BOSTON
PUBLIC
LIBRARY
Dppartmpn t
buUetBn
f e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 87 /Number 21 18
AID'S 25th Anniversary/1
The Secretary/23
CSCE Followup Meeting/47
Iran/65
January 1987
Departntpni of State
bulletin
Volume 87 / Number 2118/ January 1987
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its pui-pose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; se-
lected press releases issued by the
White House, the Department, and the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and
treaties and other agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party. Special features, articles, and
other supportive material (such as maps,
charts, photographs, and graphs) are
published frequently to provide addi-
tional information on current issues but
should not necessarily be interj^reted as
official U.S. policy statements.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
GEORGE B. HIGH
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
SHARON R. LOTZ
Assistant Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is necessary
in the transaction of the public business
required by law of this Department. Use of
funds for printing this periodical has been
approved by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget through March 31,
1987.
Department of State Bulletin (ISSI
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CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 The AID Challenge
■jie Secretary
General
1 Secretary Praises AID and Com-
ments on Iran
2 Restoring the Foreign Affairs
Budget
2 Promoting Inter-American
Cooperation
; Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control,
and the Future of Deterrence
irms Control
: A World Without Nuclear
Weapons {Kenneth L. Adelman)
C Permitted and Prohibited
Activities Under the ABM
Treaty (Paul H. Nitze)
i Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
Close Round Six (Max M.
|, Kampelman, President Reagan)
hst Asia
' U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets
(W. Allen Wallis)
56
61
U.S. Policy Toward the Third
World (Michael H. Armacost)
U.S. Foreign Policy:
Achievements and Challenges
(Michael H. Armacost)
Middle East
65 U.S. Initiative in Iran (Edwin
Meese III. President Reagan.
Secretary Shultz, John C.
Whitehead)
Narcotics
74 President Convenes Conference
on Narcotics
Nuclear Policy
75 International Prospects for Civil
Nuclear Power in the Post-
Chernobyl Era (John D.
Negroponte)
United Nations
80 Situation in Cambodia (Vernon A.
Walters. Text of Resolution)
82 Nicaragua (Herbert S. Okun)
84 Situation in Afghanistan (Herbert
S. Okun)
86 U.S. Reconfirms Support for
IAEA (Richard T. Kennedy)
87 Libyan Occupation of Northern
Chad (Herbert S. Okun)
87 Libya (Larry Pressler)
Western Hemisphere
89 Secretary Visits Earthquake Site
in El Salvador
Treaties
90 Current Actions
Press Releases
92 Department of State
92 USUN
;onomics
U.S. -EC Relations and the Inter-
national Trading System
|, (W. Allen Wallis)
jrope
Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki
(Secretary Shultz)
Vienna CSCE FoUowup Meeting
Secretary's News Conference in
Vienna
Visit of West German Chancellor
Kohl (Helmut Kohl, President
Reagan, Joint Statement)
Pacific
78 U.S. Relationship With Pacific
Islands (President Reagan)
Terrorism
79 U.S. Takes Measures Against
Syria (White House Statement)
79 U.S. Supports Council of Europe
Resolution on Terrorism
(Department Statement)
79 American Hostage Released in
Beirut (President Reagan)
Publications
94 Department of State
94 Current Documents Volume
Released
Index
Why Foreign Aid
A child in Latin America learns to read . . .
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FEATURE
A family in Asia
opens a small business . . .
A farmer in Africa
grows more food . . .
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Education, health, private enter-
prise and agriculture are some of
the areas in which U.S. foreign
economic assistance is helping people
in less developed countries (LDCs) to
help themselves improve the quality
of their lives. Such assistance also
serves U.S. national security interests.
By helping people in LDCs, U.S.
foreign aid enhances regional security,
promotes economic development,
encourages the growth of democratic
institutions and stimulates commer-
cial relations with the Third World.
, infant
Ingof
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spared
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qhnology
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i^ar, salt
flii water . .
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Life expectancy in
developing nations has
increased by 20%, literacy
by 33% and per capita
income by 50%.
For over a quarter of a century, the
United States has been providing
economic assistance to the nations of
the developing world.
During that time, more than 303
million tons of food were provided to
1.8 billion people in more than 100
nations. Emergency relief was
provided to victims of over 770
natural disasters in 129 countries.
Smallpox was eradicated, and a
vaccine for malaria is on the way. A
"Green Revolution" in agriculture
introduced new high-yielding varieties
of grains and enabled many nations
to become self-sufficient in food
production.
Life expectancy in developing
nations has increased by 20%, literacy
by 33% and per capita income by
50%. High rates of population growth
are beginning to level off in parts of
Asia and Latin America, where up to
50% or more of the people in some
countries now use family planning
methods. Primary school enrollment
has tripled, and secondary school
enrollment has increased sixfold.
Programs to assist people in
developing countries are an expression
of the American people's sense of
justice and compassion. They also
play an important role in America's
efforts to find peaceful solutions to
conflicts and to encourage the
development of freedom and oppor- f
tunity throughout the world. j
Interdependence in I
Today's World
Foreign aid plays an important |
role in American foreign policy, ill
is also an indispensable part of a |
growing economic link between the i
United States and the developing '
world. The United States is deeply
involved in the world economy. Toda /
America benefits significantly from I
trade and direct investment with
developing nations. More than 40%
of all U.S. private direct investment
today — or some $50 billion — is in th
Third World.
The U.S. trade relationship with
developing nations underscores the
interdependence of the world econom
For example, almost half of all
American manufactured goods and
over 50% of U. S. food grains and
feed grains go to growing markets i)
the developing world. As these
developing economies become more
viable, they can become more effecti'
markets for U.S. products.
Developing nations supply almos
half of all American imports includii
many strategic minerals vital to
national defense. The United States
imports significant quantities of silvc
\n AID-supported
women's co-op in the
Dominican Republic
assists in the country's
rural development.
FEATURE
cobalt, aluminum, tin, tungsten,
nickel, manganese, platinum, mercury
and bauxite from these nations. For
example, 52% of the cobalt imported
by the United States comes from
Zaire. Cobalt is a critical component
of the alloys necessary for the
construction of jet engines. In
addition, most American imports of
petroleum and natural rubber as well
as everyday products such as coffee,
bananas, tea and cocoa come from
the developing world.
U.S. foreign aid programs not only
benefit recipients abroad, but also
help secure jobs for Americans at
home. For example, 70 cents out of
every dollar that goes for bilateral
foreign assistance is spent on goods
and services from the United States.
American firms supply commodities,
equipment, consulting services and
other expertise to foreign assistance
projects. Foreign aid programs
support more than five million
American manufacturing jobs in all
50 states and create new markets for
U.S. products abroad.
Foreign Aid in Perspective
Foreign assistance as a national
policy originated with the
Marshall Plan in 1947 when U.S.
economic support helped rebuild
Europe following World War II. In
1949, President Harry S Truman
initiated the Point IV program to
provide technical assistance to
Taiwan, South Korea, nations in
Indochina and the less developed
countries in Europe and the Middle
East.
The focus of foreign aid switched
from Europe to the developing world.
In June 1950, the Act for Inter-
Efforts to raise the
productivity and income
of the poor focus on
increasing access to
resources such as land,
water, fertilizer and
renewable sources of
energy.
Foreign aid helps
America — about 70 cents
of every dollar is spent on
U.S. equipment, food,
goods or services.
AID encourages the
development of the private
sector as a vehicle for
generating employment
and higher incomes.
^A
national Development was passed,
and the Technical Cooperation
Administration (TCA) was estab-
lished within the State Department.
When the Korean War broke out in
1950, U.S. economic assistance took
on a new purpose. In 1951. military
and economic assistance were united
with technical assistance programs
under the Mutual Security Agency.
Two years later, programs of technical
cooperation became the responsibility
of the newly established Foreign
Operations Administration, which
later became the International
Cooperation Administration. This
effort was supplemented in 1954 by
the Food for Peace Act, which uses
U.S. agricultural abundance to feed
the hungry in other nations. Shortly
thereafter, the Development Loan
Fund was established, enabling devel-
oping countries to obtain capital
assistance.
The Agency for International
Development (AID), created by the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
income of the poor by increasing
access to resources such as land,
water, fertilizer, seeds, tools, credit
and renewable sources of energy.
Health, nutrition, voluntary family
planning and education programs also
were expanded.
Today, U.S. economic aid programs
emphasize four basic principles: policy
dialogue and reform; transfer of
appropriate technology; institution
building; and reliance on the private
sector and market forces as engines
of economic growth. |
Policy Dialogue
The ability of economic assistance
programs to achieve their goals
depends to a large degree on the
soundness of development policies ii
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tion Administration and the Develop-
ment Loan Fund. AID today carries
out U.S. economic assistance programs
in the developing world.
The passage of "New Directions"
legislation by Congress in 1973 led to
efforts to raise the productivity and
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AID develops and
introduces technologies
that can be maintained
and operated easily and
are appropriate in local
cultures.
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FEATURE
cipient nations. Inappropriate
: bsidies, price and wage controls,
ide restrictions, overvalued
rchange rates, interest rate ceilings
; d rapid population growth all
:rtail economic performance. For
sample, farmers need to sell their
foducts at market-determined prices
rther than at artificially low prices
: en imposed by governments. These
blow-cost-of-production prices are set
tiprovide less expensive food for
iban dwellers. Because of such
flicies, farmers grow only enough
F ■ their own families plus a little
stra to sell. The result can lead to
tdespread food shortages. In Africa,
:r capita food production has fallen
The ability of economic
assistance programs to
achieve their goals depends
to a large degree on the
soundness of development
policies in recipient nations.
\11) engineers have helj iiai government construct a number
of water systems that provide people with clean, potable water.
f helps strengthen
b emational agricultural
v. earch centers
fa developing
c| jntries by
[j)viding25%
their funding
jary 1987
AID promotes programs
that emphasize immuni-
zation and proper feeding
of hvestock, which are
important for increasing
agricultural productivity.
Developing nations with
strong private sectors have
achieved faster, sounder
and more sustained
economic grourth.
each year for 20 years, in part due to
this type of pricing policy.
When a nation requests economic
assistance from the United States,
help is provided to design economic
policies that allow development to
succeed. With AID assistance and
the growing recognition of the negative
effects of restrictive policies, a number
of reforms recently have taken place
throughout the developing world. For
example, 16 African countries have
increased food prices substantially to
provide incentives for farmers to grow
more and better crops. This will help
prevent famine in the future. In
Somalia alone, a year after prices for
sorghum were raised, production went
up 40%.
and use of high-yielding rice and
wheat varieties. Rice production in
Indonesia has increased from 12
million to 22 million tons in less th;
15 years. India, one of the most
populous nations in the world, is
becoming increasingly self-reliant ii
food.
AID is focusing on research,
development and transfer of tech-
I
The emphasis of AID's
population assistance is
on enhancing the well-
being of families by
expanding the availabilitv
and use of voluntary
family planning services.
Sixteen African countries
have increased food prices
substantially to provide
incentives for farmers to
grow more and better
crops.
FEATURE
rdogy in the areas of greatest need.
cse include: food production and
iculture; forestry (fuelwood
xiuction and use); biomedical
nearch; and voluntary family
pinning methods,
^s part of this process, AID helps
■ engthen scientific institutions in
j.eloping countries and assists in
bilding their research development
aid technology distribution facilities.
Lititutional Development
'"'he U.S. foreign aid program
. promotes democracy as well as
d/elopment by building and
sengthening institutions that enable
p^ple to help themselves and that
ii rease citizen participation in
d ;ision making. The growth of viable
ii titutions is essential to successful
d /elopment.
J.S. support builds schools and
u iversities and provides access to
self-sustaining sources of credit for
productive investment. Institution
building activities also include training
to upgrade technical and managerial
expertise.
U.S. foreign aid supports small
business and farmer-controlled
cooperatives and other institutions
that provide the means for people to
express their views, choose their
leaders and promote needed reforms.
U.S. assistance and support are
provided in conducting free and
democratic elections. AID has also
launched a $25 million program
aimed at improving the administration
of justice in Latin American
democracies and strengthening local
democratic institutions.
Private Sector Growth
Developing nations with strong
private sectors have achieved
faster, sounder and more sustained
.iHHfiiaii
' 3. foreign aid supports
jiiall business and
Inner-controlled
operatives.
Because of the scarcity
of fuel in developing
countries, people use
alternative sources such
as dried dung.
economic growth. Private manage-
ment of industries, for example,
provides more efficient services at
lower cost to the public than is the
case with state-owned and -operated
enterprises. This has led to many
requests from developing countries
for aid's technical assistance in
drafting privatization strategies.
In recent years, the interest in
reducing the role of government in
national economies has become a
global phenomenon.
AID encourages the development
of the private sector as a vehicle for
generating employment and higher
incomes. In Bangladesh, AID assisted
in transferring the marketing of
fertilizer from the government to the
private sector. As a result, over 45,000
Bangladeshi businessmen now sell
fertilizer to small farmers.
In Jamaica, a 1 984 AID loan
provided for an audit of state
enterprises and for privatization of
30 companies. At the request of the
Costa Rican government, AID made
local currency available to establish a
trust fund to take possession of
government-owned subsidiaries and
offer them for sale to private investors.
A program for divestment of state-
owned enterprises is being developed
jointly by AID and the government of
Honduras.
nuary 1987
Foreign Aid:
How It Works
Development Assistance
Development assistance is
administered by AID in the forn
of loans and grants. Its objective is
to broaden economic opportunity by
improving the quality of life of the
poorest people in developing countries
through programs in agriculture,
rural development, nutrition,
voluntary family planning, health,
education and human resources,
energy, and science and technology.
The programs are concentrated in
countries where U.S. assistance is
needed most, where there is a clear
commitment to broadly based growtl
and where the United States has a
strong interest in long-term
development.
This represents the basic type of
assistance provided by AID in
accordance with the Foreign
Assistance Act.
Economic Support Fund
The Economic Support Fund, pari
of the U.S. Security Assistance
Program, promotes economic and
political stability in regions where
the United States has special security
interests and has determined that
economic assistance can be useful in
helping to secure peace or to avert
major economic or political crises.
SI
FEATURE
rhese resources meet a variety of
leeds, including balance-of-payments
iupport and financing of infrastruc-
ure and other capital projects as well
IS support for development programs.
Food for Peace
Food aid is provided in cooperation
with the Department of Agricul-
ure through the Food for Peace
urogram or P.L. (Public Law) 480.
The United States is the largest
ood donor in the world, providing
nore nourishment to the world's
lungry than all other nations
:ombined.
The Food for Peace program has
lelivered over 303 billion tons of food
vorth almost $37 billion to people on
ilmost every continent. It has brought
lew hope and economic opportunity
o more than 1 .8 billion people in
)ver 100 countries.
Food aid is provided in three
lifferent ways:
Title I, a concessional sales
urogram, provides developing coun-
ries long-term, low-interest loans to
purchase U.S. farm products. In
exchange, these countries agree to
;elf-help requirements that can mean
mproved policies and local currency
unding for development activities,
■lecent legislation emphasizes the use
3f local currency proceeds from Title
I sales to promote private enterprise
development through local institutions.
Title II, a donation program,
provides food aid to the victims of
famines, disasters and emergencies
throughout the world. Title II
programs fall into broad categories of
maternal-child health care, school
feeding and Food for Work. Most
The United States is the
largest food donor in the
world , providing more
nourishment to the world's
hungry than all other
nations combined.
infrastructure development such as the
construction of access roads.
Title II supplementary feeding is
administered through U.S. private
voluntary agencies and their counter-
parts overseas. However, U.S. food is
also provided through direct bilateral
programs with other governments
through the U.N. World Food
Program.
Food for Peace helped save millions
of lives during the recent African
famine. In 1985 alone, the United
States provided over three million
tons of American food, valued at $1 .1
billion, in response to the African
emergency. This represented half of
all food delivered to that continent.
Title III, Food for Development, is
another sales program similar to Title
I. However, Title III goes one step
further by waiving all repayment
requirements in exchange for more
specific self-help development initia-
tives. Another newly established
program. Food for Progress, empha-
sizes the use of U.S. food resources to
support countries that have com-
mitted themselves to agricultural
policy reform.
Disaster Assistance
Natural and man-made disasters
are a constant threat to people
throughout the world. They take their
highest toll among the poor, who are
the most vulnerable.
AID'S Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
coordinates U.S. government and
private relief work whenever help is
needed. Programs are conducted,
often in conjunction with those of
other nations, to alleviate the effects
of disaster quickly and to reduce
human suffering.
Over the years, this assistance has
taken many forms. Donations under
the Food for Peace program, search
and rescue missions, medical supplies
and personnel, shelter and equipment
and money to buy relief goods all
have been provided.
AID responds to an average of 38
emergency disasters a year. During
the past 22 years, the United States
provided emergency relief to victims
of 865 natural and man-made foreign
disasters in 129 countries in which
2.7 million have died and 818 million
have been affected.
aid's international disaster assis-
tance program not only alleviates
suffering resulting from disasters, but
also strengthens the ability of
countries to cope with disasters by
helping them improve their own
disaster response networks.
AID develops early warning
systems and provides technical
assistance to strengthen relief
institutions in disaster-prone
Natural and man-made
disasters are a constant
threat throughout the
world and take their
highest toll among the
poor.
countries. A 24-hour response
capability is maintained to rush life-
support supplies and services to
disaster victims anywhere in the
world.
What Does Aid Cost?
The 1987 foreign aid program
totals less than 1% of the overalll
federal budget or about $6 b'Uion.
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FEATURE
hese funds support over 1 .500
svelopment assistance programs in
3 countries and include the Food
ir Peace program, the U.S. contri-
ation to multinational development
inks and Economic Support Funds
1 countries such as Egypt and Israel.
The amount of money spent on
ireign assistance by the United States
r year is considerably less than
what the American people spend for
alcoholic beverages, cosmetics or toilet
articles. In 1984 Americans spent
over $10 billion on haircuts, $31 bil-
lion on cigarettes, $25 billion on
household cleaning supplies and
$53 billion on alcohol. The same year,
the U.S. government spent only
$8.7 billion on foreign aid.
Sharing the Task
Thirty-five years ago, the United
States was the only nation offer-
ing economic assistance as a national
policy. The U.S. share of worldwide
assistance is shrinking. Today,
virtually all developed nations — and
some that are still developing —
maintain aid programs.
In 1983, while still providing the
largest absolute amount of aid, the
United States' relative share fell to
less than 30%. By 1984, among the
17 leading non-communist countries
providing aid, the United States stood
last in the amount of aid provided in
relation to the gross national product.
The Nordic countries, Switzerland,
Belgium, Austria, Australia, New
Zealand, Denmark and the Nether-
lands are among the nations that
outrank the United States. Net
disbursements for U.S. economic aid
in 1984 represented less than .3% of
the gross national product.
In 1985 alone, the U.S.
provided over 3 million tons
of American food, valued at
$1.1 billion, in response to
the African emergency. This
represented half of all food
delivered to that continent.
The Feb. 4, 1976, earthquake in Guatemala
left about 23,000 persons dead, 75,000
injured and one million homeless. AID
provided more than 500 family tents, 500
pints of blood plasma, 5,000 doses of
antibiotics, 100 portable water storage
tanks (3,000-gaUon size), generators,
pumps and water purification equipment.
11
The
AID Challenge
I
The environment of poverty is a
barrier to economic growth and to
long-term global peace and security.
The lack of skills, education, health
services, access to safe water and
adequate food all contribute to
poverty. Growing population pressure,
adverse climatic conditions, a deterio-
rating natural resource base and
inappropriate government policies
further exacerbate the problem.
Malnutrition and disease take the
lives of more than 1 4 million children
under the age of five every year in the
developing world. This is almost the
entire preschool population of the
United States. Every day 40,000
children under the age of five die
from largely preventable causes.
A substantial portion of the
population in the developing world
does not have access to enough food
AID works to provide
appropriate technology to
help farmers improve
production.
to meet nutritional needs, and three
out of five people do not have easy
access to safe water. Life expectancy
in less developed countries is about
58 years on the average compared to
75 in the United States. Average
annual income is $700 compared to
$1 1,070 in the developed nations,
and unemployment rates are very
high — up to 50% — particularly in
densely populated urban areas. Over
half of the people throughout the
developing world do not have even
basic reading skills.
The challenge faced by donor
agencies such as AID and the
governments of developing nations
to break through the barrier of pover
and provide incentives for economic
progress that will lead to self-reliant
and sustained growth.
Agriculture and Nutrition
Insufficient food supplies and inac
quate diets are principal concernf
in most developing nations. Over 80
million people or about one-seventh
of the world's population are mal-
nourished. Half of the world's hung
are children.
While enough food is being
produced to feed the world's five
billion people, in undernourished
areas of the developing world,
problems are experienced because
people do not have enough money t(
purchase food or build roads. They
may not have adequate ways of
delivering or storing food. Low
agricultural productivity in many
areas of the world also results from
shortage of appropriate technology
generate production.
Most countries in Africa, for
example, are unable to produce or
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The United States plays a
leading role in alleviating
human suffering in Africa
by providing food and
other emergency supplies.
FEATURE
istribute the food that they need,
ood production in these nations has
?cHned in the last decade,
in the future, land available for
rming will be limited. Most good
.able land, especially in Asia, already
being cultivated. Land available for
.!,ricultural purposes is expected to
crease by only a small amount by
le turn of the century. Efforts to
crease food production are hampered
irther by the depletion of the world's
rests for fuel and other products,
eforestation causes watershed
■struction that, in turn, threatens
;ricultural land with erosion or
joding.
To meet the growing demand for
food generated by population growth,
food production must increase 3-4%
annually. To do this, production of
major food crops in the developing
countries must be increased signifi-
cantly, the food purchasing power of
the poor must improve, and policies
that act as a constraint to development
must be changed.
AID is meeting the challenge of
increasing food production by helping
to improve existing agricultural
technology and self-sustaining agri-
cultural institutions in developing
nations. Conducting research and
developing and disseminating ap-
propriate technologies are the essence
of aid's program in agriculture.
Research is a key factor in
improving agricultural production.
AID-supported research has helped
bring about a "Green Revolution" in
agriculture in Asia. Work now is
under way to help bring food self-
sufficiency to the African continent.
Support is provided to a network
of international agricultural research
centers conducting studies on
improving the productivity and quality
of food crops such as sorghum, millet,
beans, cowpeas, cassava, peanuts
and potatoes. The International
Center for Tropical Agriculture in
Colombia has developed bean vari-
eties that have resulted in increased
yields and higher farm incomes with-
out pesticide use. Research conducted
on high-yielding rice varieties
primarily at the International Rice
Research Institute in the Philippines
has resulted in a 40% increase over
yields of traditional varieties. For
wheat, the average increase has been
close to 100%.
AID support to the Asian Vegetable
Research and Development Center
has developed heat- and bacterial-
resistant tomatoes that will make
tomato production feasible in hot and
humid climates for the first time.
Other research at the center has
helped design household gardens that
provide food with adequate vitamin
A for families.
AID collaborates on research
programs with U.S. land and sea
grant colleges and universities in fields
such as aquaculture, ocean fisheries,
soil management, nutrition and food
crop production, and post-harvest
technology and works closely with
private voluntary organizations,
private sector firms, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and other
U.S. government agencies such as the
Peace Corps.
Collaborative agricultural research
also has benefited U.S. agriculture.
The United States has benefited from
In Honduras, where coffee
is vital to the economy,
farmers apply new tech-
nologies resulting in
increased production.
AID-funded research has
led to the production of
new varieties of sorghum that
are increasing yields
up to 150%.
the use of genetic materials from
developing countries to improve
virtually every major U.S. crop by
providing resistance to disease and
insects, dwarf stature, higher
yields as well as one-day length-
sensitivity.
AID also draws on technical
expertise from developing countries
as well as the food and agricultural
development experience of the U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), the World Food Council
(WFC). the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD),
the U.N. World Food Program (WFP)
and other donor agencies.
The U.S. foreign assistance program
provides both short- and long-term
training for scientists, economists and
other specialists needed for sustained
agricultural and rural development.
For example. AID assisted in building
a college of agriculture in Morocco
that now is graduating about 600
persons a year. U.S. -based training is
provided for some 50 Zambians as
part of a project in agricultural
training, planning and institutional
development. A university based on a
U.S. land grant model is being created
in Cameroon and is expected to pro-
vide 300 agricultural graduates a year.
AID also helps developing nations
increase agricultural production
through irrigation, swamp drainage,
access road building, produce market-
ing, building of storage facilities and
rural electrification systems. In
Guatemala, AID assisted in the
construction of about 206 kilometers
of farm-to-market access roads that
provided employment for 12,000
laborers and allowed 20% more
produce to arrive at markets in good
condition. In Sri Lanka, an AID
project helped organize water users
associations in the dry Gal Oya
region in the southeastern part of the
country and rehabilitated over 600
kilometers of irrigation canals. In
Costa Rica, a joint U.S. -Costa Rican
agricultural consultative committee
was set up with AID's help. During
the first six months of operation, it
was instrumental in launching a
number of major joint ventures in
production and export of herbs,
spices, vegetables and dehydrated
banana and pineapple chips.
U.S. foreign assistance helps create
more jobs in rural areas and provides
farmers better access to credit,
markets and technology. In Honduras,
for example, where the coffee crop is
vital to the economy, coffee rust, a
fungal disease, led to a decrease in
production. With AID assistance,
new technologies were introduced,
and credit was extended to some
Agricultural research,
such as that under way at
CIMMYT, benefits crop
producers in both the
United States and in
developing countries.
14
FEATURE
!,000 small farmers. As a result, in
wo years, coffee production of these
armers increased fivefold.
AID is attempting to direct such
Titical productive resources as credit,
echnology and training to females
vho perform much of the developing
vorld's agricultural labor.
^uman Resource
Development
health
For millions of people in the
developing world, good health is
m elusive goal. Many deaths today
Kcur from malnutrition and illnesses
;uch as diarrhea, respiratory infec-
ions, measles, tetanus and polio.
These deaths can be easily prevented
)r treated if services are available.
How^ever, efforts to improve health
'ire hampered by a lack of trained
personnel at the community level,
scarcity of rural health clinics, limited
esources and lack of technical
■xpertise.
AID helps developing countries
expand basic health care by
emphasizing immunization, oral
rehydration therapy and con-
rol of major communicable
aarasitic diseases.
Over 50% of AID's health budget is
directed at health service delivery.
AID recently doubled its budget for
biomedical research, committing
roughly 13% of the total health budget
(about $31.5 million) to this research.
Research will improve the ability to
diagnose, treat and even prevent
diseases and will reduce the cost of
health service delivery in the
developing world.
Today, research is carried out on
tropical diseases such as malaria and
onchocerciasis (river blindness).
Onchocerciasis, when uncontrolled,
can disable humans in the prime of
life. AID is the major donor in the
worldwide effort to control this
disease. In the Volta River Basin in
Africa, for example, some 27,000
cases of blindness have been pre-
vented, valuable land has been
returned to production, and the
majority of children born in the
region have been protected from
infection.
During the past 30 years, the
United States has spent more than
$ 1 billion to control the spread of
malaria, a disease which may kill up
to five million people a year. It is
estimated that one million children
die annually from malaria in Africa
alone.
More than 50% of AID's
health budget is directed
at health service delivery.
Two prototype vaccines
against malaria have been
developed as a result of
research funded by AID.
Females provide much of
the developing world's
agricultural labor.
15
Malaria had been eliminated in 39
countries until it resurfaced recently
in some areas of the world due to
widespread and growing resistance
to insecticides and to traditional anti-
malarial drugs.
As a result of research funded by
AID, two prototype vaccines have
been developed against malaria. One
is for the most deadly form of the
disease and the other for the most
common form. If human testing is
successful, the vaccine could be
available for use by 1990 and should
have a significant impact in
controlling the disease.
AID is committed to a "child
survival" program to focus on a
limited number of manageable and
proven technologies thafpromise
sustained and direct health benefits
for infants and children. These are
oral rehydration therapy, immuniza-
tion, birth spacing and improved
nutrition practices including the
ORT— a simple solution
of water, sugar and salt
that can be administered
in the home — is preventing
millions of deaths from
diarrheal dehydration
each year.
Moroccan children benefit
from an AID-supported
program that provides
vitamin-enriched dietary
supplements.
promotion of breast feeding,
appropriate weaning and growth
monitoring.
Promoting the use of oral
rehydration therapy is an important
part of aid's child survival effort.
Between five and six million children
in developing nations die every year
from dehydration resulting from
diarrhea. Diarrhea is brought on by
cholera, measles and the many viruses
and bacteria that thrive in unsanitary
environments. Children in developing
countries, often already malnourished,
may survive the disease but not the
dehydration resulting from severe
diarrhea.
The only treatment was to
rehydrate those children with fluids
given intravenously. But that
required hospitals, trained medical
personnel and clean needles — all in
short supply in the developing world.
Over the course of 20 years, AID
has helped support the research that
has demonstrated that oral rehydration
therapy (ORT) is a safe and effective
treatment for diarrhea from all causes
and for children and adults of all
ages. Because it can be given by
spoon, mothers and fathers can
administer it to their children at home.
AID now is working to make ORT
available worldwide with activities in
42 countries. The U. N. International
Children's Emergency Fund
(UNICEF) and the World Health
Organization (WHO) are major
partners in this global effort.
It is proving successful. For
example, the AID-supported National
Control of Diarrheal Diseases project
in Egypt began in 1983. By the end
of 1985, close to 90% of all health
facilities around the country were
providing on-site rehydration services.
According to approximations based
on sample surveys, diarrhea-caused
deaths in under-two-year-olds had
been cut by two-thirds since 1980
and infant deaths (0-1 year) by more
than half.
In the developing world, children
are afflicted by a full range of
illnesses once common in indus-
trialized nations but now largely
controlled. Measles, for example, is a
far greater killer in developing
countries than sleeping sickness.
Whooping cough is a greater hazard
than river blindness. Vaccines to
combat diseases such as measles,
whooping cough, tetanus and polio
have long been available but are only
recently reaching the developing
world.
Because immunization is an
important and cost-effective interven-
tion, AID supports immunization
programs in more than 50 countries.
16
FEATURE
AID also is supporting the research
md development of:
— a measles vaccine that can be
given to infants as young as six
months;
— heat-stable vaccines such as for
polio to reduce dependence on cold
chains;
— a single-dose vaccine for
whooping cough that does not have
Tithe negative side effects that often
discourage mothers from completing
the DPT series;
— a genetically-engineered oral
vaccine, as well as a new injectable,
for typhoid, a disease that has
become resistant to antibiotics in
several parts of the developing world;
— an oral vaccine for cholera, the
most severe of the diarrheal diseases,
affecting some 20-24 million adults
and children;
— a vaccine for rotavirus, the most
:ommon cause of diarrhea in the
United States as well as in the Third
World; and,
— a leprosy vaccine that can be
used not only as a preventative but
i also to reduce the severity of the
disease in those who are already
infected.
AID-supported research is under
way on technological improvements
that could make vaccines easier to
deliver in the developing world.
AID also is conducting promising
research to further reduce childhood
mortality. Vitamin A deficiency is a
public health problem in an estimated
73 countries and territories around
the world, affecting some five million
children under the age of five in Asia
alone. About 250,000 children in Asia
are blinded every year as a result of
this deficiency in their diet. Since
1974, AID has helped developing
countries recognize, treat and prevent
vitamin A deficiency. AID-supported
research in Indonesia has shown that
vitamin A may also play a key role in
preventing deaths from diarrhea and
acute respiratory infection. AID is
expanding its research into the links
between vitamin A and childhood
mortality and disease.
In addition, AID provides technical
support for planning and managing
improved water and sanitation
systems. In Malawi, for example, the
AID-assisted Self-Help Rural Water
Supply project has resulted in the
installation of nearly 2,000 miles of
pipe and 3,000 public taps since 1968.
AID also provides training in hygiene
and basic health care.
Education
Meeting the challenge of economic
development requires the
leadership and technical know-how
AID also is conducting
promising research to
further reduce childhood
mortality.
The Agency's immuniza-
tion program in Africa has
assisted in protecting 8.3
million children from the
ravages of childhood
diseases.
The Agency's heahh pro-
gram focuses on infants
and young children — a
group highly vulnerable
to disease.
17
Some 600 million adults in
developing nations cannot
read or do basic calculations.
that comes from sound education
and training. Yet, the countries facing
the most acute challenge are often
those most severely hampered by lack
of trained professionals and skilled
personnel.
Some 600 million adults in
developing nations cannot read or do
basic calculations. Only three-fifths
of school-age children enter primary
school, and only half will stay in
school long enough to acquire even
the most rudimentary skills.
In the developing world, the ratio
of physicians, teachers and other
trained persons to a growing
population is strikingly low. In
Bangladesh, a country with an
estimated 100 million people, there is
one physician for every 10,000
persons. In Niger, there are only 128
physicians to serve over five million
citizens. In Liberia, estimates show
one high school teacher for every
121,000 teens.
The U.S. foreign aid program
emphasizes primary education for
children, non-formal education in life
skills for adults and advanced training
for development program managers,
scientists and professional personnel.
In addition, the program emphasizes
that formal and non-formal education
and participant training be directed
to both males and females since each
contributes significantly to the overall
economic development process.
Support is provided for private
voluntary organizations to conduct
educational programs in basic literacy.
*
^~j*
Opening the book of
knowledge releases
huniEin potential.
18
lealth care, occupational health and
afety and other subjects.
Modern technology also is applied
educate persons in remote regions,
ladio and satellite communications
re used to reach people in rural
reas. In Kenya, Thailand and the
)ominican Republic, AID has helped
levelop instructional radio programs
hat have taught children basic skills,
'hese have been useful particularly
i-here qualified teachers are in short
upply.
In Costa Rica, students are using
;xtbooks written and printed in their
wn country through funds provided
1 local currency generated by the
iID program.
In addition, "scholarship diplomacy"
-training and educating Third
V'orld citizens in the United States —
; an important part of the foreign
ssistance program. Nearly 250,000
ersons from the developing world
ave received training — most of them
1 the United States — under the
jreign assistance program. AID is
?sponsible for managing most U.S.
overnment-sponsored scholarships
)r students and trainees from the
hird World.
In 1985, AID initiated a five-year,
146 million program to provide
aining in the United States for
ndergraduate and high school-level
students from Central America. The
Central American Peace Scholarship
Program (CAPS) will reach socially
and economically disadvantaged
students and also will enable primary
and secondary school teachers and
administrators to observe programs
in the United States related to their
fields. CAPS will fund over 7,000
scholarships. In addition, the U.S.
Information Agency will sponsor
training for 3,000 Central Americans.
Along with providing scholarships,
AID offers assistance to countries
that want to invest their own
resources in training but need help
with programming and supervising
their citizens being trained in the
United States. This assistance and
related services are provided under
aid's Reimbursable Training
Program.
Environment and
Natural Resources
Receding tropical forest cover, soil
erosion, exhaustion of croplands,
depletion of fisheries, advancing
desert frontiers, water pollution,
indiscriminate pesticide use and inad-
equate industrial and urban pollution
control, and inadequate or underused
energy sources often are serious
problems in developing countries.
FEATURE
AID assists in identifying and
solving these problems in a number
of ways. Technical environmental
analysis is integrated into AID's
development projects. Foreign
governments are encouraged to adopt
sound environmental policies. Support
is provided for scientific and
developmental institutions in
developing countries engaged in
environmental research and problem
solving.
Integrating environmental analysis
into development projects in Rwanda,
Somalia and the Gambia will ensure
against future erosion and degradation
in development of river basins.
In Panama, AID is providing a loan
that will increase the government's
capability to manage the watersheds
that must be adequately protected to
keep the Panama Canal operational.
AID has helped develop a network
of environmental centers in Indonesia
used for training and research by the
ID helps developing
luntries use natural
sources wisely.
m^M
I'lf- ■
So^-^t
Ministry of Environment and
Development.
AID also worics to protect
environmentally sound development
projects funded by other donors. AID
and the World Bank are partners in
educating people about safe pesticide
use.
Effective forest land management
is crucial to economic development.
The U.S. foreign assistance program
helps more than 70 forestry projects
in 37 countries to improve management
and support related soil, water, forest
and range vegetation conservation
efforts.
Haiti is an example. Working
closely with private voluntary organi-
zations, AID is supporting an effort
to plant and maintain six million to
nine million trees over four years in
addition to obtaining data on
forestation in the country and
promoting soil conservation.
Energy
The Agency's energy program
helps developing countries assess
their energy needs and resources plus
develop affordable energy systems
required for agricultural, health,
educational and other development.
In Haiti, AID is introducing a
smokeless, briquetted fuel made from
coal to replace fuelwood and kerosene
in homes and businesses. In Jamaica,
AID funded a promising study of the
potential for large-scale electricity
generation from sugarcane. Successful
application could revitalize Jamaica's
major agricultural resource and lead
to savings in foreign exchange funds
through reduced oil imports.
Population
Population growth rates in most
developing countries today remain
high mainly because of dramatic
improvements in public health and
medical services over the past three
decades, traditions favoring large
families, and lack of knowledge and
availability of effective family planning
methods. Though the world's popu-
lation growth rate has begun to fall,
the present rate of growth will still
mean a 33% increase in the world's
population by the year 2000. More
than 90% of these additional people
will be born in the developing world.
Rapid population growth can
compound serious development
problems and increase the cost of
national and international efforts to
reduce disease, poverty, malnutrition
and environmental degradation. In
Africa, for instance, population is
growing about 3% yearly while annual
food production is increasing
only 2%.
For the individual family, populatio
growth means large family size, whic
may seriously affect the health of
mothers and children. Complication
of pregnancy are a major cause of
death for women in the developing
world. The risk of complications
increases for women who are very
young or at the end of their
reproductive period and with the
number of pregnancies. When
children are born too close together,
they have a significantly greater risk
of dying than when births are well-
spaced.
The emphasis of AID's populatior
assistance is on enhancing the well-
being of families by expanding the
availability and use of voluntary
family planning services. AID support
voluntary family planning programs
that provide a wide range of choices
in family planning methods, includin
natural family planning.
AID helps developing country
programs by training physicians anc
other staff, providing commodities
and medical equipment, expanding
the number of channels through
which family planning information i
distributed and providing technical
assistance to design and improve
family planning programs.
Voluntary family planning pro-
grams in many countries have
I
^
20
.u
FEATURE
)roduced positive results with AID
support. In Thailand, for example,
'oluntary family planning programs
ontributed to a decline in the
)opuIation growth rate from over 3%
n 1 970 to 1 .7% today. In Jamaica,
luch voluntary programs helped
educe the birth rate by 23% over the
)ast decade. Population growth rates
ilso have declined in Indonesia,
ylexico, Colombia and other countries
vith the help of strong AID-assisted
oluntary family planning programs.
iousing
\dequate shelter is a critical need
in the developing world. By the
jrn of the century, the world's
opulation will be predominantly
rban. Three-fourths of these urban
dwellers will live in developing
countries. Providing minimum,
decent shelter is a major problem
resulting from rapid urbanization.
Shelter ranks next only to food and
medical care as a basic need of the
poor.
All but a small fraction of the
housing in developing countries is
built by the private sector. Most
people build their own housing over
time. The primary role of government
in housing is to provide those goods
and services that people are unable to
provide for themselves, to remove
constraints on private sector housing
construction and to encourage self-
help efforts.
AID assists governments in
developing nations to respond to the
housing needs of their citizens. U.S.
foreign aid projects emphasize self-
help techniques and private sector
construction of housing units. A
number of approaches to providing
low-cost housing are promoted,
including slum upgrading, basic or
core housing and preparation of lots
with utilities for later improvement
by purchasers.
In Africa, population is
growing about 3% yearly
while food production is
increasing only 2% .
By the turn of the century,
the world's population
will be predominantly urban.
Meeting
The Challenge
The Agency is facing the
challenge of the 1980s by sharin -.
American scientific, technical and '
entrepreneurial skills to meet critica |
needs in the developing world. By ,
encouraging policy dialogue, mobilij |
ing the private sector, building I
durable institutions and transferring '
appropriate technology, AID helps |
build a better life for everyone both ; |
home and abroad.
I
This feature is reprinted from a
pamphlet entitled "The AID Challenge,
produced by the Bureau for External
Affairs, U.S. Agency for Intem.ational
Development, in November 1986.
HE SECRETARY
>ecretary Praises AID
md Comments on Iran
iiitary Shultz's remarks at a
ri niony commemorating the 25th
mirersary of the Agency for Intema-
iniil Derelopment (AID) on Novem-
r ^5. 1986.^
e're here to celebrate the 25th
miversary of the Agency for Interna-
mal Development. It's a very impor-
nt part of our foreign policy. So let me
art there.
President Reagan has put in place a
reign policy that's comprehensive, that
operating very strongly in the interest
the United States and of the great
aditions of the United States. I am
oud and feel quite privileged to be
sociated with him in this endeavor,
id I support President Reagan fully,
ross-the-board.
Insofar as our efforts in the Middle
ist, and particularly with respect to
e Iran-Iraq war and associated mat-
rs. the President has set out our objec-
es there trying to be as helpful as we
n in bringing an end to that war— it's
e bloodiest battle going on on the
obe today— in trying to see what we
n do to establish a more constructive
lationship with Iran, if that's at all
issible, in combatting the scourge of
rrorism— all of these objectives are
ry much a part of our foreign policy,
le President has set out our objectives,
id 1 fully subscribe to them and support
em and intend to be very much a part
the effort to bring them to fruition.
We've had a lot of discussion about
iw best to evaluate where we are right
iw and where we go from here. We will
■ working as part of the Administra-
ins's effort on this. Under Secretary of
ate [for Political Affairs] Mike Arma-
■st will be the lead person, insofar as
e State Department is concerned, in
ving us leadership in this effort. So it
ill s^-o forward following the objectives
at the President has laid out and go
rward with strength and enthusiasm.
Insofar as the problems that have
ime to light through the efforts of the
ttorney General, I think it is quite clear
lat the Attorney General and the Presi-
dent mean business. Insofar as I per-
sonally am concerned, of course, I sup-
port that effort. I have met with the
Attorney General and his associate,
Mr. Cooper, and provided all of the in-
formation that we have here in the
Department that I may have about all of
the things involved. So they have that
complete record. And, as we may turn
up other things, of course, we'll imme-
diately make them available. So that
goes on.
But in the meantime, our foreign
policy with all of its forward thrust goes
on, including our efforts with respect to
Iran, with respect to the Iran-Iraq war,
with respect to all of these matters, as
we will be seeking in every way possible
to pursue the President's objectives and
bring them about.
Turning to the subject of AID itself,
this is a very important element in the
total picture. And it represents an idea
that's been around a long while— even
longer than the 25 years and which has
had a refreshing rebirth under the
leadership of President Reagan.
As I think about it, this idea that
AID represents now goes back at least
to lend-lease during World War II. And
we see its seeds in the Marshall Plan and
derivatives of the Marshall Plan. We see
it as part of the structure that was put in
place by the great statesmen after
World War II, from which emerged the
International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank and the other banks, and our
bilateral assistance program. And it has
done a lot of good. It's had its problems
off and on but basically has been an
extremely powerful force for good in the
world.
It has been part of something that
opens the world up, that stands for the
fact that we know that what to the
United States is going to be in some con-
siderable part a reflection of what hap-
pens elsewhere. It is a way of saying we
understand the stake we have in seeing
people in countries that are worse off
than we get a break and get a chance to
move ahead.
And as President Reagan has
worked with this program and sponsored
increases in it, working with [AID
Administrator] Peter McPherson, who is
an outstanding colleague, the ideas of
economic development through the
market, through enterprise, have taken
on much more meaning. And by now, we
see that the ideas that the President
expressed early in his term at Cancun
and at other places, in which we're often
greeted as way off the mark, are now
almost the conventional wisdom. And I
personally saw at the UN special session
on Africa the emergence of these ideas
insofar as many African nations were
concerned, and you see them all around
the world.
So I think this is a birthday that we
can truly celebrate as representing an
important idea that distinguishes the
post-World War II period from the
earlier periods. And it represents
understanding, it represents the forward
motion and open outlook of the United
States; it's an integral part of the Presi-
dent's foreign policy, and I'm very
pleased and proud to be a part of that
policy and his team and very pleased to
have an opportunity to take part in this
ceremony that marks what you've been
doing, Peter.
Just a word about Peter. He's been a
great colleague for me. He's tireless. I
don't know how he does all the things he
does and how he knows all the things he
knows. But at any rate, he's always
there and is one of those people who,
when he comes to you, even if he's got a
problem he also brings a solution. The
people you like to see are the ones who
bring answers as well as problems. It's
the people who only bring you the prob-
lems that drive you crazy. But Peter's
got answers and solutions and ideas, and
he's always constructive. And so it's a
great pleasure for me to work with you
personally, Peter.
•Press release 2.53 of Nov. 26, 1986.
Einuary 1987
23
THE SECRETARY
Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget
Secretary Shultz 's address before the
Locust Club in Philadelphia on Novem-
ber 3, 1986.''
I thank you for honoring me with your
performance award. I take it as an
important opportunity to say a few
words about some "performing" we all
have to do if the United States is to have
an effective foreign policy.
I've been giving a lot of speeches
lately. Most of them have been about
U.S. -Soviet relations and the meaning of
Reykjavik, our human rights concerns,
and arms control. I don't want to
downplay these subjects. They're fun-
damental components of our foreign
policy. But the Soviets and arms control
aren't the only issues needing attention
right now. Tonight, I'd like to take a
breather from them and raise some
other issues much closer to home that
are just as urgent and just as important
to our security.
My message tonight is simple: right
now, the United States has a tremen-
dous number of things going for it
around the world— we have a winning
hand; we've got to be allowed to play
it— yet, we're on the verge of throwing
away recent and potential gains instead
of building on them for the future.
That's a double-edged message, I
know. But then, American foreign policy
■ is not a monolithic enterprise. It has
always rested on two pillars, two
mutually supporting traditions of
political thought— and on two branches
of government, the executive and the
Congress, that formulate and conduct
our foreign relations. It started right
here in Philadelpia, where our Founding
Fathers set down the documents that
ever since have shaped our ways of
thinking and our institutions of
government.
And I might say that I had the
privilege and the fun of coming here to
Philadelphia a little early and renewing
my acquaintance, my wife and I, with
Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell,
and we wandered around and listened
and breathed that air and saw where
George Washington sat and Thomas
Jefferson sat, and so on. It's just a
great, thrilling tradition to be here and
to have a chance to visit those places
and, I might say, to speak here to the
Locust Club against the background of
the American flag.
Now, one of those documents— the
Declaration of Independence— left us
with a tradition of idealism. It set forth a
revolutionary statement of human
rights. It said that those rights were the
sacred trust of all mankind; a legacy for
all places and times.
Another document— the Constitu-
tion—gave us a complementary tradition
of pragmatism. It spoke of the limits of
human action and political power. It
gave us practical ways of resolving com-
petitive interests for the common good.
The legacy of the Constitution was
realism.
In our best moments, we've
understood how these complementary
traditions interact. We've tried to keep
our immediate attention focused on the
possible and our broad vision elevated
toward the ideal. The statesmen of the
postwar era— I guess I'm showing my
age— the post-World War II era— were
masters of that art. They understood
that realism and idealism weren't com-
peting forces but mutually supporting
components of an effective foreign
policy. And they used that insight to
create the great institutions of the
postwar order. They sustained our
involvement in a political system of
global scope; and they helped to build a
global economic system. They said we
shouldn't retreat from realities but turn
them to our advantage— and to the
attainment of our ideals. Their creation
was both an intellectual effort and an act
of learning and vision applied. And it has
worked.
But we Americans have had our
lesser moments as well. Sometimes,
when our vision got blurred or lost its
focus on reality, we've wavered between
crusading involvement in the world and
an isolationist indifference to it. Take
the 1930s. Wliat did we learn from the
Smoot-Hawley tariff? What did we learn
about the dangers of countries in various
parts of the world raising barriers to
trade and closing in on themselves?
What did we learn by ignoring agression
in supposedly faraway places— like
Europe and Asia?
What we learned was that
withdrawal was a recipe for global
economic depression and world war. At
least, that's what we should have
learned. But you have to wonder how
well we learned it when you see similar
pressures mounting today for contem-
porary forms of isolationism. We need to
watch ourselves when we start divorcing
ourselves from that creative tradition of
idealism salted with ample doses of real
ity. And I'm distressed to say that toda.
seems to be one of those times.
The Mismatch of Ends and Means
The warning signs of isolationism are
increasingly evident. We see them in
calls for economic protectionism— which
would only bring on retaliation by our
trading partners and damage us stra-
tegically, politically, and economically.
We see them in the attempts to sub-
stitute moralism for policy toward
friendly nations who fall short of our
own hard-won and hard-gained stand-
ards. We see them in pressures for mail '
taining the nuclear status quo rather
than exploring, as the President wants
to do, negotiated approaches to reducin
nuclear arms. And we see them in
resistance to investigating new
technologies which might give us some ■
protection against nuclear weapons— lik
the President's Strategic Defense
Initiative.
It's the 1930s all over again. The
desire to wash our hands of a
troublesome world seems to be a
recurrent— and peculiarly American-
temptation.
That temptation appears most
starkly in the unrelenting assault on oui
foreign affairs budget, which is now
under the indiscriminate knife of con-
gressional surgeons. Last January,
President Reagan submitted to Congret
an international affairs budget for fisca
year (FY) 1987 that we had stripped to
the bone. It amounted to less than 2% o
the total Fedei-al budget. That minimal
request was cut by the Congress by 20*^
a reduction with far more threatening
effects than even that substantial percen
age implies. After congressional ear-
markings and other constraints on our
spending are taken into account, the
bulk of our foreign affairs operations
will have to be cut by a third and secu-
rity assistance by about 50%. That's a
big cut.
Let me be clear about the dangers o
this misguided economizing. We are not
talking about just another bureaucratic
battle for funds. The deep cuts in our
foreign affairs resources are now
dangerously widening the gap between
our interests and our capabilities for pur
suing them. In effect, we are being
asked to play Russian roulette with our
international interests and our national
security.
Here are just a few examples of the
dangerous disparity between our
increasingly meager resources and our
widely supported foreign policy
objectives.
24
Department of State Bulletir
THE SECRETARY
Number one, in the past few months,
ire've seen extraordinary concern about
he dangers of illegal drugs. That con-
em is legitimate and long overdue. I
night say that the President and Nancy
leagan have been giving magnificent
sadership to this war on the illicit drug
raffic, and our hearts and our hands
ave to go out and help them. Illegal
larcotics ravage the bodies of their vic-
ims and the spirit of society at large.
'hey encourage the kind of lawlessness
hat reduces civilization to a Hobbesian
tate of nature, making life all too
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
hort" for victims of the traffic.
Nor is our own society alone in suf-
ering the effects of the drug trade.
Elsewhere, it's even worse. Traffickers
"Ihrive on chaos, and their parasitical
fforts to intimidate so-called host
overnments destroy political integrity.
II Latin America and other crop-
roducing regions, drug traders collude
ith terrorists and radical guerrillas
gainst their common enemies: the rule
f law and the stability of civilized
jciety.
For all of these reasons, we are
■itnessing widespread anxiety around
le country and around the world about
le effects of illegal drugs. There is
road public support for using every
vailable resource against the drug trade
t home and abroad. In fact, I can't
link of any single issue that has
lustered more support among our
itizens and public officials than the war
n drugs.
But this concern is falling victim to
Use economizing. Stemming the flow of
legal narcotics into the United States is
costly enterprise. It is a battle that
lust be waged on two fronts. First, we
eed funds to enforce the law, to
radicate crops, and to educate people to
le dangers of narcotics. And here let
ie give you the good news: Congress
as allotted us generous funds for all of
lese purposes.
But there is a second side to the
rug problem— one that involves the
olitical and economic realities of crop-
roducing countries. You can't just force
easants— many of them impoverished—
stop growing their best cash crop
/ithout offering them some sort of
conomic alternatives. You can't expect
he governments of these nations— many
f them desperately poor and weakened
r(im within by the gangsterism and ter-
oi- endemic in the trade— to launch
(lajor programs without the economic
esiiurces necessary to sustain them,
et, to take an important example, aid
or the Andean countries— Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru— will be
practically eliminated by the draconian
budget cuts recently enacted by
Congress.
So we're left with a paradox.
America is determined to act against the
drug scourge, but unable to translate
that determination into programs effec-
tive enough to make a difference.
That same paradox can be found in
our efforts to thwart another problem
that cuts to the heart of American
society: terrorism. In the past few years,
the United States has taken important
steps against this barbarism of our age,
and we have done so with the clear sup-
port of Congress and the American
people. Judging by the results of last
spring's Tokyo summit, our allies are
more in agreement with us than ever
about the seriousness of the terrorist
threat.
That threat was highlighted just
last week by clear evidence that Syria
was directly involved in an attempt to
murder hundreds of innocent travelers-
including more than 200 Americans— by
bombing an airliner in midflight. This
complicity was confirmed by Great
Britain through independent judicial pro-
ceedings. Syria was caught redhanded.
Britain responded immediately by break-
ing diplomatic ties and banning other
contacts with Assad's regime. The
United States applauds the British
move. Together with Canada, we
immediately offered meaningful support
to Britain's decision. And we will do
more.
Yet now, of all times, the United
States is having trouble of its own in the
battle against terrorism. Our hearts are
in the right place: but where are our
resources? After years of educating our
own citizens and our allies, after years of
building a consensus, America's hands
seem financially tied.
To fight terrorism, we need accurate
and up-to-date reporting on political con-
ditions around the world. We need good
operational intelligence, so that planned
attacks can be identified and thwarted.
We're doing a better job of that. Bear in
mind that over three-quarters of the
reporting and analysis used by the U.S.
Government comes from Foreign Serv-
ice officers at embassies around the
world. Yet the State Department may
have to reduce sharply its full-time work
force. And we are likely to have to shut
down another 10 consulates, in addition
to the seven posts already being closed.
And that's not all. We also need
resources to protect these same
embassies against our enemies. Yet the
probable effect of congressional action
on our foreign affairs budget will be
to slow substantially our proposed
diplomatic security program.
Let me give you a third example of
how indiscriminate cuts are threatening
our most widely held goals. Over the
past few years, America's strength and
example have boosted the forces of
freedom in diverse corners of the globe.
We have seen our influence construc-
tively at work in the Philippines, in
Haiti, and across the continent of Latin
America. The democratic reawakening
in these countries has been a matter of
great pride to America and a source of
political and strategic gain to the entire
free world.
Yet the work that awaits the leaders
of this new democratic generation has
only begun. Democratic transitions are
fragile. They require careful nurturing
and constant vigilance against adver-
saries both within and without. Many
newly democratic governments face
Marxist-Leninist insurgencies inside
their countries. Others border on com-
munist nations that are armed to the
teeth and in an expansionist mood.
Look at Central America, where
three democratic countries— Costa Rica,
Honduras, and El Salvador— neighbor
the communist police state of Nicaragua.
Costa Rica has no army. The combined
forces of Honduras and El Salvador
do not match Nicaragua's massive
buildup— a buildup managed and sup-
plied by the Soviet Union. Naturally,
these democratic nations are turning to
us for support. We simply must come
through in support of freedom, democ-
racy, and the rule of law.
People think we should help coun-
tries like Haiti. I feel that wherever I go.
I've been there; I do, too. People think
we should help the Philippines; and I do,
too. But help means money; and money
is not in this foreign affairs budget. The
Caribbean countries alone— we say the
Caribbean is so important to us— the
Caribbean countries alone may have
their aid cut by more than two-thirds.
Even the powerful, global force of
America's example is shrinking as funds
for USIA [United States Information
Agency]— our primary voice abroad— are
reduced below minimal levels. For years,
the United States has fallen behind the
Soviets in telling our own story to the
world. Today, instead of catching up—
which we have been doing, and fast,
under the great leadership of Charlie
Wick, working with the President— we
are in danger of falling even further
behind. At a time when a vigorous
leadership in the Kremlin is showing
heightened interest and sophistication in
using propaganda to undermine public
January 1987
25
THE SECRETARY
confidence in our policies, we are being
forced to reduce broadcasts of the Voice
of America and close American libraries
and cultural centers abroad. It doesn't
make any sense.
What else will these cuts do to us? I
could go on and on, but here are just two
more examples.
• Except for items already
earmarked— in other words, the Con-
gress puts a mark on them and says,
"You've got to spend this much money
on this project"— our economic assist-
ance to many countries around the world
will be reduced by more than half from
last year's levels. This assistance helps
these countries develop more healthy
economies and helps us maintain close
relations with them. That's important to
us. These are often countries where we
have bases vital to our defense and the
security of our allies.
• Right now we have a plan— called
the Baker plan— that has caught people's
imagination and attention. It's a con-
structive approach to encouraging
growth in the developing countries so
that they can do more to help them-
selves, provide a better market for our
products, and get over their welfare
dependency on the West. Obviously, we
need money to get the plan in action.
But we're supposed to cut a third of our
funding for the multilateral banks on
which the plan depends. We're cutting
ourselves off at the knees.
Bipartisan Gains at Risk
All of these examples point to the same
dismal fact. The United States is drifting
and stumbling toward a weakened global
position. I could at least understand it if
this were a purposeful policy; but we're
deluding ourselves that we can conduct
an effective foreign policy without
money.
Ironically, this trend is developing
alongside a contrary movement that is
advancing our interests, our influence,
and our ideals. Maybe our very strength
misleads us into thinking we can have
influence without applying ourselves.
Maybe our isolationist tendencies only
surface when we feel strong enough to
ignore the rest of the world. Whatever
the reason, we need to wake up to all
that we are placing in jeopardy by
this thoughtless exercise in false
economizing.
One of the trends in our favor today
is the systematic transformation now
occurring in the global economy. It's the
information revolution. Just as we left
the agricultural age a hundred years
ago, we're now moving beyond the
industrial age. To be sure, we still pro-
duce the same proportion of manufactur-
ing goods, as a fraction of our GNP, that
we did 20 years ago— but more effi-
ciently. But the cutting edge of change,
and our new comparative advantage, is
elsewhere. If you look for a symbol of
our economy and society today, it isn't
the blast furnace, or the smokestack, or
the assembly line— it's the computer, the
microchip, the direct broadcast satellite.
From a technological standpoint,
from a strategic and political perspec-
tive, what's happening is very much to
our potential benefit. Success in the
information age depends on openness-
openness to ideas, to innovation, to the
free flow of data. Countries which can
accommodate this openness will reap its
rewards. Those which can't, won't. How
are states that keep the Xerox machine
under lock and key going to cope? The
answer is that the future is already
receding for them. For us, it holds out
enormous promise— i/" we stay open to
the world and don't impose our own
barriers.
Our economic message about open
markets and individual initiative is
reverberating around the world. I can
tell you from my own experience in the
annual economic summits that the terms
of economic debate have changed
decisively among the industrialized
democracies.
And the economic message of
markets and entrepreneurship has gone
even further. Last May, at a special ses-
sion of the United Nations, the African
nations issued an extraordinary state-
ment repudiating planned economies and
supporting more open economic systems.
Essentially, they said: "We blew it. Our
command economies didn't work; and
now we have to do things differently."
The attitude toward freedom has
changed too. Once it was fashionable to
say that the democracies of the world
were on the wrong side of history. Not
anymore. The freedom fighters have
changed all that. The people of the
Philippines and Latin America have
changed all that. They're showing the
world that freedom is neither the luxury
of a few, nor a cultural peculiarity of
Western societies. It can work all over
the world.
Restoring the Balance
Let me summarize these thoughts with a
few words about the strategic dangers
of inadequate funding. The serious
mismatch between our policies and our
resources creates vacuums that others
can— and will— exploit to their own
advantage. And it encourages confusion
among friends and adversaries alike
about the scope and aims of American
policy.
The disturbing fact is that we've
seen all this before; yet apparently we
have forgotten the lessons of the 1930s.
But today's pressures for withdrawal
add up to isolationism with a dangerous
difference. For just as America's power
in the postwar world has grown at an
exponential rate, so too have the risks o
indifference.
For nearly half a century, the Unite
States has shouldered its responsibilitie;
as leader of the free world and the
champion of those struggling to join us.
Through our efforts, we have made
enormous gains in advancing our own
interests and our ideals. Our prosperity,
our technological dynamism, the vitality
of our alliances are all making us a force
for progress as never before. We hold
the winning hand— if we only persevere.
The force of our example is a mighty
reality in the world; but by itself, it can-
not burn a narcotics crop, thwart a ter-
rorist, or deter a communist army. We
must not permit our capacity for con-
structive leadership to atrophy for lack
of adequate funding.
Over the past 6 years. Republicans
and Democrats have made important
strides toward reaching a consensus
about the challenges and opportunities
before us as this century comes to a
close: realism about Soviet aims,
appreciation of the need for a strong
defense, and solidarity with allies and
friends. Despite some controversial
exceptions, our domestic debate has
been marked by common cause toward
our policies and goals. You don't hear
much these days about the erosion of
American power or self-confidence. You
don't hear much about political malaise
or lack of national purpose.
We must use our consensus, and oui
momentum, to restore the budgetary
resources needed to conduct a respon-
sible foreign policy. We must rise above
the procedural complexities of con-
gressional-executive branch relations to
forge a foreign policy that will enable
the national interest to prevail.
You are an audience of informed an(
influential citizens. You can help shape
our public debate so that we do not
repeat the isolationist mistakes of the
past. I urge you to let your elected
officials know that there is broad sup-
port for an active and properly funded
foreign policy. With your help, we can
realize the extraordinary opportunities
before us.
'Press release 240 of Nov. 4, 1986. I
26
Department of State Bulleti;
THE SECRETARY
•romoting Inter-American Cooperation
Secretary Shultz',s address before the
'eneral Assembly of the Organization of
niirican States (OAS) in Guatemala
'it 11 on November 11, 1986.^
et me begin by thanking President
erezo and the people of Guatemala for
iviting us to meet here. Their offer to
?rve as hosts of this General Assembly
early expresses the progress Guate-
mala is making in putting democratic
leals into practice. I welcome the
pportunity to be here, and I salute
uatemala's new democracy.
I also want to pay a personal tribute
j) President Duarte and the Salvadoran
sople. During my brief visit to San
alvador last month, I was moved by the
etermined effort they are making to
>build their shattered capital. President
uarte and the Salvadoran people are
jain showing that they have what it
ikes to build a democratic society. They
?serve our admiration and respect, as
ell as our support.
Guatemala and El Salvador are both
aders in a revolution that is transform-
.g the hemisphere. Latin America is
)nclusively demonstrating that the
jmocratic form of government has
liversal meaning, that it is not just a
-xury for wealthy industrial societies,
n the contrary, democracy, by freeing
itapped social energies and providing
Dportunities for their productive exer-
se, can serve as the foundation for
aterial prosperity and social progress
. our hemisphere.
President Reagan captured the
;sence of the relationship between
■eedom and progress when he noted:
Everywhere, people and governments are
;ginning to recognize that the secret of a
"ogressive new world is the creativity of the
aman spirit Our open advocacy of
eedom as the engine of progress [is one of]
le most important ways to bring about a
orld where prosperity is commonplace, con-
ict an aberration, and human dignity a way
Mife.
My remarks today address three
isues central to this assembly, to the
olitical and economic vitality of our
egion, and to cooperation among the
overnments of the hemisphere. They
re: combatting the traffic in illegal
rugs; restoring economic growth; and
onsolidating the democratic gains that
're essential to political stability and
.egional security.
Combatting Illegal Drug Traffic
The Specialized Assembly on Narcotic
Drugs, held in Rio de Janeiro last April,
unanimously proposed that the OAS
undertake an action program on drug
abuse and drug trafficking. That pro-
gram is now before us for final approval.
The Inter-American Program of
Action Against Drug Abuse expresses
the shared recognition of our govern-
ments that the production and consump-
tion of illegal narcotics, and traffic in
them, constitute intolerable threats to
our security. We all agree that these
challenges must be met by joint action
on a truly hemispheric basis. No nation
is totally free from production, traffick-
ing, or abuse. There has been an explo-
sion in the cocaine traffic that exploits
millions of coca growers at one end of
the production-transportation-
consumption chain and enslaves millions
of users at the other end. Drug-
producing countries, which may have
throught they were immune from the
effects of consumption, are now
confronting the corrosive impact of drug
abuse in their own societies.
Drug abuse is both a moral insult
and a national security challenge. Its
effects cut across all regional, political,
economic, and social boundaries. Drugs
do not discriminate between rich and
poor, user and pusher. All of us are
victimized.
The economic and social toll of the
drug trade is enormous. Our societies
are paying a price far greater than the
grotesque profits that traffickers daily
extort from our citizens. Countless
individuals— government officials,
judges, journalists, and ordinary
citizens— have been assassinated by the
traffickers and their hired guns. As they
pursue their destructive ends, drug
traders endanger our children, our fam-
ily structure, and our very way of life.
Two years ago in Miami, I said that
narcotics trafficking is the "modern-day
equivalent of piracy." Today, we find
narcotics traffickers allying themselves
with terrorist groups and political
extremists, seeking safehavens from
justice, respecting no international boun-
daries, and recognizing no loyalty
beyond their commitment to obscene
profits.
We can only counter this interna-
tional coalition of the lawless with an
even stronger and more resolute alliance
of the democracies of the Americas.
Thus, we must take the lead in
creating a climate of outspoken
intolerance against those who live out-
side the law; against those who prey on
the innocent; against those who
challenge our common democratic
values. President Reagan has committed
the prestige of his office, the leadership
of his personal example and that of our
First Lady, the energies of his
immediate staff and of the Federal
Government in leading America to
become a drug-free society. That is our
object, a drug-free society. On Octo-
ber 27, the President signed the Anti-
Drug Act of 1986. This sweeping legisla-
tion doubles the budget of U.S. agencies
involved in drug enforcement and anti-
drug educational activities; stiffens
prison sentences, with a provision for a
mandatory 10-year minimum sentence
for major traffickers; and introduces a
host of new initiatives aimed at reducing
demand for drugs in the United States
and strengthening our cooperation
abroad.
We must also work together to make
drug trafficking an unprofitable activity.
Despite enormous difficulties, govern-
ments from Bolivia to Mexico are begin-
ning to strike back. Two years ago, only
two countries were eradicating narcotics
crops; today, 15 countries in the world
are engaged in eradication programs— on
the ground and from the air. We are
expanding regional cooperation and
forging national and international solu-
tions to the scourge of narcotics. We can
be proud of this progress.
Still, the road ahead is long and
arduous. More, much more, remains to
be done. Our approach has to be based
on regional cooperation rather than local
or national initiatives; otherwise, traf-
fickers will simply move their operations
across the nearest border. The keystone
of the regionwide program we are to
approve here will be a new Inter-
American Commission on Drug Abuse
Control. The commission will be com-
posed of senior government represent-
atives in the area of narcotics control. It
will be supported by an Executive
Secretariat to carry out technical
assistance projects and operate three
programs; regional training centers, a
central data bank, and a documentation
center.
anuary 1987
27
THE SECRETARY
As a strong believer in multilateral
cooperation. I welcome the creation of
this inter-American commission. With its
Secretariat, the commission will perform
precisely the kind of work the OAS is
best suited for: the study of common
problems and the coordination of our
efforts to achieve a more efficient divi-
sion of labor in confronting the problems
of our hemisphere. Our concerted attack
on the drug scourge is urgently needed,
and I believe it is destined to succeed.
For too long, our societies have not
faced up fully and squarely to the giant
narcotics trafficking empire; and our
individual and bilateral actions were not
adequate to the challenge. Today, we all
understand that through inter-American
cooperation, narcotics organizations can
and will be crippled. And success in that
effort will yield additional dividends in
terms of cooperation in other fields of
endeavor.
Restoring Economic Growth
We turn to the field of economics:
cooperation on economic matters is also
critical for all of us. The nations of Latin
America have faced difficult cir-
cumstances in recent years as the reces-
sion and debt crises have compromised
prospects for economic growth. But the
potential is greater than ever, and I
believe we are now back on the road to
long-term and self-sustaining growth. A
joint report by Brazilian, Mexican, and
U.S. research institutions concludes that
"the world environment is improving"
for "a strategy centered on outward
orientation, new market incentives for
savings and investment, and a fun-
damental shift in the role of the state."
We must reject policies that, by sti-
fling individual initiative, perpetuate
poverty. Freedom is the key to
development— freedom of the entre-
preneur to innovate, to invest, to move
capital and freedom of the market to set
wages, prices, interest rates, and
exchange rates. Without the foundation
of freedom, foreign loans and aid will
have, at best, short-term effects in
economies incapable of sustaining long-
term economic growth.
There is growing recognition of this
reality in Latin America. Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay are
among the countries that have taken
major steps to construct more market-
oriented economies, to reduce inflation,
and to encourage entrepreneurship.
Guatemala and other Central American
countries have taken encouraging steps
toward stabilization. In most countries,
however, more work needs to be done on
domestic reform. The United States, too,
has plenty of work to do on its own fiscal
problem: our way-too-large budget
deficit. We must all make a genuine com-
mitment to removing those impediments
that limit growth, discourage external
capital flows, and encourage capital
flight. The United States stands ready to
support such efforts.
In October 1985, at the annual
meetings of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank in Seoul, the
United States proposed that the interna-
tional community undertake a major,
coordinated Program for Sustained
Growth. It became known as the "Baker
plan." This effort, we asserted, must
focus on growth-oriented structural
reforms supported by the international
financial community.
I might say that during this long-
term effort we went through a stage
where the answer to the problem seemed
to be austerity. And, of course, there
are, no doubt, instances where austerity
in various forms is essential. But I think
we all see that certainly the basis of the
Baker plan is that in the longer run the
answer to our debt problem, let alone all
other problems, is not austerity; it is
growth: economic growth is what we
have to get.
The International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank have developed
activities in support of the program for
sustained growth. We must work
together to ensure that the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB)
becomes an active participant in this pro-
gram. This new role for the IDB is under
discussion as an integral part of the 7th
replenishment negotiations. We believe
that agreement can be reached on an
increase in the IDB's lending program to
support the domestic reforms necessary
for sound development.
Trade is another and indispensable
element of the "global bargain ' I out-
lined last year. An open global commer-
cial system responsive to changing
economic conditions is a stimulator of
growth. Maintenance and expansion of
such a system require that all
countries— developed and developing—
resist domestic pressures for protec-
tionist measures. We must take positive,
market-opening actions that eliminate
unfair trading practices and expand
market access for goods and services.
We have together taken a major step
in that direction in Uruguay this past
September with the successful launching
of the current round of multilateral
trade negotiations under the auspices of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, known as the GATT. Twenty
Latin American and Caribbean countrie
are now members of the GATT. They
have an important role to play, and thei
participation will be enhanced if more
countries of the region join them in seel<
ing improved trading opportunities.
But what of the U.S. role? The
LInited States historically has champ-
ioned free trade. We believe that an
international trading system based on
free trade is the best assurance of pros-
perity for ourselves and for the rest of
the world.
Free trade has also clearly benefitec
Latin America. The U.S. trade balance
with the region went from a $1 billion
surplus in 1981 to a $19 billion deficit in
1985. In 1985, Latin America exported
$103 billion worth of goods and services^
of this, $49 billion went to the United
States— just about half.
We have taken the lion's share of thi
increase in Latin American exports sincj
the onset of the debt crisis. We are
proud of our record in keeping our
markets open, and we will stress to our
trading partners the critical importance
of a common effort to keep the interna-
tional economy open.
Without such an effort, the protec-
tionist forces now at work in the United
States will find easy justification for
their destructive policies. The Reagan
Administration has vigorously opposed
protectionist legislation. We know full
well that untold damage would be done
to the world's— and, in particular, to
Latin America's— chances for prosperity
if we succumb to the pressures for these
shortsighted measures.
We have not won every battle
against protectionism, but we have won
the most important ones. President
Reagan vetoed restrictions on copper
and footwear. His veto of the highly
restrictive textile bill was recently, if
narrowly, upheld. Congress adjourned
without passing other, broader protec-
tionist legislation that had been intro-
duced, and, in fact, one passed the
House of Representatives. These protec-
tionist forces will reemerge next year.
You can count on it! And you can count
on President Reagan's determination to
continue the fight. But we need your
help!
We in the United States cannot help
but observe that many other countries
do not maintain markets as open for
U.S. goods and services as our markets
are open for foreign manufactures and
services. If we are to win the war
against protectionism, we must
28
Department of State Bullet!
\
THE SECRETARY
■emonstrate, through progress in
ilateral discussions and in the new
-ade round, that we are taking effective
ction to broaden global trading oppor-
anities for everyone— including U.S.
xporters.
I've stressed the necessity of restor-
ig growth to the hemisphere, because
rowth is the best way to deal with the
ebt problems, and the only way to
nprove living standards. Recent move-
lents in interest rates and exchange
ites have favored the renewal of
rowth. Since 1981— it is interesting to
lok back; it is only 5 years ago—
iternational interest rates have dropped
•om around 17% to around 6%. It's a
jge decline. For each percentage point
eduction, the eight major debtor coun-
•ies save appro.ximately $2 billion per
^ar. So, let us do a little arithmetic
?re: 17 minus 6 equals 11 multiplied by
equals . . . and that is how much per
,'ar: $22 billion, approximately per
'ar. And that ain't hay, as they say.
owever, a severe drop in private
ipital flows— from $49 billion in 1981 to
:7 billion in 1982, to less than $6 bilhon
1985— remains a major constraint on
gher growth in the hemisphere,
dvances in regional growth have been
lanced almost entirely from official
nding, international trade, and some
ructural adjustments in a few
•untries.
To address this problem, the OAS
'Id a special meeting in San Juan this
■ar on domestic and foreign capital
)ws. That meeting concluded that more
ts to be done to encourage the invest-
ent of private capital. You have a
port on that meeting before you, and I
)pe you will approve it. Each nation is
sponsible for creating the conditions
at will establish confidence among
vestors. Many countries in the
■misphere are moving in that direction,
it much, much more needs to be done,
istained reforms and an improved
'erall climate for investment— foreign
id domestic— are crucial to achieving
ir goal of growth.
Dnsolidating Democratic Gains
s was stated so eloquently by many
iring our informal dialogue, economic
id political freedom go together. The
tiarter of the Organization of American
;ates proclaims that "the historic mis-
on of America is to offer man a land of
)erty." The resurgence of democracy is
itting us in a better position than ever
' fulfill the promise of the Charter.
As an expression of our commit-
ment to democracy, last year we all
agreed to an addition to the Charter that
states, "Representative democracy is an
indispensable condition for the stability,
peace, and development of the region."
Democracy is the practical expression of
self-determination. The solidarity it
creates increases security from foreign
intervention.
It is vitally important that all of us in
this organization have a clear agreement
on the priority of democracy and on the
relationship between democratic govern-
ment and the other fundamental prin-
ciples of inter-American cooperation.
Democracy, security, political stability,
and economic development are not
separate, free-floating concepts. On the
contrary, they are closely linked. Self-
determination cannot be denied without
weakening democracy. A threat to
security challenges the principle of
nonintervention. The United States
believes these principles must all be
defended.
Let me take the crisis in Central
America as an example.
• The United States does not want
any Central American country to
become a threat to the stability or
security of its neighbors.
• The United States wants
pluralistic democracy and economic and
social development to thrive in Central
America.
• The United States believes that
the people of Central America can
achieve peace, development, and justice
without external interference, by their
own decisions and based on their own
experiences.
The challenge to these principles
does not come from the United States.
Does anyone really think the United
States wants to turn Central America
into a vortex of East-West turmoil? The
United States provided aid to help
Nicaragua rebuild after the fall of
Somoza in 1979. And for a period there,
the per capita flow of aid from the
United States was the highest of any
flow to any country in the world. So
what did the Nicaraguan communists do?
They sought arms from the Soviet bloc
and used them to deny the Nicaraguan
people their right of self-determination.
The United States accepted the new
Nicaraguan junta's pledges of democracy
and nonalignment. But what are the
Nicaraguan communists doing? They are
intervening in the internal affairs of
their neighbors. The Nicaraguan regime
is fundamentally destabilizing to Central
America; and instability there will have
its effects throughout the hemisphere.
As Costa Rican President Arias told us
at this fall's UN General Assembly,
reading from the speech:
There is no respite from the path chosen
by the cotnandant.es who betrayed a revolu-
tion destined to give democracy to genera-
tions who knew only repression. There is no
respite for a people, frustrated and deceived,
who have returned to civil war. There is no
respite for neighboring lands, who feel the
threat from a new dogmatic totalitarianism
and who suffer now the consequences of a
border rife with anguish and disenchantment.
So spoke President Arias in the UN
General Assembly, the President of
Costa Rica.
The regional arms race launched by
the comandantes is a matter of grave
concern to us. They displayed it the
other day. With the assistance of the
Cubans and the Soviets, they have built
the largest military establishment in
Central America's history. It is impos-
sible to imagine peace and stability
returning to the region until this massive
growth in armaments is constrained and
ultimately eliminated.
We must not forget, however, that
the external relations of the regime in
Managua are not the core of the
challenge they pose to us. That core is
their perversion of the principles of the
revolution against Somoza. As we in this
organization know particularly well, they
came to us and we helped them; the com-
andantes have systematically violated
the solemn democratic undertakings
with which they obtained domestic and
international support. As long as the
legitimate desires of the Nicaraguan
people for genuine democracy are
repressed, the inevitable result will be
rebellion, insurgency, and civil war.
We cannot give lip service to
democracy when it is convenient and
costless, but then turn our backs on it
when there are costs or risks. Foreign
intervention in the form of alien
ideologies and foreign cadres— from
Cuba, the Soviet Union, East Germany,
North Korea, even Vietnam and Libya-
is, at this very moment, promoting
instability and violence in Central
America. Failure to confront this threat
will only guarantee that the region will
be increasingly drawn into great power
rivalries. The only road to peace and
stability is to eliminate that alien
intervention.
The Contadora process could be an
important component of our efforts to
make the practice of democracy univer-
sal in Central America. We supported
the Contadora process from the start for
two reasons. First, we saw it as a way of
anuary 1987
29
THE SECRETARY
addressing both the political and security
issues underlying continued instability
and violence in Central America. And
second, it offered the prospect of produc-
ing regional solutions to regional prob-
lems. We were, and are, prepared to
support a comprehensive, simultaneous,
and verifiable agreement that will attain
the 21 objectives agreed to by the Con-
tadora nations in 1983— all of them.
Unfortunately, nearly 4 years of
effort by the Contadora countries and,
more recently, by the Contadora support
group have not produced a workable
agreement. The comandantes continue to
act as an armed vanguard against their
people and their neighbors. But Central
America's democracies will not be
intimidated. They are insisting on a
negotiated solution that will satisfy the
interests of all the countries of Central
America and of the hemisphere.
We must also affirm that threats to
democracy and regional security are not
confined to Central America. Those
countries which have consistently pur-
sued the principles of democracy, and
those which have recently returned to
them, have an obligation to hasten a
democratic transition in all the remain-
ing nondemocratic nations of the
hemisphere. In our recent relations with
Chile, for example, we have made
absolutely clear our strong support for a
prompt and successful return to
democratic government.
We also have an obligation to offer
our moral, political, and material support
to those peoples already struggling to
implant true democracies in their coun-
tries. I particularly have in mind the
heroic efforts of the Haitian people and
their leaders to overcome generations of
tyranny and build democracy virtually
from the ground up. I want to commend
the Secretary General for his initiative
on Haiti. The United States is prepared
to support it.
The danger of foreign intervention
and exploitation of instability is present
wherever democracy and human rights
have been systematically denied. The
recent discovery in Chile of several
secret arms caches is a vivid but by no
means isolated example. The caches con-
tained a mixture of new Soviet-bloc arms
and secondhand American weapons. The
American weapons had been left behind
in Vietnam and were similar to ones the
Soviets and Cubans have, in recent
years, shipped to subversives in Colom-
bia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, and other countries of the
region. If you bear in mind the recent
assassination attempt against the
Chilean President, these arms caches
were most likely meant for use in the
context of a post-Pinochet govern-
ment—in other words, against a
democratic outcome in Chile, more than
against the present government. Such
interventions will continue if we relax
our vigilance or if we waver in our sup-
port for democracy and justice in the
Americas.
Conclusion
It is clear that we who live in this
hemisphere face a series of common
challenges to our security and well-
being; the powerful and lethal alliance of
terrorists and drug smugglers; major
problems of economic growth; the
vestiges of authoritarianism; and com-
munist subversion supported by the
Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua.
Each of these challenges— alone or in
combination— threatens the great prog-
ress we have achieved. But we cannot
deal with them if we are divided. Unless
we join forces in common battle against
common foes, we will not be successful
in defending our vital interests and our
shared ideals.
To be sure, our tasks are demanding.
But their cost is far less than the price of
inaction. If we fail to launch a
hemisphere-wide attack on narcotics
traffickers and drug abuse, the very
future of our next generation will be in
jeopardy. If we do not improve the
economic well-being of our people, the
great promise of democratic self-
government will go unfulfilled. And if we
do not make the Americas a region of
secure freedoms, we will betray our
most fundamental values and
convictions.
In addressing these great challenges
we can draw encouragement from a
most important discovery. We have onC'
again discovered that freedom is a
revolutionary force. Dictatorships—
whether of the left or the right— are not
permanent. Not so many years ago,
democratic nations were thought to be i
dwindling minority. Today, we see that
the vitality of the democratic idea is the
most important political reality of our
time.
What we are witnessing is the
re-creation and growth in our hemispher
of a genuine democratic community.
When the people of Guatemala, or
Venezuela, or Brazil go to the polls, the.
advance the cause of freedom not only i
their own country but throughout the
Americas. Everywhere in the region,
people understand that the future of
their freedom is closely tied to the fate
of freedom elsewhere. They know that ^
the success of their democratic govern- '
ment is enhanced by cooperation and
mutual support among democratic
leaders and peoples everywhere. And |
they realize that regimes which deny th .
right of democratic self-government pos |
an inexorable threat to peace.
Perhaps our fellow Foreign Ministe
Edgar Teran of Ecuador said it best thi I
past September, again, at the United
Nations. Reading what he said:
In the end, so long as democracy does nt
find true and effective expression, so long a;
there is no setting aside the practice of fore- i
ibiy compelling people to accept regimes I
which they have not themselves freely chose ,
so long as it is impossible for many to live in
their own country, dominated by tyrannical j
elements, peace will be a distant and almost I
contradictory aspiration.
And so he said. I agree with him. ,
We can and must work together to |
end tryanny in all of Latin America. Wt ,
must eradicate the scourge of narcotics. I
And we must stimulate the economic
growth that will build a better life for ',
our people. Let the New World stand as j
a vital example of human dignity and '
democratic self-government, to men anc
women everywhere.
iPress release 249 of Nov. 12, 1986.
30
Department of State Bulleti
THE SECRETARY
Vjuclear Weapons, Arms Control,
and the Future of Deterrence
Secretary Shultz's address before the
hilirnational House of Chicago and The
Jhicago Sun-Times Forum at the
['iiirersity of Chicago on November 17.
['ni delighted to be back here at the pin-
lacle, and I come here to the University
if Chicago to talk about nuclear
.veapons. arms control, and our national
^ecurity. These issues have been given
special timeliness by the President's
■eeent meeting with Soviet General
secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. In
.-ears to come, we may look back at their
liscussions as a turning point in our
strategy for deterring war and preserv-
ng peace. It has opened up new
)ossibilities for the way in which we
•lew nuclear weapons and their role in
■nsuring our security.
Questions for the Future
Ne now face a series of questions of fun-
lamental importance for the future: how
;an we maintain peace through deter-
■ence in the midst of a destabilizing
growth of offensive nuclear weapons?
low can we negotiate a more stable
;trategic balance at substantially lower
evels of offensive forces? How can we
ise new defensive technologies to con-
ribute to that stability? How can the
A^est best seek to reduce its reliance on
iffensive nuclear weapons without run-
ling new risks of instability arising from
■onventional imbalances?
These are exceptionally difficult and
lomplex issues. They go to the heart of
)ur ability as a democratic nation to
;urvive in a world threatened by
otalitarianism and aggression. These
juestions should engage the best minds
n American society, and, of course, they
lave to be treated at reasonable lengths
50 the best minds have to have a half-
Afay decent attention span. So that's
why I have come to speak to this par-
;icular audience at the University of
3hicago. So this isn't going to be an easy
speech, or a short one. I'll ask that you
isten carefully, and I hope that you'll
reflect at greater length on the text of
;my remarks.
Forty-four years ago, and about 200
yards from where I am now standing,
mankind generated its first self-
sustained and controlled nuclear chain
reaction. Enrico Fermi's crude atomic
pile was the prototype for all that
followed— both reactors to generate
energy for peaceful uses and weapons of
ever-increasing destructiveness. Seldom
are we able to mark the beginning of a
new era in human affairs so precisely.
I'm not here tonight to announce the
end of that era. But I will suggest that
we may be on the verge of important
changes in our approach to the role of
nuclear weapons in our defense. New
technologies are compelling us to think
in new ways about how to ensure our
security and protect our freedoms. Reyk-
javik served as a catalyst in this process.
The President has led us to think
seriously about both the possible
benefits— and the costs— of a safer
strategic environment involving pro-
gressively less reliance on nuclear
weapons. Much will now depend on
whether we are far-sighted enough to
proceed toward such a goal in a realistic
way that enhances our security and that
of our allies.
It may be that we have arrived at a
true turning point. The nuclear age can-
not be undone or abolished; it is a per-
manent reality. But we can glimpse now,
for the first time, a world freed from the
incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear
devastation. The threat of nuclear con-
flict can never be wholly banished, but it
can be vastly diminished— by careful but
drastic reductions in the offensive
nuclear arsenals each side possesses. It
is just such reductions— not limitations in
expansion but reductions— that is the
vision President Reagan is working to
make a reality.
Such reductions would add far
greater stability to the U.S. -Soviet
nuclear relationship. Their achievement
should make other diplomatic solutions
obtainable and perhaps lessen the
distrust and suspicion that have
stimulated the felt need for such
weapons. Many problems will accompany
drastic reductions: problems of deploy-
ment, conventional balances, verifica-
tion, multiple warheads, and chemical
weapons. The task ahead is great but
worth the greatest of efforts.
This will not be a task for Americans
alone. We must engage the collective
effort of all of the Western democracies.
And as we do, we must also be prepared
to explore cooperative approaches with
the Soviet Union, when such cooperation
is feasible and in our interests.
The Evolution of Our Thinking
About Nuclear Weapons
Let me start by reviewing how our
thinking has evolved about the role of
nuclear weapons in our national security.
In the years immediately after
Fermi's first chain reaction, our
approach was relatively simple. The
atomic bomb was created in the midst of
a truly desperate struggle to preserve
civilization against fascist aggression in
Europe and Asia. There was a compel-
ling rationale for its development and
use.
But since 1945— and particularly
since America lost its monopoly of such
weapons a few years later— we have had
to adapt our thinking to less clearcut cir-
cumstances. We have been faced with
the challenges and the ambiguities of a
protracted global competition with the
Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons have
shaped, and at times restrained, that
competition; but they have not enabled
either side to achieve a decisive
advantage.
Because of their awesome destruc-
tiveness, nuclear weapons have kept in
check a direct U.S. -Soviet clash. With
the advent in the late 1950s of
intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles— a delivery system for large
numbers of nuclear weapons at great
speed and with increasing accuracy—
both the United States and the Soviet
Union came to possess the ability to
mount a devastating attack on each
other within minutes.
The disastrous implications of such
massive attacks led us to realize, in the
words of President Kennedy, that "total
war makes no sense." And as President
Reagan has reiterated many times: "a
nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought"— words that the Presi-
dent and General Secretary Gorbachev
agreed on in their joint statement at
Geneva a year ago.
Thus, it came to be accepted in the
West that a major role of nuclear
weapons was to deter their use by
others— as well as to deter major conven-
tional attacks— by the threat of their use
in response to aggression. Over the
years, we sought through a variety of
means and rationales— beginning with
"massive retaliation" in the 1950s up
through "flexible response" and "selec-
tive nuclear options" in the 1970s— to
maintain a credible strategy for that
retaliatory threat.
January 1987
31
THE SECRETARY
At the same time, we also accepted a
certain inevitability about our own
nation's vulnerability to nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles. When nuclear weapons
were delivered by manned bombers, we
maintained air defenses. But as the
ballistic missile emerged as the basic
nuclear delivery system, we virtually
abandoned the effort to build defenses.
After a spirited debate over antiballistic
missile systems in the late 1960s, we
concluded that— on the basis of
technologies now 20 years old— such
defenses would not be effective. So our
security from nuclear attack came to
rest on the threat of retaliation and a
state of mutual vulnerability.
In the West, many assumed that the
Soviets would logically see things this
way as well. It was thought that once
both sides believed that a state of mutual
vulnerability had been achieved, there
would be shared restraint on the further
growth of our respective nuclear
arsenals.
The Antiballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty of 1972 reflected that assump-
tion. It was seen by some as elevating
mutual vulnerability from technical fact
to the status of international law. That
treaty established strict limitations on
the deployment of defenses against
ballistic missiles. Its companion Interim
Agreement on strategic offensive arms
was far more modest. SALT I [strategic
arms limitation talks] was conceived of
as an intermediate step toward more
substantial future limits on offensive
nuclear forces. It established only a cap
on the further growth in the numbers of
ballistic missile launchers then opera-
tional and under construction. The most
important measures of the two sides'
nuclear arsenals— numbers of actual
warheads and missile throw-weight—
were not restricted.
But controlling the number of launch-
ers without limiting warheads actually
encouraged deployment of multiple
warheads— called multiple independently-
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)— on
a single launcher. This eventually led to
an erosion of strategic stability as the
Soviets— by proliferating MIRVs—
became able to threaten all of our inter-
continental ballistic missiles with only a
fraction of their own. Such an imbalance
makes a decision to strike first seem all
the more profitable.
During this postwar period, we and
our allies hoped that American nuclear
weapons would serve as a comparatively
cheap offset to Soviet conventional
military strength. The Soviet Union,
through its geographic position and its
massive mobilized conventional forces.
has powerful advantages it can bring to
bear against Western Europe, the
Mideast, and East Asia— assets useful
for political intimidation as well as for
potential military aggression. The
West's success or failure in countering
these Soviet advantages has been, and
will continue to be, one of the keys to
stability in our postwar world.
Our effort to deter a major Soviet
conventional attack through the
existence of opposing nuclear forces has
been successful over the past four
decades. It gave the industrialized
democracies devastated by the Second
World War the necessary "breathing
space" to recover and thrive. But there
has also been recurring debate over the
credibility of this strategy, as well as
controversy about the hardware required
for its implementation.
Over time, we and our allies came to
agree that deterrence required a tle.xible
strategy combining both conventional
and nuclear forces. This combined
strategy has been successful in avoiding
war in Europe. But our reliance for so
long on nuclear weapons has led some to
forget that these arms are not an inex-
pensive substitute— mostly paid for by
the United States— for fully facing up to
the challenges of conventional defense
and deterrence.
Sources of Strategic Instability
The United States and our allies will
have to continue to rely upon nuclear
weapons for deterrence far, far into the
future. That fact, in turn, requires that
we maintain credible and effective
nuclear deterrent forces.
But a defense strategy that rests on
the threat of escalation to a strategic
nuclear conflict is, at best, an unwelcome
solution to ensuring our national secu-
rity. Nuclear weapons, when applied to
the problem of preventing either a
nuclear or conventional attack, present
us with a major dilemma. They may
appear a bargain— but a dangerous one.
They make the outbreak of a Soviet-
American war most unlikely; but they
also ensure that should deterrence fail,
the resulting conflict would be vastly
more destructive, not just for our two
countries but for mankind as a whole.
Moreover, we cannot assume that
the stability of the present nuclear
balance will continue indefinitely. It can
deteriorate, and it has. We have come to
realize that our adversary does not share
all of our assumptions about strategic
stability. Soviet military doctrine
stresses warfighting and survival in a
nuclear environment, the importance of
numerical superiority, the contribution
of active defense, and the advantages of
preemption.
Over the past 15 years, the growth
of Soviet strategic forces has continued
unabated— and far beyond any reason-
able assessment of what might be
required for rough equivalency with U.S.
forces. As a result, the Soviet Union haS'
acquired a capability to put at risk the
fixed land-based missiles of the U.S.
strategic triad— as well as portions of
our bomber and in-port submarine force
and command and control systems— with
only a fraction of their force, leaving
many warheads to deter any retaliation.
To date, arms control agreements
along traditional lines— such as SALT I
and II— have failed to halt these
destabilizing trends. They have not
brought about significant reductions in
offensive forces, particularly those
systems that are the most threatening to:
stability. By the most important measure
of destructive capability, ballistic missile
warheads— those are the things that hit
you— Soviet strategic forces have grown
by a factor of four since the SALT I
Interim Agreement was signed. This
problem has been exacerbated by a
Soviet practice of stretching their
implementation of such agreements to
the edge of violation— and, sometimes,
beyond. The evidence of Soviet actions
contrary to SALT II, the ABM Treaty,
and various other arms control
agreements is clear and unmistakable.
At the same time, technology has
not stood still. Research and
technological innovation of the past
decade now raise questions about
whether the primacy of strategic offense
over defense will continue indefinitely.
For their part, the Soviets have never
neglected strategic defenses. They
developed and deployed them even when
offensive systems seemed to have over-
whelming advantages over any defense.
As permitted by the ABM Treaty of
1972, the Soviets constructed around
Moscow the world's only operational
system of ballistic missile defense. Soviet
military planners apparently find that
the modest benefits of this system justify
its considerable cost, even though it
would provide only a marginal level of
protection against our overall strategic
force. It could clearly be a base for the
future expansion of their defenses.
For well over a decade— long before
the President announced 3 years ago the
American Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI)— the Soviet Union has been
actively investigating much more
advanced defense technologies, including
directed energy systems. If the United
32
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
states were to abandon this field of
idvanced defensive research to the
Soviet Union, the results 10 years hence
lould be disastrous for the West.
The President's Approach:
Seeking Greater Stability
^resident Reagan believes we can do
)etter. He believes we can reverse the
'ver-increasing numbers and potency of
luclear weapons that are eroding stabil-
ty. He believes we can and must find
vays to keep the peace without basing
lur security so heavily on the threat of
luclear escalation. To those ends, he has
let in motion a series of policies which
lave already brought major results.
First, this Administration has taken
nuch-needed steps to reverse dangerous
rends in the military balance by
trengthening our conventional and
lUclear deterrent forces. We have
;one forward with their necessary
nodernization.
Second, we have sought ambitious
mis control measures— not agreements
or their own sake but steps which could
eriously contribute to the goal of
tabilizing reductions in offensive forces,
n 1981, the President proposed the
lobal elimination of all Soviet and
American longer range INF [inter-
:iediate-range nuclear forces] nuclear
aissiles. Not a freeze or token reduc-
ions, as many urged at the time, but the
omplete elimination of this class of
/eapons.
The following year, at Eureka Col-
jge, the President proposed major
eductions in strategic offensive forces,
ailing for cuts by one-third to a level of
,000 ballistic missile warheads on each
ide. Again, this was a major departure
rom previous negotiating approaches—
lOth in the importance of the weapons to
le reduced and in the magnitude of their
eduction. Critics claimed he was
mrealistic, that he was not really
nterested in arms control. But the
'resident's call for dramatic reductions
n nuclear warheads on the most
lestabilizing delivery systems has been
it the core of our negotiating efforts.
:he Soviets have finally begim to
espond to the President's approach and
ire now making similar proposals.
Finally, the President also set out to
explore whether it would be possible to
levelop an effective defense against
)allistic missiles, the central element of
I'urrent strategic offensive arsenals. To
find that answer, he initiated in 1983 the
'SDI program— a broad-based research
■ffort to explore the defensive implica-
ions of new technologies. It is a pro-
gram that is consistent with our obliga-
tions under the ABM Treaty. He set as a
basic goal the protection of the United
States and our allies against the ballistic
missile threat.
Since then, we have been seeking
both to negotiate deep reductions in the
numbers of those missiles, as well as to
develop the knowledge necessary to con-
struct a strategic defense against them.
It is the President's particular innova-
tion to seek to use these parallel efforts
in a reinforcing way— to reduce the
threat while exploring the potential for
defense.
Reykjavik: A Potential Watershed
in Nuclear Arms Control
All of these efforts will take time to
develop, but we are already seeing their
first fruits. Some became apparent at
Reykjavik. Previously, the prospect of
30%, let alone 50%, reductions in Soviet
and American offensive nuclear arsenals
was considered an overly ambitious goal.
At Reykjavik, the President and
General Secretary Gorbachev reached
the basis for an agreement on a first
step of 50% reductions in Soviet and
American strategic nuclear offensive
forces over a 5-year period. We agreed
upon some numbers and counting
rules— that is, how different types of
weapons would count against the
reduced ceilings.
For INF nuclear missiles, we
reached the basis for agreement on even
more drastic reductions, down from a
current Soviet total of over 1,400
warheads to only 100 on longer range
INF missiles worldwide on each side.
This would represent a reduction of
more than 90% of the Soviet SS-20
nuclear warheads now targeted on our
allies and friends in Europe and Asia.
There would also have to be a ceiling on
shorter range INF missiles, the right for
us to match the Soviets in this category,
and follow-on negotiations aimed at the
reduction in numbers of these weapons.
Right there is the basis for an arms
control agreement that doesn't just limit
the future growth of Soviet and
American nuclear arsenals but which
actually makes deep and early cuts in
existing force levels. These cuts would
reduce the numbers of heavy, accurate,
multiple-warhead missiles that are the
most threatening and the most destabi-
lizing. These ideas discussed at Reyk-
javik flowed directly from the Presi-
dent's longstanding proposals. They are
a direct result of his vision of major
offensive reductions as a necessary step
to greater stability.
At Reykjavik, the President and the
General Secretary went on to discuss
possible further steps toward enhanced
stability. The President proposed to
eliminate all ballistic missiles over the
subsequent 5 years. Mr. Gorbachev pro-
posed to eliminate all strategic offensive
forces. They talked about these and
other ideas, including the eventual
elimination of all nuclear weapons. The
very scope of their discussion was
significant. The President and the
General Secretary set a new arms con-
trol agenda at Reykjavik, one that will
shape our discussions with the Soviets
about matters of nuclear security for
years to come.
Of course, make no mistake about it.
Tough, and probably drawn-out, negotia-
tions will still be required if we are to
nail down any formal agreement on
offensive force reductions. For example,
the Soviets are now linking agreement
on anything with agreement on
everything. But the fact that we now
have such reductions clearly on the table
has only been made possible by:
• Our steps to restore America's
military strength:
• Our firm and patient negotiating
efforts over the past 5 years:
• The sustained support of our
allies; and, not the least,
• By our active investigation into
strategic defenses.
The prospect of effective defenses
and our determined force modernization
program have given the Soviet Union an
important incentive to agree to cut back
and eventually to eliminate ballistic
missiles. Within the SDI program, we
judge defenses to be desirable only if
they are survivable and cost effective at
the margin. Defenses that meet these
criteria— those which cannot be easily
destroyed or overwhelmed— are precisely
the sort which would lead Soviet military
planners to consider reducing, rather
than continuing to expand, their offen-
sive missile force.
But only a dynamic and ongoing
research program can play this role. And
for their part, the Soviets are making
every effort to cripple our program.
Thus, there were major differences over
strategic defenses at Reykjavik. The
President responded to Soviet concerns
by proposing that, for 10 years, both
sides would not exercise their existing
right of withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty and would confine their strategic
defense programs to research, develop-
ment, and testing activities permitted by
the ABM Treaty. This commitment
would be in the context of reductions of
January 1987
33
THE SECRETARY
strategic offensive forces by 50% in the
first 5 years and elimination of the remain-
ing ballistic missiles in the second 5 years,
and with the understanding that at the end
of this 10-year period, either side would
have the right to deploy advanced defenses,
unless otherwise agreed.
But at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union
wanted to change existing ABM Treaty
provisions to restrict research in a way
that would cripple the American SDI
program. This we cannot accept.
Even as we eliminate all ballistic
missiles, we will need insurance policies
to hedge against cheating or other con-
tingencies. We don't know now what
form this will take. An agreed-upon
retention of a small nuclear ballistic
missile force could be part of that
insurance. Wliat we do know is that the
President's program for defenses
against ballistic missiles can be a key
part of our insurance. A vigorous
research program will give the United
States and our allies the options we will
need to approach a world with far fewer
nuclear weapons— a world with a safer
and more stable strategic balance, one
no longer dependent upon the threat of
mutual annihilation.
Next Steps With the Soviets
In the short term, our task is to follow
up on the progress arising out of the
Reykjavik discussions. For our part, we
are energetically seeking to do so. Our
negotiators in Geneva have instructions
to pick up where the two leaders'
exchanges left off. We have formally
tabled our proposals, based on the prog-
ress at Reykjavik, and we are ready to
discuss them.
To give additional impetus to that
process, I met with Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna at the
beginning of this month to continue our
exchanges— not just on arms control but
on the full agenda of U.S. -Soviet issues,
including those regional and human
rights problems which are so critical to
building trust and confidence between
our two nations.
Our negotiating efforts— and the
President's own discussions with the
General Secretary— have been based on
years of analysis of these issues and on
our frequent exchanges with the Soviets.
The Reykjavik meeting, for instance,
was preceded by extensive preliminary
discussions with the Soviets at the
expert level in Geneva, Moscow, and
Washington. We have had our senior
negotiators and best advisers at all of
these sessions— as well as at our most
recent encounter in Vienna.
So we have been well prepared to
move. But whether we can achieve con-
crete results now depends on the
Soviets. General Secretary Gorbachev
has spoken positively of the need to
capitalize on the "new situation," he
called it, created by Reykjavik. But at
Vienna 2 weeks ago, the Soviets seemed
primarily interested in trying to
characterize SDI in the public mind as
the sole obstacle to agreement. Mr.
