
would like to make right now. 

A. Thank you very much. And may 
I say how delighted Nancy and I are to 
be back in Japan. The last time we 
visited Japan was 1978 at the invitation 
of one of your Diet Members, Shintaro 
Ishihara. I was also here in 1971, when I 
had the pleasure of seeing Kyoto, your 
beautiful, ancient capital city. 

There is so much in Japan's history 
and culture that impresses us. 
Americans are full of admiration for the 
Japanese people, the warmth of your 
ways, your spirit of initiative and team- 
work, and your strong traditions of 
devotion to family, education, and 
progress. 

You have brought great develop- 
ment and prosperity to your country. 
We know that the struggle for better 
living was often difficult in earlier days. 
But endurance, tenacity, and sheer hard 
work — qualities which I understand are 
beautifully portrayed in your popular TV 
drama. "Oshin" — have brought your na- 
tion great success. 

Recently, I have received a letter 
from Masayasu Okumura, principal of 
the Nishisawa School in Akita Prefec- 
ture, which I understand is very far 
from Tokyo. Mr. Okumura invited 
Nancy and me to visit his country school 
and his 27 students. Mr. Okumura, I 
wanted to drop in on your school and 
talk with your students, but our stay in 
Japan this week has been too short. We 
wish we had time to meet more people 
and see more of your beautiful country, 
including such places as Kyoto, Hok- 
kaido, Hiroshima, Nara, and Nagasaki. 

But we depart tomorrow, confident 
that our relations are strong and good. 
As I have said to the Diet today, we 
may live thousands of miles apart, but 



Department of State Bulletin 



^Srtatle 
soialih. 

Since voi 
(letiavekee, 



Ntradii 



r 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



we're neighbors, friends, and partners, 
bound by a community of interests and 
shared values. Michitaro Matsusaki, one 
of Japan's earlier diplomats, said to 
Commodore Perry in 1854 what millions 
of us feel today: Japan and America, all 
the same heart. 

Our countries enjoy great prosperi- 
ty. We live in free and open societies. 
But much of the world lives in poverty, 
dominated by dictators unwilling to let 
people live in peace and freedom. That's 
why our relationship is so important. 
Japan and America shoulder global 
responsibilities, but with every respon- 
sibility comes opportunity. 

We can share with the world our 
secrets of economic growth and human 
Drogress. We can offer the sunlight of 
democracy to people everywhere who 
Iream of escaping the darkness of 
:yranny to decide their own destinies. 

Japan and America are nations of 
:he future, builders of tomorrow, and 
together we can build a brighter tomor- 
row. We can make this world a much 
safer, more secure, and prosperous 
place. I know with all my heart that if 
we have faith to believe in each other, to 
trust in the talent and goodness of the 
hard-working people in our great cities 
and small towns, then, yes, we will make 
3ur partnership grow, and together 
there is nothing Japan and America can- 
not do. 

Q. Listening to your statement, 
ike many other people, I find that you 
are, indeed, a g^reat communicator. I 
nay this not because you said very 
idnd words about our famous city of 
drama, but because I think that your 
oersonal style on television is more 
elaxed and informal than that of 
many other politicians. That is why, 
with your approval, I would like to 
•;onduct this interview in a very infor- 
mal way so that the Japanese people 
;an get a clearer view of your per- 
sonality. 

Since your arrival, Japanese peo- 
«jle have been following very closely 
'our visit. And yesterday we saw that 
'ou enjoyed a lot about our 
lemonstration of Yabusame at Meiji 
shrine. What did you think of that 
ypical traditional Japanese sport? 



January 1984 





At Yabusame Field. President and Mrs. 
Reagan attend demonstration of horseback 
archery (Nov. 10) by Yabusame riders. 



13 



And if I may ask, apart from horse 
riding, what are your personal hob- 
bies, Mr. President? 

A. Horseback riding is certainly 
one, and all the things that go with hav- 
ing a ranch. I do a lot of the work 
whenever I have the opportunity to get 
there that has to be done around a 
ranch. As a matter of fact, just this 
summer we had a number of days at the 
ranch, and I managed to build— with the 
help of two friends— about 400 more 
feet of fence out of telephone poles. 
[Laughter] And it can get a little 
backbreaking, but I enjoy that. 

Someone once asked me when I was 
ever going to have the ranch finished, 
and I said I hope never, because I enjoy 
that. But there are other things, of 
course. I enjoy reading. I enjoy athletics 
of other kinds. And now, thanks to the 
generosity of your Prime Minister since 
his last visit there — while I don't get to 
play golf very often— I will now be play- 
ing it with a brand new set of golf clubs 
which he presented to me. 

Q. You have now completed 
almost all the events of your very full 
schedule for Japan. Yesterday you 
gave us your official view of the visit, 
but I wonder if you could give us now 
a more personal view of this visit? 

A. Yes, I'm very pleased with what 
has taken place here. First of all the 
warmth of the reception from all your 
people, and I mean not just the people 
of diplomacy and government that I had 
dealings with, but your people there on 
the streets and their showing of 
hospitality and friendship has been very 
heartwarming. But I have always be- 
lieved that we only get in trouble when 
we're talking about each other instead of 
to each other. And since we've had an 
opportunity here to not only speak with 
your Diet, but then to meet with your 
Prime Minister and others — and, of 
course, I have been greatly honored to 
have been received by His Imperial Ma- 
jesty, your Emperor— I think that we 
have established a human kind of bond, 
not just one that is framed in diplomacy, 
but an understanding of each other as 
people. And I think that the world needs 
more of this. 



Q. I would like you to know, in 
the first place, that many of my com- 
patriots will be surprised and very 
happily so at the inclusion of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the list of 
the places that you'd like to visit or 
you wish you could visit. And to this 
end, of course, you'll have to be a 
young — [inaudible] — sagacious man so 
that you'll be able to fulfill your and 
our common desire in this regard. 
Now, are you going to be one? Are you 
going to be a sagacious man? 

A. I'm certainly going to try. This is 
too dangerous a world to just be 
careless with words or deeds. And if 
ever there was a need for the world to 
work toward peace and to work out of 
the dangerous situation that we're in, 
that time is now. 

Q. On a more, a little more serious 
note, my question is e.xactly related to 
this point. And that is, because of the 
experience that we in Japan went 
through, we are very genuine in hop- 
ing even for a very minimum, limited 
progress in the arms control talks 
which are currently underway. And 
just as it took another Republican 
President with very conservative 
credentials to effect a rapprochement 
very successfully with China, there 
are Japanese who hope that, perhaps, 
your hard-line policy may lead to the 
relaxation of East- West tensions. In 
light of these hopes and expectations, 
could you comment on these talks? 
And, also, I would appreciate it a 
great deal if you would give us your 
assessment of the current state of 
and, perhaps, future prospects for 
U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly in 
the arms control area. 

A. Now, if all of your question— you 
prefaced it with remarks about the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China. Yes, we're work- 
ing very hard to improve relations there 
and establish trust and friendship. I 
think we've made great progress. I 
know there is a question that is raised 
sometimes with regard to our friends on 
Taiwan — the Republic of China. I have 
to say that I have repeatedly said to the 
leaders of the People's Republic of China 
that they must understand that we will 
not throw over one friend in order to 
make another. And I would think that 




I:;»f'(<rtfftrf!>nn!niT)Mtft««Tmnnfi?nifnifiiv 



that would be reassuring to them, that 
they, then, might not be thrown over at 
some time in the future. 

But with regard to the Soviet 
Union — and you mentioned my hard 
line. And that is— I know I'm described 
that way a great deal. [Laughter] What 
is being called a hard line, I think, is 
realism. I had some experience with 
Communists— not of the Soviet kind, 
but domestic, in our own country, some 
years ago when I was president of a 
labor union there. 

I feel that we have to be realistic 
with the Soviet Union. It is not good for 
us, as some in the past have to think 
they're just like us and we can appeal to 
their kindliness or their better nature. 
No, I think they're very materialistic. 
They're very realistic. They have some 
aggressive and expansionist aims in the 
world. And I believe that, yes, you can 
negotiate with them; yes, you can talk to 
them. But it must be on the basis of 
recognizing them as the way they are 
and presenting the proposals in such a 
way that they can see that it is to their 
advantage to be less hostile in the world 
and to try and get along with rest of the 
nations of the world. And if this is hard- 
line, then I'm hard-line. 

But it is important because of, also, 
your opening remarks with reference to 
"the great nuclear forces in the world. 
We are going to stay at that negotiating 
table. We won't walk away from it. 
We're going to stay there trying— not as 
we have in the past to set some limits or 
ceilings on how many more missiles 
would be built, how much more growth 
they could take in those weapons — we 
want a reduction in the numbers. But 
really and practically, when we start 
down that road, and if we can get 
cooperation from them in reducing 
them, we should then continue down 
that road to their total elimination. 

Many years ago. after he became 
President, Dwight Eisenhower wrote a 
letter to a noted publisher in our coun- 
try. And he said in that letter that we 
had to face the fact that weapons were 
being developed in which we could no 
longer see a war that would end in vic- 
tory or defeat as we had always known 
it. But the weapons were such that it 
would end in the destruction of human 
kind. And, as he said, when we reach 



Deoartment of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



that moment, let us then have the in- 
telligence to sit down at a table and 
negotiate our problems before we 
destroy the world. 

I see it also in another way that he 
didn't mention. Once upon a time, we 
had rules of warfare. War is an ugly 
thing, but we had rules in which we 
made sure that soldiers fought soldiers, 
but they did not victimize civilians. That 
was civilized. Today we've lost 
something of civilization in that the very 
weapons we're talking about are de- 
signed to destroy civilians by the 
millions. And let us at least get back to 
where we once were — that if we talk 
war at all, we talk it in a way in which 
there could be victory or defeat and in 
which civilians have some measure of 
protection. 

Q. You referred to the current 
situation as being very dangerous. 
And in recent months, we have 
witnessed one act of violence after 
another— the assassination of Mr. 
Aquino in the Philippines, the 
shooting down of the Korean Airlines 
passenger jet, the terrorist bombing in 
Rangoon, the bombing in Lebanon, 
and Beirut, and the regfional conflicts 
that persist at many different parts of 
the world, including the Middle East 
and the Caribbean. I think we certain- 
ly live in a very dangerous world, and 
your Administration has advocated 
very strongly for building more effec- 
tive defense capabilities of the United 
States and of its allies. 

My question is that the kind of 
danger that the world faces today 
would be minimized if the United 
States and its partners, including 
Japan, become stronger militarily? 

A. Yes, and this is part of that 
realism that I meant. I once did a lot of 
negotiating across a table as a labor 
leader on behalf of a union, and I think I 
know and understand the give and take 
of negotiations. But for a number of 
years now, recently, we have sat at the 
table in meetings with the Soviet leaders 
-who have engaged in the biggest 
military buildup in the history of 
mankind. They sat on their side of the 
table looking at us knowing that, 
iunilaterally, we were disarming without 



January 1984 



getting anything in return. They didn't 
have to give up anything. They saw 
themselves get stronger in relation to all 
of us as we, ourselves, made ourselves 
weaker. 

I think, realistically, to negotiate 
arms reductions they have to see that 
there is a choice. Either they join in 
those arms reductions or they face the 
fact that we are going to turn our in- 
dustrial might to building the strength 
that would be needed to deter them 
from ever starting a war. 

Wars don't start because a nation 
is — they don't start them when they are 
weak; they start them when they think 
they're stronger than someone else. And 
it is very dangerous to let them see that 
they have a great margin of superiority 
over the rest of us. There's nothing to 
prevent them from then becoming ag- 
gressive and starting a war. 

Now, if they know that they cannot 
match us — and when I say us, I mean 
our allies and Japan and the United 
States — they cannot match us if we are 
determined to build up our defenses. So 
they then face the fact that as we build 
them up, they might then find them- 
selves weaker than we are. 

It was all summed up in a cartoon in 
one of our papers. This was before the 
death of Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev 
was portrayed talking to a Russian 
general, and he was saying to the 
general, "I liked the arms race better 
when we were the only ones in it." 
[Laughter] 

Q. Some of the dangers that I 
refer to do not take place only in the 
context of the confrontation between 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union. I think some of the regional 
conflicts have indigenous roots for 
that. And I just wonder if we are not 
having the kind of crises and dangers 
that don't lend themselves to the 
military solutions, which might call 
for some other approach to solving 
these problems and thereby reducing 
the tension in the world as a whole. 

A. If I understand your question 
correctly, what we're talking about 
is— you mentioned the Middle East. 
Once upon a time, nations like our own 
with oceans around us could have a 



defensive army on our own land; we 
could have coastal artillery batteries; 
and we knew that if a war came to us, it 
would come to our shores, and we would 
defend our shores. Today, there are 
strategic points in various places in the 
world. The Middle East is one. Could 
the allies, Western Europe, could Japan 
stand by and see the Middle East come 
into the hands of someone who would 
deny the oil of the Middle East to the in- 
dustrialized world? Could we see that 
energy supply shut off without knowing 
that it would bring absolute ruin to our 
countries? 

There are other areas. More than 
half of the minerals that the United 
States needs for its own industries come 
from spots all over the world. An ag- 
gressor nation, a nation that maybe has 
designs on other nations, recognizes that 
also. We have to look and see where 
those strategic spots are which we can- 
not afford to let fall. 

With the problem of Cuba in the 
Mediterranean— in the Caribbean, we 
have to recognize that more than half of 
all of our shipping of those necessities 
we must have come through the Carib- 
bean. It wasn't an accident that back in 
the First World War that the German 
submarine packs took up their places 
there. We know that the strategic 
waterways of the world— the Soviet 
Union has now built up the greatest 
navy in the world, and the biggest part 
of that navy is here in the Pacific, in the 
vicinity of your own country. But they 
know, as anyone must know in world 
strategy, that there are a limited 
number of choke points, sea passages 
that are essential to your livelihood and 
to ours. You can start with the Panama 
Canal and the Suez Canal, then the 
Straits of Gibraltar, right here in the 
passages that lead to your own island, 
the Malacca and the Makassar Straits. 
There are a total of no more than 16 in 
the whole world. And a nation that 
could dominate those narrow passages 
and shut them off to our shipping could 
secure victory without firing a shot at 
any of us. 

Q. The American economy has 
been rapidly improving, we hear, yet 
unemployment is still high. Could you 



15 



tell us what you believe will happen to 
the American domestic economy in the 
coming year and whether the improve- 
ment of the American economy, 
domestic economy, will help to resolve 
remaining trade problems between the 
United States and Japan? 

A. The American economy is im- 
proving. This recession that we've just 
been going through is the eighth that 
we've known in the last 40 or so years. 
And each time in the past our govern- 
ment has resorted to what I call a quick 
fix. It has artificially stimulated the 
money supply; it has stimulated govern- 
ment spending, increased taxes on the 
people which reduced their incentive to 
produce. And yes, there would be seem- 
ing recovery from the recession which 
would last about 2 or 3 years because it 
was artificial, and then we would be into 
another recession. And each time the 
recession was deeper and worse than 
the one before. 

We embarked on an economic pro- 
gram that was based on reducing 
government spending to leave a greater 
share of the earnings of the people in 
the hands of the people. We not only 
reduced the spending, we reduced taxes. 
And it was set out to be a lasting and 
real recovery. 

When we started in 1981 our reces- 
sion was about— roughly 12V2%. People 
were saying that it couldn't be 
eliminated in less than 10 years. Our in- 
terest rates were more than double what 
they are now. Our program, once put in- 
to effect, and as the tax cuts did have 
the effect we hoped they would have on 
the ability of people to purchase and also 
the incentive of their being allowed to 
keep more of the money they earned — 
the inflation for the last year has been 
running at about 2V2% or so, down from 
the 12.4%. The interest rates have been 
halved. We have a long way to go. The 
last thing to recover will be unemploy- 
ment. But even there, last month our 
unemployment dropped to a rate that in 
our own optimistic predictions we had 
said would not happen until the end of 
1984. And here it is in 1983, down to 
what we'd predicted that far ahead. 

We've come down from a very high 
unemployment rate to 8.7%. And I think 
that we're on the road to a solid 



recovery. I'll tell you, when our political 
opponents were claiming that our plan 
wouldn't work, they named it 
"Reaganomics." [Laughter] And lately, 
they haven't been calling it Reaganomics 
anymore. I assume, because it's work- 
ing. [Laughter] 

But what it will do for the rest of 
the world and our own relationship, I 
think that our country — I think your 
country, largely — certainly between the 
two of us, we do affect the world's 
economy. The world has been in reces- 
sion. I think that the United States and 
Japan and, certainly, with us together, 
we can help bring back and bring out of 
recession the rest of the industrial 
world. 

Q. You said that— in the National 
Diet this morning — that you have 
vigorously opposed the quick fix of 
protectionism in America. But there 
remains the danger of protectionist 
legislation to restrict Japanese im- 
ports to the United States. Do you 
believe such anticompetitive legisla- 
tion will be passed? And in regard to 
this, what do you think of the steps 
which Japan has been taking to fur- 
ther open up its own markets? 

A. We heartily approve. And we've 
been discussing some of the points of 
difference that still remain between our 
two marketplaces. I have pointed to the 
danger of those in our Congress which, 
because of the unemployment, think the 
answer could be protectionism. I think 
that protectionism destroys everything 
we want. I believe in free trade and fair 
trade. And yet, the pressure on them as 
legislators to adopt these bills, these 



measures — I am opposed to them — and 
yet, I know they're under the pressure, 
and they're tempted. And they're talking 
of this. There probably have been 40 
bills that have been brought up and pro- 
posed, all of which would have some 
elements of protectionism in them. 

But as I described it in the speech to 
the Diet this morning, protectionism 
is— that's the case of one fellow shooting 
a hole in the bottom of the boat, and 
then the other fellow answers by 
shooting another hole in the boat. You 
don't get well; you get wet. I don't want 
us to start shooting holes in the bottom 
of the boat. 

Q. I understand you have a strong 
interest in increasing personal con- 
tacts between the Japanese and the 
Americans. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you have any idea, specific 
idea, how this could be accomplished? 

A. Yes. I think we can increase our 
student exchange. Almost 14,000 of 
your fine young people are in our coun- 
try now. 'We would like to see more of 
ours coming here. There is talk now of 
the Association of Japanese and 
American Businessmen in using private 
funds, having an American House in 
Tokyo as we have a Japanese House in 
New York, both designed for more 
cultural exchange, more things such as 
student exchange and all. And I believe, 
again, that's another example of people 
talking to each other instead of about 
each other. 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



trong 



chs 




Arrival at Kimpo Airport, Seoul. Left to right: Mrs. Chun, Mrs. Keagan. the President, 
and President Chun. Following are Secretary and Mrs. Shultz (center), U.S. Ambassador 
to Korea Richard L. Walker, and Korean Chief of Protocol Lo Young Chan (right). 



SEOUL 

Arrival Remarks, 
Nov. 12, 1983' 

I bring to you— to the people of Korea 
the warmest expressions of friendship 
from the American people. The friend- 
ship between our two peoples is a long 
and a close one. It has endured more 
than a century. It has been molded in 
struggle, hardened through danger, and 
strengthened by victory. 

Since those days three decades ago 
when young Koreans and Americans 
fought together in the cause of human 



freedom, the world has undergone swift 
and sometimes violent change. Yet the 
peace, economic progress, and freedom 
from foreign domination that have 
characterized modern Korea are 
testimony to their vigilance and their 
sacrifice. 

We are resolved never to forget the 
dangers they so bravely resisted, nor 
abandon the struggle they so willingly 
joined. Today, in a tense time of peace, 
we stand together as we once did in 
time of war. Our purpose is the same, 
our resolve unshaken. We renew today 
our commitment to each other and to 
the cause of Korean and American 
freedom. 

As we begin a second century of 



friendship between our peoples, Nancy 
and I are particularly happy to return to 
this beautiful country. We look forward 
to seeking old friends and making new 
ones. But our hope most of all is that 
our visit will bring the people of Korea 
and the United States even closer 
together, and that our mutual efforts in 
pursuit of peace will bear fruit, not just 
for the Korean and the American people 
but for all the peoples of the Earth. 

We're grateful to the Korean people 
and the Government of Korea for this 
invitation. Let me assure you we bring 
with us the fondest hopes of the 
American people for continued peace 
and prosperity in this scenic "Land of 
the Morning Calm." 



S I .1 I 



Radio Address 
to the Nation, 
Nov. 12, 1983^° 

I'm sure you've heard Nancy and I have 
been traveling far from home this week. 
We're visiting two of America's most 
valued friends in the Pacific, Japan and 
the Republic of Korea. 

The great energy and vitality of 
these free people is most impressive, 
and we're enchanted by the treasures of 
their past. We visited the revered and 
lovely Meiji Shrine in Tokyo. While 
there, we watched an exhibition of 
Yabusame, a spectacular equestrian 
sport dating hundreds of years, where 
riders gallop at full gait shooting arrows 
at three separate targets. On Friday I 
had the honor of being the first 
American President to address the 
Japanese Diet, their national parliament. 

Today we're in South Korea, a 
staunch ally recently struck by great 
tragedy— the downing of Korean Air 
Lines Flight 007, followed by the 
assassination of key members of the 
Korean Cabinet. This has brought grief 
and bitterness to this part of the world, 
but it has also brought new determina- 
tion. Free people, no matter where they 
live, must stand united with the people 
of Japan and Korea. 

I will underline our commitment on 
Sunday when I visit our GI's along the 
demilitarized zone at the 38th Parallel. 
Our soldiers are serving with our 
Korean allies to deter aggression from 
the Communist North. Working with 
our partners to make tomorrow more 
prosperous and more secure is what our 
trip is all about. 

America is a Pacific nation with 
good reason to strengthen our ties in 
this region. Mike Mansfield, our Am- 
bassador to Japan, likes to say, "The 
next century will be the century of the 
Pacific." The citizens of our lands may 
live 5,000 miles apart, we may be dif- 
ferent in customs, language, and tradi- 
tions, and yes, we are often competitors 
in the world's markets. But what unites 
us is more important— our love of 
freedom and our optimism for the 
future. 



Japan, Korea, the United States, 
and our many other friends in the 
Pacific region are building a better 
tomorrow. Individual opportunity 
coupled with hard work and reward pro- 
duces astonishing results. When an en- 
tire society pursues these goals, miracles 
occur. Japan and Korea are classic ex- 
amples of nations rising from the ashes 
of war to set standards of economic 
prosperity that dazzle the world. 

■There's much talk in the Congress of 
protecting American jobs, but protec- 
tionism is defensive and dangerous. 
Erecting barriers always invites retalia- 
tion, and retaliation is a threat to the 
one out of every eight American jobs 
dependent on our exports. At the end of 
this vicious cycle are higher costs for 
consumers and lost American jobs, the 
exact opposite of what we all want. 

Let's recognize Japanese and Korean 
efficiency for what it is. If their prod- 
ucts are better made and less expensive, 
then Americans who buy them benefit 
by receiving quality and value. And 
that's what the magic of the market- 
place is all about. 

The best course for us to take is to 
take the offensive and create new jobs 
through trade, lasting jobs tied to the 
products and technology of tomorrow. 
I'm confident American products can 
compete in world markets if they can 
enter foreign markets as easily as 
foreign products can enter ours. Cur- 
rently, they can't. Restrictions and 
tariffs limit U.S. imports into Japan and 
Korea. In our meetings I've insisted that 
reciprocity and open markets are vital to 
our mutual prosperity. 

Prime Minister Nakasone and I have 
agreed on an agenda for progress to 
reduce and gradually eliminate these 
barriers. My goal is to help our farmers 
bring Japanese consumers lower prices 
for beef, citrus, and other agricultural 
goods, help our mining, coal, and gas in- 
dustries export energy resources to a 
resource-poor Japan, and help our com- 
munications industries find new markets 
for their satellites and other products. 

I also encouraged the Prime Min- 
ister to open his capital markets to more 
foreign investment. This will increase 
demand for Japanese yen, helping its 
price rise in relation to the dollar, 
thereby making it easier for the 



Japanese to buy our products and mak- 
ing our products better able to compete 
in other markets. 

Economic issues are important, but 
as I noted, freedom and peace exist in 
an uneasy climate here. We need to 
remember that Japan and Korea are ke> 
allies. They know what living in the 
shadow of communisim is like. It was a 
Japanese communications center that 
tracked the cold, calculating words of 
that Soviet pilot who gunned down the 
Korean airliner and 269 innocent vic- 
tims. 

Japan contributes about $20,000 for 
every U.S. soldier stationed here. Both 
Korea and Japan are committed to help 
us defend peace, and both are carrying 
an important share of the military 
burden. They and we share the same 
hopes and dreams for our loved ones. 
We're civilized nations believing the 
same virtues of freedom and democracy. 

The Williamsburg summit this sum- 
mer brought together representatives of 
the Atlantic alliance and Japan in a com- 
mon strategy for economic growth and 
military security. It demonstrated that 
our free world, spread across oceans, 
can join together to protect peace and 
freedom. 

On this trip, we and our Pacific 
friends are taking another important 
step forward together. We've made our 
partnership stronger, and that means 
tomorrow can be better for us, our 
children, and people everywhere. 

Until next week, thanks for listening 
and God bless you. 



Address before the 
Korean 

National Assembly, 
Nov. 12, 1983" 

I'm privileged to be among such friends. 
I stand in your Assembly as Presidents 
Eisenhower and Johnson have stood 
before me. And I reaffirm, as they did, 
America's support and friendship for the 
Republic of Korea and its people. 

Not long after the war on this penin- 
sula, your President paid a visit to 
Washington. In his remarks at the state 



Pep a rtment of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



dinner, President Eisenhower spoke of 
the Korean people's courage, stamina, 
and self-sacrifice. He spoke of America's 
pride in joining with the Korean people 
to prevent their enslavement by the 
North. In response, your first President 
expressed his country's deep, deep ap- 
preciation for what America had done. 
He concluded by saying, "I tell you, my 
friends, if I live hundreds of years, we 
will never be able to do enough to pay 
our debt of gratitude to you." 

I have come today to tell the people 
of this great nation: Your debt has long 
been repaid. Your loyalty, your friend- 
ship, your progress, your determination 
to build something better for your peo- 
ple has proven many times over the 
depth of your gratitude. In these days of 
turmoil and testing, the American peo- 
ple are very thankful for such a constant 
and devoted ally. Today, America is 
grateful to you. 

And we have long been friends. 
Over a hundred years ago when 
American ships first approached Korea, 
our people knew almost nothing of each 
other. Yet, the first words from the 
kingdom of Chosun to the emissaries 
from America were words of welcome 
and hope. I would like to read part of 
that greeting to the Americans, because 
it tells much of the Korean people's 
character. 

"Of what country are you? . . . are 
you well after your journey of 10,000 le 
through winds and waves? Is it your 
plan to barter merchandise ... or do you 
rather wish to pass by to other places 
and to return to your native land? All 
under heaven are of one original nature, 
clothes and hats are very different and 
language is not the same, yet they can 
treat each other with mutual friendship. 
What your wish is, please make it 
known. . . ." 

The journey from America is now 
swift. The winds and waves no longer 
endanger our way. But the rules of con- 
duct which assist travelers are the same 
today as they were over a century ago, 
or even in ancient times. The weary are 
restored, the sick healed, the lost 
sheltered and returned safely to their 
way. This is so on all continents among 
civilized nations. 



January 1984 




Korean National Assembly meeting. Left to right: .'Vmbassador Walker, Secretary Shultz, 
President Reagan, Mrs. Reagan, Mun-Shik Ch'ae, Speaker. Korean National Assembly, 
Mrs. Ch'ae, Mrs. Shultz, and Mrs. Walker. 



Our world is sadder today, because 
these ancient and honorable practices 
could not protect the lives of some re- 
cent travelers. Instead of offering 
assistance to a lost civilian airliner, the 
Soviet Union attacked. Instead of offer- 
ing condolences, it issued denials. In- 
stead of offering reassurances, it 
repeated its threats. Even in the search 
for our dead, the Soviet Union barred 
the way. This behavior chilled the entire 
world. The people of Korea and the 
United States shared a special grief and 
anger. 

My nation's prayers went out to the 
Korean families who lost loved ones 
even as we prayed for our own. May I 
ask you today to pause for a moment of 
silence for those who perished. Please 
join me in this tribute in which the spirit 
of our two peoples will be as one. [The 
moment of silence was observed.] 

Amen. 

Growth of the Korean Economy 

In recent weeks, our grief deepened. 
The despicable North Korean attack in 
Rangoon deprived us of trusted advisers 
and friends. So many of those who died 
had won admirers in America as they 



studied with us or guided us with their 
counsel. I personally recall the wisdom 
and composure of Foreign Minister Lee, 
with whom I met in Washington just a 
few short months ago. To the families 
and countrymen of all those who were 
lost, America expresses its deep sorrow. 

We also pledge to work with your 
government and others in the interna- 
tional community to censure North 
Korea for its uncivilized behavior. Let 
every aggressor hear our words, because 
Americans and Koreans speak with one 
voice. People who are free will not be 
slaves, and freedom will not be lost in 
the Republic of Korea. 

We in the United States have suf- 
fered a similar savage act of terrorism 
in recent weeks. Our marines in 
Lebanon were murdered by madmen 
who cannot comprehend words like 
"reason" or "decency." They seek to 
destroy not only peace but those who 
search for peace. We bear the pain of 
our losses just as you bear the pain of 
yours. As we share friendship, we also 
share grief. 

I know citizens of both our countries 
as well as those of other nations do not 
understand the meaning of such 
tragedies. They wonder why there must 



19 



be such hate. Of course, regrettably 
there is no easy answer. We can place 
greater value on our true friends and 
allies. We can stand more firmly by 
those principles that give us strength 
and guide us, and we can remember that 
some attack us because we symbolize 
what they do not: hope, promise, the 
future. Nothing exemplifies this better 
than the progress of Korea. Korea is 
proof that people's lives can be better. 
And I want my presence today to draw 
attention to a great contrast. I'm talking 
about the contrast between your 
economic miracle in the South and their 
economic failure in the North. 



In the early years following World 
War II, the future of Korea and of all 
Asia was very much in doubt. Against 
the hopes of Korea and other new na- 
tions for prosperity and freedom stood 
the legacies of war, poverty, and colonial 
rule. In the background of this struggle, 
the great ideological issues of our era 
were heard: Would the future of the 
region be democratic or totalitarian? 
Communism, at that time, seemed to of- 
fer rapid industrialization. The notion 
that the people of the region should 
govern their own lives seemed to some 
an impractical and undue luxury. But 
Americans and the people of Korea 



shared a different vision of the future. 

Then North Korea burst across the 
border, intent on destroying this coun- 
try. We were a world weary of war, but 
we did not hesitate. The United States 
as well as other nations of the world 
came to your aid against the aggression, 
and tens of thousands of Americans 
gave their lives in defense of freedom. 

As heavy as this price was, the 
Korean people paid an even heavier one. 
Civilian deaths mounted to the hundreds 
of thousands. President Johnson said 
before this very Assembly "Who will 
ever know how many children starved? 
How many refugees lie in unmarked 



Republic of Korea— A Profile 



People 

Noun and adjective: Korean(s). Population 
(1983): 40 million. Annual ^owth rate: 
1.6%. Ethnic groups: Korean; small Chinese 
minority. Religions: Buddhism, Christianity, 
Shamanism, Confucianism. Language: 
Korean. Education: Years compulsory — 6. 
Number of students — 9,951,000. Attend- 
ance— oi those eligible 91.65% attend middle 
school, 56.8% high school, and 13.9% college 
(1980). Literacy— over 90%. Health: 1 doc- 
tor/1,554 persons (1979). Infant mortality 
rate— 3211,000 (1982). Life expectancy— 6S 
yrs. (1979). Work force (14,722,000, 1982): 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing — 30.6%. 
Mining and manufacturing — 22.4%. Serv- 
ices— 41%. 



Geography 

Area: 98,.500 sq. km. (38,000 sq. mi.); about 
the size of Indiana. Cities: Capital — Seoul 
(1980 pop. over 8 million). Other major 
cities — Pusan (over 3 million), Taegu (1.7 
million), Inchon (1 million), Kwangju 
(727,000), Taejon (651,000). Terrain: Partial- 
ly forested mountain ranges, separated by 
deep, narrow valleys; cultivated plains along 
the coasts, particularly in the west and south. 
Climate: Temperate. 

Government 

Type: Republic, with power centralized in a 
strong executive. Independence: August 15, 
1948. Constitution: July 17, 1948; revised 
1962, 1972, 1980. Branches: Executive— 
president (chief of state). Legislative— 



unicameral National Assembly. Judicial — 
Supreme Court and appellate courts. Con- 
stitutional Court. Subdivisions: Nine prov- 
inces, four administratively separate cities 
(Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Taegu). 

Political parties: Govenment party — 
Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Opposition 
parties — Democratic Korea Party (DKP), 
Korean National Citizens Party (KNCP). Suf- 
frage: Universal over age 20. 

Central government budget (1983 pro- 
jected): Expenditures, $13.9 billion. 

Defense (1983 est.): 6% of GNP. about 
one-third of national budget. Armed forces 
(1982): About 600,000 active. 

Economy 

GNP (1982): $65,944 billion. Annual growth 
rate (1961-81): 8%. Per capita GNP (1982): 
$1,680. Consumer price index (1982 avg. in- 
crease): 7.3%. 

Natural resources: Limited coal, 
tungsten, iron ore, limestone, kaolinite, and 
graphite. 

Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries: 
18.1% of 1982 GNP. Products— rke, barley, 
vegetables, fish. Arable land— 22% of land 
area. 

Manufacturing and mining: 35.3% of 
1982 GNP. Products— Textiles, footwear, 
electronics, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, 
petrochemicals, industrial machinery. 

Social overhead capital and other serv- 
ices: 46.5% of GNP. 

Trade (1982): Exports— $.23.5 billion: tex- 
tiles ($5.4 billion); transportation equipment 



($3.4 billion), base metals and articles ($3.1 
billion), electrical products ($2.1 billion), 
footwear ($1.2 billion), fish and fish products 
($0.8 billion). Major markets— \JS, Japan, 
European Community, Middle East. Im- 
ports— $24.3 billion: crude oil ($6 billion), 
grains ($0.9 billion), machinery ($4.4 billion), 
chemicals and chemical products ($1.8 billion), 
base metals and articles ($1.7 billion), 
transportation equipment ($1.4 billion). Major 
suppliers — Middle East, Japan, US. 

Official exchange rate (October 1983): 
About 780 won = US$1 

Fiscal year: Calendar year. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

Official observer status at UN; active in 
many UN specialized agencies (FAO, GATT, 
IAEA, IBRD. ICAO, IDA, IPC, ICO, IMF, 
ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO) 
and other international organizations (Asian- 
African Legal Consultative Committee. Asian 
People's Anti-Communist League, World 
Anti-Communist League, Colombo Plan, 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific, Geneva Conventions of 1949 
for the Protection of War Victims, Asian 
Development Bank, INTELSAT, Interna- 
tional Whaling Commission, Interparliamen- 
tary Union, INTERPOL); official observer 
status in African Development Bank and 
Organization of American States. 

Taken from the Background Notes of October 
1983, published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



20 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



graves along the roads south? There is 
hardly a Korean family which did not 
lose a loved one in the assault from the 
North." 

In 1951, in the midst of the war, 
General Douglas MacArthur addressed a 
Joint Session of our Congress. He spoke 
of you, saying, "The magnificence of the 
courage and fortitude of the Korean 
people defies description." As he spoke 
those words, our Congress interrupted 
him with applause for you and your peo- 
ple. 

After the war, Koreans displayed 
that same fortitude. Korea faced every 
conceivable difficulty. Cities were in 
ruins; millions were homeless and 
without jobs; factories were idle or 
destroyed; hunger was widespread; the 
transportation system was dismem- 
bered; and the economy was devastated 
as a result of all these plagues. And 
what did the Korean people do? You 
rebuilt your lives, your families, your 
homes, your towns, your businesses, 
your country. And today the world 
speaks of the Korean economic miracle. 

The progress of the Korean economy 
is virtually without precedent. With few 
natural resources other than the in- 
telligence and energy of your people, in 
one generation you have transformed 
this country from the devastation of war 
to the threshold of full development. 
Per capita income has risen from 
about $80 in 1961 to more than 20 
times— $1,700 today. Korea has become 
an industrial power, a major trading na- 
tion, and an economic model for develop- 
ing nations throughout the world. And 
you have earned the growing respect of 
the international community. This is 
recognized in your expanding role as 
host to numerous international events, 
including the 1986 Asian games and the 
1988 Olympics. 

Now as the years have passed, we 
know our vision was the proper one. 
North Korea is one of the most 
repressive societies on Earth. It does 
not prosper; it arms. The rapid progress 
of your economy and the stagnation of 
the North has demonstrated perhaps 
more clearly here than anywhere else 
the value of a free economic system. Let 
the world look long and hard at both 



January 1984 



sides of the 38th Parallel and then ask: 
"Which side enjoys a better life?" 

The other side claims to be the wave 
of the future. If that's true, why do they 
need barriers, troops, and bullets to 
keep their people in? The tide of history 
is a freedom tide, and communism can- 
not and will not hold it back. 

The United States knows what 
you've accomplished here. In the 25 
years following the war, America pro- 
vided almost $5V2 billion in economic aid. 
Today that amounts to less than 6 
months' trade between us. That trade is 
virtually in balance. We are at once 
Korea's largest market and largest 
source of supplies. We're a leading 
source of the investment and technology 
needed to fuel further development. 
Korea is our ninth largest trading part- 
ner, and our trade is growing. 

Korea's rapid development benefited 
greatly from the free flow of trade 
which characterized the 1960s and 
1970s. Today, in many countries, the call 
for protectionism is raised. I ask Korea 
to join with the United States in reject- 
ing those projectionist pressures to en- 
sure that the growth you've enjoyed is 
not endangered by a maze of restrictive 
practices. 

And just as we work together 
toward prosperity, we work toward 
security. Let me make one thing very 
plain. You are not alone, people of 
Korea. America is your friend, and we 
are with you. 

U.S. Commitment to 
Security Assistance 

This year marks the 30th anniversary of 
the mutual defense treaty between the 
United States and the Republic of 
Korea. The preamble to that treaty af- 
firms the determination of our two coun- 
tries to oppose aggression and to 
strengthen peace in the Pacific. We re- 
main firmly committed to that treaty. 
We seek peace on the peninsula. And 
that is why U.S. soldiers serve side by 
side with Korean soldiers along your 
demilitarized zone. They symbolize the 
U.S. commitment to your security and 
the security of the region. The United 





A 



U.S. Ambassador to 
the Republic of Korea 

Richard Louis Walker, a native of Penn- 
sylvania, graduated from Drew University 
and holds a master's degree and doctorate 
from Yale University, where he subsequently 
taught prior to going to South Carolina. 

Ambassador Walker has specialized in the 
politics and international relations of East 
Asia since World War II, when he served 
with Army Intelligence as a Chinese inter- 
preter in the Pacific Theater. 

He has been the James F. Byrnes Pro- 
fessor of International Relations and Director 
of the Institute of International Studies at 
the University of South Carolina for more 
than two decades. He has also served on the 
faculty of the National War College and as a 
consultant for both the Departments of State 
and Defense. 

Well known throughout East Asia, and 
especially in Korea where he has lived and 
visited on numerous occasions over the past 
three decades, Ambassador Walker's 
numerous writings on problems of peace and 
security in Asia have been published in 
Korea, Japan, and the United States. He was 
appointed Ambassador to Korea on July 24, 
1981. ■ 



21 



States will stand resolutely by you, just 
as we stand with our allies in Europe 
and around the world. 

In Korea, especially, we have 
learned the painful consequences of 
weakness. I am fully aware of the 
threats you face only a few miles from 
here. North Korea is waging a campaign 
of intimidation. Their country is on a 
war footing, with some 50 divisions and 
brigades and 750 combat aircraft. The 
North has dug tunnels under the de- 
militarized zone in their preparations for 
war. They are perched and primed for 
conflict. They attacked you in Rangoon, 
and yet, in spite of such constant threats 
from the North, you have progressed. 

Our most heartfelt wish is that one 
day the vigil will no longer be needed. 
America shares your belief that con- 
frontation between North and South is 
not inevitable. Even as we stand with 
you to resist aggression from the North, 
we will work with you to strengthen the 
peace on the peninsula. 

Korea today remains the most firmly 
divided of the states whose division 
stemmed from World War II. Austrian 
unity was reestablished peacefully 10 
years after the war. Germany remains 
divided, but some of the pain of that 
division has been eased by the inner- 
German agreement of a decade ago. I 
know the Korean people also long for 
reconciliation. We believe that it must be 
for the people of this peninsula to work 
toward that reconciliation, and we ap- 
plaud the efforts you've made to begin a 
dialog. For our part, we would, as we've 
often stressed, be willing to participate 
in discussions with North Korea in any 
forum in which the Republic of Korea 
was equally represented. The essential 
way forward is through direct discus- 
sions between South and North. 

Americans have watched with a mix- 
ture of sadness and joy your campaign 
to reunite families separated by war. We 
have followed the stories of sisters torn 
apart at the moment of their parents' 
death; of small children swept away in 
the tides of war; of people who have 
grown old not knowing whether their 
families live or have perished. 

I've heard about the program that 
uses television to reunite families that 
have been torn apart Today, I urge 



North Korea: It is time to participate in 
this TV reunification program and to 
allow your people to appear. I would say 
to them, whatever your political dif- 
ferences with the South, what harm can 
be done by letting the innocent families 
from North and South know of their 
loved ones' health and welfare? Full 
reunification of families and peoples is a 
most basic human right. 

Until the day arrives, the United 
States, like the Republic of Korea, ac- 
cepts the existing reality of two Korean 
States and supports steps leading to im- 
proved relations among those states and 
their allies. 

We have also joined with you over 
the past 2 years in proposing measures 
which, if accepted, would reduce the risk 
of miscalculation and the likelihood of 
violence on the peninsula. The proposals 
we have made, such as mutual notifica- 
tion and observation of military exer- 
cises, are similar to ones negotiated in 
Europe and observed by NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. These proposals are not 
intended to address fundamental 
political issues, but simply to make this 
heavily armed peninsula a safer place. 
For we must not forget that on the 
peninsula today there are several times 
more men under arms and vastly more 
firepower than in June of 1950. We will 
continue to support efforts to reduce 
tensions and the risks of war. 

I have spoken of the need for 
vigilance and strength to deter aggres- 
sion and preserve peace and economic 
progress, but there is another source of 
strength, and it is well represented in 
this assembly. The development of 
democratic political institutions is the 
surest means to build the national con- 
sensus that is the foundation of true 
security. 

The United States realizes how dif- 
ficult political development is when, 
even as we speak, a shell from the 
North could destroy this Assembly. My 
nation realizes the complexities of keep- 
ing a peace so that the economic miracle 
can continue to increase the standard of 
living of your people. The United States 
welcomes the goals that you have set for 
political development and increased 



respect for human rights for democratic 
practices. We welcome President Chun's 
farsighted plans for a constitutional 
transfer of power in 1988. Other 
measures for further development of 
Korean political life will be equally im- 
portant and will have our warm support. 

Now, this will not be a simple proc- 
ess because of the ever-present threat 
from the North. But I wish to assure 
you once again of America's unwavering 
support and the high regard of 
democratic peoples everywhere as you 
take the bold and necessary steps 
toward political development. 

Over 100 years ago you asked 
earlier American travelers to make their 
wishes known. I come today to you with 
our answer: Our wish is for peace and 
prosperity and freedom for an old and 
valued ally. 

In Washington several weeks ago, a 
memorial service was held for those who 
had perished on Flight 007. During that 
service, a prayer was read. I would like 
to read you that prayer, because it is a 
prayer for all mankind. 

"0 God . . . 

Look with compassion on the whole 
human family; 

Take away the arrogance and hatred 
which infect our hearts; 

Break down the walls that separate 
us; 

Unite us in bonds of love; 

And work through our struggle and 
confusion to accomplish your pur- 
pose on earth; 

That, in your good time, all the na- 
tions and races may serve you in 
harmony ..." 

That, too, is our wish and prayer. 
Onyonghi Keshipshiyo. [Stay in peace.] 



Remarks at Reception 
for Korean 
Community Leaders, 
Nov. 12, 1983^2 

Nancy and I are honored to be so warm- 
ly greeted by your distinguished group. 
We've come to Korea to demonstrate 
the deep and affectionate concern that 
the American people have for your coun- 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



try. Our hearts went out to you in the 
wake of the two murderous attacks on 
your citizens, and we came today to say 
that we'll continue to stand steadfastly 
by you. We hope our presence in your 
country will show the world our firm 
support for Korea. 

Probably the most important con- 
tribution we can make here is to con- 
tinue helping protect your national 
security. Our shared commitment to 
your defense is symbolized by the 
presence of American soldiers standing 
with Koreans along the demilitarized 
zone. This is the shield that enables you 
to pursue your bold economic and 
political objectives. 

We also support your development 
of a democratic political system. As you 
know, the United States pays close at- 
tention to political developments in 
Korea, particularly those that are affect- 
ing democratic rights — a matter very 
important to Americans. We do this not 
because we believe our security commit- 
ment gives us a right to intervene in 
your internal affairs but simply because 
such issues are at the center of our own 
poHtical ideology and, we feel, are 
reflected, then, in our foreign policy. 

But in approaching such internal 
matters, I believe it's important to 
adhere to the discipline of diplomacy, 
rather than indulging in public postur- 
ing. This has been the policy of our Ad- 
ministration throughout the world. 
Where we feel strongly about a par- 
ticular situation, we make our views 
known, often quite candidly, to the ap- 
propriate level of the government con- 
cerned. 

I have faith in the Korean people's 
ability to find a political system meeting 
their democratic aspirations, even in the 
face of the heavy security challenge 
presented by the North. You have ac- 
complished so much already in the face 
of that threat. Who would have 
predicted a mere 20 years ago that an 
impoverished Korea would become one 
of the world's legendary economic suc- 
cess legends? 

This was a Korean accomplishment. 
Your friends offered help and guidance 
as these were needed, but they didn't 
seek to dictate your course. Political 
development may, in some respects, be a 



January 1984 



more difficult process, but it, too, is one 
in which you alone must control. 

I respect and strongly support Presi- 
dent Chun's pledge to turn over power 
constitutionally in 1988. This will be an 
invaluable political legacy to the Korean 
people. And I believe in the will and 
ability of the Korean people to develop 
the foundations required for viable 
democratic institutions. The shared 
democratic aspirations of our two 
peoples are important to our relation- 
ship, and continued progress toward the 
broadening of democracy in Korea 
strengthens the ties between our two 
countries. As you continue along this 
path of political evolution, you do so 
with our deep support, our affection, 
and our prayers. 

And, again, we thank you from the 
bottom of our hearts for your warm and 
very gracious welcome from the first 
moment that we arrived here today. We 
are deeply grateful. God bless you. 



Dinner Toast, 
Nov. 12. 1983'^ 

Nancy and I both want to thank you and 
Madame Chun for your gracious 
hospitality and your warm words of 
welcome to us. We're delighted and 
honored to return here to visit your 
dynamic country. 

Much has been written concerning 
the Korean economic miracle of the past 
decades. The startling industry and 
progress of the Korean people are gain- 
ing increasing international recognition 
and respect. Only recently, the Inter- 
parliamentary Union met in Seoul, and a 
new series of international events will 
culminate here in the 1988 Summer 
Olympics. This will be a proud moment 
for Korea. You and the Korean people 
have every right to feel joy in your 
hearts. 

As Korea grows in international 
stature, you will hear increasing calls for 
assistance from allies and friends, calls 
to defend and promote the values — 
political, economic, humanitarian — that 
both our peoples seek to live by. 



Our mutual belief in economic 
freedom, for example, must not only be 
defended but spread as far as possible 
throughout the world. The 66 years that 
have followed the Russian Revolution 
and its attempt to turn Communist 
theory into practice have been marked 
by tragic failure. Innumerable variations 
of the Marxist economic system have 
brought stagnation, waste, and hardship 
to many countries and many peoples. 
We must never tire of reminding the 
world of this. We must never tire of ex- 
plaining and promoting the free market 
system and its benefits. 

And so, too, we must resist internal 
threats to our economic freedom, the 
calls to choke off international trade, to 
somehow protect jobs by denying our 
consumers the benefits of freedom of 
choice. The $12 billion in trade between 
our two countries has provided in- 
numerable jobs to both our nations, and 
we must redouble our efforts to expand 
rather than constrict that trade. 
Our political values also face 
unremitting challenges. Democracy and 
freedom of opinion are virtues the free 
world must cherish and defend. They 
distinguish us from totalitarian states. 
They are the source of our strength as 
nations, the very reason for our ex- 
istence. 

And finally, the most basic human 
values — our concern for the rights of 
the individual, our belief in the 
sacredness of human life — there also, 
these go to the heart of our existence. 
The murder of 269 innocent people in a 
defenseless airliner, the very absence 
here tonight of some of your nation's 
finest public servants— these events 
have written in blood the stark contrast 
between those nations that respect 
human life and those that trample it. 
The vicious attack in Rangoon 
dramatizes the threat your people face. 
We must stand together to confront this 
dangerous challenge and to preserve the 
peace. And this we will do. 

The increasing strength of the 
United States, our allies, and the prog- 
ress of nations like Korea — as con- 
trasted with the continuing failure and 



23 



moral decline of the Communist na- 
tions — only serve to strengthen my con- 
viction: The tide of history is a freedom 
tide, and communism cannot and will 
not hold it back. 

Our first hundred years of friendship 
are history; we are now beginning to 
write the history of our second hundred 
years. May the new era of Korean- 
American partnership be even more 
fruitful than the last. And may it bring 
to both our peoples a stronger prosperi- 
ty, a renewed friendship and confidence, 
and the genuine peace and security 
which we so fervently seek. 

Will you all join me in a toast to the _ 
Korean people, our staunch allies and | 
good friends, and to the President of the tS 
Republic of Korea and Madame Chun. | 



Remarks to 
Assembled Troops, 
Nov. 13, 1983^" 

It's an honor for me to be with you. And 
as you see, this morning, the first thing 
when I got here, somebody made sure 
that I would be dressed in what the well- 
dressed man, American, is wearing, and 
I'm very proud to have that. Somebody 
asked me if I'd be safe up here so close 
to North Korean troops, and I said, "I'll 
be with the 2d Infantry Division." 

You know, this prompts a story, and 
I can't help but tell it. Back in World 
War II days a young draftee was com- 
plaining about some of the methods of 
the Army and the way the Army did 
things and was asking an old Regular 
Army sergeant about this. And the 
Regular Army sergeant said, "Son, look, 
if you were in charge of a brand new 
country and you were creating your 
army for that brand new country and 
you finally got a division created, what 
would you call it?" And the kid said, 
"Well, I guess I'd call it the 1st 
Division." He said: "Well, in the United 
States they called the first one the 2d 
Division and," he said: "when you 
understand that, you'll understand 
everything there is to know about the 
Army." 

This has been an experience that I 
will always remember. "There's no better 
proof of the relationship between 




Camp Liberty Bell, Guard Post Collier. Escorted by Second Lt. Charles A. Preysler, 
Guard Post Commander, President Reagan views North Korean positions from the Guard 
Post Observation Deck at the DMZ (demilitarized zone). 



strength and freedom than right here on 
the DMZ [demilitarized zone] in Korea. 
You are in the frontlines of freedom and 
I want each of you to know that I bring 
you warm greetings from your family 
and friends back in the States. And I 
bring something else, too — the gratitude 
of 230 million Americans who told me to 
tell you. "We love you, 2d Infantry Divi- 
sion." 

You stand between the free world 
and the armed forces of a system that is 
hostile to everything we believe in as 
Americans. The Communist system to 
the North is based on hatred and op- 
pression. It brutally attacks every form 
of human liberty and declares those who 
worship God to be enemies of the peo- 
ple. Its attack against the leaders of the 
South Korean Government in Rangoon 
made clear what kind of enemy you face 
across the DMZ. 

In so many ways the Korean Penin- 
sula is symbolic of the larger world. In 
the South, energy and creativity abound. 
The positive mood of the people, their 



enthusiasm and work are propelling this 
part of Korea into the 21st century and 
a new era of opportunity and prosperity. 
To the North, the Communist regime's 
heavy hand stagnates the economy, sup- 
presses the spirit of the people. Like 
most Communist regimes, the only thing 
it can produce well is repression and 
military might. The only thing deterring 
the use of that miltiary might is a com- 
mitment by the Korean people here in 
the South and the dedication of brave 
men and women like yourselves. 

You in the 2d Infantry Division and 
in the other branches of the Armed 
Forces are our shield against the tyr- 
anny and the deprivation that engulfs so 
much of the world. 

After speaking to many Koreans 
both in and out of government, I know 
that they, like our citizens, are pro- 
foundly grateful to you. We fully under- 
stand the hardship of your task. We 
know about the cold, windswept nights 
that leave you aching from head to foot, 
I'm sure. We know about having to stay 
awake and alert on guard duty when 



Dfnartmpnt nf State Bulletin 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



you'd rather be at a movie or doing 
something more pleasant back home. We 
know about the birthdays and the 
holidays that you can't spend with your 
loved ones. And we know about the 
danger. You're facing a heavily armed, 
unpredictable enemy with no record — or 
regard, I should say, for human life. 

Let's always remember August 18th, 
1976, the day that two Army officers. 
Major Arthur Bonifas and First Lt. 
Mark Barrett, were murdered across the 
road from here by ax-wielding North 
Korean troops. Let me state for the 
record, and I know you feel this way, 
nothing like that better happen again. 

The self-doubts of the 1970s are giv- 
ing way in America to a new era of con- 
fidence and a sense of purpose. Com- 
munism is not the wave of the future, 
and it never was — freedom is. And it's 
good to see people beginning to wake up 
to that fact. 

Yes, we, too, have our faults. But 
we've got a heck of a lot more to be 
proud of, and we're not afraid to say so. 
In Lebanon, for example, our marines 
are peacekeepers in the truest sense of 
the world. We're there to give some 
chance to people of that troubled land, a 
region whose destiny is crucial to our 
own security. More than 230 of our 
marines — actually, I understand the 
final count now is — the final indentifica- 
tion is 239 of our marines and soldiers 
gave the last, full measure of devotion in 
that honorable endeavor. And each of us 
is indebted to every one of them. 

Recently, as you know, we sent our 
forces to the island of Grenada. Some 
critics compared that operation with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Let me 
just say there's something seriously 
wrong with anyone who can't see the 
difference between 100,000 Soviets try- 
ing to force a dictatorship down the 
throats of the Afghan people and 
America and eight Caribbean 
democracies joining to stop Cubans and 
local Communists from doing the same 
thing in Grenada. 

And let me ask a question of my 
own. Why are the Soviets being at- 
tacked by the people of Afghanistan, 
while our U.S. and Caribbean forces 
have been greeted as liberators by the 



January 1984 




President Reagan addresses the 2d Infan- 
try Division from a sandbag platform in the 
mortar bunker area telling them that they 
". . . stand between the free world and the 
armed forces of a system that is hostile to 
everything we believe in as Americans." 



people in Grenada? The answer is: No 
people in history have ever chosen to be 
slaves. 

We have held interviews with some 
of the Soviet soldiers who have deserted 
in Afghanistan. And a significant thing 
is, in different areas, without their hav- 
ing a chance to communicate with each 
other or even knowing about each other, 
one of the prime reasons they have 
given us — young Russians, men like 
yourselves, only from Russia — for de- 
serting is they were ordered to kill 
women and children. And some of them 
proved that there is still some hope 
there among the people if the people can 
ever get a chance to speak. 



People everywhere want to be free. 
That's the difference between 
Afghanistan and Grenada, and between 
North Korea and South Korea. Let me 
just repeat to you what I said to the 
American people. My paramount con- 
cern in Grenada was protecting the lives 
of our citizens living there. And anyone 
who questions whether their lives were 
in jeopardy should read the letters I've 
received from those students. And on 
television we saw them dropping down 
when they stepped off the planes in 
Carolina, kissing the ground as they ar- 
rived on American soil. And just the day 
before I left on this trip, we had some 
400 of them on the South Lawn of the 
White House to meet some of the men 
who had come back after freeing them. 
And that's all you needed was to see 
their gratitude to your comrades in 
uniform, and hear their statements of 
what they felt their plight was, and how 
they had truly been saved. 

And only 10 years ago, youngsters 
of that age in too many places in our 
country were throwing rocks at men in 
uniform. There's a different attitude 
now. And when you're rotated and 
you're back home. I think you're going 
to find out how proud the American peo- 
ple are of you. To call what we did in 
Grenada an invasion as many have, is a 
slur and a misstatement of fact. It was a 
rescue mission, plain and simple. 

We Americans bear a heavy burden. 
Others must do their part. The people of 
Korea — the Republic of Korea — are cer- 
tainly doing their share. Yet, if freedom 
is to survive, if peace is to be main- 
tained, it will depend on us. Our commit- 
ment in Korea exemplifies this heavy 
responsibility. We've stood shoulder to 
shoulder with the Korean people for 30 
years now. It reflects well on the 
character of our country that we've been 
willing to do this in a land so far away 
from home. And in the end, it is this 
strength of character that will make the 
difference between slavery and 
freedom — but more important, between 
peace and war. 

Thirty-three years ago, Americans 
gallantly fought and died in the gullies, 
in the hills of the Korean Peninsula 
here. One of them was M. Sgt. Stanley 
Adams and another was Capt. Lewis 



.liu'.uHUiiuifihiiiiii'AhtiiiiimmHHiiiMihmAmHtumiiiijii^^^ 



Millet. They both led bayonet charges 
against vastly superior forces. Another 
hero was M.Sgt. Ernest Kouma, who 
exposed himself to enemy fire by man- 
ning his machinegun from the back of 
his tank and in so doing saved his com- 
rades from an onslaught that could have 
devastated their ranks. A fourth was Lt. 
Col. John Page, one of the heroes of the 
Chosin Reservoir, whose ingenuity and 
bravery saved so many. 

All of these were Congressional 
Medal of Honor recipients. Yet, we 
know that all who fought here were 
heroes and deserve our respect. They 
did their duty, and by doing so they pro- 
tected not only Korea but a whole 
generation of Americans. 

By the way, one of the children of a 
Medal of Honor recipient I just men- 
tioned, Capt. Lewis Millet, sent me a 
telegram a few days ago in support of 
the Grenada rescue mission. 

Today you carry on an honorable 
tradition of those who went before you. 
And I know that you're keeping faith 
with them and with their families and 
friends. Americans are now standing tall 
and firm. No terrorist should question 
our resolve, and no tyrant should doubt 
our courage. Your division motto is "Fit 
to fight, second to none." Well, you've 
lived up to that motto, and we're proud 
of you for it. And with your courage and 
dedication as an example, we're going to 
make as certain as we can that the 
United States remains second to none. 
I have never been as proud as I am 
right now and from what I've seen here. 
And I know that in spite of what I said 
about our people back home, I'm not 
sure that very many of them realize that 
you aren't just sitting here doing some 
kind of garrison duty. I'm going to do 
everything I can to make sure that the 
folks back home know what you really 
are doing. 

So, soldiers of the 2d Infantry Divi- 
sion, God bless you, and God bless 
America. 



Secretary Shultz's 
Interview, 
Nov. 13, 1983^' 

Q. Secretary Shultz, you're in Seoul, 
Korea, coining in by satellite. Thanks 
very much for coming in to talk with 
us today. It's a pleasure to have you 
with us. Could I ask you first— Presi- 
dent Reagan says today, yesterday, 
that North Korea is poised and ready 
for a war. Is that— did you see that as 
an immediate threat? How do you see 
that? 

A. They have made lots of threats. 
They are somewhat mobilized. They are 
very well armed. They make continual 
talks about their aggressive intentions. 
They've made an effort to murder the 
President of South Korea and did suc- 
ceed in murdering a number of promi- 
nent Cabinet members; so that's a pretty 
war-like stance. 

Q. North Korea has even issued 
threats against President Reagan, 
rather blustery threats. Why do they 
do things like that? Do you take them 
seriously? 

A. Of course, you have to take 
threats seriously and— when you see 
what they did in Rangoon; however, the 
security here is very good, and the 
President is determined; he's not a per- 
son who gets intimidated. 

Q. What was his purpose in going 
to the DMZ? What sort of message did 
he want to send by doing that? 

A. It's a visit to our forces there, an 
encouragement to our forces, and it 
sends the message of the determination 
of the United States to stand in there in 
this battle, for freedom. 

Q. Perhaps we're just all becom- 
ing callous, but it does seem that the 
attack on the South Korean Govern- 
ment officials, that North Korea 
seems to have carried out in Burma, 
was a quite extraordinary development 
even by the standards of this century. 
Is there anything the United States, in 
conjunction with its allies, and par- 
ticularly its European allies who have 
commercial dealings with North 



26 



Korea, can or will do as a sanction 
against North Korea after that attack? 

A. We have practically, or no deal- 
ings with North Korea, but we have 
been working with others encouraging 
others, on the one hand, to develop their 
relations with South Korea, and on the 
other, to curtail or eliminate their rela- 
tions with North Korea as a response to 
this uncivilized and totally unacceptable 
pattern of behavior. So it has been a 
strong effort on the diplomatic side to 
work at it that way. 

I might say we were struck by the 
strength of view in Japan and their 
determination to register exactly this 
same kind of point. So we've been work- 
ing with the South Koreans on this and 
with the Japanese and others. 

Q. The Europeans don't seem ter- 
ribly concerned with SS-20s that are 
not targeted on European targets, but 
Korea and Japan, being nonnuclear 
nations, are understandably upset 
about this. Can the United States ac- 
cept an agreement on intermediate- 
range forces that leave in place a 
significant number of SS-20s, 
targeted at Japan and Korea? 

A. What we are doing is taking a 
global approach to these negotiations. 
That has been the approach right from 
the beginning. It's been the approach 
that has been worked out within our 
NATO allies. They don't have any 
doubts in their minds about the impor- 
tance of that approach. That has been 
the nature of the bargaining and has 
been the nature of our proposals, right 
along. 

Where, within a global limit, the 
Soviet Union chooses to deploy its 
weapons, of course, is another matter. It 
has to be global because the SS-20s are 
mobile missiles, and if you limit them in 
one area, but not in another, you really 
haven't accomplished very much. 

Q. It is said that Soviet President 
Andropov is seriously ill. Would his 
passing from the scene in any way af- 
fect the chances of an arms agree- 
ment? Does it really matter to us who 
is in charge at this moment as they go 
through a power transition in the 
Soviet Union? 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



A. I have no information on Mr. 
Andropov's health, beyond what is 
generally available to everybody; but any 
time you have uncertainty and transition 
in government, it tends to make the 
situation a little less decisive or, at least, 
probably that way. But I think it's up to 
us, not so much to speculate about what 
the Soviet Union may do or what its 
leadership may be, but to say to 
ourselves, what should we do? And we 
know what we should do. We know that 
we have to be realistic about what is 
taking place in the Soviet Union— their 
arms buildup, their attitude, their 
strength, and their weaknesses. 

At the same time, we have to be 
reasonable and ready to negotiate and 
ready to work out problems, and Presi- 
dent Reagan has been in that posture 
right along and will remain in that 
posture. 

Q. We are promising to join with 
South Korea in its defense should that 
become necessary, should there be an 
attack from the north, while at the 
same time — 

A. It isn't a question of promising. 
We are here. We have almost 40,000 
troops here. We fought on this penin- 
sula; and so it's a matter of deeds and 
presence, not promises. 

Q. I was about to say that in this 
country and, indeed, in South Korea 
itself, there continues to be a good 
deal of complaint about a militarist 
government, with dissidents locked up 
and so on. What's your view of that? 

A. There are some problems here. 
We work at them. The President spoke 
eloquently in the National Assembly and 
to a group — a cross-section of Korean 
leaders yesterday where I was pres- 
ent — on the importance of advances 
toward democratic principles. I must say 
that I talked with a number of people at 
the meeting who are active in the 
defense of people whose political rights 
have been curtailed. So there are prob- 
lems. 

On the other hand, there has been a 
considerable amount of progress, and 
you do have to remember that when a 
neighbor is challenging you, and has 
done such things as this almost- 



January 1984 



unimaginable murder of members of 
your government, you have to take some 
pretty strong measures; so we're work- 
ing both sides of the street — and I think 
pretty effectively— on this. 

Q. As you travel, all the world's 
troubles travel with you, presumably, 
including Lebanon. 'There seems to be 
a lot of feeling that Syria's real aim in 
Lebanon is domination and, perhaps, 
even annexation of a large part of 
Lebanon. How would you characterize 
Syria's aims? And what, if anything, 
can the United States do to alter 
them? 

A. Syria, of course, does have 
legitimate concerns and a long, historic 
relationship with Lebanon. Nobody quar- 
rels with that or expects that it would 
ever be different. It wouldn't even be 
desirable for it to be different. If you 
look at the map, you see that Lebanon 
has got Israel on its southern border; 
the rest, other than the sea, is Syria. So 
it is bound to have a close relationship 
with Syria. 

A dominant relationship, however, 
would be different and, I think, has its 
implications for the peacefulness of the 
Middle East, generally. A Syria domi- 
nant over the PLO, dominant over the 
region, and exerting itself in a negative 
way on peace with Israel, would be, in 
my judgment, a bad thing. 

Q. Is that what you think— 

A. But we will continue — we will 
continue to work with Syria, and we 
hope that the Lebanon situation will 
straighten itself out. I might say that 
the Geneva talks on reconciliation have 
gone rather well, at least as compared 
with people's expectations. 

Q. Do you reject the view that 
domination of a large part of Lebanon 
is a Syrian aim? 

A. Syria does dominate a large part 
of Lebanon. It occupies the whole Bekaa 
Valley and exerts a very considerable in- 
fluence. That's just a description of the 
present situation. And my guess is that 
they certainly do aim to have a domi- 
nant voice. 

Q. With Judge [William] Clark 
gone from the White House, and Mr. 



McFarlane now the President's Na- 
tional Security Adviser, you read lots 
of stories about how you are, finally 
and at last, in charge — and a real 
tough guy. How do you feel, reading 
those stories? 

A. I'm not in charge— you know 
that. 

Q. All right, the President is in 
charge. 

A. The President is in charge. 

Q. But, after him, you are his 
prophet. 

A. I might say that the President 
has done an absolutely remarkable job 
on this trip, considering the time zone 
change and everything. He hit the 
ground running and he's carried the trip 
all the way. 

So he is very much in charge. I find 
Bud McFarlane a great person to work 
with. He's knowledgeable, a broad- 
gauged person, and we have a very good 
working relationship, as I did with 
Judge Clark. 

Q. But it is said that you advanced 
the cause for military intervention in 
Grenada, and that you are taking a 
very tough line in Lebanon. 

A. As far as the Grenada operation 
is concerned, every one of the 
President's advisers agreed on the Presi- 
dent's decision. There was no difference 
of opinion. I think it was a very clear-cut 
case but a difficult decision. The Presi- 
dent stepped up to it very decisively and 
courageously; so there was no difference 
of view, and I certainly totally support 
what was done. 



Joint Statement, 
Nov. 14, 1983^' 

1. At the invitation of President Chun 
Doo Hwan, the President of the United 
States and Mrs. Ronald Reagan paid a 
state visit to the Republic of Korea from 
November 12 to 14, 1983. The two 
Presidents met at the Blue House on 
November 12 and again on November 13 



27 



for discussions of both bilateral and 
world affairs. The talks were held in a 
most cordial and open atmosphere. 

President Reagan addressed the Na- 
tional Assembly, visited field installa- 
tions of both the Korean and the U.S. 
Armed Forces, and also met with senior 
Korean officials, other Korean citizens, 
and a group of American businessmen. 

2. President Chun expressed his ap- 
preciation to President Reagan for 
America's steadfast support in the wake 
of the tragedies which the people of 
Korea have endured so recently: the 
September 1 Soviet attack on a Korean 
civil airliner and the October 9 North 
Korean terrorist attack in Burma which 
tragically claimed the lives of 17 inno- 
cent Koreans, among them many of the 
nation's most important leaders in 
economics, diplomacy, and politics. 

Both Presidents noted the throrough 
and conclusive investigation by the 
Government of Burma of the Rangoon 
bomb atrocity, which has produced une- 
quivocal evidence that the North Korean 
regime perpetrated this deliberate act of 
state terrorism. They agreed that such 
acts cannot be tolerated and called for 
effective international sanctions against 
North Korea. President Reagan af- 
firmed his admiration for the resolution 
and courage of the Korean people and 
their leaders in the face of these bar- 
baric acts. 

President Chun expressed his con- 
dolences to President Reagan and the 
American people on the tragic loss of 
life caused by the October 23 attack on 
the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. 
President Chun and President Reagan 
joined in declaring the unswerving op- 
position of the Korean and American 
peoples to such acts of terrorism and 
pledged continued efforts to remove the 
scourge of terrorism from the earth. 

3. The two Heads of State ex- 
changed views on a variety of interna- 
tional issues of mutual concern. Presi- 
dent Reagan outlined U.S. determina- 
tion to strengthen the defenses of the 
United States and its allies around the 
world, to bring about a reduction of ten- 
sions in volatile regions such as the Mid- 
dle East, and to reach an agreement 
with the Soviet Union to reduce the 



28 



global deployment of strategic weapons. 

President Chun explained in detail 
the overall security situation on the 
Korean Peninsula with particular 
reference to the continuing threat from 
North Korea, reflected in its military 
buildup and aggravated by its domestic 
problems. 

Both Presidents reaffirmed the im- 
portance of maintaining deterrence and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula, 
thereby ensuring peace there and in 
Northeast Asia, a region of critical 
strategic significance. 

President Reagan stated that the 
United States would continue to fulfill 
its role and responsibilities as a Pacific 
power, dedicated to maintaining peace 
and stability in the region. President 
Chun avowed his full support for these 
efforts. 

4. In particular. President Reagan, 
noting the security of the Republic of 
Korea is pivotal to the peace and stabili- 
ty of Northeast Asia and in turn, vital to 
the security of the United States, reaf- 
firmed the continuing strong commit- 
ment of the United States to the securi- 
ty of the Republic of Korea. The two 
Presidents pledged to uphold the obliga- 
tions embodied in the Republic of Korea- 
United States Mutual Defense Treaty 
signed in 1953, noting the success of 
that alliance in deterring aggression for 
more than 30 years. 

President Reagan stressed that the 
United States would continue to main- 
tain U.S. forces in Korea and to 
strengthen their capabilities. President 
Chun reaffirmed his support for the 
presence in Korea of American military 
forces as part of the United Nations and 
Combined Forces Commands. 

President Reagan noted that Korea 
spends 6% of its GNP on defense and 
further noted the efforts of the Republic 
of Korea to modernize and upgrade its 
defense capabilities. The two Presidents 
concurred that the program is essential 
if peace is to be maintained. President 
Reagan reconfirmed that the United 
States will continue to make available 
the weapons systems and technology' 
necessary to enhance the strength of 
Korea's armed forces. 

5. President Chun explained the 
Korean government's continuing efforts 



for the resumption of dialogue between 
South and North Korea and its policy 
for peaceful reunification with a view to 
easing tensions on the Korean Penin- 
sula, and achieving the Korean people's 
long-cherished aspiration for peaceful 
reunification. Expressing support of the 
United States for the sincere and patient 
efforts of the Republic of Korea. Presi- 
dent Reagan especially noted President 
Chun's comprehensive Proposal for 
Democratic Reunification through Na- 
tional Reconciliation put forth on 
January 22, 1982. 

President Reagan reconfirmed that 
the United States would not undertake 
talks with North Korea without full and 
equal participation of the Republic of 
Korea. The two Presidents reaffirmed 
that any unilateral steps toward North 
Korea which are not reciprocated 
toward the Republic of Korea by North 
Korea's principal allies would not be con- 
ducive to promoting stability or peace in 
the area. 

6. President Reagan expressed his 
admiration and support for the expand- 
ing and increasingly active international 
diplomacy of the Republic of Korea, and 
took note of the determination of the 
Republic of Korea to pursue an open 
door policy of dialogue with all nations. 

The two Presidents noted the 
significance of their respective nation's 
role as the hosts to important global 
gatherings and events, including the Los 
Angeles Olympics of 1984 and the Seoul 
Olympics of 1988. Both countries will 
abide by their commitments to admit 
representatives of all nations to par- 
ticipate in these international events. 

7. Recognizing the growing impor- 
tance of the Asia-Pacific region and also 
the growing sense of community among 
the Pacific rim countries, the two 
Presidents agreed that frequent ex- 
changes at all levels among the nations 
of the Pacific are necessary to enhance 
regional cohesion. They agreed that 
multilateral relations among the coun- 
tries in the region should be further 
strengthened in the fields of trade, 
finance, science, technology, culture, and 
tourism. 

8. The two Presidents expressed 
their belief that the Republic of Korea 
should be accepted in the United Nations 



Department of State Bulletin 



k. BtL •■!:.__ _. 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and tlie 
Republic of Korea 



pursuant to the principle of universality 
of the United Nations and that the entry 
of the Republic of Korea to the United 
Nations would contribute both to the 
reduction of tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula and the maintenance of inter- 
national peace. President Reagan prom- 
ised continuing support for the entry of 
the Republic of Korea into the United 
Nations. 

9. The two Presidents affirmed the 
importance of defending and strengthen- 
ing freedom and the institutions that 
serve freedom, openness, and political 
stability. 

10. President Chun and President 
Reagan exchanged views on a range of 
economic issues. They noted the impor- 
tance of ensuring that global economic 
recovery not be hindered by reversion to 
protectionism. In particular, President 
Reagan welcomed the trade liberaliza- 
tion measures being undertaken and 
planned by the Korean Government, 
despite its continuing deficit in foreign 
trade and the global trend of protec- 
tionism. Both Presidents agreed that 
such steps are an example of the 
positive actions all trading nations must 
take to defend the world trade system 
against protectionist attacks and 
recognize an urgent need for concerted 
international efforts in this direction. 

Both Presidents noted with satisfac- 
tion the continued expansion of bilateral 
trade, which totaled over $11 billion in 
1982, making the Republic of Korea one 
of the United States' most important 
trading partners and fifth largest 
market for U.S. agricultural products, 
and the United States the Republic of 
Korea's largest trading partner in ex- 
ports as well as imports. They agreed 
that this continued growth of bilateral 
trade attests to the vitality of 
U.S. -Korean economic relations. 

President Chun also expressed his 
appreciation for President Reagan's 
strong commitment to free trade and 
hoped that the Republic of Korea's ma- 
jor export commodities will be given 
greater access to the U.S. market with 
the continuation of the Republic of 
Korea's eligibility for GSP [generalized 
system of preferences] benefits on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. President 
Reagan took note of President Chun's 



January 1984 



views on the issues. In this regard, both 
Presidents recognized the necessity of 
coordinated actions by their respective 
governments to reduce various tariff 
and nontariff barriers. 

11. President Chun explained the re- 
cent efforts by the Korean Government 
to create a more favorable environment 
for foreign investment in the Republic of 
Korea and invited the United States to 
take advantage of such improved oppor- 
tunities. Both Presidents noted that a 
hospitable climate for foreign investors 
in both countries will continue to con- 
tribute to the flow of technology and to 
an expansion of employment oppor- 
tunities in the Republic of Korea and the 
United States. Both Presidents also 
noted that the continued participation of 
American firms in the Republic of 
Korea's major development projects by 
providing competitively priced and high- 
quality goods and services is another in- 
dication of the strong and cooperative 
economic ties that link the Republic of 
Korea and the United States. 

12. President Chun and President 
Reagan discussed prospects for further 
broadening cooperation in the fields of 
technology and energy. They agreed to 
further promote programs for scientific 
and technological cooperation. 

President Reagan assured President 
Chun that the United States will remain 
a reliable supplier of energy resources 
and energy technology, and in par- 
ticular, that the United States will seek 
to assist the Republic of Korea to obtain 
stable energy supplies in the event of a 
security emergency. In this regard. 
President Reagan noted positively the 
Korean Government's efforts to build up 
energy reserves for economic emergen- 
cies. President Chun expressed his ap- 
preciation for the U.S. pledge, and the 
Republic of Korea's interest in the pur- 
chase and development of energy 
resources in the United States. 

13. President Chun and President 
Reagan took note of the strong and 
myriad bonds of friendship and coopera- 
tion that have linked the United States 
and the Republic of Korea in the 
postwar era and judged those ties to be 



in excellent condition. As one reflection 
of the expanding scope and importance 
of those relationships, President Reagan 
informed President Chun of the inten- 
tion of the United States to establish in 
the near future a consulate in Pusan, 
Korea's second greatest city and a focal 
point of the U.S. -Korean economic inter- 
course. President Chun welcomed that 
decision. 

President Chun and President 
Reagan pledged to carry forward the 
full range of security, political, 
economic, scientific, and cultural 
meetings and consultations on our joint 
agenda, in order to maintain and deepen 
our already excellent relations in those 
diverse fields. 

14. The two Presidents underscored 
the necessity for the promotion of 
mutual understanding and exchanges 
between the Korean and American 
peoples, and agreed to work toward ex- 
panded cultural and educational ex- 
changes. The two Presidents expressed 
their satisfaction with the promotion of 
American studies in the Republic of 
Korea as well as Korean studies in the 
United States. 

15. President and Mrs. Reagan ex- 
pressed their deep appreciation to Presi- 
dent and Mrs. Chun for the warm 
welcome they received in the Republic of 
Korea, and their heartfelt thanks to the 
people of the Republic of Korea for the 
hospitality, graciousness, and good will 
they had been shown. 

The two Presidents agreed that ex- 
changes of visits between the two 
Presidents have contributed to the fur- 
ther development of the existing friendly 
relations between the two countries. In 
that context. President Reagan asked 
President Chun to visit Washington 
again at a mutually convenient time and 
President Chun accepted that invitation 
with appreciation. 



29 



>iin!n,intiiii 



mmiiiUiMmMmmMu^mi^^^^^ 



WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Arrival Remarks, 
Nov. 14, 1983" 

Thank you all for coming out to greet 
us, and thank you for minding the store 
while we were away. I know I speak for 
Nancy and for everyone of our party 
when I say it's great to be home. 

We won't keep you long, but I just 
want to tell you how proud I am of 
everyone who helped make this trip a 
great success. We traveled nearly 16,000 
miles to visit two countries that are vital 
to us and to our future. Japan and 
Korea have very different roots from 
our own, but each of us is a Pacific na- 
tion, and we're bound together by a 
great treasure of shared values— our 
love of freedom and democracy, the 
drive, determination, and skill of our 
people, and our optimism for the future. 

Mike Mansfield, our very wise Am- 
bassador in Tokyo, likes to say, "The 
next century will be the century of the 
Pacific." And he's right. The East Asian 
and Pacific region is growing faster than 
any other region in the world. Japan has 
become our largest overseas trading 
partner, and Korea ranks among our top 
10 worldwide. We're building a future 
together. This means we shoulder great 
responsibilities, but we also have 
tremendous opportunities. And working 
as partners to make tomorrow better 
and more secure is what this trip is all 
about. 

I'm pleased to report some good 
news. America's partnerships are 
stronger, and prospects for a more 
secure peace and prosperity are better 
today than a week ago. 

In Japan we established an agenda 
for progress so we can solve problems 
and create jobs, security, and safety for 
our families and for theirs. That agenda 
ranges from efforts to lower trade bar- 
riers to assisting recovery of the U.S. 
auto industry, to expanding our energy 
trade, promoting greater investment in 
capital markets, cooperating in defense 
technology, encouraging exports and im- 
ports of high technology, coordinating 



our foreign assistance efforts, and ex- 
panding our cultural programs. 

We also agreed on an approach to 
correct the imbalance between the 
Japanese yen and the American dollar. 
Our currencies should reflect the 
political stability and economic strength 
that our two countries enjoy. In Japan's 
case this will mean a stronger yen, 
which means that American products 
will compete more effectively in world 
markets. 

Because of the breadth and complex- 
ity of these issues, I intend to establish a 
management group, under the leader- 
ship of the Vice President, to assure 
essential foUowup action. If each side is 
willing to give a little, then all of us will 
gain a lot. 

Diplomacy is important. Strengthen- 
ing the spirit of friendship is the best 
way to solve problems and create lasting 
partnerships. And I can't tell you how 
proud I was to have the historic oppor- 
tunity to address the Japanese Diet and 
all the people of Japan. I told them what 
we Americans feel in our hearts — that 
we, like they, are people of peace, that 
we deeply desire a nuclear arms reduc- 
tion agreement, and that we will never 
walk away from the negotiating table. 

Those who disagree with the United 
States get plenty of publicity. But one 
thing becomes more plain to me each 
time I travel: Across the globe, America 
is looked to as a friend and as a leader 
in preserving peace and freedom. This 
was certainly true in Japan and Korea. 

I was at one of the meetings in 
Korea, and I just assumed that Nancy 
was out sightseeing or probably even 
shopping for souvenirs. And knowing 
Nancy as well as I do, I wasn't surprised 
when I came home and found that she 
had two little Korean friends, Lee Kil 
Woo and Ahn Ji Sook. They have come 
over to the States where they're going 
to be treated at St. Francis Hospital in 
Roslyn, New York. And Nancy met 
them by way of a very remarkable 
woman, Harriet Hodges, who has suc- 
ceeded in bringing some 600 children 
like this, who needed medical attention 
that could only be given here in this 
country, to bring them to the United 
States. 



So they've had their first Air Force 
[ONE] ride— or airplane ride, and 
they've had their first helicopter ride, 
and they've been very active for some 16 
or 17 hours. [Laughter] 

I wish you could have been with us 
in Korea — a country scarred by the re- 
cent bombing in Rangoon and the 
Korean airliner tragedy. The South 
Koreans live under the shadow of Com- 
munist aggression. They understand the 
value of freedom, and they're paying the 
price to defend it. You know, sometimes 
you hear events are more symbolism 
than substance. There's more than sym- 
bolism when over a million Koreans line 
the streets to wave and cheer Americans 
and to thank America for helping keep 
them free. 

There's more than symbolism in the 
threat to the people of Seoul, who live 
within range of North Korean artillery 
just some 30 kilometers away. And 
there's more than symbolism in the 
danger to our American soldiers helping 
to guard the border of the DMZ, often 
in weather that leaves them freezing 
from their heads to their toes. 

I have just been looking forward to 
telling the American people we've had 
such a wrong impression. I think most 
of us just sort of pictured our forces 
over there as kind of garrison troops, 
just waiting on hand that anything 
should happen. That's not true. They are 
combat ready, and they are the farthest 
advanced toward a potential enemy of 
any American forces in the world. 

I reaffirmed to the Korean people 
America's commitment to their peace 
and freedom and encouraged them to 
develop further their democracy. And I 
must tell you that one of the most un- 
forgettable experiences of my life was 
the time I spent Sunday afternoon and 
morning with our brave troops at the 
DMZ. 

If you could have been with me, you 
would have been at the worship service 
Sunday morning that we had with our 
soldiers in an open field, less than a mile 
from one of the most tyrannical regimes 
on earth. And there, singing, was a 
choir of little girls, not much bigger than 



Department of State Bulletin 



FEATURE 
Visit to 

Japan and the 
Republic of Korea 



this one, all orphans from an orphanage 
that is maintained and supported by our 
GFs. And they have done this with 
several others there. The young men 
and women of the 2d Infantry Division 
maintain those institutions. 

And to hear these children closing 
the service, singing "America, the 
Beautiful" in our language, was a 
spiritual experience. And you would 
have heard, if you'd been at that service, 
their chaplain telling us that we were 
standing on the edge of freedom. Being 
there teaches us that freedom is never 
free, nor can it be purchased in one in- 
stallment. We can only struggle to keep 
it, pass it on to the next generation, and 
hope they'll preserve it for their children 
and their children's children. 

And that's the risk that our soldiers 
have accepted day in and day out for 
more than 30 years. As that chaplain 
reminded us, "Greater love hath no man 
than to lay down his life for his friends." 
And this they have done at the DMZ. I 
was honored to meet our men, and I 
promised them that I would tell the 
American people how crucial their jobs 



are, not just to the people of Korea but 
to people everywhere who love freedom. 
So much of what we take for granted 
each day we owe to these heroes and 
others like them around the world. They 
make us so proud to be Americans. 

Coming home from Korea and 
Japan, all of us bring with us renewed 
energy and renewed commitment to our 
fundamental goals, building a new era of 
peace and prosperity — just as soon as 
we readjust our clocks. [Laughter] 

God bless you, and God bless this 
wonderful country. 



'Made in the East Room of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 14, 1983). 

^Made in the Banquet Hall of the Prime 
Minister's official residence (text from Week- 
ly Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
5Jov. 21, 1983). 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of 'Nov. 21. 1983. 

■•Made in the Haeoromo-No-Ma Room at 
the Akasaka Palace (text from Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of 
Nov. 21, 1983). 

■^Made in the Banquet Hall at the Im- 
perial Palace in response to a toast by 
Emperor Hirohito (text from Weekly Com- 

Silation of Presidential Documents of 
[ov. 21, 1983). 

^Made in the Assembly Hall of the House 
of Representatives at the 'National Diet 
Buildmg (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). 

*Held in the Shairan-No-Ma Room of the 
Akasaka Palace (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents of^Nov. 21, 
1983). 

'Made in the International Terminal at 
the Kimpo Airport (text from Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of 
Nov. 21, 1983). 

'"Recorded in Tokyo on Nov. 11 for 
broadcast Nov. 12 in tlie United States (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). 

"Made in the Assembly Chamber of the 
National Assembly Building (text from Week- 
ly Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Nov. 21, 1983). 

'-Made at the U.S. Embassy (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). 

''Made in the State Dining Room at the 
Blue House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). 

'■"Made in the mortar bunker area of the 
camp, located near the DMZ (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). 

'^The Secretary was interviewed on ABC- 
TV's "This Week With David Brinkley" via 
satellite from South Korea, by David 
Brinkley, Sam Donaldson, and George Will of 
ABC News (press release 400 of Nov. 22, 
1983). 

'^Issued at conclusion of visit (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). 

"Made on the South Lawn of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). ■ 



January 1984 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



Promoting Peace in the 
iVIiddie East 



Secretary Shultz's address before the 
Cmmcil of Jewish Federations and 
Welfare Funds, Atlanta, Georgia, on 
November 19, 1983.^ 

Every Secretary of State becomes a 
Middle East expert very rapidly, 
whether he wants to or not. Usually his 
training is a process of ordeal by fire. 
But the process has a healthy way of 
bringing you back to the basics of 
foreign policy: the importance of stand- 
ing by principles and commitments to 
friends; the virtue of courage and stead- 
fastness in the face of challenges; the 
uses and limits of power as a factor in 
diplomacy; and the need for a moral 
compass to steer you on a steady course 
through turbulent waters. 

Today, in the Middle East the 
United States is engaged on a variety of 
fronts. We are extending our coopera- 
tion with Israel. We are seeking to 
restore peace in Lebanon. We are trying 
to strengthen the forces of moderation 
in the Arab world. We are exploring 
new possibilities for progress in the 
peace process. We are attempting to 
contain the possibly dangerous conse- 
quences of the Iran-Iraq war. 

It may seem a confusing kaleido- 
scope of problems, but there is a central 
core to our diplomacy, which pulls 
together all these issues and all our 
strategic, political, and moral concerns 
about the future of the Middle East. 
And that core is the effort to achieve a 
secure peace between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors. So all our activities, in 
whatever dimension of the Middle East, 
are geared in one way or another to that 
central goal. 

And that goal itself has a deeper 
meaning. In the final analysis — behind 
all the code words about "just and 
comprehensive peace" and "secure and 
recognized boundaries"— we are talking 
about people and the quality of their 
lives. True peace is not measured only 
by legal or political criteria but in human 
terms: by whether individuals can live 
their lives and go about their business 
and raise their children without ele- 
mental fear for their personal safety. It 
means people's confidence that their 
community and their society have a 
future. It means a sense of opportunity 
and possibility, not fear of random 
danger or deliberate threat. 



As the poet said, "no man is an 
island." So the fate of others affects our 
own. No people understands this better 
than the Jewish people. Anti-Semitism 
in a faraway country; persecution of 
Jews in the Soviet Union, Iran, and 
Ethiopia; mindless denunciations of 
"Zionism as racism" in international 
forums; Katyusha rockets landing on the 
towns of northern Israel— these touch 
you deeply. No people understands bet- 
ter than you the fragility of the 
restraints that hold civilized society 
together, because no one knows better 
the profound inhumanity of which the 
darker recesses of human nature are 
capable. 

Similarly, the people of Israel have 
struggled so long and so hard for peace 
with their neighbors, but then the first 
leader to make peace with them is 
assassinated. And Lebanon, the second 
moderate Arab country to negotiate an 
agreement with them, is right now 
under assault from Arab radicals 
precisely because it did so. 

There should be no doubt of where 
the United States stands on any of these 
questions. The Jewish tradition is one of 
the principal sources of the values of our 
civilization— freedom, democracy, the 
dignity of the individual. In a world 
where those values are widely threat- 
ened, the condition of Israel and the 
Jewish people is a measure of the 
vulnerability/ of those values. The ap- 
pearance of anti-Semitism has always 
been a symptom of the deeper sickness 
of a society; similarly, the vicious inter- 
national campaign against the existence 
of Israel is a reflection of a much 
broader ideological assault on the in- 
terests, well-being, and principles of the 
whole free world. Therefore, when we 
concern ourselves with the fate of Israel, 
we are also concerning ourselves with 
the fate of the values that both we and 
Israel stand for. 

In this spirit, I want to say a few 
words about our policy in Lebanon and 
then about the broader subject of pro- 
moting peace between Israel and all its 
Arab neighbors. 



The Agony of Lebanon 

At stake in Lebanon are some of these 
basic values and some basic principles of 
international law and international 
morality: 

• The principle that differences 
among nations are to be settled by 
reason and negotiation, not by the use 
or threat of force; and 

• The right of a small country to 
decide for itself how to achieve its 
sovereign objectives, free from outside 
pressure, threat, or blackmail. 

Lebanon is a proud and beautiful 
country whose people have contributed 
much to the world. Yet it has had a 
complex and turbulent history. The roots 
of enmity in that country go very deep. 
Nevertheless, for many years Lebanon 
thrived because political rivalries were 
accommodated and a delicate balance 
maintained. The yearning for peace, too, 
runs deep in Lebanon. 

But the delicate balance in Lebanon 
was upset, primarily by the involvement 
of outside, non-Lebanese forces— just as 
today, the primary obstacle to the inter- 
nal reconciliation is the presence of out- 
side, non-Lebanese forces. 

The Palestinian terrorists, expelled 
from Jordan in September 1970, came to 
Lebanon and proceeded to do in 
Lebanon what they had attempted to do 
in Jordan. They turned southern 
Lebanon into an armed camp which 
became a state-within-a-state terrorizing 
the local population; ultimately, it 
became a battleground. Raids and rocket 
attacks on the towns and villages of 
northern Israel became a common occur- 
rence. Diplomacy did achieve a cease- 
fire, but tension remained high. In any 
case, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 
with an announced intention to eradicate 
the threat once and for all. 

When the guns fell silent, the ter- 
rorists had been driven from Beirut and 
south Lebanon. Although we had not 
agreed with Israel's decision to invade 
Lebanon, we accepted the request of 
Lebanon and Israel to help them 
negotiate a longer term solution to the 
basic problem. Months of negotiation 
produced the Lebanese-Israeli agree- 
ment of last May 17, which provides for 
total withdrawal of Israeli troops, ar- 
rangements to assure the safety of the 
people of northern Israel, and the oppor- 
tunity for the Lebanese Government to 
extend its sovereignty throughout its 
territory and achieve reconciliation 
among the country's many religious com- 
munities. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



■m 



THE SECRETARY 



But the agony of Lebanon continues. 
The May 17 agreement has not yet been 
implemented, largely because of Syria's 
refusal to negotiate the withdrawal of 
its own forces from Lebanon, reneging 
on repeated pledges to do so once Israel 
did so. No one questions that Syria has 
legitimate security concerns with respect 
to Lebanon. But Syria, unlike Israel, has 
so far been unwilling to negotiate with 
Lebanon over how to reconcile those 
concerns with Lebanon's sovereign right 
to decide its own destiny. 

We are heartened by the willingness 
of a broad spectrum of Lebanese leaders 
finally to sit down with President 
Gemayel at Geneva. We believe the 
political process that they have begun 
can start the urgent task of rebuilding 
their country on the basis of an 
equitable sharing of authority and 
responsibility. This must be our first 
priority. After so much suffering, the 
people of Lebanon are entitled to it. 
With patriotism, vision, and courage on 
all sides, a political solution can be 
achieved. 

But we are realists: It is essential to 
maintain an environment of stability and 
security so that radical forces cannot 
steamroU the negotiations and so that a 
fair political solution can be reached. 
The cease-fire agreed upon Septem- 
ber 26— which launched the Geneva 
negotiations — was achieved only because 
we and our friends were able to 
demonstrate that there were limits 
beyond which we could not be pushed. 

America's support for Lebanon is 
not and cannot be separated from our 
broader peace objectives in the Middle 
East. If America's efforts for peaceful 
solutions were to be overwhelmed by 
brute force, our role as a force for peace 
would be that much weakened every- 
where. Friends who rely on us would be 
disheartened and would be that much 
less secure. Moderates in the Arab 
world whom we are encouraging to take 
risks for peace would feel it far less safe 
to do so. The rejectionists would have 
scored a victory, confirming the value of 
reliance on the Soviet Union. Israel's 
security would be jeopardized. That is 
what is at stake in Lebanon. 

I must say a word here about the 
American forces in Lebanon, and off- 
shore, whose commitment and courage 
have already helped bring about the 
Geneva conference. As a former Marine 
myself, I have a very deep appreciation 
of what these fighting men can con- 
tribute and of our duty to see that they 
are not put at risk except where they 



are performing an essential role in our 
national interest. And in Lebanon they 
are. 

Our Marines were sent to Lebanon 
to take part in a multinational force re- 
quested by the Lebanese Government. 
The presence of that force was meant to 
further that government's efforts to 
assure the safety of innocent civilians in 
the Beirut area in the wake of the 
massacres at Sabra and Shatila. And it 
was meant to back up that government 
in its efforts to extend its authority and 
restore national unity. 



and we are confident that Israel will be 
using this influence in support of the 
Lebanese Government and its efforts of 
national reconciliation. 

At stake, as I said earlier, is the fate 
of the second Arab country to negotiate 
directly an agreement with Israel. I 
need not elaborate on what it would 
mean for the overall peace process if 
Lebanon should be coerced into renounc- 
ing that agreement. It is the only ex- 
isting formula that ensures both Israeli 
withdrawal and a solution to the securi- 
ty problem that created the Lebanese 



America's support for Lebanon is not and 
cannot be separated from our broader peace objec- 
tives in the Middle East. If America's efforts for 
peaceful solutions were to be overwhelmed by brute 
force, our role as a force for peace would be that 
much weakened everywhere. 



It is truly and importantly a multina- 
tional effort. Our British, French, and 
Italian allies are there with us. Including 
the UN peacekeeping forces in southern 
Lebanon, there are over 11,000 interna- 
tional troops in the country— of which 
ours are about a tenth of the 
total — symbolizing that the world com- 
munity, not just the United States, feels 
an important stake in the future of 
Lebanon. 

The primary military responsibility 
rests, of course, on the Lebanese Army, 
which we have helped to turn into an ef- 
fective fighting force and which is get- 
ting stronger by the day. But the 
multinational force including our 
Marines is a further deterrent to 
challenges and a crucial weight in the 
scales. The bipartisan support in the 
Congress for our Marines was a valuable 
contribution to our objectives, dispelling 
doubts about our staying power and 
strengthening our hand. We need to be 
patient, and we need to be steadfast. To 
remove these forces now would be a 
serious mistake, which we would regret: 
It would only upset the balance in 
Lebanon, undermine the chances of a 
political settlement, and precipitate new 
chaos. 

For Israel, the sovereign in- 
dependence and peace of Lebanon con- 
tinue to be a major strategic interest, 
directly affecting its own security. 
Israel, too, has influence in Lebanon, 



crisis in the first place. We will not ac- 
cept its abrogation. 

But the main issue now is national 
reconciliation. Especially in view of the 
sacrifices that have been made, the in- 
ternational community has a right to ask 
all the parties in Lebanon to settle their 
national problem. As the Bible tells us, 
to everything there is a season. Now in 
Lebanon is the time to decide. As in 
every negotiation, there must be com- 
promise. For every risk taken, there is 
gain. And the risks of failure to act 
right now are far greater than any of 
the risks of a fair political solution. 

The Peace Process 

As long as there is no solution to the 
basic issue of Middle East peace, 
however, the region is bound to be sub- 
ject to other crises, in other places, in 
other forms. Therefore, our efforts in 
Lebanon have not diverted us from the 



January 1984 



The issues at stake in Lebanon, as I 
said before, have wider significance: the 
principle of peaceful settlement of 
disputes, the right of small countries to 
live in peace and security with their 
neighbors. As Israelis and Jews have 
learned very clearly from bitter ex- 
perience, we all live in a world in which 
many do not share these principles. 
Therefore, these principles must be 
defended, sometimes at the price of 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



iiihimmmmmmummmHimmmimmiimiim 



great risk or sacrifice. If the free na- 
tions are to preserve their security and 
defend their ideals, they must have suffi- 
cient military power to deter or resist 
aggression. Whether in Central 
America, the Middle East, Western 
Europe, or Asia, history shows that 
diplomacy works only when aggressors 
conclude that no military option is 
available. 

The United States has always 
understood that a strong Israel is not 
only a guarantor of security for the 
Jewish people but also a powerful force 
for freedom and a strategic partner to 
America and the West. 

That's why we have ensured— and 
will continue to ensure— that Israel 
receives the help it needs to maintain a 
military advantage to deter its enemies. 
The Soviet military buildup in Syria 
underlines this necessity and underlines 
it again and again for anyone who will 
look to see. The United States has fur- 
nished over $20 billion in military and 
economic aid since 1949, most of it in 
the last 10 years. In fiscal year 1984, 
Israel will receive a total of $2.6 billion 
in military and economic assistance. 

But military power is not enough. 
Israel's dream of becoming "a nation like 
all other nations" is yet to be realized. 
The Jewish state did not rescue the sur- 
vivors of the ghettos in Europe and the 
Middle East in order to become itself a 
new ghetto among nations. And yet, 35 
years after its founding, Israel remains 
rejected by most of its neighbors and 
isolated in international forums. I 
remember being in Israel just after 
Sadat's historic journey to Jerusalem 
and feeling personally— very per- 
sonally—what a tremendous emotional 



and the long-term threat from advanced 
weapons technology in enemy hands, 
cannot help but be deeply troublesome 
to Israel's people. And the moral burden 
of the occupation can undermine the 
values on which Israel was founded and 
can divide its society. 

Military might and control of ter- 
ritory have prevented defeat on the bat- 
tlefield, but true security and peace of 
mind can come only when Israel has 
gained the acceptance and recognition of 
its neighbors. That is why, even as we 
assist Israel's capacity to defend itself 
militarily, the promotion of Arab-Israeli 
peace through negotiation is the 
number-one priority of our policy and 
our efforts in the Middle East. 

Since the great achievement of the 
Camp David accords, the peace process 
has encountered many problems. On the 
Israeli side, we remain deeply concerned 
about the ongoing construction and ex- 
pansion of settlements, unilaterally 
changing the status of the occupied ter- 
ritories even while their future is subject 
to negotiation. On the Arab side, there 
is the intense and continuing struggle 
between those who want to secure a bet- 
ter future through negotiation and those 
who reject peaceful solutions as a matter 
of ideology. The outcome of this strug- 
gle will go a long way toward determin- 
ing the chances for progress. 

Once before when our focus was on 
Lebanon, on September 1, 1982, Presi- 
dent Reagan reminded us of the bigger 
picture and of our commitment to a 
broader peace. On the day the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] com- 
pleted its evacuation of Beirut, the 
President challenged the parties to make 
a "fresh start" in the Middle East. He 



The Palestinians have been victimized above 
all by their self-appointed leaders and spokesmen 
who, for decades, have chased the illusion of 
military options and foolishly rejected the only 
possible path to a solution: direct negotiations. 



impact Sadat's visit had. It was clear to 
me how deeply all Israelis yearn for true 
peace. 

The requirements of defense are still 
a heavy burden on Israel's economy. 
Military reserve duties disrupt family 
life and economic productivity. The pros- 
pect of living with perpetual hostility. 



34 



spelled out the foundation of the 
American position— in essence the prin- 
ciple of exchanging territory for peace, 
as called for in UN Security Council 
Resolution 242, which has been our 
policy ever since 1967. 

At the same time, the President 
added: ". . . our view on the extent to 



which Israel should be asked to give up 
territory will be heavily affected by the 
extent of true peace and normalization 
and the security arrangements offered 
in return." He made clear the American 
view, among other things, that the 
security and legitimacy of Israel are 
crucial criteria that have to be recog- 
nized in any settlement; that neither a 
Palestinian state, nor permanent Israeli 
control of occupied territories, nor a 
return to the pre- 1967 security situation 
is a viable solution; that Palestinian self- 
government in the West Bank and Gaza 
in association with Jordan offers the 
best chance for a durable peace; that 
Jerusalem must be undivided; and most 
fundamentally, that the terms of a set- 
tlement can only be determined by the 
parties concerned in direct negotiations. 

