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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




Dppartmpn t 



buUetBn 

f e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 87 /Number 21 18 






AID'S 25th Anniversary/1 



The Secretary/23 

CSCE Followup Meeting/47 

Iran/65 



January 1987 




Departntpni of State 

bulletin 



Volume 87 / Number 2118/ January 1987 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its pui-pose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 
The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and 
treaties and other agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party. Special features, articles, and 
other supportive material (such as maps, 
charts, photographs, and graphs) are 
published frequently to provide addi- 
tional information on current issues but 
should not necessarily be interj^reted as 
official U.S. policy statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

GEORGE B. HIGH 

Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business 
required by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



Department of State Bulletin (ISSI 
0041-7610) is published monthly (plus a al 
inde.x) by the Department of State, 220 
Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520. S « 
class postage paid at Washington, D.C, d 
additional mailing offices. POSTMASTE 
Send address changes to Superintenden ( 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing ic 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



NOTE: Most of the contents of this publica- 
tion are in the public domain and not 
copyrighted. Those items may be reprinted; 
citation of the Department of State 
Bl'LLETlN as the source will be appreciated. 
Permission to reproduce all copyrighted 
material (including photographs) must be ob- 
tained from the original source. The 
Bulletin is inde.xed in the Readers' Guide 
to Periodical Literature and in the PAIS 
(Public Affairs Infonnation Service, Inc.) 
Bulletin. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Docu 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



CONTENTS 



FEATURE 



1 The AID Challenge 



■jie Secretary 



General 



1 Secretary Praises AID and Com- 

ments on Iran 

2 Restoring the Foreign Affairs 

Budget 
2 Promoting Inter-American 

Cooperation 
; Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, 

and the Future of Deterrence 

irms Control 

: A World Without Nuclear 

Weapons {Kenneth L. Adelman) 

C Permitted and Prohibited 

Activities Under the ABM 
Treaty (Paul H. Nitze) 

i Nuclear and Space Arms Talks 
Close Round Six (Max M. 

|, Kampelman, President Reagan) 

hst Asia 

' U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets 
(W. Allen Wallis) 



56 



61 



U.S. Policy Toward the Third 
World (Michael H. Armacost) 

U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Achievements and Challenges 
(Michael H. Armacost) 



Middle East 

65 U.S. Initiative in Iran (Edwin 
Meese III. President Reagan. 
Secretary Shultz, John C. 
Whitehead) 

Narcotics 

74 President Convenes Conference 

on Narcotics 

Nuclear Policy 

75 International Prospects for Civil 

Nuclear Power in the Post- 
Chernobyl Era (John D. 
Negroponte) 



United Nations 

80 Situation in Cambodia (Vernon A. 

Walters. Text of Resolution) 
82 Nicaragua (Herbert S. Okun) 
84 Situation in Afghanistan (Herbert 

S. Okun) 

86 U.S. Reconfirms Support for 

IAEA (Richard T. Kennedy) 

87 Libyan Occupation of Northern 

Chad (Herbert S. Okun) 
87 Libya (Larry Pressler) 

Western Hemisphere 

89 Secretary Visits Earthquake Site 
in El Salvador 



Treaties 

90 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

92 Department of State 
92 USUN 



;onomics 

U.S. -EC Relations and the Inter- 
national Trading System 
|, (W. Allen Wallis) 

jrope 

Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki 

(Secretary Shultz) 
Vienna CSCE FoUowup Meeting 
Secretary's News Conference in 

Vienna 
Visit of West German Chancellor 

Kohl (Helmut Kohl, President 

Reagan, Joint Statement) 



Pacific 

78 U.S. Relationship With Pacific 

Islands (President Reagan) 

Terrorism 

79 U.S. Takes Measures Against 

Syria (White House Statement) 
79 U.S. Supports Council of Europe 

Resolution on Terrorism 

(Department Statement) 
79 American Hostage Released in 

Beirut (President Reagan) 



Publications 

94 Department of State 
94 Current Documents Volume 
Released 



Index 



Why Foreign Aid 



A child in Latin America learns to read . . . 




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FEATURE 



A family in Asia 

opens a small business . . . 

A farmer in Africa 
grows more food . . . 






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Education, health, private enter- 
prise and agriculture are some of 
the areas in which U.S. foreign 
economic assistance is helping people 
in less developed countries (LDCs) to 
help themselves improve the quality 
of their lives. Such assistance also 
serves U.S. national security interests. 

By helping people in LDCs, U.S. 
foreign aid enhances regional security, 
promotes economic development, 
encourages the growth of democratic 
institutions and stimulates commer- 
cial relations with the Third World. 



, infant 

Ingof 
l( lydration 
spared 
h;toa 
iiple new 
qhnology 
Hit combines 
i^ar, salt 
flii water . . 



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Life expectancy in 

developing nations has 

increased by 20%, literacy 

by 33% and per capita 

income by 50%. 




For over a quarter of a century, the 
United States has been providing 
economic assistance to the nations of 
the developing world. 

During that time, more than 303 
million tons of food were provided to 
1.8 billion people in more than 100 
nations. Emergency relief was 
provided to victims of over 770 
natural disasters in 129 countries. 
Smallpox was eradicated, and a 
vaccine for malaria is on the way. A 
"Green Revolution" in agriculture 
introduced new high-yielding varieties 
of grains and enabled many nations 
to become self-sufficient in food 
production. 

Life expectancy in developing 
nations has increased by 20%, literacy 
by 33% and per capita income by 
50%. High rates of population growth 
are beginning to level off in parts of 
Asia and Latin America, where up to 
50% or more of the people in some 
countries now use family planning 
methods. Primary school enrollment 
has tripled, and secondary school 
enrollment has increased sixfold. 

Programs to assist people in 
developing countries are an expression 
of the American people's sense of 
justice and compassion. They also 
play an important role in America's 
efforts to find peaceful solutions to 
conflicts and to encourage the 



development of freedom and oppor- f 
tunity throughout the world. j 

Interdependence in I 

Today's World 

Foreign aid plays an important | 
role in American foreign policy, ill 
is also an indispensable part of a | 
growing economic link between the i 
United States and the developing ' 
world. The United States is deeply 
involved in the world economy. Toda / 
America benefits significantly from I 
trade and direct investment with 
developing nations. More than 40% 
of all U.S. private direct investment 
today — or some $50 billion — is in th 
Third World. 

The U.S. trade relationship with 
developing nations underscores the 
interdependence of the world econom 
For example, almost half of all 
American manufactured goods and 
over 50% of U. S. food grains and 
feed grains go to growing markets i) 
the developing world. As these 
developing economies become more 
viable, they can become more effecti' 
markets for U.S. products. 

Developing nations supply almos 
half of all American imports includii 
many strategic minerals vital to 
national defense. The United States 
imports significant quantities of silvc 




\n AID-supported 
women's co-op in the 
Dominican Republic 
assists in the country's 
rural development. 



FEATURE 



cobalt, aluminum, tin, tungsten, 
nickel, manganese, platinum, mercury 
and bauxite from these nations. For 
example, 52% of the cobalt imported 
by the United States comes from 
Zaire. Cobalt is a critical component 
of the alloys necessary for the 
construction of jet engines. In 
addition, most American imports of 
petroleum and natural rubber as well 
as everyday products such as coffee, 
bananas, tea and cocoa come from 
the developing world. 

U.S. foreign aid programs not only 
benefit recipients abroad, but also 
help secure jobs for Americans at 
home. For example, 70 cents out of 
every dollar that goes for bilateral 



foreign assistance is spent on goods 
and services from the United States. 
American firms supply commodities, 
equipment, consulting services and 
other expertise to foreign assistance 
projects. Foreign aid programs 
support more than five million 
American manufacturing jobs in all 
50 states and create new markets for 
U.S. products abroad. 

Foreign Aid in Perspective 

Foreign assistance as a national 
policy originated with the 
Marshall Plan in 1947 when U.S. 
economic support helped rebuild 
Europe following World War II. In 



1949, President Harry S Truman 
initiated the Point IV program to 
provide technical assistance to 
Taiwan, South Korea, nations in 
Indochina and the less developed 
countries in Europe and the Middle 
East. 

The focus of foreign aid switched 
from Europe to the developing world. 
In June 1950, the Act for Inter- 




Efforts to raise the 
productivity and income 
of the poor focus on 
increasing access to 
resources such as land, 
water, fertilizer and 
renewable sources of 
energy. 



Foreign aid helps 
America — about 70 cents 
of every dollar is spent on 
U.S. equipment, food, 
goods or services. 



AID encourages the 
development of the private 
sector as a vehicle for 
generating employment 
and higher incomes. 



^A 



national Development was passed, 
and the Technical Cooperation 
Administration (TCA) was estab- 
lished within the State Department. 
When the Korean War broke out in 
1950, U.S. economic assistance took 
on a new purpose. In 1951. military 
and economic assistance were united 
with technical assistance programs 
under the Mutual Security Agency. 
Two years later, programs of technical 
cooperation became the responsibility 
of the newly established Foreign 
Operations Administration, which 
later became the International 
Cooperation Administration. This 
effort was supplemented in 1954 by 
the Food for Peace Act, which uses 
U.S. agricultural abundance to feed 
the hungry in other nations. Shortly 
thereafter, the Development Loan 
Fund was established, enabling devel- 
oping countries to obtain capital 
assistance. 

The Agency for International 
Development (AID), created by the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 



income of the poor by increasing 
access to resources such as land, 
water, fertilizer, seeds, tools, credit 
and renewable sources of energy. 
Health, nutrition, voluntary family 
planning and education programs also 
were expanded. 

Today, U.S. economic aid programs 
emphasize four basic principles: policy 
dialogue and reform; transfer of 



appropriate technology; institution 
building; and reliance on the private 
sector and market forces as engines 
of economic growth. | 

Policy Dialogue 

The ability of economic assistance 
programs to achieve their goals 
depends to a large degree on the 
soundness of development policies ii 



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tion Administration and the Develop- 
ment Loan Fund. AID today carries 
out U.S. economic assistance programs 
in the developing world. 

The passage of "New Directions" 
legislation by Congress in 1973 led to 
efforts to raise the productivity and 










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AID develops and 
introduces technologies 
that can be maintained 
and operated easily and 
are appropriate in local 
cultures. 






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Department of State Bullel 



FEATURE 



cipient nations. Inappropriate 
: bsidies, price and wage controls, 
ide restrictions, overvalued 
rchange rates, interest rate ceilings 
; d rapid population growth all 
:rtail economic performance. For 
sample, farmers need to sell their 
foducts at market-determined prices 
rther than at artificially low prices 
: en imposed by governments. These 
blow-cost-of-production prices are set 
tiprovide less expensive food for 
iban dwellers. Because of such 
flicies, farmers grow only enough 
F ■ their own families plus a little 
stra to sell. The result can lead to 
tdespread food shortages. In Africa, 
:r capita food production has fallen 



The ability of economic 

assistance programs to 

achieve their goals depends 

to a large degree on the 

soundness of development 

policies in recipient nations. 






\11) engineers have helj iiai government construct a number 

of water systems that provide people with clean, potable water. 



f helps strengthen 
b emational agricultural 
v. earch centers 
fa developing 
c| jntries by 
[j)viding25% 
their funding 



jary 1987 



AID promotes programs 
that emphasize immuni- 
zation and proper feeding 
of hvestock, which are 
important for increasing 
agricultural productivity. 



Developing nations with 

strong private sectors have 

achieved faster, sounder 

and more sustained 

economic grourth. 



each year for 20 years, in part due to 
this type of pricing policy. 

When a nation requests economic 
assistance from the United States, 
help is provided to design economic 
policies that allow development to 
succeed. With AID assistance and 
the growing recognition of the negative 
effects of restrictive policies, a number 
of reforms recently have taken place 
throughout the developing world. For 
example, 16 African countries have 
increased food prices substantially to 
provide incentives for farmers to grow 
more and better crops. This will help 
prevent famine in the future. In 
Somalia alone, a year after prices for 
sorghum were raised, production went 
up 40%. 



and use of high-yielding rice and 
wheat varieties. Rice production in 
Indonesia has increased from 12 
million to 22 million tons in less th; 
15 years. India, one of the most 
populous nations in the world, is 
becoming increasingly self-reliant ii 
food. 

AID is focusing on research, 
development and transfer of tech- 



I 





The emphasis of AID's 
population assistance is 
on enhancing the well- 
being of families by 
expanding the availabilitv 
and use of voluntary 
family planning services. 



Sixteen African countries 
have increased food prices 
substantially to provide 
incentives for farmers to 
grow more and better 
crops. 



FEATURE 



rdogy in the areas of greatest need. 
cse include: food production and 
iculture; forestry (fuelwood 
xiuction and use); biomedical 
nearch; and voluntary family 
pinning methods, 
^s part of this process, AID helps 
■ engthen scientific institutions in 
j.eloping countries and assists in 
bilding their research development 
aid technology distribution facilities. 

Lititutional Development 

'"'he U.S. foreign aid program 
. promotes democracy as well as 
d/elopment by building and 
sengthening institutions that enable 
p^ple to help themselves and that 
ii rease citizen participation in 
d ;ision making. The growth of viable 
ii titutions is essential to successful 
d /elopment. 

J.S. support builds schools and 
u iversities and provides access to 



self-sustaining sources of credit for 
productive investment. Institution 
building activities also include training 
to upgrade technical and managerial 
expertise. 

U.S. foreign aid supports small 
business and farmer-controlled 
cooperatives and other institutions 
that provide the means for people to 
express their views, choose their 
leaders and promote needed reforms. 
U.S. assistance and support are 
provided in conducting free and 
democratic elections. AID has also 
launched a $25 million program 
aimed at improving the administration 
of justice in Latin American 
democracies and strengthening local 
democratic institutions. 

Private Sector Growth 

Developing nations with strong 
private sectors have achieved 
faster, sounder and more sustained 




.iHHfiiaii 



' 3. foreign aid supports 
jiiall business and 
Inner-controlled 
operatives. 



Because of the scarcity 
of fuel in developing 
countries, people use 
alternative sources such 
as dried dung. 



economic growth. Private manage- 
ment of industries, for example, 
provides more efficient services at 
lower cost to the public than is the 
case with state-owned and -operated 
enterprises. This has led to many 
requests from developing countries 
for aid's technical assistance in 
drafting privatization strategies. 

In recent years, the interest in 
reducing the role of government in 
national economies has become a 
global phenomenon. 

AID encourages the development 
of the private sector as a vehicle for 
generating employment and higher 
incomes. In Bangladesh, AID assisted 
in transferring the marketing of 
fertilizer from the government to the 
private sector. As a result, over 45,000 
Bangladeshi businessmen now sell 
fertilizer to small farmers. 

In Jamaica, a 1 984 AID loan 
provided for an audit of state 
enterprises and for privatization of 
30 companies. At the request of the 
Costa Rican government, AID made 
local currency available to establish a 
trust fund to take possession of 
government-owned subsidiaries and 
offer them for sale to private investors. 
A program for divestment of state- 
owned enterprises is being developed 
jointly by AID and the government of 
Honduras. 







nuary 1987 



Foreign Aid: 
How It Works 



Development Assistance 

Development assistance is 
administered by AID in the forn 
of loans and grants. Its objective is 
to broaden economic opportunity by 
improving the quality of life of the 
poorest people in developing countries 
through programs in agriculture, 
rural development, nutrition, 
voluntary family planning, health, 
education and human resources, 
energy, and science and technology. 

The programs are concentrated in 
countries where U.S. assistance is 
needed most, where there is a clear 
commitment to broadly based growtl 
and where the United States has a 
strong interest in long-term 
development. 

This represents the basic type of 
assistance provided by AID in 
accordance with the Foreign 
Assistance Act. 

Economic Support Fund 

The Economic Support Fund, pari 
of the U.S. Security Assistance 
Program, promotes economic and 
political stability in regions where 
the United States has special security 
interests and has determined that 
economic assistance can be useful in 
helping to secure peace or to avert 
major economic or political crises. 



SI 




FEATURE 



rhese resources meet a variety of 
leeds, including balance-of-payments 
iupport and financing of infrastruc- 
ure and other capital projects as well 
IS support for development programs. 

Food for Peace 

Food aid is provided in cooperation 
with the Department of Agricul- 
ure through the Food for Peace 
urogram or P.L. (Public Law) 480. 

The United States is the largest 
ood donor in the world, providing 
nore nourishment to the world's 
lungry than all other nations 
:ombined. 

The Food for Peace program has 
lelivered over 303 billion tons of food 
vorth almost $37 billion to people on 
ilmost every continent. It has brought 
lew hope and economic opportunity 
o more than 1 .8 billion people in 
)ver 100 countries. 

Food aid is provided in three 
lifferent ways: 

Title I, a concessional sales 
urogram, provides developing coun- 
ries long-term, low-interest loans to 
purchase U.S. farm products. In 
exchange, these countries agree to 
;elf-help requirements that can mean 
mproved policies and local currency 
unding for development activities, 
■lecent legislation emphasizes the use 
3f local currency proceeds from Title 



I sales to promote private enterprise 
development through local institutions. 

Title II, a donation program, 
provides food aid to the victims of 
famines, disasters and emergencies 
throughout the world. Title II 
programs fall into broad categories of 
maternal-child health care, school 
feeding and Food for Work. Most 



The United States is the 
largest food donor in the 
world , providing more 
nourishment to the world's 
hungry than all other 
nations combined. 





infrastructure development such as the 
construction of access roads. 



Title II supplementary feeding is 
administered through U.S. private 
voluntary agencies and their counter- 
parts overseas. However, U.S. food is 
also provided through direct bilateral 
programs with other governments 
through the U.N. World Food 
Program. 

Food for Peace helped save millions 
of lives during the recent African 
famine. In 1985 alone, the United 
States provided over three million 
tons of American food, valued at $1 .1 
billion, in response to the African 
emergency. This represented half of 
all food delivered to that continent. 

Title III, Food for Development, is 
another sales program similar to Title 
I. However, Title III goes one step 
further by waiving all repayment 
requirements in exchange for more 
specific self-help development initia- 
tives. Another newly established 
program. Food for Progress, empha- 
sizes the use of U.S. food resources to 
support countries that have com- 
mitted themselves to agricultural 
policy reform. 

Disaster Assistance 

Natural and man-made disasters 
are a constant threat to people 
throughout the world. They take their 
highest toll among the poor, who are 
the most vulnerable. 



AID'S Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 
coordinates U.S. government and 
private relief work whenever help is 
needed. Programs are conducted, 
often in conjunction with those of 
other nations, to alleviate the effects 
of disaster quickly and to reduce 
human suffering. 

Over the years, this assistance has 
taken many forms. Donations under 
the Food for Peace program, search 
and rescue missions, medical supplies 
and personnel, shelter and equipment 
and money to buy relief goods all 
have been provided. 

AID responds to an average of 38 
emergency disasters a year. During 
the past 22 years, the United States 
provided emergency relief to victims 
of 865 natural and man-made foreign 
disasters in 129 countries in which 
2.7 million have died and 818 million 
have been affected. 

aid's international disaster assis- 
tance program not only alleviates 
suffering resulting from disasters, but 
also strengthens the ability of 
countries to cope with disasters by 
helping them improve their own 
disaster response networks. 

AID develops early warning 
systems and provides technical 
assistance to strengthen relief 
institutions in disaster-prone 



Natural and man-made 
disasters are a constant 
threat throughout the 
world and take their 
highest toll among the 
poor. 




countries. A 24-hour response 
capability is maintained to rush life- 
support supplies and services to 
disaster victims anywhere in the 
world. 

What Does Aid Cost? 

The 1987 foreign aid program 
totals less than 1% of the overalll 
federal budget or about $6 b'Uion. 



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10 




FEATURE 



hese funds support over 1 .500 
svelopment assistance programs in 
3 countries and include the Food 
ir Peace program, the U.S. contri- 
ation to multinational development 
inks and Economic Support Funds 
1 countries such as Egypt and Israel. 

The amount of money spent on 
ireign assistance by the United States 

r year is considerably less than 




what the American people spend for 
alcoholic beverages, cosmetics or toilet 
articles. In 1984 Americans spent 
over $10 billion on haircuts, $31 bil- 
lion on cigarettes, $25 billion on 
household cleaning supplies and 
$53 billion on alcohol. The same year, 
the U.S. government spent only 
$8.7 billion on foreign aid. 

Sharing the Task 

Thirty-five years ago, the United 
States was the only nation offer- 
ing economic assistance as a national 
policy. The U.S. share of worldwide 
assistance is shrinking. Today, 
virtually all developed nations — and 
some that are still developing — 
maintain aid programs. 

In 1983, while still providing the 
largest absolute amount of aid, the 
United States' relative share fell to 
less than 30%. By 1984, among the 
17 leading non-communist countries 
providing aid, the United States stood 
last in the amount of aid provided in 
relation to the gross national product. 
The Nordic countries, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Austria, Australia, New 
Zealand, Denmark and the Nether- 
lands are among the nations that 
outrank the United States. Net 
disbursements for U.S. economic aid 
in 1984 represented less than .3% of 
the gross national product. 



In 1985 alone, the U.S. 

provided over 3 million tons 

of American food, valued at 

$1.1 billion, in response to 

the African emergency. This 

represented half of all food 

delivered to that continent. 




The Feb. 4, 1976, earthquake in Guatemala 
left about 23,000 persons dead, 75,000 
injured and one million homeless. AID 
provided more than 500 family tents, 500 
pints of blood plasma, 5,000 doses of 
antibiotics, 100 portable water storage 
tanks (3,000-gaUon size), generators, 
pumps and water purification equipment. 



11 



The 
AID Challenge 



I 



The environment of poverty is a 
barrier to economic growth and to 
long-term global peace and security. 
The lack of skills, education, health 
services, access to safe water and 
adequate food all contribute to 
poverty. Growing population pressure, 
adverse climatic conditions, a deterio- 
rating natural resource base and 
inappropriate government policies 
further exacerbate the problem. 

Malnutrition and disease take the 
lives of more than 1 4 million children 
under the age of five every year in the 
developing world. This is almost the 
entire preschool population of the 
United States. Every day 40,000 
children under the age of five die 
from largely preventable causes. 

A substantial portion of the 
population in the developing world 
does not have access to enough food 

AID works to provide 
appropriate technology to 
help farmers improve 
production. 



to meet nutritional needs, and three 
out of five people do not have easy 
access to safe water. Life expectancy 
in less developed countries is about 
58 years on the average compared to 
75 in the United States. Average 
annual income is $700 compared to 
$1 1,070 in the developed nations, 
and unemployment rates are very 
high — up to 50% — particularly in 
densely populated urban areas. Over 
half of the people throughout the 
developing world do not have even 
basic reading skills. 

The challenge faced by donor 
agencies such as AID and the 



governments of developing nations 
to break through the barrier of pover 
and provide incentives for economic 
progress that will lead to self-reliant 
and sustained growth. 

Agriculture and Nutrition 

Insufficient food supplies and inac 
quate diets are principal concernf 
in most developing nations. Over 80 
million people or about one-seventh 
of the world's population are mal- 
nourished. Half of the world's hung 
are children. 

While enough food is being 
produced to feed the world's five 
billion people, in undernourished 
areas of the developing world, 
problems are experienced because 
people do not have enough money t( 
purchase food or build roads. They 
may not have adequate ways of 
delivering or storing food. Low 
agricultural productivity in many 
areas of the world also results from 
shortage of appropriate technology 
generate production. 

Most countries in Africa, for 
example, are unable to produce or 



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The United States plays a 
leading role in alleviating 
human suffering in Africa 
by providing food and 
other emergency supplies. 



FEATURE 



istribute the food that they need, 
ood production in these nations has 
?cHned in the last decade, 
in the future, land available for 
rming will be limited. Most good 
.able land, especially in Asia, already 
being cultivated. Land available for 
.!,ricultural purposes is expected to 
crease by only a small amount by 
le turn of the century. Efforts to 
crease food production are hampered 
irther by the depletion of the world's 
rests for fuel and other products, 
eforestation causes watershed 
■struction that, in turn, threatens 
;ricultural land with erosion or 
joding. 




To meet the growing demand for 
food generated by population growth, 
food production must increase 3-4% 
annually. To do this, production of 
major food crops in the developing 
countries must be increased signifi- 
cantly, the food purchasing power of 
the poor must improve, and policies 
that act as a constraint to development 
must be changed. 

AID is meeting the challenge of 
increasing food production by helping 
to improve existing agricultural 
technology and self-sustaining agri- 
cultural institutions in developing 
nations. Conducting research and 
developing and disseminating ap- 
propriate technologies are the essence 
of aid's program in agriculture. 

Research is a key factor in 
improving agricultural production. 
AID-supported research has helped 
bring about a "Green Revolution" in 
agriculture in Asia. Work now is 
under way to help bring food self- 
sufficiency to the African continent. 

Support is provided to a network 
of international agricultural research 
centers conducting studies on 
improving the productivity and quality 
of food crops such as sorghum, millet, 
beans, cowpeas, cassava, peanuts 
and potatoes. The International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture in 
Colombia has developed bean vari- 



eties that have resulted in increased 
yields and higher farm incomes with- 
out pesticide use. Research conducted 
on high-yielding rice varieties 
primarily at the International Rice 
Research Institute in the Philippines 
has resulted in a 40% increase over 
yields of traditional varieties. For 
wheat, the average increase has been 
close to 100%. 

AID support to the Asian Vegetable 
Research and Development Center 
has developed heat- and bacterial- 
resistant tomatoes that will make 
tomato production feasible in hot and 
humid climates for the first time. 
Other research at the center has 
helped design household gardens that 
provide food with adequate vitamin 
A for families. 

AID collaborates on research 
programs with U.S. land and sea 
grant colleges and universities in fields 
such as aquaculture, ocean fisheries, 
soil management, nutrition and food 
crop production, and post-harvest 
technology and works closely with 
private voluntary organizations, 
private sector firms, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and other 
U.S. government agencies such as the 
Peace Corps. 

Collaborative agricultural research 
also has benefited U.S. agriculture. 
The United States has benefited from 



In Honduras, where coffee 
is vital to the economy, 
farmers apply new tech- 
nologies resulting in 
increased production. 













AID-funded research has 

led to the production of 

new varieties of sorghum that 

are increasing yields 

up to 150%. 




the use of genetic materials from 
developing countries to improve 
virtually every major U.S. crop by 
providing resistance to disease and 
insects, dwarf stature, higher 
yields as well as one-day length- 
sensitivity. 

AID also draws on technical 
expertise from developing countries 
as well as the food and agricultural 
development experience of the U.N. 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the World Food Council 
(WFC). the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) 
and other donor agencies. 

The U.S. foreign assistance program 
provides both short- and long-term 
training for scientists, economists and 
other specialists needed for sustained 
agricultural and rural development. 
For example. AID assisted in building 
a college of agriculture in Morocco 
that now is graduating about 600 
persons a year. U.S. -based training is 
provided for some 50 Zambians as 
part of a project in agricultural 
training, planning and institutional 
development. A university based on a 
U.S. land grant model is being created 
in Cameroon and is expected to pro- 
vide 300 agricultural graduates a year. 

AID also helps developing nations 
increase agricultural production 



through irrigation, swamp drainage, 
access road building, produce market- 
ing, building of storage facilities and 
rural electrification systems. In 
Guatemala, AID assisted in the 
construction of about 206 kilometers 
of farm-to-market access roads that 
provided employment for 12,000 
laborers and allowed 20% more 
produce to arrive at markets in good 
condition. In Sri Lanka, an AID 
project helped organize water users 
associations in the dry Gal Oya 
region in the southeastern part of the 
country and rehabilitated over 600 
kilometers of irrigation canals. In 
Costa Rica, a joint U.S. -Costa Rican 
agricultural consultative committee 
was set up with AID's help. During 
the first six months of operation, it 
was instrumental in launching a 
number of major joint ventures in 
production and export of herbs, 
spices, vegetables and dehydrated 
banana and pineapple chips. 

U.S. foreign assistance helps create 
more jobs in rural areas and provides 
farmers better access to credit, 
markets and technology. In Honduras, 
for example, where the coffee crop is 
vital to the economy, coffee rust, a 
fungal disease, led to a decrease in 
production. With AID assistance, 
new technologies were introduced, 
and credit was extended to some 



Agricultural research, 
such as that under way at 
CIMMYT, benefits crop 
producers in both the 
United States and in 
developing countries. 




14 



FEATURE 



!,000 small farmers. As a result, in 
wo years, coffee production of these 
armers increased fivefold. 

AID is attempting to direct such 
Titical productive resources as credit, 
echnology and training to females 
vho perform much of the developing 
vorld's agricultural labor. 

^uman Resource 
Development 

health 

For millions of people in the 
developing world, good health is 
m elusive goal. Many deaths today 
Kcur from malnutrition and illnesses 
;uch as diarrhea, respiratory infec- 
ions, measles, tetanus and polio. 
These deaths can be easily prevented 
)r treated if services are available. 

How^ever, efforts to improve health 
'ire hampered by a lack of trained 
personnel at the community level, 
scarcity of rural health clinics, limited 
esources and lack of technical 
■xpertise. 

AID helps developing countries 
expand basic health care by 
emphasizing immunization, oral 
rehydration therapy and con- 
rol of major communicable 
aarasitic diseases. 



Over 50% of AID's health budget is 
directed at health service delivery. 

AID recently doubled its budget for 
biomedical research, committing 
roughly 13% of the total health budget 
(about $31.5 million) to this research. 
Research will improve the ability to 
diagnose, treat and even prevent 
diseases and will reduce the cost of 
health service delivery in the 
developing world. 

Today, research is carried out on 
tropical diseases such as malaria and 
onchocerciasis (river blindness). 

Onchocerciasis, when uncontrolled, 
can disable humans in the prime of 
life. AID is the major donor in the 



worldwide effort to control this 
disease. In the Volta River Basin in 
Africa, for example, some 27,000 
cases of blindness have been pre- 
vented, valuable land has been 
returned to production, and the 
majority of children born in the 
region have been protected from 
infection. 

During the past 30 years, the 
United States has spent more than 
$ 1 billion to control the spread of 
malaria, a disease which may kill up 
to five million people a year. It is 
estimated that one million children 
die annually from malaria in Africa 
alone. 






More than 50% of AID's 
health budget is directed 
at health service delivery. 



Two prototype vaccines 
against malaria have been 
developed as a result of 
research funded by AID. 



Females provide much of 
the developing world's 
agricultural labor. 



15 



Malaria had been eliminated in 39 
countries until it resurfaced recently 
in some areas of the world due to 
widespread and growing resistance 
to insecticides and to traditional anti- 
malarial drugs. 

As a result of research funded by 
AID, two prototype vaccines have 
been developed against malaria. One 
is for the most deadly form of the 
disease and the other for the most 
common form. If human testing is 
successful, the vaccine could be 
available for use by 1990 and should 
have a significant impact in 
controlling the disease. 

AID is committed to a "child 
survival" program to focus on a 
limited number of manageable and 
proven technologies thafpromise 
sustained and direct health benefits 
for infants and children. These are 
oral rehydration therapy, immuniza- 
tion, birth spacing and improved 
nutrition practices including the 




ORT— a simple solution 
of water, sugar and salt 
that can be administered 
in the home — is preventing 
millions of deaths from 
diarrheal dehydration 
each year. 



Moroccan children benefit 
from an AID-supported 
program that provides 
vitamin-enriched dietary 
supplements. 



promotion of breast feeding, 
appropriate weaning and growth 
monitoring. 

Promoting the use of oral 
rehydration therapy is an important 
part of aid's child survival effort. 
Between five and six million children 
in developing nations die every year 
from dehydration resulting from 
diarrhea. Diarrhea is brought on by 
cholera, measles and the many viruses 
and bacteria that thrive in unsanitary 
environments. Children in developing 
countries, often already malnourished, 
may survive the disease but not the 
dehydration resulting from severe 
diarrhea. 

The only treatment was to 
rehydrate those children with fluids 
given intravenously. But that 
required hospitals, trained medical 
personnel and clean needles — all in 
short supply in the developing world. 

Over the course of 20 years, AID 
has helped support the research that 
has demonstrated that oral rehydration 
therapy (ORT) is a safe and effective 
treatment for diarrhea from all causes 
and for children and adults of all 
ages. Because it can be given by 
spoon, mothers and fathers can 
administer it to their children at home. 

AID now is working to make ORT 
available worldwide with activities in 
42 countries. The U. N. International 



Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) are major 
partners in this global effort. 

It is proving successful. For 
example, the AID-supported National 
Control of Diarrheal Diseases project 
in Egypt began in 1983. By the end 
of 1985, close to 90% of all health 
facilities around the country were 
providing on-site rehydration services. 
According to approximations based 
on sample surveys, diarrhea-caused 
deaths in under-two-year-olds had 
been cut by two-thirds since 1980 
and infant deaths (0-1 year) by more 
than half. 

In the developing world, children 
are afflicted by a full range of 
illnesses once common in indus- 
trialized nations but now largely 
controlled. Measles, for example, is a 
far greater killer in developing 
countries than sleeping sickness. 
Whooping cough is a greater hazard 
than river blindness. Vaccines to 
combat diseases such as measles, 
whooping cough, tetanus and polio 
have long been available but are only 
recently reaching the developing 
world. 

Because immunization is an 
important and cost-effective interven- 
tion, AID supports immunization 
programs in more than 50 countries. 



16 







FEATURE 



AID also is supporting the research 
md development of: 

— a measles vaccine that can be 
given to infants as young as six 
months; 

— heat-stable vaccines such as for 
polio to reduce dependence on cold 
chains; 

— a single-dose vaccine for 
whooping cough that does not have 

Tithe negative side effects that often 
discourage mothers from completing 
the DPT series; 

— a genetically-engineered oral 
vaccine, as well as a new injectable, 
for typhoid, a disease that has 
become resistant to antibiotics in 
several parts of the developing world; 

— an oral vaccine for cholera, the 
most severe of the diarrheal diseases, 
affecting some 20-24 million adults 
and children; 

— a vaccine for rotavirus, the most 
:ommon cause of diarrhea in the 
United States as well as in the Third 
World; and, 

— a leprosy vaccine that can be 
used not only as a preventative but 

i also to reduce the severity of the 
disease in those who are already 
infected. 

AID-supported research is under 
way on technological improvements 
that could make vaccines easier to 
deliver in the developing world. 



AID also is conducting promising 
research to further reduce childhood 
mortality. Vitamin A deficiency is a 
public health problem in an estimated 
73 countries and territories around 
the world, affecting some five million 
children under the age of five in Asia 
alone. About 250,000 children in Asia 
are blinded every year as a result of 
this deficiency in their diet. Since 
1974, AID has helped developing 
countries recognize, treat and prevent 
vitamin A deficiency. AID-supported 
research in Indonesia has shown that 
vitamin A may also play a key role in 
preventing deaths from diarrhea and 
acute respiratory infection. AID is 
expanding its research into the links 
between vitamin A and childhood 
mortality and disease. 

In addition, AID provides technical 
support for planning and managing 
improved water and sanitation 
systems. In Malawi, for example, the 
AID-assisted Self-Help Rural Water 
Supply project has resulted in the 
installation of nearly 2,000 miles of 
pipe and 3,000 public taps since 1968. 
AID also provides training in hygiene 
and basic health care. 

Education 

Meeting the challenge of economic 
development requires the 
leadership and technical know-how 



AID also is conducting 

promising research to 

further reduce childhood 

mortality. 





The Agency's immuniza- 
tion program in Africa has 
assisted in protecting 8.3 
million children from the 
ravages of childhood 
diseases. 



The Agency's heahh pro- 
gram focuses on infants 
and young children — a 
group highly vulnerable 
to disease. 



17 



Some 600 million adults in 

developing nations cannot 

read or do basic calculations. 




that comes from sound education 
and training. Yet, the countries facing 
the most acute challenge are often 
those most severely hampered by lack 
of trained professionals and skilled 
personnel. 

Some 600 million adults in 
developing nations cannot read or do 
basic calculations. Only three-fifths 
of school-age children enter primary 
school, and only half will stay in 
school long enough to acquire even 
the most rudimentary skills. 

In the developing world, the ratio 
of physicians, teachers and other 
trained persons to a growing 
population is strikingly low. In 
Bangladesh, a country with an 
estimated 100 million people, there is 
one physician for every 10,000 



persons. In Niger, there are only 128 
physicians to serve over five million 
citizens. In Liberia, estimates show 
one high school teacher for every 
121,000 teens. 

The U.S. foreign aid program 
emphasizes primary education for 
children, non-formal education in life 
skills for adults and advanced training 
for development program managers, 
scientists and professional personnel. 
In addition, the program emphasizes 
that formal and non-formal education 
and participant training be directed 
to both males and females since each 
contributes significantly to the overall 
economic development process. 

Support is provided for private 
voluntary organizations to conduct 
educational programs in basic literacy. 



* 






^~j* 



Opening the book of 
knowledge releases 
huniEin potential. 




18 



lealth care, occupational health and 
afety and other subjects. 
Modern technology also is applied 

educate persons in remote regions, 
ladio and satellite communications 
re used to reach people in rural 
reas. In Kenya, Thailand and the 
)ominican Republic, AID has helped 
levelop instructional radio programs 
hat have taught children basic skills, 
'hese have been useful particularly 
i-here qualified teachers are in short 
upply. 

In Costa Rica, students are using 
;xtbooks written and printed in their 
wn country through funds provided 

1 local currency generated by the 
iID program. 

In addition, "scholarship diplomacy" 
-training and educating Third 
V'orld citizens in the United States — 
; an important part of the foreign 
ssistance program. Nearly 250,000 
ersons from the developing world 
ave received training — most of them 
1 the United States — under the 
jreign assistance program. AID is 
?sponsible for managing most U.S. 
overnment-sponsored scholarships 
)r students and trainees from the 
hird World. 

In 1985, AID initiated a five-year, 
146 million program to provide 
aining in the United States for 
ndergraduate and high school-level 



students from Central America. The 
Central American Peace Scholarship 
Program (CAPS) will reach socially 
and economically disadvantaged 
students and also will enable primary 
and secondary school teachers and 
administrators to observe programs 
in the United States related to their 
fields. CAPS will fund over 7,000 
scholarships. In addition, the U.S. 
Information Agency will sponsor 
training for 3,000 Central Americans. 
Along with providing scholarships, 
AID offers assistance to countries 
that want to invest their own 
resources in training but need help 
with programming and supervising 
their citizens being trained in the 
United States. This assistance and 
related services are provided under 
aid's Reimbursable Training 
Program. 

Environment and 
Natural Resources 

Receding tropical forest cover, soil 
erosion, exhaustion of croplands, 
depletion of fisheries, advancing 
desert frontiers, water pollution, 
indiscriminate pesticide use and inad- 
equate industrial and urban pollution 
control, and inadequate or underused 
energy sources often are serious 
problems in developing countries. 



FEATURE 



AID assists in identifying and 
solving these problems in a number 
of ways. Technical environmental 
analysis is integrated into AID's 
development projects. Foreign 
governments are encouraged to adopt 
sound environmental policies. Support 
is provided for scientific and 
developmental institutions in 
developing countries engaged in 
environmental research and problem 
solving. 

Integrating environmental analysis 
into development projects in Rwanda, 
Somalia and the Gambia will ensure 
against future erosion and degradation 
in development of river basins. 

In Panama, AID is providing a loan 
that will increase the government's 
capability to manage the watersheds 
that must be adequately protected to 
keep the Panama Canal operational. 

AID has helped develop a network 
of environmental centers in Indonesia 
used for training and research by the 



ID helps developing 
luntries use natural 
sources wisely. 





m^M 



I'lf- ■ 



So^-^t 



Ministry of Environment and 
Development. 

AID also worics to protect 
environmentally sound development 
projects funded by other donors. AID 
and the World Bank are partners in 
educating people about safe pesticide 
use. 

Effective forest land management 
is crucial to economic development. 
The U.S. foreign assistance program 
helps more than 70 forestry projects 
in 37 countries to improve management 
and support related soil, water, forest 
and range vegetation conservation 
efforts. 

Haiti is an example. Working 
closely with private voluntary organi- 
zations, AID is supporting an effort 
to plant and maintain six million to 
nine million trees over four years in 
addition to obtaining data on 
forestation in the country and 
promoting soil conservation. 

Energy 

The Agency's energy program 
helps developing countries assess 
their energy needs and resources plus 
develop affordable energy systems 
required for agricultural, health, 
educational and other development. 
In Haiti, AID is introducing a 
smokeless, briquetted fuel made from 
coal to replace fuelwood and kerosene 



in homes and businesses. In Jamaica, 
AID funded a promising study of the 
potential for large-scale electricity 
generation from sugarcane. Successful 
application could revitalize Jamaica's 
major agricultural resource and lead 
to savings in foreign exchange funds 
through reduced oil imports. 

Population 

Population growth rates in most 
developing countries today remain 
high mainly because of dramatic 
improvements in public health and 
medical services over the past three 
decades, traditions favoring large 
families, and lack of knowledge and 
availability of effective family planning 
methods. Though the world's popu- 
lation growth rate has begun to fall, 
the present rate of growth will still 
mean a 33% increase in the world's 
population by the year 2000. More 
than 90% of these additional people 
will be born in the developing world. 

Rapid population growth can 
compound serious development 
problems and increase the cost of 
national and international efforts to 
reduce disease, poverty, malnutrition 
and environmental degradation. In 
Africa, for instance, population is 
growing about 3% yearly while annual 
food production is increasing 
only 2%. 



For the individual family, populatio 
growth means large family size, whic 
may seriously affect the health of 
mothers and children. Complication 
of pregnancy are a major cause of 
death for women in the developing 
world. The risk of complications 
increases for women who are very 
young or at the end of their 
reproductive period and with the 
number of pregnancies. When 
children are born too close together, 
they have a significantly greater risk 
of dying than when births are well- 
spaced. 

The emphasis of AID's populatior 
assistance is on enhancing the well- 
being of families by expanding the 
availability and use of voluntary 
family planning services. AID support 
voluntary family planning programs 
that provide a wide range of choices 
in family planning methods, includin 
natural family planning. 

AID helps developing country 
programs by training physicians anc 
other staff, providing commodities 
and medical equipment, expanding 
the number of channels through 
which family planning information i 
distributed and providing technical 
assistance to design and improve 
family planning programs. 

Voluntary family planning pro- 
grams in many countries have 



I 




^ 




20 



.u 



FEATURE 



)roduced positive results with AID 
support. In Thailand, for example, 
'oluntary family planning programs 
ontributed to a decline in the 
)opuIation growth rate from over 3% 
n 1 970 to 1 .7% today. In Jamaica, 
luch voluntary programs helped 
educe the birth rate by 23% over the 
)ast decade. Population growth rates 
ilso have declined in Indonesia, 
ylexico, Colombia and other countries 
vith the help of strong AID-assisted 
oluntary family planning programs. 

iousing 

\dequate shelter is a critical need 
in the developing world. By the 
jrn of the century, the world's 
opulation will be predominantly 
rban. Three-fourths of these urban 




dwellers will live in developing 
countries. Providing minimum, 
decent shelter is a major problem 
resulting from rapid urbanization. 
Shelter ranks next only to food and 
medical care as a basic need of the 
poor. 

All but a small fraction of the 
housing in developing countries is 
built by the private sector. Most 
people build their own housing over 
time. The primary role of government 
in housing is to provide those goods 
and services that people are unable to 
provide for themselves, to remove 
constraints on private sector housing 
construction and to encourage self- 
help efforts. 

AID assists governments in 
developing nations to respond to the 
housing needs of their citizens. U.S. 
foreign aid projects emphasize self- 
help techniques and private sector 
construction of housing units. A 
number of approaches to providing 
low-cost housing are promoted, 
including slum upgrading, basic or 
core housing and preparation of lots 
with utilities for later improvement 
by purchasers. 



In Africa, population is 

growing about 3% yearly 

while food production is 

increasing only 2% . 



By the turn of the century, 

the world's population 

will be predominantly urban. 



Meeting 
The Challenge 



The Agency is facing the 
challenge of the 1980s by sharin -. 
American scientific, technical and ' 
entrepreneurial skills to meet critica | 
needs in the developing world. By , 
encouraging policy dialogue, mobilij | 
ing the private sector, building I 

durable institutions and transferring ' 
appropriate technology, AID helps | 
build a better life for everyone both ; | 
home and abroad. 



I 




This feature is reprinted from a 
pamphlet entitled "The AID Challenge, 
produced by the Bureau for External 
Affairs, U.S. Agency for Intem.ational 
Development, in November 1986. 



HE SECRETARY 



>ecretary Praises AID 
md Comments on Iran 



iiitary Shultz's remarks at a 
ri niony commemorating the 25th 
mirersary of the Agency for Intema- 
iniil Derelopment (AID) on Novem- 
r ^5. 1986.^ 

e're here to celebrate the 25th 
miversary of the Agency for Interna- 
mal Development. It's a very impor- 
nt part of our foreign policy. So let me 
art there. 

President Reagan has put in place a 
reign policy that's comprehensive, that 
operating very strongly in the interest 
the United States and of the great 
aditions of the United States. I am 
oud and feel quite privileged to be 
sociated with him in this endeavor, 
id I support President Reagan fully, 
ross-the-board. 

Insofar as our efforts in the Middle 
ist, and particularly with respect to 
e Iran-Iraq war and associated mat- 
rs. the President has set out our objec- 
es there trying to be as helpful as we 
n in bringing an end to that war— it's 
e bloodiest battle going on on the 
obe today— in trying to see what we 
n do to establish a more constructive 
lationship with Iran, if that's at all 
issible, in combatting the scourge of 
rrorism— all of these objectives are 
ry much a part of our foreign policy, 
le President has set out our objectives, 
id 1 fully subscribe to them and support 
em and intend to be very much a part 
the effort to bring them to fruition. 

We've had a lot of discussion about 
iw best to evaluate where we are right 
iw and where we go from here. We will 
■ working as part of the Administra- 
ins's effort on this. Under Secretary of 
ate [for Political Affairs] Mike Arma- 
■st will be the lead person, insofar as 
e State Department is concerned, in 
ving us leadership in this effort. So it 
ill s^-o forward following the objectives 
at the President has laid out and go 
rward with strength and enthusiasm. 

Insofar as the problems that have 
ime to light through the efforts of the 
ttorney General, I think it is quite clear 
lat the Attorney General and the Presi- 



dent mean business. Insofar as I per- 
sonally am concerned, of course, I sup- 
port that effort. I have met with the 
Attorney General and his associate, 
Mr. Cooper, and provided all of the in- 
formation that we have here in the 
Department that I may have about all of 
the things involved. So they have that 
complete record. And, as we may turn 
up other things, of course, we'll imme- 
diately make them available. So that 
goes on. 

But in the meantime, our foreign 
policy with all of its forward thrust goes 
on, including our efforts with respect to 
Iran, with respect to the Iran-Iraq war, 
with respect to all of these matters, as 
we will be seeking in every way possible 
to pursue the President's objectives and 
bring them about. 

Turning to the subject of AID itself, 
this is a very important element in the 
total picture. And it represents an idea 
that's been around a long while— even 
longer than the 25 years and which has 
had a refreshing rebirth under the 
leadership of President Reagan. 

As I think about it, this idea that 
AID represents now goes back at least 
to lend-lease during World War II. And 
we see its seeds in the Marshall Plan and 
derivatives of the Marshall Plan. We see 
it as part of the structure that was put in 
place by the great statesmen after 
World War II, from which emerged the 
International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the other banks, and our 
bilateral assistance program. And it has 
done a lot of good. It's had its problems 
off and on but basically has been an 
extremely powerful force for good in the 
world. 

It has been part of something that 
opens the world up, that stands for the 
fact that we know that what to the 
United States is going to be in some con- 
siderable part a reflection of what hap- 
pens elsewhere. It is a way of saying we 
understand the stake we have in seeing 
people in countries that are worse off 
than we get a break and get a chance to 
move ahead. 



And as President Reagan has 
worked with this program and sponsored 
increases in it, working with [AID 
Administrator] Peter McPherson, who is 
an outstanding colleague, the ideas of 
economic development through the 
market, through enterprise, have taken 
on much more meaning. And by now, we 
see that the ideas that the President 
expressed early in his term at Cancun 
and at other places, in which we're often 
greeted as way off the mark, are now 
almost the conventional wisdom. And I 
personally saw at the UN special session 
on Africa the emergence of these ideas 
insofar as many African nations were 
concerned, and you see them all around 
the world. 

So I think this is a birthday that we 
can truly celebrate as representing an 
important idea that distinguishes the 
post-World War II period from the 
earlier periods. And it represents 
understanding, it represents the forward 
motion and open outlook of the United 
States; it's an integral part of the Presi- 
dent's foreign policy, and I'm very 
pleased and proud to be a part of that 
policy and his team and very pleased to 
have an opportunity to take part in this 
ceremony that marks what you've been 
doing, Peter. 

Just a word about Peter. He's been a 
great colleague for me. He's tireless. I 
don't know how he does all the things he 
does and how he knows all the things he 
knows. But at any rate, he's always 
there and is one of those people who, 
when he comes to you, even if he's got a 
problem he also brings a solution. The 
people you like to see are the ones who 
bring answers as well as problems. It's 
the people who only bring you the prob- 
lems that drive you crazy. But Peter's 
got answers and solutions and ideas, and 
he's always constructive. And so it's a 
great pleasure for me to work with you 
personally, Peter. 



•Press release 2.53 of Nov. 26, 1986. 



Einuary 1987 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget 



Secretary Shultz 's address before the 
Locust Club in Philadelphia on Novem- 
ber 3, 1986.'' 

I thank you for honoring me with your 
performance award. I take it as an 
important opportunity to say a few 
words about some "performing" we all 
have to do if the United States is to have 
an effective foreign policy. 

I've been giving a lot of speeches 
lately. Most of them have been about 
U.S. -Soviet relations and the meaning of 
Reykjavik, our human rights concerns, 
and arms control. I don't want to 
downplay these subjects. They're fun- 
damental components of our foreign 
policy. But the Soviets and arms control 
aren't the only issues needing attention 
right now. Tonight, I'd like to take a 
breather from them and raise some 
other issues much closer to home that 
are just as urgent and just as important 
to our security. 

My message tonight is simple: right 
now, the United States has a tremen- 
dous number of things going for it 
around the world— we have a winning 
hand; we've got to be allowed to play 
it— yet, we're on the verge of throwing 
away recent and potential gains instead 
of building on them for the future. 

That's a double-edged message, I 
know. But then, American foreign policy 
■ is not a monolithic enterprise. It has 
always rested on two pillars, two 
mutually supporting traditions of 
political thought— and on two branches 
of government, the executive and the 
Congress, that formulate and conduct 
our foreign relations. It started right 
here in Philadelpia, where our Founding 
Fathers set down the documents that 
ever since have shaped our ways of 
thinking and our institutions of 
government. 

And I might say that I had the 
privilege and the fun of coming here to 
Philadelphia a little early and renewing 
my acquaintance, my wife and I, with 
Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell, 
and we wandered around and listened 
and breathed that air and saw where 
George Washington sat and Thomas 
Jefferson sat, and so on. It's just a 
great, thrilling tradition to be here and 
to have a chance to visit those places 
and, I might say, to speak here to the 
Locust Club against the background of 
the American flag. 

Now, one of those documents— the 
Declaration of Independence— left us 



with a tradition of idealism. It set forth a 
revolutionary statement of human 
rights. It said that those rights were the 
sacred trust of all mankind; a legacy for 
all places and times. 

Another document— the Constitu- 
tion—gave us a complementary tradition 
of pragmatism. It spoke of the limits of 
human action and political power. It 
gave us practical ways of resolving com- 
petitive interests for the common good. 
The legacy of the Constitution was 
realism. 

In our best moments, we've 
understood how these complementary 
traditions interact. We've tried to keep 
our immediate attention focused on the 
possible and our broad vision elevated 
toward the ideal. The statesmen of the 
postwar era— I guess I'm showing my 
age— the post-World War II era— were 
masters of that art. They understood 
that realism and idealism weren't com- 
peting forces but mutually supporting 
components of an effective foreign 
policy. And they used that insight to 
create the great institutions of the 
postwar order. They sustained our 
involvement in a political system of 
global scope; and they helped to build a 
global economic system. They said we 
shouldn't retreat from realities but turn 
them to our advantage— and to the 
attainment of our ideals. Their creation 
was both an intellectual effort and an act 
of learning and vision applied. And it has 
worked. 

But we Americans have had our 
lesser moments as well. Sometimes, 
when our vision got blurred or lost its 
focus on reality, we've wavered between 
crusading involvement in the world and 
an isolationist indifference to it. Take 
the 1930s. Wliat did we learn from the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff? What did we learn 
about the dangers of countries in various 
parts of the world raising barriers to 
trade and closing in on themselves? 
What did we learn by ignoring agression 
in supposedly faraway places— like 
Europe and Asia? 

What we learned was that 
withdrawal was a recipe for global 
economic depression and world war. At 
least, that's what we should have 
learned. But you have to wonder how 
well we learned it when you see similar 
pressures mounting today for contem- 
porary forms of isolationism. We need to 
watch ourselves when we start divorcing 
ourselves from that creative tradition of 



idealism salted with ample doses of real 
ity. And I'm distressed to say that toda. 
seems to be one of those times. 

The Mismatch of Ends and Means 

The warning signs of isolationism are 
increasingly evident. We see them in 
calls for economic protectionism— which 
would only bring on retaliation by our 
trading partners and damage us stra- 
tegically, politically, and economically. 
We see them in the attempts to sub- 
stitute moralism for policy toward 
friendly nations who fall short of our 
own hard-won and hard-gained stand- 
ards. We see them in pressures for mail ' 
taining the nuclear status quo rather 
than exploring, as the President wants 
to do, negotiated approaches to reducin 
nuclear arms. And we see them in 
resistance to investigating new 
technologies which might give us some ■ 
protection against nuclear weapons— lik 
the President's Strategic Defense 
Initiative. 

It's the 1930s all over again. The 
desire to wash our hands of a 
troublesome world seems to be a 
recurrent— and peculiarly American- 
temptation. 

That temptation appears most 
starkly in the unrelenting assault on oui 
foreign affairs budget, which is now 
under the indiscriminate knife of con- 
gressional surgeons. Last January, 
President Reagan submitted to Congret 
an international affairs budget for fisca 
year (FY) 1987 that we had stripped to 
the bone. It amounted to less than 2% o 
the total Fedei-al budget. That minimal 
request was cut by the Congress by 20*^ 
a reduction with far more threatening 
effects than even that substantial percen 
age implies. After congressional ear- 
markings and other constraints on our 
spending are taken into account, the 
bulk of our foreign affairs operations 
will have to be cut by a third and secu- 
rity assistance by about 50%. That's a 
big cut. 

Let me be clear about the dangers o 
this misguided economizing. We are not 
talking about just another bureaucratic 
battle for funds. The deep cuts in our 
foreign affairs resources are now 
dangerously widening the gap between 
our interests and our capabilities for pur 
suing them. In effect, we are being 
asked to play Russian roulette with our 
international interests and our national 
security. 

Here are just a few examples of the 
dangerous disparity between our 
increasingly meager resources and our 
widely supported foreign policy 
objectives. 



24 



Department of State Bulletir 



THE SECRETARY 



Number one, in the past few months, 
ire've seen extraordinary concern about 
he dangers of illegal drugs. That con- 
em is legitimate and long overdue. I 
night say that the President and Nancy 
leagan have been giving magnificent 
sadership to this war on the illicit drug 
raffic, and our hearts and our hands 
ave to go out and help them. Illegal 
larcotics ravage the bodies of their vic- 
ims and the spirit of society at large. 
'hey encourage the kind of lawlessness 
hat reduces civilization to a Hobbesian 
tate of nature, making life all too 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
hort" for victims of the traffic. 

Nor is our own society alone in suf- 
ering the effects of the drug trade. 
Elsewhere, it's even worse. Traffickers 
"Ihrive on chaos, and their parasitical 
fforts to intimidate so-called host 
overnments destroy political integrity. 
II Latin America and other crop- 
roducing regions, drug traders collude 
ith terrorists and radical guerrillas 
gainst their common enemies: the rule 
f law and the stability of civilized 
jciety. 

For all of these reasons, we are 
■itnessing widespread anxiety around 
le country and around the world about 
le effects of illegal drugs. There is 
road public support for using every 
vailable resource against the drug trade 
t home and abroad. In fact, I can't 
link of any single issue that has 
lustered more support among our 
itizens and public officials than the war 
n drugs. 

But this concern is falling victim to 
Use economizing. Stemming the flow of 
legal narcotics into the United States is 
costly enterprise. It is a battle that 
lust be waged on two fronts. First, we 
eed funds to enforce the law, to 
radicate crops, and to educate people to 
le dangers of narcotics. And here let 
ie give you the good news: Congress 
as allotted us generous funds for all of 
lese purposes. 

But there is a second side to the 
rug problem— one that involves the 
olitical and economic realities of crop- 
roducing countries. You can't just force 
easants— many of them impoverished— 
stop growing their best cash crop 
/ithout offering them some sort of 
conomic alternatives. You can't expect 
he governments of these nations— many 
f them desperately poor and weakened 
r(im within by the gangsterism and ter- 
oi- endemic in the trade— to launch 
(lajor programs without the economic 
esiiurces necessary to sustain them, 
et, to take an important example, aid 
or the Andean countries— Bolivia, 



Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru— will be 
practically eliminated by the draconian 
budget cuts recently enacted by 
Congress. 

So we're left with a paradox. 
America is determined to act against the 
drug scourge, but unable to translate 
that determination into programs effec- 
tive enough to make a difference. 

That same paradox can be found in 
our efforts to thwart another problem 
that cuts to the heart of American 
society: terrorism. In the past few years, 
the United States has taken important 
steps against this barbarism of our age, 
and we have done so with the clear sup- 
port of Congress and the American 
people. Judging by the results of last 
spring's Tokyo summit, our allies are 
more in agreement with us than ever 
about the seriousness of the terrorist 
threat. 

That threat was highlighted just 
last week by clear evidence that Syria 
was directly involved in an attempt to 
murder hundreds of innocent travelers- 
including more than 200 Americans— by 
bombing an airliner in midflight. This 
complicity was confirmed by Great 
Britain through independent judicial pro- 
ceedings. Syria was caught redhanded. 
Britain responded immediately by break- 
ing diplomatic ties and banning other 
contacts with Assad's regime. The 
United States applauds the British 
move. Together with Canada, we 
immediately offered meaningful support 
to Britain's decision. And we will do 
more. 

Yet now, of all times, the United 
States is having trouble of its own in the 
battle against terrorism. Our hearts are 
in the right place: but where are our 
resources? After years of educating our 
own citizens and our allies, after years of 
building a consensus, America's hands 
seem financially tied. 

To fight terrorism, we need accurate 
and up-to-date reporting on political con- 
ditions around the world. We need good 
operational intelligence, so that planned 
attacks can be identified and thwarted. 
We're doing a better job of that. Bear in 
mind that over three-quarters of the 
reporting and analysis used by the U.S. 
Government comes from Foreign Serv- 
ice officers at embassies around the 
world. Yet the State Department may 
have to reduce sharply its full-time work 
force. And we are likely to have to shut 
down another 10 consulates, in addition 
to the seven posts already being closed. 

And that's not all. We also need 
resources to protect these same 
embassies against our enemies. Yet the 
probable effect of congressional action 
on our foreign affairs budget will be 



to slow substantially our proposed 
diplomatic security program. 

Let me give you a third example of 
how indiscriminate cuts are threatening 
our most widely held goals. Over the 
past few years, America's strength and 
example have boosted the forces of 
freedom in diverse corners of the globe. 
We have seen our influence construc- 
tively at work in the Philippines, in 
Haiti, and across the continent of Latin 
America. The democratic reawakening 
in these countries has been a matter of 
great pride to America and a source of 
political and strategic gain to the entire 
free world. 

Yet the work that awaits the leaders 
of this new democratic generation has 
only begun. Democratic transitions are 
fragile. They require careful nurturing 
and constant vigilance against adver- 
saries both within and without. Many 
newly democratic governments face 
Marxist-Leninist insurgencies inside 
their countries. Others border on com- 
munist nations that are armed to the 
teeth and in an expansionist mood. 

Look at Central America, where 
three democratic countries— Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and El Salvador— neighbor 
the communist police state of Nicaragua. 
Costa Rica has no army. The combined 
forces of Honduras and El Salvador 
do not match Nicaragua's massive 
buildup— a buildup managed and sup- 
plied by the Soviet Union. Naturally, 
these democratic nations are turning to 
us for support. We simply must come 
through in support of freedom, democ- 
racy, and the rule of law. 

People think we should help coun- 
tries like Haiti. I feel that wherever I go. 
I've been there; I do, too. People think 
we should help the Philippines; and I do, 
too. But help means money; and money 
is not in this foreign affairs budget. The 
Caribbean countries alone— we say the 
Caribbean is so important to us— the 
Caribbean countries alone may have 
their aid cut by more than two-thirds. 

Even the powerful, global force of 
America's example is shrinking as funds 
for USIA [United States Information 
Agency]— our primary voice abroad— are 
reduced below minimal levels. For years, 
the United States has fallen behind the 
Soviets in telling our own story to the 
world. Today, instead of catching up— 
which we have been doing, and fast, 
under the great leadership of Charlie 
Wick, working with the President— we 
are in danger of falling even further 
behind. At a time when a vigorous 
leadership in the Kremlin is showing 
heightened interest and sophistication in 
using propaganda to undermine public 



January 1987 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



confidence in our policies, we are being 
forced to reduce broadcasts of the Voice 
of America and close American libraries 
and cultural centers abroad. It doesn't 
make any sense. 

What else will these cuts do to us? I 
could go on and on, but here are just two 
more examples. 

• Except for items already 
earmarked— in other words, the Con- 
gress puts a mark on them and says, 
"You've got to spend this much money 
on this project"— our economic assist- 
ance to many countries around the world 
will be reduced by more than half from 
last year's levels. This assistance helps 
these countries develop more healthy 
economies and helps us maintain close 
relations with them. That's important to 
us. These are often countries where we 
have bases vital to our defense and the 
security of our allies. 

• Right now we have a plan— called 
the Baker plan— that has caught people's 
imagination and attention. It's a con- 
structive approach to encouraging 
growth in the developing countries so 
that they can do more to help them- 
selves, provide a better market for our 
products, and get over their welfare 
dependency on the West. Obviously, we 
need money to get the plan in action. 
But we're supposed to cut a third of our 
funding for the multilateral banks on 
which the plan depends. We're cutting 
ourselves off at the knees. 

Bipartisan Gains at Risk 

All of these examples point to the same 
dismal fact. The United States is drifting 
and stumbling toward a weakened global 
position. I could at least understand it if 
this were a purposeful policy; but we're 
deluding ourselves that we can conduct 
an effective foreign policy without 
money. 

Ironically, this trend is developing 
alongside a contrary movement that is 
advancing our interests, our influence, 
and our ideals. Maybe our very strength 
misleads us into thinking we can have 
influence without applying ourselves. 
Maybe our isolationist tendencies only 
surface when we feel strong enough to 
ignore the rest of the world. Whatever 
the reason, we need to wake up to all 
that we are placing in jeopardy by 
this thoughtless exercise in false 
economizing. 

One of the trends in our favor today 
is the systematic transformation now 
occurring in the global economy. It's the 
information revolution. Just as we left 
the agricultural age a hundred years 
ago, we're now moving beyond the 



industrial age. To be sure, we still pro- 
duce the same proportion of manufactur- 
ing goods, as a fraction of our GNP, that 
we did 20 years ago— but more effi- 
ciently. But the cutting edge of change, 
and our new comparative advantage, is 
elsewhere. If you look for a symbol of 
our economy and society today, it isn't 
the blast furnace, or the smokestack, or 
the assembly line— it's the computer, the 
microchip, the direct broadcast satellite. 

From a technological standpoint, 
from a strategic and political perspec- 
tive, what's happening is very much to 
our potential benefit. Success in the 
information age depends on openness- 
openness to ideas, to innovation, to the 
free flow of data. Countries which can 
accommodate this openness will reap its 
rewards. Those which can't, won't. How 
are states that keep the Xerox machine 
under lock and key going to cope? The 
answer is that the future is already 
receding for them. For us, it holds out 
enormous promise— i/" we stay open to 
the world and don't impose our own 
barriers. 

Our economic message about open 
markets and individual initiative is 
reverberating around the world. I can 
tell you from my own experience in the 
annual economic summits that the terms 
of economic debate have changed 
decisively among the industrialized 
democracies. 

And the economic message of 
markets and entrepreneurship has gone 
even further. Last May, at a special ses- 
sion of the United Nations, the African 
nations issued an extraordinary state- 
ment repudiating planned economies and 
supporting more open economic systems. 
Essentially, they said: "We blew it. Our 
command economies didn't work; and 
now we have to do things differently." 

The attitude toward freedom has 
changed too. Once it was fashionable to 
say that the democracies of the world 
were on the wrong side of history. Not 
anymore. The freedom fighters have 
changed all that. The people of the 
Philippines and Latin America have 
changed all that. They're showing the 
world that freedom is neither the luxury 
of a few, nor a cultural peculiarity of 
Western societies. It can work all over 
the world. 

Restoring the Balance 

Let me summarize these thoughts with a 
few words about the strategic dangers 
of inadequate funding. The serious 
mismatch between our policies and our 
resources creates vacuums that others 
can— and will— exploit to their own 
advantage. And it encourages confusion 



among friends and adversaries alike 
about the scope and aims of American 
policy. 

The disturbing fact is that we've 
seen all this before; yet apparently we 
have forgotten the lessons of the 1930s. 
But today's pressures for withdrawal 
add up to isolationism with a dangerous 
difference. For just as America's power 
in the postwar world has grown at an 
exponential rate, so too have the risks o 
indifference. 

For nearly half a century, the Unite 
States has shouldered its responsibilitie; 
as leader of the free world and the 
champion of those struggling to join us. 
Through our efforts, we have made 
enormous gains in advancing our own 
interests and our ideals. Our prosperity, 
our technological dynamism, the vitality 
of our alliances are all making us a force 
for progress as never before. We hold 
the winning hand— if we only persevere. 
The force of our example is a mighty 
reality in the world; but by itself, it can- 
not burn a narcotics crop, thwart a ter- 
rorist, or deter a communist army. We 
must not permit our capacity for con- 
structive leadership to atrophy for lack 
of adequate funding. 

Over the past 6 years. Republicans 
and Democrats have made important 
strides toward reaching a consensus 
about the challenges and opportunities 
before us as this century comes to a 
close: realism about Soviet aims, 
appreciation of the need for a strong 
defense, and solidarity with allies and 
friends. Despite some controversial 
exceptions, our domestic debate has 
been marked by common cause toward 
our policies and goals. You don't hear 
much these days about the erosion of 
American power or self-confidence. You 
don't hear much about political malaise 
or lack of national purpose. 

We must use our consensus, and oui 
momentum, to restore the budgetary 
resources needed to conduct a respon- 
sible foreign policy. We must rise above 
the procedural complexities of con- 
gressional-executive branch relations to 
forge a foreign policy that will enable 
the national interest to prevail. 

You are an audience of informed an( 
influential citizens. You can help shape 
our public debate so that we do not 
repeat the isolationist mistakes of the 
past. I urge you to let your elected 
officials know that there is broad sup- 
port for an active and properly funded 
foreign policy. With your help, we can 
realize the extraordinary opportunities 
before us. 



'Press release 240 of Nov. 4, 1986. I 



26 



Department of State Bulleti; 



THE SECRETARY 



•romoting Inter-American Cooperation 



Secretary Shultz',s address before the 
'eneral Assembly of the Organization of 
niirican States (OAS) in Guatemala 
'it 11 on November 11, 1986.^ 

et me begin by thanking President 
erezo and the people of Guatemala for 
iviting us to meet here. Their offer to 
?rve as hosts of this General Assembly 
early expresses the progress Guate- 
mala is making in putting democratic 
leals into practice. I welcome the 
pportunity to be here, and I salute 
uatemala's new democracy. 

I also want to pay a personal tribute 
j) President Duarte and the Salvadoran 
sople. During my brief visit to San 
alvador last month, I was moved by the 
etermined effort they are making to 
>build their shattered capital. President 
uarte and the Salvadoran people are 
jain showing that they have what it 
ikes to build a democratic society. They 
?serve our admiration and respect, as 
ell as our support. 

Guatemala and El Salvador are both 
aders in a revolution that is transform- 
.g the hemisphere. Latin America is 
)nclusively demonstrating that the 
jmocratic form of government has 
liversal meaning, that it is not just a 
-xury for wealthy industrial societies, 
n the contrary, democracy, by freeing 
itapped social energies and providing 
Dportunities for their productive exer- 
se, can serve as the foundation for 
aterial prosperity and social progress 
. our hemisphere. 

President Reagan captured the 
;sence of the relationship between 
■eedom and progress when he noted: 

Everywhere, people and governments are 
;ginning to recognize that the secret of a 
"ogressive new world is the creativity of the 

aman spirit Our open advocacy of 

eedom as the engine of progress [is one of] 
le most important ways to bring about a 
orld where prosperity is commonplace, con- 
ict an aberration, and human dignity a way 
Mife. 

My remarks today address three 
isues central to this assembly, to the 
olitical and economic vitality of our 
egion, and to cooperation among the 
overnments of the hemisphere. They 
re: combatting the traffic in illegal 
rugs; restoring economic growth; and 
onsolidating the democratic gains that 
're essential to political stability and 
.egional security. 



Combatting Illegal Drug Traffic 

The Specialized Assembly on Narcotic 
Drugs, held in Rio de Janeiro last April, 
unanimously proposed that the OAS 
undertake an action program on drug 
abuse and drug trafficking. That pro- 
gram is now before us for final approval. 

The Inter-American Program of 
Action Against Drug Abuse expresses 
the shared recognition of our govern- 
ments that the production and consump- 
tion of illegal narcotics, and traffic in 
them, constitute intolerable threats to 
our security. We all agree that these 
challenges must be met by joint action 
on a truly hemispheric basis. No nation 
is totally free from production, traffick- 
ing, or abuse. There has been an explo- 
sion in the cocaine traffic that exploits 
millions of coca growers at one end of 
the production-transportation- 
consumption chain and enslaves millions 
of users at the other end. Drug- 
producing countries, which may have 
throught they were immune from the 
effects of consumption, are now 
confronting the corrosive impact of drug 
abuse in their own societies. 

Drug abuse is both a moral insult 
and a national security challenge. Its 
effects cut across all regional, political, 
economic, and social boundaries. Drugs 
do not discriminate between rich and 
poor, user and pusher. All of us are 
victimized. 

The economic and social toll of the 
drug trade is enormous. Our societies 
are paying a price far greater than the 
grotesque profits that traffickers daily 
extort from our citizens. Countless 
individuals— government officials, 
judges, journalists, and ordinary 
citizens— have been assassinated by the 
traffickers and their hired guns. As they 
pursue their destructive ends, drug 
traders endanger our children, our fam- 
ily structure, and our very way of life. 

Two years ago in Miami, I said that 
narcotics trafficking is the "modern-day 
equivalent of piracy." Today, we find 
narcotics traffickers allying themselves 
with terrorist groups and political 
extremists, seeking safehavens from 
justice, respecting no international boun- 
daries, and recognizing no loyalty 
beyond their commitment to obscene 
profits. 

We can only counter this interna- 
tional coalition of the lawless with an 
even stronger and more resolute alliance 
of the democracies of the Americas. 




Thus, we must take the lead in 
creating a climate of outspoken 
intolerance against those who live out- 
side the law; against those who prey on 
the innocent; against those who 
challenge our common democratic 
values. President Reagan has committed 
the prestige of his office, the leadership 
of his personal example and that of our 
First Lady, the energies of his 
immediate staff and of the Federal 
Government in leading America to 
become a drug-free society. That is our 
object, a drug-free society. On Octo- 
ber 27, the President signed the Anti- 
Drug Act of 1986. This sweeping legisla- 
tion doubles the budget of U.S. agencies 
involved in drug enforcement and anti- 
drug educational activities; stiffens 
prison sentences, with a provision for a 
mandatory 10-year minimum sentence 
for major traffickers; and introduces a 
host of new initiatives aimed at reducing 
demand for drugs in the United States 
and strengthening our cooperation 
abroad. 

We must also work together to make 
drug trafficking an unprofitable activity. 
Despite enormous difficulties, govern- 
ments from Bolivia to Mexico are begin- 
ning to strike back. Two years ago, only 
two countries were eradicating narcotics 
crops; today, 15 countries in the world 
are engaged in eradication programs— on 
the ground and from the air. We are 
expanding regional cooperation and 
forging national and international solu- 
tions to the scourge of narcotics. We can 
be proud of this progress. 

Still, the road ahead is long and 
arduous. More, much more, remains to 
be done. Our approach has to be based 
on regional cooperation rather than local 
or national initiatives; otherwise, traf- 
fickers will simply move their operations 
across the nearest border. The keystone 
of the regionwide program we are to 
approve here will be a new Inter- 
American Commission on Drug Abuse 
Control. The commission will be com- 
posed of senior government represent- 
atives in the area of narcotics control. It 
will be supported by an Executive 
Secretariat to carry out technical 
assistance projects and operate three 
programs; regional training centers, a 
central data bank, and a documentation 
center. 



anuary 1987 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



As a strong believer in multilateral 
cooperation. I welcome the creation of 
this inter-American commission. With its 
Secretariat, the commission will perform 
precisely the kind of work the OAS is 
best suited for: the study of common 
problems and the coordination of our 
efforts to achieve a more efficient divi- 
sion of labor in confronting the problems 
of our hemisphere. Our concerted attack 
on the drug scourge is urgently needed, 
and I believe it is destined to succeed. 
For too long, our societies have not 
faced up fully and squarely to the giant 
narcotics trafficking empire; and our 
individual and bilateral actions were not 
adequate to the challenge. Today, we all 
understand that through inter-American 
cooperation, narcotics organizations can 
and will be crippled. And success in that 
effort will yield additional dividends in 
terms of cooperation in other fields of 
endeavor. 

Restoring Economic Growth 

We turn to the field of economics: 
cooperation on economic matters is also 
critical for all of us. The nations of Latin 
America have faced difficult cir- 
cumstances in recent years as the reces- 
sion and debt crises have compromised 
prospects for economic growth. But the 
potential is greater than ever, and I 
believe we are now back on the road to 
long-term and self-sustaining growth. A 
joint report by Brazilian, Mexican, and 
U.S. research institutions concludes that 
"the world environment is improving" 
for "a strategy centered on outward 
orientation, new market incentives for 
savings and investment, and a fun- 
damental shift in the role of the state." 

We must reject policies that, by sti- 
fling individual initiative, perpetuate 
poverty. Freedom is the key to 
development— freedom of the entre- 
preneur to innovate, to invest, to move 
capital and freedom of the market to set 
wages, prices, interest rates, and 
exchange rates. Without the foundation 
of freedom, foreign loans and aid will 
have, at best, short-term effects in 
economies incapable of sustaining long- 
term economic growth. 

There is growing recognition of this 
reality in Latin America. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay are 
among the countries that have taken 
major steps to construct more market- 
oriented economies, to reduce inflation, 
and to encourage entrepreneurship. 
Guatemala and other Central American 



countries have taken encouraging steps 
toward stabilization. In most countries, 
however, more work needs to be done on 
domestic reform. The United States, too, 
has plenty of work to do on its own fiscal 
problem: our way-too-large budget 
deficit. We must all make a genuine com- 
mitment to removing those impediments 
that limit growth, discourage external 
capital flows, and encourage capital 
flight. The United States stands ready to 
support such efforts. 

In October 1985, at the annual 
meetings of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank in Seoul, the 
United States proposed that the interna- 
tional community undertake a major, 
coordinated Program for Sustained 
Growth. It became known as the "Baker 
plan." This effort, we asserted, must 
focus on growth-oriented structural 
reforms supported by the international 
financial community. 

I might say that during this long- 
term effort we went through a stage 
where the answer to the problem seemed 
to be austerity. And, of course, there 
are, no doubt, instances where austerity 
in various forms is essential. But I think 
we all see that certainly the basis of the 
Baker plan is that in the longer run the 
answer to our debt problem, let alone all 
other problems, is not austerity; it is 
growth: economic growth is what we 
have to get. 

The International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank have developed 
activities in support of the program for 
sustained growth. We must work 
together to ensure that the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) 
becomes an active participant in this pro- 
gram. This new role for the IDB is under 
discussion as an integral part of the 7th 
replenishment negotiations. We believe 
that agreement can be reached on an 
increase in the IDB's lending program to 
support the domestic reforms necessary 
for sound development. 

Trade is another and indispensable 
element of the "global bargain ' I out- 
lined last year. An open global commer- 
cial system responsive to changing 
economic conditions is a stimulator of 
growth. Maintenance and expansion of 
such a system require that all 
countries— developed and developing— 
resist domestic pressures for protec- 
tionist measures. We must take positive, 
market-opening actions that eliminate 
unfair trading practices and expand 
market access for goods and services. 

We have together taken a major step 
in that direction in Uruguay this past 
September with the successful launching 
of the current round of multilateral 



trade negotiations under the auspices of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, known as the GATT. Twenty 
Latin American and Caribbean countrie 
are now members of the GATT. They 
have an important role to play, and thei 
participation will be enhanced if more 
countries of the region join them in seel< 
ing improved trading opportunities. 

But what of the U.S. role? The 
LInited States historically has champ- 
ioned free trade. We believe that an 
international trading system based on 
free trade is the best assurance of pros- 
perity for ourselves and for the rest of 
the world. 

Free trade has also clearly benefitec 
Latin America. The U.S. trade balance 
with the region went from a $1 billion 
surplus in 1981 to a $19 billion deficit in 
1985. In 1985, Latin America exported 
$103 billion worth of goods and services^ 
of this, $49 billion went to the United 
States— just about half. 

We have taken the lion's share of thi 
increase in Latin American exports sincj 
the onset of the debt crisis. We are 
proud of our record in keeping our 
markets open, and we will stress to our 
trading partners the critical importance 
of a common effort to keep the interna- 
tional economy open. 

Without such an effort, the protec- 
tionist forces now at work in the United 
States will find easy justification for 
their destructive policies. The Reagan 
Administration has vigorously opposed 
protectionist legislation. We know full 
well that untold damage would be done 
to the world's— and, in particular, to 
Latin America's— chances for prosperity 
if we succumb to the pressures for these 
shortsighted measures. 

We have not won every battle 
against protectionism, but we have won 
the most important ones. President 
Reagan vetoed restrictions on copper 
and footwear. His veto of the highly 
restrictive textile bill was recently, if 
narrowly, upheld. Congress adjourned 
without passing other, broader protec- 
tionist legislation that had been intro- 
duced, and, in fact, one passed the 
House of Representatives. These protec- 
tionist forces will reemerge next year. 
You can count on it! And you can count 
on President Reagan's determination to 
continue the fight. But we need your 
help! 

We in the United States cannot help 
but observe that many other countries 
do not maintain markets as open for 
U.S. goods and services as our markets 
are open for foreign manufactures and 
services. If we are to win the war 
against protectionism, we must 



28 



Department of State Bullet! 



\ 



THE SECRETARY 



■emonstrate, through progress in 
ilateral discussions and in the new 
-ade round, that we are taking effective 
ction to broaden global trading oppor- 
anities for everyone— including U.S. 
xporters. 

I've stressed the necessity of restor- 
ig growth to the hemisphere, because 
rowth is the best way to deal with the 
ebt problems, and the only way to 
nprove living standards. Recent move- 
lents in interest rates and exchange 
ites have favored the renewal of 
rowth. Since 1981— it is interesting to 
lok back; it is only 5 years ago— 
iternational interest rates have dropped 
•om around 17% to around 6%. It's a 
jge decline. For each percentage point 
eduction, the eight major debtor coun- 
•ies save appro.ximately $2 billion per 
^ar. So, let us do a little arithmetic 
?re: 17 minus 6 equals 11 multiplied by 
equals . . . and that is how much per 
,'ar: $22 billion, approximately per 
'ar. And that ain't hay, as they say. 
owever, a severe drop in private 
ipital flows— from $49 billion in 1981 to 
:7 billion in 1982, to less than $6 bilhon 
1985— remains a major constraint on 
gher growth in the hemisphere, 
dvances in regional growth have been 
lanced almost entirely from official 
nding, international trade, and some 
ructural adjustments in a few 
•untries. 

To address this problem, the OAS 
'Id a special meeting in San Juan this 
■ar on domestic and foreign capital 
)ws. That meeting concluded that more 
ts to be done to encourage the invest- 
ent of private capital. You have a 
port on that meeting before you, and I 
)pe you will approve it. Each nation is 
sponsible for creating the conditions 
at will establish confidence among 
vestors. Many countries in the 
■misphere are moving in that direction, 
it much, much more needs to be done, 
istained reforms and an improved 
'erall climate for investment— foreign 
id domestic— are crucial to achieving 
ir goal of growth. 

Dnsolidating Democratic Gains 

s was stated so eloquently by many 
iring our informal dialogue, economic 
id political freedom go together. The 
tiarter of the Organization of American 
;ates proclaims that "the historic mis- 
on of America is to offer man a land of 
)erty." The resurgence of democracy is 
itting us in a better position than ever 
' fulfill the promise of the Charter. 



As an expression of our commit- 
ment to democracy, last year we all 
agreed to an addition to the Charter that 
states, "Representative democracy is an 
indispensable condition for the stability, 
peace, and development of the region." 
Democracy is the practical expression of 
self-determination. The solidarity it 
creates increases security from foreign 
intervention. 

It is vitally important that all of us in 
this organization have a clear agreement 
on the priority of democracy and on the 
relationship between democratic govern- 
ment and the other fundamental prin- 
ciples of inter-American cooperation. 
Democracy, security, political stability, 
and economic development are not 
separate, free-floating concepts. On the 
contrary, they are closely linked. Self- 
determination cannot be denied without 
weakening democracy. A threat to 
security challenges the principle of 
nonintervention. The United States 
believes these principles must all be 
defended. 

Let me take the crisis in Central 
America as an example. 

• The United States does not want 
any Central American country to 
become a threat to the stability or 
security of its neighbors. 

• The United States wants 
pluralistic democracy and economic and 
social development to thrive in Central 
America. 

• The United States believes that 
the people of Central America can 
achieve peace, development, and justice 
without external interference, by their 
own decisions and based on their own 
experiences. 

The challenge to these principles 
does not come from the United States. 
Does anyone really think the United 
States wants to turn Central America 
into a vortex of East-West turmoil? The 
United States provided aid to help 
Nicaragua rebuild after the fall of 
Somoza in 1979. And for a period there, 
the per capita flow of aid from the 
United States was the highest of any 
flow to any country in the world. So 
what did the Nicaraguan communists do? 
They sought arms from the Soviet bloc 
and used them to deny the Nicaraguan 
people their right of self-determination. 

The United States accepted the new 
Nicaraguan junta's pledges of democracy 
and nonalignment. But what are the 
Nicaraguan communists doing? They are 
intervening in the internal affairs of 
their neighbors. The Nicaraguan regime 
is fundamentally destabilizing to Central 
America; and instability there will have 



its effects throughout the hemisphere. 
As Costa Rican President Arias told us 
at this fall's UN General Assembly, 
reading from the speech: 

There is no respite from the path chosen 
by the cotnandant.es who betrayed a revolu- 
tion destined to give democracy to genera- 
tions who knew only repression. There is no 
respite for a people, frustrated and deceived, 
who have returned to civil war. There is no 
respite for neighboring lands, who feel the 
threat from a new dogmatic totalitarianism 
and who suffer now the consequences of a 
border rife with anguish and disenchantment. 

So spoke President Arias in the UN 
General Assembly, the President of 
Costa Rica. 

The regional arms race launched by 
the comandantes is a matter of grave 
concern to us. They displayed it the 
other day. With the assistance of the 
Cubans and the Soviets, they have built 
the largest military establishment in 
Central America's history. It is impos- 
sible to imagine peace and stability 
returning to the region until this massive 
growth in armaments is constrained and 
ultimately eliminated. 

We must not forget, however, that 
the external relations of the regime in 
Managua are not the core of the 
challenge they pose to us. That core is 
their perversion of the principles of the 
revolution against Somoza. As we in this 
organization know particularly well, they 
came to us and we helped them; the com- 
andantes have systematically violated 
the solemn democratic undertakings 
with which they obtained domestic and 
international support. As long as the 
legitimate desires of the Nicaraguan 
people for genuine democracy are 
repressed, the inevitable result will be 
rebellion, insurgency, and civil war. 

We cannot give lip service to 
democracy when it is convenient and 
costless, but then turn our backs on it 
when there are costs or risks. Foreign 
intervention in the form of alien 
ideologies and foreign cadres— from 
Cuba, the Soviet Union, East Germany, 
North Korea, even Vietnam and Libya- 
is, at this very moment, promoting 
instability and violence in Central 
America. Failure to confront this threat 
will only guarantee that the region will 
be increasingly drawn into great power 
rivalries. The only road to peace and 
stability is to eliminate that alien 
intervention. 

The Contadora process could be an 
important component of our efforts to 
make the practice of democracy univer- 
sal in Central America. We supported 
the Contadora process from the start for 
two reasons. First, we saw it as a way of 



anuary 1987 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



addressing both the political and security 
issues underlying continued instability 
and violence in Central America. And 
second, it offered the prospect of produc- 
ing regional solutions to regional prob- 
lems. We were, and are, prepared to 
support a comprehensive, simultaneous, 
and verifiable agreement that will attain 
the 21 objectives agreed to by the Con- 
tadora nations in 1983— all of them. 

Unfortunately, nearly 4 years of 
effort by the Contadora countries and, 
more recently, by the Contadora support 
group have not produced a workable 
agreement. The comandantes continue to 
act as an armed vanguard against their 
people and their neighbors. But Central 
America's democracies will not be 
intimidated. They are insisting on a 
negotiated solution that will satisfy the 
interests of all the countries of Central 
America and of the hemisphere. 

We must also affirm that threats to 
democracy and regional security are not 
confined to Central America. Those 
countries which have consistently pur- 
sued the principles of democracy, and 
those which have recently returned to 
them, have an obligation to hasten a 
democratic transition in all the remain- 
ing nondemocratic nations of the 
hemisphere. In our recent relations with 
Chile, for example, we have made 
absolutely clear our strong support for a 
prompt and successful return to 
democratic government. 

We also have an obligation to offer 
our moral, political, and material support 
to those peoples already struggling to 
implant true democracies in their coun- 
tries. I particularly have in mind the 
heroic efforts of the Haitian people and 
their leaders to overcome generations of 
tyranny and build democracy virtually 
from the ground up. I want to commend 
the Secretary General for his initiative 
on Haiti. The United States is prepared 
to support it. 

The danger of foreign intervention 
and exploitation of instability is present 
wherever democracy and human rights 
have been systematically denied. The 
recent discovery in Chile of several 
secret arms caches is a vivid but by no 



means isolated example. The caches con- 
tained a mixture of new Soviet-bloc arms 
and secondhand American weapons. The 
American weapons had been left behind 
in Vietnam and were similar to ones the 
Soviets and Cubans have, in recent 
years, shipped to subversives in Colom- 
bia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, and other countries of the 
region. If you bear in mind the recent 
assassination attempt against the 
Chilean President, these arms caches 
were most likely meant for use in the 
context of a post-Pinochet govern- 
ment—in other words, against a 
democratic outcome in Chile, more than 
against the present government. Such 
interventions will continue if we relax 
our vigilance or if we waver in our sup- 
port for democracy and justice in the 
Americas. 

Conclusion 

It is clear that we who live in this 
hemisphere face a series of common 
challenges to our security and well- 
being; the powerful and lethal alliance of 
terrorists and drug smugglers; major 
problems of economic growth; the 
vestiges of authoritarianism; and com- 
munist subversion supported by the 
Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua. 

Each of these challenges— alone or in 
combination— threatens the great prog- 
ress we have achieved. But we cannot 
deal with them if we are divided. Unless 
we join forces in common battle against 
common foes, we will not be successful 
in defending our vital interests and our 
shared ideals. 

To be sure, our tasks are demanding. 
But their cost is far less than the price of 
inaction. If we fail to launch a 
hemisphere-wide attack on narcotics 
traffickers and drug abuse, the very 
future of our next generation will be in 
jeopardy. If we do not improve the 
economic well-being of our people, the 
great promise of democratic self- 
government will go unfulfilled. And if we 
do not make the Americas a region of 
secure freedoms, we will betray our 
most fundamental values and 
convictions. 



In addressing these great challenges 
we can draw encouragement from a 
most important discovery. We have onC' 
again discovered that freedom is a 
revolutionary force. Dictatorships— 
whether of the left or the right— are not 
permanent. Not so many years ago, 
democratic nations were thought to be i 
dwindling minority. Today, we see that 
the vitality of the democratic idea is the 
most important political reality of our 
time. 

What we are witnessing is the 
re-creation and growth in our hemispher 
of a genuine democratic community. 
When the people of Guatemala, or 
Venezuela, or Brazil go to the polls, the. 
advance the cause of freedom not only i 
their own country but throughout the 
Americas. Everywhere in the region, 
people understand that the future of 
their freedom is closely tied to the fate 
of freedom elsewhere. They know that ^ 
the success of their democratic govern- ' 
ment is enhanced by cooperation and 
mutual support among democratic 
leaders and peoples everywhere. And | 
they realize that regimes which deny th . 
right of democratic self-government pos | 
an inexorable threat to peace. 

Perhaps our fellow Foreign Ministe 
Edgar Teran of Ecuador said it best thi I 
past September, again, at the United 
Nations. Reading what he said: 

In the end, so long as democracy does nt 
find true and effective expression, so long a; 
there is no setting aside the practice of fore- i 
ibiy compelling people to accept regimes I 

which they have not themselves freely chose , 
so long as it is impossible for many to live in 
their own country, dominated by tyrannical j 
elements, peace will be a distant and almost I 
contradictory aspiration. 

And so he said. I agree with him. , 

We can and must work together to | 
end tryanny in all of Latin America. Wt , 
must eradicate the scourge of narcotics. I 
And we must stimulate the economic 
growth that will build a better life for ', 
our people. Let the New World stand as j 
a vital example of human dignity and ' 
democratic self-government, to men anc 
women everywhere. 



iPress release 249 of Nov. 12, 1986. 



30 



Department of State Bulleti 



THE SECRETARY 



Vjuclear Weapons, Arms Control, 
and the Future of Deterrence 



Secretary Shultz's address before the 
hilirnational House of Chicago and The 
Jhicago Sun-Times Forum at the 
['iiirersity of Chicago on November 17. 

['ni delighted to be back here at the pin- 
lacle, and I come here to the University 
if Chicago to talk about nuclear 
.veapons. arms control, and our national 
^ecurity. These issues have been given 
special timeliness by the President's 
■eeent meeting with Soviet General 
secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. In 
.-ears to come, we may look back at their 
liscussions as a turning point in our 
strategy for deterring war and preserv- 
ng peace. It has opened up new 
)ossibilities for the way in which we 
•lew nuclear weapons and their role in 
■nsuring our security. 

Questions for the Future 

Ne now face a series of questions of fun- 
lamental importance for the future: how 
;an we maintain peace through deter- 
■ence in the midst of a destabilizing 
growth of offensive nuclear weapons? 
low can we negotiate a more stable 
;trategic balance at substantially lower 
evels of offensive forces? How can we 
ise new defensive technologies to con- 
ribute to that stability? How can the 
A^est best seek to reduce its reliance on 
iffensive nuclear weapons without run- 
ling new risks of instability arising from 
■onventional imbalances? 

These are exceptionally difficult and 
lomplex issues. They go to the heart of 
)ur ability as a democratic nation to 
;urvive in a world threatened by 
otalitarianism and aggression. These 
juestions should engage the best minds 
n American society, and, of course, they 
lave to be treated at reasonable lengths 
50 the best minds have to have a half- 
Afay decent attention span. So that's 
why I have come to speak to this par- 
;icular audience at the University of 
3hicago. So this isn't going to be an easy 
speech, or a short one. I'll ask that you 
isten carefully, and I hope that you'll 
reflect at greater length on the text of 
;my remarks. 

Forty-four years ago, and about 200 
yards from where I am now standing, 
mankind generated its first self- 
sustained and controlled nuclear chain 
reaction. Enrico Fermi's crude atomic 



pile was the prototype for all that 
followed— both reactors to generate 
energy for peaceful uses and weapons of 
ever-increasing destructiveness. Seldom 
are we able to mark the beginning of a 
new era in human affairs so precisely. 

I'm not here tonight to announce the 
end of that era. But I will suggest that 
we may be on the verge of important 
changes in our approach to the role of 
nuclear weapons in our defense. New 
technologies are compelling us to think 
in new ways about how to ensure our 
security and protect our freedoms. Reyk- 
javik served as a catalyst in this process. 
The President has led us to think 
seriously about both the possible 
benefits— and the costs— of a safer 
strategic environment involving pro- 
gressively less reliance on nuclear 
weapons. Much will now depend on 
whether we are far-sighted enough to 
proceed toward such a goal in a realistic 
way that enhances our security and that 
of our allies. 

It may be that we have arrived at a 
true turning point. The nuclear age can- 
not be undone or abolished; it is a per- 
manent reality. But we can glimpse now, 
for the first time, a world freed from the 
incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear 
devastation. The threat of nuclear con- 
flict can never be wholly banished, but it 
can be vastly diminished— by careful but 
drastic reductions in the offensive 
nuclear arsenals each side possesses. It 
is just such reductions— not limitations in 
expansion but reductions— that is the 
vision President Reagan is working to 
make a reality. 

Such reductions would add far 
greater stability to the U.S. -Soviet 
nuclear relationship. Their achievement 
should make other diplomatic solutions 
obtainable and perhaps lessen the 
distrust and suspicion that have 
stimulated the felt need for such 
weapons. Many problems will accompany 
drastic reductions: problems of deploy- 
ment, conventional balances, verifica- 
tion, multiple warheads, and chemical 
weapons. The task ahead is great but 
worth the greatest of efforts. 

This will not be a task for Americans 
alone. We must engage the collective 
effort of all of the Western democracies. 
And as we do, we must also be prepared 
to explore cooperative approaches with 
the Soviet Union, when such cooperation 
is feasible and in our interests. 



The Evolution of Our Thinking 
About Nuclear Weapons 

Let me start by reviewing how our 
thinking has evolved about the role of 
nuclear weapons in our national security. 

In the years immediately after 
Fermi's first chain reaction, our 
approach was relatively simple. The 
atomic bomb was created in the midst of 
a truly desperate struggle to preserve 
civilization against fascist aggression in 
Europe and Asia. There was a compel- 
ling rationale for its development and 
use. 

But since 1945— and particularly 
since America lost its monopoly of such 
weapons a few years later— we have had 
to adapt our thinking to less clearcut cir- 
cumstances. We have been faced with 
the challenges and the ambiguities of a 
protracted global competition with the 
Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons have 
shaped, and at times restrained, that 
competition; but they have not enabled 
either side to achieve a decisive 
advantage. 

Because of their awesome destruc- 
tiveness, nuclear weapons have kept in 
check a direct U.S. -Soviet clash. With 
the advent in the late 1950s of 
intercontinental-range ballistic 
missiles— a delivery system for large 
numbers of nuclear weapons at great 
speed and with increasing accuracy— 
both the United States and the Soviet 
Union came to possess the ability to 
mount a devastating attack on each 
other within minutes. 

The disastrous implications of such 
massive attacks led us to realize, in the 
words of President Kennedy, that "total 
war makes no sense." And as President 
Reagan has reiterated many times: "a 
nuclear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought"— words that the Presi- 
dent and General Secretary Gorbachev 
agreed on in their joint statement at 
Geneva a year ago. 

Thus, it came to be accepted in the 
West that a major role of nuclear 
weapons was to deter their use by 
others— as well as to deter major conven- 
tional attacks— by the threat of their use 
in response to aggression. Over the 
years, we sought through a variety of 
means and rationales— beginning with 
"massive retaliation" in the 1950s up 
through "flexible response" and "selec- 
tive nuclear options" in the 1970s— to 
maintain a credible strategy for that 
retaliatory threat. 



January 1987 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



At the same time, we also accepted a 
certain inevitability about our own 
nation's vulnerability to nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles. When nuclear weapons 
were delivered by manned bombers, we 
maintained air defenses. But as the 
ballistic missile emerged as the basic 
nuclear delivery system, we virtually 
abandoned the effort to build defenses. 
After a spirited debate over antiballistic 
missile systems in the late 1960s, we 
concluded that— on the basis of 
technologies now 20 years old— such 
defenses would not be effective. So our 
security from nuclear attack came to 
rest on the threat of retaliation and a 
state of mutual vulnerability. 

In the West, many assumed that the 
Soviets would logically see things this 
way as well. It was thought that once 
both sides believed that a state of mutual 
vulnerability had been achieved, there 
would be shared restraint on the further 
growth of our respective nuclear 
arsenals. 

The Antiballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty of 1972 reflected that assump- 
tion. It was seen by some as elevating 
mutual vulnerability from technical fact 
to the status of international law. That 
treaty established strict limitations on 
the deployment of defenses against 
ballistic missiles. Its companion Interim 
Agreement on strategic offensive arms 
was far more modest. SALT I [strategic 
arms limitation talks] was conceived of 
as an intermediate step toward more 
substantial future limits on offensive 
nuclear forces. It established only a cap 
on the further growth in the numbers of 
ballistic missile launchers then opera- 
tional and under construction. The most 
important measures of the two sides' 
nuclear arsenals— numbers of actual 
warheads and missile throw-weight— 
were not restricted. 

But controlling the number of launch- 
ers without limiting warheads actually 
encouraged deployment of multiple 
warheads— called multiple independently- 
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)— on 
a single launcher. This eventually led to 
an erosion of strategic stability as the 
Soviets— by proliferating MIRVs— 
became able to threaten all of our inter- 
continental ballistic missiles with only a 
fraction of their own. Such an imbalance 
makes a decision to strike first seem all 
the more profitable. 

During this postwar period, we and 
our allies hoped that American nuclear 
weapons would serve as a comparatively 
cheap offset to Soviet conventional 
military strength. The Soviet Union, 
through its geographic position and its 
massive mobilized conventional forces. 



has powerful advantages it can bring to 
bear against Western Europe, the 
Mideast, and East Asia— assets useful 
for political intimidation as well as for 
potential military aggression. The 
West's success or failure in countering 
these Soviet advantages has been, and 
will continue to be, one of the keys to 
stability in our postwar world. 

Our effort to deter a major Soviet 
conventional attack through the 
existence of opposing nuclear forces has 
been successful over the past four 
decades. It gave the industrialized 
democracies devastated by the Second 
World War the necessary "breathing 
space" to recover and thrive. But there 
has also been recurring debate over the 
credibility of this strategy, as well as 
controversy about the hardware required 
for its implementation. 

Over time, we and our allies came to 
agree that deterrence required a tle.xible 
strategy combining both conventional 
and nuclear forces. This combined 
strategy has been successful in avoiding 
war in Europe. But our reliance for so 
long on nuclear weapons has led some to 
forget that these arms are not an inex- 
pensive substitute— mostly paid for by 
the United States— for fully facing up to 
the challenges of conventional defense 
and deterrence. 

Sources of Strategic Instability 

The United States and our allies will 
have to continue to rely upon nuclear 
weapons for deterrence far, far into the 
future. That fact, in turn, requires that 
we maintain credible and effective 
nuclear deterrent forces. 

But a defense strategy that rests on 
the threat of escalation to a strategic 
nuclear conflict is, at best, an unwelcome 
solution to ensuring our national secu- 
rity. Nuclear weapons, when applied to 
the problem of preventing either a 
nuclear or conventional attack, present 
us with a major dilemma. They may 
appear a bargain— but a dangerous one. 
They make the outbreak of a Soviet- 
American war most unlikely; but they 
also ensure that should deterrence fail, 
the resulting conflict would be vastly 
more destructive, not just for our two 
countries but for mankind as a whole. 

Moreover, we cannot assume that 
the stability of the present nuclear 
balance will continue indefinitely. It can 
deteriorate, and it has. We have come to 
realize that our adversary does not share 
all of our assumptions about strategic 
stability. Soviet military doctrine 
stresses warfighting and survival in a 
nuclear environment, the importance of 



numerical superiority, the contribution 
of active defense, and the advantages of 
preemption. 

Over the past 15 years, the growth 
of Soviet strategic forces has continued 
unabated— and far beyond any reason- 
able assessment of what might be 
required for rough equivalency with U.S. 
forces. As a result, the Soviet Union haS' 
acquired a capability to put at risk the 
fixed land-based missiles of the U.S. 
strategic triad— as well as portions of 
our bomber and in-port submarine force 
and command and control systems— with 
only a fraction of their force, leaving 
many warheads to deter any retaliation. 

To date, arms control agreements 
along traditional lines— such as SALT I 
and II— have failed to halt these 
destabilizing trends. They have not 
brought about significant reductions in 
offensive forces, particularly those 
systems that are the most threatening to: 
stability. By the most important measure 
of destructive capability, ballistic missile 
warheads— those are the things that hit 
you— Soviet strategic forces have grown 
by a factor of four since the SALT I 
Interim Agreement was signed. This 
problem has been exacerbated by a 
Soviet practice of stretching their 
implementation of such agreements to 
the edge of violation— and, sometimes, 
beyond. The evidence of Soviet actions 
contrary to SALT II, the ABM Treaty, 
and various other arms control 
agreements is clear and unmistakable. 

At the same time, technology has 
not stood still. Research and 
technological innovation of the past 
decade now raise questions about 
whether the primacy of strategic offense 
over defense will continue indefinitely. 
For their part, the Soviets have never 
neglected strategic defenses. They 
developed and deployed them even when 
offensive systems seemed to have over- 
whelming advantages over any defense. 
As permitted by the ABM Treaty of 
1972, the Soviets constructed around 
Moscow the world's only operational 
system of ballistic missile defense. Soviet 
military planners apparently find that 
the modest benefits of this system justify 
its considerable cost, even though it 
would provide only a marginal level of 
protection against our overall strategic 
force. It could clearly be a base for the 
future expansion of their defenses. 