Shevardnadze was quick to accuse us of
backsliding from the Reykjavik results
and to label our Vienna meeting "a
failure" because of our unwillingness to
accede to their demands to cripple SDI.
We will doubtless hear more such
accusations over the coming weeks.
So all of this will take time to work
out. But that's to be expected in
negotiating with the Soviets. We are
serious about our objectives, and we are
determined to hold firmly to them. We
have a clear sense of how our two
nations might be able to move toward
greater strategic stability. We are ready
to move quickly to that end, but we are
also prepared to be patient.
The Challenges of a
Less Nuclear World
The longer term implications of the
Reykjavik discussions may prove even
more challenging for us. Thus far in the
nuclear age, we have become accustomed
to thinking of nuclear weapons in terms
of "more bang for the buck" and of the
high price for any possible substitute for
these arms. But to my mind, that sort of
bookkeeping approach risks obscuring
our larger interests. We should begin by
determining what is of value to us and
then what costs we are prepared to pay
to attain those ends.
The value of steps leading to a less
nuclear world is clear— potentially
enhanced stability and less chance of a
nuclear catastrophe. Together with our
allies, we could enjoy a safer, more
secure strategic environment.
But we would not seek to reduce
nuclear weapons only to increase the
risks of conventional war or, more likely,
of political intimidation through the
threat of conventional attack. Therefore,
a central task will be to establish a stable
conventional balance as a necessary cor-
ollary for any less nuclear world.
How would a less nuclear world, one
in which ballistic missiles have been
eliminated, work? What would it mean?
It would not be the end of nuclear deter-
rence for the West. With a large inven-
tory of aircraft and cruise missiles, the
United States and NATO would retain a
powerful nuclear capability. In a sense,
we would return to the situation of the
1950s, when strategic bombers served as
our primary nuclear deterrent force. But
there would be an important difference
in the 1990s and beyond. Our aircraft
would now be supplemented by a host of
new and sophisticated technologies as
well as cruise missiles launched from the
air and sea. It would be a much more
diverse and capable force than in
previous decades.
In such circumstances, both the
United States and the Soviet Union
would lose the capability provided by
ballistic missiles to deliver large
numbers of nuclear weapons on each
others' homelands in less than 30-
minutes time. But Western strategy is,
in fact, defensive in nature, built upon
the pledge that we will only use our
weapons, nuclear and conventional, in
self-defense. Therefore, the loss of this
quick-kill capability— so suited to
preemptive attack— will ease fears of a
disarming first strike.
For our friends and allies in Europe
and Asia, the elimination of Soviet
ballistic missiles— including not just the
Soviet Union's strategic ballistic missiles
and its many SS-20s but also the shortei
range missiles for which we currently
have no deployed equivalent— would
remove a significant nuclear threat.
But it would also have non-nuclear
military benefits as well. Today, the
Soviet Union has ballistic missiles with
conventional and chemical warheads
targeted on NATO airfields, ports, and
bases. The elimination of ballistic
missiles would thus be a significant plus
for NATO in several respects.
The nuclear forces remaining—
aircraft and cruise missiles— would be
far less useful for first-strike attacks but
would be more appropriate for retalia-
tion. They would be more flexible in use
than ballistic missiles. The slower t\\nng
aircraft can be recalled after launch.
They can be retargeted in flight. They
can be re-used for several missions. We
currently have a major advantage in the
relative sophistication of our aircraft anc
cruise missiles; the Soviets have greater
numbers of these systems and are striv-
ing hard to catch up in quality. They
have given far more attention to
defense, where we have a lot of catching
up to do. But our remaining nuclear
forces would be capable of fulfilling the
requirements of the Western alliance's
deterrent strategy.
34
Department of State Bulletir
ARMS CONTROL
le West's Advantages in
Less Nuclear World
The prospect of a less nuclear world has
laused concern in both Europe and
America. Some fear that it would place
;he West at a grave disadvantage. I
lon't think so.
In any competition ultimately
lepending upon economic and political
■ iynamism and innovation, the United
States, Japan, and Western Europe have
remendous inherent advantages. Our
hree-to-one superiority in gross national
jroduct over the Warsaw Pact, our far
rreater population, and the Western
ead in modern technologies— these are
)nly partial measures of our advantages.
The West's true strength lies in the fact
hat we are not an ideological or military
)loc like the Warsaw Pact; we are an
illiance of free nations, able to draw
ipon the best of the diverse and creative
■nergies of our peoples.
But dramatic reductions in nuclear
veapons and the establishment of
tronger conventional defenses will
equire a united alliance effort. In light
if the President's discussions in Reyk-
avik, we must join with our allies in a
nore systematic consideration of how to
leal with a less nuclear world. To my
nind, that sort of process of joint
nquiry is healthy for the alliance, par-
icularly since we remain firmly agreed
in the basics— the alliance's fundamental
irinciple of shared risks and shared
lurdens on behalf of the common
lefense.
All of these steps— deep reductions
if nuclear weapons, a strong research
irogram in strategic defense, improve-
nents in conventional defenses, and
legotiations with the Soviet Union and
Varsaw Pact— will have to be closely
•ynchronized. This will require a care-
ully coordinated political strategy on
he part of the alliance to deal with these
nterrelated aspects of the larger prob-
em of stability and Western security.
A^e will begin a preliminary discussion of
ust such an approach during my next
■neeting with my NATO counterparts in
Brussels at the December session of the
"Jorth Atlantic Council.
Conclusion
This is a full and complex agenda for all
3f us to consider. Is it ambitious? Yes.
Unrealistic? No. I think that, on the
oasis of the progress made at Reykjavik,
substantial reductions in Soviet and
American nuclear forces are possible,
and they can be achieved in a phased and
stabilizing way.
But we need to think hard about how
to proceed. We are taking on a difficult
task as we seek to create the conditions
in which we can assure the freedom and
security of our country and our allies
without the constant threat of nuclear
catastrophe.
And, of course, our work to achieve
greater strategic stability at pro-
gressively lower levels of nuclear arms is
only part of our larger effort to build a
more realistic and constructive relation-
ship with the Soviet Union. We cannot
pursue arms control in isolation from
other sources of tension. We will con-
tinue to seek a resolution of the more
fundamental sources of political distrust
between our nations, especially those in
the areas of human rights and regional
conflicts.
Progress— whether in science or
foreign affairs— often has to do with the
reinterpretation of fundamental ideas.
That's no easy task. It requires challeng-
ing conventional wisdom. And often we
find that gaining new benefits requires
paying new costs.
Just as what happened 44 years ago
in the squash court under old Stagg
Field opened up both new horizons and
new dangers, so we now see new
possibilities for protecting our security,
as well as new risks if we don't manage
them well. So it is up to us— working
together with both allies and
adversaries— to ensure that we use these
new opportunities to achieve a more
stable and secure peace.
'Press release 2.50 of Nov. 18, 1986. The
question-and-answer session following the
address is not printed here. ■
A World Without Nuclear Weapons
by Kenneth L. Adelman
Address before the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International
Affairs at Princeton University on
November 13, 1986. Mr. Adelman is
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
Since the Reykjavik meeting between
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev, a lot of people have begun to
take a fresh and serious look at an old
question: would we be better off in a
world without nuclear weapons? Over
the past few weeks there have been
numerous articles on the subject in such
publications as Time, Newsweek, and The
New York Times. I detect something of a
sea change out there. Commentators
who usually devote their column inches
to telling us how desperately we need a
new arms control agreement have
suddenly taken to telling us how
desperately we need nuclear weapons.
Since Reykjavik, everybody seems to be
learning to love nuclear deterrence.
What about this question? Is it really
possible to eliminate nuclear weapons
entirely, and would we be better off in a
world without them? These are serious
issues for arms control. They are serious
issues for our national security. The
elimination of nuclear weapons has been,
at least, a distant goal of our arms con-
trol and disarmament policy since the
beginning of the nuclear era. But I think
we have always understood that it was
not a simple or immediate goal.
Problems of Eliminating
Nuclear Weapons
Today, I think it would be useful to
remind ourselves of some of the prob-
lems it would entail. So let's imagine, for
a moment, a world in which nuclear
weapons were about to be completely
eliminated. What kind of world would
this be? What kinds of problems would
we face?
Soviet Superiority in Conventional
Arms. The first problem we would face
is Soviet superiority in conventional
arms. In Europe right now there is a
serious imbalance in conventional forces
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
At present, the Warsaw Pact has a for-
midable margin of superiority— almost
twice as many divisions, nearly two-and-
a-half times as many tanks, and nearly
five times the number of artillery pieces
in place in Europe. On the purely con-
ventional plane, NATO forces are out-
numbered and outgunned. Reinforce-
ments can obviously be brought from the
United States, but that is a complicated
task, and even then the Warsaw Pact
enjoys a considerable edge. That is why
deterrence in Europe continues to
January 1987
35
ARMS CONTROL
depend on nuclear weapons and cannot
be anchored on conventional forces
alone.
This is nothing new. Ever since
1945, when the United States rapidly
demobilized its armed forces, we have
depended, and Western Europe has
depended, on U.S. nuclear weapons to
deter Soviet aggression. Time and again
over the years we have reaffirmed the
need to strengthen conventional forces.
And we have made some progress, insuf-
ficient progress but some nonetheless.
But the imbalance remains.
Under these circumstances, to
eliminate the nuclear threat would be to
weaken our deterrence of Soviet aggres-
sion. The first task we would face were
we to proceed in a steady way to
eliminate nuclear weapons, therefore,
would be to right the balance in conven-
tional arms. This may be difficult, for
despite the greater wealth of the West,
we are still free peoples. And free
peoples do not easily choose to commit
large increases in current defense spend-
ing, even if only to match expenditures
by totalitarian states.
Verification. The second problem
we would face is that of verifying a total
ban on nuclear weapons. The verification
problems posed by such an agreement
would be truly monumental. For the past
15 years in arms control, we have relied
on national technical means to verify
compliance. We have been dealing with
many provisions— for example, gross
totals of fixed missile silos— that are
comparatively easy to verify. These
methods of verification have serious
limitations. As we look a short distance
down the arms control trail, we can see
new verification problems emerging.
Mobile missiles already pose a problem
for verification. Warhead limits pose a
problem for verification. As the tech-
nological trend moves in the direction of
smaller and more mobile systems, these
verification problems will only increase.
But these hurdles— by no means
insignificant ones— pale in comparison
with the huge difficulty of ensuring
against clandestine production of nuclear
weapons themselves. The verification
problems posed by this idea take us back
to the kinds of issues we first con-
fronted 40 years ago, when the United
States proposed the Baruch Plan to the
United Nations. The Baruch Plan was
our first nuclear arms control initiative,
a comprehensive proposal to eliminate
nuclear weapons and place all atomic
energy activities under control of an
international authority.
Had it been accepted by the Soviet
Union in 1946, the Baruch Plan would
have been a major undertaking even
then. But at that time, circumstances
were so much simpler. In 1946, when we
proposed the Baruch Plan to the United
Nations, we had a monopoly on atomic
weapons.
Elimination of nuclear weapons
would require the most extensive and
intrusive system of onsite inspections
anyone could imagine. It is hard to think
of a major military or even industrial
installation that could be legally
exempted from inspection on demand.
That would mean, in turn, unprece-
dented openness to foreign intrusion on
the part of all nations. Thus far the
Soviet Union has raised objections to
even the most limited inspection
arrangements.
The Soviets have always resisted
inspection in practice. As Khrushchev
said to Arthur Robens, a British official,
in 1956: "Why should I let you into my
back garden so that you can peep
through my kitchen window?" We still
do not have government-to-government
inspection of Soviet territory. We are a
vast distance away from the kind of
inspection we would need for such a
comprehensive agreement. One need
only think of the fate of Major
Nicholson— who was shot to death in
1985 by Soviet soldiers while carrying
out his inspection duties in East
Germany as permitted under interna-
tional agreement— to see the kinds of
barriers we are up against. We continue
to hope that the Soviet Union will come
to accept more effective verification
measures. In the meantime, without a
comprehensive and thoroughly intrusive
inspection system, a treaty eliminating
nuclear weapons would simply be
impractical.
Third Countries and Nuclear
Weapons. The third problem we must
address is the issue of third countries.
Needless to say, nuclear technology is
far more widely disseminated today than
it was in 1946. We already have a Non-
proliferation Treaty, of course. And we
have been very successful at curbing the
spread of nuclear weapons. But in a
nuclear-weapons-free world, the incen-
tive to cheat might well increase, since a
single madman, a single terrorist leader
armed with atomic weapons, could wield,
if only for a while, disproportionate
power.
Fundamental Problems. But behind
all these problems I have mentioned are
two very fundamental ones. The first is
that we can't put the nuclear genie back
in the bottle. While it may some day be
possible to return to a non-nuclear
world, it is utterly impossible to return
to a prenuclear world. It is utterly
impossible to return to a world where
the secrets of nuclear fission and nucleai
fusion are not yet known. The knowl-
edge for creating atomic bombs exists
and will remain. The knowledge is
widely disseminated. It cannot be
unlearned. Nuclear weapons cannot be
disinvented. Like Adam and Eve, we
have eaten of the apple, and we can't go
back to Eden.
The other fundamental problem is
the nature of the Soviet Union. The mosi
basic reason that eliminating nuclear
weapons will not solve our problem is
that nuclear weapons are not the cause
of our problem. 'They are merely the
symptom. The cause of tension, the
cause of fear, and the cause of danger
are not weapons but aggressive inten-
tions and aggressive policies. Nobody in
the United States loses any sleep over
the British nuclear arsenal. The source
of tension is not the possession of
nuclear weapons but the presence of
aggressive intentions. The most basic
barrier to radical measures of arms con-
trol thus far has been the secretive and
aggressive nature of the Soviet regime.
Until that changes, arms control is up
against some serious hurdles.
Eliminating Ballistic Missiles
But what about the possiblity— proposed
by President Reagan at Reykjavik— of
eUminating ballistic missiles? That is a
different proposition from eliminating al
nuclear weapons. Eliminating ballistic
missiles would be a big job. It is a job we
would have to go about very carefully,
with a clear understanding of the com-
plexities and problems involved. But a
world without ballistic missiles would
offer great advantages over our present
situation, provided we had some form of
insurance like the Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative (SDI) coming on stream to cope
with potential cheating.
Why single out ballistic missiles as a
problem?
First, ballistic missiles are weapons
par excellence of surprise attack and
nuclear blackmail. They travel to their
targets very quickly, 25-30 minutes for
intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), 10-15 minutes for some sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs). Once fired, they cannot be
called back. They cover in minutes the
36
Department of State Bulletin
ARMS CONTROL
distances that bombers cross only in
hours. They also appear most threaten-
ing psychologically and politically. They
are vulnerable, at least partly so, when
based on land, and highly accurate in any
basing mode. In a nutshell, they are the
weapon system most likely to prompt a
"use it or lose it" type of response in a
crisis.
The Soviets were the first to test
and deploy intercontinental ballistic
missiles in 1957, the year in which they
launched the Sputnik satellite.
Khrushchev made exaggerated claims
about the number of missiles that the
Soviet Union possessed, and many peo-
ple in the West became frightened.
Khrushchev's threats helped to prompt
an antinuclear movement— the "ban the
3omb" movement of the late 1950s.
Since that time, the land-based ballistic
Tiissile has always been the weapon of
:hoice for Soviet nuclear intimidation.
A world without the threat of ballis-
;ic missiles would thus be a world in
A'hich a major instrument of surprise
luclear attack and nuclear blackmail had
)een eliminated.
Second, there is also reason to
jelieve that without ballistic missiles,
luclear deterrence would be more
stable. The Soviets have always seen the
ballistic missile as a preemptive weapon,
^ven as we have placed emphasis on
•etaliation. The heart of the present
Soviet arsenal is a force of 308 SS-18
Tiissiles with 10-plus warheads each.
These warheads are powerful and
iccurate. The SS-18 missiles are
designed as a first-strike weapon. They
ire designed to destroy our land-based
nissiles in their silos, to destroy a large
oart of our land-based retaliatory force
before it can get off the ground.
If both sides' weapons are
vulnerable, temptation on both sides to
ase them in a crisis increases. So ballistic
missiles, in addition to being very
threatening weapons, can be destabiliz-
ing. If we move away from these hair-
trigger weapons, we may improve
stability.
But what about the problems of a
world without ballistic missiles? There is
no use pretending that such a world
would be problem free. What would be
some of the difficulties we would face in
moving to a world without ballistic
missiles? First, nuclear deterrence would
still operate. But now we would be talk-
ing about slower flying, air-breathing
delivery vehicles.
Soviet Air Defense Superiority.
The first problem we would face in this
world is Soviet air defense superiority.
The Soviets have invested massively in
air defenses. The Soviets have more
than 9,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM)
launchers, over 4,600 tactical SAM
launchers, and some 10,000 air defense
radars. We have nothing comparable to
this. If deterrence is no longer going to
rely on ballistic missiles, then we need to
think seriously about improving our own
air defenses. We would also have to
think seriously about improving our abil-
ity to penetrate Soviet air defenses. And
we would probably have to think seri-
ously also about strengthening conven-
tional forces.
Verification and Compliance. But
the truly major problem we would face is
verification and compliance. It would be
a formidable problem. In a world without
ballistic missiles and without strategic
defense, there would always be a
tremendous temptation for a potential
aggressor to produce a clandestine force
of ballistic missiles. Such a force would
give its possessor enormous power. The
danger would be far greater than it was
in the 1950s. Because ballistic missiles
have already been built, extremely
powerful and accurate missiles could be
fielded much more rapidly than they
were then. Indeed, rocket technology
would continue to advance, since space
programs would continue.
In addition, clandestine production,
storage, and deployment of missiles
would be very hard to detect. Mobile
missiles are of particular concern in this
regard. Indeed, we should not forget
that the Soviets have already deployed a
mobile ICBM, the SS-25, which was
itself a violation of the SALT II
[strategic arms limitation talks] agree-
ment. Research and production have
always been extremely difficult to verify
by national technical means.
In a world without ballistic missiles,
we would have to worry about not just
Soviet noncompliance. We would also
have to worry about third countries.
These are all very serious problems.
The Need for Strategic Defenses
But this is where defenses come in. If we
were to couple elimination of ballistic
missiles with deployment of strategic
defenses against ballistic missiles, we
would have a critical hedge against
cheating. We would also create a power-
ful disincentive against cheating, since in
the presence of effective defenses,
ballistic missiles would tend to lose the
overwhelming military value they now
have. If defenses exist to stop ballistic
missiles, then there would be less
military reason, in a world where
ballistic missiles had been eliminated, to
bring them back. Strategic defenses
would thus be an insurance policy for
arms control.
I am not saying that elimination of
ballistic missiles would be an easy job.
But defenses at least make the idea of a
world without ballistic missiles seem a
lot more reasonable than it might have
seemed in the past.
That is what President Reagan pro-
posed to General Secretary Gorbachev in
Reykjavik— a plan for elimination of
ballistic missiles coupled with deploy-
ment of strategic defenses. It is, in my
view, a powerful and creative vision. It
is a vision of a world in which the most
menacing weapons, ballistic missiles, had
been eliminated by arms control and
simultaneously rendered obsolete by
defenses. It is a vision in which paper
agreements are backed up by strong
physical guarantees. That's partly
what's been missing in arms control in
the past, a clear insurance policy against
noncompliance.
President Reagan's offer suggests
how strategic defense can assist and
strengthen arms control. In fact,
strategic defense technologies represent
possibly the most promising develop-
ment for arms control and national
security since space launches made
possible the reconaissance satellite. The
Strategic Defense Initiative could prove
an even more radical advance than the
emergence of "national technical
means" of verification.
The President proposed the idea to
show the Soviets how defenses and arms
control can work together. The Presi-
dent proposed the idea to show how
defenses can make arms control possible
on a scale, I think, few people dreamed
of in the recent past. Finally, the Presi-
dent proposed the idea to allay Soviet
fears that we are seeking a first-strike
capability through SDL We are not, and
by now the Soviets should realize this. If
ballistic missiles are phased out, a first
strike will become impossible. There will
be no swift sword— only a defensive
shield.
For me, the real significance of all
this is the way in which the idea of
defenses is allowing us to think in a new
way about the problems of arms control
and national security generally. And I
would call upon everyone in this room to
stop and give a moment's thought to
what important possibilities lie before
us. For I believe Reykjavik was an
important moment, and I believe we are
at a critical crossroads. We are at a
critical crossroads, and we are being
asked to choose between two paths.
January 1987
37
ARMS CONTROL
Fourteen years ago, when we signed
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, we deliberately chose as a nation
the path of nuclear vulnerability. We
chose the path of vulnerability because
we believed that it would be a path to
a safer world. We chose the path of
vulnerability because we believed that it
would be a way to real arms control. We
chose the path of vulnerability because
we believed it would be a road to
genuine reductions in nuclear arms.
The 1972 ABM Treaty committed us
to keep our society vulnerable to nuclear
attack. But the preamble of the treaty
also affirmed the "premise" that "the
limitation of antiballistic missile
systems" would "contribute to the crea-
tion of more favorable conditions for
further negotiations on limiting strategic
arms." The preamble of the treaty
spelled out the explicit connection
between our agreement to remain
vulnerable and our intention to get
reductions in nuclear arms. The pream-
ble of the treaty stated the expectation
that both nations would "take effective
measures toward reductions in strategic
arms" at "the earliest possible date."
The chief American negotiator, my
predecessor at ACDA, Gerard Smith,
made a unilateral American statement
on May 9, 1972, that:
... if an agreement providing for more
complete strategic offensive arms limitations
were not achieved within five years, U.S.
supreme interests could be jeopardized.
Should that occur, it would constitute a basis
for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
Well, 5 years came and went, and
there was no move on the Soviet side
toward reductions. Five years after 1972
was 1977. And in 1977 President Carter
sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to
Moscow with a proposal for deep reduc-
tions in nuclear arms. The Soviets
turned President Carter down flat. Two
years later, we signed SALT II, a treaty
which permitted vast increases in
strategic offensive arms. Since 1972, the
number of nuclear weapons in the Soviet
arsenal has quadrupled, and the Soviets
have accumulated weapons designed to
be used preemptively— those SS-18
missiles, which are weapons designed to
deprive us of the retaliatory capacity
that our vulnerability was supposed to
guarantee. Our own arsenal has grown,
too, though more slowly.
In short, the path of vulnerability
has proved to be a blind alley. We sought
reductions in offensive weapons and con-
sented to vulnerability. All we got in
return was vastly increased offensive
weapons and increased vulnerability. It
is time that we turn to the path of
defenses. What can strategic defenses
offer to national security and to arms
control?
Strategic defenses, once deployed by
both sides, can make three contributions
to mutual security.
First, they can enhance stability by
complicating any surprise attack and
thus making a preemptive attack
extremely difficult to plan with
confidence.
Second, they can counteract nuclear
blackmail by blunting the missile threat.
Third, by making ballistic missiles
less effective, defenses can make them
less of a factor in the military balance
and in world politics generally. They can
make ballistic missiles less valuable and
thus create incentives for reducing them.
In fact, it was SDI that brought the
Soviets back to the bargaining table in
Geneva after their 1983 walkout from
the arms talks.
In short, defensive research is point-
ing the way toward a world in which
ballistic missiles play less of a
role, in which fast, first-strike systems
will become less effective, and in which
slower, second-strike systems come to
dominate the military equation. It is
pointing away from the current hair-
trigger balance based on the primacy of
ballistic missiles. These are precisely the
goals we have sought to achieve over the
years with arms control. Defenses can
achieve many of the goals of arms con-
trol and can also be combined with arms
control.
Soviet Intentions and
U.S. National Security
The basic question is this: what do the
Soviets want? Do they want safety for
themselves? Will that be enough for
them? For if that is the case, then they
should be willing to move with us toward
a world in which ballstic missiles are
built down and defenses are built up.
They should be willing to move with us
toward a world in which offensive arms
reductions are combined with defenses
to reduce the total ballistic missile threat
to each side.
Or do they, rather, wish to threaten
others? If that is the case— if they need
to threaten others in order to feel secure
in themselves— then prospects for genu-
inely improving stability for both sides
with negotiated agreements are very
dim.
But I am hopeful. I believe our arms
control policy and our national security
ought to have a single goal. That goal is
almost too obvious to state: it is to de-
fend ourselves, to decrease the dangers
that we face by whatever means are at
our disposal. I believe we ought to be
willing to move toward that goal by
whatever path presents itself— whether
by technology or by negotiated
agreements or, hopefully, by some
mutually reinforcing mixture of the two.
I believe it is time to reject the idea that
technology always has to work against
us and can never be made to work for
us. I believe it is time to reject the idea
that the way to a safer world is by
restraining American technology while
letting Soviet weapons multiply and
become more lethal.
I believe we are in a better position
today than we have been in years to
achieve real, stablizing arms control
agreements. I believe the Soviets ought
to have every incentive to join us, and I
hope that they will. But I also believe we
are in a better position today than ever
before to guarantee our future by our
own ingenuity, whether they do or not.
In short, I believe the day has
arrived once again when it is not the
totalitarian dictatorships of the world
but rather the free societies, with their
creativity and energy and ingenuity, tha
are calling the tune and setting the pace
and pointing the way to the future. At
the end of the Revolutionary War in
1782, a citizen of Philadelphia remarked
to Dr. Benjamin Rush, "It looks as if the
battle for independence is finally over."
Rush replied, "Sir, you are mistaken.
The Revolutionary War may be over, bu
the battle of independence has just
begun."
We have preserved freedom, and we
have preserved peace for 40 years. But
in a real sense the battle for peace and
for freedom is just beginning. But I am
confident, in this nation's courage, its
technological ingenuity, its dedication,
and its good sense. "No problem of
human dignity is beyond human beings,"
President Kennedy once said. "Man's
reason and spirit have often solved the
seemingly unsolvable— and we believe
they can do it again." I believe that we
can do it. I believe that with all the tools
at our disposal— by deterrence, by
defense, and by negotiation— we can
build a more permanent and a more
stable peace. That is why I believe that
our children and our children's children
will enjoy the same safety and prosperity
that we enjoy and breathe the same air
of liberty that we breathe in democratic
countries that are secure and strong and
free. ■
38
Department of State Bulletir
ARMS CONTROL
Permitted and Prohibited
Activities Under the ABIVI Treaty
by Paul H. Nitze
Address before the Intematiorial Law
Wtekend Groups in New York City on
October 31, 1986. Ambassador Nitze is
imperial adviser to the President and the
Strretary of State on arms control
iiKitters.
At Reykjavik, a number of issues arose
with respect to the interrelationship
between limitations on defense and
space programs and reductions in offen-
sive systems. One issue involved the
■-elevant time period, or date, to govern
rertain obligations that the United
States and the Soviet Union would
undertake regarding these problems,
jeneral Secretary Gorbachev insisted on
1 time period of 10 years. President
• ?leagan was prepared to agree to this
;ime period provided agreement could be
ichieved on three subjects, namely, the
•egime of control over defenses, the pro-
gram of reductions in offensive ballistic
nissiles during those 10 years, and what
>ach side was to be allowed to do after
he 10 years.
On the issue of the regime of control
)ver defenses, President Reagan pro-
)osed to Mr. Gorbachev that both sides
itrictly abide by the limitations of the
Vntiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Mr.
jorbachev insisted on what he called
neasures to strengthen the ABM Treaty
)ut what, in fact, amounted to an at-
empt to amend it. Specifically, he pro-
)osed to restrict to the laboratory
esting of all space elements or com-
)onents of antiballistic missile defense.
The positions of the two sides in part
•eflect substantially different views as to
vhat defensive research, development,
md testing activities should be per-
nitted over the next 10 years. The
United States believes that the nature of
ictivities permitted and prohibited by
;he ABM Treaty, based on the treaty
;ext and the negotiating record, is clear.
The Soviet side, under the guise of
'strengthening" the ABM Treaty,
ivishes, in effect, to amend the treaty to
orohibit activities that it was not
intended to prohibit. What follows
focuses on this issue.
Distinguishing
Research from Development
First, it should be noted that nowhere
does the ABM Treaty use the word
"research." Neither the U.S. nor the
Soviet delegations to the SALT I
[strategic arms limitation talks] negotia-
tions believed that it was possible to
verify limitations on research. In fact,
neither side wished research to be
limited, and the ABM Treaty makes no
attempt to do so. In a major statement
before the Soviet Presidium in 1972.
shortly after the ABM Treaty was
signed, then-Soviet Defense Minister
Grechko stated that the ABM Treaty
"places no limitations on the perform-
ance of research and experimental work
aimed at resolving the problem of
defending the country from nuclear
missile strike."
The United States has traditionally
distinguished "research" from "develop-
ment" along the lines outlined by Harold
Brown in a 1971 statement to the Soviet
SALT I delegation. Research includes
conceptual design and testing conducted
both inside and outside the laboratory.
Development follows research and
precedes full-scale testing of systems
and components designed for actual
deployment. Development of a weapon
system commences with the construction
and testing of one or more prototypes of
the system or its major components.
Development and Testing
in the ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty does address and, in
certain articles, places specific limits on
the development and testing of certain
ABM systems and components.
Article I prohibits deployment of
ABM systems for a territorial defense or
for defense of an individual region
except as provided in article III; it limits
deployment, not development or testing,
and limits ABM systems, not ABM
components.
Article II defines an ABM system as
"a system to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajec-
tory." According to article 11(1), the
components of an ABM system "cur-
rently" consist of: ABM interceptor
missiles, which are missiles constructed
and deployed for an ABM role or tested
in an ABM mode; ABM launchers, which
launch ABM interceptor missiles; and
ABM radars, which are radars con-
structed and deployed for an ABM role
or tested in an ABM mode.
Article III specifies the areas in
which ABM systems or their components
may be deployed and the number that
may be deployed in those areas.
Article IV exempts from the limita-
tions of article III systems or their com-
ponents used for development or testing
and located within agreed test ranges.
Article V prohibits the development,
testing, and deployment of sea-based,
air-based, space-based, and mobile land-
based ABM systems and ABM components.
Article VI prohibits giving non-ABM
systems or components an ABM capabil-
ity or testing them in an ABM mode.
Agreed Statement D, reinforcing
restrictions on deployment in article III,
provides that, if ABM systems or com-
ponents based on "other physical prin-
ciples" than those used for ABM com-
ponents in 1972 and capable of sub-
stituting for ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers, or ABM radars are
created in the future, limitations on
those systems would be subject to discus-
sion in accordance with article XIII and
agreement in accordance with article
XIV.
Permitted Development
and Testing Activities
Taken together, the provisions of the
ABM Treaty permit various types of
ABM development and testing activity. I
will describe that activity in four general
classes.
• First, the treaty does not limit the
development and testing of devices that
are neither components of an ABM
system, as defined in article II, nor
substitutes for such components. Such
elements are not, and were not intended
to be, governed by the treaty's develop-
ment and testing prohibitions.
• Second, the treaty permits tests
that are not in an ABM mode (e.g.,
against satellites) of devices that do not
have an ABM capability. The term
"tested in an ABM mode" is specifically
addressed in a classified agreed state-
January 1987
39
ARMS CONTROL
ment negotiated in 1978 by the United
States and the Soviet Union in the
Standing Consultative Commission. That
agreement provides, in part, that an
interceptor missile is considered to be
"tested in an ABM mode" if it has
attempted to intercept a strategic
ballistic missile or its elements in flight
trajectory. The term "strategic ballistic
missile or its elements in flight trajec-
tory" would include a ballistic target-
missile with the flight trajectory charac-
teristics of a strategic ballistic missile or
its elements over that portion of the
flight trajectory involved in the test.
In practice, neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union considers
"flight trajectory" to include an orbit in
space or "tested in an ABM mode" to
encompass tests against targets in space
that do not follow a ballistic missile
flight trajectory. The Soviet Union con-
ducted tests against objects in Earth
orbit in the 1970s both prior to and after
deploying their antisatellite weapon.
Based both on this understanding of
"tested in an ABM mode" and on the
fact that components, as defined in
article II, were not involved, the United
States recently conducted the Delta 180
SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]
experiment to test our ability to track
targets in orbit. Since no device in the
experiment was tested in an ABM mode
and no device in the experiment could
substitute for an ABM component, none
of the devices in this experiment was
itself an ABM component; the exper-
iment, therefore, was fully consistent
with the ABM Treaty.
• Third, the treaty permits the
development and testing at agreed test
ranges of certain ABM systems and com-
ponents based on physical principles
used in 1972. As modified by article V,
article IV permits both the United
States and the Soviet Union to develop
and test fixed, land-based ABM
launchers and ABM radars located at
permitted test ranges and to launch
ABM interceptors into space from those
ABM launchers.
• The fourth class of development
and testing activity permitted by the
ABM Treaty involves ABM systems
based on physical principles other than
the physical principles used in 1972 and
components of such systems capable of
substituting for the ABM components
defined in article II. Agreed Statement
D to the ABM Treaty, which has the
same legal standing as the main text of
the treaty, permits the "creation"— i.e.,
the development and testing— of, for
example, space-based ABM systems that
are based on "other physical principles"
and their components.
This legally correct reading of
Agreed Statement D is fully justified by
the treaty text and the negotiating
record. The President, nonetheless, has
decided that, as long as we continue to
believe that our program objectives can
be met, the United States will not
restructure the originally planned SDI
program and, therefore, need not con-
duct its SDI activities according to this
"broader" interpretation of the treaty in
order to achieve the SDI research
objectives.
During the SALT I negotiations, the
United States sought to constrain the
development and testing of devices,
other than the three components defined
in article II, that might perform an ABM
function, including, for example, devices
based on other physical principles. The
Soviet delegation, however, refused to
consider any such limitations, arguing
that the sides could not agree about
something that could not be defined or
understood and that neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union had any idea
what devices or combination of devices
might substitute for an ABM component,
as defined in article II.
A careful reading of the treaty text
and review of the negotiating record
demonstrate that in Agreed Statement
D, ABM systems based on other physical
principles and their components are not,
and were not intended to be, subject to
the constraints on development and
testing specified elsewhere in the treaty.
Specifically, the restrictions of article V
of the treaty do not apply to ABM
systems based on other physical prin-
ciples and their components.
Reykjavik and Beyond
In Reykjavik, substantial differences
between the United States and the
Soviet Union over Soviet-proposed
restrictions going beyond those of the
ABM Treaty prevented progress toward
agreement on a comprehensive
framework for a predictable and stable
arms control regime. The United States
believes that both sides should adhere to
the ABM Treaty as currently formu-
lated. Specifically, the United States
need not accept limitations on develop-
ment and testing activities going beyond
those provided by the treaty. We also
must register both our concern over
Soviet ABM-related activities that sug-
gest that they may be preparing an
ABM defense of their national territory
and our conviction that the Soviets
should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar
being constructed in direct violation of
the treaty.
In contrast to the U.S. position, the
Soviets proposed in Iceland to modify
the ABM Treaty to confine to the
laboratory research and testing on any
space elements of space-based systems.
The Soviets intended to impose con-
straints on our SDI research program
far more severe than those imposed ever
by the "narrower" interpretation of the
ABM Treaty. Such additional constraints
would kill the SDI program. The Presi
dent could not accept this.
The United States calls upon the
Soviet Union to recognize that its pro-
posal would impose constraints that havf
no basis or justification in the ABM
Treaty. We must reject Soviet attempts
to amend the ABM Treaty indirectly by
reopening questions of permitted and
prohibited activities under the treaty.
The Soviet Union must understand that
the United States opposes restrictions
on development and testing beyond
those that were negotiated, agreed, and
codified in the ABM Treaty.
With such an understanding, we can
move forward toward a comprehensive,
stabilizing agreement on a future arms
control regime providing for defensive
research and testing, strategic offensive
reductions, and a jointly managed transi-
tion to greater reliance on defenses.
K
it
H
S
'The International Law Weekend Group
is comprised of the American branch of the
International Law Association, the
International Law Committee of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of New York City, the
American Society of International Law, and p
the American Foreign Law Association. ■
40
!
Department of State Bulletin
ARMS CONTROL
luclear and Space Arms Talks
^lose Round Six
Following are statements by Presi-
I'lif Reagan and Ambassador Max M.
'lunpelman, head of the U.S. delegation
I the nuclear and space arms
tyotiations.
'RESIDENTS STATEMENT,
JOV. 12. 19861
ince today marks the close of round six
f the nuclear and space talks (NST)
etween the United States and the
oviet Union, I want to take this occa-
ion to reaffirm our commitment to
chieving deep, equitable, and verifiable
eductions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear
rsenals. Such reductions would reduce
le risk of nuclear war and create a far
ifer world.
When this round opened 8 weeks
go, it held the promise of important
rogress in our effort to get Soviet
greement to deep reductions in nuclear
rms. Those hopes were heightened by
le progress made during my meeting
'ith General Secretary Gorbachev at
leykjavik last month. We discussed
lere the full range of issues between
ur countries, including human rights,
egional conflicts, arms reductions, and
xpanded bilateral contacts and com-
lunication. And specifically, in regard
T arms control, the General Secretary
nd I made significant headway in nar-
owing U.S. -Soviet differences on
everal key issues.
I • We agreed to a 50% reduction in
trategic offensive arms over the next 5
ears, to be implemented by reductions
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery
ehicles and 6,000 warheads on those
lelivery vehicles.
• We recognized the need for
■ignificant cuts in Soviet heavy ICBMs
intercontinental ballistic missiles], the
nost destabilizing missiles of all.
• We agreed to a global limit of 100
varheads on longer range INF
intermediate-range nuclear force]
nissiles, with no such missiles in
Europe.
The United States proposed that
leither the United States nor U.S.S.R.
Jeploy advanced strategic defenses for
10 years while conducting research,
development, and testing, which are per-
mitted by the ABM [Antiballistic Missile]
Treaty. This would be coupled with
agreement that during the first 5 years
of this period, strategic offensive arms
would be reduced by 50% and that dur-
ing the second 5 years, all remaining
U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic
missiles would be totally eliminated. We
made clear that at the end of the 10-year
period, either side could deploy defenses
if it so chose, unless the parties agreed
otherwise. Mr. Gorbachev did not accept
this proposal and instead insisted on
making the ABM Treaty more restric-
tive by limiting our research exclusively
to the laboratory and, in effect, killing
the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.
During this round, our negotiators in
Geneva formally tabled new U.S. pro-
posals reflecting the areas of agreement
I reached with Mr. Gorbachev in Reyk-
javik, as well as our other proposals. On
November 7, the Soviet Union took some
new steps as well, by tabling proposals
that partially reflect the headway made
at Reykjavik. These areas of agreement
can serve as the starting point from
which U.S. and Soviet negotiators could
hammer out significant arms reduction
treaties. But this has not yet been the
case. While this may have been the most
productive round to date, the Soviet
negotiations have still not followed up
adequately to build on the progress made
at Reykjavik. Instead, at times, the
Soviets have seemed more interested in
conducting a public relations campaign
than in pursuing the serious give-and-
take of the bargaining table.
This is particularly true in the case
of reductions in intermediate-range
nuclear forces. One year ago, at our
summit meeting in Geneva, Mr. Gor-
bachev and I agreed to build upon areas
of common ground, including an interim
agreement in INF. The Soviets
reiterated this position in proposals they
made earlier this year. And they reaf-
firmed the goal of a separate INF agree-
ment only days before our meeting in
Iceland. Now, however, the Soviets have
taken a major step backwards by
insisting that progress in every area of
nuclear arms control must be linked
together in a single package. This
attempt to hold progress in other areas
of arms control hostage to acceptance of
the Soviet effort to kill our SDI program
is patently unacceptable.
In light of the continuing Soviet
offensive buildup, the longstanding and
extensive Soviet programs in strategic
defense, and continued Soviet non-
compliance with existing arms control
agreements, SDI is crucial to the future
security of the United States and our
allies. Americans recognize that SDI was
essential in getting the Soviets to return
to the negotiating table and that it is
essential as well to our prospects for
concluding an agreement with the
Soviets to reduce nuclear arms. Effec-
tive strategic defenses would be
insurance against Soviet cheating or
abrogation of such an agreement. In
addition, they would provide a continu-
ing incentive to the Soviets to pursue
further reductions in offensive weapons.
SDI is, therefore, a vital insurance policy
that we cannot, and will not, bargain
away. That is a commitment which I
have made to the American people, and I
stand by it.
U.S. negotiators have worked hard
in translating the progress made at
Reykjavik into concrete new arms reduc-
tion proposals. These new American
proposals, along with some new Soviet
proposals, are now on the table in
Geneva. Let us hope that when the talks
resume on January 15, as we have
already agreed, the Soviets will move
with us to bring about, for the first time
in history, significant reductions in
nuclear weapons. Such reductions are
now within our grasp if the Soviet Union
will join us in serious pursuit of
agreements which are equitable and
stabilizing for both sides, and in the
interest of the entire world. We are
ready for this. We await Soviet
readiness to move forward.
AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S
STATEMENT,
NOV. 12. 1986
This has been a useful and a productive
round, our most productive to date. We
end the round— a round which, of course,
included the meeting between President
Reagan and General Secretary Gor-
bachev at Reykjavik on October 11-12—
with important areas of agreement, as
well as with important areas of dif-
ference between us.
Let me run through the major areas
of agreement.
• We are agreed that there should
be a 50% reduction in intercontinental-
range missiles and bombers within a
5-year period and that these reductions
should leave each side with no more than
6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery
vehicles,
• We are also agreed that
intermediate-range missiles in Europe
would be eliminated and reduced to a
January 1987
41
EAST ASIA
global equality level of 100 warheads.
This is a reduction of 100% in Europe of
the Soviet SS-20 missiles that threaten
every European city, and a reduction of
80% of the Soviet SS-20s in Asia. The
Soviets have now agreed that British
and French nuclear systems have no
place in these negotiations. We are
agreed that an agreement should also
contain constraints on shorter range
missiles and provide for future negotia-
tions on this issue.
• In the defense and space area,
both sides are now prepared to under-
take a commitment not to exercise their
right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty
for a period of 10 years. Conditions sur-
rounding that commitment continue to
divide us.
As you can see, we have made
important progress. I do not, however,
wish to minimize the number and
significance of the differences that still
divide us, or the difficult negotiations
that will be required to overcome them. I
will not elaborate upon them here
because they are serious parts of our
current negotiations. An additional
obstacle that emerged in Reykjavik is
the renewed Soviet insistence on
artificially linking progress in one
negotiating group to progress in the
other two. In particular, the Soviet
insistence on holding the elimination of
intermediate-range nuclear forces
hostage to our acceptance of their
insistence on amending the ABM Treaty
is not only inherently illogical but runs
contrary to the position they have taken
publicly and privately since early this
year.
Nevertheless, we are determined to
continue our search for full agreement.
We will be studying the issues when we
return home to Washington in prepara-
tion for our next round, which will begin
on January 15. We also intend to con-
tinue the pattern we have developed of
between-round exchanges.
U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets
ji^
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986.
Following is a statement made by
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
W. Alle7i Wallis on October 31. 1986.
During this week [October 29-.31, 1986]
U.S. Government subcabinet level
officials have held a series of talks with
their Japanese counterparts. These in-
cluded the first full-scale session of our
dialogue on structural economic issues,
our semiannual subcabinet consultations
on economic and trade issues, and the
Energy Working Group. The two
governments agreed during Prime
Minister Nakasone's visit to Washington
in April this year to begin a dialogue on
structural issues. We held an organiza-
tional meeting in San Francisco in July
and began the substantive discussion this
week. The subcabinet and Energy Work-
ing Group meetings occur twice a year;
the last meetings were in Tokyo in
February.
The focus of the discussion in the
subcabinet consultations was U.S. -Japan
trade and economic relations. We
discussed the progress in Japan's
implementation of its undertakings in
the MOSS [market-oriented, sector-
selective] talks and hope to see U.S.
sales to Japan in the MOSS sectors
increase pursuant to the market opening
measures on which we have agreed. The
United States believes unresolved MOSS
issues should be settled, and the two
sides agreed to continue to work on
outstanding issues.
We noted we recently had resolved
some longstanding trade issues,
including aluminum and semiconductors.
On October 3, Japan agreed to reduce its
duty on cigarettes to zero and to lessen
other impediments to sales of U.S.
tobacco products in Japan. We expect
these measures will result in a mean-
ingful increase in U.S. tobacco and
tobacco-product exports to Japan.
While we are pleased that these and
other issues have been resolved, the U.S.
delegation was frank in pointing out that
serious and unsustainable imbalances
remain in our economic relationship with
Japan and that future actions by Japan
are urgently needed.
Japan is expected to continue to
have large trade surpluses with the
United States and with the world this
year. Japan continues to rely heavily on
exports for growth and economic pros-
perity. In this connection, we urged the
Japanese Government to allow full and
immediate pass through of the benefits
of yen appreciation and lower oil prices,
to accelerate the process of restructur
ing its economy and to place greater
emphasis on domestic-led growth. At the
same time the U.S. delegation pointed t(
the importance of eliminating barriers tc
Japanese imports.
Among the trade matters raised by
the U.S. delegation were: Ij
• The importance of accelerated f
implementation of Prime Minister
Nakasone's April 1986 statement that
Japan must take actions leading to a Ij
significant increase in imports, par-
ticularly of manufactured products;
• The need for removal of remainin|(
barriers to U.S. exports to Japan. This
includes meaningful access to and par-
ticipation in the Kansai Airport project,
rapid progress in the transportation
machinery MOSS, resolution of the U.S.
complaints on Japan's quotas on fish anc
the so-called GATT 12 [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] agricultural
products, and tariff reductions in high
value and processed agricultural prod-
ucts, namely vegetables, fruits and nuts,
and processed foods and feeds; and
• More Japanese purchases of com-
petitive U.S. energy products and invest
ment in U.S. coal and gas projects.
As is usual in the subcabinet
meetings, the two sides discussed global
economic developments. The United
States expects a pickup in real GNP
growth in the United States and in
Europe later this year and sees slightly
less than 3% average OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development] growth this year and
about 3.5% growth next year. Expansior
is expected to weaken in Europe late in
1987. We noted the yen appreciation had
dampened economic growth in Japan but
suggested that this weakness might be
mitigated by full and immediate pass
through of Japan's improved terms of
trade. We hope Japan will encourage
strong domestic-led growth which would
have a beneficial effect on the U.S. and
Japanese external imbalances and on
growth in the developing countries. I
believe Japan's analysis of the world
economy was similar to ours.
We had a useful discussion on the
new GATT round. We and the Japanese,
of course, will play active and, we hope,
cooperative roles in this negotiation. We
urged Japan to join us in pressing for a
speedy agreement on agricultural issues.
We also discussed development assist-
ance and, in particular, the important
1
42
Department of State Bulletin
ECONOMICS
lontributions our two countries can
lake to the Philippines need for more
levelopment aid and for help on trade
pd investment. Japan indicated its
iterest in the development of the Philip-
|ines, and we hope it will help that
[ountry.
Our first, full-scale dialogue on struc-
tural impediments to reducing external
Imbalances focused on the evolution of
loth the external and domestic
mbalances in the United States and
apan. Differences in consumption, sav-
ngs, and investment patterns; the role
if exchange rates in adjustment process;
nd the composition of trade flows were
ome of the topics discussed.
In the Energy Working Group, we
liscussed the international energy
lutlook, energy security prospects, and
i)rogress in implementing the November
983 joint statement on energy coopera-
:ion, agreed to by President Reagan and
'rime Minister Nakasone. Special
mphasis was given to removing barriers
energy trade and to taking advantage
f lower oil prices to build strategic oil
tocks. The United States stressed the
leed to halt the decline in Japanese
Tiports of competitively priced U.S.
oal. It sought progress on coal and
quefied natural gas export projects and
xpressed interest in the implementation
f the coal recommendations in the
4aekawa report.
Let me conclude by saying that the
J.S. and the Japanese delegations
.greed that the economic problems the
wo sides confront require urgent and
ontinued attention by both govern-
nents. We agreed to redouble our
fforts to resolve particular trade issues
nd to address the fundamental factors
hat underlie both countries' large exter-
lal imbalances. ■
U.S.-EC Relations and
the International Trading System
by W. Allen Wallis
Address before the Luxembourg
Society for International Affairs in Lux-
embourg on October 8, 1986. Mr. Wallis
is Under Secretary for Economic
AJfairs.
It is an honor to appear before the
Luxembourg Society for International
Affairs. This is a particularly appro-
priate setting in which to discuss U.S.
relations with the the European Com-
munity (EC) and the importance of U.S.-
European cooperation in strengthening
the international trading system.
In the United States, we are well
aware of Luxembourg's strong interna-
tional orientation, which stems from its
location in the heart of Europe. Over
80% of your gross national product
(GNP) comes from international trade.
You understand better than just about
any country the benefits of an open
trading system.
Luxembourg is also the site of many
important European institutions, includ-
ing the European Parliament, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the European
Investment Bank, and other major Com-
munity institutions.
As a cofounder of the Benelux
[Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
economic union] arrangement, Luxem-
bourg helped lay the cornerstone for
European economic integration. Today,
Luxembourg participates actively and
constructively in the European Com-
munity and can play a significant role in
helping the EC address the challenges of
the future.
Luxembourg has made an important
contribution to U.S. -European under-
standing and friendship that you may
not think much about. Having been
involved in university education all of my
life, I am keenly aware— and appreci-
ative—of the fact that you have made
possible visits to Europe by hundreds of
thousands of Americans (especially
students and other young people) who
could not have afforded the trip if you
had not allowed Iceland Air Lines to
land its inexpensive flights here when no
other country in Europe would accept
them. Whether these young people made
friends for America, I do not know— I
hope so— but I do know that they
returned to America with their friend-
ship for Europeans and their under-
standing of Europe much enlarged.
The Basis for U.S.-EC Relations
Before I turn to current economic issues
between the United States and the EC
agenda, it is well to recall the basis of
our relationship.
Fundamentally, the United States
was born from the values and traditions
of Western Europe. While we now have
millions of citizens who trace their
ancestry to Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, Europeans were the original
immigrants to America. They brought
with them an established philosophy of
government which is incorporated into
our Constitution and political institu-
tions. This includes our commitment to
democracy, individual liberty, human
rights, economic freedom, and the rule
of law. Those European settlers brought
us also our codes of law, which are based
primarily on British common law but
also, in some parts of the country, on the
Napoleonic Code and Spanish law.
Moreover, Europe has been the
wellspring for American culture and
intellectual achievement. Your music,
art, literature, and science became the
foundations of ours, and now our culture
and accomplishments have become part
of yours.
We also share nearly 400 years of
historical experience. As the graves at
the American military cemetery in
Hamm testify, the United States has
been involved in all three of the major
European wars since our founding. That
involvement was and is an earnest of
America's commitment to a free and
prosperous European Continent.
Although our Pacific ties are growing, as
is only natural for a country whose
expansion has been toward the Pacific
January 1987
43
ECONOMICS
and which has global interests, com-
mitments, and responsibilities, we are—
and, for the foreseeable future, will
remain— essentially European in outlook
and orientation.
Our common heritage and shared
values are the source for U.S. -European
cooperation in a wide range of areas.
Geopolitically, we face a common threat
and stand together in NATO for our
common defense. This is why we have
stationed over 300,000 U.S. forces in
Europe and why we installed additional
missiles here after our NATO allies
asked us in 1979 to do so.
We also cooperate on a broad range
of foreign policy issues, for example, ter-
rorism. South Africa, and the Middle
East. On terrorism, in particular, our
message is clear: perpetrators of ter-
rorism will be identified, no concessions
will be made to terrorists, and acts of
terrorism will be costly to the
perpetrators.
In addition, we share a special com-
mitment to promote economic develop-
ment and nurture newly emerging
democracies. We cooperate in our
parliaments and in international
organizations toward this end.
Finally, we enjoy one of the largest
and most comprehensive economic rela-
tionships in the world. This year, two-
way trade between the United States
and the EC will exceed $125 billion,
second only to trade between Canada
and the United States. Two-way direct
investment stands at nearly $190 billion.
The firms responsible for that invest-
ment produced over $700 billion worth
of goods and services in 1985. That is
larger than the GNP of all but a handful
of countries and a graphic illustration of
the extent of U.S. -European interde-
pendence.
During the past 5 years, the United
States has seen a dramatic shift in its
trade balance with the EC. Until 1984,
we consistently ran balance-of -payments
surpluses with the Community. Those
surpluses reached a peak in 1980 of
$18 billion. Our trade position has
deteriorated since then, however. We
now project for 1986 a deficit of $28
billion in our trade with the Community.
Among the factors accounting for
this change has been a sharp change on
agriculture: since 1980, our agricultural
sales to the EC have fallen by 40%. Our
agricultural trade surplus declined from
a high of $6.8 billion in 1981 to only
$1.6 billion in 1985 and may disappear
entirely this year.
This stands in sharp contrast with
the Community's emergence over the
last two decades as the second largest
agricultural exporter. Contrary to the
usual course of economic development,
agricultural exports from Europe
actually are increasing as a share of its
total exports.
Despite high production costs and
the need to subsidize virtually all
exports, the EC has become the world's
largest exporter of poultry, eggs, beef,
veal, refined sugar, and dairy products.
The Community is also one of the largest
growers and exporters of wheat. Its sub-
sidized exports of wheat and wheat flour
have increased nearly sevenfold since
1970 and now take some 17% of world
markets. While this may be good news
for European farmers, every increment
to EC output of these products has cost
European taxpayers and consumers
dearly. Massive misallocation of
resources to agriculture may quite
possibly be one of the reasons that
Europe is falling behind Japan and the
United States in high technology.
Trade Issues
With so much trade between us, and
with as much government intervention
as there is in both Europe and the
United States, trade conflicts will
naturally arise. The current list of prob-
lems includes EC enlargement. Airbus,
and telecommunications. However,
agriculture and the new trade round
are the two most serious issues which
we both face, and they are closely
intertwined.
Agriculture. The problem of
agriculture is particularly vexing and
demands urgent attention. We are enter-
ing a period when fundamental adjust-
ments in agriculture are made necessary
by global surpluses in virtually all major
commodities. Traditional markets for
agricultural products have been shrink-
ing, and new competitors have arrived
from the underdeveloped countries. An
explosion in agricultural technology is
about to exacerbate the situation.
A major part of the problem is that
the EC and the United States both
devote too much of their resources to
agriculture. Both heavily support or sub-
sidize agriculture. Since 1980, the
United States has kept agricultural
prices high, pricing itself, to a con-
siderable extent, out of world markets.
Since U.S. prices generally set world
prices, this has allowed the EC to sell oi
world markets at those artifically high
prices, despite the EC's high internal
prices, through the use of export sub-
sidies in the form of restitutions. In
effect, the EC pays its farmers the
amount by which world prices fall short
of the levels that would equate farm
incomes with incomes in industry.
At the 1982 GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] ministerial,
the United States and other countries
sought to launch a new trade round to
deal with agriculture, services, and othe
new areas. The EC alone blocked com-
mencement of negotiations, and within
the EC, France alone. This in turn led ti
pressures in the United States for expoii
subsidies to match the EC's. Although
President Reagan opposed this, in 1985,
Congress mandated a large program of
export subsidies.
We now face a major subsidy war
between the United States and the EC,
and it is getting more and more expen-
sive for both of us. In a recent deal with
the Soviets, the EC sold wheat for abou
$75 per ton, which meant a subsidy of
about $130 per ton. The United States
recently contracted to sell Egypt frozen ;
poultry at $875 per ton, which was less
than the cost to the government by
$1,210.33 per ton.
Another egregious example is our
respective sugar policies. The EC is a
net exporter of some 3.3 million metric
tons annually, all subsidized. In
response, the United States imposed
import quotas which have reduced sugai
imports by another 3.3 million metric
tons. The results are costly domestic
programs and the loss to the under-
developed countries of about $1 billion ii
sugar exports.
The EC now spends over two-thirds
of its total budget in support of
agriculture. The direct budgetary cost ol
EC agricultural supports was over 20
billion European Currency Units (ECU)
in 1985 ($15.4 billion at 1985 average
exchange rates), with export subsidies
alone costing over 6.8 billion ECU ($5.3
billion). The indirect costs— that is, the
total transfer to farmers from European
taxpayers and consumers— are estimatec
to be on the order of $60-$70 billion.
Roughly 60% of the value added is now
attributable to transfers and subsidies.
44
Department of State Bulletin
ECONOMICS
The EC's agricultural policy will prob-
ably cost the Community budget well
over $20 billion this year, not counting
the substantial sums spent on agricul-
ture by EC member governments.
In the United States, our agriculture
outlays are approaching $30 billion for
all Federal programs. This substantially
exceeds the net income of U.S. farms.
The late Senator Everett Dirksen once
said, "a million here and a million there
and pretty soon you are talking about
real money." Agricultural subsidies are a
"billion here and a billion there, and
already we are talking about very real
money which taxpayers pay.
Four effects of such policies are
becoming obvious to all.
First, we are bankrupting ourselves
and preventing our economies from
' reaching the growth of which they are
capable.
Second, we are making serious
trouble with and for each other, which
threatens to strain the fabric of our
overall relationship.
Third, we are injuring nonsub-
, sidizing exporters, such as Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.
Fourth, and perhaps most impor-
tant, we are damaging developing coun-
tries by eliminating their ability to feed
themselves and to develop agricultural
exports to help pay their foreign
obligations.
Uruguay Trade Round. Just a few
weeks ago, the excellent achievements at
Punta del Este gave a renewed indica-
tion of what we can accomplish when we
cooperate. The leadership of the United
States and the EC, together with Japan,
Canada, Australia, and a number of
developing countries, was mainly respon-
sible for launching the Uruguay trade
round. The EC and the United States
both knew that the new trade round was
indispensable if we were to strengthen
the international trading system and
adapt it to the realities of the interna-
tional marketplace of the late 20th and
early 21st centuries. We both under-
stood also the serious risks to the inter-
national trading system and global
prosperity if the Punta del Este meeting
failed— a failure which could have led to
a sharp increase in protectionism.
Agriculture must be addressed as an
issue of high priority in the new round.
We recognize that, in each country, the
core of agricultural policy is funda-
mentally political and social, not just
economic. The problems can be solved
only jointly, not by countries acting
alone. The Uruguay round offers a
unique opportunity to work together
with the other agricultural producers
and exporters to achieve reforms in a
climate of mutual concessions and gains.
Implementation of new rules will take
time, but we need to negotiate those
new rules expeditiously in order to avoid
protectionism and further costly trade
wars.
The new round also will reach out to
such new areas as services, intellectual
property, and trade-related investment
measures. These are enormously impor-
tant and will be even more important in
the future.
Certain developing countries, failing
to understand their own interests,
opposed the introduction of services into
the round. If the less developed coun-
tries (LDCs) and newly industrialized
countries are to take over the making of
such products as steel, televisions,
toasters, automobiles, refrigerators,
semiconductors, and machine tools, then
the developed countries will have to be
able to export other products such as
services. Otherwise, the developed
countries cannot yield the production of
manufactures to the developing
countries.
Intellectual property relates, like
services, to areas where developed coun-
tries have a comparative advantage.
LDCs should want developed countries
to move into those areas and away from
areas where LDCs have the comparative
advantage. New rules on intellectual
property will faciliate such a process
and, thereby, will be of distinct benefit
to deve'oping countries.
It is also vital that we develop
disciplines on international direct invest-
ment, particularly on trade-related
aspects of investment. This would con-
tribute to improving the investment
climate in developing countries and help
them to attract foreign investment,
which is increasingly becoming a key
source of capital flows to LDCs and an
important contributor to their growth.
By helping more efficiently to allocate
resources on a global basis, rules on
investment will enhance the prospects
for growth in the international economy.
Structural Adjustment
Trade frictions are manifestations of
basic structural maladjustments. Policies
which inhibit adjustment to change
hamper not only the domestic economy
but also the global economy.
The United States wants an
economically vibrant Europe. While that
would make the Community an even
stronger competitor, it also would make
the Community an even larger customer,
and both of us would benefit. Of course,
our support for an economically robust
Europe goes well beyond narrow com-
mercial interests. Economic health
underpins our common security, is a
prerequisite to political stability, and
permits democratic values to flourish.
Increasingly, Europeans are pointing
to structural problems as major reasons
for Europe's failure to create new jobs
and to promote new, dynamic industries.
They point to such things as overly
generous unemployment and employee
benefit packages, rigid hiring and firing
practices, housing programs that hamper
worker mobility, disincentives to
employment-generating investment, and
interference with business decisions on
when and where to open or close plants.
In efforts to protect existing jobs,
key sectors of Europe's markets have
been closed to imports, especially in such
sectors as agriculture, telecommunica-
tions, steel and automobiles, and,
increasingly, aircraft. By freezing labor
and capital in inefficient activities,
Europe missed opportunities to grow
and expand into more dynamic activities
where it might compete better in inter-
national markets. If we are not willing to
risk change, living standards will surely
decline.
The United States also must heed
this lesson. Although we are generally
more willing than Europe to see old
industries replaced by new, we still have
pockets of protectionism that hurt our
own citizens as well as other countries.
It is hard to call a nation protectionist
which is running a $I70-billion trade
deficit, but that same deficit gives extra
power to those in our economy who
advocate barriers to imports.
Structural adjustment is not a
panacea for eliminating trade conflicts.
However, it would go far, very far
indeed, toward reducing the number and
severity of the trade problems which
confront us. Many of those problems
arise from obsolescent or inefficient
industries, wages unresponsive to the
market, and social policies which impede
growth. It is to these practices that
adjustment strategies must be aimed.
The United States has approached
structural reform with four principal
economic priorities: deregulating our
domestic economy; curtailing the growth
January 1987
45
ECONOMICS
of government expenditures; reforming
our tax system; and resisting protec-
tionism, in part through a new round of
international trade negotiations.
We have not done badly. Tax reform
is a reality. Far-reaching steps have
been taken in deregulation. A new trade
round is about to begin, and we are
aggressively tackling the most intrac-
table problem, excessive government
expenditure. This is a positive agenda
for change. We are interested in seeing
similarly positive, growth-promoting
approaches adopted by our friends and
partners.
There is, happily, visible movement
on four fronts.
First, there is a growing recogni-
tion that change is required. At the 1985
Bonn economic summit, in the
September 1985 "Plaza agreement" on
economic policy, and at the Tokyo
economic summit last spring, the major
industrialized countries pledged to pur-
sue appropriate domestic structural
measures, such as reducing rigidities in
labor and capital markets, to provide a
sound basis for more balanced, noninfla-
tionary economic growth. We see this in
concrete terms in recent moves toward
liberalization in France, privatization in
the United Kingdom, and modifica-
tions of the welfare system in the
Netherlands.
Second, work is being done in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) on structural
adjustment that will lay foundations for
the hard political decisions that govern-
ments must make.
Third, the EC Commission and the
European Court of Justice are now
facilitating change through a more
vigorous competition policy and the
drive to remove obstacles to an internal
market. I would cite, in particular, the
moves against anticompetitive practices
of the European airlines, which have
made air travel in Europe shockingly
expensive.
Fourth, the new trade round should
promote the process of adjustment,
as I have earher discussed, and by
strengthening the GATT's procedures, it
should reduce protectionism.
Current U.S.-EC Trade Issues
Earlier I emphasized the importance of
the U.S.-EC relationship because, on
specific trade issues, relations often
seem to be marked by conflict. We have
settled some problems recently, but it
took either retaliation, or the threat of
retaliation, to convince both partners
that a mutually satisfactory solution was
needed.
EC enlargement is a case in point.
As you know, the United States has long
supported the entry of Spain and Por-
tugal into the Community, and we con-
gratulate the Community, as well as the
two countries, on their accession.
As a consequence of the enlarge-
ment, however, the United States now
faces major new restrictions on its
agricultural exports to Spain and
Portugal. These include high variable
levies on Spain's grain imports, where
before there were fixed tariffs bound
under the GATT. They also include Por-
tuguese import quotas on soybeans and
other oilseeds and a requirement that
Portugal guarantee its other EC part-
ners some 15% of its grain market.
Since U.S. exports valued at roughly
$1 billion were at stake, we objected.
Moreover, important GATT principles
were involved. Only recently, after dif-
ficult negotiations, and with hundreds of
millions of dollars of retaliatory and
counterretaliatory measures in the off-
ing, was an interim solution found.
The United States and the EC have
agreed to complete negotiations by the
end of this year on a final enlargement
compensation package. We hope that the
EC understands that lower industrial
tariffs in Spain and Portugal do not
represent acceptable compensation,
either in GATT or in practical terms, for
lost agricultural sales. In fact, we face
the prospect of substantial losses in the
industrial area since, despite lower
tariffs on many products, the position of
U.S. producers relative to their Euro-
pean competitors will worsen.
Trade in civil aircraft is a growing
problem. The Airbus governments are
considering pouring enormous sums into
the development of new models which
have little or no chance of a commercial
return on investment. U.S. manufac-
turers, who must obey the harsh laws of
the marketplace, are rightly concerned
about the competition-distorting effects
of government supports for Airbus.
While we were able to agree on some
points in our recent consultations with
the Airbus governments, we must deal
with the issue of government supports.
Another area of concern is access to
European markets for telecommunica-
tion equipment and services. The United
States now has one of the most open
telecommunications markets in the
world, and Japan has made remarkable
progress in opening its telecommunica-
tions market. In many European coun-
tries, however, telecommunication
monopolies are resisting change and are
using protectionist procurement and
standards policies to keep out foreign
suppliers. We are discussing our con-
cerns with several European govern-
ments. The United States and Europe
could make a big step in the Uruguay
round toward resolving some of these
issues by bringing postal and telecom-
munications authorities into the GATT
Government Procurement Code.
Prospects
We are at a turning point in the history
of the international trading system, but
it is difficult to say now what the out-
come will be. The choice is between
increased protectionism and an unravel-
ing of the international trading system
on the one hand and, on the other hand,
a strengthened set of trade rules and
global prosperity. Much will depend on
how successful we are in containing pro-
tectionism in the United States.
Some say that the new trade round
has come too late. Many expect major
protectionist legislation from the 100th
Congress next year. However, if we can
manage this very serious threat and
avoid a torpedoing of the new round
negotiations, as at the London economic
conference of 1933, then the prospects
should be good.
I believe this for several reasons.
For the first time, agriculture is being
addressed. At the April OECD minis-
terial and at the Tokyo economic summit
last May, leaders of the major indus-
trialized countries recognized that
agriculture must now be at the top of the
international economic agenda. They
recognized that the problems of
agriculture arise in large part from
national agricultural policies that arise
from politics, not economics. Focusing
their discussions on the enormous costs
of present policies, heads of state and
government agreed in Tokyo that
"action is needed to redirect policies and
adjust the structure of agricultural pro-
duction."
The world's trading nations are also
moving forward expeditiously in organiz-
ing the Uruguay trade round negotia-
tions. There is a growing revulsion to
central planning and control. Peoples
around the world are turning to
economic freedom and the marketplace
i
46
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
;o solve problems of growth and develop-
Tient, and this provides a receptive
lackground for liberalizing international
rade.
Building on the progress we have
ichieved in launching the Uruguay
•ound, we can reinvigorate our markets
md make our domestic economies more
productive. We must recognize that
•hange is not only inevitable but also
iesirable and that our future lies in
'xploiting change, not hampering it.
Our goal is to pursue and promote
)ositive, creative strategies that will
ead to expansion of world trade and
hereby to world economic growth. To
ichieve this goal, we must convince our
lartners. as well as the protectionists
imong our own citizens, that unshack-
ing the market is not a zero-sum game
in which winners inevitably produce
iosers. We believe European leaders
hare our goals, and we will work
ogether to achieve them. But it will be a
3ng and arduous process. ■
Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki
Secretary Shultz's address before the
Review Meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) in Vienna on November 5. 1986.^
We thank the people of Austria for their
generous hospitality in hosting this con-
ference. We have all appreciated the
special warmth and courtesy of their
welcome.
We are gathered together— 35
nations of various and differing political
systems, beliefs, and circumstances— in a
common effort to build a more durable
foundation for peace and reconciliation
between the peoples of East and West.
The Helsinki Final Act provides us with
guidelines for our work. It sets forth the
promise of a more secure peace and
greater cooperation between our
peoples— a promise that can be realized
only through an expansion of basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms
for each individual.
Our common task should be to fulfill
that promise— to meet the commitments
to security and freedom contained in the
Helsinki Final Act. And to do so, we
must look to the past and the present as
well as to the future. We cannot and
should not pass lightly over our
experiences and our disappointments of
the last decade. We must examine those
occasions on which governments have
failed to implement the principles that
they have voluntarily undertaken to
uphold in the Final Act.
Such critical review is necessary if
the conference is to make genuine prog-
ress in reducing distrust and building
confidence. But at the same time, the
conference also offers us an important
opportunity to look forward. It gives us
the chance to shape a future that will
release the creative energies of all our
peoples.
The world is entering a period of
dramatic technological change, one in
which old ways of thinking and past pat-
terns of effort are increasingly inap-
propriate to new realities. The tradi-
tional barriers of time and space are day
by day eroded by advanced transport
and electronic communications, leaving
only the barriers between peoples which
are imposed by governments. The
familiar measures of industrial
development— and, by extension,
military and political strength— are less
and less capable of capturing the real
sources of social vitality. In the place of
past approaches to centralized decision-
making and management, information-
based technologies are making possible,
and necessary, greater decentralization
and individual initiative.
This trend can only be a source of
hope to all who value human creativity.
For the future, the true measure of the
dynamism of a society— and of a com-
munity of nations— will be how freely it
can encourage, exchange, and utilize
human knowledge and individual innova-
tion, how it can profit from the creativ-
ity of individual people. It is precisely
these goals of freedom and openness— so
necessary for progress in this emerging
new age— that are already embodied in
the Final Act. In seeking to heal the divi-
sions arising out of the past, the Final
Act provides us with guidelines and com-
mitments for the future. The past four
decades have seen Europe rebuilt. The
future gives us hope for a Europe
reunited. The fundamental principles of
the Final Act, if fully implemented by all
of the CSCE's participating states, give
promise of a Europe vital and confident
in its capacity for progress, of a Europe
whose people are secure in their
independence and freedom.
The Final Act recognized that peace
is not simply the absence of war. And
genuinely constructive European rela-
tions must involve more than the mere
fact of diplomatic dialogue. In the words
of President Reagan: "True peace rests
on the pillars of individual freedom,
human rights, national self-deter-
mination, and respect for the rule of
law."
U.S. Commitment to Europe
I have come to Vienna to reaffirm the
determination of the United States to
work energetically and in concert with
our friends in support of the full
implementation of the principles of the
Final Act. They are the basis of our own
policies. The American people fully sup-
port the objective of a reunified, free, and
independent community of European
nations, East and West. We are commit-
ted to that goal, and not as outsiders.
For as Europe's heirs and children, we
share and participate in the aspirations
as well as the responsibilities of Europe.
Europe and America are bound together
by ties of history, family, broad common
interest, and shared values; we can
ignore the importance and strength of
these ties only at our peril.
January 1987
47
EUROPE
The security and welfare of our
people are firmly interwoven. We
learned from bitter experience— in the
aftermath of the First World War- that
the United States cannot cut itself off
from Europe. Isolation was a course to
disaster that we are determined not to
repeat. In the years of the Second World
War, America rejoined the peoples of
Europe— first, to defeat the scourge of
tyranny and, subsequently, to help
Europe regenerate its strength through
the Marshall Plan, begun exactly 40
years ago.
Today, the United States expresses
its commitment to Europe in many
forms. Our active participation in CSCE
is one of them. We believe that we have
a positive and important role to play in
the accomplishment of CSCE's objec-
tives. We will neither forsake nor
diminish that role.
The American people believe in the
principles of freedom and openness set
forth in the Final Act. We are confident
in the vitality of our democratic values,
and we are proud to test them in open
peaceful competition with other values.
But we do not attempt to force our
beliefs on others, nor can we accept the
claim of some governments to an
inherent subversion. We respect the
inherent diversity of other societies. But
we cannot ignore the actions of govern-
ments which deny their people funda-
mental human rights. We do not seek
military superiority for ourselves, but
neither can we accept the claim of others
to a right of so-called equal security,
which has the result of creating insecu-
rity for their neighbors.
We have sought to engage the
nations of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union in a constructive discussion
of all the issues that divide us. We have
no illusions that our differences— so pro-
foundly based on conflicting visions of
the individual and the state— can be
easily resolved. But we do believe that it
is possible to build greater understand-
ing and confidence in East-West
relations.
In the area of nuclear arms control,
we may have reached a watershed in our
recent discussions with the Soviet
Union. On other issues, such as human
rights and regional conflicts, there con-
tinues to be a disappointing lack of
positive movement. To promote progress
in all of these areas, President Reagan
met with General Secretary Gorbachev
in Reykjavik last month. They continued
their discussion— begun in Geneva a year
ago— of the full agenda of East- West
\
issues. Their 2-day meeting opened a
new stage in our high-level dialogue.
Basic differences persist, but the Presi-
dent and the General Secretary reaf-
firmed their earlier agreement on the
desirability of moving ahead in our rela-
tionship, seeking to expand common
ground wherever possible.
Arms Control
Turning first to arms control, there is
now much to be done. The progress
made at Reykjavik needs to be vigor-
ously pursued. For our part, American
negotiators are prepared to do so
creatively and without delay. I will meet
with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze later today and again tomorrow to
continue our own exchanges, and I
might say we have a strong team here
together, including all three of our
principal arms negotiators in Geneva.
The United States has sought not
just limitations on the future growth of
Soviet and American nuclear arms but
their substantial reduction. Therefore,
we were encouraged when the President
and General Secretary Gorbachev
reached the basis of an agreement for a
first step of 50% reductions in Soviet
and American strategic nuclear offensive
forces over a 5-year period. For
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, we
reached an agreement of even deeper
reductions, down from a current Soviet
total of over 1,300 warheads to only 100
on longer range INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] missiles worldwide on
each side. There would be a ceiling on
shorter range INF missiles and negotia-
tions to reduce their numbers as well.
Our two nations now have a historic
opportunity to move quickly to formal
agreement on these reductions in offen-
sive nuclear weapons. We look to the
Soviet Union to join us in doing so. The
President and the General Secretary laid
the groundwork for a process of improv-
ing verification of existing agreements
to limit nuclear testing. Both sides pro-
posed to begin negotiations on the
testing issue and discussed an agenda
that would meet both sides' concerns.
Major differences on strategic defenses
remain. The President responded to
Soviet concerns by proposing that, for
10 years, both sides confine their
strategic defense programs to research,
development, and testing activities per-
mitted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty. This would take place in
the context of steady reductions in U.S.
and Soviet offensive forces and lead to
the elimination of their offensive ballistic
missiles during this decade— and on the
understanding that either side would
then have the right to deploy advanced
defenses unless agreed otherwise.
But at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union
wanted to go further— to go beyond
existing ABM Treaty provisions to
restrict research in such a way as to
cripple the American SDI [Strategic
Defense Initiative] program. This we
cannot accept. The West needs a
vigorous SDI program as permitted by
the ABM Treaty, both as an investment
in and insurance for a safer and more
stable strategic balance, a balance no
longer solely dependent upon the threat .
of mutual annihilation. Defenses can
open the way to even more ambitious
reductions in offensive nuclear forces
than those I have already described.
But such reductions can be realisti-
cally accomplished only in conjunction
with progress in addressing the very
reasons why Western deterrence must
be based today on nuclear weapons.
These include the insecurity and uncer-
tainty created by the Warsaw Pact's
massive conventional force deployment!
including its large arsenal of chemical
weapons. Together with our NATO
allies, we have been seeking to address
this imbalance in conventional forces
between East and West within the ongo^
ing mutual and balanced force reduction
in Europe, designed to meet the stated
concerns of the East and to open the
way for an agreement. The East has ye
to respond constructively.
The United States is committed to
the goal of strengthening stability and
security in the whole of Europe. We
believe that this objective can be pro-
moted through increased openness and
the establishment of a verifiable, com-
prehensive, and stable balance of con-
ventional forces at lower levels. Last
May, the NATO foreign ministers
recognized the importance of this task.
Together with our allies, we are examin
ing how best to achieve the goals set
forth in our Halifax statement on con-
ventional arms control.
Other Sources of Tension
But arms control cannot exist as process
in isolation from other sources of tensioi
in East- West relations. If arms control
measures are to make a meaningful con-
tribution to stability, they can only rein-
force, never supplant, efforts to resolve
more fundamental sources of suspicion
and political confrontation. Nowhere
does the problem of distrust and division
between East and West have greater
meaning than in the context of Europe.
48
Department of State Bulleti'
EUROPE
Since 1945, an artificial barrier has
i; divided the continent and its peoples.
. This barrier is not of Western construc-
■tion. The members of the Atlantic
alliance and the various neutral and
nonaligned nations of Europe have not
forced the division of families nor denied
our citizens the right of free movement.
I We have not sought to cut our societies
off from competing ideas through press
censorship, radio jamming, or other
means. We have not used threats or
armed intervention to enforce bloc
discipline upon individual countries.
The Helsinki Final Act and the
Madrid concluding document deal com-
prehensively with the dilemma of a
divided Europe. They recognize that the
freedom of individual men and women
must be a fundamental element of
stability and security in Europe. When
justice is violated and freedom is denied,
then the potential for conflict inevitably
' grows between nations. The delicate
•process of building confidence, coopera-
tion, and security is undermined. Presi-
' dent Reagan put it best when he noted:
"A government that will break faith
with its own people cannot be trusted to
keep faith with foreign powers .... We
place far less weight on words that are
spoken at meetings, than upon the deeds
that follow."
The commitments of the Final Act
strike a necessary balance among the
related problems of military security,
political confidence, economic coopera-
tion, fundamental human rights and
freedoms, and contacts among people. It
is important that we keep that balance.
We should welcome and encourage prog-
ress in all of these areas, but we should
not imagine that any single element
alone is sufficient to carry the whole. A
failure on our part to pursue the full
implementation of the Final Act— our
acquiescence in selective adherence to
these commitments— would undercut fur-
ther efforts to secure a more stable
peace. Impatience with the difficulties of
securing compliance should not drive us
into successive new negotiations for
their own sake. We must resist the
notion that consensus-building requires
compromises that would distort or deny
the right promised by the Final Act.
Escape from the violation of existing
commitments cannot be found in the
flight to new commitments.
Assessing CSCE Implementation
As we begin our review of the Final
Act's implementation in recent years, we
can note some important results. Over
the past decade, the CSCE umbrella has
sheltered a remarkable expansion of
human contacts between East and West.
It has supported the two-way flow of
ordinary people across a still-divided
Europe. Building upon the Final Act, the
Madrid concluding document has added
important new commitments with
respect to human rights, trade union
freedoms, religious liberties, and the
reunification of families.
The Madrid concluding document
also laid down as a basic principle the
unacceptability of supporting terrorism,
directly or indirectly. It called for
greater international cooperation in com-
batting this menace. Sadly, the events of
past months have only underscored the
pressing need for such cooperation.
In Stockholm, our nations have
adopted an accord on military
confidence-building measures. If faith-
fully implemented, this agreement will
reduce the risk of conflict in Europe,
making military activities more predict-
able and inhibiting opportunities for
political intimidation.
But success at the Stockholm
meeting earlier this fall only highlights
the disappointing lack of progress in
other aspects of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. In
particular, we continue to see a tragic
human rights situation within the
nations of the East. The list of continu-
ing human rights abuses is all too
lengthy. Within the Soviet Union, 41
members of a citizens' group established
to monitor implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act— among them
Anatoliy Marchenko and Anatoliy
Koryagin— languish in detention. There
are many more such Soviet citizens
incarcerated for trying to exercise their
basic human rights. These include Rus-
sians, Ukrainians, Baits, Jews, and men
and women of other nationalities. One of
that country's most distinguished
citizens, Dr. Audrey Sakharov, remains
incommunicado, cut off from the world
in the closed city of Gorkiy.
The Helsinki accord and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights are
solemn agreements, voluntarily signed
by the Soviet Union, which provide for
the right of emigration. Those
agreements are as solemn, as binding, as
signed, as explicit as any arms control
agreement you could imagine. So
verification and compliance are called
for. Yet spouses of our citizens are
denied exit visas. And hundreds of
thousands of Soviet Jewish citizens, as
well as Armenians, Germans, and
others, are denied permission to
emigrate. This is a direct violation-
clear, explicit, unequivocal— of what the
country signed up to do.
Elsewhere in the East, members of
Charter 77, the Catholic Church, and the
jazz section of the Musicians' Union have
been either harassed or imprisoned in
Czechoslovakia. Courageous activists of
Solidarity have suffered similarly in
Poland. 'The right to practice religious
beliefs and exercise cultural and national
rights freely continue to be limited for
many men and women in various Eastern
countries. This is particularly the case
for religious, cultural, or ethnic
minorities— as evidenced by the recent
program of forced cultural assimilation
of Bulgaria's Turkish citizens. While the
major violations of the Helsinki com-
mitments are in the human rights area,
the United States seeks balanced prog-
ress among all the elements of the CSCE
process. During the Vienna meeting, we
will work with all interested states to
achieve full implementation of the com-
mitments contained in the Helsinki Final
Act, the Madrid concluding document,
and the Stockholm document.
In the field of human rights, we will
work for full compliance with the com-
mitments already undertaken by all of
the signatories of the Final Act. We seek
steps that will bring us closer to realiz-
ing the goals set forth in principle VII
and basket 3.
In the area of economic relations, we
are prepared to explore new possibilities
for cooperation in the context of the
Final Act's provisions.
In information, we will seek to
strengthen and expand commitments to
reduce barriers to communications,
specifically, the jamming of radio
broadcasts— a violation, documented by
the United Nations, of international
agreement. It must be stopped.
In the field of security, we welcome
the positive outcome of Stockholm. The
United States will promptly and fully
implement the terms of the Stockholm
accord. We urge all others to do
likewise. Full compliance by the Soviet
Union, especially with the verification
provision of the Stockholm document,
will be an important gauge of the
possibilities for future progress in con-
ventional arms control.
But the details of the Stockholm
accord illustrate that there is still con-
siderable scope for improvement in the
area of confidence- and security-building.
The concept of openness— central to any
effort to reduce the risks of surprise
attack— has yet to be fully put into prac-
tice. Thus, the CSCE has an important
January 1987
49
EUROPE
task still before it— to encourage com-
plete implementation of the Conference
on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe
and to examine ways of carrying on the
work begun in Stockholm to enhance
confidence-building.
Meeting Commitments to
Security and Freedom
The strength of our own commitment to
the success of this followup meeting has
been expressed in the exceptional degree
of cooperation between our executive
branch and the Congress in preparations
for this meeting. Our delegation is led by
one of our most able veterans of CSCE
diplomacy, Ambassador Warren Zim-
merman. He has worked closely with the
American CSCE Commission, under the
able leadership of Senator Alfonse
D'Amato and Congressman Steny
Hoyer. His delegation includes a number
of distinguished private citizens. It has
consulted with a broad range of
American nongovernmental organiza-
tions. This delegation is representative
of the diversity of America and of
America's roots in Europe. Its voice
truly reflects the hopes and concerns of
the American people.
I spoke earlier of the past— with its
legacy of division— and of the future—
with its promise of a reunified Europe.
The continuing division of Europe has
been a source of tension, which at times
has threatened us all. But most impor-
tantly, it has meant a deadening repres-
sion of pluralism, openness, and free
inquiry among the peoples and societies
of some of the states represented here.
Because we have not sought to impose
barriers on our own peoples, the nations
of Western Europe, of North America,
and of East Asia and other regions as
well, have seen a reconciliation of former
hostilities and a dramatic expansion of
prosperity and invention. Their
success— the excitement of their
advances— is built upon the idea and
values contained in the Final Act,
including a belief in human progress, in
intellectual freedom, in political and
religious tolerance, and in the
democratic rights and creative genius
inherent in individual men and women.
We in America look to a time when
all the peoples in the community of
CSCE can share in this spirit of open-
ness and creativity and can participate in
a similar release of intellectual and social
energy. Our goal is a future in which all
the peoples of the states represented
here, both large and small, can
flourish— and by doing so, contribute to a
more secure peace and an expanded
freedom. That is the promise of Helsinki.
It is our common commitment to see
that that promise is fulfilled.
'Press release 244 of Nov. 7, 1986.
Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting
Background
On November 4, 1986, in Vienna, the 35
states of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will meet
to review implementation of commit-
ments undertaken when their govern-
ments signed the Helsinki Final Act in
1975. The Final Act established a code of
conduct for participating states'
behavior and outlined practical steps for
reducing the barriers dividing Europe. It
also created a forum in which the states
of Eastern and Western Europe, as well
as the United States and Canada, discuss
security, economic, and human rights
issues. Two followup meetings have
already been held in Belgrade (1977-78)
and Madrid (1980-83). These meetings,
in turn, mandated periodic meetings of
experts on particular aspects of the
Final Act. Most recently, experts from
CSCE states have met to discuss human
rights (Ottawa, 1985), cultural freedom
and cooperation (Budapest, 1985), and
human contacts (Bern, 1986).
Progress to Date
Although the CSCE balance sheet shows
mixed results to date, the basic fact of
the CSCE process has been the failure of
the Soviet Union and, to varying
degrees, its East European allies to com-
ply with their Helsinki and Madrid com-
mitments. As Secretary Shultz stated in
1985: "Ten years after the signing of the
Final Act, no one can deny the gap
between hope and performance. Despite
the real value of the Final Act as a
standard of conduct, the most important
promises of a decade ago have not been
kept."
Egregious new compliance failures
occur and old ones continue. The Soviet
Union still occupies Afghanistan and
imprisons and otherwise penalizes its
own citizens for exercising the rights
and freedoms promised in the Final Act.
Despite the recent resolution of several
cases, many Soviet citizens married to
Americans are cruelly separated from
their spouses by official denial of exit
permission. The number of Soviet Jews
allowed to emigrate, mainly for family
reunification, has fallen drastically from
the levels permitted in the late 1970s.
The same is true for Soviet citizens of
German and Armenian nationality.
Recently, U.S. reporter Nicholas
Daniloff was taken hostage on fabricatedl
charges of espionage— in flagrant viola-
tion of CSCE pledges concerning the
treatment of journalists.
Over the years, however, there has
been some progress in CSCE. Some
Warsaw Pact states have taken steps
toward fulfilling their Helsinki and
Madrid CSCE commitments, and a few
notable cases involving human rights
activists and divided families have been
resolved. Under the CSCE umbrella,
contacts between the peoples of Eastern
CSCE Process
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, Geneva, Sept.' 18, 1973-July 21,
1975; the Final Act was signed in Helsinki
Aug. 1, 1975 (text in BULLETIN of Sept. 1,
1975)
Followup Meetings
• Belgrade. Oct. 4, 1977-Mar. 8, 1978
(te.xt of concluding document in BULLETIN of
Apr. 1978)
. Madrid, Nov. 11, 1980-Sept. 9. 1983
(text of concluding document in Bulletin of
Oct. 1983)
• Vienna, Nov. 4, 1986'
Experts' Meetings
• Peaceful settlement of disputes (Mon-
treaux, 1978; Athens, 1984)
• Cooperation in the Mediterranean
(Valletta, 1979; Venice, 1984)
• Science (Hamburg. 1979)
• Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (Stockholm, 1984-86)
• Human rights (Ottawa, 1985)
• Cultural fonim (Budapest, 1985)
• Human contacts (Bern, 1986) ■
50
Department of State Bulletin |l,
EUROPE
md Western Europe have multiplied. At
);he Stockholm Conference on Con-
fidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the
35 participants concluded more than 2V2
v'ears of negotiations in September 1986
A'ith agreement on specific measures to
[•educe the risk of war through miscal-
:ulation. The agreement, which enters
nto effect in January 1987. extends
Helsinki provisions concerning the
notification and observation of military
activities from the Atlantic to the Urals.
For the first time, the East accepted
:hallenge inspection of such activities by
ither states.
U.S. Objectives
For the United States and its NATO
illies at Vienna, the primary aim is to
mprove significantly Eastern com-
Dliance with all the principles and provi-
sions of the Helsinki and Madrid
locuments. At the outset, the West will
"eview thoroughly Eastern performance
ijince the close of the Madrid meeting,
i'aising specific problems in conference
sessions and bilateral meetings.
Another important aim is to promote
mlanced progress among the different
dimensions of the CSCE process to
ensure human rights are given at least
equal weight with other CSCE elements.
Balance is critical to promoting the Final
Act's goals of security and cooperation.
The successful outcome of the Stockholm
security talks highlights the need to
iddress human problems— human rights,
Dasic freedoms, and humanitarian
:ooperation. Tangible steps in these
fields are necessary if the CSCE process
IS to advance. It is important that the
new steps forward be based solidly on
significant improvement in compliance
with existing commitments.
Considerable interest has been
expressed in encouraging compliance
and cooperation on economic,
environmental, and scientific matters.
The meeting also will review the future
of the CDE conference in the context of
the broader CSCE process.
Secretary's News Conference In Vienna
Taken from the GIST series of Oct. 1986,
gublished by the Bureau of Public Affairs,
department of State. Editor: Harriet
Cufley. ■
Secretary Shultz held a news confer-
ence in Vienna on Noremher 6. 1986. fol-
lowing his meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.'
We came here well prepared to build on
the results of Reykjavik. We are also
prepared to be patient in doing so, as we
must be, since the rhythm and pace of
this negotiation cannot be forced by
either side. I cannot report the kind of
progress we would like, but we will con-
tinue to work for progress in all areas of
our extensive agenda with the Soviet
Union.
I have just concluded over 5 hours of
talks with Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze, including about 3 hours of private
time. The meetings dealt with all four
areas of our agenda. The U.S. purpose in
coming here was to confirm and build on
the results of Reykjavik. We brought
along our top experts so we could have
the kind of intensive discussions that
have brought progress over the last few
months. The experts met last night for
more than 3 hours. I can't say that the
meetings have moved arms control mat-
ters along in any significant way, and I
regret this. We did move along in other
areas, and I'll review them.
First, on human rights: I took the
occasion of my private session for a
thorough and frank statement of our
most pressing concerns on human rights
and humanitarian issues. During the
course of the discussions, we pressed the
Soviets for some regular process to
review these kinds of concerns. We do
believe that they now agree that these
issues will be part of the regular reviews
that we have on bilateral issues, and we
will bring them up. I will, of course, con-
tinue to raise these issues at my level, as
we will on all occasions when we meet
with the Soviets. It's important that the
Soviets come to realize how strongly we
in the West feel about Soviet abuse of
human rights, and how serious an
obstacle it is to the long-term progress in
our relations.
On regional issues: There has been
an expanding dialogue. We held one
cycle of experts' meetings in 1985, and
we have repeated the cycle this year. In
August, we added a new, more broadly
focused meeting at the level of Under
Secretary of State. We have suggested
to the Soviets that we start planning a
new cycle of those meetings, and they
are considering that proposal, and I
expect that in due course we will
proceed.
On bilateral affairs: At Reykjavik
we reached agreement on a fairly
ambitious program of bilateral activities.
This work has gone forward since then
and produced results. Last week, for
example, we reached agreement on the
basic elements for cooperation in civil
space programs. We have also had some
good exchanges on a number of other
areas, such as nuclear fusion, transporta-
tion, and energy. Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze and I agreed that this
bilateral work program should move
forward.
We had extensive discussions about
nuclear arms control. Since Reykjavik,
our objective has been to build on the
results of Reykjavik and translate them
into action at Geneva. In fact, the
United States has already been doing
this by formally incorporating the
Reykjavik results into our negotiating
positions at Geneva.
Thus, we came to Vienna prepared
to confirm the progress made at Reyk-
javik. In addition, there are still some
very important areas of disagreement in
each of the three negotiating areas of
Geneva— START [strategic arms reduc-
tion talks], INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces], and defense in space.
We came there hoping to discuss these
differences, to clarify them, and, if possi-
ble, to narrow them. In other words, we
came prepared to move forward. We
brought our arms control experts, and
we had prepared papers covering each of
the major nuclear arms control subjects.
These papers reflected areas of agree-
ment, and where there were differences,
we stated clearly our positions and our
understanding of the Soviet positions.
Unfortunately, it has not been possible
to move ahead as we had hoped. These
issues will continue to be pursued by our
negotiators in Geneva, who will continue
explaining the new U.S. proposals
reflecting the progress in Reykjavik. To
maintain momentum, we also proposed
that the U.S. and Soviet experts get
together between the nuclear and space
talks rounds— the current one will end
early next week and the next one won't
start until January— so we proposed that
experts get together as they did last
summer between rounds and see if they
can make some progress as they did last
summer. That offer is on the table. We
suggested language that would permit
initiation of negotiations on nuclear
testing. The Soviets didn't seem to be
interested.
January 1987
51
EUROPE
The Foreign Minister and I discussed
conventional arms control and chemical
weapons. I emphasized that progress in
these areas was a necessary complement
to progress in reducing nuclear arms. I
also pointed out a key to existing
negotiations on both subjects was
verification. And, we are still waiting for
a serious Soviet effort to address our
proposals in this regard. We gave them a
package which set out what we believe
was agreed at Reykjavik and where
there are differences, set forth our posi-
tion and our understanding of their
position.
On START, the point of departure is
the agreement at Reykjavik to 1,600
intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and heavy bombers. There
would be no more than 6,000 warheads
on these systems. That was agreed. We
repeated the counting rule for bombers
that was worked out at Reykjavik.
Now, the next step which we pro-
posed is to add sublimits to this
framework. We proposed sublimits of
4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300
ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on
permitted ICBMs except those on silo-
based, light- and medium-ICBMs with
six or fewer warheads. These numbers
represent substantial movement in the
direction of the Soviet position. These
reductions would be carried out in a
phased manner and completed by the
end of 1991.
We also put forward verification
ideas that were discussed and agreed in
principle in Reykjavik. These call for a
comprehensive exchange of data, on-site
observation of elimination down to
agreed levels, an effective monitoring of
remaining inventories, and associated
facilities, including on-site inspection.
So, that's in essence our START
position, and where we think the
agreements are in Reykjavik— where it's
important to move forward.
Our presentation on INF began with
the solution agreed upon at Reykjavik:
to reduce longer range INF missiles to
100 warheads worldwide on each side.
The 100 warheads on the Soviet side
would be in Soviet Asia. The 100 on the
U.S. side would be in the United States.
Neither side would deploy such missiles
in Europe. Basically, that was agreed in
Reykjavik. These reductions would be
carried out in a phased manner and com-
pleted i)y the end of 1991. We set forth
our position on shorter range missiles,
that the numbers should be constrained
at or below the current Soviet level, and
that the United States, of course, would
have the right to the same number. We
understand the Soviet vievv is that their
present monopoly in such weapons
should be frozen. We cannot accept that.
We advanced for INF the same verifica-
tion ideas discussed a moment ago for
START and which were agreed in princi-
ple in Reykjavik. These limits would
remain in effect until superseded by
agreement providing for further reduc-
tions. Follow-on negotiations would
begin by a date certain aimed at the
elimination of long-range INF missiles
on both sides worldwide, and also would
deal with the question of shorter range
INF missiles.
In the area of defense in space, we
repeated our willingness to undertake
for 10 years not to exercise our existing
right of withdrawal from the ABM [Anti-
ballistic Missile] Treaty. During that
period, the sides would strictly observe
all provisions of the ABM Treaty. Within
the first 5 years of the 10-year period,
the strategic offensive arms of the two
sides would be reduced by 50%, as I've
just discussed. During the following 5
years, our position is that the remaining
offensive ballistic missiles of the two
sides would be eliminated. The Soviet
position is that all strategic offensive
arms would be eliminated. At the end of
this 10-year period, in our view, either
side would be free to deploy advance
strategic defenses if it so chose, unless
the sides agreed otherwise. Again, the
verification ideas I discussed a few
moments ago would be applied to this
agreement as well.
In the area of verification, since
there was a considerable discussion back
and forth in Reykjavik between the two
leaders, and they both confirmed to each
other their insistence that extensive and
intrusive verification had to accompany
agreements of this magnitude, we put
forward some separate statements on
the subject. We laid out in some detail
our view on the central role of verifica-
tion in this process and the need to con-
currently negotiate effective measures
that would give both sides confidence in
the observance of the obligations that
were assumed.
On nuclear testing, we laid out the
basis on which we are prepared to begin
negotiations on nuclear testing. The
agenda for these negotiations would first
be to resolve verification issues
associated with existing treaties. With
this resolved, the two sides would
immediately proceed in parallel with the
reduction and elimination of nuclear
weapons to address further step-by-step
limitations on testing, leading ultimately
to the elimination of nuclear testing.
So you can see that we laid out in
some detail our view of where we stand
following Reykjavik. The agreements we
proposed are fair to both sides and
would be a dramatic step forward. And I
continue to believe that as this process
and the rhythm and pace of it moves
along we may wind up, 4 or 5 years from
now, looking back at Reykjavik as a
watershed meeting. We put forward
language to record what was agreed;
and where differences remain, we put
forward our position and our under-
standing of the Soviet position. Our
objective was to clarify where we stand
and, where possible, to narrow dif-
ferences. The only real progress I can
report is that we, again, made our posi-
tion clear, and we affirmed our readiness
to move ahead on these important
matters.
I'll be glad to have your questions.
Q. Apart from Geneva, what hap-
pens now? Will you and Mr. Shevard-
nadze meet again?
A. We haven't made any explicit
date, but we affirmed to each other that
as two human beings and foreign
ministers we have a responsibility to the
potentiality of what was agreed in
Reykjavik— to keep after it. And I men-
tioned the proposal we have on the table
for some experts' talks, and we, of
course, are in constant touch through
our diplomatic channels. If a meeting
between us seems useful, I'm sure we'll
be able to arrange it, but getting
ourselves set to make such a meeting
fruitful is the key.
Q. You did not, I believe, refer to
the issue of terrorism, and it was our
understanding that you would try to
enlist Soviet understanding, if not
cooperation, in the U.S. concern about
Syrian state-support of terrorism and
other incidents of terrorism. Did you
discuss the issue? Did you get any
results?
A. I certainly did discuss the issue.
And I pointed up the fact that a careful
British judicial process sifted through
and weighed evidence and came to the
conclusion— and the facts are there— that
Syria, as a government, took part in the
planned terrorist act in connection with
the El Al plane. I think it is also
apparent from the investigations of
other terrorist incidents that Syria
seems to have a role, but the British
evidence is the most concrete and com-
plete. There is also continuing evidence
about Libya's involvement.
Of course, the investigation by
Pakistan of the Karachi terrorist act
continues, and I invited the Foreign
nil
ilii
9
§
[ft
81
M
52
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
f
linister to look carefully at tills
vidence. I didn't get any agreement
•ith him that Syria is involved in ter-
irist acts, but he said he would look at
ne evidence.
Q. You spoke a lot of the
imerican position as being very forth-
oming. Did the Soviets simply listen
9 you? Did they put forward their own
litiative and proposals to narrow the
ap?
A. I'm sure they will give their
lews, so it's not for me to try to do
hat. However, as we found it difficult to
ngage them in a discussion of all of
hese various issues that were covered in
Reykjavik, and found them focusing con-
inuously on the question of the meaning
f the ABM Treaty as to permitted ac-
ivities and their proposal about
iboratory research, it seemed to us that
heir objective of trying to cripple— or it
1, eemed to us that they have the objec-
ts ive of crippling— the President's effort
find out how we can defend ourselves
gainst ballistic missiles. If that is their
'bjective, it is not going to work. On the
•ther hand, there are some very impor-
ant matters that can be moved forward
in, and we will continue patiently to
vork at them.
■ Q. Did you propose to the Soviets
' 'hat we go ahead and try to reach a
.eparate agreement on INF, and did
hey respond to you by saying that all
)f this must be [inaudible]?
A. We didn't get to that point
)ecause we found it so difficult to
■ngage them with these different sub-
ects as they were fixed on only one
subject.
Q. Did you have a chance to raise
ivith the Secretary the Baltic issue,
ind if you have not, will the American
Jelegation raise the Baltic issue of the
Estonian, Latvian [inaudible]?
A. All of these issues will be raised
at the CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] Conference.
I heard a lot about it last night, and we
have made our views clear, across the
board, on humanitarian and human
rights issues.
Q. Could you amplify on what you
meant by them trying to cripple the
SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] pro-
gram by their insistence on discussing
the meaning of ABM in the laboratory
proposal? Because some people have
suggested that really the Soviets are
making a compromise here or that they
weren't really trying to cripple it, that
there was a misunderstanding. Could
you explain why — what the Soviets are
talking about— would make it impossi-
ble for the SDI to proceed?
A. If you narrow the scope of what
can be done by way of research and
testing and discovering how to defend
yourself against ballistic missiles, if you
constrain the scope of that program
beyond what is called for under the ABM
Treaty, you make it more and more dif-
ficult for the research to be productive;
and, therefore, you slow down and crip-
ple the program. That's what we won't
agree to. We believe that the program
can go forward perfectly effective,
strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the ABM Treaty, which are being
observed, and that's sufficient. We'll
stick with the treaty. We don't want to
change it.
Q. The main question is why the
United States needs the SDI when
there are possibilities to disappear the
whole atomic nuclear weapons in 10
years. Could you go, please, a little
deeper toward this problem?
A. For three reasons. First, it may
or may not be true that these weapons
will disappear. So, in the meantime, if
we can learn how to defend ourselves
against them, we must do so. Second,
it's clear that if you believe there is a
chance for these radical reductions to
take place, it is also clear that one of the
reasons why that is so is the existence of
a strong, active, and promising program
of research. Third, if an agreement is
reached and a process of reduction takes
place, you want to be sure it continues.
