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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign PoH;e¥;fVolume 84/Nunnber 2082

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President Reagan
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bulletin

Volume 84 / Number 2082 / January 1984

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

A.s.sistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department, llse of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March 31,
1987.

Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610
published monthly (plus annual index) by the
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW,
Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage paid
at Washington, D.C, and additional mailing offices
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 20402.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
of the Drpartme.nt ok State Bulletin as the source
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.Si
Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C.
20402

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CONTENTS

FEATURE

3
20

President Reagan Visits Japan and the Republic of Korea
(President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, Remarks, Joint
Statements, Toasts, Addresses, Radio Address, and
Interviews)

Japan — A Profile

Republic of Korea— A Profile

The Secretary

32 Promoting Peace in the Middle

East
35 News Conference of December 5

Africa

Reagan Administration's Africa
Policy: A Progress Report
{Chester A. Crocker)

Visit of Sudanese President
Nimeiri (Gaafar Muhammad
Nimeiri, President Reagan)

Arms Control

45 Paradox, Problems, and Promise
of Arms Control {Kenneth L.
Adelman)

48 Soviets Suspend INF Negotia-

tions {Paul H. Nitze, President
Reagan)

49 The CDE and European Security

in the 1980s {Gerhard Mally)

Europe

Developments in Cyprus

(Richard N. Haass, Department

Statement)
50th Anniversary of U.S. -Soviet

Relations (President Reagan,

Exchange of Letters)
U.S. Sanctions Against Poland

{White House Statement)

Human Rights

59 B

Human Rights Situation in South
America {Elliott Abrams.
James H. Michel)
ill of Rights Day; Human
Rights Day and Week, 1983
(Proclamation)

International Law

Treaty Protection of Foreign In-
vestment (Davis R. Robinson)

A Critique of the Restatement
Revision (Davis R. Robinson)

Middle East

69 Situation in Lebanon (White

House Statement)

Narcotics

70 Marijuana Production and Con-

trol Abroad (Dominick L.
DiCarlo)

South Asia

73 Afghanistan: 4 Years of Occupa-
tion

Western Hemisphere

80 The Caribbean Basin Initiative
and Central America
(Kenneth W. Dam)

83 The Political Economy of the

Caribbean Basin (Kenneth W.
Dam)

84 CBI Recipients Designated

(Letter to the Congress)

85 Nicaragua (Secretary Shultz's

Letter to the Congress)

87 Need for Rule of Law in Central

America (James H. Michel)

88 President Opposes El Salvador

Certification Legislation (White
House Statement)

Treaties

90 Current Actions

Chronology

92 November 1983

Press Releases

94 Department of State

Index

«ia

but those talks demonstrated that
despite the 5,000 miles of ocean betweer
us and the difference in our geography,
history, and culture, Japan and America
share the same deeply held values.

Both our nations are democracies
founded on the sacredness of the in-
dividual. We both believe that every per-
son deserves to be listened to, so we
give all of our citizens a voice in govern-
ment. And we both hold that every man
and woman has certain inalienable
rights, so we enshrine these rights in
law.

As the American educator Robert
Hutchins wrote "Democracy is the only
form of government that is founded on
the dignity of man — not the dignity of
some men, or rich men, or educated
men . . . but on all men." Democratic
freedoms, we both know, make a nation
not only noble but dynamic. Individuals
in democracies can give full scope to

their energies and talents, conducting
experiments, exchanging knowledge,
and making breakthrough after
breakthrough.

In just the past few decades, men
and women acting in freedom have
markedly improved the health and living
standards of the whole human race. In-
novations in fertilizers, farm machinery,
and land use made in democracies have
increased agricultural output across the
world.

Medical advances made in democ-
racies, from the discovery of penicillin to
the identification of vitamins, means
that people everywhere on Earth live
longer than ever before. And electronics
breakthroughs made in democracies
have produced a telecommunications
network that links nations around the
globe. Of course, Japan has been leading
the way in one of those— electronics.
And I can't resist telling you that we

An exchange of toasts between Prime Minister and Mrs. Nakasone and President and
Mrs. Reagan at luncheon held in Banquet Hall of Prime Minister's official residence.

Americans who have traditionally prided
ourselves in being the first with the
most have now met our competition.
[Laughter] I understand that in a single
Tokyo store, one can find 205 varieties
of stereo headphones and 100 different
television models.

Today it's the democracies —
especially Japan and America— that are
leading a high-tech revolution that prom
ises to change life on Earth even more
profoundly than did the industrial
revolution of a century ago. This revolu-
tion ranges from electron microscopes
that can inspect molecules to satellites
that are probing the dark infinities of
space. It's a revolution that's making in-
dustries vastly more efficient, putting
the world's great literature, film, and
music at families' fingertips, and produc
ing medical breakthroughs that are help
ing many of the blind see and many of
the handicapped to walk.

State-controlled economies, by con-
trast, just haven't been able to keep up.
Before Korea was divided, its industrial
center was in the north. Today the
Republic of Korea outproduces North
Korea by 3 to 1. In Europe the per
capita income of West Germany is more
than twice that of East Germany. As wt
both know, the true division in the work
today is not between east and west, but
between progress and stagnation, be-
tween freedom and oppression, between
hope and despair.

Looking back on his long career, one
of Japan's foremost leaders, Yukio
Ozaki, said, "For the happiness of one
nation we should endeavor toward the
enhancement of the happiness of the en-
tire world." Both Japan and America
share this view, and we both know that
the happiness of the world depends on
liberty.

As a man who has worked tirelessly
to defend and promote human freedom,
you have led a career of long and varied
service to your country. You first won a
seat in the Diet in 1947; since 1959
\()u've held five Cabinet posts; and toda;
you lead your nation. With gratitude for
your efforts, on behalf of the American
people, I salute you.

And please join me in a toast to His
Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of
Japan.

Department of State Bulletir

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FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

nyof

Joint Statements,
Nov. 10, 1983^

Prime Minister Nakasone

For the people and Government of
Japan, as well as for my wife and
myself, it is, indeed, a great pleasure to
welcome the President of the United
States of America and Mrs. Reagan as
state guests.

Yesterday and today, the President
and I had very productive meetings
covering a wide range of subjects.
Through these meetings, we recon-
firmed the importance for Japan and the
United States, two countries sharing the
common ideas and values of freedom
and democracy of promoting further
cooperation toward peace and prosperity
of the world.

The President has a clear recogni-
tion of the importance of the Asian and
the Pacific region. His present visit to
Japan and the Republic of Korea and his
planned visit to China next year amply
testify to this fact, together with his
visit to the countries in Southeast Asia,
which I am sure will be rescheduled in
the future. The economic dynamism in
the Asian and the Pacific region is one
of the central elements in the expansion
of the world economy. Thus, the Presi-
dent and I are in full agreement that we
should continue to make efforts for the
further development of the Asian and
the Pacific region.

I issued on November 1 the Tokyo
statement jointly with Chancellor
[Helmut] Kohl of the Federal Republic of
Germany, in line with the spirit of the
political statement adopted at the
Williamsburg summit in May [1983]
declaring that we should maintain the
unity and solidarity among the Western
countries in our joint endeavor in pur-
suit of freedom, peace, and stability of
the prosperity of the world economy,
and of the development in the Third
World.

As I know the recent events of in-
creasing tension in the East- West rela-
tions, as well as frequent occurrences of
regional disputes and violence in various
parts of the world, I am worried that

January 1984

the peace in the world could be gravely
threatened if such trends continue and
amplify themselves. Under such cir-
cumstances, I firmly believe that the
countries of the world should renew
their resolve for the maintenance of
freedom, peace, and stability; for the
revitalization of the world economy; and
for the prosperity of the peoples of the
world.

I further believe that the rational
dialogues and negotiations should be

conducted to solve such international
conflicts and disputes, and that the par-
ties concerned should spare no effort in
taking step-by-step measures or gradual
approach in pursuit of ultimate goals,
and should carry on steady and realistic
endeavors. This I consider is particularly
pertinent to the arms control negotia-
tions.

The Western countries should stand
firmly in unity and solidarity for
freedom and peace and should not

Japan— A Profile

People

Noun and adjective: Japanese. Population

(1982): 118.450,000. Annual growth rate:
0.8%. Ethnic gfroups: Japanese; Korean 0.6'
Religions: Shintoism and Buddhism; Chris-
tian 0.8%. Language: Japanese. Literacy:
99%. Life expectancy — Males 73 yrs.,
females 78 yrs. Work force (55.3 million,
1979): Agriculture — 11%. Trade, manufac-
turing, mining, and construction — 34%.
Services— i8%. Government — 5%.

Geography

Area: 381,945 sq. km. (147,470 sq. mi.);
slighty smaller than California. Cities:
Capital — Tokyo. Other cities — Sapporo,
Kyoto, Osaka. Terrain: Rugged, mountainous
islands. Climate: Varies from subtropical to
temperate.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Constitu-
tion: May 3, 1947.

Branches: Executive — prime minister
(head of government). Legislative — bicameral
Diet (House of Representatives and House of
Councilors). Judicial — Civil law system with
Anglo-American influence.

Subdivisions: 47 prefectures.

Political parties: Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP),
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Komeito
(Clean Government Party), Japan Communist
Party (JCP), Suffrage: Universal over age
20.

Economy

GNP (1982): $1,046 trillion. Real growth

rate: 2.5% 1982, 4.0% 1972-82. Per capita
GNP (1982): $8,836.

Natural resources: Negligible mineral
resources, fish.

Agriculture: Rice, vegetables, fruits,
milk, meat, silk.

Industries: Machinery and equipment,
metals and metal products, textiles, autos,
chemicals, electrical and electronic equip-
ment.

Trade (1981): Exports— $152 billion:
machinery and equipment, metals and metal
products, textiles. Major markets — US 25%,
EC 12.4%, Southeast Asia 22.6%, communist
countries 6.0%. Imports — $143.2 billion:
fossil fuels, metal ore, raw materials,
foodstuffs, machinery and equipment. Major
suppliers— VS 17.5%, EC 6.0%, Southeast
Asia 22.0%, communist countries 5.4%.

Fiscal year: April 1-Mareh 31.

Official exchange rate (April 1983,
floating): About 235 yen = US$1.

Total official development assistance:
$4.5 billion (budget 1982 = 0.34% of GNP).

Membership in International
Organizations

UN and its specialized agencies, such as In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), General Agree-
ment on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT), and In-
ternational Labour Organization; Interna-
tional Energy Agency (lEA); Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD); INTELSAT.

Taken from the Background Notes (special
updated edition for Presidential visit)
November 1983, published by the Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor:
Joanne Reppert Reams . ■

hesitate to bear any hardships in
upholding this cause. All these points
are included in the Tokyo statement. It
is, indeed, truly significant, that you
have fully endorsed this statement in
our meeting.

The President and I had exchanges
of views on East-West relations with
emphasis on the question of arms con-
trol and on the situation in such areas as
Asia, the Middle East, and Central
America.

With regard to the INF [intermedi-
ate-range nuclear forces] negotiations in
particular, it was reconfirmed that the
negotiations should not be conducted at
the sacrifice of the Asian region, but
should be conducted on a global basis,
taking the Asian security into considera-
tion.

With respect to the recent bombing
in Burma, the very act of terrorism, we
agreed that it should be strongly con-
demned as an inexcusable conduct in
challenge of world peace and order and
that continued efforts must be made to
bring about lasting peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula.

On the Middle East, I expressed my
deep appreciation for the role played by
the multinational forces for stabilizing
the situation in Lebanon.

The Japan-U.S. security arrange-
ments are the foundation of the peace
and security of Japan and the Far East.
I wish to express that Japan will con-
tinue her efforts toward further
strengthening the credibility of the
Japan-U.S. security arrangements. With
respect to the improvement of our
defense capability, I wish to continue to
make further efforts along the lines of
the joint communique of May 1981.

As to the international economy, the
President and I reconfirmed — in line
with the declaration of the Williamsburg
summit — the importance of obtaining
sustained noninflationary growth of the
world economy, of rolling back protec-
tionism, and of lowering the prevailing
high interest rates. We consider them
important, together with extending
financial cooperation, in order to
alleviate the plight of the developing
countries, which are suffering from ac-
cumulated debts.

With regard to bilateral economic

issues, we acknowledge the achieve-
ments made thus far and agree to con-
tinue our efforts for the solution of the
remaining issues. In this context, I
highly appreciated the pledge by the
President to combat protectionism in the
United States.

The President and I are in full
agreement on the importance of the yen-
dollar issue. We have agreed on
establishing consultative fora on ex-
change rate issues and investment. In
this connection, I asked for continued
U.S. efforts to lower U.S. interest rates.

The President and I have also under-
scored the importance of greater two-
way investment flows between our two
countries, and I expressed my concern
that the unitary method of taxation is
becoming a serious impediment to the
Japanese investment in the United
States. I stressed the importance of pro-
moting the preparations of a new round
of multilateral trade negotiations in
order to consolidate the free trading
system and to inject renewed confidence
in the world economy. I am very glad
that the President has strongly sup-
ported my view. We intend to call on
other countries to join in our efforts.

In the present international situa-
tion, you are shouldering enormous
global responsibilities. I will, on my part,
make as much contribution as possible to
the peace and prosperity of the world.

President Reagan

On behalf of the American people and
our government, I would like to thank
His Imperial Majesty the Emperor,
Prime Minister [Yasuhiro] Nakasone,
and the Government and people of
Japan for the generous and warm recep-
tion that you have extended to my wife,
Nancy, myself, and my staff during our
trip to your country.

Prime Minister Nakasone [and I], as
you've been told, have just completed 2
days of very productive discussions on a
wide range of bilateral issues and global
affairs. As leaders of two great Pacific
nations, we're guardians of a strong,
rich, and diverse relationship. Japan and
America are bound by shared values of
freedom, democracy, and peace. We're
committed to greater future cooperation
across a broad spectrum of political.

economic, security, educational, cultural,
and scientific affairs.

I have come as a friend of Japan
seeking to strengthen our partnership
for peace, prosperity, and progress. I
will leave Japan confident that our part-
nership is stronger than before and con-
fident that we're giving birth to a new
era in Japanese- American relations. We
have agreed to move forward with an
agenda for progress by drawing upon
the great well of talent, drive, deter-
mination, and creativity of our free
peoples. We welcome Japan's more
assertive role as a fellow trustee of
peace and progress in international
economic and political affairs.

We have discussed global issues, and
we hold many similar views on oppor-
tunities for cooperation. The principles
that Prime Minister Nakasone has enun-
ciated as the Tokyo statement are prin

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ciples that I fully endorse. Together we ■PJ'
have no greater responsibility than to
make our world a safer place.

There are serious threats to peace
on the Korean Peninsula, in the Middle
East, in the Caribbean, and over the
Northwestern Pacific. Also, the attitude
on the part of our adversary at the
negotiating table on arms talks is at
odds with the will of the world to reduce
the weapons of war and build a more
stable peace.

I conveyed to the Prime Minister my
satisfaction that our mutual security
relationship is proceeding smoothly.
Japan is host to 45,000 American
troops, and our bases in Japan, made
possible by the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, are essential
not only to the defense of Japan but also
contribute to peace and prosperity in the
Far East. As for Japan's defense ef-
forts, the United States remains con-
vinced that the most important contribu-
tion Japan can make toward the peace
and security in Asia is for Japan to pro-
vide for its own defense and share more
of the burden of our mutual defense ef-
fort.

During our discussions on arms con-
trol, I assured Prime Minister Nakasone
that we seek global reductions in the
Soviet's intermediate-range SS-20's to
the lowest level possible. The United
States will take no action in the in-
termediate nuclear forces negotiations

Departnnent of State Bulletin S-jafyijj

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FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

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that adversely affects the security of
Asia. We agreed on the urgency of
achieving consensus on comprehensive
international safeguards to prevent the
spread of nuclear weaponry.

Prime Minister Nakasone and I
discussed Japan and America's compel-
ling international economic respon-
sibilities as spelled out at the
Williamsburg summit. Together we must
aress for continuing liberalization of the
nternational trade and financial system,
?ight protectionism, promote economic
development without inflation by en-
:ouraging the growth of free enterprise
;hroughout the world, and share the
obligation of assisting developing coun-
tries, including those facing severe debt
oroblems. We also agreed to enhance
iioordination in foreign assistance.

Trade issues figure prominently in
■;he Japan-U.S. relationship. There's no
dmple, overnight solution to our trade
problems, but we have agreed to exert
)ur best and continued efforts to solve
chese issues. We welcome recent actions
oy your government to reduce trade bar-
riers, and I've emphasized the impor-
tance of further measures to open the
Japanese market to trade and invest-
ment.

I didn't come to negotiate specific
trade issues, but I did indicate certain
issues of immediate importance to us.
Because of both their trade and con-
sumer significance, for example, we're
seeking reductions in Japan's tarriffs on
certain products in which the United
States is highly competitive. Japanese
quotas on agricultural products are a
cause for concern. In return, the United
States must combat protectionism in our
country, and I have given the Prime
Minister my pledge to do so.

Progress in Japan-U.S. trade issues
can foster greater trade liberalization ef-
forts worldwide, such as the Prime
Minister's call for a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations, which I
heartily endorse.

I expressed confidence that the
United States can be a reliable long-
term supplier of energy, particularly
:oal, to Japan. And I was pleased that
Prime Minister Nakasone shared this
dew. Expanded energy trade will mean
more jobs for Americans and greater
security for both our countries.

January 1984

With the approval of Prime Minister
Nakasone and myself, a joint press
statement is being released today by
Finance Minister [Noboru] Takeshita
and Treasury Secretary Reagan —
[Donald T.] Regan — [laughter]— I tried
to get him to pronounce it the other
way — on the yen-dollar issue and other
financial and economic issues of mutual
interest. We agree that the com-
mitments and steps outlined in that
statement will further strengthen
economic relations between the United
States and Japan.

We have noted the importance of
the yen-dollar exchange rate, of free and
open capital markets in each country.
We stress the need for closer economic
consultations between the two govern-
ments. A ministerial-level working group
is being set up to monitor each side's
progress in carrying out the agreed-
upon actions to improve the yen-dollar
exchange rate.

Our mutual commitment toward

specific steps to achieve open capital
markets will allow the yen to reflect
more fully Japan's underlying political
stability and economic strength as the
second largest economy in the free
world. In addition, we've agreed to in-
struct our economic sub-Cabinet
members to form a committee to pro-
mote mutual investments.

Progress must come one step at a
time, but Japan and America have
begun taking those steps together. I've
been heartened that beginning with our
first meeting last January, continuing
with the Williamsburg summit, and now
again during our visit this week, Prime
Minister Nakasone and I have agreed
that our two great democracies share
special responsibilities to each other and
to the world. Let us continue to go for-
ward, building on our progress step by
step. We must set milestones to monitor
the success of our agenda for progress
and to assure the followthrough that is
essential. I will be discussing this matter

U.S. Ambassador to Japan

Michael J. Mansfield was born in New York
City on March 16, 1903; since childhood,
however, his home has been Montana. He
enlisted in the Navy at age 14 and subse-
quently enlisted in the Army and Marines.
He worked as a miner and mining engineer in
Montana (1922-30), then attended the Mon-
tana School of Mines and the University of
Montana, where he received A.B. and M.A.
degrees. He was professor of Latin American
and Far Eastern History at the University of
Montana (1933-43).

Ambassador Mansfield began his political
career in 1943 when he was elected to the
House of Representatives. He served in the
House until 1952. He was then elected to the
Senate where he served continuously until his
retirement in 1977. In the Senate, he was
Assistant Majority Leader (1957-61) and Ma-
jority Leader (1961-77). He was also a
member of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, where he was Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Far Eastern Affairs.

Outside the Congress, Ambassador
Mansfield has played an active role in inter-
national affairs. In 1944 he went to China as
a representative of the President. He was the
U.S. delegate to the Ninth Inter-American

Conference in Colombia in 1948; attended the
Sbcth UN Assembly in Paris in 1951 and
1952; and was the U.S. delegate to the
Southeast Asia Conference in Manila in 1954.

On assignments for the President in
1962, 1965, and 1969, he visited the West In-
dies, Southeast Asia, and Europe. In 1972
the Ambassador returned to China at the in-
vitation of Chou En-Lai. He also visited that
country in 1974 and 1976 as a guest of the
Chinese Government. He was appointed Am-
bassador to Japan on April 22, 1977. ■

in more detail with the Prime Minister
tomorrow.

This visit has strengthened the
bonds of friendship between our two
great nations. We are now better
prepared to work together as partners
to build a more peaceful and prosperous
future at home and throughout the
world. We know what needs to be done;
we know how it must be done. Let us
have the faith to believe in each other,
the courage to get on with the job, and
the determination to see it through.

President Reagan's Remarks
at Reception for
American and Japanese
Businessmen,
Nov. 10, 1983*

I don't usually go around in these
clothes, but I'm dining with His Imperial
Majesty tonight. [Laughter] But I'm
delighted to have this chance to meet
with such a distinguished group of
Japanese and American leaders.

Before I go any further, may I ex-
tend my early birthday greeting to
someone who couldn't be here, my good
friend and your distinguished former
Prime Minister, Mr. Nobazuki Kishi,
who in just 3 days turns 88.

This gathering marks the way that
we Americans and Japanese rely on
each other for our prosperity. Japan and
America are separated by thousands of
miles of ocean, different languages, and
different cultures, yet in our robust
trade — everything from food to com-
puters — we've found a way to help each
other create abundance.

In 1967, my first year as Governor
of California, trade between our two
countries amounted to $5.7 billion, and I
remember how much importance even
then my fellow Governors and I placed
on trade with Japan. By 1974, my last
year as Governor, the figure had shot up
to $23 billion. And this year it's expected
that Japan will account for a tenth of all
America's exports, more than any other
nation overseas; that America will buy a
quarter of all Japanese exports; and the
total trade between our two nations will
surpass $60 billion.

Our vigorous trade has given us a
chance to learn from one another, and it
is in large part because of that trade
that today our nations are leading a
technological revolution that promises to
change life even more profoundly than
did the Industrial Revolution of a cen-
tury ago.

All of us want to keep Japanese-
American business healthy and expand-
ing. And that means we must continue
to promote not just trade but free trade.
To the Japanese here tonight, let me
say, "Congratulations." Many in this
room played a key role over the past
three-and-a-half decades in making
Japan an economic miracle. Your im-
agination, energy, and determination
have made this nation one of the most
prosperous on Earth and focused
economic growth throughout the Pacific
Basin.

Now that Japan has become a giant
in the world economy, your nation
shares the responsibility for keeping the
economy strong. In recent years, Japan
has begun to open its markets to more
goods and services from abroad. Prime
Minister Nakasone has continued these
positive actions, and we appreciate all
your efforts.

America does have trade problems
with Japan, and we seek the cooperation
of your government so we can solve
them together. We must work for lower
barriers on both sides of the Pacific.
And we hope to see your capital
markets open to more foreign participa-
tion. This will help establish a greater
international role for the yen and would
contribute to an improvement in the im-
balance between our two currencies.

As leaders of Japanese business, you
can help make certain that Japan leads
in the drive for greater free trade to
strengthen the international economy.
The well-being of both our nations will
depend, to a large extent, on your ef-
forts.

I've heard — as leaders of Japanese
business, you can make certain that
Japan leads in the drive for greater free
trade to strengthen the international
economy. The well-being of both our na-
tions will depend, to a large extent, on
your efforts. I've heard about the
private efforts of Japanese businessmen
to establish a permanent home for the

America- Japan Society of Tokyo and
other organizations dedicated to expand-
ing cultural exchanges and good will be-
tween our two countries. And I hope
these efforts succeed.

To the Americans here tonight, let
me say simply, "Keep up the good
work." You're pioneers, showing that
although doing business here is hard
work, the rewards are worth it. More
and more, Japan is proving a fruitful
market for American goods and serv-
ices. Your fine example will encourage
other American businesses to follow you
here and expand Japanese-American
trade still further.

And in January, you'll be pleased to
hear the Department of Commerce is
sending a high-level delegation of
American business people, led by
Richard McElheny, Assistant Commerce
Secretary for Trade Development, and
Jim Jenkins, my Deputy Counsellor at
the White House, on a special trade mis
sion to Japan.

I want you to know that as
Americans doing business in Japan, you
have this Administration's full support.
We're working as hard in Washington as
you are here to make certain your op-
portunities in Japan keep growing. 'The
Tsukuba Exposition will provide an ex-
cellent opportunity for America to
demonstrate the latest in technology. I
hope many of your companies will be
able to participate and cooperate in this
exposition with Jim Needham, who's
directing the U.S. pavilion.

The message I want to leave with
everyone here tonight is simple. It's a
lesson history has taught us again and
again. Protectionism hurts everyone, bu'
free trade benefits all.

I understand that it's a tradition in
Japan for businessmen to make con-
tracts final simply by giving their word
or shaking hands. That kind of transac-
tion, of course, requires deep mutual
trust and respect. Neither of our nations
can open its markets completely in an
afternoon. But working step by step and
without delay, we can build that kind of
mutual trust and respect.

Department of State Bulletir

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

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Toast at the
Imperial
Banquet,
Nov. 10, 1983'

You have honored us with a magnificent
and unforgettable occasion this evening,
and we express our sincere thanl^s to
you.

One hundred and thirty-one years
ago our ancestors began gradually lay-
ing the foundation for one of the most
significant relationships between two
countries anywhere in the world. When
our people first met on shores not too
far from here, we had difficulty
understanding each other. Few cultures
and histories could have been more dif-
ferent than our two were in the 1850s.

Today, the language of our two
icountries is still different, but we
understand and appreciate each other as
never before. We, in fact, depend on
each other and benefit beyond calcula-
tion from our relationship. We're not
only major trading partners; we're also
cooperating in a host of international
and political endeavors to strengthen
peace and increase prosperity beyond
our own borders.

Basic to all our efforts are the close
and cooperative ties that we've built be-
tween our people, from young students
who study in each other's schools and
universities, to the daily interaction of
our businessmen, politicians, scientists,
creative artists, and athletes. The
multitude of personal and professional
relationships is like millions of threads
binding us together with a strength and
resilience that will not be broken.

The ties between our people are
based on common ideals and values. But
beyond this, our people like and admire
each other. Americans appreciate the
energy and hard work of the Japanese.
And while in the arena of business
we're, indeed, competitors, we are
friendly competitors, and we respect one
another.

If friendship has meaning, it can be
found in the genuine feelings and com-
mitment between our two peoples. As
the American philospher Emerson
wrote: "The only way to have a friend is
to be one." The American people admire

January 1984

Banquet Hall of Imperial Palace. President
Reagan makes remarks and proposes a
toast to the Emperor and members of the
Imperial Family, members of the official
suite, and other guests.

Japan, its great progress, its people's
fortitude and dedication, its splendid and
delicate culture, its increasingly vital
role in world affairs.

We admire you. Your Majesty,
because you symbolize this nation's
history and traditions and represent the
dramatic transformation of these
beautiful islands and stalwart people.
Your love of country and for Japan's
democratic institutions, your devotion to
science, to the search for truth, your

deep attachment to nature around
you — these and many other aspects of
your life and that of your splendid fami-
ly, give your people strength and unite
them in their beliefs and ideals.

Every spring from all over the
United States, Americans come to their
capital in Washington, D.C., to view the
beauty of cherry blossoms. This beauty
is a gift from Japan. The cherry trees
were presented to us by the city of
Tokyo in 1912.

Last year the Flower Association of
Japan presented a million flowering
cherry tree seeds to the people of the
United States so this beauty could be
spread throughout our country. In
January of this year, our National
Arboretum presented flowering
dogwood seeds to your country. These
flowers can serve to remind us of the
beauty of our friendship. Unlike these
trees which blossom only once a year, let
the flower of our friendship be never
ending.

Our two countries, beginning their
relationship in confusion and uncertain-
ty, now are the closest of friends and
partners. My visit to your country has
reaffirmed my confidence in the future
of our relations. May they ever be as
close as they are today.

I ask you to join me in a toast to
Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor
and Empress of Japan.

Address before the
Japanese Diet,
Nov. 11, 1983«

It is with great honor and respect that I
come before you today, the first
American President ever to address the
Japanese Diet.

I have been in your country only 2
days, but speaking for my wife, Nancy,
and myself, may I say you have more
than made us feel at home. The warmth
of your welcome has touched our hearts.
In welcoming us, you pay tribute to the
more than 230 million Americans whom
I have the privilege to represent. From
all of us — all of them to you we reach
out to say: The bonds of friendship
which unite us are even greater than the

...^:n:l,lllimiulimiiUimMi^iiil^^

Addressing the Japanese Diet in the Assembly Hall of the House of Representatives,
National Diet Building.

ocean which divides us. Nichibei no yuho
wa eien de.su. [Japanese-American frien-
ship is forever.]

It was a dozen years ago on an
autumn day like this one that I first
visited Japan, and today, as then, I feel
energy, initiative, and industry surging
through your country in a mightly cur-
rent for progress. And just as before, I
am struck by a unique gift of the
Japanese people: You do not build your
future at the expense of the grace and
beauty of your past.

Harmony is a treasured hallmark of
Japanese civilization, and this has
always been pleasing to Americans. Har-
mony requires differences to be joined in
pursuit of higher ideals, many of which
we share. When former President

Ulysses S. Grant visited here in 1878, he
discovered Japan is a land of enchant-
ment.

During his stay, he met with the
Emperor, and their discussion turned to
democracy, the pressing issue of the
day, President Grant observed that
governments are always more stable and
nations more prosperous when they tru-
ly represent their people.

I am proud to help carry forward
the century-old tradition, meeting first
with your Emperor on my arrival and
now meeting with you a great milestone
in your history: the 100th session of the
Diet under the modern Japanese Con-
stitution. In 6 years you will celebrate
your 100th anniversary of representative
government in Japan, just as we will
celebrate the birth of our own Congress.
I bring you the best wishes and heartfelt

greetings from your American counter-
parts, the Congress of the United
States.

One cannot stand in this chamber
without feeling a part of your proud
history of nationhood and democracy,
and the spirit of hope carrying the
dreams of your free people. Of all the
strengths we possess, of all the ties that
bind us, I believe the greatest is our
dedication to freedom. Japan and
America stand at the forefront of the
free nations and free economies in the
world.

Yes, we are 5,000 miles apart; yes,
we are distinctly different in customs,
language, and tradition; and yes, we are
often competitors in the world markets.
But I believe the people represented by
this proud parliament and by my own
U.S. Congress are of one heart in their

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FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and tlie
Republic of Korea

devotion to the principles of our free
societies.

I'm talking about principles that
begin with the sacred worth of human
life; the cherished place of the family;
the responsibility of parents and schools
to be teachers of truth, tolerance, hard
work, cooperation, and love; and the
role of our major institutions — govern-
ment, industry, and labor — to provide
the opportunities and security — oppor-
tunities and security free people need to
Duild and leave behind a better world for
:heir children and their children's
children.

America and Japan are situated far
apart, but we are united in our belief
;hat freedom means dedication to the
iignity, rights, and equality of man.
5fukichi Fukuzawa, the great Meiji-era
jducator, said it for you: "Heaven has
-nade no man higher or no man lower
:han any other man."

Our great American hero Abraham
Lincoln put it in political perspective for
us: "No man is good enough to govern
another man without that other's con-
ent." We both value the right to have a
government of our own choosing. We
expect government to serve the people;
we do not expect the people to serve
government.

America and Japan speak with dif-
ferent tongues, but both converse, wor-
ship, and work with the language of
freedom. We defend the right to voice
our views, to speak words of dissent
without being afraid, and to seek inner
ipeace through communion with our God.

We believe in rewarding initiative,
savings, and risk-taking. And we en-
courage those who set their sights on
the farthest stars and chart new paths
"to progress through the winds and
waters of commerce. Others censor and
stifle their citizens. We trust in freedom
ito nurture the diversity and creativity
that enriches us all. I like what your
ipoet Basho said "Many kinds of plants
land each one triumphant in its special
iblossoms."

Finally, our freedom inspires no fear
because it poses no threat. We in-
timidate no one, and we will not be in-
timidated by anyone. The United States
(and Japan do not build walls to keep our
tpeople in. We do not have armies of

January 1984

secret police to keep them quiet. We do
not throw dissidents into so-called men-
tal hospitals. And we would never cold-
bloodedly shoot a defenseless airliner out
of the sky. We share your grief for that
tragic and needless loss of innocent
lives.

Our two countries are far from
perfect. But in this imperfect and
dangerous world, the United States and
Japan represent the deepest aspirations
of men and women everywhere — to be
free, to live in peace, and to create and
renew the wealth of abundance and
spiritual fulfillment.

Risking the

Challenge of Partnership

I have come to Japan because we have
an historic opportunity, indeed, an
historic responsibility. We can become a
powerful partnership for good, not just
in our own countries, not just in the
Pacific region but throughout the world.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my
question is: Do we have the determina-
tion to meet the challenge of partnership
and make it happen? My answer is
without hesitation: Yes, we do, and yes,
we will.

For much of our histories, our coun-
tries looked inward. Those times have
passed. With our combined economies
accounting for half the output of the
free world, we cannot escape our global
responsibilities. Our industries depend
on the importation of energy and
minerals from distant lands. Our pros-
perity requires a sound international
financial system and free and open
trading markets. And our security is in-
separable from the security of our
friends and neighbors.

The simple hope for world peace and
prosperity will not be enough. Our two
great nations, working with others,
must preserve the values and freedoms
our societies have struggled so hard to
achieve. Nor should our partnership for
peace, prosperity, and freedom be con-
sidered a quest for competing goals. We
cannot prosper unless we are secure,
and we cannot be secure unless we are
free. And we will not succeed in any of
these endeavors unless Japan and
America work in harmony.

Arms Control

I have come to your country carrying
the heartfelt desires of America for
peace. I know our desires are shared by
Prime Minister Nakasone and all of
Japan. We are people of peace. We
understand the terrible trauma of
human suffering. I have lived through
four wars in my lifetime. So, I speak not
just as President of the United States,
but also as a husband, a father, and as a
grandfather. I believe there can be only
one policy for preserving our precious
civilization in this modern age. A nuclear
war can never be won and must never
be fought.

The only value in possessing nuclear
weapons is to make sure they can't be
used ever. I know I speak for people
everywhere when I say our dream is to
see the day when nuclear weapons will
be banished from the face of the Earth.

Arms control must mean arms
reductions. America is doing its part. As
I pledged to the United Nations less
than 2 months ago, the United States
will accept any equitable, verifiable
agreement that stabilizes forces at lower
levels than currently exist. We want
significant reductions, and we're willing
to compromise.

In the strategic arms reduction talks
[START], American negotiators con-
tinue to press the Soviet Union for any
formula that will achieve these objec-
tives. In the longer range INF talks, we
are pursuing the same course, even of-
fering to eliminate an entire category of
weapons. I'm very conscious of our
negotiating responsibility on issues that
concern the safety and well-being of the
Japanese people. And let me make one
thing very plain. We must not and we
will not accept any agreement that
transfers the threat of longer range
nuclear missiles from Europe to Asia.

Our great frustration has been the
other side's unwillingness to negotiate in
good faith. We wanted to cut deep into
nuclear arsenals, and still do. But
they're blocking the dramatic reductions
the world wants. In our good-faith effort
to move the negotiations forward, we
have offered new initiatives, provided
for substantial reductions to equal levels,

and the lower the level the better. But
we shall wait. We still wait for the first
positive response.

Despite this bleak picture, I will not
be deterred in my search for a
breakthrough. The United States will
never walk away from the negotiating
table. Peace is too important. Common
sense demands that we persevere, and
we will persevere.

We live in uncertain times. There
are trials and tests for freedom
wherever freedom stands. It is as stark
as the tragedy over the Sea of Japan,
when 269 innocent people were killed for
the so-called cause of sacred airspace. It
is as real as the terrorist attacks last
month on the Republic of Korea's leader-
ship in Rangoon and against American
and French members of the interna-
tional peacekeeping force in Beirut. And
yes, it is as telling as the stonewalling of
our adversaries at the negotiating table,
and as their crude attempts to intimi-
date freedom-loving people everywhere.

These threats to peace and freedom
underscore the importance of closer
cooperation among all nations. You have
an old proverb that says, "A single ar-
row is easily broken, but not three in a
bunch." The stronger the dedication of
Japan, the United States, and our allies
to peace through strength, the greater
our contributions to building a more
secure future will be. The U.S. -Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security must continue to serve us as
the bedrock of our security relationship.
Japan will not have to bear the burden
of defending freedom alone. America is
your partner. We will bear that burden
together.

The defense of freedom should be a
shared burden. We can afford to defend
freedom; we cannot afford to lose it.
The blessings of your economic miracle,
created with the genius of a talented,
determined, and dynamic people, can
only be protected in the safe harbor of
freedom.

Economic Growth

In his book, "In Quest of Peace and
Freedom," former Prime Minister Sato
wrote: "in the hundred years since the
Meiji Restoration, Japan has constantly

endeavored to catch up and eventually
overtake the more advanced countries of
the world." I don't think I'll be making
headlines when I say, you've not only
caught up in some cases, you've pulled
ahead. [Laughter] Here again, our part-
nership is crucial. But this time, you can
be teachers.

To all those who lack faith in the
human spirit, I have just three words of
advice: Come to Japan. Come to a coun-
try whose economic production will soon
surpass the Soviet Union's, making
Japan's economy the second largest in
the entire world. Come to learn from a
culture that instills in its people a strong
spirit of cooperation, discipline, and
striving for excellence; and yes, learn
from government policies which helped
create this economic miracle — not so
much by central planning, as by
stimulating competition, encouraging ini-
tiative, and rewarding savings and risk-
taking.

Our country has made great strides
in this direction during the last 3 years.
We're correcting past mistakes. Hope is
being reborn. Confidence is returning.
America's future looks bright again. We
have turned the corner from overtaxing,
overspending, record interest rates, high
inflation, and low growth. The United
States is beginning the first stage of a
new industrial renaissance, and we're
helping pull other nations forward to
worldwide recovery.

But some in my country still flinch
from the need to restrain spending.
Under the guise of lowering deficits,
they would turn back to policies of
higher taxes. They would ignore the
lesson of Japan. A look at Japan's
postward history yields two stunning
conclusions. Among the major in-
dustrialized countries, your tax burden
has remained the lowest and your
growth and saving rates the highest.
Savers in Japan can exempt very large
amounts of interest income from taxa-
tion. Your taxes on so-called unearned
income — [laughter] — are low. You have
no capital gains tax on securities for in-
vestors. And the overwhelming majority
of your working people face tax rates
dramatically lower than in the other in-
dustrial counties, including my own. And

incentives for everyone — that's the
secret of strong growth for a shining
future filled with hope, and oppor-
tunities and incentives for growth, not
tax increases — is our policy for America.
Sometimes I wonder if we shouldn't fur-
ther our friendship by my sending our
Congress here and you coming over and
occupying our Capitol building for a
while.

Partnership must be a two-way
street grounded in mutual trust. Let us
always be willing to learn from each
other and cooperate together. We have
every reason to do so. Our combined
economies account for almost 35% of the
world's entire economic output. We are
the world's two largest overseas trading
partners. Last year Japan took about
10% of our total exports, and we bought
some 25% of yours. Our two-way trade
will exceed $60 billion in 1983, more
than double the level of just 7 years ago.

At the Williamsburg summit last
May, the leaders of our industrial
democracies pledged to cooperate in roll-
ing back protectionism. My personal
commitment to that goal is based on
economic principles, old-fashioned com-
mon sense, and experience. I am old
enough to remember what eventually
happened the last time countries pro-
tected their markets from competition:
It was a nightmare called the Great
Depression. And it was worldwide.
World trade fell at that time by 60%.
And everyone, workers, farmers, and
manufacturers, were hurt.

Let us have the wisdom never to
repeat that policy. We're in the same
boat with our trading partners around
the globe. And if one partner in the boat
shoots a hole in the boat, it doesn't make
much sense for the other partner to
shoot another hole in the boat. Some
say, yes, and call that getting tough.
Well, forgive me, but I call it getting
wet all over. Rather than shoot holes, let
us work together to plug them up so our
boat of free markets and free trade and
fair trade can lead us all to greater
economic growth and international
stability.

I have vigorously opposed quick
fixes of protectionism in America. Anti-
competitive legislation like the local con-
tent rule, which would force our

Department of State Bulletin

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FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

domestic manufacturers of cars to use a
rising share of U.S. labor and
parts — now, this would be a cruel hoax.
It would be raising prices without pro-
tecting jobs. We would buy less from
you. You would buy less from us. The
world's economic pie would shrink.
Retaliation and recrimination would in-
crease.

It is not easy for elected officials to
balance the concerns of constituents
with the greater interests of the nation,
but that's what our jobs are all about.
And we need your help in demonstrating
free trade to address concerns of my
own people. Americans believe your
markets are less open than ours. We
need your support to lower further the
barriers that still make it difficult for
some American products to enter your
markets easily. Your government's re-
cent series of actions to reduce trade
barriers are positive steps in this direc-
tion. We very much hope this process
will continue and accelerate. In turn, I
pledge my support to combat protec-
tionist measures in my own country.

If we each give a little, we can all
igain a lot. As two great and mature
democracies, let us have the faith to
believe in each other, to draw on our
long and good friendship, and to make
our partnership grow. We are leaders in
the world economy. We and the other
industrialized countries share a respon-
sibility to open up capital and trading
markets, promote greater investment in
each other's country, assist developing
nations, and stop the leakage of military
technology to an adversary bent on ag-
igression and domination.

We believe that the currency of the
world's second largest free market
economy should reflect the economic
■strength and political stability that you
enjoy. We look forward to the yen play-
ing a greater role in international finan-
cial and economic affairs. We welcome
the recent trend toward a stronger yen.
And we would welcome Japan's increas-
ingly active role in global affairs. Your
leadership in aid to refugees and in
economic assistance to various countries
ihas been most important in helping to
promote greater stability in key regions

of the world. Your counsel on arms
reduction initiatives is highly valued by
us.

We may have periodic disputes, but
the real quarrel is not between us. It is
with those who would impose regimenta-
tion over freedom, drudgery over
dynamic initiative, a future of despair
over the certainty of betterment, and
the forced feeding of a military Goliath
over a personal stake in the products
and progress of tomorrow.

You and your neighbors are shining
examples for all who seek rapid develop-
ment. The Pacific Basin represents the
most exciting region of economic growth
in the world today. Your people stretch
your abilities to the limit, and when an
entire nation does this, miracles occur.
Being a Californian I have seen many
miracles hardworking Japanese have
brought to our shores.

In 1865 a young Samurai student,
Kanaye Nagasawa, left Japan to learn
what made the West economically
strong and technologically advanced.
Ten years later he founded a small
winery at Santa Rosa, California, called
the Fountaingrove Round Barn and
Winery. Soon he became known as the
grape king of Calfornia. Nagasawa came
to California to learn and stayed to
enrich our lives. Both our countries owe
much to this Japanese warrior-turned
businessman.

As the years pass, our contacts con-
tinue to increase at an astounding rate.
Today some 13,000 of your best college
and graduate students are studying in
America, and increasing numbers of
U.S. citizens are coming here to learn
everything they can about Japan. Com-
panies like Nissan, Kyocera, Sony, and
Toshiba have brought thousands of jobs
to America's shores. The State of
California is planning to build a rapid
speed train that is adapted from your

highly successful bullet train. In 1985
the United States will join Japan in a
major exhibition of science and
technology at Tsukuba, another symbol
of our cooperation.

For my part, I welcome this new
Pacific tide. Let it roll peacefully on,
carrying a two-way flow of people and
ideas that can break from barriers of
suspicion and mistrust and build up
bonds of cooperation and shared op-
timism.

Conclusion

Our two nations may spring from
separate pasts; we may live at opposite
sides of the Earth; but we have been
brought together by our indomitable
spirit of determination, our love of liber-
ty, and devotion to progress. We are
like climbers who begin their ascent
from opposite ends of the mountain. The
harder we try, the higher we climb, and
the closer we come together — until that
moment we reach the peak and we are
as one.

It happened just last month. One
American and two Japanese groups
began climbing Mt. Everest — the
Japanese from the side of Nepal and the
Americans from the side of Tibet. The
conditions were so difficult and
dangerous that before it ended two
Japanese climbers tragically lost their
lives. But before that tragedy, those
brave climbers all met and shook hands
just under the summit. And then,
together, they climbed to the top to
share that magnificent moment of
triumph.

Good and dear friends of Japan, if
those mountaineers could join hands at
the top of the world, imagine how high
our combined 350 million citizens can
climb, if all of us work together as
powerful partners for the cause of good.
Together there is nothing that Japan
and America cannot do.

Uanuary 1984

mi^m

Joint Statement on
Japan-U.S. Energy
Cooperation,
Nov. 11, 1983'

Prime Minister Nakasone and President
Reagan share the view that further
progress be made in energy trade and
cooperation in oil, natural gas, and coal
between Japan and the United States as
outlined in the following Joint Policy
Statement recommended by the Japan-
United States Energy Working Group:

Taking account of the energy pros-
pects for the entire Pacific Basin, the
two countries agree that the sound ex-
pansion of U.S. -Japan energy trade will
contribute to the further development of
the close economic and energy security
relationship which exists between the
two countries,

They will continue to discuss and
find ways of developing this trade for
the mutual benefit of both countries,
noting the importance of long-term
cooperation, the central role of the
private sector, and the need for a
balance between economic cost and
energy security.

Both countries consider Alaska to be
a particularly promising area for joint
development of energy resources. Both
governments will encourage private sec-
tor discussions regarding the possi-
bilities for such development.

With regard to trade in oil, gas, and
coal we have agreed on the following
next steps:

A. The U.S. and Japan recognize
that if legislative barriers can be re-
moved, the U.S. has the potential to ship
substantial quantities of crude oil to
Japan, thereby increasing economic in-
centives for U.S. oil production and
helping to diversify Japan's energy
sources. The United States will con-
tinue to keep under review the removal
of restrictions on exports of domestic
crude oil.

B. The United States and Japan will
encourage private industry in both coun-
tries to undertake now the prefeasibility
or feasibility studies necessary to deter-
mine the extent to which Alaskan

natural gas can be jointly developed by
U.S. and Japanese interests.

C. The United States and Japan will
encourage private industry in both coun-
tries to discuss the possibility of con-
cluding long-term coal contracts and
jointly developing mines and transporta-
tion systems to make American coal
more competitive in the Japanese
market.

D. In this regard, the two countries
welcome the examinations underway of
the technical and economic aspects of
several steam coal projects by private
companies concerned on both sides. As
economic recovery proceeds, Japan will
encourage its industries to consider pur-
chase of more competitively priced U.S.
steam coal to meet future demands not
already covered by existing contracts.
In addition, Japan will invite the private
sector concerned to explore the possibili-
ty of further increasing substitution of
coal for oil in electrical generation.

E. With regard to metallurgical
coal, both sides noted that the depressed
state of world steel manufacturing had
reduced demand for traded coal.
However, in view of the fact that the
United States has been a major supplier
to the Japanese market, both sides will
endeavor to maintain the level of
Japanese imports of U.S. coal. Japan
expects that imports of competitively
priced U.S. metallurgical coal will not
continue to decline, and will encourage
its steel industry to increase U.S. coal
imports when conditions in the industry
permit.

F. As a first step toward developing
U.S. -Japan coal trade, from a mid- to
long-term prospective, a mission com-
posed of representatives of major
Japanese coal users and other ap-
propriate interests will visit the United
States to meet with major coal mining
and transporation interests. The pur-
pose of this mission will be to explore
the possibility of expanding coal trade
between the United States and Japan,
and the possibility of conducting a major
study of the opportunities for reducing
the delivered price in Japan of U.S. coal.

Interview With Japanese
National Television,
Nov. 11, 1983«

Q. On behalf of all my colleagues pres-
ent here and of the truly nationwide
audience, I would like to thank you,
first of all, for having agreed to do
this interview. I understand that you
have prepared a statement for the
Japanese people that perhaps you
would like to make right now.

A. Thank you very much. And may
I say how delighted Nancy and I are to
be back in Japan. The last time we
visited Japan was 1978 at the invitation
of one of your Diet Members, Shintaro
Ishihara. I was also here in 1971, when I
had the pleasure of seeing Kyoto, your
beautiful, ancient capital city.

There is so much in Japan's history
and culture that impresses us.
Americans are full of admiration for the
Japanese people, the warmth of your
ways, your spirit of initiative and team-
work, and your strong traditions of
devotion to family, education, and
progress.

You have brought great develop-
ment and prosperity to your country.
We know that the struggle for better
living was often difficult in earlier days.
But endurance, tenacity, and sheer hard
work — qualities which I understand are
beautifully portrayed in your popular TV
drama. "Oshin" — have brought your na-
tion great success.

Recently, I have received a letter
from Masayasu Okumura, principal of
the Nishisawa School in Akita Prefec-
ture, which I understand is very far
from Tokyo. Mr. Okumura invited
Nancy and me to visit his country school
and his 27 students. Mr. Okumura, I
wanted to drop in on your school and
talk with your students, but our stay in
Japan this week has been too short. We
wish we had time to meet more people
and see more of your beautiful country,
including such places as Kyoto, Hok-
kaido, Hiroshima, Nara, and Nagasaki.

But we depart tomorrow, confident
that our relations are strong and good.
As I have said to the Diet today, we
may live thousands of miles apart, but

Department of State Bulletin

^Srtatle
soialih.

Since voi
(letiavekee,

Ntradii

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

we're neighbors, friends, and partners,
bound by a community of interests and
shared values. Michitaro Matsusaki, one
of Japan's earlier diplomats, said to
Commodore Perry in 1854 what millions
of us feel today: Japan and America, all
the same heart.

Our countries enjoy great prosperi-
ty. We live in free and open societies.
But much of the world lives in poverty,
dominated by dictators unwilling to let
people live in peace and freedom. That's
why our relationship is so important.
Japan and America shoulder global
responsibilities, but with every respon-
sibility comes opportunity.

We can share with the world our
secrets of economic growth and human
Drogress. We can offer the sunlight of
democracy to people everywhere who
Iream of escaping the darkness of
:yranny to decide their own destinies.

Japan and America are nations of
:he future, builders of tomorrow, and
together we can build a brighter tomor-
row. We can make this world a much
safer, more secure, and prosperous
place. I know with all my heart that if
we have faith to believe in each other, to
trust in the talent and goodness of the
hard-working people in our great cities
and small towns, then, yes, we will make
3ur partnership grow, and together
there is nothing Japan and America can-
not do.

Q. Listening to your statement,
ike many other people, I find that you
are, indeed, a g^reat communicator. I
nay this not because you said very
idnd words about our famous city of
drama, but because I think that your
oersonal style on television is more
elaxed and informal than that of
many other politicians. That is why,
with your approval, I would like to
•;onduct this interview in a very infor-
mal way so that the Japanese people
;an get a clearer view of your per-
sonality.

Since your arrival, Japanese peo-
«jle have been following very closely
'our visit. And yesterday we saw that
'ou enjoyed a lot about our
lemonstration of Yabusame at Meiji
shrine. What did you think of that
ypical traditional Japanese sport?

January 1984

At Yabusame Field. President and Mrs.
Reagan attend demonstration of horseback
archery (Nov. 10) by Yabusame riders.

And if I may ask, apart from horse
riding, what are your personal hob-
bies, Mr. President?

A. Horseback riding is certainly
one, and all the things that go with hav-
ing a ranch. I do a lot of the work
whenever I have the opportunity to get
there that has to be done around a
ranch. As a matter of fact, just this
summer we had a number of days at the
ranch, and I managed to build— with the
help of two friends— about 400 more
feet of fence out of telephone poles.
[Laughter] And it can get a little
backbreaking, but I enjoy that.

Someone once asked me when I was
ever going to have the ranch finished,
and I said I hope never, because I enjoy
that. But there are other things, of
course. I enjoy reading. I enjoy athletics
of other kinds. And now, thanks to the
generosity of your Prime Minister since
his last visit there — while I don't get to
play golf very often— I will now be play-
ing it with a brand new set of golf clubs
which he presented to me.

Q. You have now completed
almost all the events of your very full
schedule for Japan. Yesterday you
gave us your official view of the visit,
but I wonder if you could give us now
a more personal view of this visit?

A. Yes, I'm very pleased with what
has taken place here. First of all the
warmth of the reception from all your
people, and I mean not just the people
of diplomacy and government that I had
dealings with, but your people there on
the streets and their showing of
hospitality and friendship has been very
heartwarming. But I have always be-
lieved that we only get in trouble when
we're talking about each other instead of
to each other. And since we've had an
opportunity here to not only speak with
your Diet, but then to meet with your
Prime Minister and others — and, of
course, I have been greatly honored to
have been received by His Imperial Ma-
jesty, your Emperor— I think that we
have established a human kind of bond,
not just one that is framed in diplomacy,
but an understanding of each other as
people. And I think that the world needs
more of this.

Q. I would like you to know, in
the first place, that many of my com-
patriots will be surprised and very
happily so at the inclusion of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the list of
the places that you'd like to visit or
you wish you could visit. And to this
end, of course, you'll have to be a
young — [inaudible] — sagacious man so
that you'll be able to fulfill your and
our common desire in this regard.
Now, are you going to be one? Are you
going to be a sagacious man?

A. I'm certainly going to try. This is
too dangerous a world to just be
careless with words or deeds. And if
ever there was a need for the world to
work toward peace and to work out of
the dangerous situation that we're in,
that time is now.

Q. On a more, a little more serious
note, my question is e.xactly related to
this point. And that is, because of the
experience that we in Japan went
through, we are very genuine in hop-
ing even for a very minimum, limited
progress in the arms control talks
which are currently underway. And
just as it took another Republican
President with very conservative
credentials to effect a rapprochement
very successfully with China, there
are Japanese who hope that, perhaps,
your hard-line policy may lead to the
relaxation of East- West tensions. In
light of these hopes and expectations,
could you comment on these talks?
And, also, I would appreciate it a
great deal if you would give us your
assessment of the current state of
and, perhaps, future prospects for
U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly in
the arms control area.

A. Now, if all of your question— you
prefaced it with remarks about the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. Yes, we're work-
ing very hard to improve relations there
and establish trust and friendship. I
think we've made great progress. I
know there is a question that is raised
sometimes with regard to our friends on
Taiwan — the Republic of China. I have
to say that I have repeatedly said to the
leaders of the People's Republic of China
that they must understand that we will
not throw over one friend in order to
make another. And I would think that

I:;»f'(<rtfftrf!>nn!niT)Mtft««Tmnnfi?nifnifiiv

that would be reassuring to them, that
they, then, might not be thrown over at
some time in the future.

But with regard to the Soviet
Union — and you mentioned my hard
line. And that is— I know I'm described
that way a great deal. [Laughter] What
is being called a hard line, I think, is
realism. I had some experience with
Communists— not of the Soviet kind,
but domestic, in our own country, some
years ago when I was president of a
labor union there.

I feel that we have to be realistic
with the Soviet Union. It is not good for
us, as some in the past have to think
they're just like us and we can appeal to
their kindliness or their better nature.
No, I think they're very materialistic.
They're very realistic. They have some
aggressive and expansionist aims in the
world. And I believe that, yes, you can
negotiate with them; yes, you can talk to
them. But it must be on the basis of
recognizing them as the way they are
and presenting the proposals in such a
way that they can see that it is to their
advantage to be less hostile in the world
and to try and get along with rest of the
nations of the world. And if this is hard-
line, then I'm hard-line.

But it is important because of, also,
your opening remarks with reference to
"the great nuclear forces in the world.
We are going to stay at that negotiating
table. We won't walk away from it.
We're going to stay there trying— not as
we have in the past to set some limits or
ceilings on how many more missiles
would be built, how much more growth
they could take in those weapons — we
want a reduction in the numbers. But
really and practically, when we start
down that road, and if we can get
cooperation from them in reducing
them, we should then continue down
that road to their total elimination.

Many years ago. after he became
President, Dwight Eisenhower wrote a
letter to a noted publisher in our coun-
try. And he said in that letter that we
had to face the fact that weapons were
being developed in which we could no
longer see a war that would end in vic-
tory or defeat as we had always known
it. But the weapons were such that it
would end in the destruction of human
kind. And, as he said, when we reach

Deoartment of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

that moment, let us then have the in-
telligence to sit down at a table and
negotiate our problems before we
destroy the world.

I see it also in another way that he
didn't mention. Once upon a time, we
had rules of warfare. War is an ugly
thing, but we had rules in which we
made sure that soldiers fought soldiers,
but they did not victimize civilians. That
was civilized. Today we've lost
something of civilization in that the very
weapons we're talking about are de-
signed to destroy civilians by the
millions. And let us at least get back to
where we once were — that if we talk
war at all, we talk it in a way in which
there could be victory or defeat and in
which civilians have some measure of
protection.

Q. You referred to the current
situation as being very dangerous.
And in recent months, we have
witnessed one act of violence after
another— the assassination of Mr.
Aquino in the Philippines, the
shooting down of the Korean Airlines
passenger jet, the terrorist bombing in
Rangoon, the bombing in Lebanon,
and Beirut, and the regfional conflicts
that persist at many different parts of
the world, including the Middle East
and the Caribbean. I think we certain-
ly live in a very dangerous world, and
your Administration has advocated
very strongly for building more effec-
tive defense capabilities of the United
States and of its allies.

My question is that the kind of
danger that the world faces today
would be minimized if the United
States and its partners, including
Japan, become stronger militarily?

A. Yes, and this is part of that
realism that I meant. I once did a lot of
negotiating across a table as a labor
leader on behalf of a union, and I think I
know and understand the give and take
of negotiations. But for a number of
years now, recently, we have sat at the
table in meetings with the Soviet leaders
-who have engaged in the biggest
military buildup in the history of
mankind. They sat on their side of the
table looking at us knowing that,
iunilaterally, we were disarming without

January 1984

getting anything in return. They didn't
have to give up anything. They saw
themselves get stronger in relation to all
of us as we, ourselves, made ourselves
weaker.

I think, realistically, to negotiate
arms reductions they have to see that
there is a choice. Either they join in
those arms reductions or they face the
fact that we are going to turn our in-
dustrial might to building the strength
that would be needed to deter them
from ever starting a war.

Wars don't start because a nation
is — they don't start them when they are
weak; they start them when they think
they're stronger than someone else. And
it is very dangerous to let them see that
they have a great margin of superiority
over the rest of us. There's nothing to
prevent them from then becoming ag-
gressive and starting a war.

Now, if they know that they cannot
match us — and when I say us, I mean
our allies and Japan and the United
States — they cannot match us if we are
determined to build up our defenses. So
they then face the fact that as we build
them up, they might then find them-
selves weaker than we are.

It was all summed up in a cartoon in
one of our papers. This was before the
death of Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev
was portrayed talking to a Russian
general, and he was saying to the
general, "I liked the arms race better
when we were the only ones in it."
[Laughter]

Q. Some of the dangers that I
refer to do not take place only in the
context of the confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet
Union. I think some of the regional
conflicts have indigenous roots for
that. And I just wonder if we are not
having the kind of crises and dangers
that don't lend themselves to the
military solutions, which might call
for some other approach to solving
these problems and thereby reducing
the tension in the world as a whole.

A. If I understand your question
correctly, what we're talking about
is— you mentioned the Middle East.
Once upon a time, nations like our own
with oceans around us could have a

defensive army on our own land; we
could have coastal artillery batteries;
and we knew that if a war came to us, it
would come to our shores, and we would
defend our shores. Today, there are
strategic points in various places in the
world. The Middle East is one. Could
the allies, Western Europe, could Japan
stand by and see the Middle East come
into the hands of someone who would
deny the oil of the Middle East to the in-
dustrialized world? Could we see that
energy supply shut off without knowing
that it would bring absolute ruin to our
countries?

There are other areas. More than
half of the minerals that the United
States needs for its own industries come
from spots all over the world. An ag-
gressor nation, a nation that maybe has
designs on other nations, recognizes that
also. We have to look and see where
those strategic spots are which we can-
not afford to let fall.

With the problem of Cuba in the
Mediterranean— in the Caribbean, we
have to recognize that more than half of
all of our shipping of those necessities
we must have come through the Carib-
bean. It wasn't an accident that back in
the First World War that the German
submarine packs took up their places
there. We know that the strategic
waterways of the world— the Soviet
Union has now built up the greatest
navy in the world, and the biggest part
of that navy is here in the Pacific, in the
vicinity of your own country. But they
know, as anyone must know in world
strategy, that there are a limited
number of choke points, sea passages
that are essential to your livelihood and
to ours. You can start with the Panama
Canal and the Suez Canal, then the
Straits of Gibraltar, right here in the
passages that lead to your own island,
the Malacca and the Makassar Straits.
There are a total of no more than 16 in
the whole world. And a nation that
could dominate those narrow passages
and shut them off to our shipping could
secure victory without firing a shot at
any of us.

Q. The American economy has
been rapidly improving, we hear, yet
unemployment is still high. Could you

tell us what you believe will happen to
the American domestic economy in the
coming year and whether the improve-
ment of the American economy,
domestic economy, will help to resolve
remaining trade problems between the
United States and Japan?

A. The American economy is im-
proving. This recession that we've just
been going through is the eighth that
we've known in the last 40 or so years.
And each time in the past our govern-
ment has resorted to what I call a quick
fix. It has artificially stimulated the
money supply; it has stimulated govern-
ment spending, increased taxes on the
people which reduced their incentive to
produce. And yes, there would be seem-
ing recovery from the recession which
would last about 2 or 3 years because it
was artificial, and then we would be into
another recession. And each time the
recession was deeper and worse than
the one before.

We embarked on an economic pro-
gram that was based on reducing
government spending to leave a greater
share of the earnings of the people in
the hands of the people. We not only
reduced the spending, we reduced taxes.
And it was set out to be a lasting and
real recovery.

When we started in 1981 our reces-
sion was about— roughly 12V2%. People
were saying that it couldn't be
eliminated in less than 10 years. Our in-
terest rates were more than double what
they are now. Our program, once put in-
to effect, and as the tax cuts did have
the effect we hoped they would have on
the ability of people to purchase and also
the incentive of their being allowed to
keep more of the money they earned —
the inflation for the last year has been
running at about 2V2% or so, down from
the 12.4%. The interest rates have been
halved. We have a long way to go. The
last thing to recover will be unemploy-
ment. But even there, last month our
unemployment dropped to a rate that in
our own optimistic predictions we had
said would not happen until the end of
1984. And here it is in 1983, down to
what we'd predicted that far ahead.

We've come down from a very high
unemployment rate to 8.7%. And I think
that we're on the road to a solid

recovery. I'll tell you, when our political
opponents were claiming that our plan
wouldn't work, they named it
"Reaganomics." [Laughter] And lately,
they haven't been calling it Reaganomics
anymore. I assume, because it's work-
ing. [Laughter]

But what it will do for the rest of
the world and our own relationship, I
think that our country — I think your
country, largely — certainly between the
two of us, we do affect the world's
economy. The world has been in reces-
sion. I think that the United States and
Japan and, certainly, with us together,
we can help bring back and bring out of
recession the rest of the industrial
world.

Q. You said that— in the National
Diet this morning — that you have
vigorously opposed the quick fix of
protectionism in America. But there
remains the danger of protectionist
legislation to restrict Japanese im-
ports to the United States. Do you
believe such anticompetitive legisla-
tion will be passed? And in regard to
this, what do you think of the steps
which Japan has been taking to fur-
ther open up its own markets?

A. We heartily approve. And we've
been discussing some of the points of
difference that still remain between our
two marketplaces. I have pointed to the
danger of those in our Congress which,
because of the unemployment, think the
answer could be protectionism. I think
that protectionism destroys everything
we want. I believe in free trade and fair
trade. And yet, the pressure on them as
legislators to adopt these bills, these

measures — I am opposed to them — and
yet, I know they're under the pressure,
and they're tempted. And they're talking
of this. There probably have been 40
bills that have been brought up and pro-
posed, all of which would have some
elements of protectionism in them.

But as I described it in the speech to
the Diet this morning, protectionism
is— that's the case of one fellow shooting
a hole in the bottom of the boat, and
then the other fellow answers by
shooting another hole in the boat. You
don't get well; you get wet. I don't want
us to start shooting holes in the bottom
of the boat.

Q. I understand you have a strong
interest in increasing personal con-
tacts between the Japanese and the
Americans.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any idea, specific
idea, how this could be accomplished?

A. Yes. I think we can increase our
student exchange. Almost 14,000 of
your fine young people are in our coun-
try now. 'We would like to see more of
ours coming here. There is talk now of
the Association of Japanese and
American Businessmen in using private
funds, having an American House in
Tokyo as we have a Japanese House in
New York, both designed for more
cultural exchange, more things such as
student exchange and all. And I believe,
again, that's another example of people
talking to each other instead of about
each other.

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

trong

chs

Arrival at Kimpo Airport, Seoul. Left to right: Mrs. Chun, Mrs. Keagan. the President,
and President Chun. Following are Secretary and Mrs. Shultz (center), U.S. Ambassador
to Korea Richard L. Walker, and Korean Chief of Protocol Lo Young Chan (right).

SEOUL

Arrival Remarks,
Nov. 12, 1983'

I bring to you— to the people of Korea
the warmest expressions of friendship
from the American people. The friend-
ship between our two peoples is a long
and a close one. It has endured more
than a century. It has been molded in
struggle, hardened through danger, and
strengthened by victory.

Since those days three decades ago
when young Koreans and Americans
fought together in the cause of human

freedom, the world has undergone swift
and sometimes violent change. Yet the
peace, economic progress, and freedom
from foreign domination that have
characterized modern Korea are
testimony to their vigilance and their
sacrifice.

We are resolved never to forget the
dangers they so bravely resisted, nor
abandon the struggle they so willingly
joined. Today, in a tense time of peace,
we stand together as we once did in
time of war. Our purpose is the same,
our resolve unshaken. We renew today
our commitment to each other and to
the cause of Korean and American
freedom.

As we begin a second century of

friendship between our peoples, Nancy
and I are particularly happy to return to
this beautiful country. We look forward
to seeking old friends and making new
ones. But our hope most of all is that
our visit will bring the people of Korea
and the United States even closer
together, and that our mutual efforts in
pursuit of peace will bear fruit, not just
for the Korean and the American people
but for all the peoples of the Earth.

We're grateful to the Korean people
and the Government of Korea for this
invitation. Let me assure you we bring
with us the fondest hopes of the
American people for continued peace
and prosperity in this scenic "Land of
the Morning Calm."

S I .1 I

Radio Address
to the Nation,
Nov. 12, 1983^°

I'm sure you've heard Nancy and I have
been traveling far from home this week.
We're visiting two of America's most
valued friends in the Pacific, Japan and
the Republic of Korea.

The great energy and vitality of
these free people is most impressive,
and we're enchanted by the treasures of
their past. We visited the revered and
lovely Meiji Shrine in Tokyo. While
there, we watched an exhibition of
Yabusame, a spectacular equestrian
sport dating hundreds of years, where
riders gallop at full gait shooting arrows
at three separate targets. On Friday I
had the honor of being the first
American President to address the
Japanese Diet, their national parliament.

Today we're in South Korea, a
staunch ally recently struck by great
tragedy— the downing of Korean Air
Lines Flight 007, followed by the
assassination of key members of the
Korean Cabinet. This has brought grief
and bitterness to this part of the world,
but it has also brought new determina-
tion. Free people, no matter where they
live, must stand united with the people
of Japan and Korea.

I will underline our commitment on
Sunday when I visit our GI's along the
demilitarized zone at the 38th Parallel.
Our soldiers are serving with our
Korean allies to deter aggression from
the Communist North. Working with
our partners to make tomorrow more
prosperous and more secure is what our
trip is all about.

America is a Pacific nation with
good reason to strengthen our ties in
this region. Mike Mansfield, our Am-
bassador to Japan, likes to say, "The
next century will be the century of the
Pacific." The citizens of our lands may
live 5,000 miles apart, we may be dif-
ferent in customs, language, and tradi-
tions, and yes, we are often competitors
in the world's markets. But what unites
us is more important— our love of
freedom and our optimism for the
future.

Japan, Korea, the United States,
and our many other friends in the
Pacific region are building a better
tomorrow. Individual opportunity
coupled with hard work and reward pro-
duces astonishing results. When an en-
tire society pursues these goals, miracles
occur. Japan and Korea are classic ex-
amples of nations rising from the ashes
of war to set standards of economic
prosperity that dazzle the world.

■There's much talk in the Congress of
protecting American jobs, but protec-
tionism is defensive and dangerous.
Erecting barriers always invites retalia-
tion, and retaliation is a threat to the
one out of every eight American jobs
dependent on our exports. At the end of
this vicious cycle are higher costs for
consumers and lost American jobs, the
exact opposite of what we all want.

Let's recognize Japanese and Korean
efficiency for what it is. If their prod-
ucts are better made and less expensive,
then Americans who buy them benefit
by receiving quality and value. And
that's what the magic of the market-
place is all about.

The best course for us to take is to
take the offensive and create new jobs
through trade, lasting jobs tied to the
products and technology of tomorrow.
I'm confident American products can
compete in world markets if they can
enter foreign markets as easily as
foreign products can enter ours. Cur-
rently, they can't. Restrictions and
tariffs limit U.S. imports into Japan and
Korea. In our meetings I've insisted that
reciprocity and open markets are vital to
our mutual prosperity.

Prime Minister Nakasone and I have
agreed on an agenda for progress to
reduce and gradually eliminate these
barriers. My goal is to help our farmers
bring Japanese consumers lower prices
for beef, citrus, and other agricultural
goods, help our mining, coal, and gas in-
dustries export energy resources to a
resource-poor Japan, and help our com-
munications industries find new markets
for their satellites and other products.

I also encouraged the Prime Min-
ister to open his capital markets to more
foreign investment. This will increase
demand for Japanese yen, helping its
price rise in relation to the dollar,
thereby making it easier for the

Japanese to buy our products and mak-
ing our products better able to compete
in other markets.

Economic issues are important, but
as I noted, freedom and peace exist in
an uneasy climate here. We need to
remember that Japan and Korea are ke>
allies. They know what living in the
shadow of communisim is like. It was a
Japanese communications center that
tracked the cold, calculating words of
that Soviet pilot who gunned down the
Korean airliner and 269 innocent vic-
tims.

Japan contributes about $20,000 for
every U.S. soldier stationed here. Both
Korea and Japan are committed to help
us defend peace, and both are carrying
an important share of the military
burden. They and we share the same
hopes and dreams for our loved ones.
We're civilized nations believing the
same virtues of freedom and democracy.

The Williamsburg summit this sum-
mer brought together representatives of
the Atlantic alliance and Japan in a com-
mon strategy for economic growth and
military security. It demonstrated that
our free world, spread across oceans,
can join together to protect peace and
freedom.

On this trip, we and our Pacific
friends are taking another important
step forward together. We've made our
partnership stronger, and that means
tomorrow can be better for us, our
children, and people everywhere.

Until next week, thanks for listening
and God bless you.

Address before the
Korean

National Assembly,
Nov. 12, 1983"

I'm privileged to be among such friends.
I stand in your Assembly as Presidents
Eisenhower and Johnson have stood
before me. And I reaffirm, as they did,
America's support and friendship for the
Republic of Korea and its people.

Not long after the war on this penin-
sula, your President paid a visit to
Washington. In his remarks at the state

Pep a rtment of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

dinner, President Eisenhower spoke of
the Korean people's courage, stamina,
and self-sacrifice. He spoke of America's
pride in joining with the Korean people
to prevent their enslavement by the
North. In response, your first President
expressed his country's deep, deep ap-
preciation for what America had done.
He concluded by saying, "I tell you, my
friends, if I live hundreds of years, we
will never be able to do enough to pay
our debt of gratitude to you."

I have come today to tell the people
of this great nation: Your debt has long
been repaid. Your loyalty, your friend-
ship, your progress, your determination
to build something better for your peo-
ple has proven many times over the
depth of your gratitude. In these days of
turmoil and testing, the American peo-
ple are very thankful for such a constant
and devoted ally. Today, America is
grateful to you.

And we have long been friends.
Over a hundred years ago when
American ships first approached Korea,
our people knew almost nothing of each
other. Yet, the first words from the
kingdom of Chosun to the emissaries
from America were words of welcome
and hope. I would like to read part of
that greeting to the Americans, because
it tells much of the Korean people's
character.

"Of what country are you? . . . are
you well after your journey of 10,000 le
through winds and waves? Is it your
plan to barter merchandise ... or do you
rather wish to pass by to other places
and to return to your native land? All
under heaven are of one original nature,
clothes and hats are very different and
language is not the same, yet they can
treat each other with mutual friendship.
What your wish is, please make it
known. . . ."

The journey from America is now
swift. The winds and waves no longer
endanger our way. But the rules of con-
duct which assist travelers are the same
today as they were over a century ago,
or even in ancient times. The weary are
restored, the sick healed, the lost
sheltered and returned safely to their
way. This is so on all continents among
civilized nations.

January 1984

Korean National Assembly meeting. Left to right: .'Vmbassador Walker, Secretary Shultz,
President Reagan, Mrs. Reagan, Mun-Shik Ch'ae, Speaker. Korean National Assembly,
Mrs. Ch'ae, Mrs. Shultz, and Mrs. Walker.

Our world is sadder today, because
these ancient and honorable practices
could not protect the lives of some re-
cent travelers. Instead of offering
assistance to a lost civilian airliner, the
Soviet Union attacked. Instead of offer-
ing condolences, it issued denials. In-
stead of offering reassurances, it
repeated its threats. Even in the search
for our dead, the Soviet Union barred
the way. This behavior chilled the entire
world. The people of Korea and the
United States shared a special grief and
anger.

My nation's prayers went out to the
Korean families who lost loved ones
even as we prayed for our own. May I
ask you today to pause for a moment of
silence for those who perished. Please
join me in this tribute in which the spirit
of our two peoples will be as one. [The
moment of silence was observed.]

Amen.

Growth of the Korean Economy

In recent weeks, our grief deepened.
The despicable North Korean attack in
Rangoon deprived us of trusted advisers
and friends. So many of those who died
had won admirers in America as they

studied with us or guided us with their
counsel. I personally recall the wisdom
and composure of Foreign Minister Lee,
with whom I met in Washington just a
few short months ago. To the families
and countrymen of all those who were
lost, America expresses its deep sorrow.

We also pledge to work with your
government and others in the interna-
tional community to censure North
Korea for its uncivilized behavior. Let
every aggressor hear our words, because
Americans and Koreans speak with one
voice. People who are free will not be
slaves, and freedom will not be lost in
the Republic of Korea.

We in the United States have suf-
fered a similar savage act of terrorism
in recent weeks. Our marines in
Lebanon were murdered by madmen
who cannot comprehend words like
"reason" or "decency." They seek to
destroy not only peace but those who
search for peace. We bear the pain of
our losses just as you bear the pain of
yours. As we share friendship, we also
share grief.

I know citizens of both our countries
as well as those of other nations do not
understand the meaning of such
tragedies. They wonder why there must

be such hate. Of course, regrettably
there is no easy answer. We can place
greater value on our true friends and
allies. We can stand more firmly by
those principles that give us strength
and guide us, and we can remember that
some attack us because we symbolize
what they do not: hope, promise, the
future. Nothing exemplifies this better
than the progress of Korea. Korea is
proof that people's lives can be better.
And I want my presence today to draw
attention to a great contrast. I'm talking
about the contrast between your
economic miracle in the South and their
economic failure in the North.

In the early years following World
War II, the future of Korea and of all
Asia was very much in doubt. Against
the hopes of Korea and other new na-
tions for prosperity and freedom stood
the legacies of war, poverty, and colonial
rule. In the background of this struggle,
the great ideological issues of our era
were heard: Would the future of the
region be democratic or totalitarian?
Communism, at that time, seemed to of-
fer rapid industrialization. The notion
that the people of the region should
govern their own lives seemed to some
an impractical and undue luxury. But
Americans and the people of Korea

shared a different vision of the future.

Then North Korea burst across the
border, intent on destroying this coun-
try. We were a world weary of war, but
we did not hesitate. The United States
as well as other nations of the world
came to your aid against the aggression,
and tens of thousands of Americans
gave their lives in defense of freedom.

As heavy as this price was, the
Korean people paid an even heavier one.
Civilian deaths mounted to the hundreds
of thousands. President Johnson said
before this very Assembly "Who will
ever know how many children starved?
How many refugees lie in unmarked

Republic of Korea— A Profile

People

Noun and adjective: Korean(s). Population
(1983): 40 million. Annual ^owth rate:
1.6%. Ethnic groups: Korean; small Chinese
minority. Religions: Buddhism, Christianity,
Shamanism, Confucianism. Language:
Korean. Education: Years compulsory — 6.
Number of students — 9,951,000. Attend-
ance— oi those eligible 91.65% attend middle
school, 56.8% high school, and 13.9% college
(1980). Literacy— over 90%. Health: 1 doc-
tor/1,554 persons (1979). Infant mortality
rate— 3211,000 (1982). Life expectancy— 6S
yrs. (1979). Work force (14,722,000, 1982):
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing — 30.6%.
Mining and manufacturing — 22.4%. Serv-
ices— 41%.

Geography

Area: 98,.500 sq. km. (38,000 sq. mi.); about
the size of Indiana. Cities: Capital — Seoul
(1980 pop. over 8 million). Other major
cities — Pusan (over 3 million), Taegu (1.7
million), Inchon (1 million), Kwangju
(727,000), Taejon (651,000). Terrain: Partial-
ly forested mountain ranges, separated by
deep, narrow valleys; cultivated plains along
the coasts, particularly in the west and south.
Climate: Temperate.

Government

Type: Republic, with power centralized in a
strong executive. Independence: August 15,
1948. Constitution: July 17, 1948; revised
1962, 1972, 1980. Branches: Executive—
president (chief of state). Legislative—

unicameral National Assembly. Judicial —
Supreme Court and appellate courts. Con-
stitutional Court. Subdivisions: Nine prov-
inces, four administratively separate cities
(Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Taegu).

Political parties: Govenment party —
Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Opposition
parties — Democratic Korea Party (DKP),
Korean National Citizens Party (KNCP). Suf-
frage: Universal over age 20.

Central government budget (1983 pro-
jected): Expenditures, $13.9 billion.

Defense (1983 est.): 6% of GNP. about
one-third of national budget. Armed forces
(1982): About 600,000 active.

Economy

GNP (1982): $65,944 billion. Annual growth
rate (1961-81): 8%. Per capita GNP (1982):
$1,680. Consumer price index (1982 avg. in-
crease): 7.3%.

Natural resources: Limited coal,
tungsten, iron ore, limestone, kaolinite, and
graphite.

Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries:
18.1% of 1982 GNP. Products— rke, barley,
vegetables, fish. Arable land— 22% of land
area.

Manufacturing and mining: 35.3% of
1982 GNP. Products— Textiles, footwear,
electronics, shipbuilding, motor vehicles,
petrochemicals, industrial machinery.

Social overhead capital and other serv-
ices: 46.5% of GNP.

Trade (1982): Exports— $.23.5 billion: tex-
tiles ($5.4 billion); transportation equipment

($3.4 billion), base metals and articles ($3.1
billion), electrical products ($2.1 billion),
footwear ($1.2 billion), fish and fish products
($0.8 billion). Major markets— \JS, Japan,
European Community, Middle East. Im-
ports— $24.3 billion: crude oil ($6 billion),
grains ($0.9 billion), machinery ($4.4 billion),
chemicals and chemical products ($1.8 billion),
base metals and articles ($1.7 billion),
transportation equipment ($1.4 billion). Major
suppliers — Middle East, Japan, US.

Official exchange rate (October 1983):
About 780 won = US$1

Fiscal year: Calendar year.

Membership in International
Organizations

Official observer status at UN; active in
many UN specialized agencies (FAO, GATT,
IAEA, IBRD. ICAO, IDA, IPC, ICO, IMF,
ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO)
and other international organizations (Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee. Asian
People's Anti-Communist League, World
Anti-Communist League, Colombo Plan,
Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific, Geneva Conventions of 1949
for the Protection of War Victims, Asian
Development Bank, INTELSAT, Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, Interparliamen-
tary Union, INTERPOL); official observer
status in African Development Bank and
Organization of American States.

Taken from the Background Notes of October
1983, published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne
Reppert Reams. ■

Departnnent of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

graves along the roads south? There is
hardly a Korean family which did not
lose a loved one in the assault from the
North."

In 1951, in the midst of the war,
General Douglas MacArthur addressed a
Joint Session of our Congress. He spoke
of you, saying, "The magnificence of the
courage and fortitude of the Korean
people defies description." As he spoke
those words, our Congress interrupted
him with applause for you and your peo-
ple.

After the war, Koreans displayed
that same fortitude. Korea faced every
conceivable difficulty. Cities were in
ruins; millions were homeless and
without jobs; factories were idle or
destroyed; hunger was widespread; the
transportation system was dismem-
bered; and the economy was devastated
as a result of all these plagues. And
what did the Korean people do? You
rebuilt your lives, your families, your
homes, your towns, your businesses,
your country. And today the world
speaks of the Korean economic miracle.

The progress of the Korean economy
is virtually without precedent. With few
natural resources other than the in-
telligence and energy of your people, in
one generation you have transformed
this country from the devastation of war
to the threshold of full development.
Per capita income has risen from
about $80 in 1961 to more than 20
times— $1,700 today. Korea has become
an industrial power, a major trading na-
tion, and an economic model for develop-
ing nations throughout the world. And
you have earned the growing respect of
the international community. This is
recognized in your expanding role as
host to numerous international events,
including the 1986 Asian games and the
1988 Olympics.

Now as the years have passed, we
know our vision was the proper one.
North Korea is one of the most
repressive societies on Earth. It does
not prosper; it arms. The rapid progress
of your economy and the stagnation of
the North has demonstrated perhaps
more clearly here than anywhere else
the value of a free economic system. Let
the world look long and hard at both

January 1984

sides of the 38th Parallel and then ask:
"Which side enjoys a better life?"

The other side claims to be the wave
of the future. If that's true, why do they
need barriers, troops, and bullets to
keep their people in? The tide of history
is a freedom tide, and communism can-
not and will not hold it back.

The United States knows what
you've accomplished here. In the 25
years following the war, America pro-
vided almost $5V2 billion in economic aid.
Today that amounts to less than 6
months' trade between us. That trade is
virtually in balance. We are at once
Korea's largest market and largest
source of supplies. We're a leading
source of the investment and technology
needed to fuel further development.
Korea is our ninth largest trading part-
ner, and our trade is growing.

Korea's rapid development benefited
greatly from the free flow of trade
which characterized the 1960s and
1970s. Today, in many countries, the call
for protectionism is raised. I ask Korea
to join with the United States in reject-
ing those projectionist pressures to en-
sure that the growth you've enjoyed is
not endangered by a maze of restrictive
practices.

And just as we work together
toward prosperity, we work toward
security. Let me make one thing very
plain. You are not alone, people of
Korea. America is your friend, and we
are with you.

U.S. Commitment to
Security Assistance

This year marks the 30th anniversary of
the mutual defense treaty between the
United States and the Republic of
Korea. The preamble to that treaty af-
firms the determination of our two coun-
tries to oppose aggression and to
strengthen peace in the Pacific. We re-
main firmly committed to that treaty.
We seek peace on the peninsula. And
that is why U.S. soldiers serve side by
side with Korean soldiers along your
demilitarized zone. They symbolize the
U.S. commitment to your security and
the security of the region. The United

U.S. Ambassador to
the Republic of Korea

Richard Louis Walker, a native of Penn-
sylvania, graduated from Drew University
and holds a master's degree and doctorate
from Yale University, where he subsequently
taught prior to going to South Carolina.

Ambassador Walker has specialized in the
politics and international relations of East
Asia since World War II, when he served
with Army Intelligence as a Chinese inter-
preter in the Pacific Theater.

He has been the James F. Byrnes Pro-
fessor of International Relations and Director
of the Institute of International Studies at
the University of South Carolina for more
than two decades. He has also served on the
faculty of the National War College and as a
consultant for both the Departments of State
and Defense.

Well known throughout East Asia, and
especially in Korea where he has lived and
visited on numerous occasions over the past
three decades, Ambassador Walker's
numerous writings on problems of peace and
security in Asia have been published in
Korea, Japan, and the United States. He was
appointed Ambassador to Korea on July 24,
1981. ■

States will stand resolutely by you, just
as we stand with our allies in Europe
and around the world.

In Korea, especially, we have
learned the painful consequences of
weakness. I am fully aware of the
threats you face only a few miles from
here. North Korea is waging a campaign
of intimidation. Their country is on a
war footing, with some 50 divisions and
brigades and 750 combat aircraft. The
North has dug tunnels under the de-
militarized zone in their preparations for
war. They are perched and primed for
conflict. They attacked you in Rangoon,
and yet, in spite of such constant threats
from the North, you have progressed.

Our most heartfelt wish is that one
day the vigil will no longer be needed.
America shares your belief that con-
frontation between North and South is
not inevitable. Even as we stand with
you to resist aggression from the North,
we will work with you to strengthen the
peace on the peninsula.

Korea today remains the most firmly
divided of the states whose division
stemmed from World War II. Austrian
unity was reestablished peacefully 10
years after the war. Germany remains
divided, but some of the pain of that
division has been eased by the inner-
German agreement of a decade ago. I
know the Korean people also long for
reconciliation. We believe that it must be
for the people of this peninsula to work
toward that reconciliation, and we ap-
plaud the efforts you've made to begin a
dialog. For our part, we would, as we've
often stressed, be willing to participate
in discussions with North Korea in any
forum in which the Republic of Korea
was equally represented. The essential
way forward is through direct discus-
sions between South and North.

Americans have watched with a mix-
ture of sadness and joy your campaign
to reunite families separated by war. We
have followed the stories of sisters torn
apart at the moment of their parents'
death; of small children swept away in
the tides of war; of people who have
grown old not knowing whether their
families live or have perished.

I've heard about the program that
uses television to reunite families that
have been torn apart Today, I urge

North Korea: It is time to participate in
this TV reunification program and to
allow your people to appear. I would say
to them, whatever your political dif-
ferences with the South, what harm can
be done by letting the innocent families
from North and South know of their
loved ones' health and welfare? Full
reunification of families and peoples is a
most basic human right.

Until the day arrives, the United
States, like the Republic of Korea, ac-
cepts the existing reality of two Korean
States and supports steps leading to im-
proved relations among those states and
their allies.

We have also joined with you over
the past 2 years in proposing measures
which, if accepted, would reduce the risk
of miscalculation and the likelihood of
violence on the peninsula. The proposals
we have made, such as mutual notifica-
tion and observation of military exer-
cises, are similar to ones negotiated in
Europe and observed by NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. These proposals are not
intended to address fundamental
political issues, but simply to make this
heavily armed peninsula a safer place.
For we must not forget that on the
peninsula today there are several times
more men under arms and vastly more
firepower than in June of 1950. We will
continue to support efforts to reduce
tensions and the risks of war.

I have spoken of the need for
vigilance and strength to deter aggres-
sion and preserve peace and economic
progress, but there is another source of
strength, and it is well represented in
this assembly. The development of
democratic political institutions is the
surest means to build the national con-
sensus that is the foundation of true
security.

The United States realizes how dif-
ficult political development is when,
even as we speak, a shell from the
North could destroy this Assembly. My
nation realizes the complexities of keep-
ing a peace so that the economic miracle
can continue to increase the standard of
living of your people. The United States
welcomes the goals that you have set for
political development and increased

respect for human rights for democratic
practices. We welcome President Chun's
farsighted plans for a constitutional
transfer of power in 1988. Other
measures for further development of
Korean political life will be equally im-
portant and will have our warm support.

Now, this will not be a simple proc-
ess because of the ever-present threat
from the North. But I wish to assure
you once again of America's unwavering
support and the high regard of
democratic peoples everywhere as you
take the bold and necessary steps
toward political development.

Over 100 years ago you asked
earlier American travelers to make their
wishes known. I come today to you with
our answer: Our wish is for peace and
prosperity and freedom for an old and
valued ally.

In Washington several weeks ago, a
memorial service was held for those who
had perished on Flight 007. During that
service, a prayer was read. I would like
to read you that prayer, because it is a
prayer for all mankind.

"0 God . . .

Look with compassion on the whole
human family;

Take away the arrogance and hatred
which infect our hearts;

Break down the walls that separate
us;

Unite us in bonds of love;

And work through our struggle and
confusion to accomplish your pur-
pose on earth;

That, in your good time, all the na-
tions and races may serve you in
harmony ..."

That, too, is our wish and prayer.
Onyonghi Keshipshiyo. [Stay in peace.]

Remarks at Reception
for Korean
Community Leaders,
Nov. 12, 1983^2

Nancy and I are honored to be so warm-
ly greeted by your distinguished group.
We've come to Korea to demonstrate
the deep and affectionate concern that
the American people have for your coun-

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

try. Our hearts went out to you in the
wake of the two murderous attacks on
your citizens, and we came today to say
that we'll continue to stand steadfastly
by you. We hope our presence in your
country will show the world our firm
support for Korea.

Probably the most important con-
tribution we can make here is to con-
tinue helping protect your national
security. Our shared commitment to
your defense is symbolized by the
presence of American soldiers standing
with Koreans along the demilitarized
zone. This is the shield that enables you
to pursue your bold economic and
political objectives.

We also support your development
of a democratic political system. As you
know, the United States pays close at-
tention to political developments in
Korea, particularly those that are affect-
ing democratic rights — a matter very
important to Americans. We do this not
because we believe our security commit-
ment gives us a right to intervene in
your internal affairs but simply because
such issues are at the center of our own
poHtical ideology and, we feel, are
reflected, then, in our foreign policy.

But in approaching such internal
matters, I believe it's important to
adhere to the discipline of diplomacy,
rather than indulging in public postur-
ing. This has been the policy of our Ad-
ministration throughout the world.
Where we feel strongly about a par-
ticular situation, we make our views
known, often quite candidly, to the ap-
propriate level of the government con-
cerned.

I have faith in the Korean people's
ability to find a political system meeting
their democratic aspirations, even in the
face of the heavy security challenge
presented by the North. You have ac-
complished so much already in the face
of that threat. Who would have
predicted a mere 20 years ago that an
impoverished Korea would become one
of the world's legendary economic suc-
cess legends?

This was a Korean accomplishment.
Your friends offered help and guidance
as these were needed, but they didn't
seek to dictate your course. Political
development may, in some respects, be a

January 1984

more difficult process, but it, too, is one
in which you alone must control.

I respect and strongly support Presi-
dent Chun's pledge to turn over power
constitutionally in 1988. This will be an
invaluable political legacy to the Korean
people. And I believe in the will and
ability of the Korean people to develop
the foundations required for viable
democratic institutions. The shared
democratic aspirations of our two
peoples are important to our relation-
ship, and continued progress toward the
broadening of democracy in Korea
strengthens the ties between our two
countries. As you continue along this
path of political evolution, you do so
with our deep support, our affection,
and our prayers.

And, again, we thank you from the
bottom of our hearts for your warm and
very gracious welcome from the first
moment that we arrived here today. We
are deeply grateful. God bless you.

Dinner Toast,
Nov. 12. 1983'^

Nancy and I both want to thank you and
Madame Chun for your gracious
hospitality and your warm words of
welcome to us. We're delighted and
honored to return here to visit your
dynamic country.

Much has been written concerning
the Korean economic miracle of the past
decades. The startling industry and
progress of the Korean people are gain-
ing increasing international recognition
and respect. Only recently, the Inter-
parliamentary Union met in Seoul, and a
new series of international events will
culminate here in the 1988 Summer
Olympics. This will be a proud moment
for Korea. You and the Korean people
have every right to feel joy in your
hearts.

As Korea grows in international
stature, you will hear increasing calls for
assistance from allies and friends, calls
to defend and promote the values —
political, economic, humanitarian — that
both our peoples seek to live by.

Our mutual belief in economic
freedom, for example, must not only be
defended but spread as far as possible
throughout the world. The 66 years that
have followed the Russian Revolution
and its attempt to turn Communist
theory into practice have been marked
by tragic failure. Innumerable variations
of the Marxist economic system have
brought stagnation, waste, and hardship
to many countries and many peoples.
We must never tire of reminding the
world of this. We must never tire of ex-
plaining and promoting the free market
system and its benefits.

And so, too, we must resist internal
threats to our economic freedom, the
calls to choke off international trade, to
somehow protect jobs by denying our
consumers the benefits of freedom of
choice. The $12 billion in trade between
our two countries has provided in-
numerable jobs to both our nations, and
we must redouble our efforts to expand
rather than constrict that trade.
Our political values also face
unremitting challenges. Democracy and
freedom of opinion are virtues the free
world must cherish and defend. They
distinguish us from totalitarian states.
They are the source of our strength as
nations, the very reason for our ex-
istence.

And finally, the most basic human
values — our concern for the rights of
the individual, our belief in the
sacredness of human life — there also,
these go to the heart of our existence.
The murder of 269 innocent people in a
defenseless airliner, the very absence
here tonight of some of your nation's
finest public servants— these events
have written in blood the stark contrast
between those nations that respect
human life and those that trample it.
The vicious attack in Rangoon
dramatizes the threat your people face.
We must stand together to confront this
dangerous challenge and to preserve the
peace. And this we will do.

The increasing strength of the
United States, our allies, and the prog-
ress of nations like Korea — as con-
trasted with the continuing failure and

moral decline of the Communist na-
tions — only serve to strengthen my con-
viction: The tide of history is a freedom
tide, and communism cannot and will
not hold it back.

Our first hundred years of friendship
are history; we are now beginning to
write the history of our second hundred
years. May the new era of Korean-
American partnership be even more
fruitful than the last. And may it bring
to both our peoples a stronger prosperi-
ty, a renewed friendship and confidence,
and the genuine peace and security
which we so fervently seek.

Will you all join me in a toast to the _
Korean people, our staunch allies and |
good friends, and to the President of the tS
Republic of Korea and Madame Chun. |

Remarks to
Assembled Troops,
Nov. 13, 1983^"

It's an honor for me to be with you. And
as you see, this morning, the first thing
when I got here, somebody made sure
that I would be dressed in what the well-
dressed man, American, is wearing, and
I'm very proud to have that. Somebody
asked me if I'd be safe up here so close
to North Korean troops, and I said, "I'll
be with the 2d Infantry Division."

You know, this prompts a story, and
I can't help but tell it. Back in World
War II days a young draftee was com-
plaining about some of the methods of
the Army and the way the Army did
things and was asking an old Regular
Army sergeant about this. And the
Regular Army sergeant said, "Son, look,
if you were in charge of a brand new
country and you were creating your
army for that brand new country and
you finally got a division created, what
would you call it?" And the kid said,
"Well, I guess I'd call it the 1st
Division." He said: "Well, in the United
States they called the first one the 2d
Division and," he said: "when you
understand that, you'll understand
everything there is to know about the
Army."

This has been an experience that I
will always remember. "There's no better
proof of the relationship between

Camp Liberty Bell, Guard Post Collier. Escorted by Second Lt. Charles A. Preysler,
Guard Post Commander, President Reagan views North Korean positions from the Guard
Post Observation Deck at the DMZ (demilitarized zone).

strength and freedom than right here on
the DMZ [demilitarized zone] in Korea.
You are in the frontlines of freedom and
I want each of you to know that I bring
you warm greetings from your family
and friends back in the States. And I
bring something else, too — the gratitude
of 230 million Americans who told me to
tell you. "We love you, 2d Infantry Divi-
sion."

You stand between the free world
and the armed forces of a system that is
hostile to everything we believe in as
Americans. The Communist system to
the North is based on hatred and op-
pression. It brutally attacks every form
of human liberty and declares those who
worship God to be enemies of the peo-
ple. Its attack against the leaders of the
South Korean Government in Rangoon
made clear what kind of enemy you face
across the DMZ.

In so many ways the Korean Penin-
sula is symbolic of the larger world. In
the South, energy and creativity abound.
The positive mood of the people, their

enthusiasm and work are propelling this
part of Korea into the 21st century and
a new era of opportunity and prosperity.
To the North, the Communist regime's
heavy hand stagnates the economy, sup-
presses the spirit of the people. Like
most Communist regimes, the only thing
it can produce well is repression and
military might. The only thing deterring
the use of that miltiary might is a com-
mitment by the Korean people here in
the South and the dedication of brave
men and women like yourselves.

You in the 2d Infantry Division and
in the other branches of the Armed
Forces are our shield against the tyr-
anny and the deprivation that engulfs so
much of the world.

After speaking to many Koreans
both in and out of government, I know
that they, like our citizens, are pro-
foundly grateful to you. We fully under-
stand the hardship of your task. We
know about the cold, windswept nights
that leave you aching from head to foot,
I'm sure. We know about having to stay
awake and alert on guard duty when

Dfnartmpnt nf State Bulletin

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

you'd rather be at a movie or doing
something more pleasant back home. We
know about the birthdays and the
holidays that you can't spend with your
loved ones. And we know about the
danger. You're facing a heavily armed,
unpredictable enemy with no record — or
regard, I should say, for human life.

Let's always remember August 18th,
1976, the day that two Army officers.
Major Arthur Bonifas and First Lt.
Mark Barrett, were murdered across the
road from here by ax-wielding North
Korean troops. Let me state for the
record, and I know you feel this way,
nothing like that better happen again.