For well over a decade— long before 
the President announced 3 years ago the 
American Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI)— the Soviet Union has been 
actively investigating much more 
advanced defense technologies, including 
directed energy systems. If the United 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



states were to abandon this field of 
idvanced defensive research to the 
Soviet Union, the results 10 years hence 
lould be disastrous for the West. 

The President's Approach: 
Seeking Greater Stability 

^resident Reagan believes we can do 
)etter. He believes we can reverse the 
'ver-increasing numbers and potency of 
luclear weapons that are eroding stabil- 
ty. He believes we can and must find 
vays to keep the peace without basing 
lur security so heavily on the threat of 
luclear escalation. To those ends, he has 
let in motion a series of policies which 
lave already brought major results. 

First, this Administration has taken 
nuch-needed steps to reverse dangerous 
rends in the military balance by 
trengthening our conventional and 
lUclear deterrent forces. We have 
;one forward with their necessary 
nodernization. 

Second, we have sought ambitious 
mis control measures— not agreements 
or their own sake but steps which could 
eriously contribute to the goal of 
tabilizing reductions in offensive forces, 
n 1981, the President proposed the 
lobal elimination of all Soviet and 
American longer range INF [inter- 
:iediate-range nuclear forces] nuclear 
aissiles. Not a freeze or token reduc- 
ions, as many urged at the time, but the 
omplete elimination of this class of 
/eapons. 

The following year, at Eureka Col- 
jge, the President proposed major 
eductions in strategic offensive forces, 
ailing for cuts by one-third to a level of 
,000 ballistic missile warheads on each 
ide. Again, this was a major departure 
rom previous negotiating approaches— 
lOth in the importance of the weapons to 
le reduced and in the magnitude of their 
eduction. Critics claimed he was 
mrealistic, that he was not really 
nterested in arms control. But the 
'resident's call for dramatic reductions 
n nuclear warheads on the most 
lestabilizing delivery systems has been 
it the core of our negotiating efforts. 
:he Soviets have finally begim to 
espond to the President's approach and 
ire now making similar proposals. 

Finally, the President also set out to 
explore whether it would be possible to 
levelop an effective defense against 
)allistic missiles, the central element of 
I'urrent strategic offensive arsenals. To 
find that answer, he initiated in 1983 the 
'SDI program— a broad-based research 
■ffort to explore the defensive implica- 
ions of new technologies. It is a pro- 



gram that is consistent with our obliga- 
tions under the ABM Treaty. He set as a 
basic goal the protection of the United 
States and our allies against the ballistic 
missile threat. 

Since then, we have been seeking 
both to negotiate deep reductions in the 
numbers of those missiles, as well as to 
develop the knowledge necessary to con- 
struct a strategic defense against them. 
It is the President's particular innova- 
tion to seek to use these parallel efforts 
in a reinforcing way— to reduce the 
threat while exploring the potential for 
defense. 

Reykjavik: A Potential Watershed 
in Nuclear Arms Control 

All of these efforts will take time to 
develop, but we are already seeing their 
first fruits. Some became apparent at 
Reykjavik. Previously, the prospect of 
30%, let alone 50%, reductions in Soviet 
and American offensive nuclear arsenals 
was considered an overly ambitious goal. 

At Reykjavik, the President and 
General Secretary Gorbachev reached 
the basis for an agreement on a first 
step of 50% reductions in Soviet and 
American strategic nuclear offensive 
forces over a 5-year period. We agreed 
upon some numbers and counting 
rules— that is, how different types of 
weapons would count against the 
reduced ceilings. 

For INF nuclear missiles, we 
reached the basis for agreement on even 
more drastic reductions, down from a 
current Soviet total of over 1,400 
warheads to only 100 on longer range 
INF missiles worldwide on each side. 
This would represent a reduction of 
more than 90% of the Soviet SS-20 
nuclear warheads now targeted on our 
allies and friends in Europe and Asia. 
There would also have to be a ceiling on 
shorter range INF missiles, the right for 
us to match the Soviets in this category, 
and follow-on negotiations aimed at the 
reduction in numbers of these weapons. 

Right there is the basis for an arms 
control agreement that doesn't just limit 
the future growth of Soviet and 
American nuclear arsenals but which 
actually makes deep and early cuts in 
existing force levels. These cuts would 
reduce the numbers of heavy, accurate, 
multiple-warhead missiles that are the 
most threatening and the most destabi- 
lizing. These ideas discussed at Reyk- 
javik flowed directly from the Presi- 
dent's longstanding proposals. They are 
a direct result of his vision of major 
offensive reductions as a necessary step 
to greater stability. 



At Reykjavik, the President and the 
General Secretary went on to discuss 
possible further steps toward enhanced 
stability. The President proposed to 
eliminate all ballistic missiles over the 
subsequent 5 years. Mr. Gorbachev pro- 
posed to eliminate all strategic offensive 
forces. They talked about these and 
other ideas, including the eventual 
elimination of all nuclear weapons. The 
very scope of their discussion was 
significant. The President and the 
General Secretary set a new arms con- 
trol agenda at Reykjavik, one that will 
shape our discussions with the Soviets 
about matters of nuclear security for 
years to come. 

Of course, make no mistake about it. 
Tough, and probably drawn-out, negotia- 
tions will still be required if we are to 
nail down any formal agreement on 
offensive force reductions. For example, 
the Soviets are now linking agreement 
on anything with agreement on 
everything. But the fact that we now 
have such reductions clearly on the table 
has only been made possible by: 

• Our steps to restore America's 
military strength: 

• Our firm and patient negotiating 
efforts over the past 5 years: 

• The sustained support of our 
allies; and, not the least, 

• By our active investigation into 
strategic defenses. 

The prospect of effective defenses 
and our determined force modernization 
program have given the Soviet Union an 
important incentive to agree to cut back 
and eventually to eliminate ballistic 
missiles. Within the SDI program, we 
judge defenses to be desirable only if 
they are survivable and cost effective at 
the margin. Defenses that meet these 
criteria— those which cannot be easily 
destroyed or overwhelmed— are precisely 
the sort which would lead Soviet military 
planners to consider reducing, rather 
than continuing to expand, their offen- 
sive missile force. 

But only a dynamic and ongoing 
research program can play this role. And 
for their part, the Soviets are making 
every effort to cripple our program. 
Thus, there were major differences over 
strategic defenses at Reykjavik. The 
President responded to Soviet concerns 
by proposing that, for 10 years, both 
sides would not exercise their existing 
right of withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty and would confine their strategic 
defense programs to research, develop- 
ment, and testing activities permitted by 
the ABM Treaty. This commitment 
would be in the context of reductions of 



January 1987 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



strategic offensive forces by 50% in the 
first 5 years and elimination of the remain- 
ing ballistic missiles in the second 5 years, 
and with the understanding that at the end 
of this 10-year period, either side would 
have the right to deploy advanced defenses, 
unless otherwise agreed. 

But at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union 
wanted to change existing ABM Treaty 
provisions to restrict research in a way 
that would cripple the American SDI 
program. This we cannot accept. 

Even as we eliminate all ballistic 
missiles, we will need insurance policies 
to hedge against cheating or other con- 
tingencies. We don't know now what 
form this will take. An agreed-upon 
retention of a small nuclear ballistic 
missile force could be part of that 
insurance. Wliat we do know is that the 
President's program for defenses 
against ballistic missiles can be a key 
part of our insurance. A vigorous 
research program will give the United 
States and our allies the options we will 
need to approach a world with far fewer 
nuclear weapons— a world with a safer 
and more stable strategic balance, one 
no longer dependent upon the threat of 
mutual annihilation. 

Next Steps With the Soviets 

In the short term, our task is to follow 
up on the progress arising out of the 
Reykjavik discussions. For our part, we 
are energetically seeking to do so. Our 
negotiators in Geneva have instructions 
to pick up where the two leaders' 
exchanges left off. We have formally 
tabled our proposals, based on the prog- 
ress at Reykjavik, and we are ready to 
discuss them. 

To give additional impetus to that 
process, I met with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna at the 
beginning of this month to continue our 
exchanges— not just on arms control but 
on the full agenda of U.S. -Soviet issues, 
including those regional and human 
rights problems which are so critical to 
building trust and confidence between 
our two nations. 

Our negotiating efforts— and the 
President's own discussions with the 
General Secretary— have been based on 
years of analysis of these issues and on 
our frequent exchanges with the Soviets. 
The Reykjavik meeting, for instance, 
was preceded by extensive preliminary 
discussions with the Soviets at the 
expert level in Geneva, Moscow, and 
Washington. We have had our senior 
negotiators and best advisers at all of 
these sessions— as well as at our most 
recent encounter in Vienna. 



So we have been well prepared to 
move. But whether we can achieve con- 
crete results now depends on the 
Soviets. General Secretary Gorbachev 
has spoken positively of the need to 
capitalize on the "new situation," he 
called it, created by Reykjavik. But at 
Vienna 2 weeks ago, the Soviets seemed 
primarily interested in trying to 
characterize SDI in the public mind as 
the sole obstacle to agreement. Mr. 
Shevardnadze was quick to accuse us of 
backsliding from the Reykjavik results 
and to label our Vienna meeting "a 
failure" because of our unwillingness to 
accede to their demands to cripple SDI. 
We will doubtless hear more such 
accusations over the coming weeks. 

So all of this will take time to work 
out. But that's to be expected in 
negotiating with the Soviets. We are 
serious about our objectives, and we are 
determined to hold firmly to them. We 
have a clear sense of how our two 
nations might be able to move toward 
greater strategic stability. We are ready 
to move quickly to that end, but we are 
also prepared to be patient. 

The Challenges of a 
Less Nuclear World 

The longer term implications of the 
Reykjavik discussions may prove even 
more challenging for us. Thus far in the 
nuclear age, we have become accustomed 
to thinking of nuclear weapons in terms 
of "more bang for the buck" and of the 
high price for any possible substitute for 
these arms. But to my mind, that sort of 
bookkeeping approach risks obscuring 
our larger interests. We should begin by 
determining what is of value to us and 
then what costs we are prepared to pay 
to attain those ends. 

The value of steps leading to a less 
nuclear world is clear— potentially 
enhanced stability and less chance of a 
nuclear catastrophe. Together with our 
allies, we could enjoy a safer, more 
secure strategic environment. 

But we would not seek to reduce 
nuclear weapons only to increase the 
risks of conventional war or, more likely, 
of political intimidation through the 
threat of conventional attack. Therefore, 
a central task will be to establish a stable 
conventional balance as a necessary cor- 
ollary for any less nuclear world. 

How would a less nuclear world, one 
in which ballistic missiles have been 
eliminated, work? What would it mean? 
It would not be the end of nuclear deter- 
rence for the West. With a large inven- 



tory of aircraft and cruise missiles, the 
United States and NATO would retain a 
powerful nuclear capability. In a sense, 
we would return to the situation of the 
1950s, when strategic bombers served as 
our primary nuclear deterrent force. But 
there would be an important difference 
in the 1990s and beyond. Our aircraft 
would now be supplemented by a host of 
new and sophisticated technologies as 
well as cruise missiles launched from the 
air and sea. It would be a much more 
diverse and capable force than in 
previous decades. 

In such circumstances, both the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
would lose the capability provided by 
ballistic missiles to deliver large 
numbers of nuclear weapons on each 
others' homelands in less than 30- 
minutes time. But Western strategy is, 
in fact, defensive in nature, built upon 
the pledge that we will only use our 
weapons, nuclear and conventional, in 
self-defense. Therefore, the loss of this 
quick-kill capability— so suited to 
preemptive attack— will ease fears of a 
disarming first strike. 

For our friends and allies in Europe 
and Asia, the elimination of Soviet 
ballistic missiles— including not just the 
Soviet Union's strategic ballistic missiles 
and its many SS-20s but also the shortei 
range missiles for which we currently 
have no deployed equivalent— would 
remove a significant nuclear threat. 

But it would also have non-nuclear 
military benefits as well. Today, the 
Soviet Union has ballistic missiles with 
conventional and chemical warheads 
targeted on NATO airfields, ports, and 
bases. The elimination of ballistic 
missiles would thus be a significant plus 
for NATO in several respects. 

The nuclear forces remaining— 
aircraft and cruise missiles— would be 
far less useful for first-strike attacks but 
would be more appropriate for retalia- 
tion. They would be more flexible in use 
than ballistic missiles. The slower t\\nng 
aircraft can be recalled after launch. 
They can be retargeted in flight. They 
can be re-used for several missions. We 
currently have a major advantage in the 
relative sophistication of our aircraft anc 
cruise missiles; the Soviets have greater 
numbers of these systems and are striv- 
ing hard to catch up in quality. They 
have given far more attention to 
defense, where we have a lot of catching 
up to do. But our remaining nuclear 
forces would be capable of fulfilling the 
requirements of the Western alliance's 
deterrent strategy. 



34 



Department of State Bulletir 



ARMS CONTROL 



le West's Advantages in 
Less Nuclear World 

The prospect of a less nuclear world has 
laused concern in both Europe and 
America. Some fear that it would place 
;he West at a grave disadvantage. I 
lon't think so. 

In any competition ultimately 
lepending upon economic and political 

■ iynamism and innovation, the United 
States, Japan, and Western Europe have 
remendous inherent advantages. Our 
hree-to-one superiority in gross national 
jroduct over the Warsaw Pact, our far 
rreater population, and the Western 
ead in modern technologies— these are 
)nly partial measures of our advantages. 
The West's true strength lies in the fact 
hat we are not an ideological or military 
)loc like the Warsaw Pact; we are an 
illiance of free nations, able to draw 
ipon the best of the diverse and creative 
■nergies of our peoples. 

But dramatic reductions in nuclear 
veapons and the establishment of 
tronger conventional defenses will 
equire a united alliance effort. In light 
if the President's discussions in Reyk- 
avik, we must join with our allies in a 
nore systematic consideration of how to 
leal with a less nuclear world. To my 
nind, that sort of process of joint 
nquiry is healthy for the alliance, par- 
icularly since we remain firmly agreed 
in the basics— the alliance's fundamental 
irinciple of shared risks and shared 
lurdens on behalf of the common 
lefense. 

All of these steps— deep reductions 
if nuclear weapons, a strong research 
irogram in strategic defense, improve- 
nents in conventional defenses, and 
legotiations with the Soviet Union and 
Varsaw Pact— will have to be closely 
•ynchronized. This will require a care- 
ully coordinated political strategy on 
he part of the alliance to deal with these 
nterrelated aspects of the larger prob- 
em of stability and Western security. 
A^e will begin a preliminary discussion of 
ust such an approach during my next 

■neeting with my NATO counterparts in 

Brussels at the December session of the 

"Jorth Atlantic Council. 

Conclusion 

This is a full and complex agenda for all 
3f us to consider. Is it ambitious? Yes. 
Unrealistic? No. I think that, on the 
oasis of the progress made at Reykjavik, 
substantial reductions in Soviet and 
American nuclear forces are possible, 
and they can be achieved in a phased and 
stabilizing way. 



But we need to think hard about how 
to proceed. We are taking on a difficult 
task as we seek to create the conditions 
in which we can assure the freedom and 
security of our country and our allies 
without the constant threat of nuclear 
catastrophe. 

And, of course, our work to achieve 
greater strategic stability at pro- 
gressively lower levels of nuclear arms is 
only part of our larger effort to build a 
more realistic and constructive relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union. We cannot 
pursue arms control in isolation from 
other sources of tension. We will con- 
tinue to seek a resolution of the more 
fundamental sources of political distrust 
between our nations, especially those in 
the areas of human rights and regional 
conflicts. 



Progress— whether in science or 
foreign affairs— often has to do with the 
reinterpretation of fundamental ideas. 
That's no easy task. It requires challeng- 
ing conventional wisdom. And often we 
find that gaining new benefits requires 
paying new costs. 

Just as what happened 44 years ago 
in the squash court under old Stagg 
Field opened up both new horizons and 
new dangers, so we now see new 
possibilities for protecting our security, 
as well as new risks if we don't manage 
them well. So it is up to us— working 
together with both allies and 
adversaries— to ensure that we use these 
new opportunities to achieve a more 
stable and secure peace. 



'Press release 2.50 of Nov. 18, 1986. The 
question-and-answer session following the 
address is not printed here. ■ 



A World Without Nuclear Weapons 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Address before the Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International 
Affairs at Princeton University on 
November 13, 1986. Mr. Adelman is 
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. 

Since the Reykjavik meeting between 
President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev, a lot of people have begun to 
take a fresh and serious look at an old 
question: would we be better off in a 
world without nuclear weapons? Over 
the past few weeks there have been 
numerous articles on the subject in such 
publications as Time, Newsweek, and The 
New York Times. I detect something of a 
sea change out there. Commentators 
who usually devote their column inches 
to telling us how desperately we need a 
new arms control agreement have 
suddenly taken to telling us how 
desperately we need nuclear weapons. 
Since Reykjavik, everybody seems to be 
learning to love nuclear deterrence. 

What about this question? Is it really 
possible to eliminate nuclear weapons 
entirely, and would we be better off in a 
world without them? These are serious 
issues for arms control. They are serious 
issues for our national security. The 
elimination of nuclear weapons has been, 
at least, a distant goal of our arms con- 
trol and disarmament policy since the 



beginning of the nuclear era. But I think 
we have always understood that it was 
not a simple or immediate goal. 

Problems of Eliminating 
Nuclear Weapons 

Today, I think it would be useful to 
remind ourselves of some of the prob- 
lems it would entail. So let's imagine, for 
a moment, a world in which nuclear 
weapons were about to be completely 
eliminated. What kind of world would 
this be? What kinds of problems would 
we face? 

Soviet Superiority in Conventional 
Arms. The first problem we would face 
is Soviet superiority in conventional 
arms. In Europe right now there is a 
serious imbalance in conventional forces 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
At present, the Warsaw Pact has a for- 
midable margin of superiority— almost 
twice as many divisions, nearly two-and- 
a-half times as many tanks, and nearly 
five times the number of artillery pieces 
in place in Europe. On the purely con- 
ventional plane, NATO forces are out- 
numbered and outgunned. Reinforce- 
ments can obviously be brought from the 
United States, but that is a complicated 
task, and even then the Warsaw Pact 
enjoys a considerable edge. That is why 
deterrence in Europe continues to 



January 1987 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



depend on nuclear weapons and cannot 
be anchored on conventional forces 
alone. 

This is nothing new. Ever since 
1945, when the United States rapidly 
demobilized its armed forces, we have 
depended, and Western Europe has 
depended, on U.S. nuclear weapons to 
deter Soviet aggression. Time and again 
over the years we have reaffirmed the 
need to strengthen conventional forces. 
And we have made some progress, insuf- 
ficient progress but some nonetheless. 
But the imbalance remains. 

Under these circumstances, to 
eliminate the nuclear threat would be to 
weaken our deterrence of Soviet aggres- 
sion. The first task we would face were 
we to proceed in a steady way to 
eliminate nuclear weapons, therefore, 
would be to right the balance in conven- 
tional arms. This may be difficult, for 
despite the greater wealth of the West, 
we are still free peoples. And free 
peoples do not easily choose to commit 
large increases in current defense spend- 
ing, even if only to match expenditures 
by totalitarian states. 

Verification. The second problem 
we would face is that of verifying a total 
ban on nuclear weapons. The verification 
problems posed by such an agreement 
would be truly monumental. For the past 
15 years in arms control, we have relied 
on national technical means to verify 
compliance. We have been dealing with 
many provisions— for example, gross 
totals of fixed missile silos— that are 
comparatively easy to verify. These 
methods of verification have serious 
limitations. As we look a short distance 
down the arms control trail, we can see 
new verification problems emerging. 
Mobile missiles already pose a problem 
for verification. Warhead limits pose a 
problem for verification. As the tech- 
nological trend moves in the direction of 
smaller and more mobile systems, these 
verification problems will only increase. 

But these hurdles— by no means 
insignificant ones— pale in comparison 
with the huge difficulty of ensuring 
against clandestine production of nuclear 
weapons themselves. The verification 
problems posed by this idea take us back 
to the kinds of issues we first con- 
fronted 40 years ago, when the United 
States proposed the Baruch Plan to the 
United Nations. The Baruch Plan was 
our first nuclear arms control initiative, 
a comprehensive proposal to eliminate 
nuclear weapons and place all atomic 
energy activities under control of an 
international authority. 



Had it been accepted by the Soviet 
Union in 1946, the Baruch Plan would 
have been a major undertaking even 
then. But at that time, circumstances 
were so much simpler. In 1946, when we 
proposed the Baruch Plan to the United 
Nations, we had a monopoly on atomic 
weapons. 

Elimination of nuclear weapons 
would require the most extensive and 
intrusive system of onsite inspections 
anyone could imagine. It is hard to think 
of a major military or even industrial 
installation that could be legally 
exempted from inspection on demand. 
That would mean, in turn, unprece- 
dented openness to foreign intrusion on 
the part of all nations. Thus far the 
Soviet Union has raised objections to 
even the most limited inspection 
arrangements. 

The Soviets have always resisted 
inspection in practice. As Khrushchev 
said to Arthur Robens, a British official, 
in 1956: "Why should I let you into my 
back garden so that you can peep 
through my kitchen window?" We still 
do not have government-to-government 
inspection of Soviet territory. We are a 
vast distance away from the kind of 
inspection we would need for such a 
comprehensive agreement. One need 
only think of the fate of Major 
Nicholson— who was shot to death in 
1985 by Soviet soldiers while carrying 
out his inspection duties in East 
Germany as permitted under interna- 
tional agreement— to see the kinds of 
barriers we are up against. We continue 
to hope that the Soviet Union will come 
to accept more effective verification 
measures. In the meantime, without a 
comprehensive and thoroughly intrusive 
inspection system, a treaty eliminating 
nuclear weapons would simply be 
impractical. 

Third Countries and Nuclear 
Weapons. The third problem we must 
address is the issue of third countries. 
Needless to say, nuclear technology is 
far more widely disseminated today than 
it was in 1946. We already have a Non- 
proliferation Treaty, of course. And we 
have been very successful at curbing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. But in a 
nuclear-weapons-free world, the incen- 
tive to cheat might well increase, since a 
single madman, a single terrorist leader 
armed with atomic weapons, could wield, 
if only for a while, disproportionate 
power. 

Fundamental Problems. But behind 
all these problems I have mentioned are 
two very fundamental ones. The first is 



that we can't put the nuclear genie back 
in the bottle. While it may some day be 
possible to return to a non-nuclear 
world, it is utterly impossible to return 
to a prenuclear world. It is utterly 
impossible to return to a world where 
the secrets of nuclear fission and nucleai 
fusion are not yet known. The knowl- 
edge for creating atomic bombs exists 
and will remain. The knowledge is 
widely disseminated. It cannot be 
unlearned. Nuclear weapons cannot be 
disinvented. Like Adam and Eve, we 
have eaten of the apple, and we can't go 
back to Eden. 

The other fundamental problem is 
the nature of the Soviet Union. The mosi 
basic reason that eliminating nuclear 
weapons will not solve our problem is 
that nuclear weapons are not the cause 
of our problem. 'They are merely the 
symptom. The cause of tension, the 
cause of fear, and the cause of danger 
are not weapons but aggressive inten- 
tions and aggressive policies. Nobody in 
the United States loses any sleep over 
the British nuclear arsenal. The source 
of tension is not the possession of 
nuclear weapons but the presence of 
aggressive intentions. The most basic 
barrier to radical measures of arms con- 
trol thus far has been the secretive and 
aggressive nature of the Soviet regime. 
Until that changes, arms control is up 
against some serious hurdles. 

Eliminating Ballistic Missiles 

But what about the possiblity— proposed 
by President Reagan at Reykjavik— of 
eUminating ballistic missiles? That is a 
different proposition from eliminating al 
nuclear weapons. Eliminating ballistic 
missiles would be a big job. It is a job we 
would have to go about very carefully, 
with a clear understanding of the com- 
plexities and problems involved. But a 
world without ballistic missiles would 
offer great advantages over our present 
situation, provided we had some form of 
insurance like the Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative (SDI) coming on stream to cope 
with potential cheating. 

Why single out ballistic missiles as a 
problem? 

First, ballistic missiles are weapons 
par excellence of surprise attack and 
nuclear blackmail. They travel to their 
targets very quickly, 25-30 minutes for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), 10-15 minutes for some sub- 
marine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs). Once fired, they cannot be 
called back. They cover in minutes the 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



distances that bombers cross only in 
hours. They also appear most threaten- 
ing psychologically and politically. They 
are vulnerable, at least partly so, when 
based on land, and highly accurate in any 
basing mode. In a nutshell, they are the 
weapon system most likely to prompt a 
"use it or lose it" type of response in a 
crisis. 

The Soviets were the first to test 
and deploy intercontinental ballistic 
missiles in 1957, the year in which they 
launched the Sputnik satellite. 
Khrushchev made exaggerated claims 
about the number of missiles that the 
Soviet Union possessed, and many peo- 
ple in the West became frightened. 
Khrushchev's threats helped to prompt 
an antinuclear movement— the "ban the 
3omb" movement of the late 1950s. 
Since that time, the land-based ballistic 
Tiissile has always been the weapon of 
:hoice for Soviet nuclear intimidation. 

A world without the threat of ballis- 
;ic missiles would thus be a world in 
A'hich a major instrument of surprise 
luclear attack and nuclear blackmail had 
)een eliminated. 

Second, there is also reason to 
jelieve that without ballistic missiles, 
luclear deterrence would be more 
stable. The Soviets have always seen the 
ballistic missile as a preemptive weapon, 
^ven as we have placed emphasis on 
•etaliation. The heart of the present 
Soviet arsenal is a force of 308 SS-18 
Tiissiles with 10-plus warheads each. 
These warheads are powerful and 
iccurate. The SS-18 missiles are 
designed as a first-strike weapon. They 
ire designed to destroy our land-based 
nissiles in their silos, to destroy a large 
oart of our land-based retaliatory force 
before it can get off the ground. 

If both sides' weapons are 
vulnerable, temptation on both sides to 
ase them in a crisis increases. So ballistic 
missiles, in addition to being very 
threatening weapons, can be destabiliz- 
ing. If we move away from these hair- 
trigger weapons, we may improve 
stability. 

But what about the problems of a 
world without ballistic missiles? There is 
no use pretending that such a world 
would be problem free. What would be 
some of the difficulties we would face in 
moving to a world without ballistic 
missiles? First, nuclear deterrence would 
still operate. But now we would be talk- 
ing about slower flying, air-breathing 
delivery vehicles. 

Soviet Air Defense Superiority. 

The first problem we would face in this 



world is Soviet air defense superiority. 
The Soviets have invested massively in 
air defenses. The Soviets have more 
than 9,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
launchers, over 4,600 tactical SAM 
launchers, and some 10,000 air defense 
radars. We have nothing comparable to 
this. If deterrence is no longer going to 
rely on ballistic missiles, then we need to 
think seriously about improving our own 
air defenses. We would also have to 
think seriously about improving our abil- 
ity to penetrate Soviet air defenses. And 
we would probably have to think seri- 
ously also about strengthening conven- 
tional forces. 

Verification and Compliance. But 

the truly major problem we would face is 
verification and compliance. It would be 
a formidable problem. In a world without 
ballistic missiles and without strategic 
defense, there would always be a 
tremendous temptation for a potential 
aggressor to produce a clandestine force 
of ballistic missiles. Such a force would 
give its possessor enormous power. The 
danger would be far greater than it was 
in the 1950s. Because ballistic missiles 
have already been built, extremely 
powerful and accurate missiles could be 
fielded much more rapidly than they 
were then. Indeed, rocket technology 
would continue to advance, since space 
programs would continue. 

In addition, clandestine production, 
storage, and deployment of missiles 
would be very hard to detect. Mobile 
missiles are of particular concern in this 
regard. Indeed, we should not forget 
that the Soviets have already deployed a 
mobile ICBM, the SS-25, which was 
itself a violation of the SALT II 
[strategic arms limitation talks] agree- 
ment. Research and production have 
always been extremely difficult to verify 
by national technical means. 

In a world without ballistic missiles, 
we would have to worry about not just 
Soviet noncompliance. We would also 
have to worry about third countries. 
These are all very serious problems. 

The Need for Strategic Defenses 

But this is where defenses come in. If we 
were to couple elimination of ballistic 
missiles with deployment of strategic 
defenses against ballistic missiles, we 
would have a critical hedge against 
cheating. We would also create a power- 
ful disincentive against cheating, since in 
the presence of effective defenses, 
ballistic missiles would tend to lose the 
overwhelming military value they now 
have. If defenses exist to stop ballistic 
missiles, then there would be less 



military reason, in a world where 
ballistic missiles had been eliminated, to 
bring them back. Strategic defenses 
would thus be an insurance policy for 
arms control. 

I am not saying that elimination of 
ballistic missiles would be an easy job. 
But defenses at least make the idea of a 
world without ballistic missiles seem a 
lot more reasonable than it might have 
seemed in the past. 

That is what President Reagan pro- 
posed to General Secretary Gorbachev in 
Reykjavik— a plan for elimination of 
ballistic missiles coupled with deploy- 
ment of strategic defenses. It is, in my 
view, a powerful and creative vision. It 
is a vision of a world in which the most 
menacing weapons, ballistic missiles, had 
been eliminated by arms control and 
simultaneously rendered obsolete by 
defenses. It is a vision in which paper 
agreements are backed up by strong 
physical guarantees. That's partly 
what's been missing in arms control in 
the past, a clear insurance policy against 
noncompliance. 

President Reagan's offer suggests 
how strategic defense can assist and 
strengthen arms control. In fact, 
strategic defense technologies represent 
possibly the most promising develop- 
ment for arms control and national 
security since space launches made 
possible the reconaissance satellite. The 
Strategic Defense Initiative could prove 
an even more radical advance than the 
emergence of "national technical 
means" of verification. 

The President proposed the idea to 
show the Soviets how defenses and arms 
control can work together. The Presi- 
dent proposed the idea to show how 
defenses can make arms control possible 
on a scale, I think, few people dreamed 
of in the recent past. Finally, the Presi- 
dent proposed the idea to allay Soviet 
fears that we are seeking a first-strike 
capability through SDL We are not, and 
by now the Soviets should realize this. If 
ballistic missiles are phased out, a first 
strike will become impossible. There will 
be no swift sword— only a defensive 
shield. 

For me, the real significance of all 
this is the way in which the idea of 
defenses is allowing us to think in a new 
way about the problems of arms control 
and national security generally. And I 
would call upon everyone in this room to 
stop and give a moment's thought to 
what important possibilities lie before 
us. For I believe Reykjavik was an 
important moment, and I believe we are 
at a critical crossroads. We are at a 
critical crossroads, and we are being 
asked to choose between two paths. 



January 1987 



37 



ARMS CONTROL 



Fourteen years ago, when we signed 
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty, we deliberately chose as a nation 
the path of nuclear vulnerability. We 
chose the path of vulnerability because 
we believed that it would be a path to 
a safer world. We chose the path of 
vulnerability because we believed that it 
would be a way to real arms control. We 
chose the path of vulnerability because 
we believed it would be a road to 
genuine reductions in nuclear arms. 

The 1972 ABM Treaty committed us 
to keep our society vulnerable to nuclear 
attack. But the preamble of the treaty 
also affirmed the "premise" that "the 
limitation of antiballistic missile 
systems" would "contribute to the crea- 
tion of more favorable conditions for 
further negotiations on limiting strategic 
arms." The preamble of the treaty 
spelled out the explicit connection 
between our agreement to remain 
vulnerable and our intention to get 
reductions in nuclear arms. The pream- 
ble of the treaty stated the expectation 
that both nations would "take effective 
measures toward reductions in strategic 
arms" at "the earliest possible date." 
The chief American negotiator, my 
predecessor at ACDA, Gerard Smith, 
made a unilateral American statement 
on May 9, 1972, that: 

... if an agreement providing for more 
complete strategic offensive arms limitations 
were not achieved within five years, U.S. 
supreme interests could be jeopardized. 
Should that occur, it would constitute a basis 
for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. 

Well, 5 years came and went, and 
there was no move on the Soviet side 
toward reductions. Five years after 1972 
was 1977. And in 1977 President Carter 
sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to 
Moscow with a proposal for deep reduc- 
tions in nuclear arms. The Soviets 
turned President Carter down flat. Two 
years later, we signed SALT II, a treaty 
which permitted vast increases in 
strategic offensive arms. Since 1972, the 
number of nuclear weapons in the Soviet 
arsenal has quadrupled, and the Soviets 
have accumulated weapons designed to 
be used preemptively— those SS-18 
missiles, which are weapons designed to 
deprive us of the retaliatory capacity 
that our vulnerability was supposed to 
guarantee. Our own arsenal has grown, 
too, though more slowly. 

In short, the path of vulnerability 
has proved to be a blind alley. We sought 
reductions in offensive weapons and con- 
sented to vulnerability. All we got in 
return was vastly increased offensive 
weapons and increased vulnerability. It 



is time that we turn to the path of 
defenses. What can strategic defenses 
offer to national security and to arms 
control? 

Strategic defenses, once deployed by 
both sides, can make three contributions 
to mutual security. 

First, they can enhance stability by 
complicating any surprise attack and 
thus making a preemptive attack 
extremely difficult to plan with 
confidence. 

Second, they can counteract nuclear 
blackmail by blunting the missile threat. 

Third, by making ballistic missiles 
less effective, defenses can make them 
less of a factor in the military balance 
and in world politics generally. They can 
make ballistic missiles less valuable and 
thus create incentives for reducing them. 
In fact, it was SDI that brought the 
Soviets back to the bargaining table in 
Geneva after their 1983 walkout from 
the arms talks. 

In short, defensive research is point- 
ing the way toward a world in which 
ballistic missiles play less of a 
role, in which fast, first-strike systems 
will become less effective, and in which 
slower, second-strike systems come to 
dominate the military equation. It is 
pointing away from the current hair- 
trigger balance based on the primacy of 
ballistic missiles. These are precisely the 
goals we have sought to achieve over the 
years with arms control. Defenses can 
achieve many of the goals of arms con- 
trol and can also be combined with arms 
control. 

Soviet Intentions and 
U.S. National Security 

The basic question is this: what do the 
Soviets want? Do they want safety for 
themselves? Will that be enough for 
them? For if that is the case, then they 
should be willing to move with us toward 
a world in which ballstic missiles are 
built down and defenses are built up. 
They should be willing to move with us 
toward a world in which offensive arms 
reductions are combined with defenses 
to reduce the total ballistic missile threat 
to each side. 

Or do they, rather, wish to threaten 
others? If that is the case— if they need 
to threaten others in order to feel secure 
in themselves— then prospects for genu- 
inely improving stability for both sides 
with negotiated agreements are very 
dim. 

But I am hopeful. I believe our arms 
control policy and our national security 



ought to have a single goal. That goal is 
almost too obvious to state: it is to de- 
fend ourselves, to decrease the dangers 
that we face by whatever means are at 
our disposal. I believe we ought to be 
willing to move toward that goal by 
whatever path presents itself— whether 
by technology or by negotiated 
agreements or, hopefully, by some 
mutually reinforcing mixture of the two. 
I believe it is time to reject the idea that 
technology always has to work against 
us and can never be made to work for 
us. I believe it is time to reject the idea 
that the way to a safer world is by 
restraining American technology while 
letting Soviet weapons multiply and 
become more lethal. 

I believe we are in a better position 
today than we have been in years to 
achieve real, stablizing arms control 
agreements. I believe the Soviets ought 
to have every incentive to join us, and I 
hope that they will. But I also believe we 
are in a better position today than ever 
before to guarantee our future by our 
own ingenuity, whether they do or not. 

In short, I believe the day has 
arrived once again when it is not the 
totalitarian dictatorships of the world 
but rather the free societies, with their 
creativity and energy and ingenuity, tha 
are calling the tune and setting the pace 
and pointing the way to the future. At 
the end of the Revolutionary War in 
1782, a citizen of Philadelphia remarked 
to Dr. Benjamin Rush, "It looks as if the 
battle for independence is finally over." 
Rush replied, "Sir, you are mistaken. 
The Revolutionary War may be over, bu 
the battle of independence has just 
begun." 

We have preserved freedom, and we 
have preserved peace for 40 years. But 
in a real sense the battle for peace and 
for freedom is just beginning. But I am 
confident, in this nation's courage, its 
technological ingenuity, its dedication, 
and its good sense. "No problem of 
human dignity is beyond human beings," 
President Kennedy once said. "Man's 
reason and spirit have often solved the 
seemingly unsolvable— and we believe 
they can do it again." I believe that we 
can do it. I believe that with all the tools 
at our disposal— by deterrence, by 
defense, and by negotiation— we can 
build a more permanent and a more 
stable peace. That is why I believe that 
our children and our children's children 
will enjoy the same safety and prosperity 
that we enjoy and breathe the same air 
of liberty that we breathe in democratic 
countries that are secure and strong and 
free. ■ 



38 



Department of State Bulletir 



ARMS CONTROL 



Permitted and Prohibited 
Activities Under the ABIVI Treaty 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the Intematiorial Law 
Wtekend Groups in New York City on 
October 31, 1986. Ambassador Nitze is 
imperial adviser to the President and the 
Strretary of State on arms control 
iiKitters. 

At Reykjavik, a number of issues arose 
with respect to the interrelationship 
between limitations on defense and 
space programs and reductions in offen- 
sive systems. One issue involved the 
■-elevant time period, or date, to govern 
rertain obligations that the United 
States and the Soviet Union would 
undertake regarding these problems, 
jeneral Secretary Gorbachev insisted on 
1 time period of 10 years. President 
• ?leagan was prepared to agree to this 
;ime period provided agreement could be 
ichieved on three subjects, namely, the 
•egime of control over defenses, the pro- 
gram of reductions in offensive ballistic 
nissiles during those 10 years, and what 
>ach side was to be allowed to do after 
he 10 years. 

On the issue of the regime of control 
)ver defenses, President Reagan pro- 
)osed to Mr. Gorbachev that both sides 
itrictly abide by the limitations of the 
Vntiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Mr. 
jorbachev insisted on what he called 
neasures to strengthen the ABM Treaty 
)ut what, in fact, amounted to an at- 
empt to amend it. Specifically, he pro- 
)osed to restrict to the laboratory 
esting of all space elements or com- 
)onents of antiballistic missile defense. 

The positions of the two sides in part 
•eflect substantially different views as to 
vhat defensive research, development, 
md testing activities should be per- 
nitted over the next 10 years. The 
United States believes that the nature of 
ictivities permitted and prohibited by 
;he ABM Treaty, based on the treaty 
;ext and the negotiating record, is clear. 
The Soviet side, under the guise of 
'strengthening" the ABM Treaty, 
ivishes, in effect, to amend the treaty to 
orohibit activities that it was not 
intended to prohibit. What follows 
focuses on this issue. 



Distinguishing 

Research from Development 

First, it should be noted that nowhere 
does the ABM Treaty use the word 
"research." Neither the U.S. nor the 
Soviet delegations to the SALT I 
[strategic arms limitation talks] negotia- 
tions believed that it was possible to 
verify limitations on research. In fact, 
neither side wished research to be 
limited, and the ABM Treaty makes no 
attempt to do so. In a major statement 
before the Soviet Presidium in 1972. 
shortly after the ABM Treaty was 
signed, then-Soviet Defense Minister 
Grechko stated that the ABM Treaty 
"places no limitations on the perform- 
ance of research and experimental work 
aimed at resolving the problem of 
defending the country from nuclear 
missile strike." 

The United States has traditionally 
distinguished "research" from "develop- 
ment" along the lines outlined by Harold 
Brown in a 1971 statement to the Soviet 
SALT I delegation. Research includes 
conceptual design and testing conducted 
both inside and outside the laboratory. 
Development follows research and 
precedes full-scale testing of systems 
and components designed for actual 
deployment. Development of a weapon 
system commences with the construction 
and testing of one or more prototypes of 
the system or its major components. 

Development and Testing 
in the ABM Treaty 

The ABM Treaty does address and, in 
certain articles, places specific limits on 
the development and testing of certain 
ABM systems and components. 

Article I prohibits deployment of 
ABM systems for a territorial defense or 
for defense of an individual region 
except as provided in article III; it limits 
deployment, not development or testing, 
and limits ABM systems, not ABM 
components. 

Article II defines an ABM system as 
"a system to counter strategic ballistic 
missiles or their elements in flight trajec- 
tory." According to article 11(1), the 
components of an ABM system "cur- 
rently" consist of: ABM interceptor 



missiles, which are missiles constructed 
and deployed for an ABM role or tested 
in an ABM mode; ABM launchers, which 
launch ABM interceptor missiles; and 
ABM radars, which are radars con- 
structed and deployed for an ABM role 
or tested in an ABM mode. 

Article III specifies the areas in 
which ABM systems or their components 
may be deployed and the number that 
may be deployed in those areas. 

Article IV exempts from the limita- 
tions of article III systems or their com- 
ponents used for development or testing 
and located within agreed test ranges. 

Article V prohibits the development, 
testing, and deployment of sea-based, 
air-based, space-based, and mobile land- 
based ABM systems and ABM components. 

Article VI prohibits giving non-ABM 
systems or components an ABM capabil- 
ity or testing them in an ABM mode. 

Agreed Statement D, reinforcing 
restrictions on deployment in article III, 
provides that, if ABM systems or com- 
ponents based on "other physical prin- 
ciples" than those used for ABM com- 
ponents in 1972 and capable of sub- 
stituting for ABM interceptor missiles, 
ABM launchers, or ABM radars are 
created in the future, limitations on 
those systems would be subject to discus- 
sion in accordance with article XIII and 
agreement in accordance with article 
XIV. 

Permitted Development 
and Testing Activities 

Taken together, the provisions of the 
ABM Treaty permit various types of 
ABM development and testing activity. I 
will describe that activity in four general 
classes. 

• First, the treaty does not limit the 
development and testing of devices that 
are neither components of an ABM 
system, as defined in article II, nor 
substitutes for such components. Such 
elements are not, and were not intended 
to be, governed by the treaty's develop- 
ment and testing prohibitions. 

• Second, the treaty permits tests 
that are not in an ABM mode (e.g., 
against satellites) of devices that do not 
have an ABM capability. The term 
"tested in an ABM mode" is specifically 
addressed in a classified agreed state- 



January 1987 



39 



ARMS CONTROL 



ment negotiated in 1978 by the United 
States and the Soviet Union in the 
Standing Consultative Commission. That 
agreement provides, in part, that an 
interceptor missile is considered to be 
"tested in an ABM mode" if it has 
attempted to intercept a strategic 
ballistic missile or its elements in flight 
trajectory. The term "strategic ballistic 
missile or its elements in flight trajec- 
tory" would include a ballistic target- 
missile with the flight trajectory charac- 
teristics of a strategic ballistic missile or 
its elements over that portion of the 
flight trajectory involved in the test. 

In practice, neither the United 
States nor the Soviet Union considers 
"flight trajectory" to include an orbit in 
space or "tested in an ABM mode" to 
encompass tests against targets in space 
that do not follow a ballistic missile 
flight trajectory. The Soviet Union con- 
ducted tests against objects in Earth 
orbit in the 1970s both prior to and after 
deploying their antisatellite weapon. 
Based both on this understanding of 
"tested in an ABM mode" and on the 
fact that components, as defined in 
article II, were not involved, the United 
States recently conducted the Delta 180 
SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] 
experiment to test our ability to track 
targets in orbit. Since no device in the 
experiment was tested in an ABM mode 
and no device in the experiment could 
substitute for an ABM component, none 
of the devices in this experiment was 
itself an ABM component; the exper- 
iment, therefore, was fully consistent 
with the ABM Treaty. 

• Third, the treaty permits the 
development and testing at agreed test 
ranges of certain ABM systems and com- 
ponents based on physical principles 
used in 1972. As modified by article V, 
article IV permits both the United 
States and the Soviet Union to develop 
and test fixed, land-based ABM 
launchers and ABM radars located at 
permitted test ranges and to launch 
ABM interceptors into space from those 
ABM launchers. 

• The fourth class of development 
and testing activity permitted by the 
ABM Treaty involves ABM systems 
based on physical principles other than 
the physical principles used in 1972 and 
components of such systems capable of 



substituting for the ABM components 
defined in article II. Agreed Statement 
D to the ABM Treaty, which has the 
same legal standing as the main text of 
the treaty, permits the "creation"— i.e., 
the development and testing— of, for 
example, space-based ABM systems that 
are based on "other physical principles" 
and their components. 

This legally correct reading of 
Agreed Statement D is fully justified by 
the treaty text and the negotiating 
record. The President, nonetheless, has 
decided that, as long as we continue to 
believe that our program objectives can 
be met, the United States will not 
restructure the originally planned SDI 
program and, therefore, need not con- 
duct its SDI activities according to this 
"broader" interpretation of the treaty in 
order to achieve the SDI research 
objectives. 

During the SALT I negotiations, the 
United States sought to constrain the 
development and testing of devices, 
other than the three components defined 
in article II, that might perform an ABM 
function, including, for example, devices 
based on other physical principles. The 
Soviet delegation, however, refused to 
consider any such limitations, arguing 
that the sides could not agree about 
something that could not be defined or 
understood and that neither the United 
States nor the Soviet Union had any idea 
what devices or combination of devices 
might substitute for an ABM component, 
as defined in article II. 

A careful reading of the treaty text 
and review of the negotiating record 
demonstrate that in Agreed Statement 
D, ABM systems based on other physical 
principles and their components are not, 
and were not intended to be, subject to 
the constraints on development and 
testing specified elsewhere in the treaty. 
Specifically, the restrictions of article V 
of the treaty do not apply to ABM 
systems based on other physical prin- 
ciples and their components. 

Reykjavik and Beyond 

In Reykjavik, substantial differences 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union over Soviet-proposed 
restrictions going beyond those of the 
ABM Treaty prevented progress toward 



agreement on a comprehensive 
framework for a predictable and stable 
arms control regime. The United States 
believes that both sides should adhere to 
the ABM Treaty as currently formu- 
lated. Specifically, the United States 
need not accept limitations on develop- 
ment and testing activities going beyond 
those provided by the treaty. We also 
must register both our concern over 
Soviet ABM-related activities that sug- 
gest that they may be preparing an 
ABM defense of their national territory 
and our conviction that the Soviets 
should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar 
being constructed in direct violation of 
the treaty. 

In contrast to the U.S. position, the 
Soviets proposed in Iceland to modify 
the ABM Treaty to confine to the 
laboratory research and testing on any 
space elements of space-based systems. 
The Soviets intended to impose con- 
straints on our SDI research program 
far more severe than those imposed ever 
by the "narrower" interpretation of the 
ABM Treaty. Such additional constraints 
would kill the SDI program. The Presi 
dent could not accept this. 

The United States calls upon the 
Soviet Union to recognize that its pro- 
posal would impose constraints that havf 
no basis or justification in the ABM 
Treaty. We must reject Soviet attempts 
to amend the ABM Treaty indirectly by 
reopening questions of permitted and 
prohibited activities under the treaty. 
The Soviet Union must understand that 
the United States opposes restrictions 
on development and testing beyond 
those that were negotiated, agreed, and 
codified in the ABM Treaty. 

With such an understanding, we can 
move forward toward a comprehensive, 
stabilizing agreement on a future arms 
control regime providing for defensive 
research and testing, strategic offensive 
reductions, and a jointly managed transi- 
tion to greater reliance on defenses. 



K 
it 
H 



S 



'The International Law Weekend Group 
is comprised of the American branch of the 
International Law Association, the 
International Law Committee of the Associa- 
tion of the Bar of New York City, the 
American Society of International Law, and p 
the American Foreign Law Association. ■ 



40 



! 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



luclear and Space Arms Talks 
^lose Round Six 



Following are statements by Presi- 
I'lif Reagan and Ambassador Max M. 
'lunpelman, head of the U.S. delegation 
I the nuclear and space arms 
tyotiations. 



'RESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
JOV. 12. 19861 

ince today marks the close of round six 
f the nuclear and space talks (NST) 
etween the United States and the 
oviet Union, I want to take this occa- 
ion to reaffirm our commitment to 
chieving deep, equitable, and verifiable 
eductions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear 
rsenals. Such reductions would reduce 
le risk of nuclear war and create a far 
ifer world. 

When this round opened 8 weeks 
go, it held the promise of important 
rogress in our effort to get Soviet 
greement to deep reductions in nuclear 
rms. Those hopes were heightened by 
le progress made during my meeting 
'ith General Secretary Gorbachev at 
leykjavik last month. We discussed 
lere the full range of issues between 
ur countries, including human rights, 
egional conflicts, arms reductions, and 
xpanded bilateral contacts and com- 
lunication. And specifically, in regard 
T arms control, the General Secretary 
nd I made significant headway in nar- 
owing U.S. -Soviet differences on 
everal key issues. 

I • We agreed to a 50% reduction in 
trategic offensive arms over the next 5 
ears, to be implemented by reductions 
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery 
ehicles and 6,000 warheads on those 
lelivery vehicles. 

• We recognized the need for 
■ignificant cuts in Soviet heavy ICBMs 
intercontinental ballistic missiles], the 
nost destabilizing missiles of all. 

• We agreed to a global limit of 100 
varheads on longer range INF 
intermediate-range nuclear force] 
nissiles, with no such missiles in 
Europe. 

The United States proposed that 
leither the United States nor U.S.S.R. 
Jeploy advanced strategic defenses for 
10 years while conducting research, 
development, and testing, which are per- 
mitted by the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] 
Treaty. This would be coupled with 
agreement that during the first 5 years 



of this period, strategic offensive arms 
would be reduced by 50% and that dur- 
ing the second 5 years, all remaining 
U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic 
missiles would be totally eliminated. We 
made clear that at the end of the 10-year 
period, either side could deploy defenses 
if it so chose, unless the parties agreed 
otherwise. Mr. Gorbachev did not accept 
this proposal and instead insisted on 
making the ABM Treaty more restric- 
tive by limiting our research exclusively 
to the laboratory and, in effect, killing 
the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. 

During this round, our negotiators in 
Geneva formally tabled new U.S. pro- 
posals reflecting the areas of agreement 
I reached with Mr. Gorbachev in Reyk- 
javik, as well as our other proposals. On 
November 7, the Soviet Union took some 
new steps as well, by tabling proposals 
that partially reflect the headway made 
at Reykjavik. These areas of agreement 
can serve as the starting point from 
which U.S. and Soviet negotiators could 
hammer out significant arms reduction 
treaties. But this has not yet been the 
case. While this may have been the most 
productive round to date, the Soviet 
negotiations have still not followed up 
adequately to build on the progress made 
at Reykjavik. Instead, at times, the 
Soviets have seemed more interested in 
conducting a public relations campaign 
than in pursuing the serious give-and- 
take of the bargaining table. 

This is particularly true in the case 
of reductions in intermediate-range 
nuclear forces. One year ago, at our 
summit meeting in Geneva, Mr. Gor- 
bachev and I agreed to build upon areas 
of common ground, including an interim 
agreement in INF. The Soviets 
reiterated this position in proposals they 
made earlier this year. And they reaf- 
firmed the goal of a separate INF agree- 
ment only days before our meeting in 
Iceland. Now, however, the Soviets have 
taken a major step backwards by 
insisting that progress in every area of 
nuclear arms control must be linked 
together in a single package. This 
attempt to hold progress in other areas 
of arms control hostage to acceptance of 
the Soviet effort to kill our SDI program 
is patently unacceptable. 

In light of the continuing Soviet 
offensive buildup, the longstanding and 
extensive Soviet programs in strategic 
defense, and continued Soviet non- 
compliance with existing arms control 



agreements, SDI is crucial to the future 
security of the United States and our 
allies. Americans recognize that SDI was 
essential in getting the Soviets to return 
to the negotiating table and that it is 
essential as well to our prospects for 
concluding an agreement with the 
Soviets to reduce nuclear arms. Effec- 
tive strategic defenses would be 
insurance against Soviet cheating or 
abrogation of such an agreement. In 
addition, they would provide a continu- 
ing incentive to the Soviets to pursue 
further reductions in offensive weapons. 
SDI is, therefore, a vital insurance policy 
that we cannot, and will not, bargain 
away. That is a commitment which I 
have made to the American people, and I 
stand by it. 

U.S. negotiators have worked hard 
in translating the progress made at 
Reykjavik into concrete new arms reduc- 
tion proposals. These new American 
proposals, along with some new Soviet 
proposals, are now on the table in 
Geneva. Let us hope that when the talks 
resume on January 15, as we have 
already agreed, the Soviets will move 
with us to bring about, for the first time 
in history, significant reductions in 
nuclear weapons. Such reductions are 
now within our grasp if the Soviet Union 
will join us in serious pursuit of 
agreements which are equitable and 
stabilizing for both sides, and in the 
interest of the entire world. We are 
ready for this. We await Soviet 
readiness to move forward. 



AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S 

STATEMENT, 
NOV. 12. 1986 

This has been a useful and a productive 
round, our most productive to date. We 
end the round— a round which, of course, 
included the meeting between President 
Reagan and General Secretary Gor- 
bachev at Reykjavik on October 11-12— 
with important areas of agreement, as 
well as with important areas of dif- 
ference between us. 

Let me run through the major areas 
of agreement. 

• We are agreed that there should 
be a 50% reduction in intercontinental- 
range missiles and bombers within a 
5-year period and that these reductions 
should leave each side with no more than 
6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery 
vehicles, 

• We are also agreed that 
intermediate-range missiles in Europe 
would be eliminated and reduced to a 



January 1987 



41 



EAST ASIA 



global equality level of 100 warheads. 
This is a reduction of 100% in Europe of 
the Soviet SS-20 missiles that threaten 
every European city, and a reduction of 
80% of the Soviet SS-20s in Asia. The 
Soviets have now agreed that British 
and French nuclear systems have no 
place in these negotiations. We are 
agreed that an agreement should also 
contain constraints on shorter range 
missiles and provide for future negotia- 
tions on this issue. 

• In the defense and space area, 
both sides are now prepared to under- 
take a commitment not to exercise their 
right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty 
for a period of 10 years. Conditions sur- 
rounding that commitment continue to 
divide us. 

As you can see, we have made 
important progress. I do not, however, 
wish to minimize the number and 
significance of the differences that still 
divide us, or the difficult negotiations 
that will be required to overcome them. I 
will not elaborate upon them here 
because they are serious parts of our 
current negotiations. An additional 
obstacle that emerged in Reykjavik is 
the renewed Soviet insistence on 
artificially linking progress in one 
negotiating group to progress in the 
other two. In particular, the Soviet 
insistence on holding the elimination of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces 
hostage to our acceptance of their 
insistence on amending the ABM Treaty 
is not only inherently illogical but runs 
contrary to the position they have taken 
publicly and privately since early this 
year. 

Nevertheless, we are determined to 
continue our search for full agreement. 
We will be studying the issues when we 
return home to Washington in prepara- 
tion for our next round, which will begin 
on January 15. We also intend to con- 
tinue the pattern we have developed of 
between-round exchanges. 



U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets 



ji^ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986. 



Following is a statement made by 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs 
W. Alle7i Wallis on October 31. 1986. 

During this week [October 29-.31, 1986] 
U.S. Government subcabinet level 
officials have held a series of talks with 
their Japanese counterparts. These in- 
cluded the first full-scale session of our 
dialogue on structural economic issues, 
our semiannual subcabinet consultations 
on economic and trade issues, and the 
Energy Working Group. The two 
governments agreed during Prime 
Minister Nakasone's visit to Washington 
in April this year to begin a dialogue on 
structural issues. We held an organiza- 
tional meeting in San Francisco in July 
and began the substantive discussion this 
week. The subcabinet and Energy Work- 
ing Group meetings occur twice a year; 
the last meetings were in Tokyo in 
February. 

The focus of the discussion in the 
subcabinet consultations was U.S. -Japan 
trade and economic relations. We 
discussed the progress in Japan's 
implementation of its undertakings in 
the MOSS [market-oriented, sector- 
selective] talks and hope to see U.S. 
sales to Japan in the MOSS sectors 
increase pursuant to the market opening 
measures on which we have agreed. The 
United States believes unresolved MOSS 
issues should be settled, and the two 
sides agreed to continue to work on 
outstanding issues. 

We noted we recently had resolved 
some longstanding trade issues, 
including aluminum and semiconductors. 
On October 3, Japan agreed to reduce its 
duty on cigarettes to zero and to lessen 
other impediments to sales of U.S. 
tobacco products in Japan. We expect 
these measures will result in a mean- 
ingful increase in U.S. tobacco and 
tobacco-product exports to Japan. 

While we are pleased that these and 
other issues have been resolved, the U.S. 
delegation was frank in pointing out that 
serious and unsustainable imbalances 
remain in our economic relationship with 
Japan and that future actions by Japan 
are urgently needed. 

Japan is expected to continue to 
have large trade surpluses with the 
United States and with the world this 
year. Japan continues to rely heavily on 
exports for growth and economic pros- 
perity. In this connection, we urged the 
Japanese Government to allow full and 
immediate pass through of the benefits 
of yen appreciation and lower oil prices, 



to accelerate the process of restructur 
ing its economy and to place greater 
emphasis on domestic-led growth. At the 
same time the U.S. delegation pointed t( 
the importance of eliminating barriers tc 
Japanese imports. 

Among the trade matters raised by 
the U.S. delegation were: Ij 

• The importance of accelerated f 
implementation of Prime Minister 
Nakasone's April 1986 statement that 
Japan must take actions leading to a Ij 
significant increase in imports, par- 
ticularly of manufactured products; 

• The need for removal of remainin|( 
barriers to U.S. exports to Japan. This 
includes meaningful access to and par- 
ticipation in the Kansai Airport project, 
rapid progress in the transportation 
machinery MOSS, resolution of the U.S. 
complaints on Japan's quotas on fish anc 
the so-called GATT 12 [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade] agricultural 
products, and tariff reductions in high 
value and processed agricultural prod- 
ucts, namely vegetables, fruits and nuts, 
and processed foods and feeds; and 

• More Japanese purchases of com- 
petitive U.S. energy products and invest 
ment in U.S. coal and gas projects. 

As is usual in the subcabinet 
meetings, the two sides discussed global 
economic developments. The United 
States expects a pickup in real GNP 
growth in the United States and in 
Europe later this year and sees slightly 
less than 3% average OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] growth this year and 
about 3.5% growth next year. Expansior 
is expected to weaken in Europe late in 
1987. We noted the yen appreciation had 
dampened economic growth in Japan but 
suggested that this weakness might be 
mitigated by full and immediate pass 
through of Japan's improved terms of 
trade. We hope Japan will encourage 
strong domestic-led growth which would 
have a beneficial effect on the U.S. and 
Japanese external imbalances and on 
growth in the developing countries. I 
believe Japan's analysis of the world 
economy was similar to ours. 

We had a useful discussion on the 
new GATT round. We and the Japanese, 
of course, will play active and, we hope, 
cooperative roles in this negotiation. We 
urged Japan to join us in pressing for a 
speedy agreement on agricultural issues. 
We also discussed development assist- 
ance and, in particular, the important 



1 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



lontributions our two countries can 
lake to the Philippines need for more 
levelopment aid and for help on trade 
pd investment. Japan indicated its 
iterest in the development of the Philip- 
|ines, and we hope it will help that 
[ountry. 

Our first, full-scale dialogue on struc- 
tural impediments to reducing external 
Imbalances focused on the evolution of 
loth the external and domestic 
mbalances in the United States and 
apan. Differences in consumption, sav- 
ngs, and investment patterns; the role 
if exchange rates in adjustment process; 
nd the composition of trade flows were 
ome of the topics discussed. 

In the Energy Working Group, we 
liscussed the international energy 
lutlook, energy security prospects, and 
i)rogress in implementing the November 
983 joint statement on energy coopera- 
:ion, agreed to by President Reagan and 
'rime Minister Nakasone. Special 
mphasis was given to removing barriers 
energy trade and to taking advantage 
f lower oil prices to build strategic oil 
tocks. The United States stressed the 
leed to halt the decline in Japanese 
Tiports of competitively priced U.S. 
oal. It sought progress on coal and 
quefied natural gas export projects and 
xpressed interest in the implementation 
f the coal recommendations in the 
4aekawa report. 

Let me conclude by saying that the 
J.S. and the Japanese delegations 
.greed that the economic problems the 
wo sides confront require urgent and 
ontinued attention by both govern- 
nents. We agreed to redouble our 
fforts to resolve particular trade issues 
nd to address the fundamental factors 
hat underlie both countries' large exter- 
lal imbalances. ■ 



U.S.-EC Relations and 

the International Trading System 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Luxembourg 
Society for International Affairs in Lux- 
embourg on October 8, 1986. Mr. Wallis 
is Under Secretary for Economic 
AJfairs. 

It is an honor to appear before the 
Luxembourg Society for International 
Affairs. This is a particularly appro- 
priate setting in which to discuss U.S. 
relations with the the European Com- 
munity (EC) and the importance of U.S.- 
European cooperation in strengthening 
the international trading system. 

In the United States, we are well 
aware of Luxembourg's strong interna- 
tional orientation, which stems from its 
location in the heart of Europe. Over 
80% of your gross national product 
(GNP) comes from international trade. 
You understand better than just about 
any country the benefits of an open 
trading system. 

Luxembourg is also the site of many 
important European institutions, includ- 
ing the European Parliament, the Euro- 
pean Court of Justice, the European 
Investment Bank, and other major Com- 
munity institutions. 

As a cofounder of the Benelux 
[Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg 
economic union] arrangement, Luxem- 
bourg helped lay the cornerstone for 
European economic integration. Today, 
Luxembourg participates actively and 
constructively in the European Com- 
munity and can play a significant role in 
helping the EC address the challenges of 
the future. 

Luxembourg has made an important 
contribution to U.S. -European under- 
standing and friendship that you may 
not think much about. Having been 
involved in university education all of my 
life, I am keenly aware— and appreci- 
ative—of the fact that you have made 
possible visits to Europe by hundreds of 
thousands of Americans (especially 
students and other young people) who 
could not have afforded the trip if you 
had not allowed Iceland Air Lines to 



land its inexpensive flights here when no 
other country in Europe would accept 
them. Whether these young people made 
friends for America, I do not know— I 
hope so— but I do know that they 
returned to America with their friend- 
ship for Europeans and their under- 
standing of Europe much enlarged. 

The Basis for U.S.-EC Relations 

Before I turn to current economic issues 
between the United States and the EC 
agenda, it is well to recall the basis of 
our relationship. 

Fundamentally, the United States 
was born from the values and traditions 
of Western Europe. While we now have 
millions of citizens who trace their 
ancestry to Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, Europeans were the original 
immigrants to America. They brought 
with them an established philosophy of 
government which is incorporated into 
our Constitution and political institu- 
tions. This includes our commitment to 
democracy, individual liberty, human 
rights, economic freedom, and the rule 
of law. Those European settlers brought 
us also our codes of law, which are based 
primarily on British common law but 
also, in some parts of the country, on the 
Napoleonic Code and Spanish law. 

Moreover, Europe has been the 
wellspring for American culture and 
intellectual achievement. Your music, 
art, literature, and science became the 
foundations of ours, and now our culture 
and accomplishments have become part 
of yours. 

We also share nearly 400 years of 
historical experience. As the graves at 
the American military cemetery in 
Hamm testify, the United States has 
been involved in all three of the major 
European wars since our founding. That 
involvement was and is an earnest of 
America's commitment to a free and 
prosperous European Continent. 
Although our Pacific ties are growing, as 
is only natural for a country whose 
expansion has been toward the Pacific 



January 1987 



43 



ECONOMICS 



and which has global interests, com- 
mitments, and responsibilities, we are— 
and, for the foreseeable future, will 
remain— essentially European in outlook 
and orientation. 

Our common heritage and shared 
values are the source for U.S. -European 
cooperation in a wide range of areas. 
Geopolitically, we face a common threat 
and stand together in NATO for our 
common defense. This is why we have 
stationed over 300,000 U.S. forces in 
Europe and why we installed additional 
missiles here after our NATO allies 
asked us in 1979 to do so. 

We also cooperate on a broad range 
of foreign policy issues, for example, ter- 
rorism. South Africa, and the Middle 
East. On terrorism, in particular, our 
message is clear: perpetrators of ter- 
rorism will be identified, no concessions 
will be made to terrorists, and acts of 
terrorism will be costly to the 
perpetrators. 

In addition, we share a special com- 
mitment to promote economic develop- 
ment and nurture newly emerging 
democracies. We cooperate in our 
parliaments and in international 
organizations toward this end. 

Finally, we enjoy one of the largest 
and most comprehensive economic rela- 
tionships in the world. This year, two- 
way trade between the United States 
and the EC will exceed $125 billion, 
second only to trade between Canada 
and the United States. Two-way direct 
investment stands at nearly $190 billion. 
The firms responsible for that invest- 
ment produced over $700 billion worth 
of goods and services in 1985. That is 
larger than the GNP of all but a handful 
of countries and a graphic illustration of 
the extent of U.S. -European interde- 
pendence. 

During the past 5 years, the United 
States has seen a dramatic shift in its 
trade balance with the EC. Until 1984, 
we consistently ran balance-of -payments 
surpluses with the Community. Those 
surpluses reached a peak in 1980 of 
$18 billion. Our trade position has 
deteriorated since then, however. We 
now project for 1986 a deficit of $28 
billion in our trade with the Community. 

Among the factors accounting for 
this change has been a sharp change on 
agriculture: since 1980, our agricultural 
sales to the EC have fallen by 40%. Our 
agricultural trade surplus declined from 



a high of $6.8 billion in 1981 to only 
$1.6 billion in 1985 and may disappear 
entirely this year. 

This stands in sharp contrast with 
the Community's emergence over the 
last two decades as the second largest 
agricultural exporter. Contrary to the 
usual course of economic development, 
agricultural exports from Europe 
actually are increasing as a share of its 
total exports. 

Despite high production costs and 
the need to subsidize virtually all 
exports, the EC has become the world's 
largest exporter of poultry, eggs, beef, 
veal, refined sugar, and dairy products. 
The Community is also one of the largest 
growers and exporters of wheat. Its sub- 
sidized exports of wheat and wheat flour 
have increased nearly sevenfold since 
1970 and now take some 17% of world 
markets. While this may be good news 
for European farmers, every increment 
to EC output of these products has cost 
European taxpayers and consumers 
dearly. Massive misallocation of 
resources to agriculture may quite 
possibly be one of the reasons that 
Europe is falling behind Japan and the 
United States in high technology. 

Trade Issues 

With so much trade between us, and 
with as much government intervention 
as there is in both Europe and the 
United States, trade conflicts will 
naturally arise. The current list of prob- 
lems includes EC enlargement. Airbus, 
and telecommunications. However, 
agriculture and the new trade round 
are the two most serious issues which 
we both face, and they are closely 
intertwined. 

Agriculture. The problem of 
agriculture is particularly vexing and 
demands urgent attention. We are enter- 
ing a period when fundamental adjust- 
ments in agriculture are made necessary 
by global surpluses in virtually all major 
commodities. Traditional markets for 
agricultural products have been shrink- 
ing, and new competitors have arrived 
from the underdeveloped countries. An 
explosion in agricultural technology is 
about to exacerbate the situation. 

A major part of the problem is that 
the EC and the United States both 
devote too much of their resources to 
agriculture. Both heavily support or sub- 
sidize agriculture. Since 1980, the 
United States has kept agricultural 



prices high, pricing itself, to a con- 
siderable extent, out of world markets. 
Since U.S. prices generally set world 
prices, this has allowed the EC to sell oi 
world markets at those artifically high 
prices, despite the EC's high internal 
prices, through the use of export sub- 
sidies in the form of restitutions. In 
effect, the EC pays its farmers the 
amount by which world prices fall short 
of the levels that would equate farm 
incomes with incomes in industry. 

At the 1982 GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade] ministerial, 
the United States and other countries 
sought to launch a new trade round to 
deal with agriculture, services, and othe 
new areas. The EC alone blocked com- 
mencement of negotiations, and within 
the EC, France alone. This in turn led ti 
pressures in the United States for expoii 
subsidies to match the EC's. Although 
President Reagan opposed this, in 1985, 
Congress mandated a large program of 
export subsidies. 

We now face a major subsidy war 
between the United States and the EC, 
and it is getting more and more expen- 
sive for both of us. In a recent deal with 
the Soviets, the EC sold wheat for abou 
$75 per ton, which meant a subsidy of 
about $130 per ton. The United States 
recently contracted to sell Egypt frozen ; 
poultry at $875 per ton, which was less 
than the cost to the government by 
$1,210.33 per ton. 

Another egregious example is our 
respective sugar policies. The EC is a 
net exporter of some 3.3 million metric 
tons annually, all subsidized. In 
response, the United States imposed 
import quotas which have reduced sugai 
imports by another 3.3 million metric 
tons. The results are costly domestic 
programs and the loss to the under- 
developed countries of about $1 billion ii 
sugar exports. 

The EC now spends over two-thirds 
of its total budget in support of 
agriculture. The direct budgetary cost ol 
EC agricultural supports was over 20 
billion European Currency Units (ECU) 
in 1985 ($15.4 billion at 1985 average 
exchange rates), with export subsidies 
alone costing over 6.8 billion ECU ($5.3 
billion). The indirect costs— that is, the 
total transfer to farmers from European 
taxpayers and consumers— are estimatec 
to be on the order of $60-$70 billion. 
Roughly 60% of the value added is now 
attributable to transfers and subsidies. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



The EC's agricultural policy will prob- 
ably cost the Community budget well 
over $20 billion this year, not counting 
the substantial sums spent on agricul- 
ture by EC member governments. 

In the United States, our agriculture 
outlays are approaching $30 billion for 
all Federal programs. This substantially 
exceeds the net income of U.S. farms. 
The late Senator Everett Dirksen once 
said, "a million here and a million there 
and pretty soon you are talking about 
real money." Agricultural subsidies are a 
"billion here and a billion there, and 
already we are talking about very real 
money which taxpayers pay. 

Four effects of such policies are 
becoming obvious to all. 

First, we are bankrupting ourselves 
and preventing our economies from 
' reaching the growth of which they are 
capable. 

Second, we are making serious 
trouble with and for each other, which 
threatens to strain the fabric of our 
overall relationship. 

Third, we are injuring nonsub- 
, sidizing exporters, such as Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. 

Fourth, and perhaps most impor- 
tant, we are damaging developing coun- 
tries by eliminating their ability to feed 
themselves and to develop agricultural 
exports to help pay their foreign 
obligations. 

Uruguay Trade Round. Just a few 
weeks ago, the excellent achievements at 
Punta del Este gave a renewed indica- 
tion of what we can accomplish when we 
cooperate. The leadership of the United 
States and the EC, together with Japan, 
Canada, Australia, and a number of 
developing countries, was mainly respon- 
sible for launching the Uruguay trade 
round. The EC and the United States 
both knew that the new trade round was 
indispensable if we were to strengthen 
the international trading system and 
adapt it to the realities of the interna- 
tional marketplace of the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries. We both under- 
stood also the serious risks to the inter- 
national trading system and global 
prosperity if the Punta del Este meeting 
failed— a failure which could have led to 
a sharp increase in protectionism. 

Agriculture must be addressed as an 
issue of high priority in the new round. 
We recognize that, in each country, the 
core of agricultural policy is funda- 
mentally political and social, not just 
economic. The problems can be solved 



only jointly, not by countries acting 
alone. The Uruguay round offers a 
unique opportunity to work together 
with the other agricultural producers 
and exporters to achieve reforms in a 
climate of mutual concessions and gains. 
Implementation of new rules will take 
time, but we need to negotiate those 
new rules expeditiously in order to avoid 
protectionism and further costly trade 
wars. 

The new round also will reach out to 
such new areas as services, intellectual 
property, and trade-related investment 
measures. These are enormously impor- 
tant and will be even more important in 
the future. 

Certain developing countries, failing 
to understand their own interests, 
opposed the introduction of services into 
the round. If the less developed coun- 
tries (LDCs) and newly industrialized 
countries are to take over the making of 
such products as steel, televisions, 
toasters, automobiles, refrigerators, 
semiconductors, and machine tools, then 
the developed countries will have to be 
able to export other products such as 
services. Otherwise, the developed 
countries cannot yield the production of 
manufactures to the developing 
countries. 

Intellectual property relates, like 
services, to areas where developed coun- 
tries have a comparative advantage. 
LDCs should want developed countries 
to move into those areas and away from 
areas where LDCs have the comparative 
advantage. New rules on intellectual 
property will faciliate such a process 
and, thereby, will be of distinct benefit 
to deve'oping countries. 

It is also vital that we develop 
disciplines on international direct invest- 
ment, particularly on trade-related 
aspects of investment. This would con- 
tribute to improving the investment 
climate in developing countries and help 
them to attract foreign investment, 
which is increasingly becoming a key 
source of capital flows to LDCs and an 
important contributor to their growth. 
By helping more efficiently to allocate 
resources on a global basis, rules on 
investment will enhance the prospects 
for growth in the international economy. 

Structural Adjustment 

Trade frictions are manifestations of 
basic structural maladjustments. Policies 
which inhibit adjustment to change 
hamper not only the domestic economy 
but also the global economy. 



The United States wants an 
economically vibrant Europe. While that 
would make the Community an even 
stronger competitor, it also would make 
the Community an even larger customer, 
and both of us would benefit. Of course, 
our support for an economically robust 
Europe goes well beyond narrow com- 
mercial interests. Economic health 
underpins our common security, is a 
prerequisite to political stability, and 
permits democratic values to flourish. 

Increasingly, Europeans are pointing 
to structural problems as major reasons 
for Europe's failure to create new jobs 
and to promote new, dynamic industries. 
They point to such things as overly 
generous unemployment and employee 
benefit packages, rigid hiring and firing 
practices, housing programs that hamper 
worker mobility, disincentives to 
employment-generating investment, and 
interference with business decisions on 
when and where to open or close plants. 

In efforts to protect existing jobs, 
key sectors of Europe's markets have 
been closed to imports, especially in such 
sectors as agriculture, telecommunica- 
tions, steel and automobiles, and, 
increasingly, aircraft. By freezing labor 
and capital in inefficient activities, 
Europe missed opportunities to grow 
and expand into more dynamic activities 
where it might compete better in inter- 
national markets. If we are not willing to 
risk change, living standards will surely 
decline. 

The United States also must heed 
this lesson. Although we are generally 
more willing than Europe to see old 
industries replaced by new, we still have 
pockets of protectionism that hurt our 
own citizens as well as other countries. 
It is hard to call a nation protectionist 
which is running a $I70-billion trade 
deficit, but that same deficit gives extra 
power to those in our economy who 
advocate barriers to imports. 

Structural adjustment is not a 
panacea for eliminating trade conflicts. 
However, it would go far, very far 
indeed, toward reducing the number and 
severity of the trade problems which 
confront us. Many of those problems 
arise from obsolescent or inefficient 
industries, wages unresponsive to the 
market, and social policies which impede 
growth. It is to these practices that 
adjustment strategies must be aimed. 

The United States has approached 
structural reform with four principal 
economic priorities: deregulating our 
domestic economy; curtailing the growth 



January 1987 



45 



ECONOMICS 



of government expenditures; reforming 
our tax system; and resisting protec- 
tionism, in part through a new round of 
international trade negotiations. 

We have not done badly. Tax reform 
is a reality. Far-reaching steps have 
been taken in deregulation. A new trade 
round is about to begin, and we are 
aggressively tackling the most intrac- 
table problem, excessive government 
expenditure. This is a positive agenda 
for change. We are interested in seeing 
similarly positive, growth-promoting 
approaches adopted by our friends and 
partners. 

There is, happily, visible movement 
on four fronts. 

First, there is a growing recogni- 
tion that change is required. At the 1985 
Bonn economic summit, in the 
September 1985 "Plaza agreement" on 
economic policy, and at the Tokyo 
economic summit last spring, the major 
industrialized countries pledged to pur- 
sue appropriate domestic structural 
measures, such as reducing rigidities in 
labor and capital markets, to provide a 
sound basis for more balanced, noninfla- 
tionary economic growth. We see this in 
concrete terms in recent moves toward 
liberalization in France, privatization in 
the United Kingdom, and modifica- 
tions of the welfare system in the 
Netherlands. 

Second, work is being done in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) on structural 
adjustment that will lay foundations for 
the hard political decisions that govern- 
ments must make. 

Third, the EC Commission and the 
European Court of Justice are now 
facilitating change through a more 
vigorous competition policy and the 
drive to remove obstacles to an internal 
market. I would cite, in particular, the 
moves against anticompetitive practices 
of the European airlines, which have 
made air travel in Europe shockingly 
expensive. 

Fourth, the new trade round should 
promote the process of adjustment, 
as I have earher discussed, and by 
strengthening the GATT's procedures, it 
should reduce protectionism. 

Current U.S.-EC Trade Issues 

Earlier I emphasized the importance of 
the U.S.-EC relationship because, on 
specific trade issues, relations often 
seem to be marked by conflict. We have 
settled some problems recently, but it 



took either retaliation, or the threat of 
retaliation, to convince both partners 
that a mutually satisfactory solution was 
needed. 

EC enlargement is a case in point. 
As you know, the United States has long 
supported the entry of Spain and Por- 
tugal into the Community, and we con- 
gratulate the Community, as well as the 
two countries, on their accession. 

As a consequence of the enlarge- 
ment, however, the United States now 
faces major new restrictions on its 
agricultural exports to Spain and 
Portugal. These include high variable 
levies on Spain's grain imports, where 
before there were fixed tariffs bound 
under the GATT. They also include Por- 
tuguese import quotas on soybeans and 
other oilseeds and a requirement that 
Portugal guarantee its other EC part- 
ners some 15% of its grain market. 

Since U.S. exports valued at roughly 
$1 billion were at stake, we objected. 
Moreover, important GATT principles 
were involved. Only recently, after dif- 
ficult negotiations, and with hundreds of 
millions of dollars of retaliatory and 
counterretaliatory measures in the off- 
ing, was an interim solution found. 

The United States and the EC have 
agreed to complete negotiations by the 
end of this year on a final enlargement 
compensation package. We hope that the 
EC understands that lower industrial 
tariffs in Spain and Portugal do not 
represent acceptable compensation, 
either in GATT or in practical terms, for 
lost agricultural sales. In fact, we face 
the prospect of substantial losses in the 
industrial area since, despite lower 
tariffs on many products, the position of 
U.S. producers relative to their Euro- 
pean competitors will worsen. 

Trade in civil aircraft is a growing 
problem. The Airbus governments are 
considering pouring enormous sums into 
the development of new models which 
have little or no chance of a commercial 
return on investment. U.S. manufac- 
turers, who must obey the harsh laws of 
the marketplace, are rightly concerned 
about the competition-distorting effects 
of government supports for Airbus. 
While we were able to agree on some 
points in our recent consultations with 
the Airbus governments, we must deal 
with the issue of government supports. 

Another area of concern is access to 
European markets for telecommunica- 
tion equipment and services. The United 
States now has one of the most open 



telecommunications markets in the 
world, and Japan has made remarkable 
progress in opening its telecommunica- 
tions market. In many European coun- 
tries, however, telecommunication 
monopolies are resisting change and are 
using protectionist procurement and 
standards policies to keep out foreign 
suppliers. We are discussing our con- 
cerns with several European govern- 
ments. The United States and Europe 
could make a big step in the Uruguay 
round toward resolving some of these 
issues by bringing postal and telecom- 
munications authorities into the GATT 
Government Procurement Code. 

Prospects 

We are at a turning point in the history 
of the international trading system, but 
it is difficult to say now what the out- 
come will be. The choice is between 
increased protectionism and an unravel- 
ing of the international trading system 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, 
a strengthened set of trade rules and 
global prosperity. Much will depend on 
how successful we are in containing pro- 
tectionism in the United States. 

Some say that the new trade round 
has come too late. Many expect major 
protectionist legislation from the 100th 
Congress next year. However, if we can 
manage this very serious threat and 
avoid a torpedoing of the new round 
negotiations, as at the London economic 
conference of 1933, then the prospects 
should be good. 

I believe this for several reasons. 
For the first time, agriculture is being 
addressed. At the April OECD minis- 
terial and at the Tokyo economic summit 
last May, leaders of the major indus- 
trialized countries recognized that 
agriculture must now be at the top of the 
international economic agenda. They 
recognized that the problems of 
agriculture arise in large part from 
national agricultural policies that arise 
from politics, not economics. Focusing 
their discussions on the enormous costs 
of present policies, heads of state and 
government agreed in Tokyo that 
"action is needed to redirect policies and 
adjust the structure of agricultural pro- 
duction." 

The world's trading nations are also 
moving forward expeditiously in organiz- 
ing the Uruguay trade round negotia- 
tions. There is a growing revulsion to 
central planning and control. Peoples 
around the world are turning to 
economic freedom and the marketplace 



i 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



;o solve problems of growth and develop- 
Tient, and this provides a receptive 
lackground for liberalizing international 
rade. 

Building on the progress we have 
ichieved in launching the Uruguay 
•ound, we can reinvigorate our markets 
md make our domestic economies more 
productive. We must recognize that 
•hange is not only inevitable but also 
iesirable and that our future lies in 
'xploiting change, not hampering it. 

Our goal is to pursue and promote 
)ositive, creative strategies that will 
ead to expansion of world trade and 
hereby to world economic growth. To 
ichieve this goal, we must convince our 
lartners. as well as the protectionists 
imong our own citizens, that unshack- 
ing the market is not a zero-sum game 
in which winners inevitably produce 
iosers. We believe European leaders 
hare our goals, and we will work 
ogether to achieve them. But it will be a 
3ng and arduous process. ■ 



Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki 



Secretary Shultz's address before the 
Review Meeting of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in Vienna on November 5. 1986.^ 

We thank the people of Austria for their 
generous hospitality in hosting this con- 
ference. We have all appreciated the 
special warmth and courtesy of their 
welcome. 

We are gathered together— 35 
nations of various and differing political 
systems, beliefs, and circumstances— in a 
common effort to build a more durable 
foundation for peace and reconciliation 
between the peoples of East and West. 
The Helsinki Final Act provides us with 
guidelines for our work. It sets forth the 
promise of a more secure peace and 
greater cooperation between our 
peoples— a promise that can be realized 
only through an expansion of basic 
human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for each individual. 

Our common task should be to fulfill 
that promise— to meet the commitments 
to security and freedom contained in the 
Helsinki Final Act. And to do so, we 
must look to the past and the present as 
well as to the future. We cannot and 
should not pass lightly over our 
experiences and our disappointments of 
the last decade. We must examine those 
occasions on which governments have 
failed to implement the principles that 
they have voluntarily undertaken to 
uphold in the Final Act. 

Such critical review is necessary if 
the conference is to make genuine prog- 
ress in reducing distrust and building 
confidence. But at the same time, the 
conference also offers us an important 
opportunity to look forward. It gives us 
the chance to shape a future that will 
release the creative energies of all our 
peoples. 

The world is entering a period of 
dramatic technological change, one in 
which old ways of thinking and past pat- 
terns of effort are increasingly inap- 
propriate to new realities. The tradi- 
tional barriers of time and space are day 
by day eroded by advanced transport 
and electronic communications, leaving 
only the barriers between peoples which 
are imposed by governments. The 
familiar measures of industrial 
development— and, by extension, 
military and political strength— are less 
and less capable of capturing the real 
sources of social vitality. In the place of 



past approaches to centralized decision- 
making and management, information- 
based technologies are making possible, 
and necessary, greater decentralization 
and individual initiative. 

This trend can only be a source of 
hope to all who value human creativity. 
For the future, the true measure of the 
dynamism of a society— and of a com- 
munity of nations— will be how freely it 
can encourage, exchange, and utilize 
human knowledge and individual innova- 
tion, how it can profit from the creativ- 
ity of individual people. It is precisely 
these goals of freedom and openness— so 
necessary for progress in this emerging 
new age— that are already embodied in 
the Final Act. In seeking to heal the divi- 
sions arising out of the past, the Final 
Act provides us with guidelines and com- 
mitments for the future. The past four 
decades have seen Europe rebuilt. The 
future gives us hope for a Europe 
reunited. The fundamental principles of 
the Final Act, if fully implemented by all 
of the CSCE's participating states, give 
promise of a Europe vital and confident 
in its capacity for progress, of a Europe 
whose people are secure in their 
independence and freedom. 

The Final Act recognized that peace 
is not simply the absence of war. And 
genuinely constructive European rela- 
tions must involve more than the mere 
fact of diplomatic dialogue. In the words 
of President Reagan: "True peace rests 
on the pillars of individual freedom, 
human rights, national self-deter- 
mination, and respect for the rule of 
law." 



U.S. Commitment to Europe 

I have come to Vienna to reaffirm the 
determination of the United States to 
work energetically and in concert with 
our friends in support of the full 
implementation of the principles of the 
Final Act. They are the basis of our own 
policies. The American people fully sup- 
port the objective of a reunified, free, and 
independent community of European 
nations, East and West. We are commit- 
ted to that goal, and not as outsiders. 
For as Europe's heirs and children, we 
share and participate in the aspirations 
as well as the responsibilities of Europe. 
Europe and America are bound together 
by ties of history, family, broad common 
interest, and shared values; we can 
ignore the importance and strength of 
these ties only at our peril. 



January 1987 



47 



EUROPE 



The security and welfare of our 
people are firmly interwoven. We 
learned from bitter experience— in the 
aftermath of the First World War- that 
the United States cannot cut itself off 
from Europe. Isolation was a course to 
disaster that we are determined not to 
repeat. In the years of the Second World 
War, America rejoined the peoples of 
Europe— first, to defeat the scourge of 
tyranny and, subsequently, to help 
Europe regenerate its strength through 
the Marshall Plan, begun exactly 40 
years ago. 

Today, the United States expresses 
its commitment to Europe in many 
forms. Our active participation in CSCE 
is one of them. We believe that we have 
a positive and important role to play in 
the accomplishment of CSCE's objec- 
tives. We will neither forsake nor 
diminish that role. 

The American people believe in the 
principles of freedom and openness set 
forth in the Final Act. We are confident 
in the vitality of our democratic values, 
and we are proud to test them in open 
peaceful competition with other values. 
But we do not attempt to force our 
beliefs on others, nor can we accept the 
claim of some governments to an 
inherent subversion. We respect the 
inherent diversity of other societies. But 
we cannot ignore the actions of govern- 
ments which deny their people funda- 
mental human rights. We do not seek 
military superiority for ourselves, but 
neither can we accept the claim of others 
to a right of so-called equal security, 
which has the result of creating insecu- 
rity for their neighbors. 

We have sought to engage the 
nations of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union in a constructive discussion 
of all the issues that divide us. We have 
no illusions that our differences— so pro- 
foundly based on conflicting visions of 
the individual and the state— can be 
easily resolved. But we do believe that it 
is possible to build greater understand- 
ing and confidence in East-West 
relations. 

In the area of nuclear arms control, 
we may have reached a watershed in our 
recent discussions with the Soviet 
Union. On other issues, such as human 
rights and regional conflicts, there con- 
tinues to be a disappointing lack of 
positive movement. To promote progress 
in all of these areas, President Reagan 
met with General Secretary Gorbachev 
in Reykjavik last month. They continued 
their discussion— begun in Geneva a year 
ago— of the full agenda of East- West 



\ 



issues. Their 2-day meeting opened a 
new stage in our high-level dialogue. 
Basic differences persist, but the Presi- 
dent and the General Secretary reaf- 
firmed their earlier agreement on the 
desirability of moving ahead in our rela- 
tionship, seeking to expand common 
ground wherever possible. 

Arms Control 

Turning first to arms control, there is 
now much to be done. The progress 
made at Reykjavik needs to be vigor- 
ously pursued. For our part, American 
negotiators are prepared to do so 
creatively and without delay. I will meet 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevard- 
nadze later today and again tomorrow to 
continue our own exchanges, and I 
might say we have a strong team here 
together, including all three of our 
principal arms negotiators in Geneva. 

The United States has sought not 
just limitations on the future growth of 
Soviet and American nuclear arms but 
their substantial reduction. Therefore, 
we were encouraged when the President 
and General Secretary Gorbachev 
reached the basis of an agreement for a 
first step of 50% reductions in Soviet 
and American strategic nuclear offensive 
forces over a 5-year period. For 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, we 
reached an agreement of even deeper 
reductions, down from a current Soviet 
total of over 1,300 warheads to only 100 
on longer range INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] missiles worldwide on 
each side. There would be a ceiling on 
shorter range INF missiles and negotia- 
tions to reduce their numbers as well. 

Our two nations now have a historic 
opportunity to move quickly to formal 
agreement on these reductions in offen- 
sive nuclear weapons. We look to the 
Soviet Union to join us in doing so. The 
President and the General Secretary laid 
the groundwork for a process of improv- 
ing verification of existing agreements 
to limit nuclear testing. Both sides pro- 
posed to begin negotiations on the 
testing issue and discussed an agenda 
that would meet both sides' concerns. 
Major differences on strategic defenses 
remain. The President responded to 
Soviet concerns by proposing that, for 
10 years, both sides confine their 
strategic defense programs to research, 
development, and testing activities per- 
mitted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty. This would take place in 
the context of steady reductions in U.S. 
and Soviet offensive forces and lead to 
the elimination of their offensive ballistic 
missiles during this decade— and on the 



understanding that either side would 
then have the right to deploy advanced 
defenses unless agreed otherwise. 

But at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union 
wanted to go further— to go beyond 
existing ABM Treaty provisions to 
restrict research in such a way as to 
cripple the American SDI [Strategic 
Defense Initiative] program. This we 
cannot accept. The West needs a 
vigorous SDI program as permitted by 
the ABM Treaty, both as an investment 
in and insurance for a safer and more 
stable strategic balance, a balance no 
longer solely dependent upon the threat . 
of mutual annihilation. Defenses can 
open the way to even more ambitious 
reductions in offensive nuclear forces 
than those I have already described. 

But such reductions can be realisti- 
cally accomplished only in conjunction 
with progress in addressing the very 
reasons why Western deterrence must 
be based today on nuclear weapons. 
These include the insecurity and uncer- 
tainty created by the Warsaw Pact's 
massive conventional force deployment! 
including its large arsenal of chemical 
weapons. Together with our NATO 
allies, we have been seeking to address 
this imbalance in conventional forces 
between East and West within the ongo^ 
ing mutual and balanced force reduction 
in Europe, designed to meet the stated 
concerns of the East and to open the 
way for an agreement. The East has ye 
to respond constructively. 

The United States is committed to 
the goal of strengthening stability and 
security in the whole of Europe. We 
believe that this objective can be pro- 
moted through increased openness and 
the establishment of a verifiable, com- 
prehensive, and stable balance of con- 
ventional forces at lower levels. Last 
May, the NATO foreign ministers 
recognized the importance of this task. 
Together with our allies, we are examin 
ing how best to achieve the goals set 
forth in our Halifax statement on con- 
ventional arms control. 

Other Sources of Tension 

But arms control cannot exist as process 
in isolation from other sources of tensioi 
in East- West relations. If arms control 
measures are to make a meaningful con- 
tribution to stability, they can only rein- 
force, never supplant, efforts to resolve 
more fundamental sources of suspicion 
and political confrontation. Nowhere 
does the problem of distrust and division 
between East and West have greater 
meaning than in the context of Europe. 



48 



Department of State Bulleti' 



EUROPE 



Since 1945, an artificial barrier has 
i; divided the continent and its peoples. 
. This barrier is not of Western construc- 
■tion. The members of the Atlantic 
alliance and the various neutral and 
nonaligned nations of Europe have not 
forced the division of families nor denied 
our citizens the right of free movement. 
I We have not sought to cut our societies 
off from competing ideas through press 
censorship, radio jamming, or other 
means. We have not used threats or 
armed intervention to enforce bloc 
discipline upon individual countries. 
The Helsinki Final Act and the 
Madrid concluding document deal com- 
prehensively with the dilemma of a 
divided Europe. They recognize that the 
freedom of individual men and women 
must be a fundamental element of 
stability and security in Europe. When 
justice is violated and freedom is denied, 
then the potential for conflict inevitably 
' grows between nations. The delicate 
•process of building confidence, coopera- 
tion, and security is undermined. Presi- 
' dent Reagan put it best when he noted: 
"A government that will break faith 
with its own people cannot be trusted to 
keep faith with foreign powers .... We 
place far less weight on words that are 
spoken at meetings, than upon the deeds 
that follow." 

The commitments of the Final Act 
strike a necessary balance among the 
related problems of military security, 
political confidence, economic coopera- 
tion, fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, and contacts among people. It 
is important that we keep that balance. 
We should welcome and encourage prog- 
ress in all of these areas, but we should 
not imagine that any single element 
alone is sufficient to carry the whole. A 
failure on our part to pursue the full 
implementation of the Final Act— our 
acquiescence in selective adherence to 
these commitments— would undercut fur- 
ther efforts to secure a more stable 
peace. Impatience with the difficulties of 
securing compliance should not drive us 
into successive new negotiations for 
their own sake. We must resist the 
notion that consensus-building requires 
compromises that would distort or deny 
the right promised by the Final Act. 
Escape from the violation of existing 
commitments cannot be found in the 
flight to new commitments. 

Assessing CSCE Implementation 

As we begin our review of the Final 
Act's implementation in recent years, we 
can note some important results. Over 



the past decade, the CSCE umbrella has 
sheltered a remarkable expansion of 
human contacts between East and West. 
It has supported the two-way flow of 
ordinary people across a still-divided 
Europe. Building upon the Final Act, the 
Madrid concluding document has added 
important new commitments with 
respect to human rights, trade union 
freedoms, religious liberties, and the 
reunification of families. 

The Madrid concluding document 
also laid down as a basic principle the 
unacceptability of supporting terrorism, 
directly or indirectly. It called for 
greater international cooperation in com- 
batting this menace. Sadly, the events of 
past months have only underscored the 
pressing need for such cooperation. 

In Stockholm, our nations have 
adopted an accord on military 
confidence-building measures. If faith- 
fully implemented, this agreement will 
reduce the risk of conflict in Europe, 
making military activities more predict- 
able and inhibiting opportunities for 
political intimidation. 

But success at the Stockholm 
meeting earlier this fall only highlights 
the disappointing lack of progress in 
other aspects of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 
particular, we continue to see a tragic 
human rights situation within the 
nations of the East. The list of continu- 
ing human rights abuses is all too 
lengthy. Within the Soviet Union, 41 
members of a citizens' group established 
to monitor implementation of the 
Helsinki Final Act— among them 
Anatoliy Marchenko and Anatoliy 
Koryagin— languish in detention. There 
are many more such Soviet citizens 
incarcerated for trying to exercise their 
basic human rights. These include Rus- 
sians, Ukrainians, Baits, Jews, and men 
and women of other nationalities. One of 
that country's most distinguished 
citizens, Dr. Audrey Sakharov, remains 
incommunicado, cut off from the world 
in the closed city of Gorkiy. 

The Helsinki accord and the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights are 
solemn agreements, voluntarily signed 
by the Soviet Union, which provide for 
the right of emigration. Those 
agreements are as solemn, as binding, as 
signed, as explicit as any arms control 
agreement you could imagine. So 
verification and compliance are called 
for. Yet spouses of our citizens are 
denied exit visas. And hundreds of 
thousands of Soviet Jewish citizens, as 
well as Armenians, Germans, and 



others, are denied permission to 
emigrate. This is a direct violation- 
clear, explicit, unequivocal— of what the 
country signed up to do. 

Elsewhere in the East, members of 
Charter 77, the Catholic Church, and the 
jazz section of the Musicians' Union have 
been either harassed or imprisoned in 
Czechoslovakia. Courageous activists of 
Solidarity have suffered similarly in 
Poland. 'The right to practice religious 
beliefs and exercise cultural and national 
rights freely continue to be limited for 
many men and women in various Eastern 
countries. This is particularly the case 
for religious, cultural, or ethnic 
minorities— as evidenced by the recent 
program of forced cultural assimilation 
of Bulgaria's Turkish citizens. While the 
major violations of the Helsinki com- 
mitments are in the human rights area, 
the United States seeks balanced prog- 
ress among all the elements of the CSCE 
process. During the Vienna meeting, we 
will work with all interested states to 
achieve full implementation of the com- 
mitments contained in the Helsinki Final 
Act, the Madrid concluding document, 
and the Stockholm document. 

In the field of human rights, we will 
work for full compliance with the com- 
mitments already undertaken by all of 
the signatories of the Final Act. We seek 
steps that will bring us closer to realiz- 
ing the goals set forth in principle VII 
and basket 3. 

In the area of economic relations, we 
are prepared to explore new possibilities 
for cooperation in the context of the 
Final Act's provisions. 

In information, we will seek to 
strengthen and expand commitments to 
reduce barriers to communications, 
specifically, the jamming of radio 
broadcasts— a violation, documented by 
the United Nations, of international 
agreement. It must be stopped. 

In the field of security, we welcome 
the positive outcome of Stockholm. The 
United States will promptly and fully 
implement the terms of the Stockholm 
accord. We urge all others to do 
likewise. Full compliance by the Soviet 
Union, especially with the verification 
provision of the Stockholm document, 
will be an important gauge of the 
possibilities for future progress in con- 
ventional arms control. 

But the details of the Stockholm 
accord illustrate that there is still con- 
siderable scope for improvement in the 
area of confidence- and security-building. 
The concept of openness— central to any 
effort to reduce the risks of surprise 
attack— has yet to be fully put into prac- 
tice. Thus, the CSCE has an important 



January 1987 



49 



EUROPE 



task still before it— to encourage com- 
plete implementation of the Conference 
on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
and to examine ways of carrying on the 
work begun in Stockholm to enhance 
confidence-building. 

Meeting Commitments to 
Security and Freedom 

The strength of our own commitment to 
the success of this followup meeting has 
been expressed in the exceptional degree 
of cooperation between our executive 
branch and the Congress in preparations 
for this meeting. Our delegation is led by 
one of our most able veterans of CSCE 
diplomacy, Ambassador Warren Zim- 
merman. He has worked closely with the 
American CSCE Commission, under the 
able leadership of Senator Alfonse 
D'Amato and Congressman Steny 
Hoyer. His delegation includes a number 
of distinguished private citizens. It has 
consulted with a broad range of 
American nongovernmental organiza- 
tions. This delegation is representative 
of the diversity of America and of 
America's roots in Europe. Its voice 
truly reflects the hopes and concerns of 
the American people. 

I spoke earlier of the past— with its 
legacy of division— and of the future— 
with its promise of a reunified Europe. 
The continuing division of Europe has 
been a source of tension, which at times 
has threatened us all. But most impor- 
tantly, it has meant a deadening repres- 
sion of pluralism, openness, and free 
inquiry among the peoples and societies 
of some of the states represented here. 
Because we have not sought to impose 
barriers on our own peoples, the nations 
of Western Europe, of North America, 
and of East Asia and other regions as 
well, have seen a reconciliation of former 
hostilities and a dramatic expansion of 
prosperity and invention. Their 
success— the excitement of their 
advances— is built upon the idea and 
values contained in the Final Act, 
including a belief in human progress, in 
intellectual freedom, in political and 
religious tolerance, and in the 
democratic rights and creative genius 
inherent in individual men and women. 

We in America look to a time when 
all the peoples in the community of 
CSCE can share in this spirit of open- 
ness and creativity and can participate in 
a similar release of intellectual and social 



energy. Our goal is a future in which all 
the peoples of the states represented 
here, both large and small, can 
flourish— and by doing so, contribute to a 
more secure peace and an expanded 



freedom. That is the promise of Helsinki. 
It is our common commitment to see 
that that promise is fulfilled. 



'Press release 244 of Nov. 7, 1986. 



Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting 



Background 

On November 4, 1986, in Vienna, the 35 
states of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will meet 
to review implementation of commit- 
ments undertaken when their govern- 
ments signed the Helsinki Final Act in 
1975. The Final Act established a code of 
conduct for participating states' 
behavior and outlined practical steps for 
reducing the barriers dividing Europe. It 
also created a forum in which the states 
of Eastern and Western Europe, as well 
as the United States and Canada, discuss 
security, economic, and human rights 
issues. Two followup meetings have 
already been held in Belgrade (1977-78) 
and Madrid (1980-83). These meetings, 
in turn, mandated periodic meetings of 
experts on particular aspects of the 
Final Act. Most recently, experts from 
CSCE states have met to discuss human 
rights (Ottawa, 1985), cultural freedom 
and cooperation (Budapest, 1985), and 
human contacts (Bern, 1986). 

Progress to Date 

Although the CSCE balance sheet shows 
mixed results to date, the basic fact of 
the CSCE process has been the failure of 
the Soviet Union and, to varying 
degrees, its East European allies to com- 
ply with their Helsinki and Madrid com- 
mitments. As Secretary Shultz stated in 
1985: "Ten years after the signing of the 
Final Act, no one can deny the gap 
between hope and performance. Despite 
the real value of the Final Act as a 
standard of conduct, the most important 
promises of a decade ago have not been 
kept." 

Egregious new compliance failures 
occur and old ones continue. The Soviet 
Union still occupies Afghanistan and 
imprisons and otherwise penalizes its 
own citizens for exercising the rights 
and freedoms promised in the Final Act. 
Despite the recent resolution of several 
cases, many Soviet citizens married to 
Americans are cruelly separated from 



their spouses by official denial of exit 
permission. The number of Soviet Jews 
allowed to emigrate, mainly for family 
reunification, has fallen drastically from 
the levels permitted in the late 1970s. 
The same is true for Soviet citizens of 
German and Armenian nationality. 
Recently, U.S. reporter Nicholas 
Daniloff was taken hostage on fabricatedl 
charges of espionage— in flagrant viola- 
tion of CSCE pledges concerning the 
treatment of journalists. 

