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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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, BOSTON PUBLtC LIBRARY 



/Volume 86 / Number 2106 



January 1986 




The Fireside Summit 



Departmeni of State 

bulletin 



Volume 86 / Number 2106 / January 1986 



Cover: President Reagan shares a light 
moment with General Secretary Gorbachev 
in Geneva. 



(White House photu by Terry Aithui-) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State: 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 

publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of State BnxETiN as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ | 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affair" 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Ed'tor 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041- 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by th 
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, 
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at Washington, D.C and additional mailing c 
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: t L i VDENT OF DOC 
DEPOSITORY 

FEB 6 1985 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 
GOVERNME;-:! documents CI7ARTOENT 



ONTENTS 



EATURE 

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev 
Meet in Geneva (Mikhail S. Gorbachev, RobeH C. 
McFarlane, President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, 
Joint Statement) 

President Meets With NATO Allies (Lord Carnngton) 



he President 

' Arms Control and Reduction 
Negotiations 

he Secretary 

1 Secretai-y's Interview on "Meet 

the Press" 
I Secretary's Interview on "This 
Week With David Brinkley" 
News Conference of 

November 14 
Secretary's Interview on "Face 
the Nation" 

Frica 

U.S. and Soviet Interests in the 
Horn of Africa {Chester A. 
Crocker) 

The African Economic Crisis 
(John C. Wntekead) 

•ms Control 

The Challenge of Negotiating by 

Democracies (Kenneth L. 

Adelman) 
Arms Control Negotiations 

(President Reagan) 
Making Aj-ms Control Work 

(Kenneth L. Adelman) 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations on 

Nuclear and Space Arms 

(President Reagan) 

inada 

Secretary Visits Canada (Joseph 
Clark, Secretary Shultz, Toast, 
Joint News Conference) 

spartment 

Legislative Proposals Regarding 
Diplomatic Security (Ronald I. 
Spiers) 



East Asia 

49 Developments in the Philippines 

(Paul D. Wolfoivitz) 
52 U.S.-Pakistan Relations: The 

Economic Dimension (W. Allen 

Wallis) 
54 The United Nations at Forty: 

Economic Successes and 

Failures (W. Allen Wallis) 



Europe 



56 

57 
58 
61 
62 



U.K. -Ireland Agreement Concern- 
ing Northern Ireland 

(President Reagan) 
Secretary's Visit to Northern 

Europe (Secretary Shultz) 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Air Service 

(Department Announcement) 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group 

Meets (Final Communique) 
U.S. Role in the Case of Soviet 

Seaman Medvid (Rozanne L. 

Ridgivay) 



Human Rights 

64 Religion in Eastern Europe 
(Richard D. Schifter) 

International Law 

67 U.S. Terminates Acceptance of 
ICJ Compulsoi-y Jurisdiction 
(Secretary's Letter, Abraham 
D. Sofaer. Department 
Statement) 

69 U.S.-Italy Agi-ee to Submit 

Dispute to ICJ (Department 
Statement) 



Terrorism 

72 IMO Endorses U.S. Initiative on 
Ship and Passenger Security 
(Department Announceynent) 

72 U.S. Offers Reward for Achille 
Lauro Terrorists (Department 
Announcement) 

United Nations 

72 Promoting Peaceful Change in 

South Africa (Vernon A. 
Walters) 

73 Situation in Angola (Vernon A. 

Walters, Security Council 
Resolution) 

Western Hemisphere 

75 Human Rights Situation in Peru 
(Elliott Abrams) 

78 Promoting Economic Develop- 

ment in Central America 
(Richard T. McConnack) 

End Notes 

79 November 1985 

Treaties 

80 Cuirent Actions 

Press Releases 

81 Department of State 

Publications 

82 Department of State 

82 Foi-eign Relations Volume 
Released 

Index 




President Reagan gives the "thumbs up" sign to members of the press just before 
his first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev on November 19. 



Department of State Bulli 



FEATURE 

The Fireside Summit 



President Reagan 

and 

General Secretary Gorbachev 

Meet in Geneva 

President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 

General Secretary of the Central Committee 

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 

met in Geneva, November 19-21, 1985. 



esident's Radio Address, 
)v. 9, 19851 

're expanding the format of our radio 
adcast today. During the next 10 
lutes, I'll be speaking to the citizens 
he Soviet Union over the Voice of 
lerica about the upcoming Geneva 
imit. My words will be directed to 
m, but I want you to hear what I 
. My speech is also being broadcast 
)ver 50 nations by the Worldnet 
evision Network. 
Good evening, this is Ronald 
igan, President of the United States, 
aking to you from Washington about 
upcoming meeting with General 
retary Gorbachev in Geneva and my 
es for a better relationship between 
two governments. 
Your leaders can freely appear on 
erican radio and television and be in- 
dewed by our magazines and 
'spapers. I was grateful for my re- 
i and rare opportunity to speak with 
resentatives of the Soviet press. 
ile I appreciate that, only parts of 
interview were published in 
•stia. and much of what was left out 
ink is important. I vsish to speak to 
personally as a husband, father, and 
idfather who shares your deepest 



hopes— that all of our children can live 
and prosper in a world of peace. 

I grew up in a small towTi in 
America's heartland where values of 
faith in God, freedom, family, friends, 
and concern for one's neighbors were 
shared by all— values you also share. 
During my school years, I worked dur- 
ing vacations, for a time on construction 
and then for several summers as a 
lifeguard at a river beach. After 
finishing my education, I became a radio 
sports announcer, which led to acting in 
Hollywood where I was elected head of 
our actor's guild. I'm the only American 
President who was also president of a 
labor union. 

Back then I had no intention of 
engaging in national politics, but 
America's a great country filled with op- 
portunities. In the years that followed, 
including my years as Governor of 
California and as President, I have not 
forgotten the values I learned as a boy 
nor have my fellow Americans. 

I know that much has been written 
in your press about America's hostile in- 
tentions toward you. Well, I reject these 
distortions. Americans are a peace- 
loving people; we do not threaten your 
nation and never will. The American 
people are tolerant, slow to anger, but 
staunch in defense of their liberties and, 



like you, their country. More than once, 
our two countries have joined to oppose 
a common enemy. Duiing our War of 
Independence, Russia provided 
assistance to the distant American col- 
onists. A century and a half later, we 
joined together to defeat the common 
enemy of fascism; before that, we were 
allies in World War I. 

Even before we entered World War 
II, America was supplying massive 
quantities of food and equipment to 
those fighting the Nazis. We provided 
14,795 aircraft to your forces, 7,056 
tanks, more than "half a million vehicles, 
and more than 6 million tons of food and 
other staples. Americans will never 
forget the valor, the pain, and, at last, 
the joy of victory that our peoples 
shared. I remember President 
Roosevelt's praise for the Russian peo- 
ple's heroism. How can any of us alive 
then forget that terrible year of 1941 
when the Nazis were repulsed at the 
gates of Moscow, the courage of Len- 
ingraders during the 900-day siege, the 
victory at Stalingrad, or our historic 
meeting on the Elbe in 1945? 

Americans fought for 4 years on all 
fronts. Many lie buried in northern 
Africa, Europe, Burma, China, the 
Pacific islands, and at the bottom of the 



jary 1986 



sea. Some are buried on Soviet soil— in 
the hero city of Murmansk, where they 
had brought precious supplies through 
the treacherous convoy route. 

Yet after that victory, Americans 
gave generously to help rebuild war- 
torn countries, even to former enemies, 
because we had made war on a vicious 
ideology, not on a people. And we 
demonstrated our desire for peace by 
rapidly demobilizing. At the end of 1945, 
we had an armed force of almost 12 
million men; by 1948 we had reduced 
that number to less than 1.5 million. 

We were the only country with 
nuclear weapons. We proposed giving 
those weapons up altogether to an inter- 
national authority so that no country 
would have such destructive power at 
its disposal. What a pity this idea was 
not accepted. 

Today we must both face the 
challenge of eliminating nuclear 
weapons. I have said many times and 
will say again to you: A nuclear war 
cannot be won and must never be 
fought. I pray God that we can rid the 
world of these dangerous weapons, in 
part by finding a reliable defense 
against them. Our negotiators in Geneva 
are working hard to reach a break- 
through. I am pleased that the Soviet 
Union finally responded to our original 
proposals. We studied the response 
carefully and replied quickly. These are 
complicated negotiations, and satisfac- 
tory results will take long, hard work. 
Let me be clear about our research 
and testing program on strategic 
defense technologies. Our goal is to 
make the world safer through develop- 
ment of non-nuclear security shields that 
would protect people by preventing 
weapons from reaching their targets 
and, hopefully, render balHstic missiles 
obsolete. Your own government has 
been conducting longstanding and exten- 
sive programs on its own defensive 
systems, including advanced research. 

The United States is just beginning 
a long process of investigating defenses. 
If and when our research proves that a 
defensive shield against nuclear missiles 



is practical, I believe our two nations, 
and those others that have nuclear 
weapons, should come together and 
agree on how, gi-adually, to eliminate of- 
fensive nuclear weapons, as we make 
our defensive system available to all. 
We ought to start talking about this 
process at the Geneva arms talks. 

We must live together in peace. 
America's whole history has been a 
search for peace and opportunity by 
pioneers seeking freedom, many from 
the old European order. We're proud of 
the Russians, the Uki-ainians, the Jews, 
the Armenians, and many others who 
sailed by our Statue of Liberty and 
reached our shores. Diversity is one of 
our great strengths. This is partly why 
we're confusing to outsiders. Our 
government is elected by the people; it 
is not above the people or above the 
law. 

We believe the truth is found 
through debate and discussion. Truth 
does not burn in the fire or drowm in 
the water. Our system is often uncom- 
fortable for elected officials, because one 
of our proudest institutions is a free 
press. The press criticizes me, and 
sometimes it hurts, but that is their 
role— to raise difficult questions and 
keep officials accountable to the people. 
But no one should mistake our freedoms 
for weakness. We favor free and open 
dialogue, not just for Americans but for 
all peoples. We believe in freedom of 
the individual. Freedom of worship, 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press 
are, as our Declaration of Independence 
says, unalienable rights of all men. 

Ten years ago the United States and 
the Soviet Union, along with 33 other 
countries, signed the Helsinki accords. 
We all pledged to respect human rights, 
permit our citizens freedom of speech 
and travel, and improve communication 
among the peoples of the signatory na- 
tions. America asks the world's leaders 
to abide by what they have committed 
themselves to do. As the woi'ld's two 
strongest nations, we owe it to the rest 
of humanity not only to keep our word 
but to help find peaceful settlements to 
local and regional conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Africa, Latin America, and 
elsewhere. 



We must also join forces against tei 
rorism. There is no place in a civilized 
world for assassinations, terrorist bomb 
ings, and other mindless violence. I 
strongly urge you and your governmen' 
to join us in combating terrorism and 
ensuring that no country will offer suc- 
cor or comfort to terrorists. 

We have much to leam from each 
other. Americans have long been en- 
riched by your cultural giants. The 
works of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, 
Turgenev, Chekov, and Pasternak are 
taught in many American universities; 
just as American authors from James 
Fenimore Cooper, Mark Twain, and 
Jack London to Ernest Hemingway an. I 
William Faulkner are popular in your I 
country. 

I want expanded contacts between 
our two great societies, wherever ther , 
is mutual interest. I am particularly in 
terested in increasing exchanges amonj i 
our young people, for they are our 
future. We should open a dialogue be- 
tween our nations, so leaders of each 
country would have the same chance ti 
communicate to the people of the othei 
on television. If more of your citizens 
visited us, you would understand that 
our people want peace as fervently as 
you do. 

I hope my discussions with Mr. Go 
bachev in Geneva will be fruitful and 
will lead to future meetings. We seek 
peace not only for ourselves but for ali 
those who inhabit this small planet. 

We share borders with three 
countries— Mexico, Canada, and the 
Soviet Union. We pride ourselves on ci 
friendly relations and open borders wi 
our two North American neighbors. A 
I hope the day will come when that n; 
row chain of islands stretching from 
Alaska to the eastern shore of Siberia 
will symbolize the ties between our t\» 
great" peoples, not the distance betwet 
us. 

Everything has a season. Let us 
hope as we near Christmas and the 
New Year that this will be the season 
for peace. Thank you for welcoming n 
into your homes. God bless you. 



Department of State Bull 



FEATURE 



The Fireside Summit 



resident's Address 
the Nation, 
[)v. 14, 19852 

36 houi's I will be leaving for Geneva 
the first meeting between an 
lerican President and a Soviet leader 
6 years. I know that you and the peo- 
of the world are looking forward to 
it meeting with gi-eat interest, so 
light I want to share with you my 
:)es and tell you why I'm going to 
neva. 

My mission, stated simply, is a mis- 
n for peace. It is to engage the new 
v'iet leader in what I hope will be a 
logue for peace that endures beyond 
presidency. It is to sit down across 
m Mr. Gorbachev and ti-y to map out, 
:ether, a basis for peaceful discourse 
;n though our disagreements on fun- 
nentals will not change. 
It is my fervent hope that the two 
IS can begin a process which our suc- 
sors and our peoples can continue— 
ng our differences frankly and 
nly and beginning to narrow and 
olve them; communicating effectively 
;hat our actions and intentions are 
misunderstood; and eliminating the 
riers between us and cooperating 
jrever possible for the greater good 
ill. 

This meeting can be a historic oppor- 
ity to set a steady, more constructive 
rse to the 21st century. The history 
Vmerican-Soviet relations, however, 
s not augur well for euphoria. Eight 
ny predecessors— each in his own 
', in his own time— sought to achieve 
ore stable and peaceful relationship 
1 the Soviet Union. None fully suc- 
ied. So, I don't underestimate the 
iculty of the task ahead. But these 
chapters do not relieve me of the 
gation to try to make this a safer, 
,er woi'ld. For our children, our 
idchildi-en, for all mankind, I intend 
nake the effort. And with your 
y'ers and God's help, I hope to 
;eed. 

Success at the summit, however, 
ild not be measured by any short - 
n agreements that may be signed. 



Only the passage of time will tell us 
whether we constructed a durable 
bridge to a safer world. 

Building a Foundation 
for Lasting Peace 

This, then, is why I go to Geneva— to 
build a foundation for lasting peace. 
When we speak of peace, we should not 
mean just the absence of war. Ti'ue 
peace rests on the pillars of individual 
freedom, human rights, national self- 
determination, and respect for the rule 
of law. Building a safer future requires 
that we address candidly all the issues 
which divide us and not just focus on 
one or two issues, important as they 
may be. When we meet in Geneva, our 
agenda will seek not just to avoid war 
but to strengthen peace, prevent con- 
frontation, and remove the sources of 
tension. We should seek to reduce the 
suspicions and mistrust that have led us 
to acquire mountains of strategic 
weapons. 

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, 
every American President has sought to 
limit and end the dangerous competition 
in nuclear arms. I have no higher pri- 
ority than to finally realize that dream. 
I've said before, I will say again, a 
nuclear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought. 



weapons. In 1983, the Soviet Union got 
up and walked out of the Geneva 
nuclear arms control negotiations 
altogether. They did this in protest 
because we and our European allies had 
begun to deploy nuclear weapons as a 
counter to Soviet SS-20s aimed at our 
European and other allies. 

I'm pleased now', how'ever, with the 
interest expressed in reducing offensive 
weapons by the new Soviet leadership. 
Let me repeat tonight what I announced 
last week. The United States is pre- 
pared to reduce comparable nuclear 
systems by 50%. We seek reductions 
that will result in a stable balance be- 
tween us with no first-strike capability— 
and veiified full compliance. 

If we both reduce the weapons of 
war, there would be no losers, only win- 
ners. And the whole world would bene- 
fit if we could both abandon these 
weapons altogether and move to non- 
nuclear defensive systems that thi-eaten 
no one. 

But nuclear arms control is not of 
itself a final answer. I told four Soviet 
political commentators 2 weeks ago that 
nations do not distrust each other be- 
cause they're armed; they arm them- 
selves because they distrust each other. 
The use of force, subversion, and terror 
has made the world a more dangerous 
place, and thus, today, there's no peace 



. . . nations do not distrust each other because 
they're armed; they arm themselves because they 
distrust each other. 



We've gone the exti-a mile in amis 
control, but our offers have not always 
been welcome. In 1977 and again in 
1982, the United States proposed to the 
Soviet Union deep reciprocal cuts in 
strategic forces. These offers were re- 
jected out-of-hand. In 1981, we proposed 
the complete elimination of a whole 
category of intermediate-range nuclear 
forces. Three years later, we proposed a 
treaty for a global ban on chemical 



in Afghanistan; no peace in Cambodia; 
no peace in Angola, Ethiopia, or 
Nicaragua. 

These wars have claimed hundreds 
of thousands of lives and threaten to 
spill over national frontiers. That's why 
in my address to the United Nations, I 
proposed a way to end these conflicts: a 
regional peace plan that calls for nego- 
tiations among the warring parties, 



uary 1986 



withdrawal of all foreign troops, demo- 
cratic reconciliation, and economic 
assistance. 

Four times in my lifetime, our 
soldiers have been sent overseas to fight 
in foreign lands. Their remains can be 
found from Flanders Field to the islands 
of the Pacific. Not once were those 
young men sent abroad in the cause of 
conquest. Not once did they come home 
claiming a single square inch of some 
other country as a trophy of war. 

American Commitment 

to Freedom and Democracy 

A great danger in the past, however, 
has been the failure by our enemies to 
remember that while we Americans 
detest war, we love freedom and stand 
ready to sacrifice for it. We love 
freedom not only because it's practical 
and beneficial but because it is morally 
right and just. 

In advancing freedom, we Americans 
carry a special burden— a belief in the 
dignity of man in the sight of the God 
who gave birth to this country. This is 
central to our being. 



Freedom and democracy are the 
best guarantors of peace. History has 
shown that democratic nations do not 
start wars. The rights of the individual 
and the rule of law are as fundamental 
to peace as arms control. A government 
which does not respect its citizens' 
rights and its international commitments 
to protect those rights is not likely to 
respect its other international 
undertakings. 

And that's why we must and will 
speak in Geneva on behalf of those who 
cannot speak for themselves. We are not 
trying to impose our beliefs on others. 
We have a right to expect, however, 
that great states will live up to their in- 
ternational obligations. 

The Need for Increased 
People-to-People Contact 

Despite our deep and abiding differ- 
ences, we can and must prevent our in- 
ternational competition from spilling 
over into violence. We can find as yet 
undiscovered avenues where American 
and Soviet citizens can cooperate fruit- 
fully for the benefit of mankind. And 
this, too, is why I'm going to Geneva. 



. . . while we Americans detest war, we love 
freedom and stand ready to sacrifice for it. 



A century and a half ago, Thomas 
Jefferson told the world: ". . . the mass 
of mankind has not been bom with sad- 
dles on their backs. . . ." Freedom is 
America's core. We must never deny it 
or forsake it. Should the day come when 
we Americans remain silent in the face 
of armed aggression, then the cause of 
America— the cause of freedom— will 
have been lost, and the great heart of 
this country will have been broken. 
This affuTTiation of freedom is not only 
our duty as Americans, it's essential for 
success at Geneva. 



Enduring peace requires openness, 
honest communications, and opportuni- 
ties for our peoples to get to know one 
another directly. The United States has 
always stood for openness. Thirty years 
ago in Geneva, President Eisenhower, 
preparing for his first meeting with the 
then Soviet leader, made his "open 
skies" proposal and an offer of new 
educational and cultural exchanges with 
the Soviet Union. He recognized that 
removing the barriers between people is 
at the heart of our relationship. He said: 

Restrictions on communications of all 
kinds, including radio and travel, existing in 
extreme form in some places, have operated 
as causes of mutual distrust. In America, the 



fei-vent belief in freedom of thought, of ex- 
pression, and of movement is a vital part of 
our heritage. 

Well, I have hopes that we can 
lessen the distrust between us, reduce 
the levels of secrecy, and bring forth a 
more "open world." Imagine how mucl 
good we could accomplish, how the 
cause of peace would be served, if mon i 
individuals and families from our respfri 
tive countries could come to know each 
other in a personal way. 

For example, if Soviet youth could 
attend American schools and univer- 
sities, they could leam firsthand what 
spirit of freedom rules our land and th; 
we do not wish the Soviet people any 
harm. If American youth could do like- 
wise, they could talk about their in- 
terests and values and hopes for the 
future with their Soviet friends. They 
would get firsthand knowledge of life i 
the U.S.S.R., but most important, they 
would leai-n that we're all God's childr 
with much in common. 

Imagine if people in our nation cou 
see the Bolshoi Ballet again, while 
Soviet citizens could see American pla; 
and hear groups hke the Beach Boys. 
And how about Soviet children watchiiJ 
Sesame Street? 

We've had educational and cultural' 
exchanges for 25 years and are now 
close to completing a new agreement. 
But I feel the time is ripe for us to ta 
bold new steps to open the way for ou. 
peoples to participate in an unprece- 
dented way in the building of peace. 

Why shouldn't I propose to Mr. G(' 
bachev at Geneva that we exchange 
many more of our citizens from fraterc 
nal, religious, educational, and cultura. 
groups? Why not suggest the exchang 
of thousands of undergraduates each 
year and even of younger students wl 
"would live with a host family and atte 
schools or summer camps? We could 
look to increased scholarship program 
improve language studies; conduct 
courses in history, culture, and other 
subjects; develop new sister cities; 
estabUsh libraries and cultural centers 
and, yes, increase athletic competition 
People of both our nations love sports 
If we must compete, let it be on the 
playing fields and not the battlefields. 



nonortmont nf .'itate Bull! 



FEATURE 

The Fireside Summit 



In science and technologj' we could 
inch new joint space ventures and 
tablish joint medical research projects, 
communications, we'd like to see 
)re appearances in the other's mass 
idia by representatives of both our 
intries. If Soviet spokesmen are free 
appear on American television, to be 
blished and read in the American 
3ss, shouldn't the Soviet people have 
i same right to see, hear, and read 
lat we Americans have to say? 

Such proposals will not bridge our 
ferences, but people-to-people contacts 
1 build genuine constituencies for 
ice in both countries. After all, people 
I't start wars, governments do. 

nclusion 

t me summarize, then, the vision and 
)es that we carry with us to Geneva. 

We go with an appreciation, born of 
)erience, of the deep differences be- 
?en us— between our values, our 
tems, our beliefs. But we also carry 
h us the deteiTnination not to permit 
se differences to erupt into confron- 
ion or conflict. We do not threaten 

Soviet people and never will. 

We go without illusion but with 
le— hope that progress can be made 
our entire agenda. We believe that 
gress can be made in resolving the 
ional conflicts now burning on three 
tinents— including our own hemi- 
ere. The regional plan we proposed 
;he United Nations will be raised 
in at Geneva. 

We're proposing the broadest 
ple-to-people exchanges in the 
cry of American-Soviet relations, ex- 
nges in sports and culture, in the 
iia, education, and the arts. Such ex- 
nges can build in our societies 
asands of coalitions for cooperation 

peace. 

Governments can only do so much: 
s they get the ball rolling, they 
uld step out of the way and let peo- 
get together to share, enjoy, help, 
m, and learn from each other, 
jcially young people. 
Finally, we go to Geneva with the 
jr realization that nuclear weapons 
J the greatest threat in human 



history to the survival of the human 
i-ace— that the arms race must be 
stopped. We go determined to search 
out and discover common ground- 
where we can agree to begin the reduc- 
tion, looking to the eventual elimination, 
of nuclear weapons from the face of the 
earth. 

It is not an impossible dream that 
we can begin to reduce nuclear arsenals, 
reduce the risk of war, and build a solid 
foundation for peace. It is not an im- 
possible dream that our children and 
grandchildren can some day travel 



buried, heroes who died of wounds sus- 
tained on the treacherous North Atlan- 
tic and North Sea convoys that carried 
to Russia the indispensable tools of sur- 
vival and victory. While it would be 
naive to think a single summit can 
establish a permanent peace, this con- 
ference can begin a dialogue for peace. 
So we look to the future with optimism, 
and we go to Geneva with confidence. 
Both Nancy and I are grateful for 
the chance you've given us to serve this 
nation and the trust you've placed in us. 
I know how deep the hope of peace is in 



Should the day come when we Americans remain 
silent in the face of armed aggression, then the 
cause of America— the cause of freedom— will have 
been lost. . . . 



freely back and forth between America 
and the Soviet Union; visit each other's 
homes; work and study together; enjoy 
and discuss plays, music, television; and 
root for teams when they compete. 

These, then, are the indispensable 
elements of a true peace: the steady ex- 
pansion of human rights for all the 
world's peoples; support for resolving 
conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America that carry the seeds of a wider 
war; a broadening of people-to-people 
exchanges that can diminish the distrust 
and suspicion that separate our two 
peoples; and the steady reduction of 
these awesome nuclear arsenals until 
they no longer threaten the world we 
both must inhabit. This is our agenda 
for Geneva; this is our policy; this is our 
plan for peace. 

We have cooperated in the past. In 
both World Wars, Americans and Rus- 
sians fought on separate fronts against a 
common enemy. Near the city of Mur- 
mansk, sons of our own nation are 



her heart, as it is in the heart of every 
American and Russian mother. 

I received a letter and picture from 
one such mother in Louisiana recently. 
She wTote: 

Mr. President, how could anyone be more 
blessed than I? These children you see are 
mine, gi-anted to me by the Lord for a short 
time. WTien you go to Geneva, please remem- 
ber these faces, remember the faces of my 
children— of Jonathan, my son, and of my' 
twins, Lara and Jessica. Their future depends 
on your actions. I will pray for guidance for 
you and the Soviet leaders. 

Her words, "my children," read like 
a cry of love. And I could only think 
how that ci-y has echoed down through 
the centuries, a cry for all the children 
of the world, for peace, for love of 
fellowman. Here is the central truth of 
our time— of any time— a truth to which 
I've tried to bear witness in this office. 

When I first accepted the nomina- 
tion of my party, I asked you, the 
American people, to join with me in 
prayer for our nation and the world. Six 
days ago in the Cabinet Room, religious 
leaders— Ukrainian and Greek Orthodox 



uary 1986 



bishops, Catholic Church representatives 
including a Lithuanian bishop, Protes- 
tant pastors, a Mormon elder, and 
Jewish rabbis— made me a similar 
request. 

Well, tonight I'm honoring that re- 
quest. I am asking you, my fellow 
Americans, to pray for God's grace and 
His guidance for all of us at Geneva, so 
that the cause of true peace among men 
will be advanced and all of humanity 
thereby served. 



Mr. McFarlane's Statement, 
Nov. 18, 1985 

This afternoon it was the pleasure of 
the President to meet and exchange 
views with President Furgler and 
members of his Cabinet-the Foreign 
Minister, the State Secretary. 

The meeting held in Le Reposoir 
was extremely cordial and it afforded 
the President an opportunity to express 
his deep gratitude for all of the support 



pi-ovided by the Government of 
Switzerland in hosting this session with 
the General Secretary. He expressed his 
highest regard for the traditional role 
that Switzerland has played in making 
possible periodic meetings which, on 
many occasions, have fostered improved 
understanding between countries, a bet- 
ter chmate, and the resolution of specific 
problems. Bilateral issues as well were 
discussed, to include civil air matters, 
technology transfer matters. However, 
both leaders acknowledged that the 
state of the relationship is excellent. 

The President was pleased to hear 
of Switzerland's introduction, of making 
public, a proposal in the Stockholm con- 
ference where discussions have been 
underway for over a year on confidence- 
building measures. The President 
thought this an extremely constructive 
initiative on the part of Switzerland and 
looks forward to studying it in the days 
ahead. 

The Swiss President expressed his 
deep sentiment of support for the objec- 
tives both countries coming to this 




President Reagan holds an informal meeting with (from left) national secu- 
rity adviser McFarlane, Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Hartman, and Chief of 
Staff Regan at Maison de Saussure on November 17. 



meeting have expressed and hope that i 
may be an opportunity for a reduction 
in tensions in the establishment of an 
improved climate for the resolution of 
disagreements in the years ahead. It 
was in all an extremely worthwhile 
meeting typified by cordiality on both 
sides, gi-a"titude, and mutual respect. 

On the eve of his meetings with the^ 
General Secretary, the President feels i 
deep sense of responsibility, of 
challenge, and of opportunity. He 
believes that the meeting, as its centran 
purpose, provides an opportunity for 
each leader to make fundamental 
presentations on their own countries. 
For his part, he intends a comprehen- 
sive presentation on the strengths, 
values, purposes, and goals of the 
United States looking to the end of the 
century. He will, as well, express the 
views of the United States of the Sovii 
Union and of its purposes, strengths, 
and so forth. 

He will make clear in the opening 
session that we have concerns regardir 
the pattern of behavior of the Soviet 
Union in international affairs and looks' 
forward to being explicit in these; but 
finally, to propose a framework for V.i 
Soviet relations that will encompass th 
full agenda of bilateral, regional, huma: 
rights, and security issues, devoted to 
sustained dialogue in the interest of th 
resolution of the problems between us. 
He has said, in coming here, that Yt 
has come on a mission for peace. And 
believes that that mission requires 
frank, forthright discussions of the inti 
related elements of these. As he told 
the American people last week, he wil 
present his views on the need to 
strengthen and stabilize the nuclear 
balance, to restrain the use of force ar 
subversion, to increase respect for 
human rights, and to improve com- 
munication between both peoples and 
governments. 

The President's goals and specific 
proposals in each of the four areas I'v 
mentioned are very well known to all 
you. They are on the table, and he wi 
have more to say in detail about each 
them with Mr. Gorbachev. He wants 
start solving problems. If the Soviet 
side is equally committed to practical 
solutions, there will be progress. 



Department of State Bulll 



FEATURE 



The Fireside Summit 




President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev hold their second plenary session at the Soviet Mission on November 20. 



The President approaches these 
jtings with a strong sense of realism. 
it means understanding a point that 
; easily forgotten in past post-summit 
dhnes. Peace isn't based on 
;tings. It depends above all on 
cies that work and that make clear 
erica's determination to defend its 
rests and those of its friends and 

!S. 

We will seek sound agreements 
;re we can, but we will fulfill our 
)onsibilities where we must. In this 
■, the President beheves that we can 
,er avoid swings between complacen- 
md confrontation. Neither of these 
•ernes has served us very well in the 
;. In fact, as the historical record 
Ks, the one can all too easily en- 
'age the other. 

In the late 19o0s, the spirit of 
eva gave way to years of crisis over 
lin. In the late 1960s, the spirit of 
isboro was dispelled by the invasion 
Czechoslovakia. And in the late 1970s, 
confidence and hope that efforts at 
tegic arms control were supposed to 



bring to Soviet- American relations 
disappeared. They were undone by a 
relentless military buildup and by a half 
decade of Soviet activity in the Thii-d 
World, culminating in the invasion of 
and continued occupation of 
Afghanistan. 

President Reagan believes deeply 
that we have to do better. This has 
been the goal of all the policies that he 
has put in place since 1981. He feels 
that we can learn and profit from 
historical experience. He wants to chart 
a course— a consistent course— sustained 
by strong public support at home, and 
its aim is simple: to make restraint the 
most realistic Soviet option. 

Perhaps the most frequently asked 
question of the week is, "Will the 
meeting be a success or a failure?" The 
President certainly hopes for progress 
and intends to make as much as is feasi- 
ble. But a real answer to that question 
v\-ill not be immediately available. He 
has not come to Geneva to seek 2 days' 
of atmospheric improvements but to put 
down a strong foundation on which 



future results can be built. It is by such 
results that the value of this week's 
meetings, like those of the past, will be 
judged in the years ahead. 

Joint Statement, 
Nov. 21, 19853 

By mutual agreement. President of the 
United States Ronald Reagan and 
General Secretary of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev met in 
Geneva November 19-21. Attending the 
meeting on the U.S. side were 
Secretary- of State George Shultz; Chief 
of Staff Donald Regan; Assistant to the 
President Robert McFarlane; Am- 
bassador to the U.S.S.R. Arthur Hart- 
man; Special Adviser to the President 
and the Secretary of State for ai-ms con- 
trol Paul H. Nitze; Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs Rozanne 
Ridgway; Special Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for National Security Affairs Jack 



uary t986 



Matlock. Attending on the Soviet side 
were Member of the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. 
Shevardnadze; First Deputy Foreign 
Minister G.M. Korniyenko; Ambassador 
to the United States A.F. Dobrynin; 
head of the Department of Propaganda 
of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 
A.N. Yakovlev; head of the Department 
of International Information of the Cen- 
tral Committee of the CPSU L.M. 
Zamyatin; Assistant to the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the CPSU A.M. Aleksandrov. 

These comprehensive discussions 
covered the basic questions of U.S.- 
Soviet relations and the current interna- 
tional situation. The meetings were 
frank and useful. Serious differences re- 
main on a number of critical issues. 

While acknowledging the differences 
in their systems and approaches to in- 
ternational issues, some greater 
understanding of each side's view was 
achieved by the two leaders. They 
agreed about the need to improve U.S.- 
Soviet relations and the international 
situation as a whole. 

In this connection, the two sides 
have confirmed the importance of an 
ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong 
desire to seek common ground on ex- 
isting problems. 

They agreed to meet again in the 
nearest future. The General Secretary 
accepted an invitation by the President 
of the United States to visit the United 
States of America, and the President of 
the United States accepted an invitation 
by the General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU to visit the 
Soviet Union. Arrangements for and 
timing of the visits will be agreed upon 
through diplomatic channels. 

In their meetings, agreement was 
reached on a number of specific issues. 
Areas of agreement are registered in 
the following pages. 

Security 

The sides, having discussed key security 
issues, and conscious of the special 
responsibility of the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed 



that a nuclear war cannot be won and 
must never be fought. Recognizing that 
any conflict between the U.S.S.R. and 
the U.S. could have catastrophic conse- 
quences, they emphasized the impor- 
tance of preventing any war between 
them, whether nuclear or conventional. 
They will not seek to achieve military 
superiority. 

Nuclear and Space Talks 

The President and the General 
Secretary discussed the negotiations on 
nuclear and space arms. 

They agi-eed to accelerate the work 
at these negotiations, with a view to ac- 
complishing the tasks set down in the 
joint U.S.-Soviet agreement of January 
8, 1985, namely to prevent an arms race 
in space and to terminate it on Earth, 
to limit and reduce nuclear arms and 
enhance strategic stability. 

Noting the proposals recently tabled 
by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they 
called for early progress, in particular in 
areas where there is common ground, 
including the principle of 50 percent 
reductions in the nuclear arms of the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. appropriately ap- 
plied, as well as the idea of an interim 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
agreement. 

During the negotiation of these 
agreements, effective measures for 
verification of compliance with obliga- 
tions assumed \rill be agreed upon. 

Risk Reduction Centers 

The sides agreed to study the question 
at the expert level of centers of reduced 
nuclear risk, taking into account the 
issues and developments in the Geneva 
negotiations. They took satisfaction in 
such recent steps in this direction as the 
modernization of the Soviet-U.S. "Hot 
Line." 

Nuclear Nonproliferation 

General Secretary Gorbachev and Presi- 
dent Reagan reaffirmed the commitment 
of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and their interest in 
strengthening, together with other coun- 



tries, the nonproliferation regime and i 
further enhancing the effectiveness of 
the treaty, inter alia, by enlarging its 
membership. 

They note with satisfaction the 
overall positive results of the recent 
review conference of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. reaffirn- 
their commitment, assumed by them 
under the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on 
matters of nuclear arms limitation and 
disarmament in accordance with Articl 
VI of the treaty. 

The two sides plan to continue to 
promote the strengthening of the Inte 
national Atomic Energy Agency and t^ 
support the activities of the agency in 
implementing safeguards as well as in 
promoting the peaceful uses of nucleai 
energy. 

They view positively the practice 
regular Soviet-U.S. consultations on m 
proliferation of nuclear weapons which 
have been businesslike and constructi\ 
and express their intent to continue tl 
practice in the future. 

Chemical Weapons 

In the context of discussing security 
problems, the two sides reaffirmed th: 
they are in favor of a general and con 
plete prohibition of chemical weapons 
and the destruction of existing 
stockpiles of such weapons. They agre 
to accelerate efforts to conclude an ef 
fective and verifiable international cor 
vention on this matter. 

The two sides agi-eed to intensify 
bilateral discussions on the level of ex 
perts on all aspects of such a chemica 
weapons ban, including the question c 
verification. They agreed to initiate a 
dialogue on preventing the proliferati> 
of chemical weapons. 

MBFR 

The two sides emphasized the impor- 
tance they attach to the Vienna (MBI 
[mutual and balanced force reductions 
negotiations and expressed their will- 
ingness to work for positive results 



Department of State Bui 



FEATURE 

The Fireside Summit 



>E 

taching great importance to the 
)ckholm Conference on Confidence- 
i Security-Building Measures and 
iarmament in Europe and noting the 
igress made there, the two sides 
ted their intention to facilitate, 
■ether with the other participating 
tes, an early and successful comple- 
1 of the work of the conference. To 
5 end, they reaffirmed the need for a 
ument which would include mutually 
eptable confidence- and security- 
Iding measures and give concrete ex- 
ssion and effect to the principle of 
i-use of force. 

•cess of Dialogue 

'sident Reagan and General 
retary Gorbachev agi-eed on the 
d to place on a regular basis and in- 
sify dialogue at various levels. Along 
h meetings between the leaders of 

two countries, this envisages regular 
Jtings between the U.S.S.R. Minister 
■"oreign Affairs and the U.S. 
retary of State, as well as between 

heads of other ministries and agen- 
. They agreed that the recent visits 
he heads of ministries and depart- 
its in such fields as agi-iculture, hous- 

and protection of the environment 
e been useful. 

Recognizing that exchanges of views 
•egional issues on the expert level 
e proven useful, they agreed to con- 
le such exchanges on a regular basis. 
The sides intend to expand the pro- 
71S of bilateral cultural, educational, 

scientific-technical exchanges and 

to develop trade and economic ties. 

President of the United States and 
General Secretary of the Central 
imittee of the CPSU attended the 
ing of the Agreement on Contacts 

Exchanges in Scientific, Educational 

Cultural Fields. 

They agreed on the importance of 
living humanitarian cases in the 
it of cooperation. 

They believe that there should be 
Iter understanding among our 
3les and that to this end, they will 
)urage greater travel and people-to- 
Dle contact. 




President Reagan takes an afternoon walk with 
Genera! Secretary Gorbachev outside Fluer d'Eau. 



Jary 1986 




General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, 
Technological, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields, with Program of 
Cooperation and Exchanges for 1986-1988 was signed Nov. 21, 1985 in Geneva 
by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz. 



U.S.S.R.; the annual exchange of pro- 
fessors to conduct special courses in 
history, culture, and economics at the 
relevant departments of Soviet and 
American institutions of higher educa- 
tion; mutual allocation of scholarships 
for the best students in the natural 
sciences, technology', social sciences, an 
humanities for the period of an academ 
year; holding regiilar meets in various 
sports and increased television coverag 
of sports events). The two sides agreed 
to resume cooperation in combatting 
cancer diseases. 

The relevant agencies in each of tb | 
countries are being instructed to 
develop specific prop-ams for these ex- 
changes. The resulting pi-ograms will b j 
reviewed by the leaders at their ne.xt I 
meeting. 

Fusion Research 

The two leaders emphasized the poten- 
tial importance of the work aimed at 
utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusio 
for peaceful pui-poses and, in this con- 
nection, advocated the widest prac- 
ticable development of international 
cooperation in obtaining this source of 
energy, which is essentially inexhausti- 
ble, for the benefit of all mankind. 



Northern Pacific Air Safety 

The two leaders also noted with satisfac- 
tion that, in cooperation with the 
Government of Japan, the United States 
and the Soviet Union have agreed to a 
set of measures to promote safety on air 
routes in the North Pacific and have 
worked out steps to implement them. 

Civil Aviation/Consulates 

They acknowledged that delegations 
from the United States and the Soviet 
Union have begun negotiations aimed at 
resumption of air services. The two 
leaders expressed their desire to reach a 
mutually beneficial agreement at an ear- 
ly date. In this regard, an agreement 
was reached on the simultaneous open- 
ing of Consulates General in New York 
and Kiev. 



Environmental Protection 

Both sides agreed to contribute to the 
preservation of the environment— a 
global task— through joint reseaixh and 
practical measures. In accordance with 
the existing U.S.-Soviet agreement in 
this area, consultations will be held next 
year in Moscow and Washington on 
specific programs of cooperation. 

Exchange Initiatives 

The two leaders agreed on the utility of 
broadening exchanges and contacts in- 
cluding some of their new forms in a 
number of scientific, educational, 
medical, and sports fields {inter alia, 
cooperation in the development of 
educational exchanges and software for 
elementary and secondary school in- 
struction; measures to promote Russian 
language studies in the United States 
and English language studies in the 



10 



Concluding Remarks, 
Nov. 21, 19853 

General Secretary Gorbachev^ 

You've already been handed the joint 
statement. The President and I have 
done a huge amount of work. We've 
gone into great detail; we've really do 
it in depth. And we've done it totally 
openly and frankly. We've discussed 
several most important issues. 

The relations between our two coi 
tries and the situation in the world in 
general today— these are issues and 
problems the solving of which in the 
most concrete way is of concern both 
our countries and the peoples of othei 
countries in the world. 

We've discussed these issues, basi 
our discussions on both sides' deter- 
mination to improve relations betwee: i 



Department of State Bull 



FEATURE 

The Fireside Summit 



Soviet Union and the United States 
\merica. We've decided that we must 
p to decrease the threat of nuclear 
r. We must not allow the arms race 
nove off into space, and we must cut 
lown on Earth. 

It goes without saying that discus- 
is of these sorts we consider to be 
y useful, and in its results, you find 
ear reflection of what the two sides 
e agreed together. We have to be 
listic and straightforward, and, 
fefore, the solving of the most impor- 
t problems concerning the arms race 
increasing hopes of peace, we didn't 
:eed in meeting at this meeting. 
So, of course, there are important 
igreements on matters of principle 
: remain between us. However, the 
sident and I have agi-eed that this 
•k of seeking mutually acceptable 
isions for these questions will be con- 
led here in Geneva by our 
resentatives. 

We're also going to seek new kinds 
eveloping bilateral Soviet-Amei'ican 
tions. And also we're going to have 
her consultations on several impor- 
, questions whei-e, for the most part, 
positions again are completely dif- 
nt. All this, we consider these forth- 
ing talks to be very, very useful. 
But the significance of everything 
:h we have agreed with the Presi- 
t can only, of course, be reflected if 
carry it on into concrete measures, 
'e really want to succeed in 
ething, then both sides are going to 
3 to do an awful lot of work in the 
it of the joint statement which we 
? put out. And in this connection, I 
Id like to announce that the Soviet 
3n, for its part, will do all it can in 
cooperation with the United States 
.merica in order to achieve practical 
ilts to cut down the arms race, to 
dovm the arsenals which we've piled 
and produce the conditions which 
be necessary for peace on Earth 
in space. 

We make this announcement perfect- 
ivare of our responsibility both to 
own people and to the other peoples 
le Earth. And we would verj' much 
; that we can have the same ap- 
ich from the Administration of the 



United States of America. If that can be 
so, then the work that has been done in 
these days in Geneva will not have been 
done in vain. 

I would like to finish by thanking 
most profoundly the Government of 
Switzerland foi- the conditions which 
they've created for us to be able to 
work. 



President Reagan 

May I express Nancy's and my deep 
personal appreciation and that of all 
Americans to the people of Switzerland 
for welcoming us so warmly and prepar- 
ing the foundations for productive 
discussions. Yours is a long and 
honorable tradition of pi-omoting inter- 
national peace and understanding. You 
should take pride in being the capital 
for international discussions. So again to 
the Government of Switzerland and the 
citizens of Geneva, many, many thanks. 

We've packed a lot into the last 2 
days. I came to Geneva to seek a fresh 
start in relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and we 
have done this. General Secretary Gor- 
bachev and I have held comprehensive 
discussions covering all elements of our 
relationship. I'm convinced that we're 
heading in the right direction. 

We've reached some useful interim 
results, which are described in the joint 
statement that is being issued this 
morning. In agreeing to accelerate the 
work of our nuclear arms negotiators, 
Mr. Gorbachev and I have addressed 
our common responsibility to strengthen 
peace. I believe that we have estabhsh- 
ed a process for more intensive contacts 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. These 2 days of talks 
should inject a certain momentum into 
our work on the issues between us— a 
momentum we can continue at the 
meeting that we have agi-eed on for 
next year. 

Before coming to Geneva, I spoke 
often of the need to build confidence in 
our dealing with each other. Frank and 
forthright conversations at the summit 
are part of this process. But I'm certain 
General Secretary Gorbachev would 
agree that real confidence in each other 
must be built on deeds, not simply 



words. This is the thought that ties 
together all the proposals that the 
United States has put on the table in 
the past, and this is the critei-ia by with 
our meetings will be judged in the 
future. 

The real report card on Geneva will 
not come in for months or even years. 
But w^e know the questions that must 
be answered. Will we join together in 
sharply reducing offensive nuclear arms 
and moving to non-nuclear defensive 
strength for systems to make this a 
safer world? Will we join together to 
help bring about a peaceful resolution of 
conflicts in Asia, Afiica, and Central 
Ameiica so that the peoples there can 
freely determine their own destiny 
without outside interference? Will the 
cause of liberty be advanced? And will 
the treaties and agi-eements signed— 
past and future— be fulfilled? The people 
of America, the Soviet Union, and 
throughout the world are ready to 
answer yes. 

I leave Geneva today and our 
fireside summit determined to pursue 
evei-y opportunity to build a safer world 
of peace and freedom. Thei-e's hard 
work ahead, but we're ready for it. 
General Secretary Gorbachev, we ask 
you to join us in getting the job done, 
as I'm sure you will. 

Secretary's News 
Briefing, Nov. 21, 1985^ 

The President came to Geneva with a 
constructive approach and with an effort 
to make a fresh start in our relationship 
with the Soviet Union, and I think he 
achieved that fresh start. 

All of us who have worked in sup- 
port of the two leaders who met here 
this week, I think, share the view that 
perhaps we have a process undei-way 
that can lead to a more stable and con- 
structive relationship. Of course, as both 
men basically emphasize, that remains 
to be seen. And we will be looking, over 
the coming months and years, to see 
what truly happens. But at any rate, we 
have made a fresh start. 



jary 1986 



11 



Q. Is "Star Wars" more negotiable 
now as a result of the summit, or is it 
still where it stood before the Presi- 
dent came, where he said it would not 
be any way a bargaining chip? 

A. The subject of strategic defense 
was discussed in considerable detail and 
with great intensity on both sides. In- 
sofar as the President is concerned, he 
feels as strongly as ever that the 
research program designed to find the 
answer, "Is it possible to defend against 
ballistic missiles?" is essential. And he 
insists upon that. There was no give on 
that at all. 

Q. Did Gorbachev go along with 
the research idea at all? 

A. The General Secretary and 
Soviets will speak for themselves, but I 
would say their position did not change. 

Q. What has this 2 days of sum- 
mitry done to curb the nuclear arms 
race? 

A. It has not produced anything by 
way of a further agreement. It has pro- 
duced, perhaps, some political impulse 
to the negotiators in Geneva, which will 
undoubtedly be reflected in our own 
discussions in Washington as we con- 
sider the next round. 

Perhaps more important, it has con- 
tributed to a relationship between these 
two leaders based on a lot of substan- 
tive discussion between them. So it was 
just the kind of get-acquainted that we 
wanted and, I believe. General 
Secretary Gorbachev wanted; that is, 
they got acquainted on the basis of 
wrestling with difficult substance, and it 
worked well. 

Q. Did the President give the 
Soviet leader any assurances that we 
would not go beyond research in SDI 
at this point? 

A. The President's statements in our 
meetings were very parallel to 
statements you've heard him make 
many times— on the one hand, insisting 
that we must pursue the research and 
answer the question. And if the answer 
to the question is positive, then, as he 
has said many times, he believes that 
we should all sit down and share this 
technology so that we can move into a 
pattern of deterrence that has a greater 



12 



defense component to it. If you had 
been sitting in the meeting, you would 
have recognized very clearly the things 
the President said. 

Q. Do you think it was impulse 
which you referred to as the prospect 
of resulting in a new agreement, 
either in strategic arms or in INF in 
the coming year? 

A. It remains to be seen. And I 
think it is at least notable that in the 
joint statement, the idea of a separate 
INF agreement is identified. Now, of 
course, that was emerging in the 
negotiations as they were taking place, 
but certainly, the subject came in for 
considerable discussion. 

Q. After 2 days of such intense 
talks on all of these complicated ques- 
tions, the two leaders couldn't agree 
to more than a restatement of what 
you had achieved last January here in 
Geneva and what had been emerging 
in Paris and at the negotiations on 
the interim INF group. Why shouldn't 
people think that those problems are 
intractable, that you've actually had a 
setback here because they couldn't get 
any further than where they'd already 
been on arms control? 

A. People will believe whatever they 
want to believe. I don't know where 
your reference to Paris comes in. But, 
actually, I think what we have seen is a 
process, starting with the agreement 
last January, the beginning of the 
negotiations and the tabling of proposals 
by us. We've seen some counter- 
proposals from the Soviet Union that 
constituted movement, some counter- 
countei-proposals by us that constituted 
further movement, and you see that 
movement identified in this document. 
So I think there is a process here, and if 
you say, "What assurance do I have 
that it" will go anywhere," I don't have 
any assurance. 

Q. What you're saying, though, is 
that this is basically cataloging the 
progress that has been made over the 
past year on these issues, but not ad- 
vancing them at all. 

A. 1 would say you get a little ad- 
vanced by this kind of discussion, but 



certainly there wasn't any definitive 
movement or decision. In fact, the 
meetings didn't set themselves up, real- 
ly, as detailed bargaining sessions on 
the particulars of these things, but 
handled more on a general plane. But I 
think it was quite positive in general. 

Q. Are there some guidelines givei 
to the negotiators in the arms talks 
that do not appear in the joint state- 
ment? And second, on the statement 
of agreeing not to achieve military 
superiority, how does that differ froir 
the agreement made in Moscow in 
1972 or 1973-almost identical 
language— which the Soviets then 
almost immediately violated in Angol 
and other spots around the world? 

A. I think the military superiority 
refers to the respective forces. We hav 
felt that the regional issues which you 
referred to are a very important compc 
nent of this total picture. As it has 
emerged in the course of this meeting, 
the notion that problems around the 
woHd and the distress that they pro- 
duce is a major part of this problem, 
that emerged as something that is 
recognized on both sides. There is set 
out here indications of an effort to get 
at it. And I think the notion that peopl 
ann themselves because of distrust, no 
the other way around, is very promine 
here. So we have to start with these 
areas that create the tensions and ther 
of course, working on arms control, bu 
wanting to see an interplay there. 

Q. What does the statement in th 
joint statement mean when they say 
they agree to accelerate the work at 
these negotiations? Does that mean 
they're going to meet more often, do 
that mean that both sides have 
pledged to put new things on the tab 
faster? What are you talking about? 

A. They're talking about a sense o 
importance and urgency and a kind of 
mutual commitment to give a little he; 
to those who are going to be doing th. 
negotiating. 

You asked about guidelines, and w 
discussed various ways of putting whj 
might be said to negotiators. And in t 
joint statement some things are 
identified-50% is in there, separate 



Department of State Bull' 



FEATURE 

The Fireside Summit 



F is in there. But, in the process of 
cussing the ideas that they have and 
.t we have, perhaps they should have 
ttle clearer idea of the sort of 
delines that we're going to give our 
i;otiators. And, of course, we're going 
^0 back and, under the light of all 
t's been said, prepare ourselves and 
' negotiators for the next round. 

Q. The President's UN speech puts 
much emphasis on regional issues. 
I yet there's only one short 
tence in here about it. Was there 
'thing that you would determine 
5 progress on Afghanistan, on Cen- 

I America? Can you elaborate? 
A. I thought that we had really a 
y good discussion on the regional 
les in the plenary sessions, 
hanistan was treated at some length, 
it of the areas you would think of 

•e referred to. And the idea is in 

:-e that we need a process. And. of 

rse, we've been having these 

ional meetings for the last year, and 

baps you noticed that Foreign 

ister meetings will be regularized, so 

II definitely have them set out more 
n than just in connection with the 

General Assembly time and that the 
'tings of the Foreign Ministers will 
oubtedly take as items for the 
ida— and prepared agenda— certain 
onal issues. I think we expect Mr. 
varnadze and me to get away from 
pattern that has been typical where 
sort of cover the waterfront every 
; and say, "All right, let's have a 
ting, and this time let's focus on 
e two topics and not on 
•ything," and go into them in more 
;h. There is emerging a sense of 
:ess, and the President's initiatives 
le United Nations have been a 
lite contributor to that sense of 
;ress. 

3. In Moscow, you said that you 
ight you knew 95% of what would 
e out of this summit meeting. 
^. I did? 

J. Yes, you did. I wonder if you 
d say whether it turned out much 
way expected or whether there 
significant difference. 



A. It's hard to know exactly what to 
expect in meetings of this kind! But 
what is set out in the joint statement, I 
think, represents a first step in the 
sense that some concrete things were 
put down and moved along as well as a 
process started, that interaction. 

But I believe that the most impor- 
tant thing that happened here is that 
these two individuals took this over 
completely. It was very much their 
meeting, and they spent a lot of time 
together. It got to be a problem for the 
schedulers because every time they got 
together they went much longer than 
was thought. But that was really what 
we came here for and was very fruitful. 
And I think that length of time and the 
intensity and the frankness and the 
scope of what was talked about between 
the two by the fireside really went 
beyond anything I could have expected, 
although I felt myself that that kind of 
pattern was the desirable way to do it. 

Q. May I ask you about human 
rights? Was the President specific? 
Did he name names, like Sakharov or 
Shcharanskiy? And did he raise Major 
Nicholson's name? 

A. The President had an extensive 
discussion on the subject of human 
rights. And that is all I'm going to say 
about it. 



President's Address 
Before a Joint Session 
of Congress, 
Nov. 21, 19853 

It's great to be home, and Nancy and I 
thank you for this wonderful home- 
coming. And before I go on, I want to 
say a personal thank you to Nancy. She 
was an outstanding ambassador of good 
will for all of us. She didn't know I was 
going to say that. 

Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want 
you to know that your statements of 
support here were greatly appreciated. 
You can't imagine how much it means in 
dealing with the Soviets to have the 
Congress, the allies, and the American 
people firmly behind you. 



I guess you know that I have just 
come from Geneva and talks with 
General Secretary Gorbachev. In the 
past few days, we spent over 15 hours 
in various meetings with the General 
Secretary and the members of his 
official party. And approximately 5 
of those hours were talks between 
Mr. Gorbachev and myself, just one on 
one. That was the best part— our fire- 
side summit. 

There will be, I know, a gi-eat deal 
of commentary and opinion as to what 
the meetings produced and what they 
were like. There were over 3,000 
reporters in Geneva, so it's possible 
there will be 3,000 opinions on what 
happened; so maybe it's the old broad- 
caster in me, but I decided to file my 
own report directly to you. 

History and Context 
of the Summit 

We met, as we had to meet. I called for 
a fresh start— and we made that start. I 
can't claim we had a meeting of the 
minds on such fundamentals as ideology 
or national purpose— but we understand 
each other better, and that's a key to 
peace. I gained a better perspective; I 
feel he did, too. 

It was a constructive meeting. So 
constructive, in fact, that I look forward 
to welcoming Mr. Gorbachev to the 
United States next year. And I have ac- 
cepted his invitation to go to Moscow 
the following year. We arranged that 
out in the parking lot. 

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be an 
energetic defender of Soviet policy. He 
was an eloquent speaker and a good 
listener. Our subject matter was shaped 
by the facts of this century. 

These past 40 years have not been 
an easy time for the West or for the 
world. You know the facts; there is no 
need to recite the historical record. Suf- 
fice it to say that the United States can- 
not afford illusions about the nature of 
the U.S.S.R. We cannot assume that 
their ideology and purpose will change. 
This implies enduring competition. Our 
task is to assure that this competition 
remains peaceful. With all that divides 
us, we cannot afford to let confusion 
complicate things further. We must be 
clear with each other and direct. We 



jary 1986 



13 



must pay each other the tribute of 
candor. 

When I took the oath of office for 
the first time, we began dealing with 
the Soviet Union in a way that was 
more reahstic than in, say, the recent 
past. And so, in a very real sense, 
preparations for the summit started not 
months ago but 5 years ago when, with 
the help of Congress, we began 
strengthening our economy, restoring 
our national will, and rebuilding our 
defenses and alliances. America is once 
again strong— and our strength has 
given us the ability to speak with confi- 
dence and see that no true opportunity 
to advance freedom and peace is lost. 
We must not now abandon policies that 
work. I need your continued support to 
keep America strong. 



That is the history behind the 
Geneva summit, and that is the context 
in which it occurred. And may I add 
that we were especially eager that our 
meetings give a push to important talks 
already underway on reducing nuclear 
weapons. On this subject, it would be 
foolish not to go the extra mile— or, in 
this case, the extra 4,000 miles. 

Confronting Major Issues 

We discussed the great issues of our 
time. I made clear before the first 
meeting that no question would be 
swept aside, no issue buried, just 
because either side found it uncomfort- 
able or inconvenient. I brought these 
questions to the summit and put them 
before Mr. Gorbachev. 



President Meets With NATO Allies 



NATO SECRETARY GENERAL 
CARRINGTON'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 21, 1985' 

In our original announcement of Presi- 
dent Reagan's visit, we said that this 
special session of the North Atlantic 
Council would enable the participants 
both to hear at first hand of the results 
of the meeting between President 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev and to con- 
sult together on the wider and longer 
term process of strengthening security 
and improving East-West relations, of 
which that meeting was an important 
part. 

That is very much how it turned 
out. The high-level of attendance con- 
fiiTTis the importance allied governments 
attached to this occasion, and President 
Reagan was left no doubt of his col- 
leag^ies' appreciation of his visit here in 
the middle of a quite exceptionally long 
and busy day. 

The President, as you know, is fly- 
ing straight from here to address a joint 
session of the U.S. Congress. It would 
be wrong for me to anticipate his report 



by commenting in any detail on what he 
was able to say in confidence to his col- 
leagues. But you will have read the 
joint statement issued in Geneva, and I 
don't think that I would be revealing 
any secrets if I were to say that the 
President was able to report in positive 
tei-ms on important aspects of what has 
transpired in Geneva and that allied 
reactions were strongly supportive. 

Geneva is not the end of a process, 
but, we hope, the beginning of a new 
and more constructive stage. Alliance 
consultations, which have been very 
close and productive since the resump- 
tion of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotia- 
tions in Geneva at the beginning of this 
year, will be equally important in the 
future; and the next major occasion will 
be the ministeiial meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in December. President 
Reagan's visit, and this successful high- 
level meeting of the Council, underline 
the determination of allied governments 
to work together to keep the peace and 
to improve East-West relations. 



•Made available to the press by the 
NATO Infoi-mation Service in Brussels. 



We discussed nuclear arms and how 
to reduce them. I explained our pro- 
posals for equitable, verifiable, and dee 
reductions. I outlined my conviction thii 
our proposals would make not just for 
world that feels safer but one that is 
really safer. 

And I am pleased to report tonight 
that General Secretary Gorbachev and 
did make a measure of progress here. 
While we still have a long way to go, 
we're still heading in the right directio 
We moved arms control forward from 
where we were last January, when the 
Soviets returned to the table. We are 
both instructing our negotiators to 
hasten their vital work and the world 
waiting for results. 

Specifically, we agreed in Geneva 
that each side should move to cut offei 
sive nuclear arms by 50% in appropria 
categories. In our joint statement, we 
called for early progress on this, turni: 
the talks toward our chief goal— offen- 
sive reductions. We called for an inter 
accord on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces, leading, I hope, to the complet( 
elimination of this class of missiles. Ar 
all of this with tough verification. 

We also made progress in com- 
bating, together, the spread of nuclear 
weapons— an arms control area in whi( 
we've cooperated effectively over the 
years. We are also opening a dialogue 
on combating the spread and use of 
chemical weapons, while moving to bai 
them altogether. Other arms control 
dialogues— in Vienna on conventional 
forces and in Stockholm on lessening t 
chances for surprise attack in Europe- 
also received a boost. And finally, we 
agreed to begin work on risk reduetioi 
centers, a decision that should give 
special satisfaction to Senators Nunn 
and Warner, who so ably pi-omoted th 
idea. 

I described our Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI)— our research effort tl 
envisions the possibility of defensive 
systems which could ultimately protec 
all nations against the danger of nucle 
war. This discussion produced a very 
direct exchange of views. 

Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we 
might use a strategic defense system 
put offensive weapons into space and 
establish nuclear superiority. 



14 



Department of State Bull( 



FEATURE 

The Fireside Summit 



I made it clear that SDI has nothing 
do with offensive weapons; that, in- 
ead, we are investigating non-nuclear 
!fense systems that would only 
reaten offensive missiles, not people. 
our research succeeds, it will bring 
uch closer the safei-, moi-e stable world 
at we seek. Nations could defend 
emselves against missile attack and 
ankind, at long last, escape the prison 
mutual terror. This is my dream. 

So I welcomed the chance to tell 
r. Gorbachev that we are a nation that 
fends rather than attacks, that our 
iances are defensive, not offensive, 
e don't seek nuclear superiority. We 
not seek a first-strike advantage over 
e Soviet Union. Indeed, one of my 
ndamental arms conti-ol objectives is 
get i-id of first-strike weapons 
ogether. And this is why we've pro- 
sed a 50% reduction in the most 
reatening nuclear weapons, especially 
3se that could carry out a first strike. 

I went further in expressing our 
aceful intentions. I described our pro- 
sal in the Geneva negotiations for a 
npi-ocal program of open laboratories 
strategic defense research. We're 
ering to permit Soviet e.xperts to see 
3thand that SDI does not involve 
ensive weapons. American scientists 
uld be allowed to visit comparable 
ilities of the Soviet strategic defense 
)gTam, which, in fact, has involved 
ich more than research for many 
irs. 

Finally, I reassured Mr. Gorbachev 
another point. I promised that if our 
learch reveals that a defense against 
;lear missiles is possible, we would sit 
vn with our allies and the Soviet 
ion to see how, together, we could 
ilace all strategic ballistic missiles 
h such a defense, which thi'eatens no 

We discussed threats to the peace in 
eral regions of the world. I explained 

proposals for a peace process to stop 

wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, 
liopia, Angola, and Cambodia— those 
ces where insurgencies that speak for 

people are pitted against regimes 
ich obviously do not represent the 
1 or the approval of the people. I 



tiied to be very clear about where our 
sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. 

We discussed human rights. We 
Americans believe that history teaches 
no clearer lesson than this: those coun- 
tries which respect the rights of their 
own people tend, inevitably, to respect 
the rights of their neighbors. Human 
rights, therefore, is not an abstract 
moral issue— it is a peace issue. 

Finally, we discussed the barriers to 
communication between our societies, 
and I elaborated on my proposals for 
real people-to-people contacts on a wide 
scale. 

Americans should know the people 
of the Soviet Union— their hopes and 
fears and the facts of their lives. And 
citizens of the Soviet Union need to 
know of America's deep desire for peace 
and our unwavering attachment to 
freedom. 

Building a More Stable Relationship 

As you can see, our talks were wide 
ranging. And let me, at this point, tell 
you what we agi-eed upon and what we 
didn't. 

We remain far apart on a number of 
issues, as had to be expected. However, 
we reached agreement on a number of 
matters, and, as I mentioned, we agreed 
to continue meeting, and this is impor- 
tant and very good. There's always 
room for movement, action, and prog- 
ress when people are talking to each 
other instead of about each other. 

Well, we've concluded a new agree- 
ment designed to bring the best of 
America's artists and academics to the 
Soviet Union. The exhibits that will be 
included in this exchange are one of the 
most effective ways for the average 
Soviet citizen to learn about our way of 
life. This agreement will also expand the 
opportunities for Americans to experi- 
ence the Soviet people's rich cultural 
heritage— because their artists and 
academics will be coming here. 

We've also decided to go forward 
with a number of people-to-people initia- 
tives that will go beyond greater con- 
tact, not only between the political 
leaders of our two countries but our 
respective students, teachers, and 



others, as well. We have emphasized 
youth exchanges. And this will help 
break dow^n stereotypes, build friend- 
ships, and, frankly, provide an alterna- 
tive to propaganda. 

We've agreed to establish a new 
Soviet consulate in New York and a 
new American consulate in Kiev. And 
this will bring a permanent U.S. 
presence to the Ukraine for the first 
time in decades. 

And we have also, together with the 
Government of Japan, concluded a 
Pacific air safety agreement with the 
Soviet Union. This is designed to set up 
cooperative measures to improve civil 
air safety in that region of the Pacific. 
What happened before must never be 
allowed to happen there again. 

And as a potential way of dealing 
with the energy needs of the world of 
the future, we have also advocated 
international cooperation to explore the 
feasibility of developing fusion energj'. 

All of these steps are part of a long- 
term effort to build a more stable rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. No one 
ever said it could be easy, but we've 
come a, long way. 

Limits and Possibilities 

As for Soviet expansionism in a number 
of regions of the world— while there's 
httle chance of immediate change, we 
will continue to support the heroic ef- 
forts of those who fight for freedom. 
But we have also agreed to continue— 
and to intensify— our meetings with the 
Soviets on this and other regional con- 
flicts and to work toward political 
solutions. 

We know the limits as well as the 
promise of summit meetings. This is, 
after all, the 11th summit of the 
postwar era— and still the differences 
endure. But we believe continued 
meetings between the leaders of the 
United States and the Soviet Union can 
help bridge those differences. 

The fact is, every new day begins 
with possibilities; it's up to us to fill it 
with the things that move us towai-d 
progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is 
a realistic attitude— and despair an 
uninteresting little vice. 



uary 1986 



15 



And so, was our journey worth- 
while? 

Well, 30 years ago, when Ike-Presi- 
dent Eisenhower— had just returned 
from a summit in Geneva, he said, 
"... the wide gulf that separates so far 
East and West is wide and deep." Well, 
today, three decades later, that is still 
true. 

But, yes, this meeting was worth- 
while for both sides. A new realism 
spawned the summit; the summit itself 
was a good start; and now our byword 
must be: steady as we go. 

I am, as you are, impatient for 
results. But good will and good hopes do 
not always yield lasting results. And 
quick fixes don't fix big problems. 

Just as we must avoid illusions on 
our side, so we must dispel them on the 
Soviet side. I have made it clear to Mr. 
Gorbachev that we must reduce the 
mistrust and suspicions between us if 



we are to do such things as reduce 
arms, and this will take deeds, not 
words alone. And I believe he is in 
agreement. 

Where do we go from here? Well, 
our desire for improved relations is 
strong. We're ready and eager for step- 
by-step progress. We know that peace is 
not just the absence of war. We don't 
want a phony peace or a frail peace; we 
didn't go in pursuit of some kind of illu- 
sory detente. We can't be satisfied with 
cosmetic improvements that won't stand 
the test of time. We want real peace. 

As I flew back this evening, I had 
many thoughts. In just a few days, 
families across America will gather to 
celebrate Thanksgiving. And again, as 
our forefathers who voyaged to 
America, we traveled to Geneva with 
peace as our goal and freedom as our 
guide— for there can be no greater good 
than the quest for peace and no finer 
purpose than the preservation of 
freedom. 



It is 350 years since the first 
Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and 
Indians huddled together on the edge of 
an unknovra continent. And now, here 
we are gathered together on the edge a 
an unknown future— but, like our fore- 
fathers, really not so much afraid, but 
full of hope and trusting in God, as 
ever. 



'Broadcast from the studios of the Voice 
of America (text from Weekly Compilation ol 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 18, 1985). 

^Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 18. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 25. 

■•General Secretary Gorbachev spoke in 
Russian, and his remarks were translated by 
an interpreter. 

^Press release 265. ■ 



16 



Department of State Bulle" 



HE PRESIDENT 



Vrms Control 

ind Reduction Negotiations 



President Reagan's radio address to 
e nation on November 2, 1985.^ 

jsterday in Geneva, American 
gotiators presented to their Soviet 
unterparts new proposals designed to 
hieve real reductions in the nuclear 
senals of both the United States and 
e Soviet Union. My instructions to our 
gotiators also asked that this round of 
i negotiations be extended into this 
ning week so that our team can make 
"uU presentation of our new proposals 
d so that the Soviets have the oppoi-- 
lity to ask questions about them. 

I am very pleased that the Soviet 
lion has agreed to this extension of 
i talks. I know you join me in hoping 
it this will be a pi'oductive week in 
neva. Our new proposals address all 
•ee areas of these negotiations: 
ategic nuclear arms, intermediate- 
ige nuclear forces, and defense and 
ice systems. They build upon the con- 
te reduction proposals American 
gotiators have had on the table since 
■ly in the talks, and they take into ac- 
int expressed Soviet concerns. 

Our objective since the start of the 
ministration in 1981 has been to 
lieve real progress in reducing not 
y nuclear arms but conventional 
;es and chemical weapons as well, 
've been firm and consistent in our 
is conti-ol approach. Just as im- 
tant, we have placed great value on 
intaining the strength and unity of 

aUiances and ensuring that the 
urity interests of our allies are 
lanced in these negotiations. And 
ve demonstrated flexibility in taking 
timate Soviet interests into account. 
I'm pleased to report to you that 

strategy' has been working. I believe 
ve laid the groundwork for produc- 
I negotiations in Geneva. The first 
1 of this was when Soviet Foreign 
lister Shevardnadze presented to me 
lur White House meeting in 



September a Soviet counteroffer to our 
own earlier proposals. The Soviet 
negotiators then presented this in detail 
in Geneva, and our negotiators and our 
experts here at home have had a chance 
to analyze it carefully. 

Based on this analysis, I decided 
upon the new U.S. proposals and in- 
structed our negotiating team to present 
them in Geneva. Judged against our 
very careful criteria for reaching sound 
arms control agreements, we found that 
the Soviet countei-proposal had some 
flaws and in some ways was one-sided. 
But as I made clear in my speech to the 
United Nations, the Soviet move also 
had certain positive seeds which we 
wish to nurture. 

Our new proposals build upon these 
positive elements. One of them is the 
Soviet call for o09c reduction in certain 
types of nuclear arms. For more than 3 
years, we've been proposing a reduction 
of about half in the strategic ballistic 
missiles of both sides. We, therefore, 
have accepted the 507c reduction by the 
Soviets. 

At the same time, we're making it 
clear that we have a safei' and more 
stable world. And if we're to have that, 
reductions must be applied to systems 
which ai-e comparable, and especially to 
those which would give either side a 
destabilizing first-strike advantage. 

We not only want to bring nuclear 
arms way dowTi to equal levels in a 
stable way, we also want to decrease 
our mutual reliance for security on these 
extremely destructive offensive arsenals. 
Thus, we're seeking to discuss at the 
same time with the Soviets in Geneva 
how together we can try to help make 
the world a safer place by relying more 
on defenses which threaten no one, 



rather than on these offensive arsenals. 
Each of us is pui-suing research on such 
defenses, and we need to be talking to 
each other about it. 

I have written to both allied leaders 
and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev 
about our new proposals. And I have in- 
formed Mr. Gorbachev how much I am 
looking forward to our meeting later 
this month in Geneva. He and I will 
have a broad agenda at our meeting, 
one that includes human rights, regional 
issues, and contacts between our 
peoples, as well as the Geneva and 
other arms control negotiations. 

If we hope to succeed in our efforts 
to create a safer world and to bring 
about a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship, progress will be needed in 
all of these areas. And this can only be 
accomplished if the Soviet leaders share 
our determination. We're encouraged 
because after a long wait, legitimate 
negotiations are underway. 

Now, we've had a proposal on the 
table in Geneva for quite a while. Now 
the Soviet Union has offered a counter- 
proposal, and we, in turn, have a new 
proposal now reflecting some of the 
elements of both of the others. And this 
is what negotiation is all about. 

I can't give you any more details 
about our new arms control proposals 
because we have to let the negotiators 
work this out behind closed doors in 
Geneva. But I want to leave you with 
the four key objectives our American 
negotiators are seeking: deep cuts, no 
first-strike advantages, defensive 
research— because defense is much safer 
than offense— and no cheating. 



'Broadcast from Camp David, Md. (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Nov. 11, 1985). ■ 



uary 1986 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary's Interview 
on "Meet the Press" 

Secretary Shultz ivas mterviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on 
November 2i. 1985. by Marrin Kalb, 
NBC News: John Wallach, Hearst 
Neu'spapers; and Robert Novak, syn- 
dicated colmnnistJ 

Q. Let's start, if you can fill us in, 
with the latest information on this hi- 
jacking. Could you tell us, if you 
know, how many Americans are on 
board? Any Americans been killed as 
yet? What can the United States do 
about it? 

A. The United States is working 
very closely with other governments— 
the Governments of Malta, of Egypt, of 
Greece, of Italy, other governments, to 
deal with this as expeditiously and firm- 
ly as possible. 

Terrorists deserve no quarter. Tei-- 
rorists should have no place to hide. We 
must stamp out this terrorist activity. 
These people are not worth the time of 
day. They're not even people doing 
what they're doing. So we have an 
unambiguous, unequivocal attitude 
toward what's going on. 

Now, as far as precisely what the 
situation is, you've heard your report. 
The number of Americans on that plane 
is not exactly certain so I don't want to 
help the terrorists any by giving a 
number or giving our estimates, but 
they are very much in the minority as 
far as the total passenger list is 
concerned. 

Q. Any Americans been killed so 
far? 

A. It's possible that that is so, but I 
don't want to make a confirming 
statement. 

Q. The capture of the Egypt 
airline plane by the United States in 
the Achille Lauro affair was not ap- 
preciated by President Mubarak. Does 
that make it more difficult for the 
United States now to act in this case? 

A. We are working very closely and 
cooperatively with the Government of 
Egypt on this case. 

Q. On the other hand, there was a 
lot of speculation by members of your 
Administration that the triumph in 
the Achille Lauro case would inhibit 
hijacking. That doesn't seem to be the 
case, does it? 



A. We have another hijacking but 
that doesn't mean we shouldn't be put- 
ting them down firmly, and we'll con- 
tinue to do it. 

This notion that somehow or other if 
you are firm with hijackers and ter- 
rorists, you'll only invoke more ter- 
rorists, i reject that totally. And the 
way to get after these people is to get 
after them with both barrels. 

Q. Do you think that this is any 
threat to the Mubarak government? 
Do you think this has any connections 
in Egyptian politics? 

A. I don't have any idea of who 
these people are and what connections 
they may have. I do know this: Presi- 
dent Mubarak is very— working on this 
very hard, and we're working 
cooperatively with him. 

Q. You said "both barrels." Is 
there a possibility that the United 
States might be involved in the sense 
of using military action to try to end 
this hijacking episode? 

A. I have no comment to make 
whatever on precisely what our strategy 
will be or the strategy of other people 
will be except to say that no one should 
give any quarter, no place to hide for 
these terrorists. 

Q. You said "what our strategy 
will be." This hijacking is already 20 
hours in the making. Is there a 
strategy? 

A. Of course. 

Q. Is it connected with the Egypt 
C-1.30 that's on the runway? 

A. It's none of your business at this 
point. 

Q. During your meetings last 
week, and the President's meetings 
with Soviet leader Gorbachev, Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze, did the ques- 
tion come up of Soviet-American 
cooperation against international 
terrorism? 

A. We've discussed that subject, but 
it was not— didn't play any particular 
part in the Geneva meetings. 

Q. Because in Beirut the Russians 
were also affected by terrorism? 

A. That's right, and we saw some 
impact of that on their attitudes. We 
are also working with them and others 
on a possible UN resolution on this 
subject. 



Q. Because the Russians seemed, 
after the American action in the 
Achille Lauro, to be taking a public 
position quite different toward 
American action against terrorism 
than they had taken in the past. 

A. That's correct, and we'd like to 
encourage that. 

Q. After the summit, after all the 
plaudits for President Reagan, the 
critics of your foreign policy are say- 
ing that the next time, the next sum- 
mit in Washington can't just be 
another get-acquainted session. The 
New York Times editorial page— 

A. First of all, this was not what I 
would call, or the implication of a get- 
acquainted session. This was a session, 
of course, in which these two leaders 
got acquainted with each other. They 
got acquainted in the right way; not 
talking about the weather in Geneva, 
but by talking about the difficult, 
substantive differences there are be- 
tween our countries, and showing that : 
is possible for them to disagree about 
things but also to agree about some 
things. 

Q. Okay. But the New York Timei 
editorial page. Senator [Albert] Gore 
of Tennessee— 

A. Never mind about the New York 
Times editorial page. 

Q. Let me just ask the question, 
sir, if I might. They are saying that 
next time the President must come up- 
in the next summit in Washington- 
must bargain, must deal, must come 
up with an arms control agreement. 
Don't you have terrific pressure for 
the next summit to come up with the 
bacon? 

A. We will have the same 
approach— I'm sure the President will- 
at the next or any subsequent major 
meeting that he had in this one. Name-, 
ly, that if there is an agreement to be ' 
found that is in the interests of the 
United States to make, we're quite 
ready and anxious to make it. And if 
there isn't, no amount of deadlining wil 
cause the President to make one, and 
that's the approach we took this time; 
that's the approach we'll take the next 
time, and some agreements were made 
this time. 

Q. If I may return to this hijack- 
ing just very briefly. The Libyan Am- 
bassador at Malta has been in touch 
with the Egyptian revolutionaries whi 
hijacked this airplane. 

A. They asked him to come aboard, 
and he did. 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Is there evidence of a Libyan 
nnection to this hijacking? 

A. There is a faii-ly large number of 
ssengers— I think on the order of 
out 26— who were transit passengers, 
at is, they came from Libya to 
hens, were held in the transit lounge, 
:1 then boarded the Egyptian airliner 
go to Cairo since there are no direct 
jya-to-Cairo flights. Those are two 
ces of infoi-mation, but I don't have a 
iis of drawing anv conclusion from 
it. 

Q. Would it surprise you if there 
re Libyan involvement. Libyan 
vernment involvement? 

A. I don't want to make any state- 
nt of implications without knowing 
at I'm talking about, and what I 
)w is only what I just told you. 

Q. The State Department a couple 
months ago gave a clean bill of 
ilth to the Athens Airport in terms 
security. Now. this has originated 
the Athens Airport. What does that 
about the State Department's 
ort? Has there been further laxness 
the airport? What's going on there? 
A. A total investigation was made, 
by the State Department but by the 
ncies that work on aii-ports— it falls 
ler the Department of Transporta- 
i; we took part in it. And the of- 
lis, the Greek officials, really paid at- 
tion this time in a way that they 
n't before and brought the Athens 
port security arrangements up to 
it was seen as a good international 
idard. 

Whether there's been any relaxation 
e that time, I can't tell you. 

Q. But it does show that terrorists 
get through these standards that 
set up for international airport— 

A. It shows that the system in 
ens, or perhaps anywhere else, is 
perfect. 

Actually, just take U.S. airports. We 
? picked up in the last 10 years or so 
ething like 35,000 pieces of arma- 
,t through these devices at airpoi-ts, 
that doesn't say that these things 
perfect. We know they're not 
ect. 

9. I wonder if I could get back to 
summit for a minute? I'm con- 
d, and perhaps other people are, 
as to whether the Soviets were in- 
led of the violations that they 
; made on the SALT (strategic 
s limitation talks) II Treaty? It's 
?r been ratified but signed between 

iident Carter and Mr. Brezhnev in 

I? 



Were there violations pointed out 
to them in Geneva? 

A. The problem of violations and 
compliance with treaties was brought 
out by the President very strongly and 
firmly in his direct discussions wdth Mr. 
Gorbachev, including at the plenary ses- 
sion where I observed them myself 

Q. There was a report that we had 
agreed in advance and informed the 
Soviets in advance that we were going 
to continue observing the' unratified 
treaty even though they violated it. Is 
that true or false? 

A. The report is totally false. What 
has been said publicly and privately by 
the President, by me, and by others 
ever since last June, continues to be the 
President's policy. Namely, he has 
decided not to undercut the SALT II 
Treaty and [is] continuing to review that 
decision, watching the pattern of Soviet 
violations, the Geneva negotiations, and 
other aspects of our relationship with 
the Soviet Union. The President has it 
under review; and if he makes a change, 
that will be announced. 

Q. You said a few days ago that 
the Soviets have done some things on 
compliance to stop their cheating, 
their violating. Did Mr. Gorbachev 
give you any indication in Geneva that 
they would step up that effort? 

A^ No. There wasn't that much 
detail on the discussion. There was a 
statement about the general problem, 
and what this does to confidence in 
arms control. 

Q. Do they have to do that now, 
step up those efforts in order for the 
President in December to renew the 
policy of not undercutting the SALT 
II accord? 

A. The President has the question 
under constant review. He's had a 
report just 1 week ago from the 
Defense Department, which will be com- 
mented on by everybody. 

Q. Don't the Soviets have to do 
something next? That's what I'm— 

A. —and he will be observing and 
deciding what he wants to do. 

Q. I just have a followup on this 
SALT II. I understand that the 
nuclear— under the terms of the SALT 
II agreement, the nuclear submarine 
Sam Rayburn was supposed to be cut 
up on November 28. I've heard a 
report that before the summit the 
cutting-up began and the submarine is 
now inoperative. Is that true or false? 

A. I don't know. 



Q. You don't know whether the 
terms have been carried out? 

A. I don't know what is happening 
to that submarine. I don't keep track of 
things like that. 

Q. Wasn't that a very important 
decision, whether that was done? 

A. It was an important decision to 
do it; and once the President decides 
that it will be done and gives that order 
to the military authorities— 

Q. Did he make the decision? 

A. —I assume it'll be done. 

Q. Has he made that decision? 

A. He made a decision last June, 
which was announced, about— I think it 
was in .June— about that submaiine. And 
once he announces it, as far as I'm con- 
cerned that's the end of it, and other 
people carry it out and I assume they 
will. 

Q. You are always fond of quoting 
Albert Einstein who said that "With 
the dawn of the atomic age. 
everything has changed except the 
way man thinks." 

Do you feel that President Reagan, 
now that he has met the personifica- 
tion of what he used to call "the evil 
empire." do you think that his own 
thinking has in any way been 
changed? 

A. His thinking about the nature 
and the differences between the two 
societies— the Soviet society and ours— is 
as it was, as it must be. The President 
speaks about realism and about the 
necessity for realism as we approach our 
relations with the Soviet Union, and it 
has been unchanged. 

At the same time, the President has 
had a chance to meet directly with the 
new Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, and 
his associates, and have an intense 
discussion with them. And he's done 
that because he thinks that with all of 
our differences and all of our difficulties, 
nevertheless, here we are two countries 
that either one of which could blow up 
the world, and we just have to see if we 
can't put together a more stable and 
constructive relationship and that's what 
he's trying to do. 

Q. Talk to us about Afghanistan 
for a moment. Did you find at the 
summit that there was any possible 
give on the Soviet position in the 
sense of them being willing to agree 
to some kind of timetable for their 
withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan 
in exchange for setting up a neutralist 
government, or the ending of 
American aid to the rebels? 



jary 1986 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



A. The President put forward our 
concerns about Soviet behavior in 
various regions of the world and the in- 
stabilities caused by them, and 
Afghanistan is certainly a leading exam- 
ple. 

The President, as he addressed the 
subject of ai-ms control, I remember, 
said that "Nations arm because they 
distrust each other," not the other way 
around. Therefore, we need to be sure 
that we address the reasons why this 
distrust takes place, and aggressive 
behavior in various regions of the world 
is one of the leading causes. And Mr. 
Gorbachev responded, and I think, in 
fact, agi-ees that these kinds of conflicts 
lie underneath as an important problem. 

And so in his responses he talked 
about Afghanistan, at least to my ear, 
and we'll have to study the transcripts 
carefully and see how we can follow up. 
I thought he had some interesting and a 
little bit different kinds of things to say. 

Q. How interesting? What was in- 
teresting about it? 

A. I don't want to go into it in 
detail. I'd like to study it carefully. But 
the principal thing, of course, is address- 
ing directly the problem of Soviet troops 
in Afghanistan and their withdrawal. 
That's the key. 

Q. So the idea that a timetable 
may be implicit in whatever shift 
there may be in the Soviet position— 
the acceptance of a timetable? 

A. We'll have to see what will take 
place. There will be a continuation of 
the U.N. -sponsored Afghanistan negotia- 
tions in Geneva, I think in December, 
and we'll want to see what we can do to 
support success in those negotiations. 

Q. Was there any indication that 
at those talks the Soviets might be 
willing to provide for the first time 
some kind of schedule for 
withdrawals? 

A. I thought there was some indica- 
tion of it, but we'll just have to see. The 
principal thing is that Mr. Gorbachev 
and President Reagan both talked about 
the importance of political solutions to 
these problems. 

Q. Twice since the summit. Presi- 
dent Reagan has talked about our 
commitment, the U.S. commitment to 
supporting freedom fighters around 
the world. Is it now the U.S. policy to 
give support to Jonas Savimbi in 
Angola? 

A. This is a subject that's been 
discussed a great deal, and what I can 
say is this: First of all, we support the 
freedom fighting of Jonas Savimbi and 
UNITA. 



Second, we want to support their ef- 
forts in a way that's effective. 

Third, as in other areas, we believe 
that if there can be a political solution, a 
negotiated solution to the problems of 
Angola as well as the problem of 
Namibia, linked as it is to the dif- 
ficulties in southern Africa generally 
and in South Africa, that's the way to 
go, and we're trying to do that. 

Q. Would you still take the posi- 
tion that you made in your letter to 
Minority Leader [Robert] Michel in 
the House of Representatives that the 
Congress should not vote funds for 
Mr. Savimbi because it might under- 
cut those negotiations? 

A. That's not the basis for my posi- 
tion, that the Congi-ess should not vote 
for open aid to Savimbi. And I can tell 
you that among those who have thought 
carefully about this problem and are 
very knowledgeable, I don't know of 
anybody who disagrees with that. 

Q. What about— just to finish that 
up, will you then oppose the Claude 
Pepper— Congressman Claude Pepper, 
Florida, legislation to that end? 
Would the Administration ask Con- 
gress not to pass it? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What is Mr. Gorbachev suppos- 
ed to think if within 2 or 3 days after 
the summit, the proclamation of new 
understandings of each other, the 
President of the United States says 
outright that he is prepared to give 
money for what amounts to the over- 
throw of an established government in 
Angola, and that government is sup- 
ported by the Russians? 

A. He is supposed to think that the 
United States will support people who 
fight for freedom, and we will try to 
figure out how to support them in a 
way that will be effective and I hope he 
has that message, and I'm sure he does. 



Q. If the Soviets do something to 
move toward withdrawal in 
Afghanistan, would that help shape 
American attitudes toward Soviet par 
ticipation in other parts of the world, 
particularly the Middle East? 

A. I think a constructive pattern in 
these regional areas would be a great 
contribution to stability throughout the 
world. Everybody would welcome it. 

Now, as far as the Middle East is 
concerned, to have a ticket of admissioi 
at least a country ought to have 
diplomatic relationships with Israel; at 
least it ought to address the way it 
treats Jews within its own country; at 
least it ought to take a look at the pro! 
lem of people who want to emigi-ate 
from the Soviet Union, so these are 
some of the things. 

Q. On that subject, the President 
said a couple of days ago he did not 
raise individual cases with Secretary 
Gorbachev, just types of cases. What 
does that mean? 

A. The President had a lengthy an( 
intense discussion of what we think of 
as the human rights question with 
General Secretary Gorbachev, and he 
feels that— once again, the best way to 
be effective is to let people know that 
he is concerned and not to go further i: 
to it. 

Q. Can we then expect a continua 
tion of the mode of detente of several 
years ago where we do not— the Unit* 
States Government does not publicly 
criticize the Soviet Union for human 
rights violations? 

A. We have been very clear, and I 
have— if you read the speech I gave in 
Helsinki last July, you'll see it spelled I 
out in great detail. Now, our concern 
about human rights is fundamental. Tb 
nature of our societies differ greatly ar 
this is the essence of the difference. 



iPress release 269 of Nov. 24, 1985. 



Secretary's Interview 

on "This \Neek With David Brinl<ley 



J 5 



Secretary Shultz was interviexved on 
ABC-TV's "This Week With David 
Brinkley" on November 17, 1985, by 
David Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, 
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC 
News analysts 

Q. Mr. Reagan will meet Mr. Gor- 
bachev during the coming days. You 



have already met him. You've alread, 
spent some hours with him, talking 
and, I gather, doing a little arguing. 
Tell us about it. will you— about him 
and about your meeting, what you 
think of him? 

A. Our meeting was a strong convf 
sation, and I thought he was very dire 



npnartment of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



bout what he wanted to say, and so 
'as I. It went on a long time. There 
■ere— the kind of conversation where 
ou interrupt bacl< and forth, and I 
lought it was a worthwhile exchange. I 
as glad to have had it. 

Q. Did anything he said surprise 
au? 

A. Not really, although it's always 
irprising, I suppose, to hear your coun- 
■y described in a way that you don't 
link conforms to the reality. 

Q. On the subject of SALT 
trategic arms limitation talks] II, on 
me 10 the President said we would 
>ntinue the no-undercut policy, but 
e're looking for improved compliance 
om the Soviet Union. That's 5 
onths ago now, plus some. Has there 
?en any improved compliance? 

A. There have been some things 
ke place by way of Soviet activities, 
owever, the President's position re- 
ains e.xactly as it was then. His policy 
that he will maintain interim resti-aint 
ider the SALT II agreement, observ- 
j Soviet behavior, including what 
ogress there may or may not be in 
e negotiations on arms control. 

Q. But since June 10, the Federal 
jvernment has made a pronounced 
itement about the deployment of 
obile missiles. That would seem to 
iply that their compliance is worse 
w than it was in June. 

A. The deployment of a second 
ssile is a violation of SALT II, in our 
inion, and I think it's a pretty open- 
d-shut case myself. It's not a modeni- 
.tion of an existing missile. 

Q. But you'll have a— 

A. There isn't a prohibition on 
ibile missiles, although we think that 
ibile missiles should be prohibited 
:ause they give you a very tough 
rification problem, particularly if they 
1 roam around throughout the vast 
rions of the Soviet Union. 

Q. Are you looking for some 
;isfaction here in Geneva on com- 
ance, such as on the SS-25? 

A. It's certainly going to come up. 
e subject of compliance and verifica- 
n will be one of the things the Presi- 
it will want to talk about. 

Q. And what if he says, 
onsense, it's not a violation." You 
' it's clear-cut. Then what? Do you 
•n around to the President and say 
> time to abandon the no-undercut 
icy? 



A. The President will have an ex- 
change here. He is observing. He got a 
report from the Secretary of Defense. It 
will be discussed. And after the Presi- 
dent takes into consideration all of the 
things that come to him, he'll make up 
his mind. 

Q. Secretary Weinberger's letter to 
the President, as we all know now— it 
was leaked to the press— urged the 
President to hang tough, not make a 
deal here in Geneva on extending the 
provisions of SALT II. 

One, are you saying he won't 
make such a deal here? And, two, 
you've just heard a Soviet official say 
that he thought you were offended 
that that letter was leaked. It was not 
helpful. Is that correct? 

A. I have no sense of offense. I 
think so much leaks in Washington 
these days that what does offend me is 
the lack of discipline in the government 
in that so much and many damaging 
things do leak, and this is just a 
relatively minor example. 

Q. All right. Now, are you then 
ruling out the possibility that if Mr. 
Gorbachev says, "Let's make a deal 
and extend SALT II," Mr. Reagan 
won't say, "All right." 

A. The Pi-esident will decide what 
he's going to decide, and I'm not going 
to try to prejudge what he will do. 

Q. If I may just be clear on this, 
then you are not foreclosing the 
possibility that we could come out of 
this Geneva summit with both sides 
having agreed to extend for another 
year, at the end of this year, the pro- 
visions of SALT II? 

A. I'm not foreclosing it, but I think 
it is not very likely. At any rate, the 
President's position I described, and 
when he decides to change it, one way 
or another, you'll know about it. 

Q. Let me ask another question 
about the possibility of guidelines to 
help the arms negotiators in the com- 
ing round. 

A. Right. 

Q. You said the other day it was 
possible, but not probable. Have you 
raised that estimate a little bit now? 

A. Not particularly. I don't have any 
information I didn't have the other day, 
but there are some things that their 
proposals and our proposals have at 
least in a rough way in common. And it 
may be possible that something can be 
drawn up that's useful; but, as I said 
before, it's possible but not probable. 



Q. One of the many leaks in 
Washington recently is that some peo- 
ple in the government want the United 
States to make a pledge that in the 
next 5 years it will not exercise its op- 
tion to give a 1-year notice for 
withdrawal from the ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missile] Treaty. Is that part 
of your agenda? 

A. I haven't heard that particular— I 
haven't run across that particulai- leak, 
but then there are so many I can't keep 
up with them. [Laughter] 

Q. Could we ask which Gorbachev 
is the one that you think is control- 
ling on basic research on SDI 
[Strategic Defense Initiative]? We've 
just heard a top Soviet scientist say 
that the policy is as described in the 
Time magazine interview, and there 
Mr. Gorbachev seemed to say research 
is all right. 

But it was my understanding that 
he told you directly in Moscow that 
research was not all right. How do 
you see it? 

A. He basically expresses himself 
against strategic defense, and in our 
conversation in Moscow we didn't try to 
define in a very precise way what that 
might mean. 

The fact of the matter is that the 
Soviet Union is doing a great deal of 
research on this subject, and it isn't all 
just what somebody might write dowTi 
on a blackboard, because you can see 
large buildings and you can notice that 
lots of people are working there, and 
things like that. So it isn't just purely 
laboratory. 

Q. Do you sense that perhaps at 
this summit, if Gorbachev gives a lit- 
tle and the President is able to accom- 
modate a little bit, you might be able 
to remove this obstacle of SDI from 
an ability to go forward in arms 
reduction? 

A. The President is determined to 
find the answer to the question, "Is it 
possible to construct a shield that will 
protect us in some measure against 
ballistic missiles?" And we have a pro- 
gram that's designed and in operation, 
and, so far as I can tell, we believe that 
program will give us an answer to that 
question. And there is no way the Presi- 
dent can be persuaded not to continue 
seeking that answer. 

And I might say further, there is no 
one in the group of people that are ad- 
vising the President who believes that 
he should do anything except continue 
to find that answer. 



uary 1986 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Let me fix upon three words: 
"In some measure." You said it's 
possible to have a successful SDI "in 
some measure." Most people, I think, 
would concede already that there's 
some form of strategic defense for 
knocking down some incoming 
missiles or warheads, so you have the 
answer already, don't you? 

A. It depends. I think some judge it 
by whether or not an impenetrable 
shield can be constructed. That's a way- 
out test. 

Q. But you were suggesting that in 
some measure— 

A. I qualified that deliberately, 
because I think that if, with a layered 
defense, with each layer only very 
moderately successful— that is, say only 
20% succe'ssful-by the time you go 
through four layers, you take out 
enough incoming missiles to make a 
large difference about cutting down 
your opponent's first-strike capabiUty, 
and that is very worthwhile. 

Q. Almost every point of discus- 
sion between us and the Soviet Union 
in our preliminary meetings, including 
yours in Moscow, has been resisted. 
So tell me what— 

A. Has been what? 

Q. Has been resisted. Everyone's 
position has been pretty much frozen. 

A. That's not the case at all. 

Q. That's what has seemed to us. 
Who has thawed? 

A. There has been discussion of a lot 
of things that probably you would 
classify of a lesser nature, but which 
have had a lot of back and forth, give 
and take, and considerable progress 
made. And it may be that the discus- 
sions will be completed by the time our 
leaders meet. 

Q. Those are discussions we 
haven't heard about yet, so we look 
forward to them. In the meantime, I 
wanted to ask you, what do you think 
might reasonably be expected to hap- 
pen here that would justify calling it a 
successful summit? 

A. These two men are going to 
meet, and I think to a certain extent it's 
going to be a vei-y personal thing, 
although they're certainly going to be 
supported by plenty of advisers on both 
sides. And if out of this meeting can 
come a clearer understanding of what is 
troubling each side, with some way 
showTi where we might make a little 
progress on some of the most difficult 
issues— personally I think those are, 



from our standpoint, the Soviet aggres- 
sion in many parts of the world, and I 
think the problems that human beings in 
the Soviet Union have, the lack of abili- 
ty to emigrate, and so on— those are the 
deepest and most difficult issues that 
show the differences between our 
societies, but we'll want to talk about 
them. Of course, the problems of gi-ow- 
ing armaments, huge nuclear ai-senals 
that we both have, are big problems; 
and the President would like to see 
some way of getting them dowTi and 
getting them under control, and I think 
we all would. And if progress can be 
made on that in any manner, I think it 
will be a success. 

Q. On one point: You mentioned 
their aggression. This is a rumor, as 
far as I know. Have you heard that 
they are looking around for some con- 
venient way to get out of Afghanistan? 

A. I read that all the time— 

Q. So do I. 

A. —that the Soviets say that, and I 
try to probe into it whenever I have the 
opportunity, and I've had quite a few 
opportunities in the last 4 or 5 months, 
and I don't get any sense that it's 
there. But we're certainly prepared to 
try to be helpful on that, and there are 
negotiations going on, conducted by the 
United Nations, and we'd like nothing 
better than to see them succeed. 

Q. What do you make of this news 
conference they held here in Geneva 
yesterday, in which Soviet officials 
said that their losses had been mount- 
ing and they really wanted to try to 
find some way to negotiate a settle- 
ment there? Was that just propaganda 
to try to make them look more peace- 
loving than they are? 

A. I think that if they want some 
way, it's easy to find it. There has been 
negotiation in Geneva under the 
auspices of the United Nations, and 
some things have been worked out. The 
big thing that has not been worked out 
is really to come to grips with Soviet 
troop withdrawal. 

Until you have a commitment for 
Soviet troop withdrawal over a relative- 
ly short span of time, none of the other 
things necessary for a settlement can 
come into effect. 

Q. Maybe you don't put much 
stock in what they said yesterday? 

A. I didn't say that. I think if 
they're looking for a means, the means 
is there. And insofar as the attitude of 
the United States is concerned, if there 
are some aspects of this that we can 
contribute to, we'll be glad to do it. 



The President set out a kind of pro- 
gram or process in his speech to the 
United Nations that the Afghanistan 
situation could fit into as well as others. 

Q. About 6 weeks ago on this 
show. Bud McFarlane said human 
rights would be the lead item on the 
agenda at the summit for the United 
States. 

I'd like to ask you about the 
mechanics of how this gets raised. Th( 
United States' position is that the 
Soviet Union is comprehensibly 
violating its obligations under the 
Helsinki agreement. But it seems thati 
to comply with those terms of the 
agreement, it would have to dismantle 
its entire domestic structure of 
repression. 

You go into a meeting, and you 
say, "Why don't you cut this out?" 
And they say, "It's none of your 
business. It's an internal affair, and 
we're complying with the obliga- 
tions." What's the next question? 
How do you continue a discussion? 
A. Actually, there has been some 
shift— at least it seems to me, in 
responses on this question over the 
period of time that I've been discussing 
it with Soviet officials— from a posture 
of, "This is not anything we're wilhng 
to discuss," to a posture of saying, 
"There's certain categories of cases tha 
are legitimate, and we're willing to 
discuss them, and we're willing to do 
something about them if our security 
problems are not violated." 

There are others they're not willing 
to discuss, and now there is the added 
element of accusations about oui- humar 
rights problems. 

Now, if what comes out of it is sort 
of a joint investigation about human 
rights problems, we'll welcome that. Bu 
what the President, I'm sure, intends t( 
do is to try to talk in a w-ay to Mr. Gor 
bachev that will lead him to understand 
why it is that we're so concerned about 
this problem. 

Q. One of the possible agreements 
that's talked about is one in which th 
two sides agree to work against the 
spread of chemical weapons. Since th 
Soviet Union is using chemical 
weapons, according to the U.S. posi- 
tion, wouldn't that be the thing to go 
after, not some rather innocuous 
measure on the spread? 

A. I think there are many things 
that should be gone after. We have 
tabled a comprehensive chemical 
weapons ban on production and use, in 
Geneva, and we think that ought to be 



rionartmont nf RtatP Rlllle' 



THE SECRETARY 



irsued. Obviously, use of chemical 
eapons is deplorable. It's also true 
;at chemical weapons are spreading, 
id I think the proliferation of them 
presents one of the biggest problems 
e face, and I think they see that, too. 

Q. Will there be a joint communi- 
le at the end of the summit? 

A. It remains to be seen what will 
■ the way of repoiling the meeting. 

Q. How do you have a joint com- 
unique with both sides talking, for 
ample, about terrorism, which we 
y they fund and finance and 
ganize, and both sides talking about 
emical warfare, which we say 
ey're committing, how do you have 
joint statement on these subjects 
thout us sort of papering over dif- 
-ences and relinquishing principles? 

A. You'll have to wait and see how 
3 meeting is reported, and I don't 



think Ronald Reagan is likely to paper 
ovei- |)rinciples. 

Q. We understand that earlier to- 
day .vou met with the U.S. Am- 
bassador to Lebanon, Reginald Bar- 
tholomew. Did he give you any prog- 
ress report that was hopeful concern- 
ing Terry Waite's mission there or the 
possible release of our hostages there? 

A. He told me that there seems to 
be more pressure on the situation right 
now, and we will, of course, work with 
it to the best of our ability because we 
want to get those people back, and it's 
long overdue. And I asked Reg to come 
up and talk a Kttle bit, because we had 
a sense of some motion, and I just 
wanted to talk to him firsthand. 



'Broadcast via satellite from Geneva, 
Switzerland. Press i-elease 263 of Nov. 18 
1985. ■ 



ews Conference of November 14 



Secretary Shultz held a neivs con- 
ence at the Old Executive Office 
ilding on November H, 1985.^ 

What do you think is going to 
ne out of the summit? Will there be 
\ kind of strong agreements, any 
eements at all? 

A. Pretty soon we won't have to 
■culate any more, so that v\ill be a 
lef for everyone. 

Q. Is that your answer? 

A. But I think that— well, there will 
some things of a significant but not 
jor sort that will be agi'eed on. We 
iw that. On the other hand, the main 
nt of the meeting is to have a good, 
rough exchange between the heads 
hese two gi-eat countries, and that 
take place. And we can hope, 
haps even expect, that it will be a 
tful exchange and worthy of 
tinuance. 

Q. Can we hope, perhaps even ex- 
t, that there will be some guidance 
arms control? That there will be a 
le more out of this than you've led 
to believe so far? 

A. Whether on arms control you're 
■rring to the space defense talks— 
*e are lots of other arms control 
is where progress and movement 
ard agreement varies from one to 
other— but on the nuclear and space 



talks, there now has been a U.S. pro- 
posal, a Soviet countei-proposal, a U.S. 
counter-counterproposal, and some in- 
teresting numbers have emerged from 
that. And if there can be some impulse 
to the negotiators out of this meeting, 
that will be all to the good. But I think 
we have to wait and see, and there isn't 
any way of predicting that at this point. 
Or, in other words, there has been 
nothing negotiated out that would sug- 
gest that we're somewhere near that 
point. 

Q. What does it depend on? 

A. I suppose it depends on whether 
or not the Soviet Union will see the 
light and see the reasonableness of our 
positions. 

Q. The Soviets have been in 
Geneva all week briefing foreign 
press. They have been holding news 
conferences, going on television, the 
Ambassador's speaking later today. 

What effect do you think all of 
this Soviet publicity had on expecta- 
tions of the summit and on the U.S. 
bargaining positions? 

A. You're a better judge of the 
pubUcity side than I am. From our 
standpoint, we're very serious about 
this meeting and about the other things 
that we're talking about in various other 
fora with the Soviet Union. We're trj'- 
ing to approach them all in a construc- 
tive way. We try to make our proposals 



at the place which is designated for 
them, and, on the whole, I think that's 
generally appreciated. 

Q. Do you think it puts us in any 
way on the defensive in the case of 
world opinion, or a little bit on the 
defensive? 

A. I don't feel particularly defensive, 
no. We have stated our positions. We 
are available to the press. But we don't 
have to go running all over the place 
buttonholing the place. So there's 
nothing wrong with that, and if they 
want to make themselves available, I 
think that's fine. 

Actually, I think that the notion that 
there is public opinion out there, in- 
cluding American public opinion, per- 
haps especially American opinion, is a 
good perception. It has always seemed 
to me that when you have to appeal to 
the common sense of the American peo- 
ple, it's a good thing for you. So if the 
Soviet Union starts to feel that way, 
that's good. 

Q. In line with that answer, do 
you see any value, then, perhaps in a 
joint appearance or joint press con- 
ference of the kind that General 
Secretary Gorbachev had with the 
French President in Geneva? 

A. There will need to be worked 
out— and we're in the process of doing 
it— a way of reporting the results of the 
meeting, and just exactly how that will 
emerge remains to be seen. Obviously, 
you report to people in each country, 
and you report to people all around the 
world who are interested, and you do it 
through the press to a very considerable 
extent, and so we're trying to figure out 
what the best way is. But I don't think 
it's necessarily the best way to have 
two heads of state standing in front of I 
don't know how many thousand 
reporters fielding whatever question 
comes along. But, at any rate, that sub- 
ject is under review by the two sides. 

Q. You wouldn't discount the 
possibility of some kind of limited or 
controlled joint appearance before 
some group of press? You wouldn't 
rule that out at this point? 

A. I don't like words like "con- 
trolled," and that's your word, not my 
word. 

Q. Whatever. 

A. But, at any rate, there will be a 
way of reporting the results of the 
meeting. No doubt many ways. As you 
know, among other things, the Presi- 
dent intends to go to Brussels and give 
a report to our allies. Our allies in 
Europe and in the Pacific region, Japan, 



uary 1986 



THE SECRETARY 



are very important to us. Their con- 
tribution to the strength of our ideals 
and posture is very great, so we'll be 
reporting to them. And then the Presi- 
dent, of course, will report to the 
American people and the Congi-ess. 

Q. What are the prospects now for 
some kind of guidelines on arms con- 
trol being reached at the summit? 
We've had some hopeful signs from 
Paul Nitze, some not so hopeful signs 
from others. I'm wondering what you 
can tell us at this point. 

A. It's possible, but not probable. 
And if you were in a statistical frame of 
mind, or if Jimmy the Greek were here, 
and we were talking with Jimmy the 
Greek, I suppose maybe the prob- 
abihties would be somewhere between 
.2 and .4. 

Q. Apart from your hopes or 
anybody else's hopes, what do you 
think in a hardheaded way Gorbachev 
really wants to get out of this 
meeting? Another official of this Ad- 
ministration suggested it was to get a 
unilateral advantage for Soviet in- 
terests abroad. What do you think? 

A. You have to ask Mr. Gorbachev 
what he wants to get out of the 
meeting. I think you can absolutely 
assume that he will pursue Soviet in- 
terests, and you can also assume that 
Ronald Reagan will pursue U.S. and 
alliance interests. And our objective is 
to see if there are places where the in- 
tersection of that pursuit of these in- 
terests comes together enough so that 
either some things can be agreed on 
that seem to be in mutual interests, or 
an atmosphere or some sort of thrust 
toward doing that in some other fora 
can be created there. That's the name of 
the game. 

Q. But you must have some assess- 
ment as to whether Gorbachev genu- 
inely wants to see if there aren't these 
areas where the mutual interests can 
prevail, or whether in fact he simply 
wants to come to Geneva to push 
unilaterally the Soviet interests and 
go away with some sort of hardnosed 
propaganda stand. 

A. The game seems to be played on 
a propaganda level and on a substantive 
level, and there's an interplay between 
these things. And to the extent you 
remove a word like "propaganda" from 
the lingo and just talk about it in terms 
of appealing to the common sense of 
people in respective countries, it's good. 

Now, I can't— I'm no authority on 
the way in which Mr. Gorbachev is ap- 
proaching the meeting. I talked with 



him at some length and found him a 
very vigorous interlocutor. We had what 
I considered to be a worthwhile ex- 
change, and there was no holding back 
on either side. 

And I think that kind of exchange is 
positive. That's the way you find out 
what's on somebody else's mind and 
what's important to him. That's the 
name of the game here. 

Q. When you had that session with 
him, he was pretty tough from what 
we were told later, at one point accus- 
ing the United States of carrying the 
war to the heavens, speaking of Star 
Wars, or SDI [Strategic Defense 
Initiative]. 

What happens in Geneva if 
Mr. Gorbachev comes in and makes an 
American concession on SDI the ab- 
solute prerequisite for any kind of 
joint statement or any kind of prog- 
ress coming out of the summit? 

A. I'm not going to speculate on 
what he may or may not do there, but if 
it's a question of good, strong advocacy 
of positions, Ronald Reagan is no slouch 
at that, as everybody has learned. And 
he will put forward U.S. positions and 
allied positions very strongly. There is 
strength of conviction. There is strength 
of purpose. There is inherent capability 
of ourselves and our alliance, and 
there's also reasonableness. So that's 
what Ronald Reagan will project: 
strength and reasonableness, and we'll 
see where we go from there. 

Q. If you have that kind of a 
clash, could the summit not fail? 

A. We will undoubtedly have impor- 
tant differences of opinion. Going into 
this meeting, we know we do, and I 
don't have any doubt whatever that 
when the meeting ends, there will still 
be important differences of opinion. 

The question is whether they will be 
narrowed at all, whether some things 
can emerge that will be on the positive 
side, and whether the differences are 
highlighted in a useful way, and 
whether there's any sense of an agenda 
for the future. Those are the kinds of 
questions, and a lot of it will depend on 
the meeting between these two 
individuals. 

At least as I see it, those of us who 
are scurrying around in the woodwork 
like me and trying to get things 
prepared have worked at it. We've 
worked very hard at it, and the Presi- 
dent's worked very hard at it. It's been 
a good preparatory effort. And my 
observation is that the same can be said 
on the Soviet side, and we've had a lot 
of discussions together. And now all of 



that has been laid in, and we're moving 
to a different stage of this in which the 
two leaders take over, and it's their 
meeting. And we can all— I'll be a spec- 
tator and a little closer than you, and I 
hope it works out. 

Q. As a prelude to the summit, 
there's a report that the Soviets of- 
fered a first slice cut of 200 land-based 
missiles on either side in your meeting 
in Moscow. 

One. is it true; and, two, is this 
acceptable? 

A. The Soviets in their counter- 
proposal last October, whenever it was, 
put out a broad range of things, and on( 
of them did have to do with a small 
reduction of the kind you described. It 
wasn't discussed at all in my meetings 
in Moscow. 

And, of course, we consider all of 
the things that have been proposed. 
There are some obvious problems with 
small, absolute-number reductions. 
When you start from inequitable levels, 
if you go down absolutely, you don't ge1 
to an equitable end point. Furthermore, 
small reductions usually get made from 
systems that are not that meaningful 
anyway. But, at any rate, it was put on 
the table, and I don't think it's any big 
deal. 

Q. When you went to Moscow, it 
seemed that the United States had 
greater expectations than you had 
when you left Moscow. 