The self-doubts of the 1970s are giv-
ing way in America to a new era of con-
fidence and a sense of purpose. Com-
munism is not the wave of the future,
and it never was — freedom is. And it's
good to see people beginning to wake up
to that fact.

Yes, we, too, have our faults. But
we've got a heck of a lot more to be
proud of, and we're not afraid to say so.
In Lebanon, for example, our marines
are peacekeepers in the truest sense of
the world. We're there to give some
chance to people of that troubled land, a
region whose destiny is crucial to our
own security. More than 230 of our
marines — actually, I understand the
final count now is — the final indentifica-
tion is 239 of our marines and soldiers
gave the last, full measure of devotion in
that honorable endeavor. And each of us
is indebted to every one of them.

Recently, as you know, we sent our
forces to the island of Grenada. Some
critics compared that operation with the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Let me
just say there's something seriously
wrong with anyone who can't see the
difference between 100,000 Soviets try-
ing to force a dictatorship down the
throats of the Afghan people and
America and eight Caribbean
democracies joining to stop Cubans and
local Communists from doing the same
thing in Grenada.

And let me ask a question of my
own. Why are the Soviets being at-
tacked by the people of Afghanistan,
while our U.S. and Caribbean forces
have been greeted as liberators by the

January 1984

President Reagan addresses the 2d Infan-
try Division from a sandbag platform in the
mortar bunker area telling them that they
". . . stand between the free world and the
armed forces of a system that is hostile to
everything we believe in as Americans."

people in Grenada? The answer is: No
people in history have ever chosen to be
slaves.

We have held interviews with some
of the Soviet soldiers who have deserted
in Afghanistan. And a significant thing
is, in different areas, without their hav-
ing a chance to communicate with each
other or even knowing about each other,
one of the prime reasons they have
given us — young Russians, men like
yourselves, only from Russia — for de-
serting is they were ordered to kill
women and children. And some of them
proved that there is still some hope
there among the people if the people can
ever get a chance to speak.

People everywhere want to be free.
That's the difference between
Afghanistan and Grenada, and between
North Korea and South Korea. Let me
just repeat to you what I said to the
American people. My paramount con-
cern in Grenada was protecting the lives
of our citizens living there. And anyone
who questions whether their lives were
in jeopardy should read the letters I've
received from those students. And on
television we saw them dropping down
when they stepped off the planes in
Carolina, kissing the ground as they ar-
rived on American soil. And just the day
before I left on this trip, we had some
400 of them on the South Lawn of the
White House to meet some of the men
who had come back after freeing them.
And that's all you needed was to see
their gratitude to your comrades in
uniform, and hear their statements of
what they felt their plight was, and how
they had truly been saved.

And only 10 years ago, youngsters
of that age in too many places in our
country were throwing rocks at men in
uniform. There's a different attitude
now. And when you're rotated and
you're back home. I think you're going
to find out how proud the American peo-
ple are of you. To call what we did in
Grenada an invasion as many have, is a
slur and a misstatement of fact. It was a
rescue mission, plain and simple.

We Americans bear a heavy burden.
Others must do their part. The people of
Korea — the Republic of Korea — are cer-
tainly doing their share. Yet, if freedom
is to survive, if peace is to be main-
tained, it will depend on us. Our commit-
ment in Korea exemplifies this heavy
responsibility. We've stood shoulder to
shoulder with the Korean people for 30
years now. It reflects well on the
character of our country that we've been
willing to do this in a land so far away
from home. And in the end, it is this
strength of character that will make the
difference between slavery and
freedom — but more important, between
peace and war.

Thirty-three years ago, Americans
gallantly fought and died in the gullies,
in the hills of the Korean Peninsula
here. One of them was M. Sgt. Stanley
Adams and another was Capt. Lewis

.liu'.uHUiiuifihiiiiii'AhtiiiiimmHHiiiMihmAmHtumiiiijii^^^

Millet. They both led bayonet charges
against vastly superior forces. Another
hero was M.Sgt. Ernest Kouma, who
exposed himself to enemy fire by man-
ning his machinegun from the back of
his tank and in so doing saved his com-
rades from an onslaught that could have
devastated their ranks. A fourth was Lt.
Col. John Page, one of the heroes of the
Chosin Reservoir, whose ingenuity and
bravery saved so many.

All of these were Congressional
Medal of Honor recipients. Yet, we
know that all who fought here were
heroes and deserve our respect. They
did their duty, and by doing so they pro-
tected not only Korea but a whole
generation of Americans.

By the way, one of the children of a
Medal of Honor recipient I just men-
tioned, Capt. Lewis Millet, sent me a
telegram a few days ago in support of
the Grenada rescue mission.

Today you carry on an honorable
tradition of those who went before you.
And I know that you're keeping faith
with them and with their families and
friends. Americans are now standing tall
and firm. No terrorist should question
our resolve, and no tyrant should doubt
our courage. Your division motto is "Fit
to fight, second to none." Well, you've
lived up to that motto, and we're proud
of you for it. And with your courage and
dedication as an example, we're going to
make as certain as we can that the
United States remains second to none.
I have never been as proud as I am
right now and from what I've seen here.
And I know that in spite of what I said
about our people back home, I'm not
sure that very many of them realize that
you aren't just sitting here doing some
kind of garrison duty. I'm going to do
everything I can to make sure that the
folks back home know what you really
are doing.

So, soldiers of the 2d Infantry Divi-
sion, God bless you, and God bless
America.

Secretary Shultz's
Interview,
Nov. 13, 1983^'

Q. Secretary Shultz, you're in Seoul,
Korea, coining in by satellite. Thanks
very much for coming in to talk with
us today. It's a pleasure to have you
with us. Could I ask you first— Presi-
dent Reagan says today, yesterday,
that North Korea is poised and ready
for a war. Is that— did you see that as
an immediate threat? How do you see
that?

A. They have made lots of threats.
They are somewhat mobilized. They are
very well armed. They make continual
talks about their aggressive intentions.
They've made an effort to murder the
President of South Korea and did suc-
ceed in murdering a number of promi-
nent Cabinet members; so that's a pretty
war-like stance.

Q. North Korea has even issued
threats against President Reagan,
rather blustery threats. Why do they
do things like that? Do you take them
seriously?

A. Of course, you have to take
threats seriously and— when you see
what they did in Rangoon; however, the
security here is very good, and the
President is determined; he's not a per-
son who gets intimidated.

Q. What was his purpose in going
to the DMZ? What sort of message did
he want to send by doing that?

A. It's a visit to our forces there, an
encouragement to our forces, and it
sends the message of the determination
of the United States to stand in there in
this battle, for freedom.

Q. Perhaps we're just all becom-
ing callous, but it does seem that the
attack on the South Korean Govern-
ment officials, that North Korea
seems to have carried out in Burma,
was a quite extraordinary development
even by the standards of this century.
Is there anything the United States, in
conjunction with its allies, and par-
ticularly its European allies who have
commercial dealings with North

Korea, can or will do as a sanction
against North Korea after that attack?

A. We have practically, or no deal-
ings with North Korea, but we have
been working with others encouraging
others, on the one hand, to develop their
relations with South Korea, and on the
other, to curtail or eliminate their rela-
tions with North Korea as a response to
this uncivilized and totally unacceptable
pattern of behavior. So it has been a
strong effort on the diplomatic side to
work at it that way.

I might say we were struck by the
strength of view in Japan and their
determination to register exactly this
same kind of point. So we've been work-
ing with the South Koreans on this and
with the Japanese and others.

Q. The Europeans don't seem ter-
ribly concerned with SS-20s that are
not targeted on European targets, but
Korea and Japan, being nonnuclear
nations, are understandably upset
about this. Can the United States ac-
cept an agreement on intermediate-
range forces that leave in place a
significant number of SS-20s,
targeted at Japan and Korea?

A. What we are doing is taking a
global approach to these negotiations.
That has been the approach right from
the beginning. It's been the approach
that has been worked out within our
NATO allies. They don't have any
doubts in their minds about the impor-
tance of that approach. That has been
the nature of the bargaining and has
been the nature of our proposals, right
along.

Where, within a global limit, the
Soviet Union chooses to deploy its
weapons, of course, is another matter. It
has to be global because the SS-20s are
mobile missiles, and if you limit them in
one area, but not in another, you really
haven't accomplished very much.

Q. It is said that Soviet President
Andropov is seriously ill. Would his
passing from the scene in any way af-
fect the chances of an arms agree-
ment? Does it really matter to us who
is in charge at this moment as they go
through a power transition in the
Soviet Union?

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

A. I have no information on Mr.
Andropov's health, beyond what is
generally available to everybody; but any
time you have uncertainty and transition
in government, it tends to make the
situation a little less decisive or, at least,
probably that way. But I think it's up to
us, not so much to speculate about what
the Soviet Union may do or what its
leadership may be, but to say to
ourselves, what should we do? And we
know what we should do. We know that
we have to be realistic about what is
taking place in the Soviet Union— their
arms buildup, their attitude, their
strength, and their weaknesses.

At the same time, we have to be
reasonable and ready to negotiate and
ready to work out problems, and Presi-
dent Reagan has been in that posture
right along and will remain in that
posture.

Q. We are promising to join with
South Korea in its defense should that
become necessary, should there be an
attack from the north, while at the
same time —

A. It isn't a question of promising.
We are here. We have almost 40,000
troops here. We fought on this penin-
sula; and so it's a matter of deeds and
presence, not promises.

Q. I was about to say that in this
country and, indeed, in South Korea
itself, there continues to be a good
deal of complaint about a militarist
government, with dissidents locked up
and so on. What's your view of that?

A. There are some problems here.
We work at them. The President spoke
eloquently in the National Assembly and
to a group — a cross-section of Korean
leaders yesterday where I was pres-
ent — on the importance of advances
toward democratic principles. I must say
that I talked with a number of people at
the meeting who are active in the
defense of people whose political rights
have been curtailed. So there are prob-
lems.

On the other hand, there has been a
considerable amount of progress, and
you do have to remember that when a
neighbor is challenging you, and has
done such things as this almost-

January 1984

unimaginable murder of members of
your government, you have to take some
pretty strong measures; so we're work-
ing both sides of the street — and I think
pretty effectively— on this.

Q. As you travel, all the world's
troubles travel with you, presumably,
including Lebanon. 'There seems to be
a lot of feeling that Syria's real aim in
Lebanon is domination and, perhaps,
even annexation of a large part of
Lebanon. How would you characterize
Syria's aims? And what, if anything,
can the United States do to alter
them?

A. Syria, of course, does have
legitimate concerns and a long, historic
relationship with Lebanon. Nobody quar-
rels with that or expects that it would
ever be different. It wouldn't even be
desirable for it to be different. If you
look at the map, you see that Lebanon
has got Israel on its southern border;
the rest, other than the sea, is Syria. So
it is bound to have a close relationship
with Syria.

A dominant relationship, however,
would be different and, I think, has its
implications for the peacefulness of the
Middle East, generally. A Syria domi-
nant over the PLO, dominant over the
region, and exerting itself in a negative
way on peace with Israel, would be, in
my judgment, a bad thing.

Q. Is that what you think—

A. But we will continue — we will
continue to work with Syria, and we
hope that the Lebanon situation will
straighten itself out. I might say that
the Geneva talks on reconciliation have
gone rather well, at least as compared
with people's expectations.

Q. Do you reject the view that
domination of a large part of Lebanon
is a Syrian aim?

A. Syria does dominate a large part
of Lebanon. It occupies the whole Bekaa
Valley and exerts a very considerable in-
fluence. That's just a description of the
present situation. And my guess is that
they certainly do aim to have a domi-
nant voice.

Q. With Judge [William] Clark
gone from the White House, and Mr.

McFarlane now the President's Na-
tional Security Adviser, you read lots
of stories about how you are, finally
and at last, in charge — and a real
tough guy. How do you feel, reading
those stories?

A. I'm not in charge— you know
that.

Q. All right, the President is in
charge.

A. The President is in charge.

Q. But, after him, you are his
prophet.

A. I might say that the President
has done an absolutely remarkable job
on this trip, considering the time zone
change and everything. He hit the
ground running and he's carried the trip
all the way.

So he is very much in charge. I find
Bud McFarlane a great person to work
with. He's knowledgeable, a broad-
gauged person, and we have a very good
working relationship, as I did with
Judge Clark.

Q. But it is said that you advanced
the cause for military intervention in
Grenada, and that you are taking a
very tough line in Lebanon.

A. As far as the Grenada operation
is concerned, every one of the
President's advisers agreed on the Presi-
dent's decision. There was no difference
of opinion. I think it was a very clear-cut
case but a difficult decision. The Presi-
dent stepped up to it very decisively and
courageously; so there was no difference
of view, and I certainly totally support
what was done.

Joint Statement,
Nov. 14, 1983^'

1. At the invitation of President Chun
Doo Hwan, the President of the United
States and Mrs. Ronald Reagan paid a
state visit to the Republic of Korea from
November 12 to 14, 1983. The two
Presidents met at the Blue House on
November 12 and again on November 13

for discussions of both bilateral and
world affairs. The talks were held in a
most cordial and open atmosphere.

President Reagan addressed the Na-
tional Assembly, visited field installa-
tions of both the Korean and the U.S.
Armed Forces, and also met with senior
Korean officials, other Korean citizens,
and a group of American businessmen.

2. President Chun expressed his ap-
preciation to President Reagan for
America's steadfast support in the wake
of the tragedies which the people of
Korea have endured so recently: the
September 1 Soviet attack on a Korean
civil airliner and the October 9 North
Korean terrorist attack in Burma which
tragically claimed the lives of 17 inno-
cent Koreans, among them many of the
nation's most important leaders in
economics, diplomacy, and politics.

Both Presidents noted the throrough
and conclusive investigation by the
Government of Burma of the Rangoon
bomb atrocity, which has produced une-
quivocal evidence that the North Korean
regime perpetrated this deliberate act of
state terrorism. They agreed that such
acts cannot be tolerated and called for
effective international sanctions against
North Korea. President Reagan af-
firmed his admiration for the resolution
and courage of the Korean people and
their leaders in the face of these bar-
baric acts.

President Chun expressed his con-
dolences to President Reagan and the
American people on the tragic loss of
life caused by the October 23 attack on
the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.
President Chun and President Reagan
joined in declaring the unswerving op-
position of the Korean and American
peoples to such acts of terrorism and
pledged continued efforts to remove the
scourge of terrorism from the earth.

3. The two Heads of State ex-
changed views on a variety of interna-
tional issues of mutual concern. Presi-
dent Reagan outlined U.S. determina-
tion to strengthen the defenses of the
United States and its allies around the
world, to bring about a reduction of ten-
sions in volatile regions such as the Mid-
dle East, and to reach an agreement
with the Soviet Union to reduce the

global deployment of strategic weapons.

President Chun explained in detail
the overall security situation on the
Korean Peninsula with particular
reference to the continuing threat from
North Korea, reflected in its military
buildup and aggravated by its domestic
problems.

Both Presidents reaffirmed the im-
portance of maintaining deterrence and
stability on the Korean Peninsula,
thereby ensuring peace there and in
Northeast Asia, a region of critical
strategic significance.

President Reagan stated that the
United States would continue to fulfill
its role and responsibilities as a Pacific
power, dedicated to maintaining peace
and stability in the region. President
Chun avowed his full support for these
efforts.

4. In particular. President Reagan,
noting the security of the Republic of
Korea is pivotal to the peace and stabili-
ty of Northeast Asia and in turn, vital to
the security of the United States, reaf-
firmed the continuing strong commit-
ment of the United States to the securi-
ty of the Republic of Korea. The two
Presidents pledged to uphold the obliga-
tions embodied in the Republic of Korea-
United States Mutual Defense Treaty
signed in 1953, noting the success of
that alliance in deterring aggression for
more than 30 years.

President Reagan stressed that the
United States would continue to main-
tain U.S. forces in Korea and to
strengthen their capabilities. President
Chun reaffirmed his support for the
presence in Korea of American military
forces as part of the United Nations and
Combined Forces Commands.

President Reagan noted that Korea
spends 6% of its GNP on defense and
further noted the efforts of the Republic
of Korea to modernize and upgrade its
defense capabilities. The two Presidents
concurred that the program is essential
if peace is to be maintained. President
Reagan reconfirmed that the United
States will continue to make available
the weapons systems and technology'
necessary to enhance the strength of
Korea's armed forces.

5. President Chun explained the
Korean government's continuing efforts

for the resumption of dialogue between
South and North Korea and its policy
for peaceful reunification with a view to
easing tensions on the Korean Penin-
sula, and achieving the Korean people's
long-cherished aspiration for peaceful
reunification. Expressing support of the
United States for the sincere and patient
efforts of the Republic of Korea. Presi-
dent Reagan especially noted President
Chun's comprehensive Proposal for
Democratic Reunification through Na-
tional Reconciliation put forth on
January 22, 1982.

President Reagan reconfirmed that
the United States would not undertake
talks with North Korea without full and
equal participation of the Republic of
Korea. The two Presidents reaffirmed
that any unilateral steps toward North
Korea which are not reciprocated
toward the Republic of Korea by North
Korea's principal allies would not be con-
ducive to promoting stability or peace in
the area.

6. President Reagan expressed his
admiration and support for the expand-
ing and increasingly active international
diplomacy of the Republic of Korea, and
took note of the determination of the
Republic of Korea to pursue an open
door policy of dialogue with all nations.

The two Presidents noted the
significance of their respective nation's
role as the hosts to important global
gatherings and events, including the Los
Angeles Olympics of 1984 and the Seoul
Olympics of 1988. Both countries will
abide by their commitments to admit
representatives of all nations to par-
ticipate in these international events.

7. Recognizing the growing impor-
tance of the Asia-Pacific region and also
the growing sense of community among
the Pacific rim countries, the two
Presidents agreed that frequent ex-
changes at all levels among the nations
of the Pacific are necessary to enhance
regional cohesion. They agreed that
multilateral relations among the coun-
tries in the region should be further
strengthened in the fields of trade,
finance, science, technology, culture, and
tourism.

8. The two Presidents expressed
their belief that the Republic of Korea
should be accepted in the United Nations

Department of State Bulletin

k. BtL •■!:.__ _.

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and tlie
Republic of Korea

pursuant to the principle of universality
of the United Nations and that the entry
of the Republic of Korea to the United
Nations would contribute both to the
reduction of tensions on the Korean
Peninsula and the maintenance of inter-
national peace. President Reagan prom-
ised continuing support for the entry of
the Republic of Korea into the United
Nations.

9. The two Presidents affirmed the
importance of defending and strengthen-
ing freedom and the institutions that
serve freedom, openness, and political
stability.

10. President Chun and President
Reagan exchanged views on a range of
economic issues. They noted the impor-
tance of ensuring that global economic
recovery not be hindered by reversion to
protectionism. In particular, President
Reagan welcomed the trade liberaliza-
tion measures being undertaken and
planned by the Korean Government,
despite its continuing deficit in foreign
trade and the global trend of protec-
tionism. Both Presidents agreed that
such steps are an example of the
positive actions all trading nations must
take to defend the world trade system
against protectionist attacks and
recognize an urgent need for concerted
international efforts in this direction.

Both Presidents noted with satisfac-
tion the continued expansion of bilateral
trade, which totaled over $11 billion in
1982, making the Republic of Korea one
of the United States' most important
trading partners and fifth largest
market for U.S. agricultural products,
and the United States the Republic of
Korea's largest trading partner in ex-
ports as well as imports. They agreed
that this continued growth of bilateral
trade attests to the vitality of
U.S. -Korean economic relations.

President Chun also expressed his
appreciation for President Reagan's
strong commitment to free trade and
hoped that the Republic of Korea's ma-
jor export commodities will be given
greater access to the U.S. market with
the continuation of the Republic of
Korea's eligibility for GSP [generalized
system of preferences] benefits on a
nondiscriminatory basis. President
Reagan took note of President Chun's

January 1984

views on the issues. In this regard, both
Presidents recognized the necessity of
coordinated actions by their respective
governments to reduce various tariff
and nontariff barriers.

11. President Chun explained the re-
cent efforts by the Korean Government
to create a more favorable environment
for foreign investment in the Republic of
Korea and invited the United States to
take advantage of such improved oppor-
tunities. Both Presidents noted that a
hospitable climate for foreign investors
in both countries will continue to con-
tribute to the flow of technology and to
an expansion of employment oppor-
tunities in the Republic of Korea and the
United States. Both Presidents also
noted that the continued participation of
American firms in the Republic of
Korea's major development projects by
providing competitively priced and high-
quality goods and services is another in-
dication of the strong and cooperative
economic ties that link the Republic of
Korea and the United States.

12. President Chun and President
Reagan discussed prospects for further
broadening cooperation in the fields of
technology and energy. They agreed to
further promote programs for scientific
and technological cooperation.

President Reagan assured President
Chun that the United States will remain
a reliable supplier of energy resources
and energy technology, and in par-
ticular, that the United States will seek
to assist the Republic of Korea to obtain
stable energy supplies in the event of a
security emergency. In this regard.
President Reagan noted positively the
Korean Government's efforts to build up
energy reserves for economic emergen-
cies. President Chun expressed his ap-
preciation for the U.S. pledge, and the
Republic of Korea's interest in the pur-
chase and development of energy
resources in the United States.

13. President Chun and President
Reagan took note of the strong and
myriad bonds of friendship and coopera-
tion that have linked the United States
and the Republic of Korea in the
postwar era and judged those ties to be

in excellent condition. As one reflection
of the expanding scope and importance
of those relationships, President Reagan
informed President Chun of the inten-
tion of the United States to establish in
the near future a consulate in Pusan,
Korea's second greatest city and a focal
point of the U.S. -Korean economic inter-
course. President Chun welcomed that
decision.

President Chun and President
Reagan pledged to carry forward the
full range of security, political,
economic, scientific, and cultural
meetings and consultations on our joint
agenda, in order to maintain and deepen
our already excellent relations in those
diverse fields.

14. The two Presidents underscored
the necessity for the promotion of
mutual understanding and exchanges
between the Korean and American
peoples, and agreed to work toward ex-
panded cultural and educational ex-
changes. The two Presidents expressed
their satisfaction with the promotion of
American studies in the Republic of
Korea as well as Korean studies in the
United States.

15. President and Mrs. Reagan ex-
pressed their deep appreciation to Presi-
dent and Mrs. Chun for the warm
welcome they received in the Republic of
Korea, and their heartfelt thanks to the
people of the Republic of Korea for the
hospitality, graciousness, and good will
they had been shown.

The two Presidents agreed that ex-
changes of visits between the two
Presidents have contributed to the fur-
ther development of the existing friendly
relations between the two countries. In
that context. President Reagan asked
President Chun to visit Washington
again at a mutually convenient time and
President Chun accepted that invitation
with appreciation.

>iin!n,intiiii

mmiiiUiMmMmmMu^mi^^^^^

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Arrival Remarks,
Nov. 14, 1983"

Thank you all for coming out to greet
us, and thank you for minding the store
while we were away. I know I speak for
Nancy and for everyone of our party
when I say it's great to be home.

We won't keep you long, but I just
want to tell you how proud I am of
everyone who helped make this trip a
great success. We traveled nearly 16,000
miles to visit two countries that are vital
to us and to our future. Japan and
Korea have very different roots from
our own, but each of us is a Pacific na-
tion, and we're bound together by a
great treasure of shared values— our
love of freedom and democracy, the
drive, determination, and skill of our
people, and our optimism for the future.

Mike Mansfield, our very wise Am-
bassador in Tokyo, likes to say, "The
next century will be the century of the
Pacific." And he's right. The East Asian
and Pacific region is growing faster than
any other region in the world. Japan has
become our largest overseas trading
partner, and Korea ranks among our top
10 worldwide. We're building a future
together. This means we shoulder great
responsibilities, but we also have
tremendous opportunities. And working
as partners to make tomorrow better
and more secure is what this trip is all
about.

I'm pleased to report some good
news. America's partnerships are
stronger, and prospects for a more
secure peace and prosperity are better
today than a week ago.

In Japan we established an agenda
for progress so we can solve problems
and create jobs, security, and safety for
our families and for theirs. That agenda
ranges from efforts to lower trade bar-
riers to assisting recovery of the U.S.
auto industry, to expanding our energy
trade, promoting greater investment in
capital markets, cooperating in defense
technology, encouraging exports and im-
ports of high technology, coordinating

our foreign assistance efforts, and ex-
panding our cultural programs.

We also agreed on an approach to
correct the imbalance between the
Japanese yen and the American dollar.
Our currencies should reflect the
political stability and economic strength
that our two countries enjoy. In Japan's
case this will mean a stronger yen,
which means that American products
will compete more effectively in world
markets.

Because of the breadth and complex-
ity of these issues, I intend to establish a
management group, under the leader-
ship of the Vice President, to assure
essential foUowup action. If each side is
willing to give a little, then all of us will
gain a lot.

Diplomacy is important. Strengthen-
ing the spirit of friendship is the best
way to solve problems and create lasting
partnerships. And I can't tell you how
proud I was to have the historic oppor-
tunity to address the Japanese Diet and
all the people of Japan. I told them what
we Americans feel in our hearts — that
we, like they, are people of peace, that
we deeply desire a nuclear arms reduc-
tion agreement, and that we will never
walk away from the negotiating table.

Those who disagree with the United
States get plenty of publicity. But one
thing becomes more plain to me each
time I travel: Across the globe, America
is looked to as a friend and as a leader
in preserving peace and freedom. This
was certainly true in Japan and Korea.

I was at one of the meetings in
Korea, and I just assumed that Nancy
was out sightseeing or probably even
shopping for souvenirs. And knowing
Nancy as well as I do, I wasn't surprised
when I came home and found that she
had two little Korean friends, Lee Kil
Woo and Ahn Ji Sook. They have come
over to the States where they're going
to be treated at St. Francis Hospital in
Roslyn, New York. And Nancy met
them by way of a very remarkable
woman, Harriet Hodges, who has suc-
ceeded in bringing some 600 children
like this, who needed medical attention
that could only be given here in this
country, to bring them to the United
States.

So they've had their first Air Force
[ONE] ride— or airplane ride, and
they've had their first helicopter ride,
and they've been very active for some 16
or 17 hours. [Laughter]

I wish you could have been with us
in Korea — a country scarred by the re-
cent bombing in Rangoon and the
Korean airliner tragedy. The South
Koreans live under the shadow of Com-
munist aggression. They understand the
value of freedom, and they're paying the
price to defend it. You know, sometimes
you hear events are more symbolism
than substance. There's more than sym-
bolism when over a million Koreans line
the streets to wave and cheer Americans
and to thank America for helping keep
them free.

There's more than symbolism in the
threat to the people of Seoul, who live
within range of North Korean artillery
just some 30 kilometers away. And
there's more than symbolism in the
danger to our American soldiers helping
to guard the border of the DMZ, often
in weather that leaves them freezing
from their heads to their toes.

I have just been looking forward to
telling the American people we've had
such a wrong impression. I think most
of us just sort of pictured our forces
over there as kind of garrison troops,
just waiting on hand that anything
should happen. That's not true. They are
combat ready, and they are the farthest
advanced toward a potential enemy of
any American forces in the world.

I reaffirmed to the Korean people
America's commitment to their peace
and freedom and encouraged them to
develop further their democracy. And I
must tell you that one of the most un-
forgettable experiences of my life was
the time I spent Sunday afternoon and
morning with our brave troops at the
DMZ.

If you could have been with me, you
would have been at the worship service
Sunday morning that we had with our
soldiers in an open field, less than a mile
from one of the most tyrannical regimes
on earth. And there, singing, was a
choir of little girls, not much bigger than

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Visit to

Japan and the
Republic of Korea

this one, all orphans from an orphanage
that is maintained and supported by our
GFs. And they have done this with
several others there. The young men
and women of the 2d Infantry Division
maintain those institutions.

And to hear these children closing
the service, singing "America, the
Beautiful" in our language, was a
spiritual experience. And you would
have heard, if you'd been at that service,
their chaplain telling us that we were
standing on the edge of freedom. Being
there teaches us that freedom is never
free, nor can it be purchased in one in-
stallment. We can only struggle to keep
it, pass it on to the next generation, and
hope they'll preserve it for their children
and their children's children.

And that's the risk that our soldiers
have accepted day in and day out for
more than 30 years. As that chaplain
reminded us, "Greater love hath no man
than to lay down his life for his friends."
And this they have done at the DMZ. I
was honored to meet our men, and I
promised them that I would tell the
American people how crucial their jobs

are, not just to the people of Korea but
to people everywhere who love freedom.
So much of what we take for granted
each day we owe to these heroes and
others like them around the world. They
make us so proud to be Americans.

Coming home from Korea and
Japan, all of us bring with us renewed
energy and renewed commitment to our
fundamental goals, building a new era of
peace and prosperity — just as soon as
we readjust our clocks. [Laughter]

God bless you, and God bless this
wonderful country.

'Made in the East Room of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 14, 1983).

^Made in the Banquet Hall of the Prime
Minister's official residence (text from Week-
ly Compilation of Presidential Documents of
5Jov. 21, 1983).

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of 'Nov. 21. 1983.

■•Made in the Haeoromo-No-Ma Room at
the Akasaka Palace (text from Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents of
Nov. 21, 1983).

■^Made in the Banquet Hall at the Im-
perial Palace in response to a toast by
Emperor Hirohito (text from Weekly Com-

Silation of Presidential Documents of
[ov. 21, 1983).

^Made in the Assembly Hall of the House
of Representatives at the 'National Diet
Buildmg (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983).

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983).

*Held in the Shairan-No-Ma Room of the
Akasaka Palace (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents of^Nov. 21,
1983).

'Made in the International Terminal at
the Kimpo Airport (text from Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents of
Nov. 21, 1983).

'"Recorded in Tokyo on Nov. 11 for
broadcast Nov. 12 in tlie United States (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983).

"Made in the Assembly Chamber of the
National Assembly Building (text from Week-
ly Compilation of Presidential Documents of
Nov. 21, 1983).

'-Made at the U.S. Embassy (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983).

''Made in the State Dining Room at the
Blue House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983).

'■"Made in the mortar bunker area of the
camp, located near the DMZ (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983).

'^The Secretary was interviewed on ABC-
TV's "This Week With David Brinkley" via
satellite from South Korea, by David
Brinkley, Sam Donaldson, and George Will of
ABC News (press release 400 of Nov. 22,
1983).

'^Issued at conclusion of visit (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Nov. 21, 1983).

"Made on the South Lawn of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983). ■

January 1984

THE SECRETARY

Promoting Peace in the
iVIiddie East

Secretary Shultz's address before the
Cmmcil of Jewish Federations and
Welfare Funds, Atlanta, Georgia, on
November 19, 1983.^

Every Secretary of State becomes a
Middle East expert very rapidly,
whether he wants to or not. Usually his
training is a process of ordeal by fire.
But the process has a healthy way of
bringing you back to the basics of
foreign policy: the importance of stand-
ing by principles and commitments to
friends; the virtue of courage and stead-
fastness in the face of challenges; the
uses and limits of power as a factor in
diplomacy; and the need for a moral
compass to steer you on a steady course
through turbulent waters.

Today, in the Middle East the
United States is engaged on a variety of
fronts. We are extending our coopera-
tion with Israel. We are seeking to
restore peace in Lebanon. We are trying
to strengthen the forces of moderation
in the Arab world. We are exploring
new possibilities for progress in the
peace process. We are attempting to
contain the possibly dangerous conse-
quences of the Iran-Iraq war.

It may seem a confusing kaleido-
scope of problems, but there is a central
core to our diplomacy, which pulls
together all these issues and all our
strategic, political, and moral concerns
about the future of the Middle East.
And that core is the effort to achieve a
secure peace between Israel and its
Arab neighbors. So all our activities, in
whatever dimension of the Middle East,
are geared in one way or another to that
central goal.

And that goal itself has a deeper
meaning. In the final analysis — behind
all the code words about "just and
comprehensive peace" and "secure and
recognized boundaries"— we are talking
about people and the quality of their
lives. True peace is not measured only
by legal or political criteria but in human
terms: by whether individuals can live
their lives and go about their business
and raise their children without ele-
mental fear for their personal safety. It
means people's confidence that their
community and their society have a
future. It means a sense of opportunity
and possibility, not fear of random
danger or deliberate threat.

As the poet said, "no man is an
island." So the fate of others affects our
own. No people understands this better
than the Jewish people. Anti-Semitism
in a faraway country; persecution of
Jews in the Soviet Union, Iran, and
Ethiopia; mindless denunciations of
"Zionism as racism" in international
forums; Katyusha rockets landing on the
towns of northern Israel— these touch
you deeply. No people understands bet-
ter than you the fragility of the
restraints that hold civilized society
together, because no one knows better
the profound inhumanity of which the
darker recesses of human nature are
capable.

Similarly, the people of Israel have
struggled so long and so hard for peace
with their neighbors, but then the first
leader to make peace with them is
assassinated. And Lebanon, the second
moderate Arab country to negotiate an
agreement with them, is right now
under assault from Arab radicals
precisely because it did so.

There should be no doubt of where
the United States stands on any of these
questions. The Jewish tradition is one of
the principal sources of the values of our
civilization— freedom, democracy, the
dignity of the individual. In a world
where those values are widely threat-
ened, the condition of Israel and the
Jewish people is a measure of the
vulnerability/ of those values. The ap-
pearance of anti-Semitism has always
been a symptom of the deeper sickness
of a society; similarly, the vicious inter-
national campaign against the existence
of Israel is a reflection of a much
broader ideological assault on the in-
terests, well-being, and principles of the
whole free world. Therefore, when we
concern ourselves with the fate of Israel,
we are also concerning ourselves with
the fate of the values that both we and
Israel stand for.

In this spirit, I want to say a few
words about our policy in Lebanon and
then about the broader subject of pro-
moting peace between Israel and all its
Arab neighbors.

The Agony of Lebanon

At stake in Lebanon are some of these
basic values and some basic principles of
international law and international
morality:

• The principle that differences
among nations are to be settled by
reason and negotiation, not by the use
or threat of force; and

• The right of a small country to
decide for itself how to achieve its
sovereign objectives, free from outside
pressure, threat, or blackmail.

Lebanon is a proud and beautiful
country whose people have contributed
much to the world. Yet it has had a
complex and turbulent history. The roots
of enmity in that country go very deep.
Nevertheless, for many years Lebanon
thrived because political rivalries were
accommodated and a delicate balance
maintained. The yearning for peace, too,
runs deep in Lebanon.

But the delicate balance in Lebanon
was upset, primarily by the involvement
of outside, non-Lebanese forces— just as
today, the primary obstacle to the inter-
nal reconciliation is the presence of out-
side, non-Lebanese forces.

The Palestinian terrorists, expelled
from Jordan in September 1970, came to
Lebanon and proceeded to do in
Lebanon what they had attempted to do
in Jordan. They turned southern
Lebanon into an armed camp which
became a state-within-a-state terrorizing
the local population; ultimately, it
became a battleground. Raids and rocket
attacks on the towns and villages of
northern Israel became a common occur-
rence. Diplomacy did achieve a cease-
fire, but tension remained high. In any
case, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982
with an announced intention to eradicate
the threat once and for all.

When the guns fell silent, the ter-
rorists had been driven from Beirut and
south Lebanon. Although we had not
agreed with Israel's decision to invade
Lebanon, we accepted the request of
Lebanon and Israel to help them
negotiate a longer term solution to the
basic problem. Months of negotiation
produced the Lebanese-Israeli agree-
ment of last May 17, which provides for
total withdrawal of Israeli troops, ar-
rangements to assure the safety of the
people of northern Israel, and the oppor-
tunity for the Lebanese Government to
extend its sovereignty throughout its
territory and achieve reconciliation
among the country's many religious com-
munities.

Department of State Bulletin

■m

THE SECRETARY

But the agony of Lebanon continues.
The May 17 agreement has not yet been
implemented, largely because of Syria's
refusal to negotiate the withdrawal of
its own forces from Lebanon, reneging
on repeated pledges to do so once Israel
did so. No one questions that Syria has
legitimate security concerns with respect
to Lebanon. But Syria, unlike Israel, has
so far been unwilling to negotiate with
Lebanon over how to reconcile those
concerns with Lebanon's sovereign right
to decide its own destiny.

We are heartened by the willingness
of a broad spectrum of Lebanese leaders
finally to sit down with President
Gemayel at Geneva. We believe the
political process that they have begun
can start the urgent task of rebuilding
their country on the basis of an
equitable sharing of authority and
responsibility. This must be our first
priority. After so much suffering, the
people of Lebanon are entitled to it.
With patriotism, vision, and courage on
all sides, a political solution can be
achieved.

But we are realists: It is essential to
maintain an environment of stability and
security so that radical forces cannot
steamroU the negotiations and so that a
fair political solution can be reached.
The cease-fire agreed upon Septem-
ber 26— which launched the Geneva
negotiations — was achieved only because
we and our friends were able to
demonstrate that there were limits
beyond which we could not be pushed.

America's support for Lebanon is
not and cannot be separated from our
broader peace objectives in the Middle
East. If America's efforts for peaceful
solutions were to be overwhelmed by
brute force, our role as a force for peace
would be that much weakened every-
where. Friends who rely on us would be
disheartened and would be that much
less secure. Moderates in the Arab
world whom we are encouraging to take
risks for peace would feel it far less safe
to do so. The rejectionists would have
scored a victory, confirming the value of
reliance on the Soviet Union. Israel's
security would be jeopardized. That is
what is at stake in Lebanon.

I must say a word here about the
American forces in Lebanon, and off-
shore, whose commitment and courage
have already helped bring about the
Geneva conference. As a former Marine
myself, I have a very deep appreciation
of what these fighting men can con-
tribute and of our duty to see that they
are not put at risk except where they

are performing an essential role in our
national interest. And in Lebanon they
are.

Our Marines were sent to Lebanon
to take part in a multinational force re-
quested by the Lebanese Government.
The presence of that force was meant to
further that government's efforts to
assure the safety of innocent civilians in
the Beirut area in the wake of the
massacres at Sabra and Shatila. And it
was meant to back up that government
in its efforts to extend its authority and
restore national unity.

and we are confident that Israel will be
using this influence in support of the
Lebanese Government and its efforts of
national reconciliation.

At stake, as I said earlier, is the fate
of the second Arab country to negotiate
directly an agreement with Israel. I
need not elaborate on what it would
mean for the overall peace process if
Lebanon should be coerced into renounc-
ing that agreement. It is the only ex-
isting formula that ensures both Israeli
withdrawal and a solution to the securi-
ty problem that created the Lebanese

America's support for Lebanon is not and
cannot be separated from our broader peace objec-
tives in the Middle East. If America's efforts for
peaceful solutions were to be overwhelmed by brute
force, our role as a force for peace would be that
much weakened everywhere.

It is truly and importantly a multina-
tional effort. Our British, French, and
Italian allies are there with us. Including
the UN peacekeeping forces in southern
Lebanon, there are over 11,000 interna-
tional troops in the country— of which
ours are about a tenth of the
total — symbolizing that the world com-
munity, not just the United States, feels
an important stake in the future of
Lebanon.

The primary military responsibility
rests, of course, on the Lebanese Army,
which we have helped to turn into an ef-
fective fighting force and which is get-
ting stronger by the day. But the
multinational force including our
Marines is a further deterrent to
challenges and a crucial weight in the
scales. The bipartisan support in the
Congress for our Marines was a valuable
contribution to our objectives, dispelling
doubts about our staying power and
strengthening our hand. We need to be
patient, and we need to be steadfast. To
remove these forces now would be a
serious mistake, which we would regret:
It would only upset the balance in
Lebanon, undermine the chances of a
political settlement, and precipitate new
chaos.

For Israel, the sovereign in-
dependence and peace of Lebanon con-
tinue to be a major strategic interest,
directly affecting its own security.
Israel, too, has influence in Lebanon,

crisis in the first place. We will not ac-
cept its abrogation.

But the main issue now is national
reconciliation. Especially in view of the
sacrifices that have been made, the in-
ternational community has a right to ask
all the parties in Lebanon to settle their
national problem. As the Bible tells us,
to everything there is a season. Now in
Lebanon is the time to decide. As in
every negotiation, there must be com-
promise. For every risk taken, there is
gain. And the risks of failure to act
right now are far greater than any of
the risks of a fair political solution.

The Peace Process

As long as there is no solution to the
basic issue of Middle East peace,
however, the region is bound to be sub-
ject to other crises, in other places, in
other forms. Therefore, our efforts in
Lebanon have not diverted us from the

January 1984

The issues at stake in Lebanon, as I
said before, have wider significance: the
principle of peaceful settlement of
disputes, the right of small countries to
live in peace and security with their
neighbors. As Israelis and Jews have
learned very clearly from bitter ex-
perience, we all live in a world in which
many do not share these principles.
Therefore, these principles must be
defended, sometimes at the price of

THE SECRETARY

iiihimmmmmmummmHimmmimmiimiim

great risk or sacrifice. If the free na-
tions are to preserve their security and
defend their ideals, they must have suffi-
cient military power to deter or resist
aggression. Whether in Central
America, the Middle East, Western
Europe, or Asia, history shows that
diplomacy works only when aggressors
conclude that no military option is
available.

The United States has always
understood that a strong Israel is not
only a guarantor of security for the
Jewish people but also a powerful force
for freedom and a strategic partner to
America and the West.

That's why we have ensured— and
will continue to ensure— that Israel
receives the help it needs to maintain a
military advantage to deter its enemies.
The Soviet military buildup in Syria
underlines this necessity and underlines
it again and again for anyone who will
look to see. The United States has fur-
nished over $20 billion in military and
economic aid since 1949, most of it in
the last 10 years. In fiscal year 1984,
Israel will receive a total of $2.6 billion
in military and economic assistance.

But military power is not enough.
Israel's dream of becoming "a nation like
all other nations" is yet to be realized.
The Jewish state did not rescue the sur-
vivors of the ghettos in Europe and the
Middle East in order to become itself a
new ghetto among nations. And yet, 35
years after its founding, Israel remains
rejected by most of its neighbors and
isolated in international forums. I
remember being in Israel just after
Sadat's historic journey to Jerusalem
and feeling personally— very per-
sonally—what a tremendous emotional

and the long-term threat from advanced
weapons technology in enemy hands,
cannot help but be deeply troublesome
to Israel's people. And the moral burden
of the occupation can undermine the
values on which Israel was founded and
can divide its society.

Military might and control of ter-
ritory have prevented defeat on the bat-
tlefield, but true security and peace of
mind can come only when Israel has
gained the acceptance and recognition of
its neighbors. That is why, even as we
assist Israel's capacity to defend itself
militarily, the promotion of Arab-Israeli
peace through negotiation is the
number-one priority of our policy and
our efforts in the Middle East.

Since the great achievement of the
Camp David accords, the peace process
has encountered many problems. On the
Israeli side, we remain deeply concerned
about the ongoing construction and ex-
pansion of settlements, unilaterally
changing the status of the occupied ter-
ritories even while their future is subject
to negotiation. On the Arab side, there
is the intense and continuing struggle
between those who want to secure a bet-
ter future through negotiation and those
who reject peaceful solutions as a matter
of ideology. The outcome of this strug-
gle will go a long way toward determin-
ing the chances for progress.

Once before when our focus was on
Lebanon, on September 1, 1982, Presi-
dent Reagan reminded us of the bigger
picture and of our commitment to a
broader peace. On the day the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] com-
pleted its evacuation of Beirut, the
President challenged the parties to make
a "fresh start" in the Middle East. He

The Palestinians have been victimized above
all by their self-appointed leaders and spokesmen
who, for decades, have chased the illusion of
military options and foolishly rejected the only
possible path to a solution: direct negotiations.

impact Sadat's visit had. It was clear to
me how deeply all Israelis yearn for true
peace.

The requirements of defense are still
a heavy burden on Israel's economy.
Military reserve duties disrupt family
life and economic productivity. The pros-
pect of living with perpetual hostility.

spelled out the foundation of the
American position— in essence the prin-
ciple of exchanging territory for peace,
as called for in UN Security Council
Resolution 242, which has been our
policy ever since 1967.

At the same time, the President
added: ". . . our view on the extent to

which Israel should be asked to give up
territory will be heavily affected by the
extent of true peace and normalization
and the security arrangements offered
in return." He made clear the American
view, among other things, that the
security and legitimacy of Israel are
crucial criteria that have to be recog-
nized in any settlement; that neither a
Palestinian state, nor permanent Israeli
control of occupied territories, nor a
return to the pre- 1967 security situation
is a viable solution; that Palestinian self-
government in the West Bank and Gaza
in association with Jordan offers the
best chance for a durable peace; that
Jerusalem must be undivided; and most
fundamentally, that the terms of a set-
tlement can only be determined by the
parties concerned in direct negotiations.

The positions laid out in the Presi-
dent's initiative are fair, balanced, and
realistic. They were meant as a stimulus
to negotiation, not as the dictated out-
come of a negotiation. The initiative was
an opportunity for the seekers after
justice in the Arab world to achieve
their goal through negotiations leading
to peace. Although it triggered a
vigorous— and, on the whole, construc-
tive—debate among Arab leaders, none
of them has yet seized that opportunity.
Likewise, it was a challenge to Israel to
achieve true and lasting security
through peace, rather than relying on
the short-term illusion of security
through territory. The Israeli Govern-
ment, I regret to note, rejected the
President's initiative. But I have little
doubt that if an Arab leader comes for-
ward with a mandate to negotiate on the
basis of those principles, Israel will not
let such a historic opportunity slip away.

We cannot be certain, however, that
that opportunity will remain open in-
definitely. Every passing month creates
new facts on the ground which, I am
convinced, are making the process for
reaching a negotiated settlement ever
more difficult and its prospects ever
more uncertain. The peace treaty with
Egypt— and the return of the Sinai to
Egyptian sovereignty— prove that
negotiations work. Both sides must
recognize, and soon, that negotiations
are the only hope for a secure, just, and
peaceful future— the only hope. The
absence of negotiation is a formula for
endless conflict and mounting danger.

I have spoken a lot tonight about the
human dimension of the Middle East
conflict, and there is another aspect that
must be mentioned. I am thinking of the
Palestinian people. The Palestinians
have been victimized above all by their
self-appointed leaders and spokesmen

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

who, for decades, have chased the illu-
sion of military options and foolishly re-
jected the only possible path to a solu-
tion: direct negotiations. The utter
failure of rejectionist policies ought to be
obvious by now. But I am thinking in
particular of the 1.3 million Palestinians
living in the West Bank and Gaza. Their
well-being, their desire for a greater
voice in determining their own destiny
must be another issue of moral concern,
even while we continue to pursue an
agreed solution to the final status of the
occupied territories. If their acceptance
of a peaceful future with Israel is to be
nurtured, they must be given some stake
in that future by greater opportunities
for economic development, by fairer ad-
ministrative practices, and by greater
concern for the quality of their lives.

I must add a word here about Jor-
dan. It has been our view since the 1967
war that Jordan is the key to a
negotiated solution in the West Bank
and Gaza. The PLO has thus far ex-
cluded itself as a negotiating partner by
its refusal to recognize Israel's right to
exist. Jordan, in contrast, under the
leadership of King Hussein, has long
sought a path toward moderation and
conciliation. Jordan's participation in the
peace process has been inhibited by
many considerations, including the
absence of the necessary support from
other moderate Arabs but most of all
the fierce opposition of Arab radicals.

Last spring King Hussein nearly
achieved an agreement that would have
permitted him to take a more active role
in the peace process on behalf of the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
The effort failed because of radical Arab
opposition. More recently, a bitter and
violent struggle has broken out within
the PLO and between the PLO and
Syria. King Hussein has pointedly and
courageously raised the question of
whether the PLO, if dominated by Syria,
can continue to claim legitimacy as
spokesman for the Palestinian people.
The outcome of this struggle is sure to
have major implications for Jordan, the
Palestinians, and the future of the peace
process. For our part, the door will
always be kept open for a negotiation in
accordance with the President's
September 1 initiative.

There may be some who have
already written off the peace process for
the next year. They think we will shy
away from the sensitive issues of the
Middle East during a presidential elec-
tion year. Well, they are wrong. Ronald
Reagan has no intention of letting the
search for peace lapse. We cannot afford
to. Let it never be said that the United

January 1984

States was too busy practicing politics to
pursue peace.

The Future

In the next 2 weeks. President Reagan
will be receiving in Washington Israel's
new leaders— President Herzog, Prime
Minister Shamir, and Defense Minister
Arens. Our two governments have many
things to talk about: Lebanon; the rela-
tionship with Egypt; the possibilities for
progress toward peace; the threat of
Soviet expansionism in the Middle East;
the need for Israel to restore its
economic vitality; the fate of threatened
Jewish communities around the world,
especially in the Soviet Union; and other
important common concerns.

Our cooperation is an enduring reali-
ty, whichever party is in office in either
country, because this relationship is
deeply rooted in the sentiments of our
peoples and in the values of our civiliza-
tion. There is no stronger bond between
countries. So we come back, in the end,
to the human dimension. The fate of
Antoliy Shcharanskiy and the fate of
Lebanon and the fate of the villagers of
Kiryat Sh'monah and the fate of the
Palestinians— indeed, the fate of all men
and women of good will, who wish to
live in peace— this is the common agenda
of Israel and the United States, as it is
the common agenda of our
civilization.

'Press release 403 of Nov. 22, 1983.

News Conference of December 5

Secretary Shultz's news conference at
the Department of State on December 5,
1983.^

Q. The process of the Lebanese
Government asserting its sovereignty
over its entire territory may take a
long time. Is the United States
prepared to keep the Marines in
Beirut until there is a national recon-
ciliation and until the Lebanese
Government is able to assert its
sovereignty?

A. We will work with the Lebanese
Government so that it can create a
broadly based government for itself, and
we will work for the removal of all
foreign forces so that Lebanon can be
sovereign over all its territory.

Precisely what tactical moves will
implement that policy remains to be
seen, but we intend to see this through
with the Government of Lebanon.

Q. In our recent clashes with the
Syrians and other elements in
Lebanon, don't these place us in the
position of becoming a party to the
conflict? Are we becoming the enemy
to some elements who then want to at-
tack us?

A. There are many who try to put
us in that position, but that is certainly
not our position. We are there at the in-
vitation of the duly constituted,
legitimate Government of Lebanon, and
we, as any armed force, are present
with the understanding that, of course,
we have the right to self-defense and

that is universal, and we will defend our-
selves, as we are doing. But we are not
there contending with anybody. We are
trying to be helpful. We are there in a
peacekeeping role, along with the other
countries in the multinational force— the
U.K., France, and Italy— and that is our
role and that is our objective, but we
will defend ourselves.

Q. The Syrians appear to be will-
ing to hold the downed American pilot
hostage for withdrawal of American
Marines from Lebanon. Let me ask
that in a larger context.

The Soviets, in a press conference
this morning, gave an impression to
one watching it live that the whole
business of European missiles was a
fairly well-controlled situation, but
that the situation in the Middle East
seemed to be more dangerous than
before because it seemed to be
somewhat more out of control, maybe
on both sides. Could you assess how
serious that is?

A. I will try to take that question
apart into its various components, if I
could.

First of all, insofar as the airman is
concerned, through Ambassador [to
Syria] Paganelli we have made strong
representations to the Syrian Govern-
ment requesting his prompt return, and
we have made the same statements in
international fora, particularly in the
United Nations. At least as of this mo-
ment, while I have seen some news
reports. Ambassador Paganelli has not

uihii'i'MttiHtimMiMmmmmiMmiiiMmi^^

THE SECRETARY

had anything come back to him, and that
is our official channel of communication
on that subject.

I think that it is the case that the
situation in the Middle East has great
points of tension in it, and, of course, we
are trj'ing to do everything we can to
settle those points of tension down.

One has to do with the emergence of
the Government of Lebanon and the
withdrawal of foreign forces, as we have
been discussing. Still another point of
tension comes out of the fact that there
is a major dispute, apparently, among
factions of the Palestinians, and that
dispute is being apparently supported by
Syria, and so you have had intense
fighting in the Tripoli area. This has
nothing to do with many other aspects
of Middle East tension. And at the same
time there is a major war between Iraq
and Iran, and there is always the
possibility that the offshoots of that war
may involve third parties to a greater
extent than formerly, and so we have to
be alert to that, and, of course, to con-
tinue to try to get that war settled; but
barring that, at least to have an
understanding that it not spread itself in
the gulf region, as was envisaged in the
UN resolution recently passed.

So I think it is true that there are
many points of tension in the Middle
East and they come from a lot of dif-
ferent sources. The United States, see-
ing that peace has its enemies,
recognizes that it also must have its
defenders, and that is one of our roles
and that is one of our objectives in the
region.

Q. You haven't mentioned the
Soviet Union. Is that one of the third
parties?

A. The Soviet Union, of course, has
been the major supplier of arms to
Syria, and it does have considerable
numbers of military personnel in Syria,
probably on the order of 7,000 or so.

So it is there. It represents a
presence, and it is connected with
Syrian aggression. What its advice to
Syria is, of course, we don't know, but
we urge the Soviet Union to urge Syria
to look at the Lebanon problem in a sen-
sible way, and we hope that they do so.

Insofar as the Iran-Iraq war is con-
cerned, they have, obviously, no direct
involvement in it and may have the
same concerns we do to see Iran and
Iraq work out a negotiated solution. But
it does seem far away.

Q. The President said yesterday,
when asked about the leadership
situation in Syria, he said, "Your

guess is as good as mine on who's in
control there." Could you articulate a
little more today on what we know
about, number one, Assad's health;
and, number two, how decisions are
being made on a day-to-day basis in
Damascus?

A. I believe it's a mistake for me to
speculate about something like that. We
have all sorts of information coming in
and official statements being made, and,
as far as we're concerned, we deal with
the Government of Syria, and principally
our Ambassador deals with the Foreign
Minister and the Ministry.

We deal with the Government of
Syria here in Washington, and have, in
the last 48 hours, had quite a number of
conversations, both here and there, and
that is the process through which we're
going.

You have your speculations about it,
and we hear a lot of information, but I
don't think it's worthwhile for me to try
to sort that out.

Q. President Assad is such a domi-
nant figure there, would not a leader-
ship problem compound the problems
of bringing about a Mideast solution?

A. We don't know precisely what
the situation of President Assad is. As
far as we know, he's firmly in control,
and until we have some evidence other-
wise, that's the assumption we'll go on.

As far as we're concerned, Syria is
very much a functioning government,
and we deal with the Foreign Ministry
through our Ambassador. When higher
level visitors go there and may expect to
see President Assad, if he's well enough,
I'm sure that he will see them. He'll
receive people from other areas if he's
well enough, and that will be one way in
which we perhaps will know what his
condition is. But there are all sorts of
rumors, and I don't think they're worth
my commenting on.

Q. The Syrians appear to have
answered yesterday's attack by shell-
ing the Marine compound in which an
additional eight Marines have been
killed. Where does that leave us? Are
you now going to retaliate for that,
and aren't we engaged in a rather
dangerous escalation that could cer-
tainly bring us up against the Soviet
Union?

A. We can speculate that that is
Syrian retaliation, but we don't have any
evidence for that. There's nothing that
we know about that says it's a direct

result. There was a fair amount of shell-
ing in the Beirut area yesterday, not
simply in the airport area. But it may
be.

As far as we're concerned, we're
there in a peacekeeping role. We're
there as a country offering our good of-
fices. Ambassador Rumsfeld [Donald
Rumsfeld, President's personal represen-
tative in the Middle East] will be
heading back to the region tomorrow.
Ambassador [to Lebanon] Bartholomew,
having been here with President
Gemayel, is about back in Beirut by
now, and we're there trying to be
helpful.

We have returned fire to those who
have fired at us, in terms of the places
from which they have fired. We don't
say we're firing at this or that country
or faction. We return fire to the source
of fire.

Q. Does that mean that there are
going to be more air strikes? Exactly
how will U.S. airpower be used in the
future? And, again today, there are
calls from Capitol Hill to pull the
Marines out of Lebanon. Can you
discuss, what is the commitment on
keeping the Marines there? Is this an
open-ended commitment?

A. The Marines are there and our
other forces are there to support our
policies which are policies having to do
with the Middle East and related to the
importance of the Middle East, and
more particularly in Lebanon to our ob-
jectives of helping the reconstruction of
that country and the emergence of it as
a working, sovereign country, important
not only for itself but also for the con-
tribution that such a result can make to
Middle East peace more generally.

That's the mission of our forces
there, and they will be there in support
of that mission. As I said earlier, I think
discussion tactically of precisely when
we're going to do what is not the sort
of thing that I want to comment on
publicly.

Q. This is the first time that the
airpower has been used yesterday in
this particular way. Is this now part
of the operating procedure, is this a
one-time kind of thing, or is this
something that's going to be con-
sidered on a day-to-day basis from
here?

A. The airpower has been there, the
ships have been there, and we have
flown reconnaissance missions over
Lebanon, I think since September, and
this is with the authorization of the

Departnnent of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

Government of Lebanon and supports,
as an intelligence matter, our MNF
posture.

Those flights have been flown. There
have been no problems about it until the
day before yesterday when a recon-
naissance flight was fired on and fired
on rather heavily with evidence that we
consider conclusive that those firing
knew they were firing on a U.S. plane.
The firing was heavy and, therefore,
can't be ascribed to some individual,
local person unloading a round on
somebody.

So under those circumstances we
felt, and since we had told in advance
everybody, including the Syrians about
these reconnaissance flights, that they
were purely defensive, there was no at-
tack connected with them, that we
should fire back at those who fired on
us, and it's just as simple as that, and
that's the best means of doing so. We
have to use the force that we have to ac-
complish the missions that need to be ac-
complished.

Q. What is that mission, because
that seems to be a question everyone
was asking today in various interview
shows? Is it there to just help the
Lebanese get their act together? That
doesn't seem to be much good. If it
was to be a peacekeeping force,
wouldn't you need more men on the
ground? You had more men in little
Grenada with much less opposition
than you have in Lebanon.

A. We are there as part of a
multinational force which together
numbers some 6,000, I guess, something
on that order. It's not there with the in-
tention of taking military control. It's
there to help the Lebanese gain control.
It's there in support of the development
of the Lebanese Armed Forces which
have come a long way from a standing
start, and I think that it's fair to say
that with all of the turmoil and the dif-
ficulty that there has been a con-
siderable amount of progress made.

We've had two visits this past week,
one from the Government of Israel and
the other from the Government of
Lebanon. I think out of that process, as
far as we're concerned, we feel that we
have an improved basis for working
toward the objectives that we are seek-
ing.

And, as I said, our Ambassador is
back by now, and Ambassador Rumsfeld
will be leaving Washington early tomor-
row morning, and he'll be returning to
the area, and we're going to push our
thoughts very actively.

January 1984

Q. What is the understanding you
have with the Israelis?

A. The understanding? We have lots
of understandings with the Israelis and
with many other countries.

Q. You have an approved basis for
the objectives we are seeking. What is
the improved basis for the with-
drawal?

A. We've had very full discussions,
not only of the situation in Lebanon but
other aspects of the Middle East, with
the Israelis. We've had a full discussion
with President Gemayel of Lebanon.
We've explored a lot of more or less
operational things, and I believe that
they're going to be helpful to us in mak-
ing some concrete steps here.

At any rate, that remains our objec-
tive — to help the Government of
Lebanon take control of its territory,
starting, of course, with the territory
not occupied by foreign forces but
recognizing that the presence of foreign
forces makes even the unoccupied areas
hard to control. So that is the immediate
objective, and I think we're going to
make some progress.

Q. Mr. Eagleburger [Under
Secretary for Political Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger] yesterday
said on ABC television that the U.S.
strategic agfreement with Israel in-
tends to stabilize the Middle East and
that it will work to help Israel and the
moderate Arab states. How can you
explain that?

A. I think that, first of all, the
security of Israel is a very important ele-
ment of stability in the Middle East in-
sofar as the United States is concerned.
So, always, in our relationships with
Israel we examine that problem, and we
seek to do everything we can to ensure
that.

In the present situation, what we
have seen is a very substantial Soviet
buildup in Syria, and that is a fact. We
discussed it in great detail with the
Israelis, and it's something to which we
need to pay attention and be prepared to
respond. I think doing so does help bring
stability in the area.

We discussed many other things
with the Israelis, and we agreed, among
other things, with them to establish a
joint political military group. It will have
its first meeting in January, and it will
be a way to keep track systematically of
many of these matters that we discuss
when we have visits back and forth. So
that process will be in motion, and I
think it will help the cooperative action
between the countries, but it's
something for the future, of course.

Q. Are you implying by your
answer that Israel asked you to keep
the Marines in; and, secondly, if there
is an overwhelming —

A. I don't mean to imply that at all.
The Marines are there, came there
originally as the Palestinians were leav-
ing Beirut, and they're there on our
decision; not Israel's decision.

Q. If there is an overwhelming
clamor from the American public to
request the Marines be withdrawn,
will the Administration take the
Marines out?

A. Of course, we obviously pay at-
tention to what our people want. At the
same time, we know that people want to
see peace and stability in the Middle
East. I think it's a very clear fact that
the American people recognize the im-
portance of the Middle East to this
country, and so we have used our
capabilities and continue to use them to
support our objectives there, and we'll
continue to do that.

Q. Do you think the American peo-
ple have the stomach to continue to
sustain the losses of American lives
that we've seen? Don't you either have
to change what you're doing with the
Marines or pull them out if these
losses continue?

A. We certainly want to see prog-
ress made, and we will work hard and
are working hard to bring progress
about or help others bring it about. That
is the purpose of having those forces
there. The American people are support-
ing our efforts. We had favorable votes
in the Congress on this very subject, and
by a wide margin, particularly in the
House of Representatives. This was
even following the terrible tragedy of
the car bomb in our Marine installation
at the airport.

I think the American people are pur-
poseful and determined. We have, of
course, to convince people that our ob-
jectives are sound, as I believe they are,
and that we have a plan and a strategy
as we do. We need to keep talking about
it, as we do, and I think we'll have sup-
port.

Q. You spoke about self-defense
for yesterday's attacks, in terms of
self-defense. Isn't it also part of a
strategy to put pressure on Syria, to
tell Syria, to send them a signal that
staying in Lebanon will have a cost?

A. The military action that we
undertook was part of our commitment
to our forces and to ourselves that we
will defend ourselves. And that is all the
justification that it needs. I think the

AFRICA

presence of those forces, of course, em-
phasizes the commitment the United
States has, and the other countries
which are there have to the objectives
that we seek together.

Q. Do you think the raid was suc-
cessful or a failure in its mission?

A. In terms of the targets that the
air strike went to, my understanding is,
from the Pentagon, that the strikes
were quite effective; that they hit the
targets, and so on. In that sense, we did
hit what we were after, and they were
successful.

I think the main point, however, to
be driven home is that we will support
ourselves, we will defend ourselves. So
if you see somebody who will defend
himself and can defend himself, then,
maybe you better be a little careful how
you handle him. Just where we're going
to get with that, the future will tell. But
those are the objectives. Technically, in
terms of the military action, it was suc-
cessful in the sense that they went after
certain batteries that fired on them and
they hit them.

Q. What is your feeling about
Nicaragua's offer of amnesty for the
rebels and the election process an-
nounced yesterday?

A. I think that the statements being
made by the Government of Nicaragua
right now are vastly different than the
statements they were making some 6
months or so ago. And I welcome that.
Of course, what we want is for a reality
to be put behind the rhetoric. And so,
naturally, we want to probe and find out
what is there, and we believe that the
best forum for conducting negotiations
with Nicaragua and with other elements
in the region is through the Contadora
process. We support that process.

That process has produced a very
useful 21-point set of objectives. So we
want to see reality put behind those ob-
jectives by Nicaragua and by the other
countries in the region. We will be work-
ing at that process and with the Con-
tadora group to hope that it happens.
And if Nicaragua is moving genuinely in
the right direction, that's fine.

Reagan Administration's Africa
Policy: A Progress Report

'Press release 414.

by Chester A. Crocker

Address before the fourth annual
Conference on International Affairs:
U.S.-Africa Relations Since 1960, at the
University of Kansas, Lawrence,
Kansas, on November 10, 1983. Mr.
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs.

Thank you for inviting me here this
evening. It has been almost 3 years
since President Reagan assumed office.
I thought it would be timely at this con-
ference, which is examining U.S. -African
relations over the past quarter century,
to take the opportunity to review the
Administration's Africa policy and
achievements. We have not yet taken
our final exam, but we have certainly
made important strides toward the
realization of the goals we set at the
outset of the Administration. We set out
to:

• Forge a new and mature partner-
ship with Africa;

• Support those nations which resist
external aggression and destabilization;

• Help meet Africa's humanitarian
needs;

• Help Africa with its development
needs;

• Support democratic institutions;

• Work for Namibian independence
on the basis of UN [Security Council]
Resolution 435;

• Support regional security and
peacemaking in southern Africa; and

• Encourage positive, peaceful
change inside South Africa.

In approaching these challenges, we
have consistently and without apology
pursued U.S. interests. But our actions
are carefully tailored to African realities
and African concerns.

Forging A Mature Partnership

We believe, as Vice President Bush said
in Africa a year ago, that Africans have
the capacity and will to control their
own destiny. We have worked to forge a
new and mature partnership with the
nations and peoples of Africa. That part-
nership is based on mutual respect. It in-
cludes frank and honest discussions of
the issues. Such partnership is a two-
way street which rests on shared goals,
common principles, and mutual in-
terests. For, as we have deepened the

dialogue with Africa, each of us — Afri-
cans and Americans — have come to
recognize that there is much more that
pulls us together than separates us.

Africa's leadership has changed re-
markably in outlook in the two-and-a-
half decades since independence, when
anticolonialist cliches and rhetoric too
often substituted for serious policy and
decisionmaking. We, in this country,
have come to a greater appreciation of
the obstacles to the continent's develop-
ment and the dilemmas facing its
leaders. Realism and pragmatism in-
creasingly shape attitudes and decisions
on both sides of the Atlantic.

The channels for communicating
with Africa's leaders have been widened
and are being utilized. The result is an
atmosphere which permits useful discus-
sion of those issues on which the United
States and Africa must focus: security,
economic development, tensions and
change in southern Africa, humanitarian
crises, and the strengthening of demo-
cratic institutions.

President Reagan has met with 17
heads of state and governments during
his first 3 years in office. Vice President
Bush made a seven-nation tour of Africa
in November 1982. We are talking with
African leaders across the full spectrum
of African politics and ideology. Ours is
an unprecedented activist diplomacy in
Africa aimed at addressing conflicts,
strengthening genuine nonalignment,
working for creative approaches to
Africa's economic crisis, and creating op-
tions for peaceful change. The President
has met with leaders of nations which
are moving to reopen doors to the West
after years of close but disappointing
relations with the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc. He has also made clear
our firm support for traditional friends
who look to the West as a source of
security, economic support, and human
inspiration.

Helping Resist External Aggression
and Destabilization

We place great importance on the
strengthening of Africa's security and on
our role as a reliable partner in this ef-
fort. Both the United States and Africa
seek the opportunity to get on with the
business of development and nation

Department of State Bulletin

■o

bcariniuy

AFRICA

building. Without security, these objec-
tives cannot be achieved. This fact is an
essential element in our support for the
Organization of African Unity (OAU),
whose charter and foreign policy prin-
ciples we endorse. The OAU is dedicated
to the peaceful settlement of disputes,
the protection of African states' ter-
ritorial integrity, and the defense of the
continent against external aggression
and subversion.

In considering the security problems
facing Africa today, we must recognize
the interaction of political, economic,
and security factors that make up the
African security equation. Africa is a full
participant in the global system. It is
directly influenced by and also helps
determine the ebb and flow of com-
petitive global politics. For either the
United States or Africa to pretend
otherwise is foolish and very short-
sighted.

This does not mean that the United
States sees Africa exclusively as a
theater for East- West conflict or com-
petition. Quite the contrary. We have no
mandate— either at home or in Africa—
to be the policeman of Africa, nor would
we wish to be. But just as certainly, our
pohtical, economic, and security in-
terests in Africa are not served by
political or economic instability. Nor— do
we believe— are Africa's own interests.
Such conditions inhibit the development
of modern African economic and
political institutions which can interact
with our own to mutual advantage. Our
strategic goal in Africa is to limit and
thwart the application of outside force in
African conflicts and thereby to permit
Africans to shape their own futures. The
purpose of our diplomatic and security
policies is to discourage nations from
resorting to military solutions to prob-
lems and to strengthen Africa's ability to
resist adventurism and destabilization.

Instability, caused by local economic
and political weakness and often deep-
rooted regional conflict, is often ex-
ploited by outside powers unfriendly to
the United States. When this takes
place, the United States— and the
West— is confronted with a new dimen-
sion, a global dimension with potential
effects on the global balance. Neither
African states nor Western nations gain
when an outside power or a regional
state aligned to one seeks to gain advan-
tage by resorting to military force on
the continent. If we in the West fail to
react, the climate necessary to achieve
African security and development is
eroded. We cannot be a credible power
if we ignore friendly states which turn
to us for help when threatened.

January 1984

Our resolve was dramatically demon-
strated in our response to Libyan ag-
gression in Chad. In 1980, 7,000 Libyan
troops intervened in the Chadian civil
war. That action quickly became a major
cause of regional instability, posing a
direct threat to Sudan and creating
unease among Chad's other neighbors.
When, the following year, the Chadian
Government called on Libya to remove
its military force, the OAU deployed a
peacekeeping force— the first ever in the
organization's history— to Chad to main-
tain order after the Libyans left.

We moved immediately to support
this initiative on the part of the OAU by
allocating $12 million to support the
OAU peacekeeping force with transport
and equipment. By June 1982, then Cha-
dian President [Weddeye] Goukouni,
who had refused reconciliation efforts
proposed by the OAU, was forced out of
Chad and replaced by his principal rival,
Hissene Habre. The OAU withdrew its
troops.

In July 1983, Libya's [Col. Muam-
mer] Qadhafi invaded Chad in support of
a rebel force led by the former presi-
dent. In response to this blatant act of

and Somalia — countries which play a
key part in U.S. strategic interests in
the Indian Ocean.

Sudan and Somalia face significant
Soviet-backed military and subversive
threats directed against them from
across national borders. Nevertheless,
our security assistance has been
measured and moderate, focused on in-
ternal mobility, border security, air
defense, and communications. It does
not begin, nor does it seek to match the
enormous and irresponsible export of
billions of dollars of Soviet arms into
Libya and Ethiopia alone.

Moreover, we have made clear our
readiness to assist in any way we can in
the resolution of longstanding tensions
in the region, especially in the Horn of
Africa, which have been the cause of so
much war and suffering in the past.

Humanitarian Crises

Africa's poverty is marked, and exacer-
bated, by the constant threat to human
life on a wide scale. It is not just one
drought or one emergency refugee situa-
tion. Drought is endemic in Africa, strik-

The purpose of our diplomatic and security policies
is to discourage nations from resorting to military
solutions to problems and to strengthen Africa's
ability to resist adventurism and destabilization.

aggression, the President made available
up to $25 million in military assistance
to the internationally recognized govern-
ment of Habre, and after consultations
with France, we deployed AW ACS [air-
borne warning and control system] air-
craft to the area. France sent 2,000
troops to Chad which halted the Libyan
advance southward; the northern half of
the country remains occupied by Libyan
forces. Our efforts now, together with
the OAU and France, are aimed at
bringing about the withdrawal of all
foreign troops from Chad so that the in-
ternationally recognized government can
get on with the urgent tasks of economic
development and political reconciliation.

The Administration has also, in a
few selective and important cases, in-
creased our security assistance to friend-
ly African countries. Almost all of these
increases have been to Sudan, Kenya,

ing first one region, then another. In
some countries, like Mauritania, drought
conditions have persisted so intensely
over the last 7 or 8 years that whole
segments of the population have been
driven from their ancestral homes and
way of life, perhaps never to return.

Food. In this situation, the U.S. role
as a supplier of food and other agri-
cultural assistance becomes more than
an occasional humanitarian act. The
United States is a major source of long-
term and emergency food to Africa. We
have an unparalleled record of assist-
ance in addressing this problem. We
have not shrunk from this call, regard-
less of the political ideology of govern-
ments whose people are hungry and
threatened.

In fiscal year 1983, the United
States provided $250 million of food to
sub-Saharan Africa, of which over $40

AFRICA

million was in emergency food aid. Re-
cipients have included Mauritania,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Djibouti, Ghana,
Upper Volta, and other countries.

In just over a month of this fiscal
year, we have already committed $11
million and are likely to increase our
fiscal year 1984 emergency food assist-
ance level for Africa to well over $50
million. In addition, regular food assist-
ance under PL 480 will be maintained at
substantial levels in 1984.

The long-term problems of food pro-
duction and availability are also being
urgently addressed. For the past two
decades, per capita agricultural produc-
tion has declined in Africa— the only
region of the world where that is true.
For that reason our foreign aid pro-
grams in Africa have concentrated on
means to increase the continent's food
production. In addition, we have used
our own country's abundant agricultural
production to help encourage reforms
and policies to increase Africa's own
food production.

constant danger of starvation and ex-
posure. At a conference that year jointly
sponsored by the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity, the
United States, represented by Ambassa-
dor Jeane Kirkpatrick, stepped out front
in pledging $285 million for refugee pro-
grams. Since then, working closely with
the [Office of the UN] High Commis-
sioner for Refugees and private volun-
tary organizations, we have succeeded in
improving the management of relief ef-
forts to the point where most refugees
are out of immediate danger, and we
can concentrate on contingency planning
and lasting solutions.

We have supported repatriation as
the best solution where that is possible.
There have been successful programs of
that sort in Equatorial Guinea and Zim-
babwe. We are particularly proud of a
program now underway to repatriate
Ethiopians from Djibouti, which was
worked out despite many difficulties.
Another significant approach has been
our $1.5 million training and education

African nations have an extraordinary record
of accepting refugees into their countries and pro-
viding long-term shelter. But the strain on already
poor economies is enormous.

Refugees. As with drought and
hunger, refugees are a part of the
African scene and a problem of both im-
mediate and long-term concern. Wars,
famine, and internal strife have pro-
duced throughout Africa hundreds of
thousands of refugees and displaced per-
sons. Some of the largest pockets of
refugees— in Sudan and Somalia— have
been in this condition for many years,
and there is no early prospect for resolv-
ing their plight. In Angola, torn by in-
ternal and internationalized strife,
thousands are constantly periled by lack
of food and shelter.

African nations have an extraor-
dinary record of accepting refugees into
their countries and providing long-term
shelter. But the strain on already poor
economies is enormous. The United
States has been consistently sensitive
and responsive to this problem. In 1981,
we faced a dire situation in which many
thousands of African refugees were in

program for southern African refugees
aimed at making them self-sufficient and
alleviating the burden they represent to
host countries.

We are constantly concerned to see
that funding for continuing these efforts
will be adequate. Traditionally, we have
contributed about one-third of the UN
refugee budget for Africa, and we in-
tend to continue to pull our weight while
pressing other donors to pull theirs.

Similarly, we have contributed the
largest single share of the International
Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC)
Africa program to help those displaced
by war or famine within their own coun-
tries. Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan,
Uganda, and a number of other coun-
tries benefit from this humanitarian ef-
fort and the ICRC's presence on the
ground.

Africa's Urgent Economic Needs

Per capita food production in Africa has
been declining slowly but steadily for the
last two decades. Population is growing
more rapidly in Africa than in any other

continent. Two-thirds of the countries
officially designated by the United Na-
tions as being "least-developed" are in
Africa. And in the last year or so, a
massive drought of unprecedented pro-
portions has turned despair into tragedy
in many parts of Africa.

We have been in the forefront of the
international response to Africa's im-
mediate needs and to its longer-term
problems. We have consciously directed
our economic assistance programs
almost exclusively toward increasing
food production and toward other areas
of activity which support that goal, such
as health programs, skills training, re-
search of seed varieties and farming
techniques, and support of agricultural
extension services. We are working
closely with other donors, with par-
ticularly satisfying results in the Sahel
countries, southern Africa, and some
other areas. We have joined the African
Development Bank, having long sup-
ported its affiliate the African Develop-
ment Fund.

We have been in the lead in en-
couraging the World Bank to devote a
greater proportion of its IDA [Interna-
tional Development Association] soft-
loan resources to Africa, with gratifying
success. We have reduced the loan com-
ponent of our own assistance programs
to an insignificant proportion of the
total, realizing that most African coun-
tries today are in no position to accept
additional future debt obligations. And,
as I have mentioned, we are providing
food assistance in substantial quantities.

In each of these endeavors, we have
worked closely with the Congress, and I
would like to digress long enough to
acknowledge here the strong support
and encouragement, and invariably wise
and helpful counsel, always experienced
in dealing with Nancy Kassebaum. She
is one of our very best friends in Wash-
ington.

Let me speak for a moment about
money, just to give you some idea of the
magnitude of our involvement in, and
commitment to, Africa in the 1980s.
U.S. direct bilateral economic assistance
to Africa last year totaled over $800
million. For the fiscal year just begun —
FY 1984— we have requested a level in
excess of $900 million. Despite the in-
tense, and correct, pressures in Wash-
ington to hold budgets down, I am
pleased to report that the FY 1984 level
would represent an increase of over 20%
since this Administration took office. I
take no honor in busting the budget, but

Department of State Bulletin

'HI

OUai M III ly w^

AFRICA

I am proud that this Administration has
seen fit to address Africa's urgent and
profound economic problems head-on.

I should tell you, parenthetically,
that we are also providing military
assistance and training to a number of
friendly African countries and that, last
year, the dollar value of military assist-
ance was less than one-sixth the dollar
value of our economic assistance. In
fact, we rank somewhere around fifth as
a supplier of military assistance to
Africa, far behind the Soviets and some
of their surrogates, and even behind
allies such as France. If you take into
account the assistance we are providing
through such intermediaries as the
World Bank, the African Development
Bank and Fund, and the FAO [Food and
Agriculture Organization] and its world
food program — all that assistance being
economic — the balance is even more
heavily skewed, and the total of our
economic assistance far surpasses the
billion dollar mark.

In the post-independence period, as
they began the process of nation
building, many African governments ex-
perimented with various forms of state
socialism. They instituted central plan-
ning, created state corporations to con-
trol key economic sectors, instituted
costly subsidy programs and, along the
way, incurred incredible, unsustainable
debt burdens. With the world economic
downturn from which the West, thank-
fully, is now beginning to emerge, many
African countries have been faced with
the harsh reality of what we would call
in the private sector impending bank-
ruptcy. They have become increasingly
dependent on Western donors and the
international financial system. They
have turned to the International
Monetary Fund for support. They have
turned to the World Bank for assistance
with structural adjustment.

As I have indicated, the United
States has been responsive and will con-
tinue to be. But, along with the bank
and the fund, we have encouraged the
African governments to reexamine their
own economic systems and priorities.
Many of them now realize the errors of
past ways and the awful price that past
practices have imposed. There is, across
the continent, a new awareness of the
importance of putting limits on govern-
ment's role in the economy, a new com-
mitment to the private sector and the
free market— indigenous and foreign—
and a new striving for sound economic
management.

This process of transition, of policy
reform, is bound to be slow and halting.

January 1984

for the fundamental changes implicit in
the process are bound to be destabiliz-
ing. Significant increases in the prices of
basic foodstuffs, divestiture of state
enterprises which have traditionally
employed far more people than they
need, dramatic alteration in a currency
exchange rate — this is the stuff of which
riots and revolutions are made. Stripped
to its essentials, economic policy reform
is a complex political process affecting
bread-and-butter interests of different
constituencies within African societies at
every point of decision.

Yet, there is a growing awareness
that steps such as these are necessary,
that without them African countries can-
not hope for the foreseeable future to
find themselves even in a situation of
tolerable equilibrium, let alone on a path
to economic growth. We are working
with many African governments, inter-
national financial institutions, and other
donors right now to analyze such prob-
lems and to advise and assist them in
such directions. This work, in the long
term, will be even more important to
Africa than the millions and billions of
dollars we commit through our economic
assistance programs, even more impor-
tant than the hunger we might help to
stave off, the diseases we might help to
eradicate, the dams we might help to
design, the schools we might help to
build, the skills we might help to trans-
fer. The response of the Africans them-
selves — their willingness to take very
hard decisions with severe short-term
risks — has been heartening.

Let me say, further, a few words
about the private sector thrust of this
Administration. What we are really talk-
ing about is encouraging the release of
the productive economic forces potential-
ly available — domestically and exter-
nally—for the goal of development. It is
a long-term proposition with many
aspects. Let me give some examples.

• David Rockefeller headed a high-
level banking and investment team that
visited Africa last year. The team found
governments anxious to secure foreign
private investment and officials who are
willing to make reforms to encourage
private investment.

• Guinea, with its abundant natural
resources, is one example. President
Sekou Toure visited the United States
last fall to attend and lead an ambitious
trade and investment seminar sponsored
by Chase Manhattan. The Guinean
Government has since set up a special
office to help prospective investors cut
through red tape.

• Cabinet-level trade missions have
visited Africa. We have held trade and
investment seminars throughout major
regional centers in the United States to
encourage American business to look at
opportunities in Africa. And, we have
supported private American organiza-
tions such as the U.S. -Nigerian Joint
Agricultural Consultative Committee
(JACC) seeking to expand trade and in-
vestment.

• More recently, we have estab-
lished an informal interagency working
group in the executive branch to coordi-
nate and strengthen U.S. development
and promotional activities in the fields of
trade and investment. While just begin-
ning, we can play a useful role in those
African countries which are capable and
willing to work with us. Ultimately,
private trade and investment flows into
Africa are a function of the political and
economic climate that exists in various
countries, particularly the investment
climate.

Only Africans themselves can make
their economies attractive to foreign
businessmen. Similarly, only African
leaders can unleash the enormous
creative potential of African artisans,
entrepreneurs, farmers, and risktakers.
Our role is to develop, explore, and
discuss road maps; to build bridges;
share concepts and information; and
help build the networks of people, data,
and institutions that will be needed.

Democracy

The Administration has given support to
the strengthening of democratic institu-
tions in Africa. The President's Con-
ference on Free Elections held in Wash-
ington last year is stirring evidence to
this commitment. One of the best re-
ceived contributions to that conference
attended by delegates from around the
world was made by the representative of
Nigeria, a nation which enjoyed im-
pressive multiparty democratic elections
this year at all levels of its federal struc-
ture, one modeled in certain respects on
our own. We have applauded the demo-
cratic elections which have taken place
during the last year in Nigeria, Senegal,
and Mauritius. We have provided fund-
ing to help the Liberian authorities
manage the transition to elected govern-
ment in 1985, the first time Liberia will
have experienced an open democratic
process in its long history.

We cannot help but believe that
democratic elections are both a
manifestation of and stimulant to health,

AFRICA

wealth, and wisdom in government. As
President Reagan said a few months ago
in a major foreign policy address, there
is a quiet revolution at work in Africa
today. That revolution is a signal of
hope and self-confidence to a region buf-
feted by economic crisis and instability.

Constructive Change
in Southern Africa

Let me conclude my comments this
evening with a discussion of southern
Africa. At the outset, I want to make
absolutely clear the depth of this Ad-
ministration's commitment to peaceful
change in southern Africa. We have en-
gaged our prestige and our energies in
defining a regional strategy and in using
our influence and resources to imple-
ment it.

The southern Africa region holds
great potential. It is strategically
important because of its vast mineral
wealth and its geographic location
astride the sealanes which carry the oil
of the Persian Gulf to Western nations.
It is also an area of tension, unfulfilled
political and economic aspirations and,
unfortunately, the potential for growing
violence with incalculable consequences
for Western interests, African interests,
and East-West relations.

We ignore southern Africa and the
positive and negative aspects of its
potential at the risk of both Western in-
terests and our most deeply held prin-
ciples. President Reagan concluded early
in his first year that southern Africa
matters. Only the enemies of the United
States and Africa can benefit from a ris-
ing tide of violence and instability. Such
conditions offer them an opportunity to
expand their influence at the expense of
political and economic development. The
goals of our policy are simply stated:

• Independence for Namibia based
on UN [Security Council] Resolution
435;

• A framework of enhanced security
including a practical basis of coexistence
between all states in the region;

• The emergence of a regional
climate in which foreign forces go home,
boundaries of sovereign states are re-
spected, and governments and people
can dedicate themselves to the priority
of development and nation building;

• Continued and accelerated move-
ment in the ongoing process of essential
change in South Africa away from an
approach to government based on the
laws and principles of racial separa-
tion—an approach repugnant to us as

Americans and serving, as long as it
prevails, as an absolute barrier to nor-
mal relations between the United States
and South Africa.

This Administration— unlike some
prior ones— has a strategy for achieving
its goals in southern Africa, a strategy
we call constructive engagement. There
are, no doubt, some here tonight whose
impression of that approach is influ-
enced by the prevalence of misunder-
standings, willful or unintentional distor-
tions, and just plain rubbish that is cur-
rent on this controversial policy arena.
What I want to do for the remainder of
my time this evening is explain construc-
tive engagement in terms of progress
toward the achievement of our goals.

Namibia. Namibia is, in effect,
Africa's last colony and a focus of strife,
violence, external involvement, and
political polarization. Previous U.S. Ad-
ministrations have helped bring about
Namibia's independence. This Ad-
ministration, early on, was determined
to try to bring about conditions which
would make it politically possible for
South Africa to relinquish control of this
territory.

With our allies in the contact
group— Canada, Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom— we have built on
earlier efforts of previous Administra-
tions (starting with that of President
Ford) to bring about Namibian independ-
ence. We have based our effort on UN
Security Council Resolution 435,
adopted in 1978 and substantially
strengthened since that time by subse-
quent understandings and agreements.
We have helped shape principles which
will guide the drafters of an independent
Namibia's constitution. We have found
solutions to a series of issues related to
the role of the United Nations in the
transition process leading to independ-
ence.

In fact, through intensive efforts
with our allies in the contact group,
Africa's front-line states [Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe], SWAPO [South
West Africa People's Organization],
South Africa, internal Namibian parties,
and the United Nations we now have in
place virtually all the elements for the
implementation of Resolution 435 and
the transition to Namibian independ-
ence.

It has taken longer than we hoped
to achieve this much, but Namibian in-
dependence today depends only on some
key political decisions of governments in

the region turning on one issue. The UN
Secretary General [Javier Perez de
Cuellar y Guerra] defined the remaining
hurdle. He visited southern Africa
earlier this fall and met with all the par-
ties with interests in this issue. His
report confirmed that South Africa has
agreed to the terms of Resolution 435.
But he also learned and made clear in
his report that the South African
Government is not prepared to withdraw
from Namibia and begin the implementa-
tion of Resolution 435 in the absence of
a commitment from the Angolan
Government on the withdrawal of Cuban
forces from that strife-torn land. The
South African Government's position on
this issue reflects its assessment of pros-
pects for its own future security in the
region.

Angola. Consequently, we are also
fully engaged in a separate but parallel
series of talks with the Angolan Govern-
ment, which, if successful, will result in
an agreement on the Cuban troop issue.
This would open the way to South
Africa's implementation of the interna-
tional agreements we have reached for
Namibia's transition to independence.

Cuban withdrawal from Angola and
South African withdrawal from Angola
and Namibia would open the way for
Angolans to build a brighter future, pur-
sue their substantial development poten-
tial, and end the long night of strife that
land has experienced since its independ-
ence exactly 8 years ago.

Regional Security. The United
States is actively engaged in efforts to
reduce and contain cross-border violence
in southern Africa, whether that
violence comes in the form of terrorist
bombs shattering glass and ending lives
in South Africa or South African mili-
tary raids into neighboring states. We
are seeking to support those realistic
leaders in the region who recognize the
need for a framework of peace based on
dialogue and understandings between
South Africa and its neighbors. We have
used our good offices, our communica-
tions channels, and our influence to en-
courage a process which can only be
conducted by those who live there.
There can be no imposed peace in
southern Africa. The reduction and con-
trol of violence depends on many things
including a readiness to coexist despite
fundamental political and ideological
rifts; sufficient regional confidence to
resist the temptation to import violent

Department of State Bulletin

means and invite foreign intervention-
ists; and demonstrated progress on the
agenda of constructive, negotiated
change so that the siren song of violence
is, indeed, resisted.

As Under Secretary [Lawrence S.]
Eagleburger told the National Confer-
ence of Editorial Writers last June:
"There can be no double standards for
either South Africa or its neighbors. The
obligations of statehood . . . are ... re-
ciprocal." The Under Secretary con-
tinued to say the "United States cate-
gorically reaffirms the principle that all
states have a duty to refrain from toler-
ating. . .organized activities within their
territory by guerrillas or dissidents plan-
ning acts of violence in the territory of
another state." This applies to all states
in the region.

We, ourselves, have taken steps to
enhance our ability to play a construc-
tive, catalytic role. We have moved to
rebuild our relations with Mozambique
on a basis of full reciprocity while re-
sponding to that nation's desperate
economic situation with food aid. We
have quietly encouraged bilateral talks
between Mozambique and South Africa
and have found a commitment on the
part of both sides to continued negotia-
tions in the search for mutual under-
standing. We have recently sent an Am-
bassador to Maputo to help foster this
fragile dialogue between our two states.

Similarly, we have moved to counsel
restraint and dialogue between South
Africa and other neighbors such as
Lesotho and Zimbabwe, complementing
and reinforcing their own efforts to ar-
rive at a workable basis of coexistence.
Whether this vulnerable beginning sur-
vives is up to the governments directly
concerned. The states of the region are
making a choice between violence and
coexistence. To accept the challenge of
coexistence is much more difficult, but it
represents the best hope of fostering
constructive change and avoiding inter-
national strife.

South Africa. An essential ingre-
dient in this volatile mix, and one which
will profoundly influence the region's
success or failure in addressing its prob-
lems, is how South Africans shape their
own future.

Vice President Bush said in Nairobi
[Kenya] last November [1982]:

Apartheid is wrong. It is legally en-
trenched racism— inimical to the fundamental
ideas of the United States. America's history
and America's future can only be understood
in terms of our commitment to a multiracial
democracy in which all citizens participate
and from which all benefit. The rule of law,

January 1984

the principles of consent and participation in
the political process, and the right of every
human being to citizenship which reflects
these principles are to Americans a sacred
trust. We will not betray this trust.

There are those in the United States
and Africa who advocate punitive
measures against and isolation of South
Africa and other countries with whose
policies they disagree. There are pro-
posals before the U.S. Congress, and, I
understand, the Kansas state legislature
as well, that would ban bank loans to
South Africa or Krugerrand gold coin

AFRICA

Meaningful and broadened power shar-
ing will occur as blacks acquire the
economic and organizational base from
which to insist on it, bargain for it, and
negotiate. Economic growth supported
by foreign investment is, therefore,
essential to the creation of opportunity
for black South Africans.

For these reasons, the Administra-
tion opposes punitive measures and, in-
stead, strongly supports the voluntary
Sullivan Code of Fair Employment Prac-
tices. American firms are playing and
can continue to play a role in bringing

. . . the South African Government is not prepared
to withdraw from Namibia and begin the im-
plementation of Resolution 435 in the absence of a
commitment from the Angolan Government on the
withdrawal of Cuban forces from that strife-torn
land.

imports from South Africa, deny access
to the International Monetary Fund's
stabilization programs, call for disinvest-
ment or no new investment in South
Africa, and institute punitive trade con-
trols on civilian commerce.

The advocates of this approach
would have us disengage and somehow
walk away from the issues which
southern Africa presents, as if they will
magically solve themselves or not affect
us if we turn our back on them. I reject
that approach; it is basically a "cop-out,"
cloaked in a fastidious false piety.
Worse, it presumes without a shred of
supporting evidence that change in
South Africa would be advanced if the
United States washed its hands of the
problem, leaving the scene to others to
work their will. That is not foreign
policy; it is "ostrich" policy.

The prime focus of our efforts
should rather be on positive steps to
back constructive change and those in
South Africa who are working for peace-
ful change. Constructive engagement is
aimed at institution building and
supporting those advocates of construc-
tive change in South Africa of all races
in and out of government. American and
European business carry a particularly
heavy burden in this regard. It is within
the capacity of this community to hasten
the process of constructive change.

about constructive change. An objective
look at South Africa clearly demon-
strates that blacks are gaining economic
strength. Black labor and black purchas-
ing power are vital to South Africa's
economy. American and other firms are
channeling hundreds of millions of
dollars into black advancement in the
work place, often setting the pace on a
national scale and opening up new
avenues for black advancement.

We are also backing up our views on
change by the commitment of public
funds to the process. And we are doing
so, I might add, with bipartisan support
in Congress.

• We have undertaken a $4 million-
a-year scholarship program to bring 100
black South African students annually to
the United States to study in our univer-
sities. The legislative basis of this pro-
gram preceded this Administration. It
has been substantially increased in the
past few years.

• We have initiated training pro-
grams, in cooperation with the AFL-CIO
[American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations], for
black South African trade unionists to
which the U.S. Government will con-
tribute over $1 million this year and
next.

• We are supporting small business
development in black communities at a

uA'iii'VA)!^;mihuiii!>i>ihhu>>iiniuHMii^^^^^^^

AFRICA

cost of some $3 million over the next 2
years.

• We are providing $2 million over
the next 2 years to help tutor black
South African high school students to
improve their chances of entering pro-
fessional schools.

These are illustrations of an approach
that can be expanded further and, with
congressional support, it will be.

I cannot leave this subject without
commenting on the recently approved
constitutional proposals in South Africa.
While it would be inappropriate for the
U.S. Government to propose or endorse
any particular blueprint for political
change in South Africa, it seems clear
the 66% yes vote by South Africa's
white electorate is a reflection of a
growing consensus within that electorate
of the need for change.

In that sense, November 2, 1983, is
already a milestone in the modern
history of South Africa. The proposals
themselves did not address the question
of political rights for the country's black
majority. But a clear majority of white
South African voters decided to take a
step which opens the way to construc-
tive, evolutionary change toward a
system based on the consent of all South
African citizens, 80% of whom are not
white.

The referendum results give the
South African Government a mandate to
move decisively along the road of
change. The U.S. Government hopes
that the South African Government will
use its mandate to address the problem
of the political rights of South Africa's
black majority— for the sake of the peo-
ple of South Africa and of southern
Africa, and for the sake of its relations
with the rest of the world, inchiding the
United States.

Conclusion

I have talked long enough, but I thought
it important that you have a clear pic-
ture of how this Administration views
Africa and is addressing the major
issues. It is an ambitious program, but
one which we believe will draw increas-
ing support and understanding in Africa
and here at home. ■

Visit of Sudanese President

President Gaafar Muhammed
Nimeiri of the Sudan made an official
working visit to Washington, D.C.,
November 19-22, 1983, to meet with
President Reagan and other government
officials.

Following are remarks made by
Presidents Reagan and Nimeiri after
their meeting on November 21.^

President Reagan

It's been an honor and a pleasure to
welcome President Nimeiri to
Washington once again. President
Nimeiri is a friend. Few can match his
courage and foresight as a peacemaker
in Africa and in the Middle East. I place
great value on his insights and wise
counsel and appreciate this opportunity
to speak with him directly.

In our discussions, we found
ourselves in basic agreement on critical
issues in the Middle East and the Horn
of Africa. President Nimeiri and I
reviewed efforts to find a solution to the
conflict in Chad. We're agreed that the
first step necessary to achieve that end
is the withdrawal of Libyan forces from
Chad. Likewise, we're of one mind on
the need to support African countries
threatened by Libyan-supported aggres-
sion.

We also discussed the urgent need
to reach a just and comprehensive peace
for the Middle East. A key to this is a
settlement that would permit all states
in the region to live in peace with secure
borders, while at the same time protect-
ing the legitimate rights of the Palestin-
ian people. I thanked President Nimeiri
for his continued support of our current
peace initiative.

On bilateral issues, I reaffirmed our
willingness to help the Sudan meet the
economic and military challenges that it
faces. We applaud the Sudan's efforts to
reinvigorate its private sector and
reform governmental policies that
hinder economic progress. Economic
development is of utmost importance to
the people of the Sudan. And in this
endeavor, the United States is happy to
lend a hand to a friend.

President Nimeiri's visit underlines
the significant role that Sudan is playing
in Africa and the Middle East. The peo-
ple of America are proud to stand with
the people of the Sudan as friends and
partners for peace and progress.

President Nimeiri

I would like to thank President Reagan
for his invitation to me to come to visit
once again the United States. And I
would like to say to him that we are
very pleased by our friendship to the
people of the United States.

President Reagan and myself have
discussed bilateral relations between our
two countries and reviewed ways and
means to further strengthen them. We
are hoping that the important role

I ' j> n 1 ; !;iH«Hjnff7T3ij«ij<.

a.:.

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

played by the United States toward
refugees will continue and expand at a
time where we in the Sudan face and
cater to ever-increasing numbers from
our neighboring countries, especially
Ethiopia.

In Africa, we have been— and still
are— very concerned about the
destabilization policies represented by
Libya and its intervention in the internal
affairs of others. Libya is undermining
the unity of Chad by invading and occu-
pying its territory and plotting against
the unity and stability of the Sudan.
Ethiopia and Libya are both playing a
very dangerous role and executing
policies serving the interests of a
superior power.