Over the years, however, there has 
been some progress in CSCE. Some 
Warsaw Pact states have taken steps 
toward fulfilling their Helsinki and 
Madrid CSCE commitments, and a few 
notable cases involving human rights 
activists and divided families have been 
resolved. Under the CSCE umbrella, 
contacts between the peoples of Eastern 



CSCE Process 



Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, Geneva, Sept.' 18, 1973-July 21, 
1975; the Final Act was signed in Helsinki 
Aug. 1, 1975 (text in BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 
1975) 

Followup Meetings 

• Belgrade. Oct. 4, 1977-Mar. 8, 1978 
(te.xt of concluding document in BULLETIN of 

Apr. 1978) 

. Madrid, Nov. 11, 1980-Sept. 9. 1983 
(text of concluding document in Bulletin of 
Oct. 1983) 

• Vienna, Nov. 4, 1986' 

Experts' Meetings 

• Peaceful settlement of disputes (Mon- 
treaux, 1978; Athens, 1984) 

• Cooperation in the Mediterranean 
(Valletta, 1979; Venice, 1984) 

• Science (Hamburg. 1979) 

• Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe (Stockholm, 1984-86) 

• Human rights (Ottawa, 1985) 

• Cultural fonim (Budapest, 1985) 

• Human contacts (Bern, 1986) ■ 



50 



Department of State Bulletin |l, 



EUROPE 



md Western Europe have multiplied. At 
);he Stockholm Conference on Con- 
fidence- and Security-Building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the 
35 participants concluded more than 2V2 
v'ears of negotiations in September 1986 
A'ith agreement on specific measures to 
[•educe the risk of war through miscal- 
:ulation. The agreement, which enters 
nto effect in January 1987. extends 
Helsinki provisions concerning the 
notification and observation of military 
activities from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
For the first time, the East accepted 
:hallenge inspection of such activities by 
ither states. 

U.S. Objectives 

For the United States and its NATO 
illies at Vienna, the primary aim is to 
mprove significantly Eastern com- 
Dliance with all the principles and provi- 
sions of the Helsinki and Madrid 
locuments. At the outset, the West will 
"eview thoroughly Eastern performance 
ijince the close of the Madrid meeting, 
i'aising specific problems in conference 
sessions and bilateral meetings. 

Another important aim is to promote 
mlanced progress among the different 
dimensions of the CSCE process to 
ensure human rights are given at least 
equal weight with other CSCE elements. 
Balance is critical to promoting the Final 
Act's goals of security and cooperation. 
The successful outcome of the Stockholm 
security talks highlights the need to 
iddress human problems— human rights, 
Dasic freedoms, and humanitarian 
:ooperation. Tangible steps in these 
fields are necessary if the CSCE process 
IS to advance. It is important that the 
new steps forward be based solidly on 
significant improvement in compliance 
with existing commitments. 

Considerable interest has been 
expressed in encouraging compliance 
and cooperation on economic, 
environmental, and scientific matters. 
The meeting also will review the future 
of the CDE conference in the context of 
the broader CSCE process. 



Secretary's News Conference In Vienna 



Taken from the GIST series of Oct. 1986, 

gublished by the Bureau of Public Affairs, 
department of State. Editor: Harriet 
Cufley. ■ 



Secretary Shultz held a news confer- 
ence in Vienna on Noremher 6. 1986. fol- 
lowing his meeting with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.' 

We came here well prepared to build on 
the results of Reykjavik. We are also 
prepared to be patient in doing so, as we 
must be, since the rhythm and pace of 
this negotiation cannot be forced by 
either side. I cannot report the kind of 
progress we would like, but we will con- 
tinue to work for progress in all areas of 
our extensive agenda with the Soviet 
Union. 

I have just concluded over 5 hours of 
talks with Foreign Minister Shevard- 
nadze, including about 3 hours of private 
time. The meetings dealt with all four 
areas of our agenda. The U.S. purpose in 
coming here was to confirm and build on 
the results of Reykjavik. We brought 
along our top experts so we could have 
the kind of intensive discussions that 
have brought progress over the last few 
months. The experts met last night for 
more than 3 hours. I can't say that the 
meetings have moved arms control mat- 
ters along in any significant way, and I 
regret this. We did move along in other 
areas, and I'll review them. 

First, on human rights: I took the 
occasion of my private session for a 
thorough and frank statement of our 
most pressing concerns on human rights 
and humanitarian issues. During the 
course of the discussions, we pressed the 
Soviets for some regular process to 
review these kinds of concerns. We do 
believe that they now agree that these 
issues will be part of the regular reviews 
that we have on bilateral issues, and we 
will bring them up. I will, of course, con- 
tinue to raise these issues at my level, as 
we will on all occasions when we meet 
with the Soviets. It's important that the 
Soviets come to realize how strongly we 
in the West feel about Soviet abuse of 
human rights, and how serious an 
obstacle it is to the long-term progress in 
our relations. 

On regional issues: There has been 
an expanding dialogue. We held one 
cycle of experts' meetings in 1985, and 
we have repeated the cycle this year. In 
August, we added a new, more broadly 
focused meeting at the level of Under 
Secretary of State. We have suggested 
to the Soviets that we start planning a 
new cycle of those meetings, and they 
are considering that proposal, and I 
expect that in due course we will 
proceed. 



On bilateral affairs: At Reykjavik 
we reached agreement on a fairly 
ambitious program of bilateral activities. 
This work has gone forward since then 
and produced results. Last week, for 
example, we reached agreement on the 
basic elements for cooperation in civil 
space programs. We have also had some 
good exchanges on a number of other 
areas, such as nuclear fusion, transporta- 
tion, and energy. Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze and I agreed that this 
bilateral work program should move 
forward. 

We had extensive discussions about 
nuclear arms control. Since Reykjavik, 
our objective has been to build on the 
results of Reykjavik and translate them 
into action at Geneva. In fact, the 
United States has already been doing 
this by formally incorporating the 
Reykjavik results into our negotiating 
positions at Geneva. 

Thus, we came to Vienna prepared 
to confirm the progress made at Reyk- 
javik. In addition, there are still some 
very important areas of disagreement in 
each of the three negotiating areas of 
Geneva— START [strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks], INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces], and defense in space. 
We came there hoping to discuss these 
differences, to clarify them, and, if possi- 
ble, to narrow them. In other words, we 
came prepared to move forward. We 
brought our arms control experts, and 
we had prepared papers covering each of 
the major nuclear arms control subjects. 
These papers reflected areas of agree- 
ment, and where there were differences, 
we stated clearly our positions and our 
understanding of the Soviet positions. 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible 
to move ahead as we had hoped. These 
issues will continue to be pursued by our 
negotiators in Geneva, who will continue 
explaining the new U.S. proposals 
reflecting the progress in Reykjavik. To 
maintain momentum, we also proposed 
that the U.S. and Soviet experts get 
together between the nuclear and space 
talks rounds— the current one will end 
early next week and the next one won't 
start until January— so we proposed that 
experts get together as they did last 
summer between rounds and see if they 
can make some progress as they did last 
summer. That offer is on the table. We 
suggested language that would permit 
initiation of negotiations on nuclear 
testing. The Soviets didn't seem to be 
interested. 



January 1987 



51 



EUROPE 



The Foreign Minister and I discussed 
conventional arms control and chemical 
weapons. I emphasized that progress in 
these areas was a necessary complement 
to progress in reducing nuclear arms. I 
also pointed out a key to existing 
negotiations on both subjects was 
verification. And, we are still waiting for 
a serious Soviet effort to address our 
proposals in this regard. We gave them a 
package which set out what we believe 
was agreed at Reykjavik and where 
there are differences, set forth our posi- 
tion and our understanding of their 
position. 

On START, the point of departure is 
the agreement at Reykjavik to 1,600 
intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles, and heavy bombers. There 
would be no more than 6,000 warheads 
on these systems. That was agreed. We 
repeated the counting rule for bombers 
that was worked out at Reykjavik. 

Now, the next step which we pro- 
posed is to add sublimits to this 
framework. We proposed sublimits of 
4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 
ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on 
permitted ICBMs except those on silo- 
based, light- and medium-ICBMs with 
six or fewer warheads. These numbers 
represent substantial movement in the 
direction of the Soviet position. These 
reductions would be carried out in a 
phased manner and completed by the 
end of 1991. 

We also put forward verification 
ideas that were discussed and agreed in 
principle in Reykjavik. These call for a 
comprehensive exchange of data, on-site 
observation of elimination down to 
agreed levels, an effective monitoring of 
remaining inventories, and associated 
facilities, including on-site inspection. 

So, that's in essence our START 
position, and where we think the 
agreements are in Reykjavik— where it's 
important to move forward. 

Our presentation on INF began with 
the solution agreed upon at Reykjavik: 
to reduce longer range INF missiles to 
100 warheads worldwide on each side. 
The 100 warheads on the Soviet side 
would be in Soviet Asia. The 100 on the 
U.S. side would be in the United States. 
Neither side would deploy such missiles 
in Europe. Basically, that was agreed in 
Reykjavik. These reductions would be 
carried out in a phased manner and com- 
pleted i)y the end of 1991. We set forth 
our position on shorter range missiles, 
that the numbers should be constrained 
at or below the current Soviet level, and 
that the United States, of course, would 
have the right to the same number. We 



understand the Soviet vievv is that their 
present monopoly in such weapons 
should be frozen. We cannot accept that. 
We advanced for INF the same verifica- 
tion ideas discussed a moment ago for 
START and which were agreed in princi- 
ple in Reykjavik. These limits would 
remain in effect until superseded by 
agreement providing for further reduc- 
tions. Follow-on negotiations would 
begin by a date certain aimed at the 
elimination of long-range INF missiles 
on both sides worldwide, and also would 
deal with the question of shorter range 
INF missiles. 

In the area of defense in space, we 
repeated our willingness to undertake 
for 10 years not to exercise our existing 
right of withdrawal from the ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missile] Treaty. During that 
period, the sides would strictly observe 
all provisions of the ABM Treaty. Within 
the first 5 years of the 10-year period, 
the strategic offensive arms of the two 
sides would be reduced by 50%, as I've 
just discussed. During the following 5 
years, our position is that the remaining 
offensive ballistic missiles of the two 
sides would be eliminated. The Soviet 
position is that all strategic offensive 
arms would be eliminated. At the end of 
this 10-year period, in our view, either 
side would be free to deploy advance 
strategic defenses if it so chose, unless 
the sides agreed otherwise. Again, the 
verification ideas I discussed a few 
moments ago would be applied to this 
agreement as well. 

In the area of verification, since 
there was a considerable discussion back 
and forth in Reykjavik between the two 
leaders, and they both confirmed to each 
other their insistence that extensive and 
intrusive verification had to accompany 
agreements of this magnitude, we put 
forward some separate statements on 
the subject. We laid out in some detail 
our view on the central role of verifica- 
tion in this process and the need to con- 
currently negotiate effective measures 
that would give both sides confidence in 
the observance of the obligations that 
were assumed. 

On nuclear testing, we laid out the 
basis on which we are prepared to begin 
negotiations on nuclear testing. The 
agenda for these negotiations would first 
be to resolve verification issues 
associated with existing treaties. With 
this resolved, the two sides would 
immediately proceed in parallel with the 
reduction and elimination of nuclear 
weapons to address further step-by-step 
limitations on testing, leading ultimately 
to the elimination of nuclear testing. 



So you can see that we laid out in 
some detail our view of where we stand 
following Reykjavik. The agreements we 
proposed are fair to both sides and 
would be a dramatic step forward. And I 
continue to believe that as this process 
and the rhythm and pace of it moves 
along we may wind up, 4 or 5 years from 
now, looking back at Reykjavik as a 
watershed meeting. We put forward 
language to record what was agreed; 
and where differences remain, we put 
forward our position and our under- 
standing of the Soviet position. Our 
objective was to clarify where we stand 
and, where possible, to narrow dif- 
ferences. The only real progress I can 
report is that we, again, made our posi- 
tion clear, and we affirmed our readiness 
to move ahead on these important 
matters. 

I'll be glad to have your questions. 

Q. Apart from Geneva, what hap- 
pens now? Will you and Mr. Shevard- 
nadze meet again? 

A. We haven't made any explicit 
date, but we affirmed to each other that 
as two human beings and foreign 
ministers we have a responsibility to the 
potentiality of what was agreed in 
Reykjavik— to keep after it. And I men- 
tioned the proposal we have on the table 
for some experts' talks, and we, of 
course, are in constant touch through 
our diplomatic channels. If a meeting 
between us seems useful, I'm sure we'll 
be able to arrange it, but getting 
ourselves set to make such a meeting 
fruitful is the key. 

Q. You did not, I believe, refer to 
the issue of terrorism, and it was our 
understanding that you would try to 
enlist Soviet understanding, if not 
cooperation, in the U.S. concern about 
Syrian state-support of terrorism and 
other incidents of terrorism. Did you 
discuss the issue? Did you get any 
results? 

A. I certainly did discuss the issue. 
And I pointed up the fact that a careful 
British judicial process sifted through 
and weighed evidence and came to the 
conclusion— and the facts are there— that 
Syria, as a government, took part in the 
planned terrorist act in connection with 
the El Al plane. I think it is also 
apparent from the investigations of 
other terrorist incidents that Syria 
seems to have a role, but the British 
evidence is the most concrete and com- 
plete. There is also continuing evidence 
about Libya's involvement. 

Of course, the investigation by 
Pakistan of the Karachi terrorist act 
continues, and I invited the Foreign 



nil 

ilii 

9 

§ 
[ft 



81 



M 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



f 



linister to look carefully at tills 
vidence. I didn't get any agreement 
•ith him that Syria is involved in ter- 
irist acts, but he said he would look at 
ne evidence. 



Q. You spoke a lot of the 
imerican position as being very forth- 
oming. Did the Soviets simply listen 
9 you? Did they put forward their own 
litiative and proposals to narrow the 
ap? 

A. I'm sure they will give their 
lews, so it's not for me to try to do 
hat. However, as we found it difficult to 
ngage them in a discussion of all of 
hese various issues that were covered in 
Reykjavik, and found them focusing con- 
inuously on the question of the meaning 
f the ABM Treaty as to permitted ac- 
ivities and their proposal about 
iboratory research, it seemed to us that 
heir objective of trying to cripple— or it 
1, eemed to us that they have the objec- 
ts ive of crippling— the President's effort 
find out how we can defend ourselves 
gainst ballistic missiles. If that is their 
'bjective, it is not going to work. On the 
•ther hand, there are some very impor- 
ant matters that can be moved forward 
in, and we will continue patiently to 
vork at them. 

■ Q. Did you propose to the Soviets 
' 'hat we go ahead and try to reach a 
.eparate agreement on INF, and did 
hey respond to you by saying that all 
)f this must be [inaudible]? 

A. We didn't get to that point 
)ecause we found it so difficult to 
■ngage them with these different sub- 
ects as they were fixed on only one 
subject. 

Q. Did you have a chance to raise 
ivith the Secretary the Baltic issue, 
ind if you have not, will the American 
Jelegation raise the Baltic issue of the 
Estonian, Latvian [inaudible]? 

A. All of these issues will be raised 
at the CSCE [Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] Conference. 
I heard a lot about it last night, and we 
have made our views clear, across the 
board, on humanitarian and human 
rights issues. 

Q. Could you amplify on what you 
meant by them trying to cripple the 
SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] pro- 
gram by their insistence on discussing 
the meaning of ABM in the laboratory 
proposal? Because some people have 
suggested that really the Soviets are 
making a compromise here or that they 
weren't really trying to cripple it, that 
there was a misunderstanding. Could 



you explain why — what the Soviets are 
talking about— would make it impossi- 
ble for the SDI to proceed? 

A. If you narrow the scope of what 
can be done by way of research and 
testing and discovering how to defend 
yourself against ballistic missiles, if you 
constrain the scope of that program 
beyond what is called for under the ABM 
Treaty, you make it more and more dif- 
ficult for the research to be productive; 
and, therefore, you slow down and crip- 
ple the program. That's what we won't 
agree to. We believe that the program 
can go forward perfectly effective, 
strictly in accordance with the provisions 
of the ABM Treaty, which are being 
observed, and that's sufficient. We'll 
stick with the treaty. We don't want to 
change it. 

Q. The main question is why the 
United States needs the SDI when 
there are possibilities to disappear the 
whole atomic nuclear weapons in 10 
years. Could you go, please, a little 
deeper toward this problem? 

A. For three reasons. First, it may 
or may not be true that these weapons 
will disappear. So, in the meantime, if 
we can learn how to defend ourselves 
against them, we must do so. Second, 
it's clear that if you believe there is a 
chance for these radical reductions to 
take place, it is also clear that one of the 
reasons why that is so is the existence of 
a strong, active, and promising program 
of research. Third, if an agreement is 
reached and a process of reduction takes 
place, you want to be sure it continues. 

I've said there were only three 
reasons; I've got a fourth. AJfter you 
have completed the process, it's known 
in the world how to produce these 
weapons. So when something is known, 
you can't be sure that it won't be pro- 
duced somewhere. So you need an in- 
surance policy. If you're going to build 
yourself a nice house and invest your 
fortune in it, of whatever size, you cer- 
tainly are going to want to take out an 
insurance policy, and having the ability 
to defend yourself is that insurance 
policy. So there are very important 
reasons why it's critical for us, and for 
people all over the world, that this effort 
to find out how to defend ourselves go 
forward. 

Q. Did you discuss the question of 
another summit in the near future? 

A. No, the subject never came up. 

Q. Is it now your conclusion there 
is no prospect for an agreement on 
European missiles so long as 
[inaudible]? 



A. No, I tried to indicate my view. 
This is a long-paced negotiation, I'm 
sure, and it has its rhythm. The pace 
can't be forced by either party. So it 
shifts around, and our approach is to be 
in close consultation with our allies, to 
maintain the strong and unified position 
that we have, and to be patient in work- 
ing for the results that we believe are 
essential. And we'll keep at it. I think 
that in the end there is a very good 
chance that we'll get there. 

Q. Going back to the question of 
what the Soviets want the ABM Treaty 
to mean, did they offer you any 
extended definition of the laboratory 
that might include, say, space-based 
research facilities, or did they offer in 
any way to adhere to an agreement 
that would essentially enshrine the 
[inaudible] United States as a restric- 
tive interpretation of the ABM Treaty? 

A. The discussions really didn't get 
into that kind of detail; although, cer- 
tainly if we are able to engage them in 
Geneva, or if there is the kind of 
experts' meeting that I referred to, we 
are prepared to state what we think that 
treaty permits. We've done so, and did 
so last night briefly, for that matter, and 
listened to what they had to say. 

Q. Mr. Gorbachev should have 
gone to Washington before the end of 
this year to meet with Mr. Reagan, 
and Mr. Reagan should have gone to 
Moscow some time next year. Are the 
prospects now for any major arms con- 
trol deal within the Reagan presidency 
now dead? 

A. I think that the meeting at Reyk- 
javik moved matters forward across the 
board in dramatic ways, and the problem 
now is to somehow capture that move- 
ment in all of the areas that I've gone 
through here and make it a reality. And 
since there has been so much progress 
comparing now with, say, 2 years ago— I 
recalled with Mr. Shevardnadze this 
morning, we sat in a room in their 
embassy— I sat there for 6 hours with 
Mr. Gromyko. At the end, there came 
the beginnings of what emerged at the 
President's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev 
in Geneva a year ago. So we keep at 
this, and I think some progress will 
be made. 

Q. The Soviet Minister, Shevard- 
nadze, left saying that these talks left 
him with a bitter aftertaste. He 
accused the United States of 
backtracking — his words — from the 
achievements made at Reykjavik. Do 
these talks leave you with a bitter 
aftertaste as to the lack of prog^ress 
he's obviously referring to here? 



January 1987 



53 



EUROPE 



A. Bitter aftertaste is his word. He 
told me he was going to say that, and I 
told him what I was going to say, and we 
each choose our words, no doubt with 
care. I prefer words like "we were well 
prepared," "we're prepared to be pa- 
tient," "we understand that negotiations 
of this kind have a rhythm and pace to 
them, and we'll work with it." 

Q. In the context of either ter- 
rorism or regional disputes, did the 
subject of the U.S. arms embargo on 
Iran come up, was that subject 
discussed, and does the United States 
still have an arms embargo? 

A. The subject didn't come up. 

Q. You now have just about 2 
years before the end of the Reagan 
Administration. In light of what's hap- 
pened here, do you think there is really 
any prospect for any kind of agree- 
ment within these 2 years? 

A. We are certainly prepared for 
one, and as I pointed out a number of 
times, we came here with a very strong 
team and with written statements to 
work from. We'll continue in that vein. 
Two years is a long time. 

Q. Did the Soviet proposal or 
argument [inaudible] change in any 
way between Reykjavik and what you 
heard [inaudible]? 

A. The problem wasn't so much 
change as it was an inability somehow in 
the discussions we had here to review 
carefully the sweep of things discussed 
in Reykjavik, as they seemed so fixed on 
just one or two aspects of it. There was 
progress made across the board, and 
there were problems identified across 
the board. So we came here feeling that 
the way to proceed is to, in a sense, 
codify, nail down the progress, identify 
where the problems are; and that's a 
method of starting to work through solu- 
tions to the problems. And we'll continue 
to strive for that. 

Q. Even though the subject didn't 
come up in your meetings with Mr. 
Shevardnadze, can you give us your 
views on approaches to Iran over the 
hostages in Lebanon [inaudible] spare 
parts? 

A. All of those questions, as I said 
earlier, are being handled out of the 
White House, and I don't have any com- 
ment on them. 

'Press release 243. ■ 



Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl 






Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the 
Federal Republic of Germany made an 
official visit to the United States October 
20-23. 1986. to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are arrival remarks made 
by President Reagan and Chancellor 
Kohl and the text of a joint statement on 
the establishment of the U.S. -German 
Youth Exchange Council.'^ 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 
OCT. 21, 19862 



President Reagan 

Today it's an honor to welcome 
Chancellor Kohl. This marks his sixth 
visit to us as leader of the German 
Federal Republic. He and his fellow 
citizens are friends and partners with 
whom we share a desire for peace and a 
commitment to the principles of human 
freedom. 

Our nations' solid bilateral ties, our 
resolve to maintain the viability of the 
Western alliance, and our dedication to 
the values and ideals which are the 
underpinning of political and economic 
freedom have been a great boon to the 
German and American peoples. The 
great German writer-philosopher 
Gotthold Lessing once wrote: "Nothing 
under the sun is ever accidental." Well, 
40 years of European peace have been 
no accident. The good fortune can be 
traced, to a great degree, to the solidar- 
ity and cooperation between our two 
peoples and governments. 

When a buildup of intermediate- 
range missiles by our adversary 
threatened the peace, our alliance was 
put to the test. Chancellor Kohl and his 
government stood firm in the face of a 
well-orchestrated international and 
domestic propaganda campaign aimed at 
paralyzing our ability to respond. 

The deployment, however, of 
weapons is not an end in itself; it is a 
means to an end. What we seek is the 
security of our countries, the freedom of 
our peoples, and the peace of the world. 
Our strength of purpose, as well as our 
military might, are vehicles in the search 
for a lasting peace. 

Chancellor Kohl's visit comes at an 
opportune time. I look forward to 
discussing with him my recent meetings 
with General Secretary Gorbachev and 
subsequent events. There is, as I will 
explain, ample reason for optimism. 



Whatever progress is made, it will be 
based on the solid foundation Germans 
and Americans have built together, par- 
ticularly in the last half decade. 

Three years ago, I presented a plan 
which would have reduced American and 
Soviet longer range INF missiles to zero 
globally, thus called the zero option. 
Building on the diplomacy of interceding 
years as well as the deployment of our 
cruise and Pershings, General Secretary 
Gorbachev and I came close in Iceland to 
reaching an agreement that would have 
drastically reduced these missiles on 
both sides. We are now striving to build 
upon the progress achieved in Reykjavik. 

And it should not escape anyone's 
attention that the Soviet Union and the 
United States are now seriously talking 
about reducing offensive weapons. This 
is a giant step forward from the time, 
not so long ago, when arms talks merely 
put a cap on weapons at high levels, per- 
mitting the building of more missiles and 
more warheads. 

When the next agreement is finally 
reached with the Soviet Union— and I 
say when, not if— it will not be the result 
of weakness or timidity on the part of 
Western nations. Instead, it will flow 
from our strength, realism, and unity. 

Our allies in these last few years 
have withstood intimidation and brazen 
interference in their domestic political 
processes. Our adversaries misjudged 
individuals like Chancellor Kohl and the 
other leaders of the Western 
democracies. Under intense pressure, 
they did what was necessary: held firm. 
And because of their fortitude, the free 
world is now neither vulnerable nor 
subservient. 

The record of the European peoples 
is long and glorious. In so many ways, 
Europe is the cradle of modern civiliza- 
tion. The indomitable spirit demon- 
strated by our European neighbors and 
allies in the postwar era— from the 
Berlin airlift to our solidarity leading to 
my recent meetings in Iceland— has 
made the difference. The tide has been 
met, the tide turned, and the flow of 
history is now on the side of the free. 

We in the West are now engaged in 
a great technological revolution: in 
medicine, electronics, physics, and so 
many fields of human endeavor. More 
has been discovered in the 20th century 
than in all the preceding centuries put 
together. Our scientists, at this moment 
are making great strides toward 
developing technology that can protect 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



nankind against ballistic missiles, and 
hat protection applies to the United 
■ states, our allies, and, yes, even our 
idversaries, if need be. 

A purely defensive system that 
nakes these missiles ineffective also 
nakes them more negotiable. A defen- 
■ive system makes an arms reduction 
agreement more likely because it offers 
irotection against cheating. This and not 
rust will lead to reducing, and we hope 
iltimately eliminating, the nuclear 
irsenals that now threaten all humanity, 
f a defensive system was not a viable 
iption, the Soviet Union would not be 
lommitting so much of its own resources 
n developing and deploying strategic 
lefenses of its own. 

Technology can open up new doors 

peace and security, and that's what 
lur Strategic Defense Initiative is all 
ibout. The time has come to rechannel 

' he efforts of some of our best minds to 
levelop tools which can be used to main- 
ain peace, tools that protect rather than 
;ill. The United States stands ready, as I 
issured Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland and 
•eaffirm today, to negotiate seriously 
ibout safeguards that will enable the 
Soviet Union to share in the benefits of 
trategic defense. 

What we in the West have done to 
ebuild our strength and revitalize our 
lUiance has guaranteed the peace, but a 
asting peace cannot be based simply on 
m arms agreement. Better relations 
nust include more and open, freer con- 
acts between people and governments, 

1 respect for human rights, and an end 
,0 those regional conflicts that continue 
.0 plague mankind. 

Chancellor Kohl and the German 
people have been steadfast in their sup- 
port and in their friendship for many 
/ears. They know, as we do, that our 
lestinies and those of all free people are 
.led. We strive for a free, secure, and 
prosperous world— a world at peace; and 
tve do it, together, with our friends and 
lilies, the German people. So it gives me 
great pleasure to welcome Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, a partner, colleague, and 
friend. 

Chancellor KohP 

I'm delighted to be in Washington again, 
and I feel that this wonderful fall day, 
■with its sunshine, is a very true symbol 
standing for the nature of the relation- 
ship between our two countries. 

And it gives me particular pleasure, 
Mr. President, to see you again— a good 
friend of our country and an esteemed 
personal friend. This is the seventh time 
that we have met since I took over the 



office of Federal Chancellor back in 
1982, and this figure alone gives an 
indication of the intensity and closeness 
of the relations between our two coun- 
tries and governments. 

And in addition, we have often been 
in contact, consulting each other by let- 
ter or telephone. And I would like to 
take this opportunity before the public of 
your country, here, to express my 
appreciation and my great gratitude for 
this trustful cooperation. I thank you for 
this form of close cooperation which is 
based on mutual trust, and it is a token 
of a friendship and partnership under- 
pinned by shared values, ideals, and 
interests. 

Germans and Americans are united 
with the British, the French, the 
Italians, and others in the Atlantic 
alliance, an alliance of historical dimen- 
sion. It is a community based on 
reciprocity, a defensive alliance against 
aggression and political blackmail, an 
alliance for the preservation of 
democracy, freedom, and human rights. 

The security of the Federal Republic 
of Germany is indissolubly linked with 
this alliance and through our partnership 
with the United States of America. Only 
with the assistance of the United States 
can the security of Western Europe be 
assured. The American troops in the 
Federal Republic of Germany are 
defending our common freedom together 
with our troops, and they are welcome in 
our country. Mr. President, you and 
your fellow citizens in this country 
should know that the vast majority of 
the citizens of the Federal Republic of 
Germany are in favor of the presence of 
these troops, and they regard them as 
their friends. And we know that we can 
rely on each other. 

The European allies render an 
important contribution to our common 
defense. And the 12 states united in the 
European Community are undergoing a 
dynamic process of political and 
economic integration through which the 
European pillar of the alliance will be 
strengthened. And we Europeans have 
recognized that this is the only way in 
which we can play a role in tomorrow's 
work. 

In your speech to the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg in May 1985, 
you welcomed and appreciated this 
development. It will not be detrimental 
to our alliance, but is going to 
strengthen it. 

It remains our goal— and I know that 
I share it with you, Mr. President— to 
create peace and security with ever 
fewer weapons. In Reykjavik, thanks to 
your serious and consistent efforts in 



pursuit of peace, a major step was taken 
in this direction; and we must now take 
the opportunities that present them- 
selves without endangering our defen- 
sive capability. 

Your meeting with General 
Secretary Gorbachev confirmed that the 
Soviet Union, too, is interested in an 
improvement of the relations between 
West and East. And we should take the 
Soviet Union at its word and sound out 
at the negotiating table where real prog- 
ress could be made. 

My government is contributing 
actively to the efforts to promote 
dialogue and cooperation, confidence, 
understanding, and reconciliation. The 
world is looking hopefully to the two 
superpowers, but the small- and medium- 
sized states must play their part and 
make their contributions as well. 

In your impressive speech to the 
young Germans gathered at Hamburg 
Castle, in my home district, in 1985, you 
said: "The future belongs to the free." 
Let us continue to work together for this 
goal. We must convince the young 
people, the young generation, in the 
United States, in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, all over the world, that it is 
worthwhile to stand up for our values for 
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. 

You have been persuasive and 
vigorous, Mr. President, in your support 
of an increase in youth exchanges be- 
tween our peoples. For that, I am 
grateful to you, and we will discuss this 
subject further. Together, we shall 
create conditions under which even more 
young people from our two countries will 
have the chance to get to know one 
another. 

Under your leadership, the United 
States of America has rediscovered self- 
confidence and regained a spirit of enter- 
prising leadership. As in the past, these 
are the qualities that will enable the 
American nation to master the chal- 
lenges of the future. The Federal 
Republic of Germany, with all its 
citizens, will be a loyal friend and part- 
ner to the United States of America as it 
goes about this task. 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
OCT. 21, 1986 

U.S. -German friendship and cooperation 
enhance our mutual interests. We are 
convinced that youth exchange of all 
kinds will help ensure that this friend- 
ship will flourish in the future. We agree 
on the need to have our succeeding 
generations play an increasingly active 
role in promoting this friendship. In 
recent decades there have been many 



January 1987 



55 



GENERAL 



youth exchanges between the United 
States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany 

Recently, with the impetus of the 
Presidential Youth Exchange Initiative 
of 1982 and subsequent important con- 
tributions from the Federal Republic of 
Germany, bilateral exchanges have 
nearly tripled. To ensure that these 
exchanges will thrive, we have agreed to 
the creation of a U.S-German Youth 
Exchange Council. 

Our two governments, as well as 
nongovernmental organizations and 
individuals who have been involved in 
youth exchanges, or those who have 
played a leading role in U.S. -German 
relations, will be represented. The Coun- 
cil will provide advice on improving 
youth exchange programs, suggest new 
exchange initiatives, and explore addi- 
tional funding resources. The Council 
will meet at least once a year in 
Washington or Bonn in connection with 
the cultural exchange talks between the 
United States and the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 



U.S. Policy Toward the Third World 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27, 1986. 

2Made at the South Portico of the White 
House, where Chancellor Kohl was accorded a 
formal welcome with full military honors. 

'Chancellor Kohl spoke in German, and 
his remarks were translated by an inter- 
preter. ■ 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Address before the National Third 
World Studies Conference in Omaha, 
Nebraska, on October 17, 1986. 
Ambassador Armacost is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 

I'm delighted to be here this afternoon 
to address the ninth National Third 
World Studies Conference. I have been 
asked to offer some observations re- 
garding U.S. policy toward this large, 
diverse, and important group of 
countries. 

I am happy to do so. There is more 
than a little challenge in the assignment, 
for you should know that there is no 
bureau in the Department of State 
responsible for dealing with the Third 
World per se. Those who deal with its 
myriad concerns and the numerous 
challenges it presents are scattered 
among a variety of offices. Let me 
attempt to pull together a few of the 
central threads. 



The Third World 
and Its Importance 

What is the "Third World," and why is 
it important to the conduct of our 
foreign policy? 

When we speak of the Third World, 
we are using an imprecise description— a 
term of journalistic convenience, not of 
precise analysis. We usually credit the 
French with coining it. To those with a 
sense of history, it perhaps recalled the 
Third Estate of commoners, who 
opposed both the king and the church. In 
practical political parlance, the Third 
World has come to describe developing 
countries that seek to avoid domination 
by the superpowers and to preserve 
their freedom of maneuver between East 
and West. To the extent the term sug- 
gests common aspirations among coun- 
tries as diverse as China and Burma, 
Cuba and Brazil, Libya and Saudi 
Arabia, Nigeria and Botswana, the term 
can be positively misleading. 

Yet there is a core of solidarity 
among Third World countries that 
derives from shared memories of past 
humiliations, a resolve to remove the 
remaining relics of colonialism, and what 
one astute observer has described as "an 



almost racial feeling that Asians and 
Africans were, in a sense, a separate 
part of humanity, long victimized and 
now claiming their birthright." i 

Third World nations are of great 
importance to the United States. , 

Developing countries occupy more than ; 
half of the world's surface and embrace ■ 
75% of its population. They contain vast; 
material and human resources and are o' 
great consequence to our economy as ■ 
suppliers and markets. ] 

A third of our manufactured exports 
goes to the Third World, which also 
takes about 40% of our agricultural 
exports. A high percentage of our crude 
oil imports comes from the Third World 
as does the bulk of certain industrial rav 
materials. For example about two-thirds 
of our bauxite comes from Jamaica and 
Guinea. Nearly two-thirds of our tin is 
imported from Thailand, Malaysia, Indo 
nesia, and Bolivia. 

Increasingly, Third World countries^ 
including a number without impressive 
natural resource endowments, exert a 
powerful force on investment flows and 
world trade in manufactured products 
through their entrepreneurial prowess, 
their capacity for innovation, and their 
marketing skill. For these latter coun- 
tries, the line between a developed and ; 
developing nation has been crossed or a 
least blurred. 

The strategic location of many 
developing countries also gives them a 
special military and geopolitical impor- 
tance to us. Some, like South Korea, 
Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, 
are close allies; others provide us access 
to important military facilities; still 
others deny the Soviets such facilities. 

Beyond this, the countries of the 
Third World collectively represent an 
important political force. Over time, the; 
have given various organizational 
expressions to their shared perspectives 
and aims. The Nonaligned Movement 
(NAM) was formally organized at the 
Belgrade summit convoked by Marshal 
Tito in 1961. But the roots of Third 
World efforts to define foreign policies 
independent of the superpowers can be 
traced back at least to the Bandung con- 
ference of April 1955. The leaders of the 
movement at that point were primarily 
Asians— among them, Nehru, U Nu, 
Sukarno, and Chou En-lai. 

In the 1960s, the newly independent 
countries of Africa sought strength in 
numbers and found common cause in 



I 



t 



56 



Department of State Bulletir 



GENERAL 



iforts to protect their independence and 
•omote their development. Their 
fluence was registered in the brief 
jpearance of the Afro-Asian Peoples 
olidarity Organization and more per- 
anently in the expansion and growing 
)iceof the NAM. 

As attention shifted from the protec- 
on of sovereignty to economic develop- 
ent, the Latin American countries— 
ost of whom attained independence in 
le 19th century— found they shared 
lany common aims and common afflic- 
ons with the Africans and Asians. 
ideed. the Latin Americans asserted a 
Tong lead in the first UN Conference 
ti Trade and Development in Geneva in 
964. The Group of 77 (G-77)-which 
icreased its numbers but kept its 
crony m— became the principal lobbying 
("ganization through which developing 
juntries pressed for radical adjust- 
lents in the international economic 
,'stem. 

In the 1970s, certain Arab states— 
irticularly those with oil— found their 
iace in the forefront of the NAM and 
-77. OPEC's [Organization of 
etroleum Exporting Countries] success 
5 a supplier cartel able to manipulate 
applies and administer prices fueled a 
rowing sense of power among all 
eveloping countries. A number of 
lem— Algeria, in particular, comes to 
lind— took the lead in pressing for a 
ew international economic order based 
n the premise that the structural 
:onomic problems of developing coun- 
ties were the responsibility of the 
eveloped world, whose members conse- 
uently had an obligation to redistribute 
lobal wealth and economic power as 
Dmpensation for past transgressions. 

By the mid-1980s, a changing inter- 
ational economy and the success of 
ome developing countries with market- 
riented economic development had 
aken much of the steam out of efforts to 
egislate a new international economic 
rder. The NAM maintained ritual sup- 
lort for far-reaching structural economic 
eforms, but attention returned strongly 
political issues. 

Economically, the differentiation of 
?hird World nations is well advanced, 
^or do they speak with a single voice 
)olitically. Yet, to enhance their coUec- 
ive influence in international fora, they 
lave coordinated closely on many such 
ssues through the NAM. 



U.S. Policy Principles 

Let me turn to some of the principles 
that inform U.S. policy toward the Third 
World. For peoples and nations so heter- 
ogeneous and so diverse in their claims 
on our interest, there can be no simple 
U.S. policy. However, we approach the 
Third World with a number of general 
policy guidelines in mind. 

First, we attach high importance to 
the economic development of the Third 
World. This is a matter of self-interest 
but also reflects our sense of respon- 
sibility for helping to create a stable 
global environment in which all share a 
stake. 

We have been the leading source of 
financial and technical assistance to 
developing nations since World War IL 
We sponsored most of the international 
financial institutions that have 
shouldered a growing share of the 
burden for financing development. We 
pioneered institutions like the Fulbright 
Exchange Program and the Peace 
Corps. 

Our capital market has been fully 
open to borrowers from developing coun- 
tries. By 1984, our commercial lending 
institutions had lent some $140 billion to 
Third World countries. Equity invest- 
ment in the Third World exceeded $50 
billion, or roughly a quarter of our total 
overseas investment. Oar transnational 
corporations have taken the lead in 
fostering the global diffusion of 
industrial know-how, technology 
transfer, and capital movement. 

The sustained growth of our 
economy and the open access we afford 
others to trade in our market is perhaps 
the largest contribution we make to the 
growth of developing countries. Policy 
lines in a field so vast are difficult to 
summarize, but we proceed on the basic 
premise that, for Third World countries 
as for others, the path to sustained 
growth lies in the efficiency of free and 
open markets, encouragement to entre- 
preneurial activity in the private sector, 
and the full use of the opportunities 
available for mutually beneficial 
economic transactions in the interna- 
tional trading and financial systems. 

With respect to the instruments of 
policy, aid and trade are, of course, 
paramount. 

Development Assistance— Despite 
severe budgetary constraints arising out 
of our own deficit, we continue to lead 
the world in bilateral economic 
assistance and in our support for 



multilateral development banks and 
other financial institutions. Over the 
past 5 years, the Reagan Administration 
increased U.S. official development 
assistance from $6. .5 billion to $8.8 
billion a year— a level well above other 
industrial democracies and about four 
times that provided by the Soviet Union. 
Contrary to the popular misconception, 
the bulk of our bilateral aid is not 
military assistance but, rather, is 
economic aid. America has been the prin- 
cipal source of financial relief to those 
struggling with debt problems. And we 
have repeatedly taken the lead in 
organizing relief efforts in response to 
natural calamities such as the African 
drought and the El Salvador earthquake. 

Trade— The developing countries 
understandably want trade more than 
aid— an opportunity rather than a hand- 
out. That serves our interests as well 
and explains why we have kept our 
market more open to Third World 
exports than has any other industrial 
nation. Our two-way trade with the 
Third World is now greater than our 
trade with Japan and Western Europe 
combined; it is 10 times greater than 
Soviet trade with the Third World. We 
are also taking the lead in further 
strengthening the world trading system. 
The successful Punta del Este meeting 
last month cleared the way for a new 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. The objective must be to 
reduce further the impediments to free 
and fair trade— particularly by removing 
nontariff barriers to trade. We shall be 
sensitive to the interests of developing 
countries by resisting protectionist trade 
pressures. We will also seek to address 
subjects of special interest to us— 
services, protection of intellectual prop- 
erties, and agriculture. 

The point, however, is this: we 
recognize a large American stake in 
assuring that the Third World enjoys a 
full opportunity to share the benefits of 
growth and prosperity. 

Second, beyond seeking to 
encourage economic growth in the Third 
World, we have taken an active hand in 
promoting the peaceful resolution of 
Third World regional disputes. 

• We have attempted to use our 
relationship with South Africa and the 
front-line states to promote an equitable 



January 1987 



57 



GENERAL 



resolution of the issues of Angola and 
Namibia and to foster the swift and 
peaceful dismantling of apartheid in 
South Africa while expanding our tangi- 
ble support for the black community in 
South Africa and for Pretoria's 
neighbors. 

• In the Middle East, we remain the 
only power that can exert significant 
influence on both sides of the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. We continue to promote 
a just and lasting solution to the 
Palestinian problem in the context of 
peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. Some maintain that an inter- 
national conference is a necessary step 
to move the process along. In our view, 
such proposals should be judged in terms 
of their efficacy for facilitating direct 
negotiations among the parties directly 
concerned. As the Camp David accords 
demonstrated, we can work closely with 
the parties, we can facilitate talks, but in 
the end, direct negotiations among the 
parties to the dispute are the key to an 
enduring settlement. 

• In Central America, we have 
directed our energies to consolidating 
the stability of our democratic friends, 
shielding them from subversive forces 
directed from Nicaragua, encouraging a 
dialogue between the Nicaraguan 
Government and its democratic opposi- 
tion, and supporting a negotiated settle- 
ment through the Contadora process. 

With respect to conflicts arising out 
of Soviet attempts in the late 1970s to 
reshape political forces in a number of 
Third World countries through direct or 
indirect application of force— as, for 
example, in Afghanistan, Angola, and 
Cambodia— we are determined to sup- 
port those resistance forces that are 
fighting for their independence and 
freedom. However, we also believe these 
conflicts can and should be resolved 
politically. We have outlined a frame- 
work for promoting such solutions. The 
key is a negotiating process between the 
warring parties to bring an end to 
violence, national reconciliation, and the 
withdrawal of foreign troops; we see 
scope for U.S. -Soviet talks to support 
such negotiations, ensure a verifiable 
departure of foreign troops, and stem 
the flow of outside arms; and, finally, we 
have affirmed our willingness to extend 
generous support for the reintegration 
of those countries into the world 
economy. 

Third, while the Third World may 
share some common perceptions, by and 
large, it is a highly differentiated group 



of countries with which we should 
cultivate strong bilateral ties. Brazil, 
Argentina, and Mexico in Latin 
America; Egypt, Israel, and Jordan in 
the Middle East; key oil-producing states 
in the gulf; India and Pakistan in South 
Asia; Nigeria, Zambia, and Zaire in 
Africa; South Korea, China, and the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] countries in Asia are only 
the most obvious of the Third World 
countries whose size, location, resources, 
economic prowess, military potential, 
and capacity for effective action invite 
special attention from the United States. 
There are scores of others. We are 
devoting much attention to this task. 

Fourth, we strongly support emerg- 
ing Third World regional associations 
that are demonstrating a collective will 
to solve problems. Regional groups that 
provide a means for pragmatic coopera- 
tion to solve concrete day-to-day prob- 
lems tend to flourish. The Gulf Coopera- 
tion Council, the South Asian Associa- 
tion for Regional Cooperation, the 
Organization of American States, the 
Association of South East Asian 
Nations, and the Organization of African 
Unity all have demonstrated this poten- 
tial. We are providing encouragement 
and support. 

Fifth, we recognize that the United 
Nations is an institution of special impor- 
tance to Third World countries. It is 
easy to understand why. Americans 
themselves regard the United Nations as 
an international expression of our hope 
for a more orderly, peaceful, and pros- 
perous world. We are committed to the 
United Nations as a world forum and a 
sort of parliament for mankind. For the 
countries of the Third World, the United 
Nations offers a means of spotlighting 
attention on their concerns, a forum in 
which they can seek to influence great 
power behavior and use the strength of 
their numbers to press their case on 
economic and political issues. 

The General Assembly and Security 
Council are the proper places for 
political debate. With our great tradition 
of freedeom of expression, we feel at 
home working in such quasilegislative 
bodies. We take words and ideas seri- 
ously. We intend to express our views 
forcefully, and we pay attention to what 
others say on the issues and about us. 

In the United Nations, as in other 
multilateral institutions, however intense 
the clash of interests, norms of civility 
must be observed. A tough debate is to 



be expected, but double standards, 
abuse, and the constant introduction of 
extraneous issues should be avoided. We 
want to strengthen the United Nations 
so that it can make a more effective con 
tribution to international peace and 
problemsolving. We cannot do this alone 
The cooperation of all countries is 
necessary. 

We thus remain strongly committed 
both to the United Nations as an institu- 
tion and to its reform. The recommenda 
tions of the Group of 18, if implemented 
by the General Assembly, will be an 
important starting point. 

The Nonaligned Movement 
and the United States 

In this context, let me say a further 
word about the Nonaligned Movement, 
which remains the principal Third World 
lobby within the United Nations. A 
notable feature of many nonaligned pro- 
nouncements is the disparity in the 
critical standards applied to the United 
States and Soviet Union, respectively. 

Americans find it difficult to accept 
these unequal standards. It was the 
West that conferred independence on 
vast territories in Africa and Asia, whilf» 
the Soviets have not loosened their grip; 
on Eastern Europe. The West— not the 
Soviet Union— has extended vast quan- 
tities of foreign assistance and afforded 
developing countries preferred access 
to its markets. It is the West— not 
Moscow— that has sustained the 
multilateral agencies and institutions or 
which the Third World has come to 
depend for its development. Yet, on bot 
political and economic issues, it is the 
West— and particularly the United 
States— that absorbs the brunt of 
criticism and complaint. 

What accounts for this disparity? 
The basic answer is that the United 
States attracts more Third World atten- 
tion and criticism because our policies 
and actions matter. We have the greate. 
power to affect events; and, in most of 
the Third World, we have a much more 
active presence than the Soviets. We 
have the capacity to influence highly 
charged issues like the Middle East and 
South Africa. Third World countries 
view these with high emotion; and horse 
trading among regional caucuses in the 
United Nations often results in the 
aggregation of extreme views. 

The membership policies of the NAR 
further encourage this tendency. Soviet 
surrogates make their voices heard 
because the NAM has permitted Cuba, 






58 



Department of State Bullet!: 



GENERAL 



•ietnam, Laos, North Korea, and other 
luntries with whom the Soviet Union 
IS a relationship of miHtary support to 
'tain formal nonaligned status— indeed, 
) exercise a measure of leadership, 
egimes that have come under Soviet 
)ntrol, such as that in Afghanistan, are 
3t expelled. Yet the NAM continues to 
■cclude countries such as Honduras, El 
alvador. South Korea, Thailand, and 
enezuela. The cadre of pro-Soviet coun- 
:'ies within the NAM and the nature of 
AM procedures themselves have made 
possible for the Soviet Union both to 
ock criticism of its own policies and 
isture as a "natural ally" and to 
icourage extreme positions and max- 
aum abuse of the United States. 

Although an increasing number of 
AM members— moderates by our stand- 
I'ds— are concerned by this imbalance 
id are actively seeking more genuinely 
Dnaligned positions, they are disadvan- 
iged by the practice of taking decisions 
/ consensus. 

The eighth nonaligned summit, held 
St month in Harare, illustrates this 
tuation. Some attempts at name-calling 
ere struck down in committee, and 
ime notable successes were achieved 
.s, for example, on resolutions dealing 
ith Cambodia and Afghanistan), 
owever, the final political declaration is 
fe with anti-American references. The 
nited States is assailed for its policies 
n disarmament, South Africa, the 
[iddle East, and Central America. A 
Bction condemns U.S. "aggression" and 
state terrorism" against Libya and 
emands compensation— this despite 
olonel Qadhafi's bizarre and much 
ssented attack on the NAM. In the 
jmmit's concluding declaration, the 
Inited States is mentioned by name 67 
mes, almost invariably in a negative 
ontext. The Soviet Union is not men- 
loned once. 

Some say the rhetorical excesses of 
he NAM and other Third World groups 
re akin to letting off political steam and 
hat the United States should not take 
hese verbal criticisms at face value. 
Americans increasingly think otherwise, 
'heir attitudes on U.S. programs for 
?hird World countries, as reflected in 
he Congress, are a clear index of this 
hanging mood. 

The effect of NAM positions and 
■hetoric on the United Nations is par- 
icularly significant in this regard. The 
■esults of NAM meetings reappear in 
■esolutions, votes, and speeches at the 
'nited Nations and its agencies. 



Extreme positions, refusals to negotiate 
or compromise, and vitriolic verbal 
attacks on opponents all poison the UN's 
processes and compromise its ability to 
carry out its important mission. It is for 
this reason that we have made an issue 
of "name-calling" and are mixing it up 
very actively in the struggle for ideas. 
We expect that our views and votes will 
often diverge on the basis of differing 
national interests. We do not ask NAM 
members to abandon their principles of 
nonalignment. On the contrary, we ask 
them simply to adhere to their own self- 
proclaimed goals in a genuine way. 

U.S. Policy Opportunities 
and Challenges 

I have outlined some broad principles 
that inform U.S. policy toward the Third 
World and its principal political group- 
ing, the NAM. Now let me turn briefly 
to some of the trends which offer U.S. 
policy opportunities, as well as some 
which complicate our capacity to pursue 
them. 

One favorable global trend is the 
unfolding of an extraordinary movement 
toward democracy around the world. In 
the Western Hemisphere, over the last 6 
years, elected civilian leaders have 
replaced authoritarian regimes in Argen- 
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Hon- 
duras, Peru, and Uruguay. Today, 90% 
of the people in Latin America and the 
Caribbean enjoy democratic rule, com- 
pared to only one-third a decade ago. 
Nicaragua, Cuba, Paraguay, and Chile 
remain notable and disturbing excep- 
tions to this trend. Elsewhere, the 
yearning for freedom in the Philippines 
brought a remarkably swift and peaceful 
transition to a democracy last February. 
Pakistan has replaced a martial law 
regime with a vigorous civilian 
government. 

We have an opportunity to nurture 
and expand this drive toward 
democracy. Not many years ago, 
democratic nations were thought to be a 
dwindling minority. Today, the vitality 
of the democratic idea is one of the most 
important political realities of our time, 
and American power and influence are 
firmly committed to its support and 
advancement. 

Similarly, our commitment to 
market forces as the key to economic 
development has found increasing 
resonance in the Third World. Nothing 
invigorates the global economic system 
today more than the powerful economic 



recovery that has been underway in the 
United States for nearly 4 years. Suc- 
cess invites emulation. Many Third 
World countries are abandoning the 
economic dogmas of the immediate 
postcolonial period. There is a growing 
recognition of the connection between 
individual initiative and economic 
progress— a growing realization that the 
talents of individual human beings are 
the greatest resource a society can bring 
to the tasks of national development. 

This is apparent in the dynamism of 
the new industrial economies in East 
Asia— economies that have achieved 
incredible growth over extended periods 
by keeping bureaucracies lean and 
encouraging the initiative of their 
private sectors. 

It is equally apparent in Africa, 
where many nations are embarked on 
bold economic reform. At the UN 
Special Session on the Critical Economic 
Situation in Africa held last May, the 
African nations— including those hardest 
hit by collectivist planning— issued an 
extraordinary document calling for more 
open markets and less intervention by 
the state. This was a concerted position 
that African countries brought with 
them to the United Nations after 
deliberations in their regional body, the 
Organization of African Unity. Our ideas 
are taking hold. Thus, there are very 
important opportunities. 

It is ironic that, at a time when 
global trends favor us and we have 
opportunities to pursue more construc- 
tive relations with Third World coun- 
tries, pressures are mounting within our 
country to turn our backs on the world. 

We are the largest free market on 
Earth. Our open trading policies confer 
tangible economic benefits on the 
American people; they have also pro- 
vided vast opportunities for our trading 
partners. Yet America's large trade 
deficit is now stimulating new calls in 
the Congress for protectionist legisla- 
tion. Not since the days of Smoot- 
Hawley have protectionist forces been as 
powerful as they are today. If enacted, 
protectionist measures would endanger 
the new democracies, the poorer coun- 
tries burdened by debt, and many key 
friends around the world. Here at home, 
we will feel the results in higher prices 
and diminished efficiency. In today's 
interdependent global economy, our 
prosperity and that of other nations are 
mutually dependent as never before. 



January 1987 



59 



GENERAL 



A second development that will con- 
strain U.S. policies toward the Third 
World at an important time of oppor- 
tunity is the reduction of our foreign 
affairs budget by the Congress. Last 
January, the President submitted an 
international affairs budget for fiscal 
year 1987 that we had already stripped 
bare. It amounted to only 2% of the total 
Federal budget. Yet the current congres- 
sional budget resolution cuts that 
minimal request by about a quarter 
across the board and even more deeply 
in such crucial areas as support for inter- 
national organizations and economic 
assistance. If enacted, these reductions, 
and the earmarking of aid levels to a few 
countries, will severely impair our ability 
to protect important U.S. interests in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South 
America, the Caribbean, and East Asia. 
They would seriously cut our funding for 
the multilateral development banks, 
which are crucial to Third World 
economic recovery and growth. They 
would reduce our financial leverage for 



real reform in the budget and adminis- 
tration of the United Nations. They 
would result in the closing of diplomatic 
posts and the reduction of our official 
personnel abroad— to a level lower than 
when George C. Marshall was Secretary 
of State. 



Conclusion 

Let me summarize. Both we and the 
countries of the Third World face hard 
choices as we look ahead. But our rela- 
tions with key countries are sound. 
Regional associations are emerging. 
Soviet competitiveness is diminishing. 



Our ideas enjoy a currency they have 
rarely enjoyed. 

We in America face a fundamental 
choice: at a time when favorable global 
trends present new opportunities for 
U.S. policy in the Third World, we can 
continue to be engaged with its countrit 
on behalf of our deepest values and com 
mitments. Or we can choose to stand 
aside and allow events in those increas- 
ingly important parts of the world to 
play themselves out without effective 
U.S. involvement. That decision is ours 
to make, and educators and opinion- 
makers such as you have a decisive role 
to play. ■ 



ic 



r 

IS 



60 



Department of State Bulletir 






GENERAL 



J.S. Foreign Policy 
\chievements and Challenges 



}j Michael H. Armacost 

Address before a State Department 
igional foreign polio/ conference in Salt 
ake City on October 18, 1986. 

his is a beautiful setting in which to 
in a foreign policy conference cospon- 
)red by the University of Utah, 
righam Young University, and the 
tate Department. Throughout our coun- 
y we feel a renewed confidence that 
imerica is in a position to play a positive 
oreign policy role. This is a major 
nange and one of my themes today. 

Journalists normally keep score on 
n administration by adding up the for- 
mal agreements signed with foreign 
Duntries. This is at best an incomplete 
tieasure of success. The Carter Adminis- 
! "ation secured ratification of the 
anama Canal Treaty, moderated the 
amp David agreement, normalized rela- 
ons with China, and negotiated the 
ALT II [strategic arms limitation talks] 
greement on arms control. Yet 
.mericans intuitively understood that 
lese agreements did not add up to suc- 
sss in foreign policy. By 1980, there 
'as a widespread perception both here 
nd abroad that American power had 
een eroded, as had our will to utilize 
ower to protect our interests overseas. 

With congressional elections coming 
nd with President Reagan and General 
•ecretary Gorbachev having met in 
:eland last week, this is an appropriate 
ime to reflect on some of the 
chievements and challenges of 
American foreign policy. Let me briefly 
eport some "good news" and some 
bad news" by describing some of the 
rends in the international and domestic 
■nvironment which currently affect our 
ability to promote foreign policy 
nterests. 

First, the good news. Many global 
rends and developments now favor us. 

\ Favorable 
'Correlation of Forces" 

The most important development in recent 
years is this: a significant shift has 
occurred in what the Soviets call the 
"global correlation of forces." 



You remember the 1970s. We 
experienced a constitutional crisis. We 
endured the ordeal of the American 
hostages in Iran. Long gas lines 
reminded us of America's growing 
dependence on others for basic 
resources. Economists introduced the 
term "stagflation" into our vocabularies. 
President Carter described the national 
mood as one of "malaise." 

The bitter legacy of Vietnam was an 
American disposition to retreat tem- 
porarily from international leadership. 
Divisions appeared in our alliances. The 
cumulative effect of inadequate invest- 
ment in U.S. military modernization 
began to show. 

In contrast, the Soviets appeared to 
be on a roll. The momentum of Moscow's 
strategic modernization effort far 
exceeded ours. Through the direct or 
indirect application of their military 
power, they expanded their influence in 
Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozam- 
bique, and Nicaragua. They invaded and 
attempted to occupy Afghanistan. They 
supported the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia. During this period, many 
Third World countries embraced statist 
political and economic practices; the 
influence of democratic and free market 
principles appeared to wane. 

Much has changed in the 1980s. We 
have substantially rebuilt our military 
power and revitalized our economy. 
There is a new pride in our country, a 
strong consensus that the United States 
should play an active role in the world. 
We have a President who enjoys the lux- 
ury of a second term and the continuity 
of policy which that affords. Our 
alliances are in solid shape. It is now the 
Soviets who are encountering growing 
difficulties at home and abroad and who 
apparently need some respite from the 
East- West competition in order to put 
their house in order. 

Winning the Global 
Contest of Ideas 

My second bit of good news is that we 
are doing very well in the global contest 
of ideas. This is particularly apparent in 
the currency of democracy and market 
economics in the Third World. A decade 
ago, martial law and other forms of 
authoritarianism were de rigueur in the 



.developing countries. We confronted a 
S|Mrited drive by the nonaligned for a 
new international economic order which 
was blatantly statist in its approach. 

Today, 90% of all Latin Americans 
live under governments which can 
plausibly claim to be democratic. Nor is 
this trend confined to this hemisphere. 
All Americans were thrilled by the swift 
and peaceful democratic revolution in 
the Philippines last February. Though 
problems remain, Pakistan made the 
transition from military to civilian 
government. Haiti was relieved of the 
oppression of the Duvaliers. The extraor- 
dinary movement toward democracy 
unfolding in diverse corners of the earth 
reminds us that dictatorship— whether 
of the left or of the right— is not 
permanent. 

President Reagan has personally 
urged democracies to assert their values. 
A National Endowment for Democracy 
was created and has undertaken projects 
in support of democratic institutions in 
the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Chile, 
Haiti, and South Africa. Other projects 
have assisted elementary school educa- 
tion for anticommunist Afghans and sup- 
ported Solidarity and other gi'oups work- 
ing to establish independent institutions 
in Poland. 

So, not many years ago, democratic 
nations were thought to be a dwindling 
minority; democracy was thought to be a 
unique and distinctive attribute of 
Western industrial culture. Today, the 
vitality of the democratic idea is one of 
the most important political realities of 
our time, and America is firmly commit- 
ted to its advancement. 

The movement toward democracy 
has been matched by a growing commit- 
ment to market economics. The reasons 
are obvious. Economies dominated by 
the public sector simply did not produce. 
Those which limited governmental 
intervention and expanded the inter- 
play of market forces have achieved 
remarkable results. 

Today, there is no force in the world 
doing more to invigorate the global 
economic system than the powerful 
economic recovery which has now been 
underway in the United States for nearly 
4 years. It is success that invites 



January 1987 



61 



GENERAL 



emulation. More and more countries are 
looking to the efficiency of free and open 
markets, the vigor of the private sector, 
and the opportunities available in the 
international trading and financial 
systems. From India, to Yugoslavia, to 
Brazil, we find movements to decen- 
tralize, deregulate, and denationalize. 
The dynamism of East Asia's economy is 
well known, as are China's experiments 
with market principles and the dramatic 
growth it has achieved. 

Both these trends— toward 
democracy and the market system— owe 
much to America's example and 
American power. The single biggest 
extension of democratic liberties in 
recent memory occurred at the end of 
World War II when American power 
was at its zenith. It is no coincidence 
that respect for our values has grown in 
recent years as we have renewed the 
sources of our military, economic, and 
political power in the world. 

Soviets on Wrong 
Side of Nationalism 

There is a related trend of considerable 
importance. In those countries where the 
Soviets extended their influence in the 
late 1970s, they now find themselves at 
cross-purposes with the forces of 
nationalism. In Afghanistan. Cambodia, 
Angola, and Nicaragua, regimes of 
dubious legitimacy are supported by 
Soviet subsidies and Soviet or allied 
troops. Each confronts growing 
indigenous resistance. In a nationalist 
era, dependence on outsiders inevitably 
diminishes the appeal and authority of 
Soviet-supported regimes. The Russians 
are learning that it costs a great deal 
more to subsidize such regimes than 
it does to encourage and support 
nationalist forces fighting for a cause. 

Our Agenda on 

Arms Control and Trade 

There is a fourth development of great 
consequence. In the fields of arms con- 
trol and trade— matters of overriding 
consequence to all Americans— the key 
negotiations now address our agenda. 

High drama always attends meetings 
between the President of the United 
States and the General Secretary of the 
Soviet Union, and the meetings in 
Iceland last week were no exception. In 
over 10 hours of intensive discussion, we 
succeeded in getting the Soviets to 
address in a bold and imaginative man- 



ner a number of our key strategic con- 
cerns. In Iceland, we proposed— and the 
Soviets accepted— a .5-year period of 
reductions in strategic forces in which all 
strategic nuclear arms would be reduced 
by 50%. In the next 5 years, we would 
continue by eliminating all remaining 
offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges. 
In INF, we reached agreement that all 
LRINF [longer range intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] missile warheads 
would be eliminated in Europe and all 
but 100 warheads eliminated from the 
Asian portion of the U.S.S.R. 

Note the contrast from a few years 
ago. Then, professional arms controllers 
seemed content to propose limits on the 
rate at which U.S. and Soviet strategic 
offensive systems grew. We are now 
discussing radical reductions of strategic 
nuclear systems. 

In 1983, the zero option for INF put 
forward by the Reagan Administration 
was dismissed by critics as unserious. 
Yet the proposal discussed in Reykjavik 
last weekend involved the elimination of 
all LRINF missiles from Europe and an 
80% reduction of those deployed by the 
Soviet Union in Asia. Until recently, the 
arms control community seemed univer- 
sally to accept the premise that deter- 
rence required mutual threats of 
annihilation. 

In the past, arms control verifica- 
tion arrangements were essentially 
synonymous with national technical 
means of inspection. Both in Stockholm 
and Reykjavik, more rigorous inspection 
methods— including onsite inspec- 
tion—have reentered the vocabulary of 
negotiators. 

In an attempt to take into account 
Soviet concerns, we agreed at Reykjavik 
to defer deployment of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) for 10 years. 
The General Secretary wanted more, 
however. He wanted wording that, in 
effect, would have kept us from develop- 
ing the SDI for the entire 10-year 
period. Gorbachev said that unless we 
acquiesced in his position on the SDI, all 
the progress made on eliminating 
nuclear weapons was canceled. But on 
the SDI President Reagan had to stand 
firm. The SDI has already demonstrated 
its utility as an inducement for serious 
arms control negotiations. It has 
stimulated hope for deterrence which 
relies upon non-nuclear defenses rather 
than mutual threats of annihilation. 



ii 



3 



■i 



f 



!1 



Major substantive progress was 
achieved at Reykjavik. The proposals 
discussed there remain on the table. 
Our arms control negotiators at Genev; 
now have new possibilities with which 
to work toward possibly historic 
agreements. Secretary Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will 
meet in Vienna. We remain patiently 
hopeful and will continue to pursue not 
only arms control but arms reductions, 
with persistence, vigor, and flexibility. 

The trade negotiations held last 
month in Punta del Este received much 
less publicity than the meeting held in 
Iceland. But the results regarding inter? 
national trade are also encouraging. 
That meeting opened the door to 
a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations— one in which trade in serv 
ices, protection of intellectual property, 
and agricultural trade are on the agend; 
for the first time. These are areas of pa: 
ticular concern to us in our determined 
effort to make trade free, open, and fail 

To that end, the United States has 
played a lead role in a series of high-levi 
economic meetings among the indus- 
trialized countries aimed at strengthen- 
ing the global economic system. These 
meetings have sought to promote sus- 
tained growth by relating basic currency 
and structural adjustments to major 
economic indicators, including exchange 
rates. These measures offer the hope of 
increasing exchange rate stability and, 
thereby, of bringing exchange rates and 
international trade surpluses and deficit 
more in line with underlying economic 
realities. 

We have worked closely with Japan 
and other countries to rectify the struc- 
tural imbalances that, among other 
things, contribute to America's huge 
trade deficits. Premier Nakasone, 
recently returned to office in an electors 
landslide, has said Japan must transforn 
its economy to rely more on domestic 
demand and imports, especially manufac 
tured products. Elsewhere, we have 
established free trade areas with Israel 
and Canada. 

In the general trade area, we have 
investigated, denounced, and, in some 
301 cases, retaliated against unfair 
trading practices. 

In short, in the crucial global arenas 
of arms control and international trade, 
America's ability to shape the agenda is 
strong, and we will do all we can to see 
that our issues are kept front and center 
in the bargaining to come. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



GENERAL 



taised Public Consciousness 
m Terrorism and Drugs 

\nother favorable trend is that public 
onsciousness— here and abroad— has 
leen raised regarding two issues of 
remendous importance to Americans: 
errorism and drug trafficking. 

Few terrorist incidents have 
ccurred in the United States, but many 
^.mericans have been affected by such 
ncidents abroad. We have put the world 
-n notice that we will not countenance 
lolitically inspired terrorist actions 
gainst our citizens. 

During the past few years, we have 
chieved remarkable progress in 
eveloping our own intelligence 
apabilities vis-a-vis international ter- 
orists and in sharing that intelligence 
I n a real-time basis with friendly 
ations. We have expanded international 
[ooperation in the field of law enforce- 
jient and counterterrorist training. Last 
I ear, we and our friends foiled 126 
lanned terrorist attacks. 

We are generating support for put- 
.ng teeth into international antiter- 
Drism conventions. For example, the 
nternational Civil Aviation Organization 
DUghened its regulations dramatically 
fter the hijacking of TWA 847. In 
ssponse to the Achille Lauro hijacking, 
le International Maritime Organization 
egan to develop similar regulations 
3r seaborne transportation. Last 
lovember, the UN General Assembly 
dopted a strong resolution declaring 
errorism a crime. 

We have also developed our own 
ounterterrorist military capabilities to 
eact swiftly to terrorist situations. In 
oth the Achille Lauro affair and last 
ipril's assault on Tripoli, we demon- 
trated our willingness and ability to use 
Dree in extremis in pursuit of terrorists 
nd against states who support them. 
Lgainst terrorism we are determined; 
gainst terrorism we will prevail. 

We have seen a similar growth of 
nternational consciousness and coopera- 
ion on the drug question. Here at home, 
nuch needs to be done to reduce the 
lemand for drugs. Abroad, we are 
.Iready rapidly increasing cooperative 
■fforts to restrict drug supplies. The 
Irug problem is becoming a high 
priority. Other countries are visibly 
! ooperating with us in drug eradication 
md enforcement programs. For exam- 
)le, in 1981, only one nation was 
■radicating narcotics crops; in 1986, 14 



nations have signed agreements with the 
United States to undertake aerial or 
manual eradication efforts. 

In 1986, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, and Colombia signed the 
Lara Bonilla Treaty— named after the 
Colombian Justice Minister slain by nar- 
cotics traffickers 2 years before. They 
thereby pledged regional cooperation in 
fighting narcotics production and 
trafficking. In keeping with this commit- 
ment, the Andean nations have under- 
taken major efforts to halt the produc- 
tion, processing, and shipment of 
narcotics. These include the recent suc- 
cessful "Blast Furnace" operation in 
Bolivia which used U.S. military assets. 

That is the good news. Naturally, in 
this business, one does not expect 
everything to go right. There are plenty 
of challenges to go around. Let me 
single out a couple of specific issues for 
special mention. I do so because these 
are matters over which, hopefully, we 
can exert some control. 

Resolving Regional Conflicts 

In regions of conflict around the world, 
America is on the right side of history. 
In the Middle East, Central America, 
and South Africa, for example, we are 
playing a constructive role in helping the 
parties directly involved to bridge their 
differences and to work toward peaceful 
solutions. 

In the Middle East, despite the con- 
tinuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we 
continue to maintain close relations with 
both our Israeli and Arab friends. We 
have developed a broad institutionalized 
framework for economic, political, and 
military cooperation with Israel. We 
work closely with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. The recent Egyptian-Israeli 
summit, as well as the meeting between 
[Israeli] Prime Minister Peres and King 
Hassan of Morocco, suggest that the 
psychological barrier in the Arab world 
against recognition of and dialogue with 
Israel seems to be crumbling. 

Yet, as always, the Middle East 
poses especially difficult challenges. We 
must still find an effective way to bring 
Palestinians of good will who are willing 
to engage in serious and peaceful 
dialogue with the Israelis into the peace 
process. The Egyptian economic situa- 
tion remains a high priority. The Iran- 
Iraq war, now in its sixth year, is a 
human catastrophe which threatens to 
destabilize the entire area. 



While we recognize the role Syria 
plays in the region, its apparent con- 
tinued support for terrorism as an 
instrument of foreign policy prohibits us 
from engaging more fully with it on the 
fundamental problems in the area. 
Libya, because of the policies Qadhafi 
has chosen to pursue, remains an outcast 
both in the region and in the wider com- 
munity of civilized nations. 

In Central America, we are working 
closely with moderate forces for peace- 
ful progress. We have supported El 
Salvador through three democratic elec- 
tions since the so-called final offensive of 
the communist insurgents in January 
1981. We are extending assistance to 
help El Salvador recover from its recent 
tragic earthquake. 

Through economic and security 
assistance, diplomatic support, and close 
consultation, the Administration is 
working with the Central American 
democracies to contain the Nicaraguan 
communist "revolution without 
borders." Like El Salvador, Nicaragua 
had a revolution in 1979. However, 
unlike El Salvador, the Sandinista 
regime has banished legitimate opposi- 
tion, censored the press, and sought to 
intimidate its neighbors by using Cuban 
advisers and Soviet equipment to build 
up the largest military force in the 
region. 

In South Africa, we seek the early 
elimination of apartheid and the exten- 
sion of meaningful civil and economic 
rights to all. President Reagan put 
Americans' hopes for the future of South 
Africa this way: 

This Administration is not only . . . against 
apartheid; we are for a new South Africa, a 
new nation where all that has been built up 
over generations is not destroyed, a new 
society where participation in the social, 
cultural, and political life is open to all 
peoples— a new South Africa that comes home 
to the family of free nations where it belongs. 

The challenge for us in southern 
Africa is to be the champion of construc- 
tive change. Sanctions, in and of 
themselves, do not add up to a policy for 
South Africa. Our policy is to help the 
victims of apartheid— we spent $20 
million is fiscal year (FY) 1986 and will dou- 
ble that this year— and to foster dialogue 
between the South African Government 
and authoritative leaders of the black 
community. We will continue to work 
with all those of good will in southern 
Africa who want to eliminate apartheid, 
to diminish cross-border violence, and to 
deny this strategic area to Soviet 
influence. 



January 1987 



63 



GENERAL 



Too often in discussions of foreign 
policy in this country, people seem 
unprepared to face up to the ambiguity of 
many external situations and the 
necessity of pursuing a complex two- or 
three-track strategy of our own. In deal- 
ing with the Soviets, for example, we 
must compete aggressively even as we 
explore for wider areas of cooperation. 

In dealing with regional conflicts, we 
must be prepared to support our friends 
even as we keep the door open to 
negotiated solutions. In dealing with 
complex political and moral issues, we 
must remember that the test of policy 
is less the goodness of our intentions 
than the results of our actions. In a 
democracy we know that a successful 
policy requires not only a sensible con- 
cept and steady implementation but 
public understanding and support. 

Difficulties with Congress 

We face challenges at home as well. 
Speaking frankly, we have a huge prob- 
lem with the Congress. Actually, we con- 
front two adverse tendencies on the Hill. 

On the one hand. Congress seems 
increasingly disposed to micromanage 
foreign policy. Rather than attempting 
to chart broad objectives in concert with 
the Administration, Congress seeks to 
enforce its will with respect to the 
details of policy execution. That is 
unhelpful— indeed, in the long term, it's 
self-defeating. No nation can manage its 
affairs with 535 Secretaries of State- 
even a country with the margins for 
error we possess. 

At the same time. Congress is deny- 
ing us the resources with which to con- 
duct any coherent policy. The foreign 
affairs budget has been devastated. Our 
foreign assistance program for FY 1987 
was cut by 27%. Since much of the 



budget is earmarked by Congress for 
specific countries or programs, we have 
limited latitude to allocate cuts in an 
equitable fashion. One result is the pros- 
pect of 50%-60% cuts in FY 1987 for 
non-earmarked programs. No one can 
expect us to defend effectively our 
interests in the world while imposing 
such limits on our means. 

Foreign policy is not like writing 
Christmas wish lists. It is a tough proc- 
ess of allocating means which are scarce 
against aims which are legion. Our 
interests abroad are not declining. 
The means of conducting policy are. 
Something will have to give. We either 
accept a more modest role in the world, 
or we flirt with failure to achieve our 
objectives. There is no free lunch in this 
business. 

Our economy is the most prosperous 
in the world. This is another reason why 
cuts in America's foreign affairs budget 
are so difficult to explain to our foreign 
friends and allies. Access to our market 
is coveted by all. By furnishing such 
access to others— and securing, in 
return, fair entree to foreign markets— 
we enable our consumers to buy high 
quality, reasonably priced products, pro- 
vide the spur of competition to our own 
industry, and contribute to the growth 
and prosperity of friendly nations 
around the world. 

There is no doubt that our recent 
trade deficits are not sustainable. Nor do 
we intend to allow them to continue. 
Adjustment of the value of our currency, 
structural adjustments in the economies 
of key trading partners, aggressive 
enforcement of our reciprocal trading 
rights, and multilateral and bilateral 
trade negotiations represent the prin- 
cipal tools of our policy for surmount- 
ing them. On occasion, the threat of 
legislative remedies enhances our 



bargaining position with others. But pn 
tectionist legislation in general does lit- 
tle service for us or others. We should 
resist that temptation. 

Conclusion 

This afternoon, I have spoken of good 
news and bad. I have described some 
global trends which favor us, as well as 
some of the achievements and challenge 
of American foreign policy. All countrie 
confront significant challenges, but a 
society is more likely to best its 
challenges if it retains the conviction 
that its values are worth defending. 

Certain truths, which we say are 
self-evident, give us a realistic yet 
hopeful view of the world. Our fun- 
damental challenge is to preserve the 
balance of power through a willingness 
and strength to defend the cause of 
freedom. Without such stability, the 
sentiments of the Declaration of 
Independence have little chance of 
becoming a reality for men and women 
everywhere. 

We are a democratic country, and 
our success and failure in meeting our 
foreign policy challenges rests with the 
American people. The interests and con 
cern of this group, like that of many 
others throughout our country, give me 
every reason to say that, while our 
challenges are real, our future is also 
bright. ■ 



64 



Department of State Bulletir 



TIIDDLE EAST 



J.S. Initiative to Iran 



•RESIDENT'S ADDRESS 

TO THE NATION. 
JOV. 13. 1986' 

know you've been reading, seeing, and 
earing a lot of stories the past several 
•ays attributed to Danish sailors, 
nnamed observers at Italian ports and 
■panish harbors, and especially unnamed 
overnment officials of my Administra- 
,.on. Well, now you are going to hear the 
icts from a White House source, and 
ou know my name. 

I wanted this time to talk with you 
bout an extremely sensitive and pro- 
jundly important matter of foreign 
olicy. For 18 months now we have had 
nderway a secret diplomatic initiative 
) Iran. That initiative was undertaken 
)r the simplest and best of reasons— to 
jnew a relationship with the nation of 
•an. to bring an honorable end to the 
loody 6-year war between Iran and 
•aq, to eliminate state-sponsored ter- 
irism and subversion, and to effect the 
ife return of all hostages. 

Without Iran's cooperation, we can- 
Dt bring an end to the Persian Gulf 
ar; without Iran's concurrence, there 
m be no enduring peace in the Middle 
ast. 

For 10 days now, the American and 
orld press have been full of reports and 
amors about this initiative and these 
Djectives. Now, my fellow Americans, 
lere is an old saying that nothing 
)reads so quickly as a rumor. So I 
lought it was time to speak with you 
rectly— to tell you firsthand about our 
jalings with Iran. As Will Rogers once 
lid, "Rumor travels faster, but it don't 
:ay put as long as truth." So let's get to 
le facts. 

The charge has been made that the 
nited States has shipped weapons to 
•an as ransom payment for the release 
f American hostages in Lebanon— that 
le United States undercut its allies and 
jcretly violated American policy against 
•afficking with terrorists. 

Those charges are utterly false. The 
nited States has not made concessions 
) those who hold our people captive in 
ebanon. And we will not. The United 
tates has not swapped boatloads or 
laneloads of American weapons for the 
eturn of American hostages. And we 
ill not. 



Other reports have surfaced alleging 
U.S. involvement: reports of a sealift to 
Iran using Danish ships to carry 
American arms; of vessels in Spanish 
ports being employed in secret U.S. 
arms shipments; of Italian ports being 
used; of the United States sending spare 
parts and weapons for combat aircraft. 
All these reports are quite exciting, but 
as far as we are concerned, not one of 
them is true. 

Sending a Signal to Tehran 

During the course of our secret discus- 
sions. I authorized the transfer of small 
amounts of defensive weapons and spare 
parts for defensive systems to Iran. My 
purpose was to convince Tehran that our 
negotiators were acting with my author- 
ity, to send a signal that the United 
States was prepared to replace the 
animosity between us with a new rela- 
tionship. These modest deliveries, taken 
together, could easily fit into a single 
cargo plane. They could not, taken 
together, affect the outcome of the 
6-year war between Iran and Iraq— nor 
could they affect in any way the military 
balance between the two countries. 

Those with whom we were in contact 
took considerable risks and needed a 
signal of our serious intent if they were 
to carry on and broaden the dialogue. 

At the same time we undertook this 
initiative, we made clear that Iran must 
oppose all forms of international ter- 
rorism as a condition of progress in our 
relationship. The most significant step 
which Iran could take, we indicated, 
would be to use its influence in Lebanon 
to secure the release of all hostages held 
there. 

Some progress has already been 
made. Since U.S. Government contact 
began with Iran, there's been no 
evidence of Iranian Government com- 
plicity in acts of terrorism against the 
United States. Hostages have come 
home, and we welcome the efforts that 
the Government of Iran has taken in the 
past and is currently undertaking. 



Iran's Strategic Importance 

But why, you might ask, is any relation- 
ship with Iran important to the United 
States? Iran encompasses some of the 
most critical geography in the world. It 
lies between the Soviet Union and access 



to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. 
Geography explains why the Soviet 
Union has sent an army into 
Afghanistan to dominate that country 
and, if they could, Iran and Pakistan. 

Iran's geography gives it a critical 
position from which adversaries could 
interfere with oil flows from the Arab 
states that border the Persian Gulf. 
Apart from geography, Iran's oil 
deposits are important to the long-term 
health of the world economy. For these 
reasons, it is in our national interest to 
watch for changes within Iran that 
might offer hope for an improved rela- 
tionship. Until last year, there was little 
to justify that hope. 

Indeed, we have bitter and enduring 
disagreements that persist today. At the 
heart of our quarrel has been Iran's past 
sponsorship of international terrorism. 
Iranian policy has been devoted to 
expelling all Western influence from the 
Middle East. We cannot abide that 
because our interests in the Middle East 
are vital. At the same time, we seek no 
territory or special position in Iran. The 
Iranian revolution is a fact of history, 
but between American and Iranian basic 
national interests there need be no per- 
manent conflict. 

Since 1983, various countries have 
made overtures to stimulate direct con- 
tact between the United States and Iran. 
European, Near Eastern, and Far 
Eastern countries have attempted to 
serve as intermediaries. Despite a U.S. 
willingness to proceed, none of these 
overtures bore fruit. With this history in 
mind, we were receptive last year when 
we were alerted to the possibility of 
establishing a direct dialogue with Ira- 
nian officials. 

Now, let me repeat. America's 
longstanding goals in the region have 
been to help preserve Iran's inde- 
pendence from Soviet domination; to 
bring an honorable end to the bloody 
Iran-Iraq war; to halt the export of 
subversion and terrorism in the region. 
A major impediment to those goals has 
been an absence of dialogue, a cutoff in 
communication between us. 

The Search for a Better Relationship 

It's because of Iran's strategic impor- 
tance and its influence in the Islamic 
world that we chose to probe for a better 
relationship between our countries. 



anuary 1987 



65 



MIDDLE EAST 



Our discussions continued into the 
spring of this year. Based upon the prog- 
ress we felt we had made, we sought to 
raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A 
meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then 
asked my former national security 
adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake 
a secret mission and gave him explicit 
instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to 
open a dialogue, making stark and clear 
our basic objectives and disagreements. 

The 4 days of talks were conducted 
in a civil fashion; and American person- 
nel were not mistreated. Since then, the 
dialogue has continued, and step-by-step 
progress continues to be made. 

Let me repeat: our interests are 
clearly served by opening a dialogue 
with Iran and thereby helping to end the 
Iran-Iraq war. That war has dragged on 
for more than 6 years, with no prospect 
of a negotiated settlement. The 
slaughter on both sides has been enor- 
mous; and the adverse economic and 
political consequences for that vital 
region of the world have been growing. 
We sought to establish communication 
with both sides in that senseless strug- 
gle, so that we could assist in bringing 
about a cease-fire and, eventually, a set- 
tlement. We have sought to be even- 
handed by working with both sides and 
with other interested nations to prevent 
a widening of the war. 

This sensitive undertaking has 
entailed a great risk for those involved. 
There is no question but that we could 
never have begun or continued this 
dialogue had the initiative been disclosed 
earlier. Due to the publicity of the past 
week, the entire initiative is very much 
at risk today. 

There is ample precedent in our 
history for this kind of secret diplomacy. 
In 1971, then-President Nixon sent his 
national security adviser on a secret mis- 
sion to China. In that case, as today, 
there was a basic requirement for discre- 
tion and for a sensitivity to the situation 
in the nation we were attempting to 
engage. 

Since the welcome return of former 
hostage David Jacobsen, there have been 
unprecedented speculation and countless 
reports that have not only been wrong 
but have been potentially dangerous to 
the hostages and destructive of the 
opportunity before us. The efforts of 
courageous people like Terry Waite [lay 
assistant to the Archbishop of Canter- 
bury] have been jeopardized. So exten- 
sive have been the false rumors and 
erroneous reports that the risks of 
remaining silent now exceed the risks of 



speaking out. And that's why I decided 
to address you tonight. 

It's been widely reported, for exam- 
ple, that the Congress, as well as top 
executive branch officials, were cir- 
cumvented. Although the efforts we 
undertook were highly sensitive and 
involvement of government officials was 
limited to those with a strict need to 
know, all appropriate Cabinet officers 
were fully consulted. The actions I 
authorized were and continue to be in 
full compliance with Federal law. And 
the relevant committees of Congress are 
being and will be fully informed. 

Another charge is that we have 
tilted toward Iran in the gulf war. This, 
too, is unfounded. We have consistently 
condemned the violence on both sides. 
We have consistently sought a 
negotiated settlement that preserves the 
territorial integrity of both nations. The 
overtures we've made to the Govern- 
ment of Iran have not been a shift to 
supporting one side over the other. 
Rather, it has been a diplomatic 
initiative to gain some degree of access 
and influence within Iran— as well as 
Iraq— and to bring about an honorable 
end to that bloody conflict. It is in the 
interests of all parties in the gulf region 
to end that war as soon as possible. 

To summarize, our government has a 
firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist 
demands. That "no concessions" policy 
remains in force— in spite of the wildly 
speculative and false stories about arms 
for hostages and alleged ransom 
payments. We did not— repeat— did not 
trade weapons or anything else for 
hostages; nor will we. Those who think 
that we have "gone soft" on terrorism 
should take up the question with Col. 
Qadhafi. 

We have not, nor will we, capitulate 
to terrorists. We will, however, get on 
with advancing the vital interests of our 
great nation— in spite of terrorists and 
radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts 
and immobilize the United States. Our 
goals have been and remain: 



Iran; 



To restore a relationship with 



• To bring an honorable end to the 
war in the gulf; 

• To bring a halt to state-supported 
terror in the Middle East; and 

• Finally, to effect the safe return of 
all hostages from Lebanon. 

As President, I've always operated 
on the belief that, given the facts, the 
American people will make the right 
decision. I believe that to be true now. 



I cannot guarantee the outcome. 
But, as in the past, I ask for your sup- 
port because I believe you share the 
hope for peace in the Middle East, for 
freedom for all hostages, and for a wof 
free of terrorism. Certainly, there are 
risks in this pursuit, but there are 
greater risks if we do not persevere. 

It will take patience and understan( 
ing; it will take continued resistance to 
those who commit terrorist acts; and it 
will take cooperation with all who seek 
to rid the world of this scourge. 



SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW 
ON "FACE THE NATION," 
NOV. 16, 1986= 



} 



i 



Q. Is it true, as has been widely 
reported, that this secret shipment of 
arms to Iran — the operation — went 
forward despite your objections to it?? 
And if that's true, why did you objecft 
to it? 

A. I never discuss the advice I give 
to the President. That's something be- 
tween the President and me. But let m* 
tell you how I see this. 

First of all, as Congressman 
Wright— Speaker Wright— said, there 
was an opportunity to probe for a dif- 
ferent relationship with Iran; and 
because of the strategic situation, that 
seemed important to us. And I might 
say, because of the strategic situation, i 
undoubtedly is important to Iran. So 
there's something mutual there. 

In addition, the war, Iran's terroris< 
acts, its effort to ship its revolution 
abroad constituted a problem; and if 
something could be done about that, w 
we'd be better off. |f 

By and large, everybody agrees tha 
that's a good thing to do. So the Presi- 
dent decided on a probing operation to 
sort of feel his way, find out what migh 
be done. In order to be effective, clearlj 
that had to be done secretly— and I thin 
people would agree on that. 

In the course of that probe, which I 
was conducted by his national security I 
adviser— that's his designated hitter— as , 
the President said in his address to the | 
nation last week, he decided that a i 

signal should be sent in terms of a small I 
defensive arms shipment to show his 
serious intent and good faith. That's ' 
debatable. If you can— 

Q. But that's the crux of it. 

A. No. Wait a minute. You can 
argue for that— there are some good 
reasons why; you can argue against it. 
At any rate, when you get elected Presi- 
dent, that's one of the things you get th( 



66 



Department of State Bulleti 



MIDDLE EAST 



' ight to do, to make decisions of that 
ind. So the President decided on this 
ignal, and he did it. And he— 

Q. On whose advice, though? 

A. And he set that out before the 
ation very clearly. 

Now, the probe has gone on, and we 
11 recognize that there are two principal 
bstacles to the kind of relationship we'd 
■ke to see with Iran. One is the continu- 
ig war with Iraq— and Iran is the coun- 
ry that seems intransigent, not wanting 
get it settled. Furthermore, Iran has 
nd continues to pursue a policy of ter- 
orism, as shown for example in the fact 
nat some terrorists were part of the 
ilgrimage to Mecca recently, last sum- 
ler. So they continue in that policy, and 
'e have to be concerned about ter- 
orism, whether directed against us or 
irected against anybody else. 

So those are two principal and 
lixed-together obstacles, and we need 
3, of course, respond to those. Among 
ur responses is our denial of arms 
nipments to Iran, and that policy 
amains our policy. It is in effect, and 
lere it is. 

Q. You must explain that to the 
.merican people. You — 

A. I've just explained it. 

Q. No, that— no. Let's try to con- 
entrate on the arms part of this. 
Iverybody will— I'll stipulate with you 
tiat a lot of people think the probe 
/as a good idea. It's the arms that 
verybody is concerned about. 

First, before we even get into it, 
ou just said that that continues to be 
ur policy. You went, yourself, to the 
fnited Nations 6 weeks ago while this 
ecret operation was underway, after 
he President had sent some arms 
irectly and apparently sanctioned, 
ondoned third-party shipments to 
ran, and told the moderate Arab 
tates at the United Nations that we 
k'eren't doing that. Now how could 
ou have done that? 

A. The President decided, as he said 
■ublicly to the nation— he didn't par- 
icularly want to disclose it at that time, 
'Ut he felt he needed to. 

I Q. Because he got caught. 

A. He decided— well, no, I don't 
hink that's a fair way to put it. 

He was conducting an ongoing 
irobe, and he was seeing some 
esponses to that, and so he wanted to 
:eep it going. I think we all recognize 
'hat, for better or worse, all the publicity 
)robably sets that back somewhat. At 
my rate, he decided to put forward as a 
gesture- as a signal, I think was the 



word he used— of his good intent some- 
thing that they recognized was tough for 
him to do; and he did it, wanting to give 
a signal of a desire for a different kind of 
relationship. 

Now, that's controversial, and there 
it is. And you can argue for it; you can 
argue against it. 

Q. But why did you, then, go and 
tell the Arabs that we weren't doing 
that? 

A. First of all, my own information 
about the operational aspects of what 
was going on was fragmentary at best- 
so that's one point. Second, our policy, 
insofar as arms shipments is concerned, 
remains; and there hasn't been any flood 
of U.S. arms to Iran, as seems to be 
implied as far as I understand. 

Q. I still don't understand why 
you went and pledged and told the 
moderate Arab states that we were not 
sending shipments of arms to Iran 
when we were. 

A. As far as I knew at that time, we 
didn't have any ongoing further signals. 
We had a signal, we had given a signal, 
and our discussion continued. It's a pro- 
blem. But the President decided to send 
something small as a signal, and he did 
it. 

Q. I don't want to. you know— I 
don't want to badger you, but you're 
not answering my question. 

A. Oh, no. You can badger me. 

Q. Okay. good. Why did you not 
tell the Arabs the truth? Why did you 
tell them an untruth? 

A. The basic truth is that we con- 
tinue to have a very firm arms 
embargo— 

Q. How can you say that to the 
American people? 

A. —and we continue to work at it. 

Q. You're trying to say— you 
know, it's just like Daniloff. You try 
to tell us that a swap wasn't a swap. 
You're trying to tell us that we have a 
policy of not sending arms when we 
have sent arms directly, and we have 
permitted it through Israel. And I 
know that— I expect you're not going 
to confirm that, we all know that. 
Now how can you say we have a policy 
against sending shipments to Iran? 
How can you look at the American 
people and tell them that? 

A. We have a policy of not sending 
arms. The President decided that he 
would go ahead and send this signal, and 
that's a decision that he made in the 
light of all the circumstances. And as I 
say, you can argue for it and you can 
argue against, but there it is. 



Q. What did we get in return for 
the shipments of arms? 

A. It remains to be seen what 
precisely takes place. There is a certain 
amount of evidence that our ability to 
talk to Iran in a sensible fashion has 
improved and a certain amount of 
evidence that their terrorist acts against 
Americans, at least, has improved— 
although I want to quickly say that we 
must look on the terrorism matter as an 
international matter, not just something 
limited to Americans. 

Q. Did you ever consider resigning 
over this? 

A. Oh, I talk to the President. I 
serve at his pleasure, and anything that 
I have to say on that subject, I'd just say 
to him. 

Q. Who has taken the three new 
hostages? Mr. Poindexter. the national 
security adviser, went on a television 
show earlier this week and said that 
radical elements in Iran took the three 
new hostages. Is that your 
understanding? 

A. I think it's hard to know exactly 
what is going on. We don't know where 
our hostages are, and we don't know 
exactly who holds them; but it does seem 
to be reasonably clear that groups in 
Lebanon associated with Iran are the 
ones who are dealing with the hostages. 
And I might say that Iran's use of ter- 
rorism, Iran's taking of hostages, to me 
is something that we have to fight 
against very hard and unequivocally. 

Q. What can the United States do 
to restore its credibility, its greatly 
damaged credibility, over this with the 
Arabs who are scalding mad. as I 
know you know because you've been 
meeting with some of their represent- 
atives here, and U.S. allies whom 
we've been leaning on not to send 
shipments of arms to Iran? What are 
you going to do to try to repair this 
damage? 

A. We have to set out our policy, let 
them know clearly that what we sent 
was a signal— a signal has been sent, and 
that's that— and continue to probe and 
probably have to put it in some different 
framework, with all of the publicity 
about it. 

Q. If you tell our allies and other 
diplomats that our policy remains to 
embargo arms against Iran, aren't 
they just going to smile and laugh and 
say, "Come on. You're doing it. We're 
going to do it."? 

A. Probably, they will. On the other 
hand, we have to be serious about it 
ourselves, and we have to reinforce it, 



January 1987 



67 



MIDDLE EAST 



and we have to point out to them the 
reason why we have that policy. And the 
reason why we have it apphes to them as 
well. 

They have a stake in a changed Iran; 
they have a stake in an end of the war; 
they have a stake in a change in terror; 
and so on. So I think the basic policies of 
probing Iran, but at the same time being 
tough about an arms embargo and being 
tough on terrorism and not trading arms 
for hostages— the President said that 
was not his intent and he did not do 
that— and I think it is clearly wrong to 
trade arms for hostages. So that is our 
policy; that remains our policy. 

And I might say that all of the public 
discussions probably helped somewhat 
because it has kind of confirmed the fact 
that, cruel as it may seem to the families 
involved— and we all can feel that— still 
it isn't the right thing for governments 
to trade arms or anything else for 
hostages, just because it encourages 
taking more. 

Q. Will there be any more arms 
shipments to Iran, either directly by 
our government or through any third 
parties? 

A. It's certainly against our policy— 



That's not an answer. 

—and I think the signal has been 



Q. 

A. 

given. 

Q. It was against our policy 
before, and we went ahead and did it. 
You seem to be saying there will be. 

A. We gave a signal, and the signal 
has been given; and as far as I'm con- 
cerned, I don't see any need for further 
signals. 

Q. Then, why don't you answer 
the question directly? I'll ask it again: 
Will there be any more arms shipments 
to Iran, either directly by the United 
States or through any third parties? 

A, Under the circumstances of 
Iran's war with Iraq, its pursuit of ter- 
rorism, its association with those holding 
our hostages I would certainly say, as 
far as I'm concerned, no. 

Q. Do you have the authority to 
speak for the entire Administration? 
A. No. 



PRESIDENTS NEWS 

CONFERENCE (EXCERPT), 
NOV. 19, 19863 

Eighteen months ago, as I said last 
Thursday, this Administration began a 
secret initiative to the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Our purposes were fourfold: to 
replace a relationship of total hostility 
with something better; to bring a 
negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war; to 
bring an end to terrorism; and to effect 
the release of our hostages. 

We knew this undertaking involved 
great risks, especially for our people and 
i^or the Iranian officials with whom we 
dealt. That is why the information was 
restricted to appropriate Cabinet officers 
and those officials with an absolute need 
to know. This undertaking was a matter 
of considerable debate within Admini- 
stration circles. Our policy objectives 
were never in dispute. There were dif- 
ferences on how best to proceed. 

The principal issue in contention was 
whether we should make isolated and 
limited exceptions to our arms embargo 
as a signal of our serious intent. Several 
top advisers opposed the sale of even a 
modest shipment of defensive weapons 
and spare parts to Iran. Others felt no 
progress could be made without the sale. 
I weighed their views. I considered the 
risks of failure and the rewards of suc- 
cess, and I decided to proceed. The 
responsibility for the decision and the 
operation is mine and mine alone. 

As Mr. Lincoln said of another 
presidential decision, "If it turns out 
right, the criticism will not matter. If it 
turns out wrong, ten angels swearing I 
was right will make no difference." 

I understand this decision is deeply 
controversial and that some profoundly 
disagree with what was done. Even 
some who support our secret initiative 
believe it was a mistake to send any 
weapons to Iran. I understand and I 
respect those views, but I deeply believe 
in the correctness of my decision. I was 
convinced then and I am convinced now 
that while the risks were great, so, too, 
was the potential reward. Bringing Iran 
back into the community of responsible 
nations, ending its participation in 
political terror, bringing an end to that 
terrible war, and bringing our hostages 
home— these are the causes that justify 
taking risks. 

In foreign policy, the presence of 
risks alone cannot be reason enough not 
to act. There were risks when we 
liberated Grenada, when we went into 
Lebanon, when we aided the Philippines, 
and when we acted against Libya, so 
we'll continue our efforts. However, to 



68 



eliminate the widespread but mistaken 
perception that we have been exchang- 
ing arms for hostages, I have directed 
that no further sales of arms of any kini 
be sent to Iran. I have further directed 
that all information relating to our 
initiative be provided to the appropriate 
Members of Congress. There may be 
some questions which for reasons of 
national seciirity or to protect the safet; 
of the hostages I will be unable to 
answer publicly. But again, all informa- 
tion will be provided to the appropriate 
Members of Congress. 

Q. In the recent past, there was ai 
Administration whose by-word was, 
"Watch what we do, not what we 
say." How would you assess the 
credibility of your own Administratioi 
in the light of the prolonged deceptio) 
of Congress and the public in terms of 
your secret dealing with Iran, the 
disinformation, the trading of 
Zakharov for Daniloff? 

A. Let me take the last one first. 
Some persist in saying that we traded 
Zakharov for Daniloff. We did not. We 
said that we would have no dealings wit! 
the Soviet Union, even on going to 
Iceland, until Daniloff was in our hands- 

But to bring it up to date on this, 
there was no deception intended by us. 
There was the knowledge that we were 
embarking on something that could be c 
great risk to the people we were talking 
to, great risk to our hostages. And, 
therefore, we had to have it limited to 
only the barest number of people that 
had to know. I was not breaking any lav 
in doing that. It is provided for me to d( 
that. At the same time, I have the right 
under the law to defer reporting to Con 
gress, to the proper congressional com- 
mittees, on an action and defer it until 
such time as I believe it can safely be 
done with no risk to others. 

And that's why I have ordered in 
this coming week the proper committees 
will be briefed on this. There are still 
some parts of this that we cannot go 
public with because it will bring to risk 
and danger people that are held and 
people that we have been negotiating 
with. We were not negotiating 
government-to-government. We were 
negotiating with certain individuals 
within that country. 

Q. You don't think your credibilit) 
has been damaged? And are you 
prepared now to disavow the finding 
which let you make end runs around 
the Iranian arms embargo? Are you 
going to tear it up? 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



A. No. As I say, we are going to 
jbserve that embargo and it's part of the 
ame reason that, as I've said, we were 
oing this in the first place. And that is 

I .■^ee, among the other issues involved, 
' we can help bring about peace be- 
ween those two countries— a peace 
,'ithout victory to either one or defeat 
,nd that will recognize the territorial in- 
egrity of both. And this is something 
lat all of our allies are seeking also. 

But I think the people understand 
lat sometimes you have to keep a 
lecret in order to save human lives and 
J succeed in the mission, just as we 
'ent into Grenada without prior notice, 
ecause then we would have put to risk 

II of those men who were going to hit 
le beach. 

Q. Has Secretary Shultz discussed 
is resignation with you? Have you 
greed to accept it or have you asked 
im to stay on? 

A. He has never suggested to me in 
ur meetings that— resignation and, in 
ict, he has made it plain that he will 
tay as long as I want him and I want 
im. So, there's never been any discus- 
on there. He knows that I want him to 
;ay and he has in advance said that he 
■ants to. There's been no talk of 
3signation. 

Q. Has he made his staying condi- 
loned on your agreeing not to send 
irther arms to Iran? 

A. No. There has been no condi- 
ons. As I say, we didn't discuss that, 
.nd, as I've said now, there is no need 
3 go further with this. The mission was 
2rved that made us waive temporarily 
lat for that really miniscule amount of 
Dare parts and defensive weapons. 

Q. You have stated flatly and you 
tated flatly again tonight that you did 
ot trade weapons for hostages. And 
et the record shows that every time 
n American hostage was released — 
1st September, this July, and again 
ast this very month — there had been a 
lajor shipment of arms just before 
hat. Are we all to believe that was 
ust a coincidence? 

A. The only thing I know about 
"lajor shipments of arms— as I've said, 
verything that we sold them could be 
ut in one cargo plane, and there would 
e plenty of room left over. Now, if 
here were major shipments— and we 
now this has been going on— there have 
I'een other countries that have been 
■ ealing in arms with Iran. There have 
leen also private merchants of such 
hings that have been doing the same 
hing. Now, I've seen the stories about a 
)anish tramp steamer and a Danish 



sailor's union officials talking about their 
ships taking various supplies to Iran. I 
didn't know anything about that until I 
saw the press on it, because we certainly 
never had any contact with anything of 
the kind. It's just that we did something 
for a particular mission, that there was a 
risk entailed, and Iran held no hostages. 
Iran did not kidnap anyone, to our 
knowledge, and the fact that part of the 
operation was that we knew, however, 
that the kidnappers of our hostages did 
have some kind of relationship in which 
Iran could at times influence them— not 
always— but could influence them. And 
so three of our hostages came home. 