A. No. I don't know what it seemed 
but if you say, did I have greater expec 
tations before I went than after, the 
answer is no. 

Q. But in your talk with Mr. Gor- 
bachev, in the Time interview, for in- 
stance, I mean, he seemed to indicate 
that he would accept research. The 
Soviets seemed to go back on that dui 
ing your meeting in Moscow and ques 
tioned it. Why— 

A. There are— you can quote Soviet 
leaders in varying ways on the question 
of research. They have said right along 
that, however you want to define it, 
pure research, obviously, can't be dealt 
with in any kind of agreement. And 
then what" exactly that means one can 
argue about. 

But from our standpoint, we are 
pursuing a research program designed 
to answer the question, "Can you de- 
fend yourself at all adequately against 
ballistic missiles?" That program is go- 
ing forward in a manner consistent witl 
the ABM (Antiballistic Missile] Treaty, 
in fact, consistent with what is generall 



Dfinartment of Stale Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



farded as a relatively narrow inter- 
3tation of that treaty, and we feel 
it it is possible to find the answer one 
.y or another on the basis of that 
)cess. 

So what we're doing is consistent 
;h the obligations that have been 
dertaken, and the President will con- 
ue to pursue that program. 

Q. It has been suggested that you 
d other Administration officials are 
lying an expectations game and pur- 
sely low-balling chances for success 
the summit so that if it is a failure, 
von't seem so, or if you get little 
;cesses, they will seem big suc- 
ses. Are you playing that kind of 
Tie? 

A. No. [Laughter] I tell you, I gave 
ress conference in Moscow after my 
etings, and the wTiteups of the press 
ference were all that somehow it was 
ig downer. So I was surprised. So I 
it to my counselor on these matters, 
-nie Kalb— where is Bernie? There he 
I said, "Bernie, what kind of a story 
lid you have wiitten?" He said, "Oh, 
robably would have written it about 

way the guys said." [Laughter] But 
t was not intentional. [Laughter] 

Q. The guy's had a little help. 

A. Sometime I'll speak prose and 
I't know it. [Laughter] 

Q. Now that you've had a chance 
see Mr. Gorbachev close up and 
ce you've worked many times with 
President, how do you think these 
I men will get on in their talks, 
I do you think that there is a 
sonable chance that in their private 
;ussions. they might be able to 
eh a new understanding or any 
akthrough, where their diplomats 
'ar have failed? 

A. I'm going to be fascinated to 
ch and see what the answer to that 
stion is, and we're not going to have 
vait much longer. But they are both, 
ould say, strong, engaging per- 
ilities. So we'll just see what 
pens. 

Q. In all of this pre-summit activi- 
people on the left seem to be con- 
led that the President is going to 
ndon arms control concerns, while 
pie on the right seem to be con- 
led that he's going to sell out 
lan rights concerns. Is the Presi- 
t going to be equally emphatic on 
9f those areas? 



A. We have said consistently, going 
way back to the beginning of this Ad- 
ministration, and set it out painstaking- 
ly, that our agenda and our concerns are 
broad. We have great concerns about 
Soviet behavior in various regions of the 
world. I think it's worth noting that in 
the United Nations yesterday there was 
a vote about Afghanistan by the widest 
margin ever, so we think that world 
opinion shares the concerns we have 
about Afghanistan, and so on. Regional 
issues— that's a big problem. It must be 
talked about, and it will be, and the 
Soviets are prepared to talk about it. 
The problem of human rights: We 
are deeply concerned about that. We 
must be. It's part of our way of life. It's 
part of our tradition. Emigration— we're 
a nation of immigrants. We've got to 
think that it should be okay for people if 
they want to leave and go some place 
else, to do so. That's what we all did, or 
our forefathers did. The Helsinki ac- 
cords, we believe, give a proper basis 
for discussing these things. 

So these matters will be talked 
about and always will be. Now, there's 
always a question of what's the best 
way to do it. Now, there are a number 
of bilateral questions, and to some ex- 
tent these are a little more readily 
resolved. 

Because they're more readily re- 
solved, you shouldn't get the feeling, or 
we shouldn't get the feeling that they're 
not important, because they can over a 
period of time add up to something that 
can help a little bit in atmospherics and 
maybe help in settling things that are 
broader and deeper and more difficult. 
And then, of course, there are the sub- 
jects of arms control. 

And while, obviously, the nuclear 
and space talks are at the center of at- 
tention and properly so, there are a 
number of other arms control issues 
that we are concerned about, and they 
are, and there are places where we are 
in an official way discussing various 
issues with them, and all of these things 
will come up. 

So the agenda at this meeting will 
be a broad agenda. That doesn't mean 
that there are going to be so many tick 
points to get across on each subject. I 
don't think that's in the nature of a 
heads of state meeting. But, never- 
theless, all of these things will be 
discussed, and none will be dropped off 
the table as far as we're concerned. 

Q. Since you talked about regional 
issues, and since— 

A. Since I talked about what? 



Q. Regional issues. 
A. Yes. 

Q. And since Richard Murphy is 
accompanying you to Geneva, are we 
to expect a major breakthrough re- 
garding the international conference 
on Middle East, especially while Mr. 
Peres is now talking about interna- 
tional context, and so on? 

A. I would be very much surprised 
if there were any breakthrough on an 
international conference in the Middle 
East. However, we will talk about 
regional issues, and certainly the Middle 
East is one of them that both countiies 
have a major intei-est in. 

I would remind you that the Middle 
East is a place that contains many dif- 
ficulties, and one of them involves Iran 
and Iraq. That is a war that deserves 
attention, and that's a war that's been 
very deadly, where chemical weapons 
have been used, where there doesn't 
seem to be any outcome in prospect, 
and which is not in any inherent way a 
product of conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. And I 
would hope that we might be able to 
talk about it constructively, but that 
again remains to be seen. But the 
regional issues will get plenty of 
attention. 

Q. Going back to your bookmaker, 
Jimmy the Greek, would you spell out 
for us, as you did on the arms control 
question, what the odds would be for 
agreement on specific issues such as 
cultural exchange, civil aviation 
agreement. Pacific air safety agree- 
ment, chemical weapons, and so on? 
[Laughter] Would you give the same 
odds? 

Q. Give us the morning line. 
[Laughter] 

A. No. I don't think I want to get 
into the morning line across the board. 
[Laughter] 

Q. What does 3-2-what does .2 
mean? 

A. Didn't you ever study statistics? 

Q. No, I didn't. 

A. Gosh, you're uneducated. 

[Laughter] 

Q. Give us a feeling, please, how 
close you are— 

A. Two chances out of ten— point 2. 

Q. Give us a feeling of how close 
you are on those kinds of bilateral 
issues as opposed to the arms control 
issues that you discussed earlier. 

A. There are some things that I 
think have some real significance, where 
I think we're pretty well there. There 



jary 1986 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



are other things which are being worked 
on very hard, and which may very well 
get agreed to, and so there's a varia- 
tion. So I could give you .95 on some. 
How's that? You got that? [Laughter] 
And others may be— [Laughter] So 
there's a range of probabilities here, but 
there will definitely be some things that 
have been agreed to. 

Q. On SALT [strategic arms 
limitation talks] U, the Soviets are 
reported to be rather interested in 
continuing the no-undercut policy 
after the end of the year when the 
treaty under its terms would have ex- 
pired. President Reagan in June said 
that we would continue under certain 
conditions for a time which wasn't 
specified. 

What is the U.S. position regard- 
ing the extension of SALT IL no- 
undercut policy after December 31st, 
and do you think that it is possible, 
even likely, that the two leaders will 
be able to reach some agreement on 
this subject in Geneva? 

A. The President's position on that 
is e.xactly as he stated it last June. He 
said then that he was going the extra 
mile. We broke up the boat, and he said 
that he would continue, and what he 
would be watching was parallel Soviet 
behavior, on the one hand, and progress 
in negotiations on the other. That was 
his position then, and that's his position 
right now. There hasn't been any 
change in it. 

Q. Does December 31st make any 
difference to the United States? 

A. I just simply said that the Presi- 
dent's position now is exactly what it 
was then. There hasn't been any change 
in it. 

Q. How about the— 

A. That's all I'm going to say on the 
subject. 

Q. But to follow that, if the Presi- 
dent's position was also to study 
behavior of Soviet responses, and— 

A. Yes, I said that. 

Q. —if there is no satisfaction of 
the U.S. complaint about verification 
at the summit, would that then be a 
logical time for the President to 
reconsider and analyze again the pros- 
pects and consider proportional 
responses? 

A. The President's position today is 
the same as it was then, and he's watch- 
ing all these things, and if it changes, 
you'll be the first to know. 

Q. [Inaudible] 



A. And I'm sure that's true. 
[Laughter] And I don't mean you, I 
mean you. [Laughter] 

Q. What is the prospect of a joint 
reaffirmation toward the ABM Treaty, 
and what would make it easy or 
difficult? 

A. As far as we are concerned, we 
are adhering to the ABM Treaty, so we 
don't need to reaffirm it; we are adher- 
ing to it. 

Q. Either in statistical terms or 
otherwise, could you give us your 
estimate of where we are toward an 
agreement for a second summit? 

A. We have agreed with the Soviets 
that one of the things that ought to get 
a little reflection is the agenda for the 
future: Where do we go from mid- 
November— there's life after mid- 
November, and how are we going to get 
there? So the question of both substance 
and the means of talking about 
substance, namely, meetings of one kind 
or another, including heads of state, will 
be, I'm sure, dealt with. And precisely 
what the outcome of the discussion will 
be, I can't tell you at this point. 

Q. Would you assess what impact, 
if any, these recent events will have 
on the talks, the events including the 
sailor who jumped in the Mississippi 
River and Mr. Yurchenko's return to 
the Soviet Union? 

A. As far as the sailor is concerned, 
and for that matter the soldier who 
came into our Embassy in Kabul, the 
Soviet Union in our presence made cer- 
tain undertakings to those two in- 
dividuals, and so I think we're entitled 
to ask, "How are they doing?" 

As far as the defector/redefector is 
concerned, he seems to be singing in 
Moscow as he sang here, and I don't 
think anybody takes seriously these 
things that he's now saying. So I don't 
see that it has any particular effect as 
far as we're concerned. 

Q. If there is less hope now that 
there will be an arms reduction agree- 
ment, does that give the United States 



a greater interest in reaching 
agreements on confidence-building 
measures such as perhaps joint crisis 
centers or joint military command 
centers? 

A. I don't know where the notion 
comes from that there's less hope now. 
Less hope than when? Actually, I think 
what has happened is a quickening of 
the pace of negotiations insofar as the 
nuclear and space talks are concerned. 

Early last January we agreed to 
hold the talks. They got under way in 
the spring. We put a comprehensive set 
of proposals on the table, that sat there 
and got discussed through basically two 
rounds of negotiations. Then the Soviet 
Union came in with a counterproposal, 
and we came very promptly back with 
counter-countei-proposal. And in our 
counter-counterproposal, we picked up 
some of the ideas that were in the 
Soviet countei-proposal. So that's, I 
think, a quickening of the pace, so I 
don't see where you get the "less 
hope." 

There is— I think there is more tak- 
ing place, but insofar as, "Will there bs 
an agreement, when will it be," and so 
on, I think at least my basic rule is yoi 
don't have an agi-eement until you've 
got an agreement, and we're nowhere 
near that point at this stage of the 
game. 

Q. How would you assess the Pen 
tagon report on SALT violations? 
Have you seen it? Do you find it dis- 
quieting, and will it be brought up at 
this summit? 

A. I think the problem of violations 
of agreements is a matter of tremendoi 
moment, and it highlights the impor- 
tance of that subject, and it highlights 
the importance of adequate means for 
verification, and that subject, verifica- 
tion, is very much a part of any discus- 
sions we have on subjects in the field c 
arms control or otherwise. So I think 
the Pentagon report underlines that— 
the importance of that subject and puti 
an exclamation point behind it. 



'Press release 262 of Nov. 15, 1985. 



Pi^rNrtr+m/Mtt r\( Ct^tA RiillOr 



THE SECRETARY 



iecretary's Interview 
n "Face the Nation" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
3S-TV's -Face the Nation" on 
member 10, 1985. by Lesley Stahl and 
n-ence Smith, CBS News.^ 

As we all know, that ship with the 
viet sailor Medvid has now sailed, 
is sailing, out of U.S. waters. Why 
i the Administration not seek to 
estion the sailor one more time, 
ce we knew that he had tried to 
mmit suicide and that there were 
estions about his sincerity in not 
mting to defect? 

A. We went aboard that ship, after 
was mistakenly returned to it, and 
listed that he be taken off the ship, 
it it wasn't sufficient to interview him 
Dard; brought him onto a Coast Guard 
;ter; when he appeared to be sick, 
jught him ashore into a naval facility, 
i after he had had a good long sleep, 
estioned him intensively in the 
jsence of a doctor, with a medical ex- 
lination, a psychiatric examination, 
i repeatedly talked to him about his 
shes. Well, all the people who were 
;re are satisfied that he was perfectly 
control of himself and able to make a 
:ision, which he repeatedly stated, 
it he wished to go back. 

Q. But during this time— 

A. Why did he jump ship? Well, it 
uld look as though he decided 
nehow that he wanted to come to the 
[ited States, and after he was sub- 
ted to whatever he was subjected to 
)ard that ship, he changed his mind. 

Q. Who made— 

A. In the interview in the 
chiatrist's report, which is quite in- 
esting to read, he repeatedly referred 
"Mama and Papa," and he talked 
put life. So I have no basis for being 
)licit about what threats may have 
m suggested to him, but it's clear 
t he had his mother and father on his 
id and, all things considered, decided 
at he wanted to do. And that was 
le vei\v carefully, very intensively 
I properly, and we insisted on doing 

Q. You know there was a pub- 

led report this week that the United 

ites intercepted an instruction from 

Soviet Embassy here in Washing- 



ton to that ship to drug Medvid, which 
certainly would have affected and 
changed his view. Is that true? Can 
you confirm that story? 

A. I can't confirm that story, but I 
can say that when we insisted that he 
come off the ship, he was ill; and that's 
why we didn't just do the interview on 
the Coast Guard cutter. He was brought 
ashore, allowed to sleep, examined by a 
doctor, examined by a psychiatrist, and 
carefully— this was all very cai-efully 
done. 

Q. Did you explain all of this to 
Senator Jesse Helms and the other 
members of the Agriculture Commit- 
tee? And if not, why do you think 
they kept pressing for a second 
interview? 

A. All of this has been explained 
very carefully, and why other people do 
whatever they do, I don't know. But I 
think, from the standpoint of what we 
did in the Department of State, we did 
a very careful job of seeing to it that 
this young man had every opportunity, 
in an environment where it was clear to 
him that if he decided he wanted to stay 
in the United States, he could do so, to 
make that decision. 

Q. Was it the President's decision 
not to intercept the ship and take him 
off for another interview? 

A. It was the consensus of all the 
people working on this— and in the end, 
it's a Justice Department matter what 
to do— but all the people. Departments 
of Transportation, Justice, State, and so 
on, agi-eed that there was no legal basis 
to hold the ship. 

Q. The President himself raised 
the possibility that there might be 
some link or connection between this 
case, the redefection of Mr. Yur- 
chenko, the KGB agent, and even the 
Soviet soldier in Kabul, some sort of 
deliberate "ploy," in his words, as 
pre-summit theatrics. Is that the way 
it seems to you? 

A. I suppose it's possible, but I 
don't think we can say that it is with 
any kind of assurance. 

Q. Do you think he was a plant, or 
do you think that he had a midlife 
crisis, as some people are suggesting, 
and got depressed and— 



A. You mean the spy, now you're 
talking about, not Medvid? 

Q. We're talking about Mr. Yur- 
chenko, who redefected— 

A. Yes, right. 

Q. —and whether he was mishan- 
dled by his debriefers. Which side do 
you come down on? 

A. I think he was a— he is a high 
person in the Soviet KGB, and my opin- 
ion is that he defected and, for some 
reason or another, changed his mind. 

Q. Was the information he gave 
the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] 
golden, or was it, as some people sug- 
gest, "chicken feed?" 

A. I'm not going to comment on 
what he provided for us. 

Q. What about the other side of 
that? What did he learn while he was 
here? Did he learn important things 
about our debriefing techniques or 
any other aspect about the way the 
CIA works that he can now take back 
to Moscow? 

A. Obviously, he knows how he was 
handled because he was there, but he 
was not given any U.S. secrets at all. 

Q. Why do you think the Soviets 
paraded him out and made this such a 
public thing? They very easily could 
have sort of hustled him back to 
Moscow and not made it so public. Do 
you think that they were trying to 
chill the atmosphere before the sum- 
mit, or what's your theory? 

A. Again, it's hard for me to know 
why they do the things they do, but I 
suppose they wanted to dramatize his 
redefection, since it has been di-amatized 
that he had defected. Of course, what he 
said was just a packet of lies. He was 
not kidnapped; he was not drugged or 
any of those things, and I know nobody 
takes it seriously at all. 

Q. We had another rather poignant 
story in the news this week with the 
hostages, the American hostages being 
held in Lebanon— 

A. Yes, that is a— 

Q. —sending a letter to the Presi- 
dent and others describing their situa- 
tion. Let me ask you this very quick- 
ly: If quiet diplomacy, as they say, is 
not working, and if the Administra- 
tion says it can't negotiate on a thing 
like this, what do we do now? Is there 
any middle ground here? 

A. We keep talking to those— trying 
to talk directly or indirectly— to those 
who are holding these innocent 
Americans— 



'luary 1986 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Do you know who they are? 

A. —and to try to have the 
Syrians— we try to work out through 
whatever indirect contacts we have with 
the Iranians; we get after the Lebanese. 
We do everything we can think of, if 
there are others who seem to have a 
possibility of intennediation, such as the 
Algerians. We talk to everybody to try 
to make it clear to those holding 
hostages that they are holding innocent 
people, that they are not going to gain 
their objectives that way; they only 
bring opprobrium on their heads, and 
get them to release these people. 

Q. You came back from Moscow 
this week telling people that Mr. Gor- 
bachev was combative, that he inter- 
rupted you, and now we learn from 
the national security adviser [Robert 
C. McFarlane] that there will not be a 
communique after the summit, be- 
tween Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorba- 
chev. Was the meeting that unproduc- 
tive that you've decided now that 
there will be no statement, no mutual 
communique at the end? 

A. What the national security ad- 
viser said was that it was unlikely. We 
have to report whatever happens at the 
big Geneva meeting. What form that 
will take remains to be seen; it depends 
upon what amount of things are able to 
be put together at that time. 

Q. It's possible that the U.S. 
delegation reports one thing, or one 
way, and the Soviet delegation reports 
another. Wouldn't you say— 

A. It's possible to do it that way. 

Q. You sat and talked to this man 
for some time, Gorbachev, and we're 
all curious about him. What's he like? 
What sort of a person is he? 

A. He's bright. You used the word 
"combative"— that's true. He inter- 
rupted, and I interrupted, and we had a 
good, vigorous, strong conversation. 
Personally— 

Q. Was he like Khrushchev? 

A. I didn't know Khrushchev; I 
didn't ever deal with Khrushchev. I 
dealt with Brezhnev; I dealt with 
Kosygin; I've dealt with Gromyko, 
Patolichev. I've dealt with quite a few 
of the Russian leaders. He is very much 
"on the front burner," smart— actually a 
good, strong, combative conversation. I 
liked it. 

I think you learn something that 
way. It's much better than him reading 
something to me and my reading 
something to him, so it was worthwhile. 



28 



Q. What did you learn? 

A. I learned that his view of the 
United States is very different from 
how I believe the United States is. I 
learned something about his various 
positions on all the subjects. We touched 
upon, in one way or another, practically 
anything you could mention. 

I transmitted to him— and Bud 
McFarlane also was there; did a very 
good job of trying to get him to under- 
stand not simply what our positions are, 
but why our positions are the way they 
are. 

Q. The American public has been, 
in a sense, subjected to a game of 
kind of "great expectations" here in 
recent days with a roller coaster ef- 
fect. One day, they're told to expect a 
framework for agreement, or a state- 
ment of agreed ideas; the next day 
they're told, "No, very little." 

Now, we can understand pre- 
positioning. But you tell us, what is 
the very minimum that we should ex- 
pect out of this summit? 

A. I think that there has been a 
very steady and consistent appraisal of 
this by the Administration. We have 
said from the beginning that we have to 
be realistic about it, that there are 
great differences between our two coun- 
tries, and that it is important, almost 
therefore, to have a strong conversation 
between the President and the General 
Secretary and to have subsidiary con- 
versations, such as the one that I had. 
And we hope that there will come out of 
this a more constructive and stable kind 
of relationship; but it remains to be 
seen. 

Q. Do you have— 

A. It's necessary to work at it. 
There isn't any up-and-down strategy; 
it's a consistent strategy. 

Q. Do you have reason to believe, 
from what you heard this week, for 
example, that we might get an agree- 
ment to have at least annual summits, 
and perhaps even semi-annual 
meetings between you and 
Mr. Shevardnadze? 

A. It's certainly possible. 

Q. It's something you want? 

A. Actually, with Shevardnadze, I've 
met with him in the last 4 or 5 months 
four times, and I think it's been a good 
thing. 

Q. I'd like to ask you about 
something the President said in his in- 
terview with Izvestia, when apparently 



he was imprecise, as officials say, in 
saying that he would give the Soviets 
a veto over his Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative (SDI). 

A. He didn't say that. 

Q. It was sort of— [Laughter] 
A. No- 

Q. As I understand, it was 
corrected. 

A. His Strategic Defense Initiative 
is a research program designed to find 
out whether or not it's possible to de- 
fend ourselves against ballistic missiles. 
The President will never give up on 
that. 

Q. But what about the question of 
deployment? When White House of- 
ficials sought to correct or clarify 
what the President had said, they 
repeated several times that the Presi- 
dent reserves the right to deploy the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. 

Is that a signal that he plans to 
abrogate the ABM [Antiballistic 
Missile] Treaty eventually, that that's 
really what this Administration is 
aiming toward? 

A. He has not only said what I just 
said about his Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative; he has also said that we are anc 
will conduct ourselves in complete ac- 
cord with the ABM Treaty. And insofai 
as what would happen if we find that it 
is possible to defend yourself against 
ballistic missiles, the President has said 
repeatedly that at that time, he's 
prepared to discuss and negotiate about 
it, in accordance with the ABM Treaty, 
not only with the Soviet Union but wit) 
our friends and allies. 

Q. But you don't rule out even- 
tually deploying it, isn't that correct? 
That's not being ruled out in anythini 
you said or anything the White Housi 
has said? 

A. One of the important things 
about this possibility is that if it's possj 
ble to defend ourselves, and we're able 
to put up a shield against ballistic 
missiles, wouldn't you feel a little more 
comfortable than with a strategy that 
depends upon somebody's forbearance 
against wiping you out? So we're not 
going to preclude that possibility. 

Q. Which would mean abrogating 
the ABM Treaty? 

A. No. What it means is that we 
want to talk with the Soviet Union and 
others about why a proper defense 
would not only be in our interest, but i 
their interest, and I think it's true. 



Department of State Bulla oi 



AFRICA 



Q. And if they don't agree, you're 
ort of sigTialing that you would 
eploy it. I mean that is what I keep 
eading in all of this. 

A. We're not going to give up on 
Dmething that we think will improve 
le security and safety of the American 
eople. 

Q. Isn't there a logical com- 
romise here that could be struck 
ight at Geneva in which the United 
tates agrees to proceed with research 
n this, but since there is nothing to 
!st right now anyway— that's what 
ie scientists say on SDI— that they 
ill defer and negotiate later about 
!sting and deployment. Isn't that the 
eart of a possible compromise? 

A. The ABM Treaty has a lot of 
lings in it about this subject, and we 
ill adhere to that treaty. In fact, the 
resident has decided that we can 
iswer the question that he has raised, 
ithin what people are referring to as a 
ilatively narrow interpretation of that 
eaty, and that's where he is. 

Q. Very quickly, because we are 
inning out of time, will the Presi- 
fnt recommit to the SALT II Treaty 

the summit? 

A. What he has said is that 
herence to the SALT II Treaty 
pends upon Soviet behavior and the 
ility to have our negotiations go for- 
ird toward lowering offensive arms 
'els— and that's the test. 



U.S. and Soviet Interests 
in the Horn of Africa 



iPress release 261 of Nov. 12, 198.5. 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council on November IS, 1985. Mr. 
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. 

I want to speak to you this evening 
about the Horn of Africa because it 
demonstrates some of the basic prin- 
ciples of American diplomacy in the 
Third World and the shai-p contrast of 
those principles with those of the Soviet 
Union. The Horn is especially relevant 
for such discussion. It is a region of 
great strategic importance and, there- 
fore, inevitably an area of world power 
involvement. It is also a region with 
deep and longstanding internal conflicts 
and fundamental economic and humani- 
tarian challenges. 

Thus, it is a perfect example of the 
situation about which President Reagan 
spoke in his recent address before the 
United Nations. It is an area in which 
the Soviet Union could, but does not, 
play a role in helping solve regional con- 
flicts or in promoting regional peace. 

The Horn of Africa is the northeast 
corner of Africa, composed of the na- 
tions of Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and parts of Kenya. It has con- 
siderable strategic importance for the 
United States as it is relevant to both 
the security of the Middle East and to 
Africa. Physically, it is a key crossroads 
of air and sea routes. The Horn guards 
access to the Red Sea. It protects the 
southwest approaches of Arabia and sits 
astride the waters of the Nile on the 
southern flank of Egypt. 

American interests in this area in- 
clude safeguarding shipping lanes, par- 
ticularly for oil tankers which fuel the 
economy of Western Europe. We seek 
access to airfields and harbors for our 
military forces should they, in times of 
crisis, be required to defend against 
Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf 
or the Indian Ocean or which challenges 
our friends in the region. We strive to 
halt Libyan adventurism and teiTrorism, 
which poses a threat to every peace- 
loving countiy in the region. We seek to 
avoid the isolation of Egj-pt. We work 
to prevent radical pressures on Saudi 
Arabia and efforts to destabilize Sudan 
and Somalia. 



The United States, for many years, 
has followed a consistent policy of pro- 
moting regional security, economic 
growth, and internal stability. These 
objectives are fully compatible with 
those of the peoples of the region. 

By contrast, I can say, without exag- 
geration, that the Soviets, their Cuban 
allies, and their Libyan associates have 
systematically exploited internal divi- 
sions, civil strife, and historical cleav- 
ages to promote discord and dissension. 
The Soviet Union has not used its good 
offices or influence to promote a peace- 
ful resolution of either internal or cross- 
border violence. Its major source of 
extending its influence and promoting 
its own interests has been through the 
e.xport of weapons. At the same time, 
the Soviets ignore the massive economic 
needs of the people. Indeed, the Soviets 
stood by almost mute as their owii 
client state, Ethiopia, wTestled with one 
of the greatest human tragedies of our 
time— the devastating drought of this 
past year, which all of us in America 
witnessed on our television screens and 
to which we responded with our hearts 
and our pocketbooks. 

Soviet Regional Objectives 

The Soviets have important objectives 
in this region, and we must be clear 
about what they are. For them, the nar- 
row Straits of Bab el Mandeb at the 
mouth of the Red Sea are a potential 
chokepoint against Western Europe. Via 
the Horn, the Soviet Union seeks a 
foothold in Africa whence it can destabi- 
lize governments across the continent. 
The Soviets know that true nonalign- 
ment and economic and political growth 
will foreclose Soviet opportunities to 
remake the world in a Stalinist image. 

These are not loose charges. The 
record is very clear. In pursuit of these 
objectives, the Soviet Union has devel- 
oped a militarized diplomacy of tactical 
alliances; it has supported terrorism and 
dissidence against established govern- 
ments and encouraged ethnic violence. 

An alliance formed with Sudan in 
1969 had faded away by 1976 following 
several Soviet-inspired coup attempts 
against the verj- Sudanese Government 
the Soviets professed to support. 

The Soviets also established a strong 
military relationship with Somalia in the 
early 1970s and sought to exploit the 



nuary 1986 



29 



AFRICA 



deep-seated tensions between Somalia 
and Ethiopia. They provided Somalia 
$435 million of arms— enough to convert 
this desperately poor land into an offen- 
sive threat to its neighbors. However, 
when Somalia and Ethiopia became 
engaged in a major war in the Ogaden 
region in 1977, the Soviets switched 
sides to e.xploit the superior strategic 
position of Ethiopia and the needs and 
personal orientation of Ethiopia's dicta- 
tor, Mengistu Haile Mariam. Quickly, 
the Soviet Union began massive ship- 
ments of arms to its new client— ship- 
ments whose value has now exceeded $3 
billion. It is symbolic of Soviet goals and 
Soviet means in its African policy that 
this war between Somalia and Ethiopia, 
which served to deepen the antagonisms 
between these neighbors, was fought 
with Soviet weapons on both sides. 
Furthermore, 2,500 of the 25,000 Cuban 
troops which fought in that war remain 
posted in Ethiopia's Ogaden frontier 
areas as a continuing tangible reminder 
of Soviet-Cuban adventurism— seeking 
unilateral advantages in the Third 
World— and of Ethiopian Government 
dependence on communist forces. 

The Soviet Union has also estab- 
lished military bases in the Honi and 
adjacent areas. They first established 
bases at Berbera in Somalia but, after 
switching sides to Ethiopia, built an 
extensive facility in the Dahlak Islands 
in the Red Sea. Additionally, the 
Soviets are well-ensconced on the south- 
ern tip of the Arabian Peninsula at 
Aden and on the Yemeni island of 
Socotra in the Gulf of Aden. There are 
no American counterparts in this area to 
these extensive and exclusive Soviet 
military bases. Furthermore, we seek 
none. 



U.S. Commitment to 
Fundamental Principles 

We are, thus, talking about a region of 
unquestioned strategic importance and 
one where both superpowers are en- 
gaged. How the superpowers pursue 
their interests spells the difference 
between war and peace, between devel- 
opment and decay, for the peoples of 
the area. 

In the Horn, the United States has 
remained committed to fundamental 
values as we protect our interests. 
Those principles are: 

• We have helped by means of 
humanitarian aid, support for develop- 
ment, and— where opportunity exists, 
as in Sudan today— encouragement of 
democracy. 



• Our support has been balanced 
and principled. Thus, we have placed 
emphasis on economic assistance and 
development, for this is what the region 
needs most. To this end, in nonemerg- 
ency assistance we provided $337 million 
last year and took strong stands on 
reform which would provide greater 
equity and return to the majority. For 
example, price reforms in Sudan have 
given farmers far gi'eater income and 
opportunity than they have enjoyed for 
years. 

• Our military response has been 
clearly and unabashedly aimed at deter- 
ring aggression. We deployed American 
radar planes to Sudan to counter the 
naked aggression of Libya in Chad and 
again in response to the bombing of the 
Sudanese towTi of Omdurman. Similarly, 
we sent emergency military supplies to 
Somalia in 1982 to counter Ethiopian 
incursions. 

• Our military assistance has been 
carefully designed to improve our 
friends' abilities to protect themselves 
but not to give them the capacity to 
make war on their neighbors. There 

is no incidence in this region of Ameri- 
can military assistance having fueled 
aggression. 

• Unlike the Soviets and their allies, 
we have never sought to exploit ten- 
sions within the region. On the contrary, 
we have offered our help and have con- 
ditioned our assistance on the pursuit of 
peaceful settlements in the region. 

We have consistently urged resolu- 
tion of the insurgency in southern 
Sudan. We made clear to the regime of 
President Nimeiri that we saw no 
military solution to this problem and 
that we would have to reexamine our 
military assistance program if a purely 
military solution was pursued. We have 
offered full encouragement to efforts by 
the new government in Sudan to find a 
peaceful settlement. We have consistent- 
ly made clear to the parties to the con- 
flict that we offer our help in bringing 
about a negotiated settlement to 
legitimate grievances. 

Similarly, we have urged peace 
along the Ogaden border between 
Ethiopia and Somalia. While we have 
responded positively to Somalia's 
defense needs, we have never wavered 
from our support for Ethiopia's ter- 
ritorial integrity. Our assistance to 
Somalia poses no offensive threat to 
Ethiopia, and Ethiopia knows it. 

WTien political change came to 
Sudan earlier this year, American prin- 
ciples were again in evidence. With 
President Nimeiri, we shared a convic- 
tion about the dangers of Libyan sub- 
■O'ersion and Soviet ambitions. Since his 



departure, we have welcomed the opporn 
tunity that now exists for greater 
democracy and reconciliation in Sudan. 
Thus, we have continued every form of 
our assistance to Sudan since the change 
in government. We have received the 
new government's assurances that it 
will not disrupt traditional ties of friend- 
ship to the United States or Sudan's 
commitment to regional peace or con- 
tinuation of Sudan's hospitality toward 
refugees. 

At the same time, we look with con- 
cern at the efforts of Libya and Ethio- 
pia to subvert and frustrate the process 
of reconciliation and democratization in 
Sudan. Initial Libyan promises of petro- 
leum and military items cannot hide the 
fact that their terrorists walk the 
streets of Khartoum. Libyan political 
operatives organize revolutionary com- 
mittees dedicated to Qadhafi-style dicta- 
torship, orchestrate political demon- 
strations, and subvert the newiy freed 
press. We fear that Sudan may be 
forced down a path of internal insta- 
bility and divisive politics which will 
undermine democracy and will threaten 
peace in the region. 

Finally, when nature's calamitous 
hand brought drought and famine to thu 
Horn, America's response was imme- 
diate and effective. The toll of human 
suffering was immense, indiscriminately^ 
striking down innocent people irrespec- 
tive of the political orientation of their 
government. Our response was as unre- 
stricted by geography or politics as the 
drought. American humanitarian aid wa 
given to all countries affected by the 
drought— Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Djibouti, and Kenya alike. In fiscal yeai 
(FY) 1985 alone, the U.S. Government 
provided over $700 million of emergenc; 
aid to the nations of the Horn, and 
another $150 million was donated by 
private citizens and corporations. This 
outpouring of assistance, both private 
and public, was truly a demonstration o 
what America is all about— compassion 
and respect for individual rights and 
opportunities. 

The drama of this effort is, perhaps 
well known. But the political signifi- 
cance is worthy of attention. In westen 
Sudan, where millions were threatened 
with starvation because drought was 
compounded by the failure of the rail- 
roads and impassable nature of the 
roads, America, along with our Euro- 
pean allies, stepped in with an air 
bridge, including American helicopters 
operating in the far reaches of western 
Sudan. In Sudan, the grain delivered 
by this bridge came to be known as 
"Reagan" and "Bush." And a new croi 



Denartment of State Bullel 



AFRICA 



if sorghum, grown fi-om seeds delivered 
n this effort, is similarly called the 
Reagan harvest." 

Elsewhere in Sudan, as well as in 
lomalia and Djibouti, 1.3 million Ethio- 
ians fleeing war, internal oppression, 
rought, and famine have found refuge, 
lospitality toward I'efugees is a long- 
tanding African tradition, and they 
ave been well received. But resources 
D support refugees must come from 
broad. Again, Americans responded 
enerously. U.S. Government refugee 
id totaled almost $200 million in 
'Y 1985. And, as I earlier recounted, 
ie level of U.S. private donations was 
npreeedented. 

This is Amei-ica. These are Ameri- 
m principles at work. In the midst of 
olitical change and uncertainty in 
udan, "Reagan"— lifegiving sorghum- 
delivered. In Ethiopia, where a Mar.x- 
t government pursues policies of inter- 
al repression with Soviet weaponry, 
mer-ica is represented by desperately 
3eded food, by caring American relief 
^encies, by unbelievably dedicated 
■forts to supply each and every needy 
'gion of the country with food— not 
eapons, not political dissension, not 
ar. 

jviet Involvement in Ethiopia 

ow, by contrast, do the Soviets and 
leir allies operate in the Horn? I have 
)oken of Libyan activities in Sudan, 
ut the answer is cleai-est in Ethiopia, 
r it is in Ethiopia that the Soviets 
ive gained their gi-eatest foothold in 
e Horn. It is there, because of the 
llout by a small band of Ethiopian 
arxist ideologues, that the blueprint of 
)viet ends and means is most visible. 
3 President Reagan detailed during his 
cent address at the United Nations, 
thiopia stands not only as a bastion of 
)viet influence but also as a case study 
Soviet policy in Africa. Soviet in- 
lence and near domination have re- 
iced this once proud and ti-aditionally 
^rcely independent nation, with a 
Story dating back to biblical times, 
neai- vassalage. And the toll on the 
;hiopians, as well as on the region, has 
en enormous. 

Look at Ethiopia's internal condi- 
m. Since the Soviets became the domi- 
nt influence, Ethiopia's economy has 
riously deterioi-ated. Even the once 
omising gains of the i-evolution have 
en undercut. Land reform, which all 
?lcomed, has now been overshadowed 

an emphasis on collectivization. To- 
y, Soviet-style collective farms drain 
fny the national agricultural budget 



but produce little. The economic policies 
pursued by Mengistu's regime have 
made it virtually impossible for interna- 
tional or bilateral donors to help Ethio- 
pian development. As a result, Ethiopia 
is among the lowest per capita recipient 
of economic assistance of any country in 
Africa. 

When the drought hit, deaths were 
exacerbated by bad policies which 
diminished food procluction in areas less 
affected by drought. But even more dis- 
turbing was the lack of willingness by 
the government to face the crisis and 
the Soviet influence that has, to this 
day, thwarted the Addis Ababa regime 
from full and open cooperation with 
Westeni relief agencies. Yet the Soviets 
stood by and offered no logistical help 
or food until after the West had made 
an enormous and well-publicized re- 
sponse. Out of the IV2 million tons of 
emergency food sent to Ethiopia since 
1984, only 10,000 tons-less than 
1%— came from the Soviet Union. 

And what of Ethiopia's internal 
stability? In the years of Soviet in- 
fluence, Ethiopia has been more terribly 
wracked by civil war than any time in ' 
modern history. The Soviets supply the 
ai-ms and advisers, pushing their Ethio- 
pian clients toward a military solution. 
And in doing so, in complete cynicism 
toward principle and in a situation 
where they had the potential to work 
for peace, they instead turn on the 
Marxist-oriented guerrilla groups that 
they once helped. The success of Soviet 
policy in Ethiopia can be measured by 
the casualties in the north and by the 
ci'owded hospitals in the capital city. 
One can only wonder if the Soviets find 
this grim harvest of death a means to 
keep Ethiopia hopelessly and endlessly 
dependent upon them. 

And what of regional peace? Not on- 
ly has Mengistu been a willing ally of 
the Soviet Union, marching down a path 
of terrible internal devastation, he was 
completely duped by Qadhafi into ar- 
rangements that have had grave conse- 
quences for the region. In 1981, 
Ethiopia joined Libya and South Yemen 
in a tripartite pact. Ethiopia was sup- 
posed to get large amounts of Libyan 
economic aid— a form of aid the Soviets 
refuse to provide— and help against their 
traditional enemy, Somalia. 

In exchange, Mengistu abandoned 
the policy of mutual accommodation be- 
tween Sudan and Ethiopia that is essen- 
tial to peace and balance in the region 
and became the principal supporter of 
the southern Sudanese insurgents, en- 
meshed in Sudan's internal struggles. 



And what has Ethiopia gained? In 
1985, in true Qadhafi fashion, Libya 
abandoned support for the southern 
Sudanese in order to try to woo the 
new Sudanese Government. Apparently 
Qadhafi also promised to end his sup- 
port for Somali dissidents based in 
Ethiopia in order to open his way into 
Somalia. Meanwhile, the promised Lib- 
yan economic aid to Ethiopia never 
materialized. Ethiopia has been left in 
deeper dependence on the Soviets and 
without a single ally on the Continent of 
Africa. Mengistu and his ideological 
cohorts have been as great a failure in 
diplomacy as they have been in 
economics. 



Efforts To Improve 
U.S. -Ethiopian Relations 

What has been true for some years, 
however, does not have to remain that 
way. The United States has been ready 
to engage with Ethiopia to bring about 
an improvement in relations between us 
on a basis that would not only improve 
bilateral relations but allow Ethiopia to 
regain its once proud role in the region- 
one in favor of peace, regional security, 
a strong OAU [Organization of African 
Unity], and African solutions to African 
problems. 

Our efforts go back several years. 
We have repeatedly taken steps to 
engage the Ethiopian leadei-ship in the 
kind of ongoing discussion of our dif- 
ferences that is necessary to build a bet- 
ter relationship. We offered such a 
dialogue through the normal channels of 
the Foreign Ministry, and through high- 
placed personages who professed a 
desire to see better U.S.-Ethiopian rela- 
tions. Several efforts of this kind, each 
originally promising, ended in failure. 

A year ago, we embarked on 
another such effort at dialogue. We 
sought discreet, serious, and substantive 
talks on the issues which divided us, 
e.g., those which stood in the way of 
regular economic assistance to Ethiopia, 
issues of regional peace and security, 
issues affecting Ethiopia's security, and 
bilateral political problems between our 
two countiies. 

For many months, the Ethiopians 
put off responding. Then they said they 
preferred to establish an agenda first. ' 
We developed as complete an agenda as 
one could ask and offered it to the 
government. They did not respond; we 
received nothing but obfuscation. 

Last summer, there seemed to be a 
breakthrough. Congress, angered by 
reports of Ethiopian Government bru- 
tality and intransigence in obstructing 



.nuary 1986 



31 



AFRICA 



relief efforts, passed legislation that 
called for a presidential determination 
on whether the Ethiopian Government 
was following a deliberate policy of 
starving its owti population. Suddenly, 
the Ethiopian Government started send- 
ing positive signals, including dispatch- 
ing a delegation which professed a 
general desire for improved relations. 
When we asked, in this context, about 
our proposal for an indepth e.xchange on 
serious issues, which had remained 
unanswered for a year, the delegation 
pi-omised that the Foreign Minister 
would reply during his presence here for 
the 40th anniversary of the United Na- 
tions. It saddens me to say that when 
the Foreign Minister came, he had no 
mandate from his superiors to engage 
on any of these issues. Fearful of a 
trade embargo, the government mounted 
a public relations campaign about a 
desire for better relations. But the 
Ethiopian leadership, apparently fearful 
of its Soviet mentors, would not permit 
any real progress in this direction. 

' That is the sad lesson of Ethiopia. 
Under Soviet domination, Ethiopia has 
lost its reputation for peace, its chances 
for development, its internal stability. It 
has become the one country in the 
region that makes no efforts toward 
peaceful solution of the region's many 
conflicts. Ethiopia today occupies two 
salients of Somali territory. These 
points lack any strategic significance. 
The Ethiopians know that withdrawal 
from those salients could set in motion a 
process of talks about peace on the 
Ogaden border, yet the Ethiopians 
refuse. 

Ethiopia, alone of the African coun- 
tries of the region, puts its full support 
behind military actions in southern 
Sudan and blocks those who try even to 
see the SPLM [Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Movement] leaders to talk peace. 
Thus, Ethiopia becomes part of the 
problem rather than the solution. 

How sad a contrast to the Ethiopia 
that was a founding member of the 
OAU and whose capital, Addis Ababa, 
in recognition of Ethiopia's role in the 
process, names the accords which ended 
an earlier Sudanese civil war. 

I am heartened to report that our 
friendship with the Ethiopian people 
stands strong. The people— the farmers 
plagued by drought, the old, the infirm, 
the weak," the diseased, the children, the 
students, the urban dwellers, the militia, 
the military, government civil servants, 
and, we know, many senior officials 
themselves— know who helped Ethiopia 



in time of greatest need— not the Soviet 
Union, but the United States of 
America. 

I am proud to state, as well, that 
oui- massive humanitarian effort in 
Ethiopia-providing over 50% of the 
food delivered and helping save millions 
of Ethiopian hves— was unconditional. 
We did not link the relief of human suf- 
fering to bilateral politics. When our 
diplomatic efforts were spurned, we con- 
tinued to send food. I believe we did the 
right thing— as a matter of morality and 
of good foreign policy. 

Today, I renew our offer of dialogue 
with theEthiopian Government. We 
have much to discuss. There are issues 
of regional peace and stability; human 
rights, particularly the resettlement pro- 
gram; bilateral problems; the drought; 
and recovery. All of these issues must 
be addressed candidly. But, above all, I 
call upon the Ethiopian leadership to 
reassess its adherence to a partnership 
which has so far brought nothing to that 
war- and drought-stricken land. 

Exploring Alternatives 

There are alternatives, and the evidence 
is right before us in the Horn. We talk 
of deep-seated enmities. But two coun- 
tries of the Horn, Kenya and Somalia, 
have addressed those enmities with 
statesmanship and determination. Over 
the last 2 years, there has been sig- 
nificant movement to overcome the 
border problems that plagued these two 
countries. Dialogue goes on between 
them; cooperation at the border has 
been enhanced; solutions are being 
found to nettlesome problems that once 
produced violence. We have been happy 
to help encourage this process. When 
our friends in the region are at peace, 
our interests are also served. 

And there is an alternative to the 
economic misery in Ethiopia. Kenya also 
faced a major drought in 1984. It did 
not make the nightly news; not because 
it was not serious. Over a million people 
were at risk. But the Kenyan Govern- 
ment acted swiftly. It brought in grain; 
it worked closely with the concerned 
international community. It gave top 
priority to the emergency effort in the 
country's logistical system. You didn't 
see Kenya on your TV screen because 



Kenya acted in a manner in which there 
was "no need for camps and almost no 
loss of life. Today, because of ample 
prices paid to farmers, Kenya is enjoy- 
ing a bumper crop as the drought 
recedes. 

And there is an alternative for 
longer term recovery. Somalia once 
followed the Soviet lead. It placed its 
economy under the stranglehold of 
Soviet systems and controls. Commerce 
declined", and Somalia's prospects 
seemed bleak. But recently, Somalia has 
taken steps to rid itself of these con- 
trols. Last year, some price controls 
were lifted," and trade was liberalized so 
that commerce might flourish. Despite 
the loss, for other reasons, of one of its 
principal markets, Somali exports 
jumped by 60%. And last week, in sup- 
port of Somalia's development. Western 
donors and international institutions met 
in Paris and pledged $313 million for 
Somalia's development progi-am next 
year. 

This is our vision of the Horn. It is 
shared bv our allies in Europe and Asia 
and our friends in the Middle East and 
Africa. The President issued the Soviets 
a challenge. The Horn is one of the 
regions where they could, if they were 
so inclined, respond. We call on the 
Soviets to: 

• Work for peace in Ethiopia on the 
basis of regional autonomy, reconcilia- 
tion, and respect for human rights. In 
return, we urge the leaders of the 
Eritrean and Tigi-ean movements to 
reciprocate and pursue all openings for i 
peaceful Ethiopia. But the Ethiopian 
leadership must set a framework for 
peace. 

• Work for peace in Sudan. Urge 
Ethiopia to stop its support for Sudan- 
ese civil war and put its weight behind 
the process of reconciliation instead of 
destabilization. 

• Urge the Ethiopian leadership to 
take the first steps toward peace along 
the Somali border by withdrawing from 
the towns of Balenbale and Goldegob. 

For our part, we must remain 
involved in the Horn of Africa, and we 
plan to do so. Our principles for involve 
ment are clear. To all the countries of 
the region, we hold out our hopes and 
our active cooperation in the cause of 
peace, stability, respect for territorial 
integrity, and improvement in the lives 
of all the people in all the countries of 
this region. ■ 



19 



AFRICA 



[he African Economic Crisis 



y John C. Whitehead 

Oral statement before the Subcom- 
littee on African Affairs of the Senate 
'oreign Relations Committee on Oc- 
>ber 2J,, 1985. Mr. Whitehead is Deputy 
ecretary of State. ' 

appreciate this opportunity to discuss 
16 African economic crisis, its roots, 
nd what we, together with many of the 
frican governments, can do about it. 
his is a propitious time for this hear- 
ig. Much has been happening in Africa 
I recent years. The opportunities for us 
) join in a more effective effort there 
-e greater than during any time in the 
!cent past. At the same time, the 
3eds are more urgent. 

The State Department, AID [Agency 
ir International Development], and 
reasury have been working very 
osely over the past several months on 
lese issues. We have developed a 
gnificant new proposal for Africa and 
:her poor countries which Secretary [of 
le Treasury James] Baker presented at 
le annual IMF [International Monetary 
und]-World Bank meeting in Seoul 
ist 2 weeks ago. This proposal offers a 
imprehensive approach to Africa's 
'oblems of growth and development. It 
ills for a much more coordinated inter- 
itional effort and, particularly, for a 
ronger relationship between the IMF 
id the World Bank. Part of this pro- 
)sal was adopted at Seoul, and we 
ive strong indications of interest from 
le African beneficiary countries and 
om other potential donor countries on 
le broader aspects of our proposal. 

auses of the Crisis 

ib-Saharan Africa is in the most pro- 
und economic crisis of its history— a 
isis many years in the making. The 
luses of this crisis— aggravated by the 
ivere drought of the past several 
;ars— are many and complex. African 
luntries came to independence, by and 
rge, less developed than those coun- 
ies on other continents. They have 
iffered from deteriorating terms of 
ade during the last several years. 
Itogether, sub-Saharan Africa's terms 
trade have declined by approximately 
''% since 1977, with each 1% costing 
ese countries about $200 million in lost 
;t export earnings. 



But Africa's development potential 
has been further undermined by a series 
of policy factors which, in our view, 
represent equally fundamental roots of 
the problem. These include: 

• Inappropriate domestic economic 
policies based on an overreliance on the 
public sector and inadequate attention 
to private sector development and free 
market factors; 

• Disastrous neglect of the all- 
important agricultural sector, in which 
over 75% of Africans are employed; 

• A population explosion: Africa now 
has the highest population grow'th rate 
in the world— over 3% per annum; and 



• The rapid buildup since the 1970s 
of African external debt, with the 
resulting heavy economic burden of debt 
servicing. From 1973, to 1983 Africa's 
medium- and long-term debt rose from 
$14 billion to $66 billion. 

As a result, Africa faces a crisis of 
gi'owth. The average African today is 
poorer than he was in 1970. According 
to World Bank data, average per capita 
GDP [gross domestic product] in Africa 
has declined by about 4.5% since 1970. 
Unless current trends are reversed, 
African standards of living will continue 
to deteriorate. Without renewed growth, 



Deputy Secretary of State 




John C. Whitehead was 

born in Evanston, Illinois, 
on April 2, 1922. He grew 
up in Montclair, New 
Jersey, attended public 
schools there, and 
graduated from Montclair 
High School in 1939. 

He attended Haver- 
foi'd College, from which 
he graduated in 1943 with 
a B.A. degree in 
economics. 
Dui-ing World War 11 he served in the 
U.S. Navy aboard the U.S.S. Thomas Jeffer- 
son and participated in the invasions of Nor- 
mandy, southern France, Iwo Jima, and 
Okinawa. While still in the Navy, he was 
later assigned as an insti-uctor at the Har- 
vard Business School. 

After the war he attended the Han'ard 
Business School and received his M.B.A. 
degree with distinction in 1947. He later 
received honorary LL.D. degrees from 
Haverford College and Pace University. 
He joined Goldman, Sachs and Co. in 
1947 as a junior statistician and has worked 
there ever since. He became a partner in 
1956 and senior partner and cochairman in 
1976. During that period, Goldman Sachs 
developed into one of the world's foremost in- 
vestment banking and brokerage fu-ms. Mr. 
Whitehead announced in August 1984 that he 
would step down as cochairman and as a 
general partner of Goldman Sachs on 
November 30 but continue as a limited part- 
ner and as chairman of the firm's Interna- 
tional Advisory Board. Since that time he has 
devoted the majority of his time to activities 
in the nonprofit sector. 

Mr. whitehead has served on the boards 
of directors of numerous companies, including 



American District Telegraph Company, 
Crompton Company, Crompton and Knowles 
Corporation, Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 
Household International Inc., Loctite Cor- 
poration, and the Pillsbury Company. As a 
leader in his industry, he has served as a 
director and chairman of the Securities In- 
dustry Association and as a director of the 
New York Stock Exchange. From 1968 to 
1970 he was chairman of the Advisory Com- 
mittee to the Securities and E.xchange Com- 
mission's Institutional Investor Study. 

Long active in a variety of educational, 
civic, and charitable activities, he is a 
member of the Board of Managers of Haver- 
ford College and of the Board of Overseers of 
Hai-vard University. He was previously a 
ti-ustee of the Carnegie Corporation and the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching. 

He was formerly the president of the In- 
ternational Rescue Committee, in which 
capacity he traveled widely around the world 
in the cause of political refugees. He was also 
a director of the New York City Partnership, 
the New York Chamber of Commerce, the 
Economic Development Council of New York 
City, the American Productivity Center, 
Junior Achievement, and Outward Bound. He 
remains a member of the Conference Board 
and the Council on Foreign Relations. 

For many years he has been active in 
Republican political affairs and was for 10 
years a councilman in his hometowTi of Essex 
Fells, New Jersey. A former cochairman of 
the Republican National Finance Committee, 
he has been an active fundraiser for local, 
state, and national candidates. He is a former 
member of the President's Commission of 
Executive Exchange. 

Mr. Whitehead was sworn in as Deputy 
Secretary of State on July 9, 1985. ■ 



inuary 1986 



33 



AFRICA 



the threat of famine and starvation will 
continue. Without renewed growth, 
African countries will increasingly be 
subject to political upheaval and 
instability. 

The Need for 

Economic Policy Reform 

Our policy toward the Continent of 
Africa is based on a search for peace, 
stability, economic gi-owth, and develop- 
ment, those objectives are intimately 
related, are widely shared by most 
African governments, and are mutually 
reinforcing. The challenge today is to 
create an environment in which Africa 
can get back on the path of growth and 
pursue those objectives. 

To encourage growth, some major 
policy changes had first to take place in 
Africa, and the donor community has 
had to change the way assistance was 
provided. 

This need for policy change has, 
thus, been the focus not only of recent 
U.S. economic policy in Africa but of the 
World Bank, the IMF, other donors, and 
the African governments themselves. 
We have made policy reform one of the 
pillars of our assistance program in 
Africa and a major part of our dialogue 
in international financial institutions. 

African governments have made it a 
central concern as well. There is a 
definite trend now toward policy reform 
designed to encourage the private sector 
and to reduce the role and size of state 
involvement in the economy. Let me 
cite some examples: 

• Twelve African countries have 
taken strong steps in a effort to 
stabilize their economies by reducing 
government deficits and limiting credit 
to the public sector. In Zaire, the cen- 
tral government has converted a deficit 
equivalent to 6% of GDP in 1982 to an 
anticipated surplus in 1985. 

• Fourteen countries have allowed 
agricultural prices to rise substantially 
toward market levels and have liber- 
alized the marketing of agricultural 
products. In Somalia, all price controls 
on produce and internal agricultural 
marketing restrictions have been 
eliminated. 

• Eleven countries have begun to 
reform their public commercial enter- 
prises. Guinea expects to reduce the 
number of such enterprises from 

150 to 15. 



The United States has played a 
positive and influential role in this proc- 
ess. Aid to Africa has increased steadily 
under this Administration. We now pro- 
vide a total of more than $1 biUion a 
year in regular assistance to the 46 
counti'ies of sub-Saharan Africa— a 
fivefold increase over a decade ago. In 
addition, the American people and the 
U.S. Government responded in e.xtraor- 
dinary ways to the devastating drought 
and the terrible specter of famine. Our 
emergency aid in FY [fiscal year] 1984 
and 1985 was itself more than $1 billion; 
private American donations have 
amounted to more than $200 million. 

What I want to emphasize, however, 
is that our assistance policies now focus 
on the need for recipient government 
policy reform. Since FY 1982, we have 
increasingly used our balance-of- 
payments assistance to Africa to pro- 
mote trade liberalization, agricultural 
price changes, reductions in the number 
and influence of public commercial 
entei-prises, an improved climate for 
private investment, and other reforms. 
Evidence of this can be found in 
Senegal, Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya. 
Last year, we launched the Africa 
economic policy reform program, which 
provided additional and more flexible 
forms of support to those African coun- 
tries that were not major recipients of 
U.S. balance-of-payments aid and that 
were prepared to undertake significant 
reforms. 

Our policy refonn program was a 
precursor and has given impetus to the 
creation of a similar program: the World 
Bank's special African facility— a facility 
which, together with bilateral funds 
available for cofinancing, will have about 
$1.2 billion over 3 years to finance 
policy reform programs in Africa. We 
have coordinated our policy reform ef- 
forts closely with the World Bank and, 
as the Bank's facility enters an opera- 
tional phase, we will have greater op- 
portunities for such cooperation. 

Impediments to Growth 

As important as this fundamental shift 
in thinking and policy is, Africa's return 
to growth will not be as rapid or 
dramatic as any of us would like. Africa 
still depends, in large part, on exports 
of raw material for which prices remain 
depressed. With proper incentives, new 
export sectors, especially in agriculture, 
will develop; but this will take time. 
Meanwhile, Africa suffers from a major 
debt problem, and servicing that debt 
directly affects Africa's ability to pro- 
mote the growth it so desperately 



needs. Indeed, without more resources 
for growth-oriented investment, Africa's 
recent reform efforts will stumble 
because of continued stagnation and the 
political resistance and instability 
stagnation breeds. 

We already see the manifestation of 
this problem in several cases where 
reform has been significant. For 
example, in Zaire, which has adhered 
closely to the reform recommendations 
of both the IMF and the Woiid Bank 
since 1982, debt service takes almost 
60% of the domestic budget, crowding 
out needed services and infrastructure 
maintenance. If nothing is done, it will 
grow to more than 90% by 1990— clearly 
an intolerable situation. In Zambia, the 
government's inability to repay 
mounting debt is holding Zambia back, 
even though it has just adopted a major 
reform of its trade and marketing struc- 
tures. Somalia, Liberia, Gambia, and 
many, many other African countries facf 
this same problem. 

We are at a critical turning point. 
We must enable this process of reform 
and growth-oriented policies to go for- 
ward, or we will witness further stagna- 
tion, loss of will, backlash, and potential 
instability. Our friends in Africa— those 
on whom we count for many things and 
who have joined us in taking sound 
steps to restructure their economies on 
fi-ee market principles— will be the ones 
most threatened. 

U.S. Proposal 

It is for this reason that the Administra 
tion has put so much effort into the pro 
posal which Secretary Baker made at 
Seoul and which my colleague, [Assist- 
ant Secretary of the Treasury for Inter- 
national Affairs] David C. Mulford, will 
describe to you today in greater detail. 
This proposal would, in the first in- 
stance, increase substantially the 
amount of concessional financing that 
African and other poor countries could 
receive from the IMF through the Trus 
Fund. Our broader proposal calls for a 
greater role for the World Bank throug, 
increased structural lending and by 
putting more World Bank resources int 
the poorer countries. The success of thi 
broader approach depends on a stronge 
relationship between the World Bank 
and the IMF, working together with 
African countries to develop comprehen 
sive growth-oriented economic program 
that both Worid Bank and IMF Trust 
Fund financing would support. 



Deoartment of State Bullet 



ARMS CONTROL 



The pi'oposal for channeling Trust 
'unci repayments to the poorer coun- 
ries was adopted by the interim com- 
littee at Seoul. We are now receiving 
idications of support and interest for 
le broader proposals from both 
ifricans and other donors. Much re- 
lains to be done to develop this 
roader proposal and to give it specific 
)rm. We plan to work hard with our 
ii-ican and OECD [Organization for 
Iconomic Cooperation and Develop- 
lent] friends and with the international 
nancial institutions to make it work. 

In the context of this broader ap- 
roach, we would be prepared to con- 
der additional resources for this effort 
1 coming years if other donors also 
lake equitable additional contributions, 
^e know the magnitude of the task is 
reat. I am convinced, however, that 
hile a sustained effort by the interna- 
onal community and the United States 
ill be required, this joint effort can 
timately provide the very engine of 
•owth needed to reduce Africa's 
ihealthy dependence on foreign donor 
jsistance. However, we can only go for- 
ard with such an additional effort 
hen the mechanisms of coordination 
•e established and the pace of struc- 
iral adjustment in Africa makes the 
se of such resources productive. 

DMclusion 

am encouraged that we can find solu- 
Dns to Africa's current problems, 
frican countries have already em- 
irked on an economic reform process 

a wide range of areas. The interna- 
)nal community, in turn, is responding 
ith more flexible forms of assistance 
rgeted to structui-al change in favor of 
arket forces. We are addressing the 
lecial problem of debt. The United 
ates has played a leading, catalytic 
le in all these efforts. But, clearly, the 
sk ahead is beyond the capability of a 
igle country. As the Bonn summit ex- 
its' report stated; "The magnitude of 
e challenge calls for a renewed and 
rengthened intei-national partnership 
ith Africa." 

We wholeheartedly accept this call 
r action, and we have begun. 



The Challenge of Negotiating 
by Democracies 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
11 be published by the committee jiiid will 

available from the Superintendent of 
)cuments, U.S. Govemment Printing Office, 
ashington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Address before the 16th Annual 
Leadership Conference Center for the 
Study of the Presidency in Grand 
Rapids. Michigan, on November 3, 1985. 
Mr. Adelman is Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. 

This weekend is a good time to be 
discussing arms control and the media's 
participation in it. Just this past Fiiday 
oiu' negotiators in Geneva began present- 
ing President Reagan's new arms con- 
trol proposal, which is both detailed and 
far-reaching. That presentation will con- 
tinue over the next few days. 

President Reagan's proposal seeks 
to nurture those positive "seeds" in the 
Soviet proposal a few weeks ago— 
particularly by using some of their con- 
cepts but applying them in a way that 
would be fair and equitable. Our new- 
proposal attempts to reconcile and meet 
the major problems that have bedeviled 
this arms control endeavor for years. I 
want today to touch only briefly upon 
those major problems and then to focus 
on aspects that make arms control 
especially difficult for any President in 
our political system. 

Looking at U.S. -Soviet arms control 
negotiations, what may first stiike any 
objective observer is the extreme in- 
tellectual difficulty in fashioning 
proposals— as we have done over the 
past month— in a fair way to offset the 
two sides' force structures and ap- 
proaches. The two sides could not be 
more different in these respects. The 
U.S. force structure stresses balance 
between the three legs of the triad— on 
land, sea, and air— and technological 
sophistication; U.S. doctiine emphasizes 
deterrence and a retaliatory strategy'. 
The Soviet force structure places heavy 
emphasis on much larger land-based 
forces with more hard-target kill 
capability; Soviet doctrine emphasizes 
classical warfighting which includes 
preemption, or striking first if they 
believe w-ar is imminent. 

Also, the two sides could hardly be 
more different in terms of compliance, 
once an agi-eement is signed. As Presi- 
dent Reagan has documented to the 
Congress over the past 2 years, the 
Soviets have clearly violated a number 
of arms control obligations they have 
undertaken, and probably violated many 



others. These include undertakings in 
nearly all the arms control treaties to 
date— including the ABM [Antiballistic 
Missile] Treaty, SALT [strategic arms 
limitation talks] U, the 1925 Geneva pro- 
tocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Con- 
vention, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 
Helsinki accoi'ds. 

Soviet violations of arms control 
commitments they freely entered into 
cut to the quick of the arms control 
process itself. I am often asked, "why 
go for new agreements, when the 
Soviets are violating e.xisting ones?" 
Good question. The answer is primarily 
because in the negotiations and in other 
channels, we should not give up seeking 
effectively verifiable limits that are in 
the interest of the United States and 
would reduce the lisk of war— and 
because in these processes we can press 
the Soviets to comply fully with their 
existing obligations. However, their 
refusal to do so thus far casts a dark 
shadow over the future of arms control. 

Another, and perhaps the greatest, 
obstacle to successful U.S.-Soviet arms 
control over these many years of effort 
stems from the character of the Soviet 
Union itself. It is clear to one and all 
that the Soviet Union poses the greatest 
threat to our values and to our security 
in the world today. The Soviet Union 
unmistakably has an expansionist inter- 
national policy and a repressive 
domestic policy. 

Arms control is designed, above all, 
to reduce the risks of war, especially 
nuclear war. This Soviet pattern of ' 
behavior only increases the risk of w^ar. 
Soviet or Soviet-sponsored intervention 
and troublemaking in various regions— 
whether in Berlin in the late 1940s, 
Korea in the 1950s, Cuba in the 1960s, 
the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s, 
and Afghanistan in the 1980s— have 
raised the danger point of wider conflict 
in the world. 

Moreover, aggressive Soviet 
behavior poisons the atmosphere for 
true arms control. The Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and intervention in the 
affairs of Angola and Ethiopia— along 
with its unrelenting buildup of militarj' 
forces— effectively iced amis control in 
general and SALT II in particular in 
the late 1970s. Their expansionism and 
repression can only diminish the 



nuary 1986 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



American peoples' enthusiasm for strik- 
ing deals with them. 

Today I would like, as I said, to ex- 
amine most closely the set of problems 
in arms control that confront our 
Presidents in managing arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
President Ford faced these problems, as 
have other postwar Presidents. Presi- 
dent Reagan faces these problems acute- 
ly today. Here, as in many other areas, 
the greatest strengths of our democratic 
institutions can also cause the most dif- 
ficulties to those of us out there, on the 
front lines, trying to make progress in 
arms control. 



The Public's Attitude 
Toward Arms Control 

The American people, as in so many 
areas, tyjjically vacillate in their at- 
titudes toward arms control, surging 
from crashing disappointment to 
euphoric hope: disappointment at times 
when meaningful outcomes seem nigh 
unto impossible to achieve. Hope at 
times because democratic societies have 
a fantastic ability to overcome obstacles 
and achieve the unexpected. 

Former Secretary of Defense Harold 
BrowTi understood the disappointment, 
which he shared after all his years deal- 
ing with arms control, when he wrote: 

Measured against these glittering 
possibilities, the achievements of arms 
negotiations to date have been modest in- 
deed. . . In all, not much to show for 35 years 
of negotiations and 20 years of treaties. 

On the other hand, Ale.xis de 
Tocqueville shared the hope, the great 
potential of democracies, when writing 
in Democracy in America 150 years 
ago. "Democracy," he observed: 

does not give the people the most skillful 
government, but it produces what ablest 
goveniments are frequently unable to create; 
namely, an all-pervading and restless activity, 
a superabundant force, and an energy which 
is inseparable from it, and which may, 
however unfavorable circumstances may be, 
produce wonders. 

With all of this potential, why are 
we so discouraged, so frustrated? Disap- 
pointment stems naturally from unreal- 
ized and, in many cases, unrealizable ex- 
pectations. Some Americans expect that 
arms control negotiations can produce a 
significant and lasting "peace accord" 
with the Soviet Union, one that can be 
settled fairly quickly and last forever- 
more. It is remarkable how often the 
media, even the best of the lot, inter- 
changes "arms control agreement" with 



a "peace accord"— even though arms 
control is only one ingredient of peace, 
and not the most central one. For arms 
control cannot usher in a less 
totalitarian type of government and 
more open society in the Soviet Union. 
Arms control alone cannot temper its 
expansionist tendencies. 

Arms control negotiations— like other 
international talks, but probably more 
so— require "political patience," and lots 
of it. That is a commodity rare indeed in 
our "go-go" society. For America's im- 
patience is as old as it is endemic. Our 
national impatience runs strongly in our 
veins and is manifested in Congi-ess. De 
Tocqueville saw this other side of the 
coin— noting that our system: ". . .can 
only with great difficulty regulate the 
details of an important undertaking, 
persevere in a fixed design, and work 
out its executions in spite of serious 
obstacles. It cannot combine its 
measures with secrecy or wait their con- 
sequences with patience." 

Persevering "in a fixed design" is a 
major difference between our 
democratic, free-entei-prise system— 
which rewards risktaking and thrives on 
innovation— and a totalitarian, central- 
ized system— which rewards risk aver- 
sion and thrives on predictable control. 
Surely, the Soviets have previously 
watched the pace of changes in U.S. 
arms control proposals over the years 
with a fair amount of pleasure, which 
frequently have not even prompted new 
approaches from the Soviet side. They 
typically wait for us to move closer to 
their positions, which we invariably do, 
while they basically stand pat. The 
Soviets happily watch our twists and 
turns in negotiations among ourselves, 
pocketing benefits to themselves while 
persevering in their own objectives. 

To stay the course on our goals is to 
be serious about arms control. You no 
doubt appreciate how the recent Soviet 
counterproposal contains several unac- 
ceptable and extremely one-sided 
elements designed to increase, not 
strategic stability, but rather Soviet 
superiority in key elements. 

In a nutshell, the Soviet counter- 
proposal did nothing to narrow the gaps 
between their position and ours. Rather, 
their countei-proposal would have us 
choose between clear U.S. strategic in- 
feriority or clear U.S. withdrawal from 
the defense of our allies. That's no 
choice at all. No U.S. Administration 
would ever accept either alternative. 
It's a no-go from square one. 



Still, for the first time, the Soviets 
have seemed willing to entertain at leastr 
the idea of deep reductions in nuclear 
arsenals. This is the key "seed" that, as 
the President has said, we are nurturing 
with our new ideas. Significantly reduc- 
ing the nuclear arsenals that e.xist today 
has been one of President Reagan's 
prime ai-ms control objectives since tak- 
ing office. By sticking to this course, the 
Soviets may now be getting the Presi- 
dent's message. We hope so, but we 
have yet to see. 

To be successful over the long haul, 
we must curb some of our instinctive 
American impatience. No significant 
agi-eement lends itself to speedy 
results— even those without all the in- 
tricacies and complexities of nuclear ac- 
cords, and without the natural caution 
that both sides have when negotiating 
over items at the core of their national 
security. 

The Austrian State Agreement of 
1955, for example, took more than 10 
years of hard negotiations to conclude. 
Impatience there may have doomed 
Austria to less than the complete 
removal of Soviet occupation troops and 
less than the establishment of a fully 
democratic, neutral state in the heart of 
Europe. A free, neutral Austria was 
worth 10 years of often maddening 
negotiations with the Soviets. The 
Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations 
spanned 5 years, the Nonproliferation 
Treaty took more than 3 years, SALT I 
took over 2 years, and SALT II over 7 
years. 

Information Leaks 

that Sabotage Negotiations i 

The inability of democracies to keep a 
secret, for long anyway— as also 
recognized by de Tocqueville— is as 
endemic as our impatience. Leaks in 
arms control sabotage success in 
negotiations. The likely prospect of 
leaks often spurs administrations to 
preemptively announce any new offer- 
ings to get it right on the record. The 
President has resisted temptation, par- 
ticularly last week, as he wanted our 
negotiators in Geneva to be the focal 
point for the Soviets to learn of our pro 
posal. Unfortunately, however, leaks 
still occurred. 

Leaks of this kind have become 
standard fare, and not a very positive 
one, to those who desire extensive 
substantive progress in arms control 
talks. Sure, all the publicity adds a 
dramatic flare, but such is precisely 
what arms control does not need. Public 
fanfare invariably leads to dashed hopes 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



and deepening suspicions that the arms 
L'onlrol endeavor is more one of public 
relations than of national security. 

The problem here is a colossal one. 
A. glaring deficiency in democratic 
systems is the unavoidable urge, if not 
lecessity, to e.xaggerate in oi'der to 
•nake an impact. Flamboyant rhetoric 
md startling conclusions come where 
!ubtlety and even ambiguity would be 
Tiuch more apt. Our flamboyance and 
)penness contrast with Soviet 
;todginess and secrecy. Looking at us, 
;he Soviets face a cacophony of voices, 
)f facts and views, an infor'mation- 
)verload. Looking at the Soviets, we 
ace an unsettling scarcity of inside 
oiowledge and hard data. 

Due to such a contrast, verification 
s a problem almost e.xclusively for the 
Jnited States. The Soviets should and, I 
)elieve do, know that we comply with 
igreements. They can learn easily about 
J.S. actions and progi-ams through our 
)ress and Congress. It's all there for 
hem to read, see, and hear. 

These— or really any type of— 
reedoms are none.xistent in the Soviet 
Jnion. We cannot thus count on any 
ongi'essional hearings there, on leaks 
here, on any Aviation Week there, on 
nvestigative reporters there, or on 
nemoirs thei-e. Rather, we must rely 
,lmost exclusively on our intelligence 
apabilities to verify their compliance, 
^hat is tough, and is simply not enough 
or many arms control measures. 

!!ompliance and 
Verification Problems 

jven more worrisome and nettlesome is 
erification's twin sister, compliance, 
'he two are related, and each is critical, 
irms control is empty without com- 
liance. What to do about Soviet viola- 
ions of arms control accords remains 
erhaps the most confounding of all 
rms control problems. 

• The usual diplomatic deliberations 
f the Standing Consultative Committee 
nd higher-level diplomatic protests are 
pcessary but surely not sufficient. Too 
ften. they become a dialogue of the 
paf when the Soviets choose, as they 
[•equently do, not to be responsive. 

• Responding with military pro- 
ranis can be useful, and President 
leagan has directed a review of defense 
iieasures that may be appropriate and 
scessarv. 



• Cancellation of our obligations in 
treaties that the Soviets violate is 
another possible recourse, but one 
politically painful in our country and at 
times, I believe, clearly unwise. 

For years, it was surmised that 
strong domestic and international reac- 
tions would invariably follow a Soviet 
violation, which would prompt the 
Soviets to avoid or, at least, end any 
violations. People once believed in this 
"massive i-eaction" theory of treaty 
adherence. But the muffled voices com- 
ing after the President's report identify- 
ing clear Soviet violations sadly shows 
this theory to have been wrong. 

But the bottom line remains un- 
changed: Effective responses must be 
found; Soviet cheating must stop. Other- 
wise, arms control simply is doomed. 
For a treaty limitation respected by 
open societies and violated by closed 
societies is no treaty limitation at all. It 



is not arms control at all. Instead, it is 
unilateral disarmament in the guise of 
bilateral arms control. 



The Discontinuity of 
Changing Leadership 

Another problem democracies face, in 
what de Tocqueville called "persevering 
in a fi.xed design," centers around our 
leadership changes. Presidential 
changes, which were frequent in the 
1960s, and 1970s, break continuity and 
inhibit tough, consistent approaches to 
arms control which are so essential to 
achieving a sound agreement. 

In the initial decade-and-a-half of 
strategic arms discussions, five different 
U.S. Presidents faced the same General 
Secretary of the Soviet Union. Arms 
control was characterized by a fair 
amount of discontinuity on our side, 
especially since three of the past four 



Arms Control Negotiations 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 14, 1985' 

I met today with the senior American 
negotiators at the Geneva nuclear and 
space arms talks. Ambassadors Max 
Kampelman, John Tower, and Maynard 
Glitman. The meeting provided an op- 
portunity for our chief negotiators to 
brief me on the just concluded round of 
negotiations in Geneva and on theii- 
perspectives for future developments in 
the talks. 

This past round in Geneva, the third 
in the negotiations which began this 
past March, has been useful. It was 
marked by the Soviet presentation, in 
late September, of a counterproposal to 
the concrete reductions offers which the 
United States had put forward at the 
outset of the talks. Drawing on the 
counsel of our negotiating team and of 
our experts in Washington, we analyzed 
this Soviet counteroffer very carefully, 
making clear both its positive elements 
and the areas in which it fell seriously 
short of the criteiia which w'e have 
established for an effective and 
equitable arms reduction agreement. As 
I have emphasized before, these 
necessary criteria are deep cuts; no 
first-strike advantages; research on 
defense, because defense is much safer 
than offense; and no cheating— that is to 
say, full compliance. 



Building upon these criteria, as well 
as the positive seeds in the Soviet 
counterproposal, I instructed, on 
November 1, our negotiators to table a 
new set of proposals in Geneva. These 
new U.S. proposals cover all three areas 
of the negotiations: strategic nuclear 
arms, intermediate nuclear forces, and 
defense and space anns. 

These new developments in the 
Geneva negotiations demonstrate that a 
serious give-and-take process can now 
take place. We welcome this, and we 
are determined to do our part to bring 
about the real nuclear reductions that 
the world desires and deserves. If there 
is equal determination and flexibility on 
the Soviet part, this can be done. I, 
therefore, hope that my coming meeting 
with General Secretary Gorbachev will 
give further momentum to this process. 

Finally, I expressed the gi-atitude of 
all Americans to Ambassadors 
Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman for 
their highly professional and very pa- 
tient negotiating efforts in Geneva, and 
my own appreciation for the wise 
counsel they have provided to me. Their 
continued efforts and advice will be vital 
in the days and months ahead, as we 
strive for radical, equitable, and 
verifiable cuts in nuclear arms. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 18, 1985. 



inuary 1986 



37 



ARMS CONTROL 



Presidential elections have been marked 
by challengers who had vigorously op- 
posed the incumbents' arms control ap- 
proach, and who won. 

While such changes ai'e the norm in 
democracies in the 1980s, a role reversal 
occurred. Instead of rotating American 
leaders there has been a pattern of 
fleeting Soviet leaders. President 
Reagan had to deal with three different 
Soviet leaders in his first 3 years in of- 
fice. All those Soviet leaders were af- 
flicted with serious ailments. The 
(lisi'uption here was not so much 
newcomers opposing their predecessors 
as it was stagnation in Soviet policy. 

Today, howevei', the Soviet Union 
has a younger and much more dynamic 
leader. As witnessed by General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev's actions and pubUc af- 
fairs efforts, the stagnation in Soviet 
policy has ended. A stronger regime in 
Moscow can preside over the tough 
arms control decisions necessary for a 
good agi-eement. But a stronger regime 
in Moscow can— if it so decides— 
constitute a gi-eater rather than lesser 
threat to the interests of free societies. 
Beware of too much vigor by the 
Soviets. 



Struggling Inside the U.S. 
Political Factor 

Last— in any list of factors challenging 
our Presidents in managing amis 
control— surely is the bureaucratic and 
political factor. A Washington wag has 
it that negotiating with the Soviets is 
nowhere as maddening as the ordeal of 
negotiating within the U.S. Government. 
This is said only half in jest, the smaller 
half to be sure. The struggle occurs on 
many fields: within the Executive 
Branch itself, between the Executive 
Branch and the Congress, among 
various interest groups, and out in the 
general public. 

Congi-ess, of course, has a major role 
not just because of the requirement for 
Senate advice and consent for any 
treaty, but also because of its power 
over the purse and its formidable power 
to bring pressure to bear. Participating 
in the midst of the political interplay in 
Washington is like playing multidimen- 
sional chess. 

Free and open exchanges are part of 
what makes us a healthy nation. 
Divergency of viewpoints on arms con- 
trol should always persist, and no doubt 
will. President Reagan consistently 
welcomes a full range of views on arms 
control from his top advisors. He surely 
gets his wish fulfilled, and in spades. 



But this is an area where a large 
degi-ee of consensus on the big issues is 
needed if ai-ms control is to serve our 
security interests. On the big issues, the 
differences among contending parties in 
Washington is miniscule— at any time- 
compared to the gap between U.S. and 
Soviet positions. 

Much of the media play about arms 
control being in disarray simply 
misreads why more progress has not 
been made. It is part of the "blame 
America first" phenomenon described 
by my former boss, Jeane Kirkpatrick. 
The fault lies not in our governmental 
system, but rather in Soviet 
intransigence. 

Another problem that can impede 
arms control progress is the growing 
tendency for- Congi-ess to link support 
for individual weapons systems with the 
vicissitudes of arms negotiations. This 
approach has grown remarkably popular 
in Congress, far more popular than it 
desei'ves to be. 

An extreme example was embodied 
in the June 1984 Aspin amendment. This 
was at the time when the Soviets had 
walked out of the nuclear arms control 
talks. The amendment provided the 
Soviet Union an opportunity in effect to 
kill the MX missile— a strategic system 
supported by four U.S. Presidents and a 
distinguished bipartisan panel (the 
Scowcroft commission) as essential to 
our national defense. And, what did 
Moscow have to give up in return? All 
Moscow had to do under the amend- 
ment's term was to send a delegation to 
Geneva to resume a negotiation that it 
had no business of interrupting in the 
first place. 

Defense progi-ams— whether the MX, 
the Pershing II, or AS AT [antisatellite 
system]— should be designed and sup- 
ported to meet U.S. security needs. 
They should be funded or discarded 
solely on that basis. If those security 
needs change because of sound arms 
control agreements made with and 
respected by the Soviet Union, so much 
the better. We can then change our 
defense programs— but not until then. 



The President must work and 
negotiate with Congi-ess. But there is a 
big price to be paid when these 
negotiations— not with the Soviets— but 
with the Congress go too far. Presiden- 
tial control over both arms control and 
strategic planning thereby ebbs. Both 
are deprived of the coherence and con- 
tinuity they desperately need. 

No arms control negotiation can be 
Successful without central management. 
Indeed, no negotiation of any kind can 
be. If the President fails to gain con- 
gressional approval of basic strategic 
progi'ams, the Soviets are encouraged to 
be obstinate even longer. The Soviets 
are tough negotiators to begin with— 
taking what they can and giving as littk 
as possible, or preferably nothing, in 
return. Actions which weaken our 
negotiating hand can, and usually do, 
strengthen theirs. 

No amount of American imploiing oi 
unilateral concessions— such as killing 
the MX, or decreasing funding for 
strategic defense, or stopping ASAT 
tests— is likely to get the Soviets to 
negotiate more seriously. If we hand tha 
Soviets strategic superiority by our owiW 
neglect in defense progi-ams, we cannot 
retain strategic parity through diligence" 
in arms negotiations. Unilateral conces- 
sions on our side result in unilateral ad- 
vantages on their side. The Soviets take 
such concessions not as a sign of good 
will but as a sign of a lack of will. 

While I have focused today on key 
problems democracies face in arms con- 
trol and, to be sure, other negotiations, 
the freedom which democratic institu- 
tions protect is our most cherished 
asset, our gi-eatest strength and our 
brightest light to oppressed people 
around the w'orld. 

Despite the problems found in the 
practice of freedom, none of us would 
trade the system for the world. Winstor' 
Churchill summed it up nicely in the 
House of Commons in 1947: "It has 
been said that democracy is the worst 
form of government except all those 
other forms that have been tried from 
time to time."H 



an 



Deoartment of State Bullet 



ARMS CONTROL 



Making Arms Control Work 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Address before the Associated Press 
Managing Editors Association in San 
Francisco on October 31, 1985. Mr. 
Adelman is Director of the Anns Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency. 

I would like, today, for you to picture 
this: Russia pi-oposes a freeze on 
weapons and weapons technology and an 
agreement renouncing first use. Ger- 
many debates the proposal. Many label 
it a trick to mislead Western opinion. 

The year was not 1983 or 1985. It 
was 1898. The SDP [Socialist Demo- 
cratic Party] Congress in Germany 
eventually welcomed Czar Nicholas' pi-o- 
posal to the e.xtent that it recognized 
the need to stop accumulating weap- 
3nry. But the SDP also said that to take 
the proposal "seriously it is necessary 
For the Russian Government to set a 
jood example ... by ceasing to ac- 
:!umulate weapons, by ending the cruel 
aersecution of those who do not share 
ts political beliefs, and by granting the 
Russian people those rights and liber- 
ties" necessary for civilization. 

Some things never change. But some 
;hings do. Nuclear weapons now present 
1 new specter hanging over civilization. 

Unfortunately, rational public discus- 
iion on arms control matters has been 
;he victim of increasing emotion, 
•hetoric, and propaganda. This has been 
particularly true with respect to the 
J.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 

But other issues frequently fall vic- 
tim as well. The Soviet Union has open 
iccess to the public debates in free 
?ocieties. It marshalls its public 
iiplomacy and propaganda tools to serve 
ts owTi objectives, while allowing no 
such openness or give-and-take within 
ts own society. 

As the world focuses on the ongoing 
legotiations in Geneva, and on the up- 
;oming meeting between President 
Reagan and Secretary' General Gor- 
bachev, reason should prevail over emo- 
,ion. No easy solutions exist to the 
ough arms control problems we face 
md that so-called quick fixes are il- 
usory at best, exceedingly dangerous at 
vorst. The essajist, H. L. Mencken, 
)nce quipped: "There is always an easy 
;olution for every human problem— neat, 
)lausible and WTong." 

The primary security objective of 
he United States and— I beheve, of 
lemocracies evei'j'where— is to reduce 



the risk of war while pi-eserving our 
most precious national hallmark: 
Americans— especially those who work 
in the press— have a vested interest in 
freedom. There can be no impartiality in 
the global battle between open and clos- 
ed societies, between democracy and 
totalitarianism. There, free people 
around the globe stand together. 

Keeping the Spotlight 
on Arms Control 

Arms control is one important element 
of our security policy, but only one. It 
complements other necessary measures 
such as maintaining forces for an ade- 
quate deterrent. 

Indeed, history shows that strength 
deters and weakness is provocative. 
Adequate defenses provide the founda- 
tion on which effective deterrence and 
arms control must rest. Inadequate 
defenses are conducive— not to arms 
control and mutual r-estraint- but to in- 
stability and aggression. 

As was the situation in 1898, to 
which I referred earlier, so today arms 
control must be part of a broader policy 
and framework— the broader policy to 
stop aggression and spread human 
rights and freedom. The rivalry between 
East and West is not the result of per- 
sonalities, of simple misunderstandings, 
of arms buildup, or of economic competi- 
tion. That rivalry stems from fundamen- 
tal moral and political differences that 
are reflected in differences over a wide 
range of international, regional, human 
rights, defense, and other problems. 
Weapons are the symptom of this strug- 
gle, not its cause. Weapons do not bring 
war. Aggressive policies do. 

Thus, arms control cannot be the 
sole element in the East-West dialogue. 
The Soviets would like to make it so 
since highlighting arms control plays in- 
to their strong suit— military power— 
and allows them to put themselves, in 
this realm at least, on an equal plane 
with the United States. Putting the 
spotlight on arms control serves the 
Soviet interest in increasing pressure 
from the American public, Congress, 
and allies to make unilateral conces- 
sions, while the Soviets themselves face 
no such pressures since they have no 
such free publics, pariiament, or alUes. 
Keeping the spotlight on arms con- 
trol also serves the Soviet interest in 
keeping the light off human rights 
issues and regional issues— particularly, 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and 



their direct or indirect aggression in 
Africa, Central America, and South 
Asia. Arms control is the sole area 
where they can reasonably expect the 
United States to give up some gains, 
whereas in human rights and regional 
issues, the world reasonably expects the 
Soviets to give up their repression of 
their most creative citizens and their 
conquests of the 1970s— in Afghanistan, 
Nicaragua, Angola, Laos, Cambodia, et 
cetera. 

The Soviet Union's expansionist 
behavior and disruptive policies fuel 
mistrust and undermine the arms con- 
trol process. It is impossible to forget 
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and intervention in the affairs of Angola 
and Ethiopia— combined with its unre- 
lenting buildup of nuclear and conven- 
tional forces— derailed detente and effec- 
tively stalled arms control in the 1970s. 

Soviet failure to comply with under- 
takings it has freely entered into also 
fuels mistrust and undermines arms con- 
trol. The Soviets' questionable activities 
under a number of treaties and its clear 
violations of some are deeply troubling. 
The violations include: 

• A new large radar being con- 
structed at Krasnoyarsk in central 
Siberia that is contrary to a fundamen- 
tal prohibition of the 1972 ABM [An- 
tiballistic Missile] Treaty; 

• Development of yet another new 
type of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 
missile] and encryption of information on 
missile tests— both contrary to the 
obligation not to undercut the SALT 
[strategic arms limitation talks] II ac- 
cord; and, 

• Involvement in chemical weapons 
use in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia 
contrary to the longstanding interna- 
tional norms against such conduct as 
embodied in the 1925 Geneva protocol. 

To be serious about arms control is 
to be serious about compUance. For one 
side to respect an obligation and for the 
other side to violate it— this is not arms 
control, but rather unilateral disarma- 
ment in disguise. 

Will the Strategic Balance 
Remain Stable? 

What do we believe can be reasonably 
accomplished through arms control? 
Reducing the risk of war requires ad- 
di-essing the areas of political conflict; 
but the military postures of the two 
sides are vitally important. In the 
nuclear age, even more than earlier, the 
structure of forces will not just shape 



January 1986 



39 



ARMS CONTROL 



the capability for conflict but will affect 
the likelihood of conflict as well. 

Strategic stability is critical. And we 
must now ask, will the strategic balance 
remain stable in the face of the steady 



buildup of both Soviet offensive 
weapons— particularly those that 
threaten the retaliatory forces of the 
West— and the enormous Soviet invest- 
ment in defensive programs? 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations 
on Nuclear and Space Arms 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
OCT. 31, 1985' 

I have instructed our negotiators in 
Geneva at the nuclear and space talks to 
present a new U.S. proposal designed to 
advance the prospects for achieving real 
reductions in nuclear arms, enhancing 
stability, and addressing the legitimate 
concerns of the United States and our 
allies as well as of the Soviet Union. 

I have also asked our negotiators to 
seek Soviet agreement to extend this 
round of the negotiations into ne.\t week 
so that our negotiating team can make a 
full presentation of our proposal and 
have a real give-and-take with the 
Soviets on its details. 

Finally, I have written to the 
leaders of allied nations and have 
transmitted a personal letter to General 
Secretary [Mikhail] Gorbachev on this 
subject. 

History has shown that progress is 
more surely made through confidential 
negotiations; therefore, I'm not going in- 
to any details about our proposal. Suf- 
fice to say that our proposal is serious, 
it is detailed, and it addi-esses all three 
areas of the negotiations. It builds upon 
the very concrete reductions proposals, 
which our negotiators had tabled earlier, 
as well as the Soviet counterproposal. 

The Soviet counterproposal was first 
presented to me by Foreign Minister 
[Eduard] Shevardnadze at our White 
House meeting in September, following 
which it was tabled at Geneva by the 
Soviet negotiators. Since that time, our 
arms control experts have analyzed the 
Soviet counterproposal extremely 
carefully. This analysis now completed, I 
have met with my senior advisers, 
decided on our response, and have in- 
structed our negotiators to make this 
move. 

During our careful review, we 
measured the Soviet counter])roposal 
against our concrete proposals for deep, 
equitable, and verifiable reductions 



which we already had on the table and 
against the criteria which we have long 
held for attaining effective arms control 
agreements. We have made clear that, 
measured against these criteria, the 
Soviet counter-proposal, unfortunately, 
fell significantly short in several key 
areas. 

At the same time, as I indicated in 
my address to the UN General 
Assembly last week, the counter- 
proposal also had certain positive seeds 
which we wish to nurture. 

Our new proposal builds upon these 
positive elements and calls for very 
significant balanced reductions of com- 
parable nuclear systems, particularly 
those that are the most destabilizing. 
It's my hope that our new proposal will 
enable both of our nations to start mov- 
ing away from ever-larger arsenals of of- 
fensive forces. At the same time, we 
seek in Geneva to undertake with the 
Soviets a serious examination of the im- 
portant relationship between offensive 
and defensive forces and how people 
everywhere can benefit from exploring 
the potential of non-nuclear defenses 
which threaten no one. 

I'm pleased that we seem to have 
made a successful start on this long 
process. The Soviet response to our 
earlier proposals and the new proposal 
which we're making are important 
milestones in moving these negotiations 
forward. 

Additionally, I hope we can achieve 
progress in the other key areas of the 
broad agenda which Mr. Gorbachev and 
I will discuss in Geneva— human rights, 
regional issues, and bilateral matters. 

Strengthening the peace and 
building a more constructive, long-term 
U.S. -Soviet relationship requires that 
we move ahead in all of these areas. I 
believe progress is, indeed, possible if 
the Soviet leadership is willing to match 
our own commitment to a better 
relationship. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 4, 1985. 



This has been the central issue in 
strategic anns control negotiations since 
they began in 1969. We thought we 
basically remedied that matter favorably 
in 1972"with the ABM Treaty. It turned 
out not to be so. 

When the United States and the 
Soviet Union concluded that treaty, 
with its stringent limits on defensive 
systems, we set down a marker for 
strategic arms reductions to follow. In 
fact, our chief negotiator and one of my 
predecessors, Gerard Smith, said at that 
time that the United States put "the 
U.S.S.R. on notice that if an agreement 
providing for more complete offensive 
arms limitations were not achieved [by 
1977], U.S. supreme interests could be 
jeopardized and should that occur, 
would be the basis for withdrawal from 
the [ABM] Treaty." 

But that assumption has not been 
fulfilled. The Soviet Union long resisted 
any agreement to reduce strategic offen- 
sive arms or even to effectively limit 
them. While the strategic arsenals on 
both sides have grown, that increase has 
been disproportionate on the Soviet 
side. They now have nearly four times 
the number of strategic ballistic missile 
warheads than in 1972. Their capability 
to quickly destroy hard targets in a 
disarming first strike has increased by a 
factor of ten or more. 

This growth contrasts starkly to 
what we had hoped for when the ABM 
Treaty and SALT I were concluded. As 
former Defense Secretary [Harold] 
Brown once reflected: "We build, they 
build. We stop, they build." 

Another assumption underlying the 
ABM Treaty was that both sides would 
adhere to it. Yet, as I noted, the 
Soviets have violated the limits on new 
large phased-array radars. They did this 
though they must have realized the 
United States would surely detect it— 
the Ki'asnoyarsk radar being several 
football fields large— and that it could 
not conceivably be reconciled with the 
terms of the treaty. This planning had 
to begin around the mid-1970s, not long 
after the conclusion of the ABM Treaty. 

The nature and extent of Soviet 
defensive progi-ams, even those that 
raise no compliance problems, raise 
other profound concerns about strategic 
stabiUty. Over the past 20 years, the 
Soviets have spent roughly as much for 
strategic defense as for strategic of 
fense. Besides passive defenses, they 
have deployed extensive air defenses; 
they have extensive civil defense; they 
have the world's only ABM system, 
which is deployed around Moscow, and 



40 



Department of State Bulletin ' 



ARMS CONTROL 



,he world's only operational antisatellite 
;ystem. 

The Soviets have long been in- 
vestigating some of the same advanced 
echnologies for strategic defense that 
ire now being examined in the U.S. 
•esearch program. These include high- 
^nergj- lasers, particle-beam weapons, 
•adio frequency weapons, and kinetic 
inergy weapons. The Soviet programs- 
is made clear in a recent U.S. publica- 
ion "Soviet Strategic Defense Pro- 
frams"— long antedate those of the 
Jnited States. 

Thus, it seems dubious that the 
Soviets ever really accepted the concept 
,nd assumptions underlying the ABM 
Yeaty. 

IDI: A Better Way 
f Deterrence 

n this light and others, our research 
nder the Strategic Defense Initiative 
)oks toward a more promising basis for 
eterrence in the future, toward greater 
Lability through radical reductions in 
uclear offensive arms and through 
lore and more reliance on defense and 
rotection and less and less on offense 
nd retaliation. If a better way of deter- 
mce is possible, do we not have an 
bligation to search for it? I believe we 

0. 

Yet within a few hours of the Presi- 
ent's 1983 speech, the Soviet 
overnment-controlled news agency, 
ASS. issued a statement which was 
le beginning of a propaganda campaign 
I stop the United States from pursuing 
le Strategic Defense Initiative. 

The Soviet propaganda line against 
DI is as predictable as it is 
tT30critical. The Soviets hope to foster 
situation in which the United States is 
•essured unilaterally to restrain its 
search effort, even though such 
■search is fully consistent with existing 
eaties. They wish to stop something 
hich is fully consistent with the ABM 
•eaty— namely our SDI progi-am— while 
ey continue something which is clearly 
'ohibited by the ABM Treaty— namely 
e Krasnoyarsk radar. This approach 
Duld leave the Soviets with a virtual 
onopoly in advanced strategic defense 
search; obviously they see this as the 
ost desirable outcome. 

Such a virtual monopoly would be 
ost dangerous for the West. It has 
:en recognized for many years that of- 
nse and defense are vitally related to 
ch other, that it is essential to keep- 
g the peace. Unilateral restraint by 
e United States in the defense area 



would jeopardize this balance and could, 
therefore, potentially undermine our 
deterrent ability. 

The United States and its allies can 
expect the Soviets to continue to protest 
strongly and publicly about SDI and 
alleged U.S. designs to "militarize 
space," all the while denying that they 
are conducting similar programs and 
portraying themselves as a promoter 
rather than an obstacle to progress in 
aiTns control. 

Perhaps the most poignant domestic 
criticism of SDI is the judgment of so- 
called experts that it simply won't work. 
Such "expert analysis" has been 
rendered before and found wanting 
before. For e.xample: 

• Thomas Edison forecast, "Fooling 
around with alternating cui-rents is just 
a waste of time. Nobody will use it, 
ever. It's too dangerous. . . . Direct cur- 
rent is safe." 

• Simon Newcomb noted in 1903, 
"Aerial flight is one of that class of 
problems with which man will never be 
able to cope." 

• Lee Deforrest argued in 1926 that, 
"While theoretically and technically 
television may be feasible, commercially 
and financially I consider it an im- 
possibility, a development of which we 
need waste little time dreaming." 

• Admiral William Leahy, Chief of 
Staff to President Truman, warned in 
1945 that, "The (Atomic) bomb will 
never go off, and I speak as an e.xpert 
in explosives." 

• One scientist argued in 1932 that, 
"There is not the slightest indication 
that [nuclear] energy will ever be ob- 
tainable. It would mean that the atom 
would have to be shattered at will." 

If the point of the criticism is that 
SDI wouldn't work today, then I plead: 
"Guilty as charged." That's precisely 
why the President has ordered a 
research program— to see if it can work 
in the future. This approach is 
quintessentially American— holding out 
an objective which is right and 
beneficial and then working diligently to 
make it happen. SDI has become an 
American challenge. 

U.S. Proposals in Geneva 

In the talks on strategic arms, the 
United States has proposed reductions 
of nearly 50% in strategic ballistic 
missile warheads and in missiles on each 
side. We have proposed significant 
limits and tradeoffs between areas 
where the Soviets have an advantage 
(destructive power of ballistic missile 



forces) and where the United States has 
an advantage (heavy bomber forces with 
associated cruise missiles). We need to 
reduce weapons that exist today, par- 
ticularly the most threatening and 
destabilizing systems. 

The Soviet Union would have us 
believe that this central issue has all but 
disappeared— as if the threat from large 
existing MIRVed [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry 
vehicled] ICBMs, of which the Soviets 
have over 800, is somehow less impor- 
tant than a program of research into 
new defensive systems which do not 
even exist today, which will not e.xist 
for many years at best, and which will 
not come into being at all unless they 
can meet the stringent stability criteria 
we have set. 

The United States is also trying in 
Geneva to ehminate the entire class of 
longer range INF [intei-mediate-range 
nuclear force] missiles, or to limit them 
to the lowest equal level possible. The 
threat of the Soviet's triple-headed INF 
missile, the SS-20, goes to the heart of 
our commitment to our allies. 

In the defense and space negotia- 
tions we are seeking to explore with the 
Soviets how to effect a stable transition 
to a more defense-reliant deteiTent 
posture— if the new technologies being 
investigated by both of us support such 
a change. 

Our proposals in Geneva are 
paralleled by other U.S. and Western 
arms control initiatives in other fora. 
We have advanced ideas and programs 
to strengthen the bulwarks against the 
further spread of nuclear weapons— a 
critically important area where we, the 
Soviets, and many other countries 
cooperate well, as evidenced from the 
successful conclusion of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
last month. 

We have advanced proposals to stem 
the proliferation of chemical weapons 
and to effectively eliminate them 
evei-ywhere, to reduce conventional 
forces in Europe, to construct con- 
fidence and security building measures 
to reduce the risk of war in Europe 
through accident or miscalculation, and 
to make progress on verifying nuclear 
test limits. We have, with our NATO 
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
allies, agreed to significantly reduce the 
number of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe. President Reagan's ai-ms con- 
trol agenda is— I believe— the most com- 
prehensive one of any President in oui- 
history. 



inuary 1986 



41 



CANADA 



The Soviet Counterproposal 

We now have, at long last, a Soviet 
counterproposal in Geneva. In the first 
two rounds, the Soviets by and large 
failed to engage in constructive negotia- 
tions at all. They tabled no new pro- 
posals; nor did they reaffirm their 
previous positions. 

We welcome the Soviet decision to 
do something even if it does not really 
bridge the gaps between us, which their 
counteroffer clearly did not do. 

The most striWng thing about the 
Soviet counterproposal is the number of 
elements in it that have been rejected 
by the United States and by our allies 
time and time again throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Someone once said that 
Russian peasants sell the same cow 
twice, but Russian negotiators sell the 
same dead cow almost yearly. Many of 
these, like their inclusion of so-called 
U.S. forward-based systems, seem to 
periodically rise up again— like the 
Phoenix— and reappear in their same 
self-serving form. T?he Soviet package 
combines a blatantly one-sided mix of 
bans, freezes, and reductions that would 
prove positively dangerous to the securi- 
ty of the United States and our allies if 
ever accepted. 

The major problems in the Soviet 
counterproposal can be summarized 
easily. 

First, it is unequal and unfair. It 
sounds good by claiming to propose 50% 
reductions in each side's relevant 
delivery vehicles. But there is a catch. 
These are defined in such a way as to 
include all U.S. nuclear weapons as well 
as some dual-purpose systems meant to 
defend our allies in Europe and Asia, 
but none of the Soviet systems aimed at 
our allies. It would grant no significant 
reduction in the large SS-20 threat 
while erasing our limited counter to that 
threat. 

Accepting such a definition would 
render us the stark choice of either hav- 
ing to accept strategic inferiority or to 
sacrifice our defensive commitments to 
our alhes. We should do neither. We 
will do neither. 

Secondly, the Soviet counter- 
proposal would make the strategic 
balance less, rather than more, stable. 
They propose that no more than 60% of 
the 6,000 total permitted weapons be on 
any one leg of the triad, that is, on 
ICBMs, SLBMs [submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles] or aircraft. These 
numbers again sound good, but they are 
designed in a way that does not get at 



the central problem of large, land-based 
MIRVed ICBMs that threaten 
retaliatory forces. The Soviet Union's 
advantage in hard-target, killer ICBMs 
would actually be increased. 

Finally, the Soviets make all offen- 
sive limitations contingent on banning 
our Strategic Defense Initiative in- 
cluding, as they say, "scientific 
research." This Soviet condition remains 
unchanged. But its repetition does not 
make it any more realistic or acceptable, 
especially in light of their own extensive 
programs on advanced defensive 
technologies. What they surely want is 
to continue their program while stop- 
ping ours. The Soviets know, of course, 
that their package cannot and will not 
be accepted by the West. 

While there is some good news and 
a great deal of bad news in the Soviet 
counterproposal at Geneva, their begin- 
ning to move, in and of itself, is a 
positive sign. If they are serious, if they 
are willing to bargain realistically, then 
progress can be made. We are ready for 
give-and-take. 



Conclusion 

We should not look for "breakthroughs" 
by the time of the November meeting, 
but we do look for some progress. 
Before that time, we can expect even 
more Soviet propaganda— and possibly 
some new Soviet thrast on arms control. 
Their officials have been far more active 
in the media rooms than they have been 
in the negotiating rooms. They want to 
gain the propaganda momentum before 
the November meeting. We hope that 
the Soviets are prepared to get down to 
the tough business of arms control. The 
chief Soviet negotiator, Mr. Kaipov, cor- 
rectly noted that it takes "two for a 
tango," and we welcome the fact that 
the Soviets have finally ventured out on 
the floor. 

Let us venture on the floor together 
so that we can find the necessary com- 
mon ground to handle the nuclear dilem- 
ma that so bothers us all. Just as we 
are exceedingly proud of our 
predecessors, let us live and work so as 
to give plenty of cause for our suc- 
cessors to be even prouder of us. ■ 



Secretary Visits Canada 



Secretary Shultz visits Canada on 
October 28 to meet with Secretary of 
State for External Affairs Joseph Clark. 
Following are his toast and a joint 
news conference by the two Secretaries. 



TOAST, 

CALGARY, ALBERTA, 

OCT. 28, 1985' 

We certainly appreciate— the President 
does, I do, all of us do— the wise counsel 
and advice that we are getting from you 
[Joseph Clark] and the Prime Minister 
[Brian Mulroney]. We sat together in 
New York last week during the UN 
meetings, talked about the upcoming 
Geneva meeting, the arms control, some 
of our bilateral problems, and I think it 
is very rewarding for us to have the ad- 
vice and the counsel and the point of 
view that you bring. So, the President 
seeks that, not simply because you are a 
neighbor but because he finds it worth- 
while and we truly do appreciate it. 

Joe Clark and I have now met six 
times over the last year to discuss U.S.- 
Canada relations and to exchange views 
on current international developments. 



Our discussions have always been can- 
did, detailed, and mutually informative, 
as befits close friends and good 
neighbors. 

Meeting in Calgary is a special 
pleasure for me particularly on this an- 
niversary as you described. We know 
Alberta as Canada's fastest-growdng 
province, and one which has benefited 
from the robust leadership of Premier 
Peter Lougheed over the last 14 years. 
We salute him as a tireless advocate of 
Alberta's and Canada's economic in- 
terests, and we wish him well as he 
leaves office after such distinguished 
service. 

When we Americans picture Alber- 
ta, we think of hard work, competition, 
and straight talk— the very qualities 
which turned these prairies into parts o 
the breadbasket of the world and the 
source of such a large share of North 
America's energy resources. When the 
International Olympic Committee chose 
Calgary as the home of the 1988 Olym- 
pics, it looked beyond your physical 
splendors and playing fields and saw th 
requisite civic pride and "can do" at- 
titude so necessary for the success of 
the games. We look forward to friendly 



42 



Department of State Bulleti 



CANADA 



and spirited competition in those games, 
just as we look forward to another 
chance at the Stanley Cup. It's a ques- 
tion whether we will vnn the Stanley 
Cup again before you win the World 
Series. Of course, Joe is a little worried 
about getting into the World Series and 
having it snowed out. 

These themes— vigor, competition, 
and frankness— characterize the bilateral 
relationship which our two governments 
are continuing to build. 

President Reagan and Prime 
Minister Mulroney last March called for 
a "new partnership" to help rein- 
vigorate our economic relationship, to 
tackle common environmental problems, 
and to bolster our defense i-elationship. 

We have made commendable prog- 
ress in many of these areas and when 
the Prime Minister and President meet 
next March they can point with pride to 
a healthier and more productive rela- 
tionship between our two countries. 
Phis is an effort which has enlisted the 
support of key top-level representatives 
Df both governments— as shown by the 
live visits of U.S. Cabinet officers to 
[Canada v\ithin the past 2 months and 
:he four Canadian Ministers who have 
/isited Washington over the last 6 
nonths. This is not business as usual— it 
s an especially active effort to advance 
3ur common interests through a process 
)f more intense dialogue and the forging 
)f personal as well as professional ties 
Detween officials from both Ottawa and 
iVashington. These links have been mir- 
rored at the state and local levels on 
50th sides of our common border. 

Our success in achieving an enhanc- 
ed market approach to energy trade is a 
;lear example of how our bilateral rela- 
ionship has improved over the last 
r'ear. We note this accomplishment with 
satisfaction, while recognizing that fur- 
,hei' work needs to be done in the 
;nei-g>- area, and maybe it will be done 
ater this week. 

We have now come to an historic 
uncture in the relations between our 
-wo countries. Prime Minister Mulroney 
las proposed that we explore the pros- 
)ects for a broad-based, mutually 
)eneficial bilateral trade agreement, 
i'resident Reagan has warmly welcomed 
-his initiative, and the Administration 
las begun consultations with the Con- 
fess. On the basis of these early talks 
ind with our statutory requirements for 
consulting with Congress and the 
)rivate sector in mind, we believe it will 
)e possible to begin formal bilateral 
legotiations early in 1986. 

The road to a bilateral trade agi-ee- 
nent will be steep, but it is worth the 



climb. Hard work and good faith will be 
required to attain the goal of freer trade 
and strengthened economies. 

We have laid out a challenge to each 
other, and the rest of the world will be 
watching our pi-ogress. We have said 
that it is not enough to have the largest 
two-way ti'ade on the globe. 

It is not enough that the greater 
part of our trade crosses borders duty 
free. Rather than congratulate each 
other on our accomplishments, we have 
chosen to recognize that dealing with 
tough issues— remaining tariffs, nontariff 
barriers, subsidies, and market access- 
will help us pave the way for greater 
economic efficiency and prosperity in 
both countries in the next century. 

Now that we have accepted the 
challenge to work toward a bilateral 
trade agi-eement, we should be frank in 
discussing what is and is not intended in 
such an agreement. 

First, as is inherent in any agree- 
ment between independent, sovereign 
countries the agreement must be 
mutually beneficial with no 
preponderance of advantage to either 
side. 

Second, benefits from the agreement 
must be substantial. The gains from 
trade must outweigh the costs of in- 
evitable economic dislocations. When we 
see academic studies estimating that a 
trade agreement could eventually boost 
Canadian per capita income by up to 
10%, we see the prospect for substantial 
benefit to Canada. When we realize that 
Canada's remaining tariffs are among 
the highest in industrialized countries, 
we see prospects for substantially in- 
creased U.S. exports. 

Lastly, the agreement will not 
remove all economic and trade disputes 
between our tw-o countries. There will 
be ongoing problems. That is the very 
nature of our existence as tw-o indepen- 
dent countries on the same continent. 

In sum, we are talking about a new 
undertaking, truly a "new partnership," 
between old friends. We are talking 
about working through our differences, 
not whitewashing them. We will con- 
tinue to disagree on many issues, know- 
ing that we have a unique record for 
discussing problems before they fester, 
seeking compromise where possible, and 
respecting the values and intentions of 
the other party when differences 
remain. 

And now, I e.xpress my appreciation 
to my colleague Joe Clark for the high 
quality of his public service and for his 
warm hospitality. And to Albertans and 
all Canadians I raise my glass in 
gi'atitude and friendship. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
OCT. 28, 19852 

Q. Just 3 weeks ago, a man named 
Peter Widdrington, the Chief Ex- 
ecutive Officer of John Labatt's 
Corporation— I quote him in saying 
that "Canada has not done its 
homework on free trade. That we are 
not ready to enter negotiations with 
the U.S." Can you make any 
comments? 

Secretary Clark. I am inclined to 
speak about the marketing of beer, but 
I don't think I will reciprocate. No, we 
believe that we have made extensive 
preparations. I think the United States' 
side has made extensive preparations. 
We are naturally continuing consulta- 
tions in this country. I think that you 
might find that Labatt's has an interest 
in the negotiations, and that may well 
explain the comment. But I am confi- 
dent we are well prepared as we enter 
into whatever negotiations that might 
ensue. 

Q. Mr. Clark, we heard the prob- 
lems that the United States has with 
lumber, with steel, other problems 
with free trade. I want you to com- 
ment about doing anything further 
while these issues— where we are 
trading with them— are unresolved and 
we are running into increasing pro- 
blems. I would like perhaps to hear 
from Secretary Shultz, too. 