I've said there were only three
reasons; I've got a fourth. AJfter you
have completed the process, it's known
in the world how to produce these
weapons. So when something is known,
you can't be sure that it won't be pro-
duced somewhere. So you need an in-
surance policy. If you're going to build
yourself a nice house and invest your
fortune in it, of whatever size, you cer-
tainly are going to want to take out an
insurance policy, and having the ability
to defend yourself is that insurance
policy. So there are very important
reasons why it's critical for us, and for
people all over the world, that this effort
to find out how to defend ourselves go
forward.
Q. Did you discuss the question of
another summit in the near future?
A. No, the subject never came up.
Q. Is it now your conclusion there
is no prospect for an agreement on
European missiles so long as
[inaudible]?
A. No, I tried to indicate my view.
This is a long-paced negotiation, I'm
sure, and it has its rhythm. The pace
can't be forced by either party. So it
shifts around, and our approach is to be
in close consultation with our allies, to
maintain the strong and unified position
that we have, and to be patient in work-
ing for the results that we believe are
essential. And we'll keep at it. I think
that in the end there is a very good
chance that we'll get there.
Q. Going back to the question of
what the Soviets want the ABM Treaty
to mean, did they offer you any
extended definition of the laboratory
that might include, say, space-based
research facilities, or did they offer in
any way to adhere to an agreement
that would essentially enshrine the
[inaudible] United States as a restric-
tive interpretation of the ABM Treaty?
A. The discussions really didn't get
into that kind of detail; although, cer-
tainly if we are able to engage them in
Geneva, or if there is the kind of
experts' meeting that I referred to, we
are prepared to state what we think that
treaty permits. We've done so, and did
so last night briefly, for that matter, and
listened to what they had to say.
Q. Mr. Gorbachev should have
gone to Washington before the end of
this year to meet with Mr. Reagan,
and Mr. Reagan should have gone to
Moscow some time next year. Are the
prospects now for any major arms con-
trol deal within the Reagan presidency
now dead?
A. I think that the meeting at Reyk-
javik moved matters forward across the
board in dramatic ways, and the problem
now is to somehow capture that move-
ment in all of the areas that I've gone
through here and make it a reality. And
since there has been so much progress
comparing now with, say, 2 years ago— I
recalled with Mr. Shevardnadze this
morning, we sat in a room in their
embassy— I sat there for 6 hours with
Mr. Gromyko. At the end, there came
the beginnings of what emerged at the
President's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev
in Geneva a year ago. So we keep at
this, and I think some progress will
be made.
Q. The Soviet Minister, Shevard-
nadze, left saying that these talks left
him with a bitter aftertaste. He
accused the United States of
backtracking — his words — from the
achievements made at Reykjavik. Do
these talks leave you with a bitter
aftertaste as to the lack of prog^ress
he's obviously referring to here?
January 1987
53
EUROPE
A. Bitter aftertaste is his word. He
told me he was going to say that, and I
told him what I was going to say, and we
each choose our words, no doubt with
care. I prefer words like "we were well
prepared," "we're prepared to be pa-
tient," "we understand that negotiations
of this kind have a rhythm and pace to
them, and we'll work with it."
Q. In the context of either ter-
rorism or regional disputes, did the
subject of the U.S. arms embargo on
Iran come up, was that subject
discussed, and does the United States
still have an arms embargo?
A. The subject didn't come up.
Q. You now have just about 2
years before the end of the Reagan
Administration. In light of what's hap-
pened here, do you think there is really
any prospect for any kind of agree-
ment within these 2 years?
A. We are certainly prepared for
one, and as I pointed out a number of
times, we came here with a very strong
team and with written statements to
work from. We'll continue in that vein.
Two years is a long time.
Q. Did the Soviet proposal or
argument [inaudible] change in any
way between Reykjavik and what you
heard [inaudible]?
A. The problem wasn't so much
change as it was an inability somehow in
the discussions we had here to review
carefully the sweep of things discussed
in Reykjavik, as they seemed so fixed on
just one or two aspects of it. There was
progress made across the board, and
there were problems identified across
the board. So we came here feeling that
the way to proceed is to, in a sense,
codify, nail down the progress, identify
where the problems are; and that's a
method of starting to work through solu-
tions to the problems. And we'll continue
to strive for that.
Q. Even though the subject didn't
come up in your meetings with Mr.
Shevardnadze, can you give us your
views on approaches to Iran over the
hostages in Lebanon [inaudible] spare
parts?
A. All of those questions, as I said
earlier, are being handled out of the
White House, and I don't have any com-
ment on them.
'Press release 243. ■
Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the
Federal Republic of Germany made an
official visit to the United States October
20-23. 1986. to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.
Following are arrival remarks made
by President Reagan and Chancellor
Kohl and the text of a joint statement on
the establishment of the U.S. -German
Youth Exchange Council.'^
ARRIVAL REMARKS,
OCT. 21, 19862
President Reagan
Today it's an honor to welcome
Chancellor Kohl. This marks his sixth
visit to us as leader of the German
Federal Republic. He and his fellow
citizens are friends and partners with
whom we share a desire for peace and a
commitment to the principles of human
freedom.
Our nations' solid bilateral ties, our
resolve to maintain the viability of the
Western alliance, and our dedication to
the values and ideals which are the
underpinning of political and economic
freedom have been a great boon to the
German and American peoples. The
great German writer-philosopher
Gotthold Lessing once wrote: "Nothing
under the sun is ever accidental." Well,
40 years of European peace have been
no accident. The good fortune can be
traced, to a great degree, to the solidar-
ity and cooperation between our two
peoples and governments.
When a buildup of intermediate-
range missiles by our adversary
threatened the peace, our alliance was
put to the test. Chancellor Kohl and his
government stood firm in the face of a
well-orchestrated international and
domestic propaganda campaign aimed at
paralyzing our ability to respond.
The deployment, however, of
weapons is not an end in itself; it is a
means to an end. What we seek is the
security of our countries, the freedom of
our peoples, and the peace of the world.
Our strength of purpose, as well as our
military might, are vehicles in the search
for a lasting peace.
Chancellor Kohl's visit comes at an
opportune time. I look forward to
discussing with him my recent meetings
with General Secretary Gorbachev and
subsequent events. There is, as I will
explain, ample reason for optimism.
Whatever progress is made, it will be
based on the solid foundation Germans
and Americans have built together, par-
ticularly in the last half decade.
Three years ago, I presented a plan
which would have reduced American and
Soviet longer range INF missiles to zero
globally, thus called the zero option.
Building on the diplomacy of interceding
years as well as the deployment of our
cruise and Pershings, General Secretary
Gorbachev and I came close in Iceland to
reaching an agreement that would have
drastically reduced these missiles on
both sides. We are now striving to build
upon the progress achieved in Reykjavik.
And it should not escape anyone's
attention that the Soviet Union and the
United States are now seriously talking
about reducing offensive weapons. This
is a giant step forward from the time,
not so long ago, when arms talks merely
put a cap on weapons at high levels, per-
mitting the building of more missiles and
more warheads.
When the next agreement is finally
reached with the Soviet Union— and I
say when, not if— it will not be the result
of weakness or timidity on the part of
Western nations. Instead, it will flow
from our strength, realism, and unity.
Our allies in these last few years
have withstood intimidation and brazen
interference in their domestic political
processes. Our adversaries misjudged
individuals like Chancellor Kohl and the
other leaders of the Western
democracies. Under intense pressure,
they did what was necessary: held firm.
And because of their fortitude, the free
world is now neither vulnerable nor
subservient.
The record of the European peoples
is long and glorious. In so many ways,
Europe is the cradle of modern civiliza-
tion. The indomitable spirit demon-
strated by our European neighbors and
allies in the postwar era— from the
Berlin airlift to our solidarity leading to
my recent meetings in Iceland— has
made the difference. The tide has been
met, the tide turned, and the flow of
history is now on the side of the free.
We in the West are now engaged in
a great technological revolution: in
medicine, electronics, physics, and so
many fields of human endeavor. More
has been discovered in the 20th century
than in all the preceding centuries put
together. Our scientists, at this moment
are making great strides toward
developing technology that can protect
54
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
nankind against ballistic missiles, and
hat protection applies to the United
■ states, our allies, and, yes, even our
idversaries, if need be.
A purely defensive system that
nakes these missiles ineffective also
nakes them more negotiable. A defen-
■ive system makes an arms reduction
agreement more likely because it offers
irotection against cheating. This and not
rust will lead to reducing, and we hope
iltimately eliminating, the nuclear
irsenals that now threaten all humanity,
f a defensive system was not a viable
iption, the Soviet Union would not be
lommitting so much of its own resources
n developing and deploying strategic
lefenses of its own.
Technology can open up new doors
peace and security, and that's what
lur Strategic Defense Initiative is all
ibout. The time has come to rechannel
' he efforts of some of our best minds to
levelop tools which can be used to main-
ain peace, tools that protect rather than
;ill. The United States stands ready, as I
issured Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland and
•eaffirm today, to negotiate seriously
ibout safeguards that will enable the
Soviet Union to share in the benefits of
trategic defense.
What we in the West have done to
ebuild our strength and revitalize our
lUiance has guaranteed the peace, but a
asting peace cannot be based simply on
m arms agreement. Better relations
nust include more and open, freer con-
acts between people and governments,
1 respect for human rights, and an end
,0 those regional conflicts that continue
.0 plague mankind.
Chancellor Kohl and the German
people have been steadfast in their sup-
port and in their friendship for many
/ears. They know, as we do, that our
lestinies and those of all free people are
.led. We strive for a free, secure, and
prosperous world— a world at peace; and
tve do it, together, with our friends and
lilies, the German people. So it gives me
great pleasure to welcome Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, a partner, colleague, and
friend.
Chancellor KohP
I'm delighted to be in Washington again,
and I feel that this wonderful fall day,
■with its sunshine, is a very true symbol
standing for the nature of the relation-
ship between our two countries.
And it gives me particular pleasure,
Mr. President, to see you again— a good
friend of our country and an esteemed
personal friend. This is the seventh time
that we have met since I took over the
office of Federal Chancellor back in
1982, and this figure alone gives an
indication of the intensity and closeness
of the relations between our two coun-
tries and governments.
And in addition, we have often been
in contact, consulting each other by let-
ter or telephone. And I would like to
take this opportunity before the public of
your country, here, to express my
appreciation and my great gratitude for
this trustful cooperation. I thank you for
this form of close cooperation which is
based on mutual trust, and it is a token
of a friendship and partnership under-
pinned by shared values, ideals, and
interests.
Germans and Americans are united
with the British, the French, the
Italians, and others in the Atlantic
alliance, an alliance of historical dimen-
sion. It is a community based on
reciprocity, a defensive alliance against
aggression and political blackmail, an
alliance for the preservation of
democracy, freedom, and human rights.
The security of the Federal Republic
of Germany is indissolubly linked with
this alliance and through our partnership
with the United States of America. Only
with the assistance of the United States
can the security of Western Europe be
assured. The American troops in the
Federal Republic of Germany are
defending our common freedom together
with our troops, and they are welcome in
our country. Mr. President, you and
your fellow citizens in this country
should know that the vast majority of
the citizens of the Federal Republic of
Germany are in favor of the presence of
these troops, and they regard them as
their friends. And we know that we can
rely on each other.
The European allies render an
important contribution to our common
defense. And the 12 states united in the
European Community are undergoing a
dynamic process of political and
economic integration through which the
European pillar of the alliance will be
strengthened. And we Europeans have
recognized that this is the only way in
which we can play a role in tomorrow's
work.
In your speech to the European
Parliament in Strasbourg in May 1985,
you welcomed and appreciated this
development. It will not be detrimental
to our alliance, but is going to
strengthen it.
It remains our goal— and I know that
I share it with you, Mr. President— to
create peace and security with ever
fewer weapons. In Reykjavik, thanks to
your serious and consistent efforts in
pursuit of peace, a major step was taken
in this direction; and we must now take
the opportunities that present them-
selves without endangering our defen-
sive capability.
Your meeting with General
Secretary Gorbachev confirmed that the
Soviet Union, too, is interested in an
improvement of the relations between
West and East. And we should take the
Soviet Union at its word and sound out
at the negotiating table where real prog-
ress could be made.
My government is contributing
actively to the efforts to promote
dialogue and cooperation, confidence,
understanding, and reconciliation. The
world is looking hopefully to the two
superpowers, but the small- and medium-
sized states must play their part and
make their contributions as well.
In your impressive speech to the
young Germans gathered at Hamburg
Castle, in my home district, in 1985, you
said: "The future belongs to the free."
Let us continue to work together for this
goal. We must convince the young
people, the young generation, in the
United States, in the Federal Republic of
Germany, all over the world, that it is
worthwhile to stand up for our values for
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.
You have been persuasive and
vigorous, Mr. President, in your support
of an increase in youth exchanges be-
tween our peoples. For that, I am
grateful to you, and we will discuss this
subject further. Together, we shall
create conditions under which even more
young people from our two countries will
have the chance to get to know one
another.
Under your leadership, the United
States of America has rediscovered self-
confidence and regained a spirit of enter-
prising leadership. As in the past, these
are the qualities that will enable the
American nation to master the chal-
lenges of the future. The Federal
Republic of Germany, with all its
citizens, will be a loyal friend and part-
ner to the United States of America as it
goes about this task.
JOINT STATEMENT,
OCT. 21, 1986
U.S. -German friendship and cooperation
enhance our mutual interests. We are
convinced that youth exchange of all
kinds will help ensure that this friend-
ship will flourish in the future. We agree
on the need to have our succeeding
generations play an increasingly active
role in promoting this friendship. In
recent decades there have been many
January 1987
55
GENERAL
youth exchanges between the United
States and the Federal Republic of
Germany
Recently, with the impetus of the
Presidential Youth Exchange Initiative
of 1982 and subsequent important con-
tributions from the Federal Republic of
Germany, bilateral exchanges have
nearly tripled. To ensure that these
exchanges will thrive, we have agreed to
the creation of a U.S-German Youth
Exchange Council.
Our two governments, as well as
nongovernmental organizations and
individuals who have been involved in
youth exchanges, or those who have
played a leading role in U.S. -German
relations, will be represented. The Coun-
cil will provide advice on improving
youth exchange programs, suggest new
exchange initiatives, and explore addi-
tional funding resources. The Council
will meet at least once a year in
Washington or Bonn in connection with
the cultural exchange talks between the
United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany.
U.S. Policy Toward the Third World
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27, 1986.
2Made at the South Portico of the White
House, where Chancellor Kohl was accorded a
formal welcome with full military honors.
'Chancellor Kohl spoke in German, and
his remarks were translated by an inter-
preter. ■
by Michael H. Armacost
Address before the National Third
World Studies Conference in Omaha,
Nebraska, on October 17, 1986.
Ambassador Armacost is Under
Secretary for Political Affairs.
I'm delighted to be here this afternoon
to address the ninth National Third
World Studies Conference. I have been
asked to offer some observations re-
garding U.S. policy toward this large,
diverse, and important group of
countries.
I am happy to do so. There is more
than a little challenge in the assignment,
for you should know that there is no
bureau in the Department of State
responsible for dealing with the Third
World per se. Those who deal with its
myriad concerns and the numerous
challenges it presents are scattered
among a variety of offices. Let me
attempt to pull together a few of the
central threads.
The Third World
and Its Importance
What is the "Third World," and why is
it important to the conduct of our
foreign policy?
When we speak of the Third World,
we are using an imprecise description— a
term of journalistic convenience, not of
precise analysis. We usually credit the
French with coining it. To those with a
sense of history, it perhaps recalled the
Third Estate of commoners, who
opposed both the king and the church. In
practical political parlance, the Third
World has come to describe developing
countries that seek to avoid domination
by the superpowers and to preserve
their freedom of maneuver between East
and West. To the extent the term sug-
gests common aspirations among coun-
tries as diverse as China and Burma,
Cuba and Brazil, Libya and Saudi
Arabia, Nigeria and Botswana, the term
can be positively misleading.
Yet there is a core of solidarity
among Third World countries that
derives from shared memories of past
humiliations, a resolve to remove the
remaining relics of colonialism, and what
one astute observer has described as "an
almost racial feeling that Asians and
Africans were, in a sense, a separate
part of humanity, long victimized and
now claiming their birthright." i
Third World nations are of great
importance to the United States. ,
Developing countries occupy more than ;
half of the world's surface and embrace ■
75% of its population. They contain vast;
material and human resources and are o'
great consequence to our economy as ■
suppliers and markets. ]
A third of our manufactured exports
goes to the Third World, which also
takes about 40% of our agricultural
exports. A high percentage of our crude
oil imports comes from the Third World
as does the bulk of certain industrial rav
materials. For example about two-thirds
of our bauxite comes from Jamaica and
Guinea. Nearly two-thirds of our tin is
imported from Thailand, Malaysia, Indo
nesia, and Bolivia.
Increasingly, Third World countries^
including a number without impressive
natural resource endowments, exert a
powerful force on investment flows and
world trade in manufactured products
through their entrepreneurial prowess,
their capacity for innovation, and their
marketing skill. For these latter coun-
tries, the line between a developed and ;
developing nation has been crossed or a
least blurred.
The strategic location of many
developing countries also gives them a
special military and geopolitical impor-
tance to us. Some, like South Korea,
Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines,
are close allies; others provide us access
to important military facilities; still
others deny the Soviets such facilities.
Beyond this, the countries of the
Third World collectively represent an
important political force. Over time, the;
have given various organizational
expressions to their shared perspectives
and aims. The Nonaligned Movement
(NAM) was formally organized at the
Belgrade summit convoked by Marshal
Tito in 1961. But the roots of Third
World efforts to define foreign policies
independent of the superpowers can be
traced back at least to the Bandung con-
ference of April 1955. The leaders of the
movement at that point were primarily
Asians— among them, Nehru, U Nu,
Sukarno, and Chou En-lai.
In the 1960s, the newly independent
countries of Africa sought strength in
numbers and found common cause in
I
t
56
Department of State Bulletir
GENERAL
iforts to protect their independence and
•omote their development. Their
fluence was registered in the brief
jpearance of the Afro-Asian Peoples
olidarity Organization and more per-
anently in the expansion and growing
)iceof the NAM.
As attention shifted from the protec-
on of sovereignty to economic develop-
ent, the Latin American countries—
ost of whom attained independence in
le 19th century— found they shared
lany common aims and common afflic-
ons with the Africans and Asians.
ideed. the Latin Americans asserted a
Tong lead in the first UN Conference
ti Trade and Development in Geneva in
964. The Group of 77 (G-77)-which
icreased its numbers but kept its
crony m— became the principal lobbying
("ganization through which developing
juntries pressed for radical adjust-
lents in the international economic
,'stem.
In the 1970s, certain Arab states—
irticularly those with oil— found their
iace in the forefront of the NAM and
-77. OPEC's [Organization of
etroleum Exporting Countries] success
5 a supplier cartel able to manipulate
applies and administer prices fueled a
rowing sense of power among all
eveloping countries. A number of
lem— Algeria, in particular, comes to
lind— took the lead in pressing for a
ew international economic order based
n the premise that the structural
:onomic problems of developing coun-
ties were the responsibility of the
eveloped world, whose members conse-
uently had an obligation to redistribute
lobal wealth and economic power as
Dmpensation for past transgressions.
By the mid-1980s, a changing inter-
ational economy and the success of
ome developing countries with market-
riented economic development had
aken much of the steam out of efforts to
egislate a new international economic
rder. The NAM maintained ritual sup-
lort for far-reaching structural economic
eforms, but attention returned strongly
political issues.
Economically, the differentiation of
?hird World nations is well advanced,
^or do they speak with a single voice
)olitically. Yet, to enhance their coUec-
ive influence in international fora, they
lave coordinated closely on many such
ssues through the NAM.
U.S. Policy Principles
Let me turn to some of the principles
that inform U.S. policy toward the Third
World. For peoples and nations so heter-
ogeneous and so diverse in their claims
on our interest, there can be no simple
U.S. policy. However, we approach the
Third World with a number of general
policy guidelines in mind.
First, we attach high importance to
the economic development of the Third
World. This is a matter of self-interest
but also reflects our sense of respon-
sibility for helping to create a stable
global environment in which all share a
stake.
We have been the leading source of
financial and technical assistance to
developing nations since World War IL
We sponsored most of the international
financial institutions that have
shouldered a growing share of the
burden for financing development. We
pioneered institutions like the Fulbright
Exchange Program and the Peace
Corps.
Our capital market has been fully
open to borrowers from developing coun-
tries. By 1984, our commercial lending
institutions had lent some $140 billion to
Third World countries. Equity invest-
ment in the Third World exceeded $50
billion, or roughly a quarter of our total
overseas investment. Oar transnational
corporations have taken the lead in
fostering the global diffusion of
industrial know-how, technology
transfer, and capital movement.
The sustained growth of our
economy and the open access we afford
others to trade in our market is perhaps
the largest contribution we make to the
growth of developing countries. Policy
lines in a field so vast are difficult to
summarize, but we proceed on the basic
premise that, for Third World countries
as for others, the path to sustained
growth lies in the efficiency of free and
open markets, encouragement to entre-
preneurial activity in the private sector,
and the full use of the opportunities
available for mutually beneficial
economic transactions in the interna-
tional trading and financial systems.
With respect to the instruments of
policy, aid and trade are, of course,
paramount.
Development Assistance— Despite
severe budgetary constraints arising out
of our own deficit, we continue to lead
the world in bilateral economic
assistance and in our support for
multilateral development banks and
other financial institutions. Over the
past 5 years, the Reagan Administration
increased U.S. official development
assistance from $6. .5 billion to $8.8
billion a year— a level well above other
industrial democracies and about four
times that provided by the Soviet Union.
Contrary to the popular misconception,
the bulk of our bilateral aid is not
military assistance but, rather, is
economic aid. America has been the prin-
cipal source of financial relief to those
struggling with debt problems. And we
have repeatedly taken the lead in
organizing relief efforts in response to
natural calamities such as the African
drought and the El Salvador earthquake.
Trade— The developing countries
understandably want trade more than
aid— an opportunity rather than a hand-
out. That serves our interests as well
and explains why we have kept our
market more open to Third World
exports than has any other industrial
nation. Our two-way trade with the
Third World is now greater than our
trade with Japan and Western Europe
combined; it is 10 times greater than
Soviet trade with the Third World. We
are also taking the lead in further
strengthening the world trading system.
The successful Punta del Este meeting
last month cleared the way for a new
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] round of multilateral trade
negotiations. The objective must be to
reduce further the impediments to free
and fair trade— particularly by removing
nontariff barriers to trade. We shall be
sensitive to the interests of developing
countries by resisting protectionist trade
pressures. We will also seek to address
subjects of special interest to us—
services, protection of intellectual prop-
erties, and agriculture.
The point, however, is this: we
recognize a large American stake in
assuring that the Third World enjoys a
full opportunity to share the benefits of
growth and prosperity.
Second, beyond seeking to
encourage economic growth in the Third
World, we have taken an active hand in
promoting the peaceful resolution of
Third World regional disputes.
• We have attempted to use our
relationship with South Africa and the
front-line states to promote an equitable
January 1987
57
GENERAL
resolution of the issues of Angola and
Namibia and to foster the swift and
peaceful dismantling of apartheid in
South Africa while expanding our tangi-
ble support for the black community in
South Africa and for Pretoria's
neighbors.
• In the Middle East, we remain the
only power that can exert significant
influence on both sides of the Arab-
Israeli dispute. We continue to promote
a just and lasting solution to the
Palestinian problem in the context of
peace between Israel and its Arab
neighbors. Some maintain that an inter-
national conference is a necessary step
to move the process along. In our view,
such proposals should be judged in terms
of their efficacy for facilitating direct
negotiations among the parties directly
concerned. As the Camp David accords
demonstrated, we can work closely with
the parties, we can facilitate talks, but in
the end, direct negotiations among the
parties to the dispute are the key to an
enduring settlement.
• In Central America, we have
directed our energies to consolidating
the stability of our democratic friends,
shielding them from subversive forces
directed from Nicaragua, encouraging a
dialogue between the Nicaraguan
Government and its democratic opposi-
tion, and supporting a negotiated settle-
ment through the Contadora process.
With respect to conflicts arising out
of Soviet attempts in the late 1970s to
reshape political forces in a number of
Third World countries through direct or
indirect application of force— as, for
example, in Afghanistan, Angola, and
Cambodia— we are determined to sup-
port those resistance forces that are
fighting for their independence and
freedom. However, we also believe these
conflicts can and should be resolved
politically. We have outlined a frame-
work for promoting such solutions. The
key is a negotiating process between the
warring parties to bring an end to
violence, national reconciliation, and the
withdrawal of foreign troops; we see
scope for U.S. -Soviet talks to support
such negotiations, ensure a verifiable
departure of foreign troops, and stem
the flow of outside arms; and, finally, we
have affirmed our willingness to extend
generous support for the reintegration
of those countries into the world
economy.
Third, while the Third World may
share some common perceptions, by and
large, it is a highly differentiated group
of countries with which we should
cultivate strong bilateral ties. Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico in Latin
America; Egypt, Israel, and Jordan in
the Middle East; key oil-producing states
in the gulf; India and Pakistan in South
Asia; Nigeria, Zambia, and Zaire in
Africa; South Korea, China, and the
ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] countries in Asia are only
the most obvious of the Third World
countries whose size, location, resources,
economic prowess, military potential,
and capacity for effective action invite
special attention from the United States.
There are scores of others. We are
devoting much attention to this task.
Fourth, we strongly support emerg-
ing Third World regional associations
that are demonstrating a collective will
to solve problems. Regional groups that
provide a means for pragmatic coopera-
tion to solve concrete day-to-day prob-
lems tend to flourish. The Gulf Coopera-
tion Council, the South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation, the
Organization of American States, the
Association of South East Asian
Nations, and the Organization of African
Unity all have demonstrated this poten-
tial. We are providing encouragement
and support.
Fifth, we recognize that the United
Nations is an institution of special impor-
tance to Third World countries. It is
easy to understand why. Americans
themselves regard the United Nations as
an international expression of our hope
for a more orderly, peaceful, and pros-
perous world. We are committed to the
United Nations as a world forum and a
sort of parliament for mankind. For the
countries of the Third World, the United
Nations offers a means of spotlighting
attention on their concerns, a forum in
which they can seek to influence great
power behavior and use the strength of
their numbers to press their case on
economic and political issues.
The General Assembly and Security
Council are the proper places for
political debate. With our great tradition
of freedeom of expression, we feel at
home working in such quasilegislative
bodies. We take words and ideas seri-
ously. We intend to express our views
forcefully, and we pay attention to what
others say on the issues and about us.
In the United Nations, as in other
multilateral institutions, however intense
the clash of interests, norms of civility
must be observed. A tough debate is to
be expected, but double standards,
abuse, and the constant introduction of
extraneous issues should be avoided. We
want to strengthen the United Nations
so that it can make a more effective con
tribution to international peace and
problemsolving. We cannot do this alone
The cooperation of all countries is
necessary.
We thus remain strongly committed
both to the United Nations as an institu-
tion and to its reform. The recommenda
tions of the Group of 18, if implemented
by the General Assembly, will be an
important starting point.
The Nonaligned Movement
and the United States
In this context, let me say a further
word about the Nonaligned Movement,
which remains the principal Third World
lobby within the United Nations. A
notable feature of many nonaligned pro-
nouncements is the disparity in the
critical standards applied to the United
States and Soviet Union, respectively.
Americans find it difficult to accept
these unequal standards. It was the
West that conferred independence on
vast territories in Africa and Asia, whilf»
the Soviets have not loosened their grip;
on Eastern Europe. The West— not the
Soviet Union— has extended vast quan-
tities of foreign assistance and afforded
developing countries preferred access
to its markets. It is the West— not
Moscow— that has sustained the
multilateral agencies and institutions or
which the Third World has come to
depend for its development. Yet, on bot
political and economic issues, it is the
West— and particularly the United
States— that absorbs the brunt of
criticism and complaint.
What accounts for this disparity?
The basic answer is that the United
States attracts more Third World atten-
tion and criticism because our policies
and actions matter. We have the greate.
power to affect events; and, in most of
the Third World, we have a much more
active presence than the Soviets. We
have the capacity to influence highly
charged issues like the Middle East and
South Africa. Third World countries
view these with high emotion; and horse
trading among regional caucuses in the
United Nations often results in the
aggregation of extreme views.
The membership policies of the NAR
further encourage this tendency. Soviet
surrogates make their voices heard
because the NAM has permitted Cuba,
58
Department of State Bullet!:
GENERAL
•ietnam, Laos, North Korea, and other
luntries with whom the Soviet Union
IS a relationship of miHtary support to
'tain formal nonaligned status— indeed,
) exercise a measure of leadership,
egimes that have come under Soviet
)ntrol, such as that in Afghanistan, are
3t expelled. Yet the NAM continues to
■cclude countries such as Honduras, El
alvador. South Korea, Thailand, and
enezuela. The cadre of pro-Soviet coun-
:'ies within the NAM and the nature of
AM procedures themselves have made
possible for the Soviet Union both to
ock criticism of its own policies and
isture as a "natural ally" and to
icourage extreme positions and max-
aum abuse of the United States.
Although an increasing number of
AM members— moderates by our stand-
I'ds— are concerned by this imbalance
id are actively seeking more genuinely
Dnaligned positions, they are disadvan-
iged by the practice of taking decisions
/ consensus.
The eighth nonaligned summit, held
St month in Harare, illustrates this
tuation. Some attempts at name-calling
ere struck down in committee, and
ime notable successes were achieved
.s, for example, on resolutions dealing
ith Cambodia and Afghanistan),
owever, the final political declaration is
fe with anti-American references. The
nited States is assailed for its policies
n disarmament, South Africa, the
[iddle East, and Central America. A
Bction condemns U.S. "aggression" and
state terrorism" against Libya and
emands compensation— this despite
olonel Qadhafi's bizarre and much
ssented attack on the NAM. In the
jmmit's concluding declaration, the
Inited States is mentioned by name 67
mes, almost invariably in a negative
ontext. The Soviet Union is not men-
loned once.
Some say the rhetorical excesses of
he NAM and other Third World groups
re akin to letting off political steam and
hat the United States should not take
hese verbal criticisms at face value.
Americans increasingly think otherwise,
'heir attitudes on U.S. programs for
?hird World countries, as reflected in
he Congress, are a clear index of this
hanging mood.
The effect of NAM positions and
■hetoric on the United Nations is par-
icularly significant in this regard. The
■esults of NAM meetings reappear in
■esolutions, votes, and speeches at the
'nited Nations and its agencies.
Extreme positions, refusals to negotiate
or compromise, and vitriolic verbal
attacks on opponents all poison the UN's
processes and compromise its ability to
carry out its important mission. It is for
this reason that we have made an issue
of "name-calling" and are mixing it up
very actively in the struggle for ideas.
We expect that our views and votes will
often diverge on the basis of differing
national interests. We do not ask NAM
members to abandon their principles of
nonalignment. On the contrary, we ask
them simply to adhere to their own self-
proclaimed goals in a genuine way.
U.S. Policy Opportunities
and Challenges
I have outlined some broad principles
that inform U.S. policy toward the Third
World and its principal political group-
ing, the NAM. Now let me turn briefly
to some of the trends which offer U.S.
policy opportunities, as well as some
which complicate our capacity to pursue
them.
One favorable global trend is the
unfolding of an extraordinary movement
toward democracy around the world. In
the Western Hemisphere, over the last 6
years, elected civilian leaders have
replaced authoritarian regimes in Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Peru, and Uruguay. Today, 90%
of the people in Latin America and the
Caribbean enjoy democratic rule, com-
pared to only one-third a decade ago.
Nicaragua, Cuba, Paraguay, and Chile
remain notable and disturbing excep-
tions to this trend. Elsewhere, the
yearning for freedom in the Philippines
brought a remarkably swift and peaceful
transition to a democracy last February.
Pakistan has replaced a martial law
regime with a vigorous civilian
government.
We have an opportunity to nurture
and expand this drive toward
democracy. Not many years ago,
democratic nations were thought to be a
dwindling minority. Today, the vitality
of the democratic idea is one of the most
important political realities of our time,
and American power and influence are
firmly committed to its support and
advancement.
Similarly, our commitment to
market forces as the key to economic
development has found increasing
resonance in the Third World. Nothing
invigorates the global economic system
today more than the powerful economic
recovery that has been underway in the
United States for nearly 4 years. Suc-
cess invites emulation. Many Third
World countries are abandoning the
economic dogmas of the immediate
postcolonial period. There is a growing
recognition of the connection between
individual initiative and economic
progress— a growing realization that the
talents of individual human beings are
the greatest resource a society can bring
to the tasks of national development.
This is apparent in the dynamism of
the new industrial economies in East
Asia— economies that have achieved
incredible growth over extended periods
by keeping bureaucracies lean and
encouraging the initiative of their
private sectors.
It is equally apparent in Africa,
where many nations are embarked on
bold economic reform. At the UN
Special Session on the Critical Economic
Situation in Africa held last May, the
African nations— including those hardest
hit by collectivist planning— issued an
extraordinary document calling for more
open markets and less intervention by
the state. This was a concerted position
that African countries brought with
them to the United Nations after
deliberations in their regional body, the
Organization of African Unity. Our ideas
are taking hold. Thus, there are very
important opportunities.
It is ironic that, at a time when
global trends favor us and we have
opportunities to pursue more construc-
tive relations with Third World coun-
tries, pressures are mounting within our
country to turn our backs on the world.
We are the largest free market on
Earth. Our open trading policies confer
tangible economic benefits on the
American people; they have also pro-
vided vast opportunities for our trading
partners. Yet America's large trade
deficit is now stimulating new calls in
the Congress for protectionist legisla-
tion. Not since the days of Smoot-
Hawley have protectionist forces been as
powerful as they are today. If enacted,
protectionist measures would endanger
the new democracies, the poorer coun-
tries burdened by debt, and many key
friends around the world. Here at home,
we will feel the results in higher prices
and diminished efficiency. In today's
interdependent global economy, our
prosperity and that of other nations are
mutually dependent as never before.
January 1987
59
GENERAL
A second development that will con-
strain U.S. policies toward the Third
World at an important time of oppor-
tunity is the reduction of our foreign
affairs budget by the Congress. Last
January, the President submitted an
international affairs budget for fiscal
year 1987 that we had already stripped
bare. It amounted to only 2% of the total
Federal budget. Yet the current congres-
sional budget resolution cuts that
minimal request by about a quarter
across the board and even more deeply
in such crucial areas as support for inter-
national organizations and economic
assistance. If enacted, these reductions,
and the earmarking of aid levels to a few
countries, will severely impair our ability
to protect important U.S. interests in
sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South
America, the Caribbean, and East Asia.
They would seriously cut our funding for
the multilateral development banks,
which are crucial to Third World
economic recovery and growth. They
would reduce our financial leverage for
real reform in the budget and adminis-
tration of the United Nations. They
would result in the closing of diplomatic
posts and the reduction of our official
personnel abroad— to a level lower than
when George C. Marshall was Secretary
of State.
Conclusion
Let me summarize. Both we and the
countries of the Third World face hard
choices as we look ahead. But our rela-
tions with key countries are sound.
Regional associations are emerging.
Soviet competitiveness is diminishing.
Our ideas enjoy a currency they have
rarely enjoyed.
We in America face a fundamental
choice: at a time when favorable global
trends present new opportunities for
U.S. policy in the Third World, we can
continue to be engaged with its countrit
on behalf of our deepest values and com
mitments. Or we can choose to stand
aside and allow events in those increas-
ingly important parts of the world to
play themselves out without effective
U.S. involvement. That decision is ours
to make, and educators and opinion-
makers such as you have a decisive role
to play. ■
ic
r
IS
60
Department of State Bulletir
GENERAL
J.S. Foreign Policy
\chievements and Challenges
}j Michael H. Armacost
Address before a State Department
igional foreign polio/ conference in Salt
ake City on October 18, 1986.
his is a beautiful setting in which to
in a foreign policy conference cospon-
)red by the University of Utah,
righam Young University, and the
tate Department. Throughout our coun-
y we feel a renewed confidence that
imerica is in a position to play a positive
oreign policy role. This is a major
nange and one of my themes today.
Journalists normally keep score on
n administration by adding up the for-
mal agreements signed with foreign
Duntries. This is at best an incomplete
tieasure of success. The Carter Adminis-
! "ation secured ratification of the
anama Canal Treaty, moderated the
amp David agreement, normalized rela-
ons with China, and negotiated the
ALT II [strategic arms limitation talks]
greement on arms control. Yet
.mericans intuitively understood that
lese agreements did not add up to suc-
sss in foreign policy. By 1980, there
'as a widespread perception both here
nd abroad that American power had
een eroded, as had our will to utilize
ower to protect our interests overseas.
With congressional elections coming
nd with President Reagan and General
•ecretary Gorbachev having met in
:eland last week, this is an appropriate
ime to reflect on some of the
chievements and challenges of
American foreign policy. Let me briefly
eport some "good news" and some
bad news" by describing some of the
rends in the international and domestic
■nvironment which currently affect our
ability to promote foreign policy
nterests.
First, the good news. Many global
rends and developments now favor us.
\ Favorable
'Correlation of Forces"
The most important development in recent
years is this: a significant shift has
occurred in what the Soviets call the
"global correlation of forces."
You remember the 1970s. We
experienced a constitutional crisis. We
endured the ordeal of the American
hostages in Iran. Long gas lines
reminded us of America's growing
dependence on others for basic
resources. Economists introduced the
term "stagflation" into our vocabularies.
President Carter described the national
mood as one of "malaise."
The bitter legacy of Vietnam was an
American disposition to retreat tem-
porarily from international leadership.
Divisions appeared in our alliances. The
cumulative effect of inadequate invest-
ment in U.S. military modernization
began to show.
In contrast, the Soviets appeared to
be on a roll. The momentum of Moscow's
strategic modernization effort far
exceeded ours. Through the direct or
indirect application of their military
power, they expanded their influence in
Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozam-
bique, and Nicaragua. They invaded and
attempted to occupy Afghanistan. They
supported the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia. During this period, many
Third World countries embraced statist
political and economic practices; the
influence of democratic and free market
principles appeared to wane.
Much has changed in the 1980s. We
have substantially rebuilt our military
power and revitalized our economy.
There is a new pride in our country, a
strong consensus that the United States
should play an active role in the world.
We have a President who enjoys the lux-
ury of a second term and the continuity
of policy which that affords. Our
alliances are in solid shape. It is now the
Soviets who are encountering growing
difficulties at home and abroad and who
apparently need some respite from the
East- West competition in order to put
their house in order.
Winning the Global
Contest of Ideas
My second bit of good news is that we
are doing very well in the global contest
of ideas. This is particularly apparent in
the currency of democracy and market
economics in the Third World. A decade
ago, martial law and other forms of
authoritarianism were de rigueur in the
.developing countries. We confronted a
S|Mrited drive by the nonaligned for a
new international economic order which
was blatantly statist in its approach.
Today, 90% of all Latin Americans
live under governments which can
plausibly claim to be democratic. Nor is
this trend confined to this hemisphere.
All Americans were thrilled by the swift
and peaceful democratic revolution in
the Philippines last February. Though
problems remain, Pakistan made the
transition from military to civilian
government. Haiti was relieved of the
oppression of the Duvaliers. The extraor-
dinary movement toward democracy
unfolding in diverse corners of the earth
reminds us that dictatorship— whether
of the left or of the right— is not
permanent.
President Reagan has personally
urged democracies to assert their values.
A National Endowment for Democracy
was created and has undertaken projects
in support of democratic institutions in
the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Chile,
Haiti, and South Africa. Other projects
have assisted elementary school educa-
tion for anticommunist Afghans and sup-
ported Solidarity and other gi'oups work-
ing to establish independent institutions
in Poland.
So, not many years ago, democratic
nations were thought to be a dwindling
minority; democracy was thought to be a
unique and distinctive attribute of
Western industrial culture. Today, the
vitality of the democratic idea is one of
the most important political realities of
our time, and America is firmly commit-
ted to its advancement.
The movement toward democracy
has been matched by a growing commit-
ment to market economics. The reasons
are obvious. Economies dominated by
the public sector simply did not produce.
Those which limited governmental
intervention and expanded the inter-
play of market forces have achieved
remarkable results.
Today, there is no force in the world
doing more to invigorate the global
economic system than the powerful
economic recovery which has now been
underway in the United States for nearly
4 years. It is success that invites
January 1987
61
GENERAL
emulation. More and more countries are
looking to the efficiency of free and open
markets, the vigor of the private sector,
and the opportunities available in the
international trading and financial
systems. From India, to Yugoslavia, to
Brazil, we find movements to decen-
tralize, deregulate, and denationalize.
The dynamism of East Asia's economy is
well known, as are China's experiments
with market principles and the dramatic
growth it has achieved.
Both these trends— toward
democracy and the market system— owe
much to America's example and
American power. The single biggest
extension of democratic liberties in
recent memory occurred at the end of
World War II when American power
was at its zenith. It is no coincidence
that respect for our values has grown in
recent years as we have renewed the
sources of our military, economic, and
political power in the world.
Soviets on Wrong
Side of Nationalism
There is a related trend of considerable
importance. In those countries where the
Soviets extended their influence in the
late 1970s, they now find themselves at
cross-purposes with the forces of
nationalism. In Afghanistan. Cambodia,
Angola, and Nicaragua, regimes of
dubious legitimacy are supported by
Soviet subsidies and Soviet or allied
troops. Each confronts growing
indigenous resistance. In a nationalist
era, dependence on outsiders inevitably
diminishes the appeal and authority of
Soviet-supported regimes. The Russians
are learning that it costs a great deal
more to subsidize such regimes than
it does to encourage and support
nationalist forces fighting for a cause.
Our Agenda on
Arms Control and Trade
There is a fourth development of great
consequence. In the fields of arms con-
trol and trade— matters of overriding
consequence to all Americans— the key
negotiations now address our agenda.
High drama always attends meetings
between the President of the United
States and the General Secretary of the
Soviet Union, and the meetings in
Iceland last week were no exception. In
over 10 hours of intensive discussion, we
succeeded in getting the Soviets to
address in a bold and imaginative man-
ner a number of our key strategic con-
cerns. In Iceland, we proposed— and the
Soviets accepted— a .5-year period of
reductions in strategic forces in which all
strategic nuclear arms would be reduced
by 50%. In the next 5 years, we would
continue by eliminating all remaining
offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges.
In INF, we reached agreement that all
LRINF [longer range intermediate-
range nuclear forces] missile warheads
would be eliminated in Europe and all
but 100 warheads eliminated from the
Asian portion of the U.S.S.R.
Note the contrast from a few years
ago. Then, professional arms controllers
seemed content to propose limits on the
rate at which U.S. and Soviet strategic
offensive systems grew. We are now
discussing radical reductions of strategic
nuclear systems.
In 1983, the zero option for INF put
forward by the Reagan Administration
was dismissed by critics as unserious.
Yet the proposal discussed in Reykjavik
last weekend involved the elimination of
all LRINF missiles from Europe and an
80% reduction of those deployed by the
Soviet Union in Asia. Until recently, the
arms control community seemed univer-
sally to accept the premise that deter-
rence required mutual threats of
annihilation.
In the past, arms control verifica-
tion arrangements were essentially
synonymous with national technical
means of inspection. Both in Stockholm
and Reykjavik, more rigorous inspection
methods— including onsite inspec-
tion—have reentered the vocabulary of
negotiators.
In an attempt to take into account
Soviet concerns, we agreed at Reykjavik
to defer deployment of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) for 10 years.
The General Secretary wanted more,
however. He wanted wording that, in
effect, would have kept us from develop-
ing the SDI for the entire 10-year
period. Gorbachev said that unless we
acquiesced in his position on the SDI, all
the progress made on eliminating
nuclear weapons was canceled. But on
the SDI President Reagan had to stand
firm. The SDI has already demonstrated
its utility as an inducement for serious
arms control negotiations. It has
stimulated hope for deterrence which
relies upon non-nuclear defenses rather
than mutual threats of annihilation.
ii
3
■i
f
!1
Major substantive progress was
achieved at Reykjavik. The proposals
discussed there remain on the table.
Our arms control negotiators at Genev;
now have new possibilities with which
to work toward possibly historic
agreements. Secretary Shultz and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will
meet in Vienna. We remain patiently
hopeful and will continue to pursue not
only arms control but arms reductions,
with persistence, vigor, and flexibility.
The trade negotiations held last
month in Punta del Este received much
less publicity than the meeting held in
Iceland. But the results regarding inter?
national trade are also encouraging.
That meeting opened the door to
a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations— one in which trade in serv
ices, protection of intellectual property,
and agricultural trade are on the agend;
for the first time. These are areas of pa:
ticular concern to us in our determined
effort to make trade free, open, and fail
To that end, the United States has
played a lead role in a series of high-levi
economic meetings among the indus-
trialized countries aimed at strengthen-
ing the global economic system. These
meetings have sought to promote sus-
tained growth by relating basic currency
and structural adjustments to major
economic indicators, including exchange
rates. These measures offer the hope of
increasing exchange rate stability and,
thereby, of bringing exchange rates and
international trade surpluses and deficit
more in line with underlying economic
realities.
We have worked closely with Japan
and other countries to rectify the struc-
tural imbalances that, among other
things, contribute to America's huge
trade deficits. Premier Nakasone,
recently returned to office in an electors
landslide, has said Japan must transforn
its economy to rely more on domestic
demand and imports, especially manufac
tured products. Elsewhere, we have
established free trade areas with Israel
and Canada.
In the general trade area, we have
investigated, denounced, and, in some
301 cases, retaliated against unfair
trading practices.
In short, in the crucial global arenas
of arms control and international trade,
America's ability to shape the agenda is
strong, and we will do all we can to see
that our issues are kept front and center
in the bargaining to come.
62
Department of State Bulletin
GENERAL
taised Public Consciousness
m Terrorism and Drugs
\nother favorable trend is that public
onsciousness— here and abroad— has
leen raised regarding two issues of
remendous importance to Americans:
errorism and drug trafficking.
Few terrorist incidents have
ccurred in the United States, but many
^.mericans have been affected by such
ncidents abroad. We have put the world
-n notice that we will not countenance
lolitically inspired terrorist actions
gainst our citizens.
During the past few years, we have
chieved remarkable progress in
eveloping our own intelligence
apabilities vis-a-vis international ter-
orists and in sharing that intelligence
I n a real-time basis with friendly
ations. We have expanded international
[ooperation in the field of law enforce-
jient and counterterrorist training. Last
I ear, we and our friends foiled 126
lanned terrorist attacks.
We are generating support for put-
.ng teeth into international antiter-
Drism conventions. For example, the
nternational Civil Aviation Organization
DUghened its regulations dramatically
fter the hijacking of TWA 847. In
ssponse to the Achille Lauro hijacking,
le International Maritime Organization
egan to develop similar regulations
3r seaborne transportation. Last
lovember, the UN General Assembly
dopted a strong resolution declaring
errorism a crime.
We have also developed our own
ounterterrorist military capabilities to
eact swiftly to terrorist situations. In
oth the Achille Lauro affair and last
ipril's assault on Tripoli, we demon-
trated our willingness and ability to use
Dree in extremis in pursuit of terrorists
nd against states who support them.
Lgainst terrorism we are determined;
gainst terrorism we will prevail.
We have seen a similar growth of
nternational consciousness and coopera-
ion on the drug question. Here at home,
nuch needs to be done to reduce the
lemand for drugs. Abroad, we are
.Iready rapidly increasing cooperative
■fforts to restrict drug supplies. The
Irug problem is becoming a high
priority. Other countries are visibly
! ooperating with us in drug eradication
md enforcement programs. For exam-
)le, in 1981, only one nation was
■radicating narcotics crops; in 1986, 14
nations have signed agreements with the
United States to undertake aerial or
manual eradication efforts.
In 1986, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Venezuela, and Colombia signed the
Lara Bonilla Treaty— named after the
Colombian Justice Minister slain by nar-
cotics traffickers 2 years before. They
thereby pledged regional cooperation in
fighting narcotics production and
trafficking. In keeping with this commit-
ment, the Andean nations have under-
taken major efforts to halt the produc-
tion, processing, and shipment of
narcotics. These include the recent suc-
cessful "Blast Furnace" operation in
Bolivia which used U.S. military assets.
That is the good news. Naturally, in
this business, one does not expect
everything to go right. There are plenty
of challenges to go around. Let me
single out a couple of specific issues for
special mention. I do so because these
are matters over which, hopefully, we
can exert some control.
Resolving Regional Conflicts
In regions of conflict around the world,
America is on the right side of history.
In the Middle East, Central America,
and South Africa, for example, we are
playing a constructive role in helping the
parties directly involved to bridge their
differences and to work toward peaceful
solutions.
In the Middle East, despite the con-
tinuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we
continue to maintain close relations with
both our Israeli and Arab friends. We
have developed a broad institutionalized
framework for economic, political, and
military cooperation with Israel. We
work closely with the Gulf Cooperation
Council. The recent Egyptian-Israeli
summit, as well as the meeting between
[Israeli] Prime Minister Peres and King
Hassan of Morocco, suggest that the
psychological barrier in the Arab world
against recognition of and dialogue with
Israel seems to be crumbling.
Yet, as always, the Middle East
poses especially difficult challenges. We
must still find an effective way to bring
Palestinians of good will who are willing
to engage in serious and peaceful
dialogue with the Israelis into the peace
process. The Egyptian economic situa-
tion remains a high priority. The Iran-
Iraq war, now in its sixth year, is a
human catastrophe which threatens to
destabilize the entire area.
While we recognize the role Syria
plays in the region, its apparent con-
tinued support for terrorism as an
instrument of foreign policy prohibits us
from engaging more fully with it on the
fundamental problems in the area.
Libya, because of the policies Qadhafi
has chosen to pursue, remains an outcast
both in the region and in the wider com-
munity of civilized nations.
In Central America, we are working
closely with moderate forces for peace-
ful progress. We have supported El
Salvador through three democratic elec-
tions since the so-called final offensive of
the communist insurgents in January
1981. We are extending assistance to
help El Salvador recover from its recent
tragic earthquake.
Through economic and security
assistance, diplomatic support, and close
consultation, the Administration is
working with the Central American
democracies to contain the Nicaraguan
communist "revolution without
borders." Like El Salvador, Nicaragua
had a revolution in 1979. However,
unlike El Salvador, the Sandinista
regime has banished legitimate opposi-
tion, censored the press, and sought to
intimidate its neighbors by using Cuban
advisers and Soviet equipment to build
up the largest military force in the
region.
In South Africa, we seek the early
elimination of apartheid and the exten-
sion of meaningful civil and economic
rights to all. President Reagan put
Americans' hopes for the future of South
Africa this way:
This Administration is not only . . . against
apartheid; we are for a new South Africa, a
new nation where all that has been built up
over generations is not destroyed, a new
society where participation in the social,
cultural, and political life is open to all
peoples— a new South Africa that comes home
to the family of free nations where it belongs.
The challenge for us in southern
Africa is to be the champion of construc-
tive change. Sanctions, in and of
themselves, do not add up to a policy for
South Africa. Our policy is to help the
victims of apartheid— we spent $20
million is fiscal year (FY) 1986 and will dou-
ble that this year— and to foster dialogue
between the South African Government
and authoritative leaders of the black
community. We will continue to work
with all those of good will in southern
Africa who want to eliminate apartheid,
to diminish cross-border violence, and to
deny this strategic area to Soviet
influence.
January 1987
63
GENERAL
Too often in discussions of foreign
policy in this country, people seem
unprepared to face up to the ambiguity of
many external situations and the
necessity of pursuing a complex two- or
three-track strategy of our own. In deal-
ing with the Soviets, for example, we
must compete aggressively even as we
explore for wider areas of cooperation.
In dealing with regional conflicts, we
must be prepared to support our friends
even as we keep the door open to
negotiated solutions. In dealing with
complex political and moral issues, we
must remember that the test of policy
is less the goodness of our intentions
than the results of our actions. In a
democracy we know that a successful
policy requires not only a sensible con-
cept and steady implementation but
public understanding and support.
Difficulties with Congress
We face challenges at home as well.
Speaking frankly, we have a huge prob-
lem with the Congress. Actually, we con-
front two adverse tendencies on the Hill.
On the one hand. Congress seems
increasingly disposed to micromanage
foreign policy. Rather than attempting
to chart broad objectives in concert with
the Administration, Congress seeks to
enforce its will with respect to the
details of policy execution. That is
unhelpful— indeed, in the long term, it's
self-defeating. No nation can manage its
affairs with 535 Secretaries of State-
even a country with the margins for
error we possess.
At the same time. Congress is deny-
ing us the resources with which to con-
duct any coherent policy. The foreign
affairs budget has been devastated. Our
foreign assistance program for FY 1987
was cut by 27%. Since much of the
budget is earmarked by Congress for
specific countries or programs, we have
limited latitude to allocate cuts in an
equitable fashion. One result is the pros-
pect of 50%-60% cuts in FY 1987 for
non-earmarked programs. No one can
expect us to defend effectively our
interests in the world while imposing
such limits on our means.
Foreign policy is not like writing
Christmas wish lists. It is a tough proc-
ess of allocating means which are scarce
against aims which are legion. Our
interests abroad are not declining.
The means of conducting policy are.
Something will have to give. We either
accept a more modest role in the world,
or we flirt with failure to achieve our
objectives. There is no free lunch in this
business.
Our economy is the most prosperous
in the world. This is another reason why
cuts in America's foreign affairs budget
are so difficult to explain to our foreign
friends and allies. Access to our market
is coveted by all. By furnishing such
access to others— and securing, in
return, fair entree to foreign markets—
we enable our consumers to buy high
quality, reasonably priced products, pro-
vide the spur of competition to our own
industry, and contribute to the growth
and prosperity of friendly nations
around the world.
There is no doubt that our recent
trade deficits are not sustainable. Nor do
we intend to allow them to continue.
Adjustment of the value of our currency,
structural adjustments in the economies
of key trading partners, aggressive
enforcement of our reciprocal trading
rights, and multilateral and bilateral
trade negotiations represent the prin-
cipal tools of our policy for surmount-
ing them. On occasion, the threat of
legislative remedies enhances our
bargaining position with others. But pn
tectionist legislation in general does lit-
tle service for us or others. We should
resist that temptation.
Conclusion
This afternoon, I have spoken of good
news and bad. I have described some
global trends which favor us, as well as
some of the achievements and challenge
of American foreign policy. All countrie
confront significant challenges, but a
society is more likely to best its
challenges if it retains the conviction
that its values are worth defending.
Certain truths, which we say are
self-evident, give us a realistic yet
hopeful view of the world. Our fun-
damental challenge is to preserve the
balance of power through a willingness
and strength to defend the cause of
freedom. Without such stability, the
sentiments of the Declaration of
Independence have little chance of
becoming a reality for men and women
everywhere.
We are a democratic country, and
our success and failure in meeting our
foreign policy challenges rests with the
American people. The interests and con
cern of this group, like that of many
others throughout our country, give me
every reason to say that, while our
challenges are real, our future is also
bright. ■
64
Department of State Bulletir
TIIDDLE EAST
J.S. Initiative to Iran
•RESIDENT'S ADDRESS
TO THE NATION.
JOV. 13. 1986'
know you've been reading, seeing, and
earing a lot of stories the past several
•ays attributed to Danish sailors,
nnamed observers at Italian ports and
■panish harbors, and especially unnamed
overnment officials of my Administra-
,.on. Well, now you are going to hear the
icts from a White House source, and
ou know my name.
I wanted this time to talk with you
bout an extremely sensitive and pro-
jundly important matter of foreign
olicy. For 18 months now we have had
nderway a secret diplomatic initiative
) Iran. That initiative was undertaken
)r the simplest and best of reasons— to
jnew a relationship with the nation of
•an. to bring an honorable end to the
loody 6-year war between Iran and
•aq, to eliminate state-sponsored ter-
irism and subversion, and to effect the
ife return of all hostages.
Without Iran's cooperation, we can-
Dt bring an end to the Persian Gulf
ar; without Iran's concurrence, there
m be no enduring peace in the Middle
ast.
For 10 days now, the American and
orld press have been full of reports and
amors about this initiative and these
Djectives. Now, my fellow Americans,
lere is an old saying that nothing
)reads so quickly as a rumor. So I
lought it was time to speak with you
rectly— to tell you firsthand about our
jalings with Iran. As Will Rogers once
lid, "Rumor travels faster, but it don't
:ay put as long as truth." So let's get to
le facts.
The charge has been made that the
nited States has shipped weapons to
•an as ransom payment for the release
f American hostages in Lebanon— that
le United States undercut its allies and
jcretly violated American policy against
•afficking with terrorists.
Those charges are utterly false. The
nited States has not made concessions
) those who hold our people captive in
ebanon. And we will not. The United
tates has not swapped boatloads or
laneloads of American weapons for the
eturn of American hostages. And we
ill not.
Other reports have surfaced alleging
U.S. involvement: reports of a sealift to
Iran using Danish ships to carry
American arms; of vessels in Spanish
ports being employed in secret U.S.
arms shipments; of Italian ports being
used; of the United States sending spare
parts and weapons for combat aircraft.
All these reports are quite exciting, but
as far as we are concerned, not one of
them is true.
Sending a Signal to Tehran
During the course of our secret discus-
sions. I authorized the transfer of small
amounts of defensive weapons and spare
parts for defensive systems to Iran. My
purpose was to convince Tehran that our
negotiators were acting with my author-
ity, to send a signal that the United
States was prepared to replace the
animosity between us with a new rela-
tionship. These modest deliveries, taken
together, could easily fit into a single
cargo plane. They could not, taken
together, affect the outcome of the
6-year war between Iran and Iraq— nor
could they affect in any way the military
balance between the two countries.
Those with whom we were in contact
took considerable risks and needed a
signal of our serious intent if they were
to carry on and broaden the dialogue.
At the same time we undertook this
initiative, we made clear that Iran must
oppose all forms of international ter-
rorism as a condition of progress in our
relationship. The most significant step
which Iran could take, we indicated,
would be to use its influence in Lebanon
to secure the release of all hostages held
there.
Some progress has already been
made. Since U.S. Government contact
began with Iran, there's been no
evidence of Iranian Government com-
plicity in acts of terrorism against the
United States. Hostages have come
home, and we welcome the efforts that
the Government of Iran has taken in the
past and is currently undertaking.
Iran's Strategic Importance
But why, you might ask, is any relation-
ship with Iran important to the United
States? Iran encompasses some of the
most critical geography in the world. It
lies between the Soviet Union and access
to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.
Geography explains why the Soviet
Union has sent an army into
Afghanistan to dominate that country
and, if they could, Iran and Pakistan.
Iran's geography gives it a critical
position from which adversaries could
interfere with oil flows from the Arab
states that border the Persian Gulf.
Apart from geography, Iran's oil
deposits are important to the long-term
health of the world economy. For these
reasons, it is in our national interest to
watch for changes within Iran that
might offer hope for an improved rela-
tionship. Until last year, there was little
to justify that hope.
Indeed, we have bitter and enduring
disagreements that persist today. At the
heart of our quarrel has been Iran's past
sponsorship of international terrorism.
Iranian policy has been devoted to
expelling all Western influence from the
Middle East. We cannot abide that
because our interests in the Middle East
are vital. At the same time, we seek no
territory or special position in Iran. The
Iranian revolution is a fact of history,
but between American and Iranian basic
national interests there need be no per-
manent conflict.
Since 1983, various countries have
made overtures to stimulate direct con-
tact between the United States and Iran.
European, Near Eastern, and Far
Eastern countries have attempted to
serve as intermediaries. Despite a U.S.
willingness to proceed, none of these
overtures bore fruit. With this history in
mind, we were receptive last year when
we were alerted to the possibility of
establishing a direct dialogue with Ira-
nian officials.
Now, let me repeat. America's
longstanding goals in the region have
been to help preserve Iran's inde-
pendence from Soviet domination; to
bring an honorable end to the bloody
Iran-Iraq war; to halt the export of
subversion and terrorism in the region.
A major impediment to those goals has
been an absence of dialogue, a cutoff in
communication between us.
The Search for a Better Relationship
It's because of Iran's strategic impor-
tance and its influence in the Islamic
world that we chose to probe for a better
relationship between our countries.
anuary 1987
65
MIDDLE EAST
Our discussions continued into the
spring of this year. Based upon the prog-
ress we felt we had made, we sought to
raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A
meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then
asked my former national security
adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake
a secret mission and gave him explicit
instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to
open a dialogue, making stark and clear
our basic objectives and disagreements.
The 4 days of talks were conducted
in a civil fashion; and American person-
nel were not mistreated. Since then, the
dialogue has continued, and step-by-step
progress continues to be made.
Let me repeat: our interests are
clearly served by opening a dialogue
with Iran and thereby helping to end the
Iran-Iraq war. That war has dragged on
for more than 6 years, with no prospect
of a negotiated settlement. The
slaughter on both sides has been enor-
mous; and the adverse economic and
political consequences for that vital
region of the world have been growing.
We sought to establish communication
with both sides in that senseless strug-
gle, so that we could assist in bringing
about a cease-fire and, eventually, a set-
tlement. We have sought to be even-
handed by working with both sides and
with other interested nations to prevent
a widening of the war.
This sensitive undertaking has
entailed a great risk for those involved.
There is no question but that we could
never have begun or continued this
dialogue had the initiative been disclosed
earlier. Due to the publicity of the past
week, the entire initiative is very much
at risk today.
There is ample precedent in our
history for this kind of secret diplomacy.
In 1971, then-President Nixon sent his
national security adviser on a secret mis-
sion to China. In that case, as today,
there was a basic requirement for discre-
tion and for a sensitivity to the situation
in the nation we were attempting to
engage.
Since the welcome return of former
hostage David Jacobsen, there have been
unprecedented speculation and countless
reports that have not only been wrong
but have been potentially dangerous to
the hostages and destructive of the
opportunity before us. The efforts of
courageous people like Terry Waite [lay
assistant to the Archbishop of Canter-
bury] have been jeopardized. So exten-
sive have been the false rumors and
erroneous reports that the risks of
remaining silent now exceed the risks of
speaking out. And that's why I decided
to address you tonight.
It's been widely reported, for exam-
ple, that the Congress, as well as top
executive branch officials, were cir-
cumvented. Although the efforts we
undertook were highly sensitive and
involvement of government officials was
limited to those with a strict need to
know, all appropriate Cabinet officers
were fully consulted. The actions I
authorized were and continue to be in
full compliance with Federal law. And
the relevant committees of Congress are
being and will be fully informed.
Another charge is that we have
tilted toward Iran in the gulf war. This,
too, is unfounded. We have consistently
condemned the violence on both sides.
We have consistently sought a
negotiated settlement that preserves the
territorial integrity of both nations. The
overtures we've made to the Govern-
ment of Iran have not been a shift to
supporting one side over the other.
Rather, it has been a diplomatic
initiative to gain some degree of access
and influence within Iran— as well as
Iraq— and to bring about an honorable
end to that bloody conflict. It is in the
interests of all parties in the gulf region
to end that war as soon as possible.
To summarize, our government has a
firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist
demands. That "no concessions" policy
remains in force— in spite of the wildly
speculative and false stories about arms
for hostages and alleged ransom
payments. We did not— repeat— did not
trade weapons or anything else for
hostages; nor will we. Those who think
that we have "gone soft" on terrorism
should take up the question with Col.
Qadhafi.
We have not, nor will we, capitulate
to terrorists. We will, however, get on
with advancing the vital interests of our
great nation— in spite of terrorists and
radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts
and immobilize the United States. Our
goals have been and remain:
Iran;
To restore a relationship with
• To bring an honorable end to the
war in the gulf;
• To bring a halt to state-supported
terror in the Middle East; and
• Finally, to effect the safe return of
all hostages from Lebanon.
As President, I've always operated
on the belief that, given the facts, the
American people will make the right
decision. I believe that to be true now.
I cannot guarantee the outcome.
But, as in the past, I ask for your sup-
port because I believe you share the
hope for peace in the Middle East, for
freedom for all hostages, and for a wof
free of terrorism. Certainly, there are
risks in this pursuit, but there are
greater risks if we do not persevere.
It will take patience and understan(
ing; it will take continued resistance to
those who commit terrorist acts; and it
will take cooperation with all who seek
to rid the world of this scourge.
SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW
ON "FACE THE NATION,"
NOV. 16, 1986=
}
i
Q. Is it true, as has been widely
reported, that this secret shipment of
arms to Iran — the operation — went
forward despite your objections to it??
And if that's true, why did you objecft
to it?
A. I never discuss the advice I give
to the President. That's something be-
tween the President and me. But let m*
tell you how I see this.
First of all, as Congressman
Wright— Speaker Wright— said, there
was an opportunity to probe for a dif-
ferent relationship with Iran; and
because of the strategic situation, that
seemed important to us. And I might
say, because of the strategic situation, i
undoubtedly is important to Iran. So
there's something mutual there.
In addition, the war, Iran's terroris<
acts, its effort to ship its revolution
abroad constituted a problem; and if
something could be done about that, w
we'd be better off. |f
By and large, everybody agrees tha
that's a good thing to do. So the Presi-
dent decided on a probing operation to
sort of feel his way, find out what migh
be done. In order to be effective, clearlj
that had to be done secretly— and I thin
people would agree on that.
In the course of that probe, which I
was conducted by his national security I
adviser— that's his designated hitter— as ,
the President said in his address to the |
nation last week, he decided that a i
signal should be sent in terms of a small I
defensive arms shipment to show his
serious intent and good faith. That's '
debatable. If you can—
Q. But that's the crux of it.
A. No. Wait a minute. You can
argue for that— there are some good
reasons why; you can argue against it.
At any rate, when you get elected Presi-
dent, that's one of the things you get th(
66
Department of State Bulleti
MIDDLE EAST
' ight to do, to make decisions of that
ind. So the President decided on this
ignal, and he did it. And he—
Q. On whose advice, though?
A. And he set that out before the
ation very clearly.
Now, the probe has gone on, and we
11 recognize that there are two principal
bstacles to the kind of relationship we'd
■ke to see with Iran. One is the continu-
ig war with Iraq— and Iran is the coun-
ry that seems intransigent, not wanting
get it settled. Furthermore, Iran has
nd continues to pursue a policy of ter-
orism, as shown for example in the fact
nat some terrorists were part of the
ilgrimage to Mecca recently, last sum-
ler. So they continue in that policy, and
'e have to be concerned about ter-
orism, whether directed against us or
irected against anybody else.
So those are two principal and
lixed-together obstacles, and we need
3, of course, respond to those. Among
ur responses is our denial of arms
nipments to Iran, and that policy
amains our policy. It is in effect, and
lere it is.
Q. You must explain that to the
.merican people. You —
A. I've just explained it.
Q. No, that— no. Let's try to con-
entrate on the arms part of this.
Iverybody will— I'll stipulate with you
tiat a lot of people think the probe
/as a good idea. It's the arms that
verybody is concerned about.
First, before we even get into it,
ou just said that that continues to be
ur policy. You went, yourself, to the
fnited Nations 6 weeks ago while this
ecret operation was underway, after
he President had sent some arms
irectly and apparently sanctioned,
ondoned third-party shipments to
ran, and told the moderate Arab
tates at the United Nations that we
k'eren't doing that. Now how could
ou have done that?
A. The President decided, as he said
■ublicly to the nation— he didn't par-
icularly want to disclose it at that time,
'Ut he felt he needed to.
I Q. Because he got caught.
A. He decided— well, no, I don't
hink that's a fair way to put it.
He was conducting an ongoing
irobe, and he was seeing some
esponses to that, and so he wanted to
:eep it going. I think we all recognize
'hat, for better or worse, all the publicity
)robably sets that back somewhat. At
my rate, he decided to put forward as a
gesture- as a signal, I think was the
word he used— of his good intent some-
thing that they recognized was tough for
him to do; and he did it, wanting to give
a signal of a desire for a different kind of
relationship.
Now, that's controversial, and there
it is. And you can argue for it; you can
argue against it.
Q. But why did you, then, go and
tell the Arabs that we weren't doing
that?
A. First of all, my own information
about the operational aspects of what
was going on was fragmentary at best-
so that's one point. Second, our policy,
insofar as arms shipments is concerned,
remains; and there hasn't been any flood
of U.S. arms to Iran, as seems to be
implied as far as I understand.
Q. I still don't understand why
you went and pledged and told the
moderate Arab states that we were not
sending shipments of arms to Iran
when we were.
A. As far as I knew at that time, we
didn't have any ongoing further signals.
We had a signal, we had given a signal,
and our discussion continued. It's a pro-
blem. But the President decided to send
something small as a signal, and he did
it.
Q. I don't want to. you know— I
don't want to badger you, but you're
not answering my question.
A. Oh, no. You can badger me.
Q. Okay. good. Why did you not
tell the Arabs the truth? Why did you
tell them an untruth?
A. The basic truth is that we con-
tinue to have a very firm arms
embargo—
Q. How can you say that to the
American people?
A. —and we continue to work at it.
Q. You're trying to say— you
know, it's just like Daniloff. You try
to tell us that a swap wasn't a swap.
You're trying to tell us that we have a
policy of not sending arms when we
have sent arms directly, and we have
permitted it through Israel. And I
know that— I expect you're not going
to confirm that, we all know that.
Now how can you say we have a policy
against sending shipments to Iran?
How can you look at the American
people and tell them that?
A. We have a policy of not sending
arms. The President decided that he
would go ahead and send this signal, and
that's a decision that he made in the
light of all the circumstances. And as I
say, you can argue for it and you can
argue against, but there it is.
Q. What did we get in return for
the shipments of arms?
A. It remains to be seen what
precisely takes place. There is a certain
amount of evidence that our ability to
talk to Iran in a sensible fashion has
improved and a certain amount of
evidence that their terrorist acts against
Americans, at least, has improved—
although I want to quickly say that we
must look on the terrorism matter as an
international matter, not just something
limited to Americans.
Q. Did you ever consider resigning
over this?
A. Oh, I talk to the President. I
serve at his pleasure, and anything that
I have to say on that subject, I'd just say
to him.
Q. Who has taken the three new
hostages? Mr. Poindexter. the national
security adviser, went on a television
show earlier this week and said that
radical elements in Iran took the three
new hostages. Is that your
understanding?
A. I think it's hard to know exactly
what is going on. We don't know where
our hostages are, and we don't know
exactly who holds them; but it does seem
to be reasonably clear that groups in
Lebanon associated with Iran are the
ones who are dealing with the hostages.
And I might say that Iran's use of ter-
rorism, Iran's taking of hostages, to me
is something that we have to fight
against very hard and unequivocally.
Q. What can the United States do
to restore its credibility, its greatly
damaged credibility, over this with the
Arabs who are scalding mad. as I
know you know because you've been
meeting with some of their represent-
atives here, and U.S. allies whom
we've been leaning on not to send
shipments of arms to Iran? What are
you going to do to try to repair this
damage?
A. We have to set out our policy, let
them know clearly that what we sent
was a signal— a signal has been sent, and
that's that— and continue to probe and
probably have to put it in some different
framework, with all of the publicity
about it.
Q. If you tell our allies and other
diplomats that our policy remains to
embargo arms against Iran, aren't
they just going to smile and laugh and
say, "Come on. You're doing it. We're
going to do it."?
A. Probably, they will. On the other
hand, we have to be serious about it
ourselves, and we have to reinforce it,
January 1987
67
MIDDLE EAST
and we have to point out to them the
reason why we have that policy. And the
reason why we have it apphes to them as
well.
They have a stake in a changed Iran;
they have a stake in an end of the war;
they have a stake in a change in terror;
and so on. So I think the basic policies of
probing Iran, but at the same time being
tough about an arms embargo and being
tough on terrorism and not trading arms
for hostages— the President said that
was not his intent and he did not do
that— and I think it is clearly wrong to
trade arms for hostages. So that is our
policy; that remains our policy.
And I might say that all of the public
discussions probably helped somewhat
because it has kind of confirmed the fact
that, cruel as it may seem to the families
involved— and we all can feel that— still
it isn't the right thing for governments
to trade arms or anything else for
hostages, just because it encourages
taking more.
Q. Will there be any more arms
shipments to Iran, either directly by
our government or through any third
parties?
A. It's certainly against our policy—
That's not an answer.
—and I think the signal has been
Q.
A.
given.
Q. It was against our policy
before, and we went ahead and did it.
You seem to be saying there will be.
A. We gave a signal, and the signal
has been given; and as far as I'm con-
cerned, I don't see any need for further
signals.
Q. Then, why don't you answer
the question directly? I'll ask it again:
Will there be any more arms shipments
to Iran, either directly by the United
States or through any third parties?
A, Under the circumstances of
Iran's war with Iraq, its pursuit of ter-
rorism, its association with those holding
our hostages I would certainly say, as
far as I'm concerned, no.
Q. Do you have the authority to
speak for the entire Administration?
A. No.
PRESIDENTS NEWS
CONFERENCE (EXCERPT),
NOV. 19, 19863
Eighteen months ago, as I said last
Thursday, this Administration began a
secret initiative to the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Our purposes were fourfold: to
replace a relationship of total hostility
with something better; to bring a
negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war; to
bring an end to terrorism; and to effect
the release of our hostages.
We knew this undertaking involved
great risks, especially for our people and
i^or the Iranian officials with whom we
dealt. That is why the information was
restricted to appropriate Cabinet officers
and those officials with an absolute need
to know. This undertaking was a matter
of considerable debate within Admini-
stration circles. Our policy objectives
were never in dispute. There were dif-
ferences on how best to proceed.
The principal issue in contention was
whether we should make isolated and
limited exceptions to our arms embargo
as a signal of our serious intent. Several
top advisers opposed the sale of even a
modest shipment of defensive weapons
and spare parts to Iran. Others felt no
progress could be made without the sale.
I weighed their views. I considered the
risks of failure and the rewards of suc-
cess, and I decided to proceed. The
responsibility for the decision and the
operation is mine and mine alone.
As Mr. Lincoln said of another
presidential decision, "If it turns out
right, the criticism will not matter. If it
turns out wrong, ten angels swearing I
was right will make no difference."
I understand this decision is deeply
controversial and that some profoundly
disagree with what was done. Even
some who support our secret initiative
believe it was a mistake to send any
weapons to Iran. I understand and I
respect those views, but I deeply believe
in the correctness of my decision. I was
convinced then and I am convinced now
that while the risks were great, so, too,
was the potential reward. Bringing Iran
back into the community of responsible
nations, ending its participation in
political terror, bringing an end to that
terrible war, and bringing our hostages
home— these are the causes that justify
taking risks.
In foreign policy, the presence of
risks alone cannot be reason enough not
to act. There were risks when we
liberated Grenada, when we went into
Lebanon, when we aided the Philippines,
and when we acted against Libya, so
we'll continue our efforts. However, to
68
eliminate the widespread but mistaken
perception that we have been exchang-
ing arms for hostages, I have directed
that no further sales of arms of any kini
be sent to Iran. I have further directed
that all information relating to our
initiative be provided to the appropriate
Members of Congress. There may be
some questions which for reasons of
national seciirity or to protect the safet;
of the hostages I will be unable to
answer publicly. But again, all informa-
tion will be provided to the appropriate
Members of Congress.
Q. In the recent past, there was ai
Administration whose by-word was,
"Watch what we do, not what we
say." How would you assess the
credibility of your own Administratioi
in the light of the prolonged deceptio)
of Congress and the public in terms of
your secret dealing with Iran, the
disinformation, the trading of
Zakharov for Daniloff?
A. Let me take the last one first.
Some persist in saying that we traded
Zakharov for Daniloff. We did not. We
said that we would have no dealings wit!
the Soviet Union, even on going to
Iceland, until Daniloff was in our hands-
But to bring it up to date on this,
there was no deception intended by us.
There was the knowledge that we were
embarking on something that could be c
great risk to the people we were talking
to, great risk to our hostages. And,
therefore, we had to have it limited to
only the barest number of people that
had to know. I was not breaking any lav
in doing that. It is provided for me to d(
that. At the same time, I have the right
under the law to defer reporting to Con
gress, to the proper congressional com-
mittees, on an action and defer it until
such time as I believe it can safely be
done with no risk to others.
And that's why I have ordered in
this coming week the proper committees
will be briefed on this. There are still
some parts of this that we cannot go
public with because it will bring to risk
and danger people that are held and
people that we have been negotiating
with. We were not negotiating
government-to-government. We were
negotiating with certain individuals
within that country.
Q. You don't think your credibilit)
has been damaged? And are you
prepared now to disavow the finding
which let you make end runs around
the Iranian arms embargo? Are you
going to tear it up?
Department of State Bulletin
MIDDLE EAST
A. No. As I say, we are going to
jbserve that embargo and it's part of the
ame reason that, as I've said, we were
oing this in the first place. And that is
I .■^ee, among the other issues involved,
' we can help bring about peace be-
ween those two countries— a peace
,'ithout victory to either one or defeat
,nd that will recognize the territorial in-
egrity of both. And this is something
lat all of our allies are seeking also.
But I think the people understand
lat sometimes you have to keep a
lecret in order to save human lives and
J succeed in the mission, just as we
'ent into Grenada without prior notice,
ecause then we would have put to risk
II of those men who were going to hit
le beach.
Q. Has Secretary Shultz discussed
is resignation with you? Have you
greed to accept it or have you asked
im to stay on?
A. He has never suggested to me in
ur meetings that— resignation and, in
ict, he has made it plain that he will
tay as long as I want him and I want
im. So, there's never been any discus-
on there. He knows that I want him to
;ay and he has in advance said that he
■ants to. There's been no talk of
3signation.
Q. Has he made his staying condi-
loned on your agreeing not to send
irther arms to Iran?
A. No. There has been no condi-
ons. As I say, we didn't discuss that,
.nd, as I've said now, there is no need
3 go further with this. The mission was
2rved that made us waive temporarily
lat for that really miniscule amount of
Dare parts and defensive weapons.
Q. You have stated flatly and you
tated flatly again tonight that you did
ot trade weapons for hostages. And
et the record shows that every time
n American hostage was released —
1st September, this July, and again
ast this very month — there had been a
lajor shipment of arms just before
hat. Are we all to believe that was
ust a coincidence?
A. The only thing I know about
"lajor shipments of arms— as I've said,
verything that we sold them could be
ut in one cargo plane, and there would
e plenty of room left over. Now, if
here were major shipments— and we
now this has been going on— there have
I'een other countries that have been
■ ealing in arms with Iran. There have
leen also private merchants of such
hings that have been doing the same
hing. Now, I've seen the stories about a
)anish tramp steamer and a Danish
sailor's union officials talking about their
ships taking various supplies to Iran. I
didn't know anything about that until I
saw the press on it, because we certainly
never had any contact with anything of
the kind. It's just that we did something
for a particular mission, that there was a
risk entailed, and Iran held no hostages.
Iran did not kidnap anyone, to our
knowledge, and the fact that part of the
operation was that we knew, however,
that the kidnappers of our hostages did
have some kind of relationship in which
Iran could at times influence them— not
always— but could influence them. And
so three of our hostages came home.
Q. On that first point, your own
Chief of Staff, Mr. Regan, has said
that the United States condoned
Israeli shipments of arms to Iran and
aren't you, in effect, sending the very
message you always said you didn't
want to send? Aren't you saying to the
terrorists, either you or your state
sponsor — which in this ease was
Iran — can gain from the holding of
hostages?
A. Because I don't see where the
kidnappers or the hostage-holders gained
anything. They didn't get anything.
They let the hostages go. Now, whatever
is the pressure that brought that about,
I'm just grateful to it for the fact that
we got them. As a matter of fact, if
there had not been so much publicity, we
would have had two more that we were
expecting.
Q. When you had the arms
embargo on, you were asking other
nations, our allies particularly, to
observe it — publicly. But at the same
time privately, you concede you were
authorizing a breaking of that
embargo by the United States. How
can you justify this duplicity?
A. I don't think it was duplicity, and
as I say, the so-called violation did not in
any way alter the balance, military
balance, between the two countries. But
what we were aiming for, I think, made
it worthwhile, and this was a waiver of
our own embargo. The embargo still
stays now and for the future. But the
causes that I outlined here in my open-
ing statement, first of all, to try and
establish a relationship with a country
that is of great strategic importance to
peace and everything else in the Middle
East. At the same time also, to strike a
blow against terrorism and to get our
hostages back, as we did, and to— this
particular thing was, we felt necessary
in order to make the contacts that we
made, and that could lead to better rela-
tions with us. And there was a fourth
item, also, as I pointed out.
Q. The polls show that a lot of
American people just simply don't
believe you. But the one thing that
you've had going for you more than
anything else in your presidency, your
credibility, has been severely
damaged. Can you repair it? What does
it mean for the rest of your
presidency?
A. I imagine I'm the only one
around who wants to repair it, and I
didn't have anything to do with damag-
ing it.
Q. You say that the equipment
which was shipped didn't alter the
military balance. Yet, several things —
we understand that there were 1,000
TOW [tube-launched, optically
tracked, wire-guided] antitank
missiles shipped by the United States.
The United States apparently con-
doned shipments by Israel and other
nations of other quantities of arms as
an ancillary part of this deal — not
directly connected but had to condone
it, or the shipments could not have
gone forward. So, how can you say
that it cannot alter the military
balance, and how can you say that it
didn't break the law when the
National Security Act of 1977 plainly
talks about timely notification of Con-
gress and also stipulates that if the
national security required secrecy, the
President is still required to advise the
leadership and the chairmen of the
intelligence committees?
A. Everything you've said here is
based on a supposition that is false. We
did not condone and do not condone the
shipment of arms from other countries.
And what was the other point that you
made here—
Q. There were the antitank
missiles.
A. Oh no, about the— that it
didn't— no, that it didn't violate the— or
that did violate the law. No, as I've said,
the President, believe it or not, does
have the power if, in his belief, national
security can be served to waive the pro-
visions of that law, as well as to defer
the notification of the Congress on this.
Q. Is it possible that the Iraqis
might think that 1,000 antitank
missiles were enough to alter the
balance of that war?
A. This is a purely defensive
weapon— it is a shoulder-carried weapon
and we don't think that in this defensive
thing— we didn't add to any offensive
power on the part of Iran. We know that
Iraq has already announced that they
would be willing to settle the conflict, as
January 1987
69
MIDDLE EAST
we've said, with no winners or losers.
And that, and the other parts, happened
to be spare parts for an antiaircraft
Hawk battery. And, as I say, all of those
weapons could be very easily carried in
one mission.
Q. I don't think it's still clear just
what Israel's role was in this — the
questions that have been asked about a
condoned shipment. We do understand
that the Israelis sent a shipment in
1985, and there were also reports that
it was the Israelis that contacted your
Administration and suggested that you
make contact with Iran. Could you
explain what the Israeli role was here?
A. No, because we, as I say, have
had nothing to do with other countries
or their shipment of arms or doing what
they're doing. And, no— as a matter of
fact, the first ideas about the need to
restore relations between Iran and the
United States or the Western world, for
that matter, actually began before our
Administration was here. But from the
very first, if you look down the road at
what could happen and perhaps a change
of government there— that it was abso-
lutely vital for the Western world and to
the hope for peace in the Middle East
and all, for us to be trying to establish
this relationship. And we worked to— it
started about 18 months ago, really, as
we began to find out— some individuals
that it might be possible for us to deal
with, and who also were looking at the
probability of a further accident.
Q. The contacts that you're sug-
gesting are with moderates in the Ira-
nian Government and in the Iranian
system. Barry Goldwater tonight said
in his judgment there are no
moderates in Iran. I don't mean to
suggest that there may not be, but
how did you know that you were
reaching the moderates, and how do
you define a moderate in that kind of a
government?
A. Again, you're asking questions
that I cannot get into with regard to the
answers. But believe me, we had infor-
mation that led us to believe that there
are factions within Iran and many of
them with an eye toward the fact that
they think sooner, rather than later,
there is going to be a change in the
government there and there is great
dissatisfaction among the people in Iran.
Q. Your chief arms negotiator.
Max Kampelman, said that as a result
of your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in
Iceland that there, indeed, were
substantial results and agreements.
But the Soviet — the leadership of the
Soviet Union say that there were no
results — nothing positive — and the
area is widely scattered still. How do
you propose in your term — in the
remainder of your term, to close the
gap and bring — for an agreement?
A. The thing is about thai situation,
they are not widely scattered. All the
agreements or the apparent places
where we agreed at Reykjavik are on the
table now with our arms negotiators in
Geneva. And for the first time, there
was an agreement reached on the desir-
ability of eliminating all strategic
nuclear missiles in a 5-year period and
then dealing with the intermediate-range
missiles in Germany. And just before the
meeting broke up was the first time
that— it had always been our purpose,
and it was our purpose when we went
there, to see if this— these are the
destabilizing weapons, these are the
weapons that people in their minds can
picture someone pushes a button and a
lot of places blow up. And we always
thought that if we could make a start on
those— the destabilizing missiles— and
then we could work on to the other
nuclear weapons— bombs carried by
airplanes and so forth.
And we had gone there with the
express purpose of seeing if we could
arrive at some kind of a settlement on
one of the other of these other two
missile types. And it was just before the
meeting broke up that for the first time
they suggested that they were talking
about all weapons— nuclear weapons—
not just the others. There was no time
for us to discuss them— this new force
that was in there.
But I think Mr. Kampelman was say-
ing right— that I just call to your atten-
tion that never in the history of the
Soviet Union has a Soviet leader ever
publicly proposed eliminating weapons
they already have. And this Soviet
leader has. He has talked actually of
totally eliminating them.
And so the only thing I can say to
this is, I know they are difficult to deal
with, but all I can say is, they are still at
the table in Geneva, and the proposals
are still there, so I continue to be
optimistic.
Q. Do you think you are going to
see Mr. Gorbachev again during your
term, or do you think he is thinking
that he'll wait for the next President
to negotiate an arms control
agreement?
A. I have to believe there is reason
for optimism because he, himself, sug-
gested the Iceland meeting as a forerun-
ner to the summit that was supposed to
take place in the United States. And all I
can do is recall that when the Soviets
II
sometime ago got up and walked out oi
the Geneva arms meetings because we
were installing medium-range— the Per
shings and the cruise missiles in Europe
and they walked out and said, "That
does it." Well, they came back.
Q. Do you have a date to meet
them again?
A. No. That's what we're waiting
for, is for them to give us a day.
Q. Going back over your answers
tonight about the arms shipments anc
the numbers of them, are you telling
us tonight that the only shipments
with which we were involved were th
one or two that followed your Januari
17 finding and that, whatever your I
aides have said on backg^round or on '
the record, there are no other
shipments with which the United
States condoned?
A. That's right. I'm saying nothing
but the missiles that we sold— and
remember, there are too many people
that are saying "gave." They bought
them.
Q. We've been told by the Chief o
Staff Donald Regan that we eondonec
this government condoned, an Israeli
shipment in September of 1985, short
before the release of hostage Benjam
Weir. That was 4 months before your
intelligence finding on January 17 thi
you say gave you the legal authority
not to notify Congress. Can you clear
that up why this government was not
in violation of its arms embargo and (
the notification to Congress for havir
condoned American-made weapons
shipped to Iran in September of 1985;
A. No, that— I've never heard Mr.
Regan say that and I'll ask him about
that, because we believe in the embargc
and, as I say, we waived it for a specific
purpose, in fact, with four goals in mine
Q. What is unclear to, I think,
many people in the American public is
why, if you are saying tonight that
there will be no further arms
shipments to Iran, why you won't
cancel the January 17th intelligence
finding so that you can put to rest anj
suggestion that you might again,
without notification and in complete
secrecy and perhaps with the objectioi
of some of your Cabinet members, con
tinue to ship weapons if you think tha
it is necessary?
A. No. I have no intention of doing
that, but at the same time, we are
hopeful that we're going to be able to
continue our meetings with these people
these individuals.
*
70
Department of State Bulletii
MIDDLE EAST
Q. But you won't cancel the
ntelligence finding?
A. I don't know whether it's called
or or whether I have to wait until we've
■eported to Congress and all. I don't
aiow just what the technicality legally is
in that.
Q. Why do you think, its strategic
)osition notwithstanding, the
American people would ever support
veapons to the Ayatollah Khomeini?
A. We weren't giving them to the
\yatollah Khomeini. It's a strange situa-
ion. As I say, we were dealing with
ndividuals and we believe that those—
ind some of those individuals are in
;overnment, in positions in government.
5ut it was not a meeting officially of the
J.S. head of state and the Iranian head
<{ state. But these people, we believed,
nd their closeness to the Iran military
vas such that this was necessary to let
hem know, number one, that we were
erious and sincere in our effort about
:ood relations and also that they were
ealing with the head of government
ver here— that this wasn't something
oming out of some agency or bureau-
hat I was behind it.
Q. If that's the case, some have
sked that if Libya occupied a
trategical position as Iran did, would
ou then arm Qadhafi and bomb
[homeini?
A. I know that's a— believe me,
hat's about as hypothetical a question as
nyone could imagine. The situations are
uite different.
Q. You said that you were not
wapping — or you did not think you
vere swapping arms for hostages. But
lid it ever occur to you or did it never
iccur to you that certainly the Iranians
vould see it that way and that they
night take it as an inducement to take
nore hostages, especially in light of
he fact that they've released three but
aken three more?
A. No— to the best of our
;nowledge, Iran does not own or have
luthority over the Hezbollah. They can-
lot order them to do something. It is
apparent that they evidently have either
lome persuasion and they don't always
;ucceed, but they can sometimes per-
iuade or pressure the Hezbollah into
icing what they did in this instance.
And, as I say, the Iranian Government
lad no hostages, and they bought a ship-
■nent from us and we, in turn— I might
IS well tell you— that we, in turn, had
:5aid when they wanted to kind of know
|)ur position and whether we were
Tustworthy and all of this, we told them
-hat we were— we did not want to do
business with any nation that openly
backed terrorism. And they gave us
information that they did not and they
said also that they had some evidence
that there had been a lessening of this
on the part of— Khomeini and the
government and that they'd made some
progress. As a matter of fact, some
individuals associated with terrorist acts
had been put in prison there. And so
that was when we said, "Well, there's a
very easy way for you to verify that if
that's the way you feel, and they're
being held hostage in Lebanon."
Q. If your arms shipments had no
effect on the release of the hostages,
then how do you explain the release of
the hostages at the same time that the
shipments were coming in?
A. No. I said that at the time I said
to them that there was something they
could do to show their sincerity and if
they really meant it that they were not
in favor of backing terrorists, they could
begin by releasing our hostages. And, as
a matter of fact, I believe and have
reason to believe that we would have had
all five of them by this last weekend had
it not been for the attendant— confusion
that arose here in the reporting room.
Q. On that point, you said earlier,
and you said just now again, that but
for the publicity, two other hostages
would have been returned home by
now. As you know, the publicity began
in a Syrian-backed, pro-Syrian
magazine in Lebanon. My question is,
therefore, are you suggesting that
someone who was a party to this
sabotaged it by deliberately leaking
that original report?
A. To our best information, the leak
came from a person in government in
Iran and not one of the people that we
were dealing with, someone that would
be more hostile to us. And that
individual gave the story to the
magazine, and the magazine then
printed the story there in Beirut.
Q. There has been an obvious
change in policy toward Iran — from
refusing to deal with a terrorist state
to even sending weapons as a gesture
of good will. Would you consider, in
the name of the same geopolitical
interest that you invoked with Iran,
changing your policy toward
Nicaragua?
A. No, and I believe that I've
answered that question, I think, more
than once here— that no, we still hold to
our position, and Iran officially is still on
our list of nations that have been sup-
porting terrorism. But I'm talking about
the people that we were doing business
with, and they gave us indication and
evidence that that policy was changing.
And so, as I said, to give them more
prestige and muscle there, where they
were, we made this sale.
Q. Then would you consider break-
ing diplomatic relations with
Nicaragua to increase the pressure on
the Sandinista government?
A. No, we have not thought of that,
and we still believe very much in sup-
porting the Contras, because we believe
in the Contras' cause. The Contras have
made it plain that they— all they seek is
to be able to put enough pressure on the
Sandinista government for that govern-
ment to negotiate with them and the
people of Nicaragua for the kind of
government that they altogether had
promised when they were fighting the
revolution against the Somoza dictator-
ship. And it was the Sandinistas who, as
communist groups usually do, simply
when the revolution was over— they did
everything they could to get rid of their
fellow revolutionaries, and they seized
power and created a totalitarian com-
munist state.
Now, the Sandinistas— or the Con-
tras have never proposed overthrowing
the government. They have repeatedly
offered and said, we simply want to be
able to negotiate and have a chance to
have the government installed that we
had promised the Organization of
American States we were fighting for.
So, I think we continue to help them, but
we believe that there is a value in main-
taining relations. It gives us a listening
post in Nicaragua.
Q. There is a mood in Washington
tonight of a President who is very
much beleagfuered, very much on the
defensive. Why don't you seize the
offensive by giving your Secretary of
State a vote of confidence declaring
that all future covert activities will
have his support and by shaking up the
National Security Council in such a
way as to satisfy the concerns in Con-
gress that he has been running a
paramilitary operation out of the base-
ment of the White House in defiance
of the State Department and the
Congress?
A. The State Department and the
Secretary of State were involved, and
the Director of the CIA was involved in
what we were doing, and, as I said
before, there are certain laws in which,
for certain actions, I would not have
been able to keep them a secret as they
were. But these people you've mentioned
have been involved— did know what was
January 1987
71
MIDDLE EAST
going on. And I don't see that the action
that you've suggested has called for it,
but what you've disappointed me the
most in is suggesting that I sound defen-
sive up here. I've just been trying to
answer all your questions as well as I
can. and I don't feel that I have anything
to defend about at all. With the cir-
cumstances the way they were, the deci-
sion I made I still believe was the correct
decision, and I believe that we achieved
some portion of our goals.
Q. Do you believe that any of the
additional hostages will be released?
A. I have to believe that.
Q. During any of these discussions
with your Administration, was there
ever any hint or suggestion that these
weapons might be used to topple the
Ayatollah?
A. No, and I don't see in any way
how that could be with the particular
things that we were using. I don't see
where the Ayatollah could be a logical
target for an antiaircraft missile or even
for TOW missiles, for that matter.
Q. You made an exception for the
arms embargo when you thought it
was in the U.S. interest to do so. Why
shouldn't other nations ship weapons
to Iran when they think it's in their
interests?
A. I would like to see the indication
as to how it could be in their interest. I
know that there are other nations that
feel as we do that the Western world
should be trying to find an avenue to get
Iran back where it once was, and that is
in the family of democratic nations and
the family of nations that want peace in
the Middle East and so forth.
Q. How does shipping weapons to
Iran help bring them back into the
community of nations? You've
acknowledged that you were dealing
with only a small portion of the
government.
A. I was talking of strengthening a
particular group who needed the
prestige that that could give them who
needed that bargaining power,
themselves, within their own ranks.
Q. I believe you may have been
slightly in error in describing a TOW
as a shoulder-mounted weapon. It's a
ground-to-ground weapon— Red-Eye is
the shoulder weapon, but that's beside
the point. TOWs are used to destroy
tanks. I don't think its fired from your
shoulder.
A. If I have been misinformed, then
I will yield on that, but it was my
understanding that that is a man-carried
weapon, and we have a number of other
shoulder-borne weapons.
72
Q. I did have a question, though.
A. You mean that wasn't a
question?
Q. No, I thought I knew what a
TOW was. I just wanted to ask you,
what would be wrong at this stage of
the game, since everything seems to
have gone wrong that could possibly
go wrong, like the Murphy Law, the
Reagan Law, the O'Leary Law, this
week — what would be wrong in saying
that a mistake was made on a very
high-risk gamble and that — so that you
can get on with the ne.xt 2 years?
A. Because I don't think a mistake
was made. It was a high-risk gamble,
and it was a gamble that, as I've said, I
believe the circumstances warranted.
And I don't see that it has been a fiasco
or a great failure of any kind. We still
have those contacts, we still have made
some ground, we got our hostages
back— three of them. And so I think that
what we did was right, and we're going
to continue on this path.
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT
There may be some misunderstanding of
one of my answers tonight. There was a
third country involved in our secret proj-
ect with Iran. But taking this into
account, all of the shipments of the
token amounts of defensive arms and
parts that I have authorized or condoned
taken in total could be placed aboard a
single cargo aircraft. This includes all
shipments by the United States or any
third country. Any other shipments by
third countries were not authorized by
the U.S. Government.
DEPUTY SECRETARY
WHITEHEADS STATEMENT.
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE,
NOV. 24, 1986^
I have been asked to discuss with you
our policy toward Iran in light of the
recent events. I look forward to sharing
with you our assessment of our policy
toward the region, our goals in the Iran-
Iraq war, the reactions of our friends to
the revelations in the media, and our
future objectives.
It is important to point out that the
extreme sensitivity of the undertaking
prompted implementation be held to the
smallest group possible. Consequently,
the State Department had no operational
role. We in the Department still do not
have a detailed record of what happened,
and I am, therefore, not able to address
specific questions of what may have
occurred.
As you are aware, our government
has had contact with the Iranian Goven
ment over the last 18 months. The goals
of such contact have been:
• The resumption of a stable rela-
tionship with Iran;
• An honorable end to the Iran-Irac
war and greater stability in the gulf
region;
• The countering of Soviet attempt
to influence developments in Iran and
the gulf;
• The elimination of Iranian state-
sponsored terrorism and subversion; an
• The safe return of all of our— and
others'— hostages.
We have also had several other
avenues of communication with Iranian
officials. These include the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal at The Hague; Federal
Reserve and Treasury officials and Ira-
nian bankers; communications through
third parties; and occasional exchanges
in international fora.
About 18 months ago, the President
authorized a more directed dialogue wit
Iranian officials. It was not an easy deci
sion to begin and pursue such a dialogut
Serious obstacles remain:
li
J)
6
!l
X
!1
• Iran's determination to use its we*
with Iraq as a means of overthrowing
the Iraqi Government and establishing i
radical fundamentalist government in ifc
place;
• Iran's continuing support for
terrorism;
• Iran's continued financial,
logistical, and material support for
radical Shi'as living in the gulf, Lebanoi
and elsewhere; and
• Iran's association with hostage-
takings in Lebanon, including the receni
abduction of three American hostages
there.
The Iranians understand our posi-
tion. There is no need for further signaUj
of the seriousness of our intentions
through arms transfers. The President
publicly stated on November 17 that we
will not be shipping any further arms to
Iran. Our arms embargo is in effect.
Operation Staunch remains in effect.
Iran-Iraq War and Arms Transfers
Our policy on the Iran-Iraq war remains
unchanged. We continue to be deeply
concerned about the terrible loss and
disruption which this war has brought to
the people of both Iran and Iraq, and we
remain concerned at the possibility that
miscalculation or misunderstanding
might lead to a widening of the war.
Since the beginning of the conflict in
Department of State Bulletir
MIDDLE EAST
ptember 1980, we have worked for the
rliest possible end to the war— one
;ich preserves both the independence
d territorial integrity of both states,
that end, the United States has
lowed several paths. These include:
A policy to deny Munitions List
^ms to both Iran and Iraq;
Pursuit of Operation Staunch— our
jmpt to discourage arms supply from
lers to Iran— this had been relatively
fective until word of our Iran
Mpments became public. We believe we
jiyed an important role in reducing the
pbal volume of arms sent to Iran. We
' 11 now have to redouble our efforts to
store the credibility of this policy,
lich remains the best means to bring
e Iranians to accept a mediated or
gotiated settlement; and
• Support for diplomatic efforts to
c courage Iran to join Iraq in working
award a peaceful end to the war. These
(Forts include active U.S. encourage-
ment of the UN Secretary General, the
amic Conference, the Nonaligned
jvement, and various other efforts— by
/eden, Japan, and Algeria among
lers- to draw Iran into talks.
TForism
cretary Shultz has recently recon-
■ med the fundamental premises of our
unterterrorism policy:
• Opposition to all acts of terrorism,
t just those against Americans;
• Refusal of terrorist demands;
• Willingness to use all available
jans to defend ourselves against ter-
rists; and
• Seeking the cooperation of our
ends and allies in combatting ter-
rism and isolating those nations which
onsor or shelter terrorists.
In particular, we believe that those
.tions which sponsor or support ter-
rism must remain outside the family of
/ilized nations until they cease their
pport of terrorists. We seek the
operation of all civilized nations in our
forts. We strongly believe that our
•m policy is the best guarantee of pro-
cting American citizens and interests
orldwide.
Let me say a special word about our
maining hostages in Lebanon. We will
mtinue to seek the safe release of all
merican hostages. We will talk to
lyone, any group, or any government
)out them and their safe return. In
)ing so, however, we will not under-
ine the basic tenets of our policy.
Iraq
Our bilateral relations with Iraq have
improved markedly over the past few
years, as Iraq has increasingly modified
its traditional hardline regional policies
and has established closer diplomatic
working relationships with moderate
Arab states with which we have long-
standing ties. Iraq has made clear its
rejection of terrorism as an instrument
of state policy by expelling the notorious
Abu Nidal. Unlike Iran, Iraq seeks an
early negotiated end to the war. We
want to keep relations with Iraq on an
even keel, even though the news of the
limited arms shipments to Iran have
been very unwelcome in Baghdad. After
the war ends, we will continue to have a
stake and equity in Iraq's pursuit of its
modified regional policies. Trade, com-
merce, and investment of Iraq's
ambitious postwar development plans
will be of great interest to us. Iraq's
distancing itself from support for inter-
national terrorism has been
substantial— the trend is clearly in the
direction we encourage.
The Gulf States
The nonbelligerent gulf Arab states,
while they understand our reasons for
establishing contacts with Iran, strongly
disapproved of the transfer of arms. Our
ties with these states are close, and we
want to do whatever we can to assure
that there will be no lasting damage to
our mutually beneficial security relation-
ships. Nothing has changed to affect our
policy of support for the security and
territorial integrity of these good
friends. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) states continue to believe that
their security and stability are in
American interests and understand our
determination to protect those interests.