Q. On that first point, your own 
Chief of Staff, Mr. Regan, has said 
that the United States condoned 
Israeli shipments of arms to Iran and 
aren't you, in effect, sending the very 
message you always said you didn't 
want to send? Aren't you saying to the 
terrorists, either you or your state 
sponsor — which in this ease was 
Iran — can gain from the holding of 
hostages? 

A. Because I don't see where the 
kidnappers or the hostage-holders gained 
anything. They didn't get anything. 
They let the hostages go. Now, whatever 
is the pressure that brought that about, 
I'm just grateful to it for the fact that 
we got them. As a matter of fact, if 
there had not been so much publicity, we 
would have had two more that we were 
expecting. 

Q. When you had the arms 
embargo on, you were asking other 
nations, our allies particularly, to 
observe it — publicly. But at the same 
time privately, you concede you were 
authorizing a breaking of that 
embargo by the United States. How 
can you justify this duplicity? 

A. I don't think it was duplicity, and 
as I say, the so-called violation did not in 
any way alter the balance, military 
balance, between the two countries. But 
what we were aiming for, I think, made 
it worthwhile, and this was a waiver of 
our own embargo. The embargo still 
stays now and for the future. But the 
causes that I outlined here in my open- 
ing statement, first of all, to try and 
establish a relationship with a country 
that is of great strategic importance to 
peace and everything else in the Middle 
East. At the same time also, to strike a 
blow against terrorism and to get our 
hostages back, as we did, and to— this 
particular thing was, we felt necessary 
in order to make the contacts that we 
made, and that could lead to better rela- 
tions with us. And there was a fourth 
item, also, as I pointed out. 



Q. The polls show that a lot of 
American people just simply don't 
believe you. But the one thing that 
you've had going for you more than 
anything else in your presidency, your 
credibility, has been severely 
damaged. Can you repair it? What does 
it mean for the rest of your 
presidency? 

A. I imagine I'm the only one 
around who wants to repair it, and I 
didn't have anything to do with damag- 
ing it. 

Q. You say that the equipment 
which was shipped didn't alter the 
military balance. Yet, several things — 
we understand that there were 1,000 
TOW [tube-launched, optically 
tracked, wire-guided] antitank 
missiles shipped by the United States. 
The United States apparently con- 
doned shipments by Israel and other 
nations of other quantities of arms as 
an ancillary part of this deal — not 
directly connected but had to condone 
it, or the shipments could not have 
gone forward. So, how can you say 
that it cannot alter the military 
balance, and how can you say that it 
didn't break the law when the 
National Security Act of 1977 plainly 
talks about timely notification of Con- 
gress and also stipulates that if the 
national security required secrecy, the 
President is still required to advise the 
leadership and the chairmen of the 
intelligence committees? 

A. Everything you've said here is 
based on a supposition that is false. We 
did not condone and do not condone the 
shipment of arms from other countries. 
And what was the other point that you 
made here— 

Q. There were the antitank 
missiles. 

A. Oh no, about the— that it 
didn't— no, that it didn't violate the— or 
that did violate the law. No, as I've said, 
the President, believe it or not, does 
have the power if, in his belief, national 
security can be served to waive the pro- 
visions of that law, as well as to defer 
the notification of the Congress on this. 

Q. Is it possible that the Iraqis 
might think that 1,000 antitank 
missiles were enough to alter the 
balance of that war? 

A. This is a purely defensive 
weapon— it is a shoulder-carried weapon 
and we don't think that in this defensive 
thing— we didn't add to any offensive 
power on the part of Iran. We know that 
Iraq has already announced that they 
would be willing to settle the conflict, as 



January 1987 



69 



MIDDLE EAST 



we've said, with no winners or losers. 
And that, and the other parts, happened 
to be spare parts for an antiaircraft 
Hawk battery. And, as I say, all of those 
weapons could be very easily carried in 
one mission. 

Q. I don't think it's still clear just 
what Israel's role was in this — the 
questions that have been asked about a 
condoned shipment. We do understand 
that the Israelis sent a shipment in 
1985, and there were also reports that 
it was the Israelis that contacted your 
Administration and suggested that you 
make contact with Iran. Could you 
explain what the Israeli role was here? 

A. No, because we, as I say, have 
had nothing to do with other countries 
or their shipment of arms or doing what 
they're doing. And, no— as a matter of 
fact, the first ideas about the need to 
restore relations between Iran and the 
United States or the Western world, for 
that matter, actually began before our 
Administration was here. But from the 
very first, if you look down the road at 
what could happen and perhaps a change 
of government there— that it was abso- 
lutely vital for the Western world and to 
the hope for peace in the Middle East 
and all, for us to be trying to establish 
this relationship. And we worked to— it 
started about 18 months ago, really, as 
we began to find out— some individuals 
that it might be possible for us to deal 
with, and who also were looking at the 
probability of a further accident. 

Q. The contacts that you're sug- 
gesting are with moderates in the Ira- 
nian Government and in the Iranian 
system. Barry Goldwater tonight said 
in his judgment there are no 
moderates in Iran. I don't mean to 
suggest that there may not be, but 
how did you know that you were 
reaching the moderates, and how do 
you define a moderate in that kind of a 
government? 

A. Again, you're asking questions 
that I cannot get into with regard to the 
answers. But believe me, we had infor- 
mation that led us to believe that there 
are factions within Iran and many of 
them with an eye toward the fact that 
they think sooner, rather than later, 
there is going to be a change in the 
government there and there is great 
dissatisfaction among the people in Iran. 

Q. Your chief arms negotiator. 
Max Kampelman, said that as a result 
of your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in 
Iceland that there, indeed, were 
substantial results and agreements. 
But the Soviet — the leadership of the 
Soviet Union say that there were no 



results — nothing positive — and the 
area is widely scattered still. How do 
you propose in your term — in the 
remainder of your term, to close the 
gap and bring — for an agreement? 

A. The thing is about thai situation, 
they are not widely scattered. All the 
agreements or the apparent places 
where we agreed at Reykjavik are on the 
table now with our arms negotiators in 
Geneva. And for the first time, there 
was an agreement reached on the desir- 
ability of eliminating all strategic 
nuclear missiles in a 5-year period and 
then dealing with the intermediate-range 
missiles in Germany. And just before the 
meeting broke up was the first time 
that— it had always been our purpose, 
and it was our purpose when we went 
there, to see if this— these are the 
destabilizing weapons, these are the 
weapons that people in their minds can 
picture someone pushes a button and a 
lot of places blow up. And we always 
thought that if we could make a start on 
those— the destabilizing missiles— and 
then we could work on to the other 
nuclear weapons— bombs carried by 
airplanes and so forth. 

And we had gone there with the 
express purpose of seeing if we could 
arrive at some kind of a settlement on 
one of the other of these other two 
missile types. And it was just before the 
meeting broke up that for the first time 
they suggested that they were talking 
about all weapons— nuclear weapons— 
not just the others. There was no time 
for us to discuss them— this new force 
that was in there. 

But I think Mr. Kampelman was say- 
ing right— that I just call to your atten- 
tion that never in the history of the 
Soviet Union has a Soviet leader ever 
publicly proposed eliminating weapons 
they already have. And this Soviet 
leader has. He has talked actually of 
totally eliminating them. 

And so the only thing I can say to 
this is, I know they are difficult to deal 
with, but all I can say is, they are still at 
the table in Geneva, and the proposals 
are still there, so I continue to be 
optimistic. 

Q. Do you think you are going to 
see Mr. Gorbachev again during your 
term, or do you think he is thinking 
that he'll wait for the next President 
to negotiate an arms control 
agreement? 

A. I have to believe there is reason 
for optimism because he, himself, sug- 
gested the Iceland meeting as a forerun- 
ner to the summit that was supposed to 
take place in the United States. And all I 
can do is recall that when the Soviets 



II 



sometime ago got up and walked out oi 
the Geneva arms meetings because we 
were installing medium-range— the Per 
shings and the cruise missiles in Europe 
and they walked out and said, "That 
does it." Well, they came back. 

Q. Do you have a date to meet 
them again? 

A. No. That's what we're waiting 
for, is for them to give us a day. 

Q. Going back over your answers 
tonight about the arms shipments anc 
the numbers of them, are you telling 
us tonight that the only shipments 
with which we were involved were th 
one or two that followed your Januari 
17 finding and that, whatever your I 
aides have said on backg^round or on ' 
the record, there are no other 
shipments with which the United 
States condoned? 

A. That's right. I'm saying nothing 
but the missiles that we sold— and 
remember, there are too many people 
that are saying "gave." They bought 
them. 

Q. We've been told by the Chief o 
Staff Donald Regan that we eondonec 
this government condoned, an Israeli 
shipment in September of 1985, short 
before the release of hostage Benjam 
Weir. That was 4 months before your 
intelligence finding on January 17 thi 
you say gave you the legal authority 
not to notify Congress. Can you clear 
that up why this government was not 
in violation of its arms embargo and ( 
the notification to Congress for havir 
condoned American-made weapons 
shipped to Iran in September of 1985; 

A. No, that— I've never heard Mr. 
Regan say that and I'll ask him about 
that, because we believe in the embargc 
and, as I say, we waived it for a specific 
purpose, in fact, with four goals in mine 

Q. What is unclear to, I think, 
many people in the American public is 
why, if you are saying tonight that 
there will be no further arms 
shipments to Iran, why you won't 
cancel the January 17th intelligence 
finding so that you can put to rest anj 
suggestion that you might again, 
without notification and in complete 
secrecy and perhaps with the objectioi 
of some of your Cabinet members, con 
tinue to ship weapons if you think tha 
it is necessary? 

A. No. I have no intention of doing 
that, but at the same time, we are 
hopeful that we're going to be able to 
continue our meetings with these people 
these individuals. 



* 



70 



Department of State Bulletii 



MIDDLE EAST 



Q. But you won't cancel the 
ntelligence finding? 

A. I don't know whether it's called 
or or whether I have to wait until we've 
■eported to Congress and all. I don't 
aiow just what the technicality legally is 
in that. 

Q. Why do you think, its strategic 
)osition notwithstanding, the 
American people would ever support 
veapons to the Ayatollah Khomeini? 

A. We weren't giving them to the 
\yatollah Khomeini. It's a strange situa- 
ion. As I say, we were dealing with 
ndividuals and we believe that those— 
ind some of those individuals are in 
;overnment, in positions in government. 
5ut it was not a meeting officially of the 
J.S. head of state and the Iranian head 
<{ state. But these people, we believed, 
nd their closeness to the Iran military 
vas such that this was necessary to let 
hem know, number one, that we were 
erious and sincere in our effort about 
:ood relations and also that they were 
ealing with the head of government 
ver here— that this wasn't something 
oming out of some agency or bureau- 
hat I was behind it. 

Q. If that's the case, some have 
sked that if Libya occupied a 
trategical position as Iran did, would 
ou then arm Qadhafi and bomb 
[homeini? 

A. I know that's a— believe me, 
hat's about as hypothetical a question as 
nyone could imagine. The situations are 
uite different. 

Q. You said that you were not 
wapping — or you did not think you 
vere swapping arms for hostages. But 
lid it ever occur to you or did it never 
iccur to you that certainly the Iranians 
vould see it that way and that they 
night take it as an inducement to take 
nore hostages, especially in light of 
he fact that they've released three but 
aken three more? 

A. No— to the best of our 
;nowledge, Iran does not own or have 
luthority over the Hezbollah. They can- 
lot order them to do something. It is 
apparent that they evidently have either 
lome persuasion and they don't always 
;ucceed, but they can sometimes per- 
iuade or pressure the Hezbollah into 
icing what they did in this instance. 
And, as I say, the Iranian Government 
lad no hostages, and they bought a ship- 
■nent from us and we, in turn— I might 
IS well tell you— that we, in turn, had 
:5aid when they wanted to kind of know 
|)ur position and whether we were 
Tustworthy and all of this, we told them 
-hat we were— we did not want to do 



business with any nation that openly 
backed terrorism. And they gave us 
information that they did not and they 
said also that they had some evidence 
that there had been a lessening of this 
on the part of— Khomeini and the 
government and that they'd made some 
progress. As a matter of fact, some 
individuals associated with terrorist acts 
had been put in prison there. And so 
that was when we said, "Well, there's a 
very easy way for you to verify that if 
that's the way you feel, and they're 
being held hostage in Lebanon." 

Q. If your arms shipments had no 
effect on the release of the hostages, 
then how do you explain the release of 
the hostages at the same time that the 
shipments were coming in? 

A. No. I said that at the time I said 
to them that there was something they 
could do to show their sincerity and if 
they really meant it that they were not 
in favor of backing terrorists, they could 
begin by releasing our hostages. And, as 
a matter of fact, I believe and have 
reason to believe that we would have had 
all five of them by this last weekend had 
it not been for the attendant— confusion 
that arose here in the reporting room. 

Q. On that point, you said earlier, 
and you said just now again, that but 
for the publicity, two other hostages 
would have been returned home by 
now. As you know, the publicity began 
in a Syrian-backed, pro-Syrian 
magazine in Lebanon. My question is, 
therefore, are you suggesting that 
someone who was a party to this 
sabotaged it by deliberately leaking 
that original report? 

A. To our best information, the leak 
came from a person in government in 
Iran and not one of the people that we 
were dealing with, someone that would 
be more hostile to us. And that 
individual gave the story to the 
magazine, and the magazine then 
printed the story there in Beirut. 

Q. There has been an obvious 
change in policy toward Iran — from 
refusing to deal with a terrorist state 
to even sending weapons as a gesture 
of good will. Would you consider, in 
the name of the same geopolitical 
interest that you invoked with Iran, 
changing your policy toward 
Nicaragua? 

A. No, and I believe that I've 
answered that question, I think, more 
than once here— that no, we still hold to 
our position, and Iran officially is still on 
our list of nations that have been sup- 
porting terrorism. But I'm talking about 



the people that we were doing business 
with, and they gave us indication and 
evidence that that policy was changing. 
And so, as I said, to give them more 
prestige and muscle there, where they 
were, we made this sale. 

Q. Then would you consider break- 
ing diplomatic relations with 
Nicaragua to increase the pressure on 
the Sandinista government? 

A. No, we have not thought of that, 
and we still believe very much in sup- 
porting the Contras, because we believe 
in the Contras' cause. The Contras have 
made it plain that they— all they seek is 
to be able to put enough pressure on the 
Sandinista government for that govern- 
ment to negotiate with them and the 
people of Nicaragua for the kind of 
government that they altogether had 
promised when they were fighting the 
revolution against the Somoza dictator- 
ship. And it was the Sandinistas who, as 
communist groups usually do, simply 
when the revolution was over— they did 
everything they could to get rid of their 
fellow revolutionaries, and they seized 
power and created a totalitarian com- 
munist state. 

Now, the Sandinistas— or the Con- 
tras have never proposed overthrowing 
the government. They have repeatedly 
offered and said, we simply want to be 
able to negotiate and have a chance to 
have the government installed that we 
had promised the Organization of 
American States we were fighting for. 
So, I think we continue to help them, but 
we believe that there is a value in main- 
taining relations. It gives us a listening 
post in Nicaragua. 

Q. There is a mood in Washington 
tonight of a President who is very 
much beleagfuered, very much on the 
defensive. Why don't you seize the 
offensive by giving your Secretary of 
State a vote of confidence declaring 
that all future covert activities will 
have his support and by shaking up the 
National Security Council in such a 
way as to satisfy the concerns in Con- 
gress that he has been running a 
paramilitary operation out of the base- 
ment of the White House in defiance 
of the State Department and the 
Congress? 

A. The State Department and the 
Secretary of State were involved, and 
the Director of the CIA was involved in 
what we were doing, and, as I said 
before, there are certain laws in which, 
for certain actions, I would not have 
been able to keep them a secret as they 
were. But these people you've mentioned 
have been involved— did know what was 



January 1987 



71 



MIDDLE EAST 



going on. And I don't see that the action 
that you've suggested has called for it, 
but what you've disappointed me the 
most in is suggesting that I sound defen- 
sive up here. I've just been trying to 
answer all your questions as well as I 
can. and I don't feel that I have anything 
to defend about at all. With the cir- 
cumstances the way they were, the deci- 
sion I made I still believe was the correct 
decision, and I believe that we achieved 
some portion of our goals. 

Q. Do you believe that any of the 
additional hostages will be released? 

A. I have to believe that. 

Q. During any of these discussions 
with your Administration, was there 
ever any hint or suggestion that these 
weapons might be used to topple the 
Ayatollah? 

A. No, and I don't see in any way 
how that could be with the particular 
things that we were using. I don't see 
where the Ayatollah could be a logical 
target for an antiaircraft missile or even 
for TOW missiles, for that matter. 

Q. You made an exception for the 
arms embargo when you thought it 
was in the U.S. interest to do so. Why 
shouldn't other nations ship weapons 
to Iran when they think it's in their 
interests? 

A. I would like to see the indication 
as to how it could be in their interest. I 
know that there are other nations that 
feel as we do that the Western world 
should be trying to find an avenue to get 
Iran back where it once was, and that is 
in the family of democratic nations and 
the family of nations that want peace in 
the Middle East and so forth. 

Q. How does shipping weapons to 
Iran help bring them back into the 
community of nations? You've 
acknowledged that you were dealing 
with only a small portion of the 
government. 

A. I was talking of strengthening a 
particular group who needed the 
prestige that that could give them who 
needed that bargaining power, 
themselves, within their own ranks. 

Q. I believe you may have been 
slightly in error in describing a TOW 
as a shoulder-mounted weapon. It's a 
ground-to-ground weapon— Red-Eye is 
the shoulder weapon, but that's beside 
the point. TOWs are used to destroy 
tanks. I don't think its fired from your 
shoulder. 

A. If I have been misinformed, then 
I will yield on that, but it was my 
understanding that that is a man-carried 
weapon, and we have a number of other 
shoulder-borne weapons. 



72 



Q. I did have a question, though. 

A. You mean that wasn't a 
question? 

Q. No, I thought I knew what a 
TOW was. I just wanted to ask you, 
what would be wrong at this stage of 
the game, since everything seems to 
have gone wrong that could possibly 
go wrong, like the Murphy Law, the 
Reagan Law, the O'Leary Law, this 
week — what would be wrong in saying 
that a mistake was made on a very 
high-risk gamble and that — so that you 
can get on with the ne.xt 2 years? 

A. Because I don't think a mistake 
was made. It was a high-risk gamble, 
and it was a gamble that, as I've said, I 
believe the circumstances warranted. 
And I don't see that it has been a fiasco 
or a great failure of any kind. We still 
have those contacts, we still have made 
some ground, we got our hostages 
back— three of them. And so I think that 
what we did was right, and we're going 
to continue on this path. 

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT 

There may be some misunderstanding of 
one of my answers tonight. There was a 
third country involved in our secret proj- 
ect with Iran. But taking this into 
account, all of the shipments of the 
token amounts of defensive arms and 
parts that I have authorized or condoned 
taken in total could be placed aboard a 
single cargo aircraft. This includes all 
shipments by the United States or any 
third country. Any other shipments by 
third countries were not authorized by 
the U.S. Government. 



DEPUTY SECRETARY 

WHITEHEADS STATEMENT. 
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

COMMITTEE, 
NOV. 24, 1986^ 

I have been asked to discuss with you 
our policy toward Iran in light of the 
recent events. I look forward to sharing 
with you our assessment of our policy 
toward the region, our goals in the Iran- 
Iraq war, the reactions of our friends to 
the revelations in the media, and our 
future objectives. 

It is important to point out that the 
extreme sensitivity of the undertaking 
prompted implementation be held to the 
smallest group possible. Consequently, 
the State Department had no operational 
role. We in the Department still do not 
have a detailed record of what happened, 
and I am, therefore, not able to address 
specific questions of what may have 
occurred. 



As you are aware, our government 
has had contact with the Iranian Goven 
ment over the last 18 months. The goals 
of such contact have been: 

• The resumption of a stable rela- 
tionship with Iran; 

• An honorable end to the Iran-Irac 
war and greater stability in the gulf 
region; 

• The countering of Soviet attempt 
to influence developments in Iran and 
the gulf; 

• The elimination of Iranian state- 
sponsored terrorism and subversion; an 

• The safe return of all of our— and 
others'— hostages. 

We have also had several other 
avenues of communication with Iranian 
officials. These include the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal at The Hague; Federal 
Reserve and Treasury officials and Ira- 
nian bankers; communications through 
third parties; and occasional exchanges 
in international fora. 

About 18 months ago, the President 
authorized a more directed dialogue wit 
Iranian officials. It was not an easy deci 
sion to begin and pursue such a dialogut 
Serious obstacles remain: 



li 
J) 
6 

!l 

X 



!1 






• Iran's determination to use its we* 
with Iraq as a means of overthrowing 
the Iraqi Government and establishing i 
radical fundamentalist government in ifc 
place; 

• Iran's continuing support for 
terrorism; 

• Iran's continued financial, 
logistical, and material support for 
radical Shi'as living in the gulf, Lebanoi 
and elsewhere; and 

• Iran's association with hostage- 
takings in Lebanon, including the receni 
abduction of three American hostages 
there. 

The Iranians understand our posi- 
tion. There is no need for further signaUj 
of the seriousness of our intentions 
through arms transfers. The President 
publicly stated on November 17 that we 
will not be shipping any further arms to 
Iran. Our arms embargo is in effect. 
Operation Staunch remains in effect. 

Iran-Iraq War and Arms Transfers 

Our policy on the Iran-Iraq war remains 
unchanged. We continue to be deeply 
concerned about the terrible loss and 
disruption which this war has brought to 
the people of both Iran and Iraq, and we 
remain concerned at the possibility that 
miscalculation or misunderstanding 
might lead to a widening of the war. 
Since the beginning of the conflict in 



Department of State Bulletir 






MIDDLE EAST 



ptember 1980, we have worked for the 
rliest possible end to the war— one 
;ich preserves both the independence 
d territorial integrity of both states, 
that end, the United States has 
lowed several paths. These include: 

A policy to deny Munitions List 
^ms to both Iran and Iraq; 

Pursuit of Operation Staunch— our 
jmpt to discourage arms supply from 
lers to Iran— this had been relatively 
fective until word of our Iran 
Mpments became public. We believe we 
jiyed an important role in reducing the 
pbal volume of arms sent to Iran. We 
' 11 now have to redouble our efforts to 
store the credibility of this policy, 
lich remains the best means to bring 
e Iranians to accept a mediated or 
gotiated settlement; and 

• Support for diplomatic efforts to 
c courage Iran to join Iraq in working 
award a peaceful end to the war. These 
(Forts include active U.S. encourage- 
ment of the UN Secretary General, the 

amic Conference, the Nonaligned 
jvement, and various other efforts— by 
/eden, Japan, and Algeria among 
lers- to draw Iran into talks. 

TForism 

cretary Shultz has recently recon- 
■ med the fundamental premises of our 
unterterrorism policy: 

• Opposition to all acts of terrorism, 
t just those against Americans; 

• Refusal of terrorist demands; 

• Willingness to use all available 
jans to defend ourselves against ter- 
rists; and 

• Seeking the cooperation of our 
ends and allies in combatting ter- 
rism and isolating those nations which 
onsor or shelter terrorists. 

In particular, we believe that those 
.tions which sponsor or support ter- 
rism must remain outside the family of 
/ilized nations until they cease their 
pport of terrorists. We seek the 
operation of all civilized nations in our 
forts. We strongly believe that our 
•m policy is the best guarantee of pro- 
cting American citizens and interests 
orldwide. 

Let me say a special word about our 
maining hostages in Lebanon. We will 
mtinue to seek the safe release of all 
merican hostages. We will talk to 
lyone, any group, or any government 
)out them and their safe return. In 
)ing so, however, we will not under- 
ine the basic tenets of our policy. 



Iraq 

Our bilateral relations with Iraq have 
improved markedly over the past few 
years, as Iraq has increasingly modified 
its traditional hardline regional policies 
and has established closer diplomatic 
working relationships with moderate 
Arab states with which we have long- 
standing ties. Iraq has made clear its 
rejection of terrorism as an instrument 
of state policy by expelling the notorious 
Abu Nidal. Unlike Iran, Iraq seeks an 
early negotiated end to the war. We 
want to keep relations with Iraq on an 
even keel, even though the news of the 
limited arms shipments to Iran have 
been very unwelcome in Baghdad. After 
the war ends, we will continue to have a 
stake and equity in Iraq's pursuit of its 
modified regional policies. Trade, com- 
merce, and investment of Iraq's 
ambitious postwar development plans 
will be of great interest to us. Iraq's 
distancing itself from support for inter- 
national terrorism has been 
substantial— the trend is clearly in the 
direction we encourage. 

The Gulf States 

The nonbelligerent gulf Arab states, 
while they understand our reasons for 
establishing contacts with Iran, strongly 
disapproved of the transfer of arms. Our 
ties with these states are close, and we 
want to do whatever we can to assure 
that there will be no lasting damage to 
our mutually beneficial security relation- 
ships. Nothing has changed to affect our 
policy of support for the security and 
territorial integrity of these good 
friends. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states continue to believe that 
their security and stability are in 
American interests and understand our 
determination to protect those interests. 

Conclusion 

To conclude, let me say that the United 
States recognizes the importance of Iran 
in the region and the Islamic world. The 
emergence of leaders willing to change 
Iran's unacceptable international 
behavior and seek a normal relationship 
with the international community cannot 
be ignored by the United States. The 
President has made clear the importance 
the United States attaches to a stable 
relationship with Iran and the benefits 
which can accrue to the region and to 
the West should such a situation evolve. 
We will persevere in efforts to pursue a 
dialogue to reach the goals I have noted. 



But we will do so only in the context of 
our strong and firm commitment to the 
security of the gulf states, our desire to 
see an end to the war, our relationship 
with Iraq, and our promise to combat 
terrorism. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. 
NOV. 25, 1986^ 

Last Friday, after becoming concerned 
whether my national security apparatus 
had provided me with a complete factual 
record with respect to the implementa- 
tion of my policy toward Iran, I directed 
the Attorney General to undertake a 
review of this matter over the weekend 
and report to me on Monday. And 
yesterday. Attorney General Meese pro- 
vided me and the White House Chief of 
Staff with a report on his preliminary 
findings. And this report led me to con- 
clude that I was not fully informed on 
the nature of one of the activities under- 
taken in connection with this initiative. 
This action raises serious questions of 
propriety. 

I've just met with my national 
security advisers and congressional 
leaders to inform them of the actions 
that I'm taking today. Determination of 
the full details of this action will require 
further review and investigation by the 
Department of Justice. 

Looking to the future, I will appoint 
a special review board to conduct a com- 
prehensive review of the role and pro- 
cedures of the National Security Council 
staff in the conduct of foreign and 
national security policy. 

I anticipate receiving the reports 
from the Attorney General and the 
special review board at the earliest possi- 
ble date. Upon the completion of these 
reports, I will share their findings and 
conclusions with the Congress and the 
American people. 

Although not directly involved. Vice 
Admiral John Poindexter has asked to 
be relieved of his assignment as Assis- 
tant to the President for National 
Security Affairs and to return to another 
assignment in the Navy. Lt. Col. Oliver 
North has been relieved of his duties on 
the National Security Council staff. 

I am deeply troubled that the 
implementation of a policy aimed at 
resolving a truly tragic situation in the 
Middle East has resulted in such con- 
troversy. As I've stated previously, I 
believe our policy goals toward Iran 
were well-founded. However, the infor- 
mation brought to my attention yester- 
day convinced me that in one aspect, 
implementation of that policy was 
seriously flawed. 



anuary 1987 



73 



NARCOTICS 



President Convenes 
Conference on Narcotics 




The President invited a representative 
group of U.S. Ambassadors from countries 
where drug production, trafficking, and 
consumption are major problems, or might 
develop into major problems, to meet at the 
White House with him and Secretary Shultz 
November 12-1:5, 1986. 

Its threefold purpose was to provide 
the President with the opportunity to 
demonstrate U.S. commitment to the issue 
of narcotics control and to update the 
ambassadors on recent domestic drug- 
control initiatives; to encourage ambas- 
sadors to discuss ways to enhance the inter- 
national narcotics control program by 
exploring options for regional cooperation; 
and to send to foreign governments a 
strong message that narcotics is a critical 
international problem which must be 
addressed. 



Those ambassadors attending were; 
Carol Boyd Hallett (Bahamas), Edward M. 
Rowell (Bolivia), Harry W. Shlaudeman 
(Brazil), Melvyn Levitsky (Bulgaria), Daniel 
O'Donohue (Burma), Charles A. Gillespie, 
Jr. (Colombia), P>rnando E. Rondon 
(Ecuador), Richard R. Burt (West Ger- 
many), Maxwell M. Rabb (Italy), Michael 
Sotirhos (Jamaica). Charles J. Pilliod, Jr. 
(Mexico), Princeton Lyman (Nigeria), 
Deane R. Hinton (Pakistan), Arthur H. 
Davis (Panama), .Alexander F. Watson 
(Peru), William A. Brown (Thailand), Otto 
J. Reich (Venezuela), Herbert S. Okun 
(Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations), and Bruce Chapman 
(Representative to the Vienna Office of the 
United Nations), and Charge d' Affaires" 
Maurice Ealum (Afghanistan) and Charge 
d'Affaires Harriet Isom (Laos). ■ 



While I cannot reverse what has 
happened, I'm initiating steps, including 
those I've announced today, to assure 
that the implementation of all future 
foreign and national security policy 
initiatives will proceed only in accord- 
ance with my authorization. 

Over the past 6 years, we've realized 
many foreign policy goals. I believe we 
can yet achieve, and I intend to pursue, 
the objectives on which we all agree— a 
safer, more secure and stable world. 



ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE'S 
NEWS BRIEFING (EXCERPT). 
NOV. 25. 1986* 

On Friday afternoon— or Friday at 
noon— the President asked me to look 
into and bring together the facts concer- 
ning the, particularly the impleinenta- 
tion of the strategic initiative in Iran and 
more precisely, anything pertaining to 
the transfer of arms. Over the weekend, 
this inquiry was conducted. Yesterday 
evening I reported to the President. We 
continued our inquiry, and this morning 
the President directed that we make this 
information immediately available to the 
Congress and to the public through this 
medium this noon. 



itai 





74 



Let me say that all of the informa- 
tion is not yet in. We are still continuing 
our inquiry. But he did want me to mak 
available immediately what we know at 
the present time. 

What is involved is that in the coursi 
of the arms transfers, which involved th! 
United States providing the arms to 
Israel and Israel in turn transferring thi 
arms— in effect, selling the arms to ! 
representatives of Iran. Certain monies ' 
which were received in the transaction \ 
between representatives of Israel and 
representatives of Iran were taken and ' 
made available to the forces in Central 
America which are opposing the San- 
dinista government there. 

In essence, the way in which the 
transactions occurred was that a certair 
amount of money was negotiated by 
representatives outside of the United 
States with Iran for arms. This amount: 
of money was then transferred to 
representatives, as best we know, that 
can be described as representatives of 
Israel. They, in turn, transferred to the 
CIA, which was the agent for the U.S. 
Government under a finding prepared b 
the President— signed by the President 
in January of 1986. And, incidentally, ai 
of these transactions that I am referrin) 
to took place between January of 1986 
and the present time. They transferred 
to the CIA the exact amount of the 
money that was owed to the U.S. 
Government for the weapons that were 
involved plus any costs of transportatio 
that might be involved. This money was 
then repaid by the CIA to the Depart- 
ment of Defense under the normal pro- 
cedures, and all governmental funds an( 
all governmental property was 
accounted for and statements of that 
have been verified by us up to the pres- 
ent time. 

The money— the difference between 
the money owed to the U.S. Governmen 
and the money received from represent- 
atives of Iran was then deposited in ban- 
accounts which were under the control 
of representatives of the forces in Cen- 
tral America. ' 

Q. How much money? How much , 
involved? 

A. We don't know the exact , 

amount, yet. Our estimate is that it is i 
somewhere between $10 and $30 million, 

Q. How did it come to your 
attention? 

A. In the course of a thorough 
review of a number of intercepts, and 
other materials, this— the hint of a ' 

possibility that there were some monies ' 
being made available for some other pur 



Departnnent of State Bulletii 



" 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



pe came to our attention, and then we 
rsued that with the individuals 
Mved. 

Q. Why wasn't the President told? 

A. The President was told as soon 
we found out about it. 

Q. And he knew nothing about it? 

A. The President knew nothing 
aaut it until I reported it to him. I 
a rted him yesterday morning that we 
sil had some more work to do, and then 

I ave him the details that we had 
Uerday afternoon. 

Q. Is this what you were looking 
f • when you began? Or is this just 
sTiething that turned up in the course 
cyour weekend investigation? 

A. This turned up in the course of 
t: investigation. The first thing that 
tjgered, if you will, an inquiry was the 
f t that as people prepared their 
t timony— because this had been done 
i J rather compartmentalized way— as 
f )ple prepared their testimony for the 

I I on Friday, there appeared to be 
r re facts out there than we had 

a eady put together. And it was a mat- 
t , then, of the President requesting me 
t ;alk with everyone who had any par- 
t pation at all, because one agency was 
c ng one thing, another agency was 
c ng another thing— there was very lit- 
t paperwork— and to determine 
I 'cisely what all of the facts were 
t 'ause he wanted to be sure that he 
Y i all of the information about anything 
t t may have occurred in the course of 
1 3 whole situation. That was— it was 
c -ing the course of that inquiry that 
1 3 information was found and then was 
f owed out to the conclusions that I 
r ntioned. 

Q. Can you tell us who is running 
I tional security policy? Can you clear 
I for the American people, is 
i cretary Shultz staying? Who is the 
I w national security adviser? And 
1 lat are you recommending in terms 
« possibly restructuring the White 
1 luse staff? 

A. In answer to your questions in 
( ier, at the present time, upon Admiral 
1 indexter actually leaving his post, Al 
]'el, his deputy, will be the Acting 
1 sistant to the President for National 
'curity Affairs. The President has not 
; t selected a replacement, but he will 
' So as soon as possible. 

Secretary Shultz is remaining in his 
■ sition— is Secretary of State. That has 
t been a matter of conjecture or 
;cussion or inquiry. 



We will make whatever recommen- 
dations for further proceedings come out 
of it, but more particularly, the Presi- 
dent will be appointing a small commis- 
sion which will look into the procedures 
and role of the NSC staff and will make 
specific recommendations to him as far 
as the process for the future. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of ^lov. 17, 1986. 
-Press release 251. 



'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 24. 

■■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 1. The text of 
the Secretary's remarks made on the evening 
of Nov. 25 concerning Iran are printed on 
p. 23. 

^For full text of Attorney General's news 
briefing, see Wfiite House press release. ■ 



International Prospects for Civil Nuclear 
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era 



by John D. .\egropoiite 

Address before the Rotary Club of 
Detroit on November 5. 19S6. Ambassti- 
dor Negroponte is Assistant Secretary 
for Oceans and International Environ- 
ine)ita! and Scientific Affairs. 

As head of the bureau in the State 
Department responsible for peaceful 
nuclear energy affairs, I have been very 
much involved with a number of inter- 
national issues arising from the serious 
accident that destroyed the Soviet 
reactor at Chernobyl earlier this year. I 
would like to discuss some of these 
issues with you. 

The Chernobyl accident has obvi- 
ously raised anxieties and renewed ques- 
tions about commercial nuclear power, 
not just in the Soviet Union but 
everywhere. At the time of the Three 
Mile Island accident— whose conse- 
quences, it should be noted, were far less 
severe than those resulting from 
Chernobyl— one frequently heard it said 
that "a nuclear accident anywhere is a 
nuclear accident everj-where." This 
expression was beginning to seem a little 
trite, perhaps, when Chernobyl came 
along to underscore its essential truth. 
Happily, we in the United States and 
Canada were spared from all but the 
most inconsequential effects of the 
radioactive debris from the shattered 
Chernobyl core. The situation was 
somewhat different in Western and Cen- 
tral Europe, however. There, the long- 
term effects on public health will need to 
be scrutinized very closely. 

There is, thus, no denying that the 
Chernobyl accident was a serious one. It 
has provoked fresh doubts in the minds 



of many about the wisdom of continuing 
to rely routinely on nuclear reactors to 
generate electrical power. In a few 
cases, these doubts have already been 
translated into political action opposing 
continued reliance on commercial 
nuclear power. 

The point I would like to make today 
is that questions concerning commercial 
nuclear power, legitimate though they 
may be, do not in themselves invalidate 
civil nuclear power as an energy 
resource, as some critics seem to sup- 
pose. Any large technological enterprise 
will raise major questions of public 
policy. What is important is not the 
questions themselves but the answers to 
those questions. 

Economic and 
Environmental Factors 

In my view, civil nuclear energy is a 
necessary energy resource and will 
become increasingly important as the 
world's finite supply of fossil fuels con- 
tinues to be depleted. Civil nuclear 
energy is a key element in any program 
of energy resource management that is 
prudently diversified. Overdependence 
on a single energy source such as 
imported oil is unwise and unacceptable 
for our nation's energy policy. Just recall 
the severe effects on our national well- 
being as we dealt with the OPEC 
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries]-induced oil shocks of 1973 
and 1979. The repercussions linger in 
our economy to this day. We would be 
foolish to court a repetition of those 
events by an arbitrary refusal to allocate 
a place for civil nuclear energy in our 
overall energy program. Nor can we 



nuary 1987 



75 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



assume that an alternative such as 
fusion energy will replace the current 
generation of nuclear reactors in the 
decades ahead. Fusion is unlikely to play 
a significant role until well into the next 
century at the earliest. 

These points are less easily grasped 
in our country, perhaps, with its rela- 
tively wide range of energy options. But 
they are valid points, and their impor- 
tance is fully appreciated by some of our 
major allies, such as Japan and France, 
that lack abundant alternative sources of 
energy. These countries are, of course, 
highly industrialized, and for them, 
reliance on civil nuclear energy has 
become indispensable. In 1985, for exam- 
ple, France derived 65% of its electricity 
from nuclear power generation. 

Is civil nuclear power cost-effective? 
The answer is yes— resoundingly so in 
many industrialized countries, qualifiedly 
so in our own. The difference lies in the 
availability of alternative energy 
resources and the way different coun- 
tries have planned and managed their 
civil nuclear programs. In particular, 
those countries that have opted for 
standardized reactor designs— thus 
simplifying the licensing process and 
sharply reducing the costs of bringing 
new reactors into service— seem to be 
making out best. 

In considering the economics of civil 
nuclear power, it is also important to 
keep in mind the long-term picture. To 
be sure, prices of crude oil are relatively 
low today. But complacency can be a 
dangerous thing. It would be rash, 
indeed, to predict that we will enjoy 
indefinitely the luxury of today's 
relatively low prices. 

What about the effect of nuclear 
power reactors on the environment? It is 
quite clear that nuclear power plants, in 
their normal operation, are environ- 
mentally more benign than some other 
types of plants. I do not need to remind 
you, here on our border with Canada, 
how important an issue acid rain has 
become in relations between our two 
countries. I might note in passing that 
this is another issue with which I have 
been very much preoccupied, inasmuch 
as my bureau in the State Department is 
also responsible for environmental 
issues. I mention the problem here, 
however, only to make one simple point: 
unlike some other types of generating 
plants, nuclear power plants do not con- 
tribute to the problem of acid rain. 

There is also another, longer term 
environmental problem associated with 
the burning of fossil fuels. This is the 
so-called greenhouse effect, a gradual 
warming of the Earth's atmosphere with 
possibly serious long-term implications 



76 



for weather patterns and ocean levels. 
Although we have much to learn about 
the "greenhouse effect," at this point we 
are confident that nuclear power plants 
do not contribute in any appreciable way 
to this problem. 

Safety Concerns 

I come now to the question of nuclear 
safety. This, it seems to me, is the key 
question for determining what the pros- 
pects for civil nuclear power are likely to 
be in the post-Chernobyl era. Countries 
intending to rely on civil nuclear power 
must address resolutely some very real 
concerns relating to nuclear safety and 
to nuclear safeguards as well— an impor- 
tant distinction to which I will return 
later on. 

The first thing to be said is that, 
despite well-publicized accidents like 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the 
safety record of nuclear power compares 
favorably with that of other types of 
powerplants. But as the accident at 
Chernobyl has demonstrated so graph- 
ically, a serious accident at a nuclear 
power plant, however statistically rare it 
may be, is different in scope and dimen- 
sion from an accident at any other type 
of electrical generating plant. It is not 
enough, therefore, merely to state that 
nuclear plants compare well statistically 
with other types of plants with respect 
to frequency of accidents and to let the 
argument stand at that. A serious acci- 
dent at a nuclear power plant has the 
potential for being far more damaging 
than an accident at any other type of 
generating plant, and so our efforts 
must be more rigorous and comprehen- 
sive to ensure against its happening at 
all. 

It is also important to bear in mind 
that not all reactors are equally safe. We 
are, of course, seeking to learn all that 
we can about how the accident at 
Chernobyl occurred and to apply the 
lessons to our own experience, where 
appropriate. The Soviet operators at 
Chernobyl clearly made major errors on 
the night of the accident, and to err is 
human; any feeling of smugness on our 
part would be inappropriate and prob- 
ably self-defeating. But the fact remains 
that the Chernobyl reactor, with its 
inadequate containment and its propen- 
sity to surge in power as coolant was 
lost (positive void coefficient), could not 
have been licensed to operate in the 
United States, Canada, or probably any 
other Western country. Our standards 
are stricter, our commitment to safety 
and environmental protection more pro- 
nounced. We see it as incumbent on the 



Soviets to implement changes to ensure 
that basic design problems contributing 
to the Chernobyl disaster will be cor- 
rected in the numerous similar reactors 
throughout the Soviet Union. We can 
only regret that an accident at one reac 
tor has called into question the safety o: 
all reactors, however dissimilar. 

Let me make a related point. As 
some of you may know, the Soviets are 
currently building two nuclear power 
reactors at Cienfuegos in Cuba. I would 
like to stress that these reactors are nc 
of the Chernobyl type. In addition, I 
would like to assure you that we have 
made it clear to the Soviets and Cubans 
that these Cuban reactors, particularly 
in view of their proximity to our shores' 
must be designed and built to exacting 
safety standards and that they must be 
operated in a safe manner at all times. 
We will be paying close attention 
to make sure these standards are 
adhered to. 

U.S. and International 
Responses to Chernobyl 

The months since Chernobyl have been 
time for critical reflection on nuclear 
power safety, both within the United 
States and within the international coiri 
munity. Let me review very briefly son? 
of our activities on the international 
plane in response to Chernobyl. From 
the very outset, the United States took 
leading role in prodding the Soviet 
Union to fulfill its international respon; 
bilities by following up its initially quite 
meager and delayed account of the acci 
dent with a full and complete disclosure 
of the facts. I am pleased to say that th 
Soviets themselves soon recognized the 
wisdom of this course, and their subse- 
quent report to a specially convened 
meeting of international experts at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna, August 25-29, was 
notably open and forthcoming. I should 
add that we have deliberately resisted 
any temptation to make political capita, 
from the Soviets' misfortune and, in 
fact, have offered our assistance on a 
number of fronts. 

The United States was also instru- 
mental in mobilizing efforts under Intel 
national Atomic Energy Agency 
auspices to put in place procedures for 
dealing with possible similar accidents i 
the future. Even before Chernobyl, the: 
was a broad consensus, at least among 
the countries of the industrialized West 
that each individual country engaged in 
nuclear power generation must be fully 
responsible for ensuring safety in the 
design, manufacture, operation, and 



\. 



t' 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



aintenance of its nuclear installations; 
lat avoiding potential transboundary 
■^changes resulting from nuclear activ- 
ies involves a responsibility to other 
itions; and that prompt and adequate 
formation on nuclear emergencies and 
■cidents must be provided where there 
a potential for transboundary conse- 
;iences of radiological safety signif- 
ance. In the immediate aftermath of 
hernobyl, the need became clear for a 
nding international agreement that 
ould embody these principles. It was 
so clear that the International Atomic 
nergy Agency would be the most 
ipropriate forum within which to 
■ganize international efforts toward 
is goal. 

In early May, therefore, while events 
Chernobyl were still unfolding, the 
nited States and its allies called for a 
lecial meeting of the agency's Board of 
jvernors, which in turn commissioned 
group of government experts to draft 
'■0 international conventions: one pro- 
ding for the early notification of 
iclear accidents with transboundary 
fects and the dissemination of com- 
ehensive information concerning them; 
e other providing a framework for 
ordinating international assistance, 
:luding emergency response measures, 
the event of such accidents. These two 
nventions on notification and on 
sistance were drafted, submitted to a 
ecial session of the agency's General 
jnference, adopted, opened for signa- 
re, and signed by over 50 states by the 
id of September— a near-record pace 
' the usual standards for activities in 
ternational bodies. 

All this is very well, you may say, 
it it seems to relate only to what hap- 
■ns after an accident has taken place, 
"hat is being done to reduce the 
lances of an accident occurring in the 
'st place? As it happens, a great deal, 
ough even more can and should be 
me. The International Atomic Energy 
gency and the Nuclear Energy Agency 
' the Organization for Economic 
Doperation and Development in Paris 
ive longstanding programs aimed at 
;tablishing safe nuclear design, 
igineering, and operating standards on 
universal basis. The U.S. nuclear 
dustry is pursuing similar work 
irough its Institute for Nuclear Power 
Operations in Atlanta— an effort that has 
"awn the active participation of a 
jmber of foreign reactor operators. 
he U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis- 
on has a well-established program of 
^operation with other countries in the 
^change of information relating to 
uclear safety. Bilateral agreements on 



nuclear safety cooperation exist with 37 
nations. 

The United States has also launched 
an initiative aimed at creating a nuclear 
safety training academy, organized as a 
nonprofit foundation and based on joint 
industry and government participation. 
Its goal is to provide assistance to 
cooperating countries by introducing 
their nuclear energy decisionmakers to 
U.S. safety programs and approaches 
and by providing information, training, 
guidance, and advice on nuclear safety 
matters. An initial pilot program at 
Stanford University in the summer of 
1985 was very well received. 

All these are important components 
in efforts to ensure that today's genera- 
tion of nuclear power reactors will be 
operated with the utmost dedication to 
safety. An even greater challenge— but 
one that I think we can meet— will be the 
design of a new generation of reactors 
relying on physical principles, rather 
than on safety devices, to ensure that 
they come to an automatic safe shut- 
down in the event of a serious malfunc- 
tion. The United States and other 
nations are already at work on a number 
of reactor concepts along these lines. 

Another challenge we must address 
is the permanent disposal of radioactive 
wastes. I have argued that nuclear 
power production has a relatively benign 
impact on the environment compared to 
other generating methods, and histor- 
ically, this is true. But it will remain true 
for the future only if adequate means are 
implemented to ensure that radioactive 
wastes can be securely stored indefi- 
nitely in a way that neither harms the 
environment nor poses a health and 
safety hazard to the public. The technical 
issues have already been addressed 
satisfactorily. The Department of 
Energy is proceeding with a program for 
implementing the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982. But questions of public and 
political acceptance must still be 
resolved if technologies already 
demonstrated are to be successfully 
deployed. 

Promoting International Safeguards 

Let me return now to a distinction I 
made earlier between safety and safe- 
guards in the international context. The 
latter term— safeguards— has become a 
term of art as used with respect to civil 
nuclear energy. It refers neither to the 
safe operation of nuclear installations 
nor to the physical protection— safe- 
keeping, if you will— of nuclear 
materials. It refers, rather, to a system 
of inspections and other measures whose 
objective— if I may quote more or less 



verbatim the formal IAEA language— is 
the timely detection of diversion of 
significant quantities of nuclear material 
from peaceful nuclear activities for the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
nuclear devices and the deterrence of 
any such diversion by the risk of early 
detection. 

Just as the general public has a right 
to insist that civil nuclear energy is 
safely employed both at home and 
abroad, so, too, does it have a right to 
insist that its use be confined exclusively 
to peaceful purposes. The complex of 
international legal commitments, 
assurances, and other arrangements 
developed to ensure that civil nuclear 
energy is used only for peaceful pur- 
poses is often referred to as the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. International 
nuclear safeguards, including onsite 
inspections administered by the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, are one 
of the main components of this regime. 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, with more 
than 135 member states, is another 
indispensable component. 

The Reagan Administration, like all 
U.S. administrations since the dawn of 
the nuclear era, regards the prevention 
of the spread of nuclear explosives to 
additional countries as a fundamental 
national security and foreign policy 
objective. We are pursuing this goal in a 
number of ways. 

• We are striving to reduce the 
motivation that other states may have 
for acquiring nuclear explosives by work- 
ing to improve regional and global 
stability and, where appropriate, by 
helping states to provide for their 
legitimate security needs by non-nuclear 
means. 

• We continue to promote wider 
adherence to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibi- 
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America, known as the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco. 

• We are constantly looking for 
ways to work more effectively with 
other countries on measures to combat 
the risks of proliferation. 

• We strictly control the export of 
sensitive nuclear material, equipment, 
and technology from the United States, 
particularly where the danger of pro- 
liferation requires it, and we coordinate 
closely with other nuclear suppliers 
within a framework of common export 
norms. 

• We strongly support the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency and con- 
tinue to work with other countries to 
strengthen it, particularly in its role of 



anuary 1987 



77 



PACIFIC 



applying international safeguards. 
Indeed, we regard the agency's 
safeguards as such a critical element in 
the international nonproliferation regime 
that we have urged all nuclear suppliers 
to agree on a policy of requiring 
safeguards on all nuclear activities of a 
recipient non-nuclear weapon state as a 
condition for significant new nuclear 
export commitments to such states— a 
condition known as "comprehensive" or 
"full-scope" safeguards. The United 
States, I might note, already requires 
full-scope safeguards as a condition for 
significant nuclear exports to its non- 
nuclear weapon state trading partners, 
including reactors and reactor fuel. 

• Finally, we are making a serious 
effort to restore the reputation of the 
United States as a reliable nuclear 
trading partner, for only if we maintain 
our credibility with other nations in the 
nuclear area can we expect them to 
listen when we attempt to influence 
their nuclear programs in directions we 
regard as desirable. 

Conclusion 

Civil nuclear power today is an increas- 
ingly widely used source of energy. 
Properly managed from an environmen- 
tal and nonproliferation point of view, it 
will continue to play a critical role in 
meeting man's energy needs until well 
into the next century and possibly 
beyond. It is clean, efficient, and 
relatively inexpensive. It makes an 
essential contribution to the industrial- 
ized world's energy mix, especially in 
countries that have few alternative 
domestic energy resources. It is a key 
component for assuring our energy 
security, and even in the wake of Cher- 
nobyl, there is no valid reason to aban- 
don it. I am convinced that we can and 
should continue to rely on nuclear 
energy as one of our major options for 
electrical generation. 

If civil nuclear programs are really 
to prosper, of course, they must have the 
support of the general public. They 
must, therefore, be safe, even safer than 
they are now. And they must be safe- 
guarded so that there is minimal risk of 
their serving as a subterfuge for nuclear 
explosives development. Responsible 
governments have made great strides in 
both these areas, and we plan to con- 
tinue with our efforts. ■ 



U.S. Relationship With Pacific Islands 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 3, 1986' 



Today I am pleased to announce the 
beginning of new relationships between 
the United States and the island groups 
that have emerged from the Pacific 
Islands Trust Territory. One of these, 
the Northern Mariana Islands, is now a 
U.S. Commonwealth, and its people are 
now U.S. citizens. The other two— the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia— are 
sovereign, self-governing nations in free 
association with the United States. 

The fourth and remaining island 
group, Palau, has not yet finally 
approved its compact of free association. 
Until Palau's future political status is 
resolved, the United States will continue 
to discharge its responsibilities there as 
administering authority under the 
trusteeship agreement. 

The United States liberated these 
Islands during our westward drive across 
the Pacific toward the end of World 
War II and has administered them as a 
UN strategic trusteeship since 1947. In 
these last four decades, we have worked 
with the islanders to improve health, 
education, and social service facilities 
throughout the more than 2,000 islands 
comprising the trust territory. Our most 
valuable contribution to the islands, a 
legacy in which we can take pride, are 
the democratic, representative govern- 



il 



ments created and now enjoyed by the 
peoples of the trust territory. 

The United States is happy to com 
mence these new relationships with the 
Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshal 
Islands, and the Federated States of 
Micronesia. We deeply appreciate thosf' 
who have worked so long and hard, in 
the negotiations and in the Congress, t 
fashion and enact the commonwealth 
covenant and the compacts of free 
association. We especially want to 
welcome the people of the Northern 
Mariana Islands into the American 
family as fellow citizens. We are honor 
by the choices of the peoples and leadei 
of the two new freely associated states 
to associate with us in close and long- 
lasting relationships, which reflect the 
good will and affection between our 
peoples. For these peoples, the long 
years of trusteeship are over and the 
dignity and opportunity for self- 
government are here. We in the Unitec 
States pledge our friendship and suppo 
as the Northern Mariana Islands, the 
Marshall Islands, and the Federated 
States of Micronesia now walk the pat! 
they themselves have chosen. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1986, 
which also carries the text of Executive Orq 
.5564 of Nov. 3 entitled "Placing Into Full 
Force and Effect the Covenant With the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands and the Compacts of Free Associati 
With the Federated States of Micronesia an 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands." ■ 



78 



I 



ERRORISM 



I.S. Takes 
Measures Against 
lyria 



KITE HOUSE STATEMENT. 
'3V. 14. 1986' 

'le President today decided to take 
.eeific steps in response to Syria's con- 
nued support for international ter- 
irism. The conviction of Nizar Hindawi 
i a British court directly implicated the 
I'rian Government in the attempted 
Hilling of the El Al airplane. More 
an 230 Americans and almost 200 
ssengers of other nationalities were on 
ard the flight and would have died had 
e terrorist operation been successful. 
Syria has been on the Department's 
t of state sponsors of terrorism since 
e list's inception in 1979. As such, con- 
ils aimed at restricting the export of 
ods and technology that would make a 
jnificant contribution to the military 
tential or would enhance the terrorist 
pport capabilities of Syria are in 
feet. Other measures, such as a cutoff 
foreign assistance to Syria, have also 
en imposed. 

We believe further steps must be 
ken to discourage such Syrian behavior 
d to express our outrage, and that of 
e American people, at Syrian sponsor- 
ip of this attack and its long pattern of 
pport for terrorism. We have been in 
nsultation with our allies on this mat- 
r, including members of the European 
zonomic Community who announced 
eir own measures on November 10. 
e welcome these decisions. These 
easures and our own actions will send 
clear and unequivocal message to 
,'ria: Its support of terrorism is unac- 
ptable to the international community 
nations. As a result, the President is 
■dering the following actions. 

• The Secretary of Commerce, in 
msultation with the Secretary of State, 
ill expand current controls on exports 

' any items controlled for national 
'curity purposes including related 
■chnical data, along with all aircraft, 
;licopters, and related parts and 
)mponents. 

• The Secretary of State will ter- 
linate the availability of Export-Import 
ank programs for Syria. 

• The Secretary of State will advise 
yria of our decision to terminate the air 
•ansport agreement between the United 
tates of America and Syria. 



• The Secretary of Transportation 
will prohibit the sale of tickets in the 
United States for transportation by air 
on Syrian Arab Airlines. 

In addition to these actions, we have 
informed U.S. oil companies that we con- 
sider their continued involvement in 
Syrian oil operations inappropriate 
under these circumstances. 

More vigorous procedures will be 
applied to Syrian visa applications. We 
also have revised an advisory statement 
on American travel in Syria to alert 
citizens to the potential for terrorist 
activity originating there. 

Finally, we are reducing the staff of 
our Embassy in Damascus, and no high- 
level visits between the United States 
and Syria will take place. 

These measiu^es are intended to con- 
vince the Syrian Government that state 
support of terrorism will not be tolerated 
by the civilized world. We will continue 
to closely monitor the situation and take 
additional steps as necessary. As long as 
Syria does not stop terrorism launched 
from its own territory, or areas of 
Lebanon under its effective control, the 
security of all states in the region is 
jeopardized. Syrian-supported terrorism 
has introduced an unpredictable element 
of instability in the region and risks the 
danger of open violence there. Syria can 
play an important role in a key region of 
the world but it cannot expect to be 
accepted as a responsible power or 
treated as one as long as it continues to 
use terrorism as an instrument of its 
foreign policy. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986. 



U.S. Supports 
Council of Europe 
Resolution on Terrorism 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 24, 1986' 

The Department of State, after review 
of the recent Council of Europe resolu- 
tion on preventing the abuse by terror- 
ists of diplomatic and consular immu- 
nities, today announces its support and 
intent to adhere to the principles con- 
tained in this resolution. 

Its principal provisions concern a 
closer scrutiny of diplomats who are 
suspected of having connections to ter- 
rorism, exchanging such information 
among the states subscribing to the 



resolution, considering refusing to 
accept diplomats about whom another 
member state has concrete information 
of their involvement in terrorism, and 
considering restricting the size of 
diplomatic or consular posts when there 
is evidence of involvement in terrorism 
by that state. 

We are pleased to support these 
important measures to prevent the abuse 
of diplomatic and consular immunities by 
those supporting terrorism. 

The Council of Europe passed this 
resolution at its ministerial meeting in 
Strasbourg on November 4 and 5. It was 
confirmed by the Committee of Foreign 
Ministers November 20. We believe the 
council is doing excellent work in 
establishing a legal framework to com- 
bat terrorism, and the United States is 
seeking to work closely with the council. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



American Hostage 
Released in Beirut 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
NOV. 2. 1986' 

I am pleased to announce that one of the 
Americans held hostage in Beirut has 
been released. David Jacobsen was 
released early this morning by his cap- 
tors in Beirut. His family has been 
notified and will be joining him soon. I 
do want to express my personal appre- 
ciation to the various parties and 
intermediaries who have been helpful in 
arranging this release. We have been 
working through a number of sensitive 
channels for a long time. Unfortunately, 
we cannot divulge any of the details of 
the release, because the lives of other 
Americans and other Western hostages 
are still at risk. 

Again I call on the captors of all 
hostages in Lebanon to release their 
innocent victims. No political goals are 
or will be achieved by resorting to extor- 
tion and terrorism. We hold the captors 
of the remaining American hostages in 
Lebanon responsible for the safety of 
those Americans. My thoughts and 
prayers go out to the families of those 
American hostages as we continue to 
work for their safe return. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1986. 



January 1987 



79 



UNITED NATIONS 



Situation in Cambodia 



Statement by Ambassador Vernon A. 
Walters. U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations, in a UN General 
Assembly plenary session on October 20. 
1986. and the text of the General 
Assembly adopted October 21. 

AMBASSADOR WALTERS' 

STATEMENT. 
OCT. 20, 1986' 

We meet today to discuss a question of 
searing humanitarian importance— the 
continued existence of the Cambodian 
people. 

The Cambodians have a proud and 
glorious heritage which traces its lineage 
over hundreds of years, from the 8th 
century when the first Cambodian king 
established himself on the shores of the 
Great Lake, the Tonle Sap. P'rom this 
beginning grew the Angkor Kingdom, 
one of Southeast Asia's mightiest 
empires. The Cambodians searched out 
the secrets of water management and 
irrigation and built the huge reservoirs 
which allowed bountiful agricultural pro- 
duction. The Cambodians of the Angkor 
period developed into the master 
builders of the time and left the world 
that unsurpassed masterpiece. Angkor 
Wat. He who gazes at Angkor Wat and 
Angkor Thorn cannot but be awed by the 
Cambodians' accomplishment and what 
they bequeathed to all mankind. 

The glories of Angkor, however, are 
far in the past, and the Cambodian peo- 
ple now find themselves in far different 
circumstances. Instead of the proud war- 
riors who kept their enemies at bay for 
centuries, the Cambodians are now pros- 
trate. Their country is occupied by 
foreign forces, and their very future 
existence as a people in question. It is 
right and proper that we in the United 
Nations should address ourselves to this 
question, for the fate of Cambodia and 
the Cambodian people is one of concern 
to the entire world community. It is one 
of the principal functions of the United 
Nations to defend just such a small 
nation and helpless people. 

The origins of the Cambodian 
tragedy are well known. In April 1975, 
the black-clad Khmer Rouge stormed 
Phnom Penh and opened a chapter in 
world history which will live forever in 
infamy. Applying extreme ideas of 
agrarian revolution, the Khmer Rouge 
emptied the cities and treated the 
inhabitants as little better than draft 
animals. Hundreds of thousands of inno- 



cent Cambodians died from exhaustion, 
disease, and malnutrition. Others were 
brutally executed by the increasingly 
paranoid Khmer Rouge leaders. 

In December 1978, Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia and drove the Khmer Rouge 
from power. The Vietnamese claim that 
they acted to liberate the country from 
Pol Pot, but the truth is far different. 
Before the Khmer Rouge seized power. 
Vietnam gave them massive support. 
Many Khmer Rouge leaders were 
trained in Vietnam; but once Pol Pot 
was in power, Vietnam quickly learned 
that it could not control him. It was at 
this time that the Vietnamese used the 
growing world condemnation of the 
Khmer Rouge as a pretext to invade. 

After nearly 8 years, Vietnam's 
intentions for Cambodia have become 
increasingly plain— Vietnam seeks 
nothing less than creation of a vassal 
and colonized state. The Heng Samrin 
regime which it installed in Phnom Penh 
could not survive without the 140,000 
Vietnamese occupation troops. All senior 
Heng Samrin officials have Vietnamese 
"advisors" who insure that Vietnam's 
dictates are followed to the letter. Even 
those officials must resent the hours of 
political "education" designed to pro- 
duce conformity to Vietnam's outlook. 
No policy can be promulgated in Phnom 
Penh without Vietnamese approval, and 
woe to the Cambodian official who dares 
to display any hint of independence of 
nationalism. The fate of Pen Sovan 
serves as a vivid reminder of what hap- 
pens to those who step out of line. Viet- 
namese control reaches down to the 
district and village levels, where Viet- 
namese "advisors" have often unilat- 
erally established their own governmen- 
tal structures. 

The Vietnamese presence, however, 
is not limited to the government. It 
permeates all aspects of the society. The 
schools have been turned into instru- 
ments of Vietnamese propaganda, seek- 
ing to justify the Vietnamese occupation. 
Knowledge of the Vietnamese language 
is a prerequisite to advancement. 
Students have regularly been sent to 
study in Vietnam. The local press is also 
directed by the ever-present Vietnamese 
"advisors." The shattered Cambodian 
economy continues to be drained by the 
Vietnamese. Cambodia's hard-pressed 
farmers still have to help supply the 
Vietnamese occupation forces. 



The most insidious of Vietnam's 
plans to subjugate Cambodia is the set- 
tlement of hundreds of thousands of 
Vietnamese nationals on Cambodian ter 
ritory. His Royal Highness Prince 
Sihanouk has repeatedly raised the 
alarm about the Vietnamese colonizatio 
of his country. Estimates of the number 
of Vietnamese settlers now run as high 
as 700,000, or over 10% of the popula- 
tion. And more arrive all the time. 
Former Prime Minister H.E. Son Sann 
recently said in Washington that Camb< 
dians were being forced out of the cities 
to the villages to make way for new 
Vietnamese arrivals. Even in the 
villages, Vietnamese authorities were 
apparently requisitioning the best housi 
and the choicest farm lands for their 
compatriots. That the master builders 
who once raised the magnificent Angko 
Wat from the swamps of the Great Lak 
should be reduced to being outcasts in 
their own land is a source of outrage an 
deep concern to us all. 

As has occurred in many other 
oppressed lands, the Vietnamese occupt 
tion has fanned popular revolt inside 
Cambodia. Armed resistance to the Vie- 
namese is spreading. Vietnamese and 
Heng Samrin installations throughout 
the country are now targets of 
resistance attacks. Key lines of com- 
munications are often interdicted and 
even the suburbs of Phnom Penh have 
witnessed resistance incursions. Heng 
Samrin conscripts are defecting to the 
resistance ranks in increasing numbers. 
Several hundred Vietnamese soldiers 
have also thrown down their arms and 
fled to the Thai border to escape involv' 
ment in this unjust war. 

HRH Prince Sihanouk detailed for i 
in his September 30 general debate 
speech the growing strength of the 
resistance, reaching ever deeper within 
Cambodia. Stung by the increasing effe 
tiveness of the Cambodian resistance 
forces, the Vietnamese have tried unsuc 
cessfully to crush them militarily. In tht 
winter of 1984-85, Vietnamese division: 
brutally attacked refugee camps on the 
Thai border, killing scores of innocent 
civilians and uprooting tens of thousand 
more. The resistance, however, 
remained unaffected and, indeed, is 
stronger than ever before. Recently, the 
Vietnamese have tried another tack by 
constructing barriers along the Thai- 
Cambodian border. In a move reminis- 
cent of the Khmer Rouge, the Viet- 
namese have conscripted thousands of 
civilians to clear land, plant antiper- 
sonnel mines, and construct barriers. Ai 
untold number of these conscripts have 
died because of disease, exhaustion, and 



H 



80 



DepartRient of State Bullet 



UNITED NATIONS 



lines. Despite this effort, the resistance 
jntinues to grow and is now more than 
rer firmly established inside Cambodia. 

The growing opposition to Viet- 
amese imperialist ambitions in Cam- 
odia has other dimensions. The 240,000 
:ambodians who remain on the Thai 
.order bear witness to their continued 
tefiance. Living in spartan conditions 
nd under the constant threat of attack, 
le border Cambodians courageously 
pitomize the love of country and 
■eedom which has characterized the 
ambodian people down through the 
enturies. Our hearts go out to them, 
nd we pray that they will soon be able 
) return to a free and independent 
ambodia. We also deeply appreciate the 
ork of Mr. Kunugi, the Secretary 
reneral's Special Representative for 
i ambodian Relief, and a dedicated staff 
'f the UN Border Relief Operation 
JNBRO), the World Food Program, the 
iternational Committee of the Red 
ross (ICRC), and the voluntary agen- 
es which have turned the border relief 
Deration into a humanitarian success 
;ory of the highest order. The Royal 
hai Government should also be com- 
lended for its unswerving commitment 
) the support and protection of the 
jrder Cambodians. 

The world community also remains 
nited in its opposition to Vietnam's 
ctions. For years, an overwhelming 
umber of UN members have called for 
le unconditional withdrawal of Viet- 
amese troops from Cambodia. This year 
larks the eighth time we have met 
nder the auspices of the United Nations 
) debate Cambodia and to issue the sim- 
le plea that the Cambodians be allowed 
) decide their own destiny. What has 
een Vietnam's response to world oppro- 
rium? The record is clear. The Viet- 
amese have rejected all calls for peace 
nd have continued undeterred in the 
Tiperialist and colonialist policies. Fur- 
nermore, an October 15 letter signed by 
he Acting Permanent Representative of 
^etnam and circulated as a General 
assembly document declares that Viet- 
am will consider null and void any 
esolution emerging from our debate 
ere. 

The Vietnamese, nevertheless, have 
ried to sway public opinion by an inten- 
ive propaganda campaign. The most 
ecent example took place at an August 
neeting in Hanoi, where the Foreign 
tlinisters of Vietnam, Laos, and the pup- 
)et Heng Samrin regime issued a com- 
nunique which once again claimed that 
jreat strides were being made inside 
"^ambodia, that the changes in Cambodia 



were irreversible, and that the Viet- 
namese occupation troops would be 
withdrawn by 1990. But how can we talk 
about "great strides" when Cambodia 
suffers poverty, hunger, and disease; 
when young people are conscripted 
against their will to die for a foreign 
invader; when innocent civilians are 
press-ganged into building defensive for- 
tifications in malaria-infested forests 
with little food or medical care? Let 
there be no doubt about it: Cambodia 
today is an abjectly poor, battered coun- 
try on the brink of disaster. Without 
peace and self-determination, the very 
existence of Cambodia and of the Khmer 
as an independent people is threatened. 

Moreover, the Vietnamese claim to 
withdraw its forces from Cambodia by 
1990 is clearly based on the hope that 
their puppet, Heng Samrin, would be 
able by then to manage largely on his 
own. The recent performance of Heng 
Samrin's soldiers suggests that Viet- 
namese hopes are as illusory as their 
protestations of peaceful intent. The 
Vietnamese troop withdrawals to date 
are nothing more than a public relations 
fraud aimed at deceiving world opinion. 
There has been no general withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. 
What we have seen is the regular rota- 
tion of some units, nothing more. There 
are still an estimated 140,000 Viet- 
namese troops inside Cambodia, roughly 
the same number as at the onset of the 
occupation, despite claimed withdrawals. 

Above all, there is one basic fallacy 
to the Vietnamese arguments: Vietnam 
has no right to lay down any conditions 
for a settlement. The Vietnamese are 
the invaders, and they must leave Cam- 
bodia. It is as simple as that. Moreover, 
there is no need for new formulations for 
a Cambodian solution. They are already 
clearly laid out in the principles of the 
1981 International Conference on Kam- 
puchea as follows: 

• A cease-fire and withdrawal of all 
foreign forces in the shortest time possi- 
ble under the supervision and verifica- 
tion of a UN peacekeeping force; 

• Arrangements to ensure that 
armed factions will not be able to pre- 
vent or disrupt the holding of free elec- 
tions and will respect the results of the 
free elections; 

• Appropriate measures to maintain 
law and order until the establishment of 
a new government; and 

• The holding of free elections under 
UN supervision. 

In contrast to Vietnam's intran- 
sigence, other parties involved in the 
Cambodian issue continue to demon- 



strate a sincere effort to reach a 
peaceful solution. The members of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in particular should be com- 
mended for their efforts on behalf of 
peace. Since 1981 the members of 
ASEAN have advanced a series of dif- 
ferent ideas to address Vietnamese con- 
cerns. Unfortunately, Vietnam has 
ignored all efforts at conciliation. 

Other proposals have also been 
advanced to the Vietnamese containing 
elements which, if accepted by all the 
parties involved, could advance the 
search for peace. Again and again, Viet- 
nam has rejected these out of hand. 

Vietnam's Minister of State, Vo 
Dong Giang, recently told the General 
Assembly that a Cambodian solution 
must be based on guaranteeing the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, on the 
elimination of the genocidal Pol Pot 
clique, and on guaranteeing a process of 
national reconciliation. Vietnam clearly 
wants peace only on its own terms; but 
since proposals with many reasonable 
elements have been made to the Viet- 
namese by its neighbors, it remains for 
the Vietnamese to initiate the process. 
Genuine willingness to negotiate a settle- 
ment in Cambodia would be a welcome 
development, above all, for the Cambo- 
dian people. The Vietnamese occupation 
of Cambodia, more than any other fac- 
tor, stands in the path of Vietnam's par- 
ticipation as a constructive member of 
the peaceful community of nations. 
Surely the Vietnamese would benefit 
enormously from a peaceful settlement 
of the Cambodian conflict. If they are 
serious, let them begin serious troop 
withdrawals and seek serious solutions 
to this grave problem. Until then, the 
world must judge them by their actions. 

Let us remember also that Vietnam 
is not the only country which shares 
responsibility for the Cambodian plight. 
Vietnam could not continue with its sub- 
jugation of this land if it were not for the 
massive military support received from 
its Soviet backers. Most of the bombs 
and bullets the Vietnamese use against 
the Cambodians are from the Soviet 
Union. If the Soviet Union were to cut 
off this military support, Vietnam would 
be hard-pressed to maintain its occupa- 
tion, and peace might be possible. We 
call on Moscow to place sufficient 
pressure on the Vietnamese to agree to 
a comprehensive settlement. 

The Cambodian tragedy must be 
brought to an end. The Cambodian peo- 
ple have suffered long enough. Now is 
the time to end violence and the human 
suffering. Now is the time for us to join 
hands and contribute jointly to the 



January 1987 



81 



UNITED NATIONS 



rebirth of a truly free and independent 
Cambodia. With our help, there can be a 
resurgence of the Angkor spirit which 
illuminated Southeast Asia in the past. 
To make this possible, however, we must 
first bring peace to this ravaged land; 
and to do that, Vietnam must heed the 
appeals of the world community to with- 
draw its troops and negotiate. There is 
no other choice. 



GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

RESOLUTION 41/6, 
OCT. 21, 1986^ 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14 
November 1979. 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 36/5 
of 21 October 1981, 37/6 of 28 October 1982, 
38/3 of 27 October 1983, 39/5 of 30 October 
1984 and 40/7 of 5 November 1985, 

Recalling further the Declaration on Kam- 
puchea and resolution 1(1) adopted by the 
International Conference on Kampuchea, 
which offer the negotiating framework for a 
comprehensive political settlement of the 
Kampuchean problem. 

Taking note of the report of the 
Secretary-General on the implementation of 
General Assembly resolution 40/7, 

Deploring that foreign armed interven- 
tion and occupation continue and that foreign 
forces have not been withdrawn from Kam- 
puchea, thus causing continuing hostilities in 
that country and seriously threatening inter- 
national peace and security, 

Noting the continued and effective strug- 
gle waged against foreign occupation by the 
Coalition with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk 
as President of Democratic Kampuchea, 

Taking note of Economic and Social Coun- 
cil decision 1986/146 of 23 May 1986 on the 
right of peoples to self-determination and its 
application to peoples under colonial or alien 
domination or foreign occupation. 

Greatly disturbed that the continued 
fighting and instability of Kampuchea have 
forced an additional large number of Kam- 
pucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean 
border in search of food and safety, 

Recognizing that the assistance extended 
by the international community has continued 
to reduce the food shortages and health prob- 
lems of the Kampuchean people, 

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable 
right of the Kampuchean people who have 
sought refuge in neighboring countries to 
return safely to their homeland. 

Emphasizing further that no effective 
solution to the humanitarian problems can be 
achieved without a comprehensive political 
settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. 

Seriously concerned about reported 
demographic changes being imposed in Kam- 
puchea l)y foreign occupation forces. 

Convinced that, to bring about lasting 
peace in South-East Asia and reduce the 
threat to international peace and security, 
there is an urgent need for the international 



community to find a comprehensive political 
solution to the Kampuchean problem that will 
provide for the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces and ensure respect for the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and neutral 
and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well 
as the right of the Kampuchean people to self- 
determination free from outside interference. 

Reiterating its conviction that, after the 
comprehensive political settlement of the 
Kampuchean question through peaceful 
means, the States of the South-East Asian 
region can pursue efforts to establish a zone 
of peace, freedom and neutrality in South- 
East Asia so as to lessen international ten- 
sions and to achieve lasting peace in the 
region. 

Reaffirming the need for all States to 
adhere strictly to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, which call for 
respect for the national independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
States, non-intervention and non-interference 
in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse 
to the threat or use of force and peaceful set- 
tlement of disputes. 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22. 35/6. 
36/5. 37/6. 38/3. 39/5 and 40/7 and calls for 
their full implementation; 

2. Reiterates its conviction that the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kam- 
puchea, the restoration and preservation of 
its independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, the right of the Kampuchean people 
to determine their own destiny and the com- 
mitment by all States to non-interference and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
Kampuchea are the principal components of 
any just and lasting resolution of the Kam- 
puchean problem; 

3. Takes note with appreciation of the 
report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Inter- 
national Conference on Kampuchea on its 
activities during 1985-1986 and requests that 
the Committee continue its work, pending the 
reconvening of the Conference; 

4. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee to 
convene when necessary and to carry out the 
tasks entrusted to it in its mandate; 

5. Reaffirms its decision to reconvene the 
Conference at an appropriate time, in accord- 
ance with Conference resolution 1(1); 

6. Renews its appeal to all States of 
South-East Asia and others concerned to 
attend future sessions of the Conference; 

7. Requests the Conference to report to 
the General Assembly on its future sessions; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to con- 
tinue to consult with and assist the Con- 
ference and the Ad Hoc Committee and to 
provide them on a regular basis with the 
necessary facilities to carry out their 
functions; 

9. Expresses its appreciation once again 
to the Secretary-General for taking appro- 
priate steps in following the situation closely 
and requests him to continue to do so and to 
exercise his good offices in order to con- 
tribute to a comprehensive political 
settlement; 



10. Expresses its deep appreciation onct 
again to donor countries, and the United 
Nations and its agencies and other humani- 
tarian organizations, national and interna- 
tional, that have rendered relief assistance t 
the Kampuchean people, and appeals to thei 
to continue to provide emergency assistance 
to those Kampucheans who are still in need, 
especially along the Thai-Kampuchean bordi 
and in the holding centers in Thailand; 

11. Reiterates its deep appreciation to t 
Secretary-General for his efforts in 
co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance 
and in monitoring its distribution, and 
requests him to intensify such efforts as are 
necessary; 

12. Urges the States of South-East Asir 
once a comprehensive political solution to t\ 
Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert 
renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace 
freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia; 

13. Reiterates the hope that, following a 
comprehensive political solution, an inter- 
governmental committee will be established 
to consider a programme of assistance to 
Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its 
economy and for the economic and social 
development of all States in the region; 

14. Requests the Secretary-General to 
report to the General Assembly at its forty- 
second session on the implementation of the 
present resolution; 

15. Decides to include in the provisional 
agenda of its forty-second session the item 
entitled "The situation in Kampuchea." 

'USUN press release 120. 
-Adopted by a vote of 115 for (U.S.) anc 
21 against, with 13 abstentions. ■ 



Nicaragua 



by Herbert S. Okun 

Statement in a plenary session oft 
UN General Assembly on November 3, 
1986. Ambassador Okun is U.S. Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the Unitei 
Nations.^ 

As my delegation stated in the General 
Committee on October 30, the United 
States believes the new item proposed 
by Nicaragua is not an appropriate iten 
for consideration by the General 
Assembly. In regards to judgments of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Article 94(2), provides that a "party mi 
have recourse to the Security (Ilouncil." 
There is no mention of any role for the 
General Assembly. 

For this reason, until now, no 
member state has requested the GenerE 
Assembly to take a decision on an issue^ 
of this nature. Even those member 
states which have accepted the com- 



82 



Department of State Bullet 



UNITED NATIONS 



Isiiry jurisdiction of the International 
iii't of Justice should have serious 
iivations about involving the Cieneral 
M'lnbly in implementing decisions of 
International Court of Justice. 
The United States believes that the 
,'Stion that Nicaragua has insisted on 
lining up today must be considered in 
' lontext of what is happening within 
:iragua and between Nicaragua and 
neighbors in Central America. I will 
,1.' more to say about that presently. 

As we have often stated before, it is 
I enough to claim that, just because 
tii'le 36(6) of the Court's statute says 
It It may decide disputes concerning 
ixiiction, the Court, indeed, dirf have 
I isdiction in this particular dispute. No 
C-irt, including the International Court 
(; Justice, has the legal power to assert 
j isdiction where there is no basis for 
tit jurisdiction. 

The absence of any foundation in 
{her law or fact for the Court's asser- 
tn of jurisdiction in this case is clear. 
I ok at the language and the negotiat- 
i; history of the Charter of the United 
I tions. Look at the language and the 
Ijotiating history of the Statute of the 
l:ernational Court of Justice. Look at 
1 > consistent interpretation of these 

truments by the Court, by the Secu- 
j V Council, and by member states. 

The resolution before us today is 
I sed on a fundamentally flawed inter- 
i etation of the significance and validity 
I the decision of the International Court 
' Justice. Moreover, even if it were not 
I flawed, it is not appropriate for con- 
■ leration by the General Assembly. 
' LOse are two of the reasons why my 
legation will vote against this draft 
solution. 

Given this background, why has 
caragua chosen to come to the General 
isembly today? As it has done so often 
the Security Council in the past, the 
indinistas clearly intend to manipulate 
e U.N. General Assembly for prop- 
:anda purposes. If Nicaragua wished 
rious consideration of this issue in its 
tality, it would have agreed to take it 
• as part of Item 42, the Situation in 
?ntral America, which is already on the 
?neral Assembly's agenda for 
scussion. 

In spite of what the representative 
' Nicaragua has asserted here this 
orning, the issue at stake is the crisis 
Central America and how to resolve 
. Nicaragua has twisted the issue by 
irtraying it as a conflict between 
icaragua and the United States. My 
3vernment, the people of Central 
merica, and the Sandinistas themselves 
now that this is not the case. The 



Sandinista regime is responsible for the 
crisis. It has waged a campaign of sub- 
version against all of its neighbors and a 
campaign of repression against its own 
people, whose revolution it has betrayed. 

During the 1979 revolution in 
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas pledged to 
follow a policy of nonalignment. They 
promised not to e.xport their revolution. 
But, from the outset, the Sandinistas 
planned to ally themselves with Cuba 
and the Soviet bloc. By 1980 the 
Sandinistas were deeply involved in 
regional subversion, supporting the 
Marxist guerrillas seeking to overthrow 
the Government of El Salvador. The 
evidence proves this support is massive 
and undeniable. It ranges from state- 
ments by former guerrillas and moun- 
tains of captured documents to physical 
proof such as captured weapons and 
munitions. 

Nicaraguan subversion goes far 
beyond El Salvador. The Sandinistas 
provide clandestine assistance to subver- 
sive groups throughout the region. The 
Sandinistas directly participated in the 
1983 and 1984 attempts to infiltrate 
subversives into Honduras, as captured 
subversives themselves have admitted. 
The Sandinistas have also supported ter- 
rorists in Costa Rica, and their agents 
have repeatedly attempted assassina- 
tions in that country. The Nicaraguan 
connection with the weapons used by the 
Colombian M-19 in the bloody attack on 
the Palace of Justice in Bogota is well 
known. 

A threatening rise in Nicaragua's 
conventional forces has accompanied the 
Sandinistas' subversion of their 
neighbors. Since 1979 the Sandinistas 
have created the largest army in the 
history of Central America— ten times 
the size of Somoza's. To equip it, they 
have received from their Cuban and 
Soviet allies an arsenal without prece- 
dent in the region, including fleets of 
combat helicopters, battalions of tanks 
and armored vehicles, and scores of 
artillery pieces and rocket launchers. 
They have militarized Nicaragua, turn- 
ing the country into an armed camp. I 
refer you to an article printed just last 
Wednesday in The New York Times on 
the latest delivery of Soviet helicopter 
gunships. Every day these formidable 
weapons, piloted in many cases by 
Cubans, are killing ever-escalating 
numbers of Nicaraguans. 

Just as the Sandinistas have 
betrayed their neighbors, all of whom 
welcomed the Nicaraguan revolution, 
they have also betrayed the Nicaraguans 
who believed the Sandinistas' promises 
of freedom and democracy. In recent 



months, the Sandinista regime has 
ruthlessly intensified the consolidation of 
its totalitarian rule. Using its secret 
police— ten times the size of Somoza's— 
and its network of Cuban-inspired "block 
committees," it has created an atmos- 
phere of fear and repression that far 
exceeds the worst excesses of the 
Somoza regime. The Sandinistas have 
suspended even the most basic of human 
rights. They have engaged in a sys- 
tematic pattern of summary executions, 
arbitrary detentions, and physical and 
psychological abuse of prisoners. 

Let me dwell for a moment on the 
Sandinistas' violations of human rights. 
According to the Organization of 
American States' (OAS) human rights 
office, there are some 2,000 Nicaraguan 
prisoners who have been tried or are 
awaiting trial by the so-called Popular 
Anti-Somocista Tribunals, whose convic- 
tion rate is 99%. The OAS report notes 
that these prisoners enjoy no presump- 
tion of innocence, have limited access to 
defense counsel, and face judges whose 
"impartiality, fairness, and independ- 
ence of judgment are seriously com- 
promised." 

Since the Nicaraguan representative 
insists upon invoking the rule of law and 
concepts of justice before this body, let 
me call to the attention of those who 
may have missed it the description of the 
Sandinista system for dispensing justice 
which appeared in the October 31 issue 
of The New York Time>:. The article 
reported that the popular tribunals have 
become a principal Sandinista instru- 
ment for repressing the peaceful 
democratic opposition under the guise of 
adjudicating national security cases. I 
quote from the article. 

Independent labor unionists, opposition 
party activists, journalists and other peaceful 
dissidents have been proclaimed "counter- 
revolutionaries" and given stiff jail terms by 
the tribunals .... The common experience of 
political defendants is arrest without warrant 
and incommunicado detention. Though the 
tribunals' summary procedures are meant to 
expedite justice, many defendants are held 
for several months before being charged or 
tried. They are interrogated in harsh condi- 
tions, invariably making self-incriminating 
statements under duress and sometimes tor- 
ture. Once charges are brought, proceedings 
are speedy .... Human rights groups have 
noted that several lawyers have been 
imprisoned for too vigorously defending 
political clients. 

The Sandinistas claim that they 
somehow have been given a mandate to 
rule Nicaragua. From whom or what did 
they obtain this mandate? Certainly not 
from the hundreds of thousands of 



anuary 1987 



83 



UNITED NATIONS 



I 



Nicaraguans who participated in the 
1979 revolution, thinking it would bring 
genuine democracy to Nicaragua and 
who subsequently had to tlee the coun- 
try. The Sandinistas have persecuted the 
genuinely democratic political parties 
that played such a noble role in the 
revolution, forcing many of their leaders 
into exile and harassing and intimidating 
those who chose to remain. Among the 
many tragic ironies of the Sandinistas 
betrayal of the revolution is the fate of 
La Prem^a. The assassination of La 
Pren.sd'.s publisher in 1978 was the spark 
which ignited the revolution. In June of 
this year, the Sandinistas closed down 
La Prensa as the last step in their 7-year 
effort to stamp out a free press, one of 
the essential elements of democratic 
government. 

Because the revolution before us 
today totally ignores the situation that 
prevails between Nicaragua and its 
neighbors, making not even a single 
reference to the Contadora process, and 
because it also ignores the fundamental 
principles of human rights embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations, my 
delegation believes that it is a totally 
unacceptable portrayal of the tragic 
reality of Central America. This is yet 
another reason why my delegation will 
vote against this resolution. 

My delegation had been planning to 
elaborate its views on how to reach a 
peaceful settlement in Central America 
during the long-scheduled plenary debate 
on Central America. In spite of today's 
diversionary exercise by the Sandinistas, 
my delegation still plans to do so. Let 
me, nevertheless, restate the fundamen- 
tal approach of my government to the 
conflict in the region. 

The United States continues to seek 
a negotiated settlement. It has sup- 
ported and continues to support the Con- 
tadora process in its quest for a regional 
solution. U.S. policy toward Nicaragua 
remains fully consistent with the 21 
points of the Contadora Document of Ob- 
jectives agreed to by the four Contadora 
group countries and the five Central 
American countries, including Nicaragua 
in September 1983. The United States 
has stated repeatedly and categorically 
that it would abide by a comprehensive, 
verifiable, and simultaneous implementa- 
tion of the Document of Objectives. But 
only the full realization of all 21 points, 
including true national reconciliation and 
democratization in Nicaragua, can lead 
to a lasting peace in Central America. 

Once again the United States calls 
on the Sandinistas to enter into serious 
negotiations with the democratic opposi- 
tion aimed at achieving national recon- 



ciliation and democratization. Our long- 
standing offer to hold simultaneous talks 
with the Sandinistas if they undertake 
such negotiations still stands. 

My delegation is concerned that the 
tactics used by the Sandinistas so 
blatantly in provoking this debate today 
have been designed with one purpose in 
mind. They wish to avoid answering 
some basic questions about their inten- 
tions toward their neighbors and toward 
their own people. 

• Why do the Sandinistas continue 
to attack and subvert their neighbors? 

• Why do the Sandinistas continue 
to destroy those within Nicaragua— such 
as labor unions, the free press, the 
church, the private sector, and even the 
Miskito Indians— who cling to the ideals 
of the revolution and attempt peacefully 
to make these ideals a reality? 

• Why do the Sandinistas need a 
secret police ten times the size of 
Somoza's? 

• And finally, why are the San- 
dinistas unwilling to enter into the 
dialogue with all of the democratic 
opposition that could lead to genuine 
national reconciliation? 

We ask; When will this body and— 
more important— the Nicaraguan 
people— be given answers to these 
questions? 



HJSUN press release 141. ■ 

Situation in 
Afghanistan 

by Herbert S. Okun 

Statement in a plenary session of the 
UN General Assetnbly on November !,. 
1986. Ambassador Okun is U.S. Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations. ^ 

A whole nation is dying. Even now, as 
we speak, innocent Afghan men, women, 
and children are being indiscriminately 
slaughtered— simply because they refuse 
to relinquish what is theirs: their homes, 
their land, their families, their culture 
and religion, their way of life. 

This Assembly has an abundance of 
well-documented material from many 
sources which describes the conse- 
quences of 7 years of brutal Soviet 
onslaught against an entire nation. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, 



1^ 



whose report will be considered by thei 
Assembly later in this session, has coni 
eluded that "the only solution to the i 
human rights situation in Afghanistan i 
the withdrawal of all foreign troops. 
Continuation of the military solution 
will . . . lead inevitably to a situation 
approaching genocide." 

"Genocide" is a term which meansi 
"the systematic killing of, or a prograi 
of action intended to destroy, a whole 
national or ethnic group." It is uncon- 
scionable that in today's world a situa- 
tion exists that might justify being 
characterized as approaching genocide 
Despite considerable efforts by the 
Soviet Union and the Kabul regime to 
restrict and manipulate news coverage 
of the war, no one— certainly no one ir 
this forum— can claim to be ignorant 
about what is happening in Aighanista 

Since the Soviet Union's unprovok 
invasion of a friendly nonaligned 
neighbor 7 years ago, we have gathere 
here to express our collective outrage 
the transgressions of basic human righ 
being perpetrated against the Afghan 
people. We are all aware of the numbe 
and scope of violations of international 
humanitarian law being carried out in 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union or its 
puppets. These include, but by no mea 
are limited to: 

• The 1949 Geneva conventions ai 
customary international law designed 
protect civilians; these proscribe murd 
and mutilation and the large-scale use 
antipersonnel weapons; 

• The 1925 Geneva protocol and tl 
1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Cc 
vention which prohibit the use of asph; 
iating, poisonous, or other gases; 

• Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which prohibits torture and other cruel 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment; and 

• The 1954 Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict. 

This list— incomplete as it is— is 
impressive in its total disregard for the 
basic principles of human rights and 
decency. It is inconceivable in today's 
world that a country be permitted to 
remain unaccountable on the applicatio 
of human rights. It is inconceivable tha 
among the world community of nations 
gathered here today, there are govern- 
ments that continue to remain unmovei 
by the tragedy of Afghanistan— so 
unmoved that they refuse to vote in 
favor of a resolution that merely asks 
that the Afghan people be permitted to 
determine their own fate in peace and 



84 



Department of State Bulle' 



UNITED NATIONS 



nity, free from the yoke of military 
)ression. Abstention on an issue 

jecting the survival of an entire people 

I nexcusable. 
Have we become so accustomed to 

I ssacre and torture, to indiscriminate 
nbings and mutilation that we no 
ger comprehend the full horror of 
t> at is happening in Afghanistan? Is it 
, crystal clear that the situation in 
jhanistan is not only one of violence 
1 death, bombings and military 
:ounters, but that it is a situation 
ich, if permitted to continue 
;hecked, could result in the elimina- 

I of "a whole national or ethnic 
)up"? 

The very fabric of Afghanistan's 
ditional society is being rent under 
ce of arms. Village life has been shat- 
ed; families have been separated; 
men widowed; children orphaned, 
[ildren are being born and raised in 
r ugee camps and have no prospect of 
e leriencing life in their own country. 
' iliiren who remain in Soviet- 

II mated areas of Afghanistan are 
iiu taught a distorted version of 
;lian history viewed through the 

f jHi of Mar.xist-Leninist dogma. 

The world's largest refugee popula- 
ti has been created, as over one-third 
c .Afghanistan's prewar population has 
t 'n violently displaced. And, as if this 
\ re not enough, the regime recently 
I Kiunced plans to relocate 30,000 peo- 
{ from areas near the Pakistani border 
t sparsely populated areas in western 
1 ^hanistan. Such a policy would almost 
c 'tainly involve a massive violation of 
I man rights; it also indicates the 
1 gths to which the Soviet Union must 
J to deny popular support to the 
i ghan resistance. 

After 7 years of a war waged by a 
i Derpower against one of the poorest 
itions in the world, the Soviet Union 
1 s apparently realized that a national 
leration movement cannot be con- 
I ered by conventional military tactics 
;d weaponry. Instead it has conceived 
:d begun to implement a much more 
btle three-pronged strategy composed 
military, intelligence, and political 
^asures. This military -political cam- 
ign, combining intimidation and 
Dlence with subtle bribery and a 
assive propaganda effort, is intended 
; permit the Soviet Union to proceed to 
nsolidate its power in Afghanistan 
ith a minimum of international outcry. 
Since its invasion of Afghanistan in 
•79, the Soviet Union has moved 
leadily toward creating a fighting force 
Hat is more appropriate to counter- 
surgency. It has increased reliance on 



light airborne forces rather than heavy 
motorized columns; it has intensified 
ambush and interdiction operations 
along the border areas; it has signifi- 
cantly increased the number of Soviet 
special purpose forces, of which there 
are now over eight battalions in 
Afghanistan, roughly double the 1983 
level. 

This redefined military effort has 
been accomplished by a campaign to win 
hearts, minds, and pocketbooks led by 
the former chief of the Afghan secret 
police, Najibullah. There has been a 
dramatic increase in sabotage efforts in 
the tribal areas of Pakistan along the 
Afghanistan border. Bribery of tribal 
leaders, regional and town leaders, even 
religious leaders, has been accompanied 
by threats of violence as a penalty for 
cooperating with the mujahidin. Indoc- 
trination efforts continue, aimed at 
creating a loyal cadre of pro-Soviet 
Afghans, and thousands of children are 
sent every year to the Soviet Union. 

Despite these efforts, the Soviet 
Union is no closer today to consolidating 
its control over Afghanistan than it was 
on December 27, 1979, when its invading 
troops murdered President Amin— the 
man who allegedly first invited Soviet 
troops into Afghanistan. The Soviet 
Union, despite all its efforts, cannot 
break the will of a people united in a 
national liberation struggle. The Afghan 
people will not, they cannot, acquiesce in 
what amounts to their own destruction 
as a people and a.s a nation. There is an 
old Afghan saying: "the mujahid waited 
100 years for his revenge and cursed 
himself for his impatience." 

The Afghan people will never sur- 
render. The magnitude of the Soviet 
threat— not only militarily but for tradi- 
tional Afghan religious and cultural 
values— has forged a unity of purpose 
among resistance fighters unparalleled 
in Afghanistan's history. Today the 
resistance is cooperating more closely 
together than ever before— joining 
forces, coordinating attacks, and sharing 
intelligence and battle techniques. 
Regular rocketing of Kabul, including 
the spectacular ammunition dump explo- 
sion on August 26, testifies to mujahidin 
ability to penetrate even the most for- 
tified of Soviet security rings. 

It is not the brave freedom fighters 
of Afghanistan who have failed to adapt 
and take countermeasures against a 
more subtle Soviet political strategy. 
Many of us in the world community of 
nations are being lulled into inaction by 
Soviet hints of flexibility. Many prefer to 
close their eyes and ears rather than 



acknowledge and demand a cessation of 
the horrors visited daily on the Afghan 
people. 

On July 28, General Secretary Gor- 
bachev announced the Soviet intention 
to withdraw six regiments from 
Afghanistan. This token withdrawal was 
hailed by the Soviets as "evidence" of 
their desire for a political settlement. In 
reality, it is intended to obscure the per- 
sistent Soviet refusal to provide a time- 
table for comprehensive withdrawal. 
Militarily insignificant, the so-called 
withdrawal has been unmasked by con- 
vincing evidence which indicates that 
significant additional amounts of equip- 
ment and troops were introduced into 
Afghanistan after the July 28 speech for 
the sole purpose of publicly withdrawing 
them. Many of you are familiar with this 
evidence. 

If the Soviet Union wants to demon- 
strate its interest in a political settle- 
ment in Afghanistan, it need only 
respond to seven General Assembly 
resolutions which call for the immediate 
withdrawal of all foreign forces; it need 
only present a short timetable at Geneva 
for a complete troop withdrawal. This is 
the missing element in the search for an 
end to 7 years of war and destruction in 
Afghanistan. 

As we all know, the UN Secretary 
General and his personal representative, 
Under Secretary General Diego 
Cordovez, have been conducting negotia- 
tions aimed at achieving a political set- 
tlement. The U.S. Government supports 
the efforts of the Secretary General and 
his representative and applauds their 
diligence and their commitment to a just 
and durable settlement. We have stated 
at previous sessions of the General 
Assembly— and reiterate today— that the 
United States firmly supports this proc- 
ess. We have made known our will- 
ingness, in writing, to play an appro- 
priate guarantor's role with respect to a 
comprehensive and balanced settlement 
that protects the legitimate security 
interests of all concerned. 

Three of the four basic documents 
which would comprise a comprehensive 
settlement have been largely completed. 
These include agreements on mutual 
non-interference and non-intervention, 
voluntary return of the refugees, and 
international guarantees. The fourth 
document, which was discussed for the 
first time in May of this year, lays out 
the interrelationship of the three docu- 
ments to the central issue of Soviet 
troop withdrawals. Although progress 
has been made on the format and scope 
of this fourth instrument, the Soviet 
Union has persisted in its refusal to pro- 



anuary 1987 



85 



UNITED NATIONS 



vide a realistic timetable for the com- 
plete withdrawal of all Soviet troops. 
The time has come for deeds, not 
words. The Soviet Union is counting on 
outlasting the Afghans and those who 
support their fight for freedom. By pro- 
longing the war and enshrouding it in 
hints and meaningless gestures, they are 
hoping and waiting for the world's atten- 
tion span to slip, for our outrage to 
wane. We cannot permit this to happen. 
Collectively, we can and must help put 
an end to the carnage and destruction in 
Afghanistan. In voting for this resolu- 
tion, let us demonstrate our commitment 
to the comprehensive political settlement 
which is now in sight, except for one 
missing element— a short timetable for 
the withdrawal of all Soviet troops. In 
voting for this resolution, let us demon- 
strate that we— the world community of 
nations— will not permit the Afghan 
nation to perish from this Earth. 



'USUN press release 142. 



U.S. Reconfirms 
Support for IAEA 

by Richard T. Kennedy 

Statement in a plenary session of the 
UN General Assembly on November 11, 
1986. Ambassador Kennedy is U.S. per- 
manent representative to the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and Ambassador at Large and special 
adviser to the Secretary on nonprolifera- 
tion policy and nuclear energy affairs.^ 

As the U.S. representative to the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency, it is a 
great pleasure for me today to consider, 
with my distinguished colleagues, the 
annual report of the IAEA. I am par- 
ticularly gratified for the important 
work of the IAEA and to reflect briefly 
on its solid record of accomplishment in 
promoting the safe and peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy for the benefit of people 
throughout the world. 

My government joins those who have 
commended the Director General for his 
excellent report and statement and for 
the agency's work which it reflects. The 
IAEA— its staff and its member states- 
can look with justifiable pride and satis- 
faction upon its ongoing safeguards and 
technical cooperation activities and its 
accomplishments in the field of nuclear 
safety. 

Over the 30 years of its life, the 
IAEA has assumed ever greater impor- 



tance as a key instrument in the global 
efforts to protect against the further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, while 
assuring that the benefits of peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy are made widely 
available. It is an agency which the 
United States ranks among the most 
important of the international 
institutions. 

The vital international safeguards 
program which the IAEA administers 
provides the necessary confidence to 
states throughout the world that nuclear 
energy is being used only in the intended 
peaceful ways. And, thus, the agency's 
safeguards program provides the neces- 
sary underpinning for broad cooperation 
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
for the benefit of all. My government is 
particularly gratified that the agency has 
continued to strengthen its safeguards 
program, developing new and more 
effective ways to increase international 
confidence, while at the same time keep- 
ing a watchful eye on the resource com- 
mitments involved. 

The agency also is to be congratu- 
lated for its successful efforts to pro- 
mote the widespread use of the peaceful 
atom. Its technical cooperation activities 
in nuclear energy— including nuclear 
medicine— in improvement of food and 
agriculture contribute greatly to the 
well-being of peoples throughout the 
world. 

The IAEA plays a leading role, too, 
in efforts to assure that nuclear power is 
used in a way which fully protects the 
public health and safety. Earlier this 
year, following the tragic accident at 
Chernobyl, we were vividly reminded of 
the critical role of the IAEA in the field 
of nuclear safety. The rapid and effec- 
tive response of the IAEA to that acci- 
dent, and its subsequent efforts to 
address in a comprehensive manner its 
immediate and long-term consequences, 
amply reflect the initiative and serious- 
ness of purpose which have, for so many 
years, distinguished the agency's work. 

My government wishes particularly 
to commend the IAEA for its support of 
the successful efforts by member states 
to complete negotiations, within a period 
of weeks, on two international conven- 
tions regarding early notification and 
emergency assistance in the event of 
nuclear accidents. These conventions are 
significant not only for their practical 
applications but for the fact that they 
emerged from a spirit of compromise 
and cooperation, all too rare in 
multilateral fora. 

This same constructive spirit was 
evidenced at the post-Chernobyl experts 



iiii 
»i 



i 



meeting in August and at the special s 
sion of the IAEA general conference o 
nuclear safety in September. Each of 
these meetings resulted in a thoroughl 
constructive exchange of views, which 
doubtless will form the basis for the 
agency's future activities in the nuclea 
safety area. 

I have cited these recent initiative 
by the agency because they so clearly 
typify the manner in which the IAEA 
does its work year after year. In that 
light, 1985— on which the Director 
General has so well reported— was no 
exception. While most of its activites a 
not featured on the front pages of the 
world's newspapers, and while most oi 
its projects, courses, and special pro- s 
grams receive little or no public atten- 
tion, the agency consistently approach' 
its work with dedication and com- 
petence. It seeks always to respond 
effectively to the diverse interests and 
needs of its members. 