The positions laid out in the Presi- 
dent's initiative are fair, balanced, and 
realistic. They were meant as a stimulus 
to negotiation, not as the dictated out- 
come of a negotiation. The initiative was 
an opportunity for the seekers after 
justice in the Arab world to achieve 
their goal through negotiations leading 
to peace. Although it triggered a 
vigorous— and, on the whole, construc- 
tive—debate among Arab leaders, none 
of them has yet seized that opportunity. 
Likewise, it was a challenge to Israel to 
achieve true and lasting security 
through peace, rather than relying on 
the short-term illusion of security 
through territory. The Israeli Govern- 
ment, I regret to note, rejected the 
President's initiative. But I have little 
doubt that if an Arab leader comes for- 
ward with a mandate to negotiate on the 
basis of those principles, Israel will not 
let such a historic opportunity slip away. 

We cannot be certain, however, that 
that opportunity will remain open in- 
definitely. Every passing month creates 
new facts on the ground which, I am 
convinced, are making the process for 
reaching a negotiated settlement ever 
more difficult and its prospects ever 
more uncertain. The peace treaty with 
Egypt— and the return of the Sinai to 
Egyptian sovereignty— prove that 
negotiations work. Both sides must 
recognize, and soon, that negotiations 
are the only hope for a secure, just, and 
peaceful future— the only hope. The 
absence of negotiation is a formula for 
endless conflict and mounting danger. 

I have spoken a lot tonight about the 
human dimension of the Middle East 
conflict, and there is another aspect that 
must be mentioned. I am thinking of the 
Palestinian people. The Palestinians 
have been victimized above all by their 
self-appointed leaders and spokesmen 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



who, for decades, have chased the illu- 
sion of military options and foolishly re- 
jected the only possible path to a solu- 
tion: direct negotiations. The utter 
failure of rejectionist policies ought to be 
obvious by now. But I am thinking in 
particular of the 1.3 million Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and Gaza. Their 
well-being, their desire for a greater 
voice in determining their own destiny 
must be another issue of moral concern, 
even while we continue to pursue an 
agreed solution to the final status of the 
occupied territories. If their acceptance 
of a peaceful future with Israel is to be 
nurtured, they must be given some stake 
in that future by greater opportunities 
for economic development, by fairer ad- 
ministrative practices, and by greater 
concern for the quality of their lives. 

I must add a word here about Jor- 
dan. It has been our view since the 1967 
war that Jordan is the key to a 
negotiated solution in the West Bank 
and Gaza. The PLO has thus far ex- 
cluded itself as a negotiating partner by 
its refusal to recognize Israel's right to 
exist. Jordan, in contrast, under the 
leadership of King Hussein, has long 
sought a path toward moderation and 
conciliation. Jordan's participation in the 
peace process has been inhibited by 
many considerations, including the 
absence of the necessary support from 
other moderate Arabs but most of all 
the fierce opposition of Arab radicals. 

Last spring King Hussein nearly 
achieved an agreement that would have 
permitted him to take a more active role 
in the peace process on behalf of the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 
The effort failed because of radical Arab 
opposition. More recently, a bitter and 
violent struggle has broken out within 
the PLO and between the PLO and 
Syria. King Hussein has pointedly and 
courageously raised the question of 
whether the PLO, if dominated by Syria, 
can continue to claim legitimacy as 
spokesman for the Palestinian people. 
The outcome of this struggle is sure to 
have major implications for Jordan, the 
Palestinians, and the future of the peace 
process. For our part, the door will 
always be kept open for a negotiation in 
accordance with the President's 
September 1 initiative. 

There may be some who have 
already written off the peace process for 
the next year. They think we will shy 
away from the sensitive issues of the 
Middle East during a presidential elec- 
tion year. Well, they are wrong. Ronald 
Reagan has no intention of letting the 
search for peace lapse. We cannot afford 
to. Let it never be said that the United 



January 1984 



States was too busy practicing politics to 
pursue peace. 

The Future 

In the next 2 weeks. President Reagan 
will be receiving in Washington Israel's 
new leaders— President Herzog, Prime 
Minister Shamir, and Defense Minister 
Arens. Our two governments have many 
things to talk about: Lebanon; the rela- 
tionship with Egypt; the possibilities for 
progress toward peace; the threat of 
Soviet expansionism in the Middle East; 
the need for Israel to restore its 
economic vitality; the fate of threatened 
Jewish communities around the world, 
especially in the Soviet Union; and other 
important common concerns. 



Our cooperation is an enduring reali- 
ty, whichever party is in office in either 
country, because this relationship is 
deeply rooted in the sentiments of our 
peoples and in the values of our civiliza- 
tion. There is no stronger bond between 
countries. So we come back, in the end, 
to the human dimension. The fate of 
Antoliy Shcharanskiy and the fate of 
Lebanon and the fate of the villagers of 
Kiryat Sh'monah and the fate of the 
Palestinians— indeed, the fate of all men 
and women of good will, who wish to 
live in peace— this is the common agenda 
of Israel and the United States, as it is 
the common agenda of our 
civilization. 



'Press release 403 of Nov. 22, 1983. 



News Conference of December 5 



Secretary Shultz's news conference at 
the Department of State on December 5, 
1983.^ 

Q. The process of the Lebanese 
Government asserting its sovereignty 
over its entire territory may take a 
long time. Is the United States 
prepared to keep the Marines in 
Beirut until there is a national recon- 
ciliation and until the Lebanese 
Government is able to assert its 
sovereignty? 

A. We will work with the Lebanese 
Government so that it can create a 
broadly based government for itself, and 
we will work for the removal of all 
foreign forces so that Lebanon can be 
sovereign over all its territory. 

Precisely what tactical moves will 
implement that policy remains to be 
seen, but we intend to see this through 
with the Government of Lebanon. 

Q. In our recent clashes with the 
Syrians and other elements in 
Lebanon, don't these place us in the 
position of becoming a party to the 
conflict? Are we becoming the enemy 
to some elements who then want to at- 
tack us? 

A. There are many who try to put 
us in that position, but that is certainly 
not our position. We are there at the in- 
vitation of the duly constituted, 
legitimate Government of Lebanon, and 
we, as any armed force, are present 
with the understanding that, of course, 
we have the right to self-defense and 



that is universal, and we will defend our- 
selves, as we are doing. But we are not 
there contending with anybody. We are 
trying to be helpful. We are there in a 
peacekeeping role, along with the other 
countries in the multinational force— the 
U.K., France, and Italy— and that is our 
role and that is our objective, but we 
will defend ourselves. 

Q. The Syrians appear to be will- 
ing to hold the downed American pilot 
hostage for withdrawal of American 
Marines from Lebanon. Let me ask 
that in a larger context. 

The Soviets, in a press conference 
this morning, gave an impression to 
one watching it live that the whole 
business of European missiles was a 
fairly well-controlled situation, but 
that the situation in the Middle East 
seemed to be more dangerous than 
before because it seemed to be 
somewhat more out of control, maybe 
on both sides. Could you assess how 
serious that is? 

A. I will try to take that question 
apart into its various components, if I 
could. 

First of all, insofar as the airman is 
concerned, through Ambassador [to 
Syria] Paganelli we have made strong 
representations to the Syrian Govern- 
ment requesting his prompt return, and 
we have made the same statements in 
international fora, particularly in the 
United Nations. At least as of this mo- 
ment, while I have seen some news 
reports. Ambassador Paganelli has not 



35 



uihii'i'MttiHtimMiMmmmmiMmiiiMmi^^ 



THE SECRETARY 



had anything come back to him, and that 
is our official channel of communication 
on that subject. 

I think that it is the case that the 
situation in the Middle East has great 
points of tension in it, and, of course, we 
are trj'ing to do everything we can to 
settle those points of tension down. 

One has to do with the emergence of 
the Government of Lebanon and the 
withdrawal of foreign forces, as we have 
been discussing. Still another point of 
tension comes out of the fact that there 
is a major dispute, apparently, among 
factions of the Palestinians, and that 
dispute is being apparently supported by 
Syria, and so you have had intense 
fighting in the Tripoli area. This has 
nothing to do with many other aspects 
of Middle East tension. And at the same 
time there is a major war between Iraq 
and Iran, and there is always the 
possibility that the offshoots of that war 
may involve third parties to a greater 
extent than formerly, and so we have to 
be alert to that, and, of course, to con- 
tinue to try to get that war settled; but 
barring that, at least to have an 
understanding that it not spread itself in 
the gulf region, as was envisaged in the 
UN resolution recently passed. 

So I think it is true that there are 
many points of tension in the Middle 
East and they come from a lot of dif- 
ferent sources. The United States, see- 
ing that peace has its enemies, 
recognizes that it also must have its 
defenders, and that is one of our roles 
and that is one of our objectives in the 
region. 

Q. You haven't mentioned the 
Soviet Union. Is that one of the third 
parties? 

A. The Soviet Union, of course, has 
been the major supplier of arms to 
Syria, and it does have considerable 
numbers of military personnel in Syria, 
probably on the order of 7,000 or so. 

So it is there. It represents a 
presence, and it is connected with 
Syrian aggression. What its advice to 
Syria is, of course, we don't know, but 
we urge the Soviet Union to urge Syria 
to look at the Lebanon problem in a sen- 
sible way, and we hope that they do so. 

Insofar as the Iran-Iraq war is con- 
cerned, they have, obviously, no direct 
involvement in it and may have the 
same concerns we do to see Iran and 
Iraq work out a negotiated solution. But 
it does seem far away. 

Q. The President said yesterday, 
when asked about the leadership 
situation in Syria, he said, "Your 



guess is as good as mine on who's in 
control there." Could you articulate a 
little more today on what we know 
about, number one, Assad's health; 
and, number two, how decisions are 
being made on a day-to-day basis in 
Damascus? 

A. I believe it's a mistake for me to 
speculate about something like that. We 
have all sorts of information coming in 
and official statements being made, and, 
as far as we're concerned, we deal with 
the Government of Syria, and principally 
our Ambassador deals with the Foreign 
Minister and the Ministry. 

We deal with the Government of 
Syria here in Washington, and have, in 
the last 48 hours, had quite a number of 
conversations, both here and there, and 
that is the process through which we're 
going. 

You have your speculations about it, 
and we hear a lot of information, but I 
don't think it's worthwhile for me to try 
to sort that out. 

Q. President Assad is such a domi- 
nant figure there, would not a leader- 
ship problem compound the problems 
of bringing about a Mideast solution? 

A. We don't know precisely what 
the situation of President Assad is. As 
far as we know, he's firmly in control, 
and until we have some evidence other- 
wise, that's the assumption we'll go on. 

As far as we're concerned, Syria is 
very much a functioning government, 
and we deal with the Foreign Ministry 
through our Ambassador. When higher 
level visitors go there and may expect to 
see President Assad, if he's well enough, 
I'm sure that he will see them. He'll 
receive people from other areas if he's 
well enough, and that will be one way in 
which we perhaps will know what his 
condition is. But there are all sorts of 
rumors, and I don't think they're worth 
my commenting on. 

Q. The Syrians appear to have 
answered yesterday's attack by shell- 
ing the Marine compound in which an 
additional eight Marines have been 
killed. Where does that leave us? Are 
you now going to retaliate for that, 
and aren't we engaged in a rather 
dangerous escalation that could cer- 
tainly bring us up against the Soviet 
Union? 

A. We can speculate that that is 
Syrian retaliation, but we don't have any 
evidence for that. There's nothing that 
we know about that says it's a direct 



result. There was a fair amount of shell- 
ing in the Beirut area yesterday, not 
simply in the airport area. But it may 
be. 

As far as we're concerned, we're 
there in a peacekeeping role. We're 
there as a country offering our good of- 
fices. Ambassador Rumsfeld [Donald 
Rumsfeld, President's personal represen- 
tative in the Middle East] will be 
heading back to the region tomorrow. 
Ambassador [to Lebanon] Bartholomew, 
having been here with President 
Gemayel, is about back in Beirut by 
now, and we're there trying to be 
helpful. 

We have returned fire to those who 
have fired at us, in terms of the places 
from which they have fired. We don't 
say we're firing at this or that country 
or faction. We return fire to the source 
of fire. 

Q. Does that mean that there are 
going to be more air strikes? Exactly 
how will U.S. airpower be used in the 
future? And, again today, there are 
calls from Capitol Hill to pull the 
Marines out of Lebanon. Can you 
discuss, what is the commitment on 
keeping the Marines there? Is this an 
open-ended commitment? 

A. The Marines are there and our 
other forces are there to support our 
policies which are policies having to do 
with the Middle East and related to the 
importance of the Middle East, and 
more particularly in Lebanon to our ob- 
jectives of helping the reconstruction of 
that country and the emergence of it as 
a working, sovereign country, important 
not only for itself but also for the con- 
tribution that such a result can make to 
Middle East peace more generally. 

That's the mission of our forces 
there, and they will be there in support 
of that mission. As I said earlier, I think 
discussion tactically of precisely when 
we're going to do what is not the sort 
of thing that I want to comment on 
publicly. 

Q. This is the first time that the 
airpower has been used yesterday in 
this particular way. Is this now part 
of the operating procedure, is this a 
one-time kind of thing, or is this 
something that's going to be con- 
sidered on a day-to-day basis from 
here? 

A. The airpower has been there, the 
ships have been there, and we have 
flown reconnaissance missions over 
Lebanon, I think since September, and 
this is with the authorization of the 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Government of Lebanon and supports, 
as an intelligence matter, our MNF 
posture. 

Those flights have been flown. There 
have been no problems about it until the 
day before yesterday when a recon- 
naissance flight was fired on and fired 
on rather heavily with evidence that we 
consider conclusive that those firing 
knew they were firing on a U.S. plane. 
The firing was heavy and, therefore, 
can't be ascribed to some individual, 
local person unloading a round on 
somebody. 

So under those circumstances we 
felt, and since we had told in advance 
everybody, including the Syrians about 
these reconnaissance flights, that they 
were purely defensive, there was no at- 
tack connected with them, that we 
should fire back at those who fired on 
us, and it's just as simple as that, and 
that's the best means of doing so. We 
have to use the force that we have to ac- 
complish the missions that need to be ac- 
complished. 

Q. What is that mission, because 
that seems to be a question everyone 
was asking today in various interview 
shows? Is it there to just help the 
Lebanese get their act together? That 
doesn't seem to be much good. If it 
was to be a peacekeeping force, 
wouldn't you need more men on the 
ground? You had more men in little 
Grenada with much less opposition 
than you have in Lebanon. 

A. We are there as part of a 
multinational force which together 
numbers some 6,000, I guess, something 
on that order. It's not there with the in- 
tention of taking military control. It's 
there to help the Lebanese gain control. 
It's there in support of the development 
of the Lebanese Armed Forces which 
have come a long way from a standing 
start, and I think that it's fair to say 
that with all of the turmoil and the dif- 
ficulty that there has been a con- 
siderable amount of progress made. 

We've had two visits this past week, 
one from the Government of Israel and 
the other from the Government of 
Lebanon. I think out of that process, as 
far as we're concerned, we feel that we 
have an improved basis for working 
toward the objectives that we are seek- 
ing. 

And, as I said, our Ambassador is 
back by now, and Ambassador Rumsfeld 
will be leaving Washington early tomor- 
row morning, and he'll be returning to 
the area, and we're going to push our 
thoughts very actively. 



January 1984 



Q. What is the understanding you 
have with the Israelis? 

A. The understanding? We have lots 
of understandings with the Israelis and 
with many other countries. 

Q. You have an approved basis for 
the objectives we are seeking. What is 
the improved basis for the with- 
drawal? 

A. We've had very full discussions, 
not only of the situation in Lebanon but 
other aspects of the Middle East, with 
the Israelis. We've had a full discussion 
with President Gemayel of Lebanon. 
We've explored a lot of more or less 
operational things, and I believe that 
they're going to be helpful to us in mak- 
ing some concrete steps here. 

At any rate, that remains our objec- 
tive — to help the Government of 
Lebanon take control of its territory, 
starting, of course, with the territory 
not occupied by foreign forces but 
recognizing that the presence of foreign 
forces makes even the unoccupied areas 
hard to control. So that is the immediate 
objective, and I think we're going to 
make some progress. 

Q. Mr. Eagleburger [Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger] yesterday 
said on ABC television that the U.S. 
strategic agfreement with Israel in- 
tends to stabilize the Middle East and 
that it will work to help Israel and the 
moderate Arab states. How can you 
explain that? 

A. I think that, first of all, the 
security of Israel is a very important ele- 
ment of stability in the Middle East in- 
sofar as the United States is concerned. 
So, always, in our relationships with 
Israel we examine that problem, and we 
seek to do everything we can to ensure 
that. 

In the present situation, what we 
have seen is a very substantial Soviet 
buildup in Syria, and that is a fact. We 
discussed it in great detail with the 
Israelis, and it's something to which we 
need to pay attention and be prepared to 
respond. I think doing so does help bring 
stability in the area. 

We discussed many other things 
with the Israelis, and we agreed, among 
other things, with them to establish a 
joint political military group. It will have 
its first meeting in January, and it will 
be a way to keep track systematically of 
many of these matters that we discuss 
when we have visits back and forth. So 
that process will be in motion, and I 
think it will help the cooperative action 
between the countries, but it's 
something for the future, of course. 



Q. Are you implying by your 
answer that Israel asked you to keep 
the Marines in; and, secondly, if there 
is an overwhelming — 

A. I don't mean to imply that at all. 
The Marines are there, came there 
originally as the Palestinians were leav- 
ing Beirut, and they're there on our 
decision; not Israel's decision. 

Q. If there is an overwhelming 
clamor from the American public to 
request the Marines be withdrawn, 
will the Administration take the 
Marines out? 

A. Of course, we obviously pay at- 
tention to what our people want. At the 
same time, we know that people want to 
see peace and stability in the Middle 
East. I think it's a very clear fact that 
the American people recognize the im- 
portance of the Middle East to this 
country, and so we have used our 
capabilities and continue to use them to 
support our objectives there, and we'll 
continue to do that. 

Q. Do you think the American peo- 
ple have the stomach to continue to 
sustain the losses of American lives 
that we've seen? Don't you either have 
to change what you're doing with the 
Marines or pull them out if these 
losses continue? 

A. We certainly want to see prog- 
ress made, and we will work hard and 
are working hard to bring progress 
about or help others bring it about. That 
is the purpose of having those forces 
there. The American people are support- 
ing our efforts. We had favorable votes 
in the Congress on this very subject, and 
by a wide margin, particularly in the 
House of Representatives. This was 
even following the terrible tragedy of 
the car bomb in our Marine installation 
at the airport. 

I think the American people are pur- 
poseful and determined. We have, of 
course, to convince people that our ob- 
jectives are sound, as I believe they are, 
and that we have a plan and a strategy 
as we do. We need to keep talking about 
it, as we do, and I think we'll have sup- 
port. 

Q. You spoke about self-defense 
for yesterday's attacks, in terms of 
self-defense. Isn't it also part of a 
strategy to put pressure on Syria, to 
tell Syria, to send them a signal that 
staying in Lebanon will have a cost? 

A. The military action that we 
undertook was part of our commitment 
to our forces and to ourselves that we 
will defend ourselves. And that is all the 
justification that it needs. I think the 



37 



AFRICA 



presence of those forces, of course, em- 
phasizes the commitment the United 
States has, and the other countries 
which are there have to the objectives 
that we seek together. 

Q. Do you think the raid was suc- 
cessful or a failure in its mission? 

A. In terms of the targets that the 
air strike went to, my understanding is, 
from the Pentagon, that the strikes 
were quite effective; that they hit the 
targets, and so on. In that sense, we did 
hit what we were after, and they were 
successful. 

I think the main point, however, to 
be driven home is that we will support 
ourselves, we will defend ourselves. So 
if you see somebody who will defend 
himself and can defend himself, then, 
maybe you better be a little careful how 
you handle him. Just where we're going 
to get with that, the future will tell. But 
those are the objectives. Technically, in 
terms of the military action, it was suc- 
cessful in the sense that they went after 
certain batteries that fired on them and 
they hit them. 

Q. What is your feeling about 
Nicaragua's offer of amnesty for the 
rebels and the election process an- 
nounced yesterday? 

A. I think that the statements being 
made by the Government of Nicaragua 
right now are vastly different than the 
statements they were making some 6 
months or so ago. And I welcome that. 
Of course, what we want is for a reality 
to be put behind the rhetoric. And so, 
naturally, we want to probe and find out 
what is there, and we believe that the 
best forum for conducting negotiations 
with Nicaragua and with other elements 
in the region is through the Contadora 
process. We support that process. 

That process has produced a very 
useful 21-point set of objectives. So we 
want to see reality put behind those ob- 
jectives by Nicaragua and by the other 
countries in the region. We will be work- 
ing at that process and with the Con- 
tadora group to hope that it happens. 
And if Nicaragua is moving genuinely in 
the right direction, that's fine. 



Reagan Administration's Africa 
Policy: A Progress Report 



'Press release 414. 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Address before the fourth annual 
Conference on International Affairs: 
U.S.-Africa Relations Since 1960, at the 
University of Kansas, Lawrence, 
Kansas, on November 10, 1983. Mr. 
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. 

Thank you for inviting me here this 
evening. It has been almost 3 years 
since President Reagan assumed office. 
I thought it would be timely at this con- 
ference, which is examining U.S. -African 
relations over the past quarter century, 
to take the opportunity to review the 
Administration's Africa policy and 
achievements. We have not yet taken 
our final exam, but we have certainly 
made important strides toward the 
realization of the goals we set at the 
outset of the Administration. We set out 
to: 

• Forge a new and mature partner- 
ship with Africa; 

• Support those nations which resist 
external aggression and destabilization; 

• Help meet Africa's humanitarian 
needs; 

• Help Africa with its development 
needs; 

• Support democratic institutions; 

• Work for Namibian independence 
on the basis of UN [Security Council] 
Resolution 435; 

• Support regional security and 
peacemaking in southern Africa; and 

• Encourage positive, peaceful 
change inside South Africa. 

In approaching these challenges, we 
have consistently and without apology 
pursued U.S. interests. But our actions 
are carefully tailored to African realities 
and African concerns. 

Forging A Mature Partnership 

We believe, as Vice President Bush said 
in Africa a year ago, that Africans have 
the capacity and will to control their 
own destiny. We have worked to forge a 
new and mature partnership with the 
nations and peoples of Africa. That part- 
nership is based on mutual respect. It in- 
cludes frank and honest discussions of 
the issues. Such partnership is a two- 
way street which rests on shared goals, 
common principles, and mutual in- 
terests. For, as we have deepened the 



38 



dialogue with Africa, each of us — Afri- 
cans and Americans — have come to 
recognize that there is much more that 
pulls us together than separates us. 

Africa's leadership has changed re- 
markably in outlook in the two-and-a- 
half decades since independence, when 
anticolonialist cliches and rhetoric too 
often substituted for serious policy and 
decisionmaking. We, in this country, 
have come to a greater appreciation of 
the obstacles to the continent's develop- 
ment and the dilemmas facing its 
leaders. Realism and pragmatism in- 
creasingly shape attitudes and decisions 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 

The channels for communicating 
with Africa's leaders have been widened 
and are being utilized. The result is an 
atmosphere which permits useful discus- 
sion of those issues on which the United 
States and Africa must focus: security, 
economic development, tensions and 
change in southern Africa, humanitarian 
crises, and the strengthening of demo- 
cratic institutions. 

President Reagan has met with 17 
heads of state and governments during 
his first 3 years in office. Vice President 
Bush made a seven-nation tour of Africa 
in November 1982. We are talking with 
African leaders across the full spectrum 
of African politics and ideology. Ours is 
an unprecedented activist diplomacy in 
Africa aimed at addressing conflicts, 
strengthening genuine nonalignment, 
working for creative approaches to 
Africa's economic crisis, and creating op- 
tions for peaceful change. The President 
has met with leaders of nations which 
are moving to reopen doors to the West 
after years of close but disappointing 
relations with the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern bloc. He has also made clear 
our firm support for traditional friends 
who look to the West as a source of 
security, economic support, and human 
inspiration. 

Helping Resist External Aggression 
and Destabilization 

We place great importance on the 
strengthening of Africa's security and on 
our role as a reliable partner in this ef- 
fort. Both the United States and Africa 
seek the opportunity to get on with the 
business of development and nation 



Department of State Bulletin 



■o 



bcariniuy 



AFRICA 



building. Without security, these objec- 
tives cannot be achieved. This fact is an 
essential element in our support for the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
whose charter and foreign policy prin- 
ciples we endorse. The OAU is dedicated 
to the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
the protection of African states' ter- 
ritorial integrity, and the defense of the 
continent against external aggression 
and subversion. 

In considering the security problems 
facing Africa today, we must recognize 
the interaction of political, economic, 
and security factors that make up the 
African security equation. Africa is a full 
participant in the global system. It is 
directly influenced by and also helps 
determine the ebb and flow of com- 
petitive global politics. For either the 
United States or Africa to pretend 
otherwise is foolish and very short- 
sighted. 

This does not mean that the United 
States sees Africa exclusively as a 
theater for East- West conflict or com- 
petition. Quite the contrary. We have no 
mandate— either at home or in Africa— 
to be the policeman of Africa, nor would 
we wish to be. But just as certainly, our 
pohtical, economic, and security in- 
terests in Africa are not served by 
political or economic instability. Nor— do 
we believe— are Africa's own interests. 
Such conditions inhibit the development 
of modern African economic and 
political institutions which can interact 
with our own to mutual advantage. Our 
strategic goal in Africa is to limit and 
thwart the application of outside force in 
African conflicts and thereby to permit 
Africans to shape their own futures. The 
purpose of our diplomatic and security 
policies is to discourage nations from 
resorting to military solutions to prob- 
lems and to strengthen Africa's ability to 
resist adventurism and destabilization. 

Instability, caused by local economic 
and political weakness and often deep- 
rooted regional conflict, is often ex- 
ploited by outside powers unfriendly to 
the United States. When this takes 
place, the United States— and the 
West— is confronted with a new dimen- 
sion, a global dimension with potential 
effects on the global balance. Neither 
African states nor Western nations gain 
when an outside power or a regional 
state aligned to one seeks to gain advan- 
tage by resorting to military force on 
the continent. If we in the West fail to 
react, the climate necessary to achieve 
African security and development is 
eroded. We cannot be a credible power 
if we ignore friendly states which turn 
to us for help when threatened. 



January 1984 



Our resolve was dramatically demon- 
strated in our response to Libyan ag- 
gression in Chad. In 1980, 7,000 Libyan 
troops intervened in the Chadian civil 
war. That action quickly became a major 
cause of regional instability, posing a 
direct threat to Sudan and creating 
unease among Chad's other neighbors. 
When, the following year, the Chadian 
Government called on Libya to remove 
its military force, the OAU deployed a 
peacekeeping force— the first ever in the 
organization's history— to Chad to main- 
tain order after the Libyans left. 

We moved immediately to support 
this initiative on the part of the OAU by 
allocating $12 million to support the 
OAU peacekeeping force with transport 
and equipment. By June 1982, then Cha- 
dian President [Weddeye] Goukouni, 
who had refused reconciliation efforts 
proposed by the OAU, was forced out of 
Chad and replaced by his principal rival, 
Hissene Habre. The OAU withdrew its 
troops. 

In July 1983, Libya's [Col. Muam- 
mer] Qadhafi invaded Chad in support of 
a rebel force led by the former presi- 
dent. In response to this blatant act of 



and Somalia — countries which play a 
key part in U.S. strategic interests in 
the Indian Ocean. 

Sudan and Somalia face significant 
Soviet-backed military and subversive 
threats directed against them from 
across national borders. Nevertheless, 
our security assistance has been 
measured and moderate, focused on in- 
ternal mobility, border security, air 
defense, and communications. It does 
not begin, nor does it seek to match the 
enormous and irresponsible export of 
billions of dollars of Soviet arms into 
Libya and Ethiopia alone. 

Moreover, we have made clear our 
readiness to assist in any way we can in 
the resolution of longstanding tensions 
in the region, especially in the Horn of 
Africa, which have been the cause of so 
much war and suffering in the past. 

Humanitarian Crises 

Africa's poverty is marked, and exacer- 
bated, by the constant threat to human 
life on a wide scale. It is not just one 
drought or one emergency refugee situa- 
tion. Drought is endemic in Africa, strik- 



The purpose of our diplomatic and security policies 
is to discourage nations from resorting to military 
solutions to problems and to strengthen Africa's 
ability to resist adventurism and destabilization. 



aggression, the President made available 
up to $25 million in military assistance 
to the internationally recognized govern- 
ment of Habre, and after consultations 
with France, we deployed AW ACS [air- 
borne warning and control system] air- 
craft to the area. France sent 2,000 
troops to Chad which halted the Libyan 
advance southward; the northern half of 
the country remains occupied by Libyan 
forces. Our efforts now, together with 
the OAU and France, are aimed at 
bringing about the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from Chad so that the in- 
ternationally recognized government can 
get on with the urgent tasks of economic 
development and political reconciliation. 

The Administration has also, in a 
few selective and important cases, in- 
creased our security assistance to friend- 
ly African countries. Almost all of these 
increases have been to Sudan, Kenya, 



ing first one region, then another. In 
some countries, like Mauritania, drought 
conditions have persisted so intensely 
over the last 7 or 8 years that whole 
segments of the population have been 
driven from their ancestral homes and 
way of life, perhaps never to return. 

Food. In this situation, the U.S. role 
as a supplier of food and other agri- 
cultural assistance becomes more than 
an occasional humanitarian act. The 
United States is a major source of long- 
term and emergency food to Africa. We 
have an unparalleled record of assist- 
ance in addressing this problem. We 
have not shrunk from this call, regard- 
less of the political ideology of govern- 
ments whose people are hungry and 
threatened. 

In fiscal year 1983, the United 
States provided $250 million of food to 
sub-Saharan Africa, of which over $40 



39 



AFRICA 



million was in emergency food aid. Re- 
cipients have included Mauritania, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Djibouti, Ghana, 
Upper Volta, and other countries. 

In just over a month of this fiscal 
year, we have already committed $11 
million and are likely to increase our 
fiscal year 1984 emergency food assist- 
ance level for Africa to well over $50 
million. In addition, regular food assist- 
ance under PL 480 will be maintained at 
substantial levels in 1984. 

The long-term problems of food pro- 
duction and availability are also being 
urgently addressed. For the past two 
decades, per capita agricultural produc- 
tion has declined in Africa— the only 
region of the world where that is true. 
For that reason our foreign aid pro- 
grams in Africa have concentrated on 
means to increase the continent's food 
production. In addition, we have used 
our own country's abundant agricultural 
production to help encourage reforms 
and policies to increase Africa's own 
food production. 



constant danger of starvation and ex- 
posure. At a conference that year jointly 
sponsored by the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity, the 
United States, represented by Ambassa- 
dor Jeane Kirkpatrick, stepped out front 
in pledging $285 million for refugee pro- 
grams. Since then, working closely with 
the [Office of the UN] High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees and private volun- 
tary organizations, we have succeeded in 
improving the management of relief ef- 
forts to the point where most refugees 
are out of immediate danger, and we 
can concentrate on contingency planning 
and lasting solutions. 

We have supported repatriation as 
the best solution where that is possible. 
There have been successful programs of 
that sort in Equatorial Guinea and Zim- 
babwe. We are particularly proud of a 
program now underway to repatriate 
Ethiopians from Djibouti, which was 
worked out despite many difficulties. 
Another significant approach has been 
our $1.5 million training and education 



African nations have an extraordinary record 
of accepting refugees into their countries and pro- 
viding long-term shelter. But the strain on already 
poor economies is enormous. 



Refugees. As with drought and 
hunger, refugees are a part of the 
African scene and a problem of both im- 
mediate and long-term concern. Wars, 
famine, and internal strife have pro- 
duced throughout Africa hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and displaced per- 
sons. Some of the largest pockets of 
refugees— in Sudan and Somalia— have 
been in this condition for many years, 
and there is no early prospect for resolv- 
ing their plight. In Angola, torn by in- 
ternal and internationalized strife, 
thousands are constantly periled by lack 
of food and shelter. 

African nations have an extraor- 
dinary record of accepting refugees into 
their countries and providing long-term 
shelter. But the strain on already poor 
economies is enormous. The United 
States has been consistently sensitive 
and responsive to this problem. In 1981, 
we faced a dire situation in which many 
thousands of African refugees were in 



40 



program for southern African refugees 
aimed at making them self-sufficient and 
alleviating the burden they represent to 
host countries. 

We are constantly concerned to see 
that funding for continuing these efforts 
will be adequate. Traditionally, we have 
contributed about one-third of the UN 
refugee budget for Africa, and we in- 
tend to continue to pull our weight while 
pressing other donors to pull theirs. 

Similarly, we have contributed the 
largest single share of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) 
Africa program to help those displaced 
by war or famine within their own coun- 
tries. Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda, and a number of other coun- 
tries benefit from this humanitarian ef- 
fort and the ICRC's presence on the 
ground. 

Africa's Urgent Economic Needs 

Per capita food production in Africa has 
been declining slowly but steadily for the 
last two decades. Population is growing 
more rapidly in Africa than in any other 



continent. Two-thirds of the countries 
officially designated by the United Na- 
tions as being "least-developed" are in 
Africa. And in the last year or so, a 
massive drought of unprecedented pro- 
portions has turned despair into tragedy 
in many parts of Africa. 

We have been in the forefront of the 
international response to Africa's im- 
mediate needs and to its longer-term 
problems. We have consciously directed 
our economic assistance programs 
almost exclusively toward increasing 
food production and toward other areas 
of activity which support that goal, such 
as health programs, skills training, re- 
search of seed varieties and farming 
techniques, and support of agricultural 
extension services. We are working 
closely with other donors, with par- 
ticularly satisfying results in the Sahel 
countries, southern Africa, and some 
other areas. We have joined the African 
Development Bank, having long sup- 
ported its affiliate the African Develop- 
ment Fund. 

We have been in the lead in en- 
couraging the World Bank to devote a 
greater proportion of its IDA [Interna- 
tional Development Association] soft- 
loan resources to Africa, with gratifying 
success. We have reduced the loan com- 
ponent of our own assistance programs 
to an insignificant proportion of the 
total, realizing that most African coun- 
tries today are in no position to accept 
additional future debt obligations. And, 
as I have mentioned, we are providing 
food assistance in substantial quantities. 

In each of these endeavors, we have 
worked closely with the Congress, and I 
would like to digress long enough to 
acknowledge here the strong support 
and encouragement, and invariably wise 
and helpful counsel, always experienced 
in dealing with Nancy Kassebaum. She 
is one of our very best friends in Wash- 
ington. 

Let me speak for a moment about 
money, just to give you some idea of the 
magnitude of our involvement in, and 
commitment to, Africa in the 1980s. 
U.S. direct bilateral economic assistance 
to Africa last year totaled over $800 
million. For the fiscal year just begun — 
FY 1984— we have requested a level in 
excess of $900 million. Despite the in- 
tense, and correct, pressures in Wash- 
ington to hold budgets down, I am 
pleased to report that the FY 1984 level 
would represent an increase of over 20% 
since this Administration took office. I 
take no honor in busting the budget, but 



Department of State Bulletin 

'HI 



OUai M III ly w^ 



AFRICA 



I am proud that this Administration has 
seen fit to address Africa's urgent and 
profound economic problems head-on. 

I should tell you, parenthetically, 
that we are also providing military 
assistance and training to a number of 
friendly African countries and that, last 
year, the dollar value of military assist- 
ance was less than one-sixth the dollar 
value of our economic assistance. In 
fact, we rank somewhere around fifth as 
a supplier of military assistance to 
Africa, far behind the Soviets and some 
of their surrogates, and even behind 
allies such as France. If you take into 
account the assistance we are providing 
through such intermediaries as the 
World Bank, the African Development 
Bank and Fund, and the FAO [Food and 
Agriculture Organization] and its world 
food program — all that assistance being 
economic — the balance is even more 
heavily skewed, and the total of our 
economic assistance far surpasses the 
billion dollar mark. 

In the post-independence period, as 
they began the process of nation 
building, many African governments ex- 
perimented with various forms of state 
socialism. They instituted central plan- 
ning, created state corporations to con- 
trol key economic sectors, instituted 
costly subsidy programs and, along the 
way, incurred incredible, unsustainable 
debt burdens. With the world economic 
downturn from which the West, thank- 
fully, is now beginning to emerge, many 
African countries have been faced with 
the harsh reality of what we would call 
in the private sector impending bank- 
ruptcy. They have become increasingly 
dependent on Western donors and the 
international financial system. They 
have turned to the International 
Monetary Fund for support. They have 
turned to the World Bank for assistance 
with structural adjustment. 

As I have indicated, the United 
States has been responsive and will con- 
tinue to be. But, along with the bank 
and the fund, we have encouraged the 
African governments to reexamine their 
own economic systems and priorities. 
Many of them now realize the errors of 
past ways and the awful price that past 
practices have imposed. There is, across 
the continent, a new awareness of the 
importance of putting limits on govern- 
ment's role in the economy, a new com- 
mitment to the private sector and the 
free market— indigenous and foreign— 
and a new striving for sound economic 
management. 

This process of transition, of policy 
reform, is bound to be slow and halting. 



January 1984 



for the fundamental changes implicit in 
the process are bound to be destabiliz- 
ing. Significant increases in the prices of 
basic foodstuffs, divestiture of state 
enterprises which have traditionally 
employed far more people than they 
need, dramatic alteration in a currency 
exchange rate — this is the stuff of which 
riots and revolutions are made. Stripped 
to its essentials, economic policy reform 
is a complex political process affecting 
bread-and-butter interests of different 
constituencies within African societies at 
every point of decision. 

Yet, there is a growing awareness 
that steps such as these are necessary, 
that without them African countries can- 
not hope for the foreseeable future to 
find themselves even in a situation of 
tolerable equilibrium, let alone on a path 
to economic growth. We are working 
with many African governments, inter- 
national financial institutions, and other 
donors right now to analyze such prob- 
lems and to advise and assist them in 
such directions. This work, in the long 
term, will be even more important to 
Africa than the millions and billions of 
dollars we commit through our economic 
assistance programs, even more impor- 
tant than the hunger we might help to 
stave off, the diseases we might help to 
eradicate, the dams we might help to 
design, the schools we might help to 
build, the skills we might help to trans- 
fer. The response of the Africans them- 
selves — their willingness to take very 
hard decisions with severe short-term 
risks — has been heartening. 

Let me say, further, a few words 
about the private sector thrust of this 
Administration. What we are really talk- 
ing about is encouraging the release of 
the productive economic forces potential- 
ly available — domestically and exter- 
nally—for the goal of development. It is 
a long-term proposition with many 
aspects. Let me give some examples. 

• David Rockefeller headed a high- 
level banking and investment team that 
visited Africa last year. The team found 
governments anxious to secure foreign 
private investment and officials who are 
willing to make reforms to encourage 
private investment. 

• Guinea, with its abundant natural 
resources, is one example. President 
Sekou Toure visited the United States 
last fall to attend and lead an ambitious 
trade and investment seminar sponsored 
by Chase Manhattan. The Guinean 
Government has since set up a special 
office to help prospective investors cut 
through red tape. 



• Cabinet-level trade missions have 
visited Africa. We have held trade and 
investment seminars throughout major 
regional centers in the United States to 
encourage American business to look at 
opportunities in Africa. And, we have 
supported private American organiza- 
tions such as the U.S. -Nigerian Joint 
Agricultural Consultative Committee 
(JACC) seeking to expand trade and in- 
vestment. 

• More recently, we have estab- 
lished an informal interagency working 
group in the executive branch to coordi- 
nate and strengthen U.S. development 
and promotional activities in the fields of 
trade and investment. While just begin- 
ning, we can play a useful role in those 
African countries which are capable and 
willing to work with us. Ultimately, 
private trade and investment flows into 
Africa are a function of the political and 
economic climate that exists in various 
countries, particularly the investment 
climate. 

Only Africans themselves can make 
their economies attractive to foreign 
businessmen. Similarly, only African 
leaders can unleash the enormous 
creative potential of African artisans, 
entrepreneurs, farmers, and risktakers. 
Our role is to develop, explore, and 
discuss road maps; to build bridges; 
share concepts and information; and 
help build the networks of people, data, 
and institutions that will be needed. 

Democracy 

The Administration has given support to 
the strengthening of democratic institu- 
tions in Africa. The President's Con- 
ference on Free Elections held in Wash- 
ington last year is stirring evidence to 
this commitment. One of the best re- 
ceived contributions to that conference 
attended by delegates from around the 
world was made by the representative of 
Nigeria, a nation which enjoyed im- 
pressive multiparty democratic elections 
this year at all levels of its federal struc- 
ture, one modeled in certain respects on 
our own. We have applauded the demo- 
cratic elections which have taken place 
during the last year in Nigeria, Senegal, 
and Mauritius. We have provided fund- 
ing to help the Liberian authorities 
manage the transition to elected govern- 
ment in 1985, the first time Liberia will 
have experienced an open democratic 
process in its long history. 

We cannot help but believe that 
democratic elections are both a 
manifestation of and stimulant to health, 



41 



AM 



AFRICA 



wealth, and wisdom in government. As 
President Reagan said a few months ago 
in a major foreign policy address, there 
is a quiet revolution at work in Africa 
today. That revolution is a signal of 
hope and self-confidence to a region buf- 
feted by economic crisis and instability. 

Constructive Change 
in Southern Africa 

Let me conclude my comments this 
evening with a discussion of southern 
Africa. At the outset, I want to make 
absolutely clear the depth of this Ad- 
ministration's commitment to peaceful 
change in southern Africa. We have en- 
gaged our prestige and our energies in 
defining a regional strategy and in using 
our influence and resources to imple- 
ment it. 

The southern Africa region holds 
great potential. It is strategically 
important because of its vast mineral 
wealth and its geographic location 
astride the sealanes which carry the oil 
of the Persian Gulf to Western nations. 
It is also an area of tension, unfulfilled 
political and economic aspirations and, 
unfortunately, the potential for growing 
violence with incalculable consequences 
for Western interests, African interests, 
and East-West relations. 

We ignore southern Africa and the 
positive and negative aspects of its 
potential at the risk of both Western in- 
terests and our most deeply held prin- 
ciples. President Reagan concluded early 
in his first year that southern Africa 
matters. Only the enemies of the United 
States and Africa can benefit from a ris- 
ing tide of violence and instability. Such 
conditions offer them an opportunity to 
expand their influence at the expense of 
political and economic development. The 
goals of our policy are simply stated: 

• Independence for Namibia based 
on UN [Security Council] Resolution 
435; 

• A framework of enhanced security 
including a practical basis of coexistence 
between all states in the region; 

• The emergence of a regional 
climate in which foreign forces go home, 
boundaries of sovereign states are re- 
spected, and governments and people 
can dedicate themselves to the priority 
of development and nation building; 

• Continued and accelerated move- 
ment in the ongoing process of essential 
change in South Africa away from an 
approach to government based on the 
laws and principles of racial separa- 
tion—an approach repugnant to us as 



Americans and serving, as long as it 
prevails, as an absolute barrier to nor- 
mal relations between the United States 
and South Africa. 

This Administration— unlike some 
prior ones— has a strategy for achieving 
its goals in southern Africa, a strategy 
we call constructive engagement. There 
are, no doubt, some here tonight whose 
impression of that approach is influ- 
enced by the prevalence of misunder- 
standings, willful or unintentional distor- 
tions, and just plain rubbish that is cur- 
rent on this controversial policy arena. 
What I want to do for the remainder of 
my time this evening is explain construc- 
tive engagement in terms of progress 
toward the achievement of our goals. 

Namibia. Namibia is, in effect, 
Africa's last colony and a focus of strife, 
violence, external involvement, and 
political polarization. Previous U.S. Ad- 
ministrations have helped bring about 
Namibia's independence. This Ad- 
ministration, early on, was determined 
to try to bring about conditions which 
would make it politically possible for 
South Africa to relinquish control of this 
territory. 

With our allies in the contact 
group— Canada, Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom— we have built on 
earlier efforts of previous Administra- 
tions (starting with that of President 
Ford) to bring about Namibian independ- 
ence. We have based our effort on UN 
Security Council Resolution 435, 
adopted in 1978 and substantially 
strengthened since that time by subse- 
quent understandings and agreements. 
We have helped shape principles which 
will guide the drafters of an independent 
Namibia's constitution. We have found 
solutions to a series of issues related to 
the role of the United Nations in the 
transition process leading to independ- 
ence. 

In fact, through intensive efforts 
with our allies in the contact group, 
Africa's front-line states [Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zam- 
bia, and Zimbabwe], SWAPO [South 
West Africa People's Organization], 
South Africa, internal Namibian parties, 
and the United Nations we now have in 
place virtually all the elements for the 
implementation of Resolution 435 and 
the transition to Namibian independ- 
ence. 

It has taken longer than we hoped 
to achieve this much, but Namibian in- 
dependence today depends only on some 
key political decisions of governments in 



the region turning on one issue. The UN 
Secretary General [Javier Perez de 
Cuellar y Guerra] defined the remaining 
hurdle. He visited southern Africa 
earlier this fall and met with all the par- 
ties with interests in this issue. His 
report confirmed that South Africa has 
agreed to the terms of Resolution 435. 
But he also learned and made clear in 
his report that the South African 
Government is not prepared to withdraw 
from Namibia and begin the implementa- 
tion of Resolution 435 in the absence of 
a commitment from the Angolan 
Government on the withdrawal of Cuban 
forces from that strife-torn land. The 
South African Government's position on 
this issue reflects its assessment of pros- 
pects for its own future security in the 
region. 

Angola. Consequently, we are also 
fully engaged in a separate but parallel 
series of talks with the Angolan Govern- 
ment, which, if successful, will result in 
an agreement on the Cuban troop issue. 
This would open the way to South 
Africa's implementation of the interna- 
tional agreements we have reached for 
Namibia's transition to independence. 

Cuban withdrawal from Angola and 
South African withdrawal from Angola 
and Namibia would open the way for 
Angolans to build a brighter future, pur- 
sue their substantial development poten- 
tial, and end the long night of strife that 
land has experienced since its independ- 
ence exactly 8 years ago. 

Regional Security. The United 
States is actively engaged in efforts to 
reduce and contain cross-border violence 
in southern Africa, whether that 
violence comes in the form of terrorist 
bombs shattering glass and ending lives 
in South Africa or South African mili- 
tary raids into neighboring states. We 
are seeking to support those realistic 
leaders in the region who recognize the 
need for a framework of peace based on 
dialogue and understandings between 
South Africa and its neighbors. We have 
used our good offices, our communica- 
tions channels, and our influence to en- 
courage a process which can only be 
conducted by those who live there. 
There can be no imposed peace in 
southern Africa. The reduction and con- 
trol of violence depends on many things 
including a readiness to coexist despite 
fundamental political and ideological 
rifts; sufficient regional confidence to 
resist the temptation to import violent 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



means and invite foreign intervention- 
ists; and demonstrated progress on the 
agenda of constructive, negotiated 
change so that the siren song of violence 
is, indeed, resisted. 

As Under Secretary [Lawrence S.] 
Eagleburger told the National Confer- 
ence of Editorial Writers last June: 
"There can be no double standards for 
either South Africa or its neighbors. The 
obligations of statehood . . . are ... re- 
ciprocal." The Under Secretary con- 
tinued to say the "United States cate- 
gorically reaffirms the principle that all 
states have a duty to refrain from toler- 
ating. . .organized activities within their 
territory by guerrillas or dissidents plan- 
ning acts of violence in the territory of 
another state." This applies to all states 
in the region. 

We, ourselves, have taken steps to 
enhance our ability to play a construc- 
tive, catalytic role. We have moved to 
rebuild our relations with Mozambique 
on a basis of full reciprocity while re- 
sponding to that nation's desperate 
economic situation with food aid. We 
have quietly encouraged bilateral talks 
between Mozambique and South Africa 
and have found a commitment on the 
part of both sides to continued negotia- 
tions in the search for mutual under- 
standing. We have recently sent an Am- 
bassador to Maputo to help foster this 
fragile dialogue between our two states. 

Similarly, we have moved to counsel 
restraint and dialogue between South 
Africa and other neighbors such as 
Lesotho and Zimbabwe, complementing 
and reinforcing their own efforts to ar- 
rive at a workable basis of coexistence. 
Whether this vulnerable beginning sur- 
vives is up to the governments directly 
concerned. The states of the region are 
making a choice between violence and 
coexistence. To accept the challenge of 
coexistence is much more difficult, but it 
represents the best hope of fostering 
constructive change and avoiding inter- 
national strife. 

South Africa. An essential ingre- 
dient in this volatile mix, and one which 
will profoundly influence the region's 
success or failure in addressing its prob- 
lems, is how South Africans shape their 
own future. 

Vice President Bush said in Nairobi 
[Kenya] last November [1982]: 

Apartheid is wrong. It is legally en- 
trenched racism— inimical to the fundamental 
ideas of the United States. America's history 
and America's future can only be understood 
in terms of our commitment to a multiracial 
democracy in which all citizens participate 
and from which all benefit. The rule of law, 



January 1984 



the principles of consent and participation in 
the political process, and the right of every 
human being to citizenship which reflects 
these principles are to Americans a sacred 
trust. We will not betray this trust. 

There are those in the United States 
and Africa who advocate punitive 
measures against and isolation of South 
Africa and other countries with whose 
policies they disagree. There are pro- 
posals before the U.S. Congress, and, I 
understand, the Kansas state legislature 
as well, that would ban bank loans to 
South Africa or Krugerrand gold coin 



AFRICA 



Meaningful and broadened power shar- 
ing will occur as blacks acquire the 
economic and organizational base from 
which to insist on it, bargain for it, and 
negotiate. Economic growth supported 
by foreign investment is, therefore, 
essential to the creation of opportunity 
for black South Africans. 

For these reasons, the Administra- 
tion opposes punitive measures and, in- 
stead, strongly supports the voluntary 
Sullivan Code of Fair Employment Prac- 
tices. American firms are playing and 
can continue to play a role in bringing 



. . . the South African Government is not prepared 
to withdraw from Namibia and begin the im- 
plementation of Resolution 435 in the absence of a 
commitment from the Angolan Government on the 
withdrawal of Cuban forces from that strife-torn 
land. 



imports from South Africa, deny access 
to the International Monetary Fund's 
stabilization programs, call for disinvest- 
ment or no new investment in South 
Africa, and institute punitive trade con- 
trols on civilian commerce. 

The advocates of this approach 
would have us disengage and somehow 
walk away from the issues which 
southern Africa presents, as if they will 
magically solve themselves or not affect 
us if we turn our back on them. I reject 
that approach; it is basically a "cop-out," 
cloaked in a fastidious false piety. 
Worse, it presumes without a shred of 
supporting evidence that change in 
South Africa would be advanced if the 
United States washed its hands of the 
problem, leaving the scene to others to 
work their will. That is not foreign 
policy; it is "ostrich" policy. 

The prime focus of our efforts 
should rather be on positive steps to 
back constructive change and those in 
South Africa who are working for peace- 
ful change. Constructive engagement is 
aimed at institution building and 
supporting those advocates of construc- 
tive change in South Africa of all races 
in and out of government. American and 
European business carry a particularly 
heavy burden in this regard. It is within 
the capacity of this community to hasten 
the process of constructive change. 



about constructive change. An objective 
look at South Africa clearly demon- 
strates that blacks are gaining economic 
strength. Black labor and black purchas- 
ing power are vital to South Africa's 
economy. American and other firms are 
channeling hundreds of millions of 
dollars into black advancement in the 
work place, often setting the pace on a 
national scale and opening up new 
avenues for black advancement. 

We are also backing up our views on 
change by the commitment of public 
funds to the process. And we are doing 
so, I might add, with bipartisan support 
in Congress. 

• We have undertaken a $4 million- 
a-year scholarship program to bring 100 
black South African students annually to 
the United States to study in our univer- 
sities. The legislative basis of this pro- 
gram preceded this Administration. It 
has been substantially increased in the 
past few years. 

• We have initiated training pro- 
grams, in cooperation with the AFL-CIO 
[American Federation of Labor and Con- 
gress of Industrial Organizations], for 
black South African trade unionists to 
which the U.S. Government will con- 
tribute over $1 million this year and 
next. 

• We are supporting small business 
development in black communities at a 



43 



uA'iii'VA)!^;mihuiii!>i>ihhu>>iiniuHMii^^^^^^^ 



AFRICA 



cost of some $3 million over the next 2 
years. 

• We are providing $2 million over 
the next 2 years to help tutor black 
South African high school students to 
improve their chances of entering pro- 
fessional schools. 

These are illustrations of an approach 
that can be expanded further and, with 
congressional support, it will be. 

I cannot leave this subject without 
commenting on the recently approved 
constitutional proposals in South Africa. 
While it would be inappropriate for the 
U.S. Government to propose or endorse 
any particular blueprint for political 
change in South Africa, it seems clear 
the 66% yes vote by South Africa's 
white electorate is a reflection of a 
growing consensus within that electorate 
of the need for change. 

In that sense, November 2, 1983, is 
already a milestone in the modern 
history of South Africa. The proposals 
themselves did not address the question 
of political rights for the country's black 
majority. But a clear majority of white 
South African voters decided to take a 
step which opens the way to construc- 
tive, evolutionary change toward a 
system based on the consent of all South 
African citizens, 80% of whom are not 
white. 

The referendum results give the 
South African Government a mandate to 
move decisively along the road of 
change. The U.S. Government hopes 
that the South African Government will 
use its mandate to address the problem 
of the political rights of South Africa's 
black majority— for the sake of the peo- 
ple of South Africa and of southern 
Africa, and for the sake of its relations 
with the rest of the world, inchiding the 
United States. 

Conclusion 

I have talked long enough, but I thought 
it important that you have a clear pic- 
ture of how this Administration views 
Africa and is addressing the major 
issues. It is an ambitious program, but 
one which we believe will draw increas- 
ing support and understanding in Africa 
and here at home. ■ 



Visit of Sudanese President 




President Gaafar Muhammed 
Nimeiri of the Sudan made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., 
November 19-22, 1983, to meet with 
President Reagan and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
Presidents Reagan and Nimeiri after 
their meeting on November 21.^ 

President Reagan 

It's been an honor and a pleasure to 
welcome President Nimeiri to 
Washington once again. President 
Nimeiri is a friend. Few can match his 
courage and foresight as a peacemaker 
in Africa and in the Middle East. I place 
great value on his insights and wise 
counsel and appreciate this opportunity 
to speak with him directly. 



In our discussions, we found 
ourselves in basic agreement on critical 
issues in the Middle East and the Horn 
of Africa. President Nimeiri and I 
reviewed efforts to find a solution to the 
conflict in Chad. We're agreed that the 
first step necessary to achieve that end 
is the withdrawal of Libyan forces from 
Chad. Likewise, we're of one mind on 
the need to support African countries 
threatened by Libyan-supported aggres- 
sion. 

We also discussed the urgent need 
to reach a just and comprehensive peace 
for the Middle East. A key to this is a 
settlement that would permit all states 
in the region to live in peace with secure 
borders, while at the same time protect- 
ing the legitimate rights of the Palestin- 
ian people. I thanked President Nimeiri 
for his continued support of our current 
peace initiative. 

On bilateral issues, I reaffirmed our 
willingness to help the Sudan meet the 
economic and military challenges that it 
faces. We applaud the Sudan's efforts to 
reinvigorate its private sector and 
reform governmental policies that 
hinder economic progress. Economic 
development is of utmost importance to 
the people of the Sudan. And in this 
endeavor, the United States is happy to 
lend a hand to a friend. 

President Nimeiri's visit underlines 
the significant role that Sudan is playing 
in Africa and the Middle East. The peo- 
ple of America are proud to stand with 
the people of the Sudan as friends and 
partners for peace and progress. 

President Nimeiri 

I would like to thank President Reagan 
for his invitation to me to come to visit 
once again the United States. And I 
would like to say to him that we are 
very pleased by our friendship to the 
people of the United States. 

President Reagan and myself have 
discussed bilateral relations between our 
two countries and reviewed ways and 
means to further strengthen them. We 
are hoping that the important role 



44 



I ' j> n 1 ; !;iH«Hjnff7T3ij«ij<. 



a.:. 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



played by the United States toward 
refugees will continue and expand at a 
time where we in the Sudan face and 
cater to ever-increasing numbers from 
our neighboring countries, especially 
Ethiopia. 

In Africa, we have been— and still 
are— very concerned about the 
destabilization policies represented by 
Libya and its intervention in the internal 
affairs of others. Libya is undermining 
the unity of Chad by invading and occu- 
pying its territory and plotting against 
the unity and stability of the Sudan. 
Ethiopia and Libya are both playing a 
very dangerous role and executing 
policies serving the interests of a 
superior power. 

In the Middle East, the Sudan is ful- 
ly committed to a just solution to the 
Palestinian problem. In this context, the 
Sudan stands firm behind the Fez 
resolution. And it also supported the 
Reagan initiative as a step toward a 
more comprehensive solution. We 
deplore and regret the continued blood- 
shed in Lebanon and call on all parties 
to save Lebanon and its independence. 
We also condemn all policies and prac- 
tices aimed at liquidating the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] and 
deplore the shedding of Arab blood by 
Arab hands. 

Israel remains the cause of the prob- 
lem in the Middle East. We call on 
President Reagan to exert his utmost to 
stop the Israeli expansion policy and 
play the role becoming a great power 
that has such a great interest in the 
Arab world. And we call, also, on the 
Soviet Union to assist in peace progress 
in the Middle East. 



Paradox, Problems, and Promise 
of Arms Control 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidental Documents of Nov. 28, 1983. 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Address before the Los Angeles 
World Affairs Council on November 1 7, 
1983. Ambassador Adelman is Director 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA). 

It is a great pleasure to be here with all 
of you today. I want to thank you for 
this welcome opportunity to discuss one 
of, if not the most intellectually challeng- 
ing, emotionally gripping, and profound- 
ly important issues of our era— how to 
control arms and reduce the risk of war. 
It is a matter of survival and also of 
how we make a better, safer world 
wherein freedom and justice flourish. It 
is, in an era of nuclear weaponry, a mat- 
ter of global dimensions. And it is, I can 
assure you, an area that deeply and per- 
sonally involves the President. It 
receives the highest priority of all of us 
serving under his leadership. 

In a few days, many television 
viewers across the land will witness a 
powerful, draining portrayal of the hor- 
rors of nuclear war and its aftermath. 
The movie is, as you probably know, 
"The Day After." Believe me, it is mov- 
ing. Recently, scientific panels also have 
reminded us that nuclear war would 
have horrrible and far-reaching conse- 
quences that would, by no means, be 
limited to the participants or to their 
hemisphere. 

The thought of a "nuclear winter 
nightmare," the drama of the destruc- 
tion of a typical American city— such as 
Lawrence, Kansas— and of society as we 
know and cherish it are piercing 
reminders of the need to do everything 
possible to eliminate the chances of 
nuclear war from ever occurring. As 
President Reagan has said on several oc- 
casions: "A nuclear war cannot be won 
and must never be fought." And: "There 
are no winners in a nuclear war— only 
losers." 

Avoiding war while preserving 
freedom is by no means easy. It is, in 
fact, a tough business. It requires not 
just defense efforts but an array of 
diplomatic relationships and security, 
cultural, and economic ties with other 
countries. It often entails hard choices 
with each one having risks and costs. It 
requires— perhaps above all else— our 
mightiest moral, intellectual, and emo- 
tional resources. 



The dramatizations of these weeks 
depict the horrors. They show the prob- 
lem but not the solution. Given the over- 
whelming—indeed, unimaginable- 
tragedy if we fail and the heavy 
demands made on us to succeed— as we 
must— it is only natural that simple for- 
mulas gain popularity. The ideas of a 
"freeze" on nuclear weapons or 
unilateral nuclear disarmament are, in 
this respect, understandable. 

But these ideas are deceptively allur- 
ing. As H. L. Mencken said: "There is 
always an easy solution to every human 
problem— neat, plausible, and wrong." 
Contrary to appearances, a freeze or 
unilateral disarmament will not help 
achieve greater stability or reduce the 
chances of war. They run a high risk, in 
fact, of inviting just the opposite results. 

Paradoxes 

The paradoxes of arms control are glar- 
ing, often to the confusion of many con- 
cerned citizens. History has taught us 
that we must be prepared for war in 
order to avoid it. Strength can and does 
deter aggression. Weakness may invite 
it, and thus weakness is provocative. 

Nuclear balance is essential to keep 
the peace. Deterrence means that a 
potential aggressor realizes that the 
costs to him will be unacceptably high. 
To pose that prospect, we must have 
forces and be seen as able and prepared, 
if necessary, to use those forces against 
key elements of Soviet power. Deter- 
rence hinges upon the Soviet leaders' 
views of our capabilities and of our will. 
Deterrence may be difficult to com- 
prehend and somewhat abstract, but it 
works. It has, for example, kept the 
peace in Europe for 38 years. 

Another paradox is that a strong 
U.S. defense posture is necessary, not 
just for deterrence but also for effective 
arms control. The Soviets are not unlike 
any tough negotiator. If they can realize 
their goals without giving up anything in 
return, they will surely prefer that deal. 
If we grant them strategic superiority 
by neglecting our force modernization, 
we cannot hope to regain strategic pari- 
ty by pursuing arms control ever so 
diligently. On the other hand, if we pur- 
sue programs to redress the imbalances 
that have developed through the un- 
paralleled Soviet military buildup, the 



January 1984 



45 



r'>i^n!nm^:Hi'Jji:hi'JH:liuiiJhmtltiiMtihm^^ 



ARMS CONTROL 



Soviets will have strong incentives to 
negotiate for genuine arms and reduc- 
tions. 

Our actions cannot, of course, 
guarantee that the Soviets will agree to 
substantial reductions in U.S. and Soviet 
nuclear arsenals. We might fail if we 
try. But we will surely fail if we don't 
try. No effective arms control will come 
about if we do not pursue deep reduc- 
tions and needed defense programs. 
Weakness not only diminishes deter- 
rence but also undercuts arms control. 

Problems 

A number of problems, as you can im- 
agine, arise between the paradox and 
the promise of arms control. These prob- 
lems include: 

• The unabated Soviet buildup of 
military forces: 

• Asymmetries between the two 
sides' force structures: and 

• American impatience. 



Both effective deterrence and real 
arms control have become tougher to 
achieve because of Soviet conduct and 
the Soviet weapons buildup over the 
past decade. Since 1972 the Soviet 
Union has tripled its number of strategic 
nuclear weapons. The Soviets dedicate 
at least 12-14% of their gross national 
product to defense, or basically double 
what the United States spends on 
defense relative to its GNP. 

The Soviets have kept production 
lines open and active for all three legs of 
the strategic triad — land-based missiles, 
submarine-based missiles, and 
bombers — whereas the United States 
had an open production line only for sub- 
marines when President Reagan took of- 
fice. The Soviets have also steadily in- 
creased their intermediate-range, land- 
based nuclear forces targeted on 
Western Europe and Asia, having for 
years a monopoly on these weapons. 

The United States has no interest in 
an arms race with the Soviet Union. In 



Director, Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency 




Kenneth L. Adelman was born in Chicago on 
June 9, 1946. He received a bachelor's degree 
from Grinnell College (1967) and a masters in 
Foreign Service from Georgetown University 
(1969). 

His government career began in 1968 at 
the Department of Commerce. From 1970 to 
1972, he served as special assistant to the 
Director of VISTA. He then participated in a 
research project in Kinshasha, Zaire 
(1973-75). Ambassador Adelman pursued ad- 
vanced studies at Georgetown beginning in 
1975. He was a liasion officer for the Agency 
for International Development (1975-76) and 
assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
(1976-77). From the 1977 to 1981, he was 
employed as a senior political scientist at the 
Strategic Studies Center of Stanford 
Research Institute in Arlington, Va., where 
he wrote extensively on national security af- 
fairs. His articles have appeared in Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Policy, Washington Quarter- 
ly, The Wall Street Journal, and the New 
Republic. 

From 1981 to 1983, Ambassador 
Adelman was U.S. Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations. While 
there he led the U.S. delegation to the Sec- 
ond Special Session on Disarmament. 

He was sworn in as Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency on Aug. 
22, 1983. ■ 



fact we have not been racing at all. Our 
increase in strategic weaponry has been 
at a much slower pace. The destructive 
capability of our strategic weapons is to- 
day 60% less than that of the Soviets. 
Looking at our total nuclear stockpile, 
the number of U.S. nuclear weapons is 
at its lowest level in 20 years, and the 
megatonnage of our nuclear weapons to- 
day is only a quarter of what it was in 
the late 1960s. In more graphic terms, 
we have deployed today some 8,000 
fewer nuclear weapons than in the 
1960s. 

As President Regan noted in his 
radio address last month. Western 
restraint stands in stark contrast to the 
Soviet buildup in intermediate-range 
nuclear forces. The Soviets began in the 
mid-1970s to increase these forces 
targeted on our allies in Europe and 
Asia with a new, triple-warheaded, more 
accurate missile— the SS-20. They have 
continued to deploy these mobile 
missiles. They now have 360 SS-20s 
with 1,080 warheads. 

For its part, the United States has 
withdrawn 1,000 nuclear weapons from 
1980 and has just this month announced 
that another 1,400 will be withdrawn. 
For each new nuclear weapon that may 
be deployed in Europe over the coming 
times pursuant to NATO's 1979 decision, 
more than five nuclear weapons will 
have been withdrawn from Europe. 

This is as it should be. We should 
tolerate only the bare minimum number 
of nuclear weapons necessary for effec- 
tive deterrence. Moreover, together with 
our allies, we are dedicating ourselves 
toward less reliance on nuclear weapons 
and more on new conventional methods 
for preserving our freedom. This, too, is 
as it should be. 

The President has taken major ini- 
tiatives to try to eliminate this 
intermediate-range class of weapons en- 
tirely — our zero-zero solution. Since the 
Soviets have continued to refuse to do 
that, the President has taken other ini- 
tiatives to reduce these weapons to the 
lowest possible equal level. 

His efforts— in the INF [inter- 
mediate range nuclear forces] talks in 
Geneva — have regrettably met with 
Soviet stonewalling. We are faced this 
week with the prospect that the Soviets 
may not negotiate if U.S. deployments 
go forward, as NATO has planned since 
1979, to balance this Soviet military 
threat. A Soviet walk-out would be 
ironic and unjustified. We have 
negotiated for several years while the 
Soviets steadily deployed new weapons. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



on an average of one new SS-20 a 
week. Since negotiations began, the 
Soviet Union has fielded over 100 addi- 
tional SS-20 systems with some 300 
warheads. 

Now that U.S. deployments are 
starting according to the schedule estab- 
lished 4 years ago, the Soviets threaten 
to walk out unless we agree to give 
them a monopoly on these missiles. All 
their proposals have had the same bot- 
tom line: hundreds of these missiles for 
them and zero for us. 

If the Soviets were serious about an 
agreement, they would stay at the table 
and negotiate. The United States will 
negotiate as long as necessary to reach a 
sound settlement. We are also prepared 
at any time to modify or reverse our 
missile deployments if such a settlement 
is achieved. 

Pressure tactics are, of course, 
standard Soviet methods. In 1979 the 
Soviet Union said that there could be no 
negotiations if NATO decided to deploy 
these missiles. Nine months later they 
agreed to talks after NATO showed its 
determination. In 1982 the Soviets 
threatened to suspend negotiations if 
NATO moved forward with preparations 
for deployment. These preparations have 
gone forward, and the talks have con- 
tinued. 

We do not know exactly what the 
Soviets have in mind now. But we do 
know that we should not be surprised by 
their pressure tactics. Nor should we be 
cowed or intimidated. Staying the course 
we are on provides the only opportunity 
for a balance or reduction of these 
weapons that will enhance stability and 
reduce the risk of war. 

Another problem for arms control 
relates to the broader context of Soviet 
conduct around the world. Arms control 
cannot be immune from major outside 
forces, and it has not been. President 
Johnson's plans for a Moscow visit to 
launch the first strategic arms limitation 
talks (SALT) were dashed by the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba 
in the Fall of 1979, plus the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, 
adversely affected Senate consideration 
of the SALT II Treaty signed in June of 
that year. 

The Reagan Administration does not 
seek to link arms control efforts to other 
areas of Soviet behavior. In the wake of 
the tragedy of the Korean commercial 
airliner shot down by the Soviets, for 
example, the President did not suspend 



the arms talks. On the contrary, he con- 
tinued to review problems in the 
negotiations and to undertake steps to 
overcome them. 

But Soviet behavior can and at times 
will impact on our arms control efforts, 
like it or not. This is inevitable in a 
democracy, where neither the public nor 
its representatives can place aspects of 
Soviet conduct in totally separate boxes. 
Soviet adherence to existing arms con- 
trol treaties or to pledges on their part 
also raises perplexing problems. 

It is particularly tragic that the use 
of chemical warfare in Asia continues to- 
day in violation of international 
agreements, international law, and 
civilized behavior. These actions by the 
Soviet Union or its allies have accounted 
for an estimated 10,000 deaths among 
the Afghan hill peoples and Asian 
peasants. This assaults everyone's sense 
of human decency. Other Soviet actions 
raise serious questions about their com- 
pliance with the ABM [Antiballistic 
Missile] Treaty and with their political 
undertakings related to the SALT II 
Treaty. 

We cannot turn our back on 
evidence of such violations. If we are 
serious about arms control, we must be 
equally serious about problems of com- 
pliance. The Reagan Administration is 
comprehensively reviewing these issues, 
and we continue to raise them with the 
Soviets at high levels. 

Another major problem in nuclear 
arms control stems from the two sides' 
different force structures and ap- 
proaches. The United States has, for ex- 
ample, over time leaned toward smaller 
missiles with improved accuracy and 
technology and toward a balance be- 
tween the three legs of the strategic 
triad. The Soviets, on the other hand, 
have placed greater emphasis on 
destabilizing heavier, land-based 
missiles. 

Differences of perspective resulting 
from geography, from history, and from 
tradition further compound the dif- 
ficulties of negotiation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets see any weapons targeted on the 
U.S.S.R. as "strategic," whereas we dif- 
fer on that definition since some of our 
weapons in Europe are there only to off- 
set Soviet weapons targeted on our 
allies in Europe. 

Differences lie also in that the 
Soviets seek forces that far outnumber 
all their potential adversaries combined. 
But were we to agree with that formula- 
tion, the Soviet Union would be far 



stronger than any single potential adver- 
sary, such as the United States. Grant- 
ing the Soviet Union superiority by arms 
control is obviously unacceptable. 

Simply put, the two sides' forces are 
not comparable in many respects. Thus 
even with good faith and major efforts 
by both sides, it is difficult intellectually 
to bridge the wide gaps. 

But that is precisely the challenge of 
negotiations and, I can assure you, one 
of the things that makes my job and 
others so extraordinarily stimulating. 
How to balance systems that are com- 
parable and to make tradeoffs between 
systems that are not is easier said than 
done, but still possible. 

Last month President Reagan made 
clear that the United States is prepared 
in the strategic arms reductions talks 
(START) to negotiate tradeoffs between 
Soviet advantages and U.S. advantages. 
He also called for a mutual, guaranteed 
build-down of ballistic missile warheads 
and bomber platforms. This would 
reduce the number of missile warheads 
by a third on both sides, an approach 
which offers a promising beginning if 
the Soviets are willing. 

A third problem — besides the Soviet 
military buildup and asymmetries be- 
tween the U.S. and Soviet forces — is 
uniquely ours: It is traditional American 
impatience. This, of course, has many 
beneficial and noble aspects. We are an 
active people. We see problems, and we 
want to solve them — sooner rather than 
later. Our creativity and problem-solving 
impulse have built the kind of society 
which we are so fortunate and justifiably 
proud to have today. 

But effective arms control, like most 
worthwhile endeavors, does not come 
quickly. The key issues we face today 
are extremely complicated, as you might 
have discerned from my remarks above, 
progress will be more difficult than in 
the past, and, needless to say, it was not 
particularly easy then. Achieving 
militarily significant reductions and 
sound limitations promises to be a long, 
hard road. 

We cannot be discouraged by the 
difficulty of the passage. As we travel 
down this road, we should be wary of 
the lure of agreements which may look 
appealing but, on reflection, do not real- 
ly serve the goals for which they are in- 
tended. We should be wary of any so- 
called simple solutions and should not 
allow sweeping, unverifiable declarations 
of intent to be confused with real arms 
control. 

Empty agreements would be easy 
and quick. We could have one tomorrow. 
But they would inflate expectations 



January 1984 



47 



>\-i:i-utui-jH'h>,iifhiiiuhii>!mHmmiummmmmmmms^ 



ARMS CONTROL 



without offering much in the way of con- 
crete benefit. 

Effective arms control will, thus, 
take considerable time and patience. 
Negotiation of the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for 
example, took some 5 years. Other 
agreements have required even more 
time. The Austrian state treaty took 
more than 10 years to negotiate and 
conclude. Would we have a free and in- 
dependent Austria today if the West 
had, at any stage, given up or com- 
promised its basic principles and objec- 
tives? There is, I am sorry to report, no 
quick and easy route to a better world. 



Promise 

Under President Reagan, the United 
States has been embarked on one of the 
most ambitious arms control agendas 
ever developed. That fact is often insuf- 
ficiently understood and sometimes bald- 
ly misrepresented. 

I do not plan to bore you with all the 
intricate details of our negotiations. A 
summary review of our major efforts 
clearly illustrates just how broad the 
current arms control agenda is. 

• In the strategic arms reductions 
talks in Geneva, we seek deep reduc- 
tions in strategic nuclear weapons. We 



should not be satisfied with merely cap- 
ping nuclear arms at high levels. Since 
SALT I and SALT H, we have seen 
substantial increases in the Soviet 
nuclear forces that have created 
strategic imbalances. Arms control 
needs to do better. 

• In the talks on intermediate- 
range, land-based nuclear forces in 
Geneva, we continue to seek the com- 
plete elimination of these weapons but 
are willing to accept any agreement that 
would substantially and effectively 
reduce the systems to equal and low 
U.S. and Soviet levels on a global basis. 

• While we push ahead to reduce 



Soviets Suspend INF Negotiations 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 23, 19831 

I deeply regret that the Soviet Union 
has chosen to discontinue the present 
round of intermediate-range nuclear 
force (INF) negotiations in Geneva. 
While their decision did not come as a 
surprise, it is a terrible disappointment. 
The search for an agreement to reduce 
nuclear weapons is so important to peo- 
ple everywhere that the effort cannot be 
abandoned. 

Common sense demands that we 
continue. We have negotiated for 2 
years while the Soviets have continued 
to deploy their SS-20 missiles. There is 
no justification for their breaking off 
negotiations just as NATO is beginning 
to restore the balance. The United 
States will never walk away from the 
negotiating table. Peace is too impor- 
tant. 

We are prepared to resume the talks 
at once. The initiatives we have placed 
on the negotiating table have only one 
objective: to reach a fair agreement that 
reduces the level of nuclear arms. The 
United States and its NATO allies are 
united in our commitment to succeed. 

We have no higher priority than the 
reduction of nuclear weapons. Arms 
reductions are the only sound course to 
a safer future. We seek sound and 
verifiable agreements that meet the 
legitimate security interests of both 
sides. 

We are continuing other negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union — on 



strategic arms reductions, on the reduc- 
tion of conventional forces in Europe, on 
a chemical weapons ban, and soon on 
confidence-building measures aimed at 
preventing military surprises in Europe. 
The people of the world deserve and 
want our negotiations to succeed. We 
look forward to the day when the Soviet 
Union hears their call and returns to the 
INF negotiating table. Our negotiations 
have been on the right course. We must 
persevere if we are to serve the cause of 
peace. 



AMBASSADOR NITZE'S 

STATEMENT, 

NOV. 23, 19832 

The United States profoundly regrets 
the unilateral decision of the Soviet 
Union to suspend the INF negotiations. 
This decision is as unjustified as it is un- 
fortunate. 

The Soviet Union has rationalized 
the suspension of these negotiations on 
the grounds that approval by the NATO 
parliaments of U.S. missile deployments 
and U.S. deployment of those missiles 
makes continuation of such talks im- 
possible. In 1979 when the United States 
first proposed INF negotiations to the 
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had 
already deployed some 140 SS-20s 
globally. The global total of SS-20s now 
is 360, and this Soviet buildup continues. 
This continuing Soviet buildup has not 
prevented the United States from pursu- 
ing these negotiations and making every 



effort to reach an equitable agreement. 
These negotiations should continue until 
an agreement is reached. 

The schedule for U.S. deployments 
has never been a secret. Nor has the 
reason for them. They were mandated 
by the NATO 1979 decision as a 
necessary response to the Soviet 
deployments of SS-20 missiles. That 
decision was mandated as an effort to 
limit such arms through negotiations be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 

The United States remains commit- 
ted to reaching a negotiated solution 
which meets the security needs of all 
concerned. The U.S. delegation has 
sought both formally and informally to 
explore all opportunities for reconciling 
the differences between the two sides. 
The U.S. proposals are flexible and 
designed to meet expressed Soviet con- 
cerns. 

The United States stands ready to 
halt or reverse its deployments if an 
equitable agreement to reduce and limit 
or eliminate U.S. and Soviet missiles can 
be achieved. 

For its part, the United States re- 
mains prepared to continue the INF 
negotiations until an agreement has 
been reached and our two countries 
have thus fulfilled their responsibilities 
to contribute to the cause of peace. 



'Issued in Santa Barbara (text from 
White House press release). 

-Made in Geneva. Ambassador Paul H. 
Nitze is head of the U.S. delegation to the 
INF negotiations. ■ 



48 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



existing nuclear arsenals, we also con- 
tinue vigorous efforts to prevent the fur- 
ther spread of nuclear weapons. It is im- 
perative that the spread of nuclear 
weapons around the world be halted. 

• In the Committee on Disarma- 
ment in Geneva, we are actively en- 
gaged in trying to rid the world of all 
chemical weapons. As expressed by one 
keen observer, these weapons have all 
the potential for becoming "the poor 
countries' weapons of mass destruction." 
The world cannot afford that, and we 
are redoubling our efforts to work out a 
complete and effective ban on all 
chemical weapons. I personally feel 
strongly about this important area. The 
moral, legal, and political barriers that 
have been built up over the decades on 
chemical weapons use are in danger of 
being eroded and of tumbling down. We 
need to buttress and build on them, just 
as we have done in preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

• In the mutual and balanced force 
reductions talks, we have, with our 
allies, taken initiatives to seek reduc- 
tions in conventional forces in Europe. 

• In the upcoming Conference on 
Confidence and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 
we are again working with our allies to 
achieve agreements that will reduce the 
risk of war arising through error or 
miscalculation. 

Despite this impressive agenda, 
some critics argue that the Reagan Ad- 
ministration is not serious about arms 
control. Nothing could be further from 
the truth, as you can see. 

Another line of criticism is, ironical- 
ly, that the President's arms control pro- 
posals are too ambitious. I am not en- 
tirely sure what such criticisms mean. 
Should we not seek deep and militarily 
significant reductions in strategic 
nuclear weapons? Should we not ensure 
that reductions are balanced in a way 
that contributes to, rather than detracts 
from, stability? Should we not seek 
much lower levels of nuclear weapons 
and conventional forces in Europe? 
Should we not seek to prevent the fur- 
ther spread of nuclear weapons and to 
ban all chemical weapons? 

These goals are surely ambitious. 
But can we afford to be anything less? I 
do not think so. The President does not 
think so. And I doubt that the American 
people think so. 

The promise of arms control is fre- 



quently exaggerated by some and under- 
estimated by others. It cannot, by itself, 
resolve the world's problems. We should 
not burden it with the task of resolving 
the major political and ideological dif- 
ferences that separate free people from 
the Soviet Union — particularly its 
repression at home and aggression 
abroad. Arms control cannot and was 
not meant to carry such a load. 

But arms control can make a key 
contribution. It holds out a promise of a 
world with fewer and fewer nuclear 
weapons, with less and less overall 
destructive capability; a promise of 
greater stability and reductions in the 
chances of war by error or miscalcula- 



tion in crisis; and a promise of a better 
basis for security planning. When all is 
said and done, it can be one of the foun- 
dations for the better world that we all 
seek. 

Arms control, in general terms, 
represents the embodiment of hope 
among peoples for a world spared from 
the kind and intensity of conflict that so 
deeply marred the first half of this cen- 
tury. These vital efforts deserve 
everyone's support. As President 
Reagan and the other summit partners 
noted earlier this year in Williamsburg, 
arms control is part of "a vision of a 
world in which the shadow of war has 
been lifted from all mankind." ■ 



The CDE and European 
Security in the 1980s 



by Gerhard Mally 

Dr. Mally is a foreign affairs officer 
in the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA). 

Introduction 

After 3 years of sometimes acrimonious 
deliberations, the 35 participants in the 
second follow-up meeting of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) adopted a concluding 
document in Madrid on September 9, 
1983. This consensus document had been 
approved by President Reagan on July 
15 when he stated that: 

We have agreed to this concluding docu- 
ment, as we did in 1975 to the Helsinki Final 
Act itself, with no illusions about the nature 
of the Soviet Union or about the system 
which it seeks to impose over much of 
Europe . . . 

Together with the Helsinki accords, this 
agreement sets forth a clearer code of con- 
duct for all 35 CSCE states. . . . Giving 
substance to the promises of Madrid and 
Helsinki will remain one of our prime objec- 
tives. 

The concluding document calls, inter 
alia, for the convening of a Conference 
or Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
(CDE) to be held in Stockholm, Sweden, 
in 1984. In his final address in Madrid, 
Secretary of State George Shultz stated 
that "the United States will negotiate 
seriously to reach agreement on militari- 
ly significant, political binding, and 



January 1984 



verifiable measures applicable to the 
whole of Europe" at the Stockholm con- 
ference. 

Genesis of the 
Stockholm Conference 

The concept of a conference on Euro- 
pean security was originally proposed by 
the Warsaw Pact members at their 
meeting in Bucharest in 1966. At that 
time, the East called for the convening 
of an "all-European" security conference 
and the dissolution of both NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. The East's proposal 
was clearly aimed at elimination of the 
U.S. military presence from Europe, and 
the West rejected it. 

When the Warsaw Pact met in 
Budapest in 1970, it reiterated its pro- 
posal for a European security con- 
ference, this time with the United States 
and Canada as full participants. During 
this period (1968-72), NATO repeatedly 
challenged the Warsaw Pact to join in 
negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR). In fact, NATO 
made Warsaw Pact acceptance of 
MBFR a sine qua nan for parallel 
negotiations on European security and 
cooperation. Thus a linkage was 
established between East-West negotia- 
tions on MBFR and CSCE, and 
preparatory meetings began in Vienna 
and Helsinki in 1972 and 1973, respec- 
tively. 

Whereas the 19 participants in 
MBFR have been meeting in Vienna at 
regular intervals over the last decade, 
the 35 participants in the CSCE have 



49 



:Al,UiAmtuji.j:uUVntm!nM^^^^^ 



ARMS CONTROL 



met less frequently, including in Helsinki 
to sign the Final Act (1975), in Belgrade 
for their first follow-up meeting 
(1977-78), in Madrid for the second 
review conference (1980-83), and in 
Helsinki for the preparatory meeting 
which set the agenda, timetable, and 
modalities of the CDE (October 1983). 

The formal opening date of the CDE 
is January 17, 1984, in Stockholm. The 
CSCE process will continue with several 
additional meetings — on peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes (Athens, 1984), on 
Mediterranean cooperation (Venice, 
1984), an experts' meeting on human 
rights (Ottawa, 1985), a cultural forum 
(Budapest, 1985), the 10th anniversary 
session of CSCE (Helsinki, 1985), an ex- 
perts' meeting on human contacts (Bern, 
1986), and the third foUowup conference 
on CSCE (Vienna, 1986). 

Purpose of the CDE 

According to the concluding document, 
"the aim of the Conference is ... to 
undertake, in stages, new, effective and 
concrete actions designed to make prog- 
ress in strengthening confidence and 
security and in achieving disarma- 
ment ..." These objectives are to be 
achieved in stages, the first of which is 
devoted to negotiating the adoption of a 
set of mutually complementary 
confidence- and security-building 
measures designed to reduce the risk of 
military confrontation in Europe. A 
future foUowup meeting of CSCE will 
consider the issue of supplementing the 
CDE mandate. 

Confidence- and security-building 
measures to be negotiated in stage one 
will cover the whole of Europe as well 
as the adjoining sea area and airspace. 
They will be of military significance, be 
politically binding, and will be provided 
with adequate measures of verification. 

During the Madrid followup 
meeting, the Soviet Union had per- 
sistently called for a conference on 
reducing armaments in Europe to follow 
the second CSCE followup meeting in 
the fall of 1983. This was a clear at- 
tempt to use such a forum to derail the 
scheduled deployment of U.S. inter- 
mediate-range ballistic (Pershings lis) 
and cruise missiles in Western Europe in 
accordance with NATO's dual-track deci- 
sion of 1979. Instead, the West insisted 
on placing the focus of the Stockholm 
conference on negotiating effective 
confidence-building measures (as 
originally advocated by France in 1978). 



SO 



The Concept of Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures 

In the Western view, confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs) are 
designed to enhance knowledge and 
understanding about military forces and 
activities between states and/or con- 
fronting alliances, such as NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. They involve 
reciprocal exchanges of significant 
military data and information for the 
purpose of reducing the risk of military 
confrontation by accident or miscalcula- 
tion and to provide early warning about 
impending military operations. The 
resulting increase in accuracy of percep- 
tions minimizes opportunities for sur- 
prise attack and/or miscalculation and 
thus increases stability. CSBMs com- 
plement — but are no substitute 
for — arms reduction agreements which 
seek to constrain the size, armaments, 
and structure of military forces. 

Significance of CSBMs 
in the European Context 

The chief source of potential military in- 
stability in Europe is the threat of War- 
saw Pact armed forces — numerically 
superior, geographically advantaged, 
and directed by the Soviet Union, the 
dominant military power on the Conti- 
nent. Western military planners must 
prepare for the possibility of a Warsaw 
Pact surprise attack against NATO, an 
alliance with a purely defensive 
strategy. In the event of Soviet aggres- 
sion, the Warsaw Pact would have the 
tactical advantage of choosing the time 
and avenues of attack while benefiting 
from rapid mobilization and reinforce- 
ment capabilities. Under these condi- 
tions, the West European quest for 
negotiating a viable regime of CSBMs 
assumes great importance. 

The first set of confidence-building 
measures (CBMs) for the European 
theater is contained in the CSCE Final 
Act; it involves multilateral, regional, 
selective, and mostly voluntary CBMs 
which apply to the territories of the 35 
signatories. Basket 1 includes a "docu- 
ment on confidence-building measures 
and certain aspects of security and 
disarmament" which provides for one 
mandatory CBM and four others: 

• Prior notification of major 
military maneuvers exceeding a total of 
25,000 troops, independently or com- 
bined with any possible air or naval com- 
ponent. In the case of a state whose ter- 
ritory extends beyond Europe, prior 
notification need be given only of 



maneuvers which take place in an area 
within 250 kilometers from its frontier 
facing or shared with any other Euro- 
pean state, and notification has to be 
given 21 days or more in advance of the 
start of the maneuvers. This CBM is 
mandatory; 

• Exchange of observers to attend 
military maneuvers; 

• Prior notification of smaller scale 
maneuvers, involving a total of less than 
25,000 troops; 

• Prior notification of major 
military movements; and 

• Exchange of military personnel 
and delegations. 

The Soviet record of implementation 
regarding notification of maneuvers has 
been mixed. In fact, the very spirit of 
"confidence-building" measures was soon 
eroded by Soviet aggression in Afghani- 
stan and blatant intervention in the in- 
ternal affairs of Poland in 1979-80. In- 
deed, the Soviet Union has effectively 
violated all basic principles of basket 1 
of the Final Act including respect for 
the sovereign equality of nations; 
refraining from the threat or use of 
force; inviolability of frontiers; ter- 
ritorial integrity of states; noninterven- 
tion in internal affairs; and self- 
determination of peoples. 

In 1978 the West put forward pro- 
posals for additional CBMs at the CSCE 
review conference in Belgrade, including 
a call to encourage openness in military 
budgets. Yet none of these ideas was ac- 
cepted at the inconclusive first follow-up 
meeting. At the second review con- 
ference in Madrid, the Western nations 
relaunched their effort to promote the 
cause of more effective CBMs for the 
European region. 

Western Approach to 
CSBMs for the 1980s 

Based upon a French proposal, the 
Western participants in the Madrid 
review conference identified the follow- 
ing criteria for negotiating a CSBM 
regime at the Stockholm meeting. 

• Military Significance— CSBMs to 

be meaningful would have to focus on 
military activities that threaten the 
security of other states rather than 
cosmetic provisions that create the illu- 
sion of security. 

• Obligation — CSBMs would have 
to be mandatory and be implemented 
without exception and at all times rather 
than selectively and irregularly at the 
discretion of the signatories. 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



• Verif lability — implementation of 
CSBMs would have to be governed by 
specific provisions for verification of 
commitments rather than based upon 
good faith and mutual trust. Indeed, it is 
the very lack of mutual trust that makes 
CSBMs necessary in the first place. 
Moreover to the extent that CSBMs 
would complement and reinforce arms 
control agreements, they would have to 
be verifiable. 

• Applicability— in order to be ef- 
fective, CSBMs would have to cover the 
entire European Continent, from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, including the 
western area of the U.S.S.R. Given the 
geopolitical and strategic advantages of 
the Soviet Union in Eurasia, the exten- 
sion of the CSBM regime to the Urals is 
imperative. 

• Linkage with CSCE— the CDE 
mandate would have to define the con- 
ference as part of the CSCE process, 
and it would be up to a subsequent 
follow-up meeting to assess progress 
and extend the mandate. 

Although the specifics for CSBMs 
are subject to negotiations at the 
Stockholm conference, the concluding 
document of Madrid set two important 
geographic parameters. 

First, the area to be covered by 
CSBMs is the whole of Europe, extend- 
ing to the Urals. This principle is signifi- 
cant because the limited CBMs adopted 
in the Final Act of Helsinki exempted 
the U.S.S.R., except for the first 250 
kilometers from its western borders. 
The Soviet Union, after first rejecting 
the extended CBM coverage to the 
Urals, urged that the geographic area be 
enlarged into the Atlantic Ocean as com- 
pensation for Moscow. The Soviet 
motive was, of course, to obtain a droit 
de regard for interference with the 
movement of U.S. naval forces in con- 
tingencies involving areas outside 
Europe. 

Thereafter, the West insisted on a 
second parameter for CSBMs: that only 
"adjoining sea area and airspace" would 
be included and only when activities in 



that area are part of military operations 
taking place within Europe. This was 
eventually accepted by the East. 

The mandate for negotiating Euro- 
pean-wide CSBMs in Stockholm is im- 
portant to West Europeans in the face 
of the possibility of a Soviet surprise at- 
tack. In this context, however, it is im- 
portant to recall that even the most 
elaborate CSBMs cannot substitute for a 
credible defense posture. Indeed, the 
prospects for negotiating a viable CSBM 
regime with the East in Stockholm de- 
pend largely on improving NATO's 
deterrent forces, both conventional and 
nuclear. 

Conclusion 

Determined Western efforts to establish 
an effective regime of CSBMs in Europe 
are symptomatic of the existing political 
atmosphere on the Continent which is 
characterized by increasing uncertainty 
and anxiety about the future of East- 
West relations. The principal reasons for 
the prevailing attitudes are the Soviet 
Union's unprecedented military 
capabilities and aggressive behavior. The 
state of European insecurity manifests 
itself in three dimensions, caused by a 
triple disparity between East and West: 

First, the continuing asymmetry of 
conventional forces between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact in central Europe in 



favor of the East (some 160,000 troops 
and a tank superiority of 3:1), capable of 
rapid mobilization for aggression; 

Second, the imbalance in intermed- 
iate-range nuclear forces, caused by the 
unilateral Soviet deployment of more 
than 350 mobile, triple warhead SS-20 
missiles, two-thirds of which are 
targeted at NATO military installations 
and capable of obliterating all population 
centers in Western Europe; and 

Third, the legacy of direct Soviet 
military intervention in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the German 
Democratic Republic, Afghanistan, and 
the record of support of proxy regimes 
and revolutionary movements in Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Viet- 
nam — all are manifestations of Soviet 
expansionism. 

Under these circumstances, Euro- 
pean security and stability will only be 
restored when the leaders of the Soviet 
Union are prepared to accept the 
equitable Western proposals for genuine 
force reductions in the intermediate- 
range nuclear forces and mutual and 
balanced force reductions negotiations. 
The CSCE-sponsored Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
provides an appropriate forum for 
negotiating a set of binding and 
verifiable CSBMs which could contribute 
to European security in the 1980s. ■ 



January 1984 



51 



EUROPE 



Developments in Cyprus 



by Richard N. Haass 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
November 2, 1983. Mr. Haass is special 
Cyprus coordinator and Deputy for 
Policy in the Bureau of European and 
Canadian Affairs.^ 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss 
with you the subject of Cyprus and the 
Administration's policy toward that 
country. I hope this marks the beginning 
of a regular dialogue with this commit- 
tee and the Congress more generally on 
this important subject. Realizing prog- 
ress on the Cyprus question remains a 
high priority in the foreign policy of the 
Reagan Administration. I very much ap- 
preciate the confidence Secretary Shultz 
has placed in me as his special Cyprus 
coordinator and consider keeping the 
Congress informed on developments 
there a vital part of my coordination 
duties. Assistant Secretary [for Euro- 
pean and Canadian Affairs Richard R.] 
Burt's introductory remarks place the 
Cyprus question in its proper regional 
and global context. With his and the 
Secretary's active support, I undertake 
my new duties. No one should doubt our 
determination to see progress toward a 
fair, negotiated settlement in Cyprus. 

Today I propose to describe recent 
developments affecting Cyprus and 
make some remarks on Administration 
policies. I would like to begin, however, 
by providing a brief look at the history 
of Cyprus and a description of how the 
present situation has developed. 

Historical Overview 

The creation of the Republic of Cyrpus 
in 1960 followed a long and difficult 
history of anticolonial and intercom- 
munal violence in which Cypriots of both 
the Turkish and Greek communities 
died. The Constitution of 1960 was an 
attempt to create a unitary state in 
which the two communities were to live 
together, something that had proven, at 
best, difficult. Greece, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom were guarantors of the 
1960 agreement establishing the basis of 
that Constitution. The United States 
was an active supporter of the process 
but played no role in the planning or ex- 
ecution of the establishment of the new 
state. Unfortunately, the Constitution 



did not work, and by 1963 it was evident 
that communal animosities were 
stronger than the spirit of nationhood 
which the founders had hoped would 
emerge. Regrettably the violence of the 
preindependence era resumed and U.N. 
peacekeeping forces were stationed on 
the island under a Security Council man- 
date of March 1964— a mandate the 
Council has renewed every 6 months 
since. Despite their presence, the 
violence continued, reaching serious 
levels again in 1967. 

By 1974 the situation had deteri- 
orated further, and the government in 
Athens, for its own reasons, engineered 
the overthrow of the government of 
President Makarios. In response to the 
threat of increased violence against the 
Turkish Cypriot community, the Turkish 
Government intervened militarily, citing 
the need to protect the security of the 
Turkish Cypriot community. On 
August 15, the Turkish forces expanded 
the area under their control to take in 
approximately the northern third (some 
37%) of the island. By the end of 1974, 
the Makarios government had been 
recreated and controlled the southern 
portion of the island. Thousands of 
Cypriots of both communities were 
uprooted and relocated on the island. 
UN troops moved onto the newly 
established buffer zone dividing the com- 
munities and brought about a relatively 
effective separation of the two. 

In the period following the arrival of 
the Turkish troops and the establish- 
ment of the buffer zone controlled by 
the U.N. forces, the United States and 
other friends of Cyprus worked con- 
tinually to assist the two sides in resolv- 
ing their differences. Intercommunal 
negotiations, which had taken place off 
and on since before independence, 
resumed following the arrival of the 
U.N. forces but broke down in the 
spring of 1977. 

In an effort to stimulate the resump- 
tion of the talks, the United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom sub- 
mitted a proposal in November 1978 to 
the two Cypriot communities. This ini- 
tiative attempted to build upon the 
points agreed to by President Makarios 
and Turkish leader Denktash in their 
February 1977 meeting. It was not a 
detailed plan for settlement of the prob- 
lems: rather, it was an attempt— within 



the parameters already agreed to by the 
leaders— to outline the form of an even- 
tual government. The proposal also 
made suggestions concerning settlement 
of the refugee problem and the 
establishment of an economic modus 
Vivendi in a future bicommunal state. 

The 1978 proposal was not accepted 
by either side as a basis for restarting 
the intercommunal process. Since that 
time the United States has not made 
substantive settlement proposals. Rather 
it has been U.S. policy to support the 
UN Secretary General's efforts to bring 
the parties together. We continue to 
believe this approach holds out the best 
promise for progress. That effort, man- 
dated by the UN Security Council, en- 
joys nearly unanimous international sup- 
port. 

Today, 20 years after the outbreak 
of intercommunal violence and 9 years 



Department Statement, 
Nov. 15, 1983^ 

We have learned today of the declara- 
tion by the Turkish Cypriot community 
of its independence. The announcement 
came following a resolution reportedly 
approved in that community's legislative 
assembly creating a polity called the 
"Turkish Republic of Northern C.vprus." 

This move by the Turkish Cypriots 
comes as a complete surprise to us. We 
are dismayed by the move which we con- 
sider unhelpful to the process of finding 
a settlement to the Cyprus problem. We 
are actively meeting with all parties to 
the Cyprus problem both in Washington 
and other capitals to urge calm in the 
wake of today's developments. 

The Turkish Cypriots should reverse 
their actions. We have urged the 
Government of Turkey to use its in- 
fluence with the Turkish Cypriot com- 
munity to bring about such a reversal. 
We will not recognize the new polity, 
and we urge all countries of the world 
not to recognize it. 

We urge all parties to the Cj^jrus 
question to support the efforts of the 
[UN] Secretary General to bring about a 
fair and final negotiated settlement of 
the problems of that country. In our 
opinion, the secession of the Turkish 
community from the Republic of Cyprus 
represents potentially serious damage to 
that process. 



2Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



after the dramatic events of the summer 
of 1974, the communities remain 
physically separated; the UN and 
Turkish troops remain in place, although 
their numbers have been reduced. Over 
the intervening years, numerous at- 
tempts have been made by the com- 
munities themselves, by the United Na- 
tions, and by interested outside parties 
to bring the de facto partition of the 
island to an end. While none has yet suc- 
ceeded, the process of intercommunal 
negotiations has produced general 
agreements in principle on several 
points of an eventual Cypriot settlement, 
including the federated and bicommunal 
nature of the future state. Intercom- 
munal talks, usefully employed over the 
last 15 years and presently under the 
sponsorship of the UN Secretary 
General, represent the only effective 
dialogue between the two Cypriot com- 
munities. Gaps in the talks, such as we 
see at present, are caused by one or 
both parties believing their particular in- 
terests are better served by resort to 
other fora or by delay rather than by 
progress. Such delays must be avoided; 
when the dialogue stops, the potential 
for intercommunal misunderstanding in- 
creases dramatically. 

Recent Developments 

In August 1983 UN Secretary General 
Perez de Cuellar, acting within his good- 
offices role mandated by the Security 
Council, took "soundings" to determine 
the possibility of once again resuming 
the talks which have been stalled since 
last spring. The two parties were asked 
to look both at methodology (i.e.: the 
Secretary General taking the task of 
outlining parameters of key issues 
within which the two sides could 
negotiate) and at the substance of three 
such "indicators" (form of the executive, 
the legislature, and territorial division). 
The United States urged the two parties 
to respond constructively to the 
Secretary General's initiative but did not 
comment on the substance of the pro- 
posals themselves. 

While the results of this soundings 
have not yet been announced, we 
understand the Greek Cypriots indicated 
their acceptance of and support for the 
Secretary General's personal involve- 
ment in the attempt to find solutions. In 
the Turkish response, we understand, 
was included a call for a return to the 
intercommunal talks. The Secretary 
General is carefully studying the two 



responses now, and we remain hopeful 
the two Cypriot communities can agree 
to return to negotiations with a renewed 
determination to find a fair and lasting 
settlement. Our role is and will remain 



50th Anniversary of 

U.S.-Sovlet 

Relations 



EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, 
NOV. 16, 19831 

November 16th will mark 50 years from the 
moment of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of 
America. This is a major landmark in rela- 
tions between our two states. 

In establishing diplomatic relations, both 
sides proceeded from a recognition of the 
fundamental difference in their socio- 
economic systems, but at the same time from 
a recognition that this difference is not an 
obstacle to normal interstate relations. 

This principle is of lasting significance. 
The Soviet state, unfailingly devoted to the 
cause of peace among peoples and to the 
development of equitable, mutually advan- 
tageous relations, is to this day firmly guided 
by this principle in its relations with the 
USA. 

We assume that there is a basis in our 
countries for proper appreciation of the 
significance of such a date as the 50th an- 
niversary of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. 



Moscow 



Presidum of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR 



Fifty years have passed since the diplomatic 
relations were established between our coun- 
tries. As we note this anniversary, I hope 
that we can recommit ourselves to working 
constructively on the problems before us. 

The United States has no higher aim nor 
more urgent goal than achieving and preserv- 
ing world peace and security. 

Let us seek ways, despite the differences 
in our governments, philosophies and values, 
to cooperate in reducing international ten- 
sions and creating a safer world. 