In the Middle East, the Sudan is ful-
ly committed to a just solution to the
Palestinian problem. In this context, the
Sudan stands firm behind the Fez
resolution. And it also supported the
Reagan initiative as a step toward a
more comprehensive solution. We
deplore and regret the continued blood-
shed in Lebanon and call on all parties
to save Lebanon and its independence.
We also condemn all policies and prac-
tices aimed at liquidating the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] and
deplore the shedding of Arab blood by
Arab hands.

Israel remains the cause of the prob-
lem in the Middle East. We call on
President Reagan to exert his utmost to
stop the Israeli expansion policy and
play the role becoming a great power
that has such a great interest in the
Arab world. And we call, also, on the
Soviet Union to assist in peace progress
in the Middle East.

Paradox, Problems, and Promise
of Arms Control

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidental Documents of Nov. 28, 1983.

by Kenneth L. Adelman

Address before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council on November 1 7,
1983. Ambassador Adelman is Director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA).

It is a great pleasure to be here with all
of you today. I want to thank you for
this welcome opportunity to discuss one
of, if not the most intellectually challeng-
ing, emotionally gripping, and profound-
ly important issues of our era— how to
control arms and reduce the risk of war.
It is a matter of survival and also of
how we make a better, safer world
wherein freedom and justice flourish. It
is, in an era of nuclear weaponry, a mat-
ter of global dimensions. And it is, I can
assure you, an area that deeply and per-
sonally involves the President. It
receives the highest priority of all of us
serving under his leadership.

In a few days, many television
viewers across the land will witness a
powerful, draining portrayal of the hor-
rors of nuclear war and its aftermath.
The movie is, as you probably know,
"The Day After." Believe me, it is mov-
ing. Recently, scientific panels also have
reminded us that nuclear war would
have horrrible and far-reaching conse-
quences that would, by no means, be
limited to the participants or to their
hemisphere.

The thought of a "nuclear winter
nightmare," the drama of the destruc-
tion of a typical American city— such as
Lawrence, Kansas— and of society as we
know and cherish it are piercing
reminders of the need to do everything
possible to eliminate the chances of
nuclear war from ever occurring. As
President Reagan has said on several oc-
casions: "A nuclear war cannot be won
and must never be fought." And: "There
are no winners in a nuclear war— only
losers."

Avoiding war while preserving
freedom is by no means easy. It is, in
fact, a tough business. It requires not
just defense efforts but an array of
diplomatic relationships and security,
cultural, and economic ties with other
countries. It often entails hard choices
with each one having risks and costs. It
requires— perhaps above all else— our
mightiest moral, intellectual, and emo-
tional resources.

The dramatizations of these weeks
depict the horrors. They show the prob-
lem but not the solution. Given the over-
whelming—indeed, unimaginable-
tragedy if we fail and the heavy
demands made on us to succeed— as we
must— it is only natural that simple for-
mulas gain popularity. The ideas of a
"freeze" on nuclear weapons or
unilateral nuclear disarmament are, in
this respect, understandable.

But these ideas are deceptively allur-
ing. As H. L. Mencken said: "There is
always an easy solution to every human
problem— neat, plausible, and wrong."
Contrary to appearances, a freeze or
unilateral disarmament will not help
achieve greater stability or reduce the
chances of war. They run a high risk, in
fact, of inviting just the opposite results.

Paradoxes

The paradoxes of arms control are glar-
ing, often to the confusion of many con-
cerned citizens. History has taught us
that we must be prepared for war in
order to avoid it. Strength can and does
deter aggression. Weakness may invite
it, and thus weakness is provocative.

Nuclear balance is essential to keep
the peace. Deterrence means that a
potential aggressor realizes that the
costs to him will be unacceptably high.
To pose that prospect, we must have
forces and be seen as able and prepared,
if necessary, to use those forces against
key elements of Soviet power. Deter-
rence hinges upon the Soviet leaders'
views of our capabilities and of our will.
Deterrence may be difficult to com-
prehend and somewhat abstract, but it
works. It has, for example, kept the
peace in Europe for 38 years.

Another paradox is that a strong
U.S. defense posture is necessary, not
just for deterrence but also for effective
arms control. The Soviets are not unlike
any tough negotiator. If they can realize
their goals without giving up anything in
return, they will surely prefer that deal.
If we grant them strategic superiority
by neglecting our force modernization,
we cannot hope to regain strategic pari-
ty by pursuing arms control ever so
diligently. On the other hand, if we pur-
sue programs to redress the imbalances
that have developed through the un-
paralleled Soviet military buildup, the

January 1984

r'>i^n!nm^:Hi'Jji:hi'JH:liuiiJhmtltiiMtihm^^

ARMS CONTROL

Soviets will have strong incentives to
negotiate for genuine arms and reduc-
tions.

Our actions cannot, of course,
guarantee that the Soviets will agree to
substantial reductions in U.S. and Soviet
nuclear arsenals. We might fail if we
try. But we will surely fail if we don't
try. No effective arms control will come
about if we do not pursue deep reduc-
tions and needed defense programs.
Weakness not only diminishes deter-
rence but also undercuts arms control.

Problems

A number of problems, as you can im-
agine, arise between the paradox and
the promise of arms control. These prob-
lems include:

• The unabated Soviet buildup of
military forces:

• Asymmetries between the two
sides' force structures: and

• American impatience.

Both effective deterrence and real
arms control have become tougher to
achieve because of Soviet conduct and
the Soviet weapons buildup over the
past decade. Since 1972 the Soviet
Union has tripled its number of strategic
nuclear weapons. The Soviets dedicate
at least 12-14% of their gross national
product to defense, or basically double
what the United States spends on
defense relative to its GNP.

The Soviets have kept production
lines open and active for all three legs of
the strategic triad — land-based missiles,
submarine-based missiles, and
bombers — whereas the United States
had an open production line only for sub-
marines when President Reagan took of-
fice. The Soviets have also steadily in-
creased their intermediate-range, land-
based nuclear forces targeted on
Western Europe and Asia, having for
years a monopoly on these weapons.

The United States has no interest in
an arms race with the Soviet Union. In

Director, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency

Kenneth L. Adelman was born in Chicago on
June 9, 1946. He received a bachelor's degree
from Grinnell College (1967) and a masters in
Foreign Service from Georgetown University
(1969).

His government career began in 1968 at
the Department of Commerce. From 1970 to
1972, he served as special assistant to the
Director of VISTA. He then participated in a
research project in Kinshasha, Zaire
(1973-75). Ambassador Adelman pursued ad-
vanced studies at Georgetown beginning in
1975. He was a liasion officer for the Agency
for International Development (1975-76) and
assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(1976-77). From the 1977 to 1981, he was
employed as a senior political scientist at the
Strategic Studies Center of Stanford
Research Institute in Arlington, Va., where
he wrote extensively on national security af-
fairs. His articles have appeared in Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Policy, Washington Quarter-
ly, The Wall Street Journal, and the New
Republic.

From 1981 to 1983, Ambassador
Adelman was U.S. Deputy Permanent
Representative to the United Nations. While
there he led the U.S. delegation to the Sec-
ond Special Session on Disarmament.

He was sworn in as Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency on Aug.
22, 1983. ■

fact we have not been racing at all. Our
increase in strategic weaponry has been
at a much slower pace. The destructive
capability of our strategic weapons is to-
day 60% less than that of the Soviets.
Looking at our total nuclear stockpile,
the number of U.S. nuclear weapons is
at its lowest level in 20 years, and the
megatonnage of our nuclear weapons to-
day is only a quarter of what it was in
the late 1960s. In more graphic terms,
we have deployed today some 8,000
fewer nuclear weapons than in the
1960s.

As President Regan noted in his
radio address last month. Western
restraint stands in stark contrast to the
Soviet buildup in intermediate-range
nuclear forces. The Soviets began in the
mid-1970s to increase these forces
targeted on our allies in Europe and
Asia with a new, triple-warheaded, more
accurate missile— the SS-20. They have
continued to deploy these mobile
missiles. They now have 360 SS-20s
with 1,080 warheads.

For its part, the United States has
withdrawn 1,000 nuclear weapons from
1980 and has just this month announced
that another 1,400 will be withdrawn.
For each new nuclear weapon that may
be deployed in Europe over the coming
times pursuant to NATO's 1979 decision,
more than five nuclear weapons will
have been withdrawn from Europe.

This is as it should be. We should
tolerate only the bare minimum number
of nuclear weapons necessary for effec-
tive deterrence. Moreover, together with
our allies, we are dedicating ourselves
toward less reliance on nuclear weapons
and more on new conventional methods
for preserving our freedom. This, too, is
as it should be.

The President has taken major ini-
tiatives to try to eliminate this
intermediate-range class of weapons en-
tirely — our zero-zero solution. Since the
Soviets have continued to refuse to do
that, the President has taken other ini-
tiatives to reduce these weapons to the
lowest possible equal level.

His efforts— in the INF [inter-
mediate range nuclear forces] talks in
Geneva — have regrettably met with
Soviet stonewalling. We are faced this
week with the prospect that the Soviets
may not negotiate if U.S. deployments
go forward, as NATO has planned since
1979, to balance this Soviet military
threat. A Soviet walk-out would be
ironic and unjustified. We have
negotiated for several years while the
Soviets steadily deployed new weapons.

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

on an average of one new SS-20 a
week. Since negotiations began, the
Soviet Union has fielded over 100 addi-
tional SS-20 systems with some 300
warheads.

Now that U.S. deployments are
starting according to the schedule estab-
lished 4 years ago, the Soviets threaten
to walk out unless we agree to give
them a monopoly on these missiles. All
their proposals have had the same bot-
tom line: hundreds of these missiles for
them and zero for us.

If the Soviets were serious about an
agreement, they would stay at the table
and negotiate. The United States will
negotiate as long as necessary to reach a
sound settlement. We are also prepared
at any time to modify or reverse our
missile deployments if such a settlement
is achieved.

Pressure tactics are, of course,
standard Soviet methods. In 1979 the
Soviet Union said that there could be no
negotiations if NATO decided to deploy
these missiles. Nine months later they
agreed to talks after NATO showed its
determination. In 1982 the Soviets
threatened to suspend negotiations if
NATO moved forward with preparations
for deployment. These preparations have
gone forward, and the talks have con-
tinued.

We do not know exactly what the
Soviets have in mind now. But we do
know that we should not be surprised by
their pressure tactics. Nor should we be
cowed or intimidated. Staying the course
we are on provides the only opportunity
for a balance or reduction of these
weapons that will enhance stability and
reduce the risk of war.

Another problem for arms control
relates to the broader context of Soviet
conduct around the world. Arms control
cannot be immune from major outside
forces, and it has not been. President
Johnson's plans for a Moscow visit to
launch the first strategic arms limitation
talks (SALT) were dashed by the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba
in the Fall of 1979, plus the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979,
adversely affected Senate consideration
of the SALT II Treaty signed in June of
that year.

The Reagan Administration does not
seek to link arms control efforts to other
areas of Soviet behavior. In the wake of
the tragedy of the Korean commercial
airliner shot down by the Soviets, for
example, the President did not suspend

the arms talks. On the contrary, he con-
tinued to review problems in the
negotiations and to undertake steps to
overcome them.

But Soviet behavior can and at times
will impact on our arms control efforts,
like it or not. This is inevitable in a
democracy, where neither the public nor
its representatives can place aspects of
Soviet conduct in totally separate boxes.
Soviet adherence to existing arms con-
trol treaties or to pledges on their part
also raises perplexing problems.

It is particularly tragic that the use
of chemical warfare in Asia continues to-
day in violation of international
agreements, international law, and
civilized behavior. These actions by the
Soviet Union or its allies have accounted
for an estimated 10,000 deaths among
the Afghan hill peoples and Asian
peasants. This assaults everyone's sense
of human decency. Other Soviet actions
raise serious questions about their com-
pliance with the ABM [Antiballistic
Missile] Treaty and with their political
undertakings related to the SALT II
Treaty.

We cannot turn our back on
evidence of such violations. If we are
serious about arms control, we must be
equally serious about problems of com-
pliance. The Reagan Administration is
comprehensively reviewing these issues,
and we continue to raise them with the
Soviets at high levels.

Another major problem in nuclear
arms control stems from the two sides'
different force structures and ap-
proaches. The United States has, for ex-
ample, over time leaned toward smaller
missiles with improved accuracy and
technology and toward a balance be-
tween the three legs of the strategic
triad. The Soviets, on the other hand,
have placed greater emphasis on
destabilizing heavier, land-based
missiles.

Differences of perspective resulting
from geography, from history, and from
tradition further compound the dif-
ficulties of negotiation between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The
Soviets see any weapons targeted on the
U.S.S.R. as "strategic," whereas we dif-
fer on that definition since some of our
weapons in Europe are there only to off-
set Soviet weapons targeted on our
allies in Europe.

Differences lie also in that the
Soviets seek forces that far outnumber
all their potential adversaries combined.
But were we to agree with that formula-
tion, the Soviet Union would be far

stronger than any single potential adver-
sary, such as the United States. Grant-
ing the Soviet Union superiority by arms
control is obviously unacceptable.

Simply put, the two sides' forces are
not comparable in many respects. Thus
even with good faith and major efforts
by both sides, it is difficult intellectually
to bridge the wide gaps.

But that is precisely the challenge of
negotiations and, I can assure you, one
of the things that makes my job and
others so extraordinarily stimulating.
How to balance systems that are com-
parable and to make tradeoffs between
systems that are not is easier said than
done, but still possible.

Last month President Reagan made
clear that the United States is prepared
in the strategic arms reductions talks
(START) to negotiate tradeoffs between
Soviet advantages and U.S. advantages.
He also called for a mutual, guaranteed
build-down of ballistic missile warheads
and bomber platforms. This would
reduce the number of missile warheads
by a third on both sides, an approach
which offers a promising beginning if
the Soviets are willing.

A third problem — besides the Soviet
military buildup and asymmetries be-
tween the U.S. and Soviet forces — is
uniquely ours: It is traditional American
impatience. This, of course, has many
beneficial and noble aspects. We are an
active people. We see problems, and we
want to solve them — sooner rather than
later. Our creativity and problem-solving
impulse have built the kind of society
which we are so fortunate and justifiably
proud to have today.

But effective arms control, like most
worthwhile endeavors, does not come
quickly. The key issues we face today
are extremely complicated, as you might
have discerned from my remarks above,
progress will be more difficult than in
the past, and, needless to say, it was not
particularly easy then. Achieving
militarily significant reductions and
sound limitations promises to be a long,
hard road.

We cannot be discouraged by the
difficulty of the passage. As we travel
down this road, we should be wary of
the lure of agreements which may look
appealing but, on reflection, do not real-
ly serve the goals for which they are in-
tended. We should be wary of any so-
called simple solutions and should not
allow sweeping, unverifiable declarations
of intent to be confused with real arms
control.

Empty agreements would be easy
and quick. We could have one tomorrow.
But they would inflate expectations

January 1984

>\-i:i-utui-jH'h>,iifhiiiuhii>!mHmmiummmmmmmms^

ARMS CONTROL

without offering much in the way of con-
crete benefit.

Effective arms control will, thus,
take considerable time and patience.
Negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for
example, took some 5 years. Other
agreements have required even more
time. The Austrian state treaty took
more than 10 years to negotiate and
conclude. Would we have a free and in-
dependent Austria today if the West
had, at any stage, given up or com-
promised its basic principles and objec-
tives? There is, I am sorry to report, no
quick and easy route to a better world.

Promise

Under President Reagan, the United
States has been embarked on one of the
most ambitious arms control agendas
ever developed. That fact is often insuf-
ficiently understood and sometimes bald-
ly misrepresented.

I do not plan to bore you with all the
intricate details of our negotiations. A
summary review of our major efforts
clearly illustrates just how broad the
current arms control agenda is.

• In the strategic arms reductions
talks in Geneva, we seek deep reduc-
tions in strategic nuclear weapons. We

should not be satisfied with merely cap-
ping nuclear arms at high levels. Since
SALT I and SALT H, we have seen
substantial increases in the Soviet
nuclear forces that have created
strategic imbalances. Arms control
needs to do better.

• In the talks on intermediate-
range, land-based nuclear forces in
Geneva, we continue to seek the com-
plete elimination of these weapons but
are willing to accept any agreement that
would substantially and effectively
reduce the systems to equal and low
U.S. and Soviet levels on a global basis.

• While we push ahead to reduce

Soviets Suspend INF Negotiations

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
NOV. 23, 19831

I deeply regret that the Soviet Union
has chosen to discontinue the present
round of intermediate-range nuclear
force (INF) negotiations in Geneva.
While their decision did not come as a
surprise, it is a terrible disappointment.
The search for an agreement to reduce
nuclear weapons is so important to peo-
ple everywhere that the effort cannot be
abandoned.

Common sense demands that we
continue. We have negotiated for 2
years while the Soviets have continued
to deploy their SS-20 missiles. There is
no justification for their breaking off
negotiations just as NATO is beginning
to restore the balance. The United
States will never walk away from the
negotiating table. Peace is too impor-
tant.

We are prepared to resume the talks
at once. The initiatives we have placed
on the negotiating table have only one
objective: to reach a fair agreement that
reduces the level of nuclear arms. The
United States and its NATO allies are
united in our commitment to succeed.

We have no higher priority than the
reduction of nuclear weapons. Arms
reductions are the only sound course to
a safer future. We seek sound and
verifiable agreements that meet the
legitimate security interests of both
sides.

We are continuing other negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union — on

strategic arms reductions, on the reduc-
tion of conventional forces in Europe, on
a chemical weapons ban, and soon on
confidence-building measures aimed at
preventing military surprises in Europe.
The people of the world deserve and
want our negotiations to succeed. We
look forward to the day when the Soviet
Union hears their call and returns to the
INF negotiating table. Our negotiations
have been on the right course. We must
persevere if we are to serve the cause of
peace.

AMBASSADOR NITZE'S

STATEMENT,

NOV. 23, 19832

The United States profoundly regrets
the unilateral decision of the Soviet
Union to suspend the INF negotiations.
This decision is as unjustified as it is un-
fortunate.

The Soviet Union has rationalized
the suspension of these negotiations on
the grounds that approval by the NATO
parliaments of U.S. missile deployments
and U.S. deployment of those missiles
makes continuation of such talks im-
possible. In 1979 when the United States
first proposed INF negotiations to the
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had
already deployed some 140 SS-20s
globally. The global total of SS-20s now
is 360, and this Soviet buildup continues.
This continuing Soviet buildup has not
prevented the United States from pursu-
ing these negotiations and making every

effort to reach an equitable agreement.
These negotiations should continue until
an agreement is reached.

The schedule for U.S. deployments
has never been a secret. Nor has the
reason for them. They were mandated
by the NATO 1979 decision as a
necessary response to the Soviet
deployments of SS-20 missiles. That
decision was mandated as an effort to
limit such arms through negotiations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union.

The United States remains commit-
ted to reaching a negotiated solution
which meets the security needs of all
concerned. The U.S. delegation has
sought both formally and informally to
explore all opportunities for reconciling
the differences between the two sides.
The U.S. proposals are flexible and
designed to meet expressed Soviet con-
cerns.

The United States stands ready to
halt or reverse its deployments if an
equitable agreement to reduce and limit
or eliminate U.S. and Soviet missiles can
be achieved.

For its part, the United States re-
mains prepared to continue the INF
negotiations until an agreement has
been reached and our two countries
have thus fulfilled their responsibilities
to contribute to the cause of peace.

'Issued in Santa Barbara (text from
White House press release).

-Made in Geneva. Ambassador Paul H.
Nitze is head of the U.S. delegation to the
INF negotiations. ■

Departnnent of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

existing nuclear arsenals, we also con-
tinue vigorous efforts to prevent the fur-
ther spread of nuclear weapons. It is im-
perative that the spread of nuclear
weapons around the world be halted.

• In the Committee on Disarma-
ment in Geneva, we are actively en-
gaged in trying to rid the world of all
chemical weapons. As expressed by one
keen observer, these weapons have all
the potential for becoming "the poor
countries' weapons of mass destruction."
The world cannot afford that, and we
are redoubling our efforts to work out a
complete and effective ban on all
chemical weapons. I personally feel
strongly about this important area. The
moral, legal, and political barriers that
have been built up over the decades on
chemical weapons use are in danger of
being eroded and of tumbling down. We
need to buttress and build on them, just
as we have done in preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons.

• In the mutual and balanced force
reductions talks, we have, with our
allies, taken initiatives to seek reduc-
tions in conventional forces in Europe.

• In the upcoming Conference on
Confidence and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe,
we are again working with our allies to
achieve agreements that will reduce the
risk of war arising through error or
miscalculation.

Despite this impressive agenda,
some critics argue that the Reagan Ad-
ministration is not serious about arms
control. Nothing could be further from
the truth, as you can see.

Another line of criticism is, ironical-
ly, that the President's arms control pro-
posals are too ambitious. I am not en-
tirely sure what such criticisms mean.
Should we not seek deep and militarily
significant reductions in strategic
nuclear weapons? Should we not ensure
that reductions are balanced in a way
that contributes to, rather than detracts
from, stability? Should we not seek
much lower levels of nuclear weapons
and conventional forces in Europe?
Should we not seek to prevent the fur-
ther spread of nuclear weapons and to
ban all chemical weapons?

These goals are surely ambitious.
But can we afford to be anything less? I
do not think so. The President does not
think so. And I doubt that the American
people think so.

The promise of arms control is fre-

quently exaggerated by some and under-
estimated by others. It cannot, by itself,
resolve the world's problems. We should
not burden it with the task of resolving
the major political and ideological dif-
ferences that separate free people from
the Soviet Union — particularly its
repression at home and aggression
abroad. Arms control cannot and was
not meant to carry such a load.

But arms control can make a key
contribution. It holds out a promise of a
world with fewer and fewer nuclear
weapons, with less and less overall
destructive capability; a promise of
greater stability and reductions in the
chances of war by error or miscalcula-

tion in crisis; and a promise of a better
basis for security planning. When all is
said and done, it can be one of the foun-
dations for the better world that we all
seek.

Arms control, in general terms,
represents the embodiment of hope
among peoples for a world spared from
the kind and intensity of conflict that so
deeply marred the first half of this cen-
tury. These vital efforts deserve
everyone's support. As President
Reagan and the other summit partners
noted earlier this year in Williamsburg,
arms control is part of "a vision of a
world in which the shadow of war has
been lifted from all mankind." ■

The CDE and European
Security in the 1980s

by Gerhard Mally

Dr. Mally is a foreign affairs officer
in the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA).

Introduction

After 3 years of sometimes acrimonious
deliberations, the 35 participants in the
second follow-up meeting of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) adopted a concluding
document in Madrid on September 9,
1983. This consensus document had been
approved by President Reagan on July
15 when he stated that:

We have agreed to this concluding docu-
ment, as we did in 1975 to the Helsinki Final
Act itself, with no illusions about the nature
of the Soviet Union or about the system
which it seeks to impose over much of
Europe . . .

Together with the Helsinki accords, this
agreement sets forth a clearer code of con-
duct for all 35 CSCE states. . . . Giving
substance to the promises of Madrid and
Helsinki will remain one of our prime objec-
tives.

The concluding document calls, inter
alia, for the convening of a Conference
or Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe
(CDE) to be held in Stockholm, Sweden,
in 1984. In his final address in Madrid,
Secretary of State George Shultz stated
that "the United States will negotiate
seriously to reach agreement on militari-
ly significant, political binding, and

January 1984

verifiable measures applicable to the
whole of Europe" at the Stockholm con-
ference.

Genesis of the
Stockholm Conference

The concept of a conference on Euro-
pean security was originally proposed by
the Warsaw Pact members at their
meeting in Bucharest in 1966. At that
time, the East called for the convening
of an "all-European" security conference
and the dissolution of both NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. The East's proposal
was clearly aimed at elimination of the
U.S. military presence from Europe, and
the West rejected it.

When the Warsaw Pact met in
Budapest in 1970, it reiterated its pro-
posal for a European security con-
ference, this time with the United States
and Canada as full participants. During
this period (1968-72), NATO repeatedly
challenged the Warsaw Pact to join in
negotiations on mutual and balanced
force reductions (MBFR). In fact, NATO
made Warsaw Pact acceptance of
MBFR a sine qua nan for parallel
negotiations on European security and
cooperation. Thus a linkage was
established between East-West negotia-
tions on MBFR and CSCE, and
preparatory meetings began in Vienna
and Helsinki in 1972 and 1973, respec-
tively.

Whereas the 19 participants in
MBFR have been meeting in Vienna at
regular intervals over the last decade,
the 35 participants in the CSCE have

:Al,UiAmtuji.j:uUVntm!nM^^^^^

ARMS CONTROL

met less frequently, including in Helsinki
to sign the Final Act (1975), in Belgrade
for their first follow-up meeting
(1977-78), in Madrid for the second
review conference (1980-83), and in
Helsinki for the preparatory meeting
which set the agenda, timetable, and
modalities of the CDE (October 1983).

The formal opening date of the CDE
is January 17, 1984, in Stockholm. The
CSCE process will continue with several
additional meetings — on peaceful settle-
ment of disputes (Athens, 1984), on
Mediterranean cooperation (Venice,
1984), an experts' meeting on human
rights (Ottawa, 1985), a cultural forum
(Budapest, 1985), the 10th anniversary
session of CSCE (Helsinki, 1985), an ex-
perts' meeting on human contacts (Bern,
1986), and the third foUowup conference
on CSCE (Vienna, 1986).

Purpose of the CDE

According to the concluding document,
"the aim of the Conference is ... to
undertake, in stages, new, effective and
concrete actions designed to make prog-
ress in strengthening confidence and
security and in achieving disarma-
ment ..." These objectives are to be
achieved in stages, the first of which is
devoted to negotiating the adoption of a
set of mutually complementary
confidence- and security-building
measures designed to reduce the risk of
military confrontation in Europe. A
future foUowup meeting of CSCE will
consider the issue of supplementing the
CDE mandate.

Confidence- and security-building
measures to be negotiated in stage one
will cover the whole of Europe as well
as the adjoining sea area and airspace.
They will be of military significance, be
politically binding, and will be provided
with adequate measures of verification.

During the Madrid followup
meeting, the Soviet Union had per-
sistently called for a conference on
reducing armaments in Europe to follow
the second CSCE followup meeting in
the fall of 1983. This was a clear at-
tempt to use such a forum to derail the
scheduled deployment of U.S. inter-
mediate-range ballistic (Pershings lis)
and cruise missiles in Western Europe in
accordance with NATO's dual-track deci-
sion of 1979. Instead, the West insisted
on placing the focus of the Stockholm
conference on negotiating effective
confidence-building measures (as
originally advocated by France in 1978).

The Concept of Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures

In the Western view, confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs) are
designed to enhance knowledge and
understanding about military forces and
activities between states and/or con-
fronting alliances, such as NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. They involve
reciprocal exchanges of significant
military data and information for the
purpose of reducing the risk of military
confrontation by accident or miscalcula-
tion and to provide early warning about
impending military operations. The
resulting increase in accuracy of percep-
tions minimizes opportunities for sur-
prise attack and/or miscalculation and
thus increases stability. CSBMs com-
plement — but are no substitute
for — arms reduction agreements which
seek to constrain the size, armaments,
and structure of military forces.

Significance of CSBMs
in the European Context

The chief source of potential military in-
stability in Europe is the threat of War-
saw Pact armed forces — numerically
superior, geographically advantaged,
and directed by the Soviet Union, the
dominant military power on the Conti-
nent. Western military planners must
prepare for the possibility of a Warsaw
Pact surprise attack against NATO, an
alliance with a purely defensive
strategy. In the event of Soviet aggres-
sion, the Warsaw Pact would have the
tactical advantage of choosing the time
and avenues of attack while benefiting
from rapid mobilization and reinforce-
ment capabilities. Under these condi-
tions, the West European quest for
negotiating a viable regime of CSBMs
assumes great importance.

The first set of confidence-building
measures (CBMs) for the European
theater is contained in the CSCE Final
Act; it involves multilateral, regional,
selective, and mostly voluntary CBMs
which apply to the territories of the 35
signatories. Basket 1 includes a "docu-
ment on confidence-building measures
and certain aspects of security and
disarmament" which provides for one
mandatory CBM and four others:

• Prior notification of major
military maneuvers exceeding a total of
25,000 troops, independently or com-
bined with any possible air or naval com-
ponent. In the case of a state whose ter-
ritory extends beyond Europe, prior
notification need be given only of

maneuvers which take place in an area
within 250 kilometers from its frontier
facing or shared with any other Euro-
pean state, and notification has to be
given 21 days or more in advance of the
start of the maneuvers. This CBM is
mandatory;

• Exchange of observers to attend
military maneuvers;

• Prior notification of smaller scale
maneuvers, involving a total of less than
25,000 troops;

• Prior notification of major
military movements; and

• Exchange of military personnel
and delegations.

The Soviet record of implementation
regarding notification of maneuvers has
been mixed. In fact, the very spirit of
"confidence-building" measures was soon
eroded by Soviet aggression in Afghani-
stan and blatant intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of Poland in 1979-80. In-
deed, the Soviet Union has effectively
violated all basic principles of basket 1
of the Final Act including respect for
the sovereign equality of nations;
refraining from the threat or use of
force; inviolability of frontiers; ter-
ritorial integrity of states; noninterven-
tion in internal affairs; and self-
determination of peoples.

In 1978 the West put forward pro-
posals for additional CBMs at the CSCE
review conference in Belgrade, including
a call to encourage openness in military
budgets. Yet none of these ideas was ac-
cepted at the inconclusive first follow-up
meeting. At the second review con-
ference in Madrid, the Western nations
relaunched their effort to promote the
cause of more effective CBMs for the
European region.

Western Approach to
CSBMs for the 1980s

Based upon a French proposal, the
Western participants in the Madrid
review conference identified the follow-
ing criteria for negotiating a CSBM
regime at the Stockholm meeting.

• Military Significance— CSBMs to

be meaningful would have to focus on
military activities that threaten the
security of other states rather than
cosmetic provisions that create the illu-
sion of security.

• Obligation — CSBMs would have
to be mandatory and be implemented
without exception and at all times rather
than selectively and irregularly at the
discretion of the signatories.

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

• Verif lability — implementation of
CSBMs would have to be governed by
specific provisions for verification of
commitments rather than based upon
good faith and mutual trust. Indeed, it is
the very lack of mutual trust that makes
CSBMs necessary in the first place.
Moreover to the extent that CSBMs
would complement and reinforce arms
control agreements, they would have to
be verifiable.

• Applicability— in order to be ef-
fective, CSBMs would have to cover the
entire European Continent, from the
Atlantic to the Urals, including the
western area of the U.S.S.R. Given the
geopolitical and strategic advantages of
the Soviet Union in Eurasia, the exten-
sion of the CSBM regime to the Urals is
imperative.

• Linkage with CSCE— the CDE
mandate would have to define the con-
ference as part of the CSCE process,
and it would be up to a subsequent
follow-up meeting to assess progress
and extend the mandate.

Although the specifics for CSBMs
are subject to negotiations at the
Stockholm conference, the concluding
document of Madrid set two important
geographic parameters.

First, the area to be covered by
CSBMs is the whole of Europe, extend-
ing to the Urals. This principle is signifi-
cant because the limited CBMs adopted
in the Final Act of Helsinki exempted
the U.S.S.R., except for the first 250
kilometers from its western borders.
The Soviet Union, after first rejecting
the extended CBM coverage to the
Urals, urged that the geographic area be
enlarged into the Atlantic Ocean as com-
pensation for Moscow. The Soviet
motive was, of course, to obtain a droit
de regard for interference with the
movement of U.S. naval forces in con-
tingencies involving areas outside
Europe.

Thereafter, the West insisted on a
second parameter for CSBMs: that only
"adjoining sea area and airspace" would
be included and only when activities in

that area are part of military operations
taking place within Europe. This was
eventually accepted by the East.

The mandate for negotiating Euro-
pean-wide CSBMs in Stockholm is im-
portant to West Europeans in the face
of the possibility of a Soviet surprise at-
tack. In this context, however, it is im-
portant to recall that even the most
elaborate CSBMs cannot substitute for a
credible defense posture. Indeed, the
prospects for negotiating a viable CSBM
regime with the East in Stockholm de-
pend largely on improving NATO's
deterrent forces, both conventional and
nuclear.

Conclusion

Determined Western efforts to establish
an effective regime of CSBMs in Europe
are symptomatic of the existing political
atmosphere on the Continent which is
characterized by increasing uncertainty
and anxiety about the future of East-
West relations. The principal reasons for
the prevailing attitudes are the Soviet
Union's unprecedented military
capabilities and aggressive behavior. The
state of European insecurity manifests
itself in three dimensions, caused by a
triple disparity between East and West:

First, the continuing asymmetry of
conventional forces between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact in central Europe in

favor of the East (some 160,000 troops
and a tank superiority of 3:1), capable of
rapid mobilization for aggression;

Second, the imbalance in intermed-
iate-range nuclear forces, caused by the
unilateral Soviet deployment of more
than 350 mobile, triple warhead SS-20
missiles, two-thirds of which are
targeted at NATO military installations
and capable of obliterating all population
centers in Western Europe; and

Third, the legacy of direct Soviet
military intervention in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the German
Democratic Republic, Afghanistan, and
the record of support of proxy regimes
and revolutionary movements in Cuba,
Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Viet-
nam — all are manifestations of Soviet
expansionism.

Under these circumstances, Euro-
pean security and stability will only be
restored when the leaders of the Soviet
Union are prepared to accept the
equitable Western proposals for genuine
force reductions in the intermediate-
range nuclear forces and mutual and
balanced force reductions negotiations.
The CSCE-sponsored Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe
provides an appropriate forum for
negotiating a set of binding and
verifiable CSBMs which could contribute
to European security in the 1980s. ■

January 1984

EUROPE

Developments in Cyprus

by Richard N. Haass

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
November 2, 1983. Mr. Haass is special
Cyprus coordinator and Deputy for
Policy in the Bureau of European and
Canadian Affairs.^

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss
with you the subject of Cyprus and the
Administration's policy toward that
country. I hope this marks the beginning
of a regular dialogue with this commit-
tee and the Congress more generally on
this important subject. Realizing prog-
ress on the Cyprus question remains a
high priority in the foreign policy of the
Reagan Administration. I very much ap-
preciate the confidence Secretary Shultz
has placed in me as his special Cyprus
coordinator and consider keeping the
Congress informed on developments
there a vital part of my coordination
duties. Assistant Secretary [for Euro-
pean and Canadian Affairs Richard R.]
Burt's introductory remarks place the
Cyprus question in its proper regional
and global context. With his and the
Secretary's active support, I undertake
my new duties. No one should doubt our
determination to see progress toward a
fair, negotiated settlement in Cyprus.

Today I propose to describe recent
developments affecting Cyprus and
make some remarks on Administration
policies. I would like to begin, however,
by providing a brief look at the history
of Cyprus and a description of how the
present situation has developed.

Historical Overview

The creation of the Republic of Cyrpus
in 1960 followed a long and difficult
history of anticolonial and intercom-
munal violence in which Cypriots of both
the Turkish and Greek communities
died. The Constitution of 1960 was an
attempt to create a unitary state in
which the two communities were to live
together, something that had proven, at
best, difficult. Greece, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom were guarantors of the
1960 agreement establishing the basis of
that Constitution. The United States
was an active supporter of the process
but played no role in the planning or ex-
ecution of the establishment of the new
state. Unfortunately, the Constitution

did not work, and by 1963 it was evident
that communal animosities were
stronger than the spirit of nationhood
which the founders had hoped would
emerge. Regrettably the violence of the
preindependence era resumed and U.N.
peacekeeping forces were stationed on
the island under a Security Council man-
date of March 1964— a mandate the
Council has renewed every 6 months
since. Despite their presence, the
violence continued, reaching serious
levels again in 1967.

By 1974 the situation had deteri-
orated further, and the government in
Athens, for its own reasons, engineered
the overthrow of the government of
President Makarios. In response to the
threat of increased violence against the
Turkish Cypriot community, the Turkish
Government intervened militarily, citing
the need to protect the security of the
Turkish Cypriot community. On
August 15, the Turkish forces expanded
the area under their control to take in
approximately the northern third (some
37%) of the island. By the end of 1974,
the Makarios government had been
recreated and controlled the southern
portion of the island. Thousands of
Cypriots of both communities were
uprooted and relocated on the island.
UN troops moved onto the newly
established buffer zone dividing the com-
munities and brought about a relatively
effective separation of the two.

In the period following the arrival of
the Turkish troops and the establish-
ment of the buffer zone controlled by
the U.N. forces, the United States and
other friends of Cyprus worked con-
tinually to assist the two sides in resolv-
ing their differences. Intercommunal
negotiations, which had taken place off
and on since before independence,
resumed following the arrival of the
U.N. forces but broke down in the
spring of 1977.

In an effort to stimulate the resump-
tion of the talks, the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom sub-
mitted a proposal in November 1978 to
the two Cypriot communities. This ini-
tiative attempted to build upon the
points agreed to by President Makarios
and Turkish leader Denktash in their
February 1977 meeting. It was not a
detailed plan for settlement of the prob-
lems: rather, it was an attempt— within

the parameters already agreed to by the
leaders— to outline the form of an even-
tual government. The proposal also
made suggestions concerning settlement
of the refugee problem and the
establishment of an economic modus
Vivendi in a future bicommunal state.

The 1978 proposal was not accepted
by either side as a basis for restarting
the intercommunal process. Since that
time the United States has not made
substantive settlement proposals. Rather
it has been U.S. policy to support the
UN Secretary General's efforts to bring
the parties together. We continue to
believe this approach holds out the best
promise for progress. That effort, man-
dated by the UN Security Council, en-
joys nearly unanimous international sup-
port.

Today, 20 years after the outbreak
of intercommunal violence and 9 years

Department Statement,
Nov. 15, 1983^

We have learned today of the declara-
tion by the Turkish Cypriot community
of its independence. The announcement
came following a resolution reportedly
approved in that community's legislative
assembly creating a polity called the
"Turkish Republic of Northern C.vprus."

This move by the Turkish Cypriots
comes as a complete surprise to us. We
are dismayed by the move which we con-
sider unhelpful to the process of finding
a settlement to the Cyprus problem. We
are actively meeting with all parties to
the Cyprus problem both in Washington
and other capitals to urge calm in the
wake of today's developments.

The Turkish Cypriots should reverse
their actions. We have urged the
Government of Turkey to use its in-
fluence with the Turkish Cypriot com-
munity to bring about such a reversal.
We will not recognize the new polity,
and we urge all countries of the world
not to recognize it.

We urge all parties to the Cj^jrus
question to support the efforts of the
[UN] Secretary General to bring about a
fair and final negotiated settlement of
the problems of that country. In our
opinion, the secession of the Turkish
community from the Republic of Cyprus
represents potentially serious damage to
that process.

2Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

Department of State Bulletin

after the dramatic events of the summer
of 1974, the communities remain
physically separated; the UN and
Turkish troops remain in place, although
their numbers have been reduced. Over
the intervening years, numerous at-
tempts have been made by the com-
munities themselves, by the United Na-
tions, and by interested outside parties
to bring the de facto partition of the
island to an end. While none has yet suc-
ceeded, the process of intercommunal
negotiations has produced general
agreements in principle on several
points of an eventual Cypriot settlement,
including the federated and bicommunal
nature of the future state. Intercom-
munal talks, usefully employed over the
last 15 years and presently under the
sponsorship of the UN Secretary
General, represent the only effective
dialogue between the two Cypriot com-
munities. Gaps in the talks, such as we
see at present, are caused by one or
both parties believing their particular in-
terests are better served by resort to
other fora or by delay rather than by
progress. Such delays must be avoided;
when the dialogue stops, the potential
for intercommunal misunderstanding in-
creases dramatically.

Recent Developments

In August 1983 UN Secretary General
Perez de Cuellar, acting within his good-
offices role mandated by the Security
Council, took "soundings" to determine
the possibility of once again resuming
the talks which have been stalled since
last spring. The two parties were asked
to look both at methodology (i.e.: the
Secretary General taking the task of
outlining parameters of key issues
within which the two sides could
negotiate) and at the substance of three
such "indicators" (form of the executive,
the legislature, and territorial division).
The United States urged the two parties
to respond constructively to the
Secretary General's initiative but did not
comment on the substance of the pro-
posals themselves.

While the results of this soundings
have not yet been announced, we
understand the Greek Cypriots indicated
their acceptance of and support for the
Secretary General's personal involve-
ment in the attempt to find solutions. In
the Turkish response, we understand,
was included a call for a return to the
intercommunal talks. The Secretary
General is carefully studying the two

responses now, and we remain hopeful
the two Cypriot communities can agree
to return to negotiations with a renewed
determination to find a fair and lasting
settlement. Our role is and will remain

50th Anniversary of

U.S.-Sovlet

Relations

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS,
NOV. 16, 19831

November 16th will mark 50 years from the
moment of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of
America. This is a major landmark in rela-
tions between our two states.

In establishing diplomatic relations, both
sides proceeded from a recognition of the
fundamental difference in their socio-
economic systems, but at the same time from
a recognition that this difference is not an
obstacle to normal interstate relations.

This principle is of lasting significance.
The Soviet state, unfailingly devoted to the
cause of peace among peoples and to the
development of equitable, mutually advan-
tageous relations, is to this day firmly guided
by this principle in its relations with the
USA.

We assume that there is a basis in our
countries for proper appreciation of the
significance of such a date as the 50th an-
niversary of the establishment of diplomatic
relations.

Moscow

Presidum of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR

Fifty years have passed since the diplomatic
relations were established between our coun-
tries. As we note this anniversary, I hope
that we can recommit ourselves to working
constructively on the problems before us.

The United States has no higher aim nor
more urgent goal than achieving and preserv-
ing world peace and security.

Let us seek ways, despite the differences
in our governments, philosophies and values,
to cooperate in reducing international ten-
sions and creating a safer world.

If we can work together to this end, we
shall be fulfilling the promise of Novem-
ber 16, 1933, when formal ties between our
countries began,

/s/ Ronald Re.\gan

EUROPE

one of supporting the efforts of the
Cypriot people to find solutions and of
the Secretary General to facilitate that
search. We have also made clear to the
parties that we will continue material
assistance to help all Cypriots improve
their standard of living and diplomatic
assistance to facilitate communications
and exchange between the communities
as they pursue the intercommunal
negotiating process.

Administration Policies

U.S. policy has been, and remains, based
upon the strong desire to see a stable
and peaceful Cyprus in which all
Cypriots, regardless of their ethnic iden-
tity, can live together in peace and pros-
perity. Further, we support a demo-
cratic, independent, and nonaligned
Cyprus exercising its rights and duties
within the family of nations— a viable
and responsible state in a strategically
important area of the world.

On a more specific level, U.S. Cy-
prus policy is based upon active support
for the U.N. Secretary General in the
good-offices role entrusted to him by the
Security Council. We maintain a close
liaison with the Secretary General and
other UN officials concerned with the
Cyprus problem, and, wherever possible,
we use our diplomatic resources to rein-
force their programs.

The Reagan Administration intends
to continue following the Secretary
General's lead, believing strongly that in
his good-offices role lies the best chance
for making progress in Cyprus.

The general principles of an eventual
Cypriot state are contained in the foun-
dations of the present round of inter-
communal talks:

• The Makarios-Denktash instruc-
tions to their negotiators of Febru-
ary 12, 1977;

• The Denktash-Kyprianou 10-point
agreement of May 19, 1979;

• The Secretary General's statement
opening the talks on August 9, 1980;
and

• The Secretary General's evalua-
tion of 1981.

Collectively these documents, along
with the Secretary General's recent
soundings, represent evidence of con-
siderable progress toward a settlement.
They constitute a foundation upon which
the parties could reconstruct their state.

Further progress will be determined.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983.

January 1984

Ufilo<i::.:ii,U't'iHU,h<,nUIU'l'ihi;niihUilUHhtmmM^^^^

EUROPE

above all, by the degree of political will
on the part of the two Cypriot parties
themselves. Without the sincere desire
for a settement— and the incumbent
willingness to compromise — nothing we
do and nothing the Secretary General
does will matter. For that reason our
resolve will not waver. We must con-
tinue to urge the parties to negotiate,
support the Secretary General in his ef-
forts to provide the platform for prog-
ress, and convince all interested parties
that there is no viable alternative to a
fair and final negotiated settlement in
Cyprus.

Department of State Counselor Ed-
ward Derwinski, Assistant Secretary
Richard Burt, and I have visited Cyprus
this year as part of the Administration's
effort to facilitate a settlement.
Together with Secretary Shultz, we met
in New York during the General
Assembly session with representatives
of the two Cypriot parties, with Turkish
and Greek officials, and with UN of-
ficials. We have also maintained close
coordination with our European allies
whose interests in Cyprus parallel our
own and who have joined us in support-
ing the Secretary General's role. In all
these meetings we have forcefully made
the points I have outlined for you today.

In addition, over the past year a
number of congressional delegations
have visited Cyprus. These visits, we
trust, have helped to provide a depth of
understanding of, and empathy with, the
people of Cyprus who sincerely long for
an end to the division of their island.

Our resolve in the search for solu-
tions to the Cyprus problem must con-
tinue. Over the coming months we will
work closely with the Secretary General
and with the representatives of the two
Cypriot communities to find paths for
progress. The long-term peace, prosperi-
ty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus
are too important to permit relaxing our
efforts. I assure you we will continue
and will keep the Congress appraised of
our progress in this important mission.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be iiublisned by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Sanctions Against Poland

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT.
NOV. 2, 1983'

In the past months, we and our allies
have been engaged in extensive dialogue
on the situation in Poland. Very serious
problems still remain. The Polish Gov-
ernment continues to defy the wishes of
the majority of the Polish people; a
number of political prisoners are still in-
carcerated, and indictments have been
brought against certain of these
prisoners; free labor unions have not
been restored; no genuine economic
reforms have been implemented, and
stringent censorship still exists.

For these reasons, our sanctions
presently remain in place. These include
the suspension of Polish civil aviation
privileges in the United States; the
freeze on Export-Import Bank's line of
export credit insurance for Poland; the
implementation of a no-exceptions policy
which restricts export licensing of high
technology items to Poland; opposition
to the extension of any new credits and
Poland's entry into the IMF [Interna-
tional Monetary Fund]; suspension of
Poland's MNF [most-favored-nation]
status; curtailment of the shipment of
nonhumanitarian agricultural com-
modities for distribution by the Polish
Government; suspension of joint travel
under the Maria Sklodowska Curie Fund
which finances joint scientific research
projects; and curtailment of Polish
fishing in U.S. waters.

In the hope of inducing the Polish
Government to begin pursuing a path of
national reconciliation and restore free
trade unions, the President has endorsed
two limited steps. Specifically, the
United States jointly with its allies has
agreed to enter into discussions on the
Polish debt to official creditors. We seek
repayment of U.S. loans to Poland. In
this regard, the United States is not ex-
tending Poland new credits nor support-
ing Poland's entry into the IMF. As a
bilateral step, we have agreed to permit
Polish officials to engage in discussions
with private fishing companies about
potential fishing arrangements. Our ban
on Polish fishing in U.S. waters still re-
mains in place. Moreover, even though
discussions have been authorized, no ac-
tual allocation of fish will be provided at
this time. Rather, any future allocation
of fish at the end of the discussions will
be contingent on the Polish
Government's actions on human rights.

These steps taken represent a
limited response to very modest im-
provement in the human rights situation
in Poland. The United States has taken
note of the successful June visit of His
Holiness John Paul II to his homeland
and of the release of the majority of
political prisoners in Poland. We are
waiting for the Polish Government to
take definitive action to restore the
human rights of the Polish
people — rights which belong to them
from birth and which are not the
government's to take away.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 7, 1983. 1

Department of State Bulletin

HMIA^MW moiMmii nnnntn*iJti±%irmm\v%Tt It

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Situation
in South America

Following are statements by Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and
James H. Michel, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
before the Subcommittees on Human
Rights and International Organizations
and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on
October 21, 1983.'^

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ABRAMS

I am pleased to be here today to discuss
with you the human rights situation in
the southern cone of Latin America, a
region which has always been of par-
ticular interest to Americans. I shall be
as brief as possible in my opening
remarks so as to provide more time for
questions.

Paraguay

As members of this committee are
aware, Paraguay has been ruled under
the state of siege provisions of the Con-
stitution almost continuously since 1929.
President Alfredo Stroessner, an army
general, has governed Paraguay since
1954 under these provisions. His rule is
based on the military and is exercised
through the Colorado Party. President
Stroessner is widely believed to be genu-
inely popular among large sections of
the population, although his popularity
has never been put to the test in free
elections. The opposition parties are
kept under control and given little op-
portunity to conduct a real election cam-
paign. Only members in good standing
of the Colorado Party can participate
fully in the political process, such as it

The human rights safeguards in the
Paraguayan Constitution frequently are
not upheld. The judiciary, while formally
independent, does not serve as an effec-
tive check on the actions of the ex-
ecutive. Constitutional guarantees such
as protection of the integrity of the in-
dividual, the need for judicial warrants,
freedom of assembly and association, the
right of habeas corpus, and a prompt
and fair trial for the accused often are
ignored by government officials. While
the state of siege is legally in force only

in the capital, security officials operate
as though it existed throughout the
country.

Major violations of the integrity of
the individual in Paraguay have de-
creased since the mid-1970s. However,
there were increased detentions and no
improvement in the areas of political
rights and individual liberties in the last
year or so. The major current human
rights issue is the continued detention of
three remaining members out of about
20 persons arrested in May and June for
violation of Paraguay's elastic an-
tisubversive law 209, in connection with
the Banco Paragxiayo de Datos, a
research organization.

Over the past 3 months, the govern-
ment has released most of the detainees,
but three still remain in detention. Two
of those detained are believed to have
been tortured by the police during their
initial interrogation.

Other human rights problems of cur-
rent concern are occasional instances of
government censorship of the press and
radio, such as the closing down of Radio
Nanduti on July 9 for 30 days and the
arrest of a columnist for the newspaper
ABC Color. We are also concerned about
the issue of forced exiles.

On the positive side, however, we
were pleased that last year's country
report for Paraguay was published in
the Paraguayan press. It must also be
acknowledged that President
Stroessner's rule has brought relative
stability and economic growth to
Paraguay, although at considerable cost
to individual rights and political liberties.
Freedom House, in its 1982 report for
1981, classified Paraguay as partly free.

The United States has used its in-
fluence in Paraguay to encourage as
great a degree of liberalization as possi-
ble. We have worked quietly but steadily
on specific human rights cases. And we
have made it clear that we favor steps
now toward a more open and democratic
society.

Uruguay

Uruguay had long been a democracy
with advanced social welfare policies.
Since 1973, however, Uruguay has been
governed by a military junta, composed
of the ranking flag officers of the three
services and led by the President, who is
a former Commander of the Army. The

January 1984

President and junta, or the three service
commanders, make the most important
national policy decisions. Currently, the
military rules as a government of transi-
tion, having publicly committed itself to
support a constitutional process in
1983-84 which will lead to national elec-
tions in 1984 and the return to constitu-
tional, elected government by March
1985.

The period 1968-72 was marked by
violence, the suspension of political
rights, and the loss of an independent
judiciary in Uruguay. Since 1978 viola-
tions of individual rights have declined,
although the institutional framework
under which the violations occurred still
remains. There are still some 600-900
national security or political prisoners in
Uruguay, compared with over 1,000 in

1981. Although the government ordered
an end to the use of torture in 1979, we
continue to receive reports of torture be-
ing used both in prison and during inter-
rogation of recently arrested individuals.
We have been unable to corroborate
these reports. Since 1978 no permanent
disappearances have been documented —
although there are allegations by human
rights groups of three disappearances—
but there were a few cases where the
government detained individuals for
several months without revealing their
whereabouts.

The independence of the judiciary
was formally restored in 1981 in
Uruguay, but the full independence of
the civilian judiciary has not been
reestablished. The information media
are restricted, but the trend toward
greater freedom of expression, begun in

1982, continues. A number of weekly
and monthly publications, some opposed
to the government, circulate widely in
Uruguay. However, the Government of
Uruguay has closed down publications,
mostly political weeklies, for periods
ranging from 4 week to 6 months for ex-
ceeding the limits of censorship, which
might simply mean printing the name of
a proscribed politician like Wilson
Ferreira.

In November 1982, civilian political
activity took a significant step forward.
The traditional Colorado and Blanco
Parties held internal elections to choose
party leaders with 60% of the registered
populace voting in a peaceful and order-
ly election. The election marked an im-
portant step toward the return to
civilian rule promised in 1985. During
the campaign, freedom of assembly,
speech, and press were liberalized,
although the government maintained

.utmn^mMinHmtiiiifiiiumhimHim^^^^

HUMAN RIGHTS

control of the process, suppressing
several publications and arresting 19 in-
dividuals. Today the major human rights
issue remains the success of the
democratization process. Talks between
the political parties and the military
broke down where the parties withdrew
on July 5 because they maintained the
military was demanding too large a role
in the next civilian government. There
have been some indications that the
talks, or some version thereof, may have
resumed behind the scenes.

U.S. human rights policy toward
Uruguay is clear. As President Reagan
stated on September 8, 1982, "As a
staunch proponent of democracy, the
United States warmly applauds
Uruguay's decision to restore full con-
stitutional government through national
elections." Both the Department of State
and our Embassy are in close touch with
leaders of the political parties in
Uruguay. These leaders know, and the
Government of Uruguay also knows,
that we strongly support the return to
democracy and that our bilateral rela-
tions will improve as the democratiza-
tion process continues.

Argentina

The Argentine Armed Forces have held
power since 1976. In the wake of severe
and growing economic problems and
Argentina's defeat in the Falklands con-
flict, the military government instituted
major changes in 1982. The government
of President Reynaldo Bignone, installed
on July 1, 1982, announced that it was a
government of transition whose main
task was to oversee the return to
democracy. The government has
scheduled municipal, provincial, and na-
tional elections for October 30. In addi-
tion to the election of 600 electors who
will choose Argentina's president, some
254 deputies and 46 senators are to be
elected, the deputies directly and the
senators indirectly by the provincial
legislatures. The electors will then meet
on November 30 to elect the president
and vice president who are due to be in-
augurated on January 30, 1984—
although that date may be moved closer.

Since late 1982, there has been a
significant upsurge in political activity in
Argentina. Political parties — including
the Communist Party — have sUiged
large rallies, and human rights groups
have held demonstrations. The political
debate has been free and open, and all
sides have had full access to the media.
Press restraints are practically non-
existent, and controls of the largely

government-owned electronic media are
less onerous than at any time since the
1976 coup. The judicial branch displays
independence, and its strictures on the
executive are observed. Trade union
freedom is greater than at any time in
the recent past, and strikes, including
national strikes, occur although they are
technically illegal.

The situation regarding individual
rights in Argentina has also shown
dramatic improvement. There have been
no reported disappearances for the last
2 years, and only three politically
motivated killings occurred this year.
Detentions for "national security" of
political prisoners have virtually ceased.
National security or political prisoners
held under national executive power
(PEN) authorization were reduced
sharply, with 425 freed in 1982 and
about 100 freed so far in 1983.

I would like to point out that the
situation in Argentina, where elections
will be held in 9 days, is still evolving
and improving. Since I submitted my
written statement to the committee, it
has been reported that the Government
of Argentina has announced that it will
release or charge the remaining 243
PEN detainees, those persons held
without charges under the national ex-
ecutive power.

Of the 243, 67 persons now in prison
will be released, 63 will be turned over
to the Ministry of Justice because their
cases in court are pending or they have
already been sentenced by a court, and
113 who are already out of prison, but
under a status similar to our parole, will
be given complete freedom.

If these reports are accurate, once
these steps have been taken, there will
be no more PEN prisoners in Argentina.

Human rights groups and some
political parties in Argentina have con-
centrated their activities on efforts to
force an accounting for past disap-
pearances — estimates of which range
from 6,000 to 30,000— and to punish
those responsible. In April 1983, the
Government of Argentina issued a
report stating that all the remaining
<lisappeared are either dead, abroad, or
in hiding. The report was widely criticiz-
ed both in Argentina and by European
governments. We expressed our "disap-
pointment" that an opportunity had been
lost to resolve this problem.

This issue of the disappeared is the
most controversial and sensitive human
rights issue remaining and is central to
the future of Argentina's politics. Most ,

human rights groups say that recorded
disappearances are between 6,000-
7,000. Some 6,600 families have peti-
tioned the government for information
concerning the fate of their relatives.
Especially poignant are the cases involv-
ing several hundred young children who
have disappeared. I recognize that the
unresolved issue of disappearances has
come to symbolize the horrible brutality
of the "dirty war" in Argentina. The
mothers of the Plaza de Mayo remind
us, each time they appear, of how many
innocent people were tortured or jailed
or killed, how many families were torn
asunder or destroyed forever by violence
and inhumanity. At the same time, I
believe this issue, agonizing though it
surely is, is one which the Argentine
people themselves will have to come to
grips with. It is not an issue for
foreigners to decide.

Chile

Chile has been ruled by a military
government since 1973 when the Chilean
Armed Forces overthrew the elected
government of Salvador Allende. The
government formally dissolved Chile's
political parties, restricted freedom of
speech and assembly, severely limited
trade union activity, and carried out a
series of harsh actions against op-
ponents of the regime. In 1980 Chile
adopted a new Constitution, which was
approved by national plebiscite after a
government-controlled campaign. The
Constitution provides for a further 8
years of military government (1981-89)
"headed by President Augusto Pinochet.
In 1989 a plebiscite is scheduled on
whether the nominee of the junta — who
could be Pinochet— should continue in
office until normal elections are held in
1977. If the Chilean people reject this
proposal, national presidential elections
would be held in 1990, along with con-
gressional elections already scheduled
for that year. Under the current Con-
stitution, there are no elections schedul-
ed prior to 1989. Much of the current in-
ternal debate in Chile is over the
possibility of amending the Constitution
to move up congressional and/or
presidential elections.

After significant improvement in the
Chilean human rights situation from
1977 to 1980, there has been less im-
provement, particularly in the protection
of individual rights, since 1980. On the
positive side, some 3,591 C'hilean exiles
have been permitted to return. Some
lessening of censorship has occurred. Of
major importance is the Government of
Chile's initiative in underttiking a

Department of State Bulletin

HUMAN RIGHTS

dialogue with the moderate political op-
position to define the transition to
democracy. As part of the dialogue, the
government has indicated a willingness
to formulate new laws legalizing political
parties and elections and invited opposi-
tion participation. On September 16 of
this year, the Government of Chile
reestablished the right of citizens to
assemble and to hold peaceful marches
without government authorization. The
courts have become somewhat more in-
dependent, and the Government of Chile
has increasingly resorted to them rather
than de facto actions in dealing with op-
position. On August 26, the state of
emergency, which gave the government
extraordinary authority to deal with
what it considered an extremist threat
and which has been extended every 3
months, was lifted.

On the negative side, however, we
continue to receive credible reports of
violence and torture by the policy and
security forces. While the state of
emergency was lifted on August 26, the
less restrictive "state of danger of the
disturbance of internal peace" remains in
force. Trade union rights are still
restricted. Many of the Chileans living in
imposed or voluntary exile — total
figures range from 10,000 to
30,000 — have either not yet been per-
mitted to return or have not received
adequate guarantees of their safety.
Some censorship still clearly exists.
Political parties remain formally illegal,
although some political activity and con-
siderable criticism and press discussion
are tolerated. The practice of internal
exile for opponents of the regime con-
tinues. While the possibility of advancing
the date for congressional elections has
been publicly mentioned, no timetable
for a return to democratic government
has yet been established other than the
1989 plebiscite provided for in the 1980
Constitution. Finally, demonstrations
protesting economic and political condi-
tions have continued, resulting in
numerous arrests and credible reports of
police violence.

The United States publicly sup-
ported negotiations between leaders of
the Democratic Alliance and Interior
Minister Jarpa. Our own policy is
clear — to encourage great respect for
human rights and a return to democracy
in Chile.

Let me conclude my remarks by
observing that we believe that our
human rights policy has been a force for
good throughout the southern cone.

Bulletin January 1984

Throughout the region, the United
States has made clear our commitment
to human rights and a return to
democracy.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MICHEL

I am pleased to appear before your two
subcommittees in response to your re-
quest, to discuss the human rights situa-
tions in Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay.

As you know, a vigorous election
campaign is underway in Argentina. The
national elections scheduled for October
30 are the first that country has seen in
about 10 years. At this time, I would
like to urge upon you the need for assur-
ing that these public hearings do not af-
fect the course of the campaign or make
U.S. policies and attitudes a campaign
issue.

U.S. Interests

American policy flows From our national
interests, including the furtherance of
our ideals. It makes sense, therefore, to
reflect on what our interests are in
southern South America and how they
interact. In a region such as the
southern cone, it is not surprising that
the Llnited States has a number of in-
terests — political, economic, and
strategic. Some are immediate while
others are longer term. Obviously, they
vary in importance and, indeed, shift
somewhat over time, in response to
evolving U.S. priorities and to changing
circumstances in the area. Our policy in
the region must seek to take into ac-
count all of our interests, immediate and
long term, political, economic, and
strategic.

In the southern cone, as elsewhere,
promotion of human rights and demo-
cratic government represents an in-
tegrating dimension in our relations,
reflecting both the policy of the ex-
ecutive branch and the will of the Con-
gress. As President Reagan said on
April 27, 1983 [before a joint session of
Congress]:

... we will support democracy, reform, and
human freedom. This means using our
assistance, our powers of persuasion, and our
legitimate "leverage" to bolster humane
democratic systems where they already exist
and to help countries on their way to that
goal complete the process as quickly as
human institutions can he changed . . . We
will work at human rights problems, not walk
away from them.

That statement was made in
reference to Central America, but it ex-
presses precisely the intent of U.S.
policy throughout the hemisphere, in-
cluding southern South America.

In all four countries under discus-
sion, the issues of promotion of
democratic institutions and protection of
human rights are matters of great sen-
sitivity. These issues have been at the
crux of our relationships with these
countries for a number of years. And
they will remain so.

One of the basic tenets of U.S.
foreign policy is that democracy is fun-
damental to the advancement of human
rights. Democratic institutions — such as
regular elections, a free press, an in-
dependent judiciary, and the right of in-
dividuals to organize themselves to pro-
mote their well-being and individual in-
terests—provide the best guarantees
that governments will not abuse the
freedoms and rights of the individual.
Under democratic systems, a watchful
press and the right of the individual to
redress wrongs through impartial courts
and fair elections are powerful weapons
to ensure that human rights are
respected. Therefore, I want to take this
opportunity to review with you the prog-
ress each country has made toward
establishment of democratic systems of
government.

Argentina

In Argentina, the situtation regarding
individual rights has shown dramatic im-
provement. Disappearances and deten-
tions for national security reasons have
virtually ceased. Reports of prisoner
mistreatment have similarly declined.
Moreoever, the courts have shown en-
couraging independence, ordering the
release of PEN prisoners, convicting
prison officials for human rights abuses,
levying fines on military officers where
appropriate, and shortening sentences
imposed by the highest military court.
Recently enacted amnesty and antiter-
rorism laws are being challenged in the
courts, and many Argentines believe
they will be changed by the new con-
gTess. Problems remain, but there is no
question that Argentina has made im-
portant progress toward an interna-
tionally recognized standard of human
rights performance.

Perhaps most impressive of all is
Argentina's progress toward democracy.
Elections are scheduled to be held in less
than 2 weeks — on October 30, with the

HUMAN RIGHTS

installation of a new government to take
place not later than January 30, 1984.
Political parties have organized
themselves and are competing vigorous-
ly for public office. Most walls in the ur-
ban areas are painted with political
slogans, and posters are everywhere.
Equal free time on radio and television
has been made available to all officially
recognized parties, and the press is t'ull
of political commentary. Hundreds of
party organizers are active in towns and
cities throughout the country without of-
ficial hindrance.

We are pleased that Argentina is
launched again along the democratic
path We are fully aware of the impor'A
tance of this development to the protec-
tion of human rights in Argentina. We
will offer our cooperation in the
economic, political, and human rights
areas to whomever the people of Argen-
tina choose to lead their country. We
recognize the importance of their coun-
try and of its return to democracy for
the future peace, stability, and develop-
ment of this hemisphere. We wish them
well in their new venture.

Chile

In Chile, the human rights situation has
improved significantly compared with
the period immediately after the 1973
coup. However, much is left to be
achieved. After some years of progress,
there has been a resurgence of credible
reports of violence and abuse by the
police and security forces. In addition,
through Transitory Article 24 of the
Chilean Constitution of 1980, the
government retains the ability to
abridge commonly accepted human
rights practices, including due process,
freedom of assembly, freedom of speech,
and freedom of movement. It also re-
tains the right to send persons into ex-
ile. Of equal concern is the failure to in-
stitutionalize such human rights prog-
ress as has been made.

These factors must be weighed
against improvements that have been
achieved. More internal criticism of the
government is permitted, and prior buok
censorship has ended. There is increas-
ing use of civilian statutes rather than
security laws to deal with domestic
discontent. The formal state of emergen
cy has V)een lifted. Many exiles have
been permitted to return to Chile in re-
cent months, including prominent
political figures, an<l the government ha
assured us that more will be permitted

to return. While this is a promising
start, perhaps as many as 7,000— plus
families— remain outside Chile.

On the political front, a dialogue on
the transition to democracy has begun,
but its fate is uncertain. The dialogue
arranged with the support of the Arch-
bishop of Santiago, has made some prog-
ress, although it is fragile and is subject
to interruption. Indeed, it was suspend-
ed temporarily in September and again,
we hope only temporarily, just last

week. .

The issues under discussion between
the government and a coalition known
as the Democratic Alliance include ad-
vancing the dates for congressional elec-
tions (now slated for 1990), legalizing
political parties, establishing new elec-
toral laws, and modifying economic
policies.

Sergio Onofre Jarpa, a veteran Na-
tional Party politician who is Interior
Minister and represents the Pinochet
government in these discussions, has
lifted the 10-year-old state of emergen-
cy has indicated that the government
will consider advancing the dates of con-
gressional elections, and has suggested
that legalization of non-Marxist political
parties is attainable in the near future.
The Democratic Alliance consists of
an informal coalition of 11 political
groups ranging from moderate right to
moderate left. Its political objectives are
to establish a specific timetable for the
transition to democratic civilian govern-
ment to advance congressional elec-
tions, to legalize political parties, and to
foster changes in economic policies. The
radical left seems to be trying to disrupt
the dialogue l)y provoking a government
crackdown.

We will take all appropriate steps to
encourage the Chilean Government to
make further improvements in the
human rights environment in that coun-
try. We consider that the initiation ot a
dialogue between the Government ot
Chile and opposition groups— if sus-
tained and nurtured by moderates on
l,„th sides— could be the most promising
political event to take place in Chile in
recent years. We will continue, both
l.ublicly and privately, to encourage the
transition to democracy. We have
stressed the need for moderate leaders
on all sides to find ways to avoid con-
frontation and work toward national
conciliation. We have continually ex-
pressed the hope that this will be done
peacefully and with full respect for
political and human rights.

Uruguay

Overall, the human rights situation in
Uruguay has improved since the
mid-1970s. The number of national
security prisoners continues to
decline— albeit slowly, presently down to
about 800-900 from over 3,000 in the
mid-1970s— and there has been a trend
toward greater freedom of press and
speech although problems remain. For
example, the Uruguayan Government
continues to close down publications for
periods of time when it perceives that an
"unwritten rule" has been violated, e.g.,
mention of a proscribed politician or
criticism of the government's economic
policies. The Government of Uruguay s
decision to allow prison visits by the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross
in 1983 was an important step. We
believe further progress will be made as
the transition to democracy continues.
Despite serious economic problems
and the continuing absence of an agree-
ment between the government and op-
position political groups, Uruguay is still
moving toward the restoration of
democratic government after nearly 10
years of armed forces rule.

As part of the 1981 political plan ap
proved by Uruguay's military govern-
ment internal party elections were held
on schedule in November 1982, giving
an overwhelming victory to opposition
factions. Presidential elections are
scheduled for November 1984, with the
new president to be inaugurated in
March 1985.

In the spring of 1983, Uruguay em-
barked on the next major step in the
transition process— a constitutional
dialogue between the government and
the elected representatives of the
political parties. Because of differences
over issues such as the future role in the
military in a civilian government, the
formal' dialogue broke down on July 5.
After opposition gi-oups announced a
series of public demonstrations, the
government proclaimed on August 2 a
series of measures limiting already cir-
cumscribed political activity.

In the latter part of August,
however, the armed forces formed a
commission to continue a dialogue via in-
formal talks with political party
representatives. And some discussions
have Uiken place.

On October 8, leaders ot the Col-
orado and Blanco Parties, in a published
declaration, challenged the government
to make concessions to get the transition
moving Their demands included lifting
restrictions on the fi-eedom of the press
and on political activities of individuals

adtkep

Depart nnent of State Bulletin
iiciumnKHif tMuuiiHiiuuanuuuiUBIflililBiliJft! iUm PiiJI^^^^EiE^lki

mtk

HUMAN RIGHTS

and groups. So far, the government has
not responded, but we remain hopeful
that the two sides will be able to reach
an agreement and that the transition
process will go forward. As the military
and the political parties continue to seek
a peaceful and amicable transition, ten-
sions and doubts are likely to surface
again and again. However, the armed
forces have repeatedly reiterated their
commitment to the November 1984
presidential elections and both sides ap-
pear to have room for accommodation.

U.S. policy has been one of public
and private support for the democratiza-
tion process in Uruguay. We have
repeatedly reaffirmed our support for
the transition process through public
statements and in our frequent political
contacts with Uruguayan officials and
political leaders in Washington and in
Montevideo. For example, with the
breakdown of the dialogue on July 5 and
the subsequent August 2 restrictions on
public political party activity and the
press, we expressed our concern publicly
and also in private to senior officials of
the Uruguayan government. President
Reagan earlier underlined our strong in-
terest in Uruguay's democratic opening
on September 8, 1982, when he said:
"As a staunch proponent of democracy,
the U.S. warmly applauds Uruguay's
decision to restore full constitutional
government through national elections."

In sum, we remain hopeful that
momentum toward the restoration of
democratic rule will continue to bring
further improvement in the human
rights environment and result in the
reestablishment of a democratically
elected and fully participatory govern-
ment. In our view, this will offer the
best guarantee for the protection of
human rights, including civil and
political liberties in Uruguay.

Paraguay

Paraguay has been ruled by Gen.
Alfredo Stroessner since 1954 under
state of siege provisions of the Constitu-
tion. His popular support has never been
tested in free elections. We discern no
significant progress toward the kind of
meaningful political change that is evi-
dent in the three other countries under
discussion here today. There has been no
significant change in the human rights
environment, and human rights remains
an important problem in our relation-
ship. We ai'e working through all ap-
propriate channels, including our Am-
bassador in Asuncion, to influence the

January 1984

Paraguayan Government in this area.
Because of human rights issues, the sale
of military supplies was sharply
restricted beginning in 1977. This policy
remains essentially unchanged.

Conclusion

In conclusion, progress toward
democracy and an improved human
rights environment varies widely in the
four countries of the southern cone. In
Argentina a new democratic government
is on the verge of being elected and in-
stalled. In Chile and Uruguay a transi-
tion is clearly underway. And in
Paraguay, no progress toward
democracy is evident.

Our policy toward the countries of
the region must take into account their
different circumstances, but it is fun-
damentally consistent for all. We en-
courage change in the direction of an
improved human rights environment and
support the development of democratic
institutions as the best guarantee that
individual rights and freedoms will be
protected over the long run. In our
view, democratic institutions are also
our best bet for assuring stability and
peace in the region.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Bill of Rights Day;

Human Rights Day and Week, 1983

A PROCLAMATION,
Dec. 9, 1983'

On December 15, 1791, our Founding
Fathers rejoiced in the ratification of the first
10 amendments to the Constitution of the
United States — a Bill of Rights which has
helped guarantee all Americans the liberty
we so cherish.

One hundred and fifty-seven years later,
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, an effort aimed at securing basic
human rights for the peoples of all nations.

Americans have long honored the gift of
liberty. So it is with glad hearts and thankful
minds that on Bill of Rights Day we
recognize the special benefits of freedom be-
queathed to posterity by the Founding
Fathers. They had a high regard for the
liberty of all humanity as reflected by
Thomas Jefferson when he wrote in 1787, "A
bill of rights is what the people are entitled
to against every government on earth." In
this century alone, thousands of Americans
have laid down their lives on distant bat-
tlefields in Europe, Asia, Africa, and in our
Western Hemisphere itself in defense of the
basic human rights.

When the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1948,
Americans hoped that the Jeffersonian vision
was about to be realized at last. The Univer-
sal Declaration, it was believed, would em-
body the consensus of the international com-
munity in favor of human rights and in-
dividual liberty. And the United Nations, it
was further thought, would serve as the in-
strument through which the observance of
human rights by governments would he en-
forced by tlie international community.

Thirty-five years after the adoption of the
Universal Declaration, it is clear that these
hopes have been fulfilled only in part. Never-
theless, the Universal Declaration remains an
international standard against which the
human rights practices of all governments
can be measured. Its principles have become
the basis of a number of binding international
covenants and conventions. At the United
Nations, it has served to strengthen the
arguments of those governments which are
genuinely interested in promoting human
rights.

Still, the fact remains that even as we
celebrate Bill of Rights Day and Human
Rights Day, human rights are frequently
violated in many nations. In the Soviet
Union, for example, brave men and women
seeking to promote respect for human rights
are often declared mentally ill by their
government and incarcerated in psychiatric
institutions. In Poland, the free trade-union
movement Solidarity has been brutally sup-
pressed by the regime. Throughout Eastern
Europe and the Baltic States, the rights of
workers and other basic human rights as the
freedom of speech, assembly, and religion
and the right of self-determination are
denied. This same tragic situation also occurs
just 90 miles off our southern coast. In South
Africa the apartheid system institutionalizes
racial injustice, and in Iran the Bahai people
are being persecuted because of their
religion. And, in Afghanistan and Southeast
Asia, toxic weapons, the use of which is
outlawed by international conventions, are
being utilized by foreign occupation forces
against brave peoples fighting for their
freedom and independence.

As Americans recall these and other
human rights violations, we should reflect on
both the similarities and the differences be-
tween the Bill of Rights and the Universal

i!:!!!i'J';.;i(!li!JJti/'!'fii!'!i!ti)t!!iiii;J|t(lifi/ii!iliiiii

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Declaration of Human Rights. Both great
human rights documents were adopted in the
aftermath of a bitter war. Both envision a
societj- where rulers and ruled are bound by
the laws of the land and where government
rests on the consent of the governed, is
limited in its powers, and has as its principal
purpose the protection of individual liberty.

Yet while the Bill of Rights was adopted
by a Nation in which free institutions already
flourished, many of the countries which
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights lacked free institutions. Since human
rights are the product of such institutions as
a free press, free elections, free trade unions,
and an independent judiciary, it is not sur-
prising that formal adherence to the Univer-
sal Declaration by governments which sup-
press these institutions has resulted in no
real human rights gains.

By posing as champions of human rights,
many governments hope to disguise their
own human rights abuses. It was with special
pleasure that I noted the recognition offered
by the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Walesa for
his real efforts on behalf of human rights in a
country where the government speaks only of
the illusion of human rights.

Human rights can only be secured when
government empowers its people, rather than
itself, through the operation of free institu-
tions. Because our Founding Fathers
understood this, we are blessed with a
system of government which protects our
human rights. Today, let us rededicate
ourselves to respect these rights at home and
to strive to make the words of the Universal
Declaration a living reality for all mankind.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1983 as
Human Rights Day and December 15, 1983
as Bill of Rights Day, and call upon all
Americans to observe the week beginning
December 10, 1983 as Human Rights Week.
During this period, let each of us give special
thought to the blessings we enjoy as a free
people and renew our efforts to make the
promise of our Bill of Rights a living reality
for all Americans and, whenever possible, for
all mankind.

In Witnes.s Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this ninth day of December, in
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-three, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred
and eighth.

Ronald Reagan

'Proclamation 5135 (text from weekly
compilation of Presidential Documents oi
Dec. 12, 1983).B

Treaty Protection of
Foreign Investment

The United States is a party to a
series of bilateral friendship, commerce,
and navigation treaties with other na-
tions, including in particular Iran,
which have as a major purpose the pro-
tection of foreign investment. On Octo-
ber 13. 1983, Davis R. Robinson, the
Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, released the following memoran-
dum of law demonstrating that the treaty
with Iran remains in effect and explain-
ing the standard of compensation for ex-
propriation which must be paid under
the treaty.

INTRODUCTION

The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal'
in The Hague has heard or scheduled for
hearing numerous claims seeking com-
pensation for the expropriation of prop-
erty of U.S. nationals by Iran. In each of
these cases, as in numerous others
which will follow, the Tribunal must
ascertain the applicable standard of com-
pensation for expropriated property.
The United States maintains that the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations
and Consular Rights between the United
States of America and Iran^ ("the Treaty
of Amity" or "the Treaty") provides the
standard of compensation which must be
applied to the cases before the
Tribunal.^

This memorandum discusses the ap-
plicability of the Treaty of Amity to the
determination of compensation for the
expropriation of property of U.S. na-
tionals in Iran. Part I demonstrates that
the Treaty is still in force. Part II shows
that the Treaty requires the payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation for the expropriation of such
property in Iran. Part III demonstrates
that, for purposes of determining the
amount of compensation, property must
be appraised at its fair market value.
Part IV shows that property must be
valued as of the date of expropriation,
disregarding the effects of any actions
attributable to the Government of Iran
that were unlawful or taken in anticipa-
tion of the expropriation.

I. The Treaty of Amity Remains in
Force

A. The Treaty Remains in Force By
Its Own Terms. The Treaty of Amity
explicitly provides that it shall continue
in effect until terminated by a party.
Specifically, Article XXIII(2) states that
the Treaty "shall remain in force for ten
years and shall continue in force
thereafter until terminated as provided
herein." (Emphasis added.) The sole
method of termination under the Treaty
is described in Article XXIII, which pro-
vides that the Treaty may be terminated
only upon one year's written notice by
one party to the other.-*

Neither the United States nor Iran
has provided written notice to the other
that the Treaty has been terminated.^ In
fact, to the contrary, Iran on numerous
occasions as recent as late 1980 has
argued before U.S. domestic courts that
the Treaty remains in full force and ef-
fect.*^ Iran, moreover, has continued to
enjoy the benefits of the Treaty.'' Thus,
it is abundantly clear that the Treaty of
Amity has not been terminated in ac-
cordance with its terms and, therefore,
remains in effect.

B. The International Court of
Justice Has Ruled That the Treaty Is
Still in Force. The continued validity of
the Treaty of Amity has been confirmed
conclusively by a judgment of the Inter-
national Court of Justice. On Novem-
ber 29, 1979, the United States filed an
application with the Court seeking a
declaration, inter alia, that Iran's
November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran violated the Treaty.
On May 24, 1980, the Court rendered its
judgment, in which it held that the Trea-
ty's provisions "remain part of the cor-
pus of law applicable between the United
States and Iran."^ In so holding, the
Court explained that the continued ap-
plicability of a treaty of this nature is
especially important when the parties
are in dispute:

The very purpose of a treaty of amity, and
indeed of a treaty of establishment, is to pro-
mote friendly relations between the two
countries concerned, and between their two
peoples, more especially by mutual undertak-
ings to ensure the protection and security of
their nationals in each other's territory. It is

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL LAW

ieI],S,

idereiiits
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security 01

precisely when difficulties arise that the trea-
ty assumes its greatest importance. . . .'

Under the principle of res judicata,'^''
this decision by the International Court
of Justice established conclusively the
continued validity of the Treaty of Ami-
ty as of May 24, 1980.

The Court's rationale and holding
are no less applicable now. Iran has not
alleged any event since the issuance of
the Court's decision which would affect
the continued validity of the Treaty.
Moreover, although the hostages have
been released, Iran continues to hold
U.S. diplomatic and consular properties
in violation of international law and the
two nations remain divided by serious
disputes concerning, inter alia, the ex-
ipropriation of U.S. nationals' in-
vestments in Iran. Given that the protec-
tion of foreign investment was a central
purpose of the Treaty," the present
situation is precisely the moment when
treaty provisions setting forth the stand-
ard of compensation for expropriated
property, in the words of the ICJ,
assume [their] greatest importance."

C. The Treaty Has Not Been "Im-
iplicitly Terminated" as a Result of
Alleged Breaches by the United
States. Despite its repeated reliance
upon the Treaty in recent years and
despite the ICJ's decision, Iran now ap-
pears to have adopted before the
Tribunal a new position which alleges
that certain actions by the United States
implicitly terminated" the Treaty of
Amity. '^ Specifically, Iran alleges the
U.S. Executive Orders adopting certain
countermeasures'3 in response to Iran's
unlawful seizure of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran on November 4, 1979, violated,
respectively. Articles VIP'' and VIII of
the Treaty. Such an assertion, however,
is entirely contrary to established prin-
ciples of international law.

1. The United States Has Not
Breached the Treaty. The measures
adopted by the United States, in fact,
did not violate the Treaty. Rather, under
both the law of treaties and the law of
nonforcible reprisals, they were a fully
lawful response to Iran's flagrant and
continuous violations of the Treaty of
Amity.

a. Iran Flagrantly and Repeated-
ly Violated the Treaty. Throughout
1979 and 1980, '^ the Iranian govern-
ment, its agencies, instrumentalities and
other controlled entities engaged in a
long series of actions directed against
American lives and property in Iran.

January 1984

These actions included, inter alia,
government-sponsored attempts to
harass and intimidate U.S. nationals
with the goal of driving Americans out
of Iran,'" the repudiation of numerous
contracts with American firms without
legal justification," massive expropria-
tion of American property in Iran
without compensation,'* the imposition
of currency restrictions to prevent
repatriation of American earnings'^ and
the announced intention (finally im-
plemented) of ceasing all oil exports to
the United States.^" These actions by
Iran repeatedly and flagrantly violated
numerous provisions of the Treaty of
Amity, ^' resulting in the virtual repudia-
tion of all personal, contract and proper-
ty rights of Americans in Iran and the
collapse of commercial relations between
the two nations.

Iran's violations of the Treaty
culminated on November 4, 1979, with
its seizure of the U.S. Embassy and for-
cible detention of more than sixty U.S.
nationals on the Embassy premises. On
May 24, 1980, the International Court of
Justice held explicitly that these actions
by Iran constituted "successive and con-
tinuing breaches" of the Treaty of Amity
and other applicable international law.^^

b. The U.S. Countermeasures
Were Justified Under the Law of
Treaties and the Law of Nonforcible
Reprisals. Shortly after the seizure of
its Embassy, the United States initiated
a series of countermeasures in response
to Iran's violations of the Treaty and
other norms of international law. On
November 12, 1979, the same day that
Iran announced that it would no longer
export oil to the United States, Presi-
dent Carter ordered a halt to the impor-
tation of Iranian oil.-^ On November 14,
1979, President Carter issued an order
to block all official Iranian assets in the
United States. 2" Further Executive
Orders of April 7 and 17, 1980, pro-
hibited most exports to and imports
from Iran and restricted financial trans-
actions related to travel by Americans to
I ran. 2^

Each of these countermeasures was
adopted in response to Iran's continuous
violations of the Treaty.^" As the Inter-
national Court of Justice observed in its
order of May 24, 1980,

All measures in question were taken by the
United States after the seizure of its Em-
bassy by an armed group and subsequent
detention of its diplomatic and consular staff
as hostages. They were measures taken in
response to what the United States believed
to be grave and manifest violations of inter-
national law by Iran.^'

Moreover, the countermeasures
were reasonably related^* and propor-
tional' to Iran's prior breaches. They
were limited in scope, relative to Iran's
prior treaty violations, and involved no
harassment of Iranians in U.S. territory
and no expropriation of Iranian proper-
ty. The restrictions on trade with and
travel to Iran formalized a situation
which had existed in practice for many
months as a direct result of Iran's illegal
conduct.^" Similarly, Iran's assets were
blocked only after Iran announced that
all its assets in the United States were
to be withdrawn.^' The blocking was in-
tended in part to preserve a remedy for
Americans whose rights already had
been violated by Iran in the course of
Iran's unlawful actions. ^^

International law long has recog-
nized that, where a party to a bilateral
treaty has breached its obligations
thereunder, the other party may
withhold lawfully its performance of the
treaty in a manner reasonably related to
the breach. ^^ Such withholding of per-
formance by the aggrieved party does
not violate the treaty but, on the con-
trary, is actually a means of enforcing it.
As the foregoing discussion
demonstrates, each of the U.S.
countermeasures was a reasonable
response to Iran's prior breaches of the
Treaty and, therefore, was justified
under the law of treaties.^''

Similarly, under the law of nonforci-
ble reprisals, a nation may lawfully take
otherwise unlawful nonforcible actions if

(1) the actions are in response to prior
international delicts by another nation;

(2) the aggrieved nation has sought
redress unsuccessfully through other
means; and (3) the actions are propor-
tional to the prior delicts. ^^ As
demonstrated above, these requirements
were satisfied and thus the U.S.
countermeasures were equally justified
under the law of nonforcible reprisals.

2. Even if the United States Had
Breached the Treaty, the Treaty
Would Not Have Been "Implicity" Ter-
minated. The preceding section makes
clear that the actions taken by the
United States in response to Iran's viola-
tions of the Treaty were fully justified
under international law and, therefore,
did not breach the Treaty of Amity.
Even if those actions had been in breach
of the Treaty, however, such violations
could not have resulted in its "implicit"
or automatic termination.

It is clear as a matter of interna-
tional law that a treaty cannot be "im-
plicitly" terminated, that is, a breach of
a treaty by one party does not of itself

INTERNATIONAL LAW

terminate the treaty. Rather, a treaty
may be terminated by a breach only if
(1) the breach is material, going to the
heart of the treaty;^'' (2) the aggrieved
party sends formal notice of the treaty's
termination to the other party;^' and (3)
the formal notice of termination is sent
within a reasonable time after the
breach.^**

In this case, the actions taken by the
United States in no way violated the
Treaty— materially or otherwise. These
actions were tatcen in an effort to
restore full observance of the Treaty by
Iran and were a limited, gradual and
proportional response to Iran's prior
violations.

Further, as already noted, Iran has
not sent the United States the formal
notice necessary to trigger termination
of the Treaty, either before or after the
alleged U.S. violations. Indeed, more
than ten months after the alleged viola-
tions, Iran was continuing to plead in
U.S. federal court that the Treaty was
still in force.'"

Finally, because a reasonable time
after the alleged U.S. violations already
has elapsed without a notice of termina-
tion, such alleged violations no longer
may form the legal basis for termination
of the Treaty.

D. Iran is Estopped From
Repudiating the Treaty of Amity.
Repudiation of the Treaty of Amity by
Iran is further barred because it would
violate well-established principles of in-
ternational law concerning estoppel and
good faith. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
has written,

A State cannot be allowed to avail itself of
the advantages of the treaty when it suits it
to do so and repudiate it when its perform-
ance becomes onerous. It is of little impor-
tance whether the rule is based on what in
English law is known as the principle of
estoppel or the more generally conceived re-
quirement of good faith.'"'

Prior to the signing of the Algiers
Accords in 1981, Iran repeatedly relied
upon the Treaty as a defense against
litigation in U.S. courts. Now that such
litigation has been suspended pursuant
to the Accords, Iran simply cannot
argue that the Treaty was implicitly ter-
minated as early as November of 1979.

E. Even If the Treaty Had Been Ter-
minated, Its Provisions Would Con-
tinue to Apply to All Acts of Ex-
propriation Which Occurred Prior to
the Termination Date. Even if the Ira-
nian position were accepted in toto, it
would have only a minimal effect on the
result of the proceedings before the

Tribunal. The well-settled rule of inter-
national practice is that the termination
of a treaty does not affect pre-existing
rights created through execution of the
treaty.'" Thus, even if the Treaty of
Amity were held no longer to be in
force, the standard of compensation set
forth in the Treaty still would be ap-
plicable to any act of expropriation
which occurred prior to the Treaty's ter-
mination.

II. The Treaty of Amity Requires That
U.S. Claimants Be Paid Prompt, Ade-
quate and Effective Compensation For
All Property Expropriated By Iran.

The Treaty of Amity expressly requires
Iran to pay compensation for the ex-
propriation of property owned by U.S.
nationals. Such compensation must
represent the full equivalent of the ex-
propriated property and must be paid
within a reasonable time after ex-
propriation in a readily convertible cur-
rency. More particularly, the Treaty re-
quires Iran to pay "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation" for ex-
propriated property.''^

Specifically, Article IV(2) of the
Treaty provides that:

Property of nationals and companies of either
High Contracting Party, including interests
in property, shall receive the most constant
protection and security within the territories
of the other High Contracting Party, in no
case less than that required by international
law. Such property shall not be taken except
for public purpose, nor shall it be taken
without the prompt payment of just compen-
sation. Such compensation shall be in an ef-
fectively realizable form and shall represent
the/«M equivalent of the property taken; and
adequate provision shall have been made at
or prior to the time of taking for the deter-
mination and payment thereof. (Emphasis
added.)

Thus, Article IV(2) requires "prompt
payment ... in an effectively realizable
form" of "just compensation" which
represents "the full equivalent of the
property taken." This explicit language
leaves no doubt that, under the Treaty,
Iran must pay prompt, adequate and ef-
fective compensation for the expropria-
tion of U.S. property. '*'

The negotiating history of the Trea-
ty clearly confirms this conclusion. Im-
mediately following World War II, the
United States negotiated a series of
some 21 bilateral FCN treaties with
other nations. One important purpose of
these treaties, including the Treaty of
Amity, was to protect investment
abroad,^** and thus each of the treaties
contained a section which required

prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation for the expropriation of foreign
investment.''^ Now to interpret those
treaties as permitting payment of
something less would defeat one central
purpose of their execution.

Throughout the negotiation of the
Treaty, moreover, Iran was fully aware
of the United States' views and treaty
practice with respect to the standard of
compensation'"' and agreed to that prac-
tice in the Treaty of Amity. ■''' The
language of Article IV(2) was a standard
text used by the United States in most
of its post-war FCN treaties"* and, dur-
ing the negotiations, Iran made
numerous references to the language of
these other FCN treaties."' After
negotiations. Article IV(2) was un-
changed from the original draft except
for the addition of the phrase "in no case
less than that required by international
law," a phrase which also appears in
many other U.S. FCN treaties.^" Thus,
the negotiating history makes clear that
the Treaty of Amity, as proposed and
executed, requires the payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation for expropriation. ^^

III. The Treaty of Amity Requires
That, For Purposes of Compensation,
Expropriated Property Be Appraised
At Fair Market Value

The Treaty of Amity also requires that,
for purposes of determining the amount
of compensation, expropriated property
be appraised at its fair market value, ^^
which in the case of an operating enter-
prise is equivalent to "going concern"
value. This conclusion is evidence from
both the language and the history of the
Treaty.

Article IV{2) of the Treaty mandates
the payment of "just compensation" for
expropriated property. International law
long has understood "just compensation"
to require payment of fair market
value. ^' The term "just compensation"
also can be traced to the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, which
provides that no property may be taken
by the government without just compen-
sation. The U.S. Supreme Court
repeatedly has held that the payment of
"just compensation" requires the use of
fair market value. ^''

Article IV(2) further provides that
"compensation . . . shall represent the
full equivalent of the property taken,"
i.e., the full value of the property. The
term "full equivalent" indicates that com-
pensation must be comprehensive and
must take into account eoery valuable

Department of State Bulletin

■ l'i()(i4u«4ninn?inuiiitit><ir

INTERNATIONAL LAW

element of the expropriated property.
The value of property, of course,
depends upon its ability to generate
future income, ^^ a fact which has been
repeatedly recognized in international
law.^*^ Measures of valuation such as
"book value" and "replacment cost" do
not consider the capacity of an asset to
produce future income.^' Thus, fair
market value, ^* which does take account
of the property's income-producing
capacity, generally represents the truest
measure of an asset's full equivalence.^^
The history of the Treaty confirms
that its language requires the use of fair
market value for determining compensa-
tion. As already shown. Article IV(2) of
the Treaty is standard treaty language
proposed by the United States and ac-
cepted by Iran without substantial
modification. Such language consistently
has been understood to require that ex-
propriated property be appraised at fair
market value.''"

IV. The Treaty of Amity Requires
That Property Be Valued as of the
Date of Expropriation, Disregarding
the Effects of Any Actions At-
tributable to the Expropriating
Government That Were Unlawful or
Were Taken in Anticipation of the Ex-
propriation.

The Treaty of Amity further requires
that, for purposes of determining com-
pensation, expropriated property must
ibe valued as of the date of expropriation
disregarding the effects of any actions
attributable to the expropriating govern-
ment (1) that were unlawful or (2) that
were taken in anticipation of the ex-
propriation. ''' These requirements con-
cerning valuation are inherent in the
principle of just compensation,''^ which is
embodied in Article IV(2) of the Treaty.
These requirements are also well-
-established in customary international
law and were similarly incorporated into
the Treaty of Amity by the further pro-
vision of Article IV(2), which states that
compensation for expropriation must be
"in no case less than that required by in-
ternational law."''^ The Treaty of Amity,
moreover, has been consistently
understood to incorporate these re-
quirements."''

The authorities cited above make
clear that in determining the value of
expropriated property, the Tribunal
should disregard the effects of actions
attributable to the Government of Iran
which were unlawful. As explained
above,"^ throughout the course of the
Islamic Revolution, the Iranian govern-
ment, its agencies, instrumentalities and

controlled entities engaged in a long
series of unlawful actions directed
against American property in Iran.
These actions included, among others,
harassment of Americans in Iran, the
repudiation of contracts, massive ex-
propriations without compensation and
the imposition of unlawful currency
restrictions. As already shown, all of
these actions violated the Treaty of Ami-
ty and, therefore, the effects of these ac-
tions and other Treaty violations must
be disregarded in determining the value
of expropriated property.""

Certain omissions of the Govern-
ment of Iran were equally unlawful
under the Treaty. Article IV(2) of the
Treaty contains the solemn promise of
the Government of Iran to guarantee to
the property of U.S. nationals "the most
constant protection and security" in
Iran. This article imposed upon the
Government of Iran an affirmative duty
to protect the property of U.S. nationals
against injury arising from unlawful ac-
tivity, whether by public officials or in-
dividual private citizens."'' The failure of
the Government of Iran to extend this
protection was itself a violation of the
Treaty, and the effects of this failure
also must be disregarded in valuing ex-
propriated property. "8

Actions by the Government of Iran
which were arbitrary or discriminatory
must also be disregarded in determining
the fair market value of expropriated
property. Government conduct which
does not intrinsically violate interna-
tional law is nevertheless unlawful if it is
arbitrary*^ or it discriminates against
aliens. ''° Thus, actions by the Govern-
ment of Iran which otherwise might
have been lawful were unlawful if the
Government engaged in these actions ar-
bitrarily or directed them against U.S.
nationals. Any decrease in the value of
expropriated property attributable to
such actions must be disregarded in
calculating the fair market value of such
property.

The authorities cited above also re-
quire that, in determining the value of
expropriated property, the Tribunal
should disregard the effects of actions
attributable to the Government of Iran
that, while lawful, nevertheless were
taken in anticipation of the expropria-
tion. Any other rule would permit an ex-
propriating government to avoid entirely
the requirement of compensation by act-
ing to ruin the value of a company
before formally seizing control. Thus, ac-
tions by the Government of Iran that
were taken in anticipation of the ex-
propriation, including the threat of ex-
propriation or the expropriation of other

companies, even if lawful in themselves,
must be disregarded in valuing ex-
propriated property.

Furthermore, under settled interna-
tional law, a government brought to
power by revolution is legally account-
able for the acts of the revolutionary
forces from the revolution's inception. '^
Accordingly, the actions of the revolu-
tion which empowered the present
Government of Iran are attributable to
that Government. Any diminution in the
value of expropriated property caused
by the actions of revolutionary forces is
equally attributable to the present
Government of Iran. If such actions
were unlawful or were taken in anticipa-
tion of an expropriation, their effects on
the value of expropriated property must
be disregarded.

CONCLUSION

Because it has not been terminated in
accordance with its terms or provisions
of international law, the Treaty of Ami-
ty remains in force between the United
States and Iran. Article IV(2) of that
Treaty provides the standard of compen-
sation which must be paid for the ex-
propriation by Iran of property of U.S.
nationals. Specifically, that Article re-
quires payment of the fair market value
of the expropriated property, calculated
as of the date of expropriation without
regard to actions attributable to the
Government of Iran which were
unlawful or taken in anticipation of the
expropriation. Under Article V of the
Claims Settlement Declaration, '^ ^his is
the appropriate standard of compensa-
tion for application by the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal to pending
claims for expropriation.

Davis R. Robinson

October 13, 1983

'The Tribunal was established in 1981
pursuant to the Declarations of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
concerning commitments and settlement of
claims by the United States and Iran with
respect to resolution of the crisis arising out
of the detention of 52 United States nationals
in Iran, reprinted in XX Int'l Leg. Mat. 223
(1981).

^Signed August 15, 1955, entered into
force. June 16, 1957, TIAS 3853, 8 U.S.T.
899.