At the same time, we must look to 
the future to assure that the IAEA 
remains an effective international 
institution— one which maintains a cleg 
focus on its technical mandate of safe- 
guards, technical cooperation, and 
nuclear safety. In the past, the agency 
on occasion has become embroiled in 
political controversies and issues 
extraneous to its statute and its missio 
Such controversies unfortunately have 
occupied unnecessarily and undesirabl; 
the attention of its policymaking orgar 
and governing bodies. We are pleased 
that there appears to be a trend away 
from such extraneous debate. It is 
incumbent on all of its members to 
assure that the agency not be distracte 
from its vital technical missions. 

My government also believes that 
the IAEA must continue to be the prin 
cipal international institution in which 
states can join together to promote the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, 
universality of membership must con- 
tinue to be a guiding principle for the 
agency. For otherwise, the goal of assu 
ing that the peoples of the world can er 
joy the greatest possible benefits of the 
safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy 
will be unattainable. 

I have high confidence that other 
member states share our appreciation c 
the agency and concur in the importanc 
of its technical mission. I am certain th; 
as the agency approaches the year 
ahead— a year which promises to be one 
of challenge and growth— it will continu 
to uphold the high standards of excel- 
lence it has established. I am equally ce 
tain that the solid record of achievemen 
which we have seen in this past year wi 



86 



Department of State Bullet 



UNITED NATIONS 



yirepeated in the next— in no small 
nlasure, as a result of the outstanding 
ijdership provided by Director General 
ins Blix. 

Before closing please let me observe 
it my delegation has noted with inter- 
the comments of some previous 
;akers concerning efforts to enhance 
dear arms control and to achieve the 
imate elimination of all nuclear 
apons. My delegation would note that 
> United States, too, has put forward 
istructive, viable proposals directed 
vard these objectives. The United 
ites, too, hopes that these proposals 
1 be carefully considered by the Soviet 
lion as discussion of all proposals con- 
ning nuclear weapons continues. 
My government is pleased, there- 
's, to join with other states in support- 
; the resolution [No. L-32] on the 
EA annual report. We look forward to 
irking with the agency staff and with 
iier member states in support of the 
ency's programs, which so clearly 
nefit us all. 



"USUN press release 150. 



ibyan Occupation 
f Northern Chad 



Herbert S. Okun 

Statement in the Security Council on 
member 18. 1986. Ambassador Okun is 
Is. Deputy Permanent Representative 
Uhe United Nations.^ 

le U.S. delegation believes that the 
ivernment of the Third Republic of 
lad, since it came to power in 1982, 
s vigorously worked to achieve 
itional reconciliation. It has attempted 
heal the wounds caused by the long 
/il war in that country. It has met with 
leat success. The Chadian Government 
Is welcomed back thousands of former 
iponents and helped them to resume 
eir place in Chad's national life. 

As the Permanent Representative of 
aad has just pointed out, Chad's 
omestic progress has been disrupted by 
:ternal military aggression directed 
jainst it. In 1983, in clear violation of 
Dt only the Charter of the United 
ations but also that of the Organization 
African Unity, Libya invaded and 
sized nearly half of the territory of the 
epublic of Chad. This Libyan occupa- 

Ion of Chad's northern provinces still 
jntinues today. 



[ 



Libya's occupation of northern Chad 
is maintained only through harsh 
military rule. Several thousand Libyan 
troops have constructed and occupy a 
number of military bases and airfields on 
Chadian soil. Many Chadian civilians 
have been forced to flee from their 
ancestral homes in the north and to seek 
refuge south of the 16th parallel, in the 
territory controlled by the Government 
of Chad. This massive flow of refugees is 
clear evidence of aggression against the 
Government and people of Chad. 

A member of this organization, one 
that claims to uphold the Charter, is 
responsible for this aggression. Libya's 
attack on Chad threatens not only its 
smaller neighbor but the peace and 
stability of other nations in the region as 
well. Let us review what has happened 
since the Council last met on this subject 
in January 1985. 

In February and March 1986, 
Libyan-controlled military forces, 
operating from the territory they had 
previously occupied in northern Chad, 
launched heavy attacks against Chadian 
Government posts along and south of the 
16th parallel. As you will recall, in 
February of this year, the Permanent 
Representative of the Republic of Chad 
again reminded the Security Council of 
continued Libyan military aggression 
against his country in flagrant violation 
of resolutions of the United Nations and 
the Organization of African Unity. He 
also informed this body that his govern- 
ment had requested, under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, assistance from the 
Government of France in order to resist 
this aggression. 

In intense fighting, Chadian Govern- 
ment troops repulsed all of these 
attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on 
the attackers and taking hundreds of 
prisoners, including a number of Libyan 
soldiers. The Libyan response was to 
send a military aircraft to bomb 
N'Djamena airport on February 17. 

The international community has 
just learned of new Libyan repression in 
northern Chad. We understand that the 
latest Libyan actions are directed not 
just against Chadian military units but 
also involved open warfare against the 
civilian population of northern Chad. 
Libya is bombing villages, indiscrimi- 
nately killing Chadian civilians, and con- 
ducting a scorched earth policy by burn- 
ing plantations and killing cattle. In his 
persuasive memorandum of November 
13, 1986, to the Council, the Permanent 
Representative of Chad has referred to 
these Libyan actions as genocide. 

Libya has attempted to justify its 
invasion, seizure, and occupation of 
northern Chad and support for a former 



Chadian regime, the GUNT, [National 
Union Transition Government]. The 
falsity of this claim has now been 
demonstrated by the Libyans them- 
selves. Libya acknowledges that the 
GUNT has collapsed. Most GUNT mem- 
bers have rallied to the Government of 
Chad and are now fighting against the 
Libyan invaders. In Tripoli the Libyans 
themselves shot and wounded GUNT 
leader Goukouni Oueddei when they 
attempted to arrest him. 

Chad is not a colony of Libya. Chad 
is an independent, nonaligned member of 
the United Nations. It threatens no 
other nation, least of all Libya. The 
Chadian people do not want Libyan 
soldiers in their country. Chad is one of 
the poorest countries in the world. It 
wants to devote its energies to rebuild- 
ing and recovering from civil war and 
natural disaster. Its efforts in the field of 
economic development are greatly inhib- 
ited by the efforts it must make to resist 
Libyan military aggression. 

In its struggle against outside 
aggression, Chad deserves the support 
of all of us. By its aggression against 
Chad, Libya merits the condemnation of 
the international community. All 
members of this organization, if they 
really believe in the Charter, should 
demand that Libya withdraw its military 
forces from Chad and cease its aggres- 
sion against a member of this 
organization. 

The United States strongly supports 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Chad. We join with Chad in calling for 
an immediate end to brutal Libyan 
actions against the people of Chad. We 
join with those other members of the 
United Nations which call for the prompt 
withdrawal of Libyan military forces 
from Chad and an early end to Libyan 
aggression against Chad. 



1986. 



'USUN press release 158 of Nov. 18, 



Libya 



anuary 1987 



by Larry Pressler 

Statement in a plenary session of the 
General Assembly on November 19. 1986. 
Senator Pressler is a U.S. delegate to the 
J, 1st session of the UN General 
Assembly.^ 

The General Assembly is meeting here 
this morning at the behest of Libya. 
Libya is trying to portray itself as an 
innocent victim and to portray the 



87 



UNITED NATIONS 



United States as having engaged in 
unprovoked and unjustified action 
against it. Let us look first at these pro- 
fessions of innocence. Such a look should 
make clear why the United States, after 
many years of verbal warnings and 
appeals to this body, finally found it 
necessary, in accordance with Article 51 
of the UN Charter, to act in self-defense 
on April 15 and 16 of this year. 

Let us turn to this sordid record of 
Libyan terrorism and violence. We could 
begin in 1969 when Qadhafi came to 
power. But let us go back only toward 
the end of the last decade. In the wake 
of the seizure of our embassy in Tehran, 
the LJ.S. Embassy in Tripoli was burned 
on December 2, 1979. The United States 
suspended most diplomatic activities, but 
a small embassy staff remained. The 
attack on our embassy was followed by 
similar attacks on the French Embassy 
in Tripoli in early 1980, which led to the 
closing of our embassy on February 15. 

The record of Libya's readiness to 
carry its terrorist campaign to other 
countries was similarly established early 
on. Already in February 1979, Libya had 
used civilian aircraft to send troops to 
assist Uganda's dictator, Idi Amin. By 
1981 Libya had begun its campaign of 
assassination attempts and interference 
against Chad. In October 1981, the 
planned assassination of Hussein Habre 
during a visit to the Sudan failed when 
Libyans sent to conduct the operation 
surrendered to Sudanese authorities. In 
July 1983, Libyan forces invaded and 
occupied parts of Chad for the second 
time. 

The Libyans started attacks on air- 
line passengers, airports, and civilian 
transport in 1981. In February a Libyan 
gunman opened fire on passengers arriv- 
ing on a flight from Algiers at Rome's 
airport, targeting a prominent anti- 
Qadhafi exile. In October two bombs 
exploded in luggage being unloaded from 
a plane arriving in Egypt from Libya. In 
April 1984, a bomb hidden in an 
unclaimed suitcase unloaded from a 
Libyan airliner exploded at London's 
Heathrow Airport, injuring 25 innocent 
civilians. 

Another aspect of Qadhafi's world- 
wide terrorist campaign which started in 
the early 1980s has been assassinations 
of his opponents living abroad. In 
October 1980, a graduate student was 
shot and seriously wounded in Colorado; 
the following July another anti-Qadhafi 
student was killed in Ogden, Utah. 
Throughout 1982 and 1983, Libyan 
students studying in Europe were 
harassed and their lives threatened. In 
March 1984, four bombs exploded in 



London and Manchester near the homes 
and businesses of Libyan exiles; over 25 
people were injured. 

The year 1984 was a particularly 
bloody one as Qadhafi spread his ter- 
rorist net throughout Europe and the 
Mediterranean. In March a mob burned 
the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli, while 
Libyan authorities stood by and took no 
action. In April shots were fired from 
the offices of the Libyan People's 
Bureau in London, killing a British 
policewoman. When the British Govern- 
ment closed the bureau and severed 
diplomatic relations, the Libyans 
arrested a number of British subjects in 
Tripoli on trumped-up charges and held 
them hostage in an effort to pressure the 
British Government not to prosecute 
those arrested in London. 

By mid-1984 Qadhafi's terrorist cam- 
paign entered high gear. In June the 
official Libyan news agency, Jana, 
announced that the "Libyan masses have 
decided to form suicide commandos to 
chase traitors and stray dogs wherever 
they are and liquidate them physically." 
The same month the anti-Qadhafi Libyan 
editor of an Arab newspaper in Athens 
was killed by two men on a motorbike. 
Three months later, a Libyan exile was 
found gagged and strangled in his hotel 
room in Rome. That summer 19 ships 
were damaged by mines which exploded 
in the Red Sea. These mines were gener- 
ally accepted to have been laid by a 
Libyan vessel. In September the Libyans 
were again implicated in a plot to 
assassinate Chad's President Hussein 
Habre using a briefcase bomb. In 
November Egypt's President Mubarak 
announced that four assassins who had 
been sent to Egypt by Qadhafi to kill 
former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush 
were arrested. Pictures were sent to the 
Libyan People's Bureau in Malta show- 
ing Bakoush apparently dead. Official 
Libyan press sources then claimed that 
Bakoush had been executed by suicide 
squads sent abroad to liquidate enemies 
of the revolution. Qadhafi's intentions 
were clearly on record, although his 
thugs fortunately were unable to 
accomplish their mission. 

Libya's terrorist campaign continued 
unabated during 1985. In a speech on 
March 31, Qadhafi urged that "our task 
here in this command is to see to it that 
individual suicidal operations are 
transformed into an organized action 
which will bear fruit, defeat the enemy, 
and liberate the nation ... we want 
everyone of us to say: I have decided to 
die just to spite America, because this 
decision is one that America cannot 
veto." 



Who have been the victims? In 
February it was the former Libyan 
Ambassador to Austria who had 
resigned in protest against the regim 
5 years earlier. In March it was a Lib 
jeweler in Rome; in April a Libyan 
businessman in Nicosia, a Libyan stu- 
dent, and a Moroccan citizen resident 
West Germany. In September it was" 
postal workers in Tunis injured by let 
bombs smuggled into Tunisia by a 
Libyan diplomat. The incident caused 
Tunisia to sever diplomatic relations. 
That same summer my government 
expelled a Libyan diplomat here at th 
United Nations whom we had found t 
be involved in a plot against Libyan o 
ponents of the Qadhafi regime living 
the United States. 

The year 1985 ended with the hor 
rendous terrorist attacks at the airpo 
in Rome and Vienna on December 27 
Twenty people were killed, including 
four terrorists. More than 110 people 
were wounded. Five of the dead were 
Americans, including a teenage girl. 
Libya was deeply involved in support 
the Abu Nidal group which coordinati 
and carried out these terrorist attack 
Libyan complicity was clear. Tunisian 
officials reported that the Qadhafi 
regime was in possession of two Tuni 
sian passports which had been used b 
the terrorists. Those passports could 
only have come into their possession 
with the deliberate connivance of the 
Libyan authorities. 

We now come to 1986. Qadhafi's 
determination to spread death and 
destruction has led to further atrociti' 
The pattern of interference by force i 
the affairs of other African states has 
continued. On February 10 Libyan- 
backed rebels attacked Chadian force: 
southern Chad, and on February 17 a 
Libyan bomber attacked the airfield a 
N'Djamena. While Libya denied any 
involvement in the fighting, the Chad 
Government I'eported the Libyans we; 
among those who were taken prisoner 
Alongside these events, Qadhafi's 
speeches were full of hate and violeno 
On March 5, he announced that "any 
person who left Libya is now in the 
hostile ranks on America's side. He is 
finished. He will receive no mercy or 
compassion at home or abroad. All 
traces of him should be wiped out. Ev( 
his house should not remain." On Apri 
3, a bomb ripped through a West Berli 
discotheque frequented by American 
troops, killing an American servicemai 
and a Turkish woman and injuring mo 
than 230 people, about one-fourth of 
them Americans. A second soldier die( 
of his wounds in June. The irrefutable 



ite 



88 



Department of State Bulle' 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



nee pointed clearly to the involve- 
of the Libyan People's Bureau in 
Berlin. 
, will not repeat here the long list of 
il warnings and diplomatic efforts 
igh this organization by which we 
ht to dissuade Libya from its cani- 
1 of terrorism. They are a matter of 
c record in the documents of the 
ed Nations and are available to all 
u. 

t was in these circumstances that 
nally acted in self-defense. On 
1 14, President Reagan authorized 
ns against centers of terrorist plan- 
in Libya in response to repeated 
irist attacks against U.S. persons 
Droperty mounted under Libyan 
ices. This step was taken with great 
tance: after repeated warnings; 
conclusive evidence that the 
lafi government continued to 
ve itself in support and control of 
■rist actions against U.S. targets; 
ifter conspicuous surveillance of 
rican installations and personnel 
)ther similar actions by Libyans 
jfi pointed to further terrorism. Our 
fes were limited to terrorist facilities 
iliiilitary assets which support 
I afi's attacks on us. As the Presi- 
1 stated at the time: "The attacks 
- concentrated and carefully tar- 

i to minimize casualties among the 
! in ))eople, with whom we have no 
11 -el." 

!'hat night, the President, describing 
if nonstrous brutality of Qadhafi's 
i I of terror, laid out the following 
3 lard of proof: "The evidence is now 
)i lusive that the terrorist bombing of 
a Bile discotheque was planned and 
uted under the direct orders of the 
il an regime. On March 25, more than 
V ek before the attack, orders were 
'I from Tripoli to the Libyan People's 
i-au in East Berlin to conduct a ter- 
M t attack against Americans to cause 
liimum and indiscriminate casualties. 

a's agents then planted the bomb. 
; vpril 4, the People's Bureau alerted 
roll that the attack would be carried 
a:he following morning. The next day, 
1' reported back to Tripoli on the 
r t success of their mission. Our evi- 
e'e is direct; it is precise; it is 
•I'utable." 

Our evidence is sound. Those 
H'ged by their governments with deal- 
* n this kind of evidence recognize it 
-uii. The Government of the Federal 
■ ublic of Germany has announced that 
IS independent confirmation of the 
ail involvement in the LaBelle 
Ijinij. The members of the Tokyo 
loniic summit and the European 



Secretary Visits 
Earthquake Site in El Salvador 



Secretary Shultz (shown here with Presi- 
dent Jose Napoleon Duarte) went to San 
Salvador October 16, 1986, to assess the 
damage and express the concern of 
President Reagan and the American peo- 
ple as a result of an earthquake a week 
earlier. This disaster resulted in nearly 
1,000 deaths, some 21,000 injured, and 
left about 250,000 people homeless. 
Replacement costs for structures is 
expected to exceed $1 billion. The U.S. 
Agency for International Development 
(AID) provided over $2 million for the 
relief phase in the form of food, medical 
supplies, temporary shelters, and search- 
and-rescue equipment. Congress 
authorized AID to provide another $50 
million for the initial rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase. The U.S. Embassy 
in San Salvador suffered extensive 
damage but there were no casualties. ■ "* 




Community have declared that they can- 
not have normal relations with a state 
which supports terrorism, specifically 
citing Libya as one such state. 

The question which many countries 
have asked is whether the U.S. response 
was proportionate; was it in accord with 
international law? The answer is yes on 
both counts. President Reagan has said; 
"When our citizens are abused or 
attacked anywhere in the world on the 
direct orders of a hostile regime, we will 
respond so long as I'm in this Oval 
Office. Self-defense is not only our right, 
it is our duty. It is the purpose behind 
the mission. . .fully consistent with Arti- 
cle 51 of the UN Charter," which 
recognized the "inherent right of. . .self- 
defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United 
Nations. ..." 

The U.S. action was taken to reduce 
Libya's ability to continue to commit 
unlawful aggression through terrorist 
force against the United States and its 
nationals. The U.S. action was not blind 
retaliation or the seeking of retribution. 
No. The U.S. actions were designed only 
to prevent fui'ther attacks. 

Unfortunately, while responsible 
governments have sought to isolate and 
contain Libya's terrorist virus, Libyan 
violence has continued. On April 17 four 
rocket-propelled grenades were fired at 
the British Ambassador's residence in 
Beirut. A Libyan-affiliated group, Omar 



Al Mukhtar, claimed responsibility. On 
the same day, one American and two 
British hostages were murdered in 
Beirut, allegedly in reprisal for the air 
strikes on Libya. The next day four 
Libyans, including members of the 
Libyan People's Bureau, were arrested 
by Turkish authorities in Ankara for 
attempting to attack a U.S. Officers' 
Club. 

Many of you were present at the 
nonaligned summit meeting in Harare 
this September. Qadhafi used that 
rostrum to challenge the principles of 
this organization, to divide us into 
hostile camps, and to champion the cause 
of terrorism. He said; "I promise you 
from this rostrum that from now on I 
will, with all my capabilities, divide this 
world into two camps— the liberation 
camp and the imperialist camp. . . 
everything must be liberated ... all the 
French-speaking states . . . are not 
independent and are a fifth column 
inside this movement. . .the word com- 
monwealth is very embarrassing. . .it 
means that you are properties of Brit- 
ain. . .it is something shameful." 

Two weeks later he equated ter- 
rorism with wars of liberation and 
revolution. 

I have presented here today the 
record of the Qadhafi regime. The proof 
of Qadhafi's moral bankruptcy is before 
you. I ask you: What is the source of 
Libya's moral authority to appear before 
this Assembly? What is the basis of its 



luary 1987 



89 



TREATIES 



claim to be the exponent of international 
law and respect for the principles of the 
UN Charter? It is the height of hypocrisy 
for Libya to present a draft resolution^ 
to the General Assembly which reaffirms 
"the obligation of all states to refrain 
from the use or threat of use of force in 
their international relations" and "the 
inalienable right of all peoples ... to 
choose their political, social and 
economic system without any inter- 
ference, subversion, coercion or con- 
straint of any kind whatsoever." 

With all this Libya-inspired activity, 
it is hardly surprising that Qadhafi's 
regime increasingly is shunned globally 
by governments which abide by a sense 
of principled adherence to interna- 
tionally acceptable norms of behavior. 
My delegation did not ask for this 
debate. But now that it has taken place, 
we hope it will be the occasion for every 
country represented here to make clear 
its opposition to Libyan terrorism and to 
dissociate itself from Libya's aggressive 
rhetoric and reprehensible actions. The 
American people, as well as all those 
around the world who have been the vic- 
tims of or who fear Libyan terrorism, 
will be watching what this body says and 
does on this hypocritical complaint from 
a regime that deserves the contempt of 
the international community. 



'USUN press release 159 of Nov. 19. 
1986. 

2 On Nov. 20, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution condemning the United 
States for its air attack on terrorist targets in 
Libya. The vote was 79 for 28 (U.S.) against, 
with 33 abstentions and 19 absent. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance 
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc- 
tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Canberra 
July 24, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 30, 
1962. TIAS 5094. 

Adopted at Buenos Aires July 28, 1962. 
Entered into force .Jan. 11, 1963, TIAS 5274. 

Adopted at Brussels June 2-13, 1964. 
Entered into force July 27, 1966, Sept. 1, 
1966, Dec. 22, 1978. and Nov. 1, 1982. TIAS 
50.58, 10485. 

Adopted at Santiago Nov. 18, 1966. Entered 
into force (except for Rec. IV- 12) Oct. 30, 
1968, and Nov.l, 1982. TIAS 6668. 

Adopted at Paris Nov. 29, 1968. Entered into 
force May 26, 1972, July 31, 1972, and Nov. 
1, 1982. TIAS 7692. 



Adopted at Tokyo Oct. 30, 1970. Entered into 
force (except for Recs. VI-8 and 10) Oct. 10, 
1973, and Nov. 1, 1982. 

Adopted at Wellington Nov. 10, 1972. 
Entered into force (except for Rec. VII-5) 
May 29, 1975, and June 24, 1981. TIAS 8500. 

Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975. Entered into 
force Dec. 16, 1978, Sept. 1, 1980, Nov. 1, 
1982, and Jan. 26, 1984. TIAS 10486. 

Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into 
force Sept. 8, 1983. TIAS 10735. 
Notification of approval: Brazil, Oct. 27. 1986. 

Arbitration 

Inter-American convention on international 

commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City 

Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 16, 

1976.' 

Instrument of ratification signed by 

President: Nov. 10, 1986.^ 

Aviation 

International air services transit agreement. 
Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
force Jan. 20, 1945; for the U.S. Feb. 8, 1945. 
EAS 487; 59 Stat. 1693. 
Notice of denimciation: Canada, Nov. 12, 
1986, effective Nov. 12. 1987. 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts 
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo 
Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 
1969. TIAS 6768. 
Accession deposited: Brunei, May 23, 1986. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 

seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 

16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971. 

TIAS 7192. 

Accession deposited: Madagascar, Nov. 18, 

1986^ 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done 
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into 
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Madagascar, Nov. 18, 
1986^ 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the develop- 
ment, production, and stockpiling of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons 
and on their destruction. Done at 
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 
8062. 

Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, Nov. 18, 
1986. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement, 1983, with 
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983; 
definitively Sept. 11, 1985. 
Ratification deposited: Greece. Sept. 19, 
1986. 

Conservation 

Convention on wetlands of international 
. importance especially as waterfowl habitat. 
Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into 
force Dec. 21, 1975.' 



Protocol to the convention on wetlands of 
international importance especially as wai 
fowl habitat of Feb. 2. 1971. Adopted at I 
Dec. 2, 1982.3 
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi 



!' 



d ent: Nov. 10, 1986. 

Fisheries 

Convention for the conservation of salmoi 

the North Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjj 

Mar. 2. 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1 

TIAS 10789. 

Rat ification deposited: Sweden, May 17, 

1984. 

Accession deposited: U.S.S.R. Sept. 11. 1 

Protocol to amend the international eonvs 
tion of May 14. 1966, for the conservatior 
Atlantic tiinas (TIAS 6767). Done at Parii 
July 10, 1984.3 
Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 10. 198' 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and politic 

rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 

Entered into force Mar. 23. 1976. 999 U> 

111.' 

Ratification deposited: Philippines. Oct. 2 

1986.'' 

Judicial Procedure 

Inter-American convention on letters 
rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, \ 
Entered into force Jan. 16. 1976.' 

Additional protocol to the Inter-Americai 
convention on letters rogatory, with anne 
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entere 
into force June 14, 1980.' 

Instrument of ratification signed by Pres 
dent: Nov. 10, 1986.' 

Convention on the civil aspects of interna 

tional child abduction. Done at The HagU' 

Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 

1983.' 

Instrumen t of ratification signed by Pres; 

denlTNovriO, 1986.2 

Signature: Australia, Oct. 29, 1986. 

Ratifications deposited: Australia, Oct. 2S 

1986;5 Luxembourg, Oct. 9, 1986. 

Marine Pollution 

Convention for the protection and develo] 
ment of the marine environment of the w 
Caribbean region, with annex. Done at C; 
tagena Mar. 24, 1983.=" 

Protocol concerning cooperation in combj 

ting oil spills in the wider Caribbean regit 

with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24, 

1983.3 

Accession deposited: Trinidad & Tobago, 

24, 1986. 

Ratifications deposited: France, Nov. 13, 

1985;2 U.K., Feb. 28, 1986."^ 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the international convent 
on load lines. 1966 (TIAS 6629. 6720). 
Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1983. ^ 
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 14, 1'.5 



90 



Department of State Bui: 



ear Accidents 

ention on early notification of a nuclear 
ent. Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. 
red into force Oct. 27. 1986.' 

.tures: India, Deni. People's Rep. of 
a, Luxembourg, Sept. 29, 1986; Jordan, 

Paraguay, Oct. 2, 1986; Zaire, Sept. 30, 

ention on assistance in the case of a 
fax accident or radiological emergency. 
I at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. » 
itures: India, Dem. People's Rep. of 
a, Jordan, Mali, Paraguay, Oct. 2, 1986; 
!, Sept. 30. 1986. 

ear Test Ban 

ty banning nuclear weapon tests in the 
sphere, in outer space, and under water. 

at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963. Entered into 

Oct. 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 
'ication deposited: Argentina, Nov. 21, 



lear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

ty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
ions. Done at Washington, London, and 

ow Julv 1, 1968. Entered into force 

5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
'ication deposited: Trinidad & Tobago, 



80, 1986. 

^Ilite Communications Systems 

'4 ention on the International Maritime 
a lite Organization (INMARSAT), with 

\ Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. 

i.d into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
I ssio n deposited: Indonesia, Oct. 9, 1986.^ 

! aling agreement on the International 
: time Satellite Organization (INMAR- 
I. with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 
i;iitered into force July 16, 1979, TIAS 

, ;iture: Indonesia, Oct. 9, 1986. 



r ty on principles governing the activities 
f ates in the exploration and use of outer 
including the Moon and other celestial 
Done at Washington. London, and 
. >>i\ Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into force 
111. 1967. TIAS 6347. 
!i' ation deposited: Sri Lanka. Nov. 18. 



<i ar 

riiational sugar agreement, 1984, with 
\is. Done at Geneva July 5, 1984. 
■v>'i\ into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1985; 
iitively Apr. 4, 1985.' 
I fication deposited: Panama, Oct. 29, 



F( 'communications 

) national telecommunication convention, 
innexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi 
'i, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984; 

aitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986. 

il'irations deposited: Cyprus, Aug. 22, 

> fiia. Aug. 26, 1986; Rwanda, Sept. 5, 
i<-. Sri Lanka, Sept. 1, 1986. 



Trade 

United Nations convention on contracts for 
the international sale of goods. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 11, 1980.^ 
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi- 
dent: Nov. 10, 1986.^ 

Protocol extending the arrangement of Dec. 
20, 1973, (TIAS 7840) regarding international 
trade in textiles. Done at Geneva July 31, 
1986. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986; for the 
U.S. Aug. 5, 1986. 

Acceptances deposited: Austria, Sept. 16, 
1986; Indonesia, Sept. 30, 1986; Korea, Oct, 
9, 1986; Malaysia, Oct. 29, 1986; Norway, 
Oct. 27, 1986; Sweden, Sept. 20, 1986; 
Thailand, Oct. 16, 1986. 

UN Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) 

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, with annexes. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into 
force June 21, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Bahamas, Nov. 13, 1986. 

Women 

Convention on the political rights of women. 
Done at New York Mar. 31. 1953. Entered 
into force July 5, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 
1976. TIAS 8289. 

Accessions deposited: Angola, Sept. 17, 1986; 
Colombia, Aug. 5, 1986. 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement on aviation security. Signed at 
Ottawa Nov. 21, 1986. Entered into force 
Nov. 21, 1986. 

Agreement concerning the transboundary 
movement of hazardous waste. Signed at 
Ottawa Oct. 28, 1986. Entered into force 
Nov. 8, 1986. 

China 

Agreement for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of tax evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, with protocol and 
exchange of notes. Signed at Beijing Apr. 30, 
1984. 

Protocol concerning the interpretation of 
paragraph 7 of the protocol to the agreement 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of tax evasion with respect to 
taxes on income of Apr. 30. 1984. Signed at 
Beijing May 10. 1986. 
Entered into force: Nov. 21, 1986. 

Agreement amending and extending the pro- 
tocol of Oct. 17, 1981 (TIAS 10287), on^ 
cooperation in nuclear safety matters. Signed 
at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. Entered into force 
Sept. 26, 1986; effective Oct. 17, 1986. 

Denmark 

Technical schedule setting forth defense areas 
pursuant to article 11(3) of agreement of Apr. 
27, 1951, (TIAS 2292) concerning the defense 
of Greenland. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Copenhagen Sept. 30, 1986. Entered into 
force Sept. 30, 1986. 



TREATIES 



Egypt 

Grant agreement for commodity imports. 
Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1986. Entered into 
force Aug. 21, 1986. 

Grant agreement for cash transfer. Signed at 
Cairo Aug. 27, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 
27, 1986. 

Sixth agreement to the program grant agree- 
ment of Aug. 29, 1982, (TIAS 10472), as 
amended, for decentralization sector support. 
Signed at Cairo June 19, 1986. Entered into 
force June 19, 1986. 

Agreement amending agreement of Nov. 12, 
1985, for the sale of agricultural commodities. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Sept. 
21, 1986. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1986. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Jan. 11. 1981, (TIAS 10066) relating to 
cooperation in science and technology. Signed 
at Cairo Nov. 9, 1986. Entered into force 
Nov. 9, 1986; effective Jan. 11, 1986. 

EI Salvador 

Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 20, 
1985, for the sale of agricultural commodities. 
Effected by exchange of notes at San 
Salvador .June 27, 1986. 
Entered into force: Sept. 26, 1986. 

Greece 

Defense industrial cooperation agreement, 
with annexes and exchange of letters. Signed 
at Athens Nov. 10, 1986. Entered into force 
Nov. 10, 1986. 

Guinea-Bissau 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bissau Sept. 10 and Oct. 16, 1986. 
Entered into force Oct. 16, 1986. 

Israel 

Grant agreement to assist in balance-of- 
payments financing and budget support to 
promote economic and political stability. 
Signed at Washington Sept. 29, 1986. 
Entered into force Sept. 29, 1986. 

Jamaica 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 15, 1986, as amended, for sale of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Kingston Sept. 24 and 
Oct. 8. 1986. Entered into force Oct. 8, 1986. 

Korea 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 22, 1976, as e.xtended (TIAS 8456, 
10295), relating to scientific and technical 
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Nov. 4 and 6, 1986. Entered into 
force Nov. 6, 1986. 

Agreement on mutual customs service 
assistance. Signed at Washington Nov. 3, 
1986. Enters into force 90 days after the par- 
ties have notified each other that all 
necessary requirements for entry into force 
have been met. 



luary 1987 



91 



PRESS RELEASES 



Malaysia 

Agreement amending agreement of July 1 
and 11, 1985, as amended, relating to trade in 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and 
textile products. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Kuala Lumpur Oct. 14 and 25, 1986. 
Entered into force Oct. 25, 1986. 

Mexico 

Agreement of cooperation regarding the 
transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes 
and hazardous substances. Signed at Wash- 
ington Nov. 12, 1986. Enters into force upon 
exchange of notes stating that each party has 
completed its necessary internal procedures. 

Norway 

Memorandum of understanding on the 
exchange of officers between the U.S. Marine 
Corps and the Norwegian Army. Signed at 
Oslo and Washington May 21 and July 3, 
1986. Entered into force July 3, 1986'. 

Pakistan 

Fifth amendatory agreement to the agree- 
ment of Apr. 13, 1982, (TIAS 10378) for 
agricultural commodities and equipment. 
Signed at Islamabad Sept. 25, 1986. Entered 
into force Sept. 25, 1986. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 8528, 10531, 10532, 10696), concerning 
fisheries off the coasts of the United States. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
May 16 and June 17, 1986. 
Entered into force: Oct. 31, 1986. 

Agreement modifying the agreement of July 
30, 1984, concerning diplomatic and other 
visas. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Oct. 31, 1986. Entered into force 
Oct. 31, 1986. 

Agreement relating to immunity of family 
members of consular officers and employees 
from criminal jurisdiction. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 31, 
1986. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1986. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement in the field of radioactive waste 
management technology. Signed at London 
Oct. 30, 1986. Entered into force Oct. 30, 
1986. 

Uruguay 

Agreement concerning cooperation in 
highway technology. Signed at Washington 
June 18, 1986. Entered into force June 18, 
1986. 



'Not in force for U.S. 

^With reservation(s). 

^Not in force. 

"With declaration(s). 

^Extends to legal system applicable only 
in Australian States mainland Territories. 

•^Extended to Cayman Islands and Turks 
and Caicos Islands. 

'In force provisionally for U.S. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Date 



*236 11/3 



•237 11/3 



238 11/3 



239 11/3 



240 11/4 



•241 11/4 



•242 11/5 



243 11/6 



.Sul>]ect 

Shultz, Perkins: remarks at 
swearing-in ceremony of 
LI.S. Ambassador to South 
Africa Edward Perkins. 

Edward Joseph Perkins 
sworn in as Ambassador to 
South Africa (biographic 
data). 

Shultz: address and question- 
and-answer session before 
the World Affairs Council, 
Los Angeles, Oct. 31. 

Shultz: address and question- 
and-answer session before 
the Commonwealth Club, 
San Francisco, Oct. 31. 

Shultz: address before the 
Locust Club, Philadelphia, 
Nov. 3. 

James Daniel Phillips sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Burundi (biographic data). 

Elinor G. Constable sworn in 
as Ambassador to Kenya 
(biographic data). 

Shultz; news conference, 
Vienna. 



USUN 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York, N.Y. 10017. 

Subject 

Reed: trade and develop- 
ment. Committee II. 

Wrobleski: narcotics, 
ECOSOC. 

Fleming: population, 
ECOSOC 

Byrne: social development. 
Committee II. 

Byrne: TTPI, Trusteeship 
Council. 

Reagan: women, ECOSOC. 

Chacon: American Samoa, 
Decolonization Committee. 

Byrne: trusteeship peti- 
tioners. Trusteeship 
Council. 

Walters: TTPI, Trusteeship 
Council. 

Bader: Guam, Decolonization 
Committee. 

Walters: human rights, Com- 
mittee II. 



No, 


Date 


39 


5/5 


40 


5/7 


41 


5/8 


42 


5/9 


43 


.5/12 


44 


5/13 


45 


5/15 



•46 



5/15 



•47 5/16 
•48 .5/16 
•49 5/19 



244 11/7 

•245 11/7 

•246 11/7 

•247 11/7 

•248 11/12 

249 11/12 

2.50 11/18 

251 11/16 

•252 11/24 

2.53 11/26 

2.54 11/24 



Shultz: address before th 
CSCE review meeting, 
Vienna, Nov. 5. 

Shultz: remarks at a rece 
tion for nongovernmen 
organizations, Vienna, 
Nov. 5. 

Armacost: remarks made 
the return of former 
hostage David Jacobsei 

James Wilson Rawlings 
sworn in as Ambassadc 
Zimbabwe, Nov. 6 
(biographic data). 

Shultz, Cerezo: remarks 
following meeting, 
Guatemala City, Nov. ] 

Shultz: address before th 
OAS General Assemblj 
Guatemala City, Nov. ] 

Shultz: address and quest 
and-answer session bef 
the International HouS' 
Chicago and The Chica, 
Sun-Times forum, Chic 
Nov. 17. 

Shultz: interview on "Fai 
the Nation." 

U.S. Government and pri 
sector support ITU Cei 
for Telecommunication 
Development. 

Shultz: remarks at AID's 
25th anniversary recep 
tion, Nov. 25. 

Shultz, Clark: news con- 
ference, Ottawa, Nov. : 



•Not printed in the Bulletin. 



*50 5/22 Reed: remarks to press 
before UNGA Special S 
sion on the Critical 
Economic Situation in 
Africa. 

•51 5/22 Okun: South Africa, Secu 
Council. 

•52 5/23 Okun: South Africa raids 
Botswana, Security 
Council. 

•53 5/23 Barthelemy: disarmamenl 
Disarmament Commiss 

•54 5/23 Byrne: South Africa, Sect 
rity Council. 

•55 5/23 Byrne: South Africa, Sect 
rity Council. 

•56 5/27 Brookner: U.S. Virgin 

Islands, Decolonization 
Committee. 

*57 5/27 White House statement 01 
opening of UNGA Spec: 
Session on the Critical 
Economic Situation in 
Africa. 
58 5/28 Shultz: statement to the 
UNGA Special Session i 
the Critical Economic 
Situation in Africa. 



92 



Department of State Bulki 



PRESS RELEASES 



89 


9/16 


90 


9/16 


91 


9/20 


92 


9/22 


93 


9/23 


94 


9/23 


95 


10/1 


96 


10/1 


97 


10/6 


98 


10/6 


99 


10/9 


100 


10/7 



5/28 U.S. delegation to the UNGA *87 8/14 

Special Session on the 

Critical Economic Situa- 
tion in Africa, May 27-31. '88 9/11 
5/28 Shultz; remarks at reception 

in honor of U.S. delegation 

to the special session. 
5/29 Announcement by the U.S. 

African Development 

Foundation on signing an 

agreement of cooperation 

with the African Develop- 
ment Bank. 
6/1 McPherson: statement to 

UNGA Special Session on 

the Critical Economic 

Situation in Africa. 
6/4 Byrne: trusteeship. 

Trusteeship Council. 
6/4 Lowell: space. Committee on 

the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space. 
6/4 Eskin: space. Committee on 

the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space. 
6/5 Eskin: space. Committee on 

the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space. 
6/9 Morrison: space. Committee 

on the Peaceful Uses of 

Outer Space. 
6/10 Borek: space. Committee on 

the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space. 
6/11 Eskin: space, Committee on 

the Peaceful Uses of Outer ' 101 10/9 

Space. 
6/13 Okun: South Africa, Security 

Council. 
6/16 Okun: South Africa, Security 

Coimcil. 
6/18 Okun: South Africa, Secu- 
rity Council. 
6/25 Hottelet: information. Com- 
mittee on Information. 
6/25 Hottelet: information. Com- 
mittee on Information. 
7/1 Byrne: trusteeship. 

Trusteeship Council. 
7/1 Walters: Nicaragua, Security 

Council. 
7/2 Walters: Nicaragua, Security 

Council. 
7/3 Immerman: Nicaragua, 

Security Council. 
7/7 Jarrett: information. Com- 
mittee on Information. 
7/10 Walters: ECOSOC summer 

session, Geneva, July 8. 
7/15 Orlando: transnational cor- 
porations, ECOSOC, '111 10/15 

Geneva, July 4. 
7/18 Byrne: UNIFIL, Security 

Council. 112 10/15 

7/29 Walters: Nicaragua, Security 

Council. 
7/30 Walters: Nicaragua, Security *113 10/15 

Council. 
7/31 Walters: Libya, Nicaragua, '114 10/16 

Security Council. 
7/31 Walters: Nicaragua, Security 

Council. *115 10/17 



102 


10/8 


103 


10/9 


104 


10/9 


105 


10/10 


106 


10/10 


107 


10/13 


108 


10/13 


109 


10/13 


110 


10/15 



USUN statement after vote 

on Puerto Rico in 

Decolonization Committee. 
Byrne: meeting of donors of 

humanitarian assistance to 

the Kampuchean people. 
Immerman: Libya, General 

Committee. 
Norris: external debt crisis 

and development. General 

Committee. 
Walters: Namibia, UNGA 

special session. 
Reagan: address before 41st 

session of the UN General 

Assembly. 
Walters: UNIFIL, Security 

Council. 
Reed: Angola, UN General 

Assembly. 
Reed: auditors' report. Com- 
mittee V. 
Taylor: Cuba; UN General 

Assembly. 
Reed: economic development. 

Committee II. 
Taylor: terrorism, Puerto 

Rico, SDI, UN General 

Assembly. 
Shearouse: conferences. 

Committee V. 
Byrne: multinational com- 
panies in non-self- 
governing territories. 

Committee IV. 
U.S. delegation to the 41st 

session of the LIN General 

Assembly. 
Walters: Iran-Iraq war. 

Security Council. 
Clark: Report on the Effects 

of Atomic Radiation, 

Special Political 

Committee. 
Walters: Libya, L'N General 

Assembly. 
Okun: Nicaragua, LIN 

General Assembly. 
Walters: reappointment of 

the UN Secretary General, 

UN General Assembly. 
Byrne: apartheid. Committee 

III. 
Amselem: Vietnam, Commit- 
tee III. 
Rosenstock: non-use of force. 

Committee VI. 
Immerman: Israeli nuclear 

armament, LIN General 

Assembly. 
Yost: emergency assistance 

to El Salvador, UN 

General Assembly. 
Walters: administrative and 

financial function, UN 

General Assembly. 
Clark: self-determination, 

Committee III. 
Clark: peacekeeping opera- 
tions. Special Political 

Committee. 
Reed: food poHcy, Committee 

II. 



'116 10/16 Byrne: small territories, 
Committee IV. 

*117 10/17 Rosenstock: strengthening 
the role of the organiza- 
tion. Committee VI. 

*118 10/17 Reed: external debt crisis 

and development, Commit- 
tee II. 

*n9 10/20 Adelman: arms control, Com- 
mittee I. 
120 10/20 Walters: Cambodia, UN 
General Assembly. 

*121 10/20 Reed: condolence to people 
of Mozambique, LIN 
General Assembly. 

*122 10/22 Reed: economic situation in 
Africa, UN General 
Assembly. 
123 10/22 Okun: arms control. Commit- 
tee I. 

•124 10/22 Walters: Nicaragua, Security 
Council. 

•125 10/22 Walters: Western Sahara. 
Committee IV. 

•126 10/23 Byrne: social issues. Commit- 
tee III. 

•127 10/24 Reed: ECOSOC report. Com- 
mittee II. 

*128 10/24 Reagan: women. Committee 
III. 

•129 10/27 Gross: zone of peace and 
cooperation in the South 
Atlantic, LIN General 
Assembly. 

•130 10/27 Walters: Central America, 
Security Council. 

•131 10/28 Walters: Nicaragua, Security 
Council. 

•132 10/29 Reed: trade and develop- 
ment. Committee II. 

•133 10/29 Okun: IsraeH attack on Iraqi 
nuclear facilities, UN 
General Assembly. 

♦134 [Not issued.] 

*135 10/30 Okun: host country respon- 
sibilities. Committee on 
Relations with the Host 
Country. 

•136 10/30 Clark: UNRWA, Special 
Political Committee, 
137 10/30 Lowitz: chemical weapons. 
Committee I. 

•138 10/30 Byrne: racial discrimination. 
Committee III. 

•139 10/31 Wrobleski: drug trafficking. 
Committee III. 

•140 11/4 Clark: UNRWA, Special 
Political Committee, 

141 11/3 Okun: ICJ judgment on 

Nicaragua, LIN General 
Assembly. 

142 11/4 Okun: Afghanistaji, UN 

General Assembly. 
•143 11/5 Byrne: aging and disabled. 

Committee III. 
•144 11/5 Gross: Law of the Sea, UN 

General Assembly. 

*Not printed in the Bi'lletin. ■ 



93 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

U.S. Initiative to Iran, TV address to the 
nation, Nov. 13, 1986 (Current Policy #890). 

Secretary Shultz 

Human Rights and Soviet-American Rela- 
tions, World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 
Oct. 31. 1986 (Current Policy #882). 

Reykjavik; A Watershed in U.S. -Soviet Rela- 
tions, Commonwealth Club. San Francisco, 
Oct. 31, 1986 (Current Policy #883). 

Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget, Locust 
Club, Philadelphia, Nov. 3, 1986 (Current 
Policy #884). 

Promoting Inter-American Cooperation, OAS 
General Assembly, Guatemala City. Nov. 
11, 1986 (Current Policy #891). 

Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki, CSCE 
review meeting, Vienna. Nov. 5, 1986 (Cur- 
rent Policy #892). 

Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the 
Future of Deterrence, International House 
of Chicago and The Chicago Sun-Times 
forum, Chicago, Nov. 17, 1986 (Current 
Policy #893). 

Africa 

The Human Rights Dimension in Africa, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Freeman, 
World Affairs Council, Philadelphia, Nov. 
6, 1986 (Current Policy #888). 

Sanctions Against South Africa (GIST, Nov. 
1986). 

Arms Control 

Permitted and Prohibited Activities Under 
the ABM Treaty, Ambassador Nitze, Inter- 
national Law Weekend Group, New York 
City, Oct. 31, 1986 (Current Policy #886). 

East Asia 

The U.S. Approach to East Asia and the 
Pacific, Assistant Secretary Sigur, Pacific 
and Asian Affairs Council and the Pacific 
Forum conference, Honolulu, Oct. 29, 1986 
(Current Policy #895). 

Anti-Piracy in Southeast Asia (GIST, Nov. 
1986). 

Economics 

U.S. -EC Relations and the International 
Trading System, Under Secretary Wallis, 
Society for International Affairs, Luxem- 
bourg, Oct. 8, 1986 (Current Policy ; 



General 

U.S. Foreign PoHcy Achievements and 
Challenges, Under Secretary Armacost, 
State Department regional foreign policy 
conference, Salt Lake City, Oct. 18, 1986 
(Current Policy #885). 

U.S. Policy Toward the Third World, Under 
Secretary Armacost, National Third World 
Studies Conference, Omaha, Oct. 17, 1986 
(Current Policy #894). 



Recent Anti-American Forgeries, Nov. 1986 
(Foreign Affairs Note). 

Helping Americans to Understand the World: 
Some Proposals, Nov. 1986 (Public Infor- 
mation Series). 

Nuclear Policy 

International Prospects for Civil Nuclear 
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era, Assist- 
ant Secretary Negroponte, Rotary Club, 
Detroit, Nov. 5, 1986 (Current Policy #887). 

Refugees 

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (GIST, Nov. 
1986). 

Western Hemisphere 

Guatemala's Transition Toward Democracy. 
Nov. 1986 (Public Information Series). ■ 



Current Documents 
Volume Released 



The Department of State on October 2, 
1986, released American Foreign Policy: 
Current Dock merits. 198U- The book is 
the most recent volume in an ongoing 
Department of State series. 

Like earlier volumes in the series, 
this book represents official public 
expressions of policy that best set forth 
the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign 
policy. Included are the te.xts of major 
official messages, addresses, statements, 
interviews, press conferences and brief- 
ings, reports, congressional testimony, 
and communications by the White 
House, the Department of State, and 
other Federal agencies or officials 
involved in the foreign policy process. 
The volume contains 1,174 pages 
arranged chronologically within 15 
geographic and topical chapters, and 
includes a list of documents, editorial 
annotations, maps, a list of names and 
abbreviations, and an index. 

The volume covers the fourth year of 
the Reagan Administration. It presents 
the major statements by President 
Reagan, the Secretary of State, and 
other government leaders setting forth 
the most important general principles of 
American foreign policy in 1984. Policy 
statements are included on national 
security policy, arms control, foreign 
economic policy, terrorism, the role of 
the United States in the United Nations, 
the approach to human rights around the 
world, the concern with refugees, and 
the law of the sea. The volume also 
presents expressions of U.S. policy on 
regional and bilateral aspects of 
American foreign relations in 1984. 



The American Foreign Policy 
documentary series began in 1950. 
Following the publication of three 
volumes covering the 1941 to 1955 
years, annual volumes entitled A meri' 
Foreign Policy: Curreyit Documents w 
issued for the years 1956-1967. After 
interruption the series was resumed v 
the publication in August 1983 of 
American Foreign Policy: Basic 
Documents. 1977-1980. The annual 
volumes were revived with the public; 
tion oi Amei'ican Foreign Policy: Cur 
rent Documents, 1981. The 1982 and 
1983 annual volumes have also been 
published. It is the Department's intei 
tion to publish the annual volume for 
1985 later this year. 

The Department, which released ; 
microfiche supplement to the 1981 
printed volume in February 1985, alsc 
plans to publish microfiche supplemer 
to the later printed volumes in the 
series. These microfiche publications ' 
include the full texts of many docume 
printed only in part in the printed 
volumes and will also reproduce a mui 
larger and more complete selection of 
documents than appear in the books. 

A^nerican Foreign Policy: Currrn 
Documents. 1984 was prepared in the 
Office of the Historian, Bureau of Pul 
Affairs, Department of State, Copies 
this volume (Department of State Pul 
lication No. 9462; GPO Stock No. 
044-000-02087-4) may be purchased 
$37.00 (domestic prepaid) from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. Checks or money 
orders should be made payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents 



Press release 195 of Oct. 2, 1986 



94 



Department of State Bullei 






^ )EX 



uary 1 987 
.87, No. 2118 



1 
„ 



DieiiBBiiistan. Situation in Afghanistan 

:un) 84 

ican Principles 

ring the Foreign Affairs Budget 

ultz) 24 

Foreign Policy: Achievements and 

illenges (Arnnacost) 61 

Control 
lar and Space Arms Talks Close Round 

(Kampelman, Reagan) 41 

lar Weapons, Arms Control, and the 

tare of Deterrence (Shultz) 31 

itted and Prohibited Activities Under 

ABM Treaty (Nitze) 39 

ling the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47 
itary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51 
Foreign Policy: Achievements and 

' (allenges (Armaeost) 61 

.Mnitiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan, 

i jitz, Whitehead) 65 

' irld Without Nuclear Weapons 

(lelman) 35 

, a )odia. Situation in Cambodia (Walters, 

t t of resolution) 80 

h . Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad 
(;un) 87 

Tess. U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese, 

1 agan, Shultz, Whitehead) 65 

i«irtment & Foreign Service. Secretary 

Jaises AID and Comments on Iran ... .23 
It loping Countries 

h ^ID Challenge 1 

'. Policy Toward the Third World 

1 rmacost) 56 

'.t lomics 

"r loting Inter-American Cooperation 

^ I lultz) 27 

It oring the Foreign Affairs Budget 

I mltz) 24 

J. -EC Relations and the International 

ading System (Wallis) 43 

J. Foreign Policy: Achievements and 

lallenges (Armaeost) 61 

J. -Japan Subcabinet Meets (Wallis) 42 

J. Policy Toward the Third World 

rmacost) 56 

il alvador. Secretary Visits Earthquake 

tein El Salvador 89 

E rgy. International Prospects for Civil 

uclear Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era 

legroponte) 75 

E ope 

M lear Weapons, Arms Control, and the 

uture of Deterrence (Shultz) 31 

P suing the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47 

(tary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51 
EC Relations and the International 

rading System (Wallis) 43 

V nna CSCE Followup Meeting 50 

.^Vorld Without Nuclear Weapons 

\delman) 35 



Foreign Assistance 

The AID Challenge 1 

Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget 

(Shultz) 24 

Secretary Visits Earthquake Site in El 

Salvador 89 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and 

Challenges (Armaeost) 61 

Germany. Visit of West German Chancellor 

Kohl (Kohl, Reagan, joint statement) ... .54 
Guatemala. Promoting Inter- American 

Cooperation (Shultz) 27 

Human Rights 

Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47 

Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51 

Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting 50 

International Law. Nicaragua (Okun) ... .82 

Iran 

Secretary Praises AID and Comments on 

Iran 23 

U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan, 

Shultz, Whitehead) 65 

Japan. U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets 

(Wallis) 42 

Libya 

Libya (Pressler) 87 

Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad 

(Okun) 87 

Marshall Islands. U.S. Relationship With 

Pacific Islands (Reagan) 78 

Micronesia. U.S. Relationship With Pacific 

Islands (Reagan) 78 

Military Affairs. Permitted and Prohibited 

Activities Under the ABM Treaty (Nitze) 39 
Narcotics 
President Convenes Conference on 

Narcotics 74 

Promoting Inter- American Cooperation 

(Shultz) 27 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua (Okun) 82 

U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan, 

Shultz, Whitehead) 65 

Northern Mariana Islands. U.S. Relationship 

With Pacific Islands (Reagan) 78 

Nuclear Policy 

International Prospects for Civil Nuclear 

Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era 

(Negroponte) 75 

U.S. Reconfirms Support for IAEA 

(Kennedy) 86 

Presidential Documents 

American Hostage Released in Beirut 79 

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Close Round 

Six (Kampelman, Reagan) 41 

U.S. Relationship With Pacific Islands 78 

Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl (Kohl, 

Reagan, joint statement) 54 

Publications 

Current Documents Volume Released 94 

Department of State 94 

Syria. U.S. Takes Measures Against Syria 

(Wfiite House statement) 79 



Terrorism 

American Hostage Released in Beirut 

(Reagan) 79 

Libya (Pressler) 87 

Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51 
U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and 

Challenges (Armaeost) 61 

U.S. Supports Council of Europe Resolution 

on Terrorism (Department statement) ... 79 
U.S. Takes Measures Against Syria (Wfiite 

House statement) 79 

Trade 

U.S. -EC Relations and the International 

Trading System (Wallis) 43 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and 

Challenges (Armaeost) 61 

U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets (Wallis) 42 

U.S. Policy Toward the Third World 

(Armaeost) 56 

Treaties. Current Actions 90 

U.S.S.R. 

International Prospects for Civil Nuclear 

Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era 

(Negroponte) 75 

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Close Round 

Six (Kampelman. Reagan) 41 

Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the 

Future of Deterrence (Shultz) 31 

Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51 

Situation in Afghanistan (Okun) 84 

A World Without Nuclear Weapons 

(Adelman) 35 

United Nations 

Libya (Pressler) 87 

Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad 

(Okun) 87 

Nicaragua (Okun) 82 

Situation in Afghanistan (Okun) 84 

Situation in Cambodia (Walters, text of 

resolution) 80 

U.S. Reconfirms Support for IAEA 

(Kennedy) 86 

Vietnam. Situation in Cambodia (Walters, 

text of resolution) 80 

Western Hemisphere. Promoting Inter- 
American Cooperation (Shultz) 27 

Name Index 

Adelman, Kenneth L 35 

Armaeost, Michael H 56, 61 

Kampelman, Max M 41 

Kennedy, Richard T 86 

Kohl, Helmut 54 

Meese, Edwin III 65 

Negroponte, John D 75 

Nitze, Paul H 39 

Okun, Herbert S 82, 84, 87 

Pressler, Larry 87 

Reagan, President 41, 54, 65, 78, 79 

Shultz, Secretary . . .23, 24, 27, 31, 47, 51, 65 

Wallis, W. Allen 42, 43 

Walters, Vernon A 80 

Whitehead, John C 65 



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D 



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.3- 



buUetBn 



e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/Volume 87/Number 2119 



February 1987 




Afghanist 





1 




%n/22 ^M 
Cuba/62 
Terrorism/70 







Departntpnt of State 

bulletin 



Volumes/ / Number 21 19 / February 1987 



Cover: Afghan refugees. 

(British Information Services) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
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The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
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tional information on current issues but 
should not necessarily be interpreted as 
official U.S. policy statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

GEORGE B. HIGH 

Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



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For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
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CONTENTS 




FEATURE 

1 Afghanistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupation 
{Craig Karp) 



Secretary 



2 1 Iran and U.S. Policy 
3 Interview on "Worldnet" 
Southern Africa: American 
Hopes for the Future 

kfca 

South Africa: Toward Peace and 
Stability {Chester A. Crocker) 

2 The Human Rights Dimension in 
Africa (C/(ar/c.s \V. Freeman) 

^iiada 



15 



Secretary Visits Canada {Joseph 
Clark. Secretary Shultz) 



)< )artment 

17 Secretary and Marine 

jU, Commandant Sign Memoran- 

■- dum of Understanding 



Ei ;t Asia 



18 



China Policy Today: Consensus, 

Consistence, and Stability 

{Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.) 
Vitality and Possibility on the 

Pacific Rim 

{Ga.ston J. Sigur, Jr.) 
The U.S. Approach to East Asia 

and the Pacific 

{Gaston J. Sigur. Jr.) 



Europe 

57 NATO Defense Planning Com- 

mittee Meets in Brussels 
{Final Connnunique) 

58 29th Report on Cyprus {Message 

to the Cong7-ess) 

59 Secretary's Joint News Con- 

ference After Meeting 
With EC Ministers {James A. 
Baker III. Willy De Clercq. 
Jacques Delors, Secretary 
Shultz, Clayton Yeutte?') 

Human Rights 

62 Human Rights in Castro's Cuba 
67 Human Rights Progi'ess in 1986 
{Richard Schifter) 



Oceans 

69 



Navigation Rights and the Gulf 
of Sidra 



Terrorism 



70 



73 



Terrorism: The Challenge and 

the Response 

{John C. Whitehead) 
Syrian Support for International 

Terrorism: 1983-86 {Fart 

Paper. Chronology) 



United Nations 

77 UN Administration and 

Finances (yer7i0Wi4. Walters) 



Western Hemisphere 

78 Visit of Haiti President Namphy 
tH7(/7(' House Statement) 

78 Expanding Freedom: A For- 
mula for Growth in the 
Americas {Elliott Ahrams. 
PaulD. Taylor) 

84 Guatemala's Transition Toward 
Democracy 

Treaties 



86 



Current Actions 



Press Releases 

89 Department of State 

Publications 

89 Department of State 

90 Exjjanded Chiefs of Mission 

Volume Released 
90 Background Notes 



Index 



."•i OiTi 



'"T^E^Bsmms 



^'^ITGfiY 







National capital 
a Gasdeld 
^ Airlield 
y//// Refugee areas 






50 100 


150 200 Kilometers 





50 


100 150 200 Miles 




FEATURE 

Afghanistan 



Afghanistan: 

Seven Years 

of Soviet Occupation 



'ollowing report was prepared by 
qKarp, Afghanistan analyst, with 
■ssistance of other analysts in the 
au of Intelligence and Research and 
■rtment officials. It is part of an 
lal series of Special Reports on the 
Uion in Afghanistan. 



Summary 

The war in Afghanistan remains a stand- 
off, but miHtary activity has increased on 
both sides. Combat was more diffuse and 
unpredictable. During the past year, the 
mujahidin brought the war increasingly 
to Afghanistan's major cities, particu- 
larly the capital, Kabul, and north of the 
Hindu Kush mountain range. 

Afghan resistance activities were 
widespread, with operations in nearly all 
parts of the country. The mujahidin con- 
tinue to improve their arms and training 
and to develop more effective forms of 
cooperation and coordination. They 
demonstrated an improved capability to 
blunt Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan (DRA) and Soviet opera- 
tions, and they made major advances in 
air defense with the increasing use of 
surface-to-air missiles. Resistance 
alliance spokesmen brought their cause 
to several countries, including the 
United States, and to Islamic and inter- 
national organizations. 

Soviet military forces focused more 
on small-unit operations and air attacks 
and no longer relied on massive valley 
sweep operations. Efforts to strengthen 
their allies in the DRA came to nought; 
the regime's forces remain largely 
crippled by low morale, desertion, and 
intraparty factionalism. Instead of risk- 
ing the lives of Soviet troops, the Soviet 
40th Army used more firepower, from 
both artillery and aircraft, sometimes 
with devastating effect. 

Politically, the Soviets have adopted 
a public posture designed to suggest 
greater flexibility than heretofore, focus- 
ing on their willingness to withdraw but 
insisting on too long a timeframe. In 
July 1986, at Vladivostok, Soviet leader 
Gorbachev promised to withdraw six 
regiments from Afghanistan in order to 
provide a "stimulus" for a political set- 
tlement. In fact, two of the six 
regiments (and part of a third) that were 



withdrawn in October had arrived in 
Afghanistan after the Vladivostok 
speech. The newly introduced units were 
the only relevant combat units in the 
withdrawal plan. To avoid even a minor 
degradation of their military position, 
the Soviets apparently brought in these 
units solely for the purpose of withdraw- 
ing them. 

In Kabul, Babrak Karmal was 
replaced as Soviet-backed ruler of 
Afghanistan by the former head of the 
.secret police, Najibullah. The switch in 
party leadership, in May, was the most 
important change in the Kabul regime 
since 1979. 

In November, Karmal lost his last 
senior post as ceremonial head of state. 
He was replaced by a nonparty member 
as part of the regime's campaign to sug- 
gest a broadened base. Karmal's ouster 
and purges of his followers led to com- 
plicated factional differences within the 
ruling People's Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA). 

The Soviet occupation has 
devastated the countryside. Although 
refugee outflow is reduced, the new 
refugees appear to have suffered more 
than those who left earlier. The Soviets 
have stepped up reprisal attacks on 
civilians. The Kabul regime has con- 
sistently violated the human rights of 
Afghan citizens through indiscriminate 
imprisonment, torture, and other abuses. 
The Kabul regime and the Soviets have 
been condemned for these abuses by 
independent international organizations 
and the UN Human Rights Commission. 

Pakistan remains stalwart in its sup- 
port of the Afghan people, despite a 
stepped-up Soviet/DRA campaign of 
sabotage and subversion in the border 
areas. Air violations of Pakistani ter- 
ritory tripled; artillery shellings 
increased approximately fivefold. 
Pakistan has worked for a solution to the 
crisis through UN-sponsored talks at 
Geneva. There were indications of 



bruary 1987 







An Afghan guerrilla stands guard on a Soviet helicopter shot down in the Panjsher Valley. 




increased support for the Afghan people 
from Iran. 

In November, the United Nations 
voted 122 to 20, with 11 abstentions, to 
condemn, for the eighth time since 1979, 
the presence of foreign forces in 
Afghanistan and demand the return of 
that country to an independent and 
nonaligned status. Absent a settlement, 
the United States remains committed to 
the Afghan cause. 



Outlook: Given current trends, the 
stalemate is likely to continue, and 
violence will escalate. The Soviets will 
remain unable to consolidate their 
political or military position and will find 
it increasingly threatened. But they will 
continue to project an international 
image of flexibility, while looking to 
invest their client regime with as much 
political legitimacy as possible. The 
inujahidin resistance will remain stead- 
fast, however: they are prepared to fight 
on for a decade and more. 



Military Activity 

The level of fighting fluctuated widelj 
1986, not always in accord with norms' 
seasonal patterns. Combat remained a 
higher than usual levels throughout th 
winter. In April it was twice that of la 
year. The pace then slowed, without tl 
massive late spring Soviet combat ope ■ 
tions of previous years. Traditionally 
heavy inujahidin activity in the summc 
also was delayed this year. This lag we 
due in part to a late thaw in tjie crucia 



I 



Department of State Bulle.i 




FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



ntain passes and Soviet/DRA pres- 
on supply caravans. Fighting soared 
istoric seasonal levels as 1986 drew 
close. 

Despite increased emphasis on 
iipting resistance lines of com- 
lication, Soviet and regime forces 
e able to capture only a fraction of 
stance supplies. The amount lost to 
rdiction grew, complicating move- 
it and contributing to a rise in 
sport costs. However, there has 
n an increase in the overall volume of 
.pons and equipment available to the 
Iters. Soviet and regime attacks on 
voys have concentrated on the pack 
nals used to transport supplies across 
passes of eastern Afghanistan. 
Resistance ability to ambush 
liet/DRA convoys also increased 
ig with the acquisition of more heavy 
.pons and improved demolition capa- 
iies. Throughout the country, the 
mhidin knocked out bridges, shut 
vn stretches of road, and caused long 
Brsions. The road system, the Soviet 
stical lifeline, has been severely 
tared. 

•5 War of the Cities 

spite significant Soviet/DRA efforts 
mprove control, the mujahidin in 
i6 brought the war to Afghanistan's 
jor cities. In the smaller provincial 
litals, the regime continues to main- 
a daytime control but has little sway 
'r the surrounding areas. In Kabul, 
' illusion of increasing urban security 
tered over the past few years has 
;n shattered. 



Herat. Combat in and around Herat 
' .s intense all year. Initiative and con- 
il passed from one side to the other, 
■rat mujahidin continue to operate 
. ntly under the command of Ismail 
lan and Allahuddin Khan of the 
iniiit-i-Islami party. In house-to-house 
;hting, they have occasionally been on 
e brink of overwhelming regime forces 
id taking complete control of the town. 

Each time, the Soviets and their 
fghan allies struck back with massive 
rce, including artillery and air attacks, 
estruction may have been worse in 
erat than in any other city; Soviet 
-imbardments have seriously damaged 
i;nturies-old, internationally renowned 



monuments. In February, Herat's large 
Shia district was le^■eled in retaliation 
for a resistance attack. DRA forces 
refused to enter the district, while the 
mujahidin fought on in the rubble. 

During the summer, the mujahidin 
reportedly controlled some 90% of the 
old city and 50% of the new. Soviet and 
DRA forces launched several operations, 
including one with nearly 10,000 men, to 
reoccupy the city. In October, foreign 
journalists attending "withdrawal" 
ceremonies at nearby Shindand had to 
be brought into and out of Herat by 



hours at midday; the city closes down 
completely by midafternoon. 

The Soviets enjoyed some short-term 
success in the Qandahar region. The 
Spet.-inaz regularly ambushed caravans 
and attacked local resistance bases. In 
the early spring, a huge Soviet force was 
dispatched to Qandahar from Kabul. 
Although able to reassert control in 
town only briefly before returning north, 
it did establish a network of outposts 
and minefields similar to those around 
Kabul. Manned chiefly by Afghans, the 
security belt has complicated but not 



After 7 years of brutal occupation, the 
Soviet Union has failed to consolidate its 
rule over Afghanistan. In 1986, the Soviets 
were forced to revise drastically their 
military tactics and replace the ruler they 
installed in 1979. The resistance grew 
stronger and retained overwhelming sup- 
port in Afghanistan, among Afghan 
refugees, and in international forums. 



armored personnel carrier. The Soviets 
informed them it was unsafe to spend 
the night. 

Detailed information on the rest of 
western Afghanistan is sketchy, but 
combat activity was reported in every 
province. Coordination may have in- 
creased after the designation of Ismail 
Khan as regional Jnmiat commander for 
several western provinces. 

Qandahar. In Qandahar, too, 
fighting raged throughout the year and. 
at times, control of the city and sur- 
rounding areas was in dispute. Qan- 
dahar' s bazaars are open only a few 



prevented movement in and out of the 
city. The outposts have provided enticing 
targets for the mujahidin. 

The regime made some political 
advances with local tribes and villages. 
Ruling party officials, including politburo 
member Nur Ahmed Nur, offered money 
and weapons to tribal chieftains for their 
cooperation. By exploiting local rivalries, 
Kabul may have gained temporary 
support. 

Asmatullah Achekzai, the resistance 
commander who defected to the regime 
last year, has become something of a 
local warlord. He lives under regime pro- 
tection behind the governor's house in 



ebruary 1987 



Qandahar. Asmatullah's tribal militia, 
operating south to Spin Buldak, attacked 
tribal rivals in the resistance, mujahidin 
supply lines, and occasionally even 
regime targets. 

Combat escalated in late summer 
and early fall. In late August, the 
mujahidin forced abandonment of the 
central police station. On September 1, 
the main telephone exchange was 
attacked and communications cut. Later 
that week, the radio station was 
damaged by a rocket, and the Central 
Bank was hit. Soviet/DRA control was 
limited to the airport and a single gar- 
rison in the city. The highway linking the 
two points, usually in regime hands, 
reportedly passed under mujahidin con- 
trol. The Soviets counterattacked, but 
the mujahidin lay low, fearing reprisals. 
Still, casualties evidently were heavy, 
particularly among farmers, perhaps 
because the latter were reluctant to 
hand over recently harvested grain to 
the regime. 

The persistent resistance challenge 
to the capital of southern Afghanistan 
stems from a high degree of cooperation, 
proximity to supplies, and strong local 
support. The local resistance council 
includes the seven Peshawar-based 
organizations (most have active fronts in 
the area), parties not included in the 
alliance (e.g.. the Harakaf-Inlami of 
Ayatollah Mohseni), and independent 
groups. The council has assumed new 
functions, both political and military, and 
has not been hampered by internal 
squabbles. There are several important 
local commanders, like Mullah Malang or 
Haji Latif of the National Islamic Front 
{Mnhaz-e-Milli party), but no individual 
is dominant. 

Kabul and Surrounding Areas. 

Stability and security in the Afghan 
capital are a key Soviet goal. The 
Soviets strengthened the security 
perimeter around the city this year and 
attempted to extend it to counter the 
growing long-range weapons capabilities 
of the mujahidin. The Soviets continued 
to fire indiscriminately on nearby areas 
suspected of harboring the mujahidin. 
Even deserted villages north of the city 
were harassed nightly. 



Soviet troops behave like an occupy- 
ing force. Many Kabul shopowners 
grumble privately about frequent shop- 
lifting by Soviet civilians and troops. 
Drunken Soviet soldiers regularly broke 
into homes and threatened the 
inhabitants. The Soviets appear to treat 
their Afghan allies with equal disdain. 

Although there was some mujahidin 
activity all year, resistance pressure 
peaked later than in previous years. At 
times, particularly in midwinter, there 
has been a deceptive appearance of nor- 
malcy in the capital. The bazaars are 
filled with many items, including 
videotapes, not commonly available in 
the U.S.S.R. Visitors note a surprising 
number of Mercedes and new Toyotas. 
But Kabul residents were reminded of 
the proximity of war by the constant 
drone of aircraft. Both planes and 
helicopters eject an increasing number of 
flares (as many as 50-60 on takeoff or 
landing) to protect against heat-seeking 
missiles. 

During the first half of the year, the 
resistance made its impact felt primarily 
through rocket attacks (especially on 
such occasions as the sixth anniversary 



of the Soviet invasion). In late Januai 
the mujahidin fired 122mm rockets 
the Soviet Embassy; on January 31, 
122mm damaged the U.S. Embassy 
compound. 

By midsummer, the war intensifii 
for the regime and the Soviets in Kat 
Repeated rocket barrages and period) 
firefights followed mujahidin penetr; 
tion of the heavily fortified security b 
As in past years, the Soviet Embassy, 
and Soviet and Afghan military insta) 
tions were rocketed. In July, a rocket 
heavily damaged the Polish Embassy. 

The resistance periodically rocket 
the DRA's 8th Division supply base at 
Qarghah, on the outskirts of Kabul. C 
the night of August 26-27, a direct hi 
set off a 2-hour series of explosions tl 
shook the city. A giant fireball at mid 
night (possibly rockets or missiles sto 
at the site) produced a cloud more tha 
1,000 feet high. The explosions, visiW 
all over the capital, were compared tc 
erupting volcano. Despite regime clai; 
of "no human losses," as many as 10( 
were reported killed and perhaps sev< 
thousand injured. The Soviets responi 
quickly by firing on the launch area 




Commander Mahsud teaches military tactics. 



Department of State Bulll 




FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



Sfhan guerrilla 
his RPG-7 
nk grenade 
iner readv. 



iation came later), but were unable 
:h the attackers. Despite inten- 
security, within 3 days the mu- 
in resumed rocketing of the capital. 
iUgh the Soviets can replace the 
|royed supplies, the loss of one of the 
':'s largest depots was a blow to the 
ne's prestige. 

n late September, the fragility of 
d's security was brought home to 
ir Soviet leadership. First Deputy 
rman of the U.S.S.R. Council of 
sters Murakhovskiy was buffeted by 
plosion at the Soviet Embassy, 
aps a car bomb, just before a 
liiiled meeting with Najibullah. The 
f.-t-ranking civilian Soviet to visit 
il in recent years, Murakhovskiy 
rlfdly is close to General Secretary 
>achev, whom he replaced as 

il Topol party chief. 
The outskirts of Kabul were again 
■> i-ne of heavy fighting over the past 
. Soviet and regime forces were 
ed to return continually to areas pro- 
Hcd safe and free of mujahidin. 
I 'nmmanders, like Abdul Haq of 

1 1hi'-Islami (Khalis) party, have 

■'• ked to increase coordination and 

3 5sure on the regime. 




The Lowgar Valley, 40 miles south 
of Kabul, has been emptied of much of 
its population due to the severity of the 
fighting. The Kabul-Gardez road, which 
runs through the province, is often cut. 
In August, there was heavy fighting 
between a Soviet/DRA force and Hezh-e- 
hla m i fighters under Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar. Gulbuddin 's men apparently 
shot down several helicopters, a clear 
indication of a more potent resistance air 
defense. In nearby Sarowbi, a Hezb-e- 
hlfimi (Khalis) group bombed hydroelec- 
tric installations, disrupting the capital's 
power supply. 

Foreigners can still picnic on 
weekends or play the world's most 
embattled golf course on the road to 
Paghman, in the mountains just outside 
of Kabul. Visitors have at times 
remarked on the apparent calm; yet 
beginning in the spring, regime and 
Soviet military forces struck Paghman 
nearly every month. Many villages have 
been leveled by air strikes and artillery. 
For much of the summer, shelling was 
audible and visible as far away as Kabul. 



The largest Soviet/DRA operation in 
Paghman took place in September, 
targeted against the mujahidin who 
rocketed the Qarghah ammo dump. It 
marked the beginning of a significant 
combat role for DRA Interior Ministry 
troops (Sarandoy), whom Interior 
Minister and Khalq chief Gulabzoi 
reportedly led personally into battle. 

f^urther north, the Shomali suffered 
from a recurring cycle of resistance and 
reprisal. Early in the year, numbers of 
children injured in a Soviet/DRA bom- 
bardment of Estalif were brought to the 
Kabul children's hospital. In early 
October, another brutal Soviet/DRA 
campaign devastated civilian areas and 
destroyed livestock and crops. This time 
the regime attempted to stop refugees 
from fleeing to Kabul. 

Mujahidin interdicted traffic along 
the Salang highway from the U.S.S.R. 
throughout the year. Even the major 
Soviet air base at Bagram, 50 kilometers 
north of Kabul, came under fire several 
times. In July, a large ammunition store 
at Bagram blew up. 



Iruary 1987 



Panjsher and North Afghanistan 

Commander Ahmed Shah Mahsud of the 
Ja-ndat-i-hhimi still leads the sole 
resistance organization in the Panjsher 
Valley. Although the Panjsher organiza- 
tion was active outside the valley, no 
major battles occurred within the Panj- 
sher itself. Most mujahidin remaining in 
the valley are camped in its upper 
reaches, from which they periodically 
attacked regime outposts and convoys. 
In the winter, the Soviets attempted to 
e.xpand their area of control but were 
turned back. They occasionally launched 
heliborne assaults on -mujahidin posi- 
tions, with little success. 

Panjsher is divided into 22 base 
areas (karargaK). Each base is responsi- 
ble for political and civil as well as 
military affairs in its area. Only a few 
F'anjsheris have fled to Pakistan. In the 
Soviet/regime-occupied lower valley, the 
population is comprised mostly of 
women, children, and the elderly. 

Mahsud Moves North. In one of the 

most significant developments of the 
conflict, mujahidin cooperation 
expanded out of the Panjsher Valley to 
the north of the Hindu Kush. For 
perhaps the first time since the Soviet 
invasion, a resistance organization 
played a major role in a large-scale 
assault outside its home base area. 
Mahsud has begun to build institutions 
whose reach extends not only beyond his 
valley but also across geographical bar- 
riers and even party lines. 

These organizational efforts began 
during the year-long cease-fire preceding 
1984's massive seventh Soviet offensive 
in the Panjsher. While focusing his 
efforts on fellow members of the Jaw iat- 
i-Islami party— mostly ethnic Tajiks— 
Mahsud also aimed at winning coopera- 
tion from other parties and ethnic 
groups. Mahsud initially offered to assist 
local commanders to consolidate their 
own base areas. He also provided staff 
training— stressing the benefits of 
cooperation— to mid-level commanders, 
some from other parties or distant 
fighting groups. 

In early 1985, the Council of the 
North was established, involving com- 
manders from Baghlan, Konduz. Takhar, 
and parts of Badakhshan. They were 
encouraged to form local councils and 
work on civil as well as military affairs. 




•■.flpi 13-flfi STATE IIMR/GE) 



Kilometers 



Council members agreed to provide 
volunteers for central units- 
professionalized forces proposed by 
Mahsud to be the core of a mobile 
regional guerrilla force. 

These efforts began to bear fruit in 
1986. In March a multiparty force 
blunted a Soviet drive along the Konduz- 
Faizabad highway. In mid-June, taking 
advantage of Ramadan, the Soviets 
undertook a large operation to counter 
the growing local threat and to supply 
garrisons. They attacked ynujahidin 
bases around Khanabad and Eshkamesh. 
Soviet/regime forces reportedly killed 
and wounded hundreds of civilians, 
burned local crops, and damaged irriga- 
tion canals in Takhar. Soviet artillery 
units later moved to target the pro- 
liferating mujahidin bases in the area. 
Both operations were strongly opposed 
by local mujahidin and men from 
Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, and mobile 



groups from the Panjsher. The Soviei 
were unable to disrupt evolving 
resistance plans. 

Capture of Farkhar. On August 
the joint resistance forces went on tl 
offensive. A multipronged assault on 
DRA garrison of Farkhar was carefi 
planned; the Jamiat commander froi 
Takhar, Abdul Wadud, assisted by a 
commander from Panjsher, led the 
attack. By early next morning, half t 
garrison was captured, the remainde 
the DRA forces were overwhelmed t 
following day. There were more than 
100 DRA casualties at Farkhar. Mon 
than 200 were captured, along with 
nearly 100 tons of supplies and ord- 
nance. Resistance casualties were 
relatively light but included an impor 
local commander. The fall of Farkhai 
a well-planned assault involving train 
forces from six districts in four prov- 
inces, was a major strategic advance 
the resistance. 



Department of State Bultir 




(7 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



»2 12-86 STATE (INR/GE) 



[n November, with Soviet forces 
ve in the Panjsher, the northern 
dnization again went on the offen- 
capturing a number of outposts. In 
November, they overran the DRA 
'rict headquarters at Nahrin and an 

icimpanying garrison. The mujahidin 

^ ured enough supplies to further the 
It to create a regional threat oppos- 

aihe main Soviet lifeline into 

i hanistan. 

North Central and Northwestern 
A hanistan. Further west, in the 
' hern flatlands bordering the Soviet 
"ii, Soviet/regime control remained 
tri- than in tne rest of the country. 
' I'theless, resistance forces harassed 
ri'i^ime throughout the north. The 
oleum pipelines from the U.S.S.R. 
ain a favorite target. In the fall, 
'in escalated in Andkhvoy and 
iniana, near the Soviet border. 



Central Afghanistan 

A coalition of pro-Iranian Shia groups, 
including Nasr and Sepah-e Pasdaran, 
now controls the Hazarajat. It remains 
the major recipient of the limited Iranian 
support in Afghanistan. Given the 
absence of regime or Soviet presence 
and its relative impenetrability, the 
Hazarajat is of strategic importance as a 
refuge for the resistance. The Hazara 
Shia obtain a significant part of their 
arms from other resistance groups, in 
return for protection of supply routes. In 
1986, pro-Iranian groups were reported 
active for the first time against the 
minimal regime presence in the moun- 
tains and outside the Hazarajat, in the 
north. West of the Hazara heartland, in 
Ghor, there was an upswing in 
resistance activity. 



Eastern Afghanistan 

The eastern provinces, particularly near 
the Pakistani border and the major 
roads, remain a primary theater of com- 
bat. Soviet efforts to interdict resistance 
supply are focused there. A 50-mile strip 
along the frontier continues to suffer 
devastation and depopulation. The 
regime expanded its border forces and 
established more posts; more posts were 
attacked and taken by the mujahidin. 
The Konar Valley, scene of a major 
Soviet push last year, was relatively 
quiet, although Barikowt and at times all 
Soviet/DRA posts in the valley were 
under siege. Combat centered on key 
provinces, Nangarhar and Paktia. 

Nangarhar Province juts down the 
Kabul river valley toward Pakistan 
before ending at the foot of the Khyber 
Pass. It carries the major road link 
between the two countries, and con- 
siderable commercial traffic moves in 
both directions. 

The provincial capital, Jalalabad, 
remains securely in regime hands but 
occasionally was hit by rockets. In 1986, 
there were more small arms firefights in 
the city, nighttime fighting, and out- 
going Soviet/regime artillery fire. In the 
fall, mujahidin employed surface-to-air 
missiles to knock down regime aircraft 
landing at Jalalabad airport, and air 
operations were suspended. 

Early in the year, the strategic 
Nazian Valley, which leads to the 
Khyber Pass, was the scene of a major 
effort to prove that regime forces could 
operate effectively on their own. After 
initial setbacks, DRA units secured con- 
trol of the valley and established a 
number of posts near the foot of the 
Khyber. After the withdrawal of the 
main Afghan force, however, the mu- 
jahidin attacked troops left behind and 
forced most of them out. The regime 
could not reestablish control and by late 
November had to mount another offen- 
sive in the area. 

Paktia Province. Both sides were 
active throughout the year in Paktia, 
which sits astride important resistance 
supply routes. The regime can move only 
with difficulty, if at all, on most of the 
provincial roads. Ali Khayl (Jaji) was 
harassed for much of the year, par- 
ticularly by the Ittihadia party of 
Sayyaf. The main DRA garrison in east 
Paktia, at Khowst, must still be supplied 
by air. 



loruary 1987 



In early April, as fighting escalated, 
Afghan forces launched a combined 
ground and heiiborne assault on a major 
resistance base, Zhawar Fort, about 10 
kilometers from the Pakistan border. 
The base was an especially inviting 
target because it had been described in 
Western press stories, complete with 
detailed descriptions and photos, as an 
impregnable redoubt. 

Hezh-e-hlami (Khalis) Commander 
Jalaluddin Haqqani suffered severe 
napalm burns in an initial airstrike but 
stayed on to lead his men. Instead of 
retreating, the mujahidin defended 
Zhawar. Government troops, numbering 
at least 1,000, moved steadily forward, 
suffering heavy casualties, including 
several aircraft. One of the regime's best 
commando units was decimated during a 
parachute landing. 

Resistance forces from Paktia and 
elsewhere moved to help but were slowed 
down by artillery barrages. Violations of 
Pakistani airspace associated with the 
Zhawar battle were unprecedented. Two 
weeks after the fighting began, the 
mujahidin withdrew, and regime forces 
entered the camp. Many mujahidin 
casualties were suffered in the evacua- 
tion, when they had no protection from 
airstrikes. After carting away or 
destroying considerable supplies, the 
Afghan Army pulled out. Within a week 
the mujahidin were back. This costly but 
temporary setback may have discour- 
aged further use of large supply bases, 
which, like Zhawar, will always be 
vulnerable to Soviet firepower. 



The Afghan Resistance 

Seven major resistance parties head- 
quartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, are 
joined in an alliance and have promoted 
the international political dimension of 
the resistance. Smaller groupings of 
various ethnic, tribal, religious, and 
political affiliations, including leftists, 
also exist. A Kabul regime amnesty 
announced on the anniversary of the 
coup specifically exempted "Maoists." 
Parties representing the Shia minority 
tend to based in Quetta, Pakistan, and in 
Iran. Most, but not all, of the hundreds 
of separate fighting groups are linked to 
one or more of the major parties. 



The alliance in Peshawar has now 
been in existence for 18 months. The 
spokesmanship has successfully rotated, 
more or less on a 3-month schedule, 
through six of the party leaders: Yunus 
Khalis (Hezb-e-hlwmi Khalis faction); 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e-Islami); 
Burhanuddin Rabbani {Jam.iat-i-Islami); 
Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Jehh-e Najat-i 
Milli); Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani 
(Mahaz-e-Milliy, and Nabi Mohammedi 
(Harakat-e-Inqelab). The seventh, Abdul 
Rasool Sayyaf (Itiihadia-Islami), is due 
to serve as representative in early 1987. 

The alliance is governed by a council 
of party leaders. Alliance committees 
have begun to work on education and 
social services and coordinate outside 
humanitarian assistance. The seven par- 
ties continued to differ on current tactics 
and Afghanistan's future. 

Military Developments. The 

resistance is increasingly better armed, 
trained, and organized, although short- 
comings continue, and there are notable 
differences in military capabilities 
among the various resistance groups. 
Mujahidin air defense capabilities 
improved considerably in 1986. The 
Dashaka (Soviet DShK 12.7mm heavy 
machinegun) remains the mainstay of 
resistance air defense. In 1986, the 
resistance used heavier air defense guns. 
The mujahidin also made greater use of 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) of various 
types. More sophisticated weapons were 
effective against the full range of air- 
craft employed by the Soviets and the 
DRA. Helicopter downings reportedly 
increased, although it is difficult to 
estimate exact losses. 

Mujahidin supplies have grown con- 
siderably over the past few years and 
include a variety of heavy weapons, 
including surface-to-surface rockets. 
Although the rapid development of the 
logistic net is one of the truly 
remarkable accomplishments of the 
resistance, the increase in supplies has 
created problems relating to movement 
and storage. Nevertheless, the improved 
supply situation has contributed to 
greater cooperation and coordination. A 
loosening of supply constraints has 
removed a major cause of squabbling— 
arms. Some groups now devote 
resources to improving and protecting 



supply routes in their territory that 
used by other groups further inside ij» 
country. | ^ 

Cooperation also has been stimu!lei 
by local residents tired of intra- 
resistance squabbles. Groups have 
loaned their heavy weapons to other: (I 
On several occasions when a group c riel 
under heavy attack, calls went out fc . 
support or diversionary actions. Othi 
groups responded, sometimes from f ■ 
away and across party lines. During 
spring fighting on the eastern bordei > 
many commanders helped each othet 
Mahsud sent men and materiel from e 
Panjsher. Rabbani's call for action tf 
divert Soviet attention from Herat w 
answered by an increase in activity i n- 
trywide. This is a far cry from the 
spontaneous and widespread, but 
uncoordinated and often fractious, 
opposition to the 1978 Marxist coup. 

Regional institutions for coordim 
tion are evolving, sometimes involvir^ 
single party as in the Council of the 
North (planned to include parties oth 
than the Jamiat); sometimes several 
ties, as in Herat; sometimes all the 
groups, such as the Qandahar Counc: 
reportedly chaired by a respected fig| 
without ties to any party. Although s' 
in a preliminary stage, the building o 
transprovincial (and potentially, 
multiparty) organizations is 
unprecedented. 

As a result of these development) 
morale is high, and mujahidin and 
civilians alike reveal little war wearir 
Most people view the conflict as an 
acceptable burden that has become pi» 
of their lives. Most areas subject to 
retaliatory attacks are already vacate 
The civilian population still overwheh 
ingly supports the resistance. There i 
little support for political accommoda 
with the regime, whether inside the 
country or among the vast majority ii 
the refugee camps, most of whom ha\ 
relatives in the resistance. There is nc 
shortage of young recruits. 

International Achievements. Th( 

alliance has made major strides in 
presenting the Afghan case to the wo 
In January, spokesman Sayed Ahmed 
Gailani traveled to Fez, Morocco, for i 
16th foreign ministers session of the 
Islamic Conference Organization. In 
June, a delegation led by spokesman 



I 




FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



lanuddin Rabbani came to the 
ed States. They were received by 
ident Reagan and other U.S. 
ials and Members of Congress. 
Dn its return trip, the delegation 
ed France and met with Prime 
ster Chirac and Foreign Minister 
lond. The visit resulted in the 
17 announcement by the French 
srnment that for the first time 
ice would grant public humanitarian 
stance to the Afghan people. King 
i of Saudi Arabia subsequently 
lived alliance spokesman Rabbani. 
(n November, spokesman Moham- 
', Nabi Mohammedi led a delegation 
lie United Nations during the 
Bral Assembly's consideration of the 
nanistan resolution (see "Refugees"), 
followed an initial visit to the 
ted Nations in 1985 by an alliance 
gation led by spokesman Hekmatyar. 
(•oute to a UN press conference with 
UN Correspondents Association, 
gation members were accosted and 
E ulted by some staff of the DRA Per- 
Ti ent Mission to the United Nations, 
alliance's hosts at the United 
''lis, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 
lally protested this misconduct. The 
u ltd States later urged the United 
N ions to take effective measures to 
ent any repetition. 

T DRA Military 

A ;r decades of Soviet training, 8 years 
"' umbat, and 7 years of Soviet 

\ ice" and direction, Afghan armed 
ii es remain incapable of defending the 
rf ime. The DRA apparently was under 
h' vy pressure to improve its military 
labilities this year. Its inability to 
It ie significant gains was a major fac- 
te in the Soviet decision to replace 
B )rak Karmal, but its performance has 
n improved under Najibullah. 

At present there are about 30,000 in 
tl army, and perhaps 10,000 in the air 
fi:e. The regime employs an equal 
nnber of paramilitary border guards, 
pice troops, secret police, and various 
r. itias, but total strength is insufficient 
t ?urb the resistance. 

With the support of Soviet advisers 
'<■ i firepower, and the benefit of 
iielligence provided by local tribesmen 
(villagers, a few specialized DRA units 
i .e at times been able to hold their 



own. Early in the year, some elements 
fought fairly well in Nangarhar and 
Paktia. But these gains proved 
transitory. 

Morale problems and factional 
infighting remain serious. Government 
forces (often at the highest levels) are 
filled with resistance sympathizers, who 
provide valuable intelligence and some 
arms to the mujahidin. Truces between 
garrisons and local mujahidin are not 
unusual. 

Conscription and Desertion. The 

familiar DRA press gangs were inten- 



sified and exemptions tightened in order 
to meet the goal of an expanded 
military. In March, Kabul school 
teachers lost their exemptions and were 
told to report. Students living abroad 
were drafted as soon as they returned to 
Afghanistan: others were required to 
show proof of service before going 
abroad to study or gaining admission to 
the university. One reported dragnet 
picked up graduating high school 
students before they could flee the coun- 
try. A May "amnesty" decree for army 
deserters and others who had evaded 




Commander Jalaluddin Haqqani on a captured Soviet tank. 



service apparently has yielded few 
results. 

When Najibullah came into power, 
he intensified the conscription campaign, 
extended it to party members, and 
lashed out at those who avoid military 
service by "hiding under the wings of 
influential relatives." The drive has 
probably alienated many of the regime's 
supporters. 

Enhanced conscription has only 
resulted in increased desertion. Indeed, 
desertion rates may have worsened over 
the past year. Eight years into the war, 
whole units still decamp enmasse from 
time to time. High-level officers (many 
with a record of cooperating with the 
miijahidin) continue to desert. In the 
summer, the deputy commander of 
Paktia Province, Colonel Hashmatullah, 
defected, then immediately after a press 
conference in Pakistan returned to fight 
against the regime. In October an 
Afghan pilot flew his MiG-21 to 
Pakistan. 

Paramilitary Forces. Regime 
efforts to mobilize additional support 
from the paramilitary forces have made 
some progress. These locally recruited, 
lightly armed troops, who man many 
border posts, although disinclined to bat- 
tle the mujahidin. may provide the 
regime or the Soviets with useful 
intelligence. 

Militia. The regime also has had 
some success in expanding militias. Most 
worker, party, female, or other urban 
militias have had little effect. Tribal 
militias operate under the Ministry of 
Tribes and Nationalities. This year some 
have been more willing to fight local 
mujahidin, often their clan or tribal 
rivals. The militias were increasingly 
integrated into joint operations with 
Soviet and regular army troops but prob- 
ably have little utility outside home 
areas. 

The tribes are fickle, and often 
remain on the regime payroll only for 
the winter months. In December 1985, 
the regime recruited 400 Hazaras near 
Ghazni and stationed them with an army 
brigade. The Hazaras joined the 
mujahidin and attacked the brigade, 
bringing along many deserters. The 
regime had to bring two other brigades 
in to restore order. Later in the winter, 
a group of young Afridis were trained as 
militia in the Nazian Valley, near the 



10 



Pakistan border. They turned on their 
advisers the first time they were used in 
combat and caught them in a crossfire 
with the mujahidin. The Afridis then 
escaped over the border. 

Police. Many of the DRA's fewer 
than 20,000 police have been turned into 
a light infantry force, the Sarandoy. 
They were increasingly active in the 
closing months of 1986, especially in 
joint operations with the Soviets. Under 
the control of Khalq faction chief and 
Interior Minister Sayed Mohammed 
Gulabzoi, the Sarandoy is an independ- 
ent Khalq force, led by Khalq ex-army 
officers and subject to the same pattern 
of conscription and desertion as the 
army. There were continued reports of 
Sarandoy fighting against forces loyal to 
the ruling Parcham faction. 

The Secret Police (KHAD, WAD). 

In January, KHAD (the Dari acronym 
for State Information Services) was pro- 
moted to the Ministry for State Security 
(Dari acronym: WAD), but it is still 
generally known by its former title. Like 
the Soviet KGB, the ministry also has its 
own combat units. 

The change of name and status of 
the secret police has not changed its 
methods or reputation as a brutal 
organization. Human rights groups 
amply document its use of torture. The 
ministry has a major hand in the subver- 
sion campaign against Pakistan. Yet 



even the secret police have factional i f 
problems; pro-Babrak employees are 
an excellent position to cause trouble r 
Najibullah and the Soviets. 



The Soviets in Afghanistar 

The Soviet Union evidently believes t,t 
in the long run its objectives in 
Afghanistan can be ensured by milita 
means, augmented— but not replaced 
by political tactics. Soviet military op i- 
tions are designed to destroy the 
mujahidin and to gain time and accej 
ability for the "revolutionary" regims 
Kabul. 

Reporting to the Soviet Party Co 
gress in February 1986, Gorbachev 
described Afghanistan in terms of Sc 
border security. Soviet policy is 
calculated to win domestic and intern' 
tional credibility for the Kabul regime 
and to curtail the support the mujahii 
have received from Pakistan and othel 
countries. Moscow became more 
involved than ever before in 
manipulating Afghan domestic politic: 
but achieved little success. 



E 



n 



Military Developments. In 1986, 
Soviets continued to adjust their 
numbers, weapons, and tactics to 
counter the greater capabilities of the 
mujahidin and compensate for the 
DRA's limited military effectiveness. 
Only a few thousand underutilized tro 





^ 



X-*- 






Afghan Army deserters who have joined the resistance. 




Department of State Bulle 




FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



iluring a much-publicized 
thdrawal," not as many as Gor- 
lev promised or as claimed by the 
lets (see p. 12). 

Soviet combat forces are roughly the 
in number as last year. According 
le most recent estimates, there are 
It 118,000 Soviet troops in the coun- 
supported by some 30,000 additional 
■ps in the Soviet Union. 
In 1986, the Soviets drastically 
•£ sed their military tactics in 
■innistan. In the past, large valley 
kji operations using tanks and 
iired personnel carriers and up to 
i( )00 troops were the centerpiece of 
tj- Soviet effort. Now Soviet operations 
ai smaller scale, more focused, and 
ol n employ heliborne assaults. Some 
let units were more active and 
ressive, concentrating on the border 
IS, resistance supply lines and, when 
could be found, stockpiles and 
s. Most Soviet troops, however, 
.1 ain in static defensive/security 
d loyments. The overall counterin- 
31 jency capabilities of the average 
S let conscript remain unimpressive. 

Soviet tactics seem aimed at 
rr imizing of casualties. The Soviets 
a d more firepower, from artillery and 
tl air, sometimes on short notice, often 
w 1 devastating effect. 

There were at least 3,000 casualties 
t lugh the fall of 1986, bringing the 
t il number of Soviet losses in 
/ jhanistan since 1979 to at least 
3 DOO-35,000, more than one-third of 
V Dm were killed. Some Soviet sources 

irate that casualties could be con- 
■ ei-ably higher, perhaps as many as 
- 1)1 10 killed over the course of the war, 
i this cannot be confirmed. In addi- 
t :i, the Soviets and Afghans together 
1 /e lost nearly 1,000 aircraft to the 
> jahidin since 1979, mostly helicop- 
t s. Aircraft losses increased in the lat- 
t part of the year. 

Moscow has increased the use of its 
i ecial Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz). Their 
imbers have grown over the past few 
'irs to roughly 4,500-5,000. These 
• tter trained and more experienced 
"ips deploy in smaller formations than 
ler units, are often active at night, 
li are used to ambush resistance con- 
ys. Even the Spetsnaz have, at times, 
en defeated, however, and they appear 
experience the same morale, 




*i^^-- 




Soviet heavy machineguns remain the principal air defense weapon of the resistance. 



discipline, and other problems as regular 
Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan. 
Some mujahidin groups use counter- 
ambush tactics against the Spetsnaz. 

In 1986, the Soviets invested further 
in military facilities in the country. They 
upgraded military and dual-use 
infrastructure, including road links from 
Soviet Turkestan. They continued to 
refine their order of battle and send in 
more appropriate equipment. Recent 
additions include rockets, a variety of 
artillery weapons, and the SU-25 ground 
attack "fighter. Existing equipment has 
been upgraded. Most wheeled armored 
personnel carriers were replaced with 
newer models or tracked vehicles. Self- 
propelled artillery has been substituted 
for towed artillery in many units. 

Soviet forces continue to suffer from 
low morale problems. Disease, partic- 
ularly dysentery and hepatitis, may keep 
as many troops out of action as combat 
injuries. Theft and sale of military stores 
(including fuel, weapons, medicine, and 
auto parts) are common. The black 
market is so developed that orders can 
be placed for specific items. Soviet 
soldiers often use the proceeds to pay for 
liquor and dmgs. 

Soviet Defectors and Prisoners. In 

the early years of the conflict, few 
prisoners were taken by either side. 
There is no evidence of major detention 



centers for resistance fighters, but 
important captives are probably held in 
regime prisons. The resistance is 
believed to hold some Soviet prisoners in 
secure base areas inside Afghanistan, 
but few prisoners survive long. In 
Paghman, a group of Soviets captured 
by the mujahidin have reportedly been 
offered in return for mujahidin 
prisoners. The son of a Soviet Com- 
munist Party dignitary reportedly was 
exchanged for captive mujahidin in 
1986. 

Several Soviets have defected to the 
resistance; some convert to Islam and 
even fight alongside the mujahidiii. In 
November, five Soviet soldiers serving 
with the mujahidin for a number of 
years were granted asylum in Canada. 

Soviet Political Moves. Gorbachev 
inherited the various military and 
political efforts to resolve the Afghan 
problem. There is no indication that he 
disagrees with previous policy or tactics, 
but he has tried to develop an image of 
flexibility. The UN-sponsored Geneva 
talks constitute the main focus of Soviet 
diplomacy. 

Gorbachev's two major statements 
on Afghanistan have each contained a 
dramatic gesture, however, and he 
seems intent on improving Moscow's 
public image. He told the 27th Party 
Congress in February that a schedule for 



ibruary 1987 



11 



, In his July 28 speech at Vladivostok, 
[Gorbachev announced: 

Before the end of 1986, six regiments- 
one tank regiment, two motorized rifle 
regiments, and three antiaircraft 
regiments— will be returned from 
Afghanistan to the homeland, with their 
authorized equipment and arms. These units 
will return to their areas of permanent 
deployment in the Soviet Union and in such a 
way that all those who are interested can 
easily verify this. 

^ The Soviet Defense Ministry later 
'announced that the withdrawal would be 
completed by the end of October 1986. 
Soviet military spokesmen insisted that 
the units to be withdrawn had been in 
Afghanistan for years. 

Through a variety of methods, 
including national technical means of 
verification, the United States tracked 
the different categories of units in ques- 
tion before Gorbachev's July 28 speech 
and afterward. 

Air Defense. Soviet air defense 
units play no military role against the 
mujahidin, who lack an air force. Yet 
three air defense regiments comprised 
half of the promised withdrawal 
package, illustrating the limited 
significance of the original Soviet pro- 
posal. These units were withdrawn to 
the Soviet Union as Gorbachev prom- 
ised. The SA-8 surface-to-air missile 
regiment based in Kabul was withdrawn 
from Afghanistan on October 19, The 
SA-8 air defense regiment from Shin- 
dand departed for the Soviet Union by 
October 21, The air defense regiment 
from Konduz— the last of the six 
regiments to withdraw— also returned, 
whereupon the Soviets announced the 
withdrawal was complete. 

The only tank regiment in 

Afghanistan, stationed at Shindand, was 
'severely understrength and not involved 



Soviet Withdrawal Deception 

in any significant combat. To bring the 
unit to full strength for the withdrawal 
parades, the Soviets sent additional 
tanks into Afghanistan in September 
and October, On October 15, the day 
promised by Moscow, withdrawal 
ceremonies began. Correspondents noted 
that the vehicles showed few signs of 
wear and reported that the Soviet 
soldiers claimed never to have seen 
any mujahidin. Subsequently, the 
reconstituted tank regiment returned to 
the U.S.S.R, 

Motorized rifle regiments con- 
stitute the heart of the deception effort. 
Of all the units cited by Gorbachev, only 
the motorized rifle regiments are 
capable of finding and fighting the mu- 
jahidin. Although the Soviets included 
these units in order to present a more 
credible withdrawal package, they did 
not intend to degrade the military effec- 
tiveness of their forces in Afghanistan, 

Within days of the Vladivostok 
speech, the Soviets began to move addi- 
tional units into Afghanistan through 
Termez in the east and Kushka in the 
west. These new units moved into areas 
of the Soviet bases at Shindand and Kon- 
duz normally occupied by the motorized 
rifle regiments that were garrisoned 
there but had temporarily moved to 
nearby dispersal areas. 