Secretary Clark. One reason we are 
interested from our side in looking at a 
larger trading arrangement is precisely 
because there has been a plethora of in- 
dividual problems, some of which we 
think could be better handled by some 
new arrangements. But, I make the 
point, that we are dealing with those in- 
dividual circumstances, whether they 
are lumber, steel, or strawberries, or 
whatever, one by one and in a way 
unlinked and separated from the ques- 
tion of negotiations that we might enter 
into. The facts are clear. There are 
some risks to Canada now from protec- 
tionist pressure in the United States. 
We have a duty to take account of those 
risks, to try to put a better system in 
place. There are some immense oppor- 
tunities for Canada in the larger market 
for Canadian produce and Canadian 
productivity that would exist in the 
United States. We have an obligation to 
respond to the opportunity. That is 
what we are looking to. 

Secretary Shultz. I subscribe to his 
answer. 

Q. My question is for Secretary 
Shultz. Here in Alberta, our Premier 



anuary 1986 



43 



CANADA 



spoke repeatedly about "window of 
opportunity," that if we didn't make 
progress within a short time frame, 
that we might lose it. I am wondering 
if you could comment on whether that 
window is half open, or nearly shut, 
or what? 

Secretary Shultz. I think the win- 
dow is wide open. We beheve in the 
United States— we, this Administration, 
the President in particular— that open 
trading is good for us, that we will 
benefit by opening still further the op- 
portunities for trade with Canada, which 
historically have benefited us tremen- 
dously. We have a huge two-way flow 
now, and trade takes place when both 
parties to the trade want it to happen. 
It never takes place when it's only to 
one person's advantage. So, it is not a 
zero sum game. It is plus-plus, and we 
think we will benefit from it. 

Q. Mr. Clark, does the fact that 
negotiations on lumber, and the other 
subjects [inaudible] are held hostage 
by negotiations on bilateral trade? 

Secretary Clark. I think that the 
Canadian economy— Canadian employ- 
ment in the forestry sector for 
example— is in a sense hostage now to 
the absence of a more efficient system 
than now exists. And as I said, we wall 
have two goals: The first is to face up to 
the actual threat that now exists to 
Canadian employment. It's necessary to 
have a more effective response. Second- 
ly, there are great opportunities, great 
possibilities for Canadians, across 
Canada, we think, and it is for that 
reason that we want to at least try to 
reach an approach with the United 
States. 

Q. Mr. Clark, Mr. Shultz, how 
close are you to being able to name 
chief negotiators for the 1986 
negotiations? 

Secretary Shultz. From the stand- 
point of the United States, there is a 
statutory requirement before we official- 
ly enter the negotiations, that we have 
a thorough-going consultation with the 
Congress and with private interests. I 
believe this is a good thing, because it 
allows us to generate broad-based sup- 
port for what is to be undertaken. And, 
I think, myself, that it is important to 
go through that process and have it 
behind us and then name a negotiator. 
But we will find a person of eminent 
qualifications, who will understand the 
political process that is involved and 
have the confidence of the many 
economic interests that are necessarily 
represented in a complicated trade 
negotiation. 



Secretary Clark. As for Canada's 
part, we have set no deadline for the 
designation of a chief negotiator. We are 
involved, and have been for some time, 
in extensive consultations with other 
governments and industry sectors. 
Those are going to continue. The 
negotiating team that is put in place 
when that time arrives, will naturally fit 
into that system of negotiations. This is 
going to be, apart from being an historic 
process, quite an unusual one, in that it 
wall require from our side a very exten- 
sive degree of consultation, perhaps 
greater than we have found before in a 
trade negotiation. And I frankly expect 
it will be one of the more public negotia- 
tions, because I expect that you fellows 
will be there with microphones, in- 
troducing whomever is our negotiator to 
the joys of the scrum. 

Q. There is a lot of concern about 
cultural industries and cultural 
sovereignty, the Time purchase of 
Prentice Hall and so on. I would like 
each of you to comment on whether 
cultural issues are indeed on the table 
in these negotiations. 

Secretary Clark. Thei'e are some 
Canadian culture industries which are 
very much anxious to find new markets 
for whatever cultural products they are 
involved with, and naturally, I wouldn't 
want to close the door on their oppor- 
tunity to find markets in the United 
States for Canadian expression. As I 
have said again today at noon, the ques- 
tion of culture is obviously an important 
one, that we take seriously. I have in- 
dicated in the House of Commons that 
prior to becoming involved in any 
negotiations, I will be consulting per- 
sonally with representatives of the 
cultural industries across the country, 
both so that I will understand their 
position and so that they will have a 
greater feeling of confidence about their 
own role in any negotiations, if those 
particular sectors are involved. 

Secretary Shultz. I think the 
answer is yes. The industries, so to 
speak, if you want to call them that— 
you mentioned Prentice Hall, the 
publishing company— are things that 
need to be talked about. What the out- 
come of the discussion is, is another 
question. But I know the Prentice Hall 
issue is up front here in Canada right 
now. I gave Secretary Clark a list today 
of recent acquisitions by Canadians of 
U.S. pubhshing houses. It's a long list; 
it covers two pages, single spaced. So, 
as I said in my comments at lunch, 
opening up trade has got to be a two- 
way street. 



Q. Given the strong protectionist 
pressure in the Congress, can you ex- 
plain your optimism that this idea of 
a trade agreement, how will it go 
anywhere? I mean, you are asking the 
Members of Congress to move in the 
opposite direction from the one they 
are moving in now. Why are you op- 
timistic that they will do that? 

Secretary Shultz. When we all came 
back from a summer vacation this year, 
it was widely said everywhere, by all 
the people who know everything, that 
protectionist sentiment was sweeping 
the country, sweeping the Congress, 
and President Reagan, in his naive free 
trade attitudes, would be swept by it. 
As it turned out, those views are 
wrong. President Reagan has stood up 
to them. He denied shoe quotas. He has 
expressed his view very strongly. There 
was a vote recently in the House of 
Representatives, which is very heavily 
of the opposite party, and while a tex- 
tile protectionist trade bill passed, it 
didn't pass by a tw^o-thirds majority. In 
ordei' to beat the President, you have 
got to generate over a third of the votes ■ 
in both Houses. So, he is clear in his 
mind that protectionism is bad for 
America and he is preaching that 
gospel. And those who think he can't be 
effective should look at his track record. 
So, don't count us out. We are going to 
do the right thing for America. 

Q. Mr. Shultz. Secretary Clark 
made reference at lunch to the 
possibility that certain industries that 
Canada views as cultural may not be 
seen that way in the United States. 
Are you concerned that Canada has 
tried to define its culture too broadly 
and put too many areas off the table 
before the talks begin? 

Secretary Shultz. It's up to Canada 
to define things as it chooses. And, of 
course, it is up to us. We have to 
negotiate. As I pointed out with respect 
to publishing houses in the United 
States. So, it shouldn't come as a sur- 
prise that we would think it might be 
all right for a U.S. company to make an 
acquisition. But, at any rate, a negotia- 
tion is not settled when it starts. It's 
settled as a process unfolds and as peo- 
ple examine issues and learn. I might 
say, with respect to the question of 
preparation, you are never prepared at 
the beginning for absolutely everything 
that takes place. That's impossible. 
What you have to have is a sense of a 
process, capable people, and then, a way 
of being in communication with the af- 
fected industries so that they express 
themselves and you come to understand 



44 



Deoartment of State Bulletin 



CANADA 



it. And then gradually it works out. 
We've been through this in the suc- 
cessive rounds of trade negotiations that 
have opened up world markets, begin- 
ning with reciprocal trade efforts of 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. It has 
been a long inarch back to open 
markets, and we don't have any inten- 
tion of marching back in the other 
direction. 

Q. Mr. Clark, the pilot of the air- 
craft that dropped those flags on the 
IJ.S. icebreaker. Polar Sea, a couple 
jf months ago is apparently being 
charged by the Ministry of Transport 
for dropping hazardous objects— bunch 
jf Canadian flags. You expressed 
shortly after that episode you didn't 
think charges would be laid. Could I 
jsk you now how you feel about 
ivhether they should be laid, and if 
;hey will proceed? 

Secretary Clark. Don, you say, "ap- 
jarently." I will find out what the facts 
ire that he is being charged. I will then 
iefer to my colleague who is responsible 
or that part of the Government of 
IJanada to comment, but I may well talk 
him before he talks to you. 

Q. You mean Mr. Mazankowski? 

Secretary Clark. You know more 
ibout this stoi-y than I do, Don, and I 
:an't— I learned some time ago, when I 
vas reporter for the Edmonton 
Journal, that people who answered 
)lind get in trouble, so I won't. 

Q. I have a question for both 
secretary Shultz and Mr. Clark. In 
986, the NORAD [North American 
Aerospace Defense Command] Agree- 
nent will be renewed. I was wonder- 
ng if Canada anticipates any prob- 
ems in negotiating that agreement, in 
ight of the SDI [Strategic Defense 
nitiative] and what adjustments the 
Americans, the United States, would 
le interested in, in light of SDI and 
arious other strategic concerns? 

Secretary Shultz. They are separate 
Bsues, and we would hope the agree- 
iient would be renewed. As far as SDI 
5 concerned, it is my understanding 
hat the Canadian Government has 
^ken the position that as a government, 
L doesn't participate, but it has no ob- 
pction to private firms taking part in 
jidding on research contracts and so 
orth. And, of course, what we are talk- 
ig about here is a research program 
esigned to answer the question: Is it 
ossible to find a shield that will protect 
ou against incoming ballistic missiles? 
ind we think in the United States, the 
'resident thinks, that it is tremendously 



important to find the answer to that 
question, because if it is possible to con- 
struct even a partially better defense, 
then it will be possible to reduce 
tremendously the possibilities or the 
threat of a first strike. And that is an 
extremely important thing for the safety 
of all of us. So, SDI is a completely dif- 
ferent matter, and we think it is a mat- 
ter of gi-eat importance to not just the 
United States but to the whole world. 

Secretary Clark. Very briefly, they 
ai'e separate questions. I anticipate no 
particular difficulty in the negotiations 
regarding a renewal. As you know, we 
i-efei-i-ed the matter to the Standing 
Committee of the House of Commons. 
We have followed the practice con- 
sistently since the election of the Con- 
servative Government of taking steps 
that involve Parliament and the people 
of Canada in the discussion of foreign 
policy. That hadn't happened before. We 
think it is a step forward. We think that 
among other things, it will result in a 
much broader understanding in the 
country of what is and what is not in- 
volved in the discussion of NORAD. 

Q. Could I ask you a supplemen- 
tary? Are you suggesting, then, sir, 
that we would not look at SDI until 
such time as NORAD— until such time 
as it is proven that such a shield could 
develop? 

Secretary Clark. They are separate 
questions, as Secretary Shultz made 
clear, and I think it is broadly 
understood in the country. I have no 
doubt, Parliamentary committees being 
what they are, that questions relating to 
SDI will come up in discussions on the 
NORAD renewal. But they are separate 
questions. 

Q. Mr. Clark, the most recent poll 
suggests the party is not as popular in 
the Province of Ontario as it used to 
be. Ontario was the one opponent to 
the idea of freer trade. Is that going 
to pose an obstacle in going ahead 
with negotiations with the United 
States? 

Secretary Clark. I, in fact, have 
been impressed so far by the degree to 
which the discussions on freer trade 
have not become divisive on either par- 
tisan or regional lines in the country. I 
think that is very important that it con- 
tinue to be the case. The Premier of On- 
tario has some views that do not 
precisely mirror my own. That is his 
right. He has some concerns about On- 
tario industry. We share those concerns. 
My understanding of his position is that 
he thinks it makes sense for us to enter 



into discussions and to try to see if we 
can achieve an arrangement that is bet- 
ter for Ontario, better for Alberta, bet- 
ter for Canada. We intend to involve 
him quite actively, and other Premiers, 
in the process of those discussions. 

Q. Mr. Shultz, how important are 
the Canada-U.S. trade negotiations to 
both those the United States has with 
Japan and the European Economic 
Community? 

Secretary Shultz. Canada is the 
most important trading partner of the 
United States by far, a much larger 
volume of trade than we have with 
Japan or with all of the European Com- 
munity combined. So, from the stand- 
point of importance to the United States 
of trading ari-angement, our trading ar- 
rangement with Canada and the 
relatively open trading arrangement we 
now have is of tremendous importance. 
We, I am sure, will want to respond 
positively to the invitation of Prime 
Minister Mulroney to negotiate further 
on this. 

Q. I meant, actually, more in rela- 
tionship to any further extension of 
free trade negotiations as you may 
have with those other countries, like, 
how important is this as a precedent 
to what the United States may do with 
other countries? 

Secretary Shultz. I suppose, when 
people see something in place that 
works, they ask themselves, maybe it 
will work for us, too. But other than 
that, I don't see that it has any special 
implication. 

Q. Mr. Shultz, your remarks at 
noon appear to suggest you have 
already taken a preliminary poll in 
Congress toward free trade. .Are you 
satisfied that at this point you have 
the one-third endorsement that you 
need, and if not, what would the 
percentage of the fraction be at this 
point? 

Secretary Shultz. When I spoke of 
the one-third, it had to do with votes on 
specific pieces of protectionist legisla- 
tion. And the one I was referring to had 
to do with the textile industry, which is 
already protected. The question of 
entering negotiations with Canada is of 
a different nature. And we have a 
statute under which these negotiations 
are authorized, after careful consultation 
with the Congress and with piivate 
groups, and we will undertake that proc- 
ess. But there is in the United States a 
strong fund of recognition that our 
trading i-elationship with Canada is 



anuary 1986 



45 



CANADA 



basically good. And, so, we proceed with 
a lot going for us in that regard. 

Q. If I could just clarify that for a 
moment, then, at this point how 
would you assess congressional sup- 
port for this? Could you give me a 
percentage of how many members of 
Congress would vote for this right 
now? 

Secretary Shultz. I can't tell you 
the answer to that question. We have 
been going around talking with 
Members of Congress and the general 
tone of d'scussion and responses is quite 
positive. But we are not going about 
taking a poll. 

Q. Would each of you expect a free 
trading agreement to need a long 
period of transition and management 
of the consequences for the industries 
affected? 

Secretary Clark. I think there is 
no doubt that any trading agreement 
that might be entered into would 
feature both of those elements. 

Secretary Shultz. I think what 
would tend to happen is that you have 
different arrangements for different in- 
dustries. So that it may be there— is an 
industry with particularly sensitive 
problems in Canada or in the United 
States, and, so, you would say, well, 
then the gradual movement toward the 
reduction of tariffs would take place 
over a period of time. So that those who 
would be affected can make an adjust- 
ment, whereas there might be other 
cases in other industries where there 
isn't really that much of a problem and 
you might as well just do it right away. 
So, it would be orchestrated. And that 
is exactly the sort of thing that 
negotiators would have to work at. 

Q. Mr. Shultz, I would like to 
ask— you talked in your pre-lunch 
remarks about beginning negotiations 
in early 1986. Can we infer from this 
that you are going for a fast track ap- 
proach with Congress, and can you 
tell us something about the mechanics 
that you foresee and whether you have 
any date on when these negotiations 
could realistically begin? 

Secretary Shultz. We hope that we 
will be able to have done the consulta- 
tions required by the statute during the 
month of— by the time the month of 
November and December, along in 
there— here worked themselves through. 
I can't say that is a definite thing, but 
that is our object, and we are working 
at it quite hard. Under those cir- 
cumstances, I think what I said at the 



luncheon was sometime in early 1986 we 
would hope that we could get started. 
Now, those are guesses, estimates on 
my part, and I hope that they will turn 
out to be right. I wouldn't have said 
them if I didn't think there was a very 
good chance of it. But, obviously, it is 
not as though something is locked in 
concrete. 

Q. I believe you spoke this morn- 
ing in your private session about East- 
West issues. Can you tell us how you 
think the current incident going on 
down around New Orleans involving 
the Soviet freighter and the man who 
tried to defect might affect U.S. rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union? And what 
is the United States prepared to do if 
the Soviets continue to refuse to let us 
interview this man in the kind of con- 
ditions that we are looking for? 

Secretary Shultz. We have been 
working at this problem through 
diplomatic channels through the 
weekend, and my information is that 
right now there is an interview being 
conducted under circumstances that we 
insisted on. And I believe, at the same 
time, that it is essential, in looking at 
the coming meetings in Geneva, that we 
always make a point of doing what's 
right. So, in a case like this, what is 
right is that we see to it that the in- 
dividual involved has a chance to ex- 
press himself in an environment free of 
coercion. And, so we must do that 
without consideration of people saying, 
"Oh, my, if you do that, perhaps the 
Soviets will get mad and you won't have 
a meeting." Well, nonsense. The way to 
be sure that we have a good meeting, 
and I am sure the same applies on their 
side as well, is to be sure everybody 
knows we are going to do what is right. 
That is in the nature of conducting this 
thing properly. But I think— I hope— it 
is very much in the process or working 
itself out. 



Q. [Inaudible.] 

Secretary Clark. To take the first 
question I believe that it is very clear 
that President Reagan and the 
American Administration are looking for 
freer trade. This has been a longstand- 
ing undertaking for the President and 
the American Administration. There are 
pressures in Congi-ess today which exist 
and which threaten Canada, but I am 
confident it will be possible for us to 
find the means to change our overall 
relations in a way to protect ourselves, 
generally, against this kind of activity. 
Insofar as cultural industries are con- 
cerned, there are several Canadian 
cultural industries that are looking at an 
American market larger than currently 
exists, and there are others which feel 
themselves threatened by the possibility 
of [trade] arrangements. It is for this 
reason that I am going to have direct 
conversations with cultural industry 
spokesmen to ensure that I know their 
situation, industry by industry, and that 
they are confident about the Canadian 
position. 

Q. Mr. Shultz, I understand Arctic 
sovereignty was discussed this morn- 
ing. I would be interested in hearing 
your thoughts on whether the United 
States, you think, should recognize 
Canadian sovereignty, or whether it 
might have to wind up in a venue like 
the World Court. 

Secretary Shultz. I couldn't really 
hear all the words in your question, but 
I gather it had to do with the sovereign 
ty issue in the Arctic. 

Q. I am wondering about your 
thought on whether you think that th. 
United States should recognize 
Canadian sovereignty? 

Secretary Shultz. Of course, we 
recognize Canada's sovereignty. At the 
same time, there are problems about 
straits and passages that are important 
to us. And that we are engaged in a 
process of discussion, and we are 
gathering our thoughts together, and I 
think it's our nickel. We will make a 
response to some observations the Cans 
dians have made to us. So, we hope tha 
we will work this through properly. 



'Press release 252 of Oct. 31, 1985. 
^Press release 251 of Oct. 31. ■ 



46 



DEPARTMENT 



.egislative Proposals 
Regarding Diplomatic Security 



y Ronald I. Spiers 

Testimony before the Subcommittee 
n International Operations of the 
louse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
lovember 13, 1985. Ambassador Spiers 
•< Under Secretary for Managem.ent.^ 

In Monday, November 4, the Bureau of 
liplomatic Security and the Diplomatic 
ecurity Service were officially 
stablished, bringing to fruition the 
rincipal organizational recommenda- 
ons of the Secretary's Advisory Panel 
n Overseas Secui'ity, chaired by Ad- 
liral B.R. Inman. 

The Inman panel's report, which 
)ntained over 100 recommendations, 
as a comprehensive update on a securi- 
r situation that has changed significant- 
■ over the past few years. 

Nearly every day the media carries 
virtual catalogue of the latest terroi'ist 
;ts. Official Americans and American 
.cilities overseas are frequently targets 
' mob violence, terrorism, criminal 
;ts, and espionage. 

The nature and intensity of the 
ireat varies from region to region, 
om country to counti-y. While in 
ebanon we face nearly every imag- 
able threat— from car bombs to ar- 
llery, kidnapping, assassination, and 
mdom violence— in Jamaica our chief 
orry is ci'ime. In Africa, political in- 
ability often produces security con- 
:rns for our personnel. In Europe 
.dical leftists and several Middle 
astern terroi'ist groups carry out acts 

violence against Americans and 
merican facilities. 

Our experience has shown that ex- 
ting threats will not disappear. In fact, 
[w threats will be layered on top of 
e existing threats. We have seen this 
parly in Lebanon, for example. Our 
^ncipal concei-n in Beirut used to be 
|sassination and kidnapping of our per- 
innel. We are still concerned about 
lis, but now we also have to protect 
jir personnel against car bombs and ar- 
lery fire. We need a dynamic program 

protect our people and facilities 
■ainst this expanding array of threats. 
le believe the Inman panel's recom- 
endations foiTn a solid foundation for 
ch a program. 



The Chain of Command 

The central theme of the Inman panel's 
report was that in order to manage and 
direct seeuiity overseas and at home ef- 
fectively, there must be clear cut chain 
of command for overall authority and 
responsibility of our security progr-ams. 
The Inman panel clearly preferred that 
these programs rest with the Secretary 
of State. The report went further to say 
that the fundamental problem of the ex- 
isting situation was the lack of central- 
ized authority; that the program was, in 
fact, overly fragmented and without a 
clear chain of command. Secretary 
Shultz recently stated "neither the Con- 
gress, nor the American public 
understands or can be expected to con- 
done confusion in security responsibility, 
authority or hierarchy." 

The establishment of the new- 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the 
Diplomatic Security Service exemplifies 
the Secretary's commitment to ending 
such confusion. Overseas, as the 
Secretary testified before the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs last July, 
"the Ambassador ultimately has to be 
the responsible party." He went further 
to say, "We have tried to make it ab- 
solutely clear that the Ambassador is 
responsible for security, and we have 
got to take this seriously and that's 
where the responsibility Ues." The 
establishment of the Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security is intended to attain 
that objective. 

Improving the Professionalism 
of Security Personnel 

One of the principal goals of the Bureau 
of Diplomatic Security is to raise the 
level of professionalism among the 
Department's security personnel. It 
should have a clearly defined mandate, 
outlined in legislation, and stnjctured 
along the lines of other Federal law en- 
forcement, security, and intelligence 
agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Serv- 
ice and the Office of Naval Intelligence. 
The director of the Diplomatic Security 
Service would be a professional security, 
law enforcement, or management 
official. 

In order to ensure the profes- 
sionalism and effectiveness of the 



Diplomatic Security Service, comprehen- 
sive training is essential. A gi'eat many 
of the panel's recommendations dealt 
directly and indirectly with improving 
the training of our personnel both here 
and abroad. This would include profes- 
sional training for seeuiity personnel 
and intelligence analysis, and security 
awareness programs for the Foreign 
Service in general. This progi-am would 
help foster a more realistic view of the 
threats overseas, and of our individual 
responsibilities. 

We plan to revise our recruitment 
literature to reflect more accurately the 
threat of terrorism and crime while 
serving our country abroad. We are pro- 
viding "hands on" training in evasive 
driving and firearms familiarization to 
employees stationed at high-threat 
posts; we have identified resources 
needed to implement this progi-am. We 
are expanding and improving on the 
"Coping With Violence" course offei-ed 
to all personnel assigned overseas from 
all agencies. 

The Inman panel stressed the 
necessity of a standard of accountability 
for those responsible for the implemen- 
tation and enforcement of the security 
program. We have already acted on this 
recommendation using the existing 
statutory authority held by the Inspec- 
tor General of the Foreign Service and 
the Foreign Service Grievance Board. 
Further, an accountability review proc- 
ess is incorporated into the legislation 
currently being cleared within the ex- 
ecutive branch. 



Combatting Terrorism Through 
Diplomacy 

Another very important aspect of the 
panel's report was the improvement of 
our efforts to combat terrorism through 
diplomacy. We have slightly modified 
the panel's specific recommendation that 
the diplomatic initiatives of the Office 
for Counter-Terrorism be transferred to 
the Office of the Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. In order to give these 
diplomatic efforts the focus and priority 
they deserve, we have instead chosen to 
estabUsh the Office of Ambassador-at- 
Large for Counter-Terrorism. We feel 
this is a clear indication to other na- 
tions, friendly and uiofriendly, of the im- 
portance placed upon these efforts by 
the Administration. 

The panel recommended that all 
operational and administrative respon- 
sibihties of the Office for Counter- 
Terrorism— emergency planning, crisis 
management exercises, and anti-terrorist 



inuary 1986 



47 



DEPARTMENT 



training assistance-be part and parcel 
of the new bureau. This has been done. 
The Office for Counter-Teri-orism will 
focus on developing within the interna- 
tional community an offensive against 
terrorism. 

The panel recommended that we en- 
sure that each post is prepared to deal 
with emergencies, including terrorism. 
This would include review and regular 
testing of the emergency action plans 
and a significant expansion of the 
Washington office conducting crisis 
management simulations. This recom- 
mendation was accepted, and implemen- 
tation has begun. 

Protecting Foreign Officials 

The protection of foreign officials in the 
United States was the subject of 17 of 
the panel's recommendations ranging 
from improving the competence, train- 
ing, and professionalism of protective 
details to establishing an interagency 
working group to facilitate cooperation 
between the Department and the Secret 
Service. 

The panel was originally inclined to 
recommend transferring the protective 
security functions in toto to the Secret 
Service. This was also the position of 
the Secretary. However, the Secret 
Service has made a strong case that any 
expansion of its authority in this area 
would undermine its primary respon- 
sibility of protecting the President. 
Nevertheless, our nation has an obliga- 
tion to protect foreign diplomats and 
missions in the United States. We are 
therefore prepared to accept this 
responsibility. 

The Department of State has a par- 
ticular interest in ensuring that we 
fulfill our responsibility for protecting 
foreign diplomats. Many nations see a 
relationship between the level of protec- 
tion they provide our officials overseas 
and the protection we accord their of- 
ficials here. By providing better protec- 
tion here, we can help to ensure that 
our officials are properly protected 
while they are serving overseas. 

We routinely exchange information 
and ideas with the Secret Service. 
However, the existing division of 
responsibility between the State Depart- 
ment and the Secret Service will con- 
tinue, certainly for the immediate 
future. 



Physical Security Recommendations 

The Inman panel made a variety of 
recommendations concerning the 
physical security of our overseas mis- 
sions. The recommendations on physical 
security measures are now being ad- 
dressed in the interagency Overseas 
Security Policy Group, chaired by the 
Department's Director of Security. A 
multiagency residential security plan has 
already been prepared and approved, 
approved. 

The panel made 12 recommendations 
concerning the adequacy of both the 
local contract guard forces protecting 
the perimeter of our missions and 
residences, and the Marine Security 
Guard progi-am which provides internal 
security for our posts. The panel con- 
cluded that we must improve the train- 
ing and competence of our local guard 
forces. Funding for these guard forces is 
now being consolidated in the new 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 

The Department has already sent 
training teams overseas to instruct local 
guard forces. We are preparing a 
manual for our guard forces worldwide. 
We are providing regional security of- 
ficers (RSOs) additional training on the 
management of local guard forces. 

The panel recommended the assign- 
ment of Marine Security Guards to all 
embassies and other posts with major 
classified holdings. The panel also 
recommended increased training for the 
Marines and for the post security of 
ficers. Marines are now being assigned 
to all sensitive posts. At those posts 
where, because of size or limited 
American presence, it is not feasible to 
post Marines, we are reducing the 
amount of classified and sensitive equip- 
ment. We support Marine Corps re- 
quests for additional resources needed 
to implement this recommendation. 

Security Construction Program 

Finally, I would like to address the pro- 
posed building program. The security 
construction program is the cornerstone 
of our security enhancement effort. It is 
designed to protect our facilities and 
personnel against both terrorists and es- 
pionage. Our present capital construc- 
tion program is woefully inadequate. 
The serious security and safety concerns 
identified by the Inman panel at over 
half of our embassies and consulates 
overseas point out the urgency of this 
massive security construction program. 
We must renovate or replace those 
buildings which do not meet minimal 
security standards. Significant additional 



resources will be needed to carry out 
this progi-am. 

We are improving the physical 
security of our facilities abroad. The Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences is now- 
developing design criteria for physical 
security for the "Embassy of the 
Future." Security specialists are design- 
ing new construction materials and 
techniques which will minimize the ef 
fects of a bomb blast. Perimeter securi- 
ty standards are being promulgated. 
To implement the vital security 
recommendations outlined in the panel's 
report, we must undertake a massive 
security construction progi-am. Our ini- 
tial planning for this work centers on 
almost 200 individual facilities. We will 
have to construct many new chanceries, 
consulates, and offices and rehabilitate 
or relocate many others. Some may be 
closed. This will be a multibillion-doUar 
program. 

To date, there have been some othei j 
significant accomplishments of which thf | 
bureau is proud. The "Coping With 
Violence" seminar will be expanded to £i 
second day by January 1986. The train- 
ing of the' instructors has begun with 
the Marine Corps providing a training 
workshop for 12 participants, six of 
whom will be members of the 
Diplomatic Security Service. The target' 
date for this workshop is early January 
1986. A week long curriculum has been 
developed for post security officer 
training. 

Threat alerting procedures are now 
more timely and effective. A uniform 
residential policy has been approved anc , 
disseminated. We have enhanced our 
technical security and countermeasures. 
Security engineering officers or security | 
officers will be assigned to every 
Eastern European embassy and all con- 
sulates with significant classified I 
holdings. The numbers of Marine Guard 
detachments and Seabees have been in- 
creased worldwide. The Department's 
counterintelligence staff has been 
doubled and the training of its personne 
has been enhanced. Communications, 
automated systems, and information 
security progi-ams have been upgraded; 
and we have plans to improve our pro- 
tective services for foreign diplomats 
and visiting foreign officials. 

We have accomplished a great deal, 
but there is still a great deal to be dom 
We hope we can count on your con- 
tinued support. 



>The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offict 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Deoartment of State Bullet 



EAST ASIA 



Developments in the Philippines 



y Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statenient before the Senate Foreign 
elations Coynmittee on October SO, 
185. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant 
scretary for East Asian and Pacific 
ffairs. 

am pleased to be able today to con- 
nue our close dialogue on develop- 
ents in the Philippines and their im- 
ict on our longstanding and vital in- 
rests there. I believe that this 
alogue is crucial to ensuring continued 
fective cooperation between the Ad- 
inistration and the Congress in ad- 
•essing one of the most serious foreign 
)licy challenges we face, not just in 
ast Asia but worldwide. 

The Philippines, one of our closest 
id most impoi'tant allies, is in deep 
ouble. Serious, interlocking political, 
onomic, and security problems directly 
reaten the long-term stability and 
sll-being of that country. U.S. in- 
rests of immense importance are at 
ik. but it is not just our interests 
3ne that are at stake. A communist 
keover in the Philippines would 
reaten the stability of the East Asian 
gion and the many countries in it who 
,ve so successfully focused their efforts 

recent years on economic develop- 
mt. Most of all, it would threaten the 
lilippine people themselves, perma- 
ntly destroying all hopes for 
mocracy. 

Thus, there are many others who 
ve a stake in a successful outcome 
d a responsibility to help bring it 
out. Above all, no solution will be 
ssible without great effort, respon- 
)ility, and even courage on the part of 

Filipinos. But historical circum- 
mces and our owti strengths as a na- 
'n give the United States a large role 
play, a role which we have not 
irked. 

Our policy toward the Philippines is 

active and djmamic one designed to 
al with an evolving situation. As 
fits a longstanding ally, we intend to 
itinue working closely with the Philip- 
le Govemment to find solutions to 
sir problems. At the same time, w-e 
ve made unmistakably clear to the 
iUppine leadership the need for early 
d di'amatic progress toward funda- 
mtal reforms if we are to be of effec- 
e assistance. 



Specifically, we support the revital- 
ization of democratic institutions, 
restoration of a free market economy, 
and reinvigoration of military profession- 
alism as the best approach to putting 
the Philippines back on the right track. 
In this regard, we have recently 
strengthened our approaches to the 
Philippine Govemment at the highest 
levels in support of an urgently needed 
program of reforms. In the coming 
months we will continue to look to this 
committee for your counsel and support 
in helping to fashion an effective 
strategy for dealing with the Philip- 
pines' crisis. 

American Interests 

Important American interests are in 
jeopardy in the Philippines today. These 
interests include: 

• A stable, prosperous, and demo- 
cratically oriented Philippines: our na- 
tions have deep ties, both historically 
and through the present flows of immi- 
gration, travel, trade, and culture. The 
democi-atic institutions in the Philippines 
were nurtured under American leader- 
ship, and this gives us an even larger 
stake in their success or failure. 

• Prevention of a communist take- 
over: in addition to shattering all hopes 
for democratic solutions to the nation's 
problems and inflicting suffering on the 
Filipino people that would probably 
make the present situation with all its 
flaws, look good by comparison, a com- 
munist takeover would be a significant 
blow to stability in the entire East 
Asian region. 

• Strategic access to the naval and 
air force facilities at Subic and Clark: 
these facilities are of crucial importance 
in maintaining our forward deployment 
posture in the Pacific and Indian Oceans 
and offsetting the expanded Soviet mili- 
tary presence in Asia. These facilities 
have also helped to preserve a degree of 
stability which has permitted states in 
the region to avoid diverting excessive 
amounts of scarce resources to military' 
efforts and to concentrate instead on 
economic development which is crucial 
to long-term stability. Alternatives to 
our present facilities exist but would be 
much more expensive and considerably 
less desirable and effective. 

As important as these facilities are, 
however, let us be clear that our policy 



toward the Philippines cannot be, and is 
not, made hostage to our interest in the 
bases. There is no conflict between our 
interest in the bases and our interest in 
democratic reforni. We are not afraid of 
democratic change. To the contrary, we 
believe that reform is essential to pre- 
vent a communist victory that would 
end, at one and the same time, both our 
hopes for democracy and our access to 
these important military facilities. 

• Successful regional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia: regionally, a strong 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] that includes a healthy 
Philippines allied to the United State's is 
a key barrier to communist pressure in 
Southeast Asia and a model of what 
economic freedom and democratic prog- 
ress can accomplish. 

U.S. Policy 

In seeking to protect these fundamental 
interests in this troubled period in the 
Philippines, we have sought to promote 
peaceful change through the revitaliza- 
tion of institutions which will enable the 
country more effectively to cope with its 
current interlocking crises. Our objec- 
tive is a strong, stable, dynamically 
growing Philippines which is demo- 
cratically oriented. We are confident 
that the deep mutual interests of our 
two nations and peoples will permit us 
to work with such a govemment con- 
structively to enhance mutual security 
and economic development in the region. 

We have concentrated our efforts for 
reform in three areas— political, eco- 
nomic, and military— each of which can 
contribute significantly to the rebuilding 
of institutions, stopping the growth of 
the insurgency, and creating a positive 
climate for the protection of our inter- 
ests. We have not tried to impose our 
own agenda but, instead, we have sup- 
ported a constructive Philippine agenda, 
one that is being pursued energetically 
by responsible, politically active ele- 
ments of Philippine society. The solu- 
tions must be Philippine solutions, as 
the problems are Philippine problems. 

Nevertheless, our deep ties, our im- 
portant mutual interests, and the expec- 
tations of the Philippine people them- 
selves all require that we help in every 
way consistent with om- role as friend 
and ally. 



nuary 1986 



49 



EAST ASIA 



You have asked me to concentrate 
on developments this year, and, thus, I 
propose to review each of these areas- 
political, economic, and military— and 
describe what I consider to be some 
salient developments as well as our own 
efforts. 

Political Reforms 

The requirement that the agenda of 
reform is and should be a Philippine 
agenda applies with particular force in 
the area of political reform. It is appro- 
priate, however, for us to make clear 
our deep conviction that the invigoration 
of democratic institutions offers the best 
means of restoring public confidence in 
government and provides the best alter- 
native to the unacceptable recourse to 
armed insurgency. 

We have discussed in earlier ses- 
sions some of the significant steps taken 
in 1983 and 1984, including: 

• Changes in the presidential succes- 
sion machinery; 

• Increased freedom of the press; 

• Rise of a citizens' movement for 
free elections; 

• The much fairer and more open 
parliamentary elections of the spring of 
1984; and 

• The Agrava Board's impartial in- 
vestigation of the Aquino assassination. 

At present, local elections for gov- 
ernors and mayors are scheduled for the 
spring of 1986, and an election for presi- 
dent and vice president is scheduled for 
the spring of 1987. Fair elections are 
essential components for restoring sta- 
bility and growth. 

The court, which throughout the 
year has been trying those accused in 
connection with the Aquino assassina- 
tion, has completed presentation of 
evidence and arguments. We anticipate 
that a verdict will be rendered in the 
near future. The perception of the 
Philippine public as to whether justice 
has been done will have an important 
bearing on whether stability and public 
confidence can be restored. 

As you know, we believe that full 
prosecution and punishment of those 
responsible is very important. Where 
feasible, the United States has co- 
operated both in the very successful 
fact-finding effort of the Agrava Board, 
whose work contributed significantly to 
revived faith by Filipinos in their own 
institutions, and, this year, in provision 
to prosecutors of any relevant evidence 
in the possession of U.S. Government 
employees. 



The Economy and Economic Reform 

In 1984 the Philippine GNP [gross na- 
tional product] declined by 5.5%. Al- 
though final figures for 1985 are not yet 
available (the decline is about 4.5% for 
the first half of 1985), we estimate that 
this year will end with a decrease of 
between 3% and 5%. However, inflation, 
which reached an annual rate of over 
60% in November 1984, is now down to 
an annual rate of about 8% during the 
first 9 months of 1985 and has been only 
about 6% in recent months. Both cur- 
rent account and balance of payments 
have shown marked improvement. 

This year we have also witnessed 
the collapse of the sugar economy in the 
west-central Philippines, with conse- 
quent major social disruption and pov- 
erty in the plantation areas. 

"it is our judgment that intrusive and 
erratic government interference in the 
economy, together with control of im- 
portant segments of the economy by 
personal monopolies and monopsonies, 
have contributed significantly to the 
overwhelming economic problems now 
faced by the Philippines. These prob- 
lems, aggravated by declining world 
prices for Philippine export commodities, 
came to a head with the significant loss 
in political confidence precipitated by 
the Aquino assassination in mid- 1983. 
Over the past year we have been 
engaged in a full and frank dialogue 
with the Philippine Government con- 
cerning fundamental reforms which can 
contribute significantly to reviving the 
economic energies and potential of the 
country. The Philippines is blessed with 
considerable natural resources, a hard- 
working people, high literacy, and an 
able entrepreneurial class. We strongly 
believe that a reorientation toward a 
free market system and a restoration of 
confidence can, in combination, unleash 
considerable productive economic energy 
and investment. Some recent develop- 
ments should be noted: 

• The Philippine Government 
entered into a standby agreement with 
the IMF [Intel-national Monetary Fund] 
in December 1984 which set financial 
criteria; decontrolled the exchange rate; 
and undertook measures to reform the 
tax system, the coconut and sugar sec- 
tors, and financial institutions and public 
corporations. 

• By mid- 1985, the Philippines had 
come into full compliance with the finan- 
cial criteria of the IMF program. 

More recently, disbursement of the 
third tranche of the IMF standby has 



been delayed while the IMF, the IBRD 
[International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development], and the Philippine 
Government try to come to grips with 
the difficult policy issues involved in 
reform of the coconut and sugar monop- 
olies. It is too early to make a judgment 
on the likely effectiveness of proposed 
reforms stifl under discussion. If the 
spirit and letter of the proposals are 
fully implemented, we beheve benefits 
would flow to producers at all levels of 
these industries. However, we have 
not yet seen any substantial reform 
implementation. 

We have lent our strong support to 
these efforts, believing that both the 
short-term financial stabilization pro- 
gram under the IMF agreement and 
longer term structural reform of goverr 
ment economic policies are necessary if 
a renewal of sustained economic growth 
is to be achieved. 

Responding to Philippine efforts to 
reintroduce market forces and fair com- 
petition in key agricultural commodi- 
ties—rice, wheat, flour, and fertilizer— 
we provided effective readjustment in- 
centive through the signature last sum- 
mer of a PL 480 title I agreement for 
$40 million in U.S. agiicultural com- 
modities. The self-help provisions of th£ 
agi-eement provide for reintroduction ol 
market forces in these areas, previously 
subject to administrative controls and 
government monopolies. 

Although some initial steps have 
been taken to implement these reforms 
serious questions remain about the 
government's intent to establish com- 
petitive market conditions for these 
commodities. The level of our economic 
assistance will be influenced strongly b, 
the implementation record for these as 
well as other basic reform measures. 

The attitude of the private sector ii 
also a critical factor for economic re- 
covery. Continued bank lending and 
trade" financing are both dependent upc 
the Philippines remaining in satisfactor 
comphance with IMF guidelines. Much- 
needed investment, both domestic and 
foreign, is inhibited by an investment 
climate which investors perceive to be 
unstable. American investors observe 
that Filipino entrepreneurs are not 
themselves investing at this time as 
they await a return of political con- 
fidence and improved government eco- 
nomic policies. These factors are known 
to the political and economic leadership 
of the Philippines and provide a power 
ful incentive for attention to an agends 
of reform which we can support. 



50 



EAST ASIA 



he Military Situation 
nd Military Reforms 

Ihile my colleague fi-oin the Defense 
'epartment, Assistant Secretary [for In- 
'rnational Security Affairs Richard L.j 
rmitage will comment in greater detail 
1 recent military developments, no 
jport on the Philippines would be com- 
ete without some assessment of the 
!curity situation. 

I would note first that all the 
mailable indicators point to continued 
"owth this year of the CPP/NPA [Com- 
unist Party of the Philippines/New 
eople's Army] insui-gency in overall 
rategic terms. Increasing NPA pres- 
ice and influence have become particu- 
rly apparent this year in the central 
hilippines (the Visayas) and in prov- 
ces near the capital of Manila. Com- 
unist "taxation" is on the increase, 
he AFP [Anned Forces of the Philip- 
nes] has scored a numbei- of tactical 
ctories in local encounters, but these 
nited successes have had not a signifi- 
int impact in slowing the momentum of 
le insurgency as a whole. 

Nevertheless, in 1985 the govem- 
ent leadership and the military estab- 
;hment have demonstrated an in- 
eased awareness of the seriousness of 
,e insurgency and have taken steps to 
!al with it more directly. 

Important elements of the AFP 
adership have sought to restore the 
infidence of the Philippine people in 
eir armed forces by returning to the 
isic militai-y values of discipline and 
rvice. They have publicly acknowl- 
Iged that the armed forces had become 
flicted with "arrogance, abuse of 
ithority, laziness, and corruption." The 
nited States welcomes this inci-eased 
lilippine Government attention to com- 
iting the insurgency and the recogni- 
)n that rebuilding the professionalism 
the armed forces will be essential to 
at effort. However, we believe much 
ore progress is needed if the military 
to develop the capability to counter 
e communist insurgency and begin the 
fficult process of regaining the confi- 
■nce and support of the Philippine 
lople. 

As concerned civilian and military 
Ifures in the Phihppines have noted in 
iblic and private, there are continuing 
■oblems in the areas of armed forces 
adership, opportunities for upward 
obility, and accountability for incompe- 
nce, cori-uption, or abuse of authority 
hich have not yet been fully addressed. 



Until the resolution of the current trial 
of military officers and men who have 
been implicated in connection with the 
Aquino assassination, it appears unHkely 
that any significant restructuiing of 
armed forces leadership or authority 
will take place. 

This remains a significant impedi- 
ment to full realization of the reforms 
which have been initiated. In our contin- 
uing dialogue with the Philippine 
Government, we have strongly conveyed 
our concern for rapid progress on 
elimination of military abuses and 
enhanced professionalism. 

An effective effoit against the in- 
surgency requires far more than just 
military means. The Philippine Ai-med 
Forces do not need any lectui-es from us 
on that score. In fact, one could say that 
they wrote the book on how to fight an 
insurgency successfully in their struggle 
against the Huk rebelhon in the 1950s. 
And they followed the same prescrip- 
tions in largely putting dowai the Moro 
insui'gency in the 1970s through a cam- 
paign that was as much political and 
economic as it was military. What they 
need to do now is to take that book off 
the shelf and apply its lessons, no mat- 
ter how demanding they may be in 
terms of professionalism, discipline, and 
courage. 

We Americans must recognize, how- 
ever, that such a campaign cannot suc- 
ceed with only political and economic 
measures and that an effective military 
requires more than just professional- 
ism—it needs equipment as well. That 
may seem elementary. But for the 
PhiUppine military— which has had its 
budget cut heavily in the last few years 
and which gets a smaller share of GNP 
(roughly 1%) than any other country in 
Southeast Asia— it is not something that 
can be taken for granted. 

Those who propose to cut our rela- 
tively modest military assistance to the 
Philippines for the sake of reducing the 
incidence of military abuse or promoting 
political reform do a disservice to both 
goals. The reform that has begun within 
the Philippine military desei'ves to be 
encouraged. Stan'ing the militai-y, to 
the contrary, will, at best, divert their 
attention from essential tasks and, at 
worst, force them to commandeer 
resources from an unwilling population. 

The process of rebuilding the Philip- 
pine Armed Forces is long overdue and 
will take a long time to complete. Those 
who will gain from delay are not Mar- 
cos' democratic opposition but only the 
NPA. Indeed, if the democratic opposi- 
tion does gain power some day, they, 



too, will need effective protection 
against the communists and vrill wish 
that the process of rebuilding the Philip- 
pine military had been started earlier. 

The Continuing Dialogue 

It is not our intent to produce a 
deepened crisis in the Philippines but to 
assist in those measures which will 
revitalize essential institutions which 
either the present government or its 
successor will need to defeat the in- 
surgency, restore economic gi-owth, pro- 
mote respect for human rights, and give 
the public confidence and hope in the 
future. 

In this connection, we have main- 
tained and expanded frank and open 
relations with all responsible elements 
of the Philippine body politic and have 
engaged in a continuing dialogue with 
the Philippine Government regarding 
our mutual concerns. 

Senator Laxalt's recent visit at the 
personal behest of the President was a 
pait of this continuing dialogue. The trip 
signified no fundamental change in our 
appraisal of the situation. It was, how- 
ever, an important part of the ongoing 
process of contact and consultation be- 
tween the leaders of our two countries. 
As a senior member of the Senate and a 
close personal confidant of President 
Reagan, Senator Laxalt was able, w-e 
beheve, to convey U.S. concerns and 
present U.S. policy in the most authoii- 
tative way possible. 

The Senator discussed our concerns 
fully. However, he delivered no hostile 
messages, and there was no rejection of 
our views on President Marcos' part. 
President Marcos indicated that some 
positive steps would be taken in the 
areas of elections and improved military 
performance. We are studying carefully 
the comments of President Marcos to 
Senator Laxalt. Obviously, the key to 
success will depend not on words but on 
the actions which the Philippine Govern- 
ment takes to correct the economic, 
political, and military problems that now 
e.xist in that country. 

In sum, our Philippine policy has 
multiple dimensions, all designed to 
rebuild and reenergize institutions which 
will be required to restore stability and 
growth. One indispensable element of 
this policy is assistance resources, pro- 
vided by the Congress, some of which 
fulfill honorable commitments in connec- 
tion v\ith our important military facilities 
and all of which enable us to work more 
effectively for constructive change. 



anuary 1986 



51 



ECONOMICS 



We believe that our policy is a 
sound one. We do not underestimate the 
problems or the vital interests involved. 
Nevertheless, we are determined to 
stay the course and not be deterred by 
easy cynicism. No "quick fixes" or 
cheap solutions are available. 

Nevertheless, I am confident that 
the Filipino people, with such assistance 
from us as they feel appropriate and we 
can appropriately provide, will success- 
fully overcome current problems and 



launch the new generation on a renewed 
era of growth and democratic progress 
in productive association with neighbors 
and allies. We will mutually gain from 
such an outcome, and the entire region 
will be more secure and stable. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Supei-intendent of 
Documents, U.S. Govemment Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S. -Pakistan Relations: 
The Economic Dimension 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Federation of 

Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in Karachi on November 19, 
1985. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs. 

After 2 days of govemment talks on 
economic and commercial issues in 
Islamabad, I welcome this opportunity 
to meet with leaders of Pakistan's 
business community to share ideas and 
enjoy good fellowship. I had a similar 
opportunity in Lahore on Sunday and 
found it informative, constructive, and 
interesting, as I am sure this occasion 
will be also. 

Shared Objectives and 
Interdependence 

The renewal of the security assistance 
relationship between the United States 
and Pakistan in 1981 began a train of 
events that has resulted in broadened 
and strengthened relations between our 
two nations. Those relations are based 
on mutual respect, shared political and 
economic objectives, and a recognition of 
each other's interests. It is a relation- 
ship of gi-owing interdependence, as 
decisions taken in Washington and 
Islamabad have important implications 
for the interests of both our govern- 
ments and peoples. 

Our shared objectives include the 
following: 

• Opposition to Soviet aggression 
and repression in Afghanistan; 

• Reduction of tensions in the 
region; and 

• A desire for peace, stability, and 
prosperity for all nations in the region. 



Pakistani Economic Growth: 
A Key to Stability 

The stability of Pakistan, a nation living 
under the constant threat of Soviet ag- 
gression and expansionism, is critical to 
the fulfillment of these objectives. Our 
security assistance provides Pakistan 
with equipment necessary to meet this 
threat, and it also demonstrates our con- 
fidence in Pakistan and our commitment 
to Pakistan's security and territorial in- 
tegrity. This is a vital component of 
Pakistan's stability. 

Another vital component to Paki- 
stan's stability is a healthy economy. 
The people of Pakistan aspire to eco- 
nomic progress and its benefits. But 
Pakistan has a special burden: it must 
achieve economic growth at the same 
time that it is striving to enhance its 
defenses in the face of the constant 
Soviet threat and at the same time that 
it has the world's largest refugee 
population— nearly 3 million. 

Pakistan is meeting this challenge, 
and the American people have deep ad- 
miration for what Pakistan is accom- 
pUshing. Since the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, despite the heavy costs 
associated with responding to that 
threat, Pakistan has recorded real 
economic growth of about 6% per year— 
a creditable performance by any stand- 
ard. Pakistan's agricultural base has 
strengthened, and new industries have 
increased Pakistan's manufacturing 
capabilities. 

Pakistan's Challenge: 
Domestic Resource Mobilization 

Much of this growth has depended on 
capital from outside, on funds remitted 
by the millions of Pakistanis working 



abroad, and on official transfers from in- 
ternational sources. 

There is a new challenge facing 
Pakistan today, as overseas remittances 
are declining and international financing 
is becoming tighter. The challenge im- 
mediately ahead is to mobilize domestic 
resources to provide the investment 
needed for the economy to continue to 
grow vigorously. The challenge is to ad- 
just to declining capital inflow from 
abroad. How Pakistan responds to this 
challenge will determine what the 
longer term prospects are for Pakistan's 
economic welfare and will have an im- 
portant impact on political stability. 

The United States has a large stake 
in the resolution of this issue, and we 
stand prepared to support your efforts. 
Our private sector will respond if 
Pakistan improves its industrial base i 
and mobilizes resources through greater-j 
reliance on market forces. The strength 
of our government's commitment is il- 
lustrated by President Reagan's pledge 
to seek a new multiyear program of 
security and economic assistance for 
Pakistan when our current $3.2 billion 
program concludes in September 1987. 
But the challenge is, first and foremost, 
yours. It is a challenge to do at least 
five things: 

First, overhaul the mechanisms of 
domestic resource mobilization; 

Second, unleash the resources and 
initiative of the private sector; 

Third, increase the self-financing of 
those public corporations which cannot 
be readily divested; 

Fourth, rely to a greater extent on 
user charges for public services; and 

Fifth, ehminate wasteful subsidies 
which only lead to inefficiency. 

I am confident that Pakistan's great 
est asset, its talented people, will accep 
this challenge with the same vigor that 
has resulted in Pakistan's impressive 
economic performance in the first half c 
this decade. 

America's Challenge: 
International Trade Policy 

Just as the United States has a large 
stake in the outcome of Pakistan's ef- 
forts at domestic resource mobilization, 
so also does Pakistan have a large stak 
in the results of the Reagan Administr: 
tion's efforts to preserve and strengthe 
the international open trading system 
and to avoid a worldwide slide into 
protectionism. 

During the past 4 years. President 
Reagan has charted a course for the 
U.S. economy that has fostered new 



nortor+mcint r»f Qtatta Rlllloi 



i 



ECONOMICS 



ompetition in our economy through 
eregiilation, tax incentives, and re- 
uced inflation. The results are im- 
ressive. I will mention three. 

First, new products and services 
ave been spawned by established firms 
nd by hundi-eds of thousands of new 
rms. 

Second, our gross national product 
as increased by nearly 13% after allow- 
ig foi- inflation. 

Third, our unemployment rate has 
illen from 10% in 1982* to 7% today, 
nd 7 million new jobs have been 
reated. 

At the same time, however, our 
■ade deficit has lisen to more than 
LOO billion annually. Despite this huge 
eficit and the increasing calls for pro- 
sctionist legislation, President Reagan 
as stood firmly in support of free inter- 
itional trade. The basis of his commit- 
lent is that historical experience has 
lown that the dislocations and costs 
'Suiting from protectionism are 
sastrous. The President witnessed the 
'fects of protectionist trade policies in 
le 1930s— the Great Depression— and 
)ne of us want to see this happen 
jain. 

President Reagan recognizes also 
lat he has a responsibility and a duty 
I ensure that American companies and 
orkers are not subject to unfair com- 
?tition. He is aware that our adjust- 
ent to changes in our comparative ad- 
mtages can be disniptive, with domes- 
: political consequences. 

The President's program for ad- 
■essing these concerns is contained in 
le trade policy we are now vigorously 
irsuing. It has three main components: 

First, a new round of international 
ade negotiations designed to reduce 
ade barriers and to strengthen the 
lies under which international trade in 
)ods and services is conducted; 

Second, elimination of unfair trading 
•actices by foreign countries that in- 
re American exporters; and 

Third, negotiations v\ath our trading 
irtners (especially Japan) to open their 
arkets. 

New GATT Trade Round 

is the outcome of the first item, a 
?w international trade round, that is of 
ost importance to Pakistan, because if 
is effort is successful, it will expand 
ade opportunities for all nations. 

The United States has three key ob- 
ctives for this new round: 



First, to strengthen and improve 
the trading rules to create a more open 
trading envii'onment; 

Second, to expand the exchange of 
goods through the reduction of trade 
barriers, thus raising standards of liv- 
ing; and 

Third, to establish rules for free and 
fair trade in services, investment, and 
intellectual property. 

These are our goals, but in addition 
we are prepared to negotiate all of the 
concerns of all our trading partners. But 
they must participate to have their con- 
cerns addressed. 

The support of developing countries 
such as Pakistan for a new round is 
essential if we are to strengthen the 
world trading regime and thereby 
strengthen Pakistan's trading prospects. 
Your concerns with the trade policies of 
the United States and other developed 
countries cannot be adequately handled 
in isolation; a successful new trade 
round will create the environment under 
which all our concerns can be dealt 
with. 

U.S. Textile Import Policy 

You are especially interested, I know, in 
U.S. policy on textile imports. You must 
realize that our trade policies are deter- 
mined by the interplay of economic in- 
terests among domestic political groups. 
That is true of trade policies in all 
countries. 

The American Government must en- 
sure that the structural adjustment we 
are now undergoing is not unduly dis- 
ruptive. The U.S. textile industry in 
1980 employed 848,000 workers. Today, 
it employs 746,000— a loss of over 
100,000 jobs in 5 years. Our textile in- 
dustry supplied 89% of the U.S. market 
in 1980 but only about 77% today. Paki- 
stani textile imports to the United 
States last year increased from $119 
million to $176 million— just short of 
50%. The total U.S. market has been 
growing only about 1% per year. 

The U.S. textile industry— manufac- 
turers and workers— can be found in 
almost every state in the United States. 
They have sought U.S. Government 
help in easing the adjustment as their 
market share has fallen substantially, 
with severe economic disruption in 
many parts of our country. The decision 
to provide them some relief is a political 
decision I believe most governments 
would consider it their responsibility to 
take. 



For 23 years nations have dealt with 
textile trade in a unique and special 
manner. Despite the enormous adjust- 
ment problem the United States has had 
to face in response to textile imports, 
and despite the long history of inter- 
national regulation of textile trade, the 
United States has been the market most 
open to textile exports from developing 
countries such as Pakistan. 

Between 1982 and 1984, textile im- 
ports into the United States increased 
64%, into Japan only 14%, and into the 
European Community less than 1%. 
Lack of access to other markets has 
caused textiles from all over the world 
to surge toward the United States, thus 
aggravating the problem for the United 
States and creating pressures for 
protection. 

For Pakistan, U.S. textile import 
quotas have provided guaranteed access 
to the U.S. market during a period of 
intense competition from other coun- 
tries. If such access had not been 
guaranteed to Pakistan through our 
quota system, I can only speculate about 
what would have happened to Pakistan's 
share of our market. The quota system 
has protected you from some tough com- 
petitors, principally in East Asia. 

Despite intense pressures on the 
Reagan Administration to restrict tex- 
tile imports further, I want to make 
clear to you President Reagan's firm op- 
position to the protectionist legislation 
now pending in our Congress, including 
the Jenkins bill to which your president 
referred when he introduced me. 

But we need your help, and the help 
of other textile suppliers, to convince 
those who call for protectionist legisla- 
tion that the world marketplace is, in- 
deed, moving toward freer and fairer 
trade. We can make that move through 
multilateral trade talks. It shocked us 
greatly last week in Geneva that Paki- 
stan joined India, Brazil, and a few- 
other countries in obstructing prepara- 
tions for a new round, even though 
countries which carry on 95% of the 
world's trade want to proceed. 

Conclusion 

As we look to new negotiations of the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement and a new 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] round of interaational trade 
talks, we need to keep open minds and 
to recognize that our specific concerns 
must fit into a larger framew-ork. 

Freer and fairer trade— whether in 
services, high-technology products, or 



anuary 1986 



53 



ECONOMICS 



textiles— is in both our interests, and it 
is in the international multilateral con- 
text that we can find the solution that 
unlocks new markets for efficient 
industries. 

The stakes for both of us in these 
talks are high, just as they are in other 
aspects of our relationship. We are 
linked by a long-tei-m commitment and 
shared objectives, and we must re- 
commit ourselves to working together to 



strengthen this relationship. This re- 
quires understanding each other's con- 
cerns and basic honesty in confiding 
what can and cannot be done to resolve 
our problems. It is in this spirit that I 
have talked with you today, and I can 
assure you that it is in this spirit that I 
have listened to your government in 
Islamabad and will listen to you this 
evening. ■ 



The United Nations at Forty: 
Economic Successes and Failures 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Business Council 
for the United Nations on November 6, 
1985. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs. 

Just over 2 weeks ago, President 
Reagan spoke before the General As- 
sembly of the United Nations. At the 
beginning of his address, he compared 
the UN's laudable ideal of sparing suc- 
ceeding generations from the "scourge 
of war" with the painful reality in which 
"too many dreams have been shattered, 
too many promises have been broken, 
too many lives have been lost." 

Today, I wish to discuss with you 
another of the noble objectives em- 
bodied in the UN Charter— "to promote 
social progress and better standards of 
life in larger freedom." 

Notice that the drafters of the 
Charter linked freedom to social and 
economic progress. President Reagan, in 
an eloquent statement on this theme at 
the General Assembly, said: 

Only when the human spirit can worship, 
create, and build, only when people are given 
a personal stake in determining their own 
destiny and benefiting from their own risks 
do societies become prosperous, progressive, 
dynamic, and free. 

We need only open our eyes to the econ- 
omic evidence all around us. Nations that 
deny their people opportunity— in Eastern 
Europe, Indochina, southern Africa, and 
Latin America— without exception are drop- 
ping further behind in the race for the 
future. But where we see enlightened leaders 
who understand that economic freedom and 
personal incentive are key to development, 
we see economies striding forward- 
Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea; India, 
Botswana, and China. These are among the 
current and emerging success stories because 



they have the courage to give economic in- 
centives a chance. 

Too often during the last 40 years 
the United Nations and its member na- 
tions have forgotten these basic truths. 
Many nations embraced theories of 
development based on central planning 
and government coercion. When un- 
sound domestic policies of this type have 
led to economic stagnation, as inevitably 
they must, many of these same develop- 
ing countries have turned to the interna- 
tional arena and sought to establish a 
new international economic order. In its 
extreme form, the new international 
economic order would establish an inter- 
national welfare state in which economic 
power would be shifted from individuals 
to governments and intergovernmental 
bureaucracies and in which wealth 
would be redistributed internationally 
rather than be created through econ- 
omic growth. 

The Success of the 
Market System 

Actually, the new international economic 
order would not be new at all. For as 
far into the past as historical records ex- 
tend, there have been rulers and 
bureaucracies that have sought to con- 
trol commerce and increase their own 
wealth and power at the expense of 
their citizens. 

The really new ideas in economics 
and politics are little more than 200 
years old. Adam Smith, in The Wealth 
of Nations, was the first writer to ex- 
plain how a competitive, free market 
will lead individuals, while freely pursu- 
ing their own self-interest, to order 
their activities in ways that lead to a 
pattern of production, consumption, and 
distribution that cannot be equaled by 



even the most omniscient and omnipo- 
tent economic planner. Economists ever 
since Smith have been impressed with 
the capacity of the market system to 
promote economic gi-owth and spread its 
benefits broadly without coercion. As 
the President noted, e.xperience has 
shown that those nations that have 
trusted the market most have prospered 
most. 

The market, so successful within na- 
tions that have relied on it, is equally 
effective in organizing economic rela- 
tions among the peoples of different na- 
tions. Greater reliance on market piin- 
ciples not only would promote social pro- 
gress and economic development but 
also would increase prospects for achiev- 
ing other goals of the United Nations— 
for example, preventing war, protecting 
human rights, and strengthening the 
rule of law. 

This point was elucidated eloquently 
by [Singapore's] Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew in a brilliant address to a 
joint session of Congress recently. 
Prime Minister Lee noted that, before 
the Second World War, the "desire for 
a better life had caused squabbles over 
markets and the expansion of empires in 
order to build larger markets and ac- 
quire resources." But, he noted, while 
these efforts to expand territory or gain 
assured markets did not bring prosper- 
ity, prosperity did come later in a very 
different way. As Lee put it: 

. . . political leaders in former colonial ter- 
ritories watched in wonderment as the 
British, French, Belgian and Dutch Govern- 
ments dismantled their empires . . . and grew 
more prosperous. Their former subject 
peoples had expected them to decline into 
relative poveity after they lost their empires, 
like Spain and Portugal. The secret lay in 
GATT [General Agi-eement on Tariffs and 
Trade] and the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund], which ensured that ti-ade and in- 
vestments continued and expanded after 
decolonization. 

Put more bluntly, the nations of the 
world have seen that to secure the pros» 
perity that comes from access to 
markets and raw materials, free trade is 
far more effective than armies. 

Coordination of economic activity 
through markets involves voluntary ex- 
change, not coercion or central manage- 
ment. There are many countries in the 
world whose values and social systems 
diverge sharply from our owai. The 
market system will not dissolve these 
differences, and free trade will not 
create universal harmony. Rather, ti-ade 
permits economic cooperation to take 
place in spite of differences, even amonj 



S4 



ECONOMICS 



leople who hate each other. In that 
t'ay, the mai-ket system makes a con- 
i-ibiition toward the goal of eUminating 
he scourge of war. 

The market system also is support- 
ive of another basic ideal expressed in 
he UN Charter, that of "faith in fun- 
amental rights, in the dignity and 
/orth of the human person, in equal 
ights of men and women and of nations 
irge and small." By allowing men and 
>'omen to pursue their own economic 
elf-interest, the market system max- 
iiizes individual freedom. In a market 
ystem the individual— not government— 
i paramount. 

In command-and-control economies, 
y contrast, the energy and productivity 
f the individual are appropriated by the 
bate. Economic coordination is secured 
y government coercion that intrudes 
ito individuals' decisions on where to 
'ork, what to buy, and even how many 
liildren to have. Government coercion 
; the antithesis of individual freedom 
nd human rights. 

The market system is not 
/nonymous with anarchy. A market 
ystem needs a rule of law that protects 
rivate property and enforces contracts, 
he development of international 
larkets advances a third objective of 
le UN Charter, the establishment of 
conditions under which justice and 
aspect for the obligations arising from 
'eaties and other sources of interna- 
onal law can be maintained." 

There are encouraging signs that, 
Fter being overlooked too long, these 
rinciples now are being quietly 
:knowiedged and cautiously put into 
ractice. In their national policies and 
ilateral relations with the United 
tates, many developing countries have 
imed toward market mechanisms. The 
yo most populous countries in the 
;orld— China and India— have begun 
owly to deregulate, decentralize, and 
Deralize their economies. The more 
ymamic economies of Asia have already 
lowii that full participation in the open 
•ading system is the key to economic 
ivancement. 

It is not only in Asia that success 
.cries are found. In Africa, nations like 
otswana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and 
laire have increased the scope given to 
larket forces. The Nigerian Govem- 
ient recently opened a public debate on 
^onomic policy, and it is emphasizing 
16 important role the market should 

ay. 



The UN Debate on 
International Economic Issues 

Unfortunately, these positive 
developments have hardly penetrated 
the sterile debate on international 
economic issues at the UN General 
Assembly and the UN Conference on 
Trade aiid Development (UNCTAD). 
For instance, despite progress on debt 
that is quietly supported by debtor na- 
tions, their UN delegations continue to 
parrot timewom calls for global 
economic conferences and negotiations. 
The call is continued without regard for 
whether such conferences would have 
practical benefits for developing 
countries. 

Since the need for debt relief varies 
widely from country to country, con- 
ferences are not likely to address the in- 
dividual needs of debtors but are likely 
to be harmful. By treating alike coun- 
tries with solvable, short-tei-m problems 
and countries that have more fundamen- 
tally mismanaged their economies, con- 
ferences convey the impression that all 
the participating debtors are poor credit 
risks. 

Although there is gi-owing recogni- 
tion that sound domestic pohcies are 
critical to economic development, 
reports of the UN Second Committee 
and UNCTAD continue to imply that 
development can occur only if developed 
countries donate unrestricted and ever- 
increasing amounts of charity. These 
major UN bodies seem unable to come 
to grips with the central role of 
domestic economic pohcies in economic 
development. Fortunately, their per- 
formance is in sharp contrast to the ex- 
cellent advice and technical support for 
developing countries provided by such 
specialized UN agencies as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. 

Although developing countries 
clearly gain from the open trading 
system— and could gain even more from 
further trade liberalization under a new 
trade round— UN debate in New York 
focuses on demands for unilateral trade 
concessions from developed countries to 
developing countries. Free trade is not a 
one-way street, and political realities 
will not allow markets to remain open 
forever to exports of newly industiializ- 
ing countries without at least the pros- 
pect of reciprocal rights and benefits 
among trading partners. Nor are high 
trade barriers in the interest of the 
developing countries themselves. Again 
the world is fortunate that there is a 
specialized UN agency— the GATT— 
where it is still possible to address 



many trade issues in a realistic fashion, 
soon in the context of a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. But even 
in the GATT, too many developing coun- 
tries resist progress on a new trade 
round and cling to ancient dogmas. 

Despite growing acknowledgment 
that private direct foreign investment is 
an attractive alternative to debt financ- 
ing, some representatives of developing 
countries in the United Nations continue 
to seek rigorous codes to restrict 
transnational companies. The UN 
rhetoric reinforces the notion that most 
developing countries are hostile to 
foreign investors, thus discouraging in- 
vestment and, along with it, the 
associated transfer of technology and 
know-how. 

Resources in the United Nations 
continue to be devoted to the many ac- 
tivities of the UN Centre on Transna- 
tional Corporations. Unfortunately, the 
center accomplishes nothing because it 
insists on playing pohtics. It refuses to 
apply a uniform set of criteria that 
would encompass both public and 
private entei-prises, regardless of 
whether they are from the West or the 
East. If the center contends that 
transnational corporations are evil, then 
Soviet transnational corporations must 
be just as evil as those of the United 
States. But, of course, there is a more 
fundamental problem with the center's 
activity— namely, that it has sought only 
to condemn and restrict transnational 
corporations instead of fostering the 
benefits they can bring to the develop- 
ment process. If we are to restore con- 
fidence to international investors, it will 
be necessary to bring balance to UN ac- 
tivities in this field. 

Toward a More Realistic 
and Effective UN Role 

Now and then we see glimmers of light. 
Individual delegates from developing 
countries are beginning to recognize 
that the confrontational tactics and 
ideological extremes of the past have 
done nothing to bring their nations the 
economic development they seek. At a 
recent UNCTAD meeting, an African 
delegate sat through hours of discussion 
analyzing a report written by a Soviet 
national employed by the United Na- 
tions. The report disingenuously argued 
that the trade surplus the East bloc was 
running with LDC Dess developed coun- 
tries] countries contributed greatly to 
LDC development. Finally, the African 
delegate threw up his hands in disgust 
and said, "We have had enough analysis 



anuary 1986 



55 



EUROPE 



on the Soviet-LDC trade. What we want 
to know is how we can market our com- 
modities in your country." He got no 
satisfactory answer, of course, because 
the Soviet' Union and its economic part- 
ners have neither the desire nor the 
ability to serve as important markets 
for developing countries. 

Members of the large gi-oup of 
developing countries which gathers 
unders the G-77 banner are coming to 
realize that their economic needs and 
problems are not uniform. They see that 
they must seek solutions tailored 
realistically to their individual problems. 
There also are modest signs of 
resistance among developing countries 
to continuing to march in lockstep sup- 
port of unrealistic, ideological positions 
that in UNCTAD, ECOSOC [Economic 
and Social Council], and UNIDO [UN 
Industrial Development Organization] 
have prevented pragmatic problem 
solving. 

We see the brightest spots in the 
work of some of the UN technical 
organizations. For example, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and 
the World Food Program have provided 
focal points for international efforts to 
deal with the African hunger crisis. 
They have distributed record amounts 
of emergency food aid and played an im- 
portant role in coordinating the efforts 
of donors, in addition to their regular 
food aid in support of economic develop- 
ment. The World Health Organization 
(WHO), the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), the Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), and the International Maritime 
Organization (I MO) have sought prac- 
tical solutions to real problems. WHO 
works to limit the spread of global 
health problems; it eliminated smallpox 
from the face of the earth, a monu- 
mental accomplishment. IAEA supports 
our commitment to nuclear nonprolifera- 
tion. ICAO has been the central point 
for reducing the threat of terrorism to 
civil aviation. In the aftermath of the 
Achille Lauro piracy, we will look to 
the IMO to help halt terrorism at sea. 

The effectiveness of the various UN 
organizations and agencies in the future 
will depend on the success of U.S. and 
Western efforts to undertake reform 
throughout the UN system. The United 
States for one, pursues this objective 
vigorously. We have had some minor 
success, in UNCTAD, for example, we 
now see some progress being made 
under improved leadership, although, 
admittedly, against a backdrop of the 
usual unfocused and duplicative work 



programs which have been the hallmark 
of UNCTAD. The Secretariat has been 
forced to recognize that it does not exist 
solely to advocate G-77 political causes, 
no matter how impractical they may be. 
It is learning that an ideologically 
neutral Secretariat can be an effective 
prodevelopment Secretariat. We have 
seen, for example, major improvements 
in the latest UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Report, an analysis of 
world economic conditions; for the first 
time in many years, the report was 
written objectively enough to be taken 
seriously. 

Unfortunately, it sometimes seems 
that we take two steps backward for 
every three forward. We spend inor- 
dinate amounts of time in childish 
bickering over fatuous resolutions that 
are irrelevant to development problems. 

Conclusion 

To sum up, the United States has a 
straightforward goal in its work in the 
United Nations on economic and social 
issues. We want the United Nations to 



come to understand that development is 
possible only if it is gi-ounded in in- 
dividual initiative, private property, a 
rule of law, and freedom. We want to 
ensure that the activities of the United 
Nations return to the fundamental prin- 
ciples set out in the UN Charter. We 
want to channel the economic and social 
progi-ams of the United Nations into ac- 
tivities that really do promote "social 
progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom," that support the rule 
of law, and that strengthen human 
rights. 

We recognize that, as the President 
pointed out, there are deep and abiding 
differences among the nations of the 
world. Market-oriented approaches to in 
ternational economic and social relations 
will not dissolve these differences, but 
they can reduce the chances that 
economic and social tensions become 
politicized and lead to conflict. By pro- 
moting greater reliance on the market, 
the United Nations would reinforce its 
other efforts "to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war."! 



U.K.-lreland Agreement 
Concerning Northern Ireland 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 15, 1985' 

I am delighted to join with Speaker [of 
the House of Representatives Thomas 
P.] O'Neill in welcoming the important 
Anglo- Irish accord announced today by 
Mrs. Thatcher and Dr. FitzGerald. We 
applaud its promise of peace and a new 
dawn for the troubled communities of 
Northern Ireland. I wish to congratulate 
my two good friends— and outstanding 
Prime Ministers— who have demon- 
strated such statesmanship, vision, and 
courage. 

The peoples of the United Kingdom 
and of Ireland have made a great con- 
tribution to the political and intellectual 
heritage of the United States and to our 
economic and social development. We 
are particularly pleased that these two 
neighbors— faithful friends of America, 
so close to the United States in their 
ties of history, kinship, and commitment 
to democratic values— have joined on a 
common causeway toward hope and har- 
mony in Northern Ireland. All 
Americans— and above all, those of Irish 
descent who have prayed for an end to 



violence in the land of their ancestry 
can take pride in this important step 
forward. 

We view this agreement as a clear 
demonstration of British and Irish 
determination to make progress conceri 
ing Northern Ireland and in their 
bilateral relations. Given the complex 
situation in Northern Ireland, all may 
not applaud this agreement. But let me 
state that the United States strongly 
supports this initiative, which pledges t 
both communities in Northern Ireland 
respect for their rights and traditions 
within a society free from violence and 
intimidation. 

On a number of occasions, we have 
joined the Irish and British Govern- 
ments in condemning violence and 
discord in Northern Ireland and calling 
on all Americans not to assist, either 
\rith money or moral support, those 
misguided "efforts that prolong the 
nightmare for terrorism and hatred. Oi 
call is even more compelling now that 
framework for peace has been agreed 
upon. I wish to reconfirm and reinforce 



Department of State Bulle 



EUROPE 



ir condemnation of terrorism wherever 
may take place. 

Now that a framework has been 
itablished, the work of constructing a 
irable peace must proceed. This will 
volve rebuilding what has been 
!stroyed by hatred and violence and 
ving hope to those who have been 
mpted by despair. We have often en- 
uraged Americans to let their foreign 
vestments and vacation dollai-s, and 
e employment opportunities that ac- 
mpany such spending, find their way 
the Emerald Isle. I am proud that 
orthern Ireland enterprises in which 
merican money is involved are among 
e most progressive in promoting equal 
iportunity for all. 

The British and Irish Governments 
,ve pledged their cooperation in pro- 
ating the economic and social develop- 
3nt of those areas, in both parts of 
eland, which have suffered from the 
stability of recent years. 

It is entirely fitting that the United 
ates and other governments join this 
portant endeavor. As President 
irter said on August 30, 1977: "In the 
ent of a settlement, the U.S. Govern- 
mt would be prepared to join with 
hers to see how additional job-creating 
.'estment could be encouraged to the 
nefit of all the people of Northern 
3land." 

There are many in Congress who 
ve shown their concern and sympathy 
• the people of Northern Ireland. And 
vill be working closely with the Con- 
ess, in a bipartisan effort, to find 
igible ways for the United States to 
id practical support to this important 
reement. The Speaker, who has kind- 
joined me at the White House today, 
d I have already discussed how the 
lited States could assist in promoting 
ace, friendship, and harmony between 
e two great Irish traditions. 

In closing, peiTnit me to underscore 
r heartfelt support for this courageous 
i determined effort to promote peace 
i reconciliation in Northern Ireland. 



Secretary's Visit to Northern Europe 



'Text frum Weekly Compilation of 
;sidential Documents of Nov. 18, 1985.1 



Secretary Shultz departed 
Washington. D. C, on November 2, 
1985, to visit Finland (Nov. 3-W, the 
Soviet Union (Nov. lt-5), and Iceland 
(Nov. 5-6). He returned to Washington 
on November 6. 

Following are news conferences 
held by the Secretary in Moscow and 
Reykjavik. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

MOSCOW, 

NOV. 5, 1985 

We all have just concluded around 14 
hours of intensive chscussion, with 
General Secretary Gorbachev this morn- 
ing, with Foreign Minister Shevard- 
nadze yesterday and this afternoon. In 
addition, a small group from our delega- 
tion met with a small group of theirs 
and tried to define further some of the 
issues that we have been talking about. 
We came here to exchange views, and 
w'e did so in a systematic manner: in 
painstaking detail with the Foreign 
Minister, and on a more general basis, 
or discursive basis, with the General 
Secretary. This has allowed each of us 
to explore all the possibilities and to ex- 
plore the nature of problems and oppor- 
tunities that involve our two countries, I 
might say not only in the sense of 
preparing for the meeting in Geneva 
between President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev, but more general- 
ly to examine our relationship, thinking 
of this meeting, and even such a major 
event as the one taking place in Geneva, 
as part of a process that we would like 
to see continued. In evaluating our 
discussions, I would say that there was 
nothing surprising in them. We an- 
ticipated a frank and thorough review of 
the issues; that's what we had. And I 
think this kind of across the board 
survey is important in its owTi right, 
and a useful part of the process of 
assembling of more constructive rela- 
tions between our two countries. 

As we broke up late this afternoon, 
as we had had a custom of doing, we 
now always pick out a few words to use 
to characterize these discussions, and I 
think we would agi'ee that this meeting, 
set of meetings, have been an important 
part of the preparations for the Geneva 
meeting. They've been frank; we have 
identified respective positions; we've 
seen some positive developments; we 



also see that there are many serious dif- 
ferences between us, which, I suppose, 
only suggest the need for the meeting 
that we anticipate. And so as we broke 
up we wished for success in the upcom- 
ing Geneva meeting and beyond, and 
pledged to each other that we would 
work hard for continuing preparations, 
inspired, so to speak, by the importance 
of this endeavor. If you have any ques- 
tions, I'd be glad to try them; if they're 
too difficult, I'll ask Ambassador [Paul] 
Nitze or Mr. [Robert] McFarlane or 
Ambassador [Arthur] Hartman to 
[inaudible]. 

Q. You spoke of some positive 
developments. Could you possibly 
identify them for us? 

A. I think first of all, a deep ex- 
change of views in itself is a positive 
development. We have tried to work at 
all the issues, and there are quite a 
range of them. I can't say that anything 
definitive was settled as such, although 
we did, I think, narrow our differences 
in some, but as I said there are deep 
differences remaining. 

Q. Would you say now there is an 
understanding— not in writing, but a 
general understanding— that to pursue 
the dialogue you spoke of, there ought 
to be more than one summit meeting, 
that perhaps, a year or so after this 
meeting, it would be a good thing for 
them to meet again? 

A. There has been no real e.xplora- 
tion of that although obviously the ques- 
tion of where do we go from here— and 
undoubtedly a part of where we go from 
here involves subsequent meetings, not 
only of the heads but of others. So that 
question is before us, but nothing has 
been settled about it. 

Q. Could you tell us a little bit 
about your meeting with Mr. Gor- 
bachev, and what the two of you 
discussed, with as much specificity as 
possible? 

A. I can easily do it with as much 
specificity as possible, but I think on the 
whole I'd prefer not to go into the 
detailed substance of these exchanges, 
as they're part of a process that we're 
working on. But it went on for quite a 
long while— the General Secretary had 
to break off a little before 2:00, as he 
was dedicating a Lenin statue here— but 
so we had close to 4 hours of— I think 
the only way to describe it is vigorous 
discussion. And he's accustomed to in- 
terrupting and e.xpressing a view, and 



nuary 1986 



iini 



57 



EUROPE 



so when in Moscow, do as those in 
Moscow do: we interrupted too. And so 
we had a very vigorous exchange, and I 
think it's helpful to both sides to get a 
sense of the way each thinks about 
these issues, the vigor of the view, and 
so on. So in that sense it was very good, 
and I would say it covered everything. 
There was hardly a subject you can 
think of that wasn't in some manner 
referred to or touched on. 

Q. Just to follow that up, how do 
you think he and Mr. Reagan might 
interrelate on this question of inter- 
rupting and having vigorous 
discussion? 

A. That remains to be seen. But the 
President is an old hand at this, and ob- 
viously the General Secretary is. So I— 
from my standpoint that will be 
something of a spectator sport— I'm 
looking forward to it. 

Q. Did the subject of Vitaly Yur- 
chenko come up, and the charges that 
he has made about the United States? 

A. The charges that he has made 
are totally false. Insofar as what hap- 
pens to him is concerned, we follow a 
practice in the case of a person who has 
given strong indication of a desire to 
stay in the United States, and that prac- 
tice will be followed faithfully in this 
case. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Air Service 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV. 22, 1985' 

American and Soviet civil aviation 
delegations met November 18-22 in 
Moscow to discuss the resumption of 
direct air service between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. The two sides 
have reached tentative agreement to 
resume regularly scheduled service be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Regularly scheduled flights 
would serve Moscow, Leningrad, New 
York, and Washington. It is anticipated 
that service will begin in 1986. 
Designated carriers for this service vrill 
be Pan American for the United States 
and Aeroflot for the U.S.S.R. 



'Read to news correspondents by Charles 
Redman, State Department deputy 
spokesman. ■ 



Q. Did it come up? 

A. We had a very brief discussion of 
it at the end. 

Q. Can you tell me if the Soviets 
expressed any interest in Mr. 
Reagan's remarks about SDI [Strate- 
gic Defense Initiative] in the interview 
with Soviet journalists, to wit, that 
the United States would only deploy 
this after offensive missiles had been 
removed? 

A. He had a general— we had a 
discussion, as I say, about everything, 
including SDI, but I don't think any 
particular statement was picked out in 
that discussion. But we certainly 
discussed the issue, and I think they are 
well aware of the importance the Presi- 
dent attaches to this issue 

Q. Did the Soviets here in Moscow 
give a response to the counteroffer, or 
counter-counteroffer, whatever one 
wishes to term it, that was put down 
by the United States in Geneva just a 
few days ago. and either in that con- 
nection or some other connection, was 
there here some narrowing of the posi- 
tions between the two countries on the 
subject of the arms negotiations which 
are going on? 

A. There was a narrowdng with 
respect to those nuclear and space talks. 
We presented the U.S. position as it has 
been presented in Geneva, although in a 
much briefer style, and they made some 
obsei-vations which they labelled as 
preliminary, but neither side regarded 
this as the appropriate place to 
negotiate on that subject. We have the 
negotiations in Geneva, and that's 
where we beUeve the negotiations 
should take place. So there wasn't any 
real effort to try to turn this into a 
negotiating forum as such. 

Q. Can you say whether propor- 
tionally more time was spent on arms 
control than on other subjects? Can 
you just give us some idea of how the 
time was split up? 

A. First, in responding to your ques- 
tion, let me note, as you know, that 
there's a lot of arms control other than 
what's being discussed in the nuclear 
and space arms talks. We presented our 
views about that subject, and all of the 
other arms control settings, the posi- 
tions of the United States, and sugges- 
tions of the United States. And I don't 
have in my head how long that took, 
and they had some responses, and then 
scattered through our conversations 
there were references to arms control. I 
don't know, I haven't toted it up that 
way, but certainly both sides agree that 



this is a subject of central importance. 
It's not the only subject: regional issue 
are of great importance, bilateral issue 
are of importance, human rights issues 
are of importance. The— perhaps 
underneath it all there is more to be 
said than perhaps we all realize— I feel 
this after these exchanges-to having 
frank arguments that kind of bring out 
to us the fact that the view here of th. 
United States is very different from 
what we think the reality is. From soi 
of their reactions, maybe they think w 
don't understand their reahty. But at 
any rate, it's worthwhile to dig in on 
that basis, and we certainly did that ii 
a major way, and I'm sure that that 
kind of thing will continue, and there 
should be that kind of exchange as we 
in Geneva. 

Q. If there was some narrowing 
issues and it wasn't in the main arn 
control areas, was it in regional, wa 
it in bilateral, was it in human righ 
could you give us some flavor? 

A. I don't want to overdo the nar- 
rowing of issues. It's-I was going to 
say that would be gilding the lily, but 
don't know whether the lily is the rig 
image to cast up here. I think that th' 
thorough explanation of what we thin; 
on all these various subjects and why, 
and what we propose, and listening tc 
their responses, hearing their views, i 
did a great deal of that, very painstal- 
ing and systematic, with— going dowTi 
list so to "speak. So in that sense, I 
think, perhaps there was some narrov 
ing. But as I said, I can't-maybe the 
are one or two things that we can saj 
"Yeah, we agreed on that, we agreed 
that," but basically we have a lot of 
work to do. 

Q. With 2 weeks left before the 
summit, does it look at all realistic 
for us to expect anything like an 
agreement in principle on arms 
negotiations or a final communique 
that has any substantive agreement 
in it. or is it more likely now that i 
would be, as you've sketched out, 
more or less a laundry list of where 
the two sides differ? 

A. As far as what likelihoods are 
the former part of the question, I 
wouldn't bet the New York Times on 

Q. You wouldn't bet that there' 
be anything [inaudible]? 

A. No, I wouldn't, but I don't- 1 
think these things are open, but ther 
nothing from our discussions today fi 
which to draw that conclusion. But tl 
have made, after quite a distance of 



Deoartment of State Bui 



EUROPE 



le, a counterproposal to what we put 
the table in Geneva, and we have, 
her quickly, given a counter- 
inteiproposal. The Geneva negotia- 
ns have been extended a little bit, so 
3ple are talking, that's— and that's 
)Ut all you can say on it. 

Q. You say the Yurchenko matter 
1 come up. Did this, and the Em- 
5sy episode in Kabul and the Soviet 
iman— do these events at all im- 
ige on the atmosphere, or were you 
ally insulated from these events? 

A. I don't think they particularly im- 
ged on our talks. We were very in- 
sive and hardworking on this. Of 
irse, we have been working on the 
bul part before we came here, and as 
urned out, it got resolved, I think, 
•ing the first day of our meetings, in 
ordance with the proper application 
uii- principles. It obviously is the sort 
;hing that takes up time, but we 
n't talk about it. We might have if it 
1 dragged on, but it didn't. 

Q. What you're describing sounds 
i a shouting match between you 
i- 

A. No, it was— there was none. 
It's— I think one of the points that 
ds to be made here is that the at- 
sphere was far from a shouting 
:ch, quite the reverse. The discus- 
is wei-e straightfci-ward, frank, as I 
1, the atmosphere was quite cordial 
I think reflected a desire to use the 
e as effectively as could be. So it 
m't— there was no sense of a 
uting match at all. 

Q. May I ask a followup, a related 
stion? The groups that were ap- 
nted to define further the issues- 
Id they be called drafting groups? 

A. They were not particularly a 
fting gi'oup. You see, by this time 
have a fairly well known to each 
2r set of things that we're stnaggling 
h, and we talked about them for 
•e or less 8 hours, and then we 
jght it might be worthwhile to have 
nailer gi-oup- 1 think we had three 
3aeh side— discuss a few of these 
es, and see if they could make a lit- 
more headway. Now, obviously when 
take up a subject, and you want to 
whether you agree on it or not, and 
ou think in a general way you do, it 
s to write something dowm and see if 
rybody will sign on to that. So in 
; sense, there's a little drafting in- 
'ed, but that's not really— it's not 
ut drafting, it's about trying to see if 
really can come to an agi-eement on 
le matter. 



Q. Do you have an agenda now? Is 
the American side ready for the sum- 
mit, or is there some major issue that 
still needs to be resolved? 

A. There's a lot of work to do, in my 
opinion. We intend to do it. Whether or 
not there'll be more set in by the time 
the middle of November emerges, ar- 
rives, or not, remains to be seen. But 
there are quite a few things that I think 
may very well yield to further work, 
and we have agreed. Through our 
i-espective embassies, and through the 
negotiating groups that are at work now 
on various issues— for instance, there's a 
trilateral group meeting in Washington 
starting yesterday on the Northern 
Pacific air problem, and so on, and there 
are a lot of these going on— to keep 
pushing. So there's lots of work to do. 
And I would say that while, of course, 
the fact that there is going to be a big 
meeting in Geneva coming up tends to 
be useful as a kind of bureaucratic 
device to get people to decide things, at 
the same time life doesn't end in the 
middle of November. And in fact the 
whole pur]3ose is not just to see if we 
can have a meeting where people come 
and talk, but whether or not through all 
the things that are going on it is possi- 
ble to develop a more constructive rela- 
tionship between these two countries. 
And we know it's hard, because the dif- 
ferences are wide. 

Q. There have been a number of 
suggestions in the last few weeks that 
there might be some changes in Soviet 
human rights policy. Did you pursue 
those in your meetings, and at the end 
of the meetings, do you think there is 
a chance that there would be some 
changes in Soviet human rights 
policy? 

A. The subject was certainly dis- 
cussed, as a matter of fact rather fully. 
But I don't have anything that I can tell 
you. I don't mean that I have some 
things, but I can't tell you, but I have 
nothing to report as to what possible 
outcome there may be. 

Q. Will any of the working groups 
that were established here at this 
meeting remain in operation? Will 
anyone remain here or return here 
between now and the middle of 
November, or vice-versa, will the 
members of the Soviet working groups 
come to Washington to continue that 
process? 

A. The real working groups, of 
course, are the people who are 
negotiating different things, like the e.x- 
changes agi-eement, on the consulates, 
and so on. Those are the designated 



working groups. As far as the three 
people who met last night are concern- 
ed, that was just kind of a rump session 
that we put together, and it isn't 
necessarily to continue. We don't plan to 
leave anybody behind; the Embassy 
here is very well staffed, and Am- 
bassador Hartman knows more about 
these issues than anybody, so we're well 
prepared here to follow through. But if 
it turns out that we think it's useful to 
have a little more exchange, we're quite 
prepared to move people back and forth, 
and I assume they are too. 

Q. Were you disappointed by the 
lack of progress in narrowing issues? 

A. I said in my opening statement 
that the views expressed were not sur- 
prising, and I think that we're still very 
much in that process of pushing along, 
and a word like disappointment or ela- 
tion or whatever is— it's a function of 
what your expectations were, as much 
as anything else, so I guess I'd have to 
say no, I wasn't turned on or off one 
way or another. It reminds me a little 
bit about the other day, I was playing 
golf, and I had a putt to make, and 
there was quite a little curve on the 
green. I asked the caddy how much he 
thought the putt would break: he said 
"more than you think." And I stopped 
and I thought about that a little bit. 
Same kind of question. 

Q. At this point, do you see the 
possibility of agreement on any of the 
substantive issues outstanding between 
these two countries at the summit? 

A. You give me pretty wide range— 
"any." And so I confidently answer that 
question "yes" [inaudible], but that isn't 
necessarily saying a lot. 

Q. Which ones? 

A. I'm not going to go into that. 

Q. Did you get some new informa- 
tion about Andrei Sakharov and Elena 
Bonner? 

A. The information that we had 
about Mrs. Bonner we had before I left 
Washington, and nothing that I've heard 
here has changed that; in fact, it's only 
been confirmed further by the various 
things that are public knowledge. 

Q. Did you discuss the possibility 
of Mr. Gorbachev appearing [inaudi- 
ble] on American television before the 
summit? 

A. The subject of television ap- 
pearances is one of the items in the— we 
discuss in the exchanges agreement. But 
I would point out to you that Mr. Gor- 
bachev appears on American television 
all the time, because— when he was in 



luary 1986 



59 



EUROPE 



France, he was being interviewed, it 
was all shown— that's in the nature of 
our system. Whomever the news people 
think the American people want to see, 
they'll show, and we'd like to see it the 
other way around as well, but unfor- 
tunately it isn't that way. I might say 
we were disappointed that the interview 
given by President Reagan was not 
reproduced in full, and that didn't seem 
to us quite a fair way to proceed. 

Q. After your meetings, do you 
still believe that the Soviet proposals 
on disarmament in Euromissiles is 
aimed at driving a wedge between 
North America and its Western Euro- 
pean Allies? 

A. I've never said that, so I don't 
want you to put words in my mouth. On 
the other hand, I think it is a quite 
readily observable fact that the Soviet 
Union for a long time has tried to divide 
the United States from our allies, and it 
is quite obviously a tactic that hasn't 
succeeded, and the alliance is very 
strong— not only the North Atlantic 
Alliance, but our relationships with 
others around the world. As you know, 
the President met with five others, 
European and Japan, in New York, last 
week, I guess it was, and it was a very 
successful and warm and supportive 
meeting. 

Q. You said that in the course of 
your discussions you've gathered that 
the view here of the United States is 
very different from what reality is. 
What misconceptions does Mr. Gor- 
bachev have about the United States? 

A. I'm not going to try to go into all 
of those ins and outs, but I suppose it 
isn't really even surprising that 
somebody who has never been in the 
United States and not been subjected to 
a wide array of competing flows of infor- 
mation and news and analysis that we 
tend to see all the time would have 
misinformation. So we hope that 
through the process of discussion and 
visits here of people and so on that a 
better picture will emerge. 

Q. Could you tell us what propor- 
tion of the preparation you feel are 
completed, and, at this point, what 
your assessment is of the prospects for 
a successful summit? 

A. The meeting will take place. And 
we have been preparing. What will be 
accomplished between now and then 
that will help the meeting to be produc- 
tive, of course, I don't know; we'll work 
on it. But it's kind of impossible for me 
to envisage some sort of amount of 



preparations and then carve a percen- 
tage into it. But I do believe that, in the 
end, both leaders are likely to be very 
well prepared for this meeting; that we 
have done a reasonable job of creating a 
mutual understanding of how the 
meeting will be set up and how it will 
flow and what topics there will be and 
things of that kind, and of exploring 
each other's views enough so that I can 
give a pretty good I'undown to Presi- 
dent Reagan of just where the Soviets 
stand on various things, and no doubt 
the same can be said on the other side. 
So I don't know quite how to put a pro- 
portion dowm, but I think that the 
preparations for the meeting will be 
pretty good in the end. 

Q. And the assessment for 
success— do you think, at the end of 
it, both leaders will be happy with 
what resulted? 

A. I don't have any way of knowing, 
and success of course is a question of 
expectations again. I think that, at least 
in my owai judgment, the measure of 
whether the meeting was worthwhile is 
most likely, and most importantly for 
that matter, to be taken by both men 
themselves, what do they think. And if 
it was worth the really very large ex- 
penditure of time and effort to them, in 
their view, as they see things unfolding, 
then I'd say it's a success. If they don't 
think so, but yet various things happen 
that lead other people to think it's a 
success, I wouldn't feel that good about 
it. So I think it's, at this stage of the 
game, quite a personal thing, and I 
know from the side of President 
Reagan, he is working very hard at it, 
and is genuinely desirous of seeing not 
simply a good meeting in Geneva— that's 
really not so important in the scheme of 
things— in the scheme of things what's 
important is that the relationship be- 
tween these two very important coun- 
tries have a turn for the better. That's 
the name of the game. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

REYKJAVIK, 

NOV. 6, 19852 

We have been very pleased to have had 
a chance for an hour or so visit here 
with the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister. This is part of our 
process of maintaining close consultation 
with our friends in Iceland and hearing 
their views and letting them hear ours 
about outstanding developments. 



Of course, the primary focus in tht- 
relations between two friendly countri 
as we are has to be on the direct rela- 
tions between us. So we spent a fair 
fraction of our time this morning, half 
so, discussing the shipping issue, and 
was pleased to be able to report that 
our Department of Justice has decidec 
to appeal the decision made on the ac- 
tions of the U.S. Government. So that 
appeal will be going forward, and in t 
meantime our government seeks a sta 
on the decision made, which we think 
an incorrect decision, and we hope for 
although we can't know of course whi 
a court wall rule, but we hope for a st 
to be issued certainly before the end > 
this month. So we are working very 
hard on the shipping issue and we do 
believe that shipping determined on t 
basis of competitive bids is the right 
way to do it. It makes sense in terms- 
our system of thought about competi- 
tion, and so we favor that. 

We also had some discussion abou 
whaling problems, and I have a 
memorandum from the Prime Ministei 
on that. We'll look into that and see 
that that subject doesn't become a 
problem. 

We also had an opportunity to giv 
a description of what happened durinj; 
our most recent trip, Mr. McFarlane'i- 
and mine, to Moscow and to discuss 
basically our alliance relationships and 
the alliance approach to East- West re\ 
tions generally. I was interested to he* 
from my friends here about the recen 
visit of Mr. Shevardnadze to Iceland, 
we managed to keep ourselves closely-| 
consultation. And I think that's the w 
in which you maintain the strength of 
the alliance that's been such an out- 
standing fact of life here in recent 
times. 

If you have any questions I'll be 
glad to try them. If you have tough 
questions, Mr. McFarlane will handle 
them. 

Q. Do you think the Rainbow 
navigation case has harmed the rela 
tionship between your countries? 

A. Not at all. Actually I think the 
questions raised by the Government c 
Iceland have been quite legitimate qu 
tions. And the Reagan Administratior 
has been supporting a line of effort tl 
I think is very much the same as you 
government viashes to pursue. 

Q. It seems 'that an agreement 
made this summer with the Icelandi 
Government didn't have much [inau 
ble]. The case was just delayed. [In- 
audible] and is this the case? 



60 



Department of State BulJii 



EUROPE 



A. What happened was our Ad- 

inistration, the Department of the 
avy, which is the branch of our 
ivei-nment that is administering this 
irticular case, made a decision involv- 
g an interpretation of our law. The 
■cision that we feel is right and I think 
lur government feels is right. And that 
icision was challenged in our courts. 
We live under the rule of law, as 
lu do, and an aggrieved party can 
allenge a decision of the government, 
id they did, and the judge in that case, 
Judge Green, ruled in favor of the 
allenger. And what I have told you to- 
.y is that our Justice Department has 
cided to appeal that decision. In other 
Drds, we don't agi-ee with it. We'll 
ke it to a higher court. In the mean- 
ne, we also seek a stay. So we are 
)rking within our judicial process to 
V to get this turned around. So I 
juldn't say that's meaningless. I would 
y that's a lot of effort going on to try 
get a good result and do it in the 
oper way. As we all know, in a free 
untry operating under the rule of law, 
u have a lot of pulling and hauling 
d that's the way we work. It's a terri- 
3 form of government. It's just better 
an any other alternative, that's all. 

Q. Are you optimistic after your 
;eting in Moscow? 

A. I don't like words like "op- 
listic" and "pessimistic." I'd rather 
)t describe the reahty, which is that 

have lots of issues, some of them 
ite deep, between ourselves and the 
viet Union, as you well know. And a 
ry extensive effort, a systematic ef- 
t, is being made to deal with those 
ues, both in a broad general way and 
terms of going through systematically 
i carefully a whole list of particular 
ngs that we are negotiating about. So 
i fact of the matter is that each side 
working at it hard and will continue 
do so. President Reagan and General 
cretary Gorbachev will have their 
mce to work at it too in the middle of 
vember. 

Q. You met with Mr. Gorbachev 
iterday and you work with Presi- 
it Reagan all the time. Given the 
lod and the climate of everything 
it is going on right now and know- 
', the personalities of the two men, 
at do you feel is perhaps the most 
sitive thing, one very positive thing, 
it would come out of this summit 
eting? 

A. I think the fact that we are talk- 
to each other instead of about each 
«r— it's one of President Reagan's 



favorite phrases— is a good thing. On the 
other hand, it isn't simply a question of 
getting acquainted. Or, I'll put it 
another way, the best way to get ac- 
quainted is to struggle together at 
substantive and important issues and 
see if something can be done with them. 
So there is a process that is underway. 
The setting of a meeting tends to in- 
vigorate that process. And no doubt the 
outcome of the meeting will be in part a 
continuing process, and you need to look 
at it that way. In terms of what 
substantive may be possible to bring 
about or announce at such a meeting, 
that very much remains to be seen, but 
there are a number of issues that are 
under review. 

Q. Is it true that in Moscow Mr. 
Gorbachev didn't seem to be properly 



informed of many of the issues that 
were discussed? 

A. He probably feels he is propeiiy 
informed, but it seemed to us that many 
statements made by various people on 
the Soviet side showed, in our view, a 
lack of understanding about how the 
United States works and what patterns 
of thinking are in the United States. 
They may feel we have the same picture 
of their owti country. But in any case I 
think when you see what seemed to 
each side to be misunderstanding, 
perhaps that shows the importance of 
having more interaction and ability to 
talk, explain, and let people see for 
themselves, and so that's what we're 
doing. 



'Press release 257 of Nov. 
^Press release 260 of Nov. 



1985. 



NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets 



The Nuclear Planning Group of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) met in Brussels October 29-30, 
1985. The United States was represented 
by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger. Following is the final com- 
munique issued on October 30. 

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
met in ministerial session at NATO Head- 
quarters on 29th and 30th October, 1985. 
Spain attended as an observer. 

On the eve of the meeting between Presi- 
dent Reagan and General Secretai-y Gor- 
bachev, we declare that the President goes to 
Geneva with the full support and solidarity of 
the Alliance. 

We reviewed the status of Alliance 
nuclear forces including the ongoing arms 
control negotiations in Geneva. In this con- 
text, we received comprehensive briefings by 
the United States secretary of defense on 
developments in the balance of nuclear 
forces, the arms control negotiations, the con- 
tinuing Soviet deployment, improvement and 
research programmes in the field of ballistic 
missile defense, and the United States 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research 
programme. We continue to support the 
United States and the United Kingdom ef- 
forts to maintain the credibility of their 
strategic nuclear deterrent in preserving 
security, peace and freedom. 

We welcome the opportunity for effective 
arms control offered by the Geneva negotia- 
tions now underway. We reviewed the status 
of the Geneva negotiations and expressed 
strong support for United States positions 
concerning intermediate, strategic, and 
defense and space systems. We discussed the 



prospects for progress in each of these areas 
stressing that close consultation among the 
Alliance partners remains essential. We hope 
that the recent Soviet counterproposals, 
despite their one-sided and self-serving 
nature, indicate a Soviet willingness to accept 
verifiable and equitable arms control 
agreements involving deep reductions in 
numbers of nuclear weapons. We stressed the 
flexibility contained in the United States pro- 
posals for significant reductions, which have 
been on the table since the opening of the 
negotiations. 

We received a detailed briefing from the 
United States secretary of defense on the 
evidence of Soviet treaty violations. We take 
the most serious view of this and call on the 
new Soviet leadership to take the steps 
necessary to assure full compliance with its 
commitments. We noted in this connection 
that a double standard of compliance with 
arms control agreements would be unaccept- 
able and would undermine the security of the 
Alliance. In this context, we reaffirmed the 
requirement for effective verification of, and 
full compliance with, all ai-ms control 
agreements. 

We continue to be concerned by the 
steady buildup of Soviet nuclear forces, in 
particular the testing and deployment of new- 
strategic systems, including the SS-X-24 and 
the recently deployed SS-25, the deployment 
of a new generation of air-launched cruise 
missiles and the preparation for deplo.\Tnent 
of ground- and sea-based versions. We also 
note that the total SS-20 force has fuilher in- 
creased to 441 launchers with 1,323 
warheads. Alliance policy in comparison is to 
maintain only the minimum number of 
nuclear weapons necessary for credible 
deterrence. 



luary 1986 



61 



EUROPE 



In accordance with the Montebello deci- 
sion, SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe] presented at our meeting in Luxem- 
bourg a programme to reduce NATO's 
nuclear stocl<pile in Europe by a further 
1,400 warheads by the end of 1988. These 
reductions are undei-way; they include the 
withdrawal of Atomic Demolition Munitions 
(ADMs), from the Alliance's nuclear stockpile. 
Taken together with the 1,000 warheads 
already withdrawn, this would reduce the 
number of nuclear warheads in the Alliance's 
stockpile to the lowest point in 20 years. At 
the Luxembourg meeting, SACEUR also 
presented his proposals to improve the 
responsiveness, effectiveness, and survivabili- 
ty of the remaining forces. At this meeting 
we received a progress report reflecting the 
status of SACEUR's proposals. We continued 
to review those reduction and improvement 
measures, recommended by SACEUR, which 
are currently being undertaken through the 
appropriate channels by the nations concern- 
ed. We agreed to consider periodically the 
progress of further implementation which 
depends on decisions by the nations 
concerned. 



We noted the progress made on longer 
range INF (LRINF) deployments by NATO 
nations and the fact that negotiations on INF 
systems are currently underway. We re- 
viewed, in particular, the status and the pros- 
pects for these negotiations and expressed 
support for the United States negotiating 
position developed in close consultation with 
its Allies. We emphasized NATO's deter- 
mination to continue the deployment of 
LRINF missiles as scheduled in the absence 
of a concrete negotiated result with the 
Soviet Union obviating the need for such 
deployment. At the same time, we reiterated 
our willingness to reverse, halt or modify the 
LRINF deployment-including the removal 
and dismantling of missiles already 
deployed— upon achievement of a balanced, 
equitable and verifiable agreement calling for 
such action. 

We accepted with pleasure an invitation 
from Dr. M. Wornei-, the German Minister of 
Defense, to hold our next meeting in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in spring 1986. 
Greece expressed its views in a statement 
included in the minutes. Denmark reserved 
its position on the INF part.H 



U.S. Role in the Case 
of Soviet Seaman l\/iedvid 



by Rozanne L. Ridgway 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
November 7, 1985. Ambassador 
Ridgway is Assistant Secretary for 
European and Canadian Affairs.^ 

I welcome the opportunity to testify 
today about the role of the Department 
of State in the case of Soviet Seaman 
Miroslav Medvid. This case, which 
focuses attention on the fundamental 
issue of political freedom, has drawn the 
attention of many concerned Americans 
and Members of Congress. 

Before I describe in detail the role 
we played in this case, I would like to 
underscore three important points. 

• First, that from the moment we 
were informed of this case, our objective 
was clear and straightforward: to 
remove Seaman Medvid from the Soviet 
ship in order to interview him in a 
neutral, nonthreatening environment 
under our control to determine whether 
or not he wished to remain here or 
return to the U.S.S.R. The operating 
assumption of the Department of State, 
the Department of Justice and the 
White House was that Seaman Medvid'? 
behavior in jumping from his ship and 



his resistance to being returned to it 
constituted presumptive evidence of his 
desire to remain in the United States. 

• Second, that decisions taken in 
this case, including the final decision to 
permit Seaman Medvid to sign a state- 
ment and return to his ship, were made 
at the highest levels of the White 
House, the Department of State, and 
the Department of Justice. 

• Third, that it is and will continue 
to be the general policy of the U.S. 
Government not to force individuals to 
return to a country where they would 
be persecuted on account of race, 
religion, ethnic origin, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opin- 
ion. This principle remained fully 
operative throughout our involvement in 
the case of Seaman Medvid. 

At 3:40 p.m. Friday, October 25, 

when it was first informed of this case 
by the Border Patrol Section of the Im- 
migration and Naturalization Service 
(INS), the Department of State im- 
mediately requested the U.S. Coast 
Guard and Treasury Department to take 
steps' to prevent the departure of the 
M. V. Konev from the Belle Chasse area 
of the port of New Orleans. We also im- 
mediately dispatched a Russian-speaking 
Foreign Service officer and an assistant 
legal adviser to the scene. 



The Department of State represen 
ative arrived in New Orleans and 
boarded the M. V. Konev at approx- 
imately 10:30 p.m. CST [Central Stanc 
ard Time] that night; from then on, th 
United States had a team of at least 
officials aboard the Soviet vessel at al 
times until Seaman Medvid was 
transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard 
ter Salvia on October 28. This team ii 
eluded representatives of the Depart- 
ment of State, the INS, the Treasury 
Department (Customs Service), and a 
U.S. Navy doctor. From the evening 
October 26 an expert interpreter re- 
tained by the Department of State w; 
also on the scene to ensure there wot 
be no difficulty in communicating witl 
Seaman Medvid. Of Uki-ainian heritag 
himself, this interpreter was fluent in 
both Russian and Uki-ainian and was 
able to communicate with Seaman Mt 
vid in both languages. 

Prior to our arrival on the scene, 
INS officials had observed Seaman M 
vid on the M.V. Konev during the aft 
noon of Friday, October 25, and they 
reported that he was in bed and ap- 
peared to be sedated; there was a ba 
dage on his left wTist and it was 
reported that Seaman Medvid had 
inflicted a laceration on his forearm. 
Department of State representative f 
saw Seaman Medvid on Saturday, Oc 
tober 26, at approximately 3:00 p.m. 
CST. A U.S. doctor conducted a 
preliminary physical examination and 
reported that Seaman Medvid was ah 
and that he appeared to be in genera 
good condition; he did not appear to I 
sedated or under the influence of dru 
During that examination Seaman Mec 
vid told the Department of State 
representative that he wished to retu 
to the U.S.S.R. and asked whether w 
had any questions for him. Our 
repi-esentative replied that we would I 
reserve our questions until we could 
range a formal interview off the Sovi 
vessel. 

From the stall we made clear to 
Soviets that Seaman Medvid had to 1: 
removed from the Soviet ship to be i: 
terviewed in a nonthreatening enviro 
ment under our control. In diplomati( 
discussions with the Soviet Embassy, 
we made clear that if Soviet officials 
not agree to this demand, we were 
prepared to remove Seaman Medvid 
from the M.V. Konev by force if 
necessary. As a result of these 
diplomatic discussions it was agi-eed 
that Seaman Medvid would be trans- 
ferred from the M. V. Konev to the I 



62 



EUROPE 



ast Guard cutter Salvia for an inter- 
w in an environment where he would 
free from coercion. The transfer oc- 
■red without incident at appi-oximate- 
1:30 p.m. CST on Monday, October 
after Hurricane Juan, which was 
sing over the New Orleans area, 
ited. Upon arrival on the Salvia, 
iman Medvid was offered some 
reshment and an opportunity to rest 
relax, which he declined. 
The interview was conducted by a 
te Department representative in the 
;'d room of the Salvia. Also present 
'e a U.S. Navy doctor, an INS of- 
il, our intei-preter, and four Soviets: 
I officials from the Soviet Embassy, a 
■iet doctor and the master of the 
/. Konev. We allow the Soviet 
sence during such interviews in 
er to ensure our very important 
its to similar access to Americans in 
Soviet Union. However, the meeting 
I structured so that at no time were 
Soviets present allowed to in- 
idate Seaman Medvid. At the 
?ting only one Soviet representative 
, allowed to speak, and then only at 
start and end of the interview: he 
not allowed to interrupt while the 
lar-tment of State interviewer ques- 
ed Seaman Medvid or while Seaman 
Ivid responded. Not present during 
interview, but aboard the Coast 
.rd cutter to assist if required, were 
additional Department of State 
•esentatives including an assistant 
.1 adviser, and also a U.S. Air Force 
Aiatrist, and representatives from 
i, the Border Patrol, and the U.S. 
toms Service. The interview was 
lucted through the U.S. interpreter 
oth Russian and English. 
Shortly after the intei-view began, 
ever. Seaman Medvid said he felt 
5eous, and he asked to go outside for 
e fresh air. At that time, the sea 
still rough as a result of Hurricane 
1 and the Coast Guard vessel was 
tig as a result of the turbulent 
;r. Seaman Medvid was escorted to 
deck and attended to by the U.S. 
y medical doctor who recommended 
he lie dowTi in the ship's sickbay. 
Soviet medical doctor was present 
ti observer but did not participate in 
reatment. After approximately a 
hour. Seaman Medvid indicated that 
-as prepared to resume the inter- 
■ and the U.S. doctor concurred that 
e was no medical impediment to 
inuing the interview. 
Vhen the inter\aew resumed, 
aan Medvid was repeatedly assured 
lie Department of State interviewer 
he was not under arrest, that he 



was free to remain in the United States, 
that he was free to depart immediately 
with the U.S. representatives, and that 
he would not have to return to his ship 
or to the U.S.S.R. against his will. He 
was also questioned extensively about 
the events of the preceding days, par- 
ticularly why he first jumped from the 
M.V. Konev and what had happened 
when he was returned to the ship. 
Seaman Medvid replied that he had 
fallen overboard while making some 
electi-ical repairs on the ship and that he 
could recall almost nothing from that 
time until he woke up in the sickbay of 
the Soviet ship. He repeatedly stated 
that he wanted to return to the Soviet 
Union. Nevertheless, because we 
wanted to be absolutely certain that 
Seaman Medvid understood that he had 
a clear choice, and considering his 
nausea earlier that evening, the Depart- 
ment of State in Washington decided 
that Seaman Medvid should be given an 
opportunity to get a good night's sleep 
on shore. A nearby U.S. Government 
military facility was selected for this 
purpose. 