Conclusion
To conclude, let me say that the United
States recognizes the importance of Iran
in the region and the Islamic world. The
emergence of leaders willing to change
Iran's unacceptable international
behavior and seek a normal relationship
with the international community cannot
be ignored by the United States. The
President has made clear the importance
the United States attaches to a stable
relationship with Iran and the benefits
which can accrue to the region and to
the West should such a situation evolve.
We will persevere in efforts to pursue a
dialogue to reach the goals I have noted.
But we will do so only in the context of
our strong and firm commitment to the
security of the gulf states, our desire to
see an end to the war, our relationship
with Iraq, and our promise to combat
terrorism.
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.
NOV. 25, 1986^
Last Friday, after becoming concerned
whether my national security apparatus
had provided me with a complete factual
record with respect to the implementa-
tion of my policy toward Iran, I directed
the Attorney General to undertake a
review of this matter over the weekend
and report to me on Monday. And
yesterday. Attorney General Meese pro-
vided me and the White House Chief of
Staff with a report on his preliminary
findings. And this report led me to con-
clude that I was not fully informed on
the nature of one of the activities under-
taken in connection with this initiative.
This action raises serious questions of
propriety.
I've just met with my national
security advisers and congressional
leaders to inform them of the actions
that I'm taking today. Determination of
the full details of this action will require
further review and investigation by the
Department of Justice.
Looking to the future, I will appoint
a special review board to conduct a com-
prehensive review of the role and pro-
cedures of the National Security Council
staff in the conduct of foreign and
national security policy.
I anticipate receiving the reports
from the Attorney General and the
special review board at the earliest possi-
ble date. Upon the completion of these
reports, I will share their findings and
conclusions with the Congress and the
American people.
Although not directly involved. Vice
Admiral John Poindexter has asked to
be relieved of his assignment as Assis-
tant to the President for National
Security Affairs and to return to another
assignment in the Navy. Lt. Col. Oliver
North has been relieved of his duties on
the National Security Council staff.
I am deeply troubled that the
implementation of a policy aimed at
resolving a truly tragic situation in the
Middle East has resulted in such con-
troversy. As I've stated previously, I
believe our policy goals toward Iran
were well-founded. However, the infor-
mation brought to my attention yester-
day convinced me that in one aspect,
implementation of that policy was
seriously flawed.
anuary 1987
73
NARCOTICS
President Convenes
Conference on Narcotics
The President invited a representative
group of U.S. Ambassadors from countries
where drug production, trafficking, and
consumption are major problems, or might
develop into major problems, to meet at the
White House with him and Secretary Shultz
November 12-1:5, 1986.
Its threefold purpose was to provide
the President with the opportunity to
demonstrate U.S. commitment to the issue
of narcotics control and to update the
ambassadors on recent domestic drug-
control initiatives; to encourage ambas-
sadors to discuss ways to enhance the inter-
national narcotics control program by
exploring options for regional cooperation;
and to send to foreign governments a
strong message that narcotics is a critical
international problem which must be
addressed.
Those ambassadors attending were;
Carol Boyd Hallett (Bahamas), Edward M.
Rowell (Bolivia), Harry W. Shlaudeman
(Brazil), Melvyn Levitsky (Bulgaria), Daniel
O'Donohue (Burma), Charles A. Gillespie,
Jr. (Colombia), P>rnando E. Rondon
(Ecuador), Richard R. Burt (West Ger-
many), Maxwell M. Rabb (Italy), Michael
Sotirhos (Jamaica). Charles J. Pilliod, Jr.
(Mexico), Princeton Lyman (Nigeria),
Deane R. Hinton (Pakistan), Arthur H.
Davis (Panama), .Alexander F. Watson
(Peru), William A. Brown (Thailand), Otto
J. Reich (Venezuela), Herbert S. Okun
(Deputy Permanent Representative to the
United Nations), and Bruce Chapman
(Representative to the Vienna Office of the
United Nations), and Charge d' Affaires"
Maurice Ealum (Afghanistan) and Charge
d'Affaires Harriet Isom (Laos). ■
While I cannot reverse what has
happened, I'm initiating steps, including
those I've announced today, to assure
that the implementation of all future
foreign and national security policy
initiatives will proceed only in accord-
ance with my authorization.
Over the past 6 years, we've realized
many foreign policy goals. I believe we
can yet achieve, and I intend to pursue,
the objectives on which we all agree— a
safer, more secure and stable world.
ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE'S
NEWS BRIEFING (EXCERPT).
NOV. 25. 1986*
On Friday afternoon— or Friday at
noon— the President asked me to look
into and bring together the facts concer-
ning the, particularly the impleinenta-
tion of the strategic initiative in Iran and
more precisely, anything pertaining to
the transfer of arms. Over the weekend,
this inquiry was conducted. Yesterday
evening I reported to the President. We
continued our inquiry, and this morning
the President directed that we make this
information immediately available to the
Congress and to the public through this
medium this noon.
itai
74
Let me say that all of the informa-
tion is not yet in. We are still continuing
our inquiry. But he did want me to mak
available immediately what we know at
the present time.
What is involved is that in the coursi
of the arms transfers, which involved th!
United States providing the arms to
Israel and Israel in turn transferring thi
arms— in effect, selling the arms to !
representatives of Iran. Certain monies '
which were received in the transaction \
between representatives of Israel and
representatives of Iran were taken and '
made available to the forces in Central
America which are opposing the San-
dinista government there.
In essence, the way in which the
transactions occurred was that a certair
amount of money was negotiated by
representatives outside of the United
States with Iran for arms. This amount:
of money was then transferred to
representatives, as best we know, that
can be described as representatives of
Israel. They, in turn, transferred to the
CIA, which was the agent for the U.S.
Government under a finding prepared b
the President— signed by the President
in January of 1986. And, incidentally, ai
of these transactions that I am referrin)
to took place between January of 1986
and the present time. They transferred
to the CIA the exact amount of the
money that was owed to the U.S.
Government for the weapons that were
involved plus any costs of transportatio
that might be involved. This money was
then repaid by the CIA to the Depart-
ment of Defense under the normal pro-
cedures, and all governmental funds an(
all governmental property was
accounted for and statements of that
have been verified by us up to the pres-
ent time.
The money— the difference between
the money owed to the U.S. Governmen
and the money received from represent-
atives of Iran was then deposited in ban-
accounts which were under the control
of representatives of the forces in Cen-
tral America. '
Q. How much money? How much ,
involved?
A. We don't know the exact ,
amount, yet. Our estimate is that it is i
somewhere between $10 and $30 million,
Q. How did it come to your
attention?
A. In the course of a thorough
review of a number of intercepts, and
other materials, this— the hint of a '
possibility that there were some monies '
being made available for some other pur
Departnnent of State Bulletii
"
NUCLEAR POLICY
pe came to our attention, and then we
rsued that with the individuals
Mved.
Q. Why wasn't the President told?
A. The President was told as soon
we found out about it.
Q. And he knew nothing about it?
A. The President knew nothing
aaut it until I reported it to him. I
a rted him yesterday morning that we
sil had some more work to do, and then
I ave him the details that we had
Uerday afternoon.
Q. Is this what you were looking
f • when you began? Or is this just
sTiething that turned up in the course
cyour weekend investigation?
A. This turned up in the course of
t: investigation. The first thing that
tjgered, if you will, an inquiry was the
f t that as people prepared their
t timony— because this had been done
i J rather compartmentalized way— as
f )ple prepared their testimony for the
I I on Friday, there appeared to be
r re facts out there than we had
a eady put together. And it was a mat-
t , then, of the President requesting me
t ;alk with everyone who had any par-
t pation at all, because one agency was
c ng one thing, another agency was
c ng another thing— there was very lit-
t paperwork— and to determine
I 'cisely what all of the facts were
t 'ause he wanted to be sure that he
Y i all of the information about anything
t t may have occurred in the course of
1 3 whole situation. That was— it was
c -ing the course of that inquiry that
1 3 information was found and then was
f owed out to the conclusions that I
r ntioned.
Q. Can you tell us who is running
I tional security policy? Can you clear
I for the American people, is
i cretary Shultz staying? Who is the
I w national security adviser? And
1 lat are you recommending in terms
« possibly restructuring the White
1 luse staff?
A. In answer to your questions in
( ier, at the present time, upon Admiral
1 indexter actually leaving his post, Al
]'el, his deputy, will be the Acting
1 sistant to the President for National
'curity Affairs. The President has not
; t selected a replacement, but he will
' So as soon as possible.
Secretary Shultz is remaining in his
■ sition— is Secretary of State. That has
t been a matter of conjecture or
;cussion or inquiry.
We will make whatever recommen-
dations for further proceedings come out
of it, but more particularly, the Presi-
dent will be appointing a small commis-
sion which will look into the procedures
and role of the NSC staff and will make
specific recommendations to him as far
as the process for the future.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of ^lov. 17, 1986.
-Press release 251.
'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 24.
■■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 1. The text of
the Secretary's remarks made on the evening
of Nov. 25 concerning Iran are printed on
p. 23.
^For full text of Attorney General's news
briefing, see Wfiite House press release. ■
International Prospects for Civil Nuclear
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era
by John D. .\egropoiite
Address before the Rotary Club of
Detroit on November 5. 19S6. Ambassti-
dor Negroponte is Assistant Secretary
for Oceans and International Environ-
ine)ita! and Scientific Affairs.
As head of the bureau in the State
Department responsible for peaceful
nuclear energy affairs, I have been very
much involved with a number of inter-
national issues arising from the serious
accident that destroyed the Soviet
reactor at Chernobyl earlier this year. I
would like to discuss some of these
issues with you.
The Chernobyl accident has obvi-
ously raised anxieties and renewed ques-
tions about commercial nuclear power,
not just in the Soviet Union but
everywhere. At the time of the Three
Mile Island accident— whose conse-
quences, it should be noted, were far less
severe than those resulting from
Chernobyl— one frequently heard it said
that "a nuclear accident anywhere is a
nuclear accident everj-where." This
expression was beginning to seem a little
trite, perhaps, when Chernobyl came
along to underscore its essential truth.
Happily, we in the United States and
Canada were spared from all but the
most inconsequential effects of the
radioactive debris from the shattered
Chernobyl core. The situation was
somewhat different in Western and Cen-
tral Europe, however. There, the long-
term effects on public health will need to
be scrutinized very closely.
There is, thus, no denying that the
Chernobyl accident was a serious one. It
has provoked fresh doubts in the minds
of many about the wisdom of continuing
to rely routinely on nuclear reactors to
generate electrical power. In a few
cases, these doubts have already been
translated into political action opposing
continued reliance on commercial
nuclear power.
The point I would like to make today
is that questions concerning commercial
nuclear power, legitimate though they
may be, do not in themselves invalidate
civil nuclear power as an energy
resource, as some critics seem to sup-
pose. Any large technological enterprise
will raise major questions of public
policy. What is important is not the
questions themselves but the answers to
those questions.
Economic and
Environmental Factors
In my view, civil nuclear energy is a
necessary energy resource and will
become increasingly important as the
world's finite supply of fossil fuels con-
tinues to be depleted. Civil nuclear
energy is a key element in any program
of energy resource management that is
prudently diversified. Overdependence
on a single energy source such as
imported oil is unwise and unacceptable
for our nation's energy policy. Just recall
the severe effects on our national well-
being as we dealt with the OPEC
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries]-induced oil shocks of 1973
and 1979. The repercussions linger in
our economy to this day. We would be
foolish to court a repetition of those
events by an arbitrary refusal to allocate
a place for civil nuclear energy in our
overall energy program. Nor can we
nuary 1987
75
NUCLEAR POLICY
assume that an alternative such as
fusion energy will replace the current
generation of nuclear reactors in the
decades ahead. Fusion is unlikely to play
a significant role until well into the next
century at the earliest.
These points are less easily grasped
in our country, perhaps, with its rela-
tively wide range of energy options. But
they are valid points, and their impor-
tance is fully appreciated by some of our
major allies, such as Japan and France,
that lack abundant alternative sources of
energy. These countries are, of course,
highly industrialized, and for them,
reliance on civil nuclear energy has
become indispensable. In 1985, for exam-
ple, France derived 65% of its electricity
from nuclear power generation.
Is civil nuclear power cost-effective?
The answer is yes— resoundingly so in
many industrialized countries, qualifiedly
so in our own. The difference lies in the
availability of alternative energy
resources and the way different coun-
tries have planned and managed their
civil nuclear programs. In particular,
those countries that have opted for
standardized reactor designs— thus
simplifying the licensing process and
sharply reducing the costs of bringing
new reactors into service— seem to be
making out best.
In considering the economics of civil
nuclear power, it is also important to
keep in mind the long-term picture. To
be sure, prices of crude oil are relatively
low today. But complacency can be a
dangerous thing. It would be rash,
indeed, to predict that we will enjoy
indefinitely the luxury of today's
relatively low prices.
What about the effect of nuclear
power reactors on the environment? It is
quite clear that nuclear power plants, in
their normal operation, are environ-
mentally more benign than some other
types of plants. I do not need to remind
you, here on our border with Canada,
how important an issue acid rain has
become in relations between our two
countries. I might note in passing that
this is another issue with which I have
been very much preoccupied, inasmuch
as my bureau in the State Department is
also responsible for environmental
issues. I mention the problem here,
however, only to make one simple point:
unlike some other types of generating
plants, nuclear power plants do not con-
tribute to the problem of acid rain.
There is also another, longer term
environmental problem associated with
the burning of fossil fuels. This is the
so-called greenhouse effect, a gradual
warming of the Earth's atmosphere with
possibly serious long-term implications
76
for weather patterns and ocean levels.
Although we have much to learn about
the "greenhouse effect," at this point we
are confident that nuclear power plants
do not contribute in any appreciable way
to this problem.
Safety Concerns
I come now to the question of nuclear
safety. This, it seems to me, is the key
question for determining what the pros-
pects for civil nuclear power are likely to
be in the post-Chernobyl era. Countries
intending to rely on civil nuclear power
must address resolutely some very real
concerns relating to nuclear safety and
to nuclear safeguards as well— an impor-
tant distinction to which I will return
later on.
The first thing to be said is that,
despite well-publicized accidents like
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the
safety record of nuclear power compares
favorably with that of other types of
powerplants. But as the accident at
Chernobyl has demonstrated so graph-
ically, a serious accident at a nuclear
power plant, however statistically rare it
may be, is different in scope and dimen-
sion from an accident at any other type
of electrical generating plant. It is not
enough, therefore, merely to state that
nuclear plants compare well statistically
with other types of plants with respect
to frequency of accidents and to let the
argument stand at that. A serious acci-
dent at a nuclear power plant has the
potential for being far more damaging
than an accident at any other type of
generating plant, and so our efforts
must be more rigorous and comprehen-
sive to ensure against its happening at
all.
It is also important to bear in mind
that not all reactors are equally safe. We
are, of course, seeking to learn all that
we can about how the accident at
Chernobyl occurred and to apply the
lessons to our own experience, where
appropriate. The Soviet operators at
Chernobyl clearly made major errors on
the night of the accident, and to err is
human; any feeling of smugness on our
part would be inappropriate and prob-
ably self-defeating. But the fact remains
that the Chernobyl reactor, with its
inadequate containment and its propen-
sity to surge in power as coolant was
lost (positive void coefficient), could not
have been licensed to operate in the
United States, Canada, or probably any
other Western country. Our standards
are stricter, our commitment to safety
and environmental protection more pro-
nounced. We see it as incumbent on the
Soviets to implement changes to ensure
that basic design problems contributing
to the Chernobyl disaster will be cor-
rected in the numerous similar reactors
throughout the Soviet Union. We can
only regret that an accident at one reac
tor has called into question the safety o:
all reactors, however dissimilar.
Let me make a related point. As
some of you may know, the Soviets are
currently building two nuclear power
reactors at Cienfuegos in Cuba. I would
like to stress that these reactors are nc
of the Chernobyl type. In addition, I
would like to assure you that we have
made it clear to the Soviets and Cubans
that these Cuban reactors, particularly
in view of their proximity to our shores'
must be designed and built to exacting
safety standards and that they must be
operated in a safe manner at all times.
We will be paying close attention
to make sure these standards are
adhered to.
U.S. and International
Responses to Chernobyl
The months since Chernobyl have been
time for critical reflection on nuclear
power safety, both within the United
States and within the international coiri
munity. Let me review very briefly son?
of our activities on the international
plane in response to Chernobyl. From
the very outset, the United States took
leading role in prodding the Soviet
Union to fulfill its international respon;
bilities by following up its initially quite
meager and delayed account of the acci
dent with a full and complete disclosure
of the facts. I am pleased to say that th
Soviets themselves soon recognized the
wisdom of this course, and their subse-
quent report to a specially convened
meeting of international experts at the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna, August 25-29, was
notably open and forthcoming. I should
add that we have deliberately resisted
any temptation to make political capita,
from the Soviets' misfortune and, in
fact, have offered our assistance on a
number of fronts.
The United States was also instru-
mental in mobilizing efforts under Intel
national Atomic Energy Agency
auspices to put in place procedures for
dealing with possible similar accidents i
the future. Even before Chernobyl, the:
was a broad consensus, at least among
the countries of the industrialized West
that each individual country engaged in
nuclear power generation must be fully
responsible for ensuring safety in the
design, manufacture, operation, and
\.
t'
NUCLEAR POLICY
aintenance of its nuclear installations;
lat avoiding potential transboundary
■^changes resulting from nuclear activ-
ies involves a responsibility to other
itions; and that prompt and adequate
formation on nuclear emergencies and
■cidents must be provided where there
a potential for transboundary conse-
;iences of radiological safety signif-
ance. In the immediate aftermath of
hernobyl, the need became clear for a
nding international agreement that
ould embody these principles. It was
so clear that the International Atomic
nergy Agency would be the most
ipropriate forum within which to
■ganize international efforts toward
is goal.
In early May, therefore, while events
Chernobyl were still unfolding, the
nited States and its allies called for a
lecial meeting of the agency's Board of
jvernors, which in turn commissioned
group of government experts to draft
'■0 international conventions: one pro-
ding for the early notification of
iclear accidents with transboundary
fects and the dissemination of com-
ehensive information concerning them;
e other providing a framework for
ordinating international assistance,
:luding emergency response measures,
the event of such accidents. These two
nventions on notification and on
sistance were drafted, submitted to a
ecial session of the agency's General
jnference, adopted, opened for signa-
re, and signed by over 50 states by the
id of September— a near-record pace
' the usual standards for activities in
ternational bodies.
All this is very well, you may say,
it it seems to relate only to what hap-
■ns after an accident has taken place,
"hat is being done to reduce the
lances of an accident occurring in the
'st place? As it happens, a great deal,
ough even more can and should be
me. The International Atomic Energy
gency and the Nuclear Energy Agency
' the Organization for Economic
Doperation and Development in Paris
ive longstanding programs aimed at
;tablishing safe nuclear design,
igineering, and operating standards on
universal basis. The U.S. nuclear
dustry is pursuing similar work
irough its Institute for Nuclear Power
Operations in Atlanta— an effort that has
"awn the active participation of a
jmber of foreign reactor operators.
he U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
on has a well-established program of
^operation with other countries in the
^change of information relating to
uclear safety. Bilateral agreements on
nuclear safety cooperation exist with 37
nations.
The United States has also launched
an initiative aimed at creating a nuclear
safety training academy, organized as a
nonprofit foundation and based on joint
industry and government participation.
Its goal is to provide assistance to
cooperating countries by introducing
their nuclear energy decisionmakers to
U.S. safety programs and approaches
and by providing information, training,
guidance, and advice on nuclear safety
matters. An initial pilot program at
Stanford University in the summer of
1985 was very well received.
All these are important components
in efforts to ensure that today's genera-
tion of nuclear power reactors will be
operated with the utmost dedication to
safety. An even greater challenge— but
one that I think we can meet— will be the
design of a new generation of reactors
relying on physical principles, rather
than on safety devices, to ensure that
they come to an automatic safe shut-
down in the event of a serious malfunc-
tion. The United States and other
nations are already at work on a number
of reactor concepts along these lines.
Another challenge we must address
is the permanent disposal of radioactive
wastes. I have argued that nuclear
power production has a relatively benign
impact on the environment compared to
other generating methods, and histor-
ically, this is true. But it will remain true
for the future only if adequate means are
implemented to ensure that radioactive
wastes can be securely stored indefi-
nitely in a way that neither harms the
environment nor poses a health and
safety hazard to the public. The technical
issues have already been addressed
satisfactorily. The Department of
Energy is proceeding with a program for
implementing the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982. But questions of public and
political acceptance must still be
resolved if technologies already
demonstrated are to be successfully
deployed.
Promoting International Safeguards
Let me return now to a distinction I
made earlier between safety and safe-
guards in the international context. The
latter term— safeguards— has become a
term of art as used with respect to civil
nuclear energy. It refers neither to the
safe operation of nuclear installations
nor to the physical protection— safe-
keeping, if you will— of nuclear
materials. It refers, rather, to a system
of inspections and other measures whose
objective— if I may quote more or less
verbatim the formal IAEA language— is
the timely detection of diversion of
significant quantities of nuclear material
from peaceful nuclear activities for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or
nuclear devices and the deterrence of
any such diversion by the risk of early
detection.
Just as the general public has a right
to insist that civil nuclear energy is
safely employed both at home and
abroad, so, too, does it have a right to
insist that its use be confined exclusively
to peaceful purposes. The complex of
international legal commitments,
assurances, and other arrangements
developed to ensure that civil nuclear
energy is used only for peaceful pur-
poses is often referred to as the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. International
nuclear safeguards, including onsite
inspections administered by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, are one
of the main components of this regime.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, with more
than 135 member states, is another
indispensable component.
The Reagan Administration, like all
U.S. administrations since the dawn of
the nuclear era, regards the prevention
of the spread of nuclear explosives to
additional countries as a fundamental
national security and foreign policy
objective. We are pursuing this goal in a
number of ways.
• We are striving to reduce the
motivation that other states may have
for acquiring nuclear explosives by work-
ing to improve regional and global
stability and, where appropriate, by
helping states to provide for their
legitimate security needs by non-nuclear
means.
• We continue to promote wider
adherence to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, known as the Treaty of
Tlatelolco.
• We are constantly looking for
ways to work more effectively with
other countries on measures to combat
the risks of proliferation.
• We strictly control the export of
sensitive nuclear material, equipment,
and technology from the United States,
particularly where the danger of pro-
liferation requires it, and we coordinate
closely with other nuclear suppliers
within a framework of common export
norms.
• We strongly support the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and con-
tinue to work with other countries to
strengthen it, particularly in its role of
anuary 1987
77
PACIFIC
applying international safeguards.
Indeed, we regard the agency's
safeguards as such a critical element in
the international nonproliferation regime
that we have urged all nuclear suppliers
to agree on a policy of requiring
safeguards on all nuclear activities of a
recipient non-nuclear weapon state as a
condition for significant new nuclear
export commitments to such states— a
condition known as "comprehensive" or
"full-scope" safeguards. The United
States, I might note, already requires
full-scope safeguards as a condition for
significant nuclear exports to its non-
nuclear weapon state trading partners,
including reactors and reactor fuel.
• Finally, we are making a serious
effort to restore the reputation of the
United States as a reliable nuclear
trading partner, for only if we maintain
our credibility with other nations in the
nuclear area can we expect them to
listen when we attempt to influence
their nuclear programs in directions we
regard as desirable.
Conclusion
Civil nuclear power today is an increas-
ingly widely used source of energy.
Properly managed from an environmen-
tal and nonproliferation point of view, it
will continue to play a critical role in
meeting man's energy needs until well
into the next century and possibly
beyond. It is clean, efficient, and
relatively inexpensive. It makes an
essential contribution to the industrial-
ized world's energy mix, especially in
countries that have few alternative
domestic energy resources. It is a key
component for assuring our energy
security, and even in the wake of Cher-
nobyl, there is no valid reason to aban-
don it. I am convinced that we can and
should continue to rely on nuclear
energy as one of our major options for
electrical generation.
If civil nuclear programs are really
to prosper, of course, they must have the
support of the general public. They
must, therefore, be safe, even safer than
they are now. And they must be safe-
guarded so that there is minimal risk of
their serving as a subterfuge for nuclear
explosives development. Responsible
governments have made great strides in
both these areas, and we plan to con-
tinue with our efforts. ■
U.S. Relationship With Pacific Islands
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
NOV. 3, 1986'
Today I am pleased to announce the
beginning of new relationships between
the United States and the island groups
that have emerged from the Pacific
Islands Trust Territory. One of these,
the Northern Mariana Islands, is now a
U.S. Commonwealth, and its people are
now U.S. citizens. The other two— the
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia— are
sovereign, self-governing nations in free
association with the United States.
The fourth and remaining island
group, Palau, has not yet finally
approved its compact of free association.
Until Palau's future political status is
resolved, the United States will continue
to discharge its responsibilities there as
administering authority under the
trusteeship agreement.
The United States liberated these
Islands during our westward drive across
the Pacific toward the end of World
War II and has administered them as a
UN strategic trusteeship since 1947. In
these last four decades, we have worked
with the islanders to improve health,
education, and social service facilities
throughout the more than 2,000 islands
comprising the trust territory. Our most
valuable contribution to the islands, a
legacy in which we can take pride, are
the democratic, representative govern-
il
ments created and now enjoyed by the
peoples of the trust territory.
The United States is happy to com
mence these new relationships with the
Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshal
Islands, and the Federated States of
Micronesia. We deeply appreciate thosf'
who have worked so long and hard, in
the negotiations and in the Congress, t
fashion and enact the commonwealth
covenant and the compacts of free
association. We especially want to
welcome the people of the Northern
Mariana Islands into the American
family as fellow citizens. We are honor
by the choices of the peoples and leadei
of the two new freely associated states
to associate with us in close and long-
lasting relationships, which reflect the
good will and affection between our
peoples. For these peoples, the long
years of trusteeship are over and the
dignity and opportunity for self-
government are here. We in the Unitec
States pledge our friendship and suppo
as the Northern Mariana Islands, the
Marshall Islands, and the Federated
States of Micronesia now walk the pat!
they themselves have chosen.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1986,
which also carries the text of Executive Orq
.5564 of Nov. 3 entitled "Placing Into Full
Force and Effect the Covenant With the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands and the Compacts of Free Associati
With the Federated States of Micronesia an
the Republic of the Marshall Islands." ■
78
I
ERRORISM
I.S. Takes
Measures Against
lyria
KITE HOUSE STATEMENT.
'3V. 14. 1986'
'le President today decided to take
.eeific steps in response to Syria's con-
nued support for international ter-
irism. The conviction of Nizar Hindawi
i a British court directly implicated the
I'rian Government in the attempted
Hilling of the El Al airplane. More
an 230 Americans and almost 200
ssengers of other nationalities were on
ard the flight and would have died had
e terrorist operation been successful.
Syria has been on the Department's
t of state sponsors of terrorism since
e list's inception in 1979. As such, con-
ils aimed at restricting the export of
ods and technology that would make a
jnificant contribution to the military
tential or would enhance the terrorist
pport capabilities of Syria are in
feet. Other measures, such as a cutoff
foreign assistance to Syria, have also
en imposed.
We believe further steps must be
ken to discourage such Syrian behavior
d to express our outrage, and that of
e American people, at Syrian sponsor-
ip of this attack and its long pattern of
pport for terrorism. We have been in
nsultation with our allies on this mat-
r, including members of the European
zonomic Community who announced
eir own measures on November 10.
e welcome these decisions. These
easures and our own actions will send
clear and unequivocal message to
,'ria: Its support of terrorism is unac-
ptable to the international community
nations. As a result, the President is
■dering the following actions.
• The Secretary of Commerce, in
msultation with the Secretary of State,
ill expand current controls on exports
' any items controlled for national
'curity purposes including related
■chnical data, along with all aircraft,
;licopters, and related parts and
)mponents.
• The Secretary of State will ter-
linate the availability of Export-Import
ank programs for Syria.
• The Secretary of State will advise
yria of our decision to terminate the air
•ansport agreement between the United
tates of America and Syria.
• The Secretary of Transportation
will prohibit the sale of tickets in the
United States for transportation by air
on Syrian Arab Airlines.
In addition to these actions, we have
informed U.S. oil companies that we con-
sider their continued involvement in
Syrian oil operations inappropriate
under these circumstances.
More vigorous procedures will be
applied to Syrian visa applications. We
also have revised an advisory statement
on American travel in Syria to alert
citizens to the potential for terrorist
activity originating there.
Finally, we are reducing the staff of
our Embassy in Damascus, and no high-
level visits between the United States
and Syria will take place.
These measiu^es are intended to con-
vince the Syrian Government that state
support of terrorism will not be tolerated
by the civilized world. We will continue
to closely monitor the situation and take
additional steps as necessary. As long as
Syria does not stop terrorism launched
from its own territory, or areas of
Lebanon under its effective control, the
security of all states in the region is
jeopardized. Syrian-supported terrorism
has introduced an unpredictable element
of instability in the region and risks the
danger of open violence there. Syria can
play an important role in a key region of
the world but it cannot expect to be
accepted as a responsible power or
treated as one as long as it continues to
use terrorism as an instrument of its
foreign policy.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986.
U.S. Supports
Council of Europe
Resolution on Terrorism
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
NOV. 24, 1986'
The Department of State, after review
of the recent Council of Europe resolu-
tion on preventing the abuse by terror-
ists of diplomatic and consular immu-
nities, today announces its support and
intent to adhere to the principles con-
tained in this resolution.
Its principal provisions concern a
closer scrutiny of diplomats who are
suspected of having connections to ter-
rorism, exchanging such information
among the states subscribing to the
resolution, considering refusing to
accept diplomats about whom another
member state has concrete information
of their involvement in terrorism, and
considering restricting the size of
diplomatic or consular posts when there
is evidence of involvement in terrorism
by that state.
We are pleased to support these
important measures to prevent the abuse
of diplomatic and consular immunities by
those supporting terrorism.
The Council of Europe passed this
resolution at its ministerial meeting in
Strasbourg on November 4 and 5. It was
confirmed by the Committee of Foreign
Ministers November 20. We believe the
council is doing excellent work in
establishing a legal framework to com-
bat terrorism, and the United States is
seeking to work closely with the council.
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■
American Hostage
Released in Beirut
PRESIDENTS STATEMENT,
NOV. 2. 1986'
I am pleased to announce that one of the
Americans held hostage in Beirut has
been released. David Jacobsen was
released early this morning by his cap-
tors in Beirut. His family has been
notified and will be joining him soon. I
do want to express my personal appre-
ciation to the various parties and
intermediaries who have been helpful in
arranging this release. We have been
working through a number of sensitive
channels for a long time. Unfortunately,
we cannot divulge any of the details of
the release, because the lives of other
Americans and other Western hostages
are still at risk.
Again I call on the captors of all
hostages in Lebanon to release their
innocent victims. No political goals are
or will be achieved by resorting to extor-
tion and terrorism. We hold the captors
of the remaining American hostages in
Lebanon responsible for the safety of
those Americans. My thoughts and
prayers go out to the families of those
American hostages as we continue to
work for their safe return.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1986.
January 1987
79
UNITED NATIONS
Situation in Cambodia
Statement by Ambassador Vernon A.
Walters. U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, in a UN General
Assembly plenary session on October 20.
1986. and the text of the General
Assembly adopted October 21.
AMBASSADOR WALTERS'
STATEMENT.
OCT. 20, 1986'
We meet today to discuss a question of
searing humanitarian importance— the
continued existence of the Cambodian
people.
The Cambodians have a proud and
glorious heritage which traces its lineage
over hundreds of years, from the 8th
century when the first Cambodian king
established himself on the shores of the
Great Lake, the Tonle Sap. P'rom this
beginning grew the Angkor Kingdom,
one of Southeast Asia's mightiest
empires. The Cambodians searched out
the secrets of water management and
irrigation and built the huge reservoirs
which allowed bountiful agricultural pro-
duction. The Cambodians of the Angkor
period developed into the master
builders of the time and left the world
that unsurpassed masterpiece. Angkor
Wat. He who gazes at Angkor Wat and
Angkor Thorn cannot but be awed by the
Cambodians' accomplishment and what
they bequeathed to all mankind.
The glories of Angkor, however, are
far in the past, and the Cambodian peo-
ple now find themselves in far different
circumstances. Instead of the proud war-
riors who kept their enemies at bay for
centuries, the Cambodians are now pros-
trate. Their country is occupied by
foreign forces, and their very future
existence as a people in question. It is
right and proper that we in the United
Nations should address ourselves to this
question, for the fate of Cambodia and
the Cambodian people is one of concern
to the entire world community. It is one
of the principal functions of the United
Nations to defend just such a small
nation and helpless people.
The origins of the Cambodian
tragedy are well known. In April 1975,
the black-clad Khmer Rouge stormed
Phnom Penh and opened a chapter in
world history which will live forever in
infamy. Applying extreme ideas of
agrarian revolution, the Khmer Rouge
emptied the cities and treated the
inhabitants as little better than draft
animals. Hundreds of thousands of inno-
cent Cambodians died from exhaustion,
disease, and malnutrition. Others were
brutally executed by the increasingly
paranoid Khmer Rouge leaders.
In December 1978, Vietnam invaded
Cambodia and drove the Khmer Rouge
from power. The Vietnamese claim that
they acted to liberate the country from
Pol Pot, but the truth is far different.
Before the Khmer Rouge seized power.
Vietnam gave them massive support.
Many Khmer Rouge leaders were
trained in Vietnam; but once Pol Pot
was in power, Vietnam quickly learned
that it could not control him. It was at
this time that the Vietnamese used the
growing world condemnation of the
Khmer Rouge as a pretext to invade.
After nearly 8 years, Vietnam's
intentions for Cambodia have become
increasingly plain— Vietnam seeks
nothing less than creation of a vassal
and colonized state. The Heng Samrin
regime which it installed in Phnom Penh
could not survive without the 140,000
Vietnamese occupation troops. All senior
Heng Samrin officials have Vietnamese
"advisors" who insure that Vietnam's
dictates are followed to the letter. Even
those officials must resent the hours of
political "education" designed to pro-
duce conformity to Vietnam's outlook.
No policy can be promulgated in Phnom
Penh without Vietnamese approval, and
woe to the Cambodian official who dares
to display any hint of independence of
nationalism. The fate of Pen Sovan
serves as a vivid reminder of what hap-
pens to those who step out of line. Viet-
namese control reaches down to the
district and village levels, where Viet-
namese "advisors" have often unilat-
erally established their own governmen-
tal structures.
The Vietnamese presence, however,
is not limited to the government. It
permeates all aspects of the society. The
schools have been turned into instru-
ments of Vietnamese propaganda, seek-
ing to justify the Vietnamese occupation.
Knowledge of the Vietnamese language
is a prerequisite to advancement.
Students have regularly been sent to
study in Vietnam. The local press is also
directed by the ever-present Vietnamese
"advisors." The shattered Cambodian
economy continues to be drained by the
Vietnamese. Cambodia's hard-pressed
farmers still have to help supply the
Vietnamese occupation forces.
The most insidious of Vietnam's
plans to subjugate Cambodia is the set-
tlement of hundreds of thousands of
Vietnamese nationals on Cambodian ter
ritory. His Royal Highness Prince
Sihanouk has repeatedly raised the
alarm about the Vietnamese colonizatio
of his country. Estimates of the number
of Vietnamese settlers now run as high
as 700,000, or over 10% of the popula-
tion. And more arrive all the time.
Former Prime Minister H.E. Son Sann
recently said in Washington that Camb<
dians were being forced out of the cities
to the villages to make way for new
Vietnamese arrivals. Even in the
villages, Vietnamese authorities were
apparently requisitioning the best housi
and the choicest farm lands for their
compatriots. That the master builders
who once raised the magnificent Angko
Wat from the swamps of the Great Lak
should be reduced to being outcasts in
their own land is a source of outrage an
deep concern to us all.
As has occurred in many other
oppressed lands, the Vietnamese occupt
tion has fanned popular revolt inside
Cambodia. Armed resistance to the Vie-
namese is spreading. Vietnamese and
Heng Samrin installations throughout
the country are now targets of
resistance attacks. Key lines of com-
munications are often interdicted and
even the suburbs of Phnom Penh have
witnessed resistance incursions. Heng
Samrin conscripts are defecting to the
resistance ranks in increasing numbers.
Several hundred Vietnamese soldiers
have also thrown down their arms and
fled to the Thai border to escape involv'
ment in this unjust war.
HRH Prince Sihanouk detailed for i
in his September 30 general debate
speech the growing strength of the
resistance, reaching ever deeper within
Cambodia. Stung by the increasing effe
tiveness of the Cambodian resistance
forces, the Vietnamese have tried unsuc
cessfully to crush them militarily. In tht
winter of 1984-85, Vietnamese division:
brutally attacked refugee camps on the
Thai border, killing scores of innocent
civilians and uprooting tens of thousand
more. The resistance, however,
remained unaffected and, indeed, is
stronger than ever before. Recently, the
Vietnamese have tried another tack by
constructing barriers along the Thai-
Cambodian border. In a move reminis-
cent of the Khmer Rouge, the Viet-
namese have conscripted thousands of
civilians to clear land, plant antiper-
sonnel mines, and construct barriers. Ai
untold number of these conscripts have
died because of disease, exhaustion, and
H
80
DepartRient of State Bullet
UNITED NATIONS
lines. Despite this effort, the resistance
jntinues to grow and is now more than
rer firmly established inside Cambodia.
The growing opposition to Viet-
amese imperialist ambitions in Cam-
odia has other dimensions. The 240,000
:ambodians who remain on the Thai
.order bear witness to their continued
tefiance. Living in spartan conditions
nd under the constant threat of attack,
le border Cambodians courageously
pitomize the love of country and
■eedom which has characterized the
ambodian people down through the
enturies. Our hearts go out to them,
nd we pray that they will soon be able
) return to a free and independent
ambodia. We also deeply appreciate the
ork of Mr. Kunugi, the Secretary
reneral's Special Representative for
i ambodian Relief, and a dedicated staff
'f the UN Border Relief Operation
JNBRO), the World Food Program, the
iternational Committee of the Red
ross (ICRC), and the voluntary agen-
es which have turned the border relief
Deration into a humanitarian success
;ory of the highest order. The Royal
hai Government should also be com-
lended for its unswerving commitment
) the support and protection of the
jrder Cambodians.
The world community also remains
nited in its opposition to Vietnam's
ctions. For years, an overwhelming
umber of UN members have called for
le unconditional withdrawal of Viet-
amese troops from Cambodia. This year
larks the eighth time we have met
nder the auspices of the United Nations
) debate Cambodia and to issue the sim-
le plea that the Cambodians be allowed
) decide their own destiny. What has
een Vietnam's response to world oppro-
rium? The record is clear. The Viet-
amese have rejected all calls for peace
nd have continued undeterred in the
Tiperialist and colonialist policies. Fur-
nermore, an October 15 letter signed by
he Acting Permanent Representative of
^etnam and circulated as a General
assembly document declares that Viet-
am will consider null and void any
esolution emerging from our debate
ere.
The Vietnamese, nevertheless, have
ried to sway public opinion by an inten-
ive propaganda campaign. The most
ecent example took place at an August
neeting in Hanoi, where the Foreign
tlinisters of Vietnam, Laos, and the pup-
)et Heng Samrin regime issued a com-
nunique which once again claimed that
jreat strides were being made inside
"^ambodia, that the changes in Cambodia
were irreversible, and that the Viet-
namese occupation troops would be
withdrawn by 1990. But how can we talk
about "great strides" when Cambodia
suffers poverty, hunger, and disease;
when young people are conscripted
against their will to die for a foreign
invader; when innocent civilians are
press-ganged into building defensive for-
tifications in malaria-infested forests
with little food or medical care? Let
there be no doubt about it: Cambodia
today is an abjectly poor, battered coun-
try on the brink of disaster. Without
peace and self-determination, the very
existence of Cambodia and of the Khmer
as an independent people is threatened.
Moreover, the Vietnamese claim to
withdraw its forces from Cambodia by
1990 is clearly based on the hope that
their puppet, Heng Samrin, would be
able by then to manage largely on his
own. The recent performance of Heng
Samrin's soldiers suggests that Viet-
namese hopes are as illusory as their
protestations of peaceful intent. The
Vietnamese troop withdrawals to date
are nothing more than a public relations
fraud aimed at deceiving world opinion.
There has been no general withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
What we have seen is the regular rota-
tion of some units, nothing more. There
are still an estimated 140,000 Viet-
namese troops inside Cambodia, roughly
the same number as at the onset of the
occupation, despite claimed withdrawals.
Above all, there is one basic fallacy
to the Vietnamese arguments: Vietnam
has no right to lay down any conditions
for a settlement. The Vietnamese are
the invaders, and they must leave Cam-
bodia. It is as simple as that. Moreover,
there is no need for new formulations for
a Cambodian solution. They are already
clearly laid out in the principles of the
1981 International Conference on Kam-
puchea as follows:
• A cease-fire and withdrawal of all
foreign forces in the shortest time possi-
ble under the supervision and verifica-
tion of a UN peacekeeping force;
• Arrangements to ensure that
armed factions will not be able to pre-
vent or disrupt the holding of free elec-
tions and will respect the results of the
free elections;
• Appropriate measures to maintain
law and order until the establishment of
a new government; and
• The holding of free elections under
UN supervision.
In contrast to Vietnam's intran-
sigence, other parties involved in the
Cambodian issue continue to demon-
strate a sincere effort to reach a
peaceful solution. The members of the
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in particular should be com-
mended for their efforts on behalf of
peace. Since 1981 the members of
ASEAN have advanced a series of dif-
ferent ideas to address Vietnamese con-
cerns. Unfortunately, Vietnam has
ignored all efforts at conciliation.
Other proposals have also been
advanced to the Vietnamese containing
elements which, if accepted by all the
parties involved, could advance the
search for peace. Again and again, Viet-
nam has rejected these out of hand.
Vietnam's Minister of State, Vo
Dong Giang, recently told the General
Assembly that a Cambodian solution
must be based on guaranteeing the
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, on the
elimination of the genocidal Pol Pot
clique, and on guaranteeing a process of
national reconciliation. Vietnam clearly
wants peace only on its own terms; but
since proposals with many reasonable
elements have been made to the Viet-
namese by its neighbors, it remains for
the Vietnamese to initiate the process.
Genuine willingness to negotiate a settle-
ment in Cambodia would be a welcome
development, above all, for the Cambo-
dian people. The Vietnamese occupation
of Cambodia, more than any other fac-
tor, stands in the path of Vietnam's par-
ticipation as a constructive member of
the peaceful community of nations.
Surely the Vietnamese would benefit
enormously from a peaceful settlement
of the Cambodian conflict. If they are
serious, let them begin serious troop
withdrawals and seek serious solutions
to this grave problem. Until then, the
world must judge them by their actions.
Let us remember also that Vietnam
is not the only country which shares
responsibility for the Cambodian plight.
Vietnam could not continue with its sub-
jugation of this land if it were not for the
massive military support received from
its Soviet backers. Most of the bombs
and bullets the Vietnamese use against
the Cambodians are from the Soviet
Union. If the Soviet Union were to cut
off this military support, Vietnam would
be hard-pressed to maintain its occupa-
tion, and peace might be possible. We
call on Moscow to place sufficient
pressure on the Vietnamese to agree to
a comprehensive settlement.
The Cambodian tragedy must be
brought to an end. The Cambodian peo-
ple have suffered long enough. Now is
the time to end violence and the human
suffering. Now is the time for us to join
hands and contribute jointly to the
January 1987
81
UNITED NATIONS
rebirth of a truly free and independent
Cambodia. With our help, there can be a
resurgence of the Angkor spirit which
illuminated Southeast Asia in the past.
To make this possible, however, we must
first bring peace to this ravaged land;
and to do that, Vietnam must heed the
appeals of the world community to with-
draw its troops and negotiate. There is
no other choice.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 41/6,
OCT. 21, 1986^
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14
November 1979. 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 36/5
of 21 October 1981, 37/6 of 28 October 1982,
38/3 of 27 October 1983, 39/5 of 30 October
1984 and 40/7 of 5 November 1985,
Recalling further the Declaration on Kam-
puchea and resolution 1(1) adopted by the
International Conference on Kampuchea,
which offer the negotiating framework for a
comprehensive political settlement of the
Kampuchean problem.
Taking note of the report of the
Secretary-General on the implementation of
General Assembly resolution 40/7,
Deploring that foreign armed interven-
tion and occupation continue and that foreign
forces have not been withdrawn from Kam-
puchea, thus causing continuing hostilities in
that country and seriously threatening inter-
national peace and security,
Noting the continued and effective strug-
gle waged against foreign occupation by the
Coalition with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk
as President of Democratic Kampuchea,
Taking note of Economic and Social Coun-
cil decision 1986/146 of 23 May 1986 on the
right of peoples to self-determination and its
application to peoples under colonial or alien
domination or foreign occupation.
Greatly disturbed that the continued
fighting and instability of Kampuchea have
forced an additional large number of Kam-
pucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean
border in search of food and safety,
Recognizing that the assistance extended
by the international community has continued
to reduce the food shortages and health prob-
lems of the Kampuchean people,
Emphasizing that it is the inalienable
right of the Kampuchean people who have
sought refuge in neighboring countries to
return safely to their homeland.
Emphasizing further that no effective
solution to the humanitarian problems can be
achieved without a comprehensive political
settlement of the Kampuchean conflict.
Seriously concerned about reported
demographic changes being imposed in Kam-
puchea l)y foreign occupation forces.
Convinced that, to bring about lasting
peace in South-East Asia and reduce the
threat to international peace and security,
there is an urgent need for the international
community to find a comprehensive political
solution to the Kampuchean problem that will
provide for the withdrawal of all foreign
forces and ensure respect for the sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and neutral
and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well
as the right of the Kampuchean people to self-
determination free from outside interference.
Reiterating its conviction that, after the
comprehensive political settlement of the
Kampuchean question through peaceful
means, the States of the South-East Asian
region can pursue efforts to establish a zone
of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-
East Asia so as to lessen international ten-
sions and to achieve lasting peace in the
region.
Reaffirming the need for all States to
adhere strictly to the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, which call for
respect for the national independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
States, non-intervention and non-interference
in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse
to the threat or use of force and peaceful set-
tlement of disputes.
1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22. 35/6.
36/5. 37/6. 38/3. 39/5 and 40/7 and calls for
their full implementation;
2. Reiterates its conviction that the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kam-
puchea, the restoration and preservation of
its independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the right of the Kampuchean people
to determine their own destiny and the com-
mitment by all States to non-interference and
non-intervention in the internal affairs of
Kampuchea are the principal components of
any just and lasting resolution of the Kam-
puchean problem;
3. Takes note with appreciation of the
report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Inter-
national Conference on Kampuchea on its
activities during 1985-1986 and requests that
the Committee continue its work, pending the
reconvening of the Conference;
4. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee to
convene when necessary and to carry out the
tasks entrusted to it in its mandate;
5. Reaffirms its decision to reconvene the
Conference at an appropriate time, in accord-
ance with Conference resolution 1(1);
6. Renews its appeal to all States of
South-East Asia and others concerned to
attend future sessions of the Conference;
7. Requests the Conference to report to
the General Assembly on its future sessions;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to con-
tinue to consult with and assist the Con-
ference and the Ad Hoc Committee and to
provide them on a regular basis with the
necessary facilities to carry out their
functions;
9. Expresses its appreciation once again
to the Secretary-General for taking appro-
priate steps in following the situation closely
and requests him to continue to do so and to
exercise his good offices in order to con-
tribute to a comprehensive political
settlement;
10. Expresses its deep appreciation onct
again to donor countries, and the United
Nations and its agencies and other humani-
tarian organizations, national and interna-
tional, that have rendered relief assistance t
the Kampuchean people, and appeals to thei
to continue to provide emergency assistance
to those Kampucheans who are still in need,
especially along the Thai-Kampuchean bordi
and in the holding centers in Thailand;
11. Reiterates its deep appreciation to t
Secretary-General for his efforts in
co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance
and in monitoring its distribution, and
requests him to intensify such efforts as are
necessary;
12. Urges the States of South-East Asir
once a comprehensive political solution to t\
Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert
renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace
freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia;
13. Reiterates the hope that, following a
comprehensive political solution, an inter-
governmental committee will be established
to consider a programme of assistance to
Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its
economy and for the economic and social
development of all States in the region;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the General Assembly at its forty-
second session on the implementation of the
present resolution;
15. Decides to include in the provisional
agenda of its forty-second session the item
entitled "The situation in Kampuchea."
'USUN press release 120.
-Adopted by a vote of 115 for (U.S.) anc
21 against, with 13 abstentions. ■
Nicaragua
by Herbert S. Okun
Statement in a plenary session oft
UN General Assembly on November 3,
1986. Ambassador Okun is U.S. Deputy
Permanent Representative to the Unitei
Nations.^
As my delegation stated in the General
Committee on October 30, the United
States believes the new item proposed
by Nicaragua is not an appropriate iten
for consideration by the General
Assembly. In regards to judgments of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Article 94(2), provides that a "party mi
have recourse to the Security (Ilouncil."
There is no mention of any role for the
General Assembly.
For this reason, until now, no
member state has requested the GenerE
Assembly to take a decision on an issue^
of this nature. Even those member
states which have accepted the com-
82
Department of State Bullet
UNITED NATIONS
Isiiry jurisdiction of the International
iii't of Justice should have serious
iivations about involving the Cieneral
M'lnbly in implementing decisions of
International Court of Justice.
The United States believes that the
,'Stion that Nicaragua has insisted on
lining up today must be considered in
' lontext of what is happening within
:iragua and between Nicaragua and
neighbors in Central America. I will
,1.' more to say about that presently.
As we have often stated before, it is
I enough to claim that, just because
tii'le 36(6) of the Court's statute says
It It may decide disputes concerning
ixiiction, the Court, indeed, dirf have
I isdiction in this particular dispute. No
C-irt, including the International Court
(; Justice, has the legal power to assert
j isdiction where there is no basis for
tit jurisdiction.
The absence of any foundation in
{her law or fact for the Court's asser-
tn of jurisdiction in this case is clear.
I ok at the language and the negotiat-
i; history of the Charter of the United
I tions. Look at the language and the
Ijotiating history of the Statute of the
l:ernational Court of Justice. Look at
1 > consistent interpretation of these
truments by the Court, by the Secu-
j V Council, and by member states.
The resolution before us today is
I sed on a fundamentally flawed inter-
i etation of the significance and validity
I the decision of the International Court
' Justice. Moreover, even if it were not
I flawed, it is not appropriate for con-
■ leration by the General Assembly.
' LOse are two of the reasons why my
legation will vote against this draft
solution.
Given this background, why has
caragua chosen to come to the General
isembly today? As it has done so often
the Security Council in the past, the
indinistas clearly intend to manipulate
e U.N. General Assembly for prop-
:anda purposes. If Nicaragua wished
rious consideration of this issue in its
tality, it would have agreed to take it
• as part of Item 42, the Situation in
?ntral America, which is already on the
?neral Assembly's agenda for
scussion.
In spite of what the representative
' Nicaragua has asserted here this
orning, the issue at stake is the crisis
Central America and how to resolve
. Nicaragua has twisted the issue by
irtraying it as a conflict between
icaragua and the United States. My
3vernment, the people of Central
merica, and the Sandinistas themselves
now that this is not the case. The
Sandinista regime is responsible for the
crisis. It has waged a campaign of sub-
version against all of its neighbors and a
campaign of repression against its own
people, whose revolution it has betrayed.
During the 1979 revolution in
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas pledged to
follow a policy of nonalignment. They
promised not to e.xport their revolution.
But, from the outset, the Sandinistas
planned to ally themselves with Cuba
and the Soviet bloc. By 1980 the
Sandinistas were deeply involved in
regional subversion, supporting the
Marxist guerrillas seeking to overthrow
the Government of El Salvador. The
evidence proves this support is massive
and undeniable. It ranges from state-
ments by former guerrillas and moun-
tains of captured documents to physical
proof such as captured weapons and
munitions.
Nicaraguan subversion goes far
beyond El Salvador. The Sandinistas
provide clandestine assistance to subver-
sive groups throughout the region. The
Sandinistas directly participated in the
1983 and 1984 attempts to infiltrate
subversives into Honduras, as captured
subversives themselves have admitted.
The Sandinistas have also supported ter-
rorists in Costa Rica, and their agents
have repeatedly attempted assassina-
tions in that country. The Nicaraguan
connection with the weapons used by the
Colombian M-19 in the bloody attack on
the Palace of Justice in Bogota is well
known.
A threatening rise in Nicaragua's
conventional forces has accompanied the
Sandinistas' subversion of their
neighbors. Since 1979 the Sandinistas
have created the largest army in the
history of Central America— ten times
the size of Somoza's. To equip it, they
have received from their Cuban and
Soviet allies an arsenal without prece-
dent in the region, including fleets of
combat helicopters, battalions of tanks
and armored vehicles, and scores of
artillery pieces and rocket launchers.
They have militarized Nicaragua, turn-
ing the country into an armed camp. I
refer you to an article printed just last
Wednesday in The New York Times on
the latest delivery of Soviet helicopter
gunships. Every day these formidable
weapons, piloted in many cases by
Cubans, are killing ever-escalating
numbers of Nicaraguans.
Just as the Sandinistas have
betrayed their neighbors, all of whom
welcomed the Nicaraguan revolution,
they have also betrayed the Nicaraguans
who believed the Sandinistas' promises
of freedom and democracy. In recent
months, the Sandinista regime has
ruthlessly intensified the consolidation of
its totalitarian rule. Using its secret
police— ten times the size of Somoza's—
and its network of Cuban-inspired "block
committees," it has created an atmos-
phere of fear and repression that far
exceeds the worst excesses of the
Somoza regime. The Sandinistas have
suspended even the most basic of human
rights. They have engaged in a sys-
tematic pattern of summary executions,
arbitrary detentions, and physical and
psychological abuse of prisoners.
Let me dwell for a moment on the
Sandinistas' violations of human rights.
According to the Organization of
American States' (OAS) human rights
office, there are some 2,000 Nicaraguan
prisoners who have been tried or are
awaiting trial by the so-called Popular
Anti-Somocista Tribunals, whose convic-
tion rate is 99%. The OAS report notes
that these prisoners enjoy no presump-
tion of innocence, have limited access to
defense counsel, and face judges whose
"impartiality, fairness, and independ-
ence of judgment are seriously com-
promised."
Since the Nicaraguan representative
insists upon invoking the rule of law and
concepts of justice before this body, let
me call to the attention of those who
may have missed it the description of the
Sandinista system for dispensing justice
which appeared in the October 31 issue
of The New York Time>:. The article
reported that the popular tribunals have
become a principal Sandinista instru-
ment for repressing the peaceful
democratic opposition under the guise of
adjudicating national security cases. I
quote from the article.
Independent labor unionists, opposition
party activists, journalists and other peaceful
dissidents have been proclaimed "counter-
revolutionaries" and given stiff jail terms by
the tribunals .... The common experience of
political defendants is arrest without warrant
and incommunicado detention. Though the
tribunals' summary procedures are meant to
expedite justice, many defendants are held
for several months before being charged or
tried. They are interrogated in harsh condi-
tions, invariably making self-incriminating
statements under duress and sometimes tor-
ture. Once charges are brought, proceedings
are speedy .... Human rights groups have
noted that several lawyers have been
imprisoned for too vigorously defending
political clients.
The Sandinistas claim that they
somehow have been given a mandate to
rule Nicaragua. From whom or what did
they obtain this mandate? Certainly not
from the hundreds of thousands of
anuary 1987
83
UNITED NATIONS
I
Nicaraguans who participated in the
1979 revolution, thinking it would bring
genuine democracy to Nicaragua and
who subsequently had to tlee the coun-
try. The Sandinistas have persecuted the
genuinely democratic political parties
that played such a noble role in the
revolution, forcing many of their leaders
into exile and harassing and intimidating
those who chose to remain. Among the
many tragic ironies of the Sandinistas
betrayal of the revolution is the fate of
La Prem^a. The assassination of La
Pren.sd'.s publisher in 1978 was the spark
which ignited the revolution. In June of
this year, the Sandinistas closed down
La Prensa as the last step in their 7-year
effort to stamp out a free press, one of
the essential elements of democratic
government.
Because the revolution before us
today totally ignores the situation that
prevails between Nicaragua and its
neighbors, making not even a single
reference to the Contadora process, and
because it also ignores the fundamental
principles of human rights embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations, my
delegation believes that it is a totally
unacceptable portrayal of the tragic
reality of Central America. This is yet
another reason why my delegation will
vote against this resolution.
My delegation had been planning to
elaborate its views on how to reach a
peaceful settlement in Central America
during the long-scheduled plenary debate
on Central America. In spite of today's
diversionary exercise by the Sandinistas,
my delegation still plans to do so. Let
me, nevertheless, restate the fundamen-
tal approach of my government to the
conflict in the region.
The United States continues to seek
a negotiated settlement. It has sup-
ported and continues to support the Con-
tadora process in its quest for a regional
solution. U.S. policy toward Nicaragua
remains fully consistent with the 21
points of the Contadora Document of Ob-
jectives agreed to by the four Contadora
group countries and the five Central
American countries, including Nicaragua
in September 1983. The United States
has stated repeatedly and categorically
that it would abide by a comprehensive,
verifiable, and simultaneous implementa-
tion of the Document of Objectives. But
only the full realization of all 21 points,
including true national reconciliation and
democratization in Nicaragua, can lead
to a lasting peace in Central America.
Once again the United States calls
on the Sandinistas to enter into serious
negotiations with the democratic opposi-
tion aimed at achieving national recon-
ciliation and democratization. Our long-
standing offer to hold simultaneous talks
with the Sandinistas if they undertake
such negotiations still stands.
My delegation is concerned that the
tactics used by the Sandinistas so
blatantly in provoking this debate today
have been designed with one purpose in
mind. They wish to avoid answering
some basic questions about their inten-
tions toward their neighbors and toward
their own people.
• Why do the Sandinistas continue
to attack and subvert their neighbors?
• Why do the Sandinistas continue
to destroy those within Nicaragua— such
as labor unions, the free press, the
church, the private sector, and even the
Miskito Indians— who cling to the ideals
of the revolution and attempt peacefully
to make these ideals a reality?
• Why do the Sandinistas need a
secret police ten times the size of
Somoza's?
• And finally, why are the San-
dinistas unwilling to enter into the
dialogue with all of the democratic
opposition that could lead to genuine
national reconciliation?
We ask; When will this body and—
more important— the Nicaraguan
people— be given answers to these
questions?
HJSUN press release 141. ■
Situation in
Afghanistan
by Herbert S. Okun
Statement in a plenary session of the
UN General Assetnbly on November !,.
1986. Ambassador Okun is U.S. Deputy
Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. ^
A whole nation is dying. Even now, as
we speak, innocent Afghan men, women,
and children are being indiscriminately
slaughtered— simply because they refuse
to relinquish what is theirs: their homes,
their land, their families, their culture
and religion, their way of life.
This Assembly has an abundance of
well-documented material from many
sources which describes the conse-
quences of 7 years of brutal Soviet
onslaught against an entire nation. The
UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan,
1^
whose report will be considered by thei
Assembly later in this session, has coni
eluded that "the only solution to the i
human rights situation in Afghanistan i
the withdrawal of all foreign troops.
Continuation of the military solution
will . . . lead inevitably to a situation
approaching genocide."
"Genocide" is a term which meansi
"the systematic killing of, or a prograi
of action intended to destroy, a whole
national or ethnic group." It is uncon-
scionable that in today's world a situa-
tion exists that might justify being
characterized as approaching genocide
Despite considerable efforts by the
Soviet Union and the Kabul regime to
restrict and manipulate news coverage
of the war, no one— certainly no one ir
this forum— can claim to be ignorant
about what is happening in Aighanista
Since the Soviet Union's unprovok
invasion of a friendly nonaligned
neighbor 7 years ago, we have gathere
here to express our collective outrage
the transgressions of basic human righ
being perpetrated against the Afghan
people. We are all aware of the numbe
and scope of violations of international
humanitarian law being carried out in
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union or its
puppets. These include, but by no mea
are limited to:
• The 1949 Geneva conventions ai
customary international law designed
protect civilians; these proscribe murd
and mutilation and the large-scale use
antipersonnel weapons;
• The 1925 Geneva protocol and tl
1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Cc
vention which prohibit the use of asph;
iating, poisonous, or other gases;
• Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which prohibits torture and other cruel
inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; and
• The 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict.
This list— incomplete as it is— is
impressive in its total disregard for the
basic principles of human rights and
decency. It is inconceivable in today's
world that a country be permitted to
remain unaccountable on the applicatio
of human rights. It is inconceivable tha
among the world community of nations
gathered here today, there are govern-
ments that continue to remain unmovei
by the tragedy of Afghanistan— so
unmoved that they refuse to vote in
favor of a resolution that merely asks
that the Afghan people be permitted to
determine their own fate in peace and
84
Department of State Bulle'
UNITED NATIONS
nity, free from the yoke of military
)ression. Abstention on an issue
jecting the survival of an entire people
I nexcusable.
Have we become so accustomed to
I ssacre and torture, to indiscriminate
nbings and mutilation that we no
ger comprehend the full horror of
t> at is happening in Afghanistan? Is it
, crystal clear that the situation in
jhanistan is not only one of violence
1 death, bombings and military
:ounters, but that it is a situation
ich, if permitted to continue
;hecked, could result in the elimina-
I of "a whole national or ethnic
)up"?
The very fabric of Afghanistan's
ditional society is being rent under
ce of arms. Village life has been shat-
ed; families have been separated;
men widowed; children orphaned,
[ildren are being born and raised in
r ugee camps and have no prospect of
e leriencing life in their own country.
' iliiren who remain in Soviet-
II mated areas of Afghanistan are
iiu taught a distorted version of
;lian history viewed through the
f jHi of Mar.xist-Leninist dogma.
The world's largest refugee popula-
ti has been created, as over one-third
c .Afghanistan's prewar population has
t 'n violently displaced. And, as if this
\ re not enough, the regime recently
I Kiunced plans to relocate 30,000 peo-
{ from areas near the Pakistani border
t sparsely populated areas in western
1 ^hanistan. Such a policy would almost
c 'tainly involve a massive violation of
I man rights; it also indicates the
1 gths to which the Soviet Union must
J to deny popular support to the
i ghan resistance.
After 7 years of a war waged by a
i Derpower against one of the poorest
itions in the world, the Soviet Union
1 s apparently realized that a national
leration movement cannot be con-
I ered by conventional military tactics
;d weaponry. Instead it has conceived
:d begun to implement a much more
btle three-pronged strategy composed
military, intelligence, and political
^asures. This military -political cam-
ign, combining intimidation and
Dlence with subtle bribery and a
assive propaganda effort, is intended
; permit the Soviet Union to proceed to
nsolidate its power in Afghanistan
ith a minimum of international outcry.
Since its invasion of Afghanistan in
•79, the Soviet Union has moved
leadily toward creating a fighting force
Hat is more appropriate to counter-
surgency. It has increased reliance on
light airborne forces rather than heavy
motorized columns; it has intensified
ambush and interdiction operations
along the border areas; it has signifi-
cantly increased the number of Soviet
special purpose forces, of which there
are now over eight battalions in
Afghanistan, roughly double the 1983
level.
This redefined military effort has
been accomplished by a campaign to win
hearts, minds, and pocketbooks led by
the former chief of the Afghan secret
police, Najibullah. There has been a
dramatic increase in sabotage efforts in
the tribal areas of Pakistan along the
Afghanistan border. Bribery of tribal
leaders, regional and town leaders, even
religious leaders, has been accompanied
by threats of violence as a penalty for
cooperating with the mujahidin. Indoc-
trination efforts continue, aimed at
creating a loyal cadre of pro-Soviet
Afghans, and thousands of children are
sent every year to the Soviet Union.
Despite these efforts, the Soviet
Union is no closer today to consolidating
its control over Afghanistan than it was
on December 27, 1979, when its invading
troops murdered President Amin— the
man who allegedly first invited Soviet
troops into Afghanistan. The Soviet
Union, despite all its efforts, cannot
break the will of a people united in a
national liberation struggle. The Afghan
people will not, they cannot, acquiesce in
what amounts to their own destruction
as a people and a.s a nation. There is an
old Afghan saying: "the mujahid waited
100 years for his revenge and cursed
himself for his impatience."
The Afghan people will never sur-
render. The magnitude of the Soviet
threat— not only militarily but for tradi-
tional Afghan religious and cultural
values— has forged a unity of purpose
among resistance fighters unparalleled
in Afghanistan's history. Today the
resistance is cooperating more closely
together than ever before— joining
forces, coordinating attacks, and sharing
intelligence and battle techniques.
Regular rocketing of Kabul, including
the spectacular ammunition dump explo-
sion on August 26, testifies to mujahidin
ability to penetrate even the most for-
tified of Soviet security rings.
It is not the brave freedom fighters
of Afghanistan who have failed to adapt
and take countermeasures against a
more subtle Soviet political strategy.
Many of us in the world community of
nations are being lulled into inaction by
Soviet hints of flexibility. Many prefer to
close their eyes and ears rather than
acknowledge and demand a cessation of
the horrors visited daily on the Afghan
people.
On July 28, General Secretary Gor-
bachev announced the Soviet intention
to withdraw six regiments from
Afghanistan. This token withdrawal was
hailed by the Soviets as "evidence" of
their desire for a political settlement. In
reality, it is intended to obscure the per-
sistent Soviet refusal to provide a time-
table for comprehensive withdrawal.
Militarily insignificant, the so-called
withdrawal has been unmasked by con-
vincing evidence which indicates that
significant additional amounts of equip-
ment and troops were introduced into
Afghanistan after the July 28 speech for
the sole purpose of publicly withdrawing
them. Many of you are familiar with this
evidence.
If the Soviet Union wants to demon-
strate its interest in a political settle-
ment in Afghanistan, it need only
respond to seven General Assembly
resolutions which call for the immediate
withdrawal of all foreign forces; it need
only present a short timetable at Geneva
for a complete troop withdrawal. This is
the missing element in the search for an
end to 7 years of war and destruction in
Afghanistan.
As we all know, the UN Secretary
General and his personal representative,
Under Secretary General Diego
Cordovez, have been conducting negotia-
tions aimed at achieving a political set-
tlement. The U.S. Government supports
the efforts of the Secretary General and
his representative and applauds their
diligence and their commitment to a just
and durable settlement. We have stated
at previous sessions of the General
Assembly— and reiterate today— that the
United States firmly supports this proc-
ess. We have made known our will-
ingness, in writing, to play an appro-
priate guarantor's role with respect to a
comprehensive and balanced settlement
that protects the legitimate security
interests of all concerned.
Three of the four basic documents
which would comprise a comprehensive
settlement have been largely completed.
These include agreements on mutual
non-interference and non-intervention,
voluntary return of the refugees, and
international guarantees. The fourth
document, which was discussed for the
first time in May of this year, lays out
the interrelationship of the three docu-
ments to the central issue of Soviet
troop withdrawals. Although progress
has been made on the format and scope
of this fourth instrument, the Soviet
Union has persisted in its refusal to pro-
anuary 1987
85
UNITED NATIONS
vide a realistic timetable for the com-
plete withdrawal of all Soviet troops.
The time has come for deeds, not
words. The Soviet Union is counting on
outlasting the Afghans and those who
support their fight for freedom. By pro-
longing the war and enshrouding it in
hints and meaningless gestures, they are
hoping and waiting for the world's atten-
tion span to slip, for our outrage to
wane. We cannot permit this to happen.
Collectively, we can and must help put
an end to the carnage and destruction in
Afghanistan. In voting for this resolu-
tion, let us demonstrate our commitment
to the comprehensive political settlement
which is now in sight, except for one
missing element— a short timetable for
the withdrawal of all Soviet troops. In
voting for this resolution, let us demon-
strate that we— the world community of
nations— will not permit the Afghan
nation to perish from this Earth.
'USUN press release 142.
U.S. Reconfirms
Support for IAEA
by Richard T. Kennedy
Statement in a plenary session of the
UN General Assembly on November 11,
1986. Ambassador Kennedy is U.S. per-
manent representative to the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and Ambassador at Large and special
adviser to the Secretary on nonprolifera-
tion policy and nuclear energy affairs.^
As the U.S. representative to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, it is a
great pleasure for me today to consider,
with my distinguished colleagues, the
annual report of the IAEA. I am par-
ticularly gratified for the important
work of the IAEA and to reflect briefly
on its solid record of accomplishment in
promoting the safe and peaceful uses of
nuclear energy for the benefit of people
throughout the world.
My government joins those who have
commended the Director General for his
excellent report and statement and for
the agency's work which it reflects. The
IAEA— its staff and its member states-
can look with justifiable pride and satis-
faction upon its ongoing safeguards and
technical cooperation activities and its
accomplishments in the field of nuclear
safety.
Over the 30 years of its life, the
IAEA has assumed ever greater impor-
tance as a key instrument in the global
efforts to protect against the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, while
assuring that the benefits of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy are made widely
available. It is an agency which the
United States ranks among the most
important of the international
institutions.
The vital international safeguards
program which the IAEA administers
provides the necessary confidence to
states throughout the world that nuclear
energy is being used only in the intended
peaceful ways. And, thus, the agency's
safeguards program provides the neces-
sary underpinning for broad cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
for the benefit of all. My government is
particularly gratified that the agency has
continued to strengthen its safeguards
program, developing new and more
effective ways to increase international
confidence, while at the same time keep-
ing a watchful eye on the resource com-
mitments involved.
The agency also is to be congratu-
lated for its successful efforts to pro-
mote the widespread use of the peaceful
atom. Its technical cooperation activities
in nuclear energy— including nuclear
medicine— in improvement of food and
agriculture contribute greatly to the
well-being of peoples throughout the
world.
The IAEA plays a leading role, too,
in efforts to assure that nuclear power is
used in a way which fully protects the
public health and safety. Earlier this
year, following the tragic accident at
Chernobyl, we were vividly reminded of
the critical role of the IAEA in the field
of nuclear safety. The rapid and effec-
tive response of the IAEA to that acci-
dent, and its subsequent efforts to
address in a comprehensive manner its
immediate and long-term consequences,
amply reflect the initiative and serious-
ness of purpose which have, for so many
years, distinguished the agency's work.
My government wishes particularly
to commend the IAEA for its support of
the successful efforts by member states
to complete negotiations, within a period
of weeks, on two international conven-
tions regarding early notification and
emergency assistance in the event of
nuclear accidents. These conventions are
significant not only for their practical
applications but for the fact that they
emerged from a spirit of compromise
and cooperation, all too rare in
multilateral fora.
This same constructive spirit was
evidenced at the post-Chernobyl experts
iiii
»i
i
meeting in August and at the special s
sion of the IAEA general conference o
nuclear safety in September. Each of
these meetings resulted in a thoroughl
constructive exchange of views, which
doubtless will form the basis for the
agency's future activities in the nuclea
safety area.
I have cited these recent initiative
by the agency because they so clearly
typify the manner in which the IAEA
does its work year after year. In that
light, 1985— on which the Director
General has so well reported— was no
exception. While most of its activites a
not featured on the front pages of the
world's newspapers, and while most oi
its projects, courses, and special pro- s
grams receive little or no public atten-
tion, the agency consistently approach'
its work with dedication and com-
petence. It seeks always to respond
effectively to the diverse interests and
needs of its members.
At the same time, we must look to
the future to assure that the IAEA
remains an effective international
institution— one which maintains a cleg
focus on its technical mandate of safe-
guards, technical cooperation, and
nuclear safety. In the past, the agency
on occasion has become embroiled in
political controversies and issues
extraneous to its statute and its missio
Such controversies unfortunately have
occupied unnecessarily and undesirabl;
the attention of its policymaking orgar
and governing bodies. We are pleased
that there appears to be a trend away
from such extraneous debate. It is
incumbent on all of its members to
assure that the agency not be distracte
from its vital technical missions.
My government also believes that
the IAEA must continue to be the prin
cipal international institution in which
states can join together to promote the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus,
universality of membership must con-
tinue to be a guiding principle for the
agency. For otherwise, the goal of assu
ing that the peoples of the world can er
joy the greatest possible benefits of the
safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy
will be unattainable.
I have high confidence that other
member states share our appreciation c
the agency and concur in the importanc
of its technical mission. I am certain th;
as the agency approaches the year
ahead— a year which promises to be one
of challenge and growth— it will continu
to uphold the high standards of excel-
lence it has established. I am equally ce
tain that the solid record of achievemen
which we have seen in this past year wi
86
Department of State Bullet
UNITED NATIONS
yirepeated in the next— in no small
nlasure, as a result of the outstanding
ijdership provided by Director General
ins Blix.
Before closing please let me observe
it my delegation has noted with inter-
the comments of some previous
;akers concerning efforts to enhance
dear arms control and to achieve the
imate elimination of all nuclear
apons. My delegation would note that
> United States, too, has put forward
istructive, viable proposals directed
vard these objectives. The United
ites, too, hopes that these proposals
1 be carefully considered by the Soviet
lion as discussion of all proposals con-
ning nuclear weapons continues.
My government is pleased, there-
's, to join with other states in support-
; the resolution [No. L-32] on the
EA annual report. We look forward to
irking with the agency staff and with
iier member states in support of the
ency's programs, which so clearly
nefit us all.
"USUN press release 150.
ibyan Occupation
f Northern Chad
Herbert S. Okun
Statement in the Security Council on
member 18. 1986. Ambassador Okun is
Is. Deputy Permanent Representative
Uhe United Nations.^
le U.S. delegation believes that the
ivernment of the Third Republic of
lad, since it came to power in 1982,
s vigorously worked to achieve
itional reconciliation. It has attempted
heal the wounds caused by the long
/il war in that country. It has met with
leat success. The Chadian Government
Is welcomed back thousands of former
iponents and helped them to resume
eir place in Chad's national life.
As the Permanent Representative of
aad has just pointed out, Chad's
omestic progress has been disrupted by
:ternal military aggression directed
jainst it. In 1983, in clear violation of
Dt only the Charter of the United
ations but also that of the Organization
African Unity, Libya invaded and
sized nearly half of the territory of the
epublic of Chad. This Libyan occupa-
Ion of Chad's northern provinces still
jntinues today.
[
Libya's occupation of northern Chad
is maintained only through harsh
military rule. Several thousand Libyan
troops have constructed and occupy a
number of military bases and airfields on
Chadian soil. Many Chadian civilians
have been forced to flee from their
ancestral homes in the north and to seek
refuge south of the 16th parallel, in the
territory controlled by the Government
of Chad. This massive flow of refugees is
clear evidence of aggression against the
Government and people of Chad.
A member of this organization, one
that claims to uphold the Charter, is
responsible for this aggression. Libya's
attack on Chad threatens not only its
smaller neighbor but the peace and
stability of other nations in the region as
well. Let us review what has happened
since the Council last met on this subject
in January 1985.
In February and March 1986,
Libyan-controlled military forces,
operating from the territory they had
previously occupied in northern Chad,
launched heavy attacks against Chadian
Government posts along and south of the
16th parallel. As you will recall, in
February of this year, the Permanent
Representative of the Republic of Chad
again reminded the Security Council of
continued Libyan military aggression
against his country in flagrant violation
of resolutions of the United Nations and
the Organization of African Unity. He
also informed this body that his govern-
ment had requested, under Article 51 of
the UN Charter, assistance from the
Government of France in order to resist
this aggression.
In intense fighting, Chadian Govern-
ment troops repulsed all of these
attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on
the attackers and taking hundreds of
prisoners, including a number of Libyan
soldiers. The Libyan response was to
send a military aircraft to bomb
N'Djamena airport on February 17.
The international community has
just learned of new Libyan repression in
northern Chad. We understand that the
latest Libyan actions are directed not
just against Chadian military units but
also involved open warfare against the
civilian population of northern Chad.
Libya is bombing villages, indiscrimi-
nately killing Chadian civilians, and con-
ducting a scorched earth policy by burn-
ing plantations and killing cattle. In his
persuasive memorandum of November
13, 1986, to the Council, the Permanent
Representative of Chad has referred to
these Libyan actions as genocide.
Libya has attempted to justify its
invasion, seizure, and occupation of
northern Chad and support for a former
Chadian regime, the GUNT, [National
Union Transition Government]. The
falsity of this claim has now been
demonstrated by the Libyans them-
selves. Libya acknowledges that the
GUNT has collapsed. Most GUNT mem-
bers have rallied to the Government of
Chad and are now fighting against the
Libyan invaders. In Tripoli the Libyans
themselves shot and wounded GUNT
leader Goukouni Oueddei when they
attempted to arrest him.
Chad is not a colony of Libya. Chad
is an independent, nonaligned member of
the United Nations. It threatens no
other nation, least of all Libya. The
Chadian people do not want Libyan
soldiers in their country. Chad is one of
the poorest countries in the world. It
wants to devote its energies to rebuild-
ing and recovering from civil war and
natural disaster. Its efforts in the field of
economic development are greatly inhib-
ited by the efforts it must make to resist
Libyan military aggression.
In its struggle against outside
aggression, Chad deserves the support
of all of us. By its aggression against
Chad, Libya merits the condemnation of
the international community. All
members of this organization, if they
really believe in the Charter, should
demand that Libya withdraw its military
forces from Chad and cease its aggres-
sion against a member of this
organization.
The United States strongly supports
the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Chad. We join with Chad in calling for
an immediate end to brutal Libyan
actions against the people of Chad. We
join with those other members of the
United Nations which call for the prompt
withdrawal of Libyan military forces
from Chad and an early end to Libyan
aggression against Chad.
1986.
'USUN press release 158 of Nov. 18,
Libya
anuary 1987
by Larry Pressler
Statement in a plenary session of the
General Assembly on November 19. 1986.
Senator Pressler is a U.S. delegate to the
J, 1st session of the UN General
Assembly.^
The General Assembly is meeting here
this morning at the behest of Libya.
Libya is trying to portray itself as an
innocent victim and to portray the
87
UNITED NATIONS
United States as having engaged in
unprovoked and unjustified action
against it. Let us look first at these pro-
fessions of innocence. Such a look should
make clear why the United States, after
many years of verbal warnings and
appeals to this body, finally found it
necessary, in accordance with Article 51
of the UN Charter, to act in self-defense
on April 15 and 16 of this year.
Let us turn to this sordid record of
Libyan terrorism and violence. We could
begin in 1969 when Qadhafi came to
power. But let us go back only toward
the end of the last decade. In the wake
of the seizure of our embassy in Tehran,
the LJ.S. Embassy in Tripoli was burned
on December 2, 1979. The United States
suspended most diplomatic activities, but
a small embassy staff remained. The
attack on our embassy was followed by
similar attacks on the French Embassy
in Tripoli in early 1980, which led to the
closing of our embassy on February 15.
The record of Libya's readiness to
carry its terrorist campaign to other
countries was similarly established early
on. Already in February 1979, Libya had
used civilian aircraft to send troops to
assist Uganda's dictator, Idi Amin. By
1981 Libya had begun its campaign of
assassination attempts and interference
against Chad. In October 1981, the
planned assassination of Hussein Habre
during a visit to the Sudan failed when
Libyans sent to conduct the operation
surrendered to Sudanese authorities. In
July 1983, Libyan forces invaded and
occupied parts of Chad for the second
time.
The Libyans started attacks on air-
line passengers, airports, and civilian
transport in 1981. In February a Libyan
gunman opened fire on passengers arriv-
ing on a flight from Algiers at Rome's
airport, targeting a prominent anti-
Qadhafi exile. In October two bombs
exploded in luggage being unloaded from
a plane arriving in Egypt from Libya. In
April 1984, a bomb hidden in an
unclaimed suitcase unloaded from a
Libyan airliner exploded at London's
Heathrow Airport, injuring 25 innocent
civilians.
Another aspect of Qadhafi's world-
wide terrorist campaign which started in
the early 1980s has been assassinations
of his opponents living abroad. In
October 1980, a graduate student was
shot and seriously wounded in Colorado;
the following July another anti-Qadhafi
student was killed in Ogden, Utah.
Throughout 1982 and 1983, Libyan
students studying in Europe were
harassed and their lives threatened. In
March 1984, four bombs exploded in
London and Manchester near the homes
and businesses of Libyan exiles; over 25
people were injured.
The year 1984 was a particularly
bloody one as Qadhafi spread his ter-
rorist net throughout Europe and the
Mediterranean. In March a mob burned
the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli, while
Libyan authorities stood by and took no
action. In April shots were fired from
the offices of the Libyan People's
Bureau in London, killing a British
policewoman. When the British Govern-
ment closed the bureau and severed
diplomatic relations, the Libyans
arrested a number of British subjects in
Tripoli on trumped-up charges and held
them hostage in an effort to pressure the
British Government not to prosecute
those arrested in London.
By mid-1984 Qadhafi's terrorist cam-
paign entered high gear. In June the
official Libyan news agency, Jana,
announced that the "Libyan masses have
decided to form suicide commandos to
chase traitors and stray dogs wherever
they are and liquidate them physically."
The same month the anti-Qadhafi Libyan
editor of an Arab newspaper in Athens
was killed by two men on a motorbike.
Three months later, a Libyan exile was
found gagged and strangled in his hotel
room in Rome. That summer 19 ships
were damaged by mines which exploded
in the Red Sea. These mines were gener-
ally accepted to have been laid by a
Libyan vessel. In September the Libyans
were again implicated in a plot to
assassinate Chad's President Hussein
Habre using a briefcase bomb. In
November Egypt's President Mubarak
announced that four assassins who had
been sent to Egypt by Qadhafi to kill
former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush
were arrested. Pictures were sent to the
Libyan People's Bureau in Malta show-
ing Bakoush apparently dead. Official
Libyan press sources then claimed that
Bakoush had been executed by suicide
squads sent abroad to liquidate enemies
of the revolution. Qadhafi's intentions
were clearly on record, although his
thugs fortunately were unable to
accomplish their mission.
Libya's terrorist campaign continued
unabated during 1985. In a speech on
March 31, Qadhafi urged that "our task
here in this command is to see to it that
individual suicidal operations are
transformed into an organized action
which will bear fruit, defeat the enemy,
and liberate the nation ... we want
everyone of us to say: I have decided to
die just to spite America, because this
decision is one that America cannot
veto."
Who have been the victims? In
February it was the former Libyan
Ambassador to Austria who had
resigned in protest against the regim
5 years earlier. In March it was a Lib
jeweler in Rome; in April a Libyan
businessman in Nicosia, a Libyan stu-
dent, and a Moroccan citizen resident
West Germany. In September it was"
postal workers in Tunis injured by let
bombs smuggled into Tunisia by a
Libyan diplomat. The incident caused
Tunisia to sever diplomatic relations.
That same summer my government
expelled a Libyan diplomat here at th
United Nations whom we had found t
be involved in a plot against Libyan o
ponents of the Qadhafi regime living
the United States.
The year 1985 ended with the hor
rendous terrorist attacks at the airpo
in Rome and Vienna on December 27
Twenty people were killed, including
four terrorists. More than 110 people
were wounded. Five of the dead were
Americans, including a teenage girl.
Libya was deeply involved in support
the Abu Nidal group which coordinati
and carried out these terrorist attack
Libyan complicity was clear. Tunisian
officials reported that the Qadhafi
regime was in possession of two Tuni
sian passports which had been used b
the terrorists. Those passports could
only have come into their possession
with the deliberate connivance of the
Libyan authorities.
We now come to 1986. Qadhafi's
determination to spread death and
destruction has led to further atrociti'
The pattern of interference by force i
the affairs of other African states has
continued. On February 10 Libyan-
backed rebels attacked Chadian force:
southern Chad, and on February 17 a
Libyan bomber attacked the airfield a
N'Djamena. While Libya denied any
involvement in the fighting, the Chad
Government I'eported the Libyans we;
among those who were taken prisoner
Alongside these events, Qadhafi's
speeches were full of hate and violeno
On March 5, he announced that "any
person who left Libya is now in the
hostile ranks on America's side. He is
finished. He will receive no mercy or
compassion at home or abroad. All
traces of him should be wiped out. Ev(
his house should not remain." On Apri
3, a bomb ripped through a West Berli
discotheque frequented by American
troops, killing an American servicemai
and a Turkish woman and injuring mo
than 230 people, about one-fourth of
them Americans. A second soldier die(
of his wounds in June. The irrefutable
ite
88
Department of State Bulle'
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
nee pointed clearly to the involve-
of the Libyan People's Bureau in
Berlin.
, will not repeat here the long list of
il warnings and diplomatic efforts
igh this organization by which we
ht to dissuade Libya from its cani-
1 of terrorism. They are a matter of
c record in the documents of the
ed Nations and are available to all
u.
t was in these circumstances that
nally acted in self-defense. On
1 14, President Reagan authorized
ns against centers of terrorist plan-
in Libya in response to repeated
irist attacks against U.S. persons
Droperty mounted under Libyan
ices. This step was taken with great
tance: after repeated warnings;
conclusive evidence that the
lafi government continued to
ve itself in support and control of
■rist actions against U.S. targets;
ifter conspicuous surveillance of
rican installations and personnel
)ther similar actions by Libyans
jfi pointed to further terrorism. Our
fes were limited to terrorist facilities
iliiilitary assets which support
I afi's attacks on us. As the Presi-
1 stated at the time: "The attacks
- concentrated and carefully tar-
i to minimize casualties among the
! in ))eople, with whom we have no
11 -el."
!'hat night, the President, describing
if nonstrous brutality of Qadhafi's
i I of terror, laid out the following
3 lard of proof: "The evidence is now
)i lusive that the terrorist bombing of
a Bile discotheque was planned and
uted under the direct orders of the
il an regime. On March 25, more than
V ek before the attack, orders were
'I from Tripoli to the Libyan People's
i-au in East Berlin to conduct a ter-
M t attack against Americans to cause
liimum and indiscriminate casualties.
a's agents then planted the bomb.
; vpril 4, the People's Bureau alerted
roll that the attack would be carried
a:he following morning. The next day,
1' reported back to Tripoli on the
r t success of their mission. Our evi-
e'e is direct; it is precise; it is
•I'utable."
Our evidence is sound. Those
H'ged by their governments with deal-
* n this kind of evidence recognize it
-uii. The Government of the Federal
■ ublic of Germany has announced that
IS independent confirmation of the
ail involvement in the LaBelle
Ijinij. The members of the Tokyo
loniic summit and the European
Secretary Visits
Earthquake Site in El Salvador
Secretary Shultz (shown here with Presi-
dent Jose Napoleon Duarte) went to San
Salvador October 16, 1986, to assess the
damage and express the concern of
President Reagan and the American peo-
ple as a result of an earthquake a week
earlier. This disaster resulted in nearly
1,000 deaths, some 21,000 injured, and
left about 250,000 people homeless.
Replacement costs for structures is
expected to exceed $1 billion. The U.S.
Agency for International Development
(AID) provided over $2 million for the
relief phase in the form of food, medical
supplies, temporary shelters, and search-
and-rescue equipment. Congress
authorized AID to provide another $50
million for the initial rehabilitation and
reconstruction phase. The U.S. Embassy
in San Salvador suffered extensive
damage but there were no casualties. ■ "*
Community have declared that they can-
not have normal relations with a state
which supports terrorism, specifically
citing Libya as one such state.
The question which many countries
have asked is whether the U.S. response
was proportionate; was it in accord with
international law? The answer is yes on
both counts. President Reagan has said;
"When our citizens are abused or
attacked anywhere in the world on the
direct orders of a hostile regime, we will
respond so long as I'm in this Oval
Office. Self-defense is not only our right,
it is our duty. It is the purpose behind
the mission. . .fully consistent with Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter," which
recognized the "inherent right of. . .self-
defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United
Nations. ..."
The U.S. action was taken to reduce
Libya's ability to continue to commit
unlawful aggression through terrorist
force against the United States and its
nationals. The U.S. action was not blind
retaliation or the seeking of retribution.
No. The U.S. actions were designed only
to prevent fui'ther attacks.
Unfortunately, while responsible
governments have sought to isolate and
contain Libya's terrorist virus, Libyan
violence has continued. On April 17 four
rocket-propelled grenades were fired at
the British Ambassador's residence in
Beirut. A Libyan-affiliated group, Omar
Al Mukhtar, claimed responsibility. On
the same day, one American and two
British hostages were murdered in
Beirut, allegedly in reprisal for the air
strikes on Libya. The next day four
Libyans, including members of the
Libyan People's Bureau, were arrested
by Turkish authorities in Ankara for
attempting to attack a U.S. Officers'
Club.
Many of you were present at the
nonaligned summit meeting in Harare
this September. Qadhafi used that
rostrum to challenge the principles of
this organization, to divide us into
hostile camps, and to champion the cause
of terrorism. He said; "I promise you
from this rostrum that from now on I
will, with all my capabilities, divide this
world into two camps— the liberation
camp and the imperialist camp. . .
everything must be liberated ... all the
French-speaking states . . . are not
independent and are a fifth column
inside this movement. . .the word com-
monwealth is very embarrassing. . .it
means that you are properties of Brit-
ain. . .it is something shameful."
Two weeks later he equated ter-
rorism with wars of liberation and
revolution.
I have presented here today the
record of the Qadhafi regime. The proof
of Qadhafi's moral bankruptcy is before
you. I ask you: What is the source of
Libya's moral authority to appear before
this Assembly? What is the basis of its
luary 1987
89
TREATIES
claim to be the exponent of international
law and respect for the principles of the
UN Charter? It is the height of hypocrisy
for Libya to present a draft resolution^
to the General Assembly which reaffirms
"the obligation of all states to refrain
from the use or threat of use of force in
their international relations" and "the
inalienable right of all peoples ... to
choose their political, social and
economic system without any inter-
ference, subversion, coercion or con-
straint of any kind whatsoever."
With all this Libya-inspired activity,
it is hardly surprising that Qadhafi's
regime increasingly is shunned globally
by governments which abide by a sense
of principled adherence to interna-
tionally acceptable norms of behavior.
My delegation did not ask for this
debate. But now that it has taken place,
we hope it will be the occasion for every
country represented here to make clear
its opposition to Libyan terrorism and to
dissociate itself from Libya's aggressive
rhetoric and reprehensible actions. The
American people, as well as all those
around the world who have been the vic-
tims of or who fear Libyan terrorism,
will be watching what this body says and
does on this hypocritical complaint from
a regime that deserves the contempt of
the international community.
'USUN press release 159 of Nov. 19.
1986.
2 On Nov. 20, the UN General Assembly
adopted a resolution condemning the United
States for its air attack on terrorist targets in
Libya. The vote was 79 for 28 (U.S.) against,
with 33 abstentions and 19 absent. ■
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Canberra
July 24, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 30,
1962. TIAS 5094.
Adopted at Buenos Aires July 28, 1962.
Entered into force .Jan. 11, 1963, TIAS 5274.
Adopted at Brussels June 2-13, 1964.
Entered into force July 27, 1966, Sept. 1,
1966, Dec. 22, 1978. and Nov. 1, 1982. TIAS
50.58, 10485.
Adopted at Santiago Nov. 18, 1966. Entered
into force (except for Rec. IV- 12) Oct. 30,
1968, and Nov.l, 1982. TIAS 6668.
Adopted at Paris Nov. 29, 1968. Entered into
force May 26, 1972, July 31, 1972, and Nov.
1, 1982. TIAS 7692.
Adopted at Tokyo Oct. 30, 1970. Entered into
force (except for Recs. VI-8 and 10) Oct. 10,
1973, and Nov. 1, 1982.
Adopted at Wellington Nov. 10, 1972.
Entered into force (except for Rec. VII-5)
May 29, 1975, and June 24, 1981. TIAS 8500.
Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975. Entered into
force Dec. 16, 1978, Sept. 1, 1980, Nov. 1,
1982, and Jan. 26, 1984. TIAS 10486.
Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into
force Sept. 8, 1983. TIAS 10735.
Notification of approval: Brazil, Oct. 27. 1986.
Arbitration
Inter-American convention on international
commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City
Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 16,
1976.'
Instrument of ratification signed by
President: Nov. 10, 1986.^
Aviation
International air services transit agreement.
Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Jan. 20, 1945; for the U.S. Feb. 8, 1945.
EAS 487; 59 Stat. 1693.
Notice of denimciation: Canada, Nov. 12,
1986, effective Nov. 12. 1987.
Convention on offenses and certain other acts
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo
Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4,
1969. TIAS 6768.
Accession deposited: Brunei, May 23, 1986.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec.
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971.
TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: Madagascar, Nov. 18,
1986^
Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Madagascar, Nov. 18,
1986^
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production, and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons
and on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS
8062.
Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, Nov. 18,
1986.
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1983, with
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983;
definitively Sept. 11, 1985.
Ratification deposited: Greece. Sept. 19,
1986.
Conservation
Convention on wetlands of international
. importance especially as waterfowl habitat.
Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into
force Dec. 21, 1975.'
Protocol to the convention on wetlands of
international importance especially as wai
fowl habitat of Feb. 2. 1971. Adopted at I
Dec. 2, 1982.3
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi
!'
d ent: Nov. 10, 1986.
Fisheries
Convention for the conservation of salmoi
the North Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjj
Mar. 2. 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1
TIAS 10789.
Rat ification deposited: Sweden, May 17,
1984.
Accession deposited: U.S.S.R. Sept. 11. 1
Protocol to amend the international eonvs
tion of May 14. 1966, for the conservatior
Atlantic tiinas (TIAS 6767). Done at Parii
July 10, 1984.3
Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 10. 198'
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and politic
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23. 1976. 999 U>
111.'
Ratification deposited: Philippines. Oct. 2
1986.''
Judicial Procedure
Inter-American convention on letters
rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, \
Entered into force Jan. 16. 1976.'
Additional protocol to the Inter-Americai
convention on letters rogatory, with anne
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entere
into force June 14, 1980.'
Instrument of ratification signed by Pres
dent: Nov. 10, 1986.'
Convention on the civil aspects of interna
tional child abduction. Done at The HagU'
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,
1983.'
Instrumen t of ratification signed by Pres;
denlTNovriO, 1986.2
Signature: Australia, Oct. 29, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Australia, Oct. 2S
1986;5 Luxembourg, Oct. 9, 1986.
Marine Pollution
Convention for the protection and develo]
ment of the marine environment of the w
Caribbean region, with annex. Done at C;
tagena Mar. 24, 1983.="
Protocol concerning cooperation in combj
ting oil spills in the wider Caribbean regit
with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24,
1983.3
Accession deposited: Trinidad & Tobago,
24, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: France, Nov. 13,
1985;2 U.K., Feb. 28, 1986."^
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the international convent
on load lines. 1966 (TIAS 6629. 6720).
Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1983. ^
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 14, 1'.5
90
Department of State Bui:
ear Accidents
ention on early notification of a nuclear
ent. Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986.
red into force Oct. 27. 1986.'
.tures: India, Deni. People's Rep. of
a, Luxembourg, Sept. 29, 1986; Jordan,
Paraguay, Oct. 2, 1986; Zaire, Sept. 30,
ention on assistance in the case of a
fax accident or radiological emergency.
I at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. »
itures: India, Dem. People's Rep. of
a, Jordan, Mali, Paraguay, Oct. 2, 1986;
!, Sept. 30. 1986.
ear Test Ban
ty banning nuclear weapon tests in the
sphere, in outer space, and under water.
at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963. Entered into
Oct. 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
'ication deposited: Argentina, Nov. 21,
lear Weapons — Nonproliferation
ty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
ions. Done at Washington, London, and
ow Julv 1, 1968. Entered into force
5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
'ication deposited: Trinidad & Tobago,
80, 1986.
^Ilite Communications Systems
'4 ention on the International Maritime
a lite Organization (INMARSAT), with
\ Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.
i.d into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
I ssio n deposited: Indonesia, Oct. 9, 1986.^
! aling agreement on the International
: time Satellite Organization (INMAR-
I. with annex. Done at London Sept. 3,
i;iitered into force July 16, 1979, TIAS
, ;iture: Indonesia, Oct. 9, 1986.
r ty on principles governing the activities
f ates in the exploration and use of outer
including the Moon and other celestial
Done at Washington. London, and
. >>i\ Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into force
111. 1967. TIAS 6347.
!i' ation deposited: Sri Lanka. Nov. 18.
<i ar
riiational sugar agreement, 1984, with
\is. Done at Geneva July 5, 1984.
■v>'i\ into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1985;
iitively Apr. 4, 1985.'
I fication deposited: Panama, Oct. 29,
F( 'communications
) national telecommunication convention,
innexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi
'i, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984;
aitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986.
il'irations deposited: Cyprus, Aug. 22,
> fiia. Aug. 26, 1986; Rwanda, Sept. 5,
i<-. Sri Lanka, Sept. 1, 1986.
Trade
United Nations convention on contracts for
the international sale of goods. Done at
Vienna Apr. 11, 1980.^
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi-
dent: Nov. 10, 1986.^
Protocol extending the arrangement of Dec.
20, 1973, (TIAS 7840) regarding international
trade in textiles. Done at Geneva July 31,
1986. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986; for the
U.S. Aug. 5, 1986.
Acceptances deposited: Austria, Sept. 16,
1986; Indonesia, Sept. 30, 1986; Korea, Oct,
9, 1986; Malaysia, Oct. 29, 1986; Norway,
Oct. 27, 1986; Sweden, Sept. 20, 1986;
Thailand, Oct. 16, 1986.
UN Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO)
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, with annexes.
Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into
force June 21, 1985.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, Nov. 13, 1986.
Women
Convention on the political rights of women.
Done at New York Mar. 31. 1953. Entered
into force July 5, 1954; for the U.S. July 7,
1976. TIAS 8289.
Accessions deposited: Angola, Sept. 17, 1986;
Colombia, Aug. 5, 1986.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement on aviation security. Signed at
Ottawa Nov. 21, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 21, 1986.
Agreement concerning the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste. Signed at
Ottawa Oct. 28, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 8, 1986.
China
Agreement for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of tax evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with protocol and
exchange of notes. Signed at Beijing Apr. 30,
1984.
Protocol concerning the interpretation of
paragraph 7 of the protocol to the agreement
for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of tax evasion with respect to
taxes on income of Apr. 30. 1984. Signed at
Beijing May 10. 1986.
Entered into force: Nov. 21, 1986.
Agreement amending and extending the pro-
tocol of Oct. 17, 1981 (TIAS 10287), on^
cooperation in nuclear safety matters. Signed
at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. Entered into force
Sept. 26, 1986; effective Oct. 17, 1986.
Denmark
Technical schedule setting forth defense areas
pursuant to article 11(3) of agreement of Apr.
27, 1951, (TIAS 2292) concerning the defense
of Greenland. Effected by exchange of notes
at Copenhagen Sept. 30, 1986. Entered into
force Sept. 30, 1986.
TREATIES
Egypt
Grant agreement for commodity imports.
Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1986. Entered into
force Aug. 21, 1986.
Grant agreement for cash transfer. Signed at
Cairo Aug. 27, 1986. Entered into force Aug.
27, 1986.
Sixth agreement to the program grant agree-
ment of Aug. 29, 1982, (TIAS 10472), as
amended, for decentralization sector support.
Signed at Cairo June 19, 1986. Entered into
force June 19, 1986.
Agreement amending agreement of Nov. 12,
1985, for the sale of agricultural commodities.
Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Sept.
21, 1986. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1986.
Agreement extending the agreement of
Jan. 11. 1981, (TIAS 10066) relating to
cooperation in science and technology. Signed
at Cairo Nov. 9, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 9, 1986; effective Jan. 11, 1986.
EI Salvador
Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 20,
1985, for the sale of agricultural commodities.
Effected by exchange of notes at San
Salvador .June 27, 1986.
Entered into force: Sept. 26, 1986.
Greece
Defense industrial cooperation agreement,
with annexes and exchange of letters. Signed
at Athens Nov. 10, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 10, 1986.
Guinea-Bissau
Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
International Military Education and Training
(IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bissau Sept. 10 and Oct. 16, 1986.
Entered into force Oct. 16, 1986.
Israel
Grant agreement to assist in balance-of-
payments financing and budget support to
promote economic and political stability.
Signed at Washington Sept. 29, 1986.
Entered into force Sept. 29, 1986.
Jamaica
Agreement amending the agreement of
Jan. 15, 1986, as amended, for sale of
agricultural commodities. Effected by
exchange of notes at Kingston Sept. 24 and
Oct. 8. 1986. Entered into force Oct. 8, 1986.
Korea
Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 22, 1976, as e.xtended (TIAS 8456,
10295), relating to scientific and technical
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Nov. 4 and 6, 1986. Entered into
force Nov. 6, 1986.
Agreement on mutual customs service
assistance. Signed at Washington Nov. 3,
1986. Enters into force 90 days after the par-
ties have notified each other that all
necessary requirements for entry into force
have been met.
luary 1987
91
PRESS RELEASES
Malaysia
Agreement amending agreement of July 1
and 11, 1985, as amended, relating to trade in
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and
textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Kuala Lumpur Oct. 14 and 25, 1986.
Entered into force Oct. 25, 1986.
Mexico
Agreement of cooperation regarding the
transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes
and hazardous substances. Signed at Wash-
ington Nov. 12, 1986. Enters into force upon
exchange of notes stating that each party has
completed its necessary internal procedures.
Norway
Memorandum of understanding on the
exchange of officers between the U.S. Marine
Corps and the Norwegian Army. Signed at
Oslo and Washington May 21 and July 3,
1986. Entered into force July 3, 1986'.
Pakistan
Fifth amendatory agreement to the agree-
ment of Apr. 13, 1982, (TIAS 10378) for
agricultural commodities and equipment.