The newly introduced motorized rifle 
regiments were far different in equip- 
ment from the regiments they tem- 
porarily displaced. Specifically, the new 
regiments had truck-towed artillery, as 
contrasted with self-propelled artillery. 
They did not have the tracked armored 
personnel carriers, called BMPs, stand- 
ard equipment for the units they 
replaced. In addition, to transport 
troops, the newly introduced regiments 
depended principally on trucks. To 
operate effectively and protect troops 
from mujahidiyi attacks, the Soviets had 



11 



come to rely on armored personnel car- 
riers instead of trucks to move motor- 
ized rifle troops in Afghanistan. 

In September, the introduction of 
the new motorized rifle regiments w; 
complete. On October 17, the new 
motorized rifle regiment at Shindand' 
was on its way north and soon arriv© 
Kushka in the Soviet Union, About ti 
same time, the old motorized rifle re] 
ment from Shindand, with its charac 
istic tracked armored personnel carrii 
had begun to return to its garrison. 

By October 21, the newly introduce^ L 
Konduz regiment had arrived at Terme; 
in the Soviet Union, Shortly thereafter, 
the motorized rifle regiment originally 
stationed in Konduz began returning to 
base. All motorized rifle regiments in 
Afghanistan on the day of Gorbachev's 
speech remained there at the end of 
1986, 

Previous Soviet Deception. The 

Soviets have previously staged deceptiv 
withdrawals or reductions of forces. In 
1980, for example, they announced the 
withdrawal from Afghanistan of some 
troops several weeks before the Moscow 
Olympics. Numbering about 5,000, thesi 
troops turned out to be forces unsuited 
to Afghan terrain or to counterguerrilla 
operations. Even as the unwanted force 
were being withdrawn, new and more 
useful units were being introduced. 

Soviet Insecurity. The Soviets' 
unwillingness to withdraw militarily 
significant assets from Afghanistan— 
despite a commitment from Gorbachev 
himself— indicates something important, 
Contrary to their assertions for interna- 
tional audiences and back home in the 
U,S,S.R,, the Soviets apparently do not 
feel secure enough to give up any real 
fighting capabilities. 



1 



12 



Department of Slate Buile'i 




FEATURE 

Afghanistan 



SOVIET FORCE MOVEMENT ASSOCIATED 
^ WITH WITHDRAWAL SCHEME ■ 1986 




the step-by-step withdrawal of Soviet 
forces had been worked out with the 
Afghan side and would be implemented 
when a political settlement was 
achieved. This was Moscow's first high- 
level public confirmation of a withdrawal 
timetable. On July 28, Gorbachev 
announced in Vladivostok that six Soviet 
regiments would be withdrawn from 
Afghanistan by the end of the year to 
provide a "stimulus" for a settlement. 

Neither statement produced signifi- 
cant results. Following the February 
Party Congress, the timetable was 
discussed in Geneva, but Kabul insisted 
on an unrealistic period of up to 4 years 
for the withdrawal. 

The Vladivostok initiative was more 
misleading, and the token six-regiment 
withdrawal proved to be an exercise in 
deception (see box). The ruse was 
implemented even though the Soviets 
must have been aware it would be 
detected. The withdrawal occurred just 
before the November UN General 
Assembly vote on Afghanistan and did 
not convince the world of Soviet interest 
in a just solution. The vote against 
the presence of foreign forces in 
Afghanistan was approved by the same 
overwhelming number, 122, as in 1985. 

Criticism on the Home Front. 

There is little evidence of widespread 
opposition to the war in the U.S.S.R. 
Public support is mostly passive and 
unenthusiastic, but complaints about the 
war have become more frequent and 
open. Special counterpropaganda cam- 
paigns have been launched in the three 
Soviet republics bordering Afghanistan. 

To generate greater support, the 
Soviet media have expanded coverage of 
the fighting. Combat fatalities are 
reported more frequently, decorations 
for heroism played up, special features 
on men fighting in Afghanistan carried 
in their hometown newspapers, and the 
war generally portrayed with increasing 
realism. A reading of samizdat (privately 
circulated dissident manuscripts) sug- 
gests that the expanded publicity may 
have had the unintended consequence of 
making Soviet citizens more worried 
about the war. 

There are signs of increasing unhap- 
piness about the Afghan conflict among 
veterans and those who might be sent to 
Afghanistan. Draft evasion appears to 
have increased, prompting the Soviet 
authorities to criticize sharply those who 



Ibruary 1987 



13 



try to avoid military service in general 
and service in Afghanistan in particular. 
Reports of payments for exemptions or 
safer assignments have become more 
common. 

The Lithuanian Komaomfil skaya 
Pravda on October 10 carried an "Open 
Letter to Those Who Attempt To Pro- 
tect Their Sons From the Difficulties of 
Military Service." Written by an officer 
of the Baltic Military District, the article 
condemned Lithuanian youth who try to 
use forged medical records to gain defer- 
ment and parents who seek "soft" 
assignments for their sons. 



Regime Developments 

In a slow-motion process, Babrak 
Karmal was replaced in 1986 by 
Najibullah as Soviet-backed ruler of 



Afghanistan. It was the biggest change 
in the Kabul regime since 1979, when 
the Soviets brought Karmal in with their 
invading troops to head the "new phase 
of the April Revolution."' 

Soviet dissatisfaction with Karmal 
increased over the years. The Soviets 
were unhappy with his inability to heal 
the factional dispute and with his lack of 
tangible military and political gains. 
Moreover, his well-known installation by 
Soviet forces was an international liabil- 
ity. Pakistan specifically had refused to 
deal with a Karmal-led government. Gor- 
bachev did not see Karmal during the 
CPSU congress in March, a clear snub. 

In early April Karmal flew back to 
Moscow, ostensibly for medical care, and 
then dropped out of sight. In contrast, 
the Soviets warmly received Prime 
Minister Keshtmand during a state visit 
April 21-24. Karmal still was absent 



from Kabul during the April 27 anni' 
sary of the 1978 Marxist coup, and h' 
supporters there began to worry abo 
his fate. There was an unprecedentec 
series of semipublic protests by regir 
backers. A demonstration by women 
probably organized by Karmal con- 
fidante and women's organization he; 
Anahita Ratebzad. (Najibullah con- 
demned these protests as "the black 
strivings of factionalists." He later t( 
the women's group from Anahita by 
changing its name and appointing a 
woman militia member as the first hei 
of the new organization.) 

The gesture of support was for 
nought. Babrak returned quietly to 
Kabul on May 1. The following day 
Soviet troops took up key positions 
around the city. At the 18th plenum, 
Karmal "asked" to be relieved of dut' 
as General Secretary of the PDPA "f 




Najibullah— Moscow's New Man in Kabul 



» 



Mohammed Najibullah' was born in 
Kabul in 1947. the son of a banker and 
merchant and gi-andson of a Paktia 
tribal chief. As a youth, he joined his 
father who was posted with an Afghan 
liaiik in Peshawar, Pakistan. His tribal 
roots are with the Ahmedzai, part of the 
Ghilzai confederation of Pashtun tribes. 
Najibullah is married and has one 
daughter. 



Najib entered Kabul University as a 
medical student in 1964. In 1965 he 
joined the newly established PDPA and 
was recruited into Babrak Karmal's Par- 
cham faction. In 1967 he followed Kar- 
mal when the PDPA split. He was 
imprisoned in 1969 for political 
activities. Back in school in 1970, he was 
soon jailed again. He finally earned his 
inedical degree in 1975, served in the 
military for a year, and then became a 
full-time political activist. He is a capable 
speaker in Pashto, unlike Karmal, as 
well as in Dari, and was a street orator 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 

In 1977, Najibullah was named to 
the PDPA's central committee and was 
appointed to the Parcham liaison com- 
mittee with the Soviet Union. After the 
PDPA coup in 1978, he became a 
member of the Revolutionary Council. 
Dismissed later that year, he spent much 
of 1979 abroad— first as Ambassador to 
Iran and then in exile in Eastern 
Europe. 

After the Soviet invasion in 
December 1979, Najibullah returned to 
Afghanistan. In 1980 he became head of 
KHAD, the secret police, and was once 
again named to the Revolutionary Coun- 



cil. He became a full member of the 
politburo in 1981. In late 1985 he was 
promoted from KHAD to become a 
secretary to the central committee, 
reportedly with party responsibility fc 
all security forces. In May 1986, he 
became General Secretary of the PDF 
and has headed the Kabul regime sine 
then. 

Since accession to leadership of th 
PDPA, Najib has often appeared in 
public and has traveled the country, 
including war-torn Herat, and met fre 
quently with the press. Najib is close t 
the Soviets and responsive to their 
wishes. As party leader, as he was wh( 
he headed the secret police, Najib is 
responsive to his Soviet advisers. Like 
Karmal, he is usually accompanied by 
Soviet bodyguards. Many Afghans 
believe that he is a long-time KGB 
agent. 

' The General Secretary is known by the 
single name Najibullah. but he is often re- 
ferred to as Najib. Some sources indicate he 
purposely dropped the "ullah"— a reference 
to God— though now he sometimes uses it to 
suggest new-found piety. 



14 



Department of State Built i 



a 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



th reasons." The politburo then con- 
led Najibullah as party leader. 
For a time, the regime, and par- 
larly the Soviets, promoted the 
on of a collective leadership in 
lul, with Najibullah as party chief, 
mal heading the Revolutionary Coun- 
and Prime Minister Keshtmand run- 
f the government. However, there 
no question that Najibullah was in 
•ge, and over the summer regime 
lia began to refer to him as com- 
n ider in chief. 
Xajibullah at first moved cautiously 
:ii(i consolidating control over the 
\ . He was frank in criticizing party 
tiomings. In a speech to the 19th 
j1 luni in July, he complained about 
2 'e arrogance, nepotism, unwill- 
n less to go to the provinces, and 
11 -ight corruption, including embezzle- 
it. bribery, and theft of state prop- 

\t the plenum he announced a 
iiatic expansion of the central com- 
r ee, packing it with unknowns 
W amiably loyal only to him. Karmal 
b lists were purged. 

Parcham split. The ouster of Kar- 
V and removal of his followers led to 
' i-niergence of a pro-Karmal opposi- 

. Its reported activities range from a 
■i .ilown in the ministries to coopera- 
with the mujahidin. The dispute 
il be taking on an ethnic tinge, with 
rak's multiethnic urban backers 
11.4 Najibullah's largely Pashtun 
K. jwers. 
Foreign journalists brought into 
■hanistan to witness the October 
iet "withdrawal" ceremonies were 
uptly ordered out of the country after 
ing a spontaneous pro-Karmal 
lonstration. 

Instability within the regime may 
e led Moscow finally to agree to 
love Karmal. The 20th PDPA plenum 
3 suddenly convened on November 20. 
i plenum endorsed Karmal 's "request 
08 relieved of party and state posts." 
ipped of the chairmanship of the 
rolutionary Council presidium (head 
state) and a spot on the politburo, 
rmal still retained seats on the 
volutionary Council and the central 
tnmittee. Najibullah told the central 



committee that Babrak's health was 
"deteriorating." Karmal was voted a 
medal (the Order of the April Revolu- 
tion) and granted a pension. 

The plenum awarded secret police 
chief Ghulam Farid Yacubi the politburo 
seat vacated by Karmal. Khalq chief 
Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoi and Demo- 
cratic Youth Organization head Farid 
Mazdak were elected candidate 
members. 

In December, Foreign Minister Shah 
Mohammed Dost, a long-time diplomat 
and holdover from the pre-1978 regime, 
was replaced by Abdul Wakil, a cousin of 
Babrak Karmal, and most recently 
ambassador to Vietnam. Dost was made 
a minister of state and sent to the 
United Nations. At the same time, 
Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Nazar 
Mohammed was named First Deputy 
Prime Minister. His replacement, the 
current Deputy Prime Minister, Gen. 
Mohammed Rafi, served as Defense 
Minister from 1979 to 1982. Changes in 
the upper echelons of the regime were 
expected to continue. 

Khalq revival. Were Najibullah able 
to forge a unified party, through purges 
or conciliation, it would be a major step 
toward regime consolidation. The 
increased activities of the paramilitary 
police troops suggest a deal with the 
Khalqis and their leader, Interior 
Minister Gulabzoi. Tribal connections 
between Najibullah and many of his 
fellow Ghilzai tribesmen of the Khalqis 
may account for this unanticipated rap- 
prochement. On the other hand, Gulabzoi 
may be positioning the Khalqis to return 
to power, were Najibullah to falter. In 
any case, Khalq disaffection continues, 
compounded by its ideological disagree- 
ment over the "broadening" of the 
regime and the steady abandonment of 
radical Marxist policies. 

Efforts To Suggest a Broadening 
of the Regime. On December 26, 1985, 
the regime announced the appointment 
of a number of purportedly "nonparty" 
figures. Sayed Amanuddin Amin was 
named deputy prime minister; a 
technocrat, he previously had served the 
DRA as a deputy minister and chairman 
of the Economic Consultative Council. 
Other appointees also had held impor- 
tant regime positions, but they will add 
little credibility to the regime. 



In January 1986, Kabul added 79 
new members to the Revolutionary 
Council, doubling its size. Kabul claims 
that more than half of the expanded 
council are not party members. The 
presidium (chaired at the time by Kar- 
mal) also was enlarged. Haji Mohammed 
Chamkani. who had chaired the 1985 
Border Tribes Jirga. was named vice 
president of the presidium, the first time 
a nonparty figure had been elevated to 
such a high position. In April, the tribal 
Jirgn (assembly of tribal leaders) 
obtained a secretariat, and Chamkani's 
visibility increased. In November, follow- 
ing Karmal's ouster, Chamkani was 
named interim chairman of the Revolu- 
tionary Council presidium. 

The regime claims to have begun 
elections in all provinces (only party elec- 
tions have been held since the 1978 
coup), but it has been unable to conduct 
them outside secured areas. One of the 
excited victors confessed he was 
unaware he had been nominated until 
just before hearing he was elected. 

Kabul's only gain has been the induc- 
tion into the party of two leftist labor 
groups that for 7 years had been 
independent (Democratic Workers of 
Afghanistan; Revolutionary Society of 
Afghanistan's Toilers). This merger 
indicates that "national reconciliation" is 
not intended to lead to a departure from 
Kabul's Marxist and pro-Soviet 
orientation. 

Since publication in December 1985 
of a Pravda article suggesting the need 
to include real elements of the opposition 
in the broadening process, Kabul has 
often repeated its interest in national 
reconciliation. The National Fatherland 
Front (NFF, Kabul's organizational 
framework for integrating nonparty 
groups into the regime) was charged 
with coordinating the process— a sure 
indication that power sharing is not 
intended. The delay in the NFF congress 
scheduled for early November suggests a 
lack of progress on reconciliation in addi- 
tion to problems with the draft constitu- 
tion (in preparation since early in the 
year). Regime efforts to entice coopera- 
tion from the vast majority of Afghans 
have been to no avail. 



bruary 1987 



15 



The Afghan Economy 

Given wartime disruption, the economy 
of Afghanistan continues to provide a 
standard of Hving not greatly different 
from that before the 1978 Marxist coup. 
In some areas, particularly along major 
lines of communication for both sides, 
the countryside has been devastated and 
depopulated. But in many parts of the 
country, traditions of autarchy, sub- 
sistence farming, nomadic and semi- 
nomadic herding, smuggling, and infor- 
mal trade persist. The regime claims 
that material damage caused by the war 
totals 40 billion Afghanis- (up a third 
from last year's claim). 

Food. Kabul's bazaars remain amply 
stocked, although some items were in 
short supply. In general, the food supply 
in Afghanistan was adequate, although 
shortages of some items continued in 
some areas. As wheat accounts for about 
60% of the Afghan diet, most of the 
population has enough to eat. 

Abundant snowfall in the winter 
months of 1985-86 and good weather in 
the growing season produced a wheat 
crop about as large as harvests before 
the Soviet invasion. Because several 
million refugees have fled, per capita 
wheat availability is probably higher 
than before 1979. The impact of land 
abandonment in areas of heavy fighting 
has been softened by the shift from cash 
crops to wheat in regions of less intense 
fighting. 

Most land abandonment and food 
shortages occur in a 50-mile belt along 
the Pakistan frontier. Most reports of 
food shortages and most of the refugees 
come from this area, where fighting has 
been heavy. In the fall, shortages were 
reported in the northwest. 

Scarcities are aggravated by damage 
to Afghanistan's limited transportation 
infrastructure. Shortages are worst in 
the spring. Some items are periodically 
in short supply: vegetables, oils, rice, 
sugar, and tea. The supply of meat, 
however, appears adequate. Flocks have 
stabilized at preinvasion levels, probably 
because most of the 20 million sheep are 
safe in the mountains when the fighting 
is heaviest. 

The cities, especially refugee-swollen 
Kabul, are largely fed from imports. In 
recent years, about half of the DRA's 
grain imports has come from the Soviet 
Union. 



Scorched Earth? Although there are 
many credible reports of deliberate 
Soviet/regime destruction of crops, 
homes, and agricultural infrastructure, it 
appears that the Soviets do not have a 
general scorched earth policy. Total crop 
destruction has been limited and has not 
had much impact on countrywide food 
availability. 

Electricity shortages fluctuate with 
mujakidin damage to the hydroelectric 
plants. Market conditions in the pro- 
vinces are more varied. Fighting near 
the trade routes temporarily raised 
prices of items that have to be brought 
in from outside. 

DRA Economic Policies. A major 
component of the regime's initiative to 
"broaden the social base" was an effort 
to involve the private sector. In January, 
when Kabul announced a planned doub- 
ling of the state share of retail trade, an 
Economic Consultative Council was set 
up to improve the climate for "national 
traders and entrepreneurs." Its chair- 
man, Sayed Amanuddin Amin, was 
named a deputy prime minister. In the 
summer, Kabul offered to back investors 
with low interest loans. Traders have 
fared rather well; their margins have 
been adequate to cover spiraling 
transport costs as well as the obligatory 
payoffs to both sides. 

The private sector grew apprehen- 
sive during the summer as Najibullah 
increasingly criticized Commerce 
Minister Jallalar, a nonparty civil serv- 
ant long regarded as guardian of its 
interests. Businessmen worried that 
their conscription exemptions and 
deferments would be eliminated. 

In January, after extensive consulta- 
tion with the Soviets, Prime Minister 
Keshtmand reported the successful com- 
pletion of a Five-Year Plan (1981-86). 
He also previewed the next Five-Year 
Plan (1986-1991), which commenced in 
March, the beginning of the Afghan 
year. The large increase in natural gas 
output may be due to a new find, hinted 
at by Keshtmand in a March speech. 

Soviet Economic Relations With 
the DRA. In 1985, Moscow pledged $320 
million in new economic aid— the second 
largest commitment since 1979. The new 
agreements provided $120 million in 



DRA Five-Year Plans 




Growth in Selected Sectors 




1981-86 


Increase in GNP 


11% 


Industry 


NA 


Agriculture 


NA 


Natural gas extraction 


11% 


Government worker 




housing 


200% 


State share of retail 




trade 


22% 


State investment 


67 billion 




Afs. 



114.53 



Source; Radio Kubut. .January 1986, 



food and consumer goods grants for 
1985 delivery, and $200 million in or 
for projects in Afghanistan's new Fi" 
Year Plan. The latter include the 
Sarowbi II hydropower plant, tunnel 
the Hairatan-Kabul highway and Sal 
Pass road, technical schools, and ext 
slve road construction and modernizi 
tion. Such projects help support Sov 
political and military efforts in 
Afghanistan. 

Soviet aid deliveries reached $22 
million in 1985 under old and new 
agreements, bringing deliveries sinci« 
invasion to $1.6 billion. According to] 
Afghan Government, at least 5,000 
Soviet economic technicians were 
employed in Afghanistan in 1985, wc 
ing on 63 projects. Under an agreeni 
signed on March 20, 1986, Soviet 
assistance would increase from 70% 
80% of all foreign aid. The aid progr; i 
includes the construction of 840 apar 
ments in Microrayon, a Kabul neighb - 
hood where many Soviet advisers livi 

Soviet-Afghan trade has tripled s ce 
the invasion. Trade hovered around t 
$1 billion mark in 1985. The Soviets 1 1- 
tinued to take Afghan natural gas in 
exchange for essential commodities, 
machinery, and equipment. Some 65" if 
Afghanistan's total trade is now withie 
Soviet Union. A trade protocol signet n , 
Moscow on February 13 provided for i 
additional 30% increase in Soviet- 
Afghan trade during new Five-Year 
Plan. 






16 



Department of State Bui in 



c/ 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



•jicJal Developments 

Eiication 

line efforts to build a loyal following 
Uijh indoctrination of the population 
iinued without evident success. Kabul 
'lis to have reached more than a 
^•n adult Afghans through its 
ricy programs and to have increased 
Hilattendance by 15%, to 685,000. 
lie Minister Keshtmand claimed that 
■ogram to teach minority languages 
ey divisive tactic) reached 6,000 
lents in 40 schools. This is probably a 
li indication of the regime's limited 
h outside the capital. 
Bringing Afghans, including young 
li'en, to study in the U.S.S.R. is an 
iTtant element of the "Sovietization" 
'I't. About 6,000 Afghans studied in 
Soviet Union in 1986. An Afghan- 
let protocol signed this summer pro- 
■d for 1,800 secondary and university 
J lents to go to the U.S.S.R. in the 
1 6-87 school year. This represents 
a ut a 50% increase over 1985-86. 
Study in the U.S.S.R. is unpopular 
t(i the restrictions on student move- 
it inside the Soviet Union and on the 
riculum and to the increased prospect 
leing drafted on return. Afghan 
dents in the Soviet Union, even in 
itral Asia, report being harassed by 
il people. 

alth 



I ? length of the conflict and the disrup- 

I I of Afghanistan's rudimentary health 
i '•astructui-e have contributed to an 

£ )arent increase in the incidence of 
cease. Most doctors have fled. Soviet 
I /sicians in urban areas or foreign 
\ unteers in resistance-controlled areas 
( 1 only meet a fraction of the demand 
t medical care. The wounded take up 
' ny of the existing hospital beds and 
< ler medical resources. Sanitation, 
i»'er adequate, has become nonexistent 
imany areas. Endemic hepatitis 
'igues residents and Soviet soldiers 
■■ ke. Tuberculosis, which through 
vernment vaccination efforts had been 
■tually eliminated, is reportedly on the 



Status of Women 

Women traditionally were responsible 
for maintaining Afghan culture. Their 
role has been magnified under conditions 
of wartime dislocation, especially in the 
refugee camps. Women have a major 
voice in the decision to leave the coun- 
try. But most are reluctant to leave 
Afghanistan and give up their traditions. 

The Kabul regime claims to promote 
the status of women, often featuring 
them in propaganda. The position of 
most has not changed much, although 
some women (for example, Karmal's 
wife, Mahbooba, and Anahita Ratebzad) 
reached positions of influence under 
Karmal. Women's issues apparently 
have been downplayed since the acces- 
sion of Najibullah. The regime has 
formed and armed women's militia units, 
but participation has not been 
widespread. 

Women's role in traditional Afghan 
society has been reflected in their 
limited participation in the resistance. 
Women have not taken a combat role, 
but in urban areas they have been active 
as spies and messengers for the 
mujahidin. 

Religion 

Under Najibullah, the atheist People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan has 
tried harder to appear pro-Islam, for 
"we know our people are religious." The 
regime is now fronted by an acting chief 
of state, Haji Mohammed Chamkani, 
who uses the Mecca pilgrimage honorific 
as a first name. 

The Kabul Marxists' belated recogni- 
tion that they are incapable of 
eradicating the Islamic faith has increas- 
ingly led them to endorse religious sym- 
bols and institutions. The attendance of 
three top leaders— Karmal, Keshtmand, 
and Najibullah— at Eid-nl Adha (Feast of 
Sacrifice) prayers in Kabul's central 
mosque, August 15, was emphasized in 
the regime media. 

The government praises "patriotic 
clergy" (those who will accept Marxist 
rule) and has stepped up efforts' to win 
over religious leaders. Currently, the 
regime claims more than 10,000 mullahs 
on its payroll, in some 5,000 mosques. 
The "patriotic clergy" do not enjoy 
popular respect and are often attacked 
by the resistance. 



Kabul publicizes its allocations to 
religious institutions, without mention- 
ing that these are paid out of the institu- 
tions' endowments, which have been 
seized by the state under various 
"reform" measures. Patronage is used 
to foster control. In .lune, Najibullah 
asked the National Fatherland F'ront to 
"enhance its role in the appointment and 
removal of imams." 

The Islamic Affairs Department has 
been elevated to a ministry; the High 
Council of Ulema (religious scholars) 
oversees religious activities and prop- 
erty. Religious education is more directly 
controlled. Priva-te rnadratmahf: (religious 
schools) were closed down in 1978 and 
replaced by state-run institutions. 

Illegal Drugs 

Afghanistan continues to be a major pro- 
ducer of opium and hashish. The 1985 
poppy harvest yielded an estimated 
400-500 metric tons; preliminary reports 
suggest that the 1986 crop will be con- 
siderably larger. In recent years, Afghan 
traffickers have acquired the capability 
to refine opium into heroin. Much of 
Afghanistan's opium and nearly all of its 
heroin are exported to or through 
Pakistan and Iran. 

Lack of progress against drug pro- 
duction and trafficking will continue 
until political and military stability 
returns to Afghanistan. All major 
resistance organizations oppose narcotic 
production, trafficking, and abuse, and 
most individual guerrillas adhere to this 
policy. 

There are increasing indications that 
drugs from Afghanistan, some brought 
by returning troops, are turning up in 
the Soviet Union, aggravating domestic 
drug problems. The Soviet Union also is 
apparently being used as a transship- 
ment route for Afghan drugs to the 
West. In June, Dutch police seized 485 
pounds of pure heroin hidden in con- 
tainers of Afghan raisins being unloaded 
from a Soviet freighter in Rotterdam. 

Human Rights 

As documented by reputable interna- 
tional organizations, e.g., Helsinki 
Watch, Amnesty International, and the 
UN Human Rights Commission, human 
rights violations in Afghanistan continue 



ibruary 1987 



17 



to be perpetrated by Soviet and regime 
forces on a massive scale. ^ Through 
reprisal attacks, indiscriminate air and 
artillery bombardments, use of antiper- 
sonnel mines and booby-trapped toys, 
arbitrary killings, and torture, the 
Soviets and the Kabul regime have 
sought to intimidate the Afghan people 
into submission or fleeing the country. 
In a February 1986 report to the UN 
Human Rights Commission in Geneva, 
the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan 
concluded that "continuation of the 
military solution in Afghanistan will lead 
to a situation approaching genocide." 

Over one-third of Afghanistan's 
prewar population of 15 million has been 
violently displaced. Over 1 million 
Afghans have been driven into urban 
areas, such as Kabul, whose population 
has more than doubled since the inva- 
sion. An estimated 4 million Afghans 
have fled abroad, to become the world's 
largest refugee population. Human 
rights groups have estimated that more 
than 600,000 Afghans have been killed. 
Under the Kabul regime, arbitrary 
arrests, detention without trial, execu- 
tion of political opponents, and the prac- 
tice of torture are commonplace. Former 
prisoners told Amnesty International 
that Soviet advisers had been present at 
some torture sessions. 

For the second year in a row. the 
UN General Assembly adopted a resolu- 
tion on the human rights situation in 
Afghanistan by a vote of 89 in favor, 24 
opposed, and 36 abstentions, an 
improvement over the 1985 vote. The 
resolution was based on the findings of 
Professor Felix Ermacora, the UN 
Human Rights Commission Special 
Rapporteur. 



Refugees 

Afghans in Pakistan are the single 
largest group of refugees in the world. 
The Government of Pakistan reports 
registration of more than 2.8 million 
Afghans; numbers continue to grow, 
although at a slower pace than before. 
The refugees are sheltered in more than 
300 camps, primarily in the rural areas 
of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Prov- 
ince and Baluchistan. Relief assistance, 
including food, shelter, clothing, and 
medicine, is provided by the interna- 
tional community, primarily through the 



UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the World Food Program. 

Recently arrived refugees appear to 
be in worse shape than their predeces- 
sors and are more likely to have been 
directly touched by the fighting. They 
bring with them fewer possessions, or 
income-generating assets such as 
livestock, thereby placing an additional 
burden on relief efforts in Pakistan. 

Despite considerable economic and 
political costs, the Government and 
people of Pakistan have extended an 
impressive welcome to the Afghans. The 



Government of Pakistan estimates th^ 
the annual relief effort costs some $36 
million, of which it bears nearly half tl 
cost, chiefly expenditures for program 
administration and transportation of 
relief commodities. 

In addition to the financial burden 
caring for the Afghans, the citizens of 
Pakistan have absorbed costs far more 
difficult to calculate. Pakistan's inland 
transportation system moves several 
hundred thousand tons of relief 
materials each year. Land prices have 
risen as a result of the refugees' 




Women and children fetch water from one of the pumps financed bv UNHCR. 



18 



Department of State Bullet 



(7 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



jsence. and in an economy already 
jeriencing high unemployment, 
■hans sometimes compete with 
kistanis for scarce jobs. The refugees 
^i their livestock have strained scarce 
V ter supplies and denuded forestlands 
i already poor areas near the frontier. 
Refugee-Pakistani relations have 
ii surprisingly good, with few violent 
1 idents, largely due to the strong 
c tural and social ties between the 
i ligenous population and the 
r >vcomers. Since early 1986, however, 
Siet/DRA-backed attempts to exploit 
Ikistani concern over the refugees' 
I 'sence have increased. 

In a further effort to minimize social 
I isions and address the longer term 
■ 'lis of a population with no immediate 
I ispect of returning home, many relief 
ranizations, with the concurrence of 
I '.iivernment of Pakistan, have 
i landed their programming to include 
1 ijects that enhance refugee 
s f-reliance. 

Between 1983 and 1986, the World 
1 nk, in conjunction with the UNHCR, 
( nmitted $20 million for forestation, 
i igation, and road-building projects 
1 it employ refugee and local labor in 
1 3airing environmental damage caused 
1 the refugees. This project has 
1 'ently been extended for 3 years. 

The U.S. Government, the largest 
( itributor to the relief effort, pledged 
1 arly $50 million for Afghan assistance 
i fiscal year 1986, including $25 million 

iirth of commodities through the World 
iod Program. To date, total U.S. con- 
butions for Afghan refugee assistance 
ceed $480 million. Other major con- 
butors are Japan, Canada, Australia, 
.udi Arabia, and a number of West 
iropean nations. 

The second largest concentration of 
■ghan refugees is in Iran. The Iranian 
)vernment estimates that up to 1.9 
iUion Afghans are within its borders, 
.If of them located in the sparsely 
ipulated eastern provinces of Khorasan 
id Sistan-Baluchistan. Many Afghans 
Iran have successfully integrated into 
e local population. However, the 
wernment does pi'ovide some assist- 
ice through its Council for Afghan 
efugees, part of the Iranian Ministry of 
le Interior. In addition to providing 
juipment for an extensive network of 
jception and transit centers, UNHCR is 



developing programs to train refugees in 
the skills they require to become self- 
sufficient. The United States is not a 
contributor to the UNHCR effort in 
Iran. 



Regional Environment 

Pakistan 

During 1986, the war spilled over into 
Pakistan much more frequently than in 
previous years. The all-out effort by the 
Soviets to knock out mujahidin 
strongholds in Afghanistan near the 
Pakistan border led to a dramatic rise in 
border violations. By late November, air 
violations numbered more than 700 
(compared to more than 200 in 1985) and 
artillery shellings more than 150 (com- 
pared to about 25 in 1985). Although 
most of the air violations were 
overflights, some were concentrated 
attacks on targets just inside Pakistan. 
Pakistan reports the loss of more than 
100 civilians killed and 200 wounded in 
these attacks, about two-thirds from 
shelling. 

In mid-May, the Pakistani Govern- 
ment announced that an intruding 
ground attack aircraft had been shot 
down by a Pakistani F-16 and had 
crashed inside Pakistan. 

This year, Soviet/DRA agents have 
been actively engaged in a campaign of 
subversion inside Pakistan to turn 
Pakistani opinion against the govern- 
ment's policy of support for the Afghan 
refugees. Beginning with the January 
bombing of the Pakistan International 
Airlines office in Peshawar, subsequent 
terrorist acts in the Peshawar Area have 
included train derailments and bombings 
in restaurants and at a well-known hotel. 

Similar incidents have occurred 
elsewhere in the North-West Frontier 
Province and in Baluchistan. The Soviets 
have spent large sums of money trying 
to recruit Pakistani tribesmen to stir up 
trouble inside Pakistan and to aid the 
Kabul regime against the resistance. 

Pakistanis are understandably con- 
cerned about acts of sabotage and about 
the long-term impact of the war. Never- 
theless, Pakistanis continue to show 
generous support for the Afghans. 



Iran 

Iran continues to call for the speedy and 
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet 
troops and to condemn Soviet efforts to 
control Afghanistan, despite improved 
relations with the U.S.S.R. Iranian 
media strongly publicized Tehran's sup- 
port for the resistance during the visit to 
Tehran of Soviet First Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kornienko, the highest level 
Soviet visit since the revolution. 

Iranian relations with Afghanistan 
deteriorated further in 1986, in tandem 
with DRA and Soviet allegations of 
increased Iranian support for the 
resistance. Early in the year, a group of 
Iranian religious leaders returned from 
several months in central Afghanistan. 
They had been sent by Kliomeini's 
designated successor, Ayatollah Mon- 
tazari, who has taken an active interest 
in the Afghan cause. Soviet media con- 
demned the mission. 

Complaints of border violations came 
from both sides during the course of the 
year. In March, Kabul charged Iran with 
causing a water shortage in the Afghan 
cities of the Helmand Valley, threaten- 
ing to reopen a long-dormant dispute. 

Iranian opposition groups— Tudeh 
and Fedayeen-e Khalq— continue to be 
welcome in Kabul. In a congratulatory 
message to Najibullah on his accession in 
May, Tudeh first secretary Khaveri 
called for strengthening ties between his 
party and the PDPA. 

India 

Prime Minister Gandhi reiterated India's 
interest in a political solution to the 
Afghan problem. India continued to call 
for an end to foreign intervention and 
interference in Afghanistan. India main- 
tained good relations with the Kabul 
government and a modest program of 
assistance to the DRA. In 1986, India 
once again abstained on the UN General 
Assembly resolution condemning the 
presence of foreign forces in 
Afghanistan. 



China 

China cites the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan as a major obstacle to 
improving relations with the U.S.S.R. 
On the sixth anniversary of the Soviet 
invasion in December 1985, Chinese 



Sbruary 1987 



19 



media noted that the invasion "sabo- 
taged peace and stability" in the area 
and posed a threat to China's security. 
China viewed Gorbachev's Vladivostok 
withdrawal proposal with "interest," but 
when the offer proved to be a sham, the 
Chinese engaged in sharp public 
polemics with the U.S.S.R. and con- 
demned Moscow's "facade of sincerity." 



International Concern 

The plight of the Afghan people has not 
escaped the world's attention. Countries 
around the globe took special notice of 
the sixth anniversary of the Soviet inva- 
sion in December 1985. The United 
States recognized Afghanistan Day, 
March 21, with a presidential 
proclamation. 

Afghanistan was one of the most 
controversial issues at the congress of 
the World Peace Council, the most pro- 
minent Soviet international front group. 
At the congress, held in Copenhagen in 
October, Danish Radical Party president 
Niels Helveg Pedersen denounced the 
"inhuman and brutal war being waged 
by the Soviets in Afghanistan." The con- 
ference concluded in uproar after 40 
demonstrators, many of them Afghan 
refugees, were ejected. 

In April, a representative of the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) visited Kabul, the first 
visit since contacts were broken in 1982 
after Kabul's refusal to allow the ICRC 
to visit prisoners held by the regime. 
Although the DRA agreed in principle to 
the reestablishment of an ICRC presence 
in Kabul, the issue of prisoner access has 
remained a major stumbling block. 

International media interest con- 
tinued to report on the plight of the 
Afghan people and their heroic resist- 
ance. Press coverage of resistance 
operations increased, despite the hazards 
of traveling inside Afghanistan and 
Soviet threats against journalists. 

The United States Information 
Agency has funded a program to 
improve the ability of Afghans to tell 
their own story of the occupation and 
resistance, particularly through video. 



In 1986, the Kabul regime allowed 
increased access for foreign journalists, 
including those from the West. A group 
of reporters was flown in from Moscow 
in January, during the customary winter 
lull, and to witness Soviet "withdrawal" 
ceremonies in October. Journalists, 
however, are given little scope to probe 
beyond regime interviews or guided 
tours. 

The Department of State has issued 
a warning against travel by U.S. citizens 
in Afghanistan because of the war and 
the U.S. Government's inability, in a 
hostile war zone, to provide consular 
protection for American citizens who 
may be in distress. 

UN Negotiations. Since January 
1980, the UN General Assembly has 
voted eight times, by overwhelming 
margins, for a resolution calling for the 
complete withdrawal of foreign forces 
from Afghanistan; the restoration of 
Afghanistan's independent and non- 
aligned status; Afghan self-deter- 
mination; and the creation of conditions 
that would enable the refugees to return 
home with safety and honor. The resolu- 
tion, introduced as in the past by 
Pakistan and cosponsored by 47 coun- 
tries, passed again on November 5, 1986, 
by a vote of 122 to 20, with 11 absten- 
tions, equaling last year's record positive 
vote. 

UN attempts to negotiate a settle- 
ment date from a November 1980 man- 
date of the General Assembly. Negotia- 
tions are led by UN Under Secretary 
General for Special Political Affairs 
Diego Cordovez, the Secretary General's 
personal representative. Talks have been 
held periodically since 1982 in Geneva. 
Cordovez shuttles between delegations 
from Pakistan and Afghanistan, offi- 
cially informing Iran of the discussions 
while unofficially informing the Soviets. 
Two sessions of indirect talks were held 
in Geneva in 1986. The first, convened in 
May, lasted an unprecedented 3 weeks. 
The negotiations recommenced July 30 
and ran through early August. In addi- 
tion, Cordovez shuttled between 
Islamabad and Kabul in March and again 
in November; during the November shut- 
tle, he also visited Tehran. 



^S' 



k 
i 



At the May session, the discussion 
focused on a timetable for Soviet trooi 
withdrawal and on implementation 
issues. The DRA dropped its prior 
refusal to discuss a timetable without 
direct negotiations with Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, the parties remain far 
apart on this central issue. Pakistani 
Prime Minister Junejo on a June visit 
Washington revealed that the Soviet- 
DRA side had offered a Soviet troop 
withdrawal timetable covering a 4-yea 
period, which Pakistan rejected. He 
indicated that a 3- or 4-month period 
would be sufficient. 

The UN Secretary General has 
reported that the four instruments tha 
would comprise the agreement are "vi 
tually complete." The text is largely 
settled on three of four proposed 
instruments, the first dealing with 
mutual noninterference in Afghanistan 
affairs, the second encompassing interii 
national guarantees, and the third 
governing the voluntary return of the 
refugees. 

The fourth agreement, which is to 
address the key issue of a Soviet troop; 
withdrawal and the interrelationship 
between that document and the other 
three, is unfinished. The principal 
outstanding issue remains an agreemen 
on a realistic timetable for the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops. 

Despite hopes generated at variouf 
points in the negotiations, the sides are- 
far apart. The Soviet Union has not 
substantially altered its original positio? 
justifying its presence in Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, all sides are committed t! 
continuing the talks. 



U.S. Policy 

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan aims at 
achieving a negotiated political settle- 
ment, predicated on the prompt and 
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops 
and consistent with eight UN resolutiori 
on Afghanistan. The United States sup^ 
ports UN-sponsored efforts to achieve s 
settlement and has expressed in writing 
its willingness to lend its political sup- 
port to a comprehensive and balanced 



20 



Department of State Bullei 



:>enient that protects the legitimate 
: irity interests of all parties. Absent 
^1 a settlement, the United States is 
emitted to support the Afghan cause 
mull all appropriate means. 

Humanitarian Assistance. The 

■ ted States has responded to the 

ht of the Afghan people by 
- lijishing a long-term humanitarian 

iiionram for war-affected Afghans. 

[inigram emphasizes direct 

-taiice to the Afghan resistance 
, nee and is intended to provide those 
6 aining in Afghanistan with the 
(li.ns to sustain themselves. In fiscal 
■r 1986, Congress appropriated $15 
n ion in economic support funds for 
\i -affected Afghans. In fiscal year 
i 7, Congress earmarked an additional 
Iv, million for the program. 
\,ainistered by the U.S. Agency for 
r rnational Development, the program 
n ides three new projects in health, 
!( :ation, and commodity support. 



U.S. and European private voluntary 
organizations help implement the pro- 
gram. Support is being provided from 
the United States, France, Belgium, 
West Germany, Sweden, United King- 
dom, and Austria. In 198ti, total support 
for voluntary agencies amounted to $10 
million; an additional $10 million is 
planned for 1987. 

Educational assistance, implemented 
through the alliance education commit- 
tee, will provide direct support (text- 
books, supplies, curriculum development, 
teacher training, and stipends) to 
primary education in free areas of 
Afghanistan. The health project envi- 
sions a massive training program of first 
aid for emergency care, mobile health 
clinics and hospitals for urgent care, a 
medical evacuation system, and a supply 
system. Basic humanitarian goods, such 
as food, agricultural commodities, 
medical supplies, clothing, shelter, and 
animals also will be furnished. In addi- 
tion, under PL-480, a Title II program 
consisting of wheat and vegetable oil 



lT" 



FEATURE 

Afghanistan 



valued at about $15 million was 
approved in 1986 for war-affected 
Afghans. 

Congress has separately authorized 
$10 million for transporting human- 
itarian commodities to war-affected 
Afghans; the authority also provides 
funds to transport Afghan patients 
to the United States for medical 
treatment. 



■For background, see Special Reports 7'.t. 
86, 91. 106, 112. 118. 120, 135, and 139. 

' 2The U.S. dollar is worth .55 Afghanis at 
the official rate. In the Kabul money market, 
one of the freest exchanges in the world, it 
was 139 Afs/dollar in January, and in 
November about 152 Afs/dollar. 

■^Siliiiilioii ofhuman nghh hi 
Afghanhtiin. United Nations General 
Assembly Document A/41/778, 31 October 
1986. Amnesty International. AfyhnniMaii: 
Torture ofPolitirnl Pri^timcrn. November 
1986. See also, Helsinki Watch Committee, 
Afghan Children: The Other Wtir. December 
1986.H 



oruary 1987 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



Iran and U.S. Policy 



Following are the statement by 
Secretary Shultz before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
question-and-answer session with some 
members of the committee on December 8, 
1986 J 

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT^ 

This is the first time in my 10 years of 
service as a Cabinet officer that I have 
been asked to take an oath before Con- 
gress. I do so in good spirit, fully 
recognizing your authority to require an 
oath and your duty to ensure that the 
record of these proceedings is as full and 
true as possible. Taking an oath is 
something American citizens do every 
day. I regard this act as fulfilling my 
duty as a citizen to respect our laws and 
institutions. 

I want you to know, however, that 
when I was sworn in as Secretary of 
State, I took an oath "to support and 
defend the Constitution of the United 
States." I have always considered that 
solemn promise to impose the permanent 
duty upon me as Secretary of State 
always to tell the truth to the President, 
the Congress, the courts, and, most 
importantly, the American people. In 
addition to being a citizen, I am, at the 
moment, a public servant. If a public 
servant is not prepared to tell the truth, 
he has no business being a public serv- 
ant, oath or no oath. It is as simple as that. 

I am grateful for the committee's 
understanding that I must depart at 
10:30 in order to meet with President 
Mobutu of Zaire, after which I will leave 
early this afternoon for Great Britain 
and Belgium for meetings with NATO 
foreign ministers. 

The hearings you are holding come 
at a crucial point for the nation. The 
President has recognized that serious 
problems have been created in our con- 
duct of foreign affairs by the manner in 
which some individuals implemented our 
effort to establish better contacts with 
Iran and by the diversion of funds from 
arms sales to the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance. He has taken the lead in rec- 
tifying any problems that may exist. 

• The President has appointed 
Frank Carlucci, a respected foreign 
policy professional of exceptionally broad 
experience and the highest integrity, to 
revitalize and lead the National Security 
Council. 

• He has instituted a senior-level 
Special Review Board under the distin- 
guished leadership of John Tower to 
review the proper role of the National 



22 



Security Council and the functioning of 
its staff. 

• He has recommended the appoint- 
ment of an independent counsel to inves- 
tigate the possiblity of any wrongdoing 
regarding the Iran project. 

• He has welcomed a unified con- 
gressional approach to its oversight role 
in these matters and has promised full 
cooperation with its inquiries. 

• He has ordered me to implement 
an interagency study of our relations 
with Iran, and that process is underway 
with the experienced leadership of 
Under Secretary [for Political Affairs 
Michael H.] Armacost. 

• And he has instructed his Cabinet 
officers to share with the Congress and 
the American people all that they knew 
about this recent initiative toward 
Iran— which is why I'm here with you 
this morning. 

As you know, I am ready to tell you 
everything I knew at the time about our 
sales of arms to Iran. The President has 
authorized the release of this informa- 
tion to Congress. I am not free, 
however, to violate the laws of the 
United States in the process. Much of 
the material that I knew at the time is 
still classified. I realize that some of this 
material has become public. 

But this does not permit me to con- 
firm as fact some matters that have, up 
to now, been published without official 
authority. Furthermore, while it may 
seem difficult to believe, some of what I 
am ready to tell you is still not publicly 
known. Finally, in addition to the prob- 
lem of classified material, to tell you all 
that I know in public session could well 
interfere with ongoing criminal investi- 
gations, would improperly reveal intel- 
ligence sources and methods, and would 
expose privileged communications. 

All this pains me greatly. I have 
sworn to tell the full truth, and I am 
prepared to do so in a manner consistent 
with my legal and ethical respon- 
sibilities. This can best be done in a 
closed session where all my obligations 
can faithfully be fulfilled. I want to put 
to rest now any doubt as to my readiness 
to respond to questions about my prior 
knowledge and activity. I have already 
made all the information at my disposal 
available to the FBI. I have been inter- 
viewed by the Department of Justice. I 
am ready in this open session to bring 
forward all the materials I properly can. 
And, at whatever appropriate time you 
choose, I am prepared to make a state- 
ment and to answer questions in closed 
session giving classified details of my 
knowledge and activities. 



n 



Having said this, I fully believe yo- 
have made the right decision by calling 
for an initial open session and stating 
that this particular hearing might con^ pP 
centrate on looking forward. I warmly f} 
endorse this purpose. We need very 
much to look forward. And I will do so 
this testimony. 

I will start by looking at our futun 
relations in the Persian Gulf area. Tha 
subject is of crucial importance to the 
nation, and it easily warrants the limit 
time we have this morning. So, let me 
turn to it, with the hope of leaving tim 
for your comments and questions. 

The Importance of Iran 
and the Persian Gulf 

The Persian Gulf is important to the 
United States— and for many of our k6 
friends and allies as well. A quarter of 
the free world's oil flows through the 
Persian Gulf, and an even higher 
percentage sustains the economies of ( 
allies in Europe and Japan. It is vital 
that Western access to that oil con- 
tinues. The region is a strategic focal 
point— one in which the Soviet Union Y 
long sought to expand its presence am 
control. We have an important stake iii 
denying to them such an expansion. 

We have major political interests 
with individual gulf states, both in thein 
own right and because of their influen< 
on events in the Middle East, Afghan- 
istan, and elsewhere. Therefore, we 
want the states of the gulf to enjoy a 
peace and political stability free from 
threats of Soviet intimidation, externa* 
aggression, or internal subversion. W& 
wish to sustain productive relations wi 
these states of the region, in part so th» 
the supply of oil to the West can con 
tinue unabated. 

But our strategic, economic, and 
political interests in the gulf have been 
and continue to be challenged from a 
number of quarters— by war and politic 
instability in the region, by the Soviet 
Union's brutal occupation of Afghan- 
istan and persistent efforts to expand i 
influence, and by terrorism. And Iran b 
come to be a most important element ii 
all of these considerations. 

The Iran-Iraq war, now in its 
seventh year, shows all too clearly howi 
continuation of regional conflict and 
instability can threaten not only our 
interests but those of many states 
friendly to us as well. And for that 
reason, the United States has consist- 
ently worked for an early end to that 
conflict, under terms which provide for 
the territorial integrity and independ- 
ence of both belligerents. 

In meeting the threat of escalating 
terrorism, we must also deal with the 



Department of State Bulled 



THE SECRETARY 



Ifiii of Iran. The current Iranian 
■tnment continues to believe that 
■rism is a legitimate instrument of 
isn policy. It has been prepared to 

> y that instrument when and where 
tod its needs. It is in our interest to 

. hat it stops. 

\s the President has said, he 
iiized the transfer of some arms to 
iM send a signal that the United 

> was prepared to replace the 
-ity between us with a new rela- 

liip. That signal has been sent. No 
:■ r arms shipment will be made to 
\>y the United States, and we will 
t all our influence to discourage 
- sales to Iran by others. The reason 
at it is Iran which refuses to end the 
1 w ar, and it is the capability of Iran 
aitinue the war that we must 
i I'ss. Iran cannot expect a better 

idiiship with us until it acts to end 
I A ai', ceases its support for terrorism, 
i-i'S its influence with those who 
iiir hostages to achieve their 
n :lum. 
Dur dealings with Iran are shaped by 
: -ategic dilemma. We have a 
r-thern" concern— to keep Iran free 
'\ let influence— and a "southern" 
(Til- to keep Iran from dominating 
nlf neighbors. Because Iran con- 
11 es to resist Soviet influence but 
h atens the gulf, our near-term prior- 
i] nust be to reassure gulf Arab states 
i jr support and stand fast on our anti- 
e orism and arms embargo policies. 
i nwhile, we must use alternative 
\ inels to bolster Iranian resistance to 
ii let influence and focus on shared 
1 rests such as Afghanistan. Similarly, 
t lility in the gulf will affect our efforts 
[ ncourage meaningful movement in 
1 peace process between Israel and its 
I b neighbors. 

) . Policy Toward Iran 

■refore, we have a legitimate interest 
r 'etter relations with Iran, and the 
' sident determined last year that we 
I uld respond to approaches from 

nents within Iran to see whether 
I aian leaders were prepared to shift 
lir policies in a more positive direc- 
ii. Last Saturday, the President 
'.erated our purposes: "to end the war 
I he Middle East, to prevent Soviet 
!)ansionism, to halt terrorism, and to 
:P gain release of American hostages." 
I illy support every one of these pur- 
ees. I am sure that you and this com- 
'ttee likewise support them. 

The problems created by recent 
'nts were not caused by these pur- 
ses but by the way they were imple- 
nted in this one instance and by cer- 
n unauthorized actions of officials on 



whom the President had relied to imple- 
ment his policy. Facts being revealed 
have made clear, as the President has 
forthrightly stated, "that the execution 
of these policies was flawed and 
mistakes were made." 

The policies the President has reaf- 
firmed are his own. He has made clear 
that it was neither his intent nor his 
policy to trade weapons for hostages, 
nor to undercut our stand against ter- 
rorism. I fully support him and his 
policies. As a nation, we must remain 
opposed to terrorism in every form. All 
terrorism, whether directed against 
Americans or others, is unacceptable and 
must be eliminated. That principle is 
central to our efforts to encourage 
broader international cooperation 
against state-sponsored terrorism. 

Therefore, we must continue to 
speak out and take action against all acts 
of terrorism. However much we share 
the anguish of the families involved, we 
must oppose concessions or ransom for 
the release of hostages. To do otherwise 
would encourage the taking of additional 
hostages and would raise the value in the 
eyes of the hostage-takers of those 
already held. And we must continue to 
strengthen our efforts with friends and 
allies in such areas as intelligence 
exchange and security measures to 
thwart terrorism and its attendant 
violence and to isolate states which 
sponsor and support terrorism. 

With respect to Iran, the President 
has noted: "The Iranian revolution is a 
fact of history, but between American 
and Iranian basic national interests 
there need be no permanent conflict." 
He has also reaffirmed that it was not 
his intent to do business with the 
Khomeini regime as long as its policies 
threaten the peace and stability of the 
region. Here again, I fully agree. 

We must continue to encourage an 
end to regional hostilities and peaceful 
relations between all of the gulf states. 
We seek a negotiated resolution of the 
Iran-Iraq war that respects the sov- 
ereignty and territorial integrity of all 
nations in the region. 

In working for the stability of the 
gulf, we will continue to support the 
cooperative efforts of moderate and 
friendly states of the region to ensure 
their own security and stability. We will 
oppose Soviet encroachment in the 
region and seek an early end to its occu- 
pation of Afghanistan. 

Recent Events in a Historical 
Perspective 

Finally, we must put recent events into 
proper historical perspective. The 



President has been here for 6 years. 
When he took over, the nation was 
neither as secure nor as confident as it 
should have been. 

Where do we stand after 6 years of 
President Reagan's leadership in foreign 
affairs? Working with Congress and with 
the broad support of the American peo- 
ple. President Reagan's policies have 
brought us to the threshold of a new and 
remarkably different world— a world in 
which America's interests, America's 
pride, and America's ideals are 
flourishing. 

What is this different world? Why is 
it cause for renewed confidence and 
hope for the future? Because: 

• We can glimpse now, for the first 
time, a world in which the incessant and 
pervasive fear of nuclear devastation is 
reduced. The threat of nuclear conflict 
can never be wholly banished, but it can 
be vastly diminished by careful but 
drastic reductions in offensive nuclear 
arsenals and by creating an ability to 
defend against them. It is just such 
reductions— not limitations in expansion, 
but reductions— and just such defenses 
that are the vision President Reagan is 
working to make a reality. 

• Only a few years ago, the democ- 
racies of the world were believed to be 
an embattled, shrinking handful of 
nations. Today, people struggling under 
oppressive regimes of the right and the 
left can see democracy as a vital force 
for the future. Vital but nonviolent 
movements toward more open societies 
have succeeded. The failure of closed, 
command economies is more evident 
every day. A new wind of change is 
blowing. 

• People who are ready to stand up 
for freedom and have no choice but to 
fight for their rights now know that 
communism's march is not inevitable. 
President Reagan is a freedom fighter— 
and the world knows it. And I stand with 
Ronald Reagan. 

Strong defenses, sound alliances, 
and support for the free economic and 
political development of peoples 
everywhere: that's what President 
Reagan stands for. His policies are not 
the policies of a party. They are the 
policies of all the American people. They 
are inevitable policies if our country is to 
remain the best and greatest on Earth 
and the hope of humanity everywhere. 
Let us show the strength of our free 
institutions by a full investigation of 
every detail of this Iran episode. But as 
we do so, let us unite, pull ourselves 
together, and keep this country moving 
ahead to meet the dangers and the 
opportunities of this moment. 



bruary 1987 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 
SESSION 

Chairman Fascell. Everything you say 
here in your testimony is obviously 
absolutely right since you are a man of 
honor and have told the truth. But 
someone's zeal in this U.S. Govern- 
ment of ours, in this Iranian arms 
deal, has put the credibility of U.S. 
foreign policy at the lowest ebb that I 
know of. 

It has been alleged that you were 
opposed to this Iranian initiative as a 
member of the National Security Coun- 
cil and as Secretary of State. If you 
were, did you convey your concern to 
the President, and, if you did, when 
did you do it? 

A. I conveyed my concerns on many 
occasions— in two full meetings, on 
another occasion, according to my 
records, and I don't think anyone 
involved in this is under any illusion 
whatever about my views. 

Chairman Fascell. I'm not sure I 
understand whether or not you con- 
veyed your concern to the President or 
not. 

A. Yes. 

Chairman Fascell. In opposition to 
the Iranian arms deal? 

A. Let me comment on that. I sup- 
ported and continue to support, as my 
statement indicates, the idea of trying to 
see if we can't rearrange the furniture a 
little bit insofar as Iran is concerned, 
and there are various ways to try to do 
that which I support and which is the 
President's basic intent. So I support his 
policy. 

However, when it comes to the use 
of arms, I have a different view. But I do 
believe that it's a legitimate subject for 
debate as a policy matter. The President 
listened to views pro and con, and he has 
said publicly that in the end, he decided 
that he should send a signal— I think that 
was his word— to Iran to show our 
serious intent, and so he authorized 
some arms shipments to Iran for that 
purpose. 

You can argue in favor of it, and the 
President has put forward the argu- 
ments in favor of it; you can argue 
against it, and the various people have 
done so. Nevertheless, it's a legitimate 
issue. The President made a decision 
about it, and that's one of the things you 
get the right to do when you get elected 
President. You get the opportunity to 
undertake those tough calls, and he 
stood up to it. 

Mr. Broomfield. There's two 
aspects of this that really disturb me. 



One is the arms transfer to Iran, 
which I thought was extremely ill- 
advised. But my question this morning 
deals with the transfer of funds to 
support the contra effort. Over the 
weekend, we read about the Sultan of 
Brunei contributing large sums of 
money into a secret Swiss bank 
account to support the contras. 

I wonder how many other Third 
World countries have done the same 
thing? Who has control of this fund, 
and who handles it, basically? What 
knowledge do you have on that partic- 
ular fund that circumvents what I 
believe is the spirit of the law in sup- 
port of the contra effort in Nicaragua? 

A. First of all, it would not be 
proper for me to talk about any par- 
ticular third country, and so I will not do 
that. I did see a report in the press that 
during a visit to Brunei last summer, I 
raised this issue or sold the Sultan on 
transferring funds. That is not correct. I 
did visit Brunei. It was the only ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian 
Nations] country that I had not visited, 
and I wanted to visit each of them, just 
as I try to stop in the Pacific island 
states and stopped in Palau on that same 
trip. But there were no conversations 
with any Bruneian during that visit by 
me of this matter. 

Having said that, let me go on and 
say, first reminding you, that in August 
1985, Congress approved $27 million in 
humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Resistance. The funds were 
appropriated in December for obligation 
through March 31, 1986. At the time, 
the Congress expressly confirmed that, 
in addition to expending this $27 million, 
the law did not preclude— I'm quoting 
from the law that you passed— "activities 
of the Department of State to solicit 
such humanitarian assistance for the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance." 

So it was a perfectly proper activity 
for the Department of State, for me, to 
do that. There's nothing illegal about it. 
There's nothing improper about it. Quite 
the contrary. It was the policy of the 
United States, put into place by congres- 
sional action signed by the President 
after due debate, to provide humani- 
tarian assistance and to permit the 
Department of State to solicit funds. We 
went about it very carefully and con- 
sidered it last summer because, with the 
delays, you remember, in enacting the 
final appropriations— even though both 
Houses had voted— the resistance was 
having great trouble. They were incur- 
ring debts. They didn't have funds. 

And so in discussions with Assistant 
Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs 
Elliott] Abrams, we tried to think 



[lai 



iliil 



i 



through where we might properly solic 9^' 
some funds. We wanted to be very 
careful that we lived completely by the 
spirit, let alone the letter, of the law an 
didn't get involved with a country whe 
it might be thought that we had treme 
dous leverage, say, because of our aid 
program or something of that kind. So 
we were very, very careful about that. 

We did successfully persuade one 
government to make a contribution. Sc 
that is what we did. The discussions wi 
the government were conducted by 
Assistant Secretary Abrams but with r 
authority, explicitly, and I feel very go^ 
about anything that I can do to suppon 
the people in Nicaragua who are fightiii 
for the freedom and independence of 
that country. 

If you don't think it's of any 
significance, let me just read you, as a 
snippet, a little insight into what's goin 
on down there from excerpts from a 
report I got the other day from our 
embassy in Nicaragua. There are peoplt 
in our embassy who have been around. 
I'm just reading from this report. 

"The Nicaraguan communists 
celebrated their anniversary this year ( 
November 7, exactly the anniversary 
date of the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia. The Soviet motif was nicely caa 
ried through as the special foreign 
guests here for the 25th anniversary 
were taken by the Nicaraguan host nig| 
after night to performances of the 
Bolshoi Ballet. Fragments of 'Swan 
Lake' passed before the eyes of Third 
World revolutionaries and rustic Sandij 
nistas whose sensibilities to the expreS' 
sion and synchronization of the dance 
are, to put it kindly, imperfectly 
developed. But Nicaraguans are getting 
used to all the Kremlin arts, both the 
arts of peace and those of war." 

Those of you who know our missiop 
can probably figure out who wrote this, 

"For anyone who has been in 
Moscow's Red Square on November 7, 
what happened here on that day and tht 
next was redolent with similarities 
evoking those sounds and sites. 

"In Moscow the November 7 parad« 
was always worth very careful attentioi 
because it tended to reveal both what 
the leadership thought it most importar 
to say about Soviet society as well as 
some aspects of its true nature. 

"All of the things present in 
Moscow, or almost all, were to be found 
in Managua on the day of its parade, 
November 8. Just as the Soviet Defens( 
Minister begins the ceremonies by takir 
the salute of his troops standing in an 
open car, before returning to the top of 
the Lenin Mausoleum to join his col- 
leagues for the march pass, so Humbert 



i4 



24 



THE SECRETARY 



foa did the same in Managua to the 
'I'ded hurrahs of the troops. Then the 
ide began with various Sandinista 
s marching in tight, perfectly formed 
:ires, using the port arms tradition of 
Soviet forces and the goosestep bor- 
ed from the Prussians by the last 
rs for their household regiments, but 
Lir time sharply odorous of Nazi 
ades. Then came armored personnel 
,i-iers." 

Chairman Fascell. Is that a regular 
Biision report to the Secretary of 
Ste? 

A. This is a special- 
Chairman Fascell. I think we got 

tl drift. Could we just put that in the 

r ord? 

A. Let me just finish it because I 
tl ik you ought to hear it. 

"Then came armored personnel car- 
r -s, towed artillery, and tanks. The 
oy thing missing from the Soviet 
ndel was the intercontinental ballistic 
n isiles with the warheads painted red 
V ich always bring up the end of a 
J scow parade. 

"The Nicaraguan troops are 
L formed exactly like Soviets. The 
f rines looked just in from the Baltic 
f it at Kronstadt. The infantry forma- 
t as could have been Soviet regiments, 
I formed and sand-colored fatigues for 
1 ^hanistan. The T-55 tank com- 
I nders in their leather helmets were 
( ectly out of a Soviet-armored division, 
I i the reservists carried in Soviet 
1 icks with their wide-beamed Soviet 
1 mets recalled the motorized rifle divi- 
i ns one sees in the western military 
( tricts of the Soviet Union." 

So that's what's going on down 
1 jre. 

Mr. Hamilton. We appreciate your 
: pearanee here today. As I under- 
ind your testimony at this point, 
u've said that you personally 
posed the sale of arms to Iran. And, 
condly, you said that you did not 
low of the diversion of any of the 
nds to the contras until it became 
iblic or shortly there before. 

I have two things I'd like you to 
imment on. Mr. McFarlane [formerly 
ssistant to the President for National 
jcurity Affairs] has said publicly, "I 
Iked to the Secretary of State 
jpeatedly and often of every item in 
le relationship with Iran." 

Secondly, I'd like you to clarify 
tr me what the Administration 
elieves the mistakes to have been, 
he President has said, "I did not 
lake a mistake." And then in his 
adio address the other day, he said, 
Mistakes were made." I think it's 



important for the Congress to under- 
stand how the Administration analyzes 
this event. 

Was the mistake in supplying arms 
to Iran? Was the mistake in diverting 
funds to the contras"! Was the mistake 
in not informing the Congress? Just 
what is it that the President referred 
to when he said that mistakes were 
made? 

A. Very clearly, it was a mistake to 
get involved in the illegal funds transfer. 
That, I think- 

Mr. Hamilton. To the contras? 

A. To the extent— I don't know the 
ins and outs of that. I don't want to act 
like a judge passing judgment on what 
happened— I don't have the facts— but 
from what I have seen and what the 
Attorney General said, some things took 
place that were illegal, and so that's 
clearly a mistake. 

I might say it's not only a mistake 
because it's illegal, but it has confused 
the situation insofar as our support for 
the Nicaraguan resistance is concerned 
and unfairly to them, because they have 
no part in that. So it's a mistake from 
that standpoint as well. 

I do not know in detail— in fact, I 
don't know much at all about the arms 
transfers that apparently took place in 
the calendar year 1986. I know more 
about what took place during 1985, and 
I'm prepared in a closed session, based 
on documents that I have, cable traffic 
and notes that were taken at the time— 
and I don't claim that my notes encom- 
pass everything that I knew, but I've 
tried to stick in my— what I've prepared 
for a closed session to things that I could 
be pretty confident of, recognizing that 
in these things when you go into them 
and you are questioned and people 
remind you of this or that, it jogs your 
memory. 

But at any rate, I knew that arms 
transfers to Iran were periodically con- 
sidered after June 1985 as part of an 
effort to improve relations with Iran and 
secure the release of our hostages. There 
was considerable discussion between Mr. 
McFarlane and me about that and, at 
least on one occasion that I distinctly 
recall, with the President. 

I learned— not as a result of being 
involved in the development of the plan 
but, so to speak, as a plan was about to 
be implemented— I learned in various 
ways of two proposed transfers during 
1985. But I was never informed and had 
the impression that they were not con- 
summated. I later heard that one ship- 
ment had misfired— that is, it had been 
delivered, but due to Iranian rejection of 
the arms involved was not consum- 
mated. 



I knew that in December 1985, 
following a full-scale discussion of this 
matter with the President, that we 
instructed a mission that talked with the 
Iranians that were the interlocutors, or 
representing themselves as the inter- 
locutors; they were told on instructions 
that we would engage the Iranians in a 
dialogue if they released our hostages 
but that we would not sell them arms. 
That was an explicit part of the instruc- 
tion that the President authorized. 

So there was, you might say, a 
period of time from more or less the 
middle of 1985 until this period following 
the December meeting in which there 
was a fair amount of discussion of the 
subject— and I expressed my views dur- 
ing that period— in which some things 
were apparently structured— I can't tell 
you exactly how— but which, so far as I 
could see, never came off. 

And at the end of this process, after 
a full discussion, wanting to see the 
dialogue with Iran continue but having 
become convinced that there shouldn't 
be an arms transfer connected with it, 
the instructions that I referred to were 
the instructions of the mission. 

The subject was reviewed again by 
the President in a full-scale meeting in 
January 1986. This was not a meeting in 
which an explicit decision was stated. 
People made arguments. I made my 
arguments. 

However, I could fairly conclude 
from the meetings that the point of view 
that I thought had prevailed in 
December was not— didn't seem to be 
prevailing, but it wasn't as though there 
was some sharp decision. 

I learned in November that a finding 
was made authorizing, among other 
things, arms sales, but I was not 
informed of that finding at the time, so I 
can't tell you anything about the think- 
ing that went into the finding as such. 
That came as a— 

Mr, Gilman. The finding was in 
January — 

A. The finding was in January, and 
I was notified of it at about the same 
time as you were notified of it. I did not 
learn about any transfers of arms during 
1986 in a direct way, but, as is always 
the case, you have bits and pieces of 
evidence float in, and so I weighed in on 
the basis of that, restating my views. 
What I heard was conflicting; at times 
that there was some sort of deal or 
signal in the works and at other times 
that the operation was closed down. 
And, in fact, the word used at one time 
with me was that the people involved 
had been told to "stand down." 

So, again, there was this ambiguity 
from my standpoint. I would say to you 



ebruary 1987 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



that I did take the position, in part 
because of all the problems that we have 
with leaks and recognizing that if the 
President's initiative had any chance of 
success, it would have to be a secret 
initiative for all the reasons that have 
been developed— perfectly good reasons— 
that whenever I would be called upon to 
do something to carry out those policies, 
I needed to know, but I didn't need to 
know things that were not in my sphere 
to do something about. 

This past weekend our Ambassador 
in Beirut, Mr. John Kelly, responded to 
an all-post directive that we put out. We 
put out a directive from the State 
Department— and I don't have the date 
of it, but shortly after this investigation 
started— telling our posts to discover 
anything that they had about this, to 
secure it, and to make it available here 
in Washington. So I got a response from 
Mr. John Kelly, and I will read his 
response. 

"I met in Washington in July or 
August 1986 with Robert McFarlane 
who briefed me on the hostage negotia- 
tions involving arms to Iran as an 
inducement. Between the dates of 
October 30 and November 4, 1986, I had 
numerous conversations with Lt. Col. 
Oliver North [deputy director for 
political-military affairs on the National 
Security Council staff] and Richard V. 
Secord [retired U.S. Air Force major 
general] relating to the hostage negotia- 
tions with Iran. During that period I 
received and sent numerous 'back chan- 
nel' messages to and from the White 
House, Admiral Poindexter JAssistant to 
the President for National Security 
Affairs], concerning the hostage negotia- 
tions. Those messages were transmitted 
and received in what is referred to as 
the 'privacy channel' using CIA 
communications facilities. 

"In accordance with our standard 
practice at Embassy Beirut"— which they 
have to do, given the situation there— 
"all of that message traffic was 
destroyed thereafter at my direction." 
That is a standing order in a post like 
Beirut— nothing wrong with that. I 
would assume that copies may be 
available at CIA Headquarters or at the 
White House Situation Room. 

"With regard to my conversations 
with McFarlane, North, and Secord, I 
stand ready to discuss them with appro- 
priate officials upon the Department's 
direction." 

I have instructed Ambassador Kelly 
to return to Washington immediately, 
bringing with him all records of sucli 
activities to be available to the FBI and 
other appropriate investigative bodies. I 



am, to put it mildly, shocked to learn this 
after the event from an ambassador, but, 
at any rate, I am just reading you this 
report. 

Throughout the entire period, I 
opposed the transfer of arms to Iran 
until Iran stopped the war in the gulf, 
ended its support for terrorism, and 
obtained the release of the hostages. 
Throughout the entire period, I fully 
agreed with the President's objective of 
finding a way to modify Iran's behavior 
in a manner consistent with our 
strategic interests and those of our 
friends in the region and around the 
world. 

The President has confirmed publicly 
that he believed in principle in the light 
of all the circumstances that we should 
use a limited amount of arms to send a 
signal. There are legitimate arguments 
to be made in favor of this decision, and 
the President has made them, and I fully 
accept their legitimacy and the legiti- 
macy and propriety of the President's 
decision and right to make that decision 
and support that. 

It's difficult for me to talk about par- 
ticular incidents without violating secu- 
rity requirements, to give you a full 
accounting, which, as I've said, I'm 
perfectly prepared to do, but it must be 
done in a way that is proper. But I 
believe a review of the classified 
records— if you go through it with me— 
will support the statements that I have 
made, and it will also show that my 
knowledge of what took place was 
sporadic and fragmentary and materially 
incomplete. So I'm not the witness to tell 
you all of the things that took place, 
because I'm not informed. 

Insofar as any question— I'm 
repeating, but I want to repeat— any 
question of diversion of funds to support 
the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, 
my knowledge was not fragmentary. It 
was non-existent. 

Chairman Fascell. The committee 
will be happy to receive those 
classified documents and hold them in 
accordance with the rules of the 
committee. 

Mr. Lagomarsino. Has the U.S. 
Government undertaken a counter- 
intelligence review of the Iran initi- 
ative and related events to determine 
whether the U.S. Government fell for a 
covert action by a third country? 

A. We are reviewing all of our 
efforts, what took place, carefully, and 
determining how best to go forward in 
support of the objectives the President 
has set out and which, as far as I can 
see, are broadly agreed to. But we want 
to make it clear to Iran that thev cannot 



expect any fruitful relationship with u 
as long as they fail to exert the influei 
that they undoubtedly can to get our 
hostages released and to stop terroriS' 

Now, of course, bringing the Iran 
Iraq war to an end is a very important 
objective for us, and we believe that o 
tacts with us, or perhaps we can work 
with others who do have contacts with 
Iran, can bring about some change. Sc 
far there's little evidence of it. 

But, at any rate, we are reviewing 
matters carefully, and what materials 
have been denied to us in the State 
Department— that is, certain materials 
collected by the intelligence communit 
were not made available to us— those j 
now available to us. This review is goii 
forward, as I said, under the general 
direction of Under Secretary [for 
Political Affairs Michael H.] Armacost 
the President's direction. 

Mr. Yatron. Did the Inter- 
American Affairs Bureau at State hai 
any knowledge of or was it involved 
the coordination of funds for the con 
tras from the Iran arms sales? 

A. No. Let me say, not to their 
knowledge. If there were some funds p 
somewhere that were useful, then they: 
were trying to provide— properly- 
humanitarian aid when that was 
authorized, and, since the $100 million 
authorized, they've been involved in 
that, and there is an explicit congres- 
sional mandate for the State Depart- 
ment to play a strong role in that, and 
we're trying to do that. 

But nobody in our bureau that I 
know of, and I'm certain Elliott Abram 
and his group, had no knowledge of thi; 
Iranian funds transfer question at 
all— zero. 

Mr. Yatron. Was the bureau awan 
of the methods by which the contras 
were receiving lethal aid during the 
period in which the Boland amendmei 
was in effect? 

A. We don't presume to know 
everything that a person may do 
somewhere in the government. It was 
clear that from private sources, 
presumably, some aid was flowing to th( 
people fighting for freedom and indepenc 
ence in Nicaragua, and personally I 
applaud that. There's a lot of aid flowing 
from America to the Nicaraguan commu' 
nists. There are quite a few Americans 
down there. That's their right to be. Ano 
it shouldn't be surprising that there are 
Americans who want to help the people 
fighting for freedom. 

Mr. Yatron. To what extent do 
intelligence operatives from other 
agencies apprise the bureau of their 



itiii 



it: 



iBl 



26 



Department of State Bulletii 



THE SECRETARY 



ivities with respect to coordinating 
ding for contra operations, and 
s the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
erican Affairs receive such reports? 

A. He does, and he chairs the inter- 
ncy group that includes people from 
)f the agencies involved whose task it 
evaluate what is going on and to 
;e recommendations, if needed, for 
legislation or what our policies 
Id be and to oversee the tactics 
lived. 

Mr. Yatron. From the management 
idpoint, are you apprised on a 
eular basis of the Department's 
iv)lvement in contra operations by 
Liistant Secretary Abrams, and do 
hie reports include summaries of the 
B lligence community's operations? 

A. I see reports from time to time. I 
e Elliott Abrams frequently, and so I 
r to keep abreast of what is going on 
sest I can. I have lots of things to 
:e ) abreast of, but I do try to stay 
rmed and, of course, most impor- 
l\ , to see that the people involved 
<ti'iing, capable people, and I put Mr. 
mis down as one who knows what 
1 1, ling. 

Mr. Oilman. We appreciate your 
a lid response, and you've demon- 
t ted once again why so many of us 
II he committee have full confidence 
n le manner in which you have 
If -oaehed this problem, 

I'm disturbed about the mistakes 
h were made, as many of us on the 
mittee are, and I think one of the 
sous mistakes is a lack of consulta- 
ii . And what I'm concerned about 
i( is the disclosures you've made to 
16 iince you did have some knowledge 
ir since the State Department had 
ti wledge prior to the event, why 
h e was not consultation with the 
A gress. There are several statutes 
h require consultation, particularly 
5(tion 1.5 of the State Department's 
S;ic Authorities Act which sets out 
h Department's responsibility to 
icp us informed with respect to 
Mvities that are within our 
lusdiction. 

Can you tell us whether you were 
aier any constraint, or whether the 
D lartment was under any constraint, 
w to reveal any of the information 
«'h regard to the Iranian arms sales? 
.\. No. We were, of course, bound 
Iccisions that would be made about 
• ■thing that was to be held in con- 
nee. But as far as our measuring up 
111- responsibilities was concerned, we 
I' engaged, you might say, in an 
inient about what should be done. 



And there were these incidents that 
came along that I have pointed up for 
you, without being in a position to, for 
various reasons— partly lack of 
knowledge, partly because of the nature 
of the open hearing here— to give you 
full information about them. 

Mr. Gilman. But once the project 
was underway, didn't you feel that the 
Department had a necessity of con- 
sulting with the Congress with regard 
to these initiatives? 

A, I don't feel that we should sort of 
bring all our internal debates to the Con- 
gress, particularly on something like 
this. Of course, policy toward Iran, 
policy toward terrorism— all of these 
basic things that have been laid out, we 
have discussed here in the committee 
many times. 

Mr. Gilman. But I'm not talking 
about debate. I'm talking about the 
actual operation that was underway. 
Once that was underway, and some of 
that was brought to the Department's 
attention, wasn't there a responsibility 
for the Department to consult with 
Congress? 

A. Perhaps so. I'm not here to claim 
that my actions in all this were all that 
they should be— you'll have to judge that 
for yourself— and I can tell you what I 
knew and what I did. 

Mr. Gilman. You mention 
Ambassador Kelly's report to the CIA 
but a failure to report to your office. 
Is that an unusual or a unique situa- 
tion or something that's in violation of 
any of the State Department's 
regulations? 

A. I hope it's unique. There is sup- 
posed to be— I say supposed to be— a 
chain of command that goes from the 
President to me— not to the NSC 
[National Security Council], to me, and 
through the Assistant Secretary, by and 
large, to the ambassador. That's the 
chain of command- 
Mr. Gilman. And is that a violation 
then? 

A. —and if something comes up that 
causes an ambassador to go outside the 
chain of command, there needs to be a 
good reason. Now, it may be very well 
that Ambassador Kelly will say that he 
was told on the authority of the Presi- 
dent that he was supposed to do this and 
that, and I would think that he would 
have checked with me to see if that were 
so. 

Mr. Gilman. Who would enable 
such an ambassador to waive that 
responsibility? 



A. At this point, all I can tell you is 
the cable that I got. I don't consider it a 
satisfactory situation. 

I think we should recognize, how- 
ever, what life is like in Washington. 
Now, come on, here we are, and who 
was it— the Canadian Ambassador- 
coined the phrase, "It's never over." 
Nothing ever gets settled in this town. 
It's not like running a company, nor 
even a university. It's a seething 
debating society in which the debate 
never stops, in which people never give 
up, including me, and so that's the 
atmosphere in which you administer. 

And what I try to do is stay as close 
to the President as I can— and I feel very 
close to him, and I admire and respect 
him tremendously, I think he has trans- 
formed the situation— done a marvelous 
job. I try to stay very close to him, and I 
support his policies. I don't win every 
argument, by a long shot, but I am in the 
arguments, and when the President 
decides something, then I do my best to 
make it work. 

Chairman Fascell. The evidence is 
quite clear, it's very, very — almost 
impossible and incredible to bypass all 
of the institutions of government and 
the checks and balances built into our 
system in an effort to drive a policy 
decision. 

A. I think it's also true that anyone 
in this town who does something, let's 
say is controversial and who thinks it 
can be a secret, should have his head 
examined. 

Chairman Fascell. I certainly 
agree. 

A, You should say to yourself, how 
is this— how am I going to defend this 
when it comes out? It's going to come 
out. Now, I personally believe that there 
is a lack of discipline in the government 
beyond what I remember when I was 
here before, which makes it difficult to 
operate, and there are things that should 
be done secretly and which should not be 
consulted about. 

I'll give an example. Last September 
we were in the final throes of our 
negotiations on confidence-building 
measures in the CDE [Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe] 
in Stockholm, and, clearly, the negotia- 
tion was coming toward the short 
strokes, and the Soviets were beginning 
to adjust their position. And it was 
clearly the time in the bargaining when 
we should try with our allies to strike a 
deal if a good and reasonable deal in our 
interests was available, and we felt it 



)ruary 1987 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



And so with the President's author- 
ity, we changed our instructions to our 
ambassador to give him some negotiat- 
ing room. The new instructions promptly 
appeared in The New York Times, about 
the same time they arrived for our 
negotiator. So that pulled the rug right 
out from under him. You give away his 
negotiating position. You don't want to 
tell the other side that you're willing to 
do X; you want to hold that and get 
something for X. And it just drives you 
crazy. The ambassador got it straight- 
ened around, and we wound up with a 
good deal, but it was a very embarrass- 
ing and deleterious incident. And, of 
course, it makes other countries feel, 
how can they deal with us when we have 
no capacity to do anything in a properly 
secret way. There are lots of things that 
have to be that way, and which you 
shouldn't be consulted upon, because 
there's no need for that. 

Mr. Solarz. For 6 years, the 
Administration has said it would never 
yield to the demands of terrorists, pay 
ransom for hostages, or sell arms to 
states that sponsor and support ter- 
rorism. It now turns out that we have 
done all three. 

How could this have happened, 
how much damage has it done to our 
credibility, and what assurances can 
you give us that it won't happen 
again? 

A. The President decided to give a 
signal. I'm just quoting the President 
here. He's made a public statement of 
what he authorized and why, and he has 
acknowledged that in doing so, he 
recognizes that there were risks as well 
as potential benefits, and he had to 
weigh that. 

Right now, because of the way this 
has blown up, the emphasis is all on the 
risks. I dare say that if somehow we had 
our hostages all returned, and we saw a 
different kind of situation in one way or 
another emerging in Iran, and this came 
out, people would say, "Well, the Presi- 
dent showed guts. He took a risk, and he 
knew that if it didn't work out, he would 
get panned, but he did it for a good pur- 
pose." 

So I've told you what my opinion 
was, but I believe the President's deci- 
sion was a perfectly legitimate decision, 
and at this point, perhaps in part 
because it all has emerged the way it 
has, it has not succeeded as he wished. 

Mr. Solarz. Were you consulted or 
informed about the request of Lt. Col. 
North to Ross Perot [U.S. business- 
man] to pay $2 million in ransom 
money for the release of our hostages? 



And is it conceivable to you that Lt. 
Col. North would have made such a 
request without the approval of the 
President or some higher authority? 

A. I was not informed. So far as I 
know, the President wasn't informed. 
But I have no knowledge about Lt. Col. 
North's activities in this regard. I think 
the offer of Mr. Perot, if that is what 
took place— I don't know; I just read 
about it— I think it's outrageous. 

Mr. Leach. You come before us as 
a man of very great integrity. You've 
been a good soldier even when I think 
many of us considered the Administra- 
tion's policies very, very wrong. In the 
past, when those of us have differed 
with you, the issues have entirely been 
those of judgment and policy. It 
appears today we have a political crisis 
that's become a constitutional confron- 
tation. 

A. I don't believe it's a constitu- 
tional confrontation at all. What the 
President has done is move out people 
who seem to be involved. He has put in a 
new and outstanding National Security 
Council director [Frank Carlucci]; he has 
asked for the appointment of a Special 
Prosecutor; he has said that he will make 
available to the Congress and instructed 
me to come here and talk to you. 
Where's the constitutional crisis? There 
is no constitutional crisis. 

Mr. Leach. It revolves around the 
issue of whether a war can be illegally 
prosecuted. But before getting to this, 
I was intending to say something fur- 
ther, kind about yourself. 

A. Please. [Laughter] 

Mr. Leach. In this confrontation, it 
appears to me that you and the Depart- 
ment have stood rather firmly on the 
side of law. and I personally think it 
would be ironic if your job were placed 
in jeopardy. Frankly. I hope it isn't 
true that the only thing worse in 
public life of being proven wrong is to 
be proved right when your boss is 
visibly wrong. 

A. I don't say that I've been proved 
right. It could very well have come out 
some other way. 

Mr. Leach. It may be the case. In 
any regard, my question is aimed at 
the future. We all know from history 
that leaders, when they're embattled, 
sometimes are prone to seek outlets in 
belligerency sometimes even more. 

My question is, given the great 
prospect for arms control, given the 
prospect as well that there might be an 
island somewhere — potentate 
somewhere — that might be bombed, 
can you assure this committee that 



lit 



iSl 



there is a good chance that we will ^ 
seek peace and arms controls, an 
anecdote to this scandal, instead of 
some sort of outbreak of political or 
military crisis? 

A. I can assure this committee tb 
the effort to deal with the present 
Iranian matter that we're discussing 
here today is going to have nothing tc 
with decisions about arms control or 
other activities. Those have to stand c 
their feet. 

What I was trying to do in my opi 
ing statement, and I believe in doing i 
was following what both the chairmar 
and ranking member were recommem 
ing, is to say that in addition to doing 
the investigating, the important thing 
to get on with the business and to let 
people who are supposed to do the im 
tigating investigate. But let's not geti 
put in the center of all activity so thai 
we're paralyzed. We are not paralyze^ 
We are working hard on all of these 
issues, including the issues of arms 
control. 

There, at least in my judgment, 
we're finally getting up and on the tai 
at least the numbers of dramatic redi 
tions in intermediate-range missiles ol 
an equal basis. It really fulfills the 
strategy and tactics involved in the 
NATO dual-track decision— that was . 
big achievement— in getting the numl 
up and on the table and the beginning 
counting rules and the beginning of 
some interstructure for drastic reduc- 
tions in strategic arms. That represei 
a tremendous advance. 

We are a long way from agreeme* 
And so our task is somehow to captui 
that common ground that we arrived 
with the Soviets and capitalize on it. 1 
a hard thing to do but we are actively* 
trying to do it. Max Kampelman [heab 
the U.S. delegation on arms control 
negotiations] spent last week in Gene^ 
with his counterparts, for example. 

Mr. Honker. As you know, this 
committee is primarily interested in| 
the foreign policy implications of tM 
activities and, specifically, where 
those activities were contrary to V.i 
policy: (1) contrary to our official 
policy of our government of not ship 
ping arms to terrorist nations; (2) cc 
trary to this Administration's stated 
policy of neutrality in the Iraqi-Iran i 
war; (3) contrary to the explicit polit 
of the Congress on not giving milita 
assistance to insurgent groups whic 
were engaged in the overthrow of tli 
Nicaraguan Government; and (4) con 
trary to the enunciated policy of botl 
the White House and the Congress o 
efforts to get the allies to quit doing 
business with terrorist nations. 



k! 



tl 



1 



5 

I 



28 



Department of State Bull n 



THE SECRETARY 



As the Cabinet officer who is 
riponsible for the conduct of this 
ion's foreign policy, if you are tell- 

us this morning — and I believe all 
ous feel you're stating the truth — 
tit your role was zero or nonexistent, 
t;n how is it possible — 

A. My role is nonexistent insofar as 
tl apparent reported use of funds 
Tierated by sales of arms to Iran and 
: diversion of those funds to help the 
.varagTjan resistance. I knew nothing 
aiiut that. I did not say that I knew 

liing about any of the other things. 
,, U' to the contrary. I tried to tell you 
wat I knew about it. 

Mr. Bonker. I appreciate that 
c rification. But, nonetheless, many 
©these activities were directly con- 
tiry to the stated policies of our 
g ernment. My question is. how is it 
pisible for this duplicitous activity to 
gon? In other words, how is it pos- 
s le that another agency, aside from 
ti State Department, is engaged in 
a ivities or operations that are con- 
t rv to the official policv of the 
I ited States? 

Shouldn't the State Department 
a ert its natural constitutional, 
p per role over the conduct of the 
fi sign policy so we don't end up with 
c tradictory policies that possibly 
c fuse not only our allies but people 
h e in America? 

A. First of all, the President made a 
p 'lie statement explaining his reason- 
it for sending a signal, a signal involv- 
ii arms transfers that you have 
c racterized in various ways and which 
h e been widely characterized as such. 
T >re is a whole other side to that argu- 
n fit which the President presented, 
e 'laining to the American people and 
tl rou. why he decided to send that 
s lal. knowing full well the risks 
ii olved but seeking an objective that, if 
ilould be achieved, I'm sure that 
e rybody would applaud. So that's a 
d ision that the President made, 
liitimately. 

Now, insofar as the State Depart- 
nnt is concerned, I believe it is correct 
tsay that we do not have a foreign 
picy in the State Department; the 
resident has a foreign policy. I work 

the President. We are engaged in a 
H CSS. and I am, by directive and by 
cnmon understanding and I hope by 
I association with the President, prin- 
( al foreign policy adviser to him. But it 
i he President's policy. It's always 
1 ?n clear to me. and I try to keep it 
I. 'ore me in my 10 years of experience 
i|a Cabinet officer, that I didn't go out 
id get elected. The President did, so 
' s the boss. He's the guy that calls the 



shots, and I try to help him formulate 
policy, and I try to help him execute it. 

I believe that the conduct, the opera- 
tional conduct, of diplomatic activity 
should be lodged in the State Depart- 
ment and by and large it is. If there is a 
lesson out of all this, insofar as how- 
things operate are concerned, I think the 
lesson is that operational activities and 
the staff who are conducting operational 
activities out of the National Security 
Council staff is very questionable and 
shouldn't be done except in very rare 
circumstances. 

The example is given of Henry Kiss- 
inger's diplomacy with China, and, of 
course, that's spectacular. Everybody 
refers to it. It was a wonderful thing. On 
the other hand, to the extent that it 
causes other people to aspire to be 
Henry Kissinger, it can get you into 
trouble. There's only one. They broke 
the mold when they made him. 

Mr. Studds. I think we may have 
gotten some sympathy from one 
another, that is, the committee and the 
Secretary of State. All of these years, 
we've sat here in great frustration, not 
being able to find out what was going 
on, and now we learn to our even 
deeper frustration that neither the 
Secretary of State nor the President 
knew what was going on in some of 
these cases. I don't mean that 
facetiously. I understand and I sense 
some of the agony in what you've said. 

There is an op-ed piece, as I 
suspect you know, today in The 
Washington Post by the Director of 
Communications in the White House 
[Patrick J. Buchanan] which comes 
perilously close to saying, and I think 
one could say does say, that the end 
justifies the means, at least in the case 
of American policy in Central America. 

Mr. Buchanan says the President 
is right. Oliver North is an American 
hero, and he says things about his 
kidney and spleen and his heart and 
his soul and when we cease to produce 
soldiers with said qualities, that this 
country has gone into an irreversible 
decline. He calls them the Billy 
Mitchell of this generation. And the 
clear message of that piece is that, 
thank God, there's someone around 
here with guts, notwithstanding what 
the law or the niceties of the law may 
or may not have been, to do what is so 
clearly in the eyes of this Administra- 
tion, right. 

Last October, Mr. Abrams of your 
Department told a subcommittee of 
this committee over and over and over 
again that the U.S. Government — no 



agency, no official of our govern- 
ment — had helped to finance or to 
facilitate or to direct flights from El 
Salvador carrying military supplies to 
the contras. 

Since that time, as you very well 
know, we've had a lot of disturbing 
reports. We understand that phone 
calls were placed to U.S. officials in 
Washington by those involved in the 
air supply operations. We understand 
that flights were closely monitored by 
military officials attached to our 
embassy in San Salvador. The same 
planes, the air crew, the secret landing 
strips were used by the State Depart- 
ment to send nonlethal aid as were 
used to send the military supplies. Our 
ambassador in Costa Rica apparently 
unsuccessfully sought permission to 
use a small airfield in that country to 
assist the flights and all of the flights 
involved with the active cooperation of 
the Governments of El Salvador and 
Honduras with which presumably we 
exercise some considerable influence. 

I wonder if you could take this 
opportunity, first of all, to tell us what 
you knew and did not know about the 
extent to which the U.S. Government 
in that period was, indeed, involved in 
these flights. And, secondly, would 
you associate or disassociate yourself 
from the implicit assumptions of the 
column by Mr. Buchanan that the ends 
clearly justify the means and that 
disobedience and disregard for the law 
is justified when in one's own mind 
one is as sure as this President and his 
subordinates apparently are that they 
are right? 

A. I don't believe that a constitu- 
tional officer has a right to declare 
himself above the law. You have to carry 
out the law. 

In the various Cabinet jobs I've had, 
there are a lot of laws that the Congress 
has passed that I didn't agree with. 
When I was Secretary of Labor, I didn't 
agree with the Davis-Bacon Act but I ad- 
ministered it as safely as I could. I made 
no secret of my view of it. But, never- 
theless, you have the obligation to ad- 
minister it properly and so on. So any of- 
ficer has that obligation, and there is no 
way to explain away a turning-away 
from that obligation. 

I believe I have made myself clear, 
reading longer than the chairman 
wanted me to, on some stuff about 
what's going on in Nicaragua that I 
believe, at the emergence on the 
American land mass of a Soviet- 
communist state, is a threat to our 
security, and we need to take it seri- 
ously. I believe in the votes of the Con- 
gress, that have now put in place the 



bruary 1987 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



program that we now have there, has 
come to be a general agreement about 
that and I fully recognize. Lots of people 
here don't. 

I believe there has come to be a 
perception of what kind of regime the 
Nicaraguan regime is and there's very 
little argument about that. 

So to the extent that I can properly 
lend a hand to the Nicaraguan 
resistance, you can count on the fact 
that I'm going to do it. 

As I testified earlier, in response to 
a question about assistance, I also 
pointed out that that was done abso- 
lutely in accordance with the law, and I 
quoted the law to you. 

Now, as far as activities are con- 
cerned and exactly how they went on, 
I don't try to keep track of all of that 
although I try to stay generally 
informed. I think that you have to 
recognize that the program of humani- 
tarian aid, which was voted by the Con- 
gress, necessarily has to get delivered to 
the people for whom it was intended. 
Right? We ought to get it there. You've 
got to account for it as best you can, but 
you've also got to get it there. If you 
didn't get it there, just kept it in the 
warehouse, you would not be carrying 
out the intent of the Congress. So you 
have to have some means of flying it in, 
dropping it off, or whatever. That's part 
and parcel of what the intent of Con- 
gress was, and there should be no prob- 
lem about that. 

Intermixing it with arms is a prob- 
lem, but I don't see any reason why 
there's anything wrong with an ambas- 
sador trying to see how he can help 
arrange, or a military officer seeing how 
he can help arrange, to have these 
authorized materials delivered to the 
people they were intended to serve. 

Mr. Roth. I think one of the key 
concerns the American people have is 
this concern, for example, of the 
secret Swiss bank account. When you 
visited Brunei — the Sultan — did you 
know about that bank account at that 
time last June? 

A. I had no discussion of this matter 
with the Sultan or anyone else in Brueni. 

Mr. Roth. Right. I know you had 
mentioned that to begin with. But did 
you know of that account at that time? 

A. I knew there was a way in which 
a contribution could be made. Obviously, 
a country that you go to is probably 
going to want to do that secretly and so 
you have to have a way of doing it. I 
knew that there was such a way because 
we had been discussing the subject and 
trying to figure out, pursuant to the law 
and in accordance with the law, how we 



30 



might get some funds to people who, at 
least as far as we could see, were 
desperately in need of some. 

Mr. Roth. How did you learn about 
this if it wasn't a Swiss bank account 
but there was some method? When did 
you first learn about that? Was that at 
the very origin of this episode? 

A. You've gotten me sworn all the 
way to Sunday here. I have to be kind of 
careful how I answer. This is sort of off 
the top of my head, this question. But in 
the middle of the year, we had some dis- 
cussions about the desperate need of the 
Nicaraguan resistance for funds. We 
were all aware of the fact that the 
Congress— each body had voted funds, 
you remember, but the parliamentary 
situation was such that the flow of funds 
was delayed so we were trying to figure 
out how can we properly and legally do 
something about it. 

Mr. Roth. When you say "we," 
who is "we?" 

A. "We" is me and my colleagues in 
the Department. Elliott Abrams, of 
course, had the lead responsibility, and 
others in the Department took part in 
the discussion as we properly should. 

Mr. Roth. You had mentioned on 
numerous times that you talked to the 
President and you were opposed to 
this policy. 

A. No, I wasn't opposed to this 
policy. I was very much in favor of the 
policy of helping the Nicaraguan 
resistance, which is what you're asking 
me about. 

Mr. Roth. I'm talking about the 
arms to Iran. 

A. I was in favor of the objectives 
that the President was trying to achieve. 
I was opposed to and very skeptical 
about the use of arms in that connection. 
There are lots of things that we can 
argue back and forth about, and there 
are legitimate arguments on both sides. 

Mr. Roth. In this episode, we are 
going around in circles so often, I was 
wondering, you had the President's 
ear. Do you think that it would be wise 
for the President to call the people in, 
whether it's Poindexter, North, who- 
ever was involved, and say, "Okay 
fellows, what are the facts?" 

A. I certainly would welcome find- 
ing out what the facts are, and I think 
the sooner people can get the facts the 
better. I don't know what the proprieties 
are. Both those people have sought 
counsel, as they're entitled to do as 
American citizens. They have apparently, 
on advice of counsel, decided that they 
are not going to discuss their activities. 



Maybe the President could persuade 
them otherwise. I don't know whethei 
it's proper to do that or not. I see hal' 
you are lawyers. I'm sure you would 
have a better opinion on that than I. 

But I would like to see, as a citize 
let's get the dope out here, deal with 
wrongdoing where it's found, and let 
get on with the nation's business. Thi 
what I'm trying to focus on. 

Mr. Mica. You appointed me to 
your commission on terrorism. I 
served on it for 18 months. 

A. And we appreciated your serv 
You were a strong, effective, and gooi 
member of that. 



Mr. Mica. I thank you, and I app 
ciated the opportunity. But I just 
would say that I feel somewhat 
betrayed, as I indicated to you, that 
for 18 months, we were told that co 
cessions were the only sure way to t 
more acts of terrorism. And, indeed 
now we see that concessions were 
separate route. 

A. If I may just interject. The Pn 
dent has repeatedly said that it was m 
his intent to swap arms for hostages. . 
When you have something that has a . 
variety of objectives to it, these thingj 
can get mixed up. But, at any rate, he 
has stated his objective, and you knov' 
that because you've heard it. 

Mr. Mica. I understand that. Bn 
note, for instance, that eight times I 
your 12 pages, or 13 pages, of 
testimony, we talked about fighting 
terrorism. 

A. I'm very big on that. 

Mr. Mica. For 24 months, we 
worked on a bill and the group wor! 
together, and we find the combined 
wisdom of every group that I worke 
with and you worked with recom- 
mended against this type of proposa 
would just indicate, too, as I recall. 
Col. North sat on— and sits still on- 
the interagency group to combat 
terrorism. 

A. I don't think he sits still. He's 
never sat still. 

Mr. Mica. He sat on it. [Laughte 
I think you're right there. 

Obviously, at that time, he was 
telling us the information or giving P 
information to the State Departmen 
or not carrying back what had been 
said. Three quick points I have, 
though. You have revealed here tod; 
that we have either a rogue ambassa 
dor or one who was directed not to tl 
you. I don't know what the situatiori 
but I hope you can report to us as to 
what is done about that. 



I 



Department of State Bull 






THE SECRETARY 



i. I've already reported to you that 
ent out an all-post directive 
iptly. He responded fully and in 
I faith, and he has been— 

fjtfr. Mica. But we don't know who 
itcted him not to talk to you. 

\. -and he has said that he's ready 
aki' his information available. So 
t find out. 

VIr. Mica. The Miami Herald has 
»l rted yesterday that the U.S. Gov- 
rment had direct information that 
rt paid $2 million, I believe, for the 
iing of our Marines in Beirut, and 
?(iad this information at the time 
ji this policy was initiated. Is that 
nect? 
V. I'm going to pass on that, 
u,~,c it's a very specific question, and 

V nt to be sure that you can get an 
cn-ate answer. 

The fact of the matter is that Iran is 
' mtry on oiu- terrorist list. We know 
any acts of terrorism with which 
111 one way or another seems to 

I heen connected— and connected can 
( ill' training people, providing funds, 

iding eiiuijJiiient, providing safe 
11. as well as some specific acts, such 
V VA Al case that the British courts 
Nrought forward. So there are a lot 
[H'CtS to it. 

Now, it does seem to be true that for 
'.■ period of time, over a year, there 
■n't Americans taken in Beirut, and 
ic lere was some evidence— I think the 
Pi iident has pointed to that— that con- 
:e ably shows the beginnings of a modi- 
Be Jon of Iranian behavior. But at least 
as le information that I have suggests, 
■y Iranians at least in some fashion 
lieen involved in the most recent 

II age-taking of Americans, and they 
ai involved in cases with other coun- 

.. And I make the point to you that 
ia\e to be, of course, particularly 
■crned about Americans. But if we're 
iH to have an impact internationally 
ic fight against terrorism, we've got 
\>-\x it internationally, and we've got 
'• as concerned about terrorist acts 

ij inst others as we are against 

01 selves. 

Mr. Wolpe. You indicated in the 
C( rse of your remarks with respect to 
tl arms transfer to Iran, that when 
y disagreed with that tactic and 

V h the transfer itself, that you felt it 
w 5, in fact, a legitimate foreign 
p icy question, and it was legitimate — 
I link it was your words— that the 
F I'sident consider that approach. 
\ luld your view be the same if it were 
t be found that that arms transfer to 
I n, particularly the one that took 



place before the January finding, was 
in violation of American law? 

A. I've gone over that question of 
violating the law. There isn't any 
authorization on anybody's part to 
violate a law. There are certain constitu- 
tional rights the President has, and 
there are various directives dealing with 
this subject, including directives in the 
national secui-ity field as distinct from 
the direct arms transfer field. 

Mr. Wolpe. Why then would it be a 
legitimate question for the President 
to consider an arms transfer if it, in 
fact, were in violation of the law? 

A. First of all, there is the question, 
should we seek privately in some manner 
designed to be as effective as possible 
some different kind of arrangement that 
we hope might change behavior in Iran? 
The answer to that question was thought 
by the President's advisers, including 
me, to be yes, and as the discussion has 
proceeded and listened to [by] Members 
of the Congress and others, that by and 
large people agreed that's the proper 
thing. 

Then the question comes, should the 
possibility of change in our willingness to 
sell arms, at least to the extent of giving 
a signal, be in play tactically? So that 
can be debated back and forth, and the 
President has said publicly that he 
judged that the objective was worth giv- 
ing the signal. And I've said that's a 
legitimate judgment to be made. 

Having made that judgment, you 
have to see to it that you execute it in a 
proper way, and I presume that was the 
thinking of the Attorney General and 
others in the January finding. 

Mr. Wolpe. Should there ever be a 
covert policy in conflict with the overt, 
open policy of the U.S. Government? 