Seaman Medvid was given supper on 
the Coast Guard cutter and at approx- 
imately 11:15 p.m. EST [Eastern Stand- 
ard Time] on October 28, he and the ac- 
companying U.S. and Soviet represent- 
atives were transferred to a nearby 
naval support facility, traveling first by 
launch and then by motor vehicle. At 
the naval facility. Seaman Medvid was 
given a thoi-ough physical examination 
by the U.S. Navy medical doctor, which 
lasted approximately 45 minutes, and a 
psychological evaluation by a U.S. Air 
Force psychiatrist which lasted approx- 
imately 1 hour. The medical doctor 
determined at that time that Seaman 
Medvid did not appear to be under the 
influence of drugs. The Soviet doctor 
was allowed to observe but not par- 
ticipate in these examinations. We will 
be providing to the committee, as 
privileged information and not for public 
release, copies of these medical reports. 

Seaman Medvid was housed over- 
night in a comfortable suite in the 
bachelor officers quarters (BOQ). No 
more than one Soviet representative 
was allowed in the living room area out- 
side his bedroom and then onlv when an 



Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs 





Rozanne L. Ridgway 

was bom August 22, 
1935, in St, Paul, Miii- 
j^j^. '^- nesota. She received a 

TCiS'., '^ ;_ . Bachelor of Aits 
\ ' Ji."',.- ilegree from Hamline 

• Vr' ■» w'^'"^ University in 1957 
where she subse- 
i|uently received an 
honorary LL.D. in 
■ 1978. 

Ambassador Kidgway joined the Depart- 
ment of State in 1957 as a Foreign Sei-\'ice 
information specialist. She sei-ved as person- 
nel officer in Manila in 1959-62 and as visa 
officer in Palermo in 1962-64. In 1964 she 
was assigned to the Department as an inter- 
national relations officer until her posting in 
Oslo (1967) as political officer. She returned 
to the Department in 1970 as Ecuador desk 
officer and as deputy director for policy plan- 
ning and coordination in the Bureau of Inter- 
American Affairs in 1972-73. She served as 
Deputy Chief of Mission in Nassau from 1973 
until her appointment in 1975 as Deputy 
Assistant SecretaiT for Oceans and Fisheries 



Affairs. In February 1976, she was confirmed 
as Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries 
Affairs. 

She served as Ambassador to Finland 
from 1977 to 1980, when she became 
Counselor for the Department. After a period 
of service as a special negotiator assigned to 
the Secretary's staff, she served as Am- 
bassador to the German Democratic Republic 
(1982-85). 

Ambassador Ridgway received the 
Department's Superior Honor Award in 1966, 
1975, and 1981, the Meritorious Honor Award 
in 1970, and the William Jump Meritorious 
Award for Exemplary Achievement in Public 
Administration in 1972. In Api-il 1977, she 
received the annual national award of the Na- 
tional Fisheries Institute and in Octobei- 1982 
the .Joseph C. Wilson Award fni- Achievement 
in International Affairs. 

Ambassador Ridgw-ay was sworn in as 
Assistant Secretai-y for European and Cana- 
dian Affairs on July 19, 1985, and holds the 
rank of Career Minister. ■ 



Ijary 1986 



63 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



American was present. The other Soviet 
representatives were quartered in a 
separate room at the BOQ. Before going 
to sleep and again in the morning, 
Seaman Medvid relaxed by watching 
TV; he was especially interested in 
viewing TV coverage about himself. In 
conversations with the State Depart- 
ment representative that evening and 
again the next morning, Seaman Medvin 
kept up a steady stream of informal con- 
versation, and lie frequently opined that 
things in the U.S.S.R. were better than 
in the United States. He also repeatedly 
expressed his desire to return to the 

U.S.S.R. 

At approximately 1:00 a.m. CST on 
October 29, he went to his room where 
he slept until around 8:00 a.m. CST. 
After breakfast Seaman Medvid par- 
ticipated in an extended interview with 
a U.S. Air Force psychiatrist; the Soviet 
doctor was present only as an observer. 
Through extensive questioning, the 
psychiatrist determined that Seaman 
Medvid was alert, capable of doing 
calculations, and in touch with reality. 
He did not appear to be sedated or 
under the influence of drugs. At one 
point Seaman Medvid strongly objected 
to questions by the U.S. psychiatrist 
which he interpreted as implying that 
he might not be in control of his 
faculties. The U.S. psychiatrist deter- 
mined that Seaman Medvid was capable 
of making important decisions about his 
future. Following this examination. 
Seaman Medvid continued to watch TV 
and converse informally with the 
American and Soviet representatives 
present. 

At approximately 12:00 a.m. CST on 
October 29, the U.S. representatives 
reconvened the interview with Seaman 
Medvid. The U.S. interviewer ques- 
tioned him extensively concerning his 
wishes and assured him he could not be 
subject to prosecution or forced to 
return to the custody of Soviet 
authorities against his will. If he chose, 
he could leave immediately with U.S. 
authorities. He was alert and was deter- 
mined by U.S. medical, legal, and other 
representatives to be competent to 
make a decision concerning whether he 
wanted to remain in the United States. 
During the final interview. Seaman 
Medvid reaffirmed his repeated 
statements that he wished to return to 
the U.S.S.R.; he specifically expressed 
his desire to return home to see his 
mother and father. On instruction, the 
U.S. representatives then adjourned the 
interview to seek advice from 
Washington. 



At 3:45 p.m. EST on October 29, the 
White House, the Department of State, 
the Department of Justice, and INS in- 
structed the U.S. representatives to 
reconvene the interview and to tell 
Seaman Medvid that he would be al- 
lowed to return to the Soviet ship as he 
had repeatedly requested. Seaman Med- 
vid was asked' to sign a statement in 
Russian and English confinning his 
wishes and his understanding that he 
would be free to leave with U.S. 
representatives immediately if he chose 
to do so. After insisting on a few 
changes in Russian to the text of the 
statement. Seaman Medvid signed it. 
These were changes in the verb tenses 
and an additional sentence which 
repeated that he had decided to return 
to the U.S.S.R. Medvid said he wanted 
these changes to make it clear that he 
had never waivered in his determination 
to return to his country. The Depart- 
ment of State representative then ac- 
companied Seaman Medvid and the 
Soviet representatives to the M. V. 
Konev in accordance with Seaman Med- 
vid's wishes, where he was greeted with 
cheers by the Soviet crew. 

In conclusion, I would like to 
underscore the fact that at every point 
in the Department of State's involve- 
ment in this case, our paramount con- 
cern was the welfare of Seaman Medvid. 
We were determined to ensure that he 
had an opportunity freely to express his 
preferences. Over a period of days, ex- 
traordinary measures were taken to en- 
sure that he was given that opportunity, 
first aboard the U.S. Coast Guard cutter 
and then again at the U.S. naval facility 
after he had had a good night's rest. We 
were obviously not able to recreate 
Seaman Medvid's original frame of mind 
of October 24, nor will any of us ever 
know what pressures may have been ex- 



erted on Seaman Medvid while he was 
on the Soviet ship prior to his transfer 
to our custody on October 28. Nor did 
we ever discount the fact that such 
pressures may have influenced Seaman' 
Medvid's final decision. None of us is 
under illusions about the repressive 
nature of the Soviet Government and i 
willingness to use coercion and threats- 
to control its people. From the outset 
there was always the possibility that 
Seaman Medvid might indicate that he 
wished to return to his ship and to thei 
U.S.S.R. and that if he did so, we wou 
have to respect that choice and 
whatever considerations led to that 
decision. 

In our questioning of Seaman Medti 
vid he repeatedly expressed his desir&' 
to return to the'U.S.S.R. and there w' 
no doubt on the part of U.S. medical 
doctors who examined him about his 
ability to make such a decision. All of 
ficials involved in the case, both in 
Washington and New Orleans, concur 
red that the U.S. should allow Seama 
Medvid to return to the Soviet ship. 1 
is of course possible for anyone to sec 
ond guess whether we should have at 
tempted to keep Seaman Medvid long 
in circumstances calculated to try to 
overcome presumed Soviet pressures. 
That is a judgment call. I would only 
ask that consideration also be given t 
whether the United States wishes to 
tain a foreign citizen against his 
repeatedly expressed wishes, recogni; 
ing that only that citizen, in cases sue 
as this, can truly weigh the risks taki 
for himself or for others. 



'The complete transcript of the hearin 
will be published by the committee and w 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Religion in Eastern Europe 



by Richard D. Schifter 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on European Affairs of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on 
November U, 1985. Ambassador 
Schifter is Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs.^ 

In"recent years, particularly in light of 
Jeane Kirkpatrick's well-known article 
in Commentary, there has been a good 
deal of discussion of the dichotomy be- 
tween totalitarianism and authoritar- 



ianism. The question has been posed 
whether the differences between tho; 
two forms of dictatorial rule are real 
merely imagined. What I want to suj 
gest to you in this statement is that 
there are clear differences and that t 
way in which a government deals wi 
religion is as good a litmus test as ai 
in telling the difference between an 
authoritarian and a totalitarian 
government. 

An authoritarian government wil ; 
generally speaking, permit a purely 
religious organization to function 



n,:>r-.or*mont nf Qtatp Rii 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



hout interference or might occasional- 
ipai- with it, particularly if the 
erninental authorities believe that 

religious oi'ganization is seeking to 
roach on what the ruling group con- 
;rs to be the domain of the govern- 
it. A totalitarian government, by 
trast, cannot tolerate a situation in 
ch it lives side by side with any kind 
ndependent association of its citizens, 
,t religious or secular. It will try to 
troy them or take them over, or if it 

do neither, it will try to control 
r every activity. What a totalitarian 
:em simply cannot accept are private 
mizations of citizens which are 
ond its ability to manipulate. 
When we examine the situation of 
^on in Eastern Europe today, that 
n countries which profess to be 
erents of the Mar.xist-Leninist ap- 
ich to government, we need to keep 
lind that they started out with a 
I ideological commitment to atheism 
, therefore, with a policy to root out 
nous belief Today, in Eastern 
ope, there is one countiT which is so 
lly committed to Leninist ideology 

it has, in fact, outlawed religion. It 
Ibania, the country in which the 
•tice of religion, in any form, con- 
ites a crime. 

rhe commitment to atheism on 
;h Albania has followed thj-ough 

the utmost consistency was a com- 
lent to which the founders of the 
et state adhei-ed as well. The ad- 
cy of atheism has been established 
et policy since the days of Lenin. 

et Bureaucratic 
trol of Religion 

t the leaders of the Soviet state 
ivered in due coui-se was that 
ion could not be stamped out as 
y as they might have thought at the 
;t. So, in the spiiit of the principle 
"if you cannot beat them, join 
I," the Soviet Union created as long 
IS 1929 a massive system for the 
aucratic control of religion, 
'he statutory scheme created in the 
?t Union permits the conducting of 
ious activities by groups only if 
are registered as "religious associa- 
." Religious associations, in turn, 
igidly controlled through a body of 
enforced by a state bureaucracy 
ti is headed by the so-called Council 
jligious Affairs. Working under the 
icil of Religious Affairs are regional 
nissioners, with whom religious 
iations must register. A eommis- 
r can refuse to register an associa- 



tion or can cancel a registration without 
citing any reason. Through this process, 
the commissioner can also regulate the 
selection of clergymen to any church 
position. 

Furthermore, as all real property, 
including ancient church buildings, is 
owned by the local units of government, 
the religious association must sign an 
agi-eement with these local units of 
government before it can obtain use of a 
building. That agreement will often add 
to the limitations placed upon the 
association by the national religious- 
control bureaucracy. 

Generally speaking, the regulators 
will authorize liturgical services at 
designated hours in designated places, 
namely the officially authorized places of 
worship. All other religious activities 
ai-e forbidden. Thus, all persons whose 
personal commitments or the rules of 
whose religion call for religious activity 
and experience beyond those sanctioned 
by the bureaucracy must forego the 
demands of their conscience or risk 
punishment at the hands of the state. 
Moreover, in a special effort to prevent 
parents from passing on their religious 
beliefs to theii- children, membership in 
religious associations is denied to per- 
sons under the age of 18. Every effort 
is made to discourage all foiTns of 
religious instruction. 

Religious associations are thus left 
between a rock and a hard place. If 
they do not register, yet still engage in 
religious practices, they find themselves 
in violation of the law. If they register, 
they subject themselves to government 
control, particularly as to the selection 
of their clergy, and submit to a large 
body of rules imposed upon them from 
the outside. Violation of the rules can 
lead to loss of registered status, and 
thus, once again to violation of the law. 
It is clearly a "Catch-22" situation. 

Enforcing the Laws 
on Religious Activities 

It is worthy of note that as the police 
are evidently kept busy perfoi-ming 
functions other than the enforcement of 
the laws of the subject of religion, a 
special volunteer spy system has been 
created for that pui"pose. Neighborhood 
committees which are called "public 
commissions for control over obsen'ance 
on the laws about religious cults" watch 
their neighbors and report their viola- 
tions of the laws on religion to the ap- 
propriate authorities. 

This, then, is the system which 
serves to deprive those persons of 
religious freedom who look to their 



religious associations to provide them 
with more than a government-approved 
ritual ceremony in a government- 
appi-oved location during a government- 
approved time period. E\-angelical 
Christians, Seventh-day Adventists, 
Mennonites, Baptists, and Pentecos- 
tals— many of whom have refused to 
register— are most often the victims of 
government persecution of religious ac- 
tivists. Roman Catholic priests in 
Lithuania have in recent years also 
more and more frequently been sevei-ely 
punished for engaging in religious ac- 
tivities and for the violations of govern- 
ment edicts. So have Jews, whose legal- 
ly authorized synagogues have been 
reduced to 50 throughout the Soviet 
Union, and whose training institutions 
for rabbinical students have long been 
closed. 

The objective of present Soviet 
policy toward religion is reasonably 
clear. To the extent to which religious 
observance constitutes an individual act, 
even if carried out in the pi-esence of 
others, it is permitted. To the extent to 
which it involves interaction among 
fellow-believers and unity of purpose of 
a group, the state seeks to prevent it. 
Yet, to the chagiin of the authorities, 
interest in religion on the part of the 
Soviet people has been on the increase 
rather than on the decline. Violations of 
the law are thus too numerous for these 
laws to be enforced rigidly. Instead, as 
students of the subject have noted, a 
good many minor violations will simply 
be ignored. But when the KGB's pa- 
tience runs out, its agents clamp down 
hard and the person guilty of the illegal 
practice of religion is sent off for years 
in a prison, a forced-labor colony or into 
exile, most often on a trumped-up 
charge. And in those cases in which it 
appeai-s inconvenient to invoke "socialist 
legahty" through a criminal proceeding, 
the luckless religious practitioner is sent 
off to an institution for the mentally ill. 

Thus, in today's Soviet Union, 
religious associations run afoul of the 
government whenever they try to assert 
any independence or when believers 
want to engage in religious activities 
beyond those authorized by the Soviet 
Union's religious-control bureaucracy. 

Some church organizations have ac- 
cepted the government's decision, as it 
were, to "join" them. They limit their 
activities to those that the government 
permits and, in retuni for being gi-anted 
permission to function and to perform 
authorized religious rituals, dutifully ex- 
press the government line on issues of 
foreign policy when called upon to do so 



ary 1986 



65 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



at international gatherings. It is said 
that KGB agents may even have in- 
filtrated the clergy- and hear confessions. 

Aside from repressive measures 
against religious gi-oups which seek to 
e.xercise religious independence, the 
Soviet Union has also adopted 
repressive measures against churches 
associated with particular brands of 
disapproved nationalism. In its efforts to 
suppress Uki-ainian nationalist tenden- 
cies, the Soviet Union close to 40 years 
ago outlawed the Uniate Church of the 
Ukraine, an Eastern Rite Catholic 
Church. For similar reasons, the Soviet 
Government has also acted harshly 
against the Roman Catholic churches of 
Lithuania and Latvia. 

Eradicating Islam in Bulgaria 

The Soviet approach to religion is not 
copied by all the countries which are 
members of the Warsaw Pact. Among 
these European states, we see policies 
ranging from the efforts of the 
Bulgarian Government to destroy entire- 
ly the identity of its Islamic population 
of Turkish ethnic descent to the ap- 
proach followed by Poland, which has 
decided to live with the fact that it can- 
not destroy the independence of the 
Polish Roman Catholic church. 

The most recent large-scale, violent 
attack on religion in Eastern Europe 
began last fall with Bulgaria's campaign 
to eradicate the identity of the country's 
ethnic Turkish population. About 1 
million people, approximately 10% of the 
entire population, were suddenly told 
that they were not in fact Turks, that 
they had to change their names to 
Slavic names, stop speaking Turkish, 
stop wearing Turkish clothing, and stop 
performing most Islamic religious 
customs. Many who resisted were killed, 
and many more imprisoned. Most 
mosques in the country have been 
closed, converted to museums, or turned 
into various types of secular structures. 
Few Moslem religious leaders remain, 
and the training of new ones has effec- 
tively been halted. Religious rites essen- 
tial to the conduct of Islam have been 
banned, including circumcision, mar- 
riage, and funeral rites. The pilgrimage 
to Mecca has in practice ceased to occur. 
Islam is not alone among religions in 
Bulgaria facing repression. The Or- 
thodox Church, the church of the ma- 
jority of the population, receives some 
favored treatment from the state due to 
its historic role in helping preserve 
Bulgarian nationalism and culture. At 
the same time, though, it is allowed only 



a very narrow range of activities, and 
must subordinate itself completely to 
the state. The Roman Catholic and 
several small Protestant churches lead 
tenuous existences, suffering constant 
harassment and enjoying few legal 
rights. 

Religious Revival 

and Repression in Romania 

Romania presents perhaps the most 
mixed and complex religious situation in 
Eastern Europe. While encountering 
persistent, often ruthless persecution by 
the state, various religious groups in 
Romania have in recent years under- 
gone tremendous gi-owth. Many observ- 
ers have pointed to the fact that 
Romania seems to be experiencing a 
religious revival which is making the 
open, fervent practice of religion in that 
country second only to that of Poland in 
Eastern Europe. Because of the scale of 
this revival, and, perhaps, due to the 
need for a safety valve in a society suf- 
fering from serious economic difficulties, 
the authorities have in practice allowed 
a degi-ee of open religious activity far 
beyond that of some of their neighbors. 
' Unfortunately, this acquiescence in 
considerable religious activity has gone 
hand in hand with spasmodic measures 
of ruthless repression. Charismatic 
religious leaders have been harassed, 
imprisoned, or forced to emigrate. There 
are reports that some have been killed. 
Churches with rapidly growing con- 
gregations have had great difficulty in 
gaining permission to enlarge their 
facilities, and a number of churches 
which have attempted to proceed with 
enlargements on their own have had 
their buildings torn down by the 
authorities. The various churches face 
severe restrictions on the printing or 
import of religious materials, including 
Bibles, and there is strong evidence that 
some Bibles have actually been pulped 
for the manufacture of toilet paper. 

Just as in Bulgaria, due in part to 
the Orthodox Church's historic role in 
preserving Romanian identity, and to 
the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of believers in Romania are Orthodox, 
the Romanian Government does accord 
that church a somewhat favored position 
among religious groups. The govern- 
ment has, at times, argued the need to 
protect the status of the Orthodox 
Church as grounds for restricting the 
proliferation of other Christian groups. 
When criticized for not allowing church- 
es such as the Jehovah's Witnesses to 
function legally, Romanian authorities 



sometimes comment that "14 sects are 
enough. We don't need any more." 

Religious Activities 

in Czechoslovakia and East German 

Legally, the situation in Czechoslovak 
very much resembles conchtions in thi 
Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, as ir 
the Soviet Union, a religious-control 
bureaucracy tries to monitor and 
regulate the activities of the chui-ches 
Priests who sponsor religious activitie 
outside the legally-authorized framew 
are punished in Czechoslovakia as the 
are punished in the Soviet Union, in 
both situations for violating the laws 
and regulations governing the exercis 
of religion. What can be said for 
Czechoslovakia on this point is that t. 
sentences meted out to violators of 
these laws and regulations are 
significantly shorter than those metei 
out in the Soviet Union. 

The G.D.R., East Germany, has 
moved significantly toward coexisten 
with independent churches. The sam< 
has, for some time, been true of 
Hungary and, as I have already said 
Poland acquiesces in the existence of 
totally independent church. 

Conclusion 

There remains the question of what 
can do about all that I have describe 
The answer in this situation, as in th 
case of other human rights problems 
to shine a spotlight on the violators, 
long as these repressive government 
can continue their practices without 
world at large paying attention, they 
will do so. Only if a gi-eat deal of pul 
attention is focused on these activitie 
there a chance that they might modi 
them. Hearings such as this one ser\ 
that purpose. So do the speeches tha 
we deliver on the subject of religious 
tolerance at international gatherings 
such as meetings of the UN Human 
Rights Commission, the Third Comn 
tee of the UN General Assembly, an 
meetings held under the provisions ( 
the Helsinki accords. In each case it 
of course, also important that the in! 
mation contained in testimony or in 
speeches be picked up by the media. 
I, for one, sincerely hope that at 
tion will be paid to what it is that is 
ing said at this hearing. The issues 
deserve such attention. 



'The complete transcript of the heari 
will be published by the committee and \ 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Goveniment Printing C 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



66 



Department of State Bu 



TERNATIONAL LAW 



.S. Terminates Acceptance 
f ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction 



CRETARYS LETTER TO 
SECRETARY GENERAL, 

T. 7, 1985 

.r Mr. Secretary-General: 

I have the honor on behalf of the Govern- 
[t of the United States of America to 
r to the declaration of my Government of 
August 1946, as modified by my note of 6 
il 1984, concerning the acceptance by the 
ted States of America of the compulsoi-y 
sdiction of the International Court of 
^iee, and to state that the aforesaid 
aration is hereby tei-minated, with effect 
months from the date hereof. 
Sincerely youi's, 

George P. Shultz 



PARTMENT STATEMENT, 

r. 7, 1985' 

iccordance with the instructions of 
President, on October 7, 1985, the 
retary of State deposited with the 
retary General of the United Nations 
nal notice of termination of the U.S. 
aration, deposited on August 26, 
5, accepting the optional compulsory 
sdiction of the International Court of 
:ice (ICJ). This action will become ef- 
ive 6 months after the deposit of 
\ notice. 

This decision is fully compatible with 
Statute of the ICJ, which leaves it 
!ie discretion of each state to deter- 
e its relationship with the World 
rt. That Statute also explicitly 
rs to the right to condition accept- 
' of the Court's compulsory jurisdic- 

on the principle of reciprocity. 
When President Truman signed the 

declaration accepting the World 
rt's optional compulsory jurisdiction 
August 1, 1946, this countrj' ex- 
ed that other states would soon act 
larly. The essential underpinning of 
UN system, of which the Woiid 
rt is a part, is the principle of 
ersality. Unfortunately, few other 
5s have follow-ed our example, 
■er than one-third of the world's 

s have accepted the Court's com- 
ory jurisdiction, and the Soviet 
)n and its allies have never been 
ng them. Nor, in our judgment, has 
iragua. Of the five permanent 
ibers of the UN Seciirity Council, 



only the United States and the United 
Kingdom have submitted to the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction. 

Our experience with compulsory 
jurisdiction has been deeply disappoint- 
ing. We have never been able to use our 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to 
bring other states before the Court but 
have ourselves been sued three times. 
In 1946 we accepted the risks of our 
submitting to the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction because we beheved that 
the respect owed to the Court by other 
states and the Court's owoi appreciation 
of the need to adhere scrupulously to its 
proper judicial role would prevent the 
Court's process from being abused for 
political ends. Those assumptions have 
now been proved wrong. As a result, 
the President has concluded that con- 
tinuation of our acceptance of the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction would 
be contrary to our commitment to the 
principle of the equal application of the 
law and would endanger our vital na- 
tional interests. 

On January 18, 1985, we announced 
that the United States would no longer 
participate in the proceedings instituted 
against it by Nicaragua in the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice. Neither the rule 
of law nor the search for peace in Cen- 
tral America would have been served by 
further U.S. participation. The objec- 
tives of the ICJ to which we 
subscribe— the peaceful adjudication of 
international disputes— were being 
subverted by the effort of Nicaragua 
and its Cuban and Soviet sponsors to 
use the Court as a political weapon. In- 
deed, the Court itself has never seen fit 
to accept jurisdiction over any other 
political conflict involving ongoing 
hostilities. 

This action does not signify any 
diminution of our traditional commit- 
ment to international law and to the In- 
ternational Court of Justice in perform- 
ing its proper functions. U.S. acceptance 
of the World Court's jurisdiction under 
Article 36(1) of its Statute remains 
strong. We are committed to the prop- 
osition that the jurisdiction of the Court 
comprises all cases which the parties 
refer to it and all matters that are ap- 
propriate for the Court to handle pur- 
suant to the UN Charter or treaties and 
conventions in force. We will continue to 



make use of the Court to resolve 
disputes whenever appropriate and will 
encourage others to da likewise. Indeed, 
as we have announced today, we have 
reached agreement in principle with 
Italy to take a longstanding dispute to 
the Court. 



LEGAL ADVISER 
SOFAER STATEMENT, 
DEC. 4, 1985^ 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
the background to the President's deci- 
sion of October 7 terminating our ac- 
ceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). This decision will take effect 6 
months from that date. I will discuss 
what the President's decision means in 
practical terms before turning to some 
of the reasons for it. 

Jurisdiction of the Court 

The ICJ has limited jurisdiction, based 
on its Statute and on the consent of 
states. Under Article 36(1) of the 
Court's Statute, the ICJ has jurisdiction 
when states sign a special agreement 
referring a dispute to it or are parties 
to a treaty providing for ICJ dispute 
resolution. The President's action does 
not affect this basis for jurisdiction. In- 
deed, we have just agreed with Italy to 
submit an important dispute, involving 
millions of dollars, to the Court for ad- 
judication. We also are party to some 60 
treaties providing for adjudication of 
disputes by the ICJ. 

The second basis for ICJ jurisdiction 
exists when a state accepts the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction under Article 
36(2) of the Statute— the so-called op- 
tional clause. Historically, acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction has been less 
important as a basis for the Court's 
work than specific agreement between 
the parties to a dispute. 



jary 1986 



67 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



A state accepts compulsory jurisdic- 
tion by depositing with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations a declara- 
tion to the effect that it agrees to be 
sued by any state depositing a similar 
declaration. In return, the filing state 
may bring suit under compulsory juris- 
diction against any other state filing 
such a declaration. Generally, a state 
has no way of knowing in advance by 
whom or on what issue a suit may be 
filed. A declaration covers any issue of 
international law, except to the extent 
that the state excludes specific disputes 
or categories of disputes. A state faced 
with a suit under compulsory' jurisdic- 
tion may invoke any exclusion in its 
declaration and, on the basis of reci- 
procity, any exclusion in its opponent's 
declaration to seek to defeat jurisdic- 
tion. It also may raise nonjurisdictional 
objections to the Court's taking the 
case. If the parties disagree over the 
scope of a declaration or its exclusions, 
the Court itself decides the issue. 

Under the Court's Statute, a state is 
free to accept or to decline the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction. A state accept- 
ing the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
likewise is free to terminate or modify 
its acceptance whenever the state con- 
cerned believes that doing so would 
serve its interests. The President's ac- 
tion terminating our 1946 declaration, 
thus, is entirely consistent with our in- 
ternational legal obligations. 

The President's action also is con- 
sistent with his domestic legal authority. 
Declarations under Article 36(2) of the 
Statute are not treaties under either in- 
temational law or the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, in 1946 the executive 
branch considered that congressional ap- 
proval of the declaration was necessary 
for several reasons. Any such a declara- 
tion necessarily entails an open-ended 
exposure to suit, including potential 
financial liability. In addition, Congi-ess 
traditionally had been reluctant to allow 
the President to enter into compulsory 
third-party dispute settlement arrange- 
ments, as the fate of repeated executive 
efforts to have the United States accept 
the jurisdiction of the predecessor 
Court, the Permanent Court of Interna- 
tional Justice, showed. 

The termination of the 1946 declara- 
tion, on the other hand, does not expose 
the United States to new commitments 
or obligations. On the contrary, it 
reduces or eliminates that exposure. 



Furthermore, by its terms, the declara- 
tion authorizes termination on 6 months' 
notice, and our October 7 note is consist- 
ent with that condition. Finally, the 
Constitution allows the President uni- 
laterally to terminate treaties consistent 
with their terms; and his authority is 
even clearer with respect to lesser in- 
struments such as the 1946 declaration. 

Reasons for U.S. Review 

Our experience in the case instituted 
against the United States by Nicaragua 
in April 1984 provided the chief motiva- 
tion for the Administration's review of 
our acceptance of the Court's compul- 
sory jurisdiction. The principal basis of 
jurisdiction cited by Nicaragua in bring- 
ing that case was the 1946 U.S. declara- 
tion accepting compulsory jurisdiction. 
We believed at the time, and still 
beheve, that Nicaragua itself never had 
validly accepted the Court's compulsoi-y 
jurisdiction. More important, Nicaragua 
sought to bring before the Court politi- 
cal and security disputes that were 
never previously considered part of the 
Court's mandate to resolve. In our view, 
the Court's decision last November that 
Nicaragua had, indeed, accepted compul- 
sory jurisdiction and that Nicaragua's 
claims were justiciable could not be sup- 
ported as a matter of law. These con- 
siderations led the President to decide 
last January that we would no longer 
participate in the case. 

The Court's decision also caused us 
to undertake a thorough evaluation of 
our 1946 declaration and its place in the 
system of compulsory jurisdiction estab- 
lished by Article 36(2) of the Court's 
Statute. That we were evaluating these 
questions was well knowTi. The issues at 
stake were considered and debated in 
government and private groups inter- 
ested in this question. All the relevant 
points were carefully considered. 

We recognized, first of all, that the 
hopes originally placed in compulsory 
jurisdiction by the architects of the 
Court's Statute have never been real- 
ized and will not be realized in the fore- 
seeable future. We had hoped that wide- 
spread acceptance of compulsory juris- 
diction and its successful employment in 
actual cases would increase confidence 
in judicial settlement of international 
disputes and, thus, eventually lead to its 
universal acceptance. 



E.xperience has dashed these hopes 
Only 47 of the 162 states entitled to a( 
cept the Court's compulsory jurisdictic 
now do so. This number represents a 
proportion of states that is substantial 
lower than in the late 1940s. The Unit 
Kingdom is the only other permanent 
member of the UN Security Council 
that accepts compulsory jurisdiction ir 
any form. Neither the Soviet Union n. 
any other Soviet-bloc state has ever a 
cepted compulsory jurisdiction. Many 
our closet friends and allies— such as 
France, Italy, and the Federal Repub 
of Germany— do not accept compulsor; 
jurisdiction. Moreover, a substantial 
number of the states accepting com- 
pulsory jurisdiction have attached res 
vations to their acceptances that depr 
them of much of their meaning. The 
United Kingdom, for example, retains 
the power to decline to accept the 
Court's jurisdiction in any dispute at 
any time before a case is actually file' 
Compulsory jurisdiction cases hav 
not been the piincipal part of the 
Court's overall jurisprudence. Of som 
50 contentious cases between 1946 an 
the end of 1983, 22 were based on th« 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction, of 
which only five resulted in final judg- 
ment on the merits. The last case de- 
cided under the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction, the Temple of Preah 
Vihear, was completed in 1962. In thi 
remaining 17 cases, objections to the 
Court's jurisdiction were sustained in 
13; four were dismissed on other 
grounds. 

Another consideration we weighec 
the fact that, although we have tried 
seven times, we have never been abb 
successfully to bring a state before tl 
Court. We have been barred from 
achieving this result not only by the 
that few other states accept compulsi 
jurisdiction but also by the principle 
reciprocity as applied to our 1946 
declaration. That principle allows a 
respondent state to invoke any reser 
tion in the applicant state's declarati( 
to seek to defeat the Court's jurisdic 
tion. Thus, respondent states may in- 
voke reservations in our 1946 declart 
tion against us. The so-called Connall 
reservation in our 1946 declaration p 
vides that the United States does no 
accept compulsory jurisdiction over s 
dispute involving matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of th 
United States, as determined by the 



68 



Department of State Bu 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



lited States. In other words, we 
serve to ourselves the power to deter- 
ne whether the Court has jurisdiction 
er us in a particular case. Any state 
I sue may avail itself of that power on 
•eciprocal basis to defeat jurisdiction. 

This is, in fact, precisely what hap- 
ned when we tried to sue Bulgaria in 
57 on claims arising out of the loss of 
nerican lives and property when 
ilgaria shot down an unarmed civilian 
liner that had strayed into its air- 
ice. Bulgaria claimed that the Court 
d no jurisdiction because the matter 
dispute was within Bulgarian domes- 
jurisdiction as determined by 
ilgaria. Even though we had pledged 
ver to invoke our Connally reserva- 
n in bad faith to cover a manifestly 
ernational dispute, we were com- 
lled to acknowledge that its invocation 
any case would be binding as a mat- 
• of law. Hence, Bulgai'ia's reciprocal 
'ocation of the Connally reservation 
ced us to discontinue the case. 

On a more general level, other eoun- 
es, the intei'national legal community, 
d, indeed, the e.xecutive branch have 
'erely criticized the "self -judging" 
,ure of the Connally reservation, 
me commentators even argue that the 
nnally reservation made the 1946 
ilaration a legal nullity because of its 
lOlly unilateral and potentially limit- 
3 character. Certainly, that reserva- 
1 has undercut the example the 
ited States tried to set for other 
mtries by its acceptance of compul- 
y jurisdiction. 

For these reasons we have never 
n able successfully to bring another 
te before the Court on the basis of 

acceptance of compulsory jurisdic- 
1. On the other hand, we have been 
d under it three times: by France in 

Rights of Nationals of the United 
tes in Morocco case in 1950-1952; by 
itzerland in the Interhandel case in 
7-1959; and, finally, by Nicaragua 

year. 

The terms of our acceptance of com- 
5ory jurisdiction contain an additional 
ikness. Nothing in it prevents 
ther state from depositing an accept- 
e of compulsory juiisdiction solely 

the purpose of bringing suit against 

United States and, thereafter, vvith- 
wing its acceptance to avoid being 
d by anyone in any other matter, 
dents of the Court long have recog- 
!d that this "sitting duck" or "hit- 

■run" problem is one of the principal 



disadvantages to the system of compul- 
sory jurisdiction under Article 36(2). It 
places the minority of states that have 
accepted compulsory jurisdiction at the 
mercy of the majority that have not. 
The Court's composition also is a 
source of institutional weakness. At 
present, 9 of 15 judges come from states 
that do not accept compulsory jurisdic- 
tion; most of these states have never 
used the Court at all. Judges are elected 
by the General Assembly and Security 
Council, frequently after intense elec- 
tioneering. One reasonably may expect 
at least some judges to be sensitive to 
the impact of their decisions on their 
standing with the UN majority. Where- 
as in 1945 the United Nations had some 
50 members, most which were aligned 
with the United States and shared its 
views regarding world order, there are 
now 160 members. A great many of 
these cannot be counted on to share our 
view of the original constitutional con- 
ception of the UN Charter, particularly 
with regard to the special position of 
the permanent members of the Security 
Council in the maintenance of interna- 
tional peace and security. This same ma- 
jority often opposes the United States 
on important international questions. 

The Nicaragua Case 

None of the weaknesses deriving from 
the Court's composition and our 1946 
declaration is new. We have hitherto en- 
dured them on the assumption that the 



respect states owed to the Court and 
the Court's own scrujjulous adherence 
to its judicial role would insulate us 
from abuses of the Court's process for 
political or propaganda ends. The Nica- 
ragua case showed that it would be 
unrealistic to continue to rely on that 
assumption. 

Several aspects of the Couil's deci- 
sions in the Nicaragua case were dis- 
turbing. First, the Court departed ft-om 
its traditionally cautious approach to 
finding jurisdiction. It disregarded fun- 
damental defects in Nicaragua's claim to 
have accepted compulsory jurisdiction. 
This question involves more than a legal 
technicality. It goes to the heai-t of the 
Court's jurisdiction, which is the con- 
sent of states. International law— in pai-- 
ticular, the Court's ov\n Statute— estab- 
lishes precise rules that states must 
follow in order to manifest that consent. 
The purpose of such technical rules is to 
ensure that a state's consent is genuine 
and that all other states are given objec- 
tive notice of it. Nicaragua never com- 
plied with those rules, and the historical 
evidence makes clear that its failure to 
do so was deliberate and designed to en- 
sure that Nicaragua could never be sued 
successfully under Article 36(2). A ma- 
jority of the Court, on the other hand, 
was prepared to discover an exception 
to those rules that allowed Nicaragua to 
bring suit, an exception that is inconsist- 
ent with the Court's prior jurisprudence 
on the subject. The result-oriented il- 
logic of the majority's position was 



U.S.-ltaly Agree to Submit Dispute to ICJ 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
OCT. 7, 1985» 

The United States and Italy have been 
engaged in a longstanding dispute aris- 
ing from certain actions by Italian 
Government officials against a wholly 
ovmed subsidiary of Raytheon Company 
and Machlett Laboratories, Inc., both 
U.S. corporations. 

The two governments have come to 
the conclusion that they are unable to 
resolve the diplomatic claim of the 
United States on behalf of Raytheon 
Company and Machlett Laboratories, 
Inc., through diplomatic negotiation or 



binding arbitration. Therefore, the 
United States, in conformity with the 
U.S. -Italian Treaty of Friendship, Com- 
merce, and Navigation of 1948, has 
determined to approach the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) with a view 
to submitting that dispute to a special 
chamber as provided by the Court's 
Statute and rules of procedure, subject 
to mutually satisfactory resolution of im- 
plementing arrangements. Italy concurs 
in the opinion that this is an appropriate 
course of action. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by State Department deputy spokesman 
Charles Redman. ■ 



jary 1986 



69 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



vigorously exposed in the opinions of 
the dissenting judges. 

Furthermore, the Court engaged in 
unprecedented procedural actions— such 
as rejecting without even a hearing El 
Salvador's application to intervene as of 
right— that betrayed a predisposition to 
find that it had jurisdiction and that 
Nicaragua's claims were justiciable, 
regardless of the overwhelming legal 
case to the contrary. In the particular 
case of the Salvadoran intervention, the 
Court ignored Article 63 of the Statute, 
which deprives the Court of discretion 
to reject such interventions. The Court 
sought to cover itself by holding out the 
possibility of accepting the Salvadoran 
intervention at the merits stage— at 
which point Salvadoran objections to the 
Court's jurisdiction and the justiciability 
of Nicaragua's claims would have been 
too late. 

Even more disturbing, for the first 
time in its history, the Court has sought 
to assert jurisdiction over a controversy 
concerning claims related to an ongoing 
use of armed force. This action concerns 
every state. It is inconsistent with the 
structure of the UN system. The only 
prior case involving use-of-force issues— 
the Corfu Channel case— went to the 
Court after the disputed actions had 
ceased and the Security Council had 
determined that the matter was suitable 
for judicial consideration. In the Nica- 
ragua case, the Court rejected without a 
soundly reasoned explanation our argu- 
ments that claims of the sort made by 
Nicaragua were intended by the UN 
Charter exclusively for resolution by 
political mechanisms— in particular, the 
Security Council and the Contadora 
process— and that claims to the exercise 
of the inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defense were excluded by 
Article 51 of the Charter from review 
by the Court. 

I cannot predict whether the Court's 
approach to these fundamental Charter 
issues in the jurisdictional phase of the 
Nicaragua case will be followed in the 
Court's judgment on the merits. Never- 
theless, the record gives us little reason 



for confidence. It shows a Court ma- 
jority apparently prepared to act in 
ways profoundly inconsistent with the 
structure of the Charter and the Court's 
place in that structure. The Charter 
gives to the Security Council— not the 
Court— the responsibility for evaluating 
and resolving claims concerning the use 
of armed force and claims of self-defense 
under Article 51. With regard to the 
situation in Central America, the Secu- 
rity Council exercised its responsibility 
by endorsing the Contadora process as 
the appropriate mechanism for resolving 
the interlocking political, security, 
economic, and other concerns of the 
region. 

Implications for 

U.S. National Security 

The fact that the ICJ indicated it would 
hear and decide claims about the on- 
going use of force made acceptance of 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction an 
issue of strategic significance. Despite 
our deep reluctance to do so and the 
many domestic constraints that apply, 
we must be able to use force in our self- 
defense and in the defense of our 
friends and allies. We are a law-abiding 
nation, and when we submit ourselves 
to adjudication of a subject, we regard 
ourselves as obliged to abide by the 
result. For the United States to recog- 
nize that the ICJ has authority to define 
and adjudicate with respect to our right 
of self-defense, therefore, is effectively 
to surrender to that body the power to 
pass on our efforts to guarantee the 
safety and security of this nation and of 
its allies. 

This development particularly con- 
cerned us as a matter of principle and 
for reasons bearing directly on the 
capacity of the ICJ to reach sound, cor- 
rect decisions on use-of-force issues and 
to enforce principles it eventually may 
articulate on our communist adversaries. 
The Court has no expertise in finding 
facts about ongoing hostilities or any 
other activities occurring in areas such 
as Central America. Based on my years 
as a trial judge and considerable ex- 
perience with complicated cases, I doubt 



that the 16 judges sitting on the Nica- 
ragua case may reliably resolve the 
evidentiary problems presented. The 
ICJ is similar to an appellate court, 
more at home with abstract legal ques- 
tions than with competing factual 
claims. Moreover, the Court's rejectior 
of El Salvador's application to interver 
deprived it of that nation's indispensab 
contribution to a true picture of the 
situation in Central America, a contrib 
tion that goes to the heart of our legal 
position. 

Even if the Court were inclined to 
allow participation by all necessary pa 
ties, it has no power to compel that pi 
ticipation. We have, for example, no 
doubt that Cuba, and quite probably t 
Soviet Union, help Nicaragua's efforts 
to subvert the democratic regime in E 
Salvador as well as to undertake unlai 
ful acts against Costa Rica and Hon- 
duras. But, in view of their consistent 
refusal to submit to the Court's jurisd 
tion in any other matter, neither Cub; 
nor the Soviet Union can be expected 
join in the proceedings, and the Court 
cannot force them to do so. These fad 
render even more questionable the 
capacity of the Court to determine thi 
facts concerning Nicaragua's aggressi' 
acts. 

The Court's lack of jurisdiction ov 
Soviet-bloc nations, especially the Sov 
Union, also has long-term significance 
for the strategic acceptability of ICJ 
review of self-defense issues. The 
Soviets have long advanced the view- 
by the Brezhnev doctrine and otherwi 
and by their actions in places like 
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan— that 
force is acceptable in order to keep a 
nation in the socialist orbit or to pro- 
mote a socialist revolution but have n 
hesitated to condemn responsive uses 
force as violating the UN Charter. 

We reject this view. We believe 
that, when a nation asserts a right to 
use force illegally and acts on that 
assertion, other affected nations have 
the right to counter such illegal ac- 
tivities. The United States cannot rel; 
on the ICJ properly and fairly to deci 
such questions. Indeed, no state can ( 



70 



Department of State Bull 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



If we acquiesce in this claimed 
thority, we would be bound by the 
urt's decisions that limited our ability 
confront Soviet expansionism, even 
)ug:h the Soviets could and would do 
they pleased. That most of the 
urt's judges come from nations that 
not submit to its jurisdiction, in- 
ding Soviet-bloc nations and other 
tes that i-outinely support that bloc, 
)f special concern on these funda- 
ntal issues. 

Mr. Chairman [Sen. Richard Lugar], 
considering this complex and impor- 
it subject, I hope that you and the 
ler members of this distinguished 
nmittee weigh carefully the national 
urity implications of accepting the 
urt as a foi'um for resolving use-of- 
ce questions. For example, would the 
urt be the proper foi'um for resolving 
disputes that gave rise to such ac- 
is as the Berlin airlift, the Cuban 
isile crisis, and. most recently, our 
ersion of the Achille Lauro ter- 
ists? Each event involved questions 
nternational law. 

At the same time, however, at stake 
each occasion were interests of a 
damentally political nature, going to 
nation's security. Such matters can- 
be left for resolution by judicial 
ms, let alone by a court such as the 
; rather, they are the ultimate 
jonsibilities assigned by our Consti- 
on to the President and Congress, 
did not consider such issues to be 
ject to review by the ICJ at the 
3 we accepted the Court's compul- 
! jurisdiction, and we do not consider 
Ti to be encompassed by that accept- 
; now. The Court's apparent willing- 
5 to construe our declaration other- 
3 left us with no prudent alternative 
to terminate that aspect of our use 
-s facilities. 

We carefully considered modifying 
1946 declaration as an alternative to 
.ermination, but we concluded that 
lification would not meet our con- 
is. No limiting language that we 



could draft would prevent the Court 
from asserting jurisdiction if it wanted 
to take a particular case, as the Court's 
treatment of our multilateral treaty 
reservation in the Nicaragua case 
demonstrates. That reservation excludes 
disputes arising under a multilateral 
treaty unless all treaty partners affected 
by the Court's decision are before the 
Court. Despite Nicaragua's own written 
and oral pleadings before the Court— 
which expressly implicated El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica in the alleged 
violations of the UN and OAS [Organi- 
zation of American States] Charters and 
prayed for a termination of U.S. assist- 
ance to them— and statements received 
directly from those countries, a majority 
of the Court refused to recognize that 
those countries would be affected by its 
decision and refused to give effect to 
the reservation. Furthermore, merely 
having filed a declaration is enough for 
the Court to indicate provisional 
measures against the filing party, 
whether or not the Court later found it 
had jurisdiction under the declaration. 
Finally, the 1946 declaration expressly 
provides only for its termination, and 
we would not wish to have the legality 
or effectiveness of any lesser step open 
to question. 

Conclusion 

Looked at from the standpoint of the 
reality of compulsory jurisdiction today, 
the decision to terminate our 1946 ac- 
ceptance was a regrettable but neces- 
sary measure taken in order to safe- 
guard U.S. interests. It does not signify 
a lessening of our traditionally strong 



support for the Court in the exercise of 
its proper functions, much less a diminu- 
tion of our commitment to international 
law. We remain prepared to use the 
Court for the resolution of international 
disputes whenever possible and 
appropriate. 

We recognize that this nation has a 
special obligation to support the ICJ and 
all other institutions that advance the 
rule of law in a world full of terror and 
disorder. Our belief in this obligation is 
what led us to set an example by ac- 
cepting the Court's compulsory jurisdic- 
tion in 1946 and by continuing that ac- 
ceptance long after it became clear that 
the world would not follow suit and that 
our acceptance failed to advance our in- 
terests in any tangible manner. 

Yet, the President also is responsi- 
ble to the American people and to Con- 
gress to avoid potential threats to our 
national security. The ICJ's decisions in 
the Nicaragua case created real and im- 
portant additional considerations that 
made the continued acceptance of com- 
pulsory jurisdiction unacceptable, 
despite its symbolic significance. We 
hope that, in the long run, this action, 
coupled with our submission of disputes 
under Ai-ticle 36(1), will stregthen the 
Court in the performance of its proper 
role in the international system 
established by the UN Charter and the 
Court's own Statute. 



•Made available to news correspondents 
by State Department deputy spokesman 
Charles Reciman. 

^Made before the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee by Abraham D. Sofaer. ■ 



Jary 1986 



71 



TERRORISM 



UNITED NATIONS 



IMO Endorses U.S. Initiative 
on Ship and Passenger Security 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT. 

Nov. 22, 1985' 

The assembly of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), meeting in 
London yesterday, November 21, gave 
unanimous endorsement to a U.S.- 
sponsored initiative designed to improve 
security practices on ships and thus to 
guard against further terrorist incidents 
such as the one occurring recently on 
the Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean. 

The U.S.-drafted resolution calls 
upon the IMO Maritime Safety Commit- 
tee to draft detailed and practical 
technical measures which may be 
employed by governments, port ad- 
ministrations, shipowners, shipmasters, 
and crews to ensure the security of 



passengers and crews on board ships. 
The committee will meet in London at 
the end of January to consider proposals 
that may be considered and adopted by 
governments and interested parties. 
The Governments of Egypt and 
Italy were among the nine which joined 
in cosponsoring the U.S. resolution. We 
are encouraged by the unanimity of the 
international community on the need to 
take immediate and concerted action to 
deal vnth unlawful acts against shipping 
and passengers and take satisfaction in 
the adoption of this resolution by 
the IMO. 



iRead to news correspondents by Charles 
Redman, State Department deputy 
spokesman. ■ 



U.S. Offers Reward 

for Achille Lauro Terrorists 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV. 25, 1985> 

Today the U.S. Government announces 
a reward of up to $250,000 for informa- 
tion leading to the apprehension and ef- 
fective prosecution and punishment of 
Abu el Abbas, as well as any others not 
yet in custody responsible for the ter- 
rorist action which resulted in the seiz- 
ure of the Achille Lauro on October 7, 
1985, the taking of hostages, including 
14 Americans, and the killing of one 
American, Leon Klinghoffer. 

Those with information in the 
United States should notify the Federal 



Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the 
Diplomatic Security Service, Depart- 
ment of State. Those with information in 
any other country should notify the 
nearest U.S. Embassy. The information 
received will be handled confidentially 
and the identities of informants will be 
protected. 

Officers or employees of any govern- 
mental organization who furnish infor- 
mation while in performance of official 
duties are not eligible for a reward. 



'Read to news correspondents by Charles 
Redman, State Department deputy 
spokesman. ■ 



Promoting 
Peaceful Change 
in South Africa 

by Vernon A. Walters 

Statement made in plenary sessio 
at the UN General Assembly on OctO' 
30, 1985. Ambassador Walters is U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the Uni 
Nations.'^ 

We all know the meaning of apartheii 
deliberate, systematic, institutionalize 
racial discrimination denying South 
Africa's black people their God-given 
rights. America's view of apartheid it 
simple and straightforward: We belie 
it is wrong. We condemn it. And 
because we live by Lincoln's words— 
"No person is good enough to goveri 
another without the other's consent" 
all Americans are united in hoping fc 
the day when apartheid will exist no 
more. 

The history of the United States 
one of struggle against all forms of 
racial, cultural, and political intolerai 
Our constitution resolutely forbids in 
tolerance. And our commitment to 
equality and freedom does not end a' 
our borders. We oppose political and 
economic systems based upon the sel 
proclaimed" right of any race, religior 
tribe, clan, or economic or political e 
to rule over and oppress other peopl 
Such elitist orders produce misery ai 
refugees, many of whom bring their 
talent and energ>' to open societies, 
eluding my owt\. 

My country can thus only reject 
apartheid. And we are working tow£ 
the eUmination of this unjust and un 
justifiable system. The question has 
never been whether apartheid shoul 
end— all of us recognize that it is 
doomed. The question is how to end 
while realizing the democratic aspirf 
tions of South Africa's people. The 
policy of the United States, outlined 
dozens of addresses before this and 
other bodies and most recently by F 
dent Reagan on September 9, is to ] 
mote positive, peaceful change that 
lead to a system in South Africa ba: 
on the consent of all those governec 
it. We want to encourage change th 
assures rather than destroys South 
Africa's futui-e. 



72 



Department of State B 



UNITED NATIONS 



I should also point out that the 
ted States believes that apartheid 
not be undone by demagogic postur- 
and sloganeering. Exhortations to 
)dy revolution, calls for mandatory 
:tions and hypocritical talk about 
ration from the leaders and 
'esentatives of nations that deny 
rty to their own people will not 
ig peace and justice to millions of 
th Africans. 

Ending apartheid is a task that 
lands more than hot rhetoric, no 
ter how emotionally satisfying it 
■ be. That is the spirit of President 
gan's E.xecutive Order of September 
he measures he announced then, 
:h vrill go into force by the end of 
year, are aimed at specific areas: 
apparatus and symbols of apartheid. 
y are designed to deprive the 
ernment of South Afiica of any 
ct or indirect U.S. support in main- 
ing its police, military, and 
•theid-enforcing structure. And, 
illy important, they commit the 
,ed States to sustaining a strong 
ence in South Africa as a basis from 
•h to exert influence for change. The 
Government is taking concrete 
s to encourage U.S. businesses and 
epreneurs to seek an end to the 
•iminatory labor and employment 
tices of apartheid. And we shall 
tly increase our economic assistance 
he education and training of disad- 
aged South Africans and our sup- 
to peaceful opponents of apartheid 
ugh our human lights program. 
Some might argue that this is not 
gh— that these improvements are 
economic and do not represent 
ical gains. This reminds me of the 
n that one of the lessons of history 
at we do not remember the lessons 
story. One of these lessons is surely 
economic and political freedoms are 
-ricably linked. It is exactly this 
for real improvement in their lives 
has brought so many people to 
1 Africa— black and white— and that 
impels an unstoppable push for 
cal change in that countrj'. 
•thers call for destructive, punitive 
ions, arms, and more violence. We 
jobs, better housing, and health 
rams. We want freedom of associa- 
of movement, and all the other 
cal rights and economic freedoms 
allow the individual, rather than 
:overnment, to choose his way of 
We take this approach because we 
ricans are builders, not destroyers. 



Our government is actively pressing for 
democratic, peaceful change in South 
Africa. So too are our foundations, our 
labor unions, our universities, our 
corporations— we want our every link 
with South Africa to be dedicated to the 
pur-pose of bringing constructive in- 
fluence to bear on that country. In other 
words, we are striving to utilize every 
instrument of peaceful change in South 
Africa to the benefit of our common 
cause: the end of apartheid and the 
creation of a political process in which 
all South Africans can participate freely. 
This we do because another lesson of 
histoi-y is that we cannot retreat from 
all the difficult and complex moral 
choices in the world. We Americans 
have accepted the hard reality that our 
passionate commitment to moral prin- 
ciples can be no substitute for a sound 
foreign policy. The choice for us, 
however, is not between moral prin- 
ciples and the national interest, but be- 
tween moral principles divorced from 
political reality and moral principles an- 
chored in political reality. Part of that 
reality is progress towards democracy 
and greater freedom around the world 
may be slower than we would like. If 
we use our power to push nondemo- 
cratic states too far and too fast, we 
may destroy the hope for gi-eater 
freedom. 

What we see in South Africa is a 
beginning of a process of change. The 
changes in official policy so far are 
plainly inadequate— but ironically they 
have been enough to raise the expecta- 
tions and impel demands for fundamen- 
tal reforms such as we all desire. This 
fundamental change will occur— there 
can be no doubt about it. All Americans 
are disturbed by the trend of events in 
South Africa— the violence and official 
repression will not lead to serious 
negotiations over a new political future 
for the country. 

A cause of hope is that South Africa 
is not a totalitarian society. Ever>' day 
we see examples of outspoken protest 
and access to the international media 
that would not be possible in some coun- 
tries represented in this chamber today. 
This degree of openness in South 
African society and our willingness to 
engage with that society for constrac- 
tive pui-poses are the sources of our in- 
fluence. The United States will continue 
to take advantage of this opportunity to 
do what we can as a responsible nation 



to end apartheid. Oui- policy is aimed at 
seeking engagement with all sides in 
South Africa for the purpose of en- 
couraging negotiations that will produce 
fundamental reforms, and we regard 
such a course as in the best traditions of 
the United Nations. 

I urge that the United Nations use 
its prestige to work constructively to 
help the South African people achieve a 
democratic state under which they 
would enjoy all the rights enumerated in 
the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. I also urge that the United 
Nations increase its efforts to work ef- 
fectively for the elimination of all forms 
of racism and racial discrimination. 



'USUN press release 132. 



Situation in Angola 

by Vernon A. Walters 

Statement before the UN Security 
Council on October 7, 1985.^ Also in- 
cluded is the text of the Security Coun- 
cil resolution adopted on October 7. Am- 
bassador Walters is U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations. 

Once again, we find ourselves gathered 
around this table to consider a violation 
of the territorial integiity of Angola's 
borders. And once again I shall set forth 
U.S. policy toward South African opera- 
tions of this sort. We condemn them. 
They serve to exacerbate an already 
volatile situation. Besides their negative 
consequences on chances for a 
negotiated solution to the problems 
besetting the region, they cause misery 
and death. So long as they continue, 
they will frustrate the aspirations of all 
those in southern Africa longing to fulfill 
their simple, inalienable right to a life 
without war and bloodshed. 

The diplomacy of the United States 
in the region is geared to peaceful, 
negotiated solutions; it is the road to a 
deeper, more lasting settlement than 
gunpowder can ever offer. My govern- 
ment asks all parties to recognize the 
folly of this strife. They should realize 
the necessity of turning back forthwith, 
in their own interests, to the negotiating 
track. 

There is a clear and unmistakable 
contrast between this policy of 
negotiation— supported without reserva- 
tions by my government— and the policy 
of certain forces outside the region who 
fuel the conflict in the benighted belief 



ary 1986 



73 



UNITED NATIONS 



that their owti interests are served. 
Why d(i these distant forces fear 
peaceful negotiations among the in- 
volved parties unless for self-serving 
reasons. Theirs is a selfish and a myopic 
policy: it leads ineluctably to more 
bloodletting for the Angolans; more 
hardship for civilians who have been so 
long under the yoke of Mars. And it is a 
devious policy that feigns concern for 
the interests of the Angolans: that 
distorts realities to serve its owti expan- 
sionist goals; that under the guise of 
disinterest has a clear mission for the 
region which does not incorporate the 
hopes of all for peace, freedom, and 
security. 

My delegation welcomes this resolu- 
tion as an occasion to reiterate our call 
for an immediate withdrawal of South 
African troops from Angola. We join 
once again all members of the Security 
Council in deploring this lataest 
incursion. 

But as I stated a little over 2 weeks 
ago, my government believes that the 
introduction of more weapons of war 
into the area will result in an escalation 
of violence, more death, more misery. 
Angola needs peace, not more foreign 
troops, foreign intervention, and im- 
ported arms. 

The United States supports the ter- 
ritorial integrity of Angola. We call on 
South Africa, yet again, to halt further 
acts of aggression. We could not, 
however, vote in favor of operative 
paragraph six, for the same reasons that 
we could not vote in favor of a similar 
call to arms in Security Council Resolu- 
tion 571. For that reason, my delegation 
abstained on paragraph six of the 
resolution. Since the rest of the resolu- 
tion was acceptable to us, I had no 
hestitation in voting for it. 



1985. 



'USUN press release 107 of Oct. 7, 



SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 574, 
OCTOBER 7, 19852 

The Security Council. 

Having considered the request of the 
Pei-manent Representative of Angola to the 
United Nations contained in document 
S/17510, 

Having heard the statement of the Per- 
manent Representative of Angola to the 
United Nations, 

Bearing in mind that all Member States 
are obliged to refrain in their intemational 
relations from the threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State and 
from acting in any other manner inconsistent 
with the principles and purposes of the 
United Nations, 

Recalling its resolutions 387 (1976), 428 
(1978) 447 (1979), 454 (1979), 475 (1980), 545 
(1983)', 546 (1984). 567 (1985) and 571 (198.5), 
which, inter alia, condemned South Africa's 
aggression against the People's Republic of 
Angola and demanded that South Africa 
scrupulously respect the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
People's Republic of Angola, 

Gravely concerned at the persistent, 
hostile and unprovoked acts of aggression 
and sustained anned invasions committed by 
the racist regime of South Africa in violation 
of the sovereignty, airspace and territorial in- 
tegrity of the People's Republic of Angola 
and. in particular, the armed invasion of 
Angola canned out on 28 September 1985, 
Conscious of the need to take effective 
steps for the prevention and removal of all 
threats to intemational peace and security 
posed by South Africa's acts of aggression, 

1. Strongly condemns the racist regime 
of South Africa foi- its latest, premeditated 
and unprovoked aggression against the Peo- 
ple's Republic of Angola, as well as its 
continuing occupation of parts of the territory 
of that State, which constitute a flagi-ant 
violation of the sovereignty and territorial in- 
tegrity of Angola and seriously endanger in- 
ternational peace and security; 



2. Strongly condemns also South Afric: 
for its utilization of the illegally occupied ti 
ritory of Namibia as a springboard for 
perpetrating acts of aggression against the 
People's Republic of Angola, as well as sus 
taining its occupation of part of the ten-ito 
of that country; 

3. Demands once again that South Afri 
cease immediately all acts of aggression an 
unconditionally withdraw forthwith all 
militarj' forces occupring Angolan territor 
as well as scrupulously respect the soverei 
ty, airspace, territorial integrity and in- 
dependence of the People's Republic of 
Angola; 

4. Reaffirms the right of the People's 
Republic of Angola, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the United Nations 
Charter, in particular Article 51, to take s 
the measures necessary to defend and 
safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integ 
and independence; 

5. Calls upon all States to implement 
ly the arms embargo imposed against Sou 
Africa in Security Council resolution 418 
(1977); 

6. Renews its request to Member Stat 
to extend all necessary assistance to the 1 
pie's Republic of Angola in order to 
strengthen its defence capability in the fa 
of South Africa's escalating acts of aggi-e: 
and the occupation of parts of its territor 
the South African military forces; 

7. Requests the Commission of Invest 
tion established in pursuance of resolutioi 
571 (1985), consisting of Australia, Eg>'pt 
Peru, to report urgently on its evaluation 
the damage resulting from South African 
gi-ession, including the latest bombings; 

8. Decides to meet again in the event 
non-compliance by South Africa with the 
present resolution in order to consider th 
adoption of more effective measures in 
accordance with appropriate provisions of 
Charter; 

9. Decides to remain seized of the ma 



^Unanimously adopted. 



74 



Department of State Bi 



ESTERN HEMISPHERE 



jman Rights Situation in Peru 



Uliott Abrams 

°repared statement before the Sub- 
mittees on Human Rights and In- 
jtional Organizatioiis and on 
lem Hemisphere Affairs of the 
se Foreign Affairs Committee on 
?mber 13. 1983. Mr. Abrams is 
stant Secretary for Inter-American 
irs. ' 

areciate your invitation to review 
you the human i-ights situation in 
,. Both the country and the topic 
mportant. And there are many 
lopments to discuss. In our bilateral 
ions there are many unresolved 
fS relating, for instance, to the new 
rnment's confrontation policy on 
. The rhetoric coming from Pei'u 
)een excessive. This prepared state- 
., however, deals just wdth the 
in i-ights question and its general 
\g: It does not attempt to cover all 
nany topics in U.S.-Penivian 
ions. 



toral Support for Democracy 

fice only 3'-^ months, Peruvian 
dent Alan Gai-cia has taken swift 
1 to stop and prevent human rights 
is. This is not sui-prising: issues 
id to human rights have concerned 
dans across a broad political spec- 
for some time. Progress has been 
m and at times difficult to analyze 
ise of terrorism. But I can report 
Peni today is a nation striving to 
ct and promote human i-ights. 
Ian Garcia's inauguration on July 
President of Peru marked both a 
nal triumph for him and a victory 
le American Popular Revolutionary 
ice (APRA), which despite con- 
ible influence during its 61 years of 
>nce, had never occupied the coun- 
highest elective office. Peru's 
cractic development was solidified 
lay in another sense as well: For 
rst time in 40 years, a demo- 
ally elected president, Fernando 
:nde, transferred power to a 
cratically elected successor. We ap- 
that achievement, and con- 
late the Peinivian people for their 
ss in building democratic 
utions. 

Ihe military regime which ruled 
from 1968 to 1980 came to power 



claiming it sought to modify social struc- 
tures to include greater opportunities 
for social, economic, and educational ad- 
vancement for the masses. President 
Juan Velasco increased the role of the 
state but failed to develop effective 
popular participation. This contributed 
to many of the difficulties Peru faces to- 
day. The statism of the Velasco peinod 
has proved particularly damaging. Cen- 
tralization hastened migration from 
rural to urban areas, greatly increasing 
unemployment in the cities. Meanwhile, 
neglect of the countryside provided fer- 
tile grounds for communism and ter- 
rorism. The failui'e to generate new 
economic gi-owth contributed directly to 
Peru's current serious debt situation. 
The now entrenched Soviet presence in 
Peru also dates back to the early 1970s 
when the military turned to the Soviet 
Union for equipment and the technicians 
to service it. The Velasco regime, 
moreover, was unstable because it 
lacked electoral legitimacy. Realizing 
this, acknowledging the failures of the 
military government, and acceding to 
the democratic yearnings of the Peru- 
vian people, General Morales Bermudez 
organized fair and competitive elections 
for a constitutional assembly, then relin- 
quished power when in accordance with 
the constitution the people chose a new 
president. 

Fernando Belaunde Terry, who won 
those elections in 1980, identified closely 
with the ideals of democracy. He was 
responsible for the restoration of the 
many civil liberties enjoyed in Peru to- 
day, including a free uncensored press. 
Having turned over power, Peru's 
military leaders showed restraint and 
maturity and continued to support the 
fledgling democratic government as it 
faced its daunting challenges. In this 
respect the military of Peru must be 
praised. 

Belaunde's 5 years in office were not 
easy. His administration saw an inten- 
sification of the economic crisis, brought 
on by falling export commodity prices 
combined with devastating natural 
disasters, and by the terrorism of the 
brutal Sendero Luminoso, or Shining 
Path, guerrilla movement. Diverting 
resources and entangling the govern- 
ment authorities in an elusive guerrilla 
war, the struggle with the Sendero 
Luminoso became a thom to the 
Belaunde administration and to Peru- 
vian society. As terrorist and 
counterterrorist activities spread, so too 
did the concern for human rights in 



Peru. Allegations of human rights 
abuses multiplied. The number of alleged 
disappearances mounted. International 
organizations monitored the situation, so 
too did the Peruvian people. It is 
apparent that ending the violence is a 
general concern throughout the country. 

Alan Garcia took office with more 
electoral support than any president of 
Peru in decades, and his first steps in 
office have earned him unprecedented 
popularity— 85% in some recent polls. 
Moreover, APRA has a majority in the 
Peruvian legislature, so that President 
Garcia has a good chance to obtain 
legislative backing for his progi-am. 
Every bit of this broad support will be 
needed as Garcia faces the daunting 
agenda he inherited. 

Immediately seizing the moral high 
ground, Garcia began a forceful cam- 
paign against corruption and moved 
quickly to implement his oft-repeated 
pledge to eliminate human rights 
abuses. He has acted to improve an 
overloaded judicial system and over- 
crowded penal institutions, and to gi-ap- 
ple with continuing acts of violence fi-om 
communist terrorists and narcotics traf- 
fickers. Pledged to wage war against 
narcotics trafficking. President Garcia 
scored immediate notable successes by 
participating in Operation Condor, a 
highly successful joint drug interdiction 
program with Colombia and the United 
States. 

Confrontational Policy 
on Debt 

President Garcia has also begun an 
economic program which, although still 
incomplete, begins to confront a dismal 
economic situation. GDP [gi-oss domestic 
product] per capita today expressed in 
constant dollars is no better than 1965 
levels. Inflation, unemployment, poor 
health, and education standards, and the 
forgotten rural poor are but some of the 
issues Alan Garcia addressed at his in- 
auguration, which I attended. If not 
dealt with fii-mly, this situation augurs 
further decline In a country already in 
the grips of poverty. Since Peru began 
to implement a nationally defined 
austerity program inflation has slowed 
perceptibly, but it is too early to assess 
future results. 

Part of PeiTj's economic difficulty is 
its heavy debt burden, a problem Peru 
shares with other countries of the 
hemisphere. How to deal with debt is a ' 
vexing problem without ready or quick 
solutions, but with much room for 
arguments and misunderstanding. An 
overly rhetorical approach could hinder 
practical cooperation; the new govem- 



^ry 1986 



75 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



ment rhetoric has given us cause for 
concern in this regard. 

In the early months of his ad- 
ministration, President Garcia and some 
members of his government have been 
quick to publicly blame the United 
States for Peru's problems. These 
unpleasant words have been puzzling to 
us and in some instances made coopera- 
tion more difficult. Nevertheless, we 
will continue to seek ways to advance 
our common concerns, including, and 
here I want to emphasize, the desire to 
see the country return to healthy 
economic growth. 

We believe the U.S. proposal for a 
"Program for Sustained Gi'owth," 
presented by Treasury Secretary 
[James] Baker at the Seoul IMF [Inter- 
national Monetary Fund] World Bank 
meeting, involving increased commercial 
bank lending, enhanced international 
financial institution effectiveness, and 
structural change in the economies of 
the principal debtors, offers a concrete 
manner to cope with the debt problem. 
In our view, this program has elements 
which can appeal to Peru. It is clearly 
in our national interest to pursue with 
the Government of Peru a serious and 
quiet dialogue on how we can cooperate 
to help restore economic growth. 

As we evaluate the first steps of the 
Garcia administration we must keep in 
mind that none of Peru's long festering 
problems has disappeared. Finding the 
solutions to Peru's dramatic plight will 
not be easy for Peru or its new presi- 
dent. Perhaps the most positive change 
brought about so far by President Gar- 
cia is psychological. Peru, once the seat 
of the Inca Empire, is a country with a 
history; what Alan Garcia said to his 
people is that Peru is also a country 
with a future. He has helped Peruvians 
to believe their situation is not hopeless, 
that they can improve their and their 
children's lot. We applaud his efforts to 
reenergize the country and restore its 
will. We are prepared to assist Peru 
where we can be helpful. 

Terrorism, Narcotics, and 
Political Violence 

Turning now specifically to civil and 
human rights issues, allow me to review 
for you some key areas of concern and 
actions taken thus far by the Garcia 
administration. 

With regard to civil rights, the 
overall situation is e.xcellent. Not- 
withstanding terrorist violence against 
the elections, including the attempted 
assassination of the president of the Na- 
tional Electoral Board, the campaign 



and the April 14 elections proceeded 
without significant irregularities. Over 
90% of eligible Peruvians went to the 
polls, electing as their president the can- 
didate of the center-left Aprista Party, 
as well as a congr-ess whose membership 
ranges from conservative to communist. 
The elections and peaceful transfer of 
power represent a triumph for 
democracy as well as for the departing 
Belaunde administration, which had 
made this a key goal. 

The media take a lively role in 
political debates. The press is particular- 
ly sensitive to reports of human rights 
abuses, calling for investigations of 
allegations and punishment of responsi- 
ble individuals. Freedom of the press 
was further strengthened by the ad- 
ministration's recent repeal of the law of 
contempt under w'hich some journalists 
had been charged in previous years. 

The Peruvian Government has main- 
tained a "state of emergency" in 24 
provinces where terrorists and narcotics 
traffickers are especially active. The 
state of emergency gives total authority 
to the military in those areas and 
suspends the constitutional requirement 
for a search warrant to enter private 
homes, restricts freedom of movement 
and freedom of assembly, and effectively 
suspends habeas corpus. President Gar- 
cia has stated that, for the time being, 
conditions are not right for lifting the 
state of emergency. Despite concerns 
about the limitations on normal protec- 
tion of rights, he renewed the state of 
emergency for 60 days. These are 
severe measures, but the terrorism and 
narcotics problems are so serious they 
could destroy the entire fabric of Peru- 
vian society. 

Violence and killings, many with ap- 
parent political motivation, remain 
serious problems in the Ayacucho and 
Upper Huallaga emergency zones. The 
Sendero Linninoso has continued its 
program of vicious killings in both 
emergency zones, targeting recalcitrant 
campesinos, civilian officials, and 
members of the police and security 
forces. The situation in Tingo Maria in 
Upper Huallaga is further complicated 
by the presence of unscrupulous nar- 
cotics traffickers, who periodically settle 
accounts by force with each other as 
well as with law enforcement officials. 
Attributing responsibility for acts of 
violence in these areas is difficult since 
traffickers attempt to pin the blame for 
murders on the terrorists and vice 
versa. But whatever their motivation 
and whoever perpetrates them, the U.S. 
Government condemns this violence. 
Shining Path terrorists have also carried 



out numerous assassinations and a 
policy of indiscriminate car bombing; 
urban areas, especially in the Lima < 
which is home to nearly one out of 
every three Peruvians. 

Another terrorist group, the urb 
based Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupac Amaru (MRTA), announced 
temporary truce with the Garcia ad- 
ministration, saying that it would w: 
to judge the actions of the new gov( 
ment, but vowed to continue its stn 
against "imperialist enterprises." L; 
week the MRTA reportedly claimed 
responsibility for a bomb hurled in 
of our Embassy and for a car bomb 
off in front of Citibank in Lima. A c 
munique threatening "the beginning 
countdowTi" unless the government 
ries out change suggests that, despi 
the vigorous actions of the APRA 
government, the MRTA may be clo; 
reinitiating armed activities against 
government. 

Extrajudicial Killings 

Political kilhng is a policy of neithei 
current Peruvian Government nor i 
predecessor. Nevertheless there is ; 
dant evidence that in the face of br 
terrorism some in the security forct 
have responded with excessive viok 
of their own. Peruvian Government 
vestigations revealed the extrajudic 
killings in August of seven persons 
Pucayacu and at least 40 more in A 
comarca. In addition, there are allej 
tions that local self-defense groups, 
sometimes created by the security 
forces, sometimes not, have killed o 
tortured alleged terrorists they hav 
captured. One news magazine repor 
the lynching deaths of two alleged 
Sendero members in Marcas, Huan- 
cavelica on August 29, following a 
Sendero raid that killed six villager 
The new government moved sw 
to halt these extrajudicial killings. 
Following the allegations of violatic 
Pucayacu and Accomarca, the Garc; 
government ordered expedited milii 
investigations. When the investigate 
revealed the involvement of three 
military members in the Pucayacu 
ings. President Garcia removed the 
Armed Forces Joint Command Chii 
General Cesar Enrico. After subsec 
revelation that military members w 
also responsible for the Accomarca 
massacre, Garcia ordered two high 
ranking army generals responsible 
the Ayacucho emergency zone, Gei 
Jarama and Mori, relieved of their 
mands. The Peruvian military has 
tified eight persons directly respon 



76 



Department of State B 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



the Pucayacu and Accomarca deaths, 
y have been charged in both military 
civilian court systems. The supreme 
•t is to decide final jurisdiction. The 
lie has applauded Garcia's response 
ourageous and correct. While 
ling senior officers responsible for 
irs within their commands, the 
ian government has also sought to 
inguish the military as an institution 
1 possible crimes committed by in- 
dual members. 

Alleged disappearances decreased 
kedly between January and July 
> according to preliminary data 
mbled by the independent human 
ts commission (CONADEH), and 
irmed by the Catholic Bishops' 
al Action Commission (CEAS) and 
Association for Human Rights 
RODEH). Reported disappearances 
led 40 in January, 62 in February, 
1 March, 25 in April, 18 in May, 4 in 
;, and 2 in July (total of 181). the 
ivian Attorney General recently 
ed Ayacucho and returned with 
3 files on cases of individuals 
Tted missing in the past 4 years. He 
publicly committed himself to study 

case carefully. Again, the new 
ernment of Peru has made clear its 

that the counterterrorist fight 
; be waged with respect for law and 
an rights. We applaud that commit- 
t and will continue to monitor the 
.tion cai-efully. 

5oth the Belaunde and Garcia ad- 
strations have rejected the use of 
ire. However, security forces 
rtedly tortured Pucayacu victims as 
as those in Accomarca, where 
asses allege that soldiers raped 
ral women before shooting and 
ing some 40 victims. 

tment of Prisoners 

pendent human rights gi-oups re- 
concerned about mistreatment of 
ners. The rapid increase in the 
)er of detainees has led to severe 
;rowding in prisons and has exacer- 
i sanitary and nutrition problems in 
! institutions. Recent rioting at the 
^ancho Penitentiary caused 30 
IS and several injuries to inmates 
he police. The government stated 
the riots started while it was seek- 
establish control over the 
ocks where the terrorists were 
and were believed to be anning 
selves for an escape. It offered per- 
ve evidence that, of the 30 killed, 
imed to death in a fire set by other 



inmates and that the police had not 
abused their authority. 

The Garcia administi-ation has 
already signalled its indignation with 
regard to prison conditions, although 
lack of resources continues to be an im- 
pediment. The Government of Peru 
hopes to ameliorate this problem by 
speeding up the trial process for 
prisoners, but this, too, is hampered by 
the lack of resources in the court 
system. The reform of Peruvian police 
services, which President Garcia has 
ordered in an effort to correct police 
corruption and abuses, also should have 
a positive effect on ti-eatment of de- 
tainees; 56 police generals and over 170 
other officers have been dismissed. 

In his inaugural address, the Presi- 
dent indicated that persons erroneously 
sentenced or accused of terrorist ac- 
tivities should be freed. President Gar- 
cia has steadfastly denied that there are 
"political" piisoners in Peru. The new 
government has indicated that it is ap- 
palled by the lai-ge number of persons in 
jail awaiting trial or final sentencing 
(approximately 15,000 of the 22,000 
prisoners). Accused criminals frequently 
are detained for 2 or 3 years pending 
trial. In September, the Government of 
Peru ordered 50 prosecutors to report 
foi- extra duty at one prison in order to 
speed up the trial process. One of the 
duties of the recently announced Peace 
Commission will be to study possible 
pardons for individuals improperly im- 
prisoned in the past. 

The Government of Peru has also 
acknowledged the need for judicial 
reform to speed up the trial process, 
and is working on legislative proposals 
in this area. Our Embassy officials have 
met with the Ministry of Justice 
representatives to discuss possible U.S. 
Government support for an Administra- 
tion of Justice Project, under the 
authority provided in the 1985 amend- 
ments to the Foreign Assistance Act. 
Our AID [Agency for International 
Development] Mission in Lima has been 
authorized to finance an assessment by 
a local institution of the Peruvian justice 
system as the first step toward develop- 
ing a project that can support this im- 
portant initiative by the Government of 
Peru. Also, in an interesting pilot pro- 
gram, the Government of Peru has 
opened free legal clinics in poorer 
neighborhoods of Lima. 

Strategy for Human Rights 
Improvements 

The human rights situation in Peru is 
closely tied to terrorism and the 
Government of Peru's response. To the 



extent the Government of Peru can 
carry out an effective counterterrorist 
policy, this will also contribute to im- 
proving the human rights situation. The 
new Government of Peru's new strategy 
contains sevei'al elements. 

• Continued military efforts against 
terrorists' niral bases in the emergency 
zones, but with increased emphasis in 
the wake of the Pucayacu and Accomar- 
ca incidents on preventing abuses by 
security forces; 

•Increased economic assistance to 
the emergency zone areas. In addition, 
the Ayacucho region should benefit from 
the Government of Peru's general 
policies that aim to benefit the poor and 
the rural areas, particularly in the 
highlands; and 

• While i-efusing negotiation with 
terrorists, the Government of Peru in 
September established a Peace Commis- 
sion composed of six nongovernment in- 
dividuals, including a member from the 
Catholic Church hierarchy. The commis- 
sion will seek to establish a dialogue 
with terrorists with a view to reincor- 
porating them into a democratic society, 
and will study questions of pardons and 
amnesty. 

To conclude, we believe that events 
in recent months indicate improvements 
in human rights in Peru. Although 
significant problems remain, we are en- 
couraged by the firm resolve of the Gar- 
cia administration to identify and con- 
front them. Nevertheless, the major 
source of abuses, terrorist violence, con- 
tinues and probably cannot be controlled 
in the short term. We believe the Garcia 
administration's initial efforts to addi-ess 
these issues are praiseworthy and 
deserve the support of the U.S. Govern- 
ment and the international community. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



lary 1986 



77 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Promoting Economic Development 
in Central America 



by Richard T. McCormack 

Address before the Central 
American Forum sponsored by the Pan 
American Development Foundation in 
San Pedro Sula, Honduras, on October 
23, 1985. Ambassador McCormack is 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
Organization of American States. 

We are meeting here at a critical time 
in the development of Central America— 
both politically and economically. Latin 
America in general is facing major 
challenges, and how they are dealt with 
in the next few months and years will 
decide the course of developments in 
this hemisphere into the 21st century. I 
understand that this is the first time 
this group has met, and the Pan Ameri- 
can Development Foundation is to be 
congi-atulated for helping to organize 
this meeting, and you are to be con- 
gratulated for engaging in this forum at 
this time. 

This group has the opportunity to in- 
fluence positively what happens in this 
area of the world. In democratic govern- 
ments it is the private sector— the 
private individual— that has a crucial 
voice and who, together with his fellow 
citizens, decides what happens or does 
not happen. You in this meeting have 
command over substantial resources 
that will determine whether there is 
growth and prosperity in this region of 
the world. You will help decide whether 
democracy succeeds or fails. That is a 
heavy responsibility, and I know that 
you do not take it lightly. 

Objectives of U.S. Assistance 

The U.S. Government and its people are 
watching events in Central America. It 
is no exaggeration to say that this area 
is one of the highest priorities of Presi- 
dent Reagan. Our policies on economic 
growth and development and the secu- 
rity of this hemisphere are being tested 
in this area of the world. If all of us 
working together succeed here, we will 
demonstrate that we are on the right 
track and can succeed elsewhere. But if 
we stumble here, we will set back our 
united efforts throughout this 
hemisphere. 

At the strong urgings of your gov- 
ernments, and the wise suggestions of 
the late Senator Jackson of Washington, 



78 



we embarked several yeai's ago on a 
program to help bring stronger eco- 
nomic and social growth and stability in 
this part of the world. President Reagan 
appointed a national commission which 
rendered its report in January 1984. We 
are now implementing what is called, for 
this region, the Central American initia- 
tive [Centi-al America Democracy, Peace, 
and Development Initiative or Jackson 
plan]. 

Our participation in economic pro- 
grams in Central America was $625 
million in 1983. The program increased 
by almost 50% to $892 million in 1985, 
and almost $1 billion is requested for 
1986. In current dollars, then, we are 
planning to assist in Central America 
with the same amount we provided for 
the Alliance for Progi-ess in the 1960s. 
That is a major undertaking for the 
United States. The broad strategy is: 

First, to arrest the declines in in- 
comes, employment, and economic activ- 
ity by means of major balance-of- 
payments assistance; 

Second, to lay the foundation for 
long-term economic growth via improve- 
ments in economic policy and the infra- 
structure necessary for an export 
orientation; 

Third, to assure the widest possible 
distribution of the benefits of growth 
through assistance for improving health, 
education, and housing for the poorest 
groups; and 

Fourth, to suppoi't democratic proc- 
esses and institutions through assistance 
for the administration of justice, techni- 
cal training, and the development of 
leadership skills. 

Progress in Implementing 
U.S. Initiatives 

The efforts to assist the region are 
changing the economic climate and 
achieving results. The decline in gross 
national product has ceased. The 
region's gross national product (exclud- 
ing Nicaragua) gi-ew by 1.2% in 1984 
and is expected to grow by 1.7% in 
1985. It is clear that the strategy is 
working. The private sector has been 
strengthened; the region's international 
competitiveness has improved; econo- 
mies are returning to equilibrium; and 
-trade and exports have increased by 
12% in the past year. Such changes are, 
of course, the responsibility of the coun- 
tries concerned, but I believe our assist- 



ance has made a significant differenc 
and we want to continue to help. No 
of us here should underestimate the 
ficulty of such an adjustment, but a 
substantial start has been made. We 
also hoping that the Inter-American 
Development Bank will also increase 
efforts to promote the recovery and 
development of the region. 

A critical objective is economic 
stabilization. In the absence of econc 
stabilization, it is doubtful that the )• 
of the Central American initiative c; 
be achieved. 

Economic adjustment is the seco 
major objective and is at the core ot 
Central American initiative. Bluntly 
stated, all of the region's economies 
need to be restructured to some deg 
if they are ever to achieve levels of 
economic growth necessary to gener 
the needed employment levels and i 
crease the dissemination of the ben« 
of growth to larger segments of the 
region's population. Generally, this ■ 
involve changing the productive bas 
i.e., diversifying the region's produc 
and, in particular, its export sector. 
This, in turn, will require creation c 
policy framework that encourages n 
investment into nontraditional expoi 
development of a strong private sec 
adequate infrastructure, and an in- 
creased flow of technology. 

The process is long term, w^hich 
why the broader program for Centr 
America and the Caribbean, called t 
Caribbean Basin Initiative, was autl 
ized for 12 years. Significant progi-e 
already being made on restructurinj 
economies. For example, both Costs 
Rica and Honduras are planning to 
or close down enteiprises operated 
the government. In El Salvador, thi 
government is considering a divesti' 
program of activities better handlec 
the private sector. New investment 
joint ventures, contracts, and other 
ness activities totaling $45 million h 
been made in Centi-al America up t 
June of this year. This has created 
nearly 13,000 new jobs. 

An agiibusiness development pi 
ect, working from a $12 million loar 
base and private capital, has promo 
210 agribusiness pi-ojects under the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative. The Na 
Investment Council of Panama, whi 
was created in 1983 with a $3.7 mil 
loan and $200,000 grant, has attract 
28 firms to Panama with $32 millioi 
investment and over 4,000 new job: 






\ 



END NOTES 



Need To Pursue Political 
Economic Democracy 

ve outlined in some detail the vigor- 
?ffort that the United States is 
mg, and plans to continue making, 
icourage economic and social gi-owth 
antral America and the Caribbean, 
ire persuaded, because of our own 
inal experience, that a strong, 
,hy economy and social justice are 
itial foundation stones for effective 
jcracy. 

5ut I would be less than candid if I 
lot discuss with you what your 
tries are doing to assure your own 
Dmic prosperity and social equity. 
1 America in general has accumula- 
;ubstantial debt. Some of the coun- 
in the area have acquired so much 
they consider it unbearable and 
of default. 

'he unfortunate fact is that too 
' counti'ies have professed to favor 
and democratic countries with free 
jmies but have followed policies 
'y inconsistent with those objectives. 

It is a common affliction in Latin 
■ica to run uneconomical state 
prises, subsidize them with tax 
y, and then wonder why the 
et is so unbalanced, there are few 
|ves, and the country is accumu- 
f huge debts. 

It is a common practice to main- 
mrealistic exchange rates for 
;al reasons and then wonder what 
ned when the foreign exchange is 
and the debt cannot be paid. 
It is a common practice to protect 
nomic enteiprises— some call them 
an" industries— with high tariffs 
ther restrictions and then wonder 
)rices are high, domestic entei-prise 
[competitive, and products cannot 
ported. 

And it is still a common practice 
;p out foreign capital that will 
technologj', employment, and eco- 
growth because of events in the 
mtury that led to the theology 
lebt is better than equity. 

would hope that countries now 
ling under the burden of the debt 
his theology continually helps to 
larger will begin to reassess this 
)pment strategy. I know that re- 
ices have to be paid, and they can 
lurden. But the bankers want their 
-' in good times and bad. The busi- 
an has to suffer with the economy, 
hen it is dowm, profits are down 
so remittances. 

we believe in democracy, then we 
Delieve in both political and eco- 



nomic democracy because they are in- 
separable. One cannot survive without 
the other. 

My country has thrived on the crea- 
tivity of the individual and private in- 
vestment. It would be no mistake to say 
that European capital financed the 
American industrial revolution in the 
past century. So we believe that there 
is nothing to match the initiative, 
creativity, and productiveness of the 
individual in a free society. That is the 
great strength of democratic countries. 
That is how we grew and developed. 

The threat to Latin American coun- 
tries is not foreign intervention, as ex- 
treme nationalists would suggest. The 
threat is foreign indifference— when 
your friends and allies become absorbed 
in their own national problems and 
weary of their efforts to [jrovide access 
to their markets and the world economy 
because your domestic policies do not 
permit you to take advantage of what is 
offered. 

The world is moving forward, and it 
is developing at a rapid rate. Technol- 
ogy that we thought to be the latest 
thing in the 1970s is obsolete in the 
1980s. And because of restrictions that 
your countries have imposed, the tech- 
nology of the 1970s has yet to arrive in 
your countries. Europe is concerned that 
it will fall behind in the fast technology 
race that the United States is leading. I 
think that those concerns may be some- 
what exaggerated. But the Soviet Union 
already sees that its economic system 
has left it hopelessly behind, with no 
chance that the bold statement of 
Krushchev that "we will bury you" will 
ever be realized. 

The world is becoming integi-ated. 
No country can any longer be truly in- 
dependent and also participate in the 
world economy. Decisions made in the 
markets of London, Frankfurt, and 
Tokyo profoundly affect the United 
States. We are learning to live in this 
interdependent world and to grow and 
prosper. The countries represented in 
this room must do the same. Other 
countries in Latin America must also do 
so. It is a national decision for each of 
you whether you will join the woiid and 
prosper with it or be left behind. We 
cannot make that decision for you. We 
can try to be helpful, help provide 
resources, and encourage our citizens to 
do the same if their contribution is 
welcome and treated with dignity. But 
the competition for resources in the 
United States and elsew-here is severe. 
In brief, it is the policy of my gov- 
ernment to do everything it reasonably 
can to promote democracy and economic 



growth in this i-egion of the world, and 
we are doing that, but in the final 
analysis, the decision is yours. 

It has been an inspiration to be here 
with you and in Central America and to 
sense and feel the thirst for democracy 
and the opportunities that it will pro- 
vide. I know, perhaps not as well as 
you, how difficult your task is to satisfy 
the just aspirations of your people. El 
Salvador has made unbelievable prog- 
ress, held open and free elections in the 
face of the greatest adversity, and now 
democracy is rooted more firmly than 
ever before. Three of your countries will 
have elections in the coming year. Un- 
fortunately, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua 
in recent days have more clearly repudi- 
ated their promises to the Nicaraguan 
people and moved to imjjose a cruel 
police state. So you are confronted with 
a predatory dictatorship in your midst. 

You have a gi-eat obligation— in 
truth to pledge your lives, your for- 
tunes, and your saci-ed honor to the 
future welfare and freedom of your 
countries. I know that you have the will 
and courage to do just that. You can be 
certain that you will have the strong 
continuing support of the United 
States. ■ 



November 1985 



The following are some of the signifi- 
cant official U.S. foreign policy actions 
and statements during the month that are 
not reported elsewhere in this periodical. 



November 1 

U.S. and EC negotiators completed an agi-ee- 
ment to curtail the export of EC steel into 
the U.S., bringing the total number of 
agreements under the President's Steel Pro- 
gram to 16. 

The U.S. increases duties on EC pasta 
imports in retaliation for the EC's failure to 
settle a longstanding citrus trade dispute 
begun in 1976. The EC responds by increas- 
ing tariffs on imports of U.S. lemons and 
walnuts. 

U.S. welcomes the decision by the 
Netherlands Parliament to deploy NATO 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons on its 
soil. 

November 5 

UN General Assembly calls on Vietnam to 
withdraw its troops from Cambodia and let 
the Khmer people detei-mine their own 
destiny. The vote is 114 (U.S.) to 21 with 16 
abstentions. 



•y 1986 



79 



TREATIES 



The following newly appointed am- 
bassadors present their credentials to Presi- 
dent Reagan: Stanislas Batchi (Congo), 
Leshele Abel Thoahlane (Lesotho), Timon 
Sam Mangwazu (Malawi), Salah Ahmed 
(Sudan), Nalumino Mundia (Zambia), J.H.A. 
Buekes (South Africa), Albert Oswyn Xavier 
(Grenada), and Edouard Kadigiri (Burundi). 

November 6-9 

Deputy Secretary WTiitehead visits Hon- 
duras," El Salvador, Costa Rica, and 
Guatemala to meet with senior host- 
government officials and to become familiar 
with the region. 

November 13 

UN General Assembly approves a resolution 
calling for the immediate withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Afghanistan. The vote is 
122 (U.S.) to 19 with 12 abstentions. 

November 20 

The Department of State issues a travel ad- 
visory for the city of Khartoum. It advises 
that "due to the presence in Khartoum of 
known terrorists, and possible threats to U.S. 



interests, American citizens are advised to 
avoid the Sudanese capital of Khartoum." 
This advisory is in addition to a more general 
travel advisory for the Sudan issued January 
12, 1985. 

AID Administrator McPherson visits the 
site of the Nevado de Ruiz volcano, 100 miles 
west of Bogota, and reviews the efforts made 
to rescue and aid thousands of Colombians af- 
fected by the disaster. The volcano erupted 
Nov. 13 killing an estimated 23,000 people. 
The U.S. responded quickly to the call for 
assistance with U.S. personnel, helicopters, 
tents, blankets, and a team of seismologists 
and volcanologists. As of the end of 
November, the cost of the initial U.S. 
response is $2.5 million. 

November 27-28 

U.S.-Angolan delegations meet in Lusaka, 
Zambia, to continue efforts in achieving a 
peaceful resolution of important southern 
Africa issues. Assistant Secretary Crocker 
heads the U.S. delegation. ■ 



to force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532 
Accession deposited: New Zealand, Nov. 
1985." 

Trade 

Agreement on technical barriers to trade 
(standards code). Done at Geneva Apr. U 
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TL 
9616. 

Agreement on implementation of Art. VI 

the general agreement on tariffs and tra( 

(customs valuation code). Done at Genev; 

Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 

1981. TIAS 10402. 

Acceptances deposited: Portugal, Oct. 14 

1985. 

Wheat 

1983 Protocol for the further e.xtension o 
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 714- 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Enter 
into force July 1, 1983.= 

1983 Protocol for the further e.xtension o 
food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). : 
at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered int 
force July 1, 1983.=" 
Ratifications: Argentina, Nov. 15, 1985. 



Current Actions 



BILATERAL 



MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbiti-al awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force 
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. 
TIAS 6997. 
Accession deposited: Malaysia, Nov. 5, 1985. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement, 1983, with 
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1983. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983; 
definitively Sept. 11, 1985. 
Ratification deposited: Zaire, Oct. 25, 1985. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 

rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 

Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 999 UNTS 

171.' 

International covenant on economic, social 

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 

1976. 999 UNTS 3.' 

Accessions deposited: San Marino, 

Oct. 18, 1985 

Jute 

International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro- 
visionally Jan 9, 1984. 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Nov. 8, 
1985. 

Ratification deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep. 
of, Nov. 13, 1985. 



Marine Pollution 

Convention on the prevention of marine 
pollution by dumping of wastes and other 
matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mex- 
ico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 
1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 
8165. 
Accession deposited: China, Nov. 5, 1985. 

Pollution 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1979 
(TIAS 10541), concerning monitoring and 
evaluation of the long-range transmission of 
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with annex. 
Done at Geneva Sept. 23, 1984.^ 
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Oct. 22, 
1985. 

Sugar 

International sugar agi-eement, 1984, with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva July 5, 1984. Entered 
into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1985; 
definitively Apr. 4, 1985.= 
Accession deposited: Haiti, Oct. 30, 1985. 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Nov. 13, 
1985; Belize Nov. 13, 1985. 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking of 

hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. 

Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. 

Jan. 6, 1985. 

Ratification deposited: New Zealand, 

Nov. 12, 1985.'' 

Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of crimes against internationally pro- 
tected persons, including diplomatic agents. 
Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered in- 



Argentina 

Air transport services agreement, with ; 
nexes. Signed at Buenos Aires Oct. 22, 1 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 22, 
definitively upon exchange of diplomatic 
notes confirming that each party has cor 
ed its internal procedures. 

Canada 

Agreement between the United States a 
Great Britain (for Canada and Newfound 
for the prevention of interference by shi) 
the coasts of these countries with radio 
broadcasting. Effected by exchange of nc 
at Manchester, Mass., and Washington S 
18 and 23 and Oct. 1, 1925. Entered into 
force Oct. 1, 1925. TS 724-A. 
Notification of termination by Canada: A 
7, 1985; effective Aug. 7, 1986. 

Ai-rangement relative to the assignment 
frequencies on the North American conti 
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa 
Feb. 26 and 28, 1929. Entered into force 
1, 1929. TS 777-A. 
Notification of termination by Canada: A 
7, 1985; effective Aug. 7, 1986. 

Regional arrangement governing the use 
radio for civil aeronautical services. Effe' 
by exchange of notes at Washington Feb 
1939. 53 Stat. 2157; EAS 143. 
Notification of termination by Canada: A 
7, 1985; effective Oct. 6, 1985. 

Agreement relating to land line commun 
tion facilities between Edmonton, Albert 
and Fairbanks, Alaska. Effected by exch 
of notes at Washington Mar. 1 and 31, 1'. 
Entered into force Mar. 31, 1948. TIAS 
Notification of termination by Canada: f 
7, 1985; effective Aug. 7, 1986. 



80 



Department of State 



PRESS RELEASES 



!meiit relating to the sealing of mobile 
transmitting equipment. Effected by 
nge of notes at Washington Mar. 9, and 
'53. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1953. 
3138. 

cation of termination bv Canada: Aug. 
5; effective Sept. 26, 1985. 

t 

•ment relating to the agreement for the 
f agricultural commodities of June 7, 
TIAS 7855). Signed at Cairo Nov. 12. 
Entered into force Nov. 12, 1985. 



?ol to the convention with respect to 
on income and property of July 28, 
riAS 6518), as amended by the Pro- 
of Oct. 12, 1970 (TIAS 7270), and Nov. 
78 (TIAS 9.500). Signed at Paris Jan. 17, 
Entered into force Oct. 1, 1985. 
imed by the President: Nov. 1, 1985. 

ntion on the transfer of sentenced per- 
Signed at Washington Jan. 25, 1983. 
sd into force Feb. 1, 1985. 
imed by the President: Nov. 4, 1985. 

ment e.xtending the memorandum of 
itanding of July 8 and 23, 1982 (TIAS 
, covering cooperation in the field of 
ical sciences. Signed at Reston and 
s Sept. 27 and Oct. 23, 1985. Entered 
rce Oct. 23, 1985; effective July 23, 



nent amending agreement of Dec. 21, 
?lating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
ide fiber te.xtiles and textile products 
10624). Effected by e.xchange of letters 

Delhi Sept. 25 arid Oct. 28, 1985. 
d into force Oct. 28, 1985. 



nent relating to the employment of 
ents of official government employees, 
d by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv 
•usalem Sept. 23 and Oct. 3, 1985. 
d into force Oct. 3, 1985. 



andum of understanding for a 
itive program concerning earthquake 
d evaluation of seismic hazard. Signed 
e and Reston Sept. 30 and Nov. 6, 
ntered into force Nov. 6, 1985. 

indum of understanding concerning in- 
m and management of U.S. naviga- 
ids. Signed at Rome and Ramstein 
le Oct. 8 and 11, 1985. Entered into 
ct. 11, 1985. 

a 

lent regarding the consolidation and 
uling of certain debts owed to, 
eed by, or insured by the U.S. 
ment and its agencies, with annexes, 
at Washington Sept. 26. 1985. 
i into force Nov. 18, 1985. 



Japan 

Agreement i-elating to the acquisition and 
production in Japan of the patriot weapon 
system. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Tokyo Oct. 4, 1985." Entered into force Oct. 4, 
1985. 

Agreement extending the technical exchange 
arrangement of Sept. 12 and 29. 1980 (TIAS 
10537), in the field of [nuclear] regulatory 
matters. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington and Tokyo Sept. 25 and 26, 1985. 
Entered into force Sept. 26, 1985. 

Madagascar 

Agi-eement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insui-ed by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annex. 
Signed at Antananarivo Oct. 8, 1985. Entered 
into force Nov. 12, 1985. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agi-icultural commodities of Sept. 27, 1985. 
Effected by exchange of letters at An- 
tananarivo Oct. 28 and Nov. 7. 1985. Entered 
into force Nov. 7, 1985. 

Saudi Arabia 

Memorandum of arrangement relating to 
technical assistance in developing and 
modernizing Saudi Arabia's civil aviation 
system, with annex. Signed at Washington 
and Riyadh May 16 and Aug. 3, 1985. 
Entered into force Aug. 3, 1985. 

Sri Lanka 

Agi-eement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Colombo Oct. 23, 1985. 
Entered into force Oct. 23, 1985. 

Sweden 

Agreement extending" the agreement of Sept. 
9, 1980. concerning a coopei-ative program in 
the field of management of radioactive 
wastes. Signed at Stockholm Oct. 8, 1985. 
Entered into force Oct. 8, 1985; effective 
Sept. 9, 1985. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement relating to sharing facility con- 
struction costs on Ascension Island, with 
memorandum of agreement. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at London Mar. 25, 1985. 
Entered into force Mar. 25, 1985. 

Agreement amending annex 2 of the air serv- 
ices agreement of July 23, 1977. as amended 
(TIAS 8641. 8965, 9722, 10059). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington May 28. 
1985. Entered into force May 28, 1985. 

Venezuela 

Agreement extending the implementing 
agreement of Oct. 29 and Nov. 9, 1982 re- 
garding air transport ser\'ices. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Caracas Feb. 1 and 
Mar. 18, 1985. Entered into force Mar. 18, 
1985; effective May 1, 1985. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement amending and extending agree- 
ment of Oct. 26 and 27, 1978 (TIAS 9447), as 
amended, concerning trade in men's and 



boys' wool and manmade fiber suits. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Belgrade Oct. 9 and 
Nov. 12, 1985. Entered into force Nov. 12, 
1985. 



'Not in force for the U.S. 

^Not in force. 

^In force provisionally for the U.S. 

■■Applicable to Cook Islands and Niue. 



Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. 


Date 


Subject 


*254 


11/6 


Natale H. Bellocehi swoj-n in 
as Ambassador to 
Botswana, Oct. 28 
fbiographic data). 


*255 


11/4 


Regional foreign policy con- 
ference, San Antonio, 
Nov. 21. 


*256 


11/4 


Shultz: arrival statement. 
Moscow 


257 


11/7 


Shultz: news conference. Mos 
cow. Nov. 5. 


*258 


11/14 


Alan Lee Keyes sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary for In- 
tei-national Organization Af- 
fairs. Nov. 13 (biogi-aphic 
data). 


*259 


11/5 


Paul H. Vishny named U.S. 
representative to the Ad- 
visory Board of the Centre 
for Telecommunications 
Development (biographic 
data). 


260 


11/7 


Shultz: news conference, 
Reykjavik, Nov. 6. 


261 


11/12 


Shultz: interview on "Face 
the Nation," Nov. 10. 


262 


11/15 


Shultz: news conference, 
Nov. 14. 


263 


11/18 


Shultz: interview on "This 
Week With David 
Brinklev," Nov. 17. 


*264 


11/22 


Shultz: interview on "Good 
Morning, America," 
Geneva. 


265 


11/21 


Shultz: news briefing, 
Geneva. 


*266 


11/22 


Shultz: interview for the 
"McNeil-Lehrer Report," 
Geneva, Nov. 18. 


■*267 


11/22 


Shultz: interview by CNN, 
Geneva, Nov. 18. 


269 


11/25 


Shultz: interview on "Meet 
the Press," San Francisco, 
Nov. 24. 


*270 


11/27 


James C. McKinney ap- 
pointed chairman of the 
U.S. delegation to the MF 
Broadcasting Regional Ad- 
ministrative Radio Con- 
ference (biographic data). 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



ry 1986 



81 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State Foreign Relations Volume Released 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affaii's, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

A Mission for Peace, TV address to the na- 
tion, Nov. 14, 1985 (Current Policy #765). 

The Geneva Summit: A Fresh Start, address 
before a joint session of the Congress, Nov. 
21, 1985 (Current Policy #766). 

Africa 

U.S. Interests in Regional Conflicts, Assist- 
ant Secretary Crocker, World Affairs 
Council, Nov. 13, 1985 (Current Policy 
#764). 

Arms Control 

Arms Control: Confidence-Building Measures 

(GIST, Nov. 1985). 
NPT Review Conference (GIST, Nov. 1985). 

East Asia 

Developments in the Philippines, Assistant 
Secretary Wolfowitz, Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee, Oct. 30, 1985 (Current 
Policy #760). 

Europe 

Soviet Use of Active Measures, CIA Director 
Casey, World Affairs Council, Dallas, Sept. 
18, 1985 (Current Policy #761). 

International Law 

The Political Offense Exception and Ter- 
rorism, Legal Adviser Sofaer, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 1, 1985 
(Current Policy #762). 

United Nations 

The United Nations at Forty: Economic Suc- 
cesses and Failures, Under Secretary 
Wallis, Business Council for the United Na- 
tions, Nov. 6, 1985 (Current Policy #763). 

Western Hemisphere 

Promoting Economic Development in Central 
America, Ambassador McCormack, Central 
American Forum sponsored by the Pan 
American Development Foundation, San 
Pedro Sula, Honduras, Oct. 23, 1985 (Cur- 
rent Policy #759). 

Central America: U.S. Policy (GIST, Nov. 
1985). ■ 



The Department of State on October 7, 
1985, released Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1951, Volume IV, 
Europe. The volume presents over 1,800 
pages of previously classified documents 
on U.S. policy with regard to Western 
Europe (Part 1) and Central and 
Eastern Europe (Part 2). 

Part 1 contains over 1,000 pages of 
documents, covering both multilateral 
topics and bilateral relations with the 
nations of Western Europe and Scan- 
dinavia. Regionally, U.S. policy focused 
on support for the political and economic 
integration of Western Europe, pro- 
viding encouragement for ratification of 
the Schuman Plan for a European Coal 
and Steel Community, as well as for the 
Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC), the Council of 
Europe, and the European Payments 
Union. Bilateral materials are arranged 
alphabetically from Belgium through the 
Vatican. The largest compilations, which 
deal with France and Italy, cover efforts 
to ensure political stability in both coun- 
tries and highlight visits to the United 
States by French Prime Minister Pleven 
and President Auriol and Italian Prime 
Minister De Gasperi. Documents on the 
United Kingdom e.xplain U.S. views con- 
cerning Britain's defense policy, par- 
ticularly in light of its economic 
situation. 

Part 2 consists of some 800 pages in- 
troduced by the section on Austria, 
which centers on problems of the oc- 
cupation as well as U.S. participation in 
negotiations for an Austrian State Trea- 
ty. Additional mateiial on Central 
Europe, relating to Germany and the 



problems of Western European secur 
was published in Foreign Relations, 
1951, Volume III, released in 1981. W 
of Part 2 deals with Eastern Europe, 
eluding a multilateral section and 
bilateral portions on the countries. Tl 
largest components are those on the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The 
former sets forth principal issues in 
bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R., 
presents major appraisals and estima 
of Soviet intentions, and offers repor 
on internal developments of significa 
to the formulation of U.S. policy. Th 
final section on Yugoslavia relates to 
U.S. interest in supporting Yugoslav 
dependence through military and 
economic assistance programs and th 
encouragement of expanded political 
relations with the West. 

Foreign Relations, 1951, Volume 
was prepared in the Office of the 
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Copies of Volt 
IV, (Department of. State Publicatioi 
No. 9424 (Part I) and 9425 (Part 2); 
Stock No. O44-000-02053-0) may be j 
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as the official record of U.S. foreign 
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the last of seven to be published co^ 
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iPress release 236 of Oct. 4, 1985. 