'"If a treaty requires a special standard
of compensation, the compensation shall be
paid in accordance with the treaty." Sohn and
Baxter, "Convention on the International
Responsibility of States for Injuries to

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Aliens," Final Draft, Art. 10(2), in Garcia-
Amador, Sohn and Baxter, Recent Codifica-
tion of the Law of State Responsibility for In-
juries to Aliens 133, 204 (1974). Because the
Treaty of Amity sets forth the standard of
compensation to be used for determining
compensation for the expropriation of U.S.
property by Iran, the Tribunal need not
decide which standard would apply in the
absence of the Treaty. The United States
maintains, as it has for decades, that in the
absence of a treaty, customary international
law requires the payment of prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation for proper-
ty appraised at its fair market value. See note
42, infra.

■•Where a treaty specifically establishes
the method of its termination, the parties are
obligated to adhere to that method. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article
54(a), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, May 23,
1969, reprinted in VIII Int'l Leg. Mat. 679
(1969). Although the United States has not
ratified the Vienna Convention and,
therefore, is not bound by it, the U.S. con-
siders many provisions of the Convention, in-
cluding Article 54(a), to be declaratory of
customary international law. See Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, [1971] I.C.J. 16, 47; I.
Brownlie, Principles of Public International
Law 601 (3d ed. 1979).

^Furthermore, where treaties are ter-
minable by notice, international law generally
recognizes certain formal requirements for
the notice. As the International Law Commis-
sion has noted, "a declaration of termination
which is not officially communicated to the
other party has no effect . . . ." Special Rap-
porteur Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the
Law of Treaties, [1957] II Y. B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 69, quoted in 14 M. Whiteman,
Digest of International Law 443 (1970).

Moreover, "it is essential that the notice
should be in due form, emanate from an
authority competent for the purpose, and be
regularly communicated to the other in-
terested States. ... In general it is thought
better in the interest of regularity and cer-
tainty in treaty relations, to require the legal
basis of the notice to be stated in every case.
Again, in the interest of regularity and cer-
tainty, it is thought desirable to require that
the date of the notice and the date when it is
considered to take effect should be specified
in the instrument."

Special Rapporteur Waldock, Second
Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] II Y.
B. Int'l L. Comm'n 86, quoted in 14 M.
Whiteman, Digest of International Law 444
(1970).

'•See, e.g. Memorandum of the Govern-
ment of Iran in Opposition to Continuation of

Attachments 16-17, 74-75, Iranian Attach-
ment Cases (S.D.N.Y.) (filed April 21, 1980);
The Islamic Republic of Iran's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Mo-
tion to Dismiss 2, Starrelt Housing Corpora-
tion V. Government of Iran, Civil Action No,
79-6364 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed July 15, 1980);
Defendant Government of Iran's Motion to
Dismiss, Memorandum of Points and
Authorities 1, Starrett Housing Corporation
V. Government of Iran, Civil Action No.
79-6364 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed September 18,
1980).

'The United States Government, for ex-
ample, continues to issue "treaty trader" and
"treaty investor" visas to Iranian nationals,
who qualify for such visas only because the
Treaty of Amity remains in force. In Fiscal
Year 1982, alone, 514 such visas were
granted. These visas permit Iranian nationals
entry into the United States for purposes of
trade or investment.

^Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States of America v. Iran), (1980)
I.C.J. 3, 28 reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat.
553 (1980). (Emphasis added.)

^Id. (Emphasis added.)

'""That the sanctity of res judicata at-
taches to a final decision of an internatioinal
tribunal is an essential and settled rule of in-
ternational law." Trail Smelter Arbitration
Between the United States and Canada Under
Convention of April 15, 1935, Decision of the
Tribunal reported March 11, 1941, at 17, 35
Am. J. Int'l L. 684, 699, excerpted in VI G.
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 140
(1943); Company General of The Orinoco
Case. 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 184, 276
(1902); Pious Funds Case, For. Rel. 1902,
Appendix II; D. Sandifer, Evidence Before
International Tribunals 404 (1975 ed.); II C.
Hyde, International Law Chiefly As Inter-
preted and Applied by the United States
1633 (1945).

"As explained below, the Treaty of Ami-
ty is part of a modern series of treaties,
known generically as "Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation Treaties" ("FCN Treaties"),
which were negotiated between the U.S. and
other nations after World War II and which
had as a major purpose the protection of
foreign investment. See notes 44 and 45,
infra.

'^Iran has made this allegation in a
number of its pleadings submitted to the
Tribunal. Because of the confidential nature
of Tribunal proceedings in specific cases,
however, citation to particular pleadings by
claim name or number would be inap-
propriate.

"These Executive Orders are described
at IClb.

'■•Article VII limits the right of the par-
ties to apply exchange restrictions, except,
inter alia, where such restrictions have been
approved by the International Monetary

Fund. Under IMF Dec. No. 144 (52/51)
reprinted in Selected Decisions of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund 203, 204 (9th ed.
1981), a state may assume that the IMF has
approved exchange restrictions imposed for
security reasons unless the state receives
notice to the contrary within 30 days of
notification to the IMF of the imposition of
the restrictions. The United States notified
the IMF of its exchange restrictions on
November 28, 1979, and received no notice of
disapproval from that body.

'^Revolutionary forces also engaged in
considerable unlawful activity directed
against Americans in Iran in 1978 prior to
the Ayatollah Khomeini's return. As shown
below, this activity is attributable to the cur-
rent Government of Iran.

"^Shortly after returning to Iran,
Ayatollah Khomeini demanded that all
Americans leave Iran. New York Times,
Feb. 2, 1979, at Al. The weeks following saw
considerable harassment of U.S. nationals. In
mid-February, armed bands detained and in-
terrogated hundreds of Americans and other
foreigners. Int'l Herald Tribune. Feb. 15,
1979, at 1, col. 6. In March, the Government
of Iran conducted a two-day demonstration
against the United States. Id. Mar. 14, 1979,
at 1; Mar. 15, 1979, at 2. Over 150,000 Ira-
nians marched on the U.S. Embassy on
May 24, demanding "Death to America," and
80,000 more Iranians marched the following
day. Id. May, 25, 1979, at 1.

"In Jan. 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini
called for a review of all foreign investment
projects in Iran. Kayhan. Jan. 28, 1979, at 8,
col. 8; Jan. 22, 1979 at 8, col. 3. Contracts
terminated that year included those involving
military procurement, Etela'at, June 22, 1979
at 8, col. 1; nuclear power stations, Kayhan,
June 3, 1979 at 5, col. 2; a dam and
agricultural project, Etela'at, Sept. 29, 1979,
at 11, col. 5; and a radar system, Jomhmiri
Eslami, Nov. 11, 1979, at 7. In early 1980, it
was announced that the Revolutionary Coun-
cil would review all contracts with oil com-
panies. Etela'at, Jan. 10, 1980 at 1, col. 3.

"During the spring of 1979, the Govern-
ment of Iran announced its intention to na-
tionalize firms which were poorly managed or
unprofitable, Kayhan, Mar. 25, 1979, at 5,
col. 1, or whose owners had left Iran,
Kayhan. June 23, 1979, at col. 3. In June of
that year, Iran nationalized all banks and in-
surance companies. In July, Iran enacted the
Law for the Protection and Development of
Iranian Industry, which nationalized addi-
tional industries, the share-holdings of certain
individuals, and all firms whose debts to the
banks exceeded their assets. Additional firms
were nationalized by the Act Concerning the
Appointment of a Temporary Director or
Directors for the Custody of Production and
Industrial and Commercial and Agricultural
and Service Units whether in the Public or
Private Sector, enacted June 16, 1979, and
by the Act Concerning the Management and
Ownership of the Shares of Contracting and
Consulting Companies and Firms, enacted
Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in Official Gazette
No. 10254. By Feb. 1981, according to the
Minister of Industries and Mines, some 580

'hH'<iIf!}ifl(ilUfH{HRiH;ni:(UItJhtltiiiI7{]Ul'i>l<uuia«i;i>nirn>fHiHuuiiu«niiMi<HniHtiiii

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL LAW

II companies had been nationalized since the
revolution. Etala'at, Feb. 5, 1981, at 14,
Col. 1.

i^See, e.g., Circular NA/lieOO, Bank
Markazi, Nov. 14, 1978; Circular NA 5/2090,
Bank Markazi, May 5, 1979. Iran has conced-
ed in its pleadings before the Tribunal the im-
position of exchange controls beginning in
November of 1978. Because of the confiden-
tial nature of Tribunal proceedings in specific
cases, however, citation to particular
pleadings by claim name or number would be
inappropriate.

^"The Government of Iran repeatedly
declared its intention to halt oil exports to
the United States. The day after the seizure
of the U.S. Embassy, Iranian Oil Minister Ali
Akbar Mointhar announced that he was
prepared to stop oil exports to the U.S. if
Khomeini gave the order. Washington Post,
Nov. 6, 1979, at Al; New York Times,
Nov. 6, 1979, at Al. AyatoUah Beheshti
reiterated the threat on Nov. 11. The threat
was carried out on Nov. 12, when the Revolu-
tionary Council decided to stop oil exports to
the U.S. New York Times, Nov. 13, 1979, at
Al.

2'Among the provisions violated by Iran
■were Article 11(1), assuring the right of
Americans to travel to Iran for commercial
purposes; Article 11(4), guaranteeing the lives
and property of U.S. nationals "the most con-
stant protection and security" Article IV, pro-
tecting American property and other legal
rights in Iran; Article VII, limiting restric-
tions on the transfer of funds; Article VIII,
regulating import and export controls; and
Article X, guaranteeing freedom of com-
merce between the United States and Iran.

^^Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States of America v. Iran), [1980]
I.C.J. 3, 41, reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat.
553 (1980). The provisions of the Treaty
violated were Article 11(4), guaranteeing to
U.S. nationals "the most constant protection
and security," and Articles XIII, XVIII and
XIX, protecting the rights of consular of-
Ificials and the security of consular premises.

"Proclamation 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65581
(1979).

2<Executive Order No. 12170 of Nov. 14,
;1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979).

26Executive Order No. 12205 of Apr. 7,
1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 24099 (1980); Executive
Order No. 12211 of Apr. 17, 1980, 45 Fed.
Reg. 26685 (1980).

^''Furthermore, the countermeasures
were adopted only after the United States
had used every available diplomatic and legal
means to stop Iran's illegal action, including
appeals directly to Iran and indirectly
through organs such as the United Nations
and the International Court of Justice. See
'ase Corweming United States Diplomatic
ind Consular Staff in Tehran (United States
Df America v. Iran), [1980] I.C.J. 3, 25,
reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat. 553 (1980).
See also Statement by President Carter in his
report to Congress concerning the economic
anctions in 16 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc.
814 (Apr. 14, 1980) ("The United States has

used every diplomatic and legal means avail-
able to it to end [Iran's illegal conduct] but to
no avail.")

'''Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States of America v. Iran), [1980]
I.C.J. 3, 28, reprinted in XIX Int'l Leg. Mat.
533 (1980).

^'Iran has alleged that the U.S. sanctions
violated Articles VII and VIII of the Treaty.
As explained above, Iran previously had
violated both of these articles, and several
others as well.

^'Indeed, the sanctions adopted by the
United States were in accord with sanctions
that would have been adopted by the U.N.
Security Council, but for a veto by the Soviet
Union. 16 Weekly Comp. for Pres. Doc.
614-615 (Apr. 14, 1980). See also Security
Council Draft Resolution of Jan. 13, 1980, 35
U.N. SCOR, Supp (Jan.-Mar. 1980) 10, U.N.
Doc. S/13735 (1980), reprinted in XIX Int'l
Leg. Mat. 256 (1980).

^"The restriction of commerce as a form
of reprisal has long been recognized as prop-
er under international law. Hyde wrote that,

"In order to save itself and its nationals from
being subjected to treatment deemed subver-
sive of international law, as well as to compel
the abandonment of reprehensible conduct, a
State may suspend all commercial intercourse
with that other whose acts are the source of
complaint,"

II C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly As
Interpreted and Applied by the United
States, 1674-1675 (1945). Similarly, O'Con-
nell writes that,

"The aggrieved State may seize the assets of
the wrongdoer situated within its jurisdiction,
it may freeze credits, and it may take non-
violent measures of reprisal, perhaps involv-
ing large-scale economic consequences."

I D.P. O'Connell, International Law 328
(1965). See also Bowett, "Economic Coercion
and Reprisals by States," 13 Va. J. Int'l L. 1
(1972); Bowett, "International Law and
Economic Coercion," 16 Va. J. Int'l L. 245
(1976).

'•In reporting to Congress the reason for
the asset blocking, President Carter said,

"On November 14, 1979, I took the step of
blocking certain property or interests in prop-
erty of the Government of Iran, its in-
strumentalities and controlled entities and
the Central Bank of Iran. At that time the
United States Embassy in Tehran was oc-
cupied and American personnel were being
held hostage there in flagrant violation of in-
ternational law. In addition, Iran had
threatened suddenly to withdraw its assets
from United States banks, to refuse payment
in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations
owed to the United States and to United
States nationals. Iran's actions attacked the
foundations of the international legal order as
well as the stability of the world economy
and the international monetary system."

16 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 611-612
(Apr. 14, 1980). The President previously had
explained that.

"Blocking property and property interests of
the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities
and controlled entities and the Central Bank
of Iran will enable the United States to in-
sure that these resources will be available to
satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities
of the United States against the Government
of Iran."

15 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 2118
(Nov. 19, 1979).

^^Asset freezes specifically have been
recognized as legitimate responses to viola-
tions of international law. See I D.P. O'Con-
nell, International Law 328 (1968); Sardino v.
Federal Reserve Board, of New York, 361
F.2d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 1966), cert, denied,
385 U.S. 898 (1966).

^^Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Article 60(1); Special Rapporteur
Waldock, Second Report on the Law of
Treaties, [1963] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
72-76; Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States §158
(1965); A. McNair, The Law of Treaties
570-578 (1961); see generally authorities
cited at 14 M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna-
tional Law 476 (1970).

^••The U.S. countermeasures also were
justified under Article XX(1) (d) of the Trea-
ty, which provides that the Treaty shall not
preclude the application of measures
"necessary to protect [a party's] essential
security interests."

^^The classic definition of reprisals is:

"Such injurious and otherwise internationally
illegal acts of one state against another as
are exceptionally permitted for the purpose
of compelling the latter to consent to a
satisfactory settlement of a difference
created by its own international delinquency."

II H, Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's Interna-
tional Law 110 (1945). The three criteria set
forth in the text are derived specifically from
the Naulilaa arbitration of 1928, [1927-28]
Ann. Dig., Case 360. See VI G. Hackworth,
Digest of International Law 154-155 (1943);
12 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law
148-149 (1971); Bowett, "Economic Coercion
and Reprisals by States," 13 Va. J. Int'l L. 1
(1972); Bowett, "International Law and
Economic Coercion," 16 Va. J. Int'l L. 245
(1976).

^^Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Art. 60; Special Rapporteur
Waldock, Second Report on the Law of
Treaties, [1963] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 73;
Sinha, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaty
Because of Prior Violations of Obligations by
Other Party 215 (1966).

^'The International Law Commission of
the United Nations commented in 1963 that
"a breach of treaty, however serious, [does]
not ipso facto put an end to the treaty. ..."
Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly, [1963] II Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n
205; accord, In re Lepeschkin, 51 Journal du
Droit International 1136 (1924), Ann. Dig.
1923-1924, Case No. 189, digested in VI G.
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 347
(1943). Similarly, the publicists are in agree-
ment that violation of a treaty does not

January 1984

INTERNATIONAL LAW

automatically terminate it, but only makes it
voidable at the option of the aggrieved party.
I H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International
Law 947 (8th ed. 1955); I. Brownlie, Prin-
ciples of Public International Law 618 (3d ed.
1979). See also, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Articles 65-68 (requiring
formal notice to terminate treaty), U.N. Con-
ference on the Law of Treaties, Doc.
A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969; Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States §158, Comment a (1965) ("The
violation of an international agreement does
not automatically terminate it."); Sinha,
Unilateral Denunciation of Treaty Because of
Prior Violation of Obligations by Other Party
206 (1966).

^^Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States §158,
Comment b (1965); I Lauterpacht, Op-
penheims International Law 948 (8th ed.
1955); Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice, Sec-
ond Report on the Law of Treaties, [1957] II
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 31; Sinha, Unilateral
Denunciation of Treaty Because of Prior
Violations of Obligations by Other Party 215
(1966).

3»See note 6, supra, and authorities cited
therein. The Iranian position, if generally ac-
cepted in the international community, would
cast international treaty practice into inter-
minable chaos. Without the requirement of
formal written notice of termination within a
reasonable time after an alleged breach, no
party could ever be certain whether any
given treaty still was considered binding by
the other parties, or, if not, when the treaty
supposedly was terminated.

■'"Special Rapporteur Lauterpacht, Report
on the Law of Treaties, [1953]- II Y. B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 90, 144; accord. The Tempk of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [1962]
I.C.J. 32; The Arbitral Award made by the
King of Spain (Honduras v. Nicaragua),
[1960] I.CJ. 213. See also MacGibb, "Estop-
pel in International Law," 7 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 468 (1958).

•""[T]he termination a treaty . . . does not
affect any right, obligation or legal situation
of the parties created through the execution
of the treaty prior to its termination." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article
70 (1) (b); Special Rapporteur Waldock, Sec-
ond Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] II
Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 94; Special Rapporteur
Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of
Treaties, [1957] II Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 35;
A. McNair, Law of Treaties 532 (1961).

■•^The phrase "prompt, adequate and ef-
fective compensation" is a legal term of art
which describes the measure of compensation
that a state is required to pay for the ex-
propriation of property of aliens. The term is
understood to mean payment within a
reasonable time after expropriation of the
fair market value of the expropriated proper-
ty in a readily convertible currency. The
United States has long maintained that, in
the absence of the Treaty of Amity,
customary international law would require
compensation for the expropriation of U.S.

property to be "prompt, adequate and effec-
tive." As shown herein, this is also the stand-
point imposed by the Treaty.

For elaborations upon the meaning of
prompt, adequate and effective, see "Ex-
propriation of American Investments
Abroad," Memorandum by the Office of the
Legal Adviser, Department of State, ex-
cerpted in M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna-
tional Law 1143 (1967); Department of State
GIST, July 1978, excerpted in 1978 Digest of
United States Practices in International Law
1226-27; Address of Richard Smith, Director
of the Office of Investment Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, at Vanderbilt University
(April 9, 1976), excerpted in 1976 Digest of
United States Practices in International Law
443, 444; 1938 correspondence between
United States and Mexico, excerpted in VI
Hackworth, Digest of International Law
655-65 (1942) (first formulation of "prompt,
adequate and effective" standard by U.S.);
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, Sections
187-190 (1965); I. Brownlie, Principles of
Public International Law 533-536 (3d ed.
1979).

"In hearings on other FCN treaties with
virtually identical language, the standard of
compensation set forth therein was described
by the State Department as "prompt, just
and effective." Hearings on Commercial
Treaties Before the Subcomm. on Commer-
cial Treaties and Consular Conventions of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 82
Cong. 2d Sess. 8 (1952) (remarks of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs on proposed FCN treaties between
the U.S. and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Ita-
ly, Denmark and Greece. The subject treaties
required payment of "just compensation." In-
deed, in his correspondence with the Mexican
government setting forth the original for-
mulation of the "prompt, adequate and effec-
tive" standard. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull used that phrase and the term "just com-
pensation" interchangeably. See, e.g., 2 Dept.
State Bulletin 380 (1940). U.S. courts have
also regarded the terms "just compensation"
and "prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation" as synonymous. See, e.g.. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd as
modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
^'Hearings on Commercial Treaties
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 83 Cong. 1st Sess. 2-3
(1953) (remarks of Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs on purpose of
FCN treaties was to provide legal protection
against expropriation of investment abroad.
Indeed, in forwarding the draft Treaty of
Amity to the American Embassy in Tehran
on July 24, 1954, the Department of State
referred to Article IV(2) as "the essential
nucleus" of the proposed treaty. Department
of State Airgram No. A-18 of July 23, 1954.
See also H. Walker, "Treaties for the En-
couragement and Protection of Foreign In-
vestment: Present United States Practice," 5
Am. J. Comp. L. 229 (1956); R. Wilson, U.S.
Commercial Treaties and International Law

coint)

Rtotlie.ta

iman'ofSt

asfinle

95-125 (1960); R. Wilson, The International
Law Standard in Treaties of the United
States 92-105 (1953).

■■^Language virtually identical so that in
the Treaty of Amity is contained in U.S.
FCN treaties with the following nations:
Greece, signed Aug. 3, 1951, TIAS 3057, 5
U.S.T. 1829; Israel, signed Aug. 23, 1951,
TIAS 2948, 5 U.S.T. 550; Denmark, treaty
signed Oct. 1, 1951, TIAS 4797, 12 U.S.T.
908; Japayi, signed Apr. 2, 1953, TIAS 2863,
4 U.S.T. 2063; Federal Republic of Germany,
signed Oct. 29, 1954, TIAS 3593, 7 U.S.T.
1839; Nicaragua, signed Jan. 21, 1956,
TIAS 4024, 9 U.S.T. 449; Netherlands,
signed Mar. 27, 1956, TIAS 3942, 8 U.S.T.
2043; Korea, signed Nov. 28, 1956, TIAS
3947, 8 U.S.T. 2217; Muscat and Oman,
signed Dec. 20, 1958, TIAS 4530, 11 U.S.T.
1835; Pakistan, signed Nov, 12, 1959, TIAS
4683, 12 U.S.T. 110; France, signed Nov. 25,
1959, TIAS 4625, 11 U.S.T. 2398; Belgium,
signed Feb. 21, 1961, TIAS 5432, 14 U.S.T.
1284; Viet-Nam, signed Apr. 3, 1961, TIAS
4890, 12 U.S.T. 1703; Luxembourg, signed
Feb. 23, 1962, TIAS 5306, 14 U.S.T. 251;
and Togo, signed Feb. 8, 1966, TIAS 6193,
18 U.S.T. 1. Language substantially similar
to that in the Treaty of Amity is contained in
U.S. FCN treaties with Republic of China,
signed Nov. 4, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, TIAS
1871 ("without due process of law and
without the prompt payment of just and ef-
fective compensation"); Italy, signed Feb. 2,
1948, 63 Stat. 2255, TIAS 1965 ("without due|iitlieiiKki
process of law and without the prompt pay-
ment of just and effective compensation");
Ireland, signed Jan. 21, 1949, TUS 2155, 1
U.S.T. 785 ("without the prompt payment of
just and effective compensation"); Ethiopia,
signed Sept. 7, 1951, TIAS 2864, 4 U.S.T.
2134 ("without the prompt payment of just
and effective compensation"); and Thailand,
signed May 29, 1966, T.I.A.S. 6540, 19
U.S.T. 5843 ("without due process of law or
without payment of just compensation").

"Less than three years before the Treaty
of Amity was negotiated, W. Averell
Harriman, serving as special emissary from
the U.S. to Iran, sent a note to Prime
Minister Mossadegh in which he made clear
the U.S. view that prompt, adequate and ef-
fective compensation must be paid for ex-
propriated property. Specifically, he stated:

"As I have pointed out to Your Excellency, in
the view of the United States Government
the seizure by any government of foreign-
owned assets without either prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation or alter-
native arrangements satisfactory to the
former owner is, regardless of intent, con-
fiscation. . . . There must be more than a
willingness to pay; there must be an ability to
do so in an effective form."

k2I,l
in.

lattice, p
(gDtiition

Irs not affect

Tin

JHtompenia

Reply of Sept. 15, 1951, from Mr.
Harriman to Dr. Mossadegh, reprinted in
Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents on International Affairs at 510
(Oxford 1951), quoted in G. White, Na-
tionalisation of Foreign Property 184 (1961).

■"Iran has openly acknowledged that it

JKse than j

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-105

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S3H

INTERNATIONAL LAW

otainediii

itotj.i

entered into the Treaty of Amity and other
international obligations involving the protec-
tion of foreign investment because of its
desire to attract capital and technology from
developed countries. See U.N. Doc. A/C.
2/SR 1650, pp. 10-11, quoted in Simmonds
(ed.). Legal Problems of Multinational Cor-
porations 148 (1977). Thus, Iran fully
recognized and accepted its obligation to pay
full compensation for the expropriation of
iproperty owned by U.S. nationals.

*'See note 45, supra.

■"These negotiations were reported in the
■following diplomatic correspondence:
Telegram No. 105 of July 15, 1954, from the
American Embassy in Tehran to the
■Secretary of State; Telegram No. 119 of July
16, 1954, from the American Embassy in
Tehran to the Secretary of State; Depart-
ment of State Airgram No. A-18 of July 23,
1954, to the American Embassy in Tehran;
Telegram No. 212 of Oct. 16, 1954, from the
American Embassy in Tehran to the
Secretary of State; Department of State
Telegram No. 963 of Nov. 13, 1954, to the
American Embassy in Tehran; Telegram No.
1176 of Nov. 27, 1954, from the American
Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State;
Department of State Telegram No. 1137 of
■Nov. 27, 1954, to the American Embassy in
IDehran.

^"A careful review of U.S. FCN treaty
oractice, published just one year prior to the
negotiation of the Treaty of Amity, concluded
ihat the inclusion of references in treaty
ianguage to the international law standard
Joes not affect the standard of "just compen-
sation." U.S. negotiators came to prefer the
'just compensation" and "full equivalent"
language because it was regarded as more
Drecise than general references to interna-
donal law. See R. Wilson, The International
law Standard In Treaties of the United
States 92-105 (1953).

'Futhermore, subsequent actions by the
Jnited Nations or the Iranian Government do
act alter Iran's obligations under the Treaty.
^or example, in casting Iran's vote in favor
of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Ch.
T, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (1974), approved
oy the U.N. General Assembly in 1974, the
ranian delegate explicitly stated his govern-
ment's understanding that approval of the
^Iharter was "without prejudice to any ar-
rangements or agreeements reached between
States concerning investments and the
nodalities of compensation in the event of
oationjilization or expropriation of foreign
property." U.N. Doc. A/C. 2/SR. 1650, pp
0-11, quoted in Simmonds (ed.) Legal Prob-
6ms of MultinationsJ Corporations 148
1977). Thus, as Iran has acknowledged, the
'tandard set by the Treaty is the governing
aw between the United States and Iran.

^^This includes interest from the date of
aking until the date compensation is paid.
ke Chorzow Factory Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A
iJo. 17 at p. 47; Norwegian Skipoumers' Case
Norway v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308
1922); OECD Draft Convention on the Pro-
lection of Foreign Property, Art. 3, Note 9, 7
nt'l Leg. Mat. 117 (1968); 8 M. Whiteman,
Mgest of International Law 1186-92 (1967).

anuary 1984

^^See, e.g., Norwegian Shipowners Case
(Norway v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308
(1922); OECD Draft Convention on the Pro-
tection of Foreign Property, Art. 3, Com-
ment 9 (a). 7 I.L.M. 117, 127 (1968); Sohn
and Baxter, " Convention on the Interna-
tional Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens," Final Draft, in Garcia-Amador,
Sohn and Baxter. Recent Codification of the
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens 133, 203 (1974).

"See, e.g. United States v. 564,54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); Alrnoto Farmers
Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States.
409 U.S. 470 (1973); United States v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624
(1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369
(1943); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246
(1934).

^^Modern economics universally recognizes
that the value of property is determined by
its capacity to generate future income. See,
e.g., J. Williams, The Theory of Investment
Value 1 (1938) ("[I]n the end all prices depend
on someone's estimate of future income.") I.
Fisher, The Theory of Interest 12 (1954 ed.)
(The value of any property ... is its value as
a source of income. . . . "); E. Solomon & J.
Pringle, An Introduction to Financial
Management 259 (1980 ed.) ("[T]he age-old
concept that the value of an asset depends
not on its cost or its past usefulness but on
its future usefulness . . . underlies the modern
theory of value.") See also S. Pratt, Valuing a
Business Enterprise, 28-29 (1981).

'''^See, e.g.. Sapphire International
Petroleujns v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35
I.L.R. 136 (1963); Chorzow Factory Case.
(1928) P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 17; Delagoa Bay
and East African Railway Company Case.
(Great Britain & U.S. v. Portugal), 3 M.
Whiteman, Damages in International Law
1694-1703 (1943); Shufeld.t Case (U.S. v.
Guatemala), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 1080
(1929); Lena Goldfields Ltd (1930) (unpub-
lished opinion), 36 Cornell L. Q. 42 (1950);
Norwegian Shipowners' Claim (Norway v.
United States), 1. R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308
(1922); Palestine Railway Case, disacssed in
J. Wetter and S. 0. Schwebel, "Some Little-
Known Cases on Concessions" 40 Brit. Y. B.
Int'l L. 183, 222-231 (1964), May v.
Guatemala, 3 M. Whiteman, Damages in In-
ternational Law 1704-1710 (1943);
Lighthouse Arbitration, (France v. Greece),
23 I.L.R. 299 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1956); Cape
Horn Pigeon Case (U.S. v. Russia), 9 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 63 (1902); Amimil Arbitration,
XXI Int'l Leg. Mat. 976, 1033 (1982);
TOPCO/CALASIATIC Arbitration, 53 I.L.R:
(1977); R. Lillich, International Claims:
Postwar British Practice 114 (1967). See also
cases cited in V Hackworth, Digest of Inter-
national Law 728-731 (1943).

"See Address of Richard J. Smith, Direc-
tor of the Office of Investment Affairs, Dept.
of State, at Vanderbilt University, April 9,
1976, excerpted in 1978 Digest of United
States Practice in International Law 444.

^*As noted above, in the case of an
operating enterprise, fair market value is
equivalent to the "going concern" value of the
enterprise. See sources cited at notes 59 and
50, infra. In some instances, a market for a

particular enterprise may not exist and,
therefore, the "fair market value" of the
property must be determined through an in-
direct means. One method for determining in-
directly the fair market value of a going con-
cern is the discounted cash flow method,
under which the total amount of future net
income from an enterprise is discounted by
the time value of money and the degree of
risk associated -with the future income to
derive the present value of the asset's future
income stream. Another method is to value
the enterprise with reference to other com-
parable going concerns which have similar an-
ticipated cash flows and which recently have
been ascribed with a fair market value.
See, e.g., City ofThibodaux v. Lousiana
Power & Light Co., 373 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.
1967), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967);
United States v. Eden Memorial Park
Association, 350 F. 2d 933 (9th Cir. 1965);
Bailey v. United States 325 F. 2d 571 (1st
Cir. 1963); Fairfield Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 306 F. 2d 167 (9th Cir. 1962); United
States V. Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F. 2d
398 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 366 U.S.
944 (1961); Cal-Bay Corp. v. United States,
169 F. 2d 15 (9th Cir. 1948), cert, denied, 335
U.S. 859 (1948); United States v. Certain In-
terests in Property, 205 F. Supp. 745 (D.
Mont. 1962).

^^See McCosker, "Book Values in Na-
tionalization Settlements," II Lillich (ed.) The
Valuation of Nationalized Property in Inter-
national Law 35-51 (1973) (Book value
generally understates value of an enterprise);
Dept. of State Note to the Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, dated September 14,
1973, Dept. of State File No. D730067-0256,
excerpted in 1975 Digest of United States
Practice in International Law 489-490 ("net
book value" formula for compensation pro-
posed by Libya did not satisfy requirements
of prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion); Address of Richard J. Smith, Director
of Office of Investment Affairs, Department
of State, at Vanderbilt University, April 9,
1976, excerpted in 1976 Digest of United
States Practice in International Law 444
(Replacement cost generally is less acceptable
than "going concern" value, and book value is
the least acceptable method of valuation).

'"For example, in the 1920s, the United
States negotiated an FCN treaty with
Estonia, 44 Stat. 2379 (1925), which required
payment of "just compensation" for ex-
propriated property. In the course of negotia-
tions, the U.S. negotiators explained that just
compensation required payment of the
market value of property (plus interest from
the date of expropriation until the date of
settlement). These negotiations were de-
scribed in a leading work on U.S. FCN Trea-
ty practice, published one year prior to the
negotiation of the Treaty of Amity. See R.
Wilson, The International Law Standard in
Treaties of the U.S. 98 (1953). Similarly, the
Legal Adviser to the Department of State
wrote in 1962 that:

"The Department of State has traditionally
defined fair compensation as adequate,
prompt and effective payment. ... In the

lUlUi'tilhU

iH'timi^iiimtiniivMmmmmimmM^^^

INTERNATIONAL LAW

case of an operating enterprise, adequate
compensation is usually considered to be an
amount representing the market value or "go-
ing concern" value of the enterprise,
calculated as if the expropriation or other
governmental act decreasing the value of the
business had not occurred and was not
threatened."

"Expropriation of American Investments
Abroad," Memorandum by the Office of the
Legal Adviser, Department of State, ex-
cerpted in 8 Whiteman, Digest of Interna-
tional Law 1143 (1967). See also Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States §188, Comments a and b
(1965); Department of State GIST, July 1978,
excerpted in 1978 Digest of United States
Practice in International Law 1226-27; Ad-
dress of Richard J. Smith, Director of Office
of Investment Affairs, Department of State,
at Vanderbilt University, April 9, 1976, ex-
cerpted in 1976 Digest of United States Prac-
tice in International Law 444; State Depart-
ment Press Release No. 630 (Dec. 30, 1975),
excerpted in 74 Dept. of State Bulletin No.
1910, at 138 (Feb. 2, 1976) ("foreign in-
vestors are entitled to the fair market value
of their interests").

^'This includes, of course, all of the
events which constituted or resulted in the
expropriation. It also includes the prospect of
the expropriation which ultimately occurs,
other expropriations by the government, and
the general conduct of the government which
makes such expropriations likely.

^^See Lighthouse Arbitration. 23 I.L.R.
299, (1956); Chorzow Factory, [1928] P.C.I.J.
Ser. A, No.l7, 1 Hudson, World Court
Reports 646; Norwegian Shipoumers' Claim,
1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308 (1922); Mariposa
Claim, 7 Ann. Dig. 255 (1933); Case concern-
ing the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970]
I.C.J. 3, 46 I.L.R. 1 (Separate Opinion of
Judge Gros); Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
§188, Comment b (1965); OECD Draft Con-
vention on the Protection of Foreign Proper-
ty, Art. 3, Comment 9 (a), 7 Int'l Leg. Mat.
117, 127 (1968); Sohn and Baxter, "Conven-
tion on the International Responsibility of
States for Injury to Aliens," Final Draft, in
Garcia-Amador, Sohn and Baxter, Recent
Codification of the Law of State Responsibili-
ty for Injuries to Aliens 133, 203, 210 (1974);
R. Lillich, "The Valuation of Nationalized
Property by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission," in The Valuation of National-
ized Property in International Law, 97 n.l3
(1972); "Expropriation of American In-
vestments Abroad," Department of State
Memorandum, excerpted in 8 M. Whiteman,
Digest of International Law 1143 (1967). Cjf.
Banco Naciorud de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 658 F. 2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). (Value of
good will at time of expropriation arbitrarily
included in "book value" of company not part
of fair market value.)

•^^See authorities cited at note 62, supra.
For the relationship between these two provi-
sions of Article IV(2), see note 50, supra.
'^^Thus, for example, 3 years before the

Treaty of Amity was signed, the Legal Ad-
viser of the Department of State described to
Congress the meaning of virtually identical
language in other FCN treaties:

"Compensation based on the value of the ini-
tial investment would not meet the standard
of the treaty or of international law, if it were
less than the value at the time of taking."

See Commercial Treaties, Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1952) (statement of the Office of the Legal
Adviser on proposed Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia,
Italy, Denmark and Greece). (Emphasis add-
ed.) The subject treaties required payment of
"just compensation."

"'See pages 7-10, supra.

'^Hn his concurring opinion in ITT In-
dustries, Inc. V. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
Award No. 47-156-2, (May 26, 1983) (Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal). Judge
Aldrich observed, at page 12, that "[t]he
Islamic Revolution in Iran was not a 'wrong'
for which foreign investors are entitled to
compensation under international law." Leav-
ing aside the legal status of the revolution as
a generalized whole, it is clear beyond doubt
that certain specific actions taken during the
revolution were "wrongs" for which interna-
tional law provides a remedy. Such wrongs
include the expropriation of property of the
United States or its nationals without com-
pensation and the failure of the government
to provide U.S. nationals and their property
with the "most constant protection and
security." As shown above, in valuing ex-
propriated property, the Tribunal should
disregard the effects of all unlawful acts at-
tributable to the Government of Iran.

<*'The scope of this protection is to be in-
terpreted in light of the overall purpose of
the Treaty to establish friendship and com-
merce between the two nations and, in par-
ticular, to provide for the protection of
foreign investment. The Treaty contains
numerous provisions intended to foster a
favorable climate for U.S. investment in Iran.
See provisions cited at note 21, supra. See
also Art. 1 of the Treaty ("There shall be
firm and enduring peace and sincere friend-
ship between the United States of America
and Iran.") As one leading commentator on
U.S. FCN treaties wrote in a much-cited arti-
cle, published during the ratification of the
Treaty of Amity,

"In a real sense, therefore, the FCN treaty as
a whole is an investment treaty: not a mosaic
which merely contains discrete investment
segments. It regards and treats investment
as a process inextricably woven into the
fabric of human affairs generally; and its
premise is that investment is inadequately
dealt with unless set in the total "climate" in
which it is to exist. A specialized "investment
agreement" based on a narrower premise
would be to that extent unrealistic and inade-
quate.

"These treaties focus, in fundamental
terms of enduring value over the long range,

upon the line between policy favorable and
policy unfavorable to foreign investment:
namely, hospitalit>' to and equality for the
foreigner under the law, and respect for his
person and property."

H. Walker, "Treaties for the Encourage-
ment and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice." 5 Am. J.
Comp. L. 229, 246-247 (1956) (emphasis add-
ed). Thus, the promise made by Iran in the
Treaty of Amity was not merely to protect
property of U.S. nationals against violence,
but to provide a favorable climate for U.S. in-
vestment, and it was in reliance upon this
promise that U.S. nationals invested in Iran.
See note 47, su/yra (admission by Iran that it
executed the Treaty of Amity in order to at-
tract foreign investment and technology to
Iran). Iran's total abdication of this respon-
sibility in favor of an overt policy of virulent
anti-Americanism was in itself a violation of
the Treaty of Amity.

''"Customary international law also im-
posed on Iran the duty to provide "the most
constant protection and security" to U.S. na-
tionals in Iran. See Case Concerning
Barcelona Light, Power and Traction Com-
pany, Ltd., [1970] I.C.J. 3, 46 I.L.R. 1;
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property, Article 1, Note 5, 7 Int'l
Leg. Mat. 117, 120 (1968); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States §183 (1965); C. Eagleton, The
Responsibility Law of the States in Interna-
tional Law 87-92 (1928); Sohn and Baxter,
"Convention on the International Respon-
sibilities of States for Injuries to Aliens,"
Final Draft, in Garcia-Amador, Sohn and
Baxter, Recent Codification of the Law of
State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens
133, 234-240 (1974). Given its purpose of
establishing enduring friendship and com-
merce between the parties, the Treaty of
Amity must be regarded as providing a
standard of protection broader than that of
customary international law. See note 67,
supra.

"^Treaty of Amity, Art. IV(1); See also
Universal Declaratory of Human Rights, Art.
17(2), G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71 (1948); OECD Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property, Article 1,
Note 7, 7 Int'l Leg. Mat. 117, 121-122 (1968);
F. V. Garcia-Amador, "Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of the State for Injuries
Caused in its Territory to the Person or
Property of Aliens." in Garcia-Amador, Sohn
and Baxter, Recent Codification of the Law
of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens
42-43 (1974); Sohn and Baxter, "Convention
on the International Responsibility of States
for Injuries to Aliens," Final Draft, in Id., at
164-176.

'"Treaty of Amity, Art. IV(1). See also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Arts. 2, 7, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948); OECD Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property, Article 1,
Note 8, 7 Int'l Leg. Mat. 117, 122 (1968);
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States §166 (1965).

^^George S. Pinson (France v. United
Mexican States, 5 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 327

y-^-^'-iiaOHIRHnilJdOUIItllliniffTni'il.liIJIfiHifHitniiiiitriituuuitHf,

MIDDLE EAST

(1928); Bolivar Ry Company Case (Great
Britain v. Venezuela), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
445 (1903); Dix Case (United States v.
Venezuela), 9 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 119
(1902); 8 M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna-
tional Law 819-824 (1967); V G. Hackworth,
Digest of International Law 681-682 (1943);
Sohn and Baxter, "Convention on the Inter-
national Responsibility of States for Injuries
to Aliens," Final Draft, in Garcia-Amador,
Sohn and Baxter, Recent Codification of the
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens 133, 257-260 (1974); 2 D.P. O'Connell,
International Law 968 (2nd ed. 1970);
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States §§ 109, 110 (1965);
A.H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commis-
sions 156-7, 163 (1935).

"The Claims Settlement Declaration is
one of the Declarations of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria pursuant to
which the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
was established. See note 1, supra. Article V
of that Declaration provides that "[t]he
Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of
respect for law. . . . " ■

A Critique of the

Restatement

Revision

Following is the text of a letter from
Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser to the
Department of State, to Professor Louis
Henkin. principal reporter for the
American Law Institute's (ALI) revision
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States

October 18, 1983

Professor Louis Henkin
Columbia University Law School
435 West 116th Street
New York, New York 10027

Dear Professor Henkin:

I wanted to take this opportunity to express
my appreciation for permitting Hal Maier to
serve as a non-participating observer and my
personal representative at the Advisers'
Meeting on October 6-8. I am sorry that I
could not attend.

I also want to express some very grave
concerns about the projected time table for
completing work on the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law. As I understood it,
the Reporters have agreed to redraft several
sections or portions of sections in response to
recommendations or suggestions by the Ad-
visers and other interested parties. However,
these redrafted sections will be circulated to

the Advisers with no opportunity for them to
meet to discuss whether the revisions meet
the concerns that stimulated them or whether
further redrafting may be necessary or
desirable.

I am also very concerned that the Council
will not be asked to review a Proposed Final
Draft as has been the practice, as I under-
stand it, with past Restatements. Such a
review would permit the Council to make fur-
ther recommendations for polishing the final
product and to receive recommendations for
further change or revision where appropriate.

It is certainly understandable that you
and the other reporters, who have devoted so
much of their time and energy to this project,
should desire to bring it to a close. On the
other hand, once a position is taken in the
Restatement, it runs the risk of being re-
garded in some quarters as authoritative,
whether or not it is in fact an accurate state-
ment of the law. In this sense preparation of
a Restatement is quasi-legislative in nature.
This may be particularly true of a restate-
ment of foreign relations law because only a
few courts in this country have significant ex-
pertise in the area and there is a real paucity
of case law. Furthermore, much of the world
may view the ALI Restatement a.s, represent-
ing much more than the opinion of a private
institute on matters over which there may be
considerable controversy.

I urge, therefore, that because of the
unique nature of this Restatement and the
very special impact that it is likely to have on
the bar, the government and the academic
profession, serious consideration be given to
delaying seeking final approval by the ALI
until an entire proposed final draft can be
submitted, both to the Advisers and to the
Council. Such a delay would allow those
bodies to review carefully the revisions that
have been accepted and the concerns that
have been addressed by those revisions.

This Restatement is likely to be in use for
at least 20 years. I can understand the desire
of many members of the ALI, including, no
doubt, the Reporters, to "write into law"
theories that in many respects may be
laudable but which do not in fact reflect cur-
rent practice of states, especially the United
States. As you know, I do not believe that
many portions of the proposed Restatement
are an accurate or appropriate reflection of
the law. It is, therefore, especially important
in my view that the Restatement receive fur-
ther careful consideration by the Reporters,
the Advisers and the Council.

Consequently, I would strongly urge the
Reporters and the members of the Council to
prepare a time table that will permit full and
fair consideration of all important aspects of
the work and the relevant comments offered
by the academic community, the private bar
and others.

I will submit written comments on
Preliminary Draft No. 5 as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Davis R. Robinson

cc: Reporters
Advisers
Council Members ■

Situation in
Lebanon

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
NOV. 10, 1983'

We're revolted that once again the peo-
ple of Lebanon have been subjected to
terror and injury, this time around
Tripoli by the radical and brutal
behavior of Palestinian factions and
their supporters. It is tragic that once
again the civilian population of Lebanon
is victim to hostilities not of their mak-
ing and over which they are unable to
exercise influence and control.

We urge the governments in the
area to bring their influence to bear con-
structively to end the fighting. We sug-
gest that all governments be open to any
suggestions from appropriate interna-
tional organizations for humanitarian
and relief efforts to relieve the suffer-
ing. As a first specific step to assist, the
United States is in the process of con-
tributing $1 million to the International
Red Cross to be used for relief activities
in Lebanon.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 1983.

i January 1984

■i^'V'rdimi'uiHimm^i'jmuMmmmmm^^^^^^^

NARCOTICS

Marijuana Production
and Control Abroad

by Dominick L. DiCarlo

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Crime of the House Committee on the
Judiciary an November 17, 1983. Mr.
DiCarlo is Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Narcotics Matters. '-

SUMMARY

The subcommittee has asked our Bureau
to testify on the production of marijuana
in foreign nations which export mari-
juana and other cannabis products to the
United States and on control efforts in
those nations.

1982 Developments

There were important cannabis
developments in 1982, including signifi-
cant changes in the cannabis market
profile, an improved capability for
eradication, and enhanced interdiction
capabilities at the source and on our
borders.

A table attached to this testimony
reports the national marijuana supply
and import estimates of the National
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Com-
mittee (NNICC) for the years 1979
through 1982. The 1982 figures are
preliminary, pending final NNICC ap-
proval which is expected by the end of
of year. I wish to emphasize the softness
of these estimates of production, im-
ports, and availability, which we are
striving to improve.

The preliminary NNICC estimate is
that national supplies of marijuana were
in the range of 12,340-14,090 metric
tons in 1982, compared with a 1981
estimated range of 9,600-13,900 metric
tons. The estimate is that imports were
in the range of 10,340-12,090 metric
tons, compared to a range of
8,700-12,700 metric tons in 1981.

Colombia continues to dominate the
U.S. marijuana market. Estimated im-
ports from Colombia in 1982 were in a
range of 7,000-8,000 metric tons, com-
pared to a range of 7,500-11,000 metric
tons in 1981. The NNICC estimate is
that Colombia's share of total U.S. su|)-
ply declined from T^% to .57%.

The estimate is that domestic pro
duction increased from a range of
900-1,200 metric tons in 1981 to an

estimated 2,000 metric tons in 1982, in-
creasing the domestic market share
from 9% to about 15%.

Jamaica's estimated market share in-
creased from an estimated 9% to 16%,
while Mexico's estimated share rose
from 3% to 6%. Retail marijuana prices
were reported to be relatively static in
1982; however, Jamaican wholesale
prices increased slightly while Colombian
wholesale prices declined.

Marginal exporters to the United
States in 1982 included Belize, Thailand,
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Panama, which
are now estimated to account collective-
ly for 6% of the U.S. cannabis market.

A factor affecting the market pro-
file, according to the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), is the preference
among U.S. users for high-grade can-
nabis products, such as sensimilla, which
is produced in the United States and in
Jamaica, Belize, and Mexico. This move
away from lower potency marijuana is
expected to continue.

Authority for U.S. support of mari-
juana eradication programs using para-
quat was restored by the Congress in
December 1981. The Department of
State thereafter began the process of
compliance with the National En-
vironmental Protection Act and related
executive orders to satisfy health and
environment concerns related to para-
quat use. On December 21, 1982, I
approved an environmental impact state-
ment permitting U.S. support for pro-
grams for herbicidal eradication of mari-
juana in the Western Hemisphere.

Imports of hashish are estimated to
have remained at approximately 200
metric tons. The principal suppliers of
hashish were Lebanon, Pakistan, and
Morocco, with a small but indeterminate
amount of hashish oil being provided by

1983 Production

The NNICC analysts are projecting in-
creased cannabis cultivation in Colombia
in 1983 but have not made projections
for Mexico, and other suppliers.

However, there is a question as to
how much of the foreign production will
reach the U.S. market in 1983-84. This
year marijuana eradication progr'ams us-
ing paraquat have been conducted in
Mexico and Belize, while (jolombia con-
tinued its manual eradication programs.

There are ongoing enforcement efforts
in Mexico, Belize, and Colombia which
are designed both to eradicate cannabis
crops and to seize marijuana in transit.
Also Jamaica has begun what we hope
will be a sustained eradication and inter-;
diction program. '

The Belizan program is particularly
noteworthy, because it involves a
bilateral agreement under which Belize
and Mexico conducted a joint eradication!
project, with U.S. assistance.

The objective is to contain any ex-
panded 1983 cultivation by limiting im-
ports through interdiction efforts, while
simultaneously preparing the eradication
programs needed to reduce cannabis
cultivation in all source areas.

The Government of Mexico is con-
tinuing its effective herbicidal eradica-
tion programs against marijuana. We
are hopeful that Colombia and Jamaica
will undertake comprehensive cannabis
eradication programs in 1983, including
the use of herbicidal eradication where
appropriate.

We will continue to encourage the
governments of cannabis source coun-
tries to undertake comprehensive
eradication programs, and we will con-
tinue to monitor developments in poten-
tial new sources, as we have in Belize.
And, we will continue our role in the
multiagency effort to interdict traffick-
ing in marijuana and other drugs
through the Caribbean and Central
America.

PRODUCERS

Colombia

Background. Colombia is the major ex-
porter of marijuana to the United
States — 67% of total estimated imports
in 1982, which amounted to 57% of sup-
ply from all sources.

The NNICC estimate is that 1982
Colombian cannabis production was
13, .500 metric tons, cultivated on 15,000
acres. The NNICC further estimates
that 7,000-8,000 metric tons were ex-
()orted to the United States.

The difference between production
and U.S. -bound exports includes
estimated crop losses due to eradication,
seizures, weather damage, and losses
due to quality control. An unknown
amount is consumed in Colombia.

Colombia's share of the U.S. market
also declined in 1982, according to
NNICC analysis, because of competition
from other marijuana sources, especially
those supplying higher potency sen-
similla and. related to that, a perception

taeni

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NARCOTICS

ffl'orts

■affifk-

.[(fptioil

that other marijuana is of superior
quality.

Currently Colombia employs a
manual marijuana eradication program
land has undertaken a substantial inter-
diction effort. In 1981 Colombian
lauthorities reported seizing 3,310 metric
tons of marijuana, a 345% increase over
1980. In 1982 Colombian officials
reported seizing 3,409 metric tons of
marijuana. The authorities also reported
manually destroying 8.5 million mari-
juana plants.

Current Status. The government of
President Betancur has been positive in
its statements to U.S. officials, including
President Reagan, on Colombia's com-
mitment to narcotics control. Since tak-
ing office in August 1982, the Betancur
Administration has increased Colombia's
narcotics enforcement efforts, including
■Qoth interdiction and manual crop
eradication, and has undertaken an
■evaluation of more comprehensive pro-
grams for the eradication of marijuana
cultivation. We have had continuing
tliscussions with the Colombians on a

•ange of narcotics related issues and
continue to support their effective inter-
diction efforts. The United States has

incouraged the Government of Colombia

.0 undertake expanded eradication and
interdiction programs. We have provid-
ed technical assistance and training, and
financial resources to upgrade Colom-
oian capabilities in drug interdiction and
manual eradication, in judicial process-
ing and intelligence collection, as well as
in drug abuse prevention to help the Co-
lombians cope with their drug abuse
problems.

The National Police Special Anti-
Narcotics Unit (SANU) has recorded im-
pressive marijuana seizures, and there
has been manual destruction of mari-
juana plants, but enormous cultivation
remains. In late September, a Colombian
technical assistance team visited Mexico
and the United States, meeting with of-
ficials in both countries to review crop
control methods.

The government has approved in-
teractions with other Latin countries,
particularly the technical exchanges with
Mexico.

One of the important developments
regarding Colombia is its emerging ef-
fort to cope with its domestic drug
abuse problem, especially the smoking of
bazuco by its young people. A major

abuse prevention conference, with
which my office assisted, was held in

larly October in Bogota, under the

ices of the Ministries of Health and
Justice. This first-of-its-kind event not
only attracted a host of Colombian of-

llj auspii

ficials with narcotics and drug abuse
responsibilities and delegates from Peru
and Bolivia, but the antidrug messages
received prominence in Colombian
newspapers, television, and radio pro-
grams.

The recognition of Colombia's drug
abuse problem at this conference was
important, because many Colombians
have long considered drug trafficking a
problem created by and pertaining solely
to the United States. There is increasing
recognition in both government and the
private sector of the negative effects the
drug problem is having on Colombia.
Corruption among government officials,
the growth of an illegal economy the
government does not regulate or tax,
linkages between insurgent movements
and drug traffickers, and threats to
political stability — including an open in-
volvement in politics — have increased
Colombian awareness of and concern
about drug-related problems.

Outlook. Officials participating in
the NNICC Subcommittee on Production

believe the fall cultivation for 1983 may
be as much as 60% larger than plantings
for the preceding drought-affected
period. A preliminary estimate is that
15,000 metric tons could be harvested.
There is no prediction yet on how
this production will affect the U.S.
market. Colombia has strengthened the
interdiction efforts of its SANU forces,
including an expansion from three to
five helicopters for use in narcotics
operations. U.S. authorities have also in-
tensified their interdiction efforts.

Mexico

Background. Mexican production has
been severely limited by the
government's eradication program and
there is no expectation that Mexico will
once again dominate the U.S. marijuana
market, as it did in the early 1970s.
However, it is estimated that exports to
the United States increased in 1982,
from a range of 300-500 metric tons to
750 tons.

U.S.

Imports and Supplies of Marijuana
(1979-82 estimates)

1982

Colombia

Jamaica

Mexico

Domestic

Other

Total

1981

Colombia
Jamaica
Mexico
Domestic

Total

1980

Colombia
Jamaica
Mexico
Domestic

Total

1979

Colombia
Mexico
Jamaica
Domestic

Total

Metric
Tons

7,000-8,000
1,750-2,500

750
2,000

840

12,340-14,090

7,500-11,000
900- 1,200
300- 500
900- 1,200

9,600-13,900

7,700-11,300

1,000- 1,400

800- 1,300

700- 1.000

10,200-15,000

7,450-10,100

1,110- 1,500

740- 1,000

700- 1,000

10,000-13,600

Imports

(%)

Supplies

57
16

6
15

100

January 1984

:!'"•. ^'!i■!n■,;|!lM|^^•|;(lHll.(»(^(!(Lf]ti!)<if!Ii!!l|i!M|i!H);/ilf^

NARCOTICS

Current Status. The narcotics
eradication program undertatcen in
cooperation with the Mexican Attorney
General's office has been the Depart-
ment's largest international narcotics
control program. Over an 11-year
period, the United States has invested
more than $110 million in this
cooperative effort, but the Mexican
Government has spent larger amounts,
including its procurement of paraquat
for use against cannabis. The Mexicans
have lost 18 airmen in the antinarcotics
program.

The key to the success of the cam-
paign was the decision of the Mexican
Government to use aerial spraying of
herbicides instead of manual eradication
to destroy the narcotic crops.

The semiannual report from the
Mexican Government shows that control
actions have increased during the cur-
rent year; for example, the Mexicans
reported that, in the December
1982-June 1983, period, they had
eradicated .570 hectares of marijuana on
6,281 fields. Manual eradication ac-
counted for an additional 152 hectares of
marijuana. Also in this period, the Mex-
icans seized 48,321 kilos of marijuana.
In the period December 1981-December
1982, the Mexican Government reported
spraying 11,046 marijuana fields totaling
788 hectares.

In Mexico the average marijuana
field was one-tenth of a hectare. Field
sizes reflect in part the countering tac-
tics of the growers of cannabis and
opium poppy: as efforts to eradicate
become more successful, Mexican
authorities are finding that the fields are
becoming smaller, more isolated, and
more difficult to detect.

To counter these tactics, the Govern-
ment of Mexico has changed its own
search-and-destroy tactics against opium
poppy and cannabis. This week the Mex-
icans are observing tests of a U.S. crop
duster airplane— the Thrush — and a
new type of spraying boom, operable on
both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.
This equipment should permit close con-
trol of spraying in hard-to-reach cultiva-
tion areas. The United States is also
assisting in the continued modernization
of the Mexican Attorney General Office's
air wing's operations and maintenance
center.

Outlook. We believe that the Mex-
ican eradication program, which has
been supported despite Mexico's
economic problems, continues to succeed
in destroying the bulk of cannabis
cultivated in Mexico. We note that
several large fields were established by
traffickers in nontraditional growing

areas, but these were located and subse-
quently destroyed. Although large fields
have probably been cultivated in 1983 as
well, we believe continued U.S. and
Mexican efforts against cannabis cultiva-
tion and marijuana trafficking will con-
tinue to succeed in keeping most of Mex-
ico's production off U.S. markets.

Jamaica

Background. Jamaica is a source of
high-grade sensimilla, as well as lower
potency marijuana, and is this
hemisphere's only producer of hashish
oil. The estimate is that cannabis im-
ports from Jamaica increased from an
estimated range of 900-1,200 metric
tons in 1981 to 1,750-2,500 metric tons
in 1982, with an increase in market
share from 9% to 16%. Cannabis cultiva-
tion is estimated in a range of
3,500-5,000 acres.

Current Status. There has been an
active cooperation effort among DEA
and other U.S. and Jamaican law en-
forcement agencies for many years, in-
cluding Coast Guard collaboration with
its Jamaican counterparts in controlling
seaborne trafficking. We have funded
training by DEA and U.S. Customs for
Jamaican police and customs officials in
narcotics detection and enforcement. We
are processing requests to provide equip-
ment to the Jamaican police to assist its
narcotics enforcement activities.

Outlook. We are interested in
engaging the Government of Jamaica in
a cooperative program to control illicit
cannabis (ganja) production, and its ex-
ports of marijuana to the United States.
I met with Jamaican officials in
September to assure them we will give
favorable consideration to a Government
of Jamaica request for assistance on a
cooperative control effort. There have
been subsequent indications that the
government of Prime Minister Seaga is
prepared to take a series of new steps to
improve both eradication and interdic-
tion efforts. In October 1982, the
Jamaican police reportedly destroyed
138 acres of marijuana. In September
1983 the government eradicated about
250 acres of marijuana being cultivated
on government-owned lands in the
Brumdec area.

OTHER PRODUCERS

For its 1982 estimates, the forthcoming
NNICC report shows that 840 metric
tons, or 6% of U.S. supply, come from
"other" countries. The DEA estimate is

that the "other" category includes:
Thailand (240 metric tons), Brazil (200
metric tons), Belize (200 metric tons),
Costa Rica (100 metric tons), and
Panama (100 metric tons).

Small amounts of marijuana were
also believed to have been imported
from such countries as Venezuela, Hon-
duras, Guatemala, Guyana, Dominica
and St. Christopher-Nevis. Cultivation of
cannabis for export purposes has been
observed in these areas, but the
amounts of both cultivation and export
are undetermined.

The Department, with DEA, con-
tinues to be watchful for development of
new cannabis cultivation sources.

Belize

Our Embassy in Belize, ^o.sed upon ex-
tensive DEA field surveys, reported a
rapid expansion in marijuana cultivation,
most of which was intended for exporta-
tion to the United States. The Belizans
asked the Mexicans for assistance, and
the two governments formed a bilateral
effort to destroy the marijuana crops by
the aerial spraying of herbicides.

The United States has facilitated
marijuana eradication projects in which
Belize was assisted by Mexico and is
planning direct U.S. assistance for fur-
ther eradication efforts. Last month, the
most recent Belize-Mexico operation
resulted in the destruction of 1,200 acres
of marijuana in 13 days; reports indicate
that virtually all cannabis under cultiva-
tion was destroyed. This cultivation
could have yielded as much as 1,300
metric tons of marijuana.

We have an agreement to provide
police vehicles and other commodities to
better support future eradication opera-
tions.

Brazil

Approximately 700 tons of marijuana
were reportedly grown in northeastern
Brazil in 1981, and at least some of this
production was exported— 200 metric
tons to the United States, according to
NNICC analysts.

Costa Rica

The Costa Rican Government is con-
cerned about cannabis growi;h. DEA
estimates that Costa Rica exported
about 100 metric tons of marijuana to
the United States in 1982. The Depart-
ment has provided training and com-
munications gear to the Drug Control
Policy Organization, and we are now
supplying vehicles and other equipment.

Department of State Bulletin

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SOUTH ASIA

Panama

DEA estimates that Panama exported
about 100 metric tons of marijuana to
the United States in 1982 and is a tran-
sit point for narcotics transhipped from
South America. A transportation hui:i
for Latin America, Panama is a connect-
ing stop for commercial airlines, a flag
of convenience for shippers, and a
waterway between the Atlantic and
Pacific. Panama is also a bank haven
ind its "free zone" is a transit point for
i large volume of commerce, which
'acilitates drug smuggling. The drug
init in the National Guard has arrested
lumerous couriers and is very
;ooperative in authorizing the Coast
juard to board and, if drugs are found,
ieize Panamanian flag vessels on the
ligh seas. The Department of State has
)rovided communications equipment,
•adio, and laboratory equipment to the
Irug unit of the National Guard. Several
countries in the Central American and
Caribbean regions are participating in
'he inter-American marine intelligence
letwork which links island nation en-
orcement agencies to the U.S. Coast
luard; the United States financially sup-
•orted this communications project. We
ire exploring direct assistance to the
"anamian government for marijuana
radication.

*a-

HASHISH

"he NNICC estimate is that approx-
mately 200 metric tons of hashish
ntered this country in 1982. The ex-
porters (and their percent of the U.S.
narket) were:

Lebanon 43%
Pakistan 41%
Morocco 10%
Other 6%

There is an expectation among
4NICC analysts that hashish imports
nay decline in competition with sen-
imilla. However, there has been some
ecovery in hashish traffic. While still
veil below the 1980 estimate of 650
ons, Lebanese production is reported to
lave increased from a 1981 range of
0-200 tons to a 1982 estimate of
00-500 metric tons.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
/ill be published by the committee and will
e available from tne Superintendent of
documents, U.S. Governnient Printing Of-
ice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

anuary 1984

Afghanistan:

4 Years of Occupation

The following paper was prepared
by the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research in December 1983. It is a sequel
to four reports on Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan published in the Bulletin
in March 1981. October 1981, March
1982. and February 1983.

Overview

Four years after Soviet troops invaded
Afghanistan, neither a political nor a
military solution seems likely in the near
future. The Afghan resistance shows no
sign of weakening or loss of popular
support. The countrywide insurgency
continues and the mujahidin deny the
Soviets military success.

During 1983 resistance operations
against Soviet/regime forces have
become more effective even in urban
areas. Tactical cooperation has increased
among resistance groups, and most of
the country's land area remains under
resistance control. Typically, once
Soviet/regime sweep operations have
been completed, areas return to
mujahidin control. Major problems of
supply and disunity remain, however,
and resistance forces are unlikely to be
able militarily to eject the Soviets from
Afghanistan.

Despite some optimism following the
April round of indirect negotiations in
Geneva that the parties might be able to
work out a settlement, the UN-spon-
sored negotiations among the concerned
parties have thus far not made signifi-
cant progress because of Moscow's un-
willingness to set a timetable for the
withdrawal of its forces. The Soviet
Union appears committed to a strategy
of attempting to wear down the
resistance militarily, gaining control of
urban areas, and remodeling the Afghan
political and social structure in its own
image. Soviet troop strength remains at
approximately 105,000.

Afghanistan's internal problems
have multiplied as the regime remains
factionally divided and as Soviet control
deepens. During 1983 economic and ad-
ministrative chaos increased. The war
has severely damaged Afghanistan's
social and economic infrastructure, caus-
ing major declines in social services,
agricultural production, and industrial
output. Afghanistan is becoming more

dependent upon outside food sources,
and its economy is ever more dependent
upon Soviet aid.

Significant declines in security
in both urban and rural areas have
led to increased Soviet use of
KHAD—Khedamuti-i-Etarat-i-Dolati,
the Afghan intelligence and security
organization. KHAD is being greatly ex-
panded but has been ineffective in pro-
moting loyalty to the regime.

Intense Soviet efforts to fashion the
Afghan military into an effective force
also have failed, and the people are in-
creasingly alienated by forced conscrip-
tion drives. Soviet frustration over in-
ability to stop resistance activities has
led in recent months to a deliberate
policy of increased brutality and
reprisals against the civilian population.

The refugee problem continues to
grow. Between one-fifth and one-fourth
of Afghanistan's pre- 1979 population
now lives outside its borders, mainly in
Pakistan and Iran. The UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
World Food Program (WFP), and a
variety of voluntary agencies and
governments, including the United
States, assist Pakistan in caring for
these refugees— the vast majority of
whom are determined to return to their
homeland when it is freed from foreign
occupation.

U.S. policy goals for Afghanistan re-
main the same. We seek the earliest
possible negotiated political settlement
in Afghanistan to effect the withdrawal
of Soviet forces and end the agony of
the Afghan people. Such a settlement
must also provide for the other three re-
quirements spelled out in five UN
resolutions on Afghanistan: the in-
dependent and nonaligned status of
Afghanistan, self-determination of the
Afghan people, and the return of the
refugees with safety and honor. The
United States supports the UN
negotiating efforts to achieve these
goals.

The Soviet Occupation

In 1983 the military struggle for
Afghanistan continued unabated. As
before, the Soviets concentrated on
building up key logistical bases, securing
Kabul and other major cities, improving

SOUTH ASIA

security for lines of communication, and
controlling infiltration routes across the
Pakistani and Iranian borders. During
the year, no major changes occurred in
the size or composition of Soviet forces
committed to Afghanistan. The total
number remains at about 105,000 Soviet
troops in Afghanistan with some 30,000
additional men on the Soviet side of the
border.

Throughout 1983 Soviet/ Afghan
forces regularly conducted multibattalion
operations designed to interrupt
resistance supply lines and respond to
reports of mujahidin concentrations, but
these efforts have not significantly af-
fected mujahidin activity. The
resistance has been remarkably resilient.
and the ■mujahidin today are stronger
and better equipped than ever before.
They have an extensive intelligence
capability and regularly learn in advance
about Soviet/ Afghan operations from
sympathizers in the Afghan military.

Large areas of the country remain
under resistance control, and even in
principal cities Soviet/ Afghan control is
being increasingly challenged.
Throughout the year the resistance has
dramatically demonstrated its ability to
extend the war into the capital by
regularly conducting operations inside
Kabul and its suburbs. During the
winter months, Kabul's electricity supply
was a principal target of the mujahidin.
Power cuts lasting several days were
caused by destruction of the power lines
leading from power stations outside
Kabul, confronting the capital with an
energy crisis unprecedented in the
4 years of Soviet occupation. Frequent-
ly, only the Pule Charki thermal power
station located on the outskirts of Kabul
could be relied upon, but its capacity
was limited due to repeated interdiction
of fuel supplies from Termez on the
Afghan/Soviet border. A key petroleum
pipeline which services Kabul and the
major Soviet airbase at Bagram, 50 km
north of Kabul, has been sabotaged so
often that it is no longer dependable as
a regular source of fuel.

During the summer. Marshal S.L.
Sokolov, the Soviet first deputy defense
minister, returned to Afghanistan for
another inspection tour. Following his
previous visit in late 1981, the Soviets
significantly stepped up their military
operations and increased their troop
strength. While there has been no
discernible increase of troops or step-up
in operations this year, Sokolov's latest
visit clearly reflected the Soviet leader-
ship's concern about the progress of the
war. The upsurge in reprisals against

civilians also appears to reflect growing
frustration over failure to stem the
resistance.

During the summer, the level of
fighting in Kabul was also significantly
higher than last year. In mid-June, a
few days before resumption of the UN-
sponsored indirect negotiations, the
mujahidin staged a night-long attack
against the Soviet-manned Bala Hissar
fortress and attacked a Soviet command
post near the Darulaman Palace. The at-
tacks resumed in early July with a suc-
cessful rocket attack on Kabul airport
that damaged military and civilian air-
craft.

On the night of August 13-14, the
mujahidin staged the most ambitious
operation in the capital since the Soviet
invasion. Using coordinated rocket, mor-
tar, and small arms fire, they attacked
Radio Afghanistan, a Soviet residential
complex, and the Bala Hissar fortress.
On October 1 the mujahidin brought the
Soviet Embassy in Kabul under attack
for several hours. These incidents, in-
volving some of the most heavily
guarded and important installations in
the city, along with bombings and fre-
quent assassinations of regime officials,
underscore the tenuous government con-
trol in Kabul.

In a move to demonstrate the
regime's control of the capital, on
September 28 Babrak Karmal conducted
a highly publicized walking tour of
Kabul. That he felt compelled to under-
take such a step and the elaborate
security precautions necessary to carry
it out, only served to further highlight
the strength of the resistance.

Large sections of the cities of Kan-
dahar, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat
likewise remain in the hands of the
resistance. Movement of regime person-
nel into many areas of these cities is
possible only with substantial military
support and during daylight hours. In
April, in response to mujahidin attacks,
the Soviets conducted heavy bombing
and shelling of the western suburbs of
Herat. As many as 50 planes a day flew
missions over the city, causing extensive
damage and resulting in several thou-
sand civilian casualties. This savage
bombing of Herat and the surrounding
villages, however, brought no improve-
ment in the government's security situa-
tion. Even daylight resistance operations
in Herat are not uncommon, and
fighting in and around the city takes
place every night.

Throughout the year, Soviet/ Afghan
forces also have been repeatedly at-
tacked in and around Qandahar, the

country's second largest city. An inci-
dent in late August vividly demonstratei
the regime's limited control there. The
day following a regime speech proclaim-
ing that the power of the "counter-
revolutionaries" had been broken in that
citj', mujahidin from Qandahar and the
countryside appeared on rooftops
around government installations in the
city center and at many military posts
surrounding the city. For several hours
they taunted regime soldiers through
loud speakers and exhorted them to
defect.

In recent months, even in Jalalabad.
which has been one of the most secure
cities in Afghanistan, the situation has
eroded with frequent attacks on the air-
field. Similarly, the regime faces
resistance in northern Afghanistan.
Mazar-e Sharif has been subjected to
repeated mujahidin attacks. In
September, an attack against the airfiel
outside the city caused extensive
damage.

In late April and early May, follow-
ing a deterioration of security in Paktia
and Paktika Provinces, which lie astride
supply lines from Pakistan, a major
Soviet/ Afghan offensive was launched
The operation, involving some 10-15, OOi
government forces, was designed to
relieve pressure on several Afghan can
tonments that were under mujahidin
pressure and could be resupplied only b\
air. A Soviet-trained elite Afghan unit,
the 38th Commando Brigade, was
decimated near the town of Urgun. One
battalion was wiped out, and the re-
mainder of the unit deserted to the
resistance. This defeat represented a
major setback to Soviet efforts to
reconstruct the Afghan army.

In late summer, the mujahidin agaii
stepped up pressure in Paktia and
Paktika Provinces. During August and
September many isolated government
outposts in these provinces deserted or
were overrun. Major cantonments at
Urgun, Khowst, and Jaji Maidan were
brought under seige. Although no impor
tant towns fell to the mujahidin during
the September attacks, the fighting
highlighted the growing strength of the
resistance in this region and reflected in
creasing tactical coordination among
mujahidin bands inside Afghanistan.

This past year has been marked by
increased mujahidin success in convoy
interdiction. Resistance efforts in Paktia
and Paktika Provinces were significantly
boosted by the interdiction of Soviet and
regime resupply convoys traveling

74 Department of State Bulletin

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SOUTH ASIA

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through the Lowgar Valley. Although
additional government military posts
have been set up along the major
highways to protect the convoys, the
mujahidin have proven increasingly
skilled in the use of mines and in
preventing convoy movement. The road
through the Lowgar Valley— which
begins just south of Kabul and is the
primary land route from Kabul to Paktia
and Paktika Provinces— has been a par-
ticular problem for the Soviets.
Soviet/ Afghan convoys were repeatedly
ambushed with heavy losses, often forc-
ing the convoys to return to Kabul.
Security in the Shomali region south of
the Salang Tunnel on the road to Kabul
lalso has posed a major problem for the
'Soviets. Traffic through this area, the
principal line of communication between
the Soviet border and Kabul, is often
halted for days.

The insurgents likewise have become
more efficient this year in combating
Soviet air power— Moscow's most effec-
tive weapon. Using heavy machineguns,
the mujahidin have become adept at
downing Soviet MiGs and helicopters.
The resistance has capably employed
heavy machineguns during attacks on
convoys and claims its successes have
Iforced Soviet/regime helicopters to fly at
high altitudes, thus reducing their ability
to support the ground forces. Although
there have been isolated reports of
surface-to-air missiles in the hands of
the resistance, such weapons are still
limited. The presence of a few missiles,
however, is sufficient to compel
Soviet/ Afghan pilots to be more
cautious.

A disturbing trend has been the in-
creasing use of reprisal attacks in
response to mujahidin successes. The
level of violence against the civilian
population by Soviet firepower has
reached new heights. Attacks against
Soviet convoys have led to the destruc-
tion of nearby villages, cultivated fields
and orchards, and the execution of male
inhabitants. In July, Soviet forces ex-
cuted 20-30 elders in the provincial
capital of Ghazni in reprisal for the
deaths of several Soviet personnel. In
October, following a series of hit-and-run
ittacks on convoys outside Qandahar,
■eprisals were launched against villages
n the area resulting in significant
destruction and the deaths of some 100
ivilians.

In the Shomali region, the sustained
ijombing of villages has created virtual
['ree-fire zones along the highway. The
aneyards and orchards of what was

January 1984

once the showcase of Afghan agriculture
have suffered irreparable damage from
repeated Soviet attacks. In late October
during a Soviet/ Afghan operation in the
Shomali, at least half of the historic
town of Istalef was leveled by aerial
bombardment and artillery shellings in
reprisal for Soviet losses in the area.
Civilian casualties totaled several hun-
dred women and children were
bayoneted and village elders shot.

Negotiations and Cease-Fire

A new tactic adopted this past year has
been the attempted negotiation of cease-
fires between resistance groups and the
Soviets. While many have quickly
broken down, one prolonged highly
pubhcized cease-fire was in the Panjsher
Valley— which opens onto the vital
Salang pass route between Kabul and
the Soviet border. The Panjsher truce,
arranged between the mujahidin leader
Mahsud and the Soviets without the par-
ticipation of the Karmal government,
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of
both the Soviets and the resistance.
The Panjsher cease-fire began in
March and officially ended in August,
but the valley remains quiet. Coming
after six large-scale and costly Soviet
Panjsher Valley campaigns over the past
3 years, the truce promised to free
Soviet troops for duty elsewhere by
reducing the Soviet presence in the
valley to token level. At the same time,
it provided Mahsud an opportunity to
consolidate his position and develop his
logistical and economic base and harvest
a vital food crop. This cease-fire has also
enabled Mahsud to resupply and train
his forces and to expand his organization
and operations well beyond the Panjsher
Valley. In recent months Mahsud's
forces have been conducting operations
outside the valley in Konduz, Paghman,
and the Shomali region.

Soviet Casualties and POWs

Soviet casualites since December 1979
now total at least 17-20,000 killed
and wounded. General dissatisfaction
with conditions in Afghanistan have
prompted a number of Soviet troops to
desert. Accounts of indiscipline, drug
usage, and black marketing — including
the sale of weapons and ammuni-
tion — are numerous.

In the early period of the
Afghanistan war, there were very few
prisoners taken on either side, but now
various resistance groups hold Soviet
prisoners of war. In 1982 the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) was able to work out an agree-
ment among the Karmal regime, the
Soviet Union, Pakistan, Switzerland,
and the Afghan resistance whereby
Soviet prisoners of war captured in
Afghanistan and held by the resistance
would be taken to Switzerland for in-
ternment for 2 years. At the end of
their internment, the prisoners would be
turned over to the ICRC by the Swiss
Government for repatriation. In
February 1983 the president of the
ICRC told the press that the ICRC
would not participate in the forced
repatriation to the U.S.S.R. of Soviet
prisoners interned in Switzerland. In
July one of the eight Soviet prisoners in-
terned under this agreement escaped to
West Germany where he is seeking
political asylum. Another Soviet soldier
arrived in Switzerland on October 28.

Two Soviet army privates from
Afghanistan arrived in the United States
as refugees on November 28. Their
resettlement is being assisted by a
private voluntary agency.

Popular Support for the Resistance

Popular support for the mujahidin re-
mains high even though the fighting has
brought destruction and reprisals on
civilians, has disrupted social services
and administration in most of the coun-
try, and has contributed to competition
for food supplies. Local populations con-
tinue to provide the mujahidin with
shelter, food, and recruits. Casualties
among civilians and the resistance
fighters have not reduced mujahidin ac-
tivities, and morale remains high.

It is impossible to assess the exact
number of ynujahidin since the numbers
fluctuate according to the season and in
relationship to the level of Soviet opera-
tions in specific areas. Loosely organized
in some six main organizations and
several smaller groups, the resistance
forces operating out of Peshawar are
split into two alliances— the moderates
and fundamentalists— both calling
themselves the "Islamic Unity of Afghan
Mujahidin." Despite ongoing efforts—
mainly by groups in Peshawar— to pro-
mote unity, disagreements between
groups, including armed attacks upon
each other, are not infrequent.

Allegiance of the fighting groups
operating in Afghanistan to head-
quarters in Peshawar is often flexible
and contingent on a continuation of ade-
quate supplies. In the past, only a few of
the fundamentalist groups in Peshawar
have exercised significant operational
control over affiliated units in

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan. However, the major mu-
jahidin offensive in Paktia and Paktika
Provinces during September and
October was conducted by groups with
direct links to Sayed Ahmad Gailani,
leader of a moderate group in Peshawar.

Tactical cooperation among mu-
jahidin groups inside Afghanistan has
increased during this past year. This has
been evident in the Shomali region and
in attacks conducted inside the capital.
Moreover, mujahidin operations in
Paktia and Paktika Provinces have been
supported by other resistance groups
who have interdicted Soviet/regime con-
voys traveling through the Lowgar
Valley.

While the mujahidin have demon-
strated increasing military effectiveness
and cooperation this year, the resistance
is still plagued by internal divisions and
factional fighting. No nationwide
resistance organization has yet evolved
that is capable of coordinating activities
throughout the country, and progress
toward organizational and logistical
coordination is slowed by serious ter-
ritorial and ideological rivalries.

Both moderate and fundamentalist
alliances have problems of organization.
The spring of 1983 witnessed an effort
to forestall the fragmentation of the
Peshawar-based fundamentalist groups.
In May, seven of these groups appointed
Professor Abdul Rasal Sayaf, the leader
of a minor group, to a 2-year alliance
presidency. Despite this mediation,
however, internal strains continue
within the fundamentalist alliance as
some groups accuse others of being
more interested in expanding their own
power bases than in fighting the Soviets.

Supply shortage remains another
serious problem for the resistance.
Although small arms appear to be
available in sufficient numbers, ammuni-
tion, medicines, and frequently food are
sometimes critically short. Resistance
leaders frequently mention to the media
and others the need for increased sup-
plies of heavy machineguns and weapons
such as mines and rocket grenades for
use against armored vehicles. Nonethe-
less, this year the resistance has
registered a higher kill ratio against
Soviet aircraft, increased ability to
challenge the Soviet policy of urban con-
trol, and continued success in operations
against Soviet bases and supply lines.

Participation of Iranian-based
Afghans in the resistance has also in-
creased in recent months, although the
Iranian Government exercises tight con-
trol over cross-border activities. The

primary beneficiaries of the limited
Iranian support have been the Shia
groups in Afghanistan.

The most dramatic new development
this year, involving an initiative to
organize the resistance more effectively,
was an appeal by ex-King Zahir Shah in
June concerning the need to create a
united organization capable of speaking
on behalf of the Afghan people. The tim-
ing of the ex-king's announcement
stemmed from growing concerns that
representatives of the Afghan people
have not been included in the UN-
mediated indirect negotiations in Geneva
and frustration over inability to create a
united resistance organization. Zahir
Shah expressed his willingness "to better
coordinate our resistance activities and
to better represent them in international
conferences and activities." At the same
time he also stated that he had no per-
sonal ambitions and did not want to
reestablish the monarchy.

In August, following consultations
with the ex-king, the three groups
belonging to the moderate alliance an-
nounced the establishment of a "United
Front for the Liberation of
Afghanistan." Its sponsors called on
Zahir Shah to "take necessary measures"
to obtain international recognition of a
12-man committee set up to oversee im-
plementation of the united front. The
moderates hope that his involvement
will provide a rallying point and give
new visibility to the Afghan cause, thus
increasing their effectiveness in the in-
ternational arena.

Provisions were made for the acces-
sion of other resistance groups to the
united front with the same rights as the
founding members, thus leaving the
door open to participation by the funda-
mentalists. Although the latter have to
date publicly eschewed involvement in
any organization involving the ex-king, if
Zahir Shah's initiative gains momentum,
it could eventually receive some fun-
damentalist support.

Acceleration of the
Government's Problems

As the Afghan resistance against Soviet
occupation enters its fifth year, the
Soviet-sponsored Babrak Karmal regime
faces continued widespread popular
dissatisfaction. Most observers feel that
the regime could not survive without
Soviet military support.

Attacks on Soviet and regime of-
ficials are common even in areas claimed
to be under government control, and
Soviet personnel need extremely tight

personal security because of the con-
stant threat of kidnaping and assassina-
tion. Increased Soviet brutality against
civilians has, moreover, undermined the
intense Soviet/regime propaganda cam-
paign portraying the Soviets as
peacekeepers and Karmal himself as a
beloved and democratically chosen
leader.

The Karmal regime has been unable
to expand its influence beyond a small
coterie of party loyalists, who them-
selves are divided into warring factions.
Factionalism and corruption are serious
obstacles for the regime, and steps by
the dominant Parcham faction to heal
the deep divisions within the party and
promote a National Fatherland Front
have not been successful. The 12th Par-
ty Plenum in early July revealed contin-
uing rifts. Addressing the plenum, Kar-
mal observed that previous decisions han
not been fully implemented, a situation
which he blamed on "lack of unity,
disorganization, lack of ability, and
fatalism."

Serious clashes have occurred be-
tween the Parcham and Khalq factions,
including a confrontation in mid-August
near Herat in which more than 100 per-
sons were reported killed. In mid-May,
an argument over a military promotion
list favoring Parcham officers led to a
violent altercation between Minister of
Defense Abdul Qader and his Khalq
deputy, Major General Khalilullah, who
physically assaulted Qader.

Soviet dissatisfaction with Karmal
over his inability to unite the warring
factions also has surfaced. Rumors have
abounded throughout much of the year
that a major shift in leadership was im-
minent. A Cabinet reshuffle in October
may have reflected an attempt to
alleviate some of the intragovernmental
strains. Open Soviet preference for the
Parchamis could, however, exacerbate
tensions in the party. In early 1983, for
example, a money-market scandal in-
volving Soviet advisers and high-level
Parchamis was publicized by the Khalq
faction in an effort to enhance its own
position.

The Afghan intelligence and security
organization, KHAD, has been largely
ineffective in its efforts to counter the
insurgency and ensure loyalty in the
military and among the general
populace, and its operations have added
to the fear and distrust permeating
Afghan society. KHAD responsibilities
include counterinsurgency, military in-
telligence, security for Afghan VIPs and

Department of State Bulletin

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SOUTH ASIA

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official installations, and foreign in-
telligence and covert action. Organized
under Soviet direction, KHAD is de-
signed to assist the Afghan communists
in setting up the same kinds of party
and government institutions used by the
U.S.S.R. to control its own population.
The Soviet presence pervades the
KHAD leadership, and the KGB con-
tinues to play a significant role in train-
ing and operations.

KHAD, however, shares in the in-
ternecine Parcham-Khalq competition
resulting in factionalism, fear, and in-
competence within the organization
itself. Intraparty violence, moreover,
frequently overlaps with mujahidin
operations and obscures responsibility
for violent acts. Agents in the Parcham-
dominated KHAD often provide infor-
mation enabling the mujahidin to
assassinate Khalq party members. The
Khalqis play a reciprocal game with the
Parchamis. KHAD activities also have
contributed to the already low morale
with the Afghan military.

It is widely believed in Pakistan that
iKHAD has sent its agents among
refugees to foment discord in the camps
and to stir up trouble between the
refugees and their Pakistani hosts.
Nearly 3 million Afghans now live in
[Pakistan; the inevitable conflicts over ac-
cess to land, grazing rights, and social
services make fertile ground for KHAD
mischief. KHAD agents also are
suspected of having infiltrated Afghan
resistance organizations based in
IPeshawar to gain intelligence on mu-
\jahidin activities and to exacerbate divi-
sions among the resistance groups.
iKHAD agents are believed to have
fueled Shia-Sunni religious conflicts,
especially in border areas of Pakistan's
(Northwest Frontier Province where
most of the refugees have settled, and
to have supported the tribal Baluch
separatist movement in Baluchistan
Province.

In 1983 KHAD was significantly
strengthened in an effort to exert
igreater control over the Afghan civilian
population, particularly in the cities. The
organization, which now includes be-
itween 15-20,000 personnel, is widely
recognized as being responsible for
prisoner interrogation. Amnesty Inter-
national — which has appealed to Babrak
Karmal to stop torture, arbitrary arrest,
and secret trials which deny defendants
the right of defense— issued a report in
fiarly November citing systematic tor-
ture of prisoners. Based on interviews
with ex-prisoners and their relatives, the
Amnesty International report said those
tortured include civil servants, teachers,

January 1984

teenage students, and persons arrested
as a warning to others — as well as those
actually associated with armed resist-
ance to the regime.

The decline in security this year is
only one aspect of Afghanistan's grave
internal plight. Domestic opposition to
the Soviet presence and to the Karmal
regime also has accelerated the trend
toward economic and adminstrative
chaos which will take years to repair.
The country's social and economic in-
frastructure has been decimated, and
in 1983 the Afghan Government ap-
proached the International Monetary
Fund seeking credits. Social services,
agricultural production, and industrial
output continue to suffer reverses, and
inflation is estimated at around
20%-25%.

In a speech before the UN General
Assembly on October 6, Afghanistan's
Foreign Minister Mohammad Dost
acknowledged the impact of resistance
activity on the Afghan economy. He
stated that "50% of the country's
schools, 14% of our hospitals, 75% of
our public transportation vehicles, -all
communications cables and significant
numbers of other public installations
have been destroyed." He noted that the
damage to the economy totaled $287
million, or roughly half of the total in-
vestment during the 20 years before the
1978 revolution.

The continued refugee exodus is
another impediment to the functioning
of social and educational services, as
well as the business sector. Reduction of
the work force by the continuing flight
of refugees, particularly the middle
class, has had a similarly negative im-
pact. Shortages of raw materials and
manpower as well as lack of security
have forced many industrial units to
close. Mujahidin operations, moreover,
have damaged power facilities and
disrupted the flow of petroleum products
to urban areas. Most utility projects
planned before the Soviet invasion re-
main uncompleted.

The Afghan economy is increasingly
linked with the Soviet Union. In a recent
speech at the military academy, Babrak
Karmal indicated that the value of trade
between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan
will increase threefold between 1983 and
1987. He noted that more than half of
the country's industrial output comes
from facilities built with Soviet aid.

Despite other problems, the natural
gas industry continues to function more
or less normally, due in part to the prox-
imity of the Sheberghan gas fields to the
Soviet border. Babrak Karmal claims

that revenues from the sale of natural
gas amount to 40% of Afghanistan's
total exports, but the figure is probably
much higher. Afghanistan uses its
revenues from gas sales to reduce its
debt to the U.S.S.R. and as barter for
Soviet machinery and other goods.
Afghanistan also exports dried fruit,
raisins, and skins and remains a major
source of opium; trade in the latter com-
modity being conducted by Soviet
soldiers, as well as by Afghan citizens.

The war's impact on agricultural
production varies widely from province
to province. Although the Soviet/regime
forces have destroyed crops and
depopulated many food-producing areas
near highways, the country has general-
ly remained self-sufficient in food. Short-
ages have been experienced mainly in
urban areas as a result of swelling urban
populations and the interdiction of road
transportation by the resistance. Kabul's
population now stands at 1.8 million in
contrast to 600,000 in 1979; as a result
Kabul is increasingly dependent on im-
ported foodstuffs such as wheat, cooking
oil, and sugar. Other basic commodities,
including medicines, also are generally in
very short supply.

The Soviet Union has supplied food
and other commodities to meet the basic
needs of the cities. In November, for ex-
ample, the Soviet Union announced
agreement to provide Afghanistan with
20,000 tons of wheat immediately and a
further 180,000 tons over the next year.
According to official press reports from
Kabul, half of the wheat would be given
as a grant and the other half sold in
Kabul in exchange for Afghan goods.
This significant increase— 115,000 tons
of wheat were supplied from the Soviet
Union in 1982 and 74,000 tons in
1981 — illustrates both increased food
shortages and growing reliance on the
Soviet Union as a supplier. Although the
food supply improved somewhat this
year over 1982, a shortfall is again ex-
pected during the winter.

Problems in the Military

The Soviets have failed to rebuild the
Afghan army, comprised of 40-50,000
men, into an effective military force. Its
size is far short of the regime goal and
far less than the 90,000 in the Afghan
military in 1978. Morale and discipline
remain low, and the army continues to
experience desertions at about the same
rate as it gains new conscripts. Many
conscripts, in fact, desert and are
reconscripted repeatedly. The desertion
rate — up to 80% reported in some

SOUTH ASIA

units— is higher in the less secure and
more contested areas of the country.

As a result of recruiting problems
and desertions, reservists during 1983
were once again retained beyond their
legal release date. Revised draft laws
promulgated in August, in concert with
a massive conscription drive, further
reduced exemptions from military serv-
ice and increased the flight of eligible
men from the country or into rural
areas. These latest changes have led to
the recall of men who completed their
military service as late as 1980. The
regime employs the talashi— in which an
entire village or section of a city is cor-
doned off and a house-to-house search
conducted for conscripts, weapons, or
mujahidin. Following an intensive con-
scription drive in Kabul during October,
Interior Minister Gulabjoi protested that
the drafting of recent reservists would
severely disrupt the economy.

In addition to problems of low
morale and inadequate training and
equipment, the army suffers from lack
of a skilled officer corps. Many senior
officers were killed following the 1978
coup, and the army has been unable to
fill this professional vacuum. As part of
the effort to rebuild the Afghan Armed
Forces, military personnel annually
numbering in the thousands have been
sent to the Soviet Union for training. In
addition, Soviet advisers serve at all
levels of the Afghan army. The Soviet
presence has caused considerable prob-
lems. As in previous years, during 1983
there were instances of Afghan troops
turning on their Soviet advisers.

The Afghan military, which is
dominated by the Khalq faction, is fur-
ther weakened by Khalq-Parcham
animosity, with the Khalqis generally
taking the view that the Parchamis have
sold out to Moscow. The Parchamis in
turn suspect the Khalqis of disloyalty
and have moved to limit KJialq authority
in the officer corps and the military
schools.

Despite such problems, Moscow may
stOl have ambitious long-range regional
plans for the Afghan military. In 1982,
in an interview published by the
Yugoslav news agency Tanjug, Afghan
Minister of Defense Abdul Qader
asserted that the Afghan army will have
a significant future role, similar to
that played by the Cuban and Viet-
namese armies. Tanjug also quoted a
1981 statement by Babrak Karmal that,
"Not far away is the day when our army
will become a strong and energetic army
capable of defending peace and security
not only in Afghanistan, but in the
region as well."

The Refugees

At year's end 2.9 million Afghan
refugees were in Pakistan, according to
official Government of Pakistan figures,
while an estimated 650,000 Afghan
refugees were in Iran. (About 850,000
Afghans worked in Iran before 1979,
bringing the present total of Afghans in
Iran to roughly 1.5 million.) Before the
Soviet invasion, some 14-17 million per-
sons lived in Afghanistan, meaning that
between one-fifth and one-fourth of the
country's population has now been
displaced outside its borders.

Although the refugee exodus has
slowed down, it continues steadily, pick-
ing up when fighting becomes heavier or
when food supplies are particularly
scarce. This fall, for example, fighting in
Paktia and Paktika Provinces caused a
new flight into Pakistan's North
Waziristan and Kurram Agencies along
the Afghan border. A campaign by the
Kabul regime to convince refugees that
it is safe for them to return to
Afghanistan has been a complete failure.
Increasingly harsh Soviet reprisals
against civilians suspected of col-
laborating with the mujahidin will no
doubt increase the refugee flow into
Pakistan and Iran.

In addition to those persons who
have left Afghanistan, an undetermined
number have been displaced within the
country itself as fighting and destruction
have driven people into urban areas.
Since the Soviet invasion, the Kabul
population, for example, has expanded
by an estimated 1.2 million despite the
exodus from the city of large numbers
of businessmen and other professionals.

Loss of much of the country's
educated elite and work force has had a
serious negative impact on the Afghan
economy. Furthermore, changes in the
country's ethnic balance and destruction
of the educational and social infrastruc-
ture have combined with the loss of
educated professionals to create social
problems that will endure for many
years to come.

The UNHCR has, with the
assistance of the Government of
Pakistan, undertaken an international
relief program for the refugees in
Pakistan which includes basic housing
and health and educational services.
Despite the heavy burden the refugee in-
flux has placed on Pakistan, the
refugees have been welcomed and good
rapport continues between them and
their hosts. Pakistani assistance to the
refugees includes some cash allowances
to individuals and payment of relief ad-
ministration costs. Contributions from

aitraiBors,t

several other countries and internationi
voluntary agencies have greatly assist©
this program.

The Afghan refugees in Iran have nolj
been handled in any systematic way and
there have been no international relief
efforts there.

Most of the Afghan refugees are
Pathan and, therefore, feel comfortable
in the Pathan-dominated Northwest |_
Frontier Province (NWFP). Due to the
large concentration of refugees in the
Northwest Frontier Province, however,
Pakistani authorities began in 1982 to
move refugees into new camps in less
populated parts of the adjacent non-
Pathan Punjab Province. Efforts to
move the refugees increase the possibill ,

ty of conflicts between the refugees anc V*"°™
their hosts. Nonetheless, more than •

40,000 Afghans were relocated from th<^™y*'*
NWFP in order to relieve population
pressures and provide better living con-
ditions. Large numbers, however, subse
quently left the Punjab to return to
Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas
citing adverse climatic conditions in the
south and a desire to remain close to
their homeland.

Pakistani authorities continue seek-
ing ways in which to manage the
massive refugee population to the ad-
vantage of all concerned. President Zia
has reaffirmed his commitment to a
political solution including repatriation,
and the Government of Pakistan adhere
to a ruling by the Organization of the
Islamic Conference that no member
country should deal with the Karmal
regime.

Working through the UNH^R, the
World Food Program, and a variety of
voluntary agencies, the U.S. Govern-
ment continues to share in the interna-
tional assistance program. Since 1980,
the United States has contributed more
than $300 million to Afghan refugee
relief. During fiscal year 1983, the
United States contributed $80 million to
support Afghan refugees in Pakistan, in
eluding $49 million through the WFP.
The U.S. contribution represents some
35% of the total UNHCR budget and
about 50% of the international food con-
tribution.

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Soviet Strategy

The Soviets have failed to reduce the
level of the insurgency, but they do not
seem to have changed their long-term
goals or altered their overall strategy in
Afghanistan. Their troop strength re-
mains at approximately 105,000 men.
Furthermore, they seem to believe,
perhaps erroneously, that in terms of in-

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;ernational reaction, the worst is over.
iVhile Afghanistan has proved to be a
"ar knottier problem than Moscow
)riginaliy envisaged, the Soviets seem to
udge that the costs are bearable and
;hat in the long run they will be able to
vear down the insurgency.

If anything, Moscow's commitment
,0 preserving a pro-Soviet, Marxist-
lominated regime in Kabul appears to
lave grown over the last 4 years as the
ioviets have come to view Afghanistan
IS a test of their credibility. Despite con-
stant rumors, the Soviets evidently are
mprepared to replace Babrak Karmal,
ijrobable because no viable alternative
;xists.

The Soviets appear to be trying to
mpose a Soviet-style political and
:Conomic system. Their efforts,
[Qwever, have been frustrated by the
insettled conditions in the countryside,
itill, where possible, the Soviets have in-
roduced changes aimed to increase the
entral government's control and securi-
y. Afghan Government and party of-
icials are routinely sent to the U.S.S.R.
or training and indoctrination.

The Afghan economy has been pro-
rressively integrated into the Eastern
»loc. Afghanistan was an observer at
he October 1983 council meeting of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
n Havana. Last spring, TASS an-
■lounced that the U.S.S.R. was the main
'rading partner of the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviets
lontrol Afghanistan's natural gas in-
dustry, virtually all Afghan gas going to
ihe U.S.S.R. to service Kabul's Soviet
<ebt. Moscow's current ambassador to
i^ghanistan was previously the first
lecretary of the Tartar Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic where he over-
saw the development of the West
Siberian oil and gas fields.

Since the invasion, 10-20,000
Afghan students have been educated in
the U.S.S.R. Moscow considers this pro-
gram sufficiently important to exempt
(he students from military service in
i\.fghanistan. There has been a steady
stream of articles in Soviet academic
ournals and the national press compar-
Tig Afghanistan with the U.S.S.R.'s
Central Asian republics, where final
)acification and integration took a
;imilar form.