Signed at Islamabad Sept. 25, 1986. Entered
into force Sept. 25, 1986.
U.S.S.R.
Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended and extended
(TIAS 8528, 10531, 10532, 10696), concerning
fisheries off the coasts of the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 16 and June 17, 1986.
Entered into force: Oct. 31, 1986.
Agreement modifying the agreement of July
30, 1984, concerning diplomatic and other
visas. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Oct. 31, 1986. Entered into force
Oct. 31, 1986.
Agreement relating to immunity of family
members of consular officers and employees
from criminal jurisdiction. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 31,
1986. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1986.
United Kingdom
Agreement in the field of radioactive waste
management technology. Signed at London
Oct. 30, 1986. Entered into force Oct. 30,
1986.
Uruguay
Agreement concerning cooperation in
highway technology. Signed at Washington
June 18, 1986. Entered into force June 18,
1986.
'Not in force for U.S.
^With reservation(s).
^Not in force.
"With declaration(s).
^Extends to legal system applicable only
in Australian States mainland Territories.
•^Extended to Cayman Islands and Turks
and Caicos Islands.
'In force provisionally for U.S. ■
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Date
*236 11/3
•237 11/3
238 11/3
239 11/3
240 11/4
•241 11/4
•242 11/5
243 11/6
.Sul>]ect
Shultz, Perkins: remarks at
swearing-in ceremony of
LI.S. Ambassador to South
Africa Edward Perkins.
Edward Joseph Perkins
sworn in as Ambassador to
South Africa (biographic
data).
Shultz: address and question-
and-answer session before
the World Affairs Council,
Los Angeles, Oct. 31.
Shultz: address and question-
and-answer session before
the Commonwealth Club,
San Francisco, Oct. 31.
Shultz: address before the
Locust Club, Philadelphia,
Nov. 3.
James Daniel Phillips sworn
in as Ambassador to
Burundi (biographic data).
Elinor G. Constable sworn in
as Ambassador to Kenya
(biographic data).
Shultz; news conference,
Vienna.
USUN
Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.
Subject
Reed: trade and develop-
ment. Committee II.
Wrobleski: narcotics,
ECOSOC.
Fleming: population,
ECOSOC
Byrne: social development.
Committee II.
Byrne: TTPI, Trusteeship
Council.
Reagan: women, ECOSOC.
Chacon: American Samoa,
Decolonization Committee.
Byrne: trusteeship peti-
tioners. Trusteeship
Council.
Walters: TTPI, Trusteeship
Council.
Bader: Guam, Decolonization
Committee.
Walters: human rights, Com-
mittee II.
No,
Date
39
5/5
40
5/7
41
5/8
42
5/9
43
.5/12
44
5/13
45
5/15
•46
5/15
•47 5/16
•48 .5/16
•49 5/19
244 11/7
•245 11/7
•246 11/7
•247 11/7
•248 11/12
249 11/12
2.50 11/18
251 11/16
•252 11/24
2.53 11/26
2.54 11/24
Shultz: address before th
CSCE review meeting,
Vienna, Nov. 5.
Shultz: remarks at a rece
tion for nongovernmen
organizations, Vienna,
Nov. 5.
Armacost: remarks made
the return of former
hostage David Jacobsei
James Wilson Rawlings
sworn in as Ambassadc
Zimbabwe, Nov. 6
(biographic data).
Shultz, Cerezo: remarks
following meeting,
Guatemala City, Nov. ]
Shultz: address before th
OAS General Assemblj
Guatemala City, Nov. ]
Shultz: address and quest
and-answer session bef
the International HouS'
Chicago and The Chica,
Sun-Times forum, Chic
Nov. 17.
Shultz: interview on "Fai
the Nation."
U.S. Government and pri
sector support ITU Cei
for Telecommunication
Development.
Shultz: remarks at AID's
25th anniversary recep
tion, Nov. 25.
Shultz, Clark: news con-
ference, Ottawa, Nov. :
•Not printed in the Bulletin.
*50 5/22 Reed: remarks to press
before UNGA Special S
sion on the Critical
Economic Situation in
Africa.
•51 5/22 Okun: South Africa, Secu
Council.
•52 5/23 Okun: South Africa raids
Botswana, Security
Council.
•53 5/23 Barthelemy: disarmamenl
Disarmament Commiss
•54 5/23 Byrne: South Africa, Sect
rity Council.
•55 5/23 Byrne: South Africa, Sect
rity Council.
•56 5/27 Brookner: U.S. Virgin
Islands, Decolonization
Committee.
*57 5/27 White House statement 01
opening of UNGA Spec:
Session on the Critical
Economic Situation in
Africa.
58 5/28 Shultz: statement to the
UNGA Special Session i
the Critical Economic
Situation in Africa.
92
Department of State Bulki
PRESS RELEASES
89
9/16
90
9/16
91
9/20
92
9/22
93
9/23
94
9/23
95
10/1
96
10/1
97
10/6
98
10/6
99
10/9
100
10/7
5/28 U.S. delegation to the UNGA *87 8/14
Special Session on the
Critical Economic Situa-
tion in Africa, May 27-31. '88 9/11
5/28 Shultz; remarks at reception
in honor of U.S. delegation
to the special session.
5/29 Announcement by the U.S.
African Development
Foundation on signing an
agreement of cooperation
with the African Develop-
ment Bank.
6/1 McPherson: statement to
UNGA Special Session on
the Critical Economic
Situation in Africa.
6/4 Byrne: trusteeship.
Trusteeship Council.
6/4 Lowell: space. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.
6/4 Eskin: space. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.
6/5 Eskin: space. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.
6/9 Morrison: space. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.
6/10 Borek: space. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.
6/11 Eskin: space, Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer ' 101 10/9
Space.
6/13 Okun: South Africa, Security
Council.
6/16 Okun: South Africa, Security
Coimcil.
6/18 Okun: South Africa, Secu-
rity Council.
6/25 Hottelet: information. Com-
mittee on Information.
6/25 Hottelet: information. Com-
mittee on Information.
7/1 Byrne: trusteeship.
Trusteeship Council.
7/1 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council.
7/2 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council.
7/3 Immerman: Nicaragua,
Security Council.
7/7 Jarrett: information. Com-
mittee on Information.
7/10 Walters: ECOSOC summer
session, Geneva, July 8.
7/15 Orlando: transnational cor-
porations, ECOSOC, '111 10/15
Geneva, July 4.
7/18 Byrne: UNIFIL, Security
Council. 112 10/15
7/29 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council.
7/30 Walters: Nicaragua, Security *113 10/15
Council.
7/31 Walters: Libya, Nicaragua, '114 10/16
Security Council.
7/31 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council. *115 10/17
102
10/8
103
10/9
104
10/9
105
10/10
106
10/10
107
10/13
108
10/13
109
10/13
110
10/15
USUN statement after vote
on Puerto Rico in
Decolonization Committee.
Byrne: meeting of donors of
humanitarian assistance to
the Kampuchean people.
Immerman: Libya, General
Committee.
Norris: external debt crisis
and development. General
Committee.
Walters: Namibia, UNGA
special session.
Reagan: address before 41st
session of the UN General
Assembly.
Walters: UNIFIL, Security
Council.
Reed: Angola, UN General
Assembly.
Reed: auditors' report. Com-
mittee V.
Taylor: Cuba; UN General
Assembly.
Reed: economic development.
Committee II.
Taylor: terrorism, Puerto
Rico, SDI, UN General
Assembly.
Shearouse: conferences.
Committee V.
Byrne: multinational com-
panies in non-self-
governing territories.
Committee IV.
U.S. delegation to the 41st
session of the LIN General
Assembly.
Walters: Iran-Iraq war.
Security Council.
Clark: Report on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation,
Special Political
Committee.
Walters: Libya, L'N General
Assembly.
Okun: Nicaragua, LIN
General Assembly.
Walters: reappointment of
the UN Secretary General,
UN General Assembly.
Byrne: apartheid. Committee
III.
Amselem: Vietnam, Commit-
tee III.
Rosenstock: non-use of force.
Committee VI.
Immerman: Israeli nuclear
armament, LIN General
Assembly.
Yost: emergency assistance
to El Salvador, UN
General Assembly.
Walters: administrative and
financial function, UN
General Assembly.
Clark: self-determination,
Committee III.
Clark: peacekeeping opera-
tions. Special Political
Committee.
Reed: food poHcy, Committee
II.
'116 10/16 Byrne: small territories,
Committee IV.
*117 10/17 Rosenstock: strengthening
the role of the organiza-
tion. Committee VI.
*118 10/17 Reed: external debt crisis
and development, Commit-
tee II.
*n9 10/20 Adelman: arms control, Com-
mittee I.
120 10/20 Walters: Cambodia, UN
General Assembly.
*121 10/20 Reed: condolence to people
of Mozambique, LIN
General Assembly.
*122 10/22 Reed: economic situation in
Africa, UN General
Assembly.
123 10/22 Okun: arms control. Commit-
tee I.
•124 10/22 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council.
•125 10/22 Walters: Western Sahara.
Committee IV.
•126 10/23 Byrne: social issues. Commit-
tee III.
•127 10/24 Reed: ECOSOC report. Com-
mittee II.
*128 10/24 Reagan: women. Committee
III.
•129 10/27 Gross: zone of peace and
cooperation in the South
Atlantic, LIN General
Assembly.
•130 10/27 Walters: Central America,
Security Council.
•131 10/28 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council.
•132 10/29 Reed: trade and develop-
ment. Committee II.
•133 10/29 Okun: IsraeH attack on Iraqi
nuclear facilities, UN
General Assembly.
♦134 [Not issued.]
*135 10/30 Okun: host country respon-
sibilities. Committee on
Relations with the Host
Country.
•136 10/30 Clark: UNRWA, Special
Political Committee,
137 10/30 Lowitz: chemical weapons.
Committee I.
•138 10/30 Byrne: racial discrimination.
Committee III.
•139 10/31 Wrobleski: drug trafficking.
Committee III.
•140 11/4 Clark: UNRWA, Special
Political Committee,
141 11/3 Okun: ICJ judgment on
Nicaragua, LIN General
Assembly.
142 11/4 Okun: Afghanistaji, UN
General Assembly.
•143 11/5 Byrne: aging and disabled.
Committee III.
•144 11/5 Gross: Law of the Sea, UN
General Assembly.
*Not printed in the Bi'lletin. ■
93
PUBLICATIONS
Department of State
Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Correspondence Management Division,
Bureau of Public Affairs. Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
President Reagan
U.S. Initiative to Iran, TV address to the
nation, Nov. 13, 1986 (Current Policy #890).
Secretary Shultz
Human Rights and Soviet-American Rela-
tions, World Affairs Council, Los Angeles,
Oct. 31. 1986 (Current Policy #882).
Reykjavik; A Watershed in U.S. -Soviet Rela-
tions, Commonwealth Club. San Francisco,
Oct. 31, 1986 (Current Policy #883).
Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget, Locust
Club, Philadelphia, Nov. 3, 1986 (Current
Policy #884).
Promoting Inter-American Cooperation, OAS
General Assembly, Guatemala City. Nov.
11, 1986 (Current Policy #891).
Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki, CSCE
review meeting, Vienna. Nov. 5, 1986 (Cur-
rent Policy #892).
Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the
Future of Deterrence, International House
of Chicago and The Chicago Sun-Times
forum, Chicago, Nov. 17, 1986 (Current
Policy #893).
Africa
The Human Rights Dimension in Africa,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Freeman,
World Affairs Council, Philadelphia, Nov.
6, 1986 (Current Policy #888).
Sanctions Against South Africa (GIST, Nov.
1986).
Arms Control
Permitted and Prohibited Activities Under
the ABM Treaty, Ambassador Nitze, Inter-
national Law Weekend Group, New York
City, Oct. 31, 1986 (Current Policy #886).
East Asia
The U.S. Approach to East Asia and the
Pacific, Assistant Secretary Sigur, Pacific
and Asian Affairs Council and the Pacific
Forum conference, Honolulu, Oct. 29, 1986
(Current Policy #895).
Anti-Piracy in Southeast Asia (GIST, Nov.
1986).
Economics
U.S. -EC Relations and the International
Trading System, Under Secretary Wallis,
Society for International Affairs, Luxem-
bourg, Oct. 8, 1986 (Current Policy ;
General
U.S. Foreign PoHcy Achievements and
Challenges, Under Secretary Armacost,
State Department regional foreign policy
conference, Salt Lake City, Oct. 18, 1986
(Current Policy #885).
U.S. Policy Toward the Third World, Under
Secretary Armacost, National Third World
Studies Conference, Omaha, Oct. 17, 1986
(Current Policy #894).
Recent Anti-American Forgeries, Nov. 1986
(Foreign Affairs Note).
Helping Americans to Understand the World:
Some Proposals, Nov. 1986 (Public Infor-
mation Series).
Nuclear Policy
International Prospects for Civil Nuclear
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era, Assist-
ant Secretary Negroponte, Rotary Club,
Detroit, Nov. 5, 1986 (Current Policy #887).
Refugees
Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (GIST, Nov.
1986).
Western Hemisphere
Guatemala's Transition Toward Democracy.
Nov. 1986 (Public Information Series). ■
Current Documents
Volume Released
The Department of State on October 2,
1986, released American Foreign Policy:
Current Dock merits. 198U- The book is
the most recent volume in an ongoing
Department of State series.
Like earlier volumes in the series,
this book represents official public
expressions of policy that best set forth
the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign
policy. Included are the te.xts of major
official messages, addresses, statements,
interviews, press conferences and brief-
ings, reports, congressional testimony,
and communications by the White
House, the Department of State, and
other Federal agencies or officials
involved in the foreign policy process.
The volume contains 1,174 pages
arranged chronologically within 15
geographic and topical chapters, and
includes a list of documents, editorial
annotations, maps, a list of names and
abbreviations, and an index.
The volume covers the fourth year of
the Reagan Administration. It presents
the major statements by President
Reagan, the Secretary of State, and
other government leaders setting forth
the most important general principles of
American foreign policy in 1984. Policy
statements are included on national
security policy, arms control, foreign
economic policy, terrorism, the role of
the United States in the United Nations,
the approach to human rights around the
world, the concern with refugees, and
the law of the sea. The volume also
presents expressions of U.S. policy on
regional and bilateral aspects of
American foreign relations in 1984.
The American Foreign Policy
documentary series began in 1950.
Following the publication of three
volumes covering the 1941 to 1955
years, annual volumes entitled A meri'
Foreign Policy: Curreyit Documents w
issued for the years 1956-1967. After
interruption the series was resumed v
the publication in August 1983 of
American Foreign Policy: Basic
Documents. 1977-1980. The annual
volumes were revived with the public;
tion oi Amei'ican Foreign Policy: Cur
rent Documents, 1981. The 1982 and
1983 annual volumes have also been
published. It is the Department's intei
tion to publish the annual volume for
1985 later this year.
The Department, which released ;
microfiche supplement to the 1981
printed volume in February 1985, alsc
plans to publish microfiche supplemer
to the later printed volumes in the
series. These microfiche publications '
include the full texts of many docume
printed only in part in the printed
volumes and will also reproduce a mui
larger and more complete selection of
documents than appear in the books.
A^nerican Foreign Policy: Currrn
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orders should be made payable to the
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Press release 195 of Oct. 2, 1986
94
Department of State Bullei
^ )EX
uary 1 987
.87, No. 2118
1
„
DieiiBBiiistan. Situation in Afghanistan
:un) 84
ican Principles
ring the Foreign Affairs Budget
ultz) 24
Foreign Policy: Achievements and
illenges (Arnnacost) 61
Control
lar and Space Arms Talks Close Round
(Kampelman, Reagan) 41
lar Weapons, Arms Control, and the
tare of Deterrence (Shultz) 31
itted and Prohibited Activities Under
ABM Treaty (Nitze) 39
ling the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47
itary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
Foreign Policy: Achievements and
' (allenges (Armaeost) 61
.Mnitiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan,
i jitz, Whitehead) 65
' irld Without Nuclear Weapons
(lelman) 35
, a )odia. Situation in Cambodia (Walters,
t t of resolution) 80
h . Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad
(;un) 87
Tess. U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese,
1 agan, Shultz, Whitehead) 65
i«irtment & Foreign Service. Secretary
Jaises AID and Comments on Iran ... .23
It loping Countries
h ^ID Challenge 1
'. Policy Toward the Third World
1 rmacost) 56
'.t lomics
"r loting Inter-American Cooperation
^ I lultz) 27
It oring the Foreign Affairs Budget
I mltz) 24
J. -EC Relations and the International
ading System (Wallis) 43
J. Foreign Policy: Achievements and
lallenges (Armaeost) 61
J. -Japan Subcabinet Meets (Wallis) 42
J. Policy Toward the Third World
rmacost) 56
il alvador. Secretary Visits Earthquake
tein El Salvador 89
E rgy. International Prospects for Civil
uclear Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era
legroponte) 75
E ope
M lear Weapons, Arms Control, and the
uture of Deterrence (Shultz) 31
P suing the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47
(tary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
EC Relations and the International
rading System (Wallis) 43
V nna CSCE Followup Meeting 50
.^Vorld Without Nuclear Weapons
\delman) 35
Foreign Assistance
The AID Challenge 1
Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget
(Shultz) 24
Secretary Visits Earthquake Site in El
Salvador 89
U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and
Challenges (Armaeost) 61
Germany. Visit of West German Chancellor
Kohl (Kohl, Reagan, joint statement) ... .54
Guatemala. Promoting Inter- American
Cooperation (Shultz) 27
Human Rights
Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47
Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting 50
International Law. Nicaragua (Okun) ... .82
Iran
Secretary Praises AID and Comments on
Iran 23
U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan,
Shultz, Whitehead) 65
Japan. U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets
(Wallis) 42
Libya
Libya (Pressler) 87
Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad
(Okun) 87
Marshall Islands. U.S. Relationship With
Pacific Islands (Reagan) 78
Micronesia. U.S. Relationship With Pacific
Islands (Reagan) 78
Military Affairs. Permitted and Prohibited
Activities Under the ABM Treaty (Nitze) 39
Narcotics
President Convenes Conference on
Narcotics 74
Promoting Inter- American Cooperation
(Shultz) 27
Nicaragua
Nicaragua (Okun) 82
U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan,
Shultz, Whitehead) 65
Northern Mariana Islands. U.S. Relationship
With Pacific Islands (Reagan) 78
Nuclear Policy
International Prospects for Civil Nuclear
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era
(Negroponte) 75
U.S. Reconfirms Support for IAEA
(Kennedy) 86
Presidential Documents
American Hostage Released in Beirut 79
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Close Round
Six (Kampelman, Reagan) 41
U.S. Relationship With Pacific Islands 78
Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl (Kohl,
Reagan, joint statement) 54
Publications
Current Documents Volume Released 94
Department of State 94
Syria. U.S. Takes Measures Against Syria
(Wfiite House statement) 79
Terrorism
American Hostage Released in Beirut
(Reagan) 79
Libya (Pressler) 87
Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and
Challenges (Armaeost) 61
U.S. Supports Council of Europe Resolution
on Terrorism (Department statement) ... 79
U.S. Takes Measures Against Syria (Wfiite
House statement) 79
Trade
U.S. -EC Relations and the International
Trading System (Wallis) 43
U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and
Challenges (Armaeost) 61
U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets (Wallis) 42
U.S. Policy Toward the Third World
(Armaeost) 56
Treaties. Current Actions 90
U.S.S.R.
International Prospects for Civil Nuclear
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era
(Negroponte) 75
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Close Round
Six (Kampelman. Reagan) 41
Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the
Future of Deterrence (Shultz) 31
Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
Situation in Afghanistan (Okun) 84
A World Without Nuclear Weapons
(Adelman) 35
United Nations
Libya (Pressler) 87
Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad
(Okun) 87
Nicaragua (Okun) 82
Situation in Afghanistan (Okun) 84
Situation in Cambodia (Walters, text of
resolution) 80
U.S. Reconfirms Support for IAEA
(Kennedy) 86
Vietnam. Situation in Cambodia (Walters,
text of resolution) 80
Western Hemisphere. Promoting Inter-
American Cooperation (Shultz) 27
Name Index
Adelman, Kenneth L 35
Armaeost, Michael H 56, 61
Kampelman, Max M 41
Kennedy, Richard T 86
Kohl, Helmut 54
Meese, Edwin III 65
Negroponte, John D 75
Nitze, Paul H 39
Okun, Herbert S 82, 84, 87
Pressler, Larry 87
Reagan, President 41, 54, 65, 78, 79
Shultz, Secretary . . .23, 24, 27, 31, 47, 51, 65
Wallis, W. Allen 42, 43
Walters, Vernon A 80
Whitehead, John C 65
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.3-
buUetBn
e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/Volume 87/Number 2119
February 1987
Afghanist
1
%n/22 ^M
Cuba/62
Terrorism/70
Departntpnt of State
bulletin
Volumes/ / Number 21 19 / February 1987
Cover: Afghan refugees.
(British Information Services)
The Department of State Bulletin,
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foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
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GEORGE P. SHULTZ
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CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 Afghanistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupation
{Craig Karp)
Secretary
2 1 Iran and U.S. Policy
3 Interview on "Worldnet"
Southern Africa: American
Hopes for the Future
kfca
South Africa: Toward Peace and
Stability {Chester A. Crocker)
2 The Human Rights Dimension in
Africa (C/(ar/c.s \V. Freeman)
^iiada
15
Secretary Visits Canada {Joseph
Clark. Secretary Shultz)
)< )artment
17 Secretary and Marine
jU, Commandant Sign Memoran-
■- dum of Understanding
Ei ;t Asia
18
China Policy Today: Consensus,
Consistence, and Stability
{Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.)
Vitality and Possibility on the
Pacific Rim
{Ga.ston J. Sigur, Jr.)
The U.S. Approach to East Asia
and the Pacific
{Gaston J. Sigur. Jr.)
Europe
57 NATO Defense Planning Com-
mittee Meets in Brussels
{Final Connnunique)
58 29th Report on Cyprus {Message
to the Cong7-ess)
59 Secretary's Joint News Con-
ference After Meeting
With EC Ministers {James A.
Baker III. Willy De Clercq.
Jacques Delors, Secretary
Shultz, Clayton Yeutte?')
Human Rights
62 Human Rights in Castro's Cuba
67 Human Rights Progi'ess in 1986
{Richard Schifter)
Oceans
69
Navigation Rights and the Gulf
of Sidra
Terrorism
70
73
Terrorism: The Challenge and
the Response
{John C. Whitehead)
Syrian Support for International
Terrorism: 1983-86 {Fart
Paper. Chronology)
United Nations
77 UN Administration and
Finances (yer7i0Wi4. Walters)
Western Hemisphere
78 Visit of Haiti President Namphy
tH7(/7(' House Statement)
78 Expanding Freedom: A For-
mula for Growth in the
Americas {Elliott Ahrams.
PaulD. Taylor)
84 Guatemala's Transition Toward
Democracy
Treaties
86
Current Actions
Press Releases
89 Department of State
Publications
89 Department of State
90 Exjjanded Chiefs of Mission
Volume Released
90 Background Notes
Index
."•i OiTi
'"T^E^Bsmms
^'^ITGfiY
National capital
a Gasdeld
^ Airlield
y//// Refugee areas
50 100
150 200 Kilometers
50
100 150 200 Miles
FEATURE
Afghanistan
Afghanistan:
Seven Years
of Soviet Occupation
'ollowing report was prepared by
qKarp, Afghanistan analyst, with
■ssistance of other analysts in the
au of Intelligence and Research and
■rtment officials. It is part of an
lal series of Special Reports on the
Uion in Afghanistan.
Summary
The war in Afghanistan remains a stand-
off, but miHtary activity has increased on
both sides. Combat was more diffuse and
unpredictable. During the past year, the
mujahidin brought the war increasingly
to Afghanistan's major cities, particu-
larly the capital, Kabul, and north of the
Hindu Kush mountain range.
Afghan resistance activities were
widespread, with operations in nearly all
parts of the country. The mujahidin con-
tinue to improve their arms and training
and to develop more effective forms of
cooperation and coordination. They
demonstrated an improved capability to
blunt Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) and Soviet opera-
tions, and they made major advances in
air defense with the increasing use of
surface-to-air missiles. Resistance
alliance spokesmen brought their cause
to several countries, including the
United States, and to Islamic and inter-
national organizations.
Soviet military forces focused more
on small-unit operations and air attacks
and no longer relied on massive valley
sweep operations. Efforts to strengthen
their allies in the DRA came to nought;
the regime's forces remain largely
crippled by low morale, desertion, and
intraparty factionalism. Instead of risk-
ing the lives of Soviet troops, the Soviet
40th Army used more firepower, from
both artillery and aircraft, sometimes
with devastating effect.
Politically, the Soviets have adopted
a public posture designed to suggest
greater flexibility than heretofore, focus-
ing on their willingness to withdraw but
insisting on too long a timeframe. In
July 1986, at Vladivostok, Soviet leader
Gorbachev promised to withdraw six
regiments from Afghanistan in order to
provide a "stimulus" for a political set-
tlement. In fact, two of the six
regiments (and part of a third) that were
withdrawn in October had arrived in
Afghanistan after the Vladivostok
speech. The newly introduced units were
the only relevant combat units in the
withdrawal plan. To avoid even a minor
degradation of their military position,
the Soviets apparently brought in these
units solely for the purpose of withdraw-
ing them.
In Kabul, Babrak Karmal was
replaced as Soviet-backed ruler of
Afghanistan by the former head of the
.secret police, Najibullah. The switch in
party leadership, in May, was the most
important change in the Kabul regime
since 1979.
In November, Karmal lost his last
senior post as ceremonial head of state.
He was replaced by a nonparty member
as part of the regime's campaign to sug-
gest a broadened base. Karmal's ouster
and purges of his followers led to com-
plicated factional differences within the
ruling People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA).
The Soviet occupation has
devastated the countryside. Although
refugee outflow is reduced, the new
refugees appear to have suffered more
than those who left earlier. The Soviets
have stepped up reprisal attacks on
civilians. The Kabul regime has con-
sistently violated the human rights of
Afghan citizens through indiscriminate
imprisonment, torture, and other abuses.
The Kabul regime and the Soviets have
been condemned for these abuses by
independent international organizations
and the UN Human Rights Commission.
Pakistan remains stalwart in its sup-
port of the Afghan people, despite a
stepped-up Soviet/DRA campaign of
sabotage and subversion in the border
areas. Air violations of Pakistani ter-
ritory tripled; artillery shellings
increased approximately fivefold.
Pakistan has worked for a solution to the
crisis through UN-sponsored talks at
Geneva. There were indications of
bruary 1987
An Afghan guerrilla stands guard on a Soviet helicopter shot down in the Panjsher Valley.
increased support for the Afghan people
from Iran.
In November, the United Nations
voted 122 to 20, with 11 abstentions, to
condemn, for the eighth time since 1979,
the presence of foreign forces in
Afghanistan and demand the return of
that country to an independent and
nonaligned status. Absent a settlement,
the United States remains committed to
the Afghan cause.
Outlook: Given current trends, the
stalemate is likely to continue, and
violence will escalate. The Soviets will
remain unable to consolidate their
political or military position and will find
it increasingly threatened. But they will
continue to project an international
image of flexibility, while looking to
invest their client regime with as much
political legitimacy as possible. The
inujahidin resistance will remain stead-
fast, however: they are prepared to fight
on for a decade and more.
Military Activity
The level of fighting fluctuated widelj
1986, not always in accord with norms'
seasonal patterns. Combat remained a
higher than usual levels throughout th
winter. In April it was twice that of la
year. The pace then slowed, without tl
massive late spring Soviet combat ope ■
tions of previous years. Traditionally
heavy inujahidin activity in the summc
also was delayed this year. This lag we
due in part to a late thaw in tjie crucia
I
Department of State Bulle.i
FEATURE
Afghanistan
ntain passes and Soviet/DRA pres-
on supply caravans. Fighting soared
istoric seasonal levels as 1986 drew
close.
Despite increased emphasis on
iipting resistance lines of com-
lication, Soviet and regime forces
e able to capture only a fraction of
stance supplies. The amount lost to
rdiction grew, complicating move-
it and contributing to a rise in
sport costs. However, there has
n an increase in the overall volume of
.pons and equipment available to the
Iters. Soviet and regime attacks on
voys have concentrated on the pack
nals used to transport supplies across
passes of eastern Afghanistan.
Resistance ability to ambush
liet/DRA convoys also increased
ig with the acquisition of more heavy
.pons and improved demolition capa-
iies. Throughout the country, the
mhidin knocked out bridges, shut
vn stretches of road, and caused long
Brsions. The road system, the Soviet
stical lifeline, has been severely
tared.
•5 War of the Cities
spite significant Soviet/DRA efforts
mprove control, the mujahidin in
i6 brought the war to Afghanistan's
jor cities. In the smaller provincial
litals, the regime continues to main-
a daytime control but has little sway
'r the surrounding areas. In Kabul,
' illusion of increasing urban security
tered over the past few years has
;n shattered.
Herat. Combat in and around Herat
' .s intense all year. Initiative and con-
il passed from one side to the other,
■rat mujahidin continue to operate
. ntly under the command of Ismail
lan and Allahuddin Khan of the
iniiit-i-Islami party. In house-to-house
;hting, they have occasionally been on
e brink of overwhelming regime forces
id taking complete control of the town.
Each time, the Soviets and their
fghan allies struck back with massive
rce, including artillery and air attacks,
estruction may have been worse in
erat than in any other city; Soviet
-imbardments have seriously damaged
i;nturies-old, internationally renowned
monuments. In February, Herat's large
Shia district was le^■eled in retaliation
for a resistance attack. DRA forces
refused to enter the district, while the
mujahidin fought on in the rubble.
During the summer, the mujahidin
reportedly controlled some 90% of the
old city and 50% of the new. Soviet and
DRA forces launched several operations,
including one with nearly 10,000 men, to
reoccupy the city. In October, foreign
journalists attending "withdrawal"
ceremonies at nearby Shindand had to
be brought into and out of Herat by
hours at midday; the city closes down
completely by midafternoon.
The Soviets enjoyed some short-term
success in the Qandahar region. The
Spet.-inaz regularly ambushed caravans
and attacked local resistance bases. In
the early spring, a huge Soviet force was
dispatched to Qandahar from Kabul.
Although able to reassert control in
town only briefly before returning north,
it did establish a network of outposts
and minefields similar to those around
Kabul. Manned chiefly by Afghans, the
security belt has complicated but not
After 7 years of brutal occupation, the
Soviet Union has failed to consolidate its
rule over Afghanistan. In 1986, the Soviets
were forced to revise drastically their
military tactics and replace the ruler they
installed in 1979. The resistance grew
stronger and retained overwhelming sup-
port in Afghanistan, among Afghan
refugees, and in international forums.
armored personnel carrier. The Soviets
informed them it was unsafe to spend
the night.
Detailed information on the rest of
western Afghanistan is sketchy, but
combat activity was reported in every
province. Coordination may have in-
creased after the designation of Ismail
Khan as regional Jnmiat commander for
several western provinces.
Qandahar. In Qandahar, too,
fighting raged throughout the year and.
at times, control of the city and sur-
rounding areas was in dispute. Qan-
dahar' s bazaars are open only a few
prevented movement in and out of the
city. The outposts have provided enticing
targets for the mujahidin.
The regime made some political
advances with local tribes and villages.
Ruling party officials, including politburo
member Nur Ahmed Nur, offered money
and weapons to tribal chieftains for their
cooperation. By exploiting local rivalries,
Kabul may have gained temporary
support.
Asmatullah Achekzai, the resistance
commander who defected to the regime
last year, has become something of a
local warlord. He lives under regime pro-
tection behind the governor's house in
ebruary 1987
Qandahar. Asmatullah's tribal militia,
operating south to Spin Buldak, attacked
tribal rivals in the resistance, mujahidin
supply lines, and occasionally even
regime targets.
Combat escalated in late summer
and early fall. In late August, the
mujahidin forced abandonment of the
central police station. On September 1,
the main telephone exchange was
attacked and communications cut. Later
that week, the radio station was
damaged by a rocket, and the Central
Bank was hit. Soviet/DRA control was
limited to the airport and a single gar-
rison in the city. The highway linking the
two points, usually in regime hands,
reportedly passed under mujahidin con-
trol. The Soviets counterattacked, but
the mujahidin lay low, fearing reprisals.
Still, casualties evidently were heavy,
particularly among farmers, perhaps
because the latter were reluctant to
hand over recently harvested grain to
the regime.
The persistent resistance challenge
to the capital of southern Afghanistan
stems from a high degree of cooperation,
proximity to supplies, and strong local
support. The local resistance council
includes the seven Peshawar-based
organizations (most have active fronts in
the area), parties not included in the
alliance (e.g.. the Harakaf-Inlami of
Ayatollah Mohseni), and independent
groups. The council has assumed new
functions, both political and military, and
has not been hampered by internal
squabbles. There are several important
local commanders, like Mullah Malang or
Haji Latif of the National Islamic Front
{Mnhaz-e-Milli party), but no individual
is dominant.
Kabul and Surrounding Areas.
Stability and security in the Afghan
capital are a key Soviet goal. The
Soviets strengthened the security
perimeter around the city this year and
attempted to extend it to counter the
growing long-range weapons capabilities
of the mujahidin. The Soviets continued
to fire indiscriminately on nearby areas
suspected of harboring the mujahidin.
Even deserted villages north of the city
were harassed nightly.
Soviet troops behave like an occupy-
ing force. Many Kabul shopowners
grumble privately about frequent shop-
lifting by Soviet civilians and troops.
Drunken Soviet soldiers regularly broke
into homes and threatened the
inhabitants. The Soviets appear to treat
their Afghan allies with equal disdain.
Although there was some mujahidin
activity all year, resistance pressure
peaked later than in previous years. At
times, particularly in midwinter, there
has been a deceptive appearance of nor-
malcy in the capital. The bazaars are
filled with many items, including
videotapes, not commonly available in
the U.S.S.R. Visitors note a surprising
number of Mercedes and new Toyotas.
But Kabul residents were reminded of
the proximity of war by the constant
drone of aircraft. Both planes and
helicopters eject an increasing number of
flares (as many as 50-60 on takeoff or
landing) to protect against heat-seeking
missiles.
During the first half of the year, the
resistance made its impact felt primarily
through rocket attacks (especially on
such occasions as the sixth anniversary
of the Soviet invasion). In late Januai
the mujahidin fired 122mm rockets
the Soviet Embassy; on January 31,
122mm damaged the U.S. Embassy
compound.
By midsummer, the war intensifii
for the regime and the Soviets in Kat
Repeated rocket barrages and period)
firefights followed mujahidin penetr;
tion of the heavily fortified security b
As in past years, the Soviet Embassy,
and Soviet and Afghan military insta)
tions were rocketed. In July, a rocket
heavily damaged the Polish Embassy.
The resistance periodically rocket
the DRA's 8th Division supply base at
Qarghah, on the outskirts of Kabul. C
the night of August 26-27, a direct hi
set off a 2-hour series of explosions tl
shook the city. A giant fireball at mid
night (possibly rockets or missiles sto
at the site) produced a cloud more tha
1,000 feet high. The explosions, visiW
all over the capital, were compared tc
erupting volcano. Despite regime clai;
of "no human losses," as many as 10(
were reported killed and perhaps sev<
thousand injured. The Soviets responi
quickly by firing on the launch area
Commander Mahsud teaches military tactics.
Department of State Bulll
FEATURE
Afghanistan
Sfhan guerrilla
his RPG-7
nk grenade
iner readv.
iation came later), but were unable
:h the attackers. Despite inten-
security, within 3 days the mu-
in resumed rocketing of the capital.
iUgh the Soviets can replace the
|royed supplies, the loss of one of the
':'s largest depots was a blow to the
ne's prestige.
n late September, the fragility of
d's security was brought home to
ir Soviet leadership. First Deputy
rman of the U.S.S.R. Council of
sters Murakhovskiy was buffeted by
plosion at the Soviet Embassy,
aps a car bomb, just before a
liiiled meeting with Najibullah. The
f.-t-ranking civilian Soviet to visit
il in recent years, Murakhovskiy
rlfdly is close to General Secretary
>achev, whom he replaced as
il Topol party chief.
The outskirts of Kabul were again
■> i-ne of heavy fighting over the past
. Soviet and regime forces were
ed to return continually to areas pro-
Hcd safe and free of mujahidin.
I 'nmmanders, like Abdul Haq of
1 1hi'-Islami (Khalis) party, have
■'• ked to increase coordination and
3 5sure on the regime.
The Lowgar Valley, 40 miles south
of Kabul, has been emptied of much of
its population due to the severity of the
fighting. The Kabul-Gardez road, which
runs through the province, is often cut.
In August, there was heavy fighting
between a Soviet/DRA force and Hezh-e-
hla m i fighters under Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. Gulbuddin 's men apparently
shot down several helicopters, a clear
indication of a more potent resistance air
defense. In nearby Sarowbi, a Hezb-e-
hlfimi (Khalis) group bombed hydroelec-
tric installations, disrupting the capital's
power supply.
Foreigners can still picnic on
weekends or play the world's most
embattled golf course on the road to
Paghman, in the mountains just outside
of Kabul. Visitors have at times
remarked on the apparent calm; yet
beginning in the spring, regime and
Soviet military forces struck Paghman
nearly every month. Many villages have
been leveled by air strikes and artillery.
For much of the summer, shelling was
audible and visible as far away as Kabul.
The largest Soviet/DRA operation in
Paghman took place in September,
targeted against the mujahidin who
rocketed the Qarghah ammo dump. It
marked the beginning of a significant
combat role for DRA Interior Ministry
troops (Sarandoy), whom Interior
Minister and Khalq chief Gulabzoi
reportedly led personally into battle.
f^urther north, the Shomali suffered
from a recurring cycle of resistance and
reprisal. Early in the year, numbers of
children injured in a Soviet/DRA bom-
bardment of Estalif were brought to the
Kabul children's hospital. In early
October, another brutal Soviet/DRA
campaign devastated civilian areas and
destroyed livestock and crops. This time
the regime attempted to stop refugees
from fleeing to Kabul.
Mujahidin interdicted traffic along
the Salang highway from the U.S.S.R.
throughout the year. Even the major
Soviet air base at Bagram, 50 kilometers
north of Kabul, came under fire several
times. In July, a large ammunition store
at Bagram blew up.
Iruary 1987
Panjsher and North Afghanistan
Commander Ahmed Shah Mahsud of the
Ja-ndat-i-hhimi still leads the sole
resistance organization in the Panjsher
Valley. Although the Panjsher organiza-
tion was active outside the valley, no
major battles occurred within the Panj-
sher itself. Most mujahidin remaining in
the valley are camped in its upper
reaches, from which they periodically
attacked regime outposts and convoys.
In the winter, the Soviets attempted to
e.xpand their area of control but were
turned back. They occasionally launched
heliborne assaults on -mujahidin posi-
tions, with little success.
Panjsher is divided into 22 base
areas (karargaK). Each base is responsi-
ble for political and civil as well as
military affairs in its area. Only a few
F'anjsheris have fled to Pakistan. In the
Soviet/regime-occupied lower valley, the
population is comprised mostly of
women, children, and the elderly.
Mahsud Moves North. In one of the
most significant developments of the
conflict, mujahidin cooperation
expanded out of the Panjsher Valley to
the north of the Hindu Kush. For
perhaps the first time since the Soviet
invasion, a resistance organization
played a major role in a large-scale
assault outside its home base area.
Mahsud has begun to build institutions
whose reach extends not only beyond his
valley but also across geographical bar-
riers and even party lines.
These organizational efforts began
during the year-long cease-fire preceding
1984's massive seventh Soviet offensive
in the Panjsher. While focusing his
efforts on fellow members of the Jaw iat-
i-Islami party— mostly ethnic Tajiks—
Mahsud also aimed at winning coopera-
tion from other parties and ethnic
groups. Mahsud initially offered to assist
local commanders to consolidate their
own base areas. He also provided staff
training— stressing the benefits of
cooperation— to mid-level commanders,
some from other parties or distant
fighting groups.
In early 1985, the Council of the
North was established, involving com-
manders from Baghlan, Konduz. Takhar,
and parts of Badakhshan. They were
encouraged to form local councils and
work on civil as well as military affairs.
•■.flpi 13-flfi STATE IIMR/GE)
Kilometers
Council members agreed to provide
volunteers for central units-
professionalized forces proposed by
Mahsud to be the core of a mobile
regional guerrilla force.
These efforts began to bear fruit in
1986. In March a multiparty force
blunted a Soviet drive along the Konduz-
Faizabad highway. In mid-June, taking
advantage of Ramadan, the Soviets
undertook a large operation to counter
the growing local threat and to supply
garrisons. They attacked ynujahidin
bases around Khanabad and Eshkamesh.
Soviet/regime forces reportedly killed
and wounded hundreds of civilians,
burned local crops, and damaged irriga-
tion canals in Takhar. Soviet artillery
units later moved to target the pro-
liferating mujahidin bases in the area.
Both operations were strongly opposed
by local mujahidin and men from
Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, and mobile
groups from the Panjsher. The Soviei
were unable to disrupt evolving
resistance plans.
Capture of Farkhar. On August
the joint resistance forces went on tl
offensive. A multipronged assault on
DRA garrison of Farkhar was carefi
planned; the Jamiat commander froi
Takhar, Abdul Wadud, assisted by a
commander from Panjsher, led the
attack. By early next morning, half t
garrison was captured, the remainde
the DRA forces were overwhelmed t
following day. There were more than
100 DRA casualties at Farkhar. Mon
than 200 were captured, along with
nearly 100 tons of supplies and ord-
nance. Resistance casualties were
relatively light but included an impor
local commander. The fall of Farkhai
a well-planned assault involving train
forces from six districts in four prov-
inces, was a major strategic advance
the resistance.
Department of State Bultir
(7
FEATURE
Afghanistan
»2 12-86 STATE (INR/GE)
[n November, with Soviet forces
ve in the Panjsher, the northern
dnization again went on the offen-
capturing a number of outposts. In
November, they overran the DRA
'rict headquarters at Nahrin and an
icimpanying garrison. The mujahidin
^ ured enough supplies to further the
It to create a regional threat oppos-
aihe main Soviet lifeline into
i hanistan.
North Central and Northwestern
A hanistan. Further west, in the
' hern flatlands bordering the Soviet
"ii, Soviet/regime control remained
tri- than in tne rest of the country.
' I'theless, resistance forces harassed
ri'i^ime throughout the north. The
oleum pipelines from the U.S.S.R.
ain a favorite target. In the fall,
'in escalated in Andkhvoy and
iniana, near the Soviet border.
Central Afghanistan
A coalition of pro-Iranian Shia groups,
including Nasr and Sepah-e Pasdaran,
now controls the Hazarajat. It remains
the major recipient of the limited Iranian
support in Afghanistan. Given the
absence of regime or Soviet presence
and its relative impenetrability, the
Hazarajat is of strategic importance as a
refuge for the resistance. The Hazara
Shia obtain a significant part of their
arms from other resistance groups, in
return for protection of supply routes. In
1986, pro-Iranian groups were reported
active for the first time against the
minimal regime presence in the moun-
tains and outside the Hazarajat, in the
north. West of the Hazara heartland, in
Ghor, there was an upswing in
resistance activity.
Eastern Afghanistan
The eastern provinces, particularly near
the Pakistani border and the major
roads, remain a primary theater of com-
bat. Soviet efforts to interdict resistance
supply are focused there. A 50-mile strip
along the frontier continues to suffer
devastation and depopulation. The
regime expanded its border forces and
established more posts; more posts were
attacked and taken by the mujahidin.
The Konar Valley, scene of a major
Soviet push last year, was relatively
quiet, although Barikowt and at times all
Soviet/DRA posts in the valley were
under siege. Combat centered on key
provinces, Nangarhar and Paktia.
Nangarhar Province juts down the
Kabul river valley toward Pakistan
before ending at the foot of the Khyber
Pass. It carries the major road link
between the two countries, and con-
siderable commercial traffic moves in
both directions.
The provincial capital, Jalalabad,
remains securely in regime hands but
occasionally was hit by rockets. In 1986,
there were more small arms firefights in
the city, nighttime fighting, and out-
going Soviet/regime artillery fire. In the
fall, mujahidin employed surface-to-air
missiles to knock down regime aircraft
landing at Jalalabad airport, and air
operations were suspended.
Early in the year, the strategic
Nazian Valley, which leads to the
Khyber Pass, was the scene of a major
effort to prove that regime forces could
operate effectively on their own. After
initial setbacks, DRA units secured con-
trol of the valley and established a
number of posts near the foot of the
Khyber. After the withdrawal of the
main Afghan force, however, the mu-
jahidin attacked troops left behind and
forced most of them out. The regime
could not reestablish control and by late
November had to mount another offen-
sive in the area.
Paktia Province. Both sides were
active throughout the year in Paktia,
which sits astride important resistance
supply routes. The regime can move only
with difficulty, if at all, on most of the
provincial roads. Ali Khayl (Jaji) was
harassed for much of the year, par-
ticularly by the Ittihadia party of
Sayyaf. The main DRA garrison in east
Paktia, at Khowst, must still be supplied
by air.
loruary 1987
In early April, as fighting escalated,
Afghan forces launched a combined
ground and heiiborne assault on a major
resistance base, Zhawar Fort, about 10
kilometers from the Pakistan border.
The base was an especially inviting
target because it had been described in
Western press stories, complete with
detailed descriptions and photos, as an
impregnable redoubt.
Hezh-e-hlami (Khalis) Commander
Jalaluddin Haqqani suffered severe
napalm burns in an initial airstrike but
stayed on to lead his men. Instead of
retreating, the mujahidin defended
Zhawar. Government troops, numbering
at least 1,000, moved steadily forward,
suffering heavy casualties, including
several aircraft. One of the regime's best
commando units was decimated during a
parachute landing.
Resistance forces from Paktia and
elsewhere moved to help but were slowed
down by artillery barrages. Violations of
Pakistani airspace associated with the
Zhawar battle were unprecedented. Two
weeks after the fighting began, the
mujahidin withdrew, and regime forces
entered the camp. Many mujahidin
casualties were suffered in the evacua-
tion, when they had no protection from
airstrikes. After carting away or
destroying considerable supplies, the
Afghan Army pulled out. Within a week
the mujahidin were back. This costly but
temporary setback may have discour-
aged further use of large supply bases,
which, like Zhawar, will always be
vulnerable to Soviet firepower.
The Afghan Resistance
Seven major resistance parties head-
quartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, are
joined in an alliance and have promoted
the international political dimension of
the resistance. Smaller groupings of
various ethnic, tribal, religious, and
political affiliations, including leftists,
also exist. A Kabul regime amnesty
announced on the anniversary of the
coup specifically exempted "Maoists."
Parties representing the Shia minority
tend to based in Quetta, Pakistan, and in
Iran. Most, but not all, of the hundreds
of separate fighting groups are linked to
one or more of the major parties.
The alliance in Peshawar has now
been in existence for 18 months. The
spokesmanship has successfully rotated,
more or less on a 3-month schedule,
through six of the party leaders: Yunus
Khalis (Hezb-e-hlwmi Khalis faction);
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e-Islami);
Burhanuddin Rabbani {Jam.iat-i-Islami);
Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Jehh-e Najat-i
Milli); Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani
(Mahaz-e-Milliy, and Nabi Mohammedi
(Harakat-e-Inqelab). The seventh, Abdul
Rasool Sayyaf (Itiihadia-Islami), is due
to serve as representative in early 1987.
The alliance is governed by a council
of party leaders. Alliance committees
have begun to work on education and
social services and coordinate outside
humanitarian assistance. The seven par-
ties continued to differ on current tactics
and Afghanistan's future.
Military Developments. The
resistance is increasingly better armed,
trained, and organized, although short-
comings continue, and there are notable
differences in military capabilities
among the various resistance groups.
Mujahidin air defense capabilities
improved considerably in 1986. The
Dashaka (Soviet DShK 12.7mm heavy
machinegun) remains the mainstay of
resistance air defense. In 1986, the
resistance used heavier air defense guns.
The mujahidin also made greater use of
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) of various
types. More sophisticated weapons were
effective against the full range of air-
craft employed by the Soviets and the
DRA. Helicopter downings reportedly
increased, although it is difficult to
estimate exact losses.
Mujahidin supplies have grown con-
siderably over the past few years and
include a variety of heavy weapons,
including surface-to-surface rockets.
Although the rapid development of the
logistic net is one of the truly
remarkable accomplishments of the
resistance, the increase in supplies has
created problems relating to movement
and storage. Nevertheless, the improved
supply situation has contributed to
greater cooperation and coordination. A
loosening of supply constraints has
removed a major cause of squabbling—
arms. Some groups now devote
resources to improving and protecting
supply routes in their territory that
used by other groups further inside ij»
country. | ^
Cooperation also has been stimu!lei
by local residents tired of intra-
resistance squabbles. Groups have
loaned their heavy weapons to other: (I
On several occasions when a group c riel
under heavy attack, calls went out fc .
support or diversionary actions. Othi
groups responded, sometimes from f ■
away and across party lines. During
spring fighting on the eastern bordei >
many commanders helped each othet
Mahsud sent men and materiel from e
Panjsher. Rabbani's call for action tf
divert Soviet attention from Herat w
answered by an increase in activity i n-
trywide. This is a far cry from the
spontaneous and widespread, but
uncoordinated and often fractious,
opposition to the 1978 Marxist coup.
Regional institutions for coordim
tion are evolving, sometimes involvir^
single party as in the Council of the
North (planned to include parties oth
than the Jamiat); sometimes several
ties, as in Herat; sometimes all the
groups, such as the Qandahar Counc:
reportedly chaired by a respected fig|
without ties to any party. Although s'
in a preliminary stage, the building o
transprovincial (and potentially,
multiparty) organizations is
unprecedented.
As a result of these development)
morale is high, and mujahidin and
civilians alike reveal little war wearir
Most people view the conflict as an
acceptable burden that has become pi»
of their lives. Most areas subject to
retaliatory attacks are already vacate
The civilian population still overwheh
ingly supports the resistance. There i
little support for political accommoda
with the regime, whether inside the
country or among the vast majority ii
the refugee camps, most of whom ha\
relatives in the resistance. There is nc
shortage of young recruits.
International Achievements. Th(
alliance has made major strides in
presenting the Afghan case to the wo
In January, spokesman Sayed Ahmed
Gailani traveled to Fez, Morocco, for i
16th foreign ministers session of the
Islamic Conference Organization. In
June, a delegation led by spokesman
I
FEATURE
Afghanistan
lanuddin Rabbani came to the
ed States. They were received by
ident Reagan and other U.S.
ials and Members of Congress.
Dn its return trip, the delegation
ed France and met with Prime
ster Chirac and Foreign Minister
lond. The visit resulted in the
17 announcement by the French
srnment that for the first time
ice would grant public humanitarian
stance to the Afghan people. King
i of Saudi Arabia subsequently
lived alliance spokesman Rabbani.
(n November, spokesman Moham-
', Nabi Mohammedi led a delegation
lie United Nations during the
Bral Assembly's consideration of the
nanistan resolution (see "Refugees"),
followed an initial visit to the
ted Nations in 1985 by an alliance
gation led by spokesman Hekmatyar.
(•oute to a UN press conference with
UN Correspondents Association,
gation members were accosted and
E ulted by some staff of the DRA Per-
Ti ent Mission to the United Nations,
alliance's hosts at the United
''lis, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
lally protested this misconduct. The
u ltd States later urged the United
N ions to take effective measures to
ent any repetition.
T DRA Military
A ;r decades of Soviet training, 8 years
"' umbat, and 7 years of Soviet
\ ice" and direction, Afghan armed
ii es remain incapable of defending the
rf ime. The DRA apparently was under
h' vy pressure to improve its military
labilities this year. Its inability to
It ie significant gains was a major fac-
te in the Soviet decision to replace
B )rak Karmal, but its performance has
n improved under Najibullah.
At present there are about 30,000 in
tl army, and perhaps 10,000 in the air
fi:e. The regime employs an equal
nnber of paramilitary border guards,
pice troops, secret police, and various
r. itias, but total strength is insufficient
t ?urb the resistance.
With the support of Soviet advisers
'<■ i firepower, and the benefit of
iielligence provided by local tribesmen
(villagers, a few specialized DRA units
i .e at times been able to hold their
own. Early in the year, some elements
fought fairly well in Nangarhar and
Paktia. But these gains proved
transitory.
Morale problems and factional
infighting remain serious. Government
forces (often at the highest levels) are
filled with resistance sympathizers, who
provide valuable intelligence and some
arms to the mujahidin. Truces between
garrisons and local mujahidin are not
unusual.
Conscription and Desertion. The
familiar DRA press gangs were inten-
sified and exemptions tightened in order
to meet the goal of an expanded
military. In March, Kabul school
teachers lost their exemptions and were
told to report. Students living abroad
were drafted as soon as they returned to
Afghanistan: others were required to
show proof of service before going
abroad to study or gaining admission to
the university. One reported dragnet
picked up graduating high school
students before they could flee the coun-
try. A May "amnesty" decree for army
deserters and others who had evaded
Commander Jalaluddin Haqqani on a captured Soviet tank.
service apparently has yielded few
results.
When Najibullah came into power,
he intensified the conscription campaign,
extended it to party members, and
lashed out at those who avoid military
service by "hiding under the wings of
influential relatives." The drive has
probably alienated many of the regime's
supporters.
Enhanced conscription has only
resulted in increased desertion. Indeed,
desertion rates may have worsened over
the past year. Eight years into the war,
whole units still decamp enmasse from
time to time. High-level officers (many
with a record of cooperating with the
miijahidin) continue to desert. In the
summer, the deputy commander of
Paktia Province, Colonel Hashmatullah,
defected, then immediately after a press
conference in Pakistan returned to fight
against the regime. In October an
Afghan pilot flew his MiG-21 to
Pakistan.
Paramilitary Forces. Regime
efforts to mobilize additional support
from the paramilitary forces have made
some progress. These locally recruited,
lightly armed troops, who man many
border posts, although disinclined to bat-
tle the mujahidin. may provide the
regime or the Soviets with useful
intelligence.
Militia. The regime also has had
some success in expanding militias. Most
worker, party, female, or other urban
militias have had little effect. Tribal
militias operate under the Ministry of
Tribes and Nationalities. This year some
have been more willing to fight local
mujahidin, often their clan or tribal
rivals. The militias were increasingly
integrated into joint operations with
Soviet and regular army troops but prob-
ably have little utility outside home
areas.
The tribes are fickle, and often
remain on the regime payroll only for
the winter months. In December 1985,
the regime recruited 400 Hazaras near
Ghazni and stationed them with an army
brigade. The Hazaras joined the
mujahidin and attacked the brigade,
bringing along many deserters. The
regime had to bring two other brigades
in to restore order. Later in the winter,
a group of young Afridis were trained as
militia in the Nazian Valley, near the
10
Pakistan border. They turned on their
advisers the first time they were used in
combat and caught them in a crossfire
with the mujahidin. The Afridis then
escaped over the border.
Police. Many of the DRA's fewer
than 20,000 police have been turned into
a light infantry force, the Sarandoy.
They were increasingly active in the
closing months of 1986, especially in
joint operations with the Soviets. Under
the control of Khalq faction chief and
Interior Minister Sayed Mohammed
Gulabzoi, the Sarandoy is an independ-
ent Khalq force, led by Khalq ex-army
officers and subject to the same pattern
of conscription and desertion as the
army. There were continued reports of
Sarandoy fighting against forces loyal to
the ruling Parcham faction.
The Secret Police (KHAD, WAD).
In January, KHAD (the Dari acronym
for State Information Services) was pro-
moted to the Ministry for State Security
(Dari acronym: WAD), but it is still
generally known by its former title. Like
the Soviet KGB, the ministry also has its
own combat units.
The change of name and status of
the secret police has not changed its
methods or reputation as a brutal
organization. Human rights groups
amply document its use of torture. The
ministry has a major hand in the subver-
sion campaign against Pakistan. Yet
even the secret police have factional i f
problems; pro-Babrak employees are
an excellent position to cause trouble r
Najibullah and the Soviets.
The Soviets in Afghanistar
The Soviet Union evidently believes t,t
in the long run its objectives in
Afghanistan can be ensured by milita
means, augmented— but not replaced
by political tactics. Soviet military op i-
tions are designed to destroy the
mujahidin and to gain time and accej
ability for the "revolutionary" regims
Kabul.
Reporting to the Soviet Party Co
gress in February 1986, Gorbachev
described Afghanistan in terms of Sc
border security. Soviet policy is
calculated to win domestic and intern'
tional credibility for the Kabul regime
and to curtail the support the mujahii
have received from Pakistan and othel
countries. Moscow became more
involved than ever before in
manipulating Afghan domestic politic:
but achieved little success.
E
n
Military Developments. In 1986,
Soviets continued to adjust their
numbers, weapons, and tactics to
counter the greater capabilities of the
mujahidin and compensate for the
DRA's limited military effectiveness.
Only a few thousand underutilized tro
^
X-*-
Afghan Army deserters who have joined the resistance.
Department of State Bulle
FEATURE
Afghanistan
iluring a much-publicized
thdrawal," not as many as Gor-
lev promised or as claimed by the
lets (see p. 12).
Soviet combat forces are roughly the
in number as last year. According
le most recent estimates, there are
It 118,000 Soviet troops in the coun-
supported by some 30,000 additional
■ps in the Soviet Union.
In 1986, the Soviets drastically
•£ sed their military tactics in
■innistan. In the past, large valley
kji operations using tanks and
iired personnel carriers and up to
i( )00 troops were the centerpiece of
tj- Soviet effort. Now Soviet operations
ai smaller scale, more focused, and
ol n employ heliborne assaults. Some
let units were more active and
ressive, concentrating on the border
IS, resistance supply lines and, when
could be found, stockpiles and
s. Most Soviet troops, however,
.1 ain in static defensive/security
d loyments. The overall counterin-
31 jency capabilities of the average
S let conscript remain unimpressive.
Soviet tactics seem aimed at
rr imizing of casualties. The Soviets
a d more firepower, from artillery and
tl air, sometimes on short notice, often
w 1 devastating effect.
There were at least 3,000 casualties
t lugh the fall of 1986, bringing the
t il number of Soviet losses in
/ jhanistan since 1979 to at least
3 DOO-35,000, more than one-third of
V Dm were killed. Some Soviet sources
irate that casualties could be con-
■ ei-ably higher, perhaps as many as
- 1)1 10 killed over the course of the war,
i this cannot be confirmed. In addi-
t :i, the Soviets and Afghans together
1 /e lost nearly 1,000 aircraft to the
> jahidin since 1979, mostly helicop-
t s. Aircraft losses increased in the lat-
t part of the year.
Moscow has increased the use of its
i ecial Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz). Their
imbers have grown over the past few
'irs to roughly 4,500-5,000. These
• tter trained and more experienced
"ips deploy in smaller formations than
ler units, are often active at night,
li are used to ambush resistance con-
ys. Even the Spetsnaz have, at times,
en defeated, however, and they appear
experience the same morale,
*i^^--
Soviet heavy machineguns remain the principal air defense weapon of the resistance.
discipline, and other problems as regular
Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan.
Some mujahidin groups use counter-
ambush tactics against the Spetsnaz.
In 1986, the Soviets invested further
in military facilities in the country. They
upgraded military and dual-use
infrastructure, including road links from
Soviet Turkestan. They continued to
refine their order of battle and send in
more appropriate equipment. Recent
additions include rockets, a variety of
artillery weapons, and the SU-25 ground
attack "fighter. Existing equipment has
been upgraded. Most wheeled armored
personnel carriers were replaced with
newer models or tracked vehicles. Self-
propelled artillery has been substituted
for towed artillery in many units.
Soviet forces continue to suffer from
low morale problems. Disease, partic-
ularly dysentery and hepatitis, may keep
as many troops out of action as combat
injuries. Theft and sale of military stores
(including fuel, weapons, medicine, and
auto parts) are common. The black
market is so developed that orders can
be placed for specific items. Soviet
soldiers often use the proceeds to pay for
liquor and dmgs.
Soviet Defectors and Prisoners. In
the early years of the conflict, few
prisoners were taken by either side.
There is no evidence of major detention
centers for resistance fighters, but
important captives are probably held in
regime prisons. The resistance is
believed to hold some Soviet prisoners in
secure base areas inside Afghanistan,
but few prisoners survive long. In
Paghman, a group of Soviets captured
by the mujahidin have reportedly been
offered in return for mujahidin
prisoners. The son of a Soviet Com-
munist Party dignitary reportedly was
exchanged for captive mujahidin in
1986.
Several Soviets have defected to the
resistance; some convert to Islam and
even fight alongside the mujahidiii. In
November, five Soviet soldiers serving
with the mujahidin for a number of
years were granted asylum in Canada.
Soviet Political Moves. Gorbachev
inherited the various military and
political efforts to resolve the Afghan
problem. There is no indication that he
disagrees with previous policy or tactics,
but he has tried to develop an image of
flexibility. The UN-sponsored Geneva
talks constitute the main focus of Soviet
diplomacy.
Gorbachev's two major statements
on Afghanistan have each contained a
dramatic gesture, however, and he
seems intent on improving Moscow's
public image. He told the 27th Party
Congress in February that a schedule for
ibruary 1987
11
, In his July 28 speech at Vladivostok,
[Gorbachev announced:
Before the end of 1986, six regiments-
one tank regiment, two motorized rifle
regiments, and three antiaircraft
regiments— will be returned from
Afghanistan to the homeland, with their
authorized equipment and arms. These units
will return to their areas of permanent
deployment in the Soviet Union and in such a
way that all those who are interested can
easily verify this.
^ The Soviet Defense Ministry later
'announced that the withdrawal would be
completed by the end of October 1986.
Soviet military spokesmen insisted that
the units to be withdrawn had been in
Afghanistan for years.
Through a variety of methods,
including national technical means of
verification, the United States tracked
the different categories of units in ques-
tion before Gorbachev's July 28 speech
and afterward.
Air Defense. Soviet air defense
units play no military role against the
mujahidin, who lack an air force. Yet
three air defense regiments comprised
half of the promised withdrawal
package, illustrating the limited
significance of the original Soviet pro-
posal. These units were withdrawn to
the Soviet Union as Gorbachev prom-
ised. The SA-8 surface-to-air missile
regiment based in Kabul was withdrawn
from Afghanistan on October 19, The
SA-8 air defense regiment from Shin-
dand departed for the Soviet Union by
October 21, The air defense regiment
from Konduz— the last of the six
regiments to withdraw— also returned,
whereupon the Soviets announced the
withdrawal was complete.
The only tank regiment in
Afghanistan, stationed at Shindand, was
'severely understrength and not involved
Soviet Withdrawal Deception
in any significant combat. To bring the
unit to full strength for the withdrawal
parades, the Soviets sent additional
tanks into Afghanistan in September
and October, On October 15, the day
promised by Moscow, withdrawal
ceremonies began. Correspondents noted
that the vehicles showed few signs of
wear and reported that the Soviet
soldiers claimed never to have seen
any mujahidin. Subsequently, the
reconstituted tank regiment returned to
the U.S.S.R,
Motorized rifle regiments con-
stitute the heart of the deception effort.
Of all the units cited by Gorbachev, only
the motorized rifle regiments are
capable of finding and fighting the mu-
jahidin. Although the Soviets included
these units in order to present a more
credible withdrawal package, they did
not intend to degrade the military effec-
tiveness of their forces in Afghanistan,
Within days of the Vladivostok
speech, the Soviets began to move addi-
tional units into Afghanistan through
Termez in the east and Kushka in the
west. These new units moved into areas
of the Soviet bases at Shindand and Kon-
duz normally occupied by the motorized
rifle regiments that were garrisoned
there but had temporarily moved to
nearby dispersal areas.
The newly introduced motorized rifle
regiments were far different in equip-
ment from the regiments they tem-
porarily displaced. Specifically, the new
regiments had truck-towed artillery, as
contrasted with self-propelled artillery.
They did not have the tracked armored
personnel carriers, called BMPs, stand-
ard equipment for the units they
replaced. In addition, to transport
troops, the newly introduced regiments
depended principally on trucks. To
operate effectively and protect troops
from mujahidiyi attacks, the Soviets had
11
come to rely on armored personnel car-
riers instead of trucks to move motor-
ized rifle troops in Afghanistan.
In September, the introduction of
the new motorized rifle regiments w;
complete. On October 17, the new
motorized rifle regiment at Shindand'
was on its way north and soon arriv©
Kushka in the Soviet Union, About ti
same time, the old motorized rifle re]
ment from Shindand, with its charac
istic tracked armored personnel carrii
had begun to return to its garrison.
By October 21, the newly introduce^ L
Konduz regiment had arrived at Terme;
in the Soviet Union, Shortly thereafter,
the motorized rifle regiment originally
stationed in Konduz began returning to
base. All motorized rifle regiments in
Afghanistan on the day of Gorbachev's
speech remained there at the end of
1986,
Previous Soviet Deception. The
Soviets have previously staged deceptiv
withdrawals or reductions of forces. In
1980, for example, they announced the
withdrawal from Afghanistan of some
troops several weeks before the Moscow
Olympics. Numbering about 5,000, thesi
troops turned out to be forces unsuited
to Afghan terrain or to counterguerrilla
operations. Even as the unwanted force
were being withdrawn, new and more
useful units were being introduced.
Soviet Insecurity. The Soviets'
unwillingness to withdraw militarily
significant assets from Afghanistan—
despite a commitment from Gorbachev
himself— indicates something important,
Contrary to their assertions for interna-
tional audiences and back home in the
U,S,S.R,, the Soviets apparently do not
feel secure enough to give up any real
fighting capabilities.
1
12
Department of Slate Buile'i
FEATURE
Afghanistan
SOVIET FORCE MOVEMENT ASSOCIATED
^ WITH WITHDRAWAL SCHEME ■ 1986
the step-by-step withdrawal of Soviet
forces had been worked out with the
Afghan side and would be implemented
when a political settlement was
achieved. This was Moscow's first high-
level public confirmation of a withdrawal
timetable. On July 28, Gorbachev
announced in Vladivostok that six Soviet
regiments would be withdrawn from
Afghanistan by the end of the year to
provide a "stimulus" for a settlement.
Neither statement produced signifi-
cant results. Following the February
Party Congress, the timetable was
discussed in Geneva, but Kabul insisted
on an unrealistic period of up to 4 years
for the withdrawal.
The Vladivostok initiative was more
misleading, and the token six-regiment
withdrawal proved to be an exercise in
deception (see box). The ruse was
implemented even though the Soviets
must have been aware it would be
detected. The withdrawal occurred just
before the November UN General
Assembly vote on Afghanistan and did
not convince the world of Soviet interest
in a just solution. The vote against
the presence of foreign forces in
Afghanistan was approved by the same
overwhelming number, 122, as in 1985.
Criticism on the Home Front.
There is little evidence of widespread
opposition to the war in the U.S.S.R.
Public support is mostly passive and
unenthusiastic, but complaints about the
war have become more frequent and
open. Special counterpropaganda cam-
paigns have been launched in the three
Soviet republics bordering Afghanistan.
To generate greater support, the
Soviet media have expanded coverage of
the fighting. Combat fatalities are
reported more frequently, decorations
for heroism played up, special features
on men fighting in Afghanistan carried
in their hometown newspapers, and the
war generally portrayed with increasing
realism. A reading of samizdat (privately
circulated dissident manuscripts) sug-
gests that the expanded publicity may
have had the unintended consequence of
making Soviet citizens more worried
about the war.
There are signs of increasing unhap-
piness about the Afghan conflict among
veterans and those who might be sent to
Afghanistan. Draft evasion appears to
have increased, prompting the Soviet
authorities to criticize sharply those who
Ibruary 1987
13
try to avoid military service in general
and service in Afghanistan in particular.
Reports of payments for exemptions or
safer assignments have become more
common.
The Lithuanian Komaomfil skaya
Pravda on October 10 carried an "Open
Letter to Those Who Attempt To Pro-
tect Their Sons From the Difficulties of
Military Service." Written by an officer
of the Baltic Military District, the article
condemned Lithuanian youth who try to
use forged medical records to gain defer-
ment and parents who seek "soft"
assignments for their sons.
Regime Developments
In a slow-motion process, Babrak
Karmal was replaced in 1986 by
Najibullah as Soviet-backed ruler of
Afghanistan. It was the biggest change
in the Kabul regime since 1979, when
the Soviets brought Karmal in with their
invading troops to head the "new phase
of the April Revolution."'
Soviet dissatisfaction with Karmal
increased over the years. The Soviets
were unhappy with his inability to heal
the factional dispute and with his lack of
tangible military and political gains.
Moreover, his well-known installation by
Soviet forces was an international liabil-
ity. Pakistan specifically had refused to
deal with a Karmal-led government. Gor-
bachev did not see Karmal during the
CPSU congress in March, a clear snub.
In early April Karmal flew back to
Moscow, ostensibly for medical care, and
then dropped out of sight. In contrast,
the Soviets warmly received Prime
Minister Keshtmand during a state visit
April 21-24. Karmal still was absent
from Kabul during the April 27 anni'
sary of the 1978 Marxist coup, and h'
supporters there began to worry abo
his fate. There was an unprecedentec
series of semipublic protests by regir
backers. A demonstration by women
probably organized by Karmal con-
fidante and women's organization he;
Anahita Ratebzad. (Najibullah con-
demned these protests as "the black
strivings of factionalists." He later t(
the women's group from Anahita by
changing its name and appointing a
woman militia member as the first hei
of the new organization.)
The gesture of support was for
nought. Babrak returned quietly to
Kabul on May 1. The following day
Soviet troops took up key positions
around the city. At the 18th plenum,
Karmal "asked" to be relieved of dut'
as General Secretary of the PDPA "f
Najibullah— Moscow's New Man in Kabul
»
Mohammed Najibullah' was born in
Kabul in 1947. the son of a banker and
merchant and gi-andson of a Paktia
tribal chief. As a youth, he joined his
father who was posted with an Afghan
liaiik in Peshawar, Pakistan. His tribal
roots are with the Ahmedzai, part of the
Ghilzai confederation of Pashtun tribes.
Najibullah is married and has one
daughter.
Najib entered Kabul University as a
medical student in 1964. In 1965 he
joined the newly established PDPA and
was recruited into Babrak Karmal's Par-
cham faction. In 1967 he followed Kar-
mal when the PDPA split. He was
imprisoned in 1969 for political
activities. Back in school in 1970, he was
soon jailed again. He finally earned his
inedical degree in 1975, served in the
military for a year, and then became a
full-time political activist. He is a capable
speaker in Pashto, unlike Karmal, as
well as in Dari, and was a street orator
in the 1960s and 1970s.
In 1977, Najibullah was named to
the PDPA's central committee and was
appointed to the Parcham liaison com-
mittee with the Soviet Union. After the
PDPA coup in 1978, he became a
member of the Revolutionary Council.
Dismissed later that year, he spent much
of 1979 abroad— first as Ambassador to
Iran and then in exile in Eastern
Europe.
After the Soviet invasion in
December 1979, Najibullah returned to
Afghanistan. In 1980 he became head of
KHAD, the secret police, and was once
again named to the Revolutionary Coun-
cil. He became a full member of the
politburo in 1981. In late 1985 he was
promoted from KHAD to become a
secretary to the central committee,
reportedly with party responsibility fc
all security forces. In May 1986, he
became General Secretary of the PDF
and has headed the Kabul regime sine
then.
Since accession to leadership of th
PDPA, Najib has often appeared in
public and has traveled the country,
including war-torn Herat, and met fre
quently with the press. Najib is close t
the Soviets and responsive to their
wishes. As party leader, as he was wh(
he headed the secret police, Najib is
responsive to his Soviet advisers. Like
Karmal, he is usually accompanied by
Soviet bodyguards. Many Afghans
believe that he is a long-time KGB
agent.
' The General Secretary is known by the
single name Najibullah. but he is often re-
ferred to as Najib. Some sources indicate he
purposely dropped the "ullah"— a reference
to God— though now he sometimes uses it to
suggest new-found piety.
14
Department of State Built i
a
FEATURE
Afghanistan
th reasons." The politburo then con-
led Najibullah as party leader.
For a time, the regime, and par-
larly the Soviets, promoted the
on of a collective leadership in
lul, with Najibullah as party chief,
mal heading the Revolutionary Coun-
and Prime Minister Keshtmand run-
f the government. However, there
no question that Najibullah was in
•ge, and over the summer regime
lia began to refer to him as com-
n ider in chief.
Xajibullah at first moved cautiously
:ii(i consolidating control over the
\ . He was frank in criticizing party
tiomings. In a speech to the 19th
j1 luni in July, he complained about
2 'e arrogance, nepotism, unwill-
n less to go to the provinces, and
11 -ight corruption, including embezzle-
it. bribery, and theft of state prop-
\t the plenum he announced a
iiatic expansion of the central com-
r ee, packing it with unknowns
W amiably loyal only to him. Karmal
b lists were purged.
Parcham split. The ouster of Kar-
V and removal of his followers led to
' i-niergence of a pro-Karmal opposi-
. Its reported activities range from a
■i .ilown in the ministries to coopera-
with the mujahidin. The dispute
il be taking on an ethnic tinge, with
rak's multiethnic urban backers
11.4 Najibullah's largely Pashtun
K. jwers.
Foreign journalists brought into
■hanistan to witness the October
iet "withdrawal" ceremonies were
uptly ordered out of the country after
ing a spontaneous pro-Karmal
lonstration.
Instability within the regime may
e led Moscow finally to agree to
love Karmal. The 20th PDPA plenum
3 suddenly convened on November 20.
i plenum endorsed Karmal 's "request
08 relieved of party and state posts."
ipped of the chairmanship of the
rolutionary Council presidium (head
state) and a spot on the politburo,
rmal still retained seats on the
volutionary Council and the central
tnmittee. Najibullah told the central
committee that Babrak's health was
"deteriorating." Karmal was voted a
medal (the Order of the April Revolu-
tion) and granted a pension.
The plenum awarded secret police
chief Ghulam Farid Yacubi the politburo
seat vacated by Karmal. Khalq chief
Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoi and Demo-
cratic Youth Organization head Farid
Mazdak were elected candidate
members.
In December, Foreign Minister Shah
Mohammed Dost, a long-time diplomat
and holdover from the pre-1978 regime,
was replaced by Abdul Wakil, a cousin of
Babrak Karmal, and most recently
ambassador to Vietnam. Dost was made
a minister of state and sent to the
United Nations. At the same time,
Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Nazar
Mohammed was named First Deputy
Prime Minister. His replacement, the
current Deputy Prime Minister, Gen.
Mohammed Rafi, served as Defense
Minister from 1979 to 1982. Changes in
the upper echelons of the regime were
expected to continue.
Khalq revival. Were Najibullah able
to forge a unified party, through purges
or conciliation, it would be a major step
toward regime consolidation. The
increased activities of the paramilitary
police troops suggest a deal with the
Khalqis and their leader, Interior
Minister Gulabzoi. Tribal connections
between Najibullah and many of his
fellow Ghilzai tribesmen of the Khalqis
may account for this unanticipated rap-
prochement. On the other hand, Gulabzoi
may be positioning the Khalqis to return
to power, were Najibullah to falter. In
any case, Khalq disaffection continues,
compounded by its ideological disagree-
ment over the "broadening" of the
regime and the steady abandonment of
radical Marxist policies.
Efforts To Suggest a Broadening
of the Regime. On December 26, 1985,
the regime announced the appointment
of a number of purportedly "nonparty"
figures. Sayed Amanuddin Amin was
named deputy prime minister; a
technocrat, he previously had served the
DRA as a deputy minister and chairman
of the Economic Consultative Council.
Other appointees also had held impor-
tant regime positions, but they will add
little credibility to the regime.
In January 1986, Kabul added 79
new members to the Revolutionary
Council, doubling its size. Kabul claims
that more than half of the expanded
council are not party members. The
presidium (chaired at the time by Kar-
mal) also was enlarged. Haji Mohammed
Chamkani. who had chaired the 1985
Border Tribes Jirga. was named vice
president of the presidium, the first time
a nonparty figure had been elevated to
such a high position. In April, the tribal
Jirgn (assembly of tribal leaders)
obtained a secretariat, and Chamkani's
visibility increased. In November, follow-
ing Karmal's ouster, Chamkani was
named interim chairman of the Revolu-
tionary Council presidium.
The regime claims to have begun
elections in all provinces (only party elec-
tions have been held since the 1978
coup), but it has been unable to conduct
them outside secured areas. One of the
excited victors confessed he was
unaware he had been nominated until
just before hearing he was elected.
Kabul's only gain has been the induc-
tion into the party of two leftist labor
groups that for 7 years had been
independent (Democratic Workers of
Afghanistan; Revolutionary Society of
Afghanistan's Toilers). This merger
indicates that "national reconciliation" is
not intended to lead to a departure from
Kabul's Marxist and pro-Soviet
orientation.
Since publication in December 1985
of a Pravda article suggesting the need
to include real elements of the opposition
in the broadening process, Kabul has
often repeated its interest in national
reconciliation. The National Fatherland
Front (NFF, Kabul's organizational
framework for integrating nonparty
groups into the regime) was charged
with coordinating the process— a sure
indication that power sharing is not
intended. The delay in the NFF congress
scheduled for early November suggests a
lack of progress on reconciliation in addi-
tion to problems with the draft constitu-
tion (in preparation since early in the
year). Regime efforts to entice coopera-
tion from the vast majority of Afghans
have been to no avail.
bruary 1987
15
The Afghan Economy
Given wartime disruption, the economy
of Afghanistan continues to provide a
standard of Hving not greatly different
from that before the 1978 Marxist coup.
In some areas, particularly along major
lines of communication for both sides,
the countryside has been devastated and
depopulated. But in many parts of the
country, traditions of autarchy, sub-
sistence farming, nomadic and semi-
nomadic herding, smuggling, and infor-
mal trade persist. The regime claims
that material damage caused by the war
totals 40 billion Afghanis- (up a third
from last year's claim).
Food. Kabul's bazaars remain amply
stocked, although some items were in
short supply. In general, the food supply
in Afghanistan was adequate, although
shortages of some items continued in
some areas. As wheat accounts for about
60% of the Afghan diet, most of the
population has enough to eat.
Abundant snowfall in the winter
months of 1985-86 and good weather in
the growing season produced a wheat
crop about as large as harvests before
the Soviet invasion. Because several
million refugees have fled, per capita
wheat availability is probably higher
than before 1979. The impact of land
abandonment in areas of heavy fighting
has been softened by the shift from cash
crops to wheat in regions of less intense
fighting.
Most land abandonment and food
shortages occur in a 50-mile belt along
the Pakistan frontier. Most reports of
food shortages and most of the refugees
come from this area, where fighting has
been heavy. In the fall, shortages were
reported in the northwest.
Scarcities are aggravated by damage
to Afghanistan's limited transportation
infrastructure. Shortages are worst in
the spring. Some items are periodically
in short supply: vegetables, oils, rice,
sugar, and tea. The supply of meat,
however, appears adequate. Flocks have
stabilized at preinvasion levels, probably
because most of the 20 million sheep are
safe in the mountains when the fighting
is heaviest.
The cities, especially refugee-swollen
Kabul, are largely fed from imports. In
recent years, about half of the DRA's
grain imports has come from the Soviet
Union.
Scorched Earth? Although there are
many credible reports of deliberate
Soviet/regime destruction of crops,
homes, and agricultural infrastructure, it
appears that the Soviets do not have a
general scorched earth policy. Total crop
destruction has been limited and has not
had much impact on countrywide food
availability.
Electricity shortages fluctuate with
mujakidin damage to the hydroelectric
plants. Market conditions in the pro-
vinces are more varied. Fighting near
the trade routes temporarily raised
prices of items that have to be brought
in from outside.
DRA Economic Policies. A major
component of the regime's initiative to
"broaden the social base" was an effort
to involve the private sector. In January,
when Kabul announced a planned doub-
ling of the state share of retail trade, an
Economic Consultative Council was set
up to improve the climate for "national
traders and entrepreneurs." Its chair-
man, Sayed Amanuddin Amin, was
named a deputy prime minister. In the
summer, Kabul offered to back investors
with low interest loans. Traders have
fared rather well; their margins have
been adequate to cover spiraling
transport costs as well as the obligatory
payoffs to both sides.
The private sector grew apprehen-
sive during the summer as Najibullah
increasingly criticized Commerce
Minister Jallalar, a nonparty civil serv-
ant long regarded as guardian of its
interests. Businessmen worried that
their conscription exemptions and
deferments would be eliminated.
In January, after extensive consulta-
tion with the Soviets, Prime Minister
Keshtmand reported the successful com-
pletion of a Five-Year Plan (1981-86).
He also previewed the next Five-Year
Plan (1986-1991), which commenced in
March, the beginning of the Afghan
year. The large increase in natural gas
output may be due to a new find, hinted
at by Keshtmand in a March speech.
Soviet Economic Relations With
the DRA. In 1985, Moscow pledged $320
million in new economic aid— the second
largest commitment since 1979. The new
agreements provided $120 million in
DRA Five-Year Plans
Growth in Selected Sectors
1981-86
Increase in GNP
11%
Industry
NA
Agriculture
NA
Natural gas extraction
11%
Government worker
housing
200%
State share of retail
trade
22%
State investment
67 billion
Afs.
114.53
Source; Radio Kubut. .January 1986,
food and consumer goods grants for
1985 delivery, and $200 million in or
for projects in Afghanistan's new Fi"
Year Plan. The latter include the
Sarowbi II hydropower plant, tunnel
the Hairatan-Kabul highway and Sal
Pass road, technical schools, and ext
slve road construction and modernizi
tion. Such projects help support Sov
political and military efforts in
Afghanistan.
Soviet aid deliveries reached $22
million in 1985 under old and new
agreements, bringing deliveries sinci«
invasion to $1.6 billion. According to]
Afghan Government, at least 5,000
Soviet economic technicians were
employed in Afghanistan in 1985, wc
ing on 63 projects. Under an agreeni
signed on March 20, 1986, Soviet
assistance would increase from 70%
80% of all foreign aid. The aid progr; i
includes the construction of 840 apar
ments in Microrayon, a Kabul neighb -
hood where many Soviet advisers livi
Soviet-Afghan trade has tripled s ce
the invasion. Trade hovered around t
$1 billion mark in 1985. The Soviets 1 1-
tinued to take Afghan natural gas in
exchange for essential commodities,
machinery, and equipment. Some 65" if
Afghanistan's total trade is now withie
Soviet Union. A trade protocol signet n ,
Moscow on February 13 provided for i
additional 30% increase in Soviet-
Afghan trade during new Five-Year
Plan.
16
Department of State Bui in
c/
FEATURE
Afghanistan
•jicJal Developments
Eiication
line efforts to build a loyal following
Uijh indoctrination of the population
iinued without evident success. Kabul
'lis to have reached more than a
^•n adult Afghans through its
ricy programs and to have increased
Hilattendance by 15%, to 685,000.
lie Minister Keshtmand claimed that
■ogram to teach minority languages
ey divisive tactic) reached 6,000
lents in 40 schools. This is probably a
li indication of the regime's limited
h outside the capital.
Bringing Afghans, including young
li'en, to study in the U.S.S.R. is an
iTtant element of the "Sovietization"
'I't. About 6,000 Afghans studied in
Soviet Union in 1986. An Afghan-
let protocol signed this summer pro-
■d for 1,800 secondary and university
J lents to go to the U.S.S.R. in the
1 6-87 school year. This represents
a ut a 50% increase over 1985-86.
Study in the U.S.S.R. is unpopular
t(i the restrictions on student move-
it inside the Soviet Union and on the
riculum and to the increased prospect
leing drafted on return. Afghan
dents in the Soviet Union, even in
itral Asia, report being harassed by
il people.
alth
I ? length of the conflict and the disrup-
I I of Afghanistan's rudimentary health
i '•astructui-e have contributed to an
£ )arent increase in the incidence of
cease. Most doctors have fled. Soviet
I /sicians in urban areas or foreign
\ unteers in resistance-controlled areas
( 1 only meet a fraction of the demand
t medical care. The wounded take up
' ny of the existing hospital beds and
< ler medical resources. Sanitation,
i»'er adequate, has become nonexistent
imany areas. Endemic hepatitis
'igues residents and Soviet soldiers
■■ ke. Tuberculosis, which through
vernment vaccination efforts had been
■tually eliminated, is reportedly on the
Status of Women
Women traditionally were responsible
for maintaining Afghan culture. Their
role has been magnified under conditions
of wartime dislocation, especially in the
refugee camps. Women have a major
voice in the decision to leave the coun-
try. But most are reluctant to leave
Afghanistan and give up their traditions.
The Kabul regime claims to promote
the status of women, often featuring
them in propaganda. The position of
most has not changed much, although
some women (for example, Karmal's
wife, Mahbooba, and Anahita Ratebzad)
reached positions of influence under
Karmal. Women's issues apparently
have been downplayed since the acces-
sion of Najibullah. The regime has
formed and armed women's militia units,
but participation has not been
widespread.
Women's role in traditional Afghan
society has been reflected in their
limited participation in the resistance.
Women have not taken a combat role,
but in urban areas they have been active
as spies and messengers for the
mujahidin.
Religion
Under Najibullah, the atheist People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan has
tried harder to appear pro-Islam, for
"we know our people are religious." The
regime is now fronted by an acting chief
of state, Haji Mohammed Chamkani,
who uses the Mecca pilgrimage honorific
as a first name.
The Kabul Marxists' belated recogni-
tion that they are incapable of
eradicating the Islamic faith has increas-
ingly led them to endorse religious sym-
bols and institutions. The attendance of
three top leaders— Karmal, Keshtmand,
and Najibullah— at Eid-nl Adha (Feast of
Sacrifice) prayers in Kabul's central
mosque, August 15, was emphasized in
the regime media.
The government praises "patriotic
clergy" (those who will accept Marxist
rule) and has stepped up efforts' to win
over religious leaders. Currently, the
regime claims more than 10,000 mullahs
on its payroll, in some 5,000 mosques.
The "patriotic clergy" do not enjoy
popular respect and are often attacked
by the resistance.
Kabul publicizes its allocations to
religious institutions, without mention-
ing that these are paid out of the institu-
tions' endowments, which have been
seized by the state under various
"reform" measures. Patronage is used
to foster control. In .lune, Najibullah
asked the National Fatherland F'ront to
"enhance its role in the appointment and
removal of imams."
The Islamic Affairs Department has
been elevated to a ministry; the High
Council of Ulema (religious scholars)
oversees religious activities and prop-
erty. Religious education is more directly
controlled. Priva-te rnadratmahf: (religious
schools) were closed down in 1978 and
replaced by state-run institutions.
Illegal Drugs
Afghanistan continues to be a major pro-
ducer of opium and hashish. The 1985
poppy harvest yielded an estimated
400-500 metric tons; preliminary reports
suggest that the 1986 crop will be con-
siderably larger. In recent years, Afghan
traffickers have acquired the capability
to refine opium into heroin. Much of
Afghanistan's opium and nearly all of its
heroin are exported to or through
Pakistan and Iran.
Lack of progress against drug pro-
duction and trafficking will continue
until political and military stability
returns to Afghanistan. All major
resistance organizations oppose narcotic
production, trafficking, and abuse, and
most individual guerrillas adhere to this
policy.
There are increasing indications that
drugs from Afghanistan, some brought
by returning troops, are turning up in
the Soviet Union, aggravating domestic
drug problems. The Soviet Union also is
apparently being used as a transship-
ment route for Afghan drugs to the
West. In June, Dutch police seized 485
pounds of pure heroin hidden in con-
tainers of Afghan raisins being unloaded
from a Soviet freighter in Rotterdam.
Human Rights
As documented by reputable interna-
tional organizations, e.g., Helsinki
Watch, Amnesty International, and the
UN Human Rights Commission, human
rights violations in Afghanistan continue
ibruary 1987
17
to be perpetrated by Soviet and regime
forces on a massive scale. ^ Through
reprisal attacks, indiscriminate air and
artillery bombardments, use of antiper-
sonnel mines and booby-trapped toys,
arbitrary killings, and torture, the
Soviets and the Kabul regime have
sought to intimidate the Afghan people
into submission or fleeing the country.
In a February 1986 report to the UN
Human Rights Commission in Geneva,
the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan
concluded that "continuation of the
military solution in Afghanistan will lead
to a situation approaching genocide."
Over one-third of Afghanistan's
prewar population of 15 million has been
violently displaced. Over 1 million
Afghans have been driven into urban
areas, such as Kabul, whose population
has more than doubled since the inva-
sion. An estimated 4 million Afghans
have fled abroad, to become the world's
largest refugee population. Human
rights groups have estimated that more
than 600,000 Afghans have been killed.
Under the Kabul regime, arbitrary
arrests, detention without trial, execu-
tion of political opponents, and the prac-
tice of torture are commonplace. Former
prisoners told Amnesty International
that Soviet advisers had been present at
some torture sessions.
For the second year in a row. the
UN General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion on the human rights situation in
Afghanistan by a vote of 89 in favor, 24
opposed, and 36 abstentions, an
improvement over the 1985 vote. The
resolution was based on the findings of
Professor Felix Ermacora, the UN
Human Rights Commission Special
Rapporteur.
Refugees
Afghans in Pakistan are the single
largest group of refugees in the world.
The Government of Pakistan reports
registration of more than 2.8 million
Afghans; numbers continue to grow,
although at a slower pace than before.
The refugees are sheltered in more than
300 camps, primarily in the rural areas
of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Prov-
ince and Baluchistan. Relief assistance,
including food, shelter, clothing, and
medicine, is provided by the interna-
tional community, primarily through the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the World Food Program.
Recently arrived refugees appear to
be in worse shape than their predeces-
sors and are more likely to have been
directly touched by the fighting. They
bring with them fewer possessions, or
income-generating assets such as
livestock, thereby placing an additional
burden on relief efforts in Pakistan.
Despite considerable economic and
political costs, the Government and
people of Pakistan have extended an
impressive welcome to the Afghans. The
Government of Pakistan estimates th^
the annual relief effort costs some $36
million, of which it bears nearly half tl
cost, chiefly expenditures for program
administration and transportation of
relief commodities.
In addition to the financial burden
caring for the Afghans, the citizens of
Pakistan have absorbed costs far more
difficult to calculate. Pakistan's inland
transportation system moves several
hundred thousand tons of relief
materials each year. Land prices have
risen as a result of the refugees'
Women and children fetch water from one of the pumps financed bv UNHCR.
18
Department of State Bullet
(7
FEATURE
Afghanistan
jsence. and in an economy already
jeriencing high unemployment,
■hans sometimes compete with
kistanis for scarce jobs. The refugees
^i their livestock have strained scarce
V ter supplies and denuded forestlands
i already poor areas near the frontier.
Refugee-Pakistani relations have
ii surprisingly good, with few violent
1 idents, largely due to the strong
c tural and social ties between the
i ligenous population and the
r >vcomers. Since early 1986, however,
Siet/DRA-backed attempts to exploit
Ikistani concern over the refugees'
I 'sence have increased.
In a further effort to minimize social
I isions and address the longer term
■ 'lis of a population with no immediate
I ispect of returning home, many relief
ranizations, with the concurrence of
I '.iivernment of Pakistan, have
i landed their programming to include
1 ijects that enhance refugee
s f-reliance.
Between 1983 and 1986, the World
1 nk, in conjunction with the UNHCR,
( nmitted $20 million for forestation,
i igation, and road-building projects
1 it employ refugee and local labor in
1 3airing environmental damage caused
1 the refugees. This project has
1 'ently been extended for 3 years.
The U.S. Government, the largest
( itributor to the relief effort, pledged
1 arly $50 million for Afghan assistance
i fiscal year 1986, including $25 million
iirth of commodities through the World
iod Program. To date, total U.S. con-
butions for Afghan refugee assistance
ceed $480 million. Other major con-
butors are Japan, Canada, Australia,
.udi Arabia, and a number of West
iropean nations.
The second largest concentration of
■ghan refugees is in Iran. The Iranian
)vernment estimates that up to 1.9
iUion Afghans are within its borders,
.If of them located in the sparsely
ipulated eastern provinces of Khorasan
id Sistan-Baluchistan. Many Afghans
Iran have successfully integrated into
e local population. However, the
wernment does pi'ovide some assist-
ice through its Council for Afghan
efugees, part of the Iranian Ministry of
le Interior. In addition to providing
juipment for an extensive network of
jception and transit centers, UNHCR is
developing programs to train refugees in
the skills they require to become self-
sufficient. The United States is not a
contributor to the UNHCR effort in
Iran.
Regional Environment
Pakistan
During 1986, the war spilled over into
Pakistan much more frequently than in
previous years. The all-out effort by the
Soviets to knock out mujahidin
strongholds in Afghanistan near the
Pakistan border led to a dramatic rise in
border violations. By late November, air
violations numbered more than 700
(compared to more than 200 in 1985) and
artillery shellings more than 150 (com-
pared to about 25 in 1985). Although
most of the air violations were
overflights, some were concentrated
attacks on targets just inside Pakistan.
Pakistan reports the loss of more than
100 civilians killed and 200 wounded in
these attacks, about two-thirds from
shelling.
In mid-May, the Pakistani Govern-
ment announced that an intruding
ground attack aircraft had been shot
down by a Pakistani F-16 and had
crashed inside Pakistan.
This year, Soviet/DRA agents have
been actively engaged in a campaign of
subversion inside Pakistan to turn
Pakistani opinion against the govern-
ment's policy of support for the Afghan
refugees. Beginning with the January
bombing of the Pakistan International
Airlines office in Peshawar, subsequent
terrorist acts in the Peshawar Area have
included train derailments and bombings
in restaurants and at a well-known hotel.
Similar incidents have occurred
elsewhere in the North-West Frontier
Province and in Baluchistan. The Soviets
have spent large sums of money trying
to recruit Pakistani tribesmen to stir up
trouble inside Pakistan and to aid the
Kabul regime against the resistance.
Pakistanis are understandably con-
cerned about acts of sabotage and about
the long-term impact of the war. Never-
theless, Pakistanis continue to show
generous support for the Afghans.
Iran
Iran continues to call for the speedy and
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet
troops and to condemn Soviet efforts to
control Afghanistan, despite improved
relations with the U.S.S.R. Iranian
media strongly publicized Tehran's sup-
port for the resistance during the visit to
Tehran of Soviet First Deputy Foreign
Minister Kornienko, the highest level
Soviet visit since the revolution.
Iranian relations with Afghanistan
deteriorated further in 1986, in tandem
with DRA and Soviet allegations of
increased Iranian support for the
resistance. Early in the year, a group of
Iranian religious leaders returned from
several months in central Afghanistan.
They had been sent by Kliomeini's
designated successor, Ayatollah Mon-
tazari, who has taken an active interest
in the Afghan cause. Soviet media con-
demned the mission.
Complaints of border violations came
from both sides during the course of the
year. In March, Kabul charged Iran with
causing a water shortage in the Afghan
cities of the Helmand Valley, threaten-
ing to reopen a long-dormant dispute.
Iranian opposition groups— Tudeh
and Fedayeen-e Khalq— continue to be
welcome in Kabul. In a congratulatory
message to Najibullah on his accession in
May, Tudeh first secretary Khaveri
called for strengthening ties between his
party and the PDPA.
India
Prime Minister Gandhi reiterated India's
interest in a political solution to the
Afghan problem. India continued to call
for an end to foreign intervention and
interference in Afghanistan. India main-
tained good relations with the Kabul
government and a modest program of
assistance to the DRA. In 1986, India
once again abstained on the UN General
Assembly resolution condemning the
presence of foreign forces in
Afghanistan.
China
China cites the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan as a major obstacle to
improving relations with the U.S.S.R.
On the sixth anniversary of the Soviet
invasion in December 1985, Chinese
Sbruary 1987
19
media noted that the invasion "sabo-
taged peace and stability" in the area
and posed a threat to China's security.
China viewed Gorbachev's Vladivostok
withdrawal proposal with "interest," but
when the offer proved to be a sham, the
Chinese engaged in sharp public
polemics with the U.S.S.R. and con-
demned Moscow's "facade of sincerity."
International Concern
The plight of the Afghan people has not
escaped the world's attention. Countries
around the globe took special notice of
the sixth anniversary of the Soviet inva-
sion in December 1985. The United
States recognized Afghanistan Day,
March 21, with a presidential
proclamation.
Afghanistan was one of the most
controversial issues at the congress of
the World Peace Council, the most pro-
minent Soviet international front group.
At the congress, held in Copenhagen in
October, Danish Radical Party president
Niels Helveg Pedersen denounced the
"inhuman and brutal war being waged
by the Soviets in Afghanistan." The con-
ference concluded in uproar after 40
demonstrators, many of them Afghan
refugees, were ejected.
In April, a representative of the
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) visited Kabul, the first
visit since contacts were broken in 1982
after Kabul's refusal to allow the ICRC
to visit prisoners held by the regime.
Although the DRA agreed in principle to
the reestablishment of an ICRC presence
in Kabul, the issue of prisoner access has
remained a major stumbling block.
International media interest con-
tinued to report on the plight of the
Afghan people and their heroic resist-
ance. Press coverage of resistance
operations increased, despite the hazards
of traveling inside Afghanistan and
Soviet threats against journalists.
The United States Information
Agency has funded a program to
improve the ability of Afghans to tell
their own story of the occupation and
resistance, particularly through video.
In 1986, the Kabul regime allowed
increased access for foreign journalists,
including those from the West. A group
of reporters was flown in from Moscow
in January, during the customary winter
lull, and to witness Soviet "withdrawal"
ceremonies in October. Journalists,
however, are given little scope to probe
beyond regime interviews or guided
tours.
The Department of State has issued
a warning against travel by U.S. citizens
in Afghanistan because of the war and
the U.S. Government's inability, in a
hostile war zone, to provide consular
protection for American citizens who
may be in distress.
UN Negotiations. Since January
1980, the UN General Assembly has
voted eight times, by overwhelming
margins, for a resolution calling for the
complete withdrawal of foreign forces
from Afghanistan; the restoration of
Afghanistan's independent and non-
aligned status; Afghan self-deter-
mination; and the creation of conditions
that would enable the refugees to return
home with safety and honor. The resolu-
tion, introduced as in the past by
Pakistan and cosponsored by 47 coun-
tries, passed again on November 5, 1986,
by a vote of 122 to 20, with 11 absten-
tions, equaling last year's record positive
vote.
UN attempts to negotiate a settle-
ment date from a November 1980 man-
date of the General Assembly. Negotia-
tions are led by UN Under Secretary
General for Special Political Affairs
Diego Cordovez, the Secretary General's
personal representative. Talks have been
held periodically since 1982 in Geneva.
Cordovez shuttles between delegations
from Pakistan and Afghanistan, offi-
cially informing Iran of the discussions
while unofficially informing the Soviets.
Two sessions of indirect talks were held
in Geneva in 1986. The first, convened in
May, lasted an unprecedented 3 weeks.
The negotiations recommenced July 30
and ran through early August. In addi-
tion, Cordovez shuttled between
Islamabad and Kabul in March and again
in November; during the November shut-
tle, he also visited Tehran.
^S'
k
i
At the May session, the discussion
focused on a timetable for Soviet trooi
withdrawal and on implementation
issues. The DRA dropped its prior
refusal to discuss a timetable without
direct negotiations with Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the parties remain far
apart on this central issue. Pakistani
Prime Minister Junejo on a June visit
Washington revealed that the Soviet-
DRA side had offered a Soviet troop
withdrawal timetable covering a 4-yea
period, which Pakistan rejected. He
indicated that a 3- or 4-month period
would be sufficient.
The UN Secretary General has
reported that the four instruments tha
would comprise the agreement are "vi
tually complete." The text is largely
settled on three of four proposed
instruments, the first dealing with
mutual noninterference in Afghanistan
affairs, the second encompassing interii
national guarantees, and the third
governing the voluntary return of the
refugees.
The fourth agreement, which is to
address the key issue of a Soviet troop;
withdrawal and the interrelationship
between that document and the other
three, is unfinished. The principal
outstanding issue remains an agreemen
on a realistic timetable for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Despite hopes generated at variouf
points in the negotiations, the sides are-
far apart. The Soviet Union has not
substantially altered its original positio?
justifying its presence in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, all sides are committed t!
continuing the talks.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan aims at
achieving a negotiated political settle-
ment, predicated on the prompt and
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops
and consistent with eight UN resolutiori
on Afghanistan. The United States sup^
ports UN-sponsored efforts to achieve s
settlement and has expressed in writing
its willingness to lend its political sup-
port to a comprehensive and balanced
20
Department of State Bullei
:>enient that protects the legitimate
: irity interests of all parties. Absent
^1 a settlement, the United States is
emitted to support the Afghan cause
mull all appropriate means.
Humanitarian Assistance. The
■ ted States has responded to the
ht of the Afghan people by
- lijishing a long-term humanitarian
iiionram for war-affected Afghans.
[inigram emphasizes direct
-taiice to the Afghan resistance
, nee and is intended to provide those
6 aining in Afghanistan with the
(li.ns to sustain themselves. In fiscal
■r 1986, Congress appropriated $15
n ion in economic support funds for
\i -affected Afghans. In fiscal year
i 7, Congress earmarked an additional
Iv, million for the program.
\,ainistered by the U.S. Agency for
r rnational Development, the program
n ides three new projects in health,
!( :ation, and commodity support.
U.S. and European private voluntary
organizations help implement the pro-
gram. Support is being provided from
the United States, France, Belgium,
West Germany, Sweden, United King-
dom, and Austria. In 198ti, total support
for voluntary agencies amounted to $10
million; an additional $10 million is
planned for 1987.