82 



Department of State B 



lEX 



luary 1986 

lume 86, No. 2106 



anistan. Secretary's Interview on 

Meet the Press" '. IS 

a 

African Economic Crisis (Whitehead) 33 

tion in Angola (Walters) 73 

and Soviet Interests in the Horn of 

frica (Crocker) 29 

ila. Situation in Angola (Walters) 73 

■ Control 

: Control Negotiations (Reagan) 37 

i Control and Reduction Negotiations 

Jeagan) 17 

rhallenge of Negotiating by 

eniocracies (Adelman) .". 35 

ng Arms Control Work (Adelman) .... 39 
Nuclear Planning Group Meets 

:nal communi(|ue) 61 

; Confei-ence of November 14 

Ihultz) 23 

dent Reagan and General Secretary 
arbachev Meet in Geneva (Gor- 
ichev. McFarlane, Reagan, Shultz, 

int statement) 1 

tary's Interview on "Face the 

ation" 27 

tary's Interview on "Meet the 

•ess" 18 

tary's Interview on "This Week 

ith David Brinkley" 20 

tary's Visit to Northern Europe .57 

U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Nuclear 

id Space Arms (Reagan) 40 

ion. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Air Service 

department announcement) 58 

iria. Religion in Eastern Europe 

chifter) 64 

da. Secretary Visits Canada (Clark, 

lultz, toast, joint news conference) ... 42 

ress 

Ifrican Economic Crisis (Whitehead) 33 

opments in the Philippines 

''olfowitz) 49 

n Rights Situation in Pei-u 

brams) 75 

ative Proposals Regarding 

plomatic Security (Spiers) 47 

lent Reagan and General Seci-etai-y 
>rbachev Meet in Geneva (Gor- 
chev, McFarlane, Reagan, Shultz. 

nt statement) 1 

on in Eastern Europe (Schifter) 64 

lole in the Case of Soviet Seaman 

;dvid (Ridgway) 62 

?eiTninates Acceptance of ICJ Com- 
Isory .Jurisdiction (Secretary's Let- 
•, Sofaer, Department Statement) .... 67 
oslovakia. Religion in Eastern 

irope (Schifter) 64 

tment & Foreign Ser>ice. Legis- 
ive Pi-oposals Regarding Diplomatic 

curity (Spiers) 47 

|4sia. Developments in the Philip- 
lies (Wolfowitz) 49 

Ernies 

irican Economic Crisis (Whitehead) 33 

)ting Economic Development in Cen- 

il America (McCormack) 78 

-arv- Visits Canada (Clark, Shultz, 

ist, joint news conference) 42 

'nited Nations at Forty: Economic 

ccesses and Failures (Wallis) 54 

'akistan Relations; The Economic 

mension (Wallis) 52 

. Secretary's Interview on "Meet 

- Press" 18 

y Policy. Secretary Visits Canada 
ark, Shultz, toast, joint news con- 

ence) 42 

l>ia. U.S. and Soviet Interests in the 
'm of Africa (Crocker) 29 



Europe 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets 

(final communique) 61 

Religion in Eastern Europe (Schifter) 64 

Secretai-y's Visit to Northern Europe 57 

Finland. Secretary's Visit to Northern 

Eui-ope ." 57 

Foreign .Assistance. The African 

Economic Crisis (Whitehead) 33 

Human Rights 

Human Rights Situation in Peru 

(Abrams) 75 

Making Arms Control Work (Adelman) .... 39 
New's Conference of Novembei- 14 

(Shultz) 23 

Promoting Peaceful (Dhange in South 

Africa (Walters) 72 

Religion in Eastern Europe (Schifter) 64 

Seci'etary's Intei-view on "Meet the 

Press" 18 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week 

With David Brinkley" 20 

Situation in Angola (Walters) 73 

The United Nations at Forty: Economic 

Successes and Failures (Wallis) 54 

Iceland. Secretary's Visit to Northern 

Eui'o])e 57 

International Law 

U.S.-Italy Agree to Submit Dispute to 

ICJ (Department statement) 69 

U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Com- 
pulsory Jurisdiction (Secretary's letter, 

Sofaer, Department statement) 67 

Ireland. U.K.-Ireland Agi-eement Con- 
cerning Northeni Ireland (Reagan) 56 

Italy. U.S.-Italy Agree to Submit Dispute 

to ICJ (Department statement) 69 

Lebanon 

Secretary's Interview on "Face the 

Nation" 27 

Secretary's Intei-view on "This Week 

With David Brinklev" 20 

Maritime Mfairs. IMO" Endorses U.S. 
Initiative on Ship and Passenger 
Security (Department announcement) . 72 
Middle East. News Confei-ence of 

November 14 (Shultz) 23 

Military Affairs 

News Confei-ence of November 14 

(Shultz) 23 

Secretary Visits Canada (Clark, Shultz, 

toast, joint news conference) 42 

Nicaragua. U.S. Tenninates Acceptance 
of ICJ Compulsor->- Jurisdiction 
(Secretary's letter, Sofaer, Depart- 
ment statement) 67 

Narcotics. Human Rights Situation in 

Pei'u (Abrams) 75 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets 

(final communique) 61 

President Meets With NATO Allies 

(Carrington) 14 

Pakistan. U.S.-Pakistan Relations: The 

Economic Dimension (Wallis) 52 

Peru. Human Rights Situation in Pei-u 

(Abrams) 75 

Philippines. Developments in the Philip- 
pines (Wolfowitz) 49 

Presidential Documents 

Arms Control Negotiations (Reagan) 37 

Arms Control and Reduction Negotiations 

(Reagan) 17 

President Reagan and General Secretary- 
Gorbachev Meet in Geneva (Gor- 
bachev, McFarlane, Reagan, Shultz, 

joint statement) 1 

U.K.-Ireland Agi-eement Concerning 

Northern Ireland (Reagan) 56 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Nuclear 

and Space Arms (Reagan) 40 

Publications 

Department of State 82 

Foreign Relations Volume Released 82 

Romania. Religion in Eastern Europe 

(Schifter) 64 



South Africa. Promoting Peaceful Change 

in South Africa (Walters) 72 

Terrorism 

Human Rights Situation in Peru 

(Abrams) 75 

IMO Endorses U.S. Initiative on Ship and 
Passenger Security (Department 

announcement) 72 

Legislative Proposals Regarding 

Diplomatic Security (Spiers) 47 

Secretary's Interview 'on "Meet the 

Press" 18 

U.S. Offers Reward for AchiUe Lauro 
Terrorists (Department 

announcement) 72 

Trade 

Secretarv- Visits Canada (Clark, Shultz, 

toast, joint news conference) 42 

The United Nations at Forty: Economic 

Successes and Failures (Wallis) 54 

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: The Economic 

Dimension (Wallis) 52 

Treaties. Current Actions 80 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms Control Negotiations (Reagan) 37 

Ai-ms Conti-ol and Reduction Negotiations 

(Reagan) 17 

The Challenge. of Negotiating by 

Democracies (Adelman) .' 35 

Making Ai-ms Control Work (Adelman) .... 39 
News (T^onference of November 14 

(Shultz) „ 23 

President Meets With NATO Allies 

(Cai-rington) 14 

Pi-esident Reagan and Genei-al Secretary 
Gorbachev Meet in Geneva (Gor- 
bachev, McFariane, Reagan, Shultz, 

joint statement) 1 

Religion in Eastei-n Europe (Schifter) 64 

Secretary's Visit to Northern Europe 57 

U.S. Role in the Case of Soviet Seaman 

Medvid (Ridgw-ay) 62 

U.S. and Soviet Interests in the Horn of 

Africa (Crocker) 29 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Air Service (Department 

announcement) 58 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Nuclear 

and Space Arms (Reagan) 40 

United Kingdom. U.K.-Ireland Agi-ee- 
ment Concerning Northern Ireland 

(Reagan) 56 

United Nations 

IMO Endorses U.S. Initiative on Ship and 
Passenger Security (Department 

announcement) ...'. 72 

Promoting Peaceful Change in South 

Africa (Walters) 72 

Situation in Angola (Walters) 73 

The United Nations at Forty: Economic 

Successes and Failures (Wallis) 54 

Western Hemisphere. Promoting 
Economic Development in Central 
America (McCormack) 78 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 71 

Adelman, Kenneth L 35, 39 

Lord Carrington 14 

Clark, Joseph 42 

Crocker, Chester A 29 

McCoi-niack, Richard T 74 

Reagan, President 1, 17, 37, 40, 56 

Ridgway, Rozanne L 62 

Schifter, Richard D 64 

Shultz. Secretary 18, 20, 23, 27, 42, 57 

Sofaer, Abraham D 67 

Wallis, W. Allen 52, 54 

Walters. Vernon A 68, 69 

Whitehead, John C 33 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 49 



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Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 86 / Number 2107 



February 1986 



fT^l^M 



Afghanistan/1 

The Secretary/24 I ^^R 'ti r isco 

Liberia/54 'i^^l^^g^ 



UN Decade for Women Conference/89 



D^partnipnt of State 

bulletin 



Volume 86 / Number 2107 / February 1986 



I 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
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interpreted as official U.S. policy 
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GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB | 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affaii 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

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Assistant Editor 



I 



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20402 



CONTENTS 



FEATURE 

1 Afghanistan's Struggle for Freedom (John C. 

Whitehead) 
4 Afghanistan: Six Years of Soviet Occupation (Craig 
Karp) 
20 UN Calls for Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan 

(Vernon A. Walters, Text of Resolution) 
22 Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (President Reagan) 



i President 

U.S. -Soviet Relations 
Nicaragua 

p Secretary 

A New International Era: The 
American Perspective 

Berlin and the Cause of Freedom 

Beyond the Debt Problem: The 
Path to Prosperity in Latin 
America 

Trip to Europe (News Confer- 
ences, North Atlantic Council 
Final Communique, NATO 
Foreign Ministers Statement) 

News Conference of December 6 



ica 

Recent Developments in Liberia 
(Chester A. Crocker) 

Appointment of Advisory Com- 
mittee on South Africa 
{Secretary Shidtz, List of Com- 
mittee Members) 

IS Control 

The Nuclear and Space Arms 
Talks: Where We Are After the 
Summit {Paul H. Nitze) 

Nuclear Testing {White House 
Statement) 

Western Proposal Tabled at 
MBFR Negotiations {Michael 
Alexa7ider. Robert D. Blackurill, 
President Reagan) 

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 
Control Agreements {Message 
to the Congress, Text of Unclas- 
sified Report) 



East Asia 



73 



75 



The U.S. and the Philippines: 
Dangers and Opportunities 
{Michael H. Armaeost) 

U.S. -China Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement {President Reagan) 



United Nations 

89 



Europe 

76 Countering Communist 
Espionage in the U.S. 
{Rozanne L. Ridgway) 

78 24th Report on Cyprus {Message 

to the Congress) 

79 NATO Defense Planning Commit- 

tee Meets {Final Communique) 

80 CSCE Cultural Forum Meets in 

Budapest {Walter J. Stoessel, 
Jr., Western Draft Concluding 
Document) 

Human Rights 

87 Safeguarding Human Rights 
{President Reagan, Procla- 
mation) 

l\/liddle East 

89 Arms Sales to Jordan {President 
Reagan) 



UN Decade for Women Confer- 
ence Held in Nairobi {Maureen 
Reagan) 



End Notes 

92 December 1985 

Treaties 

93 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

95 Department of State 

Publications 

96 Department of State 

96 Foreign Relations Volume 

Released 

97 Basic Documents Volume 

Released 
97 Backg^-ound Notes 

Index 




Department of State Bu 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



Afghanistan's Struggle 
for Freedom 

by John C. Whitehead 



Address before the World Affairs Council in 

Washington, D.C., on December 13, 1985. 
Mr. Whitehead is Deputy Secretary of State. ^ 



Thank you for the opportunity to 
discuss Afghanistan with you today. As 
many of you know, 6 years ago, on 
Christmas eve, Soviet airborne troops 
began landing in Kabul. By Decem- 
ber 27, Soviet forces had risen to 5,000; 
within 6 months they numbered 85,000. 
Today, there are about 120,000 Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan, with an addi- 
tional 30,000 poised across the border in 
the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet invasion and continued 
occupation of Afghanistan is a blatant 
example of communist colonialism at its 
worst. Without provocation, certainly 
without invitation, the Soviet Union 
simply invaded a nonaligned, non- 
menacing, and independent country. 
Soviet troops stormed the presidential 
palace, murdered the insufficiently 
docile Marxist President Amin, and in- 
stalled Babrak Karmal as his compliant 
replacement. For 6 years, using almost 
every conceivable means available in 
their vast military arsenal, the Soviets 
have tried to pacify, conquer, and 
Sovietize Afghanistan. In this, they 
have failed and failed miserably. 

The Soviet invasion sounded the 
death knell for detente. It revealed, for 
the first time since World War II, the 
Soviet Union's willingness to use its 
owTi military force outside Eastern 
Europe. Coming in the wake of Soviet 
adventurism thi-ough proxies in Angola, 
Ethiopia, and South Yemen, the naked 
invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops 
exposed Soviet expansionism to the 
world. 



The Soviet Union has always pro- 
claimed its support for people fighting 
for their national independence. 
Afghanistan turns those hollow words 
into a bad joke. Nowhere is the will for 
freedom stronger than in Afghanistan, 
yet nowhere in the world has the car- 
nage wrought by Soviet impeiialism 
been greater. 

Soviet Tactics 

Using indoctrination, subversion, and 
stark military terror, the Soviets have 
tried for 6 years to crush the Afghan 
will to resist. They have literally tried 
to destroy everything Afghan— history, 
culture, tradition, religion, family. 

Unable to pacify or control the coun- 
tryside, for example, the Soviet Union 
in 1984 resorted to tactics aimed 
specifically at depopulating areas of 
strategic importance. High-altitude 
saturation bombings, the willful destruc- 
tion of crops and livestock, reprisals 
against civilians, and the widespread use 
of antipersonnel mines are just some of 
the tactics the Soviets are using in their 
war on the Afghan people. 

Bombs disguised as toys or pens- 
designed to maim, not kill— continue to 
be used. It is difficult to conceive what 
military objective might be served by 
such devices. One French doctor ex- 
plained it this way: 



ary 1986 



The Russians know quite well that in 
this type of war, an injured person is much 
more trouble than a dead person. In many 
cases, he will die several days or weeks 
later . . . with atrocious suffering, which fur- 
ther depresses those who must watch him 
die. 

Other moi-e subtle, but equally 
dangerous, forms of warfare are being 
waged. To create a loyal cadre of pro- 
Soviet Afghans to take eventual control 
of the government, Moscow has invaded 
the family to initiate reeducation and in- 
doctrination programs. Children as 
young as 5 and 6 years old are being 
separated from their families and sent 



been received in their simple tents and 
mud huts. I have seen at firsthand their 
fierce determination. I have felt their 
hatred of the Soviet invaders, their love 
of freedom, and their longing to return 
once again to their land and to their 
homes. 

Afghan refugees rely primarily on 
the Government of Pakistan, the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and private voluntary agen- 
cies for their basic needs. The United 
States has contributed generously to the 
Afghan relief effort. Since 1980, we have 
provided over $430 million, primarily 
through the UNHCR and the Worid 



The Soviet invasion and continued occupation of 
Afghanistan is a blatant example of communist 
colonialism at its worst. 



to the Soviet Union for as long as 10 
years of indoctrination. Since 1979, an 
estimated 40,000 Afghan students have 
been sent to the Soviet Union; 10,000 
are there at any given time. Afghan 
school curricula have been revised to in- 
clude Marxist-Leninist ideology; revised 
history books written by Soviet scholars 
have been introduced; Afghan professors 
have been replaced with those from 
communist countries. The intent is clear: 
Moscow seeks to obliterate Afghan 
cultural values from the minds of the 
country's youth and to substitute a 
made-in-Moscow view of the world. 

Refugees 

Not surprisingly, Soviet tactics in 
Afghanistan have resulted in one of the 
greatest mass migrations in history. 
Nearly 3.5 million refugees— more than 
the population of the entire Washington, 
D.C., metropolitan area and about 
20%-25% of Afghanistan's prewar 
population— have fled the country. At 
least a million more have been driven 
from the countryside into internal exile 
in cities and towns where a Red Army- 
style peace has been imposed. 

Before coming to Washington, I had 
the privilege of visiting on several occa- 
sions as president of the International 
Rescue Committee many of the refugee 
camps in the North West Frontier 
border area of Pakistan. I have spoken 
with hundreds of refugees and have 



Food Program. The Afghan relief effort 
is one of the most effective refugee pro- 
grams in the world; it is certainly the 
largest. But dependence on others' 
hospitality and charity is alien to a peo- 
ple renowned for their industriousness, 
their creativity, and theii- proud in- 
dependence. Their only request to their 
visitors is like Winston Churchill's in 
World War II: "Give us the tools and 
we will finish the job." 

I, too, am convinced that, one day, 
they will return to a free Afghanistan. 
Throughout Afghanistan's long, tumul- 
tuous history of resisting marauding 
armies and ruthless invaders, no one— 
not Alexander or Genghis Khan, not 
Tamerlane or Nadir Shah— has been 
able to conquer and rule the Afghans. 
The Afghan mujahidin say they will 
fight to the last man, and I believe 
them. The Soviets must acknowledge 
and accept that the will of a people 
united in a national liberation struggle 
cannot be broken by force of arms, 
short of genocide. 

The Military Situation 

What the Soviet Union faces in 
Afghanistan is not the opposition they 
surmounted in Central Asia in the 
1920s; nor is it a band of rag-tag rebels 
fighting without a clear pui-pose or 
cause. They face freedom fighters 
trained to fight with modern weapons 
and backed by a people united in their 
will to expel yet another invader. 



Hostility and active opposition to th 
Karmal' regime are not confined to c 
area; it encompasses the entire cour 
The Soviets have been unable to fin 
qualified, loyal Afghan technocrats 
ing to participate in Karmal's puppc 
government. They have been forced 
abandon the pretense that they are 
merely advising the Karmal regime 
now either directly make or are dec 
involved in every major political, 
military, or social decision. There ci 
no doubt that it is a Soviet-run 
government. 

On the military front, Soviet efi 
to build up the Kabul army have bf 
thwarted by disloyalty, desertions, 
defections, and disillusionment. Tht 
pet Afghan army has shrunk to les: 
than half of its preinvasion strengtl 
90,000. 

The Soviet army itself has beei 
plagued by alcohol and drug abuse; 
of discipline is a major problem. Fi 
Soviet defectors, themselves tangil 
proof of the unpopularity of the w:i 
have learned that Soviet soldiers s. 
Afghanistan are told that they will 
fighting alongside Afghans to defe; 
U.S., Chinese, and Pakistani im- 
perialists. Instead, they discover w 
dismay that they are expected to 1* 
Afghans fighting to defend their 
families, homes, and land. 

In contrast to Soviet morale, n. 
jahidin morale remains high. On ti 
battlefield, the Afghan resistance i; 
ter organized, better trained, and i 
effective than ever before. Despite 
stepped-up fighting and more aggT' 
Soviet tactics, the invaders have bi 
unable to consolidate their conques 
The resistance continues to control 
75% of the countryside. Mounting \ 
losses of supply convoys, helicoptei 
and fixed-wing aircraft testify to tl 
proved ability of resistance fighter 
use the modern weaponry at their 
disposal. They have become more ; 
at carrying guerrilla warfare to m; 
cities. Even in Kabul, the most he: 
guarded garrisons and airbases, as 
as the Soviet Embassy, have been 
rocketed. 

Six years ago, few of us could 
imagined that today we would be ■ 
ing about an Afghan resistance thi 
kept one of the most powerful arn^ 
the worid at bay. The Afghan peo] 
courage, resilience, and iron will t(i 
vive have kept open the only path ^ 
lasting solution— a negotiated polit il 
settlement. The ynujahidin cannot 
to expel the Soviet invader by for 



Department of State l| 



l-tAI UMt 

Afghanistan 



er numbers are on the Soviet side. 

military option entails only further 
:h and destruction. It will neither 
eve a Soviet victory nor crush the 

of the Afghan people to be free. 
The only lasting solution to the war 
negotiated political settlement that 
1 Soviet troops out of Afghanistan 
permits the Afghan people to deter- 
? their own destiny. Only then will 
mujahidin put down theii- arms; 

then will the refugees voluntarily 
,m to their country and global as 

as local tensions decrease. 

e Roles of Pakistan 
1 the United Nations 

admire and support Pakistan's 
ageous and unwavering stand on 
Afghanistan issue, particularly its 
■ts in the United Nations and 
vhere to achieve a negotiated settle- 
t. We believe, as do the Pakistanis, 
every avenue must be explored to 
a peaceful solution. We encourage 
r countries in the region— par- 
arly India— to contribute toward 
?ving a comprehensive and viable 
ement. 

^s you know, there is a vehicle in 
; to achieve a negotiated settlement, 
er the auspices of the United Na- 
;, the UN Secretary General's per- 
1 representative, Diego Cordovez, 
jeen conducting a series of negotia- 
. between the Government of 
3tan and the Kabul regime. The 
I, conducted indirectly through the 
negotiator rather than face to face, 
•efeiTed to as proximity talks. 
Stan does not recognize the puppet 
ne of Babrak Karmal, which was in- 
;d and is maintained solely through 
;t military force and clearly does 
•epresent the vidll of the Afghans, 
ently housing 2-3 million Afghan 
fees who have specifically fled the 
3ses of the Karmal regime, 
Stan's unwiUingness and inability to 
JTiize the puppet government is not 
understandable but morally 
fled. We support this view, 
'hese proximity talks envisage four 

documents or instruments which 
d comprise a comprehensive settle- 
;. They include agreements on 
lal noninterference and noninten-en- 

voluntary return of the refugees, 
national guarantees, and the inter- 
ionship of these instioiments to the 
:iuestion of Soviet withdi-awal. To 



date, three of the four instruments have 
been largely completed. The interrela- 
tionships document, in which the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan would be addressed, re- 
mains to be negotiated. This is the 
critical document. The issue of 
withdi-awal lies at the heart of the 
Afghan problem; it is the reason the 
proximity talks were convened. The 
questions addi-essed in the other in- 
struments, though important, are 
ancillary. 

The United States has firmly sup- 
ported and continues to support a 
negotiated withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
In this connection, we informed the 
Secretary General in writing this week 
of our willingness to play an appropriate 
guarantor's role in the context of a com- 
prehensive and balanced settlement. We 
have also conveyed our readiness to ac- 
cept the draft guarantees instrument 
that Mr. Cordovez has presented to the 
parties and to us, pi'ovided that the cen- 
tral issue of Soviet troop withdrawal 
and its interrelationship to the other in- 
struments were resolved. 

On December 16, a new round of 
UN-sponsored negotiations will begin in 
Geneva. Both parties apparently have 
agreed to maintain the proximity for- 
mat. The way is thus open to tackle, 
once and for all, the prompt and final 
withdrawal of the Soviet army from 



The Afghan mujahi- 
din say they will fight to 
the last man, and I 
believe them. 



Afghanistan. If, as General Secretary 
Gorbachev indicated in Geneva, the 
Soyiet Union supports the UN process, 
and if, as the Soviet Union continues to 
claim, it is sincerely interested in 
achieving a pohtical settlement, then 
this next round of talks will provide 
them a forum to demonstrate their 
sincerity. Let us hope that the Soviets 
have finally made the political decision 
to seriously negotiate a withdrawal of 
their troops. 

But let there be no mistake. If the 
Soviets digress and make excuses or 
unreasonable demands, the blame for 
lack of progress will be theirs alone. 



Afghanistan is and will remain a thorn 
in the Soviets' side. Time will not heal 
this wound. It will grow and fester and 
spread. Afghanistan is an international 
embarrassment to them that has in- 
creased rather than faded away. It 
serves as a painful and bloody example 
of Soviet insincerity and untrust- 
worthiness— an example that nations 
around the world, large and small, have 
taken to heart. 

The courage, steadfastness, and faith 
of the Afghan people stand in stark con- 
trast to the cowardice reflected in 
Soviet atrocities against innocent 
civilians. Last Friday, the United Na- 
tions endorsed a report prepared by 
Special Rapporteur Felix Ermacora. It 
concluded that the war in Afghanistan 
"is exacting an increasing toll in human 
lives and continues to engender human 
rights violations on a large scale." 

We must speak out about these 
atrocities. The world must know what is 
hapjjening in Afghanistan. The mu- 
jahidin are doing a magnificent job of 
resisting the Soviets. For our part, the 
rest of the world must exact from the 
Soviets a political price. They must pay 
for the death and destruction they are 
wreaking daily in Afghanistan. 

President Reagan, in his meeting 
with Mr. Gorbachev, made it clear that, 
while we seek a wider dialogue on 
issues of global concern, we will not re- 
main silent on Afghanistan. Afghanistan 
will remain an obstacle to an overall im- 
provement in our relationship. As long 
as the Soviets pursue a military solu- 
tion, we will continue to support the 
Afghan cause. 

My message to you tonight is clear. 
Collectively, we can and must help 
restore Afghanistan's independence. If 
we speak with one voice against this 
brazen use of Soviet force and continue 
to pressure the Soviets from all sides, 
we can create a situation in which it will 
be in their best interests to withdraw. 
In conclusion, allow me to quote Ed- 
mund Burke's warning which, although 
200 years old, sadly applies to the world 
today. 

When bad men combine, the good must 
associate; else they will fall, one by one, 
an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible 
struggle. 



'Press release 279 of Dec. 16, 1985. 



uary 1986 



Afghanistan: Six Years of Soviet Occupation 



The following report was prepared in 
December 1985 by Craig Karp, 
Afghanistan analyst, with the assistance 
of other analysts in the Bureau of In- 
telligence and Research and Department 
officials. It Is a sequel to Mr. Karp's 
198i report published in the January 
1985 Bulletin. 



SUMMARY 

At the end of the sixth year of the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the 
Soviet Union is no nearer to subjugating 
the country than before. The current 
military situation can best be described 
as a continuing stalemate, with a higher 
level of fighting by both the Soviets and 
the mujahidin. Both sides have adopted 
long-term strategies and neither has 
been able to defeat its adversary. Casu- 
alties were up for combatants on both 
sides, and possibly among civilians as 
well. 

Afghan opposition to the Soviet oc- 
cupation remains implacable. The resist- 
ance fighters, the mujahidin, were bet- 
ter armed and trained, and more effec- 
tive militarily than ever before. The 
Soviets were unable to shut off resist- 
ance supply lines, despite a greater in- 
volvementin combat. In 1985 the resist- 
ance initiated its largest offensive opera- 
tions of the war and for the first time 
overran an important regime military in- 
stallation. Resistance groups displayed 
increased cooperation, and intergroup 
combat was probably reduced. The in- 
crease in offensive activity was the most 
important military development of 1985. 
On the political front, the resistance 
made a potentially significant move 
toward unity with the merger of the 
seven principal political parties into an 
alliance. The alliance sent a delegation 
to New York for the 40th anniversary 
celebration of the United Nations, as 
part of its program to present Afghani- 
stan's case to the world. 

The Soviets adjusted their numbers, 
weapons, and tactics to meet the im- 
proved capabilities of the mujahidin. 
Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan in- 
creased by a few thousand to about 
118,000, and they were more aggressive 
in the field. In 1985, Soviet losses of 
both men and materiel increased 
significantly. The war received increas- 
ing publicity inside the Soviet Union as 
signs of growing internal dissatisfaction 
with the Afghan conflict mounted. 



The continued unreliability of Af- 
ghan military forces compelled the 
Soviets to assume a greater war burden. 
Opposition within the regime's own 
ranks was highlighted when Air Force 
personnel destroyed some 20 aircraft at 
the largest base in western Afghanistan. 
The Democratic Republic of Afghani- 
stan (DRA) staged an unconvincing ver- 
sion of the traditional grand national 
assembly, a series of tribal councils, and 
even a set of sham elections. These in- 
itiatives were aimed as much at an in- 
ternational audience as at the dis- 
believing Afghan people. 

Unable to mobilize support, the 
regime remained dependent for its sur- 
vival on the presence of Soviet troops. 
The Marxist ruling party remains split 
between its Khalq and Parcham fac- 
tions. Despite persistent rumors of a 
change at the top and some high-level 
reshuffling, Babrak Kannal, installed by 
the Soviets in 1979, remains head of 
state. 

The U.S.S.R. continues to pursue 
both long- and short-term strategies 
aimed at consolidating control over 
Afghanistan. An essentially defensive 
short-term military strategy aimed at 
containing the resistance allows the pur- 
suit of longer term political goals. Thou- 
sands of Afghans, including children, 
have been sent to the Soviet Union to 
prepare them to run a future Sovietized 
Afghanistan. 

International opposition to the So- 
viet occupation intensified during the 
year. On the fifth anniversary of the 
Soviet invasion, countries around the 
world condemned the war on the Af- 
ghan people and expressed their support 
for the heroic Afghan resistance. Paki- 
stan continued its firm support for the 
Afghan people, despite concerted Soviet 
pressure that included numerous viola- 
tions by Soviet/DRA aircraft and shell- 
ings of Pakistani territory. Progress 
toward a negotiated settlement in the 
UN-sponsored proximity talks foundered 
on the refusal of the Kabul regime to 
discuss the key issue— the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces. 

The UN General Assembly rebuffed 
the Soviet/DRA public relations cam- 
paign by passing for the seventh time 
by overwhelming majority a resolution 
calling for the withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Afghanistan and demanding 
self-determination for the Afghan peo- 



ple. A month later the Assembly for 
first time adopted a resolution passei 
by the UN Human Rights Committe 
condemning the violation of human 
rights in Afghanistan. 

Outlook. Without a major additi 
of Soviet forces, the stalemate is like 
to continue. The U.S.S.R. still appea 
to be committed to a military solutic 
Soviet hints of a willingness to be flc 
ble may mask a basic condition: the 
maintenance of a Soviet-dominated g 
emment that the Afghan people— an 
and the world— reject. At the same 
the will of the Afghan people to res: 
shows no sign of faltering. 

MILITARY SITUATION 

Throughout 1985, combat was at a 
higher level compared to previous s 
sonal noi-ms. Even during the custo 
winter lull, it was not uncommon fo 
fighting to occur in most of Afghani 
Stan's 29 provinces during any give 
week. 

Soviet forces were more aggi'es; 
and launched operations in every p; 
the country, focusing on efforts to { 
rupt resistance lines of communicat: 
Campaigns throughout the year in i 
eastern provinces, and particularly 
massive May-June drive into the K( 
Valley, were directed to this end. 

Resistance activity also was vnc 
spread; many Soviet/regime garriso 
came under attack during the year, 
pace of fighting escalated in the sui 
as the resistance took the offensive 
the Panjsher Valley and in Paktia 1 
ince. In the west, the mujahidin w 
nearly able to eliminate all regime 
presence from Herat. Forced to res 
in order to prevent major losses, tl 
Soviets launched large-scale counte 
attacks. Intense combat continued 
the fall. 

Better armed and trained than 
the past, the mujahidin were able 
take the initiative in the fighting. 1 
proved resistance air defense— still 
prised primarily of heavy machineg 
but increasingly supplemented by 
surface-to-air missiles— has forced t s 
Soviets to be more cautious and to » 
adopt countermeasures. As a resul t 
impact of Soviet air power has bee « 
reduced. Convoy ambushes were ii « 
creasingly effective, as a combinat: « 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



iroved weapons, more ammunition, 
better tactics led on several ceca- 
ls to the destruction of dozens of 
let or DRA vehicles. Casualties were 
on both sides, and among civilians. 
One example of the war's greater in- 
sity is the increased use of mines by 
1 sides. As part of their efforts to 
ede resistance movement, the Sovi- 
resorted to heavier use of several 
3S of mines, particularly airdropped. 
Soviets have dropped or planted an 
mated 2 million mines since the inva- 
i; these mines have probably caused 
•e casualties to civilians than to 
stance fighters. The resistance 
)loys mines mostly to attack road 
coys. On each of several occasions in 
5, the mujahidin knocked out dozens 
loviet/DRA vehicles. These ambushes 
e become more costly to the Soviets 
hamper their freedom of movement. 

tern Afghanistan 

etailed description of the year's corn- 
follows, starting with the three ma- 
battles in eastern Afghanistan dur- 
the summer. 

Konar. Barikot, an Afghan regime 
ison located where the Konar River 
ts the Pakistan border, has been 
er siege since the early days of the 
munist takeover in Kabul. Over the 
; year, even helicopter resupply 
ime difficult because of fire fi-om 
•ounding mujahidin. Soviet/ Afghan 
raft often violated the Pakistan 
ier to strike targets in Chitral, 
istan, across from Barikot. 
Eai'ly in the year, a combined 
iet/ Afghan column attempting to 
ive Barikot was forced to retreat. A 
I case of frustrated Soviet move- 
it, it was certain the Soviet 40th 
ly would try to overcome it with 
sive force. But resistance operations 
eased and threatened to overwhelm 
ikot. By April all Afghan regime 
•isons in the valley were under 
ck. 

In May, exploiting a lull in mujahi- 
activity during the Muslim fasting 
ith of Ramadan, the Soviets moved 
e than 10,000 troops with armor sup- 
. up the Konar and its side valleys, 
largest action since the spring 1984 
nsive in the Panjsher, it was accom- 
ied by the massive use of air power. 
3ome assaults on the valley heights, 
ough successful, sometimes encoun- 
d heavy opposition, including hand- 
and combat. Losses on both sides 
e high. 




The Soviets reached Barikot in 
about 2 weeks, relieving the besieged 
garrison. Almost immediately, however, 
they began to withdraw from the Konar 
Valley, turning Barikot back to the 
DRA. The 40th Army demonstrated 
that it can put large concentrations of 
troops almost anywhere in Afghanistan 
(and right up to the Pakistani border 
just before the June round of indirect 
talks in Geneva and U.S. -Soviet bilateral 
discussions on Afghanistan). But they 
could not sustain such a large presence. 
In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, 
the mujahidin returned to the Konar 
and once again surrounded Barikot. 
Despite its size, the Soviet operation 
yielded only short-term tactical gains. 

The valley was devastated by this 
intense use of Soviet firepower, but 
civilian casualties were light. Most 
villagers long ago had left this war zone 
for nearby Pakistan. The Soviets used 
napalm to strip parts of the valley— one 
of the few heavily forested areas in 
Afghanistan— of natural cover. They left 
a virtual wall of mines in an effort to 
discourage resistance movement. 

Panjsher. The heaviest fighting in 
the Panjsher Valley in 1985 did not oc- 
cur until summer. Commander Ahmed 
Shah Mahsud was preoccupied with 
nearby refugees and food shortages in 
the wake of last year's Soviet seizure of 
most of the lower valley. Yet Panjsher 



mujahidin harassed Afghan and Soviet 
garrisons throughout the winter. In 
January, a Soviet/DRA column was 
turned back after vainly trying to 
relieve a besieged garrison. 

In early March, the Panjsheris 
assaulted a garrison and caused more 
than 100 Soviet/DRA casualties. At the 
end of March, Panjsher fighters hit a 
Soviet munitions convoy near the Salang 
Pass, destroying more than 60 vehicles 
and tying up the vital highway for days. 
SuiTJiisingly, the annual Soviet spring 
push into the Panjsher failed to materi- 
alize. 

When the Soviets moved in late 
spring to cut his supply lines in the 
Konar, Mahsud sent his fighters down 
from the Panjsher hills. The mujahidiyx 
(|uickly overcame a number of regime 
iiutposts in the valley, then advanced on 
i'eshghor, the most exposed garrison in 
the valley. 

The Soviets responded hastily, in 
contrast to their more customary well- 
planned operational style. Soviet forces 
were thrown almost piecemeal into the 
valley, possibly to prevent the fall of 
garrisons further dowTi the valley. 
Afghan soldiers in Kabul were drafted 
into duty in the Panjsher, where they 
faced heavy opposition and ambushes in 
areas presumably under regime control. 
By the end of July the Soviets went 
on the offensive, having placed over 
10,000 troops in the Panjsher. Soviet 
troops retook Peshghor and moved into 
the side valleys, taking heavy casualties. 
Soviet and regime wounded filled Ka- 
bul's hospitals. Air power played less of 
a role than in the 1984 Soviet offensive, 
perhaps because of the closeness of the 
fighting or improved insurgent anti- 
aircraft capabilities. 

The mujahidin captured nearly 600 
prisoners at Peshghor. Conscripts who 
were not considered enemies of the 
resistance were paroled back to their 
homes. The remainder, mostly officers 
and perhaps a few Soviets, were held in 
a side valley. Hopes for a prisoner ex- 
change were dashed when Soviet troops 
attacked the encampment; about 130 
prisoners died. 

Peshghor was an important victory, 
the first time the mujahidin have over- 
run a major regime garrison. The resist- 
ance had taken the initiative, forcing the 
Soviets to respond. When Soviet troops 
did reach the Panjsher Valley, the mu- 
jahidin stayed to fight, then retreated 
slowly rather than melting away when 
faced with superior force. Fighting in 



jary 1986 



the Panjsher continued into the fall, 
although at a lower level. In late No- 
vember, Panjsher mujahidin i-eportedly 
again attacked Peshghor and over- 
whelmed several outposts. 

Paktia. In late summer, the heavy 
fighting shifted south to Paktia Prov- 
ince, scene of intense combat in 1984. 
Paktia Province borders the Parachinar 
salient of Pakistan extending deep into 
Afghanistan, its tip only about 50 miles 
from Kabul. All year there has been 
heavy fighting as the Soviets attempted 
to interrupt resistance supply lines. 
Most bases in the eastern part of the 
province are manned by DRA forces 
and have been under continuous insur- 
gent pressure. 

In the early part of the year, fight- 
ing was concentrated in the northern 
part of Paktia, near Parachinar. The 
garrisons at Jaji/Ali Khel and Chamkani 
were under constant pressure. Some 
relief efforts arrived; others did not. In 
April, a large Soviet/DRA convoy trav- 
eling between the Paktia capital of 
Gardez and Chamkani suffered e.xtreme- 
ly severe troop and vehicle losses. 



During the summer, the mujahidm 
launched a series of attacks on the gar- 
rison at Khowst, in the southera part of 
the province. Khowst, under siege since 
before the Soviet invasion, was the 
scene of a major battle in 1984. The 
Soviets, unable to get a convoy through 
the mountains to Khowst, must supply 
the towm by air. Nearly all civilians left 
long ago. 

The mujahidin around Khowst 
belong to several parties. Led by Jalal- 
luddin Haqqani, from the Hezb-e-Islami 
(Yunis Khahs faction), they joined foi-ces 
to attack the garrison. It was the largest 
offensive operation ever mounted by the 
resistance, involving perhaps 5,000 ynu- 
jahidin in coordinated assaults. As 
many as half of the regime outposts 
around Khowst fell to the mujahidin. 
The Soviets were forced to act to pre- 
vent the fall of this isolated but strate- 
gic garrison. 

Soviet/regime forces fought fiercely 
and overran several mujahidin camps in 
Paktia. Intense combat was accompanied 
by artillery and air attacks by Soviet/ 
DRA units across the border into Paki- 
stan. By late August, Soviet/DRA forces 




appeared to have ended a sweep opi 
tion south of Khowst. After a short 
however, Soviet and regime troops 
staged a surprise sortie from Khows:| 
press the insurgents along the bord" 
Mujahidin fighters, many of whom 
gone to rest and recuperate in Paki; 
were recalled to the fighting. 

Casualties were high on each si( 
some of the bloodiest fighting of tht 
war. Afghan and Pakistani hospitals 
were jammed with wounded. Sever: 
the cooperating resistance force con 
manders reportedly were killed, inc 
ing one of Haqqani's sons. 

The Soviets and DRA were ablt 
prevent the loss of Khowst. Howev 
year's end, the garrison remains su 
rounded by the resistance. Althoug 
unable to seize Khowst at this time 
Paktia mujahidin demonstrated im 
sive offensive capabilities, and mor; 
remains high. 

Kabul. The security situation ii 
capital, relatively quiet in the earl\ 
of the year, deteriorated over the ; 
mer. The Soviets devoted extensive 
resources to protecting themselves 
the regime in Kabul— their minimu 
tactical goal— particularly on symbi 
occasions or during important regii 
meetings. 

The U.S.S.R. continued to devi 
its military infrastructure in the ca 
Kabul now has checkpoints and gui 
tank emplacements at all access ro 
The Soviets established a second si 
ty ring of bunkers, supplemented I 
antipersonnel mines, to impede mu 
jah idin infiltration. 

A nightly curfew continues, pui 
ated by the sweep of searchlights 1 
atop the city's peaks and the souni 
helicopter gunships. Kabul's sky of 
was lit by flares— ejected from aire 
when landing or taking off— which 
designed to confuse the mujahidin 
heat-seeking missiles. Bombing an( 
rocketing of areas suspected of hai 
ing ynujahidin caused many civilia 
casualties, particularly among the 
ternal refugees who have flocked t 
Kabul to escape the fighting. Sinct 
Soviet invasion the capital's popul; 
has more than doubled to about 2 i 
million. 

The mujahidin launched rocke i 
tacks around December 27, the fift : 
niversary of the Soviet invasion, a I 
there were some bomb attacks duni 
the PDPA's 20th anniversary in e: 
January, but the city was relative) 
secure. To maintain security durin 
these internationally visible events t 



6296 12 85 STATE )INH/GE 



Department of State Ejlj 



l-tAI UMt 

Afghanistan 




tance fighter reading the Koran. 



regime deployed as many as 60,000 
Soviet or Afghan military and police 
personnel in the capital. 

Life became more dangerous in 1985 
for the Soviets in Kabul. In late January 
a massive explosion at a military hos- 
pital in Kabul left a number of Soviet 
and regime personnel killed and wound- 
ed. Soviet personnel and their depend- 
ents were shaken by a series of resist- 
ance bombs in their customary shopping 
and residential areas; Soviet women 
were among the killed and wounded. On 
several occasions during the spring, 
Soviets were stabbed on the streets of 
the capital, at least one fatally. 

In late April, with security precau- 
tions high before the Loyah Jirga, a 
Soviet/DRA task force surj)rised a mu- 
jahidin unit on the outskirts of Kabul, 
inflicting numerous casualties. That 
same week a Soviet/regime force cap- 
tured a multiple-rocket launcher fi'om a 
mujahidin group. Such weapons previ- 
ously had not been observed in the 
hands of the resistance. Nevertheless, 
the mujahidin launched a spate of 
rocket attacks that month, including 
some harassing fire at the site of the 
Loyah Jirga. 

On July 1, the resistance made a 
series of fierce and apparently coordi- 
nated attacks on the airport and Kabul's 
eastern suburbs. Later that week, the 
Soviet Embassy compound in the west- 
em suburbs was hit, reportedly kiUing 
several Soviet guards. Attacks on the 
embassy became so frequent that the 
Soviets installed a rocket launcher bat- 
tery in the embassy compound, in order 
to return the fire. The embassy re- 
mained a target through the fall. 

On July 22 the mujahidin launched 
their heaviest assault of the year, strik- 
ing Kabul airbase. The sounds of combat 
could be heard in the city all week. In 
mid-September, a series of explosions, 
possibly caused by a rocket attack, did 
major damage to the Soviet ammunition 
dump at Khair Khana. 

The bolder, more offensive-minded 
tactics employed by the resistance also 
were seen in the capital. In early No- 
vember, the mujahidin overran a DRA 
post at Abshar on Kabul's west side. 
After seizing the garrison's weapons, 
the mujahidin withdrew. 

Paghrnan, west of Kabul, was the 
scene of several Soviet and regime 
operations during the year. The regime 
has claimed successful pacification of 
this area nearly a dozen times over the 



uary 1986 



past 2 years. The civilian population 
again bore the brunt of Soviet and 
regime frustration. In September, 
residents reportedly were warned that 
if they did not stop supporting the 
resistance, their villages would be 
destroyed. 

Shomali, north of Kabul, was the 
scene of almost constant Soviet and 
regime operations around the Kabul- 
Termez road. The Soviets have made 
the security of the capital's lifeline to 
the north a top priority. These efforts, 
however, were not enough to prevent 
numerous mujahidin ambushes, often 
closing the road for days. In October, a 
Soviet/DRA force used bulldozers to 
destroy all trees, crops, and houses for 
125 feet on each side south of the 
Salang Pass, to Bagram. 

Bagram Airbase, a major Soviet 
installation, was attacked several times 
by the resistance. Early in the year, the 
resistance claimed the downing of a 
Soviet/Afghan aircraft near Bagram by 
a surface-to-air missile. 

In Vardak Province, in April, a 
large convoy, heavily armed with self- 
propelled artillery and FROG-7 long- 
range surface-to-surface rockets, was 
ambushed and forced to turn back to 
Kabul. 

The Nangarhar provincial capital, 
Jalalabad, is reportedly one of the most 
secure cities in Afghanistan. Yet even 
Jalalabad Airbase was subject to rocket 
attacks. In March, the mujahidin took 
several Afghan border posts near the 
Khyber Pass. A few days later they 
withdrew, in the face of a large Soviet/ 
DRA operation, which may have in- 
volved more than 300 armored vehicles. 

Southern Afghanistan 

In Qandahar, resistance activity all year 
long was higher than last year. The 
regime has virtually abandoned even the 
few posts it maintained in the bazaar. In 
October, a large DRA unit mutinied, 
killed their officers, and defected to the 
resistance. The government and the 
Soviets remain at the airport, which was 
periodically under attack. 

The regime gained by defection, 
before the Loyah Jirga, AsmatuUah 
Muslim Achakzai, who had commanded 
a mujahidin band called the Fedayeen-i- 
Islami. He took more than 100 men 
with him. In addition to cash and a 
bodyguard of 50 Afghan Army soldiers 
and several armored cars, the regime 



gave AsmatuUah command of a tribal 
militia unit at Spin Baldak, on the 
Pakistan border near Quetta. During 
the summer, armor and artillery under 
his command fired into Pakistan, but the 
incident cooled after Pakistan deployed 
troops to the area. Qandahar resistance 
commanders condemned AsmatuUah for 
defecting; at last report, he is staying 
under regime protection. 

In February heavy fighting took 
place in the Arghandab Valley, north of 
Qandahar. In March, the mujahidin, in 
an operation remarkable for the coopera- 
tion displayed among various parties, at- 
tacked the Kajaki Dam, built with U.S. 
assistance before the 1978 communist 
coup. It was the heaviest fighting of the 
war in the agriculturally important Hel- 
mand Valley. The Soviets and DRA 
counterattacked, and fighting continued 
into spring and summer, with consider- 
able casualties on both sides. 

Northern Afghanistan 

The tempo of fighting in northern Af- 
ghanistan was relatively lower in 1985. 
Several Soviet offensives took place, but 
none on the scale of those in the rest of 
the country. Soviet operations in the 
northeast Provinces of Konduz and 
Takhar resulted in a number of civilian 
casualties. 

The resistance suffered a major set- 
back in February, when Jamiat-i-Islami 
regional commander Zabiullah was killed 
by a mine that exploded under his jeep. 
Zabiullah had been singularly successful 
in extending his influence outside his 
own party. His successors have not yet 
been able to reestablish the coordination 
with other resistance groups operating 
in the north. 

However, there were continued re- 
ports of resistance attacks on targets in 
the north, including the pipeline that 
carries Afghanistan's natural gas to the 
Soviet Union. 



Western Afghanistan 

Some of the largest Soviet operations 
took place in western Afghanistan. They 
were directed primarily at preventing a 
resistance takeover of Herat. With a 
fraction of its prewar population (many 
have fled to nearby Iran), Herat today 
is a battlefield and virtual ghost town. 

The resistance in Herat operates as 
a coalition of several parties, led by 
Ismail Khan, a Jamiat-i-Islami corn- 
mander who had served as a captain in 
the Afghan Ai-my. At the end of 1984, 
Khan addressed a rally in the tovra of 



more than 1,000 people, without fear 
interruption by the regime. 

Although the regime is still prese- 
in Herat, it does not exercise control, 
local resistance commander, dissatisfi 
with his role in the emerging local co 
tion, defected and was appointed an 
officer in the government miUtia. He 
was shot shortly afterward on the sti 
of a government building. 

Beginning in June the mujahidin 
moved to assume full control of the 
Officials from Kabul appeared reluct; 
to go to Herat, and street fighting 
raged day and night. In June, the 
miijahidin tunneled under a major I 
outpost in the center of the city and 
ploded a massive charge, killing doz( 
of regime troops. 

By July, the resistance was push 
regime forces out of the city. The 
Soviets reportedly were forced to ca 
reinforcements directly from bases i 
the U.S.S.R. The Soviets bombed ai 
rocketed the center of town, causing 
numerous civilian casualties. Althoui 
they reasserted nominal daytime coi 
of Herat, the muja:hidin retain a sti 
presence in the city. 

The Soviets continued to build u 
their capabilities in the west. There 
were a number of incidents on the 
border with Iran in the early part c 
year. In March, a Soviet convoy ne; 
Toraghundi, a major facility on the 
Soviet/Afghan border, suffered hea\ 
casualties. Further south, in June, 
20 Afghan aircraft at Shindand Airl 
the largest Soviet facility in the are 
were destroyed by sabotage. The 
resistance attacked Shindand on seA 
other occasions in 1985. 

Central Afghanistan 

The remote Hazarajat, populated n 
by Shia Hazaras, has undergone mi 
political changes since the 1978 Mai 
coup, although regime presence is 
limited to a few isolated garrisons. 
Khomeini groups such as Nasr and 
Sepah-e-Pasdaran vanquished the t 
tional Shia resistance groups that 1 
held sway since the coup. These pr 
Iranian groups have moved to esta i 
an Islamic republic in the Hazaraja 
The previously dominant Shura pa , 
reportedly is no longer active in th 
region. 

In a meeting in Tehran in mid- ) 
several pro-Iranian groups, includii 
independent Harakat-Islami of 
AyatoUah Mohseni, pledged to stoj 
fighting other Afgharjs and direct ' i 
arms against the Soviets. Focused i 



Department of State 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



Ashkhabad 



Mary^ 




Dushanbe 



ns 



CHINA 



T erme z f Nizhniv<] 
'andzhi 



r 



t 

N 

k 



AvLd>^ Vonduz N^ 



. Mashhad 



Tay yebat J 



• Sharif 



nijii 



y 



ValltJV 



^ aghlan 
Andarah ^ 
' Valley X^A 



IRAN 

Birjandj 




^ T. 



w 



Shmdand 



,^f 



Ghazn 



Farah 



Kajaki 
Dan 



*) Qanaanar' 




Fort ■ . 

Sandeman* jv 

Chaman / I 



Zahedan 



BALUCHISTAN 



i and boundary representation 
t necessarily authoritative. 




AFGHANISTAN 

International boundary 

— Province boundary 

® National capital 

— 1 . — Railroad 

Surfaced road 

Unsurfaced road 

Hh Airfield 

• Gasfield 

Refugee areas m Pakistan 
100 200 300 

Kilometers 



1 conflict, the Hazarajat has been 
marginally involved in the 
;ance. However, because it is free 
Soviet/regime control, the town 
erved as an important transit route 
!sistance supplies. There is some in- 
on that, having confirmed their 
ol over the Hazarajat, the pro- 
leini Shia may have begun to strike 
Soviets. 



AFGHAN MILITARY 

m military effectiveness continued 
teriorate over the past year, 
te Soviet efforts to reverse the 

The December 1984 appointment 
Oialqi, Nazar Mohammed, to run 
linistry of Defense, has not im- 
:d the situation. Nor has a large 
ncrease announced in the spring, 
argely Khalq officer corps remains 
' suspicion by the ruling Parcham 



Enlisted men, mostly press-ganged 
conscripts, may fire when fired upon but 
mostly prefer not to fight the mujahi- 
din. Given the opportunity, especially in 
combat, they desert. The resistance gen- 
erally paroles them and sends them 
home or absorbs them into its ranks. 
The DRA military continues to be a ma- 
jor source of arms and ammunition for 
the resistance. 

Lack of enthusiasm, combined with 
poor performance in combat, has made 
the DRA forces unreliable and forced 
the Soviets to take a more direct role in 
the fighting. In the past year Soviet 
forces increasingly have gone into com- 
bat without an Afghan Army "shield," 
or accompanied by only a small number 
of Afghan troops. 

Even the best DRA units have had 
problems. The elite 444th commando 
brigade, thought by many to be the 
Afghan Army's most effective unit, was 
cut to pieces w-hen it parachuted into 
the Panjsher in the summer. Many of 
the survivors deserted. Some Afghan 



units, such as the garrison at Khowst, 
performed well; despite heavy losses, it 
conducted an independent offensive 
after Soviet forces withdrew from the 
area in August. 

Two regime directives illustrate the 
difficulty Kabul has in getting Afghans 
to fight for the regime. In January, the 
poUtburo announced that those who 
"volunteer" for the army would have to 
serve only 2 rather than the normal 3 
years required of conscripts. There is no 
evidence that this gesture succeeded in 
attracting many volunteers. Moreover, 
many reports describe conscripts being 
forced to serve beyond their required 
term— a major source of disaffection 
within the army. Four years of duty is 
required from those stationed in Kabul, 
where life is easier and relatively safe. 

In the second directive, issued in the 
spring, the regime decreed that anyone 
between the ages of 18 and 38 who had 
not yet served would be liable for im- 



luary 1986 



mediate callup. In the absence of effec- 
tive draft registration, the law merely 
legitimizes conscription by press gang. 

The Afghan Air Force, previously 
considered the most loyal service, was 
wracked by defection and sabotage in 
1985. The June sabotage attack at Shin- 
dand caused the lai'gest loss of aircraft 
in any single incident of the war. The 
episode evidently stemmed from unhap- 
piness over the disciplining of pilots who 
had dropped their bombs in the desert 
instead of on the target village. The ac- 
cused saboteurs were reportedly 
executed. 

Air Force woes did not end with the 
June incident; other officers planned or 
e.xecuted additional acts of sabotage. In 
July, DRA Air Force personnel defected 
to Pakistan with two Afghan Mi-25 
(Mi-24D) export version HIND 
helicopter gunships, the first HINDs to 
slip out of control of Soviet forces or 
their clients. 

KHAD. The DRA has devoted ex- 
tensive resources to build the KHAD, 
the Afghan secret police. KHAD (the 
letters are a Dari acronym for State In- 
formation Service) is overseen closely by 
the KGB and possibly assisted by East 
Gei-man and other Eastern bloc security 
forces. It continues to acquire a reputa- 
tion for brutality and torture. KHAD 
has grown steadily and is now almost as 
large as the army. Most cadres are 
based in Kabul, but the organization op- 
erates all over the country and abroad. 
By offei'ing good salaries to those with 
few alternative prospects, KHAD has 
had some success in recruiting and re- 
taining young urban males. Recruits ap- 
pear to have little or no ideological com- 
mitment, but do become committed and 
loyal to the organization. 

Militia. The regime also has tried to 
develop the militia, in areas both within 
and outside regime control. This ap- 
proach, used by Kabul rulers for cen- 
turies, has succeeded in obtaining some 
nominal adherents, although there are 
few instances of militia actually fighting 
the mujahidin. Moreover, it is a risky 
tactic. Some local groups have taken the 
government's money and arms, then de- 
fected to the resistance. 



THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN 

The U.S.S.R continues to pursue both 
long- and short-term strategies aimed at 
consolidating their position in 
Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has 
acted in the short term to preser\'e 
security in the capital and a few provin- 
cial centers, to protect its supply lines, 
and to prevent the resistance from 
growing too strong or threatening 
secure zones. This defensive stance 
allows the pursuit of longer term 
political goals of wearing down the 
Afghan people's will to resist, stabilizing 
the government in Kabul, and develop- 
ing loyal followers in the army, the 
government, and the party capable of 
running the country. 

Sovietization of the economy, socie- 
ty, and educational system are all part 
of this strategy bijt can be implemented 
only in areas of Soviet and regime con- 
trol. It took the Soviet Government 
moi-e than a decade to subdue the 
basmacki (bandit) revolt in Central Asia 
in the 1920s. The Soviets seem prepared 
to face the current level of conflict in 
Afghanistan for as long as may be 
necessary. 

Military Developments. In 1985, the 

Soviets adjusted their numbers, 
weapons, and tactics to meet the 
greater capabilities of the mujahidin 
and make up for the decreasing effec- 
tiveness of the Afghan Armed Forces. 
There is a new commander of the Soviet 
effort in Afghanistan, General Zaitsev. 
Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan in- 
creased by a few thousand in 1985 to 
about 118,000, supported by an esti- 
mated 3P.000 additional troops in the 
Soviet Central Asian republics north of 
Afghanistan. 

In 1985, Soviet forces displayed an 
ability to conduct more than one 
multibattalion assault at a time, 
although no single operation was as 
large as the 1984 attack on the Panjsher 
Valley. The Soviets have demonstrated 
that they can concentrate troops in 
strength almost anywhere in the coun- 
try. However, once these troops have 
been redeployed elsewhere, the mu- 
jahidin generally have been able to 
regain control of the area. 



In assuming a greater burden of I 
war from the ineffective Kabul regim 
forces, the Soviets were more aggi'es 
sive this year, concentrating their at- 
tacks on resistance supply lines. This 
more offensive posture, plus the neec 
react to resistance offensives, produc 
a higher rate of Soviet casualties and 
creasing aircraft losses. Soviet casual 
in Afghanistan since 1979 total more 
than 30,000, including more than 10,C 
killed. In addition, the Soviets and 
Afghans together have lost nearly 8( 
aircraft to the mujahidin since the 
invasion. 

Apparently dissatisfied with the 
formance of its regular troops, Mosci i 
has increased its use of special purp( | 
forces (Spetsnaz). These better train 
more e.xperienced troops use counte) 
guerrilla tactics and deploy in smalk 
formations than other units. The 
Spetsnaz are often active at night ai 
are used to ambush resistance convc 
However, the Soviet Union is unlike 
to insert enough of these troops intc 
Afghanistan to affect substantially t 
course of the war. 

Soviet forces in Afghanistan con 
tinue to suffer serious morale probk 
although low morale is probably not 
major factor in combat. Disease, pa» 
ticularly dysentery and hepatitis, is 
pant. Reports of theft and sale of 
militai-y items, which often end up i 
the hands of the resistance, are com 
mon. Soviet soldiers often use the p 
ceeds to pay for alcohol and drugs, 
eluding heroin. Drunkenness is ap- 
parently worse than the already hig 
cidence in the U.S.S.R. 



t 



111 



Soviet Defectors and Prisoners 

the early years of the conflict, few 
prisoners were taken by either side 
There is no evidence of major deter 
centers for resistance fighters. Con- 
tinued press reports of limited actu;i 
planned prisoner exchanges suggest 
Kabul and the Soviets do hold somti 
mujahidin. 

A few Soviets have defected to 
resistance; some even fight alongsic 
the mujahidin. According to press 
views, Soviet defectors often conve: 
Islam and go by Muslim names. Soi 
defectors, in trouble before they lei 
Soviet lines, remain with the mujai 



lie 



iiii 



10 



DeDartment of State 



J 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



?r than face severe punishment, 
aps death, should they return. In 
;ion, various resistance groups hold 
dt prisoners, generally in secure 
areas inside Afghanistan, 
'he International Committee of the 
Cross (ICRC) has a program to in- 
Soviet prisoners in Switzerland and 
tually voluntarily repatriate them, 
ral voluntarily returned to the 
?t Union after completing the 
ng period mandated by the Geneva 
■ention. In 1985, no Soviet soldiers 
released through the ICRC. Si.x 
?t soldiers asked for and received 
e admission into the United States 
83 and 1984; one returned to the 
5.R. in 1985. 

lOviet Soldier Enters U.S. Em- 

y. A 19-year old Soviet soldier 
•ed the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on 
ber 31, teUing U.S. diplomats that 
as fed up "with the soldier's life in 
anistan" and that he wanted to 
•n to the Soviet Union. Shortly 
ward, Afghan and Soviet troops 
funded the embassy, access to it 
mpeded, and the electricity was cut 
our days later the soldier agreed 
ive viath the Soviet Ambassador 
r the condition that he could return 
B Soviet Union and would not be 
hed beyond a party reprimand, 
soviet Ambassador gave assurances 
ese points to the U.S. charge in 
1. Almost immediately after the 
!r's departure the cordon was lifted 
lower restored. A similar incident 
red in 1980. 

[ET POLICY AND THE 
HAN WAR 

3W continues to pursue a military 
on to the Afghanistan problem and 
diplomacy as a means of supporting 
forts to consolidate control in the 
ry. Moscow's diplomatic efforts and 
of its Afghan proxies aim at erod- 
itemational support for the nut- 
in, intimidating Afghanistan's 
bors, Iran and Pakistan, and gain- 
itemational acceptance for the 
1 regime. 

oscow supports the concept of a 
::al settlement "around 
inistan" that will maintain and 



legitimize the client regime in Kabul. 
The Soviets endorse the continuation of 
UN-sponsored indirect negotiations in 
Geneva. Moscow has declined, however, 
to put forth a withdrawal schedule for 
the "limited contingent" of Soviet forces 
in Afghanistan, contending that the tim- 
ing and other details of such a with- 
drawal can be negotiated only bilaterally 
between Moscow and Kabul. 

Both politically and militarily, the 
Soviets appear to have settled in for a 
long, but limited, war. Over the years 
they have moderately increased their 
commitment of troops. They have made 
extensive adjustments in tactics, equip- 
ment, and types of units deployed, as 
mujahidin effectiveness has steadily 
increased. 

Criticism on the Home Front. The 

scope and duration of the Soviet mili- 
tary effort in Afghanistan has been 
reflected to a certain extent by devel- 
opments in the U.S.S.R. Although there 
is no evidence of widespread opposition, 
support for the venture in Afghanistan 
is for the most part passive and unen- 
thusiastic— particularly among those 
with family members in Afghanistan. 

During the past year, however, 
there have been increasing signs of 
unhappiness inside the Soviet Union 
about the Afghan conflict. This dissent 
has taken several forms. Public demon- 
strations against service in Afghanistan 
have taken place in Armenia, Georgia, 
Ukraine, and other republics. Draft eva- 
sion appears to have increased, prompt- 
ing the Soviet authorities to issue new 
laws punishing those failing to register. 
Samizdat criticism (privately circulated 
dissident manuscripts) has expanded, in- 
cluding both negative reports from 
Afghanistan veterans and open expres- 
sions of sympathy for the mujahidin by 
Crimean Tartar leaders. Complaints 
about the war have become more fre- 
quent and open and are implicitly 
acknowledged by coverage in the Soviet 
press. Unofficial polls conducted by 
human rights activists show a decline in 
support for the war. 

To generate more support, the 
Soviet media have expanded their cover- 
age of the fighting. Combat fatalities are 
now reported more frequently; decora- 



tions for heroism played up; and special 
features on men fighting in Afghanistan 
are carried in their home town news- 
papers. Not all coverage is up- 
beat—Soviet spokesmen have said that 
the fighting is "intensifying," a clear in- 
dication that Moscow is preparing its 
own people for a long struggle. At 
Geneva, a Soviet spokesman publicly ad- 
mitted to a sharp increase in casualties 
in Afghanistan in 1985. 



THE AFGHAN REGIME 

The Afghan regime remains ineffective, 
with little future prospect of becoming a 
viable surrogate capable of standing on 
its own. 

The Kabul regime remains essential- 
ly a city state— with military outposts in 
the hinterland and a secure civilian 
presence only in Kabul and a few other 
towns. Both Herat and Qandahar are 
substantially out of regime control. 
DRA performance, and particularly its 
efforts to build legitimacy or a political 
base, are Limited by its reach. NajibuUah, 
ex-director of KHAD, admitted to an 
Indian journalist that only 85% of the 
country was under control of the 
regime. The trae figure is uncertain but 
probably closer to the 10% often cited 
by the resistance than to the KHAD 
estimate. 

Party Developments 

The DRA is nominally ruled through the 
People's Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA). The party is riven 
by deep-seated divisions, which fre- 
quently, although perhaps not as much 
as in previous years, erupts into 
violence. The most serious incident re- 
ported in 1985 was a September gunbat- 
tle between army adherents of the rival 
Khalq and Parcham factions at the Arg 
Palace in Kabul. The Soviets have 
spared no effort to integrate the party 
factions, going back to the early 1970s, 
but regime and party changes in 1985 
appear to have shifted the balance of 
power still further away from the 
Khalq. 

Babrak's Parcham faction holds most 
state power, although its Dari-speaking, 
multiethnic, urbanized adherents still 
comprise only 40% of the party. It con- 
trols KHAD, an important source of 
leverage. 



jary 1986 



11 



The Khalq faction was headed by 
Presidents Taraki and Amin, both killed 
in 1979. The Khalq is currently led by 
Interior Minister Gulabzoi, who controls 
the regular police and was promoted 
this year to Lieutenant General. Khalqis 
are mostly Pashtu speakers (Pathans) 
from eastern areas, often from a lower 
class or rural background. Still a 
majority of party members, Khalqis 
predominate in the armed forces, which 
makes them resistant to being purged. 
In the past, the Khalqis had a reputa- 
tion for being more radical and na- 
tionalist than the Soviet-sponsored 
Parchamis. 

Factional differences probably con- 
tributed to a major regime personnel 
change, announced on June 3, when 
NajibuUah Masir replaced Mohammed 
Ismail Danesh as Minister of Mines and 
Industries. Danesh, a Khalqi, has taken 
up respectable political exile as 
Afghanistan's Ambassador to Libya. 
Three new appointments were an- 
nounced the same day, all with the rank 
of minister. Abdulbasir Ranjbir was 
named head of the Central Bank, 
Mohammed Daoud Kauian was named 
Director General of the official Bakhtar 
News Agency, and Abdul Qadr Ashna, 
Director of the State Committee for 
Culture, was elevated to Cabinet status. 
Ashna is a reputed Parchami; the other 
new ministers probably had similar 
affiliations. 

At the opening session of the 16th 
plenum of the PDPA Central Committee 
on November 21, a party reshuffle was 
announced, the first in 3 years. Ghulam 
Dastigir Panjsheri was dropped from 
the Politburo and Danesh and former 
Defense Minister Abdul Qadir— a key 
figure in the 1978 coup— were replaced 
as alternate or candidate members. 
Radio Kabul said that Qadir and Panj- 
sheri asked to be removed because of 
illness, but there is no evidence that 
they suffer from any physical infirmity; 
for Qadir it is the end of a long slide 
downward. Defense Minister Nazar 
Mohammed and Tribal Affairs Minister 
Suleiman Laeeq were named as candi- 
date members of the politburo. 

NajibuUah was named secretary of 
the PDPA Central Committee, a sign of 
the increasing power of the secret 
police. KHAD's position was further im- 
proved by the promotion of Najibullah's 
deputy, Ghulam Faruq Yacubi, from 
candidate member of the Central Com- 
mittee to full member. SaifuUah, Kabul 
City sarandoy (militia) commander, and 
a possible Gulabzoi protege, also was ap- 



12 



pointed candidate member of the 
Central Committee. On December 5, 
Radio Kabul announced that Yacubi had 
been named as KHAD's new director. 

The PDPA marked its 20th anniver- 
sai-y in January with major celebrations 
in Kabul. The Soviets supplied as guest 
of honor the first secretary of the Com- 
munist Party of Uzbekistan. The only 
member of a ruling party politburo pres- 
ent was from Poland. 

After the celebrations, party affairs 
appeared to become secondary to the 
questions of regime performance. Con- 
tinuing Soviet dissatisfaction with 
Karmal was apparent when he was ac- 
corded low-level treatment on a May 
visit to Moscow, his first state visit 
since a trip to Mongoha in July 1983. 
Karmal went from the U.S.S.R. to 
Poland, where his reception was sub- 
dued. A week before Karmal's arrival in 
Moscow, on the occasion of the Saur 
(April) Afghan revolution's seventh an- 
niversary, Soviet commentary was 
lukewarm and appeared to downgrade 
the status of the PDPA. A second Kar- 
mal trip to Moscow, ostensibly for 
medical treatment, was equally 
downplayed. 

Rumors of Karmal's impending 
replacement surfaced several times dur- 
ing the year, especially in connection 
with his shabby treatment abroad. 
Potential successors mentioned include 
Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand, 
an able administrator and party loyalist 
who is hampered by being a Hazara, 
Afghanistan's lowest status ethnic 
group. Another party leader, Nur 
Ahmed Nur, spent 2 years in Moscow 
for a training course and returned to 
Kabul, apparently for good, in 
September. 

Another organization that has not 
succeeded in mobilizing support for the 
regime is the National Fatherland Front 
(NFF). The NFF is charged with bring- 
ing together various regime front 
organizations, such as the Democratic 
Youth of Afghanistan, in a patriotic, 
nonparty context. In March, high-level 
party figure Saleh Mohammed Ziray 
was replaced as NFF chairman by 
Abdul Rahim Hatef, a Pathan tribal 
elder who served in Afghanistan's 
parliament during the monarchy. 
Although named to head Loyah Jirga, 
Hatef has added little to the regime's 
appeal. 



The Regime Strives for Legitimacy 

With little prospect of improved part 
performance or appeal, Kabul has tri^ 
to build a facade of legitimacy for th( 
regime through a series of public init 
tives. The regime was stung by criti( 
in the Ermacora report (see human 
rights section below), specifically its 
reference to Afghanistan's lack of ev 
the formality of representative instit 
tions. Kabul's political initiative may 
therefore, have been packaged more 
international than domestic consump 

Loyah Jirga. On April 12, Kabul 
nounced it would call a Loyah Jirga, 
traditional grand assembly of Afghai i 
tribal leaders. Such assemblages 
historically were used by the Afghai 
kings and by the prerevolution 
republican government to gain acqui 
escence in a transfer of power or ap 
proval of a major new policy. 

In the 1980 Fundamental Princ 
of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan, which serves as an int 
constitution, the Loyah Jirga is defi 
as the "highest organ of state powe 
Neither the Karmal regime, nor the 
preinvasion Khalq government had 
previously convoked a Loyah Jirga, 
although regional jirgas have been 1 
Reports of the event suggest that ti 
Loyah Jirga was a sham and that it 
recognized as such by the Afghan 
people. 

A high percentage of the 2,000 j 
cipants were regime functionaries, f 
the military or KHAD, or members 
the PDPA or its various front orgai 
tions. The hurried scheduling of the 
sions belies the assertation of active 
participation. The regime announcec 
was calling the Loyah Jirga on Apr 
On the 13th, Kabul announced that 
"elections for Jirga representatives 
already been held in 13 of the 29 
provinces." By April 20th the electi 
were pronounced complete— only th' 
was the April 23 meeting date ' 
announced. 

The "independent" delegates w 
paid well for attending— reportedly 
20,000 Afghanis per delegate and u] 
50,000 for those who agreed to spej 
during the televised sessions. Many 
were coerced into appearing. The 
regime took a hard line at the sessi 
denouncing the resistance as "an- 
tirevolutionaries." The role of Path 
and Baluch border tribes (delegates | 
were in attendance from both Pakis 
and Iran) in staving off "outside in- 
terference" was stressed. 



Department of State Bi 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



The resistence responded quickly. At 
ress conference in Peshawar, a group 
larty leaders from both then-existing 
Itions strongly condemned the 
tting, threatening vengeance on the 
icipants. Resistance threats were 
idle. A Bakhtar flight carrying 
gates from Badakhshan was 
)rtedly shot down April 15. A 
ber of delegates apparently were 
d in the aftermath of the Loyah 
a. At least two may have had their 
is cut off, the Islamic punishment 
:hieves. 

[n August, the initiative was re- 
ed in the same unconvincing manner 
n local council elections were an- 
iced— the day before they were to 
n. In Kabul, the "election" process 
simple: a smattering of district 
lents were assembled at a meeting 
-some unwillingly. Candidates, 
lly one per seat, were introduced 
moments before the vote. Rather 
by secret ballot, voting meant rais- 
lands under the watchful eyes of 
^D agents. The regime announced 
450.000 Kabul residents partici- 
d, about 90% of eligible voters. 
Vithin a week there were reports of 
cil members killed by the mu- 
iin. Nevertheless, council meetings 
• reported being held by the end of 
ist. The regime announced plans to 
similar elections around the 
try. 

'he regime once again focused on 
rentier in a September 17 High 
il Jirga for the Pathan and Baluch 
s whose territories span the 
ers wdth Pakistan and, in the case 
e Baluch, also with Iran. This time 
newhat higher proportion of the 
illy 3,700 delegates were actually 
the tribes. The regime's "prize" 
!tor, AsmatuUah Achakzai, was 
ed to the presidium of the Jirga, 
igain, delegates were reportedly 
well to attend. Cash payments 
ibly were supplemented by arms, 
e traditional manner of 
mment-tribal i-elations. The 
ions were reportedly for use in 
iding the frontiers and presumably 
For use in tribal lands across the 
3r. There is no evidence that the 
le has gained any adherents as a 
t of these subventions. 
)n November 7, on the eve of the 
General Assembly vote on 
lanistan and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
nit, the DRA announced a new 
itive designed to "broaden the 
il pillars" of the revolution. KaiTnal 
:ated a readiness for dialogue with 




^ 



<«r 






i 



Mujahidin with RPG-7, the basic antitank weapon of the resistance. 



the opposition and even the possibility 
of bringing into the government opposi- 
tion figures who accept the April revolu- 
tion. Thus far thei'e have been no 
takers. 

On November 11 Babrak Kamial 
paid a 1-day visit to Konduz City, in 
northern Afghanistan. Accompanied by 
the heads of KHAD and the Ministries 
of Interior and Defense, it was his first 
trip to the provinces in more than 2 
years. Later that week. Prime Minister 
Keshtmand reportedly made an equally 
rare 1-day trip to Herat. 

Economy 

The war has caused significant damage 
to the Afghan economy, already one of 
the world's poorest. The resistance has 
focused on disrupting Afghanistan's 
small industrial sector, which even 
before the 1978 coup was mostly state 
owned. The Soviets and the regime, 
largely in the course of fighting, also 
have disrupted agricultural production 
and food distribution. 

In a January 1985 speech, President 
Karmal charged that the resistance has 
caused more than $350 million in 
damage. He claimed that the mujahidui 
have destroyed 1,800 school buildings, 
31 hospitals, hundreds of trucks, 14,000 
kilometers of telephone lines, and hun- 
dreds of electricity pylons. 

Nevertheless, there is considerable 
evidence that the economy continues to 
function in much of the country. Disrup- 
tion of agriculture has been confined 
mostly to areas of heavy fighting and 
population movement, i.e., the eastern 



provinces bordering Pakistan. In much 
of the rest of the country, as noted 
below, farming and herding continue to 
provide at least subsistence to the rui-al 
population. 

Trade continues with Pakistan, 
India, and elsewhere, much of it outside 
government hands. Neither the govern- 
ment nor the resistance has tried 
significantly to disrupt nonwar-related 
commerce out of concern that the 
population might turn against the side 
that reduces the standard of living. 

Neither black market differential nor 
inflation is high enough to suggest 
severe economic disruption. The unoffi- 
cial rate for the Afghani has risen 
slightly to about 130 to the dollar, above 
the official rate of 50.6. Inflation in the 
cities has continued to run at about 25% 
annually, fed by occasional shortages 
that bid prices upward. A major factor 
limiting the rate of inflation is that the 
Soviets bring in a wide variety of goods, 
including wheat and other foodstuffs, for 
distribution in areas under their control. 

Continuing Sovietization of the 
Economy. In 1984 Soviet-Afghan trade 
was up slightly, totaling about $1.1 
billion, about 70%-80% of total Afghan 
trade. Trade is in approximate balance 
as Afghan natural gas continues to be 
pumped to the Soviet Union, despite 
occasional resistance disruptions. 

The merger of Ariana Afghan 
Airlines into the domestic Bakhtar 
Airlines provides an example of Soviet 
efforts to displace Western economic in- 
fluence. As part of the transition, 
Ariana sold its single DC- 10 jetliner; 
other Western-manufactured aircraft 



uary 1986 



13 



also may be replaced by aircraft from 
the Soviet bloc; at the end of 1985, 
Bakhtar's Boeing 727s were still flying. 

Soviet Aid. In 1984, the Soviets 
pledged more than $300 million in new- 
aid and disbursed more than $400 
million in commodities and new project 
aid. In February 1985 an agreement was 
signed granting additional project 
credits. The U.S.S.R. has provided 
Afghanistan with assistance unprece- 
dented in Soviet relations with Third- 
World countries, including about two- 
thirds of its total program of grants, 
long pa>Tnent terms for credits, and 
commodity support— even wheat, which 
the Soviet Union itself must import. 

Much of this Soviet largesse is actu- 
ally designed to support the miUtary ef- 
fort, particularly aid-financed expen- 
ditures for transportation infrastructure. 
In addition, a substantial portion of the 
commodity credits appears to be for 
war-related material (such as trucks or 
petroleum) for the Afghan Armed 
Forces. East European aid is much 
lower; only $12 million in new aid was 
extended in 1984. 

Agriculture in 1985 

Afghanistan is a country of dry, moun- 
tainous terrain, mostly unsuitable for 
agriculture. Less than 15% of the total 
land area is arable, and up to one-half of 
the arable land normally is left fallow 
each year. Only about 4 million hectares 
(10 million acres) are cultivated annual- 
ly. Precipitation varies considerably, but 
in most areas it is neither adequate nor 
reliable enough to support extensive 
fanning. Agriculture depends heavily on 
irrigation from the few permanently 
flowing rivers, snow and ice melt, and 
underground water reserves. 

Subsistence agriculture dominates 
Afghanistan's economy. It employs 
roughly three-quarters of the working 
population and accounts for more than 
half of the gross domestic product. 
Relatively little use is made of 
machines, chemical fertilizer, or 
pesticides. Wheat made up nearly half of 
all agricultural production before the 
war; this proportion has probably 
increased. 

Afghanistan suffered from unusually 
low amounts of precipitation in 1984 and 
the first few months of 1985. Drought 
reduced production, particularly in the 
dryland regions in the north, and prob- 
ably contributed to local food deficits. 
However, the situation may have eased 
later in 1985, after unusually high 



amounts of precipitation fell in the 
spring. Wheat production in 1985 was 
probably about equal to average prein- 
vasion production and above the annual 
average since the invasion. 

The net effect of the conflict in 
Afghanistan on food availability has 
been to wear away at the margin of 
agi'icultural production. Isolated food 
shortages continue to exist, particularly 
in those areas where agriculture has 
been severely disrupted by the war, and 
are exacerbated by the poor transport 
network. Food continues to be imported 
both from the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan. 
Grain has been substituted for cash 
crops. Traditional Afghan exports of 
fruit and vegetables have diminished. 
Opium, which requires less attention, 
and is therefore safer to grow, is an ex- 
ception. Opium production increased in 
1985, particularly in the east. 

Education and Youth 

The effort to educate and influence 
Afghanistan's youth is an important ele- 
ment in the long-term Soviet program to 
pacify and Sovietize Afghanistan. In 
practice this includes using education 
and the reduction of Afghanistan's over- 
whelming illiteracy as a means to gain 
acceptance for Marxist ideology, the 
Kabul regime, and Soviet hegemony. To 
rule the country in the future, the 
Soviets need to develop at least a small 
cadre that can succeed to leadership of 
the DRA. The greatest constraint on 
these efforts is the lack of physical con- 
trol over most of the population. 
Although the Soviets thus far have 
made little progress on literacy or 
recruitment, they may have gained the 
loyalty of a few young people in Kabul, 
particularly among those working for 
KHAD. 

The Soviets have encouraged univer- 
sal, compulsory education in the areas 
they control. In the schools, the study of 
Islam and Western languages has large- 
ly been replaced by the study of Marx- 
ist ideology and the Russian language. 
As many as one-third of Afghanistan's 
teachers and school administrators may 
be Soviet or bloc nationals, while most 
of the rest are PDPA members. In 
February 1985, language teachers from 
France and West Germany were ex- 
pelled, ending 60 years of educational 
cooperation with those countries. 

An important part of this strategy is 
to send Afghans to the U.S.S.R. for 
training. However, returning students 
vary greatly in their loyalty to the 
regime or to the Soviets. With adults 



sometimes more hostile to the Marxist 
after a stay in the U.S.S.R., the Sovit 
have brought children aged 10 or 
younger north for extended periods ol 
up to 10 years or more. Many are or- 
phans of regime or party personnel. 

Human Rights 

The 1984 session of the UN Human 
Rights Commission asked Austrian P 
fessor Felix Ermacora, as the commi: 
sion's special rapporteur, to report oi 
the human rights situation in 
Afghanistan. Although the DRA refu 
him entry, Ermacora was able to inti 
view in Pakistan refugees from over I 
of Afghanistan's provinces. His repoi 
presented to the Human Rights Com 
mission in March 1985, was highly 
critical of the Soviet Union and the 
Kabul regime. 

Ermacora found massive and systf 
atic violation of human rights in 
Afghanistan. He noted that "Since tl 
April Revolution, the internal humar 
rights situation has deteriorated as £ 
result of the absence of popular par- 
ticipation in the choice and administi 
tion of government." This situation j 
duced internal conflict and the mass 
odus of refugees. "Many lives have I J 
lost, many people have been incar- 
cerated in conditions far removed fn 
respect for human rights and fundan ■ 
tal freedoms, many have been tortur 
and have disappeared." 

Ermacora detailed his political ol r 
vations, adding, "The regime which s 
installed in December 1979, like its i 
mediate predecessors, was a regime U 
was not elected by the people and w li 
had never submitted to a free expre 
sion of will by the population and w; 
therefore unrepresentative." He reci ■ 
mended the initiation of a process of 
political normalization, specifically in 
eluding the convocation of a Loyah 
Jirga. 

The Soviet representative to the 
Human Rights Commission responds 
with a barrage of vituperation aimec t 
discrediting Ermacora's integrity. 
Nonetheless, the report was acclaim 
by the international press. 

The 1985 Human Rights Commi; 
extended Ei-macora's mandate for 
another year, asking him to update 
initial report and submit an interim 
draft to the 40th session of the UN 
General Assembly. After approval b 
the Human Rights Commission and f 
UN Economic and Social Council, tl 
Ermacora report was presented to 1 
General Assembly and circulated as 
UN document.' Based on the report i 



14 



Department of State Btj* 



hbAIUHb 

Afghanistan 



AFGHANISTAN: 
KNOWN MASSACRES & AERIAL ATTACKS ON VILLAGES 

By Soviet and Soviet Bacl<ed Afghan Forces 




ution condemning the violation of 
m rights in Afghanistan was ap- 
ed by the General Assembly. This 
s first time that the General 
mbly has had the opportunity to 
on this issue. Ermacora will convey 
inal version of the report to the 
Human Rights Commission in 
:h 1986. 

Violations of human rights in 
anistan continued in 1985. Reprisals 
oviet forces against Afghan civilians 
on added ferocity with the in- 
5ed involvement of Soviet troops in 
Ighting. Due to the savagery of 
; attacks, Afghan regime soldiers on 
' than one occasion tried to prevent 
Tut them. 



Some anticivilian attacks were 
especially large. In early February, for 
instance, hundreds of civihans were 
reported killed near Konduz City, north 
of the Salang Pass. In late March, 
Soviet soldiers, reportedly drunk, 
allegedly turned a house-to-house search 
into a looting spree. When residents 
protested, the soliders opened fire, kill- 
ing 17. Also in March, retaliatory at- 
tacks in Laghman Province, caused 
nearly 1,000 civilian casualties; in April, 
hundreds were reported killed when a 
meeting in a village square was 
machinegunned. 



THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE 

The Afghan resistance consists of 
several elements. Seven major parties in 
exile— now joined in a single alliance- 
represent refugee interest and work to 
promote the political dimension of the 
resistance (see box, p. 14). They coordi- 
nate their activities with mujahidin 
groups inside Afghanistan. In addition 
to the seven major parties in Peshawar, 
there are smaller groupings of every 
political stripe. Parties representing the 
Shia minority tend to be based in 
Quetta, in southern Pakistan, and in 
Iran. 



uary 1986 



15 



Mujahidin fighters appear to have 
become increasingly professionalized 
over the past year. Most, but not all, of 
the hundreds of separate fighting 
groups are linked, to at least some 
degree, to one or more of the major par- 
ties. Ordinary Afghan citizens provide 
support and manpower and sometimes 
stage their own actions against the 
regime and the Soviets. Soviet reprisals 
have generated more caution in the 
behavior of civilians but in many cases 
have hardened attitudes toward the oc- 
cupiers. Finally, there are many sym- 
pathizers among those living under 
regime control, including those 
employed by the DRA, whose anti- 
regime activities became more visible in 
1985. 

Intergroup tension continued to be a 
problem for the resistance, at times 
reflecting traditional tribal or ethnic 
squabbles, sometimes disputes over turf 
or supplies. Pressure from a population 
that is slowly gaining a national con- 
sciousness as a result of the war has 
contributed to a probable reduction in 
intergroup combat. In many sectors, 
particularly in Helmand, Paktia, Herat, 
and around Panjsher, fighting groups 
displayed increased cooperation without 
regard to party or ethnic affiliation. 

THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

Border Violations. Violations of the 
Pakistani border by DRA, and possibly 
Soviet, aircraft and artillery again 
escalated in 1985. There were more than 
200 DRA/Soviet violations of Pakistani 
airspace and more than 25 instances of 
shelling Pakistani territory. Incidents on 
the Iranian/ Afghan border also occurred. 
As in previous years, cross-border 
strikes generally were related to combat 
taking place near the border inside 
Afghanistan. There was no single inci- 
dent as large as the 1984 bomb attacks 
on Teri Mangal. 

Violations were especially numerous 
around Arandu, opposite Barikot, and 
all along the tribal areas bordering 
Paktia Province. One of the worst at- 
tacks occurred during the height of the 
Soviet offensive in the Konar Valley. On 
May 31, Soviet/ Afghan aircraft bombed 
and rocketed Swir, a village in northern 
Pakistan, about 20 miles from the 
border, where 11 civilians died and 32 
were wounded. 

Pakistan. Pakistan remains stalwart 
in its support of the Afghan people, 
both in caring for the refugees and in 



The New Resistance Alliance 



At a May 16 press conference, Malvi 
Yunus Khalis, widely respected head 
of one of the major resistance parties, 
announced the merger of the two then- 
existing alliances in Peshawar. The 
existing seven-party "fundamentalist" 
and three-party "moderate" alliances 
became a single coalition. Splinter 
groups from the three-party alliance 
also ceased to exist, making a total of 
seven parties. The alliance kept the 
same name— Islamic Unity of Afghan 
Mujahidin— previously used by both 
coalitions. 

Pressure to form the new alliance 
came from supporters both inside and 
outside the country and from the par- 
ties themselves. Infighting among the 
parties, often within the coalitions, had 
frequently turned into violent clashes 
both in Afghanistan and Peshawar. In- 
tensive discussions on possible new 
alignments had been going on for more 
than a year when the agreement was 
struck. 

The new coalition's primary goal is 
to present a unified stance to the 
world, particulai-ly to international 
bodies such as the United Nations and 
the Islamic Conference Organization. 
A key feature of the alliance is that it 
is represented by a single spokesman— 
a position rotated among the party 
leaders at regulai- intervals, probably 
quarterly. Decisions must be unani- 
mous. A standing committee will try 
to increase military cooperation. Other 
committees are to focus on political 
issues, education, and social services. 
The seven parties agi-eed to respect 
continued differences over their views 
on Afghanistan's future. 

The alliance is ran by a council 
comprised of the leaders of the seven 
component parties: 

• The "fundamentahsts": Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-hlami; the 
Hezb-e-Islami faction of Yunus 
Khalis; the Jamiat-i-Islami headed 



by Burhanuddin Rabbani; the li- 
tihadia led by Abdul Rasool Sa\ . af. 
• The "traditionalists," sometimes 
called moderates; the Harakat-c- 
Inqelab of Nabi Mohammedi; the 
Mahez-e-MUli of Pir Sayyid Gailani; 
and the Jebh-e Najat-e Milli led by 
SibaghatuUah Mojadeddi. 

Yunus Khalis was the initial spokes- 
man. He delivered a second statemen 
in August asserting the alliance's ro! 
as representative of the Afghan peo| 
and demanding Afghanistan's UN 
seat, currently occupied by DRA. Gi 
buddin Hekmatyar, who succeeded 
Khalis as spokesman, led an alliance | 
delegation, including a representative ' 
from each of the seven parties, to th 
United Nations and several friendly 
countries in October-November. Dui' 
ing the UN visit, the first interna- 
tional mission of the alliance, unity 
was maintained and the role of the 
spokesman respected by the other 
delegates. The alliance pressed its 
further on November 21, when spol 
man Gulbuddin urged friendly coun- 
tries to transfer Afghan diplomatic 
missions from DRA control to the 
resistance; Gulbuddin also has de- 
manded the Afghan seat in the Islan 
Conference Organization. 

Progress in developing resistancf 
cooperation through the alliance has 
been relatively swift, although geniu 
unity remains illusive. Agreed alliaii 
statements have been few— as could 
expected. There is no provision for 
representation by other parties oi- I 
organized gi-oups within or outside I 
Afghanistan. However, despite the ' 
many obstacles, the alliance is ex- I 
pected to play a progressively great ' 
role in presenting the Afghan c: ' * 
the world— and to help increase 
dination among the resistance ii !■ 
Afghanistan. 



11' 

J 



taking the lead, as at the United Na- 
tions, in working for a settlement of the 
Afghan problem. In his opening speech 
to the newly elected National Assembly 
on March 25, President Mohammed Zia 
ul-Haq stressed Pakistan's continuing 
and long-term commitment to the 
Afghan people. Although Pakistan re- 



mains susceptible to continuing 
Soviet/DRA pressure along the 
border— including a recent upsurge 
subversion— a wide consensus evide:y 
exists in favor of the government's 
forts to resolve the Afghan crisis. 



16 



Department of State Bif"' 



ran. Relations between Iran and 
DRA remained cool throughout 
, following a distinct downturn in 
ions between the two countries in 
. The Iranian consulate in Herat re- 
s closed as does the Afghan con- 
,e in Mashhad. Moreover, the Ira- 
; have continued to complain of 
)dic border violations during the 
. In June, the Iranians brought 
ral Afghan Shia resistance groups 
am. They were addressed by 
;ollah Montazari, Khomeini's 
piated heir, who encouraged these 
ps to stop fighting among 
iselves and concentrate on the 
iers. 

ndia. In an address to a joint ses- 
of the U.S. Congress in June 1985, 
m several other occasions during 
'ear. Prime Minister Gandhi re- 
ted India's interest in a political 
ion to the Afghan problem. Bali 
Baghat, later to be named foreign 
iter, led a Congress Party delega- 
to the January PDPA 20th anniver- 
celebrations. In April, Indian 
ign Secretary Bhandari visited 
;1 as part of a trip to all South 
1 capitals. A joint statement at the 
)f the visit expressed support for 
JN-sponsored negotiations and con- 
at increasing militarization of the 
[n. DRA Foreign Minister Shah Mo- 
Inad Dost later paid a return visit 
3lhi and negotiated an increase in 
inodest Indian program of non- 
iry assistance to the DRA. India 
jnues to call for an end to foreign 
(vention and interference in 
lanistan. In 1985, India voted 
:ist the release of the Ermacora 
rt in the UN Human Rights Com- 
mon and once again abstained on the 
!'ral Assembly resolution. India also 
inued to express to Moscow its con- 
■ over the situation in Afghanistan. 

'hina. China continues to condemn 
>oviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
I? it as a major obstacle to the im- 
enient of its own relations with the 
S.R. In a February 22 press con- 
lee, the DRA denounced Chinese 
ort for the Afghan resistance, set- 
off a media dispute that went on 
luch of the year. On February 21, 
ifficial Chinese People's Daily called 
3RA charges slander, stating that 
.;'t actions in Afghanistan rep- 
nted a threat to Chinese security. 



REFUGEES 

Pakistan. Afghans in Pakistan con- 
situte the single largest group of 
refugees in the world. The Government 
of Pakistan reports registration of over 
2.6 million Afghans; numbers continue 
to grow, although at a slower pace than 
in years past. Most refugees are located 
in some 306 camps, primarily in the 
rural areas of the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan (see 
map, p. 9). 

Traditional notions of hospitality and 
strong ethnic and tribal ties between 
the local inhabitants and the refugees 
have helped to ease the Afghans' impact 
on the local population. However, their 
presence has led to an undercurrent of 
uneasiness, which is gi-eater outside the 
areas of ethnic affinity where most of 
the refugees reside. 

The herds of goats, camels, and 
sheep that the refugees bring vidth them 
destroy, through overgrazing, land in 
the already economically depressed 
areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan. 
Also, the refugees compete with the 
local population for a limited number of 
jobs. In recent years more than 2 
million Paldstani males, some from the 
NWFP, have emigrated to work in Per- 
sian Gulf countries where wages are 
much higher than in Pakistan. Dimin- 
ished employment prospects in the gulf, 
however, have led some of these 
workers to return to Pakistan. There 
could well be increased competition for 



Afghanistan 



jobs— and lising friction— between the 
returning Pakistanis and the Afghan 
refugees in an economy already ex- 
periencing high unemployment. 

The Soviets and KHAD attempt to 
exploit Pakistani concern over the 
refugees. KHAD infiltrators are on the 
rise, although most have been ap- 
prehended by the Pakistani authorities. 
Several violent incidents in the refugee 
areas can be attributed to Soviet/KHAD 
actions designed to increase host-refugee 
tensions. Late 1985 saw a marked rise 
in attempted Soviet/DRA subversion in 
Pakistan's tribal areas along the border. 

Refugee Assistance. Pakistan has 
extended an impressive and continuing 
welcome to the Afghans. The refugees 
are subject to few restrictions and are 
allowed to travel freely, hold jobs, and 
establish businesses. The refugees are 
minimally, but adequately, supplied with 
food, shelter, clothing, and medicine. 
Relief is provided by Pakistan and by 
the international community primarily 
through the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the Worid 
Food Program (WFP). 

In keeping with Government of 
Pakistan policy, a number of relief 
organizations have expanded their pro- 
gi-amming to include projects that ad- 
dress the longer term needs of a popula- 
tion with no immediate prospect of 
voluntai-y repatriation. Greater emphasis 
is now placed on enhancing refugee self- 
reliance through programs providing 




Basic food rations are provided to the Afghan refugees by the international community. 



>uary 1986 



17 



both general education and vocational 
training. Special efforts are being made 
to provide female refugees with income- 
generating skills compatible with local 
customs. The World Bank, in conjunc- 
tion with the UNHCR, also has 
launched a series of forestation, irriga- 
tion, and road-building projects designed 
to employ refugee labor in repairing en- 
vironmental damage caused by the 
Afghans' presence. 

The U.S. Government contributed 
about $66 million to the WFP/UNHCR 
Afghan refugee relief program in 
Pakistan in fiscal year 1985, including 
$38 million woilh of commodities 
through the WFP— about one-third of 
total international conti'ibutions to 
Afghan relief. To date, total U.S. con- 
tributions to the Afghan program ex- 
ceed $430 million. Other major con- 
tributors to the UN relief program are 
Japan, Western Europe, Saudi Arabia, 
and other Persian Gulf states. 

Humanitarian Relief. In addition to 
U.S. funding of assistance to Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan, the U.S. Govern- 
ment also has provided a total of $8 
million in fiscal year 1985 for short-term 
humanitarian relief for wai'-affected 
Afghans in Afghanistan. This included 
$4 million of medical supplies and food 
aid disbursed by the U.S. Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance. A second 
$4 million portion funded medical, educa- 
tion, and other projects by private 
voluntary organizations. The objective of 
the humanitarian assistance program is 
to improve the ability of the Afghan 
people to sustain themselves inside 
Afghanistan. 

A long-term program of U.S. 
humanitarian assistance for war-affected 
Afghans began in the fall of 1985. 
Economic Support Funds totaling $15 
million have been earmarked for this 
purpose by Congress in the fiscal year 
1986 foreign assistance authorization. 
Although still being designed, the new 
program includes the provision of addi- 
tional food, educational assistance, and 
medical supplies and training, and for 
the improvement of livestock and 
agriculture (partly through the distribu- 
tion of seeds and farm implements). 

Congress has separately authorized 
$10 million for the transportation of ex- 
cess Defense Department property of a 
nonweapons, nonlethal nature to war- 
affected Afghans. 

Iran. The second largest concentra- 
tion of Afghan refugees outside Pakistan 
is in Iran. The Iranian Government 



Chronology 



December 

27: Kabul qviiet on fifth anniversary of 
invasion. 

January 

8: Soviet-DRA column turned back in 
Panjsher: operations in Paktia. 

Early January: Postponed celebrations 
of 20th anniversary of PDPA. 

Late January: Resistance commander 
ZabiuUah Khan killed in north. 

February 

20: DRA condemns Chinese aid to rnu- 
jahidin. Chinese People's Daily calls 
charges "slander." 

March 

8: Soviet/DRA operations near 
Qandahar. 

10: Konstantin Chernenko dies. 
Mikhail Gorbachev becomes new Soviet 
chaimian. 

23: Panjsheris demolish Soviet convoy 
near Salang Pass and attack in Panjsher. 

25: Pakistani President Zia pledges 
support for Afghans in address to new 
Pakistani National Assembly. 

April 

16: Major ambush of Soviet convoy 
south of Kabul. 

23: Kabul holds Loyah Jirga. 
Peshawar leaders denounce it as sham. 

27: Soviet prisoners killed at Mattani. 

May 

16: Resistance grand coalition Islamic 
Unity of Afghan Mujahidin announced. 

May 23-June 7: Soviet Konar 
operation. 

23: Eight Afghan aiixraft bomb and 
rocket Swir, Pakistan, kill 11. 

June 

12: About 20 Afghan Aii- Force planes 
destroyed in sabotage at Shindand. 



17: Pro-Iranian Afghan gi-oups promise 
to unite and fight the Soviets. 

17-18: U.S.-Soviet talks on 
Afghanistan. 

19-25: Fourth round of UN-sponsored 
Geneva indirect talks between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. 

Panjsher mujahidin overrun 
Peshghor. 

July 

13; Afghan Air Force defectors fly tW" 
Mi-2.5 HINDs to Pakistan. 

12,000-15,000 Soviet/DRA troops 
counterattack in Panjsher, retake 
Peshghor. 

August 

Aug.-Sept.: Major battles around 
Khowst, and elsewhere in Paktia 
Province. 

19: Resistance alliance demands 
political role and Afghan UN seat. 

27-30: Fifth round of Geneva talks. 

September 

19: Reporter Charles Thornton killed 
near Qandahar. 

October 

Oct. 23-Nov. 1: Heavy fighting in 
Herat. 

Oct. 31-Nov. 4: Soviet soldier enters 
U.S. Embassy in Kabul; voluntarily leave 
with Soviet Ambassador. 

November 

13: In 122-19 vote (12 abstentions) 
UNGA calls for withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Afghanistan for the seventh 
time. 

21: Afghan politiburo shakeup. 

December 

16: Opening of sixth round of Geneva 
talks. 



estimates that there are as many as 1.8 
million Afghans within its borders, half 
of them located in the eastern Provinces 
of Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan. 
Most Afghans in Iran are integrated in- 
to the local population. However, the 
government does provide assistance 
through the Council for Afghan 
Refugees. The UNHCR also operates a 
small program, budgeted at $10 million 
in 1986; UNHCR plans to emphasize ac- 
tivities that will promote refugee self- 
sufficiency. The United States does not 
contribute to this program. 



INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 



I 



The plight of the Afghan people has 
escaped the world's attention. Coun & 
throughout the world took special n ce 
of the fifth anniversary of the Sovie n- 
vasion in December 1984. Many govn- 
ments made formal statements conc'ii'' 
ing the Soviet occupation. Strong e? 
pressions of solidarity and support > I'f 
made by many Muslim countries an^ » 
a wide variety of groups around tht 
world. 

The carefully orchestrated 12th 
World Festival of Youth and Studei ■. 
held in Moscow from July 27 to Auj't 
3, was disrupted by protests from 



18 



Department of State Bi- 



i 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



•ral delegations against the Soviet 
pation of Afghanistan. Swedish 
gate Katarina Larsson, who was 
king in Afghanistan at the time of 
invasion, spoke of a growing 
larity movement for Afghanistan, 
stated that pi'otests would increase 
;il the last Russian soldier has left 
lanistan." Soviet interpreters 
apted her presentation and censored 
references to Soviet aggression, 
[nternational press coverage in 1985 
was higher than at any time since 
days immediately after the invasion. 
is interest in and reporting of 
stance operations increased. This 
in marked contrast to the relatively 

coverage of the situation inside 
me-controlled areas. Few indepen- 

joui-nalists are permitted entry, 
they are given little scope to probe 
litions in the country, 
soviet concern with foreign media 
rage led Soviet Ambassador to 
Stan Vitaly Smirnov to complain 
it foreign correspondents accompa- 
g the mujahidin. He threatened 
Western reporters entering the 
zone could meet a grim fate. 
)n the night of September 19, 
ona Republic correspondent Charles 
•nton became the first American 
vr\ to be killed inside Afghanistan 

the Soviet invasion. Thoi'nton was 

ling by truck north of Qandahar in 
;ompany of some 15 Afghans when 
jroup was ambushed by a 
et/DRA unit. 

rhe Department of State has issued 
rning against travel in Afghanistan 
use of the danger and because the 

Government is not able, in a 
lie war zone, to provide consular 
action for American citizens. 



UN NEGOTIATIONS 

Since January 1980, the UN General As- 
sembly has voted seven times, each by 
overwhelming margins, for a resolution 
expressing grave concern at the continu- 
ing foreign armed intervention in 
Afghanistan and calling for the complete 
withdrawal of foreign forces; the res- 
toration of Afghanistan's independent 
and nonaligned status; self-determina- 
tion; and the creation of conditions that 
would enable the refugees to return 
home with safety and honor. 

The resolution, introduced as in the 
past by Pakistan, and cosponsored by 46 
other countries, passed again on 
November 13, 1985. It was adopted by a 
vote of 122 to 19, with 12 abstentions, 
the widest margin to date. 

UN attempts to negotiate a settle- 
ment date from a November 1980 man- 
date of the General Assembly. Negotia- 
tions, held periodically since 1982 in 
Geneva, are led by UN Under S^retary 
General for Special Political Affairs 
Diego Cordovez as a personal represen- 
tative of the Secretary General. Cor- 
dovez shuttles between delegations from 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, officially in- 
forming Iran of the discussions while 
unofficially informing the Soviets. Three 
rounds of indirect talks were scheduled 
during 1985, from June 20 to June 25, 
August 27 to August 30, and December 
16 through December 20. 

The parties all reported progress at 
the June session. Undersecretary Cor- 
dovez described the talks as "fruitful." 
The UN has reported agreement on 
three of four proposed accords, the first 
dealing with noninteiference in Afghani- 
stan's affairs, the second encompassing 
international guarantees of a final settle- 



ment, and the third governing the 
voluntary return of the refugees. But 
discussion of a fourth agreement dealing 
with the key issue of a Soviet troop 
withdrawal and the interrelationship 
between that document and the other 
three, was blocked in August when 
Afghanistan demanded direct negotia- 
tions with Pakistan in place of the 
"proximity" foiTnat. Pakistan has re- 
fused to negotiate directly with the Kar- 
mal regime. 

Despite hopes generated at vaiious 
points in the negotiations, the sides re- 
main far apart. The Soviet Union has 
not substantially altered its original 
position justifying its presence in 
Afghanistan. But all sides are commit- 
ted to continuing the talks. 



U.S. POLICY 

U.S. Government policy on Afghanistan 
remains unchanged. We strongly oppose 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
and seek the earliest possible negotiated 
political settlement based on the prin- 
ciples encompassed in the seven General 
Assembly resolutions. 

The United States supports the 
ongoing UN-sponsored negotiations and 
is prepared to guarantee a comprehen- 
sive and balanced settlement, consistent 
with the General Assembly's resolutions 
and predicated on a complete 
withdrawal of Soviet forces within a 
fixed and reasonable length of time. 



^Situation of human rights in 
Afghanistan. Report of the Economic and 
Social Council, UN General Assembly docu- 
ment A/40/843, November 5, 1985. Amnesty 
International, the Helsinki Watch Committee, 
and the U.S. Department of State also 
prepared reports on the human rights situa- 
tion in Afghanistan in 1985. ■ 



UN Calls for Soviet Withdrawal 
from Afghanistan 



Following are a statement by 
Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, in the General Assembly on 
November 12, 1985, arid the text of a 
General Assembly resolution adopted on 
November 13. 



AMBASSADOR WALTERS' 

STATEMENT, 
NOV. 12, 1985' 

For almost 6 years now, Soviet troops 
in Afghanistan have waged a relentless 
war against everything Afghan. Nothing 
has been spared: not women or children; 
not animals or crops; not dwellings, 
mosques, schools, or hospitals; not even 
Afghan history or culture, religion, 
tradition. 

An ancient land caught in a modem 
war, Afghanistan is being subjected 
daily to the full force of Soviet modem- 
day weaponry and technology. Reports 
of deadly chemical weapons use continue 
to surface. Never in its long tumultuous 
history or resisting marauding armies 
and foreign invaders has Afghanistan 
faced as remorseless and heartless an 
enemy. 

Using a combination of military ter- 
ror on the one hand and psychological 
manipulation in the form of reeducation 
and indoctrination efforts on the other, 
the Soviet forces have tried for 6 years 
—longer than the duration of the Second 
World War— to break the Afghan spirit. 
We are here today to witness that they 
have failed. 

Despite all efforts to impose a vir- 
tual black-out on news of the war, eye- 
witness reports of inconceivable, heinous 
crimes testify to Soviet callousness in 
achieving their ultimate goal— creation 
of a docile, client state. Unable to pacify 
or control the countryside, the Soviets— 
with clinical precision— have, in some 
areas, resorted to tactics aimed at 
depopulating the land. Over SVz million 
refugees— more than the population of 
many members of this organization and 
one-fourth of Afghanistan's prewar 
population— have fled the country. 
Migratory genocide is how one historian 
has described it. High altitude satura- 
tion bombings, the willful destruction of 
crops and livestock, widespread use of 
antipersonnel mines, civilian reprisals, 
and gruesome violations of fundamental 



20 



human rights and decency have been 
and continue to be perpetrated against 
the Afghan civilian population. These 
are not tall tales or propaganda but 
rather a genuine human tragedy. The 
UN Commission on Human Rights has 
expressed "its profound concern at the 
grave and massive human rights viola- 
tions in Afghanistan," and this aspect of 
the Afghan tragedy will be considered 
by the General Assembly later in this 
session. 

But this is not all. In addition to 
strong-arm tactics aimed at physically 
crushing the Afghan spirit of resistance, 
the Soviets have embarked on a long- 
term effort to reshape this spirit into a 
docile, pHable mold. In a word, they 
wish to "Sovietize" it. How else can one 
explain the revision of Afghan school 
curricula in which Islamic teaching is 
replaced by dialectic materialism and 
Marxist-Leninist ideology? How else to 
explain the introduction of "new" 
history textbooks rewritten by Soviet 
scholars? How to explain the replace- 
ment of Aghan professors with those 
from communist countries who now com- 
prise over 60% of Kabul University's 
faculty? This effort to "Sovietize" the 
younger generation of Afghans explains 
why children as young as 5 and 6 years 
old are separated from their families for 
up to 10 years during which they are 
indoctrinated in communism and the 
Soviet way of life. Since 1979, an esti- 
mated 40,000 Afghan students have 
been sent to the Soviet Union. These 
efforts to incorporate and absorb the 
Afghan people augur ill for an early 
solution to the war in Afghanistan. 

There are currently between 118,000 
and 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghani- 
stan and an additional 30,000 poised on 
the Soviet side of the border. The 
Soviets continue to escalate their mili- 
tary effort. They continue to upgrade 
their firepower. They continue to 
assume a greater direct role in inten- 
sified fighting, relying increasingly on 
dreaded helicopter gunships, airborne 
troops, and surprise search-and-destroy 
operations. Their strategy is a long-term 
one, aimed at wearing down the resist- 
ance of and eroding international sup- 
port for the mujahidin. 



I 



Despite their military offensives, ! 
their brutal scorched earth tactics, ar 
their various subversive strategies, tl 
Soviets are no closer today to achievi ' 
their objectives than they were on 
December 27, 1979, when their invad 
troops murdered President HafizuUal '. 
Amin and installed in his place Babn | 
Karmal. Hostility and active oppositi' 
to the Karmal regime now encompas 
the entire country. The Soviets cann> 
operate anywhere in the countryside ' 
without danger of attack. Even in ' 
Kabul, their most heavily guarded gi ^ 
risons and airbases have been attack 
Unable to find qualified Afghan tech 
crats who are wiUing to participate i 
this puppet government, the Soviets 
have been forced to abandon the pre 
tense that they are merely advising 
Babrak Karmal regime and now eitb 
directly make, or are deeply involve 
every major political, military, or so 
policy decision of the regime. The K 1 
regime's army— rent by disloyalty, 
desertions, defections, disillusionmer ■' 
and indiscipline— has shrunk to less ' 5 
half its preinvasion strength of 90,0( I 

What the Soviet Union has failecr 
realize— and, of course, refuses to ' 
acknowledge— is that the will of a pt fc 
united in a national liberation strugf T 
cannot be broken by force of arms. 
Nowhere in the world is this will 
stronger or more generalized than ii 
Afghanistan. Nowhere is the simple ■ 
moral issue of what is right and wh; I 
criminally wrong more starkly defin J 
On the battlefield, the Afghan resist S' 
is better organized, better trained, iL 
more effective militarily than ever 
before. In the Panjsher Valley, in 
Konar, in Paktia and Paktika, in Hti 
in short, throughout the country- 
Afghan partisans have given a brilli 
account of themselves against Soviet 
legions equipped with a terrifying a 
of the most modern instruments of 
Mujahidin have fought in other tim 
and in other places. In this conflict, 
Afghan mujahidin are proving once 
more that their defense of their faid 
and country and their desire for 
freedom are indomitable. 



i 



Department of State 



, 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



jike a number of my coUeagiies in 
body. I was honored to be able to 
firsthand of the struggle in Afghan- 
— from the spokesmen of the 
an resistance alliance who visited 
as a delegation last month. The 
ir of this delegation and his alliance 
igues not only lead a military strug- 
gainst a foreign oppressor but also 
;late into political terms the will of 
Afghan people for freedom. As a 
er soldier, I know when I am in the 
;nce of courage and resolve. The 
tance is alive and well. The morale 
determination of its members to 
nue to fight are unshaken. 
t has been said that "in the moral 
J, there is nothing impossible if we 
)ring a thorough will to it. Man can 
^erything with himself, but he must 
■ttempt to do too much with 
•s." Nowhere is this more evident 
in Afghanistan. The Soviets will 
r succeed in imposing their will on 
Afghans. They will not succeed in 
dng the Afghan national will to 
for their freedom and their way of 
rhe Afghans will never acquiesce in 
amounts to their owti destruction 
people and as a nation, 
ut how long can the world stand 
id let this carnage continue? The 
1 human lives— not to mention the 
uction of homes, crops, and the 
e agiicultural infrastructure— is 
:ering. If both sides remain true to 
objectives, the only possible out- 
is continued death and destruction, 
dent Reagan, in his October 24 
•h to this Assembly stated: "There 
purpose more noble than for us to 
in and celebrate life in a turbulent 
1. . . . Life— and the preservation of 
cm to live it in dignity— is what we 
n this earth to do." This body, con- 
d from the ashes of one war of 
ition and .dedicated to the preserva- 
)f peace, has a moral duty to end 
var and the agony of the Afghan 
e. 

he solution to the Afghan tragedy 
; a military one. The only lasting 
ion is a negotiated political settle- 
that encompasses the four ele- 
; in the resolution to be voted on 
is body. These are: the immediate 
Irawal of foreign troops; restoration 
ghanistan's independent and non- 
3d stt ♦^us; self-determination for the 
m people; and the creation of the 
sarj' conditions which would enable 
ufghan refugees to return voluntar- 
id with honor to their homes. 



On si.\ previous occasions, this 
Assembly has overwhelmingly voted for 
a resolution urging a political solution to 
the situation in Afghanistan. Yet the 
war and the devastation continue. Presi- 
dent Reagan's regional initiative, spelled 
out in his October 24 speech, was meant 
to spur diplomatic efforts to solve the 
Afghan tragedy. It is not enough for us 
to heap praise on the Afghans for their 
brave exploits against daunting odds. It 
is not enough to support the Afghan 
struggle passively. No country— large or 
small— can be indifferent to the fate of 
the Afghans. No country that truly 
loves freedom can vote against this 
resolution. It provides the basis for a 
just and viable settlement. It provides 
the means to stop the Afghan suffering. 

The United States is prepared to 
guarantee a comprehensive and balanced 
settlement in Afghanistan, consistent 
with the General Assembly's resolutions 
and predicated on a complete with- 
drawal of Soviet forces in a fi.xed and 
reasonable length of time. We support 
and applaud the efforts of the Secretary 
General and his special representative 
to find a just and viable settlement that 
protects the legitimate security interests 
of all parties. Considerable progress has 
been made toward this end. The key 
outstanding issue remains the establish- 
ment of a timetable for the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. 
Without agreement on withdrawal, no 
solution is possible, and no guarantees 
can be given. Instead the carnage and 
destruction will continue. 

We hope that adoption of this resolu- 
tion will serve as renewed evidence of 
the international community's steadfast 
commitment to a negotiated settlement 
and will stimulate prompt resolution of 
this vital issue. This is the way to offer 
the Afghans another chance to live in 
peace and freedom. 

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

RESOLUTION 40/12, 
NOV. 13, 19852 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the item entitled "The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications 
for international peace and security", 

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 
January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 
36/34 oif 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 
November 1982. 38/29 of 23 November 1983 
and 39/13 of 15 November 1984, 



Reaffirming the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
obligation of all States to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of any 
State, 

Reaffirming further the inalienable light 
of all peoples to detemiine their own fonn of 
government and to choose their owti eco- 
nomic, political and social system free from 
outside inten'ention, subversion, coercion or 
constraint of any kind whatsoever, 

Gravely concerned at the continuing 
foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in 
contravention of the above principles, and its 
serious implications for intei-national peace 
and security, 

Noting the increasing concern of the 
international community over the continued 
and serious sufferings of the Afghan people 
and over the magnitude of social and eco- 
nomic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran 
by the presence on their soil of millions of 
Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase 
in their numbers, 

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a 
political solution of the grave situation in 
respect of Afghanistan, 

Taking note of the report of the 
Secretary-General, and the status of the 
diplomatic process initiated by him. 