In their approach to Afghan tribal
*nd nationality problems, the Soviets
.lave taken another page out of their
')wn Central Asian experience as they
Dursue a policy of divide and rule. The
Karmal regime's strategy has been to of-
fer large sums of money, weapons, and
i)rivileges as an inducement to tribes

January 1984

and villages to abandon the resistance
and to obstruct mujahidin activity. It
was the failure of this program— with
previously neutral tribal groups joining
the resistance instead— that contributed
to the government setbacks in Paktia
and Paktika Provinces this year.

In recent months the regime has
widely publicized the surrender of mu-
jahidin groups under an official amnesty
program. The resistance, however,
discourages potential collaborators from
aiding the regime by regularly using
assassination and other forms of retalia-
tion against government supporters.
Mujahidin frequently accept arms and
cash subsidies from the government only
to return to the resistance after a few
months. To date no major sustained
defections from the mujahidin to the
regime have occurred.

Status of the UN-Sponsored
Negotiations

UN efforts to help negotiate a solution
to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
date from a November 1980 resolution
by the UN General Assembly. The then
Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, ap-
pointed Perez de Cuellar as his personal
representative to see if the United Na-
tions could play an active and useful role
in negotiations concerning Afghanistan.
When Perez de Cuellar succeeded
Waldheim, he followed the same formula
and appointed Diego Cordovez, UN
Under Secretary General for Special
Political Affairs, to act for him on the
problem.

Cordovez shuttled between Kabul
and Islamabad in April 1982 and gained
agreement for a round of indirect talks
between Pakistan and Afghanistan
which were held in Geneva that June.
Iran decided not to participate formally
but agreed to be kept informed and thus
associated with the talks.

Following these discussions, the
United Nations, Pakistan, and Afghan-
istan all issued positive statements and
indicated that there was a measure of
flexibility in the negotiating positions of
both sides. Kabul apparently agreed in
principle to allow the subject of troop
withdrawal to be part of the negotiating
package and to accept the idea that at
some point the refugees must be con-
sulted on the conditions of their return.
Cordovez announced in a press con-
ference that he kept a written record of
the understandings that he has reached
and that he would work from these texts
in subsequent discussions.

From January 21 to February 7,
1983, Cordovez again visited the area to
refine the text of the agreement. His

consultations dealt with four items
previously identified for consideration:
withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan; noninterference and
nonintervention; international
guarantees of a final settlement; and
voluntary return of the refugees.

During Perez de Cuellar's March
visit to Moscow, he and Cordovez ex-
changed views on the Afghanistan situa-
tion with both Chairman Andropov and
Foreign Minister Gromyko. According to
the Secretary General, the Soviet
Government expressed itself strongly in
favor of a political settlement and sup-
ported a continuation of his efforts.
A second round of indirect talks
took place in Geneva from April 11 to
April 22, 1983. Cordovez met separately
with the Pakistani and Afghan Foreign
Ministers and with Soviet observers
daily to further develop the text of a
possible agreement. Once again Cor-
dovez also kept Iran informed of the
discussions. At the conclusion of this
round, there were suggestions that a
breakthrough might be possible.

After consultations with the capitals
concerned, another round of indirect
talks took place in Geneva from June 12
to 24, 1983. Although the parties
reportedly made progress in defining the
nature of a comprehensive settlement-
its principles and objectives, the inter-
relationship among its four components,
and the provisions for its implementa-
tion—the talks stalled on the crucial
issue of the Soviets' unwillingness to
provide a timetable for troop withdrawal
from Afghanistan. Although the parties
had agreed that Cordovez should visit
the region in September for further
discussions, Perez de Cuellar decided in
late summer that such a visit at that
time would not be productive.

On November 23, the UNGA again
passed a resolution urging immediate
withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Afghanistan by a vote of 116 to 20, with
17 abstentions— the largest majority
since the Soviet invasion nearly 4 years
ago. This was the fifth time since
January 1980 that the UNGA had called
for a troop withdrawal from Afghan-
istan, each time by overwhelming
margins.

Also during the UNGA, Perez de
Cuellar and Cordovez met informally
with both the Pakistani and Afghan
Foreign Ministers to explore conditions
for resuming the diplomatic process. On
November 30, the United Nations an-
nounced that Cordovez would continue
the diplomatic process by further
negotiations in Islamabad, Kabul, and
Tehran at a mutually convenient date. ■

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Caribbean Basin Initiative
and Central America

by Kenneth W. Dam

Address before the International
Trade Mart "World News Business
Briefing, " New Orleans, Lousiana, on
November 29, 1983. Mr. Dam is Deputy
Secretary of State.

The Policy Setting

President Reagan told a special Joint
Session of Congress last April 27 that
U.S. policy toward our neighbors in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean has four
interlocking elements:

• To actively support democracy,
reform, and human freedom against dic-
tators and would-be dictators of both
left and right;

• To promote economic recovery
within a framework of sound growth
and equitable development;

• To foster dialogue and negotia-
tions—a dialogue of democracy within
countries, a diplomacy of negotiations
among nations willing to live at peace;
and

• To provide a security shield
against those who use violence against
democratization, development, and
diplomacy.

In enunciating these principles, the
President was referring primarily to
Central America. Nonetheless, our con-
cerns and our policy include the entire
Caribbean Basin. For example, we can
rightfully congratulate ourselves and our
Caribbean friends that Grenada is back
on a democratic course together with
the rest of the eastern Caribbean com-
munity. Democracy and security are
essential to our policy. But we must not
forget the other elements, including the
need for sustained cooperation in foster-
ing economic growth and opportunity.

So I should like to focus today on
the problems of growth and what we
can do about them. I shall begin with
Central America, then conclude with the
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Overcoming
the obstacles to economic growth is im-
portant for Central America, for the
Caribbean, and for the United States.
And it has a special significance for New
Orleans, which leads all U.S. seaports in
import tonnage.

Problems of Central America's
Economies

Let me begin by recalling that the
record of the 1950s, the 1960s, and most

of the 1970s demonstrates that Central
America is capable of rapid economic
growth.

From 1960 to 1979, real gross na-
tional product in the United States grew
by an average of 3.7% per year; the in-
dustrialized market economies as a
whole grew at 4.2% per year. During
those same 20 years, every country in
Central America grew even faster. An-
nual real growth rates averaged from a
low of 4.4% in Honduras to a high of
6.3% in Costa Rica.

Central America's population growth
during those same 20 years averaged
about 3%— among the highest in the
world. Even so, per capita income in-
creased in every country. And in each
case, the percentage of total production
accounted for by manufacturing and
other industrial activity increased. For
instance, between 1960 and 1979 in-
dustrial activity in Honduras rose from
19% of total production to 26%.

Against such a favorable
background, how is it that Central
America's rapid development lost
momentum? How do economic problems
relate to today's troubles?

Three factors stand out. They are
local social and political conflicts, the
global economic recession, and the im-
pact of guerrilla warfare. Let me take
each in turn.

First, local social and political con-
flicts — Central America was still
relatively quiet politically when I trav-
eled there briefly 5 years ago. But
underlying economic problems and social
tensions were already unmistakable.

Part of the problem was described
by the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America: "The fruits of the long
period of economic expansion . . . were
distributed in a flagrantly inequitable
manner." Another part of the problem
was that growth was slowly improving
the lot of many people but that it was
also increasing expectations and
creating pressures for broader political
participation. Yet except for Costa Rica,
there were few democratic outlets to ac-
commodate the changes needed to
resolve the tensions peacefully.

The instability and repression that
ensued proved bad for both business and
labor. Over the past 5 years, social con-
flicts and political uncertainty have in-
creasingly prevented new investment
and set back development.

The second obstacle to growth was
a series of adverse developments in the

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world economy. Beginning in the late
1970s, the prices of Central America's
basic export crops plummeted. The price
of coffee, Central America's single most
important export, fell more than 26% in
nominal terms between 1977 and 1980.
In 1981, the price of cotton — the second
most important export of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua — fell some
20% in nominal terms in just 9 months.
In real terms, after adjusting for infla-
tion, the decreases were even greater.

While export revenues were falling,
import costs were rising. Two of Central
America's most important imports are
petroleum and financial capital borrowed
from hard currency countries. In 1978
and 1979, the second oil shock almost
doubled the price of imported oil. And in:
the 1980s, the higher cost of capital on
world financial markets increased the
cost of borrowing to offset falling export-
revenues.

The result was shocking economic
dislocation. To take an extreme but vital
example, the amount of coffee required
to buy one barrel of oil went from 5
pounds in 1977 to almost 26 pounds in
1981. Overall, the shift in terms of tradefi!awarfer(
meant that Costa Rica, for example,
would have had to export 70% more justJTnofveiil
to pay for the same imports as 3 years
before.

Local government policy responses
to these changes were often slow or in-
appropriate. This led to capital flight, in-
creased foreign debt, and controls that
further sapped economic vitality. The
Central American Common Market
weakened rapidly as its members'
economies grew more protectionist. No
Central American nation escaped the
general decline. Even democratic Costa
Rica, which faced fewer of the political
and social challenges prevalent else-
where in the region, went into a deep
slump. Until 1980, Costa Rica's real
growth had averaged more than 6% per
year — the highest in the region. Last
year, economic activity in Costa Rica
declined by 9%.

El Salvador's economy contracted
even faster. The reason is that El
Salvador has been hit hardest by the
third, and in many ways the most
debilitating, factor in Central America's
economic decline: the disruptions caused|ui
by guerrilla warfare.

In a nation where safe drinking
water is scarce, guerrillas have
destroyed water pumping stations and
the transmission towers that carry the
energy to run them. They have
destroyed 55 of the country's 260
bridges and damaged many more. In
1982 alone, the guerrillas destroyed oveilit

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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200 buses. Less than half the rolling
stock of the railways remains opera-
tional.

In a nation where overpopulation is
endemic, regular employment is scarce,
and capital investment must be nur-
tured, guerrilla attacks have forced the
closing of factories, the abandonment of
farms, and the displacement of
thousands of workers. One out of eight
of El Salvador's most productive land
reform cooperatives is either abandoned
or operating only sporadically.

The human costs have been enor-
mous. On the average, every man,
woman, and child in El Salvador is one-
third poorer today than 4 years ago.
During the off-season, agricultural
anemployment now reaches 40%. In
1981, El Salvador was able to import
3nly two-thirds as much by volume as in
1977. Critical imports such as fertilizers
and even medicines have been cut back
sharply. And to maintain even this
"educed level of foreign purchases, its
;entral bank has had to increase net bor-
•Qwings by almost $300 million.

The negative repercussions of guer-
illa warfare have been felt throughout
.he region. Some investors are now
-vary of ventures anywhere in Central
\merica. Even the area's most stable
;ountries, Honduras and Costa Rica, are
osing investment that would prove
lighly profitable in any other psycho-
[ogical climate.

The U.S. Response

The United States is working hard to
aelp the Central Americans overcome
(ach of these obstacles and resume
'conomic growth.

First, to combat social tensions and
he long-term instability of dictatorships,
vhether of the right or the left, we are
upporting democratic politics and
'eform. Democracy gives people a stake
a peaceful development. And it pro-
notes the stability investors need to
Ian ahead, confident that the future is
jss likely to hold arbitrary shifts in
Covernment policies or sudden outbreaks
If civil strife.

El Salvador's elected Constituent
issembly has, for example, twice ex-
nded land reform legislation in
esponse to popular demand; 500,000
■alvadorans have now benefited directly
rom the land reform. Substantial uncer-
ainties and some real problems remain,
ut yields are beginning to increase
gain. Output per cultivated acre of El
alvador's four basic grain crops was
lore than 2.5% higher this year than
ist year; coffee yields were up 3%,
igar 5%, and cotton 11%. And by
eveloping a rural middle class, with

anuary 1984

money to spend locally, land reform
should provide an indispensable base for
greater national output and employ-
ment.

Second, to help cushion adverse
developments in the world economy and
to complement local policy reforms, we
have increased bilateral economic
assistance and devised new forms of
cooperation.

Since 1980, we have tripled our
direct bilateral economic assistance to
Central America. Eighty-one cents of
every dollar of U.S. aid to Central

policies will achieve little if the security
situation keeps them from working.
There can be no growth if either
businessmen or their workers have to
fear for their lives. The killers— whether
they are leftwing guerrillas or rightwing
death squads— must be stopped.

As concerns directly economic mat-
ters, a great deal depends on the ability
of our friends in Central America to
design policies that will go beyond im-
mediate needs and improve conditions
for long-term development.

But we can— and must— help.

Eighty-one cents of every dollar of U.S. aid to
Central America during the fiscal year just con-
cluded was devoted to economic goals, including
both emergency support and development
assistance.

America during the fiscal year just con-
cluded was devoted to economic goals,
including both emergency support and
development assistance. And to facilitate
both internal adjustments and external
capital flows, we are encouraging close
cooperation between individual countries
and the International Monetary Fund
and the development banks.

We estimate that all our economic
assistance to El Salvador since 1980
does not fully offset the damage inflicted
by the guerrillas. But it is making the
critical difference between hope and
despair.

Third, to counter guerrilla violence
and economic warfare, we are providing
military assistance. Behind that shield,
people can work and economies function.

Since June, for example, the
Salvadoran Government has been mak-
ing a special effort to restore govern-
ment services in two provinces (San
Vicente and Usulutan) where guerrilla
activity has disrupted coffee, cotton,
livestock, and dairy farming. Despite
renewed guerrilla harrassment, this
operation is helping 25 of El Salvador's
largest farm cooperatives to resume
more normal operations. Forty-two
schools and twelve health centers have
been opened. More than 1,000 displaced
families have returned to their farms.

Guidelines for the Future

What does the future hold? The answer,
of course, depends partly in develop-
ments that have nothing to do with
economics as such. The best economic

Economic development in Central
America is in the national interest of
the United States— but not, let me make
it clear, because of any large U.S.
corporate investments. At the end of
last year, total U.S. private investment
in Central America was less than
$1 billion. That is less than half of 1% of
U.S. investment abroad. Our national in-
terest in Central America is founded
more broadly on the peace and prosperi-
ty of our neighbors. And that is a goal
worth spending money on, even a lot of
money.

So it is not surprising that many
Americans have recently been talking
about a "Marshall Plan" for Central
America. Our interests will be served as
much by peace and prosperity in Central
America as they were by the reconstruc-
tion of Europe after World War II.

The term "Marshall Plan," of course,
should not be taken literally. The
analogy between postwar Europe and
present-day Central America is less than
precise. Postwar Europe faced problems
of reconstruction, not of long-term
development or ongoing conflict. And
Europe had a large pool of trained man-
power with a long industrial tradition.
Massive infusions of capital were
therefore quickly usable in postwar
Europe. The problems of Central
America are different.

But if the term "Marshall Plan" is
used as a way to emphasize the high
priority we must give to Central

wmmma
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

America, it is consistent with our think-
ing—and with what we are now doing.
Central America needs relatively high
levels of assistance. It needs them now
and perhaps for some years to come. It
needs them for both development and
defense. And it needs them to restore
destroyed or deteriorated assets.

As the region recovers its balance,
however, it will be important that Cen-
tral America's economies not succumb to
the tendency of some developing
economies to adjust to large inflows of
capital in ways that create permanent
dependence.

Looking to the future, then, I would
suggest five considerations for determin-
ing realistic economic policies toward
Central America after the present
emergency.

The first is the one I just men-
tioned: the need to avoid impairing the
region's capacity to grow on a self-
sustaining basis. Massive foreign aid can
reduce the incentives for domestic sav-
ing. It can help maintain artificial ex-
change rates that discourage domestic
investment. And the necessarily large
role of governments in using foreign aid
can also inflate the size of the public sec-
tor at the expense of more dynamic
private enterprise.

Nicaragua provides a concrete il-
lustration of how the wrong policies can
foster dependence and undermine pro-
ductivity. After July 1979, Nicaragua
benefited from unprecedented levels of
economic assistance— more than $500
million each year from 1980 through
1982. During the Sandinistas' first 22
months in power, the United States was
Nicaragua's single largest bilateral donor
of assistance. Yet despite an initial
growth spurt in 1979 and 1980, the
Nicaraguan economy is now declining
rapidly. The Nicaraguan Government no
longer publishes timely statistics, but the
indications are that the rapid growth of
the nationalized sector has led to
disastrous losses in production.
Moreover, little has been done to
develop the productive activities needed
to sustain Nicaragua's literacy and
public health programs. Arturo Cruz, a
former member of the revolutionary
junta and once also the head of
Nicaragua's Central Bank, has concluded
that "Nicaragua is condemned to be an
international beggar."

A second consideration is that
private investment, not official aid, is
the key to long-term growth. And to be
self-sustaining, most of the investment
must come from domestic resources.
Adequate incentives for people to pro-
duce, save, and invest are the heart of
effective policies for sustained growth.

Political stability is a prerequisite for

. 1 iJHmMUUuuniuuBa

a business environment conducive to
private investment. Open markets, an
equitable and efficient tax system, sound
monetary and foreign exchange policies,
and a government commitment to en-
courage new enterprises are also impor-
tant. And sound government policies
and nondiscriminatory legal procedures
can attract foreign investment,
technology, and know-how to increase
Central America's international com-
petitiveness.

A third consideration is the distribu-
tion of investment. My own conviction is
that industry should be developed, but
not at the expense of agriculture. In
country after country, an increasingly
productive agricultural sector has
proved to be the force driving economic
growth.

Central America's own record makes
the point. For the most part. Central
America has been highly successful in
selling its agricultural goods to the
world market: coffee, cotton, sugar,
bananas. Without disturbing the produc-
tion of agricultural exports, the Central
Americans can also increase their in-
dustrial exports.

This brings me to a fourth con-
sideration: International trade is key to
Central America's future growth.

Central America enjoys a similar
resource base and shorter transportation
lines to major markets than the five
members of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The
ASEAN nations have had an average
growth rate of about 6% over the last
decade. With the exception of the
Singapore city-state, the ASEAN na-
tions are, like Central America, engaged
mainly in agriculture and the production
of basic commodities. But unlike the
Central American Common Market, they
have fostered growth through open
markets and exports combined with
cooperative economic policies and joint
industrial projects. The experience of
the ASEAN nations confirms what com-
mon sense suggests — that the Central
American nations should also be able to
compete effectively in world markets.

My fifth and final thought is that we
should do more to help meet the basic
human needs of the people of Central
America and the Caribbean. On a world
scale, these are "middle-income" coun-
tries. But continued technical assistance
and other forms of cooperation in
health, education, and population are
still essential. Indeed, because they are
our neighbors, the grounds for a special
U.S. effort are strong.

The CBI— A Model for Sound Policy

On February 24, 1982, President
Reagan proposed a "long-term commit-
ment to the countries of the Caribbean
and Central America to make use of the
magic of the market of the Americas to
earn their own way toward self-
sustaining growth."

The Congress agreed, and 18
months later, on August 5, 1983, the
President signed the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act which created
the Caribbean Basin Initiative— the CBI.

By harnessing normal market forces
to foster a trade and growth pattern ap-
propriate to the region, the CBI is
designed to attract capital and create
employment opportunities on a lasting
basis. It is an approach that creates op-
portunities without dependence.
Specifically, the CBI provides the folloW'
ing opportunities.

• A one-way free trade area that
eliminates duties on all Caribbean Basin
products except for limited product ex-
ceptions specified in advance. There are
also local content requirements to
stimulate maximum use of local
resources and to prevent the
passthrough of other countries' exports, ft

• The CBI also provides for tax
deductibility of expenses incurred by
U.S. citizens and companies for conven-
tions held in the Caribbean Basin. This
tax provision is a practical incentive for
investment in tourism and will take ef-
fect as nations negotiate tax informa-
tion-sharing agreements with the U.S.
Treasury.

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To be designated as a beneficiari^' of
the trade provisions, a country must
meet certain criteria. Among the man-
datory criteria are: a clean expropriatior
record, curtailment of unauthorized
government rebroadcasting of U.S. films
and programs, and cooperation on nar-
cotics matters. Other criteria include
respect for labor freedoms, economic
self-help measures, and protection of in
tellectual property and trademarks.

The President is receiving reports o^w
teams organized by the U.S. Special
Trade Representative and the Depart-
ment of State on how each Caribbean
Basin country fulfills these standards.
He is expected to designate the first
CBI beneficiaries next week. After com-
pletion of additional discussions now
underway, he will probably designate a
second group of nations before
Christmas. 'The 12-year free trade provi- W(
sions will go into effect a month from
now, on January 1.

I should like to highlight two aspect
of this legislation.

First, the CBI represents a truly

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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bipartisan and even international con-
sensus on what can and should be done.
The CBI was endorsed by every living
former Secretary of State, both
Democratic and Republican. Congres-
sional approval was secured by a strong
bipartisan coalition. Your represen-
tatives from Louisiana, incidentally, con-
tributed very ably to making this possi-
ble. And the CBI benefited greatly from
the expert advice of U.S. business
leaders, including your president here at
the International Trade Mart, Harvey
Koch.

The leaders of the Caribbean Basin
countries also contributed their unique
understanding of the problems of
development. For years, experts have
been saying that what our neighbors
wanted and needed most was "trade not
aid." That we are finally making that
concept a reality is due in no small
neasure to the counsel and persistence
)f men such as Prime Minister Seaga of
lamaica and President Monge of Costa
^ica.

Second, the CBI marks the first
ime that the United States has granted
)referential economic treatment to an
mtire geographic region. And it does so
lot on the basis of traditional bilateral
lid but by providing long-term incen-
ives to private enterprise. The CBI will
ast 12 years, long enough for its incen-
ives to influence the market and for
lusinessmen to factor them into sound
nvestment decisions that are good for
hem and good for the host nation.
Cvery investor can have confidence that,
or the life of the CBI, whatever he pro-
luces in the region — with the few excep-
ions specified in advance — will be able
enter the United States duty free.

We are often asked what the CBI
vill mean in concrete terms, in dollars
,nd cents. Some immediate benefits can,
if course, be calculated. For instance, in
982 the United States imported about
»600 million in dutiable goods from the
Caribbean Basin, about half of it from
Central America; these duties will not
ave to be paid in the future.

But the answer is that we cannot
et assign a dollar value to the CBI. The
irogram is not a giveaway; it is a net-
rork of opportimities and incentives
'nat we hope U.S. and foreign investors
all put to maximum use. The U.S.
overnment has put together a sound
Togram. But it is up to the leaders of
16 nations of the Caribbean Basin to
evelop conditions leading to increased
'ade and investment in their nations,
nd in the last analysis, it is up to the
,|, asinessmen of the region, including
S. businessmen, to determine whether

they want to take advantage of the op-
portunities so created. I think they will.
I believe that they, you, and the region
are too dynamic to let such an oppor-
tunity go unheeded.

Conclusion

The United States is now on the road to
a sustained economic recovery; most
other industrialized nations are not far
behind. The Caribbean Basin, which is
so close and so important to the United
States, must share fully in this recovery.

The framework for growth is clear.
Our neighbors can avoid dependency,
strengthen their private sectors, develop
agriculture as well as industry, and in-
crease their foreign trade. In turn, the
United States can ensure the availability
of American markets and enterprise and

cooperate to better meet their peoples'
basic human needs.

The key to establishing this dynamic
is freedom— freedom from outside in-
tervention; freedom from tyranny; and
freedom to create. As President Reagan
said in his September 1981 speech to the
IMF and World Bank:

Only when the human spirit is allowed to
invent and create, only when individuals are
given a personal stake in deciding economic
policies and benefiting from their suc-
cess—only then can societies remain
economically alive, dynamic, prosperous, pro-
gressive, and free.

That is our goal: neighbors who are
both free and independent. The CBI is a
key step toward achieving economic and
political cooperation, securely founded
on peaceful development. ■

The Political Economy of the
Caribbean Basin

by Kenneth W. Dam

Address before the seventh annual
Conference on Trade, Investment and
Development in the Caribbean Basin,
Miami, Florida, on December 2, 198S.
Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State.

Is Our Unity of Purpose Enough?

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of
Dominica, who also spoke yesterday
evening, last year recalled to this con-
ference the words of the second Presi-
dent of the United States:

The Commerce of the West Indies islands
is part of the American System of Com-
merce. They can neither do without us nor
we without them. . . . We have the means of
assisting each other and politicians and artful
contrivances cannot separate us.

The force of John Adams' vision is
manifest here today. Miami is a great
center of Caribbean life. And this
meeting is the seventh in what has
become a major forum for leaders of the
modern Caribbean to exchange ex-
periences and learn from each other.

Yet I wonder if even President
Adams foresaw the depth of the inter-
relationships among us today. At the
end of the 18th century, our contacts
took place within relatively simple pat-
terns. The burning issues of the day-
mercantilism, colonialism, slavery —
were discussed mainly among a relative
handful, by men like Adams himself, or

Alexander Hamilton, who was born in
Nevis in the eastern Caribbean.

Today, we are all part of a much
more complex and dynamic global
economy. The issues we face are as
burning as ever, but they have
multiplied. And freedom has enabled all
our citizens to debate them, including
over a million people from the Caribbean
who now live and work in the United
States.

Despite all the changes, John
Adams' basic message holds: we must
develop the means to assist each other,
and we must ensure that the artful con-
trivances of politicians work for us, and
not against us.

I need not belabor to this audience
the importance our governments assign
to our cooperation. We are working for
democracy and economic progress. We
are strengthening diplomacy and
shielding our citizens through effective
security cooperation. These are prin-
ciples that we have developed together.
Even more importantly, they are prin-
ciples we are implementing together.

So the central question, at least for
this audience, is not what we are doing,
but how we are doing. Is what we are
doing working, and if not, what is still
lacking?

Gravity of the Problems We Face

Perhaps the first point to make is that
the problems we face are serious, prbb-

i|.ij anuary 1984

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ably a great deal more serious than we
sometimes admit.

This conference is designed to pro-
mote trade, investment, and develop-
ment. The potential is clear, but the
brutal fact is that all three are in trou-
ble. The terms of trade have recently
been running against the Caribbean's
traditional exports — sugar, bananas,
rum, spices, oil, coffee, bauxite, cotton,
and nickel. Without exception, these
products have seen their real purchasing
power fall, in some cases dramatically.
In a key part of the Caribbean
Basin— Central America— political
upheaval and guerrilla warfare have in-
hibited investment and encouraged
capital flight. And after a generation of
sustained progress, 1983 will be the
second straight year of zero growth for
the basin as a whole.

Nor are the problems we face purely
economic. Our model of development is
based on freedom. It combines represen-
tative democracy and free enterprise
with a state capable of providing funda-
mental services, setting public goals, and
ensuring the rights and safety of all its
citizens. Today this vision is under grave
pressures from left and right.
Unemployment curdles the hopes of
urban youth both on the islands and on
the mainland. Emigration robs countries
of workers and entrepreneurs. Instabili-
ty disrupts lives and plans. And while
democracy is our common banner, it is
sometimes honored more in speeches
than in practice.

And there is more. An alternative
model has emerged. It is a model whose
advocates add the persuasion of the gun
to the illusions created by the frustra-
tions in our societies. Cuba knows
neither freedom nor prosperity. It is
neither a democratic alternative, nor a
model for anything worth calling
development. Yet though Castro has
failed to break Cuba's dependence on
sugar and one-man rule, he has added a
new and dangerous dependence on
Soviet military power. In President
Adams' imagery, Cuba is a contrivance
bent on separating us.

What we found in Grenada unveiled
the professional military realities behind
Cuban "economic" assistance and "con-
struction workers." We found five secret
treaties— three with the Soviet Union,
one with North Korea, and one with
Cuba — under which these communist
countries were secretly to donate,
through Cuba, military equipment in
amounts without precedent for a popula-
tion of 110,000. We found artillery, anti-
aircraft weapons, armored personnel
carriers, and rocket launchers. We found
thousands of rifles, thousands of fuses,
' ' ''"^"' • "'i millions of rounds of

ammunition. We found communications
gear and cryptographic devices. We
found Grenadians imprisoned and tor-
tured under Cuban supervision. We
found agreements authorizing the secret
presence of Cuban military advisers,
some of them on a "permanent" basis.

Today, we can take heart that the
Grenadian people and even some of
Grenada's Government leaders were not
cowed by the spurious Cuban alter-
native. We can rightfully congratulate
ourselves that Grenada is back on a
democratic course together with the rest
of the eastern Caribbean community.

But that achievement— and it is a
major achievement— must not distract
us from two basic issues.

First, we must follow through— in

Grenada, in El Salvador, and throughout
the Caribbean Basin. We must help en-
sure that democracy works and is
accompanied by genuine economic
progress.

And second, we must help
Nicaragua, where Cuba's presence is
more than 10 times what it was in
Grenada. The Sandinistas must
recognize the dangers of dictatorship, in-
tervention, and militarization. Nicaragua
must return to the original goals of the
democratic revolution against the
Somoza dictatorship.

Our Response Is Sound

Our response to this generalized crisis is
sound. As President Reagan told a

CBI Recipients Designated

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS.
NOV. 30. 1983'

Pursuant to Section 212 of the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). I
wish to inform you of my intent to designate
the following eleven Caribbean Basin coun-
tries and entities as beneficiaries of the
trade-liberalizing measures provided for in
this Act: Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama,
Netherlands Antilles, Saint Lucia, Saint Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Saint Christopher-Nevis.
Designation will entitle the products of said
countries, except for products excluded
statutorily, to duty-free treatment for a
period beginning on January 1, 1984 and end-
ing on September 30, 1995. As beneficiaries,
these eleven also have the opportunity to
become eligible for the convention expense
tax deduction under Section 274(h) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, by entering in-
to an exchange of information agreement
with the United States on tax matters.

Designation is an important step for
these countries in their battle to revitalize
and rebuild their weakened economies.
Designation is also significant because it is
further tangible evidence of the constructive
cooperation between the United States and
the peoples and governments of the Carib-
bean Basin.

My decision to designate the group of
eleven flows out of discussions held between
this Administration and potential beneficiary
countries and entities regarding the designa-
tion criteria set forth in Section 212 of the
("BK;RA. Our discussions with the eleven
began rapidly and were concluded last month.
However, active and constructive discussions
are underway with other potential
beneficiaries, and I hope to designate a
number of additional countries in the near
future.

The eleven countries have demonstrated
to my satisfaction that their laws, practices
and policies are in conformity with the
designation criteria of the CBERA. The
governments of these countries and entities
have communicated on these matters by let-
ter with Secretary of State Shultz and Am-
bassador Brock [TJ.S. Trade Representative
William Brock] and in so doing have indicate'
their desire to be designated as beneficiaries
(copies of the letters are attached). On the
basis of the statements and assurances in
these letters, and taking into account infor-
mation developed by United States Em-
bassies and through other sources. I have
concluded that the objectives of the Ad-
ministration and the Congress with respect t
the statutory designation criteria of the
CBERA have been met.

I am mindful that under Section 213(B)
(2) of the CBERA, I retain the authority to
suspend or withdraw CBERA benefits from
any designated beneficiary country if a
beneficiary's laws, policies or practices are ni
longer in conformity with the designation
criteria. The United States will keep abreast
of developments in the beneficiary countries
and entities which are pertinent to the
designation criteria.

This Administration looks forward to
working closely with its fellow governments
in the Caribbean Basin and with the private
sectors of the United States and Basin coun-
tries to ensure that the wide-ranging oppor-
tunities opened by the CBERA are fully
utilized.

Sincerely,

.lpnl2l
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of Representatives, and (ieorge Bush. Presi-
dent of the Senate (text from White House
press release). ■

Deoartment of State Bullet! '*>„„«,

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

special Joint Session of Congress last
April 27, U.S. policy toward Central
-America and the Caribbean has four in-
erlocking elements:

ite

I First, to actively support
democracy, reform, and human
freedom against dictators and would-
be dictators of both left and right.

That means that our relations are
especially close with a Barbados, a Costa
Rica, or a Dominica— with countries
where democracy is practiced in full. It
also means that we repudiate and op-
pose those who deal in death and in-
timidation. The death squads and their
Dackers in El Salvador and Guatemala
ire enemies of democracy every bit as
•nuch as the guerrillas and their Cuban
ind Soviet sponsors. Somoza's dictator-
ship in Nicaragua, and the pre-1979
Mongoose Gang" in Grenada, helped
Dave the way for the Marxist-Leninists
md their violence. If we are to con-
;ribute to stability and lasting peace, we
nust help leaders who will oppose
/■iolence and dictatorship, who will work
br law and democracy.

The second element of U.S. policy
s to promote economic recovery
vithin a framework of sound growth
ind equitable development. We have
nore than doubled U.S. bilateral
iconomic assistance and adopted the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) on
vhich so many of you have worked.
These measures will not in themselves
lOlve the economic crisis but they are a
najor beginning. And they are not tem-
)orary measures. The CBI trade provi-
ions to take effect in January will
Irespifemain in place until 1996.

Third, the United States is com-
nitted to fostering dialogue and
legotiations— a dialogue of democracy
vithin countries and a diplomacy of
legotiations among nations willing to
ive at peace. We believe elections freely
onducted can help end the internal war-
are in El Salvador and Nicaragua. We
lope the nine countries engaged in the
^lontadora process will achieve their ob-
ectives of democratization, demilitariza-
ion, an end to subversion, and the
vithdrawal of foreign military forces
ind advisers.
[ Fourth, the United States will pro-
ide a security shield against violence
ind intimidation. Those who are
genuinely committed to democratization,
ievelopment, and diplomacy will find
,)i,#RE*t jj^j. ^g ^j,g g^eadfast allies.

of* ""

,l,ileflo««

Hois mportance of Private Sector

repeat, this four-part policy is sound.
Ve see many indications that it is begin-

)anuary 1984

ning to work. And we believe that the
economic recovery now underway in the
United States will help to reactivate the
economies of our neighbors in the Carib-
bean Basin.

The daunting problems we face,

Nicaragua

SECRETARY SHULTZS
LETTER TO
THE CONGRESS,
OCT. 18, 19831

Last month the nine governments par-
ticipating in the Contadora discussions
agreed on a document of twenty-one ob-
jectives that could serve as the basis for
a negotiated settlement in the region.
The objectives include respect for
democratic pluralism and reciprocal and
verifiable commitments to end assistance
to armed opposition forces.

I believe Nicaragua's acceptance of
the document of objectives is an indica-
tion that the Sandinista regime may
ultimately reconsider its pervasive in-
tervention in the region. The growth of
the Nicaraguan opposition, a manifesta-
tion of the unpopularity of four years of
Sandinista repression at home and in-
tervention abroad, is contributing impor-
tantly to this possibility.

I therefore believe it is essential that
the House of Representatives not enact
provisions in the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion bill that would give the Sandinistas
a unilateral assurance that the United
States will withhold support from the
Nicaraguan resistance movement. In my
judgment, such an action would virtually
destroy the prospect that Nicaragua
may agree to reciprocal and verifiable
agreements to end assistance to all guer-
rilla forces operating in this region.

The Administration's policies to help
bring peace in Central America are now
beginning to bear fruit. I urge the
House not to impose restrictions on this
policy and thereby undermine the cause
of peace and democracy that we all
support.

Sincerely yours.

George P. Shultz

•Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill Jr.. Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Minority Leader Robert
H. Michel (text made available to news cor-
respondents by Department spokesman John
Hughes). ■

however, demand special efforts from
everyone, particularly those of you in
the private sector. The CBI is a special
response to the problem of economic
dislocation and long-term growth in our
hemisphere. But if it is to work,
businessmen and entrepreneurs of our
entire community must take advantage
of the opportunities it creates. The
President's policy, of which the CBI is a
part, is designed to provide the max-
imum assistance and to assure the max-
imum freedom to the nations of the
region. But again, it will take more than
government policies to bring about the
peaceful, democratic future we all seek.

The private sector, of course, is
already doing a great deal. Despite
heavy national debt burdens, Costa
Rican and Jamaican entrepreneurs are
maintaining their dynamism. In Hon-
duras, where a real external military
threat might cause others to run, pro-
duction and employment remain active
and firmly focused on the future. In El
Salvador, despite a relentless guerrilla
campaign against the economy,
businessmen are busy rebuilding and
planning for the future. And in
Nicaragua, the private sector is strug-
gling to preserve its identity, its voca-
tion, its ability to produce.

But more must be done. Social
welfare and political stability are not the
province of governments alone. Govern-
ments can set a framework; they cannot
produce prosperity. And in a free-
market system where the importance of
the individual is properly understood
and appreciated, stability and social
progress originate in economic life.

It is up to all of us — small
businessmen as well as politicians,
bankers as well as labor leaders — to
work for consensus and unity where
there is discord and fragmentation; to
work for progress where the forces of
the past seek to halt forward movement
or to reverse it; most of all, to preserve
freedom, so that political systems can
better serve the needs of all: producer
and consumer, investor and employee,
manager and laborer.

By establishing more decent, pro-
gressive, and forward-looking societies,
we can give the lie to the counterfeit
alternatives.

The Need for Training for Democracy

The message of Grenada is clear. Most
people want to run their own affairs, to
enjoy a measure of prosperity in an at-
mosphere of democracy and peace. They
are not interested in Marxist-Leninist

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

litanies or in dubious alliances with those
bent on the spread of communism and
its destructive orthodoxy.

Many will understand the message
of Grenada. But some will not. And
many of those who do not will be
relatively well educated, even relatively
prosperous. Often they will be middle-
class youths who see injustice, poverty,
and despair and vow to bring about
change. If such persons do not find
democratic outlets — peaceful yet effec-
tive means to pursue legitimate political
aims— some of them will turn to violent
alternatives. And some of them will in-
evitably be seduced by the false
promises of Soviet/Cuban rhetoric.

We believe that Grenada demon-
strates just how intrusive and single-
minded communist-bloc "assistance"
is — and how very long on guns and how
short on butter. We believe the Soviet
Ambassador was articulating a simple
and devastating truth when he told
Prime Minister Bishop that the Soviet
Union gives away guns but never fer-
tilizer. And we have learned that the
guns may ultimately be turned on those
who originally sought them. But some
others may not learn. They may not
have the facts. Or they may ignore
them. Or they may interpret them dif-
ferently. If so, they will repeat the
mistakes of Maurice Bishop.

Now is the time for us — the officials
and private citizens of the democratic
countries— to tackle this problem at its
root. The CBI is capturing the imagina-
tion and energy of entrepreneurs and
people in business. But what about the
youth? They are the ones who will shape
the future. We must prove to them that
an unjust status quo is not good enough
for us, either.

Cuban propaganda is already attack-
ing the CBI, saying that it is only an ex-
cuse to obtain lower cost labor and in-
crease exploitation. That propaganda
can be proved wrong. It can be proved
wrong with statistics and sound
economic theory. But above all, it must
be proved wrong politically. The answer
is to combine the investments made
under the CBI with investments in
people.

This is not hollow rhetoric. It is cold,
hard reality. Direct investment in
people— in future leaders, in education
and training, in international exchanges

to foster political skills — is a critical
area. We all know that, but our adver-
saries are doing something about it.

Let me cite something I find shock-
ing. U.S. Government scholarships for
Caribbean youths have been slowly but
steadily reduced through failure to keep
up with inflation. Yet between 1972 and
1982 Soviet scholarships for a handful of
Central American and Caribbean coun-
tries rose over 500%— to nearly 4,000.
Even more revealing is the urgency and
persistence with which Caribbean
leaders — from governments, political
parties, universities, and the private sec-
tor — have brought this situation to our
attention. They argue that democracy,
like any other process, can be the sub-
ject of education, promotion, and
vigorous defense.

We have begun to respond. Presi-
dent Reagan provided a global
framework for this concept in his ad-
dress to the British Parliament on
June 8, 1982, when he announced the in-
tention of the United States to make a
major effort to help ". . . foster the in-
frastructure of democracy . . . which
allows a people to choose their own way,
to develop their own culture, to reconcile
their own differences through peaceful
means."

Last month Congress agreed to sup-
port and fund a National Endowment
for Democracy. The endowment, a
nongovernmental, nonprofit organiza-
tion, guided by the two major political
parties— the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce and the AFL-CIO— was created
to "encourage free and democratic in-
stitutions throughout the world through
private sector initiatives. ..." At the
same time, Congress increased funding
for official educational and exchange ac-
tivities.

Like the CBI itself, these develop-
ments take us beyond immediate crisis
reactions. They are the beginning of a
fundamental shift in our assistance
philosophy. A shift beyond short-term
bailouts, beyond expensive public-sector
agency-creation, to the concerted
development of men and women with
modern economic, technical, and political
skills.

Caribbean/Central American Action
itself could play a key role in catalyzing
this shift and making it work. I urge you
to help the United States to invest in

people. The U.S. Government has no
equivalent of the Soviet Union's Patrice
Lumumba University. I believe it is fit-
ting that we rely instead on private and
state colleges and universities. But it is
abundantly clear that Federal funds for
foreign student scholarships are not and
will n-ot be sufficient for them to take
adequate advantage of our great educa-
tional resources. There is an urgent
need for additional sources of funding
for this purpose — from private enter-
prise, from foundations, and from the
universities themselves.

Our ultimate goal of peace and pros
perity throughout Central America and
the Caribbean can only be achieved if
you, the private sector, instill in your
policies and promote in your activities a
vigorous, democratic, and open-minded
spirit — a spirit capable of attracting
youth to the side of democracy and free
enterprise. And that is best done
through action and training, not slogans
or unrealized good intentions.

Summation

The United States is now on the road U
sustained economic recovery; most othe
industrialized nations are not far behind
The Caribbean Basin, which is so close
and so important to the United States,
must share fully in this recovery.

The framework for progress is cleai
Our neighbors can avoid dependency,
strengthen their private sectors, and in-
crease their foreign trade. The United
States can ensure the availability of
American markets and enterprise and
cooperate to better meet common needs
Together, we can train a new generatio
of men and women with the skills to
carry on.

The key to establishing this dynami(
is freedom; freedom from outside in-
tervention; freedom from tyranny; and
freedom to create. As President Reagar
said in his September 1981 speech to thi
IMF and World Bank:

Only when the human spirit is allowed tc
invent and create, only when individuals are
given a personal stake in deciding economic
policies and benefiting from their suc-
cess — only then can societies remain
economically alive, dynamic, prosperous, pro
gressive, and free.

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First,

Seconii

That is our goal: neighbors who are
both free and independent. The CBI is i
major step forward. So is the National
Endowment for Democracy. And the
key is cooperation — cooperation in
freedom and for freedom. ■

Moftl

from tie 01
•statteir

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

— j-

Need for Rule of Law
n Central America

' iy James H. Michel

Dtllf

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lencv,

Address at a seminar at the
University of Virginia Law School in
'harlottesville on October lU, 1983.
Mr. Michel is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

let me say, first of all, how pleased I
im to be on the familiar ground of a
ichool of law, discussing legal aspects of

foreign policy situation. In part
)ecause the subject of Central America
s so extraordinarily complex, public
iiscussion has not given the role of na-
ional law the prominent attention it
leserves. I hope that this symposium
vill contribute, among other things, to a
)roader interest and a continuing pro-
luctive dialogue on the rule of law as a
)Ositive force in Central America.

would like to begin by describing the
general policy framework within which
he United States is concerned about the
idministration of justice in Central
America. And I think the most helpful
ipproach is to identify what the Ad-
nlnistration holds to be the root causes
>f the conflict and to describe how our
)olicy is designed to address them.

The nations of Central America face
)roblems that have three basic dimen-
,s.

First, there is a political
locioeconomic dimension, rooted in the
raditions of oligarchic and military rule,
ften accompanied by repression of the
general population.

Second, a massive, economic
lislocation caused by a world recession
las depressed the prices of traditional
xport commodities at a time when costs
if imported oil have multiplied and in-
erest rates have increased dramatically.

Third, Cuban and Soviet support for
xtremist forces centered in Nicaragua
,nd commited to violent revolution
hroughout Central America has exacer-
lated and sustained violent conflict.

All of these things are occurring
imultaneously. No single dimension of
he problem can be resolved in isolation
rom the others. U.S. policy, therefore,
nust attempt to deal with the situation
n a comprehensive way. The strategy
ve have designed includes mutually sup-
)orting actions in four broad areas:

Support for the strengthening of

8ulieli'

democratic institutions and respect for
human rights;

• Economic development — including
financial and technical assistance — en-
couragement of structural reforms, and
trade incentives such as the recently
enacted Caribbean Basin Initiative;

• Diplomatic support for negotia-
tions among countries for regional solu-
tions to regional issues and support for
dialogue and reconciliation within coun-
tries through democratic processes; and

• A security shield consisting of
training, materiel assistance, and deter-
rence so that efforts at reform and
development will not be frustrated and
so that antidemocratic forces will be
denied the hope of military victory as an
alternative to constructive negotiations.

Implementing such a strategy
necessarily involves difficult judgments
of balance and emphasis as we seek to
encourage reforms, strengthen defensive
capabilities, facilitate negotiations, and
help rebuild stagnant economies. Par-
ticular sensitivity to the interdependence
of these four policy areas is required.
Just as all the factors that make up the
problem are present simultaneously, so
also must all the elements of a solution
be pursued concurrently. Neglect of any
one element of our strategy necessarily
impairs progress on the other elements.

Of course, there is always room for
argument that we should be doing more
of some things and less of others. We
often feel frustrated and disappointed.
And the criticisms come from all direc-
tions. But, on balance, I believe we are
making encouraging progress. Let me
cite some examples.

Examples of Progress

Our assistance is helping Costa Rica
weather its economic difficulties without
damage to its longstanding democratic
traditions. Our support is also making it
possible for established institutions in
Costa Rica — the Center for Elections,
the national university's law school, the
Supreme Court's Judicial Training
School — to help build democracy in
neighboring countries through programs
of regional cooperation.

The Constituent Assembly elected by
the people of El Salvador in March 1982
has begun to function as a legislative
body, making tough political decisions
through debate and compromise, and in

lanuary 1984

light of constituent interests. It has ex-
tended the land reform program which
otherwise would have expired in March
1983. It enacted an amnesty in May
resulting in the release of about 550
political prisoners and the surrender of
about 550 guerrillas and guerrilla sup-
porters. It is completing action on a new
constitution under which elections will
be held early next year.

Honduras, the poorest country in
Central America, installed an elected
civilian government in January 1982.
That government has been a leader in
the efforts within Central America to
find a political settlement for the ten-
sions in the region.

Guatemala, still under military rule
has ended its state of siege, abolished
secret courts, authorized political party
activity, and announced elections for
July 1984.

On the military front, the Sal-
vadoran Armed Forces are showing in-
creased effectiveness, and U.S. training
has contributed to greater profes-
sionalism and improved understanding
of the military's relationship to the
civilian population. A national campaign
plan begun in June has restored substan-
tial farming areas to government con-
trol. People are returning to their
homes, and social services destroyed by
the guerrillas are being restored.

Honduras has been reassured by the
participation of U.S. forces in joint exer-
cises, and Nicaraguan incursions have
diminished.

Economic Concerns

Things are not yet, however, looking
better from an economic standpoint.
Economies in the area remain stagnant;
unemployment remains high; savings
and investments are low. Much of our
aid necessarily goes to provide foreign
exchange, lacking because of reduced ex-
port earnings.

But we can take pride in what we
are doing. We provided the nations of
Central America more than $600 million
in economic assistance in the last fiscal
year. This aid has arrested economic
deterioration and eased human suffer-
ing.

Still, the dramatic improvement we
seek will depend on the evolution of
market-oriented, diversified commercial
activity, based on free trade and invest-
ment. This is a long-range endeavor, one
essential to the building of just and
democratic societies. The recently
enacted Caribbean Basin Economic

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Recovery Act and the National Bipar-
tisan Commission on Central America
are just a beginning.

The combination of our support for
political and economic reforms and
militant' strength to protect them has
contributed to major advances in
negotiating efforts.

Negotiating Efforts

In July, the Nicaraguan Government, for
the first time, expressed its willingness
to engage in negotiations for a regional
solution and advanced its own peace pro-
posal.

Also in July, outlines were put for-
ward by the other Central American
countries (Costa Rica, Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala) and by the
Contadora Four (Mexico, Venezuela,
Panama, and Colombia).

Then in early September, the nine
Foreign Ministers met and agreed on a
21-point document of objectives that can
provide the basis for a comprehensive
agreement.

Translating these objectives into
specific, verifiable treaty obligations will
be a difficult and uncertain process. But
agreement on a common set of objec-
tives is a necessary and important
development.

And so, for the moment at least and
on balance, things are looking better in
Central America. But lasting security,
social justice, economic progress, and
democratic political development will
come only through a sustained effort by
the people of Central America. And they
will continue to need our help over the
long road to peace and stability.

Administration of Justice

As we seek to consolidate the gains
our policy has helped bring about and to
make further progress in all areas possi-
ble, national law as a force for stability
and more just societies becomes ail the
more evident. No other aspect of
building a just and democratic society,
protecting individual rights, and en-
couraging commercial activity is more
important than the building of fair and
effective judicial machinery for the
resolution of disputes and the maintance
of public order under the rule of law.

The state of the administration of
justice in Central America today reflects
the varying levels of political and
economic development in the region. The
judicial systems of all Hispanic Central

American countries suffer from inade-
quate resources and, with the exception
of Costa Rica, a lack of judicial
autonomy.

An effective and honest judicial
system is interactive with a strong
democratic political and social structure.
Costa Rica, which has evolved a system
of broad political participation and
relative equity in the distribution of
wealth, also enjoys Central America's
most respected and efficient judicial
system and is the exception to many of
the generalizations which can otherwise
be made about Central American justice.
By contrast, in Guatemala and El
Salvador, where political and economic

power traditionally have been vested in
a conservative elite, judicial authority
has been undermined.

A core deficiency in the administra-
tion of justice in Central America is the
lack of judicial independence. Judicial
appointments are often of brief tenure
and made on a political basis. According-
ly, the courts do not command popular
respect, and the judicial career is
generally not prestigious. There are few
programs for training of judges and
court personnel. The judiciary is poorly
paid, and the entire legal system is
severely underfinanced.

Although these problems exist in
varying degrees in all areas of judicial

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Theatt

President Opposes El Salvador
Certification Legislation

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
NOV. 30, 19831

The President today withheld approval
of H.R. 4042, an enrolled bill that would
require two Presidential certifications
regarding El Salvador in 1984 or until
the enactment of new legislation impos-
ing conditions on U.S. military
assistance for that country.

This Administration is firmly com-
mitted to the protection of human
rights, economic and political reforms,
the holding of elections, and progress in
prosecuting the cases of murdered
American citizens in El Salvador.
However, the process of certification as
called for in H.R. 4042 would not serve
to support these endeavors.

His decision to oppose this certifica-
tion legislation reflects the Administra-
tion's policy that such requirements
distort our efforts to improve human
rights, democracy, and recovery in El
Salvador. The key certification provi-
sions of the present bill are already ad-
dressed in this year's continuing resolu-
tion which requires a separate certifica-
tion on progress in the area of land
reform and withholds 30% of military
assistance funds until the Government of
El Salvador has completed the investiga-
tion and trial in the churchwomen's case.

At the same time, the President
wishes to emphasize that the Ad-
ministration remains fully committed to
the support of democracy, reform, and
human rights in El Salvador. Those very
concerns are a central component of our
policy. They were clearly articulated by
our Ambassador Tom Pickering as

recently as last Friday. The withholding
of approval from H.R. 4042 in no way
reflects a lessening of our interests in
these critical areas. The President has
also instructed the Department of State
to continue to provide the Congress wit
periodic public reports — the next on
January 16, 1984 — on the political,
economic, and military situation in El
Salvador.

Working with the leadership of the
Government of El Salvador, we will
reconfirm our joint resolve to take
whatever action is necessary to help the
Government of El Salvador to end the
reprehensible activities of the violent
right as well as the violent left. The
United States will also work to preserve
and expand the progress that has been
achieved in the area of land reform and
to maintain the momentum toward
holding open and democratic elections
next year in accordance with the provi-
sion of the new constitution being
prepared in El Salvador's Constituent
Assembly.

There must exist a genuine
awareness, both in the United States as
well as in El Salvador, that our coun-
tries' strong and productive relationship
can only be based on shared values in
justice and democracy and on concerted
and sustained efforts to achieve these
goals. We know that President Alvaro
Magana of El Salvador shares these
views, and we will remain in touch on
developing enhanced efforts that will
strengthen human rights ties.

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■Made by the President's principal deput
press secretary Larry Speakes (text from
White House press release). ■

*rs'offic
■arid

Department of State Bulleti

;i'(!f!lH't)H17!TTT]ifi,';;t!!«HfiHfHinif)fi!»tItIIimuil:liHi«»il

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

■idffl

arefej

ttas

kepron-

dministration, they are most acute in
he criminal justice system, where the
tate has the strongest interest in deci-
ions and has, therefore, been most like-
r to override — or completely bypass —
idicial authority. Central America's
lany bright, energetic lawyers are thus
ot attracted to criminal law as either
rosecutors or defenders. Victims and
iw enforcement officials are frequently
nable to find competent counsel or effi-
lent, unbiased courtrooms and too often
jsort to extrajudicial remedies. Thus,
16 rise of terrorism in Central America,
hile presenting an additional strain to
16 legal system, is also, in part, at-
ibutable to that system's ineffec-
veness.

The attitude of the judiciary itself
as contributed to this negative percep-
on. Although qualifications for joining
le bar or judicial appointment are
linimal, lawyers and jurists are better
lucated and more aware of the latent
Dwer of the judicial system than is the
sneral public. A unified, politically ac-
ve bar could thus be a force for
jlitical change. However, associations
■ attorneys in Central America have
aditionally been social clubs which
either control their own profession nor
■assure the other branches of govern-
lent for financial resources or political
spect.

As political authoritarianism and in-
rnal economic inequities and exploita-
on are challenged, however, Central
mericans are also increasingly aware
lat impartial justice is fundamental to
aintaining the institutions and proc-
ses of democracy. Private groups and
jvernments throughout the region are
ji aking a variety of efforts to
rengthen and modernize their legal
'Stems, from revising outdated codes to
iproving investigative techniques to
itablishing internal mechanisms to
iview the state of the legal system and
•omote improvements.

Progress in addressing systemic
eaknesses demands local initiatives, in
jht of local circumstances, legal tradi-
3ns, and culture. But there is room for
,r greater regional cooperative efforts
lan now exist and for appropriate U.S.
ipport for local and complementary
igional projects. The United States has
;en in contact with a number of coun-
ies to express interest and a will-
gness to consider proposals to assist
lem in legal reform efforts.

The potential participants are both
)vernments — justice ministries, pros-
jutors' offices, and the court
'Stem — and private organizations — bar
sociations and law faculties. The

jepiti ^'

•stfroiii

gylletiunuary 1984

primary concerns are in the area of
criminal law and procedure, but legal
reform efforts in the region are also ap-
propriate for code modernization in
other areas of law, increasing judicial in-
dependence, court management, profes-
sional ethics, and the role of the bar and
strengthening the legal process for
agrarian reform.

In our effort to provide aid, we must
recognize the differences between our
system based on common law and theirs
based on civil law and accept that we
cannot export American models of law
and procedure. It is also important to
bear in mind that any country would be
understandably cautious about foreign
involvement in matters affecting its
legal system and sovereign institutions.
Therefore, a sensitive approach is need-
ed in addressing legal reform issues,
cautiously avoiding the errors of past at-
tempts at one-sided legal reform.

Assistance, then, cannot ordinarily
be given in the form of direct guidance,
but rather should be provided through
the development of truly cooperative
programs aimed at helping the Central
Americans to help themselves. We feel
that this will best be accomplished by a
regional approach working through ex-
isting national and regional institutions
and making maximum use of Latin
Americans who have expertise in the
key areas to be addressed.

In pursuit of this objective, a U.S.
interagency team traveled to El
Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica in
April. Their purpose was to obtain
greater insights into the problems af-
fecting the administration of justice and
identify possible assistance projects.

U.S. Assistance

In Washington, an interagency working
group on the administration of justice
was constituted to follow up on our
policy to assist reform, building on the
information gathered by the team. The
group has inaugurated a number of ac-
tivities and initiatives, concentrating
primarily at this time on the three coun-
tries visited in April.

We have contracted with the UN
Regional Institute for the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
(ILANUD) to facilitate the development
of specific programs in areas such as the
acquisition and dissemination of legal
materials, courts resources, case and
docket management systems to expedite
the orderly disposition of cases, the role
and services of the bar, and enhance-
ment of legal education. Experts
employed by ILANUD will work with
legal reform commissions and other

bodies that have been established, draw-
ing from all branches of government,
the private bar, and the academic
community. The specific projects,
therefore, will be "home grown," re-
sponding to self-identified needs but will
also benefit from the insights and ex-
perience of the Latin American experts
in judicial administration retained by
ILANUD.

We have encouraged the organizing
of regional conferences to address
various aspects of the legal system and
have facilitated the attendance at inter-
national conferences by Central
American lawyers. Examples include a
conference to be held next month by the
Bar Association of Costa Rica on the
role of the organized bar in the ad-
ministration of justice and the Canadian
Bar Association's June conference on
judicial independence. Other initia-
tives—including possible Organization of
American States (OAS) and Inter-
American Bar Association conferences
relating to legal reform are in the plan-
ning stages.

We are also working on a number of
educational projects. These include a
regional program of scholarships for
graduate study at the University of
Costa Rica Law School; a regional
judicial training center; international
visitor grants for study, consultation,
and observation in the United States;
and where feasible, positions in U.S.
Government-conducted training pro-
grams.

In all of these endeavors, we are
seeking to respond to locally identified
needs and to stimulate the existing
desire for improvement in the ad-
ministration of justice that we have en-
countered throughout the region.
Ultimately, the fairness, efficiency, and
competence of the legal systems on Cen-
tral America will be determined by Cen-
tral Americans.

We can seek to encourage the in-
volvement of others, such as the OAS,
the Inter-American Bar Association, and
other professional groups in the United
States and elsewhere in the hemisphere.
We should also consider how cooperative
efforts between universities and other
centers of learning can be engaged. It is
clear that there will be no short-term
solutions. It is equally clear that these
efforts must be undertaken to achieve
and safeguard for the long term the
evolution of democracy in Central
America.

Let me sum up by reiterating that
we have important interests in Central
America, and while we have neglected
the region for too long, we still have an
opportunity to see the peaceful evolution
there of democratic states that are

K Jl »l I I

TREATIES

friendly to the United States and that
provide justice and opportunity for their
people. Success will require hard work
over a long time, with attention to all
dimensions of a complex situation. The
development of national law and the
building of legal institutions that assure
the fair and effective administration of
justice are essential aspects of this effort
that deserve attention and support. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation.
Done at Chicago Dec. 7. 1944. Entered into
force Apr. 4, 1947. HAS 1591.

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos
Aires Sept. 24, 1968. Entered in force
Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Adherence deposited: St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, Nov. 15, 1983.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft (hijacking). Done at The
Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force
Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Nov. 8, 1983.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation
(sabotage). Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971.
Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Nov. 8, 1983.

Memorandum of understanding concerning
scheduled transatlantic passenger air fares,
with annexes. Done at Paris Dec. 17, 1982.
Entered into force Feb. 1, 1983.
Signatures: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden,
Oct. 13, 1983.

Child Abduction

Convention on the civil aspects of interna-
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1980.'

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Oct. 11,
1983.2

Commodities — Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.'
Ratification deposited: Zaire, Oct. 27, 1983.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in en-
dangered species of wild fauna and flora,
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
1973. Entered into force July 1, 1973. TIAS
8249.

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3,
1973, on international trade in endangered

spieces of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249).
Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.'
Acceptances deposited: Belgium, Oct. 3,
1983.

Customs

International convention on the simplification
and harmonization of customs procedures,
with annexes. Signed at Kyoto May 18, 1973.
Entered into force Sept. 25, 1974.
Accession deposited: U.S., Oct. 28, 19833
Enters into force for the U.S.: Jan. 28, 1984.

Fisheries

Convention for the conservation of salmon in

the North Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjavik

Mar. 2, 1982.

Ratifications deposited: Canada, Sept. 29,

1983; Denmark, Jan. 31, 1983;^ Norway,

May 20,1983.

Entered into force: Oct. 1, 1983.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the International
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977.

Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic,
Mozambique, Nov. 10, 1983.
Enters into force: Nov. 10, 1984.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended on the International
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606, 10374,). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.

Acceptances deposited: Algeria, Oct. 28,
1983; Brazil, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Gabon, Mozambique, Yemen, (Sanaa).
Nov. 10, 1983; Cuba, Nov. 3, 1983; Ghana,
Nov. 14, 1983; Singapore, Nov. 1, 1983;
Uruguay, Oct. 13, 1983.

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection

Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at Vien-
na Oct. 26, 1979.1
Ratification deposited: Poland, Oct. 5, 1983^

Red Cross

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of international armed con-
flicts (protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at
Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978.5

Accessions deposited: China, Sept. 14, 1983;
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Apr. 8, 1983.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of non-international armed
conflicts (protocol II). Adopted at Geneva
June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7,
1978.6

Accessions deposited: China, Sept. 14, 1983;
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Apr. 8, 1983

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and

slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926.

Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.Sif**^

Mar. 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Accession deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 11,

1983. Iteai

Protocol amending the slavery convention of mf^,

Sept. 25, 1926, and annex. Done at New

York Dec. 7, 1953. Entered into force Dec. '

1953 for the protocol; July 7, 1955, for anne

to protocol. TIAS 3532.

Accession deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 11,

1983.

Supplementary convention on the abolition c W

slavery, the slave trade, and institutions anc
practices similar to slavery'. Done at Geneva
Sept 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30,
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 11,
1983.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention

with annexes and protocols. Done at Malagj

Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into

force Jan. 1, 1975.; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 197

TIAS 8572.

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Aug. 29,

1983.

Radio regulations, with appendices and fina
protocol. Done at (jeneva Dec. 6, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982, except for
(1) arts. 25 and 66 and appendix 43 which
entered into force Jan. 1, 1981, and (2) cer-
tain provisions concerning aeronautical
mobile service which entered into force
Feb. 1, 1983.
Ratification deposited: U.S., Oct. 27, 1983.^

Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Concluded at Geneva Oct. 30, 1974. Enterei
into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.
Contracting party status accorded: Belize,

Oct. 7, 1983; Maldives, Apr. 19, 1983; Zam-
bia, Feb. 10, 1982.

De facto application: Antigua & Barbuda,
Nov. 1, 1981; St. Christopher & Nevis,
Sept. 19, 1983.

Agreement on technical barriers to trade.
Done at Geneva Apr, 12, 1979. Entered intu
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Oct. 14, 1983

Agreement on interpretation and applicatio
of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the Gener
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidies
and countervailing duties). Done at Geneva
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1980. TIAS 9619.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Oct. 14, 1983

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Oct. 17, 1983

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Department of State Bullet!

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TREATIES

INIDO

onstitution of the United Nations Industrial
development Organization, with annexes.
'"Aeli dopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.'

atifications deposited: Bhutan, Oct. 25,

■"' "' 383; Senegal, Oct. 24, 1983; Yemen (Sanaa)
ct. 20, 1983.

■mention I

fee Dec,

ifor

.\«v.ll,

tiitims
atGeievi

AW,

lieat

a )83 protocol for the further extension of the
heat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).
one at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered
to force July 1, 1983.
ccession deposited: Turkey, Nov. 29, 1983.

tonventioi

lpr,;,I9i
i, .lag, 29,

sandfiiii

gentina

greement extending agreement of Sept. 22,
(77, as amended (TIAS 8978, 10440),
lating to air transport services. Effected by
cchange of notes at Buenos Aires Sept. 9
id Oct. 13, 1983. Entered into force
:t. 13, 1983.

Be^se.

baling

mendments to the schedule to the interna-
onal convention for the regulation of whal-
g, 1946, (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Brighton
ily 18-23, 1983.
ntered into force: Nov. 3, 1983.

[LATERAL

ustralia

snvention for the avoidance of double taxa-
)n and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
spect to taxes on income. Signed at Sydney
ug. 6, 1982.
itifications exchanged: Oct. 31, 1983.

ntered into force: Oct, 31, 1983.

greement extending the agreement of
ct. 16, 1968 (TIAS 6589) relating to scien-
ce and technical cooperation. Effected by
[change of notes at Canberra Oct. 6 and
ov. 14, 1983. Entered into force Nov. 14,
•83; effective Oct. 16, 1983.

jZanv angladesh

greement amending the agreement of
ar, 8, 1982, for the sale of agricultural com-
odities (TIAS 10483). Effected by exchange
letters at Washington Oct. 25, 1983.
ntered into force Oct. 25, 1983.

itneii inti elize

greements amending agreement of Apr. 6,
•83, as amended, for control of illicit pro-
iction and traffic of drugs. Signed at Belize
!pt. 15 and 28, 1983. Entered into force
pt. 15 and 28, 1983. TIAS 10696.

razil

greement amending and extending the
^eement of Nov. 17, 1977, relating to equal
:cess to ocean carriage of government-
Introlled cargoes (TIAS 8981). Effected by
fjt,D«« :change of letters at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26,
itoforce p83. Entered into force Oct. 26, 1983.

anada

greement amending the agreement of

ov. 22, 1978, on Great Lakes water quality

anuary 1984

(TIAS 9257), with supplement to Annex 3.
Signed at Halifax Oct. 16, 1983. Entered into
force Oct. 16, 1983.

Memorandum of understanding on the par-
ticipation of Canada in the ocean drilling pro-
gram. Signed at Washington and Ottawa
Oct. 18 and 19, 1983. Entered into force
Oct. 19, 1983.

Cook Islands

Treaty on friendship and delimitation of the
maritime boundary between the United
States of America and the Cook Islands,
Signed at Rarotonga June 11, 1980. Entered
into force Sept. 8, 1983.
Proclaimed by the President: Oct. 31, 1983.

Denmark

Agreement concerning the inclusion of Den-
mark, Norway, and Sweden in the memoran-
dum of understanding between the United
States and members of the European Civil
Aviation Conference of Dec. 17, 1982, with
attachments. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington Aug. 2, 1983.
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983.

Agreement amending the air transport serv-
ices agreement of Dec. 16, 1944, as amended
(EAS 430, TIAS 3014, 4071, 6021). Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 2,
1983.
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983.

France

Memorandum of understanding covering
cooperation in the field of geological sciences.
Signed at Reston and Paris Sept. 19 and
Oct. 3, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 3,
1983.

Iceland

Agreement for the loan of petroleum spill
clean-up equipment. Signed at Reykjavik
July 14, 1983, Entered into force July 14,
1983.

Italy

Agreement concerning taxation of income of
some U.S. Navy employees in Italy. Effected
by exchange of notes at Rome July 24, 1982.
Entered into force July 24, 1982; effective
January 1, 1982.

Memorandum of understanding concerning
the furnishing of balloon launching and
associated services. Signed at Washington
and Rome Sept, 2 and 30, 1983. Entered into
force Sept. 30, 1983.

Japan

Memorandum of agreement for cooperation
in breeder reactor projects. Signed at Tokyo
Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30,
1983.

Kiribati

Treaty of friendship, with agreed minute.
Signed at Tarawa Sept. 20, 1979. Entered in-
to force Sept. 23, 1983.
Proclaimed by the President: Nov. 17, 1983.

Liberia

Agreement concerning provision of training
related to defense articles under the United
States International Military Education and
Training (IMET) Program. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Monrovia Feb, 23 and
Sept. 7, 1983, Entered into force Sept. 7,
1983.

New Zealand

Treaty on the delimitation of the maritime
boundary between Tokelau and the United
States of America. Signed at Atafu Dec. 2,
1980. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1983.
Proclaimed by the President: Oct. 31, 1983.

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with protocol.
Signed at Wellington July 23, 1982.
Ratifications exchanged: Nov. 2, 1983.
Entered into force: Nov. 2, 1983.

Norway

Agreement amending the air transport serv-
ices agreement of Oct. 6, 1945, as amended
(EAS 482, TIAS 3015, 4072, 6025). Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 2,
1983.
Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983.

Philippines

Agreement amending the memorandum of
consultation of the agreement concerning air
transport services of Sept. 16, 1982 (TIAS
10443). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into
force Sept. 30, 1983.

St. Lucia

General agreement for economic, technical,
and related assistance. Signed at Castries
Oct. 20, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 20,
1983.

St. Vincent & the Grenadines

General agreement for economic, technical,
and related assistance. Signed at Kingstown
Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30,
1983.

Sweden

Agreement amending the air transport serv-
ices agreement of Dec. 16, 1944, as amended
(EAS 431, TIAS 3013, 4073, 6026). Effected

CHRONOLOGY

by exchange of notes at Washington August

2 1983

Entered into force: Oct. 14, 1983

Turkey

Agreement amending the agreement of
Apr. 22, 1983, (TIAS 10725) for economic
and financial support. Signed at Ankara Sept.
30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1983.

Tuvalu

Treaty of friendship. Signed at Funafuti,

Feb. 7, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 23,

1983.

Proclaimed by the President: Nov. 21, 1983.

'Not in force.

^With designation.

'With reservation(s).

•In respect of the Farol Islands.

'^Not in force for the U.S.

•^With declaration(s). ■

November 1983

November 1

House and Senate Conference Committees
eliminate an amendment to a State Depart-
ment appropriations bill that would have cut
the U.S. contribution to the UN nearly $500
million.

Three hundred U.S. Marines land in Car-
riacou, a 13-square-mile island 20 miles north
of Grenada, looking for Cubans. They
reportedly detain 17 men believed to be
members of the Grenadian People's Revolu-
tionary Army and uncover a cache of
weapons and ammunition. U.S. officials
report the Marines encountered no opposition
and no shots were fired.

By a vote of 403 to 23, U.S. House of
Representatives overwhelmingly approves
legislation that would apply the War Powers
Act to the fighting in Grenada— 256
Democrat; 147 Republican. On Oct. 28, the
Senate approved an identical bill, but it was
added as a rider to legislation raising the
national debt ceiling.

U.S. receives intelligence reports of
"death threats" emanating from Cuba against
Americans in Latin America. State Depart-
ment officials say that the U.S. is viewing the
subject with the "gravest concern" and take
the reports "very seriously."

November 2

By a vote of 1 08 to 9 with 27 abstentions,
UN General Assembly adopts a resolution
"deeply deploring" the "armed intervention in
Grenada" calling it "a flagrant violation of in-
ternational law." U.S., Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador, Israel,
Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines vote against. The resolution,
sponsored by Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, is
virtually identical to one vetoed by the U.S.
in the Security Council on Oct. 28.

Defense Department officials announce
that "hostilities have ceased" in Grenada, and
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and the

return of the approximately 600 Cuban
prisoners would begin "within a few days."
State Department officials announce that
Grenadian Gov. Gen. Sir Paul Scoon orders
the closing of the Cuban Embassy and the
"prompt departure" of all personnel. They
add that the 57 Cuban wounded along with 8
women, 3 children, and the dead are to be
"transported" from Grenada by a J.S. C-130
aircraft leased by the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, on the morning of
Nov. 2.

Reagan Administration announces that
"in hope of inducing the Polish Government
to begin pursuing a path of national recon-
ciliation and restore free trade unions," the
U.S. and its allies are negotiating a resched-
uling of Poland's 1981 debt. The following
limited steps are being taken.

• The U.S. is not extending Poland new
credits nor supporting its entry into the In-
ternational Monetary Fund.

• As a bilateral step, the U.S. is permit-
ting preliminary discussions between the
Polish Government and U.S. fishing com-
panies on purchase of fish by Warsaw, but
the current ban on actual allocation of fish re-
mains in force "contingent on" Warsaw's
progress in restoring civil rights. Meanwhile,
the Dec. 1981 sanctions remain in force.

November 3

By voice vote, U.S. Senate approves con-
tinued aid for covert operations in Nicaragua.
The approval, contingent upon notification to
the intelligence committee of the goals and
risks of specific covert projects, would pro-
vide only $19 million of the $50 niilhon that
the Administration sought.

In a referendum vote, white South
Africans approve a program which will offer
brown minorities — but not the black ma-
jority — a voice in national life alongside
whites. Results of the vote show 66% ap-
prove proposals for a new constitution. State
Department officials say that the referendum
"is a reflection of a growing consensus within
that electorate of the need to move forward
toward broader participation by all South
Africans in the country's political process."
They add that the U.S. hopes that the South
African Government "will use its mandate to
address the problem of the political rights of
South Africa's black majority for the sake of
the people of South Africa and southern
Africa, and its relations with the rest of the
world, including the U.S."

Responding to the UN General Assem-
bly's vote on Grenada, White House officials
say that the vote "has more to say about the
state of the United Nations today than it
does about recent developments in Grenada."
White House Deputy Spokesman Larry
Speakes adds that the Reagan Administration
finds it "sad that the LIN sees fit to 'deplore'
actions taken by the United States and the
OECS for humanitarian reasons, to save in-
nocent lives, and protect human rights, in full
accord with the principles of the U.N.
Charter."

President Reagan names Donald H.
Rumsfeld his personal representative in the
Middle East. Rumsfeld succeeds Robert
McFarlane.

isffltl

.Wet

November 4

President Reagan sends a notice to the
Federal Register stating that "because our
relations with Iran have not yet been nor-
malized and the process of implementing the |$oie*'
January 19, 1981 agreements with Iran is
still underway," the national emergency witl
respect to Iran is to continue in effect beyor
the November 14, 1983 expiration date.

A truck loaded with explosives crashes
through the entrance of an Israeli head- 1 1 :-3
quarters compound in Tyre, Lebanon, killing r^j.;
at least 39 people and injuring 32. Several ffiit.S.
hours later, Israeli jets strike at Palestinian
targets along the Beirut-Damascus Highwaj
State Department officials say that the U.S.
is "revolted" by the tragic incident adding
that "those who believe that they can work
their will through terrorists actions are sadl
mistaken. Only negotiation can pave the wa
for the withdrawal of foreign forces and a
return to a peaceful and independent
Lebanon." Responsibility for the bombing
was claimed by the Islamic Holy War, the
same pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem group that
claimed responsibility for the Oct. 23 bomb-
ings on the U.S. Marines and French bases
Beirut.

State Department officials announce th:
"at the request of and in accordance with ir
structions of the Gov. Gen. of Grenada, 126
people— 49 Soviets, 6 East Germans, 15
Koreans, 3 Bulgarians, and 53 Cubans— wh
had been in the Soviet Embassy compound
Grenada were evacuated by U.S. military a
craft to Merida, Yucatan, Mexico at 1:21 a.
EST, and arrived in Mexico 5 hours later. .
personnel in the Libyan People's Bureau
were evacuated to Bridgetown, Barbados, c
Nov. 3.

Responding to an announcement made
the Burmese Government that North Korea Ui'^n
terrorists were responsible for the Oct. 9
bombing in Burma, State Department of-
ficials reiterate U.S. sympathy and support fcajujj
adding that the U.S. will consult with the
Korean Government and other government
to "consider an appropriate international
response to North Korea's uncivilized, outlf
attack."

Fourteen-member bipartisan factfindinj
mission from the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives leaves Washington, D.C., for Grena
The delegation, led by Thomas Foley
(D.-Wa.), includes House minority leader
Robert Michel and members of the Foreign ^jj^/j .
Affairs, Armed Ser\'ices, Intelligence, and "
other House committees. Foley says the pu
pose of the trip is to "bring into closer focu Sk,|„jj
the information about the American intervc
tion" in Grenada.

Lebanese factional leaders meeting in
Geneva adjourn the reconciliation conferen^
until Nov. 14 to allow President Amin
Gemayel time for an international tour aim
at securing the withdrawal of the remainin
Israeli forces from Lebanon. He will visit t
U.S., France, Italy, the U.K., and a numbe
of Arab countries.

State Department publicly releases
documents found in Grenada by American
forces. The papers include minutes of the
central committee at which former Prime
Minister Bishop was stripped of his power

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CHRONOLOGY

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and five secret treaties covering military aid
from the Soviet Union, North Korea, and
Cuba.

November 6

U.S. officials in St. Georges say more than
100 bodies had been found in a training camp
in Chevigy, which is on the southern tip of
Grenada. The official says that one of the
bodies was "presumed" to be that of former
Prime Minister Bishop. Confirming the
report, Department Spokesman John Hughes
says a U.S. military graves registration team
is investigating. He adds that Deputy Prime
Minister Bernard Coard and Gen. Austin
have been turned over to the Grenadians and
are now in the Richmond Hill prison.

lesadl; (

;ken;

November 7

Chief U.S. spokesman on Grenada denies
reports that more than 100 bodies had been
discovered on the island. State Department
spokesman John Hughes says that "there was
some confusion in the communications" and
there is no evidence to confirm the rumors

lnff.t ihat a mass grave site exists."

Results of the Nov. 6 elections in Turkey
ihow the Centrist Motherland Party led by
'ormer Deputy Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal
von 45% of the vote in the first elections in
hat country since the military takeover 3
'ears ago. The left-of-center Populist Party
."eceives 30% and the Nationalist Democracy
"arty, backed by the military, receives 24%.
Senate approves MX missile in the final

lilii tongressional vote needed before the new
J nuclear weapon enters production.

1 November 8
J.S. soldiers on Grenada discover a shallow
l^ave containing four burned bodies, one of
ivhich was reportedly that of the slain former
'rime Minister.
ffllof-
Ripsdttjklovember 8-14

'resident Reagan makes official visits to
'apan and the Republic of Korea to discuss
rade and security issues with Japanese
i.oitlj 'rime Minister Nakasone and Korean Presi-
lent Chun. Upon departure, the President
ays the trip "will spotlight the great impor-
ance we place on our ties with Northeast
J isia and the Pacific Basin." He adds that he
vould be reaffirming America's commitment
remain a reliable partner for peace and
foteijn tability" in the face of a Soviet build-up in
and ^sia.

jri^rfW November 9

itvi Jefense Department officials report that the
leath toll in the Oct. 23 Beirut bombing has
isen to 237. Officials add that there is no in-
'oiifete* onnation on how many servicemen are still
isted as missing in action but that the death
.00 oil could still rise.

t lovember 10

it( 'he Reagan Administration applauds the an-
louncement by Grenadian Gov. Gen Scoon of
new interim Government on Grenada. "We
onsider it a step in the direction of restora-
ion of the full authority of the Grenadian
pople," officials say.

leeW?'"

nerPn*

In view of the Burmese determination of
North Korean responsibility for the Oct. 9
assassination in Rangoon, State Department
announces suspension of implementation of
recently revised guidelines on contacts
between U.S. diplomats and North Korean
officials.

In Beirut, Syrian antiaircraft batteries
open fire on four U.S. F-14 fighter jets as
they flew a reconnaissance mission over
Syrian military positions. Defense Depart-
ment officials confirm that a single Navy
F-14 Tomcat encountered "what appeared to
be antiaircraft fire" on a routine flight but
returned safely to its carrier base on the
Dunght D. Eisenhower without having been
hit.

November 14

A second packet of secret Grenadian
documents released by the State Department
provides further information on conditions on
Grenada preceding the assassination of the
former Prime Minister. Included are minutes
of meetings of the political bureau and cen-
tral committee of the New Jewel Movement
which discuss problems facing the regime and
the party. The documents also suggest the
Movement was consciously developing Cuban
and Soviet structure and ideology.

American cruise missiles arrive at the
Greenham Common Airbase in England, the
first of NATO's new generation of medium-
range missiles to be deployed in Western
Europe.

Ambassador James Goodby, U.S.
Representative to the Helsinki Preparatory
Meeting for the European Security Con-
ference (CDE) announces agreement has been
reached, and the preparatory meeting ad-
journed on Nov. 11. State Department of-
ficials say that the U.S. is "gratified that,
through agreement on procedural questions
and an agenda, this important first step has
been taken toward convening of the CDE,
which will begin in Stockholm on January 17,
1984. This conference will form an important
part of the process of increasing security and
cooperation in Europe, which began in 1975
with the Helsinki Final Act and which con-
tinued at the Madrid CSCE review meeting,
which concluded in September."

November 15

Donald H. Rumsfeld, the President's personal
representative in the Middle East, arrives in
Cairo for talks with Egyptian President
Mubarak and Butros Ghali, Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs. Meetings were held on
Nov. 16.

Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash,
declares the northern part of Cyprus an in-
dependent republic proclaiming it the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey gives
the newly proclaimed republic formal recogni-
tion; the move is condemned by Greek
Cypriot Prime Minister Papandreou. Ad-
ministration officials in condemning the
move, say that it comes as a "complete sur-
prise" and the U.S. is "dismayed" and con-
siders it "unhelpful to the process of finding a
settlement to the Cyprus problem." The U.S.
urges the Turkish Government to use its in-
fluence "to bring about a reversal of their ac-

tions." Officials also say that the U.S. "will
not recognize the new polity" and urge all
other countries not to recognize it.

Capt. George Tsantes, head of the naval
section of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance
Group, Greece, and his Greek chauffeur,
Nicholas Veloutsos, are killed by two uniden-
tified gunmen in Athens. An anonymous
caller to the left-wing daily Ekftherotypia
says the "November 17" terrorist group — a
far-left organization — was responsible, the
same group that claimed responsibility for
the killing of the CIA station chief Richard
Welch 8 years ago. President Reagan says he
"deeply regrets" the "act of terrorism" and
the Embassy is "conducting a thorough
review of security precautions" in the wake
of the shooting. Prime Minister Papandreau
expresses deep regret and assures the U.S.
Ambassador that everything possible is being
done to find and punish the culprits.

November 16

U.S. and Japan agree on a series of measures
designed to reduce barriers and enhance
high-technology trade between the two coun-
tries. The major objective of these measures,
U.S. Trade Representative William Brock
says, "is to increase opportunities for U.S.
semiconductor suppliers to participate in the
Japanese market." The joint agreement calls
for the mutual elimination of the current
4.2% tariff levied on semiconductors by the
U.S. and Japan. The new zero tariff must be
approved by the U.S. Congress and the
Japanese Diet and is expected to go into ef-
fect by April 1984.

U.S. and the Soviet Union mark 50 years
of diplomatic relations. State Department of-
ficials announce that the U.S. is "prepared to
work with the Soviets to solve the problems
that confront us," and the U.S. is dedicated
to maintaining peace.

Wliite House officials announce that U.S.
combat troops will be withdrawn from
Grenada by Dec. 23, 1983.

November 18

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 541
deploring the declaration by the Turkish
Cypriot authorities of the purported secession
of part of the Republic of Cyprus. The resolu-
tion considers the declaration "legally invalid"
and calls for its withdrawal; calls upon all
states to respect the "sovereignty, in-
dependence, territorial integrity and non-
alignment" of the Republic of Cyprus and not
to recognize any "Cypriot State other than"
the Republic of Cyprus; and calls upon all
states and the two communities to refrain
from any action which might exacerbate the
situation.

November 19-22

Sudanese President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri
makes an official working visit to
Washington, D.C., to meet with President
Reagan and other U.S. officials.

November 21

The following newly appointed ambassadors
present their credentials to President
Reagan: Peter Helemisi Mtetwa of

lanuary 1984

'^■■■'i'^'ii>'n':Hih'i]'jimf\:iiii\i\'m\m

PRESS RELEASES

Swaziland; Peter Douglas Laurie of Bar-
bados; Henry Edney Conrad Cain of Belize;
Mahamat Ali Adoum of Chad; and Leon
Maxime Rajaobelina of Madagascar.

November 23

In Geneva, Soviet Union discontinues present
round of talks with U.S. on medium-range
nuclear missiles, saying it would set no date
for resuming negotiations.

Agency for International Development
prepares long-term assistance package for
Grenada totaling $15 million for FY 1984.
The package includes $4.5 million for road
rehabilitation; $2.5 million for social services;
$2 million for agriculture; $5 million for
economic support fund grant for balance-of-
payments assistance; and $1 million to ex-
pand private sector projects.

November 24

Soviet leader Andropov announces that the
Soviet Union would deploy seaborne nuclear
missiles to counter the threat to his country
posed by deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles
in Western Europe. In addition, the Soviets
announce that they will rescind a voluntary
moratorium on the deployment of its SS-20
medium-range missiles in European areas of
the Soviet Union. President Reagan says that
"while we are dismayed, we are determined
to renew our efforts to entirely do away with
the land-based intermediate-range nuclear
missile system." State Department officials
say the Nov. 23 decision to suspend negotia-
tions is unjustified and runs counter to their
professed commitment to arms control," add-
ing that the U.S. is "prepared to continue
talks on INF," and calls on the Soviet Union
to resume negotiations.

November 27-30

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir makes
official working visit to Washington, D.C. to
meet with President Reagan and other U.S.
officials.

November 29

Speaking at a WTiite House departure
ceremony for the Israeli Prime Minister,
President Reagan says that their meetings
focused on the "agony of Lebanon and the
threats there to our common interests." They
also agree to establish a joint political-
military group to examine ways to enhance
U.S. -Israeli cooperation and whose priority
will be to focus on the threat "posed by in-
creased Soviet involvement in the Middle
East."

In two independent cases, U.S. denies
visitor visas to Thomas Borge, Nicaragua's
Interior Minister, and Roberto D'Aubuisson,
President of El Salvador's Constituent
Assembly, under section 212(a) 27 of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act which excludes
from admission to the U.S. aliens whose ac-
tivities would be contrary to the public
interest.

November 30

President Reagan withholds approval of H.R.
4042, an enrolled bill that would require two
Presidential certifications regarding El

';f,-ii;ii.iifiiriii,ii-

Salvador in 1984 because the process of cer-
tification, as called for in the bill, would not
serve to support human rights, economic and
political reforms, the holding of elections, and
progress in prosecuting the cases of
murdered U.S. citizens in El Salvador.

President Reagan signs legislation ap-
propriating funds for the U.S. contribution to
the International Monetary Fund and
multinational development banks but objects
to language concerning Taiwan. The Presi-
dent says that while he believes that the U.S.
must continue "the valuable and productive
unofficial relations with the people of
Taiwan," certain terminology used in the
amendment to the bill is inconsistent with
U.S. policy which recognizes the People's
Republic of China as the "sole legal govern-
ment of China."

In response to questions about visa
denials in the D'Aubuisson and Borge cases.
State Department spokesman John Hughes
says that "the Administration is seriously
concerned about the level of death squad ac-
tivity in El Salvador ..." and "the issuance
of a visa to Mr. D'Aubuisson at this time was
not viewed as appropriate . . . such an is-
suance might well have conveyed signals, in-
tended or not, which would not have been
productive to ongoing discussions." In Mr.
Borge's case, Hughes said, "refusal of his visa
should be seen in the context of our very
clear support to the ongoing Contadora effort
to achieve a regional solution to the conflicts
in Central America."

November 30-Dec. 3

Lebanese President Amin Gemayel makes an
official working visit to Washington, D.C, to
meet with President Reagan to discuss the
Geneva reconciliation meetings and "alter-
native approaches" for making progress in
withdrawing forces from Lebanon. He also
meets with Secretary Shultz and other U.S.
officials. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*383 11/1 Department of State and

World Affairs Councils to
cosponsor conferences on
U.S. -Soviet relations, San
Diego Nov. 3 and River-
side, Calif. Nov. 4.

"384 11/1 Overseas Schools Advisory
Council, Dec. 14.

*385 11/3 Shultz: remarks at UN Asso-
ciation concert, Oct. 29.

*386 11/7 Shultz: press briefing on the
President's trip to the Far
East, Nov. 3.

*387 11/9 U.S. Org;anization for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Committee
(CCITT), Nov. 30.

•388 11/9 CCITT, study group A,
Nov. 30.

'389 11/9 U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), Dec. 2.

*390 11/9 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC). Subcommit-
tee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on ship design and
equipment, Nov. 30.

'391 11/10 Harold G. Kimball desig-
nated executive director
for the U.S. delegation to
the 1985 World Ad-
ministrative Radio Con-
ference (biographic data).

*392 11/14 Shultz: interview on "The
Today Show," Seoul.

*393 11/17 Program for the official

working visit of Sudanese
President Gaafar
Mohamed Nimeiri,
Nov. 19-22.

'394 11/22 Advisory Committee on

Oceans and International
Environmental and Scien-
tific Affairs, Dec. 5.

'395 1 1/22 SCC, Committee on Ocean
Dumping, Dec. 6.

'396 11/22 CCIR, study group 10,
Dec. 7.

•397 11/22 CCIR, study group 11
Dec. 7.

'398 1 1/22 Thomas P. Shoesmith sworn
in as Ambassador to
Malaysia (biographic data)

•399 11/21 Daniel A. O'Donohue sworn
in as Ambassador to Bur-
ma (biographic data).
400 11/22 Shultz: interview on "This
Week with David
Brinkley," Seoul, Nov. 13.

•401 11/22 Shultz, MacEachen: news

conference, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Oct. 17.

•402 11/30 Shultz: interview on "View-
point," Nov. 20
403 11/22 Shultz: address before the
Council of Jewish Federa
tions and Welfare Funds,
Atlanta, Nov. 19

•404 11/29 Program for the official

working visit of Lebanese
President Amin Gemayel
Nov. 30-Dec. 3.

•405 1 1/25 Program for the official
working visit of Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shimir, Nov. 27-30.

•406 11/30 SCC, SOLAS, working grou;
on fire protection, Dec. IS

•407 11/30 CCITT, study group C,
Dec. 16.

•408 11/30 CCITT, study group C,
Dec. 19.

•409 11/30 Edmund T. De Jarnette

sworn in as Ambassador
to the Central African
Republic, Oct. 18
(biographic data).

•Not printed in the Billetin. ■

Department of State Bulletir

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Stien-

anuary 1984
'olume 84, No. 2082

''• fghanistan. Afghanistan: 4 Years of Occupa-
tion 73

frica. Reagan Administration's Africa
Policy: A Progress Report (Crocker) ... 38

'gentina. Human Rights Situation in South
America (Abrams, Michel) 55

■ms Control

e CDE and European Security in the 1980s
(Mally) 49

radox, Problems, and Promise of Arms Con-
trol (Adelman) 45

viets Suspend INF Negotiations (Nitze,
Reagan) 48

ile. Human Rights Situation in South
America (Abrams, Michel) 55

ngress

II Recipients Designated (letter to the Con-
gress) 84

velopments in Cyprus (Haass, Department
statement) 52

.man Rights Situation in South America
(Abrams, Michel) 55

.rijuana Production and Control Abroad
(DiCarlo) 70

ssident Opposes El Salvador Certification
Legislation (White House statement) . . 88

prus. Developments in Cyprus (Haass,
Department statement) 52

onomic Assistance. The Caribbean Basin
Initiative and Central America (Dam) . .80

onomics

e Political Economy of the Caribbean Basin
(Dam) 83

9sident Reagan Visits Japan and the Re-
public of Korea (remarks, joint statements,
toasts, addresses, interviews) 1

3. Sanctions Against Poland (White House

statement) 54

Salvador. President Opposes El Salvador
Certification Legislation (White House
statement) 88

trope. The CDE and European Security in
the 1980s (Mally) 49

Teign Assistance. CBI Recipients Desig-
nated (letter to the Congress) 84

itnan Rights

1 of Rights Day; Human Rights Day and
Week, 1983 (proclamation) 59

man Rights Situation in South America

(Abrams, Michel) 55

ernational Law

Critique of the Restatement Revision (Robin-
son) 69

aty Protection of Foreign Investment
(Robinson) 60

oiiiiet

Iran. Treaty Protection of Foreign Investment
(Robinson) 60

Israel. Promoting Peace in the Middle East
(Shultz) 32

Japan

Japan— A Profile 3

President Reagan Visits Japan and the
Republic of Korea (remarks, joint
statements, toasts, addresses, inter-
views) 1

Korea

President Reagan Visits Japan and the
Republic of Korea (remarks, joint
statements, toasts, addresses, inter-
views) 1

Republic of Korea — A Profile 20

Lebanon

Promoting Peace in the Middle East
(Shultz) 32

Secretary's News Conference of Decem-
ber 5 35

Situation in Lebanon (White House state-
ment) 69

Narcotics. Marijuana Production and Control
Abroad (DiCario) 70

Nicaragua

Nicaragua (Secretary Shultz's letter to the
Congress) 85

Secretary's News Conference of Decem-
ber 5 35

Paraguay. Human Rights Situation in South
America (Abrams, Michel) 55

Poland. 1 '.S. Sanctions Against Poland (White
House .'itatement) 54

Presidential Documents

Bill of Rights Day; Human Rights Day and
Week, 1983 (proclamation) 59

CBI Recipients Designated (letter to the Con-
gress) 84

50th Anniversary of U.S. -Soviet Relations (ex-
change of letters) 53

President Reagan Visits Japan and the
Republic of Korea (remarks, joint state-
ments, toasts, addresses, interviews) ... 1

Situation in Lebanon (White House state-
ment) 69

Soviets Suspend INF Negotiations (Nitze,
Reagan) 48

U.S. Sanctions Against Poland (Wliite House
statement) 54

Visit of Sudanese President Nimeiri
(Nimeiri) 44

Security Assistance. Nicaragua (Shultz, letter
to the Congress) 85

Sudan. Visit of Sudanese President Nimeiri
(Nimeiri, Reagan) 44

Trade

The Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central
America (Dam) 80

The Political Economy of the Caribbean Basin
(Dam) 83

President Reagan Visits Japan and the Re-
public of Korea (remarks, joint statements,
toasts, addresses, interviews) 1

Treaties

Current Actions 90

Treaty Protection of Foreign Investment
(Robinson) 60

U.S.S.R.

Afghanistan: 4 Years of Occupation 73

The CDE and European Security in the 1980s
(Mally) 49

50th Anniversary of U.S. -Soviet Relations (ex-
change of letters) 53

Paradox, Problems, and Promise of Arms Con-
trol (Adelman) 45

Soviets Suspend INF Negotiations (Nitze,
Reagan) 48

United Nations. Bill of Rights Day; Human
Rights Day and Week, 1983 (proclama-
tion) 59

Uruguay. Human Rights Situation in South
America (Abrams, Michel) 55

Western Hemisphere

The Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central
America (Dam) 80

CBI Recipients Designated (President
Reagan s letter to the Congress) 84

Need for Rule of Law in Central America
(Michel) 87

The Political Economv of the Caribbean Basin
(Dam) '. 83

Name Index

Abrams, Elliott 55

Adelman, Kenneth L 45

Crocker, Chester A 38

Dam, Kenneth W 80, 83

DiCarlo, Dominick L 70

Haass, Richard N 52

Mally, Gerhard 49

Michel, James H 55,87

Nakasone, Yasuhiro 1

Nimeiri, Gaafar Muhammad 44

Nitze, Paul H 48

Reagan, President 1, 44, 48, 53, 59, 84

Robmson, Davis R 60, 69

Shultz, Secretary 1, 32, 35, 85

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•« l)> Ul» !« }^

Departnten t
of State

-m of state ^^ J ^

buUetin

rhe Official Monthly Record of United StatesFor&ign^Jfi^/sYolunne 84 / Number 2083

Cover. Clockwise from top:

President Reagan

Flag of Nepal

Deputy Secretary of State
Kenneth W. Dam

Departnumi of Statp

bulletin

Volume 84 / Number 2083 / February 1984

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with infonnation on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
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Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-76
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■^: lUr I/^ It9.|«

CONTENTS

The President

1 The U.S. -Soviet Relationship
5 Lebanon

5 News Conference of December 20
(Excerptfs)

The Vice President

9 Visit to Latin America

The Secretary

10 Visit to Europe and North Africa
(Statements, News Conferences,
Declaration of Brussels, North
Atlantic Council Final
Communique)

Economics

19 LI.S. Foreign Policy and
Agricultural Trade
(Kenneth W. Dam.)

Europe

22 NATO Defense Planning Commit-
tee Meets in Brussels (Final
Communique)

Human Rights

24 Human Rights Implications for
U.S. Action in Grenada
(Elliott Abrams)

IVIiddle East

27 Policy Options in Lebanon

(Kenneth W. Dam)

28 U.S. Forces in Lebanon

(Letter to the Congress)

29 Visit of Lebanese President

(Amin Gem.ayel. President
Reagan)

30 Visit of Israeli Prime Minister

(President Reagan. Yitzhak
Shamir)

Refugees

32 Refugee Assistance and Protec-
tion (Jam.es N. Purcell. Jr.)

Science & Technology

34 LT.S. Prepares for World Radio

Conference (Leonard H. Marks)

South Asia

36 Visit of President of the Council

of Ministers of Bangladesh
(Hussain Mohammad Ershad,
President Reagan)

37 Anniversary of the Soviet

Invasion of Afghanistan
(President Reagan)

38 Visit of King of Nepal

(King Birendra Bir Bikram
Shah Dev. President Reagan)

United Nations

41 U.S. Notifies UNESCO of Intent
to Withdraw (Secretary's Letters
to UNESCO Director General
and UN Secretary General)

Western Hemisphere

43 Democracy as a Problem-Solving
Mechanism (Langhorne A.
Motley)

45 U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada

(Letter to the Congress)

Treaties

46 Current Actions

Chronology

48 December 1983

Press Releases

51 Department of State

Publications

51 Department of State

52 Foreign Relations Volume

Released

Index

There is no rational alternative hut to steer a
course which I would call credible deterrence and
peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might
find areas in which we could engage in constructive
cooperation.

i*"^fc

jirrnniT

TMTiTrTTnmiinHlfHilifrHUHiifiitiUHi^intiaiHiiHHHtisnDKi

THE PRESIDENT

The U.S.-Soviet
Relationship

by President Reagan

Address made in the

East Room of the White House

on January 16, 198If.^

During these first days of 1984. I would
like to share with you and the people of
the world my thoughts on a subject of
great importance to the cause of peace —
relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will
join the Soviet Union and 33 other na-
tions at a European disarmament con-
ference in Stockholm. The conference
will search for practical and meaningful
ways to increase European security and
preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm
with the heartfelt wishes of our people
for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to
peace but also of opportunities for
peace. Through times of difficulty and
frustration, America's highest aspiration
has never wavered: We have and will
continue to struggle for a lasting peace
that enhances dignity for men and
women everywhere. I believe that 1984
finds the United States in its strongest
position in years to establish a construc-
tive and realistic working relationship
with the Soviet Union.