A. You have multitracks often in 
your policy, and I don't think that 
they're necessarily in conflict. You try to 
complement one with the other. Some 
may say they are in conflict but— 

Mr. Wolpe. We had an open, 
public, in fact, established statutory 
policy of not providing arms to 
nations, and Iran is specifically on the 
list of nations, that condoned or prac- 
ticed state terrorism. 

A. We also have other statutes on 
the books, and we have authorization 
under the— whatever it is— the National 
Security Act to do things in connection 
with other objectives. So it isn't as 
though the statutes of the United States 
give a clear and unambiguous picture 
with one not conflicting in any way with 
others. 



Mr. Wolpe. Have you any 
knowledge of the use of proceeds from 
the sale of arms to Iran in Angola, 
Mozambique. Ethiopia, or any other 
African country in line with the 
reports that have been made in The 
New York Times that high U.S. offi- 
cials have found some evidence that 
money was transferred, at least to 
Angola? 

A. I have no knowledge of that, just 
as I have no knowledge of any transfer 
to the Nicaraguan resistance. My warn- 
ing flag went up once when I heard 
about an arrangement that I was told 
was not any such arrangement, that 
seemed to suggest that there might have 
been something going, not necessarily to 
Angola, but to other countries. 

Mr. Wolpe. In Africa? 

A. In Africa. But this did not have 
in mind anything like what seemed to be 
described or what we're learning about 
the rontrn fund diversion. 

Ms. Snowe. Your presence is very 
important here today, because, obvi- 
ously, we need to understand the deci- 
sionmaking process that led to the 
decisions concerning the arms ship- 
ments to Iran through all the diversion 
of the funds to the contras. 

There are several issues that 
worry me that, obviously, cannot 
entirely be addressed here today, but I 
think these committee hearings are a 
beginning. Some of these issues can- 
not be cured by legislative remedies, 
because it's a question of trust— trust 
in the executive branch to implement 
the laws that were enacted by Con- 
gress, trust by the President and the 
American people that those people in a 
position to implement the laws and the 
policies will, in fact, do so. 

I'm concerned what spawned a 
mechanism within the executive 
branch that would focus on circumven- 
tion of law or to disregard the trust 
that's necessary between the 
legislative and the executive branches 
as well as between the government 
and the American people. 

You said here today that you made 
certain arguments before the Presi- 
dent on your January 7 meeting con- 
cerning the arms shipments to Iran. 
What I would like to know is, when 
you made those arguments, I'd like to 
know what they were, and were you 
opposed to the arms shipments to Iran 
because it was bad policy or because it 
represented a violation of the law? 
And, secondly, I'd like to know 
what the President's response was to 
your argument and specifically if it did 
entail violations of the law. 



Fjiruary 1987 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



And, finally, you said that you 
were not aware of the arms shipments 
to Iran until November when we were 
all informed. But at the same time you 
had fragmentary knowledge that this 
might be occurring. Didn't you think it 
was your responsibility as the Secre- 
tary of State to follow up on that 
information to find out exactly what 
was going on, and also didn't you feel 
that responsibility to raise your con- 
cerns again with the President, know- 
ing that you had some information that 
bears upon this issue in providing 
arms shipments to Iran? 

A. You've asked me— I lost track- 
about 50 questions. 

Ms. Snowe. I'll go back. 

A. Maybe you could identify the one 
you want me to answer. 

Ms. Snowe. I want you to answer 
on what basis did you make your argu- 
ments to the President? What were 
your arguments? On what basis did 
you make your arguments? Was it on 
the basis of thinking it was bad policy 
to send arms to Iran, or, secondly, 
because it was a violation of the law, 
and what was the President's response 
to those issues? And, finally, why 
didn't you attempt as Secretary of 
State to find out and follow up on the 
fragmentary knowledge that you did 
have on arms shipments to Iran that 
were occurring? 

A. First of all, insofar as the law is 
concerned, the finding is the way of deal- 
ing with that issue, and it is, so far as I 
know, a lawful finding, and under that 
finding what was done, so far as I know, 
was legal. The Attorney General was 
involved, and so that's the answer to 
that question. 

Insofar as the diversion of funds is 
concerned, if that took place, then that 
was not a legal thing to do. That was a 
violation of the law. The President has 
made it clear that that was not his policy 
and was not something that he knew 
about. So that's the answer to that 
question. 

Ms. Snowe. I guess what I'm ask- 
ing you is whether or not you men- 
tioned to the President on the Janu- 
ary 7 meeting that the arms shipments 
to Iran could represent a violation of 
the law? 

A. The question of the law was 
raised in the major discussions, and the 
point was made, and I think everyone 
agreed, that if anything is to be done, it 
has to be done in accordance with the 
law. 

However, that's not— and I don't— 
that you sort of take for granted. That's 



a necessary condition. But the focus of 
attention, insofar as I was concerned, 
was primarily on what the arguments 
were— and are— against an arms ship- 
ment to Iran— the policy implications of 
it. They've been well brought out, just as 
the President's side of that argument 
has been well brought out. It's 
debatable, and it was debated, and one 
of the things the President does do on 
issues is hear the debate, so it's a 
legitimate debate. I don't need to review 
all the arguments, you know what they 
are; half of the questions here have dealt 
with them. 

Insofar as was I energetic enough in 
trying to find out what was going on and 
keeping— weighing in on it, you'll have 
to judge that for yourself. I, obviously, 
as in anybody, you search back and you 
say to yourself, "What could I have done 
differently that might have changed the 
situation?" At times when I learned 
about something that I thought was way 
off the rails, I did weigh in, and there 
were a number of places in the chronol- 
ogy of this in which it seemed to me that 
the negotiations that tended to have 
arms connected with them had stopped— 
had been stood down. So I was glad to 
know that. I gave an example of one in 
the December instructions. 

I am perfectly willing to accept 
criticism for not doing as much as 
perhaps I should have done, and I wrack 
my brains about that— kick myself here 
and there. Probably more critical of me 
than you are. I'm kind of a tough critic 
on myself. 

Mr. Gejdenson. During these 
discussions with the President, was 
there concern raised about the 
notification provisions to Congress? 

A. Of course, I didn't know about 
the finding. It's the finding that had 
the— and that is a legitimate thing in 
delaying notification- 
Mr. Gejdenson. Correct — 
A. But I was not involved in that 
debate, so I can't really- I'm not the 
right person to ask that question to. 

Mr. Gejdenson. So you're saying 
that the discussions that you were 
involved in, at no time was there a dis- 
cussion about the necessity of the 
President or the President's people 
notifying the appropriate committees 
before Congress? 

A. There was a discussion of the 
legalities and the importance that 
whatever was done be done properly and 
legally. 

Mr. Gejdenson. And in those 
discussions, did somebody say at some 
point, "You've got to go to Capitol 



t 



Hill and tell them what's going on 
here?" 

A. Certainly. 

Mr. Gejdenson. And was there c 
cern raised about the — 

A. That's part of the process tha 
established in any arms transfer 
situation. 

Mr. Gejdenson. And in that disc 
sion, was there a timeframe discus 
that we have to do this within a cer 
tain amount of time? 

A. I don't recall the discussion w 
enough to respond to your question fv 
and I was not involved in the discussl 
that took place among those who put 
together the finding and implementeo 
so I can't really help you on the inter- 
pretation of that particular phrase. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe t 
18 months is timely notification oft 
appropriate committees of Congress 

A. This goes back to last January 
It's not 18 months— that finding— and 
the people who have been involved an e 
that the President properly had that 
right, and I think that's established. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe ti t 
an 18-month delay in notification of 
Congress is a timely notification? 

A. The finding was not 18 month 
ago. It was in -January, and there was i 
ongoing- 
Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe t ; 
9 months is a timely notification? 

A. —process that I was not by an 
means fully aware of, and the problen 
that the people conducting it continua 
faced was, if our chances of success ai 
to be maximized, this must be done 
secretly. 

Mr. Gejdenson. I understand the 
concern — 

A. They confront the fact— I don' 
say this as a comment about the Con- 
gress, but they confront the fact that ; 
you add additional people who are 
knowledgeable about what is going on 
you increase exponentially the risks of 
the secrecy being blown. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Colleagues are 
pointing out there's a significant 
amount of activity before the finding 
but I want to put all that aside. We 
understand what the law is. The law 
says there has to be a timely notifica 
tion of Congress. When that became 
law. Presidents understood the prob- 
lems that as you increase the number 
of people that know, you increase tht 
possibility word may get out. 

But we have the law to deal with 
and if part of the work of this commi 
tee is to make that law more workabi 



32 



Department of State Bullei 



THE SECRETARY 



less what we have to find out is, 
.t do you consider to be a timely 
ification of Congress within the 

A. So far as I know, there have been 
instances where a deviation from 
r notification and consultation has 
m place. One was the case in Presi- 
t Carter's Administration of the 
rt to have a I'escue of our hostages in 

and that was carried out without 
r notification, so I understand it. on 
;tly these grounds— that if you 
fy— the more people you notified, the 
■e chance of leakage, and so on. I 
n't involved in that, but that's what 
been told. 
This again was a case where the 

P'sident felt that this could not be done 
licly. If it were to be done, it had to 
Iniie secretly and that if it became 
ic, you would jeopardize the effort, 
, 'lU would jeopardize the lives of 
.' nf the people involved. So it was 
irently ongoing. I'm not the person 
;'stify before you about the ins and 
nf this, but it was ongoing. And 
r were— and judging from the cable 
II Ambassador Kelly, right until very 
Mily— prospects of something dif- 
tit happening. So that is the reason 

.^ the notification didn't take place. 

Mr. Solomon. I see the time is 
a roaehing. You just have a few 
n lutes, and you have to leave, and I 
u lerstand that, and I will probably 
r erve my questions. What I wanted 
t io in the first place was to devote at 
1( iit half of this time to an executive 
s sion, because I really think that the 
c imittee has the cart before the 
h se. It seems to me that you are put 
i; I very extenuating circumstance, as 

V 5 President Reagan when he held a 
p ss conference not so long ago and 

V s severely criticized by the press, 
b ause he had to be very careful 

a lut what he said publicly because of 
1 al restraints on classified informa- 
t ti. And I think that all of us should 
Ke had that information under our 
t ts before we subjected you to 
8iwer the questions. I think we could 
li'e properly approached the 
tBstion. 

So I want to commend you. You 
low, you and I have differences on 
» ues such as the China-U.S. com- 
I inique. I disagree with the Presi- 
' nt occasionally on things. But you're 
eking with the President, and Fm 
eking with the President, because I 
lieve him and I believe in him, and 
il save my questions for the executive 
ssion. 



Chairman Fascell. I want to thank 
you for joining us today, and, as you 
can tell, more questions have been 
raised than can be answered right 
now. But we appreciate your 
willingness — 

If members would like to [present 
questions in writing to the Secretary], 
we'll make the record available for 
that purpose. I would hope, however, 
that we can continue this more in 
depth in the executive session, but I'll 
certainly — the gentleman has a right 
to submit questions at this point. 

Let me say. first of all, Mr. 
Secretary, that we thank you very 
much — your willingness to tell us all 
you know. It seems quite clear at this 
point that you can't run foreign policy 
successfully by bypassing your Secre- 
tary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
National Security Council, and the 
Congress. You might be able to do 
something in secret for a short period 
of time that is essential to the security 
of your country, but without waiting 
for all of the evidence to come in, it is 
quite clear already that an operation of 
this size, having this sensitivity, and 
impacting on so many laws of the Con- 
gress and fundamental decisions of 



our society with regard to checks and 
balances and wisdom that is available 
is not a good way to operate. 

I'm sorry, frankly, that you've 
been put in that position as Secretary 
of State, because I know that you've 
done your level best to administer the 
laws and to be faithful and loyal to the 
President of the United States. But 
this is a country of laws and not of 
men, and as you have said yourself, no 
one — no one — is above the law. So 
we'll wish you well on your trip, and 
we'll see as soon as we can get 
together on a date to continue this 
matter with the Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee in executive session. 



'Members of the committee who par- 
ticipated in the question-and-answer session 
with the Secretary were Chairman Dante 
Fascell (D.-Fla.). Gerald B.H. Solomon (R.- 
N.Y.). William S. Broomfield (R.-Mich.), Lee 
H. Hamilton (D.-Ind.). Benjamin A. Gilman 
(R.-N.Y.), Roliert.I. Lagoniarsino (R.-Calif.). 
Gus Yatron (D.-Penn.). Stephen .1. Solarz (D.- 
N.Y.). Jim Leach (R.-lowa). Don Bonker (D.- 
Wash.). Gerry E. Studds (D.-Mass.). Toby 
Roth (R.-Wis.). Dan Mica (D.-Fla.), Howard 
Wolpe (D.-Mich.). Olympia Snowe (R. -Maine), 
and Sam Geidenson (D.-Conn.). The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, I'.S. (jovern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, 

^Press release 258. ■ 



Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
December 16. 1986. by news correspond- 
ents in Rome. Bonn. The Hague. Mainz. 
London, and Pay-is. The interview was 
broadcast live on "Worldnet. " a satellite 
TV program of the U.S. Information 
Service.' 

Q. The Italian public opinion is very 
disconcerned because while on one end 
the United States criticizes the Italian 
behavior of the Achille Lauro affair, 
the U.S. Administration itself had 
already begun its secret negotiations 
with Iran. What's your opinion about 
this? 

A. My opinion is that we have to 
recognize problems in the Persian Gulf 
area, and recognize that if it's possible to 
see Iran in a somewhat different stance, 
to see Iran stopping its use of terrorism, 
to see Iran ready to negotiate an end to 
the Iran-Iraq war, and to use its influ- 
ence to see hostages given up, that that 
would be a good thing. 



The controversial part of this effort 
was the readiness or agreement by the 
President to send a signal in the form of 
an arms transfer, and there are argu- 
ments in favor, as the President has 
given, and there are arguments against 
which are all on display right now. So 
you can argue that point back and forth. 

But I want to make it clear what the 
U.S. policy is and has been. First of all, 
we want to see an end to that war. 
Second, we observe that right now it is 
Iran that refuses to find its way to a 
negotiated solution. So. number three, 
our basic policy, which has been reaf- 
firmed, even though it had this slight 
breakover, oui' basic policy is that we 
should not sell arms to Iran and we 
should encourage others not to do so in 
an effort to deprive Iran of its war- 
making capability. And, of course, we 
are unalterably opposed to terrorism. 
Iran remains on the terrorist list of 
countries. And, obviously, as in any 
country, we want to see our hostages 
returned. That's our policy. 



|ibruary 1987 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Can a repetition of this situa- 
tion be excluded in the future? 

A. I think so. The President has 
stated unequivocally that he considered 
it a wise move to give a signal. The 
signal has been given and no further 
signals are necessary. 

Q. [Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Policy] 
Richard Perle spoke in an interview in 
the last days about relations between 
Bonn and East Berlin. Did he express 
your official position of the United 
States? 

A. I don't want to make comments 
on what other people have said. Obvi- 
ously, Assistant Secretary Perle speaks 
with authority and with a lot of 
knowledge. But let me just simply say 
this. Our relationships with the Federal 
Republic of Germany are strong. Ger- 
many is a wonderful ally. It does a fine 
job as a contributor to the alliance. All of 
us could do more, including the United 
States. But as far as I'm concerned, I'm 
very well pleased with the relationship 
we have in the alliance and directly with 
Germany. 

Q. Would you encourage the West 
German Government to continue the 
process of detention with our Eastern 
neighbors? 

A. I don't quite know— the word 
"detention" means to put somebody in 
prison or something. But I think you 
must mean "detente" or "opening" in 
your question, and I'll interpret it that 
way. 

Certainly, I think that it is 
important— and we do it in the United 
States— to see if a more constructive 
relationship can be developed with the 
countries of Eastern Europe. And it's 
only natural that the Germans in the 
P^ederal Republic of Germany should 
want to reach out to Germans in East 
Germany. 

Q. At the NATO meeting in 
Brussels last week, the Dutch 
Secretary of State, Mr. van den Broek, 
seems to be one of the few Europeans 
who supported the outcome of the 
Reykjavik summit in respect for the 
total elimination of all ballistic 
missiles in 10 years. 

That part of the Reykjavik out- 
come wasn't mentioned in the final 
communique in Brussels. Why didn't 
you support Mr. van den Brock's 
position? 

A. First of all, the meeting was 
notable for the broad measure of agree- 
ment. It was an excellent meeting, and a 
very good, thorough exchange. The allies 
supported with enthusiasm the work 



done at Reykjavik in the intermediate- 
range missile area and in the area of 
strategic arms. 

There were differences of view 
expressed about whether or not it is wise 
within 10 years to be in favor of the 
elimination of all ballistic missiles, as the 
President is, and different allies had dif- 
ferent views about it. We continue, in 
the United States, to support our posi- 
tion, which the President has stated and 
which some supported— some didn't like 
it, some were uneasy, so there was a 
variation in view in the alliance on that. 
But the communique and the general 
discussion emphasized the INF [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces] and 
START [strategic arms reduction talks] 
areas and there was great support- 
uniform support for that. 

Q. In view of the Reykjavik talks, 
whether your Administration would be 
ready to set up a new set of standards, 
about the survival of the alliance: 
namely, to consider, first, that the 
transition from offensive weapons to 
defensive weapons, which is implied 
by the development of SDI [Strategic 
Defense Initiative], could be managed 
in a way which would help the allies 
and NATO as a whole not to be left at 
the mercy of deals with the Soviets 
which would dismantle bits or parts of 
all deterrence apparatus. 

In other words, would you be 
ready, with consultation with your 
allies to have a position which would 
not leave the Soviets to decide the 
numbers and the quantities of the 
assets that both Europe and America 
need for our survival? 

A. Your question wandered all over 
the place and with something of an 
assertion on your part. But let me simply 
state what our posture is, as far as the 
alliance is concerned. 

First of all, our alliance with the 
countries of Western Europe, in NATO, 
is the center of gravity and a central ele- 
ment in how we approach the security of 
the United States. That has been true, it 
is true, and it will continue to be true. 

Second of all, in carrying out our 
side of the bargain, there are certain 
things that the United States has as a 
responsibility and will carry through on, 
continue to do so, and be engaged in. 

They are, first of all, to maintain a 
strategic deterrent force capable of 
reaching the Soviet Union. We fully 
intend to do that. Second, to maintain a 
large, credible military force on the 
ground in Europe. We have been doing 
that and we'll continue to do so. Number 
three, it's important that we have a 
NATO alliance that, so to speak, lives 



Jile 



and breathes. It studies the contingeri 
cies, it revises its plans. When it sees 
new contingencies, it conducts exercis 
It does all of the things that makes th 
things written on the paper a reality ; 
we take part in that, give leadership t 
it, and are engaged with our allies in 
that. 

And perhaps most importantly, th 
we continue in working with our frieni 
abroad, not only in Europe but else 
where, at the political workability and 
meaning of the underlying values that 
bring the alliance forward in the first 
place. That is, we all keep track of wh* 
it is we're defending and what we hav 
deterrence against. 

So these are the fundamental tene 
that have guided us in the alliance anc 
will continue to guide us in the allianC' 
We work with our partners very heav^ 
There has been immense consultation 
throughout the past year— I think unp 
cedented consultation— and that's the 
reason why there is such a broad 
measure of understanding and suppor( 
among us. 

Q. One of President Reagan's 
several stated reasons in selling arm 
to Iran is his desire to bring an 
honorable end to the Iraqi-Iranian 
war. It's now reported that the Uni1| 
States has been supplying Iraq withf 
satellite intelligence in order to 
encourage more bombing of Iranian i 
economic targets. Is that report 
broadly true and, if so, how is such 
intervention to be squared with the 
President's objective of bringing an ^ 
end to the war? 

A. First of all, let me just reassert 
as you stated, that our objective is to t 
to bring an end to the war, and we thii 
the principal recalcitrant party is Iran.' 
And so to the extent that Iran's milita> 
capability can be reduced, that pre- 
sumably will help bring them to a fram 
of mind where they're willing to sit 
down with Iraq and try to reach an 
agreement. We think the right kind of! 
agreement is one that maintains the tet 
ritorial integrity of each side and doesr 
have, so to speak, a winner and a loser' 

As far as matters of intelligence an 
intelligence-sharing are concerned, of 
course, that's something that I simply 
am not free to comment on. 

Q. If it is your intention to reduce 
Iran's capability, why are you then 
increasing it by sending it arms? 

A. The President has explained 
publicly his thinking, that he felt under 
the circumstances that it was importan) 
and worthwhile to send a small signal, 
which he did. And he has said that the 
signal has been given of the readiness o 



34 



Department of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



United States to engage with Iran, 
no furtiier signals are necessary or 
be given. So the question of any 

,er arms sales to Iran from the 
;ed States has been settled, and 
e won't be any more under the pres- 

ircumstances. 

Q. Many European governments 
that a weaker American President 
be more open to influence from 
g^ess and that the new Congress 
be more protectionist than the 
^ious one. Recent disagreements in 
cultural trade with the European 
munity have been seen as a confir- 
ni.ion of this trend. 

Don't you think that, on the con- 
tr|y, this should be a moment for 
cl ing ranks, having in mind political 
ccuderations? 

A. I think certainly in the field of 
tr' e, it's a moment for opening trade 
: Kire, not closing it down. I per- 
illy am very strongly committed to 
ilea of opening up the opportunities 
rade and knocking barriers down. 
t's why the President and all of us 
■ lieen such strong supporters of the 
( ;.'\TT [General Agreement on 
i, ffs and Trade] round which has got- 
te started now as a result of the 
ral ting in Punte del Este. 
.4nd, of course, the reasons why we 
I'' United States think protection is 
of course, is in part because it isn't 
I for our friends around the world 
w —many depend upon access to our 
m ket. 

But most of all, and perhaps this is 
ti most reassuring point as far as our 
fr ids are concerned, we're against it 
t» luse it's bad for Americans. It's bad 
ft American consumers. It lets up on 
'1 competitive thrust behind moves to 
■r costs and make things better on 
ii part of American producers, so we 
bi afit from open markets ourselves, 
! that's the reason why we want to 
I ihem that way. 

Q. Do you think that the arms sales 
a lir applies to every country to per- 
ir separate agreements to free 
h tages? 

A. I think it is a mistake to make 
ti les for hostages as normally thought 
oThe reasons why it's a mistake are, 
t nf all, it encourages people to take 
•• tages, feeling that they can get 
saething for them. And, second of all, 
" n a sense, raises the value in the eyes 
lie hostage-takers of the people they 
nly hold. So, as a matter of policy 
[iractice. we should not be ready to 
if anything for hostages. We should 
St that they be released and to seek 



every way, every pressure, every ounce 
of persuasion that we can to bring that 
about. 

Q. The headlines we've been 
reading for a while now of secret arms 
sales to Iran, money passed on to the 
Nicaraguan contras. secret informa- 
tion passed on to Iraq — the German 
paper calls it a matter of broken pieces 
today. How are you going to mend the 
pieces? 

A. The President's approach to this 
is simple and, I think, correct. It is, first 
of all, to get the facts of what took place 
out into the open to the maximum e.xtent 
possible, or. to the extent you're dealing 
with classified matters, into the hands of 
properly set-up congressional commit- 
tees or investigative bodies, to see if 
there were laws broken and by whom, 
and to prosecute those who may have 
violated the law. So that's one part of 
the strategy. It's a very forthcoming, 
open, immediate effort on the part of the 
President. And I might point out that 
practically the minute that he heard 
about the possible wrongdoing, of diver- 
sion of funds in the contra case, he took 
action. 

The second part of what the Presi- 
dent has said is that, having done that 
and sort of said, "Okay, now there's an 
area where those things are going to be 
pursued." Now, as far as we all are con- 
cerned, we have lots of work to do. We 
have problems, we have opportunities, 
we have work with our allies, so let's 
keep at it, and that's what we're doing. 
That's why we have been receiving peo- 
ple, continuing to receive people here 
practically everyday, and why Secretary 
[of Defense Caspar] Weinberger was in 
Europe and why I was in Europe. We're 
conducting the business of the govern- 
ment, and that's what we must do. 

Q. But the crisis appears to go 
deeper. You quoted the President. May 

1 quote today's Washington Post — a 
headline that reads, "Ronald Reagan's 
Government is Disintegrating," and, 
indeed, a lot of Europeans are afraid 
of the lame-duck effect for the next 

2 years. How would you react to such 
fears? 

A. I've just reacted to it by saying 
that the President has put into motion a 
way of dealing with this situation, and, 
of course, as a result of the first part of 
his decision— namely, to have things 
brought out— a lot of things are being 
brought out. That's not a mark of dis- 
integration; that's a mark of a President 
who is wanting to see whatever the facts 
are be made public. 

Now, as far as the business of con- 
ducting the nation's business is con- 
cerned, we're doing it. 



Q. A matter of concern in this 
NATO member state is the situation in 
Suriname. What do you know about 
the human rights situation in 
Suriname? Do vou have an opinion on 
it? 

A. We have reports from our 
amlmssador of brutality, of what 
amounts to murders, of gi'oss violations 
of human rights, and we consider that 
the reports are, unfortunately, credible. 
So we're quite concerned about the situ- 
ation in Suriname, and I know that it's 
of great concern to the people of Holland 
and others around the world. 

Q. Do you think there is any 
Libyan involvement in Suriname? 

A. I don't feel I have enough infor- 
mation to answer that question in a 
definitive way. There have been rumors 
about that, and there is a certain amount 
of information, but I don't consider it 
such that I would want to make a defini- 
tive statement. 

Q. Do you expect that the present 
regime in Suriname can restore democ- 
racy there? 

A. What I can say is that I think it's 
very desirable that the people of any 
country, including Suriname, be gov- 
erned by a process which reflects the 
wishes of the people of the country. And 
so I would like to see that happen. 

Q. After the revelation about the 
Iran arms deal, do you feel that you 
are now put in charge of foreign 
affairs? 

A. No one is fully in charge, but we 
try to administer this effort very 
strongly, and I think basically have it in 
hand. 

Of course, the person in charge is 
the President. It's the President that has 
a foreign policy, and I work for him, and 
I support him, and I try to help him 
shape foreign policy. He takes my advice 
lots of times. He modifies it or doesn't 
agree with it sometimes, but we work 
together very strongly and effectively, I 
think, and that continues to be the case. 
And it is, of course, primarily for the 
State Department to be the executor of 
the President's foreign policy, and we 
try to measure up to that responsibility 
in every way we can. 

Perhaps one lesson of this Iran prob- 
lem is that's a case where a piece of 
foreign policy was administered else- 
where, and it would have been better if 
it had been in normal channels, in my 
opinion. 

Q. At the beginning of this crisis, 
have you thought to resign? 

A. Any discussion of my status, of 
course, is for the President and me to 
discuss, and it's— I serve at his pleasure. 



Druary 1987 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. The advantage of banning all 
ballistic missiles is, of course, that 
more warning time would be created 
and the remaining bombers could be 
called back, and so on. and this is a 
less hair-triggering situation than 
perhaps now is the case. 

But how does this relate to 
Stealth bombers and fast cruise mis- 
siles with Stealth technology, which 
cannot be seen at all perhaps, if this 
technology works, and could attack 
from the blue? 

A. I think you very well stated a 
fundamental element in the argument 
for the elimination of ballistic missiles. 
Of course, there are many who hesitate 
for good reasons and so there is a 
healthy discussion going on in the 
alliance about that. 

If you don't have ballistic missiles, 
you're going to have to have a credible 
deterrent, as I said earlier on this pro- 
gram, and the United States is com- 
mitted to the idea that under the kind of 
world we live in, it's important to have 
in being a strategic nuclear deterrent 
that can reach the Soviet Union, and 
we're determined to maintain that 
posture, and we think it's one of our 
responsibilities to ourselves and one of 
our responsibilities to our allies. 

Q. Could I turn back to the gulf? 
In testimony to Congress last week 
you expressed surprise and shock that 
your ambassador in Beirut had used 
CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] 
back channels to communicate on the 
Iran issue. You said earlier on this 
program you would not talk about 
intelligence, but did you know of this 
policy of supplying intelligence to Iraq 
and logistics support, or was this 
another example of the CIA using back 
channels? 

A. I'm not going to comment on the 
intelligence matter, as I said earlier, and 
there are some things that I didn't know 
about in the overall situation, but by and 
large we're well informed. 

Q. On that are you saying you did 
not — 

A. I might say with respect to— 

Q. — know about certain matters 
as supplying intelligence to Iraq? 

A. I am not going to answer a ques- 
tion about the supply of intelligence to 
somebody by inference. 

Q. In line with State Department 
policy. Mr. Shultz— 

A. A very skillful question, but I'm 
not going to step into that hole. 

Q. — comment on one quote in one 
of the papers this morning suggesting 



that in the gulf the State Department 
is trying to engineer a stalemate in the 
gulf war? 

A. We're not interested in a 
stalemate. We're interested in an end, so 
that it stops; that the territorial integri- 
ty of each country is maintained, and 
people can go about the business of 
economic development for the people of 
their country. 

Q. What's your opinion about the 
careful approaches being made by Italy 
toward Libya? 

A. Libya has established itself as a 
state that virtually brags about its sup- 
port for terrorism, and there's no doubt 
about it. And the evidence accumulated 
by various European governments of 
Libyan plans and Libyan activities make 
it very clear about what the Libyan 
posture is. 



Obviously, you want them to chai , 
but I think in the meantime the policj f 
isolating a state that does that is the 
right policy. 

Q. CIA and NSC [National Secuiy 
Council] seem to function like a stai 
within a state. How can these agen( s 
be controlled, never to endanger agi, 
the Presidency to the point that it's^ 
now happened? 

A. I thmk you're jumping to a lot 
conclusions in that question, and they 
are. of course, subject to congressiom 
oversight and presidential oversight, ; 
basically are designed as service agen; 
cies; that is. their function is to provio 
intelligence to others who have the 
responsibility for policy development 
operational matters. That's the way it 
should work. 



iPress release 264 of Dec. 17, 1986. 



Southern Africa: 

American Hopes for the Future 



Secretary Shultz 's address before the 
International Management and Develop- 
ment Institute on December J,. 1986.' 

Africa's leaders know, and I know, and 
you know, that the United States and 
the West are uniquely relevant to their 
problems in southern Africa. Why is 
that? It's because our enormous wealth 
of managerial, technological, and finan- 
cial talent and resources symbolize the 
success story of the West. So at a time 
when southern Africa is poised on a 
knife-edge between hope and despair, 
you represent hope. So you represent 
why we are a nation of builders, and it's 
for this reason that I come here, and I 
welcome this opportunity to discuss our 
policy toward southern Africa, a region 
rich in potential but beset by turmoil. If 
southern Africa slides into conflict, all 
the peoples of the vast region— some 150 
million— will see their hopes for a better 
future destroyed, and major American 
interests— political, economic, and 
strategic— will be jeopardized. 

The LInited States sees the potential 
for a hopeful future southern Africa. We 
are convinced that there are constructive 
alternatives to violence, and we are try- 
ing to turn this positive vision into 
reality. Today, I want to lay out the 
Administration's policy toward the 
region in detail and examine it against 
the backdrop of present-day South 
African realities. 



The United States has had a consi^ 
tent commitment to peace with justice 
southern Africa. This is demonstrated 

• Our positive emphasis on what 
are for, as well as what we are agains« 
in southern Africa; 

• Forthright insistence that an 
effective American policy must be basi 
on a diplomatic effort; sanctions by 
themselves do not represent a policy; 

• Strong conviction that Americat 
business and investment can play a co 
structive role in South Africa and the 
region; 

• Substantial U.S. regional assist- 
ance, including the President's new 
southern Africa aid initiative; and 

• A clear challenge to all the leadt 
of southern Africa to build a better 
future rather than destroy the region 
through a self-defeating descent into 
violence. 

The premises of our policy were 
reexamined in the domestic debate tha 
preceded the latest round of U.S. sanc- 
tions. That debate once again made cle 
that the principles underlying this 
Administration's policy— many of whio 
are codified in the Anti-Apartheid Act 
1986— are shared by all Americans. Th' 
recent controversy over sanctions was, 
thus, over the means, not the ends, of 
our policy. The Administration's doubts 
about the utility of punitive sanctions 
were, and are, serious. Nevertheless, 



36 



Department of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



y are the law of the land, and we will 
brce them. 

At the same time, I sense a growing 
lization, here and in the region, that 
ctions by themselves do not amount 
in effective policy in southern Africa, 
must now use all the instruments at 
disposal to make our limited influ- 
;e count. In a word, the time ahead is 
i for diplomacy guided by a long-term 
IV of our interests and objectives in 
thern Africa. 

|]pes for the Future 

F'sident Reagan has expressed clearly 
,4ierica's hopes for the future of South 

-'■ica. 

This Administration is not only. . .against 
1 rtheid; we are for a new South Africa, a 
nation where all that has been built up 
'• m'lierations is not destroyed, a new 
s ety where participation in the social. 
c ural, and political life is open to all 

'■ — a new South Africa that comes home 
lamily of free nations where it belongs. 

~)i<>ke the President. 
We cannot prescribe— and we do not 
sume to offer— detailed political 
'in'ints for South Africa's future. But 
ran and should state with precision 
It we are for as well as what we are 
.iiist. We are/o?' a South Africa 
V jse people enjoy equal political, 
6 nomic, and social rights. We are /or a 
i ith Africa whose leaders are chosen 
i lemocratic elections with multiparty 
I ticipation and universal franchise. 
\ look forward to the day when basic 
\ nan rights for each individual are pro- 
t ted by firm constitutional guarantees, 
i d we strongly support opening the 
f e, market-oriented South African 
i nomy to all the people of that rich 
1 d so that black South Africans can 
t lidly redress past economic injustice 
i.iising their own living standards 
ill- contributing to the prosperity for 

This vision of the future of South 
'ica is ambitious. It is worthy of our 
I ;t efforts as a people. But if the 
I ited States is to contribute to a proc- 
i of positive change, we have to do 
I re than assume a righteous moral 
Future. We must reach out to all 
i^ ithern Africans and make effective 
■ I'f our limited influence. And we 
ist measure our hopes for the future 
' liiist the background of today's 
ilities. 



e C ourse of Change in South Africa 

e current cycle of repression and 
distance in South Africa will resolve 
thing. The state of emergency, with 



all its attendant denial of civil liberties, 
press freedom, and due process under 
law, cannot address the root causes of 
unrest; it can only undermine prospects 
for nonviolent change. Some may believe 
that a policy of repression and the prac- 
tice of violence will ultimately bring 
reconciliation. I disagree. Repression 
only deepens black determination to end 
the apartheid system that denies them 
fundamental political and human rights. 
And violence only stiffens white 
resistance and undermines those advo- 
cating peaceful reform and negotiation. 

The South African economy remains 
troubled. Businessmen— foreign and 
South African alike— will not invest or 
reinvest in a society that excludes the 
greater part of its citizens from full par- 
ticipation. The international banking 
community refuses to grant new loans 
because of the increased risk and inter- 
national condemnation brought about by 
apartheid. Unemployment is growing. 
Many of South Africa's most talented 
and experienced professionals are 
emigrating. A siege economy is emerg- 
ing, one that features sanctions, 
underutilized domestic capital, efforts to 
create the illusion of growth by uneco- 
nomical import substitution, more and 
more state controls, and industrial 
unrest. These developments are eroding 
the basis for future South African 
governments— no matter how consti- 
tuted—to meet the country's pressing 
social and economic needs. 

Many American and other foreign 
firms have already decided to leave. 
These decisions, induced by the hard 
realities of the marketplace, will only 
compound the potential for tragedy. 
American firms have found it increas- 
ingly difficult to stay the course in the 
face of a deteriorating political and 
economic environment in South Africa 
and mounting criticism here at home. 
These attacks on American corporate 
involvement in South Africa are both 
ironic and unwarranted because 
American business has been a force for 
promoting interracial decency and 
equality. 

American business has made a 
magnificent contribution to South 
Africa, committing well over $200 
million outside the workplace to provide 
scholarships, training, nonracial housing, 
and other benefits to their black 
employees. Western business organiza- 
tions challenge apartheid daily through 
their policies and their actions. The com- 
mitment of American firms to the 
highest standards of corporate citizen- 
ship has been an honorable undertaking 
of which all Americans can be proud. I 
want to make crystal clear that we in the 
Administration strongly support those 



firms that have taken the tough decision 
to stay. 

South Africa's troubled economy has 
long-term consequences for the coun- 
try's political future. There is an organic 
link between a truly democratic political 
order and a vibrant, free economy. 
South Africa's social and economic needs 
cannot be met by a stagnant economy. 
Such an economy will merely compound 
the legacy of apartheid. For all who 
aspire to political leadership in the 
future South Africa, restoration of a 
sound economy should be a matter of 
priority concern. And it is no less impor- 
tant to neighboring nations whose econo- 
mies are inevitably and vitally affected 
by events in South Africa. 

The South African Government has 
brought many of its current troubles on 
itself. It has resorted to suppression of 
dissent, violations of basic human rights, 
denial of economic liberties, and govern- 
ment by decree. These abuses have 
discouraged the forces of moderation 
both inside South Africa and beyond. 
Not long ago, a vigorous, independent 
press in South Africa often criticized— 
sharply and constructively— the govern- 
ment and its policies. As recently as the 
early months of this year, there was real 
hope that South Africans, with the 
assistance of the Commonwealth's 
Eminent Persons' Group (EPG), might 
begin a constructive dialogue about their 
country's future. Yet they have not, so 
far, taken advantage of these possibili- 
ties. Still, there are signs of hope. 

• We've seen impressive strides in 
the organizational and political 
capabilities of black groups in South 
Africa. From political movements to 
trade unions, from churches and com- 
munity associations to business and pro- 
fessional organizations, blacks are 
preparing themselves for leadership. 
They are understandably impatient and 
unwilling to wait another generation. 
They are ready now to play a positive 
role in building a new South Africa. And 
the United States stands with them 
through our official assistance programs 
and the many support programs coor- 
dinated by American corporations, foun- 
dations, labor unions, chttrches, and 
universities. 

• In Natal Province, the Indaba— a 
convention representing all racial groups 
and a wide range of social and political 
organizations— has, for many months, 
been wrestling on a provincial basis with 
the great questions that must also be 
addressed at the national level, including 
the creation of a nonracial legislature 
and the drafting of a bill of rights. The 
Indaba has been the only political forum 
in the country where blacks could 



;bruary 1987 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



participate on equal terms with members 
of other races. 

The Indaba has now made public its 
proposal. It is controversial in South 
Africa, as any imaginative compromise 
might be. Nevertheless, the Indaba has 
shown that South Africans are capable 
of difficult mutual accommodation to 
advance the cause of racial justice and 
representative government when they 
are challenged to do so. A recent poll 
indicates that three out of four blacks 
favor negotiations rather than violence 
as a way of ending apartheid. Yet time is 
fast running out for those blacks still 
willing to play a positive and peaceful 
role in building a new South Africa. 

• In Parliament, a badly out- 
numbered but vocal opposition continues 
to call the government to account for its 
actions. Those determined South African 
patriots deserve our admiration, for they 
preserve a parliamentary tradition that 
will be vitally important to a new South 
Africa. 

Until quite recently, it was also 
possible for South Africans to take heart 
from reforms undertaken by the govern- 
ment in Pretoria. Legalization of black 
trade unions, repeal of the pass laws, 
and relaxation of many other onerous 
apartheid restrictions raised hopes that 
the government itself might become an 
engine of constructive change. These 
reforms— as the United States recog- 
nized at the time— required real political 
courage. But we also recognized that the 



dedicated F^oreign Service officer, 
Ed Perkins. Ed has as his principal 
mission the task of broadening and 
deepening our contacts with all South 
Africans. He will be making clear to 
them that we have no intention of pack- 
ing our bags and leaving them to face 
the future in isolation. We do not ask 
that black South Africans temper their 
passion for change. We share it. We only 
ask that it be channeled into construc- 
tive strategies for reconciliation. 

Our contacts with the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC) and a wide 
array of internal black opposition groups 
are part of this effort to broaden 
American access to all parties in South 
Africa. We recognize no single group as 
the primary vehicle of black aspirations. 
And we make no secret of our deep con- 
cerns about the ANC's communist con- 
nections and links to Moscow and both 
organizations' advocacy of violence. 

The existence of these contacts does 
not signal American approbation of the 
ANC or the PAC. It signals that com- 
munication channels are open. And we 
are using them to advance the cause of 
equal rights, democracy, and constitu- 
tional government in South Africa. We 
must stimulate the members of these 
movements to begin to think seriously 
about what theij must do to get negotia- 
tions going and to produce a system of 
constitutional government acceptable to 
all South Africans. 



No policy toward South Africa can succeed unless 
it is developed within the framework of regional 
solutions to the problems of peace and stability in 
southern Africa. . . . 



South African Government's commit- 
ment to reform was tentative and often 
qualified; and it did not address the cen- 
tral question of black political rights. 

Today, the government's reform pro- 
grams are being overshadowed by its 
preoccupation with maintaining control 
at home and its determination to resist 
sanctions from abroad and minimize 
their effects. The South African Govern- 
ment must move urgently to rejuvenate 
reform; and its effects must be broad- 
ened to encompass a real political 
dialogue involving all South Africans. 
Delay only invites disaster. 

We have just sent to South Africa as 
our new ambassador a distinguished and 



It is equally important to assure 
South Africa's whites of their security as 
individuals and as a community. In a 
recent speech to the Overseas Develop- 
ment Council, the Vice President of 
Botswana, Peter Mmusi, put it in this 
way: 

We do not wish the white people of South 
Africa ill. The Afrikaner people have a secure 
and important role to play in the future, not 
only of their own country, but of the region as 
a whole. They have Africa in their blood. We 
are part and parcel of each other's history. 

Americans can agree with these 
words. We share with white South 
Africans a heritage of resistance to colo- 
nialism, a frontier tradition, and an 



appreciation of entrepreneurial enter- 
prise in an expanding modern econoirs 
Americans admire the economic accoij 
plishments of white South Africans an 
their commitment to Western political 
traditions. Our objective is to encoura 
the extension of the full benefits of 
citizenship— which white South Africa 
so rightly cherish— to all their 
countrymen. 

The United States is against tyrai. 
in all its forms. We reject and oppose 
despotism by any name. We will neve; 
support the replacement of apartheid 
repression in some other form. The 
democratic future that all South 
Africans deserve must include reliable 
constitutional guarantees for the righ* 
of majorities, minorities, and individua 
If whites begin a meaningful political 
dialogue on this basis with all their 
fellow South Africans, they will have 
firm— I repeat, firm— American suppoi 

This is a sober American message 
all the people of South Africa in a corr 
plex and challenging time. In today's 
polarized politics of South Africa, I krt 
that this view will satisfy no one com 
pletely. But we in the West need to 
challenge all the contending parties to 
rise above their divisions and the prosi 
pect of escalating violence and to 
negotiate in the interest of peace and i 
better future for all. 

Toward Regional Peace and StabilitI 

No policy toward South Africa can sun 
ceed unless it is developed within the 
framework of regional solutions to the 
problems of peace and stability in 
southern Africa. Leaders throughout i 
area are acutely aware that the reper- 
cussions of violence in South Africa 
would be felt far beyond South Africai 
borders. It would imperil Botswana's 
democracy and jeopardize hopes for 
stability and economic development in 
the entire region from Lesotho to Zair 
It would undermine American efforts 
negotiate a settlement involving Nami 
ian independence and the withdrawal ( 
all foreign forces from Angola. It woul 
jeopardize hopes for reconciliation in 
Angola and give the Soviets fresh oppo 
tunities to pursue their imperial 
ambitions. 

We have consistently assured the 
front-line states of American readiness 
to work with them to avert catastropb 
and to build for the future of southern 
Africa. We are deeply disturbed by 
recent South African threats against 
Botswana and its other neighbors. Our 
condemnation of cross-border attacks 
and other destabilizing actions by Souti 
Africa is unequivocal, as is our condem' 
nation of those who cross into South 
Africa to carrv out terrorist attacks. 






38 



Department of State Bullei 



THE SECRETARY 






This American stance against 
nee among neighboring states in 
lern Africa has been explicit in our 
ig support for the Nkomati accord 
een South Africa and Mozambique. 
; agreement has recently come under 
;asing strain as the parties have 
anged charges of violations of its 
r and spirit. We believe the time has 
for a lowering of the rhetoric and a 
rn to dialogue. The Nkomati agree- 
t remains in the interest of both 
,h Africa and Mozambique, and we 
both parties to fulfill in good faith 
■ obligations under it. Similarly, we 
ipon Mozambique and Malawi to 
Ive their differences peacefully, with 
:ct for each other's sovereignty and 
ity. 

The search for peace and stability in 
hern Africa has been made more dif- 
|t by the recent death of President 
tie! of Mozambique. The United 
s worked constructively with Presi- 
Machel as he sought to move 
ambique toward true nonalignment 
la greater role for private initiative 
iozambique's economy. We strongly 
lorted his decision to sign the 
(mati accord with South Africa. And 
nope to work with President 

»sano and his colleagues to build 
I the solid foundation he helped to 
as blish. We call upon the South 
A can Government, Mozambique's 
(A T neighbors, and the international 
Cf munity to give Mozambique a chance 
tc nd its civil strife and resume its 
« lomic development. 

At my request, Under Secretary of 
" (■ [for Political Affairs] Mike Arma- 
will soon be visiting several 
licrn African states. He will 
'rate our support for the security 
ai development of the front-line states 
ai our conviction that they have a 
< 111 role to play in the drama of 
iij,e in southern Africa. The front-line 
It i-s have a unique opportunity— 
I 'I, a responsibility— to help create 
natives to violence and confronta- 
iii South Africa and the region. It 
serve the interest of no party if they 
a fuel to the flames of regional con- 
fi itation, aggravating an already 
:L;i'rous situation. We look to them to 
I' sponsibly in the interest of 
1 1'I'ul change in southern Africa. And 
1 1 'affirm our readiness to work 
■t'l\' with them in that endeavor. 
The United States assures the states 
-iiuthern Africa that they will have 
' I'lmtinuing support as they struggle 
li the economic consequences of 
1 itical turmoil in the region. President 
auan has pledged to present to the 
■:t ( "ongress a comprehensive multi- 



ibruary 1987 



year program designed to promote 
economic reform and development in the 
black-ruled states of southern Africa. 

The Congress has expressed its con- 
cern for the region by making the 
development of such a program a matter 
of law in its Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986. 
I want to assure you today that the 
President and I are determined to 
prepare a good program and to see it 
approved. If we want to be taken 
seriously in southern Africa, we must 
put the resources on the line to make the 
President's pledge a reality. 



First, our country is united on the 
goal of ending apartheid and playing an 
active role in helping bring about a new, 
democratic South Africa that respects 
the rights and promotes the oppor- 
tunities of all its people. 

Second, this process of change and 
negotiation cannot be accomplished by 
outsiders. It must be built by South 
Africans themselves— even as we offer 
our support. And we will support genu- 
ine reconciliation and a serious grappling 
with the issues. The new South Africa 
we hope to see must be based on an 



The crisis in southern Africa cannot be 
ameliorated by external parties .... unless the 
people of the region themselves are prepared to 
turn away from violence and toward dialogue. . 



The Western Partnership 

In this and other aspects of our policy 
toward southern Africa, we are not 
alone. We have maintained close con- 
sultations and coordination with our 
major allies in Europe and with Japan. 
Our allies have been in the forefront of 
positive and hopeful efforts such as the 
EPG initiative, which sought to help the 
contending parties in South Africa move 
toward negotiations. They have joined 
with us in calling on both the South 
African Government and its opposition 
to turn from violence and toward negoti- 
ations. Our allies have been as forthright 
as we in calling on Pretoria to end the 
current state of emergency, to release 
Nelson Mandela and other political 
prisoners, to unban political parties, and 
to set a timetable for the elimination of 
the apartheid laws. 

This Western partnership will be 
even more important in the future. It is 
essential that the West speak with one 
voice if it is to be heard in the noisy 
clamor of contending parties in southern 
Africa. The United States is committed 
to working together with the other 
industrial democracies in this critical 
region, and we are sure that our allies 
are of the same mind. 

Conclusion 

So where do we go from here? The key 
element of our diplomacy must be clear 
to the American people, to our allies, 
and to Africans who care so deeply 
about this region. 



accommodation of interests— not the 
replacement of one injustice by another. 

Third, our diplomacy will actively 
seek to support dialogue and communi- 
cation—despite the difficulties posed by 
distrust and polarization. We have a 
unique interest in communicating with 
all parties. We will urge them to create 
and exploit all openings for reconcilia- 
tion and constructive change. 

Fourth, working with our allies, we 
will continue to assert a Western vision 
of what we favor as the outcome in 
South Africa. It is not enough to cam- 
paign againut apartheid. South Africans 
must know what the West stands /or as 
the country redefines itself politically. 

Fifth, we believe that the leaders of 
southern Africa— whatever their rhetoric 
of the moment— want us to be there, 
lending a hand. This is the message I 
have heard from a wide spectrum of 
leaders from the front-line states and 
South Africa. Our assistance programs 
in South Africa, established under this 
Administration with strong support from 
the Congress, represent a constructive 
accomplishment of which we can be 
proud. Our corporate, educational, and 
religious leaders have played a vital 
parallel role. We intend to sustain our 
efforts, and we urge all concerned 
Americans to continue their contribu- 
tions as well. It is the road of 
involvement— not disengagement— that 
will bring us closer to our goals. 

Sixth, we recognize that South 
Africa's evolution is intimately con- 
nected to the fate of an entire region. 
Accordingly, we are committed to play- 
ing our proper role in creating alter- 

39 



AFRICA 



natives to destructive confrontation in 
southern Africa. The West must support 
this region's economic health and 
political viability. And we will continue 
our efforts to resolve the long-festering 
conflicts that complicate the search for 
peace and development. Now is a time 
for sober reflection and careful analysis 
by all the region's leaders. We can be 
effective partners only if they resist the 
temptations of violence and the strident 
voices of destructive conflict. 

Finally, let me share with you yet 
another striking word from the recent 
remarks of Vice President Mmusi: 

We believe that those in authority in 
South Africa are made of the very same flesh 
and blood as ourselves. They share the same 
emotions and intellect as we do. They worship 
the same God. It is our hope that, sooner or 
later, they will realize the path they have 
chosen to travel spells only their own doom. 

Peter Mmusi clearly does not view 
the drama of southern Africa as a Greek 
tragedy already written. I agree with 
him wholeheartedly. There is too much 
at stake for us to turn away in despair 
and let destructive events run their 
course. The economic engine created by 
the talent and sweat of all the peoples of 
southern Africa is too important to be 
destroyed by reckless actions from any 
quarter. The hopes of all the region's 
people for a better life for themselves 
and their children are too precious to be 
squandered away in futile efforts to 
preserve apartheid in South Africa 
or by a leftward lurch toward a new 
authoritarianism. 

The crisis in southern Africa cannot 
be ameliorated by external parties— 
however powerful and well 
intentioned— unless the people of the 
region themselves are prepared to turn 
away from violence and toward dialogue. 
As I look at southern Africa today, I'm 
reminded of the Prophet Ezekiel's pro- 
verbial call on his people to renounce 
their destructive past: "The fathers have 
eaten sour grapes, and the children's 
teeth are set on edge." The fathers and 
mothers of southern Africa have eaten 
their fill of the sour grapes of repression, 
violence, and retribution for the 
mistakes of the past. 

The time has come for the children 
of every country in that vast and poten- 
tially rich region to be freed from this 
dread legacy. I pledge today that 
southern Africans— black, white, colored, 
Indian— who take this course will not be 
alone. The United States will stand with 
them. If we are true to ourselves, we can 
pursue no other course. 



South Africa: Toward Peace and Stability 



'Press release 256. 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Address before the Economic Club in 
Detroit on December 1, 1986. Mr. 
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. 

Thank you for your hospitality and for 
the opportunity to discuss with you our 
policy toward southern Africa. In the 
6 years that I've been responsible for 
this policy arena, there have been 
periods when we made real progress 
toward our goals of strengthened peace 
and stability, with democratic govern- 
ment and respect for individual human 
rights in all the countries of a region of 
critical importance to the United States. 
There have been other periods when 
these goals have seemed more distant as 
proponents of violence and extremism 
held the upper hand. We are currently in 
one of these seasons of uncertainty 
about the future of southern Africa, and 
any assessment we draw about the 
future must be sober. 

The Debate Over Sanctions 

First, let me say a word about the 
debate we have just come through over 
our policy toward South Africa. That 
debate was hard fought and doubtless 
left some bruised feelings on both sides. 
It was not, however, a debate about the 
fundamental objectives of our policy. 
This is best illustrated by the fact that 
the policy objectives set forth in the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986 parallel closely the goals set forth 
by President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, 
and other senior officials of this 
Administration. 

Our major difference with the Con- 
gress concerned the mix of policy instru- 
ments most likely to move South Africa 
toward the early end of apartheid and its 
replacement by a new, truly democratic 
South Africa with effective protection 
for the rights of majorities, minorities, 
and individuals. We forthrightly stated 
our conviction that the adoption of indis- 
criminate, punitive sanctions would not 
help achieve our objectives. Majorities in 
both Houses of Congress did not agree. 
Those sanctions are now the law of the 
land, and we are implementing them. At 
the same time, Americans on both sides 
of this debate are coming to realize that 
sanctions do not amount to an effective 
policy toward South Africa. As Secre- 
tary Shultz said at the swearing-in of 
our new Ambassador to South Africa, 



iJ: 



Ed Perkins: "It is time to raise our 
once again to the horizon and to mo 
ahead." 

Unfortunately, the horizon in Sc 
Africa and the region is turbulent w 
storm clouds of violence and polariz( 
confrontation. In response to inter 
national sanctions, the South Africa, 
Government has retreated further ir 
self-imposed laager of repression an 
anti-American sentiment. The police 
presence in black townships and res- 
tions on press freedom have helped 
scenes of violence off our evening nt 
telecasts. But the cycle of repressior 
violent resistance continues. In rece 
days, we have seen further forced 
removals of blacks and new detentio 
antiapartheid activists, including pre 
nent churchmen. In both the black a 
white communities, extremist voices 
dominate the debate, and moderates 
having to shout to be heard. 

Tensions between South Africa ii 
its neighbors have also risen dramat 
cally. South African military spokesi 
have openly threatened Mozambique 
Botswana with armed retaliation un 
these countries satisfy Pretoria that 
are taking effective steps to halt cro 
border guerrilla operations against 
South Africa. For its part, Mozambii 
has threatened action against neighl 
ing Malawi unless that country halts 
alleged assistance to the RENAMO 
[Mozambique National Resistance M 
ment] insurgency against the Maput 
government. Zambia and Zimbabwe 
considering possible economic sancti 
of their own against Pretoria, knowi 
that such moves only invite potential 
severe South African retaliation. In 
Angola, a civil war fueled by Soviet ; 
and Cuban troops drags on, even tho 
military victory is clearly beyond the 
reach of either side. 

Efforts To Promote 
Peace and Stability 

Against this bleak backdrop, questior 
have arisen about our ability to make 
positive contribution to peace, stabili 
and democracy in southern Africa. T) 
South African Government has 
responded to the congressional impos 
tion of sanctions by imposing someth 
of a chill in our bilateral relationship. 
This is perhaps best exemplified by 
Pretoria's attacks on our economic 
asistance program in South Africa. 



40 



Department of State Bu'tir 



All Americans can be proud of the 
itribution our aid program is making 
issist South Africans disadvantaged 
apartheid to develop essential skills 
1 experience. In the fiscal year that 
t ended, approximately $20.3 million 
s disbursed to individuals and institu- 
is committed to nonviolence and 
nocracy. Our aid has helped fund 
olarships for students to study in the 
ited States; training of black entre- 
neurs and trade unionists; and com- 
nity-based projects in the areas of 
Id care, youth activities, and legal 
'ice. 

Our aid program in South Africa— 
;iated during this Administration 
h bipartisan support in Congress— 
mplifies the search for alternatives to 
lence and polarized confrontation that 
it the heart of our policy toward 
jth Africa and the region. We have 
n active partners with those in South 
-ica and the region who want to turn 
ay from a mindless descent into 
lence and toward peaceful options for 
istructive change. 
This constructive American 
jroach is also exemplified in the activi- 
3 of American businesses in South 
"ica. American firms have made an 
jortant positive contribution in South 
••ica by challenging the apartheid 
item and by spending over $200 
llion outside the workplace to provide 
lolarships, training, nonracial housing, 
i other benefits to black employees, 
lile we understand the reasons why 
Tie American firms have withdrawn 
■m South Africa, we applaud the 
termination of others to stay. These 
ms are in the forefront of American 
brts to remain positively involved in 
; search for a better future in South 
rica, and their honorable contribution 
serves to be recognized by all Ameri- 
ns. Indeed, it was so recognized— 
plicitly and eloquently— in the recent 
;islation passed by Congress. 

Despite the grim realities of the 
esent situation in South Africa, we 
main hopeful that the contending par- 
's will come to their senses and 
cognize that the path of violence and 
nfrontation is a dead-end street, 
arlier this year, the Commonwealth's 
Ininent Persons' Group (EPG) seemed 
be making progress in convincing 
ith the South African Government and 
; black opposition that constructive 
ange can occur only through negotia- 
ons. There seemed also to be a growing 
cognition on all sides that no party can 
i allowed to dictate in advance the 
:enda or outcome of the negotiations 



and that all South Africans will have to 
have confidence that their fundamental 
interests and rights would be protected. 

At the heart of the EPG initiative 
was an effort to convince the parties to 
begin the essential process of confidence 
building by taking limited but important 
steps that could be reciprocated by the 
other side. The EPG effort eventually 
collapsed following the May 19 South 
African Defense Forces raids on African 
National Congress (ANC) installations in 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. 
However, the EPG's effort to help the 
parties undertake these so-called match- 
ing commitments is a positive and impor- 
tant legacy for the future. That approach 
has not run its course; indeed, it has 
barely been tested. 

President Reagan and other 
Western leaders have publicly called on 
the South African Government to do its 
part to get negotiations started by end- 
ing the state of emergency; releasing 
Nelson Mandela and other political 
prisoners; unbanning political parties, 
including the ANC; and setting a time- 
table for repealing apartheid laws. If the 
South African Government were to take 
these steps, it would be entitled to 
expect from its opposition a firm com- 
mitment to cease violence and enter 
negotiations. 

Prospects for Progress 

While the immediate prospect for 
negotiations is not bright, we have seen 
some signs that the parties remain open 
to discussion of the idea of matching 
commitments. In our contacts with both 
the South African Government and its 
opponents, we have made clear that the 
United States will not uncritically 
endorse the demands of any of the con- 
tending parties. We are, however, ready 
now to explore seriously with each of the 
parties the contribution it can and should 
make in the interest of a negotiated 
settlement. In a word, the diplomatic 
option is open, and our good offices are 
available. 

We have no illusions about the near- 
term prospects for progress. External 
parties, however well intentioned, can- 
not help solve South Africa's crisis 
unless South Africans themselves are 
prepared to take risks for peace. They 
cannot demand guarantees in advance of 
the precise outcome of a process that 
must, inevitably, entail compromise and 
accommodation of interests. We intend 
to challenge the South African Govern- 
ment, the ANC and other black opposi- 
tion groups, and the front-line states to 
do their part to help create a framework 
for negotiations that might provide real 



AFRICA 



hope for a lasting resolution of South 
Africa's crisis. 

We will also continue to support 
efforts by South Africa and its neighbors 
to work out alternatives to confrontation 
and cross-border violence. The urgent 
need for practical steps in this direction 
is nowhere more evident than in the cur- 
rent tense relations between South 
Africa and Mozambique. These countries 
are still officially party to the Nkomati 
accord, which commits each signatory 
not to aid insurgent movements on the 
territory of the other party. Following 
its signature in 1984, the Nkomati ac- 
cord did lead to a reduction of tension 
and enhanced security for both South 
Africa and Mozambique. 

In recent months, the Government 
of Mozambique has alleged that South 
Africa has resumed and increased 
assistance to the Mozambican insurgent 
movement RENAMO. For its part. 
South Africa rejects the claim and warns 
Mozambique against harboring guerrillas 
of the African National Congress. In our 
view, renewed cross-border violence or 
threats of violence, and intervention in 
neighboring countries, cannot resolve 
South Africa's problems and may well 
exacerbate them. Instead, we urged both 
parties to fulfill strictly their obligations 
under the accord and handle their 
compliance concerns through a direct 
security dialogue. The United States 
played a significant role in the negotia- 
tion of the Nkomati accord, and we 
stand ready to assist the parties in 
revitalizing it. But the primary impetus 
must come from the countries that stand 
to benefit most from the accord— South 
Africa and Mozambique. 

We have watched with growing con- 
cern as tensions have escalated between 
Mozambique and Malawi. These tensions 
arise from conflicting claims about 
Malawi's relationship with RENAMO 
and its position on the insurgency in 
Mozambique. We firmly believe that the 
interests of neither Mozambique nor 
Malawi would be served by confronta- 
tion. The two countries have agreed to 
establish a joint commission to address 
mutual security concerns. This is a 
potentially positive development, and we 
urge that this commission be activated 
immediately. 

In Angola also, we are convinced 
that there is potential for accommo- 
dation rather than violent confrontation. 
We continue to seek a diplomatic resolu- 
tion of the conflict in Angola that would 
provide for Namibian independence and 
withdrawal of all foreign forces— South 
African and Cuban— from that country. 
We believe that the gap between South 
Africa and Angola on a timetable for the 



^bruary 1987 



41 



AFRICA 



withdrawal of Cuban forces is bridge- 
able. We have made clear to all the par- 
ties our readiness to help bring this 
negotiation to a successful conclusion. 

We had hoped that South Africa's 
conditional agreement to begin imple- 
mentation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 435— the Namibian inde- 
pendence plan— on August 1, 1986, 
would prompt the Government of Angola 
to reply constructively to our ideas on a 
Cuban withdrawal schedule. Unfor- 
tunately, no such response was forth- 
coming from Luanda, and the August 1 
opportunity was lost. We, nevertheless, 
believe that this peace process remains 
the one way out of a long and bloody 
civil war for all the Angolan parties. Our 
invitation to the Governn.ent of Angola 
to resume these negotiations remains 
on the table, and we urge that they take 
it up. 

Although reconciliation among con- 
tending Angolan parties is an issue only 
Angolans themselves can resolve, we 
believe that it must occur if there is to 
be real peace in that country. Our sup- 
port for UNITA [National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola] under- 
scores our conviction that it is a 
legitimate nationalist movement which 
must participate in any serious effort at 
reconciliation among Angolans. We have 
made clear that we do not expect any 
Angolan party to commit political 
suicide, nor do we have an American 
plan for Angola's political future. We 
will continue to work actively toward the 
day when they can do so free of external 
military presence from any quarter. 

As we consider opportunities for 
accommodation among contending par- 
ties in southern Africa, our focus should 
be on practical objectives that would 
redound to the benefit of all. In our 
view, the revitalization of regional 
transportation routes disrupted by 
armed conflict would be especially 
welcome. The United States supports 
African efforts to reach practical 
arrangements among all the affected 
parties that could lead to reopening of 
these transportation routes, many of 
which have been closed for years. 

The United States has made clear its 
determination to support the efforts of 
southern African countries to deal with 
the economic consequences of the 
region's political crisis. President 
Reagan has stated that he will propose 
to Congress a new program of assistance 
to the black-ruled states of southern 
Africa in the critical areas of trade, 
transportation, and support for economic 
reform. We are now working to prepare 
the details of this program. As we move 



forward, it will be essential to consult 
and coordinate our efforts with the coun- 
tries in the region and our allies and 
friends. Despite the budgetary strin- 
gencies of the Gramm-Rudman 
[-Hollings] era, we are determined to 
fulfill the President's pledge to propose a 
good program and to see it approved by 
Congress. 

The U.S. Role 

In his recent sendoff for our new 
Ambassador in Pretoria, Secretary 
Shultz said that, in southern Africa as in 
other areas of policy, we must ask "not 
only what. . .we want, but how, practi- 
cally, we can get from here to there." I 
have tried to underscore for you, today, 
our conviction that American goals in 
southern Africa will not be achieved if 
the entire region slides into endemic 
violence. That is what could happen if we 
simply opt to disengage when the going 
gets tough. Such a course can only pro- 
duce chaos and an increase in Soviet 
influence, since Moscow's strong suit is 
the promise of arms, advisers, and 
military solutions. 

By contrast, the U.S. role must con- 
tinue to be to roll up our sleeves and 
work for negotiated solutions and a 
peaceful change. We favor this course 
because it is right. We are— as someone 
once said— a nation of builders, not 
destroyers. But we also believe it is prac- 
tical because the peoples of southern 
Africa have visions of a positive future 



for their beloved region. They nurtu: 
the hope that their children will enjo; 
future of dignity, liberty, peace, and 
prosperity. They, too, want to be 
builders. All Americans are united in 
their desire to help achieve these obj( 
fives. This is the basis of an America: 
consensus on southern Africa that wi 
last long beyond the current pessimii 
in the region and our own tactical 
debates of the moment. It is a consen 
worth preserving and nurturing becai 
it is worthy of the best traditions of t 
American people. 

And what does this mean in prac- 
tice? I submit that it means an active^ 
role. It means the maintenance of an 
active AID [Agency for International 
Development] role in South Africa an 
the region to support black advancen 
and educational development; it meai 
our diplomacy is ready and willing to 
play a catalytic role— opening channe- 
floating ideas— between the South 
African Government, front-line states 
the ANC, and other major black grou 
it means a sustained regional role 
between South Africa and its neighbc 
on behalf of peaceful settlement and 
coexistence; and, above all, it means i 
the West as a whole maintains its 
presence and influence via all availabi 
channels to support its hopes for a 
brighter future for all the peoples of t 
troubled yet strategically important 
region. ■ 



The Human Rights Dimension in Africa 



by Charles W. Freeman 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council in Philadelphia on November 6. 
1986. Mr. Freeman is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs. 

There could be no more appropriate set- 
ting for a discourse on "human rights" 
than this city, in which the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution 
first proclaimed the idea of such rights. 
The documents created here continue to 
guide our foreign relations and to inspire 
the people of many lands. 

Concern for human rights is not a 
peculiarly American idea. It is a central 
objective in man's yearning to be free. If 
anyone here believes we have a monop- 
oly on this dream, let that person reflect 
upon the struggles in Haiti and the 
Philippines, in the Soviet Union and 



South Africa, in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. The human rights 
revolution proclaimed in Philadelphia 
two centuries ago continues. Nowhere 
this more evident than in Africa. 

The news from Africa on human 
rights is not all good— in fact, much of 
is dismal. What I hope to leave you wi 
is a few thoughts on how the current 
situation evolved, recent trends, and n 
hopes and fears about the future of 
America's role in ensuring basic 
freedoms for all Africans. 

The African Experience 

I think it is important, in any discussio 
of human rights in Africa, to start witl 
historical perspective. Three main fac- 
tors in African history and heritage, 
which contrast sharply with our own, 
need emphasis. 



42 



Department of State Bulle 



AFRICA 



First, the advent of the slave 
and 19th-century coloniaHsm inter- 
d Africa's independent evolution. 
;ges and kingdoms were torn apart 
16 export of slaves to the New 
Id. Many paternalistic European 
inistrators put the interests of the 
opole far ahead of the interests of 
Deople they governed. Colonial 
:ials often did not consult local 
ilations about political or social deci- 

Economic progress, education, 
the rights of the individual fre- 
itly took a back seat to demeaning 
ide control. Such colonial adminis- 
ions were, it must be remembered, 
only modern systems of government 
t Africans had experienced at 
pendence. 

• Second, many of the first genera- 
of Africa's liberation leaders spent 
h of the colonial period in exile or in 
Anxious for alternatives to colo- 
ism, they embraced ivory-tower 
alist theories and Marxism— theories 
. have proven as irrelevant to African 
Bitions, and even more counter- 
Huctive in terms of human liberties, 
hey did in their Western birthplaces. 
'• A third and related point is that 
ly newly independent nations were 
Jlled with arbitrary borders, drawn in 
Jope without regard to tribal and 

Biistic realities. For many African 
ers new at running governments, 
; fact, coupled with the ideological 
■<ies I have mentioned, made the one- 
ty state attractive as a way to unite 
fractious populations thrown 
ether by colonial cartographers. 

One caveat: there were important 
<eptions to everything I have said. I 
aot wish to contribute to the all too 
<espread American misperception that 
nocracy and civil liberties have no 
(ure home on the African Continent. It 
Jnportant to recognize, for example, 
ft Botswana is a country with a record 
democracy and human rights that 
tipares favorably with that of any 
intry in the West. The Gambia and 
legal, with their vigorous parliamen- 
y systems, and Kenya's racial har- 
ny and free enterprise system— to cite 
ew examples— also give the lie to this 
lard. 

ricans Confront 
leir Own Record 

many African leaders review the 
:en turbulent years since independ- 
ce, they are coming to see the 
mage done to their societies by the 
ilure to protect constructive dissent. 



Increasingly, they recognize the need to 
accept ideas and initiatives from outside 
the established bureaucracies. Africa's 
attention thus is returning to the fun- 
damental issues of human dignity, 
individual rights, and civil liberties for 
which the independence struggles were 
waged. Human rights have fortunately 
been placed squarely on the African 
agenda by the continent's leaders. The 
continentwide trend toward encourage- 
ment of private initiative at the expense 
of bureaucratic power supports this. 
After all, governments willing to trust 
the people to run their own economic 
affairs are more likely also to trust them 
to make decisions in politics and social 
life. 

We see examples of this economic 
revolution all over Africa. Let me men- 
tion just a few examples. 

• Zaire, Zambia, and Somalia have 
devalued their currencies; eliminated 
most trade and price controls; and 
increased agricultural prices. 

• Mali, Guinea, and Senegal have 
begun to pare down the public sector, 
liquidating, reforming, or reducing the 
privileged position of inefficient 
parastatals. 

• Kenya has adopted a flexible 
exchange rate policy and liberalized 
import licensing and maize and fertilizer 
marketing. 

Similar measures are being adopted 
in other African countries. The process 
is an exciting one to watch. The 
economic framework is changing radi- 
cally. Market forces are beginning to 
give the right signals to the private sec- 
tor, and African economies are begin- 
ning to respond with growth. For 
example, despite declining world prices 
for its major metal exports, Zaire has 
managed to maintain positive growth 
over the past 3 years. In Somalia, 
exports have increased over 50%, and 
agricultural production has established 
new records for 3 years running. 

Recent Developments 
in African Human Rights 

The trends in human rights connected to 
these changes have yet to run their full 
course. Some impoverished African 
regimes still argue that the interests of 
society and the state must come before 
those of individuals and that human 
rights are a "Western" concept that 
developing societies cannot afford. 
Others claim that their fragile political 
institutions could not withstand a 
greater openness or tolerance of dissent. 
Some of the most serious human rights 
violators of the past have been replaced 



by newer villains in other countries. Out- 
side concern for civil and political liber- 
ties is often condemned as an intrusion 
into a country's internal affairs. Not sur- 
prisingly, this criticism often comes from 
the most repressive regimes, and we 
hear it frequently from some within the 
South African Government. But there 
are many positive developments. Let me 
share a few with you. 

• President Abdou Diouf of 
Senegal, who was also last year's chair- 
man of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), deserves special recognition and 
credit for his energy and concern for 
human rights. The OAU's adoption of its 
Charter on Human and People's Rights 
at the end of October was a significant 
step for Africa. And. with Senegalese 
sponsorship, the UN Human Rights 
Commission has just established a 
Special Rapporteur on Religious 
Tolerance. 

• Just over a year ago, a new 
military government took over in 
Nigeria, a regional power that is home 
to one in every four black Africans. Part 
of the justification for the military's 
move was the need for more attention to 
human rights. Nigeria's record under 
President Babangida has not been spot- 
less, but impressive strides have been 
made and continue. Within days of 
assuming power, the Babangida govern- 
ment released more than 100 political 
detainees, including 12 journalists, and 
appointed as Minister of Justice the 
chairman of the Human Rights Commit- 
tee of the Nigerian Bar Association, a 
strong critic of the human rights record 
of the previous regime. Since then, large 
numbers of detainees have been 
released, and more have had their 
sentences reduced. Press freedoms have 
also been restored in a country which 
traditionally has enjoyed a freewheeling, 
strongly vocal media. 

• Earlier this year in Sudan, we 
saw the former Transitional Military 
Council disband after conducting 
multiparty elections. A democratically 
chosen prime minister and parliament 
now rule Sudan. The government has 
also lifted press restrictions and repealed 
laws against strikes. A violent and pain- 
ful civil war in southern Sudan continues 
to pose a grave threat to the human 
rights of Sudanese. Nevertheless, in 
1985 and 1986, Sudan gave sanctuary to 
more than 1 million refugees from 
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad. Sudan's 
cooperation with the international com- 
munity in refugee resettlement gives 
witness to its humanitarian ideals. 

• There has been a remarkable turn- 
around in human rights in Uganda, one 



tbruary 1987 



43 



AFRICA 



of the countries that suffered most from 
abuses in the past. President Museveni's 
government has ended torture, curbed 
violence by soldiers, and reinforced the 
independence of the judiciary and the 
professionalism of the police. Museveni's 
challenge to human rights violations in 
Uganda, before he was President, gained 
credibility when former Assistant 
Secretary for Human Rights Elliott 
Abrams sharply criticized government- 
sponsored human rights atrocities in 
Uganda in 1984. By mid-1985, the 
United States had ceased disbursing 
foreign assistance to Uganda 
in light of human rights abuses and 
unrestrained civil violence. After his 
accession, President Museveni publicly 
thanked the United States for its 
uniquely forthright support of human 
rights in his country. We have now 
restarted our aid program and made a 
special grant of human rights funds to 
aid the Uganda Government's law 
codification project. 

• In Liberia, though progress has 
proceeded by fits and starts, American 
attention to human rights has likewise 
yielded some promising results. The 
return to civilian rule, while widely 
welcomed, was also tarnished by wide- 
spread reports of shortcomings in the 
October 1985 elections, including restric- 
tive party registration requirements, 
lack of open debate, the jailing of some 
opposition leadership, and a vote- 
counting procedure which undermined 
confidence in the results. Our economic 
support fund disbursements were conse- 
quently suspended foi- a period; they 
resumed only when conditions improved. 
In June, President Doe, after a great 
deal of prodding by the executive branch 
and Congress, ordered amnesty for a 
number of prominent citizens accused of 
involvement in an alleged coup attempt. 
Reconciliation talks between the govern- 
ment and opposition parties are 
continuing. 

There are. of course, as I have 
noted, continuing examples of system- 
atic and repressive denials of human 
rights in Africa. Let me cite one case in 
point. In 1984 and 1985, Ethiopia 
suffered a calamitous famine brought on, 
in part, by the government's attempts to 
impose the same discredited approach to 
peasant agriculture that had earlier 
caused the deaths of millions of Ukrain- 
ians, Vietnamese, and Cambodians. Last 
December, an international outcry led by 
the United States against forced reset- 
tlement caused the government to halt 
its brutal, ill-planned program. A 
number of very senior Ethiopian 
officials, most recently the Foreign 



Minister, have sought political asylum 
abroad to protest the regime's oppres- 
sion of its people and its subservience to 
the Soviet totalitarian model. Ethiopia's 
villagization program— a plan to move 
millions of people in rural Ethiopia into 
new, centralized villages— needs to be 
monitored closely. The Ethiopian 
Government knows the world is 
watching and that it will not tolerate a 
return to coercion and brutality. 

Human Rights and U.S. Policy 

Let me now describe what the United 
States is doing to promote human rights 
in Africa. Identification of abuses and 
strong U.S. statements in response are 
the first level of combatting human 
rights violations. In specific instances 
where human rights abuses are alleged, 
American ambassadors have standing 
instructions— sometimes supplemented 
by special directions from Washington— 
to make inquiries of local officials and 
try to bring about a change in the situa- 
tion. Our annually published "Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices" 
have become an accepted international 
standard by which to measure progress. 
Local officials know that their human 
rights performance will be weighed as 
we allocate increasingly scarce American 
assistance abroad. 

But it is not enough merely to iden- 
tify and protest human rights violations. 
The United States also directly attacks 
the causes and effects of human rights 
abuses through its assistance programs: 
in fiscal year 1986, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development and the State 
Department jointly administered a 
.$2-million human rights program in 
Africa. These funds were used to assist 
in law codification, to promote fair 
multiparty elections, to upgrade legal 
facilities, to educate people about civil 
and political rights, and to assist in the 
legal defense of those charged with 
violating repressive or discriminatory 
statutes. In addition, during this period, 
the United States provided over $100 
million in assistance to African refugees 
escaping turmoil and political persecu- 
tion in their native countries. Of this 
amount, $21 million was provided to the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross, which, among other things, aids 
political prisoners and victims of 
persecution. 

South Africa is an important example 
of how we combine diplomatic efforts 
with assistance programs to promote 
human rights. Starting with the Presi- 
dent, we have spoken out forcefully to 
denounce the evils of apartheid and the 



repressive state of emergency, voice 
objections to the detention without 
charge of thousands of South African 
and express our grave concern over 
allegations of torture occurring in dc 
tion. We make public and private 
demarches to the South African Gove 
ment over specific allegations of hum 
rights violations. For example, last w 
we called for an immediate, independ 
investigation into allegations that yoi 
people in detention were being abusei 

One and one-half million dollars o 
the Africa human rights program wei 
spent in South Africa last year. We 
support law centers which provide 
advice and legal representation for th 
victims of apartheid, apprentice oppo: 
tunities for black lawyers, and law 
libraries which have become the centi 
resource for legal research to defend 
those victimized by apartheid. We 
finance publications describing basic 
legal rights and teaching individuals h 
to protect their rights through the leg 
system. Such projects often go beyon( 
legal assistance: in one case, we helpe 
develop a water system in an area wh 
blacks were threatened with forced 
removal. The water system helped the> 
resist eviction from their homes by 
bolstering the argument that the com 
niunity was viable. 

Private U.S. firms operating in 
South Africa also play a very positive 
role in the struggle against apartheid. 
Not only have they invested millions c 
dollars to provide desegregated worki 
conditions, educational and training 
opportunities, equal benefits, and hou; 
ing assistance; they have also served e 
a force for change by their example. 
LT.S. companies have led other firms- 
particular, South African ones— to 
espouse the principles enunciated by tl 
Reverend Leon Sullivan. While their r 
in South Africa is unfortunately 
diminishing, it has been unique, and I 
would argue that it is likely to prove 
irreplaceable. 

We hope to continue and, the Con- 
gress willing, increase our assistance 
programs for black South Africans. Ou 
goal is an audacious one: to help prepa 
them to take their rightful place in Sou 
Africa's economic and political life. Oui 
$25-million aid program for this year is 
unique because we carry it out with- 
out any tie to the South African 
Government. 

This brings me to the always vital 
question of resources. LInder this 
Administration, we increased our 
economic assistance to Africa 55% in tl 
period 1980-85, playing an increasingly 
vital role in promoting growth-oriented 
economic development in Africa and, at 



44 



Department of State Bulle 



CANADA 



-ame time, advancing important 
strategic political, and humani- 
111 interests in the region. We clearly 

Ithe momentum on our side. More 
_more African countries realized that 
needed to turn to the West— rather 
the Soviet-bloc countries— to obtain 
;ritical economic support needed, 
icularly to restructure their 
lomies along more market-oriented 
. Along with increasing economic 
iness, as I have suggested, there also 
e a rediscovery of the virtues of a 
e open society and the principles of 
an rights. 

Unfortunately, during the past 2 
■s, the budgetary process has cut our 
lomic involvement in Africa and our 
ty to help African countries make 
difficult transitions they are attempt- 
Congressional cuts in foreign aid, 
5lative earmarks protecting the 
;ations of a relatively small number 
juntries and programs, and Gramm- 
man will sharply reduce our 
lomic assistance for Africa to 
3 million this fiscal year. That is 35% 
than in 1985 and 18% less than in 
5. Unless this situation is reversed, 
;an expect serious damage to our 
rests in Africa. Among the conse- 
ices could be a reversal of recent 
|can efforts to undertake the critical 
pomic reforms that are so vital as 
(erpinning to human rights reform. In 
thern Africa, moreover, we must 
3 additional resources to ensure that 
current downward spiral of violence 
economic deterioration does not set 
. part of Africa back 20 years. 

•elusion 

other country in the world so directly 
explicitly weighs its relationships in 
)int-to-point comparison with human 
its standards. I am proud of our 
)rd and of the results we have 
ieved. 

This Administration is both 
ouraged by some trends in African 
lan rights performance and awed by 
work still to be done. In many of the 
id's poorest countries, where sub- 
ence living conditions are almost 
lond the imagination of most 
iericans, we need development 
ources to assist us in urging govern- 
nts to allow basic freedoms. Freedom 
,he press, religious tolerance, and free 
;tions are noble goals and vital human 
hts. But people who do not have 
)ugh to eat or know how to read can 
■dly be expected to rise up to claim 
se rights until their basic needs are 



met. We need the resources to assist 
governments in forming societies which 
claim those God-given freedoms. We 
must not walk away from Africa just as 
Africa is walking toward us. But without 



your support, and that of Congress, for 
the resources necessary to build on 
what we and Africans have begun to 
accomplish, that is exactly what we 
may do. ■ 



Secretary Visits Canada 



Secretary Shultz visits Canada on 
November 21, 1986. to meet with 
Secretary for External Affairs Joseph 
Clark. Following is a joint news con- 
ference by the two Secretaries. 

Secretary Clark. ^ I'm particularly 
pleased to have the opportunity today to 
sign this instrument which complements 
a number of initiatives Canada has taken 
in response to threats to the security of 
civil aviation. In signing the agreement, 
Canada and the United States are seek- 
ing to ensure the security of the more 
than 13 million passengers who travel by 
air across oui- vast common border each 
year. 

At the same time, it is recognized 
that aviation security can neither be 
ensured nor terrorism effectively 
counteracted by individual states alone, 
but only on the basis of cooperation and 
united action by the international com- 
munity. In this regard, I am pleased to 
note that the assembly of the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), meeting in Montreal on the first 
of October this year, unanimously 
adopted a Canadian proposal to develop 
a new International Agreement on Air- 
port Security. 

This resolution, cosponsored by over 
30 countries representing all geographic 
regions and social economic systems, 
reflects a growing realization throughout 
the international community that united 
action is needed to close a gap in the 
existing ICAO framework concerning 
aviation security. The Hague, Montreal, 
and Tokyo conventions clearly govern 
security threats to aircraft in flight but 
do not adequately cover all terrorist 
threats or attacks at airports. 

[In French: The very complete bilat- 
eral agreement signed today by Canada 
and the United States will help not only 
to reinforce security measures in the two 
countries, but also to serve, I hope, as a 
model for other bilateral accords, and 
reinforce the multilateral initiatives 
taken by Canada within ICAO to assure 
international civil aviation security.] 

Secretary Shultz. The aviation security 
agreement, Secretary Clark and I have 
just signed, will strengthen the most 



extensive commercial aviation partner- 
ship in the world. As you noted, with 
over 13 million people flying between 
our two countries each year, it very 
fittingly reflects our shared values and 
the spirit of cooperation between our 
two countries through a mutual commit- 
ment to take practical measures to com- 
bat international terrorism. Cooperation 
which we will continue as we press for- 
ward together on the Canadian proposal 
which you mentioned for a convention on 
international airport security introduced 
at the International Civil Aviation 
Organization assembly last month in 
Montreal. 

I think this is a very significant step 
for us. From the standpoint of the 
United States, we have reached similar 
agreements with 15 other aviation part- 
ners, and we have active negotiations 
going on with some 60 other countries; 
and, this agreement with Canada is the 
strongest of any that we have. 

So it represents an important state- 
ment and partnership and example in 
this continuing battle against interna- 
tional terrorism, and I feel privileged to 
sit here with you, Joe, and sign it. 

Secretary Clark. Thank you very much. 
I just want to make one or two brief 
comments to begin the conference. We 
had a very useful and full discussion of a 
range of Canada-U.S. issues and also a 
number of international issues of con- 
cern to both our countries. Both govern- 
ments are strongly committed to the 
bilateral trade negotiation between our 
two countries. Both countries are 
strongly committed to the quick engage- 
ment of the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions. I should say that we spent some 
time here, as we have in other meetings, 
dealing specifically with some of the 
problems that exist in international 
trade and agriculture. 

A very important step forward was 
taken by the economic summit in Tokyo 
when agriculture was put on the agenda. 
That was followed through in the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] meetings in Punta del Este where 
there was a good and broad agreement 
reached to address agricultural issues 
under the GATT. I made clear again the 



bruary 1987 



45 



CANADA 



singular importance to Canada of tangi- 
ble progress on the question of acid rain 
consistent with the envoys' report jointly 
established by President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Mulroney. 

We discussed at some length, and I 
found most valuable again, the oppor- 
tunity to discuss with Secretary Shultz 
the new momentum that is developing in 
the world of arms control. Certainly in 
the view of Canada, the meeting at 
Reykjavik was a significant break- 
through. I personally was most 
impressed by the speech Secretary 
Shultz made in Chicago earlier this 
week, which I thought was a reassuring, 
strong, thorough statement of the posi- 
tion of the United States on arms control 
questions. I think the next step to be 
taken, exists to be taken by member 
nations of NATO whose foreign minis- 
ters met in Brussels in mid-December, 
and Canada looks forward to playing a 
continuing role in maintaining that new 
momentum on arms control. 

Secretary Shultz. This has been a good 
meeting. It is one of a continuing series. 
We agreed to meet at least four times a 
year. We see each other more often than 
that and among the four, one explicitly 
in the United States, another in Canada 
for the purpose of the meeting and, of 
course, our President and Prime Minis- 
ter also meet each year. So we have lots 
to talk about and we work at it together, 
and I think it pays off. 

It pays off in working through vari- 
ous questions that we have between us, 
whether they're of the trade nature or 
environmental nature or other aspects of 
our relationship which is a gigantic rela- 
tionship. It pays off from the standpoint 
of sharing views on matters such as 
arms control that you mentioned. It pays 
off in the economic scene as we review 
these potentially very significant 
negotiations on a free trade regime 
between the two countries. 

It helped a great deal in Punta del 
Este at getting started on the new 
GATT round and you were— I wasn't 
present, but all of my delegation spoke 
about the leadership you gave personally 
in the whole meeting. We were glad to 
cooperate and follow your lead in that. 
So, it's been a very worthwhile overall 
set of exchanges and this particular 
meeting fitted into that pattern. 

Q. One of the things you talked 
about today was the Iranian arms 
question. One of them, there are new 
reports of Washington's — 

Secretary Clark. What's the 
question? 



46 



Q. Was Canada one of the coun- 
tries involved in secret arms sales to 
Iran, and did the two of you discuss 
that issue today? 

Secretary Clark. No and no. The 
second question, just to be clear on that, 
there was no discussion of any Canadian 
involvement in any kind of secret arms 
sales to Iran because we are not engaged 
in any secret arms sales to Iran. There 
were, as you know, sales of some heli- 
copter engines which were for peaceful 
purposes. We found out that they might 
have been diverted. We are putting an 
end to that diversion with all the means 
at our disposal. 

Q. When did you find out that 
several other countries were selling 
arms to Iran with U.S. approval, and 
which countries were selling arms to 
Iran with U.S. approval? 

Secretary Shultz. I am not going to 
respond to questions about various 
Iranian-related issues. The people who 
have been closest to that subject have 
been testifying in Washington, and I 
think it's best to let it rest there. 

Q. If there is substantial progress 
on arms reduction, is Canada prepared 
to substantially increase its troop com- 
mitment in Western Europe? 

Secretary Clark. This government 
has already increased Canada's troop 
commitment in Western Europe. That 
was one of our campaign commitments 
during the election. We followed through 
on it early on in our mandate. We intend 
to maintain a strong Canadian presence 
there. Obviously, one of the questions 
that has to be considered, as questions of 
arms control and related issues evolve, is 
the continued role of conventional 
defense. There will be a major role; 
Canada intends to continue to play our 
active part. 

Q. Would you increase beyond 
what you've done already? 

Secretary Clark. We've no immedi- 
ate plans to increase, but I make the 
point that we just have. 

Q. You said that you participated 
in two full-scale discussions at the 
White House of the U.S. involvement 
with Iran. Can you tell us whether you 
knew after those two full-scale discus- 
sions that the United States would 
make secret weapons shipments to 
Iran? 

Secretary Shultz. I give you the 
same answer that I already gave on a 
question on that subject. 

Q. You said that you found out that 
there may have been diversions of 
helicopter parts and you said that you 



i'K 



:((ii 



'0 

are putting an end to that diversion* 
all means at our disposal. Have you 
found out how the diversions are ta 
ing place and what are the means at 
your disposal? 

Secretary Clark. We are not sun 
that they have taken place. There is a 
possibility that they have. The engine 
parts in question were shipped as I 
understand on the 29th of October. TI 
may not have arrived. The instrumen 
available to us is to require an end-usi 
certificate. We have the full cooperati 
of Pratt and Whitney who was the mj 
ufacturer in securing that, in having t 
certificate sought and secured. The 
Iranian Charge has been or will be cai 
in by our officials as a further means 
ensuring that Canadian goods destine 
for peaceful uses were used peacefull; 

Q. You say you found the 
Secretary's speech in Chicago to be 
reassuring. What was it that was sa 
reassuring about that speech and on 
what points did you need reassuran 

Secretary Clark. I didn't require 
reassurance. But I think what was 
reassuring about the speech— and I 
would presume to recommend you rea 
it. 

Q. I have. 

Secretary Clark. I would then 
presume to recommend that you repo 
it— I shouldn't do that. [Laughter] 

I think that it made clear that the 
developments at Reykjavik, while the 
went beyond what many people expec 
might occur, were part of a pattern o: 
preparation for movement and momei' 
turn in arms control that is continuing 
think that many of the allies of the 
United States, including Canada, are 
reassured by the reiteration of the 
United States that the practice of con 
sulfation which has been followed fait 
fully and effectively in our judgment 1: 
the United States will continue, and tl 
there will be an opportunity for Canac 
and other allies to continue in the con- 
text of NATO to elaborate other steps 
not simply to elaborate other steps bu 
consider together the consequences of 
the progress that is possible in arms 
control. 

Q. If there are to be massive redi 
tions, large-scale reductions of bal- 
listic missiles, one could presume th; 
the cruise missile threat might 
increase. What might this mean as fi 
as the North American Defense [Con 
mand] system, NORAD? Might Canai 
have to increase its commitment to 
NORAD, or might there have to be 
large-scale defenses against the cruii 
missile threat? 



i! 
w 
it 
if 

« 



Department of State Bulle 



DEPARTMENT 



Secretary Shultz. We'd like to see 
ihreat reduced. But the fact of the 
I er is that the Soviet system and our 
om, the Western systems, are dif- 

iit and so I think you have to foresee 

we will continue to need to be able 
efend ourselves effectively and to 
e a way of deterring aggression so 
; it doesn't take place. 
If we have fewer ballistic missiles, 
1 you have to look to the other means 
have to exercise that deterrence. I 
c it that that was the point of the 
3tion earlier about conventional 
s, and I agree with the implication 

said that in the Chicago speech. And 
;r means. 

So your bombers and cruise missiles 
things like that play a part in main- 
ing your ability to deter aggression— 
mportant part. And I think what Mr. 
rk and I have been doing today in 
; portion of our discussion, and I 
tk our discussion undoubtedly will be 
ended into what the NATO ministers 

about in Brussels next month, will 
L reexamination of the implications 
what we should be doing of the possi- 
y of the sharp cuts in the INF 
ermediate-range nuclear forces] area, 
he area of strategic arms let alone 
:r things and that's the process that 

K)ing through. I think it is a very 
thy process. 

IQ. Along the same lines, I'd like to 
whether Mr. Clark has expressed a 
earn in your discussions today 
i ut the possibility of the U.S. break- 
ii of the SALT [strategic arms limita- 
1 1 talks] II Treaty. Were you able to 
a ieve [inaudible]? 

Secretary Clark. I raised Canada's 
c cern about SALT II and I made the 
p :it that SALT II apart from— that 
" I.T II possesses among other things, 
■vy important symbolic significance 
reiterated a position that I have 
'ill'. I wouldn't want to associate 
' self with your description of the 
r tual, of the respective positions of the 
cintries on that question. 

Q. [Inaudible] 

Secretary Clark. [In French: We 
I iissed the free trade question in a 
ii')-al way. We discussed the common 
liTtaking of the two governments, of 

President of the United States and 

I'l'ime Minister of Canada ... In- 
ar as discussions now taking place in 
ncouver are concerned, we did not 
cuss these talks because there has 
'M no declaration by the Prime 
iiister coming out of them.] 

(J. [Inaudible] Secretary as you 
ve done in the past, whether Canada 
inks it advisable to [inaudible] limits 

bruary 1987 



Secretary and Marine Commandant 
Sign Memorandum of Understanding 




On December 15, 1986, Secretary Shultz 
and Commandant of the Marine Corps 
General P. X. Kelley signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding between the U.S. Marine 
Corps and the Department of State which 
provides for Marine security guards at U.S. 
Embassies around the world. The signing 
marks the .38th anniversary of the agree- 
ment, whereby, specially trained Marines 



guard embassy personnel and classified 
documents at U.S. posts overseas. This year 
an additional 100 Marines have been 
authorized for the U.S. Embassy protection 
program abroad. As a result. Marine secu- 
rity guards will be assigned to 10 new posts 
by the end of 1987. 



Press release 261. 



on cruise missiles and [inaudible] 
bombers as a result of the superpower 
talks following Reykjavik? 

Secretary Clark. That particular 
question did not come up as you put it 
today. Obviously, as Secretary Shultz 
has just indicated, if we are to achieve 
the kinds of reductions that were dis- 
cussed at Reykjavik and that are still 
capable of being discussed at Geneva, 
that will have implications for Canada 
given our geography and our location. 
But we haven't discussed that at any 
particular length today. 

That's the kind of thing that I think 
would be very useful for representatives 
of allied countries to consider with some 
urgency, but also some care and some 
frankness and I hope that that oppor- 
tunity will be provided in some of the 
meetings of NATO foreign ministers. 



Certainly, the opportunity for that, the 
setting— the stage has been set for that 
by the extensive consultations with its 
allies that the United States has under- 
taken, and in my judgment by Secretary 
Shultz's speech in Chicago which now 
that I am assured has been reported 
extensively in the American press, I 
hope might receive some attention in the 
Canadian press. 

Q. Was the subject of sanctions 
against South Africa discussed; and if 
so, what would Mr. Clark's reaction be 
to the announcement that Bata Shoes 
has terminated its operations there? 

Secretary Clark. The discussion of 
policy toward South Africa was dis- 
cussed generally. I welcomed the deci- 
sion by Bata to remove its investments 
and its association from South Africa. 



47 



EAST ASIA 



As I have indicated in the House 2 or 
3 days ago, Archbishop Ted Scott, who 
was the Canadian member of the Emi- 
nent Persons Group, has been consulting 
with Canadian and American companies, 
which are considering the nature of their 
future in South Africa, and will be mak- 
ing some recommendations to me as a 
basis for conversations I might have 
with other Canadian businesses that 
have interests there. 

Q. I am wondering if the White 
House shares the view of your trade 
negotiator, Peter Murphy, that the 
Congress may not be inclined to 
endorse a trade deal if Canada does 
not move to exchange rates more in 
line [inaudible]. 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think the 
exchange rate issue is really a part of 
these free trade negotiations. The talks 
have been going along quite well, but I 
think we need to interject into them a 
strong sense of urgency and push, so 
that we really try to get something 
accomplished certainly in the next 6, 9 
months or so, because we have a great 
opportunity here to do something of tre- 
mendous significance. 

I have to look at it from the stand- 
point of the interest of the United 
States. It will benefit us. I believe it will 
benefit Canada even more, but the real 
point is both parties can get a lot out of 
it. So we need to work on it hard, and 
Ambassador Murphy is doing so, and I 
hope very much that we will have a suc- 
cessful conclusion to this effort. 

Q. When you spoke about the 
possibility of the Pratt and Whitney 
shipments being diverted for military 
purposes as opposed to the commercial 
purpose for which the aircraft parts 
are being sent there, have you thought 
or have you asked for American 
assistance to find out if there was in 
fact any diversion? 

Secretary Clark. No. 

Q. Are you going to? 

Secretary Clark. I don't know that 
American assistance would be germane 
in this case. 

Q. Intelligence? 

Secretary Clark. We are pursuing 
directly through the company, through 
the user, and through the Iranian 
Charge. I expect we'll find out what we 
need to know and be able to ensure that 
undertakings given to the Government 
of Canada by exporters will be honored. 



China Policy Today: 

Consensus, Consistence, Stability 



'Press release 254 of Nov. 24. 1986. 

-Secretary Clark spoke in English and 
French, and his remarks in French were 
translated. ■ 



by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr. 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council of Northern California in San 
Francisco on December 11, 1986. Mr. 
Sigur is Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

It's a pleasure to appear before this 
outstanding forum this evening. Those of 
you here in California have particular 
appreciation for the importance the East 
Asian and Pacific region bears to our 
lifestyles and livelihoods. The Reagan 
Administration has done more to regis- 
ter this awareness, in Washington and 
nationally, than any other. As one who 
has spent many years living both in Asia 
and in California, I am acutely sensitive 
to the significant evolving interdepend- 
ence between our peoples, between our 
industrial and commercial enterprises, 
and between our political and security 
systems. While the nations of East Asia 
and the Pacific are culturally diverse and 
at different stages of economic and 
political development, the region as a 
whole is critical to us and will play an 
important role in our nation's future. 

China is known far better to us 
today than 20 years ago, but it is no less 
intriguing. It is a study in contrasts— the 
largest Asian nation with one of the 
region's smallest per capita income 
rates; a socialist state experimenting 
with certain free market principles; a 
historically preeminent ethnic group 
with numerous heterogeneous character- 
istics; and a nationalistic-minded people 
divided by two competing political sys- 
tems. Whatever its future, China is 
destined to remain a significant player in 
Asian affairs and a reckoning factor in 
our own objectives there. 

Five weeks ago I traveled to the 
People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), my 
first visit there since becoming Assistant 
Secretary of State, although I have 
visited the country several times before. 
Perhaps more so than on any previous 
trip, I sensed that our relations now are 
firmly on a stable and durable course. I 
attribute this, in great part, to the con- 
sistence and consensus which have char- 
acterized this Administration's China 
policy for 6 years, as well as to the suc- 
cess of our two nations in preventing 
certain differences from impeding 
overall progress we are achieving. 



The Policy Framework 

The framework for our relationship w. 
China is provided in three key docu 
ments: the 1972 Shanghai communiqu 
the 1979 Joint Communique on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relation 
with the P.R.C., and the 1982 joint co 
munique with Beijing. Collectively, th 
agreements set forth fundamental pri 
ciples which have guided, and continu 
to guide, U.S. -China relations. Our su 
port for these principles has not dimir 
ished. One of the basic principles is ou 
acknowledgment that Chinese on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
there is but one China and that Taiwa 
is part of China. A second fundament; 
principle is our conviction that the fut 
of Taiwan should be determined by 
Chinese on both sides of the strait anc 
that the predominant U.S. interest is 
that the issue be resolved peacefully. 

In normalizing relations with 
Beijing, we also established a framewi 
for continuing commercial, cultural, a 
other relations on an unofficial basis 
with the people on Taiwan. Statutory 
affirmation of these elements by meat 
of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act 
reflected a commitment by the Ameri' 
people to remain faithful to their frier 
on Taiwan. 

One cannot formulate policy towa; 
China without considering its impact 
upon other countries in the region sue 
as the Soviet Union, Japan, Korea, 
Southeast Asian nations, and the worl 
at large. China has long been a major 
factor in East Asia. In recent years, it 
has become a much more active playei 
on the global stage, and its views and 
policies increasingly make a difference 
international fora. This is a trend we 
accept and support and one we expect 
will continue in the years ahead. 

Unlike so often in the past, our 
China policy today is based upon a 
remarkable degree of consensus withii 
the executive and legislative branches 
the U.S. Government as well as among 
business and local interests around the 
country. In addition, our Asian friends 
and allies have indicated that, while th 
do not always agree with every detail ( 
our policy, they understand and essen- 
tially concur with our objectives. 
Although other hotspots in Asia captui 
more of the headlines, we continue to 
devote considerable effort and attentio 
to China. 



48 



Department of State Bulle* 



EAST ASIA 



r.S. relations with the P.R.C. have 
a positive, stabilizing influence upon 
Kast Asian and Pacific region. This 
nr has been strengthened by the con- 
■nce of our policy. Our objectives 
l' been defined clearly, and our inten- 
s have been articulated consistently, 
(.'by reducing uncertainties both at 

and abroad. 
( I insistency does not signify an 

itable and unchanging policy. Quite 
nntrary, consistency means living 
' I our principles and commitments in 
nstantly changing environment. 

• ■y cannot be frozen. It has to be 
' and responsive to new variables 
I'lnsiderations. Our relations with 
la have developed creatively within a 
•istent policy framework, in accord 

1 our fundamental interests and long- 
1 objectives. We have been able to 
it our policy, when necessary, to 

ji ^-t new challenges and opportunities. 

i:ent Developments 

•ecent months, there have been 
lificant new developments, both in 
P.R.C. and Taiwan, as well as in 
■iet interest toward Asia. 

• China's leadership has proposed 

vf guidelines for political reforms as a 
dns of further pursuing economic 
dernization. 

• Secretary of Defense Weinberger 
1 a most successful visit to China in 
'.ober, and the first U.S. Navy ship 

It to the P.R.C. took place last month. 

• Last week, Taiwan held important 
ctions representing further political 
♦lution on the island. We welcome 
tlence over the past several months 

t the authorities on Taiwan are tak- 
significant initiatives for political 

|orm, reflecting a realistic and confi- 

•it approach to the future. 

• Soviet General Secretary Gor- 
:hev's speech in Vladivostok last July 
licated that Soviet solicitations toward 
St Asia, and particularly China, will 
pressed more vigorously. 