Recognizing the importance of the initia- 
tives of the Organization of the Islamic Con- 
ference and the efforts of the Movement of 
Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution 
of the situation in respect of Afghanistan, 

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and non-aligned character of 
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solu- 
tion of the problem; 

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan peo- 
ple to determine their- own forni of govern- 
ment and to choose their economic, political 
and social system free from outside interven- 
tion, subversion, coercion or constraint of any 
kind whatsoever; 

3. Calls for the immediate withdraw^al of 
the foreign troops from Afghanistan: 

4. Calls upon all parties concerned to 
work for the urgent achievement of a 
political solution, in accordance with the pro- 
visions of the present resolution, and the 
creation of the necessary conditions which 
would enable the Afghan refugees to return 
voluntarily to their homes in safety and 
honour; 

5. Renews its appeal to all States and na- 
tional and international organizations to con- 
tinue to extend humanitarian relief assistance 
with a view to alleviating the hardship of the 
Afghan refugees, in co-ordination with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees; 

6. Expresses its appreciation a7id support 
for the efforts and constructive steps taken 
by the Secretary-General, especially the 
diplomatic process initiated by him, in the 
search for a solution to the problem; 



7. Requests the Secretary-General to con- 
tinue those efforts with a view to promoting 
a political solution, in accordance with the 
provisions of the present resolution, and the 
exploration of securing appropriate guaran- 
tees for the non-use of force, or threat of 
force, against the political independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and security 
of all neighbouring States, on the basis of 
mutual guarantees and strict non-interference 
in each other's internal affairs and with full 
regard for the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep 
Member States and the Security Council con- 
cun-ently informed of progress towards the 
implementation of the present resolution and 
to submit to Member States a report on the 
situation at the earliest appropriate 
opportunity; 

9. Decides to include in the provisional 
agenda of its forty -fu'st session the item 
entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its 
implications for international peace and 
security". 



Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan 



'USUN press release 149. 
^Adopted by a vote of 122 (U.S.) to 9, 
with 12 abstentions. ■ 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 27, 1985' 

Today, December 27, marks the sixth 
anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Since December 27, 1979, 
when a massive Soviet force crossed the 
Afghan frontier to support a faltering 
Mar.xist regime, the Afghan resistance 
has grown increasingly effective. The 
Soviet-supported regime in Kabul has 
failed to gain even a modicum of popular 
support or international acceptance. The 
Soviets and their Afghan surrogates 
have resorted to barbaric methods of 
waging war in their effort to crush this 
war of national liberation. Indiscriminate 
air and artillery bombardments against 
civilian areas, savage reprisals against 
noncombatants suspected of supporting 
tlie resistance, and the calculated 
destruction of crops and ii-rigation sys- 
tems have ravaged the Afghan country- 
side. Thousands of young Afghans are 
being shipped to the Soviet Union for 
"reeducation" in summer camps, univer- 
sities, and specialized institutions. 

The Afghan people, however, are 
unswerving in their determination to 
resist the invader. The resistance 
fighters are more numerous, better 
armed, and more effective than ever 
before. Unable to trust Kabul's forces to 
counter the enhanced resistance, the 
Soviets have begun using their own 
troops in a more active combat role. But 
the effort has availed them little. Last 
summer, when fighting was at its peak, 
resistance forces repeatedly attacked 
Soviet lines of communication, convoys, 
barracks, and facilities and mounted 
their largest, toughest, and best coordi- 
nated offensive operation of the war. 
The resistance has also drawn together 
into a political alliance which can pre- 
sent Afghanistan's cause to the world in 
unambiguous terms and coordinate all 
aspects of the liberation struggle. 

Since 1980 the United States has 
strongly advocated a negotiated political 
settlement, the only reasonable alter- 
native to the bleak prospect of an open- 
ended military struggle. Seven UN 
resolutions passed by grovdng and over- 



whelming margins since that year she 
that the United States is not alone in 
this view. These resolutions call for tl 
withdrawal of foreign troops, the rest 
ation of Afghanistan's independent ar 
nonaligned status, self-determination, 
and the voluntary and safe return of 
refugees. 

The United States reiterated its ' 
support for UN-sponsored talks durir 
the November summit meeting in 
Geneva. We also indicated that the c 
tinned Soviet occupation of AfghanisI 
remains an obstacle to overall impro' 
ment in our relationship. Although w 
welcome any suggestion that the So\ ■ 
are prepared to back UN-led peace 
efforts, we will await positive develo 
ments on the ground and concrete e\ 
dence of Soviet willingness to agree \ 
timetable for withdrawal of their tro '. 

The victims of this war also com- ' 
mand American attention. The Unite ' 
States has played, and will continue ' 
play, a major role in the humanitarij ' 
efforts to alleviate the suffering of ti ' 
2-3 million Afghan refugees now Uvi • 
in Pakistan. Since 1980 we have spei 
over $430 million in aid. In the face ' 
deteriorating conditions inside ' 

Afghanistan caused largely by the ir I 
creasingly widespread Soviet repriss'' 
against civilians suspected of opposii * 
the regime, we have allocated, in th(' 
current 2-year timeframe, almost $21 * 
million in assistance to the brave pe'k 
who remain inside Afghanistan. 

When the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan 6 long and bloody year^ 
ago, few in the West knew much ahj 
that distant land and its proud peop 
That certainly has changed, as the 
Afghan people, in their determinatid 
defend their liberty, have added ne\ 
chapters to the long annal of human 
courage in the face of tyranny. Forj 
in a similar crucible two centuries a . 
the United States stands squarely o 
the side of the people of Afghanista 
and will continue its support of thei 
historic struggle in the cause of libe 



•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 30, 1985 ' 



22 



Department of State Bif 



^E PRESIDENT 



IS. -Soviet Relations 



President Reagan's radio address to 
nation broadcast November 23, 



5 has been a busy and eventful week 
Nancy and me. Now that the sum- 
in Geneva is behind us, we need to 
: ahead and ask where do we go 
ri here? 

As I told Congress, we've made a 
h start in U.S. -Soviet relations. 
Ty issue was on the table, and our 
lours of discussions were tough and 
ly throughout. I got a better 
spective from listening to General 
'etary Gorbachev, and I think he 
t home with a lot to think about, 

I plan to meet Mr. Gorbachev again 
: year in Washington, but between 

and then, we have much work to 
Opportunities to address important 
)lems of Soviet-American relations 
lid not be squandered. We must 
lys be realistic about our deep and 
ing differences, but we should be 
king for progress wherever possible. 
3n arms control, the Soviets, after 
■ral years of resisting talks, have 

agreed that each side should cut 
ear aiTns by bWc in appropriate 
gories. And in our joint statement, 
;alled for early progress on this, 
cting the emphasis of the talks 
ird what has been the chief U.S. 

all along: deep, equitable, fully 
fiable reductions in offensive 
pons. If there's a real interest on 
Soviet side, there's a chance the 
5 can begin to make headway. 
Mr. Gorbachev and I discussed our 
k on SDI— America's Strategic 
;nse Initiative. I told him that we're 
stigating nonnuclear defensive 
ems designed to destroy offensive 
iiles and protect people. Although 
ctant to acknowledge it, the Soviets 
i been carrying foi-ward a research 
rram, far more extensive than ours, 
heir own version of SDI. 
[ think it's fair to point out that the 
ets main aim at Geneva was to 
e us to drop SDI. I think I can also 
that after Geneva Mr. Gorbachev 
?rstands we have no intention of do- 
so— far from it. We want to make 
tegie defense a strong protector of 
peace. A research and testing pro- 
n that may one day provide a peace 
Id to protect against nuclear attack 



is a deeply hopeful vision, and we 
should all be cooperating to bring that 
vision of peace alive for the entire 
world. 

Regional conflicts were prominent in 
our discussions, and we'll be watching 
very closely for any change in Soviet 
activities in the Third World. Another 
resounding vote of the UN General 
Assembly has just called for Soviet 
withdi-awal from Afghanistan. Next 
month a new round of talks on this 
question takes place, also under UN 
auspices. If these talks are to succeed, 
the Soviets must provide a timetable for 
getting out and recognize that the free- 
dom fighters will not be conquered. 

On bilateral and human rights ques- 
tions, there were some small, encourag- 
ing steps before the summit, and in the 
agreements we reached there, to pro- 
mote people-to-people contacts. In both 
areas, we're hoping greater steps will 
follow. As I also told the Congi-ess, 
human rights is a true peace issue. 

If there is one conclusion to draw 
from our fireside summit, it's that 
American policies are working. In a real 
sense, preparations for the summit 
started 5 years ago when, with the help 
of Congress, we began strengthening 
our economy, restoring our national will, 
and rebuilding our defenses and 
alliances. 

America is strong again, and 
American strength has caught the 
Soviets' attention. They recognize that 
the United States is no longer just 
reacting to world events; we are in the 
forefront of a powerful, historic tide for 
freedom and opportunity, for progress 
and peace. 

There's never been a greater need 
for courage and steadiness than now. 
Our strategic modernization program is 
an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate 
in earnest. But if Congress fails to sup- 
port the vital defense efforts needed, 
then the Soviets will conclude that 
America's patience and will are paper 
thin, and the world will become more 
dangerous again. 

Courage and steadiness are all im- 
portant for freedom fighters, too. I 
made it clear in Geneva that America 
embraces all those who resist tyranny 
and struggle for freedom. Breaking faith 
with freedom fighters would signal that 
aggression carries no risk, and this we 
will not allow. 



We are entering a season of hope. If 
we remain resolute for freedom and 
peace, if we keep faith with God, then 
our American family, 238 million strong, 
will be even more thankful for next 
year. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 2, 1985. 



Nicaragua 

Excerpt from President Reagan 's 
radio address to the yiation broadcast 
December U, 1985.^ 

Now-, I must address recent disturbing 
events in a country close to our 
borders— the communist dictatorship in 
Nicaragua. Nicaragua today is an 
imprisoned nation. It is a nation con- 
demned to unrelenting cruelty by a 
clique of very cruel men— by a dictator 
in designer glasses and his eorm-ades, 
drunk with power and all its brutal 
applications. They stripped the Nicara- 
guan people of their rights by a state 
decree last October 15th, yet that 
decree only made official, and by their 
reckoning permissible, the theft of lib- 
erty that took place years ago. 

No institution more deeply embodies 
or glorifies or seeks to perfect the moral 
and spiritual goodness of man than the 
church in all of its denominations. Yet in 
Nicaragua, the church is the enemy. 
Protestant ministers and lay people 
have been arrested, interrogated, and 
tormented at secret police headquarters; 
some forced to stand naked in very cold 
rooms for long periods. A tiny popula- 
tion of Jews was bullied and driven out. 

Cardinal Obando y Bravo, a great 
hero of truth and courage, is prevented 
from speaking freely to his flock. The 
state police have expelled foreign 
priests and drafted seminarians, who 
are virtual prisoners in the Sandinistas' 
aiTned forces. 

And the Catholic Church's news- 
paper has been seized and Radio 
Catolica censored, sometimes shut down 
entirely. The same dictators who 
insulted Pope John Paul II also stopped 
Radio Catolica from broadcasting a 
letter from the Pope and this beatitude: 
"Blessed are those who are persecuted 
for righteousness sake, for theirs is the 
kingdom of Heaven." The truth is, these 
men are nothing but thugs, a gang of 
hardcore communists to whom the word 
of God is a declaration of liberation that 
must be stamped out. 



ruary 1986 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



Their denial of rights, their tram- 
pling of human dignity, their wrecking 
of an economy with suffocating socialist 
controls— all hurt and deeply offend us. 
But there's a cause for deeper concern: 
the specter of Nicaragua transformed 
into an international aggi-essor nation, a 
base for subversion and terror. 

Some 3,000 Cuban militai-y personnel 
now lead and advise the Nicaraguan 
forces down to the smallest combat 
units. The Cubans fly the Soviet assault 
helicopters that gun down Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters. Over 7,000 Cubans, 
Soviets, East Germans, Bulgarians, 
Libyans, PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization], and other bloc and terror 
groups are turning Managua into a 
breeding ground for subversion. A dele- 
gation of Nicaraguans is now in Iran. 
Nicaragua's border violations against 
Honduras and Costa Rica continue. And 
Nicaragua's connection with the recent 
terrorist attack against Colombia's 
Supreme Court is now clear. 

What are we to do about such 
aggressions? What are we to do about 
Cuba's willful disregard of the 1962 
Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 
which President Kennedy said, "... if 
Cuba is not used for the e.xport of 
aggressive communist purposes, there 
will be peace in the Caribbean"? 

The answer is: more than we're 
doing now. If Nicaragua can get mate- 
rial support from communist states and 
terrorist regimes and prop up a hated 
communist dictatorship, should not the 
forces fighting for liberation, now 
numbering over 20,000, be entitled to 
more effective help in their struggle for 
freedom? 

Yes, and to reinforce this message, I 
sent my new national security adviser, 
John Poindexter, this week to visit the 
Central American democracies and make 
clear our commitment to a democratic 
outcome in Nicaragua. Those who strug- 
gle for freedom look to America. If we 
fail them in their hour of need, we fail 
ourselves as the last, best hope of 
liberty. 



A New International Era: 
The American Perspective 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 23, 1985. 



by Secretary Shultz 



Address before the 

Pilgrims of Great Britain 

in London on December 10, 1985.^ 



I am very delighted to be here. As it 
turns out, I am a member of, what I've 
learned is known as, a sister organiza- 
tion in the United States. And so, I 
take particular pleasure in appearing at 
this luncheon. 

Of course, there has been a great 
deal of talk about the Geneva meeting. 
For a long time, we insisted on calling it 
a meeting, and that was the word out of 
the White House. But as it seemed to 
have been a success, we now call it a 
summit. And we are even beginning to 
talk about the next summit. But choice 
of words is very important in all of 
these things, as we all know. I was 
alarmed in Geneva, when we were there 
before the meeting started. I wandered 
into a room and there were a bunch of 
White House people who were plotting 
things, and they were talking about ar- 
ranging a tete-a-tete between the Presi- 
dent and General Secretary Gorbachev. 
And I barged in and said, "You have 
got to knock this off. It's a one-on-one. 
You keep using these French words, 
and the next thing you know, you'll be 
talking about detente." 

So much for the summit. A month 
ago, Washington was charmed by a visit 
from the Prince and Princess of Wales. 
We were also pleased and impressed 
that His Royal Highness visited our 
Library of Congress and attended a 
seminar on our Constitution with our 
Chief Justice and legal scholars. This 
noble document, of course, was a prod- 
uct of our rebellion against his ancestor; 
but it was also, we all know, a product 
of the British political heritage. We 
have a written constitution; yours is un- 
written. But the principle of constitu- 
tionalism is the same: government 



limited by the rule of law to protect 1 1 
freedom of the individual against arbi i 
trary power. 

One of the striking features of to- 
day's world is how durable and relev; 
this ideal is. The principle of liberty 
turns out to be a hardy and powerful 
idea with a compelling attraction to 
peoples around the globe. The notion 
restraints on power, of course, has its 
international application, as statesmei 
struggle to build stability and balance 
into the international order. 

Yet today, we all know, the work 
order has been challenged by a host ( 
developments that yesterday's thinke 
could not have foreseen. We face new 
strategic realities, new evidence of th 
power of ideas, new understanding of 
economic realities, and a new revolut: 
in technology that will have profound 
political consequences. Each of these 
forces has posed a philosophical chal- 
lenge to established orthodoxy, to coi 
ventional wisdom about strategic, pol 
cal, and economic relations among 
nations. 

The United States approaches thi 
challenge confident that the free nati' ' 
together are in a strong position to 
shape the course of events in accorda f 
with our ideals. Perhaps it's just Am 
can brashness to feel this way. But ii 
any case, let me describe how Amen 
views these new trends— in strategy, 
ideology, economics, and technology- 
and why we feel confident about wh? 
the future will bring. 



24 



Department of State Bu\j<^ 



THE SECRETARY 



Classical Conception 
nternational Order 

mg the ideas that have been deci- 
ly altered in the postwar era is our 
eption of the balance of power. As a 
ish audience knows, the classical 
eption served well as a functional 
ription of international ordei-. The 

of national sovereignty was born in 
jpe, and thus the problem of peace 
to nurture some kind of equilibrium 
dg sovereign states. Sometimes the 
ice was stable; sometimes not. 
n some continental power seemed 

on dominance, Britain would join 
rs in restoring the balance, 
[■oday, the classical conception still 
es, to a degree. When faced with 
et e.xpansionism after World War 
Dr e.xample, the West had no choice 
:o unite to deter and resist Soviet 
!tions. 

Jut the strategic realities of the 
ivar era demanded new modes of 
tance and deterrence. In the classi- 
r European model, the balance of 
;r tended to be one-dimensional; its 
;tive was the maintenance of equi- 
im between the states in question, 
balance of power in the contempo- 
world is, by contrast, multi- 
nsional. 

lultidimensional character could not 
stter illustrated than by the variety 
pics on the agenda of the Presi- 
's recent meetings uith Mr. Gorba- 
. As the classical conception of the 
ice of power would imply, the two 

discussed the strategic military 
ice. But we also discussed regional 
icts, in a world where ideology 
itimes reflects and sometimes ex- 
3 the turbulence of vast regions of 
jlobe. We discussed human rights, 
rrepressible yearning of men and 
en everywhere for freedom and 
icracy, an issue which, in fact, lies 
e heart of a number of conflicts in 
vorld. And we discussed bilateral 
s, seeking more open exchanges as 
Tective to the self-isolation and 
ity which Soviet ideology imposes 
le Soviet system. 

New Strategic Balance: 
nse. Defense, and Stability 

le strategic dimension, the stability 
e balance is literally the main focus 
Tierican efforts in arms control. 
:egic stability, of course, is not just 
merican concern but an alliance 
;m. Stability means preventing 



Sometimes you hear Soviet claims 
that the danger of war in Europe has 
been growing. That's nonsense. Since 
the late 1940s, Europe has faced on its 
doorstep the most heavily armed power 
on Earth. Yet in a century that saw two 
European cataclysms in one generation, 
Europe has knowii unprecedented peace 
in the last four decades. The military 
balance in Europe is stable because the 
alliance has maintained the strength to 
deter attack. We have made clear that a 
threat to any of us is a threat to all of 
us. Any would-be aggi-essor knows in 
advance that an attack will fail. 

The ultimate deterrent to any such 
threat has been, and continues to be, 
U.S. strategic forces. Therefore, the 
Soviet strategic buildup in recent years 
that threatened to upset the balance had 
to be met by an American program of 
strategic modernization. This is essential 
to Europe's security as well as to our 
own. For any Soviet perception of a 
decisive strategic advantage over the 
United States would only encourage the 
Soviets to think they had an intimida- 
ting advantage over Western Europe. A 
war might never take place. But Euro- 
pean nations would surely find their con- 
fidence in American protection dimin- 
ished, the shadow of Soviet power loom- 
ing larger, and their control over their 
own sovereign destiny reduced. 

The main danger to strategic stabil- 
ity has come from the Soviet advantage 
in heavy, accurate ICBMs [interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles] with multiple 
warheads that could threaten the sur- 
vival of the land-based portion of U.S. 
forces. This category of strategic 
weapons— this offensive threat— has been 
one of our central concerns in arms con- 
trol for many years. These offensive 
weapons menace deterrence; these offen- 
sive weapons represent a serious im- 
balance; these offensive weapons pose 
the danger of surprise attack. There- 
fore, American proposals for arms con- 
trol have emphasized radical, equitable, 
verifiable reductions in these strate- 
gically significant systems. 

The Soviet response, until very re- 
cently, was to ignore the problem. Their 
most recent proposals now embrace our 
idea of radical reductions, though not 
adequately. Their main contribution to 
arms control was continual denunciation 
of the President's Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI)— a research program 
into potential defensive systems that 
don't yet exist— while slighting the 
threat from menacing offensive weapons 
that already exist in excessive numbers. 



SDI represents a conceptual leap 
into the future. If it proves feasible, it 
will enhance deterrence. It will supple- 
ment Western nuclear strategy with the 
prospect of being able to block or at 
least blunt an attack, reinforcing the 
traditional deterrence through retalia- 
tion; it will rest defense policy on a kind 
of mutual assured security instead of 
mutual assured destruction. The global 
system will be more stable if the U.S.- 
Soviet strategic relationship is more 
stable. 

You have heard these points before. 
But I would stress here the relevance of 
SDI to Europe's security. First of all, if 
it proves feasible, it can blunt the threat 
of SS-20s and other missiles against 
Europe. It can only enhance the credi- 
bility of America's pledge to risk its 
own safety on behalf of yours. And a 
structure of deterrence and defense, 
coupled with radical offensive reduc- 
tions, is likely to be the most stable en- 
vironment of all, offering hope of a 
diminished danger of war into the next 
century. 

The revolution in technology is al- 
ready underway, and prudence clearly 
requires that we examine all new possi- 
bilities. Certainly the Soviets are doing 
so. Technology doesn't stop; history 
doesn't stop; the balance of power keeps 
changing its form. All of us who care 
about avoiding war and presening 
peace must adapt our thinking to new 
conditions— especially when the new con- 
ditions offer a hopeful opportunity and a 
positive vision of a safer future. 

Ideology and Regional Conflicts 

The President and Mr. Gorbachev, as I 
noted earlier, spoke also about conflicts 
in the developing world that affect the 
stability of the international system. 

It goes without saying that not all of 
these conflicts represent the division 
between East and West in miniature. 
But if there is any real danger of U.S.- 
Soviet confrontation, it is likely to origi- 
nate in some crisis in the developing 
world— precisely because the central 
military balance in Europe is stable. 
Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethi- 
opia, Cambodia— remember how these 
interventions fed the disillusionment 
with detente in the 1970s, disrupting the 
arms control process and shattering 
hopes for better East- West relations. 

The problem of our time is to try to 
contain these regional conflicts— to help 
resolve them— and to understand what 
such a diplomacy requires in a tui-bulent 
world. 



uary 1986 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



We live in an ideological age, when 
the international order is challenged by 
movements and passions that transcend 
national boundaries. Whatever theory 
one subscribes to about the true source 
of Soviet motivation— whether com- 
munist ideology or traditional Russian 
expansionism— it is not difficult to see 
the advantage to Soviet foreign policy of 
its alliance with radical movements 
throughout the developing world. In- 
deed, until the rise of revolutionary 
Islam, almost all of these radical forces 
were left-wing, claiming "socialist" 
aspirations and seeing the Soviet Union 
as a natui'al partner. And even revolu- 
tionary Islam shai'es with other radical 
forces a profound anti-Western impulse 
bora of historical resentments, local 
social tensions, and a reflexive resort to 
force against the established order. This 
impulse clearly works to the geopolitical 
advantage of the Soviet Union— threat- 
ening moderate pro- Western govern- 
ments, menacing'the West's oil supply, 
spreading the evil of terrorism and the 
gospel of upheaval. 

All of us in the West favor political 
solutions to such conflicts. We believe 
that peoples have a right to choose their 
own systems and their own leaders; that 
conflicts should be resolved whenever 
possible by negotiation and compromise; 
that a world of diversity and tolerance 
is a world compatible with our interests. 
We can live with any political solution 
that reflects the will of the parties and 
resolves their differences. Whether 
there is an important East- West dimen- 
sion, as in the conflicts I have men- 
tioned, or where there is less of an 
East-West dimension, as in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, the United States ad- 
heres strongly to the view that negoti- 
ated political solutions represent the 
best hope for lasting peace. And this is 
our policy. 

But it is important to understand 
what negotiated solutions depend upon. 
And here I want to address an issue 
that has been on my mind for some 
time, on which we and our European 
friends have occasionally had tactical dif- 
ferences. And that is the relation be- 
tween power and diplomacy. 

Negotiated solutions require two 
things. First, we, or the friends we sup- 
port, must be willing to negotiate a fair 
solution. Whether we speak of Israel or 
our friends in Central America or in 
Africa or Southwest or Southeast Asia, 
we or our friends must pursue negotia- 
tion and compromise in good faith and 
with dedication. Such an attitude 



strengthens moderates on the other 
side, helps defuse radicalism, and offers 
hope for a solution 

But this is only half the story. Al- 
most always, it is the willingness of the 
other side to negotiate that is far more 
problematic. And thus a firm policy on 
our part, or our friends' part, is usually 
a prerequisite for good-faith negotiation 
on the other side. Only when they see 
the futility of their military "solutions" 
and the resolve of opposing strength 
will real compromise become possible. 

Occasionally, the immediate problem 
we face is, regrettably, openly military— 
a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a Viet- 
namese occupation of Cambodia, a mas- 
sive Soviet and Cuban militaiy interven- 
tion in Africa, a Nicaraguan attempt to 
subvert neighboring countries, and 
Cuban combatants using Soviet weapons 
in Nicaragua. Diplomacy is unlikely to 
work unless there is effective resistance. 
In many of these countries, there is 
resistance. It is a tribute to the courage 
of brave peoples who somehow never 
heard that communism is the wave of 
the future, peoples who reject the 
Brezhnev doctrine and its claims of per- 
manence for communist tyranny. 

What the West should do in these 
situations varies with the circumstances. 
Sometimes we should give military and 
economic assistance to neighboring 
states that are threatened; sometimes 
we should extend moral or humanitarian 
or other kinds of support to those resist- 
ing. Sometimes help may be better 
given without open acknowledgment; 
covert action has been part of the 
arsenal of states since time immemorial, 
providing a means of influence short of 
outright confrontation. We should be 
pi'udent, realistic, and always cognizant 
of the political dimension of the prob- 
lem. Nevertheless the factor of power is 
inescapable. 

In the 1980s and beyond, most likely 
we will never see a world in a total 
state of peace— or a state of total war. 
The West is relatively well prepared to 
deter an all-out war, and we have to 
stay that way, or a Soviet attack on 
Western Europe or Japan; that's why 
these are the least likely contingencies. 
But day in and day out, we will con- 
tinue to see a wide range of conflicts in 
a gray area between major war and 
millennial peace. Some of them— not 
all— will affect Western interests. Ter- 
rorism, particularly state-sponsored ter- 
rorism, is already a weapon increasingly 
resorted to by those seeking to under- 
mine Western nations and friends of the 



West in the developing world. We mu; 
be equally well prepared and organize( 
for this intermediate range of 
challenges. 

We must recognize, as well, that m 
encourage moderate solutions not only 
by our owii good faith but by den_\ing 
success to those who seek radical solu 
tions. In the Middle East, for example 
the Arab world is divided: Moderates 
like Egypt and Jordan work actively f 
peace. But radicals oppose it. Sometin 
it is said that the slowness of the peai 
process is a source of radicalism becai i 
it builds frustration. Partly true. But ' 
the violence comes from the enemies ' ' 
peace, from those who would be more ' 
angry if the peace process were maki 
rapid progress. These extremists mus 
be resisted, not appeased. They must 
shown that military options don't exi^ 
that blackmail and pressures will get 
nowhere, and that negotiation is the 
only possible hope for achievement ot 
legitimate Arab objectives. ' 

We differ with some of oui- Euro- ' 
pean friends over the role of the PLC 
[Palestine Liberation Organization]. 1 
us it seems obvious that the PLO ex- 
cludes itself as a player so long as it 
jects UN Security Council Resolutior 
242 and 338 and Israel's right to exis 
Is the PLO becoming a more modera 
organization? We shall see. Meanwhil 
the PLO is not entitled to any payme 
in advance so long as it rejects what 
are, after all, the basic premises of tl 
peace process. A country cannot be e 
pected to make concessions to those o 
resort to terrorism and who treat ne.l 
tiation as only a way-station on the r ' 
to its ultimate destruction. If PLO 
policy changes, that fact will be ac- 
knowiedged. We have always said th 
Unlike some of our European friends 
however, we feel that gestures towai 
the PLO, while it has not accepted 2 
and 338, only mislead its leaders intc 
thinking their present inadequate po 
is gaining them international acceptas 
and stature. 

For diplomacy does not depend c| 
good will alone; it does not depend O' 
good intentions alone. Sometimes it 
depends on single-mindedness and wl 
In Lebanon 2 years ago, the SyriansI 
listening to the debate in the Unitedj 
States, concluded we were, in their 
words, "short of breath"; the rationH 
of our diplomacy— that the May 17 
agreement was the way to bring Isr*! 
withdrawal— was itself undercut whei 
Israel pulled back. 



26 



Department of State Bu 



lir 



THE SECRETARY 



Today, in Central America, by con- 
ist, we do have staying power; it 
nes from bipartisan backing in the 
ngress for our progi-am. In Central 
fierica, we are aiding moderates: we 
; supporting democratic governments 
e those of El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
i Honduras, with Guatemala about to 
m a civilian elected government— all 
■eatened by Nicaragua. I might say 
it the role of the M-19 in its relation- 
p to Nicaragfua has been dramatized 
the battle, in the Palace of Justice, in 
lombia. So the threat of what 
!aragua supports is seen on a broader 
,le. Three-quarters of our aid to the 
^on has been economic aid. We are 
)poi'ting the Contadora process in 
•suit of a diplomatic solution, and we 
' supporting the democratic opposition 
hin Nicaragua, for they need our 
p to defend themselves against 
aet weapons and Cuban troops. 

In the turbulent developing world, a 
anced and realistic program of politi- 
objectives, leverage, and staying 
ver— these are the ingredients of an 
ictive diplomacy for global peace. 

; Democratic Revolution 

' course of regional conflict has re- 
red adjustments in our thinking 
ut East-West relations and the 
eloping world. But one of these ad- 
;ments is a happy one for the West: 
must make room in our theories for 
new vigor and vitality of the idea of 
locracy. As the battle rages between 
ierates and radicals in many regions 
he globe, we should never under- 
mate the longing for peace or the 
' strength of the moderate center 
I rejects extremism of both right and 
. This too is altering the global 
pee. 

jThere was a time, not long ago, 
im it was fashionable to be pessimis- 
^bout the fate of democracy in the 
•Id at large. Democracy was thought 
le culture-bound, a precious family 
loom of the industrialized West— 
1 it,'^ prospects somewhat shaky even 
arts of southern Europe. The devel- 
ig world, in any case, seemed an in- 
)itable soil for democratic habits to 
■ rdut. The massive social and eco- 
lic problems that developing nations 
'1 seemed to call for strong central 
lority: they could hardly afford the 
i;m-y" of limited government: their 
nionate pohtics seemed ill-suited to 
I'titutional restraints. 



But today, it looks different. We 
should have known better. We have 
seen democracy flourish in non-European 
societies as diverse as Japan, India, and 
Costa Rica. And today in our own 
Western Hemisphere, we see the dra- 
matic resurgence of democratic govern- 
ment after a long period of i-ule by mili- 
tary juntas and dictatorships. Over 90% 
of the people of Latin America now live 
under governments that are democratic 
or are in transition to democracy— in 
contrast to only one-third in 1979. In the 



I will be visiting Eastern Europe in 
a few days' time. We have all learned a 
great deal over the postwar period 
about both the opportunities and the 
limits of our influence in Eastern 
Europe. There is a new reality since 
Helsinki— an even more unmistakable 
yearning among these peoples for some- 
thing better. This is a powerful force 
whose significance should never be 
underestimated. 

Some day, the Soviet Union under 
wise leadership may leani that its owti 



The economy of the future will be based 
more and more on information technologies. 
And the flow of information requires. . . 

freedom of thought and communication The 

communist rulers thus face an excruciating 
problem. They remember the power of the 
Ayatollah's message on tape cassettes in 
Iran; they fear the photocopying machine 
as a dangerous instrument to be kept under 
lock and key. 



last 6 years, elected civilian leaders 
have replaced authoritarian regimes in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, EI 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Hon- 
duras, Peru, and Uruguay. In Brazil— as 
well as IncUa— we have seen the tragic 
death of an elected leader followed by a 
peaceful constitutional transition to a 
new democratic leader. With all the 
problems that many of these countries 
have, this trend is an inspiring display 
of people's faith in themselves and of 
the power of the democratic ideal. 

From the perspective of the United 
States, this means that a behef in 
democracy is not just a Wilsonian 
dream, or a naive crusade: it is a reflec- 
tion of hard reality. Consider too the re- 
emergence of human rights as a legiti- 
mate subject of international discourse- 
especially since the Helsinki Final Act 
10 years ago. 

As the Helsinki process reminds us, 
these are not only issues for the devel- 
oping world but issues quite relevant to ' 
Europe— to the eastern half of Europe 
whose aspirations for freedom remain 
artificially suppressed. 



security needs can be met without sup- 
pressing the freedom of its neighbors. 
In the meantime, we do what we can to 
foster greater openness in these coun- 
tries. We differentiate among them, and 
between them and the Soviet Union, to 
encourage more independent foreign 
policies, greater respect for human 
rights, and economic and social reforms. 
Governments that show such positive 
trends receive our reinforcing acknowl- 
edgment. 

The Future: The Economic Dimension 

Finally, I want to speak of another kind 
of revolution that is altering the world 
balance of forces— a reawakening of 
economic thought and a new era in the 
technology of communication. 

The future of the world economy 
will do much to shape the world's politi- 
cal future— much more, indeed, than 
some conventional theorists of the bal- 
ance of power may recognize. I say this 
not because of a Marxist belief in eco- 
nomic determinism, but because it is ob- 
vious that the basic conditions of life can 
affect the cohesion and goals of societies. 



:ruary 1986 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



In a world of nations less and less domi- 
nated by authoritarian structures and 
political elites, the basic needs of 
citizens will be all the more compelling 
in national policies. In the democratic 
world, growth is a key to social equity 
and also to societies' ability to look after 
essential defense needs; in times of slow 
growth, investment in defense always 
comes under budgetary strain. In the 
developing world, democratic or moder- 
ate governments are under stress as 
they struggle to overcome economic 
problems. 

Economic problems are not new in 
history. What is new in recent history is 
the intellectual shift taking place about 
how to remedy these problems. Lord 
Keynes's point about practical men be- 
ing in thrall to some defunct economist 
may be less true now than in the past. 
Or perhaps the wise perceptions of 
Adam Smith two centuries ago are once 
again gaining practical prominence. At 
any rate, reality is intruding on some 
long-held notions about economic pohcy. 

There is a new skepticism about 
statist solutions, central planning, and 
government control. Perhaps the extra- 
ordinary vigor of the American recovery 
has made the point: 10 million new jobs 
created in 3 years, with low inflation 
and declining interest rates. We have 
much more work to do. We have to do 
something about our fiscal deficit. But 
we have revised our tax system to pro- 
vide more incentives to work, to save, 
to invest, to be efficient, to take risks. 
We have reduced government regula- 
tion, intervention, and control. And we 
think it has paid off. 

And this economic wisdom isn't 
culture-bound either. We see on every 
continent— Western Europe, East Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa— movement 
to decentralize, to deregulate, to de- 
nationalize, to reduce rigidities in labor 
markets, and to enlarge the scope for in- 
dividual producers and consumers to 
interact freely in open markets. At the 
Bonn economic summit last May, the 
leaders of the industrial democracies 
stressed the importance of moving in 
that direction. This insight is revolu- 
tionizing agricultural productivity across 
the globe. It explains the extraordinary 
growth rates in noncommunist East and 
Southeast Asia, and it explains the 
extraordinary effort underway in China 
to liberate the creative energies of a 
billion talented people. 

This reawakening in economic think- 
ing itself coincides with a revolution in 
the technological base of the global econ- 



omy. Microchip computers, advanced 
telecommunications, and an accelerating 
process of innovation are transforming 
the world we live in. 

By no coincidence, this creativity is 
coming from the societies of the demo- 
cratic world that let ideas, people, and 
capital resources flow freely across 
boundaries, that encourage entrepre- 
neurship and experiment. These socie- 
ties have grasped the plain fact that the 
source of economic vitality is individual 
creativity and not the state. The ad- 
vance of these technologies is bound to 
challenge many traditional notions of 
sovereignty. But the West has the ad- 
vantage because the free flow of infor- 
mation is intrinsic to our poUtical sys- 
tem and principles. 

The industrial age is coming to an 
end. The age when economic power was 
symbolized by the steel mill and the 
assembly line is passed. In some places, 
this age is completely over. The econ- 
omy of the future will be based more 
and more on information technologies. 
And the flow of information requires 
freedom— freedom of thought and com- 
munication. Ideology has nothing to do 
with this: it's just a fact of life. 

The communist rulers thus face an 
excruciating problem. They remember 
the power of the Ayatollah's message on 
tape cassettes in Iran; they fear the 
photocopying machine as a dangerous in- 
strument to be kept under lock and key. 
The more they try to stifle these tech- 
nologies, the more they are likely to fall 
behind in this movement from the indus- 
trial to the information age; but the 
more they permit these new technolo- 
gies, the more they risk their monopoly 
of control over information and commu- 
nication. In the end, though, they don't 
really have a choice, because they can- 
not reverse the tide of technological 
advance. 

Facing the Future 

One of the great qualities of America, I 
think, is its readiness for change, its 
willingness— indeed, eagerness--to adapt 
to new conditions. But all the industrial 
democracies have the same advantages 
and the same opportunities. We are not 
status-quo powers holding the line 
against the forces of change: We are the 
pioneers of change, the champions of the 
idea of freedom, accustomed to inno- 
vating and adapting, strong enough to 
resist threats to our interests and 
ideals, and skilled at helping shape posi- 
tive solutions to international problems. 



That is why we can be confident 
about the future of the West. I do not 
envy Mr. Gorbachev and the challenge 
he faces in trying to defy the laws of 
economics and squeeze more productiv- 
ity out of a system of imposed disciplin 
and bureaucracy. He must come to rea^ 
ize that he must loosen up. And he wil 
find, as he no doubt fears, that he has 
whetted the appetites of his people, an 
the diverse peoples of Eastern Europe , 
for more freedom. Change is cei'tain. 

The West will undoubtedly suffer 
setbacks. The democracies have not 
always met their responsibilities— eitha 
in deterring aggression or in managing 
their economies wisely. But we have a 
precious advantage. We draw strength , 
from our freedom, from one another, 
and from the newly democratic nations 
that are joining our ranks inspired by i 
our heritage. 

Britain, and America, and all the 
free nations face an exhilarating chal- ' 
lenge, and we are readier for it than 
many people realize. 



'Press release 275. 



n 



28 



Department of State Bullil 



THE SECRETARY 



Berlin and the 
Cause of Freedom 



by Secretary Shultz 



Address before the 

Berlin Press Conference 

in Berlin on December IJ^, 1985.^ 



lin has a very special quality. To 
t this great city is to be reminded of 
blessings of freedom and of the 
)onsibilities we all face in preserving 
t is a bracing experience for any 
erican Secretary of State. Together 
>. more than 6,000 Americans who 
committed to defend your freedom, 
1 proud to be here, 
rhere is no place where the vital 
;tions facing the West are seen more 
rly than in Berlin. There is certainly 
'lace where the benefits of freedom' 
more evident than in Berlin. But it 
ibering to note that there is no place 
re the threats to our democracy, to 
security, and to our way of life are 
ed more deeply into the landscape 

here in this cUvided city. 

have visited Berlin once before, as 
ivate citizen, in the spring of 1982. I 
a little of it then, free of the duties 
without the entourage of a Secre- 

of State. I admired the treasures of 
Dahlem Museum and Charlotten- 
■ Palace. But I was equally im- 
sed by Berlin as a city of today— a 
alive, a city still youthful in its 
gy and freshness and vigorous 
lopment. 

Berlin can be proud that it is once 
1 one of the most vital and im- 
'ivf cities in Europe. It is a city 
attracts young people looking for 
-Uioii and e.xcitement; it beckons to 
and women of many nationalities 
ng a fresh start. Its distinguished 
'rsities make Berlin one of the 
anding centers of learning in 
.pe. The genius of German culture 
'Ts at the Deutsche Oper and the 
i!er Theater, and the Berlin Philhar- 
f: is the envy of the world. 



This is also a city where free enter- 
prise is blossoming. Berliners are 
creating new companies, mai-keting new 
products, and trying out new business 
ideas. In the past 5 years, over 300 
high-technolog>' corporations have been 
established. Universities are working 
closely vnth research institutes and 
private industries. It reminds me of 
where I lived at Stanford University in 
silicon valley, where the same partner- 
ship is so evident. 

The flourishing of this city is a 
tribute to its able leadership. It is also 
testimony to the character of the 
Berliner— and, I would add, to the 
strength and the power of the values 
that inspire free people everywhere. 
These values that Berlin represents— 
this is what I want to talk to you about. 

Between East and West 

You in this city understand the realities 
of East- West relations, both their limita- 
tions and their possibilities. You are op- 
timists and realists at the same time. 
Your history since 1945 teaches many 
lessons— lessons that all of us in the free 
world would do well to learn as we seek 
to improve the relationship between 
East and West. So let me identify these 
lessons. 

First, it is important for us all to 
understand what all Berliners under- 
stand when they look at the cruel wall 
that divides this city: you know that dif- 
ferences between East and West are far 
more than mere misunderstandings. 
Berliners know that coercion and control 
are the essence of governmental author- 
ity on the other side, and thus you 
understand that guns and tanks and 
rockets are a manifestation of basic dif- 
ferences, not the underlying cause. 



There i.sn't a Berlin Wall because there 
are weapons; there is a military confron- 
tation because of a political .system that 
is so dependent on force that it builds a 
Berlin Wall. This is why President 
Reagan has sought to place U.S.-Soviet 
arms control issues in their political con- 
te.xt. East and West need to make prog- 
ress on fundamental political differences 
in order to reduce the risk that our 
weapons will be used against one 
another— and in order to reduce the 
numbers of weapons on both sides. 
Second, the political line carved 
through Europe is not the result of 
democratic decision by the people who 
live here. Berliners know that their city 
and all of Germany are not divided 
because their citizens decided it should 
be so. Nearly one-third of the German 
people have been denied the right of 
self-determination. They did not vote to 
live under a communist system or to be 
divided from their friends and relatives 
in the West. And the nations of Eastern 
Eui'ope have never been given the right 
set forth in wartime and postwar 
agreements— including, I should stress, 
the Yalta agreement— to decide their 
own form of government and way of 
life. Quite the contrary, we have seen 
repeatedly in the postwar years that the 
people of East GeiTnany and East Berlin 
and the citizens of Eastern Europe do 
not wish to live in a continent divided 
by barbed wire, under governments sus- 
tained by military power. 

Third, the burning light of freedom 
is an atti-action which no amount of in- 
timidation or oppression can extinguish. 
The wall was built not to keep invaders 
out but to keep people in. Thus it 
speaks silently but eloquently about the 
moral condition of the communist 
system and about the beacon of liberty 
which the Western sectors of Berlin 
have always represented. In West 
Berlin free men and women, endowed 
by their Creator with rights and free 
will, choose their own leaders and shape 
their owm destiny. It was your courage 
as champions of liberty that led John 
Kennedy to say in the name of free 
peoples everywhere that we are all 
Berliners. All free peoples are in your 
debt for demonstrating so well, and 
under such difficult circumstances, the 
vitality and success of freedom. No one 
can visit and compare the Eastern and 
Western sectors of this city and not 
come away with renewed confidence 
about freedom's future. 



fuary 1986 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



Nor can the visitor to the Western 
sectors be in any doubt of the peaceful 
intentions of the West. Why should we 
desire or risk war, when we can create 
so much and achieve so much, spiritually 
and materially, in peace? This is the 
fourth lesson for us of Berlin. 

Fifth, Berliners know that the 
Soviets will push for advantage when 
they think they see weakness and in- 
decision. In 1948 they sought to starve 
this city and force the allies out. They 
assumed that Berliners, exhausted by 
war and the exertions of rebuilding a 
devastated city, would simply give up, 
and that the United States, Britain, and 
France would stand by helplessly. But 



walked out of the START [strategic 
ai-ms reduction talks] and INF [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces] talks in 
December 1983 and said they would 
never talk once our missiles were 
deployed. The alliance held fast, and the 
Soviets returned to the bargaining table 
in 1985. 

Then the Soviets said they would 
not discuss offensive reductions— in 
either START or INF-until the United 
States agi'eed to renounce the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). This, President 
Reagan has made abundantly clear, we 
will not do. Well, again our firmness 
produced results. Just over 2 months 
ago, the Soviets made a counter- 



The division of this city and the division 
of Germany are unnatural and inhuman. 
By staying in Berlin . . . we and our allies 
demonstrate clearly to all the world that we 
do not accept incorporation of Eastern 
Europe . . . into a Soviet sphere of influence. 



the Soviets did not count on the courage 
of the people of this city or on the unity 
and determination of the Western 
powers, who mounted the greatest 
airlift in history. When all of us stood 
resolutely with you and had the power 
to back up our position, the Soviets had 
no choice but to call off their blockade. 
Similarly, we had the strength and 
determination to stand up to Soviet 
pressures in later crises over Berlin. 

Thus, the sixth lesson is that 
Western unity, strength, and patience 
are necessary to make freedom secure. 
They are also prerequisites of an easing 
of tensions and fruitful negotiations with 
our Eastern neighbors. This is the true 
significance of the Quadripartite Agi-ee- 
ment of 1971. Important practical im- 
provements for everyday living, travel, 
and communications have been achieved 
because the West was strong and united 
behind basic principles. 

There are other examples. In the 
past 2 years. Western unity and firm- 
ness enabled us to carry through the 
NATO decision of December 1979 to 
maintain the balance in intermediate- 
range nuclear forces in Europe. We 
were not frightened when the Soviets 



proposal. It was deeply flawed, but in it 
they accepted the principle of deep 
reductions in offensive forces, on which 
President Reagan has long insisted. The 
United States has responded with new 
ideas of its own, and at the President's 
meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva, 
new impetus was given to the negotia- 
tions. Progress in the future, as in the 
past, depends vitally on Western unity 
and perseverence. 

Challenges for the Future 

The United States and the people of 
Berlin have come a long way together. 
What of the future? 

When Pi-esident Reagan spoke to 
the UN General Assembly in October, 
he reminded us that there can be no 
true peace where there is repression, 
partition, or mutual fear, or where we 
avert our eyes from unpleasant facts. 
We look to a peace secured by govern- 
ments responsible to free citizens, to a 
peace where walls of partition give way 
to open communication, to a peace based 
on a balance of safety rather than a 
balance of terror, and to a peace where 



the use of force has given way to trui 
observance of the UN Charter by all! 
tions. The only true peace is one baS' 
on democracy, freedom, and justice; 
these principles are the surest found: 
tion of a secure, peaceful, and pros- 
perous world. 

This is and will remain our visioi 
You will remember that President 
Reagan, when he visited Berlin in 1! 
called upon the leaders of the Soviet 
Union to join him in fulfilling the ho 
for unity, peace, and prosperity 
represented in this city. In his Berli 
itiative for peace, the President mac 
new proposals to reduce the threat c 
nuclear war and to increase contacts 
among peoples in East and West. S; 
in 1982, the Soviet Union seemed ut 
to respond to the President's vision. 
Perhaps there is greater hope today 
this spirit, let me tell you something 
our meetings in Geneva with Gener; 
Secretary Gorbachev and of our pla 
and goals for the future. 

The Geneva meeting was worth' 
for both sides because it was born i 
realism and developed into a matun 
change of views and ideas. Every on 
the age of thermonuclear weapons 
knows that our differences must be 
tained; our competition must be 
disciplined by a sense of common rii 
and an awareness of our common fui 

President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev discussed the 
great issues of our time. The Presic 
explained how, in recent years, the 
American people and our allies hav« 
questioned the vast Soviet military 
buildup and the Soviet record of cor 
pliance with past arms control 
agreements. The President explainei 
our proposals for radical reductions- 
real, equitable, and verifiable reduc p 
that would make the strategic balar ^ 
more stable and further reduce the ft 
of war. He described our Strategic 
Defense Initiative. He told Mr. Gor 
bachev that SDI means research in j* 
non-nuclear defensive system— a syi|ii 
for blunting an attack— that threate- 
no one and that might eventually fr 
all nations from the threat of mutus 
nihilation. He told him we know thi 
Soviet scientists have been researcl 
the same technologies for 15 years 
more, and that Soviet military doct 
has always stressed the value of de 
sive systems. The President expres 
his firm conviction that we should 
cooperate in moving toward a safer 
defense-dominant world, if our rese^ 
does, indeed, prove successful. 



30 



Department of State Bi i 



THE SECRETARY 



The two leaders agreed to keep 
g-otiating our differences with vigor 
ci purpose— and I consider that a good 
tcome. We also agreed to give a push 
a number of other arms control 
brts— such as preventing, pursuant to 
i 1968 treaty, the proliferation of 
clear weapons: reducing the danger of 
-prise attack in Europe; and halting 
? proliferation of chemical weapons. 
e United States, of course, has pro- 
sed a comprehensive global treaty 
nning chemical weapons. 

The two sides also discussed the 
ngers to world peace arising from 
rional conflicts. The President made 
ar that our sympathies ai'e always 
:h those who struggle for freedom 
linst tyranny. But he also stressed 
it we believe in political, not military, 
utions. The two sides agreed to con- 
ue regular discussions on these issues 
the e.xperts' level, and to begin them 
the foreign ministers' level. 

The thiixi set of issues we talked 
])ut was human rights. History 
ches no clearer lesson than this: 
'ernments that respect the rights of 
ir own people tend, inevitably, to 
pect the rights of their neighbors, 
d the yearning for liberty is a univer- 

phenomenon: indeed, it lies at the 
irt of much of the turmoil we see in 

world. Thus human rights, as the 
isident has said, is not an abstract 
ral issue— it is a peace issue. 

Finally, we discussed the barriers to 
nmunication between our societies, 
iiericans want to know more about 
' peoples of the Soviet Union. And 

peoples of the Soviet Union, it 
ms to us, have a right to know more 
lut Americans— about our desire for 
ice and about how our free system 
rks. We did reach a new agreement 
scientific, educational, and cultural 
hanges, and further agreed that they 
iuld be broadened in the future. 

As you know, Mr. Gorbachev agreed 
dsit the United States next year, 
I President Reagan will travel to the 
'iet Union the following year. We 
iw the limits as well as the 
sibilities of summit meetings. Yet we 
ieve the continued face-to-face 
logue of our top leaders could help 
ve us foi'ward. Just as we must avoid 
sions on our side, so we must dispel 
m on the Soviet side. Meetings like 
> can help dispel Soviet illusions 
liut the resolve of the West. And that 
;ood. 



It is worthwhile for the new Soviet 
leadership to see our resolve firsthand. 
The world can only be better off if these 
men see that the democracies will stand 
fii-m against pressures— and also that we 
are ready to deal with them construc- 
tively across the broad range of our dif- 
ferences. We will not be bullied; but we 
are ready for give-and-take in negotia- 
tions and for fair solutions to the prob- 
lems that divide us. These are lessons 
that we have all learned from the brave 
people of Berlin. So, what does the 
future hold for this city? 

Not sui-jjrisingly, some Berliners 
are asking why, 40 years after World 
War II, they are still living under a 
governing arrangement involving foreign 
powers. They ask whether this is not 
the time to make some changes. But I 
think we all understand the continuing 
conditions that make these arrange- 
ments still necessary. 

Soviet and East German goals have 
not changed in Germany or in Europe. 
Europe, Germany, and Berlin remain 
divided. These artificial divisions are 
themselves a cause of tension. A basic 
tenet of the Western search for peace 
must be the overcoming of these divi- 
sions. But so long as they remain, the 
Western allies ai-e prepared to preserve 
their role and act in Berlin as the 
trustees of the divided German nation. 

What are we safeguarding? First, 
the precious right of all Germans to self- 
determination. The division of this city 
and the division of Germany are un- 
natural and inhuman. By staying in 
Berlin and retaining our rights here, we 
and our allies demonstrate clearly to all 
the world that we do not accept incor- 
poration of Eastern Europe, including 
the G.D.R. [German Democratic 
Republic] and East Berlin, into a Soviet 
sphere of influence. By maintaining 
freedom in Berlin, we give evidence of 
our commitment to freedom in all of 
Europe. 

The Soviets and East Geiinans know 
this. Why else would they expend so 
much effort to wall off and undermine 
the viability of this city? The flouiishing 
of Berlin is a living challenge to their 
pretensions and their ambitions. I can 
assure you that the United States 
understands very well Berlin's impor- 
tant role in Europe and in the Western 
world. Our commitment to the freedom 
of the Western sectors is unshakable. 
Our insistence on strict observance and 
full implementation of the Quadripartite 
Agreement, as it applies to all four sec- 
tors of Berlin, remains as strong as 
ever. 



But our responsibilities do not end 
there. Nor do our goals or dreams for 
this great city. As President Von Weiz- 
saecker, your distinguished former 
mayor, has said, Americans came to 
Berlin in 1945 as liberators and became 
allies and friends. We think in the last 
40 years we have also become true 
partners. 

In education, for example, there is 
the bilingual John F. Kennedy School; 
the Kennedy Institute at the Free 
University: the Memorial Library in 
Kreuzberg; and the Aspen Institute run 
by New Hampshire-born, but Berlin's 
honorary citizen, Shep Stone. (I dis- 
covered this afternoon when he met my 
wife that they both grew up in Nashua, 
New Hampshire— not just New 
Hampshire.) 

We are also partners in industry and 
development. American industry has in- 
vested heavily in this city. Ten percent 
of Berlin's industrial production is pro- 
vided by American-owned fiirns. New 
investment is also coming, and we in 
Washington are doing all we can to en- 
courage American companies to come to 
this show]3lace city. 

We want to do still more— because 
we believe you want us to be with you 
in more than a defense and legal capac- 
ity, because we are honored to be 
associated with this great city and its 
people, and because we have confidence 
in your future. It is a mutually enrich- 
ing partnership. We believe that in our 
continuing collaboration, we contribute 
an ingredient that makes this city 
unique among German cities. Berlin is 
truly an international city, a cosmo- 
politan city, a place where Europeans 
and Americans work together for free- 
dom and progress. 

Berlin stands today, as it has since 
1945, as a model for all of us in the 
West, as a beacon to all who yearn for 
freedom everywhere. All who visit this 
city should contemplate the barbed vrire 
and brick and stone that divide it in 
two. But they should witness, as well, 
Berlin's pulsating freedom, dynamism, 
and spirit. Let them experience 
firsthand the meaning of liberty, and the 
courage that sustains it. 

This is the real lesson of Berlin to- 
day. The renaissance of this great city, 
as it approaches its 750th birthday in 
1987, is a tribute to the faith and values 
that guide all of us, and an inspiration 
as we look to the future of the West. 



'Press release 280 of Dec. 16, 1985. 



)ruary 1986 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



Beyond the Debt Problem: 

The Path to Prosperity in Latin America 



Secretary Shultz's address before 
the first plenary session of the General 
Assembly of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in Cartagena, 
Colombia, on December 2, 1985.^ 

Let me restate, at the outset, on behalf 
of President Reagan and the American 
people, our profound sympathy for Co- 
lombia over the catastrophe of the Ruiz 
Volcano. Out of the volcanic ashes and 
the mud of Armero, however, we see 
once again the courage and resilience of 
Colombia's people. Just as Colombia has 
shown its leadership in regional efforts 
against drug trafficking and for a peace- 
ful, democratic solution in Central 
America, we are confident that Colom- 
bia will overcome this latest challenge. 

We in the United States reach out 
to other human beings beset by great 
tragedy. We have been privileged to 
respond immediately to every request 
from President Betancur's government 
with rescue workers, tents, helicopters, 
supplies, and scientific monitoring ef- 
forts. The huge outpouring of donations 
from private U.S. citizens expresses elo- 
quently our sense of compassion and of 
brotherhood with the people of 
Colombia. 

I also want to take this opportunity 
to praise President Betancur for his 
firmness against the criminal terrorists 
who invaded the Palace of Justice last 
month. As the terrorists themselves ad- 
mitted, if they had known their action 
would be dealt with so firmly, they 
would not have attempted it. We can all 
learn from this Colombian example. 

Five hundred years ago next month, 
Christopher Columbus proposed to the 
Spanish Court at Cordoba a venture to 
reach China and Japan by sailing West. 
After 4 years, the committee reviewing 
the proposal reported to Ferdinand and 
Isabella: 

We find no justification for Their High- 
nesses supporting a project that rests on e.\- 
tremely weak foundations and appears im- 
possible to translate into reality to any per- 
son with any knowledge, however modest, of 
these questions. 

Nonetheless, after its power was 
consolidated, the Spanish Crown author- 
ized Columbus to sail— and his leader- 
ship, faith, and perseverance made 
history. 



32 



As we approach the 500th anniver- 
sary of the discovery of America— and 
the 100th anniversary of this organiza- 
tion—we, too, are navigating political 
and economic seas that are not well 
charted. We, too, must show the faith 
and fortitude that Columbus showed if 
this New World is to realize its promise. 

Strengthening the OAS 

This organization has a strong and 
proud record of achievement. For nearly 
a century, it has been a pacesetter for 
the world in the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. It has worked persistently and 
effectively to assure respect for human 
rights. And now the Secretary General 
has taken up the challenge of fighting 
drug abuse, for which my delegation 
commends him strongly. The United 
States looks forward to playing an ac- 
tive role in the conference next year on 
combating narcotics trafficking. We 
want this organization to be a vital force 
on all the issues that confront the 
hemisphere in the years ahead. 

Therefore, I hope that in the few 
days we have together here we can take 
new steps to strengthen this organiza- 
tion. Can't we all agree, for example, 
that the Secretary General should be 
able to bring to our attention any issue 
that affects the peace and well-being of 
this hemisphere? Any member of this 
organization, likewise, should be able to 
bring to this General Assembly, or to 
the Permanent Council, any problem 
that concerns it. And we must all work 
with the Secretary General to make 
sure that the financial structure of the 
organization is repaired and restored to 
health. Let us take these steps here and 
now. 

Democracy and Its Challenges 
in This Hemisphere 

We meet at a moment of hope in the 
hemisphere. A democratic revolution has 
been sweeping Latin America. The 
United States supports and wants to 
nurture this process, which is a blessing 
in itself for the peoples who benefit 
directly and a vindication of democratic 
values to inspire the whole world. 



In the past year, the democratic 
surge has been reinforced by presiden 
tial elections in Peru and Bolivia, by 
congressional elections in Argentina, 
by Brazil's poignant but successful co 
stitutional transfer of power after the 
death of its President-elect. Most rec* 
ly, the elections in Guatemala and He 
duras continue the democratic tide. 
There are still exceptions; there have 
been instances of backsliding. But lib"- 
ty is on the march in the Americas. 

The OAS Charter says it well: 

[T]he true significance of American sett 
darity and good neighborliness can only n-^ 
the consolidation on this continent, within 
framework of democratic institutions, of a 
system of individual liberty and social just 
based upon respect for the essential right 
man. 

And precisely because it, too, em- 
bodies this democratic imperative, th 
United States supports the Contador 
process, in which nine OAS members- 
are currently engaged. 

There are many challenges to de- 
mocracy—from terrorist violence, fro* 
communist subversion, from rulers w 
refuse to permit free elections. But b 
day, I want to speak about another 
challenge to democratic governments), 
the economic problems of this hemi- 
sphere. The subject of debt dominated 
our conversation these days. It was t 
topic of a conference involving many 
your nations in this very city. The 
United States has been listening. Wei 
recognize, as you have urged, that th' 
goal of economic adjustment is econoi t 
growth— not only for material well-be I 
but also as a stable foundation for 
freedom and democracy. 

The Debt Problem 

Today, the rise in international debt s 
clearly placed a new hurdle in the pa 
of growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In 1977, the total e.xterna 
debt of all developing countries— all 
around the world— importing capital 
came to roughly $330 billion. By the !d 
of 1984, only 7 years later, the debt 1 i 
ballooned to $830 billion. Debt servid 
has risen from 15% of exports in 197' o 
25% of exports in 1985. In the Weste 
Hemisphere, debt service now consul fS 
nearly 44% of exports. No one can 
doubt or ignore this burden on your 
economies and your people. 



Department of State Bui i' 



THE SECRETARY 



In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
ith the financial sti'ains from the sec- 
nd oil shock, both borrowing countries 
nd lending banks based their policies 
n the assumption that inflation would 
)ntinue unabated and i"eal interest 
ites would remain negative or close to 
. Some borrowers and lenders also 
3sumed continuously rising oil prices, 
large amounts of debt were incurred at 
lort-term and at variable interest 
ites. Then policies brought inflation 
own dramatically, real interest rates 
)se sharply, and recession stnack, 
psetting these expectations. The result 
as been increased debt service and 
ow gi-owth. We have seen a similar 
henomenon in the U.S. farm sector, 
hich borrow^ed heavily on the expecta- 
on of continued low interest rates and 
sing land prices. 

Over the past 3 years, all our coun- 
ies have worked together to manage 
lis debt burden. We have made prog- 
;ss. Payments problems of a short-term 
iture have been successfully sur- 
lounted; we have avoided major 
efaults that w^ould have severely 
;stricted the inflow of capital to your 
luntries and constrained growth for a 
ng time; major strides have been made 
adjustment of external imbalances; 
id export-led growth began to recover 
1984. But we have not yet reached 
ir more fundamental goal: to reestab- 
5h the conditions for vigorous, durable 
;onomic expansion. 

Our challenge, in fact, is to combine 
vo objectives: 

First, to restore the growth that 
atin America and the Caribbean so 
"gently need; and 

Second, to restore debtor countries' 
■editworthiness and external financial 
ilance. 

These two objectives are not contra- 
etory. On the contrary, the keys to 
^solving the debt problem are also the 
;ys to sustained and vigorous growth, 
hey involve actions that you, the Latin 
merican countries, and the broader in- 
rnational community must take 
(igether. Each must do its part. An ef- 
■ctive strategy, as I see it, must cover 
ll dimensions of the problem. 

First, the Latin American and 
taribbean economies need to be able to 
eploy resources more efficiently, stimu- 
|te domestic saving, and encourage pro- 
uctive domestic investment. 
t Second, conditions must be created 
> attract inflows of foreign capital, par- 
cularly foreign direct investment. 



Third, your reform efforts require 
appropriate support from official multi- 
lateral financial institutions and from 
private commercial banks. 

None of these efforts can be truly 
successful, moreover, unless we all work 
to assure a growing and open interna- 
tional marketplace that facilitates the 
growth of exports and global economic 
expansion. 

At the Bank/Fund [World Bank/In- 
ternational Monetary Fund] meeting in 
Seoul in October, our Secretary of the 
Treasury, James Baker, developed these 
points as he offered new proposals— the 
Baker plan— and explained our strategy. 
Let me share with you our analysis; 
reinforcing Secretary Baker's proposals. 

Lessons From International 
Experience 

The recent experience of the world 
economy is instioictive. The world is 
recovering from the adversity of the 
1970s and 1980s but at uneven rates. In 
1984, the average grow-th rate for all 
developing countries was 4.4%. There 
was a wide variation between Asian 
developing countries, where growth 
averaged 8.1%, and sub-Saharan Africa, 
where growth averaged only 1.6%. The 
Western Hemisphere average was 3.1% 

Why this wide variation? What are 
the factors that promote growth in some 
countries and inhibit it in others? 

Experience gives us the answer. In 
good times, economic policy need not be 
brilliant to show some success. In hard 
times, enlightened policies make a real 
difference. The countries that have con- 
tinued to prosper in the last decade 
have shared some characteristics. They 
work, they save, they invest, and they 
export. Above all, they unleash the 
creative energies of their peoples. 

The successful countries have en- 
couraged private initiative, avoided ex- 
cessive regulation, and provided ade- 
quate incentives for productive invest- 
ment. They have relied primarily on 
markets to set interest rates and prices 
and have maintained appropriate ex- 
change rates. They have avoided ex- 
cessive government consumption and 
control. The most successful countries 
have not relied on protectionism and im- 
port substitution but have followed a 
more outward-looking strategy. Many of 
them borrowed money— but they used it 
productively. 

In the 1970s, interestingly, large, 
resource-rich developing countries grew 
more slowly than small, resource-poor 



countries. Large domestic markets 
perhaps gave policymakers the illusion 
that they could isolate themselves from 
world market forces. Inefficient indus- 
tries were established that rapidly 
became a drain on the economy. When 
these industries were in the public sec- 
tor, the damage was often long lasting 
since they were rarely allowed to liqui- 
date their operations. 

Fiscal deficits drain resources from 
productive use. From the late 1970s to 
1983, the fiscal deficits for the develop- 
ing countries roughly doubled in relation 
to GDP [gross domestic product], to 
about 5.5%. The composition of those 
deficits is striking. An IMF publication 
notes that, in the 1970s, overall fiscal 
deficits of a sample of developing coun- 
tries were about 4.4% of GDP. Of this 
amount, about three-fourths w'as at- 
tributable to public enteiprises. Ex- 
penditures for, and borrowing by, public 
enterprises have been growing rapidly 
in the developing world. In fact, only 
about 10% of the investment of public 
enterprises was self-financed. This 
reflects the difficulty of running public 
enterprises efficiently. In countries 
where capital is scarce, such policies 
starve the private sector of resources 
needed for growth. Therefore, it is en- 
couraging that several Latin American 
governments are beginning to take 
steps to free themselves of this burden. 

Another lesson of experience is 
about policies toward the outside world. 
Your economies possess great potential 
for expansion of output and export earn- 
ings. To achieve this potential, you need 
to take full advantage of the opportuni- 
ties of the world trading system. 

Here, I must be blunt if I am to be 
honest. Restrictive trade practices have 
only compounded the problems of many 
heavily indebted developing countries. 
All too typically, heavy foreign borrow- 
ing has supported fiscal deficits and 
overvalued exchange rates, putting a 
great burden on export competitiveness. 
Import barriers have been erected to 
protect favored domestic industries from 
foreign competition. These barriers have 
severely hampered the growth of trade 
among Latin American and Caribbean 
nations. Other distortions have been in- 
troduced by subsidies and by controls on 
prices of consumer goods and on in- 
terest rates. 

Growth has also been hindered by 
hostility to foreign direct investment. 
This has only added to the dependence 
on debt financing; it has also shut out 
the potential benefits from the tech- 
nology and marketing capabilities of 



ebruary 1986 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



multinational firms. In some cases, 
foreign direct investment was attracted 
through promises of a protected market 
and then burdened by requirements for 
local content and export performance— a 
peculiar kind of "double whammy" 
negating economic efficiency. 

Economies ended up hobbled by con- 
trols and restrictions, wasting both 
domestic and foreign capital, starving 
the e.xtemal sectors of resources, unable 
to respond to changes in the external 
environment, and unable to generate ex- 
port earnings to service rising debt. 
And, as in the United States and other 
countries, protectionist policies create 
vested interests. If dynamic growth is 
to be restored, major economic restruc- 
turing has to take place, with resources 
redeployed to the most productive in- 
dustries that can compete effectively in 
the world market. 

I understand how difficult this 
prescription is. Governments attempting 
fundamental reforms face opposition 
from powerful interest groups currently 
protected from competition. Govern- 
ments need to show credible prospects 
for future improvements in standards of 
living in ordei- to maintain domestic sup- 
port for reform. 

But to create such prospects re- 
quires investment. Domestic and foreign 
investors are wary. Though the demand 
for capital in the world may be infinite, 
the supply is finite. These resources will 
flow to where they are wanted— to 
where the conditions are hospitable. 
Countries wanting development capital 
will have to compete for it. Before con- 
tributing their resources, investors will 
need to be convinced that sound policies 
will be sustained. 

A Comprehensive Approach 

To tie all these elements together, there 
must be a comprehensive approach. 
Developing countries, industrial coun- 
tries, international institutions, and com- 
mercial banks all have essential roles to 
play— in a kind of global bargain, if you 
Vkill, to get debtor countries back on the 
path of sustained gi-owth. 

When Secretary Baker outlined our 
approach at Seoul, he stressed what is, 
in our view, the core of any comprehen- 
sive strategy— indeed, the sine qua non: 
namely, a more focused and determined 
effort of structural reform in the debtor 
countries aimed at greater efficiency, 
more domestic saving, and a more at- 
tractive climate for foreign investment. 
And, in conjunction with this, he ad- 
dressed two other key elements de- 



signed to provide outside support and 
encouragement for structural reform: 
namely, more substantial and better 
coordinated assistance from multilateral 
institutions and more support from com- 
mercial banks. If each of these groups 
does its part, and if there is a clear 
need for additional capital for the 
multilateral development banks to meet 
the demand for quality lending, the 
United States would be prepared to ad- 
dress the issue of capital increases. 

This was a creative effort, it seems 
to me, to bring the broader Internationa 
community into the process of helping 
solve the debt problem. Both the World 
Bank and Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) are well placed to comple- 
ment the continued central role of the 
IMF by providing financing and advice 
to countries taking the essential steps 
toward structural reform. The United 
States supports a number of creative 
steps taken recently by the Woi'ld Bank, 
including the trade policy loan to Colom- 
bia, efforts for greater cofinancing with 
commercial banks, the decision to double 
the capital of the International Finance 
Corporation, and the creation of the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). The World Bank's con- 
siderable expertise can help devise pro- 
grams for growth through structural 
reform. It can support these programs 
through increased lending to private 
sectors and through increases in policy- 
based lending. 

We are also calling on the IDB to 
play a more active role in support of 
structural change oriented toward 
growth. This will require difficult 
reform measures by the IDB. I believe 
the IDB, with our and your help, can 
rise to this challenge. In particular, the 
Bank could introduce a major program 
of well-targeted nonproject lending as 
part of the upcoming replenishment 
negotiations. The Inter-American Invest- 
ment Corporation, which we expect to 
become operational soon, should play an 
important role in developing the private 
sector in Latin America, particularly 
small and medium-sized firms. 

The new commercial bank lending 
that Secretary Baker proposed— $20 
billion over a 3-year period— is also a 
vital part of the near-term effort. Bank 
lending to the principal debtor countries 
has been declining, with very little new 
lending anticipated this year. Increased 
lending can provide important support 
for policies to promote efficiency, com- 
petitiveness, and productivity— the true 
foundations of growth. Such lending, 



however, will only be forthcoming if 
there is a clear commitment to adopt 
and implement such growth-oriented 
policies. 

In the longer term, we want to se 
normal, voluntary international flows 
capital resume their appropriate role ; 
a way that will not renew or prolong 
current debt problems. Capital flows 
will need to be restructured, particu- 
larly to reduce reliance on bank lendii 
and to increase the role of equity 
finance. 

Capital flight must be stemmed oi 
better, reversed. Our best estimate is 
that capital flight from Latin AmericE 
and the Caribbean since 1980 amount: 
to well over $100 billion— it's your 
capital, and it's flowTi— offsetting a ve 
substantial portion of lending to Latir 
America. In effect, much of your bor- 
rowing has gone not to finance produ 
tive domestic investment but to finan 
capital flight. I would like nothing be ,^ 
ter than to see your governments de- 
velop creative ways to attract these ''• 
resources back to Latin America in tl '' 
form of equity. Perhaps the privatiza ■• 
tion of public enterprises could offer ; 
opportunity. 

External capital must become bet 
balanced between debt and equity. Ir 
the end, this means more foreign dire 
investment. There is no substitute foi 
In bank lending, risk is borne chiefly 
the country receiving the capital. Diri 
investment, on the other hand, allows 
receiving countries to share the risk 
with the supplier of the capital. It aid 
provides a greater flow of technology 
stronger incentives for productivity, 
development of local managerial talen 
and access to international sales net- 
works. All are vital for stronger gi-ow 

I know of the reluctance of many 
countries to welcome direct foreign ir 
vestment. But abuses can be controlU 
without overly restrictive laws and 
regulations that choke off the broad 
benefits of investment. 

The international community can 
help as well. Investment guarantees ( 
a bilateral basis, as provided by OPI 
[Overseas Private Investment Corpoi 
tion], or to be provided on a multilati 
basis by the MIGA, could help spre 
risks and encourage productive 
investment. 

At Seoul, Secretary Baker also pi 
posed that the World Bank, IMF, am 
other donors develop joint programs 
support medium-term structural adjui 
ment in the world's poorest countries 
This could be of direct benefit to som 
countries in this hemisphere. More 



34 



Deoarlmenf of Slate Built' 



THE SECRETARY 



idly, in today's interdependent 
lal economy, the world community's 
rts to promote growth throughout 
developing world can also mean 
mng markets for Latin America's 
jrts and a general stimulus to world 
le. 

But the basic preconditions for a 
aiiiable, balanced inflow of foreign 
■stment and for exploiting trade op- 
:unities are the same preconditions 
hose for stimulating domestic saving 
using it effectively; the internal en- 
nment must be attractive to both 
lestic and foreign savers and in- 
,ors. Stable, noninflationary economic 
nes, prices, and interest rates deter- 
ed by the market, and realistic ex- 
ige rates— all of these are vital, 
hout them, external support will be 
ted. 

ound Global 

nomic Environment 

extemal environment is relevant to 
debt problem in another sense, 
itenance of an open, gi'owing world 
omy is an essential prerequisite for 
ing the problems of debt and 
rth. The industrial countries bear 
main responsibility for the overall, 
roeconomic health of the global 
omic system. We have taken actions 
ister stable, durable growth in our 

economies, providing growing 
<ets and generating more saving 
investment. 

Economic recovery in the industrial- 
world, however, has been accom- 
ed by certain imbalances. These im- 
nces, the main sjTnptoms of which 
the strong dollar and the large U.S. 
e deficit, have stimulated an up- 
e in protectionist pressures that 

a serious danger to the world 
jng system and to our prosperity 
lyours. 

Phe United States is actively in- 
^d in cooperative efforts to deal 

this danger. On September 22 in 

York, the major industrial nations 
ied to work harder to achieve sus- 
|!d and better balanced growth in 
I' economies. The United States 
E;ed to reduce its fiscal deficit and to 
jurage saving through revenue- 
iral tax reform. 

.)ther participants agreed to pro- 
fi growth by a wide range of market- 
ited policies designed to stimulate 
Btment and reduce structural rigidi- 
I We also agreed that a further 
igthening of other currencies vis-a- 
he dollar was desirable in view of 



changing economic conditions and that 
we would cooperate to encourage this 
when to do so would be helpful. The ini- 
tial impact on exchange rates has been 
gratifying, and I believe the funda- 
mental policy actions underway will go 
much further in promoting balance and 
the durability of the recovery. 

The U.S. economy, which has vigor- 
ously led the world economy out of 
recession, slowed its pace of growth in 
the first half of this year; and you all 
felt it. But the signs of grovkth have 
been much stronger in the second half, 
with a 4.3% annual rate of increase in 
real GNP [gi-oss national product] for 
the third quarter. Prospects look solid 
for the remainder of the year and for 
1986. Inflation in the United States re- 
mains low; interest rates have fallen 
sharply since the summer of 1984; and 
the substantial moderation in the 
strength of the dollar— especially against 
the yen— should bear fruit eventually in 
a stronger extemal balance. 

Our expansion has been of direct 
benefit to you. Latin America's exports 
to the United States rose 25% between 
1982 and 1984-which was over 75% of 
the total increase in your exports. 

Prospects are good that growth will 
improve in the rest of the industrialized 
world. West European countries will be 
working to improve the strength and 
flexibility of their economies. Japan has 
announced measures to promote more 
domestic-led expansion. In both cases, 
lower tax burdens and freer markets 
can help. Lower inflation throughout the 
industrialized world favors sustained ex- 
pansion. Protectionist pressures, how- 
ever, pose continued dangers. 

In New York, the industrial nations 
pledged to do their utmost to resist 
these pressures. We cannot afford to 
lose this battle. The stakes are simply 
too high. 

It is essential that the industrialized 
world keep its markets open to your 
products. None of us is blameless, but 
the United States, your most important 
market, has done well in resisting pro- 
tectionist pressures— for example, re- 
cently on copper and shoes. The latest 
challenge is the congressional bill sharp- 
ly restricting imports of textiles and ap- 
parel. I will recommend to President 
Reagan that he veto it. We fully intend 
to keep up the fight. 

Our strategy against protectionism 
involves three elements. 

• The first is to correct the macro- 
economic imbalances. We must work for 
sustained and more balanced growth 
among the industrial nations and for ex- 



change markets which more fully reflect 
the progress in this direction. 

• The second element is to assure 
our public that we are being vigilant in 
pi-otecting U.S. industry, not from effi- 
cient foreign competition and shifting 
patterns of comparative advantage but 
from unfair foreign trade practices, such 
as subsidies and dumping. In this con- 
text, closed markets abroad seriously 
undermine our ability to keep markets 
open at home. 

• Third, to build support for free 
trade, all our publics must see progress 
toward a strengthened, fairer, and more 
open world trading system. A new 
round of GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] negotiations is, thus, 
a vital part of the U.S. strategy. Our 
aim is to reduce tariffs and quantitative 
trade controls. It is also to strengthen 
the role of GATT by reducing barriers 
and developing new rules for nontradi- 
tional areas such as services and high 
technology. 

We are pleased that 90 countries 
agreed in Geneva last week to establish 
a preparatory committee for a new 
trade round. This is a major step for- 
ward. The inclusion of trade in services 
will be a key element in our efforts to 
strengthen the trading system. 

We were disappointed with the hesi- 
tant response from many developing 
countries to the proposal for a new 
trade round. We believe there is a com- 
mon interest in reducing barriers, par- 
ticularly in such areas as agriculture 
where we and Latin America are both 
major exporters. We believe you, too, 
have much to gain from stronger rules 
governing trade in services. Their avail- 
ability at reasonable prices and in the 
most up-to-date form can play a key role 
in the modernization of developing 
economies. We applaud the new 
strength that Mexico brings to the 
world trading system by joining GATT. 

As deliberations proceed toward the 
launching of the new round, let us work 
together to overcome the narrow in- 
terests that threaten to impede our com- 
mon progress. We all need a stronger 
trading system. All our peoples will be 
the winners. 

Our Prospects and Our Opportunity 

If all our nations unite behind this com- 
prehensive strategy, I believe we can 
improve prospects for sustained growth 
and financial stability throughout the 
world economy. The industrial countries 
must promote their own noninflationary 



uarv 1986 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



growth and fight protectionism. The 
debtor countries must tackle the neces- 
sity of structural reform to generate and 
attract the resources needed for growth. 
The world community must see that its 
international institutions support the ef- 
fort. Commercial banks should respond 
to genuine efforts at reform. 

Global economic conditions now offer 
us a precious opportunity to put 
ourselves back on the path of sustained 
long-term growth. We know where we 
want to go and how to get there. Most 
of all, it will require us to examine our 
ways of thinking and to adopt policies 
that unleash the productive resources 
and sectors of our economies. The ques- 
tion is, do we have the political will to 
get the job done? 

We in the United States share with 
the rest of the Americas the goal of sur- 
mounting the present economic prob- 
lems. We will advance all our foreign 
policy objectives— peace and security, 
democracy and human rights, economic 
and social progress— if we succeed in 
overcoming current impediments to 
economic growth. 

A few years ago, no one predicted 
the democratic surge that has taken 
place. Today, many doubt our capacity 
to restore sustained growth. I believe 
the skeptics will again be proved wrong. 

If we let the lessons of experience 
serve as our guide, and if we work 
together to apply these lessons, the 
coming years can be a new era of pros- 
perity and progress. The blessings of 
freedom and well-being that have been 
known by the relative few will be en- 
joyed by the many. 

We cannot afford to let this oppor- 
tunity slip away. Let us act, and let us 
act together. 



Secretary's Trip to Europe 



'Press release 271. 



Secretary Shiiltz departed 
Washington, D.C., December 9, 1985, to 
visit London (December 10-11), where he 
addressed the Pilgrims of Great Britain 
(see page 2i); Brussels (December 
11-13); where he attended the regular 
semiannual session of the North Atlan- 
tic Council ministerial meeting and met 
with officials of the European Commis- 
sion; Bonn (December 13-U); Berlin 
(December H-15); where he addressed 
the Berlin Press Conference (see page 
27); Bucharest (December 15); Budapest 
(December 15-17); and Belgrade 
(December 17-18). He returned to 
Washington on December 18. 

Following are news conferences the 
Secretary held on various occasions 
during the trip and the texts of the 
North Atlantic Council final communi- 
que and a statement issued by the coun- 
cil's Foreign Ministers. 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
BRUSSELS, 
DEC. 13, 1985' 

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial 
session in Brussels on 12th and 13th 
December 1985. Ministers agreed as follows: 

1. Encouraging developments have taken 
place in East-West relations since our meet- 
ing in Lisbon in June. They demonstrate the 
validity of our policy— reaffirmed in the 
Washington statement— of preserving peace 
in freedom through adequate military 
strength and political solidarity and, on that 
basis, pursuing a more stable and co- 
operative relationship between the countries 
of East and West. 

2. We welcome recent high-level East- 
West contacts, notably the meeting between 
President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev, which marks an important step in 
our efforts to develop a realistic and con- 
structive dialogue with the countries of the 
East. We hope that this will lead to improved 
relations, more extensive contacts, including 
regular high-level meetings, and broad co- 
operation on the full range of East-West 
questions. We shall all play our full part in 
making further progress. We call upon the 
Soviet Union and its allies to join us in this 
endeavour. 

3. Meanwhile, the continuing build-up of 
Soviet nuclear and conventional arms remains 
a major Allied concern. We do not seek mil- 
itary superiority. But we are determined to 
safeguard our security by maintaining ade- 
quate conventional and nuclear forces. Our 
strategy of deterrence has proved its worth 
preserving peace, and remains fully valid. 



The close and permanent link between 
North American and European Allies, whic 
has kept the peace for 36 years, remains th 
basis of our collective security. Alliance coh 
sion will continue to be ensured through clfl 
consultations on all matters affecting our 
common interests and security. The value ( 
these consultations has again been clearly 
demonstrated in recent months. 

4. We are committed to substantive pre 
ress in arms control. This must be based oi 
the criteria of strengthened stability, equi- 
table and significant reductions and effecti^ 
verification. 

5. We have reviewed the U.S. -Soviet 
negotiations in Geneva on their strategic a) 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and oi 
defence and space systems. These aim to p| 
vent an arms race in space and terminate i 
on earth, limit and reduce nuclear arms an I 
strengthen strategic stability. We strongly 
support U.S. efforts in all three areas of t 
negotiation. We welcome the agreement bf I 
tween President Reagan and General Seen I 
tary Gorbachev to accelerate work at I 
Geneva, in particular in areas where there i 
common ground, including the principle of 
50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear 
arms, appropriately applied. | 

The Allies concerned endorse the con- i 
structive proposals on U.S. and Soviet INI ' 
[intermediate-range nuclear force] systems 
recently tabled in Geneva by the U.S., and 
support the idea of an interim agreement. 
They reiterate their willingness to modify, 
halt, reverse or dispense with longer rang* 
INF (LRINF) deployment as part of an 
equitable and verifiable arms control agree 
ment. In the absence of such an agreemeni 
they will continue to deploy LRINF missil 
on schedule.^ 

6. The Allies participating in the Vienn 
MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduc- ' 
tions] negotiations proposed on 5th Decemll 
1985 a verifiable agreement for U.S. -Soviet 
ground force reductions, followed by a eoll( 
tive no-increase commitment of three year: 
on U.S. and Soviet and NATO and Warsa\ 
Pact forces. The proposal embodies asso- 
ciated measures which open the way tothi 
establishment of reliable force levels and 
which are essential to verify compliance w" 
the agreement's provisions. It responds to 
earlier Eastern proposal and represents ar 
imaginative attempt to break a longstandir 
dead-lock. 

7. We remain deeply concerned about i 
proliferation and use of chemical weapons, 
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament w 
seek an effective and verifiable convention 
a general and complete prohibition of such 
weapons and on the the destruction of exii 
ing stockpiles. We strongly support the 
agreement between President Reagan and 
General Secretary Gorbachev to accelerate 
their efforts to this end. 



36 



Department of State Bull«i 



THE SECRETARY 



8. We call upon the Soviet and East 
•opean governments to implement effec- 
ily all provisions of the Helsinki Final Act 

the Madrid Concluding Document. We 
3 with regret that the Ottawa meeting on 
nan Rights and the Budapest Cultural 
um, although useful in themselves, re- 
led persisting deficiencies in the 
lamentation of these documents, and were 
ble to reach common conclusions. 
At the Stockholm (CDE) [Conference on 
ifidence- and Security- Building Measiu'es 

Disarmament in Europe], an integral 
t of the CSCE [Conference on Security 

Cooperation in Europe] process, we are 
vely working for early agreement con- 
ent with the Madrid mandate. Such an 
sement would embody a substantial set of 
tarily significant confidence- and security- 
ding measures, covering the whole of 
■ope, and give concrete expression and ef- 

to the existing duty of all participating 
es to refrain from the threat or use of 
e. 

All participating states reaffirmed their 
mitment to the Helsinki Final Act on its 
1 anniversary. We seek to promote gen- 
; and balanced progress in all its aspects, 
Liding those concerned with respect for 
lan rights and the fundamental freedoms 
he individual, and those relating to co- 
ration between states. We remain com- 
;ed to meaningful results at the forth- 
ing Berne meeting on human contacts. 

Vienna foUowup will review all aspects 
he CSCE process. 

9. The maintenance of a calm situation in 
around Berlin, including freedom of 

'ss to the city, remains of fundamental im- 
,ance for East- West relations. The strict 
>rvance and full implementation of the 
dripartite Agreement are essential to this 
. In this connection, we support all efforts 
romote the prosperity and viability of the 
. We also support the efforts of the 
eral Republic of Germany further to 
slop inner-German relations as a signifi- 
, contribution to peace and to the well- 
ig of the people of a divided Germany, 
icularly the Berliners. 

10. We urge the Soviet Union to end the 
:ceptable militarj' occupation of 
hanistan, now approaching its seventh 

•, to withdraw its troops and agree to a 
;ical solution restoring Afghanistan's inde- 
[ience and non-aligned status. 
We emphasise the continuing need in 
.nd for genuine dialogue between the 
pus elements of society and for national 
nciliation. 

jWe, for our part, respect the sovereignty 
i independence of all states. We will re- 
ii vigilant and will consult on events out- 
the treaty area which might threaten 
^common security. 

11. We strongly condemn terrorism and 
'continue to work to eliminate this threat. 
invite all states to join us in this resolve. 



12. We have examined ways of enhancing 
annaments co-operation among all the coun- 
tries of the Alliance. This co-operation re- 
flects our continuing concern for effective 
defence, particularly in the conventional field. 
In the light of our examination, we have 
decided to implement a strategy aimed at im- 
proving co-operation. This should give a fresh 
boost to the work being done in this field 
within the Alliance and lead in a short time 
to specific co-operative programmes encom- 
passing both its European and North Amer- 
ican members. 

13. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, we reaffirm the importance 
of special programmes for less favoured part- 
ners and remain committed to promoting the 
stability and well-being of our community of 
free nations. 

14. The Spring 1986 meeting of the Coun- 
cil in ministerial session will be held in 
Halifax, Canada, in May. 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

FOREIGN MINISTERS' 

STATEIVIENT, 
BRUSSELS, 
DEC. 13, 1985 

Armaments cooperation plays an impor- 
tant part in our collective security. 
IVIinisters have, therefore, agreed to 
direct the Conference of National Arma- 
ments Directors (CNAD) to implement a 
new armaments cooperation improve- 
ment strategy. They have decided to 
communicate its main elements to the 
public. 

Ministers have instructed the CNAD 
to address identified conventional defi- 
ciencies facing NATO with a view 
toward coordination of national and 
multilateral equipment programs, in 
order to redress these deficiencies ex- 
peditiously and effectively, in accordance 
with established priorities. 

Emphasizing their political will to 
collaborate, ministers have agreed. 

• That the challenge is to find im- 
proved ways of enhancing collaboration; 

• That every effort should be made 
to hannonize requirements and to e.x- 
plore the prospects for meeting them 
collaboratively; 

• That efforts to increase coopera- 
tion in research and technology, in par- 
ticular to exploit emerging technologies, 
should be stepped up in order to achieve 
a more cost-effective use of resources of 
the countries of the alliance and facih- 
tate the establishment of cooperative 
projects. A wider exchange of informa- 
tion is a key factor in these endeavors; 



• That sustained moves to 
strengthen cooperation in the early 
preproject stage w^ould facilitate agree- 
ment on common armaments prioiities 
leading to an effective resources 
strategy of countries of the alliance; 

• To stress the importance of effec- 
tive and coordinated armaments plan- 
ning of countries of the alliance and, 
accordingly, to direct the CNAD to 
place particular emphasis on the iden- 
tification of opportunities for greater 
rationalization; 

• That the CNAD should study the 
management of collaborative projects, 
which become increasingly complex as 
the number of participating countries in- 
creases, and submit its recommendations 
to the council; 

• To encourage and support work 
aimed at improving industry-to-industry 
cooperation; and 

• To direct the CNAD to study the 
best means of assisting those countries 
with a less developed and/or small 
defense industrial base to obtain a more 
adequate share of industrial partici- 
pation in defense research, development, 
production, and maintenance, in order to 
enhance their long-term economic 
strength. 

The framework for progress has 
been laid out. Major improvements will 
require a long-term sustained effort. 
The nations of the alliance are com- 
mitted to carrying out the key elements 
of the improvement strategy. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
NATO HEADQUARTERS, 
BRUSSELS, 
DEC. 13, 19853 

NATO is in good shape. Our discussion 
covered the full range of alliance ques- 
tions, arms control, the important effort 
to improve NATO's conventional de- 
fense through cooperation in the devel- 
opment and production of armaments, 
and East- West relations. Our discussions 
reflected a common sense of realism 
with regard to East-West relations. 

The allies reiterated their support 
for our positions at the arms control 
talks in Geneva. We all agreed that the 
true measure of the recent meeting be- 
tween President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev will come in the 
months and years ahead. For our part, 
we are ready to continue our give-and- 
take, problem-solving approach. 



ruary 1986 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



I also took the opportunity over the 
past 2 days to inform the allies about 
our efforts at home— I might say, very 
much at the urging of the Europeans, 
but on our own— to bring down the 
budget deficit and the possible effect 
this could have on resources available to 
meet our foreign policy objectives. 

This is the third month in a row 
that I've come to Brussels. Each time I 
have benefited enormously from hearing 
the views of our allies at first hand. 
These visits underline America's deep 
commitment to full and intensive 
consultations. 

Q. The Spanish Foreign Minister 
said some moments ago that you are 
convinced of two things: that there's 
going to be a referendum on NATO in 
Spain and that the government is 
going to win it. Are you convinced of 
both things? 

A. Of course, it's for the Spanish 
people to decide, and I certainly hope 
and I believe it's in their interest to be 
in NATO. I have appreciated very much 
my discussions with the Spanish For- 
eign Minister in this regard, and with 
the Prime Minister, both of whom very 
strongly support Spanish participation 
within NATO. 

Q. Based on U.S. verification 
means, can you confirm or must you 
deny what Mr. Gorbachev said about 
dismantling of SS-20 bases in the 
European part of the Soviet Union? 

A. We have no confirmation of that. 
But I think the point about the SS-20s 
is that they are mobile missiles, so you 
have to think about it in a global sense. 
In all our negotiations with the Soviet 
Union of these intermediate-range mis- 
siles, we have insisted on a global ap- 
proach, and that, of course, remains our 
position. 

Q. If you recognize a desire to 
move from generalities to specifics at 
the next summit meeting, what sort of 
specifics do you think are possible to 
achieve at this next meeting? 

A. Of course, there were a tremen- 
dous number of specifics reflected out of 
the meeting in Geneva last month; a 
tremendous number of specifics. They 
largely fell into the area of bilateral 
matters. At the same time there were 
some important developments in nuclear 
and space talks, particularly in the 
Soviet counterproposal and our counter 
to it, prior to the meeting, but in antici- 
pation of the meeting, and then the con- 
firmation of the 50% reduction idea. So 
there were a lot of things in that 
meeting. 



Insofar as the next one is concerned, 
of course, we want to see this process 
move forward. We'd like to see it move 
forward. And as I said a moment ago, 
we're committed to a full give-and-take, 
problem-solving approach. Whether any- 
thing will be agreed remains to be seen, 
and we will search hard for any good 
agreement that is possible. But, of 
course, we will not be put in the posi- 
tion where some deadline or the pros- 
pect of some meeting would cause us to 
agree to something that we don't think 
is in our interests. And I assume the 
Soviet Union would feel similarly on 
that. 

Q. Two questions with nothing to 
do with NATO. The draft resolution 
on the Armenian issues was defeated 
last night in Washington, thanks to 
the Reagan Administration's efforts, 
we are told. 

A. Thanks to the gi-owing common 
sense of those who voted on the issue. 

Q. They will try again, we are 
told, so how long can the Administra- 
tion continue to put pressure on the 
Congress on that issue? 

A. These issues do come up peri- 
odically, as you say. They don't come up 
if the sponsors think that their chances 
are low. I think, through our efforts and 
the efforts of others, there is a growing 
perception in our Congress of the 
reasons why such a resolution phrased 
as it is, is so objectionable, not only to 
Turkey but to us. That being the case, 
there are lots of people— we don't have 
to prompt people to go and give argu- 
ments. They know the arguments. And 
I think that perception gi-ows and is in- 
creasingly understood. 

Q. You've been talking very re- 
cently about the PLO [Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization] participating in 
the peace process. Can you tell us 
what are your exact, explicit condi- 
tions for the PLO to get into the 
peace process, and do you believe that 
the PLO can really fulfill them or is 
it with those conditions that you are 
trying to push them out of the peace 
process? 

A. We have, for a long time, had 
certain conditions for a dialogue be- 
tween the United States and the PLO. 
The peace process, obviously involving 
Israel, is a different proposition. As far 
as we are concerned, recognition of UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's 
right to exist have been the conditions. 



I think I need to say as well, particu- 
larly when you're talking about the 
peace process, that continued participj 
tion in terrorist activity would seem ti 
rule anybody out of the peace process 
So the so-called armed struggle is a p; 
and parcel of this problem. It's hard, 
and from Israel's standpoint— well, 
they'll speak for themselves. But thes' 
are the conditions for a dialogue with 
the United States. 

Q. Lord Carrington, under instm 
tion from the DPC [Defense Plannir- 
Committee] has written a letter to t 
Dutch Government asking them to i 
verse their decision to dismantle tw( 
of their nuclear tasks. Has that beei 
an issue in this meeting, and what i 
the U.S. position in the matter? 

A. Of course, we would prefer to 
all of these tasks retained. And it has 
been discussed. I do think that the kt 
important matter right now is the fac 
that the Dutch have decided to procei 
and many questioned whether they 
would or would not, and as it's turne( 
out they are. We have always felt coi 
dent in the Dutch resolve, just as ear • 
lier we felt the same way about the 
Belgian resolve. I believe that the fa\ 
able resolution of these issues in 
Belgium and Holland has contributed 
tremendously to the strength and coh 
siveness of our alliance and thereby t' 
the prospects of success in our discus 
sions over control of armaments with 
the Soviet Union. So it is a move in a 
very positive direction. 

Q. We haven't had an opportuni' 
to talk to you since the President 
issued his Executive order requiring 
lie detector tests of top Administrati 
officials. What's your reaction to th 
and will you take the test? 

A. That is, I think, a domestic U.i 
type issue, and I'll respond to it in a ■ 
mestic setting. 

Q. After your stay here in Brus- 
sels, you are going to visit some oth 
countries in Europe, among them 
Hungary. What do you expect from 
your visit to Hungary, and what doij 
you expect from your conversations! 
there? 

A. In Hungary I'm looking forwai 
to an education. I've read a lot about 
developments in Hungary, and it's on 
thing to read about developments anc 
it's another thing to talk to people ab 
how they are managing their economi 
system in particular. And I look forw 
to talking with them about that and a 
sharing views about East- West relatii 
generally. 



38 



Department of State Bullf- 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. What kind of backing do you 
I that the United States got for SDI 
rategic Defense Initiative] out of 
i meeting? 

A. Very good. I think the fact of the 
;ter is that the importance, the re- 
nsibility of the United States to 
lertake this research program is uni- 
sally accepted; everybody recognizes 
t. It's not an issue. There are lots of 
les, and different countries have dif- 
mt views about whether they wish to 
e a formal part in the progi-am. But 
importance of the United States 
ing this program is not controversial 
ill, and I feel as though the views 
supportive in that sense. We do 
it to look at the imphcations of SDI. 
, of course, it is a research program, 
for the present and foreseeable 
ire we have to remember that deter- 
ee, as presently conceived, has kept 
peace in Europe, and it will continue 
)e what we rely on to keep the 
ce. 

Q. Did you feel the need to counsel 
raint here on optimism toward the 
spect raised at Geneva, that of 
ly progress on INF forces with the 
iet Union, or perhaps even an in- 
m ag^reement on INF? 
A. It seemed that everyone, as we 
t around the room, felt the need to 
isel everyone else to e.xercise 
raint, and it's a universal recog- 
)n that we have to be realistic here, 
have the problem of managing a 
/ complicated process. And in a very 
sense, the meetings between Presi- 
t Reagan and General Secretary 
bachev are the tips of the iceberg. 
iy are very important, and they stick 
[here and everybody looks at them. 
I there is a big, important process 
\g on here, and we have to recognize 
L-omplexity and the great richness of 
!o people have counseled each other 
g those lines, and we have to strike 
right balance between having realis- 
■xpectations and having aspirations 
: are appropriate for the importance 
le subject. These are very important 
ects, and you can be sure that the 
ed States will be bending every ef- 
tii find a good agreement if there is 
I an agreement to be found. 

3- I imagine by now that you've 
I the New Zealand Government's 
relation on nuclear ship visits. Do 
I have any fears that any other 
i-nuclear allies may be tempted to 
l)w suit, and do you have any in- 
lion of renegotiating military rela- 
ys with Australia? 



A. Our military relationship under 
the ANZUS treaty with Australia is 
very strong, and we've had continuing 
discussions with Australia. We have no 
problems. It's very strong, and we see 
no need for any revision; it's good. 

And so far as New Zealand is con- 
cerned, what they seem to be in the 
process of doing is denying ship visits 
by the United States, and under the cir- 
cumstances what they are doing is de 
facto withdrawing themselves from the 
ANZUS treaty, in which case we'll have 
to adjust our sense of what our respon- 
sibilities are. But the treaty will remain 
there, and if, at some point, there's a 
shift it will be there. 

Insofar as other countries are con- 
cerned, no, we haven't seen any tenden- 
cy to look for legislation similar to New 
Zealand's 

Q. We understand that several 
European ministers, while perhaps 
counseling restraint, did say to you 
yesterday that Western public opinion 
would expect concrete results from the 
next summit and that a good atmos- 
phere would not be enough next time. 
Does that worry you? 

A. I think everyone wants to have 
as concrete and fulsome results to come 
about at the time of these meetings as 
is possible. Just as I pointed out earUer, 
we had quite a number of concrete re- 
sults, although not in the field of arms 
control, in the last meeting in Geneva. 
So we want to work for that. And I 
recognize that people want that. We all 
want it. 

I believe also people want us to be 
realistic, and I don't think our publics 
here or in the United States want the 
United States to make arrangements 
that are made at the expense of West- 
em security and Western values. 
There's no pressure for that at all. We 
want good agreements. And we do want 
them. But they have to be good 
agreements. 

Q. Can I ask you for a short state- 
ment on what is the aim of your visit 
to Yugoslavia? 

A. It's somewhat the same as I men- 
tioned earlier. I expect to be educated, 
and I also look forward to discussing the 
problems that both of us have on our 
minds, that have to do with world eco- 
nomic developments and the way in 
which different countries are affected by 
them. In particular, in Yugoslavia's 
case, the debt problem and how it's be- 
ing handled is an important one that 
I've talked about with Prime Minister 



Planinc before and look forward to talk- 
ing with her again about that. And, of 
course, Yugoslav perceptions of East- 
West relations are always of tremen- 
dous interest to us. 

Q. In London in the Pilgrims 
speech, you gave a rather strenuous 
defense before a European audience of 
the notion of giving moral and even 
armaments support to democratic 
groups struggling against oppression 
in Central America. Angola, Afghanis- 
tan, and Cambodia. I imagine that at 
least most of those areas came up in 
your discussions of regional problems 
here. Do you have the feeling now 
that the European allies are more or 
less convinced of the points that you 
made in that section of the Pilgrims 
speech, unhappy with them, or what's 
the state of their attitude toward 
those points? 

A. Of course, the view that I ex- 
pressed, and have expressed on other 
occasions more extensively, is that 
we're on the side of freedom, and people 
who are fighting for freedom and inde- 
pendence, therefore, have our support. 
Now what does that mean? It varies 
with different circumstances, and you 
want to do things that are going to be 
effective. We try to adapt our efforts to 
the situation and to what can be effec- 
tive but with no ambiguity about the 
fact that we're for the people who are 
fighting for freedom. That is a general 
view. 

Tactically what you should do at a 
given time in a given situation, people 
can have different points of view about. 
I'd have to say that we didn't have here 
extensive discussions about that topic 
since our focus of attention was on other 
matters, and particularly East-West 
relations. 

Q. The day before yesterday, you 
met with the Turkish minister once 
again here in Brussels. As the result 
of the continuing Turkish-American 
talks, does the U.S. Administration 
think about the form of a treaty with 
Turkey at the end of the negotiations? 

A. We have an agreement with 
Turkey under which we proceed, and we 
continually discuss it and what may or 
not be needed and adjusting it, and we 
continue to do that. We don't have any 
particular end point in mind in terms, 
certainly not of any new treaty or any- 
thing of that kind. But it remains to be 
seen how we'll want to label this when 
the time comes. I think the important 
thing is that we have agreed with 



'uarv 1986 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



Tiu-key that we want to work in a vei-y 
careful and professional way, problem 
by problem, at resolving them, and we 
have been making a good effort to do 
that. Under Secretary [for Political 
Affairs] Armacost visited Turkey, as he 
did Greece, some months ago, and we 
see a continuing process here, and I 
think a healthy one. The collaboration 
that we had on the vote that came up 
here earUer in the press confererenee is 
an example, but there are many other 
examples of this fruitful collaboration. 
The Prime Minister visited the United 
States recently and made a tremendous 
impression in the country and with our 
Congress. So it's a good, healthy proc- 
ess. I might say, I particularly look for- 
ward to my discussions with the For- 
eign Minister, whose experience in East- 
West relations and in the Middle East is 
quite unusual. 

Q. In the section concerning ter- 
rorism, it's a line we've seen before: 
We strongly condemn terrorism. And 
it's been a very rough year for ter- 
rorism. Is there anything a bit 
stronger that can be said about it? 
Has anybody proposed— I don't know— 
a new strike force, anything more 
concrete than condemning it? 

A. I think the words serve the pur- 
pose insofar as words are concerned. It 
seems that it isn't so much words as ac- 
tions that are what we need to be doing 
and we are doing. I think that the peo- 
ple are more and more alert to the 
great importance of this problem— its in- 
ternational aspects. Our intelligence col- 
laboration has improved greatly. Our 
sense of the ability to manage crises has 
improved, and so there is an ongoing 
pattern of action. I think that's where 
we want to place the emphasis. As far 
as the communique is concerned, this 
serves the purpose adequately. 

Q. What about an actual force? An 
international strike force, anything 
like that? 

A. I don't think an international 
strike force makes any particular sense. 
There are capabilities vnthin govern- 
ments. These capabilities need to be 
nourished, and we have to have the abil- 
ity to use them in a collaborative and 
cooperative fashion and exchange ideas 
on technique, you might say, and we are 
doing so. 



Q. We were told by another Amer- 
ican official the other day that on a 
preliminary basis, it's been decided 
that on the Salt II Treaty, there will 
be no expiration date as such on 
December 31. Can you elaborate on 
what the position is on the Salt II 
Treaty? 

A. It's the same position that has 
been in place since the President an- 
nounced his position, I believe it was 
last June; namely that he decided there 
to go the extra mile. It involved break- 
ing up the submarine, and he looks to 
Soviet performance insofar as com- 
pliance is concerned, insofar as arms 
control is concerned, and he will be ex- 
amining this whole question, particularly 
in the light of an additional report on 
the subject of compliance. If he makes a 
decision to make a change, it'll be an- 
nounced. And that's the position. 

Q. Yesterday you had your third 
bilateral meeting with the Greek For- 
eign Minister. I would like to know if, 
after these series of meetings, you 
think there is an improvement in 
United States-Greek relations and a 
change in the Greek Government's 
policy toward NATO. And secondly, I 
would like to know if there are any 
encouraging sig^ns from the Greek side 
if the American bases will remain in 
Greece after the present agreement 
expires. 

A. Let me just lump both questions 
together because they are basically 
similar. 

In my first meeting with the new 
Greek Foreign Minister, he said that his 
government wished to see the relation- 
ship between Greece and the United 
States improved, and we agree. We also 
agreed to set about it in a systematic 
way. And the way to do it, we agreed, 
was to identify the problems, in a con- 
crete sense, and then try to resolve 
them— big ones and little ones, but just 
try to have a problem-solving process. 
As I mentioned earlier, Under 
Secretary Armacost visited, and we've 
had discussions back and forth, and we 
also agreed that good relations are 
based on substance. I think it's fair to 
say, and I believe he would agree, that 
we have made genuine headway on sub- 
stance. Therefore I think our relation- 
ships are better, and we intend to keep 
working at it. 

Clearly the bases are an important 
part of the picture, and, of course, from 
our standpoint in the United States, we 



need to know early on whether the in- 
tention of the Greek Government is to 
end the bases at the end of this currei 
agreement or not. If the intention is t( 
end them then the United States will 
just have to make other arrangements | 
You see, it's one thing to have a nego- 1 
tiation about renewal in the context tl 
both parties agree that the bases will 
continue, and we've been talking abou 
the terms; it's another thing to have a i 
negotiation where the question is, are 
the bases going to be there at all? Of 
course, it affects the U.S. view of whi 
we should currently do with the bases 
We're not going to put a lot of money 
into bases that are about to be aban- 
doned. We'll have to address this issu 
just as we will address, as we conside 
it central to our relationship, the Gre« 
participation in NATO. All of these 
things represent matters that are und' 
discussion and review, and that will c 
tinue. I think the record so far in this , 
effort is a good one. 

Q. A question about the proposals 
for an interim INF agreement. The 
figures which the United States put 
forward when the Geneva talks re- 
sumed for American launchers will 
the same as the actual deployment. 
Does that in any way imply a willir 
ness to delay or alter the deploymefl 
schedules over, let's say, the next 6| 
months or up to the next summit? 
A. No, not in the absence of an 
agreement. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
BRUSSELS, 
DEC. 13, 1985^ 

Jacques Delors, President of the Eu 
pean Communities Commission. Ma r 

remind you that this is the fifth time '^■ 
the Secretary of State and the other 
American ministers are meeting with 
the commission. This is a meeting wh 
should be seen according to the wishi 
of the Secretary of State in a larger 
perspective. We meet frequently, 
bilaterally, and to congratulate one 
another; to express a common will or 
fight. Therefore, this meeting was 
meant to draw a balance sheet of the 
past year and to take a look at 1986, 
identifying where the difficulties he £ 
also to extend cooperation and increa 
it where it is possible. 



40 



Department of State Buli 



THE SECRETARY 



In that respect, we discussed 
onomic developments in the world, in 
6 United States and in the Com- 
anity because the United States and 
^ Community just together make up 
% of world GNP. We then discussed 
)netary matters, financial problems of 
bt, ways of strengthening world 
ide, and, finally, matters which are of 
bat interest to the world as a whole 
t are of particular interest for our 
ateral cooperation. We can say that 
s year, 1985, in tenns of the world 
iponsibihty of both the Community 
i the United States, is finishing with 
tter hope for the future than we had 
kught it would at the beginning of the 
kr. And we hope that the end of next 
'ir, and we very much hope in 
bssels, we can start the new GATT 
lind which will, of course, last a fair 
lount of time, but which, when it 
jrts, will be giving a signal to the 
Irld as a whole and a signal of the 
Immunity and the United States to 

us to resist protectionist tendencies 
•ch are just as strong in the Com- 
tiity as in the United States, even if 
y assume a less spectacular shape 
I form. 

Thanks also to the decisions of the 
|)up of Five where we now have a 
jiation where the exchange markets 
i more transparent and less jittery, 
icourse a signal like this is not 

I ugh, and I know that the interven- 

II of the central banks on its own is 

I enough. But we now have to create 
I basis for a healthy pickup in the 
Inomy of the world. And everyone 
luld make an effort, not just the 
l.ted States in reducing its budget 
.cit, not just Japan by opening up its 
nomy more and making it a full part- 
in the woiid economy, but also the 
nmunity, which has won the battle 
inst inflation and most countries too 
e reduced their external deficits. The 
nmunity, therefore, should contribute 
■e toward world trade. That was one 
he subjects we dealt with, and we 
it through the proposals that Europe 
made to make its contribution to 
and to raise these matters and 
:h a common view at the industrial- 
summit. 

Then on the matter of financial 
es— and above all, debt— we took 
k of the Baker initiative, and we dis- 
led how we could take it further so 
. with more trade, with more invest- 
nt and with more confidence, the 



LDCs— particularly the indebted LDCs— 
would find the right way of developing 
their economies in a healthy way. And 
here, of course, cooperation between the 
United States and the Community will 
be important. Apart from that, we dis- 
cussed a number of points of joint 
interest— part of our daily bread-and- 
butter work— high tech, intellectual 
property, services. We are already 
working together on these points. But I 
think the important thing, as Mr. Shultz 
said, was that we should have this over- 
all view, the overall perspective. Try 
and identify the difficulties, try and 
broaden our cooperation, and I think we 
can say without being oversatisfied that 
things are moving in the right direction. 
The world economy is moving in the 
right direction. A lot remains to be 
done, but we intend to do this together 
united by our common values. 

Secretary Shultz. President Delors 
has given a very full and complete sum- 
mary of the things that we talked about 
and the atmosphere of the discussion. I 
won't repeat it except to endorse what 
you said. 

I think we need to keep reminding 
ourselves that the United States and 
Europe have a relationship of tremen- 
dous importance, depth, richness, which 
goes across the board of matters of con- 
cern to all of our citizens. And a very 
important element of it is essentially the 
economic relationship. These annual 
meetings have become a kind of stock- 
taking, as you said, and a report to each 
other, an assessment of our respon- 
sibilities in helping to manage this 
relationship. 

The meeting this year, as you said, 
has been particularly significant because 
we had some important, broad matters 
to discuss. The global bargain on eco- 
nomic issues that's come to be known as 
the Baker plan, I think, is of great im- 
portance, and we talked about that and, 
of course, the key element in it of the 
emerging GATT round. I think it was 
especially significant that we talked 
about how we each see that and the 
great potential for collaboration in the 
preparatory commission and then, even- 
tually, in the negotiations. All of this is 
of tremendous significance and satisfac- 
tion. I might say satisfaction to me be- 
cause I'm the veteran of four of the five 
of these meetings that have been held, 
and this one I might say with the new 
commission has been particularly satis- 
fying and worthwhile. It's been a pleas- 



ure to have this time to sit down with 
your new commission and exchange 
views. 

Q. I was wondering if you could 
tell us if you, in the course of your 
discussions, reached any sort of modus 
Vivendi with the Community on how 
to avoid future situations such as the 
recent "spaghetti war" and the other 
trade conflicts that have erupted? 