We've come a long way since the
decade of the- 1970s— years when the
United States seemed filled with self-
doubt and neglected its defenses, while
the Soviet Union increased its military
might and sought to expand its influence
by armed force and threats. Over the
last 10 years, the Soviets devoted twice
as much of their gross national product
to military expenditures as the United
States, produced six times as many
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic
missiles], four times as many tanks, and

twice as many combat aircraft. And they
began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-
range missile at a time when the United
States had no comparable weapon.

History teaches that wars begin
when governments believe the price of
aggression is cheap. To keep the peace,
we and our allies must be strong enough
to convince any potential aggressor that
war could bring no benefit, only
disaster. So when we neglected our
defenses, the risks of serious confronta-
tion grew.

Three years ago we embraced a
mandate from the American people to
change course, and we have. With the
support of the American people and the
Congress, we halted America's decline.
Our economy is now in the midst of the
best recovery since the 1960s. Our
defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances
are solid, and our commitment to defend
our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken
Soviet leaders by surprise. They may
have counted on us to keep weakening
ourselves. They've been saying for years
that our demise was inevitable. They
said it so often they probably started
believing it. If so, I think they can see
now they were wrong.

This may be the reason that we've
been hearing such strident rhetoric from
the Kremlin recently. These harsh words
have led some to speak of heightened
uncertainty and an increased danger of
conflict. This is understandable but pro-
foundly mistaken. Look beyond the
words, and one fact stands out:

february 1984

*(f:|i('!'i

'y'irm}nmmm>mtmmmimimmmmumm^mmi\mfs

THE PRESIDENT

America's deterrence is more credible,
and it is making the world a safer
place— safer because now there is less
danger that the Soviet leadership will
underestimate our strength or question
our resolve.

Yes, we are safer now. But to say
that our restored deterrence has made
the world safer is not to say that it's
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic
conflicts in many parts of the world.
Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And
our working relationship with the Soviet
Union is not what it must be. These are
conditions which must be addressed and
improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve
peace and protect our way of life, but
deterrence is not the beginning and end
of our policy toward the Soviet Union.
We must and will engage the Soviets in
a dialogue as serious and constructive as

Problem Areas

But if the United States and the Soviet
Union are to rise to the challenges fac-
ing us and seize the opportunities for
peace, we must do more to find areas of
mutual interest and then build on them.
I propose that our governments make a
major effort to see if we can make prog-
ress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to re-
duce — and eventually to elimi-
nate—the threat and use of force in
solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than
100 major conflicts since the end of
World War II. Today, there are armed
conflicts in the Middle East, Afghani-
stan, Southeast Asia, Central America,
and Africa. In other regions, independ-
ent nations are confronted by heavily

. . .America's total nuclear stockpile has declined.
Today, we have far fewer nuclear weapons than we
had 30 years ago.

possible, a dialogue that will serve to
promote peace in the troubled regions of
the world, reduce the level of arms, and
build a constructive working relation-
ship.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can
wish away the differences between our
two societies and our philosophies. But
we should always remember that we do
have common interests. And the fore-
most among them is to avoid war and
reduce the level of arms. There is no ra-
tional alternative but to steer a course
which I would call credible deterrence
and peaceful competition; and if we do
so, we might find areas in which we
could engage in constructive coopera-
tion.

Our strength and vision of progress
provide the basis for demonstrating,
with equal conviction, our commitment
to stay secure and to find peaceful solu-
tions to problems through negotiations.
That is why 1984 is a year of oppor-
tunities for peace.

armed neighbors seeking to dominate by
threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their
origins in local problems, but many have
been exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates— and, of course, Afghani-
stan has suffered an outright Soviet in-
vasion. Fueling region.-a conflicts and ex-
porting violence only exacrhate local
tensions, increase suffering, and make
solutions to real social and economic
problems more difficult. Further, such
activity carries with it the risk of larger
confrontations.

Would it not be better and safer if
we could work together to assist people
in areas of conflict in finding peaceful
solutions to their problems? That should
be our mutual goal. But we must recog-
nize that the gap in American and
Soviet perceptions and policy is so great
that our immediate objective must be
more modest. As a first step, our
governments should jointly examine con-
crete actions we both can take to reduce
the risk of U.S. -Soviet confrontation in
these areas. And if we succeed, we
should be able to move beyond this im-,
mediate objective.

Our second task should be to find
ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of
armaments in the world.

It is tragic to see the world's devel^
oping nations spending more than $150
billion a year on armed forces — some
20% of their national budgets. We must
find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of
threat and response which drives arms
races everywhere it occurs.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the
simple truth is, America's total nuclear
stockpile has declined. Today, we have
far fewer nuclear weapons than we had
30 years ago. And in terms of its total
destructive power, our nuclear stockpile
is at the lowest level in 25 years.

Just 3 months ago, we and our allies
agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear
weapons from Western Europe. This
comes after the withdrawal of 1,000
nuclear weapons from Europe 3 years
ago. Even if all our planned inter-
mediate-range missiles have to be
deployed in Europe over the next 5
years— and we hope this will not be
necessary— we will have eliminated five
existing nuclear weapons for each new
weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must ac-
celerate our efforts to reach agreements
that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals
provide greater stability, and build confi
dence.

Our third task is to establish a
better working relationship with each
other, one marked by greater coopera-
tion and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are
built on deeds, not words. Complying
with agreements helps; violating them
hurts. Respecting the rights of in-
dividual citizens bolsters the relation-
ship; denying these rights harms it. Ex-
panding contacts across borders and
permitting a free interchange of infor-
mation and ideas increase confidence;
sealing off one's people from the rest of
the world reduces it. Peaceful trade
helps, while organized theft of industrial
secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are
especially important to arms control. In
recent years, we've had serious concerns
about Soviet compliance with agree
ments and treaties. Compliance is impor
tant because we seek truly effective
arms control. However, there's been
mounting evidence that provisions of
agreements have been violated and thafc
advantage has been taken of ambiguities
in oiu- agreements.

Oiifstr
I'aiiiJto
fe.Sovie

Hialoji

■*-■*■*■» U i4 ^*■^*

'IJ!l||)iini|4tn(HtiHllIMT»im>ifiiii

Department of State Bulleti

THE PRESIDENT

In response to a congressional re-
(|uest, a report on this will be submitted
ill the next few days. It is clear that we
cannot simply assume that agreements
negotiated will be fulfilled. We must
take the Soviet compliance record into
account, both in the development of our
defense program and in our approach to
arms control. In our discussions with the
Soviet Union, we will work to remove
the obstacles which threaten to under-
mine existing agreements and the
broader arms control process.

The examples I have cited illustrate
why our relationship with the Soviet
Union is not what it should be. We have
a long way to go, but we're determined
to try and try again. We may have to
start in small ways, but start we must.

U.S. Approach: Realism,
Strength, and Dialogue

In working on these tasks, our approach
is based on three guiding principles:
realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism. Realism means we must
istart with a clear-eyed understanding of
the world we live in. We must recognize
that we are in a long-term competition
with a government that does not share
our notions of individual liberties at
home and peaceful change abroad. We
must be frank in acknowledging our dif-
ferences and unafraid to promote our
values.

Strength. Strength is essential to
negotiate successfully and protect our
interests. If we're weak, we can do
neither. Strength is more than military
power. Economic strength is crucial, and
.America's economy is leading the world
into recovery. Equally important is our
strength of spirit and unity among our
people at home and with our allies
abroad. We are stronger in all these
areas than we were 3 years ago.

Our strength is necessary to deter
war and to facilitate negotiated solu-
tions. Soviet leaders know it makes
sense to compromise only if they can get
something in return. America can now
ffer something in return.

Dialogue. Strength and dialogue go
toPBhand in hand. We are determined to
II'* Hdeal with our differences peacefully,
through negotiations. We're prepared to
iiscuss the problems that divide us and
'0 work for practical, fair solutions on
^he basis of mutual compromise. We will
lever retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of
the Soviet system. I don't know why this
should come as a surprise to Soviet
leaders, who've never shied from ex-
pressing their view of our system. But
this doesn't mean we can't deal with
each other. We don't refuse to talk when
the Soviets call us "imperialist ag-
gressors" and worse, or because they
cling to the fantasy of a communist
triumph over democracy. The fact that
neither of us likes the other's system is
no reason to refuse to talk. Living in
this nuclear age makes it imperative
that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm
and unshakable. But we insist that our
negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics. In our approach to
negotiations, reducing the risk of war —
and especially nuclear war — is priority
number one. A nuclear conflict could
well be mankind's last. That is why I
proposed over 2 years ago the "zero op-
tion" for intermediate-range missiles.
Our aim was and continues to be to
eliminate an entire class of nuclear
arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for
all nuclear arms. As I have said before,
my dream is to see the day when

nuclear forces and has not set a date for
the resumption of the talks on strategic
arms and on conventional forces in
Europe. Our negotiators are ready to
return to the negotiating table to work
toward agreements in INF, START, and
MBFR [intermediate-range nuclear
forces, strategic arms limitation talks,
and mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions]. We will negotiate in good faith.
'WTienever the Soviet Union is ready to
do likewise, we'll meet them halfway.

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals
and to reduce the chances for dangerous
misunderstanding and miscalculation.
So, we have put forward proposals for
what we call "confidence-building
measures." They cover a wide range of
activities. In the Geneva negotiations,
we have proposed to exchange advance
notifications of missile tests and major
military exercises. Following up on con-
gressional suggestions, we also proposed
a number of ways to improve direct
channels of communication. Last week,
we had productive discussions with the
Soviets here in Washington on improv-
ing communications, including the
hotline.

These bilateral proposals will be
broadened at the conference in Stock-
holm. We are working with our allies to

We're prepared to discuss the problems that divide
us and to work for practical, fair solutions on the
basis of mutual compromise.

nuclear weapons will be banished from
the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense
Minister stated that his country would
do everything to avert the threat of war.
These are encouraging words. But now
is the time to move from words to
deeds.

The opportunity for progress in
arms control exists; the Soviet leaders
should take advantage of it. We have
proposed a set of initiatives that would
reduce substantially nuclear arsenals
and reduce the risk of nuclear confronta-
tion.

The world regrets — certainly we
do — that the Soviet Union broke off
negotiations on intermediate-range

develop practical, meaningful ways to
reduce the uncertainty and potential for
misinterpretation surrounding military
activities and to diminish the risk of sur-
prise attack.

The Need to Defuse
Tensions and Regional
Conflicts

Arms control has long been the most
visible area of U.S. -Soviet dialogue. But
a durable peace also requires ways for
both of us to defuse tensions and
regional conflicts.

Take the Middle East as an exam-
ple. Everyone's interests would be
served by stability in the region, and our

-ebruary 1984

THE PRESIDENT

efforts are directed toward that goal.
The Soviets could help reduce tensions
there instead of introducing sophisti-
cated weapons into the area. This would
certainly help us to deal more positively
with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union is human
rights. Soviet practices in this area, as
much as any other issue, have created

meet us halfway, we will be prepared to
protect our interests and those of our
friends and allies. But we want more
than deterrence; we seek genuine
cooperation; we seek progress for peace.
Cooperation begins with communica-
tion. As I have said, we will stay at the
negotiating tables in Geneva and Vien-
na. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will
be meeting this week with Soviet

Our request is simple and straightforward:
that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it
has freely assumed under international
covenants. . . .

the mistrust and ill will that hangs over
our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel
us to express our deep concern over
prisoners of conscience in the Soviet
Union and over the virtual halt in the
emigration of Jews, Armenians, and
others who wish to join their families
abroad.

Our request is simple and straight-
forward: that the Soviet Union live up to
the obligations it has freely assumed
under international covenants — in par-
ticular, its commitments under the
Helsinki accords. Experience has shown
that greater respect for human rights
can contribute to progress in other areas
of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the
United States and the Soviet Union are
real. But we can and must keep the
peace between our two nations and
make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.

A Challenge for Peace

Our policy toward the Soviet Union— a
policy of credible deterrence, peaceful
competition, and constructive coopera-
tion — will serve our two nations and
people everywhere. It is a policy not just
for this year but for the long term. It is
a challenge for Americans. It is also a
challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot

Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stock-
holm. This meeting should be followed
by others, so that high-level consulta-
tions become a regular and normal com-
ponent of U.S. -Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will
bring out the best in us. It also calls for
the best from the Soviet Union.

We do not threaten the Soviet
Union. Freedom poses no threat; it is
the language of progress. We proved
this 35 years ago when we had a
monopoly of nuclear weapons and could
have tried to dominate the world. But
we didn't. Instead, we used our power to
write a new chapter in the history of
mankind. We helped rebuild war-
ravaged economies in Europe and the
Far East, including those of nations who
had been our enemies. Indeed, those
former enemies are now numbered
among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet
leaders will respond to our challenge.
But the people of our two countries
share with all mankind the dream of
eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It's
not an impossible dream, because elimi-
nating these risks is so clearly a vital in-
terest for all of us. Our two countries
have never fought each other; there is
no reason why we ever should. Indeed,
we fought common enemies in World
War II. Today our common enemies are
poverty, disease, and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President
Kennedy defined an approach that is as

valid today as when he announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differ-
ences," he said, "but let us also direct at-
tention to our common interests and to
the means by which those differences
can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differ-
ences in governmental structure and
philosophy. The common interests have
to do with the things of everyday life for
people everj'where.

Just suppose with me for a moment,
that an Ivan and Anya could find them-
selves, say, in a waiting room or sharing
a shelter from the rain or a storm with
Jim and Sally, and there was no
language barrier to keep them from get-
ting acquainted. Would they then debate
the differences between their respective
governments'? Or would they find them-
selves comparing notes about their
children and what each other did for a
living?

Before they parted company they
would probably have touched on ambi-
tions and hobbies and what they wanted
for their children and the problems of
making ends meet. And as they went
their separate ways, maybe Anya would
be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she
also teaches music." Maybe Jim would
be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't
like about his boss. They might even
have decided that they were all going to
get together for dinner some evening
soon.

Above all, they would have proven
that people don't make wars. People
want to raise their children in a world
without fear and without war. They
want to have some of the good things
over and above bare subsistence that
make life worth living. They want to
work at some craft, trade, or profession
that gives them satisfaction and a sense
of worth. Their common interests cross
all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants
peace, then there will be peace.
Together we can strengthen peace,
reduce the level of arms, and know in
doing so we have helped fulfill the hopes
and dreams of those we represent and
indeed, of people everywhere. Let us
begin now.

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'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 23. 1983.

Department of State Bulletiri

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THE PRESIDENT

Lebanon

lings

(FOS

President Reagan's radio address to
the nation on December 10, 1983.^

I'd like to talk to you today about the
deep desire we all" share to bring peace
to Lebanon.

These past several weeks have
brought bitter tragedy and sorrow to all
of us. The loss of even one of our splen-
did young Americans is an enormous
price to pay. The number of dead and
wounded is a terrible burden of grief for
all Americans. It's unimaginably more so
for the families who have lost a father,
husband, a son, or a brother. Their
deaths are testimony to the savage
hatreds and greedy ambitions which
have claimed so many innocent
Lebanese lives.

The human toll in Lebanon is stag-
gering. Lebanon's losses since 1975
would be comparable to the United
States losing 10 million of its citizens.
What conceivable reason can there be
(or this wanton death and destruction?

Lebanon's suffering began long
oefore a single marine arrived. In the
early 1970s many thousands of Palestini-
ans entered Lebanon. Lebanon's fragile
oolitical consensus collapsed, and a
savage civil war broke out.

The Palestinians also had a military,
the armed PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization]. Trained in terrorist tac-
tics by Soviet-bloc nations and Libya,
the PLO joined the civil war and at-
tacked Israeli targets, villages, and
schools across the border between
Lebanon and Israel.

In the midst of all this, Syria was
asked to intervene and stop the civil
war. In the process, it occupied a large
Dart of Lebanon. However, Syria did
lothing to control terrorism against
Israel's northern border. Israel decided
:o neutralize the PLO and, in June 1982,
■nounted a full-scale invasion across the
jorder. This resulted in another major
' -ound of fighting between Syria, the
i>LO, and Israel. Shelling and bombing
Dounded Beirut. Thousands more died.

We negotiated a cease-fire and then
loined the multinational force at the re-
I juest of the Lebanese Government to
nake possible the peaceful separation of
he forces. This is the second time in 25
rears that we have come to support the
jebanese Government in restoring

In 1958 President [Dwight D.]
Eisenhower used a bipartisan congres-
sional resolution to send 8.000 American
soldiers and marines to Lebanon. When
order was restored, our military came
home. But in 1958 there were no occu-
pying foreign armies, and there was no
Soviet presence in Syria. Today, there
are more than 7,000 Soviet military ad-
visers and technicians.

In September 1982 I offered a plan to
bring peace to the region. It called for a
just solution to the Palestinian problem
as well as a reasonable settlement of
issues between the Arab States and
Israel.

Success in Lebanon is centra! to sus-
taining the broader peace process. We
have vital interests in the Middle East
which depend on peace stability in that
region. Indeed, the entire world has
vital interests there. The region is cen-
tral to the economic vitality of the
Western World. If we fail in Lebanon,
what happens to the prospects for
peace, not just in Lebanon but between
Israel and her neighbors and in the en-
tire Middle East?

Once internal stability is established
and withdrawal of all foreign forces is
assured, the marines will leave. But
because we care about human values for
ourselves, so must we be concerned
when freedom, justice, and liberty are
abused elsewhere. That's the moral basis
which brought our marines to Lebanon.
We have acted with great restraint
despite repeated provocations and
murderous attacks. Our reconnaissance
flights have only one purpose, and the
Syrians know it: to give the greatest

possible protection to our troops. We
will continue to do whatever is needed
to ensure the safety of our forces and
our reconnaissance flights.

The peace process is slow and pain-
ful, but there is progress which would
not have been possible without the
multinational force. Last May with our
help the Governments of Lebanon and
Israel negotiated an agreement pro-
viding for the withdrawal of Israeli
forces. In September when the Israelis
pulled back their forces from the Shuf
Mountains near Beirut, Lebanese at-
tempts to extend their authority into
this area were met by violent opposition
from forces supported by Syria. We will
redouble our diplomatic efforts to pro-
mote reconciliation and achieve
withdrawal of all foreign forces.

At a recent meeting in Geneva, all
the Lebanese parties agreed to
recognize the present government as the
legitimate representative of the
Lebanese people. Talks have begun to
broaden the base of the government and
to satisfy the legitimate grievances of all
the people.

My special envoy, Ambassador Don
Rumsfeld, has returned to the region
and will continue trying to move the
peace process forward on all fronts.
Lebanon's agony must end.

Today is the 35th anniversary of the
UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The Lebanese people are strug-
gling for their human rights. We call
upon everyone involved to give that
birthright back to the Lebanese.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 19, 1983.

News Conference of December 20 (Excerpts)

Excerpts from President Reagan's
news conference of December 20, 1983^

Q. Last week you said that if there's a
complete collapse, you'll pull the
troops out of Lebanon. Did you mean
that if Gemayel fails to put together a
broad, viable government that you'd
pull out, or can you clarify?

A. Actually I was asked a
hyijothetical question about whether

there were any other circumstances
other than achieving our goal by which
the Marines might leave or the whole
multinational force, and I tried— I guess
I tried to give a hypothetical answer to
that and maybe a bad choice of words.
I simply meant that the only thing
I— and I don't foresee this— but the only
thing I could think of, other than achiev-
ing our goal, would be if perhaps that
government and the forces that he's
dealing with in trying to broaden the
government, if there should be a com-
plete change of course to the place that

,Byilelif|ebruary 1984

,, *fc -ft 'I
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THE PRESIDENT

we were no longer asked to be there,
that they were going in a different direc-
tion than the one that brought us in the
first place at their request, then I sup-
pose that would be a reason for bringing
them out. But I wasn't trying to send
anyone a message or anything. I was
just trying to say: Yes. you can't say
there isn't any other way by which they
wouldn't come out.

Q. Do you think that you've put
the U.S. — the peacekeeper role in
jeopardy by making a military pact at
this time with a country that's invad-
ed, annexed, and occupied Arab land?

A. We didn't make any pact or
anything that was different from what
has been our relationship all along.
There was a reaffirmation of this. In
talking to Prime Minister [Yitzhak]
Shamir we also emphasized that we
were going to go forward with our rela-
tions with the moderate Arab States as
part of our hope for being a catalyst — or
trying to be — in bringing them all
together and ending once and for all
these hostilities that have so disturl)ed
that area and caused such tragedy for sn
long.

There was no signed agreement or
anything else. We were really reaffirm-
ing the relationship that we've had since
1948, but, at the same time, telling them
that if we're to have any chance of
bringing them together or continuing a
process that started at Camp David,
where Egypt and Israel wound up with
a peace treaty — if we're to have a
chance of bringing that kind of a
peace — we've got to befriend all those
countries. And they've got to be able to
trust us that we can be fair to all of
them.

Q. The death squad activity is con-
tinuing in El Salvador. Are you
sati-sfied now with the progress the
government there is making in halting
it, and if not, how long can you con-
tinue supporting a nation where this
takes place'/

A. I feel that we have to continue
supporting them just as long as we
would be supporting them against the
leftist guerrillas that are trying to take
over the government. We have a situa-
tion here of a 40()-year history of mainly
military dictatorships. And now, for the
first time, virtually, in all that country's
history, we have a government that has
made it plain that they are trying to
establish democratic principles and
policies.

They're being assailed from the left
by the Cuban and Soviet-backed guer-
rilla forces. But at the same time they're

being sniped at from the rear — they're
called the death squads and the so-called
rightists, who, by the same token, don't
want democracy. They want to go back
to what they've had in this 400-year
history. The El Salvador Government
has made great progress in establishing
democracy. They're hindered in their
fight against the guerrillas by this action
behind their backs. But you have to look
at punishing that government for trying
to be democratic when it is being assail-
ed from radicals from both sides. Our
obligation is to try and help democracy
triumph there, and this is why we've of-
fered some help.

When the Vice President went down
there recently and told them about how
essential it is to get a handle on this
force from the rear as well as the one on
their front that they're fighting, he was
very well received, and there was no
disagreement with what he said. There
has been a stepped-up effort, and they
want technical help from us in that
regard that we are willing and can pro-
vide.

Q. Was the Vice President carry-
ing a direct message from you on the
death squads?

A. Yes, yes. And he had his own
words, also, about it, and I'm in com-
plete agreement with those, too.

Q. The House subcommittee in-
vestigating the bombing in Beirut has
found— and I quote— "very serious er-
rors in judgment were made both by
officers on the ground and up the
military command." Do you feel that
disciplinary action should be taken
against officers found responsible by
Congress or the Pentagon?

A. There are two reports. There's a
very voluminous report and a complete
one that has been brought in by the
military team that's been investigating
this, as well as the congressional group.
Both of those have just arrived at the
Defense Department, and Secretary
Weinberger is having a complete study
made of them and will then submit a
report to me on his findings, probably
within the next several days. But they
are voluminious, and it's going to take a
little while. So, I can't comment now un-
til I see what those findings have been
in both reports.

The Secretary also has said that,
other than things that must remain
classified for security reasons, he also
intends to make public the findings in
those reports as quickly as possible.

Q. Two days after the bombing,
the Marine Commandant, P. X. Kelley,
was in Beirut and said that he was
completely satisfied with the security
there. Was he being straight with the
American people, and do you still have
confidence in him?

A. Yes, I do, very much. And I
think he was, on the basis of what he
saw, what was there — the main issue,
then, that he was addressing himself to
was, could anyone prepare themselves
for this unusual attack that took such a
tragic toll? The moving of the men in
such numbers into that building was
done because that was the safest
building from the standpoint of the
weapons that had been used against
them up until that point— mortar fire,
small-arms fire — and it was a steel-
reinforced concrete building. No, I don't
think he was attempting to cover up for
anyone.

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Q. There have been in the past few
weeks dump trucks surrounding the
White House. When you traveled to
Indianapolis, there were buses block-
ing intersections to protect you. Then
are reports that ihere are ground-to-
air missiles now near the White
House. Could you tell the American
people what the nature of the threat i:
and how this all makes you feel as
President to have this going on
around you?

A. I just feel such popularity must
be deserved. [Laughter] Frankly, I had
not noticed the blocked intersections. I
hadn't paid any attention to it, and I
was waving to the people along the
street in that appearance. The only
thing I regret is the inconvenience —
when necessary moves' have to be
made — the inconvenience that I can
cause to many other people in this.

There are no specific or definite
threats that any of us know of here. We|5fiijees Jii
only know that worldwide there has
been a call in a number of these ter-
rorist groups for stepped-up violence
The term "United States" has been used
as a potential target.

Actually, there has been a decline.
Last year, there were 52 terrorist in-
cidents in the United States. This year,
so far — and the year's practically
over — there have only been 31. And
there has been no call for special

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THE PRESIDENT

up violence in the Middle East, mainly.
It would be — it's far easier to explain
taking precautions than it is to have
something happen and then have to ex-
plain why vou didn't do something about
it.

Q. But you are concerned that by
building these barriers that you may
give the impression that you might be
giving in to threats and terrorists?

A. I don't think it's giving in to set
up a barricade to keep somebody from
doing this. You know, there have been
attempts to ram the gates at the White
House during these 3 years that we've
been here. There've been some people
that have gone over the fence.

So, I think that these are just nor-
mal security precautions in a climate
that has shown us that this sort of thing
can happen. And, as far as I'm con-
cerned, I haven't let it interfere with my
sleep or my work in the office.

Q. It seems evident from the polls
that the American people do not sup-
port the U.S. Marine presence in
Lebanon right now. Whether the
Dolicy is right or wrong, do you
jelieve the public will put up with
continuing American deaths there?

A. I can understand the public opin-
on, because they're hearing great at-
:acks from a number of sources on our
Dresence there; some of them, I think,
oolitically motivated. But I have to say
:his about the mission, the purpose in
jeing there. They do have a purpose and
1 mission there. And there has been a
"esult from this and progress made.

If you will recall, it's been several
/ears, of course, since Lebanon, kind of,
^ame unglued and the government was
lelpless to stop some of the troubles in
ts own land. We had the factor of more
;han a million refugees, Palestinian
•efugees in Lebanon. They've been there
"or decades. And over this period of
;ime, they created their own militia, the
i'LO, a military and terrorist group.
Bseifrhis group was not only causing trouble
vithin Lebanon; it was crossing the
lorthern border of Israel. It was prey-
ng on civilians, citizens there. And,
'inally, Israel crossed the border into
jebanon.

The first goal was to simply push
hem back some 25 miles so they'd be
)eyond rocket or artillery range. But the
|j)thers just repeated, and then kept on
ittacking them. So, they went all the
vay to the edge of Beirut. Then we had

ebruary 1984

a war taking place right within the city
of Beirut in which thousands of civilians
have been killed and wounded by this
kind of combat.

In the meantime, during all of this,
the Lebanese asked the Syrians to come
in and help preserve order, because in
Lebanon we had, and have, groups —
various, sometimes religious groups, but
other groups, like warlords, with their
own militias. They're fighting each other
and, at times, fighting against the forces
of the Lebanese Government.

We were then asked to come in with
the multinational force. We went in,
once the government had been formed
there and once the PLO, when they
were rejected, as they were — granted
they came back later by way of Syria.
But the goal and the idea was for the
two foreign forces that were then left
after the PLO left to get out. But the
Lebanese Government needed time to
build its strength to where it could then
go in with these internecine groups that
were fighting there— go in and establish
order over its own territory.

Israel, having completed its mission,
announced its willingness and intention
to get out. Syria did, too. Then for some
reason Syria reneged on that promise
and has refused to get out, even though
they have now been officially asked to
get out by the government that asked
them to come in.

During the occupation by both Syria
and the Israelis, they managed to keep
some hold on those fighting groups in
there, some order. The mission of the
multinational force is what it was then.
We have helped train the Lebanese Ar-
my, and it is a capable force. We have
armed it. When the other forces— the
foreign forces get out and the Lebanese
military advances to try and establish
order in their land, the multinational
force is supposed to, behind them, try to
achieve some stability and maintain
order, because Lebanon doesn't have the
forces to do both. This is the mission.
Progress has been made. The war-
ring forces meeting in Geneva have
acknowledged that the Gemayel govern-
ment is the legitimate government of
Lebanon. There is an agreement that
has been reached and signed between
Lebanon and Israel in which Israel has
agreed in writing that they will
withdraw. Indeed, I think they're anx-
ious to. Now, the stumbling block still
seems to be Syria.

But at the same time, the Gemayel
government is trying to bring these

other forces in Lebanon, and if they will
remember that they're Lebanese also
and they want a Lebanon for the
Lebanese people, they will come in at his
request and join the government. He's
trying to broaden the base of the
government to give them representation
and end that kind of fighting there.

Progress has been made toward the
goal when you think back to where we
were when airplanes and artillery were
destroying the civilian sections of Beirut.

Q. Each week the United States
seems to be using greater and greater
firepower there. We had returning
hostile fire, then artillery, then
airstrikes, and now the 16-inch guns
of the New Jersey. You said last week
that you don't want escalation or a
war. Can you avoid without Syrian
cooperation?

A. You can avoid war. But I will
say this, and I'll reiterate it: I will not
okay a mission or ask or order our
Armed Forces to go someplace where
there is danger and tell them that they
have not the right to defend themselves.
So, when the sniping began and there
was no retaliation, I made it plain by
way of the channels in the Pentagon, as
far as I was concerned, when an
American military man is shot at, he can
shoot back. There's been some indication
that rather than stepped-up activity that
there has been some pause for thought
on those that were deciding that the
multinational forces were fair game.

I don't say that they won't try these
terrorist activities again; I'm sure they
will. But are we, and where would we be
in the world— are we to let the ter-
rorists win? Are we to say that, well, if
terrorists are going to be active, we'll
give in to them; we'll back away?

Q. You said earlier tonight that
you would not send American soldiers
or marines into a situation where they
could not fight back. Haven't we sent
them into a role in Beirut, a political,
a diplomatic role as peacekeepers
where they do not have adequate
safeguards against terrorism?

A. No, I don't know what you call
adequate safeguards against terrorists
or what we would call it. You know
anytime that you— and particularly in a
place like that, where even innocent
civilians in the street are mowed down
simply because snipers want to shoot
someone— it's been that kind of a scene.

.• I /I

THE PRESIDENT

It's that kind of a thing that we're trying
to resolve in behalf of the innocent peo-
ple there who want to live in peace like
the rest of us.

Sometime I'm going to impose on
you and read some of the letters that I
get from people in Lebanon who tell us
what life would be like if the multina-
tional force wasn't there, and what it
has meant in their lives as individuals
living in the midst of that kind of
brutality and bloodshed. I was under no
illusion — and I have to tell you that I
have discovered for myself that the
hardest thing you'll ever have to do in
this job is give an order that put some of
those wonderful young men and women
in our military uniforms in places like
that. But in the interest of our own na-
tional security and in the interest of
overall peace, some of these things have
to be done.

The Middle East is a tinderbox. It is
the one place that could start a war that
no one wanted because of its impor-
tance, particularly to the free world and
to our allies. And we can't just turn
away and say if we don't look, it'll go
away. This all started because of our
determination to try and bring about
peace between those factions that have
been for so long warring with each
other. The moderate Arab states again
and the progress that we've made —
there was a refusal on their part to even
acknowledge the right of Israel to exist
as a nation. So, therefore, there could be
no negotiation.

Anwar Sadat broke out of that
mold, and we have peace between two
countries. And the territory of the Sinai
has been returned to Egypt by Israel,
and they're at peace with each other.
Our goal was to see if we couldn't find
more leaders and more governments
that would become Egypts, in a sense,
in settling their disputes and having
peace.

And today the very fact that there's
an indication that they are willing and
prepared to negotiate differences in-
dicates that they no longer are holding
that position of refusing to let Israel
exist.

Q. Does it give you some pause
when conservative thinkers like
William F. Buckley. Jr., and Richard
Viguerie suggest that you should be
taking the Marines home'/

A. 1 take my friend Bill more
seriously. I read that column, too, and
I'll have to have a talk with him shortly.

Q. The subcommittee report that
was mentioned earlier tonight also
concluded that continued deployment
of the Marines will almost certainly
lead to further casualties. I know you
don't want to discuss what the securi-
ty arrangements were before the at-
tack, but what about now? Are you
confident that as of tonight the
Marines in Beirut are as protected as
they can be, given where they are?

A. I won't be able to answer that
again until I too see the reports, par-
ticularly the report that is coming in
that's very voluminous and must go into
great detail. It's about that thick, and it
has been made by military experts. So, I
just can't comment until I know.

Q. Are you saying that you aren't
sure at this point whether tonight the
Marines are as adequately protected as
they can be?

A. I think they are to the extent
that those on the field and the officers
that are involved there are doing
everything they can to ensure that. I
just have to assume that. And I think
that I'm justified in assuming it.

Q. Within days of your inaugura-
tion in 1981, you vowed that
Americans would not be held hostage
again. The Syrians are holding airman
Lt. Robert Goodman and say they
won't release him until the Marines
leave Lebanon. Do you consider Lt.
Goodman a hostage? And what efforts
are underway to secure his release?

A. We have believed for a long time
that the settlement there must be — in
this whole area — must be political. I
should have said this earlier, in my
answer before about the history of this
Lebanese situation. But we've had Am-
bassadors there from Phil Habib to Am-
bassador McFarlane, and now, Don
Rumsfeld, because we're determined
that there is a possibility. It is the only
way. You cannot — this can't be settled
by force. And it is going to be settled
that way.

Ambassador Rumsfeld has been in
Damascus. He has met with the Syrians.
Certainly, that is very high on the
agenda. The Syrians claim that he's a
prisoner of war. I don't know how you
have a prisoner of war when there is no
declared war between nations. I don't
think that makes you eligible for the
Geneva accords.

But, yes, we want that young man
back. And, we're not missing anjlhing,
any possibility in trying to bring to
terms these various factions so that we
can achieve the goal of restoring order,
a broader based government in Lebanon
acceptable to more of the people, those
that are presently hostile to this govern-
ment, and the foreign forces back to
their own borders.

Q. Is Lt. Goodman, in your
opinion, a hostage? And do you think
the Syrians will use him as a bargain-
ing chip?

A. I doubt that very much. I really
do. In the sense of holding it up for
trading something or other, no, I don't
believe so. But I'm sorry that he is
there. And I'm glad he is alive. We're
going to make every effort to get him
back as quickly as possible.

Q. When will the Marines come
home, do you think?

A. The Marines will come home as
quickly as it is possible to bring them
home in accomplishing our mission. And
I'm glad you asked that. I'm glad I did
stay just for that, because I want to say
one thing. There have been some sug-
gestions — there have been some sugges-
tions made with regard to bringing therr
home that some of my considerations
might be based on the fact that in an
election year — and politics are coming
up — I will tell you this: No decision
regarding the lives and the safety of our
servicemen will ever be made by me for
a political reason.

'Text fr(im Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 26. 1983.

State Bulletir

iwf «,«, a». i«

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Vice President Bush Visits Latin America

Vice President Bush led the U.S.
delegation to the inauguration of Argen-
tine President Raul Alfonsin (Decem-
ber 9-11, 1983) and then visited Panama
(December 11) and El Salvador
(Deroiiher 11).

Following is the toasf made by the
Vice President at a dinner hosted by
President Alvaro Borja Magana in San
Salvador on December 11.''

Mr. President, I have been most im-
pressed by your warm hospitality. You
have welcomed me as a friend. I hope
you will permit me, in that same spirit
of friendship, to use this occasion to con-
vey to you and your fellow countrymen
some thoughts from my own perspective
and that of President Reagan.

The American people have developed
a great admiration for the people of El
Salvador. You are on the front lines
fighting for liberty against communist
aggression. The extraordinary 80%
voter turnout in the Constituent
Assembly elections of 1982 demon-
strated your people's deep faith in
democracy even under the most difficult
of circumstances.

Mr. President, I know that you
share that faith. I know that you and
many other Salvadorans are personally
committed to democracy, reform, and
human rights. But in your struggle to
bring peace and justice to your people,
you have more than one enemy. The
brave Salvadoran patriots who are now
fighting to build their new deomocracy
are under attack not only from com-
munist guerrillas supported from abroad
but also from extremist rightwing ter-
rorists, the death squads, that small
group of people within your own society
who operate outside the law.

A guerrilla war is a long, arduous
effort fought on many fronts: military,
economic, social, and political. But the

crucial battle is not for territory; it is for
men's minds. The gjuerrillas never lose
sight of that objective. They know the
government is responsible for protecting
the people. So their goal is to cripple the
government, distort its priorities, and
sow doubt about its legitimacy.

For a government to survive a guer-
rilla challenge, it must continue to pro-
tect its citizens even as it fights to de-
fend itself from those who play by other
rules— or no rules at all. As it does, it
must continue to respect the rule of law
and the rights of the individual. And it
must honor basic human decencies. If it
does not, it will lose that crucial battle
for the support and approval of the
people.

Mr. President, you and many other
Salvadorans have demonstrated extraor-
dinary personal courage in the struggle
against tyranny and extremism, but
your cause is being undermined by the
murderous violence of reactionary
minorities.

Tom Pickering's [U.S. Ambassador
to El Salvador] remarks— which I great-
ly admire and which the President and I
both fully endorse— were right on the
mark. These rightwing fanatics are the
best friends the Soviets, the Cubans, the
Sandinista comandantes, and the
Salvadoran guerrillas have. Every
murderous act they commit poisons the
well of friendship between our two coun-
tries and advances the cause of those
who would impose an alien dictatorship
on the people of El Salvador. These
cowardly death squad terrorists are just
as repugnant to me, to President
Reagan, to the U.S. Congress, and to
the American people as the terrorists of
the left.

Mr. President, I know that these
words are not those of the usual dinner
toast. My intention is not to abuse your
hospitality nor to offend you and your

other guests. I speak as a friend, one
who is committed to your success— the
success of democracy in El Salvador.
And I owe it to you as a friend to speak
frankly.

We in the United States have never
asked that others be exactly like us.
We're a nation that is constantly
debating its own shortcomings. But on
certain fundamental principles, all
Americans are united.

I ask you as a friend not to make
the mistake of thinking that there is any
division in my country on this question.
It is not just the President, it is not just
me or the Congress. If these death
squad murders continue, you will lose
the support of the American people, and
that would indeed be a tragedy.

Mr. President, your brave people
and mine have so much in common.
Your land reform has our full support,
and your staunch resistance to com-
munism has earned our great respect.
Now is the time to move vigorously to
consolidate the democratic gains you
have made and to establish fully func-
tioning democratic institutions in El
Salvador.

The people of El Salvador have
shown the world their courage and com-
mitment to democracy by turning out to
vote in overwhelming numbers despite
communist death threats, and they have
done honor to the democratic tradition
through their dynamic political debate
and action in the Constituent Assembly.
The presidential elections the assembly
has scheduled for March 25 will
strengthen your society and confirm the
bonds between our two peoples.

Mr. President, I offer a toast to the
Salvadoran people: may they soon come
to enjoy the long deferred peace and
prosperity they deserve.

'Text from the Vice President's Office of
the Press Secretary. ■

February 1984

THE SECRETARY

Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa

Secretary Shidtz departed
Washington, D.C., on December 6, 1983.
to visit Bonn (December 6-7), Brussels
(December 7-9) to attend the regular
semiannual session of the North Atlantic
Council ministerial meeting, Tunis
(December 9-10), Rabat (Decem-
ber 10-12), and Lisbon (December 12-13).
He returned to Washington on December
13.

Following are news conferences and
statements he made during this trip, as
well as the texts of the declaration of
Brussels and the final communique
issued at the conclu.^ion of the North
Atlantic Council meeting.

NEWS CONFERENCE,

BONN,

DEC. 7, 1983'

Secretary Shultz. I'd like to express my
appreciation to my host in this brief visit
to Germany, my friend Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, and also to Chancellor Kohl,
for the time and excellent meeting that
we had last night. Then today we had a
series of meetings with other leaders of
Germany. It's been a very short time,
very full, very worthwhile from my
standpoint. I must say also that the
United States, as in the case of Ger-
many, remains firmly committed to both
tracks of the dual-track decision. We are
very impressed with the way the Ger-
man people have handled the deploy-
ment issue, and we are as committed as
they to continue on and to maintain our
own willingness to continue negotiations
about these matters at any and all
times.

Q. Could you tell us what your
position will be on the conference in
Stockholm which begins January 17?
Will you personally participate?

Secretary Shultz. I have discussed
this on this trip with Mr. Genscher and
Mr. Kohl. And I expect that we will
discuss it in the NATO ministerial
meeting coming up tomorrow. It's an im-
portant conference and there are strong
arguments that the presence of foreign
ministers at the opening of the con-
ference will serve to emphasize the com-
mitment to it and its importance.

The position of the (jnited States is
that we will want to discuss this with
our colleagues and if the decision is, as I
kind of expect it will be, that we will
feel it important to go, then I certainly
will be present at Stockholm.

Q. Could you address yourself to
the issue of whether you will be
prepared to meet Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko in Stockholm if it
turns out that both you and Foreign
Minister Gromkyo are, in fact, there?

Secretary Shultz. Surely, if we are
both there, I will be more than ready to
meet with Mr. Gromyko. But, of course,
that depends upon whether we all go. as
I believe probably the Western decision
will be to go, and whether he is there.
And, at least from my standpoint, we
will work on our schedules in any way
necessary to make such a meeting possi-
ble if it is desired by Mr. Gromyko. We
certainly will be ready to meet.

Q. Are there differences of opinion
between you and the Federal Govern-
ment over a NATO strategy which, in
the opinion of the Federal Govern-
ment, could be based on the Harmel
report?

Secretary Shultz. I don't sense any
great difficulties in strategy between the
United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany. We consult constantly and
try to coordinate our views very care-
fully. And I think the way in which all
these matters have been conducted has
been an almost unprecedented display of
consultation and, in the end, a unity of
view on what we should do. Would you
agree with that, Hans-Dietrich?

Foreign Minister Genscher. I
believe that the introductory remarks by
the U.S. Secretary of State, in which he
again pledged his continuing commit-
ment to both parts of the NATO double-
track decision, reveal that both elements
of the common political security
strategies — that is the determination to
pursue one's own security interests, the
necessity to do what is required to main-
tain security, and readiness to conduct a
dialogue and negotiations for disarma-
ment and detente — are policy objectives
of both Administrations.

Q. Do you think that the time will
be ripe soon for a new Western
negotiating initiative in matters of
INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces]?

Secretary Shultz. I think, from the
standpoint of the INF issues, we have
put proposals on the table. We have ad-
justed them. We have displayed a great
amount of flexibility. The one thing that
we have insisted on is — a result in which
the Soviet Union has a complete

monopoly of intermediate-range
weapons in Europe, and Asia for that
matter, is not our idea of equality. But,
given that, we would like to see equality
defined as zero. But if that's not desired,
we'll look at other ways of defining it.
We don't think it's equality to have
deployments on one side and none on
the other. We're prepared to resume
negotiations and talks and to listen to
what the other side has to say within
that framework.

Foreign Minister Genscher. It is
not up to the West to take an initiative
at the INF negotiations, for the West
has put its negotiating proposals on the
table and the West remains at the con-
ference table as before. It is now up to
the Soviet Union to be ready for
negotiations again.

Q. After a possible meeting in
Stockholm with Gromyko, would you
exclude a coupling of INF and START
in Geneva?

Secretary Shultz. I know that there
have been good arguments not to do
that; they are not changed by what has
happened, so I don't know of any great
discussion of that question.

Q. [Inaudible] this occasion that
the deployment of Pershing II and
cruise missiles will accelerate as the
5-year period foreseen passes. Is it the
case, therefore, that deployment is not
proceeding slowly as a tactical signal
to the Soviet Union that there is yet
time for an agreement? Or is deploy-
ment proceeding at a fixed rate?

Secretary Shultz. There has been a
schedule that was decided upon and the
schedule is unaltered. The first part of
the schedule is in the process of being
implemented, and it will continue, as I
said. I think the main point is that we in
the West have values that are important
to us. And we feel we must defend
them, and we are determined to defend
them. We also feel that among the ways
of defending them is to engage in con-
structive negotiations. But they have to
be constructive negotiations. Now the
deployment schedule is part of that proc-
ess. But I think the emphasis should be
on the values and the concern that we
have for those values and our readiness
to defend those values.

Q. Polish trade union leader
Walesa called on the West to drop its
sanctions and consider giving further
credits. Is the U.S. Government will-
ing to consider this?

J) BUT Sift ||^. %0.
1^ l'> 19 'i& ft.

THE SECRETARY

Secretary Shultz. We have had a
poHcy that once again was discussed
with our allies. That's an alliance policy,
of sanctions in views of the actions of
the Polish Government. These are sanc-
tions against the government, not
against the Polish people whose per-
formance has been magnificent. I don't
see that the government has taken
measures that would warrant just lifting
sanctions or extending more credits or
anything of that kind. However, we ex-
amine the situation continuously, and I
am sure that Mr. Genscher and I will
discuss it some more. We discuss it
practically every time we meet, and we'll
review it. But at this stage of the game,
we think that actions that would be
taken ought to be a response to
something constructive done by the
Polish Government, and we will just
have to examine that.

Q. Despite all of the preparations
for the arrival of cruise missiles and
Pershings, opponents of these missiles
have managed to break through the
defenses at Schwabisch Gmund in Ger-
many. What does this say about the
state of American, German, and
British security arrangements?

Secretary Shultz. I believe what we
are intending to do will take place and I
have full confidence in the governments
to maintain the security and we'll pro-
ceed.

Foreign Minister Genscher. You
will have noted that the Federal Govern-
ment has implemented in the past, is
implementing at present, and will imple-
ment in the future all decisions recog-
nized as important and necessary re-
garding security measures.

Q. [Inaudible]

Secretary Shultz. We discussed
that some, and I didn't detect any par-
ticular difference of opinion. The situa-
tion in Lebanon is obviously a very
troublesome one.

So far as the escalation is concerned,
on the one hand, I think, it is important
to recognize that our forces are there as
part of a multinational force. In fact, the
international community is represented
further by the presence of UNIFIL [UN
Interim Force in Lebanon] in Lebanon,
which shows that extent to which the in-
ternational community worries about
and wants to help Lebanon construct
itself. That's what we are there for. We
are there in support of that objective in
Lebanon, and we are there in support of
stability and peace in the Middle East.

February 1984

So there have been lots of outbreaks of
violence and as long as we are there, of
course, we will have to defend ourselves
and we will continue to do that.

Q. [Largely inaudible question
about how the Secretary views the
contrast between the agreement of his
European government colleag^ues on
the INF issue and the opposition of
European publics.]

Secretary Shultz. We are
democracies. Germany is. The United
States is. And we have a way of making
decisions; it is through people taking
positions and the holding of elections.
Then on that basis those who are elected
take positions on behalf of their govern-
ments. And that's what's happened here.
That's what's happened in our country.
That's what happens in democracies. So,
I think that when you say that a
democratic government takes a position
on something, that doesn't mean that
every member of the population agrees
with it, but it means that there has been
a proper process gone through and
debate and open elections and so on.
And that certainly has been the case
here in Germany.

Q. [Largely inaudible question
about the escalation of American in-
volvement in Lebanon.)

Secretary Shultz. Our method of
involvement is basically to try to help
bring about peace and stability through
encouraging negotiation. We managed
to help the parties a little over a year
ago to evacuate the PLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization] from Beirut
and to the great benefit of the people
and the physical facilities in Beirut. We
have continued to try to bring about the
withdrawal of all foreign forces. I think
that's the right route, and the
emergence of a broadly based sovereign
government in Lebanon. We helped to
negotiate an agreement between Israel
and Lebanon, and there is absolutely no
doubt about the fact that Israel will
withdraw from Lebanon. It remains to
find the way of implementing that
agreement and to find the way of bring-
ing about Syrian withdrawal.

There is a definite strategy and plan
for bringing these things about,
although obviously it is not easy because
we have all been at it for quite awhile.
But that's our strategy and I believe
that the quality of people we have had in
these roles there — Phil Habib, Bob
McFarlane, Dick Fairbanks, Morrie
Draper, and now Don Rumsfeld — has

been very high. Our special negotiator
now, Don Rumsfeld, is one of the most
distinguished Americans who has had
the political experience of running for
office, being a Member of Congress who
has occupied distinguished posts in the
executive branch, including Ambassador
to NATO, and Secretary of Defense, let
alone running the poverty program in
the United States, and also now being a
successful business executive. He is a
very distinguished and high-quality per-
son. So we try to give our best to this
effort.

Q. [Inaudible] What Poland needs
now is aid in the amount of millions of
dollars. As the spokesman of the
Polish regime has stated earlier, even
if the sanctions continue, the govern-
ment will not starve. Are you of the
opinion that the sanctions should be
continued in order to cause hardship
for the Polish people and, in turn, to
destabilize the government?

Foreign Minister Genscher. We
have always held the opinion that a
positive move by those politically respon-
sible in Poland should receive a positive
reaction from the West. In all our ac-
tions concerning the People's Republic of
Poland, we have always valued highly
what the Catholic Church has said re-
garding the interests of the Polish
people — and, of course, also what Polish
labor leader Walesa has said during the
past few days will receive our due con-
sideration. I presume that this will
already come up for discussion among
the foreign ministers within the next
few days.

Q. Do you think that an active
U.S. military presence in Latin
America is necessary? How do you
assess the last decisions in Managua?

Secretary Shultz. We don't have a
military presence in Central America in
the use of military forces. We have exer-
cises that are taking place in that
region, particularly with Honduras.
Those are things that have taken place
in the past, and so we have put a
presence down there, and it is designed
for a training mission and also to give a
message that we can muster forces in
that area.

But basically, the policies of the
United States are first of all to seek
economic development for the Central
American people. They need it. Second,
to sponsor political conditions that em-
phasize democratic procedures, freedom,
justice, and things of that kind. Third, to

I .• .1 ^1

THE SECRETARY

help them provide a security shield
against those who would support prog-
ress in economic development and social
reform. And so we have provided
assistance to the Salvadoran Armed
Forces among others. And finally, to
urge that there be negotiations. We
believe that it is essentially a regional
problem and, therefore, regional
negotiations are appropriate. So we sup-
port the Contadora process, and we sup-
port what's going on there.

Insofar as recent statements from
Nicaragua are concerned, first of all we
welcome the 21-point agreement worked
out through the Contadora process, and
we welcome the fact that what
Nicaragua says now is vastly different
from what it said 6 or 8 months ago.
What we look for is a willingness to put
a reality behind the rhetoric, and that
remains to be seen. But we think there
will be many opportunities to do that
within the Contadora process.

Q. Since the Marshall Plan ini-
tiative, all U.S. Governments have
hoped for a strong and healthy Europe
as a partner. Is a Europe whose
leaders have just failed to reach an
agreement on any item on their agen-
da the kind of strong and healthy part-
ner the United States desires?

Secretary Shultz. Europe is strong
and healthy. Like the United States, like
lots of other parts of the world, there
are problems, I am sure. The fact that
one meeting doesn't produce results that
satisfy people is not an indication that
all is lost by any means. We continue to
place great weight on our relationships
with NATO, on our relationships with
the Community. And I plan to meet not
only with the NATO ministers during
this trip but also with the European
Community.

Insofar as relations between Europe
and the United States are concerned on
the economic side, of course, we have
some important strains but I think it is
also well to keep that in perspective.
There is a two-way trade between
Europe and the United States on the
order of an annual rate of ,$90 billion.
We must be doing something right, and
that's mutually beneficial. As we strug-
gle with the problems, I think it is well
to keep in mind the very beneficial
results from this huge two-way flow of
trade and also from our mutual security
support system.

Q. [Inaudible]

Secretary Shultz. No, I don't think
that it does have any bearing on the
Atlantic alliance at all, which is strong,
and insofar as the accession of Spain is
concerned, I'll let Hans-Dietrich address
himself to that, but I don't consider that
that question is over by any stretch of
the imagination.

Foreign Minister Genscher. There
have not been any differences of opinion
at all concerning the continuation of
negotiations over the accession of Spain
and Portugal. To the extent that there
was any agreement at all on this issue,
it was that negotiations should be
brought to a close during the first half
year of 1984 so that, directly following,
ratification may begin in all countries
concerned. That means the member
countries of the European Community
continue to maintain what they have
always said, namely, that they desire the
early accession of Spain and Portugal.

DECLARATION OF BRUSSELS,
DEC. 9, 1983

We. the representatives of the sixteen
member countries of the North Atlantic
Alliance, reaffirm the dedication of the Allies
to the maintenance of peace in freedom. Our
Alliance threatens no one. None of our
weapons will ever be used except in response
to attack. We do not aspire to superiority.
Neither will we accept that others should be
superior to us. Our legitimate security in-
terests can only be guaranteed through the
firm linkage between Europe and North
America. We call upon the Soviet Union to
respect our legitimate security interests as
we respect theirs.

We are determined to ensure security on
the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest
possible level. Faced with the threat posed by
the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Allies con-
cerned are going forward with the implemen-
tations of the double-track decision of 1979.
The ultimate goal remains that there should
be neither Soviet nor United States land
based long-range INF missiles. The deploy-
ment of U.S. missiles can be halted or re-
versed by concrete results at the negotiating
table. In this spirit we wish to see an early
resumption of the INF negotiations which the
Soviet Union had discontinued. ^

We urge the countries of the Warsaw
Pact to seize the opportunities we offer for a
balanced and constructive relationship and
for genuine detente. In all arms control
negotiations progress must be made among
the states participating, in particular in:

• The strategic arms reduction talks
(START);

• The intermediate-range nuclear forces
talks (INF);

• The negotiation on mutual and bal-
anced force reductions (MBFR);

• The endeavours for a complete ban on
chemical weapons in the Committee on Dis-
armament.

We are also resolved to use the forth-
coming Stockholm conference as a new op-
portunity to broaden the dialogue with the
East, to negotiate confidence-building
measures and enhance stability and security
in the whole of Europe.

We shall continue to do our utmost to
sustain a safe and peaceful future. We extend
to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw
Pact countries the offer to work together
with us to bring about a long-term construc-
tive and realistic relationship based on
equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For
the benefit of mankind we advocate an open,
comprehensive political dialogue, as well as
co-operation based on mutual advantage.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
FINAL COMMUNIQUE.
BRUSSELS,
DEC. 9, 1983

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial
session in Brussels on 8th and 9th December
1983. Ministers agreed as follows:

1. In the spirit of cohesion and solidarity,
the Allies remain determined to safeguard
their freedom and independence, to prevent
war and to build the foundations of lasting
peace and security in the NATO area. They
will maintain military strength adequate to
guarantee their collective security. None of
their weapons will ever be used, except in
response to attack. They remain firmly com-
mitted to balanced and verifiable arms con-
trol at the lowest possible level of forces, and
will work for greater stability and progress
towards genuine detente in East- West rela-
tions.

2. The Allies remain resolved to deter ag-
gression and attempts at intimidation. They
will meet their legitimate security re-
quirements with the conventional and nuclear
forces necessary. They will devote resources
and energy to the modernization of conven-
tional forces, seeking a more effective and
balanced transatlantic armaments co-
operation. The Allies note with great concern
that the Soviet Union continues its military
build-up, which far exceeds defence needs,
while promoting a concept of its own security
which is unacceptable because it rests on
maintenance of inequality in its favour.'

3. The Allies call on the Soviet Union to
act with restraint and responsibility in its in-
ternational behavior and to co-operate with
the West to promote a more constructive

I*: l?> l> %» U I, y^

THE SECRETARY

feces

rjitlesr

East-West dialogue aimed at reducing inter-
national tension. Rejecting any spirit of con-
frontation, the Allies reaffirm their deter-
mination to develop contacts and co-operation
with the Warsaw Pact countries on the basis
of mutual interest. While maintaining a firm
and realistic attitude, the Allies would
welcome any serious proposal aimed at
restoring confidence between East and West.
Ministers instructed the Permanent Council
to undertake a thorough appraisal of East-
West relations with a view to achieving a
more constructive East-West dialogue and to
report to the Ministerial meeting in spring
1984.

4. The Soviet Union bears a heavy
responsibility in the current state of interna-
tional relations. By its behavior, as in
Afghanistan and towards Poland, and by
recourse to intimidation and threats and
persecution of human rights supporters, it
has created serious obstacles to the normal
development of relations.''

5. The situation in Poland continues to
(give cause for serious concern. Some of the
steps taken by the Polish authorities, such as
the lifting of martial law and the amnesty for
most political detainees, contrast with the in-
troduction of other measures which reinforce
a repressive system. The Allies call on the
Polish authorities to respect the aspirations
of the people for reform and to abide by the
commitments in the Helsinki Final Act and
(the Concluding Document of the Madrid con-
Iference, particularly with regard to trade
union freedom and civil rights. They are
ready to respond to steps which create the
opportunity for constructive political and
economic relations with the West.

6. The Allies condemn the Soviet Union's
icontinuing and intensified aggression against
Afghanistan in violation of the United Na-
tions Charter and in flagrant disregard of
repeated calls by the United Nations General
Assembly. They deplore the terrible suffering
linflicted upon the Afghan people by Soviet
Iforces. The withdrawal of these forces is
essential for a political settlement to restore
Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty and
non-aligned status; to permit the voluntary
return of refugees and to provide the oppor-
tunity for the Afghan people to exercise
freely its right to self-determination.

7. Trade conducted on the basis of com-
mercially sound terms and mutual advantage,
that avoids preferential treatment of the
Soviet Union, contributes to constructive
East-West relations. At the same time,
(bilateral economic relations with the Soviet
lUnion and the countries of Eastern Europe
must remain consistent with broad Allied
security concerns. These include avoiding
dependence on the Soviet Union, or con-
itributing to Soviet military capabilities. Thus,
development of Western energy resources
should be encouraged. In order to avoid fur-
ther use by the Soviet Union of some forms
of trade to enhance its military strength, the
Allies will remain vigilant in their continuing

February 1984

review of the security aspects of East- West
economic relations. This work will assist
Allied governments in the conduct of their
policies in this field. ^

8. The successful conclusion of the
Madrid meeting contributes to the
strengthening of the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] process.
Although the Concluding Document agreed in
Madrid falls somewhat short of the Allies'
proposals, it is nonetheless substantive and
balanced. The Allies attach equal importance
to the implementation by all the CSCE coun-
tries of all provisions of both the Helsinki
Final Act and the Madrid document, in-
cluding their humanitarian aspects. An impor-
tant result of the Madrid meeting was the
agreement on a precise negotiating mandate
for the Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE) due to open in Stockholm in
January 1984.

9. Since peace can and must be made
more secure through equitable and verifiable
agreements on disarmament and arms con-
trol, as well as through a balance of forces,
the Allies have put forward a comprehensive
series of proposals in this field. Their commit-
ment to ensure security at the lowest possible
level of forces was recently demonstrated by
the member countries of the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group announcing at Montebello the
withdrawal of 1,400 nuclear warheads from
Europe, in addition to the reduction of 1,000
in 1980. The resulting stockpile will be the
lowest in Europe for some twenty years. The
Allies urge the Soviet Union to contribute to
disarmament efforts in a concrete way and
not to substitute declaratory proposals for
deeds.

10. Ministers underline that the two-track
decision of December 1979 by Allies concern-
ed demonstrates the commitment of the
Alliance to preserve peace and stability at the
lowest possible level of forces. The Allies con-
cerned reaffirm their commitment to pursue

a balance of intermediate-range forces
through arms control negotiations with the
USSR. The progress report of the Special
Consultative Group provides a comprehensive
account of United States efforts, on the basis
of close consultations with other involved
Allies, to achieve such an agreement.

Unfortunately, the negotiations in Geneva
have not yet achieved concrete results, due to
the Soviet effort to maintain their monopoly
of long-range land-based INF missiles.
Deployments of Pershing H and ground-
launched cruise missiles are thus proceeding
in accordance with the December 1979 deci-
sion. Building on progress already achieved in
Geneva, an agreement eliminating this entire
category of United States and Soviet
weapons, or at a minimum, limiting them to
the lowest possible level, remains attainable.
Allies concerned stress their willingness to
continue negotiation and to halt, modify or
reverse the deployments now underway, on
the basis of such an agreement. These Allies
will continue to consult closely on steps
directed towards achievement of this objec-
tive.

The Allies note with regret the un-
justified Soviet decision to leave the
negotiating table in Geneva. The United
States has negoitiated over the past two
years while Soviet deployments of SS-20s
have grown by over 300 warheads. The Allies
believe that the Soviet Union shares an in-
terest with the United States in reducing
nuclear weapons through negotiated agree-
ment. The Allies therefore call for bilateral
negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear
forces to resume as soon as possible.'^

11. The Allies fully support the United
States efforts in the strategic arms reduc-
tions talks (START), and they welcome the
recent American initiatives which provide the
basis for a significant build-down of U.S. and
Soviet strategic weapons. In particular, the
United States has indicated its willingness to
discuss trade-offs in areas of each side's par-
ticular interest and advantage in order to
achieve an equitable agreement which pro-
motes stability. The Allies call on the Soviet
Union to respond to these initiatives in a
positive spirit. In this connection they note
with regret the recent Soviet failure to agree
to a specific date for the opening of the next
round of the talks.

12. The Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE) is an important part of the
CSCE process and provides new possibilities
for increasing security throughout Europe.
Allied countries will table a comprehensive
package of concrete measures, in conformity
with the mandate agreed in Madrid, designed
to promote military openness in order to in-
crease confidence and security and reduce the
risk of surprise attack. They are resolved to
negotiate actively for an early agreement on
politically binding, militarily significant and
verifiable measures which will cover the
whole of Europe. As a sign of their deter-
mination. Ministers will themselves attend
this conference.

13. The Allies participating in the mutual
and balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks
reaffirm their determination to work for a
mutually acceptable solution to the issues still
barring progress. The Western draft treaty
presented last year provides a basis for a
sound agreement. These Allies hope that the
most recent Eastern statements indicate a
new willingness to address the longstanding
basic issues of the Vienna negotiations and
they are reviewing the state of these negotia-
tions also in the light of these statements.

14. In the Committee on Disarmament,
the Western participants continue to strive
for concrete disarmament agreements. They
consider as a priority task for this Committee
the elaboration of a verifiable agreement ban-
ning the development, production and stock-
piling of all chemical weapons.

The Allies remain gravely concerned
about strong evidence of continued use of
chemical weapons in South East Asia and
Afghanistan, in violation of international law,
and of Soviet involvement in the use of such
weapons.' They welcome the fact that the
United Nations is continuing to develop pro-
cedures to investigate allegations of the use
of chemical weapons.

f .1 .1 %

THE SECRETARY

In the context of efforts aimed at the
prevention of an arms race in outer space,
the Allies have also proposed in the Commit-
tee on Disarmament that the existing inter-
national law concerning the peaceful use of
outer space be reviewed.

15. The maintenance of a calm situation
in and around Berlin remains of fundamental
importance to East-West relations. This con-
tinues to depend in particular on the strict
observance and full implementation of the
Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September
1971. The Allies hope that the further
development of co-operation between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic will benefit Berlin
and the people in both states in Germany and
will strengthen peace in Europe in the cur-
rent state of international relations.

16. The Allies urge respect for the
sovereignty of states everywhere and for
genuine non-alignment. They recognize that
events outside the treaty area may affect
their common interests as members of the
Alliance. They will engage in timely consulta-
tions on such events, if it is established that
their common interests are involved. Suffi-
cient military capabilities must be assured in
the treaty area to maintain an adequate
defence posture. Allies who are in a position
to do so will endeavor to support those
sovereign nations who request assistance in
countering threats to their security and in-
dependence. Those Allies in a position to
facilitate the deployment of forces outside the
treaty area may do so, on the basis of na-
tional decision.

17. The Allies condemn terrorist acts,
which are a threat to democratic institutions
and to the conduct of normal international
relations. Recalling the relevant provision of
the Bonn Declaration, they reiterate their
determination to take effective measures for
the prevention and suppression of such
criminal acts.

18. The Allies recall their commitment
under Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty
and reaffirm the importance of programmes
intended to benefit the economies of less
favoured partners.

19. Ministers noted with regret the inten-
tion of Secretary General Dr. Joseph Luns to
relinquish his post. They invited Lord Car-
rington to become Secretary General of the
Organization as from 25th .June 1984 and ex-
pressed satisfaction at Lord Carrington's ac-
ceptance.

20. The spring 1984 meeting of the Coun-
cil in Ministerial session will be held in
Washington in May.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
informed the North Atlantic Council about
the review undertaken regarding Spanish
participation in the Alliance and in conse-
quence reserved his government's position on
the present Communique.

NEWS CONFERENCE,

BRUSSELS,

DEC. 9, 1983»

I've been privileged to attend an
outstanding meeting of the NATO
alliance. Outstanding in the sense of uni-
ty and cohesion that permeated the con-
versation, outstanding in the sense of
determination to carry forward with our
program, outstanding in the readiness
which we all feel to engage in a con-
structive dialogue with the Soviet Union
and its allies. Taken all together, it's
been an excellent meeting.

I can't help but feel that much of the
credit for that goes to the very exten-
sive consultative processes that have
taken place and take place just normally
in the course of our business, so that by
the time we come to a meeting like this,
we're all informed and governments
have kept each other apprised of their
views. It's a continuing process rather
than an intermittent one that might be
suggested by periodic meetings.

Let me take the occasion, finally, to
express my admiration for our retiring
Mr. Luns. He's done an outstanding job
and will continue to do so through the
balance of his term. He has our respect
and admiration and I salute him, and, of
course, also welcome Lord Carrington
who is well known and very much ad-
mired in the United States. We look for-
ward to working with Lord Carrington.

Q. Secretary General Luns told us
that the NATO ministers have urged
the Soviet Union to return to the INF
negotiations and the START negotia-
tions in Geneva. In your view, what do
you think the chances are that the
Soviets will, in fact, return to negotia-
tions?

A. That, of course, is up to the
Soviet Union. What we can control is
what we do, and what we do is take
reasonable positions and we're ready to
discuss them. So the content is there.

Let me call your attention to the
fact that there is a great difference, I
think, between the INF and the START
situations. In the case of the INF talks,
the Soviets have stated that they have
left them. In the case of START they
have simply not been willing to set a
date for the resumption of talks, and
whether or not there will be a date for
the next round of talks remains to be
seen, but we look for them to return for
the next round which would normally
take place beginning in the middle of
February.

Q. There's been some talk that the
Soviets are preparing a new initiative
to be made public at the Stockholm
conference. You're planning to attend
along with other Foreign Ministers.
Would you consider the CDE con-
ference an appropriate forum for a
new arms control initiative on the part
of the Soviets?

A. We'll welcome any initiative that
they choose to make, and the CDE con-
ference will be an important opening on
the subject that is set out for that con-
ference, and so if they make a new ini-
tiative we'll certainly welcome that. I do
plan to attend that conference.

Q. In your talks with the British
about lifting the arms embargo
against Argentina, did you give any
assurances to [Foreign Secretary] Sir
Geoffrey Howe that certain classes of
weapons— such as missiles or sub-
marines, which could be used against
the Falklands— would not be included
in any future arms contracts?

A. First of all, the action that was
taken is not so much about arms sales as
it is about human rights conditions. It is
an aspect of our outlook in the United
States and our statutory requirements
that arms sales be prohibited to coun-
tries where the human rights situation is
judged to be unacceptable, and that was
the case in Argentina.

Argentina has seen a dramatic
change in its posture, and so this action
on the part of the United States is a
reflection of that change. Arms sales as
such are a different matter, and they
are looked upon case-by-case. The situa-
tion in the region is considered
whenever we think about arms sales,
and that will be the case with respect to
Argentina. Certainly we will have told
the British that we will consult with
them.

!>■ lOr 1^ hf W
1« •% 1

Q. Do you expect the Soviets now
after Geneva, to walk out also from
the Vienna conference— MBFR— and
about Stockholm, all the talks are now
on this conference, but do you have
any idea if Mr. Gromyko will be ac-
tually attending the Stockholm con-
ference?

A. I have no way to predict what
the Soviet Union will do and can only
describe what they have done and from
the standpoint of the two arms control
discussions that you mentioned, we will
continue. Of course, at the MBFR talks,
the current round is coming to an end.
There will be another one, and we'll be
there, and we will be, of course, always
examining our positions and wanting to
see those talks go forward.

letin

THE SECRETARY

Similarly, the CDE conference
launches a new arms control initiative.
It was agreed to by everybody, including
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
countries, as an outcome of the Madrid
process. So we will be there on the basis
of the agreement to it in Madrid. I
should think they would be there but, of
course, that is up to them and I don't
have any way of knowing.

Q. Do you and your colleagues
think the basis now exists for a new
decision with regard to sanctions
against Poland, and are you moving
toward some new posture with regard
to Polish sanctions?

A. The situation in Poland has been
discussed and evaluated. Of course, the
whole discussion is highlighted
somewhat by Mr. Walesa's statement,
and he's a person whom we respect
greatly. So, of course, we have to take
his statements into account. What will
emerge from the discussion remains to
be seen. At the same time I think we do
have to basically look for the Govern-
ment of Poland to take steps that ease
the situation there, including their
dialogue with the church and their
dialogue with representatives of the
trade unions. We'll see if something like
that can emerge from Mr. Walesa's
initiative.

Q. Was there discussion among the
NATO allies this week of any
modifications in the deployment
schedules for the INF missiles and
will there be any modification in that
deployment schedule?

A. I didn't hear any discussion
about it and just assume that we have
set out a schedule and will keep the
schedule.

Q. Given the declaration of
Brussels and this new Tindemans
initiative that the Secretary General
spoke about, do you see the alliance
now putting a new emphasis or a new
overall initiative on detente and a new
relationship with the Soviet Union?

A. I think that the alliance has
always had, through its history, a kind
Df dual-track approach — a track of say-
ng we must be strong and determined
md capable of exercising a deterrent
lapability in support of peace. And it's
worked.

The other track that's also been
jresent has been one of saying that if
t's possible to have a constructive and
•easonable relationship, we're ready to
lave it. I think that it's always good to

examine the tactical aspects of imple-
menting that general approach. I'm sure
the general approach — it's our strategy
and we intend to stay with that
strategy. It's a good strategy and at the
same time there may be some tactical
ways of getting at it that will bear a
systematic study. I think it's a fair state-
ment that these matters are discussed
whenever we have a meeting like this,
and they're discussed a great deal in be-
tween meetings. What is in mind as
reflected in the communique is kind of a
systematic look at it that will be
developed as a result of work done here.
The results of that work, to whatever
extent they are fully developed, will be
available to the ministers when we meet
in May.

Q. Can you tell us what is in the
Brussels declaration and how that fits
into the scheme that you're talking
about?

A. It's a statement that, I think I
can fairly say, resulted from an initiative
by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who felt
that, in addition to the communique,
which tends to be lengthy — although I
think Mr. Luns takes considerable pride
that the communique is about half its
normal length, nevertheless it tends to
be lengthy — that there should be a
relatively short declaration about the
alliance's stance and determination and
readiness to talk. But I don't want to try
to summarize it.

Q. I want to deal with the
Lebanon crisis. Very recently — for the
first time, if I remember correctly —
Turkey agreed that U.S. forces in the
MNF use a base in southern Lebanon.
What is the implication of this new
Turkish approach?

A. I don't know that Turkey has
any particular capability of disposing of
a base in southern Lebanon. I don't
follow — southern Turkey. Turkey is an
ally and we work with Turkey. I don't
think it's especially related to Lebanon,
so I wouldn't draw any special conclu-
sions except that Turkey, I think, does
support us, as does almost everybody
else. The idea that we want to see is a
strong, unified sovereign Lebanon with
a strong central government and with
its foreign forces withdrawn.

Q. May I take you back to the
Argentina question? Despite the fact
that you have pledged to Sir Geoffrey
Howe that you will fully consult, don't
you think there's a danger that if arms

sales are resumed, this might be
damaging for the relationship between
Britain and the United States?

A. I think that we will be consulting
very carefully on this subject as we do in
the normal course of events, and I don't
think that we can expect, out of this,
damage to our relationship. Actually,
the United States has not sold arms to
Argentina for a long while and many
other countries have. And the British
relationship with those other countries
seems to be still in existence. But, as far
as any immediate plans for arms sales to
Argentina, there aren't any, and we will
have a good consultative arrangement
about it, I think.

I think that the action taken yester-
day has, as I've tried to point out in
response to an earlier question, been
overly interpreted as an arms sales deci-
sion. That's what it is about, not any
particular arms sale, or any desire to see
arms anywhere. It's a reflection of the
U.S. appraisal of what the human rights
situation has been and now is in Argen-
tina. To confirm our estimate and our
expectations, our Vice President, George
Bush, is going to lead the U.S. delega-
tion at the inauguration of the new
Argentine President.

Q. Yesterday, you spoke to the
Dutch minister about the situation in
Suriname in the Caribbean area. Does
the United States especially worry
about that situation there?

A. We, of course, pay attention to
our neighborhood, and Suriname is a
country in our neighborhood, and we
have been concerned about certain
developments in Suriname. We think
that it's very constructive that the
Surinamese have decided that the close
relationship with Cuba that seemed to
be developing doesn't seem to be too
healthy from their standpoint. That's
their decision, and we welcome that.
And so we'll follow developments there
closely and hope that Suriname can
flourish.

Q. I understand that the Israelis
today shelled near Tripoli this morn-
ing, and there are some reports also
that they are putting up some kind of
blockade to keep the PLO ships from
leaving Tripoli. What is the American
position on that? Do you think that
the PLO should be allowed to leave?

A. Insofar as the Israelis' action is
concerned, that's their action and we
didn't know anything about it in advance
at all. I assume it is part of the Israeli
tradition of retaliation against things

THE SECRETARY

that happen to them, and, as I under-
stand it, the Palestinians of all factions
claim the credit for what happened in
Israel.

As far as the PLO internal battles
are concerned, I don't have any com-
ment on that. We watch that. It's a mat-
ter of great concern that Lebanese soil
and a Lebanese city and Lebanese
citizens are once again being trampled
on in a fight on their soil, and it's a con-
tinuing tragedy. The sooner the source
of that fighting, which is foreign forces
on their soil, can be eliminated, the bet-
ter for the Lebanese. And so evacuation
and anything that will help cure that
problem we favor, but I'm not going to
take a position beyond that.

Q. Italy apparently wants to cut by
half the level of forces in Lebanon.
Does that weaken the posture of the
multinational force and its policy?

A. I had a conversation with Mr.
Andreotti individually and also as part
of our consultation of the multinational
force group, and in both cases, he and I
reaffirmed our determination to con-
tinue on with our purposes in Lebanon.
And the Italian approach seemed to be
similar to the United States as far as
the actual level of forces is concerned. I
don't know that it is appreciated that it
varies quite a lot, depending on the cir-
cumstances in each one of the forces and
essentially what happened. In response
to the request to each country by the
Government of Lebanon was, you might
say, an assigned sector or mission, and
then the people who are in charge of the
military forces involved— that is each
one separately — have to make up their
minds and they coordinate wath the
other military, of course — what it takes
to accomplish their mission. Actually the
numbers of Italians are considerably
more right now than was initially
thought, so I take from our discussion
that the Italian intention is to continue
with the assigned mission and mandate
and to uphold it. Whether that means
that some different numbers of forces at
a moment of time are necessary is for
them to decide. But the basic point is
that they continue to cooperate with the
other countries in carrying out our mis-
sion and to seeking our objectives in
Lebanon.

Q. It was announced last night
that Pierre Trudeau would be coming
to Washington in the next few days.

A. Yes, 1 think the 15th of
December.

Q. Yes, to present his peace plan
as such. What do you think will be the
outcome of your discussions and will
you encourage him to go onward to
Moscow, and, finally, what do you
think what progress is going to be
made, do you feel, in his attempt to
get Washington and Moscow talking
again?

A. He has a program of visitations
which I assume he will carry on and that
represents the decision that he's made to
take this initiative. And we'll, as always,
be glad to talk with Prime Minister
Trudeau. I'm sure the President will,
and I have no doubt but that the discus-
sion will cover his initiative but also
many other things in U.S. -Canadian
relationships, as both countries have
been placing a lot of emphasis on ad-
dressing the problems we have between
the two countries and taking actions to
do something about those problems. I
think over the last 2 or 3 years, it's been
a very successful effort. I've met with
Foreign Secretary MacEachen in-
numerable times. I think the President
has met with Prime Minister Trudeau
six or seven times, so basically the
meeting will be continued, and we'll cer-
tainly be interested in his initiative.
There's lots of communication between
Washington and Moscow. The state of
our relationship is not because it's im-
possible to communicate. It's the
substance that is giving the problem.

Q. Given concern and speculation
over the health of Russian leader
Yuriy Andropov, with whom are you
communicating in the Kremlin?

A. People speculate about health,
but as far as we're concerned, obviously
there is a Soviet Government; it is in
operation; it makes decisions. It has a
normal diplomatic flow, and our capacity
to talk with them is as it has been, and
for what it's worth, what evidence I see
is that Mr. Andropov is at work and, so
far as we know, in charge.

Q. You've talked about unity and
cohesion in this NATO meeting, but
when you turn to commercial and in-
ternational issues, that unity and
cohesion seems to be lacking. Do you
see any big problem within the two
sets of issues for the future?

A. I think it's not correct to say
that the unity and cohesion is lacking.
There are problems and issues, and
there are issues that people get very red

in the face about in the field of trade
and commerce. And I'm going to spend
the afternoon, probably, talking about
some of them.

On the other hand, I think it is too
easily forgotten that the volume of two-
way trade between the United States
and Europe runs at the annual rate of
$90 billion. That's huge. So I think the
message is: We must be doing
something right. And so we have prob-
lems, and the task for the governmental
people who are dealing with them is to
figure out how to deal with these prob-
lems which, you might say, are around
the periphery of this $90 billion bundle,
without damaging the bundle, because
that is a representation of the strength
and the mutual advantage that comes
out of this trade and commercial rela-
tionship. It's very, very large and very,
very important. I just say that to agree
on the one hand that there are problems
but to put them in the perspective of the
huge flows of commerce that does take
place in the normal course of events.

STATEMENT,

TUNIS,

DEC. 10, 1983'

I'd like to express my appreciation for
the very gracious treatment I've re-
ceived from President Bourguiba and
everyone here in Tunisia. We've had
some very frank talks that I've listened
to, and I've heard quite a number of
criticisms of the policies of the United
States. I have also been able to assure
those with whom I've spoken of the
dedication of the United States to the
causes of peace, of stability, of justice,
and of the recognition in the United
States that peace in this area cannot be
achieved unless it is possible to find a
way to solving problems that the Pales-
tinian people in particular have. We're
very aware of that fact, and I've been
made more aware of it as a result of my
conversations here.

Let me say also that we have
discussed the relationships between the
United States and Tunisia. These have
been very good and remain so. I believe
that as a result of our discussions here
and those that will continue that our
relationship will remain a strong and
constructive and helpful one to both
countries.

Department of State Bulletin

I' ■> it i% I

THE SECRETARY

NEWS CONFERENCE,

RABAT,

DEC. 11, 19831°

I'd like first to express my appreciation
to King Hassan for the graciousness of
the hospitality here and for the oppor-
tunity to talk at length with him cover-
ing a very wide range of subjects and
having an opportunity to hear his
analysis of important things going on
around the world. It's been a very
worthwhile visit from my standpoint,
from the point of view of the content,
and also it's been extremely pleasant
and naturally we appreciate that as well.

Q. What about the discussions you
had this afternoon with King Hassan
II?

A. The discussion went on for
around 2V2 hours. We discussed matters
of mutual interest having to do with the
Middle East— Lebanon, the peace proc-
ess, the problems of the Palestinians.
We discussed bilateral questions involv-
ing Morocco and the United States. We
discussed His Majesty's initiative in call-
ing for a referendum, and, of course, the
United States supports that. We dis-
cussed events in Europe: King Hassan
was interested in the meetings I had just
been in— NATO meetings. In other
words, they were very wide-ranging
discussions.

Q. What's the American perception
concerning the development of events
in West Africa, if the African parties
responsible for the preparation of the
referendum refuse the suggestion
which was proposed by His Majesty
the King as the final solution to the
problem of the Sahara?

A. I think, first of all, we have to
wait. There is an initiative that His
Majesty has proposed, and I think that if
people have an opportunity to express
themselves, that's really the proper way
to do it. I hope that people from around
the world will support this initiative, and
I hope that it does come to pass.

Q. Did the King or any of the
other Moroccan officials have
anything to say about the new
strengthened relationships between
the United States and Israel?

A. I described the intent of our re-
cent visit from Prime Minister Shamir
and also from President Gemayel, and I
think His Majesty was well posted
among the subjects that we discussed.

Q. Did he show any enthusiasm?

A. His Majesty is a very
sophisticated man, and I think I won't
speak for him: he'll speak for himself.
From my standpoint we had a searching
and satisfactory discussion.

Q. Will the United States of
America help the FLO departure from
Beirut as in the past?

A. Yes we did. We arranged the
departure of the PLO from Beirut, and
Mr. Arafat's departure from Beirut over
a year ago. We felt that there was an
understanding that he wouldn't return to
Lebanon, but, of course, he has been
there. And we see again the tragedy of
the Lebanese as one of their cities and
their people are being trampled upon in
somebody else's fight. So it's a continu-
ing tragedy. That being che case, the
Llnited States has supported the resolu-
tion under which an evacuation can take
place under the United Nations flag, and
we expect that evacuation to go for-
ward.

Q. What is your position concern-
ing the Israelis threatening the PLO
and not letting them leave the coun-
try?

A. As far as I know, what has hap-
pened recently is that a bus was blown
up in Jerusalem, and the PLO and Mr.
Arafat took credit for that act of ter-
rorism. There was an act of retaliation
by the Israelis. That's my understanding
of what took place, and that's the
substance of that exchange — something
that happens all too often in the Middle
East.

Q. How do you judge the reaction
of your Arab friends concerning the
strategic cooperation treaty between
the United States and Israel? This
treaty which confirmed once more that
the United States continues to see in
Israel the only strong and stable ally
in the region.

A. I wish some of those who are
discussing it would come forward and
show me a copy of this treaty. I have
not seen it. I will say again, the United
States has had, does have now, and will
continue to have a strong and supportive
relationship with Israel. There wasn't
any treaty signed during Prime Minister
Shamir's recent visit to the United
States.

We discussed a great many things
between the United States and the
Israelis. We discussed military matters,
economic matters, general observations

about what is going on in the Middle
East, and we discussed the buildup of
Soviet arms in Syria and many other
things. But we didn't sign a treaty,
however. I certainly want to say that we
continue to have and expect to have a
close relationship with Israel.

Q. I'd like to ask the following
question on the meeting in Brussels.
Have you had any response at all from
Moscow to the allies' proposal for a
comprehensive new dialogue with the
Soviets? Also, what would be the next
step in pursuing this dialogue with
the Soviets?

A. I have not heard of any
response. I suppose one next step would
be the attendance by Warsaw Pact
Foreign Ministers at the Conference on
Disarmament in Europe that will be con-
vened on January 17 in Stockholm. As
you know, in the Brussels meeting, the
NATO Foreign Ministers agreed that
they would attend that meeting, and, of
course, I am included in that group.

Q. It was announced today that
Marshal Orgarkov of the Soviet Union
has just spent 4 days in Algeria. Did
you know about this trip, and do you
have any feeling about Soviet relations
with this part of the world as
resulting from Orgarkov's visit?

A. The Soviet Union, of course, is
as active around the world as we are.
We believe that their influence in many
cases is not helpful. However, as we
agreed in the NATO statement, we are
prepared to engage with the Soviet
Union in a constructive dialogue, if they
are ready to do so; but this has to be
based on a realistic assessment of what
is taking place as we see it and on the
basis, of course, of the strength and
determination which we and our allies
have and have expressed.

Q. Did you and the King discuss
any ways of putting momentum behind
President Reagan's peace plan for the
Middle East, and if so, what was said?

A. We did discuss that at great
length and His Majesty had a number of
suggestions. Without feeling it proper to
try to quote His Majesty, I believe,
myself, that the problem of the Pales-
tinians is at the center of the issue. Of
course what we look for, and have
wanted to see for a long time, is a
legitimate group of Palestinians join
with King Hussein and be ready to sit
down at the peace table with Israel and
try to work out what sort of ar-
rangements will bring about stability in

February 1984

THE SECRETARY

that part of the world. We did discuss
that and other issues of the Middle East
in great detail.

Q. Is the Orgarkov visit the reason
vou did not stop in Algeria this time?
A. Xo.

Q. Were you aware of it prior to
today?

A. I was aware of it, but it had no
bearing on my own schedule.

Q. Can you tell us about the new
American initiative in the area?

A. There are President Reagan's
proposals of a year ago last September,
which the President has reaffirmed and
stated his intention to keep working to
achieve those objectives. We have also
had recent discussions not only with the
Israelis but with the Lebanese — Presi-
dent Gemayel — and his government, and
as a result of those discussions we think
we have some new ideas. Ambassador
Rumsfeld, who is the President's special
negotiator in the Middle East, has
returned to the region and has been in
various capitals already. It was an-
nounced in Washington that he will be
going to Damascus. Perhaps that's what
you are referring to.

Q. You heard during your stop in
Tunis considerable criticism of the re-
cent U.S. -Israeli policy, and I am
wondering if you have heard similar
criticism here during your stop in
Morocco?

A. We have certainly discussed the
U.S. -Israeli relationship, and particularly
the relation of some of our thinking,
with the Israelis, when they visited us,
to the Soviet buildup in Syria. I found
the discussion here was constructive and
informative in tone, and I tried to re-
spond and describe what we were doing
and thinking. So far as I can see, it was
received in that same spirit. But of
course, I don't wish at all to speak for
the Moroccans or King Hassan; they'll
speak for themselves.

Q. How does the United States
view Palestinian-Jordanian negotia-
tions as well as their consequences, in
case the negotiations succeed? What
would be the effect on Mr. Reagan's
plan?

A. We think that negotiations be-
tween Palestinians and Jordanian King
Hussein are a very positive thing to
have happened, and we certainly would
welcome very warmly a decision on the
part of King Hussein and the Pales-
tinians to be ready to enter the peace
process with Israel.

STATEMENT,
LISBON,
DEC. 13, 1983"

It is a pleasure for me to sign, on behalf
of the United States, this new defense
agreement further extending the long
period of cooperation between our two
nations.

The conclusion of this agreement is
a tribute to both our countries, as a
reaffirmation and a major example of
the shared values and strong ties of
cooperation which have existed for many
years between Portugal and the United
States. From those values, we draw
strength in our joint determination to
defend the freedom of our peoples, the
independence of our nations, and the
maintenance of the peace in a troubled
world. The accord we sign today makes
a major contribution toward those goals
and in so doing not only enhances our
bilateral relationship but also the vitality
of NATO.

This sense of joint purpose has been
reflected in the discussions it has been
my privilege to hold these past 2 days
with Portugal's leaders. We touched on
many subjects, regarding both our bi-
lateral relationship and major issues on
the international scene, I drew useful in-
sights from our talks, and I believe we
found ourselves in agreement on many
specific points. What struck me most,
however, was the clarity and strength of
our common desire to promote individ-
ual dignity and the defense of freedom
within our own societies and the world
at large and our willingness to work
together to achieve those ends.

This signing ceremony is thus a fit-
ting culmination to a most successful
visit, and I will depart Portugal grateful
for the hospitality shown me and pleased
in the knowledge that the bonds of
friendship and cooperation between our
two countries are strong and enduring.

'Press release 421 of Dec. 13. 1983.

^Denmark and Greece reserve their posi-
tions on this paragraph; Spain, not having
been a party to the double-track decision of
1979, reserves its position on this paragraph
[text in original].

^Greece expressed its views on the second
part of the last sentence of this paragraph
[text in original].

■■Greece expresed its views on the con-
tents of this paragraph [text in original].

^Greece recalled its position on various
aspects of this paragraph [text in original].

''Denmark and Greece reserve their posi-
tions on this paragraph [text in original].

•■Greece recalls its position as it has been
expressed during the previous Ministerial ses-
sions [text in original].

"Press release 437 of Dec. 28.

'Press release 418 of Dec. 12.

'"Press release 426 of Dec. 19.

"Press release 419 of Dec. 14. ■

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• ' I' it A& 1

ECONOMICS

U.S. Foreign Policy
and Agricultural Trade

by Kenneth W. Dam

Address before the Arnencayi Farm
Bureau Federation in Orlando on
January 10. 1984. Mr. Dam is Deputy
Secretary of State.

The American farmer has played a
significant role in U.S. foreign policy for
the past four decades. Agricultural prod-
ucts have constituted 20% of all U.S.
foreign economic assistance since World
War II. This assistance helped rebuild
the war-ravaged economies of Western
Europe and Japan. Those countries are
today our best cash customers for
agricultural products.

Since the 1950s, our farm products
have played a key role in establishing
economic and political stability in the
Third World. The United States con-
tributes more food aid to the developing
world— $33 billion in the last three
decades— than all other countries com-
bined. Public Law 480, "Food for
Peace," has been available since 1954 to
friendly nations that lack the resources
to supply their own food needs. As many
of these nations have grown more pros-
perous, they have continued to use our
agricultural products— not as aid
beneficiaries but as paying customers.
U.S. agriculture has also played a
key role in U.S. -Soviet relations.
Russia's need for imported grain has
generated important commerce with the
West. And with respect to China, our
agricultural exports have helped to lay
the foundation for an amicable, realistic
relationship.

This postwar history demonstrates
that when the United States can freely
pursue its comparative advantage in
agriculture, both the world and the
American farmer benefit. Since 1981,
however, U.S. agricultural exports have
been in decline. The benefits of our com-
parative advantage have long been
diminished by market-distorting trade
practices. Reversing that decline and
combating those trade practices is a ma-
jor priority not only of the U.S. farmer
and the Department of Agriculture, but
of the Department of State as well.

The Agricultural Export Problem

In the 1970s, world trade in wheat and
feedstuff's increased by 10 million metric
tons per year. U.S. exporters enjoyed a
boom with large harvests, big new
markets opening up in the developing
world, and a relatively weak dollar. The
last 3 years, however, present a sharp
contrast: world trade in grain has de-
clined from 215 to 199 million metric
tons, and coarse grain trade has fallen
from 108 to 89 million metric tons. The
reasons for this reversal are complex.
Those reasons include oversupply, the
recent worldwide recession, the ap-
preciation of the dollar, and trade-
distorting practices.

Perhaps the beginning of our
agricultural export reversal can be dated
from the partial embargo on grain
shipments to the Soviet Union imposed
by the Carter Administration in 1980.
That embargo provided an incentive for
farmers in other producing nations to in-
crease their production in order to serve
the Soviet market. The 1980 embargo
also called into question the U.S. reputa-
tion as a reliable supplier. As the Presi-
dent has said, that embargo "was bad
for our farmers, bad for our economy,
but not that bad for the aggressor we
were supposedly going to punish."

Since 1980, world agricultural pro-
duction has outpaced demand, which has
been depressed by the worldwide reces-
sion and the related debt constraints.
Eastern Europe, for example, dropped
suddenly from the ranks of major farm
importers in 1981 when its Western
bank credits were exhausted. The reces-
sion also hit the developing nations
especially hard. Debt service ratios for
non-oil-producing less developed coun-
tries (LDCs) currently average 32% of
their exports of goods and services.
These countries were forced to cut their
total imports of goods and services in
1982 by 7.7% in real terms.

The decline in world demand is not
alone responsible for the current decline
in U.S. agricultural exports. The recent
appreciation of the dollar relative to the
currencies of other agricultural export-
ing nations has also been a factor. That

appreciation has made U.S. agricultural
products relatively more expensive in
terms of foreign currencies.

The competitive position of
American farmers has also been
weakened by the use of unfair trading
practices on the part of other nations.
Many countries have trade barriers that
shut out U.S. agricultural products to
protect relatively less efficient domestic
producers. Were it not for Japanese
quotas on imported beef, for example,
U.S. farmers could put a pound of
square-cut chuck roast in Tokyo super-
markets at one-third the present price.
The subsidization of agricultural exports,
such as that practiced by the European
Community (EC), is taking third-country
markets that have not been earned
through comparative advantage.

Some of the conditions that have
contributed to the decline in U.S.
agricultural exports have improved.
While the dollar has continued to
strengthen in recent weeks, the United
States has now emerged from the reces-
sion and is on the road to sustained,
noninflationary growth. Together with
several other major industrialized coun-
tries, we can lead an expansion of the
world economy— and, hence, of world
demand for agricultural products.

Third World debt problems,
however, remain a concern. In the past
decade, the developing countries have
been the fastest growing part of the
global market for agricultural exports.
Servicing their debts, however, absorbs
foreign exchange that might be used for
imports, including food. The United
States has been a leader in developing a
strategy to meet the debt problem. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is
playing a major role in this strategy. We
appreciated the American Farm Bureau
Federation's support in obtaining con-
gressional passage of the Administra-
tion's request for $8.4 billion to fund in-
creased IMF resources. This legislation
may be regarded in part as farm legisla-
tion. Adequate IMF resources are essen-
tial to help ease the debt problems of
developing countries so that they can
buy more U.S. agricultural products.

February 1984

» I I

ECONOMICS

We are also helping to promote
growth in the developing world by
fighting protectionism at home and
abroad. The key to global economic
growth is doing more business, not less.
Quotas, tariffs, and other trade barriers
raise costs to us and deny borrowing
countries the hard currency needed to
service their debts and buy our exports.
Consequently, President Reagan has
pledged that his Administration will
fight protectionist measures, such as
local content legislation, and not turn its
back on the principle of open trade.

That does not mean, however, that
we will turn the other cheek toward
other nations' trade-distorting prac-
tices — especially those imposed on sec-
tors such as agriculture in which we en-
joy a comparative advantage. I grew up
on a farm in Kansas. And while I have
been away from farming for many
years, everything that I have since
learned has underscored my farm-bred
belief in the tremendous benefits that
flow from open trade. Trade barriers
produce no winners. If American farm-
ers — and their overseas customers — are
to benefit from the expansion of the
global economy, it is imperative that we
maintain an open trading environment.
It is for this reason that trade barriers
and export subsidies are problems that
the State Department is attacking head-
on, especially with respect to Japan and
the European Community.

Trade Barriers

Japan is our largest single export
market for agricultural products. The
Japanese bought nearly $7 billion from
us last year, representing 15% of all
American agricultural exports. Japan is
either our first or second largest
customer in almost all categories of bulk
agricultural commodities. In 1982 Japan
bought 23% of all U.S. corn exports,
16% of our soybeans, 26% of our cotton,
20% of our tobacco, 23% of our feed
grains, and 30% of our grain sorghums.

Progress has been made in
eliminating Japanese trade barriers.
Japan has reduced its import quotas
from nearly 500 product categories in
the 1960s to only 27 today. Japan's
overall tariff rates are the lowest among
the industrialized countries.

Even in those product areas where
we still have problems with the
Japanese — such as beef and citrus — the
Japanese are among our best customers.

In 1982 Japan purchased 64% of all U.S.
beef and veal exports, 26% of our
oranges and tangerines, 48% of our
grapefruit, and 82% of our lemon and
lime exports.

We have not and will not, however,
ignore Japan's remaining barriers to
U.S. agricultural exports. If Japan were
to substantially liberalize its imports of
beef and citrus, we could expect that our
market there for those two product
categories, which today stands at around
$350 million annually, would expand
over the next few years to about $1
billion. Our commitment, therefore, to
the farmers of this country and to the
open trading system means that we will
continue our effort to gain greater ac-
cess to the Japanese market. At the
same time, Japan, which benefits so
clearly from the world's open trading
system, must fulfill its international
obligations and open its markets
broadly.

President Reagan stressed these
points when he went to Japan last
November. When he addressed the
Japanese Diet, he sought the support of
Japan's parliament to lower further the
barriers that still make it so difficult for
some American products to enter the
Japanese market. He asked that they
continue and accelerate their actions to
reduce trade barriers.

Consumers know in reality what
economists teach in theory: in the end,
we pay the price of protectionism. Tokyo
housewives pay more for beef, chicken,
pork, milk, eggs, and bread than
housewives in Washington. In 1982, 28%
of the living expenses of Japanese
households went for food, compared to
only 16% in the United States.
Liberalization of agricultural trade in
Japan and an expansion of imports
would bring clear benefits to the
Japanese people. During the past three
decades, the United States has
demonstrated that it is a constant,
reliable, and stable source of food for
the Japanese people. We will continue to
be so in the future. We are working to
bring down Japan's barriers in the re-
maining product areas — beef, citrus, and
a number of value-added agricultural
products.