Educational assistance, implemented
through the alliance education commit-
tee, will provide direct support (text-
books, supplies, curriculum development,
teacher training, and stipends) to
primary education in free areas of
Afghanistan. The health project envi-
sions a massive training program of first
aid for emergency care, mobile health
clinics and hospitals for urgent care, a
medical evacuation system, and a supply
system. Basic humanitarian goods, such
as food, agricultural commodities,
medical supplies, clothing, shelter, and
animals also will be furnished. In addi-
tion, under PL-480, a Title II program
consisting of wheat and vegetable oil
lT"
FEATURE
Afghanistan
valued at about $15 million was
approved in 1986 for war-affected
Afghans.
Congress has separately authorized
$10 million for transporting human-
itarian commodities to war-affected
Afghans; the authority also provides
funds to transport Afghan patients
to the United States for medical
treatment.
■For background, see Special Reports 7'.t.
86, 91. 106, 112. 118. 120, 135, and 139.
' 2The U.S. dollar is worth .55 Afghanis at
the official rate. In the Kabul money market,
one of the freest exchanges in the world, it
was 139 Afs/dollar in January, and in
November about 152 Afs/dollar.
■^Siliiiilioii ofhuman nghh hi
Afghanhtiin. United Nations General
Assembly Document A/41/778, 31 October
1986. Amnesty International. AfyhnniMaii:
Torture ofPolitirnl Pri^timcrn. November
1986. See also, Helsinki Watch Committee,
Afghan Children: The Other Wtir. December
1986.H
oruary 1987
21
THE SECRETARY
Iran and U.S. Policy
Following are the statement by
Secretary Shultz before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the
question-and-answer session with some
members of the committee on December 8,
1986 J
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT^
This is the first time in my 10 years of
service as a Cabinet officer that I have
been asked to take an oath before Con-
gress. I do so in good spirit, fully
recognizing your authority to require an
oath and your duty to ensure that the
record of these proceedings is as full and
true as possible. Taking an oath is
something American citizens do every
day. I regard this act as fulfilling my
duty as a citizen to respect our laws and
institutions.
I want you to know, however, that
when I was sworn in as Secretary of
State, I took an oath "to support and
defend the Constitution of the United
States." I have always considered that
solemn promise to impose the permanent
duty upon me as Secretary of State
always to tell the truth to the President,
the Congress, the courts, and, most
importantly, the American people. In
addition to being a citizen, I am, at the
moment, a public servant. If a public
servant is not prepared to tell the truth,
he has no business being a public serv-
ant, oath or no oath. It is as simple as that.
I am grateful for the committee's
understanding that I must depart at
10:30 in order to meet with President
Mobutu of Zaire, after which I will leave
early this afternoon for Great Britain
and Belgium for meetings with NATO
foreign ministers.
The hearings you are holding come
at a crucial point for the nation. The
President has recognized that serious
problems have been created in our con-
duct of foreign affairs by the manner in
which some individuals implemented our
effort to establish better contacts with
Iran and by the diversion of funds from
arms sales to the Nicaraguan democratic
resistance. He has taken the lead in rec-
tifying any problems that may exist.
• The President has appointed
Frank Carlucci, a respected foreign
policy professional of exceptionally broad
experience and the highest integrity, to
revitalize and lead the National Security
Council.
• He has instituted a senior-level
Special Review Board under the distin-
guished leadership of John Tower to
review the proper role of the National
22
Security Council and the functioning of
its staff.
• He has recommended the appoint-
ment of an independent counsel to inves-
tigate the possiblity of any wrongdoing
regarding the Iran project.
• He has welcomed a unified con-
gressional approach to its oversight role
in these matters and has promised full
cooperation with its inquiries.
• He has ordered me to implement
an interagency study of our relations
with Iran, and that process is underway
with the experienced leadership of
Under Secretary [for Political Affairs
Michael H.] Armacost.
• And he has instructed his Cabinet
officers to share with the Congress and
the American people all that they knew
about this recent initiative toward
Iran— which is why I'm here with you
this morning.
As you know, I am ready to tell you
everything I knew at the time about our
sales of arms to Iran. The President has
authorized the release of this informa-
tion to Congress. I am not free,
however, to violate the laws of the
United States in the process. Much of
the material that I knew at the time is
still classified. I realize that some of this
material has become public.
But this does not permit me to con-
firm as fact some matters that have, up
to now, been published without official
authority. Furthermore, while it may
seem difficult to believe, some of what I
am ready to tell you is still not publicly
known. Finally, in addition to the prob-
lem of classified material, to tell you all
that I know in public session could well
interfere with ongoing criminal investi-
gations, would improperly reveal intel-
ligence sources and methods, and would
expose privileged communications.
All this pains me greatly. I have
sworn to tell the full truth, and I am
prepared to do so in a manner consistent
with my legal and ethical respon-
sibilities. This can best be done in a
closed session where all my obligations
can faithfully be fulfilled. I want to put
to rest now any doubt as to my readiness
to respond to questions about my prior
knowledge and activity. I have already
made all the information at my disposal
available to the FBI. I have been inter-
viewed by the Department of Justice. I
am ready in this open session to bring
forward all the materials I properly can.
And, at whatever appropriate time you
choose, I am prepared to make a state-
ment and to answer questions in closed
session giving classified details of my
knowledge and activities.
n
Having said this, I fully believe yo-
have made the right decision by calling
for an initial open session and stating
that this particular hearing might con^ pP
centrate on looking forward. I warmly f}
endorse this purpose. We need very
much to look forward. And I will do so
this testimony.
I will start by looking at our futun
relations in the Persian Gulf area. Tha
subject is of crucial importance to the
nation, and it easily warrants the limit
time we have this morning. So, let me
turn to it, with the hope of leaving tim
for your comments and questions.
The Importance of Iran
and the Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf is important to the
United States— and for many of our k6
friends and allies as well. A quarter of
the free world's oil flows through the
Persian Gulf, and an even higher
percentage sustains the economies of (
allies in Europe and Japan. It is vital
that Western access to that oil con-
tinues. The region is a strategic focal
point— one in which the Soviet Union Y
long sought to expand its presence am
control. We have an important stake iii
denying to them such an expansion.
We have major political interests
with individual gulf states, both in thein
own right and because of their influen<
on events in the Middle East, Afghan-
istan, and elsewhere. Therefore, we
want the states of the gulf to enjoy a
peace and political stability free from
threats of Soviet intimidation, externa*
aggression, or internal subversion. W&
wish to sustain productive relations wi
these states of the region, in part so th»
the supply of oil to the West can con
tinue unabated.
But our strategic, economic, and
political interests in the gulf have been
and continue to be challenged from a
number of quarters— by war and politic
instability in the region, by the Soviet
Union's brutal occupation of Afghan-
istan and persistent efforts to expand i
influence, and by terrorism. And Iran b
come to be a most important element ii
all of these considerations.
The Iran-Iraq war, now in its
seventh year, shows all too clearly howi
continuation of regional conflict and
instability can threaten not only our
interests but those of many states
friendly to us as well. And for that
reason, the United States has consist-
ently worked for an early end to that
conflict, under terms which provide for
the territorial integrity and independ-
ence of both belligerents.
In meeting the threat of escalating
terrorism, we must also deal with the
Department of State Bulled
THE SECRETARY
Ifiii of Iran. The current Iranian
■tnment continues to believe that
■rism is a legitimate instrument of
isn policy. It has been prepared to
> y that instrument when and where
tod its needs. It is in our interest to
. hat it stops.
\s the President has said, he
iiized the transfer of some arms to
iM send a signal that the United
> was prepared to replace the
-ity between us with a new rela-
liip. That signal has been sent. No
:■ r arms shipment will be made to
\>y the United States, and we will
t all our influence to discourage
- sales to Iran by others. The reason
at it is Iran which refuses to end the
1 w ar, and it is the capability of Iran
aitinue the war that we must
i I'ss. Iran cannot expect a better
idiiship with us until it acts to end
I A ai', ceases its support for terrorism,
i-i'S its influence with those who
iiir hostages to achieve their
n :lum.
Dur dealings with Iran are shaped by
: -ategic dilemma. We have a
r-thern" concern— to keep Iran free
'\ let influence— and a "southern"
(Til- to keep Iran from dominating
nlf neighbors. Because Iran con-
11 es to resist Soviet influence but
h atens the gulf, our near-term prior-
i] nust be to reassure gulf Arab states
i jr support and stand fast on our anti-
e orism and arms embargo policies.
i nwhile, we must use alternative
\ inels to bolster Iranian resistance to
ii let influence and focus on shared
1 rests such as Afghanistan. Similarly,
t lility in the gulf will affect our efforts
[ ncourage meaningful movement in
1 peace process between Israel and its
I b neighbors.
) . Policy Toward Iran
■refore, we have a legitimate interest
r 'etter relations with Iran, and the
' sident determined last year that we
I uld respond to approaches from
nents within Iran to see whether
I aian leaders were prepared to shift
lir policies in a more positive direc-
ii. Last Saturday, the President
'.erated our purposes: "to end the war
I he Middle East, to prevent Soviet
!)ansionism, to halt terrorism, and to
:P gain release of American hostages."
I illy support every one of these pur-
ees. I am sure that you and this com-
'ttee likewise support them.
The problems created by recent
'nts were not caused by these pur-
ses but by the way they were imple-
nted in this one instance and by cer-
n unauthorized actions of officials on
whom the President had relied to imple-
ment his policy. Facts being revealed
have made clear, as the President has
forthrightly stated, "that the execution
of these policies was flawed and
mistakes were made."
The policies the President has reaf-
firmed are his own. He has made clear
that it was neither his intent nor his
policy to trade weapons for hostages,
nor to undercut our stand against ter-
rorism. I fully support him and his
policies. As a nation, we must remain
opposed to terrorism in every form. All
terrorism, whether directed against
Americans or others, is unacceptable and
must be eliminated. That principle is
central to our efforts to encourage
broader international cooperation
against state-sponsored terrorism.
Therefore, we must continue to
speak out and take action against all acts
of terrorism. However much we share
the anguish of the families involved, we
must oppose concessions or ransom for
the release of hostages. To do otherwise
would encourage the taking of additional
hostages and would raise the value in the
eyes of the hostage-takers of those
already held. And we must continue to
strengthen our efforts with friends and
allies in such areas as intelligence
exchange and security measures to
thwart terrorism and its attendant
violence and to isolate states which
sponsor and support terrorism.
With respect to Iran, the President
has noted: "The Iranian revolution is a
fact of history, but between American
and Iranian basic national interests
there need be no permanent conflict."
He has also reaffirmed that it was not
his intent to do business with the
Khomeini regime as long as its policies
threaten the peace and stability of the
region. Here again, I fully agree.
We must continue to encourage an
end to regional hostilities and peaceful
relations between all of the gulf states.
We seek a negotiated resolution of the
Iran-Iraq war that respects the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of all
nations in the region.
In working for the stability of the
gulf, we will continue to support the
cooperative efforts of moderate and
friendly states of the region to ensure
their own security and stability. We will
oppose Soviet encroachment in the
region and seek an early end to its occu-
pation of Afghanistan.
Recent Events in a Historical
Perspective
Finally, we must put recent events into
proper historical perspective. The
President has been here for 6 years.
When he took over, the nation was
neither as secure nor as confident as it
should have been.
Where do we stand after 6 years of
President Reagan's leadership in foreign
affairs? Working with Congress and with
the broad support of the American peo-
ple. President Reagan's policies have
brought us to the threshold of a new and
remarkably different world— a world in
which America's interests, America's
pride, and America's ideals are
flourishing.
What is this different world? Why is
it cause for renewed confidence and
hope for the future? Because:
• We can glimpse now, for the first
time, a world in which the incessant and
pervasive fear of nuclear devastation is
reduced. The threat of nuclear conflict
can never be wholly banished, but it can
be vastly diminished by careful but
drastic reductions in offensive nuclear
arsenals and by creating an ability to
defend against them. It is just such
reductions— not limitations in expansion,
but reductions— and just such defenses
that are the vision President Reagan is
working to make a reality.
• Only a few years ago, the democ-
racies of the world were believed to be
an embattled, shrinking handful of
nations. Today, people struggling under
oppressive regimes of the right and the
left can see democracy as a vital force
for the future. Vital but nonviolent
movements toward more open societies
have succeeded. The failure of closed,
command economies is more evident
every day. A new wind of change is
blowing.
• People who are ready to stand up
for freedom and have no choice but to
fight for their rights now know that
communism's march is not inevitable.
President Reagan is a freedom fighter—
and the world knows it. And I stand with
Ronald Reagan.
Strong defenses, sound alliances,
and support for the free economic and
political development of peoples
everywhere: that's what President
Reagan stands for. His policies are not
the policies of a party. They are the
policies of all the American people. They
are inevitable policies if our country is to
remain the best and greatest on Earth
and the hope of humanity everywhere.
Let us show the strength of our free
institutions by a full investigation of
every detail of this Iran episode. But as
we do so, let us unite, pull ourselves
together, and keep this country moving
ahead to meet the dangers and the
opportunities of this moment.
bruary 1987
23
THE SECRETARY
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER
SESSION
Chairman Fascell. Everything you say
here in your testimony is obviously
absolutely right since you are a man of
honor and have told the truth. But
someone's zeal in this U.S. Govern-
ment of ours, in this Iranian arms
deal, has put the credibility of U.S.
foreign policy at the lowest ebb that I
know of.
It has been alleged that you were
opposed to this Iranian initiative as a
member of the National Security Coun-
cil and as Secretary of State. If you
were, did you convey your concern to
the President, and, if you did, when
did you do it?
A. I conveyed my concerns on many
occasions— in two full meetings, on
another occasion, according to my
records, and I don't think anyone
involved in this is under any illusion
whatever about my views.
Chairman Fascell. I'm not sure I
understand whether or not you con-
veyed your concern to the President or
not.
A. Yes.
Chairman Fascell. In opposition to
the Iranian arms deal?
A. Let me comment on that. I sup-
ported and continue to support, as my
statement indicates, the idea of trying to
see if we can't rearrange the furniture a
little bit insofar as Iran is concerned,
and there are various ways to try to do
that which I support and which is the
President's basic intent. So I support his
policy.
However, when it comes to the use
of arms, I have a different view. But I do
believe that it's a legitimate subject for
debate as a policy matter. The President
listened to views pro and con, and he has
said publicly that in the end, he decided
that he should send a signal— I think that
was his word— to Iran to show our
serious intent, and so he authorized
some arms shipments to Iran for that
purpose.
You can argue in favor of it, and the
President has put forward the argu-
ments in favor of it; you can argue
against it, and the various people have
done so. Nevertheless, it's a legitimate
issue. The President made a decision
about it, and that's one of the things you
get the right to do when you get elected
President. You get the opportunity to
undertake those tough calls, and he
stood up to it.
Mr. Broomfield. There's two
aspects of this that really disturb me.
One is the arms transfer to Iran,
which I thought was extremely ill-
advised. But my question this morning
deals with the transfer of funds to
support the contra effort. Over the
weekend, we read about the Sultan of
Brunei contributing large sums of
money into a secret Swiss bank
account to support the contras.
I wonder how many other Third
World countries have done the same
thing? Who has control of this fund,
and who handles it, basically? What
knowledge do you have on that partic-
ular fund that circumvents what I
believe is the spirit of the law in sup-
port of the contra effort in Nicaragua?
A. First of all, it would not be
proper for me to talk about any par-
ticular third country, and so I will not do
that. I did see a report in the press that
during a visit to Brunei last summer, I
raised this issue or sold the Sultan on
transferring funds. That is not correct. I
did visit Brunei. It was the only ASEAN
(Association of South East Asian
Nations] country that I had not visited,
and I wanted to visit each of them, just
as I try to stop in the Pacific island
states and stopped in Palau on that same
trip. But there were no conversations
with any Bruneian during that visit by
me of this matter.
Having said that, let me go on and
say, first reminding you, that in August
1985, Congress approved $27 million in
humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan
Democratic Resistance. The funds were
appropriated in December for obligation
through March 31, 1986. At the time,
the Congress expressly confirmed that,
in addition to expending this $27 million,
the law did not preclude— I'm quoting
from the law that you passed— "activities
of the Department of State to solicit
such humanitarian assistance for the
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance."
So it was a perfectly proper activity
for the Department of State, for me, to
do that. There's nothing illegal about it.
There's nothing improper about it. Quite
the contrary. It was the policy of the
United States, put into place by congres-
sional action signed by the President
after due debate, to provide humani-
tarian assistance and to permit the
Department of State to solicit funds. We
went about it very carefully and con-
sidered it last summer because, with the
delays, you remember, in enacting the
final appropriations— even though both
Houses had voted— the resistance was
having great trouble. They were incur-
ring debts. They didn't have funds.
And so in discussions with Assistant
Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs
Elliott] Abrams, we tried to think
[lai
iliil
i
through where we might properly solic 9^'
some funds. We wanted to be very
careful that we lived completely by the
spirit, let alone the letter, of the law an
didn't get involved with a country whe
it might be thought that we had treme
dous leverage, say, because of our aid
program or something of that kind. So
we were very, very careful about that.
We did successfully persuade one
government to make a contribution. Sc
that is what we did. The discussions wi
the government were conducted by
Assistant Secretary Abrams but with r
authority, explicitly, and I feel very go^
about anything that I can do to suppon
the people in Nicaragua who are fightiii
for the freedom and independence of
that country.
If you don't think it's of any
significance, let me just read you, as a
snippet, a little insight into what's goin
on down there from excerpts from a
report I got the other day from our
embassy in Nicaragua. There are peoplt
in our embassy who have been around.
I'm just reading from this report.
"The Nicaraguan communists
celebrated their anniversary this year (
November 7, exactly the anniversary
date of the Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia. The Soviet motif was nicely caa
ried through as the special foreign
guests here for the 25th anniversary
were taken by the Nicaraguan host nig|
after night to performances of the
Bolshoi Ballet. Fragments of 'Swan
Lake' passed before the eyes of Third
World revolutionaries and rustic Sandij
nistas whose sensibilities to the expreS'
sion and synchronization of the dance
are, to put it kindly, imperfectly
developed. But Nicaraguans are getting
used to all the Kremlin arts, both the
arts of peace and those of war."
Those of you who know our missiop
can probably figure out who wrote this,
"For anyone who has been in
Moscow's Red Square on November 7,
what happened here on that day and tht
next was redolent with similarities
evoking those sounds and sites.
"In Moscow the November 7 parad«
was always worth very careful attentioi
because it tended to reveal both what
the leadership thought it most importar
to say about Soviet society as well as
some aspects of its true nature.
"All of the things present in
Moscow, or almost all, were to be found
in Managua on the day of its parade,
November 8. Just as the Soviet Defens(
Minister begins the ceremonies by takir
the salute of his troops standing in an
open car, before returning to the top of
the Lenin Mausoleum to join his col-
leagues for the march pass, so Humbert
i4
24
THE SECRETARY
foa did the same in Managua to the
'I'ded hurrahs of the troops. Then the
ide began with various Sandinista
s marching in tight, perfectly formed
:ires, using the port arms tradition of
Soviet forces and the goosestep bor-
ed from the Prussians by the last
rs for their household regiments, but
Lir time sharply odorous of Nazi
ades. Then came armored personnel
,i-iers."
Chairman Fascell. Is that a regular
Biision report to the Secretary of
Ste?
A. This is a special-
Chairman Fascell. I think we got
tl drift. Could we just put that in the
r ord?
A. Let me just finish it because I
tl ik you ought to hear it.
"Then came armored personnel car-
r -s, towed artillery, and tanks. The
oy thing missing from the Soviet
ndel was the intercontinental ballistic
n isiles with the warheads painted red
V ich always bring up the end of a
J scow parade.
"The Nicaraguan troops are
L formed exactly like Soviets. The
f rines looked just in from the Baltic
f it at Kronstadt. The infantry forma-
t as could have been Soviet regiments,
I formed and sand-colored fatigues for
1 ^hanistan. The T-55 tank com-
I nders in their leather helmets were
( ectly out of a Soviet-armored division,
I i the reservists carried in Soviet
1 icks with their wide-beamed Soviet
1 mets recalled the motorized rifle divi-
i ns one sees in the western military
( tricts of the Soviet Union."
So that's what's going on down
1 jre.
Mr. Hamilton. We appreciate your
: pearanee here today. As I under-
ind your testimony at this point,
u've said that you personally
posed the sale of arms to Iran. And,
condly, you said that you did not
low of the diversion of any of the
nds to the contras until it became
iblic or shortly there before.
I have two things I'd like you to
imment on. Mr. McFarlane [formerly
ssistant to the President for National
jcurity Affairs] has said publicly, "I
Iked to the Secretary of State
jpeatedly and often of every item in
le relationship with Iran."
Secondly, I'd like you to clarify
tr me what the Administration
elieves the mistakes to have been,
he President has said, "I did not
lake a mistake." And then in his
adio address the other day, he said,
Mistakes were made." I think it's
important for the Congress to under-
stand how the Administration analyzes
this event.
Was the mistake in supplying arms
to Iran? Was the mistake in diverting
funds to the contras"! Was the mistake
in not informing the Congress? Just
what is it that the President referred
to when he said that mistakes were
made?
A. Very clearly, it was a mistake to
get involved in the illegal funds transfer.
That, I think-
Mr. Hamilton. To the contras?
A. To the extent— I don't know the
ins and outs of that. I don't want to act
like a judge passing judgment on what
happened— I don't have the facts— but
from what I have seen and what the
Attorney General said, some things took
place that were illegal, and so that's
clearly a mistake.
I might say it's not only a mistake
because it's illegal, but it has confused
the situation insofar as our support for
the Nicaraguan resistance is concerned
and unfairly to them, because they have
no part in that. So it's a mistake from
that standpoint as well.
I do not know in detail— in fact, I
don't know much at all about the arms
transfers that apparently took place in
the calendar year 1986. I know more
about what took place during 1985, and
I'm prepared in a closed session, based
on documents that I have, cable traffic
and notes that were taken at the time—
and I don't claim that my notes encom-
pass everything that I knew, but I've
tried to stick in my— what I've prepared
for a closed session to things that I could
be pretty confident of, recognizing that
in these things when you go into them
and you are questioned and people
remind you of this or that, it jogs your
memory.
But at any rate, I knew that arms
transfers to Iran were periodically con-
sidered after June 1985 as part of an
effort to improve relations with Iran and
secure the release of our hostages. There
was considerable discussion between Mr.
McFarlane and me about that and, at
least on one occasion that I distinctly
recall, with the President.
I learned— not as a result of being
involved in the development of the plan
but, so to speak, as a plan was about to
be implemented— I learned in various
ways of two proposed transfers during
1985. But I was never informed and had
the impression that they were not con-
summated. I later heard that one ship-
ment had misfired— that is, it had been
delivered, but due to Iranian rejection of
the arms involved was not consum-
mated.
I knew that in December 1985,
following a full-scale discussion of this
matter with the President, that we
instructed a mission that talked with the
Iranians that were the interlocutors, or
representing themselves as the inter-
locutors; they were told on instructions
that we would engage the Iranians in a
dialogue if they released our hostages
but that we would not sell them arms.
That was an explicit part of the instruc-
tion that the President authorized.
So there was, you might say, a
period of time from more or less the
middle of 1985 until this period following
the December meeting in which there
was a fair amount of discussion of the
subject— and I expressed my views dur-
ing that period— in which some things
were apparently structured— I can't tell
you exactly how— but which, so far as I
could see, never came off.
And at the end of this process, after
a full discussion, wanting to see the
dialogue with Iran continue but having
become convinced that there shouldn't
be an arms transfer connected with it,
the instructions that I referred to were
the instructions of the mission.
The subject was reviewed again by
the President in a full-scale meeting in
January 1986. This was not a meeting in
which an explicit decision was stated.
People made arguments. I made my
arguments.
However, I could fairly conclude
from the meetings that the point of view
that I thought had prevailed in
December was not— didn't seem to be
prevailing, but it wasn't as though there
was some sharp decision.
I learned in November that a finding
was made authorizing, among other
things, arms sales, but I was not
informed of that finding at the time, so I
can't tell you anything about the think-
ing that went into the finding as such.
That came as a—
Mr, Gilman. The finding was in
January —
A. The finding was in January, and
I was notified of it at about the same
time as you were notified of it. I did not
learn about any transfers of arms during
1986 in a direct way, but, as is always
the case, you have bits and pieces of
evidence float in, and so I weighed in on
the basis of that, restating my views.
What I heard was conflicting; at times
that there was some sort of deal or
signal in the works and at other times
that the operation was closed down.
And, in fact, the word used at one time
with me was that the people involved
had been told to "stand down."
So, again, there was this ambiguity
from my standpoint. I would say to you
ebruary 1987
25
THE SECRETARY
that I did take the position, in part
because of all the problems that we have
with leaks and recognizing that if the
President's initiative had any chance of
success, it would have to be a secret
initiative for all the reasons that have
been developed— perfectly good reasons—
that whenever I would be called upon to
do something to carry out those policies,
I needed to know, but I didn't need to
know things that were not in my sphere
to do something about.
This past weekend our Ambassador
in Beirut, Mr. John Kelly, responded to
an all-post directive that we put out. We
put out a directive from the State
Department— and I don't have the date
of it, but shortly after this investigation
started— telling our posts to discover
anything that they had about this, to
secure it, and to make it available here
in Washington. So I got a response from
Mr. John Kelly, and I will read his
response.
"I met in Washington in July or
August 1986 with Robert McFarlane
who briefed me on the hostage negotia-
tions involving arms to Iran as an
inducement. Between the dates of
October 30 and November 4, 1986, I had
numerous conversations with Lt. Col.
Oliver North [deputy director for
political-military affairs on the National
Security Council staff] and Richard V.
Secord [retired U.S. Air Force major
general] relating to the hostage negotia-
tions with Iran. During that period I
received and sent numerous 'back chan-
nel' messages to and from the White
House, Admiral Poindexter JAssistant to
the President for National Security
Affairs], concerning the hostage negotia-
tions. Those messages were transmitted
and received in what is referred to as
the 'privacy channel' using CIA
communications facilities.
"In accordance with our standard
practice at Embassy Beirut"— which they
have to do, given the situation there—
"all of that message traffic was
destroyed thereafter at my direction."
That is a standing order in a post like
Beirut— nothing wrong with that. I
would assume that copies may be
available at CIA Headquarters or at the
White House Situation Room.
"With regard to my conversations
with McFarlane, North, and Secord, I
stand ready to discuss them with appro-
priate officials upon the Department's
direction."
I have instructed Ambassador Kelly
to return to Washington immediately,
bringing with him all records of sucli
activities to be available to the FBI and
other appropriate investigative bodies. I
am, to put it mildly, shocked to learn this
after the event from an ambassador, but,
at any rate, I am just reading you this
report.
Throughout the entire period, I
opposed the transfer of arms to Iran
until Iran stopped the war in the gulf,
ended its support for terrorism, and
obtained the release of the hostages.
Throughout the entire period, I fully
agreed with the President's objective of
finding a way to modify Iran's behavior
in a manner consistent with our
strategic interests and those of our
friends in the region and around the
world.
The President has confirmed publicly
that he believed in principle in the light
of all the circumstances that we should
use a limited amount of arms to send a
signal. There are legitimate arguments
to be made in favor of this decision, and
the President has made them, and I fully
accept their legitimacy and the legiti-
macy and propriety of the President's
decision and right to make that decision
and support that.
It's difficult for me to talk about par-
ticular incidents without violating secu-
rity requirements, to give you a full
accounting, which, as I've said, I'm
perfectly prepared to do, but it must be
done in a way that is proper. But I
believe a review of the classified
records— if you go through it with me—
will support the statements that I have
made, and it will also show that my
knowledge of what took place was
sporadic and fragmentary and materially
incomplete. So I'm not the witness to tell
you all of the things that took place,
because I'm not informed.
Insofar as any question— I'm
repeating, but I want to repeat— any
question of diversion of funds to support
the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance,
my knowledge was not fragmentary. It
was non-existent.
Chairman Fascell. The committee
will be happy to receive those
classified documents and hold them in
accordance with the rules of the
committee.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Has the U.S.
Government undertaken a counter-
intelligence review of the Iran initi-
ative and related events to determine
whether the U.S. Government fell for a
covert action by a third country?
A. We are reviewing all of our
efforts, what took place, carefully, and
determining how best to go forward in
support of the objectives the President
has set out and which, as far as I can
see, are broadly agreed to. But we want
to make it clear to Iran that thev cannot
expect any fruitful relationship with u
as long as they fail to exert the influei
that they undoubtedly can to get our
hostages released and to stop terroriS'
Now, of course, bringing the Iran
Iraq war to an end is a very important
objective for us, and we believe that o
tacts with us, or perhaps we can work
with others who do have contacts with
Iran, can bring about some change. Sc
far there's little evidence of it.
But, at any rate, we are reviewing
matters carefully, and what materials
have been denied to us in the State
Department— that is, certain materials
collected by the intelligence communit
were not made available to us— those j
now available to us. This review is goii
forward, as I said, under the general
direction of Under Secretary [for
Political Affairs Michael H.] Armacost
the President's direction.
Mr. Yatron. Did the Inter-
American Affairs Bureau at State hai
any knowledge of or was it involved
the coordination of funds for the con
tras from the Iran arms sales?
A. No. Let me say, not to their
knowledge. If there were some funds p
somewhere that were useful, then they:
were trying to provide— properly-
humanitarian aid when that was
authorized, and, since the $100 million
authorized, they've been involved in
that, and there is an explicit congres-
sional mandate for the State Depart-
ment to play a strong role in that, and
we're trying to do that.
But nobody in our bureau that I
know of, and I'm certain Elliott Abram
and his group, had no knowledge of thi;
Iranian funds transfer question at
all— zero.
Mr. Yatron. Was the bureau awan
of the methods by which the contras
were receiving lethal aid during the
period in which the Boland amendmei
was in effect?
A. We don't presume to know
everything that a person may do
somewhere in the government. It was
clear that from private sources,
presumably, some aid was flowing to th(
people fighting for freedom and indepenc
ence in Nicaragua, and personally I
applaud that. There's a lot of aid flowing
from America to the Nicaraguan commu'
nists. There are quite a few Americans
down there. That's their right to be. Ano
it shouldn't be surprising that there are
Americans who want to help the people
fighting for freedom.
Mr. Yatron. To what extent do
intelligence operatives from other
agencies apprise the bureau of their
itiii
it:
iBl
26
Department of State Bulletii
THE SECRETARY
ivities with respect to coordinating
ding for contra operations, and
s the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
erican Affairs receive such reports?
A. He does, and he chairs the inter-
ncy group that includes people from
)f the agencies involved whose task it
evaluate what is going on and to
;e recommendations, if needed, for
legislation or what our policies
Id be and to oversee the tactics
lived.
Mr. Yatron. From the management
idpoint, are you apprised on a
eular basis of the Department's
iv)lvement in contra operations by
Liistant Secretary Abrams, and do
hie reports include summaries of the
B lligence community's operations?
A. I see reports from time to time. I
e Elliott Abrams frequently, and so I
r to keep abreast of what is going on
sest I can. I have lots of things to
:e ) abreast of, but I do try to stay
rmed and, of course, most impor-
l\ , to see that the people involved
<ti'iing, capable people, and I put Mr.
mis down as one who knows what
1 1, ling.
Mr. Oilman. We appreciate your
a lid response, and you've demon-
t ted once again why so many of us
II he committee have full confidence
n le manner in which you have
If -oaehed this problem,
I'm disturbed about the mistakes
h were made, as many of us on the
mittee are, and I think one of the
sous mistakes is a lack of consulta-
ii . And what I'm concerned about
i( is the disclosures you've made to
16 iince you did have some knowledge
ir since the State Department had
ti wledge prior to the event, why
h e was not consultation with the
A gress. There are several statutes
h require consultation, particularly
5(tion 1.5 of the State Department's
S;ic Authorities Act which sets out
h Department's responsibility to
icp us informed with respect to
Mvities that are within our
lusdiction.
Can you tell us whether you were
aier any constraint, or whether the
D lartment was under any constraint,
w to reveal any of the information
«'h regard to the Iranian arms sales?
.\. No. We were, of course, bound
Iccisions that would be made about
• ■thing that was to be held in con-
nee. But as far as our measuring up
111- responsibilities was concerned, we
I' engaged, you might say, in an
inient about what should be done.
And there were these incidents that
came along that I have pointed up for
you, without being in a position to, for
various reasons— partly lack of
knowledge, partly because of the nature
of the open hearing here— to give you
full information about them.
Mr. Gilman. But once the project
was underway, didn't you feel that the
Department had a necessity of con-
sulting with the Congress with regard
to these initiatives?
A, I don't feel that we should sort of
bring all our internal debates to the Con-
gress, particularly on something like
this. Of course, policy toward Iran,
policy toward terrorism— all of these
basic things that have been laid out, we
have discussed here in the committee
many times.
Mr. Gilman. But I'm not talking
about debate. I'm talking about the
actual operation that was underway.
Once that was underway, and some of
that was brought to the Department's
attention, wasn't there a responsibility
for the Department to consult with
Congress?
A. Perhaps so. I'm not here to claim
that my actions in all this were all that
they should be— you'll have to judge that
for yourself— and I can tell you what I
knew and what I did.
Mr. Gilman. You mention
Ambassador Kelly's report to the CIA
but a failure to report to your office.
Is that an unusual or a unique situa-
tion or something that's in violation of
any of the State Department's
regulations?
A. I hope it's unique. There is sup-
posed to be— I say supposed to be— a
chain of command that goes from the
President to me— not to the NSC
[National Security Council], to me, and
through the Assistant Secretary, by and
large, to the ambassador. That's the
chain of command-
Mr. Gilman. And is that a violation
then?
A. —and if something comes up that
causes an ambassador to go outside the
chain of command, there needs to be a
good reason. Now, it may be very well
that Ambassador Kelly will say that he
was told on the authority of the Presi-
dent that he was supposed to do this and
that, and I would think that he would
have checked with me to see if that were
so.
Mr. Gilman. Who would enable
such an ambassador to waive that
responsibility?
A. At this point, all I can tell you is
the cable that I got. I don't consider it a
satisfactory situation.
I think we should recognize, how-
ever, what life is like in Washington.
Now, come on, here we are, and who
was it— the Canadian Ambassador-
coined the phrase, "It's never over."
Nothing ever gets settled in this town.
It's not like running a company, nor
even a university. It's a seething
debating society in which the debate
never stops, in which people never give
up, including me, and so that's the
atmosphere in which you administer.
And what I try to do is stay as close
to the President as I can— and I feel very
close to him, and I admire and respect
him tremendously, I think he has trans-
formed the situation— done a marvelous
job. I try to stay very close to him, and I
support his policies. I don't win every
argument, by a long shot, but I am in the
arguments, and when the President
decides something, then I do my best to
make it work.
Chairman Fascell. The evidence is
quite clear, it's very, very — almost
impossible and incredible to bypass all
of the institutions of government and
the checks and balances built into our
system in an effort to drive a policy
decision.
A. I think it's also true that anyone
in this town who does something, let's
say is controversial and who thinks it
can be a secret, should have his head
examined.
Chairman Fascell. I certainly
agree.
A, You should say to yourself, how
is this— how am I going to defend this
when it comes out? It's going to come
out. Now, I personally believe that there
is a lack of discipline in the government
beyond what I remember when I was
here before, which makes it difficult to
operate, and there are things that should
be done secretly and which should not be
consulted about.
I'll give an example. Last September
we were in the final throes of our
negotiations on confidence-building
measures in the CDE [Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe]
in Stockholm, and, clearly, the negotia-
tion was coming toward the short
strokes, and the Soviets were beginning
to adjust their position. And it was
clearly the time in the bargaining when
we should try with our allies to strike a
deal if a good and reasonable deal in our
interests was available, and we felt it
)ruary 1987
27
THE SECRETARY
And so with the President's author-
ity, we changed our instructions to our
ambassador to give him some negotiat-
ing room. The new instructions promptly
appeared in The New York Times, about
the same time they arrived for our
negotiator. So that pulled the rug right
out from under him. You give away his
negotiating position. You don't want to
tell the other side that you're willing to
do X; you want to hold that and get
something for X. And it just drives you
crazy. The ambassador got it straight-
ened around, and we wound up with a
good deal, but it was a very embarrass-
ing and deleterious incident. And, of
course, it makes other countries feel,
how can they deal with us when we have
no capacity to do anything in a properly
secret way. There are lots of things that
have to be that way, and which you
shouldn't be consulted upon, because
there's no need for that.
Mr. Solarz. For 6 years, the
Administration has said it would never
yield to the demands of terrorists, pay
ransom for hostages, or sell arms to
states that sponsor and support ter-
rorism. It now turns out that we have
done all three.
How could this have happened,
how much damage has it done to our
credibility, and what assurances can
you give us that it won't happen
again?
A. The President decided to give a
signal. I'm just quoting the President
here. He's made a public statement of
what he authorized and why, and he has
acknowledged that in doing so, he
recognizes that there were risks as well
as potential benefits, and he had to
weigh that.
Right now, because of the way this
has blown up, the emphasis is all on the
risks. I dare say that if somehow we had
our hostages all returned, and we saw a
different kind of situation in one way or
another emerging in Iran, and this came
out, people would say, "Well, the Presi-
dent showed guts. He took a risk, and he
knew that if it didn't work out, he would
get panned, but he did it for a good pur-
pose."
So I've told you what my opinion
was, but I believe the President's deci-
sion was a perfectly legitimate decision,
and at this point, perhaps in part
because it all has emerged the way it
has, it has not succeeded as he wished.
Mr. Solarz. Were you consulted or
informed about the request of Lt. Col.
North to Ross Perot [U.S. business-
man] to pay $2 million in ransom
money for the release of our hostages?
And is it conceivable to you that Lt.
Col. North would have made such a
request without the approval of the
President or some higher authority?
A. I was not informed. So far as I
know, the President wasn't informed.
But I have no knowledge about Lt. Col.
North's activities in this regard. I think
the offer of Mr. Perot, if that is what
took place— I don't know; I just read
about it— I think it's outrageous.
Mr. Leach. You come before us as
a man of very great integrity. You've
been a good soldier even when I think
many of us considered the Administra-
tion's policies very, very wrong. In the
past, when those of us have differed
with you, the issues have entirely been
those of judgment and policy. It
appears today we have a political crisis
that's become a constitutional confron-
tation.
A. I don't believe it's a constitu-
tional confrontation at all. What the
President has done is move out people
who seem to be involved. He has put in a
new and outstanding National Security
Council director [Frank Carlucci]; he has
asked for the appointment of a Special
Prosecutor; he has said that he will make
available to the Congress and instructed
me to come here and talk to you.
Where's the constitutional crisis? There
is no constitutional crisis.
Mr. Leach. It revolves around the
issue of whether a war can be illegally
prosecuted. But before getting to this,
I was intending to say something fur-
ther, kind about yourself.
A. Please. [Laughter]
Mr. Leach. In this confrontation, it
appears to me that you and the Depart-
ment have stood rather firmly on the
side of law. and I personally think it
would be ironic if your job were placed
in jeopardy. Frankly. I hope it isn't
true that the only thing worse in
public life of being proven wrong is to
be proved right when your boss is
visibly wrong.
A. I don't say that I've been proved
right. It could very well have come out
some other way.
Mr. Leach. It may be the case. In
any regard, my question is aimed at
the future. We all know from history
that leaders, when they're embattled,
sometimes are prone to seek outlets in
belligerency sometimes even more.
My question is, given the great
prospect for arms control, given the
prospect as well that there might be an
island somewhere — potentate
somewhere — that might be bombed,
can you assure this committee that
lit
iSl
there is a good chance that we will ^
seek peace and arms controls, an
anecdote to this scandal, instead of
some sort of outbreak of political or
military crisis?
A. I can assure this committee tb
the effort to deal with the present
Iranian matter that we're discussing
here today is going to have nothing tc
with decisions about arms control or
other activities. Those have to stand c
their feet.
What I was trying to do in my opi
ing statement, and I believe in doing i
was following what both the chairmar
and ranking member were recommem
ing, is to say that in addition to doing
the investigating, the important thing
to get on with the business and to let
people who are supposed to do the im
tigating investigate. But let's not geti
put in the center of all activity so thai
we're paralyzed. We are not paralyze^
We are working hard on all of these
issues, including the issues of arms
control.
There, at least in my judgment,
we're finally getting up and on the tai
at least the numbers of dramatic redi
tions in intermediate-range missiles ol
an equal basis. It really fulfills the
strategy and tactics involved in the
NATO dual-track decision— that was .
big achievement— in getting the numl
up and on the table and the beginning
counting rules and the beginning of
some interstructure for drastic reduc-
tions in strategic arms. That represei
a tremendous advance.
We are a long way from agreeme*
And so our task is somehow to captui
that common ground that we arrived
with the Soviets and capitalize on it. 1
a hard thing to do but we are actively*
trying to do it. Max Kampelman [heab
the U.S. delegation on arms control
negotiations] spent last week in Gene^
with his counterparts, for example.
Mr. Honker. As you know, this
committee is primarily interested in|
the foreign policy implications of tM
activities and, specifically, where
those activities were contrary to V.i
policy: (1) contrary to our official
policy of our government of not ship
ping arms to terrorist nations; (2) cc
trary to this Administration's stated
policy of neutrality in the Iraqi-Iran i
war; (3) contrary to the explicit polit
of the Congress on not giving milita
assistance to insurgent groups whic
were engaged in the overthrow of tli
Nicaraguan Government; and (4) con
trary to the enunciated policy of botl
the White House and the Congress o
efforts to get the allies to quit doing
business with terrorist nations.
k!
tl
1
5
I
28
Department of State Bull n
THE SECRETARY
As the Cabinet officer who is
riponsible for the conduct of this
ion's foreign policy, if you are tell-
us this morning — and I believe all
ous feel you're stating the truth —
tit your role was zero or nonexistent,
t;n how is it possible —
A. My role is nonexistent insofar as
tl apparent reported use of funds
Tierated by sales of arms to Iran and
: diversion of those funds to help the
.varagTjan resistance. I knew nothing
aiiut that. I did not say that I knew
liing about any of the other things.
,, U' to the contrary. I tried to tell you
wat I knew about it.
Mr. Bonker. I appreciate that
c rification. But, nonetheless, many
©these activities were directly con-
tiry to the stated policies of our
g ernment. My question is. how is it
pisible for this duplicitous activity to
gon? In other words, how is it pos-
s le that another agency, aside from
ti State Department, is engaged in
a ivities or operations that are con-
t rv to the official policv of the
I ited States?
Shouldn't the State Department
a ert its natural constitutional,
p per role over the conduct of the
fi sign policy so we don't end up with
c tradictory policies that possibly
c fuse not only our allies but people
h e in America?
A. First of all, the President made a
p 'lie statement explaining his reason-
it for sending a signal, a signal involv-
ii arms transfers that you have
c racterized in various ways and which
h e been widely characterized as such.
T >re is a whole other side to that argu-
n fit which the President presented,
e 'laining to the American people and
tl rou. why he decided to send that
s lal. knowing full well the risks
ii olved but seeking an objective that, if
ilould be achieved, I'm sure that
e rybody would applaud. So that's a
d ision that the President made,
liitimately.
Now, insofar as the State Depart-
nnt is concerned, I believe it is correct
tsay that we do not have a foreign
picy in the State Department; the
resident has a foreign policy. I work
the President. We are engaged in a
H CSS. and I am, by directive and by
cnmon understanding and I hope by
I association with the President, prin-
( al foreign policy adviser to him. But it
i he President's policy. It's always
1 ?n clear to me. and I try to keep it
I. 'ore me in my 10 years of experience
i|a Cabinet officer, that I didn't go out
id get elected. The President did, so
' s the boss. He's the guy that calls the
shots, and I try to help him formulate
policy, and I try to help him execute it.
I believe that the conduct, the opera-
tional conduct, of diplomatic activity
should be lodged in the State Depart-
ment and by and large it is. If there is a
lesson out of all this, insofar as how-
things operate are concerned, I think the
lesson is that operational activities and
the staff who are conducting operational
activities out of the National Security
Council staff is very questionable and
shouldn't be done except in very rare
circumstances.
The example is given of Henry Kiss-
inger's diplomacy with China, and, of
course, that's spectacular. Everybody
refers to it. It was a wonderful thing. On
the other hand, to the extent that it
causes other people to aspire to be
Henry Kissinger, it can get you into
trouble. There's only one. They broke
the mold when they made him.
Mr. Studds. I think we may have
gotten some sympathy from one
another, that is, the committee and the
Secretary of State. All of these years,
we've sat here in great frustration, not
being able to find out what was going
on, and now we learn to our even
deeper frustration that neither the
Secretary of State nor the President
knew what was going on in some of
these cases. I don't mean that
facetiously. I understand and I sense
some of the agony in what you've said.
There is an op-ed piece, as I
suspect you know, today in The
Washington Post by the Director of
Communications in the White House
[Patrick J. Buchanan] which comes
perilously close to saying, and I think
one could say does say, that the end
justifies the means, at least in the case
of American policy in Central America.
Mr. Buchanan says the President
is right. Oliver North is an American
hero, and he says things about his
kidney and spleen and his heart and
his soul and when we cease to produce
soldiers with said qualities, that this
country has gone into an irreversible
decline. He calls them the Billy
Mitchell of this generation. And the
clear message of that piece is that,
thank God, there's someone around
here with guts, notwithstanding what
the law or the niceties of the law may
or may not have been, to do what is so
clearly in the eyes of this Administra-
tion, right.
Last October, Mr. Abrams of your
Department told a subcommittee of
this committee over and over and over
again that the U.S. Government — no
agency, no official of our govern-
ment — had helped to finance or to
facilitate or to direct flights from El
Salvador carrying military supplies to
the contras.
Since that time, as you very well
know, we've had a lot of disturbing
reports. We understand that phone
calls were placed to U.S. officials in
Washington by those involved in the
air supply operations. We understand
that flights were closely monitored by
military officials attached to our
embassy in San Salvador. The same
planes, the air crew, the secret landing
strips were used by the State Depart-
ment to send nonlethal aid as were
used to send the military supplies. Our
ambassador in Costa Rica apparently
unsuccessfully sought permission to
use a small airfield in that country to
assist the flights and all of the flights
involved with the active cooperation of
the Governments of El Salvador and
Honduras with which presumably we
exercise some considerable influence.
I wonder if you could take this
opportunity, first of all, to tell us what
you knew and did not know about the
extent to which the U.S. Government
in that period was, indeed, involved in
these flights. And, secondly, would
you associate or disassociate yourself
from the implicit assumptions of the
column by Mr. Buchanan that the ends
clearly justify the means and that
disobedience and disregard for the law
is justified when in one's own mind
one is as sure as this President and his
subordinates apparently are that they
are right?
A. I don't believe that a constitu-
tional officer has a right to declare
himself above the law. You have to carry
out the law.
In the various Cabinet jobs I've had,
there are a lot of laws that the Congress
has passed that I didn't agree with.
When I was Secretary of Labor, I didn't
agree with the Davis-Bacon Act but I ad-
ministered it as safely as I could. I made
no secret of my view of it. But, never-
theless, you have the obligation to ad-
minister it properly and so on. So any of-
ficer has that obligation, and there is no
way to explain away a turning-away
from that obligation.
I believe I have made myself clear,
reading longer than the chairman
wanted me to, on some stuff about
what's going on in Nicaragua that I
believe, at the emergence on the
American land mass of a Soviet-
communist state, is a threat to our
security, and we need to take it seri-
ously. I believe in the votes of the Con-
gress, that have now put in place the
bruary 1987
29
THE SECRETARY
program that we now have there, has
come to be a general agreement about
that and I fully recognize. Lots of people
here don't.
I believe there has come to be a
perception of what kind of regime the
Nicaraguan regime is and there's very
little argument about that.
So to the extent that I can properly
lend a hand to the Nicaraguan
resistance, you can count on the fact
that I'm going to do it.
As I testified earlier, in response to
a question about assistance, I also
pointed out that that was done abso-
lutely in accordance with the law, and I
quoted the law to you.
Now, as far as activities are con-
cerned and exactly how they went on,
I don't try to keep track of all of that
although I try to stay generally
informed. I think that you have to
recognize that the program of humani-
tarian aid, which was voted by the Con-
gress, necessarily has to get delivered to
the people for whom it was intended.
Right? We ought to get it there. You've
got to account for it as best you can, but
you've also got to get it there. If you
didn't get it there, just kept it in the
warehouse, you would not be carrying
out the intent of the Congress. So you
have to have some means of flying it in,
dropping it off, or whatever. That's part
and parcel of what the intent of Con-
gress was, and there should be no prob-
lem about that.
Intermixing it with arms is a prob-
lem, but I don't see any reason why
there's anything wrong with an ambas-
sador trying to see how he can help
arrange, or a military officer seeing how
he can help arrange, to have these
authorized materials delivered to the
people they were intended to serve.
Mr. Roth. I think one of the key
concerns the American people have is
this concern, for example, of the
secret Swiss bank account. When you
visited Brunei — the Sultan — did you
know about that bank account at that
time last June?
A. I had no discussion of this matter
with the Sultan or anyone else in Brueni.
Mr. Roth. Right. I know you had
mentioned that to begin with. But did
you know of that account at that time?
A. I knew there was a way in which
a contribution could be made. Obviously,
a country that you go to is probably
going to want to do that secretly and so
you have to have a way of doing it. I
knew that there was such a way because
we had been discussing the subject and
trying to figure out, pursuant to the law
and in accordance with the law, how we
30
might get some funds to people who, at
least as far as we could see, were
desperately in need of some.
Mr. Roth. How did you learn about
this if it wasn't a Swiss bank account
but there was some method? When did
you first learn about that? Was that at
the very origin of this episode?
A. You've gotten me sworn all the
way to Sunday here. I have to be kind of
careful how I answer. This is sort of off
the top of my head, this question. But in
the middle of the year, we had some dis-
cussions about the desperate need of the
Nicaraguan resistance for funds. We
were all aware of the fact that the
Congress— each body had voted funds,
you remember, but the parliamentary
situation was such that the flow of funds
was delayed so we were trying to figure
out how can we properly and legally do
something about it.
Mr. Roth. When you say "we,"
who is "we?"
A. "We" is me and my colleagues in
the Department. Elliott Abrams, of
course, had the lead responsibility, and
others in the Department took part in
the discussion as we properly should.
Mr. Roth. You had mentioned on
numerous times that you talked to the
President and you were opposed to
this policy.
A. No, I wasn't opposed to this
policy. I was very much in favor of the
policy of helping the Nicaraguan
resistance, which is what you're asking
me about.
Mr. Roth. I'm talking about the
arms to Iran.
A. I was in favor of the objectives
that the President was trying to achieve.
I was opposed to and very skeptical
about the use of arms in that connection.
There are lots of things that we can
argue back and forth about, and there
are legitimate arguments on both sides.
Mr. Roth. In this episode, we are
going around in circles so often, I was
wondering, you had the President's
ear. Do you think that it would be wise
for the President to call the people in,
whether it's Poindexter, North, who-
ever was involved, and say, "Okay
fellows, what are the facts?"
A. I certainly would welcome find-
ing out what the facts are, and I think
the sooner people can get the facts the
better. I don't know what the proprieties
are. Both those people have sought
counsel, as they're entitled to do as
American citizens. They have apparently,
on advice of counsel, decided that they
are not going to discuss their activities.
Maybe the President could persuade
them otherwise. I don't know whethei
it's proper to do that or not. I see hal'
you are lawyers. I'm sure you would
have a better opinion on that than I.
But I would like to see, as a citize
let's get the dope out here, deal with
wrongdoing where it's found, and let
get on with the nation's business. Thi
what I'm trying to focus on.
Mr. Mica. You appointed me to
your commission on terrorism. I
served on it for 18 months.
A. And we appreciated your serv
You were a strong, effective, and gooi
member of that.
Mr. Mica. I thank you, and I app
ciated the opportunity. But I just
would say that I feel somewhat
betrayed, as I indicated to you, that
for 18 months, we were told that co
cessions were the only sure way to t
more acts of terrorism. And, indeed
now we see that concessions were
separate route.
A. If I may just interject. The Pn
dent has repeatedly said that it was m
his intent to swap arms for hostages. .
When you have something that has a .
variety of objectives to it, these thingj
can get mixed up. But, at any rate, he
has stated his objective, and you knov'
that because you've heard it.
Mr. Mica. I understand that. Bn
note, for instance, that eight times I
your 12 pages, or 13 pages, of
testimony, we talked about fighting
terrorism.
A. I'm very big on that.
Mr. Mica. For 24 months, we
worked on a bill and the group wor!
together, and we find the combined
wisdom of every group that I worke
with and you worked with recom-
mended against this type of proposa
would just indicate, too, as I recall.
Col. North sat on— and sits still on-
the interagency group to combat
terrorism.
A. I don't think he sits still. He's
never sat still.
Mr. Mica. He sat on it. [Laughte
I think you're right there.
Obviously, at that time, he was
telling us the information or giving P
information to the State Departmen
or not carrying back what had been
said. Three quick points I have,
though. You have revealed here tod;
that we have either a rogue ambassa
dor or one who was directed not to tl
you. I don't know what the situatiori
but I hope you can report to us as to
what is done about that.
I
Department of State Bull
THE SECRETARY
i. I've already reported to you that
ent out an all-post directive
iptly. He responded fully and in
I faith, and he has been—
fjtfr. Mica. But we don't know who
itcted him not to talk to you.
\. -and he has said that he's ready
aki' his information available. So
t find out.
VIr. Mica. The Miami Herald has
»l rted yesterday that the U.S. Gov-
rment had direct information that
rt paid $2 million, I believe, for the
iing of our Marines in Beirut, and
?(iad this information at the time
ji this policy was initiated. Is that
nect?
V. I'm going to pass on that,
u,~,c it's a very specific question, and
V nt to be sure that you can get an
cn-ate answer.
The fact of the matter is that Iran is
' mtry on oiu- terrorist list. We know
any acts of terrorism with which
111 one way or another seems to
I heen connected— and connected can
( ill' training people, providing funds,
iding eiiuijJiiient, providing safe
11. as well as some specific acts, such
V VA Al case that the British courts
Nrought forward. So there are a lot
[H'CtS to it.
Now, it does seem to be true that for
'.■ period of time, over a year, there
■n't Americans taken in Beirut, and
ic lere was some evidence— I think the
Pi iident has pointed to that— that con-
:e ably shows the beginnings of a modi-
Be Jon of Iranian behavior. But at least
as le information that I have suggests,
■y Iranians at least in some fashion
lieen involved in the most recent
II age-taking of Americans, and they
ai involved in cases with other coun-
.. And I make the point to you that
ia\e to be, of course, particularly
■crned about Americans. But if we're
iH to have an impact internationally
ic fight against terrorism, we've got
\>-\x it internationally, and we've got
'• as concerned about terrorist acts
ij inst others as we are against
01 selves.
Mr. Wolpe. You indicated in the
C( rse of your remarks with respect to
tl arms transfer to Iran, that when
y disagreed with that tactic and
V h the transfer itself, that you felt it
w 5, in fact, a legitimate foreign
p icy question, and it was legitimate —
I link it was your words— that the
F I'sident consider that approach.
\ luld your view be the same if it were
t be found that that arms transfer to
I n, particularly the one that took
place before the January finding, was
in violation of American law?
A. I've gone over that question of
violating the law. There isn't any
authorization on anybody's part to
violate a law. There are certain constitu-
tional rights the President has, and
there are various directives dealing with
this subject, including directives in the
national secui-ity field as distinct from
the direct arms transfer field.
Mr. Wolpe. Why then would it be a
legitimate question for the President
to consider an arms transfer if it, in
fact, were in violation of the law?
A. First of all, there is the question,
should we seek privately in some manner
designed to be as effective as possible
some different kind of arrangement that
we hope might change behavior in Iran?
The answer to that question was thought
by the President's advisers, including
me, to be yes, and as the discussion has
proceeded and listened to [by] Members
of the Congress and others, that by and
large people agreed that's the proper
thing.
Then the question comes, should the
possibility of change in our willingness to
sell arms, at least to the extent of giving
a signal, be in play tactically? So that
can be debated back and forth, and the
President has said publicly that he
judged that the objective was worth giv-
ing the signal. And I've said that's a
legitimate judgment to be made.
Having made that judgment, you
have to see to it that you execute it in a
proper way, and I presume that was the
thinking of the Attorney General and
others in the January finding.
Mr. Wolpe. Should there ever be a
covert policy in conflict with the overt,
open policy of the U.S. Government?
A. You have multitracks often in
your policy, and I don't think that
they're necessarily in conflict. You try to
complement one with the other. Some
may say they are in conflict but—
Mr. Wolpe. We had an open,
public, in fact, established statutory
policy of not providing arms to
nations, and Iran is specifically on the
list of nations, that condoned or prac-
ticed state terrorism.
A. We also have other statutes on
the books, and we have authorization
under the— whatever it is— the National
Security Act to do things in connection
with other objectives. So it isn't as
though the statutes of the United States
give a clear and unambiguous picture
with one not conflicting in any way with
others.
Mr. Wolpe. Have you any
knowledge of the use of proceeds from
the sale of arms to Iran in Angola,
Mozambique. Ethiopia, or any other
African country in line with the
reports that have been made in The
New York Times that high U.S. offi-
cials have found some evidence that
money was transferred, at least to
Angola?
A. I have no knowledge of that, just
as I have no knowledge of any transfer
to the Nicaraguan resistance. My warn-
ing flag went up once when I heard
about an arrangement that I was told
was not any such arrangement, that
seemed to suggest that there might have
been something going, not necessarily to
Angola, but to other countries.
Mr. Wolpe. In Africa?
A. In Africa. But this did not have
in mind anything like what seemed to be
described or what we're learning about
the rontrn fund diversion.
Ms. Snowe. Your presence is very
important here today, because, obvi-
ously, we need to understand the deci-
sionmaking process that led to the
decisions concerning the arms ship-
ments to Iran through all the diversion
of the funds to the contras.
There are several issues that
worry me that, obviously, cannot
entirely be addressed here today, but I
think these committee hearings are a
beginning. Some of these issues can-
not be cured by legislative remedies,
because it's a question of trust— trust
in the executive branch to implement
the laws that were enacted by Con-
gress, trust by the President and the
American people that those people in a
position to implement the laws and the
policies will, in fact, do so.
I'm concerned what spawned a
mechanism within the executive
branch that would focus on circumven-
tion of law or to disregard the trust
that's necessary between the
legislative and the executive branches
as well as between the government
and the American people.
You said here today that you made
certain arguments before the Presi-
dent on your January 7 meeting con-
cerning the arms shipments to Iran.
What I would like to know is, when
you made those arguments, I'd like to
know what they were, and were you
opposed to the arms shipments to Iran
because it was bad policy or because it
represented a violation of the law?
And, secondly, I'd like to know
what the President's response was to
your argument and specifically if it did
entail violations of the law.
Fjiruary 1987
31
THE SECRETARY
And, finally, you said that you
were not aware of the arms shipments
to Iran until November when we were
all informed. But at the same time you
had fragmentary knowledge that this
might be occurring. Didn't you think it
was your responsibility as the Secre-
tary of State to follow up on that
information to find out exactly what
was going on, and also didn't you feel
that responsibility to raise your con-
cerns again with the President, know-
ing that you had some information that
bears upon this issue in providing
arms shipments to Iran?
A. You've asked me— I lost track-
about 50 questions.
Ms. Snowe. I'll go back.
A. Maybe you could identify the one
you want me to answer.
Ms. Snowe. I want you to answer
on what basis did you make your argu-
ments to the President? What were
your arguments? On what basis did
you make your arguments? Was it on
the basis of thinking it was bad policy
to send arms to Iran, or, secondly,
because it was a violation of the law,
and what was the President's response
to those issues? And, finally, why
didn't you attempt as Secretary of
State to find out and follow up on the
fragmentary knowledge that you did
have on arms shipments to Iran that
were occurring?
A. First of all, insofar as the law is
concerned, the finding is the way of deal-
ing with that issue, and it is, so far as I
know, a lawful finding, and under that
finding what was done, so far as I know,
was legal. The Attorney General was
involved, and so that's the answer to
that question.
Insofar as the diversion of funds is
concerned, if that took place, then that
was not a legal thing to do. That was a
violation of the law. The President has
made it clear that that was not his policy
and was not something that he knew
about. So that's the answer to that
question.
Ms. Snowe. I guess what I'm ask-
ing you is whether or not you men-
tioned to the President on the Janu-
ary 7 meeting that the arms shipments
to Iran could represent a violation of
the law?
A. The question of the law was
raised in the major discussions, and the
point was made, and I think everyone
agreed, that if anything is to be done, it
has to be done in accordance with the
law.
However, that's not— and I don't—
that you sort of take for granted. That's
a necessary condition. But the focus of
attention, insofar as I was concerned,
was primarily on what the arguments
were— and are— against an arms ship-
ment to Iran— the policy implications of
it. They've been well brought out, just as
the President's side of that argument
has been well brought out. It's
debatable, and it was debated, and one
of the things the President does do on
issues is hear the debate, so it's a
legitimate debate. I don't need to review
all the arguments, you know what they
are; half of the questions here have dealt
with them.
Insofar as was I energetic enough in
trying to find out what was going on and
keeping— weighing in on it, you'll have
to judge that for yourself. I, obviously,
as in anybody, you search back and you
say to yourself, "What could I have done
differently that might have changed the
situation?" At times when I learned
about something that I thought was way
off the rails, I did weigh in, and there
were a number of places in the chronol-
ogy of this in which it seemed to me that
the negotiations that tended to have
arms connected with them had stopped—
had been stood down. So I was glad to
know that. I gave an example of one in
the December instructions.
I am perfectly willing to accept
criticism for not doing as much as
perhaps I should have done, and I wrack
my brains about that— kick myself here
and there. Probably more critical of me
than you are. I'm kind of a tough critic
on myself.
Mr. Gejdenson. During these
discussions with the President, was
there concern raised about the
notification provisions to Congress?
A. Of course, I didn't know about
the finding. It's the finding that had
the— and that is a legitimate thing in
delaying notification-
Mr. Gejdenson. Correct —
A. But I was not involved in that
debate, so I can't really- I'm not the
right person to ask that question to.
Mr. Gejdenson. So you're saying
that the discussions that you were
involved in, at no time was there a dis-
cussion about the necessity of the
President or the President's people
notifying the appropriate committees
before Congress?
A. There was a discussion of the
legalities and the importance that
whatever was done be done properly and
legally.
Mr. Gejdenson. And in those
discussions, did somebody say at some
point, "You've got to go to Capitol
t
Hill and tell them what's going on
here?"
A. Certainly.
Mr. Gejdenson. And was there c
cern raised about the —
A. That's part of the process tha
established in any arms transfer
situation.
Mr. Gejdenson. And in that disc
sion, was there a timeframe discus
that we have to do this within a cer
tain amount of time?
A. I don't recall the discussion w
enough to respond to your question fv
and I was not involved in the discussl
that took place among those who put
together the finding and implementeo
so I can't really help you on the inter-
pretation of that particular phrase.
Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe t
18 months is timely notification oft
appropriate committees of Congress
A. This goes back to last January
It's not 18 months— that finding— and
the people who have been involved an e
that the President properly had that
right, and I think that's established.
Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe ti t
an 18-month delay in notification of
Congress is a timely notification?
A. The finding was not 18 month
ago. It was in -January, and there was i
ongoing-
Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe t ;
9 months is a timely notification?
A. —process that I was not by an
means fully aware of, and the problen
that the people conducting it continua
faced was, if our chances of success ai
to be maximized, this must be done
secretly.
Mr. Gejdenson. I understand the
concern —
A. They confront the fact— I don'
say this as a comment about the Con-
gress, but they confront the fact that ;
you add additional people who are
knowledgeable about what is going on
you increase exponentially the risks of
the secrecy being blown.
Mr. Gejdenson. Colleagues are
pointing out there's a significant
amount of activity before the finding
but I want to put all that aside. We
understand what the law is. The law
says there has to be a timely notifica
tion of Congress. When that became
law. Presidents understood the prob-
lems that as you increase the number
of people that know, you increase tht
possibility word may get out.
But we have the law to deal with
and if part of the work of this commi
tee is to make that law more workabi
32
Department of State Bullei
THE SECRETARY
less what we have to find out is,
.t do you consider to be a timely
ification of Congress within the
A. So far as I know, there have been
instances where a deviation from
r notification and consultation has
m place. One was the case in Presi-
t Carter's Administration of the
rt to have a I'escue of our hostages in
and that was carried out without
r notification, so I understand it. on
;tly these grounds— that if you
fy— the more people you notified, the
■e chance of leakage, and so on. I
n't involved in that, but that's what
been told.
This again was a case where the
P'sident felt that this could not be done
licly. If it were to be done, it had to
Iniie secretly and that if it became
ic, you would jeopardize the effort,
, 'lU would jeopardize the lives of
.' nf the people involved. So it was
irently ongoing. I'm not the person
;'stify before you about the ins and
nf this, but it was ongoing. And
r were— and judging from the cable
II Ambassador Kelly, right until very
Mily— prospects of something dif-
tit happening. So that is the reason
.^ the notification didn't take place.
Mr. Solomon. I see the time is
a roaehing. You just have a few
n lutes, and you have to leave, and I
u lerstand that, and I will probably
r erve my questions. What I wanted
t io in the first place was to devote at
1( iit half of this time to an executive
s sion, because I really think that the
c imittee has the cart before the
h se. It seems to me that you are put
i; I very extenuating circumstance, as
V 5 President Reagan when he held a
p ss conference not so long ago and
V s severely criticized by the press,
b ause he had to be very careful
a lut what he said publicly because of
1 al restraints on classified informa-
t ti. And I think that all of us should
Ke had that information under our
t ts before we subjected you to
8iwer the questions. I think we could
li'e properly approached the
tBstion.
So I want to commend you. You
low, you and I have differences on
» ues such as the China-U.S. com-
I inique. I disagree with the Presi-
' nt occasionally on things. But you're
eking with the President, and Fm
eking with the President, because I
lieve him and I believe in him, and
il save my questions for the executive
ssion.
Chairman Fascell. I want to thank
you for joining us today, and, as you
can tell, more questions have been
raised than can be answered right
now. But we appreciate your
willingness —
If members would like to [present
questions in writing to the Secretary],
we'll make the record available for
that purpose. I would hope, however,
that we can continue this more in
depth in the executive session, but I'll
certainly — the gentleman has a right
to submit questions at this point.
Let me say. first of all, Mr.
Secretary, that we thank you very
much — your willingness to tell us all
you know. It seems quite clear at this
point that you can't run foreign policy
successfully by bypassing your Secre-
tary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
National Security Council, and the
Congress. You might be able to do
something in secret for a short period
of time that is essential to the security
of your country, but without waiting
for all of the evidence to come in, it is
quite clear already that an operation of
this size, having this sensitivity, and
impacting on so many laws of the Con-
gress and fundamental decisions of
our society with regard to checks and
balances and wisdom that is available
is not a good way to operate.
I'm sorry, frankly, that you've
been put in that position as Secretary
of State, because I know that you've
done your level best to administer the
laws and to be faithful and loyal to the
President of the United States. But
this is a country of laws and not of
men, and as you have said yourself, no
one — no one — is above the law. So
we'll wish you well on your trip, and
we'll see as soon as we can get
together on a date to continue this
matter with the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee in executive session.
'Members of the committee who par-
ticipated in the question-and-answer session
with the Secretary were Chairman Dante
Fascell (D.-Fla.). Gerald B.H. Solomon (R.-
N.Y.). William S. Broomfield (R.-Mich.), Lee
H. Hamilton (D.-Ind.). Benjamin A. Gilman
(R.-N.Y.), Roliert.I. Lagoniarsino (R.-Calif.).
Gus Yatron (D.-Penn.). Stephen .1. Solarz (D.-
N.Y.). Jim Leach (R.-lowa). Don Bonker (D.-
Wash.). Gerry E. Studds (D.-Mass.). Toby
Roth (R.-Wis.). Dan Mica (D.-Fla.), Howard
Wolpe (D.-Mich.). Olympia Snowe (R. -Maine),
and Sam Geidenson (D.-Conn.). The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, I'.S. (jovern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402,
^Press release 258. ■
Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet"
Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
December 16. 1986. by news correspond-
ents in Rome. Bonn. The Hague. Mainz.
London, and Pay-is. The interview was
broadcast live on "Worldnet. " a satellite
TV program of the U.S. Information
Service.'
Q. The Italian public opinion is very
disconcerned because while on one end
the United States criticizes the Italian
behavior of the Achille Lauro affair,
the U.S. Administration itself had
already begun its secret negotiations
with Iran. What's your opinion about
this?
A. My opinion is that we have to
recognize problems in the Persian Gulf
area, and recognize that if it's possible to
see Iran in a somewhat different stance,
to see Iran stopping its use of terrorism,
to see Iran ready to negotiate an end to
the Iran-Iraq war, and to use its influ-
ence to see hostages given up, that that
would be a good thing.
The controversial part of this effort
was the readiness or agreement by the
President to send a signal in the form of
an arms transfer, and there are argu-
ments in favor, as the President has
given, and there are arguments against
which are all on display right now. So
you can argue that point back and forth.
But I want to make it clear what the
U.S. policy is and has been. First of all,
we want to see an end to that war.
Second, we observe that right now it is
Iran that refuses to find its way to a
negotiated solution. So. number three,
our basic policy, which has been reaf-
firmed, even though it had this slight
breakover, oui' basic policy is that we
should not sell arms to Iran and we
should encourage others not to do so in
an effort to deprive Iran of its war-
making capability. And, of course, we
are unalterably opposed to terrorism.
Iran remains on the terrorist list of
countries. And, obviously, as in any
country, we want to see our hostages
returned. That's our policy.
|ibruary 1987
33
THE SECRETARY
Q. Can a repetition of this situa-
tion be excluded in the future?
A. I think so. The President has
stated unequivocally that he considered
it a wise move to give a signal. The
signal has been given and no further
signals are necessary.
Q. [Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy]
Richard Perle spoke in an interview in
the last days about relations between
Bonn and East Berlin. Did he express
your official position of the United
States?
A. I don't want to make comments
on what other people have said. Obvi-
ously, Assistant Secretary Perle speaks
with authority and with a lot of
knowledge. But let me just simply say
this. Our relationships with the Federal
Republic of Germany are strong. Ger-
many is a wonderful ally. It does a fine
job as a contributor to the alliance. All of
us could do more, including the United
States. But as far as I'm concerned, I'm
very well pleased with the relationship
we have in the alliance and directly with
Germany.
Q. Would you encourage the West
German Government to continue the
process of detention with our Eastern
neighbors?
A. I don't quite know— the word
"detention" means to put somebody in
prison or something. But I think you
must mean "detente" or "opening" in
your question, and I'll interpret it that
way.
Certainly, I think that it is
important— and we do it in the United
States— to see if a more constructive
relationship can be developed with the
countries of Eastern Europe. And it's
only natural that the Germans in the
P^ederal Republic of Germany should
want to reach out to Germans in East
Germany.
Q. At the NATO meeting in
Brussels last week, the Dutch
Secretary of State, Mr. van den Broek,
seems to be one of the few Europeans
who supported the outcome of the
Reykjavik summit in respect for the
total elimination of all ballistic
missiles in 10 years.
That part of the Reykjavik out-
come wasn't mentioned in the final
communique in Brussels. Why didn't
you support Mr. van den Brock's
position?
A. First of all, the meeting was
notable for the broad measure of agree-
ment. It was an excellent meeting, and a
very good, thorough exchange. The allies
supported with enthusiasm the work
done at Reykjavik in the intermediate-
range missile area and in the area of
strategic arms.
There were differences of view
expressed about whether or not it is wise
within 10 years to be in favor of the
elimination of all ballistic missiles, as the
President is, and different allies had dif-
ferent views about it. We continue, in
the United States, to support our posi-
tion, which the President has stated and
which some supported— some didn't like
it, some were uneasy, so there was a
variation in view in the alliance on that.
But the communique and the general
discussion emphasized the INF [inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces] and
START [strategic arms reduction talks]
areas and there was great support-
uniform support for that.
Q. In view of the Reykjavik talks,
whether your Administration would be
ready to set up a new set of standards,
about the survival of the alliance:
namely, to consider, first, that the
transition from offensive weapons to
defensive weapons, which is implied
by the development of SDI [Strategic
Defense Initiative], could be managed
in a way which would help the allies
and NATO as a whole not to be left at
the mercy of deals with the Soviets
which would dismantle bits or parts of
all deterrence apparatus.
In other words, would you be
ready, with consultation with your
allies to have a position which would
not leave the Soviets to decide the
numbers and the quantities of the
assets that both Europe and America
need for our survival?
A. Your question wandered all over
the place and with something of an
assertion on your part. But let me simply
state what our posture is, as far as the
alliance is concerned.
First of all, our alliance with the
countries of Western Europe, in NATO,
is the center of gravity and a central ele-
ment in how we approach the security of
the United States. That has been true, it
is true, and it will continue to be true.
Second of all, in carrying out our
side of the bargain, there are certain
things that the United States has as a
responsibility and will carry through on,
continue to do so, and be engaged in.
They are, first of all, to maintain a
strategic deterrent force capable of
reaching the Soviet Union. We fully
intend to do that. Second, to maintain a
large, credible military force on the
ground in Europe. We have been doing
that and we'll continue to do so. Number
three, it's important that we have a
NATO alliance that, so to speak, lives
Jile
and breathes. It studies the contingeri
cies, it revises its plans. When it sees
new contingencies, it conducts exercis
It does all of the things that makes th
things written on the paper a reality ;
we take part in that, give leadership t
it, and are engaged with our allies in
that.
And perhaps most importantly, th
we continue in working with our frieni
abroad, not only in Europe but else
where, at the political workability and
meaning of the underlying values that
bring the alliance forward in the first
place. That is, we all keep track of wh*
it is we're defending and what we hav
deterrence against.
So these are the fundamental tene
that have guided us in the alliance anc
will continue to guide us in the allianC'
We work with our partners very heav^
There has been immense consultation
throughout the past year— I think unp
cedented consultation— and that's the
reason why there is such a broad
measure of understanding and suppor(
among us.
Q. One of President Reagan's
several stated reasons in selling arm
to Iran is his desire to bring an
honorable end to the Iraqi-Iranian
war. It's now reported that the Uni1|
States has been supplying Iraq withf
satellite intelligence in order to
encourage more bombing of Iranian i
economic targets. Is that report
broadly true and, if so, how is such
intervention to be squared with the
President's objective of bringing an ^
end to the war?
A. First of all, let me just reassert
as you stated, that our objective is to t
to bring an end to the war, and we thii
the principal recalcitrant party is Iran.'
And so to the extent that Iran's milita>
capability can be reduced, that pre-
sumably will help bring them to a fram
of mind where they're willing to sit
down with Iraq and try to reach an
agreement. We think the right kind of!
agreement is one that maintains the tet
ritorial integrity of each side and doesr
have, so to speak, a winner and a loser'
As far as matters of intelligence an
intelligence-sharing are concerned, of
course, that's something that I simply
am not free to comment on.
Q. If it is your intention to reduce
Iran's capability, why are you then
increasing it by sending it arms?
A. The President has explained
publicly his thinking, that he felt under
the circumstances that it was importan)
and worthwhile to send a small signal,
which he did. And he has said that the
signal has been given of the readiness o
34
Department of State Bulle
THE SECRETARY
United States to engage with Iran,
no furtiier signals are necessary or
be given. So the question of any
,er arms sales to Iran from the
;ed States has been settled, and
e won't be any more under the pres-
ircumstances.
Q. Many European governments
that a weaker American President
be more open to influence from
g^ess and that the new Congress
be more protectionist than the
^ious one. Recent disagreements in
cultural trade with the European
munity have been seen as a confir-
ni.ion of this trend.
Don't you think that, on the con-
tr|y, this should be a moment for
cl ing ranks, having in mind political
ccuderations?
A. I think certainly in the field of
tr' e, it's a moment for opening trade
: Kire, not closing it down. I per-
illy am very strongly committed to
ilea of opening up the opportunities
rade and knocking barriers down.
t's why the President and all of us
■ lieen such strong supporters of the
( ;.'\TT [General Agreement on
i, ffs and Trade] round which has got-
te started now as a result of the
ral ting in Punte del Este.
.4nd, of course, the reasons why we
I'' United States think protection is
of course, is in part because it isn't
I for our friends around the world
w —many depend upon access to our
m ket.
But most of all, and perhaps this is
ti most reassuring point as far as our
fr ids are concerned, we're against it
t» luse it's bad for Americans. It's bad
ft American consumers. It lets up on
'1 competitive thrust behind moves to
■r costs and make things better on
ii part of American producers, so we
bi afit from open markets ourselves,
! that's the reason why we want to
I ihem that way.
Q. Do you think that the arms sales
a lir applies to every country to per-
ir separate agreements to free
h tages?
A. I think it is a mistake to make
ti les for hostages as normally thought
oThe reasons why it's a mistake are,
t nf all, it encourages people to take
•• tages, feeling that they can get
saething for them. And, second of all,
" n a sense, raises the value in the eyes
lie hostage-takers of the people they
nly hold. So, as a matter of policy
[iractice. we should not be ready to
if anything for hostages. We should
St that they be released and to seek
every way, every pressure, every ounce
of persuasion that we can to bring that
about.
Q. The headlines we've been
reading for a while now of secret arms
sales to Iran, money passed on to the
Nicaraguan contras. secret informa-
tion passed on to Iraq — the German
paper calls it a matter of broken pieces
today. How are you going to mend the
pieces?
A. The President's approach to this
is simple and, I think, correct. It is, first
of all, to get the facts of what took place
out into the open to the maximum e.xtent
possible, or. to the extent you're dealing
with classified matters, into the hands of
properly set-up congressional commit-
tees or investigative bodies, to see if
there were laws broken and by whom,
and to prosecute those who may have
violated the law. So that's one part of
the strategy. It's a very forthcoming,
open, immediate effort on the part of the
President. And I might point out that
practically the minute that he heard
about the possible wrongdoing, of diver-
sion of funds in the contra case, he took
action.
The second part of what the Presi-
dent has said is that, having done that
and sort of said, "Okay, now there's an
area where those things are going to be
pursued." Now, as far as we all are con-
cerned, we have lots of work to do. We
have problems, we have opportunities,
we have work with our allies, so let's
keep at it, and that's what we're doing.
That's why we have been receiving peo-
ple, continuing to receive people here
practically everyday, and why Secretary
[of Defense Caspar] Weinberger was in
Europe and why I was in Europe. We're
conducting the business of the govern-
ment, and that's what we must do.
Q. But the crisis appears to go
deeper. You quoted the President. May
1 quote today's Washington Post — a
headline that reads, "Ronald Reagan's
Government is Disintegrating," and,
indeed, a lot of Europeans are afraid
of the lame-duck effect for the next
2 years. How would you react to such
fears?
A. I've just reacted to it by saying
that the President has put into motion a
way of dealing with this situation, and,
of course, as a result of the first part of
his decision— namely, to have things
brought out— a lot of things are being
brought out. That's not a mark of dis-
integration; that's a mark of a President
who is wanting to see whatever the facts
are be made public.
Now, as far as the business of con-
ducting the nation's business is con-
cerned, we're doing it.
Q. A matter of concern in this
NATO member state is the situation in
Suriname. What do you know about
the human rights situation in
Suriname? Do vou have an opinion on
it?
A. We have reports from our
amlmssador of brutality, of what
amounts to murders, of gi'oss violations
of human rights, and we consider that
the reports are, unfortunately, credible.
So we're quite concerned about the situ-
ation in Suriname, and I know that it's
of great concern to the people of Holland
and others around the world.
Q. Do you think there is any
Libyan involvement in Suriname?
A. I don't feel I have enough infor-
mation to answer that question in a
definitive way. There have been rumors
about that, and there is a certain amount
of information, but I don't consider it
such that I would want to make a defini-
tive statement.
Q. Do you expect that the present
regime in Suriname can restore democ-
racy there?
A. What I can say is that I think it's
very desirable that the people of any
country, including Suriname, be gov-
erned by a process which reflects the
wishes of the people of the country. And
so I would like to see that happen.
Q. After the revelation about the
Iran arms deal, do you feel that you
are now put in charge of foreign
affairs?
A. No one is fully in charge, but we
try to administer this effort very
strongly, and I think basically have it in
hand.
Of course, the person in charge is
the President. It's the President that has
a foreign policy, and I work for him, and
I support him, and I try to help him
shape foreign policy. He takes my advice
lots of times. He modifies it or doesn't
agree with it sometimes, but we work
together very strongly and effectively, I
think, and that continues to be the case.
And it is, of course, primarily for the
State Department to be the executor of
the President's foreign policy, and we
try to measure up to that responsibility
in every way we can.
Perhaps one lesson of this Iran prob-
lem is that's a case where a piece of
foreign policy was administered else-
where, and it would have been better if
it had been in normal channels, in my
opinion.
Q. At the beginning of this crisis,
have you thought to resign?
A. Any discussion of my status, of
course, is for the President and me to
discuss, and it's— I serve at his pleasure.
Druary 1987
35
THE SECRETARY
Q. The advantage of banning all
ballistic missiles is, of course, that
more warning time would be created
and the remaining bombers could be
called back, and so on. and this is a
less hair-triggering situation than
perhaps now is the case.
But how does this relate to
Stealth bombers and fast cruise mis-
siles with Stealth technology, which
cannot be seen at all perhaps, if this
technology works, and could attack
from the blue?
A. I think you very well stated a
fundamental element in the argument
for the elimination of ballistic missiles.
Of course, there are many who hesitate
for good reasons and so there is a
healthy discussion going on in the
alliance about that.
If you don't have ballistic missiles,
you're going to have to have a credible
deterrent, as I said earlier on this pro-
gram, and the United States is com-
mitted to the idea that under the kind of
world we live in, it's important to have
in being a strategic nuclear deterrent
that can reach the Soviet Union, and
we're determined to maintain that
posture, and we think it's one of our
responsibilities to ourselves and one of
our responsibilities to our allies.
Q. Could I turn back to the gulf?
In testimony to Congress last week
you expressed surprise and shock that
your ambassador in Beirut had used
CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]
back channels to communicate on the
Iran issue. You said earlier on this
program you would not talk about
intelligence, but did you know of this
policy of supplying intelligence to Iraq
and logistics support, or was this
another example of the CIA using back
channels?
A. I'm not going to comment on the
intelligence matter, as I said earlier, and
there are some things that I didn't know
about in the overall situation, but by and
large we're well informed.
Q. On that are you saying you did
not —
A. I might say with respect to—
Q. — know about certain matters
as supplying intelligence to Iraq?
A. I am not going to answer a ques-
tion about the supply of intelligence to
somebody by inference.
Q. In line with State Department
policy. Mr. Shultz—
A. A very skillful question, but I'm
not going to step into that hole.
Q. — comment on one quote in one
of the papers this morning suggesting
that in the gulf the State Department
is trying to engineer a stalemate in the
gulf war?
A. We're not interested in a
stalemate. We're interested in an end, so
that it stops; that the territorial integri-
ty of each country is maintained, and
people can go about the business of
economic development for the people of
their country.
Q. What's your opinion about the
careful approaches being made by Italy
toward Libya?
A. Libya has established itself as a
state that virtually brags about its sup-
port for terrorism, and there's no doubt
about it. And the evidence accumulated
by various European governments of
Libyan plans and Libyan activities make
it very clear about what the Libyan
posture is.
Obviously, you want them to chai ,
but I think in the meantime the policj f
isolating a state that does that is the
right policy.
Q. CIA and NSC [National Secuiy
Council] seem to function like a stai
within a state. How can these agen( s
be controlled, never to endanger agi,
the Presidency to the point that it's^
now happened?
A. I thmk you're jumping to a lot
conclusions in that question, and they
are. of course, subject to congressiom
oversight and presidential oversight, ;
basically are designed as service agen;
cies; that is. their function is to provio
intelligence to others who have the
responsibility for policy development
operational matters. That's the way it
should work.
iPress release 264 of Dec. 17, 1986.
Southern Africa:
American Hopes for the Future
Secretary Shultz 's address before the
International Management and Develop-
ment Institute on December J,. 1986.'
Africa's leaders know, and I know, and
you know, that the United States and
the West are uniquely relevant to their
problems in southern Africa. Why is
that? It's because our enormous wealth
of managerial, technological, and finan-
cial talent and resources symbolize the
success story of the West. So at a time
when southern Africa is poised on a
knife-edge between hope and despair,
you represent hope. So you represent
why we are a nation of builders, and it's
for this reason that I come here, and I
welcome this opportunity to discuss our
policy toward southern Africa, a region
rich in potential but beset by turmoil. If
southern Africa slides into conflict, all
the peoples of the vast region— some 150
million— will see their hopes for a better
future destroyed, and major American
interests— political, economic, and
strategic— will be jeopardized.
The LInited States sees the potential
for a hopeful future southern Africa. We
are convinced that there are constructive
alternatives to violence, and we are try-
ing to turn this positive vision into
reality. Today, I want to lay out the
Administration's policy toward the
region in detail and examine it against
the backdrop of present-day South
African realities.
The United States has had a consi^
tent commitment to peace with justice
southern Africa. This is demonstrated
• Our positive emphasis on what
are for, as well as what we are agains«
in southern Africa;
• Forthright insistence that an
effective American policy must be basi
on a diplomatic effort; sanctions by
themselves do not represent a policy;
• Strong conviction that Americat
business and investment can play a co
structive role in South Africa and the
region;
• Substantial U.S. regional assist-
ance, including the President's new
southern Africa aid initiative; and
• A clear challenge to all the leadt
of southern Africa to build a better
future rather than destroy the region
through a self-defeating descent into
violence.
The premises of our policy were
reexamined in the domestic debate tha
preceded the latest round of U.S. sanc-
tions. That debate once again made cle
that the principles underlying this
Administration's policy— many of whio
are codified in the Anti-Apartheid Act
1986— are shared by all Americans. Th'
recent controversy over sanctions was,
thus, over the means, not the ends, of
our policy. The Administration's doubts
about the utility of punitive sanctions
were, and are, serious. Nevertheless,
36
Department of State Bulle
THE SECRETARY
y are the law of the land, and we will
brce them.
At the same time, I sense a growing
lization, here and in the region, that
ctions by themselves do not amount
in effective policy in southern Africa,
must now use all the instruments at
disposal to make our limited influ-
;e count. In a word, the time ahead is
i for diplomacy guided by a long-term
IV of our interests and objectives in
thern Africa.
|]pes for the Future
F'sident Reagan has expressed clearly
,4ierica's hopes for the future of South
-'■ica.
This Administration is not only. . .against
1 rtheid; we are for a new South Africa, a
nation where all that has been built up
'• m'lierations is not destroyed, a new
s ety where participation in the social.
c ural, and political life is open to all
'■ — a new South Africa that comes home
lamily of free nations where it belongs.
~)i<>ke the President.
We cannot prescribe— and we do not
sume to offer— detailed political
'in'ints for South Africa's future. But
ran and should state with precision
It we are for as well as what we are
.iiist. We are/o?' a South Africa
V jse people enjoy equal political,
6 nomic, and social rights. We are /or a
i ith Africa whose leaders are chosen
i lemocratic elections with multiparty
I ticipation and universal franchise.
\ look forward to the day when basic
\ nan rights for each individual are pro-
t ted by firm constitutional guarantees,
i d we strongly support opening the
f e, market-oriented South African
i nomy to all the people of that rich
1 d so that black South Africans can
t lidly redress past economic injustice
i.iising their own living standards
ill- contributing to the prosperity for
This vision of the future of South
'ica is ambitious. It is worthy of our
I ;t efforts as a people. But if the
I ited States is to contribute to a proc-
i of positive change, we have to do
I re than assume a righteous moral
Future. We must reach out to all
i^ ithern Africans and make effective
■ I'f our limited influence. And we
ist measure our hopes for the future
' liiist the background of today's
ilities.
e C ourse of Change in South Africa
e current cycle of repression and
distance in South Africa will resolve
thing. The state of emergency, with
all its attendant denial of civil liberties,
press freedom, and due process under
law, cannot address the root causes of
unrest; it can only undermine prospects
for nonviolent change. Some may believe
that a policy of repression and the prac-
tice of violence will ultimately bring
reconciliation. I disagree. Repression
only deepens black determination to end
the apartheid system that denies them
fundamental political and human rights.
And violence only stiffens white
resistance and undermines those advo-
cating peaceful reform and negotiation.
The South African economy remains
troubled. Businessmen— foreign and
South African alike— will not invest or
reinvest in a society that excludes the
greater part of its citizens from full par-
ticipation. The international banking
community refuses to grant new loans
because of the increased risk and inter-
national condemnation brought about by
apartheid. Unemployment is growing.
Many of South Africa's most talented
and experienced professionals are
emigrating. A siege economy is emerg-
ing, one that features sanctions,
underutilized domestic capital, efforts to
create the illusion of growth by uneco-
nomical import substitution, more and
more state controls, and industrial
unrest. These developments are eroding
the basis for future South African
governments— no matter how consti-
tuted—to meet the country's pressing
social and economic needs.
Many American and other foreign
firms have already decided to leave.
These decisions, induced by the hard
realities of the marketplace, will only
compound the potential for tragedy.
American firms have found it increas-
ingly difficult to stay the course in the
face of a deteriorating political and
economic environment in South Africa
and mounting criticism here at home.
These attacks on American corporate
involvement in South Africa are both
ironic and unwarranted because
American business has been a force for
promoting interracial decency and
equality.
American business has made a
magnificent contribution to South
Africa, committing well over $200
million outside the workplace to provide
scholarships, training, nonracial housing,
and other benefits to their black
employees. Western business organiza-
tions challenge apartheid daily through
their policies and their actions. The com-
mitment of American firms to the
highest standards of corporate citizen-
ship has been an honorable undertaking
of which all Americans can be proud. I
want to make crystal clear that we in the
Administration strongly support those
firms that have taken the tough decision
to stay.
South Africa's troubled economy has
long-term consequences for the coun-
try's political future. There is an organic
link between a truly democratic political
order and a vibrant, free economy.
South Africa's social and economic needs
cannot be met by a stagnant economy.
Such an economy will merely compound
the legacy of apartheid. For all who
aspire to political leadership in the
future South Africa, restoration of a
sound economy should be a matter of
priority concern. And it is no less impor-
tant to neighboring nations whose econo-
mies are inevitably and vitally affected
by events in South Africa.
The South African Government has
brought many of its current troubles on
itself. It has resorted to suppression of
dissent, violations of basic human rights,
denial of economic liberties, and govern-
ment by decree. These abuses have
discouraged the forces of moderation
both inside South Africa and beyond.
Not long ago, a vigorous, independent
press in South Africa often criticized—
sharply and constructively— the govern-
ment and its policies. As recently as the
early months of this year, there was real
hope that South Africans, with the
assistance of the Commonwealth's
Eminent Persons' Group (EPG), might
begin a constructive dialogue about their
country's future. Yet they have not, so
far, taken advantage of these possibili-
ties. Still, there are signs of hope.
• We've seen impressive strides in
the organizational and political
capabilities of black groups in South
Africa. From political movements to
trade unions, from churches and com-
munity associations to business and pro-
fessional organizations, blacks are
preparing themselves for leadership.
They are understandably impatient and
unwilling to wait another generation.
They are ready now to play a positive
role in building a new South Africa. And
the United States stands with them
through our official assistance programs
and the many support programs coor-
dinated by American corporations, foun-
dations, labor unions, chttrches, and
universities.
• In Natal Province, the Indaba— a
convention representing all racial groups
and a wide range of social and political
organizations— has, for many months,
been wrestling on a provincial basis with
the great questions that must also be
addressed at the national level, including
the creation of a nonracial legislature
and the drafting of a bill of rights. The
Indaba has been the only political forum
in the country where blacks could
;bruary 1987
37
THE SECRETARY
participate on equal terms with members
of other races.
The Indaba has now made public its
proposal. It is controversial in South
Africa, as any imaginative compromise
might be. Nevertheless, the Indaba has
shown that South Africans are capable
of difficult mutual accommodation to
advance the cause of racial justice and
representative government when they
are challenged to do so. A recent poll
indicates that three out of four blacks
favor negotiations rather than violence
as a way of ending apartheid. Yet time is
fast running out for those blacks still
willing to play a positive and peaceful
role in building a new South Africa.
• In Parliament, a badly out-
numbered but vocal opposition continues
to call the government to account for its
actions. Those determined South African
patriots deserve our admiration, for they
preserve a parliamentary tradition that
will be vitally important to a new South
Africa.
Until quite recently, it was also
possible for South Africans to take heart
from reforms undertaken by the govern-
ment in Pretoria. Legalization of black
trade unions, repeal of the pass laws,
and relaxation of many other onerous
apartheid restrictions raised hopes that
the government itself might become an
engine of constructive change. These
reforms— as the United States recog-
nized at the time— required real political
courage. But we also recognized that the
dedicated F^oreign Service officer,
Ed Perkins. Ed has as his principal
mission the task of broadening and
deepening our contacts with all South
Africans. He will be making clear to
them that we have no intention of pack-
ing our bags and leaving them to face
the future in isolation. We do not ask
that black South Africans temper their
passion for change. We share it. We only
ask that it be channeled into construc-
tive strategies for reconciliation.
Our contacts with the African
National Congress (ANC) and the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC) and a wide
array of internal black opposition groups
are part of this effort to broaden
American access to all parties in South
Africa. We recognize no single group as
the primary vehicle of black aspirations.
And we make no secret of our deep con-
cerns about the ANC's communist con-
nections and links to Moscow and both
organizations' advocacy of violence.
The existence of these contacts does
not signal American approbation of the
ANC or the PAC. It signals that com-
munication channels are open. And we
are using them to advance the cause of
equal rights, democracy, and constitu-
tional government in South Africa. We
must stimulate the members of these
movements to begin to think seriously
about what theij must do to get negotia-
tions going and to produce a system of
constitutional government acceptable to
all South Africans.
No policy toward South Africa can succeed unless
it is developed within the framework of regional
solutions to the problems of peace and stability in
southern Africa. . . .
South African Government's commit-
ment to reform was tentative and often
qualified; and it did not address the cen-
tral question of black political rights.
Today, the government's reform pro-
grams are being overshadowed by its
preoccupation with maintaining control
at home and its determination to resist
sanctions from abroad and minimize
their effects. The South African Govern-
ment must move urgently to rejuvenate
reform; and its effects must be broad-
ened to encompass a real political
dialogue involving all South Africans.
Delay only invites disaster.
We have just sent to South Africa as
our new ambassador a distinguished and
It is equally important to assure
South Africa's whites of their security as
individuals and as a community. In a
recent speech to the Overseas Develop-
ment Council, the Vice President of
Botswana, Peter Mmusi, put it in this
way:
We do not wish the white people of South
Africa ill. The Afrikaner people have a secure
and important role to play in the future, not
only of their own country, but of the region as
a whole. They have Africa in their blood. We
are part and parcel of each other's history.
Americans can agree with these
words. We share with white South
Africans a heritage of resistance to colo-
nialism, a frontier tradition, and an
appreciation of entrepreneurial enter-
prise in an expanding modern econoirs
Americans admire the economic accoij
plishments of white South Africans an
their commitment to Western political
traditions. Our objective is to encoura
the extension of the full benefits of
citizenship— which white South Africa
so rightly cherish— to all their
countrymen.
The United States is against tyrai.
in all its forms. We reject and oppose
despotism by any name. We will neve;
support the replacement of apartheid
repression in some other form. The
democratic future that all South
Africans deserve must include reliable
constitutional guarantees for the righ*
of majorities, minorities, and individua
If whites begin a meaningful political
dialogue on this basis with all their
fellow South Africans, they will have
firm— I repeat, firm— American suppoi
This is a sober American message
all the people of South Africa in a corr
plex and challenging time. In today's
polarized politics of South Africa, I krt
that this view will satisfy no one com
pletely. But we in the West need to
challenge all the contending parties to
rise above their divisions and the prosi
pect of escalating violence and to
negotiate in the interest of peace and i
better future for all.
Toward Regional Peace and StabilitI
No policy toward South Africa can sun
ceed unless it is developed within the
framework of regional solutions to the
problems of peace and stability in
southern Africa. Leaders throughout i
area are acutely aware that the reper-
cussions of violence in South Africa
would be felt far beyond South Africai
borders. It would imperil Botswana's
democracy and jeopardize hopes for
stability and economic development in
the entire region from Lesotho to Zair
It would undermine American efforts
negotiate a settlement involving Nami
ian independence and the withdrawal (
all foreign forces from Angola. It woul
jeopardize hopes for reconciliation in
Angola and give the Soviets fresh oppo
tunities to pursue their imperial
ambitions.
We have consistently assured the
front-line states of American readiness
to work with them to avert catastropb
and to build for the future of southern
Africa. We are deeply disturbed by
recent South African threats against
Botswana and its other neighbors. Our
condemnation of cross-border attacks
and other destabilizing actions by Souti
Africa is unequivocal, as is our condem'
nation of those who cross into South
Africa to carrv out terrorist attacks.
38
Department of State Bullei
THE SECRETARY
This American stance against
nee among neighboring states in
lern Africa has been explicit in our
ig support for the Nkomati accord
een South Africa and Mozambique.
; agreement has recently come under
;asing strain as the parties have
anged charges of violations of its
r and spirit. We believe the time has
for a lowering of the rhetoric and a
rn to dialogue. The Nkomati agree-
t remains in the interest of both
,h Africa and Mozambique, and we
both parties to fulfill in good faith
■ obligations under it. Similarly, we
ipon Mozambique and Malawi to
Ive their differences peacefully, with
:ct for each other's sovereignty and
ity.
The search for peace and stability in
hern Africa has been made more dif-
|t by the recent death of President
tie! of Mozambique. The United
s worked constructively with Presi-
Machel as he sought to move
ambique toward true nonalignment
la greater role for private initiative
iozambique's economy. We strongly
lorted his decision to sign the
(mati accord with South Africa. And
nope to work with President
»sano and his colleagues to build
I the solid foundation he helped to
as blish. We call upon the South
A can Government, Mozambique's
(A T neighbors, and the international
Cf munity to give Mozambique a chance
tc nd its civil strife and resume its
« lomic development.
At my request, Under Secretary of
" (■ [for Political Affairs] Mike Arma-
will soon be visiting several
licrn African states. He will
'rate our support for the security
ai development of the front-line states
ai our conviction that they have a
< 111 role to play in the drama of
iij,e in southern Africa. The front-line
It i-s have a unique opportunity—
I 'I, a responsibility— to help create
natives to violence and confronta-
iii South Africa and the region. It
serve the interest of no party if they
a fuel to the flames of regional con-
fi itation, aggravating an already
:L;i'rous situation. We look to them to
I' sponsibly in the interest of
1 1'I'ul change in southern Africa. And
1 1 'affirm our readiness to work
■t'l\' with them in that endeavor.
The United States assures the states
-iiuthern Africa that they will have
' I'lmtinuing support as they struggle
li the economic consequences of
1 itical turmoil in the region. President
auan has pledged to present to the
■:t ( "ongress a comprehensive multi-
ibruary 1987
year program designed to promote
economic reform and development in the
black-ruled states of southern Africa.
The Congress has expressed its con-
cern for the region by making the
development of such a program a matter
of law in its Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986.
I want to assure you today that the
President and I are determined to
prepare a good program and to see it
approved. If we want to be taken
seriously in southern Africa, we must
put the resources on the line to make the
President's pledge a reality.
First, our country is united on the
goal of ending apartheid and playing an
active role in helping bring about a new,
democratic South Africa that respects
the rights and promotes the oppor-
tunities of all its people.
Second, this process of change and
negotiation cannot be accomplished by
outsiders. It must be built by South
Africans themselves— even as we offer
our support. And we will support genu-
ine reconciliation and a serious grappling
with the issues. The new South Africa
we hope to see must be based on an
The crisis in southern Africa cannot be
ameliorated by external parties .... unless the
people of the region themselves are prepared to
turn away from violence and toward dialogue. .
The Western Partnership
In this and other aspects of our policy
toward southern Africa, we are not
alone. We have maintained close con-
sultations and coordination with our
major allies in Europe and with Japan.
Our allies have been in the forefront of
positive and hopeful efforts such as the
EPG initiative, which sought to help the
contending parties in South Africa move
toward negotiations. They have joined
with us in calling on both the South
African Government and its opposition
to turn from violence and toward negoti-
ations. Our allies have been as forthright
as we in calling on Pretoria to end the
current state of emergency, to release
Nelson Mandela and other political
prisoners, to unban political parties, and
to set a timetable for the elimination of
the apartheid laws.
This Western partnership will be
even more important in the future. It is
essential that the West speak with one
voice if it is to be heard in the noisy
clamor of contending parties in southern
Africa. The United States is committed
to working together with the other
industrial democracies in this critical
region, and we are sure that our allies
are of the same mind.
Conclusion
So where do we go from here? The key
element of our diplomacy must be clear
to the American people, to our allies,
and to Africans who care so deeply
about this region.
accommodation of interests— not the
replacement of one injustice by another.
Third, our diplomacy will actively
seek to support dialogue and communi-
cation—despite the difficulties posed by
distrust and polarization. We have a
unique interest in communicating with
all parties. We will urge them to create
and exploit all openings for reconcilia-
tion and constructive change.
Fourth, working with our allies, we
will continue to assert a Western vision
of what we favor as the outcome in
South Africa. It is not enough to cam-
paign againut apartheid. South Africans
must know what the West stands /or as
the country redefines itself politically.
Fifth, we believe that the leaders of
southern Africa— whatever their rhetoric
of the moment— want us to be there,
lending a hand. This is the message I
have heard from a wide spectrum of
leaders from the front-line states and
South Africa. Our assistance programs
in South Africa, established under this
Administration with strong support from
the Congress, represent a constructive
accomplishment of which we can be
proud. Our corporate, educational, and
religious leaders have played a vital
parallel role. We intend to sustain our
efforts, and we urge all concerned
Americans to continue their contribu-
tions as well. It is the road of
involvement— not disengagement— that
will bring us closer to our goals.