Secretary Shultz. I think that when 
we come to something that we have a 
stiff difference of opinion on, we're 
going to have to fight it out. On the 
other hand, I think these discussions 
and the procedures and the understand- 
ings that develop out of them teach us 
that, sooner or later, these disputes are 
going to get resolved and it might as 
well be sooner and with as little acri- 
mony as possible. But there may be 
some that will turn out to be somewhat 
explosive. So be it. We'll have to keep 
them in the perspective of the overall 
relationship. 

Q. I have two questions. First, 
how did you summarize the situation 
following the Congress' decision con- 
cerning U.S. deficit to the Commis- 
sion, and second, there is a picture of 
yours in many of today's newspapers 
showing you yawning at the NATO 
meeting. Did you find this meeting to- 
day less boring or more exciting than 
that? [Laughter] 

Secretary Shultz. I didn't have to 
spend very much time on the budget 
reduction legislation, since basically it 
reflects what the Europeans generally 
and the European Commission has been 
teUing us we must do. And I hope that 
we will be able to follow through and 
actually do it. Of course, one of the 
reasons why our troops are a little 
reduced from last year is that Secretary 
Block [of Agriculture John R.], for ex- 
ample, stayed in Washington. Why? Be- 
cause we have a farm bill that's full of 
problems. And its going to cost too 
much. On the one hand the Congress 
has passed a bill saying we've got to get 
spending down and, on the other hand, 
they're working on a fai-m bill that's 
going to get spending up. So we're 
going to have to work on this very 
hard. 

As far as excitement is concerned, I 
would say there is an interesting sym- 
bolism in having the NATO meeting and 
the European Commission meeting as 
two significant events for us back-to- 
back because it does suggest, again, this 
broad range of our interests together, 



Jruarv 1986 



41 



THE SECRETARY 



the common values that we share. And 
the NATO meeting was a ver>' worth- 
while and productive one and this one 
has been too. [Inaudible] seven time 
zones different, even you might yawn 
once in a while. [Laughter] 

Q. Did you discuss the Jenkins 
bill, the prospects and whether the 
President is going to veto it? 

Secretary Shultz. Is that the textile 
bill? 

Q. Yes. 

Secretary Shultz. Certainly the 
recommendations across the board here 
are that he veto it, and I would be 
astonished if he didn't. He may have 
already done so. And I might say fur- 
ther we think we have the votes to sus- 
tain the veto. So it won't become law. 

Q. Last year it seems there was 
some clash of interests between the 
United States and the European Com- 
munity concerning the enlargement. 
In a few days, the Community will 
have 12 members, and I wonder if you 
have come to any sort of agreement 
on the outstanding problems, mainly 
on the farm products? 

Secretary Shultz. It isn't a clash of 
interests of the enlargement. We favor 
the enlargement, and we think a strong 
Europe is good for the United States as 
well as for Europe. We have always 
said we have that feeling but we don't 
want to have it take place at our ex- 
pense. There are some real problems in 
connection with agricultural trade and 
we haven't got them resolved, but we 
have them identified and they're going 
to be worked at. 

Q. I have a question for Mr. Yeut- 
ter [U.S. Trade Representative Clayton 
Yeutter], please. I understand the 
Commission has given you a list of 
what it considers to be unfair trade 
practices. Could you tell us something 
about this list and whether you feel 
the allegations are correct? 

Ambassador Yeutter. I have not yet 
seen the list, although Commissioner De 
Clercq has indicated that he plans to 
provide it to me. So I cannot respond to 
it. I did give Mr. De Clercq a philosoph- 
ical response this morning. That was 
simply that we believe very strongly in 
free and fair trade and, if there be any 
legitimate complaints of unfairness from 
the standpoint of U.S. conduct, we are 
pleased to have that challenged. We 
believe the Community has every right 
to challenge unfair trade practices of 



other nations or allegations or the 
prerogative of launching allegations of 
such conduct whether it be related to 
the United States or any other country. 
We feel very strongly ourselves that we 
should have that same privilege and, as 
you know, we have launched a number 
of unfair trade practice complaints dur- 
ing the past several months, a couple of 
them, vis-a-vis the Community. We do 
not construe action designed to rid the 
world of unfair trade practices as being 
protectionist in any way. Obviously, if 
we feel the Community's allegations are 
inappropriate, we will say so, just as 
they have every right to make that 
same commentary with respect to any 
allegations we might make. But it is on- 
ly conjectural at this point since I have 
not seen the list. 

Q. Can I follow that up to Mr. De 
Clercq, if he could tell us what the 
list is and what it is that you find un- 
fair in the U.S. trade practices? 

Mr. De Clercq. I don't think I'll 
surprise anyone if I say I am not going 
to comment on the list. It would be a 
bit of a diabolical liberty if Mr. Yeutter 
was to learn what was on the list during 
a press conference. I have got it in my 
briefcase. My day at work hasn't yet 
been completed and tomorrow morning, 
since I wasn't able to have dinner with 
Mr. Yeutter last night, I was in the 
European Parliament— in fact, there are 
so many, Mr. Yeutter has made so 
many speeches, in fact, that I had to 
answer all these points in the European 
Parliament. So, this shows how deter- 
mined and how competent he is in de- 
fending legitimate interests of his coun- 
try, but it means for me more work 
because I have to spend night time ses- 
sions dealing with related points in the 
European Parliament because some of 
the members of Parliament are a bit 
upset by these statements. So I missed 
dinner and I had to have a modest 
breakfast and between the croissant and 
the roll, I shall hand over this list and, 
then after that, we can discuss it, but 
please, not before. 

President Delors. This shows you 
the competence and vitality of the oppo- 
site number of Mr. Yeutter, our equiva- 
lent. He also likes making speeches. 

Q. Did you raise the question of 
the decision taken by your govern- 
ment to reduce the budget deficit over 
a 5-year period in your talks with the 
Commission, and what did you say 
about that? What will be the effect of 



this on trade relations between the 
United States and the Community? 
And, the second question, just now 
you referred to the possibility of dis- 
putes which might be of an explosive 
nature. Do you have any particular 
dispute in mind? 

Secretary Shultz. No, I was just i 
reacting to the spaghetti comment i 
which in my country is called pasta. I 
assume that's what you are talking 
about as a very particular thing that 
gets people quite excited on each side 
and is important but, at the same time 
has to be kept in the right perspective , 
As far as the Gramm-Rudmann bill is j 
concerned, I think I have said about | 
what I have to say on that subject am i 
don't see that it particularly has any i 
special bearing on trade relations as 
such. 

Q. President Delors has mentiont 
that you discussed technology'. Did 
you talk about the whole issue of | 
Europe opening telecommunications-* 
markets to the Americans which I 
know Mr. Yeutter is concerned abou 
and I'd particularly like to ask both 
him and Mr. Delors that question ar 
if you felt you got any satisfaction c 
that issue? 

Secretary Shultz. Yes. We dis- 
cussed the general subject of tech- 
nology, but I'll ask Secretary [of Com- 
merce Malcolm] Baldrige to comment i 
that or Clayton as well. 

Secretary Baldrige. We do have 
some medium and long-range concerns 
on the whole issue of telecommunica- 
tions. We didn't get into that in any 
depth today but it's very clear that th 
United States, after the breaking up o 
AT&T, has seen perhaps the most ope 
telecommunications market in the wor 
We happen to think that that regulatii 
[sic] was good but, on the other hand, 
it's certainly increased imports from 
European communities, Japan, and otl 
places. I think there is an inevitable ti 
toward wanting now to see other tele- 
communication markets as open or not 
as open but getting closer to that poir 
than they are now. So there will be di 
cussions on that, that's for certain. Bi 
we didn't go into it in depth today. 

President Delors. I have three br 
remarks to make. First, a group, a 
study group, a joint study group in- 
volving the United States and the Coi 
munity has been set up on high tech- 
nology and this group has in particula 
discussed matters pertaining to bio- 
technology and telecommunications. It 
will continue to do so. 



42 



Department of State Bullei 



THE SECRETARY 



Secondly, I told our American 
>nds, briefly, what the concerns of 
ropean firms were. They are trying 
see where they stand in this rapidly 
mging world, particularly with proj- 
s as stimulating as are the SDI and 
ers. They need to know whether 
y are in the starting blocks, if they 
nd on the same footing as other com- 
lies that are not Community com- 
lies. This is our preoccupation that 
ds us to detailed discussion and to a 
ser coopei-ation between the United 
•tes and the Community. 
Thirdly, and this is the most impor- 
t thing, there can only be coherence 
I hope for the future of the Com- 
nity if in parallel it accomplishes its 
3ntions on the internal market and if 
)articipates more in multilateral 
de. The two things go hand-in-hand. 
g cannot imagine building up the in- 
nal market on the inside without 
ipting an equally consistent attitude 
a-t'is the outside. 

Q. In his introduction to this press 
iference. President Delors was re- 
ring to the Group-of-Five meeting 
foreign exchange, and he said that 
lough there was an agreement on 
jrvention, these interventions had 

been sufficient. What was the 
erican reaction to that? 
Secretary Shultz. I think, and of 
rse President Delors will speak for 
iself, but I think the impact of the 
) announcement has been a construc- 
! one. Through some pattern of some 
srvention, perhaps even to a greater 
ent, actions within a country that sig- 
what it is doing, such as the some- 
it higher rates of interest in Japan 

things of that kind, there has been 
effect on e.xchange markets that is 
:d and perhaps it's also good for ex- 
nge markets to feel that somebody is 
tching. On the whole, those are the 
les of things talked about, and I think 
toably you and I would agree that 
; announcement was a good thing. 

didn't have a difference about it. 
President Delors. Perhaps you mis- 
ierstood me, or perhaps I wasn't ter- 
iy clear. But I would remind you that 
he Fontainebleau summit, I per- 
'ally suggested that central banks 
uld work more closely together, but 
lid at that time that this eross-inter- 
tion from the central banks could not 
'he long term remedy the unhealthy 
■ects of international economy. 



But I did say that the meeting of 
the G-5 had a twofold positive effect. 
First of all, a psychological signal to the 
markets. Just a week later, the markets 
were less jittery and easier to read. 
This was the clear determination not to 
allow the markets to be too volatile and 
to give way to nervous trends, and at 
the same time, from a technical point of 
view, this cross-intervention from the 
central banks, not in e.xcessive amounts, 
did show that it was effective to a cer- 
tain extent. 

Of course, however, this doesn't 
mean that we should not get to grips 
with the basic difficulties. There is, of 
course, among other things, the U.S. 
budget deficit. But at the same time, 
there is insufficient growth in Europe, 
there is insufficient participation of the 
Community in certain monetary and eco- 
nomic matters. There is also the role 
that Japan should play. So we should 
welcome the effects of this. But let us 
not have any illusions about this. Inter- 
vention of the central banks on their 
own will not deal with all the im- 
balances, or the unhealthy aspects of the 
international economy, and I am sure 
the Secretary will agi-ee with me. We 
discussed the other points, the other 
things that we have to work together on 
in the broad perspective he sketched 
out. 

Q. The relations which the Euro- 
pean Community wishes to intensify 
with Latin America, particularly- 
Central America in particular- 
through the cooperation ag:reement 
sigrned in Luxembourg and which does 
not preclude Nicaragua. How is this 
perceived by the government in North 
America, and what is felt about rela- 
tions between United States and the 
European Community and relations 
between the United States and Central 
America? Further, in a world shared 
by two superpowers, Europe is surely 
an alternative making it possible for 
Latin America not to have to make a 
choice with all that it implies between 
yourselves and the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Shultz. First of all on the 
European meetings with a Central 
American group, we welcome that. Cen- 
tral America needs help. We try to give 
a lot of it, and we welcome Europe also 
giving help. Of course, giving help in 
this case means opening markets to 
trade, and we have opened our markets 
to trade with Central American coun- 



tries and Caribbean countries on a 
preferential basis to ti-y to encourage 
their economic development. That is the 
principal thing that they need. 

As far as Nicaragua is concerned, 
Nicaragua is isolating itself. It's iso- 
lating itself in its own community, and 
it's isolating itself from its own popu- 
lation. Nothing was more dramatic in 
that regard than the Nicaraguan in- 
volvement with the M-19 terrorist 
group that murdered justices in Colom- 
bia and necessitated that terrible battle 
at the Palace of Justice in Bogota. And, 
I must say when I was in Cartagena 
about a week and a half ago for a meet- 
ing vrith Latin American Foreign Minis- 
ters in the OAS [Organization of Ameri- 
can States], it was quite apparent that 
Nicaragua is the odd-man out. So, I ex- 
pect that Europe may observe that too. 

I don't think on your second ques- 
tion that Latin America needs to choose 
between the Soviet Union and the 
United States and land on Europe as 
the alternative. I don't think that's the 
way to look at it. For one thing, there 
isn't an alternative between the United 
States and Western Europe insofar as 
value systems are concerned. And it's 
very important to recognize the unity, 
not disunity, of Europe and the United 
States in that regard. 

Insofar as trade is concerned, help 
yourself. The great volume of Latin 
American trade is with the United 
States and the surge of exports that's 
helped turn many of those economies 
around has come from the exports into 
the U.S. market in the last 2 or 3 years. 
So it's been of great benefit to them but 
the more they are able to ship to Eu- 
rope, why the better. They need growth 
and they need markets, and we encour- 
age the opening of European markets to 
them. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
BUCHAREST, 
DEC. 15. 1985^ 

I wish to express my appreciation to 
President Ceausescu and his colleagues 
for receiving us today on a weekend and 
for the lengthy meeting that we had 
vrith the President. During the course of 
the meeting, we discussed all of the 
issues that were on our agenda to dis- 
cuss, both in the bilateral area and in 
the international field; so you can see 
great significance to both countries. We 



ruarv 1986 



43 



THE SECRETARY 



found areas of agreement, areas where 
we didn't see things the same way, 
others where more effort seemed to be 
called for. We certainly have determined 
that we will try to make it because we 
would like to see the relationship be- 
tween the United States and Romania 
be as good as it can be. I again express 
my appreciation for what I consider to 
be a constructive and worthwhile and 
far-ranging discussion. 

Q. The existence of a big number 
of conflicts is always a big danger for 
today's peace. What do you think 
about the possibilities to solve a 
number of existing conflicts, and what 
do you think about the use of force 
and intervention? I am referring to all 
the conflicts in the world, and the 
possibilities to improve detente on 
this. 

A. Of course, the United States 
believes in peaceful solutions, in political 
solutions, in negotiated solutions. I call 
your attention to the Great Seal of our 
lepublic. It shows an eagle, and the 
eagle has in one claw an olive branch 
and in the other, arrows. And the eagle 
is always looking at the olive branch to 
show that in every sphere, the United 
States seeks peace. Peace with justice, 
but the eagle also holds onto the arrows 
because we have found through our ex- 
perience that strength is the road to 
peace. 

As we have approached the subject 
of East-West relations, and as the Presi- 
dent approached his recent meeting 
vdth Mr. Gorbachev, we spent a great 
deal of time on the subject of arms con- 
trol, and some progress was made, and 
we welcome that. But we recognized, 
and the President said, that countries 
arm because of the differences among 
them and not the other way around. It 
is important to look at the flashpoints 
around the world and see what can be 
done about them. It is important to look 
at the implications of things such as the 
Helsinki accords and the Madrid man- 
date and other things of that kind that 
go to the relationship between govern- 
ments and human beings. And of course, 
also at Geneva, just as here in Romania, 
we talked about our bilateral relation- 
ships. I think there is a great deal that 
can be done in both cases to improve 
them. 



Q. Could you tell us what you said 
to President Ceausescu about the pres- 
sures that have been building up in 
Congress to tie MFN [most-favored- 
nation] status more closely to 
Romania's human rights performance, 
and what response you got? 

A. It isn't a question of pressures in 
Congress; it is a question of what, from 
the standpoint of the United States, we 
feel is right and proper. We discussed 
these matters, of course, recognizing the 
right of eveiy country to govern its own 
internal affairs, but also the commit- 
ments that are undertaken by accords 
that I mentioned earlier. I consider that 
our conversations were candid and 
frank, and, as I said, worthwhile. We 
have set up some procedures that we 
hope vvdll resolve what differences there 
are. Beyond that I don't wash to 
comment. 

Q. At the Soviet-American summit 
in Geneva, both parties agreed to the 
principle of substantial, even 50%, 
reduction of nuclear arms. If there is 
this readiness, will you kindly explain 
why the testing and deployment of 
new arms are going on? Why is not 
beginning the process of military ex- 
penditures, reductions in favor of 
development? 

A. Actually the story of the last 
decade is one in which the United 
States has been taking more nuclear 
weapons out of use than it has put in, in 
the course of modernization, whereas 
the Soviets have built up. I think the 
important thing to focus on is the impor- 
tance of radical reductions. This has 
been our program for many years, and 
it is our program today. 

I think it is a matter of some sig- 
nificance that in the counterproposal 
prior to the Geneva meeting and at the 
Geneva meeting, the two heads of state 
personally put their endorsement on this 
idea of a 50% reduction. That is an im- 
portant idea. Obviously, it only takes 
you a certain distance because it is a 
question of 50% of what, and our views 
about the "of what" are very different. 
However, that is what the negotiation is 
about, to resolve those differences. So 
the United States will continue to work 
for radical reductions in nuclear weap- 
ons across the board. 

Of the weapons that seem to be of 
greatest concern in Europe are the so- 
called intermediate-range weapons, our 
position has been from the beginning. 



and remains today, that the best solu- 
tion is zero. Right away. And of course- 
we have stated, and so have the 
Soviets, that our ultimate goal is to 
eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. Bu i 
you have to walk before you can run, i| 
I can label 50% a walk. That's certainl | 
the step that needs to be taken. 

Q. The Romanian President, 
earlier today talking about U.S.- 
Romanian relations, said they could 
be better. After your series of meet- 
ings today, how would you charac- 
terize this relationship between the 
United States and Romania? 

A. I think the President said it we 
They could be better, and so one of th 
purposes of my trip here on the one 
hand is to pay my respects to the mar 
interesting stands and positions 
Romania has taken and the relationsh; 
that we do have and its basic fundamt 
tal importance, but also to discuss son 
of the reasons why it isn't better and 
see if there are things that we can do 
make it so. 

Q. You carried a letter from 
Minority Leader Michel to the 
Romanian Foreign Minister. Could 
you tell us something about that? I 
mean, what was the purpose of thisi 

A. It was a letter given to me by 
the Republican leader in the House oti 
Representatives. As it turned out, he ^ 
had met the Foreign Minister when tl 
Foreign Minister, with another portfo 
happened to be in Washington. So I 
think it was a natural thing that he 
should write and express some of his 
own concerns. But I don't think it is 
proper for me to disclose the contents 
a private letter between Mr. Michel a 
the Foreign Minister. 

Q. President Reagan said once 
that he recognizes the frontiers in 
Europe after World War II. That is. 
that they recognized the political m 
of the Continent as it is today. As I 
understand, during your trip— your 
present trip to Europe— you said ths 
it seems to you that Europe is arti- 
ficially divided. Now I want to put i 
very clear question. Do they, the 
United States, recognize the frontie 
as they are today? 

A. We don't, in that comment tha 
made in Berlin last night or in any 
other comments, suggest that we are 



44 



Department of State Bullf 



THE SECRETARY 



ydng to charge the boundaries that are 
tablished in Europe. But I think it is 
fact that Europe is divided. It is di- 
ied artificially; it is divided by barbed 
re; it is divided by a Berlin wall; it is 
/ided by i-estrictions of all kinds on 
e freedom of Europeans to travel to 
ch other's countries, so there is an 
tificial division of Europe. It is a di- 
iion of the people from each other, 
lat is what I referred to. I think the 
irld would be more stable, more 
aceful, more joyous if this division 
re bi-ought to an end. We constantly 
ike that point, and I might say that I 
ve heard many of my friends in 
■Stern Europe echo the same point. 

Q. Did you discuss with President 
ausescu the huge trade imbalance 
tween trade— between Romania and 
; United States— and if so, what was 
cussed, and were any plans set 
th for addressing this? 

A. We discussed the subject of 
de, and I discussed it some more 
h the Minister of Trade who hap- 
led to be seated next to me by 
.nee at luncheon. But with the Presi- 
it, the main part of the discussion 
1 to do with our policies on tech- 
ogy transfer, which he criticized and 
ich I tried to explain. And that was 

main burden of our discussion. How- 
T, the subject of trade is an impor- 
t bilateral subject, and we would like 
see trade flourish to the extent that 
an, and I believe that it can increase 
re in the future, and I hope it does. 

Q. I am wondering if you would 
tress your support to President 
lusescu about independent policy of 
b country? If so, in what way do 
1 express your support? 
A. It isn't a question of expressing 
Iport; it's a question of having a dis- 
bion, which we did at some length, of 
lious issues of foreign policy, and 
re are many important subjects on 
ich we seem to have a rather parallel 
jA'. There are others on which we 
I't. We went through these, and I 
Ilk it was quite a worthwhile discus- 
li and worth doing that. I was inter- 
id— I don't want to quote the Presi- 
t; he will speak for himself, so I 
I't expand on the comments, but just 
as I did. 



Let me just conclude by saying, and 
I mentioned to the President that at the 
opening ceremonies in Los Angeles of 
the Olympic Games a year ago last sum- 
mer, as the teams from various coun- 
tries marched into the stadium— I hap- 
pened to be there with President 
Reagan— it was quite striking that the 
team that got the greatest amount of 
spontaneous applause was the Romanian 
team. And so in that spirit and with the 
symbolism of that Olympic event, let me 
say that as we try to work at the prob- 
lems that we have and the undoubted 
problems between the United States 
and Romania, we agreed that we would 
work at them in the spirit of the 
Olympics. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BUDAPEST, 

DEC. 16, 1985« 

I'd like first to express my deep ap- 
preciation to the leadership and people 
of Hungai-y— of course, particularly my 
host, the Foreign Minister— for inviting 
me here, and for providing me with 
such an interesting program. Of course, 
it was exciting to see the Danube flow- 
ing through Budapest and to see the 
wonderful buildings and museum, but 
even more exciting were the interesting 
discussions here with the Hungarian of- 
ficials, in particular, of course, Mr. 
Kadar, who was most generous with his 
time this afternoon. 

Q. Would you please give us a 
post-Geneva rundown, scenario, the 
way you would like to see for in 1986? 

A. I think that's a little hard for me 
to foresee. The crystal ball has finger- 
prints all over it. I can't see through it 
very well. But let me say this about the 
meeting in Geneva. The President con- 
sidered it to be a most worthwhile 
meeting. He had a good opportunity for 
a thorough exchange of views with Mr. 
Gorbachev. Some things were agreed to 
that have genuine significance, and it 
was interesting to me here to have peo- 
ple point out to me something that I 
agreed with— namely, there's one thing 
for each of those leaders to say sepa- 
rately that a nuclear war cannot be won 
and must never be fought. It has a little 
bit more weight and meaning when they 
say it together in a joint statement. 



We from the United States side are 
engaged in a very intensive followoip 
process within our government and 
already in contact with the Soviet Union 
in following up on the Geneva meeting 
because we want to move things for- 
ward as much as we can. And it is our 
impression from the responses on the 
Soviet side that they are equally serious 
in trying to pursue the matters dis- 
cussed at Geneva and do what we can 
to bring them to a successful conclusion. 
What the outcome will be I can't fore- 
cast. But I can say with great con- 
fidence that a strong effort will be made 
to maintain a constructive spirit and to 
maintain an ability to agree to things 
and work out problems to the extent we 
possibly can. 

Q. Along those lines, did your 
discussions with Mr. Kadar include 
the question of the role of countries 
like Hungary in the process of improv- 
ing relations? 

A. My discussions were quite 
rewarding as far as I'm concerned. I did 
have some things to say, but I did a lot 
of listening and I felt that I heard a 
great deal of wisdom. It is certainly the 
case that the world and the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship, East-West relationships, 
are at a very important moment, per- 
haps promising moment. And the people 
here in Hungary, and Mr. Kadar in par- 
ticular, offered interesting observations, 
I felt, and that's a genuine contribution. 
And so I consider my trip to have been 
most worthw^hile. 

Q. Did your discussion include a 
discussion of Mr. Kadar's visiting 
Washington in the near future? 

A. That didn't come up, but I'm cer- 
tainly in a strong position to say to 
evei-yone in Washington that Mr. Kadar 
is a very interesting interlocutor and 
well worth listening to. 

Q. Did you discuss the prospect of 
improving trade and cultural ex- 
changes [inaudible] with Hungary? 

A. We discussed our bilateral rela- 
tions quite a bit, and I think on both 
sides we think that they are progressing 
in a satisfactory way. We don't have 
major problems. We would like to see 
trade expand to a greater extent. The 
cultural exchange is moving and in proc- 
ess, and there will be coming to the 
United States this spring— I think it 



iiruarv 1986 



45 



THE SECRETARY 



opens in April— a major display of 
Hungarian silver and gold works that 
I'm sure people in the United States 
will find interesting. I was told in the 
museum today, that 100,000 people last 
month came through there, and I'm sure 
there were some Americans present 
among them. There is a lot of that kind 
of exchange and it's certainly to be 
encouraged. 

Q. If my memory doesn't betray 
me [inaudible] you refer to the un- 
natural division of Europe. Now what 
exactly do you mean by that and 
[inaudible]? 

A. Let me say what I don't mean 
and then what I do mean. I don't mean 
anything about how the lines are drawn 
on the map. They're there. They're 
drawTi. 

What I do mean is that it seems to 
be unnatural that there be restrictions 
on movement of people in Europe from 
one place to another. I spoke about this 
particularly in Berlin, where there is the 
Berlin Wall, and what does it say? It 
says that it is a symbol of division. And 
it's not only a symbol, it's a reality of 
division, and it's unnatural. It's un- 
natural that German families can't visit 
each other freely or reunify. And the 
same through many other dimensions of 
life. I had a question a minute ago on 
cultural exchanges. So whether you're 
talking culture, science, economies, 
family, the history of Europe is one of 
diversity among different national 
gi'oups but of a tremendous flow and ex- 
change among them, and it's unnatural 
that that not be so. I think we should 
work to bring it— to make it less so and 
eliminate it if possible. For example, as 
I understand it, there is no problem at 
all about people moving across the 
Hungarian-Austrian border. There's a 
free flow there. That's good. That's the 
sort of thing we ought to see on a more 
widespread basis. That's what I mean. 

Q. According to the last census 
held in the United States, there are 
1.8 million ethnic Hungarians in the 
United States and half a million of 
them speak Hungarian. How do you 
see their role in the relations between 
the United States and Hungary? 
Maybe it serves as some kind of link 
or bridge between the two countries, 
promoting better understanding of the 
governments and the peoples. 



A. I think you make a very good 
point about the existence in the United 
States of people from many different 
countries and in this case an important 
gi-oup from Hungary. On the one hand, 
the Hungarian-Americans have made 
very significant and important contribu- 
tions to life in the United States, and 
we appreciate that. On the other hand, 
they also most generally have an in- 
terest and pride in Hungary, and so 
they call it to our attention. I think it is 
undoubtedly helpful. It was interesting 
to me to have our current Ambassador 
to Hungai-y, Mr. Salgo, as we were com- 
ing out I think it was of the National 
Museum— point out a sort of a garden 
nearby and said that when he was a 
child in school, he used to play in that 
garden. He brings a special understand- 
ing and affection and has been the 
agent, I think, for a genuine improve- 
ment in our relationships, so you have 
put your finger on something very im- 
portant with your question. 

Q. The assessments that were 
published in today's papers about 
Hungarian-American relations men- 
tioned that while it's a very good 
thing that there is a development in 
trade but still that many Hungarian 
managers are at a loss in the [inaudi- 
ble] because they cannot plan; there is 
this annual basis of most-favored- 
nation status, and this really gives a 
hindrance or an obstacle of a longer 
or a greater flow of Hungarian- 
American trade. How do you see this 
problem, and was this problem raised 
in the discussion? 

A. Yes, this question was brought 
up with me several times, whether or 
not there couldn't be some sort of 
multiyear or elimination of the MFN 
question. At this point I don't see any 
particular prospect of a change in the 
law under which that takes place. And 
it isn't really a question of Hungary, 
really. 

At the same time, there is no op- 
position in the United States, or no 
basis for it, to the continuation or of 
MFN treatment for Hungary; so, it 
really isn't an issue. But I think it 
would be at some point when the time 
is propitious to deal with the question, 
because it's quite understandable that it 
helps to have the certainty that the con- 
ditions that are in effect, let's say today, 
are going to be in effect a year from 
now or 2 years from now. It helps in 
the conduct of trade and business and 
investment without a doubt. But I think 
that anyone who makes that assumption 
under today's conditions is maldng a 
correct assumption. 



Q. It's your first visit to this part 
of Europe. Did the [inaudible] and in 
formation you got so far possibly 
enrich or probably modify your 
previous [inaudible] East-West rela- 
tions [inaudible]? 

A. It certainly enriched my under- 
standing. It's always different, and bet 
ter, [inaudible] to come to a country ar 
talk to people there, as distinct from 
talking even to the same people in son 
other place. It's good for me to come 
here and get a better appreciation of 
the view of people, of the beauty, of tl 
culture, of the history. You can feel it, 
when you're here, in a fuller sense. I 
don't think I could say I was sui-prisec 
because I expected to have good, franl 
searching, worthwhile, and rewarding 
discussions, and I have. I expected to 
see some things that would be quite e 
traordinary, and I have seen them. So 
wasn't surprised. My expectations wei 
high, and I wasn't disappointed. 

Q. You called Mr. Kadar a wise i 
terlocutor. Could you be more speeii I 
on what you wanted to learn from | 
him— a discussion, a little more on 
your discussions? , 

A. We talked about developments | 
Hungary— that was enlightening to me 
and how I should understand them. W 
talked about U.S. -Soviet relationships, 
and he gave his reflections on the 
meeting in Geneva and the importance 
of followup on Geneva, and we ex- 
changed views on that, and we talked 
general about East- West relations. He 
had many comments that I found wort 
while, but I don't think it's proper for 
me to go into detail, but those are the 
general areas on which we found 
it— good. 

Q. In your speech in Berlin, you 
also talked about how the United 
States does not accept the incorpora 
tion of other countries into a Soviet 
sphere of influence. The United Stat 
has been, I think, rather passive in i 
cent years toward most of the coun- 
tries in this part of the world. Do yo 
foresee, perhaps, more attention beii 
given to having more American in- 
fluence in the countries which do no 
perhaps have as good relations with 
the United States as Hungary does? 
I'm thinking of Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, Poland. 

A. I think that can very well be a 
natural tendency, and I hope it takes 
place just in the natural course of 
things. If it turns out to be so, and I 



46 



Department of State Bulk 



THE SECRETARY 



pe it will be so, that the general tenor 
East-West relationships and U.S.- 
viet relationships improve. We do 
ve some very interesting settings 
lieh are important for their own sake 
d also important for just the question 
who's there. 

I particularly would single out the 
jckholm negotiations on confidence- 
ilding measures in Europe. These 
lasures are important, but it's also in- 
•esting that attending those meetings 
d working at it are the NATO coun- 
es, the Warsaw Pact countries, and 
; neutral and nonaligned countries. 
s a good mixture, and a good place 
■ people to talk. It provided the occa- 
n for Foreign Ministers' meeting in 
Dckholm, and, of coui'se, the parent 
'Isinki process provided a similar set- 
g last summer, and that was fruitful, 
hink in the normal course of events if 
ngs move in a direction we'd like to 
? them move, and of course they may 
;, but if they do, then we would ex- 
.'t to see more contacts, certainly. 

Q. For Hungary, the economic side 
the relationship is quite important, 
you see a possibility for a substan- 
1 improvement on this field as a 
ult of your visit? 

A. I don't know that it's the result 
my visit, particularly, but the amount 
trade between us is small. It's signifi- 
it, but it's small. I think that it 
mldn't be difficult to have a big per- 
itage increase. Percentage increases 
small bases are always a little decep- 
e, but if that's what you mean, yes, I 
nk that could happen, and a visit 
isn't necessarily solve any of those 
)blems. Those are questions of trade, 
)resent things that businesses do, not 
ngs that in our country that govem- 
nts do, except that the governmental 
jrlay and encouragement, perhaps 
,es some reassurance, for example, on 
' MFN question that you raised, and 
it may help. I hope it does. Also we 
cussed the general world economic 
/ironment and what needs to be done 
)ut it because both the United States 
i Hungary are a part of the world 
inomy. We're affected by it. We're 
h trading nations, and so what hap- 
is in that sphere will have its impact 
hout a doubt. 

Q. How high are East-West rela- 
ns on your personal agenda in 
(lerican foreign policy? East-West 



relations turn out to be, in the major- 
ity of cases, American-European rela- 
tions as well, as it became much of a 
fashion in the United States to talk 
about the decline of Europe, and 
about American attention concen- 
trating much to the south and to the 
west within the United States [inaudi- 
ble]. How do you see it? 

A. I think the general subject of 
East- West relations and U.S.-Soviet 
relations is right up at the top of our 
agenda, and it will get full attention 
from President Reagan and all the 
people working with him. We will spare 
no effort to see that things go forward 
in that sphere. I think that in doing so, 
and doing it in collaboration with our 
friends and allies around the world, not 
just in Europe, we're doing something 
that I think people very much want to 
see. It is true that all around the world 
people would welcome a more construc- 
tive U.S.-Soviet relationship, if one can 
be built on a realistic basis that serves 
the interests of people around the 
world. So they want it, and they want it 
worked out, and we do, too, and we will 
do so. 

Q. Regarding the policy of dif- 
ferentiating among the nations of 
Eastern Europe, and between them 
and the Soviet Union, during your 
talks, and especially your talks here 
in Hungary, what do you suppose is 
the most you can hope for in the way 
of results from that policy? What 
would you like to see that policy 
achieve for the United States? 

A. I think that really it's a question 
of recognizing that countries differ from 
each other in the natural state of things. 
We speak of Europe, let alone Western 
and Eastern Europe, but when you 
come down to it, those words are a little 
too broad and you have to speak about 
individual countries. 

The same is true in other areas of 
the world. Often in the United States, 
people talk about South America, but 
when you work at the problems of 
South America and travel and do 
business there, and so on, as I have, 
you quickly drop that and say, we'd bet- 
ter talk about Argentina or Brazil or 
Venezuela or Me.xico or whatever 
because each country is distinctive in 
itself. Certainly that's true in this case, 
and what we seek to do is— where we 
can, where it's appropriate— develop a 
reciprocal pattern of improving our rela- 
tionships with countries around the 
world, including here in Hungary. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BELGRADE, 

DEC. 17, 1985' 

Secretary Shultz. I appreciate the 
reception here in Belgrade, and the very 
fully filled day of discussions. We've 
covered the subjects in our bilateral 
relationship, which basically is a good 
one; we've covered our interests in 
economic problems, including the inter- 
national economic environment; and 
we've discussed political and security 
issues generally, with many interesting 
perceptions given to me by my col- 
leagues from Yugoslavia about the 
development of East- West relationships 
and our own relationship with the 
Soviet Union and the President's 
meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva. 
In addition I had the fun of a visit to an 
extraordinary 19th century house. It 
was an interesting little visit to the 
history of your country and I ap- 
preciated that as well. 

Secretary Dizdarevic. May I say 
that we quite appreciate the fact that 
we have Secretary Shultz visiting here 
with us in Yugoslavia. And as you heard 
from him already, ever since he arrived 
in Yugoslavia, until this present mo- 
ment, we've practically been talking all 
the time. And at these talks we have 
exchanged opinions and assessments 
with regard to all aspects of our rela- 
tions and also with regard to our 
bilateral cooperation. 

Speaking of our bilateral coopera- 
tion, may I proceed from the assessment 
that our bilateral relations are good and 
that they are based on the fact that our 
two countries wish to cooperate, 
although we have different internal 
systems and although we have different 
international positions and although we 
have different views with regard to 
quite a few issues. However, there is an 
interest in cooperation on both sides, 
and we believe that in this way we can 
only contribute to world cooperation. 

We have discussed a large number 
of topical international issues during our 
talks today, and we have heard some 
very interesting appraisals of the recent 
Geneva meeting from Secretary Shultz; 
also with regard to what has been hap- 
pening since the Geneva meeting and 
also how he views the aftermath of the 
Soviet-U.S. relations. We also expressed 
our views and the views of nonaligned 
countries with regard to this process of 
negotiations, and I hope that Mr. Shultz 



bruary 1986 



47 



THE SECRETARY 



won't mind if I refer the attention of 
you all to the toast that he delivered at 
our luncheon today. I am convinced that 
it is going to be most useful to you for 
these particular purposes. May I say in 
conclusion that we are very satisfied 
with the talks we have had because 
these talks were very substantive, very 
frank and very friendly. 

Q. Did you discuss the multiyear 
rescheduling of Yugoslav debt by 
Western governments and bilateral 
trade relations between the United 
States and Yugoslavia and if so, 
what's the U.S. position? 

Secretary Shultz. You added the 
last part of your question or I could 
have just said, "yes." We did discuss 
those matters. Insofar as trade is con- 
cerned, we both believe that it could ex- 
pand; we'd like to see it expand. I think 
one of your colleagues just returned 
from the United States in a mission 
with the U.S. -Yugoslav economic mis- 
sion. There are certain problems we 
discussed: textiles, steel, the application 
of dumping, and such legislation. All this 
is part of the scene as it affects all coun- 
tries, not just Yugoslavia. But I think I 
can fairly say and my Yugoslav hosts 
did note that the U.S. market is basi- 
cally open, and we are ready to receive 
their goods. We would like to sell goods 
here. We talked about that, too. 

Insofar as the MYRA [multiyear 
rescheduling agreement] is concerned, 
we discussed that and also I was able to 
say on my own behalf and my govern- 
ment's that we're really tremendously 
impressed with the steps taken here and 
the results of them. Insofar as the com- 
mercial MYRA is concerned, that's been 
signed. We encourage that. And on the 
question of MYRA on official debts we 
have an open mind, and we're prepared 
to discuss this with the Government of 
Yugoslavia. We talked enough about the 
ins and outs of that at some length. 

Q. [Inaudible] the irreplaceable 
role and the contribution of non- 
aligned countries to the easing of ten- 
sions is well-known. How do you view 
the role of nonaligned countries to- 
day, bearing in mind the fact that 
relations between the two superpowers 
have thawed? 

Secretary Dizdarevic. You know 
that the policy of nonalignment and the 
movement of nonaligned countries ever 
since its very outset, that is, starting 
with the Belgrade conference, was in- 
volved in the easing of tensions, the 
process of negotiations and cooperation 



with the participation of all and to the 
benefit of all. The kind of policy and 
these objectives of the movement have 
always received our full support. And as 
you could see at the conference in 
Lusaka and also at this present point of 
time, the dialogue that the two super- 
powers are involved with now have 
received the support of the movement of 
nonaligned countries, which on the one 
hand did present its point of view with 
regard to these intentions and the proc- 
ess of negotiating, but on the other 
hand which also contributed with its 
ovra activity to the general international 
atmosphere, which would be conducive 
to the development of this process and 
to giving it a more sustained support. It 
was, after all, we believe that there 
could be no detente, no relaxation of 
tensions, if there is no easing of tensions 
and, if there is no cooperation between 
the two superpowers, but we also do 
not think that this can be a lasting proc- 
ess if it does not encompass all countries 
and if it does not rely upon the easing 
of tensions between all countries and 
with regard to all problems. 

Q. At your press conference in 
Budapest a few days ago, you said 
that you thought there was an im- 
provement in East-West relations and 
you also said that it was the point of 
view of the German side that there 
have been some positive impulses from 
the Soviet side. What did you have in 
mind? 

Secretary Shultz. I was referring to 
the followup process after the Geneva 
meeting. I said that we were working 
hard on that on the U.S. side and that 
we, of course, were having contact with 
the Soviet side of that process. Judging 
from the responses that we've had, we 
would estimate that the Soviet side is 
working seriously on these issues as we 
are. So neither we nor the Soviets have 
taken a deep breath after Geneva and 
said, "Fine, that's over and now we'll 
wait a year or something like that." We 
have picked right up and are following 
up and doing all that we can to see that 
as constructive and stable a relationship 
is developed as is possible. 

Q. You said before you left 
Washington that you would be visiting 
three countries named Romania, 
Hungary, and Yugoslavia that would 
benefit from your visit. Does this still 
hold true and if so, what benefits did 
you have in mind? Question for 
Secretary Dizdarevic. You said that 
flashpoints of crisis were discussed in 
these talks. Could you say something 
more specific on that? 



Secretary Shultz. I don't think I 
said that these three countries would 
benefit from my visit. That's for them 
to decide. I hope they do. What I 
believe I said was that I expected to 
benefit from the visit myself by virtue 
of going to, in the case of Yugoslavia, a 
country that I have been to before but 
not for quite a while and by visiting tw 
other countries that I haven't visited. 
And in talking with them about our 
direct relationship and in reflecting wit 
them about developments in the world, 
including East-West developments, and 
hearing their perspectives. That has 
been clearly helpful to me, and I am 
glad that I had a chance to make this 
visit. 

Secretary Dizdarevic. We did have 
an exchange of views on flashpoints of i 
crisis throughout the world, that is, hot 
Secretary Shultz and myself had our 
talks and also Secretary Shultz in his 
talks with the President of the Pres- 
idency Vlajkovic. Each side e.xpressed 
its own views with regard to these 
flashpoints. The thing we have in com- 
mon, if I can speak on behalf of us bot! 
is that we find it difficult to speak of 
easing tensions worldwide and to make 
steps toward a better situation without 
having these flashpoints overcome. 

Q. Did you discuss the question o 
hijacking and international terrorism 
and could you say what the position 
of the two sides are on the question ( 
Mohamad Abbas? 

Secretary Shultz. We did discuss 
the subject of ten-orism and, from the 
U.S. side, I expressed the great concei 
we have about this problem, about the 
fact that it has become a major probler 
that is not a national problem; it's an ill 
temational problem. Hijackers and ter- 
rorists operate across national bound- 
aries, and so we seek to coopei-ate with 
other countries in dealing with this 
problem. We think that we need to 
create an atmosphere where terrorists 
have no place to hide and are brought 
to justice. We're glad to see the four 
who are being held in Italy on trial. W 
would like to see Mr. Abbas in the san 
position. I expressed my disappointmet 
that he was allowed to pass through 
Yugoslavia, and, at the same time, I 
think I can fairly say that the Yugosla 
stated their agreement on the impor- 
tance of the problem. We've had an ex 
change through our Ambassador in 
charge of this problem, Mr. Oakley, 
who's been here, and we hope to con- 
tinue to evolve a cooperative relation- 
ship with Yugoslavia, because we thin) 



48 



Department of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



this as a problem of great importance 
both countries and to countries 
ound the world. 
Secretary Dizdarevic. We did 

jCuss the problem of terrorism. You 
e familiar with Yugoslavia's stance 
d that is that it is a very serious 
oblem that is an international prob- 
n. It calls for the involvement of 
eryone individually and for coopera- 
m in combating terrorism. 

Yugoslavia has been active in this 
spect for a long time, because it has 
!en a victim of acts of terrorism for a 
ng time, too. While expressing our 
ews with regard to this particular 
atter, we also expressed Yugoslavia's 
adiness to cooperate with the United 
ates of America with regard to that 
5ue as well. 

I should like to remind you of 
jgoslavia's point of view with regard 
international terrorism and that is 
30 that Yugoslavia clearly dis- 
iguishes between the struggle against 
lonialism, against aggression, against 
cism on the one hand and terrorism 

the other hand. When speaking of 
(Torism and the strnaggle against ter- 
rism, one must also view the causes 
at lead to it, because we beheve that 

the elimination of positive terrorism, 
e phenomenon itself can be controlled 
d eliminated. As regards the Abbas 
se, I should like to say one thing: 
/erything that we had to say to each 
her concerning the Abbas case, we did 
y at the time when this was a topical 
lue and as far as Yugoslavia is con- 
,med, this has been overcome. 

Secretary Shultz. I would like to 
d a point, if I may, on this question of 
uses. Hijacking the Italian ship, 
ordering an American, torturing and 
Iding of a whole bunch of other 
nericans is not justified by any cause 
at I know of. There is no connection 
:th any cause. It's wrong, and the in- 
rnational community must step up to 
is problem and deal with it unequiv- 
ally, firmly, definitely. There must be 

place to hide for people who do that 
id of thing, and you probably feel the 
Tie way. 

Secretary Dizdarevic. I told you to- 
.;y and you do know that Yugoslavia is 
ainst all forms of terrorism and 
ainst all terrorism acts. 

Q. In an interview 2 days ago, 
,isir Arafat said that the PLO would 
: prepared to accept all resolutions 
: the United Nations Security Coun- 
: including Resolutions 242 and 338. 



What would the attitude of the U.S. 
Government toward the PLO and an 
international conference on these 
issues be in that case if all of this 
really materializes— what Arafat 
mentioned— 

Secretary Shultz. U.S. conditions 
for a discussion with the PLO have been 
clear for many years: Let them state 
their support for UN Resolutions 242 
and 338, and recognize the right of 
Israel to exist. I might say from the 
standpoint of the peace process gen- 
erally, it's hard to imagine them taking 
part at the peace table when they advo- 
cate the elimination of Israel by armed 
struggle and take part in terrorist activ- 
ities. It's not a matter of speculation 
that they take part; they claim credit 
for terrorist activities. "There has to be a 
shift of gears and I hope certainly that 
somehow or other a shift does take 
place. 

Q. [Inaudible] did you discuss hi- 
jacking in Romania and Budapest and 
[inaudible]? 

Secretary Schultz. I discussed the 
subject of terrorism generally in each 
place that I stopped and I can't think of 
a country that I ever go to where we 
don't discuss the subject. It's on 
everybody's mind. It doesn't have to be 
me all the time that brings it up. Other 
people have it on their minds as well. 

Q. [Inaudible] the increasing of the 
hostility of the United States against 
Nicaragua. So you believe that at any 
moment the United States can order 
the invasion of Nicaragua? 

Secretary Shultz. No, there's no 
plan at all for the United States to in- 
vade Nicaragua. This is a figment of 
Nicaragua's imagination. What the trou- 
ble with Nicaragua is is that it is 
alienating itself from its own people and 
its own neighborhood. The most recent 
example is, with clear relationship to 
Nicaragua, the activities of the M-19 
terrorist group that took over in the 
House of Justice in Bogota, Colombia, 
and in the firefight that ensued, 
murdered most of the justices. It's clear 
that what they were after was the 
justices who were dealing with the drug 
trafficking, with which these terrorists 
are aligned. So there's Nicaragua for 
you and that is what is alarming its 
neighborhood. Nicaragua's problems are 
of its own making. 

Q. [Inaudible] you have been in 
Romania first, and as well Bucharest 
and Budapest, you [inaudible] up the 
issue of human rights plays a big role 



although in different ways in both 
capitals. Now recently is published a 
report of Amnesty International about 
Yugoslavia in which Amnesty ex- 
presses concerns about the human 
rights situation in Yugoslavia. Was it 
also an issue in your talks here in 
Yugoslavia, and if you say it was so, 
was there also made the same linkage 
as was made in Romania and Hungary 
between economic relations and the 
human rights record? 

Secretary Shultz. The problem is 
entirely different, and we have said our 
piece on that. We work constructively 
with the Government of Yugoslavia on 
these problems. 

Q. You said you condemn acts of 
terrorism. Do you specifically con- 
demn the hijacking of the Achille 
Lauro? Secondly, as the Secretary said 
unequivocally that the PLO is con- 
nected with acts of terrorism, do you 
agree with that statement and will 
you respond to it? 

Secretary Dizdarevic. You could 
have read that at the time of the 
hijacking— Yugoslavia's official views as 
presented in the press release of the 
Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs 
where this specific action was 
condemned. 

Q. What about the connection be- 
tween [inaudible] and the PLO and 
what the Secretary of State said it's 
not a matter of speculation about 
those that are involved in terrorist 
activities? 

Secretary Dizdarevic. You know 
what Yugoslavia's stand with regard to 
the PLO is. We consider the PLO to be 
a liberation organization and the 
legitimate representative of the Pales- 
tinian people. The policy of the PLO is 
not a policy of terrorism. And the acts 
and views of individual Palestinians and 
individual groups should not be confused 
with the PLO as an organization and 
with the policy of the PLO as an 
organization. Obviously, our views differ 
on this matter. 



'The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain 
reserves his government's position on the 
present communique [text m original]. 

^Denmark and Greece reserve their posi- 
tions on the INF part of this paragraph [text 
in original]. 

^Press release 282 of Dec. 16, 1985. 

"Press release 281 of Dee. 31. 

^Press release 285. 

«Press release 287 of Dec. 18. 

'Press release 292 of Dec. 31.B 



bruary 1986 



49 



THE SECRETARY 



News Conference of December 6 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the Department of State on 
December 6, 1985.^ 

On Monday I will begin a trip to 
Europe— Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe. In the wake of the Geneva 
summit, the United Stated rededicates 
itself to its alliance with its fellow 
democracies and reaffirms its commit- 
ment to the cause of peace and freedom 
throughout that Continent. 

Since the end of World War II, the 
countries united in the Atlantic alliance 
have drawn strategic, political, and 
economic sustenance from cooperation 
with one another. This solidarity has 
made the success at Geneva possible. 
Our hopes for a more constructive East- 
West relationship depend on the democ- 
racies' standing firm on basic principles. 

In my discussions with NATO 
foreign ministers in Brussels and in my 
visits in London and Bonn, I'll carry for- 
ward the intensive consultations which 
the President began on his way back 
from Geneva. Economic interdependence 
is also part of the bedrock on which the 
alliance is based. At our annual minis- 
terial consultations with the European 
Community, we will address the press- 
ing issues of trade policy to ensure the 
openness and fairness of the world 
trading system. 

I'll also visit Berlin. Berlin is an 
inspring symbol— a city that knows 
better than any other what is really at 
stake in the conflict between East and 
West, a city whose very survival drama- 
tizes how Western solidarity is the key 
to freedom, prosperity, and peace. 

From Berlin, I'll continue on to 
Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. The 
United States and its allies have always 
insisted that the division of Europe is 
artificial, unnatural, and illegitimate. 
The peoples of the Eastern half of the 
continent did not choose to be cut off 
from the peoples of the West. If there 
are to be more constructive East- West 
relations, they, too, must share in its 
benefits. 

Romania, Hungary, and nonaligned 
Yugoslavia have each shovra that the 
countries of the Eastern part of the con- 
tinent have their own identities and 
aspirations. My visits there will show 
that we acknowledge this and support 
it. 



And so our foreign poUcy is moving 
forward with our allies, seeking further 
developments in East-West relations 
across a broad front. 

Q. In your trip to Eastern Europe, 
would the United States like to see 
more independence on the part of 
those countries you're visiting, more 
of a sense of nonalignment? 

A. Well, of course. But we also are 
interested in their internal situation. I 
personally will be fascinated to get a 
firsthand feel of developments in 
Hungary. We have been very much 
interested in the extensive emigration 
from Romania; and Yugoslavia, of 
course, in its nonaligned status and 
leadership in that regard has always 
been a place of great interest to us. 

Q. Are there any specific prag- 
matic things that you are prepared to 
do to encourage that sense of non- 
alignment? 

A. The visit itself is a recognition of 
some of the things that are currently 
going on. And I think it is helpful to us, 
and I hope to them, to hear from the 
United States what our view is of East- 
West relations and what our view is of 
developing U.S.-U.S.S.R. matters and 
arms control matters and discussions 
across the board. And so various offi- 
cials periodically visit, and this is an 
opportunity for me to do it. I've wanted 
to do it for some time, and it's the first 
real chance I've had. 

Q. Could you tell us, please, what 
is holding up the Mideast peace talks 
that the United States hoped to see 
begin by the end of the year? 

A. Our problem, of course, is to see 
how we can get the mechanics of bring- 
ing them into being into place. There 
has been some very considerable 
progress. 

I think the recognition all around 
that in the end direct negotiations have 
to be the way in which an answer is 
found is positive. I think the recognition 
that it's a process that we need get 
going rather than feeling that there has 
to be end result preordained is progress. 

But, nevertheless, it's very hard to 
find what the right way is to represent 
Palestinians. That's been a problem all 
along. It's a problem stated, in a sense, 
in the Camp David accords, and it 
remains a difficult issue just as the 
problem of some sort of an appropriate 



international auspices is a problem. So 
those are problems, and they're difficul 
We're working on them. 

I might say Ambassador [Richard] 
Murphy has had a very interesting trip 
through the area. He's in London todai 
meeting with ambassadors, and I look 
forward to talking with him on his 
return. 

Q. You spoke of a preordained ou 
come. Well, of course, there always 
had been a notion that the Palestin- ' 
ians— even the Jordanians— know wha 
they want the results to be. 

Are you saying that the Palestin- 
ians are prepared to go into a Mideas 
peace conference without a Palestin- 
ian state being preordained? Do you 
know such Palestinians? 

A. I see that King Hussein [of 
Jordan], with support from Palestinian: 
is prepared to enter a process if we ca 
find the way to do it, and there isn't 
any preordained outcome. We don't 
know what the outcome is. That's the 
whole point of the negotiation. The 
negotiation wall have a dynamic to it 
once it gets started. That's the way it 
will work. 

As I think is pretty clear, King Hi 
sein has said if the answer is that we 
enter negotiations and what happens is 
we go back to the pre-1967 borders an 
arrangements, he said, "I don't need 
any Palestinian participation to agree 1 
that." But I assume that that's not 
what's going to come out of it, and so 
therefore, there has to be a kind of pa 
ticipation that can allow a deal to be 
made and lived with. 

Q. Are significant numbers of 
Cuban troops fighting in Nicaragua, 
and are you concerned, as is Assistai 
Secretary [Elliott] Abrams, that the 
next step might be the establishment 
of Soviet bases in that country? 

A. I certainly am concerned about 
the Cuban presence and military pres- 
ence in Nicaragua and on the mainlan( 
of this hemisphere. It's not news to us 
that this is taking place, but the bring 
ing down of the helicopter with a Cub; 
pilot and copilot on it is sort of incon- 
trovertible evidence. 

We'll have some more evidence foi 
you by late this afternoon and some 
defector reports that are being declass 
fied and will be made available throug 
the Press Office. But the fact that the 
Cubans are active militarily is clear, a 
the fact that this is happening througl 
Soviet-supplied military equipment is j 
clear. i 



50 



Department of State Bull' 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. How about the Soviet-base 
igle? 

A. To the extent that the Soviets 
e supplying and influencing and have 
preiiominant role in Nicaragua, I sup- 
ise you can say that amounts to a 
ise. Now, we certainly don't want that 
id have been pointing up consistently 
e potential of this problem. 

Q. Following up on that question 
the Cuban military personnel in 
icaragua, is there any sense in the 
Iministration that because of that 
ere might be a need to request mili- 
ry aid for the Nicaragruan insurgents 
Dm Congress next year? 

A. It remains to be seen what we 
ay request next year. I think it is 
jrth noting that in the legislation 
ider which the current assistance is 
ing provided, recognition was made 
at it's a dynamic situation; and so 
ere is a provision for a privileged— in 
her words, fast— vote on any request 
at may be sent up. But beyond that, I 
n't want to comment right now. 

Q. After Mr. [Chester] Crocker's 
Iks in Lusaka with the Angolan 
terior Minister, we were told there 
!re reasons for optimism that some 
nd of peace could be worked out in 
uthem Africa. Could you tell us 
lat those reasons are? 

A. Just that there has been some 
|)vement and recognition going 
iyond, on the one hand, acknowledg- 
9nt of the principle that Cuban troop 
thdrawal is a part of the problem. It 
■s to be dealt with; do a little bit more 
scussion about that, on the one hand. 
kd from the South African standpoint, 
pilarly, responsiveness to some of the 
ings that we have been saying. 

So I suppose the best way to put it 
.that the negotiating process is very 
:ich alive. But beyond that, I don't 
int to go into detail about it. 

Q. In the past, various members of 
? Administration have characterized 
; growing Soviet— or the growing 
ban involvement in Nicaragrua as 
^nething that is intolerable to the 
lited States. If it's intolerable, what 
I? you going to do about it? 

\. I think the first step is to be sure 
It ])eople see it and understand it and 
levy it. The Administration has been 
nting this up for some time, and we 
iVe gotten gi-eat skeptical responses, 
t at this point, I think there are 
)'ces of evidence that are undeniable, 
i it does pose a serious problem. And 



as the problem is genuinely taken on 
board, there may be further steps that 
will be possible. 

Q. The Angolan Government has 
for some time stated that it accepts 
the principle that the Cubans must 
eventually withdraw from Angola but 
has never done very much to put 
something on the table that would be 
meaningful. 

Did they do so in these last talks? 
And number two, what is your view 
today toward the provision of either 
overt or covert aid by Cong^ress to the 
Savimbi people? 

A. What has happened is that this 
issue of principle, in a sense, was re- 
solved, as you pointed out, and we made 
some more concrete suggestions that 
laid on the table, so to speak, both in 
Angola and South Africa, for some time. 
Now we've seen some responsiveness to 
those more concrete suggestions. 

That doesn't mean that we're 
somewhere near a settlement, but there 
has been some responsiveness to things 
that move beyond a question of principle 
into things that have quantities and 
timetables and so forth attached to 
them. That's where we are. 

As far as assistance to UNITA and 
Mr. Savimbi are concerned, as the Presi- 
dent has said and I have said, we sup- 
port those who fight for freedom against 
the Soviet and communist regimes 
around the world, including in Angola. 
Our desire is to support them effec- 
tively. And we don't think that the pro- 
gram being put forward by some in 
Congress, while its pui-pose is one that 
we agree with, is likely to be effective. 

Q. Let me go back for a moment 
to the Middle East, if I may. As a 
result of the Geneva summit and of 
Secretary Murphy's travels in the 
region, do you see any reason to 
believe that Syria is any more pre- 
pared to play a constructive role 
toward getting to direct negotiations? 
You said a moment ago that there 
seemed to be recognition all around. 
Does that include Syria? 

A. I was not including Syria in that. 
I was thinking about those who have 
been working on it most intensively, 
particularly Jordan and the Egyptians, 
the Israehs and to some extent states 
that have been supporting the moderate 
elements. 

I would say, without wanting to go 
into detail on it, that Dick Murphy had 
some very interesting discussions and 
worthwhile discussions in Syria, and 
Syria is obviously a country of key 



importance, and so we keep in touch 
with Syria. 

Q. Mohammed Abbas, the Palestin- 
ian being sought by the U.S., was 
quoted yesterday as being in Baghdad. 
He has been in the past traveling on 
an Iraqi passport. 

Has the United States sought Iraqi 
assistance in extraditing— in confirm- 
ing whether he's there and extraditing 
him? Have the Iraqis been coopera- 
tive? Is there any consideration, if 
not, of returning Iraq to the list of 
terrorist countries? 

A. We have been pursuing him, and 
I believe the Italians are as well now. 
His complicity is clear, and so far we 
haven't been successful in getting him. 
That's where I'll leave it. 

Q. You said a little earlier, "Fur- 
ther steps are possible" with respect 
to a U.S. response to Cuban involve- 
ment in Nicaragua. I wonder if you 
could elaborate on those further steps? 

A. No, I wouldn't want to elaborate 
on those further steps other than point- 
ing out what I already pointed out— that 
the legislation under which we're oper- 
ating envisaged in its terms that the 
situation is dynamic and therefore it 
provides that, if an Administration 
request is made, there will be a privi- 
leged vote on that request. 

Q. In the last 5 years, there's been 
a gradual escalation of Cuban and 
Soviet involvement in the country. As 
far back as 5 years ago the United 
States had threatened to go to the 
source and to take action, and it 
seems, at least from the outside, that 
so far the American reaction to this 
escalation has been to increase its 
support for the insurgents rather than 
to take direct action against the 
Cuban Government. Will action be 
taken against the Cuban Government? 

A. I think our strategy in Central 
America has been working very well as 
we see the emergence of democracies in 
the region. We see the increasing isola- 
tion and self-isolation of the communist 
government in Nicaragua from others in 
the region and increasingly from its own 
people. We see the recognition of the 
relationship of that government, for 
example, to terrorism in the region— 
the M- 19— and so I think the contrast 
between what they're doing and what 
they represent, and what others in the 
region are doing and represent, is 
increasingly clear. 



fbruary 1986 



51 



THE SECRETARY 



So, I think, in that sense, our 
strategy is working. But it is incumbent 
on us, as a moral matter as well as a 
strategic matter, to support those in 
Nicaragua who are fighting for freedom 
in that country, and we will continue to 
do so. 

Q. Has the U.S. Administration 
formulated a well-defined attitude or a 
position toward the idea of an inter- 
national context for the Middle East 
negotiation? 

A. When you say, "Middle East 
negotiation," it's a big place, and I call 
your attention to the fact that the blood- 
iest war going on right now is the war 
between Iran and Iraq which we would 
like to see brought to an end. Our influ- 
ence with Iran is negligible. 

On the other hand, we have been 
counseling our friends not to send arms 
to Iran, because they are the intran- 
sigent party at this point in coming to a 
peaceful resolution. And we feel that if 
that kind of pohcy can be implemented, 
including the flow of arms from friends 
of the Soviet Union, perhaps we can see 
a resolution to that war. 

Now, I don't know whether that's 
the war you were speaking of, but I 
think it's well to keep that in mind. It's 
a very important part of the picture. It 
has its implications for the gulf, and it's 
had its fallout into people's concerns 
about oil supplies and so on. 

As far as the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
we have a clearly defined set of goals 
and a general strategy for trying to get 
there; and I've described, in response to 
an earlier question, some of the tactical 
difficulties that are, indeed, very great 
difficulties and have made it hard to 
move this process forward for some 
time. There has been some movement, 
and we'll continue to work on it. 

Q. Could you tell us in that con- 
text what role you see for the Soviet 
Union, particularly in terms of an 
international conference? 

A. I think the Soviet Union has to 
ask itself, is it going to establish full 
diplomatic relations with Israel so that 
it has a footing with all of the countries 
involved? Is it going to examine the 
way it treats Jews in the Soviet Union? 
Is it going to take a look at its emigra- 
tion policies? All of these sorts of things 
affect the receptivity to the Soviet 
Union's activities in the region, and 
these are questions, I think, that need 
to be asked before we start talking 
about an international conference. 



Q. Can you report any progrress on 
the talks with the Israelis on having 
Justice Department and, I take it. 
State Department people in Israel to 
interrogate people involved in the 
Pollard case? And can you be more 
specific on what it is we're looking for 
from the Israelis? Do we want all the 
documents back on this case? 

And a parallel question: Are you 
concerned about the case involving the 
CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] 
employee with the Chinese Govern- 
ment, because, I mean, after all, 
we've had friendly relations with the 
Chinese for some years now and even 
have offered military help to them, 
and yet, clearly, espionage activity 
was going on in that period. 

A. Obviously we're concerned about 
all espionage against the United States, 
from whatever quarter, and that goes 
across the board. As far as the Pollard 
case is concerned, we have had continu- 
ing discussions with the Israelis about 
it, and a team will go to Israel early 
next week, and we have every reason to 
believe that the issues involved will be 
resolved satisfactorily. 

Judge [Abraham] Sofaer will lead 
the team, there will be Justice and FBI 
[Federal Bureau of Investigation] 
representation, and we expect matters 
to go forward expeditiously and 
properly. 

Q. The delivery of American aid to 
the Nicaraguan democratic forces 
seems to have a bad case of the 
hiccups— deliveries not made— and 
Honduran authorities are now saying 
that the American Government is 
holding up economic aid in retalia- 
tion. What's the situation, and what's 
the remedy? 

A. The situation is that we are 
delivering assistance in a proper way. I 
don't want to describe in detail exactly 
how that's being done. There are prob- 
lems. There always are problems. We 
confront problems; we overcome them. 
New ones arise; we'll overcome them. 
But it's an ongoing process, and the 
instructions to our office that's adminis- 
tering that are: (a) do it properly in 
faithful conformance to the legislation 
under which we're operating; (b) get it 
done, get the deliveries made. And 
that's what's taking place. 

Q. You say U.S. policy in Nica- 
ragua is working well. My question is, 
where is this policy heading? We have 
right now the Contadora peace initia- 
tive basically disintegrating at the 
same time that there is an escalation 



on both sides, if you count helicoptei 
from the Soviet Union and missiles. ! 
Where is this going? 

A. First of all, when you look at ou 
policy and ask how its doing, what you 
really have to look at is what is happei 
ing; and what is happening is that 
democracy is taking root in the region, 
steps are moving forward toward eco- 
nomic development in countries other 
than Nicaragua. There are great diffi- 
culties because of the fighting, but 
nevertheless there is definitely motion j 
there. The situation is much healthier 
than it was, let's say, 3 years ago. 

And as far as Nicaragua is con- 
cerned, the time nature of the Nicara- 
guan communist government is increas 
ingly clear to everyone— in South 
America, in Europe, as well as here. 
And the way in which they are treatin. 
their own people is evidenced by the 
strength of the movement that opposes 
them and w'hich we support. 

Now, we'd like to see this come to 
an end, and the President some month 
ago made a peace proposal which the j 
Nicaragfuan communists ignored, but 
that offer, that proposal, remains on th 
table. In the meantime, however, we 
will support our friends and try to hel] 
them develop and flourish and democ- 
racy take root and flourish; and we'll 
continue to oppose what the Cubans ar 
Nicaraguans, with Soviet support, are 
trying to do in the region. It's not only 
bad for Nicaragua, it's a cancer in the 
region. 

Q. The Nicaraguans have with- 
drawn their ambassador over this inc 
dent. They're accusing the CIA of 
supplying the missile that shot down 
the helicopter. 

First of all, do you have any inter 
tion of recalling the U.S. Ambassadoi 
for consultations over this? And, 
secondly, is there any truth to the 
Nicaraguan charge? 

A. There's no truth to the charge 
that these weapons are being supplied 
by the United States. Our legislation 
prohibits that, and we are faithful to tb 
legislation. 

Obviously, these kinds of surface-to- 
air missiles are available on the inter- 
national market. We know that the 
Nicaraguan communists have plenty of 
them themselves, so it may be that the 
got them out of— captured them from 
there, but somehow or other they got 
ahold of them. And the point is that th( 
Soviet and Cuban presence and materie 
is there and being used against the 
Nicaraguan people, and thank goodness 



52 



Department of State Bulletij 



THE SECRETARY 



at they did get ahold of some weapons 
at can knock these choppers downi and 
sre able to use them. 

Q. On the question of the 
nbassador? 

A. Ambassador [Harry] Bergold hap- 
ins to be in the United States right 
w. He wasn't recalled, but we're cer- 
inly going to have strong consultations 
,th him. But we don't have any inten- 
m at this point of withdi'awing him. 
e provides a valuable presence in 
anagua. 

Q. Going back to the Middle East, 
nee you didn't include Syria in the 
it of countries which are helpful to 
e peace process at the present time— 

A. We hope that Syria can be 
jlpful to the peace process, and I said 
at I just— in terms of my statement of 

around accepting the idea of direct 
gotiations, I didn't mean to include 
ria. But Ambassador Murphy had 
ry interesting discussions in Syria. 

Q. I might just— bear with me— 
w do you see the Jordanian-Syrian 
ipprochement? Will it be helpful to 
je peace process that is going on 

|.w? 

, A. You like to see stability in the 
igion. It's a little bit puzzling to me, 
!d I don't feel that I have a good, full 
Iderstanding of all of the factors 
j/olved in it. But, clearly, that tension 
tween Jordan and Syria has many 
tensions to it, including PLO [Pales- 
16 Liberation Organization] and Pal- 
tinian dimensions and many other 
ments. 

i Q. The Soviets have increasingly 
en talking about Mr. Gorbachev's 
oposed visit here next year as some 
nd of a target date or deadline for 
ireements in the nuclear arms field. 
I» you think that's useful? 

A. Certainly, any major event like 
at provides a sort of a deadline 
iainst which to work. At the same 
:ne, the President will approach the 
ixt meeting in the same way that he 
iproached the last one— namely, that if 
^sre are agreements that are in the in- 
'rests of the United States to be found, 
«! will want to find them and use 
latever incentive a meeting gives to 
ike that search. 

On the other hand, we won't be in 
.e position of feeling that the meeting 
1 elf provides such a prominent venue 
lat we would be willing to agree to 
imething that we don't think is com- 
^tely in the U.S. interests. So that's 



the way we have approached these 
things in the past. That's the way we'll 
continue to approach them. 

Actually, 1 think the Geneva meet- 
ing did produce, when you look at it in 
what took place preceding it, quite a 
little movement in the nuclear and space 
talks. After all, as part of the prelude to 
it, the Soviets finally put a counter- 
proposal on the table, and we came back 
very rapidly with a counter-counter- 
proposal. The motion was reflected in 
the statement of agi'eement, and so 
there was some motion connected with 
that, and perhaps there will be some as 
we move along— I certainly hope so— 
next year. 

Q. You lamented the unnatural 
division of Europe, and yet one of the 
people you're going to see on this trip, 
Janos Kadar, was the man 30 years 
ago, when he had the chance, sought 
to foster the unnatural division. And I 
wonder, are you visiting him as a kind 
of a demonstration that a leopard can 
change its spots? 

A. There are a lot of interesting 
developments in Hungary in the way 
they are managing their affairs; and as 
a person interested in economic develop- 
ment, I like to see it first hand. I've had 
a number of visits from prominent Hun- 
garians since I've been Secretary of 
State and talked to them here. But I've 
also had the experience and know that 
it's one thing to talk to somebody here; 
it's another thing to go to that person's 
country and get a feeling for what 
they're doing. And so I think it will be 
an interesting experience for me. 

Q. I don't know if you answered 
an earlier question about whether the 
conflict in Nicaragua is escalating in 
view of the Soviet helicopters and the 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Do you 
think it's escalating down there? 

A. The Soviet helicopters and the 
Cuban presence have been there for 
quite awhile, and this process of mili- 
tarization of Nicarag^ua, as one of the 
earlier questions brought out, has been 
going on for a long time. It's not some 
sudden surge; it's there. And those who 
oppose the perversion of their revolu- 
tion have been growing in numbers. 

The use of helicopters is an effective 
military tactic if it isn't opposed, and 
the fact that the contras now seem to 
have an ability to shoot at these chop- 
pers may censor their use somewhat, 
and that is very good. And I hope they 
have more of these weapons. 



Q. Couldn't it have the reverse 
effect, that if the contras use SAM-7, 
or whatever, missiles to shoot down 
helicopters, that the Soviets will, in 
fact, introduce still a higher escala- 
tion of weapons and. in fact, give 
Salvadoran guerrillas SAM missiles- 
similar missiles to shoot down U.S.- 
supplied helicopters? 

A. My impression is that they have 
been putting stuff in there as fast as 
they can, and as fast as they think it 
can be absorbed, in any case. So we are 
basically, or the contras are, reacting to 
what they're contending with, and what 
they're contending with are these heli- 
copters, and they have to deal with 
them if they're going to be successful. 

Q. But there have been limits- 
there seem to have been, if you will, 
sort of lines drawn. The Soviets have 
not introduced fighter aircraft into 
Nicaragua. The Salvadoran guerrillas 
still do not seem to have ground-to-air 
missiles. 

A. I don't think that we can expect 
people, who are fighting for freedom in 
their country and facing the kind of fire 
from helicopters that they have been 
getting, to think that that can happen 
and they shouldn't do something about 
it. If I were them, I'd certainly want to; 
and they do, and they have gotten ahold 
of missiles— surface-to-air missiles— and 
they have figured out how to use them, 
and they've used it effectively in this 
case. And I say, fine, I'm all for it. 

Q. Has a date been set for a 
followup summit? 
A. No. 

Q. And have you got a date to 
meet with Mr. Shevardnadze again? 
A. No. 

Q. Do you expect that before the 
arms control delegations get back to 
work in Geneva there will be some 
new instructions worked out, or do 
you think the United States can stand 
on its previous counterproposal? 

A. On the last question, of course, 
we have put a counter-counterproposal 
on the table in Geneva, and that was 
the last thing that happened at the end 
of the last round. There wasn't, really, 
an opportunity for the Soviets to 
respond. So I think it is perfectly 
proper and to be expected that the next 
thing that should happen is that they 
should respond. So we'll expect that to 
take place. 



ibruary 1986 



53 



AFRICA 



Now, certainly, out of the discussion 
in Geneva that the Pi'esident had, we 
will i-eflect on that. Out of the pledges 
made on each side that we want to 
move aggressively in these negotiations, 
we're going to be examining matters. 
But basically we have a very interesting 
counter-counterproposal on the table, 
and we'll want to see what the Soviet 
response to it is. 

As far as the first two questions are 
concerned, we are, of course, working 
on when would be an appropriate date 
for the General Secretary to come here. 
There hasn't been anything worked out, 
but we're working on that. And it's also 
the case that when we were in Geneva, 
it was agreed that there should be more 
frequent meetings other than the annual 
meeting in connection with the United 
Nations of Foreign Minister/Secretary of 
State. And so we are starting to try to 
find where and when those would take 
place, but we haven't made any agree- 
ment on that as yet. 

Q. Would you bear with me for 
one more followup, and then I will 
cease. There has been some confusion 
on just what the Administration 
intends to do on December 31 about 
the SALT [strategic arms limitation 
talks] II Treaty. I and some others 
have been led to believe that the 
President's policy of last June is open- 
ended and that December 31. in itself, 
is no particular mark that has to be 
met. On the other hand, some people 
have drawn attention to it because of 
the expiration date. What is your view 
on that? 

A. My view is that when the Presi- 
dent decides what he wants to do on 
that subject, it will be announced; and I 
will wait with bated breath to see what 
he has to say. But it's a presidential 
decision, and when he makes it, it will 
be announced, and I will provide my 
thoughts to him in the meantime. 



Recent Developments in Liberia 



'Press release 274.1 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on African Affairs of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on 
December 10, 1985. Mr. Crocker is 
AssiMant Secretary for African 
Affairs.'^ 

I am pleased to appear before this com- 
mittee today to give my assessment of 
recent developments in Liberia and the 
consequences for U.S. foreign policy 
toward that country. 

As you know, the United States and 
Liberia have a history of long, friendly, 
and special relations. Our country was 
closely involved in the founding of 
Liberia. Many Libeiians have family 
ties and educational and other cultural 
connections in America. Neaiiy 5,000 
Americans live in Liberia. U.S. invest- 
ment there approaches half a billion 
dollars. We have important regional 
communications facilities in Liberia, in- 
cluding the Voice of America transmis- 
sion station which sends our country's 
message through radio to people in 
cities and villages all over Afiica and to 
parts of the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia. Liberia has been a reliable ally in 
wai- and a good friend in peace, at the 
LInited Nations and elsewhere. We want 
to maintain our friendly, mutually bene- 
ficial relations with the Liberian Gov- 
ernment and people. For all of these 
reasons, we have taken a special inter- 
est in Liberia's efforts to put itself on a 
course of stability, national reconcilia- 
tion, democracy, and economic growth 
following the overthrow of the previous 
government in 1980. 

The October Elections 

The Liberian Government under Head 
of State Doe announced in 1981 its in- 
tention to return the country to civilian 
rule by 1986 through democratic elec- 
tions. Those elections were held in Oc- 
tober of this year, with a view to in- 
augurating the new civilian government 
in January 1986. Our government was 
active in each step along the way, en- 
couraging the Liberian authorities to 
live up to their promise to issue in a 
second Republic of Libeiia which would 
extend to all its citizens for the first 
time in their country's history the right 
to vote and participate equally in their 
country's political and economic life. 



There have been a number of criti- 
cisms of the October elections, and we 
share some of them, as the Liberian 
Government knows. In our view, it 
would have been better if all political 
parties which wanted to campaign had 
been allowed to do so. As it was, two 
were banned— the Liberian Peoples 
Party and the United People's Party— 
because, the government said, they pn 
posed socialist progi-ams which had no 
place in Liberia. Opposition parties 
which did participate were not regis- 
tered until late, and Decree 88A, whiel 
forbids criticism of the authorities, cou 
inhibit open debate. Finally, the vote 
was counted behind closed doors with- 
out the presence of opposition party 
representatives, albeit by a large, 
government-appointed commission of 5 
people from various walks of life. 

Despite these shortcomings, there 
were noteworthy, positive aspects of tl 
elections. Four political parties com- 
peted for the voters' support. Four 
newspapers and three radio stations- 
government and nongovernment ones 
alike— reported the campaign with 
covei-age of all parties' activities. Thos 
are rare achievements in Africa and 
elsewhere in the Third World, where 
one-party elections covered by a single 
government newspaper are too often tl 
norm. The turnout of voters was enor- 
mous: some people stood in line 10 
hours to vote, and the authorities ex- 
tended the hours of the polls until 
11 p.m. so that everyone who wanted t 
vote could do so. Although there were 
allegations on all sides that some votin: 
irregularities occurred, there is general 
agreement of observers— resident diplo 
mats, even Liberian opposition 
leaders— that election day went off ver 
well, indeed. There is now the begin- 
ning, however imperfect, of a demo- 
cratic experience that Liberia and its 
fiiends can use as a benchmark for 
future elections— one on which they 
want to build. 

Samuel Doe and his National Demc 
cratic Party of Liberia were declared 
the winners by 51% for the presidency 
and 80% of the legislative seats. The 
three opposition parties did not accept 
those results and announced their intei 
tion to challenge them in court. Mean- 
while, the declared victor— Samuel 
Doe— called on all citizens for national 
reconciliation, as did leading religious 
and other members of the community. 



54 



Department of State Bullet 



AFRICA 



The prospects for national reconcilia- 

I were brightened by Doe's claim 

,t he won only a narrow, 51% election 
tory— virtually unheard of in the rest 
Africa, where incumbent rulers nor- 
lly claim victories of 95% to 100%. In 
liming only 51%- of the vote. Doe 
nlicly acknowledged that a large seg- 
iiit of society— 49% of the voters— 
upni'ted other points of view and 
[dciship than his own. That public 
'.iiowledgment offered the prospect 
1 1 I)i le would accommodate those 
(■)■ interests in the new government 
lich he would head. 
He seems to have been moving in 
■; ilii'ection in October. We under- 
-"i I hat Doe was considering appoint- 
in important positions in his new 
liliaii government some Liberians of 
'Mil talent who were not, at the 
IV. members of his party and that 
(If i)f them were moving toward ac- 
( ting those appointments. Doe pub- 
is- asked opposition members to take 
I si'ats in the legislature which they 
.• won in the elections. One of those 
;; Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf, whom Doe 
pardoned after her conviction for 
1 atiiig the law against criticism of 
I t'l'iiment authorities— a law. Doe 
UT\ed, that was passed by the 
1 villus government. 

'? November Coup Attempt 

tvas in this setting that the attempted 
cp d'etat occurred in Monrovia on 
Ivember 12. The pei-petrators appar- 
il>' were a small gi-oup of less than 
( not all of whom were Liberians. 
'■y captured the undefended govern- 
mt radio station outside Monrovia and 
!■' military Barclay Training Center in 
Inrovia— an installation whose mission 
iiot combat. Despite broadcasts on the 
itured radio station that Quiwonkpa 
i ^ Liberia's new ruler, his small force 
1 those whom he won to his side from 
i, Barclay Training Center w'ere un- 
1? to overcome the resistance of the 
ird at the executive mansion, where 
' ' « as. Once Doe was able to com- 
■nieate with the First Infantry Bat- 
ion some 25 miles outside Monrovia, 
-.as all over. The First Battalion 
.•kly retook the radio station, which 

II announced that Doe remained in 

I trol. The remaining coup participants 
i/e defeated or fled soon thereafter. 

The coup attempt set back the pros- 
•■ts, as they existed after the October 
ibtions, that Liberians might be fmd- 
r a wav toward a measure of national 



reconciliation and would get on with the 
difficult business of addi-essing their 
pi'essing economic problems. Events oc- 
curred during the coup attempt and the 
days that followed that have left bitter 
scars. During the hours of November 12 
that Quiwonkpa claimed to be in control 
of the govei-nment, some senior mem- 
bers of Doe's government were brutally 
assaulted, threatened with execution, 
and their houses and other property 
taken or destroyed. Along with the 
celebi-ation of many in the streets at 
what they believed was a change in 
government, there were instances in 
Monrovia and throughout the country of 
retribution against Doe's supporters. 
There seems also to have been some 
settling of old scores not necessarily 
related to politics. 



The same was true on the other side 
once it became known that the coup at- 
tempt had failed. Violence against some 
who staged the coup and those in the 
military who went over to their side 
was especially brutal. Reti'ibution- 
including some killings— against civilians 
who were thought to have supported or 
sympathized with the coup attempt oc- 
curred, but rumors about this violence 
far outstrip confirmed reports. We are 
now beginning to learn that many 
reports along these lines were wrong, 
including reports of the death of key op- 
position leaders. 

There is no evidence that the lead- 
ers of the coup condoned, much less di- 
rected, the violence against civilians 
which some of their supporters commit- 
ted. For his part. Head of State Doe 



Liberia— A Profile 



People 

Nationality: Noun and adjective — Liberian(s). 
Population (1983 est.): 2.0 million. Annual 
growth rate: 3%. Ethnic groups: 5% de- 
scendants of freed American slaves, 95% indig- 
enous tribes, the largest of which are Kpelle, 
Bassa, Gio. Kru, Grebo, Mano, Krahn, Gola, 
Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, Mandingo, and 
Belle. Religions: Traditional 65%, Muslim 
20%, Christian 15% (est.). 




At /an tic Ocean 



Geography 

Area: 111,370 sq. km. (43,000 sq. mi.). 
Cities: Capita/— Monrovia (pop. 306,000). 
Other ci^es-Harbel (60,000), Buchanan 
(25,000), Yekepa (16,000). Terrain: Coastal 
plain rising to rolling plateau and low moun- 
tains near inland borders. Climate: Warm 
and humid all year. 



Economy 

GDP: $315 million at constant factor cost in 
1971 dollars. Annual growth rate: -9.2% in 
1982 (adjusted for inflation). Per capita in- 
come: $400 (in current dollars). Avg. infla- 
tion rate (1983): 1.6% per year. 

Natural resources: Iron ore, rubber, 
timber, diamonds, gold. 

Agriculture (14.7% of GDP): Prod- 
ucts— ruhher, rice, oil palm, cassava, coffee, 
cocoa. 

Industries (59.9% of GDP): Iron, gold and 
diamond mining, rubber processing, food proc- 
essing, lumber milling. 

Trade (1981): Exports-$540.7 million: 
iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds, gold. Ma- 
jor markets— FYiG, US, Italy, Belgium. Im- 
ports— $549.0 million: machinery, petroleum 
products, transportation equipment, food- 
stuffs. Major suppliers— VS, Western Europe. 

Official exchange rate: Liberia uses US 
dollars. 

US economic aid received (1983): $72.6 
million. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and most of its specialized agencies; 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Mano River Union. 



Taken from the Background Notes of June 
1984, published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita 
Adams. ■ 



3ruarv 1986 



55 



AFRICA 



quickly appealed publicly for an end to 
retribution and rumormongeiing that 
feed further violence. A curfew was in- 
stituted to help preserve the peace. 

Nonetheless, bitter memories remain 
on all sides. The Liberian authoi-ities 
now are less inclined than they were 5 
weeks ago to invite into their Cabinet 
persons from organizations whom they 
suspect collaborated in the coup 
attempt— an attempt which they say 
was set in motion before the October 
elections. Opposition leaders may be less 
willing to sei-ve in a government, some 
of whose supporters reacted so violently 
against opposition members after the 
coup attempt failed. Other Liberians 
who are not active politically but whose 
talents would make them valuable gov- 
ernment appointees, especially for ad- 
dressing the country's economic prob- 
lems, may be reluctant to enter public 
service after seeing on November 12 
how they could be personally threatened 
if there were a sudden change in 
government. 

Promoting Economic and 
Political Stability 

In the wake of these events, how can 
we help to get Liberia down the track 
of political stability that is so essential 
for economic growth, of national recon- 
ciliation, and of democratic practices and 
respect for human rights? 

I believe we must make an effort to 
achieve those goals. Our long, special 
ties to Liberia and our important, real 
interests there require us to try. To 
walk away would be irresponsible and 
clearly viewed as such elsewhere in 
Africa, where we are seen as having a 
unique responsibility for assisting Li- 
beria. Abdication of that responsibility 
could provoke chaos and bloodshed, en- 
dangering the lives of the nearly 5,000 
Americans in the country. 

We have already begun. It is essen- 
tial that we use our influence— and have 
a basis for influence— with the authori- 
ties in Monrovia who last month had a 
showdowTi of force with those who 
wished to replace them. They control 
the instruments of law and order in 
Liberia today— the armed forces, the 
police, the Ministry of Justice, and the 
courts of law. We want to encourage 
Head of State Doe to take measures 
that will win his government the na- 
tional support and talent that are so 
necessary for the period of economic 
austerity and enlightened economic ac- 
tions that Liberia must experience in 
the months ahead. 



In the economic sphere, the United 
States has been encouraging the Gov- 
ernment of Liberia to make policy 
changes necessary for economic stabili- 
zation—changes which would put Liberia 
back on the path to long-term gi'owth. 
Liberia's public sector suffers from a 
chronic cash shortage which can have a 
profound effect on Liberia's business 
climate. Any Liberian Government will 
face this problem for several years, no 
matter how responsible its policies. The 
problems were being addressed through 
combined U.S., IMF [International 
Monetary Fund], and IBRD [Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development] progi-ams, but during the 
elections period in Liberia, the IMF pro- 
gram collapsed. Liberia must now 
undertake major steps to restore its 
economic credibility. U.S. assistance uill 
be badly needed to keep the arrearages 
from building to a point which could 
permanently estrange Liberia from in- 
ternational financial institutions and 
private creditors. Such a development 
would not be in the U.S. interest or in 
the interest of Liberia because it would 
foreclose the possibility of stabilizing the 
economy and restoring gi'owth. 

Beyond national reconciliation and 
economic growth, we want to encourage 
Head of State Doe to follow a course of 
respect for human rights that vrill 
strengthen the fabric of Liberia's na- 
tional life and win Liberia today added 
support abroad, including in the United 
States. And we want to counsel all 
Liberians— in and out of government— to 
work together. This is the only way a 
politically stable and economically 
healthy Liberia can be built. 

In pursuit of those objectives, we 
have, within the past month: 

• Urged the Liberian Government 
to permit visitors to those civilians who 
are detained on suspicion of complicity 
in the November coup attempt— that 
should clear up uncertainties about their 
welfare; 

• Urged the Liberian authorities to 
move quickly to hold the open trials in 
civilian courts that they have promised 
for civilians suspected of complicity in 
the coup attempt and to pennit outside 
observers such as local diplomats and 
the American Bar Association, which 
has e.xpressed an interest in observing 
the proceedings; 

• Urged the Liberian Government 
to take concrete measures, such as ar- 
rests against those suspected of con- 
tinued acts of retribution, if Head of 



State Doe's public appeal for an end to 
those violent acts is not fully respected 
and 

• Urged the Liberian Government 
to continue to seek ways to promote m 
tional reconciliation so that the energy, 
talent, and support of all Liberians can 
be used to address the difficult econom 
problems that the country faces. 

We are somewhat encouraged by 
some recent moves of the Liberian Go\ 
ernment. Families have begun to visit 
civilian detainees, and initial reports of 
their welfare are encouraging. Already 
several persons previously rumored to 
have been killed have been seen to be 
alive and well. Seventeen civilian 
detainees— including leaders of two op- 
position parties— have recently been 
released for lack of evidence against 
them. The government says it intends 
move quickly to begin civiUan trials. A 
already mentioned, Head of State Doe 
has called publicly for an end to acts o 
retribution. The government is moving I 
forward with plans to inaugurate civili ! 
rule next month. The Head of State ec 
tinues to urge opposition parties to tal 
their seats in the legislature, even the; 
who currently are facing charges of co 
plicity in the coup, if they are not con- 
victed and sentenced. We view it as 
essential that Doe as President pursue 
his stated intent to seek national i-ecoi 
ciliation as he forms his new govern- 
ment. We note also that some leading 
members of Liberia's private sector ar 
of the view that the time has come to 
join in efforts at home to .save their 
country at this critical time. 

The Road Ahead 

The road ahead will be difficult and 
uncertain for all. But it is difficult to 
imagine a course of action that offers 
better prospects for achieving what w( 
want to do. We want to influence the 
Liberian Government to act in ways 
that I have just mentioned to promote 
national reconciliation and respect for 
human rights. We want to encourage 
the Liberian Govei-nment to institute 
needed measures of economic reform 
that will restore Liberia to internation 
creditworthiness and that will improve 
its economic management— both key n 
quirements for reversing the economic 
decline of that country. We want to 
carry out an economic assistance pro- 
gram in Liberia that will improve the 
standard of living and quality of life fc 
all the Liberian people, with whom w« 



56 



Department of State Bullei 



AFRICA 



^e such historic ties. These goals are 
rth pursuing on behalf of the aspira- 
ins that Americans share for Liberia 
nl of our important interests there. As 
\ fiilldvv this path, we will carefully 
,iess along the way what has been 
mieved and the options before us. We 
rend to remain in touch with the Con- 
'•s,-; in this effort. 



'Thf complete transcript of the hearings 
! be published bv the committee and will 
{available from the Superintendent of 
>'uments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Ishington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



appointment of 
Sdvlsory Committee 
n South Africa 



1 KETARY'S STATEMENT. 

If. 19. 1985> 

.it .September 9, the President signed 
n executive order concerning our rela- 
,cs with South Africa. Since then, all 
u one of the major provisions have 
ei elaborated publicly and, basically, 
ae been put into effect. I refer to 
r-isions on bank loans, on sales of 
5;itive technology, on imports of 
r^errands, on the minting of a U.S. 
D coin, South African-made weapons, 
rnoting fair labor standards by U.S. 
r s, and increasing official aid to the 
Mtry's disadvantaged majority. 

As part of the Executive order, the 
r^ident also directed me to establish 
n Advisory Committee on South 
ica. Today I am very pleased to 
a)unce the establishment and the 
^position of this advisory committee. 

Fwelve distinguished Americans 
te agreed to serve on this committee. 
.S'ou will note, they represent a broad 
u:e of views and come from diverse 
'a:s of life. Their pui-pose will be to 
Jfmmend to me further measures that 
'€as a government and as a nation, 
uptake to encourage peaceful change 
louth Africa. 

The committee will also render its 
Ice on how U.S. policy can be most 
t'tive in promoting equal rights in 
oh Africa and ending apartheid. And 

'11 consider ways in which the U.S. 
o'smment can work with private 
rjnizations in this country and in 
oh Africa to advance our common 
b;ctives in that country. 



The committee will be undertaking 
its task at a truly critical time; 1986 
may w^ell determine whether South 
Africa can emerge as a country at peace 
vrith itself and its neighbors or whether 
it will drift further into violent strife at 
home and ever greater international 
isolation. 

The next few months will reveal 
whether the South African Government 
can muster the vision and bold leader- 
ship that will be required to move from 
confrontation to negotiation and a new- 
constitutional order, deriving its 
strength from the consent of the 
governed. 

The committee's report, which it will 
submit by the end of next year, will 
inevitably reflect its judgment on how 
this challenge has been met and what 
the policy implications are for the 
United States. Its recommendations will 
help us chart our course for the future. 

The President and I are greatly 
indebted to these 12 Americans for 
volunteering their service in this under- 
taking. I've just met with them, and I 
want their counsel— not only in terms of 
a final report to be delivered in a year 
but also as we go along through the 
year. All of the facilities of this Depart- 
ment will be available to them as they 
carry out their task. A distinguished 
former Ambassador, William Kontos, 
will serve as Executive Director of the 
committee. 



In directing me to establish this 
committee, the President's goal was 
straightforward. He wanted me to have 
the advice of a cross-section of wise 
Americans on the best ways to promote 
the central U.S. goal of constructive 
change in South Africa. 

This is a serious undertaking, one 
that the President and I hope will lead 
to a bipartisan consensus that is a 
positive and necessary force behind any 
effective U.S. foreign policy. I'm looking 
for straight talk on our policy within the 
context of the unanimous U.S. position 
that apartheid must go, that we want it 
to go in a peaceful way, without a blood 
bath in South Africa, and that we desire 
all South Africans to get together 
urgently to shape a political order based 
on justice, equality, and rule by the con- 
sent of the governed. 

The President and I are honored by 
the participation of these 12 Ameiicans, 
and we're grateful for their patriotism 
as they undertake this task. 



'Press release 298, which also includes a 
question-and-answer session with news cor- 
respondents. ■ 



Members of the 
Advisory Committee on South Africa 



Griffin B. Bell, senior partner in the law 
fiiTn of King & Spalding; former Attorney 
General of the United States 

Owen F. Bieber. President of the UAW 

Frank T. Gary (cochairman), former Chair- 
man of the Board and Chief Executive Offi- 
cer of the IBM Corp. 

William T. Coleman, Jr. (cochairman), 
senior partner in the law firm of O'Melveny 
& Myers 

John R. Dellenback. President of the Chris- 
tian College Coalition; former Congressman 

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, President of Kiss- 
inger Associates; former Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs 



Timothy S. Healy, S.J., President of 
Georgetown University 

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., senior partner in the 
law fimi of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & 
Feld; former President of the National 
Urban League 

Helene L. Kaplan, senior partner in the law 
firm of Webster & Sheffield, Chairman of 
the Board of Trustees of the Carnegie 
Corp. of New York and of Barnard College 

Roger B. Smith, Chairman and Chief Execu- 
tive Officer of the General Motors Corp. 

Leon H. Sullivan, Pastor of the Zion Baptist 
Church of Philadelphia and author of the 
Sullivan principles 

Franklin A. Thomas, President of the Ford 
FoundationH 



e-uary 1986 



57 



ARMS CONTROL 



The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: 
Where We Are After the Summit 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the Atlantic Council 
on December 5, 1985. Ambassador Nitze 
is special adviser to the President and 
the Secretary of State on arms control 
matters. 

We stand today at the edge of what we 
hope can be a fresh start in the U.S.- 
Soviet relationship, ushered in by the 
summit meeting between President 
Reagan and General Secretary Gorba- 
chev. We are poised not just between 
rounds III and IV of the Geneva talks 
but also, in a sense, between the first 
summit and the beginning of prepara- 
tions for the second. 

It does not detract from the worth- 
while nature of the November summit 
to reflect on the difficult issues which 
continue to divide the two sides at the 
Geneva negotiations on nuclear and 
space arms. It is my intent to review 
the positions of the two sides in the 
talks and to dwell for a moment on 
those differences which appear most 
intractable. 

The November summit and the 
autumn events leading up to it repre- 
sent not only the possibility for a fresh 
start in the U.S. -Soviet relationship but 
mark what we hope is the beginning of 
a genuine pi'ocess of give-and-take in the 
nuclear and space arms talks. The bar- 
riers to agreement are, however, sub- 
stantial. 

Soviet Counterproposal 

The first break in the ice came at the 
end of September with the tabling of a 
Soviet counterproposal to our March 
1985 offer. While the effects of that 
counterproposal would be inequitable 
and destabilizing, it also contains, as the 
President expressed it, "seeds which 
should be nurtured." 

The Soviet offer consists of various 
bans and freezes, as well as limits on 
and reductions in offensive forces. 

• "Strategic dehvery systems" 
would be reduced by 50%, to a level of 
1,250 for the U.S.S.R. and 1,680 for the 
United States. However, the Soviet 
definition of strategic delivery vehicles 
would also cover, on the U.S. side, 
LRINF missiles and "medium-range" 



nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, in 
Asia, and on all of our aircraft carriers, 
while about 2,000 comparable Soviet 
nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as 300 
Backfire bombers, would not be limited. 
Thus, were the United States to retain 
equality in strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles, it would have to cut LRINF 
missiles and dual-capable aircraft to 430, 
20% of the current Soviet level. If the 
United States were to retain LRINF 
missiles and dual-capable aircraft at cur- 
rent levels, it would have to cut strate- 
gic nuclear delivei\v vehicles to less than 
half the allowed Soviet number. 

• "Nuclear charges" would be 
sharply reduced to a level of 6.000. 
However, they would be defined to in- 
clude the gravity bombs and short-range 
attack missiles carried by U.S. heavy 
and medium-range bombers. By count- 
ing such bomber weapons as equivalent 
to Soviet ballistic missile RVs, despite 
the massive Soviet air defenses faced by 
bombers and the lower readiness rate of 
bombers compared to ballistic missiles, 
the United States would be significantly 
penalized. 

• "Charges" on any one component 
(that is, ICBMs, SLBMs, or bombers) 
would be reduced to 60% of the total, 
leading to a maximum level of 3,600 
ICBM RVs. Although this subUmit 
would represent a major reduction, 
Soviet prompt counterforce capabilities 



Acronyms 

ABM— Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty) 
ALCM— air-launched cruise missile 
GLCM— ground-launched cruise 

missile 
ICBM— intercontinental ballistic 

missile 
INF — intermediate-range nuclear 

forces 
LRINF— longer range intermediate- 
range nuclear forces 
RV— reentry vehicle 
SALT— strategic arms limitation talks 
SDI— Strategic Defense Initiative 
SLBM— submarine-launched ballistic 

missile 
START— strategic arms reduction 
talks 



would actually grow against the reduct 
number of U.S. hardened facilities. 

• All cruise missiles with ranges 
above 600 kilometers would be banned 
terminating the U.S. ALCM, SLCM, 
and GLCM programs. 

• All "new" nuclear delivery sys- 
tems would be banned, probably pre- 
cluding the U.S. D-5 and Midgetman 
missiles and advanced technology bom- 
ber, while allowing the Soviet SS-25, 
SS-X-24 and SS-NX-23 missiles and 
Blackjack heavy bomber. 

• Research, development, and de- 
ployment of "space-strike arms" wouk 
be banned, halting the U.S. SDI pro- 
gi'am and allowing many Soviet ABM 
activities to continue. 

In sum, despite significant reduc- 
tions, the Soviet counterproposal woul 
block U.S. strategic defense progi-ams 
while allowing Soviet, programs to pro 
ceed; it would halt the modernization i 
U.S. strategic offensive forces; and it 
would include in reductions U.S. sys- 
tems which defend our allies and ex- 
clude Soviet systems which threaten 
them. The net effect would be a lop- 
sided nuclear balance, a weakened U.'; 
deterrent, and decreased stability for i 
both sides. 

However, in spite of its numerous 
flaws, the detailed Soviet counter- 
proposal did include the principle of 
deep cuts in strategic offensive arms 
and, along with subsequent offers in 
Geneva, seemed to contemplate an in- 
terim INF outcome which would allow 
for U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe. 
Building on such positive elements. 
President Reagan directed that a new 
U.S. proposal be advanced at the negt 
ations on November 1. 

U.S. November Proposal 

Strategic Offensive Arms. The new 

U.S. proposal builds on the 50% reduc 
tion concept in a constructive and I 
equitable way. i 

• Reentry vehicles on ICBMs and 
SLBMs would be reduced to a limit ol 
4,500— about 50% below current levels 

• Reentry vehicles on ICBMs wou 
be reduced to 3,000-about 50% below 
the current Soviet level and roughly 
halfway between our earlier pi-oposal 
a limit of 2,500 and their proposed lim 
of 3,600. 



58 



Department of State Bu 



W 



ARMS CONTROL 



' The highest overall strategic bal- 
: missile throw-weight of either side 
d be reduced by 50%, in this case, 
, the Soviet level of 11.9 million 
ids. (By way of comparison, the 
ed States has 4.4 million pounds.) 
' Contingent upon acceptance of RV 
thi-ow-weight limits, the United 
es would accept equal limits of 1,500 
le number of long-range ALCMs 
;ed by U.S. and Soviet heavy 
bers— about 50*^ below planned U.S. 
oyment levels. 

« For reasons previously alluded to. 
United States cannot agree to one 
rnon limit on ballistic missile RVs 
ALCMs. But if the Soviets were to 
pt our proposed limit of 4,500 RVs 
g with our proposed limit of 1,500 
]Ms, it would result in reduction to 
:al of 6,000 ballistic missile RVs and 
''Ms on each side. 

iVith respect to strategic nuclear 
'ery vehicles, the United States has 
losed a reduction in strategic ballis- 
lissiles to a limit of 1,250-1,450, or 
,t 40-45% below the current higher 
et level. In this conte.xt, the United 
es could accept further reduction of 
y bomber limits to 350 (compared to 
earlier proposal of 400)— about 40% 
w the current U.S. SALT-accounta- 
evel. 

•"or reasons similar to those apply- 
!,o an RV and ALCM aggregate, the 
!,ed States cannot agree to the 
jet proposal to include in a single ag- 
•ate strategic ballistic missiles and 
I'y bombers. However, if agreement 
b reached on a range of 1,250-1,450 
lCBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy 
Iber limits of 350, it would result in 
Iction of the total of strategic ballis- 
pissiles and heavy bombers to be- 
kn 1,600 and 1,800. 
rhe U.S. proposal also contains a 
'on the development and deployment 
1 ntnv heavy strategic ballistic 
ill's and on the modernization of ex- 
,u lii'avy missiles due to the destabi- 
iy character of such systems. All 
Wv ICBMs would also be banned 
usi' of inherent verification difficul- 
aiid asymmetries in deployment op- 
imities between the sides. "Build- 
n" is the suggested means of imple- 
tinu the agreed reductions. 

intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Kes. With respect to intermediate- 
r;e nuclear forces, the United States 
linues to prefer total elimination of 
•entire class of U.S. and Soviet 
ENF missiles. Thus, our previous 
'.losals remain on the table. We have 



also made a new proposal as an interim 
step toward this goal. 

• The United States would cap its 
own LRINF missile launcher deploy- 
ments in Europe at the number de- 
ployed as of December 31, 1985 (140 
Pershing II and GLCM) in return for 
Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 
missile launchers within range of NATO 
Europe to the same number. 

• There would be freedom to mix 
between systems deployed as of Decem- 
ber 31, 1985, but the mix would be a 
subject for discussion. For example, we 
could agree on a mix giving the United 
States an approximately equal number 
at around 420 to 450 LRINF missile 
warheads in NATO Europe (based on 4 
warheads per GLCM launcher, 1 war- 
head per Pershing II launcher, and 3 
warheads per SS-20 launcher). 

• The Soviets would be required to 
reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (not 
within range of NATO Europe) by the 
same proportion as the reduction of 
launchers within range of NATO 
Europe. The end result would be equal 
global LRINF warhead limits. 

• Appropriate constraints would also 
be applied to shorter range INF 
missiles. 

Defense and Space. With respect to 
defense and space, the United States 
has made clear that we are committed 
to the SDI research program, which is 
being carried out in compliance with the 
ABM Treaty. We seek a Soviet commit- 
ment to explore with us now how a co- 
operative transition could be accom- 
plished, should new defensive technolo- 
gies prove feasible. We are also propos- 
ing that the Soviets join us, even now, 
in an "open laboratories" arrangement 
under which both sides would provide 
information on each other's strategic 
defense research programs and provide 
reciprocal opportunities for visiting 
associated research facilities and 
laboratories. 

Verification and Compliance. The 

United States continues to stress the 
critical importance of agreeing to effec- 
tive means of veiification so as to be 
able to assess with confidence compli- 
ance with provisions of all agreements 
resulting from the negotiations. The im- 
portance of verification is more evident 
now than it was before, given Soviet 
violations of existing arms control 
agreements. 

The United States continues to 
stress the need for the Soviets to take 
necessary steps to correct current in- 
stances of noncompliance with existing 



arms control agreements, for noncompli- 
ance is both politically corrosive and 
militarily hazardous. Restoring compli- 
ance is, thus, a critical step. 

The Soviet Union must alter current 
practices which obstruct U.S. verifica- 
tion of compliance. One initial step is for 
Soviets to alter their current encryption 
of telemetry and revert to telemetry 
practices in use at the time of signing of 
SALT II. This is militarily important in 
its own right and is also of considerable 
political significance. 

The November Summit 

You know the duration of the sessions 
at the November summit between Presi- 
dent Reagan and General Secretary 
Goi-bachev: some 5 hours of one-on-one 
dialogue and more than 8 hours of dis- 
cussion in plenary. The two leaders had 
an intensive and frank examination of 
the issues in all four agenda categories. 
The potential intangible benefits to be 
derived from the development of per- 
sonal rapport between these two men is 
obvious, so I will confine my observa- 
tions to the language relating to the 
nuclear and space talks which appeared 
in the joint statement published at the 
conclusion of the summit and to a dis- 
cussion of issues it addresses. 

We were able in the joint statement 
to achieve Soviet commitment to early 
progress in the negotiations, focusing 
particularly on "the principle of 50% 
reductions in the nuclear arms of the 
U.S. and USSR appropriately applied" 
and "the idea of an interim INF agree- 
ment." As I have already mentioned, 
these concepts are common elements in 
the fall proposals of the two sides, but it 
is not clear that the Soviets do not still 
link such language to termination of the 
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI 
is, of course, not mentioned at all in the 
joint statement. The Soviets were con- 
tent, in the end, to repeat the language 
of the joint agreement of January 8, 
1985, which included the goal of pre- 
venting an arms race in space. We have 
made abundantly clear to the Soviets 
that, in our view, SDI is consistent with 
this goal; we are calling for a coopera- 
tive approach to the deployment of 
defensive systems— as opposed to a 
"race"— were our research, or theirs, to 
demonstrate that such systems could 
help the world get rid of the threat of 
mutual destruction. 

I would highlight another passage in 
the joint statement: "During the negoti- 
ation of these agreements, effective 
measures fni- vprifif>ation of compliance 



ruarv 1986 



59 



ARMS CONTROL 



with obligations assumed will be agreed 
upon." It will be useful for us during 
the negotiations to have this acknowl- 
edgment that effective verification 
measures must be devised concurrently 
with the resolution of other issues. It 
represents another modest step in our 
efforts to put verification concerns on a 
par with the reductions or limitations 
themselves. 

One of the less encouraging aspects 
of the summit was Gorbachev's un- 
wavering opposition to SDI. There 
were, indeed, no signs of movement 
from even the most untenable elements 
of the Soviet position on strategic 
defenses, such as the proposed ban on 
all research. The Soviets also refused to 
move from any of their fundamentally 
unacceptable positions on START and 
on INF. More encouraging are the 
growing indications that the Soviets 
may be vrilling seriously to discuss all 
three aspects of the negotiations concur- 
rently when the nuclear and space arms 
talks resume in Geneva in January with- 
out demanding a prior agreement on a 
ban on SDI research. 

It is also noteworthy that the Presi- 
dent seems to have made some progress 
in convincing Gorbachev that he is sin- 
cere in his stated intentions for SDI, 
even though the Soviet leader vigor- 
ously disputed the President's conclu- 
sions about its consequences. 

During the next round of the nuclear 
and space arms talks, commencing on 
January 16, 1986, we will be able to 
judge the Soviet implementation of our 
mutual commitment to accelerate work. 
We plan to spend the opening weeks 
describing our November 1 proposal in 
greater detail. Ma.\ Kampelman\ Sena- 
tor Tower^, and Mike Glitman^ will have 
authority to explore opportunities for 
give-and-take. We hope to elicit con- 
structive responses from the Soviet side 
so that we may then be able to report 
that they are engaged in a genuine proc- 
ess of serious negotiation toward bal- 
anced and verifiable agreements which 
will improve stability and reduce the 
risk of war. 



'Max M. Kampelman, head of U.S. dele- 
gation on arms control negotiations and U.S. 
negotiator on defense and space arms. 

*John Tower, U.S. negotiator on strategic 
nuclear arms. 

^Maynard W. Glitman, U.S. negotiator on 
intermediate-range nuclear arms. ■ 



Nuclear Testing 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 19, 1985' 

The Soviet Union has both publicly and 
through confidential diplomatic channels 
continued to press its proposal for a 
moratorium on all nuclear explosions 
that it made public on July 29. 

For our part, the President has long 
advocated a dialogue with the Soviet 
Union to arrive at the improved verifi- 
cation procedures necessary for any 
testing limitations. It was the President 
who extended an unconditional invita- 
tion to Soviet experts to visit the U.S. 
nuclear test site to measure the yield of 
a U.S. nuclear test, with any instrumen- 
tation devices they deemed necessary. 
This initiative was designed with the 
hope that it might set in motion a proc- 
ess that could increase confidence and 
cooperation betweien our nations regard- 
ing limitations on nuclear testing. The 
United States would, of course, welcome 
Soviet willingness to agree to reciprocal 
visits to nuclear testing sites. 

It is through measures of this type 
that a basis could be created to develop 
and institute the type of verification 
measures needed to make effectively 
verifiable the pending treaties deaUng 
with nuclear testing, namely, the 
Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions Treaties. 

This is an issue, however, quite 
separate from that of a moratorium on 
nuclear explosions. As we have stated 
many times previously, the United 
States has learned through experience 
that moratoria cannot be counted on to 



lead to the enhanced security desired. 
The Soviet Union broke a nuclear 
testing moratorium a quarter of a cen- 
tury ago with the most intensive nucle 
test series in history— some 40 explo- 
sions over a period of several weeks. 

We made clear when the Soviets ~ 
announced their moratorium the reasoi 
for our nuclear testing limitation policj 
as well as for continuing the U.S. test- 
ing program. U.S. testing is required t 
ensure the continued credibility and 
effectiveness of our deterrent and to 
ensure the reliability and safety of the 
U.S. arsenal. 

While we are actively investigating 
technologies that may one day make tl 
United States less dependent on offen- 
sive nuclear weapons for our security, 
nuclear weapons will remain, for the 
foreseeable future, the key element of 
our deterrent. In such a situation, 
where both the United States and our 
alUes must rely upon nuclear weapons 
deter aggression, nuclear testing will I 
required. 

A comprehensive test ban, howeve 
is a long-term objective of the United 
States in the context of achieving bros 
deep, and verifiable arms reductions; 
substantially improved verification cap 
bilities; expanded confidence-building 
measures; greater balance in conven- 
tional forces; and at a time when a 
nuclear deterrent is no longer as esser 
tial an element as currently for inter- 
national security and stabiUty. The 
United States is currently involved in 
discussions with the Soviet Union in 
most of these areas. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 23, 1985. »i\ 



Western Proposal Tabled 
at MBFR Negotiations 



I 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 5, 1985' 

Consistent with the joint statement 
issued by General Secretary Gorbachev 
and the President at the conclusion of 
the Geneva meeting, and with our ef- 
forts to promote a more constructive 
East- West relationship, we and our 
NATO alUes are introducing in Vienna 
today a new proposal designed to break 
the long deadlock on conventional arms 
reductions in Europe. 



Since the eariy 1970s, NATO has i 
engaged the Warsaw Pact in discussioij 
aimed at limiting the numbers of trooi 
on both sides in central Europe. Thest 
discussions, known as the mutual and 
balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks 
now constitute one of the longest con- 
tinuously running arms control negotiai 
tions in history. I 

The NATO aUies have consistently | 
tried to move these negotiations for- ] 
ward. In 1982 and 1984, the United 
States and the allies presented new pr 
posals designed to achieve progress in i 



60 



Department of State Bulle' 



ARMS CONTROL 



MBFR negotiations. Regi-ettably, 
h proposals were i-ejected by the 
rsaw Pact. After extensive national 
iews of these talks and their objec- 
;s, we and our allies have concluded 
t a significant and forthcoming new 
ve could provide new impetus to the 
;otiations. 