Upon his return from Japan, the
President asked Vice President Bush to
lead a followup effort to ensure con-
tinued progress toward opening Japan's
markets. Later this month, when
Japan's Foreign Minister visits
Washington and our trade negotiators

travel to Tokyo for a series of meetings
on trade, agriculture will be a priority
agenda item. Progress is imperative; we
are determined that it be made.

Trade barriers are, of course, not
limited to Japan, and we are addressing
them on a multifaceted front. But
despite the dangers and costs of trade
barriers, they present a less formidable
challenge than the problem of export
subsidies, such as those employed by the
European Community's common
agricultural policy (CAP).

Export Subsidies

Through its export subsidies, the com-
mon agricultural policy has become the
source of the most serious distortion of
agricultural trade in the world. Whereas
U.S. agricultural trade is responsive to
world markets, the CAP insulates the
EC from those markets and defies the
principle of comparative advantage. The
CAP relies on a complex, expensive
system of high domestic prices and
variable import levies to protect the
European farmer and to ensure in-
creased production. Extensive export
subsidies are then used to dispose of the
production surplus.

The CAP was originally conceived as
a social policy to maintain rural incomes
and populations. These objectives are
met by high price supports on
agricultural products. (The system is so
detailed that dairy price supports vary
according to the elevation at which the
cow lives.) High price supports en-
courage production but cause high food
prices which in turn depress demand.
The result is that large stocks ac-
cumulate.

U.S. farm programs have also
generated surpluses from time to time.
But there are two major differences be-
tween U.S. and EC farm programs.

First, farm prices in the United
States have fallen in real terms over the
last decade. In contrast, EC farm prices
have increased every year, often above
the rate of inflation. The result is that
for many farm commodities the
domestic EC price has been as much as
twice the world market price, and for
grain is now 40% above the world price.

Second, the most important U.S.
commodities compete on markets at
world prices. But the EC, as a matter of
policy, uses whatever export subsidies
are necessary to move excess produc-
tion. Needless to say, the subsidies are
huge. In 1983 the Community spent $9
billion in export subsidies to generate
about $30 billion in EC farm exports.

■^ ■» I^ |» 1^

ECONOMICS

The main point is not that the EC
subsidies are expensive in budget terms
and thus, because they distort the alloca-
tion of resources, limit Europe's ability
to keep pace technologically with other
developed countries. Rather, it is that
the EC's high-price, high-subsidy system
imposes a major portion of the true
costs of that system on its competitors
in third-country markets. When the
CAP was founded in the mid-1960s, for
example, the Community was a net
grain importer, buying perhaps 20
million metric tons of grain per year
from the rest of the world. Today the
EC exports a net 5 million metric tons
of grain. The Community has become
the world's number one exporter of
sugar, poultry, eggs, and dairy products;
it is challenging Argentina as the
number two exporter in beef; and it is
third after the United States and
Canada in wheat.

The United States and other
agricultural exporting countries are, in
effect, being taxed through lost export
sales in third-country markets to help
pay for Europe's high domestic prices.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture
estimates that because of the CAP the
United States is losing close to $6 billion
per year in farm export earnings; this in
turn deprives U.S. farmers of up to $2
billion in farm income.

The cost of the CAP has created a
severe budgetary problem for the Euro-
pean Community. In an attempt to
reduce CAP expenditures and avert an
anticipated budget crisis, the EC Com-
mission last year announced proposed
reforms of the CAP. The reforms in-
clude a proposal to move EC prices
toward the world level. This proposal is
encouraging; we will have a better sense
of the EC's commitment to this objective
when, later this month, the EC Commis-
sion makes price proposals for the
1984-85 crop year.

There are other reform proposals,
however, that worry us. Two of these
proposals do not seem designed to move
EC prices closer to world market levels.
Rather, they would raise taxes to under-
write increased production and export
subsidies, and seal off some of the few
remaining gaps in the Community's
variable levy wall.

First, the commission would in-
crease EC budgetary resources by rais-
ing the EC's share of the value-added
tax in member countries from the cur-
rent 1% to 1.4%. If this proposal had
been in effect last year, revenues raised

for the EC from this source would have
increased from $12 billion to $17 billion.
Most member states, including France,
take the position that not all of the
potential $5 billion increase in revenue
should be spent on agriculture. This pro-
posed tax hike, however, would in-
evitably relax what has been the prin-
cipal constraint on CAP spending.

Second, the commission has pro-
posed a consumption tax on vegetable
fats and oils, other than butter, and a
restriction on imports of nongrain feed
ingredients, including U.S. corn gluten
feed and citrus pellets. The tax on
vegetable oils is designed to stimulate
EC dairy consumption by making
vegetable oil more expensive and to
raise money for EC farm programs. The
import restrictions on nongrain feed in-
gredients would probably be in the form
of quotas or duty increases. If adopted
by the member states, these two pro-
posals together would affect almost $5
billion in U.S. exports, or about 60% of
U.S. agricultural exports to the EC.

Concurrently with its review of the
CAP, the EC is considering the member-
ship applications of Spain and Portugal.
The United States would applaud such
EC membership for broad political
reasons. However, current CAP prices
would sharply boost Spanish and Por-
tuguese prices for grain and oilseeds.
Such price increases will almost certain-
ly lead to dramatic production increases
as those farmers invest in irrigation, fer-
tilizer, and even new farming systems.
This prospect makes it all the more im-
perative that CAP reform move EC
prices closer to world levels.

As Secretary of Agriculture Block
said in recent testimony before Con-
gress:

We are pleased to see in the reform plan
a growing recognition that all countries have
an obligation not to let their policies ag-
gravate already unstable market conditions.
But we fail to see how broadening the EC's
protective insulation from import competition
will effect a closer alignment of EC prices
with world prices.

And we see no indication that the
CAP reform package, as currently pro-
posed, will lead to a significant curtail-
ment of surplus production and export
subsidy practices.

We have warned the EC that we
must and will defend our agricultural
trade. Last year we reluctantly subsi-
dized the credit arrangements on sales
of wheat flour, butter, and cheese to
Egypt on terms permitting us to com-

pete with the EC's export subsidies. We
have used the Department of Agricul-
ture's export credit subsidy program —
blended credits — in this connection as
well. On balance, however, we have
shown restraint in our use of export
credit subsidies.

We will take further action to pro-
tect our trade interests if the EC
unilaterally implements CAP reform
measures that restrict our access to the
Community. We have conveyed our con-
cerns to the EC on many levels.
Secretary Shultz reinforced those
messages in a November meeting with
the ambassadors of the EC-10 countries
in Washington. He also led the U.S.
Cabinet team in opposing EC trade
distorting measures at the December 9
ministerial meeting in Brussels.

Secretary Block recently noted a list
of EC agricultural exports to the United
States which we might target for
retaliation in the case of open confronta-
tion. The list includes such items as
beer, wine, cognac, cheese, and wool.
We have been genuinely reluctant to
move toward such a confrontation,
especially one that could involve retalia-
tion against EC trade with the United
States or increased American use of ex-
port subsidies in third-country markets.
But the EC has been put on notice that
the United States will not passively ac-
cept a common agricultural policy that
subverts our vital export interests.
While we are not attacking the CAP as
such, we will not acquiesce in trade-
distorting practices that negate the
benefits of our comparative advantage in
agriculture. And we do not intend to pay
through lost exports for EC efforts to
deal with the budgetary consequences of
the cap's high price policies.

U.S. Reliability as Supplier

No one questions the quality of
American farm produce, but many have
questioned our reliability as a supplier.
To be competitive, the American farmer
must be a reliable supplier. President
Reagan has emphasized more than once
the importance he attaches to this issue.
When he announced his agricultural ex-
port policy in 1982, he said that the
"granary door is open." And he meant it.
His policy to maintain the U.S. farmer's
reputation for reliability as a supplier
has the following three elements.

First, no restrictions will be im-
posed on exports of farm products
because of rising domestic prices.

February 1984

I .1 .1 •

EUROPE

Second, farm exports will not be
used as an instrument of foreign policy
except in extreme situations and as part
of a broader embargo implemented in
cooperation with other nations.

Third, world markets must be freed
of trade barriers and unfair trade prac-
tices.

Long-term grain agreements (LTAs)
have provided us with an additional
means of establishing the U.S. farmer as
a reliable supplier, especially with
respect to countries with centrally plan-
ned economies. Currently about one-
third of world grain exports are sold
under LTAs. The United States has
LTAs for our two largest wheat
markets— the Soviet Union and China.
We concluded our second LTA with
the Soviet Union last July. The new
agreement raises the minimum purchase
level by 50% to 9 million metric tons an-
nually." For the first time, the agreement
includes soybeans and soybean products
in addition to corn and wheat. The
Soviets have already purchased almost
7 million metric tons under the new
LTA.

The 1980 LTA with China provides
a foothold for the United States in an
important and growing market. China
exceeded its minimum annual purchase
commitments of 6 million metric tons in
1981 and 1982. Last year, however, the
Chinese reduced purchases of our
agricultural products, apparently in
response to difficulties encountered in
the recent textile negotiations. After
those negotiations were successfully con-
cluded in August of last year, the
Chinese resumed grain purchases.
However, they had not achieved their
1983 obligations by the end of
December. We are insisting that the
Chinese make up the shortfall, and we
will continue to work with them toward
that end.

LTAs have served our interests well
in the nonmarket economies of the
Soviet Union and China. In general,
however, the United States has tradi-
tionally avoided LTAs. In the U.S. view,
the free market system results in the
most efficient allocation of resources.

Conclusion

The State Department plays an active
and constructive role in agricultural
trade issues. We seek an international
trading environment which respects the
comparative advantage of various com-
petitors. We are firm in our efforts to
get the Japanese to allow us better ac-
cess to their agricultural and capital
markets. We oppose European efforts to
increase protectionism and to maintain
and expand export subsidies. And we
support efforts to ensure that the
United States is a reliable supplier.

I have spoken today of free markets;
I would like to conclude my remarks by
speaking of free peoples. We have our
disputes with Japan and the European
Community. But the United States and

the great democracies of Western
Europe and Japan stand together at the
forefront of the free nations and free
economies of the world. We believe in
rewarding initiative, creativity, and risk
taking. As President Reagan said in
Japan, "Our freedom inspires no fear
because it poses no threat. We in-
timidate no one. And we will not be in-
timidated by anyone." We do not "build
walls to keep our people in; we do not
have armies of secret police to keep
them quiet." Rather, in this imperfect
and sometimes dangerous world, the
United States, Japan, and Western
Europe represent the deepest aspira-
tions of men and women everywhere—
to be free, to live in peace, and to create
and renew the wealth of nations. ■

NATO Defense Planning Committee
Meets in Brussels

The DefcHsr Miinsl,,^ of the North
Atlantic Trnil,/ l h;ja„r:nti',m {NATO}
met in Brussils Dm mber 6-7, 1983. The
United Stdtrs inis n presented by Secre-
tary ofDe/fNsc ( 'iisjjar W. Weinberger.
Following is the final communique
issued on December 7.

1. The Defense Planning Committee of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in
Ministerial Session in Brussels on 6th and 7th
December 1983.

2. Ministers reaffirmed that NATO
preserves the peace, freedom and security of
its members through the maintenance of
military forces sufficient to deter aggression
and through policies designed to promote
stable international relations. The strength of
the Alliance derives from the cohesion and
solidarity of its members in pursuing these
common objectives.

3. NATO is a defensive alliance and is
committed to preserve the peace at the
lowest level of forces capable of deterring the
Warsaw Pact threat. In this respect Ministers
recalled the recent Alliance decision at
Montebello to withdraw 1,400 nuclear
warheads from Europe. This decision, taken
together with the withdrawal of 1,000
warheads in 1980, will bring to 2,400 the
total number of warheads to be removed
from Europe since 1979. The resulting
stockpile will be the lowest in Europe for
some 20 years. Furthermore any deployment
of land-based LRINF [longer range
intermediate-range nuclear force] missiles
will be matched by one for one withdrawals.
This is in clear contrast to the relentless
Soviet buildup. Ministers urged the Soviet
Union to match NATO's restraint and to
reduce rather than continue to increase the
levels of its nuclear weapons.

4. Deterrence and arms control are in-
tegral and complementary parts of the securi-
ty policy of the Alliance. Both are fundamen-
tal to NATO's long-standing objectives of
safeguarding the peace and pursuing,
through dialogue and mutually advantageous
co-operation, a constructive East-West rela-
tionship aimed at genuine detente. Therefore,
while seeking a stable balance at lower levels
of forces through militarily significant,
equitable and verifiable arms control
agreements, NATO must continue at the
same time to provide the capabilities
necessary to ensure deterrence of aggression
by means of a strong defence.

5. The security of the Alliance depends
on the maintenance of a stable military
balance: This balance has been gravely
disturbed by the relentless Soviet deployment
of SS-20 missiles. Ministers emphasized their
determination to move ahead with the dual-
track approach to LRINF modernization and
arms control as offering the opportunity to
redress this imbalance and reaffirmed that
this approach remains the most effective way
of safeguarding the security of the Alliances.

• They noted with great regret that the
Soviet Union had unilaterally ended the latest
round of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear
force] negotiations in Geneva without agree-
ing on a date for their resumption. There is
no justification for this action by the Soviet
Union, which has, during the course of the
negotiations since the United States proposed
to eliminate this entire class of weapons, ex-
panded its SS-20 force by over 300
warheads. Ministers emphasized their desire
that the negotiations be resumed as soon as
possible to achieve an agreement on equal

A li. K^> !« An. »k:'av.

EUROPE

global limits on United States and Soviet
LRINF missile warheads at reduced levels,
preferably zero for both sides.

• They reaffirmed that NATO is
prepared, in accordance with the terms of
any INF agreement that may be reached, to
halt, modify or reverse its deployments,
which are now underway in conformity with
the 1979 decision.

• They welcomed the continuing close
consultations within the Alliance on INF
negotiations. The intensity of these consulta-
tions has reflected the cohesion of the
Alliance. They stressed that Alliance firmness
in resolutely carrying out the dual-track deci-
sion was a major factor in bringing the Soviet
Union to the negotiating table and will con-
tinue to be a critical factor in inducing the
Soviet Union to recommence INF negotia-
tions in a serious fashion.'

6. Ministers welcomed the proposals the
United States has made in the strategic arms
reduction talks to reduce the most destabiliz-
ing weapons and to reduce substantially the
level of United States and Soviet strategic
arms, including the build-down concept
recently tabled in Geneva. Ministers reem-
phasized their support for the United States
position in the talks, on which they have been
fully informed, and welcomed the United
States initiatives to move the talks forward.
Ministers reaffirmed the need to strive for a
mutually acceptable solution to the issues still
barring progress in the mutual and balanced
force reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna.
They also stressed the importance they at-
tach to the Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE) as an opportunity to negoti-
ate politically binding, militarily significant
and verifiable measures which will cover the
whole of Europe and which would increase
confidence and security and reduce the threat
of surprise attack.

7. Ministers noted with concern the pace
of modernization of Warsaw Pact forces
across the entire spectrum, strategic to con-
ventional. In the face of this steady ac-
cumulation of Soviet military power, the
Alliance must take the necessary measures to
preserve the security of its peoples. NATO's
strategy of flexible response and forward
defence remains valid and continues to be the
basis for NATO defence. This requires a
balanced triad of forces: the strengthening of
the conventional component is particularly
urgent. Against this background Ministers
discussed the results of the 1983 annual
defence review and adopted the NATO force
plan for 1984-1988. Ministers welcomed the
progress achieved by nations, and agreed to
do their utmost to make available the
resources needed for the essential enhance-
ment of their deterrent and defence forces.

8. They recognized that in current
economic circumstances achieving the re-
quired improvements to NATO's defence
posture constitutes a considerable challenge.
It is imperative that national consideration of
any change to existing commitments takes in-

to account Alliance needs and priorities. The
best use of scarce resources remains a central
problem. Improvements to the combat capa-
bility and effectiveness of NATO's conven-
tional forces must be achieved,

9. In this context Ministers emphasized
the importance of making the most effective
use of available resources and of exploiting
NATO's technological strength through
greater emphasis on:

• Co-operation and co-ordination in
defence planning and in the field of research,
development and production;

• Improved co-ordination of NATO in-
frastructure planning to bring support
facilities more into line with the projected
needs of NATO forces, at the same time as
providing an appropriate level of funding to
ensure their operational effectiveness;

• A more effective and balanced frame-
work of transatlantic co-operation;

• The potential offered by technologies,
available or emerging, to make substantial
and yet affordable improvements in the con-
ventional defence of the Alliance particularly
within the context of the two-way street;

• The establishment of priorities based
on the application of rigorous criteria of
military value and cost effectiveness;

• Adequate use of the industrial capa-
bilities of member countries in the field of
defence equipment;

• Effective steps to restrict the transfer
of militarily relevant technology to the
Warsaw Pact.

Ministers acknowledged progress made in
the appropriate NATO bodies towards co-
ordinating national efforts generally and in
ensuring the successful exploitation of emerg-
ing technologies.

10. Ministers again stressed the impor-
tance of Greece, Portugal and Turkey having
adequate allied assistance to carry out their
missions more effectively to the advantage of
all. Ministers agreed that despite commend-
able efforts by some allies more aid, and by
more nations, is essential.

11. While the purpose of NATO is to
preserve the security of the North Atlantic
Treaty area. Ministers again acknowledged
that developments outside the NATO Treaty
area might threaten the vital interests of
members of the Alliance. They recalled their
agreement to take full account of the effect
of such developments on NATO security,
defence capabilities and the national interests
of member countries and the need to consult
and to share assessments on the basis of com-
monly identified objectives. They also recalled
the Bonn Summit statements and reendorsed
their communique of June 1983 which stated
that on the basis of national decision: those
countries, such as the United States, which
have the means to take action, should do so
in timely consultation with their allies; there
could be cases where other individual allied
nations would make an important contribu-
tion to the security of the Alliance by making

available facilities to assist deployments need-
ed to strengthen deterrence in such areas;
and member nations, as they may decide,
have a wide and diverse range of possibilities
from which to choose in making useful con-
tributions to promote stability and deterrence
in regions outside the treaty area involving
vital Western interests.

12. Against the background of United
States planning for its rapidly deployable
forces and the implications for defence of the
NATO area, Ministers noted work in prog-
ress to review measures necessary to main-
tain deterrent and defence capabilities within
the NATO area and agreed that measures
that could be taken by countries would be
dealt with in the defence planning process,
the next stage of which is the adoption of
force goals in spring 1984.

13. NATO's task of preserving peace and
freedom and preventing war requires a full
spectrum of credible military forces, a stable
military balance and the strategy of flexible
response. The firm support of the peoples of
the Alliance and the provision and effective
use of adequate resources are essential to
fulfill these aims. While military strength
alone cannot provide long-term security it
provides the foundation for the development
of peaceful relations through dialog^ue and
communication.

The Minister of Defence of Spain in-
formed the Defence Planning Committee
about the review undertaken and regarding
Spanish participation in the Alliance and in
consequence reserved his government's posi-
tion on the present Communique.

'Denmark and Greece reserve their posi-
tions on paragraph 5 [footnote in original]. ■

February 1984

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Implications for
U.S. Action in Grenada

by Elliott Abrams

Address before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council in Los Angeles,
on Novemhei- 22, 1983. Mr. Abrams is
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs.

November 22 is a somber day in the
lives of all Americans. On this day in
1963, President John F. Kennedy was
assassinated. For millions of Americans,
the passage of two decades has not
dimmed a single detail of the assassina-
tion and its aftermath. In our mind's
eye, we can still follow the President's
motorcade; we can see him jolted by an
explosion of shots; we can follow the
President's funeral procession making
its mournful way through the grey
streets of Washington. And as we recall
those tragic moments, we are reminded
once again of the irrational and
capricious forces which seem to be an in-
escapable part of the human condition,
and which can even claim a great and
beloved President as their victim.

It is altogether fitting, then, that we
Americans should take time out on this
day to pay tribute to the memory of
President Kennedy. And because Presi-
dent Kennedy was preeminently a po-
litical man, paying tribute to his memory
means honoring the political principles
for which he stood.

First and foremost among these
principles was the defense of human
rights. Indeed, this nation's willingness
to defend human rights was a theme
which ran through so many of President
Kennedy's speeches. In his moving and
eloquent Inaugural Address, for exam-
ple, the President declared that the
torch had been passed to a new genera-
tion of Americans, "unwilling to witness
or permit the slow undoing of those
human rights to which this nation has
always been committed." And on
November 22, 1963, the final speech of
President Kennedy's career, the speech
he did not live to deliver, concluded with
this ringing affirmation: "Our duty as a
party is not to our party alone, but to
the nation, and, indeed, to all mankind.
Our duty is not merely the preservation
of political power, but the preservation
of peace and freedom."

In retrospect, it seems clear that
President Kennedy's assassination
marked the end of a political era and the
start of what the historian Theodore
White has rightly called "the storm
decade" in American politics. During this
decade, President Kennedy's belief that
the United States was obliged by its
history and its principles to defend lib-
erty and uphold the cause of human
rights was superseded, in many
quarters, by a very different interpreta-
tion of American history. Let me read
you an excerpt from a speech delivered
in 1971 by the president of one of our
most famous universities, which best
conveys the spirit — and the perver-
sity — of those times:

In twenty six years since waging a world
war against the forces of tyranny, fascism
and genocide in Europe, we have become a
nation more tyrannical, more fascistic and
more capable of genocide than was ever con-
ceived or thought possible two decades ago.
We conquered Hitler, but we have come to
embrace Hitlerism.

Today, the notion that Americans
had somehow come to embrace
Hitlerism must surely strike sane per-
sons as bizarre and grotesque. It would
be wrong, however, to assume that the
ideas and attitudes which inspired such
remarks have disappeared from the
scene altogether. In attenuated form,
they remain influential. Among
members of what is loosely called the
human rights "community," the belief
persists that the United States is so
morally and politically flawed that the
only way it can advance human rights is
through acts of abstention: not providing
aid, not resisting aggression, not helping
fellow democracies, not getting involved.
The idea that American power can be
used to defend human rights is rejected
with scorn and derision.

The Reagan Administration came in-
to office with a very different conception
of what constitutes a proper human
rights policy. To put it simply, we
believe that American power is a force
for good in the world. We also think
that there is a necessary connection be-
tween the defense of our national in-
terest and the defense of human rights.
We, therefore, maintain, along with
President Kennedy, that the United
States cannot "witness or permit the

slow undoing of those human rights to
which this nation has always been com-
mitted." Indeed, it is precisely our un-
willingness to witness the undoing of
human rights in such areas of the world
as Grenada which is responsible for
some of the Reagan Administration's
most controversial foreign policy deci-
sions. For this reason, I would like to
address the human rights implications of
our actions in Grenada this afternoon.

Factors Determining
U.S. Action in Grenada

As everyone here is aware, the United
States acted in Grenada at the request
of the Organization of East Caribbean
States, which in turn had received a
direct appeal from the Governor General
of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon. The Gover-
nor General's appeal for action carried
exceptional moral and legal weight, as
he was the sole remaining constitutional
authority on Grenada.

Adding further weight in this situa-
tion was the fact that American concern
for human rights is inextricably linked
to our belief in democracy and our
understanding that the suspension of
democracy exposes societies to the
widest range of human rights
abuses — murder, torture, arbitrary ar-
rest and punishment, and other depriva-
tions of freedom. Without democracy,
these abuses can be imposed at the
discretion of rulers, for the society can
no longer control or remove them.

These dangers were increasingly
realized on the island of Grenada in the
late 1970s. The government of Prime
Minister [Eric] Gairy resorted to strong-
arm methods and reportedly engaged in
electoral fraud to remain in power. The
coup of 1979 brought Prime Minister
[Maurice] Bishop to power and, with
him, only unfulfilled promises to end
abuses, to hold elections, and to return
to a parliamentary system.

As the State Department's 1982
Human Rights report on Grenada makes
clear, the human rights situation in
Grenada was already serious before the
murder of Prime Minister Bishop. There
were numerous political prisoners, police
brutality had been reported, freedom of
expression was severely restricted,
freedom of assembly was nonexistent.

Bulletin

Mf BUT ■.«. M». |#

HUMAN RIGHTS

all democratic labor leaders had been
jailed, and churches operated only under
the close scrutiny of the government. No
elections had been held or were in pros-
pect. Today's Neiv York Times carries
the story of a political prisoner of the
Bishop years, jailed and tortured for
mouthing a few complaints against the
Bishop regime.

As has happened so often in history,
the sacrifice of freedom did not bring
order. Contending factions took to set-
tling their differences by an uncontrolled
process of arbitrary arrest and assas-
sination. A power struggle between
Prime Minister Bishop and Deputy
Prime Minister Bernard Coard erupted
on October 12. According to the minutes
of the Party Central Committee, Bishop
was considered a "bourgeois
deviationist" for moving too slowly to
consolidate a "Leninist" restructuring of
Grenadian society. The Prime Minister
was placed under house arrest without
legal process on the night of October
13-14, and other cabinet members were
arrested.

Within a week, Bishop and several
of his cabinet ministers were dead;
troops had fired directly on demon-
strators; a revolutionary military council
had been formed; a round-the-clock,
shoot-on-sight curfew was imposed; and
journalists from the international press
arriving at the airport were immediately
deported. Legitimate government and
order had ceased to exist.

Other eastern Caribbean states — all
of them democracies with no armed
forces to speak of — reacted strongly to
the collapse of order in Grenada. In Bar-
bados, Prime Minister Tom Adams ex-
pressed "horror at these brutal and
vicious murders" and noted that events
in Grenada marked "the difference be-
tween barbarians and human beings."

In its formal request for U.S.
assistance, the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States detailed: "the current
anarchic conditions, the serious viola-
tions of human rights and bloodshed
that have occurred and the consequent
unprecedented threat to the peace and
security of the region created by the
vacuum of authority in Grenada."

The United States felt constrained
to act. President Reagan has called this
military action a rescue, and the Grena-
dian people seem overwhelmingly to
agree. The respected Grenadian jour-
nalist Alister Hughes spoke for the vast
majority of people in Grenada when he
said of the American and Caribbean
troops, "Thank God they came. If some-

one had not come in and done some-
thing, I hesitate to say what the situa-
tion in Grenada would be now." The
Grenada Chamber of Industry and Com-
merce declared "its support for and
gratitude to the liberation forces of the
Caribbean and the United States who, in
the face of inevitable censure in the in-
ternational fora, were concerned enough
to come to the assistance of a population
held hostage by political terrorists." And
a delegation from the Grenada Council
of Churches told a visiting LI.S. congres-
sional delegation that, "We were in
favor of the American troops on the
island, because, from the experience of
our people, it was clear to us that they
felt that the American presence was
welcomed."

The Risk of Condemnation

Yet the reaction of human rights groups
in this country and abroad has been
uniformly critical. Some have gone so
far as to suggest that our action in
Grenada violated the norms of interna-
tional morality. This is a telling accusa-
tion, for it highlights the adversarial role
some human rights activists have chosen
to play in relation to the Reagan Ad-
ministration's human rights policy. Thus,
I would like to examine the moral and

Means. The issue is whether we pur-
sued these honorable goals by means
that were appropriate and proportional.
For example, had U.S. military action
resulted in the deaths of thousands, or
even hundreds of innocent civilians on
Grenada, I do not think we would con-
sider such a military action so easily
defensible. Had it entailed a risk of a
major war, many would have wondered
whether that risk was worth taking. But
here was a case where the means at
hand did not seem to risk an expanded
conflict or the deaths of innocent
civilians. The means required to achieve
our goals were entirely proportional and
appropriate.

Results. It was logically predictable
that the results of such an operation
would almost certainly be the restora-
tion of democracy to Grenada. Already
order has been restored and a compe-
tent government has taken over, and
next year there will be free elections and
a democratic government will take over.
So although it is too soon to know the
results for sure, it is really very hard to
doubt that the result will be democracy
and respect for human rights.

So it seems to me that when we con-
sider the moral questions relating to this
intervention — judged by goals, means,
and results — it meets the test.

The United States felt constrained to act.
President Reagan has called this military action a
rescue, and the Grenadian people seem overwhelm-
ingly to agree.

ethical questions which the Grenadian
action has raised.

Perhaps we should proceed by ask-
ing the following questions: Were the in-
tentions of our actions ethical? Were the
means we used ethical? Were the results
ethical?

Intentions. It seems to me clear
that those of the United States were en-
tirely ethical. We wanted to rescue
Americans from possible harm; we
wanted to restore democracy and re-
spect for human rights in Grenada; we
wanted to eliminate a threat to the se-
curity and democracy of neighboring
islands. These, plainly, are honorable in-
tentions.

The Dilemma of Moral Imperatives

Yet despite these very strong arguments
in favor of the morality of our interven-
tion, our critics would have preferred
that we place our citizens' lives at risk
and ignore the tyranny in Grenada,
rather than appear to violate the princi-
ple of national sovereignty.

Now, no one can deny that respect
for the sovereignty and national
autonomy of all states is, indeed, a
moral imperative. This principle has long
been a touchstone of American foreign
policy. Yet, is this moral imperative
determinative under any and all cir-
cumstances? If, for example, a Hitler

February 1984

HUMAN RIGHTS

had come to power in Grenada and had
threatened to implement a Caribbean
version of the "final solution," should our
respect for Grenada's national sovereign-
ty have forced us to acquiesce in such
barbarism?

The more we ponder such dilemmas,
the more we come to recognize that no
single moral value can be absolute. To
paraphrase the great American
philosopher, Sidney Hook: Our espousal
of the cause of national sovereignty does
not require us in every circumstance of
international affairs to support it, any
more than our cherishing of honesty
demands that we should always tell the
truth about everything to everyone, or
our belief in charity that we give alms in
any and every circumstance. National
sovereignty is one value among others,
and we must evaluate a claim for it in
the light of its consequences for these
other values.

All this, I think, would have been
quite clear to our critics had the Grena-
dian New JEWEL Movement been Nazi-
oriented rather than Marxist-Leninist-
oriented. If we had acted against a Nazi
or a Fascist group, I believe we would
have heard not a word of condemnation
from human rights groups. I think it is
fair to say, then, that denunciations of
the Grenada action — indeed, of Reagan
human rights policy as a whole — come
for the most part from people who have
been captured by the symbolism and
rhetoric of the left. In their view, sup-
port of human rights causes and sym-
pathy for causes of the left, for "pro-
gressive" regimes, are virtually identical
propositions. How else can we account
for the virtual silence of these groups
about human rights violations committed
by the New JEWEL Movement, in
Grenada, and the explosion of criticism
and concern from these same groups
once the New JEWEL Movement had
been overthrown? Our use of quiet
diplomacy, for example, is surely not a
matter of principle.

It is a tactic aimed at attaining
results in countries and situations where
more public action might be counter-
productive. We are well aware of the
political costs of quiet methods — we are
accused of doing nothing or too little
and cannot defend our policy by reveal-
ing our private diplomatic efforts. But
that's a choice we have made and which
you would wish us to make — to seek
results rather than publicity — to have a
human rights policy rather than a public
relations policy.

A central difference, then, between
the Reagan Administration and many of
its critics on human rights issues comes
down to this: We believe in what might
be characterized as a policy of strict
nonalignment as between human rights
violators of the extreme left and the ex-
treme right. We condemn both extremes
with equal vigor. Many of our critics,
however, practice what has come to be
known as "positive" nonalignment; that
is, alignment in favor of the side that
employs the verbiage of the left both to
justify and to mask its repression.

Not surprisingly, the Reagan Ad-
ministration's policy of strict nonalign-
ment tends to get us into trouble with
practitioners of this so-called "positive"
nonalignment. This is clearly the case
with our domestic critics, and it is even
more emphatically the case in interna-
tional fora such as the United Nations,
which are dominated by practitioners of
"positive" nonalignment.

Conclusion

Nevertheless, we are resolved not to
alter our policy. Our aim, after all, is not
to win an international popularity con-
test. Rather, we seek to improve human
rights conditions in a large number of
places around the world, so as to benefit
the people who live in those places and
to make clear the continuing commit-
ment of the United States to the cause
of liberty throughout the world. We are
interested in attaining results and not in
issuing pious pronouncements about
human rights that only serve to make us
feel good about ourselves. The Reagan
Administration believes that this ap-
proach accords with the traditional
American way of doing things. When
Americans are concerned about righting
a moral wrong, we are traditionally will-
ing to work and to sacrifice to achieve
our ideals. We generally commit
ourselves to effective action on behalf of
our principles. We are willing to make
the intellectual effort to understand a
complicated reality when we want to
change it. We are willing to commit
resources. We are willing to give of our
own labor and efforts. And, when it is a
question of diminishing suffering and in-
justices, we stick to an effort in spite of
complications and difficulties. It was, let
us recall, Lincoln who ended the shame
of slaverv — not John Brown.

No one understood this tradition
more clearly, or expressed it more elo-
quently, than President John F.
Kennedy. "The purpose of foreign
policy," President Kennedy said, "is not
to provide an outlet for our own sen-
timents of hope or indignation; it is to
shape real events in a real world."

As we confront the dilemmas and
complexities of a foreign policy that is
seriously dedicated to helping expand
freedom and human rights around the
world, let us always bear President
Kennedy's words in mind. And let us
remember, as well, that human rights
policy is, inevitably, a difficult mixing of
the highest idealism with practical
politics. It isn't easy to practice or, in-
deed, even to explain. Yet the marriage
of ideals and politics is an old American
practice — as old as the country itself.
We are committed to this effort, as
President Reagan has made clear time
after time. Human rights policy has
always been, and remains, a central ele-
ment of American foreign policy. In the
final analysis, it is what this country is
all about. ■

State Bulletin

■«■ BUT M:». 1^. t*

MIDDLE EAST

Policy Options in Lebanon

by Kenneth W. Dam

Stntrmrvt hrfarr thr Sninfe Foreigv
Relatiinis Cninnilhr n„ .J,i,ninri/ 11.
1981,. Mr. Ihiiii IS Ihjiiilii Sirniitry of
State.^

Since the tragedy that struck the
Marines on October 23 and the later
Syrian attacks on U.S. reconnaissance
aircraft, there has been legitimate anxie-
ty about our role in Lebanon. The Ad-
ministration recognizes the urgency of
this concern. I am grateful, therefore,
for this opportunity to consider with you
our policy in Lebanon.

We are involved in Lebanon not only
to help the people of Lebanon end their
suffering but also to protect major
American interests in the Middle East.

• Lebanon has been and can become
again a flashpoint for regional conflict.
And, with Soviet advisers attached to
Syrian troops, Lebanon could become a
flashpoint for international conflict as
well.

• Lebanon abuts Israel's northern
border. Civil strife in Lebanon directly
affects the security of Israel, and, as the
President has said, our commitment to
Israel's security is ironclad.

• Furthermore, America's credibility
is at stake in Lebanon. Every regional
state, friend and foe alike, is watching
our actions for proof of America's
strength and its ability to promote
peace.

• We are involved in Lebanon also
because we have an interest in maintain-
ing U.S. influence in a region that is a
strategic crossroads and an arena for
competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union.

• Finally, the struggle in Lebanon is
related to the larger conflict in the Mid-
dle East, which the United States has
been working for years to resolve. Out-
side forces have intervened to exploit
Lebanon's internal divisions and have
dragged Lebanon into the regional con-
flict.

I do not mean to suggest that the
future of the Middle East hangs entirely
on Lebanon, or that all aspects of the
Lebanese conflict must be resolved
before progress can be made elsewhere
in the region. But lack of progress
toward a more peaceful, stable Lebanon
will erode the chances for peace and
stability elsewhere in the region.

February 1984

U.S. Objectives

It is, therefore, vital for us to persevere
in Lebanon. Our policy there is straight-
forward. We seek a free and independ-
ent Lebanon. This is a goal we seek for
all friendly nations.

We seek this goal not through mili-
tary force but through a diplomatic and
political process. We recognize that such
a process will involve compromises. We
accept this reality. But if Lebanon is to
be truly free and independent, we must
continue to work for the objectives we
set for ourselves at the outset of our in-
volvement.

• The sovereign authority of the
Government of Lebanon must be ex-
tended throughout all its territory.

• All foreign forces must be with-
drawn.

• Israel's northern border must be
secured.

• The Lebanese people must be per-
mitted the opportunity to reconcile their
differences without foreign interference.

The Government of Lebanon has not
been free to pursue these objectives. It
has been under attack by Syria, Iran,
and other radical elements. Its demo-
cratic orientation has been threatened
and its sovereignty usurped by foreign
forces encamped on Lebanese soil. The
right of the Lebanese Government to
make its own decisions has been
challenged.

The Government of Lebanon has not
had sufficient resources to sustain itself
in the face of these attacks. Accordingly,
in September 1982 the government of
President Amin Gemayel asked for our
help along with that of France and Italy
and ultimately the United Kingdom.
Together we responded with the multi-
national force (MNF).

Mission of the
Multinational Force

The mission of the multinational force,
of which our Marines are a part, is to
provide an international presence in
Beirut to lend stability and confidence to
the Lebanese Government and people.
The confidence instilled by the ar-
rival of the multinational force was im-
mediately evident as the residents of
East and West Beirut discovered that,
for the first time since the civil war

began in 1975, they were able to cross
safely the green line dividing their com-
munities. As a result of the MNF's
presence, commerce in Beirut continues
today despite repeated attempts by
Syria and its allies to trigger the break-
down of order.

The MNF troops, together with
those of the United Nations, total
11,000, of which only 1,600 are U.S.
Marines. Those Marines represent a
small but vital keystone in the overall in-
ternational support for Lebanon. The
abrupt departure of the Marines could
precipitate the departure of other inter-
national forces.

But the question can be legitimately
asked: are the Marines, in fact, helping
us accomplish our goals? And even if
they are, has there been enough prog-
ress to justify keeping them there at the
risk of future sacrifices?

The answer is emphatically yes.
Progress has been slow and tortuous.
But there have been real accom-
plishments for which the MNF deserves
part of the credit and which justify the
continued presence of our Marines and
our other MNF partners. Here are some
benchmarks measuring progress over
the past year and a half.

First, Syrian and Palestinian troops
were evacuated from Beirut in the fall
of 1982, facilitated by the presence of
the multinational force.

Second, intense U.S. diplomatic ef-
forts, reinforced by the stabilizing
presence of the MNF, helped the new
Government of Lebanon extend its
authority in Beirut and led to negotia-
tions between Lebanon and Israel culmi-
nating in the May 17 agreement.

Third, a cease-fire agreement
among Lebanese factions was reached
on September 26, 1983, through diplo-
matic efforts led by the United States
and Saudi Arabia. The firm response of
the U.S. Marines themselves and our
offshore naval artillery to attacks on the
Marines was a vital factor in persuading
hostile military elements to accede to
the cease-fire.

Fourth, President Gemayel, with
our active support, began a process of
national reconciliation at Geneva, where
all of Lebanon's major leaders met
together for the first time in 9 years.

I .1 .1 1

MIDDLE EAST

Fifth, an agreement was worked out
5 weeks ago to lift the siege of Dayr al-
Qamar. Israel played a helpful role in
this operation, which evacuated Chris-
tian militiamen and refugees from a
town deep in the Lebanese mountains.
This has been one of the more important
immediate fruits of our recent intensi-
fied cooperation with Israel.

And finally, the Lebanese Armed
Forces, with training and assistance
from the United States and others, have
played an increasingly effective role in
helping the Lebanese Government ex-
pand its authority and restore order.
The army contains elements from all the
Lebanese communities and is an en-
couraging example of a truly national
Lebanese institution that works.

Reconciliation, Withdrawal,
and SjTian Intentions

The confidence engendered by the
presence of the MNF has also provided
an impetus to the process of political ac-
commodation in Lebanon. Indeed,
Lebanon's internal political dialogue,
aimed at national reconciliation, is
already moving forward under President
Gemayel's leadership. Intensive contacts
have been underway among leaders of
Lebanon's communities in the past few
weeks, flowing from last November's
reconciliation conference in Geneva.

Concerned parties inside and outside
Lebanon need not doubt that the weight
of the United States has been placed
firmly behind the process of political ac-
commodation, reform, and reconcilia-
tion. We support no faction or religious

community. But we are not neutral in
our support of the legitimate Govern-
ment of Lebanon.

In addition to supporting the process
of political accommodation, the United
States is also working to achieve the
withdrawal of all foreign forces. We
have maintained and intensified our dia-
logue with all concerned countries, in-
cluding Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

It is important to be realistic about
Syria. The United States has no doubt
that Syria is a significant party in the
Lebanon dispute and that Syria has a
stake in its outcome. But Syria has been
an obstacle to progress toward recon-
ciliation and withdrawal of foreign
forces. Syria's collaboration with Iran
and Libya and its association with ter-
rorist activities in Lebanon are an out-
rage and an affront to all parties who
truly seek peace in the region. So, too,
was its recent action in shooting at U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft whose peaceful
mission relates to the safety of our
Marines.

At the same time, there are other,
more positive signs that deserve to be
acknowledged. The release of Lt. Good-
man is an example. Syria's willingness to
open contacts with the Lebanese
Government at the highest level is
another useful development of the last
few months, as are the trilateral talks
between the Foreign Ministers of Syria,
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia — who met
again just this past Sunday in Riyadh.
Ambassador Rumsfeld [the President's
special representative to the Middle
East] plans to visit Damascus in the
near future as soon as a mutually con-

U.S. Forces in Lebanon

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
DEC. 14, 19831

I am providing herewith a further report
with respect to the situation in Lebanon and
the participation of the United States Armed
Forces in the Multinational Force. This
report, prepared by the Secretaries of State
and Defense, is consistent with Section 4 of
the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu-
tion. This report also includes the information
called for by the House version of the Resolu-
tion and is submitted in accordance with its
more restricted time limits.

I remain convinced that Congressional
support for our continued participation in the

Multinational Force is critical to peace, na-
tional reconciliation, and the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Lebanon. We will, of
course, keep you informed as to further
developments with respect to this situation.
Sincerely,

Ronald Reag.-\n

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Strom Thurmond,
President pro tempore of the Senate (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 19, 1983. ■

venient time can be arranged. In the j
meantime, our ambassador in Damascus
has frequent and businesslike contacts
with senior Syrian officials.

It remains to be seen, however,
whether Syria has decided it can live
with a fair, balanced outcome in
Lebanon. A major test of Syrian inten-
tions is whether Damascus will support
or impede agreement on the comprehen-
sive security plan now being negotiated.
This plan would permit the Government
of Lebanon to begin extending its
authority into areas outside Beirut, in-
cluding both Christian and Muslim areas
north and south of the city. Detailed
plans are being explored for replacing
nongovernmental militias in certain
areas with Lebanese police and Armed
Forces; this would be done in a manner
acceptable to, and with the agreement
of, the local inhabitants.

The Government of Lebanon sup-
ports this plan and has been negotiating
with leaders of the Druze, Muslim, and
Christian forces. These parties reached
agreement on all the basic elements of
the security plan. If the plan founders
now, the failure will be the responsibility
of Syria, which will have demonstrated
once again its willingness to sabotage
progress in Lebanon. We hope this will
not be the case, and to this end we con-
tinue to meet with Syria.

Role of Congress

I should now like to say a word about
the role of Congress in developing our
policy in Lebanon. Just last fall, the
President and the Congress agreed on a
joint resolution that supported the
presence of the U.S. Marines in Lebanor
for 18 months. That resolution was an
important expression of congressional
support for our goals in Lebanon — im-
portant because it demonstrated that the
President and Congress, working
together, could formulate and maintain
a coherent and consistent long-term
policy.

If our determination is now seen as
flagging, then we can be sure that Syria
will turn its back on the path of recon-
ciliation and negotiations. If the Con-
gress were to curtail the period of its
authorization for our Marines, then
Syria would be encouraged to believe
that it can win the game by digging in.
Syria might conclude that we are fin-
ished in Lebanon and on the way out.
Syria must not reach such a conclusion.
We — that is, the President and the Con-
gress — must convey a steadfast message
if we are to be seen in the Middle East

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as serious about our support for Presi-
dent Gemayel, political reconciliation in
Lebanon, and Ambassador Rumsfeld's
negotiations.

Now is not the time to flinch. There
are growing signs that a number of im-
portant Arab countries are coming
together to resist radical forces and en-
courage movement toward peace:
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Morocco, some Persian Gulf states, and
others are working in this regard in-
dividually, together— and with us. Much
of this activity is a response to the Ira-
nian threat and to the concerns in the
region about state terrorism. It would
be ironic, in light of this positive move-
ment, which we have worked so hard to
foster, if the United States were to
signal that we were retreating in
Lebanon. I can tell you that Administra-
tion representatives who have visited
the region have heard from the leaders
of Israel and our most important
moderate Arab friends that an American
failure of nerve in Lebanon would be a
disaster for all the forces of moderation
in the region.

Our commitment of the Marines is
mot, of course, open ended. It remains
our goal to secure the earliest possible
withdrawal of the Marines, consistent
with our paramount foreign policy objec-
tives. Much has been done, however, to
improve the security of our Marines in
Beirut. Their task remains hazardous,
and the death last weekend of one of
our Marines near the American Em-
bassy was a sad reminder of this fact.
Obviously, the Marines may have to de-
fend themselves. But I can assure you
that, consistent with the mission they
are performing, everything possible is
being done to protect the Marines from
attack and minimize casualties.

It is too early to know whether
alternative arrangements by, for exam-
ple, the United Nations will be necessary
or possible to aid the Government of
Lebanon after events permit the depar-
ture of the MNF. We would certainly
consider favorably such arrangements as
a means of furthering our support for
Lebanon. It is the growing strength and
jonfidence of the Government of
Lebanon, however, which provides the
most likely means to supplant the role of
the MNF.

We cannot forget our anguish over
he terrible tragedy which struck our
\Iarines in the MNF last October 23 or
he attack on the American Embassy

with heavy loss of life last April. But it
would be disastrous if our reaction to
such terrorist attacks were to withdraw
from the field. We must not lose sight of
the message we would be conveying by
such action to every terrorist organiza-
tion in the world— and to every govern-
ment that supports such organizations.
Nor can we lose sight of our larger in-
terests in Lebanon and the Middle East,
and the contribution the Marines are
making to protect those interests. Suc-
cessive U.S. Administrations of both
parties have learned from long experi-

ence in Middle East diplomacy that
progress comes slowly and only through
painstaking effort and patience. But
American steadfastness and perse-
verence has shown, and can again show,
results.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Visit of Lebanese President

President Amin Gemayel of the
Republic of Lebanon made an official
working visit to Washington, D.C.
November SO-December 3, 1983. to meet
with President Reagan and other govern-
ment officials.

Following are remarks made by the
two Presidents after their meeting on
December 1. 1983.'^

President Reagan

It's been my great pleasure to once
again welcome our friend. President
Gemayel, to Washington. President
Gemayel symbolizes Lebanon's hopes for
unity, peace, and stability — goals for
which all of us are working so hard and
for which many Americans and many
more Lebanese have sacrified their lives.
We admire President Gemayel's per-
sonal courage. We applaud his deter-

"ebruary 1984

mination to free his country of all
foreign forces and to reunite the
Lebanese people. Lebanon once shined
like a jewel in the sun, and America will
do what it can to support Lebanon's ef-
forts to restore its tranquility and in-
dependence.

To this end, we stand by the May
17th agreement as the best and most
viable basis for the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from Lebanon. And once again, I
appeal to the other external forces to
leave Lebanon.

I was particularly impressed by the
initiative that President Gemayel took in
calling for national dialogue. Today, he
and I have discussed his programs for
national unity. And, Mr. President, your
efforts to broaden the base of your
government, bringing in Lebanon's
many communities, will do much to
rebuild a stable and prosperous

.Ryllel'

I .1 ^1 I

MIDDLE EAST

Lebanon. It will do much to restore con-
fidence in the future. It will do much to
stop the loss of so many innocent lives.

President Gemayel has already
achieved a measure of success through
the effective leadership that he
demonstrated during the first round of
reconciliation talks in Geneva. Yet, there
is still a long way to go, and Lebanon
can count on our help.

Our Marines, along with our allies in
the multinational force, are in Beirut to
demonstrate the strength of our commit-
ment to peace in the Middle East. And I
know you agree with me that the
American people can be proud of the job
that our Marines are doing. Their
presence is making it possible for reason
to triumph over the forces of violence,
hatred, and intimidation.

My special representative for the
Middle East, Don Rumsfeld, returned
recently from his first round of meetings
in the region. He'll be returning to the
area soon and will be working directly
with President Gemayel to arrange
foreign troop withdrawals and to pursue
Lebanese national reconciliation.

We're delighted to have you with us
today, Mr. President, and we wish you
Godspeed on your return home.

President Gemayel

I want to thank you and the American
people to whom we in Lebanon owe so
much.

This is my third visit to Washington
and probably the most important
because of the intensity of the crisis in
Lebanon and the region. Yet, I'm confi-
dent that actions, properly conceived
and executed at this time, can result in
dramatic movement toward stability,
security, and peace.

Today, we explored, as partners, the
best ways and means not to merely im-
plement agreement but going beyond
the letter of the law to set up the most
appropriate mechanism and conditions
for the achievement of our common in-
terests and policy objectives. We found
ourselves in full agreement on the
necessity of withdrawal of all external
forces from Lebanon and the full
restoration of the Lebanese sovereignty
and exclusive authority over all of
Lebanon's territory within its interna-
tionally recognized borders. This, and
this alone, will put an end to the con-
tinuing tragedy which is now engulfing
not only Lebanese but Americans in
Lebanon as well. Hence, it is imperative

for us all to break the cycle of violence
which has been preventing the people of
Lebanon for the past decade from exer-
cising their divine and natural right of
self-determination and the shaping of a
free modern society in full social and
economic partnership.

I found in Washington full com-
prehension of the fact that leading
Lebanon out of the present impasse is
not only a question of justice and right
but also a matter of common interest
both for its neighbors and the United
States.

I view our discussions today with a
sense of pride and accomplishment, and
I'm gratified by President Reagan's com-
mitment, and the support of the
American people. I look forward, with
hope, that actions taken as a result of
our discussions, fortified by the courage
and vision of the American and
Lebanese people, will result in peace in
Lebanon and the entire region.

'Made to reporters assembled at the
South Portico of the White House (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. .5, 198.3). ■

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of
the State of Israel made an official work-
ing visit to Washington, D.C., Novem-
ber 27-30, 1983, to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks made by the
President and Prime Minister after their
meeting on November 29. '

President Reagan

We have held 2 days of intensive talks
with Prime Minister Shamir and his
colleagues, covering a broad range of
subjects including political, military
cooperation, Lebanon, Israel's economic
situation, and the pursuit of the Middle
East peace process. And these discus-

sions, as could be expected between
close friends and allies, have been very
productive. We reconfirmed the
longstanding bonds of the friendship and
cooperation between our two countries
and expressed our determination to
strengthen and develop them in the
cause of our mutual interests.

We have agreed on the need to in-
crease our cooperation in areas where
our interests coincide, particularly in the
political and military area. And I am
pleased to announce that we have
agreed to establish a joint political-
military group to examine ways in which
we can enhance U.S. -Israeli cooperation.
This group will give priority attention to
the threat to our mutual interest posed

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MIDDLE EAST

by increased Soviet involvement in the
Middle East. Among the specific areas
to be considered are combined planning,
joint exercise, and requirements for
prepositioning of U.S. equipment in
Israel.

We've agreed to take a number of
other concrete steps aimed at bolstering
Israel's economy and security. These in-
clude asking Congress for improved
terms for our security assistance to
Israel; using military assistance for
development of the Lavi aircraft in the
United States and for offshore procure-
ment of Lavi components manufactured
in Israel; permitting U.S. contractors to
enter into contracts with the Govern-
ment of Israel consistent with U.S. law,
which would allow Israeli industry to
participate in the production of U.S.
weapons systems procured with foreign
military sales credits; offering to
negotiate a free-trade area with Israel.

A main focus of our meetings was
the agony of Lebanon and the threats
there to our common interests. We ex-
amined, together, Soviet activities in the
Middle East and found a common con-
cern with the Soviet presence and arms
buildup in Syria. We reaffirmed our
commonly held goals of a sovereign, in-
dependent Lebanon free of all foreign
forces, and of security for Israel's north-
ern border.

We agreed that every effort must be
made to expedite implementation of the
May 17th agreement between Israel and
Lebanon. Adequate security arrange-
ments for Israel's northern border must
be assigned the highest priority. We're
hopeful that such arrangements can be
concluded soon.

We, of course, discussed the broader
goal of peace between Israel and its
Arab neighbors. The Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty remains the cornerstone of
the peace process. I reaffirmed my com-
mitment to the September 1 initiative as
the best way to realize the promise of
Camp David and the UN Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 242 and 338 upon which
it was built.

As you can see, our 2 days together
have revealed substantial areas of agree-
ment and resulted in a number of
specific concrete steps that we'll take to
strengthen our ties. We have also
discussed some issues on which we do
not see eye to eye. But disagreements
between good friends do not alter the
unique and sturdy foundation of our
relationship.

I know that Prime Minister Shamir
shares with me the renewed conviction
that the warm friendship between the
United States and Israel will endure and
strengthen.

Prime Minister Shamir

I am grateful for the invitation extended
to me by President Reagan to come here
to Washington for these discussions. The
Minister of Defense [Moshe Arens] and I
have had the opportunity to conduct
very thorough discussions with the
President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, and their senior
colleagues and advisers. These discus-
sions have been carried out in the spirit
of the traditional friendship and the
common bonds of mutual understanding
that bind our two countries.

We reaffirmed our determination to
ensure the withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Lebanon. The only basis for
a settlement of the Lebanese problem is
the full implementation of the May 17,
1983, agreement in all its parts. We
have discussed with the President and
the Secretaries the necessary steps that
could facilitate the carrying out of this
agreement. Syria constitutes today a
major threat to the peace in our area by
occupying more than 60% of Lebanon
and by its massive concentration of
Soviet arms and personnel on Syrian
territory.

Israel is ready to renew the peace
process and discuss the final status of
Judea and Samaria, following the
autonomy period in the framework of
the sole agreed basis for negotiations,
namely the Camp David accords. We
discussed during our visit here the major
threat that terrorism constitutes to the
peace, and we shall pursue our fight
against it in close cooperation with the
United States.

Due to the need to ensure our
security, a large part of our budget is
spent on defense. We hope that the
American Administration will increase
their assistance program, taking into ac-
count the great sacrifices made by Israel
in the peace treaty, by relinquishing the
oil wells and building new installations
as a result of the withdrawal from Sinai.
New measures designed to encourage
the development of our economy by
establishing a free-trade area, by shar-
ing new technology will enhance Israel's
strength and enable us to pursue our
economic program so vital to the well-
being of our society.

In order to advance the search for
peace and to strengthen the ties be-
tween our two countries, we decided to
establish the mechanism necessary to
determine the details of the nature and
scope of our cooperation inter alia in
the fields of prepositioning of equipment
for military readiness, joint exercises,
and other relevant fields. We have
agreed to establish a joint political-
military committee to work on the
details of these agreed matters. The aim
of this cooperation is to strengthen
Israel and deter threats to the reg^ion.
The group will hold periodic meetings,
starting the first week of January 1984.

I wish to once again thank the Presi-
dent and the people of the United States
for their strong support of Israel and for
the warm feelings conveyed to the
Minister of Defense and myself by the
President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense. We will proceed on the road to
peace with increased vigor. I return to
Jerusalem strengthened in my conviction
that with the aid of the United States of
America and fortified by the friendship
of its people and government, a strong
Israel can, indeed, achieve peace.

'Made to reporters assembled at the
South Portico of the White House (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 5, 1983). ■

February 198'

^f >l *M

REFUGEES

Refugee Assistance and Protection

by James N. Purcell, Jr.

Address before the Executive Com-
mittee of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva on Octo-
ber 12, 1983. Mr. Purcell is Director of
the Bureau for Refugee Programs.

The annual meeting of the Executive
Committee is singularly important to
our common objective of ensuring pro-
tection and assistance to the world's
refugees and other persons of concern to
UNHCR. I would like at the outset to
extend to High Commissioner Poul
Hartling the warm congratulations of
my government on his reelection for an
additional 3-year term. The record of the
organization he leads is one of steadily
increasing effectiveness. I wish to under-
score the credit which is due to the High
Commissioner personally and to assure
him of the continued strong support of
the United States during the coming 2
years.

The essence of the task of UNHCR
as an international humanitarian service
organization is to act across a wide spec-
trum of emergency as well as longstand-
ing refugee problems while maintaining
a qualitative, impartial, and humani-
tarian focus in the service provided. The
problems themselves are concrete in
nature and increasingly complex with
each year that passes. The needs are,
first of all, very human: those of the in-
dividual refugees themselves. Providing
for human needs is almost always com-
plicated by the local political, social, and
economic situation. In many cases an in-
hospitable logistics environment com-
pounds these problems. One must face
the complexities of program design, im-
plementation, and monitoring, as well as
the constraints of budgets and financial
controls.

It is the essence of the High Com-
missioner's task to manage complex
refugee programs and budgets while
simultaneously imbuing his programs
with a truly humanitarian character. It
is the responsibility of this Executive
Committee to understand the program-
matic character of the High Commis-
sioner's task and to be as supportive as
possible. We will deal with an imposing
array of program narrative and financial
data requiring careful scrutiny and an
emphasis on cost effectiveness and
sound managerial practice. Let us,
therefore, be certain to hold firmly in

our view the humanitarian principles
and objectives for which the UNHCR ex-
ists and which we are assembled here to
further.

In his statement, the High Commis-
sioner called our attention, in particular,
to two of these basic objectives: refugee
protection and the promotion of durable
solutions. I would like to refer to these
objectives in the context of what I con-
sider to be the mutually reinforcing ac-
tions of protection and assistance. We
may sometimes be too precise in our at-
tempts to apply analytical terminology
to multifaceted and inherently political
human situations. There is often no
clear-cut line between the material
assistance needs of refugees and the
protection of their rights under interna-
tional law. UNHCR field officers must
simultaneously ensure both. Similarly,
there is a sometimes broad intersection
between local settlement assistance and
development aid. UNHCR and its sister
international agencies, especially the UN
Development Program (UNDP), must
meet at this intersection and work out
the appropriate transition from
UNHCR's responsibilities to those of the
UNDP and the other specialized agen-
cies where appropriate.

For refugees and other persons of
concern to UNHCR, the importance of
the mutually reinforcing relationship of
protection and assistance often begins
with the storm warnings of impending
crisis leading to an emergency. Protec-
tion and material assistance are both
urgent and interdependent necessities in
those first hours and days of the crisis.
At a later stage, care and maintenance
assistance requires primary emphasis on
organization and attention to attaining
the requisite standards of shelter, nutri-
tion, and disease control. Protection
issues, whether addressed to group
security or to individual rights, may
become paramount at any point in this
process. In stable situations, refugees
must be prepared for the future through
self-reliance activities which preserve or
restore their dignity and sense of worth.
These activities include counseling and
ensuring fair treatment of refugees who
participate in local settlement, voluntary
repatriation, or in resettlement to other
countries. UNHCR faces the challenge
of having to be equipped for all of these
functions all the time.

The Emergency Response Capability

The first, the emergency response
capability, is perhaps the most impor-
tant. Emergency situations arise
because of crises. Some, to be sure, are
localized or are limited to individuals or
small groups. Many, however, result
from political forces and events which
affect an entire country or region.
Whether called upon to assist with small
or large numbers, UNHCR must be
prepared to act immediately to provide
the international community with the
critical first assessment of the scope of
the problem and of the extent of
assistance required. In the first days of
any emergency, the urgency of protec-
tion and assistance needs is at its
greatest magnitude. This urgency
demands the highest degree of profes-
sional expertise in response.

From this perspective, the United
States has observed with appreciation
the steps taken by the High Commis-
sioner to strengthen the capability of his
office to respond to emergency needs.
We have watched closely the work of
the new emergency unit, which recently
issued a comprehensive handbook con-
cerning emergency field operations and
administrative procedures. This hand-
book is a most valuable tool for all
UNHCR staff and will become increas-
ingly so if followed up by a thorough
program of related staff training. We
also wish to commend the contribution
made by the Emergency Unit Staff in
UNHCR's responses to the situation of
Miskito Indians who fled to Honduras
and to that of displaced persons in
Uganda and Rwanda. Thus, the poten-
tial will and capability to respond have
been demonstrated. May we suggest,
however, that, given the critical nature
of the initial phase of emergency situa-
tions, it would be advisable to regularize
UNHCR's structure for initial emergen-
cy response and to establish clear
guidelines regarding how this structure
relates to other UNHCR offices at head-
quarters and in the field?

Another new office which, in our
view, has bolstered UNHCR's effec-
tiveness is the Specialist Support Unit in
the Division of Assistance. The unit in-
cludes a water supply/sanitation
engineer, a rural settlement planner, a
public health/nutrition adviser, a
socioeconomist, and a physical plan-
ner/construction engineer. I have

I*. Itt 1* I^.U I4 H' ■•

enumerated these positions to establish
an explict basis for any assertion that
the creation of this unit is a most
positive development. Indeed, my
delegation believes that it is precisely
this type of professional competence
which UNHCR and other humanitarian
assistance organizations must possess if
they are to be able to respond effectively
to new emergencies as well as to ensure
the quality of services being provided in
ongoing programs. The importance of
this expertise continues in the post-
emergency phase, when material
assistance programs must be rational-
ized and projects developed within the
scope of the general programs budget.
General country programs will be a
central focus of our attention at later
sessions, so I will not dwell on these at
any length in these remarks. I would
note in general, however, that during
the past 2 years we have seen con-
siderable improvement in UNHCR's
overall project management. We also
welcome the increased attention being
paid to program evaluation, a subject
considered in detail last week by the
Subcommittee on Administrative and
Financial Matters. To design and imple-
ment effective material assistance pro-
grams is not a simple task, nor is it one
which UNHCR can accomplish on its
own. The full cooperation of host
governments is required in providing ac-
cess to those who need help, in develop-
ing accurate estimates of refugee
numbers and relief heeds, in facilitating
logistical supply arrangements, and in
conceiving practicable local integration
projects.

These demands are perhaps greatest
in Africa, which continues to shoulder
the burden of large groups of persons
who have sought refuge, and also in
Pakistan, which hosts the largest
number of refugees in any single coun-
try.

In addition to lauding the generosity
of numerous host governments, my
delegation wishes to take this opportuni-
ty to praise the vital role of the many
voluntary, nongovernmental organiza-
tions which so often are found working
in close cooperation with governments
and UNHCR and in direct contact with
the refugees themselves to accomplish
the actual delivery of assistance. Of
equal importance is the significant, ex-
pert contribution of the Intergovernmen-
tal Committee for Migration which
operates in close coordination with
UNHCR in all parts of the world where
refugees need help in arranging to move
from one place to another.

February 1984

Protection Issues

As stated earlier, assistance is but one
part of the job of a UNHCR field office.
The other— protection— is always pres-
ent, beginning in the emergency phase
and continuing until a durable solution
has been achieved. Indeed, in the past
year, protection issues have increasingly
occupied the attention of the High Com-
missioner's office and of the members of
this Executive Committee. The docu-
ment submitted to this meeting by the
High Commissioner entitled, "Note on
International Protection," provides us
with a useful recapitulation of the prin-
cipal issues. Whether or not all would
agree on the applicability of certain
generalizations to every individual situa-
tion, my delegation is particularly en-
couraged by this renewed expression of
UNHCR's willingness to play a catalytic
role in the development of innovative ap-
proaches to international protection
problems.

An example of this "reasoned ac-
tivist" approach may be found in the
lead taken by UNHCR on the issue of
rescue at sea. Practical measures taken
by UNHCR in Honduras on behalf of
persons displaced from El Salvador and
in Rwanda on behalf of expellees from
Uganda are cases of successful actions
to protect individual refugees. In
Southeast Asia, where pirates continue
their attacks on defenseless refugees at
sea, UNHCR has provided tireless and
effective leadership in the international
protection effort.

Actions of this type are to be com-
mended and encouraged. Their success,
however, depends on assistance from
the political and security resources of in-
dividual governments, from the collec-
tive capabilities of regional associations,
and from the diplomatic and public rela-
tions possibilities of the UN Secretariat.
It is our hope that UNHCR will further
strenghthen its already close collabora-
tion with the International Committee of
the Red Cross in situations where
refugees are victims of warfare and
other forms of violence.

The Search for Durable Solutions

In line with highlighting the continuum
of refugee needs and UNHCR's respon-
sibilities, I would like to mention the
more satisfactory resolution of refugee
problems. These include voluntary
repatriation, local integration, and final-
ly, for those for whom no other solution
seems appropriate, resettlement to a
third country. This solution of last resort

REFUGEES

has, of necessity, occupied much of
UNHCR's attention and energy since
1979. At the height of the boat people
crisis that year, UNHCR successfully
mobilized governments and publics alike
in support of an international effort to
provide resettlement opportunities for
great numbers of refugees and their
families and to relieve the burden borne
by the countries of first asylum.

Also in 1979, UNHCR took the ini-
tiative in negotiating with the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam to establish a safe
and orderly system for selected emigra-
tion. The year-to-year increases in the
numbers of persons leaving Vietnam to
many different resettlement countries
under the orderly departure program
procedures, whether under UNHCR
auspices or bilateral arrangements, sug-
gest that this effort can now be con-
sidered a success.

However, in spite of all that has
been accomplished since 1979, we find
ourselves still in the grip of a refugee
problem involving huge numbers of peo-
ple and great potential for human
tragedy, while the pressure from the
underlying regional political forces con-
tinues unabated.

It seems that we should concentrate
on ideas and programs which have a
demonstrable impact in the short to
medium term. Consequently, where we
have had some measure of success, as in
the orderly departure program, we
should make every effort to expand that
approach. Enhancement of this avenue
will become a critically important
responsibility should Vietnam agree to
allow reeducation camp inmates to
emigrate. We view the long years of
detention of large numbers of political
prisoners in Vietnam as a major human
tragedy of concern to the entire interna-
tional community, and we intend to
work strenuously for their release and
freedom to resettle abroad.

Concerning the most desired solu-
tion—voluntary repatriation— we are
watching with hope and admiration the
current UNHCR efforts with the parties
concerned to achieve the successful
repatriation of most of Djibouti's
refugees back to their homeland. The
progress to date is a tribute to the com-
mitment of the concerned governments
and to UNHCR's leadership.

Voluntary repatriation for refugees
from Laos and Kampuchea appears
more difficult to realize. Despite the in-
tensive efforts of UNHCR over a period
of several years, additional progress at
the political level will be necessary

'i A .1 -1 .1

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

before practical arrangements can be
established for a significant voluntary
repatriation program. The United
States, together with many other coun-
tries, is prepared to support repatriation
to Kampuchea when it is truly voluntary
in nature and when UNHCR is able to
ensure that satisfactory monitoring of
the conditions of the returnees can take
place.

The UNHCR program for repatria-
tion to Laos should also be given careful
attention and support. Since its incep-
tion in 1980, some 2,300 Lao have volun-
tarily returned to their country of origin
under UNHCR auspices and supervision.
The Government of Laos continues to
assert a willingness to cooperate in per-
mitting the return of some of its na-
tionals, and the conditions of reception
and reintegration have been monitored
by UNHCR and have been found to be
generally acceptable. Granting that
repatriation operations involve a com-
plex set of variables, we support the
continuing efforts of UNHCR to develop
the necessary procedures to make possi-
ble a further expansion of this alter-
native.

I have spoken at some length on the
specific problems of the Indochinese
refugee situation. This is for three
reasons. One, as I stated earlier, is that
it remains, in the judgment of my
delegation, one of the most intractable
problems facing UNHCR today and one
which calls for the greatest degree of in-
ternational leadership and innovative ac-
tion. The second reason is that this
situation highlights so well the
possibilities and difficulties of two of the
three durable solutions we will be
discussing this week: voluntary repatria-
tion and international resettlement.
Finally, the history of the UNHCR
response to the Indochinese refugee
problem is a superb example of effective
multilateral burdensharing. It was its
truly international character that made
the 1979 conference a success. It is
essential that the highest degree of in-
ternational participation be maintained,
not only for Indochinese refugees but
for the hundreds of thousands of people
in all world regions who look to UNHCR
for protection and assistance. We would
like to pay special tribute to countries of
asylum in Southeast Asia which have of-
fered, and continued to offer, refuge to
hundred of thousands of innocent vic-
tims while the UNHCR and the con-

cerned international community works
with these countries to secure satisfac-
tory solutions to this tragic problem.

The United Nations created the of-
fice of the High Commissioner for two
reasons: to deliver humanitarian protec-
tion and assistance services to refugees
and to provide a nonpolitical mechanism
for multilateral sharing of the refugee

burden. These purposes are just as valid
today as they were when UNHCR was
founded. It is in support of these objec-
tives and in support of the UNHCR's ef-
fective management of programs to
achieve these objectives that we
members of this Executive Committee
should turn our attention and focus our
efforts. ■

U.S. Prepares for
World Radio Conference

Pemitm

by Leonard H. Marks

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Operations of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on November
9. 1983. Aynbassador Marks is chairman
of the U.S. delegation to the World Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference on High
Frequency. '

It gives me great pleasure to be able to
appear before you today to discuss the
upcoming World Administrative Radio
Conference on High Frequency. While
the format of this conference will be
technical, the issues that will be dealt
with in Geneva have potentially serious
and far-reaching political implications. It
is, therefore, doubly reassuring that this
committee is taking an interest in this
conference at this early stage.

The general conference of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU)
that met in 1979 agreed to convene a
two-part conference dedicated to
developing a method or methods of plan-
ning the assignment of channels in the
high frequency bands of the radio spec-
trum. This was in response to an effort
by several countries, speaking for the
less developed countries (LDCs), to gain
a larger part of the spectrum for the ex-
clusive use of the LDCs. They argued
that the current system favored the
large broadcasters, divided the spectrum
unfairly, and, in general, made it dif-
ficult for small countries to enter the
field of short-wave broadcasting. The
World Administrative Radio Conference
on High Frequency is to meet in
January-February 1984 to develop the
principles for planning and a method for
the allocation of frequencies. The second
part of the conference, scheduled to
meet in 1986, is assigned the task of ac-
tually implementing the method and
planning for the high frequency spec-
trum.

Technical Problems

All this sounds good and, if the con-
ference is successful, could lead to the
more rational management of a very im-
portant limited resource. However,
development of a planning regime for
the high frequency spectrum has been
tried many times in the last 40 years,
always unsuccessfully. The reasons for
failure of such efforts— crowding of the
bands, intentional interference (jam-
ming), excessive or inadequate power
levels and so on— are still present. In
fact, we must admit that the conditions
of the spectrum are generally in worse
shape than ever before. And many ad-
ministrations have plans for expansion,
and countries new to short-wave broad-
casting are planning to enter the field.
In short, the problems are complex and
difficult on the technical side.

Political Problems

They are just as complex and difficult or
the political side, and political problems
are often more intractable than technical
ones. The larger broadcasters, of which
the United States is one, are by and
large satisfied with the existing
mechanism for planning spectrum use.
The small broadcasters find the current
arrangements for frequency identifica-
tion and assignment quite burdensome.
Often they do not have the resources,
either in personnel, technical know-how,
or funds to use the system that now ex-
ists. Finally, some of the LDCs take the
position that the spectrum is an interna-
tional resource, and they are not getting
their fair share of it.

The result has been an effort by
some of the LDCs for a fixed assign-
ment of frequencies on a long-term
basis. Such a procedure would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to implement
because of the propagation condition
change depending on the seasonal varia-
tions of the ionosphere and over the

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SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

11-year solar cycle. Also the needs of
the broadcasting nation change over
time in unpredictable ways. Hence a
rigid, long-range or a priori plan is not
implemented in our view. It is our belief
and our position that given these fac-
tors, and the added complications pro-
duced by jamming, flexibility must be
the key to any planning method that
might be developed. The central issue at
this conference might be described as
the difference between flexibility and a
priori when considering the develop-
ment of a planning method.

Required Factors

Permit me to describe those factors that
we believe must be present for any plan-
ning method to be workable.

• The planning method adopted
should result in a satisfactory quality of
service for the listener.

• The planning principles should be
applied equitably to all Administrations
[ITU member nations].

• The planning method should be
based on improvement, refinement, and
further development of workable pro-
cedures that can be implemented in a
practical manner.

• The planning method must take
into account the spectrum inefficiencies
which result from harmful interference
(jamming).

• Administrations will continue to
retain their authority to make final fre-
quency assignments to those transmis-
sions under their control.

• Any requirement submitted in ac-
cordance with the planning method
should represent a current, operational
requirement.

• The planning method must have
the flexibility to accommodate short-
term unforeseen changes in re-
quirements.

• The planning method must pro-
vide adequate flexibility so that Ad-
ministrations can undertake to resolve
incompatibilities.

• Administrations which desire
assistance from the International Fre-
quency Regulation Board may continue
to request such assistance.

• The planning method should
enable Administrations to implement
single side band systems as early as they
desire.

• The planning process should at-
tempt to maintain the continuity of an
Administration's frequency assignments
between successive schedules. Long-
term a priori planning is not a practical
solution. The extreme congestion caused
I by lack of sufficient spectrum space to
meet expected requirements dictates

'February 1984

that the most spectrum-efficient tech-
nique available be used to engineer the
channel selection process. No practical
criteria is available nor can one be
developed which would determine a
priority of one Administration's re-
quirements ms a vis another Administra-
tion's requirements. No planning method
available will totally meet the desires of
all Administrations and, therefore, com-
promises must be made if a planning
method is to be adopted. Any planning
method selected must be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate a wide range of
contingencies. The probability of the
continuation of deliberate interference
(jamming) must be considered. The out-
put of any planning method must be
reviewed and accepted by Administra-
tions prior to its implementation.

Various suggested plans have been
put forth by several member nations of
the ITU. We have studied all of them
carefully and find that while there are
elements in each which have con-
siderable merit, none of them as tabled
meets our essential needs. We have not
submitted a plan of our own. Our judg-
ment is that the best hope of developing
a realistic, workable plan is some com-
bination of the proposals currently on
the table. This will be the challenge at
the conference in January. To achieve
an equitable and acceptable planning ap-
proach, which is our aim at the con-
ference, will not be an easy task.

U.S. Preparations

I should point out that preparations for
this conference were started almost 2
years ago. Over the last 6 months, they
have intensified and will continue to do
so until the beginning of the conference
itself. At our request, all of our Em-
bassies have designated an officer to
assist in our preparations and to report
on the attitude of the host government
on related issues. We have convened
special working groups on each of the
various issues the conference will con-
sider, and we have held a series of
meetings with delegations that share our
concerns as well as with those that we
anticipate will take positions harmful to
our interests.

Based largely on the information
developed by our missions, I have trav-
eled extensively to conduct such bilateral
and multilateral discussions abroad. One
of our teams has just returned from
China and Japan, and other teams led
by former ambassadors are currently in
South America and Africa holding
bilateral discussions with countries that
will be important in Geneva. Discussions

are also planned with countries that host
our relay stations. These efforts have
been very useful in alerting us to the
views of other participants, have given
us the opportunity to present and ex-
plain our own, familiarize ourselves with
the players, and to seek areas of agree-
ment and compromise prior to the con-
ference itself.

I would like to emphasize that we
are sensitive to both U.S. needs in high
frequency broadcasting and to the con-
cerns of other users and potential users
of that portion of the spectrum. We are
committed to achieving a fair, workable,
and flexible plan in Geneva.

Finally, I would like to make a per-
sonal observation. Over the years, I
have been involved with many con-
ferences in various capacities. The tradi-
tional critics hold that the United States
is seldom prepared for international con-
ferences and that it does little in the
way of preconference consultations with
other governments. Preparations for
this conference will confound the critics.
The nerve center for our effort has been
the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-
national Communication and Informa-
tion Policy. A more sophisicated and
comprehensive approach to communica-
tion conference preparation is being
developed there. The effectiveness and
timeliness of U.S. preparations for the
World Administrative Radio Conference
on High Frequency are an excellent ex-
ample of this new coordinated approach
in this complex international arena. I
would like to commend the Department
of State, the U.S. Information Agency,
the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, the Board
for International Broadcasting, and the
other agencies that have participated in
these preparations. The participating
agencies have recognized the importance
of this conference to U.S. interests and
have moved accordingly by giving
unstintingly of their resources to ensure
that our preparations will be as com-
plete as possible. I have been impressed
by the spirit of cooperation and dedica-
tion at the working level and the sup-
port and understanding at the manage-
ment level. The problems are difficult to
be sure, but I am satisfied that we have
done everything possible to ensure that
the United States will give a good ac-
count of itself in Geneva.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

SOUTH ASIA

Visit of President of the Council
of iVIinisters of Bangladesh

President of the Coumtl uj Mintfiter>i
of Bangladesh, Lt. Gen. Hussain
Mohammad Ershad, made an official
working visit to Washington, D.C., Oc-
tober 2U-26, 1983, to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks made by
President Reagan and Lt. Gen. Ershad
after their meeting on October 2.5. '

President Reagan

Today we're honored to welcome

Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad, President of the

Council of Ministers of Bangladesh.

Over the past year and a half,
Gen. Ershad's government has taken
steps to restore democratic institutions
and economic growth to the people of
Bangladesh. In our useful and cordial
conversations today, the General and I
have had an opportunity to discuss these
admirable goals and other matters of

concern to our two countries. We
especially appreciate the General's
dedication to the economic development
of his country. The self-help reforms
which his government has put in place
reflect this commitment to reinvigorate
development and better the lives of the
Bangladesh people.

Gen. Ershad's government under-
stands the vital role of private enter-
prise. Changes taking place should at-
tract private investment to the oppor-
tunities available in that deserving coun-
try. The United States is proud of its
long association and support for the peo-
ple of Bangladesh. Today we pledge our
continued support. We look forward to
further cooperation between our two
governments as Bangladesh seeks to
overcome problems of hunger, over-
population, and poverty.

In the political realm, the General
has now set in motion a process de-
signed to build a broad base of popular

support for economic and social develop-
ment in his country. We endorse this
goal since we believe that long-term
political stability can be achieved only
through representative government.

Finally, the United States wishes to
applaud Bangladesh, a member of the
nonaligned movement, for its construc-
tive approach to issues of regional and
global concern. To cite only a few ex-
amples: Bangladesh clearly manifested
its courage and resolve in its unswerving
responses to aggression in Afghanistan
and Kampuchea. It also took the lead in
establishing the South Asian Regional
Cooperation Organization, a body
designed to build a more prosperous and
stable region for the people of South
Asia. Bangladesh's foreign policy has ex-
hibited an activism, moderation, and
force of moral conviction which has
earned the respect of the world.

Gen. Ershad, we hope that the re-
mainder of your visit to this country will
be pleasant, and we're happy to have
had you with us.

Lt. Gen. Ershad

It is both a great privilege and pleasure
for my wife and myself and for the
members of my delegation to be in the
United States of America.

We are grateful to President Ronald
Reagan for the thoughtful and cordial
invitation which he has kindly extended
to visit this great country. We bring
with us the warm greetings and sincere
good wishes of the people of
Bangladesh.

My meeting with the President was
very satisfying, and I thank him for hav-
ing received me despite his preoccupa-
tion at this critical moment. The com-
prehensive and productive exchange of
views which we have just had is an
unmistakable demonstration of our
friendship. The object of my visit is to
reinforce and consolidate the relations
between the United States of America
and Bangladesh, which, I'm happy to
say, has been achieved.

During our meeting, the President
and I covered a wide range of subjects.
It gives me great pleasure to say that
we have had the opportunity of reaffirm
ing our two countries' shared percep-
tions and close identity of interests in
strengthening the process of peace,
progress, and prosperity for mankind.

I have apprised the President of the
intensive level of activity which my
government has undertaken to improve
the quality of life of our 95 million peo-
ple, a large measure of whom live in

Department of State Bulleti

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SOUTH ASIA

rural Bangladesh. I have explained that
my government is committed to laying
firm political and economic foundations
for the long-term development and social
benefits for our people.

We have already undertaken signifi-
cant measures in the fields of population
control, food production, rural
unemployment, and energy production.
These have involved the organization
and decentralization of our administra-
tion, the streamlining of our judiciary,
and extensive work in reviewing colonial
laws, on the one hand, and our outdated
education system, on the other. We hope
that these basic efforts will substantially
reinforce the base we must have for the
restoration and maintenance of demo-
cratic values which are integral to our
society.

We are about to launch ourselves
into local government elections this
winter, followed by elections at pro-
gressively higher political echelons
throughout 1984 leading to the elections
to our Parliament in March 1985. Over
40 million people will go to the polls, not
merely to elect their representative, but
to lay the political and economic founda-
tion for our future, to enable our people
to live freely and live with honor and
dignity by the grace of God.

The President and I have agreed to
explore possible ways and means toward
further strengthening the close bonds of
friendship and cooperation between our
two countries. Indeed, I am most grate-
ful to you for the deep and abiding in-
terest you have personally shown in the
welfare and progress of our people and
for the moral support and economic
assistance which have been extended to
us.

As members of the Organized
Islamic Conference, an unaligned move-
ment in the Commonwealth, and — [in-
audible) — as chairman of the Group of
77, Bangladesh firmly believes the cur-
rent international economic situation
needs the closest vigilance by the whole
community of nations, recognizing that
interdependability is indispensable as a
way of life in this day and age. The role
of the United States is a crucial and
critical one in this regard. It is, indeed,
a matter of great satisfaction that the
President and I, in discussing these
issues, fully agree that global peace and
stability is closely interlinked with the
need to restore confidence in the current
economic climate in both developing and
developed countries.

We in Bangladesh deeply appreciate
the importance of the vital role of the
United States in upholding the principles

February 1984

of maintaining peace and stability in the
world, as enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations. I warmly welcome
your recent reassuring statement in the
UN General Assembly in this regard.

I'd like to mention here that I have
conveyed to the President our profound
sorrow and anguish at the tragic loss of
life in the recent days in Beirut. We
share your grief, and on behalf of my
government and people, I extend our
heartfelt condolences to the families of
the deceased.

My wife and I have been deeply
touched by the warm hospitality extend-
ed to us and the members of our delega-
tion. Our stay in the U.S. Capital, the
beautiful city of Washington, though
short, has been most pleasant and
rewarding. I have no doubt that I speak

on behalf of all of us when I say that we
shall trea.sure these happy moments and
cherish the memory of your warm
friendship.

During our meeting, I extended our
most cordial invitation to the President
to pay a state visit to Bangladesh as ear-
ly as is convenient. It is my sincere hope
that you will visit our country soon and
see for yourself the high esteem in
which you are held and the enormous
fount of good will that exists in
Bangladesh for your people.

I wish you good health, happiness,
long life, and every success. And I thank
you, ladies and gentlemen of the media,
for your time and patience.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 31, 1983.

Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion
of Afghanistan

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 27, 19831

While Americans are thankful for the
blessing of peace at home this holiday
season, we do not forget that the tragic
war in Afghanistan continues. For 4
long years, the Soviet Union has oc-
cupied that unhappy land. But for 4 long
years, the brave Afghan people have
held the might of a Soviet occupation
force at bay. These Islamic fighters in a
faraway land have given new meaning
to the words courage, determination,
and strength. They have set the stand-
ard for those who value freedom and in-
dependence everywhere in the world.

Afghanistan's freedom fighters — the
resistance, or mujahidin — represent an
indigenous movement that swept
through their mountainous land to
challenge a foreign military power
threatening their religion and their very
way of life. With little in the way of
arms or organization, the vast majority
of the Afghan people have demonstrated
that they will not be dominated and that
they are prepared to give their lives for
independence and freedom. The price
they have so willingly paid is in-
calculable.

While we will continue to do our
part to maintain and improve the
U.S. -Soviet dialogue, we cannot remain
silent to the tragedy of Afghanistan.
There should be no misunderstanding
that the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan has created serious interna-
tional tensions. It is not only the
Afghans themselves who oppose the
Soviet occupation of their country but
virtually the entire world community.

This has been demonstrated time
and again in five consecutive votes of
the UN General Assembly, when re-
sounding majorities of the world's na-
tions called upon the Soviet Union to
end its occupation and restore the in-
dependence and nonaligned status of
Afghanistan. In fact, the most recent
UN resolution was adopted on
November 23 by the largest vote
yet— 116 to 20.

Early this year, I had the privilege
of receiving in my office a group of six
Afghan freedom fighters. I was moved
by their simple dignity and pride and
their determination to continue their
struggle for independence. These brave
individuals have returned to the fight.

The struggle for a free Afghanistan
continues. This is not because of any
outside manipulation but because of the
Afghan peoples' own desire to be free.
And their struggle will continue until a
negotiated political settlement can be
found to allow the Afghan people to
determine their own destiny.

Our goal is to do everything we can
to help bring about a peaceful solution
which removes the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan, ends the agony and
destruction of the Afghan nation, and

I vt .1 %

SOUTH ASIA

restores that country's independence and
nonalignment. Clearly a neutral and
nonaligned Afghanistan would not be a
threat to its huge Soviet neighbor.

Thus we mark the fourth anniver-
sary of the Soviet invasion with sadness
and continued indignation. But we are
convinced that a settlement is possible,
and we are glad that consultations in the
UN process of indirect talks will go on.
We call upon the Soviet Union to reach
a settlement of the crisis which restores

the freedom, independence, and
nonalignment of Afghanistan.

Let all of us who live in lands of
freedom, along with those who dream of
doing so, take inspiration from the spirit
and courage of the Afghan patriots. Let
us resolve that their quest for freedom
will prevail and that Afghanistan will
become, once again, an independent
member of the family of nations.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 2, 1984.

Visit of King of Nepal

Their Majesties King Birendra Bir
Bikram Shah Dev and Queen Aishwarya
Rajya Laxmi Devi Shah of the Kingdom.
of Nepal made a state visit to the United
States December 5-13, 1983 and to
Washington, D.C., December 5-10 to
meet with President Reagan and other
govemmeyit officials.

Following are remarks made by
President Reagan and the King at the
arrival ceremony and toasts made at the
state dinner.

ARRIVAL CEREMONY,
DEC. 7, 19831

President Reagan

Nancy and I welcome you to the White
House and the United States of
America.

It's a particular pleasure to have
King Birendra back in our country for
the first time since his student days. We
hope that you will again feel at home
and among friends here, not only at the

White House, which you visited as
Crown Prince, but throughout our coun-
try. Queen Aishwarya, this is your first
visit to the United States, and we hope
that our good will and hospitality will
encourage you to return.

The United States and Nepal are on
opposite sides of the globe. We face dif-
ferent challenges, and our cultures sym-
bolize the diversity with which mankind
views the world. Yet our ties have
grown stronger since our countries
established relations in 1947. The vast
distance which separates us is bridged
with a miracle of modern communica-
tions and transportation. Our distinct
cultures are linked in our peoples' com-
mon commitment to peace and human
progress.

In Nepal, you've set forth to win the
battle against illiteracy, disease, hunger,
;ind poverty. The challenges you face on
the frontier of modernization are for-
midable. The very topography which
makes Nepal one of earth's most
lieautiful sites makes your task more dif-
ficult by limiting the amount of arable
land and complicating communications.
Although improved health and nutrition
in your country has saved lives, it has
also increased the pressures on finite
resources. Education and information
have expanded the horizons of your
citizens but have also raised their expec-
tations.

Your development program, which
began some 30 years ago, exemplifies
the wise and progressive leadership pro-
vided by your family. From your grand-
father's decision to seek modernization
to the present day, your people have
been blessed by something money can-
not buy: wise leadership. This, coupled
with your country's hard-working peo-
ple, tremendous hydroelectric potential,
and access to substantial technical and
financial support from the international
community, all represent opportunities
for dramatic progress.

America is proud that for a third of
a century we've played a part in your
development efforts. The record reflects
the close partnership of our govern-
ments and peoples. We plan to continue
American investment in Nepal's
economic development during the next 5
years, including the funding of the new
agricultural research and training proj-
ects, areas which Your Majesty has iden-
tified as vital to improving the well-
being of your people.

The Peace Corps will also continue
its important work in Nepal. More than
2,000 volunteers have served in your

M» M'Je I'V* 1^. |4k

SOUTH ASIA

.Bulle'i'

country, one of our largest Peace Corps
posts. The 180 volunteers presently
there are carrying on their fine tradition
of competence and compassion.

You, your father, and your grand-
father before you have been the archi-
tects of Nepal's efforts to build a better
future. In the political arena your
reforms are enlisting public participation
in identifying national goals, thus
guaranteeing that your people have a
stake in their future. The United States
respects these and other initiatives Your
Majesty is making to develop popular in-
stitutions consistent with the spirit of
the Nepalese people. There is every
reason to be confident that your goals of
economic progress, political stability,
and national security will be reached.
America is happy to offer encourage-
ment and support in these noble efforts.

Your Majesty's moral leadership in
condemning the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan is much appreciated here.
We should not forget the heroism of the
Afghan people in their fight for the
freedom and independence of their
country.

We're also grateful for the courage
your nation has shown in the cause of
peace. Nepal has been willing to do more
than just cast a ballot at the United Na-
tions. It has volunteered its military per-
sonnel to serve in some of the world's
more troubled areas, giving depth and
meaning to Nepal's commitment to
peace. The world needs more nations
like Nepal which are willing to help
shoulder the burden of preserving peace
as well as advocating it in world forums.

Once again. Your Majesties,
welcome to America. We look forward
to getting to know you better as a
means of enriching the deep friendship
which has always characterized our rela-
tions.

King Birendra

I'd like to thank you for this welcome
ceremony and for the warmth with
which my wife and I, along with the
members of my entourage, have been
received here. I also wish to convey to
you — and through you, to the Govern-
ment and people of the United States —
greetings and good wishes of the
Government and people of Nepal.

For me it is also a nostalgic
moment. I recall with fondness the time
I had stood by my august father, late
King Mahendra, on a similar occasion, in
a similar setting here in 1967.

I do not feel a complete stranger to
this land. Indeed, I come to you in the
spirit of a friend who has had the
benefit of studying in one of your
leading institutions of learning. Inspired
as Nepal and the United States are by
the common goals of striving for
freedom and dignity of man, it is also a
fulfilling experience for me to be back
here again.

Few things in the history of man
have been as eventful as the discovery
of this new-found land. It gave birth to a
republic known not only for its inspiring
ideals but also for the most epoch-
making feats of scientific endeavor.
Viewed from this angle, America stands
on the very forefront of modern history.
Indeed, what the United States
represents is a harmonious amalgam of
high human and material achievements
rarely surpassed elsewhere in the world.
As a nation that has brought about such
profound changes, it is only natural to
look up to this country in joining hands
with the rest of the world to herald a
new age of peace, understanding, friend-
ship, and prosperity for all.

Committed as we are in Nepal to
these ideals, we hold you in high esteem
and wish to see the United States as a
bulwark of peace and stability, cherish-
ing the belief that all nations of the
world — whether big or small, rich or
poor, developed or developing — must
have a place under the Sun.

It is in this spirit that I look forward
to exchange views with you on matters
of mutual interest. I also hope to meet
other leaders and seek the opportunity
to renew my acquaintances with friends
that I have known. I'm confident that
our visit to this country will be fruitful
as well as memorable.

DINNER TOASTS,
DEC. 7, 19832

President Reagan

Today King Birendra and I had the op-
portunity to review our bilateral rela-
tions and to discuss our international
concerns. We also had the chance to get
to know one another as individuals. I'm
pleased to inform you tonight that not
only are relations between Nepal and
the United States good, but King
Birendra and I have each discovered a
new friend.

Our discussion of bilateral relations
revealed a refreshing lack of difficulties.
Notwithstanding the great distance that

separates our two nations, Nepal and
the United States through the years
have enjoyed a particularly amicable
relationship. We prefer to think of you
as neighbors on the other side of the
world. We're so pleased that you've
made this neighborly visit. It will serve
to expand the good will between our
peoples when more Americans, as I did
today, get the chance to meet you
personally.

Americans respect individuals of
courage and conviction. And to give you
some idea of how this applies to King
Birendra, one of His Majesty's many
talents is parachuting. We have a great
deal in common — [laughter] — but let me
hasten to say we found our common
ground in another of his interests —
horseback riding. [Laughter]

The highest mountain on our planet,
Mt. Everest, is in Nepal. So are 8 of the
world's 10 highest peaks. And the
character of your people, the sincerity of
your convictions stand as tall and strong
as your mountains.

Any American who's visited Nepal
returns home in awe, not only of the
majestic beauty of your land but also of
the religious strength of your people.
There are countless religious shrines in
Nepal — outward symbols of your coun-
try's greatest strength. And this
spiritual side which is so important to
your nation speaks well of you and your
countrymen.

Today we had the opportunity to
discuss a proposal of which you and your
people can be rightfully proud. Through
the Nepal zone of peace concept, you're
seeking to ensure that your country's
future will not be held back by using
scarce resources for military purposes.
We Americans support the objectives of
Your Majesty's zone of peace proposal,
and we endorse it. We would only hope
that one day the world in its entirety
will be a zone of peace.

In the meantime, we encourage you
to continue to work closely with your
neighbors to make Nepal's zone of peace
a reality. Your innovative approach to
peace and development could be a
foundation for progress throughout the
region. We wish you success.

It is an honor to have you with us.
Your Majesties. Now, would all of you
please join me in a toast to His Majesty,
King Birendra, to Her Majesty, Queen
Aishwarya, and to the people of Nepal.

February 1984

SOUTH ASIA

King Birendra

I'm touched by your cordial welcome and
the warm words with which you and
Mrs Reagan have received us here m
Washington. We're equally honored by
the generous remarks you have just
made about mv country and people.
Seen from Washington, Nepal is
almost on the other side of the globe,
and yet, as this friendly gathermg here
tonight shows, distance notwithstandmg,
friendship and cordiality based on
shared ideals can exist between coun-
tries that are geographically far apart.
In 1947, as soon as Nepal broke her age-
old isolation by seeking friendship
beyond her borders, it was with the
United States of America that Nepal
sought to establish her diplomatic rela-
tions.

Since 1951, the year when my
grandfather, late King Tribhuvan, led
the Nepalese people to democracy, we
have looked to the United States as a
land of freedom and fulfillment. The en-
during ideals of the Founding Fathers ot
America, who spoke to men of liberty
and independence, have inspired men
throughout the world, including those of
us living in the mountain vastness of
Nepal.

In our part of the world, if America
is looked upon as a land of gold, grain,
and computers, a country of skyscrapers
and space shuttles, she is also regarded
as a nation committed to respect man
and his dignity. A land of discovery,
America has distinguished herself m be-
ing inventive, in breaking new grounds,
and opening newer horizons of
knowledge for the betterment of man.
With a country such as the United
States, one wonders if Nepal has
anything in common. On the surface,
there may seem very little. Yet, as men
living in the same planet, we have com-
mon stakes in the global peace, pros-
perity, and, indeed, the survival of man
in dignity and freedom.

We're happy to see your efforts to
maintain peace and stability around the
world. The Nepalese people join me in
appreciating the understanding with
which on behalf of the United States you
have extended support to the concept of
Nepal as a zone of peace. This recogni-
tion, I assure you, will go down not only
as an important landmark in the history
of our relations but also as a testimony
of your personal commitment to the
cause of peace, stability, and freedom.
Nepal rejoices in the achievements
of the American people in different
fields of human endeavors. The initiative

Nepal— A Profile

People

Nationality: .V..H«-Nep;ilese (sins, and pl.|.
,4 (/j<r( (/■('- Nepalese or Nepali. Population
(1981 I'st.): 15 million. Annual growth rate:
^^^VV,K Ethnic groups: Brahmans, Chetris,
CururiKS, Magars, Taniarigs, Newars,
Bhotias. Rais, Limbus. Sherpas. Languages:
Nepali and more than 12 others. Religions:
Hinduism (DO'^iO. Buddhism, and Islam. Edu-
cation: Yiur:< ,-<inipiiUorii—:i. Atlnid-
„,„■, —primary TIT,,, secondary U'K..
Lileniry-2Vi%. Health: Inj'nnI morkilitti
rn/c— 152/1,0(1(1. Life criieclancy—W yrs.
Work force: Agnrultinr-W-.. /h-///-s(/-//-

Subdivisions: 14 zones and 75 districts.
Political parties: None officially. Suf-
frage; liiivt-rsal.

Central government budget {V\

U»S1-«2|: $53^1 million.

Defense (FY 1981-82); $22 million or 4%
of government budget.

National holiday: December 28, King
Birendra's birthday and Nepal's National
Dav.

Flag: Two blue-edged red triangles point-
ing away from staff, with symbols of the sun
and moon in white.

Ituporarj' (

Geography

,\rea: 14.")..3;il sq. km. (.5ti.l3i; sq. mi.); slight-
ly larger than .Arkansas. Cities;
/vi/»7a/-Kathmandu (pop. 125,000). Olh.r
,.,7,<.,s_P<ikhara. Biratnagar, Birganj. Ter-
rain; Three distinct topogi-aphical regions:
Hat and fertile in the south; the lower
Himalayas and swiftly flowing mountain
rivers forming the hill country in the center;
and the high Himalayas forming the bonier
with Tibet in the nwrth. Climate: Ranges
from subtropical summers and mild winters
in the south to cool summers and severe
winters in the northern mountains.

Government

Type: Constitutional monarchy. Constitution:

December 16, 1962.