If we can work together to this end, we 
shall be fulfilling the promise of Novem- 
ber 16, 1933, when formal ties between our 
countries began, 

/s/ Ronald Re.\gan 



EUROPE 



one of supporting the efforts of the 
Cypriot people to find solutions and of 
the Secretary General to facilitate that 
search. We have also made clear to the 
parties that we will continue material 
assistance to help all Cypriots improve 
their standard of living and diplomatic 
assistance to facilitate communications 
and exchange between the communities 
as they pursue the intercommunal 
negotiating process. 

Administration Policies 

U.S. policy has been, and remains, based 
upon the strong desire to see a stable 
and peaceful Cyprus in which all 
Cypriots, regardless of their ethnic iden- 
tity, can live together in peace and pros- 
perity. Further, we support a demo- 
cratic, independent, and nonaligned 
Cyprus exercising its rights and duties 
within the family of nations— a viable 
and responsible state in a strategically 
important area of the world. 

On a more specific level, U.S. Cy- 
prus policy is based upon active support 
for the U.N. Secretary General in the 
good-offices role entrusted to him by the 
Security Council. We maintain a close 
liaison with the Secretary General and 
other UN officials concerned with the 
Cyprus problem, and, wherever possible, 
we use our diplomatic resources to rein- 
force their programs. 

The Reagan Administration intends 
to continue following the Secretary 
General's lead, believing strongly that in 
his good-offices role lies the best chance 
for making progress in Cyprus. 

The general principles of an eventual 
Cypriot state are contained in the foun- 
dations of the present round of inter- 
communal talks: 

• The Makarios-Denktash instruc- 
tions to their negotiators of Febru- 
ary 12, 1977; 

• The Denktash-Kyprianou 10-point 
agreement of May 19, 1979; 

• The Secretary General's statement 
opening the talks on August 9, 1980; 
and 

• The Secretary General's evalua- 
tion of 1981. 

Collectively these documents, along 
with the Secretary General's recent 
soundings, represent evidence of con- 
siderable progress toward a settlement. 
They constitute a foundation upon which 
the parties could reconstruct their state. 

Further progress will be determined. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983. 



January 1984 



53 



Ufilo<i::.:ii,U't'iHU,h<,nUIU'l'ihi;niihUilUHhtmmM^^^^ 



EUROPE 



above all, by the degree of political will 
on the part of the two Cypriot parties 
themselves. Without the sincere desire 
for a settement— and the incumbent 
willingness to compromise — nothing we 
do and nothing the Secretary General 
does will matter. For that reason our 
resolve will not waver. We must con- 
tinue to urge the parties to negotiate, 
support the Secretary General in his ef- 
forts to provide the platform for prog- 
ress, and convince all interested parties 
that there is no viable alternative to a 
fair and final negotiated settlement in 
Cyprus. 

Department of State Counselor Ed- 
ward Derwinski, Assistant Secretary 
Richard Burt, and I have visited Cyprus 
this year as part of the Administration's 
effort to facilitate a settlement. 
Together with Secretary Shultz, we met 
in New York during the General 
Assembly session with representatives 
of the two Cypriot parties, with Turkish 
and Greek officials, and with UN of- 
ficials. We have also maintained close 
coordination with our European allies 
whose interests in Cyprus parallel our 
own and who have joined us in support- 
ing the Secretary General's role. In all 
these meetings we have forcefully made 
the points I have outlined for you today. 

In addition, over the past year a 
number of congressional delegations 
have visited Cyprus. These visits, we 
trust, have helped to provide a depth of 
understanding of, and empathy with, the 
people of Cyprus who sincerely long for 
an end to the division of their island. 

Our resolve in the search for solu- 
tions to the Cyprus problem must con- 
tinue. Over the coming months we will 
work closely with the Secretary General 
and with the representatives of the two 
Cypriot communities to find paths for 
progress. The long-term peace, prosperi- 
ty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus 
are too important to permit relaxing our 
efforts. I assure you we will continue 
and will keep the Congress appraised of 
our progress in this important mission. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be iiublisned by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S. Sanctions Against Poland 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT. 
NOV. 2, 1983' 

In the past months, we and our allies 
have been engaged in extensive dialogue 
on the situation in Poland. Very serious 
problems still remain. The Polish Gov- 
ernment continues to defy the wishes of 
the majority of the Polish people; a 
number of political prisoners are still in- 
carcerated, and indictments have been 
brought against certain of these 
prisoners; free labor unions have not 
been restored; no genuine economic 
reforms have been implemented, and 
stringent censorship still exists. 

For these reasons, our sanctions 
presently remain in place. These include 
the suspension of Polish civil aviation 
privileges in the United States; the 
freeze on Export-Import Bank's line of 
export credit insurance for Poland; the 
implementation of a no-exceptions policy 
which restricts export licensing of high 
technology items to Poland; opposition 
to the extension of any new credits and 
Poland's entry into the IMF [Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund]; suspension of 
Poland's MNF [most-favored-nation] 
status; curtailment of the shipment of 
nonhumanitarian agricultural com- 
modities for distribution by the Polish 
Government; suspension of joint travel 
under the Maria Sklodowska Curie Fund 
which finances joint scientific research 
projects; and curtailment of Polish 
fishing in U.S. waters. 



In the hope of inducing the Polish 
Government to begin pursuing a path of 
national reconciliation and restore free 
trade unions, the President has endorsed 
two limited steps. Specifically, the 
United States jointly with its allies has 
agreed to enter into discussions on the 
Polish debt to official creditors. We seek 
repayment of U.S. loans to Poland. In 
this regard, the United States is not ex- 
tending Poland new credits nor support- 
ing Poland's entry into the IMF. As a 
bilateral step, we have agreed to permit 
Polish officials to engage in discussions 
with private fishing companies about 
potential fishing arrangements. Our ban 
on Polish fishing in U.S. waters still re- 
mains in place. Moreover, even though 
discussions have been authorized, no ac- 
tual allocation of fish will be provided at 
this time. Rather, any future allocation 
of fish at the end of the discussions will 
be contingent on the Polish 
Government's actions on human rights. 

These steps taken represent a 
limited response to very modest im- 
provement in the human rights situation 
in Poland. The United States has taken 
note of the successful June visit of His 
Holiness John Paul II to his homeland 
and of the release of the majority of 
political prisoners in Poland. We are 
waiting for the Polish Government to 
take definitive action to restore the 
human rights of the Polish 
people — rights which belong to them 
from birth and which are not the 
government's to take away. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 7, 1983. 1 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



HMIA^MW moiMmii nnnntn*iJti±%irmm\v%Tt It 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Human Rights Situation 
in South America 



Following are statements by Elliott 
Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and 
James H. Michel, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 
before the Subcommittees on Human 
Rights and International Organizations 
and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
October 21, 1983.'^ 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
ABRAMS 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss 
with you the human rights situation in 
the southern cone of Latin America, a 
region which has always been of par- 
ticular interest to Americans. I shall be 
as brief as possible in my opening 
remarks so as to provide more time for 
questions. 

Paraguay 

As members of this committee are 
aware, Paraguay has been ruled under 
the state of siege provisions of the Con- 
stitution almost continuously since 1929. 
President Alfredo Stroessner, an army 
general, has governed Paraguay since 
1954 under these provisions. His rule is 
based on the military and is exercised 
through the Colorado Party. President 
Stroessner is widely believed to be genu- 
inely popular among large sections of 
the population, although his popularity 
has never been put to the test in free 
elections. The opposition parties are 
kept under control and given little op- 
portunity to conduct a real election cam- 
paign. Only members in good standing 
of the Colorado Party can participate 
fully in the political process, such as it 

The human rights safeguards in the 
Paraguayan Constitution frequently are 
not upheld. The judiciary, while formally 
independent, does not serve as an effec- 
tive check on the actions of the ex- 
ecutive. Constitutional guarantees such 
as protection of the integrity of the in- 
dividual, the need for judicial warrants, 
freedom of assembly and association, the 
right of habeas corpus, and a prompt 
and fair trial for the accused often are 
ignored by government officials. While 
the state of siege is legally in force only 



in the capital, security officials operate 
as though it existed throughout the 
country. 

Major violations of the integrity of 
the individual in Paraguay have de- 
creased since the mid-1970s. However, 
there were increased detentions and no 
improvement in the areas of political 
rights and individual liberties in the last 
year or so. The major current human 
rights issue is the continued detention of 
three remaining members out of about 
20 persons arrested in May and June for 
violation of Paraguay's elastic an- 
tisubversive law 209, in connection with 
the Banco Paragxiayo de Datos, a 
research organization. 

Over the past 3 months, the govern- 
ment has released most of the detainees, 
but three still remain in detention. Two 
of those detained are believed to have 
been tortured by the police during their 
initial interrogation. 

Other human rights problems of cur- 
rent concern are occasional instances of 
government censorship of the press and 
radio, such as the closing down of Radio 
Nanduti on July 9 for 30 days and the 
arrest of a columnist for the newspaper 
ABC Color. We are also concerned about 
the issue of forced exiles. 

On the positive side, however, we 
were pleased that last year's country 
report for Paraguay was published in 
the Paraguayan press. It must also be 
acknowledged that President 
Stroessner's rule has brought relative 
stability and economic growth to 
Paraguay, although at considerable cost 
to individual rights and political liberties. 
Freedom House, in its 1982 report for 
1981, classified Paraguay as partly free. 

The United States has used its in- 
fluence in Paraguay to encourage as 
great a degree of liberalization as possi- 
ble. We have worked quietly but steadily 
on specific human rights cases. And we 
have made it clear that we favor steps 
now toward a more open and democratic 
society. 

Uruguay 

Uruguay had long been a democracy 
with advanced social welfare policies. 
Since 1973, however, Uruguay has been 
governed by a military junta, composed 
of the ranking flag officers of the three 
services and led by the President, who is 
a former Commander of the Army. The 



January 1984 



President and junta, or the three service 
commanders, make the most important 
national policy decisions. Currently, the 
military rules as a government of transi- 
tion, having publicly committed itself to 
support a constitutional process in 
1983-84 which will lead to national elec- 
tions in 1984 and the return to constitu- 
tional, elected government by March 
1985. 

The period 1968-72 was marked by 
violence, the suspension of political 
rights, and the loss of an independent 
judiciary in Uruguay. Since 1978 viola- 
tions of individual rights have declined, 
although the institutional framework 
under which the violations occurred still 
remains. There are still some 600-900 
national security or political prisoners in 
Uruguay, compared with over 1,000 in 

1981. Although the government ordered 
an end to the use of torture in 1979, we 
continue to receive reports of torture be- 
ing used both in prison and during inter- 
rogation of recently arrested individuals. 
We have been unable to corroborate 
these reports. Since 1978 no permanent 
disappearances have been documented — 
although there are allegations by human 
rights groups of three disappearances— 
but there were a few cases where the 
government detained individuals for 
several months without revealing their 
whereabouts. 

The independence of the judiciary 
was formally restored in 1981 in 
Uruguay, but the full independence of 
the civilian judiciary has not been 
reestablished. The information media 
are restricted, but the trend toward 
greater freedom of expression, begun in 

1982, continues. A number of weekly 
and monthly publications, some opposed 
to the government, circulate widely in 
Uruguay. However, the Government of 
Uruguay has closed down publications, 
mostly political weeklies, for periods 
ranging from 4 week to 6 months for ex- 
ceeding the limits of censorship, which 
might simply mean printing the name of 
a proscribed politician like Wilson 
Ferreira. 

In November 1982, civilian political 
activity took a significant step forward. 
The traditional Colorado and Blanco 
Parties held internal elections to choose 
party leaders with 60% of the registered 
populace voting in a peaceful and order- 
ly election. The election marked an im- 
portant step toward the return to 
civilian rule promised in 1985. During 
the campaign, freedom of assembly, 
speech, and press were liberalized, 
although the government maintained 



55 



.utmn^mMinHmtiiiifiiiumhimHim^^^^ 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



control of the process, suppressing 
several publications and arresting 19 in- 
dividuals. Today the major human rights 
issue remains the success of the 
democratization process. Talks between 
the political parties and the military 
broke down where the parties withdrew 
on July 5 because they maintained the 
military was demanding too large a role 
in the next civilian government. There 
have been some indications that the 
talks, or some version thereof, may have 
resumed behind the scenes. 

U.S. human rights policy toward 
Uruguay is clear. As President Reagan 
stated on September 8, 1982, "As a 
staunch proponent of democracy, the 
United States warmly applauds 
Uruguay's decision to restore full con- 
stitutional government through national 
elections." Both the Department of State 
and our Embassy are in close touch with 
leaders of the political parties in 
Uruguay. These leaders know, and the 
Government of Uruguay also knows, 
that we strongly support the return to 
democracy and that our bilateral rela- 
tions will improve as the democratiza- 
tion process continues. 

Argentina 

The Argentine Armed Forces have held 
power since 1976. In the wake of severe 
and growing economic problems and 
Argentina's defeat in the Falklands con- 
flict, the military government instituted 
major changes in 1982. The government 
of President Reynaldo Bignone, installed 
on July 1, 1982, announced that it was a 
government of transition whose main 
task was to oversee the return to 
democracy. The government has 
scheduled municipal, provincial, and na- 
tional elections for October 30. In addi- 
tion to the election of 600 electors who 
will choose Argentina's president, some 
254 deputies and 46 senators are to be 
elected, the deputies directly and the 
senators indirectly by the provincial 
legislatures. The electors will then meet 
on November 30 to elect the president 
and vice president who are due to be in- 
augurated on January 30, 1984— 
although that date may be moved closer. 

Since late 1982, there has been a 
significant upsurge in political activity in 
Argentina. Political parties — including 
the Communist Party — have sUiged 
large rallies, and human rights groups 
have held demonstrations. The political 
debate has been free and open, and all 
sides have had full access to the media. 
Press restraints are practically non- 
existent, and controls of the largely 



56 



government-owned electronic media are 
less onerous than at any time since the 
1976 coup. The judicial branch displays 
independence, and its strictures on the 
executive are observed. Trade union 
freedom is greater than at any time in 
the recent past, and strikes, including 
national strikes, occur although they are 
technically illegal. 

The situation regarding individual 
rights in Argentina has also shown 
dramatic improvement. There have been 
no reported disappearances for the last 
2 years, and only three politically 
motivated killings occurred this year. 
Detentions for "national security" of 
political prisoners have virtually ceased. 
National security or political prisoners 
held under national executive power 
(PEN) authorization were reduced 
sharply, with 425 freed in 1982 and 
about 100 freed so far in 1983. 

I would like to point out that the 
situation in Argentina, where elections 
will be held in 9 days, is still evolving 
and improving. Since I submitted my 
written statement to the committee, it 
has been reported that the Government 
of Argentina has announced that it will 
release or charge the remaining 243 
PEN detainees, those persons held 
without charges under the national ex- 
ecutive power. 

Of the 243, 67 persons now in prison 
will be released, 63 will be turned over 
to the Ministry of Justice because their 
cases in court are pending or they have 
already been sentenced by a court, and 
113 who are already out of prison, but 
under a status similar to our parole, will 
be given complete freedom. 

If these reports are accurate, once 
these steps have been taken, there will 
be no more PEN prisoners in Argentina. 

Human rights groups and some 
political parties in Argentina have con- 
centrated their activities on efforts to 
force an accounting for past disap- 
pearances — estimates of which range 
from 6,000 to 30,000— and to punish 
those responsible. In April 1983, the 
Government of Argentina issued a 
report stating that all the remaining 
<lisappeared are either dead, abroad, or 
in hiding. The report was widely criticiz- 
ed both in Argentina and by European 
governments. We expressed our "disap- 
pointment" that an opportunity had been 
lost to resolve this problem. 

This issue of the disappeared is the 
most controversial and sensitive human 
rights issue remaining and is central to 
the future of Argentina's politics. Most , 



human rights groups say that recorded 
disappearances are between 6,000- 
7,000. Some 6,600 families have peti- 
tioned the government for information 
concerning the fate of their relatives. 
Especially poignant are the cases involv- 
ing several hundred young children who 
have disappeared. I recognize that the 
unresolved issue of disappearances has 
come to symbolize the horrible brutality 
of the "dirty war" in Argentina. The 
mothers of the Plaza de Mayo remind 
us, each time they appear, of how many 
innocent people were tortured or jailed 
or killed, how many families were torn 
asunder or destroyed forever by violence 
and inhumanity. At the same time, I 
believe this issue, agonizing though it 
surely is, is one which the Argentine 
people themselves will have to come to 
grips with. It is not an issue for 
foreigners to decide. 

Chile 

Chile has been ruled by a military 
government since 1973 when the Chilean 
Armed Forces overthrew the elected 
government of Salvador Allende. The 
government formally dissolved Chile's 
political parties, restricted freedom of 
speech and assembly, severely limited 
trade union activity, and carried out a 
series of harsh actions against op- 
ponents of the regime. In 1980 Chile 
adopted a new Constitution, which was 
approved by national plebiscite after a 
government-controlled campaign. The 
Constitution provides for a further 8 
years of military government (1981-89) 
"headed by President Augusto Pinochet. 
In 1989 a plebiscite is scheduled on 
whether the nominee of the junta — who 
could be Pinochet— should continue in 
office until normal elections are held in 
1977. If the Chilean people reject this 
proposal, national presidential elections 
would be held in 1990, along with con- 
gressional elections already scheduled 
for that year. Under the current Con- 
stitution, there are no elections schedul- 
ed prior to 1989. Much of the current in- 
ternal debate in Chile is over the 
possibility of amending the Constitution 
to move up congressional and/or 
presidential elections. 

After significant improvement in the 
Chilean human rights situation from 
1977 to 1980, there has been less im- 
provement, particularly in the protection 
of individual rights, since 1980. On the 
positive side, some 3,591 C'hilean exiles 
have been permitted to return. Some 
lessening of censorship has occurred. Of 
major importance is the Government of 
Chile's initiative in underttiking a 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



dialogue with the moderate political op- 
position to define the transition to 
democracy. As part of the dialogue, the 
government has indicated a willingness 
to formulate new laws legalizing political 
parties and elections and invited opposi- 
tion participation. On September 16 of 
this year, the Government of Chile 
reestablished the right of citizens to 
assemble and to hold peaceful marches 
without government authorization. The 
courts have become somewhat more in- 
dependent, and the Government of Chile 
has increasingly resorted to them rather 
than de facto actions in dealing with op- 
position. On August 26, the state of 
emergency, which gave the government 
extraordinary authority to deal with 
what it considered an extremist threat 
and which has been extended every 3 
months, was lifted. 

On the negative side, however, we 
continue to receive credible reports of 
violence and torture by the policy and 
security forces. While the state of 
emergency was lifted on August 26, the 
less restrictive "state of danger of the 
disturbance of internal peace" remains in 
force. Trade union rights are still 
restricted. Many of the Chileans living in 
imposed or voluntary exile — total 
figures range from 10,000 to 
30,000 — have either not yet been per- 
mitted to return or have not received 
adequate guarantees of their safety. 
Some censorship still clearly exists. 
Political parties remain formally illegal, 
although some political activity and con- 
siderable criticism and press discussion 
are tolerated. The practice of internal 
exile for opponents of the regime con- 
tinues. While the possibility of advancing 
the date for congressional elections has 
been publicly mentioned, no timetable 
for a return to democratic government 
has yet been established other than the 
1989 plebiscite provided for in the 1980 
Constitution. Finally, demonstrations 
protesting economic and political condi- 
tions have continued, resulting in 
numerous arrests and credible reports of 
police violence. 

The United States publicly sup- 
ported negotiations between leaders of 
the Democratic Alliance and Interior 
Minister Jarpa. Our own policy is 
clear — to encourage great respect for 
human rights and a return to democracy 
in Chile. 

Let me conclude my remarks by 
observing that we believe that our 
human rights policy has been a force for 
good throughout the southern cone. 



Bulletin January 1984 



Throughout the region, the United 
States has made clear our commitment 
to human rights and a return to 
democracy. 



DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY MICHEL 

I am pleased to appear before your two 
subcommittees in response to your re- 
quest, to discuss the human rights situa- 
tions in Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. 

As you know, a vigorous election 
campaign is underway in Argentina. The 
national elections scheduled for October 
30 are the first that country has seen in 
about 10 years. At this time, I would 
like to urge upon you the need for assur- 
ing that these public hearings do not af- 
fect the course of the campaign or make 
U.S. policies and attitudes a campaign 
issue. 

U.S. Interests 

American policy flows From our national 
interests, including the furtherance of 
our ideals. It makes sense, therefore, to 
reflect on what our interests are in 
southern South America and how they 
interact. In a region such as the 
southern cone, it is not surprising that 
the Llnited States has a number of in- 
terests — political, economic, and 
strategic. Some are immediate while 
others are longer term. Obviously, they 
vary in importance and, indeed, shift 
somewhat over time, in response to 
evolving U.S. priorities and to changing 
circumstances in the area. Our policy in 
the region must seek to take into ac- 
count all of our interests, immediate and 
long term, political, economic, and 
strategic. 

In the southern cone, as elsewhere, 
promotion of human rights and demo- 
cratic government represents an in- 
tegrating dimension in our relations, 
reflecting both the policy of the ex- 
ecutive branch and the will of the Con- 
gress. As President Reagan said on 
April 27, 1983 [before a joint session of 
Congress]: 

... we will support democracy, reform, and 
human freedom. This means using our 
assistance, our powers of persuasion, and our 
legitimate "leverage" to bolster humane 
democratic systems where they already exist 
and to help countries on their way to that 
goal complete the process as quickly as 
human institutions can he changed . . . We 
will work at human rights problems, not walk 
away from them. 



That statement was made in 
reference to Central America, but it ex- 
presses precisely the intent of U.S. 
policy throughout the hemisphere, in- 
cluding southern South America. 

In all four countries under discus- 
sion, the issues of promotion of 
democratic institutions and protection of 
human rights are matters of great sen- 
sitivity. These issues have been at the 
crux of our relationships with these 
countries for a number of years. And 
they will remain so. 

One of the basic tenets of U.S. 
foreign policy is that democracy is fun- 
damental to the advancement of human 
rights. Democratic institutions — such as 
regular elections, a free press, an in- 
dependent judiciary, and the right of in- 
dividuals to organize themselves to pro- 
mote their well-being and individual in- 
terests—provide the best guarantees 
that governments will not abuse the 
freedoms and rights of the individual. 
Under democratic systems, a watchful 
press and the right of the individual to 
redress wrongs through impartial courts 
and fair elections are powerful weapons 
to ensure that human rights are 
respected. Therefore, I want to take this 
opportunity to review with you the prog- 
ress each country has made toward 
establishment of democratic systems of 
government. 

Argentina 

In Argentina, the situtation regarding 
individual rights has shown dramatic im- 
provement. Disappearances and deten- 
tions for national security reasons have 
virtually ceased. Reports of prisoner 
mistreatment have similarly declined. 
Moreoever, the courts have shown en- 
couraging independence, ordering the 
release of PEN prisoners, convicting 
prison officials for human rights abuses, 
levying fines on military officers where 
appropriate, and shortening sentences 
imposed by the highest military court. 
Recently enacted amnesty and antiter- 
rorism laws are being challenged in the 
courts, and many Argentines believe 
they will be changed by the new con- 
gTess. Problems remain, but there is no 
question that Argentina has made im- 
portant progress toward an interna- 
tionally recognized standard of human 
rights performance. 

Perhaps most impressive of all is 
Argentina's progress toward democracy. 
Elections are scheduled to be held in less 
than 2 weeks — on October 30, with the 



57 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



installation of a new government to take 
place not later than January 30, 1984. 
Political parties have organized 
themselves and are competing vigorous- 
ly for public office. Most walls in the ur- 
ban areas are painted with political 
slogans, and posters are everywhere. 
Equal free time on radio and television 
has been made available to all officially 
recognized parties, and the press is t'ull 
of political commentary. Hundreds of 
party organizers are active in towns and 
cities throughout the country without of- 
ficial hindrance. 

We are pleased that Argentina is 
launched again along the democratic 
path We are fully aware of the impor'A 
tance of this development to the protec- 
tion of human rights in Argentina. We 
will offer our cooperation in the 
economic, political, and human rights 
areas to whomever the people of Argen- 
tina choose to lead their country. We 
recognize the importance of their coun- 
try and of its return to democracy for 
the future peace, stability, and develop- 
ment of this hemisphere. We wish them 
well in their new venture. 

Chile 

In Chile, the human rights situation has 
improved significantly compared with 
the period immediately after the 1973 
coup. However, much is left to be 
achieved. After some years of progress, 
there has been a resurgence of credible 
reports of violence and abuse by the 
police and security forces. In addition, 
through Transitory Article 24 of the 
Chilean Constitution of 1980, the 
government retains the ability to 
abridge commonly accepted human 
rights practices, including due process, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, 
and freedom of movement. It also re- 
tains the right to send persons into ex- 
ile. Of equal concern is the failure to in- 
stitutionalize such human rights prog- 
ress as has been made. 

These factors must be weighed 
against improvements that have been 
achieved. More internal criticism of the 
government is permitted, and prior buok 
censorship has ended. There is increas- 
ing use of civilian statutes rather than 
security laws to deal with domestic 
discontent. The formal state of emergen 
cy has V)een lifted. Many exiles have 
been permitted to return to Chile in re- 
cent months, including prominent 
political figures, an<l the government ha 
assured us that more will be permitted 



to return. While this is a promising 
start, perhaps as many as 7,000— plus 
families— remain outside Chile. 

On the political front, a dialogue on 
the transition to democracy has begun, 
but its fate is uncertain. The dialogue 
arranged with the support of the Arch- 
bishop of Santiago, has made some prog- 
ress, although it is fragile and is subject 
to interruption. Indeed, it was suspend- 
ed temporarily in September and again, 
we hope only temporarily, just last 

week. . 

The issues under discussion between 
the government and a coalition known 
as the Democratic Alliance include ad- 
vancing the dates for congressional elec- 
tions (now slated for 1990), legalizing 
political parties, establishing new elec- 
toral laws, and modifying economic 
policies. 

Sergio Onofre Jarpa, a veteran Na- 
tional Party politician who is Interior 
Minister and represents the Pinochet 
government in these discussions, has 
lifted the 10-year-old state of emergen- 
cy has indicated that the government 
will consider advancing the dates of con- 
gressional elections, and has suggested 
that legalization of non-Marxist political 
parties is attainable in the near future. 
The Democratic Alliance consists of 
an informal coalition of 11 political 
groups ranging from moderate right to 
moderate left. Its political objectives are 
to establish a specific timetable for the 
transition to democratic civilian govern- 
ment to advance congressional elec- 
tions, to legalize political parties, and to 
foster changes in economic policies. The 
radical left seems to be trying to disrupt 
the dialogue l)y provoking a government 
crackdown. 

We will take all appropriate steps to 
encourage the Chilean Government to 
make further improvements in the 
human rights environment in that coun- 
try. We consider that the initiation ot a 
dialogue between the Government ot 
Chile and opposition groups— if sus- 
tained and nurtured by moderates on 
l,„th sides— could be the most promising 
political event to take place in Chile in 
recent years. We will continue, both 
l.ublicly and privately, to encourage the 
transition to democracy. We have 
stressed the need for moderate leaders 
on all sides to find ways to avoid con- 
frontation and work toward national 
conciliation. We have continually ex- 
pressed the hope that this will be done 
peacefully and with full respect for 
political and human rights. 



Uruguay 

Overall, the human rights situation in 
Uruguay has improved since the 
mid-1970s. The number of national 
security prisoners continues to 
decline— albeit slowly, presently down to 
about 800-900 from over 3,000 in the 
mid-1970s— and there has been a trend 
toward greater freedom of press and 
speech although problems remain. For 
example, the Uruguayan Government 
continues to close down publications for 
periods of time when it perceives that an 
"unwritten rule" has been violated, e.g., 
mention of a proscribed politician or 
criticism of the government's economic 
policies. The Government of Uruguay s 
decision to allow prison visits by the In- 
ternational Committee of the Red Cross 
in 1983 was an important step. We 
believe further progress will be made as 
the transition to democracy continues. 
Despite serious economic problems 
and the continuing absence of an agree- 
ment between the government and op- 
position political groups, Uruguay is still 
moving toward the restoration of 
democratic government after nearly 10 
years of armed forces rule. 

As part of the 1981 political plan ap 
proved by Uruguay's military govern- 
ment internal party elections were held 
on schedule in November 1982, giving 
an overwhelming victory to opposition 
factions. Presidential elections are 
scheduled for November 1984, with the 
new president to be inaugurated in 
March 1985. 

In the spring of 1983, Uruguay em- 
barked on the next major step in the 
transition process— a constitutional 
dialogue between the government and 
the elected representatives of the 
political parties. Because of differences 
over issues such as the future role in the 
military in a civilian government, the 
formal' dialogue broke down on July 5. 
After opposition gi-oups announced a 
series of public demonstrations, the 
government proclaimed on August 2 a 
series of measures limiting already cir- 
cumscribed political activity. 

In the latter part of August, 
however, the armed forces formed a 
commission to continue a dialogue via in- 
formal talks with political party 
representatives. And some discussions 
have Uiken place. 

On October 8, leaders ot the Col- 
orado and Blanco Parties, in a published 
declaration, challenged the government 
to make concessions to get the transition 
moving Their demands included lifting 
restrictions on the fi-eedom of the press 
and on political activities of individuals 



adtkep 



58 



Depart nnent of State Bulletin 
iiciumnKHif tMuuiiHiiuuanuuuiUBIflililBiliJft! iUm PiiJI^^^^EiE^lki 



m 



mtk 






HUMAN RIGHTS 



and groups. So far, the government has 
not responded, but we remain hopeful 
that the two sides will be able to reach 
an agreement and that the transition 
process will go forward. As the military 
and the political parties continue to seek 
a peaceful and amicable transition, ten- 
sions and doubts are likely to surface 
again and again. However, the armed 
forces have repeatedly reiterated their 
commitment to the November 1984 
presidential elections and both sides ap- 
pear to have room for accommodation. 

U.S. policy has been one of public 
and private support for the democratiza- 
tion process in Uruguay. We have 
repeatedly reaffirmed our support for 
the transition process through public 
statements and in our frequent political 
contacts with Uruguayan officials and 
political leaders in Washington and in 
Montevideo. For example, with the 
breakdown of the dialogue on July 5 and 
the subsequent August 2 restrictions on 
public political party activity and the 
press, we expressed our concern publicly 
and also in private to senior officials of 
the Uruguayan government. President 
Reagan earlier underlined our strong in- 
terest in Uruguay's democratic opening 
on September 8, 1982, when he said: 
"As a staunch proponent of democracy, 
the U.S. warmly applauds Uruguay's 
decision to restore full constitutional 
government through national elections." 

In sum, we remain hopeful that 
momentum toward the restoration of 
democratic rule will continue to bring 
further improvement in the human 
rights environment and result in the 
reestablishment of a democratically 
elected and fully participatory govern- 
ment. In our view, this will offer the 
best guarantee for the protection of 
human rights, including civil and 
political liberties in Uruguay. 

Paraguay 

Paraguay has been ruled by Gen. 
Alfredo Stroessner since 1954 under 
state of siege provisions of the Constitu- 
tion. His popular support has never been 
tested in free elections. We discern no 
significant progress toward the kind of 
meaningful political change that is evi- 
dent in the three other countries under 
discussion here today. There has been no 
significant change in the human rights 
environment, and human rights remains 
an important problem in our relation- 
ship. We ai'e working through all ap- 
propriate channels, including our Am- 
bassador in Asuncion, to influence the 



January 1984 



Paraguayan Government in this area. 
Because of human rights issues, the sale 
of military supplies was sharply 
restricted beginning in 1977. This policy 
remains essentially unchanged. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, progress toward 
democracy and an improved human 
rights environment varies widely in the 
four countries of the southern cone. In 
Argentina a new democratic government 
is on the verge of being elected and in- 
stalled. In Chile and Uruguay a transi- 
tion is clearly underway. And in 
Paraguay, no progress toward 
democracy is evident. 



Our policy toward the countries of 
the region must take into account their 
different circumstances, but it is fun- 
damentally consistent for all. We en- 
courage change in the direction of an 
improved human rights environment and 
support the development of democratic 
institutions as the best guarantee that 
individual rights and freedoms will be 
protected over the long run. In our 
view, democratic institutions are also 
our best bet for assuring stability and 
peace in the region. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Bill of Rights Day; 

Human Rights Day and Week, 1983 



A PROCLAMATION, 
Dec. 9, 1983' 

On December 15, 1791, our Founding 
Fathers rejoiced in the ratification of the first 
10 amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States — a Bill of Rights which has 
helped guarantee all Americans the liberty 
we so cherish. 

One hundred and fifty-seven years later, 
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, an effort aimed at securing basic 
human rights for the peoples of all nations. 

Americans have long honored the gift of 
liberty. So it is with glad hearts and thankful 
minds that on Bill of Rights Day we 
recognize the special benefits of freedom be- 
queathed to posterity by the Founding 
Fathers. They had a high regard for the 
liberty of all humanity as reflected by 
Thomas Jefferson when he wrote in 1787, "A 
bill of rights is what the people are entitled 
to against every government on earth." In 
this century alone, thousands of Americans 
have laid down their lives on distant bat- 
tlefields in Europe, Asia, Africa, and in our 
Western Hemisphere itself in defense of the 
basic human rights. 

When the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1948, 
Americans hoped that the Jeffersonian vision 
was about to be realized at last. The Univer- 
sal Declaration, it was believed, would em- 
body the consensus of the international com- 
munity in favor of human rights and in- 
dividual liberty. And the United Nations, it 
was further thought, would serve as the in- 
strument through which the observance of 
human rights by governments would he en- 
forced by tlie international community. 



Thirty-five years after the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration, it is clear that these 
hopes have been fulfilled only in part. Never- 
theless, the Universal Declaration remains an 
international standard against which the 
human rights practices of all governments 
can be measured. Its principles have become 
the basis of a number of binding international 
covenants and conventions. At the United 
Nations, it has served to strengthen the 
arguments of those governments which are 
genuinely interested in promoting human 
rights. 

Still, the fact remains that even as we 
celebrate Bill of Rights Day and Human 
Rights Day, human rights are frequently 
violated in many nations. In the Soviet 
Union, for example, brave men and women 
seeking to promote respect for human rights 
are often declared mentally ill by their 
government and incarcerated in psychiatric 
institutions. In Poland, the free trade-union 
movement Solidarity has been brutally sup- 
pressed by the regime. Throughout Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic States, the rights of 
workers and other basic human rights as the 
freedom of speech, assembly, and religion 
and the right of self-determination are 
denied. This same tragic situation also occurs 
just 90 miles off our southern coast. In South 
Africa the apartheid system institutionalizes 
racial injustice, and in Iran the Bahai people 
are being persecuted because of their 
religion. And, in Afghanistan and Southeast 
Asia, toxic weapons, the use of which is 
outlawed by international conventions, are 
being utilized by foreign occupation forces 
against brave peoples fighting for their 
freedom and independence. 

As Americans recall these and other 
human rights violations, we should reflect on 
both the similarities and the differences be- 
tween the Bill of Rights and the Universal 



59 



i!:!!!i'J';.;i(!li!JJti/'!'fii!'!i!ti)t!!iiii;J|t(lifi/ii!iliiiii 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



Declaration of Human Rights. Both great 
human rights documents were adopted in the 
aftermath of a bitter war. Both envision a 
societj- where rulers and ruled are bound by 
the laws of the land and where government 
rests on the consent of the governed, is 
limited in its powers, and has as its principal 
purpose the protection of individual liberty. 

Yet while the Bill of Rights was adopted 
by a Nation in which free institutions already 
flourished, many of the countries which 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights lacked free institutions. Since human 
rights are the product of such institutions as 
a free press, free elections, free trade unions, 
and an independent judiciary, it is not sur- 
prising that formal adherence to the Univer- 
sal Declaration by governments which sup- 
press these institutions has resulted in no 
real human rights gains. 

By posing as champions of human rights, 
many governments hope to disguise their 
own human rights abuses. It was with special 
pleasure that I noted the recognition offered 
by the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Walesa for 
his real efforts on behalf of human rights in a 
country where the government speaks only of 
the illusion of human rights. 

Human rights can only be secured when 
government empowers its people, rather than 
itself, through the operation of free institu- 
tions. Because our Founding Fathers 
understood this, we are blessed with a 
system of government which protects our 
human rights. Today, let us rededicate 
ourselves to respect these rights at home and 
to strive to make the words of the Universal 
Declaration a living reality for all mankind. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1983 as 
Human Rights Day and December 15, 1983 
as Bill of Rights Day, and call upon all 
Americans to observe the week beginning 
December 10, 1983 as Human Rights Week. 
During this period, let each of us give special 
thought to the blessings we enjoy as a free 
people and renew our efforts to make the 
promise of our Bill of Rights a living reality 
for all Americans and, whenever possible, for 
all mankind. 

In Witnes.s Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this ninth day of December, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-three, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and eighth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Proclamation 5135 (text from weekly 
compilation of Presidential Documents oi 
Dec. 12, 1983).B 



Treaty Protection of 
Foreign Investment 



The United States is a party to a 
series of bilateral friendship, commerce, 
and navigation treaties with other na- 
tions, including in particular Iran, 
which have as a major purpose the pro- 
tection of foreign investment. On Octo- 
ber 13. 1983, Davis R. Robinson, the 
Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State, released the following memoran- 
dum of law demonstrating that the treaty 
with Iran remains in effect and explain- 
ing the standard of compensation for ex- 
propriation which must be paid under 
the treaty. 



INTRODUCTION 

The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal' 
in The Hague has heard or scheduled for 
hearing numerous claims seeking com- 
pensation for the expropriation of prop- 
erty of U.S. nationals by Iran. In each of 
these cases, as in numerous others 
which will follow, the Tribunal must 
ascertain the applicable standard of com- 
pensation for expropriated property. 
The United States maintains that the 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations 
and Consular Rights between the United 
States of America and Iran^ ("the Treaty 
of Amity" or "the Treaty") provides the 
standard of compensation which must be 
applied to the cases before the 
Tribunal.^ 

This memorandum discusses the ap- 
plicability of the Treaty of Amity to the 
determination of compensation for the 
expropriation of property of U.S. na- 
tionals in Iran. Part I demonstrates that 
the Treaty is still in force. Part II shows 
that the Treaty requires the payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compen- 
sation for the expropriation of such 
property in Iran. Part III demonstrates 
that, for purposes of determining the 
amount of compensation, property must 
be appraised at its fair market value. 
Part IV shows that property must be 
valued as of the date of expropriation, 
disregarding the effects of any actions 
attributable to the Government of Iran 
that were unlawful or taken in anticipa- 
tion of the expropriation. 



60 



I. The Treaty of Amity Remains in 
Force 

A. The Treaty Remains in Force By 
Its Own Terms. The Treaty of Amity 
explicitly provides that it shall continue 
in effect until terminated by a party. 
Specifically, Article XXIII(2) states that 
the Treaty "shall remain in force for ten 
years and shall continue in force 
thereafter until terminated as provided 
herein." (Emphasis added.) The sole 
method of termination under the Treaty 
is described in Article XXIII, which pro- 
vides that the Treaty may be terminated 
only upon one year's written notice by 
one party to the other.-* 

Neither the United States nor Iran 
has provided written notice to the other 
that the Treaty has been terminated.^ In 
fact, to the contrary, Iran on numerous 
occasions as recent as late 1980 has 
argued before U.S. domestic courts that 
the Treaty remains in full force and ef- 
fect.*^ Iran, moreover, has continued to 
enjoy the benefits of the Treaty.'' Thus, 
it is abundantly clear that the Treaty of 
Amity has not been terminated in ac- 
cordance with its terms and, therefore, 
remains in effect. 

B. The International Court of 
Justice Has Ruled That the Treaty Is 
Still in Force. The continued validity of 
the Treaty of Amity has been confirmed 
conclusively by a judgment of the Inter- 
national Court of Justice. On Novem- 
ber 29, 1979, the United States filed an 
application with the Court seeking a 
declaration, inter alia, that Iran's 
November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran violated the Treaty. 
On May 24, 1980, the Court rendered its 
judgment, in which it held that the Trea- 
ty's provisions "remain part of the cor- 
pus of law applicable between the United 
States and Iran."^ In so holding, the 
Court explained that the continued ap- 
plicability of a treaty of this nature is 
especially important when the parties 
are in dispute: 

The very purpose of a treaty of amity, and 
indeed of a treaty of establishment, is to pro- 
mote friendly relations between the two 
countries concerned, and between their two 
peoples, more especially by mutual undertak- 
ings to ensure the protection and security of 
their nationals in each other's territory. It is 



Department of State Bulletin 



^i 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



ieI],S, 

idereiiits 
itieTrea- 
Ik tut- 

r,llie 
luedap- 
Hire is 



security 01 



precisely when difficulties arise that the trea- 
ty assumes its greatest importance. . . .' 

Under the principle of res judicata,'^'' 
this decision by the International Court 
of Justice established conclusively the 
continued validity of the Treaty of Ami- 
ty as of May 24, 1980. 

The Court's rationale and holding 
are no less applicable now. Iran has not 
alleged any event since the issuance of 
the Court's decision which would affect 
the continued validity of the Treaty. 
Moreover, although the hostages have 
been released, Iran continues to hold 
U.S. diplomatic and consular properties 
in violation of international law and the 
two nations remain divided by serious 
disputes concerning, inter alia, the ex- 
ipropriation of U.S. nationals' in- 
vestments in Iran. Given that the protec- 
tion of foreign investment was a central 
purpose of the Treaty," the present 
situation is precisely the moment when 
treaty provisions setting forth the stand- 
ard of compensation for expropriated 
property, in the words of the ICJ, 
assume [their] greatest importance." 

C. The Treaty Has Not Been "Im- 
iplicitly Terminated" as a Result of 
Alleged Breaches by the United 
States. Despite its repeated reliance 
upon the Treaty in recent years and 
despite the ICJ's decision, Iran now ap- 
pears to have adopted before the 
Tribunal a new position which alleges 
that certain actions by the United States 
implicitly terminated" the Treaty of 
Amity. '^ Specifically, Iran alleges the 
U.S. Executive Orders adopting certain 
countermeasures'3 in response to Iran's 
unlawful seizure of the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran on November 4, 1979, violated, 
respectively. Articles VIP'' and VIII of 
the Treaty. Such an assertion, however, 
is entirely contrary to established prin- 
ciples of international law. 

1. The United States Has Not 
Breached the Treaty. The measures 
adopted by the United States, in fact, 
did not violate the Treaty. Rather, under 
both the law of treaties and the law of 
nonforcible reprisals, they were a fully 
lawful response to Iran's flagrant and 
continuous violations of the Treaty of 
Amity. 

a. Iran Flagrantly and Repeated- 
ly Violated the Treaty. Throughout 
1979 and 1980, '^ the Iranian govern- 
ment, its agencies, instrumentalities and 
other controlled entities engaged in a 
long series of actions directed against 
American lives and property in Iran. 



January 1984 



These actions included, inter alia, 
government-sponsored attempts to 
harass and intimidate U.S. nationals 
with the goal of driving Americans out 
of Iran,'" the repudiation of numerous 
contracts with American firms without 
legal justification," massive expropria- 
tion of American property in Iran 
without compensation,'* the imposition 
of currency restrictions to prevent 
repatriation of American earnings'^ and 
the announced intention (finally im- 
plemented) of ceasing all oil exports to 
the United States.^" These actions by 
Iran repeatedly and flagrantly violated 
numerous provisions of the Treaty of 
Amity, ^' resulting in the virtual repudia- 
tion of all personal, contract and proper- 
ty rights of Americans in Iran and the 
collapse of commercial relations between 
the two nations. 

Iran's violations of the Treaty 
culminated on November 4, 1979, with 
its seizure of the U.S. Embassy and for- 
cible detention of more than sixty U.S. 
nationals on the Embassy premises. On 
May 24, 1980, the International Court of 
Justice held explicitly that these actions 
by Iran constituted "successive and con- 
tinuing breaches" of the Treaty of Amity 
and other applicable international law.^^ 

b. The U.S. Countermeasures 
Were Justified Under the Law of 
Treaties and the Law of Nonforcible 
Reprisals. Shortly after the seizure of 
its Embassy, the United States initiated 
a series of countermeasures in response 
to Iran's violations of the Treaty and 
other norms of international law. On 
November 12, 1979, the same day that 
Iran announced that it would no longer 
export oil to the United States, Presi- 
dent Carter ordered a halt to the impor- 
tation of Iranian oil.-^ On November 14, 
1979, President Carter issued an order 
to block all official Iranian assets in the 
United States. 2" Further Executive 
Orders of April 7 and 17, 1980, pro- 
hibited most exports to and imports 
from Iran and restricted financial trans- 
actions related to travel by Americans to 
I ran. 2^ 

Each of these countermeasures was 
adopted in response to Iran's continuous 
violations of the Treaty.^" As the Inter- 
national Court of Justice observed in its 
order of May 24, 1980, 

All measures in question were taken by the 
United States after the seizure of its Em- 
bassy by an armed group and subsequent 
detention of its diplomatic and consular staff 
as hostages. They were measures taken in 
response to what the United States believed 
to be grave and manifest violations of inter- 
national law by Iran.^' 



Moreover, the countermeasures 
were reasonably related^* and propor- 
tional' to Iran's prior breaches. They 
were limited in scope, relative to Iran's 
prior treaty violations, and involved no 
harassment of Iranians in U.S. territory 
and no expropriation of Iranian proper- 
ty. The restrictions on trade with and 
travel to Iran formalized a situation 
which had existed in practice for many 
months as a direct result of Iran's illegal 
conduct.^" Similarly, Iran's assets were 
blocked only after Iran announced that 
all its assets in the United States were 
to be withdrawn.^' The blocking was in- 
tended in part to preserve a remedy for 
Americans whose rights already had 
been violated by Iran in the course of 
Iran's unlawful actions. ^^ 

International law long has recog- 
nized that, where a party to a bilateral 
treaty has breached its obligations 
thereunder, the other party may 
withhold lawfully its performance of the 
treaty in a manner reasonably related to 
the breach. ^^ Such withholding of per- 
formance by the aggrieved party does 
not violate the treaty but, on the con- 
trary, is actually a means of enforcing it. 
As the foregoing discussion 
demonstrates, each of the U.S. 
countermeasures was a reasonable 
response to Iran's prior breaches of the 
Treaty and, therefore, was justified 
under the law of treaties.^'' 

Similarly, under the law of nonforci- 
ble reprisals, a nation may lawfully take 
otherwise unlawful nonforcible actions if 

(1) the actions are in response to prior 
international delicts by another nation; 

(2) the aggrieved nation has sought 
redress unsuccessfully through other 
means; and (3) the actions are propor- 
tional to the prior delicts. ^^ As 
demonstrated above, these requirements 
were satisfied and thus the U.S. 
countermeasures were equally justified 
under the law of nonforcible reprisals. 

2. Even if the United States Had 
Breached the Treaty, the Treaty 
Would Not Have Been "Implicity" Ter- 
minated. The preceding section makes 
clear that the actions taken by the 
United States in response to Iran's viola- 
tions of the Treaty were fully justified 
under international law and, therefore, 
did not breach the Treaty of Amity. 
Even if those actions had been in breach 
of the Treaty, however, such violations 
could not have resulted in its "implicit" 
or automatic termination. 

It is clear as a matter of interna- 
tional law that a treaty cannot be "im- 
plicitly" terminated, that is, a breach of 
a treaty by one party does not of itself 



61 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



terminate the treaty. Rather, a treaty 
may be terminated by a breach only if 
(1) the breach is material, going to the 
heart of the treaty;^'' (2) the aggrieved 
party sends formal notice of the treaty's 
termination to the other party;^' and (3) 
the formal notice of termination is sent 
within a reasonable time after the 
breach.^** 

In this case, the actions taken by the 
United States in no way violated the 
Treaty— materially or otherwise. These 
actions were tatcen in an effort to 
restore full observance of the Treaty by 
Iran and were a limited, gradual and 
proportional response to Iran's prior 
violations. 

Further, as already noted, Iran has 
not sent the United States the formal 
notice necessary to trigger termination 
of the Treaty, either before or after the 
alleged U.S. violations. Indeed, more 
than ten months after the alleged viola- 
tions, Iran was continuing to plead in 
U.S. federal court that the Treaty was 
still in force.'" 

Finally, because a reasonable time 
after the alleged U.S. violations already 
has elapsed without a notice of termina- 
tion, such alleged violations no longer 
may form the legal basis for termination 
of the Treaty. 

D. Iran is Estopped From 
Repudiating the Treaty of Amity. 
Repudiation of the Treaty of Amity by 
Iran is further barred because it would 
violate well-established principles of in- 
ternational law concerning estoppel and 
good faith. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 
has written, 

A State cannot be allowed to avail itself of 
the advantages of the treaty when it suits it 
to do so and repudiate it when its perform- 
ance becomes onerous. It is of little impor- 
tance whether the rule is based on what in 
English law is known as the principle of 
estoppel or the more generally conceived re- 
quirement of good faith.'"' 

Prior to the signing of the Algiers 
Accords in 1981, Iran repeatedly relied 
upon the Treaty as a defense against 
litigation in U.S. courts. Now that such 
litigation has been suspended pursuant 
to the Accords, Iran simply cannot 
argue that the Treaty was implicitly ter- 
minated as early as November of 1979. 

E. Even If the Treaty Had Been Ter- 
minated, Its Provisions Would Con- 
tinue to Apply to All Acts of Ex- 
propriation Which Occurred Prior to 
the Termination Date. Even if the Ira- 
nian position were accepted in toto, it 
would have only a minimal effect on the 
result of the proceedings before the 



Tribunal. The well-settled rule of inter- 
national practice is that the termination 
of a treaty does not affect pre-existing 
rights created through execution of the 
treaty.'" Thus, even if the Treaty of 
Amity were held no longer to be in 
force, the standard of compensation set 
forth in the Treaty still would be ap- 
plicable to any act of expropriation 
which occurred prior to the Treaty's ter- 
mination. 

II. The Treaty of Amity Requires That 
U.S. Claimants Be Paid Prompt, Ade- 
quate and Effective Compensation For 
All Property Expropriated By Iran. 

The Treaty of Amity expressly requires 
Iran to pay compensation for the ex- 
propriation of property owned by U.S. 
nationals. Such compensation must 
represent the full equivalent of the ex- 
propriated property and must be paid 
within a reasonable time after ex- 
propriation in a readily convertible cur- 
rency. More particularly, the Treaty re- 
quires Iran to pay "prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation" for ex- 
propriated property.''^ 

Specifically, Article IV(2) of the 
Treaty provides that: 

Property of nationals and companies of either 
High Contracting Party, including interests 
in property, shall receive the most constant 
protection and security within the territories 
of the other High Contracting Party, in no 
case less than that required by international 
law. Such property shall not be taken except 
for public purpose, nor shall it be taken 
without the prompt payment of just compen- 
sation. Such compensation shall be in an ef- 
fectively realizable form and shall represent 
the/«M equivalent of the property taken; and 
adequate provision shall have been made at 
or prior to the time of taking for the deter- 
mination and payment thereof. (Emphasis 
added.) 

Thus, Article IV(2) requires "prompt 
payment ... in an effectively realizable 
form" of "just compensation" which 
represents "the full equivalent of the 
property taken." This explicit language 
leaves no doubt that, under the Treaty, 
Iran must pay prompt, adequate and ef- 
fective compensation for the expropria- 
tion of U.S. property. '*' 

The negotiating history of the Trea- 
ty clearly confirms this conclusion. Im- 
mediately following World War II, the 
United States negotiated a series of 
some 21 bilateral FCN treaties with 
other nations. One important purpose of 
these treaties, including the Treaty of 
Amity, was to protect investment 
abroad,^** and thus each of the treaties 
contained a section which required 



62 



prompt, adequate and effective compen- 
sation for the expropriation of foreign 
investment.''^ Now to interpret those 
treaties as permitting payment of 
something less would defeat one central 
purpose of their execution. 

Throughout the negotiation of the 
Treaty, moreover, Iran was fully aware 
of the United States' views and treaty 
practice with respect to the standard of 
compensation'"' and agreed to that prac- 
tice in the Treaty of Amity. ■''' The 
language of Article IV(2) was a standard 
text used by the United States in most 
of its post-war FCN treaties"* and, dur- 
ing the negotiations, Iran made 
numerous references to the language of 
these other FCN treaties."' After 
negotiations. Article IV(2) was un- 
changed from the original draft except 
for the addition of the phrase "in no case 
less than that required by international 
law," a phrase which also appears in 
many other U.S. FCN treaties.^" Thus, 
the negotiating history makes clear that 
the Treaty of Amity, as proposed and 
executed, requires the payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compen- 
sation for expropriation. ^^ 

III. The Treaty of Amity Requires 
That, For Purposes of Compensation, 
Expropriated Property Be Appraised 
At Fair Market Value 

The Treaty of Amity also requires that, 
for purposes of determining the amount 
of compensation, expropriated property 
be appraised at its fair market value, ^^ 
which in the case of an operating enter- 
prise is equivalent to "going concern" 
value. This conclusion is evidence from 
both the language and the history of the 
Treaty. 

Article IV{2) of the Treaty mandates 
the payment of "just compensation" for 
expropriated property. International law 
long has understood "just compensation" 
to require payment of fair market 
value. ^' The term "just compensation" 
also can be traced to the Fifth Amend- 
ment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides that no property may be taken 
by the government without just compen- 
sation. The U.S. Supreme Court 
repeatedly has held that the payment of 
"just compensation" requires the use of 
fair market value. ^'' 

Article IV(2) further provides that 
"compensation . . . shall represent the 
full equivalent of the property taken," 
i.e., the full value of the property. The 
term "full equivalent" indicates that com- 
pensation must be comprehensive and 
must take into account eoery valuable 



Department of State Bulletin 



■ l'i()(i4u«4ninn?inuiiitit><ir 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



element of the expropriated property. 
The value of property, of course, 
depends upon its ability to generate 
future income, ^^ a fact which has been 
repeatedly recognized in international 
law.^*^ Measures of valuation such as 
"book value" and "replacment cost" do 
not consider the capacity of an asset to 
produce future income.^' Thus, fair 
market value, ^* which does take account 
of the property's income-producing 
capacity, generally represents the truest 
measure of an asset's full equivalence.^^ 
The history of the Treaty confirms 
that its language requires the use of fair 
market value for determining compensa- 
tion. As already shown. Article IV(2) of 
the Treaty is standard treaty language 
proposed by the United States and ac- 
cepted by Iran without substantial 
modification. Such language consistently 
has been understood to require that ex- 
propriated property be appraised at fair 
market value.''" 

IV. The Treaty of Amity Requires 
That Property Be Valued as of the 
Date of Expropriation, Disregarding 
the Effects of Any Actions At- 
tributable to the Expropriating 
Government That Were Unlawful or 
Were Taken in Anticipation of the Ex- 
propriation. 

The Treaty of Amity further requires 
that, for purposes of determining com- 
pensation, expropriated property must 
ibe valued as of the date of expropriation 
disregarding the effects of any actions 
attributable to the expropriating govern- 
ment (1) that were unlawful or (2) that 
were taken in anticipation of the ex- 
propriation. ''' These requirements con- 
cerning valuation are inherent in the 
principle of just compensation,''^ which is 
embodied in Article IV(2) of the Treaty. 
These requirements are also well- 
-established in customary international 
law and were similarly incorporated into 
the Treaty of Amity by the further pro- 
vision of Article IV(2), which states that 
compensation for expropriation must be 
"in no case less than that required by in- 
ternational law."''^ The Treaty of Amity, 
moreover, has been consistently 
understood to incorporate these re- 
quirements."'' 

The authorities cited above make 
clear that in determining the value of 
expropriated property, the Tribunal 
should disregard the effects of actions 
attributable to the Government of Iran 
which were unlawful. As explained 
above,"^ throughout the course of the 
Islamic Revolution, the Iranian govern- 
ment, its agencies, instrumentalities and 



controlled entities engaged in a long 
series of unlawful actions directed 
against American property in Iran. 
These actions included, among others, 
harassment of Americans in Iran, the 
repudiation of contracts, massive ex- 
propriations without compensation and 
the imposition of unlawful currency 
restrictions. As already shown, all of 
these actions violated the Treaty of Ami- 
ty and, therefore, the effects of these ac- 
tions and other Treaty violations must 
be disregarded in determining the value 
of expropriated property."" 

Certain omissions of the Govern- 
ment of Iran were equally unlawful 
under the Treaty. Article IV(2) of the 
Treaty contains the solemn promise of 
the Government of Iran to guarantee to 
the property of U.S. nationals "the most 
constant protection and security" in 
Iran. This article imposed upon the 
Government of Iran an affirmative duty 
to protect the property of U.S. nationals 
against injury arising from unlawful ac- 
tivity, whether by public officials or in- 
dividual private citizens."'' The failure of 
the Government of Iran to extend this 
protection was itself a violation of the 
Treaty, and the effects of this failure 
also must be disregarded in valuing ex- 
propriated property. "8 

Actions by the Government of Iran 
which were arbitrary or discriminatory 
must also be disregarded in determining 
the fair market value of expropriated 
property. Government conduct which 
does not intrinsically violate interna- 
tional law is nevertheless unlawful if it is 
arbitrary*^ or it discriminates against 
aliens. ''° Thus, actions by the Govern- 
ment of Iran which otherwise might 
have been lawful were unlawful if the 
Government engaged in these actions ar- 
bitrarily or directed them against U.S. 
nationals. Any decrease in the value of 
expropriated property attributable to 
such actions must be disregarded in 
calculating the fair market value of such 
property. 

The authorities cited above also re- 
quire that, in determining the value of 
expropriated property, the Tribunal 
should disregard the effects of actions 
attributable to the Government of Iran 
that, while lawful, nevertheless were 
taken in anticipation of the expropria- 
tion. Any other rule would permit an ex- 
propriating government to avoid entirely 
the requirement of compensation by act- 
ing to ruin the value of a company 
before formally seizing control. Thus, ac- 
tions by the Government of Iran that 
were taken in anticipation of the ex- 
propriation, including the threat of ex- 
propriation or the expropriation of other 



companies, even if lawful in themselves, 
must be disregarded in valuing ex- 
propriated property. 

Furthermore, under settled interna- 
tional law, a government brought to 
power by revolution is legally account- 
able for the acts of the revolutionary 
forces from the revolution's inception. '^ 
Accordingly, the actions of the revolu- 
tion which empowered the present 
Government of Iran are attributable to 
that Government. Any diminution in the 
value of expropriated property caused 
by the actions of revolutionary forces is 
equally attributable to the present 
Government of Iran. If such actions 
were unlawful or were taken in anticipa- 
tion of an expropriation, their effects on 
the value of expropriated property must 
be disregarded. 



CONCLUSION 

Because it has not been terminated in 
accordance with its terms or provisions 
of international law, the Treaty of Ami- 
ty remains in force between the United 
States and Iran. Article IV(2) of that 
Treaty provides the standard of compen- 
sation which must be paid for the ex- 
propriation by Iran of property of U.S. 
nationals. Specifically, that Article re- 
quires payment of the fair market value 
of the expropriated property, calculated 
as of the date of expropriation without 
regard to actions attributable to the 
Government of Iran which were 
unlawful or taken in anticipation of the 
expropriation. Under Article V of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration, '^ ^his is 
the appropriate standard of compensa- 
tion for application by the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal to pending 
claims for expropriation. 



Davis R. Robinson 



October 13, 1983 



'The Tribunal was established in 1981 
pursuant to the Declarations of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
concerning commitments and settlement of 
claims by the United States and Iran with 
respect to resolution of the crisis arising out 
of the detention of 52 United States nationals 
in Iran, reprinted in XX Int'l Leg. Mat. 223 
(1981). 

^Signed August 15, 1955, entered into 
force. June 16, 1957, TIAS 3853, 8 U.S.T. 
899. 

'"If a treaty requires a special standard 
of compensation, the compensation shall be 
paid in accordance with the treaty." Sohn and 
Baxter, "Convention on the International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



Aliens," Final Draft, Art. 10(2), in Garcia- 
Amador, Sohn and Baxter, Recent Codifica- 
tion of the Law of State Responsibility for In- 
juries to Aliens 133, 204 (1974). Because the 
Treaty of Amity sets forth the standard of 
compensation to be used for determining 
compensation for the expropriation of U.S. 
property by Iran, the Tribunal need not 
decide which standard would apply in the 
absence of the Treaty. The United States 
maintains, as it has for decades, that in the 
absence of a treaty, customary international 
law requires the payment of prompt, ade- 
quate and effective compensation for proper- 
ty appraised at its fair market value. See note 
42, infra. 

■•Where a treaty specifically establishes 
the method of its termination, the parties are 
obligated to adhere to that method. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 
54(a), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, May 23, 
1969, reprinted in VIII Int'l Leg. Mat. 679 
(1969). Although the United States has not 
ratified the Vienna Convention and, 
therefore, is not bound by it, the U.S. con- 
siders many provisions of the Convention, in- 
cluding Article 54(a), to be declaratory of 
customary international law. See Legal Conse- 
quences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276, [1971] I.C.J. 16, 47; I. 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law 601 (3d ed. 1979). 

^Furthermore, where treaties are ter- 
minable by notice, international law generally 
recognizes certain formal requirements for 
the notice. As the International Law Commis- 
sion has noted, "a declaration of termination 
which is not officially communicated to the 
other party has no effect . . . ." Special Rap- 
porteur Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the 
Law of Treaties, [1957] II Y. B. Int'l L. 
Comm'n 69, quoted in 14 M. Whiteman, 
Digest of International Law 443 (1970). 

Moreover, "it is essential that the notice 
should be in due form, emanate from an 
authority competent for the purpose, and be 
regularly communicated to the other in- 
terested States. ... In general it is thought 
better in the interest of regularity and cer- 
tainty in treaty relations, to require the legal 
basis of the notice to be stated in every case. 
Again, in the interest of regularity and cer- 
tainty, it is thought desirable to require that 
the date of the notice and the date when it is 
considered to take effect should be specified 
in the instrument." 

Special Rapporteur Waldock, Second 
Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] II Y. 
B. Int'l L. Comm'n 86, quoted in 14 M. 
Whiteman, Digest of International Law 444 
(1970). 

'•See, e.g. Memorandum of the Govern- 
ment of Iran in Opposition to Continuation of 



Attachments 16-17, 74-75, Iranian Attach- 
ment Cases (S.D.N.Y.) (filed April 21, 1980); 
The Islamic Republic of Iran's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Mo- 
tion to Dismiss 2, Starrelt Housing Corpora- 
tion V. Government of Iran, Civil Action No, 
79-6364 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed July 15, 1980); 
Defendant Government of Iran's Motion to 
Dismiss, Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities 1, Starrett Housing Corporation 
V. Government of Iran, Civil Action No. 
79-6364 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed September 18, 
1980). 

'The United States Government, for ex- 
ample, continues to issue "treaty trader" and 
"treaty investor" visas to Iranian nationals, 
who qualify for such visas only because the 
Treaty of Amity remains in force. In Fiscal 
Year 1982, alone, 514 such visas were 
granted. These visas permit Iranian nationals 
entry into the United States for purposes of 
trade or investment. 

^Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v. Iran), (1980) 
I.C.J. 3, 28 reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat. 
553 (1980). (Emphasis added.) 

^Id. (Emphasis added.) 

'""That the sanctity of res judicata at- 
taches to a final decision of an internatioinal 
tribunal is an essential and settled rule of in- 
ternational law." Trail Smelter Arbitration 
Between the United States and Canada Under 
Convention of April 15, 1935, Decision of the 
Tribunal reported March 11, 1941, at 17, 35 
Am. J. Int'l L. 684, 699, excerpted in VI G. 
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 140 
(1943); Company General of The Orinoco 
Case. 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 184, 276 
(1902); Pious Funds Case, For. Rel. 1902, 
Appendix II; D. Sandifer, Evidence Before 
International Tribunals 404 (1975 ed.); II C. 
Hyde, International Law Chiefly As Inter- 
preted and Applied by the United States 
1633 (1945). 

"As explained below, the Treaty of Ami- 
ty is part of a modern series of treaties, 
known generically as "Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation Treaties" ("FCN Treaties"), 
which were negotiated between the U.S. and 
other nations after World War II and which 
had as a major purpose the protection of 
foreign investment. See notes 44 and 45, 
infra. 

'^Iran has made this allegation in a 
number of its pleadings submitted to the 
Tribunal. Because of the confidential nature 
of Tribunal proceedings in specific cases, 
however, citation to particular pleadings by 
claim name or number would be inap- 
propriate. 

"These Executive Orders are described 
at IClb. 

'■•Article VII limits the right of the par- 
ties to apply exchange restrictions, except, 
inter alia, where such restrictions have been 
approved by the International Monetary 



Fund. Under IMF Dec. No. 144 (52/51) 
reprinted in Selected Decisions of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund 203, 204 (9th ed. 
1981), a state may assume that the IMF has 
approved exchange restrictions imposed for 
security reasons unless the state receives 
notice to the contrary within 30 days of 
notification to the IMF of the imposition of 
the restrictions. The United States notified 
the IMF of its exchange restrictions on 
November 28, 1979, and received no notice of 
disapproval from that body. 

'^Revolutionary forces also engaged in 
considerable unlawful activity directed 
against Americans in Iran in 1978 prior to 
the Ayatollah Khomeini's return. As shown 
below, this activity is attributable to the cur- 
rent Government of Iran. 

"^Shortly after returning to Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini demanded that all 
Americans leave Iran. New York Times, 
Feb. 2, 1979, at Al. The weeks following saw 
considerable harassment of U.S. nationals. In 
mid-February, armed bands detained and in- 
terrogated hundreds of Americans and other 
foreigners. Int'l Herald Tribune. Feb. 15, 
1979, at 1, col. 6. In March, the Government 
of Iran conducted a two-day demonstration 
against the United States. Id. Mar. 14, 1979, 
at 1; Mar. 15, 1979, at 2. Over 150,000 Ira- 
nians marched on the U.S. Embassy on 
May 24, demanding "Death to America," and 
80,000 more Iranians marched the following 
day. Id. May, 25, 1979, at 1. 

"In Jan. 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini 
called for a review of all foreign investment 
projects in Iran. Kayhan. Jan. 28, 1979, at 8, 
col. 8; Jan. 22, 1979 at 8, col. 3. Contracts 
terminated that year included those involving 
military procurement, Etela'at, June 22, 1979 
at 8, col. 1; nuclear power stations, Kayhan, 
June 3, 1979 at 5, col. 2; a dam and 
agricultural project, Etela'at, Sept. 29, 1979, 
at 11, col. 5; and a radar system, Jomhmiri 
Eslami, Nov. 11, 1979, at 7. In early 1980, it 
was announced that the Revolutionary Coun- 
cil would review all contracts with oil com- 
panies. Etela'at, Jan. 10, 1980 at 1, col. 3. 

"During the spring of 1979, the Govern- 
ment of Iran announced its intention to na- 
tionalize firms which were poorly managed or 
unprofitable, Kayhan, Mar. 25, 1979, at 5, 
col. 1, or whose owners had left Iran, 
Kayhan. June 23, 1979, at col. 3. In June of 
that year, Iran nationalized all banks and in- 
surance companies. In July, Iran enacted the 
Law for the Protection and Development of 
Iranian Industry, which nationalized addi- 
tional industries, the share-holdings of certain 
individuals, and all firms whose debts to the 
banks exceeded their assets. Additional firms 
were nationalized by the Act Concerning the 
Appointment of a Temporary Director or 
Directors for the Custody of Production and 
Industrial and Commercial and Agricultural 
and Service Units whether in the Public or 
Private Sector, enacted June 16, 1979, and 
by the Act Concerning the Management and 
Ownership of the Shares of Contracting and 
Consulting Companies and Firms, enacted 
Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in Official Gazette 
No. 10254. By Feb. 1981, according to the 
Minister of Industries and Mines, some 580 



'hH'<iIf!}ifl(ilUfH{HRiH;ni:(UItJhtltiiiI7{]Ul'i>l<uuia«i;i>nirn>fHiHuuiiu«niiMi<HniHtiiii 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



II companies had been nationalized since the 
revolution. Etala'at, Feb. 5, 1981, at 14, 
Col. 1. 

i^See, e.g., Circular NA/lieOO, Bank 
Markazi, Nov. 14, 1978; Circular NA 5/2090, 
Bank Markazi, May 5, 1979. Iran has conced- 
ed in its pleadings before the Tribunal the im- 
position of exchange controls beginning in 
November of 1978. Because of the confiden- 
tial nature of Tribunal proceedings in specific 
cases, however, citation to particular 
pleadings by claim name or number would be 
inappropriate. 

^"The Government of Iran repeatedly 
declared its intention to halt oil exports to 
the United States. The day after the seizure 
of the U.S. Embassy, Iranian Oil Minister Ali 
Akbar Mointhar announced that he was 
prepared to stop oil exports to the U.S. if 
Khomeini gave the order. Washington Post, 
Nov. 6, 1979, at Al; New York Times, 
Nov. 6, 1979, at Al. AyatoUah Beheshti 
reiterated the threat on Nov. 11. The threat 
was carried out on Nov. 12, when the Revolu- 
tionary Council decided to stop oil exports to 
the U.S. New York Times, Nov. 13, 1979, at 
Al. 

2'Among the provisions violated by Iran 
■were Article 11(1), assuring the right of 
Americans to travel to Iran for commercial 
purposes; Article 11(4), guaranteeing the lives 
and property of U.S. nationals "the most con- 
stant protection and security" Article IV, pro- 
tecting American property and other legal 
rights in Iran; Article VII, limiting restric- 
tions on the transfer of funds; Article VIII, 
regulating import and export controls; and 
Article X, guaranteeing freedom of com- 
merce between the United States and Iran. 

^^Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v. Iran), [1980] 
I.C.J. 3, 41, reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat. 
553 (1980). The provisions of the Treaty 
violated were Article 11(4), guaranteeing to 
U.S. nationals "the most constant protection 
and security," and Articles XIII, XVIII and 
XIX, protecting the rights of consular of- 
Ificials and the security of consular premises. 

"Proclamation 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65581 
(1979). 

2<Executive Order No. 12170 of Nov. 14, 
;1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979). 

26Executive Order No. 12205 of Apr. 7, 
1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 24099 (1980); Executive 
Order No. 12211 of Apr. 17, 1980, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 26685 (1980). 

^''Furthermore, the countermeasures 
were adopted only after the United States 
had used every available diplomatic and legal 
means to stop Iran's illegal action, including 
appeals directly to Iran and indirectly 
through organs such as the United Nations 
and the International Court of Justice. See 
'ase Corweming United States Diplomatic 
ind Consular Staff in Tehran (United States 
Df America v. Iran), [1980] I.C.J. 3, 25, 
reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat. 553 (1980). 
See also Statement by President Carter in his 
report to Congress concerning the economic 
anctions in 16 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 
814 (Apr. 14, 1980) ("The United States has 



used every diplomatic and legal means avail- 
able to it to end [Iran's illegal conduct] but to 
no avail.") 

'''Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v. Iran), [1980] 
I.C.J. 3, 28, reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat. 
533 (1980). 

^'Iran has alleged that the U.S. sanctions 
violated Articles VII and VIII of the Treaty. 
As explained above, Iran previously had 
violated both of these articles, and several 
others as well. 

^'Indeed, the sanctions adopted by the 
United States were in accord with sanctions 
that would have been adopted by the U.N. 
Security Council, but for a veto by the Soviet 
Union. 16 Weekly Comp. for Pres. Doc. 
614-615 (Apr. 14, 1980). See also Security 
Council Draft Resolution of Jan. 13, 1980, 35 
U.N. SCOR, Supp (Jan.-Mar. 1980) 10, U.N. 
Doc. S/13735 (1980), reprinted in XIX Int'l 
Leg. Mat. 256 (1980). 

^"The restriction of commerce as a form 
of reprisal has long been recognized as prop- 
er under international law. Hyde wrote that, 

"In order to save itself and its nationals from 
being subjected to treatment deemed subver- 
sive of international law, as well as to compel 
the abandonment of reprehensible conduct, a 
State may suspend all commercial intercourse 
with that other whose acts are the source of 
complaint," 

II C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly As 
Interpreted and Applied by the United 
States, 1674-1675 (1945). Similarly, O'Con- 
nell writes that, 

"The aggrieved State may seize the assets of 
the wrongdoer situated within its jurisdiction, 
it may freeze credits, and it may take non- 
violent measures of reprisal, perhaps involv- 
ing large-scale economic consequences." 

I D.P. O'Connell, International Law 328 
(1965). See also Bowett, "Economic Coercion 
and Reprisals by States," 13 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 
(1972); Bowett, "International Law and 
Economic Coercion," 16 Va. J. Int'l L. 245 
(1976). 

'•In reporting to Congress the reason for 
the asset blocking, President Carter said, 

"On November 14, 1979, I took the step of 
blocking certain property or interests in prop- 
erty of the Government of Iran, its in- 
strumentalities and controlled entities and 
the Central Bank of Iran. At that time the 
United States Embassy in Tehran was oc- 
cupied and American personnel were being 
held hostage there in flagrant violation of in- 
ternational law. In addition, Iran had 
threatened suddenly to withdraw its assets 
from United States banks, to refuse payment 
in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations 
owed to the United States and to United 
States nationals. Iran's actions attacked the 
foundations of the international legal order as 
well as the stability of the world economy 
and the international monetary system." 

16 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 611-612 
(Apr. 14, 1980). The President previously had 
explained that. 



"Blocking property and property interests of 
the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities 
and controlled entities and the Central Bank 
of Iran will enable the United States to in- 
sure that these resources will be available to 
satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities 
of the United States against the Government 
of Iran." 

15 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 2118 
(Nov. 19, 1979). 

^^Asset freezes specifically have been 
recognized as legitimate responses to viola- 
tions of international law. See I D.P. O'Con- 
nell, International Law 328 (1968); Sardino v. 
Federal Reserve Board, of New York, 361 
F.2d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 
385 U.S. 898 (1966). 

^^Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Article 60(1); Special Rapporteur 
Waldock, Second Report on the Law of 
Treaties, [1963] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 
72-76; Restatement (Second) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States §158 
(1965); A. McNair, The Law of Treaties 
570-578 (1961); see generally authorities 
cited at 14 M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna- 
tional Law 476 (1970). 

^••The U.S. countermeasures also were 
justified under Article XX(1) (d) of the Trea- 
ty, which provides that the Treaty shall not 
preclude the application of measures 
"necessary to protect [a party's] essential 
security interests." 

^^The classic definition of reprisals is: 

"Such injurious and otherwise internationally 
illegal acts of one state against another as 
are exceptionally permitted for the purpose 
of compelling the latter to consent to a 
satisfactory settlement of a difference 
created by its own international delinquency." 

II H, Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's Interna- 
tional Law 110 (1945). The three criteria set 
forth in the text are derived specifically from 
the Naulilaa arbitration of 1928, [1927-28] 
Ann. Dig., Case 360. See VI G. Hackworth, 
Digest of International Law 154-155 (1943); 
12 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 
148-149 (1971); Bowett, "Economic Coercion 
and Reprisals by States," 13 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 
(1972); Bowett, "International Law and 
Economic Coercion," 16 Va. J. Int'l L. 245 
(1976). 

^^Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Art. 60; Special Rapporteur 
Waldock, Second Report on the Law of 
Treaties, [1963] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 73; 
Sinha, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaty 
Because of Prior Violations of Obligations by 
Other Party 215 (1966). 

^'The International Law Commission of 
the United Nations commented in 1963 that 
"a breach of treaty, however serious, [does] 
not ipso facto put an end to the treaty. ..." 
Report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly, [1963] II Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 
205; accord, In re Lepeschkin, 51 Journal du 
Droit International 1136 (1924), Ann. Dig. 
1923-1924, Case No. 189, digested in VI G. 
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 347 
(1943). Similarly, the publicists are in agree- 
ment that violation of a treaty does not 



January 1984 



65 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



automatically terminate it, but only makes it 
voidable at the option of the aggrieved party. 
I H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International 
Law 947 (8th ed. 1955); I. Brownlie, Prin- 
ciples of Public International Law 618 (3d ed. 
1979). See also, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Articles 65-68 (requiring 
formal notice to terminate treaty), U.N. Con- 
ference on the Law of Treaties, Doc. 
A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969; Restatement 
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States §158, Comment a (1965) ("The 
violation of an international agreement does 
not automatically terminate it."); Sinha, 
Unilateral Denunciation of Treaty Because of 
Prior Violation of Obligations by Other Party 
206 (1966). 

^^Restatement (Second) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States §158, 
Comment b (1965); I Lauterpacht, Op- 
penheims International Law 948 (8th ed. 
1955); Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice, Sec- 
ond Report on the Law of Treaties, [1957] II 
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 31; Sinha, Unilateral 
Denunciation of Treaty Because of Prior 
Violations of Obligations by Other Party 215 
(1966). 

3»See note 6, supra, and authorities cited 
therein. The Iranian position, if generally ac- 
cepted in the international community, would 
cast international treaty practice into inter- 
minable chaos. Without the requirement of 
formal written notice of termination within a 
reasonable time after an alleged breach, no 
party could ever be certain whether any 
given treaty still was considered binding by 
the other parties, or, if not, when the treaty 
supposedly was terminated. 

■'"Special Rapporteur Lauterpacht, Report 
on the Law of Treaties, [1953]- II Y. B. Int'l 
L. Comm'n 90, 144; accord. The Tempk of 
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [1962] 
I.C.J. 32; The Arbitral Award made by the 
King of Spain (Honduras v. Nicaragua), 
[1960] I.CJ. 213. See also MacGibb, "Estop- 
pel in International Law," 7 Int'l & Comp. 
L.Q. 468 (1958). 

•""[T]he termination a treaty . . . does not 
affect any right, obligation or legal situation 
of the parties created through the execution 
of the treaty prior to its termination." Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 
70 (1) (b); Special Rapporteur Waldock, Sec- 
ond Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] II 
Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 94; Special Rapporteur 
Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of 
Treaties, [1957] II Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 35; 
A. McNair, Law of Treaties 532 (1961). 

■•^The phrase "prompt, adequate and ef- 
fective compensation" is a legal term of art 
which describes the measure of compensation 
that a state is required to pay for the ex- 
propriation of property of aliens. The term is 
understood to mean payment within a 
reasonable time after expropriation of the 
fair market value of the expropriated proper- 
ty in a readily convertible currency. The 
United States has long maintained that, in 
the absence of the Treaty of Amity, 
customary international law would require 
compensation for the expropriation of U.S. 



property to be "prompt, adequate and effec- 
tive." As shown herein, this is also the stand- 
point imposed by the Treaty. 

For elaborations upon the meaning of 
prompt, adequate and effective, see "Ex- 
propriation of American Investments 
Abroad," Memorandum by the Office of the 
Legal Adviser, Department of State, ex- 
cerpted in M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna- 
tional Law 1143 (1967); Department of State 
GIST, July 1978, excerpted in 1978 Digest of 
United States Practices in International Law 
1226-27; Address of Richard Smith, Director 
of the Office of Investment Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State, at Vanderbilt University 
(April 9, 1976), excerpted in 1976 Digest of 
United States Practices in International Law 
443, 444; 1938 correspondence between 
United States and Mexico, excerpted in VI 
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 
655-65 (1942) (first formulation of "prompt, 
adequate and effective" standard by U.S.); 
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela- 
tions Law of the United States, Sections 
187-190 (1965); I. Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law 533-536 (3d ed. 
1979). 

"In hearings on other FCN treaties with 
virtually identical language, the standard of 
compensation set forth therein was described 
by the State Department as "prompt, just 
and effective." Hearings on Commercial 
Treaties Before the Subcomm. on Commer- 
cial Treaties and Consular Conventions of the 
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 82 
Cong. 2d Sess. 8 (1952) (remarks of Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs on proposed FCN treaties between 
the U.S. and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Ita- 
ly, Denmark and Greece. The subject treaties 
required payment of "just compensation." In- 
deed, in his correspondence with the Mexican 
government setting forth the original for- 
mulation of the "prompt, adequate and effec- 
tive" standard. Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull used that phrase and the term "just com- 
pensation" interchangeably. See, e.g., 2 Dept. 
State Bulletin 380 (1940). U.S. courts have 
also regarded the terms "just compensation" 
and "prompt, adequate and effective compen- 
sation" as synonymous. See, e.g.. Banco Na- 
cional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd as 
modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). 
^'Hearings on Commercial Treaties 
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. 
on Foreign Relations, 83 Cong. 1st Sess. 2-3 
(1953) (remarks of Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs on purpose of 
FCN treaties was to provide legal protection 
against expropriation of investment abroad. 
Indeed, in forwarding the draft Treaty of 
Amity to the American Embassy in Tehran 
on July 24, 1954, the Department of State 
referred to Article IV(2) as "the essential 
nucleus" of the proposed treaty. Department 
of State Airgram No. A-18 of July 23, 1954. 
See also H. Walker, "Treaties for the En- 
couragement and Protection of Foreign In- 
vestment: Present United States Practice," 5 
Am. J. Comp. L. 229 (1956); R. Wilson, U.S. 
Commercial Treaties and International Law 



coint) 






Rtotlie.ta 



iman'ofSt 



asfinle 



95-125 (1960); R. Wilson, The International 
Law Standard in Treaties of the United 
States 92-105 (1953). 

■■^Language virtually identical so that in 
the Treaty of Amity is contained in U.S. 
FCN treaties with the following nations: 
Greece, signed Aug. 3, 1951, TIAS 3057, 5 
U.S.T. 1829; Israel, signed Aug. 23, 1951, 
TIAS 2948, 5 U.S.T. 550; Denmark, treaty 
signed Oct. 1, 1951, TIAS 4797, 12 U.S.T. 
908; Japayi, signed Apr. 2, 1953, TIAS 2863, 
4 U.S.T. 2063; Federal Republic of Germany, 
signed Oct. 29, 1954, TIAS 3593, 7 U.S.T. 
1839; Nicaragua, signed Jan. 21, 1956, 
TIAS 4024, 9 U.S.T. 449; Netherlands, 
signed Mar. 27, 1956, TIAS 3942, 8 U.S.T. 
2043; Korea, signed Nov. 28, 1956, TIAS 
3947, 8 U.S.T. 2217; Muscat and Oman, 
signed Dec. 20, 1958, TIAS 4530, 11 U.S.T. 
1835; Pakistan, signed Nov, 12, 1959, TIAS 
4683, 12 U.S.T. 110; France, signed Nov. 25, 
1959, TIAS 4625, 11 U.S.T. 2398; Belgium, 
signed Feb. 21, 1961, TIAS 5432, 14 U.S.T. 
1284; Viet-Nam, signed Apr. 3, 1961, TIAS 
4890, 12 U.S.T. 1703; Luxembourg, signed 
Feb. 23, 1962, TIAS 5306, 14 U.S.T. 251; 
and Togo, signed Feb. 8, 1966, TIAS 6193, 
18 U.S.T. 1. Language substantially similar 
to that in the Treaty of Amity is contained in 
U.S. FCN treaties with Republic of China, 
signed Nov. 4, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, TIAS 
1871 ("without due process of law and 
without the prompt payment of just and ef- 
fective compensation"); Italy, signed Feb. 2, 
1948, 63 Stat. 2255, TIAS 1965 ("without due|iitlieiiKki 
process of law and without the prompt pay- 
ment of just and effective compensation"); 
Ireland, signed Jan. 21, 1949, TUS 2155, 1 
U.S.T. 785 ("without the prompt payment of 
just and effective compensation"); Ethiopia, 
signed Sept. 7, 1951, TIAS 2864, 4 U.S.T. 
2134 ("without the prompt payment of just 
and effective compensation"); and Thailand, 
signed May 29, 1966, T.I.A.S. 6540, 19 
U.S.T. 5843 ("without due process of law or 
without payment of just compensation"). 

"Less than three years before the Treaty 
of Amity was negotiated, W. Averell 
Harriman, serving as special emissary from 
the U.S. to Iran, sent a note to Prime 
Minister Mossadegh in which he made clear 
the U.S. view that prompt, adequate and ef- 
fective compensation must be paid for ex- 
propriated property. Specifically, he stated: 

"As I have pointed out to Your Excellency, in 
the view of the United States Government 
the seizure by any government of foreign- 
owned assets without either prompt, ade- 
quate and effective compensation or alter- 
native arrangements satisfactory to the 
former owner is, regardless of intent, con- 
fiscation. . . . There must be more than a 
willingness to pay; there must be an ability to 
do so in an effective form." 



k2I,l 
in. 

lattice, p 
(gDtiition 



Irs not affect 

Tin 

JHtompenia 



Reply of Sept. 15, 1951, from Mr. 
Harriman to Dr. Mossadegh, reprinted in 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Documents on International Affairs at 510 
(Oxford 1951), quoted in G. White, Na- 
tionalisation of Foreign Property 184 (1961). 

■"Iran has openly acknowledged that it 



JKse than j 

bwStandarii 
-105 



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66 Department of State Bulletln_ k. 

aN.viiww»tmtiimfinii}thitH\ninf}imiumtH}nmmamitHmi»vtnmmiumiimmim»mmmi«mauanuunmasamaBmia^ 



fkh 



S3H 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



otainediii 



itotj.i 



entered into the Treaty of Amity and other 
international obligations involving the protec- 
tion of foreign investment because of its 
desire to attract capital and technology from 
developed countries. See U.N. Doc. A/C. 
2/SR 1650, pp. 10-11, quoted in Simmonds 
(ed.). Legal Problems of Multinational Cor- 
porations 148 (1977). Thus, Iran fully 
recognized and accepted its obligation to pay 
full compensation for the expropriation of 
iproperty owned by U.S. nationals. 

*'See note 45, supra. 

■"These negotiations were reported in the 
■following diplomatic correspondence: 
Telegram No. 105 of July 15, 1954, from the 
American Embassy in Tehran to the 
■Secretary of State; Telegram No. 119 of July 
16, 1954, from the American Embassy in 
Tehran to the Secretary of State; Depart- 
ment of State Airgram No. A-18 of July 23, 
1954, to the American Embassy in Tehran; 
Telegram No. 212 of Oct. 16, 1954, from the 
American Embassy in Tehran to the 
Secretary of State; Department of State 
Telegram No. 963 of Nov. 13, 1954, to the 
American Embassy in Tehran; Telegram No. 
1176 of Nov. 27, 1954, from the American 
Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State; 
Department of State Telegram No. 1137 of 
■Nov. 27, 1954, to the American Embassy in 
IDehran. 

^"A careful review of U.S. FCN treaty 
oractice, published just one year prior to the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Amity, concluded 
ihat the inclusion of references in treaty 
ianguage to the international law standard 
Joes not affect the standard of "just compen- 
sation." U.S. negotiators came to prefer the 
'just compensation" and "full equivalent" 
language because it was regarded as more 
Drecise than general references to interna- 
donal law. See R. Wilson, The International 
law Standard In Treaties of the United 
States 92-105 (1953). 

'Futhermore, subsequent actions by the 
Jnited Nations or the Iranian Government do 
act alter Iran's obligations under the Treaty. 
^or example, in casting Iran's vote in favor 
of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Ch. 
T, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (1974), approved 
oy the U.N. General Assembly in 1974, the 
ranian delegate explicitly stated his govern- 
ment's understanding that approval of the 
^Iharter was "without prejudice to any ar- 
rangements or agreeements reached between 
States concerning investments and the 
nodalities of compensation in the event of 
oationjilization or expropriation of foreign 
property." U.N. Doc. A/C. 2/SR. 1650, pp 
0-11, quoted in Simmonds (ed.) Legal Prob- 
6ms of MultinationsJ Corporations 148 
1977). Thus, as Iran has acknowledged, the 
'tandard set by the Treaty is the governing 
aw between the United States and Iran. 

^^This includes interest from the date of 
aking until the date compensation is paid. 
ke Chorzow Factory Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A 
iJo. 17 at p. 47; Norwegian Skipoumers' Case 
Norway v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308 
1922); OECD Draft Convention on the Pro- 
lection of Foreign Property, Art. 3, Note 9, 7 
nt'l Leg. Mat. 117 (1968); 8 M. Whiteman, 
Mgest of International Law 1186-92 (1967). 



anuary 1984 



^^See, e.g., Norwegian Shipowners Case 
(Norway v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308 
(1922); OECD Draft Convention on the Pro- 
tection of Foreign Property, Art. 3, Com- 
ment 9 (a). 7 I.L.M. 117, 127 (1968); Sohn 
and Baxter, " Convention on the Interna- 
tional Responsibility of States for Injuries to 
Aliens," Final Draft, in Garcia-Amador, 
Sohn and Baxter. Recent Codification of the 
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to 
Aliens 133, 203 (1974). 

"See, e.g. United States v. 564,54 Acres of 
Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); Alrnoto Farmers 
Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States. 
409 U.S. 470 (1973); United States v. 
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 
(1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 
(1943); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 
(1934). 

^^Modern economics universally recognizes 
that the value of property is determined by 
its capacity to generate future income. See, 
e.g., J. Williams, The Theory of Investment 
Value 1 (1938) ("[I]n the end all prices depend 
on someone's estimate of future income.") I. 
Fisher, The Theory of Interest 12 (1954 ed.) 
(The value of any property ... is its value as 
a source of income. . . . "); E. Solomon & J. 
Pringle, An Introduction to Financial 
Management 259 (1980 ed.) ("[T]he age-old 
concept that the value of an asset depends 
not on its cost or its past usefulness but on 
its future usefulness . . . underlies the modern 
theory of value.") See also S. Pratt, Valuing a 
Business Enterprise, 28-29 (1981). 

'''^See, e.g.. Sapphire International 
Petroleujns v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 
I.L.R. 136 (1963); Chorzow Factory Case. 
(1928) P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 17; Delagoa Bay 
and East African Railway Company Case. 
(Great Britain & U.S. v. Portugal), 3 M. 
Whiteman, Damages in International Law 
1694-1703 (1943); Shufeld.t Case (U.S. v. 
Guatemala), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 1080 
(1929); Lena Goldfields Ltd (1930) (unpub- 
lished opinion), 36 Cornell L. Q. 42 (1950); 
Norwegian Shipowners' Claim (Norway v. 
United States), 1. R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308 
(1922); Palestine Railway Case, disacssed in 
J. Wetter and S. 0. Schwebel, "Some Little- 
Known Cases on Concessions" 40 Brit. Y. B. 
Int'l L. 183, 222-231 (1964), May v. 
Guatemala, 3 M. Whiteman, Damages in In- 
ternational Law 1704-1710 (1943); 
Lighthouse Arbitration, (France v. Greece), 
23 I.L.R. 299 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1956); Cape 
Horn Pigeon Case (U.S. v. Russia), 9 R. Int'l 
Arb. Awards 63 (1902); Amimil Arbitration, 
XXI Int'l Leg. Mat. 976, 1033 (1982); 
TOPCO/CALASIATIC Arbitration, 53 I.L.R: 
(1977); R. Lillich, International Claims: 
Postwar British Practice 114 (1967). See also 
cases cited in V Hackworth, Digest of Inter- 
national Law 728-731 (1943). 

"See Address of Richard J. Smith, Direc- 
tor of the Office of Investment Affairs, Dept. 
of State, at Vanderbilt University, April 9, 
1976, excerpted in 1978 Digest of United 
States Practice in International Law 444. 

^*As noted above, in the case of an 
operating enterprise, fair market value is 
equivalent to the "going concern" value of the 
enterprise. See sources cited at notes 59 and 
50, infra. In some instances, a market for a 



particular enterprise may not exist and, 
therefore, the "fair market value" of the 
property must be determined through an in- 
direct means. One method for determining in- 
directly the fair market value of a going con- 
cern is the discounted cash flow method, 
under which the total amount of future net 
income from an enterprise is discounted by 
the time value of money and the degree of 
risk associated -with the future income to 
derive the present value of the asset's future 
income stream. Another method is to value 
the enterprise with reference to other com- 
parable going concerns which have similar an- 
ticipated cash flows and which recently have 
been ascribed with a fair market value. 
See, e.g., City ofThibodaux v. Lousiana 
Power & Light Co., 373 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 
1967), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); 
United States v. Eden Memorial Park 
Association, 350 F. 2d 933 (9th Cir. 1965); 
Bailey v. United States 325 F. 2d 571 (1st 
Cir. 1963); Fairfield Gardens, Inc. v. United 
States, 306 F. 2d 167 (9th Cir. 1962); United 
States V. Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F. 2d 
398 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 366 U.S. 
944 (1961); Cal-Bay Corp. v. United States, 
169 F. 2d 15 (9th Cir. 1948), cert, denied, 335 
U.S. 859 (1948); United States v. Certain In- 
terests in Property, 205 F. Supp. 745 (D. 
Mont. 1962). 

^^See McCosker, "Book Values in Na- 
tionalization Settlements," II Lillich (ed.) The 
Valuation of Nationalized Property in Inter- 
national Law 35-51 (1973) (Book value 
generally understates value of an enterprise); 
Dept. of State Note to the Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, dated September 14, 
1973, Dept. of State File No. D730067-0256, 
excerpted in 1975 Digest of United States 
Practice in International Law 489-490 ("net 
book value" formula for compensation pro- 
posed by Libya did not satisfy requirements 
of prompt, adequate and effective compensa- 
tion); Address of Richard J. Smith, Director 
of Office of Investment Affairs, Department 
of State, at Vanderbilt University, April 9, 
1976, excerpted in 1976 Digest of United 
States Practice in International Law 444 
(Replacement cost generally is less acceptable 
than "going concern" value, and book value is 
the least acceptable method of valuation). 

'"For example, in the 1920s, the United 
States negotiated an FCN treaty with 
Estonia, 44 Stat. 2379 (1925), which required 
payment of "just compensation" for ex- 
propriated property. In the course of negotia- 
tions, the U.S. negotiators explained that just 
compensation required payment of the 
market value of property (plus interest from 
the date of expropriation until the date of 
settlement). These negotiations were de- 
scribed in a leading work on U.S. FCN Trea- 
ty practice, published one year prior to the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Amity. See R. 
Wilson, The International Law Standard in 
Treaties of the U.S. 98 (1953). Similarly, the 
Legal Adviser to the Department of State 
wrote in 1962 that: 

"The Department of State has traditionally 
defined fair compensation as adequate, 
prompt and effective payment. ... In the 



lUlUi'tilhU 



iH'timi^iiimtiniivMmmmmimmM^^^ 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



case of an operating enterprise, adequate 
compensation is usually considered to be an 
amount representing the market value or "go- 
ing concern" value of the enterprise, 
calculated as if the expropriation or other 
governmental act decreasing the value of the 
business had not occurred and was not 
threatened." 

"Expropriation of American Investments 
Abroad," Memorandum by the Office of the 
Legal Adviser, Department of State, ex- 
cerpted in 8 Whiteman, Digest of Interna- 
tional Law 1143 (1967). See also Restatement 
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States §188, Comments a and b 
(1965); Department of State GIST, July 1978, 
excerpted in 1978 Digest of United States 
Practice in International Law 1226-27; Ad- 
dress of Richard J. Smith, Director of Office 
of Investment Affairs, Department of State, 
at Vanderbilt University, April 9, 1976, ex- 
cerpted in 1976 Digest of United States Prac- 
tice in International Law 444; State Depart- 
ment Press Release No. 630 (Dec. 30, 1975), 
excerpted in 74 Dept. of State Bulletin No. 
1910, at 138 (Feb. 2, 1976) ("foreign in- 
vestors are entitled to the fair market value 
of their interests"). 

^'This includes, of course, all of the 
events which constituted or resulted in the 
expropriation. It also includes the prospect of 
the expropriation which ultimately occurs, 
other expropriations by the government, and 
the general conduct of the government which 
makes such expropriations likely. 

^^See Lighthouse Arbitration. 23 I.L.R. 
299, (1956); Chorzow Factory, [1928] P.C.I.J. 
Ser. A, No.l7, 1 Hudson, World Court 
Reports 646; Norwegian Shipoumers' Claim, 
1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308 (1922); Mariposa 
Claim, 7 Ann. Dig. 255 (1933); Case concern- 
ing the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] 
I.C.J. 3, 46 I.L.R. 1 (Separate Opinion of 
Judge Gros); Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
§188, Comment b (1965); OECD Draft Con- 
vention on the Protection of Foreign Proper- 
ty, Art. 3, Comment 9 (a), 7 Int'l Leg. Mat. 
117, 127 (1968); Sohn and Baxter, "Conven- 
tion on the International Responsibility of 
States for Injury to Aliens," Final Draft, in 
Garcia-Amador, Sohn and Baxter, Recent 
Codification of the Law of State Responsibili- 
ty for Injuries to Aliens 133, 203, 210 (1974); 
R. Lillich, "The Valuation of Nationalized 
Property by the Foreign Claims Settlement 
Commission," in The Valuation of National- 
ized Property in International Law, 97 n.l3 
(1972); "Expropriation of American In- 
vestments Abroad," Department of State 
Memorandum, excerpted in 8 M. Whiteman, 
Digest of International Law 1143 (1967). Cjf. 
Banco Naciorud de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 658 F. 2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). (Value of 
good will at time of expropriation arbitrarily 
included in "book value" of company not part 
of fair market value.) 

•^^See authorities cited at note 62, supra. 
For the relationship between these two provi- 
sions of Article IV(2), see note 50, supra. 
'^^Thus, for example, 3 years before the 



J 



Treaty of Amity was signed, the Legal Ad- 
viser of the Department of State described to 
Congress the meaning of virtually identical 
language in other FCN treaties: 

"Compensation based on the value of the ini- 
tial investment would not meet the standard 
of the treaty or of international law, if it were 
less than the value at the time of taking." 

See Commercial Treaties, Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1952) (statement of the Office of the Legal 
Adviser on proposed Treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation between the 
United States and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, 
Italy, Denmark and Greece). (Emphasis add- 
ed.) The subject treaties required payment of 
"just compensation." 

"'See pages 7-10, supra. 

'^Hn his concurring opinion in ITT In- 
dustries, Inc. V. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award No. 47-156-2, (May 26, 1983) (Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal). Judge 
Aldrich observed, at page 12, that "[t]he 
Islamic Revolution in Iran was not a 'wrong' 
for which foreign investors are entitled to 
compensation under international law." Leav- 
ing aside the legal status of the revolution as 
a generalized whole, it is clear beyond doubt 
that certain specific actions taken during the 
revolution were "wrongs" for which interna- 
tional law provides a remedy. Such wrongs 
include the expropriation of property of the 
United States or its nationals without com- 
pensation and the failure of the government 
to provide U.S. nationals and their property 
with the "most constant protection and 
security." As shown above, in valuing ex- 
propriated property, the Tribunal should 
disregard the effects of all unlawful acts at- 
tributable to the Government of Iran. 

<*'The scope of this protection is to be in- 
terpreted in light of the overall purpose of 
the Treaty to establish friendship and com- 
merce between the two nations and, in par- 
ticular, to provide for the protection of 
foreign investment. The Treaty contains 
numerous provisions intended to foster a 
favorable climate for U.S. investment in Iran. 
See provisions cited at note 21, supra. See 
also Art. 1 of the Treaty ("There shall be 
firm and enduring peace and sincere friend- 
ship between the United States of America 
and Iran.") As one leading commentator on 
U.S. FCN treaties wrote in a much-cited arti- 
cle, published during the ratification of the 
Treaty of Amity, 

"In a real sense, therefore, the FCN treaty as 
a whole is an investment treaty: not a mosaic 
which merely contains discrete investment 
segments. It regards and treats investment 
as a process inextricably woven into the 
fabric of human affairs generally; and its 
premise is that investment is inadequately 
dealt with unless set in the total "climate" in 
which it is to exist. A specialized "investment 
agreement" based on a narrower premise 
would be to that extent unrealistic and inade- 
quate. 

"These treaties focus, in fundamental 
terms of enduring value over the long range, 



upon the line between policy favorable and 
policy unfavorable to foreign investment: 
namely, hospitalit>' to and equality for the 
foreigner under the law, and respect for his 
person and property." 

H. Walker, "Treaties for the Encourage- 
ment and Protection of Foreign Investment: 
Present United States Practice." 5 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 229, 246-247 (1956) (emphasis add- 
ed). Thus, the promise made by Iran in the 
Treaty of Amity was not merely to protect 
property of U.S. nationals against violence, 
but to provide a favorable climate for U.S. in- 
vestment, and it was in reliance upon this 
promise that U.S. nationals invested in Iran. 
See note 47, su/yra (admission by Iran that it 
executed the Treaty of Amity in order to at- 
tract foreign investment and technology to 
Iran). Iran's total abdication of this respon- 
sibility in favor of an overt policy of virulent 
anti-Americanism was in itself a violation of 
the Treaty of Amity. 

''"Customary international law also im- 
posed on Iran the duty to provide "the most 
constant protection and security" to U.S. na- 
tionals in Iran. See Case Concerning 
Barcelona Light, Power and Traction Com- 
pany, Ltd., [1970] I.C.J. 3, 46 I.L.R. 1; 
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property, Article 1, Note 5, 7 Int'l 
Leg. Mat. 117, 120 (1968); Restatement (Sec- 
ond) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States §183 (1965); C. Eagleton, The 
Responsibility Law of the States in Interna- 
tional Law 87-92 (1928); Sohn and Baxter, 
"Convention on the International Respon- 
sibilities of States for Injuries to Aliens," 
Final Draft, in Garcia-Amador, Sohn and 
Baxter, Recent Codification of the Law of 
State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 
133, 234-240 (1974). Given its purpose of 
establishing enduring friendship and com- 
merce between the parties, the Treaty of 
Amity must be regarded as providing a 
standard of protection broader than that of 
customary international law. See note 67, 
supra. 