In an effort to move the negotiations 
ward, and taking into account ex- 
ssed Eastern concerns, we have 
ay tabled a new proposal for reduc- 
es with effective veiification. 
The proposed package of veiification 
asures is intended to verify the 
nbers of troops withdrawn as well as 
numbers which will remain. Thus, in 
hange for a comprehensive and effec- 
; package of verification measures, 
.TO would be willing to accept the 
leral framework of the February 1985 
iel proposed by the Soviet Union and 
allies for a noncomprehensive agree- 
it. We will no longer insist, as we 
e since the outset of negotiations, 
t the sides come to an agreement on 
item troop levels before treaty 
lature. Nor will we continue to 
st, for now, on a comprehensive 
roach whereby East and West must 
ee at the outset on all the steps 
ded to reduce to parity. 
In this context, the United States is 
■ prepared to accept a reduction of 
10 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet ground 
)ps in the central European reduc- 
area. These figures reflect the ratio 
ffeen existing U.S. and Soviet troop 
ils in the area. 

As soon as these reductions are com- 
ed, NATO is prepared to accept a 
imitment by both alliances not to 
•ease forces in central Europe. As 
ified by implementation of the 
ification measures, this no-increase 
imitment would last for 3 years. 
The new Western proposal builds on 
aspects of the Warsaw Pact's ideas 
I'ebruary 1985. These include: a time- 
ted, noncomprehensive agreement; 
actions without prior data agreement 
Sastem forces; and a no-increase 
^ement. The main element which 
jTO has added is in the area of 
Ification. 

jFair, effective, and reciprocal 
fication measures are essential so 
both sides will be able to know 
ther the terms of the accord are 
ig complied with. This is especially 
lortant if we are to accept a no- 
ease commitment on troops in the 
1 without prior agreement on the 
1 of those troops. The Soviets have 
ended that such prior agreement 



was unnecessary and that Western con- 
cerns could be satisfied through imple- 
mentation of verification measures. This 
new Western proposal offers them an 
opportunity to pursue that approach. 
Agreement on all aspects of the pro- 
posed verification measures would, of 
course, have to be reached prior to the 
signature of a treaty. 

We urge the Soviet Union and the 
other Warsaw Pact countries to consider 
carefully the details of our proposal. 
This NATO initiative can help fulfill the 
commitments made at the Geneva sum- 
mit and produce real progress in Vienna 
which would reduce forces in central 
Europe. 



WESTERN STATEMENT 

BY AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER, 
VIENNA, 
DEC. 5, 19852 

For over 12 years, the participants in 
these talks have been trying to find a 
formula which would permit some reduc- 
tion in conventional military force levels 
in central Europe. Despite limited 
progress in some aspects of the talks, 
real success has remained out of reach. 
The pattern of proposal and, too often, 
incompatible countei-proposal has been a 
major reason for this lack of success. 
The two sides have for too long failed to 
get into a position where they were 
talking about the same kind of approach 
at the same time. 

On February 14 this year, the East 
tabled its "basic provisions" for a first- 
phase (as opposed to a comprehensive) 
agreement. The idea of a modest first- 
phase agreement was first put forward 
by the West in 1979. It was subsequent- 
ly, in 1982, dropped in response to 
Eastern criticism of its alleged lack of 
linkage with follow-on reductions. Since 
February the West has been pointing 
out at length the gaps in the East's 
text— among them the absence of any 
requirement for prior agreement be- 
tween the sides on the size of forces in 
the reductions area before the imple- 
mentation of reductions and limitations. 

In parallel with this somewhat 
unproductive debate. Western govern- 
ments have carried out in recent months 
a review of the situation in these talks 
as a whole. Bearing in mind the West's 
1979 proposal, our governments have 
concluded that the approach in the 
East's basic provisions, despite their 
imperfections, might form a framework 
on which the tw'o sides could work 
together with some hope of reaching an 



agreement. That our governments have 
taken the difficult decisions under- 
pinning this conclusion is a measure of 
the importance they attach to the talks 
and to resolving the problems with 
which we are dealing. Our governments 
have been encouraged in their action by 
the outcome of the Geneva summit last 
month. 

In the West's view, there is now a 
considerable number of points— they are 
enumerated in the full statement— where 
broad agreement exists between the 
two sides. The opening up of this area 
of accord has been made possible by an 
imaginative act by Western govern- 
ments, one which involves a basic 
change in the position which we have 
maintained consistently since the talks 
began in 1973. Until today we have 
always held the view, and it has been 
eminently reasonable to do so, that an 
essential prerequisite for progress was a 
common understanding on the starting 
point, i.e., on the size of the forces 
deployed by the two sides in the re- 
duction area. 

It has proved impossible to reach 
such an understanding. After much 
deliberation. Western governments 
have, therefore, decided, in the context 
of a time-limited agreement, to make a 
major step to move the negotiations for- 
ward. Although there remains a very 
substantial difference between our 
estimate of the forces deployed in the 
Eastern part of the reductions area and 
the Warsaw Pact's owii figures, our 
governments have agreed to offer to 
negotiate, without further delay, a joint 
reduction in American-Soviet force 
levels in central Europe and a subse- 
quent collective no-increase commitment. 

In order to ensure that both sides' 
commitment to the principle of undimin- 
ished security is preserved, the West 
has proposed some changes in the 
East's approach. These include, most 
importantly: 

• A change in the numbers of 
American and Soviet forces to be 
withdrawn under the agreement; 

• The giving to each side of discre- 
tion to decide how to deal with the 
armaments of withdrawn troops and the 
omission of armaments from the no- 
increase commitment; and 

• The establishment of a verification 
regime capable of giving confidence that 
the agreement was being honored. 

These changes correspond to the 
need for practicality, precision, and 
predictability in the agreement. Every 



iiruary 1986 



61 



ARMS CONTROL 



condition in the agreement will apply to 
both sides. Thus, rights for one side will 
be rights for the other. There will be no 
unilateral advantage to be won. Rather 
there will be a gain in mutual under- 
standing, in mutual confidence, and 
ultimately in the security of all. 

The West has, this morning, taken a 
major step. It brings the possibility of a 
limited agreement on force levels in cen- 
tral Europe within reach. We hope 
there will be no more suggestions from 
the East that the prior data require- 
ment, that differences of principle, that 
differences about framework, etc., etc., 
are blocking the way forward. 

Nonetheless, much bargaining un- 
doubtedly lies ahead. The East may not 
welcome the way we have handled the 
armaments issue. But they themselves 
have begun to recognize recently the 
objective difficulties of including arma- 
ments in a limitations agreement. They 
may not welcome the detail of our ideas 
on verification. But Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze has stated authoritatively 
to the United Nations this autumn 
"where verification with national techni- 
cal means may be inadequate to provide 
the necessary degree of confidence, we 
are ready to supplement it with addi- 
tional mutually agreed procedures." The 
West welcomes that assurance and 
hopes the East is ready to act on it. 

We are talking about a limited 
agreement. But an agreement of any 
kind involving reductions in force levels 
in central Europe and a subsequent no- 
increase commitment would be an event 
of very great political significance. If the 
East can match the West in flexibility, 
in imagination, and in pragmatism such 
an agreement can be reached, and the 
long deadlock in Vienna can be broken. 



AMBASSADOR BLACKWILL'S 
STATEMENT, 

VIENNA, 
DEC. 5, 19853 

Introduction 

In my plenary statement today on 
behalf of the West, I recalled that Presi- 
dent Reagan on September 26 pledged 
that the West "will actively seek every 
avenue of possible agreement in the 
round in order to achieve a verifiable 
accord that reduces conventional forces 
in central Europe in an equitable man- 
ner." With the imaginative initiative 
just put forward today, the West has 
fulfilled this promise and has brought 
our talks to a decisive crossroads. 



62 



Data Issue 

As everyone knows too well, these 
negotiations have been deadlocked for 
many, many years. The impasse has per- 
sisted. Week after week. Month after 
month. Year after year. 

Our Eastern colleagues have 
repeatedly made clear that this situa- 
tion, in their view, is due primarily to 
what they term the "data barrier." One 
Eastern representative, for example, 
has called the data issue the "decisive 
obstacle on the road to an agreement 
since the very beginning of the talks." 
And, another has told us, "in this 
stalemate, the greatest difficulty, as you 
know, is created by the question of 
numbers." It is a matter of record that 
the main aim of the approach adopted 
by the East in these talks beginning in 
1983 has been to "do away with the 
'data barrier.' " Indeed, as a third 
Eastern representative has noted, this 
is "central" to the proposals the East 
has put forward since the January 1983 
Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact 
Political Consultative Committee. 

Our Eastern colleagues, moreover, 
have repeatedly suggested that if the 
West were to drop its requirement for 
prior data agi-eement, substantive prog- 
i-ess could be made; indeed, that the 
path would be cleared to an agreement. 
For example, the East has observed 
that "the key to a decisive step forward 
in the Vienna negotiations is to free 
oneself from the undergrowth of the 
unproductive discussions which have 
been conducted for many years and to 
agree without further delay on simple, 
practical steps to initiate the process of 
reductions." 

For well-known reasons, the West 
has tried unsuccesfully during the more 
than 12 years of these negotiations to 
persuade the East of the merits of first 
reaching a mutual understanding on the 
size of the forces in the reductions area. 
Inter alia, this position was based on a 
sound and logical premise: namely, that 
there should be an initial meeting of 
minds on the basic facts of the situation. 
The sides should know where they are 
starting from, as well as where they are 
going. 

Despite our continuing conviction 
that prior data agi-eement would have 
been the more sensible and effective 
means to making progress in these 
negotiations, in the interest of breaking 
the decade-long logjam, the West today 
has announced its willingness to drop 
this longstanding, important aspect of 
its position. In doing so, we are pre- 
pared at the same time to work toward 



a time-limited, first-phase agi'eement, : 
building on the framework proposed bjl 
the East in February. We are, in the | 
words of one veteran Eastern repre- ( 
sentative, prepared to adopt a "radical 
solution" to the data issue and to "cut , 
this Gordian knot connected with the 
problem of numbers." 

This decision was not taken lightly. | 
It has been considered at the highest 
levels in the West. It is a sign of our 
determination to produce a break- 
through in these negotiations. 

Areas of Agreement L 

The initiative advanced by Western pf ' 
ticipants today, however, goes beyond 
this historic step to overcome the basi _ 
cause of deadlock. As the head of the ,; 
U.K. delegation has noted, we accept I 
the general framework of the East's ' 
February 1985 "basic provisions" pro- 
posal. Indeed, he has identified 16 
specific areas of agreement which now 
exist between the Eastern and Weste 
sides to these talks. Nevertheless, as ' 
Ambassador Alexander pointed out, I 



there remains more work to finish. 



Verification 

Not long ago the East stated that "if 
our Western partners have realistic 
ideas with regard also to the veiificat 
of an agreement, they should have no 
difficulties in presenting them along 
with an official response to our propos 
of 14 February 1985." We have re- 
sponded to that invitation today. 

We are also mindful of the 
authoritative statement at the United 
Nations on October 24, 1985 by Soviet 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: "Wh( 
verification with national technical 
means may be inadequate to provide I 
necessary degree of confidence, we ar 
ready to supplement it with additiona 
mutually agreed procedures. We state 
this very emphatically, because there 
are those who would like to make woi 
public opinion believe that the Soviet 
Union is against verification." And, a; 
an Eastern representative to these ta 
stated recently, the Warsaw Pact stat 
"regard verification and associated 
measures as an important part of a 
future agreement." 

We in the West, too, firmly believ 
that verification is a fundamental aspi 
of effective arms control. Indeed, any 
arms control agreement, if it is to bui 
confidence between the sides, is only 
good as its verification regime. As w€ 
have explained to our Eastern col- 
leagues on a number of occasions, a s 



Department of State BulP' 



ARMS CONTROL 



ffective verification measures is 
1. Such measures are manifestly 
issary, not only with respect to 
lotions but particularly with regai-d 
o-increase commitments: 

To help assure all parties that 
ty provisions ai-e being fully com- 
i with; 

• To deter violations of treaty obli- 
jons by increasing the likelihood that 
|i violations would be detected; and 

* To assist resolution of any 
(greements over compliance. 



klusion 

|he Geneva joint statement of 
i'ember 21, the United States and the 
(let Union "emphasized the impor- 
}'e they attach to the Vienna negotia- 
s and expressed their willingness to 
k for positive results." 
In its assessment of the summit 
ting, the Politburo of the U.S.S.R. 
■d that "the long-teiTn significance of 
Geneva meeting will show itself in 
rete practical actions." The West 
;?es with this view, as the proposal 
lave put forward today demon- 
ites beyond a shadow of a doubt. We 
on the East to join us now in pro- 
ng a concrete result in this negotia- 
, It can be done. 



3ASSAD0R BLACKWILL'S 
'ATEMENT, 

:. 12, 1985" 

1 very pleased to be here today to 
iss the Vienna negotiations on 
iial and balanced force reductions 
FR) with you. As you are aware, 
NATO aUies participating in these 
5 put forward to the Warsaw Pact 
week an imaginative and far- 
hing proposal aimed at breaking the 
de-long deadlock in these discus- 
s on conventional force reductions in 
ral Europe. 

Before turning to this new Western 
e, perhaps some general comments 
rding the Vienna negotiations are in 
r. 

Phese talks— which now constitute 
congest continuous arms control 
itiations in history— are a unique 
of NATO- Warsaw Pact dialogue. 
/ are the only foi-um in which we 
our NATO partners regularly 
iss security concerns and arms con- 
with the Warsaw Pact on an 
ice-to-alliance basis. As you know, 
NATO allies attach gi-eat political 
military importance to MBFR— not 



least because it is an East- West arms 
control forum in which they are able to 
participate directly and actively. 

This said, the talks have failed to 
date to achieve their declared objective; 
that is, the negotiated reduction and 
limitation of forces in central Europe. 
During the past 12 years, some progress 
has been made on several issues, but 
real success has remained out of reach. 
Fundamental differences have persisted 
on two key points. 

First, there has been a longstanding 
disagreement over the number of War- 
saw Pact troops stationed in central 
Europe— the so-called data issue. Since 
the outset of the negotiations in 1973, 
the West has tried unsuccesfuUy to per- 
suade the East of the merits of first 
reaching a common understanding on 
the size of forces in the reductions area. 
Second, the sides remain far apart on 
the question of veiification. There are 
differences on the actual scope and func- 
tioning of negotiated verification 
measures and on the necessary degree 
of intrusiveness of the verification 
regime. There are also differing views 
over the question of when measures 
should go into effect, i.e., during or 
after reductions. The East has so far 
refused to accept verification measures 
as precise and comprehensive as those 
proposed by the West. 

After extensive national reviews of 
these talks and their objectives, we and 
our NATO allies recently concluded that 
a significant and forthcoming new move 
could provide new impetus to the 
negotiations. Consistent with the joint 
statement issued by the President and 
General Secretary Gorbachev at the con- 
clusion of the Geneva summit meeting— 
and with our efforts to promote a "fresh 
start" and a more constructive East- 
West relationship— the United States, 
together with our NATO allies, intro- 
duced on December 5 a major new pro- 
posal designed to break the long 
deadlock in Vienna. 

Despite our continuing conviction 
that prior agreement on force data 
would have been the more sensible and 
effective means to making progress, 
NATO now is willing to drop this long- 
standing, important aspect of its posi- 
tion in the interest of breaking the 
decade-long logjam at the Vienna talks. 
This move comes in response to 
repeated Eastern suggestions over the 
years that if the West were to drop 
demands for prior data agreement, 
substantive progress could be made— 
indeed, that the path would be cleared 
to an agreement. 



In addition to this major step, the 
West now accepts the general frame- 
work of the East's February 1985 "basic 
provisions" proposal; that is, we agree 
to negotiate on a time-limited, first 
phase agreement consisting of initial 
U.S. and Soviet ground force reductions, 
followed by a no-increase commitment 
covering the forces in central Europe 
of all participants in the MBFR 
negotiations. 

This willingness to accept the frame- 
work proposed by the other side is an 
important development. In the past, the 
negotiations have been characterized by 
one side advancing a proposal, followed 
by the other side— usually after some 
interval— tabling a countei-proposal. Too 
often these have borne little or no rela- 
tion to each other, thus limiting prac- 
tical possibilities for real negotiation. 
Now for the first time in the negotia- 
tions, the sides— as a result of the West- 
ern move— are in a position where they 
are talking about the same kind of 
approach at the same time. Whether 
this marks a beginning of real negotia- 
tions will depend, of course, upon the 
Eastern reaction to our proposal. 

With regard to the specifics of the 
Western proposal, we have identified at 
least 16 specific points on which, as a 
result of the West's review of its posi- 
tion and subject to resolution of detail, 
there would now seem to be broad 
agreement between the two sides. 
These are identified in the attachment 
to my statement. There also are a num- 
ber of areas in which the sides appear 
to be in near agreement— for example, 
on a provision allowing for normal 
peacetime military activities such as 
NATO reinforcement exercises and the 
call-up of reservists for training. 

The most important differences be- 
tween the new Western positions and 
those of the East are as follows. 

First, the West is now proposing 
that initial reductions should be 5,000 
American and 11,500 Soviet ground 
troops. These figures reflect the ratio of 
U.S. and Soviet forces in the reductions 
area. The new figures thus continue to 
provide for a proportionate level of 
reduction and verification procedures of 
this first-phase agreement. 

Second, while the East has pro- 
posed that troops to be withdrawn take 
with them their organic armaments and 
combat equipment, the West proposes 
that, in order to achieve a timely first- 
phase agreement, each side should have 
discretion to decide for itself how to 
deal with such armaments. Moreover, 



ruary 1986 



63 



ARMS CONTROL 



we do not believe it would be mean- 
ingful or practicable to apply a no- 
increase commitment to armaments, as 
the East has proposed. Indeed, the East 
itself has begun to recognize recently 
the difficulties of including armaments 
in a limitations agreement. 

Third, as noted previously, the East 
envisages minimal provisions for verifi- 
cation. The West proposes an effective 
verification system which has several 
key features. 

• It converts the observation points 
proposed by the East into permanent 
and permanently manned entry and exit 
points through which all forces— those 
entering as well as those leaving the 
reductions area— should pass. 

• It provides for the exchange of 
detailed information, disaggregated 
dovra to the battalion level, on forces 
remaining in the reductions area after 
initial U.S. and Soviet withdrawals. The 
initial information exchange would con- 
stitute the basis for verifying the no- 
increase commitment. 

• It provides for an inspection 
regime under which each side would 
have the right to conduct 30 inspections 
during each of the 3 years immediately 
following the completion of U.S. and 
Soviet reductions. 

• It provides for the establishment 
of a consultative commission, whose 
tasks would include clarifying ambi- 
guities expeditiously and helping to 
resolve disputes. 

Fourth, while the East envisages 
both alliance-wide and national ceilings 
on armed forces, the West believes the 
no-increase commitment should simply 
be alliance-wide, with subceilings only 
on U.S. and Soviet forces, since they 
are the only forces involved in initial 
reductions. 

Finally, as in any international 
agreement of this kind, the West pro- 
poses to include a clause recognizing the 
right of each side to take steps to pro- 
tect its security interests in the event of 
activities by the other side which are in- 
compatible with the object or purposes 
of the agreement or which jeopardize 
those interests. 

It is too soon to predict how the 
negotiations will evolve in the wake of 
the West's new proposal. The Western 
move, however, offers a unique oppor- 
tunity to maintain the momentum 
following the Geneva summit and to pro- 
duce real progress in Vienna. 

The Soviet representative, on behalf 
of the East, has promised that the 
Western proposal would be "thoroughly 



studied." We will probably have to wait 
until the next negotiating round, which 
begins on January 30, before any 
authoritative Eastern views are regis- 
tered. It was, however, disappointing 
that the Soviet representative, as a 
preliminary reaction, also ventured to 
express the view that the Western pro- 
posal "does not inspire optimism" and 
to suggest that the Western position on 
dealing with armaments and verification 
"does not contribute to the achievement 
of a mutually acceptable agi-eement." 
Eastern press reaction we have seen 
thus far, moreover, has followed this 
line and has failed to acknowledge the 
many positive elements in the new 
NATO initiative. 

This said, it is now up to the Soviet 
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to 
show that they can match the West in 
flexibility, imagination, and prag- 
matism. 



ATTACHMENT: 

POINTS OF AGREEMENT 

As a result of the West's review of its 
position and subject to resolution of the 
details, there would now seem to be 
broad agreement between the two sides 
on the following points. 

1. The concept of a first-phase 
agreement as providing a general 
framework for our future work. 

2. The omission in the context of a 
first-phase agreement of any reference 
to the need for prior agreement on data. 

3. Initial reductions by the United 
States and the Soviet Union within 1 
year from the entry into force of the 
agreement. 

4. Reductions in units, with up to 
10% as individuals. 

5. Withdrawn forces shall return to 
within their national boundaries. 

6. Withdrawn forces shall not be 
deployed in new locations in such a way 
as to diminish the security of any state 
participant in the negotiations, including 
those with special status. 

7. Lists shall be exchanged of the 
American and Soviet military units to 
be withdrawn from the area of 
reductions. 

8. The United States and the Soviet 
Union shall inform all parties about the 
start of the practical arrangements to 
reduce their ground forces in central 
Europe and about their completion. 

9. Observation points should be 
established through which withdrawn 
Soviet and American forces shall pass. 



10. Each side should determine int | 
pendently the location of these points ' 
its own territory. I 

11. There shall be a no-increase ccf 
mitment following the period of 
reductions. 

12. National technical means of 
verification should be used in a mannt 
consistent with generally recognized 
principles of international law and the 
sides should undertake not to interfer 
with the national technical means of 
veiification of the other side. 

13. The agreement envisaged sho 
be of limited duration. 

14. Implementation of a verificati 
regime would also provide most valui 
experience in applying associated me. 
ures, which would prove useful in th( 
future in the course of more substani 
reductions. 

15. The agreement should be leg: 
binding. 

16. The East proposes that the s 
should undertake to pursue the nego 
tions on the reduction of armed fores 
and armaments in central Europe wi 
the object of reaching parity at equa ' 
collective levels of up to 900,000 mei ' 
including up to 700,000 men in grour ' 
forces. The West agrees that, subjec ^ 
the successful implementation of a fi 
phase agreement, this should remain 
objective. 



»Text from White House press releas 

^Ambassador Michael Alexander is h( 
of the U.K. delegation to the MBFR 
negotiations. 

^Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill is 
of the U.S. delegation to the MBFR 
negotiations. 

■•Made before the Arms Control Pane 
the House Arnied Services Committee. 1 
complete transcript of the hearings will 1 
published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing C 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



64 



Department of State Bl 



ARMS CONTROL 



Soviet Noncompliance With 
(rms Control Agreements 



^'Idirltig is the President's unclassified 
(iiii (1)1 Soviet noncompliance with 
■'s rantwl agreements along with his 
I r nf transmittal to the Speaker of 
\ llniise of Representatives and to the 
' s^Jrnt of the Senate on December 2S, 



ansmittal Letter 

r Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President): 

''-|"inse to Congressional requests as set 
!i III Public Law 99-145, I am foi-warding 
■wiih classified and unclassified versions 
hi .Vdniinistration's report to the Con- 
is Mil Soviet Noncompliance with Ai-ms 
trill .Agi-eements. 

Ditiiiled classified briefings will be 
lal'li' to the Congress early in the new 

' lii'lieve the additional information pro- 
1 1, ind issues addressed, especially in the 
ill M classified report, will significantly in- 
.--(■ understanding of Soviet violations and 
lalilc violations. Such understanding, and 
!iL' ( 'ongressional consensus on the impor- 
' ■!' compliance to achieving effective 
- liiitrol, will do much to strengthen our 
1> lioth in seeking corrective actions and 
iL^i'tiations with the Soviet Union. 
Sincerely. 

Ronald Reagan 



Classified Report 

•eporting to the Congi-ess on 
iruary 1 of this year on Soviet non- 
ipliance with arms control 
jemenls, I have stated that: 

[n order for arms control to have mean- 
and credibly contribute to national secu- 

and to global oi- regional stability, it is 
ntial that all parties to agreements fully 
ply with them. Strict compliance with all 
isions of ai-ms control agreements is 
lamental, and this Administration will not 
pt anrthing less. To do so would under- 
; the arms control process and damage 
chances for establishing a more construc- 

U.S. -Soviet relationship. 

rther stated that: 

soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. 
ills into question important security 
ifits from arms control, and could create 
security risks. It undermines the con- 
ice essential to an effective arms control 
ess in the future. With regard to the 
3S analyzed in the January- 1984 report. 



the Soviet Union has thus far not provided 
satisfactory explanations nor undertaken cor- 
rective actions sufficient to alleviate our con- 
cerns. The United States Government has 
vigorously pressed, and will continue to 
press, these compliance issues with the 
Soviet Union through diplomatic channels. 

The important i-ole of treaty com- 
pliance for future arms control was re- 
cently recognized by the United Nations. 
On December 12, 1985, the General 
Assembly passed by a vote of 131-0 
(with 16 abstentions) a resolution on 
arms control compliance which had been 
introduced by the United States and 
other co-sponsoi-s. The resolution: 

• urges all parties to arms limitation 
and disarmament agreements to comply 
with their provisions; 

• calls upon those parties to con- 
sider the implications of noncompliance 
for international security and stability 
and for the prospects for further prog- 
ress in the field of disarmament; and 

• appeals to all U.N. members to 
support efforts to resolve noncompliance 
questions "with a view toward encour- 
aging strict observance of the provisions 
subscribed to and maintaining or restor- 
ing the integrity of arms limitation or 
disarmament agreements." 

At the request of the Congress, I 
have in the past two years provided 
three reports to the Congress on Soviet 
compliance issues. The first, forwarded 
in January 1984, reviewed seven com- 
pliance issues, concluding that the 
Soviet Union had, in fact, violated a 
number of important arms control 
commitments. 

In September 1984 I provided, at 
the request of the Congress, a report on 
Soviet noncompliance prepared by the 
independent General Advisory Commit- 
tee on Arms Control and Disarmament. 
That report concluded that over a 
25-year span the Soviets had violated a 
substantial number of arms control 
commitments. 

In February 1985, I submitted a 
report to the Congress updating the Ad- 
ministration's Januai-y 1984 report and 
reviewing 13 issues that could be 
treated in unclassified terms and an ad- 
ditional group of six issues treated on a 
classified basis. That report discussed 
the pattem of Soviet arms control viola- 
tions, probable violations, or ambiguous 



activity in seventeen cases. The U.S. 
Government found seven Soviet viola- 
tions, three probable violations, one like- 
ly and one potential violation. The 
Soviets were found to be in compliance 
in two other cases examined. 

One of those issues, Yankee-Class 
submarine reconfiguration, is not ad- 
dressed in the current report. While a 
submarine reconfigured to carry long- 
range cruise missiles constitutes a 
threat similar to that of the original 
SSBN, I reported in February that 
Soviet reconfiguration activities have 
not been in violation of the SALT I 
[strategic arms limitation talks] Interim 
Agi-eement. This issue, therefore, re- 
quires no further judgment in terms of 
compliance at present. 

Public Law 99-145 requires the Ad- 
ministration to provide on an annual 
basis by December 1 of each year a 
classified and unclassified report to the 
Congress containing the findings of the 
President and any additional information 
necessary to keep the Congress in- 
formed on Soviet compliance with arms 
control agreements. 

The current report responds to this 
Congressional requii-ement. It is the 
product of months of careful technical 
and legal analysis by all relevant agen- 
cies of the United States Government 
and represents the Administration's 
authoritative updated treatment of this 
important matter. 

The current unclassified report ex- 
amines one new issue and updates all of 
the issues studied in the classified 
report of February 1985, except the 
issue of Yankee-Class submarine recon- 
figuration. There are violations in nine 
cases. Of the nine cases involving viola- 
tions, one SALT II issue— that of Soviet 
concealment of the association between 
missiles and their launchers— is ex- 
amined for the fii-st time. The Soviet 
Union has now also violated its commit- 
ment to the SALT I Interim Agreement 
through the prohibited use of remaining 
facilities at former SS-7 ICBM [inter- 
continental ballistic missile] sites. In ad- 
dition, Soviet deployment of the SS-25 
ICBM during 1985 constitutes a further 
violation of the SALT II prohibition on 
a second new type of ICBM. Several 
other issues involve potential, probable 
or likely violations. 

The current unclassified report reaf- 
firms the findings of the February 1985 
classified report concerning ABM [anti- 
ballistic missile] issues, making public 
two of them for the first time. It also 
reaffiiTns the February findings concern- 
ing SALT II issues involving violations, 



■uary 1986 



65 



ARMS CONTROL 



including one concerning strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles, which has not 
previously been made public. In two 
SALT 1 1 "issues with respect to which 
the Soviets were not judged to be in 
clear violation in the classified report of 
last February, the findings are altered 
or updated. These two issues are the 
SS-16 and an issue made public for the 
first time-Backfire Bomber production 

rate. 

The Administration's most recent 
studies support its conclusion that there 
is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As 
documented in this and previous 
reports, the Soviet Union has violated 
its legal obligation under or political 
commitment to the SALT I ABM 
Treaty and Interim Agi-eement, the 
SALT II agreement, the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva 
Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the 
Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the 
U.S.S.R. has likely violated provisions 
of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. 

While we remain concerned about 
Soviet violations of Basket I of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty, there is no unambiguous 
evidence of new 1985 Soviet violations 
of these two treaties. With regard to 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- 
vention, or the Geneva Protocol on 
Chemical Weapons, there also is no 
unambiguous evidence of new 1985 
Soviet lethal attacks that meets our 
strict standards of evidence. However, 
the Soviets clearly remain in violation of 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention. 



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET 
NONCOMPLIANCE 

Through its noncompliance, the Soviet 
Union has made military gains in the 
areas of strategic offensive arms as well 
as chemical, biological and toxin 
weapons. If the yields of Soviet nuclear 
tests have been substantially above 150 
kilotons, then Soviet testing would allow 
proportionately greater gains in nuclear 
weapons development than the U.S. 
could achieve. The possible extent of the 
Soviet Union's military gains by virtue 
of its noncompliance in the area of stra- 
tegic defense also is of increasing impor- 
tance and serious concern. 

In a fundamental sense, all 
deliberate Soviet violations are equally 
important. As violations of legal obliga- 
tions or political commitments, they 



cause gi-ave concern regarding Soviet 
commitment to arms control, and they 
darken the atmosphere in which current 
negotiations are being conducted in 
Geneva and elsewhere. 

In another sense, Soviet violations 
are not of equal importance. While some 
individual violations are of little ap- 
parent military significance in their own 
right, such violations can acquire impor- 
tance if, left unaddressed, they are per- 
mitted to become precedents for future, 
more threatening violations. Moreover, 
some issues that individually have little 
military significance could conceivably 
become significant when taken in their 
aggregate. 

The Krasnoyarsk Radar 

The radar under construction near 
Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for 
both political and military reasons. 
Politically, the radar demonstrates that 
the Soviets are capable of violating arms 
control obligations and commitments 
even when they are negotiating with the 
United States or when they know we 
will detect a violation. The 1972 ABM 
Treaty prohibits the Soviets from siting 
an ABM radar, or siting and orienting a 
ballistic missile detection and tracking 
radar, as the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited 
and oriented. 

Militarily, the Ki-asnoyarsk radar 
violation goes to the heart of the ABM 
Treaty. Large phased-array radars 
(LPARs) like that under construction 
near Ki-asnoyarsk were recognized dur- 
ing the ABM Treaty negotiations as the 
critical, long lead-time element of a na- 
tionwide ABM defense. 

When considered as a part of a 
Soviet network of new LPARs, the 
Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent 
potential to contribute to ABM radar 
coverage of a significant portion of the 
central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoy- 
arsk radar closes the remaining gap in 
Soviet ballistic missile detection and 
tracking coverage. 

ABM Territorial Defense and Other 
ABM Activities 

The Krasnoyarsk radar appears even 
more menacing when considered in the 
context of other Soviet ABM-related ac- 
tivities. Together they cause concern 
that the Soviet Union may be preparing 
an ABM territorial defense. Some of 
these activities, such as permitted 
LPARs and the Moscow ABM deploy- 
ment area, are consistent with the ABM 
Treaty. Others involve potential or 



probable Soviet violations or other am 
biguous activity, including: 

• the apparent testing and develo] 
ment of components required for an 
ABM system which could be deployed 
a site in months rather than years; 

• the probable concurrent testing 
air defense components and ABM 
components; 

• the development of a modern ai 
defense system, the SA-X-12, which 
may have' some ABM capabilities; am 

• the demonstration of an ability 
reload ABM launchers and to refire t 
interceptor missile in a period of timi 
shorter than previously noted. 

Soviet deployment of an ABM tei 
torial defense contrary to the ABM 
Treaty would have profound implicat 
for Western security and the vital E 
West strategic balance. A unilateral 
Soviet territorial ABM capability ac- 
quired in violation of the ABM Treat 
could erode our deterrent and leave 
doubts about its credibility. Such a 
capability might encourage the Sovie 
to take increased risks in crises, thu 
degrading crisis stability. 

SS-25 

The SS-25, a clear and ii-reversible ^ 
violation of the Soviet Union's SAL' 
commitment, also has important poll 
and military implications. Testing ar 
deployment of this missile violates a 
central provision of the SALT II 
Treaty, which was intended to limit 
number of new ICBMs. The Treaty 
mits only one new type of ICBM foi 
each Party. The Soviets have inforn 
us that their one new type will be t 
SS-X-24, which is now undergoing 
testing, and have falsely asserted ti- 
the SS-25 is a permitted moderniza' 
of the silo-based SS-13 ICBM. 

Under the pretext of permitted 
modernization, the Soviets, since tb 
last compliance report, have deployt 
prohibited second new type of missi- 
the SS-25, which is mobile and coul 
made more lethal. The SS-25 also c 
be modified to carry more than a si 
warhead. Most worrisome is the tec 
nical argument by which the Soviet 
sought to justify the SS-25, for it r 
be applied to additional prohibited ; 
types of ICBMs in the future. 



Department of State 



ARMS CONTROL 



onu'try Encryption and 
uealment of Missile/Launcher 

iociation 

'() other Soviet violations impede our 
ii\ to verify the Soviet Union's com- 
111 (■ with its political commitments, 
iet use of encryption impedes U.S. 
ification of Soviet compliance and 
s contravenes the provision of the 
LT II Treaty which prohibits use of 
berate concealment measures which 
lede verification of compliance by na- 
lal technical means. A new finding of 
1 report is that cui-rent Soviet ac- 
ties violate the pi-ovision of the 
aty which prohibits use of deliberate 
cealment measui-es associated with 
;ing, including those measures aimed 
!oncealing the association between 
}Ms and launchers during testing. 
ke deliberate Soviet concealment ac- 
ties impede our ability to know 
?ther a type of missile is in com- 
nee with SALT II i-equirements. 
•y could also make it more difficult 
the United States to assess accu- 
."ly the critical parameters of any 
ire missile. 

Since the SALT I agreement in 
2, Soviet encryption and concealment 
vities have become more extensive 
disturbing. These activities, Soviet 
Donses on these issues, and Soviet 
are to take the corrective actions 
ch the United States has repeatedly 
nested, are indicative of a Soviet at- 
de contrai-y to the fundamentals of 
nd aiTns control agreements. Soviet 
ryption and concealment activities 
sent special obstacles to maintaining 
rting arms control agreements, 
ermine the political confidence 
essarj' for concluding new treaties, 
underscore the necessity that any 
' agreement be effectively verifiable, 
iet noncompliance, as documented in 
rent and past Administration reports 
exemplified by the encryption and 
eealment issues, has made verifica- 
1 and compliance pacing elements of 
IS control today. 

!mical, Biological and Toxin 
apons 

: Soviet Union's violations of its legal 
gations under the Biological and 
in Weapons Convention and the 
leva Protocol have important political 
military implications. The Soviets 
a pi-ogi-am of biological and toxin 
ipons before they signed the multi- 
ral Treaty. Upon signing the Treaty, 
Soviets not only did not stop their 



illegal program but they expanded 
facilities and were instrumental in the 
use of prohibited agents. 

The Soviet Union has a prohibited 
offensive biological wai-fare capability 
which we do not have and against which 
we have no defense. This capability may 
include advanced biological agents about 
which we have little knowledge. Evi- 
dence suggests that the Soviets are ex- 
panding their chemical and toxin war- 
fare capabilities in a manner that has no 
parallel in NATO's retaliatory or defen- 
sive programs. Even though there has 
been no unambiguous evidence of lethal 
attacks during 1985, previous activities 
have pi-ovided testing, development and 
operational expei-ience. 

Nuclear Testing 

With respect to the Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty, Soviet testing at yields above 
the 150 kiloton limit would allow devel- 
opment of advanced nuclear weapons 
with proportionately higher yields than 
the yields of weapons that the U.S. 
could develop under the Treaty. The 
U.S. Government judges that Soviet 
test activities constitute likely violations 
of the 150 kiloton limit. 

Other Issues 

Military significance is evidently not 
necessarily the determining factor in 
Soviet decisions or actions which violate 
their arms control commitments. The 
Soviet Union has also violated or prob- 
ably violated arms control obligations 
and commitments from which at present 
it appears to reap little military gain. 
The following cases are relevant in this 
regard: 

• the use of remaining facilities at 
former SS-7 ICBM sites since the Feb- 
ruary 1985 compliance report (SALT I 
Interim Agreement); 

• exceeding the strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicle limits (SALT II); 

• probable deployment of the SS-16 
(SALT II); and 

• underground nuclear test venting 
(Limited Test Ban Treaty). 

The 1981 Soviet violation of the 
military exercise notification provisions 
of the Helsinki Final Act involved an ac- 
tion contrary to the confidence building 
measures included in that agreement. 

Soviet deployments of Backfire 
Bombers to Arctic staging bases are in- 
consistent with the Soviet Union's politi- 
cal commitment to the SALT II Treaty. 



In addition, while there are ambiguities 
concerning the data, there is evidence 
that the production rate of the Backfire 
Bomber was constant at slightly more 
than 30 per year until 1984, and slightly 
less than 30 per year since then. These 
Soviet Backfire Bomber activities will 
continue to be monitored and assessed. 



THE SOVIET RESPONSE 

At the same time as the Administration 
has reported its concerns and findings to 
the Congress, the United States has had 
extensive exchanges with the Soviet 
Union on Soviet noncompliance in the 
Standing Consultative Commission 
(SCO, where SALT-related issues (in- 
cluding ABM issues) are discussed, and 
through other appropiiate diplomatic 
channels. I expressed my personal con- 
cerns directly to General Secretary Gor- 
bachev during my recent meeting with 
him in Geneva. 

All of the violations, probable viola- 
tions and ambiguous situations included 
in this report and previously reported 
on have been raised with the Soviets, 
except certain sensitive issues. The 
Soviet Union has thus far not provided 
explanations sufficient to alleviate our 
concerns on these issues, nor has the 
Soviet Union taken actions needed to 
correct existing violations. Instead, they 
have continued to assert that they are 
in complete compliance with their arms 
control obligations and commitments. 



U.S. POLICY 

In contrast with the Soviet Union, the 
United States has fully observed its 
arms control obligations and com- 
mitments, including those under the 
SALT I and SALT II agreements. As I 
stated in my message to the Congress 
on June 10 of this year concerning U.S. 
interim restraint policy: 

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START), I decided that the 
United States would not undercut the ex- 
pired SALT 1 agreement or the unratified 
SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet 
Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my 
serious reservations about the inequities of 
the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws 
of the SALT II agreement, I took this action 
in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual 
-restraint conducive to serious negotiation as 
we entered START. 

Since then, the United States has not 
taken any actions which would undercut ex- 
isting arms control agreements. The United 
States has fully kept its part of the bargain. 



bruary 1986 



67 



ARMS CONTROL 



However, the Soviets have not. They have 
failed to comply with several provisions of 
SALT II. and we have serious concerns 
regarding their compliance with the provi- 
sions of other accords. 

The pattern of Soviet violations, if left 
uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and 
viability of arms control as an instrument to 
assist in ensui-ing a secure and stable future 
world. The United States will continue to 
pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the 
resolution of our concerns over Soviet non- 
compliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves 
a double standard that amounts to unilateral 
treaty compliance. 

On June 10, I invited the Soviet 
Union to join the United States in an in- 
terim framework of truly mutual re- 
straint on strategic offensive arms and 
to pursue with renewed vigor our top 
priority of achieving deep reductions in 
the size of existing nuclear arsenals in 
the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. I 
noted that the U.S. cannot estabhsh 
such a framework alone and that it 
would require the Soviet Union to take 
positive, concrete steps to correct its 
noncompliance, to resolve our other 
comphance concerns, to reverse its un- 
paralleled and unwarranted military 
buildup, and actively to pursue arms 
reduction agreements in the Geneva 
negotiations. 

In going the e.xtra mile, I have made 
clear that as an integral part of this 
policy, we will also take those steps re- 
quired to assure our national security 
and that of our Allies that were made 
necessary by Soviet noncompliance. 
Thus, as I indicated to the Congress on 
June 10, "appropriate and proportionate 
responses to Soviet noncompliance are 
called for to ensure our security, to pro- 
vide incentives to the Soviets to correct 
their noncompliance, and to make it 
clear to Moscow that violations of arms 
control obligations entail real costs." 
As we monitor Soviet actions for 
evidence of the positive, concrete steps 
needed on their part to correct these ac- 
tivities, I have directed the Department 
of Defense to conduct a comprehensive 
assessment aimed at identifying specific 
actions that the United States could 
take to augment as necessary the U.S. 
strategic modernization program as a 
proportionate response to, and as a 
hedge against the military consequences 
of those Soviet violations of existing 
arms control agreements which the 
Soviets fail to correct. We v^dll carefully 
study this report as soon as it has been 
completed. 

As we press for corrective Soviet ac- 
tions and while keeping open all pro- 



grammatic options for handling future 
milestones as new U.S. strategic sys- 
tems are deployed, we will continue to 
assess the overall situation in light of 
Soviet actions correcting their non- 
compliance, reversing their military 
build-up, and promoting progress in 
Geneva. 

I look forward to continued close 
consultation with the Congress as we 
seek to make progress in resolving com- 
pliance issues and in negotiating sound 
arms control agreements. 

The findings on Soviet noncompli- 
ance with arms control agreements 
follow. 



THE FINDINGS 

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 

Treaty Status 

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol 
ban deployment of ABM systems except 
that each party is permitted to deploy 
one ABM system around the national 
capital area or, alternatively, at a single 
ICBM deployment area. The ABM 
Treaty is in force and is of indefinite 
duration. Soviet actions not in accord 
with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, 
violations of a legal obligation. 

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar 

• Obligation: To preclude creation 
of a base for territorial ABM defense, 
the ABM Treaty provides that radars 
for early warning of ballistic missile at- 
tack may be deployed only at locations 
along the periphery of the national ter- 
ritory of each party and that they be 
oriented outward. The Treaty permits 
deployment (without regard to location 
or orientation) of large phased-array 
radars for purposes of tracking objects 
in outer space or for use as national 
technical means of verification of com- 
pliance with arms control agreements. 

• Issue: The January 1984 and 
February 1985 reports examined the 
issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar 
meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty 
governing phased-array radars. This 
report reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
reaffirms the conclusion in the February 
1985 report that the new large phased- 
array radar under construction at Kras- 
noyarsk constitutes a violation of legal 
obligations under the Anti- Ballistic 
Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its 
associated siting, orientation, and capa- 
bility, it is prohibited by this Treaty. 



Continuing construction and the absei 
of credible alternative explanations hi 
reinforced our assessment of its pur- 
pose. Despite U.S. requests, no corre 
five action has been taken. This and 
other ABM-related Soviet activities s 
gest that the U.S.S.R. may be prepai 
an ABM defense of its national 
territory. 

2. Mobility of ABM System 
Components 

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty ) 
hibits the development, testing or 
deployment of mobile land-based AB! 
systems or components. 

• Issue: The February 1985 repc 
examined whether the Soviet Union 
developed a mobile land-based ABM 
system, or components for such a 
system, in violation of its legal oblig; 
tion under the ABM Treaty. This re) 
reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Governmen 
judges that the evidence on Soviet a 
tions with respect to ABM componei 
mobility is ambiguous, but that the 
U.S.S.R.'s development and testing 
components of an ABM system, whi< 
apparently are designed to be 
deployable at sites requiring relative 
limited site preparation, represent a 
potential violation of its legal obligat 
under the ABM Treaty. This and otl 
ABM-related Soviet activities sugge: 
that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing 
ABM defense of its national territor 

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM 
Air Defense Components 

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty 
its Protocol limit the Parties to one 
ABM deployment area. In addition t 
the ABM systems and components a 
that one deployment area, the Partii 
may have ABM systems and compo- 
nents for development and testing p 
poses so long as they are located at 
agreed test ranges. The Treaty also 
hibits giving components, other thar 
ABM system components, the capab 
"to counter strategic ballistic missile 
their elements in flight trajectory" i 
prohibits the Parties from testing th 
in "an ABM mode." The Parties agi 
that the concurrent testing of SAM 
[surface-to-air missile] and ABM sys) 
components is prohibited. 

• Issue: The February 1985 com 
pliance report examined whether thi 
Soviet Union has concurrently teste< 
SAM and ABM system components t 
violation of its legal pbligation sincei 



68 



Department of State Bt 



ARMS CONTROL 



i not to do so. It was the purpose of 
obligation to further constrain 
ing of air defense systems in an 
VI mode. This report ree.xamines this 

Finding: The U.S. Government 
firms the judgment made in the 
ruary 1985 report that the evidence 
oviet actions with respect to concur- 
, operations is insufficient fully to 
iss compliance with Soviet obliga- 
s under the ABM Treaty. However, 
Soviet Union has conducted tests 
\ have involved air defense radars in 
M-related activities. The large 
iber, and consistency over time, of 
dents of concurrent operation of 
M and SAM components, plus Soviet 
ire to accommodate fully U.S. con- 
is, indicate the U.S.S.R. probably 
violated the prohibition on testing 
kl components in an ABM mode. In 
?ral cases this may be highly prob- 
■. This and other ABM-related activi- 
suggest the U.S.S.R. may be pre- 
ng an ABM defense of its national 
itory. 

4. ABM Capability of Modem SAM 
tems 

• Obligation: Under the ABM Trea- 

each party undertakes not to give 
•ABM interceptor missiles, launchers 
adars "capabilities to counter strate- 
ballistic missiles or their elements in 
It trajectory, and not to test them in 
\BM mode. . . ." 

• Issue: The February 1985 
sified report examined whether the 
iet Union has tested a SAM system 
omponent in an ABM mode or given 
le capability to counter strategic 
istic missiles or their elements in 

it trajectory in violation of their 
.1 obligation under the ABM Treaty. 
i report reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Goveniment 
'fiiTiis the judgment made in the 
ruary 1985 report that the evidence 
■oviet actions with respect to SAM 
rade is insufficient to assess com- 
nce with the Soviet Union's obliga- 
s under the ABM Treaty. However, 

and other ABM-related Soviet ac- 
;ies suggest that the U.S.S.R. may 
jreparing an ABM defense of its na- 
al territory. 

5. Rapid Reload of ABM 
inchers 

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty 
ts to 100 the number of deployed 
M interceptor launchers and de- 



ployed interceptor missiles. It does not 
limit the number of interceptor missiles 
that can be built and stockpiled. The 
Treaty prohibits the development, 
testing or deployment of "automatic or 
semi-automatic or other similar systems 
for rapid reload" of the permitted 
launchers. 

• Issue: The February 1985 
classified report examined whether the 
Soviet Union has developed, tested or 
deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or 
other similar systems for rapid reload of 
ABM launchers in violation of its legal 
obligation under the ABM Treaty. This 
report reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges, on the basis of the evidence 
available, that the U.S.S.R.'s actions 
with respect to the rapid reload of ABM 
launchers constitute an ambiguous situa- 
tion as concerns its legal obligations 
under the ABM Treaty not to develop 
systems for i-apid reload. The Soviet 
Union's reload capabilities are a serious 
concern. These and other ABM-related 
activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may 
be preparing an ABM defense of its na- 
tional territory. 

6. ABM Territorial Defense 

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty 
allows each party a single operational 
site, explicitly permits modernization 
and replacement of ABM systems or 
their components, and explicitly recog- 
nizes the existence of ABM test ranges 
for the development and testing of ABM 
components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, 
however, the deployment of an ABM 
system for defense of the national terri- 
tory of the parties and prohibits the 
parties from providing a base for such a 
defense. 

• Issue: The February 1985 report 
examined whether the Soviets have 
deployed an ABM system for the de- 
fense of their territory or provided a 
base for such a defense. This report 
reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that the aggregate of the Soviet 
Union's ABM and ABM-related actions 
(e.g., radar construction, concurrent 
testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid 
reload and ABM mobility) suggests that 
the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM 
defense of its national territory. 



SALT II Treaty 

Treaty Status 

SALT II was signed in June 1979 and 
has not been ratified. In 1981 the 
United States made clear to the Soviet 
Union its intention not to ratify the 
SALT II Treaty. Prior to this clarifica- 
tion of our position in 1981, both nations 
were obligated under customary inter- 
national law not to take actions which 
would defeat the object and purpose of 
the signed, but uni-atified. Treaty. Such 
Soviet actions prior to 1981 are viola- 
tions of legal obligations. Since 1981, the 
United States has observed a poHtical 
commitment to refrain from actions that 
undercut the SALT II Treaty so long as 
the Soviet Union does likewise. The 
Soviets have told us they also would 
abide by these provisions. Soviet actions 
inconsistent with this commitment are 
violations of their political commitment 
with respect to the SALT II Treaty. 

1. The SS-25 ICBM 

• Obligation: In an attempt to con- 
strain the modernization and the pro- 
liferation of new, more capable types of 
ICBMs, the provisions of SALT'II per- 
mit each side to "flight test and deploy" 
just one new type of "light" ICBM. A 
new t.vTJe is defined as one that differs 
from an existing type by more than 5 
percent in length, largest diameter, 
launch-weight or throw-weight or differs 
in number of stages or propellant type. 
In addition, it was agreed that no ICBM 
of an existing type with a post-boost 
vehicle and a single reentry vehicle 
would be flight-tested or deployed 
whose reentry vehicle weight is less 
than 50 percent of the throw-weight of 
that ICBM. This latter provision was in- 
tended to prohibit the possibility that 
single warhead ICBMs could quickly be 
converted to MIRVed systems. 

• Issues: The January 1984 and 
February 1985 reports examined the 
evidence: whether the Soviets have 
tested or deployed a second new type of 
ICBM (the SS-25) which is prohibited; 
whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on 
that missile, if it is not a new type, is in 
compliance with the provision that for 
e.xisting types of single RV missiles, the 
weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 
percent of total throw-weight; and 
whether encr>T3tion of SS-25 flight test 
telemetry impedes verification. This 
report reexamines these issues. 



iruary 1986 



69 



ARMS CONTROL 



• Findings: 

a. Second New Type— Testing 
(Did Deploiiment: The U.S. Government 
judges, based on convincing evidence 
about the SS-25, that the throw-weight 
of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM exceeds by 
more than 5 percent the throw-weight of 
the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and cannot 
therefore be considered a permitted 
modernization of the SS-13 as the 
Soviets claim. The SS-25 is a prohibited 
second "new type" of ICBM and its 
testing, in addition to the testing of the 
SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of 
the Soviet Union's political commitment 
to observe the "new type" provision of 
the SALT II Treaty, the deployment of 
this missile during 1985 constitutes a 
further violation of the SALT II prohibi- 
tion on a second "new type" of ICBM. 

b. RV-to-Throw-weight Ratio: 
The U.S. Government reaffii-ms the con- 
clusion of the January 1984 report re- 
garding the SS-25 RV-to-throw-weight 
ratio. That is, if we were to accept the 
Soviet argument that the SS-25 is not a 
prohibited "new type" of ICBM, it 
would be a violation of their political 
commitment to observe the SALT II 
provision which prohibits the testing of 
such an existing ICBM with a single 
reentry vehicle whose weight is less 
than 50 percent of the throw-weight of 
the ICBM. 

c. Encryption: The U.S. Govern- 
ment reaffii-ms its judgment made in the 
January 1984 report regarding teleme- 
try encry]3tion during tests of the 
SS-25. Encr\^Dtion during tests of this 
missile is illustrative of the deliberate 
impeding of verification of compliance in 
violation of the U.S.S.R.'s political 
commitment. 

Despite U.S. requests for explana- 
tions and corrective actions with regard 
to the SS-25 ICBM-related activities, 
Soviet actions continue unchanged, and 
the Soviet Union has proceeded to 
deployment of this missile. 

2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery 
Vehicle Limits 

• Obligation: The Soviet Union's 
political commitment to abide by SALT 
II is inteipreted by the U.S. Govern- 
ment as including an obligation not to 
increase the number of strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles (SNDVs) in its arsenal. 
The Soviet Union had 2,504 SNDVs 
when it signed SALT II. 

• Issue: The February 1985 classi- 
fied report examined the issue of 
whether the Soviet Union has abided bv 



its commitment not to exceed the level 
of 2,504 SNDVs. This report reexamines 
this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government in- 
terprets the Soviet commitment to abide 
by SALT II as including the existence 
of a cap on SNDVs-at a level of 2,504 
existing at the time SALT II was 
signed. The Soviet Union has deployed 
SNDVs above the 2,504 cap in violation 
of its political commitment under SALT 
II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet 
policy inconsistent with this political 
commitment. 

3. SS-16 Deployment 

• Obligation: The Soviet Union 
agreed in SALT II not to produce, test 
or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, 
in particular, not to produce the SS-16 
third stage or the reentry vehicle of 
that missile. 

• Issue: The January 1984 and 
February 1985 reports examined the 
evidence regarding whether the Soviets 
have deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite 
of the ban on its deployment. This 
report reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The President's Febru- 
ary 1985 Report to Congress which 
noted that the evidence is somewhat 
ambiguous and we cannot reach a defini- 
tive conclusion, found the activities at 
Plesetsk to be a probable violation of 
the U.S.S.R.'s legal obligation and 
political commitment under SALT II. 
Soviet activity in the past year at 
Plesetsk seems to indicate the probable 
removal of SS-16 ecjuipment and in- 
troduction of equipment associated with 
a different ICBM. 

4. Backfire Bomber Inter- 
continental Operating Capability 

• Obligation: At the signing of 
SALT II, the U.S.S.R. gave the U.S. 
assurances about the BACKFIRE 
bomber's intercontinental operating 
capability. The Soviet statement of June 
16, 1979, read, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 

The Soviet side informs the US side that 
the Soviet "Tu-22M" air-plane, called 
"BACKFIRE" in the USA, is a medium- 
range bomber, and that it does not intend to 
give this aii-plane the capability of operating 
at intercontinental distances. In this connec- 
tion, the Soviet side states that it will not in- 
crease the radius of action of this airplane in 
such a way as to enable it to strike targets 
on the territory of the USA. Nor does it in- 
tend to give it such a capability in any other 
manner, including by in-flight refueling. . . . 



This unilateral statement is an in-i 
tegral part of the SALT II agreemen 
and the U.S. considers it to be incor- 
porated in the Soviet Union's politics 
commitment to abide by SALT II. 

• Issue: The February 1985 
classified report addressed the issue 
whether temporary deployments of 
BACKFIRE bombers to Arctic base; 
constitute actions inconsistent with 
Brezhnev's June 16, 1979, statement 
to give the BACKFIRE an increasec 
radius of action and the capability of 
operating at intercontinental distanct 
This report reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Governmen 
judges that the temporary deployme 
of BACKFIRES to Arctic bases is c: 
for concern and continued careful mc 
toring. Bv such temporary deployme 
of BACKFIRES, the Soviet Union a 
in a manner inconsistent with its 
political commitment in the June 19'i 
BACKFIRE statement not to give 
Backfire the capability to strike targ 
on the territory of the United State: 

5. Backfire Bomber Productioni 
Rate 

• Obligation: At the signing of 
SALT II, the U.S.S.R. gave the Hi 
assurances about the BACKFIRE 
bomber's production rate. The Sovie 
statement read, in pertinent part, as 
follows: "... the Soviet side states t 
it will not increase the production n 
of this airplane as compared to the j 
sent rate." Soviet President Brezhn( 
according to Secretary Vance's SAL 
transmittal letter to the Senate, "co 
firmed that the Soviet BACKFIRE 
duction rate would not exceed thirtj 
year." President Carter stated that 
United States enters into the SALT 
Agreement on the basis of the comn 
ments contained in the Soviet stater 
and that it considers the carrying oi 
these commitments to be essential t 
the obligations under the Treaty. Tl 
U.S. considers the Soviet unilateral 
statement to be an integral part of 1 
SALT II Agi-eement and, as such, t 
incorporated in the Soviet Union's p 
cal commitment to abide by SALT 1 

• Issue: The February 1985 rep 
examined the question of whether tl 
Soviet Union has produced more th: 
BACKFIRES per year and increase 
the production i-ate since signing SI 
II. This report reexamines this issu 



70 



Department of State Bi , 



ARMS CONTROL 



Finding: The U.S. Government 
■s that the Soviet Union is obli- 
I to produce no more than 30 
KFIRE bomber aircraft per year. 
; are ambiguities concerning the 

However, there is evidence that 
oviet BACKFIRE production rate 
:onstant at slightly more than 30 
ear until 1984, and decreased since 
;ime to slightly below 30 per year. 

Encryption of Ballistic Missile 
netry 

Obligation: Provisions of SALT II 
lelibei'ate concealment measures 
mpede verification by national 
ical means. The Treaty permits 
party to use various methods of 
mitting telemetric information dur- 
isting, including encrN'jDtion, but 
deliberate denial of telemetry, such 
"ough encrj-ption, whenever such 
1 impedes verification. 
Issue: The Janaury 1984 compli- 
report examined whether the 
t Union has engaged in encrvi^tion 
isile test telemetry (radio signals) 
to impede verification. This issue 
eexamined in the February 1985 
iance report and is examined again 
!5 report. 

Finding: The U.S. Government 
■ms the conclusion in the February 
■eport that Soviet encryption prac- 
:onstitute a violation of a legal 
tion under SALT II prior to 1981 

violation of their political commit- 
since 1982. The nature and extent 
h encryption of telemetry on new 
,ic missiles, despite U.S. requests 
rrective action, continues to be an 
)le of deliberately impeding veiifi- 

of compliance in violation of this 
: political commitment. 

Concealment of Missile/ 
cher Association 

Obligation: Article XV of the 
II Treaty prohibits "deliberate 
ilment measures which impede 
;ation by national technical means 
ipliance with the provisions of this 
^." This obligation is further clari- 
1 a Common Understanding that 
that Article XV applies to all pro- 
s of the Treaty and "includes the 
tion not to use deliberate conceal- 
measures associated with testing, 
ing those measures aimed at con- 
? the association between ICBMs 
unchers during testing." 
"Issue: This report examines for 
•St time the issue of whether the 



Soviets have concealed the association 
between an ICBM and its launcher dur- 
ing testing in violation of their obliga- 
tion not to use deliberate concealment 
measures which impede verification. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges Soviet activities related to the 
SS-25 to be a violation of the Soviet 
Union's political commitment to abide 
by the SALT II Treaty provision pro- 
hibiting concealment of the association 
between a missile and its launcher dur- 
ing testing. 

SALT I Interim Agreement 

Treaty Status 

The SALT I Interim Agi-eement 
entered into force for the United States 
and the Soviet Union in 1972. Disman- 
tling procedures implementing the In- 
terim Agi'eement were concluded in 
1974. The Interim Agreement, by its 
ow^^ terms, was of limited duration and 
expired as a legally binding document in 
1977. The applicability of the Interim 
Agreement to the actions of both parties 
has, however, been extended by the par- 
ties by a series of mutual political com- 
mitments, including the President's 
May 31, 1982, statement that the United 
States would refrain from actions which 
would undercut existing strategic arms 
agi'eements so long as the Soviet Union 
shows equal restraint. The Soviets have 
told us they would abide by the SALT I 
Interim Agreement and SALT II. Any 
actions by the U.S.S.R. inconsistent 
with this commitment are violations of 
its political commitment with respect to 
the Interim Agi'eement and its imple- 
menting procedures. 

Use of "Remaining Facilities" at 
Former SS-7 Sites 

• Obligation: The SALT I Interim 
Agreement and its procedures prohibit 
the Parties from using facilities remain- 
ing at dismantled or destroyed ICBM 
sites for storage, support, or launch of 
ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent 
with this commitment are violations of a 
political commitment with respect to the 
Interim Agreement and its implement- 
ing procedures. 

• Issue: The Febiniary 1985 report 
e.xamined whether the U.S.S.R. has vio- 
lated the SALT I Interim Agreement 
prohibition against using facilities re- 
maining at dismantled former SS-7 
ICBM sites for the storage, support or 
launch of SS-25 ICBMs. This report 
reexamines this issue. 



• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that Soviet use of former SS-7 
ICBM facilities in support of the deploy- 
ment and operation of the SS-25 mobile 
ICBMs is in violation of the SALT I In- 
terim Agreement. Should the Soviets 
use "remaining facilities" in the future 
at other former SS-7 sites where the 
SS-25 is now in the process of being 
deployed, such use will also constitute 
Soviet violation of its political commit- 
ment under the SALT I Interim 
Agreement. 

Biological Weapons Convention and 
1925 Geneva Protocol 

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin 
Weapons 

• Treaty Status: The 1972 Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention (the 
BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are 
multilateral treaties to which both the 
United States and the Soviet Union are 
parties. Soviet actions not in accord 
with these treaties and customary inter- 
national law relating to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol are violations of legal 
obligations. 

• Obligations: The BWC bans the 
development, production, stockpiling or 
possession, and transfer of microbial or 
other biological agents or toxins except 
for a small quantity for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful pui-poses. It 
also bans weapons, equipment and 
means of delivery of agents or toxins. 
The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related 
rules of customary international law pro- 
hibit the first use in war of asphyxi- 
ating, poisonous or other gases and of 
all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices and prohibits use of bacteriologi- 
cal methods of warfare. 

• Issues: The January 1984 and 
February 1985 reports examined 
whether the Soviets are in violation of 
provisions that ban the development, 
production, transfer, possession and use 
of biological and toxin weapons and 
whether they have been responsible for 
the use of lethal chemicals. 'This report 
reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
judges that ongoing Soviet activities 
confirm and strengthen the conclusion of 
the Januai-y 1984 and February 1985 
reports that the Soviet Union has main- 
tained an offensive biological warfare 
program and capability in violation of its 
legal obUgation under the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. 



)iarv lQfiR 



71 



ARMS CONTROL 



Allegations concerning the use of 
lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, 
Laos, or Afghanistan have subsided in 
1985. However, there is no basis for 
amending the February 1985 conclusion 
that, prior to this time, the Soviet 
Union has been involved in the produc- 
tion, transfer, and use of trichothecene 
mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, 
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in viola- 
tion of its legal obligation under inter- 
national law as codified in the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. 

Threshold Test Ban Treaty 

Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton 
Limit 

• Treaty Status: The Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 
1974. The Treaty has not been ratified 
but neither party has indicated an inten- 
tion not to ratify. Therefore, both Par- 
ties are subject to the obligation under 
customary international law to refrain 
from acts that would defeat the object 
and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions 
that would defeat the object and pur- 
pose of the TTBT are therefore viola- 
tions of their legal obligations. The 
United States is seeking to negotiate 
improved verification measures for the 
Treaty. Both Parties have separately 
stated they would observe the 150 kilo- 
ton threshold of the TTBT. 

• Obligation: The Treaty prohibits 
any underground nuclear weapon test 
having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at 
any place under the jurisdiction or con- 
trol of the Parties beginning March 31, 
1976. In view of the technical uncertain- 
ties associated with estimating the 
precise yield of nuclear weapon tests, 
the sides agreed that one or two slight, 
unintended breaches per year would not 
be considered a violation. 

• Issue: The January 1984 and 
February 1985 reports examined 
whether the Soviets have conducted 
nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. 
This report reexamines this issue. 



• Finding: While ambiguities in the 
pattern of Soviet testing and verification 
uncertainties continued in 1985, the U.S. 
Government reaffirms the February 
1985 finding that Soviet nuclear testing 
activities for a number of tests consti- 
tute a likely violation of legal obligations 
under the threshold Test Ban Treaty of 
1974, which banned undergi-ound nuclear 
tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. 
These Soviet actions continued despite 
U.S. requests for corrective measures. 

Limited Test Ban Treaty 
Underground Nuclear Test Venting 

• Treaty Status: The Treaty Ban- 
ning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At- 
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty- 
LTBT) is a multilateral treaty that 
entered into force for the United States 
and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet ac- 
tions not in accord with this treaty are 
violations of a legal obligation. 

• Obligations: The LTBT specifical- 
ly prohibits nuclear explosions in the at- 
mosphere, in outer space and under 
water. It also prohibits nuclear explo- 
sions in any other environment "if such 
explosions cause radioactive debris to be 
present outside the territorial limits of 
the State under whose jurisdiction or 
control such explosion is conducted." 

• Issue: The February 1985 report 
examined whether the U.S.S.R.'s 
underground nuclear tests have caused 
radioactive debris to be present outside 
of its territorial limits. This report re- 
examines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Government 
reaffirms the judgment made in the 
February 1985 report that the Soviet 
Union's "underground nuclear test prac- 
tices resulted in the venting of radio- 
active matter on numerous occasions 
and caused radioactive matter to be pre- 
sent outside the Soviet Union's terri- 
torial limits in violation of its legal 
obligation under the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take 
the precautions necessary to minimize 
the contamination of man's environment 
by radioactive substances despite 
numerous U.S. demarches and requests 
for corrective action. 



Helsinki Final Act 

Helsinki Final Act Notification of 
Military Exercises 

• Legal Status: The Final Act c 
the Conference on Security and Coo] 
ation in Europe was signed in Helsu 
in 1975. This document represents a 
political commitment and was signed 
the United States and the Soviet Ui 
along with many other States. Sovie 
tions not in accord with that documt 
are violations of their political 
commitment. 

• Obligation: All signatory Stat 
of the Helsinki Final Act are commi 
to give prior notification of and othi 
details concerning, major military 
maneuvers, defined as those involvii 
more than 25,000 troops. 

• Issue: The January 1984 and 
February 1985 reports examined 
whether" notification of the Soviet m 
tary exercise "Zapad-81" was inade 
quate and therefore a violation of tl 
Soviet Union's pohtical commitment 
under the Helsinki Final Act. This 
report reexamines this issue. 

• Finding: The U.S. Govemmei 
previously judged and continues to 
that the Soviet Union in 1981 violat 
its political commitment to observe 
visions of Basket I of the Helsinki 1 
Act by not providing prior notificat: 
of exercise "ZAPAD-81." While thi 
U.S.S.R. has generally taken an ap- 
proach to the confidence-building 
measures of the Final Act which mi 
mizes the information it provides, S 
compliance with the exercise-notific 
provisions was improved in 1983. Ii 
1984, the Soviets returned to a min 
ist approach providing only the ban 
formation required under the Final 
The Soviet Union continued this ap 
proach during 1985. 



iText from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 30, 198E 



6T ASIA 



e U.S. and the Philippines: 
angers and Opportunities 



fchael H. Armacost 

ddress before the World Affairs 
:il in Portland on December 5, 
Ambassador Armacost is Under 
ary for Political Affairs. 

Id like to speak to you about the 
pines— a country with which we 
lad a long and close association 
whose future we have an impor- 
take. I had the rare privilege of 
g there as U.S. Ambassador from 
1984. It is difficult for me to 
about the Philippines with clinical 
iment; like all who have experi- 
the hospitality of Filipinos, their 
lumor and their friendly disposi- 
)ward Americans, I developed a 
iffection for the country and its 

len you read the press, sometimes 
•t the idea that our exclusive 
>t in the Philippines is our air and 
oases at Clark Field and Subic 
'hat is grossly unfair to the 
OS and demeans the very real 
ance of the Philippines and the 

people, to whom we are inex- 
y bound by ties of history, senti- 
and national interests. For both 
s, these interests extend well 

1 the bases— important as they are 
security of our respective nations. 
m glad there is now so much 
interest in the Philippines. The 

people deserve our concern and 
pport. But I would like to offer a 
erspective to the discussion. Con- 
.0 the glib analysis of many com- 
bers, the Philippines is not Viet- 
id most certainly not Iran. The 
lines is a unique society that must 
erstood in its owti terms, a rich 
.m of Asian, Hispanic, and Ameri- 
tures that is much more than the 
its parts. Philippine solutions 

e devised for their current prob- 
nd U.S. policies must respond to 
ine realities and Filipino 
ions. 

he Philippines is unique, so has 
or experience with it. It was our 
al colony. Our destinies inter- 
for nearly a century. The friend- 
'tween our peoples survived the 

1 era undiminished. That owes 

the fact that we early encour- 



aged the principle of self-government. 
We created a system of public education 
open to all. We provided a common 
language in a land of many languages. 
We accepted early on the inevitability of 
Philippine independence. We fought side 
by side with Filipinos against Japanese 
imperialism. When MacArthur honored 
his pledge to return, he earned the 
gratitude of an entire people. Thousands 
of Americans who served in the Philip- 
pines as Thomasite teachers. Peace 
Coi-ps volunteers, and AID [Agency for 
International Development] representa- 
tives claimed the respect of Filipinos— 
from aiistocratic families to rui-al 
peasants. We bequeathed to the Fili- 
pinos our commitment to representative 
institutions, our enthusiasm for elec- 
tions, the rhetoric of democratic 
idealism, and— I must add— the exuber- 
ant practice of ward-heeler, party- 
machine, pork-barrel politics. We cannot 
be indifferent to the fate of this legacy. 
What happens in the Philippines makes 
a difference to Americans. 

The Nature of the Crisis 

Everyone agrees that the Philippines 
faces enormous problems, but we ought 
to be precise about their nature. The 
difficulties are threefold: each element 
feeds on the other: 

First, there is a challenge to the 
legitimacy of government institutions; 

Second, severe economic and finan- 
cial difficulties; and 

Third, a communist-led insurgency 
that is exploiting these conditions to 
establish a foothold in the rural areas. 

The cumulative effect of these prob- 
lems poses a crisis for the Philippines. 
In some Asian languages, the word for 
crisis suggests elements of danger and 
opportunity, and that is how we should 
view the situation in the Philippines. 
There are dangers of polarization and 
growing internal conflict; there are also 
opportunities for national reconciliation, 
the revitalization of democratic institu- 
tions, the restoration of sustained 
economic growth, and the return of the 
Philippines to a leadership position in 
Southeast Asia. To avert the dangers 
and capitalize on the opportunities will 
not be easy, and it will take sustained 



efforts by Filipinos as well as substan- 
tial support from their friends, par- 
ticularly our own country. 

The Political Dimension 

There is a strong democratic tradition in 
the Philippines. President Marcos 
emerged as a political leader out of that 
tradition. He served as a member of the 
House of Representatives. He was a 
leader of the Senate. He was elected 
President in 1965 and again in 1969. In 
1972 he imposed martial law in response 
to what he characterized as government 
paralysis and the spread of lawiessness. 
While the early period of martial law 
saw some reforms and a reestablishment 
of public order, democratic institutions 
were compromised in the process. The 
centralization of power and the further 
concentration of wealth gradually 
alienated elements of the rural popula- 
tion as well as the middle class. 

Pressures for political liberalization 
increased in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. They intensified dramatically 
following the assassination of Benigno 
Aquino in 1983. The murder of this 
major opposition leader, whom many 
regarded as a possible successor to 
Marcos, occurred under conditions which 
provoked widespread suspicions of com- 
plicity on the part of governmental offi- 
cials. This, in turn, produced insistent 
demands not only for a thorough investi-, 
gation of the murder but a normalization 
of the country's political life— early elec- 
tions, clarification of the rules of succes- 
sion, and stronger procedures of account- 
ability in government. 

Economic Crisis 

While the Philippine economy compiled 
a respectable performance in the 1970s, 
its growth rate suffered in the early 
1980s. More recently, the Philippines 
has experienced negative growth, a debt 
crisis, high inflation, and weak invest- 
ment. To some degree, these problems 
were attributable to low world market 
prices for commodities and high interest 
rates for credit. Yet monopolistic prac- 
tices, government interference in the 
marketplace, and import substitution 
policies were also responsible. These 
problems were exacerbated by compara- 



irv 1986 



EAST ASIA 



tively weak incentives offered for 
foreign investment and, particularly, by 
the economic uncertainties and the 
capital flight triggered by the Aquino 
assassination. 

The Insurgency 

The third element of the crisis is a 
growing loiral insurgency. The New 
People's Army (NPA)— which has waged 
guerrilla war against the Marcos 
government for more than a decade- 
may include within its support base 
well-meaning individuals who have been 
frustrated by the economic downturn, 
disillusioned by the atrophy of repre- 
sentative institutions, or alienated by 
the sometimes undisciplined conduct of 
the military and police. 

But we should not delude ourselves. 
The NPA leaders are not agrarian 
reformers. They are ruthless; they are 
opportunistic; they have systematically 
used violence to intimidate local officials 
and to expand their influence in the 
rural areas. They are communists bent 
on radically altering the character of the 
Philippines and the close relations we 
have enjoyed with that countiy should 
they ever come to power. They do not 
represent democracy any more than 
communists have represented democracy 
anywhere else in the world. 

While the NPA does not pose an 
imminent threat to the Philippine 
Government, its growth in recent years 
is very worrisome. NPA guerrillas are 
now fighting the government in at least 
59 of the nation's 73 provinces. The 
number of their armed regulars and 
irregulars is increasing. So, too, is the 
base upon which the insurgents rely for 
support. Their supply of weapons is 
growing, and they are provoking more 
frequent and more violent incidents. 

The NPA's recent growth has cer- 
tainly been facilitated by the emerging 
political and economic crises. Those fac- 
tors also exacted their toll on the effec- 
tiveness of a military establishment 
whose budget was sharply cut during 
the last 3 years when the insurgency 
was taking off. The Armed Forces of 
the Philippines now lacks many of the 
i-udimentary items, such as fuel, ammu- 
nition, and trucks, needed to wage a 
vigorous counterinsurgency. 

An Early National Election 

Responding to these pressures and 
problems. President Marcos announced 
on November 1 that an early election for 
president and vice president would be 
held. 



We welcome this decision. Presiden- 
tial and vice-presidential elections in 
February 1986, and the local elections 
which will follow in May, present a 
timely opportunity to clear the air and 
to revive the democratic process in the 
Philippines. A credible government that 
has public confidence is an essential 
precondition to the solution of the coun- 
try's problems. Fair elections are the 
means— the only means— to achieve such 
credibility. 

This is an opportune moment for 
elections in another respect. The recent 
aquittal of all defendants in the Aquino 
trial may have ended the case but did 
not dispose of the controversy. Indeed, 
the court's decision is impossible to 
reconcile with the conclusions of the 
widely respected Agrava commission 
which unanimously rejected the govern- 
ment's suggestion that Aquino was 
assassinated by a lone gunman with 
links to the NPA— the hypothesis which 
the court embraced. Ultimately, the 
Filipino people must judge the credi- 
bility of the court's decision and assess 
rival assertions of accountability for this 
brutal crime. A fair election is an appro- 
priate vehicle for registering their 
judgment. 

The outcome of these elections is for 
Filipinos to decide. It would be wrong 
for American officials to express a 
preference for particular candidates. We 
can confidently expect to work effec- 
tively with any government produced by 
an election which Filipinos consider to 
have been fair and honest. If the elec- 
tions are rigged or the rules stacked, 
this will surely increase political cyni- 
cism, further polarize the country, 
demoralize the forces of moderation, 
accelerate NPA growth, and deprive 
whoever wins of the domestic legitimacy 
and the international support necessary 
to revive the economy and combat the 
insurgency. 

An overwhelming majority in our 
Congress— which holds the purse strings 
of our aid program— recently passed a 
concurrent resolution affirming Ameri- 
can interest in fair and free elections in 
the Philippines. They further stipulated 
the conditions which they e.xpected 
would condition Philippine judgments 
about the fairness of the electoral proc- 
ess. These included the nature of the 
electoral code; the impartiality of the 
government Commission on Elections 
(COMELEC); accreditation of the 
National Citizens' Movement for Free 
Elections (NAME RED, which has an 
admirable record as an independent 
election-monitoring organization; the 



access afforded the opposition to the 
print media, television, and radio; ani 
the neutrality of the military during 
campaign and vote count. The execut 
branch shares the convictions that 
prompted this resolution. All the con 
tions mentioned in the resolution are 
important to a free election. But of 
these, a truly independent COMELE 
and full scope for NAMFREL poll 
watching are the most essential. 

We also welcome the fact that el 
tion of presidential and vice-presider 
tial candidates will take place simul- 
taneously. Uncertainties about the s 
cession process invite fears of milita 
intervention, inspire rumors of palac 
cabals, undennine investor confidenc 
and spur doubts about the future st: 
bility of the country. The vice-presi- 
dential election can help lay such fe: 
to rest if the candidates selected pos 
authentic credentials as national lea( 

I would reiterate the central poi 
our policy interest is not directed 
toward backing a candidate or pickii 
winner. Rather, we seek to promote 
electoral process which provides a 
playing field for all contenders. 

Some may ask whether we are i 
ferent to the position of the various 
didates on issues of consequence to 
such as the bases. Of course not, bu 
for one, am confident that we can st 
tain base rights on acceptable terms 
with any Philippine administration 
enjoying a popular mandate. The mi 
benefits of our security ties are wid 
appreciated by Filipinos; widespreac 
popular opposition to our base pres( 
is not apparent; and the neighbors c 
the Philippines all desire our contini ' 
strategic presence in the area. 

Elections and Reform 

It would be naive to assume that fa 
elections, in and of themselves, will 
resolve the economic and security p ' 
lems facing the Philippines. But the 
can give to those who triumph at th.^ 
polls the confidence, the public supp 
and the credibility to tackle those p 
lems more effectively. The communi 
insurgency in the Philippines may b 
around for some years, but honest « 
tions perceived as such can restore 
authority and prestige of the goven 
ment and stymie the guerrillas. An 
effective response will require a br(| 
and sustained national effort that 
encompasses political, economic, am 
military measures. 

Reform of the armed forces is a 
essential prerequisite for any succe: 
counterinsurgency effort. Undiscipli 



74 



npnartmfint of State Btl' 



EAST ASIA 



vior by the military, when it occurs, 
popular support for the NPA, 
ates the Philippine military from 
)eople, and diminishes government 
3nce in the countryside. It is for 
reason that we have laid stress on 
oving the moi'ale and discipline 
in the armed forces and emphasized 
)aramount importance of profes- 
il leadership at all levels of the com- 
i sti-ucture. 

lilitary reform and reorganization 
! have been announced, and some 
mdei-way. Pay raises for enlisted 
jnnel and officers— to raise morale 
reduce incentives for corruption- 
been authorized. Retraining of 
has been initiated. President 
:os has declared his intentions to 
e many overstaying officers and to 
'igorate the military leadership with 
ger professionals. The success of 
m efforts wall, of course, depend 
the scope and vigor which they are 
?mented. 

,'he recently announced reinstate- 
of General Fabian Ver as Chief of 
of the Armed Forces places a 
over these reform plans. In par- 
ir, it raises questions as to whether 
inal loyalties or professional accom- 
Tients will deteiTnine advancement 
3 Philippine Armed Forces, 
in the economic front, structural 
ms will be necessary to stimulate a 
ily based recovery. Revival of 
tment requires confidence in the 
8. On that score, the elections can 
But if the future economic winners 
osers are determined by poUtical 
ions rather than by the free play of 
et forces, the banks will probably 
in reluctant to roll over old loans, 
one put up new money, and foreign 
tors will look elsewhere for oppor- 
ies. 

fnquestionably, the Philippines 
serious problems. They will not be 
ved overnight. It would be an 
aly of history if tWs largely 
alic, pro-Western country with its 
cratic traditions and its impressive 
in and natural resources should 
to communist insurgents. I do not 
i^e Filipinos are about to let this 
sn. 

U.S. Role 

(United States, as I have said, has 
hportant stake in the success with 
ii the Filipinos surmount their cur- 
iproblems. Our strategic interests 
l)ur friendship for the PhiUppine 
> e require that we lend a helping 



hand. At times, I suspect some Filipinos 
believe we furnish mainly smug 
criticism and gratuitous advice. That is 
not the case. Others may think we have 
more influence than we really have. Our 
role is limited, but I think we are 
meeting our responsibility. 

• We are furnishing substantial 
military and economic assistance as part 
of the compensation package negotiated 
for base access rights. We shall continue 
to meet our obligation. 

• We have also provided significant 
development assistance, with emphasis 
on problems in the hard-pressed raral 
areas. 

• We have supported, through our 
contributions to the international finan- 
cial institutions, efforts to redress cur- 
rent balance-of-payments difficulties and 
to undertake important structural 
adjustments. 

• We facilitated the conclusion of an 
agreement between the Philippine 
Government and foreign commercial 
banks to restructure its foreign debt. 

• We have offered additional 
PL-480 funds to encourage the wider 
opening of the agricultural sector for 
market forces. 

• And we will provide appropriate 
help, as desired, to encourage a free and 
fair electoral process. 

Thus, we have not been indifferent 
to the fate of our Filipino friends. In my 
view, moreover, we should be prepared 
to consider substantial increases in our 
economic support for their efforts if a 
Philippine Government emerging from 
free and fab- elections demonstrates the 
determination and ability to tackle the 
hard problems with boldness and 
imagination. 

Prospects 

Much of the reporting about the Philip- 
pines tends to be apocalyptic, filled with 
pessimism and foreboding. Unquestion- 
ably, the PhiUppines faces serious prob- 
lems. They will not be resolved over- 
night. But pessimism is unwarranted. 
Filipinos are talented and resilient peo- 
ple. Their friendship for America is 
deep. It would be foolhardy to embrace 
self-fulfilling prophecies of doom. 

There are ample reasons for expect- 
ing that the Philippines will weather its 
current problems; among them are 
these. 

• There is a strong natural prefer- 
ence among Filipinos for democracy, 
peaceful change, and an impressive 
potential for national reconciliation. 



• There are sufficient natural 
resources and human talent in the 
Philippines to permit a fairly rapid turn- 
around in economic fortunes if confi- 
dence in the future is restored. 

• There is a reservoir of friendship 
between our peoples that will survive 
any adversity. 

But the dangers are real. And there 
are no grounds for complacency. 

We are at one of those rare moments 
in history when we, Fihpinos and 
Americans, are faced with truly crucial 
decisions. The most important decisions 
are in the hands of Filipinos, who have 
it within their power in the next few 
months to give their country a fresh 
chance, a fresh start. The election is 
timely; it gives the people of the Philip- 
pines the great good fortune to be able 
to choose their course and give their 
government a mandate to proceed. 
Their freedom to exercise that choice is 
a precious human right that only a 
minority of peoples in the world enjoy. 
We in the United States will do what- 
ever we can to support that right and 
that freedom. ■ 



U.S. -China Nuclear 

Cooperation 

Agreement 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 16, 1985» 

I am pleased to sign into law today S.J. 
Res. 238, in which the Congress states 
that it favors the agreement for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation between the United 
States and the People's Republic of 
China, which I transmitted to Congress 
on July 24, 1985. The agreement will 
have a significant, positive effect on the 
relations between the United States and 
the People's Republic of China and will 
lead to a continuing dialogue with China 
on important nuclear energy and non- 
proliferation matters. It will further 
U.S. nonproliferation and other foreign 
policy interests. I, therefore, welcome 
the Congress' support for the agree- 
ment. 

Since I submitted the agreement 
without exempting it from any require- 
ment in Section 123(a) of the Atomic 
Energy Act, no affirmative legislation 
was required to permit the agreement 
to be brought into force after the legally 
stipulated time periods for congressional 



tjarv 1986 



75 



EUROPE 



review had been completed. The agree- 
ment may, therefore, be brought into 
force at that time in accordance with 
the procedure set forth in Article 10 of 
the agreement. 

The joint resolution does require a 
one-time certification and a one-time 
report before exports to China under 
the agreement may commence. It 
assigns exclusively to the President the 
responsibiUty to review the matters to 
be certified to and to decide whether 
the certification may be made. Three 
matters must be certified: (1) that the 
arrangements for visits and exchanges 
of information made pursuant to Arti- 
cle 8 of the agreement are, as called for 
by this article itself, designed to be 
effective in ensuring that nuclear 
exports under the agreement are used 
solely for intended peaceful purposes; 

(2) that, after examining all information 
available to the U.S. Government, 
including any additional information that 
China has provided, nuclear exports to 
China are not precluded under Section 
129(2) of the Atomic Energy Act; and 

(3) that the obligation to consider favor- 
ably a request to carry out activities 
described in Article 5(2) of the agree- 
ment does not prejudice the decision of 
the United States to approve or dis- 
approve such a request. In addition, the 
joint resolution requires a report on 
Chinese nonproliferation policies and 
practices before exports commence. 



The joint resolution also states that 
U.S. exports are subject to U.S. laws 
and regulations in effect at the time of 
export. This is a restatement of existing 
U.S. law and does not conflict with any 
obligations undertaken by the United 
States under the agreement. Finally, 
the joint resolution contains a section 
intended to ensure that the provisions in 
the China agreement that are textually 
different from provisions of the type 
contained in other U.S. peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreements will not be the 
starting point for future nuclear cooper- 
ation agreement negotiations with other 
countries. 

This joint resolution serves our 
interests in promoting peaceful nuclear 
cooperation and a nonproliferation dia- 
logue with China. For this reason, I 
have decided to sign the joint resolution. 

I appreciate the efforts of Senators 
Lugar and Cranston and Representa- 
tives Fascell, Broomfield, Bonker, 
Solarz, as well as others, in developing a 
joint resolution text that both the 
Administration and the Congress could 
accept. 

I understand that an amendment 
relating to the U.S. -China peaceful 
nuclear cooperation agreement is cur- 
rently under consideration in the con- 
ference on the continuing resolution. I 
strongly object to that amendment. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 23, 1985. 



Countering Communist Espionage 
in the U.S. 



by Rozanne L. Ridgway 

Statement before the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
on December 5, 1985. Ambassador 
Ridgway is Assistant Secretary for 
European and Canadian Affairs.^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify 
before the subcommittee on the role of 
the Department of State in countering 
hostile espionage activities in the United 
States and in achieving reciprocity in all 
areas for our missions and diplomatic 
personnel abroad. These two objectives 
are often mutually reinforcing but some- 
times require difficult decisions. They 
have become the twin pillars of our 



policies toward foreign missions and 
their personnel in the United States. 

I believe the subcommittee's hear- 
ings have contributed to a better under- 
standing on the part of the American 
public about the nature and extent of 
the threat posed by hostile intelligence 
services operating in our country. As 
the recent and continuing spate of spy 
cases demonstrates, the threat is real. 
The President has made clear the 
Administration's commitment to prose- 
cute these cases. This will help deter 
future espionage, as well as punish 
those who have been caught. 

Thanks to the support of Congress, 
our counterintelligence resources are be- 
ing restored. The Administration has 
been considering what new restrictions 



might be applied to reduce the size c 
the hostile intelligence threat and bei 
control foreign missions and their pe 
sonnel which pose significant espiona 
threats. Today I would like to share i 
with you some of our thinking and oi i 
conclusions. 

Although the FBI has the main 
responsibihty for protecting against 
espionage threat within the United 
States, the Department of State plaj I 
an important supportive role. The 
Department works closely with the ' 
and other members of the intelligenc 
community in the common effort to 
counter the hostile intelligence threa 
regulating and controlling the activit i 
of hostile country missions and pers( 
nel and by reviewing visa applicatioi i 
and, where necessary, limiting the 
number of authorized diplomats/offic i 

We all share the common objecti 
of maintaining reciprocity in our reli I 
tions with other countries, and espe 
cially the Soviet Bloc states, in tern 
numbers, status, privileges and imm 
ties, travel accommodations, and fac 
ities. This Administration from the : 
has taken steps to better ensure rec ' 
procity for our diplomats and to \m\ 
our ability to counter the hostile int 
gence threat in this country. The F( 
eign Missions Act of 1982 provided 
legal basis for major steps foi-ward. 
Through the Office of Foreign Missi . 
closer cooperation between the Dep; 
ment and the counterintelligence coi / 
munity has been institutionalized. 
Within that community, the Departi 
of State, as the principal foreign aff 
agency of the government, has two 
responsibilities: 

• To contribute to the most effe 
counterintelligence policies and 
programs: 

• To assure that a balance is foi 
between our national security intere 
at home and our national security ir, 
ests abroad. 

In weighing potential measures,' 
must remain mindful of the need to 
balance overall U.S. Government int' 
ests. A truly effective policy to cont 
the hostile intelligence threat must 
weigh both the counterintelligence 
benefits and the cost to U.S. nation.- 
interests, as represented by our ow 
presence in other countries, includir 
our own ability to operate, travel, h 
access, and to collect critical informi 
tion. Finding the balance is a most ' 
ficult challenge and one that requirt 
of us— the Congress and the executi 
branch— to work well and closely 



76 



Department of State Biiili 



EUROPE 



;her so that our collective wisdom 
nake sure that two important 
nal security interests are equally 
served and that where a choice 
be made, it is made in full aware- 
of the costs to be paid. 

rictions on Soviet Bloc Diplomats 

being said, let me review briefly 
the Department has done over the 
i, and since the passage of the 
ign Missions Act of 1982, to main- 
reciprocity in its relations with 
it Bloc countries and conti'ol the 
le intelligence threat directed 
st the United States, 
s far back as the 1950s, we 
5ed travel controls on Soviet 
mats and closed a number of areas 
3 United States to match areas in 
J.S.S.R. closed to foreigners. In 
t years, as the Soviets and their 
have stepped up their espionage 
ties against the United States, we 
imposed and strengthened controls 
e activities of Soviet, East Euro- 
and Cuban officials. 
In 1980 we imposed a ceiling on 
Umber of Soviet diplomatic and 
lar personnel allowed in this 
T- 

In 1982 we imposed the require- 
that all nonofficial Soviet visitors 
n within a set radius of their 
lation unless special approval is 
led. 

In the same year, we also took 
I to control overstays by Soviet offi- 
fr\ temporary assignment in the 
Id States through tighter limits on 
length of stay in this country. 
Soviet officials are limited to a 
ocal number of approved entry/ 
oints in the United States. Since 
he Soviets have had five approved 
exit points (New York, Washing- 
ouses Point, San Francisco, and 
lore by ship only). 
'In August 1984, Department of 
Commenced issuance/replacement 
foreign mission automobile license 
I This has been of significant 
^nce to the FBI in its identifica- 
■ hostile country officials. 
In November 1984, we informed 
iviets that leases of real property 
have to be approved by the 
tment. In addition, the Bulgarian 
sechoslovak Embassies now lease 
ising through the Department, 
il requests have already been 

ifor national security reasons, 
iroperty acquisitions, including 
ntial dwelUngs by hostile country 



missions and personnel, must be approv- 
ed by the Office of Foreign Missions. 

• Since August 1985, the Soviets 
have been required to obtain through 
the Office of Foreign Missions all con- 
struction materials for their new em- 
bassy complex. 

• In September 1985, we imposed 
travel controls and Office of Foreign 
Missions travel service requirements on 
those UN Secretariat employees whose 
UN missions were already under such 
restrictions. These are the Soviets, 
Afghans, Iranians, Libyans, and 
Vietnamese. 

• Since October 1985, the Depart- 
ment has required the Soviet and 
Eastern bloc countries to obtain permis- 
sion to purchase and install telecommu- 
nications equipment. The Department 
recently denied a Soviet request to 
install a parabolic dish antenna at their 
new embassy site and at their recrea- 
tional facility at Pioneer Point, 
Maryland. 

• The Office of Foreign Missions 
works closely with the Customs Service, 
which carefully monitors Soviet and 
East European customs shipments. 

• Most recently, we have imposed 
Office of Foreign Missions travel service 
requirements on East German, Polish, 
Czech, and Bulgarian officials assigned 
to diplomatic, consular, and commercial 
missions in the United States, as well as 
other official govei-nment offices. 

• We have also placed the Soviet 
Union's Warsaw Pact allies on notice 
that areas of the United States now 
closed to travel for the Soviets may also 
be closed to them for upwards of a year 
if any of their personnel are detected in 
espionage activities in those closed 
areas. 

In combating the hostile intelligence 
threat, we have not restricted ourselves 
only to areas covered by the Foreign 
Missions Act, useful as it has been. 
Several U.S. Government agencies are 
actively engaged to prevent technical 
penetration of U.S. missions abroad and 
to protect against electronic eaves- 
dropping by hostile country missions 
here in the United States. In this 
regard, special measures have been 
taken in Washington, New York, and 
San Francisco— where Soviet diplomatic 
missions are located— to protect sensi- 
tive U.S. Government communications. 

This subcommittee has just heard 
Mr. Nolan [James E. Nolan, Director, 
Office of Foreign Missions] describe the 
mechanisms by which the Office of 
Foreign Missions regulates travel, hous- 



ing, and other benefits accorded to 
Soviet and certain other foreign officials. 
The effect is to control the movement 
and activities of these personnel, to pro- 
vide us with critical information, and to 
help the FBI to carry out its respon- 
sibilities more effectively with the 
resources available. With the help of 
Congress, the Department has used its 
Office of Foreign Missions as a means to 
control the activities of diplomats from 
certain nations posing a significant 
intelligence threat. 

The Bureau of European and Cana- 
dian Affairs and the Office of Foreign 
Missions consult closely on all issues 
related to Soviet and Eastern bloc mis- 
sions. For example, on travel by Soviet 
personnel, the Office of Soviet Union 
Affairs is in daily contact with the 
Office of Foreign Missions' interagency 
liaison group that reviews travel to 
evaluate the impact on national security. 
On a whole array of other issues- 
customs, purchase of materials, leasing 
of property, etc.— we regularly consult. 
More has been done in the past 4 years— 
with the passage of the Foreign Mis- 
sions Act and increased funding for 
counterintelligence— than in the previous 
40. As the hostile intelligence threat 
continues to grow, we need to look at 
new ways to deal with it. I would, 
however, repeat my previous point. 
There is no substitute for the serious 
discussion among all interested parties 
which is needed to weigh each proposed 
action to determine the net gains and 
losses across the range of all our 
national security interests, here and 
abroad. 

Having discussed movements and 
activities let me now address the other 
main aspect of our strategy to counter 
the threat posed by foreign intelligence 
services in this country, namely, con- 
trolling the numbers. 

Controlling the Number of Diplomats 

Any U.S. counterintelligence effort 
would be overwhelmed if the numbers 
of hostile intelligence agents deployed in 
our country were allowed to increase 
without limit. Therefore, this Adminis- 
tration's strategy is to limit, in keeping 
with treatment reciprocally accorded 
U.S. personnel, the number of foreign 
officials serving in those diplomatic and 
other establishments which are most 
favored as cover for espionage opera- 
tives. Here, again, the question of 
balance arises. In implementing the 
Administration's strategy, we seek to 
maximize counterintelligence benefits 



'ary 1986 



77 



EUROPE 



while minimizing potential harm to the 
capability of our diplomats, military 
attaches! and other personnel to operate 
effectively in the difficult environment 
of these closed societies. 

In January 1980, we imposed a ceil- 
ing on the number of authorized Soviet 
diplomatic and consular personnel per- 
manently assigned to their bilateral mis- 
sions. That ceiling capped them at the 
existing level of 320 diplomatic and con- 
sular personnel. We have 232 diplomatic 
and consular personnel permanently 
assigned to our Embassy and Consulate 
General in the U.S.S.R. In Geneva 
President Reagan and General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev agreed to open one new 
Consulate General in each country. The 
Department has decided that no Soviet 
national employees of the consulate, if 
there are any, will have access to the 
consular office building in Kiev. The 
new Soviet Consulate General in New 
York will have no more employees than 
the number of Amei-icans assigned to 
Kiev. 

We support the goal of achieving 
substantial equivalence in the respective 
number of Soviet and American diplo- 
matic and consular personnel. The 
Department supported the language of 
the Leahy-Cohen amendment that called 
for substantial equivalence in this area. 
In April 1985, the Secretary approved a 
plan to enhance security at our Em- 
bassy in Moscow. One element of the 
plan is to replace a substantial number 
of Soviet national employees with 
Americans. Full implementation of this 
plan, which will be accomplished by the 
time we move into our new Embassy 
2-3 years from now, will result in sub- 
stantial equivalence in the respective 
sizes of the Soviet and U.S. Embassies 
in each capital. Thanks to Congress' 
willingness to appropriate the necessary 
funds, we already plan to fill as many as 
57 new American positions in Moscow 
over the next several years. 

Americans in Eastern Europe will 
be increased as we progressively replace 
local national personnel in certain 
unclassified jobs. In both the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, we will con- 
tinue to review all Foreign Service 
national positions to determine whether 
replacement by American personnel will 
contribute to the enhancement of 
embassy security and maintain an abil- 
ity to provide a workable setting for 
those Americans who are there. 



East European Involvement 

Clearly, Moscow's East European aUies 
do involve themselves as surrogates for 
the Soviet Union in the illegal acquisi- 
tion of intelligence and controlled tech- 
nologies. The recently issued assess- 
ment, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily 
Significant Western Technology, deals 
with but one aspect of this serious prob- 
lem. However, it underscores the active 
and often effective role played by East 
European surrogates in obtaining con- 
trolled technology for the Soviets. In 
taking steps to reduce the espionage 
threat in the United States, we are 
mindful of the East European 
dimension. 

The asymmetry of open versus 
closed societies is an important factor in 



this equation. Given the closed and co 
trolled nature of East European soci- 
eties, our ability to travel unimpeded 
controls or restrictions is of significan 
value to us. The East Europeans do i 
impose discriminatoi-y restrictions on 
travel by U.S. personnel in their coui 
tries. Our personnel can travel at wil 
without advance notification or autho 
zation. Hence, in reviewing possible 
travel restrictions on East European 
personnel in this country, the challen 
to our own interests is clear. We nee 
to preserve our ability to acquire vit 
political and economic information; m 
tain contacts wdth religious leaders, 
dissidents, academics, and cultural ^' 
ures; monitor military maneuvers or 
installation of new weapons systems: 



24th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 25, 1985' 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
submitting to you a bimonthly report on 
progress toward a negotiated settlement of 
the Cyprus question. 

Since my previous report, the United 
Nations Secretary General has continued to 
work with the two Cypriot communities to 
achieve a framework agj-eement for a com- 
prehensive Cyprus settlement. As I reported 
to you earlier, the Secretary General an- 
nounced in June that the Greek Cypriot side 
had accepted revised documentation incor- 
porating such an agreement. On August 8 the 
Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, sent 
the Secretary General a letter with detailed 
comments on the Secretai-y General's docu- 
mentation and expressed willingness to meet 
with him for further discussion. 

The Secretary General invited Mr. Denk- 
tash to New York and they met on Septem- 
ber 12-13. Following their meetings the 
Secretary General said he had most useful 
talks with Mr. Denktash and that these talks 
would be helpful in deciding the steps to be 
taken in the near future. 

The Security Council heard an oral report 
from the Secretary General on September 20. 
He told the Council that his efforts had 
brought the positions of the two sides closer 
than ever before; and he expressed his con- 
viction that what had been achieved so far 
should lead to an early agreement on a 
framework for a just and lasting settlement 
of the Cyprus question. The United Kingdom 



Permanent Representative to the Securi 
Council, speaking as President of the Cc 
expressed strong support on behalf of it 
members for the mandate of the Secret. 
General and called upon all parties to m 
special effort in cooperation with the 
Secretary General to reach an early 
agreement. 

Continuing his consultations, the Sei 
tai-y General met with President K.\T)ri;i 
on October 10 and October 25 for discu.- 
of recent developments on the Cyprus i: 
The Secretary General also met on Octi 
ber 25 with Turkish Prime Minister Oza 

During this period, American official 
tinued their active efforts in support of 
Secretary General's good offices missior 
urged a cooperative and constructive at 
by all the parties. Ambassador Boehm i 
couraged support for a negotiated settli 
in his meetings with President Kj-priain 
and Mr. Denktash. Secretary Shultz me 
the Secretary General and duiing the C 
eral Assembly with the Greek and Turl 
Foreign Ministers. Under Secretary Ar 
cost also had useful talks with senior of 
of Greece and Turkey during his Octo- 
ber 28-November 3 visit to those covint 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Ri 



'Identical letters addressed to Thoi 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugai 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relat. 
Committee (text from Weekly Compila 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 2, 1985 



78 



Department of State Bi 



EUROPE 



d opportunities for American busi- 
en; and provide the full range of 
ar services to American citizens in 
58. Our policy on dealing with the 
European espionage threat should 
ike account of the differing levels 
illigence activity conducted by the 
s East European governments. 
e measures we have taken 
ly to impose Office of Foreign 
ns service restrictions on East 
in, Polish, Czech, and Bulgarian 
mel will significantly enhance our 

to monitor and deter espionage 
ies. Their personnel are now 
ed to book commercial transporta- 
id hotel accommodations through 
ffice. While the East Europeans 

require our personnel to obtain 
Services through a central govem- 
[)ffice, we believe that these meas- 
"te, nonetheless, necessary to 
fe our counterintelligence capabil- 
jnilarly, we have put all of the 
IR.'s East European allies on 
jthat areas of the United States 
iDsed to the Soviets will be closed 
jn if any of their personnel are 
bd in espionage activities in those 

areas. 

|;se measures have two objectives. 

st, we will improve the capabiUty 
law enforcement agencies to 
r movements of East European 
lel. 

ond, and equally important, we 
irease the cost to the East Euro- 
should they engage in espionage, 
; introducing an element of deter- 
By making it clear to the indi- 
East European nations that 
ig in espionage will have severe 
lences for their presence, includ- 
i^el, in this country, we increase 
:e an individual country must 
plate paying for engaging in 
ge, either on its own behalf or 
ther power. 

Measures Under Review 

tion to the measures I noted that 
ready been taken, the Adminis- 
is currently considering addi- 
teps to further reduce the Soviet 
st European hostile intelligence 
Among the measures we are 
ly examining are: 

Tays to further reduce the overall 

jresence in this country; 

icreased border controls on 

sersonnel; 

lacing greater controls on the 

1/banking activities of hostile 

missions; and 



• Requiring the divestiture of prop- 
erty owned by hostile country missions 
that do not permit the U.S. Government 
to own pro|jerty in their countries. 

We believe that the strategy we are 
now carrying out— comprising the ele- 
ments of enhanced control and monitor- 
ing, constraints applied to the size and 
activities of hostile country establish- 
ment here, and deterrence— is a sound 
and effective approach to addressing 
this serious threat to our national 
security. As I said earlier, much has 
been accomphshed already, but much 
more remains to be done. The Secretary 
and the Department of State are com- 



mitted to taking further realistic and 
effective action with the tools now at 
our disposal. We are convinced that 
with the continued cooperation of the 
counterintelligence community, we can 
significantly reduce the ability of hostile 
intelligence agencies to compromise our 
national security, while protecting 
significant national interests of our 
own in the areas of collection or 
communication. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published bv the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



NATO Defense Planning 
Committee IVIeets 



The Defense Ministers of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
met in Brussels December 3. 1985. The 
United States was represented by 
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger. Following is the text of the 
final communique. 

The Defense Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
ministerial session in Brussels on 
3rd December 1985. 

2. Ministers welcomed the results 
achieved by President Reagan in his talks 
with General Secretary Gorbachev. We 
restated our full support of the efforts of the 
United States, in close consultation with its 
Allies, to reach agreement with the Soviet 
Union in order to provide a more stable 
peace. We are hopeful that this meeting has 
laid a basis for better relations between East 
and West. We especially welcome the com- 
mitment of both sides to making early prog- 
ress in the negotiations in Geneva, in par- 
ticular in areas where there is common 
ground, including the idea of an interim INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] agreement 
and the principle of 50 percent reductions in 
nuclear arms of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, appropriately applied. In this 
context, we expressed strong support for the 
United States stance concerning inter- 
mediate-range, strategic and defense and 
space systems. Alliance solidarity and cohe- 
sion have played an important role in bring- 
ing these developments about and will remain 
equally vital for future progress. We call 
upon the Soviet Union to work to achieve 
this early progress. 



3. We noted with satisfaction that deploy- 
ment of longer range INF missiles is pro- 
ceeding on schedule in all the countries 
involved, in the absence of a concrete 
negotiated result with the Soviet Union 
which would obviate the need for such 
deployment. At the same time, we reiterated 
our willingness to reverse, halt or modify this 
development— including the removal and dis- 
mantling of missiles already deployed— upon 
achievement of a balanced, equitable and 
verifiable agreement calling for such action. • 

4. We are convinced that a continued 
strong and united Alliance is essential for 
achieving our goal of peace and security at 
the lowest possible level of forces. The objec- 
tive of NATO's strategy of flexible response 
and forward defense is the prevention of all 
war. Nuclear weapons play an essential part 
in achieving this objective. But we are deter- 
mined to strengthen the credibility of our 
strategy by avoiding an undue reliance on 
the early use of nuclear weapons through the 
special effort to improve our conventional 
capabilities. 

5. This yeai- we have set in hand actions 
that provide the necessary framework for 
achieving our objective of improving our con- 
ventional defenses. Much of the significance 
of this work lies in the longer term, and we 
expect a steady pattern of improvements. We 
welcomed first signs of progress but stressed 
that this must be a continuing effort. Achiev- 
ing more effective conventional forces will 
require sustained commitment by all. The 
work underway includes: 



);y 1986 



79 



EUROPE 



• The Conventional Defense Improve- 
ments (CDI) effort, a comprehensive review 
of Alliance defense requirements which 
encourages a greater degree of convergence 
between Alliance and national planning and 
which identifies those areas where special 
attention will provide the greatest return, 
both in the medium and long term. The first 
reactions to CDI have been encouraging. We 
welcome the progress already made in ad- 
dressing the key deficiencies and reaffirm our 
determination to place special emphasis on 
these areas in our national planning; 

• Steady modernization through the 
introduction of modem, more capable 
systems. As a result of this process, the ratio 
of new to old equipment in our armed forces 
is improving markedly and will do so even 
more substantially in the future; 

• The decision last December to double 
the infrastructure budget and increase the 
number of hardened aircraft shelters: plan- 
ning is well advanced to increase the pace at 
which NATO can complete infrastructure 
projects and roughly 90 percent of the 
budget will be spent on projects related to 
CDI; 

• Implementation of the decision last 
December to acquire more ammunition stocks 
for selected battle decisive systems. The 
results are promising, particularly in the cen- 
tral region. Most nations plan more rapid 
progress towards achieving the 30-day objec- 
tive in the selected high priority items and 
there have also been improvements in plans 
for other ammunition items; 

• Continued exploitation of emerging 
technologies; 

• Progress towards a NATO Identifica- 
tion System (NIS); 

• A fresh emphasis on the need to pro- 
vide more aid, and by more nations, to 
Greece, Portugal and Turkey in order to help 
them overcome known deficiencies in their 
forces and carry out their mission more effec- 
tively to the advantage of the Alliance; 

• Endorsement of a conceptual military 
framework developed by NATO's military 
authorities which provides nations with 
broad, longer term guidance on the military 
requirements of NATO strategy; 

• The improved co-ordination of the vari- 
ous planning areas to help provide a more 
effective distribution of resources. 

6. Recalling the documents in the 1982 
Bonn Summit, we reaffirm the position 
adopted in previous communiques concerning 
developments outside the NATO Treaty area 
that might threaten the vital interests of 
members of the Alliance. Against the back- 



ground of United States planning for its 
rapidly deployable forces, we reviewed con- 
tinuing work on measures necessary to main- 
tain deterrence and defense within the 
NATO area. We will ensure that NATO 
defense planning continues to take account of 
the need for compensatorj' measures. 

7. With the objective of improving our 
conventional forces fu-mly in mind, we 
discussed the results of the 1985 Annual 
Defense Review and adopted the NATO 
Force Plan for 1986-1990. 

8. Achieving the objective of better con- 
ventional forces will not be easy. The provi- 
sion of adequate resources in accordance with 
the 1985 ministerial guidance vdll continue to 
be a serious challenge for all nations. This 
will require an even greater emphasis on 
making better use of resources and on im- 
proved co-operation and co-ordination. Better 
arms co-operation and sharing of technology 
between European and North American and 
the developed and developing members of the 
Alliance are vital parts of this process, as is 
the continued protection of militarily relevant 
technology. 

9. We emphasized the major contribution 
which co-operation on the research, develop- 
ment and production of armaments can play 
in the strengthening of conventional defenses 
in the context of the current Conventional 
Defense Improvements effort. We welcomed 



a report by the CNAD on the enhancemel 
of Alliance armaments co-operation, and v 
noted that this is to be considered by the 1 
North Atlantic Council at their meeting o | 
12th/13th December 1985. At a recent sp( j 
meeting, the North Atlantic Council had 
positive discussions on several concrete . 
measures, including co-operative research i 
development programs. We welcomed in ' 
ticular the major step forward by the CN ' 
in developing an improvement strategy f( I 
the enhancement of armaments co-operati ( 
with which all the governments of the 
Alliance can be associated. We committee 
ourselves to carry foi-ward this important 
work. 

10. We are confident that we have lai j 
the essential groundwork in the short, 
medium and long term for the objective ( ' 
achieving more effective conventional for 
Much, of course, remains to be done. We 
need a continuing and sustained effort. B I 
we have made a good start; current prog I 
augurs well for the future. 

Greece reserves its position on the II | 
and space system issues. 

The Minister of Defense of Spain res' 
his Government's position on the present i 
Communique. 



'Denmark reserves its position on I^ 
[footnote in original]. ■ 



CSCE Cultural Forum Meets in Budapest 



The Cultural Forum, mandated by 
the concluding docunieiit of the Madrid 
review conference of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), met in Budapest October 15- 
November 25, 1985. It was the first 
CSCE meeting to deal exclusively with 
the cultural provisions of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the first to be held in a 
Warsaiv Pact country. The U.S. delega- 
tion was headed by Ambassador Walter 
J. Stoessel, Jr., and consisted of 25 
distinguished artists, urriters, and ex- 
perts representing the diversity of 
American cultural life, as well as of- 
ficials from the Department of State 
and the congressional Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

The mandate for the forum called 
for discussion of the interrelated prob- 
lems of creation, dissemination, and 
cooperation, including expansion of 
cultural contacts and exchanges. Seven- 



teen Western delegations (NATO 
members and Ireland) tabled a far- 
reaching draft concliiding document 
these issues, affirming the importan 
of individual rights and freedoms. 
Although the 35 participating delegc 
tions could not agree on the text of 
final document, they were able to 
discuss important issues and lay th 
basis for more extensive