Branches: K/ccMfn-c-king (chief of
state), prune minister (head of government).
L(7y(.-;/'i///v— National Paiiflxni'il. J ml ir nil—
Supreme Court.

Stole
I lit event!

Economy
(,DP (FY 1980-81); $1.9 billion. Annual
growth rate: 2'R. at constant prices. Per
capita income: $140. Avg. inflation rate last
5 yrs.: 14%.

Natural resources: Water, timber,
hvdroelectric potential, scenic beauty.
■ Agriculture (57";. of GDI"); Rice, maize,
wheat, millet, jute, sugarcane, oilseed,
potatoes. L,n«/-i;5.62% cultivated (1971

est,).

lndustry(14"; of (;i)P): Cigarettes,
matches, bricks, sugar, lumber, jute,
hydroelectric power, cement.

Trade (FY 1980-81); &>/«'»•(.-;-$ i:!4
million: agricultural products and timber. Mu
j„, „,„rM-\nd\-d. /»i/-..r;.s--$:569 million;
textiles, other manufactured goods. Major
,s«;,/)/«/ — India.

Official exchange rate: 13.2 Nepalese
rupees = L'S$1.

Fiscal year: Mid-.luly to mid-.Iuly.

Membership in international organiza-
tions: IN

Taken from the Backgrvand Notes oiApn\
1982. published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: .loanne
Re|:)pert Reams. ■

sotN

Iklina

IotI. Till

lliwaiii th

^t of Qtatp Riiiietin

^MMMHIfUfllMIl

^«; Ift U Ir U I* V «ii

UNITED NATIONS

and enterprise of your people are ex-
emplary. Yet, what happens in this part
of the world sends its ripples even to the
roadless villages of Nepal. We receive
their fallout. When America suffers a
temporary drought, millions around the
world get affected.

Indeed, if I may seek your in-
dulgence, I would like to mention
something that on the surface may
sound trivial, but sometimes it is the
small thing that can bring about pro-
found changes. The corn maize in Nepal
was introduced from this part of
America, as were the potatoes from the
Andes nearly 300 years ago. These new
crops not only altered our hill economy
but even the mode of life, by making
settlements possible in the mountain ter-
races of Nepal.

Evidently, we do not live in islands,
but in a world bound in a nexus of in-
terdependence. What happens in
America ceases, therefore, to be a local
event. The United States as such has
shown a consistent understanding
toward this and has assisted Nepal in
stretching her hand of friendship and
cooperation in many fields, including the
building of infrastructures.

May I take this opportunity,
therefore, to thank you, and through
you, to the people and Government of
the United States for the support we
have received in meeting the challenges
of development in Nepal.

In recent years, America has
brought glory to humanity by landing
man on the Moon. It is, indeed, thrilling
to reflect that one can soar into space to
explore the unknown and scan the stars.
Yet these adventures into outerspace
would carry still deeper meaning if the
part of humanity living in Nepal could
also rid themselves of their continuing
poverty. Itself, a least developed, land-
locked country, Nepal has always sought
understanding and cooperation from our
friends and neighbors. In fact, since the
time I assumed responsibilities, I have
sought that the minimum of basic needs
•nust not be denied to people anywhere
n the world. In this regard, I take com-
brt in the reassurance that the United
States will continue to extend coopera-
;ion on a long-term basis into the future.

Modern technology has reduced
distance and joined us all into a family
of nations. This situation demands that
ffe create an enduring relationship
msed on a sense of purpose and mean-
ng. With Nepal and countries in her
•egion willing to join hands with the

g(,lleii|-ebruary 1984

United States and other international
agencies in a creative effort for pros-
perity by putting into use a fragment of
their human and capital resources to
harness the water potentials of Nepal, it
would not only enable them to walk over
a long road to progress for our region,
as a whole, but would also continue to
build bridges of understanding between
a most advanced and a least developed
nation of the world. It would also mean
eliminating the perils of hunger on the
one hand, and the danger of instability
and extremism on the other.

I have no doubt that Nepal and the
United States can cooperate in many
fields of creative endeavors. As coun-
tries that have shown respect to the
uniqueness of the individual, we believe
in the conservation of the natural as
well as the spiritual heritage of man.
But most important of all, we both
honor the freedom of man and the in-
dependence of nations. In this regard,
we appreciate the support the United
States has shown consistently to our
identity as a nation.

I cherish the fruitful exchange of
views we have had recently with each
other. You have been very reassuring,
and I wish to thank you and Mrs.
Reagan for the warmth of hospitality
shown to me, my wife, and members of
my entourage.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
may I now request you to join me in
proposing a toast to the health and hap-
piness of President Ronald Reagan of
the United States of America, and the
First Lady, Mrs. Nancy Reagan, to the
peace and prosperity of the American
people, and to the further development
of friendship between Nepal and the
United States.

'Made on the South Lawn of the White
House (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 12. 1983).

^Made in the State Dining Room of the
White House (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents of Dec. 12,
1983). ■

U.S. Notifies UNESCO
of Intent to Withdraw

December 28, 1983

His Excellency
Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow
Director General
United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural

Organization
Paris

Dear Mr. Director General:
The purpose of this letter is to notify you
within the terms of Article Two Paragraph
Six of the Constitution that my Government
will withdraw from the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion effective December 31. 1984.

You may be assured that the United
States will, within the terms of the Constitu-
tion, seek to meet fully all of its legitimate
financial obligations.

The Government of the United States,
along with the American people generally,
believe in the great principles enunciated in
the Constitution of UNESCO. Today, as in
the early years of the organization, these
principles summon us to a commitment of ef-
fort, and resources, in the interest of building
a stable and enduring framework for peace in
the world. Today, as in the early years, we
believe that education, science, culture and
communication are significant, even essential,
elements in building a peaceful world.

But while the United States continues to
devote substantial resources to the attain-
ment of these goals, it must choose carefully
the precise methods and means through
which these resources are to be used. There
are many groups and organizations whose
purpose we approve, but which are not effec-
tive at carrying out the kind of international
cooperation which will contribute to the
making of a peaceful world. Good intentions
are not enough.

For a number of years, as you know from
statements we have made at the Executive
Board and elsewhere, we have been con-
cerned that trends in the management, policy
and budget of UNESCO were detracting
from the organization's effectiveness. We
believed these trends to be leading UNESCO
away from the original principles of its Con-
stitution. We felt that they tended to
serve — willingly or unwillingly, but im-
properly — the political purposes of a few
member states. During this period we worked
energetically to encourage the organization to
reverse these trends; to redirect itself to its
founding purposes; to rigorously avoid becom-
ing a servant of one or another national
policy; and to manage itself in a way that
rewarded efficiency, promoted fearless pro-
gram evaluation and followed priorities based
on program value rather than on past habit,
political expediency or some other extraneous
consideration.

J >i .'I

UNITED NATIONS

At the same time, we also recognized,
and expressed our strong concern about,
those pressures to divert UNESCO to
politically motivated ends which emanated
from member states, rather than from within
the organization itself. We consistently
worked in the Executive Board and General
Conference to minimize or eliminate the
resulting political content— tendentious and
partisan— from UNESCO resolutions and
programs.

Many of these efforts, yours and ours,
have been productive, at least in relative
terms. The results of the recent General Con-
ference prove the point, and we appreciate
the role you played in the outcome of that
Conference.

Viewed in a larger sense, however, the
General Conference proves a different point:
if the results of the Conference demonstrate
the best that can expected from the organiza-
tion as it is presently constituted, and as it
presently governs itself, there can be little
hope for a genuine and wholehearted return
of the organization to its founding principles.

For the United States, that conclusion
has become inescapable. The responsibility to
act upon it is equally inescapable.

You. Mr. Director General, have our
esteem, our appreciation and our pledge of
the fullest cooperation to make the year in-
tervening between this letter and the date of
our withdrawal as harmonious as possible.
We recognize that you will continue to do
your best, in the difficult circumstances in
which you operate, to make UNESCO ac-
tivities productive, and relevant to unmet
needs of the world. For our part, we are con-
vinced that we can develop other means of
cooperation in education, science, culture and
communication, which better embody the
principles to which we subscribed in
UNESCO many years ago. We are convinced
that such cooperation need not be diminished
by the injection of political goals beyond its
scope; that its authority need not be weak-
ened through the compromise of such simple
and lofty goals as individual human rights
and the free flow of information. It may yet
be appreciated that our shared aims could
have been accomplished effectively through
attention to the principle that a few things
done well have more impact than superficial
examination of all the world's ills.

It is likely that the resources we present-
ly devote to UNES('0 will be used to supt)ort
such cooperation. Any alternative programs
which the U.S. develops could, in principle,
serve as a basis for future cooperation be-
tween the U.S. and UNESCO, should both
parties find that advantageous. We would be
pleased to consider that possibility at the a|i-
propriate lime.

.Sinct'rely.

Gkokok v. Sill ltz

December 29, 1983

His Excellency

.Javier Perez de Cuellar y Guerra
Secretary General of
the United Nations
New- York

Dear Mr. Secretary General:
We are delivering to the Director General of
the United Nations Educational. Scientific
and Cultural Organization a letter giving
notice that the United States will withdraw
from the organization, effective Decem-
ber 31, 1984.

While the decision to withdraw from
UNESCO is firm, we will remain a full
member during 1984. paying our financial
obligations. This year will give UNESCO a
potential opportunity to respond to the
serious concerns that have caused our
withdrawal. We remain open to indications of
significant improvement. We would, of
course, welcome meaningful changes that
would eliminate the suppression of minority
views within UNESCO, and restore fiscal in-
tegrity to the organization.

We wish you to understand that our
withdrawal from UNESCO does not presage
any wider disengagement from the United
Nations or its other Specialized Agencies. On
the contrary, as President Reagan made clear
at the General Assembly last September, the
United States is deeply attached to the prin-
ciple that genuine international cooperation is
essential to our shared purposes in the world,
and to the attainment of peaceful progress
for all.

As you are aware, the United States had
been concerned for many years over a grow-
ing tendency on the part of UNESCO to
depart from the principles upon which it was
founded, and the purposes which it was
originally called upon to fulfill. For several
years, we have been working actively with
other countries to reverse this unacceptable
trend. Some progress has been made toward
this end, but we have concluded, with
respect, that under present circumstances we
can no longer justify continuing United
States membership in UNESCO.

For our part, we are convinced that we
can develop other means of cooperation in
education, science and culture and com-
munication, which will more clearly embody
the principles to which we subscribed in
UNESCO many years ago. We plan to use
the resources we presently devote to
UNESCO to supiiort such other means of
cooperation.

In all your activity to promote the cause
of international cooperation, we wish you
well.

Sincerely yours.

Gkokck p. Sin i.tz ■

Department of State Bullet

I!l/[lilM!lUli)fWMHWRHflftiHWH){liJ]iflll

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Democracy as a Problem
Solving Mechanism

by Langhorne A. Motley

Address before the Council of the
Americas on December 8, 1983. Am-
bassador Motley is Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs.

The subject of your program today — the
national security implications of the
economic crisis in Latin America — is for
several reasons a realistic one. It sug-
gests — correctly I think — that the
economic crisis is unusually severe. And
it ties that crisis directly to what must
be the bottom line of U.S. foreign policy:
our own national security.

In my remarks today, however, I
would like to talk about more than just
debt and trade as linkages between
Latin America's economic crisis and our
security. I would like to broaden our
focus to include the issue that will
ultimately determine our capacity to re-
spond constructively. That issue is
politics. And, specifically, it is whether
something can be done to strengthen the
democratic bases that are essential both
to stability and to our capacity to
cooperate.

Debt Crisis

Let me begin with debt, the most direct
and key link between the Latin
American economic crisis and our securi-
ty. Debt is the economic problem we
have been forced to give the most
urgent and sustained attention since the
crisis first broke in Mexico in the sum-
mer of 1982.

For many of the countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, external
debt has become a vital, almost all-
consuming concern. You all know the
extent of the debt— $310 billion at the
end of 1982— and of that about 87% is
held by banks and private institutions.
You also know that while most less
developed countries (LDCs) devote about
a third of their export earnings to debt
service, in Latin America and the Carib-
bean it reached 57% in 1982. Even with
reschedulings, this debt service ratio will
remain high throughout the decade and
will hinder a rapid economic recovery.

Now this audience needs no instruc-
tion from me on the causes of this crisis,
particularly in Latin America and the

February 1984

Caribbean. Nor, I assume, on what the
Administration is doing about it. You
know that we are pursuing a broad-
based strategy comprising five elements:

• Sustainable, noninflationary
growth in the United States and other
industrialized countries within the con-
text of open markets;

• Economic adjustment efforts by
borrowing countries;

• Balance-of-payments financing
through the International Monetary
Fund (IMF);

• Short-term financing from the
United States and other governments
when debt emergencies require it; and

• Encouragement of continued lend-
ing by commercial banks to countries
that are pursuing sound adjustment pro-
grams.

You also know that this strategy is
slowly working. Maturities have been
deferred and new money provided. Bor-
rowers have adopted adjustment pro-
grams, including realistic exchange
rates. The IMF has helped negotiate
both, while providing much-needed
capital.

Although there is much talk of a new
international economic order, the inter-
national financial system has thus far
proved to be more resilient than even its
originators would have imagined.

threatened to become system-damaging
crises. This cooperation has helped pro-
vide breathing space to devise and begin
implementing adjustment measures.

Recent news provides some reason
for cautious optimism. Congress has
finally passed the U.S. share of the IMF
quota increase. Brazil has concluded its
internal debate on economic policy and
reached agreement with the IMF, with
its Paris Club creditors, and with private
commercial banks. Last week, commer-
cial banks, encouraged by the transition
to constitutional government in Argen-
tina and the high quality of the economic
team selected by President-elect Alfon-
sin, made available the first $500 million
from a medium-term loan negotiated
several months earlier. These positive
developments and Mexico's encouraging
progress are producing what may, in
retrospect, be remembered as a .
psychological turning point.

There are also some encouraging
signs for the medium term. Economic
recovery in the United States began at
the end of 1982 and was especially
vigorous during the second and third
quarters of 1983. Real growth for the
year as a whole should exceed 6%. Next
year's growth should be in the same
range.

Recovery is also spreading to the
other industrialized countries. During

The people of this hemisphere are turning again to
democratic institutions not in times of plenty but
in circumstances demanding solutions to hard-to-
resolve problems.

Through the years it has adapted to
dropping of the gold exchange, fixed ex-
change rates, the two oil price shocks,
and now the external debt crisis. In
relieving sources of systemic strain,
governments, the international financial
institutions, and the private banks have
all demonstrated the ability to
cooperate, innovate, and adjust.

In the case of major debtors such as
Brazil and Mexico, the United States has
acted quickly to help deflect what

1984 the OECD countries could grow by
an average 3.5% to 4%. A growth rate
in that range appears sustainable
throughout the mid-1980s. The less
developed countries as a whole should
return to positive growth next year as
well. The strongest performers should
be those able to increase their exports of
nontraditional products. To the extent
that we are able to avoid another runup
in interest rate levels, borrowers will
benefit.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

All this said, the problems ahead re-
main grave. We will continue to operate
uncomfortably close to tlie brink for
some time to come. In some quarters in
Latin America, there is a mistaken no-
tion, I believe, that we'll soon return to
the "go-go" growth rates of the 1970s.
But even several years of sustained
growth will not resolve the problems
that have accumulated over the past two
decades. This is the inescapable conse-
quence of policies that encouraged im-
ports and discouraged exports, provided
insufficient incentives to agricultural
development, and put more emphasis on
boosting public sector expenditures than
on keeping domestic revenues adequate.

The tendency of the various players
involved to try to minimize the ad-
justments they have to make will keep
strains high. Nonetheless, recognition
that we are all in this together is grow-
ing. Our approach is intended to
strengthen this recognition. To repeat, I
don't want to appear complacent, but I
think that we are probably beyond the
point where citing good news sounds
like whistling past the graveyard.

Keeping Markets Open

The debt management crisis is, however,
only the most direct link between Latin
American economic difficulties and our
security. Our stake in each other's
markets is also impressive. U.S. exports
to Latin America and the Caribbean
added up to $34 billion in 1982. Exports
from Latin America and the Caribbean
to the United States were only $1 billion
less.

Policies that foster free capital flows
and encourage private investment, in-
novation, and competition will be the
key to recovery and growth. The United
States is fully committed to open trade.
We have not imposed new trade-
restrictive barriers. We are, to the con-
trary, continuing to implement the
liberalization agreed upon in the
multilateral trade negotiations. We are
seeking a renewal of the generalized
system of preferences — not an easy
task — which has provided significant
benefits to Latin America. And with the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), we
have succeeded in achieving a virtually
all-inclusive free-trade status for the
Caribbean Basin.

On December 1, President Reagan
announced his intention to designate the
first 11 beneficiaries of the virtually
complete one-way free-trade provision of
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act. An interagency group is continuing

to work with other governments eligible
for designation; we expect the President
to announce a second group of
beneficiary countries later this month.
Our goal is to designate the vast majori-
ty of the 27 eligible independent coun-
tries and territories by late December so
that they can begin to benefit from the
trade-creation opportunities of the CBI
starting January 1.

Beyond these immediate initiatives,
we are also preparing for the longer
term future. At last spring's
Williamsburg economic summit, the
leaders of the industrialized world
recognized that developing countries can
earn the foreign exchange to service
their debts only if they expand exports.
The leaders agreed to consult on a new
trade negotiating round emphasizing
trade with developing countries. The
President reiterated our commitment to
such a round during his visit to Tokyo
this fall. We hope that all nations, and
Latin America in particular, will work
with us as preparations for this round
develop during the months ahead.

Importance of Democracy

A key tenet of U.S. policy in the
Americas is to defend and promote
democracy. In fact, building democracy
is in our national security interest. Why?
Because:

First, democracy's consultative proc-
ess offers the best means of translating
the people's instinctive longing for peace
into government policy. Democracy has
proven itself in practice a bulwark
against the international adventurism so
characteristic of dictatorships;

Second, democracy offers the surest
way to prevent tensions from breaking
down into internal violence. The
moderating power of effective
democracy — based on an open,
pluralistic system safeguarded by
law — is also the consistent key to
respect for human rights and the
prevention of internal abuse;

Third, as a practical matter of con-
ducting the business of diplomacy, it is
far easier to deal with other democratic
governments than it is with undemo-
cratic ones. We understand each other.
We do not mystify each other when our
respective congresses disagree with a
chief of state. And we understand the
unique power of national consensus
when it is achieved in a democratic
society;

Fourth, as a practical political mat-
ter, it is easier to mobilize U.S. public
support for the foreign policy actions we'
must take in our own interest when the
governments those actions concern are
democratic. Americans reject extremism
and violence of both the left and the
right. They would like to see democracy
restored not only in Cuba and Nicaragua
but also in Chile, Uruguay, and Guate-
mala — and defended in Costa Rica and
Peru; and

Fifth, and finally, a functioning
democractic system provides the best
chance for stability that investors need
to plan ahead, confident that the future
is less likely to hold arbitrary shifts in
government policy or sudden outbursts
of civil strife. Democracy provides the
flexibility to accomodate change and
relieve internal pressure and the
freedom that facilitates enterprise and
promotes economic growth.

There is more than rhetoric to back
all this up. In the last several years
we've witnessed a fragile but broad
trend toward restoration of democratic
government in this hemisphere: Peru
and Ecuador. Bolivia, Uruguay, Hon-
duras, El Salvador, and Panama have al
moved or are heading in this direction.
In Chile the government and opposition
remain at odds over steps to accelerate
a return to democracy, but a process has
clearly been initiated. Brazil's steady
progress in its transition to a complete
democratic structure has exercised a
powerful positive influence. And now
Argentina, with great impact, will com-
plete its transition on Saturday.

The people of this hemisphere are
turning again to democratic institutions
not in times of plenty but in cir-
cumstances demanding solutions to
hard-to-resolve problems. This should be
taken as a source of confidence.
Democracy and freedom of expression
and assembly may increase the ventila-
tion of worrisome problems and thus
create some uncertainty, but they can
also provide effective means of increas-
ing public understanding of complex
economic issues. And we must not
forget that democracy is a problem-
solving mechanism — not a nice thing to
have if you can afford it but a necessity.

Doing Something About it

Being realistic, we must recognize that,
if economic difficulty has accelerated,
the transition to democracy it is also
subjecting nascent democracies to
strains that are virtually unprecedented
in their severity.

nent of State Bulletir

* !«> l9 i% I"!

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

And so the question becomes, demo-
cratic government being in our interest,
what can we do and what are we doing
to support it?

We start first of all from the
premise that, in politics,
words — rhetoric and the symbolism they
invoke — are very much the stuff of
policy. So the President's statement to
the Congress on April 27, for example,
is important: that we will support
democracy, reform, and human freedom:
that we will work at human rights prob-
lems, not walk away from them.

On that occasion the President was
talking about Central America. But
what he said describes the common fiber
of our actions throughout the hemis-
phere. To cite a few examples:

• In Central America we are pro-
moting elections and supporting Costa
Rica and its associates in the Central
American Democratic Community;

• In Uruguay we are encouraging
the Government of Uruguay's commit-
ment to elections in 1984 and the
restoration of democracy in 1985:

• In Chile we are encouraging ef-
forts to reach agreement on steps to im-
plement the transition to democracy;

• In Cuba we will soon be bringing
the democracy message through Radio
Marti; and

• We are helping restore democracy
in Grenada.

This Administration is also develop-
ing innovative and practical approaches
to strengthening democracy. In his ad-
dress to the British Parliament on
June 8 last year. President Reagan an-
nounced that the United States would
undertake a global effort to help
". . . foster the infrastructure of
democracy . . . which allows a people to
choose their own way, to develop their
own culture, to reconcile their own dif-
ferences through peaceful means."

Congress took a major step toward
this goal last month by agreeing to fund
the National Endowment for
Democracy. The endowment is a bipar-
tisan, nongovernmental, nonprofit
organization established at the recom-
mendation of a study group that in-
cluded representatives of the Republican
and Democratic parties, the AFL-CIO,
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Under the endowment, each of these
organizations has an institute that will
work directly with organizations
overseas on democracy-related projects.

February 1984

We think the endowment constitutes
a common sense, direct investment in
people — in future leaders, in education
and training, in international exchanges
to foster political skills. These actions
take us beyond immediate crisis reac-
tions to the concerted development of
men and women with modern economic,
technical, and political skills. And it is
an area where the Council of the
Americas could play a key role.

I urge you to help the United States
invest in people. The U.S. Government
has no equivalent of the Soviet Union's
Patrice Lumumba University. Nor would
we want one. We rely instead on public
and private colleges and universities.
But Federal funds for foreign student
scholarships are not sufficient for the
youth of the Western Hem.isphere to
take full advantage of our educational
resources. There is an urgent need for
additional sources of funding from

private enterprise, from foundations,
and from the universities themselves.

Summation

It is the purpose of this Administration
to act in clear-sighted pursuit of our na-
tional interest:

• We are restoring the bases for
sustainable economic recovery, making
adjustments and modifications to a tried
system, not panicking and throwing it
away for some untried theory;

• We are working to keep our
markets open;

• We are acting constructively to
help consolidate a hemispheric move-
ment toward free democratic govern-
ment, while recognizing that democracy
is a process, not a finished process; and

• With your help, we will make it
happen. ■

U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada

LETTER TO THE
CONGRESS.
DEC. 8, 1983'

In accordance with my desire that you be
kept informed concerning the situation in
Grenada, about which I reported to you on
October 25, I am providing this further
report on the presence of United States
Armed Forces in Grenada.

Since then, the circumstances which occa-
sioned the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into Grenada have substantial-
ly changed. On November 2, the armed con-
flict in Grenada came to an end, and our task
now. together with neighboring countries, is
to assist the Grenadians in their effort to
restore and revitalize their political institu-
tions in a stable security environment.

Although it is still not possible to predict
the precise duration of the temporary
presence of United States Armed Forces in
Grenada, our forces are continuing to work
closely with other components of the collec-
tive security force in assisting the Grenadian
authorities in the maintenance of conditions
of law and order and the restoration of func-
tioning governmental institutions to the
island of Grenada.

All elements of the U.S. Marines and
U.S. Army Rangers have now been with-

drawn from Grenada; at this time, less than
2.700 U.S. Armed Forces personnel remain
on the island. U.S. Armed Forces will con-
tinue to withdraw from the island as a part
of a process whereby a peacekeeping force,
composed of units contributed by friendly
countries, takes over these responsibilities. I
anticipate that this will be accomplished in
the near future and that any members of the
U.S. Armed Forces remaining in Grenada
thereafter will have normal peacetime
assignments, such as training, local security
and the furnishing of technical services.

I am satisfied that the objectives of our
operation in Grenada, including the pro-
tection of U.S. citizens, are being met suc-
cessfully because of the valor and effec-
tiveness of our forces. I ask for your continu-
ing support as we strive to assist the people
of Grenada in their efforts to restore peace,
order, and human rights to their island.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reacan

identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, .Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives and Strom Thurmond, Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 12, 1983). ■

I .§ >! ^%

TREATIES

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970.
TIAS 6997.
Accession deposited : Haiti, Dec. 5, 1983.

Atomic Energy

Agreement concerning the transfer of a
research reactor and enriched uranium to
Morocco, with annexes and exchanges of
notes. Signed at Vienna Dec. 2, 1983.
Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.

Aviation, Civil— Fares

Protocol to the memorandum of understand-
ing [signed Dec. 17, 1982; entered into force
Feb. 1, 1983] concerning scheduled trans-
atlantic passenger air fares, with annexes.
Done at Washington Oct. 29, 1983. Entered
into force Nov. 1, 1983.
Signatures: Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, F.R.G., Greece, Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K.,
U.S., Yugoslavia, Oct. 29, 1983.

Biolog^ical Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons
and on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975.
TIAS 8062.

Ratification deposited : Colombia,
Dec. 19, 1983.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1983, with an-
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983.
Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Sept. 22, 1983; Canada,
Sweden, Thailand, Sept. 15, 1983; Ecuador,
Dec. 2, 1983; Ghana, Oct. 4, 1983; India,
Sept. 9, 1983; Madagascar, Sept. 6, 1983;
Malawi. Sept. 21. 1983;' Uganda, Sept. 28.
1983.

Accessions deposited: Equatorial Guinea,
Nov. 7. 1983; Fiji. Sept. 23. 1983; Gabon,
Sept. 27. 1983.2

Commodities — Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27. 1980.^
Ratifications deposited : Lesotho, Sao Tome
and Principe. Dec. 6, 1983.

Conservation

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-

bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,

1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS

10240.

Ratification deposited : Norway, Dec. 6,

1963.

Containers

Amendments to Annexes I and II of the in-
ternational convention for safe containers,
1972, as amended (TIAS 9037, 10220).
Adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee
at London June 23. 1983.
Entered into force : Jan. 1, 1984.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of the International
Cotton Institute. Done at Washington
Jan. 17, 1966. Entered into force Feb. 23,
1966. TIAS 5964.

Notification of withdrawal : Greece, Dec. 15,
1983; effective Dec. 31, 1983.

Customs

Customs convention on the international
transport of goods under cover of TIR
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20.
1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.
Accession deposited : Kuwait, Nov. 23, 1983.

Expositions

Protocol revising the convention of Nov. 22,
1928 relating to international expositions,
(TIAS 6548). with appendix and annex. Done
at Paris Nov. 30. 1972. Entered into force
June 9. 1980. TIAS 9948.
Accession deposited : Uruguay. June 10. 1983.

Finance— African Development Bank

Agreement establishing the African Develop-
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Khartoum
Aug. 4, 1963. as amended at Abidjan May 17.
1979. Entered into force May 7. 1982; for the
U.S.. Jan. 31. 1983.
Signature : Portugal. Dec. 8. 1983.
Accessions deposited : India. Dec. 6, 1983;
Saudi Arabia. Dec. 15. 1983.

Fisheries

Convention for the conservation of salmon in

the North Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjavik

Mar. 2. 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1.

1983.

Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 13. 1983.

Judicial Procedure

Additional protocol to the Inter-American
convention on letters rogatory, with annex.
Done at Montevideo May 8. 1979. Entered
into force June 14. 1980.-'
Signature : Mexico, Aug. 3. 1983.
Ratification deposited: Mexico. Mar. 9, 1983.

Nationality

Protocol relating to military obligations in
certain cases of double nationality, concluded
at The Hague Apr. 12, 1930. Entered into
force May 25, 1937. 50 Stat. 1317.
Notification of succession : Kiribati, Nov. 29,
1983. '

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of

all forms of racial discrimination. Done at

New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force

Jan. 4. 1969.^

Ratification deposited : Kampuchea. Nov. 28,

1983.

Red Cross

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded and sick in armed
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S., Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked members of armed forces at sea.
Done at Geneva Aug. 12. 1949. Entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2.
1956. TIAS .3363.

Geneva convention relative to the treatment
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.

Geneva convention relative to the protection
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at
Geneva Aug. 12. 1949. Entered into force
Oct. 21. 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956.
TIAS 3.365.

Accessions deposited : Namibia, UN Council
for, Oct. 18. 1983.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12. 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of international armed con-
flicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at
Geneva June 8. 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978.-'

Accessions deposited : Congo, Nov. 10, 1983;
Namibia. UN Council for. Oct. 18, 1983;
Syrian Arab Republic, Nov. 14, 1983.^

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 194S, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of noninternational armed
conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva
June 8. 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7. 1978.->

Accessions deposited : Congo. Nov. 10, 1983;
Namibia. UN Council for. Oct. 18, 1983.

UN Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the UN Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted at
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.^

Signature : Sao Tome and Principe, Nov. 29,
1983.

Ratifications deposited ; Israel, Nov. 25, 1983;
Mozambique. Dec. 14, 1983; Nepal. Dec. 6.
1983.

State Bulletin

id>; m» i> i^. |«
|v 1*^ I«'i-v t:

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively in-
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with
annexed Protocols. Adopted at Geneva
Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2,
1983.-'

Accession and acceptances deposited :
Guatemala, July 21, 1983.

Wheat

1983 protocol for the further extension of the
wheat trade convention. 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered
into force July 1, 1983.
Ratifications deposited : Belgium, Dec. 9,
1983; Finland, Dec. 16, 1983.

1983 protocol for the further extension of the
food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015).
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered
into force July 1, 1983.
Ratifications deposited : Belgium, Dec. 9,
1983; Finland, Dec. 16, 1983.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of

discrimination against women. Adopted at

New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force

Sept. 3, 1981."

Ratification deposited : France, Dec. 14,

1983.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Arts. 24 and 25 of the Con-
stitution of the World Health Organization,
as amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534).
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th
World Health Assembly.^
Acceptance deposited : Algeria, Nov. 23,

1983.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force
Dec. 1, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited : Bangladesh, Aug. 3,

1983.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement relating to limitation of imports
of specialty steel from Argentina, with an-
nexes. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Nov. 8, 1983. Entered into force
Nov. 8, 1983.

Australia

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income. Signed at Sydney
Aug. 6, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 31,
1983. TIAS 10773.

Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 5, 1983.
Supersedes convention of May 14, 1953,
TIAS 2880.

Austria

Agreement relating to limitation of imports
of specialty steel from Austria, with annexes
and related letter. Effected by exchange of
letters at Washington Oct. 19. 1983. Entered
into force Oct. 19, 1983.

Belgium

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Dec. 1 and 9, 1983. Entered into
force Dec. 9, 1983.

Brazil

Agreement extending agreement of Dec. 1,
1971 (TIAS 7221), as amended and extended,
relating to a program of scientific and
technological cooperation. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Brasilia Dec. 1, 1983.
Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983.

Canada

Agreement relating to limitation of imports
of specialty steel from Canada, with annexes.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Oct. 19, 1983. Entered into force
Oct. 19, 1983.

Costa Rica

Agreement concerning air transport. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at San Jose
Oct. 20 and Nov. 23, 1983. Entered into force
Nov. 23, 1983.

Equador

Agreement for the recovery and return of
stolen archeological, historical, and cultural
properties. Signed at Washington Nov. 17,
1983. Enters into force upon exchange of
diplomatic notes indicating that each Party
has complied with the requirements of its
domestic law.

Eg.vpt

Second amendment to the grant agreement
of Aug. 29, 1979 (TIAS 9699) for Alexandria
wastewater system development. Signed at
Cairo Sept. 28, 1983. Entered into force
Sept. 28, 1983.

France

Agreement extending the memorandum of
understanding of May 30, 1978 on a
cooperative program in science and
technology. Signed at Paris June 29, 1983.
Entered into force June 29, 1983.

Memorandum of understanding concerning
the furnishing of balloon launching and
associated services. Signed at Washington
and Paris Aug. 26 and Nov. 11, 1983.
Entered into force Nov. 11, 1983.

TREATIES

Guatemala

Agreement extending the cooperative agree-
ment of Oct. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10288) to assist
the Government of Guatemala in execution of
an eradication program of the Mediterranean
fruit fly (MEDFLY). Signed at Guatemala
Nov. 23, 1983. Entered into force Nov. 23,
1983; effective Oct. 1, 1983.

Haiti

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage-
ment and protection of investment, with an-
nex and protocol. Signed at Washington
Dec. 13, 1983. Enters into force 30 days
after the date of exchange of ratifications.

Japan

Memorandum of understanding relating to
the operation of the Landsat system, with an-
nex. Signed at Washington and Tokyo July 5
and Aug. 11, 1983. Entered into force
Aug. 11, 1983.

Agreement relating to limitation of imports
of specialty steel from Japan, with annexes.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Oct. 18, 1983. Entered into force
Oct. 18, 1983.

Agreement for the transfer of defense-
related technologies, with annex. Effected by
exchange of notes at Tokyo Nov. 8, 1983.
Entered into force Nov. 8, 1983.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of
Dec. 1, 1982 (TIAS 10611), relating to trade
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
and textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Oct. 21 and Nov. 4,
1983. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1983.

Mexico

Agreement extending the cooperative agree-
ment of Oct. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10373) to assist
the Government of Mexico in execution of an
eradication program of the Mediterranean
fruit fly (MEDFLY), Signed at Mexico
Sept. 30, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 30,
1983; effective Oct. 1, 1983.

Agreement amending the agreement of
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Mexico Nov. 10, 1983.
Entered into force Nov. 10, 1983.

New Zealand

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with protocol. i^
Signed at Wellington July 23, 1982. Entered
into force Nov. 2, 1983. TIAS 10772.
Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 5,
1983.

Supersedes convention of Mar. 16, 1948,
TIAS 2360.

February 1984

.• .1 »1

CHRONOLOGY

Pakistan

Ajrreement amending the agreement of
Mar. 9 and 11. 1982, (TIAS 10408), relating
to trade in cotton textiles and textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Oct. 2.5 and Nov. 4. 1983.
Entered into force Nov. 4. 1983.

Peru

Agreement for the establishment and opera-
tion of the Naval Medical Research Institute
(NAMRID) in Lima. Signed at Lima Oct. 21,
1983. Entered into force Oct. 21. 1983.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the employment of
dependents of official government employees.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
Sept. 20 and Oct. 20, 1983. Entered into
force Oct. 20, 1983.

Poland

Agreement relating to limitation of imports
of specialty steel from Poland, with annexes.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Oct. 18, 1983. Entered into force
Oct. 18, 1983.

St. Vincent and The Grenadines

Agreement relating to radio communications
between amateur stations on behalf of third
parties. Effected by exchange of notes at
Bridgetown and St. Vincent Apr. 22 and
Sept. 27, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 27,
1982; effective Oct. 27, 1982.

Senegal

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage-
ment and protection of investment, with
annex and protocol. Signed at Washington
Dec. 6, 1983. Enters into force 30 days after
date of exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion.

South Africa

Memorandum of understanding relating to
the operation of the Landsat system, with
annex. Signed at Washington and Pretoria
Sept. 19 and Oct. 19, 1983, Entered into
force Oct. 19, 1983.

Spain

Agreement relating to limitation of imports
of specialty steel from Spain, with annexes.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Oct. 18, 1983. Entered into force
Oct. 18, 1983.

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at
Madrid Nov. h and 22, 1983. Enters into
force on the date the Government of Spain
gives written notice that it has fulfilled its
constitutional requirements.

Sri Lanka

Agreement relating to the establishment of a
Peace Corps program in Sri Lanka. Effected
by exchange of notes at Colombo Nov. 20,
1983. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1983.

Thailand

Treaty relating to extraditi(m. Signed at
Washington Dec. 14, 1983. Enters into force
30 days after exchange of instruments of
ratification.

Togo

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government through
the Export-Import Bank. Signed at Lome
Nov. 29, 1983. Enters into force upon receipt
by Togo of written notice from the U.S. that
all necessary domestic requirements for entry
into force have been fulfilled.

United Kingdom

Memorandum of understanding between the
U.S. Coast Guard and the Royal Air Force
concerning exchange of personnel. Signed at
Washington Nov. 14 and 16, 1983. Entered
into force Nov. 16, 1983.

'With declaration.

-As a member of OAMCAF (Organisation
africaine du Cafe) group.

^Not in force.

^Not in force for the LI.S.

^With reservation.

•■Does not include Tokelau or the
Associated SeLf-Governing States of the Cook
Islands and Nine. ■

December 1983

December 1

White House officials announce that on
Nov. 30, President Reagan designated the
following countries as beneficiaries of the
rights and privileges accorded under the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act:
Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, and the Government of
Trinidad and Tobago. The President said that
such designation is "an important step to
those countries in their battle to revitalize
and rebuild their weakened economies." The
countries will be entitled to export to the
U.S. most items they produce without paying
tariffs. Benefits are effective Jan. 1, 1984.

UN General Assembly adopts a resolution
strongly condemning South Africa for block-
ing independence for Namibia and calls for
comprehensive mandatory sanctions against
the republic. Under the UN Charter only the
Security Council may order such measures;
the Assembly, however, urges the Security
Council to act to ensure South Africa's total
isolation by governments and private bodies.

December 2

Following a meeting with Lebanese President
Gemayel, Secretary Shultz discloses plans to
create committees on military and economic
matters as an approach to the "development
of a strong working partnership" with
Lebanon. The Secretary says that the
Lebanese President had reviewed the situa-
tion extensively, and they both agree that
there is a "sense of urgency about the need
to work on these problems."

December 3

On behalf of President Reagan, Secretary
Shultz transmits the 15th Semiannual Report
on Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act
to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The report covers the period June 1, 1983,
through Nov. 30, 1983, and provides a factua
survey of developments in the areas of
human rights and humanitarian concerns;
security, economic, scientific, and
technological cooperation; and educational
and cultural exchanges and concentrates on
Soviet and East European compliance with
the Final Act.

December 4

Fighting intensifies in Lebanon. Responding
to Syrian antiaircraft attacks on unarmed
U.S. reconniassance aircraft, the U.S. bombs
Syrian targets. Two American carrier jets
are shot down — one U.S. pilot. Navy Lt.
Mark Lange is killed, and an airman. Navy
Lt. Robert 0. Goodman, Jr. of Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, is reported captured. Eight
marines are reported killed during intense ar
tillery shelling by Syrian-backed militiamen
LI.S. Sixth Fleet warships open fire on militis
positions. President Reagan says that while
we don't want a military confrontation with
Syria "if our forces are attacked, we will re-
spond. We're going to defend our
personnel. . . ."

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December 5

President Reagan announces a special
cultural exchange agreement between the
U.S. and India for 1984-86. The agreement,
first discussed during Prime Minister
Gandhi's July 1982 visit to the U.S., provides
a program with special emphasis on the U.S.
in India during 1984 and special emphasis on
India in the U.S. during 1985. Mrs. Gandhi
and First Lady Nancy Reagan will serve as
honorary chairpersons of national committees
arranging the Festival of India from the
spring of 1985 to spring 1986. The festival
will depict the social and cultural life of India \i^
outlining the continuity of traditional skills as '^mn^)
well as describe India's industrial and
technological advances.

President Reagan signs H.R. 4476 ex-
tending the authorities of the Export Ad-
ministration Act until Feb. 29, 1984.

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December 5-7

NATO Defense Ministers' meeting held in
Brussels.

Department of State Bulletir
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CHRONOLOGY

December 5-13

Their Majesties King Birendra Bir Bikram
Shah Dev and Queen Aishwarya Rajya Laxmi
Devi Shah (if Nepal make a state visit to the
United States Dee. 5-13, 1983. and to
Washington. D.C., Dec. 5-10, to meet with
President Reagan and other U.S. officials.

December 6-13

Secretary Shultz makes an official visit to
Bonn, West Germany (Dec. 6-7) to hold
neetings with President Carstens, Chancellor
Kohl, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister
jenscher, and other political leaders;
3russels (Dec. 7-9) to attend the NATO
Tiinisterial meeting; North Africa, where he
consults with President Bourguiha, Prime
Vlinister M'zali and Tunisian officials in
Tunis, Tunisia (Dec. 9-10) and His Majesty
ting Hassan, Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani.
ind other Moroccan officials in Morocco (Dec.
0-12); and Lisbon, Portgual (Dec. 12-13)
vhere he meets with President Eanes, Prime
Minister Soares. Vice Prime Minister Mota
'into, and Foreign Minister Gama.

December 7

lurvivors — 1 .800 marines and sailors — of the
nit that lost 241 men in the Beirut bombing
ttack on Oct. 23. are accorded a heroes
/elcome as they arrive in Camp Lejeune,
iiJorth Carolina.

Strategic arms limitation talks (START)
-nd in Geneva with the Soviet Union failing

set a date for resuming the negotiations,
"he Soviets argue that with the deployment
f new U.S. missiles in Europe, "changes in
he global strategic situation" make it
lecessary for them to "review all problems
snder discussion" at the negotiations. U.S. of-
ijcials voice regret at the decision and
disagree with Soviet assertions that
evelopments outside the negotiations should
ffect their decisions to resume negotiations,
'he U.S. is "fully prepared" to continue the
alks and propose to resume them in early
'eb. 1984.

Oecember 8

NATO's Special Consultative Group on INF
eleases a progress report on the implementa-
ion of NATO's 1979 "dual-track" decision,
'he report provides a comprehensive account
f rationale for NATO's decision, close con-
ultations within NATO on INF arms control,
:nd extensive U.S. efforts to achieve an
.greement during the six negotiating rounds

1 Geneva.

jlnfc December 8-9

jsf emiannual North Atlantic Council
linisterial meeting is held in Brussels.

*ecember 9

lATO foreign ministers unanimously adopt a
eclaration and release it as a preamble to
le final communique urging the Warsaw
'act to accept the opportunities offered by
ij,( ilATO for "a balanced and constructive rela-
onship and for genuine detente."

ebruary 1984

Former British Foreign Secretary Lord
Carrington is unanimously chosen as NATO's
next Secretary General. He will succeed
Joseph Luns of the Netherlands on June 25,
1984.

In an effort to keep the Congress in-
formed of developments on Grenada, Presi-
dent Reagan sends a letter stating that U.S.
forces "will continue to withdraw" from
Grenada as a multinational peacekeeping
force takes over. He says, however, that it is
"still not possible" to predict when all
Americans will leave the island. White House
Deputy Spokesman Larry Speakes says that
there has been no change in the President's
plans to remove all combat troops from the
island by Dec. 23. Remaining troops will be
construction or military police personnel and
will have "normal peacetime assignments,
such as training, local security and the fur-
nishing of technical services."

Administration officials note the an-
nouncement in Rangoon of the results of the
trial of two North Korean army officers
charged in the Oct. 9 bombing attack. State
Department officials say that the "Burmese
Government's investigation of the bombing
and the Burmese Court's finding of guilty
represents a serious determination to see
justice done. In the course of the investiga-
tion and trial, it was clearly established that
these officers carried out their murders at
the direction of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea."

December 9-11

Vice President Bush leads delegation attend-
ing the inauguration of Raul Alfonsin as
President of Argentina. The delegation also
includes U.S. Ambassador to Argentina
Frank V. Ortiz, Jr.; Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley;
Gen. Paul Gorman; Congressman Robert J.
Lagomarsino (R-Calif.); Deputy Secretary of
the Treasury R. T. McNamar; Ambassador
Richard Stone, the President's personal
representative to Central America; and Am-
bassador J. William Middendorf II, Perma-
nent U.S. Representative to the Organization
of American States. The Vice President also
travels to Panama and El Salvador where he
confers with Presidents Ricardo De la
Espriella and Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borja,
respectively.

December 10

Raul Ricardo Alfonsin is inaugurated Presi-
dent of Argentina.

December 11

The head of the Bangladesh Government, Lt.
Gen. Hussain Mohammad Ershad, proclaims
himself President and dissolves his cabinet in
an effort to consolidate his power before
presidential elections he has scheduled for
May 1984.

December 12

State Department officials announce that at
about 0630 GMT (9:30 a.m.), a terrorist
crashes a Mercedes truck loaded with ex-
plosives into the U.S. Embassy compound in
Kuwait. They add that the truck proceeded
about 50 yards to an Embassy annex where
the bomb was detonated. The explosion col-
lapsed part of the building and caused exten-
sive damage to the Chancery and other
buildings in the compound. Initial reports in-
dicate that four persons (later determined to
be 3 Embassy employees and the terrorist)
are killed and 37 wounded. Of the 37
wounded, 20 Foreign Service nationals; 17
are visitors to the Embassy or private con-
tractors. While some American employees
suffered minor injuries, none required
hospitalization, and all are accounted for.

Because of the uncertainty of the situa-
tion, the State Department recommends that
nonessential travel be deferred for a few-
days. Administration officials say that the
bombing "will not deter" the U.S. "from pur-
suing a steady policy in the Middle East."
Car bombs also explode at the French Em-
bassy, the Kuwait Airport control tower, an
American housing complex outside the city, a
power station, and an oil refinery.

U.S files third written pleading with the
ICJ in the "Case Concerning the Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area" between Canada and the United
States. The Court is hearing the case as a
result of a boundary settlement treaty be-
tween the U.S. and Canada which entered in-
to force Nov. 20, 1981.

State Department spokesman Alan
Romberg confirms reports that on Dec. 11
Bangladesh President Chowdhury resigned
and Gen. Ershad assumed the presidency.
While declining to comment on specific
developments in that nation's domestic
politics, Romberg reiterates U.S. hope that
"Bangladesh will find a way to resolve its in-
ternal political difference, continue the proc-
ess of building representative political institu-
tions, and carry on with the urgent task of
economic development."

About 1,000 paratroopers of the 82d Air-
borne Division, the last U.S. combat forces to
have fought in the invasion of Grenada, are
flown off the island. Left behind are about
1,200 support troops to be reduced to 300 by
the end of the week. Administration officials
say that U.S. combat forces will be home by
Dec. 15.

December 12-13

Department of State and the University of
Nebraska at Omaha's Center for Afghanistan
Studies cosponsor a forum on Afghanistan at
the Department of State. The forum ex-
amines the implications of the continuing war
for Afghanistan and its region. Discussions
include; Afghanistan in the 4th year of Soviet
occupation; media coverage of the war; and
the problems which would confront post-
Soviet Afghanistan. Former national security
adviser Zbigniew Brzesinski is keynote
speaker and Under Secretary Eagleburger
and Chancellor Del D. Weber, University of
Nebraska at Omaha, deliver opening
remarks.

-8 .1 ^.| t

CHRONOLOGY

December 14

President Reagan says that there are two cir-
cumstances under which the MNF could be
withdrawn from Beirut. One is if the Govern-
ment of Lebanon takes control of its ter-
ritory, the other, if there is "such a collapse
of order" that it is "absolutely certain" that
there is no solution to the problem.

December 15

In Vienna, the EastAVest MBFR negotiations
on reducing military manpower in central
Europe recess with the Warsaw Pact refus-
ing to agree to a date for resumption at that
time. This action follows the Soviet's walkout
of INF and suspension of the START
negotiations.

Remaining U.S. combat troops leave
Grenada, leaving about 300 noncombat
soldiers to support Caribbean peacekeeping
forces there.

UN Security Council votes unanimously
to extend the life of the UN peacekeeping
force in Cyprus for 6 months.

December 15-16

Fifth meeting of the Mi.xed Commission
established by the June 15, 1972 Agreement
on Scientific and Technical Cooperation be-
tween the U.S. and Mexico is held in
Washington, D.C. U.S. delegation is jointly
chaired by William Schneider, Jr., Under
Secretary for Security Assistance, Science,
and Technology, and Dr. Edward A. Knapp.
Director of the National Science Foundation.
The Mexican delegation is jointly chaired by
Amb. Jorge Eduardo Navarrete, Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs of the
Secretariat of Foreign Relations, and Dr.
Daniel Resendiz, Secretary General of the
National Council of Science and Technology.

December 16

Departments of State and Defense release
third set of documents found by the
U.S. -Caribbean security forces on Grenada. A
report entitled "Grenada— A Preliminary
Report" is also released and contains basic in-
formation from the first three sets of reports.

December 18

Kuwaiti Government accuses nine Iraqis and
three Lebanese of the bombing of the U.S.
Embassy there and five other targets. All are
reported to be Shiite Moslems. Authorities
say that 10 of the men arrested had con-
fessed. One Iraqi is still at large, and
another, the driver of the truck, is dead.

December 19

In response to a U.S. request, the Govern-
ment of the Lao People's Democratic
Republic, as a humanitarian gesture, agrees
to allow a Joint Casualty Resolution Center
delegation to visit the Lao People's
Democratic Republic Dec. 19-22, 1983.

December 21

In Nicaragua, an American-born bishop, Mon-
signor Salvador Schlaefer, along with hun-
dreds of residents of the village of Francia
Sirpi, is reportedly kidnapped by rebel forces
believed to be ex-national guard officers of
the deposed and assassinated former Presi-
dent Anastasio Somoza. The Nicaraguan
Government says it holds the U.S. and Hon-
duras responsible for their fate. State
Department officials say that the U.S. has
received only "conflicting and unconfirmed
reports" including a suggestion that there has
been fighting in the northeastern area of
Nicaragua and Bishop Schlaefer is among
several individuals who are voluntarily
leading civilians — primarily Miskito In-
dians — away from the fighting. The U.S., of-
ficials say, is attempting to "clarify the cir-
cumstances and whereabouts of the in-
dividuals involved."

December 23

State Department officials announce that
according to radio reports Bishop Schlaeffer
and Rev. Wendelin Shafer have crossed the
border into Honduras with about 800 per-
sons, most of them believed to be Miskito In-
dians. Later, reports from Ll.S. Embassy in
Honduras confirm that both Bishop
Schlaeffer and Rev. Shafer are safe.

Laos turns over to a delegation from the
U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the
bodies of some unidentified American soldiers
who were reported missing in action in the
Vietnam war. The delegation conducted the
first official U.S. inspection of the site where
a U.S. Air Force C-130 cargo plane crashed
Dec. 21, 1972. This was the first such inspec-
tion since the communist takeover in 1975.

December 25

The Rev. Jesse Jackson, a Democrat
presidential candidate and civil rights leader,
says he was invited by the Syrian Govern-
ment, along with a group of American
clergymen, to Syria to discuss Middle East
issues and the release of captured U.S. air-
man Lt. Robert Goodman, Jr. The invitation
came, he said, in response to a telegram he
sent asking the Syrian Government to release
the pilot as a humanitarian gesture.

December 27

Responding to questions about the proposed
unofficial visit of Rev. Jesse Jackson to Syria,
State Department spokesman John Hughes
says that the U.S. has been pursuing the
release of the U.S. Navy flier in a "direct and
continuous manner at a high level of the
Syrian Government" and that the U.S.
reposes "full confidence" in Amb. Robert
Paganelli. Hughes continues that while the
U.S. has no objection to private Americans
seeking the release of Lt. Goodman on
humanitarian grounds, "they are operating on
their own authority and cannot speak for the
United States." The U.S., he says, is con-
cerned that such private contacts could be '
"self-defeating" or such efforts could inter-
rupt or "negate" government efforts to
secure (Joodman's release.

The fourth anniversary of the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan is marked with
"sadness and continued indignation," states
President Reagan. Our goal, he continues, is
to "do everything we can to help bring abou'
a peaceful solution which removes the Soviet
forces from Afghanistan, ends the agony ant
destruction of the Afghan nation, and
restores that country's independence and
nonalignment. He calls on the Soviet Union
to "reach a settlement of the crisis which
restores the freedom, independence and
nonalignment of Afghanistan."

December 28

The special Defense Department commission
investigating the Oct. 23 bombing attack on
Marine headquarters in Beirut publicly
releases a 166-page report concluding that
major failures of command, intelligence, and
policy contributed to the Marine defenses an
recommends that Secretary Weinberger taki
whatever disciplinary or administrative actic
he deems appropriate toward those Marine
commanders held responsible. Prior to the
release of the report. President Reagan
issues a statement of Dec. 27 overriding the
recommendations and accepting full respon-
sibility and blame for the deaths of 241 U.S.
Marines.

December 29

Following a 6-month in-depth policy review i
U.S. participation in UNESCO [United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization], the U.S. issues a statement
notifying UNESCO that it will withdraw
from the organization effective Dec. 31, 198'
The decision was made on recommendations
based upon U.S. experience that UNESCO:

• "Has extraneously politicized virtually
every subject it deals with;

• "Has exhibited hostility toward the
basic institutions of a free society, especially
a free market and a free press; and

• "Has demonstrated unrestrained
budgetary e.\pansion."

December 30

In a letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and an Executive order,
President Reagan adds nine more countries
to the list of those eligible for tariff aid unde
the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The nine in
elude Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, the
British Virgin Islands, El Salvador, Grenada
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Montserrat

December 31

The government of Nigerian President Sheh'
Shagari is overthrown in a military coup. Th
coup marks the fifth military intervention in
Nigeria since its independence from Britian
in 1960. ■

♦Tte Bulleth

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i«^i# ut

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

412

12/5

413

12/5

414

12/5

415

12/9

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Program for the state visit
to the U.S. of Their Ma-
jesties King Birendra Bir
Bikram Shah Dev and
Queen Aishwarya Rajya
Laxmi Devi Shah of
Nepal, Dec. 5-13.
''411 12/1 George Roberts Andrews
sworn in as Ambassador
to Mauritius, Oct. 13
(biographic data).
Afghanistan Forum, Dec.

12-13, Washington, D.C.
Boston Passport Agency
receives "Agency of the
Year" award.
Shultz: news conference.
FY 1983 foreign military
sales.

416 12/9 U.S. submits its pleadings to
the International Court of
Justice in the case con-
cerning the maritime
boundary with Canada in
the Gulf of Maine area.
'417 12/13 Shultz: departure statement,

Tunis, Dec. 10.
i418 12/12 Shultz: departure statement,
departure Presidential
Palace, Tunis, Dec. 10.
419 12/14 Shultz: statement at bilateral
agreement signing
ceremony, Lisbon,
Dec. 13.
Shultz; arrival statement,

Lisbon, Dec. 12.
Shultz, Genscher: news con-
ference, Bonn, Dec. 7.
Shultz: remarks at dinner
hosted by Foreign
Minister Jaime Gama,
Lisbon, Dec. 12.
Shultz: remarks at inaugura-
tion of Embassy, Lisbon,
Dec. 12.
Fifth mixed commission
meeting on scientific and
technical cooperation be-
tween Mexico and the
U.S., Dec. 15-16.

425 12/19 Shultz: arrival statement,

Tunis, Dec. 9.

426 12/19 Shultz: news conference at

U.S. Embassy, Rabat,
Dec. 11.

'420

12/14

421

12/13

422

12/14

423

12/15

424

12/16

*427
*428

12/19
12/19

*429 12/19

*430 12/19

*431 12/19

*432
*433

•434
*435

12/19
12/19

12/19

12/21

436 12/27

437 12/28
'438 12/29

Shultz: arrival statement,

Rabat, Dec. 10.
Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommit-
tee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on containers and
cargoes, Jan. 26.
U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), in-
tegrated services digital
network (ISDN). Jan.
17-18.
SCC, SOLAS, working group
on stability, load lines, and
safety of fishing vessels,
Jan. 10.
U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), Jan. 10.
CCIR, study group 6,

Jan. 10.
Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private In-
ternational Law, study
group on international
adoption of minors, Jan. 6.
CCITT, ISDN, joint working

party, Jan. 31-Feb. 1. •
Shultz: remarks at award of
the American Committee
Medal of the International
Institute for Strategic
Studies, Washington, D.C.
Dec. 20.
Foreign Relations of the
U.S.: 1952-1954.' Volume
IV: The American
Republics released.
Shultz: news conference,
NATO Headquarters.
Brussels, Dec. 9.
The Quest for Peace: Prin-
cipal U.S. Public
Statements and Documents
Relating to the Arab-
Israeli Peace Process,
1967-1983. released.

*Not printed in the Bulletin.

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State
Washington, D.C.

President Reagan

America's Commitment to Peace, address to
the nation. Oct. 27, 1983 (Current Policy
#522).

Vice President Bush

U.S. Condemns Salvadoran Death Squads,
toast at dinner given by Salvadoran Presi-
dent Magana, San Salvador, El Salvador
Dec. 11, 1983 (Current Policy #533).

Secretary Shultz

Promoting Peace in the Middle East, Council
of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds,
Atlanta, Nov. 19, 1983 (Current Policy
#528).

Africa

Reagan Administration's Africa Policy: A
Progress Report, Assistant Secretary
Crocker, University of Kansas conference
on international affairs, Lawrence, Nov. 10,
1983 (Current Policy #527).

Arms Control

INF: Where We Stand (GIST, Dec. 1983).

East Asia

Background Notes on the Republic of Korea
(Oct. 1983). Background Notes on Malaysia
(Oct. 1983)

Background Notes on ASEAN (Nov. 1983).

Background Notes on Chile (Nov. 1983).

Background Notes on Mongolia (Dec. 1983).

Economics

The Magic of the Market— At Home and
Abroad, Under Secretary Wallis, Chamber
of Commerce, San Francisco, Oct. 20 1983
(Current Policy #523).

Agricultural Export Promotion and Trade,
Under Secretary Wallis, House Committee
on Agriculture, Oct. 18, 1983 (Current
Policy #519).

International Aviation (GIST, Nov. 1983).

U.S. Prosperity and the Developing Coun-
tries (GIST, Dec. 1983).

U.S. Export Controls (GIST, Dec. 1983).

Multinational Corporations (GIST, Dec. 1983).

Energy

Oil and Energy (GIST, Nov. 1983).

Europe

Challenges of U.S.-Soviet Relations at the 50-
Year Mark, Deputy Secretary Dam, Inter-
national House, Chicago, Oct. 31, 1983
(Current Policy #525).

■ebruary 1984

]

PUBLICATIONS

KAL Flight #007: Compilation of Statements
and Documents, Sept. 1-16, 1983 (Bulletin
Reprint).

CSCE Followup Meeting Concludes in
Madrid, Sept. 9, 1983. Secretary Shultz's
remarks and test of concluding document,
Dec. 1983 (Bulletin Reprint, from Depart-
ment of State Bulletin. Oct. 1983).

Human Rights

Human Rights and Foreign Policy; Commem-
oration of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Dec. 1983 (Selected
Documents #22).

Middle East

The Price of Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy,
Deputy Secretary Dam, American Jewish
Committee, Philadelphia, Oct. 27, 1983
(Current Policy #524).

Iran-Iraq War (GIST, Nov. 1983).

South Asia

Afghanistan: Four Years of Occupation,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research report,
Dec. 1983 (Special Report #112).

Western Hemisphere

The Political Economy of the Caribbean
Basin, Deputy Secretary Dam, Conference
on Trade, Investment, and Development in
the Caribbean Basin, Miami, Dec. 2, 1983
(Current Policy #530).

The Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central
America, Deputy Secretary Dam, Interna-
tional Trade Mart's World News Business
Briefing, New Orleans, Nov. 29, 1983 (Cur-
rent Policy #529).

Background Notes on French Antilles and
Guiana (Nov. 1983).

The Larger Importance of Grenada, Deputy
Secretary Dam, Associated Press Managing
Editor's Conference, Louisville, Nov. 4,
1983. ■

Foreign Relations
Volume Released

The Department of State on January 3,
1984, released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1952-1954, Volume IV,
The American Republics.

The volume presents the previously
classified record of U.S. diplomacy and
foreign policy in Latin America during
the last years of the Truman Ad-
ministration and the first 2 years of the
Eisenhower Administration. The record
reflects the anticommunist focus of
American foreign policy and the effort
to prevent communist influence from
getting a foothold in the American
republics. The perceived threat of inter-
national communism to peace and
security in Latin America came to a
head in Guatemala with the overthrow
in 1954 of the Arbenz regime by anti-
communist forces.

In Bolivia a radical regime not open
to communist influence received
generous U.S. assistance. The Latin
American governments were primarily
concerned with economic problems. Con-
flicts with major foreign-owned firms in
the region's principal industries were a
persistent concern for American
diplomacy.

The volume includes various sections
on multilateral topics, including general
diplomatic and economic relations; policy
regarding hemisphere defense and the
provision of armaments and military
assistance; economic and technical
assistance; the 10th Inter-American con-

ference held at Caracas, Venezuela, in
March 1954; the meetings of Ministers
of Finance or Economy of the American
republics at the fourth extraordinary
meeting of the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council (Rio con-
ference) held at Quitandinha, Brazil,
November-December 1954; and policy
regarding political developments in Cen-
tral America.

Other sections of the volume cover
bilateral relations with Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.

The Foreign Relations series has
been published continuously since 1861
as the official record of U.S. foreign
policy. The volume released January 3 is
the sixth to be published in a series of
16 volumes covering the years 1952-54.

Foreign Relatiom 1952-1954,
Volimie IV, was prepared in the Office
of the Historian, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Copies of
Volume IV (Department of State
Publication No. 9354; GPO Stock No.
044-000-01989-2) may be purchased for
$23.00 (domestic postpaid) from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or
money orders should be made payable to
the Superintendent of Documents.

Press release 436 of Dec. 27, 1983.

Department of State Bulletin

l» l» Ia li Uf

^1 /I .^1 %i

I« li> I* 1/

■» V * V j

INDEX

February 1984
Volume 84, No. 2083

Afghanistan. Anniversary of the Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan (Reagan) 37

Agriculture. U.S. Foreign Pohcy and Agri-
cultural Trade (Dam) 19

American Principles. Democracy as a Prob-
lem-Solving ^Iechanism (Motley) 43

Argentina. Vice President Bush Visits Latin
America (Bush) 9

Arms Control

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in
Brussels (final communique) 22

Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa
(Genscher, Shultz, cieclaration of Brussels.
North Atlantic Council final communi-
aue) 10

The U.S. -Soviet Relationship (Reagan) 1

Bangladesh. Visit of President of the Council
of Ministers of Bangladesh (Ershad,
Reagan) 36

Congress

Policy Options in Lebanon (Dam) 27

U.S. Prepares for World Radio Conference
(Marks) 34

Cultural Affairs. U.S. Notifies UNESCO of
Intent to Withdraw (Secretary's letters to
UNESCO Director General and UN
Secretary General) 41

Economics

Democracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism
(Motley) 43

U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural Trade
(Dam) 19

Educational Affairs. U.S. Notifies UNESCO
of Intent to Withdraw (Secretary's letters
to UNESCO Director General and UN
Secretary General) 41

Egypt. President's News Conference of
December 20 (excerpts) 5

El Salvador

President's News Conference of December 20
(excerpts) 5

Vice President Bush Visits Latin America
(Bush) 9

Europe. U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural
Trade (Dam) 19

Germany. Secretary Visits Europe and North
Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declaration of
Brussels, North Atlantic Council final com-
munique) 10

, Grenada

' Human Rights Implications for U.S. Action
in Grenada (Abrams) 24

U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada (letter to the
Congress) 45

Human Rights

Human Rights Implications for U.S. Action in
Grenada (Abrams) 24

Refugee Assistance and Protection (Purcell) 32

, Information Policy. U.S. Prepares for World

Radio Conference (Marks) 34

Israel

President's News Conference of December 20
(excerpts) 5

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister (Reagan,
Shamir) 30

Japan. U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural
Trade (Dam) 19

Lebanon

Lebanon (Reagan) 5

Policy Options in Lebanon (Dam) 27

President's News Conference of December 20
(excerpts) 5

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the
Congress) 28

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel,
Reagan) 29

Middle East. Secretary Visits Europe and
North Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declara-
tion of Brussels, North Atlantic Council
final communique) 10

Morocco. Secretary Visits Europe and North
Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declaration of
Brussels. North Atlantic Council final com-
munique) 10

Nepal. Visit of King of Nepal (Birendra,
Reagan) 38

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in
Brussels (final communique) 22

Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa
(Genscher, Shultz, cieclaration of Brussels,
North Atlantic Council final communi-
que) 10

Panama. Vice President Bush Visits Latin
America (Bush) 9

Portugal. Secretary Visits Europe and North
Africa (Genscher, Shultz, declaration of
Brussels, North Atlantic Council final com-
munique) 10

Presidential Documents

Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion of Afghan-
istan 37

Lebanon 5

U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada (letter to the
Congress) 45

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the Con-
gress) 28

The U.S.-Soviet Relationship 1

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister (Reagan,
Shamir) 30

Visit of King of Nepal (Birendra, Reagan) . . 38

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel,
Reagan) ".29

Visit of President of the Council of Ministers
of Bangladesh (Ershad, Reagan) 36

Publications

Department of State 51

Foreign Relations Volume Released 52

Refugees. Refugee Assistance and Protection

(Purcell) 32

Science and Technology. U.S. Prepares for

World Radio Conference (Marks) 34

Terrorism. President's News Conference of
December 20 (excerpts) 5

Trade

Democracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism
(Motley) 43

U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural Trade
(Dam) 19

Treaties. Current Actions 46

Tunisia. Secretary Visits Europe and North
Africa (Genscner, Shultz, declaration of
Brussels, North Atlantic Council final com-
munique) 10

U.S.S.R.

Secretary Visits Europe and North Africa
(Genscher, Shultz, cieclaration of Brussels,
North Atlantic Council final communi-
que) 10

The U.S.-Soviet Relationship (Reagan) 1

United Nations

Refugee Assistance and Protection (Purcell) 32

U.S. Notifies UNESCO of Intent to Withdraw
(Secretary's letters to UNESCO Director
General and UN Secretary General) . . .41

Western Hemisphere

Democracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism
(Motley) 43

U.S. Armed Forces in Grenada (letter to the
Congress) 45

Name Index

Abrams, Elliott 24

King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev 38

Bush, Vice President 9

Dam, Kenneth W 19, 27

Ershad, Hussain Mohammad 36

Gemayel, Amin 29

Genscner, Hans-Dietrich 10

Marks, Leonard H 34

Motley, Langhorne A 43

Purcell, James N, Jr 32

Reagan, President 1, 5, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37,

38,45

Shamir, Yitzhak 30

Shultz, Secretary 10,41

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U.S. Government Printing Office
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S.NAII

" mm

Departntpnt

•» of State -m-m V ^

^uUetin

APR I 8 1984

The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2084

March 1984

Korea/16
China/20
Malaysia/25
CDE/31
Middle East/54

■Z .1 ^1 ^i

Cover (Clockwise from left):

President Reagan with Chinese Premier

Secretary Shultz with Soviet Foreign
Minister at Stockholm

Richard W. Murphy

President Reagan with Malaysian Prime
Minister

Paul D. Wolfowitz

Dppartmpnt of State

bulletin

Volume 84 / Number 2084 / March 1984

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its puqwse is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin'.s contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

As.sistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610)
is published monthly (plus annual index) by the
Department of State. 2201 C Street NW.
Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage pai(
at Washington. D.C. and additional mailing offices
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 20402.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
of the Dt:PARTMENT OK State Bii.letin as the source
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office. Washington. D.C
20402

CONTENTS

The President

1 State of the Union Address

{Excerpt)

2 Central America Commission

Report

3 25th Anniversary of the Cuban

Revolution

The Secretary

4 News Conference of January 12

7 U.S. Aid Initiative in Africa

Arms Control

8 Report on Soviet Noncompliance

With Arms Control Agreements
(Message to the Congress. Fact
Sheet)

East Asia

11 U.S. -Japan Relations in Perspec-
tive (Kenneth W. Dam)

16 The United States and Korea:
Auspicious Prospects (Paul D.
Wolfowitz)

20 Visit of Chinese Premier (Presi-
dent Reagan, Secretary Shultz,
Zhao Ziyang)

25 Visit of Malaysian Prime Minister
(Mahathir bin Mohamad, Presi-
dent Reagan)

Economics

27 International Economic Issues
(W. Allen Wallis)

30 U.S. Opposes Agricultural Trade

Restrictions by EC

Europe

31 Secretary Shultz Visits Europe

(Presidejit Reagan, Secretary
Shultz)
43 Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (Foreign Affairs
Outline)

43 NATO Allies Table Proposals at

the CDE (Department An-
nouncement)

44 The Atlantic Relationship

(Richard R. Burt)
46 17th Report on Cyprus (Message
to the Congress)

Middle East

47 Developments in Lebanon (Presi-
dent Reagan, Secretary Shultz)

U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon
(Lawrence S. Eagleburger)

Security of U.S. Marines in
Lebanon (President Reagan)

Lebanon (President Reagan)

U.S. Interests in Lebanon
(Richard W. Murphy)

53
54

Nuclear Policy

57 South Africa: Nuclear Safeguards

and Exports Announcement
(Department Statement)

Western [Hemisphere

58 El Salvador: Revolution or

Reform? (Langhome A. Motley)
67 Is Peace Possible in Central

America? (Langhome A. Motley)
70 The Decision to Assist Grenada

(Langhome A. Motley)
72 Additional CBI Recipients

Designated (Letter to the Con-
gress)

Treaties

73 Current Actions

Chronology

75 January 1984

Press Releases

77 Department of State

Publications

78 Department of State

Index

J ^i >1 ^

President Reagan addresses a joint session of Congress; Vice President Bush and
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, are in background.

^ ,,,,-^,;,- ^..^.^.^.„» . „„^„„„,^.„^^^„„^„^

THE PRESIDENT

State of the Union Address

Excerpt from President Reagan's address

before a joint session of the Congress

on January 25, 19 8 J^.'^

A lasting and meaningfu] peace is
our . . . highest aspiration. And our
record is clear: Americans resort to
force only when we must. We have
never been aggressors. We have always
struggled to defend freedom and
democracy.

We have no territorial ambitions.
We occupy no countries. We build no
walls to lock people in. Americans build
the future. And our vision of a better
life for farmers, merchants, and working
people, from the Americas to Asia,
begins with a simple premise: The future
is best decided by ballots, not bullets.
[Applause]

Governments which rest upon the
consent of the governed do not wage
war on their neighbors. Only when peo-
ple are given a personal stake in
deciding their own destiny, benefiting
from their own risks, do they create
societies that are prosperous, pro-
gressive, and free. Tonight, it is
democracies that offer hope by feeding
the hungry, prolonging life, and
eliminating drudgery.

When it comes to keeping America
strong, free, and at peace, there should
be no Republicans or Democrats, just
patriotic Americans. [Applause] We can
decide the tough issues not by who is
right but by what is right.^

Together, we can continue to ad-
vance our agenda for peace. We can
establish a more stable basis for peaceful
relations with the Soviet Union;

strengthen allied relations across the
board; achieve real and equitable reduc-
tions in the levels of nuclear arms; rein-
force our peacemaking efforts in the
Middle East, Central America, and
Southern Africa; assist developing coun-
tries, particularly our neighbors in the
Western Hemisphere; and assist in the
development of democratic institutions
throughout the world.

The wisdom of our bipartisan
cooperation was seen in the work of the
Scowcroft commission, which
strengthened our ability to deter war
and protect peace. In that same spirit, I
urge you to move forward with the
Henry Jackson plan to implement the
recommendations of the [National]
Bipartisan Commission on Central
America. [Applause]

Your joint resolution on the multina-
tional peacekeeping force in Lebanon is
also serving the cause of peace. We are
making progress in Lebanon. For nearly
10 years, the Lebanese have lived from
tragedy to tragedy with no hope for
their future. Now, the multinational
peacekeeping force and our Marines are
helping them break their cycle of
despair. There is hope for a free, in-
dependent, and sovereign Lebanon. We
must have the courage to give peace a
chance. And we must not be driven from
our objectives for peace in Lebanon by
state-sponsored terrorism. We have seen
this ugly spectre in Beirut, Kuwait, and
Rangoon. It demands international at-
tention. I will forward shortly legislative
proposals to help combat terrorism, and
I will be seeking support from our allies
for concerted actions.

March 1984

.mimmmmtm
THE PRESIDENT

Our NATO alliance is strong. Nine-
teen eight-three was a banner year for
political courage, and we have
strengthened our pai-tnerships and our
friendships in the Far East. We are
committed to dialogue, deterrence, and
promoting prosperity. We will work with
our trading partners for a new round of
negotiations in support of freer world
trade, greater competition, and more
open markets.

A rebirth of bipartisan cooperation,
of economic growth and military deter-
rence, and a growing spirit of unity
among our people at home and our allies
abroad underline a fundamental and far-
reaching change: The United States is
safer, stronger, and more secure in 1984
than before. [Applause] We can now
move with confidence to seize the oppor-
tunities for peace, and we will.

Tonight, I want to speak to the peo-
ple of the Soviet Union to tell them it's
true that our governments have had
serious differences, but our sons and
daughters have never fought each other
in war. And if we Americans have our
way, they never will. People of the
Soviet Union, there is only one sane
policy for your country and mine: to
preserve our civilization in this modern
age. And a nuclear war cannot be won
and must never be fought. [Applause]

The only value in our two nations
possessing nuclear weapons is to make
sure they will never be used. But then
would it not be better to do away with
them entirely? [Applause]

People of the Soviet [Union], Presi-
dent Dwight Eisenhower, who fought by
your side in World War II, said, "The
essential struggle is not merely man
against man or nation against nation. It
is man against war." Americans are peo-
ple of peace. If your government wants
peace, there will be peace. We can come
together in faith and friendship to build
a safer and far better world for our
children and our children's children. And
the whole world will rejoice. That is my
message to you. [Applause]

Some days when life seems hard and
we reach out for values to sustain us or
a friend to help us, we find a person
who reminds us what it means to be
Americans. Sgt. Stephen Trujillo, a
medic in the 2d Ranger Battalion, 75th
Infantry, was in the first helicopter to
land at the compound held by Cuban
forces in Grenada. He saw three other
helicopters crash. Despite the imminent
explosion of the burning aircraft, he
never hestitated. He ran across 25 yards
of open terrain through enemy fire to
rescue wounded soldiers. He directed

two other medics, administered first aid,
and returned again and again to the
crash site to carry his wounded friends
to safety.

Sgt. Trujillo, you and your fellow
servicemen and women not only saved
innocent lives, you set a nation free. Yoi
inspire us as a force for freedom, not foi
despotism; and, yes, for peace, not con-
quest. God bless you. [Applause]

•Text from White House press release.

Central America
Commission Report

President Reagan's radio address to
the nation on January 14, 198i.'^

Last April I addressed a joint session of
the Congress and asked for bipartisan
cooperation on behalf of our policies to
protect liberty and democracy in Central
America. Shortly after that speech, the
late Senator Henry Jackson encouraged
the appointment of a blue-ribbon com-
mission to chart a course for democracy,
economic improvement, and peace in
Central America.

I appointed 12 distinguished
Americans to the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America and
asked former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger to serve as its chairman. ^ This
week the members of that group
delivered to me their report on the crisis
confronting our Latin neighbors.

I believe the commission has
rendered an important service to all
Americans — all of us from pole to pole
in this Western Hemisphere. The
members of this commission represented
both political parties and a wide cross
section of our country. They reached
agreement on some very key points.
They agreed that the crisis is serious,
and our response must include support
for democratic development, improved
living conditions, and security
assistance.

They agreed that the United States
has a vital interest in preventing a com-
munist Central America, because if our
own borders are threatened, then our
ability to meet our commitments to pro-
tect peace elsewhere in the world— in
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia —
would be significantly weakened.

The members also agreed that
Nicaragua's regime has violated its
promise to restore democracy. And they
warned that Nicaragua's export of
subversion could undermine the stability
of neighboring countries, producing
wares of refugees — perhaps millions of
them— many of whom would seek entry
into the United States.

The commission concluded, "The
crisis is on our doorstep." The report of
this distinguished body presents no
quick-fix to ease the pain and suffering
of tomorrow. There is none. Nor can we
alone bring peace to this or any other
part of the world. As the report notes,
solutions to Central American problems
must primarily be the work of Central
Americans. But we can and must help
because it is in our interest to do so and
because it's morally the right thing to
do.

The commission did present us
positive recommendations to support
democratic development, improve
human rights, and bring the long
sought-for peace to this troubled region
so close to home. The recommendations
reinforce the spirit of the Administra-
tion's policies that help to our neighbors
should be primarily economic and
humanitarian. And since this report does
present a bipartisan consensus, I will
send to the Congress, when it
reconvenes, a comprehensive plan for
achieving the objectives set forth by the
commission. I urge the members of Con-
gress to respond with the same bipar-
tisan spirit that guided the commission
in its work.

Department of State Bulletin

mtotke

'ily saved
»»free,y(,

.MtCOB-

THE PRESIDENT

lentn'

This Central American democracy,
peace, and recovery initiative, which I
:all the Jackson plan, will be designed to
oring democracy, peace, and prosperity
to Central America. It won't be easy.
But it can be done. I believe peace is
worth the price.

There may be an argument for doing
much, and perhaps an argument for do-
ing nothing. But there is no valid argu-
ment for doing too little. I opt for doing
enough— enough to protect our own
security and enough to improve the lives
3f our neighbors so that they can vote
\vith ballots instead of bullets.

The Government of Nicaragua must
also understand this; they cannot
threaten their peaceful neighbors, ex-
port subversion, and deny basic human
freedom to their own people, as the
commission has so rightly observed.

You may have heard that there's a
controversy between the Administration
and the Congress over human rights and
military aid to beleagxiered El Salvador.
[ agree completely with the objective of
improving prospects for democracy and
human rights in El Salvador. I am also
committed to preventing Cuban- and
Nicaraguan-supported guerrillas from
violently overthrowing El Sali/ador's
elected government and others in the
region. So is the bipartisan commission.
So, too, I believe, is our Congress.

Our Administration will continue to
work closely with the Congress in
achieving these common goals. As we
move to implement the recommenda-
tions of the bipartisan commission, we
will be offering the promise of a better
tomorrow in Central America. But we
must oppose those who do not abide by
the norms of civilized behavior, whether
they be of the extreme right or extreme
left. Senator Henry Jackson would have
had it so.

,„ .'Broadcast from Camp David (text from
White House press release).

^FoT list of members, see Bulletin of
August 1983, p. 3. ■

25th Anniversary of the
Cuban Revolution

President Reagan's radio address to
the Cuban people on January 5, 1984.'^

On behalf of the people of the United
States, I would like to extend New
Year's greetings to the people of Cuba.

We know you're marking an historic
anniversary on your island. Twenty-five
years ago, during these early January
days, you were celebrating what all of
us hoped was the dawn of a new era of
freedom. Most Cubans welcomed the
prospects for democracy and liberty
which the leaders of the Cuban revolu-
tion had promised.

Such a free and democratic Cuba
would have been warmly welcomed by
our own people. We're neighbors in a
hemisphere that has been characterized
by the quest for human freedom.
Government which rests upon consent of
the governed is a cardinal principle that
enshrines the dignity of every individual.
We share many of the same ideals,
especially a common longing for a world
of peace and justice. We are both proud
peoples, proud of what we've achieved
through our own efforts.

But tragically, the promises made to
you have not been kept. Since 1959
you've been called upon to make one
sacrifice after another. And for what?
Doing without has not brought you a
more abundant life. It has not brought
you peace. And most important, it has
not won freedom for your people-
freedom to speak your opinions, to
travel where and when you wish, to
work in independent unions, and to
openly proclaim your faith in God, and
to enjoy all these basic liberties without
having to be afraid.

Cuba's economy is incapable of pro-
viding you and your familes your most
elementary needs despite massive sub-
sidies from abroad. But your leaders tell
you, "Don't complain, don't expect im-
provement, just be ready for more
sacrifice." In the meantime, over half a
million of your fellow citizens have
migrated to the United States, where
their talents and their hard work have
made a major contribution to our socie-
ty. We welcomed them, and we're proud
of their success. But we have to wonder.

what would Cuba's economy be like to-
day if those people had been allowed to
use their great talent, drive, and energy
to help you create prosperity on your
island?

The most important question re-
mains: Where is Cuba heading? If it
were heading toward greater welfare
and freedom for your people, that would
be wonderful. But we know prisoners of
conscience convicted for their political
activities have been languishing in
Cuban prisons, deprived of all freedom
for nearly a quarter of a century. Never
in the proud history of your country
have so many been imprisoned for so
long for so-called crimes of political dis-
sent as during these last 25 years.
Others convicted of political crimes this
past year can expect to be in prison well
into the 21st century if the present
system in Cuba survives that long.

You may not be aware of some of
these things I've just told you or will tell
you in this brief message. You may also
be unaware of many other things you
have the right to know. That's because
you are systematically denied access to
facts and opinions which do not agree
with your government's official view.
But why are your leaders so unwilling to
let you hear what others think and say?
If the power of truth is on their side,
why should they need to censor anyone's
views? Think about that.

Yet, while they supervise every
word you hear, every picture you see,
your authorities have free access to our
news services in the United States and
around the world. We don't believe in
censorship. So, to correct this injustice,
the Congress of the United States has
authorized the startup soon of a new
radio service on the Voice of America
named for your great Cuban patriot
Jose Marti.

The objective of the Radio Marti
program will be simple and straightfor-
ward: tell the truth about Cuba to the
Cuban people. We want you to know
what you haven't been told, for example,
about the situation in Grenada. When
Grenada's Prime Minister [Maurice]
Bishop was killed, the Governor General,
as well as the majority of the English-
speaking Caribbean, asked for our

March 1984

;iiii

THE SECRETARY

assistance in protecting them. Why
didn't they ask for Cuba's assistance?
The sad truth is they wanted to be pro-
tected from the Cuban Government.

The United States and other Carib-
bean forces were welcomed by Grena-
dians as liberators. The rest of the world
has seen the evidence of the popular out-
pouring of support for our action. Cuban
lives could have been saved if your
government had respected the will of
the Grenadian people and not ordered
your soldiers to fight to the death. For-
tunately, the great majority of your per-
sonnel in Grenada did not obey those
orders.

One of your government officials
said, in September 1982, that 120,000
Cubans have carried out international
missions through the revolutionary
armed forces alone. They have been sent
to countries in four continents. You're
never told how many of them are killed,
how many families lose loved ones for a
cause they have no right to resist. What
mission or vital interest does Cuba have
which can possibly justify this loss of life
in such faraway lands?

These are not pleasant questions,
but they deserve answers. I hope you'll
contemplate them with care. At the
beginning of this new year, let us pray
that the future will be kinder than the
past. And may that better future begin
soon for all of you in Cuba.

Feliz Ano Nuevo y que Dios los ben-
diga. [Happy New Year and God bless
you.]

News Conference of January 12

'Recorded at the White House for later
broadcast on the Voice of America (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Jan. 9, 1984). ■

Secretary Skultz held a news con-
ference at the Department of State on
January 12, 1984.^

Q. You will meet next week with
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in
Stockholm. The meeting comes at a
time when relations between the two
superpowers are considered at their
poorest state in many years. Are we
planning to make any proposals to the
Soviets for getting arms control
negotiations going again or that
otherwise would improve the climate?
A. We undertake this meeting with
Foreign Minister Gromyko in a construc-
tive spirit, and we're prepared to talk
about a full range of issues, including
arms control. I will be there in that
frame of mind, and I hope that he will
come in a similar frame of mind and
that we will accomplish something. But,
of course, that remains to be seen.

Q. The Kissinger commission, in
its report that was issued yesterday,
says that the crisis in Central America
is acute and that a massive infusion of
U.S. aid is required. It suggests and
says that the military aid should be
conditioned to El Salvador's as prog-
ress in halting the death squads. Do
you agree with their basic conclusion
about the acuteness of the crisis; and
two, do you agree about the condi-
tionality?

A. I think they have done us all a
great service in pointing out not only the
acuteness of the problem but its impor-
tance to the United States.

Insofar as the death squads are con-
cerned and other violations of human
rights are concerned, it has always been
the position of the Administration, and
mine personally, that these are, basical-
ly, intolerable things, and they must
change.

Vice President Bush, in a recent
visit to El Salvador, made that point
very clear. I think they must change,
not because we want them or the Con-
gress wants them, but because that
must be what it takes for there to be a
decent and secure life in El Salvador. So
the people of El Salvador must want to
see this come about.

Insofar as the question of certifica-
tion is concerned, it's something where
there are some very good arguments on
both sides of that issue, and I would
simply refer you to the comment the

President made yesterday in response tc
a question after his meeting with the
Kissinger commission. He was asked if
the argument about certification would
be a "hang-up," I think the phrase was,
and he said, no, that it was up to us to
work with the Congress and find a way
to resolve this issue just as the bipar-
tisan commission had resolved so many
issues in the course of its deliberations.

Q. Yuriy Andropov today, in a
speech, apparently referring to the
stalled Geneva negotiations, said, "If
readiness is expressed on the part of
the NATO countries to return to the
situation which had existed prior to
the start of deployment of U.S.
medium-range missiles in Europe, the
U.S.S.R. will, likewise, be ready to d*
that."

Is it still the American position
that the deployments of Pershing II
and cruise missiles that have taken
place and are going to take place can
come out if an agreement is reached?
And do you believe that any new ac-
tion is required, either by the United
States or the Soviet Union, in order t(
get the Soviets to return to Geneva?

A. If an agreement is reached hav-
ing to do with intermediate-range
missiles, then the parties to the agree-
ment would have a deployment pattern
in line with that agreement. And if, for
example, there should be an agreement
to the proposal the President and our
allies put forward some time ago, name
ly, that all of these missiles be
eliminated, then those that had been
deployed would be eliminated. But it
would be according to whatever agree-
ment was reached.

The idea of returning to the situa-
tion prior to the deployments would only
return to a situation where there is a
very large monopoly of Soviet
intermediate-range missiles, and that is
not acceptable to us or to our allies.

Q. Is it necessary for the United
States to do anything at this point to
get the Soviets to return to the talks,
in the way of indicating any new flex-
ibility? Or do you simply hope and ex-
pect the Soviets will eventually
return?

A. We've taken what we believe,
and our allies believe, are reasonable
positions in those talks and the other
talks. In the INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] especially, there has been

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Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

ink

ntense consultation so that the positions
hat have been taken are widely sup-
oorted.

Furthermore, we have always been
there in the spirit of give-and-take, and I
think that is the position that we should
oe in. That's where we are, and there is
110 need to change it.

Q. The White House issued a
statement today about the shooting of
the American helicopter pilot by the
«^icaraguans saying this action is
unacceptable. I wonder if you could
ilaborate on that and explain what ac-
ion, if any, the United States might
.ake in response.

A. It's unacceptable to fire from one
country into another country at people
md wind up killing somebody. We have
)rotested both here and in Nicaragua
md are waiting to see the response and
he results of whatever investigation the
<icaraguans make. But it's not a kind of
jehavior that is a tolerable kind of
)ehavior.

Q. Yesterday in the Kissinger
:ommission report, it said that the use
)f force in Nicaragua was not
iomething the commission at least
vould rule out if our national security
vas involved. Does this sort of thing
mswer that description?

A. If what you are asking is, is
;here a plan or an instinct on the part of
;he Administration to undertake a
"nilitary operation directly in Nicaragua,
;he answer is no.

Q. This weekend Ambassador
Rumsfeld [Donald Rumsfeld, the
President's special representative to
the Middle East] is expected to meet
with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.
Do you see from your point of view
any new flexibility on the Syrian side,
and how seriously do you take their
demand, continually repeated, that the
May 17 accord must be scrapped
before there is peace and stability in
Lebanon?

A. Ambassador Rumsfeld is back in
the area. He is very active. He has
visited a number of countries, and right
now he is in Damascus, and I believe
right at the moment talking with the
Foreign Minister, Mr. Khaddam. He is
expected to meet with President Assad
during this visit to Damascus.

We will be there with a serious pur-
,pose. There have been intermediate
things that could help stabilize the situa-
tion in Lebanon identified and lined out
lin considerable detail through negotia-
Itions in this so-called security plan, and.

Marcti 1984

of course, there is the objective in front
of everybody for the removal of all
foreign forces. Ambassador Rumsfeld
will be discussing all of these things.

Will he get anywhere? It remains to
be seen whether he will or not. There
have been some encouraging signs late-
ly, particularly the emergence of the
security plan, although discussions in
Lebanon are a constant back-and-forth
of hope and disappointment, and more
recently the immediate prospect of that
plan seems to be a little dimmer.

But, certainly, the Syrian attitude
will be very important in that, and we
will look for Ambassador Rumsfeld's
talks with President Assad as an impor-
tant moment in these negotiations.

As far as the May 17 agreement is
concerned, it's basically an agreement
between Israel and Lebanon. Both
governments have said that they don't
have any intention of altering it, and we
certainly don't. It gets a lot of discus-
sion. On the other hand, I think that
people should remember that the May 17
agreement is an agreement for one of
the occupying forces — namely, the
Israelis — to leave Lebanon completely.
And when people talk about doing away
with it or changing it or something, they
ought to rememl)er that it is the one
existing agreement whereby one of the
parties has agreed to leave Lebanon.
And so I think that's a very important
thing and personally would not let go of
that.

Q. Was the American helicopter
off course, and was it over Nicaraguan
airspace at any time?

A. It was apparently off course.
Just where it was exactly — people are
working on over in the Pentagon — and I
don't know that there has been a clear
determination of whether or not in its
movements it did wander into
Nicaraguan territory. That I don't know
the answer to. Presumably we'll have an
answer.

Apparently, it had to go up fairly
high in order to get over some moun-
tains, and it had some fairly severe wind
conditions, and in one way or another
was a little bit off course. But I don't
know the answer to the question of
whether it was over Nicaragua.

Q. Would that affect your conclu-
sions as to why the Nicaraguans may
have fired on it, or—

A. I think to fire from one country
into another country at people on the
ground is simply not an acceptable or
tolerable line of behavior.

Q. Would you say the world is a
more dangerous place without an arms
control agreement or without even ac-
tive negotiations than it might be if,
for instance, the United States had ac-
cepted the Soviet proposal to scale
down to the British and French total?
There is nothing going on now. Both
sides are piling on new weapons. Is
that better than some of these pro-
posals that we rejected?

A. I think that the acceptance of
proposals that would leave the alliance
in a position of agreeing to a monopoly
of Soviet weapons of this kind would be
a very destabilizing and very undesirable
kind of agreement to reach.

And one of the things we have to
guard against constantly is this tendency
of many to think that any agreement, if
it seems to make things look smoother,
is a good thing, even if the terms of the
agreement are really, looking at them
closely, not desirable. So I think we have
to guard against that and be in favor of
negotiations and be in favor of
agreements if the agreements truly do
serve our interests. And we know that
any agreement you reach with a strong
negotiating partner, such as the Soviet
Union, in order for it to be reached will
not only have to serve your interests but
also their interests. Otherwise, they're
not going to agree to it.

That's the way we have to proceed,
but we have to be careful as we
negotiate that we don't get into the
mood of so much wanting negotiations
to be going on or to be completed that
we agree to things that really don't
make sense from our standpoint.

Q. You said earlier today that "it
takes two to thaw." Do you think the
Soviet Union —

A. I don't know about that. I've
been thinking about that image.

Q. It's a great line.

A. It sort of came to me. [Laughter]
Don't push it. [Laughter]

Q. Do you think that the Soviet
Union is ready to tango and thaw?

A. I don't know. I think that there
are great tensions in various parts of
the world, and we've discussed some of
them right here in this press conference.
And so it's desirable to have a dialogue,
and it's desirable to reduce those ten-
sions if we can, and it must perhaps look
that way to them, too. At any rate, we'll
see.

Q. Today Mr. Kvitsinksy says in
The New York Times, in a piece, that

::i';ii;!!i!fiffl|

THE SECRETARY

Soviet weapons will be deployed on
the high seas adjacent to the
American coast line, which is a threat
you've heard before. And from
Brussels comes the word —

A. It's not only a threat we've heard
before, but, as you know, one of their
submarines got in trouble recently and
had to be towed off, so it isn't a new
thing. That's the point.

Q. From Brussels comes word of
nine new SS-20s in the western [sic]
part of the Soviet Union. Does that
suggest to you on the Soviet part an
attitude leading toward the kind of
easing of tension that you're hoping
for?

A. It seems to me that what we
observe is a consistent pattern of addi-
tional Soviet deployments of the SS-20
missiles and of their use of submarines,
and we have noted that, described that.
It has gone on before negotiations took
place, it went on during the negotia-
tions, and it's going on since the negotia-
tions on INF have been broken off.

It's a pattern of deployment on their
part, and I think that, obviously, one of
the things that is sought by both parties
presumably is a reduction in these
deployments. In fact, the President has
said in his speech to the Japanese Diet
that his dream is the elimination of all
nuclear weapons, and, of course, that's
consistent with his position of the com-
plete elimination of intermediate-range
nuclear weapons.

Q. There appears to be quite a
disintegration in the southern African
situation. Both Angola or SWAPO
[South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion] and South Africa have rejected
the disengagment proposal. What do
we see next, and does the United
States still insist on a Cuban
withdrawal from Angola?

A. That has been something that we
think is desirable, but it is clearly
necessary if South Africa is going to go
along with what has emerged as a very
real, possible way of gaining Namibian
independence; so we're for it.

As far as the immediate situation is
concerned, there have been some in-
creased military activities, but there is
also in process right now this unilateral
withdrawal by South Africa. We hope
that that's one of those signs and actions
that is taken by a country there that
perhaps can lead others to do
something, and maybe something good
will come of it, but we'll see.

Q. Next week the President is
supposed to speak about American
policy toward the Soviet Union which,
presumably, will be along the lines of
what you said here and your meeting
with Mr. Gromyko. The Administra-
tion, I gather, is also issuing a report
to Congress stating that the Soviets
have more or less violated virtually
every treaty they've entered into with
the United States.

Just so people can understand
that, what is the point of negotiating
treaties with the Soviet Union if, in
fact, they break them?

A. In general, I think we have
taken the view that it's important to be
realistic in our attitude toward the
Soviet Union, to be candid with
ourselves, with them, and others about
how we see it; and if there are unpleas-
ant facts, to put them forward. And also
to be very mindful of our own strength
and our alliances and their strength and
our capacity to defend our values and
defend our interests. And on the basis of
that, to be ready for reasonable discus-
sion and dialogue with the Soviet Union.

Calling attention to violations of
arms control agreements is perfectly
consistent with that, and I think it's im-
portant to do it. And as you undoubtedly
noted in the President's speech to the
United Nations recently, he did call at-
tention to a radar installation that's in
the process of being built. That con-
stitutes a problem. He did call attention
to the problem of encryption; he did call
attention to a new missile, all of which
we think constitute problems with
respect to arms control agreements.

I might say that's a far cry from the
way you phrased it, of saying that they
just violate every agreement they ever
make. I don't think that's a fair state-
ment about them or anyone's
characterization of them.

Q. You say it's intolerable for one
country to fire on another. Today, the
Nicaraguan Embassy released a letter
to you dated January 7, which pro-
tested two separate attacks by
helicopters on Nicaraguan territory
that were firing rockets during the
past week. I just wonder if that action
is also intolerable, or have you
responded to their protests?

A. Those are not American
helicopters, so they don't need to protest
to us. There aren't any American
military forces firing on Nicaragua.

Q. You have had three demarches
by North Korea in the last 3 months

for a unification conference grouping
the United States, South Korea, and
North Korea. Your spokesman said th,
other day that the American position I
will be that it should just be the two I
Koreas alone. There have been '

statements from Korea that it should
be four-part, including China and the
United States. There's a statement tO'
day from Japan that maybe it should
include the Soviet Union and Japan.

Could you give us the American
position, and could you also say
whether you think anything will comi'
out of the latest North Korean pro-
posal?

A. It sounds a little bit like Jimmy
Durante's lament: "Everybody wants to
get into the act!" But I think the real
point is that it's important that there b<
an act, if it's at all possible to have it, c
a constructive basis. The South Korean
have called for that. And the essence o:
the matter is to have discussions be-
tween North Korea and South Korea
that ease tensions on the peninsula and
move toward a more stable situation.
We certainly want that.

We consult very closely on all of
these things with our friends in South
Korea. We know they want that. From
all of our discussions, the Chinese, the
Japanese want that. The North Korean
have said that they want that. On the
other hand, it comes on the heels of tht
Rangoon murder of many in the South
Korean Government, and I think the
South Koreans have understandably
called for an apology and an accounting

Something like Rangoon, which
seemed to be intended for the South
Korean President, as well as those who
were murdered, does call into question
the sincerity of these moves. But we ca
examine them and see if there isn't son:
way in which worthwile discussions can
be gotten underway, and if the presenc'
of ourselves and the Chinese, the
Japanese, or the Soviets or whoever,
can be helpful in that, that's fine. But I
think we need to remember that the
essence of the matter is for North Kore
and South Korea to be doing the talkinj
It's their peninsula.

Q. Do you think that the pro-
longed absence from the scene of
Soviet President Andropov is going t«
make it more difficult, or even im-
possible, to improve relations betweei
the superpowers?

Department of State Bulleti

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