"^Treaty of Amity, Art. IV(1); See also 
Universal Declaratory of Human Rights, Art. 
17(2), G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 
71 (1948); OECD Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property, Article 1, 
Note 7, 7 Int'l Leg. Mat. 117, 121-122 (1968); 
F. V. Garcia-Amador, "Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of the State for Injuries 
Caused in its Territory to the Person or 
Property of Aliens." in Garcia-Amador, Sohn 
and Baxter, Recent Codification of the Law 
of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 
42-43 (1974); Sohn and Baxter, "Convention 
on the International Responsibility of States 
for Injuries to Aliens," Final Draft, in Id., at 
164-176. 

'"Treaty of Amity, Art. IV(1). See also 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Arts. 2, 7, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, 
at 71 (1948); OECD Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property, Article 1, 
Note 8, 7 Int'l Leg. Mat. 117, 122 (1968); 
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela- 
tions Law of the United States §166 (1965). 

^^George S. Pinson (France v. United 
Mexican States, 5 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 327 



y-^-^'-iiaOHIRHnilJdOUIItllliniffTni'il.liIJIfiHifHitniiiiitriituuuitHf, 



MIDDLE EAST 



(1928); Bolivar Ry Company Case (Great 
Britain v. Venezuela), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 
445 (1903); Dix Case (United States v. 
Venezuela), 9 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 119 
(1902); 8 M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna- 
tional Law 819-824 (1967); V G. Hackworth, 
Digest of International Law 681-682 (1943); 
Sohn and Baxter, "Convention on the Inter- 
national Responsibility of States for Injuries 
to Aliens," Final Draft, in Garcia-Amador, 
Sohn and Baxter, Recent Codification of the 
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to 
Aliens 133, 257-260 (1974); 2 D.P. O'Connell, 
International Law 968 (2nd ed. 1970); 
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States §§ 109, 110 (1965); 
A.H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commis- 
sions 156-7, 163 (1935). 

"The Claims Settlement Declaration is 
one of the Declarations of the Democratic 
and Popular Republic of Algeria pursuant to 
which the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
was established. See note 1, supra. Article V 
of that Declaration provides that "[t]he 
Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of 
respect for law. . . . " ■ 



A Critique of the 

Restatement 

Revision 



Following is the text of a letter from 
Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser to the 
Department of State, to Professor Louis 
Henkin. principal reporter for the 
American Law Institute's (ALI) revision 
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States 

October 18, 1983 

Professor Louis Henkin 
Columbia University Law School 
435 West 116th Street 
New York, New York 10027 

Dear Professor Henkin: 

I wanted to take this opportunity to express 
my appreciation for permitting Hal Maier to 
serve as a non-participating observer and my 
personal representative at the Advisers' 
Meeting on October 6-8. I am sorry that I 
could not attend. 

I also want to express some very grave 
concerns about the projected time table for 
completing work on the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law. As I understood it, 
the Reporters have agreed to redraft several 
sections or portions of sections in response to 
recommendations or suggestions by the Ad- 
visers and other interested parties. However, 
these redrafted sections will be circulated to 



the Advisers with no opportunity for them to 
meet to discuss whether the revisions meet 
the concerns that stimulated them or whether 
further redrafting may be necessary or 
desirable. 

I am also very concerned that the Council 
will not be asked to review a Proposed Final 
Draft as has been the practice, as I under- 
stand it, with past Restatements. Such a 
review would permit the Council to make fur- 
ther recommendations for polishing the final 
product and to receive recommendations for 
further change or revision where appropriate. 

It is certainly understandable that you 
and the other reporters, who have devoted so 
much of their time and energy to this project, 
should desire to bring it to a close. On the 
other hand, once a position is taken in the 
Restatement, it runs the risk of being re- 
garded in some quarters as authoritative, 
whether or not it is in fact an accurate state- 
ment of the law. In this sense preparation of 
a Restatement is quasi-legislative in nature. 
This may be particularly true of a restate- 
ment of foreign relations law because only a 
few courts in this country have significant ex- 
pertise in the area and there is a real paucity 
of case law. Furthermore, much of the world 
may view the ALI Restatement a.s, represent- 
ing much more than the opinion of a private 
institute on matters over which there may be 
considerable controversy. 

I urge, therefore, that because of the 
unique nature of this Restatement and the 
very special impact that it is likely to have on 
the bar, the government and the academic 
profession, serious consideration be given to 
delaying seeking final approval by the ALI 
until an entire proposed final draft can be 
submitted, both to the Advisers and to the 
Council. Such a delay would allow those 
bodies to review carefully the revisions that 
have been accepted and the concerns that 
have been addressed by those revisions. 

This Restatement is likely to be in use for 
at least 20 years. I can understand the desire 
of many members of the ALI, including, no 
doubt, the Reporters, to "write into law" 
theories that in many respects may be 
laudable but which do not in fact reflect cur- 
rent practice of states, especially the United 
States. As you know, I do not believe that 
many portions of the proposed Restatement 
are an accurate or appropriate reflection of 
the law. It is, therefore, especially important 
in my view that the Restatement receive fur- 
ther careful consideration by the Reporters, 
the Advisers and the Council. 

Consequently, I would strongly urge the 
Reporters and the members of the Council to 
prepare a time table that will permit full and 
fair consideration of all important aspects of 
the work and the relevant comments offered 
by the academic community, the private bar 
and others. 

I will submit written comments on 
Preliminary Draft No. 5 as soon as possible. 

Sincerely yours, 

Davis R. Robinson 

cc: Reporters 
Advisers 
Council Members ■ 



Situation in 
Lebanon 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 10, 1983' 

We're revolted that once again the peo- 
ple of Lebanon have been subjected to 
terror and injury, this time around 
Tripoli by the radical and brutal 
behavior of Palestinian factions and 
their supporters. It is tragic that once 
again the civilian population of Lebanon 
is victim to hostilities not of their mak- 
ing and over which they are unable to 
exercise influence and control. 

We urge the governments in the 
area to bring their influence to bear con- 
structively to end the fighting. We sug- 
gest that all governments be open to any 
suggestions from appropriate interna- 
tional organizations for humanitarian 
and relief efforts to relieve the suffer- 
ing. As a first specific step to assist, the 
United States is in the process of con- 
tributing $1 million to the International 
Red Cross to be used for relief activities 
in Lebanon. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983. 



i January 1984 



69 



■i^'V'rdimi'uiHimm^i'jmuMmmmmm^^^^^^^ 



NARCOTICS 



Marijuana Production 
and Control Abroad 



by Dominick L. DiCarlo 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Crime of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary an November 17, 1983. Mr. 
DiCarlo is Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
national Narcotics Matters. '- 



SUMMARY 

The subcommittee has asked our Bureau 
to testify on the production of marijuana 
in foreign nations which export mari- 
juana and other cannabis products to the 
United States and on control efforts in 
those nations. 



1982 Developments 

There were important cannabis 
developments in 1982, including signifi- 
cant changes in the cannabis market 
profile, an improved capability for 
eradication, and enhanced interdiction 
capabilities at the source and on our 
borders. 

A table attached to this testimony 
reports the national marijuana supply 
and import estimates of the National 
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Com- 
mittee (NNICC) for the years 1979 
through 1982. The 1982 figures are 
preliminary, pending final NNICC ap- 
proval which is expected by the end of 
of year. I wish to emphasize the softness 
of these estimates of production, im- 
ports, and availability, which we are 
striving to improve. 

The preliminary NNICC estimate is 
that national supplies of marijuana were 
in the range of 12,340-14,090 metric 
tons in 1982, compared with a 1981 
estimated range of 9,600-13,900 metric 
tons. The estimate is that imports were 
in the range of 10,340-12,090 metric 
tons, compared to a range of 
8,700-12,700 metric tons in 1981. 

Colombia continues to dominate the 
U.S. marijuana market. Estimated im- 
ports from Colombia in 1982 were in a 
range of 7,000-8,000 metric tons, com- 
pared to a range of 7,500-11,000 metric 
tons in 1981. The NNICC estimate is 
that Colombia's share of total U.S. su|)- 
ply declined from T^% to .57%. 

The estimate is that domestic pro 
duction increased from a range of 
900-1,200 metric tons in 1981 to an 



estimated 2,000 metric tons in 1982, in- 
creasing the domestic market share 
from 9% to about 15%. 

Jamaica's estimated market share in- 
creased from an estimated 9% to 16%, 
while Mexico's estimated share rose 
from 3% to 6%. Retail marijuana prices 
were reported to be relatively static in 
1982; however, Jamaican wholesale 
prices increased slightly while Colombian 
wholesale prices declined. 

Marginal exporters to the United 
States in 1982 included Belize, Thailand, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Panama, which 
are now estimated to account collective- 
ly for 6% of the U.S. cannabis market. 

A factor affecting the market pro- 
file, according to the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), is the preference 
among U.S. users for high-grade can- 
nabis products, such as sensimilla, which 
is produced in the United States and in 
Jamaica, Belize, and Mexico. This move 
away from lower potency marijuana is 
expected to continue. 

Authority for U.S. support of mari- 
juana eradication programs using para- 
quat was restored by the Congress in 
December 1981. The Department of 
State thereafter began the process of 
compliance with the National En- 
vironmental Protection Act and related 
executive orders to satisfy health and 
environment concerns related to para- 
quat use. On December 21, 1982, I 
approved an environmental impact state- 
ment permitting U.S. support for pro- 
grams for herbicidal eradication of mari- 
juana in the Western Hemisphere. 

Imports of hashish are estimated to 
have remained at approximately 200 
metric tons. The principal suppliers of 
hashish were Lebanon, Pakistan, and 
Morocco, with a small but indeterminate 
amount of hashish oil being provided by 



1983 Production 

The NNICC analysts are projecting in- 
creased cannabis cultivation in Colombia 
in 1983 but have not made projections 
for Mexico, and other suppliers. 

However, there is a question as to 
how much of the foreign production will 
reach the U.S. market in 1983-84. This 
year marijuana eradication progr'ams us- 
ing paraquat have been conducted in 
Mexico and Belize, while (jolombia con- 
tinued its manual eradication programs. 



There are ongoing enforcement efforts 
in Mexico, Belize, and Colombia which 
are designed both to eradicate cannabis 
crops and to seize marijuana in transit. 
Also Jamaica has begun what we hope 
will be a sustained eradication and inter-; 
diction program. ' 

The Belizan program is particularly 
noteworthy, because it involves a 
bilateral agreement under which Belize 
and Mexico conducted a joint eradication! 
project, with U.S. assistance. 

The objective is to contain any ex- 
panded 1983 cultivation by limiting im- 
ports through interdiction efforts, while 
simultaneously preparing the eradication 
programs needed to reduce cannabis 
cultivation in all source areas. 

The Government of Mexico is con- 
tinuing its effective herbicidal eradica- 
tion programs against marijuana. We 
are hopeful that Colombia and Jamaica 
will undertake comprehensive cannabis 
eradication programs in 1983, including 
the use of herbicidal eradication where 
appropriate. 

We will continue to encourage the 
governments of cannabis source coun- 
tries to undertake comprehensive 
eradication programs, and we will con- 
tinue to monitor developments in poten- 
tial new sources, as we have in Belize. 
And, we will continue our role in the 
multiagency effort to interdict traffick- 
ing in marijuana and other drugs 
through the Caribbean and Central 
America. 



PRODUCERS 

Colombia 

Background. Colombia is the major ex- 
porter of marijuana to the United 
States — 67% of total estimated imports 
in 1982, which amounted to 57% of sup- 
ply from all sources. 

The NNICC estimate is that 1982 
Colombian cannabis production was 
13, .500 metric tons, cultivated on 15,000 
acres. The NNICC further estimates 
that 7,000-8,000 metric tons were ex- 
()orted to the United States. 

The difference between production 
and U.S. -bound exports includes 
estimated crop losses due to eradication, 
seizures, weather damage, and losses 
due to quality control. An unknown 
amount is consumed in Colombia. 

Colombia's share of the U.S. market 
also declined in 1982, according to 
NNICC analysis, because of competition 
from other marijuana sources, especially 
those supplying higher potency sen- 
similla and. related to that, a perception 



taeni 



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Department of State Bulletin ^i"; 



safation, 



isfortl 



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fciioneffor 



lalerad 

I and lute 

idnigabui 

bbians co] 

Hems, 

TbeNat 

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'ftt-Ife 
*%le, 



NARCOTICS 



ffl'orts 



■affifk- 



.[(fptioil 



that other marijuana is of superior 
quality. 

Currently Colombia employs a 
manual marijuana eradication program 
land has undertaken a substantial inter- 
diction effort. In 1981 Colombian 
lauthorities reported seizing 3,310 metric 
tons of marijuana, a 345% increase over 
1980. In 1982 Colombian officials 
reported seizing 3,409 metric tons of 
marijuana. The authorities also reported 
manually destroying 8.5 million mari- 
juana plants. 

Current Status. The government of 
President Betancur has been positive in 
its statements to U.S. officials, including 
President Reagan, on Colombia's com- 
mitment to narcotics control. Since tak- 
ing office in August 1982, the Betancur 
Administration has increased Colombia's 
narcotics enforcement efforts, including 
■Qoth interdiction and manual crop 
eradication, and has undertaken an 
■evaluation of more comprehensive pro- 
grams for the eradication of marijuana 
cultivation. We have had continuing 
tliscussions with the Colombians on a 

•ange of narcotics related issues and 
continue to support their effective inter- 
diction efforts. The United States has 

incouraged the Government of Colombia 

.0 undertake expanded eradication and 
interdiction programs. We have provid- 
ed technical assistance and training, and 
financial resources to upgrade Colom- 
oian capabilities in drug interdiction and 
manual eradication, in judicial process- 
ing and intelligence collection, as well as 
in drug abuse prevention to help the Co- 
lombians cope with their drug abuse 
problems. 

The National Police Special Anti- 
Narcotics Unit (SANU) has recorded im- 
pressive marijuana seizures, and there 
has been manual destruction of mari- 
juana plants, but enormous cultivation 
remains. In late September, a Colombian 
technical assistance team visited Mexico 
and the United States, meeting with of- 
ficials in both countries to review crop 
control methods. 

The government has approved in- 
teractions with other Latin countries, 
particularly the technical exchanges with 
Mexico. 

One of the important developments 
regarding Colombia is its emerging ef- 
fort to cope with its domestic drug 
abuse problem, especially the smoking of 
bazuco by its young people. A major 

abuse prevention conference, with 
which my office assisted, was held in 

larly October in Bogota, under the 

ices of the Ministries of Health and 
Justice. This first-of-its-kind event not 
only attracted a host of Colombian of- 



llj auspii 



ficials with narcotics and drug abuse 
responsibilities and delegates from Peru 
and Bolivia, but the antidrug messages 
received prominence in Colombian 
newspapers, television, and radio pro- 
grams. 

The recognition of Colombia's drug 
abuse problem at this conference was 
important, because many Colombians 
have long considered drug trafficking a 
problem created by and pertaining solely 
to the United States. There is increasing 
recognition in both government and the 
private sector of the negative effects the 
drug problem is having on Colombia. 
Corruption among government officials, 
the growth of an illegal economy the 
government does not regulate or tax, 
linkages between insurgent movements 
and drug traffickers, and threats to 
political stability — including an open in- 
volvement in politics — have increased 
Colombian awareness of and concern 
about drug-related problems. 

Outlook. Officials participating in 
the NNICC Subcommittee on Production 



believe the fall cultivation for 1983 may 
be as much as 60% larger than plantings 
for the preceding drought-affected 
period. A preliminary estimate is that 
15,000 metric tons could be harvested. 
There is no prediction yet on how 
this production will affect the U.S. 
market. Colombia has strengthened the 
interdiction efforts of its SANU forces, 
including an expansion from three to 
five helicopters for use in narcotics 
operations. U.S. authorities have also in- 
tensified their interdiction efforts. 

Mexico 

Background. Mexican production has 
been severely limited by the 
government's eradication program and 
there is no expectation that Mexico will 
once again dominate the U.S. marijuana 
market, as it did in the early 1970s. 
However, it is estimated that exports to 
the United States increased in 1982, 
from a range of 300-500 metric tons to 
750 tons. 



U.S. 



Imports and Supplies of Marijuana 
(1979-82 estimates) 



1982 

Colombia 

Jamaica 

Mexico 

Domestic 

Other 

Total 

1981 

Colombia 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Domestic 

Total 

1980 

Colombia 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Domestic 

Total 



1979 

Colombia 
Mexico 
Jamaica 
Domestic 

Total 



Metric 
Tons 



7,000-8,000 
1,750-2,500 

750 
2,000 

840 

12,340-14,090 



7,500-11,000 
900- 1,200 
300- 500 
900- 1,200 

9,600-13,900 



7,700-11,300 

1,000- 1,400 

800- 1,300 

700- 1.000 

10,200-15,000 



7,450-10,100 

1,110- 1,500 

740- 1,000 

700- 1,000 

10,000-13,600 



Imports 

(%) 


Supplies 


67 

19 

6 



8 


57 
16 

6 
15 

6 



100 



86 


79 


10 


9 


4 


3 





9 



100 



100 



81 


75 


10 


10 


9 


8 





7 


100 


100 


80 


75 


12 


11 


8 


7 





7 


100 


100 



January 1984 



71 



:!'"•. ^'!i■!n■,;|!lM|^^•|;(lHll.(»(^(!(Lf]ti!)<if!Ii!!l|i!M|i!H);/ilf^ 



NARCOTICS 



Current Status. The narcotics 
eradication program undertatcen in 
cooperation with the Mexican Attorney 
General's office has been the Depart- 
ment's largest international narcotics 
control program. Over an 11-year 
period, the United States has invested 
more than $110 million in this 
cooperative effort, but the Mexican 
Government has spent larger amounts, 
including its procurement of paraquat 
for use against cannabis. The Mexicans 
have lost 18 airmen in the antinarcotics 
program. 

The key to the success of the cam- 
paign was the decision of the Mexican 
Government to use aerial spraying of 
herbicides instead of manual eradication 
to destroy the narcotic crops. 

The semiannual report from the 
Mexican Government shows that control 
actions have increased during the cur- 
rent year; for example, the Mexicans 
reported that, in the December 
1982-June 1983, period, they had 
eradicated .570 hectares of marijuana on 
6,281 fields. Manual eradication ac- 
counted for an additional 152 hectares of 
marijuana. Also in this period, the Mex- 
icans seized 48,321 kilos of marijuana. 
In the period December 1981-December 
1982, the Mexican Government reported 
spraying 11,046 marijuana fields totaling 
788 hectares. 

In Mexico the average marijuana 
field was one-tenth of a hectare. Field 
sizes reflect in part the countering tac- 
tics of the growers of cannabis and 
opium poppy: as efforts to eradicate 
become more successful, Mexican 
authorities are finding that the fields are 
becoming smaller, more isolated, and 
more difficult to detect. 

To counter these tactics, the Govern- 
ment of Mexico has changed its own 
search-and-destroy tactics against opium 
poppy and cannabis. This week the Mex- 
icans are observing tests of a U.S. crop 
duster airplane— the Thrush — and a 
new type of spraying boom, operable on 
both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. 
This equipment should permit close con- 
trol of spraying in hard-to-reach cultiva- 
tion areas. The United States is also 
assisting in the continued modernization 
of the Mexican Attorney General Office's 
air wing's operations and maintenance 
center. 

Outlook. We believe that the Mex- 
ican eradication program, which has 
been supported despite Mexico's 
economic problems, continues to succeed 
in destroying the bulk of cannabis 
cultivated in Mexico. We note that 
several large fields were established by 
traffickers in nontraditional growing 



72 



areas, but these were located and subse- 
quently destroyed. Although large fields 
have probably been cultivated in 1983 as 
well, we believe continued U.S. and 
Mexican efforts against cannabis cultiva- 
tion and marijuana trafficking will con- 
tinue to succeed in keeping most of Mex- 
ico's production off U.S. markets. 

Jamaica 

Background. Jamaica is a source of 
high-grade sensimilla, as well as lower 
potency marijuana, and is this 
hemisphere's only producer of hashish 
oil. The estimate is that cannabis im- 
ports from Jamaica increased from an 
estimated range of 900-1,200 metric 
tons in 1981 to 1,750-2,500 metric tons 
in 1982, with an increase in market 
share from 9% to 16%. Cannabis cultiva- 
tion is estimated in a range of 
3,500-5,000 acres. 

Current Status. There has been an 
active cooperation effort among DEA 
and other U.S. and Jamaican law en- 
forcement agencies for many years, in- 
cluding Coast Guard collaboration with 
its Jamaican counterparts in controlling 
seaborne trafficking. We have funded 
training by DEA and U.S. Customs for 
Jamaican police and customs officials in 
narcotics detection and enforcement. We 
are processing requests to provide equip- 
ment to the Jamaican police to assist its 
narcotics enforcement activities. 

Outlook. We are interested in 
engaging the Government of Jamaica in 
a cooperative program to control illicit 
cannabis (ganja) production, and its ex- 
ports of marijuana to the United States. 
I met with Jamaican officials in 
September to assure them we will give 
favorable consideration to a Government 
of Jamaica request for assistance on a 
cooperative control effort. There have 
been subsequent indications that the 
government of Prime Minister Seaga is 
prepared to take a series of new steps to 
improve both eradication and interdic- 
tion efforts. In October 1982, the 
Jamaican police reportedly destroyed 
138 acres of marijuana. In September 
1983 the government eradicated about 
250 acres of marijuana being cultivated 
on government-owned lands in the 
Brumdec area. 



OTHER PRODUCERS 

For its 1982 estimates, the forthcoming 
NNICC report shows that 840 metric 
tons, or 6% of U.S. supply, come from 
"other" countries. The DEA estimate is 



that the "other" category includes: 
Thailand (240 metric tons), Brazil (200 
metric tons), Belize (200 metric tons), 
Costa Rica (100 metric tons), and 
Panama (100 metric tons). 

Small amounts of marijuana were 
also believed to have been imported 
from such countries as Venezuela, Hon- 
duras, Guatemala, Guyana, Dominica 
and St. Christopher-Nevis. Cultivation of 
cannabis for export purposes has been 
observed in these areas, but the 
amounts of both cultivation and export 
are undetermined. 

The Department, with DEA, con- 
tinues to be watchful for development of 
new cannabis cultivation sources. 

Belize 

Our Embassy in Belize, ^o.sed upon ex- 
tensive DEA field surveys, reported a 
rapid expansion in marijuana cultivation, 
most of which was intended for exporta- 
tion to the United States. The Belizans 
asked the Mexicans for assistance, and 
the two governments formed a bilateral 
effort to destroy the marijuana crops by 
the aerial spraying of herbicides. 

The United States has facilitated 
marijuana eradication projects in which 
Belize was assisted by Mexico and is 
planning direct U.S. assistance for fur- 
ther eradication efforts. Last month, the 
most recent Belize-Mexico operation 
resulted in the destruction of 1,200 acres 
of marijuana in 13 days; reports indicate 
that virtually all cannabis under cultiva- 
tion was destroyed. This cultivation 
could have yielded as much as 1,300 
metric tons of marijuana. 

We have an agreement to provide 
police vehicles and other commodities to 
better support future eradication opera- 
tions. 

Brazil 

Approximately 700 tons of marijuana 
were reportedly grown in northeastern 
Brazil in 1981, and at least some of this 
production was exported— 200 metric 
tons to the United States, according to 
NNICC analysts. 

Costa Rica 

The Costa Rican Government is con- 
cerned about cannabis growi;h. DEA 
estimates that Costa Rica exported 
about 100 metric tons of marijuana to 
the United States in 1982. The Depart- 
ment has provided training and com- 
munications gear to the Drug Control 
Policy Organization, and we are now 
supplying vehicles and other equipment. 



Department of State Bulletin 



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SOUTH ASIA 



Panama 

DEA estimates that Panama exported 
about 100 metric tons of marijuana to 
the United States in 1982 and is a tran- 
sit point for narcotics transhipped from 
South America. A transportation hui:i 
for Latin America, Panama is a connect- 
ing stop for commercial airlines, a flag 
of convenience for shippers, and a 
waterway between the Atlantic and 
Pacific. Panama is also a bank haven 
ind its "free zone" is a transit point for 
i large volume of commerce, which 
'acilitates drug smuggling. The drug 
init in the National Guard has arrested 
lumerous couriers and is very 
;ooperative in authorizing the Coast 
juard to board and, if drugs are found, 
ieize Panamanian flag vessels on the 
ligh seas. The Department of State has 
)rovided communications equipment, 
•adio, and laboratory equipment to the 
Irug unit of the National Guard. Several 
countries in the Central American and 
Caribbean regions are participating in 
'he inter-American marine intelligence 
letwork which links island nation en- 
orcement agencies to the U.S. Coast 
luard; the United States financially sup- 
•orted this communications project. We 
ire exploring direct assistance to the 
"anamian government for marijuana 
radication. 



*a- 



HASHISH 

"he NNICC estimate is that approx- 
mately 200 metric tons of hashish 
ntered this country in 1982. The ex- 
porters (and their percent of the U.S. 
narket) were: 

Lebanon 43% 
Pakistan 41% 
Morocco 10% 
Other 6% 

There is an expectation among 
4NICC analysts that hashish imports 
nay decline in competition with sen- 
imilla. However, there has been some 
ecovery in hashish traffic. While still 
veil below the 1980 estimate of 650 
ons, Lebanese production is reported to 
lave increased from a 1981 range of 
0-200 tons to a 1982 estimate of 
00-500 metric tons. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
/ill be published by the committee and will 
e available from tne Superintendent of 
documents, U.S. Governnient Printing Of- 
ice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



anuary 1984 



Afghanistan: 

4 Years of Occupation 



The following paper was prepared 
by the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research in December 1983. It is a sequel 
to four reports on Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan published in the Bulletin 
in March 1981. October 1981, March 
1982. and February 1983. 

Overview 

Four years after Soviet troops invaded 
Afghanistan, neither a political nor a 
military solution seems likely in the near 
future. The Afghan resistance shows no 
sign of weakening or loss of popular 
support. The countrywide insurgency 
continues and the mujahidin deny the 
Soviets military success. 

During 1983 resistance operations 
against Soviet/regime forces have 
become more effective even in urban 
areas. Tactical cooperation has increased 
among resistance groups, and most of 
the country's land area remains under 
resistance control. Typically, once 
Soviet/regime sweep operations have 
been completed, areas return to 
mujahidin control. Major problems of 
supply and disunity remain, however, 
and resistance forces are unlikely to be 
able militarily to eject the Soviets from 
Afghanistan. 

Despite some optimism following the 
April round of indirect negotiations in 
Geneva that the parties might be able to 
work out a settlement, the UN-spon- 
sored negotiations among the concerned 
parties have thus far not made signifi- 
cant progress because of Moscow's un- 
willingness to set a timetable for the 
withdrawal of its forces. The Soviet 
Union appears committed to a strategy 
of attempting to wear down the 
resistance militarily, gaining control of 
urban areas, and remodeling the Afghan 
political and social structure in its own 
image. Soviet troop strength remains at 
approximately 105,000. 

Afghanistan's internal problems 
have multiplied as the regime remains 
factionally divided and as Soviet control 
deepens. During 1983 economic and ad- 
ministrative chaos increased. The war 
has severely damaged Afghanistan's 
social and economic infrastructure, caus- 
ing major declines in social services, 
agricultural production, and industrial 
output. Afghanistan is becoming more 



dependent upon outside food sources, 
and its economy is ever more dependent 
upon Soviet aid. 

Significant declines in security 
in both urban and rural areas have 
led to increased Soviet use of 
KHAD—Khedamuti-i-Etarat-i-Dolati, 
the Afghan intelligence and security 
organization. KHAD is being greatly ex- 
panded but has been ineffective in pro- 
moting loyalty to the regime. 

Intense Soviet efforts to fashion the 
Afghan military into an effective force 
also have failed, and the people are in- 
creasingly alienated by forced conscrip- 
tion drives. Soviet frustration over in- 
ability to stop resistance activities has 
led in recent months to a deliberate 
policy of increased brutality and 
reprisals against the civilian population. 

The refugee problem continues to 
grow. Between one-fifth and one-fourth 
of Afghanistan's pre- 1979 population 
now lives outside its borders, mainly in 
Pakistan and Iran. The UN High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
World Food Program (WFP), and a 
variety of voluntary agencies and 
governments, including the United 
States, assist Pakistan in caring for 
these refugees— the vast majority of 
whom are determined to return to their 
homeland when it is freed from foreign 
occupation. 

U.S. policy goals for Afghanistan re- 
main the same. We seek the earliest 
possible negotiated political settlement 
in Afghanistan to effect the withdrawal 
of Soviet forces and end the agony of 
the Afghan people. Such a settlement 
must also provide for the other three re- 
quirements spelled out in five UN 
resolutions on Afghanistan: the in- 
dependent and nonaligned status of 
Afghanistan, self-determination of the 
Afghan people, and the return of the 
refugees with safety and honor. The 
United States supports the UN 
negotiating efforts to achieve these 
goals. 

The Soviet Occupation 

In 1983 the military struggle for 
Afghanistan continued unabated. As 
before, the Soviets concentrated on 
building up key logistical bases, securing 
Kabul and other major cities, improving 



73 



SOUTH ASIA 



security for lines of communication, and 
controlling infiltration routes across the 
Pakistani and Iranian borders. During 
the year, no major changes occurred in 
the size or composition of Soviet forces 
committed to Afghanistan. The total 
number remains at about 105,000 Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan with some 30,000 
additional men on the Soviet side of the 
border. 

Throughout 1983 Soviet/ Afghan 
forces regularly conducted multibattalion 
operations designed to interrupt 
resistance supply lines and respond to 
reports of mujahidin concentrations, but 
these efforts have not significantly af- 
fected mujahidin activity. The 
resistance has been remarkably resilient. 
and the ■mujahidin today are stronger 
and better equipped than ever before. 
They have an extensive intelligence 
capability and regularly learn in advance 
about Soviet/ Afghan operations from 
sympathizers in the Afghan military. 

Large areas of the country remain 
under resistance control, and even in 
principal cities Soviet/ Afghan control is 
being increasingly challenged. 
Throughout the year the resistance has 
dramatically demonstrated its ability to 
extend the war into the capital by 
regularly conducting operations inside 
Kabul and its suburbs. During the 
winter months, Kabul's electricity supply 
was a principal target of the mujahidin. 
Power cuts lasting several days were 
caused by destruction of the power lines 
leading from power stations outside 
Kabul, confronting the capital with an 
energy crisis unprecedented in the 
4 years of Soviet occupation. Frequent- 
ly, only the Pule Charki thermal power 
station located on the outskirts of Kabul 
could be relied upon, but its capacity 
was limited due to repeated interdiction 
of fuel supplies from Termez on the 
Afghan/Soviet border. A key petroleum 
pipeline which services Kabul and the 
major Soviet airbase at Bagram, 50 km 
north of Kabul, has been sabotaged so 
often that it is no longer dependable as 
a regular source of fuel. 

During the summer. Marshal S.L. 
Sokolov, the Soviet first deputy defense 
minister, returned to Afghanistan for 
another inspection tour. Following his 
previous visit in late 1981, the Soviets 
significantly stepped up their military 
operations and increased their troop 
strength. While there has been no 
discernible increase of troops or step-up 
in operations this year, Sokolov's latest 
visit clearly reflected the Soviet leader- 
ship's concern about the progress of the 
war. The upsurge in reprisals against 



civilians also appears to reflect growing 
frustration over failure to stem the 
resistance. 

During the summer, the level of 
fighting in Kabul was also significantly 
higher than last year. In mid-June, a 
few days before resumption of the UN- 
sponsored indirect negotiations, the 
mujahidin staged a night-long attack 
against the Soviet-manned Bala Hissar 
fortress and attacked a Soviet command 
post near the Darulaman Palace. The at- 
tacks resumed in early July with a suc- 
cessful rocket attack on Kabul airport 
that damaged military and civilian air- 
craft. 

On the night of August 13-14, the 
mujahidin staged the most ambitious 
operation in the capital since the Soviet 
invasion. Using coordinated rocket, mor- 
tar, and small arms fire, they attacked 
Radio Afghanistan, a Soviet residential 
complex, and the Bala Hissar fortress. 
On October 1 the mujahidin brought the 
Soviet Embassy in Kabul under attack 
for several hours. These incidents, in- 
volving some of the most heavily 
guarded and important installations in 
the city, along with bombings and fre- 
quent assassinations of regime officials, 
underscore the tenuous government con- 
trol in Kabul. 

In a move to demonstrate the 
regime's control of the capital, on 
September 28 Babrak Karmal conducted 
a highly publicized walking tour of 
Kabul. That he felt compelled to under- 
take such a step and the elaborate 
security precautions necessary to carry 
it out, only served to further highlight 
the strength of the resistance. 

Large sections of the cities of Kan- 
dahar, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat 
likewise remain in the hands of the 
resistance. Movement of regime person- 
nel into many areas of these cities is 
possible only with substantial military 
support and during daylight hours. In 
April, in response to mujahidin attacks, 
the Soviets conducted heavy bombing 
and shelling of the western suburbs of 
Herat. As many as 50 planes a day flew 
missions over the city, causing extensive 
damage and resulting in several thou- 
sand civilian casualties. This savage 
bombing of Herat and the surrounding 
villages, however, brought no improve- 
ment in the government's security situa- 
tion. Even daylight resistance operations 
in Herat are not uncommon, and 
fighting in and around the city takes 
place every night. 

Throughout the year, Soviet/ Afghan 
forces also have been repeatedly at- 
tacked in and around Qandahar, the 



country's second largest city. An inci- 
dent in late August vividly demonstratei 
the regime's limited control there. The 
day following a regime speech proclaim- 
ing that the power of the "counter- 
revolutionaries" had been broken in that 
citj', mujahidin from Qandahar and the 
countryside appeared on rooftops 
around government installations in the 
city center and at many military posts 
surrounding the city. For several hours 
they taunted regime soldiers through 
loud speakers and exhorted them to 
defect. 

In recent months, even in Jalalabad. 
which has been one of the most secure 
cities in Afghanistan, the situation has 
eroded with frequent attacks on the air- 
field. Similarly, the regime faces 
resistance in northern Afghanistan. 
Mazar-e Sharif has been subjected to 
repeated mujahidin attacks. In 
September, an attack against the airfiel 
outside the city caused extensive 
damage. 

In late April and early May, follow- 
ing a deterioration of security in Paktia 
and Paktika Provinces, which lie astride 
supply lines from Pakistan, a major 
Soviet/ Afghan offensive was launched 
The operation, involving some 10-15, OOi 
government forces, was designed to 
relieve pressure on several Afghan can 
tonments that were under mujahidin 
pressure and could be resupplied only b\ 
air. A Soviet-trained elite Afghan unit, 
the 38th Commando Brigade, was 
decimated near the town of Urgun. One 
battalion was wiped out, and the re- 
mainder of the unit deserted to the 
resistance. This defeat represented a 
major setback to Soviet efforts to 
reconstruct the Afghan army. 

In late summer, the mujahidin agaii 
stepped up pressure in Paktia and 
Paktika Provinces. During August and 
September many isolated government 
outposts in these provinces deserted or 
were overrun. Major cantonments at 
Urgun, Khowst, and Jaji Maidan were 
brought under seige. Although no impor 
tant towns fell to the mujahidin during 
the September attacks, the fighting 
highlighted the growing strength of the 
resistance in this region and reflected in 
creasing tactical coordination among 
mujahidin bands inside Afghanistan. 

This past year has been marked by 
increased mujahidin success in convoy 
interdiction. Resistance efforts in Paktia 
and Paktika Provinces were significantly 
boosted by the interdiction of Soviet and 
regime resupply convoys traveling 



74 Department of State Bulletin 

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SOUTH ASIA 



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through the Lowgar Valley. Although 
additional government military posts 
have been set up along the major 
highways to protect the convoys, the 
mujahidin have proven increasingly 
skilled in the use of mines and in 
preventing convoy movement. The road 
through the Lowgar Valley— which 
begins just south of Kabul and is the 
primary land route from Kabul to Paktia 
and Paktika Provinces— has been a par- 
ticular problem for the Soviets. 
Soviet/ Afghan convoys were repeatedly 
ambushed with heavy losses, often forc- 
ing the convoys to return to Kabul. 
Security in the Shomali region south of 
the Salang Tunnel on the road to Kabul 
lalso has posed a major problem for the 
'Soviets. Traffic through this area, the 
principal line of communication between 
the Soviet border and Kabul, is often 
halted for days. 

The insurgents likewise have become 
more efficient this year in combating 
Soviet air power— Moscow's most effec- 
tive weapon. Using heavy machineguns, 
the mujahidin have become adept at 
downing Soviet MiGs and helicopters. 
The resistance has capably employed 
heavy machineguns during attacks on 
convoys and claims its successes have 
Iforced Soviet/regime helicopters to fly at 
high altitudes, thus reducing their ability 
to support the ground forces. Although 
there have been isolated reports of 
surface-to-air missiles in the hands of 
the resistance, such weapons are still 
limited. The presence of a few missiles, 
however, is sufficient to compel 
Soviet/ Afghan pilots to be more 
cautious. 

A disturbing trend has been the in- 
creasing use of reprisal attacks in 
response to mujahidin successes. The 
level of violence against the civilian 
population by Soviet firepower has 
reached new heights. Attacks against 
Soviet convoys have led to the destruc- 
tion of nearby villages, cultivated fields 
and orchards, and the execution of male 
inhabitants. In July, Soviet forces ex- 
cuted 20-30 elders in the provincial 
capital of Ghazni in reprisal for the 
deaths of several Soviet personnel. In 
October, following a series of hit-and-run 
ittacks on convoys outside Qandahar, 
■eprisals were launched against villages 
n the area resulting in significant 
destruction and the deaths of some 100 
ivilians. 

In the Shomali region, the sustained 
ijombing of villages has created virtual 
['ree-fire zones along the highway. The 
aneyards and orchards of what was 



January 1984 



once the showcase of Afghan agriculture 
have suffered irreparable damage from 
repeated Soviet attacks. In late October 
during a Soviet/ Afghan operation in the 
Shomali, at least half of the historic 
town of Istalef was leveled by aerial 
bombardment and artillery shellings in 
reprisal for Soviet losses in the area. 
Civilian casualties totaled several hun- 
dred women and children were 
bayoneted and village elders shot. 

Negotiations and Cease-Fire 

A new tactic adopted this past year has 
been the attempted negotiation of cease- 
fires between resistance groups and the 
Soviets. While many have quickly 
broken down, one prolonged highly 
pubhcized cease-fire was in the Panjsher 
Valley— which opens onto the vital 
Salang pass route between Kabul and 
the Soviet border. The Panjsher truce, 
arranged between the mujahidin leader 
Mahsud and the Soviets without the par- 
ticipation of the Karmal government, 
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of 
both the Soviets and the resistance. 
The Panjsher cease-fire began in 
March and officially ended in August, 
but the valley remains quiet. Coming 
after six large-scale and costly Soviet 
Panjsher Valley campaigns over the past 
3 years, the truce promised to free 
Soviet troops for duty elsewhere by 
reducing the Soviet presence in the 
valley to token level. At the same time, 
it provided Mahsud an opportunity to 
consolidate his position and develop his 
logistical and economic base and harvest 
a vital food crop. This cease-fire has also 
enabled Mahsud to resupply and train 
his forces and to expand his organization 
and operations well beyond the Panjsher 
Valley. In recent months Mahsud's 
forces have been conducting operations 
outside the valley in Konduz, Paghman, 
and the Shomali region. 

Soviet Casualties and POWs 

Soviet casualites since December 1979 
now total at least 17-20,000 killed 
and wounded. General dissatisfaction 
with conditions in Afghanistan have 
prompted a number of Soviet troops to 
desert. Accounts of indiscipline, drug 
usage, and black marketing — including 
the sale of weapons and ammuni- 
tion — are numerous. 

In the early period of the 
Afghanistan war, there were very few 
prisoners taken on either side, but now 
various resistance groups hold Soviet 
prisoners of war. In 1982 the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross 



(ICRC) was able to work out an agree- 
ment among the Karmal regime, the 
Soviet Union, Pakistan, Switzerland, 
and the Afghan resistance whereby 
Soviet prisoners of war captured in 
Afghanistan and held by the resistance 
would be taken to Switzerland for in- 
ternment for 2 years. At the end of 
their internment, the prisoners would be 
turned over to the ICRC by the Swiss 
Government for repatriation. In 
February 1983 the president of the 
ICRC told the press that the ICRC 
would not participate in the forced 
repatriation to the U.S.S.R. of Soviet 
prisoners interned in Switzerland. In 
July one of the eight Soviet prisoners in- 
terned under this agreement escaped to 
West Germany where he is seeking 
political asylum. Another Soviet soldier 
arrived in Switzerland on October 28. 

Two Soviet army privates from 
Afghanistan arrived in the United States 
as refugees on November 28. Their 
resettlement is being assisted by a 
private voluntary agency. 

Popular Support for the Resistance 

Popular support for the mujahidin re- 
mains high even though the fighting has 
brought destruction and reprisals on 
civilians, has disrupted social services 
and administration in most of the coun- 
try, and has contributed to competition 
for food supplies. Local populations con- 
tinue to provide the mujahidin with 
shelter, food, and recruits. Casualties 
among civilians and the resistance 
fighters have not reduced mujahidin ac- 
tivities, and morale remains high. 

It is impossible to assess the exact 
number of ynujahidin since the numbers 
fluctuate according to the season and in 
relationship to the level of Soviet opera- 
tions in specific areas. Loosely organized 
in some six main organizations and 
several smaller groups, the resistance 
forces operating out of Peshawar are 
split into two alliances— the moderates 
and fundamentalists— both calling 
themselves the "Islamic Unity of Afghan 
Mujahidin." Despite ongoing efforts— 
mainly by groups in Peshawar— to pro- 
mote unity, disagreements between 
groups, including armed attacks upon 
each other, are not infrequent. 

Allegiance of the fighting groups 
operating in Afghanistan to head- 
quarters in Peshawar is often flexible 
and contingent on a continuation of ade- 
quate supplies. In the past, only a few of 
the fundamentalist groups in Peshawar 
have exercised significant operational 
control over affiliated units in 



SOUTH ASIA 



Afghanistan. However, the major mu- 
jahidin offensive in Paktia and Paktika 
Provinces during September and 
October was conducted by groups with 
direct links to Sayed Ahmad Gailani, 
leader of a moderate group in Peshawar. 

Tactical cooperation among mu- 
jahidin groups inside Afghanistan has 
increased during this past year. This has 
been evident in the Shomali region and 
in attacks conducted inside the capital. 
Moreover, mujahidin operations in 
Paktia and Paktika Provinces have been 
supported by other resistance groups 
who have interdicted Soviet/regime con- 
voys traveling through the Lowgar 
Valley. 

While the mujahidin have demon- 
strated increasing military effectiveness 
and cooperation this year, the resistance 
is still plagued by internal divisions and 
factional fighting. No nationwide 
resistance organization has yet evolved 
that is capable of coordinating activities 
throughout the country, and progress 
toward organizational and logistical 
coordination is slowed by serious ter- 
ritorial and ideological rivalries. 

Both moderate and fundamentalist 
alliances have problems of organization. 
The spring of 1983 witnessed an effort 
to forestall the fragmentation of the 
Peshawar-based fundamentalist groups. 
In May, seven of these groups appointed 
Professor Abdul Rasal Sayaf, the leader 
of a minor group, to a 2-year alliance 
presidency. Despite this mediation, 
however, internal strains continue 
within the fundamentalist alliance as 
some groups accuse others of being 
more interested in expanding their own 
power bases than in fighting the Soviets. 

Supply shortage remains another 
serious problem for the resistance. 
Although small arms appear to be 
available in sufficient numbers, ammuni- 
tion, medicines, and frequently food are 
sometimes critically short. Resistance 
leaders frequently mention to the media 
and others the need for increased sup- 
plies of heavy machineguns and weapons 
such as mines and rocket grenades for 
use against armored vehicles. Nonethe- 
less, this year the resistance has 
registered a higher kill ratio against 
Soviet aircraft, increased ability to 
challenge the Soviet policy of urban con- 
trol, and continued success in operations 
against Soviet bases and supply lines. 

Participation of Iranian-based 
Afghans in the resistance has also in- 
creased in recent months, although the 
Iranian Government exercises tight con- 
trol over cross-border activities. The 



primary beneficiaries of the limited 
Iranian support have been the Shia 
groups in Afghanistan. 

The most dramatic new development 
this year, involving an initiative to 
organize the resistance more effectively, 
was an appeal by ex-King Zahir Shah in 
June concerning the need to create a 
united organization capable of speaking 
on behalf of the Afghan people. The tim- 
ing of the ex-king's announcement 
stemmed from growing concerns that 
representatives of the Afghan people 
have not been included in the UN- 
mediated indirect negotiations in Geneva 
and frustration over inability to create a 
united resistance organization. Zahir 
Shah expressed his willingness "to better 
coordinate our resistance activities and 
to better represent them in international 
conferences and activities." At the same 
time he also stated that he had no per- 
sonal ambitions and did not want to 
reestablish the monarchy. 

In August, following consultations 
with the ex-king, the three groups 
belonging to the moderate alliance an- 
nounced the establishment of a "United 
Front for the Liberation of 
Afghanistan." Its sponsors called on 
Zahir Shah to "take necessary measures" 
to obtain international recognition of a 
12-man committee set up to oversee im- 
plementation of the united front. The 
moderates hope that his involvement 
will provide a rallying point and give 
new visibility to the Afghan cause, thus 
increasing their effectiveness in the in- 
ternational arena. 

Provisions were made for the acces- 
sion of other resistance groups to the 
united front with the same rights as the 
founding members, thus leaving the 
door open to participation by the funda- 
mentalists. Although the latter have to 
date publicly eschewed involvement in 
any organization involving the ex-king, if 
Zahir Shah's initiative gains momentum, 
it could eventually receive some fun- 
damentalist support. 

Acceleration of the 
Government's Problems 

As the Afghan resistance against Soviet 
occupation enters its fifth year, the 
Soviet-sponsored Babrak Karmal regime 
faces continued widespread popular 
dissatisfaction. Most observers feel that 
the regime could not survive without 
Soviet military support. 

Attacks on Soviet and regime of- 
ficials are common even in areas claimed 
to be under government control, and 
Soviet personnel need extremely tight 



El 



personal security because of the con- 
stant threat of kidnaping and assassina- 
tion. Increased Soviet brutality against 
civilians has, moreover, undermined the 
intense Soviet/regime propaganda cam- 
paign portraying the Soviets as 
peacekeepers and Karmal himself as a 
beloved and democratically chosen 
leader. 

The Karmal regime has been unable 
to expand its influence beyond a small 
coterie of party loyalists, who them- 
selves are divided into warring factions. 
Factionalism and corruption are serious 
obstacles for the regime, and steps by 
the dominant Parcham faction to heal 
the deep divisions within the party and 
promote a National Fatherland Front 
have not been successful. The 12th Par- 
ty Plenum in early July revealed contin- 
uing rifts. Addressing the plenum, Kar- 
mal observed that previous decisions han 
not been fully implemented, a situation 
which he blamed on "lack of unity, 
disorganization, lack of ability, and 
fatalism." 

Serious clashes have occurred be- 
tween the Parcham and Khalq factions, 
including a confrontation in mid-August 
near Herat in which more than 100 per- 
sons were reported killed. In mid-May, 
an argument over a military promotion 
list favoring Parcham officers led to a 
violent altercation between Minister of 
Defense Abdul Qader and his Khalq 
deputy, Major General Khalilullah, who 
physically assaulted Qader. 

Soviet dissatisfaction with Karmal 
over his inability to unite the warring 
factions also has surfaced. Rumors have 
abounded throughout much of the year 
that a major shift in leadership was im- 
minent. A Cabinet reshuffle in October 
may have reflected an attempt to 
alleviate some of the intragovernmental 
strains. Open Soviet preference for the 
Parchamis could, however, exacerbate 
tensions in the party. In early 1983, for 
example, a money-market scandal in- 
volving Soviet advisers and high-level 
Parchamis was publicized by the Khalq 
faction in an effort to enhance its own 
position. 

The Afghan intelligence and security 
organization, KHAD, has been largely 
ineffective in its efforts to counter the 
insurgency and ensure loyalty in the 
military and among the general 
populace, and its operations have added 
to the fear and distrust permeating 
Afghan society. KHAD responsibilities 
include counterinsurgency, military in- 
telligence, security for Afghan VIPs and 



Department of State Bulletin 






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SOUTH ASIA 



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official installations, and foreign in- 
telligence and covert action. Organized 
under Soviet direction, KHAD is de- 
signed to assist the Afghan communists 
in setting up the same kinds of party 
and government institutions used by the 
U.S.S.R. to control its own population. 
The Soviet presence pervades the 
KHAD leadership, and the KGB con- 
tinues to play a significant role in train- 
ing and operations. 

KHAD, however, shares in the in- 
ternecine Parcham-Khalq competition 
resulting in factionalism, fear, and in- 
competence within the organization 
itself. Intraparty violence, moreover, 
frequently overlaps with mujahidin 
operations and obscures responsibility 
for violent acts. Agents in the Parcham- 
dominated KHAD often provide infor- 
mation enabling the mujahidin to 
assassinate Khalq party members. The 
Khalqis play a reciprocal game with the 
Parchamis. KHAD activities also have 
contributed to the already low morale 
with the Afghan military. 

It is widely believed in Pakistan that 
iKHAD has sent its agents among 
refugees to foment discord in the camps 
and to stir up trouble between the 
refugees and their Pakistani hosts. 
Nearly 3 million Afghans now live in 
[Pakistan; the inevitable conflicts over ac- 
cess to land, grazing rights, and social 
services make fertile ground for KHAD 
mischief. KHAD agents also are 
suspected of having infiltrated Afghan 
resistance organizations based in 
IPeshawar to gain intelligence on mu- 
\jahidin activities and to exacerbate divi- 
sions among the resistance groups. 
iKHAD agents are believed to have 
fueled Shia-Sunni religious conflicts, 
especially in border areas of Pakistan's 
(Northwest Frontier Province where 
most of the refugees have settled, and 
to have supported the tribal Baluch 
separatist movement in Baluchistan 
Province. 

In 1983 KHAD was significantly 
strengthened in an effort to exert 
igreater control over the Afghan civilian 
population, particularly in the cities. The 
organization, which now includes be- 
itween 15-20,000 personnel, is widely 
recognized as being responsible for 
prisoner interrogation. Amnesty Inter- 
national — which has appealed to Babrak 
Karmal to stop torture, arbitrary arrest, 
and secret trials which deny defendants 
the right of defense— issued a report in 
fiarly November citing systematic tor- 
ture of prisoners. Based on interviews 
with ex-prisoners and their relatives, the 
Amnesty International report said those 
tortured include civil servants, teachers, 



January 1984 



teenage students, and persons arrested 
as a warning to others — as well as those 
actually associated with armed resist- 
ance to the regime. 

The decline in security this year is 
only one aspect of Afghanistan's grave 
internal plight. Domestic opposition to 
the Soviet presence and to the Karmal 
regime also has accelerated the trend 
toward economic and adminstrative 
chaos which will take years to repair. 
The country's social and economic in- 
frastructure has been decimated, and 
in 1983 the Afghan Government ap- 
proached the International Monetary 
Fund seeking credits. Social services, 
agricultural production, and industrial 
output continue to suffer reverses, and 
inflation is estimated at around 
20%-25%. 

In a speech before the UN General 
Assembly on October 6, Afghanistan's 
Foreign Minister Mohammad Dost 
acknowledged the impact of resistance 
activity on the Afghan economy. He 
stated that "50% of the country's 
schools, 14% of our hospitals, 75% of 
our public transportation vehicles, -all 
communications cables and significant 
numbers of other public installations 
have been destroyed." He noted that the 
damage to the economy totaled $287 
million, or roughly half of the total in- 
vestment during the 20 years before the 
1978 revolution. 

The continued refugee exodus is 
another impediment to the functioning 
of social and educational services, as 
well as the business sector. Reduction of 
the work force by the continuing flight 
of refugees, particularly the middle 
class, has had a similarly negative im- 
pact. Shortages of raw materials and 
manpower as well as lack of security 
have forced many industrial units to 
close. Mujahidin operations, moreover, 
have damaged power facilities and 
disrupted the flow of petroleum products 
to urban areas. Most utility projects 
planned before the Soviet invasion re- 
main uncompleted. 

The Afghan economy is increasingly 
linked with the Soviet Union. In a recent 
speech at the military academy, Babrak 
Karmal indicated that the value of trade 
between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan 
will increase threefold between 1983 and 
1987. He noted that more than half of 
the country's industrial output comes 
from facilities built with Soviet aid. 

Despite other problems, the natural 
gas industry continues to function more 
or less normally, due in part to the prox- 
imity of the Sheberghan gas fields to the 
Soviet border. Babrak Karmal claims 



that revenues from the sale of natural 
gas amount to 40% of Afghanistan's 
total exports, but the figure is probably 
much higher. Afghanistan uses its 
revenues from gas sales to reduce its 
debt to the U.S.S.R. and as barter for 
Soviet machinery and other goods. 
Afghanistan also exports dried fruit, 
raisins, and skins and remains a major 
source of opium; trade in the latter com- 
modity being conducted by Soviet 
soldiers, as well as by Afghan citizens. 

The war's impact on agricultural 
production varies widely from province 
to province. Although the Soviet/regime 
forces have destroyed crops and 
depopulated many food-producing areas 
near highways, the country has general- 
ly remained self-sufficient in food. Short- 
ages have been experienced mainly in 
urban areas as a result of swelling urban 
populations and the interdiction of road 
transportation by the resistance. Kabul's 
population now stands at 1.8 million in 
contrast to 600,000 in 1979; as a result 
Kabul is increasingly dependent on im- 
ported foodstuffs such as wheat, cooking 
oil, and sugar. Other basic commodities, 
including medicines, also are generally in 
very short supply. 

The Soviet Union has supplied food 
and other commodities to meet the basic 
needs of the cities. In November, for ex- 
ample, the Soviet Union announced 
agreement to provide Afghanistan with 
20,000 tons of wheat immediately and a 
further 180,000 tons over the next year. 
According to official press reports from 
Kabul, half of the wheat would be given 
as a grant and the other half sold in 
Kabul in exchange for Afghan goods. 
This significant increase— 115,000 tons 
of wheat were supplied from the Soviet 
Union in 1982 and 74,000 tons in 
1981 — illustrates both increased food 
shortages and growing reliance on the 
Soviet Union as a supplier. Although the 
food supply improved somewhat this 
year over 1982, a shortfall is again ex- 
pected during the winter. 

Problems in the Military 

The Soviets have failed to rebuild the 
Afghan army, comprised of 40-50,000 
men, into an effective military force. Its 
size is far short of the regime goal and 
far less than the 90,000 in the Afghan 
military in 1978. Morale and discipline 
remain low, and the army continues to 
experience desertions at about the same 
rate as it gains new conscripts. Many 
conscripts, in fact, desert and are 
reconscripted repeatedly. The desertion 
rate — up to 80% reported in some 



SOUTH ASIA 



units— is higher in the less secure and 
more contested areas of the country. 

As a result of recruiting problems 
and desertions, reservists during 1983 
were once again retained beyond their 
legal release date. Revised draft laws 
promulgated in August, in concert with 
a massive conscription drive, further 
reduced exemptions from military serv- 
ice and increased the flight of eligible 
men from the country or into rural 
areas. These latest changes have led to 
the recall of men who completed their 
military service as late as 1980. The 
regime employs the talashi— in which an 
entire village or section of a city is cor- 
doned off and a house-to-house search 
conducted for conscripts, weapons, or 
mujahidin. Following an intensive con- 
scription drive in Kabul during October, 
Interior Minister Gulabjoi protested that 
the drafting of recent reservists would 
severely disrupt the economy. 

In addition to problems of low 
morale and inadequate training and 
equipment, the army suffers from lack 
of a skilled officer corps. Many senior 
officers were killed following the 1978 
coup, and the army has been unable to 
fill this professional vacuum. As part of 
the effort to rebuild the Afghan Armed 
Forces, military personnel annually 
numbering in the thousands have been 
sent to the Soviet Union for training. In 
addition, Soviet advisers serve at all 
levels of the Afghan army. The Soviet 
presence has caused considerable prob- 
lems. As in previous years, during 1983 
there were instances of Afghan troops 
turning on their Soviet advisers. 

The Afghan military, which is 
dominated by the Khalq faction, is fur- 
ther weakened by Khalq-Parcham 
animosity, with the Khalqis generally 
taking the view that the Parchamis have 
sold out to Moscow. The Parchamis in 
turn suspect the Khalqis of disloyalty 
and have moved to limit KJialq authority 
in the officer corps and the military 
schools. 

Despite such problems, Moscow may 
stOl have ambitious long-range regional 
plans for the Afghan military. In 1982, 
in an interview published by the 
Yugoslav news agency Tanjug, Afghan 
Minister of Defense Abdul Qader 
asserted that the Afghan army will have 
a significant future role, similar to 
that played by the Cuban and Viet- 
namese armies. Tanjug also quoted a 
1981 statement by Babrak Karmal that, 
"Not far away is the day when our army 
will become a strong and energetic army 
capable of defending peace and security 
not only in Afghanistan, but in the 
region as well." 



78 



The Refugees 

At year's end 2.9 million Afghan 
refugees were in Pakistan, according to 
official Government of Pakistan figures, 
while an estimated 650,000 Afghan 
refugees were in Iran. (About 850,000 
Afghans worked in Iran before 1979, 
bringing the present total of Afghans in 
Iran to roughly 1.5 million.) Before the 
Soviet invasion, some 14-17 million per- 
sons lived in Afghanistan, meaning that 
between one-fifth and one-fourth of the 
country's population has now been 
displaced outside its borders. 

Although the refugee exodus has 
slowed down, it continues steadily, pick- 
ing up when fighting becomes heavier or 
when food supplies are particularly 
scarce. This fall, for example, fighting in 
Paktia and Paktika Provinces caused a 
new flight into Pakistan's North 
Waziristan and Kurram Agencies along 
the Afghan border. A campaign by the 
Kabul regime to convince refugees that 
it is safe for them to return to 
Afghanistan has been a complete failure. 
Increasingly harsh Soviet reprisals 
against civilians suspected of col- 
laborating with the mujahidin will no 
doubt increase the refugee flow into 
Pakistan and Iran. 

In addition to those persons who 
have left Afghanistan, an undetermined 
number have been displaced within the 
country itself as fighting and destruction 
have driven people into urban areas. 
Since the Soviet invasion, the Kabul 
population, for example, has expanded 
by an estimated 1.2 million despite the 
exodus from the city of large numbers 
of businessmen and other professionals. 

Loss of much of the country's 
educated elite and work force has had a 
serious negative impact on the Afghan 
economy. Furthermore, changes in the 
country's ethnic balance and destruction 
of the educational and social infrastruc- 
ture have combined with the loss of 
educated professionals to create social 
problems that will endure for many 
years to come. 

The UNHCR has, with the 
assistance of the Government of 
Pakistan, undertaken an international 
relief program for the refugees in 
Pakistan which includes basic housing 
and health and educational services. 
Despite the heavy burden the refugee in- 
flux has placed on Pakistan, the 
refugees have been welcomed and good 
rapport continues between them and 
their hosts. Pakistani assistance to the 
refugees includes some cash allowances 
to individuals and payment of relief ad- 
ministration costs. Contributions from 



aitraiBors,t 



several other countries and internationi 
voluntary agencies have greatly assist© 
this program. 

The Afghan refugees in Iran have nolj 
been handled in any systematic way and 
there have been no international relief 
efforts there. 

Most of the Afghan refugees are 
Pathan and, therefore, feel comfortable 
in the Pathan-dominated Northwest |_ 
Frontier Province (NWFP). Due to the 
large concentration of refugees in the 
Northwest Frontier Province, however, 
Pakistani authorities began in 1982 to 
move refugees into new camps in less 
populated parts of the adjacent non- 
Pathan Punjab Province. Efforts to 
move the refugees increase the possibill , 

ty of conflicts between the refugees anc V*"°™ 
their hosts. Nonetheless, more than • 

40,000 Afghans were relocated from th<^™y*'* 
NWFP in order to relieve population 
pressures and provide better living con- 
ditions. Large numbers, however, subse 
quently left the Punjab to return to 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas 
citing adverse climatic conditions in the 
south and a desire to remain close to 
their homeland. 

Pakistani authorities continue seek- 
ing ways in which to manage the 
massive refugee population to the ad- 
vantage of all concerned. President Zia 
has reaffirmed his commitment to a 
political solution including repatriation, 
and the Government of Pakistan adhere 
to a ruling by the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference that no member 
country should deal with the Karmal 
regime. 

Working through the UNH^R, the 
World Food Program, and a variety of 
voluntary agencies, the U.S. Govern- 
ment continues to share in the interna- 
tional assistance program. Since 1980, 
the United States has contributed more 
than $300 million to Afghan refugee 
relief. During fiscal year 1983, the 
United States contributed $80 million to 
support Afghan refugees in Pakistan, in 
eluding $49 million through the WFP. 
The U.S. contribution represents some 
35% of the total UNHCR budget and 
about 50% of the international food con- 
tribution. 



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Soviet Strategy 

The Soviets have failed to reduce the 
level of the insurgency, but they do not 
seem to have changed their long-term 
goals or altered their overall strategy in 
Afghanistan. Their troop strength re- 
mains at approximately 105,000 men. 
Furthermore, they seem to believe, 
perhaps erroneously, that in terms of in- 



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SOUTH ASIA 



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;ernational reaction, the worst is over. 
iVhile Afghanistan has proved to be a 
"ar knottier problem than Moscow 
)riginaliy envisaged, the Soviets seem to 
udge that the costs are bearable and 
;hat in the long run they will be able to 
vear down the insurgency. 

If anything, Moscow's commitment 
,0 preserving a pro-Soviet, Marxist- 
lominated regime in Kabul appears to 
lave grown over the last 4 years as the 
ioviets have come to view Afghanistan 
IS a test of their credibility. Despite con- 
stant rumors, the Soviets evidently are 
mprepared to replace Babrak Karmal, 
ijrobable because no viable alternative 
;xists. 

The Soviets appear to be trying to 
mpose a Soviet-style political and 
:Conomic system. Their efforts, 
[Qwever, have been frustrated by the 
insettled conditions in the countryside, 
itill, where possible, the Soviets have in- 
roduced changes aimed to increase the 
entral government's control and securi- 
y. Afghan Government and party of- 
icials are routinely sent to the U.S.S.R. 
or training and indoctrination. 

The Afghan economy has been pro- 
rressively integrated into the Eastern 
»loc. Afghanistan was an observer at 
he October 1983 council meeting of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
n Havana. Last spring, TASS an- 
■lounced that the U.S.S.R. was the main 
'rading partner of the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviets 
lontrol Afghanistan's natural gas in- 
dustry, virtually all Afghan gas going to 
ihe U.S.S.R. to service Kabul's Soviet 
<ebt. Moscow's current ambassador to 
i^ghanistan was previously the first 
lecretary of the Tartar Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic where he over- 
saw the development of the West 
Siberian oil and gas fields. 

Since the invasion, 10-20,000 
Afghan students have been educated in 
the U.S.S.R. Moscow considers this pro- 
gram sufficiently important to exempt 
(he students from military service in 
i\.fghanistan. There has been a steady 
stream of articles in Soviet academic 
ournals and the national press compar- 
Tig Afghanistan with the U.S.S.R.'s 
Central Asian republics, where final 
)acification and integration took a 
;imilar form. 

In their approach to Afghan tribal 
*nd nationality problems, the Soviets 
.lave taken another page out of their 
')wn Central Asian experience as they 
Dursue a policy of divide and rule. The 
Karmal regime's strategy has been to of- 
fer large sums of money, weapons, and 
i)rivileges as an inducement to tribes 



January 1984 



and villages to abandon the resistance 
and to obstruct mujahidin activity. It 
was the failure of this program— with 
previously neutral tribal groups joining 
the resistance instead— that contributed 
to the government setbacks in Paktia 
and Paktika Provinces this year. 

In recent months the regime has 
widely publicized the surrender of mu- 
jahidin groups under an official amnesty 
program. The resistance, however, 
discourages potential collaborators from 
aiding the regime by regularly using 
assassination and other forms of retalia- 
tion against government supporters. 
Mujahidin frequently accept arms and 
cash subsidies from the government only 
to return to the resistance after a few 
months. To date no major sustained 
defections from the mujahidin to the 
regime have occurred. 

Status of the UN-Sponsored 
Negotiations 

UN efforts to help negotiate a solution 
to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
date from a November 1980 resolution 
by the UN General Assembly. The then 
Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, ap- 
pointed Perez de Cuellar as his personal 
representative to see if the United Na- 
tions could play an active and useful role 
in negotiations concerning Afghanistan. 
When Perez de Cuellar succeeded 
Waldheim, he followed the same formula 
and appointed Diego Cordovez, UN 
Under Secretary General for Special 
Political Affairs, to act for him on the 
problem. 

Cordovez shuttled between Kabul 
and Islamabad in April 1982 and gained 
agreement for a round of indirect talks 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
which were held in Geneva that June. 
Iran decided not to participate formally 
but agreed to be kept informed and thus 
associated with the talks. 

Following these discussions, the 
United Nations, Pakistan, and Afghan- 
istan all issued positive statements and 
indicated that there was a measure of 
flexibility in the negotiating positions of 
both sides. Kabul apparently agreed in 
principle to allow the subject of troop 
withdrawal to be part of the negotiating 
package and to accept the idea that at 
some point the refugees must be con- 
sulted on the conditions of their return. 
Cordovez announced in a press con- 
ference that he kept a written record of 
the understandings that he has reached 
and that he would work from these texts 
in subsequent discussions. 

From January 21 to February 7, 
1983, Cordovez again visited the area to 
refine the text of the agreement. His 



consultations dealt with four items 
previously identified for consideration: 
withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan; noninterference and 
nonintervention; international 
guarantees of a final settlement; and 
voluntary return of the refugees. 

During Perez de Cuellar's March 
visit to Moscow, he and Cordovez ex- 
changed views on the Afghanistan situa- 
tion with both Chairman Andropov and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko. According to 
the Secretary General, the Soviet 
Government expressed itself strongly in 
favor of a political settlement and sup- 
ported a continuation of his efforts. 
A second round of indirect talks 
took place in Geneva from April 11 to 
April 22, 1983. Cordovez met separately 
with the Pakistani and Afghan Foreign 
Ministers and with Soviet observers 
daily to further develop the text of a 
possible agreement. Once again Cor- 
dovez also kept Iran informed of the 
discussions. At the conclusion of this 
round, there were suggestions that a 
breakthrough might be possible. 

After consultations with the capitals 
concerned, another round of indirect 
talks took place in Geneva from June 12 
to 24, 1983. Although the parties 
reportedly made progress in defining the 
nature of a comprehensive settlement- 
its principles and objectives, the inter- 
relationship among its four components, 
and the provisions for its implementa- 
tion—the talks stalled on the crucial 
issue of the Soviets' unwillingness to 
provide a timetable for troop withdrawal 
from Afghanistan. Although the parties 
had agreed that Cordovez should visit 
the region in September for further 
discussions, Perez de Cuellar decided in 
late summer that such a visit at that 
time would not be productive. 

On November 23, the UNGA again 
passed a resolution urging immediate 
withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
Afghanistan by a vote of 116 to 20, with 
17 abstentions— the largest majority 
since the Soviet invasion nearly 4 years 
ago. This was the fifth time since 
January 1980 that the UNGA had called 
for a troop withdrawal from Afghan- 
istan, each time by overwhelming 
margins. 

Also during the UNGA, Perez de 
Cuellar and Cordovez met informally 
with both the Pakistani and Afghan 
Foreign Ministers to explore conditions 
for resuming the diplomatic process. On 
November 30, the United Nations an- 
nounced that Cordovez would continue 
the diplomatic process by further 
negotiations in Islamabad, Kabul, and 
Tehran at a mutually convenient date. ■ 



79 



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The Caribbean Basin Initiative 
and Central America 



by Kenneth W. Dam 

Address before the International 
Trade Mart "World News Business 
Briefing, " New Orleans, Lousiana, on 
November 29, 1983. Mr. Dam is Deputy 
Secretary of State. 

The Policy Setting 

President Reagan told a special Joint 
Session of Congress last April 27 that 
U.S. policy toward our neighbors in Cen- 
tral America and the Caribbean has four 
interlocking elements: 

• To actively support democracy, 
reform, and human freedom against dic- 
tators and would-be dictators of both 
left and right; 

• To promote economic recovery 
within a framework of sound growth 
and equitable development; 

• To foster dialogue and negotia- 
tions—a dialogue of democracy within 
countries, a diplomacy of negotiations 
among nations willing to live at peace; 
and 

• To provide a security shield 
against those who use violence against 
democratization, development, and 
diplomacy. 

In enunciating these principles, the 
President was referring primarily to 
Central America. Nonetheless, our con- 
cerns and our policy include the entire 
Caribbean Basin. For example, we can 
rightfully congratulate ourselves and our 
Caribbean friends that Grenada is back 
on a democratic course together with 
the rest of the eastern Caribbean com- 
munity. Democracy and security are 
essential to our policy. But we must not 
forget the other elements, including the 
need for sustained cooperation in foster- 
ing economic growth and opportunity. 

So I should like to focus today on 
the problems of growth and what we 
can do about them. I shall begin with 
Central America, then conclude with the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Overcoming 
the obstacles to economic growth is im- 
portant for Central America, for the 
Caribbean, and for the United States. 
And it has a special significance for New 
Orleans, which leads all U.S. seaports in 
import tonnage. 

Problems of Central America's 
Economies 

Let me begin by recalling that the 
record of the 1950s, the 1960s, and most 



80 



of the 1970s demonstrates that Central 
America is capable of rapid economic 
growth. 

From 1960 to 1979, real gross na- 
tional product in the United States grew 
by an average of 3.7% per year; the in- 
dustrialized market economies as a 
whole grew at 4.2% per year. During 
those same 20 years, every country in 
Central America grew even faster. An- 
nual real growth rates averaged from a 
low of 4.4% in Honduras to a high of 
6.3% in Costa Rica. 

Central America's population growth 
during those same 20 years averaged 
about 3%— among the highest in the 
world. Even so, per capita income in- 
creased in every country. And in each 
case, the percentage of total production 
accounted for by manufacturing and 
other industrial activity increased. For 
instance, between 1960 and 1979 in- 
dustrial activity in Honduras rose from 
19% of total production to 26%. 

Against such a favorable 
background, how is it that Central 
America's rapid development lost 
momentum? How do economic problems 
relate to today's troubles? 

Three factors stand out. They are 
local social and political conflicts, the 
global economic recession, and the im- 
pact of guerrilla warfare. Let me take 
each in turn. 

First, local social and political con- 
flicts — Central America was still 
relatively quiet politically when I trav- 
eled there briefly 5 years ago. But 
underlying economic problems and social 
tensions were already unmistakable. 

Part of the problem was described 
by the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America: "The fruits of the long 
period of economic expansion . . . were 
distributed in a flagrantly inequitable 
manner." Another part of the problem 
was that growth was slowly improving 
the lot of many people but that it was 
also increasing expectations and 
creating pressures for broader political 
participation. Yet except for Costa Rica, 
there were few democratic outlets to ac- 
commodate the changes needed to 
resolve the tensions peacefully. 

The instability and repression that 
ensued proved bad for both business and 
labor. Over the past 5 years, social con- 
flicts and political uncertainty have in- 
creasingly prevented new investment 
and set back development. 

The second obstacle to growth was 
a series of adverse developments in the 



IBH^I^Ba^ 



lii9i,pe' 

Kfoff 

(fElSalva 



world economy. Beginning in the late 
1970s, the prices of Central America's 
basic export crops plummeted. The price 
of coffee, Central America's single most 
important export, fell more than 26% in 
nominal terms between 1977 and 1980. 
In 1981, the price of cotton — the second 
most important export of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua — fell some 
20% in nominal terms in just 9 months. 
In real terms, after adjusting for infla- 
tion, the decreases were even greater. 

While export revenues were falling, 
import costs were rising. Two of Central 
America's most important imports are 
petroleum and financial capital borrowed 
from hard currency countries. In 1978 
and 1979, the second oil shock almost 
doubled the price of imported oil. And in: 
the 1980s, the higher cost of capital on 
world financial markets increased the 
cost of borrowing to offset falling export- 
revenues. 

The result was shocking economic 
dislocation. To take an extreme but vital 
example, the amount of coffee required 
to buy one barrel of oil went from 5 
pounds in 1977 to almost 26 pounds in 
1981. Overall, the shift in terms of tradefi!awarfer( 
meant that Costa Rica, for example, 
would have had to export 70% more justJTnofveiil 
to pay for the same imports as 3 years 
before. 

Local government policy responses 
to these changes were often slow or in- 
appropriate. This led to capital flight, in- 
creased foreign debt, and controls that 
further sapped economic vitality. The 
Central American Common Market 
weakened rapidly as its members' 
economies grew more protectionist. No 
Central American nation escaped the 
general decline. Even democratic Costa 
Rica, which faced fewer of the political 
and social challenges prevalent else- 
where in the region, went into a deep 
slump. Until 1980, Costa Rica's real 
growth had averaged more than 6% per 
year — the highest in the region. Last 
year, economic activity in Costa Rica 
declined by 9%. 

El Salvador's economy contracted 
even faster. The reason is that El 
Salvador has been hit hardest by the 
third, and in many ways the most 
debilitating, factor in Central America's 
economic decline: the disruptions caused|ui 
by guerrilla warfare. 

In a nation where safe drinking 
water is scarce, guerrillas have 
destroyed water pumping stations and 
the transmission towers that carry the 
energy to run them. They have 
destroyed 55 of the country's 260 
bridges and damaged many more. In 
1982 alone, the guerrillas destroyed oveilit 



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Central 



lorejB 



200 buses. Less than half the rolling 
stock of the railways remains opera- 
tional. 

In a nation where overpopulation is 
endemic, regular employment is scarce, 
and capital investment must be nur- 
tured, guerrilla attacks have forced the 
closing of factories, the abandonment of 
farms, and the displacement of 
thousands of workers. One out of eight 
of El Salvador's most productive land 
reform cooperatives is either abandoned 
or operating only sporadically. 

The human costs have been enor- 
mous. On the average, every man, 
woman, and child in El Salvador is one- 
third poorer today than 4 years ago. 
During the off-season, agricultural 
anemployment now reaches 40%. In 
1981, El Salvador was able to import 
3nly two-thirds as much by volume as in 
1977. Critical imports such as fertilizers 
and even medicines have been cut back 
sharply. And to maintain even this 
"educed level of foreign purchases, its 
;entral bank has had to increase net bor- 
•Qwings by almost $300 million. 

The negative repercussions of guer- 
illa warfare have been felt throughout 
.he region. Some investors are now 
-vary of ventures anywhere in Central 
\merica. Even the area's most stable 
;ountries, Honduras and Costa Rica, are 
osing investment that would prove 
lighly profitable in any other psycho- 
[ogical climate. 

The U.S. Response 

The United States is working hard to 
aelp the Central Americans overcome 
(ach of these obstacles and resume 
'conomic growth. 

First, to combat social tensions and 
he long-term instability of dictatorships, 
vhether of the right or the left, we are 
upporting democratic politics and 
'eform. Democracy gives people a stake 
a peaceful development. And it pro- 
notes the stability investors need to 
Ian ahead, confident that the future is 
jss likely to hold arbitrary shifts in 
Covernment policies or sudden outbreaks 
If civil strife. 

El Salvador's elected Constituent 
issembly has, for example, twice ex- 
nded land reform legislation in 
esponse to popular demand; 500,000 
■alvadorans have now benefited directly 
rom the land reform. Substantial uncer- 
ainties and some real problems remain, 
ut yields are beginning to increase 
gain. Output per cultivated acre of El 
alvador's four basic grain crops was 
lore than 2.5% higher this year than 
ist year; coffee yields were up 3%, 
igar 5%, and cotton 11%. And by 
eveloping a rural middle class, with 



anuary 1984 



money to spend locally, land reform 
should provide an indispensable base for 
greater national output and employ- 
ment. 

Second, to help cushion adverse 
developments in the world economy and 
to complement local policy reforms, we 
have increased bilateral economic 
assistance and devised new forms of 
cooperation. 

Since 1980, we have tripled our 
direct bilateral economic assistance to 
Central America. Eighty-one cents of 
every dollar of U.S. aid to Central 



policies will achieve little if the security 
situation keeps them from working. 
There can be no growth if either 
businessmen or their workers have to 
fear for their lives. The killers— whether 
they are leftwing guerrillas or rightwing 
death squads— must be stopped. 

As concerns directly economic mat- 
ters, a great deal depends on the ability 
of our friends in Central America to 
design policies that will go beyond im- 
mediate needs and improve conditions 
for long-term development. 

But we can— and must— help. 



Eighty-one cents of every dollar of U.S. aid to 
Central America during the fiscal year just con- 
cluded was devoted to economic goals, including 
both emergency support and development 
assistance. 



America during the fiscal year just con- 
cluded was devoted to economic goals, 
including both emergency support and 
development assistance. And to facilitate 
both internal adjustments and external 
capital flows, we are encouraging close 
cooperation between individual countries 
and the International Monetary Fund 
and the development banks. 

We estimate that all our economic 
assistance to El Salvador since 1980 
does not fully offset the damage inflicted 
by the guerrillas. But it is making the 
critical difference between hope and 
despair. 

Third, to counter guerrilla violence 
and economic warfare, we are providing 
military assistance. Behind that shield, 
people can work and economies function. 

Since June, for example, the 
Salvadoran Government has been mak- 
ing a special effort to restore govern- 
ment services in two provinces (San 
Vicente and Usulutan) where guerrilla 
activity has disrupted coffee, cotton, 
livestock, and dairy farming. Despite 
renewed guerrilla harrassment, this 
operation is helping 25 of El Salvador's 
largest farm cooperatives to resume 
more normal operations. Forty-two 
schools and twelve health centers have 
been opened. More than 1,000 displaced 
families have returned to their farms. 

Guidelines for the Future 

What does the future hold? The answer, 
of course, depends partly in develop- 
ments that have nothing to do with 
economics as such. The best economic 



Economic development in Central 
America is in the national interest of 
the United States— but not, let me make 
it clear, because of any large U.S. 
corporate investments. At the end of 
last year, total U.S. private investment 
in Central America was less than 
$1 billion. That is less than half of 1% of 
U.S. investment abroad. Our national in- 
terest in Central America is founded 
more broadly on the peace and prosperi- 
ty of our neighbors. And that is a goal 
worth spending money on, even a lot of 
money. 

So it is not surprising that many 
Americans have recently been talking 
about a "Marshall Plan" for Central 
America. Our interests will be served as 
much by peace and prosperity in Central 
America as they were by the reconstruc- 
tion of Europe after World War II. 

The term "Marshall Plan," of course, 
should not be taken literally. The 
analogy between postwar Europe and 
present-day Central America is less than 
precise. Postwar Europe faced problems 
of reconstruction, not of long-term 
development or ongoing conflict. And 
Europe had a large pool of trained man- 
power with a long industrial tradition. 
Massive infusions of capital were 
therefore quickly usable in postwar 
Europe. The problems of Central 
America are different. 

But if the term "Marshall Plan" is 
used as a way to emphasize the high 
priority we must give to Central 



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



America, it is consistent with our think- 
ing—and with what we are now doing. 
Central America needs relatively high 
levels of assistance. It needs them now 
and perhaps for some years to come. It 
needs them for both development and 
defense. And it needs them to restore 
destroyed or deteriorated assets. 

As the region recovers its balance, 
however, it will be important that Cen- 
tral America's economies not succumb to 
the tendency of some developing 
economies to adjust to large inflows of 
capital in ways that create permanent 
dependence. 

Looking to the future, then, I would 
suggest five considerations for determin- 
ing realistic economic policies toward 
Central America after the present 
emergency. 

The first is the one I just men- 
tioned: the need to avoid impairing the 
region's capacity to grow on a self- 
sustaining basis. Massive foreign aid can 
reduce the incentives for domestic sav- 
ing. It can help maintain artificial ex- 
change rates that discourage domestic 
investment. And the necessarily large 
role of governments in using foreign aid 
can also inflate the size of the public sec- 
tor at the expense of more dynamic 
private enterprise. 

Nicaragua provides a concrete il- 
lustration of how the wrong policies can 
foster dependence and undermine pro- 
ductivity. After July 1979, Nicaragua 
benefited from unprecedented levels of 
economic assistance— more than $500 
million each year from 1980 through 
1982. During the Sandinistas' first 22 
months in power, the United States was 
Nicaragua's single largest bilateral donor 
of assistance. Yet despite an initial 
growth spurt in 1979 and 1980, the 
Nicaraguan economy is now declining 
rapidly. The Nicaraguan Government no 
longer publishes timely statistics, but the 
indications are that the rapid growth of 
the nationalized sector has led to 
disastrous losses in production. 
Moreover, little has been done to 
develop the productive activities needed 
to sustain Nicaragua's literacy and 
public health programs. Arturo Cruz, a 
former member of the revolutionary 
junta and once also the head of 
Nicaragua's Central Bank, has concluded 
that "Nicaragua is condemned to be an 
international beggar." 

A second consideration is that 
private investment, not official aid, is 
the key to long-term growth. And to be 
self-sustaining, most of the investment 
must come from domestic resources. 
Adequate incentives for people to pro- 
duce, save, and invest are the heart of 
effective policies for sustained growth. 

Political stability is a prerequisite for 



. 1 iJHmMUUuuniuuBa 



a business environment conducive to 
private investment. Open markets, an 
equitable and efficient tax system, sound 
monetary and foreign exchange policies, 
and a government commitment to en- 
courage new enterprises are also impor- 
tant. And sound government policies 
and nondiscriminatory legal procedures 
can attract foreign investment, 
technology, and know-how to increase 
Central America's international com- 
petitiveness. 

A third consideration is the distribu- 
tion of investment. My own conviction is 
that industry should be developed, but 
not at the expense of agriculture. In 
country after country, an increasingly 
productive agricultural sector has 
proved to be the force driving economic 
growth. 

Central America's own record makes 
the point. For the most part. Central 
America has been highly successful in 
selling its agricultural goods to the 
world market: coffee, cotton, sugar, 
bananas. Without disturbing the produc- 
tion of agricultural exports, the Central 
Americans can also increase their in- 
dustrial exports. 

This brings me to a fourth con- 
sideration: International trade is key to 
Central America's future growth. 

Central America enjoys a similar 
resource base and shorter transportation 
lines to major markets than the five 
members of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The 
ASEAN nations have had an average 
growth rate of about 6% over the last 
decade. With the exception of the 
Singapore city-state, the ASEAN na- 
tions are, like Central America, engaged 
mainly in agriculture and the production 
of basic commodities. But unlike the 
Central American Common Market, they 
have fostered growth through open 
markets and exports combined with 
cooperative economic policies and joint 
industrial projects. The experience of 
the ASEAN nations confirms what com- 
mon sense suggests — that the Central 
American nations should also be able to 
compete effectively in world markets. 

My fifth and final thought is that we 
should do more to help meet the basic 
human needs of the people of Central 
America and the Caribbean. On a world 
scale, these are "middle-income" coun- 
tries. But continued technical assistance 
and other forms of cooperation in 
health, education, and population are 
still essential. Indeed, because they are 
our neighbors, the grounds for a special 
U.S. effort are strong. 



The CBI— A Model for Sound Policy 

On February 24, 1982, President 
Reagan proposed a "long-term commit- 
ment to the countries of the Caribbean 
and Central America to make use of the 
magic of the market of the Americas to 
earn their own way toward self- 
sustaining growth." 

The Congress agreed, and 18 
months later, on August 5, 1983, the 
President signed the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act which created 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative— the CBI. 

By harnessing normal market forces 
to foster a trade and growth pattern ap- 
propriate to the region, the CBI is 
designed to attract capital and create 
employment opportunities on a lasting 
basis. It is an approach that creates op- 
portunities without dependence. 
Specifically, the CBI provides the folloW' 
ing opportunities. 

• A one-way free trade area that 
eliminates duties on all Caribbean Basin 
products except for limited product ex- 
ceptions specified in advance. There are 
also local content requirements to 
stimulate maximum use of local 
resources and to prevent the 
passthrough of other countries' exports, ft 

• The CBI also provides for tax 
deductibility of expenses incurred by 
U.S. citizens and companies for conven- 
tions held in the Caribbean Basin. This 
tax provision is a practical incentive for 
investment in tourism and will take ef- 
fect as nations negotiate tax informa- 
tion-sharing agreements with the U.S. 
Treasury. 



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To be designated as a beneficiari^' of 
the trade provisions, a country must 
meet certain criteria. Among the man- 
datory criteria are: a clean expropriatior 
record, curtailment of unauthorized 
government rebroadcasting of U.S. films 
and programs, and cooperation on nar- 
cotics matters. Other criteria include 
respect for labor freedoms, economic 
self-help measures, and protection of in 
tellectual property and trademarks. 

The President is receiving reports o^w 
teams organized by the U.S. Special 
Trade Representative and the Depart- 
ment of State on how each Caribbean 
Basin country fulfills these standards. 
He is expected to designate the first 
CBI beneficiaries next week. After com- 
pletion of additional discussions now 
underway, he will probably designate a 
second group of nations before 
Christmas. 'The 12-year free trade provi- W( 
sions will go into effect a month from 
now, on January 1. 

I should like to highlight two aspect 
of this legislation. 

First, the CBI represents a truly 



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



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bipartisan and even international con- 
sensus on what can and should be done. 
The CBI was endorsed by every living 
former Secretary of State, both 
Democratic and Republican. Congres- 
sional approval was secured by a strong 
bipartisan coalition. Your represen- 
tatives from Louisiana, incidentally, con- 
tributed very ably to making this possi- 
ble. And the CBI benefited greatly from 
the expert advice of U.S. business 
leaders, including your president here at 
the International Trade Mart, Harvey 
Koch. 

The leaders of the Caribbean Basin 
countries also contributed their unique 
understanding of the problems of 
development. For years, experts have 
been saying that what our neighbors 
wanted and needed most was "trade not 
aid." That we are finally making that 
concept a reality is due in no small 
neasure to the counsel and persistence 
)f men such as Prime Minister Seaga of 
lamaica and President Monge of Costa 
^ica. 

Second, the CBI marks the first 
ime that the United States has granted 
)referential economic treatment to an 
mtire geographic region. And it does so 
lot on the basis of traditional bilateral 
lid but by providing long-term incen- 
ives to private enterprise. The CBI will 
ast 12 years, long enough for its incen- 
ives to influence the market and for 
lusinessmen to factor them into sound 
nvestment decisions that are good for 
hem and good for the host nation. 
Cvery investor can have confidence that, 
or the life of the CBI, whatever he pro- 
luces in the region — with the few excep- 
ions specified in advance — will be able 
enter the United States duty free. 

We are often asked what the CBI 
vill mean in concrete terms, in dollars 
,nd cents. Some immediate benefits can, 
if course, be calculated. For instance, in 
982 the United States imported about 
»600 million in dutiable goods from the 
Caribbean Basin, about half of it from 
Central America; these duties will not 
ave to be paid in the future. 

But the answer is that we cannot 
et assign a dollar value to the CBI. The 
irogram is not a giveaway; it is a net- 
rork of opportimities and incentives 
'nat we hope U.S. and foreign investors 
all put to maximum use. The U.S. 
overnment has put together a sound 
Togram. But it is up to the leaders of 
16 nations of the Caribbean Basin to 
evelop conditions leading to increased 
'ade and investment in their nations, 
nd in the last analysis, it is up to the 
,|, asinessmen of the region, including 
S. businessmen, to determine whether 



they want to take advantage of the op- 
portunities so created. I think they will. 
I believe that they, you, and the region 
are too dynamic to let such an oppor- 
tunity go unheeded. 

Conclusion 

The United States is now on the road to 
a sustained economic recovery; most 
other industrialized nations are not far 
behind. The Caribbean Basin, which is 
so close and so important to the United 
States, must share fully in this recovery. 

The framework for growth is clear. 
Our neighbors can avoid dependency, 
strengthen their private sectors, develop 
agriculture as well as industry, and in- 
crease their foreign trade. In turn, the 
United States can ensure the availability 
of American markets and enterprise and 



cooperate to better meet their peoples' 
basic human needs. 

The key to establishing this dynamic 
is freedom— freedom from outside in- 
tervention; freedom from tyranny; and 
freedom to create. As President Reagan 
said in his September 1981 speech to the 
IMF and World Bank: 

Only when the human spirit is allowed to 
invent and create, only when individuals are 
given a personal stake in deciding economic 
policies and benefiting from their suc- 
cess—only then can societies remain 
economically alive, dynamic, prosperous, pro- 
gressive, and free. 

That is our goal: neighbors who are 
both free and independent. The CBI is a 
key step toward achieving economic and 
political cooperation, securely founded 
on peaceful development. ■ 



The Political Economy of the 
Caribbean Basin 



by Kenneth W. Dam 

Address before the seventh annual 
Conference on Trade, Investment and 
Development in the Caribbean Basin, 
Miami, Florida, on December 2, 198S. 
Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State. 

Is Our Unity of Purpose Enough? 

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of 
Dominica, who also spoke yesterday 
evening, last year recalled to this con- 
ference the words of the second Presi- 
dent of the United States: 

The Commerce of the West Indies islands 
is part of the American System of Com- 
merce. They can neither do without us nor 
we without them. . . . We have the means of 
assisting each other and politicians and artful 
contrivances cannot separate us. 

The force of John Adams' vision is 
manifest here today. Miami is a great 
center of Caribbean life. And this 
meeting is the seventh in what has 
become a major forum for leaders of the 
modern Caribbean to exchange ex- 
periences and learn from each other. 

Yet I wonder if even President 
Adams foresaw the depth of the inter- 
relationships among us today. At the 
end of the 18th century, our contacts 
took place within relatively simple pat- 
terns. The burning issues of the day- 
mercantilism, colonialism, slavery — 
were discussed mainly among a relative 
handful, by men like Adams himself, or 



Alexander Hamilton, who was born in 
Nevis in the eastern Caribbean. 

Today, we are all part of a much 
more complex and dynamic global 
economy. The issues we face are as 
burning as ever, but they have 
multiplied. And freedom has enabled all 
our citizens to debate them, including 
over a million people from the Caribbean 
who now live and work in the United 
States. 

Despite all the changes, John 
Adams' basic message holds: we must 
develop the means to assist each other, 
and we must ensure that the artful con- 
trivances of politicians work for us, and 
not against us. 

I need not belabor to this audience 
the importance our governments assign 
to our cooperation. We are working for 
democracy and economic progress. We 
are strengthening diplomacy and 
shielding our citizens through effective 
security cooperation. These are prin- 
ciples that we have developed together. 
Even more importantly, they are prin- 
ciples we are implementing together. 

So the central question, at least for 
this audience, is not what we are doing, 
but how we are doing. Is what we are 
doing working, and if not, what is still 
lacking? 

Gravity of the Problems We Face 

Perhaps the first point to make is that 
the problems we face are serious, prbb- 



i|.ij anuary 1984 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



ably a great deal more serious than we 
sometimes admit. 

This conference is designed to pro- 
mote trade, investment, and develop- 
ment. The potential is clear, but the 
brutal fact is that all three are in trou- 
ble. The terms of trade have recently 
been running against the Caribbean's 
traditional exports — sugar, bananas, 
rum, spices, oil, coffee, bauxite, cotton, 
and nickel. Without exception, these 
products have seen their real purchasing 
power fall, in some cases dramatically. 
In a key part of the Caribbean 
Basin— Central America— political 
upheaval and guerrilla warfare have in- 
hibited investment and encouraged 
capital flight. And after a generation of 
sustained progress, 1983 will be the 
second straight year of zero growth for 
the basin as a whole. 

Nor are the problems we face purely 
economic. Our model of development is 
based on freedom. It combines represen- 
tative democracy and free enterprise 
with a state capable of providing funda- 
mental services, setting public goals, and 
ensuring the rights and safety of all its 
citizens. Today this vision is under grave 
pressures from left and right. 
Unemployment curdles the hopes of 
urban youth both on the islands and on 
the mainland. Emigration robs countries 
of workers and entrepreneurs. Instabili- 
ty disrupts lives and plans. And while 
democracy is our common banner, it is 
sometimes honored more in speeches 
than in practice. 

And there is more. An alternative 
model has emerged. It is a model whose 
advocates add the persuasion of the gun 
to the illusions created by the frustra- 
tions in our societies. Cuba knows 
neither freedom nor prosperity. It is 
neither a democratic alternative, nor a 
model for anything worth calling 
development. Yet though Castro has 
failed to break Cuba's dependence on 
sugar and one-man rule, he has added a 
new and dangerous dependence on 
Soviet military power. In President 
Adams' imagery, Cuba is a contrivance 
bent on separating us. 

What we found in Grenada unveiled 
the professional military realities behind 
Cuban "economic" assistance and "con- 
struction workers." We found five secret 
treaties— three with the Soviet Union, 
one with North Korea, and one with 
Cuba — under which these communist 
countries were secretly to donate, 
through Cuba, military equipment in 
amounts without precedent for a popula- 
tion of 110,000. We found artillery, anti- 
aircraft weapons, armored personnel 
carriers, and rocket launchers. We found 
thousands of rifles, thousands of fuses, 
' ' ''"^"' • "'i millions of rounds of 



ammunition. We found communications 
gear and cryptographic devices. We 
found Grenadians imprisoned and tor- 
tured under Cuban supervision. We 
found agreements authorizing the secret 
presence of Cuban military advisers, 
some of them on a "permanent" basis. 

Today, we can take heart that the 
Grenadian people and even some of 
Grenada's Government leaders were not 
cowed by the spurious Cuban alter- 
native. We can rightfully congratulate 
ourselves that Grenada is back on a 
democratic course together with the rest 
of the eastern Caribbean community. 

But that achievement— and it is a 
major achievement— must not distract 
us from two basic issues. 

First, we must follow through— in 



Grenada, in El Salvador, and throughout 
the Caribbean Basin. We must help en- 
sure that democracy works and is 
accompanied by genuine economic 
progress. 

And second, we must help 
Nicaragua, where Cuba's presence is 
more than 10 times what it was in 
Grenada. The Sandinistas must 
recognize the dangers of dictatorship, in- 
tervention, and militarization. Nicaragua 
must return to the original goals of the 
democratic revolution against the 
Somoza dictatorship. 

Our Response Is Sound 

Our response to this generalized crisis is 
sound. As President Reagan told a 



CBI Recipients Designated 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS. 
NOV. 30. 1983' 

Pursuant to Section 212 of the Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). I 
wish to inform you of my intent to designate 
the following eleven Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries and entities as beneficiaries of the 
trade-liberalizing measures provided for in 
this Act: Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama, 
Netherlands Antilles, Saint Lucia, Saint Vin- 
cent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Saint Christopher-Nevis. 
Designation will entitle the products of said 
countries, except for products excluded 
statutorily, to duty-free treatment for a 
period beginning on January 1, 1984 and end- 
ing on September 30, 1995. As beneficiaries, 
these eleven also have the opportunity to 
become eligible for the convention expense 
tax deduction under Section 274(h) of the In- 
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, by entering in- 
to an exchange of information agreement 
with the United States on tax matters. 

Designation is an important step for 
these countries in their battle to revitalize 
and rebuild their weakened economies. 
Designation is also significant because it is 
further tangible evidence of the constructive 
cooperation between the United States and 
the peoples and governments of the Carib- 
bean Basin. 

My decision to designate the group of 
eleven flows out of discussions held between 
this Administration and potential beneficiary 
countries and entities regarding the designa- 
tion criteria set forth in Section 212 of the 
("BK;RA. Our discussions with the eleven 
began rapidly and were concluded last month. 
However, active and constructive discussions 
are underway with other potential 
beneficiaries, and I hope to designate a 
number of additional countries in the near 
future. 



The eleven countries have demonstrated 
to my satisfaction that their laws, practices 
and policies are in conformity with the 
designation criteria of the CBERA. The 
governments of these countries and entities 
have communicated on these matters by let- 
ter with Secretary of State Shultz and Am- 
bassador Brock [TJ.S. Trade Representative 
William Brock] and in so doing have indicate' 
their desire to be designated as beneficiaries 
(copies of the letters are attached). On the 
basis of the statements and assurances in 
these letters, and taking into account infor- 
mation developed by United States Em- 
bassies and through other sources. I have 
concluded that the objectives of the Ad- 
ministration and the Congress with respect t 
the statutory designation criteria of the 
CBERA have been met. 

I am mindful that under Section 213(B) 
(2) of the CBERA, I retain the authority to 
suspend or withdraw CBERA benefits from 
any designated beneficiary country if a 
beneficiary's laws, policies or practices are ni 
longer in conformity with the designation 
criteria. The United States will keep abreast 
of developments in the beneficiary countries 
and entities which are pertinent to the 
designation criteria. 

This Administration looks forward to 
working closely with its fellow governments 
in the Caribbean Basin and with the private 
sectors of the United States and Basin coun- 
tries to ensure that the wide-ranging oppor- 
tunities opened by the CBERA are fully 
utilized. 

Sincerely, 



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'Text of identical letters addressed to 
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.. Speaker of the Housi 
of Representatives, and (ieorge Bush. Presi- 
dent of the Senate (text from White House 
press release). ■ 



Deoartment of State Bullet! '*>„„«, 



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



special Joint Session of Congress last 
April 27, U.S. policy toward Central 
-America and the Caribbean has four in- 
erlocking elements: 



ite 



I First, to actively support 
democracy, reform, and human 
freedom against dictators and would- 
be dictators of both left and right. 

That means that our relations are 
especially close with a Barbados, a Costa 
Rica, or a Dominica— with countries 
where democracy is practiced in full. It 
also means that we repudiate and op- 
pose those who deal in death and in- 
timidation. The death squads and their 
Dackers in El Salvador and Guatemala 
ire enemies of democracy every bit as 
•nuch as the guerrillas and their Cuban 
ind Soviet sponsors. Somoza's dictator- 
ship in Nicaragua, and the pre-1979 
Mongoose Gang" in Grenada, helped 
Dave the way for the Marxist-Leninists 
md their violence. If we are to con- 
;ribute to stability and lasting peace, we 
nust help leaders who will oppose 
/■iolence and dictatorship, who will work 
br law and democracy. 

The second element of U.S. policy 
s to promote economic recovery 
vithin a framework of sound growth 
ind equitable development. We have 
nore than doubled U.S. bilateral 
iconomic assistance and adopted the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) on 
vhich so many of you have worked. 
These measures will not in themselves 
lOlve the economic crisis but they are a 
najor beginning. And they are not tem- 
)orary measures. The CBI trade provi- 
ions to take effect in January will 
Irespifemain in place until 1996. 

Third, the United States is com- 
nitted to fostering dialogue and 
legotiations— a dialogue of democracy 
vithin countries and a diplomacy of 
legotiations among nations willing to 
ive at peace. We believe elections freely 
onducted can help end the internal war- 
are in El Salvador and Nicaragua. We 
lope the nine countries engaged in the 
^lontadora process will achieve their ob- 
ectives of democratization, demilitariza- 
ion, an end to subversion, and the 
vithdrawal of foreign military forces 
ind advisers. 
[ Fourth, the United States will pro- 
ide a security shield against violence 
ind intimidation. Those who are 
genuinely committed to democratization, 
ievelopment, and diplomacy will find 
,)i,#RE*t jj^j. ^g ^j,g g^eadfast allies. 



of* "" 



,l,ileflo«« 



Hois mportance of Private Sector 



repeat, this four-part policy is sound. 
Ve see many indications that it is begin- 



)anuary 1984 



ning to work. And we believe that the 
economic recovery now underway in the 
United States will help to reactivate the 
economies of our neighbors in the Carib- 
bean Basin. 

The daunting problems we face, 



Nicaragua 



SECRETARY SHULTZS 
LETTER TO 
THE CONGRESS, 
OCT. 18, 19831 

Last month the nine governments par- 
ticipating in the Contadora discussions 
agreed on a document of twenty-one ob- 
jectives that could serve as the basis for 
a negotiated settlement in the region. 
The objectives include respect for 
democratic pluralism and reciprocal and 
verifiable commitments to end assistance 
to armed opposition forces. 

I believe Nicaragua's acceptance of 
the document of objectives is an indica- 
tion that the Sandinista regime may 
ultimately reconsider its pervasive in- 
tervention in the region. The growth of 
the Nicaraguan opposition, a manifesta- 
tion of the unpopularity of four years of 
Sandinista repression at home and in- 
tervention abroad, is contributing impor- 
tantly to this possibility. 

I therefore believe it is essential that 
the House of Representatives not enact 
provisions in the Intelligence Authoriza- 
tion bill that would give the Sandinistas 
a unilateral assurance that the United 
States will withhold support from the 
Nicaraguan resistance movement. In my 
judgment, such an action would virtually 
destroy the prospect that Nicaragua 
may agree to reciprocal and verifiable 
agreements to end assistance to all guer- 
rilla forces operating in this region. 