Sixth, we recognize that South
Africa's evolution is intimately con-
nected to the fate of an entire region.
Accordingly, we are committed to play-
ing our proper role in creating alter-
39
AFRICA
natives to destructive confrontation in
southern Africa. The West must support
this region's economic health and
political viability. And we will continue
our efforts to resolve the long-festering
conflicts that complicate the search for
peace and development. Now is a time
for sober reflection and careful analysis
by all the region's leaders. We can be
effective partners only if they resist the
temptations of violence and the strident
voices of destructive conflict.
Finally, let me share with you yet
another striking word from the recent
remarks of Vice President Mmusi:
We believe that those in authority in
South Africa are made of the very same flesh
and blood as ourselves. They share the same
emotions and intellect as we do. They worship
the same God. It is our hope that, sooner or
later, they will realize the path they have
chosen to travel spells only their own doom.
Peter Mmusi clearly does not view
the drama of southern Africa as a Greek
tragedy already written. I agree with
him wholeheartedly. There is too much
at stake for us to turn away in despair
and let destructive events run their
course. The economic engine created by
the talent and sweat of all the peoples of
southern Africa is too important to be
destroyed by reckless actions from any
quarter. The hopes of all the region's
people for a better life for themselves
and their children are too precious to be
squandered away in futile efforts to
preserve apartheid in South Africa
or by a leftward lurch toward a new
authoritarianism.
The crisis in southern Africa cannot
be ameliorated by external parties—
however powerful and well
intentioned— unless the people of the
region themselves are prepared to turn
away from violence and toward dialogue.
As I look at southern Africa today, I'm
reminded of the Prophet Ezekiel's pro-
verbial call on his people to renounce
their destructive past: "The fathers have
eaten sour grapes, and the children's
teeth are set on edge." The fathers and
mothers of southern Africa have eaten
their fill of the sour grapes of repression,
violence, and retribution for the
mistakes of the past.
The time has come for the children
of every country in that vast and poten-
tially rich region to be freed from this
dread legacy. I pledge today that
southern Africans— black, white, colored,
Indian— who take this course will not be
alone. The United States will stand with
them. If we are true to ourselves, we can
pursue no other course.
South Africa: Toward Peace and Stability
'Press release 256.
by Chester A. Crocker
Address before the Economic Club in
Detroit on December 1, 1986. Mr.
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs.
Thank you for your hospitality and for
the opportunity to discuss with you our
policy toward southern Africa. In the
6 years that I've been responsible for
this policy arena, there have been
periods when we made real progress
toward our goals of strengthened peace
and stability, with democratic govern-
ment and respect for individual human
rights in all the countries of a region of
critical importance to the United States.
There have been other periods when
these goals have seemed more distant as
proponents of violence and extremism
held the upper hand. We are currently in
one of these seasons of uncertainty
about the future of southern Africa, and
any assessment we draw about the
future must be sober.
The Debate Over Sanctions
First, let me say a word about the
debate we have just come through over
our policy toward South Africa. That
debate was hard fought and doubtless
left some bruised feelings on both sides.
It was not, however, a debate about the
fundamental objectives of our policy.
This is best illustrated by the fact that
the policy objectives set forth in the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986 parallel closely the goals set forth
by President Reagan, Secretary Shultz,
and other senior officials of this
Administration.
Our major difference with the Con-
gress concerned the mix of policy instru-
ments most likely to move South Africa
toward the early end of apartheid and its
replacement by a new, truly democratic
South Africa with effective protection
for the rights of majorities, minorities,
and individuals. We forthrightly stated
our conviction that the adoption of indis-
criminate, punitive sanctions would not
help achieve our objectives. Majorities in
both Houses of Congress did not agree.
Those sanctions are now the law of the
land, and we are implementing them. At
the same time, Americans on both sides
of this debate are coming to realize that
sanctions do not amount to an effective
policy toward South Africa. As Secre-
tary Shultz said at the swearing-in of
our new Ambassador to South Africa,
iJ:
Ed Perkins: "It is time to raise our
once again to the horizon and to mo
ahead."
Unfortunately, the horizon in Sc
Africa and the region is turbulent w
storm clouds of violence and polariz(
confrontation. In response to inter
national sanctions, the South Africa,
Government has retreated further ir
self-imposed laager of repression an
anti-American sentiment. The police
presence in black townships and res-
tions on press freedom have helped
scenes of violence off our evening nt
telecasts. But the cycle of repressior
violent resistance continues. In rece
days, we have seen further forced
removals of blacks and new detentio
antiapartheid activists, including pre
nent churchmen. In both the black a
white communities, extremist voices
dominate the debate, and moderates
having to shout to be heard.
Tensions between South Africa ii
its neighbors have also risen dramat
cally. South African military spokesi
have openly threatened Mozambique
Botswana with armed retaliation un
these countries satisfy Pretoria that
are taking effective steps to halt cro
border guerrilla operations against
South Africa. For its part, Mozambii
has threatened action against neighl
ing Malawi unless that country halts
alleged assistance to the RENAMO
[Mozambique National Resistance M
ment] insurgency against the Maput
government. Zambia and Zimbabwe
considering possible economic sancti
of their own against Pretoria, knowi
that such moves only invite potential
severe South African retaliation. In
Angola, a civil war fueled by Soviet ;
and Cuban troops drags on, even tho
military victory is clearly beyond the
reach of either side.
Efforts To Promote
Peace and Stability
Against this bleak backdrop, questior
have arisen about our ability to make
positive contribution to peace, stabili
and democracy in southern Africa. T)
South African Government has
responded to the congressional impos
tion of sanctions by imposing someth
of a chill in our bilateral relationship.
This is perhaps best exemplified by
Pretoria's attacks on our economic
asistance program in South Africa.
40
Department of State Bu'tir
All Americans can be proud of the
itribution our aid program is making
issist South Africans disadvantaged
apartheid to develop essential skills
1 experience. In the fiscal year that
t ended, approximately $20.3 million
s disbursed to individuals and institu-
is committed to nonviolence and
nocracy. Our aid has helped fund
olarships for students to study in the
ited States; training of black entre-
neurs and trade unionists; and com-
nity-based projects in the areas of
Id care, youth activities, and legal
'ice.
Our aid program in South Africa—
;iated during this Administration
h bipartisan support in Congress—
mplifies the search for alternatives to
lence and polarized confrontation that
it the heart of our policy toward
jth Africa and the region. We have
n active partners with those in South
-ica and the region who want to turn
ay from a mindless descent into
lence and toward peaceful options for
istructive change.
This constructive American
jroach is also exemplified in the activi-
3 of American businesses in South
"ica. American firms have made an
jortant positive contribution in South
••ica by challenging the apartheid
item and by spending over $200
llion outside the workplace to provide
lolarships, training, nonracial housing,
i other benefits to black employees,
lile we understand the reasons why
Tie American firms have withdrawn
■m South Africa, we applaud the
termination of others to stay. These
ms are in the forefront of American
brts to remain positively involved in
; search for a better future in South
rica, and their honorable contribution
serves to be recognized by all Ameri-
ns. Indeed, it was so recognized—
plicitly and eloquently— in the recent
;islation passed by Congress.
Despite the grim realities of the
esent situation in South Africa, we
main hopeful that the contending par-
's will come to their senses and
cognize that the path of violence and
nfrontation is a dead-end street,
arlier this year, the Commonwealth's
Ininent Persons' Group (EPG) seemed
be making progress in convincing
ith the South African Government and
; black opposition that constructive
ange can occur only through negotia-
ons. There seemed also to be a growing
cognition on all sides that no party can
i allowed to dictate in advance the
:enda or outcome of the negotiations
and that all South Africans will have to
have confidence that their fundamental
interests and rights would be protected.
At the heart of the EPG initiative
was an effort to convince the parties to
begin the essential process of confidence
building by taking limited but important
steps that could be reciprocated by the
other side. The EPG effort eventually
collapsed following the May 19 South
African Defense Forces raids on African
National Congress (ANC) installations in
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana.
However, the EPG's effort to help the
parties undertake these so-called match-
ing commitments is a positive and impor-
tant legacy for the future. That approach
has not run its course; indeed, it has
barely been tested.
President Reagan and other
Western leaders have publicly called on
the South African Government to do its
part to get negotiations started by end-
ing the state of emergency; releasing
Nelson Mandela and other political
prisoners; unbanning political parties,
including the ANC; and setting a time-
table for repealing apartheid laws. If the
South African Government were to take
these steps, it would be entitled to
expect from its opposition a firm com-
mitment to cease violence and enter
negotiations.
Prospects for Progress
While the immediate prospect for
negotiations is not bright, we have seen
some signs that the parties remain open
to discussion of the idea of matching
commitments. In our contacts with both
the South African Government and its
opponents, we have made clear that the
United States will not uncritically
endorse the demands of any of the con-
tending parties. We are, however, ready
now to explore seriously with each of the
parties the contribution it can and should
make in the interest of a negotiated
settlement. In a word, the diplomatic
option is open, and our good offices are
available.
We have no illusions about the near-
term prospects for progress. External
parties, however well intentioned, can-
not help solve South Africa's crisis
unless South Africans themselves are
prepared to take risks for peace. They
cannot demand guarantees in advance of
the precise outcome of a process that
must, inevitably, entail compromise and
accommodation of interests. We intend
to challenge the South African Govern-
ment, the ANC and other black opposi-
tion groups, and the front-line states to
do their part to help create a framework
for negotiations that might provide real
AFRICA
hope for a lasting resolution of South
Africa's crisis.
We will also continue to support
efforts by South Africa and its neighbors
to work out alternatives to confrontation
and cross-border violence. The urgent
need for practical steps in this direction
is nowhere more evident than in the cur-
rent tense relations between South
Africa and Mozambique. These countries
are still officially party to the Nkomati
accord, which commits each signatory
not to aid insurgent movements on the
territory of the other party. Following
its signature in 1984, the Nkomati ac-
cord did lead to a reduction of tension
and enhanced security for both South
Africa and Mozambique.
In recent months, the Government
of Mozambique has alleged that South
Africa has resumed and increased
assistance to the Mozambican insurgent
movement RENAMO. For its part.
South Africa rejects the claim and warns
Mozambique against harboring guerrillas
of the African National Congress. In our
view, renewed cross-border violence or
threats of violence, and intervention in
neighboring countries, cannot resolve
South Africa's problems and may well
exacerbate them. Instead, we urged both
parties to fulfill strictly their obligations
under the accord and handle their
compliance concerns through a direct
security dialogue. The United States
played a significant role in the negotia-
tion of the Nkomati accord, and we
stand ready to assist the parties in
revitalizing it. But the primary impetus
must come from the countries that stand
to benefit most from the accord— South
Africa and Mozambique.
We have watched with growing con-
cern as tensions have escalated between
Mozambique and Malawi. These tensions
arise from conflicting claims about
Malawi's relationship with RENAMO
and its position on the insurgency in
Mozambique. We firmly believe that the
interests of neither Mozambique nor
Malawi would be served by confronta-
tion. The two countries have agreed to
establish a joint commission to address
mutual security concerns. This is a
potentially positive development, and we
urge that this commission be activated
immediately.
In Angola also, we are convinced
that there is potential for accommo-
dation rather than violent confrontation.
We continue to seek a diplomatic resolu-
tion of the conflict in Angola that would
provide for Namibian independence and
withdrawal of all foreign forces— South
African and Cuban— from that country.
We believe that the gap between South
Africa and Angola on a timetable for the
^bruary 1987
41
AFRICA
withdrawal of Cuban forces is bridge-
able. We have made clear to all the par-
ties our readiness to help bring this
negotiation to a successful conclusion.
We had hoped that South Africa's
conditional agreement to begin imple-
mentation of UN Security Council
Resolution 435— the Namibian inde-
pendence plan— on August 1, 1986,
would prompt the Government of Angola
to reply constructively to our ideas on a
Cuban withdrawal schedule. Unfor-
tunately, no such response was forth-
coming from Luanda, and the August 1
opportunity was lost. We, nevertheless,
believe that this peace process remains
the one way out of a long and bloody
civil war for all the Angolan parties. Our
invitation to the Governn.ent of Angola
to resume these negotiations remains
on the table, and we urge that they take
it up.
Although reconciliation among con-
tending Angolan parties is an issue only
Angolans themselves can resolve, we
believe that it must occur if there is to
be real peace in that country. Our sup-
port for UNITA [National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola] under-
scores our conviction that it is a
legitimate nationalist movement which
must participate in any serious effort at
reconciliation among Angolans. We have
made clear that we do not expect any
Angolan party to commit political
suicide, nor do we have an American
plan for Angola's political future. We
will continue to work actively toward the
day when they can do so free of external
military presence from any quarter.
As we consider opportunities for
accommodation among contending par-
ties in southern Africa, our focus should
be on practical objectives that would
redound to the benefit of all. In our
view, the revitalization of regional
transportation routes disrupted by
armed conflict would be especially
welcome. The United States supports
African efforts to reach practical
arrangements among all the affected
parties that could lead to reopening of
these transportation routes, many of
which have been closed for years.
The United States has made clear its
determination to support the efforts of
southern African countries to deal with
the economic consequences of the
region's political crisis. President
Reagan has stated that he will propose
to Congress a new program of assistance
to the black-ruled states of southern
Africa in the critical areas of trade,
transportation, and support for economic
reform. We are now working to prepare
the details of this program. As we move
forward, it will be essential to consult
and coordinate our efforts with the coun-
tries in the region and our allies and
friends. Despite the budgetary strin-
gencies of the Gramm-Rudman
[-Hollings] era, we are determined to
fulfill the President's pledge to propose a
good program and to see it approved by
Congress.
The U.S. Role
In his recent sendoff for our new
Ambassador in Pretoria, Secretary
Shultz said that, in southern Africa as in
other areas of policy, we must ask "not
only what. . .we want, but how, practi-
cally, we can get from here to there." I
have tried to underscore for you, today,
our conviction that American goals in
southern Africa will not be achieved if
the entire region slides into endemic
violence. That is what could happen if we
simply opt to disengage when the going
gets tough. Such a course can only pro-
duce chaos and an increase in Soviet
influence, since Moscow's strong suit is
the promise of arms, advisers, and
military solutions.
By contrast, the U.S. role must con-
tinue to be to roll up our sleeves and
work for negotiated solutions and a
peaceful change. We favor this course
because it is right. We are— as someone
once said— a nation of builders, not
destroyers. But we also believe it is prac-
tical because the peoples of southern
Africa have visions of a positive future
for their beloved region. They nurtu:
the hope that their children will enjo;
future of dignity, liberty, peace, and
prosperity. They, too, want to be
builders. All Americans are united in
their desire to help achieve these obj(
fives. This is the basis of an America:
consensus on southern Africa that wi
last long beyond the current pessimii
in the region and our own tactical
debates of the moment. It is a consen
worth preserving and nurturing becai
it is worthy of the best traditions of t
American people.
And what does this mean in prac-
tice? I submit that it means an active^
role. It means the maintenance of an
active AID [Agency for International
Development] role in South Africa an
the region to support black advancen
and educational development; it meai
our diplomacy is ready and willing to
play a catalytic role— opening channe-
floating ideas— between the South
African Government, front-line states
the ANC, and other major black grou
it means a sustained regional role
between South Africa and its neighbc
on behalf of peaceful settlement and
coexistence; and, above all, it means i
the West as a whole maintains its
presence and influence via all availabi
channels to support its hopes for a
brighter future for all the peoples of t
troubled yet strategically important
region. ■
The Human Rights Dimension in Africa
by Charles W. Freeman
Address before the World Affairs
Council in Philadelphia on November 6.
1986. Mr. Freeman is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs.
There could be no more appropriate set-
ting for a discourse on "human rights"
than this city, in which the Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution
first proclaimed the idea of such rights.
The documents created here continue to
guide our foreign relations and to inspire
the people of many lands.
Concern for human rights is not a
peculiarly American idea. It is a central
objective in man's yearning to be free. If
anyone here believes we have a monop-
oly on this dream, let that person reflect
upon the struggles in Haiti and the
Philippines, in the Soviet Union and
South Africa, in Latin America and
Eastern Europe. The human rights
revolution proclaimed in Philadelphia
two centuries ago continues. Nowhere
this more evident than in Africa.
The news from Africa on human
rights is not all good— in fact, much of
is dismal. What I hope to leave you wi
is a few thoughts on how the current
situation evolved, recent trends, and n
hopes and fears about the future of
America's role in ensuring basic
freedoms for all Africans.
The African Experience
I think it is important, in any discussio
of human rights in Africa, to start witl
historical perspective. Three main fac-
tors in African history and heritage,
which contrast sharply with our own,
need emphasis.
42
Department of State Bulle
AFRICA
First, the advent of the slave
and 19th-century coloniaHsm inter-
d Africa's independent evolution.
;ges and kingdoms were torn apart
16 export of slaves to the New
Id. Many paternalistic European
inistrators put the interests of the
opole far ahead of the interests of
Deople they governed. Colonial
:ials often did not consult local
ilations about political or social deci-
Economic progress, education,
the rights of the individual fre-
itly took a back seat to demeaning
ide control. Such colonial adminis-
ions were, it must be remembered,
only modern systems of government
t Africans had experienced at
pendence.
• Second, many of the first genera-
of Africa's liberation leaders spent
h of the colonial period in exile or in
Anxious for alternatives to colo-
ism, they embraced ivory-tower
alist theories and Marxism— theories
. have proven as irrelevant to African
Bitions, and even more counter-
Huctive in terms of human liberties,
hey did in their Western birthplaces.
'• A third and related point is that
ly newly independent nations were
Jlled with arbitrary borders, drawn in
Jope without regard to tribal and
Biistic realities. For many African
ers new at running governments,
; fact, coupled with the ideological
■<ies I have mentioned, made the one-
ty state attractive as a way to unite
fractious populations thrown
ether by colonial cartographers.
One caveat: there were important
<eptions to everything I have said. I
aot wish to contribute to the all too
<espread American misperception that
nocracy and civil liberties have no
(ure home on the African Continent. It
Jnportant to recognize, for example,
ft Botswana is a country with a record
democracy and human rights that
tipares favorably with that of any
intry in the West. The Gambia and
legal, with their vigorous parliamen-
y systems, and Kenya's racial har-
ny and free enterprise system— to cite
ew examples— also give the lie to this
lard.
ricans Confront
leir Own Record
many African leaders review the
:en turbulent years since independ-
ce, they are coming to see the
mage done to their societies by the
ilure to protect constructive dissent.
Increasingly, they recognize the need to
accept ideas and initiatives from outside
the established bureaucracies. Africa's
attention thus is returning to the fun-
damental issues of human dignity,
individual rights, and civil liberties for
which the independence struggles were
waged. Human rights have fortunately
been placed squarely on the African
agenda by the continent's leaders. The
continentwide trend toward encourage-
ment of private initiative at the expense
of bureaucratic power supports this.
After all, governments willing to trust
the people to run their own economic
affairs are more likely also to trust them
to make decisions in politics and social
life.
We see examples of this economic
revolution all over Africa. Let me men-
tion just a few examples.
• Zaire, Zambia, and Somalia have
devalued their currencies; eliminated
most trade and price controls; and
increased agricultural prices.
• Mali, Guinea, and Senegal have
begun to pare down the public sector,
liquidating, reforming, or reducing the
privileged position of inefficient
parastatals.
• Kenya has adopted a flexible
exchange rate policy and liberalized
import licensing and maize and fertilizer
marketing.
Similar measures are being adopted
in other African countries. The process
is an exciting one to watch. The
economic framework is changing radi-
cally. Market forces are beginning to
give the right signals to the private sec-
tor, and African economies are begin-
ning to respond with growth. For
example, despite declining world prices
for its major metal exports, Zaire has
managed to maintain positive growth
over the past 3 years. In Somalia,
exports have increased over 50%, and
agricultural production has established
new records for 3 years running.
Recent Developments
in African Human Rights
The trends in human rights connected to
these changes have yet to run their full
course. Some impoverished African
regimes still argue that the interests of
society and the state must come before
those of individuals and that human
rights are a "Western" concept that
developing societies cannot afford.
Others claim that their fragile political
institutions could not withstand a
greater openness or tolerance of dissent.
Some of the most serious human rights
violators of the past have been replaced
by newer villains in other countries. Out-
side concern for civil and political liber-
ties is often condemned as an intrusion
into a country's internal affairs. Not sur-
prisingly, this criticism often comes from
the most repressive regimes, and we
hear it frequently from some within the
South African Government. But there
are many positive developments. Let me
share a few with you.
• President Abdou Diouf of
Senegal, who was also last year's chair-
man of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), deserves special recognition and
credit for his energy and concern for
human rights. The OAU's adoption of its
Charter on Human and People's Rights
at the end of October was a significant
step for Africa. And. with Senegalese
sponsorship, the UN Human Rights
Commission has just established a
Special Rapporteur on Religious
Tolerance.
• Just over a year ago, a new
military government took over in
Nigeria, a regional power that is home
to one in every four black Africans. Part
of the justification for the military's
move was the need for more attention to
human rights. Nigeria's record under
President Babangida has not been spot-
less, but impressive strides have been
made and continue. Within days of
assuming power, the Babangida govern-
ment released more than 100 political
detainees, including 12 journalists, and
appointed as Minister of Justice the
chairman of the Human Rights Commit-
tee of the Nigerian Bar Association, a
strong critic of the human rights record
of the previous regime. Since then, large
numbers of detainees have been
released, and more have had their
sentences reduced. Press freedoms have
also been restored in a country which
traditionally has enjoyed a freewheeling,
strongly vocal media.
• Earlier this year in Sudan, we
saw the former Transitional Military
Council disband after conducting
multiparty elections. A democratically
chosen prime minister and parliament
now rule Sudan. The government has
also lifted press restrictions and repealed
laws against strikes. A violent and pain-
ful civil war in southern Sudan continues
to pose a grave threat to the human
rights of Sudanese. Nevertheless, in
1985 and 1986, Sudan gave sanctuary to
more than 1 million refugees from
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad. Sudan's
cooperation with the international com-
munity in refugee resettlement gives
witness to its humanitarian ideals.
• There has been a remarkable turn-
around in human rights in Uganda, one
tbruary 1987
43
AFRICA
of the countries that suffered most from
abuses in the past. President Museveni's
government has ended torture, curbed
violence by soldiers, and reinforced the
independence of the judiciary and the
professionalism of the police. Museveni's
challenge to human rights violations in
Uganda, before he was President, gained
credibility when former Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights Elliott
Abrams sharply criticized government-
sponsored human rights atrocities in
Uganda in 1984. By mid-1985, the
United States had ceased disbursing
foreign assistance to Uganda
in light of human rights abuses and
unrestrained civil violence. After his
accession, President Museveni publicly
thanked the United States for its
uniquely forthright support of human
rights in his country. We have now
restarted our aid program and made a
special grant of human rights funds to
aid the Uganda Government's law
codification project.
• In Liberia, though progress has
proceeded by fits and starts, American
attention to human rights has likewise
yielded some promising results. The
return to civilian rule, while widely
welcomed, was also tarnished by wide-
spread reports of shortcomings in the
October 1985 elections, including restric-
tive party registration requirements,
lack of open debate, the jailing of some
opposition leadership, and a vote-
counting procedure which undermined
confidence in the results. Our economic
support fund disbursements were conse-
quently suspended foi- a period; they
resumed only when conditions improved.
In June, President Doe, after a great
deal of prodding by the executive branch
and Congress, ordered amnesty for a
number of prominent citizens accused of
involvement in an alleged coup attempt.
Reconciliation talks between the govern-
ment and opposition parties are
continuing.
There are. of course, as I have
noted, continuing examples of system-
atic and repressive denials of human
rights in Africa. Let me cite one case in
point. In 1984 and 1985, Ethiopia
suffered a calamitous famine brought on,
in part, by the government's attempts to
impose the same discredited approach to
peasant agriculture that had earlier
caused the deaths of millions of Ukrain-
ians, Vietnamese, and Cambodians. Last
December, an international outcry led by
the United States against forced reset-
tlement caused the government to halt
its brutal, ill-planned program. A
number of very senior Ethiopian
officials, most recently the Foreign
Minister, have sought political asylum
abroad to protest the regime's oppres-
sion of its people and its subservience to
the Soviet totalitarian model. Ethiopia's
villagization program— a plan to move
millions of people in rural Ethiopia into
new, centralized villages— needs to be
monitored closely. The Ethiopian
Government knows the world is
watching and that it will not tolerate a
return to coercion and brutality.
Human Rights and U.S. Policy
Let me now describe what the United
States is doing to promote human rights
in Africa. Identification of abuses and
strong U.S. statements in response are
the first level of combatting human
rights violations. In specific instances
where human rights abuses are alleged,
American ambassadors have standing
instructions— sometimes supplemented
by special directions from Washington—
to make inquiries of local officials and
try to bring about a change in the situa-
tion. Our annually published "Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices"
have become an accepted international
standard by which to measure progress.
Local officials know that their human
rights performance will be weighed as
we allocate increasingly scarce American
assistance abroad.
But it is not enough merely to iden-
tify and protest human rights violations.
The United States also directly attacks
the causes and effects of human rights
abuses through its assistance programs:
in fiscal year 1986, the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the State
Department jointly administered a
.$2-million human rights program in
Africa. These funds were used to assist
in law codification, to promote fair
multiparty elections, to upgrade legal
facilities, to educate people about civil
and political rights, and to assist in the
legal defense of those charged with
violating repressive or discriminatory
statutes. In addition, during this period,
the United States provided over $100
million in assistance to African refugees
escaping turmoil and political persecu-
tion in their native countries. Of this
amount, $21 million was provided to the
International Committee of the Red
Cross, which, among other things, aids
political prisoners and victims of
persecution.
South Africa is an important example
of how we combine diplomatic efforts
with assistance programs to promote
human rights. Starting with the Presi-
dent, we have spoken out forcefully to
denounce the evils of apartheid and the
repressive state of emergency, voice
objections to the detention without
charge of thousands of South African
and express our grave concern over
allegations of torture occurring in dc
tion. We make public and private
demarches to the South African Gove
ment over specific allegations of hum
rights violations. For example, last w
we called for an immediate, independ
investigation into allegations that yoi
people in detention were being abusei
One and one-half million dollars o
the Africa human rights program wei
spent in South Africa last year. We
support law centers which provide
advice and legal representation for th
victims of apartheid, apprentice oppo:
tunities for black lawyers, and law
libraries which have become the centi
resource for legal research to defend
those victimized by apartheid. We
finance publications describing basic
legal rights and teaching individuals h
to protect their rights through the leg
system. Such projects often go beyon(
legal assistance: in one case, we helpe
develop a water system in an area wh
blacks were threatened with forced
removal. The water system helped the>
resist eviction from their homes by
bolstering the argument that the com
niunity was viable.
Private U.S. firms operating in
South Africa also play a very positive
role in the struggle against apartheid.
Not only have they invested millions c
dollars to provide desegregated worki
conditions, educational and training
opportunities, equal benefits, and hou;
ing assistance; they have also served e
a force for change by their example.
LT.S. companies have led other firms-
particular, South African ones— to
espouse the principles enunciated by tl
Reverend Leon Sullivan. While their r
in South Africa is unfortunately
diminishing, it has been unique, and I
would argue that it is likely to prove
irreplaceable.
We hope to continue and, the Con-
gress willing, increase our assistance
programs for black South Africans. Ou
goal is an audacious one: to help prepa
them to take their rightful place in Sou
Africa's economic and political life. Oui
$25-million aid program for this year is
unique because we carry it out with-
out any tie to the South African
Government.
This brings me to the always vital
question of resources. LInder this
Administration, we increased our
economic assistance to Africa 55% in tl
period 1980-85, playing an increasingly
vital role in promoting growth-oriented
economic development in Africa and, at
44
Department of State Bulle
CANADA
-ame time, advancing important
strategic political, and humani-
111 interests in the region. We clearly
Ithe momentum on our side. More
_more African countries realized that
needed to turn to the West— rather
the Soviet-bloc countries— to obtain
;ritical economic support needed,
icularly to restructure their
lomies along more market-oriented
. Along with increasing economic
iness, as I have suggested, there also
e a rediscovery of the virtues of a
e open society and the principles of
an rights.
Unfortunately, during the past 2
■s, the budgetary process has cut our
lomic involvement in Africa and our
ty to help African countries make
difficult transitions they are attempt-
Congressional cuts in foreign aid,
5lative earmarks protecting the
;ations of a relatively small number
juntries and programs, and Gramm-
man will sharply reduce our
lomic assistance for Africa to
3 million this fiscal year. That is 35%
than in 1985 and 18% less than in
5. Unless this situation is reversed,
;an expect serious damage to our
rests in Africa. Among the conse-
ices could be a reversal of recent
|can efforts to undertake the critical
pomic reforms that are so vital as
(erpinning to human rights reform. In
thern Africa, moreover, we must
3 additional resources to ensure that
current downward spiral of violence
economic deterioration does not set
. part of Africa back 20 years.
•elusion
other country in the world so directly
explicitly weighs its relationships in
)int-to-point comparison with human
its standards. I am proud of our
)rd and of the results we have
ieved.
This Administration is both
ouraged by some trends in African
lan rights performance and awed by
work still to be done. In many of the
id's poorest countries, where sub-
ence living conditions are almost
lond the imagination of most
iericans, we need development
ources to assist us in urging govern-
nts to allow basic freedoms. Freedom
,he press, religious tolerance, and free
;tions are noble goals and vital human
hts. But people who do not have
)ugh to eat or know how to read can
■dly be expected to rise up to claim
se rights until their basic needs are
met. We need the resources to assist
governments in forming societies which
claim those God-given freedoms. We
must not walk away from Africa just as
Africa is walking toward us. But without
your support, and that of Congress, for
the resources necessary to build on
what we and Africans have begun to
accomplish, that is exactly what we
may do. ■
Secretary Visits Canada
Secretary Shultz visits Canada on
November 21, 1986. to meet with
Secretary for External Affairs Joseph
Clark. Following is a joint news con-
ference by the two Secretaries.
Secretary Clark. ^ I'm particularly
pleased to have the opportunity today to
sign this instrument which complements
a number of initiatives Canada has taken
in response to threats to the security of
civil aviation. In signing the agreement,
Canada and the United States are seek-
ing to ensure the security of the more
than 13 million passengers who travel by
air across oui- vast common border each
year.
At the same time, it is recognized
that aviation security can neither be
ensured nor terrorism effectively
counteracted by individual states alone,
but only on the basis of cooperation and
united action by the international com-
munity. In this regard, I am pleased to
note that the assembly of the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), meeting in Montreal on the first
of October this year, unanimously
adopted a Canadian proposal to develop
a new International Agreement on Air-
port Security.
This resolution, cosponsored by over
30 countries representing all geographic
regions and social economic systems,
reflects a growing realization throughout
the international community that united
action is needed to close a gap in the
existing ICAO framework concerning
aviation security. The Hague, Montreal,
and Tokyo conventions clearly govern
security threats to aircraft in flight but
do not adequately cover all terrorist
threats or attacks at airports.
[In French: The very complete bilat-
eral agreement signed today by Canada
and the United States will help not only
to reinforce security measures in the two
countries, but also to serve, I hope, as a
model for other bilateral accords, and
reinforce the multilateral initiatives
taken by Canada within ICAO to assure
international civil aviation security.]
Secretary Shultz. The aviation security
agreement, Secretary Clark and I have
just signed, will strengthen the most
extensive commercial aviation partner-
ship in the world. As you noted, with
over 13 million people flying between
our two countries each year, it very
fittingly reflects our shared values and
the spirit of cooperation between our
two countries through a mutual commit-
ment to take practical measures to com-
bat international terrorism. Cooperation
which we will continue as we press for-
ward together on the Canadian proposal
which you mentioned for a convention on
international airport security introduced
at the International Civil Aviation
Organization assembly last month in
Montreal.
I think this is a very significant step
for us. From the standpoint of the
United States, we have reached similar
agreements with 15 other aviation part-
ners, and we have active negotiations
going on with some 60 other countries;
and, this agreement with Canada is the
strongest of any that we have.
So it represents an important state-
ment and partnership and example in
this continuing battle against interna-
tional terrorism, and I feel privileged to
sit here with you, Joe, and sign it.
Secretary Clark. Thank you very much.
I just want to make one or two brief
comments to begin the conference. We
had a very useful and full discussion of a
range of Canada-U.S. issues and also a
number of international issues of con-
cern to both our countries. Both govern-
ments are strongly committed to the
bilateral trade negotiation between our
two countries. Both countries are
strongly committed to the quick engage-
ment of the multilateral trade negotia-
tions. I should say that we spent some
time here, as we have in other meetings,
dealing specifically with some of the
problems that exist in international
trade and agriculture.
A very important step forward was
taken by the economic summit in Tokyo
when agriculture was put on the agenda.
That was followed through in the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] meetings in Punta del Este where
there was a good and broad agreement
reached to address agricultural issues
under the GATT. I made clear again the
bruary 1987
45
CANADA
singular importance to Canada of tangi-
ble progress on the question of acid rain
consistent with the envoys' report jointly
established by President Reagan and
Prime Minister Mulroney.
We discussed at some length, and I
found most valuable again, the oppor-
tunity to discuss with Secretary Shultz
the new momentum that is developing in
the world of arms control. Certainly in
the view of Canada, the meeting at
Reykjavik was a significant break-
through. I personally was most
impressed by the speech Secretary
Shultz made in Chicago earlier this
week, which I thought was a reassuring,
strong, thorough statement of the posi-
tion of the United States on arms control
questions. I think the next step to be
taken, exists to be taken by member
nations of NATO whose foreign minis-
ters met in Brussels in mid-December,
and Canada looks forward to playing a
continuing role in maintaining that new
momentum on arms control.
Secretary Shultz. This has been a good
meeting. It is one of a continuing series.
We agreed to meet at least four times a
year. We see each other more often than
that and among the four, one explicitly
in the United States, another in Canada
for the purpose of the meeting and, of
course, our President and Prime Minis-
ter also meet each year. So we have lots
to talk about and we work at it together,
and I think it pays off.
It pays off in working through vari-
ous questions that we have between us,
whether they're of the trade nature or
environmental nature or other aspects of
our relationship which is a gigantic rela-
tionship. It pays off from the standpoint
of sharing views on matters such as
arms control that you mentioned. It pays
off in the economic scene as we review
these potentially very significant
negotiations on a free trade regime
between the two countries.
It helped a great deal in Punta del
Este at getting started on the new
GATT round and you were— I wasn't
present, but all of my delegation spoke
about the leadership you gave personally
in the whole meeting. We were glad to
cooperate and follow your lead in that.
So, it's been a very worthwhile overall
set of exchanges and this particular
meeting fitted into that pattern.
Q. One of the things you talked
about today was the Iranian arms
question. One of them, there are new
reports of Washington's —
Secretary Clark. What's the
question?
46
Q. Was Canada one of the coun-
tries involved in secret arms sales to
Iran, and did the two of you discuss
that issue today?
Secretary Clark. No and no. The
second question, just to be clear on that,
there was no discussion of any Canadian
involvement in any kind of secret arms
sales to Iran because we are not engaged
in any secret arms sales to Iran. There
were, as you know, sales of some heli-
copter engines which were for peaceful
purposes. We found out that they might
have been diverted. We are putting an
end to that diversion with all the means
at our disposal.
Q. When did you find out that
several other countries were selling
arms to Iran with U.S. approval, and
which countries were selling arms to
Iran with U.S. approval?
Secretary Shultz. I am not going to
respond to questions about various
Iranian-related issues. The people who
have been closest to that subject have
been testifying in Washington, and I
think it's best to let it rest there.
Q. If there is substantial progress
on arms reduction, is Canada prepared
to substantially increase its troop com-
mitment in Western Europe?
Secretary Clark. This government
has already increased Canada's troop
commitment in Western Europe. That
was one of our campaign commitments
during the election. We followed through
on it early on in our mandate. We intend
to maintain a strong Canadian presence
there. Obviously, one of the questions
that has to be considered, as questions of
arms control and related issues evolve, is
the continued role of conventional
defense. There will be a major role;
Canada intends to continue to play our
active part.
Q. Would you increase beyond
what you've done already?
Secretary Clark. We've no immedi-
ate plans to increase, but I make the
point that we just have.
Q. You said that you participated
in two full-scale discussions at the
White House of the U.S. involvement
with Iran. Can you tell us whether you
knew after those two full-scale discus-
sions that the United States would
make secret weapons shipments to
Iran?
Secretary Shultz. I give you the
same answer that I already gave on a
question on that subject.
Q. You said that you found out that
there may have been diversions of
helicopter parts and you said that you
i'K
:((ii
'0
are putting an end to that diversion*
all means at our disposal. Have you
found out how the diversions are ta
ing place and what are the means at
your disposal?
Secretary Clark. We are not sun
that they have taken place. There is a
possibility that they have. The engine
parts in question were shipped as I
understand on the 29th of October. TI
may not have arrived. The instrumen
available to us is to require an end-usi
certificate. We have the full cooperati
of Pratt and Whitney who was the mj
ufacturer in securing that, in having t
certificate sought and secured. The
Iranian Charge has been or will be cai
in by our officials as a further means
ensuring that Canadian goods destine
for peaceful uses were used peacefull;
Q. You say you found the
Secretary's speech in Chicago to be
reassuring. What was it that was sa
reassuring about that speech and on
what points did you need reassuran
Secretary Clark. I didn't require
reassurance. But I think what was
reassuring about the speech— and I
would presume to recommend you rea
it.
Q. I have.
Secretary Clark. I would then
presume to recommend that you repo
it— I shouldn't do that. [Laughter]
I think that it made clear that the
developments at Reykjavik, while the
went beyond what many people expec
might occur, were part of a pattern o:
preparation for movement and momei'
turn in arms control that is continuing
think that many of the allies of the
United States, including Canada, are
reassured by the reiteration of the
United States that the practice of con
sulfation which has been followed fait
fully and effectively in our judgment 1:
the United States will continue, and tl
there will be an opportunity for Canac
and other allies to continue in the con-
text of NATO to elaborate other steps
not simply to elaborate other steps bu
consider together the consequences of
the progress that is possible in arms
control.
Q. If there are to be massive redi
tions, large-scale reductions of bal-
listic missiles, one could presume th;
the cruise missile threat might
increase. What might this mean as fi
as the North American Defense [Con
mand] system, NORAD? Might Canai
have to increase its commitment to
NORAD, or might there have to be
large-scale defenses against the cruii
missile threat?
i!
w
it
if
«
Department of State Bulle
DEPARTMENT
Secretary Shultz. We'd like to see
ihreat reduced. But the fact of the
I er is that the Soviet system and our
om, the Western systems, are dif-
iit and so I think you have to foresee
we will continue to need to be able
efend ourselves effectively and to
e a way of deterring aggression so
; it doesn't take place.
If we have fewer ballistic missiles,
1 you have to look to the other means
have to exercise that deterrence. I
c it that that was the point of the
3tion earlier about conventional
s, and I agree with the implication
said that in the Chicago speech. And
;r means.
So your bombers and cruise missiles
things like that play a part in main-
ing your ability to deter aggression—
mportant part. And I think what Mr.
rk and I have been doing today in
; portion of our discussion, and I
tk our discussion undoubtedly will be
ended into what the NATO ministers
about in Brussels next month, will
L reexamination of the implications
what we should be doing of the possi-
y of the sharp cuts in the INF
ermediate-range nuclear forces] area,
he area of strategic arms let alone
:r things and that's the process that
K)ing through. I think it is a very
thy process.
IQ. Along the same lines, I'd like to
whether Mr. Clark has expressed a
earn in your discussions today
i ut the possibility of the U.S. break-
ii of the SALT [strategic arms limita-
1 1 talks] II Treaty. Were you able to
a ieve [inaudible]?
Secretary Clark. I raised Canada's
c cern about SALT II and I made the
p :it that SALT II apart from— that
" I.T II possesses among other things,
■vy important symbolic significance
reiterated a position that I have
'ill'. I wouldn't want to associate
' self with your description of the
r tual, of the respective positions of the
cintries on that question.
Q. [Inaudible]
Secretary Clark. [In French: We
I iissed the free trade question in a
ii')-al way. We discussed the common
liTtaking of the two governments, of
President of the United States and
I'l'ime Minister of Canada ... In-
ar as discussions now taking place in
ncouver are concerned, we did not
cuss these talks because there has
'M no declaration by the Prime
iiister coming out of them.]
(J. [Inaudible] Secretary as you
ve done in the past, whether Canada
inks it advisable to [inaudible] limits
bruary 1987
Secretary and Marine Commandant
Sign Memorandum of Understanding
On December 15, 1986, Secretary Shultz
and Commandant of the Marine Corps
General P. X. Kelley signed a Memorandum
of Understanding between the U.S. Marine
Corps and the Department of State which
provides for Marine security guards at U.S.
Embassies around the world. The signing
marks the .38th anniversary of the agree-
ment, whereby, specially trained Marines
guard embassy personnel and classified
documents at U.S. posts overseas. This year
an additional 100 Marines have been
authorized for the U.S. Embassy protection
program abroad. As a result. Marine secu-
rity guards will be assigned to 10 new posts
by the end of 1987.
Press release 261.
on cruise missiles and [inaudible]
bombers as a result of the superpower
talks following Reykjavik?
Secretary Clark. That particular
question did not come up as you put it
today. Obviously, as Secretary Shultz
has just indicated, if we are to achieve
the kinds of reductions that were dis-
cussed at Reykjavik and that are still
capable of being discussed at Geneva,
that will have implications for Canada
given our geography and our location.
But we haven't discussed that at any
particular length today.
That's the kind of thing that I think
would be very useful for representatives
of allied countries to consider with some
urgency, but also some care and some
frankness and I hope that that oppor-
tunity will be provided in some of the
meetings of NATO foreign ministers.
Certainly, the opportunity for that, the
setting— the stage has been set for that
by the extensive consultations with its
allies that the United States has under-
taken, and in my judgment by Secretary
Shultz's speech in Chicago which now
that I am assured has been reported
extensively in the American press, I
hope might receive some attention in the
Canadian press.
Q. Was the subject of sanctions
against South Africa discussed; and if
so, what would Mr. Clark's reaction be
to the announcement that Bata Shoes
has terminated its operations there?
Secretary Clark. The discussion of
policy toward South Africa was dis-
cussed generally. I welcomed the deci-
sion by Bata to remove its investments
and its association from South Africa.
47
EAST ASIA
As I have indicated in the House 2 or
3 days ago, Archbishop Ted Scott, who
was the Canadian member of the Emi-
nent Persons Group, has been consulting
with Canadian and American companies,
which are considering the nature of their
future in South Africa, and will be mak-
ing some recommendations to me as a
basis for conversations I might have
with other Canadian businesses that
have interests there.
Q. I am wondering if the White
House shares the view of your trade
negotiator, Peter Murphy, that the
Congress may not be inclined to
endorse a trade deal if Canada does
not move to exchange rates more in
line [inaudible].
Secretary Shultz. I don't think the
exchange rate issue is really a part of
these free trade negotiations. The talks
have been going along quite well, but I
think we need to interject into them a
strong sense of urgency and push, so
that we really try to get something
accomplished certainly in the next 6, 9
months or so, because we have a great
opportunity here to do something of tre-
mendous significance.
I have to look at it from the stand-
point of the interest of the United
States. It will benefit us. I believe it will
benefit Canada even more, but the real
point is both parties can get a lot out of
it. So we need to work on it hard, and
Ambassador Murphy is doing so, and I
hope very much that we will have a suc-
cessful conclusion to this effort.
Q. When you spoke about the
possibility of the Pratt and Whitney
shipments being diverted for military
purposes as opposed to the commercial
purpose for which the aircraft parts
are being sent there, have you thought
or have you asked for American
assistance to find out if there was in
fact any diversion?
Secretary Clark. No.
Q. Are you going to?
Secretary Clark. I don't know that
American assistance would be germane
in this case.
Q. Intelligence?
Secretary Clark. We are pursuing
directly through the company, through
the user, and through the Iranian
Charge. I expect we'll find out what we
need to know and be able to ensure that
undertakings given to the Government
of Canada by exporters will be honored.
China Policy Today:
Consensus, Consistence, Stability
'Press release 254 of Nov. 24. 1986.
-Secretary Clark spoke in English and
French, and his remarks in French were
translated. ■
by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.
Address before the World Affairs
Council of Northern California in San
Francisco on December 11, 1986. Mr.
Sigur is Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs.
It's a pleasure to appear before this
outstanding forum this evening. Those of
you here in California have particular
appreciation for the importance the East
Asian and Pacific region bears to our
lifestyles and livelihoods. The Reagan
Administration has done more to regis-
ter this awareness, in Washington and
nationally, than any other. As one who
has spent many years living both in Asia
and in California, I am acutely sensitive
to the significant evolving interdepend-
ence between our peoples, between our
industrial and commercial enterprises,
and between our political and security
systems. While the nations of East Asia
and the Pacific are culturally diverse and
at different stages of economic and
political development, the region as a
whole is critical to us and will play an
important role in our nation's future.
China is known far better to us
today than 20 years ago, but it is no less
intriguing. It is a study in contrasts— the
largest Asian nation with one of the
region's smallest per capita income
rates; a socialist state experimenting
with certain free market principles; a
historically preeminent ethnic group
with numerous heterogeneous character-
istics; and a nationalistic-minded people
divided by two competing political sys-
tems. Whatever its future, China is
destined to remain a significant player in
Asian affairs and a reckoning factor in
our own objectives there.
Five weeks ago I traveled to the
People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), my
first visit there since becoming Assistant
Secretary of State, although I have
visited the country several times before.
Perhaps more so than on any previous
trip, I sensed that our relations now are
firmly on a stable and durable course. I
attribute this, in great part, to the con-
sistence and consensus which have char-
acterized this Administration's China
policy for 6 years, as well as to the suc-
cess of our two nations in preventing
certain differences from impeding
overall progress we are achieving.
The Policy Framework
The framework for our relationship w.
China is provided in three key docu
ments: the 1972 Shanghai communiqu
the 1979 Joint Communique on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relation
with the P.R.C., and the 1982 joint co
munique with Beijing. Collectively, th
agreements set forth fundamental pri
ciples which have guided, and continu
to guide, U.S. -China relations. Our su
port for these principles has not dimir
ished. One of the basic principles is ou
acknowledgment that Chinese on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain
there is but one China and that Taiwa
is part of China. A second fundament;
principle is our conviction that the fut
of Taiwan should be determined by
Chinese on both sides of the strait anc
that the predominant U.S. interest is
that the issue be resolved peacefully.
In normalizing relations with
Beijing, we also established a framewi
for continuing commercial, cultural, a
other relations on an unofficial basis
with the people on Taiwan. Statutory
affirmation of these elements by meat
of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act
reflected a commitment by the Ameri'
people to remain faithful to their frier
on Taiwan.
One cannot formulate policy towa;
China without considering its impact
upon other countries in the region sue
as the Soviet Union, Japan, Korea,
Southeast Asian nations, and the worl
at large. China has long been a major
factor in East Asia. In recent years, it
has become a much more active playei
on the global stage, and its views and
policies increasingly make a difference
international fora. This is a trend we
accept and support and one we expect
will continue in the years ahead.
Unlike so often in the past, our
China policy today is based upon a
remarkable degree of consensus withii
the executive and legislative branches
the U.S. Government as well as among
business and local interests around the
country. In addition, our Asian friends
and allies have indicated that, while th
do not always agree with every detail (
our policy, they understand and essen-
tially concur with our objectives.
Although other hotspots in Asia captui
more of the headlines, we continue to
devote considerable effort and attentio
to China.
48
Department of State Bulle*
EAST ASIA
r.S. relations with the P.R.C. have
a positive, stabilizing influence upon
Kast Asian and Pacific region. This
nr has been strengthened by the con-
■nce of our policy. Our objectives
l' been defined clearly, and our inten-
s have been articulated consistently,
(.'by reducing uncertainties both at
and abroad.
( I insistency does not signify an
itable and unchanging policy. Quite
nntrary, consistency means living
' I our principles and commitments in
nstantly changing environment.
• ■y cannot be frozen. It has to be
' and responsive to new variables
I'lnsiderations. Our relations with
la have developed creatively within a
•istent policy framework, in accord
1 our fundamental interests and long-
1 objectives. We have been able to
it our policy, when necessary, to
ji ^-t new challenges and opportunities.
i:ent Developments
•ecent months, there have been
lificant new developments, both in
P.R.C. and Taiwan, as well as in
■iet interest toward Asia.
• China's leadership has proposed
vf guidelines for political reforms as a
dns of further pursuing economic
dernization.
• Secretary of Defense Weinberger
1 a most successful visit to China in
'.ober, and the first U.S. Navy ship
It to the P.R.C. took place last month.
• Last week, Taiwan held important
ctions representing further political
♦lution on the island. We welcome
tlence over the past several months
t the authorities on Taiwan are tak-
significant initiatives for political
|orm, reflecting a realistic and confi-
•it approach to the future.
• Soviet General Secretary Gor-
:hev's speech in Vladivostok last July
licated that Soviet solicitations toward
St Asia, and particularly China, will
pressed more vigorously.
These developments demonstrate the
namism of the political and economic
nation in and around China. In this
itext, it is important to understand
basis of our China policy, the current
ite of our relations, and the direction
which we are going.
tnesis of Our Policy
S. relations with China have under-
ne a remarkable transformation in the
St decade and a half. It was just over
years ago that President Nixon made
his historic visit to China, cutting
through more than two decades of isola-
tion and hostility between our two coun-
tries. The unique confluence of U.S. and
Chinese interests at the time made his
trip possible; but only through the far-
sighted efforts of statesmen on both
sides were we able to overcome the
immense ideological hurdles.
While the international situation has
changed significantly since the early
1970s, the foundation built by conscien-
tious efforts at that time remains the
basis for Chinese and American policies.
The fundamental premise was and
remains our shared view that neither
China nor the United States is a threat
to the other's security, that we need to
work in parallel to counter policies
detrimental to our two countries, and
that both our countries have much to
gain from a constructive relationship.
Over the years, we have built broad,
mutually advantageous ties, and we are
confident that our relations will remain
on solid ground.
Our decision to normalize diplomatic
relations with China in 1979 evolved
from the belief that establishing closer,
mutually beneficial ties with China could
contribute substantially to peace and
stability in East Asia. We wanted to help
promote a modernizing China which
would act responsibly and independently
of external pressure. The best way to
advance this objective, we believed, was
to support China's efforts at economic
modernization. The significant progress
that China has made toward its modern-
ization goal over the last few years has
been made possible by the expansion
of market forces within China and
increased ties with free market
economies outside of China. We have
supported China's active participation in
international financial institutions and
other international organizations and its
expanding trade relations with its
neighbors. In the past few years, we also
have begun a limited program of defen-
sive military cooperation with the
Chinese.
Current State of Relations
Since the normalization of relations in
1979, our bilateral ties with the P.R.C.
have expanded far beyond the narrow
strategic focus that brought us together
in the early 1970s. We have experienced
some ups and downs, but, increasingly,
we have been able to narrow our dif-
ferences and prevent them from affect-
ing the fundamental basis of our
relationship.
The most dramatic growth has been
in the economic area. This has been due
partly to enthusiastic participation by
American business in developing China
trade. Also, China sees the United
States as a primary source of advanced
technology, managerial expertise, and
technical information which can assist in
its modernization. Last year, bilateral
trade exceeded $8 billion. This year we
expect that figure to exceed $9 billion.
The United States now is China's third
largest trading partner, and its second
largest investor with over $1 billion com-
mitted. American business in China is
involved in everything from oil explora-
tion, mining, and industrial production
to legal services and finance.
Naturally, our expanding economic
relations are not without a number of
specific problems and disputes. Ameri-
can businessmen complain about a poor
investment climate in China. Indeed,
foreign investment has fallen off
significantly this year. American
exporters complain about Chinese
import barriers, unclear trade regula-
tions, and the absence of copyright
legislation. Our governments disagree
over balance-of-trade figures, due to dif-
ferent statistical bases used in calculat-
ing exports and imports. There has been
a sharp growth of Chinese textile
exports to this country, prompting more
demands for protectionist legislation.
We still have not agreed on a bilateral
investment treaty. And the Chinese con-
tend that our liberalization of technology
transfer controls has not gone far
enough. It is a tribute to the strength
and maturity of the relationship that
such difficulties are being discussed on a
pragmatic, nonpolemical, case-by-case
basis without threatening the overall
development of trade.
In the areas of science and technol-
ogy, a key Chinese development priority,
we are very active. Our bilateral scien-
tific and technological exchanges are the
largest we have with any country. Hun-
dreds of delegations pass between our
nations each year, providing China with
information on technical, scientific, and
managerial subjects. China also has
much to offer us in the fields of
medicine, scientific experimentation, and
earthquake prediction. The benefits are
mutual, and we expect them to grow as
we increase our cooperation and
exchange of information.
The United States hosts approx-
imately 17,000 students from the P.R.C.
When these students return to China,
they not only will contribute to China's
modernization but also will have a much
better understanding of the United
States. Through these returning
bruary 1987
49
EAST ASIA
students and through our support of
China's technological development, we
help to strengthen China's ties to the
outside world.
Reforms in China
Internal changes in the P.R.C. have led
to new vitality and prospects for further
progress. Since 1978, China has imple-
mented far-reaching economic reforms.
In connection with that effort, it has
expanded its relations with foreign coun-
tries, a process often described as the
"open door" policy. The success of its
modernization goals depends on this
decision. Through the open door flow the
foreign expertise and technology China
needs to further its modernization objec-
tives; and it is in our interest to help
stimulate China's economic develop-
ment. A politically stable, modernizing
China is in a better position to resist out-
side pressure and intimidation and is less
likely to be a distruptive factor in Asia.
China will modernize; the critical ques-
tions are: at what pace and with what
kind of orientation? Although Chinese
efforts will determine whether or not
their goals are achieved, we believe that
continued U.S. participation in the pro-
cess will serve our long-term interests.
Some suggest that our relations with
the P.R.C. might be equated with the
care and feeding of a "baby tiger."
China's key reformer, Deng Xiaoping, is
elderly, and many, both in China and
abroad, wonder whether his pragmatic,
moderate policies will continue after his
death. His reforms and open door
policies do not enjoy unanimous support
in China, and the pace and scope of
reforms continue to be the subject of
some controversy. Decentralization of
economic and political decisionmaking
and power requires adjustments in tradi-
tional patterns of party and bureaucratic
control. Some Chinese leaders worry
about negative Western influences
sneaking through the open door together
with the positive accoutrements of the
West so desired by China.
Given the vagaries of China's
modern history, some observers fear
that China's open door one day may be
slammed shut and the P.R.C. 's moderate
policies reversed. Fortunately, the pros-
pect is unlikely. While Chinese leaders
are determined to avoid "foreign entan-
glements," they also will avoid reversion
to uncompromising self-reliance and iso-
lation. Internal economic reforms have
generated more economic development
in the past 8 years than China has wit-
nessed in many decades. The standard of
living of millions of Chinese has improved;
and continuing stability and moderation
in the years ahead will expand these
benefits. Attempts to reverse the trend
undoubtedly would be opposed by a
great majority of the people.
China'a commitment to its open door
policy is reflected well in its relationship
with Hong Kong. After lengthy negotia-
tions, China and the United Kingdom
reached agreement in 1984 on Hong
Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty
in 1997 with its economic system intact.
While many details remain to be worked
out, we are encouraged that Hong
Kong's unique status as a commercial
center and a gateway to China will con-
tinue long into the 21st century.
While differences remain apparent in
China over the pace of the reforms,
overall results indicate that the momen-
tum for reform will continue.
Regional Implications
In the political realm, the development
of a comprehensive dialogue on regional
and global issues has deepened
significantly our understanding of each
other's interests and policies, thereby
reducing disagreements and potential
frictions. As I noted earlier, we both
have been concerned about Soviet
actions that threatened international
peace and stability.
There have been recent signs that
the Soviet Union, as a Pacific power, will
begin playing a larger role in Asia. We
believe Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech
is only the beginning of a new round of
Soviet activism in Asia. Moscow may
attempt to increase its influence in the
region through subtle tactics designed to
overcome the suspicions most Asian
nations have of Soviet intentions. Our
friends and allies in the region are not
impressed by empty rhetoric. Nor do
they find much that is attractive in the
Soviet Union's economic system, and
they will judge Moscow by its actions
rather than its words. If Moscow wishes
to participate in the region, rather than
offering a vague program for peace and
stability, it should start by addressing
some of the sources of continuing ten-
sion in East Asia. The Soviet Union
should reduce its troops in Afghanistan
and along the Sino-Soviet border. It
should take steps to persuade Vietnam
to withdraw its occupying forces from
Cambodia. It should reduce its military
support for North Korea. It should
reduce its massive deployment of SS-20
nuclear missiles in Siberia, which
threatens China, Japan, and other coun-
tries in Northeast Asia. I am not opti-
mistic that the Soviet Union will take
any of these steps.
In contrast, the United States is
engaged in a close and positive dialogi
with friends and allies throughout thf
region. Our discussions with China on
political and economic issues have bee
fostered by a regular exchange of higl
level visits between leaders of both ecu
tries. This series of visits has been mn
productive in strengthening areas of
agreement and reducing differences.
Both sides feel comfortable in express
their views frankly and unemotionally
There are a number of areas wher
we and the Chinese share parallel
interests.
In Southeast Asia, for example, t
Chinese actively participate in efforts
end Vietnamese occupation of Camboo
China supports the resistance moveme
and keeps Vietnamese forces engaged
the Sino-Vietnamese border.
In Afghanistan, the Chinese con-
demn the Soviets for their continued
military operations and are strong sup
porters of the Afghan resistance. The
Chinese have made it clear to Moscow
that the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan and Soviet support for Vi'
nam's occupation of Cambodia, along
with Soviet troop deployments on the
Sino-Soviet border, are the three main
obstacles to improved Sino-Soviet
relations.
On the Korean Peninsula, the
Chinese seek, as we do, to reduce ten-
sions between the North and South. Or.
two governments may differ on how th
can be accomplished, but the same objf
tive of peace is sought. Despite China's
unwillingness to promote political or
official ties, its indirect trade with the
Republic of Korea continues to grow at
an impressive rate. China had the larg-
est delegation at the recent Asian Gam
in Seoul and took the unprecedented
step of sending its athletes there by
direct, chartered flights. We believe it
would serve the interest— which both w
and China share— in peninsular stability
for Pyongyang to resume direct talks
with Seoul and for the North to par-
ticipate in the 1988 Olympics.
Japan is China's leading trade part
ner and. thereby, plays a key role in
China's economic modernization. Com-
mon interests and mutual respect
dominate their bilateral ties, as shown
by Prime Minister Nakasone's successfi
trip to China last month. China's policy
toward Japan is shaped by many of the
same factors that determine China's
policy toward the U.S.— concern about
50
Department of State Bullet
EAST ASIA
'illtaU
Soviet Union and the need for
istment. trade, and advanced
jmology.
Despite our many areas of agree-
t, we do have differences with the
,ese on certain international issues,
larily concerning regions outside of
a., such as the Middle East, Central
erica, and Africa. These are areas
•e remote from China's immediate
rests and security concerns, where
iing follows other political motiva-
,s, such as a need to demonstrate its
jj' lependent foreign policy." In such
s, China is prone to take public posi-
is more in sympathy with Third
rid nations and at odds with our own.
While we cannot expect that two
'forii mtries as different politically,
Mh momically, and culturally as China
the United States will share iden-
views on all world issues, we do
set to positions they take in interna-
aal fora which run counter to U.S.
crests and our friendly relations. In
!!!« !er to prevent misconceptions, we
:age in frequent consultations, which
e helped improve Chinese under-
nding of our foreign policy.
alts
iOMll(
ofH
eenij
m
nple,
litary Cooperation
addition to the broad expansion in our
(nomic, science and technology, and
itical relations, we have moved, in the
i.t 3 years, into the more sensitive
iia of military cooperation, including
sale of defensive arms to China. This
(ited security cooperation is pro-
jding cautiously and deliberately. It is
Jted in the assessment that we share
(imon security concerns. The will-
fness of the United States to sell
tcific defensive weapons or tech-
ogies to the P.R.C. is based on a
srough analysis of each item's utility
enhancing Chinese defensive capabil-
«s, in light of the political-military
vironment. We also carefully take into
count the interests and concerns of
r other friends and allies in the region
'•ough frequent and regular consulta-
ins with them on this issue.
Our military cooperation to date has
«en limited to approval of the sale of
ree specific weapons systems— a large-
iiber artillery munitions manufactur-
g plant, avionics components for the
8 defensive interceptor, and antisub-
arine torpedoes. Other defensive items
e under consideration.
Taiwan Relationship
Let me turn now to the Taiwan aspect of
our China policy. In 1979, we estab-
lished, by law, a framework for conduct-
ing unofficial commercial, cultural, and
other relations between people in the
United States and people on Taiwan.
Within this framework, unofficial rela-
tions have flourished remarkably. In
1985, 180,000 Americans traveled to
Taiwan, and 100,000 people from
Taiwan came to the United States.
There are approximately 21,000 students
from Taiwan studying at American
universities and aljout 1,000 American
students studying in Taiwan. This is a
vibrant, varied relationship which
benefits both our peoples.
Time has shown that normalization
of U.S. -P.R.C. relations was accom-
panied by a relaxation of tensions in the
area and by China's turn toward moder-
ation and responsible international par-
ticipation. Because of our faithfulness to
our friends, the people of Taiwan, no
less than others in the region, have
benefited from this positive
development.
U.S. -Taiwan trade nearly has quad-
rupled since 1978, the final year of our
diplomatic relationship, to reach an
estimated $25 billion this year. Nearly
50% of all Taiwan's exports go to the
American market, and Taiwan is our
11th largest export market worldwide.
Direct U.S. investment in Taiwan totals
$750 million. Under these conditions,
Taiwan has prospered: this year, its
growth rate may reach 9%.
Ironically, Taiwan's economic suc-
cess has created certain irritants in our
commercial relations— cigarettes, steel,
tariffs, machine tools, export perform-
ance requirements, and counterfeiting,
to name a few. Taiwan has taken action
to remove many of these irritants and to
try to diversify its overseas export
markets. These steps are appreciated, as
are Taiwan's efforts to purchase more
American grain and to improve intellec-
tual property protection. Nevertheless,
Taiwan's trade surplus with the United
States will increase this year to approx-
imately $15 billion, which is much larger
in per capita terms than our deficit with
Japan. In such circumstances, demands
from U.S. industry for greater access to
Taiwan's market are reasonable. We're
pleased, therefore, that Taiwan agreed
last week to grant us market access for
tobacco, wine, and beer, on terms which
we find satisfactory.
Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves
now have surpassed $40 billion, an
amount equivalent to more than 18
months of its imports. Taiwan is in one
of the strongest foreign exchange posi-
tions in the world. With such sizable
reserves, Taiwan's currency has appre-
ciated somewhat. However, given
Taiwan's global trade surplus and its
strong reserves, one would expect a fur-
ther appreciation.
These issues are the by-products of
Taiwan's success. Most of our trading
partners gladly would exchange their
economic woes for Taiwan's situation.
The island's economic success and its
vital commercial ties with the United
States have done much to give the peo-
ple on Taiwan greater confidence in the
future and in their own ability to deal
effectively with other challenges facing
their society.
In drafting the Taiwan Relations Act
7 years ago. Congress declared that any
nonpeaceful efforts to determine
Taiwan's future would be "a threat to
the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States." The sale of defensive
arms to Taiwan, mandated by the act,
continues. The U.S. -P.R.C. communique
of August 17, 1982, sets certain
parameters for conduct of the sales. In
return for Beijing reiterating that its
fundamental policy is to seek a peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue, the
United States agreed not to increase the
quality of arms sold to Taiwan and to
reduce the quantity gradually, over time.
The United States'will abide faithfully by
its undertakings in this communique.
Some have urged the U.S. Govern-
ment to become involved in efforts to
promote peaceful resolution of the dif-
ferences between Beijing and Taipei.
However, there is a real danger that
American involvement would be counter-
productive. For at least two decades, we
have viewed this issue as an internal
matter for the P.R.C. and Taiwan to
resolve themselves. We will not serve as
an intermediary or pressure Taiwan on
the matter. We leave it up to both sides
to settle their differences; our predomi-
nant interest is that the settlement be a
peaceful one.
Earlier this year, a Taiwan cargo
plan was hijacked and flown to China.
The authorities on Taiwan authorized
airline-to-airline talks to gain the return
of the plane and some members of its
crew. The success of these talks
demonstrates the virtue of letting the
Chinese work things out for themselves.
sbruary 1987
51
EAST ASIA
Democratic Progress
I want to add a few words about internal
political developments in Taiwan.
During the past 6 months, some
remarkable and encouraging steps
toward greater democracy have been ini-
tiated by the authorities in Taiwan. In
October, Chiang Ching-kuo announced
that the martial law emergency decree
would be terminated and that a ban
against the formation of new opposition
parties would be lifted. Opposition
leaders, sensing the.?e winds of change,
have pressed ahead with the formation
of a new political party.
These developments represent a
very significant evolution of Taiwan's
political institutions. We commend the
foresight and determination that have
set this process in motion. We also
recognize that the transition to a func-
tioning democratic party system will not
be easy. There may be difficulties along
the way, but we are impressed by the
process which has begun.
Conclusion
Let me conclude my remarks with the
observation that, more so than ever
before, we Americans are aware of the
opportunities and challenges we face
throughout East Asia and the Pacific.
The many nations of the region have a
firm claim on our attention— some due to
their close, traditional friendship and
alliance with us, others because they ex-
hibit hostility or instability. We seek to
maintain our good relations with the
former while working to reduce tensions
and differences with the latter.
China occupies a unique place in the
region. The remarkable progress in our
relations with this great country has had
a major impact on the rest of the area.
We believe the basic premise of our
policy toward China— that it can be a
force for peace and stability throughout
East Asia— is correct and is producing
positive results.
There still are differences between
us, and we do not take this critical rela-
tionship for granted. On the contrary,
we devote considerable effort and atten-
tion to ensuring that we are responsive
to changes in both our bilateral ties and
the broader situation in the region. I am
confident that, through cooperation and
good will on both sides, we can continue
to strengthen our bonds with China to
our mutual benefit. ■
Vitality and Possibility on the Pacific Rim
by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.
Address before a conference spon-
sored by Meridian House International
for business executives from the United
States, Japan, and Latin America on
December 3, 1986. Mr. Sigur is Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.
I am very pleased to be here with you
today. It is appropriate that this sym-
posium takes place in the house built by
Ambassador Irwin B. Laughlin, who
served in the Foreign Service in Japan
between 1893 and 1907. Meiji Japan had
a great allure for Americans, and judg-
ing from Ambassador Laughlin's fine
collection of ukiyo-e. he must have been
intrigued with the country. It was a
fascinating time. A quarter century after
the Meiji Restoration, Japan retained an
exotic flavor for Westerners. Yet the fall
of the shogunate had released a tremen-
dous vibrancy. The energy and vitality
that characterized the Meiji era persists
in Japan, and a similar dynamism has
emerged in other countries along the
Pacific rim in East Asia. It is what
makes the region so promising and
important to the United States.
Trade With East Asia
East Asia has become our primary
source of trade. In 1985 the region
accounted for about one-third of our
global two-way trade. The East Asian
region also contains our most dynamic
trading partners. From 1981 through
1985, U.S. trade with the world
increased by 13%, but with East Asian
and Pacific countries our trade increased
by almost 42%. The United States is the
number one market for Korea, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong as well as for Japan. What
frequently is overlooked is that 7 of our
20 largest export markets are in the
region. In addition to Japan, they
include Korea, Australia, Taiwan, China,
Singapore, and Hong Kong. U.S. invest-
ment in the region exceeds $33 billion
and, like trade, is growing.
Most predictions project growing
interdependence among the economies
and societies of the Pacific rim. By the
year 2000, it is almost certain that the
Pacific Basin will account for more than
50% of the world's production. U.S. ties
to Europe will remain strong, but our
future growth increasingly lies in East
Asia and the Pacific.
Success in Development
Northeast Asia in particular has showi
the way to effective economic develop
ment. Many of the region's governmer
have adopted development strategies
which encourage private sector initia-
tive, and they serve as practical model
for developing countries in other
regions. Businessmen have been willin:
to risk domestic investment that explo
new technologies, improving quality
while cutting costs. The labor force is
hard-working, highly educated, and
adaptable. The most successful countri
in the region have promoted industriesi
geared to competitive exporting. The
concentration on exports has multiple
benefits. It overcomes the limitation ol
small domestic markets, imposes cost
consciousness, and eases foreign
exchange constraints.
This development strategy has
clearly paid off. The Asia-Pacific
region's share of world exports more
than doubled between 1960 and 1984,
rising from 7.5% to 17%. The success
this growth model, based on exports, it
even more obvious when one finds that
the economies of Taiwan, Korea, and
Singapore expanded much more quick!}
when they abandoned import substitu-
tion strategies for outward-looking
policies. The export-led growth has bee-
sustained by sound financial manage
ment. The Asian countries with rapidly
growing economies have followed sensi
ble exchange rate policies. They also
have encouraged domestic savings
through intelligent banking regulations
and have sought foreign investment. In
general these successful countries have
avoided market distorting price-fixing
and subsidies. It is no coincidence that
the debt-service ratio of the East Asian
developing countries is the lowest of an
region- 18% in 1985.
Survey of East Asia
It is handy to talk of the "East Asian
region," but that term hides a great
diversity. The region can be divided intc
five categories by degree of economic
development: first, Japan, Australia, an
New Zealand; second, the newly indus-
trialized countries— Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore; third, the rest o
the ASEAN countries; fourth, China am
the Pacific islands; and finally the stag-
nant, closed socialist economies of Asia.
The newly industrialized countries
initially concentrated their efforts on
producing labor intensive products in th«
52
EAST ASIA
Os as Japan's technological endow-
it and wage costs began to rise. They
are rapidly increasing the produc-
of manufactured goods, while
an, of course, is making high tech
ducts. As a result of yen apprecia-
1, lower oil prices, and reduced in-
;st rates, Taiwan and Korea are
ming. Korea's dramatic achievement
global current account surplus this
r will permit it to reduce its debt.
China and the ASEAN countries,
er than Singapore, are now entering
labor-intensive niche the newly
ustrialized countries are abandoning,
present the ASEAN countries, espe-
,ly the oil producers— Indonesia and
laysia— depend on raw material
Dorts. They are suffering from gen-
Jly depressed commodity prices. In
short term, some may need assist-
ce. In the medium term, these coun-
es must expand manid^actured
oorts, and to do that they should
Drove the climate for foreign
testment.
China has witnessed the economic
owth in other countries in its region
tl understands the implications for
proving the living standards of its own
3ple. Accordingly China has been
mging its economic system to include
1 ire market-based policies. China's
■cnt extraordinarily high growth rates
■ encouraging, and we look forward to
it country's continued growth and
egration into the global economy.
These days we tend to dwell gloom-
on the implications of the economic
iwth in East Asia. I refer, of course,
the region's competitive challenge to
nerican companies and to the United
ates' very large trade deficit with
;ian countries. These developments
■se serious questions, and our govern-
ent and companies must deal with
em. At the same time, we should
cognize that the growing prosperity in
ist Asia contributes mightily to politi-
,1 stability and ultimately to our
■curity.
East Asian prosperity has depended
1 the openness of the U.S. market. The
iiited States has been a ready market
)t only for the countries in Asia but for
-'veloping countries elsewhere as well.
1 1985 the United States bought 61% of
le developing countries' exports of
lanufactures. Realistically this situation
mnot go on forever. Other countries,
^jiecially Japan, must open their mar-
ets to allow an increase in imports from
R' developing countries and from the
nited States as well. We can continue
1 lie a good customer only if we enjoy
i.'cess to the markets of our trading
■ai'tners.
U.S. -Japan Interdependence
Let me now turn from the broad over-
view of the region to consider our eco-
nomic relations with Japan, which in 40
years has become an economic super-
power and an economic model for many
of the other countries in East Asia.
The United States is bound to Japan
by a history of friendship and coopera-
tion. We share a commitment to demo-
cratic values, a common view on the
important international questions, and a
security framework. Our governments
consult and cooperate closely on interna-
tional political affairs and on the man-
agement of the world economy. Though
often repeated, it remains true that the
relationship between the United States
and Japan is one of the most important
bilateral relationships in the world.
The economies of the two countries
also now are tied in an increasingly tight
and strong mesh of trade and invest-
ment. It is commonplace to note that,
after Canada, Japan is the United
States' largest trading partner. But the
statement hides the complexity of the
relationship and the growing integration
of the two countries' economies.
When we think of Japanese exports
to the United States, we usually think of
consumer products— cars, cameras,
VCRs. Certainly we buy those things
from Japan in abundance. But of the
United States' $72 billion of imports
from Japan in 1985, over $8 billion were
components used by U.S. manufacturers.
Another $2.2 billion were products made
by U.S. subsidiaries in Japan and
shipped to the United States. According
to Commerce Department statistics,
Japanese subsidiaries in the United
States in 1983 exported $22.9 billion,
which was 11.4% of U.S. exports that
year. In 1985 we shipped $22.6 billion to
Japan, more than 10% of our global
exports and more than our exports to
the United Kingdom and West Germany
combined.
Japan is now, after the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, the third
largest foreign investor in the United
States, The Ministry of Finance has
reported that at the end of 1985,
Japanese investment in this country
stood at $25.3 billion, up $5.4 billion
from the year before. The rapid growth
of investment by Japanese companies
suggests that the integration of the two
economies will continue. Several months
ago Business Week debated whether
increased Japanese investment in the
U.S. economy was beneficial and con-
cluded that it was. On balance I agree.
The United States needs capital, and it
can benefit from the investments and
technology that Japanese companies will
be able to provide.
Trade With Japan
We expect that for 1986 Japan will have
nearly a $60 billion trade surplus with
the United States and a global current
account surplus of over $80 billion.
Japan has the lowest average tariff on
manufactured goods of any developed
country and has relatively few official
trade barriers of other sorts. Yet there
are anomalies which suggest that the
Japanese economy is still not as open as
it might appear. Japan has the lowest
per capita imports of any major devel-
oped country— $1,106 compared with
$1,580 for the United States and $2,611
for West Germany. It has the highest
per capita manufactured exports to
developing countries. At the same time,
except for France, it has the lowest
manufactured imports from developing
countries— $69 compared with $285 for
the United States and $145 for West
Germany. Not just American companies
but European and Asian exporters com-
plain of the difficulty of selling in Japan.
Taken together, the real and per-
ceived problems of entering the market,
and the size of Japan's global trade
surplus and its bilateral surplus with the
United States, have resulted in persist-
ent economic tensions between the two
countries. The complexity of the trade
and investment ties between the two
countries— and the relationship of our
bilateral trade deficit with Japan to our
budget deficit, to our global trade
deficit, and to Japan's domestic economic
policies— have made it hard to deal with
the problem. From time to time, some
have suggested greater government reg-
ulation of trade or targets of some sort.
We have rejected these calls because
they would choke off economic vitality,
and they could have unintended and
unforeseeable contrary effects on com-
panies and national economies, not only
in Japan and the United States but
elsewhere.
This is not to say, however, that the
U.S. Government has failed to pursue
solutions to our economic problems with
Japan vigorously. We have approached
the trade problem on two sets of tracks.
We have sought better access to Japan's
market through the MOSS [market-
oriented, sector-selective] talks and
through negotiations on other individual
issues. I think that we have made prog-
ress. We resolved many of the issues
raised in the MOSS talks. And in the
first 8 months of 1986, U.S. exports of
MOSS products to Japan rose b.7%.
Japan has cooperated in resolving other
-ebruary 1987
53
EAST ASIA
issues as well. These include tobacco,
semiconductors, and aluminum. Prime
Minister Nakasone promised that foreign
companies would be able to compete to
participate in the new Kansai airport
project, and U.S. firms are seeking
business.
While pushing for improved market
access, the Administration also has
worked for a correction of the exchange
rate, which has a great effect on trade
flows. Following the exchange rate
agreement among the group of five
major economic powers in September
1985, the yen strengthened by over 50%.
The Tokyo summit statement in May
emphasized economic fundamentals as
determinants of exchange rates. We
believe that it is important for both the
United States and Japan to address
these fundamentals. The evolution
brought about by the exchange rate is
consistent with Japanese Government
policy. When announcing his intention to
follow up on the Maekawa report in
April this year, Prime Minister
Nakasone said that Japan's" . . .continu-
ing large current account imbalance is a
matter of serious concern not only for
the management of our own economy
but also for the harmonious development
of the world economy. Therefore, it
should be our national goal to steadily
reduce the current account imbalance to
one consistent with international har-
mony." The Maekawa report plots a
course for doing just that. We look for-
ward to continuing and effective
Japanese Government action on the
Maekawa report's goals and
recommendations.
We believe that a reduction in
Japan's global trade surplus requires a
restructuring of the economy away from
export-led growth. We have, in fact,
entered into a high-level dialogue on
structural economic issues with Japanese
officials. We held the first substantive
meeting at the end of October and will
hold another early next year. In those
talks, we will continue to discuss with
the Japanese ways of encouraging
greater domestic-led growth in Japan.
Changes in Japan's Economy
Evolution seems underway in Japan's
economy. The change in the exchange
rate is having an effect on trade flows.
During the first 9 months of 1986,
Japan's export volume was down
slightly— four-tenths of 1%— and import
volume was up by 13%. In October the
volume of exports was down 1.7%, and
the volume of imports was up by 5%. (I
might mention that U.S. exports to
Japan were up 18.9% in the first 9
months of this year.) There is no doubt
that declining export sales have
dampened economic growth in Japan.
Statistics are not yet available to deter-
mine the exchange rate's effect on indi-
vidual industries. But the effects, we
believe, are not trivial.
The Japanese steel industry is obvi-
ously in structural depression, and the
auto industry's profits are down. One
hears reports that Japanese companies
are moving production to other Asian
countries and to the United States and
that they are turning from production
for export to sales in the domestic
market.
Asia, Latin America,
and the United States
I have concentrated on East Asia and on
Japan's relations with the United States.
But I know the principal subject of this
conference is the economic relationships
among Japan, Latin America, and the
United States. We should bear in mind
the Pacific Basin is an ellipse which
borders the countries of Latin America
as well. It is an area of great importance
and potential to the nations along the
other edge of the Pacific rim as well. A
large part of Asia's trade goes through
the Panama Canal and Latin American
waters. Japan also has historical and
cultural ties to Latin America. During
this century, Japanese emigrants settled
in a number of countries in the region,
and people of Japanese ancestry now
number 1 million in Latin America. Of
those, 800,000 are in Brazil.
Despite this, Japan's economic ties
with Latin America are thin compared to
those between the United States and
Latin America and compared to Japan's
own connections with Asia. In 1985
Japan exported $7.5 billion to the region
and imported $6.1 billion from it. In that
year, U.S. exports to Latin America
were $31 billion and its imports were
$49.1 billion. Japan's economic
assistance to the area is increasing but
still constitutes only about 10% of its
worldwide assistance. Japan's interef
in the area are quite similar to those •
the United States. Both countries fa\
democratization and the sort of econi
reforms that will contribute to the sol
tion of the debt problem and to econo c
progress and political stability. We h:
cooperated closely with Japan on the
debt issue and consult with it on Latii
American questions. We will continue
doing so. We hope that Japan will in-
crease its trade with Latin America, ; i
particularly its imports from that reg i.
Japan has announced its intention to
double its worldwide foreign develop-
ment assistance over the next 5 years
In connection with this, we would likt i
see increases in assistance to Latin
America— particularly to Central
America, the Caribbean, and Bolivia.
Conclusion
I started my speech in Asia and now
have just visited Latin America. That:
a pretty long trip in 15 minutes. I wow
now like to return to Washington to
offer some final comments.
The first is obvious. That is, vitalif
and growth in the Pacific rim. East A|
and Latin America are in our economic
terest and to our political benefit. Risif
incomes will provide greater oppor-
tunities for U.S. exports, and economi
growth will strengthen the political
stability so important to our own
security.
The free flow of goods and capital,,
in the interest of the whole region. Bu ""
we can keep our market open only if v
have access to the markets of others. ^
is essential that the economically suc-
cessful countries of East Asia and Lat
America open their markets further. I
also is essential that Japan carry
through with its policy to reduce its
external surpluses substantially.
Finally, we too bear an obligation.
The appreciation of the yen provides
greater opportunity for us to increase
our exports to Japan and to other coui
tries. To take advantage of that oppor-
tunity, we will have to correct im-
balances in our own economy, improve
our competitiveness, and hustle for
sales. Vitality is not a resource found
only on the other side of the Pacific. It
exists in the United States, and we
should demonstrate that. ■
54
Department of State Bullet
i
EAST ASIA
Tie U.S. Approach
^» East Asia and the Pacific
i
HGaston J. Sigur, Jr.
. [ddress before a conference on "U.S.
'nal Seairity Interests in Asia and
I'licific: Update 1986" sponsored by
I'lirific and Asian Affairs Council
:lie Pacific Forum in Honolulu on
•lifr 29. 1986.
a pleasiire to participate in a public
nil which promises to be both educa-
lal and enjoyable. Four years ago,
idlulu's Pacific and Asian Affairs
lu-ij hosted a similar seminar for the
lie and representatives of the Bureau
^ast Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
artment of State. It was a resound-
success by all accounts, and we are
a ghted to coopei-ate with the council
oi e again. It performs an admirable job
h acilitating public discussion of inter-
n ional issues. We appreciate the
stance also provided by the Pacific
um and the cooperating organiza-
i> listed in your programs.
As many of you know, our ambas-
irs to the various East Asian and
r 'ific capitals— our chiefs of mission—
g hered in Honolulu earlier this week
f a periodic review of regional policy
a I administrative matters. We've found
ii 'ears past that an occasional
f ewheeling discussion among our
r ional diplomats, CINCPAC [Com-
r nder in Chief Pacific] officials, and
I Dartment representatives helps to
s nulate fresh perspectives, new ideas,
a I the necessary coordination that
ii )roves our methods of operation. Our
r etings this week have been tremen-
c isly useful, and we want to thank the
( .'ernor of Hawaii and the people of
I nolulu for their customary hospitality
a 1 friendliness.
Our session this afternoon is, in
sue respects, a foUowup to the 1982
f um hosted by the council, and thus it
c Ties the title "U.S. National Security
I erests in Asia and the Pacific; Update
1^6." Perhaps our fundamental secu-
r/ interests in the region have changed
1 le in 4 years; but certainly the context
; i circumstances in which those
i erests exist have undergone some
. portant transitions. One of the most
•iimatic events, of course, has been the
l;pularly inspired political evolution this
]i5t year in the Philippines, where we
' ve important security interests, and I
lit to say more about this in a
moment. Another positive adjustment is
reflected in the increasingly close and
stable relations which we now share with
the People's Republic of China, having
moved forward together from the con-
tentious period of early 1982. On the
negative side, we have had to suspend
our ANZUS [Australia. New Zealand,
and United States security treaty]
defense commitment to New Zealand in
response to Wellington's placement of
unacceptable conditions on port calls by
U.S. naval vessels. But our security
treaty relations with Australia, Japan,
Thailand, the Philippines, and the
Republic of Korea remain strong; and
our multifaceted relationships with the
ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] states and the South
Pacific islands are functioning well.
Economic ties with Taiwan remain
substantial.
We are witnessing a more assertive
Soviet policy in the region in recent
years, but the general environment
remains basically unsuited to Moscow's
ambiguous initiatives. Unfortunately, the
context of hostility and dangers of con-
frontation remain volatile on the Korean
Peninsula and in Cambodia, much as
they were 4 years ago. This Administra-
tion has supported efforts to reduce ten-
sions in those two localities, but the
response from Pyongyang and Hanoi has
been disappointing. We continue to urge
the Government of Vietnam to withdraw
its occupation forces from Cambodia and
to provide us with the fullest possible
accounting of our missing servicemen in
Southeast Asia. And we continue to
encourage North Korea to resume its
dialogue with the Republic of Korea as
the only way to ensure peace for all
Koreans.
The East Asian and Pacific region
has prospered economically and politi-
cally, relative to other geographic
regions of the globe. Technological
advances are proceeding swiftly, literacy
rates are high, and economic perform-
ance on the whole has been impressive.
Political instability is the exception
rather than the rule; and politically
motivated terrorist acts remain few and
isolated.
The Philippine Transformation
I want to say just a few words about the
situation in the Philippines, since
Ambassador Bosworth [U.S. Ambas-
sador to the Philippines Stephen W.
Bosworth] was unable to join today's
panel discussion. By now it should be
very clear that the foundation of U.S.
policy toward the Philippines is to
encourage the revitalization of the
democratic process there, to facilitate
stability and prosperity for this Pacific
ally. The Filipinos themselves have taken
giant strides this year in that direction,
and we will be as supportive and helpful
as we can in the process. President
Aquino just completed a tremendously
successful visit to the United States. She
effectively affirmed to the American
people her government's commitment to
democracy and free enterprise. In turn,
the United States demonstrated its com-
mitment to the success of the new
Philippine democracy through the pledge
of substantial economic, military, and
medical assistance to the Philippine
people. Additionally, the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank have
approved, in principle, additional loans
to support the Philippines' economic
reform program. The agreement with
the Fund and World Bank give greater
confidence to private sector bankers and
investors as they consider new
investments in the Philippines.
President Aquino gave a special
impetus to our already strong,
cooperative bilateral relationship. That is
very important, because troublesome
challenges remain. The new government
in Manila contends with massive
unemployment, heavy external debt, and
extensive poverty. The local communist
insurgency remains a serious danger.
And important trade and investment
measures still must be implemented.
But this Administration is confident
that the Aquino government is embarked
on a program of national recovery which
enjoys the overwhelming support of the
Filipino people. We will work with Con-
gress to ensure appropriate levels of
assistance in the future. We will con-
tinue to encourage vibrant private sector
involvement in the reconstruction of the
economy.
A stable, democratic, and prosperous
Philippines will contribute measurably to
the realization of our policy goals in the
region as a whole and serve well our own
national interests.
Policy Objectives and Principles
What I want to address more generally
this afternoon is those basic principles
which guide and direct U.S. policy in the
Asian and Pacific region today. They
derive, of course, from certain elemen-
tary but central policy objectives; secu-
rity and stability for the nations of the
area are top priorities for all concerned,
||bruary
1987
55
EAST ASIA
and we will do what is appropriate and
necessary to nurture these goals. The
United States wants to help promote
regional prosperity, social advancement,
and political modernization within our
limited means to do so. And we seek to
facilitate multilateral cooperation, not
simply as an end in itself but as an effec-
tive means for moving promptly toward
the other goals which we and the Asian-
Pacific nations share.
In light of these, U.S. policy toward
the region is constructed upon certain
basic principles and convictions. These
precepts reflect fundamental American
values as well as our realistic assessment
of actual circumstances in this area, and
I would identify them in this way.
First, U.S. policy is based upon
genuine respect for the interests and
prerogatives of the people of the
Asian-Pacific region. We do not seek
and we would not attempt to interfere in
the internal affairs of those nations or to
dictate their policy decisions. This
Administration approaches these rela-
tionships with a degree of sensitivity and
responsiveness which fully acknowledges
the sovereign status of the nations of the
area. We believe we have much to offer
the developing states of the region and
are willing to provide advice and
guidance as needed. Where leadership is
required in security or economic affairs,
we accept our responsibilities; but we
never will attempt to dominate or dic-
tate in those endeavors.
The United States is willing to defer
to others where new roles of construc-
tive regional leadership and participation
are emerging. For the past several
years, we have looked to the ASEAN
members for policy leadership on issues
involving the Cambodian occupation and
resistance, and we closely coordinate our
policy efforts there. We respect and sup-
port Japan's significant and growing
role in providing assistance to the
developing countries of the region. We
consult regularly with interested govern-
ments on the course of our expanding
relationship with the People's Republic
of China. And I believe we are more sen-
sitive than ever, today, to the concerns
and requirements of the emerging-
entities in the South Pacific.
Governments— even allied
governments— may not always agree on
the fine points of every policy decision,
but our differences are subject to discus-
sion. Our partners and friends will find
us receptive to their concerns on every
issue and respectful of their points of
view. We want to foster greater
cooperation through regular consulta-
tions and mutual understanding, and we
are trying hard to accomplish this.
At the same time, the United States
hopes to strengthen our alliance team-
work through clearer comprehension of
our common challenges and respon-
sibilities. If one ally sets its own
arbitrary rules for others to follow, it
involves risks for all. Reciprocal coopera-
tion and burdensharing is key to a
healthy partnership. And our unity is
essential to the broadest aspects of East-
West relations. When our President
meets with General Secretary Gorbachev,
his position is strengthened by recogni-
tion that our allies are solidly behind
him. This does not in any way diminish
us individually; rather, it strengthens us
collectively and serves the cause of
peace.
A second precept of U.S. policy in
this region is our conviction that peace
and stability are best facilitated by
addressing specific sources of regional
tension. While the Asian-Pacific region
has been, in recent years, relatively free
of conflict, its remarkable advances are
shadowed by Vietnam's military occupa-
tion of Cambodia and by the ever-
present risk of hostilities on the Korean
Peninsula. We continue to urge that
these dangerous situations be addressed
through negotiations by the parties
directly involved.
We do not believe that grand concep-
tual schemes of collaboration are the
answer— so-called confidence-building
measures sublimely superimposed upon
the region without regard to underlying
sources of danger. Peace is not a
theoretical abstraction; it is a tangible
condition. We must address the
specifics.
President Reagan has called
repeatedly for urgent resolution of
regional conflicts, as he did most
recently in his appearance before the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
Cambodia is an important part of that
message. We continue to believe that a
genuine solution to this 8-year-old prob-
lem must provide for self-determination
by the Cambodian people and the with-
drawal of Vietnamese forces. We remain
firmly behind ASEAN in its quest for a
settlement. Many elements of the pro-
posals put to the Vietnamese are a
reasonable basis for an effective settle-
ment, and we believe Moscow should
exercise influence with Hanoi to
negotiate seriously. To date, neither the
Soviets nor the Vietnamese have
responded seriously to these urgings. In
the meantime, we remain steadfast in
our support of Prince Sihanouk and Son
Sann and of the noncommunist
resistance generally; for we believe that
progress may only be possible once Vi
nam recognizes it cannot gain from pr
longing the warfare that ravages
Cambodia.
With regard to the other immediai
source for concern in this region, Kon
we believe that Moscow should restrai
its military collaboration with North
Korea, and persuade Pyongyang to
resume the dialogue with Seoul which
the North suspended last January.
Direct talks between the North and
South are still the best means for
diminishing the risk of this flashpoint
northeast Asia.
Of course, the Soviet Union also
could do much to ease regional tensior
by eliminating its nuclear-armed SS-2
missiles targeted on Asia, by reducing
its military forces in the region, and b;
responding to Japan's appeal for the
return of its Northern Territories.
Let's construct a durable peace in
Asia. But let's accomplish it by buildin
methodically from the bottom up,
instead of with superficial gestures thf
purport to work from the top down.
Turning to a third area: the Unit*
States does support, as a matter of
principle, the establishment of
democratic institutions and processes
in East Asia and the Pacific. We pro-
mote the democratic system not purely
on moral or ideological grounds but,
quite simply, because experience prove
that this is the best prescription for
political stability and economic strengt
among developing nations. As part of
this concept, I include the notion of
modern constitutionalism, the rule of
law, popular electoral processes, and tl
free enterprise system. Obviously, the
United States has particular interest in
seeing the steady evolution of
democratic reforms and responsive
government among those nations with
whom we have normal and extensive
relations.
There are at present a number of
"emerging democracies" in this region
enjoying unprecedented prosperity and
social advances. Hardly any would be
considered "perfect" by the purest
standards of the democratic model, but
the trends are encouraging, for the mos
part. When we consider how far these
governments have come just within the
current generation, and how favorably
they compare with the repressive
examples in their own neighborhood, this
record is impressive. Secretary Shultz
has commented that democratic transi-
tions are "often complex and delicate, I
and . . . can only come about in a way I
consistent with a country's history, I
culture, and political realities." But that
56
Department of State Bulleti '
EUROPE
not mean that we will overlook per-
■nt violations or infringements of
human rights. Quite the contrary,
rge enlightened behavior on all
rnments, including those in
sition.
'his year alone, we are witnessing
uraging examples of the democratic
ess in action. Aside from the
atic popular revitalization of
ocracy in the Philippines last
ruary, we have witnessed significant
ititutional reform activity this year
Dth the Philippines and the Republic
^orea. We welcome the recent deci-
by Taiwan authorities to lift martial
land the ban on new political
lies— an impressive indication of a
(mitment to political development in
an. Important parliamentary elec-
have occurred or will occur this
in several parts of the region. All
th e developments are reminders that
•h representative form of government
.ritical element of Asian-Pacific
ernization.
Ill promoting democracy, the United
es will not meddle in the internal
irs of others. We will remain in con-
with democratic political forces
uiihout the region, recognizing that
adequate time and constructive
It, the peoples of the developing
us will work out their own solutions.
Fourth, we sincerely believe that
01 common prosperity can be main-
tf ed only through the expansion of
ti le and investment. Our policy is one
ol ncouraging growth through trade,
al ig with basic reliance on the market
fc es of competition and free enter-
f. Roth protectionism and excessive
t regulation thwart the common pur-
p' 3S for which we and the Asian-Pacific
n. ons are striving. That is the message
w ch this Administration has sought to
C( imunicate, and it is at the core of our
a nomic philosophy and trading prac-
ti in the region. We do believe the
ni ions of this region are now moving in
tl direction of constructive long-range
s< itions to our trading problems. But it
' take some time yet for the natural
' es of the marketplace to rectify some
ii lalances. In the meantime, we must
S] n the temptation to clutch at quick-
fi solutions which will only increase our
r blcms in the long run.
^'(lu all know how hard the President
■' resisted protectionist sentiments in
f country. During this past year, the
i ministration successfully discouraged
i''onceived congressional efforts seek-
tn legislate away the U.S. trade
iiji. Such protectionist action only
lid have produced great damage to
ourselves and our trading partners
without solving the deficit. But we are
not out of the woods yet. Frustrations
run deep, and we must be prepared for
additional protectionist initiatives next
year. Our worldwide deficit in 1985 sur-
passed $148 billion, and the Asian area
alone accounted for more than $80
billion of that figure. In this area, which
now is our largest regional trading part-
ner, we simply must do better at specific
export promotion. Reduced barriers to
market access, national currency
adjustments, and more receptive invest-
ment conditions already are having a
favorable impact, and we pledge for our
part to work even harder to improve the
overall climate of cooperation. American
business has to work harder, too, to
regain lost competitiveness and to take
advantage of the newly opening markets
in Asia.
There are many emerging economies
in East Asia and the Pacific whose
destinies rely both on healthy market
interactions and long-term domestic
stability. The interdependence of
political stability and economic pros-
perity is fundamental, and the decline of
one unavoidably leads to the weakening
of the other. The United States
recognizes the importance to world
peace of this region's stability, and we
are prepared to do our part to preserve
it. Through the public and private sec-
tors, we offer important trade prospects,
technology transfer, foreign investment,
and educational opportunities to help the
developing countries remain on sound
footing. We cannot, of course, carry the
burden alone, and we welcome the role
of Japan and other advanced market
countries in assisting the economic
growth of the lesser developed countries
of this region.
Conclusion
In closing, let me reiterate that the U.S.
commitment to East Asia and the Pacific
remains steadfast. We believe the best
prescription for our future role in the
region is the same formula that has
directed our course successfully to this
point: policy based upon principle rather
than expediency and upon conviction
rather than opportunism. Our allies and
friends will find us always available to
discuss their concerns and, hopefully,
ever sensitive to their interests. We
intend to remain a partner, not a poten-
tate, to the region as it continues the
sometimes difficult transition to full
economic and political modernization. ■
NATO Defense Planning
Committee IVIeets in Brussels
The Defense Ministers of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
met in Brussels December U-5. 1986. The
United, States was represented by
Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger. Following is the text of the
final communique.
The Defense Planning Committee of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in
ministerial session in Brussels on 4th and .5th
December 1986, and agreed |to] the following:
2, NATO's aim is the prevention of war;
therefore, the Alliance must continue to
ensure its security through the provision of
adequate military capabilities and the parallel
pursuit of a more stable East- West relation-
ship. Credible deterrence and defense is an
essential basis for improved relations between
East and West.
:3. NATO's strategy of forward defense
and flexible response, including the commit-
ment to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent
posture, has preserved peace for many years
and remains fully valid. Against the
background of existing Warsaw Pact strength
and ongoing force improvements, this
strategy continues to require effective
nuclear deterrence, based on a mix of
systems. Given the need for stable balance at
all times, nuclear weapons cannot be con-
sidered in isolation. Reductions in nuclear
weapons would increase the importance of
eliminating the current imbalance in conven-
tional forces. We reject unilateral disarma-
ment, which would result in the abandonment
by NATO of its deterrent strategy, and hence
the basis for its security and stability. As in
the past. Alliance solidarity and cohesion will
be important in ensuring progress towards a
more secure and stable environment.
4. Our determination to avoid an undue
reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons
is reflected in our continuing efforts to im-
prove conventional forces. The Conventional
Defense Improvements (GDI) action plan has
provided the framework within which we can
ribruary
1987
57
EUROPE
make progress towards securing this objec-
tive. In particular, it lias identified those key
deficiencies and priority areas where we all
agree a special effort will bring the greatest
return for our collective defense. Our discus-
sion (}f the Annual Defense Review and the
adoption of the NATO Force Plan 1987-1991
has reflected our determination to give these
Alliance priority areas special emphasis in our
national plans and programs.
5. Considerable progress has already l)een
made towards a more effective conventional
posture. We have seen positive developments
in several areas including the substantial
modernization programs in almost all member
countries and the improvements in the sus-
tainability of our forces. These improvements
and other actions contained in GDI will con-
siderably enhance our capabilities and reduce
the areas of deficiency. We are determined to
sustain this momentum.
6. Having noted the initial assessment of
the developing threat posed to NATO by
Warsaw Pact tactical ballistic missiles, we
called for continued work on assessing the
threat and possible ways to deal with it.
7. Improvements to Alliance planning
procedures are also now being put into effect.
These include a more effective co-ordination
of the various planning areas of the Alliance
and the provision of more effective long-term
planning guidance on our military require-
ments through regular updating of the con-
ceptual military framework and the develop-
ment of long term planning guidelines by our
military authorities.
8. All of this represents substantial prog-
ress and provides a solid foundation for
achieving more effective conventional forces.
However, the provision of adequate resources
in accordance with the 1985 ministerial
guidance which reaffirmed the aims of a 3
percent real increase as a general guide, and
the need for even better use of these
resources will continue to be a serious
challenge for all nations.
9. Better armaments co-operation, stand-
ardization and sharing of technology between
the European and North American and the
developed and developing members of the
Alliance are important for ensuring the most
effective use of resources, as is the continued
protection of military relevant technology.
10. In the context of the current GDI ef-
fort, we agreed that improved armaments col-
laboration has an important role to play in the
strengthening of conventional defenses and
that NATO's armaments co-operation im-
provements strategy, approved by Ministers
in December 1985, is proving to be a useful
29th Report on Cyprus
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
NOV. 14, 1986'
In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am
submitting to you a bimonthly report on prog-
ress toward a negotiated settlement of the
Cyprus question.
The United Nations Secretary General
met on September 16 with Mr. Denktash. the
Turkish Cypriot leader, and on September 26
with President Kyprianou. The Secretary
General reviewed the Cyjjrus situation with
the leaders of the two Cypriot communities
and explored with them ways to carry for-
ward his good offices mission.
The Turkish Cypriot side has accepted the
Secretary General's draft framework agree-
ment and taken the position that the Greek
Cypriot side should also do so. The Greek
Cypriot side has not accepted the document
and. instead, has taken the position that
priority should be given to discussion of
withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers,
international guarantees, and the "three
freedoms."
United Nations Under Secretary Gem I
Goulding is visiting Cyprus this month to
follow up on the Secretary General's disc
sions with the two Cypriot leaders. He wii
also be visiting Ankara and Athens.
Secretary Shultz met with President
Kyprianou on September 23 in New York
State Department officials met with Mr.
Denktash during his September visit to tl.
United States. In those meetings, Ameri( ,
officials reiterated support for the Secret,
General's good offices mission and urged i
Cypriot leaders to cooperate with his cont •
ing efforts.
Sincerely,
Ronald Ri: ,
'Identical letters addressed to Thomas
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (text from Weekly Compilatior
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986).
I
political framework for promoting and co-
oriiinating initiatives in this field on both
sides of the Atlantic. Several of the projects
launched as a result of United States' legisla-
tion are reaching the stage when major pro-
gram decisions will be required. In the light of
experience gained to date, the independent
European program group nations have put
forward a numijer of "principles for collabora-
tion" related to program management which
have been welcomed by their North American
Allies. We are continuing to give emphasis to
the exploitation of emerging technologies in
our defense equipment programs, particularly
in the long term.
11. The 1986 Defense Review has shown
again that despite commendable efforts by a
few Allies, more support, and by more
nations, is essential to assist Greece, Portugal
and Turkey to strengthen their conventional
defenses, in order that they may more effec-
tively fulfill their assigned roles in the collec-
tive defense of the Alliance. Various forms of
assistance should continue to be examined, in
particular and in the context of support for
the development of the industrial and
technological bases of these countries,
arrangements to permit them to participate
more fully as partners in NATO armaments
co-operation programs.