The Administration's policies to help 
bring peace in Central America are now 
beginning to bear fruit. I urge the 
House not to impose restrictions on this 
policy and thereby undermine the cause 
of peace and democracy that we all 
support. 

Sincerely yours. 



George P. Shultz 



•Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill Jr.. Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Minority Leader Robert 
H. Michel (text made available to news cor- 
respondents by Department spokesman John 
Hughes). ■ 



however, demand special efforts from 
everyone, particularly those of you in 
the private sector. The CBI is a special 
response to the problem of economic 
dislocation and long-term growth in our 
hemisphere. But if it is to work, 
businessmen and entrepreneurs of our 
entire community must take advantage 
of the opportunities it creates. The 
President's policy, of which the CBI is a 
part, is designed to provide the max- 
imum assistance and to assure the max- 
imum freedom to the nations of the 
region. But again, it will take more than 
government policies to bring about the 
peaceful, democratic future we all seek. 

The private sector, of course, is 
already doing a great deal. Despite 
heavy national debt burdens, Costa 
Rican and Jamaican entrepreneurs are 
maintaining their dynamism. In Hon- 
duras, where a real external military 
threat might cause others to run, pro- 
duction and employment remain active 
and firmly focused on the future. In El 
Salvador, despite a relentless guerrilla 
campaign against the economy, 
businessmen are busy rebuilding and 
planning for the future. And in 
Nicaragua, the private sector is strug- 
gling to preserve its identity, its voca- 
tion, its ability to produce. 

But more must be done. Social 
welfare and political stability are not the 
province of governments alone. Govern- 
ments can set a framework; they cannot 
produce prosperity. And in a free- 
market system where the importance of 
the individual is properly understood 
and appreciated, stability and social 
progress originate in economic life. 

It is up to all of us — small 
businessmen as well as politicians, 
bankers as well as labor leaders — to 
work for consensus and unity where 
there is discord and fragmentation; to 
work for progress where the forces of 
the past seek to halt forward movement 
or to reverse it; most of all, to preserve 
freedom, so that political systems can 
better serve the needs of all: producer 
and consumer, investor and employee, 
manager and laborer. 

By establishing more decent, pro- 
gressive, and forward-looking societies, 
we can give the lie to the counterfeit 
alternatives. 

The Need for Training for Democracy 

The message of Grenada is clear. Most 
people want to run their own affairs, to 
enjoy a measure of prosperity in an at- 
mosphere of democracy and peace. They 
are not interested in Marxist-Leninist 



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



litanies or in dubious alliances with those 
bent on the spread of communism and 
its destructive orthodoxy. 

Many will understand the message 
of Grenada. But some will not. And 
many of those who do not will be 
relatively well educated, even relatively 
prosperous. Often they will be middle- 
class youths who see injustice, poverty, 
and despair and vow to bring about 
change. If such persons do not find 
democratic outlets — peaceful yet effec- 
tive means to pursue legitimate political 
aims— some of them will turn to violent 
alternatives. And some of them will in- 
evitably be seduced by the false 
promises of Soviet/Cuban rhetoric. 

We believe that Grenada demon- 
strates just how intrusive and single- 
minded communist-bloc "assistance" 
is — and how very long on guns and how 
short on butter. We believe the Soviet 
Ambassador was articulating a simple 
and devastating truth when he told 
Prime Minister Bishop that the Soviet 
Union gives away guns but never fer- 
tilizer. And we have learned that the 
guns may ultimately be turned on those 
who originally sought them. But some 
others may not learn. They may not 
have the facts. Or they may ignore 
them. Or they may interpret them dif- 
ferently. If so, they will repeat the 
mistakes of Maurice Bishop. 

Now is the time for us — the officials 
and private citizens of the democratic 
countries— to tackle this problem at its 
root. The CBI is capturing the imagina- 
tion and energy of entrepreneurs and 
people in business. But what about the 
youth? They are the ones who will shape 
the future. We must prove to them that 
an unjust status quo is not good enough 
for us, either. 

Cuban propaganda is already attack- 
ing the CBI, saying that it is only an ex- 
cuse to obtain lower cost labor and in- 
crease exploitation. That propaganda 
can be proved wrong. It can be proved 
wrong with statistics and sound 
economic theory. But above all, it must 
be proved wrong politically. The answer 
is to combine the investments made 
under the CBI with investments in 
people. 

This is not hollow rhetoric. It is cold, 
hard reality. Direct investment in 
people— in future leaders, in education 
and training, in international exchanges 



to foster political skills — is a critical 
area. We all know that, but our adver- 
saries are doing something about it. 

Let me cite something I find shock- 
ing. U.S. Government scholarships for 
Caribbean youths have been slowly but 
steadily reduced through failure to keep 
up with inflation. Yet between 1972 and 
1982 Soviet scholarships for a handful of 
Central American and Caribbean coun- 
tries rose over 500%— to nearly 4,000. 
Even more revealing is the urgency and 
persistence with which Caribbean 
leaders — from governments, political 
parties, universities, and the private sec- 
tor — have brought this situation to our 
attention. They argue that democracy, 
like any other process, can be the sub- 
ject of education, promotion, and 
vigorous defense. 

We have begun to respond. Presi- 
dent Reagan provided a global 
framework for this concept in his ad- 
dress to the British Parliament on 
June 8, 1982, when he announced the in- 
tention of the United States to make a 
major effort to help ". . . foster the in- 
frastructure of democracy . . . which 
allows a people to choose their own way, 
to develop their own culture, to reconcile 
their own differences through peaceful 
means." 

Last month Congress agreed to sup- 
port and fund a National Endowment 
for Democracy. The endowment, a 
nongovernmental, nonprofit organiza- 
tion, guided by the two major political 
parties— the U.S. Chamber of Com- 
merce and the AFL-CIO— was created 
to "encourage free and democratic in- 
stitutions throughout the world through 
private sector initiatives. ..." At the 
same time, Congress increased funding 
for official educational and exchange ac- 
tivities. 

Like the CBI itself, these develop- 
ments take us beyond immediate crisis 
reactions. They are the beginning of a 
fundamental shift in our assistance 
philosophy. A shift beyond short-term 
bailouts, beyond expensive public-sector 
agency-creation, to the concerted 
development of men and women with 
modern economic, technical, and political 
skills. 

Caribbean/Central American Action 
itself could play a key role in catalyzing 
this shift and making it work. I urge you 
to help the United States to invest in 



people. The U.S. Government has no 
equivalent of the Soviet Union's Patrice 
Lumumba University. I believe it is fit- 
ting that we rely instead on private and 
state colleges and universities. But it is 
abundantly clear that Federal funds for 
foreign student scholarships are not and 
will n-ot be sufficient for them to take 
adequate advantage of our great educa- 
tional resources. There is an urgent 
need for additional sources of funding 
for this purpose — from private enter- 
prise, from foundations, and from the 
universities themselves. 

Our ultimate goal of peace and pros 
perity throughout Central America and 
the Caribbean can only be achieved if 
you, the private sector, instill in your 
policies and promote in your activities a 
vigorous, democratic, and open-minded 
spirit — a spirit capable of attracting 
youth to the side of democracy and free 
enterprise. And that is best done 
through action and training, not slogans 
or unrealized good intentions. 

Summation 

The United States is now on the road U 
sustained economic recovery; most othe 
industrialized nations are not far behind 
The Caribbean Basin, which is so close 
and so important to the United States, 
must share fully in this recovery. 

The framework for progress is cleai 
Our neighbors can avoid dependency, 
strengthen their private sectors, and in- 
crease their foreign trade. The United 
States can ensure the availability of 
American markets and enterprise and 
cooperate to better meet common needs 
Together, we can train a new generatio 
of men and women with the skills to 
carry on. 

The key to establishing this dynami( 
is freedom; freedom from outside in- 
tervention; freedom from tyranny; and 
freedom to create. As President Reagar 
said in his September 1981 speech to thi 
IMF and World Bank: 

Only when the human spirit is allowed tc 
invent and create, only when individuals are 
given a personal stake in deciding economic 
policies and benefiting from their suc- 
cess — only then can societies remain 
economically alive, dynamic, prosperous, pro 
gressive, and free. 



Neei 
Ci 



Lemesa 



terves. 
icontri 



Imria. i 



iftteconf 
MlicyisA 



First, 



Seconii 



That is our goal: neighbors who are 
both free and independent. The CBI is i 
major step forward. So is the National 
Endowment for Democracy. And the 
key is cooperation — cooperation in 
freedom and for freedom. ■ 



Moftl 



from tie 01 
•statteir 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



— j- 



Need for Rule of Law 
n Central America 

' iy James H. Michel 



Dtllf 



seta 



lencv, 



Address at a seminar at the 
University of Virginia Law School in 
'harlottesville on October lU, 1983. 
Mr. Michel is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. 

let me say, first of all, how pleased I 
im to be on the familiar ground of a 
ichool of law, discussing legal aspects of 

foreign policy situation. In part 
)ecause the subject of Central America 
s so extraordinarily complex, public 
iiscussion has not given the role of na- 
ional law the prominent attention it 
leserves. I hope that this symposium 
vill contribute, among other things, to a 
)roader interest and a continuing pro- 
luctive dialogue on the rule of law as a 
)Ositive force in Central America. 

would like to begin by describing the 
general policy framework within which 
he United States is concerned about the 
idministration of justice in Central 
America. And I think the most helpful 
ipproach is to identify what the Ad- 
nlnistration holds to be the root causes 
>f the conflict and to describe how our 
)olicy is designed to address them. 

The nations of Central America face 
)roblems that have three basic dimen- 
,s. 

First, there is a political 
locioeconomic dimension, rooted in the 
raditions of oligarchic and military rule, 
ften accompanied by repression of the 
general population. 

Second, a massive, economic 
lislocation caused by a world recession 
las depressed the prices of traditional 
xport commodities at a time when costs 
if imported oil have multiplied and in- 
erest rates have increased dramatically. 

Third, Cuban and Soviet support for 
xtremist forces centered in Nicaragua 
,nd commited to violent revolution 
hroughout Central America has exacer- 
lated and sustained violent conflict. 

All of these things are occurring 
imultaneously. No single dimension of 
he problem can be resolved in isolation 
rom the others. U.S. policy, therefore, 
nust attempt to deal with the situation 
n a comprehensive way. The strategy 
ve have designed includes mutually sup- 
)orting actions in four broad areas: 

Support for the strengthening of 



8ulieli' 



democratic institutions and respect for 
human rights; 

• Economic development — including 
financial and technical assistance — en- 
couragement of structural reforms, and 
trade incentives such as the recently 
enacted Caribbean Basin Initiative; 

• Diplomatic support for negotia- 
tions among countries for regional solu- 
tions to regional issues and support for 
dialogue and reconciliation within coun- 
tries through democratic processes; and 

• A security shield consisting of 
training, materiel assistance, and deter- 
rence so that efforts at reform and 
development will not be frustrated and 
so that antidemocratic forces will be 
denied the hope of military victory as an 
alternative to constructive negotiations. 

Implementing such a strategy 
necessarily involves difficult judgments 
of balance and emphasis as we seek to 
encourage reforms, strengthen defensive 
capabilities, facilitate negotiations, and 
help rebuild stagnant economies. Par- 
ticular sensitivity to the interdependence 
of these four policy areas is required. 
Just as all the factors that make up the 
problem are present simultaneously, so 
also must all the elements of a solution 
be pursued concurrently. Neglect of any 
one element of our strategy necessarily 
impairs progress on the other elements. 

Of course, there is always room for 
argument that we should be doing more 
of some things and less of others. We 
often feel frustrated and disappointed. 
And the criticisms come from all direc- 
tions. But, on balance, I believe we are 
making encouraging progress. Let me 
cite some examples. 

Examples of Progress 

Our assistance is helping Costa Rica 
weather its economic difficulties without 
damage to its longstanding democratic 
traditions. Our support is also making it 
possible for established institutions in 
Costa Rica — the Center for Elections, 
the national university's law school, the 
Supreme Court's Judicial Training 
School — to help build democracy in 
neighboring countries through programs 
of regional cooperation. 

The Constituent Assembly elected by 
the people of El Salvador in March 1982 
has begun to function as a legislative 
body, making tough political decisions 
through debate and compromise, and in 



lanuary 1984 



light of constituent interests. It has ex- 
tended the land reform program which 
otherwise would have expired in March 
1983. It enacted an amnesty in May 
resulting in the release of about 550 
political prisoners and the surrender of 
about 550 guerrillas and guerrilla sup- 
porters. It is completing action on a new 
constitution under which elections will 
be held early next year. 

Honduras, the poorest country in 
Central America, installed an elected 
civilian government in January 1982. 
That government has been a leader in 
the efforts within Central America to 
find a political settlement for the ten- 
sions in the region. 

Guatemala, still under military rule 
has ended its state of siege, abolished 
secret courts, authorized political party 
activity, and announced elections for 
July 1984. 

On the military front, the Sal- 
vadoran Armed Forces are showing in- 
creased effectiveness, and U.S. training 
has contributed to greater profes- 
sionalism and improved understanding 
of the military's relationship to the 
civilian population. A national campaign 
plan begun in June has restored substan- 
tial farming areas to government con- 
trol. People are returning to their 
homes, and social services destroyed by 
the guerrillas are being restored. 

Honduras has been reassured by the 
participation of U.S. forces in joint exer- 
cises, and Nicaraguan incursions have 
diminished. 

Economic Concerns 

Things are not yet, however, looking 
better from an economic standpoint. 
Economies in the area remain stagnant; 
unemployment remains high; savings 
and investments are low. Much of our 
aid necessarily goes to provide foreign 
exchange, lacking because of reduced ex- 
port earnings. 

But we can take pride in what we 
are doing. We provided the nations of 
Central America more than $600 million 
in economic assistance in the last fiscal 
year. This aid has arrested economic 
deterioration and eased human suffer- 
ing. 

Still, the dramatic improvement we 
seek will depend on the evolution of 
market-oriented, diversified commercial 
activity, based on free trade and invest- 
ment. This is a long-range endeavor, one 
essential to the building of just and 
democratic societies. The recently 
enacted Caribbean Basin Economic 



87 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Recovery Act and the National Bipar- 
tisan Commission on Central America 
are just a beginning. 

The combination of our support for 
political and economic reforms and 
militant' strength to protect them has 
contributed to major advances in 
negotiating efforts. 

Negotiating Efforts 

In July, the Nicaraguan Government, for 
the first time, expressed its willingness 
to engage in negotiations for a regional 
solution and advanced its own peace pro- 
posal. 

Also in July, outlines were put for- 
ward by the other Central American 
countries (Costa Rica, Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala) and by the 
Contadora Four (Mexico, Venezuela, 
Panama, and Colombia). 

Then in early September, the nine 
Foreign Ministers met and agreed on a 
21-point document of objectives that can 
provide the basis for a comprehensive 
agreement. 

Translating these objectives into 
specific, verifiable treaty obligations will 
be a difficult and uncertain process. But 
agreement on a common set of objec- 
tives is a necessary and important 
development. 

And so, for the moment at least and 
on balance, things are looking better in 
Central America. But lasting security, 
social justice, economic progress, and 
democratic political development will 
come only through a sustained effort by 
the people of Central America. And they 
will continue to need our help over the 
long road to peace and stability. 

Administration of Justice 

As we seek to consolidate the gains 
our policy has helped bring about and to 
make further progress in all areas possi- 
ble, national law as a force for stability 
and more just societies becomes ail the 
more evident. No other aspect of 
building a just and democratic society, 
protecting individual rights, and en- 
couraging commercial activity is more 
important than the building of fair and 
effective judicial machinery for the 
resolution of disputes and the maintance 
of public order under the rule of law. 

The state of the administration of 
justice in Central America today reflects 
the varying levels of political and 
economic development in the region. The 
judicial systems of all Hispanic Central 



8B 



American countries suffer from inade- 
quate resources and, with the exception 
of Costa Rica, a lack of judicial 
autonomy. 

An effective and honest judicial 
system is interactive with a strong 
democratic political and social structure. 
Costa Rica, which has evolved a system 
of broad political participation and 
relative equity in the distribution of 
wealth, also enjoys Central America's 
most respected and efficient judicial 
system and is the exception to many of 
the generalizations which can otherwise 
be made about Central American justice. 
By contrast, in Guatemala and El 
Salvador, where political and economic 



power traditionally have been vested in 
a conservative elite, judicial authority 
has been undermined. 

A core deficiency in the administra- 
tion of justice in Central America is the 
lack of judicial independence. Judicial 
appointments are often of brief tenure 
and made on a political basis. According- 
ly, the courts do not command popular 
respect, and the judicial career is 
generally not prestigious. There are few 
programs for training of judges and 
court personnel. The judiciary is poorly 
paid, and the entire legal system is 
severely underfinanced. 

Although these problems exist in 
varying degrees in all areas of judicial 



kastl 
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tUovem 
jfeialaiitl 
Bjykrigli 
datira* 
f»'«tors 
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ke rise of I 
rese 



Theatt 



President Opposes El Salvador 
Certification Legislation 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 30, 19831 

The President today withheld approval 
of H.R. 4042, an enrolled bill that would 
require two Presidential certifications 
regarding El Salvador in 1984 or until 
the enactment of new legislation impos- 
ing conditions on U.S. military 
assistance for that country. 

This Administration is firmly com- 
mitted to the protection of human 
rights, economic and political reforms, 
the holding of elections, and progress in 
prosecuting the cases of murdered 
American citizens in El Salvador. 
However, the process of certification as 
called for in H.R. 4042 would not serve 
to support these endeavors. 

His decision to oppose this certifica- 
tion legislation reflects the Administra- 
tion's policy that such requirements 
distort our efforts to improve human 
rights, democracy, and recovery in El 
Salvador. The key certification provi- 
sions of the present bill are already ad- 
dressed in this year's continuing resolu- 
tion which requires a separate certifica- 
tion on progress in the area of land 
reform and withholds 30% of military 
assistance funds until the Government of 
El Salvador has completed the investiga- 
tion and trial in the churchwomen's case. 

At the same time, the President 
wishes to emphasize that the Ad- 
ministration remains fully committed to 
the support of democracy, reform, and 
human rights in El Salvador. Those very 
concerns are a central component of our 
policy. They were clearly articulated by 
our Ambassador Tom Pickering as 



recently as last Friday. The withholding 
of approval from H.R. 4042 in no way 
reflects a lessening of our interests in 
these critical areas. The President has 
also instructed the Department of State 
to continue to provide the Congress wit 
periodic public reports — the next on 
January 16, 1984 — on the political, 
economic, and military situation in El 
Salvador. 

Working with the leadership of the 
Government of El Salvador, we will 
reconfirm our joint resolve to take 
whatever action is necessary to help the 
Government of El Salvador to end the 
reprehensible activities of the violent 
right as well as the violent left. The 
United States will also work to preserve 
and expand the progress that has been 
achieved in the area of land reform and 
to maintain the momentum toward 
holding open and democratic elections 
next year in accordance with the provi- 
sion of the new constitution being 
prepared in El Salvador's Constituent 
Assembly. 

There must exist a genuine 
awareness, both in the United States as 
well as in El Salvador, that our coun- 
tries' strong and productive relationship 
can only be based on shared values in 
justice and democracy and on concerted 
and sustained efforts to achieve these 
goals. We know that President Alvaro 
Magana of El Salvador shares these 
views, and we will remain in touch on 
developing enhanced efforts that will 
strengthen human rights ties. 



lebarorj 



eneralpul 
vekcoi 



ressurem 

ittorfii 

)ect. 

.%poEt 

aleconi 

onarecha 

Jierians 

impart 

itaininf 

» of del 

overamenl 

gavi 

jtai 

is,frc 

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f&OFialpro; 
^ninconti 
lestoexpr 

SStOK 



■Made by the President's principal deput 
press secretary Larry Speakes (text from 
White House press release). ■ 



*rs'offic 
■arid 



Department of State Bulleti 



;i'(!f!lH't)H17!TTT]ifi,';;t!!«HfiHfHinif)fi!»tItIIimuil:liHi«»il 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



■idffl 



arefej 



ttas 



kepron- 



dministration, they are most acute in 
he criminal justice system, where the 
tate has the strongest interest in deci- 
ions and has, therefore, been most like- 
r to override — or completely bypass — 
idicial authority. Central America's 
lany bright, energetic lawyers are thus 
ot attracted to criminal law as either 
rosecutors or defenders. Victims and 
iw enforcement officials are frequently 
nable to find competent counsel or effi- 
lent, unbiased courtrooms and too often 
jsort to extrajudicial remedies. Thus, 
16 rise of terrorism in Central America, 
hile presenting an additional strain to 
16 legal system, is also, in part, at- 
ibutable to that system's ineffec- 
veness. 

The attitude of the judiciary itself 
as contributed to this negative percep- 
on. Although qualifications for joining 
le bar or judicial appointment are 
linimal, lawyers and jurists are better 
lucated and more aware of the latent 
Dwer of the judicial system than is the 
sneral public. A unified, politically ac- 
ve bar could thus be a force for 
jlitical change. However, associations 
■ attorneys in Central America have 
aditionally been social clubs which 
either control their own profession nor 
■assure the other branches of govern- 
lent for financial resources or political 
spect. 

As political authoritarianism and in- 
rnal economic inequities and exploita- 
on are challenged, however, Central 
mericans are also increasingly aware 
lat impartial justice is fundamental to 
aintaining the institutions and proc- 
ses of democracy. Private groups and 
jvernments throughout the region are 
ji aking a variety of efforts to 
rengthen and modernize their legal 
'Stems, from revising outdated codes to 
iproving investigative techniques to 
itablishing internal mechanisms to 
iview the state of the legal system and 
•omote improvements. 

Progress in addressing systemic 
eaknesses demands local initiatives, in 
jht of local circumstances, legal tradi- 
3ns, and culture. But there is room for 
,r greater regional cooperative efforts 
lan now exist and for appropriate U.S. 
ipport for local and complementary 
igional projects. The United States has 
;en in contact with a number of coun- 
ies to express interest and a will- 
gness to consider proposals to assist 
lem in legal reform efforts. 

The potential participants are both 
)vernments — justice ministries, pros- 
jutors' offices, and the court 
'Stem — and private organizations — bar 
sociations and law faculties. The 



jepiti ^' 



•stfroiii 



gylletiunuary 1984 



primary concerns are in the area of 
criminal law and procedure, but legal 
reform efforts in the region are also ap- 
propriate for code modernization in 
other areas of law, increasing judicial in- 
dependence, court management, profes- 
sional ethics, and the role of the bar and 
strengthening the legal process for 
agrarian reform. 

In our effort to provide aid, we must 
recognize the differences between our 
system based on common law and theirs 
based on civil law and accept that we 
cannot export American models of law 
and procedure. It is also important to 
bear in mind that any country would be 
understandably cautious about foreign 
involvement in matters affecting its 
legal system and sovereign institutions. 
Therefore, a sensitive approach is need- 
ed in addressing legal reform issues, 
cautiously avoiding the errors of past at- 
tempts at one-sided legal reform. 

Assistance, then, cannot ordinarily 
be given in the form of direct guidance, 
but rather should be provided through 
the development of truly cooperative 
programs aimed at helping the Central 
Americans to help themselves. We feel 
that this will best be accomplished by a 
regional approach working through ex- 
isting national and regional institutions 
and making maximum use of Latin 
Americans who have expertise in the 
key areas to be addressed. 

In pursuit of this objective, a U.S. 
interagency team traveled to El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica in 
April. Their purpose was to obtain 
greater insights into the problems af- 
fecting the administration of justice and 
identify possible assistance projects. 

U.S. Assistance 

In Washington, an interagency working 
group on the administration of justice 
was constituted to follow up on our 
policy to assist reform, building on the 
information gathered by the team. The 
group has inaugurated a number of ac- 
tivities and initiatives, concentrating 
primarily at this time on the three coun- 
tries visited in April. 

We have contracted with the UN 
Regional Institute for the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(ILANUD) to facilitate the development 
of specific programs in areas such as the 
acquisition and dissemination of legal 
materials, courts resources, case and 
docket management systems to expedite 
the orderly disposition of cases, the role 
and services of the bar, and enhance- 
ment of legal education. Experts 
employed by ILANUD will work with 
legal reform commissions and other 



bodies that have been established, draw- 
ing from all branches of government, 
the private bar, and the academic 
community. The specific projects, 
therefore, will be "home grown," re- 
sponding to self-identified needs but will 
also benefit from the insights and ex- 
perience of the Latin American experts 
in judicial administration retained by 
ILANUD. 

We have encouraged the organizing 
of regional conferences to address 
various aspects of the legal system and 
have facilitated the attendance at inter- 
national conferences by Central 
American lawyers. Examples include a 
conference to be held next month by the 
Bar Association of Costa Rica on the 
role of the organized bar in the ad- 
ministration of justice and the Canadian 
Bar Association's June conference on 
judicial independence. Other initia- 
tives—including possible Organization of 
American States (OAS) and Inter- 
American Bar Association conferences 
relating to legal reform are in the plan- 
ning stages. 

We are also working on a number of 
educational projects. These include a 
regional program of scholarships for 
graduate study at the University of 
Costa Rica Law School; a regional 
judicial training center; international 
visitor grants for study, consultation, 
and observation in the United States; 
and where feasible, positions in U.S. 
Government-conducted training pro- 
grams. 

In all of these endeavors, we are 
seeking to respond to locally identified 
needs and to stimulate the existing 
desire for improvement in the ad- 
ministration of justice that we have en- 
countered throughout the region. 
Ultimately, the fairness, efficiency, and 
competence of the legal systems on Cen- 
tral America will be determined by Cen- 
tral Americans. 

We can seek to encourage the in- 
volvement of others, such as the OAS, 
the Inter-American Bar Association, and 
other professional groups in the United 
States and elsewhere in the hemisphere. 
We should also consider how cooperative 
efforts between universities and other 
centers of learning can be engaged. It is 
clear that there will be no short-term 
solutions. It is equally clear that these 
efforts must be undertaken to achieve 
and safeguard for the long term the 
evolution of democracy in Central 
America. 

Let me sum up by reiterating that 
we have important interests in Central 
America, and while we have neglected 
the region for too long, we still have an 
opportunity to see the peaceful evolution 
there of democratic states that are 



K Jl »l I I 



TREATIES 



friendly to the United States and that 
provide justice and opportunity for their 
people. Success will require hard work 
over a long time, with attention to all 
dimensions of a complex situation. The 
development of national law and the 
building of legal institutions that assure 
the fair and effective administration of 
justice are essential aspects of this effort 
that deserve attention and support. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on international civil aviation. 
Done at Chicago Dec. 7. 1944. Entered into 
force Apr. 4, 1947. HAS 1591. 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos 
Aires Sept. 24, 1968. Entered in force 
Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Adherence deposited: St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines, Nov. 15, 1983. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft (hijacking). Done at The 
Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force 
Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Nov. 8, 1983. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation 
(sabotage). Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. 
Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Nov. 8, 1983. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
scheduled transatlantic passenger air fares, 
with annexes. Done at Paris Dec. 17, 1982. 
Entered into force Feb. 1, 1983. 
Signatures: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, 
Oct. 13, 1983. 

Child Abduction 

Convention on the civil aspects of interna- 
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague 
Oct. 25, 1980.' 

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Oct. 11, 
1983.2 

Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980.' 
Ratification deposited: Zaire, Oct. 27, 1983. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora, 
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 
1973. Entered into force July 1, 1973. TIAS 
8249. 

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973, on international trade in endangered 



I 



spieces of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). 
Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.' 
Acceptances deposited: Belgium, Oct. 3, 
1983. 

Customs 

International convention on the simplification 
and harmonization of customs procedures, 
with annexes. Signed at Kyoto May 18, 1973. 
Entered into force Sept. 25, 1974. 
Accession deposited: U.S., Oct. 28, 19833 
Enters into force for the U.S.: Jan. 28, 1984. 

Fisheries 

Convention for the conservation of salmon in 

the North Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjavik 

Mar. 2, 1982. 

Ratifications deposited: Canada, Sept. 29, 

1983; Denmark, Jan. 31, 1983;^ Norway, 

May 20,1983. 

Entered into force: Oct. 1, 1983. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1977. 

Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic, 
Mozambique, Nov. 10, 1983. 
Enters into force: Nov. 10, 1984. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374,). Adopted at London 
Nov. 15, 1979. 

Acceptances deposited: Algeria, Oct. 28, 
1983; Brazil, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Gabon, Mozambique, Yemen, (Sanaa). 
Nov. 10, 1983; Cuba, Nov. 3, 1983; Ghana, 
Nov. 14, 1983; Singapore, Nov. 1, 1983; 
Uruguay, Oct. 13, 1983. 

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at Vien- 
na Oct. 26, 1979.1 
Ratification deposited: Poland, Oct. 5, 1983^ 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of international armed con- 
flicts (protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at 
Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978.5 

Accessions deposited: China, Sept. 14, 1983; 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Apr. 8, 1983. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of non-international armed 
conflicts (protocol II). Adopted at Geneva 
June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 
1978.6 

Accessions deposited: China, Sept. 14, 1983; 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Apr. 8, 1983 



Slavery 

Convention to suppress the slave trade and 

slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926. 

Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.Sif**^ 

Mar. 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183. 

Accession deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 11, 

1983. Iteai 

Protocol amending the slavery convention of mf^, 

Sept. 25, 1926, and annex. Done at New 

York Dec. 7, 1953. Entered into force Dec. ' 

1953 for the protocol; July 7, 1955, for anne 

to protocol. TIAS 3532. 

Accession deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 11, 

1983. 

Supplementary convention on the abolition c W 



slavery, the slave trade, and institutions anc 
practices similar to slavery'. Done at Geneva 
Sept 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 11, 
1983. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention 

with annexes and protocols. Done at Malagj 

Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into 

force Jan. 1, 1975.; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 197 

TIAS 8572. 

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Aug. 29, 

1983. 

Radio regulations, with appendices and fina 
protocol. Done at (jeneva Dec. 6, 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982, except for 
(1) arts. 25 and 66 and appendix 43 which 
entered into force Jan. 1, 1981, and (2) cer- 
tain provisions concerning aeronautical 
mobile service which entered into force 
Feb. 1, 1983. 
Ratification deposited: U.S., Oct. 27, 1983.^ 

Trade 

Protocol of provisional application of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Concluded at Geneva Oct. 30, 1974. Enterei 
into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. 
Contracting party status accorded: Belize, 

Oct. 7, 1983; Maldives, Apr. 19, 1983; Zam- 
bia, Feb. 10, 1982. 

De facto application: Antigua & Barbuda, 
Nov. 1, 1981; St. Christopher & Nevis, 
Sept. 19, 1983. 

Agreement on technical barriers to trade. 
Done at Geneva Apr, 12, 1979. Entered intu 
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Oct. 14, 1983 

Agreement on interpretation and applicatio 
of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the Gener 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidies 
and countervailing duties). Done at Geneva 
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1980. TIAS 9619. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Oct. 14, 1983 

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done 
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Oct. 17, 1983 



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TREATIES 



INIDO 

onstitution of the United Nations Industrial 
development Organization, with annexes. 
'"Aeli dopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 

atifications deposited: Bhutan, Oct. 25, 

■"' "' 383; Senegal, Oct. 24, 1983; Yemen (Sanaa) 
ct. 20, 1983. 



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ifor 



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lieat 

a )83 protocol for the further extension of the 
heat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
one at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
to force July 1, 1983. 
ccession deposited: Turkey, Nov. 29, 1983. 



tonventioi 



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gentina 

greement extending agreement of Sept. 22, 
(77, as amended (TIAS 8978, 10440), 
lating to air transport services. Effected by 
cchange of notes at Buenos Aires Sept. 9 
id Oct. 13, 1983. Entered into force 
:t. 13, 1983. 



Be^se. 



baling 

mendments to the schedule to the interna- 
onal convention for the regulation of whal- 
g, 1946, (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Brighton 
ily 18-23, 1983. 
ntered into force: Nov. 3, 1983. 



[LATERAL 



ustralia 

snvention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
)n and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
spect to taxes on income. Signed at Sydney 
ug. 6, 1982. 
itifications exchanged: Oct. 31, 1983. 



ntered into force: Oct, 31, 1983. 



greement extending the agreement of 
ct. 16, 1968 (TIAS 6589) relating to scien- 
ce and technical cooperation. Effected by 
[change of notes at Canberra Oct. 6 and 
ov. 14, 1983. Entered into force Nov. 14, 
•83; effective Oct. 16, 1983. 



jZanv angladesh 

greement amending the agreement of 
ar, 8, 1982, for the sale of agricultural com- 
odities (TIAS 10483). Effected by exchange 
letters at Washington Oct. 25, 1983. 
ntered into force Oct. 25, 1983. 

itneii inti elize 

greements amending agreement of Apr. 6, 
•83, as amended, for control of illicit pro- 
iction and traffic of drugs. Signed at Belize 
!pt. 15 and 28, 1983. Entered into force 
pt. 15 and 28, 1983. TIAS 10696. 

razil 

greement amending and extending the 
^eement of Nov. 17, 1977, relating to equal 
:cess to ocean carriage of government- 
Introlled cargoes (TIAS 8981). Effected by 
fjt,D«« :change of letters at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26, 
itoforce p83. Entered into force Oct. 26, 1983. 

anada 

greement amending the agreement of 

ov. 22, 1978, on Great Lakes water quality 

anuary 1984 



(TIAS 9257), with supplement to Annex 3. 
Signed at Halifax Oct. 16, 1983. Entered into 
force Oct. 16, 1983. 

Memorandum of understanding on the par- 
ticipation of Canada in the ocean drilling pro- 
gram. Signed at Washington and Ottawa 
Oct. 18 and 19, 1983. Entered into force 
Oct. 19, 1983. 

Cook Islands 

Treaty on friendship and delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between the United 
States of America and the Cook Islands, 
Signed at Rarotonga June 11, 1980. Entered 
into force Sept. 8, 1983. 
Proclaimed by the President: Oct. 31, 1983. 

Denmark 

Agreement concerning the inclusion of Den- 
mark, Norway, and Sweden in the memoran- 
dum of understanding between the United 
States and members of the European Civil 
Aviation Conference of Dec. 17, 1982, with 
attachments. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington Aug. 2, 1983. 
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983. 

Agreement amending the air transport serv- 
ices agreement of Dec. 16, 1944, as amended 
(EAS 430, TIAS 3014, 4071, 6021). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 2, 
1983. 
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983. 

France 

Memorandum of understanding covering 
cooperation in the field of geological sciences. 
Signed at Reston and Paris Sept. 19 and 
Oct. 3, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 3, 
1983. 

Iceland 

Agreement for the loan of petroleum spill 
clean-up equipment. Signed at Reykjavik 
July 14, 1983, Entered into force July 14, 
1983. 

Italy 

Agreement concerning taxation of income of 
some U.S. Navy employees in Italy. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Rome July 24, 1982. 
Entered into force July 24, 1982; effective 
January 1, 1982. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the furnishing of balloon launching and 
associated services. Signed at Washington 
and Rome Sept, 2 and 30, 1983. Entered into 
force Sept. 30, 1983. 

Japan 

Memorandum of agreement for cooperation 
in breeder reactor projects. Signed at Tokyo 
Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30, 
1983. 

Kiribati 

Treaty of friendship, with agreed minute. 
Signed at Tarawa Sept. 20, 1979. Entered in- 
to force Sept. 23, 1983. 
Proclaimed by the President: Nov. 17, 1983. 



Liberia 

Agreement concerning provision of training 
related to defense articles under the United 
States International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) Program. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Monrovia Feb, 23 and 
Sept. 7, 1983, Entered into force Sept. 7, 
1983. 

New Zealand 

Treaty on the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary between Tokelau and the United 
States of America. Signed at Atafu Dec. 2, 
1980. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1983. 
Proclaimed by the President: Oct. 31, 1983. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, with protocol. 
Signed at Wellington July 23, 1982. 
Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 2, 1983. 
Entered into force: Nov. 2, 1983. 

Norway 

Agreement concerning the inclusion of Den- 
mark, Norway, and Sweden in the memoran- 
dum of understanding between the United 
States and members of the European Civil 
Aviation Conference of Dec. 17, 1982, with 
attachments. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington Aug. 2, 1983. 
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983 

Agreement amending the air transport serv- 
ices agreement of Oct. 6, 1945, as amended 
(EAS 482, TIAS 3015, 4072, 6025). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 2, 
1983. 
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983. 

Philippines 

Agreement amending the memorandum of 
consultation of the agreement concerning air 
transport services of Sept. 16, 1982 (TIAS 
10443). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into 
force Sept. 30, 1983. 

St. Lucia 

General agreement for economic, technical, 
and related assistance. Signed at Castries 
Oct. 20, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 20, 
1983. 

St. Vincent & the Grenadines 

General agreement for economic, technical, 
and related assistance. Signed at Kingstown 
Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30, 
1983. 

Sweden 

Agreement concerning the inclusion of Den- 
mark, Norway, and Sweden in the memoran- 
dum of understanding between the United 
States and members of the European Civil 
Aviation Conference of Dec. 17, 1982, with 
attachments. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington Aug. 2, 1983. 
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983 

Agreement amending the air transport serv- 
ices agreement of Dec. 16, 1944, as amended 
(EAS 431, TIAS 3013, 4073, 6026). Effected 



91 



CHRONOLOGY 



by exchange of notes at Washington August 

2 1983 

Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983 

Turkey 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 22, 1983, (TIAS 10725) for economic 
and financial support. Signed at Ankara Sept. 
30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1983. 

Tuvalu 

Treaty of friendship. Signed at Funafuti, 

Feb. 7, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 23, 

1983. 

Proclaimed by the President: Nov. 21, 1983. 



'Not in force. 

^With designation. 

'With reservation(s). 

•In respect of the Farol Islands. 

'^Not in force for the U.S. 

•^With declaration(s). ■ 



November 1983 



November 1 

House and Senate Conference Committees 
eliminate an amendment to a State Depart- 
ment appropriations bill that would have cut 
the U.S. contribution to the UN nearly $500 
million. 

Three hundred U.S. Marines land in Car- 
riacou, a 13-square-mile island 20 miles north 
of Grenada, looking for Cubans. They 
reportedly detain 17 men believed to be 
members of the Grenadian People's Revolu- 
tionary Army and uncover a cache of 
weapons and ammunition. U.S. officials 
report the Marines encountered no opposition 
and no shots were fired. 

By a vote of 403 to 23, U.S. House of 
Representatives overwhelmingly approves 
legislation that would apply the War Powers 
Act to the fighting in Grenada— 256 
Democrat; 147 Republican. On Oct. 28, the 
Senate approved an identical bill, but it was 
added as a rider to legislation raising the 
national debt ceiling. 

U.S. receives intelligence reports of 
"death threats" emanating from Cuba against 
Americans in Latin America. State Depart- 
ment officials say that the U.S. is viewing the 
subject with the "gravest concern" and take 
the reports "very seriously." 

November 2 

By a vote of 1 08 to 9 with 27 abstentions, 
UN General Assembly adopts a resolution 
"deeply deploring" the "armed intervention in 
Grenada" calling it "a flagrant violation of in- 
ternational law." U.S., Antigua and Barbuda, 
Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador, Israel, 
Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines vote against. The resolution, 
sponsored by Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, is 
virtually identical to one vetoed by the U.S. 
in the Security Council on Oct. 28. 

Defense Department officials announce 
that "hostilities have ceased" in Grenada, and 
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and the 



return of the approximately 600 Cuban 
prisoners would begin "within a few days." 
State Department officials announce that 
Grenadian Gov. Gen. Sir Paul Scoon orders 
the closing of the Cuban Embassy and the 
"prompt departure" of all personnel. They 
add that the 57 Cuban wounded along with 8 
women, 3 children, and the dead are to be 
"transported" from Grenada by a J.S. C-130 
aircraft leased by the International Commit- 
tee of the Red Cross, on the morning of 
Nov. 2. 

Reagan Administration announces that 
"in hope of inducing the Polish Government 
to begin pursuing a path of national recon- 
ciliation and restore free trade unions," the 
U.S. and its allies are negotiating a resched- 
uling of Poland's 1981 debt. The following 
limited steps are being taken. 

• The U.S. is not extending Poland new 
credits nor supporting its entry into the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund. 

• As a bilateral step, the U.S. is permit- 
ting preliminary discussions between the 
Polish Government and U.S. fishing com- 
panies on purchase of fish by Warsaw, but 
the current ban on actual allocation of fish re- 
mains in force "contingent on" Warsaw's 
progress in restoring civil rights. Meanwhile, 
the Dec. 1981 sanctions remain in force. 

November 3 

By voice vote, U.S. Senate approves con- 
tinued aid for covert operations in Nicaragua. 
The approval, contingent upon notification to 
the intelligence committee of the goals and 
risks of specific covert projects, would pro- 
vide only $19 million of the $50 niilhon that 
the Administration sought. 

In a referendum vote, white South 
Africans approve a program which will offer 
brown minorities — but not the black ma- 
jority — a voice in national life alongside 
whites. Results of the vote show 66% ap- 
prove proposals for a new constitution. State 
Department officials say that the referendum 
"is a reflection of a growing consensus within 
that electorate of the need to move forward 
toward broader participation by all South 
Africans in the country's political process." 
They add that the U.S. hopes that the South 
African Government "will use its mandate to 
address the problem of the political rights of 
South Africa's black majority for the sake of 
the people of South Africa and southern 
Africa, and its relations with the rest of the 
world, including the U.S." 

Responding to the UN General Assem- 
bly's vote on Grenada, White House officials 
say that the vote "has more to say about the 
state of the United Nations today than it 
does about recent developments in Grenada." 
White House Deputy Spokesman Larry 
Speakes adds that the Reagan Administration 
finds it "sad that the LIN sees fit to 'deplore' 
actions taken by the United States and the 
OECS for humanitarian reasons, to save in- 
nocent lives, and protect human rights, in full 
accord with the principles of the U.N. 
Charter." 

President Reagan names Donald H. 
Rumsfeld his personal representative in the 
Middle East. Rumsfeld succeeds Robert 
McFarlane. 



isffltl 



.Wet 



November 4 

President Reagan sends a notice to the 
Federal Register stating that "because our 
relations with Iran have not yet been nor- 
malized and the process of implementing the |$oie*' 
January 19, 1981 agreements with Iran is 
still underway," the national emergency witl 
respect to Iran is to continue in effect beyor 
the November 14, 1983 expiration date. 

A truck loaded with explosives crashes 
through the entrance of an Israeli head- 1 1 :-3 
quarters compound in Tyre, Lebanon, killing r^j.; 
at least 39 people and injuring 32. Several ffiit.S. 
hours later, Israeli jets strike at Palestinian 
targets along the Beirut-Damascus Highwaj 
State Department officials say that the U.S. 
is "revolted" by the tragic incident adding 
that "those who believe that they can work 
their will through terrorists actions are sadl 
mistaken. Only negotiation can pave the wa 
for the withdrawal of foreign forces and a 
return to a peaceful and independent 
Lebanon." Responsibility for the bombing 
was claimed by the Islamic Holy War, the 
same pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem group that 
claimed responsibility for the Oct. 23 bomb- 
ings on the U.S. Marines and French bases 
Beirut. 

State Department officials announce th: 
"at the request of and in accordance with ir 
structions of the Gov. Gen. of Grenada, 126 
people— 49 Soviets, 6 East Germans, 15 
Koreans, 3 Bulgarians, and 53 Cubans— wh 
had been in the Soviet Embassy compound 
Grenada were evacuated by U.S. military a 
craft to Merida, Yucatan, Mexico at 1:21 a. 
EST, and arrived in Mexico 5 hours later. . 
personnel in the Libyan People's Bureau 
were evacuated to Bridgetown, Barbados, c 
Nov. 3. 

Responding to an announcement made 
the Burmese Government that North Korea Ui'^n 
terrorists were responsible for the Oct. 9 
bombing in Burma, State Department of- 
ficials reiterate U.S. sympathy and support fcajujj 
adding that the U.S. will consult with the 
Korean Government and other government 
to "consider an appropriate international 
response to North Korea's uncivilized, outlf 
attack." 

Fourteen-member bipartisan factfindinj 
mission from the U.S. House of Represen- 
tatives leaves Washington, D.C., for Grena 
The delegation, led by Thomas Foley 
(D.-Wa.), includes House minority leader 
Robert Michel and members of the Foreign ^jj^/j . 
Affairs, Armed Ser\'ices, Intelligence, and " 
other House committees. Foley says the pu 
pose of the trip is to "bring into closer focu Sk,|„jj 
the information about the American intervc 
tion" in Grenada. 

Lebanese factional leaders meeting in 
Geneva adjourn the reconciliation conferen^ 
until Nov. 14 to allow President Amin 
Gemayel time for an international tour aim 
at securing the withdrawal of the remainin 
Israeli forces from Lebanon. He will visit t 
U.S., France, Italy, the U.K., and a numbe 
of Arab countries. 

State Department publicly releases 
documents found in Grenada by American 
forces. The papers include minutes of the 
central committee at which former Prime 
Minister Bishop was stripped of his power 



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CHRONOLOGY 



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and five secret treaties covering military aid 
from the Soviet Union, North Korea, and 
Cuba. 

November 6 

U.S. officials in St. Georges say more than 
100 bodies had been found in a training camp 
in Chevigy, which is on the southern tip of 
Grenada. The official says that one of the 
bodies was "presumed" to be that of former 
Prime Minister Bishop. Confirming the 
report, Department Spokesman John Hughes 
says a U.S. military graves registration team 
is investigating. He adds that Deputy Prime 
Minister Bernard Coard and Gen. Austin 
have been turned over to the Grenadians and 
are now in the Richmond Hill prison. 



lesadl; ( 

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id 



November 7 

Chief U.S. spokesman on Grenada denies 
reports that more than 100 bodies had been 
discovered on the island. State Department 
spokesman John Hughes says that "there was 
some confusion in the communications" and 
there is no evidence to confirm the rumors 

lnff.t ihat a mass grave site exists." 

Results of the Nov. 6 elections in Turkey 
ihow the Centrist Motherland Party led by 
'ormer Deputy Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal 
von 45% of the vote in the first elections in 
hat country since the military takeover 3 
'ears ago. The left-of-center Populist Party 
."eceives 30% and the Nationalist Democracy 
"arty, backed by the military, receives 24%. 
Senate approves MX missile in the final 

lilii tongressional vote needed before the new 
J nuclear weapon enters production. 

1 November 8 
J.S. soldiers on Grenada discover a shallow 
l^ave containing four burned bodies, one of 
ivhich was reportedly that of the slain former 
'rime Minister. 
ffllof- 
Ripsdttjklovember 8-14 

'resident Reagan makes official visits to 
'apan and the Republic of Korea to discuss 
rade and security issues with Japanese 
i.oitlj 'rime Minister Nakasone and Korean Presi- 
lent Chun. Upon departure, the President 
ays the trip "will spotlight the great impor- 
ance we place on our ties with Northeast 
J isia and the Pacific Basin." He adds that he 
vould be reaffirming America's commitment 
remain a reliable partner for peace and 
foteijn tability" in the face of a Soviet build-up in 
and ^sia. 

jri^rfW November 9 

itvi Jefense Department officials report that the 
leath toll in the Oct. 23 Beirut bombing has 
isen to 237. Officials add that there is no in- 
'oiifete* onnation on how many servicemen are still 
isted as missing in action but that the death 
.00 oil could still rise. 



t lovember 10 

it( 'he Reagan Administration applauds the an- 
louncement by Grenadian Gov. Gen Scoon of 
new interim Government on Grenada. "We 
onsider it a step in the direction of restora- 
ion of the full authority of the Grenadian 
pople," officials say. 



leeW?'" 



nerPn* 



In view of the Burmese determination of 
North Korean responsibility for the Oct. 9 
assassination in Rangoon, State Department 
announces suspension of implementation of 
recently revised guidelines on contacts 
between U.S. diplomats and North Korean 
officials. 

In Beirut, Syrian antiaircraft batteries 
open fire on four U.S. F-14 fighter jets as 
they flew a reconnaissance mission over 
Syrian military positions. Defense Depart- 
ment officials confirm that a single Navy 
F-14 Tomcat encountered "what appeared to 
be antiaircraft fire" on a routine flight but 
returned safely to its carrier base on the 
Dunght D. Eisenhower without having been 
hit. 

November 14 

A second packet of secret Grenadian 
documents released by the State Department 
provides further information on conditions on 
Grenada preceding the assassination of the 
former Prime Minister. Included are minutes 
of meetings of the political bureau and cen- 
tral committee of the New Jewel Movement 
which discuss problems facing the regime and 
the party. The documents also suggest the 
Movement was consciously developing Cuban 
and Soviet structure and ideology. 

American cruise missiles arrive at the 
Greenham Common Airbase in England, the 
first of NATO's new generation of medium- 
range missiles to be deployed in Western 
Europe. 

Ambassador James Goodby, U.S. 
Representative to the Helsinki Preparatory 
Meeting for the European Security Con- 
ference (CDE) announces agreement has been 
reached, and the preparatory meeting ad- 
journed on Nov. 11. State Department of- 
ficials say that the U.S. is "gratified that, 
through agreement on procedural questions 
and an agenda, this important first step has 
been taken toward convening of the CDE, 
which will begin in Stockholm on January 17, 
1984. This conference will form an important 
part of the process of increasing security and 
cooperation in Europe, which began in 1975 
with the Helsinki Final Act and which con- 
tinued at the Madrid CSCE review meeting, 
which concluded in September." 

November 15 

Donald H. Rumsfeld, the President's personal 
representative in the Middle East, arrives in 
Cairo for talks with Egyptian President 
Mubarak and Butros Ghali, Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs. Meetings were held on 
Nov. 16. 

Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, 
declares the northern part of Cyprus an in- 
dependent republic proclaiming it the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey gives 
the newly proclaimed republic formal recogni- 
tion; the move is condemned by Greek 
Cypriot Prime Minister Papandreou. Ad- 
ministration officials in condemning the 
move, say that it comes as a "complete sur- 
prise" and the U.S. is "dismayed" and con- 
siders it "unhelpful to the process of finding a 
settlement to the Cyprus problem." The U.S. 
urges the Turkish Government to use its in- 
fluence "to bring about a reversal of their ac- 



tions." Officials also say that the U.S. "will 
not recognize the new polity" and urge all 
other countries not to recognize it. 

Capt. George Tsantes, head of the naval 
section of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance 
Group, Greece, and his Greek chauffeur, 
Nicholas Veloutsos, are killed by two uniden- 
tified gunmen in Athens. An anonymous 
caller to the left-wing daily Ekftherotypia 
says the "November 17" terrorist group — a 
far-left organization — was responsible, the 
same group that claimed responsibility for 
the killing of the CIA station chief Richard 
Welch 8 years ago. President Reagan says he 
"deeply regrets" the "act of terrorism" and 
the Embassy is "conducting a thorough 
review of security precautions" in the wake 
of the shooting. Prime Minister Papandreau 
expresses deep regret and assures the U.S. 
Ambassador that everything possible is being 
done to find and punish the culprits. 

November 16 

U.S. and Japan agree on a series of measures 
designed to reduce barriers and enhance 
high-technology trade between the two coun- 
tries. The major objective of these measures, 
U.S. Trade Representative William Brock 
says, "is to increase opportunities for U.S. 
semiconductor suppliers to participate in the 
Japanese market." The joint agreement calls 
for the mutual elimination of the current 
4.2% tariff levied on semiconductors by the 
U.S. and Japan. The new zero tariff must be 
approved by the U.S. Congress and the 
Japanese Diet and is expected to go into ef- 
fect by April 1984. 

U.S. and the Soviet Union mark 50 years 
of diplomatic relations. State Department of- 
ficials announce that the U.S. is "prepared to 
work with the Soviets to solve the problems 
that confront us," and the U.S. is dedicated 
to maintaining peace. 

Wliite House officials announce that U.S. 
combat troops will be withdrawn from 
Grenada by Dec. 23, 1983. 

November 18 

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 541 
deploring the declaration by the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities of the purported secession 
of part of the Republic of Cyprus. The resolu- 
tion considers the declaration "legally invalid" 
and calls for its withdrawal; calls upon all 
states to respect the "sovereignty, in- 
dependence, territorial integrity and non- 
alignment" of the Republic of Cyprus and not 
to recognize any "Cypriot State other than" 
the Republic of Cyprus; and calls upon all 
states and the two communities to refrain 
from any action which might exacerbate the 
situation. 

November 19-22 

Sudanese President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri 
makes an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C., to meet with President 
Reagan and other U.S. officials. 

November 21 

The following newly appointed ambassadors 
present their credentials to President 
Reagan: Peter Helemisi Mtetwa of 



lanuary 1984 



'^■■■'i'^'ii>'n':Hih'i]'jimf\:iiii\i\'m\m 



PRESS RELEASES 



Swaziland; Peter Douglas Laurie of Bar- 
bados; Henry Edney Conrad Cain of Belize; 
Mahamat Ali Adoum of Chad; and Leon 
Maxime Rajaobelina of Madagascar. 

November 23 

In Geneva, Soviet Union discontinues present 
round of talks with U.S. on medium-range 
nuclear missiles, saying it would set no date 
for resuming negotiations. 

Agency for International Development 
prepares long-term assistance package for 
Grenada totaling $15 million for FY 1984. 
The package includes $4.5 million for road 
rehabilitation; $2.5 million for social services; 
$2 million for agriculture; $5 million for 
economic support fund grant for balance-of- 
payments assistance; and $1 million to ex- 
pand private sector projects. 

November 24 

Soviet leader Andropov announces that the 
Soviet Union would deploy seaborne nuclear 
missiles to counter the threat to his country 
posed by deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles 
in Western Europe. In addition, the Soviets 
announce that they will rescind a voluntary 
moratorium on the deployment of its SS-20 
medium-range missiles in European areas of 
the Soviet Union. President Reagan says that 
"while we are dismayed, we are determined 
to renew our efforts to entirely do away with 
the land-based intermediate-range nuclear 
missile system." State Department officials 
say the Nov. 23 decision to suspend negotia- 
tions is unjustified and runs counter to their 
professed commitment to arms control," add- 
ing that the U.S. is "prepared to continue 
talks on INF," and calls on the Soviet Union 
to resume negotiations. 

November 27-30 

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir makes 
official working visit to Washington, D.C. to 
meet with President Reagan and other U.S. 
officials. 

November 29 

Speaking at a WTiite House departure 
ceremony for the Israeli Prime Minister, 
President Reagan says that their meetings 
focused on the "agony of Lebanon and the 
threats there to our common interests." They 
also agree to establish a joint political- 
military group to examine ways to enhance 
U.S. -Israeli cooperation and whose priority 
will be to focus on the threat "posed by in- 
creased Soviet involvement in the Middle 
East." 

In two independent cases, U.S. denies 
visitor visas to Thomas Borge, Nicaragua's 
Interior Minister, and Roberto D'Aubuisson, 
President of El Salvador's Constituent 
Assembly, under section 212(a) 27 of the Im- 
migration and Nationality Act which excludes 
from admission to the U.S. aliens whose ac- 
tivities would be contrary to the public 
interest. 

November 30 

President Reagan withholds approval of H.R. 
4042, an enrolled bill that would require two 
Presidential certifications regarding El 



';f,-ii;ii.iifiiriii,ii- 



Salvador in 1984 because the process of cer- 
tification, as called for in the bill, would not 
serve to support human rights, economic and 
political reforms, the holding of elections, and 
progress in prosecuting the cases of 
murdered U.S. citizens in El Salvador. 

President Reagan signs legislation ap- 
propriating funds for the U.S. contribution to 
the International Monetary Fund and 
multinational development banks but objects 
to language concerning Taiwan. The Presi- 
dent says that while he believes that the U.S. 
must continue "the valuable and productive 
unofficial relations with the people of 
Taiwan," certain terminology used in the 
amendment to the bill is inconsistent with 
U.S. policy which recognizes the People's 
Republic of China as the "sole legal govern- 
ment of China." 

In response to questions about visa 
denials in the D'Aubuisson and Borge cases. 
State Department spokesman John Hughes 
says that "the Administration is seriously 
concerned about the level of death squad ac- 
tivity in El Salvador ..." and "the issuance 
of a visa to Mr. D'Aubuisson at this time was 
not viewed as appropriate . . . such an is- 
suance might well have conveyed signals, in- 
tended or not, which would not have been 
productive to ongoing discussions." In Mr. 
Borge's case, Hughes said, "refusal of his visa 
should be seen in the context of our very 
clear support to the ongoing Contadora effort 
to achieve a regional solution to the conflicts 
in Central America." 

November 30-Dec. 3 

Lebanese President Amin Gemayel makes an 
official working visit to Washington, D.C, to 
meet with President Reagan to discuss the 
Geneva reconciliation meetings and "alter- 
native approaches" for making progress in 
withdrawing forces from Lebanon. He also 
meets with Secretary Shultz and other U.S. 
officials. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*383 11/1 Department of State and 

World Affairs Councils to 
cosponsor conferences on 
U.S. -Soviet relations, San 
Diego Nov. 3 and River- 
side, Calif. Nov. 4. 

"384 11/1 Overseas Schools Advisory 
Council, Dec. 14. 

*385 11/3 Shultz: remarks at UN Asso- 
ciation concert, Oct. 29. 

*386 11/7 Shultz: press briefing on the 
President's trip to the Far 
East, Nov. 3. 

*387 11/9 U.S. Org;anization for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Committee 
(CCITT), Nov. 30. 

•388 11/9 CCITT, study group A, 
Nov. 30. 



'389 11/9 U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), Dec. 2. 

*390 11/9 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC). Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on ship design and 
equipment, Nov. 30. 

'391 11/10 Harold G. Kimball desig- 
nated executive director 
for the U.S. delegation to 
the 1985 World Ad- 
ministrative Radio Con- 
ference (biographic data). 

*392 11/14 Shultz: interview on "The 
Today Show," Seoul. 

*393 11/17 Program for the official 

working visit of Sudanese 
President Gaafar 
Mohamed Nimeiri, 
Nov. 19-22. 

'394 11/22 Advisory Committee on 

Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scien- 
tific Affairs, Dec. 5. 

'395 1 1/22 SCC, Committee on Ocean 
Dumping, Dec. 6. 

'396 11/22 CCIR, study group 10, 
Dec. 7. 

•397 11/22 CCIR, study group 11 
Dec. 7. 

'398 1 1/22 Thomas P. Shoesmith sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Malaysia (biographic data) 

•399 11/21 Daniel A. O'Donohue sworn 
in as Ambassador to Bur- 
ma (biographic data). 
400 11/22 Shultz: interview on "This 
Week with David 
Brinkley," Seoul, Nov. 13. 

•401 11/22 Shultz, MacEachen: news 

conference, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, Oct. 17. 

•402 11/30 Shultz: interview on "View- 
point," Nov. 20 
403 11/22 Shultz: address before the 
Council of Jewish Federa 
tions and Welfare Funds, 
Atlanta, Nov. 19 

•404 11/29 Program for the official 

working visit of Lebanese 
President Amin Gemayel 
Nov. 30-Dec. 3. 

•405 1 1/25 Program for the official 
working visit of Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Shimir, Nov. 27-30. 

•406 11/30 SCC, SOLAS, working grou; 
on fire protection, Dec. IS 

•407 11/30 CCITT, study group C, 
Dec. 16. 

•408 11/30 CCITT, study group C, 
Dec. 19. 

•409 11/30 Edmund T. De Jarnette 

sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Central African 
Republic, Oct. 18 
(biographic data). 

•Not printed in the Billetin. ■ 



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anuary 1984 
'olume 84, No. 2082 



''• fghanistan. Afghanistan: 4 Years of Occupa- 
tion 73 

frica. Reagan Administration's Africa 
Policy: A Progress Report (Crocker) ... 38 

'gentina. Human Rights Situation in South 
America (Abrams, Michel) 55 

■ms Control 

e CDE and European Security in the 1980s 
(Mally) 49 

radox, Problems, and Promise of Arms Con- 
trol (Adelman) 45 

viets Suspend INF Negotiations (Nitze, 
Reagan) 48 

ile. Human Rights Situation in South 
America (Abrams, Michel) 55 

ngress 

II Recipients Designated (letter to the Con- 
gress) 84 

velopments in Cyprus (Haass, Department 
statement) 52 

.man Rights Situation in South America 
(Abrams, Michel) 55 

.rijuana Production and Control Abroad 
(DiCarlo) 70 

ssident Opposes El Salvador Certification 
Legislation (White House statement) . . 88 

prus. Developments in Cyprus (Haass, 
Department statement) 52 

onomic Assistance. The Caribbean Basin 
Initiative and Central America (Dam) . .80 

onomics 

e Political Economy of the Caribbean Basin 
(Dam) 83 

9sident Reagan Visits Japan and the Re- 
public of Korea (remarks, joint statements, 
toasts, addresses, interviews) 1 

3. Sanctions Against Poland (White House 

statement) 54 

Salvador. President Opposes El Salvador 
Certification Legislation (White House 
statement) 88 

trope. The CDE and European Security in 
the 1980s (Mally) 49 

Teign Assistance. CBI Recipients Desig- 
nated (letter to the Congress) 84 

itnan Rights 

1 of Rights Day; Human Rights Day and 
Week, 1983 (proclamation) 59 

man Rights Situation in South America 

(Abrams, Michel) 55 

ernational Law 

Critique of the Restatement Revision (Robin- 
son) 69 

aty Protection of Foreign Investment 
(Robinson) 60 



oiiiiet 



Iran. Treaty Protection of Foreign Investment 
(Robinson) 60 

Israel. Promoting Peace in the Middle East 
(Shultz) 32 

Japan 

Japan— A Profile 3 

President Reagan Visits Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (remarks, joint 
statements, toasts, addresses, inter- 
views) 1 

Korea 

President Reagan Visits Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (remarks, joint 
statements, toasts, addresses, inter- 
views) 1 

Republic of Korea — A Profile 20 

Lebanon 

Promoting Peace in the Middle East 
(Shultz) 32 

Secretary's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 5 35 

Situation in Lebanon (White House state- 
ment) 69 

Narcotics. Marijuana Production and Control 
Abroad (DiCario) 70 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua (Secretary Shultz's letter to the 
Congress) 85 

Secretary's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 5 35 

Paraguay. Human Rights Situation in South 
America (Abrams, Michel) 55 

Poland. 1 '.S. Sanctions Against Poland (White 
House .'itatement) 54 

Presidential Documents 

Bill of Rights Day; Human Rights Day and 
Week, 1983 (proclamation) 59 

CBI Recipients Designated (letter to the Con- 
gress) 84 

50th Anniversary of U.S. -Soviet Relations (ex- 
change of letters) 53 

President Reagan Visits Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (remarks, joint state- 
ments, toasts, addresses, interviews) ... 1 

Situation in Lebanon (White House state- 
ment) 69 

Soviets Suspend INF Negotiations (Nitze, 
Reagan) 48 

U.S. Sanctions Against Poland (Wliite House 
statement) 54 

Visit of Sudanese President Nimeiri 
(Nimeiri) 44 



Security Assistance. Nicaragua (Shultz, letter 
to the Congress) 85 

Sudan. Visit of Sudanese President Nimeiri 
(Nimeiri, Reagan) 44 

Trade 

The Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central 
America (Dam) 80 

The Political Economy of the Caribbean Basin 
(Dam) 83 

President Reagan Visits Japan and the Re- 
public of Korea (remarks, joint statements, 
toasts, addresses, interviews) 1 

Treaties 

Current Actions 90 

Treaty Protection of Foreign Investment 
(Robinson) 60 

U.S.S.R. 

Afghanistan: 4 Years of Occupation 73 

The CDE and European Security in the 1980s 
(Mally) 49 

50th Anniversary of U.S. -Soviet Relations (ex- 
change of letters) 53 

Paradox, Problems, and Promise of Arms Con- 
trol (Adelman) 45 

Soviets Suspend INF Negotiations (Nitze, 
Reagan) 48 

United Nations. Bill of Rights Day; Human 
Rights Day and Week, 1983 (proclama- 
tion) 59 

Uruguay. Human Rights Situation in South 
America (Abrams, Michel) 55 

Western Hemisphere 

The Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central 
America (Dam) 80 

CBI Recipients Designated (President 
Reagan s letter to the Congress) 84 

Need for Rule of Law in Central America 
(Michel) 87 

The Political Economv of the Caribbean Basin 
(Dam) '. 83 



Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 55 

Adelman, Kenneth L 45 

Crocker, Chester A 38 

Dam, Kenneth W 80, 83 

DiCarlo, Dominick L 70 

Haass, Richard N 52 

Mally, Gerhard 49 

Michel, James H 55,87 

Nakasone, Yasuhiro 1 

Nimeiri, Gaafar Muhammad 44 

Nitze, Paul H 48 

Reagan, President 1, 44, 48, 53, 59, 84 

Robmson, Davis R 60, 69 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 32, 35, 85 



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•« l)> Ul» !« }^ 









Departnten t 
of State 



-m of state ^^ J ^ 

buUetin 



rhe Official Monthly Record of United StatesFor&ign^Jfi^/sYolunne 84 / Number 2083 




p 



Cover. Clockwise from top: 

President Reagan 

Flag of Nepal 

Deputy Secretary of State 
Kenneth W. Dam 



Departnumi of Statp 

bulletin 



Volume 84 / Number 2083 / February 1984 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with infonnation on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



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transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
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■^: lUr I/^ It9.|« 



CONTENTS 



The President 

1 The U.S. -Soviet Relationship 
5 Lebanon 

5 News Conference of December 20 
(Excerptfs) 

The Vice President 

9 Visit to Latin America 

The Secretary 

10 Visit to Europe and North Africa 
(Statements, News Conferences, 
Declaration of Brussels, North 
Atlantic Council Final 
Communique) 

Economics 

19 LI.S. Foreign Policy and 
Agricultural Trade 
(Kenneth W. Dam.) 

Europe 

22 NATO Defense Planning Commit- 
tee Meets in Brussels (Final 
Communique) 

Human Rights 

24 Human Rights Implications for 
U.S. Action in Grenada 
(Elliott Abrams) 

IVIiddle East 

27 Policy Options in Lebanon 

(Kenneth W. Dam) 

28 U.S. Forces in Lebanon 

(Letter to the Congress) 

29 Visit of Lebanese President 

(Amin Gem.ayel. President 
Reagan) 

30 Visit of Israeli Prime Minister 

(President Reagan. Yitzhak 
Shamir) 

Refugees 

32 Refugee Assistance and Protec- 
tion (Jam.es N. Purcell. Jr.) 



Science & Technology 

34 LT.S. Prepares for World Radio 

Conference (Leonard H. Marks) 

South Asia 

36 Visit of President of the Council 

of Ministers of Bangladesh 
(Hussain Mohammad Ershad, 
President Reagan) 

37 Anniversary of the Soviet 

Invasion of Afghanistan 
(President Reagan) 

38 Visit of King of Nepal 

(King Birendra Bir Bikram 
Shah Dev. President Reagan) 

United Nations 

41 U.S. Notifies UNESCO of Intent 
to Withdraw (Secretary's Letters 
to UNESCO Director General 
and UN Secretary General) 

Western Hemisphere 

43 Democracy as a Problem-Solving 
Mechanism (Langhorne A. 
Motley) 

45 U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada 

(Letter to the Congress) 

Treaties 

46 Current Actions 

Chronology 

48 December 1983 

Press Releases 

51 Department of State 

Publications 

51 Department of State 

52 Foreign Relations Volume 

Released 

Index 



There is no rational alternative hut to steer a 
course which I would call credible deterrence and 
peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might 
find areas in which we could engage in constructive 
cooperation. 




i*"^fc 



jirrnniT 



TMTiTrTTnmiinHlfHilifrHUHiifiitiUHi^intiaiHiiHHHtisnDKi 



THE PRESIDENT 



The U.S.-Soviet 
Relationship 



by President Reagan 



Address made in the 

East Room of the White House 

on January 16, 198If.^ 



During these first days of 1984. I would 
like to share with you and the people of 
the world my thoughts on a subject of 
great importance to the cause of peace — 
relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. 

Tomorrow, the United States will 
join the Soviet Union and 33 other na- 
tions at a European disarmament con- 
ference in Stockholm. The conference 
will search for practical and meaningful 
ways to increase European security and 
preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm 
with the heartfelt wishes of our people 
for genuine progress. 

We live in a time of challenges to 
peace but also of opportunities for 
peace. Through times of difficulty and 
frustration, America's highest aspiration 
has never wavered: We have and will 
continue to struggle for a lasting peace 
that enhances dignity for men and 
women everywhere. I believe that 1984 
finds the United States in its strongest 
position in years to establish a construc- 
tive and realistic working relationship 
with the Soviet Union. 

We've come a long way since the 
decade of the- 1970s— years when the 
United States seemed filled with self- 
doubt and neglected its defenses, while 
the Soviet Union increased its military 
might and sought to expand its influence 
by armed force and threats. Over the 
last 10 years, the Soviets devoted twice 
as much of their gross national product 
to military expenditures as the United 
States, produced six times as many 
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic 
missiles], four times as many tanks, and 



twice as many combat aircraft. And they 
began deploying the SS-20 intermediate- 
range missile at a time when the United 
States had no comparable weapon. 

History teaches that wars begin 
when governments believe the price of 
aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, 
we and our allies must be strong enough 
to convince any potential aggressor that 
war could bring no benefit, only 
disaster. So when we neglected our 
defenses, the risks of serious confronta- 
tion grew. 

Three years ago we embraced a 
mandate from the American people to 
change course, and we have. With the 
support of the American people and the 
Congress, we halted America's decline. 
Our economy is now in the midst of the 
best recovery since the 1960s. Our 
defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances 
are solid, and our commitment to defend 
our values has never been more clear. 

America's recovery may have taken 
Soviet leaders by surprise. They may 
have counted on us to keep weakening 
ourselves. They've been saying for years 
that our demise was inevitable. They 
said it so often they probably started 
believing it. If so, I think they can see 
now they were wrong. 

This may be the reason that we've 
been hearing such strident rhetoric from 
the Kremlin recently. These harsh words 
have led some to speak of heightened 
uncertainty and an increased danger of 
conflict. This is understandable but pro- 
foundly mistaken. Look beyond the 
words, and one fact stands out: 



february 1984 



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w 



THE PRESIDENT 



America's deterrence is more credible, 
and it is making the world a safer 
place— safer because now there is less 
danger that the Soviet leadership will 
underestimate our strength or question 
our resolve. 

Yes, we are safer now. But to say 
that our restored deterrence has made 
the world safer is not to say that it's 
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic 
conflicts in many parts of the world. 
Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And 
our working relationship with the Soviet 
Union is not what it must be. These are 
conditions which must be addressed and 
improved. 

Deterrence is essential to preserve 
peace and protect our way of life, but 
deterrence is not the beginning and end 
of our policy toward the Soviet Union. 
We must and will engage the Soviets in 
a dialogue as serious and constructive as 



Problem Areas 

But if the United States and the Soviet 
Union are to rise to the challenges fac- 
ing us and seize the opportunities for 
peace, we must do more to find areas of 
mutual interest and then build on them. 
I propose that our governments make a 
major effort to see if we can make prog- 
ress in three broad problem areas. 

First, we need to find ways to re- 
duce — and eventually to elimi- 
nate—the threat and use of force in 
solving international disputes. 

The world has witnessed more than 
100 major conflicts since the end of 
World War II. Today, there are armed 
conflicts in the Middle East, Afghani- 
stan, Southeast Asia, Central America, 
and Africa. In other regions, independ- 
ent nations are confronted by heavily 



. . .America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. 
Today, we have far fewer nuclear weapons than we 
had 30 years ago. 



possible, a dialogue that will serve to 
promote peace in the troubled regions of 
the world, reduce the level of arms, and 
build a constructive working relation- 
ship. 

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can 
wish away the differences between our 
two societies and our philosophies. But 
we should always remember that we do 
have common interests. And the fore- 
most among them is to avoid war and 
reduce the level of arms. There is no ra- 
tional alternative but to steer a course 
which I would call credible deterrence 
and peaceful competition; and if we do 
so, we might find areas in which we 
could engage in constructive coopera- 
tion. 

Our strength and vision of progress 
provide the basis for demonstrating, 
with equal conviction, our commitment 
to stay secure and to find peaceful solu- 
tions to problems through negotiations. 
That is why 1984 is a year of oppor- 
tunities for peace. 



armed neighbors seeking to dominate by 
threatening attack or subversion. 

Most of these conflicts have their 
origins in local problems, but many have 
been exploited by the Soviet Union and 
its surrogates— and, of course, Afghani- 
stan has suffered an outright Soviet in- 
vasion. Fueling region.-a conflicts and ex- 
porting violence only exacrhate local 
tensions, increase suffering, and make 
solutions to real social and economic 
problems more difficult. Further, such 
activity carries with it the risk of larger 
confrontations. 

Would it not be better and safer if 
we could work together to assist people 
in areas of conflict in finding peaceful 
solutions to their problems? That should 
be our mutual goal. But we must recog- 
nize that the gap in American and 
Soviet perceptions and policy is so great 
that our immediate objective must be 
more modest. As a first step, our 
governments should jointly examine con- 
crete actions we both can take to reduce 
the risk of U.S. -Soviet confrontation in 
these areas. And if we succeed, we 
should be able to move beyond this im-, 
mediate objective. 



Our second task should be to find 
ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of 
armaments in the world. 

It is tragic to see the world's devel^ 
oping nations spending more than $150 
billion a year on armed forces — some 
20% of their national budgets. We must 
find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of 
threat and response which drives arms 
races everywhere it occurs. 

With regard to nuclear weapons, the 
simple truth is, America's total nuclear 
stockpile has declined. Today, we have 
far fewer nuclear weapons than we had 
30 years ago. And in terms of its total 
destructive power, our nuclear stockpile 
is at the lowest level in 25 years. 

Just 3 months ago, we and our allies 
agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear 
weapons from Western Europe. This 
comes after the withdrawal of 1,000 
nuclear weapons from Europe 3 years 
ago. Even if all our planned inter- 
mediate-range missiles have to be 
deployed in Europe over the next 5 
years— and we hope this will not be 
necessary— we will have eliminated five 
existing nuclear weapons for each new 
weapon deployed. 

But this is not enough. We must ac- 
celerate our efforts to reach agreements 
that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals 
provide greater stability, and build confi 
dence. 

Our third task is to establish a 
better working relationship with each 
other, one marked by greater coopera- 
tion and understanding. 

Cooperation and understanding are 
built on deeds, not words. Complying 
with agreements helps; violating them 
hurts. Respecting the rights of in- 
dividual citizens bolsters the relation- 
ship; denying these rights harms it. Ex- 
panding contacts across borders and 
permitting a free interchange of infor- 
mation and ideas increase confidence; 
sealing off one's people from the rest of 
the world reduces it. Peaceful trade 
helps, while organized theft of industrial 
secrets certainly hurts. 

Cooperation and understanding are 
especially important to arms control. In 
recent years, we've had serious concerns 
about Soviet compliance with agree 
ments and treaties. Compliance is impor 
tant because we seek truly effective 
arms control. However, there's been 
mounting evidence that provisions of 
agreements have been violated and thafc 
advantage has been taken of ambiguities 
in oiu- agreements. 



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Department of State Bulleti 



THE PRESIDENT 



In response to a congressional re- 
(|uest, a report on this will be submitted 
ill the next few days. It is clear that we 
cannot simply assume that agreements 
negotiated will be fulfilled. We must 
take the Soviet compliance record into 
account, both in the development of our 
defense program and in our approach to 
arms control. In our discussions with the 
Soviet Union, we will work to remove 
the obstacles which threaten to under- 
mine existing agreements and the 
broader arms control process. 

The examples I have cited illustrate 
why our relationship with the Soviet 
Union is not what it should be. We have 
a long way to go, but we're determined 
to try and try again. We may have to 
start in small ways, but start we must. 

U.S. Approach: Realism, 
Strength, and Dialogue 

In working on these tasks, our approach 
is based on three guiding principles: 
realism, strength, and dialogue. 

Realism. Realism means we must 
istart with a clear-eyed understanding of 
the world we live in. We must recognize 
that we are in a long-term competition 
with a government that does not share 
our notions of individual liberties at 
home and peaceful change abroad. We 
must be frank in acknowledging our dif- 
ferences and unafraid to promote our 
values. 

Strength. Strength is essential to 
negotiate successfully and protect our 
interests. If we're weak, we can do 
neither. Strength is more than military 
power. Economic strength is crucial, and 
.America's economy is leading the world 
into recovery. Equally important is our 
strength of spirit and unity among our 
people at home and with our allies 
abroad. We are stronger in all these 
areas than we were 3 years ago. 

Our strength is necessary to deter 
war and to facilitate negotiated solu- 
tions. Soviet leaders know it makes 
sense to compromise only if they can get 
something in return. America can now 
ffer something in return. 

Dialogue. Strength and dialogue go 
toPBhand in hand. We are determined to 
II'* Hdeal with our differences peacefully, 
through negotiations. We're prepared to 
iiscuss the problems that divide us and 
'0 work for practical, fair solutions on 
^he basis of mutual compromise. We will 
lever retreat from negotiations. 



I have openly expressed my view of 
the Soviet system. I don't know why this 
should come as a surprise to Soviet 
leaders, who've never shied from ex- 
pressing their view of our system. But 
this doesn't mean we can't deal with 
each other. We don't refuse to talk when 
the Soviets call us "imperialist ag- 
gressors" and worse, or because they 
cling to the fantasy of a communist 
triumph over democracy. The fact that 
neither of us likes the other's system is 
no reason to refuse to talk. Living in 
this nuclear age makes it imperative 
that we do talk. 

Our commitment to dialogue is firm 
and unshakable. But we insist that our 
negotiations deal with real problems, not 
atmospherics. In our approach to 
negotiations, reducing the risk of war — 
and especially nuclear war — is priority 
number one. A nuclear conflict could 
well be mankind's last. That is why I 
proposed over 2 years ago the "zero op- 
tion" for intermediate-range missiles. 
Our aim was and continues to be to 
eliminate an entire class of nuclear 
arms. 

Indeed, I support a zero option for 
all nuclear arms. As I have said before, 
my dream is to see the day when 



nuclear forces and has not set a date for 
the resumption of the talks on strategic 
arms and on conventional forces in 
Europe. Our negotiators are ready to 
return to the negotiating table to work 
toward agreements in INF, START, and 
MBFR [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces, strategic arms limitation talks, 
and mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions]. We will negotiate in good faith. 
'WTienever the Soviet Union is ready to 
do likewise, we'll meet them halfway. 

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals 
and to reduce the chances for dangerous 
misunderstanding and miscalculation. 
So, we have put forward proposals for 
what we call "confidence-building 
measures." They cover a wide range of 
activities. In the Geneva negotiations, 
we have proposed to exchange advance 
notifications of missile tests and major 
military exercises. Following up on con- 
gressional suggestions, we also proposed 
a number of ways to improve direct 
channels of communication. Last week, 
we had productive discussions with the 
Soviets here in Washington on improv- 
ing communications, including the 
hotline. 

These bilateral proposals will be 
broadened at the conference in Stock- 
holm. We are working with our allies to 



We're prepared to discuss the problems that divide 
us and to work for practical, fair solutions on the 
basis of mutual compromise. 



nuclear weapons will be banished from 
the face of the Earth. 

Last month, the Soviet Defense 
Minister stated that his country would 
do everything to avert the threat of war. 
These are encouraging words. But now 
is the time to move from words to 
deeds. 

The opportunity for progress in 
arms control exists; the Soviet leaders 
should take advantage of it. We have 
proposed a set of initiatives that would 
reduce substantially nuclear arsenals 
and reduce the risk of nuclear confronta- 
tion. 

The world regrets — certainly we 
do — that the Soviet Union broke off 
negotiations on intermediate-range 



develop practical, meaningful ways to 
reduce the uncertainty and potential for 
misinterpretation surrounding military 
activities and to diminish the risk of sur- 
prise attack. 

The Need to Defuse 
Tensions and Regional 
Conflicts 

Arms control has long been the most 
visible area of U.S. -Soviet dialogue. But 
a durable peace also requires ways for 
both of us to defuse tensions and 
regional conflicts. 

Take the Middle East as an exam- 
ple. Everyone's interests would be 
served by stability in the region, and our 



-ebruary 1984 



THE PRESIDENT 



efforts are directed toward that goal. 
The Soviets could help reduce tensions 
there instead of introducing sophisti- 
cated weapons into the area. This would 
certainly help us to deal more positively 
with other aspects of our relationship. 

Another major problem in our rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union is human 
rights. Soviet practices in this area, as 
much as any other issue, have created 



meet us halfway, we will be prepared to 
protect our interests and those of our 
friends and allies. But we want more 
than deterrence; we seek genuine 
cooperation; we seek progress for peace. 
Cooperation begins with communica- 
tion. As I have said, we will stay at the 
negotiating tables in Geneva and Vien- 
na. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will 
be meeting this week with Soviet 



Our request is simple and straightforward: 
that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it 
has freely assumed under international 
covenants. . . . 



the mistrust and ill will that hangs over 
our relationship. 

Moral considerations alone compel 
us to express our deep concern over 
prisoners of conscience in the Soviet 
Union and over the virtual halt in the 
emigration of Jews, Armenians, and 
others who wish to join their families 
abroad. 

Our request is simple and straight- 
forward: that the Soviet Union live up to 
the obligations it has freely assumed 
under international covenants — in par- 
ticular, its commitments under the 
Helsinki accords. Experience has shown 
that greater respect for human rights 
can contribute to progress in other areas 
of the Soviet-American relationship. 

Conflicts of interest between the 
United States and the Soviet Union are 
real. But we can and must keep the 
peace between our two nations and 
make it a better and more peaceful 
world for all mankind. 

A Challenge for Peace 

Our policy toward the Soviet Union— a 
policy of credible deterrence, peaceful 
competition, and constructive coopera- 
tion — will serve our two nations and 
people everywhere. It is a policy not just 
for this year but for the long term. It is 
a challenge for Americans. It is also a 
challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot 



Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stock- 
holm. This meeting should be followed 
by others, so that high-level consulta- 
tions become a regular and normal com- 
ponent of U.S. -Soviet relations. 

Our challenge is peaceful. It will 
bring out the best in us. It also calls for 
the best from the Soviet Union. 

We do not threaten the Soviet 
Union. Freedom poses no threat; it is 
the language of progress. We proved 
this 35 years ago when we had a 
monopoly of nuclear weapons and could 
have tried to dominate the world. But 
we didn't. Instead, we used our power to 
write a new chapter in the history of 
mankind. We helped rebuild war- 
ravaged economies in Europe and the 
Far East, including those of nations who 
had been our enemies. Indeed, those 
former enemies are now numbered 
among our staunchest friends. 

We can't predict how the Soviet 
leaders will respond to our challenge. 
But the people of our two countries 
share with all mankind the dream of 
eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It's 
not an impossible dream, because elimi- 
nating these risks is so clearly a vital in- 
terest for all of us. Our two countries 
have never fought each other; there is 
no reason why we ever should. Indeed, 
we fought common enemies in World 
War II. Today our common enemies are 
poverty, disease, and, above all, war. 

More than 20 years ago, President 
Kennedy defined an approach that is as 



valid today as when he announced it: 
"So, let us not be blind to our differ- 
ences," he said, "but let us also direct at- 
tention to our common interests and to 
the means by which those differences 
can be resolved." 

Well, those differences are differ- 
ences in governmental structure and 
philosophy. The common interests have 
to do with the things of everyday life for 
people everj'where. 

Just suppose with me for a moment, 
that an Ivan and Anya could find them- 
selves, say, in a waiting room or sharing 
a shelter from the rain or a storm with 
Jim and Sally, and there was no 
language barrier to keep them from get- 
ting acquainted. Would they then debate 
the differences between their respective 
governments'? Or would they find them- 
selves comparing notes about their 
children and what each other did for a 
living? 

Before they parted company they 
would probably have touched on ambi- 
tions and hobbies and what they wanted 
for their children and the problems of 
making ends meet. And as they went 
their separate ways, maybe Anya would 
be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she 
also teaches music." Maybe Jim would 
be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't 
like about his boss. They might even 
have decided that they were all going to 
get together for dinner some evening 
soon. 

Above all, they would have proven 
that people don't make wars. People 
want to raise their children in a world 
without fear and without war. They 
want to have some of the good things 
over and above bare subsistence that 
make life worth living. They want to 
work at some craft, trade, or profession 
that gives them satisfaction and a sense 
of worth. Their common interests cross 
all borders. 

If the Soviet Government wants 
peace, then there will be peace. 
Together we can strengthen peace, 
reduce the level of arms, and know in 
doing so we have helped fulfill the hopes 
and dreams of those we represent and 
indeed, of people everywhere. Let us 
begin now. 



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'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 23. 1983. 



Department of State Bulletiri 



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THE PRESIDENT 



Lebanon 



lings 



(FOS 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation on December 10, 1983.^ 

I'd like to talk to you today about the 
deep desire we all" share to bring peace 
to Lebanon. 

These past several weeks have 
brought bitter tragedy and sorrow to all 
of us. The loss of even one of our splen- 
did young Americans is an enormous 
price to pay. The number of dead and 
wounded is a terrible burden of grief for 
all Americans. It's unimaginably more so 
for the families who have lost a father, 
husband, a son, or a brother. Their 
deaths are testimony to the savage 
hatreds and greedy ambitions which 
have claimed so many innocent 
Lebanese lives. 

The human toll in Lebanon is stag- 
gering. Lebanon's losses since 1975 
would be comparable to the United 
States losing 10 million of its citizens. 
What conceivable reason can there be 
(or this wanton death and destruction? 

Lebanon's suffering began long 
oefore a single marine arrived. In the 
early 1970s many thousands of Palestini- 
ans entered Lebanon. Lebanon's fragile 
oolitical consensus collapsed, and a 
savage civil war broke out. 

The Palestinians also had a military, 
the armed PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization]. Trained in terrorist tac- 
tics by Soviet-bloc nations and Libya, 
the PLO joined the civil war and at- 
tacked Israeli targets, villages, and 
schools across the border between 
Lebanon and Israel. 

In the midst of all this, Syria was 
asked to intervene and stop the civil 
war. In the process, it occupied a large 
Dart of Lebanon. However, Syria did 
lothing to control terrorism against 
Israel's northern border. Israel decided 
:o neutralize the PLO and, in June 1982, 
■nounted a full-scale invasion across the 
jorder. This resulted in another major 
' -ound of fighting between Syria, the 
i>LO, and Israel. Shelling and bombing 
Dounded Beirut. Thousands more died. 

We negotiated a cease-fire and then 
loined the multinational force at the re- 
I juest of the Lebanese Government to 
nake possible the peaceful separation of 
he forces. This is the second time in 25 
rears that we have come to support the 
jebanese Government in restoring 



In 1958 President [Dwight D.] 
Eisenhower used a bipartisan congres- 
sional resolution to send 8.000 American 
soldiers and marines to Lebanon. When 
order was restored, our military came 
home. But in 1958 there were no occu- 
pying foreign armies, and there was no 
Soviet presence in Syria. Today, there 
are more than 7,000 Soviet military ad- 
visers and technicians. 

In September 1982 I offered a plan to 
bring peace to the region. It called for a 
just solution to the Palestinian problem 
as well as a reasonable settlement of 
issues between the Arab States and 
Israel. 

Success in Lebanon is centra! to sus- 
taining the broader peace process. We 
have vital interests in the Middle East 
which depend on peace stability in that 
region. Indeed, the entire world has 
vital interests there. The region is cen- 
tral to the economic vitality of the 
Western World. If we fail in Lebanon, 
what happens to the prospects for 
peace, not just in Lebanon but between 
Israel and her neighbors and in the en- 
tire Middle East? 

Once internal stability is established 
and withdrawal of all foreign forces is 
assured, the marines will leave. But 
because we care about human values for 
ourselves, so must we be concerned 
when freedom, justice, and liberty are 
abused elsewhere. That's the moral basis 
which brought our marines to Lebanon. 
We have acted with great restraint 
despite repeated provocations and 
murderous attacks. Our reconnaissance 
flights have only one purpose, and the 
Syrians know it: to give the greatest 



possible protection to our troops. We 
will continue to do whatever is needed 
to ensure the safety of our forces and 
our reconnaissance flights. 

The peace process is slow and pain- 
ful, but there is progress which would 
not have been possible without the 
multinational force. Last May with our 
help the Governments of Lebanon and 
Israel negotiated an agreement pro- 
viding for the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces. In September when the Israelis 
pulled back their forces from the Shuf 
Mountains near Beirut, Lebanese at- 
tempts to extend their authority into 
this area were met by violent opposition 
from forces supported by Syria. We will 
redouble our diplomatic efforts to pro- 
mote reconciliation and achieve 
withdrawal of all foreign forces. 

At a recent meeting in Geneva, all 
the Lebanese parties agreed to 
recognize the present government as the 
legitimate representative of the 
Lebanese people. Talks have begun to 
broaden the base of the government and 
to satisfy the legitimate grievances of all 
the people. 

My special envoy, Ambassador Don 
Rumsfeld, has returned to the region 
and will continue trying to move the 
peace process forward on all fronts. 
Lebanon's agony must end. 

Today is the 35th anniversary of the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Lebanese people are strug- 
gling for their human rights. We call 
upon everyone involved to give that 
birthright back to the Lebanese. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 19, 1983. 



News Conference of December 20 (Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan's 
news conference of December 20, 1983^ 

Q. Last week you said that if there's a 
complete collapse, you'll pull the 
troops out of Lebanon. Did you mean 
that if Gemayel fails to put together a 
broad, viable government that you'd 
pull out, or can you clarify? 

A. Actually I was asked a 
hyijothetical question about whether 



there were any other circumstances 
other than achieving our goal by which 
the Marines might leave or the whole 
multinational force, and I tried— I guess 
I tried to give a hypothetical answer to 
that and maybe a bad choice of words. 
I simply meant that the only thing 
I— and I don't foresee this— but the only 
thing I could think of, other than achiev- 
ing our goal, would be if perhaps that 
government and the forces that he's 
dealing with in trying to broaden the 
government, if there should be a com- 
plete change of course to the place that 



,Byilelif|ebruary 1984 



,, *fc -ft 'I 
• S t» si >• • 



THE PRESIDENT 



we were no longer asked to be there, 
that they were going in a different direc- 
tion than the one that brought us in the 
first place at their request, then I sup- 
pose that would be a reason for bringing 
them out. But I wasn't trying to send 
anyone a message or anything. I was 
just trying to say: Yes. you can't say 
there isn't any other way by which they 
wouldn't come out. 

Q. Do you think that you've put 
the U.S. — the peacekeeper role in 
jeopardy by making a military pact at 
this time with a country that's invad- 
ed, annexed, and occupied Arab land? 

A. We didn't make any pact or 
anything that was different from what 
has been our relationship all along. 
There was a reaffirmation of this. In 
talking to Prime Minister [Yitzhak] 
Shamir we also emphasized that we 
were going to go forward with our rela- 
tions with the moderate Arab States as 
part of our hope for being a catalyst — or 
trying to be — in bringing them all 
together and ending once and for all 
these hostilities that have so disturl)ed 
that area and caused such tragedy for sn 
long. 

There was no signed agreement or 
anything else. We were really reaffirm- 
ing the relationship that we've had since 
1948, but, at the same time, telling them 
that if we're to have any chance of 
bringing them together or continuing a 
process that started at Camp David, 
where Egypt and Israel wound up with 
a peace treaty — if we're to have a 
chance of bringing that kind of a 
peace — we've got to befriend all those 
countries. And they've got to be able to 
trust us that we can be fair to all of 
them. 

Q. The death squad activity is con- 
tinuing in El Salvador. Are you 
sati-sfied now with the progress the 
government there is making in halting 
it, and if not, how long can you con- 
tinue supporting a nation where this 
takes place'/ 

A. I feel that we have to continue 
supporting them just as long as we 
would be supporting them against the 
leftist guerrillas that are trying to take 
over the government. We have a situa- 
tion here of a 40()-year history of mainly 
military dictatorships. And now, for the 
first time, virtually, in all that country's 
history, we have a government that has 
made it plain that they are trying to 
establish democratic principles and 
policies. 

They're being assailed from the left 
by the Cuban and Soviet-backed guer- 
rilla forces. But at the same time they're 



being sniped at from the rear — they're 
called the death squads and the so-called 
rightists, who, by the same token, don't 
want democracy. They want to go back 
to what they've had in this 400-year 
history. The El Salvador Government 
has made great progress in establishing 
democracy. They're hindered in their 
fight against the guerrillas by this action 
behind their backs. But you have to look 
at punishing that government for trying 
to be democratic when it is being assail- 
ed from radicals from both sides. Our 
obligation is to try and help democracy 
triumph there, and this is why we've of- 
fered some help. 

When the Vice President went down 
there recently and told them about how 
essential it is to get a handle on this 
force from the rear as well as the one on 
their front that they're fighting, he was 
very well received, and there was no 
disagreement with what he said. There 
has been a stepped-up effort, and they 
want technical help from us in that 
regard that we are willing and can pro- 
vide. 

Q. Was the Vice President carry- 
ing a direct message from you on the 
death squads? 

A. Yes, yes. And he had his own 
words, also, about it, and I'm in com- 
plete agreement with those, too. 

Q. The House subcommittee in- 
vestigating the bombing in Beirut has 
found— and I quote— "very serious er- 
rors in judgment were made both by 
officers on the ground and up the 
military command." Do you feel that 
disciplinary action should be taken 
against officers found responsible by 
Congress or the Pentagon? 

A. There are two reports. There's a 
very voluminous report and a complete 
one that has been brought in by the 
military team that's been investigating 
this, as well as the congressional group. 
Both of those have just arrived at the 
Defense Department, and Secretary 
Weinberger is having a complete study 
made of them and will then submit a 
report to me on his findings, probably 
within the next several days. But they 
are voluminious, and it's going to take a 
little while. So, I can't comment now un- 
til I see what those findings have been 
in both reports. 

The Secretary also has said that, 
other than things that must remain 
classified for security reasons, he also 
intends to make public the findings in 
those reports as quickly as possible. 



Q. Two days after the bombing, 
the Marine Commandant, P. X. Kelley, 
was in Beirut and said that he was 
completely satisfied with the security 
there. Was he being straight with the 
American people, and do you still have 
confidence in him? 

A. Yes, I do, very much. And I 
think he was, on the basis of what he 
saw, what was there — the main issue, 
then, that he was addressing himself to 
was, could anyone prepare themselves 
for this unusual attack that took such a 
tragic toll? The moving of the men in 
such numbers into that building was 
done because that was the safest 
building from the standpoint of the 
weapons that had been used against 
them up until that point— mortar fire, 
small-arms fire — and it was a steel- 
reinforced concrete building. No, I don't 
think he was attempting to cover up for 
anyone. 



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Q. There have been in the past few 
weeks dump trucks surrounding the 
White House. When you traveled to 
Indianapolis, there were buses block- 
ing intersections to protect you. Then 
are reports that ihere are ground-to- 
air missiles now near the White 
House. Could you tell the American 
people what the nature of the threat i: 
and how this all makes you feel as 
President to have this going on 
around you? 

A. I just feel such popularity must 
be deserved. [Laughter] Frankly, I had 
not noticed the blocked intersections. I 
hadn't paid any attention to it, and I 
was waving to the people along the 
street in that appearance. The only 
thing I regret is the inconvenience — 
when necessary moves' have to be 
made — the inconvenience that I can 
cause to many other people in this. 

There are no specific or definite 
threats that any of us know of here. We|5fiijees Jii 
only know that worldwide there has 
been a call in a number of these ter- 
rorist groups for stepped-up violence 
The term "United States" has been used 
as a potential target. 

Actually, there has been a decline. 
Last year, there were 52 terrorist in- 
cidents in the United States. This year, 
so far — and the year's practically 
over — there have only been 31. And 
there has been no call for special 



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THE PRESIDENT 



up violence in the Middle East, mainly. 
It would be — it's far easier to explain 
taking precautions than it is to have 
something happen and then have to ex- 
plain why vou didn't do something about 
it. 

Q. But you are concerned that by 
building these barriers that you may 
give the impression that you might be 
giving in to threats and terrorists? 

A. I don't think it's giving in to set 
up a barricade to keep somebody from 
doing this. You know, there have been 
attempts to ram the gates at the White 
House during these 3 years that we've 
been here. There've been some people 
that have gone over the fence. 

So, I think that these are just nor- 
mal security precautions in a climate 
that has shown us that this sort of thing 
can happen. And, as far as I'm con- 
cerned, I haven't let it interfere with my 
sleep or my work in the office. 



Q. It seems evident from the polls 
that the American people do not sup- 
port the U.S. Marine presence in 
Lebanon right now. Whether the 
Dolicy is right or wrong, do you 
jelieve the public will put up with 
continuing American deaths there? 

A. I can understand the public opin- 
on, because they're hearing great at- 
:acks from a number of sources on our 
Dresence there; some of them, I think, 
oolitically motivated. But I have to say 
:his about the mission, the purpose in 
jeing there. They do have a purpose and 
1 mission there. And there has been a 
"esult from this and progress made. 

If you will recall, it's been several 
/ears, of course, since Lebanon, kind of, 
^ame unglued and the government was 
lelpless to stop some of the troubles in 
ts own land. We had the factor of more 
;han a million refugees, Palestinian 
•efugees in Lebanon. They've been there 
"or decades. And over this period of 
;ime, they created their own militia, the 
i'LO, a military and terrorist group. 
Bseifrhis group was not only causing trouble 
vithin Lebanon; it was crossing the 
lorthern border of Israel. It was prey- 
ng on civilians, citizens there. And, 
'inally, Israel crossed the border into 
jebanon. 

The first goal was to simply push 
hem back some 25 miles so they'd be 
)eyond rocket or artillery range. But the 
|j)thers just repeated, and then kept on 
ittacking them. So, they went all the 
vay to the edge of Beirut. Then we had 



ebruary 1984 



a war taking place right within the city 
of Beirut in which thousands of civilians 
have been killed and wounded by this 
kind of combat. 

In the meantime, during all of this, 
the Lebanese asked the Syrians to come 
in and help preserve order, because in 
Lebanon we had, and have, groups — 
various, sometimes religious groups, but 
other groups, like warlords, with their 
own militias. They're fighting each other 
and, at times, fighting against the forces 
of the Lebanese Government. 

We were then asked to come in with 
the multinational force. We went in, 
once the government had been formed 
there and once the PLO, when they 
were rejected, as they were — granted 
they came back later by way of Syria. 
But the goal and the idea was for the 
two foreign forces that were then left 
after the PLO left to get out. But the 
Lebanese Government needed time to 
build its strength to where it could then 
go in with these internecine groups that 
were fighting there— go in and establish 
order over its own territory. 

Israel, having completed its mission, 
announced its willingness and intention 
to get out. Syria did, too. Then for some 
reason Syria reneged on that promise 
and has refused to get out, even though 
they have now been officially asked to 
get out by the government that asked 
them to come in. 

During the occupation by both Syria 
and the Israelis, they managed to keep 
some hold on those fighting groups in 
there, some order. The mission of the 
multinational force is what it was then. 
We have helped train the Lebanese Ar- 
my, and it is a capable force. We have 
armed it. When the other forces— the 
foreign forces get out and the Lebanese 
military advances to try and establish 
order in their land, the multinational 
force is supposed to, behind them, try to 
achieve some stability and maintain 
order, because Lebanon doesn't have the 
forces to do both. This is the mission. 
Progress has been made. The war- 
ring forces meeting in Geneva have 
acknowledged that the Gemayel govern- 
ment is the legitimate government of 
Lebanon. There is an agreement that 
has been reached and signed between 
Lebanon and Israel in which Israel has 
agreed in writing that they will 
withdraw. Indeed, I think they're anx- 
ious to. Now, the stumbling block still 
seems to be Syria. 

But at the same time, the Gemayel 
government is trying to bring these 



other forces in Lebanon, and if they will 
remember that they're Lebanese also 
and they want a Lebanon for the 
Lebanese people, they will come in at his 
request and join the government. He's 
trying to broaden the base of the 
government to give them representation 
and end that kind of fighting there. 

Progress has been made toward the 
goal when you think back to where we 
were when airplanes and artillery were 
destroying the civilian sections of Beirut. 

Q. Each week the United States 
seems to be using greater and greater 
firepower there. We had returning 
hostile fire, then artillery, then 
airstrikes, and now the 16-inch guns 
of the New Jersey. You said last week 
that you don't want escalation or a 
war. Can you avoid without Syrian 
cooperation? 

A. You can avoid war. But I will 
say this, and I'll reiterate it: I will not 
okay a mission or ask or order our 
Armed Forces to go someplace where 
there is danger and tell them that they 
have not the right to defend themselves. 
So, when the sniping began and there 
was no retaliation, I made it plain by 
way of the channels in the Pentagon, as 
far as I was concerned, when an 
American military man is shot at, he can 
shoot back. There's been some indication 
that rather than stepped-up activity that 
there has been some pause for thought 
on those that were deciding that the 
multinational forces were fair game. 

I don't say that they won't try these 
terrorist activities again; I'm sure they 
will. But are we, and where would we be 
in the world— are we to let the ter- 
rorists win? Are we to say that, well, if 
terrorists are going to be active, we'll 
give in to them; we'll back away? 



Q. You said earlier tonight that 
you would not send American soldiers 
or marines into a situation where they 
could not fight back. Haven't we sent 
them into a role in Beirut, a political, 
a diplomatic role as peacekeepers 
where they do not have adequate 
safeguards against terrorism? 

A. No, I don't know what you call 
adequate safeguards against terrorists 
or what we would call it. You know 
anytime that you— and particularly in a 
place like that, where even innocent 
civilians in the street are mowed down 
simply because snipers want to shoot 
someone— it's been that kind of a scene. 



.• I /I 



THE PRESIDENT 



It's that kind of a thing that we're trying 
to resolve in behalf of the innocent peo- 
ple there who want to live in peace like 
the rest of us. 

Sometime I'm going to impose on 
you and read some of the letters that I 
get from people in Lebanon who tell us 
what life would be like if the multina- 
tional force wasn't there, and what it 
has meant in their lives as individuals 
living in the midst of that kind of 
brutality and bloodshed. I was under no 
illusion — and I have to tell you that I 
have discovered for myself that the 
hardest thing you'll ever have to do in 
this job is give an order that put some of 
those wonderful young men and women 
in our military uniforms in places like 
that. But in the interest of our own na- 
tional security and in the interest of 
overall peace, some of these things have 
to be done. 

The Middle East is a tinderbox. It is 
the one place that could start a war that 
no one wanted because of its impor- 
tance, particularly to the free world and 
to our allies. And we can't just turn 
away and say if we don't look, it'll go 
away. This all started because of our 
determination to try and bring about 
peace between those factions that have 
been for so long warring with each 
other. The moderate Arab states again 
and the progress that we've made — 
there was a refusal on their part to even 
acknowledge the right of Israel to exist 
as a nation. So, therefore, there could be 
no negotiation. 

Anwar Sadat broke out of that 
mold, and we have peace between two 
countries. And the territory of the Sinai 
has been returned to Egypt by Israel, 
and they're at peace with each other. 
Our goal was to see if we couldn't find 
more leaders and more governments 
that would become Egypts, in a sense, 
in settling their disputes and having 
peace. 

And today the very fact that there's 
an indication that they are willing and 
prepared to negotiate differences in- 
dicates that they no longer are holding 
that position of refusing to let Israel 
exist. 

Q. Does it give you some pause 
when conservative thinkers like 
William F. Buckley. Jr., and Richard 
Viguerie suggest that you should be 
taking the Marines home'/ 

A. 1 take my friend Bill more 
seriously. I read that column, too, and 
I'll have to have a talk with him shortly. 



Q. The subcommittee report that 
was mentioned earlier tonight also 
concluded that continued deployment 
of the Marines will almost certainly 
lead to further casualties. I know you 
don't want to discuss what the securi- 
ty arrangements were before the at- 
tack, but what about now? Are you 
confident that as of tonight the 
Marines in Beirut are as protected as 
they can be, given where they are? 

A. I won't be able to answer that 
again until I too see the reports, par- 
ticularly the report that is coming in 
that's very voluminous and must go into 
great detail. It's about that thick, and it 
has been made by military experts. So, I 
just can't comment until I know. 

Q. Are you saying that you aren't 
sure at this point whether tonight the 
Marines are as adequately protected as 
they can be? 

A. I think they are to the extent 
that those on the field and the officers 
that are involved there are doing 
everything they can to ensure that. I 
just have to assume that. And I think 
that I'm justified in assuming it. 

Q. Within days of your inaugura- 
tion in 1981, you vowed that 
Americans would not be held hostage 
again. The Syrians are holding airman 
Lt. Robert Goodman and say they 
won't release him until the Marines 
leave Lebanon. Do you consider Lt. 
Goodman a hostage? And what efforts 
are underway to secure his release? 

A. We have believed for a long time 
that the settlement there must be — in 
this whole area — must be political. I 
should have said this earlier, in my 
answer before about the history of this 
Lebanese situation. But we've had Am- 
bassadors there from Phil Habib to Am- 
bassador McFarlane, and now, Don 
Rumsfeld, because we're determined 
that there is a possibility. It is the only 
way. You cannot — this can't be settled 
by force. And it is going to be settled 
that way. 

Ambassador Rumsfeld has been in 
Damascus. He has met with the Syrians. 
Certainly, that is very high on the 
agenda. The Syrians claim that he's a 
prisoner of war. I don't know how you 
have a prisoner of war when there is no 
declared war between nations. I don't 
think that makes you eligible for the 
Geneva accords. 



But, yes, we want that young man 
back. And, we're not missing anjlhing, 
any possibility in trying to bring to 
terms these various factions so that we 
can achieve the goal of restoring order, 
a broader based government in Lebanon 
acceptable to more of the people, those 
that are presently hostile to this govern- 
ment, and the foreign forces back to 
their own borders. 

Q. Is Lt. Goodman, in your 
opinion, a hostage? And do you think 
the Syrians will use him as a bargain- 
ing chip? 

A. I doubt that very much. I really 
do. In the sense of holding it up for 
trading something or other, no, I don't 
believe so. But I'm sorry that he is 
there. And I'm glad he is alive. We're 
going to make every effort to get him 
back as quickly as possible. 



Q. When will the Marines come 
home, do you think? 

A. The Marines will come home as 
quickly as it is possible to bring them 
home in accomplishing our mission. And 
I'm glad you asked that. I'm glad I did 
stay just for that, because I want to say 
one thing. There have been some sug- 
gestions — there have been some sugges- 
tions made with regard to bringing therr 
home that some of my considerations 
might be based on the fact that in an 
election year — and politics are coming 
up — I will tell you this: No decision 
regarding the lives and the safety of our 
servicemen will ever be made by me for 
a political reason. 



'Text fr(im Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 26. 1983. 



State Bulletir 



iwf «,«, a». i« 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President Bush Visits Latin America 



Vice President Bush led the U.S. 
delegation to the inauguration of Argen- 
tine President Raul Alfonsin (Decem- 
ber 9-11, 1983) and then visited Panama 
(December 11) and El Salvador 
(Deroiiher 11). 

Following is the toasf made by the 
Vice President at a dinner hosted by 
President Alvaro Borja Magana in San 
Salvador on December 11.'' 

Mr. President, I have been most im- 
pressed by your warm hospitality. You 
have welcomed me as a friend. I hope 
you will permit me, in that same spirit 
of friendship, to use this occasion to con- 
vey to you and your fellow countrymen 
some thoughts from my own perspective 
and that of President Reagan. 

The American people have developed 
a great admiration for the people of El 
Salvador. You are on the front lines 
fighting for liberty against communist 
aggression. The extraordinary 80% 
voter turnout in the Constituent 
Assembly elections of 1982 demon- 
strated your people's deep faith in 
democracy even under the most difficult 
of circumstances. 

Mr. President, I know that you 
share that faith. I know that you and 
many other Salvadorans are personally 
committed to democracy, reform, and 
human rights. But in your struggle to 
bring peace and justice to your people, 
you have more than one enemy. The 
brave Salvadoran patriots who are now 
fighting to build their new deomocracy 
are under attack not only from com- 
munist guerrillas supported from abroad 
but also from extremist rightwing ter- 
rorists, the death squads, that small 
group of people within your own society 
who operate outside the law. 

A guerrilla war is a long, arduous 
effort fought on many fronts: military, 
economic, social, and political. But the 



crucial battle is not for territory; it is for 
men's minds. The gjuerrillas never lose 
sight of that objective. They know the 
government is responsible for protecting 
the people. So their goal is to cripple the 
government, distort its priorities, and 
sow doubt about its legitimacy. 

For a government to survive a guer- 
rilla challenge, it must continue to pro- 
tect its citizens even as it fights to de- 
fend itself from those who play by other 
rules— or no rules at all. As it does, it 
must continue to respect the rule of law 
and the rights of the individual. And it 
must honor basic human decencies. If it 
does not, it will lose that crucial battle 
for the support and approval of the 
people. 

Mr. President, you and many other 
Salvadorans have demonstrated extraor- 
dinary personal courage in the struggle 
against tyranny and extremism, but 
your cause is being undermined by the 
murderous violence of reactionary 
minorities. 

Tom Pickering's [U.S. Ambassador 
to El Salvador] remarks— which I great- 
ly admire and which the President and I 
both fully endorse— were right on the 
mark. These rightwing fanatics are the 
best friends the Soviets, the Cubans, the 
Sandinista comandantes, and the 
Salvadoran guerrillas have. Every 
murderous act they commit poisons the 
well of friendship between our two coun- 
tries and advances the cause of those 
who would impose an alien dictatorship 
on the people of El Salvador. These 
cowardly death squad terrorists are just 
as repugnant to me, to President 
Reagan, to the U.S. Congress, and to 
the American people as the terrorists of 
the left. 

Mr. President, I know that these 
words are not those of the usual dinner 
toast. My intention is not to abuse your 
hospitality nor to offend you and your 



other guests. I speak as a friend, one 
who is committed to your success— the 
success of democracy in El Salvador. 
And I owe it to you as a friend to speak 
frankly. 

We in the United States have never 
asked that others be exactly like us. 
We're a nation that is constantly 
debating its own shortcomings. But on 
certain fundamental principles, all 
Americans are united. 

I ask you as a friend not to make 
the mistake of thinking that there is any 
division in my country on this question. 
It is not just the President, it is not just 
me or the Congress. If these death 
squad murders continue, you will lose 
the support of the American people, and 
that would indeed be a tragedy. 

Mr. President, your brave people 
and mine have so much in common. 
Your land reform has our full support, 
and your staunch resistance to com- 
munism has earned our great respect. 
Now is the time to move vigorously to 
consolidate the democratic gains you 
have made and to establish fully func- 
tioning democratic institutions in El 
Salvador. 

The people of El Salvador have 
shown the world their courage and com- 
mitment to democracy by turning out to 
vote in overwhelming numbers despite 
communist death threats, and they have 
done honor to the democratic tradition 
through their dynamic political debate 
and action in the Constituent Assembly. 
The presidential elections the assembly 
has scheduled for March 25 will 
strengthen your society and confirm the 
bonds between our two peoples. 

Mr. President, I offer a toast to the 
Salvadoran people: may they soon come 
to enjoy the long deferred peace and 
prosperity they deserve. 



'Text from the Vice President's Office of 
the Press Secretary. ■ 



February 1984 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa 



Secretary Shidtz departed 
Washington, D.C., on December 6, 1983. 
to visit Bonn (December 6-7), Brussels 
(December 7-9) to attend the regular 
semiannual session of the North Atlantic 
Council ministerial meeting, Tunis 
(December 9-10), Rabat (Decem- 
ber 10-12), and Lisbon (December 12-13). 
He returned to Washington on December 
13. 

Following are news conferences and 
statements he made during this trip, as 
well as the texts of the declaration of 
Brussels and the final communique 
issued at the conclu.^ion of the North 
Atlantic Council meeting. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BONN, 

DEC. 7, 1983' 

Secretary Shultz. I'd like to express my 
appreciation to my host in this brief visit 
to Germany, my friend Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, and also to Chancellor Kohl, 
for the time and excellent meeting that 
we had last night. Then today we had a 
series of meetings with other leaders of 
Germany. It's been a very short time, 
very full, very worthwhile from my 
standpoint. I must say also that the 
United States, as in the case of Ger- 
many, remains firmly committed to both 
tracks of the dual-track decision. We are 
very impressed with the way the Ger- 
man people have handled the deploy- 
ment issue, and we are as committed as 
they to continue on and to maintain our 
own willingness to continue negotiations 
about these matters at any and all 
times. 

Q. Could you tell us what your 
position will be on the conference in 
Stockholm which begins January 17? 
Will you personally participate? 

Secretary Shultz. I have discussed 
this on this trip with Mr. Genscher and 
Mr. Kohl. And I expect that we will 
discuss it in the NATO ministerial 
meeting coming up tomorrow. It's an im- 
portant conference and there are strong 
arguments that the presence of foreign 
ministers at the opening of the con- 
ference will serve to emphasize the com- 
mitment to it and its importance. 

The position of the (jnited States is 
that we will want to discuss this with 
our colleagues and if the decision is, as I 
kind of expect it will be, that we will 
feel it important to go, then I certainly 
will be present at Stockholm. 



10 



Q. Could you address yourself to 
the issue of whether you will be 
prepared to meet Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko in Stockholm if it 
turns out that both you and Foreign 
Minister Gromkyo are, in fact, there? 

Secretary Shultz. Surely, if we are 
both there, I will be more than ready to 
meet with Mr. Gromyko. But, of course, 
that depends upon whether we all go. as 
I believe probably the Western decision 
will be to go, and whether he is there. 
And, at least from my standpoint, we 
will work on our schedules in any way 
necessary to make such a meeting possi- 
ble if it is desired by Mr. Gromyko. We 
certainly will be ready to meet. 

Q. Are there differences of opinion 
between you and the Federal Govern- 
ment over a NATO strategy which, in 
the opinion of the Federal Govern- 
ment, could be based on the Harmel 
report? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't sense any 
great difficulties in strategy between the 
United States and the Federal Republic 
of Germany. We consult constantly and 
try to coordinate our views very care- 
fully. And I think the way in which all 
these matters have been conducted has 
been an almost unprecedented display of 
consultation and, in the end, a unity of 
view on what we should do. Would you 
agree with that, Hans-Dietrich? 

Foreign Minister Genscher. I 
believe that the introductory remarks by 
the U.S. Secretary of State, in which he 
again pledged his continuing commit- 
ment to both parts of the NATO double- 
track decision, reveal that both elements 
of the common political security 
strategies — that is the determination to 
pursue one's own security interests, the 
necessity to do what is required to main- 
tain security, and readiness to conduct a 
dialogue and negotiations for disarma- 
ment and detente — are policy objectives 
of both Administrations. 

Q. Do you think that the time will 
be ripe soon for a new Western 
negotiating initiative in matters of 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces]? 

Secretary Shultz. I think, from the 
standpoint of the INF issues, we have 
put proposals on the table. We have ad- 
justed them. We have displayed a great 
amount of flexibility. The one thing that 
we have insisted on is — a result in which 
the Soviet Union has a complete 



monopoly of intermediate-range 
weapons in Europe, and Asia for that 
matter, is not our idea of equality. But, 
given that, we would like to see equality 
defined as zero. But if that's not desired, 
we'll look at other ways of defining it. 
We don't think it's equality to have 
deployments on one side and none on 
the other. We're prepared to resume 
negotiations and talks and to listen to 
what the other side has to say within 
that framework. 

Foreign Minister Genscher. It is 
not up to the West to take an initiative 
at the INF negotiations, for the West 
has put its negotiating proposals on the 
table and the West remains at the con- 
ference table as before. It is now up to 
the Soviet Union to be ready for 
negotiations again. 

Q. After a possible meeting in 
Stockholm with Gromyko, would you 
exclude a coupling of INF and START 
in Geneva? 

Secretary Shultz. I know that there 
have been good arguments not to do 
that; they are not changed by what has 
happened, so I don't know of any great 
discussion of that question. 

Q. [Inaudible] this occasion that 
the deployment of Pershing II and 
cruise missiles will accelerate as the 
5-year period foreseen passes. Is it the 
case, therefore, that deployment is not 
proceeding slowly as a tactical signal 
to the Soviet Union that there is yet 
time for an agreement? Or is deploy- 
ment proceeding at a fixed rate? 

Secretary Shultz. There has been a 
schedule that was decided upon and the 
schedule is unaltered. The first part of 
the schedule is in the process of being 
implemented, and it will continue, as I 
said. I think the main point is that we in 
the West have values that are important 
to us. And we feel we must defend 
them, and we are determined to defend 
them. We also feel that among the ways 
of defending them is to engage in con- 
structive negotiations. But they have to 
be constructive negotiations. Now the 
deployment schedule is part of that proc- 
ess. But I think the emphasis should be 
on the values and the concern that we 
have for those values and our readiness 
to defend those values. 

Q. Polish trade union leader 
Walesa called on the West to drop its 
sanctions and consider giving further 
credits. Is the U.S. Government will- 
ing to consider this? 



J) BUT Sift ||^. %0. 
1^ l'> 19 'i& ft. 




THE SECRETARY 



Secretary Shultz. We have had a 
poHcy that once again was discussed 
with our allies. That's an alliance policy, 
of sanctions in views of the actions of 
the Polish Government. These are sanc- 
tions against the government, not 
against the Polish people whose per- 
formance has been magnificent. I don't 
see that the government has taken 
measures that would warrant just lifting 
sanctions or extending more credits or 
anything of that kind. However, we ex- 
amine the situation continuously, and I 
am sure that Mr. Genscher and I will 
discuss it some more. We discuss it 
practically every time we meet, and we'll 
review it. But at this stage of the game, 
we think that actions that would be 
taken ought to be a response to 
something constructive done by the 
Polish Government, and we will just 
have to examine that. 

Q. Despite all of the preparations 
for the arrival of cruise missiles and 
Pershings, opponents of these missiles 
have managed to break through the 
defenses at Schwabisch Gmund in Ger- 
many. What does this say about the 
state of American, German, and 
British security arrangements? 

Secretary Shultz. I believe what we 
are intending to do will take place and I 
have full confidence in the governments 
to maintain the security and we'll pro- 
ceed. 

Foreign Minister Genscher. You 
will have noted that the Federal Govern- 
ment has implemented in the past, is 
implementing at present, and will imple- 
ment in the future all decisions recog- 
nized as important and necessary re- 
garding security measures. 

Q. [Inaudible] 

Secretary Shultz. We discussed 
that some, and I didn't detect any par- 
ticular difference of opinion. The situa- 
tion in Lebanon is obviously a very 
troublesome one. 

So far as the escalation is concerned, 
on the one hand, I think, it is important 
to recognize that our forces are there as 
part of a multinational force. In fact, the 
international community is represented 
further by the presence of UNIFIL [UN 
Interim Force in Lebanon] in Lebanon, 
which shows that extent to which the in- 
ternational community worries about 
and wants to help Lebanon construct 
itself. That's what we are there for. We 
are there in support of that objective in 
Lebanon, and we are there in support of 
stability and peace in the Middle East. 



February 1984 



So there have been lots of outbreaks of 
violence and as long as we are there, of 
course, we will have to defend ourselves 
and we will continue to do that. 

Q. [Largely inaudible question 
about how the Secretary views the 
contrast between the agreement of his 
European government colleag^ues on 
the INF issue and the opposition of 
European publics.] 

Secretary Shultz. We are 
democracies. Germany is. The United 
States is. And we have a way of making 
decisions; it is through people taking 
positions and the holding of elections. 
Then on that basis those who are elected 
take positions on behalf of their govern- 
ments. And that's what's happened here. 
That's what's happened in our country. 
That's what happens in democracies. So, 
I think that when you say that a 
democratic government takes a position 
on something, that doesn't mean that 
every member of the population agrees 
with it, but it means that there has been 
a proper process gone through and 
debate and open elections and so on. 
And that certainly has been the case 
here in Germany. 

Q. [Largely inaudible question 
about the escalation of American in- 
volvement in Lebanon.) 

Secretary Shultz. Our method of 
involvement is basically to try to help 
bring about peace and stability through 
encouraging negotiation. We managed 
to help the parties a little over a year 
ago to evacuate the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] from Beirut 
and to the great benefit of the people 
and the physical facilities in Beirut. We 
have continued to try to bring about the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces. I think 
that's the right route, and the 
emergence of a broadly based sovereign 
government in Lebanon. We helped to 
negotiate an agreement between Israel 
and Lebanon, and there is absolutely no 
doubt about the fact that Israel will 
withdraw from Lebanon. It remains to 
find the way of implementing that 
agreement and to find the way of bring- 
ing about Syrian withdrawal. 

There is a definite strategy and plan 
for bringing these things about, 
although obviously it is not easy because 
we have all been at it for quite awhile. 
But that's our strategy and I believe 
that the quality of people we have had in 
these roles there — Phil Habib, Bob 
McFarlane, Dick Fairbanks, Morrie 
Draper, and now Don Rumsfeld — has 



been very high. Our special negotiator 
now, Don Rumsfeld, is one of the most 
distinguished Americans who has had 
the political experience of running for 
office, being a Member of Congress who 
has occupied distinguished posts in the 
executive branch, including Ambassador 
to NATO, and Secretary of Defense, let 
alone running the poverty program in 
the United States, and also now being a 
successful business executive. He is a 
very distinguished and high-quality per- 
son. So we try to give our best to this 
effort. 

Q. [Inaudible] What Poland needs 
now is aid in the amount of millions of 
dollars. As the spokesman of the 
Polish regime has stated earlier, even 
if the sanctions continue, the govern- 
ment will not starve. Are you of the 
opinion that the sanctions should be 
continued in order to cause hardship 
for the Polish people and, in turn, to 
destabilize the government? 

Foreign Minister Genscher. We 
have always held the opinion that a 
positive move by those politically respon- 
sible in Poland should receive a positive 
reaction from the West. In all our ac- 
tions concerning the People's Republic of 
Poland, we have always valued highly 
what the Catholic Church has said re- 
garding the interests of the Polish 
people — and, of course, also what Polish 
labor leader Walesa has said during the 
past few days will receive our due con- 
sideration. I presume that this will 
already come up for discussion among 
the foreign ministers within the next 
few days. 

Q. Do you think that an active 
U.S. military presence in Latin 
America is necessary? How do you 
assess the last decisions in Managua? 

Secretary Shultz. We don't have a 
military presence in Central America in 
the use of military forces. We have exer- 
cises that are taking place in that 
region, particularly with Honduras. 
Those are things that have taken place 
in the past, and so we have put a 
presence down there, and it is designed 
for a training mission and also to give a 
message that we can muster forces in 
that area. 

But basically, the policies of the 
United States are first of all to seek 
economic development for the Central 
American people. They need it. Second, 
to sponsor political conditions that em- 
phasize democratic procedures, freedom, 
justice, and things of that kind. Third, to 



I .• .1 ^1 



THE SECRETARY 



help them provide a security shield 
against those who would support prog- 
ress in economic development and social 
reform. And so we have provided 
assistance to the Salvadoran Armed 
Forces among others. And finally, to 
urge that there be negotiations. We 
believe that it is essentially a regional 
problem and, therefore, regional 
negotiations are appropriate. So we sup- 
port the Contadora process, and we sup- 
port what's going on there. 

Insofar as recent statements from 
Nicaragua are concerned, first of all we 
welcome the 21-point agreement worked 
out through the Contadora process, and 
we welcome the fact that what 
Nicaragua says now is vastly different 
from what it said 6 or 8 months ago. 
What we look for is a willingness to put 
a reality behind the rhetoric, and that 
remains to be seen. But we think there 
will be many opportunities to do that 
within the Contadora process. 

Q. Since the Marshall Plan ini- 
tiative, all U.S. Governments have 
hoped for a strong and healthy Europe 
as a partner. Is a Europe whose 
leaders have just failed to reach an 
agreement on any item on their agen- 
da the kind of strong and healthy part- 
ner the United States desires? 

Secretary Shultz. Europe is strong 
and healthy. Like the United States, like 
lots of other parts of the world, there 
are problems, I am sure. The fact that 
one meeting doesn't produce results that 
satisfy people is not an indication that 
all is lost by any means. We continue to 
place great weight on our relationships 
with NATO, on our relationships with 
the Community. And I plan to meet not 
only with the NATO ministers during 
this trip but also with the European 
Community. 

Insofar as relations between Europe 
and the United States are concerned on 
the economic side, of course, we have 
some important strains but I think it is 
also well to keep that in perspective. 
There is a two-way trade between 
Europe and the United States on the 
order of an annual rate of ,$90 billion. 
We must be doing something right, and 
that's mutually beneficial. As we strug- 
gle with the problems, I think it is well 
to keep in mind the very beneficial 
results from this huge two-way flow of 
trade and also from our mutual security 
support system. 



Q. [Inaudible] 

Secretary Shultz. No, I don't think 
that it does have any bearing on the 
Atlantic alliance at all, which is strong, 
and insofar as the accession of Spain is 
concerned, I'll let Hans-Dietrich address 
himself to that, but I don't consider that 
that question is over by any stretch of 
the imagination. 

Foreign Minister Genscher. There 
have not been any differences of opinion 
at all concerning the continuation of 
negotiations over the accession of Spain 
and Portugal. To the extent that there 
was any agreement at all on this issue, 
it was that negotiations should be 
brought to a close during the first half 
year of 1984 so that, directly following, 
ratification may begin in all countries 
concerned. That means the member 
countries of the European Community 
continue to maintain what they have 
always said, namely, that they desire the 
early accession of Spain and Portugal. 



DECLARATION OF BRUSSELS, 
DEC. 9, 1983 

We. the representatives of the sixteen 
member countries of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, reaffirm the dedication of the Allies 
to the maintenance of peace in freedom. Our 
Alliance threatens no one. None of our 
weapons will ever be used except in response 
to attack. We do not aspire to superiority. 
Neither will we accept that others should be 
superior to us. Our legitimate security in- 
terests can only be guaranteed through the 
firm linkage between Europe and North 
America. We call upon the Soviet Union to 
respect our legitimate security interests as 
we respect theirs. 

We are determined to ensure security on 
the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest 
possible level. Faced with the threat posed by 
the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Allies con- 
cerned are going forward with the implemen- 
tations of the double-track decision of 1979. 
The ultimate goal remains that there should 
be neither Soviet nor United States land 
based long-range INF missiles. The deploy- 
ment of U.S. missiles can be halted or re- 
versed by concrete results at the negotiating 
table. In this spirit we wish to see an early 
resumption of the INF negotiations which the 
Soviet Union had discontinued. ^ 

We urge the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact to seize the opportunities we offer for a 
balanced and constructive relationship and 
for genuine detente. In all arms control 
negotiations progress must be made among 
the states participating, in particular in: 



• The strategic arms reduction talks 
(START); 

• The intermediate-range nuclear forces 
talks (INF); 

• The negotiation on mutual and bal- 
anced force reductions (MBFR); 

• The endeavours for a complete ban on 
chemical weapons in the Committee on Dis- 
armament. 

We are also resolved to use the forth- 
coming Stockholm conference as a new op- 
portunity to broaden the dialogue with the 
East, to negotiate confidence-building 
measures and enhance stability and security 
in the whole of Europe. 

We shall continue to do our utmost to 
sustain a safe and peaceful future. We extend 
to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw 
Pact countries the offer to work together 
with us to bring about a long-term construc- 
tive and realistic relationship based on 
equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For 
the benefit of mankind we advocate an open, 
comprehensive political dialogue, as well as 
co-operation based on mutual advantage. 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 
FINAL COMMUNIQUE. 
BRUSSELS, 
DEC. 9, 1983 

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial 
session in Brussels on 8th and 9th December 
1983. Ministers agreed as follows: 

1. In the spirit of cohesion and solidarity, 
the Allies remain determined to safeguard 
their freedom and independence, to prevent 
war and to build the foundations of lasting 
peace and security in the NATO area. They 
will maintain military strength adequate to 
guarantee their collective security. None of 
their weapons will ever be used, except in 
response to attack. They remain firmly com- 
mitted to balanced and verifiable arms con- 
trol at the lowest possible level of forces, and 
will work for greater stability and progress 
towards genuine detente in East- West rela- 
tions. 

2. The Allies remain resolved to deter ag- 
gression and attempts at intimidation. They 
will meet their legitimate security re- 
quirements with the conventional and nuclear 
forces necessary. They will devote resources 
and energy to the modernization of conven- 
tional forces, seeking a more effective and 
balanced transatlantic armaments co- 
operation. The Allies note with great concern 
that the Soviet Union continues its military 
build-up, which far exceeds defence needs, 
while promoting a concept of its own security 
which is unacceptable because it rests on 
maintenance of inequality in its favour.' 

3. The Allies call on the Soviet Union to 
act with restraint and responsibility in its in- 
ternational behavior and to co-operate with 
the West to promote a more constructive 



12 



I*: l?> l> %» U I, y^ 



THE SECRETARY 



feces 



rjitlesr 



East-West dialogue aimed at reducing inter- 
national tension. Rejecting any spirit of con- 
frontation, the Allies reaffirm their deter- 
mination to develop contacts and co-operation 
with the Warsaw Pact countries on the basis 
of mutual interest. While maintaining a firm 
and realistic attitude, the Allies would 
welcome any serious proposal aimed at 
restoring confidence between East and West. 
Ministers instructed the Permanent Council 
to undertake a thorough appraisal of East- 
West relations with a view to achieving a 
more constructive East-West dialogue and to 
report to the Ministerial meeting in spring 
1984. 

4. The Soviet Union bears a heavy 
responsibility in the current state of interna- 
tional relations. By its behavior, as in 
Afghanistan and towards Poland, and by 
recourse to intimidation and threats and 
persecution of human rights supporters, it 
has created serious obstacles to the normal 
development of relations.'' 

5. The situation in Poland continues to 
(give cause for serious concern. Some of the 
steps taken by the Polish authorities, such as 
the lifting of martial law and the amnesty for 
most political detainees, contrast with the in- 
troduction of other measures which reinforce 
a repressive system. The Allies call on the 
Polish authorities to respect the aspirations 
of the people for reform and to abide by the 
commitments in the Helsinki Final Act and 
(the Concluding Document of the Madrid con- 
Iference, particularly with regard to trade 
union freedom and civil rights. They are 
ready to respond to steps which create the 
opportunity for constructive political and 
economic relations with the West. 

6. The Allies condemn the Soviet Union's 
icontinuing and intensified aggression against 
Afghanistan in violation of the United Na- 
tions Charter and in flagrant disregard of 
repeated calls by the United Nations General 
Assembly. They deplore the terrible suffering 
linflicted upon the Afghan people by Soviet 
Iforces. The withdrawal of these forces is 
essential for a political settlement to restore 
Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty and 
non-aligned status; to permit the voluntary 
return of refugees and to provide the oppor- 
tunity for the Afghan people to exercise 
freely its right to self-determination. 

7. Trade conducted on the basis of com- 
mercially sound terms and mutual advantage, 
that avoids preferential treatment of the 
Soviet Union, contributes to constructive 
East-West relations. At the same time, 
(bilateral economic relations with the Soviet 
lUnion and the countries of Eastern Europe 
must remain consistent with broad Allied 
security concerns. These include avoiding 
dependence on the Soviet Union, or con- 
itributing to Soviet military capabilities. Thus, 
development of Western energy resources 
should be encouraged. In order to avoid fur- 
ther use by the Soviet Union of some forms 
of trade to enhance its military strength, the 
Allies will remain vigilant in their continuing 



February 1984 



review of the security aspects of East- West 
economic relations. This work will assist 
Allied governments in the conduct of their 
policies in this field. ^ 

8. The successful conclusion of the 
Madrid meeting contributes to the 
strengthening of the CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] process. 
Although the Concluding Document agreed in 
Madrid falls somewhat short of the Allies' 
proposals, it is nonetheless substantive and 
balanced. The Allies attach equal importance 
to the implementation by all the CSCE coun- 
tries of all provisions of both the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Madrid document, in- 
cluding their humanitarian aspects. An impor- 
tant result of the Madrid meeting was the 
agreement on a precise negotiating mandate 
for the Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe (CDE) due to open in Stockholm in 
January 1984. 

9. Since peace can and must be made 
more secure through equitable and verifiable 
agreements on disarmament and arms con- 
trol, as well as through a balance of forces, 
the Allies have put forward a comprehensive 
series of proposals in this field. Their commit- 
ment to ensure security at the lowest possible 
level of forces was recently demonstrated by 
the member countries of the Nuclear Plan- 
ning Group announcing at Montebello the 
withdrawal of 1,400 nuclear warheads from 
Europe, in addition to the reduction of 1,000 
in 1980. The resulting stockpile will be the 
lowest in Europe for some twenty years. The 
Allies urge the Soviet Union to contribute to 
disarmament efforts in a concrete way and 
not to substitute declaratory proposals for 
deeds. 

10. Ministers underline that the two-track 
decision of December 1979 by Allies concern- 
ed demonstrates the commitment of the 
Alliance to preserve peace and stability at the 
lowest possible level of forces. The Allies con- 
cerned reaffirm their commitment to pursue 

a balance of intermediate-range forces 
through arms control negotiations with the 
USSR. The progress report of the Special 
Consultative Group provides a comprehensive 
account of United States efforts, on the basis 
of close consultations with other involved 
Allies, to achieve such an agreement. 

Unfortunately, the negotiations in Geneva 
have not yet achieved concrete results, due to 
the Soviet effort to maintain their monopoly 
of long-range land-based INF missiles. 
Deployments of Pershing H and ground- 
launched cruise missiles are thus proceeding 
in accordance with the December 1979 deci- 
sion. Building on progress already achieved in 
Geneva, an agreement eliminating this entire 
category of United States and Soviet 
weapons, or at a minimum, limiting them to 
the lowest possible level, remains attainable. 
Allies concerned stress their willingness to 
continue negotiation and to halt, modify or 
reverse the deployments now underway, on 
the basis of such an agreement. These Allies 
will continue to consult closely on steps 
directed towards achievement of this objec- 
tive. 



The Allies note with regret the un- 
justified Soviet decision to leave the 
negotiating table in Geneva. The United 
States has negoitiated over the past two 
years while Soviet deployments of SS-20s 
have grown by over 300 warheads. The Allies 
believe that the Soviet Union shares an in- 
terest with the United States in reducing 
nuclear weapons through negotiated agree- 
ment. The Allies therefore call for bilateral 
negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces to resume as soon as possible.'^ 

11. The Allies fully support the United 
States efforts in the strategic arms reduc- 
tions talks (START), and they welcome the 
recent American initiatives which provide the 
basis for a significant build-down of U.S. and 
Soviet strategic weapons. In particular, the 
United States has indicated its willingness to 
discuss trade-offs in areas of each side's par- 
ticular interest and advantage in order to 
achieve an equitable agreement which pro- 
motes stability. The Allies call on the Soviet 
Union to respond to these initiatives in a 
positive spirit. In this connection they note 
with regret the recent Soviet failure to agree 
to a specific date for the opening of the next 
round of the talks. 

12. The Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe (CDE) is an important part of the 
CSCE process and provides new possibilities 
for increasing security throughout Europe. 
Allied countries will table a comprehensive 
package of concrete measures, in conformity 
with the mandate agreed in Madrid, designed 
to promote military openness in order to in- 
crease confidence and security and reduce the 
risk of surprise attack. They are resolved to 
negotiate actively for an early agreement on 
politically binding, militarily significant and 
verifiable measures which will cover the 
whole of Europe. As a sign of their deter- 
mination. Ministers will themselves attend 
this conference. 

13. The Allies participating in the mutual 
and balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks 
reaffirm their determination to work for a 
mutually acceptable solution to the issues still 
barring progress. The Western draft treaty 
presented last year provides a basis for a 
sound agreement. These Allies hope that the 
most recent Eastern statements indicate a 
new willingness to address the longstanding 
basic issues of the Vienna negotiations and 
they are reviewing the state of these negotia- 
tions also in the light of these statements. 

14. In the Committee on Disarmament, 
the Western participants continue to strive 
for concrete disarmament agreements. They 
consider as a priority task for this Committee 
the elaboration of a verifiable agreement ban- 
ning the development, production and stock- 
piling of all chemical weapons. 

The Allies remain gravely concerned 
about strong evidence of continued use of 
chemical weapons in South East Asia and 
Afghanistan, in violation of international law, 
and of Soviet involvement in the use of such 
weapons.' They welcome the fact that the 
United Nations is continuing to develop pro- 
cedures to investigate allegations of the use 
of chemical weapons. 



13 



f .1 .1 % 



THE SECRETARY 



In the context of efforts aimed at the 
prevention of an arms race in outer space, 
the Allies have also proposed in the Commit- 
tee on Disarmament that the existing inter- 
national law concerning the peaceful use of 
outer space be reviewed. 

15. The maintenance of a calm situation 
in and around Berlin remains of fundamental 
importance to East-West relations. This con- 
tinues to depend in particular on the strict 
observance and full implementation of the 
Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September 
1971. The Allies hope that the further 
development of co-operation between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic will benefit Berlin 
and the people in both states in Germany and 
will strengthen peace in Europe in the cur- 
rent state of international relations. 

16. The Allies urge respect for the 
sovereignty of states everywhere and for 
genuine non-alignment. They recognize that 
events outside the treaty area may affect 
their common interests as members of the 
Alliance. They will engage in timely consulta- 
tions on such events, if it is established that 
their common interests are involved. Suffi- 
cient military capabilities must be assured in 
the treaty area to maintain an adequate 
defence posture. Allies who are in a position 
to do so will endeavor to support those 
sovereign nations who request assistance in 
countering threats to their security and in- 
dependence. Those Allies in a position to 
facilitate the deployment of forces outside the 
treaty area may do so, on the basis of na- 
tional decision. 

17. The Allies condemn terrorist acts, 
which are a threat to democratic institutions 
and to the conduct of normal international 
relations. Recalling the relevant provision of 
the Bonn Declaration, they reiterate their 
determination to take effective measures for 
the prevention and suppression of such 
criminal acts. 

18. The Allies recall their commitment 
under Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
and reaffirm the importance of programmes 
intended to benefit the economies of less 
favoured partners. 

19. Ministers noted with regret the inten- 
tion of Secretary General Dr. Joseph Luns to 
relinquish his post. They invited Lord Car- 
rington to become Secretary General of the 
Organization as from 25th .June 1984 and ex- 
pressed satisfaction at Lord Carrington's ac- 
ceptance. 

20. The spring 1984 meeting of the Coun- 
cil in Ministerial session will be held in 
Washington in May. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain 
informed the North Atlantic Council about 
the review undertaken regarding Spanish 
participation in the Alliance and in conse- 
quence reserved his government's position on 
the present Communique. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BRUSSELS, 

DEC. 9, 1983» 



I've been privileged to attend an 
outstanding meeting of the NATO 
alliance. Outstanding in the sense of uni- 
ty and cohesion that permeated the con- 
versation, outstanding in the sense of 
determination to carry forward with our 
program, outstanding in the readiness 
which we all feel to engage in a con- 
structive dialogue with the Soviet Union 
and its allies. Taken all together, it's 
been an excellent meeting. 

I can't help but feel that much of the 
credit for that goes to the very exten- 
sive consultative processes that have 
taken place and take place just normally 
in the course of our business, so that by 
the time we come to a meeting like this, 
we're all informed and governments 
have kept each other apprised of their 
views. It's a continuing process rather 
than an intermittent one that might be 
suggested by periodic meetings. 

Let me take the occasion, finally, to 
express my admiration for our retiring 
Mr. Luns. He's done an outstanding job 
and will continue to do so through the 
balance of his term. He has our respect 
and admiration and I salute him, and, of 
course, also welcome Lord Carrington 
who is well known and very much ad- 
mired in the United States. We look for- 
ward to working with Lord Carrington. 

Q. Secretary General Luns told us 
that the NATO ministers have urged 
the Soviet Union to return to the INF 
negotiations and the START negotia- 
tions in Geneva. In your view, what do 
you think the chances are that the 
Soviets will, in fact, return to negotia- 
tions? 

A. That, of course, is up to the 
Soviet Union. What we can control is 
what we do, and what we do is take 
reasonable positions and we're ready to 
discuss them. So the content is there. 

Let me call your attention to the 
fact that there is a great difference, I 
think, between the INF and the START 
situations. In the case of the INF talks, 
the Soviets have stated that they have 
left them. In the case of START they 
have simply not been willing to set a 
date for the resumption of talks, and 
whether or not there will be a date for 
the next round of talks remains to be 
seen, but we look for them to return for 
the next round which would normally 
take place beginning in the middle of 
February. 



Q. There's been some talk that the 
Soviets are preparing a new initiative 
to be made public at the Stockholm 
conference. You're planning to attend 
along with other Foreign Ministers. 
Would you consider the CDE con- 
ference an appropriate forum for a 
new arms control initiative on the part 
of the Soviets? 

A. We'll welcome any initiative that 
they choose to make, and the CDE con- 
ference will be an important opening on 
the subject that is set out for that con- 
ference, and so if they make a new ini- 
tiative we'll certainly welcome that. I do 
plan to attend that conference. 

Q. In your talks with the British 
about lifting the arms embargo 
against Argentina, did you give any 
assurances to [Foreign Secretary] Sir 
Geoffrey Howe that certain classes of 
weapons— such as missiles or sub- 
marines, which could be used against 
the Falklands— would not be included 
in any future arms contracts? 

A. First of all, the action that was 
taken is not so much about arms sales as 
it is about human rights conditions. It is 
an aspect of our outlook in the United 
States and our statutory requirements 
that arms sales be prohibited to coun- 
tries where the human rights situation is 
judged to be unacceptable, and that was 
the case in Argentina. 

Argentina has seen a dramatic 
change in its posture, and so this action 
on the part of the United States is a 
reflection of that change. Arms sales as 
such are a different matter, and they 
are looked upon case-by-case. The situa- 
tion in the region is considered 
whenever we think about arms sales, 
and that will be the case with respect to 
Argentina. Certainly we will have told 
the British that we will consult with 
them. 



14 



!>■ lOr 1^ hf W 
1« •% 1 



Q. Do you expect the Soviets now 
after Geneva, to walk out also from 
the Vienna conference— MBFR— and 
about Stockholm, all the talks are now 
on this conference, but do you have 
any idea if Mr. Gromyko will be ac- 
tually attending the Stockholm con- 
ference? 

A. I have no way to predict what 
the Soviet Union will do and can only 
describe what they have done and from 
the standpoint of the two arms control 
discussions that you mentioned, we will 
continue. Of course, at the MBFR talks, 
the current round is coming to an end. 
There will be another one, and we'll be 
there, and we will be, of course, always 
examining our positions and wanting to 
see those talks go forward. 



letin 



THE SECRETARY 



Similarly, the CDE conference 
launches a new arms control initiative. 
It was agreed to by everybody, including 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
countries, as an outcome of the Madrid 
process. So we will be there on the basis 
of the agreement to it in Madrid. I 
should think they would be there but, of 
course, that is up to them and I don't 
have any way of knowing. 

Q. Do you and your colleagues 
think the basis now exists for a new 
decision with regard to sanctions 
against Poland, and are you moving 
toward some new posture with regard 
to Polish sanctions? 

A. The situation in Poland has been 
discussed and evaluated. Of course, the 
whole discussion is highlighted 
somewhat by Mr. Walesa's statement, 
and he's a person whom we respect 
greatly. So, of course, we have to take 
his statements into account. What will 
emerge from the discussion remains to 
be seen. At the same time I think we do 
have to basically look for the Govern- 
ment of Poland to take steps that ease 
the situation there, including their 
dialogue with the church and their 
dialogue with representatives of the 
trade unions. We'll see if something like 
that can emerge from Mr. Walesa's 
initiative. 

Q. Was there discussion among the 
NATO allies this week of any 
modifications in the deployment 
schedules for the INF missiles and 
will there be any modification in that 
deployment schedule? 

A. I didn't hear any discussion 
about it and just assume that we have 
set out a schedule and will keep the 
schedule. 

Q. Given the declaration of 
Brussels and this new Tindemans 
initiative that the Secretary General 
spoke about, do you see the alliance 
now putting a new emphasis or a new 
overall initiative on detente and a new 
relationship with the Soviet Union? 

A. I think that the alliance has 
always had, through its history, a kind 
Df dual-track approach — a track of say- 
ng we must be strong and determined 
md capable of exercising a deterrent 
lapability in support of peace. And it's 
worked. 

The other track that's also been 
jresent has been one of saying that if 
t's possible to have a constructive and 
•easonable relationship, we're ready to 
lave it. I think that it's always good to 



examine the tactical aspects of imple- 
menting that general approach. I'm sure 
the general approach — it's our strategy 
and we intend to stay with that 
strategy. It's a good strategy and at the 
same time there may be some tactical 
ways of getting at it that will bear a 
systematic study. I think it's a fair state- 
ment that these matters are discussed 
whenever we have a meeting like this, 
and they're discussed a great deal in be- 
tween meetings. What is in mind as 
reflected in the communique is kind of a 
systematic look at it that will be 
developed as a result of work done here. 
The results of that work, to whatever 
extent they are fully developed, will be 
available to the ministers when we meet 
in May. 

Q. Can you tell us what is in the 
Brussels declaration and how that fits 
into the scheme that you're talking 
about? 

A. It's a statement that, I think I 
can fairly say, resulted from an initiative 
by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who felt 
that, in addition to the communique, 
which tends to be lengthy — although I 
think Mr. Luns takes considerable pride 
that the communique is about half its 
normal length, nevertheless it tends to 
be lengthy — that there should be a 
relatively short declaration about the 
alliance's stance and determination and 
readiness to talk. But I don't want to try 
to summarize it. 

Q. I want to deal with the 
Lebanon crisis. Very recently — for the 
first time, if I remember correctly — 
Turkey agreed that U.S. forces in the 
MNF use a base in southern Lebanon. 
What is the implication of this new 
Turkish approach? 

A. I don't know that Turkey has 
any particular capability of disposing of 
a base in southern Lebanon. I don't 
follow — southern Turkey. Turkey is an 
ally and we work with Turkey. I don't 
think it's especially related to Lebanon, 
so I wouldn't draw any special conclu- 
sions except that Turkey, I think, does 
support us, as does almost everybody 
else. The idea that we want to see is a 
strong, unified sovereign Lebanon with 
a strong central government and with 
its foreign forces withdrawn. 

Q. May I take you back to the 
Argentina question? Despite the fact 
that you have pledged to Sir Geoffrey 
Howe that you will fully consult, don't 
you think there's a danger that if arms 



sales are resumed, this might be 
damaging for the relationship between 
Britain and the United States? 

A. I think that we will be consulting 
very carefully on this subject as we do in 
the normal course of events, and I don't 
think that we can expect, out of this, 
damage to our relationship. Actually, 
the United States has not sold arms to 
Argentina for a long while and many 
other countries have. And the British 
relationship with those other countries 
seems to be still in existence. But, as far 
as any immediate plans for arms sales to 
Argentina, there aren't any, and we will 
have a good consultative arrangement 
about it, I think. 

I think that the action taken yester- 
day has, as I've tried to point out in 
response to an earlier question, been 
overly interpreted as an arms sales deci- 
sion. That's what it is about, not any 
particular arms sale, or any desire to see 
arms anywhere. It's a reflection of the 
U.S. appraisal of what the human rights 
situation has been and now is in Argen- 
tina. To confirm our estimate and our 
expectations, our Vice President, George 
Bush, is going to lead the U.S. delega- 
tion at the inauguration of the new 
Argentine President. 

Q. Yesterday, you spoke to the 
Dutch minister about the situation in 
Suriname in the Caribbean area. Does 
the United States especially worry 
about that situation there? 

A. We, of course, pay attention to 
our neighborhood, and Suriname is a 
country in our neighborhood, and we 
have been concerned about certain 
developments in Suriname. We think 
that it's very constructive that the 
Surinamese have decided that the close 
relationship with Cuba that seemed to 
be developing doesn't seem to be too 
healthy from their standpoint. That's 
their decision, and we welcome that. 
And so we'll follow developments there 
closely and hope that Suriname can 
flourish. 

Q. I understand that the Israelis 
today shelled near Tripoli this morn- 
ing, and there are some reports also 
that they are putting up some kind of 
blockade to keep the PLO ships from 
leaving Tripoli. What is the American 
position on that? Do you think that 
the PLO should be allowed to leave? 

A. Insofar as the Israelis' action is 
concerned, that's their action and we 
didn't know anything about it in advance 
at all. I assume it is part of the Israeli 
tradition of retaliation against things 



THE SECRETARY 



that happen to them, and, as I under- 
stand it, the Palestinians of all factions 
claim the credit for what happened in 
Israel. 

As far as the PLO internal battles 
are concerned, I don't have any com- 
ment on that. We watch that. It's a mat- 
ter of great concern that Lebanese soil 
and a Lebanese city and Lebanese 
citizens are once again being trampled 
on in a fight on their soil, and it's a con- 
tinuing tragedy. The sooner the source 
of that fighting, which is foreign forces 
on their soil, can be eliminated, the bet- 
ter for the Lebanese. And so evacuation 
and anything that will help cure that 
problem we favor, but I'm not going to 
take a position beyond that. 

Q. Italy apparently wants to cut by 
half the level of forces in Lebanon. 
Does that weaken the posture of the 
multinational force and its policy? 

A. I had a conversation with Mr. 
Andreotti individually and also as part 
of our consultation of the multinational 
force group, and in both cases, he and I 
reaffirmed our determination to con- 
tinue on with our purposes in Lebanon. 
And the Italian approach seemed to be 
similar to the United States as far as 
the actual level of forces is concerned. I 
don't know that it is appreciated that it 
varies quite a lot, depending on the cir- 
cumstances in each one of the forces and 
essentially what happened. In response 
to the request to each country by the 
Government of Lebanon was, you might 
say, an assigned sector or mission, and 
then the people who are in charge of the 
military forces involved— that is each 
one separately — have to make up their 
minds and they coordinate wath the 
other military, of course — what it takes 
to accomplish their mission. Actually the 
numbers of Italians are considerably 
more right now than was initially 
thought, so I take from our discussion 
that the Italian intention is to continue 
with the assigned mission and mandate 
and to uphold it. Whether that means 
that some different numbers of forces at 
a moment of time are necessary is for 
them to decide. But the basic point is 
that they continue to cooperate with the 
other countries in carrying out our mis- 
sion and to seeking our objectives in 
Lebanon. 

Q. It was announced last night 
that Pierre Trudeau would be coming 
to Washington in the next few days. 

A. Yes, 1 think the 15th of 
December. 



16 



Q. Yes, to present his peace plan 
as such. What do you think will be the 
outcome of your discussions and will 
you encourage him to go onward to 
Moscow, and, finally, what do you 
think what progress is going to be 
made, do you feel, in his attempt to 
get Washington and Moscow talking 
again? 

A. He has a program of visitations 
which I assume he will carry on and that 
represents the decision that he's made to 
take this initiative. And we'll, as always, 
be glad to talk with Prime Minister 
Trudeau. I'm sure the President will, 
and I have no doubt but that the discus- 
sion will cover his initiative but also 
many other things in U.S. -Canadian 
relationships, as both countries have 
been placing a lot of emphasis on ad- 
dressing the problems we have between 
the two countries and taking actions to 
do something about those problems. I 
think over the last 2 or 3 years, it's been 
a very successful effort. I've met with 
Foreign Secretary MacEachen in- 
numerable times. I think the President 
has met with Prime Minister Trudeau 
six or seven times, so basically the 
meeting will be continued, and we'll cer- 
tainly be interested in his initiative. 
There's lots of communication between 
Washington and Moscow. The state of 
our relationship is not because it's im- 
possible to communicate. It's the 
substance that is giving the problem. 

Q. Given concern and speculation 
over the health of Russian leader 
Yuriy Andropov, with whom are you 
communicating in the Kremlin? 

A. People speculate about health, 
but as far as we're concerned, obviously 
there is a Soviet Government; it is in 
operation; it makes decisions. It has a 
normal diplomatic flow, and our capacity 
to talk with them is as it has been, and 
for what it's worth, what evidence I see 
is that Mr. Andropov is at work and, so 
far as we know, in charge. 

Q. You've talked about unity and 
cohesion in this NATO meeting, but 
when you turn to commercial and in- 
ternational issues, that unity and 
cohesion seems to be lacking. Do you 
see any big problem within the two 
sets of issues for the future? 

A. I think it's not correct to say 
that the unity and cohesion is lacking. 
There are problems and issues, and 
there are issues that people get very red 



in the face about in the field of trade 
and commerce. And I'm going to spend 
the afternoon, probably, talking about 
some of them. 

On the other hand, I think it is too 
easily forgotten that the volume of two- 
way trade between the United States 
and Europe runs at the annual rate of 
$90 billion. That's huge. So I think the 
message is: We must be doing 
something right. And so we have prob- 
lems, and the task for the governmental 
people who are dealing with them is to 
figure out how to deal with these prob- 
lems which, you might say, are around 
the periphery of this $90 billion bundle, 
without damaging the bundle, because 
that is a representation of the strength 
and the mutual advantage that comes 
out of this trade and commercial rela- 
tionship. It's very, very large and very, 
very important. I just say that to agree 
on the one hand that there are problems 
but to put them in the perspective of the 
huge flows of commerce that does take 
place in the normal course of events. 



STATEMENT, 

TUNIS, 

DEC. 10, 1983' 

I'd like to express my appreciation for 
the very gracious treatment I've re- 
ceived from President Bourguiba and 
everyone here in Tunisia. We've had 
some very frank talks that I've listened 
to, and I've heard quite a number of 
criticisms of the policies of the United 
States. I have also been able to assure 
those with whom I've spoken of the 
dedication of the United States to the 
causes of peace, of stability, of justice, 
and of the recognition in the United 
States that peace in this area cannot be 
achieved unless it is possible to find a 
way to solving problems that the Pales- 
tinian people in particular have. We're 
very aware of that fact, and I've been 
made more aware of it as a result of my 
conversations here. 

Let me say also that we have 
discussed the relationships between the 
United States and Tunisia. These have 
been very good and remain so. I believe 
that as a result of our discussions here 
and those that will continue that our 
relationship will remain a strong and 
constructive and helpful one to both 
countries. 



Department of State Bulletin 



I' ■> it i% I 



THE SECRETARY 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

RABAT, 

DEC. 11, 19831° 

I'd like first to express my appreciation 
to King Hassan for the graciousness of 
the hospitality here and for the oppor- 
tunity to talk at length with him cover- 
ing a very wide range of subjects and 
having an opportunity to hear his 
analysis of important things going on 
around the world. It's been a very 
worthwhile visit from my standpoint, 
from the point of view of the content, 
and also it's been extremely pleasant 
and naturally we appreciate that as well. 

Q. What about the discussions you 
had this afternoon with King Hassan 
II? 

A. The discussion went on for 
around 2V2 hours. We discussed matters 
of mutual interest having to do with the 
Middle East— Lebanon, the peace proc- 
ess, the problems of the Palestinians. 
We discussed bilateral questions involv- 
ing Morocco and the United States. We 
discussed His Majesty's initiative in call- 
ing for a referendum, and, of course, the 
United States supports that. We dis- 
cussed events in Europe: King Hassan 
was interested in the meetings I had just 
been in— NATO meetings. In other 
words, they were very wide-ranging 
discussions. 

Q. What's the American perception 
concerning the development of events 
in West Africa, if the African parties 
responsible for the preparation of the 
referendum refuse the suggestion 
which was proposed by His Majesty 
the King as the final solution to the 
problem of the Sahara? 

A. I think, first of all, we have to 
wait. There is an initiative that His 
Majesty has proposed, and I think that if 
people have an opportunity to express 
themselves, that's really the proper way 
to do it. I hope that people from around 
the world will support this initiative, and 
I hope that it does come to pass. 

Q. Did the King or any of the 
other Moroccan officials have 
anything to say about the new 
strengthened relationships between 
the United States and Israel? 

A. I described the intent of our re- 
cent visit from Prime Minister Shamir 
and also from President Gemayel, and I 
think His Majesty was well posted 
among the subjects that we discussed. 



Q. Did he show any enthusiasm? 

A. His Majesty is a very 
sophisticated man, and I think I won't 
speak for him: he'll speak for himself. 
From my standpoint we had a searching 
and satisfactory discussion. 

Q. Will the United States of 
America help the FLO departure from 
Beirut as in the past? 

A. Yes we did. We arranged the 
departure of the PLO from Beirut, and 
Mr. Arafat's departure from Beirut over 
a year ago. We felt that there was an 
understanding that he wouldn't return to 
Lebanon, but, of course, he has been 
there. And we see again the tragedy of 
the Lebanese as one of their cities and 
their people are being trampled upon in 
somebody else's fight. So it's a continu- 
ing tragedy. That being che case, the 
Llnited States has supported the resolu- 
tion under which an evacuation can take 
place under the United Nations flag, and 
we expect that evacuation to go for- 
ward. 

Q. What is your position concern- 
ing the Israelis threatening the PLO 
and not letting them leave the coun- 
try? 

A. As far as I know, what has hap- 
pened recently is that a bus was blown 
up in Jerusalem, and the PLO and Mr. 
Arafat took credit for that act of ter- 
rorism. There was an act of retaliation 
by the Israelis. That's my understanding 
of what took place, and that's the 
substance of that exchange — something 
that happens all too often in the Middle 
East. 

Q. How do you judge the reaction 
of your Arab friends concerning the 
strategic cooperation treaty between 
the United States and Israel? This 
treaty which confirmed once more that 
the United States continues to see in 
Israel the only strong and stable ally 
in the region. 

A. I wish some of those who are 
discussing it would come forward and 
show me a copy of this treaty. I have 
not seen it. I will say again, the United 
States has had, does have now, and will 
continue to have a strong and supportive 
relationship with Israel. There wasn't 
any treaty signed during Prime Minister 
Shamir's recent visit to the United 
States. 

We discussed a great many things 
between the United States and the 
Israelis. We discussed military matters, 
economic matters, general observations 



about what is going on in the Middle 
East, and we discussed the buildup of 
Soviet arms in Syria and many other 
things. But we didn't sign a treaty, 
however. I certainly want to say that we 
continue to have and expect to have a 
close relationship with Israel. 

Q. I'd like to ask the following 
question on the meeting in Brussels. 
Have you had any response at all from 
Moscow to the allies' proposal for a 
comprehensive new dialogue with the 
Soviets? Also, what would be the next 
step in pursuing this dialogue with 
the Soviets? 

A. I have not heard of any 
response. I suppose one next step would 
be the attendance by Warsaw Pact 
Foreign Ministers at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Europe that will be con- 
vened on January 17 in Stockholm. As 
you know, in the Brussels meeting, the 
NATO Foreign Ministers agreed that 
they would attend that meeting, and, of 
course, I am included in that group. 

Q. It was announced today that 
Marshal Orgarkov of the Soviet Union 
has just spent 4 days in Algeria. Did 
you know about this trip, and do you 
have any feeling about Soviet relations 
with this part of the world as 
resulting from Orgarkov's visit? 

A. The Soviet Union, of course, is 
as active around the world as we are. 
We believe that their influence in many 
cases is not helpful. However, as we 
agreed in the NATO statement, we are 
prepared to engage with the Soviet 
Union in a constructive dialogue, if they 
are ready to do so; but this has to be 
based on a realistic assessment of what 
is taking place as we see it and on the 
basis, of course, of the strength and 
determination which we and our allies 
have and have expressed. 

Q. Did you and the King discuss 
any ways of putting momentum behind 
President Reagan's peace plan for the 
Middle East, and if so, what was said? 

A. We did discuss that at great 
length and His Majesty had a number of 
suggestions. Without feeling it proper to 
try to quote His Majesty, I believe, 
myself, that the problem of the Pales- 
tinians is at the center of the issue. Of 
course what we look for, and have 
wanted to see for a long time, is a 
legitimate group of Palestinians join 
with King Hussein and be ready to sit 
down at the peace table with Israel and 
try to work out what sort of ar- 
rangements will bring about stability in 



February 1984 



THE SECRETARY 



that part of the world. We did discuss 
that and other issues of the Middle East 
in great detail. 

Q. Is the Orgarkov visit the reason 
vou did not stop in Algeria this time? 
A. Xo. 

Q. Were you aware of it prior to 
today? 

A. I was aware of it, but it had no 
bearing on my own schedule. 

Q. Can you tell us about the new 
American initiative in the area? 

A. There are President Reagan's 
proposals of a year ago last September, 
which the President has reaffirmed and 
stated his intention to keep working to 
achieve those objectives. We have also 
had recent discussions not only with the 
Israelis but with the Lebanese — Presi- 
dent Gemayel — and his government, and 
as a result of those discussions we think 
we have some new ideas. Ambassador 
Rumsfeld, who is the President's special 
negotiator in the Middle East, has 
returned to the region and has been in 
various capitals already. It was an- 
nounced in Washington that he will be 
going to Damascus. Perhaps that's what 
you are referring to. 

Q. You heard during your stop in 
Tunis considerable criticism of the re- 
cent U.S. -Israeli policy, and I am 
wondering if you have heard similar 
criticism here during your stop in 
Morocco? 

A. We have certainly discussed the 
U.S. -Israeli relationship, and particularly 
the relation of some of our thinking, 
with the Israelis, when they visited us, 
to the Soviet buildup in Syria. I found 
the discussion here was constructive and 
informative in tone, and I tried to re- 
spond and describe what we were doing 
and thinking. So far as I can see, it was 
received in that same spirit. But of 
course, I don't wish at all to speak for 
the Moroccans or King Hassan; they'll 
speak for themselves. 

Q. How does the United States 
view Palestinian-Jordanian negotia- 
tions as well as their consequences, in 
case the negotiations succeed? What 
would be the effect on Mr. Reagan's 
plan? 

A. We think that negotiations be- 
tween Palestinians and Jordanian King 
Hussein are a very positive thing to 
have happened, and we certainly would 
welcome very warmly a decision on the 
part of King Hussein and the Pales- 
tinians to be ready to enter the peace 
process with Israel. 



STATEMENT, 
LISBON, 
DEC. 13, 1983" 

It is a pleasure for me to sign, on behalf 
of the United States, this new defense 
agreement further extending the long 
period of cooperation between our two 
nations. 

The conclusion of this agreement is 
a tribute to both our countries, as a 
reaffirmation and a major example of 
the shared values and strong ties of 
cooperation which have existed for many 
years between Portugal and the United 
States. From those values, we draw 
strength in our joint determination to 
defend the freedom of our peoples, the 
independence of our nations, and the 
maintenance of the peace in a troubled 
world. The accord we sign today makes 
a major contribution toward those goals 
and in so doing not only enhances our 
bilateral relationship but also the vitality 
of NATO. 

This sense of joint purpose has been 
reflected in the discussions it has been 
my privilege to hold these past 2 days 
with Portugal's leaders. We touched on 
many subjects, regarding both our bi- 
lateral relationship and major issues on 
the international scene, I drew useful in- 
sights from our talks, and I believe we 
found ourselves in agreement on many 
specific points. What struck me most, 
however, was the clarity and strength of 
our common desire to promote individ- 
ual dignity and the defense of freedom 
within our own societies and the world 
at large and our willingness to work 
together to achieve those ends. 

This signing ceremony is thus a fit- 
ting culmination to a most successful 
visit, and I will depart Portugal grateful 
for the hospitality shown me and pleased 
in the knowledge that the bonds of 
friendship and cooperation between our 
two countries are strong and enduring. 



'Press release 421 of Dec. 13. 1983. 

^Denmark and Greece reserve their posi- 
tions on this paragraph; Spain, not having 
been a party to the double-track decision of 
1979, reserves its position on this paragraph 
[text in original]. 

^Greece expressed its views on the second 
part of the last sentence of this paragraph 
[text in original]. 

■■Greece expresed its views on the con- 
tents of this paragraph [text in original]. 

^Greece recalled its position on various 
aspects of this paragraph [text in original]. 

''Denmark and Greece reserve their posi- 
tions on this paragraph [text in original]. 

•■Greece recalls its position as it has been 
expressed during the previous Ministerial ses- 
sions [text in original]. 

"Press release 437 of Dec. 28. 

'Press release 418 of Dec. 12. 

'"Press release 426 of Dec. 19. 

"Press release 419 of Dec. 14. ■ 



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• ' I' it A& 1 



ECONOMICS 



U.S. Foreign Policy 
and Agricultural Trade 



by Kenneth W. Dam 

Address before the Arnencayi Farm 
Bureau Federation in Orlando on 
January 10. 1984. Mr. Dam is Deputy 
Secretary of State. 

The American farmer has played a 
significant role in U.S. foreign policy for 
the past four decades. Agricultural prod- 
ucts have constituted 20% of all U.S. 
foreign economic assistance since World 
War II. This assistance helped rebuild 
the war-ravaged economies of Western 
Europe and Japan. Those countries are 
today our best cash customers for 
agricultural products. 

Since the 1950s, our farm products 
have played a key role in establishing 
economic and political stability in the 
Third World. The United States con- 
tributes more food aid to the developing 
world— $33 billion in the last three 
decades— than all other countries com- 
bined. Public Law 480, "Food for 
Peace," has been available since 1954 to 
friendly nations that lack the resources 
to supply their own food needs. As many 
of these nations have grown more pros- 
perous, they have continued to use our 
agricultural products— not as aid 
beneficiaries but as paying customers. 
U.S. agriculture has also played a 
key role in U.S. -Soviet relations. 
Russia's need for imported grain has 
generated important commerce with the 
West. And with respect to China, our 
agricultural exports have helped to lay 
the foundation for an amicable, realistic 
relationship. 

This postwar history demonstrates 
that when the United States can freely 
pursue its comparative advantage in 
agriculture, both the world and the 
American farmer benefit. Since 1981, 
however, U.S. agricultural exports have 
been in decline. The benefits of our com- 
parative advantage have long been 
diminished by market-distorting trade 
practices. Reversing that decline and 
combating those trade practices is a ma- 
jor priority not only of the U.S. farmer 
and the Department of Agriculture, but 
of the Department of State as well. 



The Agricultural Export Problem 

In the 1970s, world trade in wheat and 
feedstuff's increased by 10 million metric 
tons per year. U.S. exporters enjoyed a 
boom with large harvests, big new 
markets opening up in the developing 
world, and a relatively weak dollar. The 
last 3 years, however, present a sharp 
contrast: world trade in grain has de- 
clined from 215 to 199 million metric 
tons, and coarse grain trade has fallen 
from 108 to 89 million metric tons. The 
reasons for this reversal are complex. 
Those reasons include oversupply, the 
recent worldwide recession, the ap- 
preciation of the dollar, and trade- 
distorting practices. 

Perhaps the beginning of our 
agricultural export reversal can be dated 
from the partial embargo on grain 
shipments to the Soviet Union imposed 
by the Carter Administration in 1980. 
That embargo provided an incentive for 
farmers in other producing nations to in- 
crease their production in order to serve 
the Soviet market. The 1980 embargo 
also called into question the U.S. reputa- 
tion as a reliable supplier. As the Presi- 
dent has said, that embargo "was bad 
for our farmers, bad for our economy, 
but not that bad for the aggressor we 
were supposedly going to punish." 

Since 1980, world agricultural pro- 
duction has outpaced demand, which has 
been depressed by the worldwide reces- 
sion and the related debt constraints. 
Eastern Europe, for example, dropped 
suddenly from the ranks of major farm 
importers in 1981 when its Western 
bank credits were exhausted. The reces- 
sion also hit the developing nations 
especially hard. Debt service ratios for 
non-oil-producing less developed coun- 
tries (LDCs) currently average 32% of 
their exports of goods and services. 
These countries were forced to cut their 
total imports of goods and services in 
1982 by 7.7% in real terms. 

The decline in world demand is not 
alone responsible for the current decline 
in U.S. agricultural exports. The recent 
appreciation of the dollar relative to the 
currencies of other agricultural export- 
ing nations has also been a factor. That 



appreciation has made U.S. agricultural 
products relatively more expensive in 
terms of foreign currencies. 

The competitive position of 
American farmers has also been 
weakened by the use of unfair trading 
practices on the part of other nations. 
Many countries have trade barriers that 
shut out U.S. agricultural products to 
protect relatively less efficient domestic 
producers. Were it not for Japanese 
quotas on imported beef, for example, 
U.S. farmers could put a pound of 
square-cut chuck roast in Tokyo super- 
markets at one-third the present price. 
The subsidization of agricultural exports, 
such as that practiced by the European 
Community (EC), is taking third-country 
markets that have not been earned 
through comparative advantage. 

Some of the conditions that have 
contributed to the decline in U.S. 
agricultural exports have improved. 
While the dollar has continued to 
strengthen in recent weeks, the United 
States has now emerged from the reces- 
sion and is on the road to sustained, 
noninflationary growth. Together with 
several other major industrialized coun- 
tries, we can lead an expansion of the 
world economy— and, hence, of world 
demand for agricultural products. 

Third World debt problems, 
however, remain a concern. In the past 
decade, the developing countries have 
been the fastest growing part of the 
global market for agricultural exports. 
Servicing their debts, however, absorbs 
foreign exchange that might be used for 
imports, including food. The United 
States has been a leader in developing a 
strategy to meet the debt problem. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is 
playing a major role in this strategy. We 
appreciated the American Farm Bureau 
Federation's support in obtaining con- 
gressional passage of the Administra- 
tion's request for $8.4 billion to fund in- 
creased IMF resources. This legislation 
may be regarded in part as farm legisla- 
tion. Adequate IMF resources are essen- 
tial to help ease the debt problems of 
developing countries so that they can 
buy more U.S. agricultural products. 



February 1984 



19 



» I I 



ECONOMICS 



We are also helping to promote 
growth in the developing world by 
fighting protectionism at home and 
abroad. The key to global economic 
growth is doing more business, not less. 
Quotas, tariffs, and other trade barriers 
raise costs to us and deny borrowing 
countries the hard currency needed to 
service their debts and buy our exports. 
Consequently, President Reagan has 
pledged that his Administration will 
fight protectionist measures, such as 
local content legislation, and not turn its 
back on the principle of open trade. 

That does not mean, however, that 
we will turn the other cheek toward 
other nations' trade-distorting prac- 
tices — especially those imposed on sec- 
tors such as agriculture in which we en- 
joy a comparative advantage. I grew up 
on a farm in Kansas. And while I have 
been away from farming for many 
years, everything that I have since 
learned has underscored my farm-bred 
belief in the tremendous benefits that 
flow from open trade. Trade barriers 
produce no winners. If American farm- 
ers — and their overseas customers — are 
to benefit from the expansion of the 
global economy, it is imperative that we 
maintain an open trading environment. 
It is for this reason that trade barriers 
and export subsidies are problems that 
the State Department is attacking head- 
on, especially with respect to Japan and 
the European Community. 

Trade Barriers 

Japan is our largest single export 
market for agricultural products. The 
Japanese bought nearly $7 billion from 
us last year, representing 15% of all 
American agricultural exports. Japan is 
either our first or second largest 
customer in almost all categories of bulk 
agricultural commodities. In 1982 Japan 
bought 23% of all U.S. corn exports, 
16% of our soybeans, 26% of our cotton, 
20% of our tobacco, 23% of our feed 
grains, and 30% of our grain sorghums. 

Progress has been made in 
eliminating Japanese trade barriers. 
Japan has reduced its import quotas 
from nearly 500 product categories in 
the 1960s to only 27 today. Japan's 
overall tariff rates are the lowest among 
the industrialized countries. 

Even in those product areas where 
we still have problems with the 
Japanese — such as beef and citrus — the 
Japanese are among our best customers. 



In 1982 Japan purchased 64% of all U.S. 
beef and veal exports, 26% of our 
oranges and tangerines, 48% of our 
grapefruit, and 82% of our lemon and 
lime exports. 

We have not and will not, however, 
ignore Japan's remaining barriers to 
U.S. agricultural exports. If Japan were 
to substantially liberalize its imports of 
beef and citrus, we could expect that our 
market there for those two product 
categories, which today stands at around 
$350 million annually, would expand 
over the next few years to about $1 
billion. Our commitment, therefore, to 
the farmers of this country and to the 
open trading system means that we will 
continue our effort to gain greater ac- 
cess to the Japanese market. At the 
same time, Japan, which benefits so 
clearly from the world's open trading 
system, must fulfill its international 
obligations and open its markets 
broadly. 

President Reagan stressed these 
points when he went to Japan last 
November. When he addressed the 
Japanese Diet, he sought the support of 
Japan's parliament to lower further the 
barriers that still make it so difficult for 
some American products to enter the 
Japanese market. He asked that they 
continue and accelerate their actions to 
reduce trade barriers. 

Consumers know in reality what 
economists teach in theory: in the end, 
we pay the price of protectionism. Tokyo 
housewives pay more for beef, chicken, 
pork, milk, eggs, and bread than 
housewives in Washington. In 1982, 28% 
of the living expenses of Japanese 
households went for food, compared to 
only 16% in the United States. 
Liberalization of agricultural trade in 
Japan and an expansion of imports 
would bring clear benefits to the 
Japanese people. During the past three 
decades, the United States has 
demonstrated that it is a constant, 
reliable, and stable source of food for 
the Japanese people. We will continue to 
be so in the future. We are working to 
bring down Japan's barriers in the re- 
maining product areas — beef, citrus, and 
a number of value-added agricultural 
products. 

Upon his return from Japan, the 
President asked Vice President Bush to 
lead a followup effort to ensure con- 
tinued progress toward opening Japan's 
markets. Later this month, when 
Japan's Foreign Minister visits 
Washington and our trade negotiators 



travel to Tokyo for a series of meetings 
on trade, agriculture will be a priority 
agenda item. Progress is imperative; we 
are determined that it be made. 

Trade barriers are, of course, not 
limited to Japan, and we are addressing 
them on a multifaceted front. But 
despite the dangers and costs of trade 
barriers, they present a less formidable 
challenge than the problem of export 
subsidies, such as those employed by the 
European Community's common 
agricultural policy (CAP). 

Export Subsidies 

Through its export subsidies, the com- 
mon agricultural policy has become the 
source of the most serious distortion of 
agricultural trade in the world. Whereas 
U.S. agricultural trade is responsive to 
world markets, the CAP insulates the 
EC from those markets and defies the 
principle of comparative advantage. The 
CAP relies on a complex, expensive 
system of high domestic prices and 
variable import levies to protect the 
European farmer and to ensure in- 
creased production. Extensive export 
subsidies are then used to dispose of the 
production surplus. 

The CAP was originally conceived as 
a social policy to maintain rural incomes 
and populations. These objectives are 
met by high price supports on 
agricultural products. (The system is so 
detailed that dairy price supports vary 
according to the elevation at which the 
cow lives.) High price supports en- 
courage production but cause high food 
prices which in turn depress demand. 
The result is that large stocks ac- 
cumulate. 

U.S. farm programs have also 
generated surpluses from time to time. 
But there are two major differences be- 
tween U.S. and EC farm programs. 

First, farm prices in the United 
States have fallen in real terms over the 
last decade. In contrast, EC farm prices 
have increased every year, often above 
the rate of inflation. The result is that 
for many farm commodities the 
domestic EC price has been as much as 
twice the world market price, and for 
grain is now 40% above the world price. 

Second, the most important U.S. 
commodities compete on markets at 
world prices. But the EC, as a matter of 
policy, uses whatever export subsidies 
are necessary to move excess produc- 
tion. Needless to say, the subsidies are 
huge. In 1983 the Community spent $9 
billion in export subsidies to generate 
about $30 billion in EC farm exports. 



20 



■^ ■» I^ |» 1^ 



ECONOMICS 



The main point is not that the EC 
subsidies are expensive in budget terms 
and thus, because they distort the alloca- 
tion of resources, limit Europe's ability 
to keep pace technologically with other 
developed countries. Rather, it is that 
the EC's high-price, high-subsidy system 
imposes a major portion of the true 
costs of that system on its competitors 
in third-country markets. When the 
CAP was founded in the mid-1960s, for 
example, the Community was a net 
grain importer, buying perhaps 20 
million metric tons of grain per year 
from the rest of the world. Today the 
EC exports a net 5 million metric tons 
of grain. The Community has become 
the world's number one exporter of 
sugar, poultry, eggs, and dairy products; 
it is challenging Argentina as the 
number two exporter in beef; and it is 
third after the United States and 
Canada in wheat. 

The United States and other 
agricultural exporting countries are, in 
effect, being taxed through lost export 
sales in third-country markets to help 
pay for Europe's high domestic prices. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
estimates that because of the CAP the 
United States is losing close to $6 billion 
per year in farm export earnings; this in 
turn deprives U.S. farmers of up to $2 
billion in farm income. 

The cost of the CAP has created a 
severe budgetary problem for the Euro- 
pean Community. In an attempt to 
reduce CAP expenditures and avert an 
anticipated budget crisis, the EC Com- 
mission last year announced proposed 
reforms of the CAP. The reforms in- 
clude a proposal to move EC prices 
toward the world level. This proposal is 
encouraging; we will have a better sense 
of the EC's commitment to this objective 
when, later this month, the EC Commis- 
sion makes price proposals for the 
1984-85 crop year. 

There are other reform proposals, 
however, that worry us. Two of these 
proposals do not seem designed to move 
EC prices closer to world market levels. 
Rather, they would raise taxes to under- 
write increased production and export 
subsidies, and seal off some of the few 
remaining gaps in the Community's 
variable levy wall. 

First, the commission would in- 
crease EC budgetary resources by rais- 
ing the EC's share of the value-added 
tax in member countries from the cur- 
rent 1% to 1.4%. If this proposal had 
been in effect last year, revenues raised 



for the EC from this source would have 
increased from $12 billion to $17 billion. 
Most member states, including France, 
take the position that not all of the 
potential $5 billion increase in revenue 
should be spent on agriculture. This pro- 
posed tax hike, however, would in- 
evitably relax what has been the prin- 
cipal constraint on CAP spending. 

Second, the commission has pro- 
posed a consumption tax on vegetable 
fats and oils, other than butter, and a 
restriction on imports of nongrain feed 
ingredients, including U.S. corn gluten 
feed and citrus pellets. The tax on 
vegetable oils is designed to stimulate 
EC dairy consumption by making 
vegetable oil more expensive and to 
raise money for EC farm programs. The 
import restrictions on nongrain feed in- 
gredients would probably be in the form 
of quotas or duty increases. If adopted 
by the member states, these two pro- 
posals together would affect almost $5 
billion in U.S. exports, or about 60% of 
U.S. agricultural exports to the EC. 

Concurrently with its review of the 
CAP, the EC is considering the member- 
ship applications of Spain and Portugal. 
The United States would applaud such 
EC membership for broad political 
reasons. However, current CAP prices 
would sharply boost Spanish and Por- 
tuguese prices for grain and oilseeds. 
Such price increases will almost certain- 
ly lead to dramatic production increases 
as those farmers invest in irrigation, fer- 
tilizer, and even new farming systems. 
This prospect makes it all the more im- 
perative that CAP reform move EC 
prices closer to world levels. 

As Secretary of Agriculture Block 
said in recent testimony before Con- 
gress: 

We are pleased to see in the reform plan 
a growing recognition that all countries have 
an obligation not to let their policies ag- 
gravate already unstable market conditions. 
But we fail to see how broadening the EC's 
protective insulation from import competition 
will effect a closer alignment of EC prices 
with world prices. 

And we see no indication that the 
CAP reform package, as currently pro- 
posed, will lead to a significant curtail- 
ment of surplus production and export 
subsidy practices. 

We have warned the EC that we 
must and will defend our agricultural 
trade. Last year we reluctantly subsi- 
dized the credit arrangements on sales 
of wheat flour, butter, and cheese to 
Egypt on terms permitting us to com- 



pete with the EC's export subsidies. We 
have used the Department of Agricul- 
ture's export credit subsidy program — 
blended credits — in this connection as 
well. On balance, however, we have 
shown restraint in our use of export 
credit subsidies. 

We will take further action to pro- 
tect our trade interests if the EC 
unilaterally implements CAP reform 
measures that restrict our access to the 
Community. We have conveyed our con- 
cerns to the EC on many levels. 
Secretary Shultz reinforced those 
messages in a November meeting with 
the ambassadors of the EC-10 countries 
in Washington. He also led the U.S. 
Cabinet team in opposing EC trade 
distorting measures at the December 9 
ministerial meeting in Brussels. 

Secretary Block recently noted a list 
of EC agricultural exports to the United 
States which we might target for 
retaliation in the case of open confronta- 
tion. The list includes such items as 
beer, wine, cognac, cheese, and wool. 
We have been genuinely reluctant to 
move toward such a confrontation, 
especially one that could involve retalia- 
tion against EC trade with the United 
States or increased American use of ex- 
port subsidies in third-country markets. 
But the EC has been put on notice that 
the United States will not passively ac- 
cept a common agricultural policy that 
subverts our vital export interests. 
While we are not attacking the CAP as 
such, we will not acquiesce in trade- 
distorting practices that negate the 
benefits of our comparative advantage in 
agriculture. And we do not intend to pay 
through lost exports for EC efforts to 
deal with the budgetary consequences of 
the cap's high price policies. 

U.S. Reliability as Supplier 

No one questions the quality of 
American farm produce, but many have 
questioned our reliability as a supplier. 
To be competitive, the American farmer 
must be a reliable supplier. President 
Reagan has emphasized more than once 
the importance he attaches to this issue. 
When he announced his agricultural ex- 
port policy in 1982, he said that the 
"granary door is open." And he meant it. 
His policy to maintain the U.S. farmer's 
reputation for reliability as a supplier 
has the following three elements. 

First, no restrictions will be im- 
posed on exports of farm products 
because of rising domestic prices. 



February 1984 



21 



I .1 .1 • 



EUROPE 



Second, farm exports will not be 
used as an instrument of foreign policy 
except in extreme situations and as part 
of a broader embargo implemented in 
cooperation with other nations. 

Third, world markets must be freed 
of trade barriers and unfair trade prac- 
tices. 

Long-term grain agreements (LTAs) 
have provided us with an additional 
means of establishing the U.S. farmer as 
a reliable supplier, especially with 
respect to countries with centrally plan- 
ned economies. Currently about one- 
third of world grain exports are sold 
under LTAs. The United States has 
LTAs for our two largest wheat 
markets— the Soviet Union and China. 
We concluded our second LTA with 
the Soviet Union last July. The new 
agreement raises the minimum purchase 
level by 50% to 9 million metric tons an- 
nually." For the first time, the agreement 
includes soybeans and soybean products 
in addition to corn and wheat. The 
Soviets have already purchased almost 
7 million metric tons under the new 
LTA. 

The 1980 LTA with China provides 
a foothold for the United States in an 
important and growing market. China 
exceeded its minimum annual purchase 
commitments of 6 million metric tons in 
1981 and 1982. Last year, however, the 
Chinese reduced purchases of our 
agricultural products, apparently in 
response to difficulties encountered in 
the recent textile negotiations. After 
those negotiations were successfully con- 
cluded in August of last year, the 
Chinese resumed grain purchases. 
However, they had not achieved their 
1983 obligations by the end of 
December. We are insisting that the 
Chinese make up the shortfall, and we 
will continue to work with them toward 
that end. 

LTAs have served our interests well 
in the nonmarket economies of the 
Soviet Union and China. In general, 
however, the United States has tradi- 
tionally avoided LTAs. In the U.S. view, 
the free market system results in the 
most efficient allocation of resources. 



Conclusion 

The State Department plays an active 
and constructive role in agricultural 
trade issues. We seek an international 
trading environment which respects the 
comparative advantage of various com- 
petitors. We are firm in our efforts to 
get the Japanese to allow us better ac- 
cess to their agricultural and capital 
markets. We oppose European efforts to 
increase protectionism and to maintain 
and expand export subsidies. And we 
support efforts to ensure that the 
United States is a reliable supplier. 

I have spoken today of free markets; 
I would like to conclude my remarks by 
speaking of free peoples. We have our 
disputes with Japan and the European 
Community. But the United States and 



the great democracies of Western 
Europe and Japan stand together at the 
forefront of the free nations and free 
economies of the world. We believe in 
rewarding initiative, creativity, and risk 
taking. As President Reagan said in 
Japan, "Our freedom inspires no fear 
because it poses no threat. We in- 
timidate no one. And we will not be in- 
timidated by anyone." We do not "build 
walls to keep our people in; we do not 
have armies of secret police to keep 
them quiet." Rather, in this imperfect 
and sometimes dangerous world, the 
United States, Japan, and Western 
Europe represent the deepest aspira- 
tions of men and women everywhere— 
to be free, to live in peace, and to create 
and renew the wealth of nations. ■ 



NATO Defense Planning Committee 
Meets in Brussels 



The DefcHsr Miinsl,,^ of the North 
Atlantic Trnil,/ l h;ja„r:nti',m {NATO} 
met in Brussils Dm mber 6-7, 1983. The 
United Stdtrs inis n presented by Secre- 
tary ofDe/fNsc ( 'iisjjar W. Weinberger. 
Following is the final communique 
issued on December 7. 

1. The Defense Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
Ministerial Session in Brussels on 6th and 7th 
December 1983. 

2. Ministers reaffirmed that NATO 
preserves the peace, freedom and security of 
its members through the maintenance of 
military forces sufficient to deter aggression 
and through policies designed to promote 
stable international relations. The strength of 
the Alliance derives from the cohesion and 
solidarity of its members in pursuing these 
common objectives. 

3. NATO is a defensive alliance and is 
committed to preserve the peace at the 
lowest level of forces capable of deterring the 
Warsaw Pact threat. In this respect Ministers 
recalled the recent Alliance decision at 
Montebello to withdraw 1,400 nuclear 
warheads from Europe. This decision, taken 
together with the withdrawal of 1,000 
warheads in 1980, will bring to 2,400 the 
total number of warheads to be removed 
from Europe since 1979. The resulting 
stockpile will be the lowest in Europe for 
some 20 years. Furthermore any deployment 
of land-based LRINF [longer range 
intermediate-range nuclear force] missiles 
will be matched by one for one withdrawals. 
This is in clear contrast to the relentless 
Soviet buildup. Ministers urged the Soviet 
Union to match NATO's restraint and to 
reduce rather than continue to increase the 
levels of its nuclear weapons. 



4. Deterrence and arms control are in- 
tegral and complementary parts of the securi- 
ty policy of the Alliance. Both are fundamen- 
tal to NATO's long-standing objectives of 
safeguarding the peace and pursuing, 
through dialogue and mutually advantageous 
co-operation, a constructive East-West rela- 
tionship aimed at genuine detente. Therefore, 
while seeking a stable balance at lower levels 
of forces through militarily significant, 
equitable and verifiable arms control 
agreements, NATO must continue at the 
same time to provide the capabilities 
necessary to ensure deterrence of aggression 
by means of a strong defence. 

5. The security of the Alliance depends 
on the maintenance of a stable military 
balance: This balance has been gravely 
disturbed by the relentless Soviet deployment 
of SS-20 missiles. Ministers emphasized their 
determination to move ahead with the dual- 
track approach to LRINF modernization and 
arms control as offering the opportunity to 
redress this imbalance and reaffirmed that 
this approach remains the most effective way 
of safeguarding the security of the Alliances. 

• They noted with great regret that the 
Soviet Union had unilaterally ended the latest 
round of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
force] negotiations in Geneva without agree- 
ing on a date for their resumption. There is 
no justification for this action by the Soviet 
Union, which has, during the course of the 
negotiations since the United States proposed 
to eliminate this entire class of weapons, ex- 
panded its SS-20 force by over 300 
warheads. Ministers emphasized their desire 
that the negotiations be resumed as soon as 
possible to achieve an agreement on equal 



22 



A li. K^> !« An. »k:'av. 



EUROPE 



global limits on United States and Soviet 
LRINF missile warheads at reduced levels, 
preferably zero for both sides. 

• They reaffirmed that NATO is 
prepared, in accordance with the terms of 
any INF agreement that may be reached, to 
halt, modify or reverse its deployments, 
which are now underway in conformity with 
the 1979 decision. 

• They welcomed the continuing close 
consultations within the Alliance on INF 
negotiations. The intensity of these consulta- 
tions has reflected the cohesion of the 
Alliance. They stressed that Alliance firmness 
in resolutely carrying out the dual-track deci- 
sion was a major factor in bringing the Soviet 
Union to the negotiating table and will con- 
tinue to be a critical factor in inducing the 
Soviet Union to recommence INF negotia- 
tions in a serious fashion.' 

6. Ministers welcomed the proposals the 
United States has made in the strategic arms 
reduction talks to reduce the most destabiliz- 
ing weapons and to reduce substantially the 
level of United States and Soviet strategic 
arms, including the build-down concept 
recently tabled in Geneva. Ministers reem- 
phasized their support for the United States 
position in the talks, on which they have been 
fully informed, and welcomed the United 
States initiatives to move the talks forward. 
Ministers reaffirmed the need to strive for a 
mutually acceptable solution to the issues still 
barring progress in the mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna. 
They also stressed the importance they at- 
tach to the Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe (CDE) as an opportunity to negoti- 
ate politically binding, militarily significant 
and verifiable measures which will cover the 
whole of Europe and which would increase 
confidence and security and reduce the threat 
of surprise attack. 

7. Ministers noted with concern the pace 
of modernization of Warsaw Pact forces 
across the entire spectrum, strategic to con- 
ventional. In the face of this steady ac- 
cumulation of Soviet military power, the 
Alliance must take the necessary measures to 
preserve the security of its peoples. NATO's 
strategy of flexible response and forward 
defence remains valid and continues to be the 
basis for NATO defence. This requires a 
balanced triad of forces: the strengthening of 
the conventional component is particularly 
urgent. Against this background Ministers 
discussed the results of the 1983 annual 
defence review and adopted the NATO force 
plan for 1984-1988. Ministers welcomed the 
progress achieved by nations, and agreed to 
do their utmost to make available the 
resources needed for the essential enhance- 
ment of their deterrent and defence forces. 

8. They recognized that in current 
economic circumstances achieving the re- 
quired improvements to NATO's defence 
posture constitutes a considerable challenge. 
It is imperative that national consideration of 
any change to existing commitments takes in- 



to account Alliance needs and priorities. The 
best use of scarce resources remains a central 
problem. Improvements to the combat capa- 
bility and effectiveness of NATO's conven- 
tional forces must be achieved, 

9. In this context Ministers emphasized 
the importance of making the most effective 
use of available resources and of exploiting 
NATO's technological strength through 
greater emphasis on: 

• Co-operation and co-ordination in 
defence planning and in the field of research, 
development and production; 

• Improved co-ordination of NATO in- 
frastructure planning to bring support 
facilities more into line with the projected 
needs of NATO forces, at the same time as 
providing an appropriate level of funding to 
ensure their operational effectiveness; 

• A more effective and balanced frame- 
work of transatlantic co-operation; 

• The potential offered by technologies, 
available or emerging, to make substantial 
and yet affordable improvements in the con- 
ventional defence of the Alliance particularly 
within the context of the two-way street; 

• The establishment of priorities based 
on the application of rigorous criteria of 
military value and cost effectiveness; 

• Adequate use of the industrial capa- 
bilities of member countries in the field of 
defence equipment; 

• Effective steps to restrict the transfer 
of militarily relevant technology to the 
Warsaw Pact. 

Ministers acknowledged progress made in 
the appropriate NATO bodies towards co- 
ordinating national efforts generally and in 
ensuring the successful exploitation of emerg- 
ing technologies. 

10. Ministers again stressed the impor- 
tance of Greece, Portugal and Turkey having 
adequate allied assistance to carry out their 
missions more effectively to the advantage of 
all. Ministers agreed that despite commend- 
able efforts by some allies more aid, and by 
more nations, is essential. 

11. While the purpose of NATO is to 
preserve the security of the North Atlantic 
Treaty area. Ministers again acknowledged 
that developments outside the NATO Treaty 
area might threaten the vital interests of 
members of the Alliance. They recalled their 
agreement to take full account of the effect 
of such developments on NATO security, 
defence capabilities and the national interests 
of member countries and the need to consult 
and to share assessments on the basis of com- 
monly identified objectives. They also recalled 
the Bonn Summit statements and reendorsed 
their communique of June 1983 which stated 
that on the basis of national decision: those 
countries, such as the United States, which 
have the means to take action, should do so 
in timely consultation with their allies; there 
could be cases where other individual allied 
nations would make an important contribu- 
tion to the security of the Alliance by making 



available facilities to assist deployments need- 
ed to strengthen deterrence in such areas; 
and member nations, as they may decide, 
have a wide and diverse range of possibilities 
from which to choose in making useful con- 
tributions to promote stability and deterrence 
in regions outside the treaty area involving 
vital Western interests. 

12. Against the background of United 
States planning for its rapidly deployable 
forces and the implications for defence of the 
NATO area, Ministers noted work in prog- 
ress to review measures necessary to main- 
tain deterrent and defence capabilities within 
the NATO area and agreed that measures 
that could be taken by countries would be 
dealt with in the defence planning process, 
the next stage of which is the adoption of 
force goals in spring 1984. 

13. NATO's task of preserving peace and 
freedom and preventing war requires a full 
spectrum of credible military forces, a stable 
military balance and the strategy of flexible 
response. The firm support of the peoples of 
the Alliance and the provision and effective 
use of adequate resources are essential to 
fulfill these aims. While military strength 
alone cannot provide long-term security it 
provides the foundation for the development 
of peaceful relations through dialog^ue and 
communication. 

The Minister of Defence of Spain in- 
formed the Defence Planning Committee 
about the review undertaken and regarding 
Spanish participation in the Alliance and in 
consequence reserved his government's posi- 
tion on the present Communique. 



'Denmark and Greece reserve their posi- 
tions on paragraph 5 [footnote in original]. ■ 



February 1984 



23 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Human Rights Implications for 
U.S. Action in Grenada 



by Elliott Abrams 

Address before the Los Angeles 
World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, 
on Novemhei- 22, 1983. Mr. Abrams is 
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs. 

November 22 is a somber day in the 
lives of all Americans. On this day in 
1963, President John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated. For millions of Americans, 
the passage of two decades has not 
dimmed a single detail of the assassina- 
tion and its aftermath. In our mind's 
eye, we can still follow the President's 
motorcade; we can see him jolted by an 
explosion of shots; we can follow the 
President's funeral procession making 
its mournful way through the grey 
streets of Washington. And as we recall 
those tragic moments, we are reminded 
once again of the irrational and 
capricious forces which seem to be an in- 
escapable part of the human condition, 
and which can even claim a great and 
beloved President as their victim. 

It is altogether fitting, then, that we 
Americans should take time out on this 
day to pay tribute to the memory of 
President Kennedy. And because Presi- 
dent Kennedy was preeminently a po- 
litical man, paying tribute to his memory 
means honoring the political principles 
for which he stood. 

First and foremost among these 
principles was the defense of human 
rights. Indeed, this nation's willingness 
to defend human rights was a theme 
which ran through so many of President 
Kennedy's speeches. In his moving and 
eloquent Inaugural Address, for exam- 
ple, the President declared that the 
torch had been passed to a new genera- 
tion of Americans, "unwilling to witness 
or permit the slow undoing of those 
human rights to which this nation has 
always been committed." And on 
November 22, 1963, the final speech of 
President Kennedy's career, the speech 
he did not live to deliver, concluded with 
this ringing affirmation: "Our duty as a 
party is not to our party alone, but to 
the nation, and, indeed, to all mankind. 
Our duty is not merely the preservation 
of political power, but the preservation 
of peace and freedom." 



In retrospect, it seems clear that 
President Kennedy's assassination 
marked the end of a political era and the 
start of what the historian Theodore 
White has rightly called "the storm 
decade" in American politics. During this 
decade, President Kennedy's belief that 
the United States was obliged by its 
history and its principles to defend lib- 
erty and uphold the cause of human 
rights was superseded, in many 
quarters, by a very different interpreta- 
tion of American history. Let me read 
you an excerpt from a speech delivered 
in 1971 by the president of one of our 
most famous universities, which best 
conveys the spirit — and the perver- 
sity — of those times: 

In twenty six years since waging a world 
war against the forces of tyranny, fascism 
and genocide in Europe, we have become a 
nation more tyrannical, more fascistic and 
more capable of genocide than was ever con- 
ceived or thought possible two decades ago. 
We conquered Hitler, but we have come to 
embrace Hitlerism. 

Today, the notion that Americans 
had somehow come to embrace 
Hitlerism must surely strike sane per- 
sons as bizarre and grotesque. It would 
be wrong, however, to assume that the 
ideas and attitudes which inspired such 
remarks have disappeared from the 
scene altogether. In attenuated form, 
they remain influential. Among 
members of what is loosely called the 
human rights "community," the belief 
persists that the United States is so 
morally and politically flawed that the 
only way it can advance human rights is 
through acts of abstention: not providing 
aid, not resisting aggression, not helping 
fellow democracies, not getting involved. 
The idea that American power can be 
used to defend human rights is rejected 
with scorn and derision. 

The Reagan Administration came in- 
to office with a very different conception 
of what constitutes a proper human 
rights policy. To put it simply, we 
believe that American power is a force 
for good in the world. We also think 
that there is a necessary connection be- 
tween the defense of our national in- 
terest and the defense of human rights. 
We, therefore, maintain, along with 
President Kennedy, that the United 
States cannot "witness or permit the 



slow undoing of those human rights to 
which this nation has always been com- 
mitted." Indeed, it is precisely our un- 
willingness to witness the undoing of 
human rights in such areas of the world 
as Grenada which is responsible for 
some of the Reagan Administration's 
most controversial foreign policy deci- 
sions. For this reason, I would like to 
address the human rights implications of 
our actions in Grenada this afternoon. 



Factors Determining 
U.S. Action in Grenada 

As everyone here is aware, the United 
States acted in Grenada at the request 
of the Organization of East Caribbean 
States, which in turn had received a 
direct appeal from the Governor General 
of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon. The Gover- 
nor General's appeal for action carried 
exceptional moral and legal weight, as 
he was the sole remaining constitutional 
authority on Grenada. 

Adding further weight in this situa- 
tion was the fact that American concern 
for human rights is inextricably linked 
to our belief in democracy and our 
understanding that the suspension of 
democracy exposes societies to the 
widest range of human rights 
abuses — murder, torture, arbitrary ar- 
rest and punishment, and other depriva- 
tions of freedom. Without democracy, 
these abuses can be imposed at the 
discretion of rulers, for the society can 
no longer control or remove them. 

These dangers were increasingly 
realized on the island of Grenada in the 
late 1970s. The government of Prime 
Minister [Eric] Gairy resorted to strong- 
arm methods and reportedly engaged in 
electoral fraud to remain in power. The 
coup of 1979 brought Prime Minister 
[Maurice] Bishop to power and, with 
him, only unfulfilled promises to end 
abuses, to hold elections, and to return 
to a parliamentary system. 

As the State Department's 1982 
Human Rights report on Grenada makes 
clear, the human rights situation in 
Grenada was already serious before the 
murder of Prime Minister Bishop. There 
were numerous political prisoners, police 
brutality had been reported, freedom of 
expression was severely restricted, 
freedom of assembly was nonexistent. 



24 



Bulletin 



Mf BUT ■.«. M». |# 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



all democratic labor leaders had been 
jailed, and churches operated only under 
the close scrutiny of the government. No 
elections had been held or were in pros- 
pect. Today's Neiv York Times carries 
the story of a political prisoner of the 
Bishop years, jailed and tortured for 
mouthing a few complaints against the 
Bishop regime. 

As has happened so often in history, 
the sacrifice of freedom did not bring 
order. Contending factions took to set- 
tling their differences by an uncontrolled 
process of arbitrary arrest and assas- 
sination. A power struggle between 
Prime Minister Bishop and Deputy 
Prime Minister Bernard Coard erupted 
on October 12. According to the minutes 
of the Party Central Committee, Bishop 
was considered a "bourgeois 
deviationist" for moving too slowly to 
consolidate a "Leninist" restructuring of 
Grenadian society. The Prime Minister 
was placed under house arrest without 
legal process on the night of October 
13-14, and other cabinet members were 
arrested. 

Within a week, Bishop and several 
of his cabinet ministers were dead; 
troops had fired directly on demon- 
strators; a revolutionary military council 
had been formed; a round-the-clock, 
shoot-on-sight curfew was imposed; and 
journalists from the international press 
arriving at the airport were immediately 
deported. Legitimate government and 
order had ceased to exist. 

Other eastern Caribbean states — all 
of them democracies with no armed 
forces to speak of — reacted strongly to 
the collapse of order in Grenada. In Bar- 
bados, Prime Minister Tom Adams ex- 
pressed "horror at these brutal and 
vicious murders" and noted that events 
in Grenada marked "the difference be- 
tween barbarians and human beings." 

In its formal request for U.S. 
assistance, the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States detailed: "the current 
anarchic conditions, the serious viola- 
tions of human rights and bloodshed 
that have occurred and the consequent 
unprecedented threat to the peace and 
security of the region created by the 
vacuum of authority in Grenada." 

The United States felt constrained 
to act. President Reagan has called this 
military action a rescue, and the Grena- 
dian people seem overwhelmingly to 
agree. The respected Grenadian jour- 
nalist Alister Hughes spoke for the vast 
majority of people in Grenada when he 
said of the American and Caribbean 
troops, "Thank God they came. If some- 



one had not come in and done some- 
thing, I hesitate to say what the situa- 
tion in Grenada would be now." The 
Grenada Chamber of Industry and Com- 
merce declared "its support for and 
gratitude to the liberation forces of the 
Caribbean and the United States who, in 
the face of inevitable censure in the in- 
ternational fora, were concerned enough 
to come to the assistance of a population 
held hostage by political terrorists." And 
a delegation from the Grenada Council 
of Churches told a visiting LI.S. congres- 
sional delegation that, "We were in 
favor of the American troops on the 
island, because, from the experience of 
our people, it was clear to us that they 
felt that the American presence was 
welcomed." 

The Risk of Condemnation 

Yet the reaction of human rights groups 
in this country and abroad has been 
uniformly critical. Some have gone so 
far as to suggest that our action in 
Grenada violated the norms of interna- 
tional morality. This is a telling accusa- 
tion, for it highlights the adversarial role 
some human rights activists have chosen 
to play in relation to the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's human rights policy. Thus, 
I would like to examine the moral and 



Means. The issue is whether we pur- 
sued these honorable goals by means 
that were appropriate and proportional. 
For example, had U.S. military action 
resulted in the deaths of thousands, or 
even hundreds of innocent civilians on 
Grenada, I do not think we would con- 
sider such a military action so easily 
defensible. Had it entailed a risk of a 
major war, many would have wondered 
whether that risk was worth taking. But 
here was a case where the means at 
hand did not seem to risk an expanded 
conflict or the deaths of innocent 
civilians. The means required to achieve 
our goals were entirely proportional and 
appropriate. 