12. Following Reykjavik we support the
United States in seeking balanced, equitable
and effectively verifiable arms control
agreements with the Soviet Union. We
agreed that instead of simply codifying the
existing levels of arsenals, agreements
reached in Geneva should seek to achieve
substantial reductions in offensive nuclear'
forces in ways that will enhance stability a»
minimize the risk of war. We therefore
welcomed the progress at Reykjavik towar*
agreement on 50 percent reductions in
strategic offensive forces and on longer-ra>
intermediate nuclear missiles. We fully
endorse the United States' determination fj
negotiate detailed agreements on this basi^
a matter of priority and urge the Soviet
Union to join in this effort in Geneva. Prog
ress on INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] must not be held hostage to any oth>
agreement; Soviet insistence on doing so
would destroy the credibility of the
assurances given at the highest level. Nor
must such an INF agreement neglect the
existing imbalances in shorter-range INF
missiles for which constraints and equal
rights must be provided, as well as subse- ■*
quent negotiations on these missiles. In all
cases, effective verification would be an
essential condition. We will continue to ass(
and to consult closely on all these issues. W
reiterated our support for the United State;
exploration of space and defense systems, a
is permitted by the ABM [Antiballistic
Missile] Treaty.
13. We also confirmed our resolve to set
an early conclusion of a worldwide ban on
chemical weapons. In this context we called
upon the Soviet Union to take a constructive ,
attitude towards effective verification
provisions.
58
Department of State Bullet
EUROPE
14. We also emphasized the significance
?the current work in the Alliance on conven-
onal arms control. At every stage of this
tocess the Alliance must have a position
ihich protects the ability of its military corn-
landers to carry out their assigned tasks.
Ve shall be seeking to achieve increased
benness and the establishment of a stable,
pmprehensive and verifiable balance of con-
ventional forces at lower levels which would
strengthen stability and security in the whole
of Europe.
Greece recalls its position on nuclear mat-
ters and space system issues as expressed
during previous NATO ministerial meetings.
Denmark reserves its position on defense
and space systems. ■
>ecretary's Joint News Conference
\fter Meeting With EC IVIinisters
Secretary Shultz attended the sixth
\nnual ministerial meeting between the
United States and the European Com-
mnity (EC) in Brussels on December 12,
986. Following is his joint news con-
rence with President of the European
'ommunities Commission Jacques
^elors. '
'resident Delors. Before giving the
oor to our guests, Mr. Shultz, Mr.
—Jaker [Secretary of the Treasury James
laker], and their colleagues, 1 should
ke to indicate simply that, over and
hove bilateral discussions, we devoted
his plenary session, first, to a broad
verview of the world economic situa-
ion, referring also to problems that
rise respectively in the United States
nd in Europe; and, secondly, we dis-
ussed trade issues, both multilateral
nd bilateral. We reviewed both subjects
if satisfaction and difficulties that are
lending or may arise; and, thirdly, we
vere able to discuss, in a way which per-
onally I found encouraging, the ques-
ion of agriculture.
You know that the commission and,
00, our American friends, feel that we
lave to present to the world a different
,'xample from that of two elephants
'ighting and treading underfoot
everything else around. That is
something at stake which involves all of
as and this can only be treated, never-
theless, by dealing with the specific
characteristics of each country.
I Secretary Shultz. [Inaudible]
' I presented at this meeting are that our
two-way trade amounts to about $120
billion in the most recent year; that the
investment of Europe in the United
States and of the United States in
Europe amounts to about $200 billion at
present; that the sales generated by
these investments total around $700
I billion. If you add those apples and
oranges together you come to around a
trillion dollars. It's a measure of the
gigantic size and complexity of the rela-
tionship that we have and, of course, it's
a statement about the importance of the
relationship.
We have many problems. Most of
them have been solved. There are some
ahead of us. There'll always be some
ahead of us and we need to work always
very hard to resolve them, but we need
to keep reminding ourselves of the scope
of the relationship and the importance of
seeing to it that we resolve problems in a
manner consistent with the maintenance
of this relationship.
It also shows how important it is to
both of us, and for the world at large,
that we maintain openness in the trading
system. Following our meeting last year
here, we worked together well in bring-
ing into being the Punta del Este start
of a new round in GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] and we have
said to each other here that we will con-
tinue to work together to make that
round successful. Growth and openness
in trade are the names of the game as
we look ahead, and this is what we want
to achieve.
Secretary Baker. I would only add
to that, Mr. Secretary, that we spent
some time reviewing, as well, the U.S.
economy and we devoted a fair amount
of time to pointing out what we consider
to be a major problem for the world
economy generally, and that is the rise
of protectionism and, if you will, isola-
tionism in the United States, occasioned
in part by the fact that we are facing a
$140 billion trade deficit. We, I think,
are all agreed that it was important that
the United States and the European
Community work together in various
ways, whatever ways we can, to prevent
protectionist legislation from becoming a
fact, and to preserve free and open
markets.
Q. Could I ask Secretary Shultz or
Secretary Baker whether the growing
concern that has been expressed in a
number of European capitals about the
growth of bilateralism in the United
States, that is to say bilateral deals
between the United States and Japan
in some major areas, both in inter-
national monetary issues with the yen-
dollar deal and on the semiconductors,
was raised at this meeting and how
you responded to that if it was?
Secretary Shultz. My answer to
part of it: It was raised and I think the
basic response is that we feel it's impor-
tant to get markets open, and when we
are able to get a market opening agree-
ment with Japan, basically it's open to
everybody. As to the monetary side-
Secretary Baker. Adding to that,
we also feel it's important, when we can,
to enhance world economic growth, and
if we can enhance it bilaterally, we think
there's nothing inappropriate about
enhancing it bilaterally, particularly
when you are dealing in the case of the
agreement that you mentioned with two
economies that represent 70% of the
combined gross national product of the
G-7 countries [Canada, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan,
United Kingdom, and United States].
President Delors. As soon as the
monetary agreement between Japan and
the United States was known I was very
glad to see this come about. I consider
that as far as the triangle of great
powers in the free world is concerned,
Europe, the United States, and Japan,
there should be possibilities at some
stages to strengthen one of the sides of
the triangle; and, I have expressed my
desire that the Europeans should be able
to join in this cooperation agreement.
And it seems to me that the proposals
were made by Mr. Baker and others with
a view to establishing bases for a
monetary system which is less unstable
rather than more stable.
That is something which is still
under discussion and the commission will
do its utmost to persuade the member
states that it is in everybody's interest
to have convergence of economies and
greater monetary cooperation between
the major industrialized countries. As far
as I'm concerned, I hope that in Venice,
in the next summit of industrialized
countries, we will be able to make prog-
ress along these lines.
Q. I'd like to address my question
to Mr. Baker in direct response to
what Mr. Delors has said concerning
the possibility of Europe joining, in
some way, the monetary agreement
that was worked out on October 31
between the United States and Japan,
and whether this is going to be
brought up in your discussions with
February 1987
59
EUROPE
Mr. Stoltenberg [Federal Republic of
Germany Minister of Finance Gerhard
Stoltenberg] tomorrow?
Secretary Baker. The agreement
with Japan was the result of several
months of discussions and negotiations.
There were similar discussions and
negotiations with other countries that
did not come to fruition and ripen into
an agreement.
Again, let me say that anything that
we can do bilaterally or multilaterally to
enhance world economic growth, consist-
ent with maintaining the gains that the
world has made against inflation, we
would like to do, but the Japanese, under
the agreement that you're referring to,
undertook to take certain fiscal and
monetary measures which would encour-
age additional growth in Japan and addi-
tional growth in the world generally.
Q. I'd like to address a question to
Secretary Baker. What would you
expect Europe could do to pacify the
protectionists back in Washington and
to assuage the fears of this 800-pound
gorilla you have back there?
Secretary Baker. P^irst, I think we
talked a good deal about this, as a
matter of fact, in our discussions today.
We should all work to preserve open
markets as the President has indicated
and Secretary Shultz has indicated. At
the same time, anything that European
countries can do to encourage and
enhance as much economic growth as
possible without— and let me make sure I
make this clear to everybody— without
risking the gains that have been made
worldwide against inflation, we would
like to see, because that will help us
resist the 800-pound gorilla, as you put
it, which indeed I think is an 800-pound
gorilla back there in Washington.
Q. I do apologize for coming in to
raise two essential points, Mr. Shultz.
That is. first, the American interven-
tion in Nicaragua and Chile and the
perception that a person from the
Third World has of the United States,
that is a giant, and which is going
through various political difficulties,
Iran now, previously Vietnam. Can it
be said today that America is like a
giant with clay feet and clumsy hands?
And I would like to know what share
of time you allotted to the Third World
in your discussions?
And, secondly on South Africa, it
appears that America today is more
committed toward taking more prag-
matic and forward-looking positions,
vis-a-vis South Africa, than is Europe.
Did you advise the Europeans anything
about South Africa?
Secretary Shultz. The United
States has and continues to work for
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law
in Central America and in South
America. That includes Nicaragua, that
includes Chile. So, I think the objectives
that we seek and the efforts that we are
making to help the people of Central
America achieve that— there are four
democracies there now— and to help
those in Nicaragua, Nicaraguans, not
[the] United States, Nicaraguans— who
are fighting for freedom in their country
do so, are laudable.
As far as South Africa is concerned,
our policies have been highly publicized
and they are to do everything that we
can to bring apartheid to an end, and to
see put in its place a political system in
which all people can participate and
where there also are protections for
minority rights and individuals, constitu-
tional guarantees. I think again what we
are trying to achieve is right on the
mark.
We have had a great debate about
how useful it will be to impose punitive
economic sanctions on South African
business and, in the end, it was decided
that we would do so. That was decided
by Congress overriding the President's
veto of that legislation. Now U.S. firms
are leaving and I hear quite a lot of cries
of alarm that, as they leave, the good
works that they are doing leave also. So,
it represents a problem and, of course, a
continuing tragedy.
Q. I would like to put a question
to Mr. Baker. When you go to Bonn,
do you expect that your talks with Mr.
Stoltenberg will lead to more than a
repetition of the well-known points of
view that have been put forward
several times these last few months?
As far as the position of the Federal
Republic is concerned, or as far as
what the Federal Republic could do. in
order to make a g^reater contribution
to the stimulation of the world
economy?
Secretary Baker. Let me explain
that I am going to meet with Gerhard
Stoltenberg tomorrow. I'm meeting as
well with each of the other European
finance ministers of the G-7 countries. I
thought it was important, since I was
coming to this meeting, that I take
advantage of that fact that I was going
to be in Europe and have bilateral
discussions with my counterparts in
Europe.
These discussions are not intended
to reach any particular conclusions or
come to any particular results. They will
be part of ongoing discussions that we
have had over the past several months.
I would discourage— and we did
before we left Washington— people fro^
speculating about agreements that mig
come out of these discussions. That's nl
contemplated. The Federal Republic, aj
you know, is right in the middle of elec|
tions and it would be, I would suppose,,
not the most opportune time to seek to|
come to any sort of conclusion or agree
ment respecting the matters that we
have discussed before.
So we will be discussing a wide
range of things, but I would tend to
dissuade you from thinking that there i\
going to be something similar, for
instance, to the agreement between the
United States and Japan coming out of ^
my trip to Europe.
Q. President Delors referred to
your agricultural discussions earlier, H
saying that that discussion was
encouraging. I'd like to ask President
Delors and the American represen-
tatives what that actually means and,
in particular, whether that is good
augury for the 24:6 negotiations?
President Delors. Of course, as a
great philosopher has said, everything i:
connected in life. But sometimes, you
have to start by separating different
discussions. The discussions that we call
the 24:6 discussions are going ahead
under conditions which are not very
encouraging.
As for the rest, we have concerned
ourselves with the impact of our
agricultural policies, as we should do,
not only on our budget but, also, on
world trade and on the price of certain
agricultural commodities and other
materials. And, we've seen that we have
the same will to guarantee the future of
our farmers. They are indispensable to
our societies, but at the same time, we
wish to achieve agricultural policies
which are less costly and less damaging
and which do not lead us into a trade
war which will be ever more costly for
everybody.
So there is this shared will which we
have and which has been shown by the
agreement which was reached at Punta
del Este. And, this will be followed up by
regular discussions between people at a
high level on both sides of the Atlantic. I
think that this already became clear at
the Tokyo summit after the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] ministerial meeting.
But it's now the time to reaffirm this
and say that we have the courage to
meet this task. Nobody would deny that
this task is not an easy one.
Secretary Shultz. The first step in
solving a problem is to recognize that it
exists and be able to describe it. And
60
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
Jat step has been taken more and more
lEibly. So that's positive. I'll let
inbassador Yeutter [U.S. Trade Repre-
ntative Clayton Yeutter] say what else
ay be positive in this situation.
Ambassador Yeutter. Most of the
scussion today related to the longer
rm elements of the agricultural prob-
m rather than the short term. We had
nsiderable discussion about the forth-
iming negotiations in the Uruguay
'und and properly so. We are agreed
at this is one of the most important
lallenges in the Uruguay round,
•rhaps the most important, and
■rhaps the greatest potential legacy of
at round in very positive terms. This
■fleets the gravity of the situation and
e magnitude of the problem that exists
orldwide today.
So, we recognize that we are now in
situation where both the community
id the United States are deploying vast
ims of financial resources into rela-
vely unproductive uses and that we
ould do ourselves and the rest of the
orld a big favor if we could coopera-
vely and coordinately deploy these
?sources in a different way.
At the moment, we have a situation
lat is increasingly confrontational
stween ourselves and the rest of the
orld, while at the same time not prop-
rly serving the needs of our own
irmers. So, hopefully, we can advance
lat cause in a very positive way in the
fruguay round, and we are certainly
etemined to do that.
With respect to Article 24:6, we
ave a very difficult negotiation ahead of
s because our positions are still very far
part. Commissioner De Clercq [EC
lommissioner for External Relations
nd Commercial Policy Willy de Clercq]
nd I will meet on that subject tomorrow
nd we will have perhaps more to say on
hat subject at a later date. As you
;now, we have a December 31 deadline
in that exercise.
Commissioner De Clercq. Could I
■omment briefly for a minute or a
ninute and a half. That's a Belgian com-
jromise. Article 26:6, of course, is very
Ufficult, as a negotiation. The President
expressed his anxiety, and I share that
mxiety. For the moment, I just have one
jlimmer of light, but it is glimmering.
That is, the mutual will to find a solution
;o this most difficult trade conflict
oetween the United States and the EC.
It's the most difficult one we've ever
iiad. It's worthwhile finding a solution to
it, particularly now that the new round
'is to begin. It's worth even devoting the
i whole weekend to making— to finding a
solution.
On the new round, we've explained
our philosophy. The Americans know our
philosophy. We want to progress along a
broad front as quickly as possible. As far
as we're concerned, the new round
shouldn't necessarily have to last 4
years. If we can complete it before, all
the better, but we consider this enter-
prise, this undertaking, as being one
undertaking, which means that progress
has to be achieved on all fronts as
quickly as possible, and this, from a com-
prehensive point of view.
Q. Would it be possible to know
whether there is the same determi-
nation on the American side, as far as
taking steps to lighten the debt burden
for developing countries? This same
question was put to Mr. De Clercq this
morning, and the reply was that there
was not an answer there. And then, as
for the matter of making more of raw
materials from the Third World coun-
tries. I'd like to ask you a question
about that. And then, thirdly, as for
the agreements between the European
Communities and certain Mediterra-
nean countries, although these
agreements exist, there are poltical
and military links with these
countries.
Secretary Shultz. I'll ask Secretary
Baker, who's given particular attention
to this matter, particularly the debt
problem, to respond.
Secretary Baker. I think you're
probably familiar with our program for
sustained growth, for dealing with the
debt problems of lesser developed coun-
tries. And in terms of where we stand on
that, we think we're making very good
progress. A number of countries have
adopted free market-type economic
reforms.
The second leg of that program is
that the multilateral institutions, the
IMF [International Monetary Fund] and
World Bank, were to increase their lend-
ing, and they have done so, I think it's
fair to say, significantly. The third leg
was additional lending from commercial
banks, or debt-equity swaps, in lieu
thereof. I think it's significant that Mex-
ico, this year, will receive some $6 billion
in new funds. Nigeria is the beneficiary
of new lending, Uruguay, Cote D'lvoire,
so the proposal is making what we con-
sider very good progress.
In terms of whether the United
States is, itself, contributing, I think we
are. We still make the largest contribu-
tions to those multilateral organizations.
We are going, notwithstanding rather
severe budgetary constraints in the
United States, we are going up to the
Congress, this year, for an increase in
the soft loan window, IDA/8 [Interna-
tional Development Association] funds
for the World Bank. So I think that I
would have to say. "Yes, we are cer-
tainly pulling our load and doing our
share."
Secretary Shultz has just reminded
me that we have about, this year, I men-
tioned debt-equity swaps, because I
think that's very important. To the
extent that we can get equity into these
countries, they don't have to pay inter-
est on it, and it's a far better way of
financing them.
He's just mentioned to me that
we've seen .$5 billion in debt-equity
swaps generated this year. The more
the.se countries are willing to reform
their economies and invite investment
in, the more debt-equity swaps, perhaps,
we can engender. I realize that doesn't
address the third part of your question,
which I never did get a chance to hear.
Q. Mr. Shultz. Mr. Yeutter is here
also for the fifth meeting between the
Brazilian delegation and the U.S.
Trade Representative for discussing
the informatics problem. I would like
to know which are the prospective of
this informatic meeting, since the
Brazilian Government has just sent to
the Congress a new software law.
Does this new law correspond to U.S.
demands? In what points? And also,
which sector of the Brazilian exporta-
tion would be suffering retaliation, as
the U.S. Government promised, until
the end of the year, if both delegations
are not setting to an accord?
Ambassador Yeutter. We'll be
discussing all of these subjects on Sun-
day, here in Brussels. I have not yet had
an opportunity to see the Brazilian com-
puter software proposal, because I've
been traveling for the last several days,
and we've had some activity, here in
Europe, that I've had to concentrate on
until now. I'll have an opportunity to
evaluate it over the weekend, and so I'll
deliver my comments to [Ambassador]
Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, when we
meet on Sunday, but I would have
nothing to say on that subject at the
moment.
All I would comment is that, clearly,
that's a very important issue to us.
We're concerned about the intellectual
property aspects of the Brazilian infor-
matics program, as well as the invest-
ment aspects and the international com-
merce aspects, that is, the imports and
exports, so we'll look at that very
carefully and see what implications it
holds for U.S. informatics exports.
Other than that, the potential
retaliatory action is a hypothetical, at
this point. We have not determined, with
February 1987
61
HUMAN RIGHTS
specificity, what action might be tatcen,
if the negotiations break down between
now and the end of the year, but I'd
rather be optimistic and hope that we'll
not have to take that action, but we have
not concentrated on that issue, as yet.
Q. Could I ask Mr. Yeutter, you
said that — all sides said that the whole
question of agriculture has been very
big. It's going to take a long time to
solve, and what they recognize is that
they don't solve it. But you are
meeting this weekend with Mr. De
Clercq and Mr. Lyng [Secretary of
Agriculture Richard Lyng] and Mr.
Andriessen [EC Vice President for
Agriculture and Forestry Frans
Andriessen] to solve an immediate
problem, 24:6, yet there is a sword of
retaliation hanging over it at the .31st
of December. Is this sword still hang-
ing over it? Is the United States still
determined that, if there is no satisfac-
tion of its demand, that it will go
ahead with the retaliation, which will
generate, again trigger, counter-
retaliation from the EC side?
Ambassador Yeutter. That is a
decision that was made at the highest
levels of our government several months
ago, and was so communicated to our
friends here in the European Commu-
nity, so they are well aware of what is at
stake in these discussions between now
and the end of the year.
This is an issue of major concern to
the United States because our estimate
is that the accession of Spain and
Portugal will reduce our feed grains
exports, that is, corn and grain sorghum,
by something in the vicinity of $400 to
$500 million per year. With our
agricultural cominunity already in dire
financial straits, in much of the Midwest,
we're certainly not in a position to
accept that kind of trade damage from
any incident throughout the world
without receiving appropriate compen-
sation for it under the GATT rules.
That's what is at issue here, and all
we're insisting upon is that we be made
whole, that the trade damage that we
suffer, as a result of the accession, is
properly compensated for under the
GATT rules. We simply have a wide dif-
ference of opinion as to the amount of
that compensation, but we believe the
amount of damage is quite clear.
Commissioner De Clercq. The
President has given me one minute. That
will be enough. Because I don't think we
want to engage in a debate on 24:6 with
you. Perhaps next week we will have to.
but for the moment we still hold out
hope that this matter is going to be
something we will be able to discuss
tomorrow in a calm and serene
atmosphere.
And what my friend, Clayton
Yeutter, has just said underlines the dif-
ficulty of the problem. Because, of
course, we have a somewhat different
view of this. In fact, our views differ
fairly fundamentally. We feel that when
there is a customs area, or a free trade
area, or the extension of such an area,
the problems that arise have to be
examined comprehensively. You have to
look at the problems as a whole, the
advantages and the disadvantages, and
that is one of the problems that we are
going to have to try to resolve,
tomorrow.
Q. Secretary Baker, do you think
that the bilateral meetings you will be
having with the finance ministers will
be able to lead to a meeting of the
Group of Seven [G-7], as such, and
this, then, I have a question for Mr.
Shultz. To what extent is the Reagan
Administration in a position to turn
opposition to Congress' protectionism
into a priority in the present political
situation that prevails in Washington?
Secretary Baker. With respect to
the question that you directed to me, thj
purpose of these discussions is not
specifically to schedule any multilateral^
meetings G-.5 [France, Federal Republil
of Germany, Japan, United Kingdom,
and United States], G-7, or anything
else, but I would remind you that the
Tokyo summit calls for the holding of
G-7 meetings, so obviously there will bd
more G-7 meetings.
Secretary Shultz. So far as the
second part of your question is con-
cerned, the basic point is that protec-
tionism is not only bad for other coun-
tries that can't sell into our markets
after they're protected, but it's bad for
American consumers, therefore bad for j
the American economy; and we'll make
that point again and again and again,
and contrast the present and our recenti]
history with what happened in the
1930s, when we did have protectionism, j
The President has fought on that line
before and he'll continue to fight, and I
think the basic thrust of the argument is
powerful, and we intend to prevail.
'Press release 265 of Dec. 19, 1986.
Human Rights in Castro's Cuba
The following report was prepared by
the Bureaus ofHumat) Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs and of Inter-
American Affairs.
When a former Cuban political
prisoner— one who had served 27 years
in Castro's prisons— arrived in Miami in
September 1986, he made the following
comment: "Wlien they opened the gates
we still felt like prisoners. In Cuba
everyone's a prisoner."
Life in Cuba today is characterized
by an aggressive, systematic, and insti-
tutionalized denial of human rights in
virtually every form. The Communist
Party, tightly controlled from above,
dominates all aspects of life. Human
rights of Cubans are subordinated to the
aims of the party as defined by Fidel
Castro.
Denial of Freedom
Expression. Freedom of expression does
not exist. No criticism of the basic
policies and Marxist-Leninist orientation
of the government, party, or its leader-
ship is permitted. Telephones are
routinely tapped and mail opened.
Private expression of differences from
government policies is repressed by an
informer network operated by Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revolution
(block committees).
Daily life is closely monitored by these*
committees, which exist on practically
every block in Cuban cities and towns.
Committee membership is essentially
mandatory. Members are expected to
observe and report anything "unusual,"
including strangers in the neighborhood,
reception of foreign radio and television
broadcasts, unauthorized meetings, or
critical comments about the government.
Cubans overheard by neighbors
reportedly have been fined for speaking
disparagingly of Castro in their homes.
The ordinary Cuban lives in an environ-
ment of repressive fear subject to con-
stant state surveillance.
Assembly. There are no guarantees
for freedom of assembly or association in
Castro's Cuba. Nearly all associations
are government controlled. A few
private associations still operate, but
only under close government scrutiny.
All group meetings are monitored by the
62
Department of State Bulletin
HUMAN RIGHTS
immittees for the Defense of the
ivolution or State Security. When the
jretary of the Cuban Committee for
man Rights tried to legally register
organization last month, he was
■ested and beaten. At last report he
.s still being held.
Although membership in private
lups is almost precluded, membership
ligovernment-run groups is virtually
r.^uired. A 1983 Organization of
. nerican States (0 AS) report. The
:'uation of Human Rightti in Cuba,
■ ited:
. . .membership in the people's
■anizations— including the large union and
I isant associations— is practically a prereq-
i ite for any routine activity, since member-
■ p affects admission to universities, promo-
I IS, access to certain kinds of vacation or
1 reational activities, the obtainment of
I iperishable products that require that a
I on certify that the buyer is an "advanced
\ rker."
Cubans are, therefore, compelled to
' '1 such organizations simply to obtain
education, earn a living, or support
ii- families. The OAS report adds that
> difficult "to distinguish when the
I ;ision to join a people's organization
1 lects a desire to support the regime,
; i when it is a response to the material
I lefits . . . which cannot be obtained
Political. Those who choose not to
j n government organizations or who
; ' denied membership are not only
{ )nomically disadvantaged but also
< ectively deprived of political participa-
1 n. Political participation requires
; ict adherence to ideological dogma.
Cuban citizens do not enjoy the right
■ change their government. The Cuban
; ite is firmly controlled by the Cuban
' 'mmunist Party, which in turn is
I minated by Fidel Castro. There are no
I'ect elections for regional, provincial,
I national offices. Members of the Cen-
"il Committee and the Politburo are
: lected by a narrow circle of party
lers; elections simply ratify choices
■ 'eady made. The National Assembly of
■ople's Power meets briefly twice a
. ar— solely to endorse decisions already
ide by the party chiefs. No political
■position is permitted in Cuba;
:3sidents are either in jail or outside the
untry. As a result, hundreds of
ousands of Cubans have fled their
untry, and many others would do so
?re it not dangerous.
Press. There is no freedom of press
Cuba. All media outlets are controlled
■ the state, operate strictly according
to party guidelines, and are used for
indoctrination and dissemination of prop-
aganda. Foreign publications— except
those from other communist countries-
are not available.
The government censors all news,
international and domestic. Unfavorable
news, when reported, is often delayed.
Almost all news is distorted. Travel of
foreign reporters to and in Cuba— as
well as their access to the public and
officials— is strictly controlled by the
government.
Artistic. There is no artistic freedom
in Cuba. Many of Cuba's most distin-
guished literary and artistic figures have
been "erased" from cultural outlets and
broadcasts. Writers and artists have
been under severe constraints since the
beginning of the revolution, when Castro
made the following statement about
artistic freedom: "Within the revolution,
everything; against the revolution,
nothing." The National Union of Writers
and Artists of Cuba, modeled on the
Union of Soviet Writers, controls vir-
tually all literary and artistic expression.
All publishing houses are controlled by
the state. Acceptance of manuscripts is
based on suitability of contents and the
political background of the author.
Writings not published by the state
are not reproduced or circulated even
clandestinely, except in the closest circle
of friends. Even there one must proceed
with caution because of the vigilance of
the block committees and the omnipres-
ent State Security. Punishment is severe
for writing or possessing unauthorized
literature. Artists and writers who
attempt to step outside these constraints
pay heavily for their exercise of artistic
freedom. Many are imprisoned and tor-
tured. Forced renunciation of one's
artistic works— obtained through
physical or psychological coercion,
including threats against one's family— is
another technique used against artists
and writers. The lack of political content
in their writings does not serve to pro-
tect authors. It is not enough in Cuba
that art be nonpolitical; it must also
actively serve the revolution.
Religious. Repression of religion in
Cuba is thorough and pervasive.
Religious broadcasts are totally pro-
hibited (except for news of foreign
clergy defending the Castro regime
shown to prisoners of conscience to
demoralize them). The construction of
new churches is severely restricted.
Those who try to maintain religious
practice find innumerable roadblocks.
Many churches have been closed; some
have been desecrated. The few still open
are closely monitored by block commit-
tees. Only about 200 priests remain in
Cuba, compared to about 720 before the
revolution.
The observance of religious holidays
is next to impossible, and the celebration
of Christmas is specifically prohibited.
Christmas trees, so common in Eastern
Europe, are banned as counterrevolu-
tionary symbols in Cuba, and the
celebration of Holy Week has been
replaced by a celebration of the failure of
the Bay of Pigs invasion. Political
meetings and work obligations are
regularly scheduled to conflict with
religious occasions, and Cuban law pro-
hibits the observance of religious events
when they conflict with work obligations
or patriotic celebrations. Processions on
holy days are banned.
Parents of children who mention
Cod to their classmates risk being
reprimanded for teaching "unscientific"
ideas that are "remnants of an obscur-
antist past." If the parents insist, they
can be arrested for the crime of
"ideological deviationism."
Because they cannot belong to the
Communist Party, believers are excluded
from higher positions of employment.
They also are prohibited from teaching
economics, politics, philosophy, social
sciences, and other courses that might
have "any political or ideological over-
tones." Believers find it almost impos-
sible to obtain higher education because
ideology is a decisive condition for
admission to universities. Practicing
Catholics are expelled from the univer-
sity. Believers who obtain low-level jobs
are unable to advance because there is a
"political test" for promotions. Proof of
ideological soundness is required before
the purchase of durable consumer goods
and sometimes for housing.
The Jewish community in Cuba has
been reduced from 15,000 before the
revolution to 800, with no permanent
rabbi. Members of the Jewish commu-
nity also face job and educational
discrimination and are severely
restricted in attempts to pass on the
faith to their children.
Certain religious groups— usually the
smaller, more vulnerable Protestant
denominations— have been singled out
for additional punishment. The Seventh-
Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
and the Congregation of Gideon are con-
sidered counterrevolutionary sects.
Those discovered engaging in religious
practices are treated as criminals.
Many from all faiths have been
arrested, abused, tortured, and even
executed because of their religious
beliefs.
I^bruary
1987
63
HUMAN RIGHTS
In a 1985 book entitled Fidel and
Religion, and at the February 1986
Third Congress of the Cuban Communist
Party, Fidel Castro acknowledged that
discrimination against Cuban religious
practitioners exists. There is no evidence
to date that religious discrimination and
persecution have been mitigated despite
speculation that Castro, for foreign or
domestic political reasons, might be con-
sidering some relaxation of pressure on
believers.
Educational. Cuban education suf-
fers from a total lack of freedom. Cen-
sorship is rigorous. Cuban schools at all
levels are required to follow Marxist-
Leninist guidelines as interpreted by the
state. Students have been expelled and
teachers have lost their jobs for not
accepting the political or ideological
requirements imposed by the state.
There is no alternative to
government-run education. Parents can-
not choose independent schools for their
children; there are none. Schooling is
compulsory from grades one to six.
After the sixth grade the right to remain
in school is tentative and based ulti-
mately on loyalty to the regime. The
price for expressing an opinion in school
can be extremely high. Faced with such
a "choice," most 11-year-old children
naturally submit to the routine of Young
Pioneers meetings, neighborhood guard
duty, compulsory rural labor, and other
forms of regimentation.
Many students over the age of 1 1
are housed in dormitories from Sunday
night to Friday night and go home only
on weekends. This boarding system,
mandatory for many high school and
junior high school students, is intended
to drive a wedge between child and
parent and turn the child's sense of duty
toward the state. Dormitory living condi-
tions are often poor, with old wooden
barracks, primitive sanitation, poor
health care, and harsh working condi-
tions. The weekly curriculum includes 30
hours of classes (with heavy ideological
content) and 15 hours of picking crops in
the fields.
A student's educational oppor-
tunities depend not only on his own
political record but the political reliabil-
ity of his parents as well. Children of
political prisoners are notified that they
will never receive advanced education.
Students do not choose their own
careers; the choice is made for them,
depending on the needs of the state.
Economic. The right to choose one's
occupation is practically nonexistent in
Cuba. Priority is given to collective or
64
state needs over individual choice in
state decisions to provide employment.
The rights of business and labor do
not exist in Cuba. A "private sector"
constituted by private businesses or even
by self-employed individuals is virtually
nonexistent. At present, less than 1% of
the population is self-employed. In 1982,
the government launched a strong
condemnation of self-employment, which
had been legal in certain trades and pro-
fessions. Castro claimed that everyone
was taking advantage of the system to
make profits. Such work now is allowed
only after working hours or on
weekends. Self-employed people are
generally required to have state employ-
ment as well.
Castro expressed concern that the
government was losing money because
tenant farmers and sharecroppers
unregistered with the state were selling
produce on the open market. In 1983,
200 farmers refused to sell their crops to
the government because it demanded a
price lower than the cost of growing
them. (The government also had refused
to allow them to retain a small amount
of crops for personal consumption.) In
protest, the farmers burned some of
their crops in front of a government
warehouse and were arrested. Reports
from several sources indicate that 11 of
the farmers were sentenced to death and
shot. More recently, Castro has
denounced farmers markets and other
individual or group initiatives as
manifestations of corruption or
decadence, again demonsti-ating how
risky it is to engage in private
enterprise.
The state controls organized labor.
Nearly all workers belong to the
government-run Confederation of Cuban
Workers, which serves primarily to
maintain political and work discipline,
spur worker efforts and productivity,
and hold down labor costs. The con-
federation does not defend workers'
rights or fight for benefits. The recent
calls by Fidel Castro for greater work
"discipline" characteristically have come
in the framework of trade union
meetings where he and so-called labor
leaders harangue the workers to be more
diligent.
Collective bargaining does not exist.
Management, in the form of the Ministry
of Labor, and the government-run union
cooperate to maintain careful supervi-
sion. Workers who believe they have
been unfairly treated have virtually no
recourse.
Workers who act to improve work-
ing conditions are severely punished.
The right to strike is prohibited and
punishable by imprisonment. In 1983
more than 200 workers were prosecute
for attempting to organize strikes in tl
sugar and construction industries.
The right to form an independent
union is unthinkable. Even discussing
such a step is severely punished, as
demonstrated in 1983 when the goverr
ment accused five Cuban workers of
"industrial sabotage" for talking with
their colleagues about the need for an
independent union. The government
sought the death penalty, but the judg(
sentenced them to prison. Castro
demanded they be tried again by a dif-
ferent judge, who sentenced them to
death. International outcry resulted in
eventual commutation of their senteno
to 30 years of imprisonment. The first
judge, Nicasio Hernandez, was impris-
oned for an indefinite term, as were fo !
of the defense lawyers (Jose Redell Sot I
Abelardo Triay, Valdez Arnau, and Fel '
Casuso). They were sentenced to die, b
their sentences also were commuted.
Three other lawyers associated with th
case (Aramis Taboada, Francisco Moru
and Israel Tamayo) were sentenced to
years in prison. 'Taboada died in prison
in 1985 under unexplained circum-
stances.
Other workers have been arrested
for discussing the formation of an inde
pendent union, including 30 truck
drivers at the Central Chaparra sugar
mill, workers in a Havana electrical
plant, workers at an Artemisa brewery
and farmers in Menocal— three of whor
were shot during arrest.
A "Classless" Society
In Cuba, contrary to Marxist theory,
state control of the economy does not
mean control of the economy by the pe(
pie. Nor does it mean that an upper cla
is nonexistent. The party leadership coi
trols wealth and power but in a much
more concentrated, centralized, and
unchallengeable form than any
"capitalist" could ever hope to achieve.
Not surprisingly, the elitist Cuban
leaders do not live the way the Cuban
people do. They have access to special
stores, well-stocked with consumer
goods from the West, where the "com-
mon people" are not allowed. The self-
appointed vanguard is permitted to pur-
chase luxury items, such as canned
goods, not available to the average
(Duban. Officers of the political police
and government leaders also are allowec
to purchase jewelry and expensive
clothing from stores designated for theii
exclusive use. Thev have access to
Department of State Bulleti
HUMAN RIGHTS
'Within the
revolution,
everything;
against the
revolution,
nothing. "
■ivate beaches and, unlike most
ubans, may travel abroad. They live in
)mes confiscated from Cuban citizens
ho fled the country.
I;
conomic Decline
he Cuban economy is still based
rimarily on sugar; it is even less diver-
fied than it was before the revolution,
otwithstanding plans for industrial
evelopment, maniifactured goods
.^counted for only 5% of Cuban exports
1 1980; in 1960, the figures were the
ime. In contrast, other Latin American
ountries had substantial increases in the
xport of manufactured goods during the
jame 20 years.
Agricultural production is generally
down from prerevolution levels— even
though the population is 50% larger.
Food rationing, although
widespread, has not guaranteed that
food will be available. Despite increased
beef and poultry production, for exam-
ple, each Cuban is allotted only 2 pounds
of meat and IV2 pounds of chicken per
month.
Added to the food shortage is the
scarcity of consumer goods and the low
per capita income. In 1958 Cuba was
fourth in the hemisphere in per capita
income; now it ranks sixteenth.
Although much has been made of
advances in health care claimed by the
Cuban Government, severe sanitation
problems still threaten Cuban health.
Inadequate control of mosquitoes
together with the return of thousands of
soldiers from Africa have led to several
dengue fever epidemics. Castro himself
has severely criticized conditions in
Cuban hospitals.
Housing also is deficient: nearly one-
quarter of Cuba's 10 million people live
in inadequate housing.
Political Prisoners
In Cuban society, pressures to conform
and submit to the state are extremely
high. Those who choose the slightest
form of political resistance usually pay a
very high price: arrest, abuse, torture,
ebruary 1987
65
HUMAN RIGHTS
and cruel and inhuman punishment.
People often are arrested without war-
rants and held for long periods without
judicial hearings. The Cuban Constitu-
tion denies legal protections that would
prevent the regime from arresting and
detaining anyone considered harmful to
Castro's revolution. People arrested for
vandalism, practicing certain religions,
or criticizing the regime can be charged
with sabotage and counterrevolutionary
activities. Detention is permitted for
those considered "dangerous," defined
as "the special proclivity of a person
to commit crimes, demonstrated by
observed conduct manifestly contrary to
the rules of socialist ethics." Cuba
includes in its definition of "crimes" acts
that no free society would consider as
such.
The treatment of political offenders
at every step of the process is unrelent-
ingly severe— preventive detention,
house arrest, forced psychiatric treat-
ment, confinement in forced labor
camps, and imprisonment. Arrestees are
interrogated without counsel and sub-
jected to methods of intimidation
designed to force confessions. The
political detainee may be kept incom-
municado for days or weeks without
being charged and without notification
of family.
Cuban courts are, in practice, subor-
dinated to the party. People accused of
certain counterrevolutionary activities
are tried and sentenced secretly by
military tribunals. Accused individuals
generally receive little representation
from counsel at trial. The government
selects the attorney in virtually all
political cases. Detainees are given very
little time with their lawyers before trial.
The 1983 OAS report indicated that
some clients see their counsel for only an
hour before trial while others meet their
lawyers for the first time at the trial
itself. Attorneys frequently are not
informed of the trial until the day it
begins. They are cautioned against con-
ducting too rigorous a defense of their
clients. Some plead guilty for their
clients even when the clients insist on
their innocence; others refuse to
challenge accusations. Fear may
motivate some of these lawyers; they are
probably well aware that one risks sanc-
tions and even arrest and imprisonment
for defending one's client too well.
Attorneys have been jailed for conscien-
tiously defending individuals charged
with political offenses, as the case of the
late Aramis Taboada illustrates.
A trial normally consists of evidence
presented by prosecution witnesses
(generally members of State Security).
There are usually no defense witnesses.
If a member of a block committee
testifies for someone in a criminal mat-
ter, that person usually gets a reduced
sentence. Political trials generally last
from a few hours to a day, even in cases
where long prison terms are at stake.
Reports have reached the OAS that in
one case a trial lasted no longer than 10
minutes and that political trials never
last longer than 3 days, including
announcement of judgment and imposi-
tion of sentence.
Few observers are permitted at
political trials. The pressures on judges
to find guilt in these cases are strong,
especially when party leaders appear to
denounce the accused. Fidel Castro and
his brother Raul have been known to
appear at trials to denounce prominent
persons accused of political offenses. As
the OAS report stated: "Such strong
pressure. . .excessively influences the
administration of justice, and leaves it
no alternative but to endorse the verdict
of the political leadership. ..." The
report added: "... the evidence would
indicate that the sentences have always
been fully in accord with the Executive's
idea of proper justice."
Conditions and treatment in Cuban
prisons are absolutely wretched.
Armando Valladares and many other
former long-term political prisoners have
provided firsthand descriptions of the
deplorable conditions they were forced
to endure. The prisoners reported major,
systematic abuses, including beatings by
guards and officers, withholding of food
and water, inadequate diet and with-
holding of medical care, withholding of
fresh air and exercise, confining
prisoners in dungeon-like cells, with-
holding of family visits for years, with-
holding of mail for years, solitary con-
finement, physical injury caused by elec-
tronic noise machines, cell doors welded
shut, participation of prison medical
staff in acts of torture, and suspected
medical experiments carried out without
the permission of prisoners.
The most brutal treatment is
reserved for the plantados. as those
political prisoners who refuse "political
rehabilitation" are known. They spend
their days dressed only in pajamas or
underwear or without any clothing at all.
Visits by friends or relatives are limited
to one or two per year, or less, and let-
ters to one per month.
Political prisoners are not routinely
released at the end of their terms. Their
freedom depends on a personal decision
by Fidel Castro, who has frequently used
the release of political prisoners to gain
favor with an influential foreign visitor
or to put the latter under obligation to
"respond." Sentences are often
extended without any trial or due proc-
ess. Plantados are especially likely to bi
forced to remain in prison after expira- ,,
tion of their sentences. There are
reports that these prisoners are sub-
jected to particularly harsh conditions,
especially those in Boniato Prison.
Many of those forced to remain in
prison past term have been incarceratec
15-20 years when their extensions are
given. In at least one case, that of
Santos 0. Mirabal Rodriguez, the "past
term" sentence has been longer than th
original one. Mirabal was sentenced for
political offenses at the age of 12 to be
imprisoned until the age of 21. Althougl
his sentence expired in June 1971, he
has been forced to remain in prison even
since. His only moments spent outside
prison were in June 1984 when he was
subjected to the psychological torture of
being put on a bus of freed prisoners
bound for the United States only to be
removed at the last minute.
Torture and mistreatment continue
today. In April 1986, a dozen former
prisoners testified before an interna-
tional panel in Paris about additional
examples of torture and inhuman treat-
ment. Ana Lazara Rodriguez cited cases
of guards throwing women down stairs
and kicking them in the breasts and
stomachs. Raoul Carmeante reported
that 15- to 18-year-old boys were put in
prison barracks with sexual degenerates
who raped them repeatedly. Eduardo
Capote showed the panel his hand where
one of his fingers had been chopped off
by a prison guard.
Teresa Mayan, who was imprisoned
in 1982 for 1 year for attempting to flee
Cuba with her son, told the panel about
beatings and lack of medical care. She
also stated that many fellow prisoners
went mad and "almost every day a
prisoner committed suicide." Mrs.
Mayan observed: "If anybody says that
all happened years back, I am here to
tell them it is still happening."
Once political prisoners are freed,
they are sometimes forbidden to leave
Cuba. Ricardo Bofill Pages, chairman of
the Cuban Committee for the Defense of
Human Rights, was released from his
third term in prison in August 1985 but
still awaits permission to depart the
country. In August 1986, following the
arrest of five members of the committee,
Bofill— fearing a fourth prison sentence-
took refuge at the French Embassy in
Havana, where he remains today.
'While waiting for exit permits,
former political prisoners sometimes are
66
Department of State Bulletin
HUMAN RIGHTS
inied the right to work, possess ration
rds, or obtain basic identification
icuments. They are subject to discrim-
latory treatment for the rest of their
es. They must Hve with constant
rveillance and social ostracism.
Only the Cuban Government knows
■ e exact number of political prisoners in
Uba. Fidel Castro told foreign journal-
ts in February 1985 that "Political
■isoners, . . . the recalcitrant ones who
ice numbered many thousands, amount
about 200. ..." Castro, who has no
ason to exaggerate, also stated that
e total number of individuals
sentenced for counterrevolutionary
tivities" could be as many as 1,000.
mericas Watch and Amnesty Interna-
;)nal have published estimates that the
jimber is between 250 and 1,000.
The Cuban Government no longer
stinguishes political from common
iminal prisoners. Many persons have
en imprisoned for acts that are
tempts to resist or flee an oppressive
gime. Thus some former political
isoners who contend that the total
imber of political prisoners is, in fact,
■arer 10,000 may well be correct. A
i85 survey by Amnesty International of
her human rights organizations drew
sponses indicating that there may be
many as 15,000 political prisoners in
jba, though Amnesty International
self did not endorse that number. Few
ilitical prisoners have been involved in
olence against the government.
In January 1985, a delegation from
e U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference
iked for the release of 147 long-term
tlitical prisoners, after which the
jban Government offered to release 75
Tsons— the majority of them not on the
;t of 147— and allow them and their
milies to leave Cuba for the United
:ates. The United States welcomed
any of these brave people to their new
/es of freedom in September 1986.
Executions for political offenses are
ill frequent in Cuba. Twenty-nine
jople were executed in October 1982
ir "plotting against Castro." Among
lese was Armando Hernandez Gonzales
hose "plotting" consisted of putting up
iti-Castro posters and scattering some
ills in the road to hinder trucks carry-
ig people to Sunday "voluntary" labor,
everal of his relatives were similarly
larged and also executed at this time.
1 August 1983, John Olivera Alberto, a
lehovah's Witness, was executed for
ioreading propaganda inciting rebellion,
hree other Jehovah's Witnesses— Jesus
rieto Suarez, Saul Pay, and Efrem
loriegas Barroso— were executed in
October 1983 for possessing a
mimeograph machine to reproduce
religious tracts.
The Cuban Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights reported in
1984 that 37 people were executed by
firing squads between October 1983 and
May 1984. The same committee reported
in 1985 that at least five young Cubans
were executed in the first half of 1985.
A 16-year-old boy was shot to death
on November 18, 1985, and an 18-year-
old companion possibly wounded by
Cuban police guards when the two
attempted to gain access to the
Venezuelan Embassy in Havana. Accord-
ing to all accounts, no attempt was made
to warn or negotiate with the boys, who
were simply shot on sight— disturbing
evidence of the regime's standing orders
in such matters. This was the third per-
son killed at the Venezuelan Embassy in
the preceding 22 months and the 21st
killed there since 1974.
Cuba still finds it necessary to use
capital punishment for an extraordinary
range of "offenses." No free society,
and, indeed, few authoritarian ones,
executes its young people for painting
slogans on walls, preachers for passing
out religious pamphlets, workers for put-
ting up posters, or farmers for pro-
testing a low grain price. Nor does a
society having any claim to be just con-
demn to death workers for talking about
a union, judges for refusing to give a
stronger sentence, or lawyers for effec-
tively representing their clients.
Fidel Castro's revolution is now 27
years old. More than enough time has
passed to assess its results. The revolu-
tion has failed miserably to provide for
the economic and social well-being of the
Cuban people. It has been sordidly suc-
cessful in aggressively denying the
Cuban people every freedom and human
right. ■
Human Rights Progress in 1986
by Richard Schifter
Address on Human Rights Day on
December 10, 1986. at the White House.
Ambassador Schifter is Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs.
Our annual gatherings to celebrate
Human Rights Day are appropriate occa-
sions to take inventory on developments
in the field of human rights over the last
12 months. They have been marked by
progress in some countries, by setbacks
in others, and by disappointing lack of
movement in still others.
We are all, of course, well aware of
the ending of dictatorial rule in the
course of this year in Haiti and the
Philippines. Regrettably, but under-
standably, in neither country has the
change of government ushered in a
period of domestic peace. But there is
now a real chance in both countries for
progress under a democratic form of
government. Responsibility for assuring
such progress rests, of course, with the
citizens of these countries and the
political leadership which now holds
office there. Our role is to be of
assistance in this context, to do
whatever we can to be of help.
Let me add that we also witnessed a
free election in Guatemala as that coun-
try joined El Salvador in the strengthen-
ing of democratic institutions in Central
America for which Presidents Cerezo
and Duarte are to be congratulated. The
measures they have taken have, indeed,
served to restore respect for human
rights in their countries. They have
demonstrated that the democratic proc-
ess and respect for human rights go
hand in hand.
One country in the Western Hemi-
sphere in which we had hoped for far
more progress in the past year than has
been achieved has been Chile. We are
aware of the acts of terrorism with
which the Chilean Government has had
to grapple, of the support given by out-
siders to forces at work in Chile whose
intent it is to foster civil strife in that
country. But that does not justify tor-
ture or any of the other serious depriva-
tions of human rights which not only
have continued to occur in Chile but
have increased in the last year. On the
other hand, we are glad to note that in
recent weeks there has been the begin-
ning of a dialogue between persons in
governmental leadership and represent-
atives of the democratic opposition. It is
our sincere hope that in the months
ahead this dialogue will, at long last,
help initiate the first steps toward
Chile's peaceful return to democracy.
Without going into extensive detail,
let me say that our concerns over Chile
are paralleled in Paraguay, where there
jBbruary 1987
67
HUMAN RIGHTS
has been a disturbing increase in repres-
sion, even in recent weeks, as the gov-
ernment has initiated a series of arrests
of persons on political charges.
We need not revisit on this occasion
the topic of South Africa, concerning
which Secretary Shultz has spotcen so
clearly just a few days ago. Let me say
simply that our emphatic rejection of the
system of apartheid continues. We are
shocked by the massive human rights
violations occurring in South Africa
today, including the recent tightening of
restrictions on a vigorous press, at one
time a shining symbol of the recognition
of democratic values. We also, as
always, are deeply concerned about the
limits on our ability to intercede on
behalf of the victims of apartheid and of
other human rights violations.
In addition to race, another shameful
target of human rights abuse is the prac-
tice of religion. At the UN Human
Rights Commission, it proved possible
earlier this year to take a significant
step forward for the cause of religious
freedom by establishing the office of the
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. In
a world in which religious intolerance
and strife based on such intolerance have
been commonplace for millennia, we now
have a man whose task it is to lead the
fight against this scourge. I am happy to
note that the man appointed to the posi-
tion of rapporteur. Dr. Angelo Ribeiro of
Portugal, is with us in this room today.
My recitation of specific country
situations is, obviously, not exhaustive.
Nor is it my purpose to try to cover the
globe in these remarks. The State
Department's annual country reports to
the Congress, which are now in prepara-
tion, will deal with these concerns. These
reports demonstrate the strength of our
conviction that abuses must be pointed
out wherever they occur, whether in
nations friendly or antagonistic to
America's foreign policy interests.
Cuba and the Soviet Union
The remainder of my remarks shall be
devoted to two countries, namely Cuba
and the Soviet Union. The reasons why
these two states deserve special atten-
tion on an occasion like this is not only
that they are among the world's most
serious human rights violators but also
that their human rights violations have
either, as in the case of Cuba, not been
in the news for decades, or, as in the
case of the Soviet Union, have been
taken for granted by the media for a
good many years.
Cuba is the Western Hemisphere's
paramount totalitarian state, the fiefdom
of one of the world's longest lasting dic-
tators. It is a country which seeks to
repress all forms of independent expres-
sion, a country in which the population is
intimidated not only by an all-powerful
secret police apparatus, but one in which
average citizens are called upon to spy
on their neighbors. It is a country in
which the slightest, most innocent
expression of disapproval of the govern-
ment can have seriously adverse conse-
quences, such as a reduction in rations
or the loss of the educational oppor-
tunities for one's children. What we see
in Cuba at present, we fear, is the
scenario of a fast-approaching future of
Nicaragua, where the Sandinista regime
has destroyed the democratic promises
of the revolution, turning the country
from one despotism to another.
You will hear more on the subject of
Cuba from a man who has firsthand
knowledge of it, Armando Valladares.
We are also fortunate to have in our
midst today Yuriy Orlov, like Armando
Valladares, a man who had to give up
years of his life, which he had to spend
in jirison, and who ultimately gave up his
homeland— all in championing the cause
of freedom. It is Yuriy Orlov's presence
here that reminds us of the reality of life
in the Soviet Union. A year ago, as we
gathered here within weeks following
the Geneva summit, there were some of
us who cautiously hoped that improve-
ments in the Soviet human rights record
might be just around the corner. Today,
as we review events over the course of
the last 12 months, we must, sadly, take
note of the fact that the corner has not,
as yet, been turned.
What we have witnessed during the
last year has been a new look in Soviet
public relations but not in the substance
of Soviet policies. It appears as if the
Kremlin has taken on a new advertising
agency, with bright, young specialists on
the Western mind, able to design new
packaging and new selling methods. But
the product that is being sold remains
the same.
With the Western market in mind,
there have been a few high-profile
gestures from the Soviet Union. An
announcement is made, with appropriate
fanfare, that a 3-year-old baby will be
allowed to join her parents who 2 years
ago escaped to the West. Yet, where else
but in the Soviet Union and some of its
allies is it a crime to leave one's country
without proper permission? And where
else but in the Soviet Union and some of
its allies would parents be punished in
this manner'?
With appropriate fanfare, a small
number of human rights activists are
released early or allowed to emigrate.
1
But what about the many others,
courageous men and women who are
punished with prison, internal exile, or
other restrictions on their freedom
because they expressed their thoughts v
speech and in writing. And let us note
that this is punishment meted out to pe
sons who were doing nothing other thai
exercising rights accorded them under
the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act
signed by the Soviet Union.
This year we were visited in the
United States by the person who heads
the agency in the Soviet Union charged
with licensing of religious activities. Ou
visitor assured all those within earshot
that a new day has dawned in the Sovie
Union as far as the practice of religion i
concerned. One would hope that he will
soon pass this message to the managers
of the gulag, which holds hundreds of
religious believers in its prisons. During
the last 12 months, at least another 90
persons have been sentenced to long
prison terms for violating laws
regulating religious practices.
Another area of deep concern to us
is that most barbarous of Soviet prac-
tices, committing sane persons to ment;
institutions as a form of punishment for
their expression of dissenting views. It i
deeply troublesome that members of tht
medical profession have allowed them-
selves to be used in this manner. But it
is to the everlasting credit of one Soviet
psychiatrist. Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, tha
the heinous system of abuse of
psychiatry has been fully exposed. For
doing so. Dr. Koryagin has had to pay a
heavy price, a term of 7 years incarcera
tion, which he is now serving in the
infamous Chistopol Prison.
And it was out of Chistopol Prison
that the news came yesterday of the
death, at the age of 49, of another true
hero of the Soviet Union, Anatoliy
Marchenko. Marchenko was the man
who fully e-xposed Soviet prison camp
conditions in the post-Stalin era. By the
time of his death, he had spent a total of
20 years in prison. His most recent
sentence, handed down in 1981, was for
a term of 10 years for anti-Soviet pro-
paganda. Prison conditions in the Soviet
Union have broken the health of many a
man. They broke the health of Anatoliy
Marchenko and converted a prison
sentence into a sentence of death.
One action which demonstrates the
Soviet attitude toward human rights as
much as any other they have taken this
year is the fact that the Government of
the U.S.S.R. in October declared our
human rights officers, Michael Matera in
Moscow and his able counterpart in
Leningrad, Daniel Grossman, persona .
non grata.
68
Department of State Bulletin
OCEANS
Human rights officers who serve in
• embassies overseas deserve special
oo-nition. These courageous men and
men face all of the challenges and
eats which any Foreign Service
, icer must confront while bearing the
gijitional risk, in countries which are
r jor human rights violators, of incur-
rlg the hostility of authorities who have
smething to hide.
Mr. Matera is with us today. He won
t' admiration and respect of his
f reign Sei^vice colleagues in Moscow
si of those brave Soviet citizens who,
aenormous cost to themselves, try to
a/ance the cause of human rights in
t 'ir own country.
If the Soviet authorities believe that
s'h actions as expelling our human
r hts officers will discourage us from
p-suing our human rights goals in the
J^^iet Union, they ai-e badly mistaken.
And then there is the matter of
t igration. The right to leave one's
c mtry is clearly spelled out in the
1 iversal Declaration of Human Rights,
I ocument incorporated into the
I Isinki Final Act. It is another one of
t ■ obligations undertaken at Helsinki
\ ich the Soviet Union honors in the
I !ach.
In this field, too, with appropriate
i [fare, the Soviet Union has, during the
1 5t year, announced approval of a series
(applications for family reunion. The
jaouncements were, understandably,
1 Icome news to the families directly
i -olved. They were welcome news to all
( us. For let me stress that to us every
1 '. is precious, every individual's fate is
i portant. We rejoice at the unification
( every single family.
But what justification had there been
1 • originally separating these spouses,
] rents and children, siblings? 'Why
1 dn't they had a chance to be united
1 ich earlier?
To be sure, as part of the new public
1 ations effort, we have noticed a will-
i^ness on the part of Soviet officials to
Iten to appeals for permission to
nigrate, to accept letters or lists of per-
:ns interested in emigrating. Regret-
■ oly, this has proved to be nothing more
an a charade. Emigration continues to
i at a level of approximately 1,000 per
: ar, 98% below the level of "l979.
oreover, to avoid any doubt as to
lere the Soviet leadership stands on
e issue of emigration, a law was pro-
ulgated on August 31, 1986, by the
)viet Council of Ministers which pro-
des that, aside from one minor excep-
)n, no application for an exit visa will
■' approved unless the requested
migration is sponsored by a person liv-
ing abroad who is the spouse, parent,
child, or sibling of the applicant. The
intent of the law is clearly to say nyet to
appeals that the Soviet Union allow
large-scale emigration.
That this was the intent of the law,
was, in fact, made clear by Ambassador
Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delega-
tion to the CSCE [Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe] meeting
now taking place in Vienna. He told a
congressional delegation that the Soviet
Union now has a law on the subject of
emigration and that no letter or petition
will help because the law must be
obeyed. That such a law, in turn, is
clearly in conflict with the undertakings
of the Helsinki Final Act appears not to
be a matter of concern to the Soviet
authorities.
Navigation Rights
and the Gulf of Sidra
Background
In October 1973, Libya announced that
it considered all water in the Gulf of
Sidra south of a straight baseline drawn
at 32° 30' north latitude to be internal
Libyan waters because of the gulf's
geographic location and Libya's historic
control over it. The United States and
other countries, including the U.S.S.R.,
protested Libya's claim as lacking any
historic or legal justification and as
illegally restricting freedom of naviga-
tion on the high seas. Further, the U.S.
Navy has conducted many operations
within the gulf during the past 12 years
to protest the Libyan claim. These exer-
cises have resulted in two shooting inci-
dents between Libyan and U.S. forces.
The first was in 1981, when two Libyan
aircraft fired on U.S. aircraft and were
shot down in air-to-air combat, and the
second in March 1986, when the Libyans
fired several missiles at U.S. forces and
the United States responded by attack-
ing Libyan radar installations and patrol
boats.
Barbary Coast History
This is not the first time that the United
States has contended with navigational
hindrances imposed by North African
states. After the American Revolution,
the United States adhered to the then
common practice of paying tribute to the
Barbary Coast states to ensure safe
passage of U.S. merchant vessels. In
I have taken the time to spell out
these details because they have tended
to be overlooked as the Soviet Union
continues to pursue its aggressive public
relations effort. It is critically important
for us to face the reality, the reality
exemplified by Yuriy Orlov's years of
imprisonment and exile, by Natan
Shcharanskiy's years in prison, by the
fact that both of them were released
only in an exchange for spies.
However, hope springs eternal in the
human breast. None of us will want to
give up the struggle just because the
road is difficult. Wherever freedom is at
issue, be it in Chile or South Africa,
Cuba or the Soviet Union, the United
States is prepared to speak up, whether
in private or in public, in support of
human rights and human dignity. ■
A,
o MALTA
TUNISIA
_/,fi
Mediterranean Sea
ipoir
/
32° 30- N y
Gun ol Sidra 1 p. •
L
1 B Y A
1796, the United States paid a one-time
sum (equal to one-third of its defense
budget) to Algiers, with guarantees of
further annual payments. In 1801, the
United States refused to conclude a
similar agreement with Tripoli, and the
Pasha of Tripoli declared war on the
United States. After negotiations failed,
the United States blockaded Tripoli; in
the autumn of 1803 Commodore Edward
Preble led a squadron, including the
U.S.S. Constitution ("Old Ironsides"), to
the Mediterranean to continue the
blockade. Shortly after the squadron
arrived off Tripoli, a U.S. frigate, the
Philndelphia. ran aground and was cap-
tured. Lt. Stephen Decatur led a team
into Tripoli harbor and successfully
burned the Philadelphia. In June 1805,
the Pa-sha agreed to terms following a
ground assault led by U.S. Marines that
captured a port near Tripoli. In 1810
Algiers and Tripoli renewed raids
against U.S. shipping, and in 1815, Com-
modore Decatur's squadron caught the
Algerian fleet at sea and forced the Dey
February 1987
69
TERRORISM
of Algiers to agree to terms favorable to
the United States. Decatur then pro-
ceeded to Tunis and Tripoli and obtained
their consent to similar treaties. A U.S.
squadron remained in the Mediterranean
for several years to ensure compliance
with the treaties.
Current Law and Custom
By custom, nations may lay historic
claim to those bays and gulfs over which
they have exhibited such a degree of
open, notorious, continuous, and unchal-
lenged control for an extended period of
time as to preclude traditional high seas
freedoms within such waters. Those
waters (closed off by straight baselines)
are treated as if they were part of the
nation's land mass, and the navigation of
foreign vessels is generally subject to
complete control by the nation. Beyond
lawfully closed-off bays and other areas
along their coasts, nations may claim a
"territorial sea" of no more than 12
nautical miles in breadth (measured 12
miles out from the coast's low water
line— or legal straight baseline) within
which foreign vessels enjoy the limited
navigational "right of innocent
passage." Beyond the territorial sea,
vessels and aircraft of all nations enjoy
freedom of navigation and overflight.
Since Libya cannot make a valid
historic waters claim and meets no other
international law criteria for enclosing
the Gulf of Sidra, it may validly claim a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea as
measured from the normal low-water
line along its coast (see map). Libya also
may claim up to a 200-nautical-mile
exclusive economic zone in which it may
exercise resource jurisdiction, but such a
claim would not affect freedom of navi-
gation and overflight. (The United
States has confined its exercises to areas
beyond 12 miles from Libya's coast.)
U.S. Position
The United States supports and seeks to
uphold the customary law outlined
above, and it has an ongoing global pro-
gram of protecting traditional navigation
rights and freedoms from encroachment
by illegal maritime claims. This program
includes diplomatic protests (delivered to
more than 50 countries since 1975) and
ship and aircraft operations to preserve
those navigation rights. Illegal maritime
claims to which the United States
responds include:
• Excessive territorial sea claims;
• Improperly drawn baselines for
measuring maritime claims; and
• Attempts to require notification or
permission before foreign vessels can
transit a nation's territorial sea under
the right of innocent passage.
Thus Libya has not been singled out
for special consideration but represents
simply one instance in the continuing
U.S. effort to preserve worldwide
navigational rights and freedoms. The
fact that Libya chose to respond mili-
tarily to the U.S. exercise of traditional
navigation rights was regrettable and
without any basis in international law.
U.S. Intentions
The United States will pursue actively
its efforts to preserve traditional naviga-
tional rights and freedoms that are
equally guaranteed to all nations. Th^
preservation of rights is essential to
maritime commerce and global naval
air mobility and is imperative if all
nations are to share equally in the
benefits of the world's oceans. As
always, the United States will exercis
its rights and freedoms fully in accori
with international law and hopes to
avoid further military confrontations/
but it will not acquiesce in unlawful
maritime claims and is prepared to
defend itself if circumstances so requi
Taken from the GIST series of December
1986, published by the Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. ■
Terrorism:
The Challenge and the Response
by John C. Whitehead
Address before the Brookings Institu-
tion Conference on Terrorism on
December 10, 1986. Mr. Whitehead is
Deputy Secretary ofState.^
I appreciate the opportunity to par-
ticipate in this important conference on
terrorism. I note from your program
that you have already heard the perspec-
tives of many distinguished academics
and specialists; this afternoon, I would
like to present our views on this scourge.
More specifically, there are three ques-
tions that I want to address.
First, what exactly is terrorism?
Second, why is the United States so
concerned about terrorism?
And third, what are we doing to
combat it?
Let me begin with some observa-
tions on the nature of terrorism. In
recent years, we have learned a good
deal about what terrorism is and is not.
What once may have seemed the ran-
dom, senseless acts of a few crazed
individuals has come into clearer focus
as a new pattern of low-technology and
inexpensive warfare against the West
and its friends. And, while it is an alarm-
ing pattern, it is a threat that we can
identify, combat, and, ultimately, defeat.
Terrorism is a sophisticated form of
political violence. It is neither random
nor without purpose. On the contrary,
terrorism is a strategy and tool of those
who reject the norms and values of
civilized people everywhere.
Today, humanity is confronted by.
wide assortment of terrorist groups
whose stated objectives may range fn
separatist causes to ethnic grievances-
social and political revolutions. Their
methods include hijackings, bombings<
kidnappings, and political assassinatict
But the overreaching goal of virtually
terrorists is the same: to impose their
will by using force against civilians.
The horrors they inflict on the
defenseless are calculated to achieve
very specific political purposes. They
want people to feel vulnerable and
afraid; they want citizens to lose faith
their government's ability to protect
them; and they want to undermine th(-
legitimacy not only of specific govern-
ment policies but of the governments
themselves.
Terrorists gain from the confusion
and anarchy caused by their violence.
They succeed when governments alter
their policies out of intimidation. They
also succeed when governments respoi
to terrorist violence with repressive,
polarizing actions that alienate the
authorities from the populace— and,
thereby, play directly into the terrorist
hands.
State-Sponsored Terrorism
As you may well know, terrorist violen
is hardly a new phenomenon. Nearly tv
centuries ago, for example, the Barbar
pirates conducted their own form of tei
rorism, operating from North African
ports and leading to the landing of U.S
marines on the shores of Tripoli. Simi-
larly, the forerunner of the car bomb,
70
Department of State Bulle
~1
TERRORISM
cart bomb, dates back to Napoleonic
IS. Nevertheless, certain features of
lern-day terrorism seem to be, if not
lorically unprecedented, then eer-
ily very unusual.
To begin with, a good deal of con-
porary terrorism is state sponsored.
et(( in example, consider one of the most
to )rious terrorist groups of our day,
io[S Abu Nidal organization. This group
ful r receives backing and support from
lo ya; it finds sanctuary in Eastern
rei| 'ope; and Damascus has provided it
1 important logistical support since
ie 3. Indeed. Syria allows Abu Nidal's
1» up to maintain training camps in
as of Lebanon under Syrian control.
ia also provides the group with travel
uments, permits its operatives to
sit freely, and continues to sanction
operation of Abu Nidal's facilities in
i) nascus.
Nor is Abu Nidal the only terrorist
pap supported by Syria. Damascus
ll provides varying amounts of sup-
II : to other radical Palestinian groups.
Palestinian terrorist groups, as
, have facilities or have received
iiing in Syria or Syrian-controlled
s of Lebanon. These groups include
•lapanese Red Army, the Kurdish
or Party, the Armenian terrorist
mization ASALA [Armenian Secret
A ny for the Liberation of Armenia],
a al-Zulfikar of Pakistan. In the past,
» have had to rely on intelligence
SI rces for information on Syrian sup-
p t for international terrorism. More
r ently, however, public trials in Lon-
d . and Berlin have conclusively
d lonstrated Syria's complicity in ter-
r ist actions.
Unfortunately, Syria is not the only
s te which supports terrorism. Iran,
( 3a, Libya, and South Yemen are also
k ' members of today's terrorist inter-
n ional. Indeed, the deadly combination
iirect government assistance such as
a ns, explosives, communications, travel
c 'uments, and training, on the one
h id, and violent individuals or groups,
c the other hand, is a major factor in
t h the growth and the effectiveness of
t rorism in recent years.
1 e Soviet Role
1 the past, terrorism was almost
i:lusively the weapon of the weak, a
I sture by small groups of determined
treniists to call attention to their
jse. Today, however, we see that even
^jTiajor power like the Soviet Union sup-
rts terrorist activity in pursuit of its
ibitions.
We should understand the Soviet
role in international terrorism without
exaggeration or distortion. The Soviet
Union officially denounces the use of ter-
rorism as an instrument of state policy.
Yet here, as elsewhere, there is a wide
disparity between Soviet statements and
actions. The Soviet Union uses terrorist
groups to advance its own purposes and
goals, including the weakening of liberal
democracy and the undermining of
regional stability. One does not have to
believe that the Soviets are puppeteers
and the terrorists marionettes; violent or
fanatic individuals and groups can be
found in almost every society. But, cer-
tainly, in some countries terrorism has
been more violent and pervasive because
of support from the Soviet Union and its
satellites— notably Bulgaria, East Ger-
many, and Czechoslovakia.
Terrorism and Democracy
In thinking about terrorism, certain
facts must be faced. All states and all
political systems are vulnerable to ter-
rorist assault. Nevertheless, the number
of terrorist incidents in totalitarian
states is minimal; markedly fewer acts
are committed against their citizens
abroad than against Westerners. This
discrepancy has not arisen simply
because police states make it harder
for terrorists to carry out acts of vio-
lence. It also reflects the fundamental
antagonism between terrorism and
democracy.
One reason that the United States is
so concerned about terrorism, wherever
it takes place, is that it is largely
directed against the democracies— often
against our fundamental strategic
interests, always against our most basic
values. The moral values upon which
democracy is based— individual rights,
equality under the law, freedom of
thought, freedom of religion, and the
peaceful resolution of disputes— all stand
in the way of those who seek to impose
their will, their ideology, or their
religious beliefs by force. The terrorists
reject and despise the open processes of
democratic society and, therefore, con-
sider us their mortal enemy.
States that sponsor terrorism use it
as another weapon of warfare against
the United States and our allies.
Through terrorism, they seek to gain
strategic advantages where they cannot
use conventional means of attack. When
terrorists, reportedly with Iranian back-
ing, set out to bomb Western personnel
in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the
West's commitment to defend its
interests in the Middle East. When
North Korea perpetrated the murder of
South Korean Government officials in
Rangoon, it sought to weaken the non-
communist stronghold on the mainland
of East Asia. Wlien Syria participated
in the attempt to blow up the El Al
airliner and murder over 300 people, it
attempted to strike a major blow against
Israel, the United States, and Britain.
In Europe, the Middle East, and
elsewhere, the United States is a prin-
cipal target of terrorist violence, not so
much because of what we do or don't do
but, rather, because of what we are: a
nation dedicated to the peaceful resolu-
tion of conflicts.
Preventing Future
Terrorist Violence
Terrorist violence is taking an increas-
ingly grim toll on human life. Last year,
for example, nearly 800 terrorist attacks
hit citizens and public facilities in 84
countries; over 900 persons were killed,
of whom 38 were American. As an
American official, I highlight the number
of Americans who have been killed. But,
no matter what their nationality, 900
deaths are just too many.
The potential of future incidents is
even more worrying. Terrorists now rely
on guns, grenades, and bombs to spread
ruin and fear. That is bad enough. In the
future, however, states which support
terrorists could provide even more lethal
means of destruction. The fact that this
has not happened yet does not allow us
to be complacent about the future. On
the contrary, the essence of an effective
policy is to identify a danger to our
interests before it is self-evident and
implement a sensible preventive
response.
U.S. Counterterrorist Policy
What I have said thus far should
give you a clear conception of this
Administration's view of the
phenomenon of terrorism. Now let me
turn to the third and final point I want
to discuss this afternoon: U.S. counter-
terrorist policy. I hardly need say that
this is a particularly controversial topic
just now. Many of you, I am sure, have
strong views on this subject. Yet I urge
you not to lose sight of the many real
and substantial achievements this
Administration has made in the fight
against terrorism. Much of this effort
receives little attention and takes place
in the realm of intelligence gathering, in
the cluttered offices of analysts, or in
!bruary 1987
71
TERRORISM
the laboratories of scientists trying to
develop better ways of detecting hidden
explosives.
What are these achievements? Dur-
ing the past few years, we have made
i-emarkable progress in thwarting poten-
tial attacks. Only successful terrorist
acts receive front-page coverage, but I'd
like to draw your attention to the
attempts that fail— largely due to our
efforts. Last year alone, we and our
friends foiled more than 120 planned ter-
rorist attacks. For example, in Turkey
this April, security officers arrested
Libyan-supported terrorists who were
planning to attack the U.S. officers club
in Ankara during a wedding celebration.
Tn Paris, at about the same time, officials
thwarted a similar attack planned
against the visa line at the U.S.
Embassy.
A number of initiatives have con-
tributed to this progress. We have been
developing our own intelligence capa-
bilities vis-a-vis international terrorists
and sharing that intelligence with other
nations in a timely fashion. We have
expanded international cooperation in
the fields of law enforcement and
counterterrorist training. Under the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program,
which began in April 1984, we have
established active exchange and training
programs with 32 foreign governments.
States which may not actually train
and fund terrorists but which ignore ter-
rorist activity in their own countries
pose a particularly difficult problem.
Unless their own citizens are the targets
of terrorist acts, many nations assume
it's not their problem. We are respond-
ing to this unwillingness to act by
discussing terrorism with all nations—
not just our allies. I recently returned
from a trip to Eastern Europe, which is
an area well known for its leniency
toward terrorists. Eastern Europeans
are realizing that terrorism is their prob-
lem too: there were Hungarians at the
Vienna airport when it was attacked last
year, and Romania recently stated its
opposition to terrorism. Tliere is much
more to be done in Eastern Europe, but
with continued effort, we can make all
countries understand that terrorism is a
crime against humanity.
We are also for putting teeth into
international antiterrorism conventions.
For example, the International Civil
Aviation Organization toughened its
regulations dramatically after the hijack-
ing of TWA Flight 847. In response to
the Achillc Laurn hijacking, the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization began to
develop similar regulations for seaborne
72
transportation. Last year, the UN
General Assembly adopted a strong
re.solution declaring terrorism a crime,
whatever the rationale.
We have taken great strides toward
bringing our diplomatic installations in
threatened areas up to the standards
necessary to protect our people. All of
our posts have conducted intensive
reviews of their security needs, and
these reviews have been the basis for
speedy action. We have made immediate
improvements at 2.3 high-threat posts.
We are planning to construct new office
buildings that will measure up to the
latest security standards. The Inman
commission [Advisory Panel on Overseas
Security] has estimated that improving
the security of our institutions abroad
will cost $4.2 billion over a 5-year period.
Congress has approved less than
$1 billion for the first stage. There is
obviously a great need for increased
funding over the next 5 years.
Our research into new technologies
for enhancing physical security is also
continuing. We have begun working with
the private sector to help corporations
improve their capacity for dealing with
terrorists. We have passed tougher laws
against terrorism, such as the Omnibus
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which
makes terrorist acts against Americans
abroad punishable in U.S. courts. And
we are urging other nations to tighten
their procedures for issuing visas to
suspected terrorists.
We have also developed our own
counterterrorist military capabilities to
react swiftly to terrorist situations. In
both the Achille Laura affair and last
April's assault on Tripoli, we demon-
strated our willingness and ability to use
force against terrorists and against
states that support them. Col. Qadhafi
now has no illusions about our
determination— and neither should any
others who would use terrorist violence
against us.
Most important, perhaps, we are
helping to educate the public about the
real nature of the terrorist threat. Over
the years, too many of us have accepted
uncritically certain very misleading
views about the nature of terrorism-
views which disarm us intellectually and
strengthen our adversaries. For any
counterterrorism policy to be effective,
these misconceptions must be dispelled.
Misconceptions About Terrorism
What misconceptions am I referring to?
Let me briefly mention three of them.
We have all heard the insidious assertion
that "one person's terrorist is another's
freedom fighter." What this constitui
of course, is an attempt to justify ter
rorism as a legitimate form of warfai-.
and political struggle.
When Secretary Shultz addresse.'^
this issue, he sometimes quotes the
powerful rebuttal of this kind of mora
relativism made by the late Senator
Henry Jackson. Senator Jackson's st.i
ment bears repeating today.
The idea that one person's "terrorist"
another's "freedom fighter" cannot be san
tioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionarie:
don't blow up buses containing non-
combatants; terrorist murderers do. Free-
dom fighters don't set out to capture and
slaughter school children; terrorist murder
do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate inii'
cent businessmen, or hijack and hold hosta?
innocent men. women, and children; terror
murderers do. It is a disgrace that democ-
racies would allow the treasured word
"freedom" to be associated with acts of
terrorists.
So spoke Scoop Jackson. So should we
all speak.
Another fallacy we often hear is th»
military action taken to retaliate again
or preempt terrorism is contrary to
international law. Some have even sug^
gested that to use force against ter-
rorism is to lower ourselves to the bar
baric level of the terrorists. But, as th(
President and Secretary Shultz have
pointed out time and again, the UN
Charter is not a suicide pact. Article 5
explicitly allows the right of self-defen
It is absurd to argue that international
law prohibits us from acting in our selk
defense. On the contrary, there is ampj
legal authority for the view that a statf
which supports terrorist or subversive
attacks against another state or which
supports terrorist planning within its
own territory is responsible for such
attacks. Such conduct can amount toai
ongoing armed aggression against the
other state in international law. As the:
President said in connection with Libyf
support for terrorist violence:
By providing material support to terrori
groups which attack U.S. citizens. Libya has
engaged in armed aggression against the
United States under established principles o
international law, just as if [it] had used its
own armed forces.
All of us can agree, I hope, that the
United States has not only the right bui
the obligation to defend its citizens
against terrorist violence. We should us
our military power only if the stakes
justify it, if other measures are
unavailable, and then only in a manner
appropriate to a clear objective. But we
cannot rule out the use of armed force ii
every context. Our morality must be a
Department of State Bullet^
TERRORISM
'ce of strength, not paralysis. Other-
, we will be surrendering the world's
jire to those who are most brutal,
t unscrupulous, and most hostile to
jrything we believe in.
A third argument we sometimes
r is that by openly discussing ter-
sm, we're only giving the terrorists
/arranted recognition and legitimacy,
ording to this line of reasoning, we
juld downplay public expression of our
earns in the hope that a low profile
deprive the terrorists of the visibility
/ seek. Unfortunately, terrorist
ups have shown great skill in dealing
n the media, and their crimes are
ly to attract considerable press and
■vision attention, regardless of what
U,S, Government does. Under these
umstances, our duty is clear: we
5t persist in our campaign to build a
ad coalition, at home and abroad,
w ing to stand up against terrorism.
Ciclusion
me conclude with a final observa-
. Recent events may have raised
Ills in some minds about the credibil-
nf U.S. counterterrorist policy. But I
assure you that this Administra-
t: I's overall policy is well in place, and
it smains a sound framework for coun-
& ng the terrorist scourge. Today, as in
t past, our policy is based on four
ii'iples.
• We consider terrorism a criminal
a ivity that no political cause can
;ify'.
• We refuse to make concessions to
t rorists.
• We regard state-sponsored ter-
r ism as a menace to all nations and
'P imote cooperation among states on
f .ctical measures to track down,
a est, and prosecute terrorists.
• We encourage international
c iperation in isolating terrorist states
t make it clear that costs will be
i oosed on those states that support or
f ilitate the use of terror.
Implementing these guidelines will
tt be easy. There are no magic solu-
tns or quick fixes; and, as in all situa-
t ns where human lives are at stake,
t ^re are political complexities and
I >ral dilemmas that cannot be wished
■ay. But, bilaterally and multilaterally,
' are working at home and abroad in
r war against terrorism. We are in
is war for the duration, and we are
tt'iniined to win.
Syrian Support
for International Terrorism: 1983-86
'f^ress release 260 of Dec. 11, 1986.
Thefolloicing docutnoits were
prepared by the Office oftheAmbdSKdilur
at Large for Counter-Terrorism and
made available December 5. 19S6. The
chronology of selected terrorist incidents
by Syrian-suppor'ted groups is not
intended to be all-inclusive but is illus-
trative of Syria's involvement in and
support for terrorism and terrorist
groups. The groups cited in this
chronology have links with Syria.
New evidence of Syrian support for and
direct involvement in international ter-
rorism has been brought to light in two
recent trials including the conviction in
Great Britain of Nizar Hindawi for the
attempted bombing of an El Al civilian
airplane with 375 passengers aboard.
Syria clearly has a long record of
involvement in terrorism. Syria is one of
the "charter members" of countries on
the U.S. Goverment's terrorism list,
which was first compiled in 1979.'
The pattern of Syrian activity in sup-
port of terrorism has varied. From the
mid-1970s through 1983, Syrian per-
sonnel are known to have been directly
involved in terrorist operations. These
operations were primarily directed
against other Arabs such as Syrian
dissidents, moderate Arab states such as
Jordan, and pro- Arafat Palestinians, as
well as Israeli and Jewish targets. In
1982, for example, a car bomb exploded
in front of the offices of a Lebanese-
owned, pro-Iraqi newspaper in down-
town Paris, killing one person and injur-
ing scores of others. France later
expelled two Syrian diplomats and
ordered its ambassador home for
consultations.
By late 1983, Damascus had cur-
tailed use of its own personnel. Instead,
it began to rely more heavily on terrorist
groups made up of non-Syrians who have
bases and training facilities in Syria and
Syrian-occupied areas of Lebanon. The
most notorious of these is the Abu Nidal
organization.
Available evidence indicates that
Syria prefers to support groups whose
activities are generally in line with
Syrian objectives rather than to select
targets or control operations itself.
Damascus utilizes these groups to attack
or intimidate enemies and opponents and
to exert its influence in the region. Yet
at the same time, it can disavow
knowledge of their operations. Such
Syrian-supported groups have carried
out scores of attacks against Palestinian
and other Arab, Turkish, Israeli, and
Western targets during the past 3 years.
In 1986, investigations into major
incidents have revealed another change
in Syrian activities: that Syria has not
abandoned its willingness to be directly
involved in terrorist attacks. The British
trial and investigation of the abortive El
Al bombing exposed the direct involve-
ment of President Assad's intelligence
services. And the trial concerning the
bombing of the German-Arab Friendship
Union in West Berlin revealed the
involvement of Syrian officials. To a
large degree, Syria had been successful
ill covering its tracks. Now, however, in
Britain and Berlin, evidence of more
direct Syrian involvement has emerged.
London and Berlin Investigations
In the British investigation of the
aborted El Al attack, Hindawi told
British police he was recruited by
Haitham Said, an aide to Major General
al-Khuli, chief of Syrian Air F'orce intel-
ligence. According to the evidence
presented at the trial, al-Khuli's
operatives: (1) supplied Hindawi, a Jor-
danian, with a Syrian passport; (2) gave
him $12,000 and promised him more
money when he completed his mission to
plant a bomb aboard an El Al civilian
airliner; (3) provided him with the bomb
which was carried into London aboard
the Syrian Arab Airlines, which also
gave him SAA crew member hotel
accommodations; and (4) trained him in
the bomb's use.
Hindawi tried to use his pregnant
girlfriend as the unwitting carrier of the
sophisticated bomb which was built into
her carry-on bag. If an alert security
official had not spotted the device after
her bag cleared an earlier check, 37.5
innocent persons, including some 230
Americans, would have perished.
After the April 17 plan failed,
according to evidence presented at the
trial, Hindawi followed instructions to go
to the Syrian Embassy, where he was
greeted by the ambassador and hidden in
a Syrian safehouse in London. British
press reports of the investigation say
Britain also has evidence that the Syrian
Ambassador in London was personally
sbruary 1987
73
TERRORISM
involved several months before the
attempted bombing in recruiting
Hindawi for Syrian intelligence.
In West Berlin, Hindawi's brother,
Ahmad Hasi, and another Arab, Farouk
Salameh, were convicted for the March
29 bombing of the German-Arab Friend-
ship Union in West Berlin in which 11
persons were injured. In a sworn state-
ment, Hasi said he picked up this bomb
at the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin
from a senior Syrian Air Force intel-
ligence officer, Haitham Said, and a
Syrian explosives expert was sent from
Damascus to repair the device after it
twice failed to explode.
Abu Nidal
Syria continues to support the most
active and brutal international terrorist
group operating today, Abu Nidal. ^
Although Abu Nidal now also receives
backing and support from Libya and
sanctuary in Eastern Europe, Damascus
had provided Abu Nidal with important
logistical support ever since the group
moved from Iraq in 1983. Syria allows
Abu Nidal's group to maintain training
camps in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, an
area under the control of the Syrian
Armed Forces. Syria provides the group
with travel documents and permits its
operatives to transit freely through
Damascus when departing on missions.
Syria continues to permit operation of
Abu Nidal facilities in Damascus. (The
Syrian Government asserts that the sole
function of these facilities is limited to
cultural and political affairs.)
Although the December 1985 attack
on Rome's airport was committed under
Libyan sponsorship, the surviving
member of the four-man terrorist team,
according to reports on the Italian
investigation, told investigators the team
was trained in Syrian-occupied areas of
Lebanon. The team then traveled to
Damascus, where it remained while final
preparations were made for the attack in
which 16 civilians and 3 terrorists were
killed.
In Ankara on November 6, Turkish
prosecuters issued an indictment accus-
ing six Palestinians working for the Abu
Nidal organization of killing a Jordanian
diplomat in July 1985. The indictment
also linked the men with four other
actions, including the September 6,
1986, attack on an Istanbul synagogue
killing 21 persons, a 1983 attempt to
place a bomb on an Alitalia flight, and
the attempted car bombing of a U.S.
officers' club in Izmir in 1983.
The Abu Nidal organization's move
to Syria in 1983 was followed by a
dramatic increase in the group's ter-
rorist attacks: more than a dozen attacks
in 1984 and twice that number in 1985.
More than half of the 1985 attacks
occurred in Western Europe, including
attacks on British tourists at hotels in
Athens. When King Hussein launched
his February 1985 peace initiative, Jor-
dan became a major target. But when
Jordanian-Syrian relations began to
warm in mid-1985, attacks on Jordanians
at home and abroad diminished.
In its dealings with Western coun-
tries, Syria has consistently tried to play
down the importance of its connection
with Abu Nidal and has denied permit-
ting his group to engage in terrorist
activity. However, there is no evidence
that Damascus has actually restrained
Abu Nidal's activities (Abu Nidal train-
ing camps in the Syrian-conti'olled Bekaa
Valley continue to operate, for example)
or cut back on other forms of support.
Although it may not know about every
operation, given the amount and nature
of Syrian support, Damascus could influ-
ence and constrain the Abu Nidal
group's activities in Syria and Syrian-
controlled areas of Lebanon if it chose to
do so.
Other Syrian-Supported
Palestinian Groups
Syria also provides varying amounts of
support to other radical Palestinian
groups. These include Saiqa, which is
under total Syrian control; the Abu
Musa group, now almost totally depend-
ent on Damascus; the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine— General
Command (PFLP-GC); and the Marxist
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), which now maintains
its principal base in Damascus.
In all, Syrian-sponsored groups,
including the Abu Nidal organization,
were linked to about 30 terrorist attacks
during 1985, a quarter of them in Greece
alone. The Abu Musa group announced
from Damascus its responsibility for
another attempt to bomb an El Al
airliner, in Madrid on June 26, 1986. The
suspect in that attempt has admitted
being a member of the group. Two
weeks later, other groups supported by
Syria, the PFLP, and the Lebanese
Syrian Social Nationalist Party attemp-
ted an attack on an Israeli resort town
on July 10, 1986.
Support for Non-Palestinian Terrorists
In addition to the radical Palestinian
groups, a variety of other terrorists have
facilities and received terrorist training
in Syria or Syrian-controlled areas of
Lebanon: the Japanese Red Army, tht
Kurdish Labor Party, the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASALA), and the Pakistani
al Zulfikar. In addition, the Lebanese
Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)
based in the Lebanese village of
Qubayyat, within the area of Syrian cc
trol in Lebanon.
To these groups must be added tht
individual international terrorists who
frequent Damascus. Bruno Breguet, ai
associate of Carlos, the international
terrorist, was arrested in Paris in
February 1982 for transporting arms
and explosives. Later released, he was
recently sighted on a flight to Damasci>
met on arrival by Syrian authorities, ai
escorted through the airport without
having to pass through the normal con-
trols. Evidence exists that Frederic
Oriach, a militant member of the Frenw
Action Directe, spent July and August
1986 in Damascus pursuing ideological
and military studies.
Casualties and Control
Attacks by Syrian-supported groups
since 1983 have killed or wounded near»
500 people.
Syrian-supported groups have
attacked U.S. facilities in the Middle
East over 10 times since 1983. In Jords
in 1985, for example, the Syrian-
sponsored Jordanian People's Revolu-
tionary Party attempted two anti-U.S.
attacks. Bombs were found at the homi.
of an employee of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) and a
the American Center for Oriental
Studies. These operations, as well as
others aimed against Jordanian targets
have halted since the Syrian-Jordanian
rapprochement late in 1985— under-
scoring Syria's ability, if it wishes, to
control its surrogates' activities and to
severely curb the capability of those to
whom it provided safe haven and
support.
This has been acknowledged by a to
Syrian official who tried to dismiss, in a
Washington Post press interview in
September 1986, evidence that Abu
Nidal's group was involved in terrorist
attacks. Syrian Foreign Minister Faroul
Charaa said in discussing the actions of
the Abu Nidal group: "Whoever knows
my government must realize that such
attacks could not be carried out without
its awareness."
74
Department of State Bulletli
TERRORISM
RONOLOGY
i6
vember 26: West Berlin. A court
ivicted two Arabs for the March 29
nbing of the German-Arab Friendship
ion which injured 1 1 persons. In a
orn statement, one of the defendants.
mad Hasi, said he picked up the bomb
a'the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin
f m a Syrian Air Force intelligence
oicer. Hasi is a brother of Nizar
} idawi, who was convicted in a British
at for the attempted bombing of an
: Al airliner.
November 6: Turkey. Turkish prose-
c ors issued an indictment accusing six
Festinians working for the Abu Nidal
o:anization of killing a Jordanian
diomat in July 1985. An arrest warrant
8 3 was issued for the Syrian Embassy
S'ond Secretary. Mohammed Darwichi.
V was one of the original defendants
a i left Turkey. The indictment also
Ij ced members of the group with four
er actions: the September 6, 1986,
aack on an Istanbul synagogue which
k ed 22 persons; an attempt to place a
b nb on an Alitalia flight in 1983; the
a smpted car bombing of a U.S.
cers' club in Izmir in 1983; and the
k ing of a Palestinian student in
Aarain 1982.
June 26: Madrid. A Spaniard
a empted to board an El Al flight with a
S tease bomb, apparently without know-
i: it. The suspect arrested by Spanish
J ice carried a Syrian passport. A
s ikesman for the Abu Musa group,
V ich is almost totally dependent on
1 mascus, claimed responsibility for
p nting the bomb, although the Syrian
( v'ernment denied involvement.
April 17: London. El Al security
c 'overed a Syrian-made bomb in the
!'• gage of an Irish woman as she
a empted to board a plane for Tel Aviv.
I British court found her boyfriend,
} ;ar Hindawi, guilty of the attempted
I nbing, and the British Government
a lounced that it had conclusive evi-
c ice of Syrian official involvement in
t' terrorist act.
March 2: West Bank. Two gunmen
a.assinated the Mayor of Nablus, Zafer
aWasri, a Palestinian appointed by
I ael. Both the Abu Nidal group and the
f pular Front for Liberation of Pales-
t e (PFLP) claimed responsibility.
■!.5
1 cember 27: Rome and Vienna. Abu
lal terrorists simultaneously attacked
A\ ticket counters in the Rome and
Vienna airports, killing more than 20
people, including five Americans, and
wounding some 120 others. (Although
these attacks were committed under
Libyan sponsorship, reports on the
Italian investigation indicate that the
Rome terrorist team received training in
Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and
passed through Damascus.)
September 30: Netherlands. A
small bomb damaged the El Al office of
Amsterdam. Fatah Revolutionary
Council— the Abu Nidal group's official
name— claimed responsibility.
September 25: Italy. A bomb
exploded in a British Airways office in
Rome, injuring 15 people. Police
arrested Hassan Itab fleeing the scene.
Itab claimed he was a member of the
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist
Moslems, an Abu Nidal "cover" name,
and was later identified by witnesses as
the same man who threw a grenade at
the Jordanian airline office in Athens on
March 21.
September 18: Greece. Michel
Nimri, a Jordanian magazine publisher
and reportedly a personal friend of Yasir
Arafat, was assassinated in Athens.
Black September, a name used by the
Abu Nidal group, claimed responsibility
the next day.
September 16: Italy. A grenade
attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe injured
38 tourists, including nine Americans.
Police arrested a Palestinian in connec-
tion with the attack. The Revolutionary
Organization of Socialist Moslems,
another Syrian-linked group, claimed
responsibility on September 19.
September 3: Greece. Terrorists
threw hand grenades that wounded 19
British tourists at the Glyfada Hotel in
Athens. Black September claimed the
attack was to pressure the Greek
authorities to release a man arrested
near the Jordanian Embassy on
August 31.
August 8: Greece. A bomb exploded
in the kitchen of the London Hotel in
Athens, injm-ing 13 people— nine of them
British subjects. The Revolutionary
Organization of Socialist Moslems
claimed responsibility, contending the
hotel was a "hideout" for British spies.
July 24: Turkey. The First
Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy in
Ankara was assassinated by a lone gun-
man. The incident was claimed by Black
September.
July 11: Kuwait. Two bombs
exploded within minutes of each other
killing 8 people and injuring 89 in two
cafes about 10 kilometers apart. The
Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed
responsibility.
July 1: Spain. A bomb exploded at
the British Airways ticket office in
Madrid, also damaging the TWA office
upstairs. The ALIA Royal Jordanian
Airlines ticket office nearby was hit by
automatic weapons fire and two
grenades that failed to explode. One per-
son was killed, and 27 were wounded.
Claimed by Organization of the
Oppressed, Revolutionary Organization
of Socialist Moslems, and Black
September.
April 4: Greece. A rocket was fired
at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking
off from Athens airport. The projectile
hit the plane but did not explode. Black
September claimed responsibility.
April 3: Italy. A rocket narrowly
missed the Jordanian Embassy on the
fifth floor of an office building in Rome.
No casualties were reported. Black
September claimed responsibility.
March 21: Italy. Three unidentified
men threw hand grenades into a Jordan-
ian airline office in Rome, injuring two
people. Black September claimed
responsibility.
March 21: Greece. An unidentified
man threw a hand grenade into the
Jordanian airline office in Athens, injur-
ing three people. Claimed by Black
September. (See September 25, 1985,
incident.)
March 21: Cyprus. An unidentified
man threw two hand grenades into the
Jordanian airline office in Nicosia.
Claimed by Black September.
March 9: United Arab Emirates. A
bomb was found on a Jordanian airliner.
The young Palestinian who carried the
bomb onto the Karachi-to-Amman flight
said he thought he was transporting
drugs to support Abu Nidal terrorist
operations.
February 22: Jordan. The Jordanian
Peo])le's Revolutionary Party placed a
bomb at the American Center for Orien-
tal Research in Amman. The bomb was
found and defused.
January 10: Jordan. A bomb
planted by the Jordanian Peo|)le's
Revolutionary Party was defused near
an AID employee's home. The explosives
had neither a power source nor a timing
device.
1984
December 29: Jordan. Two unidentified
gunmen assassinated Fah al-Qawasmeh,
a member of the PLO Executive Com-
mittee and former mayor of Hebron, out-
side his home in Amman. Two witnesses
to the shooting were injured by gunfire
as they tried to block the assassins' flee-
ing vehicle. Black September claimed
responsibility.
■bruary 1987
75
TERRORISM
December 14: Italy. Ismail Darwish,
a leading military figure in the Fatah
movement, was gunned down on a Rome
street by an unidentified man who fled
on a waiting motor scooter. Arab
Revolutionary Brigades claimed
responsibility.
December 4: Romania. The Deputy
Chief of Mission of the Jordanian
Embassy was shot and killed as he was
getting into his car in Bucharest. Black
September claimed responsibility.
December 2: Jordan. A guard
discovered a bomb concealed in an
attache case inside the American Life
Insurance and Citibank building in
Amman. Bomb technicians defused the
device, which contained 18 blocks of
TNT and a timer. The Jordanian
People's Revolutionary Party was later
determined to be responsible.
October 4: Cyprus. A car bomb
exploded behind the Israeli Embassy in
Nicosia, slightly injuring one person.
Claimed by Abu Musa's Fatah dissident
organization.
August 13: Jordan. Jordanian police
defused a l)omb consisting of several
hundred grams of Soviet-made explo-
sives near the residence of a U.S.
Embassy official. The Jordanian People's
Revolutionary Party was later deter-
mined to be responsible.
August 11: Jordan. Members of the
Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party
tried to set off a bomb outside the Jordan-
ian radio and television station. The
bomb was discovered and defused.
August 3: Jordan. A bomb exploded
under a water truck parked near the
U.S. Embassy warehouse in Amman.
There were no casualties and only minor
damage. The Abu Nidal group claimed
responsibility.
May 29: Cyprus. A former Saiqa
officer who had switched his allegiance
to Arafat, Abdullah Ahmad Suleiman el
Saadi, was murdered in Limassol. Four
Syrian men and two women were
arrested for the murder and subse-
quently deported from Cyprus.
May 3: Cyprus. An unidentified man
shot and killed Palestinian publisher
Hanna Muqbil and wounded his
secretary in Nicosia. Muqbil was
reportedly a former member of Abu
Nidal who had defected to Arafat's
camp.
March 24: Jordan. A bomb was
defused outside the British Consulate in
Amman. The Abu Nidal group claimed
responsibility.
March 24: Jordan. A liomb was
discovered and defused outside the
British cultural center. The Abu Nidal
group claimed responsibility.
March 24: Jordan. A bomb exploded
in the parking lot of the Intercontinental
Hotel, which is across the street from
the U.S. Embassy, damaging two
vehicles and slightly injuring an AID
employee and his daughter. A second
bomb was discovered in the parking lot
and defused. The Abu Nidal group
claimed responsibility.
1983
December 29: Spain. Two Jordanian
Embassy employees were attacked by a
lone gunman as they were leaving the
embassy. 'Walid Jamal Balkis was killed
instantly and Ibrahim Sami Mohammed
was seriously wounded. The Arab
Revolutionary Brigades claimed
responsibility.
December 19: Turkey. A car bomb
was discovered in an abandoned rental
car midway between the French Cultural
House and the Cordon Hotel used by
American military personnel in Izmir.
The bomb's timer apparently malfunc-
tioned. Turkish police linked the Abu
Nidal group and Syrian agents to the
incident.
November 7: Greece. Two security
guards of the Jordanian Embassy were
wounded on a crowded street in Athens.
One of the two victims died from his
wounds. The Arab Revolutionary
Brigades claimed responsibility.
October 26: Italy. The Jordanian
Ambassador to the Vatican and his
driver were wounded in an assassination
attempt in Rome. The Arab Revolution-
ary Brigades claimed responsibility.
October 25: India. The Jordaniar
Ambassador was wounded by an
unknown assailant in New Delhi.
Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary
Brigades.
October 13: Jordan. Two hand
grenades were thrown into a police b;
racks in Amman. A member of the po e
recruited by Saiqa confessed to the
attack. Local authorities suspected th
Abu Nidal elements may also have be^
involved.
August 21: Greece. A high-level
PLO official, Ma'mum Muraysh, was
shot and killed by two unidentified m;
on a motorcycle. The victim's son and s
driver were wounded. The Movement r
Rebuilding Fatah claimed responsibili
April 10: Portugal. The PLO
observer to an international confereni
of socialists, Isam al-Sartawi, was shd
to death in a hotel lobby. Sartawi's
secretary was slightly wounded in the
attack. The Abu Nidal group claimed
responsibility.
January 1: Israel. A grenade atta
on a civilian bus in Tel Aviv injured U
Both Saiqa and Abu Nidal claimed
responsibility.
'Countries currently on the list are Syi
Libya, Iran, South Yemen, and Cuba.
-The official name of the Abu Nidal
organization is "Fatah Revolutionary Com
cil." It is headed by Sabri al-Banna, a Pale:
ian who uses the nam de guerre Abu Nidal
The group's original name was the Black
June Organization when it was formed in
1976. Ironically, this group first concentra
on Syrian targets, including an attack on
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam (now Vi
President) in 1977. ■
76
Department of State Bulle;
IITED NATIONS
Administration and Finances
■ 'rrnon A. Walters
Si:iteme)!t in a plenary session of the
ill neral Assembly on October 15.
Ambassador Walters is U.S. Per-
. "/ Representative to the United
1 'iiited Nations is at a critical junc-
It is facing a crisis of reform, the
I auses of which are poHtical and
aucratic. We have made clear that
roncern about the United Nations
resulting criticisms of some of its
ills retlect our deep-seated attach-
t to the ideals of the organization.
_: founders of the United Nations
osaw a true international community
n hich governments would join
:o ther to serve the rights, needs, and
IS rations of their people. There must
« doubt that the United States
•eiins committed to the original goals
ir ideals of the United Nations.
During this 41st session of the
j( jral Assembly, we member states of
:h Jnited Nations have the unique
T irtunity to contribute to the
ilers' dream. President Reagan said
s September 22nd speech that if we
lis session of the General Assembly
a take advantage of this opportunity
\r achieve the reforms required, the
III States, "which has always given
iiited Nations generous support,
I'l'iitinue to play a leading role in the
i t to achieve its noble purposes."
This reform crisis was uppermost in
h Tiinds of member states last year
n the General Assembly adopted,
.V out a vote, the resolution which
« Wished the Group of 18 to review the
I'licy of the administrative and
filial functioning of the United
.Nitons. The group's report and its
■p inmendations represent the culmina-
nt' a year of extensive discussion and
iileration of alternatives, in order to
k nut a common position on what
i- to be done to revitalize the United
'illS.
Like other member states, the
'I ted States entered this search for
rill w 
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