Results. It was logically predictable 
that the results of such an operation 
would almost certainly be the restora- 
tion of democracy to Grenada. Already 
order has been restored and a compe- 
tent government has taken over, and 
next year there will be free elections and 
a democratic government will take over. 
So although it is too soon to know the 
results for sure, it is really very hard to 
doubt that the result will be democracy 
and respect for human rights. 

So it seems to me that when we con- 
sider the moral questions relating to this 
intervention — judged by goals, means, 
and results — it meets the test. 



The United States felt constrained to act. 
President Reagan has called this military action a 
rescue, and the Grenadian people seem overwhelm- 
ingly to agree. 



ethical questions which the Grenadian 
action has raised. 

Perhaps we should proceed by ask- 
ing the following questions: Were the in- 
tentions of our actions ethical? Were the 
means we used ethical? Were the results 
ethical? 

Intentions. It seems to me clear 
that those of the United States were en- 
tirely ethical. We wanted to rescue 
Americans from possible harm; we 
wanted to restore democracy and re- 
spect for human rights in Grenada; we 
wanted to eliminate a threat to the se- 
curity and democracy of neighboring 
islands. These, plainly, are honorable in- 
tentions. 



The Dilemma of Moral Imperatives 

Yet despite these very strong arguments 
in favor of the morality of our interven- 
tion, our critics would have preferred 
that we place our citizens' lives at risk 
and ignore the tyranny in Grenada, 
rather than appear to violate the princi- 
ple of national sovereignty. 

Now, no one can deny that respect 
for the sovereignty and national 
autonomy of all states is, indeed, a 
moral imperative. This principle has long 
been a touchstone of American foreign 
policy. Yet, is this moral imperative 
determinative under any and all cir- 
cumstances? If, for example, a Hitler 



February 1984 



25 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



had come to power in Grenada and had 
threatened to implement a Caribbean 
version of the "final solution," should our 
respect for Grenada's national sovereign- 
ty have forced us to acquiesce in such 
barbarism? 

The more we ponder such dilemmas, 
the more we come to recognize that no 
single moral value can be absolute. To 
paraphrase the great American 
philosopher, Sidney Hook: Our espousal 
of the cause of national sovereignty does 
not require us in every circumstance of 
international affairs to support it, any 
more than our cherishing of honesty 
demands that we should always tell the 
truth about everything to everyone, or 
our belief in charity that we give alms in 
any and every circumstance. National 
sovereignty is one value among others, 
and we must evaluate a claim for it in 
the light of its consequences for these 
other values. 

All this, I think, would have been 
quite clear to our critics had the Grena- 
dian New JEWEL Movement been Nazi- 
oriented rather than Marxist-Leninist- 
oriented. If we had acted against a Nazi 
or a Fascist group, I believe we would 
have heard not a word of condemnation 
from human rights groups. I think it is 
fair to say, then, that denunciations of 
the Grenada action — indeed, of Reagan 
human rights policy as a whole — come 
for the most part from people who have 
been captured by the symbolism and 
rhetoric of the left. In their view, sup- 
port of human rights causes and sym- 
pathy for causes of the left, for "pro- 
gressive" regimes, are virtually identical 
propositions. How else can we account 
for the virtual silence of these groups 
about human rights violations committed 
by the New JEWEL Movement, in 
Grenada, and the explosion of criticism 
and concern from these same groups 
once the New JEWEL Movement had 
been overthrown? Our use of quiet 
diplomacy, for example, is surely not a 
matter of principle. 

It is a tactic aimed at attaining 
results in countries and situations where 
more public action might be counter- 
productive. We are well aware of the 
political costs of quiet methods — we are 
accused of doing nothing or too little 
and cannot defend our policy by reveal- 
ing our private diplomatic efforts. But 
that's a choice we have made and which 
you would wish us to make — to seek 
results rather than publicity — to have a 
human rights policy rather than a public 
relations policy. 



A central difference, then, between 
the Reagan Administration and many of 
its critics on human rights issues comes 
down to this: We believe in what might 
be characterized as a policy of strict 
nonalignment as between human rights 
violators of the extreme left and the ex- 
treme right. We condemn both extremes 
with equal vigor. Many of our critics, 
however, practice what has come to be 
known as "positive" nonalignment; that 
is, alignment in favor of the side that 
employs the verbiage of the left both to 
justify and to mask its repression. 

Not surprisingly, the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's policy of strict nonalign- 
ment tends to get us into trouble with 
practitioners of this so-called "positive" 
nonalignment. This is clearly the case 
with our domestic critics, and it is even 
more emphatically the case in interna- 
tional fora such as the United Nations, 
which are dominated by practitioners of 
"positive" nonalignment. 

Conclusion 

Nevertheless, we are resolved not to 
alter our policy. Our aim, after all, is not 
to win an international popularity con- 
test. Rather, we seek to improve human 
rights conditions in a large number of 
places around the world, so as to benefit 
the people who live in those places and 
to make clear the continuing commit- 
ment of the United States to the cause 
of liberty throughout the world. We are 
interested in attaining results and not in 
issuing pious pronouncements about 
human rights that only serve to make us 
feel good about ourselves. The Reagan 
Administration believes that this ap- 
proach accords with the traditional 
American way of doing things. When 
Americans are concerned about righting 
a moral wrong, we are traditionally will- 
ing to work and to sacrifice to achieve 
our ideals. We generally commit 
ourselves to effective action on behalf of 
our principles. We are willing to make 
the intellectual effort to understand a 
complicated reality when we want to 
change it. We are willing to commit 
resources. We are willing to give of our 
own labor and efforts. And, when it is a 
question of diminishing suffering and in- 
justices, we stick to an effort in spite of 
complications and difficulties. It was, let 
us recall, Lincoln who ended the shame 
of slaverv — not John Brown. 



No one understood this tradition 
more clearly, or expressed it more elo- 
quently, than President John F. 
Kennedy. "The purpose of foreign 
policy," President Kennedy said, "is not 
to provide an outlet for our own sen- 
timents of hope or indignation; it is to 
shape real events in a real world." 

As we confront the dilemmas and 
complexities of a foreign policy that is 
seriously dedicated to helping expand 
freedom and human rights around the 
world, let us always bear President 
Kennedy's words in mind. And let us 
remember, as well, that human rights 
policy is, inevitably, a difficult mixing of 
the highest idealism with practical 
politics. It isn't easy to practice or, in- 
deed, even to explain. Yet the marriage 
of ideals and politics is an old American 
practice — as old as the country itself. 
We are committed to this effort, as 
President Reagan has made clear time 
after time. Human rights policy has 
always been, and remains, a central ele- 
ment of American foreign policy. In the 
final analysis, it is what this country is 
all about. ■ 



26 



State Bulletin 



■«■ BUT M:». 1^. t* 



MIDDLE EAST 



Policy Options in Lebanon 



by Kenneth W. Dam 

Stntrmrvt hrfarr thr Sninfe Foreigv 
Relatiinis Cninnilhr n„ .J,i,ninri/ 11. 
1981,. Mr. Ihiiii IS Ihjiiilii Sirniitry of 
State.^ 

Since the tragedy that struck the 
Marines on October 23 and the later 
Syrian attacks on U.S. reconnaissance 
aircraft, there has been legitimate anxie- 
ty about our role in Lebanon. The Ad- 
ministration recognizes the urgency of 
this concern. I am grateful, therefore, 
for this opportunity to consider with you 
our policy in Lebanon. 

We are involved in Lebanon not only 
to help the people of Lebanon end their 
suffering but also to protect major 
American interests in the Middle East. 

• Lebanon has been and can become 
again a flashpoint for regional conflict. 
And, with Soviet advisers attached to 
Syrian troops, Lebanon could become a 
flashpoint for international conflict as 
well. 

• Lebanon abuts Israel's northern 
border. Civil strife in Lebanon directly 
affects the security of Israel, and, as the 
President has said, our commitment to 
Israel's security is ironclad. 

• Furthermore, America's credibility 
is at stake in Lebanon. Every regional 
state, friend and foe alike, is watching 
our actions for proof of America's 
strength and its ability to promote 
peace. 

• We are involved in Lebanon also 
because we have an interest in maintain- 
ing U.S. influence in a region that is a 
strategic crossroads and an arena for 
competition between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 

• Finally, the struggle in Lebanon is 
related to the larger conflict in the Mid- 
dle East, which the United States has 
been working for years to resolve. Out- 
side forces have intervened to exploit 
Lebanon's internal divisions and have 
dragged Lebanon into the regional con- 
flict. 

I do not mean to suggest that the 
future of the Middle East hangs entirely 
on Lebanon, or that all aspects of the 
Lebanese conflict must be resolved 
before progress can be made elsewhere 
in the region. But lack of progress 
toward a more peaceful, stable Lebanon 
will erode the chances for peace and 
stability elsewhere in the region. 



February 1984 



U.S. Objectives 

It is, therefore, vital for us to persevere 
in Lebanon. Our policy there is straight- 
forward. We seek a free and independ- 
ent Lebanon. This is a goal we seek for 
all friendly nations. 

We seek this goal not through mili- 
tary force but through a diplomatic and 
political process. We recognize that such 
a process will involve compromises. We 
accept this reality. But if Lebanon is to 
be truly free and independent, we must 
continue to work for the objectives we 
set for ourselves at the outset of our in- 
volvement. 

• The sovereign authority of the 
Government of Lebanon must be ex- 
tended throughout all its territory. 

• All foreign forces must be with- 
drawn. 

• Israel's northern border must be 
secured. 

• The Lebanese people must be per- 
mitted the opportunity to reconcile their 
differences without foreign interference. 

The Government of Lebanon has not 
been free to pursue these objectives. It 
has been under attack by Syria, Iran, 
and other radical elements. Its demo- 
cratic orientation has been threatened 
and its sovereignty usurped by foreign 
forces encamped on Lebanese soil. The 
right of the Lebanese Government to 
make its own decisions has been 
challenged. 

The Government of Lebanon has not 
had sufficient resources to sustain itself 
in the face of these attacks. Accordingly, 
in September 1982 the government of 
President Amin Gemayel asked for our 
help along with that of France and Italy 
and ultimately the United Kingdom. 
Together we responded with the multi- 
national force (MNF). 

Mission of the 
Multinational Force 

The mission of the multinational force, 
of which our Marines are a part, is to 
provide an international presence in 
Beirut to lend stability and confidence to 
the Lebanese Government and people. 
The confidence instilled by the ar- 
rival of the multinational force was im- 
mediately evident as the residents of 
East and West Beirut discovered that, 
for the first time since the civil war 



began in 1975, they were able to cross 
safely the green line dividing their com- 
munities. As a result of the MNF's 
presence, commerce in Beirut continues 
today despite repeated attempts by 
Syria and its allies to trigger the break- 
down of order. 

The MNF troops, together with 
those of the United Nations, total 
11,000, of which only 1,600 are U.S. 
Marines. Those Marines represent a 
small but vital keystone in the overall in- 
ternational support for Lebanon. The 
abrupt departure of the Marines could 
precipitate the departure of other inter- 
national forces. 

But the question can be legitimately 
asked: are the Marines, in fact, helping 
us accomplish our goals? And even if 
they are, has there been enough prog- 
ress to justify keeping them there at the 
risk of future sacrifices? 

The answer is emphatically yes. 
Progress has been slow and tortuous. 
But there have been real accom- 
plishments for which the MNF deserves 
part of the credit and which justify the 
continued presence of our Marines and 
our other MNF partners. Here are some 
benchmarks measuring progress over 
the past year and a half. 

First, Syrian and Palestinian troops 
were evacuated from Beirut in the fall 
of 1982, facilitated by the presence of 
the multinational force. 

Second, intense U.S. diplomatic ef- 
forts, reinforced by the stabilizing 
presence of the MNF, helped the new 
Government of Lebanon extend its 
authority in Beirut and led to negotia- 
tions between Lebanon and Israel culmi- 
nating in the May 17 agreement. 

Third, a cease-fire agreement 
among Lebanese factions was reached 
on September 26, 1983, through diplo- 
matic efforts led by the United States 
and Saudi Arabia. The firm response of 
the U.S. Marines themselves and our 
offshore naval artillery to attacks on the 
Marines was a vital factor in persuading 
hostile military elements to accede to 
the cease-fire. 

Fourth, President Gemayel, with 
our active support, began a process of 
national reconciliation at Geneva, where 
all of Lebanon's major leaders met 
together for the first time in 9 years. 



27 



I .1 .1 1 



MIDDLE EAST 



Fifth, an agreement was worked out 
5 weeks ago to lift the siege of Dayr al- 
Qamar. Israel played a helpful role in 
this operation, which evacuated Chris- 
tian militiamen and refugees from a 
town deep in the Lebanese mountains. 
This has been one of the more important 
immediate fruits of our recent intensi- 
fied cooperation with Israel. 

And finally, the Lebanese Armed 
Forces, with training and assistance 
from the United States and others, have 
played an increasingly effective role in 
helping the Lebanese Government ex- 
pand its authority and restore order. 
The army contains elements from all the 
Lebanese communities and is an en- 
couraging example of a truly national 
Lebanese institution that works. 

Reconciliation, Withdrawal, 
and SjTian Intentions 

The confidence engendered by the 
presence of the MNF has also provided 
an impetus to the process of political ac- 
commodation in Lebanon. Indeed, 
Lebanon's internal political dialogue, 
aimed at national reconciliation, is 
already moving forward under President 
Gemayel's leadership. Intensive contacts 
have been underway among leaders of 
Lebanon's communities in the past few 
weeks, flowing from last November's 
reconciliation conference in Geneva. 

Concerned parties inside and outside 
Lebanon need not doubt that the weight 
of the United States has been placed 
firmly behind the process of political ac- 
commodation, reform, and reconcilia- 
tion. We support no faction or religious 



community. But we are not neutral in 
our support of the legitimate Govern- 
ment of Lebanon. 

In addition to supporting the process 
of political accommodation, the United 
States is also working to achieve the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces. We 
have maintained and intensified our dia- 
logue with all concerned countries, in- 
cluding Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. 

It is important to be realistic about 
Syria. The United States has no doubt 
that Syria is a significant party in the 
Lebanon dispute and that Syria has a 
stake in its outcome. But Syria has been 
an obstacle to progress toward recon- 
ciliation and withdrawal of foreign 
forces. Syria's collaboration with Iran 
and Libya and its association with ter- 
rorist activities in Lebanon are an out- 
rage and an affront to all parties who 
truly seek peace in the region. So, too, 
was its recent action in shooting at U.S. 
reconnaissance aircraft whose peaceful 
mission relates to the safety of our 
Marines. 

At the same time, there are other, 
more positive signs that deserve to be 
acknowledged. The release of Lt. Good- 
man is an example. Syria's willingness to 
open contacts with the Lebanese 
Government at the highest level is 
another useful development of the last 
few months, as are the trilateral talks 
between the Foreign Ministers of Syria, 
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia — who met 
again just this past Sunday in Riyadh. 
Ambassador Rumsfeld [the President's 
special representative to the Middle 
East] plans to visit Damascus in the 
near future as soon as a mutually con- 



U.S. Forces in Lebanon 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
DEC. 14, 19831 

I am providing herewith a further report 
with respect to the situation in Lebanon and 
the participation of the United States Armed 
Forces in the Multinational Force. This 
report, prepared by the Secretaries of State 
and Defense, is consistent with Section 4 of 
the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu- 
tion. This report also includes the information 
called for by the House version of the Resolu- 
tion and is submitted in accordance with its 
more restricted time limits. 

I remain convinced that Congressional 
support for our continued participation in the 



Multinational Force is critical to peace, na- 
tional reconciliation, and the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Lebanon. We will, of 
course, keep you informed as to further 
developments with respect to this situation. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald Reag.-\n 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, 
President pro tempore of the Senate (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 19, 1983. ■ 



28 



venient time can be arranged. In the j 
meantime, our ambassador in Damascus 
has frequent and businesslike contacts 
with senior Syrian officials. 

It remains to be seen, however, 
whether Syria has decided it can live 
with a fair, balanced outcome in 
Lebanon. A major test of Syrian inten- 
tions is whether Damascus will support 
or impede agreement on the comprehen- 
sive security plan now being negotiated. 
This plan would permit the Government 
of Lebanon to begin extending its 
authority into areas outside Beirut, in- 
cluding both Christian and Muslim areas 
north and south of the city. Detailed 
plans are being explored for replacing 
nongovernmental militias in certain 
areas with Lebanese police and Armed 
Forces; this would be done in a manner 
acceptable to, and with the agreement 
of, the local inhabitants. 

The Government of Lebanon sup- 
ports this plan and has been negotiating 
with leaders of the Druze, Muslim, and 
Christian forces. These parties reached 
agreement on all the basic elements of 
the security plan. If the plan founders 
now, the failure will be the responsibility 
of Syria, which will have demonstrated 
once again its willingness to sabotage 
progress in Lebanon. We hope this will 
not be the case, and to this end we con- 
tinue to meet with Syria. 

Role of Congress 

I should now like to say a word about 
the role of Congress in developing our 
policy in Lebanon. Just last fall, the 
President and the Congress agreed on a 
joint resolution that supported the 
presence of the U.S. Marines in Lebanor 
for 18 months. That resolution was an 
important expression of congressional 
support for our goals in Lebanon — im- 
portant because it demonstrated that the 
President and Congress, working 
together, could formulate and maintain 
a coherent and consistent long-term 
policy. 

If our determination is now seen as 
flagging, then we can be sure that Syria 
will turn its back on the path of recon- 
ciliation and negotiations. If the Con- 
gress were to curtail the period of its 
authorization for our Marines, then 
Syria would be encouraged to believe 
that it can win the game by digging in. 
Syria might conclude that we are fin- 
ished in Lebanon and on the way out. 
Syria must not reach such a conclusion. 
We — that is, the President and the Con- 
gress — must convey a steadfast message 
if we are to be seen in the Middle East 



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as serious about our support for Presi- 
dent Gemayel, political reconciliation in 
Lebanon, and Ambassador Rumsfeld's 
negotiations. 

Now is not the time to flinch. There 
are growing signs that a number of im- 
portant Arab countries are coming 
together to resist radical forces and en- 
courage movement toward peace: 
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
Morocco, some Persian Gulf states, and 
others are working in this regard in- 
dividually, together— and with us. Much 
of this activity is a response to the Ira- 
nian threat and to the concerns in the 
region about state terrorism. It would 
be ironic, in light of this positive move- 
ment, which we have worked so hard to 
foster, if the United States were to 
signal that we were retreating in 
Lebanon. I can tell you that Administra- 
tion representatives who have visited 
the region have heard from the leaders 
of Israel and our most important 
moderate Arab friends that an American 
failure of nerve in Lebanon would be a 
disaster for all the forces of moderation 
in the region. 

Our commitment of the Marines is 
mot, of course, open ended. It remains 
our goal to secure the earliest possible 
withdrawal of the Marines, consistent 
with our paramount foreign policy objec- 
tives. Much has been done, however, to 
improve the security of our Marines in 
Beirut. Their task remains hazardous, 
and the death last weekend of one of 
our Marines near the American Em- 
bassy was a sad reminder of this fact. 
Obviously, the Marines may have to de- 
fend themselves. But I can assure you 
that, consistent with the mission they 
are performing, everything possible is 
being done to protect the Marines from 
attack and minimize casualties. 

It is too early to know whether 
alternative arrangements by, for exam- 
ple, the United Nations will be necessary 
or possible to aid the Government of 
Lebanon after events permit the depar- 
ture of the MNF. We would certainly 
consider favorably such arrangements as 
a means of furthering our support for 
Lebanon. It is the growing strength and 
jonfidence of the Government of 
Lebanon, however, which provides the 
most likely means to supplant the role of 
the MNF. 

We cannot forget our anguish over 
he terrible tragedy which struck our 
\Iarines in the MNF last October 23 or 
he attack on the American Embassy 



with heavy loss of life last April. But it 
would be disastrous if our reaction to 
such terrorist attacks were to withdraw 
from the field. We must not lose sight of 
the message we would be conveying by 
such action to every terrorist organiza- 
tion in the world— and to every govern- 
ment that supports such organizations. 
Nor can we lose sight of our larger in- 
terests in Lebanon and the Middle East, 
and the contribution the Marines are 
making to protect those interests. Suc- 
cessive U.S. Administrations of both 
parties have learned from long experi- 



ence in Middle East diplomacy that 
progress comes slowly and only through 
painstaking effort and patience. But 
American steadfastness and perse- 
verence has shown, and can again show, 
results. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Visit of Lebanese President 




President Amin Gemayel of the 
Republic of Lebanon made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C. 
November SO-December 3, 1983. to meet 
with President Reagan and other govern- 
ment officials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
two Presidents after their meeting on 
December 1. 1983.'^ 

President Reagan 

It's been my great pleasure to once 
again welcome our friend. President 
Gemayel, to Washington. President 
Gemayel symbolizes Lebanon's hopes for 
unity, peace, and stability — goals for 
which all of us are working so hard and 
for which many Americans and many 
more Lebanese have sacrified their lives. 
We admire President Gemayel's per- 
sonal courage. We applaud his deter- 



"ebruary 1984 



mination to free his country of all 
foreign forces and to reunite the 
Lebanese people. Lebanon once shined 
like a jewel in the sun, and America will 
do what it can to support Lebanon's ef- 
forts to restore its tranquility and in- 
dependence. 

To this end, we stand by the May 
17th agreement as the best and most 
viable basis for the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from Lebanon. And once again, I 
appeal to the other external forces to 
leave Lebanon. 

I was particularly impressed by the 
initiative that President Gemayel took in 
calling for national dialogue. Today, he 
and I have discussed his programs for 
national unity. And, Mr. President, your 
efforts to broaden the base of your 
government, bringing in Lebanon's 
many communities, will do much to 
rebuild a stable and prosperous 



29 



.Ryllel' 



I .1 ^1 I 



MIDDLE EAST 



U 



Lebanon. It will do much to restore con- 
fidence in the future. It will do much to 
stop the loss of so many innocent lives. 

President Gemayel has already 
achieved a measure of success through 
the effective leadership that he 
demonstrated during the first round of 
reconciliation talks in Geneva. Yet, there 
is still a long way to go, and Lebanon 
can count on our help. 

Our Marines, along with our allies in 
the multinational force, are in Beirut to 
demonstrate the strength of our commit- 
ment to peace in the Middle East. And I 
know you agree with me that the 
American people can be proud of the job 
that our Marines are doing. Their 
presence is making it possible for reason 
to triumph over the forces of violence, 
hatred, and intimidation. 

My special representative for the 
Middle East, Don Rumsfeld, returned 
recently from his first round of meetings 
in the region. He'll be returning to the 
area soon and will be working directly 
with President Gemayel to arrange 
foreign troop withdrawals and to pursue 
Lebanese national reconciliation. 

We're delighted to have you with us 
today, Mr. President, and we wish you 
Godspeed on your return home. 

President Gemayel 

I want to thank you and the American 
people to whom we in Lebanon owe so 
much. 

This is my third visit to Washington 
and probably the most important 
because of the intensity of the crisis in 
Lebanon and the region. Yet, I'm confi- 
dent that actions, properly conceived 
and executed at this time, can result in 
dramatic movement toward stability, 
security, and peace. 

Today, we explored, as partners, the 
best ways and means not to merely im- 
plement agreement but going beyond 
the letter of the law to set up the most 
appropriate mechanism and conditions 
for the achievement of our common in- 
terests and policy objectives. We found 
ourselves in full agreement on the 
necessity of withdrawal of all external 
forces from Lebanon and the full 
restoration of the Lebanese sovereignty 
and exclusive authority over all of 
Lebanon's territory within its interna- 
tionally recognized borders. This, and 
this alone, will put an end to the con- 
tinuing tragedy which is now engulfing 
not only Lebanese but Americans in 
Lebanon as well. Hence, it is imperative 



for us all to break the cycle of violence 
which has been preventing the people of 
Lebanon for the past decade from exer- 
cising their divine and natural right of 
self-determination and the shaping of a 
free modern society in full social and 
economic partnership. 

I found in Washington full com- 
prehension of the fact that leading 
Lebanon out of the present impasse is 
not only a question of justice and right 
but also a matter of common interest 
both for its neighbors and the United 
States. 



I view our discussions today with a 
sense of pride and accomplishment, and 
I'm gratified by President Reagan's com- 
mitment, and the support of the 
American people. I look forward, with 
hope, that actions taken as a result of 
our discussions, fortified by the courage 
and vision of the American and 
Lebanese people, will result in peace in 
Lebanon and the entire region. 



'Made to reporters assembled at the 
South Portico of the White House (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. .5, 198.3). ■ 



Visit of Israeli Prime Minister 




Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of 
the State of Israel made an official work- 
ing visit to Washington, D.C., Novem- 
ber 27-30, 1983, to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
President and Prime Minister after their 
meeting on November 29. ' 

President Reagan 

We have held 2 days of intensive talks 
with Prime Minister Shamir and his 
colleagues, covering a broad range of 
subjects including political, military 
cooperation, Lebanon, Israel's economic 
situation, and the pursuit of the Middle 
East peace process. And these discus- 



sions, as could be expected between 
close friends and allies, have been very 
productive. We reconfirmed the 
longstanding bonds of the friendship and 
cooperation between our two countries 
and expressed our determination to 
strengthen and develop them in the 
cause of our mutual interests. 

We have agreed on the need to in- 
crease our cooperation in areas where 
our interests coincide, particularly in the 
political and military area. And I am 
pleased to announce that we have 
agreed to establish a joint political- 
military group to examine ways in which 
we can enhance U.S. -Israeli cooperation. 
This group will give priority attention to 
the threat to our mutual interest posed 



lent of State Bulletin 



b^l» t* IIP |« 
'' I* I* II i& t 



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MIDDLE EAST 



by increased Soviet involvement in the 
Middle East. Among the specific areas 
to be considered are combined planning, 
joint exercise, and requirements for 
prepositioning of U.S. equipment in 
Israel. 

We've agreed to take a number of 
other concrete steps aimed at bolstering 
Israel's economy and security. These in- 
clude asking Congress for improved 
terms for our security assistance to 
Israel; using military assistance for 
development of the Lavi aircraft in the 
United States and for offshore procure- 
ment of Lavi components manufactured 
in Israel; permitting U.S. contractors to 
enter into contracts with the Govern- 
ment of Israel consistent with U.S. law, 
which would allow Israeli industry to 
participate in the production of U.S. 
weapons systems procured with foreign 
military sales credits; offering to 
negotiate a free-trade area with Israel. 

A main focus of our meetings was 
the agony of Lebanon and the threats 
there to our common interests. We ex- 
amined, together, Soviet activities in the 
Middle East and found a common con- 
cern with the Soviet presence and arms 
buildup in Syria. We reaffirmed our 
commonly held goals of a sovereign, in- 
dependent Lebanon free of all foreign 
forces, and of security for Israel's north- 
ern border. 

We agreed that every effort must be 
made to expedite implementation of the 
May 17th agreement between Israel and 
Lebanon. Adequate security arrange- 
ments for Israel's northern border must 
be assigned the highest priority. We're 
hopeful that such arrangements can be 
concluded soon. 

We, of course, discussed the broader 
goal of peace between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors. The Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace Treaty remains the cornerstone of 
the peace process. I reaffirmed my com- 
mitment to the September 1 initiative as 
the best way to realize the promise of 
Camp David and the UN Security Coun- 
cil Resolutions 242 and 338 upon which 
it was built. 

As you can see, our 2 days together 
have revealed substantial areas of agree- 
ment and resulted in a number of 
specific concrete steps that we'll take to 
strengthen our ties. We have also 
discussed some issues on which we do 
not see eye to eye. But disagreements 
between good friends do not alter the 
unique and sturdy foundation of our 
relationship. 



I know that Prime Minister Shamir 
shares with me the renewed conviction 
that the warm friendship between the 
United States and Israel will endure and 
strengthen. 

Prime Minister Shamir 

I am grateful for the invitation extended 
to me by President Reagan to come here 
to Washington for these discussions. The 
Minister of Defense [Moshe Arens] and I 
have had the opportunity to conduct 
very thorough discussions with the 
President, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, and their senior 
colleagues and advisers. These discus- 
sions have been carried out in the spirit 
of the traditional friendship and the 
common bonds of mutual understanding 
that bind our two countries. 

We reaffirmed our determination to 
ensure the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Lebanon. The only basis for 
a settlement of the Lebanese problem is 
the full implementation of the May 17, 
1983, agreement in all its parts. We 
have discussed with the President and 
the Secretaries the necessary steps that 
could facilitate the carrying out of this 
agreement. Syria constitutes today a 
major threat to the peace in our area by 
occupying more than 60% of Lebanon 
and by its massive concentration of 
Soviet arms and personnel on Syrian 
territory. 

Israel is ready to renew the peace 
process and discuss the final status of 
Judea and Samaria, following the 
autonomy period in the framework of 
the sole agreed basis for negotiations, 
namely the Camp David accords. We 
discussed during our visit here the major 
threat that terrorism constitutes to the 
peace, and we shall pursue our fight 
against it in close cooperation with the 
United States. 

Due to the need to ensure our 
security, a large part of our budget is 
spent on defense. We hope that the 
American Administration will increase 
their assistance program, taking into ac- 
count the great sacrifices made by Israel 
in the peace treaty, by relinquishing the 
oil wells and building new installations 
as a result of the withdrawal from Sinai. 
New measures designed to encourage 
the development of our economy by 
establishing a free-trade area, by shar- 
ing new technology will enhance Israel's 
strength and enable us to pursue our 
economic program so vital to the well- 
being of our society. 



In order to advance the search for 
peace and to strengthen the ties be- 
tween our two countries, we decided to 
establish the mechanism necessary to 
determine the details of the nature and 
scope of our cooperation inter alia in 
the fields of prepositioning of equipment 
for military readiness, joint exercises, 
and other relevant fields. We have 
agreed to establish a joint political- 
military committee to work on the 
details of these agreed matters. The aim 
of this cooperation is to strengthen 
Israel and deter threats to the reg^ion. 
The group will hold periodic meetings, 
starting the first week of January 1984. 

I wish to once again thank the Presi- 
dent and the people of the United States 
for their strong support of Israel and for 
the warm feelings conveyed to the 
Minister of Defense and myself by the 
President, the Vice President, the 
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of 
Defense. We will proceed on the road to 
peace with increased vigor. I return to 
Jerusalem strengthened in my conviction 
that with the aid of the United States of 
America and fortified by the friendship 
of its people and government, a strong 
Israel can, indeed, achieve peace. 



'Made to reporters assembled at the 
South Portico of the White House (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 5, 1983). ■ 



February 198' 



31 



^f >l *M 



REFUGEES 



1 



Refugee Assistance and Protection 



by James N. Purcell, Jr. 

Address before the Executive Com- 
mittee of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva on Octo- 
ber 12, 1983. Mr. Purcell is Director of 
the Bureau for Refugee Programs. 

The annual meeting of the Executive 
Committee is singularly important to 
our common objective of ensuring pro- 
tection and assistance to the world's 
refugees and other persons of concern to 
UNHCR. I would like at the outset to 
extend to High Commissioner Poul 
Hartling the warm congratulations of 
my government on his reelection for an 
additional 3-year term. The record of the 
organization he leads is one of steadily 
increasing effectiveness. I wish to under- 
score the credit which is due to the High 
Commissioner personally and to assure 
him of the continued strong support of 
the United States during the coming 2 
years. 

The essence of the task of UNHCR 
as an international humanitarian service 
organization is to act across a wide spec- 
trum of emergency as well as longstand- 
ing refugee problems while maintaining 
a qualitative, impartial, and humani- 
tarian focus in the service provided. The 
problems themselves are concrete in 
nature and increasingly complex with 
each year that passes. The needs are, 
first of all, very human: those of the in- 
dividual refugees themselves. Providing 
for human needs is almost always com- 
plicated by the local political, social, and 
economic situation. In many cases an in- 
hospitable logistics environment com- 
pounds these problems. One must face 
the complexities of program design, im- 
plementation, and monitoring, as well as 
the constraints of budgets and financial 
controls. 

It is the essence of the High Com- 
missioner's task to manage complex 
refugee programs and budgets while 
simultaneously imbuing his programs 
with a truly humanitarian character. It 
is the responsibility of this Executive 
Committee to understand the program- 
matic character of the High Commis- 
sioner's task and to be as supportive as 
possible. We will deal with an imposing 
array of program narrative and financial 
data requiring careful scrutiny and an 
emphasis on cost effectiveness and 
sound managerial practice. Let us, 
therefore, be certain to hold firmly in 



32 



our view the humanitarian principles 
and objectives for which the UNHCR ex- 
ists and which we are assembled here to 
further. 

In his statement, the High Commis- 
sioner called our attention, in particular, 
to two of these basic objectives: refugee 
protection and the promotion of durable 
solutions. I would like to refer to these 
objectives in the context of what I con- 
sider to be the mutually reinforcing ac- 
tions of protection and assistance. We 
may sometimes be too precise in our at- 
tempts to apply analytical terminology 
to multifaceted and inherently political 
human situations. There is often no 
clear-cut line between the material 
assistance needs of refugees and the 
protection of their rights under interna- 
tional law. UNHCR field officers must 
simultaneously ensure both. Similarly, 
there is a sometimes broad intersection 
between local settlement assistance and 
development aid. UNHCR and its sister 
international agencies, especially the UN 
Development Program (UNDP), must 
meet at this intersection and work out 
the appropriate transition from 
UNHCR's responsibilities to those of the 
UNDP and the other specialized agen- 
cies where appropriate. 

For refugees and other persons of 
concern to UNHCR, the importance of 
the mutually reinforcing relationship of 
protection and assistance often begins 
with the storm warnings of impending 
crisis leading to an emergency. Protec- 
tion and material assistance are both 
urgent and interdependent necessities in 
those first hours and days of the crisis. 
At a later stage, care and maintenance 
assistance requires primary emphasis on 
organization and attention to attaining 
the requisite standards of shelter, nutri- 
tion, and disease control. Protection 
issues, whether addressed to group 
security or to individual rights, may 
become paramount at any point in this 
process. In stable situations, refugees 
must be prepared for the future through 
self-reliance activities which preserve or 
restore their dignity and sense of worth. 
These activities include counseling and 
ensuring fair treatment of refugees who 
participate in local settlement, voluntary 
repatriation, or in resettlement to other 
countries. UNHCR faces the challenge 
of having to be equipped for all of these 
functions all the time. 



The Emergency Response Capability 

The first, the emergency response 
capability, is perhaps the most impor- 
tant. Emergency situations arise 
because of crises. Some, to be sure, are 
localized or are limited to individuals or 
small groups. Many, however, result 
from political forces and events which 
affect an entire country or region. 
Whether called upon to assist with small 
or large numbers, UNHCR must be 
prepared to act immediately to provide 
the international community with the 
critical first assessment of the scope of 
the problem and of the extent of 
assistance required. In the first days of 
any emergency, the urgency of protec- 
tion and assistance needs is at its 
greatest magnitude. This urgency 
demands the highest degree of profes- 
sional expertise in response. 

From this perspective, the United 
States has observed with appreciation 
the steps taken by the High Commis- 
sioner to strengthen the capability of his 
office to respond to emergency needs. 
We have watched closely the work of 
the new emergency unit, which recently 
issued a comprehensive handbook con- 
cerning emergency field operations and 
administrative procedures. This hand- 
book is a most valuable tool for all 
UNHCR staff and will become increas- 
ingly so if followed up by a thorough 
program of related staff training. We 
also wish to commend the contribution 
made by the Emergency Unit Staff in 
UNHCR's responses to the situation of 
Miskito Indians who fled to Honduras 
and to that of displaced persons in 
Uganda and Rwanda. Thus, the poten- 
tial will and capability to respond have 
been demonstrated. May we suggest, 
however, that, given the critical nature 
of the initial phase of emergency situa- 
tions, it would be advisable to regularize 
UNHCR's structure for initial emergen- 
cy response and to establish clear 
guidelines regarding how this structure 
relates to other UNHCR offices at head- 
quarters and in the field? 

Another new office which, in our 
view, has bolstered UNHCR's effec- 
tiveness is the Specialist Support Unit in 
the Division of Assistance. The unit in- 
cludes a water supply/sanitation 
engineer, a rural settlement planner, a 
public health/nutrition adviser, a 
socioeconomist, and a physical plan- 
ner/construction engineer. I have 



I*. Itt 1* I^.U I4 H' ■• 



enumerated these positions to establish 
an explict basis for any assertion that 
the creation of this unit is a most 
positive development. Indeed, my 
delegation believes that it is precisely 
this type of professional competence 
which UNHCR and other humanitarian 
assistance organizations must possess if 
they are to be able to respond effectively 
to new emergencies as well as to ensure 
the quality of services being provided in 
ongoing programs. The importance of 
this expertise continues in the post- 
emergency phase, when material 
assistance programs must be rational- 
ized and projects developed within the 
scope of the general programs budget. 
General country programs will be a 
central focus of our attention at later 
sessions, so I will not dwell on these at 
any length in these remarks. I would 
note in general, however, that during 
the past 2 years we have seen con- 
siderable improvement in UNHCR's 
overall project management. We also 
welcome the increased attention being 
paid to program evaluation, a subject 
considered in detail last week by the 
Subcommittee on Administrative and 
Financial Matters. To design and imple- 
ment effective material assistance pro- 
grams is not a simple task, nor is it one 
which UNHCR can accomplish on its 
own. The full cooperation of host 
governments is required in providing ac- 
cess to those who need help, in develop- 
ing accurate estimates of refugee 
numbers and relief heeds, in facilitating 
logistical supply arrangements, and in 
conceiving practicable local integration 
projects. 

These demands are perhaps greatest 
in Africa, which continues to shoulder 
the burden of large groups of persons 
who have sought refuge, and also in 
Pakistan, which hosts the largest 
number of refugees in any single coun- 
try. 

In addition to lauding the generosity 
of numerous host governments, my 
delegation wishes to take this opportuni- 
ty to praise the vital role of the many 
voluntary, nongovernmental organiza- 
tions which so often are found working 
in close cooperation with governments 
and UNHCR and in direct contact with 
the refugees themselves to accomplish 
the actual delivery of assistance. Of 
equal importance is the significant, ex- 
pert contribution of the Intergovernmen- 
tal Committee for Migration which 
operates in close coordination with 
UNHCR in all parts of the world where 
refugees need help in arranging to move 
from one place to another. 



February 1984 



Protection Issues 

As stated earlier, assistance is but one 
part of the job of a UNHCR field office. 
The other— protection— is always pres- 
ent, beginning in the emergency phase 
and continuing until a durable solution 
has been achieved. Indeed, in the past 
year, protection issues have increasingly 
occupied the attention of the High Com- 
missioner's office and of the members of 
this Executive Committee. The docu- 
ment submitted to this meeting by the 
High Commissioner entitled, "Note on 
International Protection," provides us 
with a useful recapitulation of the prin- 
cipal issues. Whether or not all would 
agree on the applicability of certain 
generalizations to every individual situa- 
tion, my delegation is particularly en- 
couraged by this renewed expression of 
UNHCR's willingness to play a catalytic 
role in the development of innovative ap- 
proaches to international protection 
problems. 

An example of this "reasoned ac- 
tivist" approach may be found in the 
lead taken by UNHCR on the issue of 
rescue at sea. Practical measures taken 
by UNHCR in Honduras on behalf of 
persons displaced from El Salvador and 
in Rwanda on behalf of expellees from 
Uganda are cases of successful actions 
to protect individual refugees. In 
Southeast Asia, where pirates continue 
their attacks on defenseless refugees at 
sea, UNHCR has provided tireless and 
effective leadership in the international 
protection effort. 

Actions of this type are to be com- 
mended and encouraged. Their success, 
however, depends on assistance from 
the political and security resources of in- 
dividual governments, from the collec- 
tive capabilities of regional associations, 
and from the diplomatic and public rela- 
tions possibilities of the UN Secretariat. 
It is our hope that UNHCR will further 
strenghthen its already close collabora- 
tion with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross in situations where 
refugees are victims of warfare and 
other forms of violence. 

The Search for Durable Solutions 

In line with highlighting the continuum 
of refugee needs and UNHCR's respon- 
sibilities, I would like to mention the 
more satisfactory resolution of refugee 
problems. These include voluntary 
repatriation, local integration, and final- 
ly, for those for whom no other solution 
seems appropriate, resettlement to a 
third country. This solution of last resort 



REFUGEES 



has, of necessity, occupied much of 
UNHCR's attention and energy since 
1979. At the height of the boat people 
crisis that year, UNHCR successfully 
mobilized governments and publics alike 
in support of an international effort to 
provide resettlement opportunities for 
great numbers of refugees and their 
families and to relieve the burden borne 
by the countries of first asylum. 

Also in 1979, UNHCR took the ini- 
tiative in negotiating with the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam to establish a safe 
and orderly system for selected emigra- 
tion. The year-to-year increases in the 
numbers of persons leaving Vietnam to 
many different resettlement countries 
under the orderly departure program 
procedures, whether under UNHCR 
auspices or bilateral arrangements, sug- 
gest that this effort can now be con- 
sidered a success. 

However, in spite of all that has 
been accomplished since 1979, we find 
ourselves still in the grip of a refugee 
problem involving huge numbers of peo- 
ple and great potential for human 
tragedy, while the pressure from the 
underlying regional political forces con- 
tinues unabated. 

It seems that we should concentrate 
on ideas and programs which have a 
demonstrable impact in the short to 
medium term. Consequently, where we 
have had some measure of success, as in 
the orderly departure program, we 
should make every effort to expand that 
approach. Enhancement of this avenue 
will become a critically important 
responsibility should Vietnam agree to 
allow reeducation camp inmates to 
emigrate. We view the long years of 
detention of large numbers of political 
prisoners in Vietnam as a major human 
tragedy of concern to the entire interna- 
tional community, and we intend to 
work strenuously for their release and 
freedom to resettle abroad. 

Concerning the most desired solu- 
tion—voluntary repatriation— we are 
watching with hope and admiration the 
current UNHCR efforts with the parties 
concerned to achieve the successful 
repatriation of most of Djibouti's 
refugees back to their homeland. The 
progress to date is a tribute to the com- 
mitment of the concerned governments 
and to UNHCR's leadership. 

Voluntary repatriation for refugees 
from Laos and Kampuchea appears 
more difficult to realize. Despite the in- 
tensive efforts of UNHCR over a period 
of several years, additional progress at 
the political level will be necessary 



33 



'i A .1 -1 .1 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



before practical arrangements can be 
established for a significant voluntary 
repatriation program. The United 
States, together with many other coun- 
tries, is prepared to support repatriation 
to Kampuchea when it is truly voluntary 
in nature and when UNHCR is able to 
ensure that satisfactory monitoring of 
the conditions of the returnees can take 
place. 

The UNHCR program for repatria- 
tion to Laos should also be given careful 
attention and support. Since its incep- 
tion in 1980, some 2,300 Lao have volun- 
tarily returned to their country of origin 
under UNHCR auspices and supervision. 
The Government of Laos continues to 
assert a willingness to cooperate in per- 
mitting the return of some of its na- 
tionals, and the conditions of reception 
and reintegration have been monitored 
by UNHCR and have been found to be 
generally acceptable. Granting that 
repatriation operations involve a com- 
plex set of variables, we support the 
continuing efforts of UNHCR to develop 
the necessary procedures to make possi- 
ble a further expansion of this alter- 
native. 

I have spoken at some length on the 
specific problems of the Indochinese 
refugee situation. This is for three 
reasons. One, as I stated earlier, is that 
it remains, in the judgment of my 
delegation, one of the most intractable 
problems facing UNHCR today and one 
which calls for the greatest degree of in- 
ternational leadership and innovative ac- 
tion. The second reason is that this 
situation highlights so well the 
possibilities and difficulties of two of the 
three durable solutions we will be 
discussing this week: voluntary repatria- 
tion and international resettlement. 
Finally, the history of the UNHCR 
response to the Indochinese refugee 
problem is a superb example of effective 
multilateral burdensharing. It was its 
truly international character that made 
the 1979 conference a success. It is 
essential that the highest degree of in- 
ternational participation be maintained, 
not only for Indochinese refugees but 
for the hundreds of thousands of people 
in all world regions who look to UNHCR 
for protection and assistance. We would 
like to pay special tribute to countries of 
asylum in Southeast Asia which have of- 
fered, and continued to offer, refuge to 
hundred of thousands of innocent vic- 
tims while the UNHCR and the con- 



cerned international community works 
with these countries to secure satisfac- 
tory solutions to this tragic problem. 

The United Nations created the of- 
fice of the High Commissioner for two 
reasons: to deliver humanitarian protec- 
tion and assistance services to refugees 
and to provide a nonpolitical mechanism 
for multilateral sharing of the refugee 



burden. These purposes are just as valid 
today as they were when UNHCR was 
founded. It is in support of these objec- 
tives and in support of the UNHCR's ef- 
fective management of programs to 
achieve these objectives that we 
members of this Executive Committee 
should turn our attention and focus our 
efforts. ■ 



U.S. Prepares for 
World Radio Conference 



Pemitm 



by Leonard H. Marks 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Operations of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on November 
9. 1983. Aynbassador Marks is chairman 
of the U.S. delegation to the World Ad- 
ministrative Radio Conference on High 
Frequency. ' 

It gives me great pleasure to be able to 
appear before you today to discuss the 
upcoming World Administrative Radio 
Conference on High Frequency. While 
the format of this conference will be 
technical, the issues that will be dealt 
with in Geneva have potentially serious 
and far-reaching political implications. It 
is, therefore, doubly reassuring that this 
committee is taking an interest in this 
conference at this early stage. 

The general conference of the Interna- 
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
that met in 1979 agreed to convene a 
two-part conference dedicated to 
developing a method or methods of plan- 
ning the assignment of channels in the 
high frequency bands of the radio spec- 
trum. This was in response to an effort 
by several countries, speaking for the 
less developed countries (LDCs), to gain 
a larger part of the spectrum for the ex- 
clusive use of the LDCs. They argued 
that the current system favored the 
large broadcasters, divided the spectrum 
unfairly, and, in general, made it dif- 
ficult for small countries to enter the 
field of short-wave broadcasting. The 
World Administrative Radio Conference 
on High Frequency is to meet in 
January-February 1984 to develop the 
principles for planning and a method for 
the allocation of frequencies. The second 
part of the conference, scheduled to 
meet in 1986, is assigned the task of ac- 
tually implementing the method and 
planning for the high frequency spec- 
trum. 



34 



Technical Problems 

All this sounds good and, if the con- 
ference is successful, could lead to the 
more rational management of a very im- 
portant limited resource. However, 
development of a planning regime for 
the high frequency spectrum has been 
tried many times in the last 40 years, 
always unsuccessfully. The reasons for 
failure of such efforts— crowding of the 
bands, intentional interference (jam- 
ming), excessive or inadequate power 
levels and so on— are still present. In 
fact, we must admit that the conditions 
of the spectrum are generally in worse 
shape than ever before. And many ad- 
ministrations have plans for expansion, 
and countries new to short-wave broad- 
casting are planning to enter the field. 
In short, the problems are complex and 
difficult on the technical side. 

Political Problems 

They are just as complex and difficult or 
the political side, and political problems 
are often more intractable than technical 
ones. The larger broadcasters, of which 
the United States is one, are by and 
large satisfied with the existing 
mechanism for planning spectrum use. 
The small broadcasters find the current 
arrangements for frequency identifica- 
tion and assignment quite burdensome. 
Often they do not have the resources, 
either in personnel, technical know-how, 
or funds to use the system that now ex- 
ists. Finally, some of the LDCs take the 
position that the spectrum is an interna- 
tional resource, and they are not getting 
their fair share of it. 

The result has been an effort by 
some of the LDCs for a fixed assign- 
ment of frequencies on a long-term 
basis. Such a procedure would be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to implement 
because of the propagation condition 
change depending on the seasonal varia- 
tions of the ionosphere and over the 

Hepartment of State Bulletir 



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SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



11-year solar cycle. Also the needs of 
the broadcasting nation change over 
time in unpredictable ways. Hence a 
rigid, long-range or a priori plan is not 
implemented in our view. It is our belief 
and our position that given these fac- 
tors, and the added complications pro- 
duced by jamming, flexibility must be 
the key to any planning method that 
might be developed. The central issue at 
this conference might be described as 
the difference between flexibility and a 
priori when considering the develop- 
ment of a planning method. 

Required Factors 

Permit me to describe those factors that 
we believe must be present for any plan- 
ning method to be workable. 

• The planning method adopted 
should result in a satisfactory quality of 
service for the listener. 

• The planning principles should be 
applied equitably to all Administrations 
[ITU member nations]. 

• The planning method should be 
based on improvement, refinement, and 
further development of workable pro- 
cedures that can be implemented in a 
practical manner. 

• The planning method must take 
into account the spectrum inefficiencies 
which result from harmful interference 
(jamming). 

• Administrations will continue to 
retain their authority to make final fre- 
quency assignments to those transmis- 
sions under their control. 

• Any requirement submitted in ac- 
cordance with the planning method 
should represent a current, operational 
requirement. 

• The planning method must have 
the flexibility to accommodate short- 
term unforeseen changes in re- 
quirements. 

• The planning method must pro- 
vide adequate flexibility so that Ad- 
ministrations can undertake to resolve 
incompatibilities. 

• Administrations which desire 
assistance from the International Fre- 
quency Regulation Board may continue 
to request such assistance. 

• The planning method should 
enable Administrations to implement 
single side band systems as early as they 
desire. 

• The planning process should at- 
tempt to maintain the continuity of an 
Administration's frequency assignments 
between successive schedules. Long- 
term a priori planning is not a practical 
solution. The extreme congestion caused 
I by lack of sufficient spectrum space to 
meet expected requirements dictates 

'February 1984 



that the most spectrum-efficient tech- 
nique available be used to engineer the 
channel selection process. No practical 
criteria is available nor can one be 
developed which would determine a 
priority of one Administration's re- 
quirements ms a vis another Administra- 
tion's requirements. No planning method 
available will totally meet the desires of 
all Administrations and, therefore, com- 
promises must be made if a planning 
method is to be adopted. Any planning 
method selected must be sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate a wide range of 
contingencies. The probability of the 
continuation of deliberate interference 
(jamming) must be considered. The out- 
put of any planning method must be 
reviewed and accepted by Administra- 
tions prior to its implementation. 

Various suggested plans have been 
put forth by several member nations of 
the ITU. We have studied all of them 
carefully and find that while there are 
elements in each which have con- 
siderable merit, none of them as tabled 
meets our essential needs. We have not 
submitted a plan of our own. Our judg- 
ment is that the best hope of developing 
a realistic, workable plan is some com- 
bination of the proposals currently on 
the table. This will be the challenge at 
the conference in January. To achieve 
an equitable and acceptable planning ap- 
proach, which is our aim at the con- 
ference, will not be an easy task. 

U.S. Preparations 

I should point out that preparations for 
this conference were started almost 2 
years ago. Over the last 6 months, they 
have intensified and will continue to do 
so until the beginning of the conference 
itself. At our request, all of our Em- 
bassies have designated an officer to 
assist in our preparations and to report 
on the attitude of the host government 
on related issues. We have convened 
special working groups on each of the 
various issues the conference will con- 
sider, and we have held a series of 
meetings with delegations that share our 
concerns as well as with those that we 
anticipate will take positions harmful to 
our interests. 

Based largely on the information 
developed by our missions, I have trav- 
eled extensively to conduct such bilateral 
and multilateral discussions abroad. One 
of our teams has just returned from 
China and Japan, and other teams led 
by former ambassadors are currently in 
South America and Africa holding 
bilateral discussions with countries that 
will be important in Geneva. Discussions 



are also planned with countries that host 
our relay stations. These efforts have 
been very useful in alerting us to the 
views of other participants, have given 
us the opportunity to present and ex- 
plain our own, familiarize ourselves with 
the players, and to seek areas of agree- 
ment and compromise prior to the con- 
ference itself. 

I would like to emphasize that we 
are sensitive to both U.S. needs in high 
frequency broadcasting and to the con- 
cerns of other users and potential users 
of that portion of the spectrum. We are 
committed to achieving a fair, workable, 
and flexible plan in Geneva. 

Finally, I would like to make a per- 
sonal observation. Over the years, I 
have been involved with many con- 
ferences in various capacities. The tradi- 
tional critics hold that the United States 
is seldom prepared for international con- 
ferences and that it does little in the 
way of preconference consultations with 
other governments. Preparations for 
this conference will confound the critics. 
The nerve center for our effort has been 
the Office of the Coordinator for Inter- 
national Communication and Informa- 
tion Policy. A more sophisicated and 
comprehensive approach to communica- 
tion conference preparation is being 
developed there. The effectiveness and 
timeliness of U.S. preparations for the 
World Administrative Radio Conference 
on High Frequency are an excellent ex- 
ample of this new coordinated approach 
in this complex international arena. I 
would like to commend the Department 
of State, the U.S. Information Agency, 
the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration, the Board 
for International Broadcasting, and the 
other agencies that have participated in 
these preparations. The participating 
agencies have recognized the importance 
of this conference to U.S. interests and 
have moved accordingly by giving 
unstintingly of their resources to ensure 
that our preparations will be as com- 
plete as possible. I have been impressed 
by the spirit of cooperation and dedica- 
tion at the working level and the sup- 
port and understanding at the manage- 
ment level. The problems are difficult to 
be sure, but I am satisfied that we have 
done everything possible to ensure that 
the United States will give a good ac- 
count of itself in Geneva. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



35 



SOUTH ASIA 



Visit of President of the Council 
of iVIinisters of Bangladesh 




President of the Coumtl uj Mintfiter>i 
of Bangladesh, Lt. Gen. Hussain 
Mohammad Ershad, made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., Oc- 
tober 2U-26, 1983, to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Lt. Gen. Ershad 
after their meeting on October 2.5. ' 

President Reagan 

Today we're honored to welcome 

Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad, President of the 

Council of Ministers of Bangladesh. 

Over the past year and a half, 
Gen. Ershad's government has taken 
steps to restore democratic institutions 
and economic growth to the people of 
Bangladesh. In our useful and cordial 
conversations today, the General and I 
have had an opportunity to discuss these 
admirable goals and other matters of 



36 



concern to our two countries. We 
especially appreciate the General's 
dedication to the economic development 
of his country. The self-help reforms 
which his government has put in place 
reflect this commitment to reinvigorate 
development and better the lives of the 
Bangladesh people. 

Gen. Ershad's government under- 
stands the vital role of private enter- 
prise. Changes taking place should at- 
tract private investment to the oppor- 
tunities available in that deserving coun- 
try. The United States is proud of its 
long association and support for the peo- 
ple of Bangladesh. Today we pledge our 
continued support. We look forward to 
further cooperation between our two 
governments as Bangladesh seeks to 
overcome problems of hunger, over- 
population, and poverty. 

In the political realm, the General 
has now set in motion a process de- 
signed to build a broad base of popular 



support for economic and social develop- 
ment in his country. We endorse this 
goal since we believe that long-term 
political stability can be achieved only 
through representative government. 

Finally, the United States wishes to 
applaud Bangladesh, a member of the 
nonaligned movement, for its construc- 
tive approach to issues of regional and 
global concern. To cite only a few ex- 
amples: Bangladesh clearly manifested 
its courage and resolve in its unswerving 
responses to aggression in Afghanistan 
and Kampuchea. It also took the lead in 
establishing the South Asian Regional 
Cooperation Organization, a body 
designed to build a more prosperous and 
stable region for the people of South 
Asia. Bangladesh's foreign policy has ex- 
hibited an activism, moderation, and 
force of moral conviction which has 
earned the respect of the world. 

Gen. Ershad, we hope that the re- 
mainder of your visit to this country will 
be pleasant, and we're happy to have 
had you with us. 

Lt. Gen. Ershad 

It is both a great privilege and pleasure 
for my wife and myself and for the 
members of my delegation to be in the 
United States of America. 

We are grateful to President Ronald 
Reagan for the thoughtful and cordial 
invitation which he has kindly extended 
to visit this great country. We bring 
with us the warm greetings and sincere 
good wishes of the people of 
Bangladesh. 

My meeting with the President was 
very satisfying, and I thank him for hav- 
ing received me despite his preoccupa- 
tion at this critical moment. The com- 
prehensive and productive exchange of 
views which we have just had is an 
unmistakable demonstration of our 
friendship. The object of my visit is to 
reinforce and consolidate the relations 
between the United States of America 
and Bangladesh, which, I'm happy to 
say, has been achieved. 

During our meeting, the President 
and I covered a wide range of subjects. 
It gives me great pleasure to say that 
we have had the opportunity of reaffirm 
ing our two countries' shared percep- 
tions and close identity of interests in 
strengthening the process of peace, 
progress, and prosperity for mankind. 

I have apprised the President of the 
intensive level of activity which my 
government has undertaken to improve 
the quality of life of our 95 million peo- 
ple, a large measure of whom live in 



Department of State Bulleti 



' l» If) it i^ i: 



iityjimMT^i^' 



' 



SOUTH ASIA 



rural Bangladesh. I have explained that 
my government is committed to laying 
firm political and economic foundations 
for the long-term development and social 
benefits for our people. 

We have already undertaken signifi- 
cant measures in the fields of population 
control, food production, rural 
unemployment, and energy production. 
These have involved the organization 
and decentralization of our administra- 
tion, the streamlining of our judiciary, 
and extensive work in reviewing colonial 
laws, on the one hand, and our outdated 
education system, on the other. We hope 
that these basic efforts will substantially 
reinforce the base we must have for the 
restoration and maintenance of demo- 
cratic values which are integral to our 
society. 

We are about to launch ourselves 
into local government elections this 
winter, followed by elections at pro- 
gressively higher political echelons 
throughout 1984 leading to the elections 
to our Parliament in March 1985. Over 
40 million people will go to the polls, not 
merely to elect their representative, but 
to lay the political and economic founda- 
tion for our future, to enable our people 
to live freely and live with honor and 
dignity by the grace of God. 

The President and I have agreed to 
explore possible ways and means toward 
further strengthening the close bonds of 
friendship and cooperation between our 
two countries. Indeed, I am most grate- 
ful to you for the deep and abiding in- 
terest you have personally shown in the 
welfare and progress of our people and 
for the moral support and economic 
assistance which have been extended to 
us. 

As members of the Organized 
Islamic Conference, an unaligned move- 
ment in the Commonwealth, and — [in- 
audible) — as chairman of the Group of 
77, Bangladesh firmly believes the cur- 
rent international economic situation 
needs the closest vigilance by the whole 
community of nations, recognizing that 
interdependability is indispensable as a 
way of life in this day and age. The role 
of the United States is a crucial and 
critical one in this regard. It is, indeed, 
a matter of great satisfaction that the 
President and I, in discussing these 
issues, fully agree that global peace and 
stability is closely interlinked with the 
need to restore confidence in the current 
economic climate in both developing and 
developed countries. 

We in Bangladesh deeply appreciate 
the importance of the vital role of the 
United States in upholding the principles 



February 1984 



of maintaining peace and stability in the 
world, as enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations. I warmly welcome 
your recent reassuring statement in the 
UN General Assembly in this regard. 

I'd like to mention here that I have 
conveyed to the President our profound 
sorrow and anguish at the tragic loss of 
life in the recent days in Beirut. We 
share your grief, and on behalf of my 
government and people, I extend our 
heartfelt condolences to the families of 
the deceased. 

My wife and I have been deeply 
touched by the warm hospitality extend- 
ed to us and the members of our delega- 
tion. Our stay in the U.S. Capital, the 
beautiful city of Washington, though 
short, has been most pleasant and 
rewarding. I have no doubt that I speak 



on behalf of all of us when I say that we 
shall trea.sure these happy moments and 
cherish the memory of your warm 
friendship. 

During our meeting, I extended our 
most cordial invitation to the President 
to pay a state visit to Bangladesh as ear- 
ly as is convenient. It is my sincere hope 
that you will visit our country soon and 
see for yourself the high esteem in 
which you are held and the enormous 
fount of good will that exists in 
Bangladesh for your people. 

I wish you good health, happiness, 
long life, and every success. And I thank 
you, ladies and gentlemen of the media, 
for your time and patience. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 31, 1983. 



Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion 
of Afghanistan 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 27, 19831 

While Americans are thankful for the 
blessing of peace at home this holiday 
season, we do not forget that the tragic 
war in Afghanistan continues. For 4 
long years, the Soviet Union has oc- 
cupied that unhappy land. But for 4 long 
years, the brave Afghan people have 
held the might of a Soviet occupation 
force at bay. These Islamic fighters in a 
faraway land have given new meaning 
to the words courage, determination, 
and strength. They have set the stand- 
ard for those who value freedom and in- 
dependence everywhere in the world. 

Afghanistan's freedom fighters — the 
resistance, or mujahidin — represent an 
indigenous movement that swept 
through their mountainous land to 
challenge a foreign military power 
threatening their religion and their very 
way of life. With little in the way of 
arms or organization, the vast majority 
of the Afghan people have demonstrated 
that they will not be dominated and that 
they are prepared to give their lives for 
independence and freedom. The price 
they have so willingly paid is in- 
calculable. 

While we will continue to do our 
part to maintain and improve the 
U.S. -Soviet dialogue, we cannot remain 
silent to the tragedy of Afghanistan. 
There should be no misunderstanding 
that the Soviet occupation of 



Afghanistan has created serious interna- 
tional tensions. It is not only the 
Afghans themselves who oppose the 
Soviet occupation of their country but 
virtually the entire world community. 

This has been demonstrated time 
and again in five consecutive votes of 
the UN General Assembly, when re- 
sounding majorities of the world's na- 
tions called upon the Soviet Union to 
end its occupation and restore the in- 
dependence and nonaligned status of 
Afghanistan. In fact, the most recent 
UN resolution was adopted on 
November 23 by the largest vote 
yet— 116 to 20. 

Early this year, I had the privilege 
of receiving in my office a group of six 
Afghan freedom fighters. I was moved 
by their simple dignity and pride and 
their determination to continue their 
struggle for independence. These brave 
individuals have returned to the fight. 

The struggle for a free Afghanistan 
continues. This is not because of any 
outside manipulation but because of the 
Afghan peoples' own desire to be free. 
And their struggle will continue until a 
negotiated political settlement can be 
found to allow the Afghan people to 
determine their own destiny. 

Our goal is to do everything we can 
to help bring about a peaceful solution 
which removes the Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan, ends the agony and 
destruction of the Afghan nation, and 



37 



I vt .1 % 



SOUTH ASIA 



restores that country's independence and 
nonalignment. Clearly a neutral and 
nonaligned Afghanistan would not be a 
threat to its huge Soviet neighbor. 

Thus we mark the fourth anniver- 
sary of the Soviet invasion with sadness 
and continued indignation. But we are 
convinced that a settlement is possible, 
and we are glad that consultations in the 
UN process of indirect talks will go on. 
We call upon the Soviet Union to reach 
a settlement of the crisis which restores 



the freedom, independence, and 
nonalignment of Afghanistan. 

Let all of us who live in lands of 
freedom, along with those who dream of 
doing so, take inspiration from the spirit 
and courage of the Afghan patriots. Let 
us resolve that their quest for freedom 
will prevail and that Afghanistan will 
become, once again, an independent 
member of the family of nations. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 2, 1984. 



Visit of King of Nepal 




Their Majesties King Birendra Bir 
Bikram Shah Dev and Queen Aishwarya 
Rajya Laxmi Devi Shah of the Kingdom. 
of Nepal made a state visit to the United 
States December 5-13, 1983 and to 
Washington, D.C., December 5-10 to 
meet with President Reagan and other 
govemmeyit officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and the King at the 
arrival ceremony and toasts made at the 
state dinner. 



38 



ARRIVAL CEREMONY, 
DEC. 7, 19831 

President Reagan 

Nancy and I welcome you to the White 
House and the United States of 
America. 

It's a particular pleasure to have 
King Birendra back in our country for 
the first time since his student days. We 
hope that you will again feel at home 
and among friends here, not only at the 



White House, which you visited as 
Crown Prince, but throughout our coun- 
try. Queen Aishwarya, this is your first 
visit to the United States, and we hope 
that our good will and hospitality will 
encourage you to return. 

The United States and Nepal are on 
opposite sides of the globe. We face dif- 
ferent challenges, and our cultures sym- 
bolize the diversity with which mankind 
views the world. Yet our ties have 
grown stronger since our countries 
established relations in 1947. The vast 
distance which separates us is bridged 
with a miracle of modern communica- 
tions and transportation. Our distinct 
cultures are linked in our peoples' com- 
mon commitment to peace and human 
progress. 

In Nepal, you've set forth to win the 
battle against illiteracy, disease, hunger, 
;ind poverty. The challenges you face on 
the frontier of modernization are for- 
midable. The very topography which 
makes Nepal one of earth's most 
lieautiful sites makes your task more dif- 
ficult by limiting the amount of arable 
land and complicating communications. 
Although improved health and nutrition 
in your country has saved lives, it has 
also increased the pressures on finite 
resources. Education and information 
have expanded the horizons of your 
citizens but have also raised their expec- 
tations. 

Your development program, which 
began some 30 years ago, exemplifies 
the wise and progressive leadership pro- 
vided by your family. From your grand- 
father's decision to seek modernization 
to the present day, your people have 
been blessed by something money can- 
not buy: wise leadership. This, coupled 
with your country's hard-working peo- 
ple, tremendous hydroelectric potential, 
and access to substantial technical and 
financial support from the international 
community, all represent opportunities 
for dramatic progress. 

America is proud that for a third of 
a century we've played a part in your 
development efforts. The record reflects 
the close partnership of our govern- 
ments and peoples. We plan to continue 
American investment in Nepal's 
economic development during the next 5 
years, including the funding of the new 
agricultural research and training proj- 
ects, areas which Your Majesty has iden- 
tified as vital to improving the well- 
being of your people. 

The Peace Corps will also continue 
its important work in Nepal. More than 
2,000 volunteers have served in your 



M» M'Je I'V* 1^. |4k 



SOUTH ASIA 



.Bulle'i' 



country, one of our largest Peace Corps 
posts. The 180 volunteers presently 
there are carrying on their fine tradition 
of competence and compassion. 

You, your father, and your grand- 
father before you have been the archi- 
tects of Nepal's efforts to build a better 
future. In the political arena your 
reforms are enlisting public participation 
in identifying national goals, thus 
guaranteeing that your people have a 
stake in their future. The United States 
respects these and other initiatives Your 
Majesty is making to develop popular in- 
stitutions consistent with the spirit of 
the Nepalese people. There is every 
reason to be confident that your goals of 
economic progress, political stability, 
and national security will be reached. 
America is happy to offer encourage- 
ment and support in these noble efforts. 

Your Majesty's moral leadership in 
condemning the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan is much appreciated here. 
We should not forget the heroism of the 
Afghan people in their fight for the 
freedom and independence of their 
country. 

We're also grateful for the courage 
your nation has shown in the cause of 
peace. Nepal has been willing to do more 
than just cast a ballot at the United Na- 
tions. It has volunteered its military per- 
sonnel to serve in some of the world's 
more troubled areas, giving depth and 
meaning to Nepal's commitment to 
peace. The world needs more nations 
like Nepal which are willing to help 
shoulder the burden of preserving peace 
as well as advocating it in world forums. 

Once again. Your Majesties, 
welcome to America. We look forward 
to getting to know you better as a 
means of enriching the deep friendship 
which has always characterized our rela- 
tions. 

King Birendra 

I'd like to thank you for this welcome 
ceremony and for the warmth with 
which my wife and I, along with the 
members of my entourage, have been 
received here. I also wish to convey to 
you — and through you, to the Govern- 
ment and people of the United States — 
greetings and good wishes of the 
Government and people of Nepal. 

For me it is also a nostalgic 
moment. I recall with fondness the time 
I had stood by my august father, late 
King Mahendra, on a similar occasion, in 
a similar setting here in 1967. 



I do not feel a complete stranger to 
this land. Indeed, I come to you in the 
spirit of a friend who has had the 
benefit of studying in one of your 
leading institutions of learning. Inspired 
as Nepal and the United States are by 
the common goals of striving for 
freedom and dignity of man, it is also a 
fulfilling experience for me to be back 
here again. 

Few things in the history of man 
have been as eventful as the discovery 
of this new-found land. It gave birth to a 
republic known not only for its inspiring 
ideals but also for the most epoch- 
making feats of scientific endeavor. 
Viewed from this angle, America stands 
on the very forefront of modern history. 
Indeed, what the United States 
represents is a harmonious amalgam of 
high human and material achievements 
rarely surpassed elsewhere in the world. 
As a nation that has brought about such 
profound changes, it is only natural to 
look up to this country in joining hands 
with the rest of the world to herald a 
new age of peace, understanding, friend- 
ship, and prosperity for all. 

Committed as we are in Nepal to 
these ideals, we hold you in high esteem 
and wish to see the United States as a 
bulwark of peace and stability, cherish- 
ing the belief that all nations of the 
world — whether big or small, rich or 
poor, developed or developing — must 
have a place under the Sun. 

It is in this spirit that I look forward 
to exchange views with you on matters 
of mutual interest. I also hope to meet 
other leaders and seek the opportunity 
to renew my acquaintances with friends 
that I have known. I'm confident that 
our visit to this country will be fruitful 
as well as memorable. 



DINNER TOASTS, 
DEC. 7, 19832 

President Reagan 

Today King Birendra and I had the op- 
portunity to review our bilateral rela- 
tions and to discuss our international 
concerns. We also had the chance to get 
to know one another as individuals. I'm 
pleased to inform you tonight that not 
only are relations between Nepal and 
the United States good, but King 
Birendra and I have each discovered a 
new friend. 

Our discussion of bilateral relations 
revealed a refreshing lack of difficulties. 
Notwithstanding the great distance that 



separates our two nations, Nepal and 
the United States through the years 
have enjoyed a particularly amicable 
relationship. We prefer to think of you 
as neighbors on the other side of the 
world. We're so pleased that you've 
made this neighborly visit. It will serve 
to expand the good will between our 
peoples when more Americans, as I did 
today, get the chance to meet you 
personally. 

Americans respect individuals of 
courage and conviction. And to give you 
some idea of how this applies to King 
Birendra, one of His Majesty's many 
talents is parachuting. We have a great 
deal in common — [laughter] — but let me 
hasten to say we found our common 
ground in another of his interests — 
horseback riding. [Laughter] 

The highest mountain on our planet, 
Mt. Everest, is in Nepal. So are 8 of the 
world's 10 highest peaks. And the 
character of your people, the sincerity of 
your convictions stand as tall and strong 
as your mountains. 

Any American who's visited Nepal 
returns home in awe, not only of the 
majestic beauty of your land but also of 
the religious strength of your people. 
There are countless religious shrines in 
Nepal — outward symbols of your coun- 
try's greatest strength. And this 
spiritual side which is so important to 
your nation speaks well of you and your 
countrymen. 

Today we had the opportunity to 
discuss a proposal of which you and your 
people can be rightfully proud. Through 
the Nepal zone of peace concept, you're 
seeking to ensure that your country's 
future will not be held back by using 
scarce resources for military purposes. 
We Americans support the objectives of 
Your Majesty's zone of peace proposal, 
and we endorse it. We would only hope 
that one day the world in its entirety 
will be a zone of peace. 

In the meantime, we encourage you 
to continue to work closely with your 
neighbors to make Nepal's zone of peace 
a reality. Your innovative approach to 
peace and development could be a 
foundation for progress throughout the 
region. We wish you success. 

It is an honor to have you with us. 
Your Majesties. Now, would all of you 
please join me in a toast to His Majesty, 
King Birendra, to Her Majesty, Queen 
Aishwarya, and to the people of Nepal. 



February 1984 



39 



SOUTH ASIA 



King Birendra 

I'm touched by your cordial welcome and 
the warm words with which you and 
Mrs Reagan have received us here m 
Washington. We're equally honored by 
the generous remarks you have just 
made about mv country and people. 
Seen from Washington, Nepal is 
almost on the other side of the globe, 
and yet, as this friendly gathermg here 
tonight shows, distance notwithstandmg, 
friendship and cordiality based on 
shared ideals can exist between coun- 
tries that are geographically far apart. 
In 1947, as soon as Nepal broke her age- 
old isolation by seeking friendship 
beyond her borders, it was with the 
United States of America that Nepal 
sought to establish her diplomatic rela- 
tions. 

Since 1951, the year when my 
grandfather, late King Tribhuvan, led 
the Nepalese people to democracy, we 
have looked to the United States as a 
land of freedom and fulfillment. The en- 
during ideals of the Founding Fathers ot 
America, who spoke to men of liberty 
and independence, have inspired men 
throughout the world, including those of 
us living in the mountain vastness of 
Nepal. 

In our part of the world, if America 
is looked upon as a land of gold, grain, 
and computers, a country of skyscrapers 
and space shuttles, she is also regarded 
as a nation committed to respect man 
and his dignity. A land of discovery, 
America has distinguished herself m be- 
ing inventive, in breaking new grounds, 
and opening newer horizons of 
knowledge for the betterment of man. 
With a country such as the United 
States, one wonders if Nepal has 
anything in common. On the surface, 
there may seem very little. Yet, as men 
living in the same planet, we have com- 
mon stakes in the global peace, pros- 
perity, and, indeed, the survival of man 
in dignity and freedom. 

We're happy to see your efforts to 
maintain peace and stability around the 
world. The Nepalese people join me in 
appreciating the understanding with 
which on behalf of the United States you 
have extended support to the concept of 
Nepal as a zone of peace. This recogni- 
tion, I assure you, will go down not only 
as an important landmark in the history 
of our relations but also as a testimony 
of your personal commitment to the 
cause of peace, stability, and freedom. 
Nepal rejoices in the achievements 
of the American people in different 
fields of human endeavors. The initiative 



40 



Nepal— A Profile 



People 

Nationality: .V..H«-Nep;ilese (sins, and pl.|. 
,4 (/j<r( (/■('- Nepalese or Nepali. Population 
(1981 I'st.): 15 million. Annual growth rate: 
^^^VV,K Ethnic groups: Brahmans, Chetris, 
CururiKS, Magars, Taniarigs, Newars, 
Bhotias. Rais, Limbus. Sherpas. Languages: 
Nepali and more than 12 others. Religions: 
Hinduism (DO'^iO. Buddhism, and Islam. Edu- 
cation: Yiur:< ,-<inipiiUorii—:i. Atlnid- 
„,„■, —primary TIT,,, secondary U'K.. 
Lileniry-2Vi%. Health: Inj'nnI morkilitti 
rn/c— 152/1,0(1(1. Life criieclancy—W yrs. 
Work force: Agnrultinr-W-.. /h-///-s(/-//- 



Subdivisions: 14 zones and 75 districts. 
Political parties: None officially. Suf- 
frage; liiivt-rsal. 

Central government budget {V\ 

U»S1-«2|: $53^1 million. 

Defense (FY 1981-82); $22 million or 4% 
of government budget. 

National holiday: December 28, King 
Birendra's birthday and Nepal's National 
Dav. 

Flag: Two blue-edged red triangles point- 
ing away from staff, with symbols of the sun 
and moon in white. 




Ituporarj' ( 



Geography 

,\rea: 14.")..3;il sq. km. (.5ti.l3i; sq. mi.); slight- 
ly larger than .Arkansas. Cities; 
/vi/»7a/-Kathmandu (pop. 125,000). Olh.r 
,.,7,<.,s_P<ikhara. Biratnagar, Birganj. Ter- 
rain; Three distinct topogi-aphical regions: 
Hat and fertile in the south; the lower 
Himalayas and swiftly flowing mountain 
rivers forming the hill country in the center; 
and the high Himalayas forming the bonier 
with Tibet in the nwrth. Climate: Ranges 
from subtropical summers and mild winters 
in the south to cool summers and severe 
winters in the northern mountains. 

Government 

Type: Constitutional monarchy. Constitution: 

December 16, 1962. 

Branches: K/ccMfn-c-king (chief of 
state), prune minister (head of government). 
L(7y(.-;/'i///v— National Paiiflxni'il. J ml ir nil— 
Supreme Court. 



Stole 
I lit event! 




Economy 
(,DP (FY 1980-81); $1.9 billion. Annual 
growth rate: 2'R. at constant prices. Per 
capita income: $140. Avg. inflation rate last 
5 yrs.: 14%. 

Natural resources: Water, timber, 
hvdroelectric potential, scenic beauty. 
■ Agriculture (57";. of GDI"); Rice, maize, 
wheat, millet, jute, sugarcane, oilseed, 
potatoes. L,n«/-i;5.62% cultivated (1971 

est,). 

lndustry(14"; of (;i)P): Cigarettes, 
matches, bricks, sugar, lumber, jute, 
hydroelectric power, cement. 

Trade (FY 1980-81); &>/«'»•(.-;-$ i:!4 
million: agricultural products and timber. Mu 
j„, „,„rM-\nd\-d. /»i/-..r;.s--$:569 million; 
textiles, other manufactured goods. Major 
,s«;,/)/«/ — India. 

Official exchange rate: 13.2 Nepalese 
rupees = L'S$1. 

Fiscal year: Mid-.luly to mid-.Iuly. 

Membership in international organiza- 
tions: IN 

Taken from the Backgrvand Notes oiApn\ 
1982. published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: .loanne 
Re|:)pert Reams. ■ 



sotN 



Iklina 



IotI. Till 



lliwaiii th 



^t of Qtatp Riiiietin 



^MMMHIfUfllMIl 



^«; Ift U Ir U I* V «ii 



UNITED NATIONS 



and enterprise of your people are ex- 
emplary. Yet, what happens in this part 
of the world sends its ripples even to the 
roadless villages of Nepal. We receive 
their fallout. When America suffers a 
temporary drought, millions around the 
world get affected. 

Indeed, if I may seek your in- 
dulgence, I would like to mention 
something that on the surface may 
sound trivial, but sometimes it is the 
small thing that can bring about pro- 
found changes. The corn maize in Nepal 
was introduced from this part of 
America, as were the potatoes from the 
Andes nearly 300 years ago. These new 
crops not only altered our hill economy 
but even the mode of life, by making 
settlements possible in the mountain ter- 
races of Nepal. 

Evidently, we do not live in islands, 
but in a world bound in a nexus of in- 
terdependence. What happens in 
America ceases, therefore, to be a local 
event. The United States as such has 
shown a consistent understanding 
toward this and has assisted Nepal in 
stretching her hand of friendship and 
cooperation in many fields, including the 
building of infrastructures. 

May I take this opportunity, 
therefore, to thank you, and through 
you, to the people and Government of 
the United States for the support we 
have received in meeting the challenges 
of development in Nepal. 

In recent years, America has 
brought glory to humanity by landing 
man on the Moon. It is, indeed, thrilling 
to reflect that one can soar into space to 
explore the unknown and scan the stars. 
Yet these adventures into outerspace 
would carry still deeper meaning if the 
part of humanity living in Nepal could 
also rid themselves of their continuing 
poverty. Itself, a least developed, land- 
locked country, Nepal has always sought 
understanding and cooperation from our 
friends and neighbors. In fact, since the 
time I assumed responsibilities, I have 
sought that the minimum of basic needs 
•nust not be denied to people anywhere 
n the world. In this regard, I take com- 
brt in the reassurance that the United 
States will continue to extend coopera- 
;ion on a long-term basis into the future. 

Modern technology has reduced 
distance and joined us all into a family 
of nations. This situation demands that 
ffe create an enduring relationship 
msed on a sense of purpose and mean- 
ng. With Nepal and countries in her 
•egion willing to join hands with the 



g(,lleii|-ebruary 1984 



United States and other international 
agencies in a creative effort for pros- 
perity by putting into use a fragment of 
their human and capital resources to 
harness the water potentials of Nepal, it 
would not only enable them to walk over 
a long road to progress for our region, 
as a whole, but would also continue to 
build bridges of understanding between 
a most advanced and a least developed 
nation of the world. It would also mean 
eliminating the perils of hunger on the 
one hand, and the danger of instability 
and extremism on the other. 

I have no doubt that Nepal and the 
United States can cooperate in many 
fields of creative endeavors. As coun- 
tries that have shown respect to the 
uniqueness of the individual, we believe 
in the conservation of the natural as 
well as the spiritual heritage of man. 
But most important of all, we both 
honor the freedom of man and the in- 
dependence of nations. In this regard, 
we appreciate the support the United 
States has shown consistently to our 
identity as a nation. 

I cherish the fruitful exchange of 
views we have had recently with each 
other. You have been very reassuring, 
and I wish to thank you and Mrs. 
Reagan for the warmth of hospitality 
shown to me, my wife, and members of 
my entourage. 

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, 
may I now request you to join me in 
proposing a toast to the health and hap- 
piness of President Ronald Reagan of 
the United States of America, and the 
First Lady, Mrs. Nancy Reagan, to the 
peace and prosperity of the American 
people, and to the further development 
of friendship between Nepal and the 
United States. 



'Made on the South Lawn of the White 
House (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 12. 1983). 

^Made in the State Dining Room of the 
White House (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Dec. 12, 
1983). ■ 



U.S. Notifies UNESCO 
of Intent to Withdraw 



December 28, 1983 

His Excellency 
Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow 
Director General 
United Nations Educational, 

Scientific and Cultural 

Organization 
Paris 

Dear Mr. Director General: 
The purpose of this letter is to notify you 
within the terms of Article Two Paragraph 
Six of the Constitution that my Government 
will withdraw from the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion effective December 31. 1984. 

You may be assured that the United 
States will, within the terms of the Constitu- 
tion, seek to meet fully all of its legitimate 
financial obligations. 

The Government of the United States, 
along with the American people generally, 
believe in the great principles enunciated in 
the Constitution of UNESCO. Today, as in 
the early years of the organization, these 
principles summon us to a commitment of ef- 
fort, and resources, in the interest of building 
a stable and enduring framework for peace in 
the world. Today, as in the early years, we 
believe that education, science, culture and 
communication are significant, even essential, 
elements in building a peaceful world. 

But while the United States continues to 
devote substantial resources to the attain- 
ment of these goals, it must choose carefully 
the precise methods and means through 
which these resources are to be used. There 
are many groups and organizations whose 
purpose we approve, but which are not effec- 
tive at carrying out the kind of international 
cooperation which will contribute to the 
making of a peaceful world. Good intentions 
are not enough. 

For a number of years, as you know from 
statements we have made at the Executive 
Board and elsewhere, we have been con- 
cerned that trends in the management, policy 
and budget of UNESCO were detracting 
from the organization's effectiveness. We 
believed these trends to be leading UNESCO 
away from the original principles of its Con- 
stitution. We felt that they tended to 
serve — willingly or unwillingly, but im- 
properly — the political purposes of a few 
member states. During this period we worked 
energetically to encourage the organization to 
reverse these trends; to redirect itself to its 
founding purposes; to rigorously avoid becom- 
ing a servant of one or another national 
policy; and to manage itself in a way that 
rewarded efficiency, promoted fearless pro- 
gram evaluation and followed priorities based 
on program value rather than on past habit, 
political expediency or some other extraneous 
consideration. 



J >i .'I 



UNITED NATIONS 



At the same time, we also recognized, 
and expressed our strong concern about, 
those pressures to divert UNESCO to 
politically motivated ends which emanated 
from member states, rather than from within 
the organization itself. We consistently 
worked in the Executive Board and General 
Conference to minimize or eliminate the 
resulting political content— tendentious and 
partisan— from UNESCO resolutions and 
programs. 

Many of these efforts, yours and ours, 
have been productive, at least in relative 
terms. The results of the recent General Con- 
ference prove the point, and we appreciate 
the role you played in the outcome of that 
Conference. 

Viewed in a larger sense, however, the 
General Conference proves a different point: 
if the results of the Conference demonstrate 
the best that can expected from the organiza- 
tion as it is presently constituted, and as it 
presently governs itself, there can be little 
hope for a genuine and wholehearted return 
of the organization to its founding principles. 

For the United States, that conclusion 
has become inescapable. The responsibility to 
act upon it is equally inescapable. 

You. Mr. Director General, have our 
esteem, our appreciation and our pledge of 
the fullest cooperation to make the year in- 
tervening between this letter and the date of 
our withdrawal as harmonious as possible. 
We recognize that you will continue to do 
your best, in the difficult circumstances in 
which you operate, to make UNESCO ac- 
tivities productive, and relevant to unmet 
needs of the world. For our part, we are con- 
vinced that we can develop other means of 
cooperation in education, science, culture and 
communication, which better embody the 
principles to which we subscribed in 
UNESCO many years ago. We are convinced 
that such cooperation need not be diminished 
by the injection of political goals beyond its 
scope; that its authority need not be weak- 
ened through the compromise of such simple 
and lofty goals as individual human rights 
and the free flow of information. It may yet 
be appreciated that our shared aims could 
have been accomplished effectively through 
attention to the principle that a few things 
done well have more impact than superficial 
examination of all the world's ills. 

It is likely that the resources we present- 
ly devote to UNES('0 will be used to supt)ort 
such cooperation. Any alternative programs 
which the U.S. develops could, in principle, 
serve as a basis for future cooperation be- 
tween the U.S. and UNESCO, should both 
parties find that advantageous. We would be 
pleased to consider that possibility at the a|i- 
propriate lime. 

.Sinct'rely. 

Gkokok v. Sill ltz 



December 29, 1983 

His Excellency 

.Javier Perez de Cuellar y Guerra 
Secretary General of 
the United Nations 
New- York 

Dear Mr. Secretary General: 
We are delivering to the Director General of 
the United Nations Educational. Scientific 
and Cultural Organization a letter giving 
notice that the United States will withdraw 
from the organization, effective Decem- 
ber 31, 1984. 

While the decision to withdraw from 
UNESCO is firm, we will remain a full 
member during 1984. paying our financial 
obligations. This year will give UNESCO a 
potential opportunity to respond to the 
serious concerns that have caused our 
withdrawal. We remain open to indications of 
significant improvement. We would, of 
course, welcome meaningful changes that 
would eliminate the suppression of minority 
views within UNESCO, and restore fiscal in- 
tegrity to the organization. 

We wish you to understand that our 
withdrawal from UNESCO does not presage 
any wider disengagement from the United 
Nations or its other Specialized Agencies. On 
the contrary, as President Reagan made clear 
at the General Assembly last September, the 
United States is deeply attached to the prin- 
ciple that genuine international cooperation is 
essential to our shared purposes in the world, 
and to the attainment of peaceful progress 
for all. 

As you are aware, the United States had 
been concerned for many years over a grow- 
ing tendency on the part of UNESCO to 
depart from the principles upon which it was 
founded, and the purposes which it was 
originally called upon to fulfill. For several 
years, we have been working actively with 
other countries to reverse this unacceptable 
trend. Some progress has been made toward 
this end, but we have concluded, with 
respect, that under present circumstances we 
can no longer justify continuing United 
States membership in UNESCO. 

For our part, we are convinced that we 
can develop other means of cooperation in 
education, science and culture and com- 
munication, which will more clearly embody 
the principles to which we subscribed in 
UNESCO many years ago. We plan to use 
the resources we presently devote to 
UNESCO to supiiort such other means of 
cooperation. 

In all your activity to promote the cause 
of international cooperation, we wish you 
well. 

Sincerely yours. 

Gkokck p. Sin i.tz ■ 



42 






Department of State Bullet 



I!l/[lilM!lUli)fWMHWRHflftiHWH){liJ]iflll 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Democracy as a Problem 
Solving Mechanism 



by Langhorne A. Motley 

Address before the Council of the 
Americas on December 8, 1983. Am- 
bassador Motley is Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs. 

The subject of your program today — the 
national security implications of the 
economic crisis in Latin America — is for 
several reasons a realistic one. It sug- 
gests — correctly I think — that the 
economic crisis is unusually severe. And 
it ties that crisis directly to what must 
be the bottom line of U.S. foreign policy: 
our own national security. 

In my remarks today, however, I 
would like to talk about more than just 
debt and trade as linkages between 
Latin America's economic crisis and our 
security. I would like to broaden our 
focus to include the issue that will 
ultimately determine our capacity to re- 
spond constructively. That issue is 
politics. And, specifically, it is whether 
something can be done to strengthen the 
democratic bases that are essential both 
to stability and to our capacity to 
cooperate. 

Debt Crisis 

Let me begin with debt, the most direct 
and key link between the Latin 
American economic crisis and our securi- 
ty. Debt is the economic problem we 
have been forced to give the most 
urgent and sustained attention since the 
crisis first broke in Mexico in the sum- 
mer of 1982. 

For many of the countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, external 
debt has become a vital, almost all- 
consuming concern. You all know the 
extent of the debt— $310 billion at the 
end of 1982— and of that about 87% is 
held by banks and private institutions. 
You also know that while most less 
developed countries (LDCs) devote about 
a third of their export earnings to debt 
service, in Latin America and the Carib- 
bean it reached 57% in 1982. Even with 
reschedulings, this debt service ratio will 
remain high throughout the decade and 
will hinder a rapid economic recovery. 

Now this audience needs no instruc- 
tion from me on the causes of this crisis, 
particularly in Latin America and the 



February 1984 



Caribbean. Nor, I assume, on what the 
Administration is doing about it. You 
know that we are pursuing a broad- 
based strategy comprising five elements: 

• Sustainable, noninflationary 
growth in the United States and other 
industrialized countries within the con- 
text of open markets; 

• Economic adjustment efforts by 
borrowing countries; 

• Balance-of-payments financing 
through the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF); 

• Short-term financing from the 
United States and other governments 
when debt emergencies require it; and 

• Encouragement of continued lend- 
ing by commercial banks to countries 
that are pursuing sound adjustment pro- 
grams. 

You also know that this strategy is 
slowly working. Maturities have been 
deferred and new money provided. Bor- 
rowers have adopted adjustment pro- 
grams, including realistic exchange 
rates. The IMF has helped negotiate 
both, while providing much-needed 
capital. 

Although there is much talk of a new 
international economic order, the inter- 
national financial system has thus far 
proved to be more resilient than even its 
originators would have imagined. 



threatened to become system-damaging 
crises. This cooperation has helped pro- 
vide breathing space to devise and begin 
implementing adjustment measures. 

Recent news provides some reason 
for cautious optimism. Congress has 
finally passed the U.S. share of the IMF 
quota increase. Brazil has concluded its 
internal debate on economic policy and 
reached agreement with the IMF, with 
its Paris Club creditors, and with private 
commercial banks. Last week, commer- 
cial banks, encouraged by the transition 
to constitutional government in Argen- 
tina and the high quality of the economic 
team selected by President-elect Alfon- 
sin, made available the first $500 million 
from a medium-term loan negotiated 
several months earlier. These positive 
developments and Mexico's encouraging 
progress are producing what may, in 
retrospect, be remembered as a . 
psychological turning point. 

There are also some encouraging 
signs for the medium term. Economic 
recovery in the United States began at 
the end of 1982 and was especially 
vigorous during the second and third 
quarters of 1983. Real growth for the 
year as a whole should exceed 6%. Next 
year's growth should be in the same 
range. 

Recovery is also spreading to the 
other industrialized countries. During 



The people of this hemisphere are turning again to 
democratic institutions not in times of plenty but 
in circumstances demanding solutions to hard-to- 
resolve problems. 



Through the years it has adapted to 
dropping of the gold exchange, fixed ex- 
change rates, the two oil price shocks, 
and now the external debt crisis. In 
relieving sources of systemic strain, 
governments, the international financial 
institutions, and the private banks have 
all demonstrated the ability to 
cooperate, innovate, and adjust. 

In the case of major debtors such as 
Brazil and Mexico, the United States has 
acted quickly to help deflect what 



1984 the OECD countries could grow by 
an average 3.5% to 4%. A growth rate 
in that range appears sustainable 
throughout the mid-1980s. The less 
developed countries as a whole should 
return to positive growth next year as 
well. The strongest performers should 
be those able to increase their exports of 
nontraditional products. To the extent 
that we are able to avoid another runup 
in interest rate levels, borrowers will 
benefit. 



43 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



All this said, the problems ahead re- 
main grave. We will continue to operate 
uncomfortably close to tlie brink for 
some time to come. In some quarters in 
Latin America, there is a mistaken no- 
tion, I believe, that we'll soon return to 
the "go-go" growth rates of the 1970s. 
But even several years of sustained 
growth will not resolve the problems 
that have accumulated over the past two 
decades. This is the inescapable conse- 
quence of policies that encouraged im- 
ports and discouraged exports, provided 
insufficient incentives to agricultural 
development, and put more emphasis on 
boosting public sector expenditures than 
on keeping domestic revenues adequate. 

The tendency of the various players 
involved to try to minimize the ad- 
justments they have to make will keep 
strains high. Nonetheless, recognition 
that we are all in this together is grow- 
ing. Our approach is intended to 
strengthen this recognition. To repeat, I 
don't want to appear complacent, but I 
think that we are probably beyond the 
point where citing good news sounds 
like whistling past the graveyard. 

Keeping Markets Open 

The debt management crisis is, however, 
only the most direct link between Latin 
American economic difficulties and our 
security. Our stake in each other's 
markets is also impressive. U.S. exports 
to Latin America and the Caribbean 
added up to $34 billion in 1982. Exports 
from Latin America and the Caribbean 
to the United States were only $1 billion 
less. 

Policies that foster free capital flows 
and encourage private investment, in- 
novation, and competition will be the 
key to recovery and growth. The United 
States is fully committed to open trade. 
We have not imposed new trade- 
restrictive barriers. We are, to the con- 
trary, continuing to implement the 
liberalization agreed upon in the 
multilateral trade negotiations. We are 
seeking a renewal of the generalized 
system of preferences — not an easy 
task — which has provided significant 
benefits to Latin America. And with the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), we 
have succeeded in achieving a virtually 
all-inclusive free-trade status for the 
Caribbean Basin. 

On December 1, President Reagan 
announced his intention to designate the 
first 11 beneficiaries of the virtually 
complete one-way free-trade provision of 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery 
Act. An interagency group is continuing 



44 



to work with other governments eligible 
for designation; we expect the President 
to announce a second group of 
beneficiary countries later this month. 
Our goal is to designate the vast majori- 
ty of the 27 eligible independent coun- 
tries and territories by late December so 
that they can begin to benefit from the 
trade-creation opportunities of the CBI 
starting January 1. 

Beyond these immediate initiatives, 
we are also preparing for the longer 
term future. At last spring's 
Williamsburg economic summit, the 
leaders of the industrialized world 
recognized that developing countries can 
earn the foreign exchange to service 
their debts only if they expand exports. 
The leaders agreed to consult on a new 
trade negotiating round emphasizing 
trade with developing countries. The 
President reiterated our commitment to 
such a round during his visit to Tokyo 
this fall. We hope that all nations, and 
Latin America in particular, will work 
with us as preparations for this round 
develop during the months ahead. 

Importance of Democracy 

A key tenet of U.S. policy in the 
Americas is to defend and promote 
democracy. In fact, building democracy 
is in our national security interest. Why? 
Because: 

First, democracy's consultative proc- 
ess offers the best means of translating 
the people's instinctive longing for peace 
into government policy. Democracy has 
proven itself in practice a bulwark 
against the international adventurism so 
characteristic of dictatorships; 

Second, democracy offers the surest 
way to prevent tensions from breaking 
down into internal violence. The 
moderating power of effective 
democracy — based on an open, 
pluralistic system safeguarded by 
law — is also the consistent key to 
respect for human rights and the 
prevention of internal abuse; 

Third, as a practical matter of con- 
ducting the business of diplomacy, it is 
far easier to deal with other democratic 
governments than it is with undemo- 
cratic ones. We understand each other. 
We do not mystify each other when our 
respective congresses disagree with a 
chief of state. And we understand the 
unique power of national consensus 
when it is achieved in a democratic 
society; 



Fourth, as a practical political mat- 
ter, it is easier to mobilize U.S. public 
support for the foreign policy actions we' 
must take in our own interest when the 
governments those actions concern are 
democratic. Americans reject extremism 
and violence of both the left and the 
right. They would like to see democracy 
restored not only in Cuba and Nicaragua 
but also in Chile, Uruguay, and Guate- 
mala — and defended in Costa Rica and 
Peru; and 

Fifth, and finally, a functioning 
democractic system provides the best 
chance for stability that investors need 
to plan ahead, confident that the future 
is less likely to hold arbitrary shifts in 
government policy or sudden outbursts 
of civil strife. Democracy provides the 
flexibility to accomodate change and 
relieve internal pressure and the 
freedom that facilitates enterprise and 
promotes economic growth. 

There is more than rhetoric to back 
all this up. In the last several years 
we've witnessed a fragile but broad 
trend toward restoration of democratic 
government in this hemisphere: Peru 
and Ecuador. Bolivia, Uruguay, Hon- 
duras, El Salvador, and Panama have al 
moved or are heading in this direction. 
In Chile the government and opposition 
remain at odds over steps to accelerate 
a return to democracy, but a process has 
clearly been initiated. Brazil's steady 
progress in its transition to a complete 
democratic structure has exercised a 
powerful positive influence. And now 
Argentina, with great impact, will com- 
plete its transition on Saturday. 

The people of this hemisphere are 
turning again to democratic institutions 
not in times of plenty but in cir- 
cumstances demanding solutions to 
hard-to-resolve problems. This should be 
taken as a source of confidence. 
Democracy and freedom of expression 
and assembly may increase the ventila- 
tion of worrisome problems and thus 
create some uncertainty, but they can 
also provide effective means of increas- 
ing public understanding of complex 
economic issues. And we must not 
forget that democracy is a problem- 
solving mechanism — not a nice thing to 
have if you can afford it but a necessity. 

Doing Something About it 

Being realistic, we must recognize that, 
if economic difficulty has accelerated, 
the transition to democracy it is also 
subjecting nascent democracies to 
strains that are virtually unprecedented 
in their severity. 

nent of State Bulletir 



* !«> l9 i% I"! 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



And so the question becomes, demo- 
cratic government being in our interest, 
what can we do and what are we doing 
to support it? 

We start first of all from the 
premise that, in politics, 
words — rhetoric and the symbolism they 
invoke — are very much the stuff of 
policy. So the President's statement to 
the Congress on April 27, for example, 
is important: that we will support 
democracy, reform, and human freedom: 
that we will work at human rights prob- 
lems, not walk away from them. 

On that occasion the President was 
talking about Central America. But 
what he said describes the common fiber 
of our actions throughout the hemis- 
phere. To cite a few examples: 

• In Central America we are pro- 
moting elections and supporting Costa 
Rica and its associates in the Central 
American Democratic Community; 

• In Uruguay we are encouraging 
the Government of Uruguay's commit- 
ment to elections in 1984 and the 
restoration of democracy in 1985: 

• In Chile we are encouraging ef- 
forts to reach agreement on steps to im- 
plement the transition to democracy; 

• In Cuba we will soon be bringing 
the democracy message through Radio 
Marti; and 

• We are helping restore democracy 
in Grenada. 

This Administration is also develop- 
ing innovative and practical approaches 
to strengthening democracy. In his ad- 
dress to the British Parliament on 
June 8 last year. President Reagan an- 
nounced that the United States would 
undertake a global effort to help 
". . . foster the infrastructure of 
democracy . . . which allows a people to 
choose their own way, to develop their 
own culture, to reconcile their own dif- 
ferences through peaceful means." 

Congress took a major step toward 
this goal last month by agreeing to fund 
the National Endowment for 
Democracy. The endowment is a bipar- 
tisan, nongovernmental, nonprofit 
organization established at the recom- 
mendation of a study group that in- 
cluded representatives of the Republican 
and Democratic parties, the AFL-CIO, 
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
Under the endowment, each of these 
organizations has an institute that will 
work directly with organizations 
overseas on democracy-related projects. 



February 1984 



We think the endowment constitutes 
a common sense, direct investment in 
people — in future leaders, in education 
and training, in international exchanges 
to foster political skills. These actions 
take us beyond immediate crisis reac- 
tions to the concerted development of 
men and women with modern economic, 
technical, and political skills. And it is 
an area where the Council of the 
Americas could play a key role. 

I urge you to help the United States 
invest in people. The U.S. Government 
has no equivalent of the Soviet Union's 
Patrice Lumumba University. Nor would 
we want one. We rely instead on public 
and private colleges and universities. 
But Federal funds for foreign student 
scholarships are not sufficient for the 
youth of the Western Hem.isphere to 
take full advantage of our educational 
resources. There is an urgent need for 
additional sources of funding from 



private enterprise, from foundations, 
and from the universities themselves. 



Summation 

It is the purpose of this Administration 
to act in clear-sighted pursuit of our na- 
tional interest: 

• We are restoring the bases for 
sustainable economic recovery, making 
adjustments and modifications to a tried 
system, not panicking and throwing it 
away for some untried theory; 

• We are working to keep our 
markets open; 

• We are acting constructively to 
help consolidate a hemispheric move- 
ment toward free democratic govern- 
ment, while recognizing that democracy 
is a process, not a finished process; and 

• With your help, we will make it 
happen. ■ 



U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada 



LETTER TO THE 
CONGRESS. 
DEC. 8, 1983' 

In accordance with my desire that you be 
kept informed concerning the situation in 
Grenada, about which I reported to you on 
October 25, I am providing this further 
report on the presence of United States 
Armed Forces in Grenada. 

Since then, the circumstances which occa- 
sioned the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces into Grenada have substantial- 
ly changed. On November 2, the armed con- 
flict in Grenada came to an end, and our task 
now. together with neighboring countries, is 
to assist the Grenadians in their effort to 
restore and revitalize their political institu- 
tions in a stable security environment. 

Although it is still not possible to predict 
the precise duration of the temporary 
presence of United States Armed Forces in 
Grenada, our forces are continuing to work 
closely with other components of the collec- 
tive security force in assisting the Grenadian 
authorities in the maintenance of conditions 
of law and order and the restoration of func- 
tioning governmental institutions to the 
island of Grenada. 

All elements of the U.S. Marines and 
U.S. Army Rangers have now been with- 



drawn from Grenada; at this time, less than 
2.700 U.S. Armed Forces personnel remain 
on the island. U.S. Armed Forces will con- 
tinue to withdraw from the island as a part 
of a process whereby a peacekeeping force, 
composed of units contributed by friendly 
countries, takes over these responsibilities. I 
anticipate that this will be accomplished in 
the near future and that any members of the 
U.S. Armed Forces remaining in Grenada 
thereafter will have normal peacetime 
assignments, such as training, local security 
and the furnishing of technical services. 

I am satisfied that the objectives of our 
operation in Grenada, including the pro- 
tection of U.S. citizens, are being met suc- 
cessfully because of the valor and effec- 
tiveness of our forces. I ask for your continu- 
ing support as we strive to assist the people 
of Grenada in their efforts to restore peace, 
order, and human rights to their island. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reacan 



identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, .Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and Strom Thurmond, Presi- 
dent pro tempore of the Senate (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 12, 1983). ■ 



45 



I .§ >! ^% 



1 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force 
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. 
TIAS 6997. 
Accession deposited : Haiti, Dec. 5, 1983. 

Atomic Energy 

Agreement concerning the transfer of a 
research reactor and enriched uranium to 
Morocco, with annexes and exchanges of 
notes. Signed at Vienna Dec. 2, 1983. 
Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983. 

Aviation, Civil— Fares 

Protocol to the memorandum of understand- 
ing [signed Dec. 17, 1982; entered into force 
Feb. 1, 1983] concerning scheduled trans- 
atlantic passenger air fares, with annexes. 
Done at Washington Oct. 29, 1983. Entered 
into force Nov. 1, 1983. 
Signatures: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, F.R.G., Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., 
U.S., Yugoslavia, Oct. 29, 1983. 

Biolog^ical Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the develop- 
ment, production and stockpiling of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons 
and on their destruction. Done at 
Washington, London and Moscow Apr. 10, 
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. 
TIAS 8062. 

Ratification deposited : Colombia, 
Dec. 19, 1983. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1983, with an- 
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Sept. 22, 1983; Canada, 
Sweden, Thailand, Sept. 15, 1983; Ecuador, 
Dec. 2, 1983; Ghana, Oct. 4, 1983; India, 
Sept. 9, 1983; Madagascar, Sept. 6, 1983; 
Malawi. Sept. 21. 1983;' Uganda, Sept. 28. 
1983. 

Accessions deposited: Equatorial Guinea, 
Nov. 7. 1983; Fiji. Sept. 23. 1983; Gabon, 
Sept. 27. 1983.2 

Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27. 1980.^ 
Ratifications deposited : Lesotho, Sao Tome 
and Principe. Dec. 6, 1983. 

Conservation 

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources, with annex for an ar- 



46 



bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 

1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS 

10240. 

Ratification deposited : Norway, Dec. 6, 

1963. 

Containers 

Amendments to Annexes I and II of the in- 
ternational convention for safe containers, 
1972, as amended (TIAS 9037, 10220). 
Adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee 
at London June 23. 1983. 
Entered into force : Jan. 1, 1984. 

Cotton 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Cotton Institute. Done at Washington 
Jan. 17, 1966. Entered into force Feb. 23, 
1966. TIAS 5964. 

Notification of withdrawal : Greece, Dec. 15, 
1983; effective Dec. 31, 1983. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR 
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20. 
1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982. 
Accession deposited : Kuwait, Nov. 23, 1983. 

Expositions 

Protocol revising the convention of Nov. 22, 
1928 relating to international expositions, 
(TIAS 6548). with appendix and annex. Done 
at Paris Nov. 30. 1972. Entered into force 
June 9. 1980. TIAS 9948. 
Accession deposited : Uruguay. June 10. 1983. 

Finance— African Development Bank 

Agreement establishing the African Develop- 
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Khartoum 
Aug. 4, 1963. as amended at Abidjan May 17. 
1979. Entered into force May 7. 1982; for the 
U.S.. Jan. 31. 1983. 
Signature : Portugal. Dec. 8. 1983. 
Accessions deposited : India. Dec. 6, 1983; 
Saudi Arabia. Dec. 15. 1983. 

Fisheries 

Convention for the conservation of salmon in 

the North Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjavik 

Mar. 2. 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1. 

1983. 

Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 13. 1983. 

Judicial Procedure 

Additional protocol to the Inter-American 
convention on letters rogatory, with annex. 
Done at Montevideo May 8. 1979. Entered 
into force June 14. 1980.-' 
Signature : Mexico, Aug. 3. 1983. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico. Mar. 9, 1983. 



Nationality 

Protocol relating to military obligations in 
certain cases of double nationality, concluded 
at The Hague Apr. 12, 1930. Entered into 
force May 25, 1937. 50 Stat. 1317. 
Notification of succession : Kiribati, Nov. 29, 
1983. ' 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 

all forms of racial discrimination. Done at 

New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 

Jan. 4. 1969.^ 

Ratification deposited : Kampuchea. Nov. 28, 

1983. 

Red Cross 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for 
the U.S., Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362. 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship- 
wrecked members of armed forces at sea. 
Done at Geneva Aug. 12. 1949. Entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2. 
1956. TIAS .3363. 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment 
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for 
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364. 

Geneva convention relative to the protection 
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at 
Geneva Aug. 12. 1949. Entered into force 
Oct. 21. 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. 
TIAS 3.365. 

Accessions deposited : Namibia, UN Council 
for, Oct. 18. 1983. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12. 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of international armed con- 
flicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at 
Geneva June 8. 1977. Entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978.-' 

Accessions deposited : Congo, Nov. 10, 1983; 
Namibia. UN Council for. Oct. 18, 1983; 
Syrian Arab Republic, Nov. 14, 1983.^ 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 194S, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of noninternational armed 
conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva 
June 8. 1977. Entered into force 
Dec. 7. 1978.-> 

Accessions deposited : Congo. Nov. 10, 1983; 
Namibia. UN Council for. Oct. 18, 1983. 

UN Industrial Development Organization 

Constitution of the UN Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted at 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.^ 

Signature : Sao Tome and Principe, Nov. 29, 
1983. 

Ratifications deposited ; Israel, Nov. 25, 1983; 
Mozambique. Dec. 14, 1983; Nepal. Dec. 6. 
1983. 



State Bulletin 



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|v 1*^ I«'i-v t: 



Weapons 

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on 
the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively in- 
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with 
annexed Protocols. Adopted at Geneva 
Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 
1983.-' 

Accession and acceptances deposited : 
Guatemala, July 21, 1983. 

Wheat 

1983 protocol for the further extension of the 
wheat trade convention. 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
into force July 1, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited : Belgium, Dec. 9, 
1983; Finland, Dec. 16, 1983. 

1983 protocol for the further extension of the 
food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
into force July 1, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited : Belgium, Dec. 9, 
1983; Finland, Dec. 16, 1983. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 

discrimination against women. Adopted at 

New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 

Sept. 3, 1981." 

Ratification deposited : France, Dec. 14, 

1983. 

World Health Organization 

Amendments to Arts. 24 and 25 of the Con- 
stitution of the World Health Organization, 
as amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). 
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th 
World Health Assembly.^ 
Acceptance deposited : Algeria, Nov. 23, 



1983. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 
Dec. 1, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Acceptance deposited : Bangladesh, Aug. 3, 



1983. 



BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement relating to limitation of imports 
of specialty steel from Argentina, with an- 
nexes. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Nov. 8, 1983. Entered into force 
Nov. 8, 1983. 

Australia 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. Signed at Sydney 
Aug. 6, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 31, 
1983. TIAS 10773. 

Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 5, 1983. 
Supersedes convention of May 14, 1953, 
TIAS 2880. 



Austria 

Agreement relating to limitation of imports 
of specialty steel from Austria, with annexes 
and related letter. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington Oct. 19. 1983. Entered 
into force Oct. 19, 1983. 

Belgium 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Dec. 1 and 9, 1983. Entered into 
force Dec. 9, 1983. 

Brazil 

Agreement extending agreement of Dec. 1, 
1971 (TIAS 7221), as amended and extended, 
relating to a program of scientific and 
technological cooperation. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Brasilia Dec. 1, 1983. 
Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983. 

Canada 

Agreement relating to limitation of imports 
of specialty steel from Canada, with annexes. 
Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Oct. 19, 1983. Entered into force 
Oct. 19, 1983. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement concerning air transport. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at San Jose 
Oct. 20 and Nov. 23, 1983. Entered into force 
Nov. 23, 1983. 

Equador 

Agreement for the recovery and return of 
stolen archeological, historical, and cultural 
properties. Signed at Washington Nov. 17, 
1983. Enters into force upon exchange of 
diplomatic notes indicating that each Party 
has complied with the requirements of its 
domestic law. 

Eg.vpt 

Second amendment to the grant agreement 
of Aug. 29, 1979 (TIAS 9699) for Alexandria 
wastewater system development. Signed at 
Cairo Sept. 28, 1983. Entered into force 
Sept. 28, 1983. 

France 

Agreement extending the memorandum of 
understanding of May 30, 1978 on a 
cooperative program in science and 
technology. Signed at Paris June 29, 1983. 
Entered into force June 29, 1983. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the furnishing of balloon launching and 
associated services. Signed at Washington 
and Paris Aug. 26 and Nov. 11, 1983. 
Entered into force Nov. 11, 1983. 



TREATIES 



Guatemala 

Agreement extending the cooperative agree- 
ment of Oct. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10288) to assist 
the Government of Guatemala in execution of 
an eradication program of the Mediterranean 
fruit fly (MEDFLY). Signed at Guatemala 
Nov. 23, 1983. Entered into force Nov. 23, 
1983; effective Oct. 1, 1983. 

Haiti 

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage- 
ment and protection of investment, with an- 
nex and protocol. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 13, 1983. Enters into force 30 days 
after the date of exchange of ratifications. 

Japan 

Memorandum of understanding relating to 
the operation of the Landsat system, with an- 
nex. Signed at Washington and Tokyo July 5 
and Aug. 11, 1983. Entered into force 
Aug. 11, 1983. 

Agreement relating to limitation of imports 
of specialty steel from Japan, with annexes. 
Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Oct. 18, 1983. Entered into force 
Oct. 18, 1983. 

Agreement for the transfer of defense- 
related technologies, with annex. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Tokyo Nov. 8, 1983. 
Entered into force Nov. 8, 1983. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 1, 1982 (TIAS 10611), relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Oct. 21 and Nov. 4, 
1983. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1983. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the cooperative agree- 
ment of Oct. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10373) to assist 
the Government of Mexico in execution of an 
eradication program of the Mediterranean 
fruit fly (MEDFLY), Signed at Mexico 
Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30, 
1983; effective Oct. 1, 1983. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the 
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico Nov. 10, 1983. 
Entered into force Nov. 10, 1983. 

New Zealand 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, with protocol. i^ 
Signed at Wellington July 23, 1982. Entered 
into force Nov. 2, 1983. TIAS 10772. 
Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 5, 
1983. 

Supersedes convention of Mar. 16, 1948, 
TIAS 2360. 



February 1984 



47 



.• .1 »1 



CHRONOLOGY 



Pakistan 

Ajrreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 9 and 11. 1982, (TIAS 10408), relating 
to trade in cotton textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Oct. 2.5 and Nov. 4. 1983. 
Entered into force Nov. 4. 1983. 

Peru 

Agreement for the establishment and opera- 
tion of the Naval Medical Research Institute 
(NAMRID) in Lima. Signed at Lima Oct. 21, 
1983. Entered into force Oct. 21. 1983. 

Philippines 

Agreement relating to the employment of 
dependents of official government employees. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Sept. 20 and Oct. 20, 1983. Entered into 
force Oct. 20, 1983. 

Poland 

Agreement relating to limitation of imports 
of specialty steel from Poland, with annexes. 
Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Oct. 18, 1983. Entered into force 
Oct. 18, 1983. 

St. Vincent and The Grenadines 

Agreement relating to radio communications 
between amateur stations on behalf of third 
parties. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Bridgetown and St. Vincent Apr. 22 and 
Sept. 27, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 27, 
1982; effective Oct. 27, 1982. 

Senegal 

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage- 
ment and protection of investment, with 
annex and protocol. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 6, 1983. Enters into force 30 days after 
date of exchange of instruments of ratifica- 
tion. 

South Africa 

Memorandum of understanding relating to 
the operation of the Landsat system, with 
annex. Signed at Washington and Pretoria 
Sept. 19 and Oct. 19, 1983, Entered into 
force Oct. 19, 1983. 

Spain 

Agreement relating to limitation of imports 
of specialty steel from Spain, with annexes. 
Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Oct. 18, 1983. Entered into force 
Oct. 18, 1983. 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Madrid Nov. h and 22, 1983. Enters into 
force on the date the Government of Spain 
gives written notice that it has fulfilled its 
constitutional requirements. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in Sri Lanka. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Colombo Nov. 20, 
1983. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1983. 



48 



Thailand 

Treaty relating to extraditi(m. Signed at 
Washington Dec. 14, 1983. Enters into force 
30 days after exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 

Togo 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, or 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government through 
the Export-Import Bank. Signed at Lome 
Nov. 29, 1983. Enters into force upon receipt 
by Togo of written notice from the U.S. that 
all necessary domestic requirements for entry 
into force have been fulfilled. 

United Kingdom 

Memorandum of understanding between the 
U.S. Coast Guard and the Royal Air Force 
concerning exchange of personnel. Signed at 
Washington Nov. 14 and 16, 1983. Entered 
into force Nov. 16, 1983. 



'With declaration. 

-As a member of OAMCAF (Organisation 
africaine du Cafe) group. 

^Not in force. 

^Not in force for the LI.S. 

^With reservation. 

•■Does not include Tokelau or the 
Associated SeLf-Governing States of the Cook 
Islands and Nine. ■ 



December 1983 

December 1 

White House officials announce that on 
Nov. 30, President Reagan designated the 
following countries as beneficiaries of the 
rights and privileges accorded under the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: 
Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, and the Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago. The President said that 
such designation is "an important step to 
those countries in their battle to revitalize 
and rebuild their weakened economies." The 
countries will be entitled to export to the 
U.S. most items they produce without paying 
tariffs. Benefits are effective Jan. 1, 1984. 

UN General Assembly adopts a resolution 
strongly condemning South Africa for block- 
ing independence for Namibia and calls for 
comprehensive mandatory sanctions against 
the republic. Under the UN Charter only the 
Security Council may order such measures; 
the Assembly, however, urges the Security 
Council to act to ensure South Africa's total 
isolation by governments and private bodies. 



December 2 

Following a meeting with Lebanese President 
Gemayel, Secretary Shultz discloses plans to 
create committees on military and economic 
matters as an approach to the "development 
of a strong working partnership" with 
Lebanon. The Secretary says that the 
Lebanese President had reviewed the situa- 
tion extensively, and they both agree that 
there is a "sense of urgency about the need 
to work on these problems." 

December 3 

On behalf of President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz transmits the 15th Semiannual Report 
on Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act 
to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commis- 
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
The report covers the period June 1, 1983, 
through Nov. 30, 1983, and provides a factua 
survey of developments in the areas of 
human rights and humanitarian concerns; 
security, economic, scientific, and 
technological cooperation; and educational 
and cultural exchanges and concentrates on 
Soviet and East European compliance with 
the Final Act. 

December 4 

Fighting intensifies in Lebanon. Responding 
to Syrian antiaircraft attacks on unarmed 
U.S. reconniassance aircraft, the U.S. bombs 
Syrian targets. Two American carrier jets 
are shot down — one U.S. pilot. Navy Lt. 
Mark Lange is killed, and an airman. Navy 
Lt. Robert 0. Goodman, Jr. of Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire, is reported captured. Eight 
marines are reported killed during intense ar 
tillery shelling by Syrian-backed militiamen 
LI.S. Sixth Fleet warships open fire on militis 
positions. President Reagan says that while 
we don't want a military confrontation with 
Syria "if our forces are attacked, we will re- 
spond. We're going to defend our 
personnel. . . ." 



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December 5 

President Reagan announces a special 
cultural exchange agreement between the 
U.S. and India for 1984-86. The agreement, 
first discussed during Prime Minister 
Gandhi's July 1982 visit to the U.S., provides 
a program with special emphasis on the U.S. 
in India during 1984 and special emphasis on 
India in the U.S. during 1985. Mrs. Gandhi 
and First Lady Nancy Reagan will serve as 
honorary chairpersons of national committees 
arranging the Festival of India from the 
spring of 1985 to spring 1986. The festival 
will depict the social and cultural life of India \i^ 
outlining the continuity of traditional skills as '^mn^) 
well as describe India's industrial and 
technological advances. 

President Reagan signs H.R. 4476 ex- 
tending the authorities of the Export Ad- 
ministration Act until Feb. 29, 1984. 



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December 5-7 

NATO Defense Ministers' meeting held in 
Brussels. 



Department of State Bulletir 
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CHRONOLOGY 



December 5-13 

Their Majesties King Birendra Bir Bikram 
Shah Dev and Queen Aishwarya Rajya Laxmi 
Devi Shah (if Nepal make a state visit to the 
United States Dee. 5-13, 1983. and to 
Washington. D.C., Dec. 5-10, to meet with 
President Reagan and other U.S. officials. 

December 6-13 

Secretary Shultz makes an official visit to 
Bonn, West Germany (Dec. 6-7) to hold 
neetings with President Carstens, Chancellor 
Kohl, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister 
jenscher, and other political leaders; 
3russels (Dec. 7-9) to attend the NATO 
Tiinisterial meeting; North Africa, where he 
consults with President Bourguiha, Prime 
Vlinister M'zali and Tunisian officials in 
Tunis, Tunisia (Dec. 9-10) and His Majesty 
ting Hassan, Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani. 
ind other Moroccan officials in Morocco (Dec. 
0-12); and Lisbon, Portgual (Dec. 12-13) 
vhere he meets with President Eanes, Prime 
Minister Soares. Vice Prime Minister Mota 
'into, and Foreign Minister Gama. 

December 7 

lurvivors — 1 .800 marines and sailors — of the 
nit that lost 241 men in the Beirut bombing 
ttack on Oct. 23. are accorded a heroes 
/elcome as they arrive in Camp Lejeune, 
iiJorth Carolina. 

Strategic arms limitation talks (START) 
-nd in Geneva with the Soviet Union failing 

set a date for resuming the negotiations, 
"he Soviets argue that with the deployment 
f new U.S. missiles in Europe, "changes in 
he global strategic situation" make it 
lecessary for them to "review all problems 
snder discussion" at the negotiations. U.S. of- 
ijcials voice regret at the decision and 
disagree with Soviet assertions that 
evelopments outside the negotiations should 
ffect their decisions to resume negotiations, 
'he U.S. is "fully prepared" to continue the 
alks and propose to resume them in early 
'eb. 1984. 

Oecember 8 

NATO's Special Consultative Group on INF 
eleases a progress report on the implementa- 
ion of NATO's 1979 "dual-track" decision, 
'he report provides a comprehensive account 
f rationale for NATO's decision, close con- 
ultations within NATO on INF arms control, 
:nd extensive U.S. efforts to achieve an 
.greement during the six negotiating rounds 

1 Geneva. 



jlnfc December 8-9 

jsf emiannual North Atlantic Council 
linisterial meeting is held in Brussels. 

*ecember 9 

lATO foreign ministers unanimously adopt a 
eclaration and release it as a preamble to 
le final communique urging the Warsaw 
'act to accept the opportunities offered by 
ij,( ilATO for "a balanced and constructive rela- 
onship and for genuine detente." 



ebruary 1984 



Former British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Carrington is unanimously chosen as NATO's 
next Secretary General. He will succeed 
Joseph Luns of the Netherlands on June 25, 
1984. 

In an effort to keep the Congress in- 
formed of developments on Grenada, Presi- 
dent Reagan sends a letter stating that U.S. 
forces "will continue to withdraw" from 
Grenada as a multinational peacekeeping 
force takes over. He says, however, that it is 
"still not possible" to predict when all 
Americans will leave the island. White House 
Deputy Spokesman Larry Speakes says that 
there has been no change in the President's 
plans to remove all combat troops from the 
island by Dec. 23. Remaining troops will be 
construction or military police personnel and 
will have "normal peacetime assignments, 
such as training, local security and the fur- 
nishing of technical services." 

Administration officials note the an- 
nouncement in Rangoon of the results of the 
trial of two North Korean army officers 
charged in the Oct. 9 bombing attack. State 
Department officials say that the "Burmese 
Government's investigation of the bombing 
and the Burmese Court's finding of guilty 
represents a serious determination to see 
justice done. In the course of the investiga- 
tion and trial, it was clearly established that 
these officers carried out their murders at 
the direction of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea." 

December 9-11 

Vice President Bush leads delegation attend- 
ing the inauguration of Raul Alfonsin as 
President of Argentina. The delegation also 
includes U.S. Ambassador to Argentina 
Frank V. Ortiz, Jr.; Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley; 
Gen. Paul Gorman; Congressman Robert J. 
Lagomarsino (R-Calif.); Deputy Secretary of 
the Treasury R. T. McNamar; Ambassador 
Richard Stone, the President's personal 
representative to Central America; and Am- 
bassador J. William Middendorf II, Perma- 
nent U.S. Representative to the Organization 
of American States. The Vice President also 
travels to Panama and El Salvador where he 
confers with Presidents Ricardo De la 
Espriella and Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borja, 
respectively. 

December 10 

Raul Ricardo Alfonsin is inaugurated Presi- 
dent of Argentina. 

December 11 

The head of the Bangladesh Government, Lt. 
Gen. Hussain Mohammad Ershad, proclaims 
himself President and dissolves his cabinet in 
an effort to consolidate his power before 
presidential elections he has scheduled for 
May 1984. 



December 12 

State Department officials announce that at 
about 0630 GMT (9:30 a.m.), a terrorist 
crashes a Mercedes truck loaded with ex- 
plosives into the U.S. Embassy compound in 
Kuwait. They add that the truck proceeded 
about 50 yards to an Embassy annex where 
the bomb was detonated. The explosion col- 
lapsed part of the building and caused exten- 
sive damage to the Chancery and other 
buildings in the compound. Initial reports in- 
dicate that four persons (later determined to 
be 3 Embassy employees and the terrorist) 
are killed and 37 wounded. Of the 37 
wounded, 20 Foreign Service nationals; 17 
are visitors to the Embassy or private con- 
tractors. While some American employees 
suffered minor injuries, none required 
hospitalization, and all are accounted for. 

Because of the uncertainty of the situa- 
tion, the State Department recommends that 
nonessential travel be deferred for a few- 
days. Administration officials say that the 
bombing "will not deter" the U.S. "from pur- 
suing a steady policy in the Middle East." 
Car bombs also explode at the French Em- 
bassy, the Kuwait Airport control tower, an 
American housing complex outside the city, a 
power station, and an oil refinery. 

U.S files third written pleading with the 
ICJ in the "Case Concerning the Delimitation 
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Area" between Canada and the United 
States. The Court is hearing the case as a 
result of a boundary settlement treaty be- 
tween the U.S. and Canada which entered in- 
to force Nov. 20, 1981. 

State Department spokesman Alan 
Romberg confirms reports that on Dec. 11 
Bangladesh President Chowdhury resigned 
and Gen. Ershad assumed the presidency. 
While declining to comment on specific 
developments in that nation's domestic 
politics, Romberg reiterates U.S. hope that 
"Bangladesh will find a way to resolve its in- 
ternal political difference, continue the proc- 
ess of building representative political institu- 
tions, and carry on with the urgent task of 
economic development." 

About 1,000 paratroopers of the 82d Air- 
borne Division, the last U.S. combat forces to 
have fought in the invasion of Grenada, are 
flown off the island. Left behind are about 
1,200 support troops to be reduced to 300 by 
the end of the week. Administration officials 
say that U.S. combat forces will be home by 
Dec. 15. 

December 12-13 

Department of State and the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha's Center for Afghanistan 
Studies cosponsor a forum on Afghanistan at 
the Department of State. The forum ex- 
amines the implications of the continuing war 
for Afghanistan and its region. Discussions 
include; Afghanistan in the 4th year of Soviet 
occupation; media coverage of the war; and 
the problems which would confront post- 
Soviet Afghanistan. Former national security 
adviser Zbigniew Brzesinski is keynote 
speaker and Under Secretary Eagleburger 
and Chancellor Del D. Weber, University of 
Nebraska at Omaha, deliver opening 
remarks. 



a9 



-8 .1 ^.| t 



CHRONOLOGY 



December 14 

President Reagan says that there are two cir- 
cumstances under which the MNF could be 
withdrawn from Beirut. One is if the Govern- 
ment of Lebanon takes control of its ter- 
ritory, the other, if there is "such a collapse 
of order" that it is "absolutely certain" that 
there is no solution to the problem. 

December 15 

In Vienna, the EastAVest MBFR negotiations 
on reducing military manpower in central 
Europe recess with the Warsaw Pact refus- 
ing to agree to a date for resumption at that 
time. This action follows the Soviet's walkout 
of INF and suspension of the START 
negotiations. 

Remaining U.S. combat troops leave 
Grenada, leaving about 300 noncombat 
soldiers to support Caribbean peacekeeping 
forces there. 

UN Security Council votes unanimously 
to extend the life of the UN peacekeeping 
force in Cyprus for 6 months. 

December 15-16 

Fifth meeting of the Mi.xed Commission 
established by the June 15, 1972 Agreement 
on Scientific and Technical Cooperation be- 
tween the U.S. and Mexico is held in 
Washington, D.C. U.S. delegation is jointly 
chaired by William Schneider, Jr., Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, 
and Technology, and Dr. Edward A. Knapp. 
Director of the National Science Foundation. 
The Mexican delegation is jointly chaired by 
Amb. Jorge Eduardo Navarrete, Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs of the 
Secretariat of Foreign Relations, and Dr. 
Daniel Resendiz, Secretary General of the 
National Council of Science and Technology. 

December 16 

Departments of State and Defense release 
third set of documents found by the 
U.S. -Caribbean security forces on Grenada. A 
report entitled "Grenada— A Preliminary 
Report" is also released and contains basic in- 
formation from the first three sets of reports. 

December 18 

Kuwaiti Government accuses nine Iraqis and 
three Lebanese of the bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy there and five other targets. All are 
reported to be Shiite Moslems. Authorities 
say that 10 of the men arrested had con- 
fessed. One Iraqi is still at large, and 
another, the driver of the truck, is dead. 

December 19 

In response to a U.S. request, the Govern- 
ment of the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, as a humanitarian gesture, agrees 
to allow a Joint Casualty Resolution Center 
delegation to visit the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic Dec. 19-22, 1983. 



December 21 

In Nicaragua, an American-born bishop, Mon- 
signor Salvador Schlaefer, along with hun- 
dreds of residents of the village of Francia 
Sirpi, is reportedly kidnapped by rebel forces 
believed to be ex-national guard officers of 
the deposed and assassinated former Presi- 
dent Anastasio Somoza. The Nicaraguan 
Government says it holds the U.S. and Hon- 
duras responsible for their fate. State 
Department officials say that the U.S. has 
received only "conflicting and unconfirmed 
reports" including a suggestion that there has 
been fighting in the northeastern area of 
Nicaragua and Bishop Schlaefer is among 
several individuals who are voluntarily 
leading civilians — primarily Miskito In- 
dians — away from the fighting. The U.S., of- 
ficials say, is attempting to "clarify the cir- 
cumstances and whereabouts of the in- 
dividuals involved." 

December 23 

State Department officials announce that 
according to radio reports Bishop Schlaeffer 
and Rev. Wendelin Shafer have crossed the 
border into Honduras with about 800 per- 
sons, most of them believed to be Miskito In- 
dians. Later, reports from Ll.S. Embassy in 
Honduras confirm that both Bishop 
Schlaeffer and Rev. Shafer are safe. 

Laos turns over to a delegation from the 
U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the 
bodies of some unidentified American soldiers 
who were reported missing in action in the 
Vietnam war. The delegation conducted the 
first official U.S. inspection of the site where 
a U.S. Air Force C-130 cargo plane crashed 
Dec. 21, 1972. This was the first such inspec- 
tion since the communist takeover in 1975. 

December 25 

The Rev. Jesse Jackson, a Democrat 
presidential candidate and civil rights leader, 
says he was invited by the Syrian Govern- 
ment, along with a group of American 
clergymen, to Syria to discuss Middle East 
issues and the release of captured U.S. air- 
man Lt. Robert Goodman, Jr. The invitation 
came, he said, in response to a telegram he 
sent asking the Syrian Government to release 
the pilot as a humanitarian gesture. 

December 27 

Responding to questions about the proposed 
unofficial visit of Rev. Jesse Jackson to Syria, 
State Department spokesman John Hughes 
says that the U.S. has been pursuing the 
release of the U.S. Navy flier in a "direct and 
continuous manner at a high level of the 
Syrian Government" and that the U.S. 
reposes "full confidence" in Amb. Robert 
Paganelli. Hughes continues that while the 
U.S. has no objection to private Americans 
seeking the release of Lt. Goodman on 
humanitarian grounds, "they are operating on 
their own authority and cannot speak for the 
United States." The U.S., he says, is con- 
cerned that such private contacts could be ' 
"self-defeating" or such efforts could inter- 
rupt or "negate" government efforts to 
secure (Joodman's release. 



The fourth anniversary of the Soviet in- 
vasion of Afghanistan is marked with 
"sadness and continued indignation," states 
President Reagan. Our goal, he continues, is 
to "do everything we can to help bring abou' 
a peaceful solution which removes the Soviet 
forces from Afghanistan, ends the agony ant 
destruction of the Afghan nation, and 
restores that country's independence and 
nonalignment. He calls on the Soviet Union 
to "reach a settlement of the crisis which 
restores the freedom, independence and 
nonalignment of Afghanistan." 

December 28 

The special Defense Department commission 
investigating the Oct. 23 bombing attack on 
Marine headquarters in Beirut publicly 
releases a 166-page report concluding that 
major failures of command, intelligence, and 
policy contributed to the Marine defenses an 
recommends that Secretary Weinberger taki 
whatever disciplinary or administrative actic 
he deems appropriate toward those Marine 
commanders held responsible. Prior to the 
release of the report. President Reagan 
issues a statement of Dec. 27 overriding the 
recommendations and accepting full respon- 
sibility and blame for the deaths of 241 U.S. 
Marines. 

December 29 

Following a 6-month in-depth policy review i 
U.S. participation in UNESCO [United Na- 
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization], the U.S. issues a statement 
notifying UNESCO that it will withdraw 
from the organization effective Dec. 31, 198' 
The decision was made on recommendations 
based upon U.S. experience that UNESCO: 

• "Has extraneously politicized virtually 
every subject it deals with; 

• "Has exhibited hostility toward the 
basic institutions of a free society, especially 
a free market and a free press; and 

• "Has demonstrated unrestrained 
budgetary e.\pansion." 

December 30 

In a letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and an Executive order, 
President Reagan adds nine more countries 
to the list of those eligible for tariff aid unde 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The nine in 
elude Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, the 
British Virgin Islands, El Salvador, Grenada 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Montserrat 

December 31 

The government of Nigerian President Sheh' 
Shagari is overthrown in a military coup. Th 
coup marks the fifth military intervention in 
Nigeria since its independence from Britian 
in 1960. ■ 



♦Tte Bulleth 



JSivn' 



i«^i# ut 






PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



412 


12/5 


413 


12/5 


414 


12/5 


415 


12/9 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

Program for the state visit 
to the U.S. of Their Ma- 
jesties King Birendra Bir 
Bikram Shah Dev and 
Queen Aishwarya Rajya 
Laxmi Devi Shah of 
Nepal, Dec. 5-13. 
''411 12/1 George Roberts Andrews 
sworn in as Ambassador 
to Mauritius, Oct. 13 
(biographic data). 
Afghanistan Forum, Dec. 

12-13, Washington, D.C. 
Boston Passport Agency 
receives "Agency of the 
Year" award. 
Shultz: news conference. 
FY 1983 foreign military 
sales. 

416 12/9 U.S. submits its pleadings to 
the International Court of 
Justice in the case con- 
cerning the maritime 
boundary with Canada in 
the Gulf of Maine area. 
'417 12/13 Shultz: departure statement, 

Tunis, Dec. 10. 
i418 12/12 Shultz: departure statement, 
departure Presidential 
Palace, Tunis, Dec. 10. 
419 12/14 Shultz: statement at bilateral 
agreement signing 
ceremony, Lisbon, 
Dec. 13. 
Shultz; arrival statement, 

Lisbon, Dec. 12. 
Shultz, Genscher: news con- 
ference, Bonn, Dec. 7. 
Shultz: remarks at dinner 
hosted by Foreign 
Minister Jaime Gama, 
Lisbon, Dec. 12. 
Shultz: remarks at inaugura- 
tion of Embassy, Lisbon, 
Dec. 12. 
Fifth mixed commission 
meeting on scientific and 
technical cooperation be- 
tween Mexico and the 
U.S., Dec. 15-16. 

425 12/19 Shultz: arrival statement, 

Tunis, Dec. 9. 

426 12/19 Shultz: news conference at 

U.S. Embassy, Rabat, 
Dec. 11. 



'420 


12/14 


421 


12/13 


422 


12/14 


423 


12/15 


424 


12/16 



*427 
*428 



12/19 
12/19 



*429 12/19 



*430 12/19 



*431 12/19 



*432 
*433 



•434 
*435 



12/19 
12/19 



12/19 

12/21 



436 12/27 

437 12/28 
'438 12/29 



Shultz: arrival statement, 

Rabat, Dec. 10. 
Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on containers and 
cargoes, Jan. 26. 
U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), in- 
tegrated services digital 
network (ISDN). Jan. 
17-18. 
SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on stability, load lines, and 
safety of fishing vessels, 
Jan. 10. 
U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), Jan. 10. 
CCIR, study group 6, 

Jan. 10. 
Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private In- 
ternational Law, study 
group on international 
adoption of minors, Jan. 6. 
CCITT, ISDN, joint working 

party, Jan. 31-Feb. 1. • 
Shultz: remarks at award of 
the American Committee 
Medal of the International 
Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Washington, D.C. 
Dec. 20. 
Foreign Relations of the 
U.S.: 1952-1954.' Volume 
IV: The American 
Republics released. 
Shultz: news conference, 
NATO Headquarters. 
Brussels, Dec. 9. 
The Quest for Peace: Prin- 
cipal U.S. Public 
Statements and Documents 
Relating to the Arab- 
Israeli Peace Process, 
1967-1983. released. 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 



Free, single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Public Information Service, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 

President Reagan 

America's Commitment to Peace, address to 
the nation. Oct. 27, 1983 (Current Policy 
#522). 

Vice President Bush 

U.S. Condemns Salvadoran Death Squads, 
toast at dinner given by Salvadoran Presi- 
dent Magana, San Salvador, El Salvador 
Dec. 11, 1983 (Current Policy #533). 

Secretary Shultz 

Promoting Peace in the Middle East, Council 
of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 
Atlanta, Nov. 19, 1983 (Current Policy 
#528). 

Africa 

Reagan Administration's Africa Policy: A 
Progress Report, Assistant Secretary 
Crocker, University of Kansas conference 
on international affairs, Lawrence, Nov. 10, 
1983 (Current Policy #527). 

Arms Control 

INF: Where We Stand (GIST, Dec. 1983). 

East Asia 

Background Notes on the Republic of Korea 
(Oct. 1983). Background Notes on Malaysia 
(Oct. 1983) 

Background Notes on ASEAN (Nov. 1983). 

Background Notes on Chile (Nov. 1983). 

Background Notes on Mongolia (Dec. 1983). 

Economics 

The Magic of the Market— At Home and 
Abroad, Under Secretary Wallis, Chamber 
of Commerce, San Francisco, Oct. 20 1983 
(Current Policy #523). 

Agricultural Export Promotion and Trade, 
Under Secretary Wallis, House Committee 
on Agriculture, Oct. 18, 1983 (Current 
Policy #519). 

International Aviation (GIST, Nov. 1983). 

U.S. Prosperity and the Developing Coun- 
tries (GIST, Dec. 1983). 

U.S. Export Controls (GIST, Dec. 1983). 

Multinational Corporations (GIST, Dec. 1983). 

Energy 

Oil and Energy (GIST, Nov. 1983). 

Europe 

Challenges of U.S.-Soviet Relations at the 50- 
Year Mark, Deputy Secretary Dam, Inter- 
national House, Chicago, Oct. 31, 1983 
(Current Policy #525). 



■ebruary 1984 






] 



PUBLICATIONS 



KAL Flight #007: Compilation of Statements 
and Documents, Sept. 1-16, 1983 (Bulletin 
Reprint). 

CSCE Followup Meeting Concludes in 
Madrid, Sept. 9, 1983. Secretary Shultz's 
remarks and test of concluding document, 
Dec. 1983 (Bulletin Reprint, from Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin. Oct. 1983). 

Human Rights 

Human Rights and Foreign Policy; Commem- 
oration of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Dec. 1983 (Selected 
Documents #22). 

Middle East 

The Price of Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy, 
Deputy Secretary Dam, American Jewish 
Committee, Philadelphia, Oct. 27, 1983 
(Current Policy #524). 

Iran-Iraq War (GIST, Nov. 1983). 

South Asia 

Afghanistan: Four Years of Occupation, 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, 
Dec. 1983 (Special Report #112). 

Western Hemisphere 

The Political Economy of the Caribbean 
Basin, Deputy Secretary Dam, Conference 
on Trade, Investment, and Development in 
the Caribbean Basin, Miami, Dec. 2, 1983 
(Current Policy #530). 

The Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central 
America, Deputy Secretary Dam, Interna- 
tional Trade Mart's World News Business 
Briefing, New Orleans, Nov. 29, 1983 (Cur- 
rent Policy #529). 

Background Notes on French Antilles and 
Guiana (Nov. 1983). 

The Larger Importance of Grenada, Deputy 
Secretary Dam, Associated Press Managing 
Editor's Conference, Louisville, Nov. 4, 
1983. ■ 



Foreign Relations 
Volume Released 



The Department of State on January 3, 
1984, released Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1952-1954, Volume IV, 
The American Republics. 

The volume presents the previously 
classified record of U.S. diplomacy and 
foreign policy in Latin America during 
the last years of the Truman Ad- 
ministration and the first 2 years of the 
Eisenhower Administration. The record 
reflects the anticommunist focus of 
American foreign policy and the effort 
to prevent communist influence from 
getting a foothold in the American 
republics. The perceived threat of inter- 
national communism to peace and 
security in Latin America came to a 
head in Guatemala with the overthrow 
in 1954 of the Arbenz regime by anti- 
communist forces. 

In Bolivia a radical regime not open 
to communist influence received 
generous U.S. assistance. The Latin 
American governments were primarily 
concerned with economic problems. Con- 
flicts with major foreign-owned firms in 
the region's principal industries were a 
persistent concern for American 
diplomacy. 

The volume includes various sections 
on multilateral topics, including general 
diplomatic and economic relations; policy 
regarding hemisphere defense and the 
provision of armaments and military 
assistance; economic and technical 
assistance; the 10th Inter-American con- 



ference held at Caracas, Venezuela, in 
March 1954; the meetings of Ministers 
of Finance or Economy of the American 
republics at the fourth extraordinary 
meeting of the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council (Rio con- 
ference) held at Quitandinha, Brazil, 
November-December 1954; and policy 
regarding political developments in Cen- 
tral America. 

Other sections of the volume cover 
bilateral relations with Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 

The Foreign Relations series has 
been published continuously since 1861 
as the official record of U.S. foreign 
policy. The volume released January 3 is 
the sixth to be published in a series of 
16 volumes covering the years 1952-54. 

Foreign Relatiom 1952-1954, 
Volimie IV, was prepared in the Office 
of the Historian, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Copies of 
Volume IV (Department of State 
Publication No. 9354; GPO Stock No. 
044-000-01989-2) may be purchased for 
$23.00 (domestic postpaid) from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or 
money orders should be made payable to 
the Superintendent of Documents. 



Press release 436 of Dec. 27, 1983. 






52 



Department of State Bulletin 



l» l» Ia li Uf 



^1 /I .^1 %i 



I« li> I* 1/ 



■» V * V j 



INDEX 

February 1984 
Volume 84, No. 2083 



Afghanistan. Anniversary of the Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan (Reagan) 37 

Agriculture. U.S. Foreign Pohcy and Agri- 
cultural Trade (Dam) 19 

American Principles. Democracy as a Prob- 
lem-Solving ^Iechanism (Motley) 43 

Argentina. Vice President Bush Visits Latin 
America (Bush) 9 

Arms Control 

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in 
Brussels (final communique) 22 

Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa 
(Genscher, Shultz, cieclaration of Brussels. 
North Atlantic Council final communi- 
aue) 10 

The U.S. -Soviet Relationship (Reagan) 1 

Bangladesh. Visit of President of the Council 
of Ministers of Bangladesh (Ershad, 
Reagan) 36 

Congress 

Policy Options in Lebanon (Dam) 27 

U.S. Prepares for World Radio Conference 
(Marks) 34 

Cultural Affairs. U.S. Notifies UNESCO of 
Intent to Withdraw (Secretary's letters to 
UNESCO Director General and UN 
Secretary General) 41 

Economics 

Democracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism 
(Motley) 43 

U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural Trade 
(Dam) 19 

Educational Affairs. U.S. Notifies UNESCO 
of Intent to Withdraw (Secretary's letters 
to UNESCO Director General and UN 
Secretary General) 41 

Egypt. President's News Conference of 
December 20 (excerpts) 5 

El Salvador 

President's News Conference of December 20 
(excerpts) 5 

Vice President Bush Visits Latin America 
(Bush) 9 

Europe. U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural 
Trade (Dam) 19 

Germany. Secretary Visits Europe and North 
Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declaration of 
Brussels, North Atlantic Council final com- 
munique) 10 

, Grenada 

' Human Rights Implications for U.S. Action 
in Grenada (Abrams) 24 

U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada (letter to the 
Congress) 45 

Human Rights 

Human Rights Implications for U.S. Action in 
Grenada (Abrams) 24 

Refugee Assistance and Protection (Purcell) 32 

, Information Policy. U.S. Prepares for World 

Radio Conference (Marks) 34 

Israel 

President's News Conference of December 20 
(excerpts) 5 

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister (Reagan, 
Shamir) 30 

Japan. U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural 
Trade (Dam) 19 

I 



Lebanon 

Lebanon (Reagan) 5 

Policy Options in Lebanon (Dam) 27 

President's News Conference of December 20 
(excerpts) 5 

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the 
Congress) 28 

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel, 
Reagan) 29 

Middle East. Secretary Visits Europe and 
North Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declara- 
tion of Brussels, North Atlantic Council 
final communique) 10 

Morocco. Secretary Visits Europe and North 
Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declaration of 
Brussels. North Atlantic Council final com- 
munique) 10 

Nepal. Visit of King of Nepal (Birendra, 
Reagan) 38 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in 
Brussels (final communique) 22 

Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa 
(Genscher, Shultz, cieclaration of Brussels, 
North Atlantic Council final communi- 
que) 10 

Panama. Vice President Bush Visits Latin 
America (Bush) 9 

Portugal. Secretary Visits Europe and North 
Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declaration of 
Brussels, North Atlantic Council final com- 
munique) 10 

Presidential Documents 

Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion of Afghan- 
istan 37 

Lebanon 5 

U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada (letter to the 
Congress) 45 

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the Con- 
gress) 28 

The U.S.-Soviet Relationship 1 

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister (Reagan, 
Shamir) 30 

Visit of King of Nepal (Birendra, Reagan) . . 38 

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel, 
Reagan) ".29 

Visit of President of the Council of Ministers 
of Bangladesh (Ershad, Reagan) 36 

Publications 

Department of State 51 

Foreign Relations Volume Released 52 



Refugees. Refugee Assistance and Protection 

(Purcell) 32 

Science and Technology. U.S. Prepares for 

World Radio Conference (Marks) 34 

Terrorism. President's News Conference of 
December 20 (excerpts) 5 

Trade 

Democracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism 
(Motley) 43 

U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural Trade 
(Dam) 19 

Treaties. Current Actions 46 

Tunisia. Secretary Visits Europe and North 
Africa (Genscner, Shultz, declaration of 
Brussels, North Atlantic Council final com- 
munique) 10 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa 
(Genscher, Shultz, cieclaration of Brussels, 
North Atlantic Council final communi- 
que) 10 

The U.S.-Soviet Relationship (Reagan) 1 

United Nations 

Refugee Assistance and Protection (Purcell) 32 

U.S. Notifies UNESCO of Intent to Withdraw 
(Secretary's letters to UNESCO Director 
General and UN Secretary General) . . .41 

Western Hemisphere 

Democracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism 
(Motley) 43 

U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada (letter to the 
Congress) 45 



Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 24 

King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev 38 

Bush, Vice President 9 

Dam, Kenneth W 19, 27 

Ershad, Hussain Mohammad 36 

Gemayel, Amin 29 

Genscner, Hans-Dietrich 10 

Marks, Leonard H 34 

Motley, Langhorne A 43 

Purcell, James N, Jr 32 

Reagan, President 1, 5, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, 

38,45 

Shamir, Yitzhak 30 

Shultz, Secretary 10,41 



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APR I 8 1984 



The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2084 



March 1984 



Korea/16 
China/20 
Malaysia/25 
CDE/31 
Middle East/54 




■Z .1 ^1 ^i 



Cover (Clockwise from left): 

President Reagan with Chinese Premier 

Secretary Shultz with Soviet Foreign 
Minister at Stockholm 

Richard W. Murphy 

President Reagan with Malaysian Prime 
Minister 

Paul D. Wolfowitz 



Dppartmpnt of State 

bulletin 



Volume 84 / Number 2084 / March 1984 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its puqwse is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin'.s contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

As.sistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610) 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by the 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
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will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office. Washington. D.C 
20402 



CONTENTS 



The President 

1 State of the Union Address 

{Excerpt) 

2 Central America Commission 

Report 

3 25th Anniversary of the Cuban 

Revolution 

The Secretary 

4 News Conference of January 12 

7 U.S. Aid Initiative in Africa 

Arms Control 

8 Report on Soviet Noncompliance 

With Arms Control Agreements 
(Message to the Congress. Fact 
Sheet) 

East Asia 

11 U.S. -Japan Relations in Perspec- 
tive (Kenneth W. Dam) 

16 The United States and Korea: 
Auspicious Prospects (Paul D. 
Wolfowitz) 

20 Visit of Chinese Premier (Presi- 
dent Reagan, Secretary Shultz, 
Zhao Ziyang) 

25 Visit of Malaysian Prime Minister 
(Mahathir bin Mohamad, Presi- 
dent Reagan) 

Economics 

27 International Economic Issues 
(W. Allen Wallis) 

30 U.S. Opposes Agricultural Trade 

Restrictions by EC 

Europe 

31 Secretary Shultz Visits Europe 

(Presidejit Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz) 
43 Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe (Foreign Affairs 
Outline) 

43 NATO Allies Table Proposals at 

the CDE (Department An- 
nouncement) 

44 The Atlantic Relationship 

(Richard R. Burt) 
46 17th Report on Cyprus (Message 
to the Congress) 



Middle East 

47 Developments in Lebanon (Presi- 
dent Reagan, Secretary Shultz) 

U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon 
(Lawrence S. Eagleburger) 

Security of U.S. Marines in 
Lebanon (President Reagan) 

Lebanon (President Reagan) 

U.S. Interests in Lebanon 
(Richard W. Murphy) 



49 



52 



53 
54 



Nuclear Policy 

57 South Africa: Nuclear Safeguards 

and Exports Announcement 
(Department Statement) 

Western [Hemisphere 

58 El Salvador: Revolution or 

Reform? (Langhome A. Motley) 
67 Is Peace Possible in Central 

America? (Langhome A. Motley) 
70 The Decision to Assist Grenada 

(Langhome A. Motley) 
72 Additional CBI Recipients 

Designated (Letter to the Con- 
gress) 

Treaties 

73 Current Actions 

Chronology 

75 January 1984 

Press Releases 

77 Department of State 

Publications 

78 Department of State 

Index 



J ^i >1 ^ 




President Reagan addresses a joint session of Congress; Vice President Bush and 
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, are in background. 



^ ,,,,-^,;,- ^..^.^.^.„» . „„^„„„,^.„^^^„„^„^ 



THE PRESIDENT 





State of the Union Address 



Excerpt from President Reagan's address 

before a joint session of the Congress 

on January 25, 19 8 J^.'^ 



A lasting and meaningfu] peace is 
our . . . highest aspiration. And our 
record is clear: Americans resort to 
force only when we must. We have 
never been aggressors. We have always 
struggled to defend freedom and 
democracy. 

We have no territorial ambitions. 
We occupy no countries. We build no 
walls to lock people in. Americans build 
the future. And our vision of a better 
life for farmers, merchants, and working 
people, from the Americas to Asia, 
begins with a simple premise: The future 
is best decided by ballots, not bullets. 
[Applause] 

Governments which rest upon the 
consent of the governed do not wage 
war on their neighbors. Only when peo- 
ple are given a personal stake in 
deciding their own destiny, benefiting 
from their own risks, do they create 
societies that are prosperous, pro- 
gressive, and free. Tonight, it is 
democracies that offer hope by feeding 
the hungry, prolonging life, and 
eliminating drudgery. 

When it comes to keeping America 
strong, free, and at peace, there should 
be no Republicans or Democrats, just 
patriotic Americans. [Applause] We can 
decide the tough issues not by who is 
right but by what is right.^ 

Together, we can continue to ad- 
vance our agenda for peace. We can 
establish a more stable basis for peaceful 
relations with the Soviet Union; 



strengthen allied relations across the 
board; achieve real and equitable reduc- 
tions in the levels of nuclear arms; rein- 
force our peacemaking efforts in the 
Middle East, Central America, and 
Southern Africa; assist developing coun- 
tries, particularly our neighbors in the 
Western Hemisphere; and assist in the 
development of democratic institutions 
throughout the world. 

The wisdom of our bipartisan 
cooperation was seen in the work of the 
Scowcroft commission, which 
strengthened our ability to deter war 
and protect peace. In that same spirit, I 
urge you to move forward with the 
Henry Jackson plan to implement the 
recommendations of the [National] 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America. [Applause] 

Your joint resolution on the multina- 
tional peacekeeping force in Lebanon is 
also serving the cause of peace. We are 
making progress in Lebanon. For nearly 
10 years, the Lebanese have lived from 
tragedy to tragedy with no hope for 
their future. Now, the multinational 
peacekeeping force and our Marines are 
helping them break their cycle of 
despair. There is hope for a free, in- 
dependent, and sovereign Lebanon. We 
must have the courage to give peace a 
chance. And we must not be driven from 
our objectives for peace in Lebanon by 
state-sponsored terrorism. We have seen 
this ugly spectre in Beirut, Kuwait, and 
Rangoon. It demands international at- 
tention. I will forward shortly legislative 
proposals to help combat terrorism, and 
I will be seeking support from our allies 
for concerted actions. 



March 1984 



.mimmmmtm 
THE PRESIDENT 



Our NATO alliance is strong. Nine- 
teen eight-three was a banner year for 
political courage, and we have 
strengthened our pai-tnerships and our 
friendships in the Far East. We are 
committed to dialogue, deterrence, and 
promoting prosperity. We will work with 
our trading partners for a new round of 
negotiations in support of freer world 
trade, greater competition, and more 
open markets. 

A rebirth of bipartisan cooperation, 
of economic growth and military deter- 
rence, and a growing spirit of unity 
among our people at home and our allies 
abroad underline a fundamental and far- 
reaching change: The United States is 
safer, stronger, and more secure in 1984 
than before. [Applause] We can now 
move with confidence to seize the oppor- 
tunities for peace, and we will. 

Tonight, I want to speak to the peo- 
ple of the Soviet Union to tell them it's 
true that our governments have had 
serious differences, but our sons and 
daughters have never fought each other 
in war. And if we Americans have our 
way, they never will. People of the 
Soviet Union, there is only one sane 
policy for your country and mine: to 
preserve our civilization in this modern 
age. And a nuclear war cannot be won 
and must never be fought. [Applause] 

The only value in our two nations 
possessing nuclear weapons is to make 
sure they will never be used. But then 
would it not be better to do away with 
them entirely? [Applause] 

People of the Soviet [Union], Presi- 
dent Dwight Eisenhower, who fought by 
your side in World War II, said, "The 
essential struggle is not merely man 
against man or nation against nation. It 
is man against war." Americans are peo- 
ple of peace. If your government wants 
peace, there will be peace. We can come 
together in faith and friendship to build 
a safer and far better world for our 
children and our children's children. And 
the whole world will rejoice. That is my 
message to you. [Applause] 



Some days when life seems hard and 
we reach out for values to sustain us or 
a friend to help us, we find a person 
who reminds us what it means to be 
Americans. Sgt. Stephen Trujillo, a 
medic in the 2d Ranger Battalion, 75th 
Infantry, was in the first helicopter to 
land at the compound held by Cuban 
forces in Grenada. He saw three other 
helicopters crash. Despite the imminent 
explosion of the burning aircraft, he 
never hestitated. He ran across 25 yards 
of open terrain through enemy fire to 
rescue wounded soldiers. He directed 



two other medics, administered first aid, 
and returned again and again to the 
crash site to carry his wounded friends 
to safety. 

Sgt. Trujillo, you and your fellow 
servicemen and women not only saved 
innocent lives, you set a nation free. Yoi 
inspire us as a force for freedom, not foi 
despotism; and, yes, for peace, not con- 
quest. God bless you. [Applause] 



•Text from White House press release. 



Central America 
Commission Report 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation on January 14, 198i.'^ 

Last April I addressed a joint session of 
the Congress and asked for bipartisan 
cooperation on behalf of our policies to 
protect liberty and democracy in Central 
America. Shortly after that speech, the 
late Senator Henry Jackson encouraged 
the appointment of a blue-ribbon com- 
mission to chart a course for democracy, 
economic improvement, and peace in 
Central America. 

I appointed 12 distinguished 
Americans to the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America and 
asked former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger to serve as its chairman. ^ This 
week the members of that group 
delivered to me their report on the crisis 
confronting our Latin neighbors. 

I believe the commission has 
rendered an important service to all 
Americans — all of us from pole to pole 
in this Western Hemisphere. The 
members of this commission represented 
both political parties and a wide cross 
section of our country. They reached 
agreement on some very key points. 
They agreed that the crisis is serious, 
and our response must include support 
for democratic development, improved 
living conditions, and security 
assistance. 

They agreed that the United States 
has a vital interest in preventing a com- 
munist Central America, because if our 
own borders are threatened, then our 
ability to meet our commitments to pro- 
tect peace elsewhere in the world— in 
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia — 
would be significantly weakened. 



The members also agreed that 
Nicaragua's regime has violated its 
promise to restore democracy. And they 
warned that Nicaragua's export of 
subversion could undermine the stability 
of neighboring countries, producing 
wares of refugees — perhaps millions of 
them— many of whom would seek entry 
into the United States. 

The commission concluded, "The 
crisis is on our doorstep." The report of 
this distinguished body presents no 
quick-fix to ease the pain and suffering 
of tomorrow. There is none. Nor can we 
alone bring peace to this or any other 
part of the world. As the report notes, 
solutions to Central American problems 
must primarily be the work of Central 
Americans. But we can and must help 
because it is in our interest to do so and 
because it's morally the right thing to 
do. 

The commission did present us 
positive recommendations to support 
democratic development, improve 
human rights, and bring the long 
sought-for peace to this troubled region 
so close to home. The recommendations 
reinforce the spirit of the Administra- 
tion's policies that help to our neighbors 
should be primarily economic and 
humanitarian. And since this report does 
present a bipartisan consensus, I will 
send to the Congress, when it 
reconvenes, a comprehensive plan for 
achieving the objectives set forth by the 
commission. I urge the members of Con- 
gress to respond with the same bipar- 
tisan spirit that guided the commission 
in its work. 



Department of State Bulletin 



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THE PRESIDENT 



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This Central American democracy, 
peace, and recovery initiative, which I 
:all the Jackson plan, will be designed to 
oring democracy, peace, and prosperity 
to Central America. It won't be easy. 
But it can be done. I believe peace is 
worth the price. 

There may be an argument for doing 
much, and perhaps an argument for do- 
ing nothing. But there is no valid argu- 
ment for doing too little. I opt for doing 
enough— enough to protect our own 
security and enough to improve the lives 
3f our neighbors so that they can vote 
\vith ballots instead of bullets. 

The Government of Nicaragua must 
also understand this; they cannot 
threaten their peaceful neighbors, ex- 
port subversion, and deny basic human 
freedom to their own people, as the 
commission has so rightly observed. 

You may have heard that there's a 
controversy between the Administration 
and the Congress over human rights and 
military aid to beleagxiered El Salvador. 
[ agree completely with the objective of 
improving prospects for democracy and 
human rights in El Salvador. I am also 
committed to preventing Cuban- and 
Nicaraguan-supported guerrillas from 
violently overthrowing El Sali/ador's 
elected government and others in the 
region. So is the bipartisan commission. 
So, too, I believe, is our Congress. 

Our Administration will continue to 
work closely with the Congress in 
achieving these common goals. As we 
move to implement the recommenda- 
tions of the bipartisan commission, we 
will be offering the promise of a better 
tomorrow in Central America. But we 
must oppose those who do not abide by 
the norms of civilized behavior, whether 
they be of the extreme right or extreme 
left. Senator Henry Jackson would have 
had it so. 



,„ .'Broadcast from Camp David (text from 
White House press release). 

^FoT list of members, see Bulletin of 
August 1983, p. 3. ■ 



25th Anniversary of the 
Cuban Revolution 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the Cuban people on January 5, 1984.'^ 

On behalf of the people of the United 
States, I would like to extend New 
Year's greetings to the people of Cuba. 

We know you're marking an historic 
anniversary on your island. Twenty-five 
years ago, during these early January 
days, you were celebrating what all of 
us hoped was the dawn of a new era of 
freedom. Most Cubans welcomed the 
prospects for democracy and liberty 
which the leaders of the Cuban revolu- 
tion had promised. 

Such a free and democratic Cuba 
would have been warmly welcomed by 
our own people. We're neighbors in a 
hemisphere that has been characterized 
by the quest for human freedom. 
Government which rests upon consent of 
the governed is a cardinal principle that 
enshrines the dignity of every individual. 
We share many of the same ideals, 
especially a common longing for a world 
of peace and justice. We are both proud 
peoples, proud of what we've achieved 
through our own efforts. 

But tragically, the promises made to 
you have not been kept. Since 1959 
you've been called upon to make one 
sacrifice after another. And for what? 
Doing without has not brought you a 
more abundant life. It has not brought 
you peace. And most important, it has 
not won freedom for your people- 
freedom to speak your opinions, to 
travel where and when you wish, to 
work in independent unions, and to 
openly proclaim your faith in God, and 
to enjoy all these basic liberties without 
having to be afraid. 

Cuba's economy is incapable of pro- 
viding you and your familes your most 
elementary needs despite massive sub- 
sidies from abroad. But your leaders tell 
you, "Don't complain, don't expect im- 
provement, just be ready for more 
sacrifice." In the meantime, over half a 
million of your fellow citizens have 
migrated to the United States, where 
their talents and their hard work have 
made a major contribution to our socie- 
ty. We welcomed them, and we're proud 
of their success. But we have to wonder. 



what would Cuba's economy be like to- 
day if those people had been allowed to 
use their great talent, drive, and energy 
to help you create prosperity on your 
island? 

The most important question re- 
mains: Where is Cuba heading? If it 
were heading toward greater welfare 
and freedom for your people, that would 
be wonderful. But we know prisoners of 
conscience convicted for their political 
activities have been languishing in 
Cuban prisons, deprived of all freedom 
for nearly a quarter of a century. Never 
in the proud history of your country 
have so many been imprisoned for so 
long for so-called crimes of political dis- 
sent as during these last 25 years. 
Others convicted of political crimes this 
past year can expect to be in prison well 
into the 21st century if the present 
system in Cuba survives that long. 

You may not be aware of some of 
these things I've just told you or will tell 
you in this brief message. You may also 
be unaware of many other things you 
have the right to know. That's because 
you are systematically denied access to 
facts and opinions which do not agree 
with your government's official view. 
But why are your leaders so unwilling to 
let you hear what others think and say? 
If the power of truth is on their side, 
why should they need to censor anyone's 
views? Think about that. 

Yet, while they supervise every 
word you hear, every picture you see, 
your authorities have free access to our 
news services in the United States and 
around the world. We don't believe in 
censorship. So, to correct this injustice, 
the Congress of the United States has 
authorized the startup soon of a new 
radio service on the Voice of America 
named for your great Cuban patriot 
Jose Marti. 

The objective of the Radio Marti 
program will be simple and straightfor- 
ward: tell the truth about Cuba to the 
Cuban people. We want you to know 
what you haven't been told, for example, 
about the situation in Grenada. When 
Grenada's Prime Minister [Maurice] 
Bishop was killed, the Governor General, 
as well as the majority of the English- 
speaking Caribbean, asked for our 



March 1984 



;iiii 



THE SECRETARY 



assistance in protecting them. Why 
didn't they ask for Cuba's assistance? 
The sad truth is they wanted to be pro- 
tected from the Cuban Government. 

The United States and other Carib- 
bean forces were welcomed by Grena- 
dians as liberators. The rest of the world 
has seen the evidence of the popular out- 
pouring of support for our action. Cuban 
lives could have been saved if your 
government had respected the will of 
the Grenadian people and not ordered 
your soldiers to fight to the death. For- 
tunately, the great majority of your per- 
sonnel in Grenada did not obey those 
orders. 

One of your government officials 
said, in September 1982, that 120,000 
Cubans have carried out international 
missions through the revolutionary 
armed forces alone. They have been sent 
to countries in four continents. You're 
never told how many of them are killed, 
how many families lose loved ones for a 
cause they have no right to resist. What 
mission or vital interest does Cuba have 
which can possibly justify this loss of life 
in such faraway lands? 

These are not pleasant questions, 
but they deserve answers. I hope you'll 
contemplate them with care. At the 
beginning of this new year, let us pray 
that the future will be kinder than the 
past. And may that better future begin 
soon for all of you in Cuba. 

Feliz Ano Nuevo y que Dios los ben- 
diga. [Happy New Year and God bless 
you.] 



News Conference of January 12 



'Recorded at the White House for later 
broadcast on the Voice of America (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Jan. 9, 1984). ■ 



Secretary Skultz held a news con- 
ference at the Department of State on 
January 12, 1984.^ 

Q. You will meet next week with 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in 
Stockholm. The meeting comes at a 
time when relations between the two 
superpowers are considered at their 
poorest state in many years. Are we 
planning to make any proposals to the 
Soviets for getting arms control 
negotiations going again or that 
otherwise would improve the climate? 
A. We undertake this meeting with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko in a construc- 
tive spirit, and we're prepared to talk 
about a full range of issues, including 
arms control. I will be there in that 
frame of mind, and I hope that he will 
come in a similar frame of mind and 
that we will accomplish something. But, 
of course, that remains to be seen. 

Q. The Kissinger commission, in 
its report that was issued yesterday, 
says that the crisis in Central America 
is acute and that a massive infusion of 
U.S. aid is required. It suggests and 
says that the military aid should be 
conditioned to El Salvador's as prog- 
ress in halting the death squads. Do 
you agree with their basic conclusion 
about the acuteness of the crisis; and 
two, do you agree about the condi- 
tionality? 

A. I think they have done us all a 
great service in pointing out not only the 
acuteness of the problem but its impor- 
tance to the United States. 

Insofar as the death squads are con- 
cerned and other violations of human 
rights are concerned, it has always been 
the position of the Administration, and 
mine personally, that these are, basical- 
ly, intolerable things, and they must 
change. 

Vice President Bush, in a recent 
visit to El Salvador, made that point 
very clear. I think they must change, 
not because we want them or the Con- 
gress wants them, but because that 
must be what it takes for there to be a 
decent and secure life in El Salvador. So 
the people of El Salvador must want to 
see this come about. 

Insofar as the question of certifica- 
tion is concerned, it's something where 
there are some very good arguments on 
both sides of that issue, and I would 
simply refer you to the comment the 



President made yesterday in response tc 
a question after his meeting with the 
Kissinger commission. He was asked if 
the argument about certification would 
be a "hang-up," I think the phrase was, 
and he said, no, that it was up to us to 
work with the Congress and find a way 
to resolve this issue just as the bipar- 
tisan commission had resolved so many 
issues in the course of its deliberations. 

Q. Yuriy Andropov today, in a 
speech, apparently referring to the 
stalled Geneva negotiations, said, "If 
readiness is expressed on the part of 
the NATO countries to return to the 
situation which had existed prior to 
the start of deployment of U.S. 
medium-range missiles in Europe, the 
U.S.S.R. will, likewise, be ready to d* 
that." 

Is it still the American position 
that the deployments of Pershing II 
and cruise missiles that have taken 
place and are going to take place can 
come out if an agreement is reached? 
And do you believe that any new ac- 
tion is required, either by the United 
States or the Soviet Union, in order t( 
get the Soviets to return to Geneva? 

A. If an agreement is reached hav- 
ing to do with intermediate-range 
missiles, then the parties to the agree- 
ment would have a deployment pattern 
in line with that agreement. And if, for 
example, there should be an agreement 
to the proposal the President and our 
allies put forward some time ago, name 
ly, that all of these missiles be 
eliminated, then those that had been 
deployed would be eliminated. But it 
would be according to whatever agree- 
ment was reached. 

The idea of returning to the situa- 
tion prior to the deployments would only 
return to a situation where there is a 
very large monopoly of Soviet 
intermediate-range missiles, and that is 
not acceptable to us or to our allies. 

Q. Is it necessary for the United 
States to do anything at this point to 
get the Soviets to return to the talks, 
in the way of indicating any new flex- 
ibility? Or do you simply hope and ex- 
pect the Soviets will eventually 
return? 

A. We've taken what we believe, 
and our allies believe, are reasonable 
positions in those talks and the other 
talks. In the INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] especially, there has been 



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Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



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ntense consultation so that the positions 
hat have been taken are widely sup- 
oorted. 

Furthermore, we have always been 
there in the spirit of give-and-take, and I 
think that is the position that we should 
oe in. That's where we are, and there is 
110 need to change it. 

Q. The White House issued a 
statement today about the shooting of 
the American helicopter pilot by the 
«^icaraguans saying this action is 
unacceptable. I wonder if you could 
ilaborate on that and explain what ac- 
ion, if any, the United States might 
.ake in response. 

A. It's unacceptable to fire from one 
country into another country at people 
md wind up killing somebody. We have 
)rotested both here and in Nicaragua 
md are waiting to see the response and 
he results of whatever investigation the 
<icaraguans make. But it's not a kind of 
jehavior that is a tolerable kind of 
)ehavior. 

Q. Yesterday in the Kissinger 
:ommission report, it said that the use 
)f force in Nicaragua was not 
iomething the commission at least 
vould rule out if our national security 
vas involved. Does this sort of thing 
mswer that description? 

A. If what you are asking is, is 
;here a plan or an instinct on the part of 
;he Administration to undertake a 
"nilitary operation directly in Nicaragua, 
;he answer is no. 

Q. This weekend Ambassador 
Rumsfeld [Donald Rumsfeld, the 
President's special representative to 
the Middle East] is expected to meet 
with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. 
Do you see from your point of view 
any new flexibility on the Syrian side, 
and how seriously do you take their 
demand, continually repeated, that the 
May 17 accord must be scrapped 
before there is peace and stability in 
Lebanon? 

A. Ambassador Rumsfeld is back in 
the area. He is very active. He has 
visited a number of countries, and right 
now he is in Damascus, and I believe 
right at the moment talking with the 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Khaddam. He is 
expected to meet with President Assad 
during this visit to Damascus. 

We will be there with a serious pur- 
,pose. There have been intermediate 
things that could help stabilize the situa- 
tion in Lebanon identified and lined out 
lin considerable detail through negotia- 
Itions in this so-called security plan, and. 



Marcti 1984 



of course, there is the objective in front 
of everybody for the removal of all 
foreign forces. Ambassador Rumsfeld 
will be discussing all of these things. 

Will he get anywhere? It remains to 
be seen whether he will or not. There 
have been some encouraging signs late- 
ly, particularly the emergence of the 
security plan, although discussions in 
Lebanon are a constant back-and-forth 
of hope and disappointment, and more 
recently the immediate prospect of that 
plan seems to be a little dimmer. 

But, certainly, the Syrian attitude 
will be very important in that, and we 
will look for Ambassador Rumsfeld's 
talks with President Assad as an impor- 
tant moment in these negotiations. 

As far as the May 17 agreement is 
concerned, it's basically an agreement 
between Israel and Lebanon. Both 
governments have said that they don't 
have any intention of altering it, and we 
certainly don't. It gets a lot of discus- 
sion. On the other hand, I think that 
people should remember that the May 17 
agreement is an agreement for one of 
the occupying forces — namely, the 
Israelis — to leave Lebanon completely. 
And when people talk about doing away 
with it or changing it or something, they 
ought to rememl)er that it is the one 
existing agreement whereby one of the 
parties has agreed to leave Lebanon. 
And so I think that's a very important 
thing and personally would not let go of 
that. 

Q. Was the American helicopter 
off course, and was it over Nicaraguan 
airspace at any time? 

A. It was apparently off course. 
Just where it was exactly — people are 
working on over in the Pentagon — and I 
don't know that there has been a clear 
determination of whether or not in its 
movements it did wander into 
Nicaraguan territory. That I don't know 
the answer to. Presumably we'll have an 
answer. 

Apparently, it had to go up fairly 
high in order to get over some moun- 
tains, and it had some fairly severe wind 
conditions, and in one way or another 
was a little bit off course. But I don't 
know the answer to the question of 
whether it was over Nicaragua. 

Q. Would that affect your conclu- 
sions as to why the Nicaraguans may 
have fired on it, or— 

A. I think to fire from one country 
into another country at people on the 
ground is simply not an acceptable or 
tolerable line of behavior. 



Q. Would you say the world is a 
more dangerous place without an arms 
control agreement or without even ac- 
tive negotiations than it might be if, 
for instance, the United States had ac- 
cepted the Soviet proposal to scale 
down to the British and French total? 
There is nothing going on now. Both 
sides are piling on new weapons. Is 
that better than some of these pro- 
posals that we rejected? 

A. I think that the acceptance of 
proposals that would leave the alliance 
in a position of agreeing to a monopoly 
of Soviet weapons of this kind would be 
a very destabilizing and very undesirable 
kind of agreement to reach. 

And one of the things we have to 
guard against constantly is this tendency 
of many to think that any agreement, if 
it seems to make things look smoother, 
is a good thing, even if the terms of the 
agreement are really, looking at them 
closely, not desirable. So I think we have 
to guard against that and be in favor of 
negotiations and be in favor of 
agreements if the agreements truly do 
serve our interests. And we know that 
any agreement you reach with a strong 
negotiating partner, such as the Soviet 
Union, in order for it to be reached will 
not only have to serve your interests but 
also their interests. Otherwise, they're 
not going to agree to it. 

That's the way we have to proceed, 
but we have to be careful as we 
negotiate that we don't get into the 
mood of so much wanting negotiations 
to be going on or to be completed that 
we agree to things that really don't 
make sense from our standpoint. 

Q. You said earlier today that "it 
takes two to thaw." Do you think the 
Soviet Union — 

A. I don't know about that. I've 
been thinking about that image. 

Q. It's a great line. 

A. It sort of came to me. [Laughter] 
Don't push it. [Laughter] 

Q. Do you think that the Soviet 
Union is ready to tango and thaw? 

A. I don't know. I think that there 
are great tensions in various parts of 
the world, and we've discussed some of 
them right here in this press conference. 
And so it's desirable to have a dialogue, 
and it's desirable to reduce those ten- 
sions if we can, and it must perhaps look 
that way to them, too. At any rate, we'll 
see. 

Q. Today Mr. Kvitsinksy says in 
The New York Times, in a piece, that 



::i';ii;!!i!fiffl| 



THE SECRETARY 



Soviet weapons will be deployed on 
the high seas adjacent to the 
American coast line, which is a threat 
you've heard before. And from 
Brussels comes the word — 

A. It's not only a threat we've heard 
before, but, as you know, one of their 
submarines got in trouble recently and 
had to be towed off, so it isn't a new 
thing. That's the point. 

Q. From Brussels comes word of 
nine new SS-20s in the western [sic] 
part of the Soviet Union. Does that 
suggest to you on the Soviet part an 
attitude leading toward the kind of 
easing of tension that you're hoping 
for? 

A. It seems to me that what we 
observe is a consistent pattern of addi- 
tional Soviet deployments of the SS-20 
missiles and of their use of submarines, 
and we have noted that, described that. 
It has gone on before negotiations took 
place, it went on during the negotia- 
tions, and it's going on since the negotia- 
tions on INF have been broken off. 

It's a pattern of deployment on their 
part, and I think that, obviously, one of 
the things that is sought by both parties 
presumably is a reduction in these 
deployments. In fact, the President has 
said in his speech to the Japanese Diet 
that his dream is the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons, and, of course, that's 
consistent with his position of the com- 
plete elimination of intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons. 

Q. There appears to be quite a 
disintegration in the southern African 
situation. Both Angola or SWAPO 
[South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion] and South Africa have rejected 
the disengagment proposal. What do 
we see next, and does the United 
States still insist on a Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola? 

A. That has been something that we 
think is desirable, but it is clearly 
necessary if South Africa is going to go 
along with what has emerged as a very 
real, possible way of gaining Namibian 
independence; so we're for it. 

As far as the immediate situation is 
concerned, there have been some in- 
creased military activities, but there is 
also in process right now this unilateral 
withdrawal by South Africa. We hope 
that that's one of those signs and actions 
that is taken by a country there that 
perhaps can lead others to do 
something, and maybe something good 
will come of it, but we'll see. 



Q. Next week the President is 
supposed to speak about American 
policy toward the Soviet Union which, 
presumably, will be along the lines of 
what you said here and your meeting 
with Mr. Gromyko. The Administra- 
tion, I gather, is also issuing a report 
to Congress stating that the Soviets 
have more or less violated virtually 
every treaty they've entered into with 
the United States. 

Just so people can understand 
that, what is the point of negotiating 
treaties with the Soviet Union if, in 
fact, they break them? 

A. In general, I think we have 
taken the view that it's important to be 
realistic in our attitude toward the 
Soviet Union, to be candid with 
ourselves, with them, and others about 
how we see it; and if there are unpleas- 
ant facts, to put them forward. And also 
to be very mindful of our own strength 
and our alliances and their strength and 
our capacity to defend our values and 
defend our interests. And on the basis of 
that, to be ready for reasonable discus- 
sion and dialogue with the Soviet Union. 

Calling attention to violations of 
arms control agreements is perfectly 
consistent with that, and I think it's im- 
portant to do it. And as you undoubtedly 
noted in the President's speech to the 
United Nations recently, he did call at- 
tention to a radar installation that's in 
the process of being built. That con- 
stitutes a problem. He did call attention 
to the problem of encryption; he did call 
attention to a new missile, all of which 
we think constitute problems with 
respect to arms control agreements. 

I might say that's a far cry from the 
way you phrased it, of saying that they 
just violate every agreement they ever 
make. I don't think that's a fair state- 
ment about them or anyone's 
characterization of them. 

Q. You say it's intolerable for one 
country to fire on another. Today, the 
Nicaraguan Embassy released a letter 
to you dated January 7, which pro- 
tested two separate attacks by 
helicopters on Nicaraguan territory 
that were firing rockets during the 
past week. I just wonder if that action 
is also intolerable, or have you 
responded to their protests? 

A. Those are not American 
helicopters, so they don't need to protest 
to us. There aren't any American 
military forces firing on Nicaragua. 

Q. You have had three demarches 
by North Korea in the last 3 months 



for a unification conference grouping 
the United States, South Korea, and 
North Korea. Your spokesman said th, 
other day that the American position I 
will be that it should just be the two I 
Koreas alone. There have been ' 

statements from Korea that it should 
be four-part, including China and the 
United States. There's a statement tO' 
day from Japan that maybe it should 
include the Soviet Union and Japan. 

Could you give us the American 
position, and could you also say 
whether you think anything will comi' 
out of the latest North Korean pro- 
posal? 

A. It sounds a little bit like Jimmy 
Durante's lament: "Everybody wants to 
get into the act!" But I think the real 
point is that it's important that there b< 
an act, if it's at all possible to have it, c 
a constructive basis. The South Korean 
have called for that. And the essence o: 
the matter is to have discussions be- 
tween North Korea and South Korea 
that ease tensions on the peninsula and 
move toward a more stable situation. 
We certainly want that. 

We consult very closely on all of 
these things with our friends in South 
Korea. We know they want that. From 
all of our discussions, the Chinese, the 
Japanese want that. The North Korean 
have said that they want that. On the 
other hand, it comes on the heels of tht 
Rangoon murder of many in the South 
Korean Government, and I think the 
South Koreans have understandably 
called for an apology and an accounting 

Something like Rangoon, which 
seemed to be intended for the South 
Korean President, as well as those who 
were murdered, does call into question 
the sincerity of these moves. But we ca 
examine them and see if there isn't son: 
way in which worthwile discussions can 
be gotten underway, and if the presenc' 
of ourselves and the Chinese, the 
Japanese, or the Soviets or whoever, 
can be helpful in that, that's fine. But I 
think we need to remember that the 
essence of the matter is for North Kore 
and South Korea to be doing the talkinj 
It's their peninsula. 

Q. Do you think that the pro- 
longed absence from the scene of 
Soviet President Andropov is going t« 
make it more difficult, or even im- 
possible, to improve relations betweei 
the superpowers? 



Department of State Bulleti 



:. Frooi 
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Korean; 
In 



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I. the 



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iBylletii 



THE SECRETARY 



A. He has been absent from the 
scene in the sense that he hasn't been 
visible. From the indications that we 
have, he's actively in charge of the 
Soviet Government, and we deal, of 
course, with the Foreign Ministry and 
with the Ambassador. And so far as we 
can perceive, we're dealing with a func- 
tioning, active government. So I think 
we just proceed on the basis that that's 
the case and continue to put forward 
reasonable proposals and be ready for 
constructive dialogue. 

Q. Back on the Nicaraguan and 
Honduran situation, does it not com- 
plicate the U.S. position, at the very 
least, about firing from one country 
into another if the United States is 
supporting forces based or supplied in 
the one country that are attacking 
people and carrying on military at- 
tacks in the other country, namely 
Nicaragua? 

A. I'm not going to comment on the 
presumption of the question except to 
say that obviously the whole problem is 
a complicated problem. But, never- 
theless, there's a very simple fact of an 
unarmed helicopter that did finally make 
it down in Honduran territory and was 
fired on from Nicaragua, and the pilot 
was killed. It is that action in shooting 
at all of the people involved and killing 
the pilot that we have protested in the 
strongest terms. 

Q. In view of the Soviet state- 
ments, do you think it's realistic to ex- 
pect any progress, even small prog- 
ress, in your meeting with Mr. 
Gromyko on getting back to the arms 
talks? 

A. If I thought that the situation 
was hopeless, I wouldn't bother sitting 
down. And I presume Mr. Gromyko 
feels the same way. But the question of 
whether or not out of our discussions 
there will come useful results remains to 
be seen. And I'll be able to tell you more 
about that after we've held the talks. 

Q. How much could we expect? 

A. I don't know what basis I have 
for speculating. I just don't see that it's 
worthwhile to say I'm optimistic or 
pessimistic or .3 or .8 or whatever. 

The fact is that a meeting will take 
place. From our standpoint we'll go to it 
ready to discuss a full range of issues, 
and we'll be ready to discuss them in a 
constructive way. 

Q. The security agreement in 
Lebanon seems to be up one day and 
down another; and the spigot, if you 
will, would appear to be Mr. Jumblatt. 



March 1984 



Do you believe that he is operating in- 
dependently, or is he being guided by 
Damascus? And also, what do you 
think of his trip to the Soviet Union; 
how do you read that? 

A. Of course, the Soviet Union and 
the Syrians are in a close collaboration 
here. And from all that we can see, Mr. 
Jumblatt, while certainly regarded as a 
strong and legitimate Druze leader, is 
very responsive to what the Syrians 
seem to want him to do. At least there's 



considerable evidence for that, and 
perhaps it isn't surprising in view of the 
Soviet-Syrian connection that he would 
go to Moscow. So it only emphasizes 
that relationship, and I think emphasizes 
the importance of the discussion that 
Ambassador Rumsfeld will be having 
with President Assad. We'll see as a 
result of that discussion whether or not 
some genuine progress is possible. 



'Press release 12. 



U.S. Aid Initiative in Africa 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. 
JAN. 30. 19841 

I'm here to announce two programs that 
we think are of great importance, one 
having to do with the short-term prob- 
lem of hunger in Africa, and the other 
having to do with the longer term prob- 
lem of economic development and 
reform in Africa. And each is the subject 
of the additional material that will be 
available to you in a little more extended 
form. 

The drought that we have in Africa 
right now is of historic proportions. So 
far the United States has contributed 
about $85 million worth of emergency 
food assistance, and we have just made 
available today an additional $10 million 
worth. And I think the message is when 
people are hungry and dying, America 
responds. 

In addition, we are asking for 
another $90 million of supplemental food 
aid for Africa during fiscal year 1984, so 
my first point is that there is a very 
serious problem of hunger basically 
relating to drought, and we're trying to 
respond to that in a constructive and 
forthcoming way. 

At the same time, we Jcnow that 
short-term solutions to these problems 
are not enough. If you contemplate that 
there has been a 20% decline in per 
capita food production over the past 20 
years in Africa, you know that that isn't 
accounted for by the weather. It's ac- 
counted for by structural problems, and 
basically it's because farmers are not 
paid the value of their crops; that 
marketing systems are often such that 
they encourage inefficiency. 

So we think that economic reform is 
of great importance to raising per capita 
production of food in Africa and great 



importance to those who are on the 
lowest end of the economic ladder. 

That brings me to the second ini- 
tiative being taken, which will be 
reflected in the President's budget, and 
that is an economic policy initiative in 
Africa. We will be asking the Congress 
for $75 million in addition to the regular 
requests in FY1985, and we expect to 
ask for a total of around $500 million 
over the next 5 years. And this is all to 
be directed to those countries that we 
feel construct themselves in terms of 
economic reform in a manner that's 
most calculated to use that money effec- 
tively. 

And I might say, there are a number 
of countries in Africa already which are 
moving in this direction, so that we are 
in effect kind of encouraging a tide of 
reform that's taking place. 

I might say that in developing this 
program, we've consulted very closely 
with other countries that take a major 
interest in Africa and with the World 
Bank. So this represents an additional 
emphasis in economic reform and, of 
course, in help in dealing with hunger on 
top of the regular flow of funds that go 
to Africa, which in FY 1984 have 
amounted to about $943 million. 

At any rate, this is a major effort on 
the part of the Administration to help 
and to help think about problems and do 
something about them. 

Q. Which countries are now 
engaging in the kind of economic 
reform that you'd like to see? 

A. We were all very impressed, for 
example, when President Diouf was here 
with what he described in Senegal as a 
country that's got great problems, and 
he's trying to turn that around. He's try- 
ing to set out some principles that we 



"• «« 'k 



ARMS CONTROL 



were very impressed with. The Presi- 
dent was struck by the discussions that 
he had in that regard. 

Other countries that we think are on 
the right track are such as Zambia, 
Madagascar. Somalia, perhaps the 
Sudan. There are efforts being made 
that we think are very constructive and 
that suggest the possibilities for the 
future. 

Q. As a corresponding disincen- 
tive, will the United States take away 
aid from those countries that do not 
restructure their food pricing policy? 

A. This is an effort to recognize, 
with this extra money, things that are 
pluses. Of course, as we structure and 
allocate what must be very scarce funds, 
it's very difficult, as we all know, to 
generate funds to use in this manner. So 
these funds are scarce, and as we review 
what's going on in various countries, ob- 
viously, we have to tailor it to where we 
think it can do the most good. But this 
is not a big stick policy; this is a big car- 
rot policy that we're engaged in. 

Q. Is the United States just giving 
money, or is it going to be giving any 
of its surplus dairy products for the 
countries to resell as we're planning 
to do with Jamaica? 

A. It works both ways in terms of 
the food support programs. I think to a 
certain extent some of the programs you 
were alluding to amount to a kind of a 
balance-of-payments support. But that's 
not what we're directed toward right 
here. 

Q. Why did we go this route 
rather than the IDA [International 
Development Association]? 

A. We believe that we can direct 
our funds more precisely this way. We 
also believe that we have a good chance 
of obtaining these funds from the Con- 
gress, as there has gotten to be more 
and more interest in this subject. 

Our analysis is that the level of 
funds being requested for IDA-7 is 
about what the traffic will bear in the 
Congress. In other words, the President 
wanted to make a proposal that he could 
deliver on as distinct from some past 
proposals, and we feel that this is one 
we can deliver on. But a very large 
number of people in the Congress have 
cautioned against going for more. So it's 
a question of trying to do something 
that's effective. 

Q. How much will short-term 
political difficulties— that the United 
States has with some countries in 



Africa — figure in these programs, par- 
ticularly I'm speaking about Mozam- 
bique? You've had political difficulties 
with Angola and Ethiopia and also 
Zimbabwe where we've had some 
problems on that U.N. vote. How 
much have those figured in these aid 
programs? 

A. This is an initiative that is in- 
dependent of the pluses and minuses in 
the complex of things you mentioned. 
There is, of course, a major diplomatic 
effort going on, and there are at least a 
few good signs right now having to do 
with the Angola-South Africa-Namibia 
and also the South Africa-Mozambique 
discussions. So I think all of that is in a 
positive direction. 

Of course, having things go well 
economically in a region is very much 
tied to how well they go politically in the 
security sense. As in other parts of the 
world, it's artificial almost to approach 



problems as though security dimensions, 
political dimensions, and economic 
(iimensions are isolated from each other. 
They're all part of the same general ap- 
proach. And I think insofar as the 
southern part of Africa is concerned, in 
addition to thinking about it country-by- 
country, we have to think about it 
also — as the reality of economic flows 
there show- you — as a region and ap- 
proach it that way. 

Let me just emphasize again that 
this strikes us in the Department and in 
the President's eyes as an important ini- 
tiative, both in the sense of extending a 
hand to people who really need it in the 
form of drought assistance, but also in 
the sense of trying to help people imple- 
ment policies that we think will allow 
them to help themselves much more ef- 
fectively in years to come. 



'Press release 27. 



Report on Soviet Noncompliance 
With Arms Control Agreements 



Following are the texts of President 
Reagan's message to the Congress 
transmitting his report as required by 
the FY 198Jt Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Act and the fact sheet provided to 
the Congress with the classified report.^ 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS. 
JAN. 23, 1984 

If the concept of arms control is to have 
meaning and credibility as a contribution to 
global or regional stability, it is essential that 
all parties to agreements comply with them. 
Because I seek genuine arms control. I am 
committed to ensuring that existing agree- 
ments are observed. In 1982 increasing con- 
cerns about Soviet noncompliance with arms 
control agreements led me to establish a 
senior group within the Administration to ex- 
amine verification and compliance issues. For 
its part the Congress, in the FY 1984 Arms 
Control and Disarmament Act. asked me to 
report to it on compliance. I am herewith 
enclosing a Report to the Congress on Soviet 
Noncompliance with Arms Control 
Agreements. 

After a careful review of many months, 
and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the 
Soviet Union, the Administration has deter- 
mined that with regard to seven initial issues 
analyzed, violations and probable violations 
have occurred with respect to a number of 
Soviet legal obligations and political com- 
nlitments in the arms control field. 



The United States Government has deter 
mined that the Soviet Union is violating the 
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the 
Biological Weapons Convention, the Helsinki 
Final Act, and two provisions of SALT II: 
telemetry encryption and a rule concerning 
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] 
modernization. In addition, we have deter- 
mined that the Soviet Union has almost cer- 
tainly violated the ABM [Antiballistic Missile 
Treaty, probably violated the SALT II limit 
on new types, probably violated the SS-16 
deployment prohibition of SALT II and is 
likely to have violated the nuclear testing 
yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. 

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter 
It calls into question important security 
benefits from arms control, and could create 
new security risks. It undermines the con- 
fidence essential to an effective arms control 
process in the future. It increases doubts 
about the reliability of the U.S.S.R. as a 
negotiating partner, and thus damages the 
chances for establishing a more constructive 
U.S. -Soviet relationship. 

The United States will continue to press 
its compliance concerns with the Soviet 
Union through diplomatic channels, and insist 
upon explanations, clarifications and correc- 
tive actions. At the same time, the United 
States is continuing to carry out its own 
obligations and commitments under relevant 
agreements. For the future, the United 
States is seeking to negotiate new arms con- 
trol agreements that reduce the risk of war. 
enhance the security of the United States ane 
its Allies and contain effective verification 
and compliance provisions. 



Department of State Bulietir 



;erifi' 
jfjertn 
mrloiig 

St Sow 

*1 



F.1CTI 

Coimii 
fiirest 



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ARMS CONTROL 



We should recognize, however, that en- 
suring compliance with arms control 
agreements remains a serious problem. Bet- 
ter verification and compliance provisions and 
better treaty drafting will help, and we are 
working toward this in ongoing negotiations. 
It is fundamentally important, however, that 
the Soviets take a constructive attitude 
toward compliance. 

The Executive and Legislative branches 
of our government have long had a shared in- 
terest in supporting the arms control process. 
Finding effective ways to ensure compliance 
is central to that process. I look forward to 
continued close cooperation with the Con- 
gress as we seek to move forward in 
negotiating genuine and enduring arms con- 
trol agreements. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



FACT SHEET 

Commitment to genuine arms control re- 
quires that all parties comply with 
agreements. Over the last several years, 
the U.S.S.R. has taken a number of ac- 
tions that have prompted renewed con- 
cern about an expanding pattern of 
Soviet violations or possible violations of 
arms control agreements. Because of the 
critical importance of compliance with 
arms control agreements, about 1 year 
ago, the President established an in- 
teragency Arms Control Verification 
Committee, chaired by his Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, to address 
verification and compliance issues. In ad- 
dition, many members of Congress ex- 
pressed their serious concerns, and the 
Congress mandated in the FY 84 Arms 
Control and Disarmanent Act authoriza- 
tion that "The President shall prepare 
and transmit to the Congress a report of 
the compliance or noncompliance of the 
Soviet Union with existing arms control 
agreements to which the Soviet Union is 
a Party." 

The President's report to Congress 
covers seven different matters of serious 
concern regarding Soviet compliance: 
chemical, biological, and toxin weapons; 
the notification of military exercises; a 
large new Soviet radar being deployed 
in the Soviet interior; encryption of data 
needed to verify arms control provisions; 
the testing of a second new intercon- 
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM); the 
deployment status of an existing Soviet 
ICBM; and the yields of underground 
nuclear tests. Additional issues of con- 
cern are under active study. 

Soviet violations of arms control 
agreements could create new security 
risks. Such violations deprive us of the 



March 1984 



security benefits of arms control directly 
because of the military consequences of 
known violations and indirectly by induc- 
ing suspicion about the existence of 
undetected violations that might have 
additional military consequences. 

We have discussed with the Soviets 
all of the activities covered in the report, 
but the Soviets have not been willing to 
meet our basic concerns which we raised 
in the Standing Consultative Commis- 
sion in Geneva and in several diplomatic 
demarches. Nor have they met our re- 
quests to cease these activities. We will 
continue to pursue these issues. 



THE FINDINGS 

The report examines the evidence con- 
cerning Soviet compliance with: the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
and the 1925 Geneva protocol and 
customary international law, the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act, the 1972 ABM Trea- 
ty, the unratified SALT II Treaty, and 
the unratified Threshold Test Ban Trea- 
ty (TTBT) signed in 1974. Preparation of 
the report entailed a comprehensive 
review of the legal obligations, political 
commitments under existing arms con- 
trol agreements, and documented inter- 
pretations of specific obligations; 
analyses of all the evidence available on 
applicable Soviet actions; and a review 
of the diplomatic exchanges on com- 
pliance issues between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 

The findings for the seven issues 
covered in the report, as reviewed in 
terms of the agreements involved, are as 
follows: 

1. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin 
Weapons 

Treaty Status. The 1972 Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and 
the 1925 Geneva protocol are 
multilateral treaties to which both the 
United States and U.S.S.R. are parties. 
Soviet actions not in accord with these 
treaties and customary international law 
relating to the 1925 Geneva protocol are 
violations of legal obligations. 

Obligations. The BWC bans the 
development, production, stockpiling or 
possession, and transfer of: microbial or 
other biological agents or toxins except 
for a small quantity for prophylactic, 
protective, or other peaceful purposes. It 
also bans weapons, equipment, and 
means of delivery of agents or toxins. 



The 1925 Geneva protocol and related 
rules of customary international law pro- 
hibit the first use in war of asphyx- 
iating, poisonous, or other gases and of 
all analogous liquids, materials, or 
devices; and prohibits use of 
bacteriological methods of warfare. 

Issues. The study addressed 
whether the Soviets are in violation of 
provisions that ban the development, 
production, transfer, possession, and use 
of biological and toxin weapons. 

Finding. The Soviets, by maintain- 
ing an offensive biological warfare pro- 
gram and capabilities and through their 
involvement in the production, transfer, 
and use of toxins and other lethal 
chemical warfare agents that have been 
used in Laos, Kampuchea, and 
Afghanistan, have repeatedly violated 
their legal obligations under the BWC 
and customary international law as 
codified in the 1925 Geneva protocol. 

2. Helsinki Final Act — Notification of 
Military Exercises 

Legal Status. The Final Act of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. 
This document represents a political 
commitment and was signed by the 
United States and the Soviet Union, 
along with many other states. Soviet ac- 
tions not in accord with that document 
are violations of their political commit- 
ment. 

Obligation. All signatory states of 
the Helsinki Final Act are committed to 
give prior notification of, and other 
details concerning, major military 
maneuvers, defined as those involving 
more than 25,000 ground troops. 

Issues. The study examined whether 
notification of the Soviet military exer- 
cise Zapad-81, which occurred on 
September 4-12, 1981, was inadequate 
and, therefore, a violation of their 
political commitment. 

Finding. With respect to the 
Helsinki Final Act, the U.S.S.R., by its 
inadequate notification of the Zapad-81 
military exercise, violated its political 
commitment under this act to observe 
the confidence-building measure requir- 
ing appropriate prior notification of cer- 
tain military exercises. 

3. ABM Treaty — Krasnoyarsk Radar 

Treaty Status. The 1972 ABM Treaty 
and its subsequent protocol ban deploy- 
ment of ABM systems except that each 



'Iftfli 



ARMS CONTROL 



party can deploy one ABM system 
around the national capital or at a single 
ICBM deployment area. The ABM Trea- 
ty is in force and is of indefinite dura- 
tion. Soviet actions not in accord with 
the ABM Treaty are, therefore, a viola- 
tion of a legal obligation. 

Obligation. In an effort to preclude 
a territorial ABM defense, the treaty 
limited the deployment of ballistic 
missile early warning radars, including 
large phased-array radars used for that 
purpose, to locations along the national 
periphery of each party and required 
that they be oriented outward. The trea- 
ty permits deployment (without regard 
to location or orientation) of large 
phased-array radars for purposes of 
tracking objects in outerspace or for use 
as national technical means of verifica- 
tion of compliance with arms control 
agreements. 

Issue. The study examined the 
evidence on whether the Soviet deploy- 
ment of a large phased-array radar near 
Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia is in 
violation of the legal obligation to limit 
the location and orientation of such 
radars. 

Finding. The new radar under 
construction at Krasnoyarsk almost cer- 
tainly constitutes a violation of legal 
obligations under the Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its 
associated siting, orientation, and 
capability, it is prohibited by this treaty. 

SALT II 

Treaty Status. SALT II was signed in 
June 1979. It has not been ratified. In 
1981 the United States made clear its in- 
tention not to ratify the treaty. Prior to 
1981, both nations were obligated under 
international law not to take actions 
which would "defeat the object and pur- 
pose" of the signed but unratified treaty; 
such Soviet actions before 1981 are 
violations of legal obligations. Since 
1981 the United States has observed a 
political commitment to refrain from ac- 
tions that undercut SALT II as long as 
the Soviet Union does likewise. The 
Soviets have told us they would abide by 
these provisions also. Soviet actions con- 
trary to SALT II after 1981 are, there- 
fore, violations of their political commit- 
ment. 

Three SALT II concerns are ad- 
dressed: encryption, SS-X-25, and 
SS-16. 



10 



4. Encryption — Impeding Verification 

Obligation. The provisions of SALT II 
ban deliberate concealment measures 
that impede verification by national 
technical means. The agreement permits 
each party to use various methods of 
transmitting telemetric information dur- 
ing testing, including encryption, but 
bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such 
as through encryption, whenever such 
denial impedes verification. 

Issue. The study examined the 
evidence whether the Soviets have 
engaged in encryption of missile test 
telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede 
verification. 

Finding. Soviet encryption practices 
constitute a violation of a legal obliga- 
tion prior to 1981 and a violation of 
their political commitment subsequent to 
1981. The nature and extent of encryp- 
tion of telemetry on new ballistic 
missiles is an example of deliberate im- 
peding of verification of compliance in 
violation of this Soviet political commit- 
ment. 

5. SS-X-25 -Second New Type. RV 
Weight to Throw-weight Ratio, 
Encryption 

Obligation. In an attempt to constrain 
the modernization and the proliferation 
of new, more capable types of ICBMs, 
the provisions of SALT II permit each 
side to "flight test and deploy" just one 
new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is 
defined as one that differs from an ex- 
isting type by more than 5% in length, 
largest diameter, launch- weight, and 
throw-weight or differs in number of 
stages or propellant type. In addition, it 
was agreed that no single reentry vehi- 
cle ICBM of an existing type with a 
postboost vehicle would be flight-tested 
or deployed whose reentry vehicle 
weight is less than 50% of the throw- 
weight of that ICBM. This latter provi- 
sion was intended to prohibit the 
possibility that single warhead ICBMs 
could quickly be converted to MIRVed 
systems. 

Issue. The study examined the 
evidence: whether the Soviets have 
tested a second new type of ICBM (the 
SS-X-25) which is prohibited (the 
Soviets have declared the SS-X-24 to be 
their allowed one new type ICBM); 
whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that 
missile, if it is not a new type, is in com- 
pliance with the provision that for ex- 
isting types of single RV missiles, the 



weight of the RV be equal to at least 
50% of total throw-weight; and whether 
encryption of its tests impedes verifica- 
tion. 

Finding. While the evidence is 
somewhat ambiguous, the SS-X-25 is a 
probable violation of the Soviets' 
political commitment to observe the 
SALT II provision limiting each party to 
one new type of ICBM. Furthermore, 
even if we were to accept the Soviet 
argument that the SS-X-25 is not a pro- 
hibited new tj'pe of ICBM, based on the 
one test for which data are available, it 
would be a violation of their political 
commitment to observe the SALT II 
provision which prohibits (for existing 
types of single reentry vehicle ICBMs) 
the testing of such an ICBM with a 
reentry vehicle whose weight is less thar 
50% of the throw-weight of that ICBM. 
Encryption on this missile is illustrative 
of the impeding of verification problem 
cited earlier. 

6. SS-16 ICBM— Banned Deployment 

Obligation. The Soviet Union agreed in 
SALT II not to produce, test, or deploy 
ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in par- 
ticular, not to produce the SS-16 third 
stage, the reentry vehicle of that missile 

Issue. The study examined the 
evidence whether the Soviets have 
deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite of the 
ban on its deployment. 

Finding. While the evidence is 
somewhat ambiguous and we cannot 
reach a definitive conclusion, the 
available evidence indicates that the ac- 
tivities at Plesetsk are a probable viola- 
tion of their legal obligation not to 
defeat the object and purpose of 
SALT II prior to 1981 during the period 
when the treaty was pending ratification 
and a probable violation of a political 
commitment subsequent to 1981. 

7. TTBT— 150 kt Test Limit 

Treaty Status. The Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The 
treaty has not been ratified but neither 
party has indicated an intention not to 
ratify. Therefore, both parties are sub- 
ject to the obligation under international 
law to refrain from acts which would 
"defeat the object and purpose" of the 
TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat 
the object and purpose of the TTBT are, 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



therefore, violations of their obligation. 
The United States is seeking to 
negotiate improved verification 
measures for the treaty. Both parties 
have each separately stated they would 
observe the 150 kt threshold of the 
TTBT. 

Obligation. The treaty prohibits any 
underground nuclear weapon test having 
a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any 
place under the jurisdiction or control of 
the parties, beginning March 31, 1976. 
In view of the technical uncertainties 
associated with predicting the precise 
yield of nuclear weapons tests, the sides 
agreed that one or two slight unintended 
breaches per year would be considered a 
violation. 

Issue. The study examined whether 
the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests 
in excess of 150 kilotons. 

Finding. While the available 
evidence is ambiguous, in view of am- 
biguities in the pattern of Soviet testing 
and in view of verification uncertainties, 
and we have been unable to reach a 
definitive conclusion, this evidence in- 
dicates that Soviet nuclear testing ac- 
tivities for a number of tests constitute 
a likely violation of legal obligations 
under the TTBT. 



CONCLUSIONS