These developments demonstrate the 
namism of the political and economic 
nation in and around China. In this 
itext, it is important to understand 

basis of our China policy, the current 
ite of our relations, and the direction 
which we are going. 

tnesis of Our Policy 

S. relations with China have under- 
ne a remarkable transformation in the 
St decade and a half. It was just over 
years ago that President Nixon made 



his historic visit to China, cutting 
through more than two decades of isola- 
tion and hostility between our two coun- 
tries. The unique confluence of U.S. and 
Chinese interests at the time made his 
trip possible; but only through the far- 
sighted efforts of statesmen on both 
sides were we able to overcome the 
immense ideological hurdles. 

While the international situation has 
changed significantly since the early 
1970s, the foundation built by conscien- 
tious efforts at that time remains the 
basis for Chinese and American policies. 
The fundamental premise was and 
remains our shared view that neither 
China nor the United States is a threat 
to the other's security, that we need to 
work in parallel to counter policies 
detrimental to our two countries, and 
that both our countries have much to 
gain from a constructive relationship. 
Over the years, we have built broad, 
mutually advantageous ties, and we are 
confident that our relations will remain 
on solid ground. 

Our decision to normalize diplomatic 
relations with China in 1979 evolved 
from the belief that establishing closer, 
mutually beneficial ties with China could 
contribute substantially to peace and 
stability in East Asia. We wanted to help 
promote a modernizing China which 
would act responsibly and independently 
of external pressure. The best way to 
advance this objective, we believed, was 
to support China's efforts at economic 
modernization. The significant progress 
that China has made toward its modern- 
ization goal over the last few years has 
been made possible by the expansion 
of market forces within China and 
increased ties with free market 
economies outside of China. We have 
supported China's active participation in 
international financial institutions and 
other international organizations and its 
expanding trade relations with its 
neighbors. In the past few years, we also 
have begun a limited program of defen- 
sive military cooperation with the 
Chinese. 

Current State of Relations 

Since the normalization of relations in 
1979, our bilateral ties with the P.R.C. 
have expanded far beyond the narrow 
strategic focus that brought us together 
in the early 1970s. We have experienced 
some ups and downs, but, increasingly, 
we have been able to narrow our dif- 
ferences and prevent them from affect- 
ing the fundamental basis of our 
relationship. 



The most dramatic growth has been 
in the economic area. This has been due 
partly to enthusiastic participation by 
American business in developing China 
trade. Also, China sees the United 
States as a primary source of advanced 
technology, managerial expertise, and 
technical information which can assist in 
its modernization. Last year, bilateral 
trade exceeded $8 billion. This year we 
expect that figure to exceed $9 billion. 
The United States now is China's third 
largest trading partner, and its second 
largest investor with over $1 billion com- 
mitted. American business in China is 
involved in everything from oil explora- 
tion, mining, and industrial production 
to legal services and finance. 

Naturally, our expanding economic 
relations are not without a number of 
specific problems and disputes. Ameri- 
can businessmen complain about a poor 
investment climate in China. Indeed, 
foreign investment has fallen off 
significantly this year. American 
exporters complain about Chinese 
import barriers, unclear trade regula- 
tions, and the absence of copyright 
legislation. Our governments disagree 
over balance-of-trade figures, due to dif- 
ferent statistical bases used in calculat- 
ing exports and imports. There has been 
a sharp growth of Chinese textile 
exports to this country, prompting more 
demands for protectionist legislation. 
We still have not agreed on a bilateral 
investment treaty. And the Chinese con- 
tend that our liberalization of technology 
transfer controls has not gone far 
enough. It is a tribute to the strength 
and maturity of the relationship that 
such difficulties are being discussed on a 
pragmatic, nonpolemical, case-by-case 
basis without threatening the overall 
development of trade. 

In the areas of science and technol- 
ogy, a key Chinese development priority, 
we are very active. Our bilateral scien- 
tific and technological exchanges are the 
largest we have with any country. Hun- 
dreds of delegations pass between our 
nations each year, providing China with 
information on technical, scientific, and 
managerial subjects. China also has 
much to offer us in the fields of 
medicine, scientific experimentation, and 
earthquake prediction. The benefits are 
mutual, and we expect them to grow as 
we increase our cooperation and 
exchange of information. 

The United States hosts approx- 
imately 17,000 students from the P.R.C. 
When these students return to China, 
they not only will contribute to China's 
modernization but also will have a much 
better understanding of the United 
States. Through these returning 



bruary 1987 



49 



EAST ASIA 



students and through our support of 
China's technological development, we 
help to strengthen China's ties to the 
outside world. 

Reforms in China 

Internal changes in the P.R.C. have led 
to new vitality and prospects for further 
progress. Since 1978, China has imple- 
mented far-reaching economic reforms. 
In connection with that effort, it has 
expanded its relations with foreign coun- 
tries, a process often described as the 
"open door" policy. The success of its 
modernization goals depends on this 
decision. Through the open door flow the 
foreign expertise and technology China 
needs to further its modernization objec- 
tives; and it is in our interest to help 
stimulate China's economic develop- 
ment. A politically stable, modernizing 
China is in a better position to resist out- 
side pressure and intimidation and is less 
likely to be a distruptive factor in Asia. 
China will modernize; the critical ques- 
tions are: at what pace and with what 
kind of orientation? Although Chinese 
efforts will determine whether or not 
their goals are achieved, we believe that 
continued U.S. participation in the pro- 
cess will serve our long-term interests. 

Some suggest that our relations with 
the P.R.C. might be equated with the 
care and feeding of a "baby tiger." 
China's key reformer, Deng Xiaoping, is 
elderly, and many, both in China and 
abroad, wonder whether his pragmatic, 
moderate policies will continue after his 
death. His reforms and open door 
policies do not enjoy unanimous support 
in China, and the pace and scope of 
reforms continue to be the subject of 
some controversy. Decentralization of 
economic and political decisionmaking 
and power requires adjustments in tradi- 
tional patterns of party and bureaucratic 
control. Some Chinese leaders worry 
about negative Western influences 
sneaking through the open door together 
with the positive accoutrements of the 
West so desired by China. 

Given the vagaries of China's 
modern history, some observers fear 
that China's open door one day may be 
slammed shut and the P.R.C. 's moderate 
policies reversed. Fortunately, the pros- 
pect is unlikely. While Chinese leaders 
are determined to avoid "foreign entan- 
glements," they also will avoid reversion 
to uncompromising self-reliance and iso- 
lation. Internal economic reforms have 
generated more economic development 
in the past 8 years than China has wit- 
nessed in many decades. The standard of 



living of millions of Chinese has improved; 
and continuing stability and moderation 
in the years ahead will expand these 
benefits. Attempts to reverse the trend 
undoubtedly would be opposed by a 
great majority of the people. 

China'a commitment to its open door 
policy is reflected well in its relationship 
with Hong Kong. After lengthy negotia- 
tions, China and the United Kingdom 
reached agreement in 1984 on Hong 
Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty 
in 1997 with its economic system intact. 
While many details remain to be worked 
out, we are encouraged that Hong 
Kong's unique status as a commercial 
center and a gateway to China will con- 
tinue long into the 21st century. 

While differences remain apparent in 
China over the pace of the reforms, 
overall results indicate that the momen- 
tum for reform will continue. 

Regional Implications 

In the political realm, the development 
of a comprehensive dialogue on regional 
and global issues has deepened 
significantly our understanding of each 
other's interests and policies, thereby 
reducing disagreements and potential 
frictions. As I noted earlier, we both 
have been concerned about Soviet 
actions that threatened international 
peace and stability. 

There have been recent signs that 
the Soviet Union, as a Pacific power, will 
begin playing a larger role in Asia. We 
believe Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech 
is only the beginning of a new round of 
Soviet activism in Asia. Moscow may 
attempt to increase its influence in the 
region through subtle tactics designed to 
overcome the suspicions most Asian 
nations have of Soviet intentions. Our 
friends and allies in the region are not 
impressed by empty rhetoric. Nor do 
they find much that is attractive in the 
Soviet Union's economic system, and 
they will judge Moscow by its actions 
rather than its words. If Moscow wishes 
to participate in the region, rather than 
offering a vague program for peace and 
stability, it should start by addressing 
some of the sources of continuing ten- 
sion in East Asia. The Soviet Union 
should reduce its troops in Afghanistan 
and along the Sino-Soviet border. It 
should take steps to persuade Vietnam 
to withdraw its occupying forces from 
Cambodia. It should reduce its military 
support for North Korea. It should 
reduce its massive deployment of SS-20 
nuclear missiles in Siberia, which 
threatens China, Japan, and other coun- 
tries in Northeast Asia. I am not opti- 



mistic that the Soviet Union will take 
any of these steps. 

In contrast, the United States is 
engaged in a close and positive dialogi 
with friends and allies throughout thf 
region. Our discussions with China on 
political and economic issues have bee 
fostered by a regular exchange of higl 
level visits between leaders of both ecu 
tries. This series of visits has been mn 
productive in strengthening areas of 
agreement and reducing differences. 
Both sides feel comfortable in express 
their views frankly and unemotionally 

There are a number of areas wher 
we and the Chinese share parallel 
interests. 

In Southeast Asia, for example, t 
Chinese actively participate in efforts 
end Vietnamese occupation of Camboo 
China supports the resistance moveme 
and keeps Vietnamese forces engaged 
the Sino-Vietnamese border. 

In Afghanistan, the Chinese con- 
demn the Soviets for their continued 
military operations and are strong sup 
porters of the Afghan resistance. The 
Chinese have made it clear to Moscow 
that the Soviet military presence in 
Afghanistan and Soviet support for Vi' 
nam's occupation of Cambodia, along 
with Soviet troop deployments on the 
Sino-Soviet border, are the three main 
obstacles to improved Sino-Soviet 
relations. 

On the Korean Peninsula, the 
Chinese seek, as we do, to reduce ten- 
sions between the North and South. Or. 
two governments may differ on how th 
can be accomplished, but the same objf 
tive of peace is sought. Despite China's 
unwillingness to promote political or 
official ties, its indirect trade with the 
Republic of Korea continues to grow at 
an impressive rate. China had the larg- 
est delegation at the recent Asian Gam 
in Seoul and took the unprecedented 
step of sending its athletes there by 
direct, chartered flights. We believe it 
would serve the interest— which both w 
and China share— in peninsular stability 
for Pyongyang to resume direct talks 
with Seoul and for the North to par- 
ticipate in the 1988 Olympics. 

Japan is China's leading trade part 
ner and. thereby, plays a key role in 
China's economic modernization. Com- 
mon interests and mutual respect 
dominate their bilateral ties, as shown 
by Prime Minister Nakasone's successfi 
trip to China last month. China's policy 
toward Japan is shaped by many of the 
same factors that determine China's 
policy toward the U.S.— concern about 



50 



Department of State Bullet 



EAST ASIA 



'illtaU 



Soviet Union and the need for 
istment. trade, and advanced 
jmology. 

Despite our many areas of agree- 
t, we do have differences with the 
,ese on certain international issues, 
larily concerning regions outside of 
a., such as the Middle East, Central 
erica, and Africa. These are areas 
•e remote from China's immediate 
rests and security concerns, where 
iing follows other political motiva- 
,s, such as a need to demonstrate its 
jj' lependent foreign policy." In such 
s, China is prone to take public posi- 
is more in sympathy with Third 
rid nations and at odds with our own. 
While we cannot expect that two 
'forii mtries as different politically, 
Mh momically, and culturally as China 
the United States will share iden- 
views on all world issues, we do 
set to positions they take in interna- 
aal fora which run counter to U.S. 
crests and our friendly relations. In 
!!!« !er to prevent misconceptions, we 
:age in frequent consultations, which 
e helped improve Chinese under- 
nding of our foreign policy. 



alts 



iOMll( 



ofH 



eenij 



m 



nple, 



litary Cooperation 

addition to the broad expansion in our 
(nomic, science and technology, and 
itical relations, we have moved, in the 
i.t 3 years, into the more sensitive 
iia of military cooperation, including 

sale of defensive arms to China. This 
(ited security cooperation is pro- 
jding cautiously and deliberately. It is 
Jted in the assessment that we share 
(imon security concerns. The will- 
fness of the United States to sell 
tcific defensive weapons or tech- 
ogies to the P.R.C. is based on a 
srough analysis of each item's utility 

enhancing Chinese defensive capabil- 
«s, in light of the political-military 
vironment. We also carefully take into 
count the interests and concerns of 
r other friends and allies in the region 
'•ough frequent and regular consulta- 
ins with them on this issue. 

Our military cooperation to date has 
«en limited to approval of the sale of 
ree specific weapons systems— a large- 
iiber artillery munitions manufactur- 
g plant, avionics components for the 
8 defensive interceptor, and antisub- 
arine torpedoes. Other defensive items 
e under consideration. 



Taiwan Relationship 

Let me turn now to the Taiwan aspect of 
our China policy. In 1979, we estab- 
lished, by law, a framework for conduct- 
ing unofficial commercial, cultural, and 
other relations between people in the 
United States and people on Taiwan. 
Within this framework, unofficial rela- 
tions have flourished remarkably. In 
1985, 180,000 Americans traveled to 
Taiwan, and 100,000 people from 
Taiwan came to the United States. 
There are approximately 21,000 students 
from Taiwan studying at American 
universities and aljout 1,000 American 
students studying in Taiwan. This is a 
vibrant, varied relationship which 
benefits both our peoples. 

Time has shown that normalization 
of U.S. -P.R.C. relations was accom- 
panied by a relaxation of tensions in the 
area and by China's turn toward moder- 
ation and responsible international par- 
ticipation. Because of our faithfulness to 
our friends, the people of Taiwan, no 
less than others in the region, have 
benefited from this positive 
development. 

U.S. -Taiwan trade nearly has quad- 
rupled since 1978, the final year of our 
diplomatic relationship, to reach an 
estimated $25 billion this year. Nearly 
50% of all Taiwan's exports go to the 
American market, and Taiwan is our 
11th largest export market worldwide. 
Direct U.S. investment in Taiwan totals 
$750 million. Under these conditions, 
Taiwan has prospered: this year, its 
growth rate may reach 9%. 

Ironically, Taiwan's economic suc- 
cess has created certain irritants in our 
commercial relations— cigarettes, steel, 
tariffs, machine tools, export perform- 
ance requirements, and counterfeiting, 
to name a few. Taiwan has taken action 
to remove many of these irritants and to 
try to diversify its overseas export 
markets. These steps are appreciated, as 
are Taiwan's efforts to purchase more 
American grain and to improve intellec- 
tual property protection. Nevertheless, 
Taiwan's trade surplus with the United 
States will increase this year to approx- 
imately $15 billion, which is much larger 
in per capita terms than our deficit with 
Japan. In such circumstances, demands 
from U.S. industry for greater access to 
Taiwan's market are reasonable. We're 
pleased, therefore, that Taiwan agreed 
last week to grant us market access for 
tobacco, wine, and beer, on terms which 
we find satisfactory. 

Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves 
now have surpassed $40 billion, an 



amount equivalent to more than 18 
months of its imports. Taiwan is in one 
of the strongest foreign exchange posi- 
tions in the world. With such sizable 
reserves, Taiwan's currency has appre- 
ciated somewhat. However, given 
Taiwan's global trade surplus and its 
strong reserves, one would expect a fur- 
ther appreciation. 

These issues are the by-products of 
Taiwan's success. Most of our trading 
partners gladly would exchange their 
economic woes for Taiwan's situation. 
The island's economic success and its 
vital commercial ties with the United 
States have done much to give the peo- 
ple on Taiwan greater confidence in the 
future and in their own ability to deal 
effectively with other challenges facing 
their society. 

In drafting the Taiwan Relations Act 
7 years ago. Congress declared that any 
nonpeaceful efforts to determine 
Taiwan's future would be "a threat to 
the peace and security of the Western 
Pacific area and of grave concern to the 
United States." The sale of defensive 
arms to Taiwan, mandated by the act, 
continues. The U.S. -P.R.C. communique 
of August 17, 1982, sets certain 
parameters for conduct of the sales. In 
return for Beijing reiterating that its 
fundamental policy is to seek a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue, the 
United States agreed not to increase the 
quality of arms sold to Taiwan and to 
reduce the quantity gradually, over time. 
The United States'will abide faithfully by 
its undertakings in this communique. 

Some have urged the U.S. Govern- 
ment to become involved in efforts to 
promote peaceful resolution of the dif- 
ferences between Beijing and Taipei. 
However, there is a real danger that 
American involvement would be counter- 
productive. For at least two decades, we 
have viewed this issue as an internal 
matter for the P.R.C. and Taiwan to 
resolve themselves. We will not serve as 
an intermediary or pressure Taiwan on 
the matter. We leave it up to both sides 
to settle their differences; our predomi- 
nant interest is that the settlement be a 
peaceful one. 

Earlier this year, a Taiwan cargo 
plan was hijacked and flown to China. 
The authorities on Taiwan authorized 
airline-to-airline talks to gain the return 
of the plane and some members of its 
crew. The success of these talks 
demonstrates the virtue of letting the 
Chinese work things out for themselves. 



sbruary 1987 



51 



EAST ASIA 



Democratic Progress 

I want to add a few words about internal 
political developments in Taiwan. 

During the past 6 months, some 
remarkable and encouraging steps 
toward greater democracy have been ini- 
tiated by the authorities in Taiwan. In 
October, Chiang Ching-kuo announced 
that the martial law emergency decree 
would be terminated and that a ban 
against the formation of new opposition 
parties would be lifted. Opposition 
leaders, sensing the.?e winds of change, 
have pressed ahead with the formation 
of a new political party. 

These developments represent a 
very significant evolution of Taiwan's 
political institutions. We commend the 
foresight and determination that have 
set this process in motion. We also 
recognize that the transition to a func- 
tioning democratic party system will not 
be easy. There may be difficulties along 
the way, but we are impressed by the 
process which has begun. 

Conclusion 

Let me conclude my remarks with the 
observation that, more so than ever 
before, we Americans are aware of the 
opportunities and challenges we face 
throughout East Asia and the Pacific. 
The many nations of the region have a 
firm claim on our attention— some due to 
their close, traditional friendship and 
alliance with us, others because they ex- 
hibit hostility or instability. We seek to 
maintain our good relations with the 
former while working to reduce tensions 
and differences with the latter. 

China occupies a unique place in the 
region. The remarkable progress in our 
relations with this great country has had 
a major impact on the rest of the area. 
We believe the basic premise of our 
policy toward China— that it can be a 
force for peace and stability throughout 
East Asia— is correct and is producing 
positive results. 

There still are differences between 
us, and we do not take this critical rela- 
tionship for granted. On the contrary, 
we devote considerable effort and atten- 
tion to ensuring that we are responsive 
to changes in both our bilateral ties and 
the broader situation in the region. I am 
confident that, through cooperation and 
good will on both sides, we can continue 
to strengthen our bonds with China to 
our mutual benefit. ■ 



Vitality and Possibility on the Pacific Rim 



by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr. 

Address before a conference spon- 
sored by Meridian House International 
for business executives from the United 
States, Japan, and Latin America on 
December 3, 1986. Mr. Sigur is Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. 

I am very pleased to be here with you 
today. It is appropriate that this sym- 
posium takes place in the house built by 
Ambassador Irwin B. Laughlin, who 
served in the Foreign Service in Japan 
between 1893 and 1907. Meiji Japan had 
a great allure for Americans, and judg- 
ing from Ambassador Laughlin's fine 
collection of ukiyo-e. he must have been 
intrigued with the country. It was a 
fascinating time. A quarter century after 
the Meiji Restoration, Japan retained an 
exotic flavor for Westerners. Yet the fall 
of the shogunate had released a tremen- 
dous vibrancy. The energy and vitality 
that characterized the Meiji era persists 
in Japan, and a similar dynamism has 
emerged in other countries along the 
Pacific rim in East Asia. It is what 
makes the region so promising and 
important to the United States. 

Trade With East Asia 

East Asia has become our primary 
source of trade. In 1985 the region 
accounted for about one-third of our 
global two-way trade. The East Asian 
region also contains our most dynamic 
trading partners. From 1981 through 
1985, U.S. trade with the world 
increased by 13%, but with East Asian 
and Pacific countries our trade increased 
by almost 42%. The United States is the 
number one market for Korea, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong as well as for Japan. What 
frequently is overlooked is that 7 of our 
20 largest export markets are in the 
region. In addition to Japan, they 
include Korea, Australia, Taiwan, China, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong. U.S. invest- 
ment in the region exceeds $33 billion 
and, like trade, is growing. 

Most predictions project growing 
interdependence among the economies 
and societies of the Pacific rim. By the 
year 2000, it is almost certain that the 
Pacific Basin will account for more than 
50% of the world's production. U.S. ties 
to Europe will remain strong, but our 
future growth increasingly lies in East 
Asia and the Pacific. 



Success in Development 

Northeast Asia in particular has showi 
the way to effective economic develop 
ment. Many of the region's governmer 
have adopted development strategies 
which encourage private sector initia- 
tive, and they serve as practical model 
for developing countries in other 
regions. Businessmen have been willin: 
to risk domestic investment that explo 
new technologies, improving quality 
while cutting costs. The labor force is 
hard-working, highly educated, and 
adaptable. The most successful countri 
in the region have promoted industriesi 
geared to competitive exporting. The 
concentration on exports has multiple 
benefits. It overcomes the limitation ol 
small domestic markets, imposes cost 
consciousness, and eases foreign 
exchange constraints. 

This development strategy has 
clearly paid off. The Asia-Pacific 
region's share of world exports more 
than doubled between 1960 and 1984, 
rising from 7.5% to 17%. The success 
this growth model, based on exports, it 
even more obvious when one finds that 
the economies of Taiwan, Korea, and 
Singapore expanded much more quick!} 
when they abandoned import substitu- 
tion strategies for outward-looking 
policies. The export-led growth has bee- 
sustained by sound financial manage 
ment. The Asian countries with rapidly 
growing economies have followed sensi 
ble exchange rate policies. They also 
have encouraged domestic savings 
through intelligent banking regulations 
and have sought foreign investment. In 
general these successful countries have 
avoided market distorting price-fixing 
and subsidies. It is no coincidence that 
the debt-service ratio of the East Asian 
developing countries is the lowest of an 
region- 18% in 1985. 

Survey of East Asia 

It is handy to talk of the "East Asian 
region," but that term hides a great 
diversity. The region can be divided intc 
five categories by degree of economic 
development: first, Japan, Australia, an 
New Zealand; second, the newly indus- 
trialized countries— Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore; third, the rest o 
the ASEAN countries; fourth, China am 
the Pacific islands; and finally the stag- 
nant, closed socialist economies of Asia. 

The newly industrialized countries 
initially concentrated their efforts on 
producing labor intensive products in th« 



52 



EAST ASIA 



Os as Japan's technological endow- 
it and wage costs began to rise. They 
are rapidly increasing the produc- 
of manufactured goods, while 
an, of course, is making high tech 
ducts. As a result of yen apprecia- 
1, lower oil prices, and reduced in- 
;st rates, Taiwan and Korea are 
ming. Korea's dramatic achievement 
global current account surplus this 
r will permit it to reduce its debt. 
China and the ASEAN countries, 
er than Singapore, are now entering 
labor-intensive niche the newly 
ustrialized countries are abandoning, 
present the ASEAN countries, espe- 
,ly the oil producers— Indonesia and 
laysia— depend on raw material 
Dorts. They are suffering from gen- 
Jly depressed commodity prices. In 
short term, some may need assist- 
ce. In the medium term, these coun- 
es must expand manid^actured 
oorts, and to do that they should 
Drove the climate for foreign 
testment. 

China has witnessed the economic 
owth in other countries in its region 
tl understands the implications for 
proving the living standards of its own 
3ple. Accordingly China has been 
mging its economic system to include 
1 ire market-based policies. China's 
■cnt extraordinarily high growth rates 
■ encouraging, and we look forward to 
it country's continued growth and 
egration into the global economy. 
These days we tend to dwell gloom- 
on the implications of the economic 
iwth in East Asia. I refer, of course, 
the region's competitive challenge to 
nerican companies and to the United 
ates' very large trade deficit with 
;ian countries. These developments 
■se serious questions, and our govern- 
ent and companies must deal with 
em. At the same time, we should 
cognize that the growing prosperity in 
ist Asia contributes mightily to politi- 
,1 stability and ultimately to our 
■curity. 

East Asian prosperity has depended 
1 the openness of the U.S. market. The 
iiited States has been a ready market 
)t only for the countries in Asia but for 
-'veloping countries elsewhere as well. 
1 1985 the United States bought 61% of 
le developing countries' exports of 
lanufactures. Realistically this situation 
mnot go on forever. Other countries, 
^jiecially Japan, must open their mar- 
ets to allow an increase in imports from 
R' developing countries and from the 
nited States as well. We can continue 
1 lie a good customer only if we enjoy 
i.'cess to the markets of our trading 
■ai'tners. 



U.S. -Japan Interdependence 

Let me now turn from the broad over- 
view of the region to consider our eco- 
nomic relations with Japan, which in 40 
years has become an economic super- 
power and an economic model for many 
of the other countries in East Asia. 

The United States is bound to Japan 
by a history of friendship and coopera- 
tion. We share a commitment to demo- 
cratic values, a common view on the 
important international questions, and a 
security framework. Our governments 
consult and cooperate closely on interna- 
tional political affairs and on the man- 
agement of the world economy. Though 
often repeated, it remains true that the 
relationship between the United States 
and Japan is one of the most important 
bilateral relationships in the world. 

The economies of the two countries 
also now are tied in an increasingly tight 
and strong mesh of trade and invest- 
ment. It is commonplace to note that, 
after Canada, Japan is the United 
States' largest trading partner. But the 
statement hides the complexity of the 
relationship and the growing integration 
of the two countries' economies. 

When we think of Japanese exports 
to the United States, we usually think of 
consumer products— cars, cameras, 
VCRs. Certainly we buy those things 
from Japan in abundance. But of the 
United States' $72 billion of imports 
from Japan in 1985, over $8 billion were 
components used by U.S. manufacturers. 
Another $2.2 billion were products made 
by U.S. subsidiaries in Japan and 
shipped to the United States. According 
to Commerce Department statistics, 
Japanese subsidiaries in the United 
States in 1983 exported $22.9 billion, 
which was 11.4% of U.S. exports that 
year. In 1985 we shipped $22.6 billion to 
Japan, more than 10% of our global 
exports and more than our exports to 
the United Kingdom and West Germany 
combined. 

Japan is now, after the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, the third 
largest foreign investor in the United 
States, The Ministry of Finance has 
reported that at the end of 1985, 
Japanese investment in this country 
stood at $25.3 billion, up $5.4 billion 
from the year before. The rapid growth 
of investment by Japanese companies 
suggests that the integration of the two 
economies will continue. Several months 
ago Business Week debated whether 
increased Japanese investment in the 
U.S. economy was beneficial and con- 
cluded that it was. On balance I agree. 
The United States needs capital, and it 
can benefit from the investments and 



technology that Japanese companies will 
be able to provide. 

Trade With Japan 

We expect that for 1986 Japan will have 
nearly a $60 billion trade surplus with 
the United States and a global current 
account surplus of over $80 billion. 
Japan has the lowest average tariff on 
manufactured goods of any developed 
country and has relatively few official 
trade barriers of other sorts. Yet there 
are anomalies which suggest that the 
Japanese economy is still not as open as 
it might appear. Japan has the lowest 
per capita imports of any major devel- 
oped country— $1,106 compared with 
$1,580 for the United States and $2,611 
for West Germany. It has the highest 
per capita manufactured exports to 
developing countries. At the same time, 
except for France, it has the lowest 
manufactured imports from developing 
countries— $69 compared with $285 for 
the United States and $145 for West 
Germany. Not just American companies 
but European and Asian exporters com- 
plain of the difficulty of selling in Japan. 

Taken together, the real and per- 
ceived problems of entering the market, 
and the size of Japan's global trade 
surplus and its bilateral surplus with the 
United States, have resulted in persist- 
ent economic tensions between the two 
countries. The complexity of the trade 
and investment ties between the two 
countries— and the relationship of our 
bilateral trade deficit with Japan to our 
budget deficit, to our global trade 
deficit, and to Japan's domestic economic 
policies— have made it hard to deal with 
the problem. From time to time, some 
have suggested greater government reg- 
ulation of trade or targets of some sort. 
We have rejected these calls because 
they would choke off economic vitality, 
and they could have unintended and 
unforeseeable contrary effects on com- 
panies and national economies, not only 
in Japan and the United States but 
elsewhere. 

This is not to say, however, that the 
U.S. Government has failed to pursue 
solutions to our economic problems with 
Japan vigorously. We have approached 
the trade problem on two sets of tracks. 
We have sought better access to Japan's 
market through the MOSS [market- 
oriented, sector-selective] talks and 
through negotiations on other individual 
issues. I think that we have made prog- 
ress. We resolved many of the issues 
raised in the MOSS talks. And in the 
first 8 months of 1986, U.S. exports of 
MOSS products to Japan rose b.7%. 
Japan has cooperated in resolving other 



-ebruary 1987 



53 



EAST ASIA 



issues as well. These include tobacco, 
semiconductors, and aluminum. Prime 
Minister Nakasone promised that foreign 
companies would be able to compete to 
participate in the new Kansai airport 
project, and U.S. firms are seeking 
business. 

While pushing for improved market 
access, the Administration also has 
worked for a correction of the exchange 
rate, which has a great effect on trade 
flows. Following the exchange rate 
agreement among the group of five 
major economic powers in September 
1985, the yen strengthened by over 50%. 
The Tokyo summit statement in May 
emphasized economic fundamentals as 
determinants of exchange rates. We 
believe that it is important for both the 
United States and Japan to address 
these fundamentals. The evolution 
brought about by the exchange rate is 
consistent with Japanese Government 
policy. When announcing his intention to 
follow up on the Maekawa report in 
April this year, Prime Minister 
Nakasone said that Japan's" . . .continu- 
ing large current account imbalance is a 
matter of serious concern not only for 
the management of our own economy 
but also for the harmonious development 
of the world economy. Therefore, it 
should be our national goal to steadily 
reduce the current account imbalance to 
one consistent with international har- 
mony." The Maekawa report plots a 
course for doing just that. We look for- 
ward to continuing and effective 
Japanese Government action on the 
Maekawa report's goals and 
recommendations. 

We believe that a reduction in 
Japan's global trade surplus requires a 
restructuring of the economy away from 
export-led growth. We have, in fact, 
entered into a high-level dialogue on 
structural economic issues with Japanese 
officials. We held the first substantive 
meeting at the end of October and will 
hold another early next year. In those 
talks, we will continue to discuss with 
the Japanese ways of encouraging 
greater domestic-led growth in Japan. 

Changes in Japan's Economy 

Evolution seems underway in Japan's 
economy. The change in the exchange 
rate is having an effect on trade flows. 
During the first 9 months of 1986, 
Japan's export volume was down 
slightly— four-tenths of 1%— and import 
volume was up by 13%. In October the 



volume of exports was down 1.7%, and 
the volume of imports was up by 5%. (I 
might mention that U.S. exports to 
Japan were up 18.9% in the first 9 
months of this year.) There is no doubt 
that declining export sales have 
dampened economic growth in Japan. 
Statistics are not yet available to deter- 
mine the exchange rate's effect on indi- 
vidual industries. But the effects, we 
believe, are not trivial. 

The Japanese steel industry is obvi- 
ously in structural depression, and the 
auto industry's profits are down. One 
hears reports that Japanese companies 
are moving production to other Asian 
countries and to the United States and 
that they are turning from production 
for export to sales in the domestic 
market. 



Asia, Latin America, 
and the United States 

I have concentrated on East Asia and on 
Japan's relations with the United States. 
But I know the principal subject of this 
conference is the economic relationships 
among Japan, Latin America, and the 
United States. We should bear in mind 
the Pacific Basin is an ellipse which 
borders the countries of Latin America 
as well. It is an area of great importance 
and potential to the nations along the 
other edge of the Pacific rim as well. A 
large part of Asia's trade goes through 
the Panama Canal and Latin American 
waters. Japan also has historical and 
cultural ties to Latin America. During 
this century, Japanese emigrants settled 
in a number of countries in the region, 
and people of Japanese ancestry now 
number 1 million in Latin America. Of 
those, 800,000 are in Brazil. 

Despite this, Japan's economic ties 
with Latin America are thin compared to 
those between the United States and 
Latin America and compared to Japan's 
own connections with Asia. In 1985 
Japan exported $7.5 billion to the region 
and imported $6.1 billion from it. In that 
year, U.S. exports to Latin America 
were $31 billion and its imports were 
$49.1 billion. Japan's economic 
assistance to the area is increasing but 
still constitutes only about 10% of its 



worldwide assistance. Japan's interef 
in the area are quite similar to those • 
the United States. Both countries fa\ 
democratization and the sort of econi 
reforms that will contribute to the sol 
tion of the debt problem and to econo c 
progress and political stability. We h: 
cooperated closely with Japan on the 
debt issue and consult with it on Latii 
American questions. We will continue 
doing so. We hope that Japan will in- 
crease its trade with Latin America, ; i 
particularly its imports from that reg i. 
Japan has announced its intention to 
double its worldwide foreign develop- 
ment assistance over the next 5 years 
In connection with this, we would likt i 
see increases in assistance to Latin 
America— particularly to Central 
America, the Caribbean, and Bolivia. 

Conclusion 

I started my speech in Asia and now 
have just visited Latin America. That: 
a pretty long trip in 15 minutes. I wow 
now like to return to Washington to 
offer some final comments. 

The first is obvious. That is, vitalif 
and growth in the Pacific rim. East A| 
and Latin America are in our economic 
terest and to our political benefit. Risif 
incomes will provide greater oppor- 
tunities for U.S. exports, and economi 
growth will strengthen the political 
stability so important to our own 
security. 

The free flow of goods and capital,, 
in the interest of the whole region. Bu "" 
we can keep our market open only if v 
have access to the markets of others. ^ 
is essential that the economically suc- 
cessful countries of East Asia and Lat 
America open their markets further. I 
also is essential that Japan carry 
through with its policy to reduce its 
external surpluses substantially. 

Finally, we too bear an obligation. 
The appreciation of the yen provides 
greater opportunity for us to increase 
our exports to Japan and to other coui 
tries. To take advantage of that oppor- 
tunity, we will have to correct im- 
balances in our own economy, improve 
our competitiveness, and hustle for 
sales. Vitality is not a resource found 
only on the other side of the Pacific. It 
exists in the United States, and we 
should demonstrate that. ■ 



54 



Department of State Bullet 



i 



EAST ASIA 



Tie U.S. Approach 

^» East Asia and the Pacific 

i 



HGaston J. Sigur, Jr. 

. [ddress before a conference on "U.S. 

'nal Seairity Interests in Asia and 
I'licific: Update 1986" sponsored by 
I'lirific and Asian Affairs Council 

:lie Pacific Forum in Honolulu on 
•lifr 29. 1986. 



a pleasiire to participate in a public 
nil which promises to be both educa- 
lal and enjoyable. Four years ago, 
idlulu's Pacific and Asian Affairs 
lu-ij hosted a similar seminar for the 
lie and representatives of the Bureau 
^ast Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
artment of State. It was a resound- 
success by all accounts, and we are 
a ghted to coopei-ate with the council 
oi e again. It performs an admirable job 
h acilitating public discussion of inter- 
n ional issues. We appreciate the 
stance also provided by the Pacific 
um and the cooperating organiza- 
i> listed in your programs. 
As many of you know, our ambas- 
irs to the various East Asian and 
r 'ific capitals— our chiefs of mission— 
g hered in Honolulu earlier this week 
f a periodic review of regional policy 
a I administrative matters. We've found 
ii 'ears past that an occasional 
f ewheeling discussion among our 
r ional diplomats, CINCPAC [Com- 
r nder in Chief Pacific] officials, and 
I Dartment representatives helps to 
s nulate fresh perspectives, new ideas, 
a I the necessary coordination that 
ii )roves our methods of operation. Our 
r etings this week have been tremen- 
c isly useful, and we want to thank the 
( .'ernor of Hawaii and the people of 
I nolulu for their customary hospitality 
a 1 friendliness. 

Our session this afternoon is, in 
sue respects, a foUowup to the 1982 
f um hosted by the council, and thus it 
c Ties the title "U.S. National Security 
I erests in Asia and the Pacific; Update 
1^6." Perhaps our fundamental secu- 
r/ interests in the region have changed 
1 le in 4 years; but certainly the context 
; i circumstances in which those 
i erests exist have undergone some 
. portant transitions. One of the most 
•iimatic events, of course, has been the 
l;pularly inspired political evolution this 
]i5t year in the Philippines, where we 
' ve important security interests, and I 
lit to say more about this in a 



moment. Another positive adjustment is 
reflected in the increasingly close and 
stable relations which we now share with 
the People's Republic of China, having 
moved forward together from the con- 
tentious period of early 1982. On the 
negative side, we have had to suspend 
our ANZUS [Australia. New Zealand, 
and United States security treaty] 
defense commitment to New Zealand in 
response to Wellington's placement of 
unacceptable conditions on port calls by 
U.S. naval vessels. But our security 
treaty relations with Australia, Japan, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and the 
Republic of Korea remain strong; and 
our multifaceted relationships with the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] states and the South 
Pacific islands are functioning well. 
Economic ties with Taiwan remain 
substantial. 

We are witnessing a more assertive 
Soviet policy in the region in recent 
years, but the general environment 
remains basically unsuited to Moscow's 
ambiguous initiatives. Unfortunately, the 
context of hostility and dangers of con- 
frontation remain volatile on the Korean 
Peninsula and in Cambodia, much as 
they were 4 years ago. This Administra- 
tion has supported efforts to reduce ten- 
sions in those two localities, but the 
response from Pyongyang and Hanoi has 
been disappointing. We continue to urge 
the Government of Vietnam to withdraw 
its occupation forces from Cambodia and 
to provide us with the fullest possible 
accounting of our missing servicemen in 
Southeast Asia. And we continue to 
encourage North Korea to resume its 
dialogue with the Republic of Korea as 
the only way to ensure peace for all 
Koreans. 

The East Asian and Pacific region 
has prospered economically and politi- 
cally, relative to other geographic 
regions of the globe. Technological 
advances are proceeding swiftly, literacy 
rates are high, and economic perform- 
ance on the whole has been impressive. 
Political instability is the exception 
rather than the rule; and politically 
motivated terrorist acts remain few and 
isolated. 

The Philippine Transformation 

I want to say just a few words about the 
situation in the Philippines, since 
Ambassador Bosworth [U.S. Ambas- 
sador to the Philippines Stephen W. 



Bosworth] was unable to join today's 
panel discussion. By now it should be 
very clear that the foundation of U.S. 
policy toward the Philippines is to 
encourage the revitalization of the 
democratic process there, to facilitate 
stability and prosperity for this Pacific 
ally. The Filipinos themselves have taken 
giant strides this year in that direction, 
and we will be as supportive and helpful 
as we can in the process. President 
Aquino just completed a tremendously 
successful visit to the United States. She 
effectively affirmed to the American 
people her government's commitment to 
democracy and free enterprise. In turn, 
the United States demonstrated its com- 
mitment to the success of the new 
Philippine democracy through the pledge 
of substantial economic, military, and 
medical assistance to the Philippine 
people. Additionally, the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank have 
approved, in principle, additional loans 
to support the Philippines' economic 
reform program. The agreement with 
the Fund and World Bank give greater 
confidence to private sector bankers and 
investors as they consider new 
investments in the Philippines. 

President Aquino gave a special 
impetus to our already strong, 
cooperative bilateral relationship. That is 
very important, because troublesome 
challenges remain. The new government 
in Manila contends with massive 
unemployment, heavy external debt, and 
extensive poverty. The local communist 
insurgency remains a serious danger. 
And important trade and investment 
measures still must be implemented. 

But this Administration is confident 
that the Aquino government is embarked 
on a program of national recovery which 
enjoys the overwhelming support of the 
Filipino people. We will work with Con- 
gress to ensure appropriate levels of 
assistance in the future. We will con- 
tinue to encourage vibrant private sector 
involvement in the reconstruction of the 
economy. 

A stable, democratic, and prosperous 
Philippines will contribute measurably to 
the realization of our policy goals in the 
region as a whole and serve well our own 
national interests. 

Policy Objectives and Principles 

What I want to address more generally 
this afternoon is those basic principles 
which guide and direct U.S. policy in the 
Asian and Pacific region today. They 
derive, of course, from certain elemen- 
tary but central policy objectives; secu- 
rity and stability for the nations of the 
area are top priorities for all concerned, 



||bruary 



1987 



55 



EAST ASIA 



and we will do what is appropriate and 
necessary to nurture these goals. The 
United States wants to help promote 
regional prosperity, social advancement, 
and political modernization within our 
limited means to do so. And we seek to 
facilitate multilateral cooperation, not 
simply as an end in itself but as an effec- 
tive means for moving promptly toward 
the other goals which we and the Asian- 
Pacific nations share. 

In light of these, U.S. policy toward 
the region is constructed upon certain 
basic principles and convictions. These 
precepts reflect fundamental American 
values as well as our realistic assessment 
of actual circumstances in this area, and 
I would identify them in this way. 

First, U.S. policy is based upon 
genuine respect for the interests and 
prerogatives of the people of the 
Asian-Pacific region. We do not seek 
and we would not attempt to interfere in 
the internal affairs of those nations or to 
dictate their policy decisions. This 
Administration approaches these rela- 
tionships with a degree of sensitivity and 
responsiveness which fully acknowledges 
the sovereign status of the nations of the 
area. We believe we have much to offer 
the developing states of the region and 
are willing to provide advice and 
guidance as needed. Where leadership is 
required in security or economic affairs, 
we accept our responsibilities; but we 
never will attempt to dominate or dic- 
tate in those endeavors. 

The United States is willing to defer 
to others where new roles of construc- 
tive regional leadership and participation 
are emerging. For the past several 
years, we have looked to the ASEAN 
members for policy leadership on issues 
involving the Cambodian occupation and 
resistance, and we closely coordinate our 
policy efforts there. We respect and sup- 
port Japan's significant and growing 
role in providing assistance to the 
developing countries of the region. We 
consult regularly with interested govern- 
ments on the course of our expanding 
relationship with the People's Republic 
of China. And I believe we are more sen- 
sitive than ever, today, to the concerns 
and requirements of the emerging- 
entities in the South Pacific. 

Governments— even allied 
governments— may not always agree on 
the fine points of every policy decision, 
but our differences are subject to discus- 
sion. Our partners and friends will find 
us receptive to their concerns on every 
issue and respectful of their points of 
view. We want to foster greater 
cooperation through regular consulta- 
tions and mutual understanding, and we 
are trying hard to accomplish this. 



At the same time, the United States 
hopes to strengthen our alliance team- 
work through clearer comprehension of 
our common challenges and respon- 
sibilities. If one ally sets its own 
arbitrary rules for others to follow, it 
involves risks for all. Reciprocal coopera- 
tion and burdensharing is key to a 
healthy partnership. And our unity is 
essential to the broadest aspects of East- 
West relations. When our President 
meets with General Secretary Gorbachev, 
his position is strengthened by recogni- 
tion that our allies are solidly behind 
him. This does not in any way diminish 
us individually; rather, it strengthens us 
collectively and serves the cause of 
peace. 

A second precept of U.S. policy in 
this region is our conviction that peace 
and stability are best facilitated by 
addressing specific sources of regional 
tension. While the Asian-Pacific region 
has been, in recent years, relatively free 
of conflict, its remarkable advances are 
shadowed by Vietnam's military occupa- 
tion of Cambodia and by the ever- 
present risk of hostilities on the Korean 
Peninsula. We continue to urge that 
these dangerous situations be addressed 
through negotiations by the parties 
directly involved. 

We do not believe that grand concep- 
tual schemes of collaboration are the 
answer— so-called confidence-building 
measures sublimely superimposed upon 
the region without regard to underlying 
sources of danger. Peace is not a 
theoretical abstraction; it is a tangible 
condition. We must address the 
specifics. 

President Reagan has called 
repeatedly for urgent resolution of 
regional conflicts, as he did most 
recently in his appearance before the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
Cambodia is an important part of that 
message. We continue to believe that a 
genuine solution to this 8-year-old prob- 
lem must provide for self-determination 
by the Cambodian people and the with- 
drawal of Vietnamese forces. We remain 
firmly behind ASEAN in its quest for a 
settlement. Many elements of the pro- 
posals put to the Vietnamese are a 
reasonable basis for an effective settle- 
ment, and we believe Moscow should 
exercise influence with Hanoi to 
negotiate seriously. To date, neither the 
Soviets nor the Vietnamese have 
responded seriously to these urgings. In 
the meantime, we remain steadfast in 
our support of Prince Sihanouk and Son 
Sann and of the noncommunist 
resistance generally; for we believe that 



progress may only be possible once Vi 
nam recognizes it cannot gain from pr 
longing the warfare that ravages 
Cambodia. 

With regard to the other immediai 
source for concern in this region, Kon 
we believe that Moscow should restrai 
its military collaboration with North 
Korea, and persuade Pyongyang to 
resume the dialogue with Seoul which 
the North suspended last January. 
Direct talks between the North and 
South are still the best means for 
diminishing the risk of this flashpoint 
northeast Asia. 

Of course, the Soviet Union also 
could do much to ease regional tensior 
by eliminating its nuclear-armed SS-2 
missiles targeted on Asia, by reducing 
its military forces in the region, and b; 
responding to Japan's appeal for the 
return of its Northern Territories. 

Let's construct a durable peace in 
Asia. But let's accomplish it by buildin 
methodically from the bottom up, 
instead of with superficial gestures thf 
purport to work from the top down. 

Turning to a third area: the Unit* 
States does support, as a matter of 
principle, the establishment of 
democratic institutions and processes 
in East Asia and the Pacific. We pro- 
mote the democratic system not purely 
on moral or ideological grounds but, 
quite simply, because experience prove 
that this is the best prescription for 
political stability and economic strengt 
among developing nations. As part of 
this concept, I include the notion of 
modern constitutionalism, the rule of 
law, popular electoral processes, and tl 
free enterprise system. Obviously, the 
United States has particular interest in 
seeing the steady evolution of 
democratic reforms and responsive 
government among those nations with 
whom we have normal and extensive 
relations. 

There are at present a number of 
"emerging democracies" in this region 
enjoying unprecedented prosperity and 
social advances. Hardly any would be 
considered "perfect" by the purest 
standards of the democratic model, but 
the trends are encouraging, for the mos 
part. When we consider how far these 
governments have come just within the 
current generation, and how favorably 
they compare with the repressive 
examples in their own neighborhood, this 
record is impressive. Secretary Shultz 
has commented that democratic transi- 
tions are "often complex and delicate, I 
and . . . can only come about in a way I 
consistent with a country's history, I 
culture, and political realities." But that 



56 



Department of State Bulleti ' 



EUROPE 



not mean that we will overlook per- 
■nt violations or infringements of 

human rights. Quite the contrary, 
rge enlightened behavior on all 

rnments, including those in 
sition. 

'his year alone, we are witnessing 
uraging examples of the democratic 
ess in action. Aside from the 

atic popular revitalization of 
ocracy in the Philippines last 
ruary, we have witnessed significant 
ititutional reform activity this year 
Dth the Philippines and the Republic 
^orea. We welcome the recent deci- 
by Taiwan authorities to lift martial 
land the ban on new political 
lies— an impressive indication of a 
(mitment to political development in 

an. Important parliamentary elec- 

have occurred or will occur this 

in several parts of the region. All 
th e developments are reminders that 
•h representative form of government 
.ritical element of Asian-Pacific 
ernization. 

Ill promoting democracy, the United 
es will not meddle in the internal 
irs of others. We will remain in con- 
with democratic political forces 
uiihout the region, recognizing that 

adequate time and constructive 
It, the peoples of the developing 
us will work out their own solutions. 

Fourth, we sincerely believe that 
01 common prosperity can be main- 
tf ed only through the expansion of 
ti le and investment. Our policy is one 
ol ncouraging growth through trade, 
al ig with basic reliance on the market 
fc es of competition and free enter- 
f. Roth protectionism and excessive 
t regulation thwart the common pur- 
p' 3S for which we and the Asian-Pacific 
n. ons are striving. That is the message 
w ch this Administration has sought to 
C( imunicate, and it is at the core of our 
a nomic philosophy and trading prac- 
ti in the region. We do believe the 
ni ions of this region are now moving in 
tl direction of constructive long-range 
s< itions to our trading problems. But it 
' take some time yet for the natural 
' es of the marketplace to rectify some 
ii lalances. In the meantime, we must 
S] n the temptation to clutch at quick- 
fi solutions which will only increase our 
r blcms in the long run. 

^'(lu all know how hard the President 

■' resisted protectionist sentiments in 

f country. During this past year, the 

i ministration successfully discouraged 

i''onceived congressional efforts seek- 

tn legislate away the U.S. trade 

iiji. Such protectionist action only 

lid have produced great damage to 



ourselves and our trading partners 
without solving the deficit. But we are 
not out of the woods yet. Frustrations 
run deep, and we must be prepared for 
additional protectionist initiatives next 
year. Our worldwide deficit in 1985 sur- 
passed $148 billion, and the Asian area 
alone accounted for more than $80 
billion of that figure. In this area, which 
now is our largest regional trading part- 
ner, we simply must do better at specific 
export promotion. Reduced barriers to 
market access, national currency 
adjustments, and more receptive invest- 
ment conditions already are having a 
favorable impact, and we pledge for our 
part to work even harder to improve the 
overall climate of cooperation. American 
business has to work harder, too, to 
regain lost competitiveness and to take 
advantage of the newly opening markets 
in Asia. 

There are many emerging economies 
in East Asia and the Pacific whose 
destinies rely both on healthy market 
interactions and long-term domestic 
stability. The interdependence of 
political stability and economic pros- 
perity is fundamental, and the decline of 
one unavoidably leads to the weakening 
of the other. The United States 
recognizes the importance to world 



peace of this region's stability, and we 
are prepared to do our part to preserve 
it. Through the public and private sec- 
tors, we offer important trade prospects, 
technology transfer, foreign investment, 
and educational opportunities to help the 
developing countries remain on sound 
footing. We cannot, of course, carry the 
burden alone, and we welcome the role 
of Japan and other advanced market 
countries in assisting the economic 
growth of the lesser developed countries 
of this region. 

Conclusion 

In closing, let me reiterate that the U.S. 
commitment to East Asia and the Pacific 
remains steadfast. We believe the best 
prescription for our future role in the 
region is the same formula that has 
directed our course successfully to this 
point: policy based upon principle rather 
than expediency and upon conviction 
rather than opportunism. Our allies and 
friends will find us always available to 
discuss their concerns and, hopefully, 
ever sensitive to their interests. We 
intend to remain a partner, not a poten- 
tate, to the region as it continues the 
sometimes difficult transition to full 
economic and political modernization. ■ 



NATO Defense Planning 
Committee IVIeets in Brussels 



The Defense Ministers of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
met in Brussels December U-5. 1986. The 
United, States was represented by 
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger. Following is the text of the 
final communique. 

The Defense Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
ministerial session in Brussels on 4th and .5th 
December 1986, and agreed |to] the following: 

2, NATO's aim is the prevention of war; 
therefore, the Alliance must continue to 
ensure its security through the provision of 
adequate military capabilities and the parallel 
pursuit of a more stable East- West relation- 
ship. Credible deterrence and defense is an 
essential basis for improved relations between 
East and West. 

:3. NATO's strategy of forward defense 
and flexible response, including the commit- 
ment to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent 
posture, has preserved peace for many years 



and remains fully valid. Against the 
background of existing Warsaw Pact strength 
and ongoing force improvements, this 
strategy continues to require effective 
nuclear deterrence, based on a mix of 
systems. Given the need for stable balance at 
all times, nuclear weapons cannot be con- 
sidered in isolation. Reductions in nuclear 
weapons would increase the importance of 
eliminating the current imbalance in conven- 
tional forces. We reject unilateral disarma- 
ment, which would result in the abandonment 
by NATO of its deterrent strategy, and hence 
the basis for its security and stability. As in 
the past. Alliance solidarity and cohesion will 
be important in ensuring progress towards a 
more secure and stable environment. 

4. Our determination to avoid an undue 
reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons 
is reflected in our continuing efforts to im- 
prove conventional forces. The Conventional 
Defense Improvements (GDI) action plan has 
provided the framework within which we can 



ribruary 



1987 



57 



EUROPE 



make progress towards securing this objec- 
tive. In particular, it lias identified those key 
deficiencies and priority areas where we all 
agree a special effort will bring the greatest 
return for our collective defense. Our discus- 
sion (}f the Annual Defense Review and the 
adoption of the NATO Force Plan 1987-1991 
has reflected our determination to give these 
Alliance priority areas special emphasis in our 
national plans and programs. 

5. Considerable progress has already l)een 
made towards a more effective conventional 
posture. We have seen positive developments 
in several areas including the substantial 
modernization programs in almost all member 
countries and the improvements in the sus- 
tainability of our forces. These improvements 
and other actions contained in GDI will con- 
siderably enhance our capabilities and reduce 
the areas of deficiency. We are determined to 
sustain this momentum. 

6. Having noted the initial assessment of 
the developing threat posed to NATO by 
Warsaw Pact tactical ballistic missiles, we 
called for continued work on assessing the 
threat and possible ways to deal with it. 

7. Improvements to Alliance planning 
procedures are also now being put into effect. 
These include a more effective co-ordination 
of the various planning areas of the Alliance 
and the provision of more effective long-term 
planning guidance on our military require- 
ments through regular updating of the con- 
ceptual military framework and the develop- 
ment of long term planning guidelines by our 
military authorities. 

8. All of this represents substantial prog- 
ress and provides a solid foundation for 
achieving more effective conventional forces. 
However, the provision of adequate resources 
in accordance with the 1985 ministerial 
guidance which reaffirmed the aims of a 3 
percent real increase as a general guide, and 
the need for even better use of these 
resources will continue to be a serious 
challenge for all nations. 

9. Better armaments co-operation, stand- 
ardization and sharing of technology between 
the European and North American and the 
developed and developing members of the 
Alliance are important for ensuring the most 
effective use of resources, as is the continued 
protection of military relevant technology. 

10. In the context of the current GDI ef- 
fort, we agreed that improved armaments col- 
laboration has an important role to play in the 
strengthening of conventional defenses and 
that NATO's armaments co-operation im- 
provements strategy, approved by Ministers 
in December 1985, is proving to be a useful 



29th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 14, 1986' 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
submitting to you a bimonthly report on prog- 
ress toward a negotiated settlement of the 
Cyprus question. 

The United Nations Secretary General 
met on September 16 with Mr. Denktash. the 
Turkish Cypriot leader, and on September 26 
with President Kyprianou. The Secretary 
General reviewed the Cyjjrus situation with 
the leaders of the two Cypriot communities 
and explored with them ways to carry for- 
ward his good offices mission. 

The Turkish Cypriot side has accepted the 
Secretary General's draft framework agree- 
ment and taken the position that the Greek 
Cypriot side should also do so. The Greek 
Cypriot side has not accepted the document 
and. instead, has taken the position that 
priority should be given to discussion of 
withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers, 
international guarantees, and the "three 
freedoms." 



United Nations Under Secretary Gem I 
Goulding is visiting Cyprus this month to 
follow up on the Secretary General's disc 
sions with the two Cypriot leaders. He wii 
also be visiting Ankara and Athens. 

Secretary Shultz met with President 
Kyprianou on September 23 in New York 
State Department officials met with Mr. 
Denktash during his September visit to tl. 
United States. In those meetings, Ameri( , 
officials reiterated support for the Secret, 
General's good offices mission and urged i 
Cypriot leaders to cooperate with his cont • 
ing efforts. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Ri: , 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar, 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilatior 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986). 



I 



political framework for promoting and co- 
oriiinating initiatives in this field on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Several of the projects 
launched as a result of United States' legisla- 
tion are reaching the stage when major pro- 
gram decisions will be required. In the light of 
experience gained to date, the independent 
European program group nations have put 
forward a numijer of "principles for collabora- 
tion" related to program management which 
have been welcomed by their North American 
Allies. We are continuing to give emphasis to 
the exploitation of emerging technologies in 
our defense equipment programs, particularly 
in the long term. 

11. The 1986 Defense Review has shown 
again that despite commendable efforts by a 
few Allies, more support, and by more 
nations, is essential to assist Greece, Portugal 
and Turkey to strengthen their conventional 
defenses, in order that they may more effec- 
tively fulfill their assigned roles in the collec- 
tive defense of the Alliance. Various forms of 
assistance should continue to be examined, in 
particular and in the context of support for 
the development of the industrial and 
technological bases of these countries, 
arrangements to permit them to participate 
more fully as partners in NATO armaments 
co-operation programs. 

12. Following Reykjavik we support the 
United States in seeking balanced, equitable 
and effectively verifiable arms control 
agreements with the Soviet Union. We 
agreed that instead of simply codifying the 
existing levels of arsenals, agreements 



reached in Geneva should seek to achieve 
substantial reductions in offensive nuclear' 
forces in ways that will enhance stability a» 
minimize the risk of war. We therefore 
welcomed the progress at Reykjavik towar* 
agreement on 50 percent reductions in 
strategic offensive forces and on longer-ra> 
intermediate nuclear missiles. We fully 
endorse the United States' determination fj 
negotiate detailed agreements on this basi^ 
a matter of priority and urge the Soviet 
Union to join in this effort in Geneva. Prog 
ress on INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] must not be held hostage to any oth> 
agreement; Soviet insistence on doing so 
would destroy the credibility of the 
assurances given at the highest level. Nor 
must such an INF agreement neglect the 
existing imbalances in shorter-range INF 
missiles for which constraints and equal 
rights must be provided, as well as subse- ■* 
quent negotiations on these missiles. In all 
cases, effective verification would be an 
essential condition. We will continue to ass( 
and to consult closely on all these issues. W 
reiterated our support for the United State; 
exploration of space and defense systems, a 
is permitted by the ABM [Antiballistic 
Missile] Treaty. 

13. We also confirmed our resolve to set 
an early conclusion of a worldwide ban on 
chemical weapons. In this context we called 
upon the Soviet Union to take a constructive , 
attitude towards effective verification 
provisions. 



58 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



14. We also emphasized the significance 
?the current work in the Alliance on conven- 
onal arms control. At every stage of this 
tocess the Alliance must have a position 
ihich protects the ability of its military corn- 
landers to carry out their assigned tasks. 
Ve shall be seeking to achieve increased 
benness and the establishment of a stable, 
pmprehensive and verifiable balance of con- 



ventional forces at lower levels which would 
strengthen stability and security in the whole 
of Europe. 

Greece recalls its position on nuclear mat- 
ters and space system issues as expressed 
during previous NATO ministerial meetings. 

Denmark reserves its position on defense 
and space systems. ■ 



>ecretary's Joint News Conference 
\fter Meeting With EC IVIinisters 



Secretary Shultz attended the sixth 
\nnual ministerial meeting between the 
United States and the European Com- 
mnity (EC) in Brussels on December 12, 
986. Following is his joint news con- 
rence with President of the European 
'ommunities Commission Jacques 
^elors. ' 

'resident Delors. Before giving the 
oor to our guests, Mr. Shultz, Mr. 
—Jaker [Secretary of the Treasury James 
laker], and their colleagues, 1 should 
ke to indicate simply that, over and 
hove bilateral discussions, we devoted 
his plenary session, first, to a broad 
verview of the world economic situa- 
ion, referring also to problems that 
rise respectively in the United States 
nd in Europe; and, secondly, we dis- 
ussed trade issues, both multilateral 
nd bilateral. We reviewed both subjects 
if satisfaction and difficulties that are 
lending or may arise; and, thirdly, we 
vere able to discuss, in a way which per- 
onally I found encouraging, the ques- 
ion of agriculture. 

You know that the commission and, 
00, our American friends, feel that we 
lave to present to the world a different 
,'xample from that of two elephants 
'ighting and treading underfoot 
everything else around. That is 
something at stake which involves all of 
as and this can only be treated, never- 
theless, by dealing with the specific 
characteristics of each country. 

I Secretary Shultz. [Inaudible] 
' I presented at this meeting are that our 
two-way trade amounts to about $120 
billion in the most recent year; that the 
investment of Europe in the United 
States and of the United States in 
Europe amounts to about $200 billion at 
present; that the sales generated by 
these investments total around $700 
I billion. If you add those apples and 
oranges together you come to around a 
trillion dollars. It's a measure of the 



gigantic size and complexity of the rela- 
tionship that we have and, of course, it's 
a statement about the importance of the 
relationship. 

We have many problems. Most of 
them have been solved. There are some 
ahead of us. There'll always be some 
ahead of us and we need to work always 
very hard to resolve them, but we need 
to keep reminding ourselves of the scope 
of the relationship and the importance of 
seeing to it that we resolve problems in a 
manner consistent with the maintenance 
of this relationship. 

It also shows how important it is to 
both of us, and for the world at large, 
that we maintain openness in the trading 
system. Following our meeting last year 
here, we worked together well in bring- 
ing into being the Punta del Este start 
of a new round in GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade] and we have 
said to each other here that we will con- 
tinue to work together to make that 
round successful. Growth and openness 
in trade are the names of the game as 
we look ahead, and this is what we want 
to achieve. 

Secretary Baker. I would only add 
to that, Mr. Secretary, that we spent 
some time reviewing, as well, the U.S. 
economy and we devoted a fair amount 
of time to pointing out what we consider 
to be a major problem for the world 
economy generally, and that is the rise 
of protectionism and, if you will, isola- 
tionism in the United States, occasioned 
in part by the fact that we are facing a 
$140 billion trade deficit. We, I think, 
are all agreed that it was important that 
the United States and the European 
Community work together in various 
ways, whatever ways we can, to prevent 
protectionist legislation from becoming a 
fact, and to preserve free and open 
markets. 

Q. Could I ask Secretary Shultz or 
Secretary Baker whether the growing 
concern that has been expressed in a 



number of European capitals about the 
growth of bilateralism in the United 
States, that is to say bilateral deals 
between the United States and Japan 
in some major areas, both in inter- 
national monetary issues with the yen- 
dollar deal and on the semiconductors, 
was raised at this meeting and how 
you responded to that if it was? 

Secretary Shultz. My answer to 
part of it: It was raised and I think the 
basic response is that we feel it's impor- 
tant to get markets open, and when we 
are able to get a market opening agree- 
ment with Japan, basically it's open to 
everybody. As to the monetary side- 
Secretary Baker. Adding to that, 
we also feel it's important, when we can, 
to enhance world economic growth, and 
if we can enhance it bilaterally, we think 
there's nothing inappropriate about 
enhancing it bilaterally, particularly 
when you are dealing in the case of the 
agreement that you mentioned with two 
economies that represent 70% of the 
combined gross national product of the 
G-7 countries [Canada, France, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
United Kingdom, and United States]. 
President Delors. As soon as the 
monetary agreement between Japan and 
the United States was known I was very 
glad to see this come about. I consider 
that as far as the triangle of great 
powers in the free world is concerned, 
Europe, the United States, and Japan, 
there should be possibilities at some 
stages to strengthen one of the sides of 
the triangle; and, I have expressed my 
desire that the Europeans should be able 
to join in this cooperation agreement. 
And it seems to me that the proposals 
were made by Mr. Baker and others with 
a view to establishing bases for a 
monetary system which is less unstable 
rather than more stable. 

That is something which is still 
under discussion and the commission will 
do its utmost to persuade the member 
states that it is in everybody's interest 
to have convergence of economies and 
greater monetary cooperation between 
the major industrialized countries. As far 
as I'm concerned, I hope that in Venice, 
in the next summit of industrialized 
countries, we will be able to make prog- 
ress along these lines. 

Q. I'd like to address my question 
to Mr. Baker in direct response to 
what Mr. Delors has said concerning 
the possibility of Europe joining, in 
some way, the monetary agreement 
that was worked out on October 31 
between the United States and Japan, 
and whether this is going to be 
brought up in your discussions with 



February 1987 



59 



EUROPE 



Mr. Stoltenberg [Federal Republic of 
Germany Minister of Finance Gerhard 
Stoltenberg] tomorrow? 

Secretary Baker. The agreement 
with Japan was the result of several 
months of discussions and negotiations. 
There were similar discussions and 
negotiations with other countries that 
did not come to fruition and ripen into 
an agreement. 

Again, let me say that anything that 
we can do bilaterally or multilaterally to 
enhance world economic growth, consist- 
ent with maintaining the gains that the 
world has made against inflation, we 
would like to do, but the Japanese, under 
the agreement that you're referring to, 
undertook to take certain fiscal and 
monetary measures which would encour- 
age additional growth in Japan and addi- 
tional growth in the world generally. 

Q. I'd like to address a question to 
Secretary Baker. What would you 
expect Europe could do to pacify the 
protectionists back in Washington and 
to assuage the fears of this 800-pound 
gorilla you have back there? 

Secretary Baker. P^irst, I think we 
talked a good deal about this, as a 
matter of fact, in our discussions today. 
We should all work to preserve open 
markets as the President has indicated 
and Secretary Shultz has indicated. At 
the same time, anything that European 
countries can do to encourage and 
enhance as much economic growth as 
possible without— and let me make sure I 
make this clear to everybody— without 
risking the gains that have been made 
worldwide against inflation, we would 
like to see, because that will help us 
resist the 800-pound gorilla, as you put 
it, which indeed I think is an 800-pound 
gorilla back there in Washington. 

Q. I do apologize for coming in to 
raise two essential points, Mr. Shultz. 
That is. first, the American interven- 
tion in Nicaragua and Chile and the 
perception that a person from the 
Third World has of the United States, 
that is a giant, and which is going 
through various political difficulties, 
Iran now, previously Vietnam. Can it 
be said today that America is like a 
giant with clay feet and clumsy hands? 
And I would like to know what share 
of time you allotted to the Third World 
in your discussions? 

And, secondly on South Africa, it 
appears that America today is more 
committed toward taking more prag- 
matic and forward-looking positions, 
vis-a-vis South Africa, than is Europe. 
Did you advise the Europeans anything 
about South Africa? 



Secretary Shultz. The United 
States has and continues to work for 
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law 
in Central America and in South 
America. That includes Nicaragua, that 
includes Chile. So, I think the objectives 
that we seek and the efforts that we are 
making to help the people of Central 
America achieve that— there are four 
democracies there now— and to help 
those in Nicaragua, Nicaraguans, not 
[the] United States, Nicaraguans— who 
are fighting for freedom in their country 
do so, are laudable. 

As far as South Africa is concerned, 
our policies have been highly publicized 
and they are to do everything that we 
can to bring apartheid to an end, and to 
see put in its place a political system in 
which all people can participate and 
where there also are protections for 
minority rights and individuals, constitu- 
tional guarantees. I think again what we 
are trying to achieve is right on the 
mark. 

We have had a great debate about 
how useful it will be to impose punitive 
economic sanctions on South African 
business and, in the end, it was decided 
that we would do so. That was decided 
by Congress overriding the President's 
veto of that legislation. Now U.S. firms 
are leaving and I hear quite a lot of cries 
of alarm that, as they leave, the good 
works that they are doing leave also. So, 
it represents a problem and, of course, a 
continuing tragedy. 

Q. I would like to put a question 
to Mr. Baker. When you go to Bonn, 
do you expect that your talks with Mr. 
Stoltenberg will lead to more than a 
repetition of the well-known points of 
view that have been put forward 
several times these last few months? 
As far as the position of the Federal 
Republic is concerned, or as far as 
what the Federal Republic could do. in 
order to make a g^reater contribution 
to the stimulation of the world 
economy? 

Secretary Baker. Let me explain 
that I am going to meet with Gerhard 
Stoltenberg tomorrow. I'm meeting as 
well with each of the other European 
finance ministers of the G-7 countries. I 
thought it was important, since I was 
coming to this meeting, that I take 
advantage of that fact that I was going 
to be in Europe and have bilateral 
discussions with my counterparts in 
Europe. 

These discussions are not intended 
to reach any particular conclusions or 
come to any particular results. They will 
be part of ongoing discussions that we 
have had over the past several months. 



I would discourage— and we did 
before we left Washington— people fro^ 
speculating about agreements that mig 
come out of these discussions. That's nl 
contemplated. The Federal Republic, aj 
you know, is right in the middle of elec| 
tions and it would be, I would suppose,, 
not the most opportune time to seek to| 
come to any sort of conclusion or agree 
ment respecting the matters that we 
have discussed before. 

So we will be discussing a wide 
range of things, but I would tend to 
dissuade you from thinking that there i\ 
going to be something similar, for 
instance, to the agreement between the 
United States and Japan coming out of ^ 
my trip to Europe. 

Q. President Delors referred to 
your agricultural discussions earlier, H 
saying that that discussion was 
encouraging. I'd like to ask President 
Delors and the American represen- 
tatives what that actually means and, 
in particular, whether that is good 
augury for the 24:6 negotiations? 

President Delors. Of course, as a 
great philosopher has said, everything i: 
connected in life. But sometimes, you 
have to start by separating different 
discussions. The discussions that we call 
the 24:6 discussions are going ahead 
under conditions which are not very 
encouraging. 

As for the rest, we have concerned 
ourselves with the impact of our 
agricultural policies, as we should do, 
not only on our budget but, also, on 
world trade and on the price of certain 
agricultural commodities and other 
materials. And, we've seen that we have 
the same will to guarantee the future of 
our farmers. They are indispensable to 
our societies, but at the same time, we 
wish to achieve agricultural policies 
which are less costly and less damaging 
and which do not lead us into a trade 
war which will be ever more costly for 
everybody. 

So there is this shared will which we 
have and which has been shown by the 
agreement which was reached at Punta 
del Este. And, this will be followed up by 
regular discussions between people at a 
high level on both sides of the Atlantic. I 
think that this already became clear at 
the Tokyo summit after the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] ministerial meeting. 
But it's now the time to reaffirm this 
and say that we have the courage to 
meet this task. Nobody would deny that 
this task is not an easy one. 

Secretary Shultz. The first step in 
solving a problem is to recognize that it 
exists and be able to describe it. And 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



Jat step has been taken more and more 
lEibly. So that's positive. I'll let 
inbassador Yeutter [U.S. Trade Repre- 
ntative Clayton Yeutter] say what else 
ay be positive in this situation. 

Ambassador Yeutter. Most of the 
scussion today related to the longer 
rm elements of the agricultural prob- 
m rather than the short term. We had 
nsiderable discussion about the forth- 
iming negotiations in the Uruguay 
'und and properly so. We are agreed 
at this is one of the most important 
lallenges in the Uruguay round, 
•rhaps the most important, and 
■rhaps the greatest potential legacy of 
at round in very positive terms. This 
■fleets the gravity of the situation and 
e magnitude of the problem that exists 
orldwide today. 

So, we recognize that we are now in 
situation where both the community 
id the United States are deploying vast 
ims of financial resources into rela- 
vely unproductive uses and that we 
ould do ourselves and the rest of the 
orld a big favor if we could coopera- 
vely and coordinately deploy these 
?sources in a different way. 

At the moment, we have a situation 
lat is increasingly confrontational 
stween ourselves and the rest of the 
orld, while at the same time not prop- 
rly serving the needs of our own 
irmers. So, hopefully, we can advance 
lat cause in a very positive way in the 
fruguay round, and we are certainly 
etemined to do that. 

With respect to Article 24:6, we 
ave a very difficult negotiation ahead of 
s because our positions are still very far 
part. Commissioner De Clercq [EC 
lommissioner for External Relations 
nd Commercial Policy Willy de Clercq] 
nd I will meet on that subject tomorrow 
nd we will have perhaps more to say on 
hat subject at a later date. As you 
;now, we have a December 31 deadline 
in that exercise. 

Commissioner De Clercq. Could I 
■omment briefly for a minute or a 
ninute and a half. That's a Belgian com- 
jromise. Article 26:6, of course, is very 
Ufficult, as a negotiation. The President 
expressed his anxiety, and I share that 
mxiety. For the moment, I just have one 
jlimmer of light, but it is glimmering. 
That is, the mutual will to find a solution 
;o this most difficult trade conflict 
oetween the United States and the EC. 
It's the most difficult one we've ever 
iiad. It's worthwhile finding a solution to 
it, particularly now that the new round 
'is to begin. It's worth even devoting the 
i whole weekend to making— to finding a 
solution. 



On the new round, we've explained 
our philosophy. The Americans know our 
philosophy. We want to progress along a 
broad front as quickly as possible. As far 
as we're concerned, the new round 
shouldn't necessarily have to last 4 
years. If we can complete it before, all 
the better, but we consider this enter- 
prise, this undertaking, as being one 
undertaking, which means that progress 
has to be achieved on all fronts as 
quickly as possible, and this, from a com- 
prehensive point of view. 

Q. Would it be possible to know 
whether there is the same determi- 
nation on the American side, as far as 
taking steps to lighten the debt burden 
for developing countries? This same 
question was put to Mr. De Clercq this 
morning, and the reply was that there 
was not an answer there. And then, as 
for the matter of making more of raw 
materials from the Third World coun- 
tries. I'd like to ask you a question 
about that. And then, thirdly, as for 
the agreements between the European 
Communities and certain Mediterra- 
nean countries, although these 
agreements exist, there are poltical 
and military links with these 
countries. 

Secretary Shultz. I'll ask Secretary 
Baker, who's given particular attention 
to this matter, particularly the debt 
problem, to respond. 

Secretary Baker. I think you're 
probably familiar with our program for 
sustained growth, for dealing with the 
debt problems of lesser developed coun- 
tries. And in terms of where we stand on 
that, we think we're making very good 
progress. A number of countries have 
adopted free market-type economic 
reforms. 

The second leg of that program is 
that the multilateral institutions, the 
IMF [International Monetary Fund] and 
World Bank, were to increase their lend- 
ing, and they have done so, I think it's 
fair to say, significantly. The third leg 
was additional lending from commercial 
banks, or debt-equity swaps, in lieu 
thereof. I think it's significant that Mex- 
ico, this year, will receive some $6 billion 
in new funds. Nigeria is the beneficiary 
of new lending, Uruguay, Cote D'lvoire, 
so the proposal is making what we con- 
sider very good progress. 

In terms of whether the United 
States is, itself, contributing, I think we 
are. We still make the largest contribu- 
tions to those multilateral organizations. 
We are going, notwithstanding rather 
severe budgetary constraints in the 
United States, we are going up to the 
Congress, this year, for an increase in 



the soft loan window, IDA/8 [Interna- 
tional Development Association] funds 
for the World Bank. So I think that I 
would have to say. "Yes, we are cer- 
tainly pulling our load and doing our 
share." 

Secretary Shultz has just reminded 
me that we have about, this year, I men- 
tioned debt-equity swaps, because I 
think that's very important. To the 
extent that we can get equity into these 
countries, they don't have to pay inter- 
est on it, and it's a far better way of 
financing them. 

He's just mentioned to me that 
we've seen .$5 billion in debt-equity 
swaps generated this year. The more 
the.se countries are willing to reform 
their economies and invite investment 
in, the more debt-equity swaps, perhaps, 
we can engender. I realize that doesn't 
address the third part of your question, 
which I never did get a chance to hear. 

Q. Mr. Shultz. Mr. Yeutter is here 
also for the fifth meeting between the 
Brazilian delegation and the U.S. 
Trade Representative for discussing 
the informatics problem. I would like 
to know which are the prospective of 
this informatic meeting, since the 
Brazilian Government has just sent to 
the Congress a new software law. 
Does this new law correspond to U.S. 
demands? In what points? And also, 
which sector of the Brazilian exporta- 
tion would be suffering retaliation, as 
the U.S. Government promised, until 
the end of the year, if both delegations 
are not setting to an accord? 

Ambassador Yeutter. We'll be 
discussing all of these subjects on Sun- 
day, here in Brussels. I have not yet had 
an opportunity to see the Brazilian com- 
puter software proposal, because I've 
been traveling for the last several days, 
and we've had some activity, here in 
Europe, that I've had to concentrate on 
until now. I'll have an opportunity to 
evaluate it over the weekend, and so I'll 
deliver my comments to [Ambassador] 
Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, when we 
meet on Sunday, but I would have 
nothing to say on that subject at the 
moment. 

All I would comment is that, clearly, 
that's a very important issue to us. 
We're concerned about the intellectual 
property aspects of the Brazilian infor- 
matics program, as well as the invest- 
ment aspects and the international com- 
merce aspects, that is, the imports and 
exports, so we'll look at that very 
carefully and see what implications it 
holds for U.S. informatics exports. 

Other than that, the potential 
retaliatory action is a hypothetical, at 
this point. We have not determined, with 



February 1987 



61 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



specificity, what action might be tatcen, 
if the negotiations break down between 
now and the end of the year, but I'd 
rather be optimistic and hope that we'll 
not have to take that action, but we have 
not concentrated on that issue, as yet. 

Q. Could I ask Mr. Yeutter, you 
said that — all sides said that the whole 
question of agriculture has been very 
big. It's going to take a long time to 
solve, and what they recognize is that 
they don't solve it. But you are 
meeting this weekend with Mr. De 
Clercq and Mr. Lyng [Secretary of 
Agriculture Richard Lyng] and Mr. 
Andriessen [EC Vice President for 
Agriculture and Forestry Frans 
Andriessen] to solve an immediate 
problem, 24:6, yet there is a sword of 
retaliation hanging over it at the .31st 
of December. Is this sword still hang- 
ing over it? Is the United States still 
determined that, if there is no satisfac- 
tion of its demand, that it will go 
ahead with the retaliation, which will 
generate, again trigger, counter- 
retaliation from the EC side? 

Ambassador Yeutter. That is a 
decision that was made at the highest 
levels of our government several months 
ago, and was so communicated to our 
friends here in the European Commu- 
nity, so they are well aware of what is at 
stake in these discussions between now 
and the end of the year. 

This is an issue of major concern to 
the United States because our estimate 
is that the accession of Spain and 
Portugal will reduce our feed grains 
exports, that is, corn and grain sorghum, 
by something in the vicinity of $400 to 
$500 million per year. With our 
agricultural cominunity already in dire 
financial straits, in much of the Midwest, 
we're certainly not in a position to 
accept that kind of trade damage from 
any incident throughout the world 
without receiving appropriate compen- 
sation for it under the GATT rules. 

That's what is at issue here, and all 
we're insisting upon is that we be made 
whole, that the trade damage that we 
suffer, as a result of the accession, is 
properly compensated for under the 
GATT rules. We simply have a wide dif- 
ference of opinion as to the amount of 
that compensation, but we believe the 
amount of damage is quite clear. 

Commissioner De Clercq. The 
President has given me one minute. That 
will be enough. Because I don't think we 
want to engage in a debate on 24:6 with 
you. Perhaps next week we will have to. 
but for the moment we still hold out 
hope that this matter is going to be 
something we will be able to discuss 



tomorrow in a calm and serene 
atmosphere. 

And what my friend, Clayton 
Yeutter, has just said underlines the dif- 
ficulty of the problem. Because, of 
course, we have a somewhat different 
view of this. In fact, our views differ 
fairly fundamentally. We feel that when 
there is a customs area, or a free trade 
area, or the extension of such an area, 
the problems that arise have to be 
examined comprehensively. You have to 
look at the problems as a whole, the 
advantages and the disadvantages, and 
that is one of the problems that we are 
going to have to try to resolve, 
tomorrow. 

Q. Secretary Baker, do you think 
that the bilateral meetings you will be 
having with the finance ministers will 
be able to lead to a meeting of the 
Group of Seven [G-7], as such, and 
this, then, I have a question for Mr. 
Shultz. To what extent is the Reagan 
Administration in a position to turn 
opposition to Congress' protectionism 
into a priority in the present political 
situation that prevails in Washington? 



Secretary Baker. With respect to 
the question that you directed to me, thj 
purpose of these discussions is not 
specifically to schedule any multilateral^ 
meetings G-.5 [France, Federal Republil 
of Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, 
and United States], G-7, or anything 
else, but I would remind you that the 
Tokyo summit calls for the holding of 
G-7 meetings, so obviously there will bd 
more G-7 meetings. 

Secretary Shultz. So far as the 
second part of your question is con- 
cerned, the basic point is that protec- 
tionism is not only bad for other coun- 
tries that can't sell into our markets 
after they're protected, but it's bad for 
American consumers, therefore bad for j 
the American economy; and we'll make 
that point again and again and again, 
and contrast the present and our recenti] 
history with what happened in the 
1930s, when we did have protectionism, j 
The President has fought on that line 
before and he'll continue to fight, and I 
think the basic thrust of the argument is 
powerful, and we intend to prevail. 



'Press release 265 of Dec. 19, 1986. 



Human Rights in Castro's Cuba 



The following report was prepared by 
the Bureaus ofHumat) Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs and of Inter- 
American Affairs. 

When a former Cuban political 
prisoner— one who had served 27 years 
in Castro's prisons— arrived in Miami in 
September 1986, he made the following 
comment: "Wlien they opened the gates 
we still felt like prisoners. In Cuba 
everyone's a prisoner." 

Life in Cuba today is characterized 
by an aggressive, systematic, and insti- 
tutionalized denial of human rights in 
virtually every form. The Communist 
Party, tightly controlled from above, 
dominates all aspects of life. Human 
rights of Cubans are subordinated to the 
aims of the party as defined by Fidel 
Castro. 



Denial of Freedom 

Expression. Freedom of expression does 
not exist. No criticism of the basic 
policies and Marxist-Leninist orientation 
of the government, party, or its leader- 
ship is permitted. Telephones are 



routinely tapped and mail opened. 
Private expression of differences from 
government policies is repressed by an 
informer network operated by Commit- 
tees for the Defense of the Revolution 
(block committees). 

Daily life is closely monitored by these* 
committees, which exist on practically 
every block in Cuban cities and towns. 
Committee membership is essentially 
mandatory. Members are expected to 
observe and report anything "unusual," 
including strangers in the neighborhood, 
reception of foreign radio and television 
broadcasts, unauthorized meetings, or 
critical comments about the government. 
Cubans overheard by neighbors 
reportedly have been fined for speaking 
disparagingly of Castro in their homes. 
The ordinary Cuban lives in an environ- 
ment of repressive fear subject to con- 
stant state surveillance. 

Assembly. There are no guarantees 
for freedom of assembly or association in 
Castro's Cuba. Nearly all associations 
are government controlled. A few 
private associations still operate, but 
only under close government scrutiny. 
All group meetings are monitored by the 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



immittees for the Defense of the 
ivolution or State Security. When the 
jretary of the Cuban Committee for 
man Rights tried to legally register 

organization last month, he was 
■ested and beaten. At last report he 
.s still being held. 
Although membership in private 
lups is almost precluded, membership 
ligovernment-run groups is virtually 
r.^uired. A 1983 Organization of 
. nerican States (0 AS) report. The 
:'uation of Human Rightti in Cuba, 

■ ited: 

. . .membership in the people's 
■anizations— including the large union and 
I isant associations— is practically a prereq- 
i ite for any routine activity, since member- 

■ p affects admission to universities, promo- 
I IS, access to certain kinds of vacation or 

1 reational activities, the obtainment of 
I iperishable products that require that a 
I on certify that the buyer is an "advanced 
\ rker." 

Cubans are, therefore, compelled to 
' '1 such organizations simply to obtain 
education, earn a living, or support 
ii- families. The OAS report adds that 
> difficult "to distinguish when the 
I ;ision to join a people's organization 
1 lects a desire to support the regime, 
; i when it is a response to the material 
I lefits . . . which cannot be obtained 



Political. Those who choose not to 

j n government organizations or who 
; ' denied membership are not only 
{ )nomically disadvantaged but also 
< ectively deprived of political participa- 
1 n. Political participation requires 
; ict adherence to ideological dogma. 
Cuban citizens do not enjoy the right 

■ change their government. The Cuban 
; ite is firmly controlled by the Cuban 

' 'mmunist Party, which in turn is 
I minated by Fidel Castro. There are no 
I'ect elections for regional, provincial, 
I national offices. Members of the Cen- 
"il Committee and the Politburo are 
: lected by a narrow circle of party 
lers; elections simply ratify choices 

■ 'eady made. The National Assembly of 
■ople's Power meets briefly twice a 

. ar— solely to endorse decisions already 
ide by the party chiefs. No political 

■position is permitted in Cuba; 

:3sidents are either in jail or outside the 
untry. As a result, hundreds of 
ousands of Cubans have fled their 
untry, and many others would do so 
?re it not dangerous. 

Press. There is no freedom of press 
Cuba. All media outlets are controlled 

■ the state, operate strictly according 



to party guidelines, and are used for 
indoctrination and dissemination of prop- 
aganda. Foreign publications— except 
those from other communist countries- 
are not available. 

The government censors all news, 
international and domestic. Unfavorable 
news, when reported, is often delayed. 
Almost all news is distorted. Travel of 
foreign reporters to and in Cuba— as 
well as their access to the public and 
officials— is strictly controlled by the 
government. 

Artistic. There is no artistic freedom 
in Cuba. Many of Cuba's most distin- 
guished literary and artistic figures have 
been "erased" from cultural outlets and 
broadcasts. Writers and artists have 
been under severe constraints since the 
beginning of the revolution, when Castro 
made the following statement about 
artistic freedom: "Within the revolution, 
everything; against the revolution, 
nothing." The National Union of Writers 
and Artists of Cuba, modeled on the 
Union of Soviet Writers, controls vir- 
tually all literary and artistic expression. 
All publishing houses are controlled by 
the state. Acceptance of manuscripts is 
based on suitability of contents and the 
political background of the author. 

Writings not published by the state 
are not reproduced or circulated even 
clandestinely, except in the closest circle 
of friends. Even there one must proceed 
with caution because of the vigilance of 
the block committees and the omnipres- 
ent State Security. Punishment is severe 
for writing or possessing unauthorized 
literature. Artists and writers who 
attempt to step outside these constraints 
pay heavily for their exercise of artistic 
freedom. Many are imprisoned and tor- 
tured. Forced renunciation of one's 
artistic works— obtained through 
physical or psychological coercion, 
including threats against one's family— is 
another technique used against artists 
and writers. The lack of political content 
in their writings does not serve to pro- 
tect authors. It is not enough in Cuba 
that art be nonpolitical; it must also 
actively serve the revolution. 

Religious. Repression of religion in 
Cuba is thorough and pervasive. 
Religious broadcasts are totally pro- 
hibited (except for news of foreign 
clergy defending the Castro regime 
shown to prisoners of conscience to 
demoralize them). The construction of 
new churches is severely restricted. 
Those who try to maintain religious 
practice find innumerable roadblocks. 
Many churches have been closed; some 



have been desecrated. The few still open 
are closely monitored by block commit- 
tees. Only about 200 priests remain in 
Cuba, compared to about 720 before the 
revolution. 

The observance of religious holidays 
is next to impossible, and the celebration 
of Christmas is specifically prohibited. 
Christmas trees, so common in Eastern 
Europe, are banned as counterrevolu- 
tionary symbols in Cuba, and the 
celebration of Holy Week has been 
replaced by a celebration of the failure of 
the Bay of Pigs invasion. Political 
meetings and work obligations are 
regularly scheduled to conflict with 
religious occasions, and Cuban law pro- 
hibits the observance of religious events 
when they conflict with work obligations 
or patriotic celebrations. Processions on 
holy days are banned. 

Parents of children who mention 
Cod to their classmates risk being 
reprimanded for teaching "unscientific" 
ideas that are "remnants of an obscur- 
antist past." If the parents insist, they 
can be arrested for the crime of 
"ideological deviationism." 

Because they cannot belong to the 
Communist Party, believers are excluded 
from higher positions of employment. 
They also are prohibited from teaching 
economics, politics, philosophy, social 
sciences, and other courses that might 
have "any political or ideological over- 
tones." Believers find it almost impos- 
sible to obtain higher education because 
ideology is a decisive condition for 
admission to universities. Practicing 
Catholics are expelled from the univer- 
sity. Believers who obtain low-level jobs 
are unable to advance because there is a 
"political test" for promotions. Proof of 
ideological soundness is required before 
the purchase of durable consumer goods 
and sometimes for housing. 

The Jewish community in Cuba has 
been reduced from 15,000 before the 
revolution to 800, with no permanent 
rabbi. Members of the Jewish commu- 
nity also face job and educational 
discrimination and are severely 
restricted in attempts to pass on the 
faith to their children. 

Certain religious groups— usually the 
smaller, more vulnerable Protestant 
denominations— have been singled out 
for additional punishment. The Seventh- 
Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, 
and the Congregation of Gideon are con- 
sidered counterrevolutionary sects. 
Those discovered engaging in religious 
practices are treated as criminals. 

Many from all faiths have been 
arrested, abused, tortured, and even 
executed because of their religious 
beliefs. 



I^bruary 



1987 



63 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



In a 1985 book entitled Fidel and 
Religion, and at the February 1986 
Third Congress of the Cuban Communist 
Party, Fidel Castro acknowledged that 
discrimination against Cuban religious 
practitioners exists. There is no evidence 
to date that religious discrimination and 
persecution have been mitigated despite 
speculation that Castro, for foreign or 
domestic political reasons, might be con- 
sidering some relaxation of pressure on 
believers. 

Educational. Cuban education suf- 
fers from a total lack of freedom. Cen- 
sorship is rigorous. Cuban schools at all 
levels are required to follow Marxist- 
Leninist guidelines as interpreted by the 
state. Students have been expelled and 
teachers have lost their jobs for not 
accepting the political or ideological 
requirements imposed by the state. 

There is no alternative to 
government-run education. Parents can- 
not choose independent schools for their 
children; there are none. Schooling is 
compulsory from grades one to six. 
After the sixth grade the right to remain 
in school is tentative and based ulti- 
mately on loyalty to the regime. The 
price for expressing an opinion in school 
can be extremely high. Faced with such 
a "choice," most 11-year-old children 
naturally submit to the routine of Young 
Pioneers meetings, neighborhood guard 
duty, compulsory rural labor, and other 
forms of regimentation. 

Many students over the age of 1 1 
are housed in dormitories from Sunday 
night to Friday night and go home only 
on weekends. This boarding system, 
mandatory for many high school and 
junior high school students, is intended 
to drive a wedge between child and 
parent and turn the child's sense of duty 
toward the state. Dormitory living condi- 
tions are often poor, with old wooden 
barracks, primitive sanitation, poor 
health care, and harsh working condi- 
tions. The weekly curriculum includes 30 
hours of classes (with heavy ideological 
content) and 15 hours of picking crops in 
the fields. 

A student's educational oppor- 
tunities depend not only on his own 
political record but the political reliabil- 
ity of his parents as well. Children of 
political prisoners are notified that they 
will never receive advanced education. 
Students do not choose their own 
careers; the choice is made for them, 
depending on the needs of the state. 

Economic. The right to choose one's 
occupation is practically nonexistent in 
Cuba. Priority is given to collective or 



64 



state needs over individual choice in 
state decisions to provide employment. 

The rights of business and labor do 
not exist in Cuba. A "private sector" 
constituted by private businesses or even 
by self-employed individuals is virtually 
nonexistent. At present, less than 1% of 
the population is self-employed. In 1982, 
the government launched a strong 
condemnation of self-employment, which 
had been legal in certain trades and pro- 
fessions. Castro claimed that everyone 
was taking advantage of the system to 
make profits. Such work now is allowed 
only after working hours or on 
weekends. Self-employed people are 
generally required to have state employ- 
ment as well. 

Castro expressed concern that the 
government was losing money because 
tenant farmers and sharecroppers 
unregistered with the state were selling 
produce on the open market. In 1983, 
200 farmers refused to sell their crops to 
the government because it demanded a 
price lower than the cost of growing 
them. (The government also had refused 
to allow them to retain a small amount 
of crops for personal consumption.) In 
protest, the farmers burned some of 
their crops in front of a government 
warehouse and were arrested. Reports 
from several sources indicate that 11 of 
the farmers were sentenced to death and 
shot. More recently, Castro has 
denounced farmers markets and other 
individual or group initiatives as 
manifestations of corruption or 
decadence, again demonsti-ating how 
risky it is to engage in private 
enterprise. 

The state controls organized labor. 
Nearly all workers belong to the 
government-run Confederation of Cuban 
Workers, which serves primarily to 
maintain political and work discipline, 
spur worker efforts and productivity, 
and hold down labor costs. The con- 
federation does not defend workers' 
rights or fight for benefits. The recent 
calls by Fidel Castro for greater work 
"discipline" characteristically have come 
in the framework of trade union 
meetings where he and so-called labor 
leaders harangue the workers to be more 
diligent. 

Collective bargaining does not exist. 
Management, in the form of the Ministry 
of Labor, and the government-run union 
cooperate to maintain careful supervi- 
sion. Workers who believe they have 
been unfairly treated have virtually no 
recourse. 

Workers who act to improve work- 
ing conditions are severely punished. 
The right to strike is prohibited and 



punishable by imprisonment. In 1983 
more than 200 workers were prosecute 
for attempting to organize strikes in tl 
sugar and construction industries. 

The right to form an independent 
union is unthinkable. Even discussing 
such a step is severely punished, as 
demonstrated in 1983 when the goverr 
ment accused five Cuban workers of 
"industrial sabotage" for talking with 
their colleagues about the need for an 
independent union. The government 
sought the death penalty, but the judg( 
sentenced them to prison. Castro 
demanded they be tried again by a dif- 
ferent judge, who sentenced them to 
death. International outcry resulted in 
eventual commutation of their senteno 
to 30 years of imprisonment. The first 
judge, Nicasio Hernandez, was impris- 
oned for an indefinite term, as were fo ! 
of the defense lawyers (Jose Redell Sot I 
Abelardo Triay, Valdez Arnau, and Fel ' 
Casuso). They were sentenced to die, b 
their sentences also were commuted. 
Three other lawyers associated with th 
case (Aramis Taboada, Francisco Moru 
and Israel Tamayo) were sentenced to 
years in prison. 'Taboada died in prison 
in 1985 under unexplained circum- 
stances. 

Other workers have been arrested 
for discussing the formation of an inde 
pendent union, including 30 truck 
drivers at the Central Chaparra sugar 
mill, workers in a Havana electrical 
plant, workers at an Artemisa brewery 
and farmers in Menocal— three of whor 
were shot during arrest. 



A "Classless" Society 

In Cuba, contrary to Marxist theory, 
state control of the economy does not 
mean control of the economy by the pe( 
pie. Nor does it mean that an upper cla 
is nonexistent. The party leadership coi 
trols wealth and power but in a much 
more concentrated, centralized, and 
unchallengeable form than any 
"capitalist" could ever hope to achieve. 
Not surprisingly, the elitist Cuban 
leaders do not live the way the Cuban 
people do. They have access to special 
stores, well-stocked with consumer 
goods from the West, where the "com- 
mon people" are not allowed. The self- 
appointed vanguard is permitted to pur- 
chase luxury items, such as canned 
goods, not available to the average 
(Duban. Officers of the political police 
and government leaders also are allowec 
to purchase jewelry and expensive 
clothing from stores designated for theii 
exclusive use. Thev have access to 



Department of State Bulleti 






HUMAN RIGHTS 



'Within the 
revolution, 
everything; 
against the 
revolution, 
nothing. " 




■ivate beaches and, unlike most 
ubans, may travel abroad. They live in 
)mes confiscated from Cuban citizens 
ho fled the country. 

I; 

conomic Decline 

he Cuban economy is still based 
rimarily on sugar; it is even less diver- 
fied than it was before the revolution, 
otwithstanding plans for industrial 
evelopment, maniifactured goods 
.^counted for only 5% of Cuban exports 
1 1980; in 1960, the figures were the 
ime. In contrast, other Latin American 
ountries had substantial increases in the 
xport of manufactured goods during the 
jame 20 years. 



Agricultural production is generally 
down from prerevolution levels— even 
though the population is 50% larger. 

Food rationing, although 
widespread, has not guaranteed that 
food will be available. Despite increased 
beef and poultry production, for exam- 
ple, each Cuban is allotted only 2 pounds 
of meat and IV2 pounds of chicken per 
month. 

Added to the food shortage is the 
scarcity of consumer goods and the low 
per capita income. In 1958 Cuba was 
fourth in the hemisphere in per capita 
income; now it ranks sixteenth. 

Although much has been made of 
advances in health care claimed by the 
Cuban Government, severe sanitation 
problems still threaten Cuban health. 



Inadequate control of mosquitoes 
together with the return of thousands of 
soldiers from Africa have led to several 
dengue fever epidemics. Castro himself 
has severely criticized conditions in 
Cuban hospitals. 

Housing also is deficient: nearly one- 
quarter of Cuba's 10 million people live 
in inadequate housing. 



Political Prisoners 

In Cuban society, pressures to conform 
and submit to the state are extremely 
high. Those who choose the slightest 
form of political resistance usually pay a 
very high price: arrest, abuse, torture, 



ebruary 1987 



65 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



and cruel and inhuman punishment. 
People often are arrested without war- 
rants and held for long periods without 
judicial hearings. The Cuban Constitu- 
tion denies legal protections that would 
prevent the regime from arresting and 
detaining anyone considered harmful to 
Castro's revolution. People arrested for 
vandalism, practicing certain religions, 
or criticizing the regime can be charged 
with sabotage and counterrevolutionary 
activities. Detention is permitted for 
those considered "dangerous," defined 
as "the special proclivity of a person 
to commit crimes, demonstrated by 
observed conduct manifestly contrary to 
the rules of socialist ethics." Cuba 
includes in its definition of "crimes" acts 
that no free society would consider as 
such. 

The treatment of political offenders 
at every step of the process is unrelent- 
ingly severe— preventive detention, 
house arrest, forced psychiatric treat- 
ment, confinement in forced labor 
camps, and imprisonment. Arrestees are 
interrogated without counsel and sub- 
jected to methods of intimidation 
designed to force confessions. The 
political detainee may be kept incom- 
municado for days or weeks without 
being charged and without notification 
of family. 

Cuban courts are, in practice, subor- 
dinated to the party. People accused of 
certain counterrevolutionary activities 
are tried and sentenced secretly by 
military tribunals. Accused individuals 
generally receive little representation 
from counsel at trial. The government 
selects the attorney in virtually all 
political cases. Detainees are given very 
little time with their lawyers before trial. 
The 1983 OAS report indicated that 
some clients see their counsel for only an 
hour before trial while others meet their 
lawyers for the first time at the trial 
itself. Attorneys frequently are not 
informed of the trial until the day it 
begins. They are cautioned against con- 
ducting too rigorous a defense of their 
clients. Some plead guilty for their 
clients even when the clients insist on 
their innocence; others refuse to 
challenge accusations. Fear may 
motivate some of these lawyers; they are 
probably well aware that one risks sanc- 
tions and even arrest and imprisonment 
for defending one's client too well. 
Attorneys have been jailed for conscien- 
tiously defending individuals charged 
with political offenses, as the case of the 
late Aramis Taboada illustrates. 

A trial normally consists of evidence 
presented by prosecution witnesses 
(generally members of State Security). 



There are usually no defense witnesses. 
If a member of a block committee 
testifies for someone in a criminal mat- 
ter, that person usually gets a reduced 
sentence. Political trials generally last 
from a few hours to a day, even in cases 
where long prison terms are at stake. 
Reports have reached the OAS that in 
one case a trial lasted no longer than 10 
minutes and that political trials never 
last longer than 3 days, including 
announcement of judgment and imposi- 
tion of sentence. 

Few observers are permitted at 
political trials. The pressures on judges 
to find guilt in these cases are strong, 
especially when party leaders appear to 
denounce the accused. Fidel Castro and 
his brother Raul have been known to 
appear at trials to denounce prominent 
persons accused of political offenses. As 
the OAS report stated: "Such strong 
pressure. . .excessively influences the 
administration of justice, and leaves it 
no alternative but to endorse the verdict 
of the political leadership. ..." The 
report added: "... the evidence would 
indicate that the sentences have always 
been fully in accord with the Executive's 
idea of proper justice." 

Conditions and treatment in Cuban 
prisons are absolutely wretched. 
Armando Valladares and many other 
former long-term political prisoners have 
provided firsthand descriptions of the 
deplorable conditions they were forced 
to endure. The prisoners reported major, 
systematic abuses, including beatings by 
guards and officers, withholding of food 
and water, inadequate diet and with- 
holding of medical care, withholding of 
fresh air and exercise, confining 
prisoners in dungeon-like cells, with- 
holding of family visits for years, with- 
holding of mail for years, solitary con- 
finement, physical injury caused by elec- 
tronic noise machines, cell doors welded 
shut, participation of prison medical 
staff in acts of torture, and suspected 
medical experiments carried out without 
the permission of prisoners. 

The most brutal treatment is 
reserved for the plantados. as those 
political prisoners who refuse "political 
rehabilitation" are known. They spend 
their days dressed only in pajamas or 
underwear or without any clothing at all. 
Visits by friends or relatives are limited 
to one or two per year, or less, and let- 
ters to one per month. 

Political prisoners are not routinely 
released at the end of their terms. Their 
freedom depends on a personal decision 
by Fidel Castro, who has frequently used 
the release of political prisoners to gain 






favor with an influential foreign visitor 
or to put the latter under obligation to 
"respond." Sentences are often 
extended without any trial or due proc- 
ess. Plantados are especially likely to bi 
forced to remain in prison after expira- ,, 
tion of their sentences. There are 
reports that these prisoners are sub- 
jected to particularly harsh conditions, 
especially those in Boniato Prison. 

Many of those forced to remain in 
prison past term have been incarceratec 
15-20 years when their extensions are 
given. In at least one case, that of 
Santos 0. Mirabal Rodriguez, the "past 
term" sentence has been longer than th 
original one. Mirabal was sentenced for 
political offenses at the age of 12 to be 
imprisoned until the age of 21. Althougl 
his sentence expired in June 1971, he 
has been forced to remain in prison even 
since. His only moments spent outside 
prison were in June 1984 when he was 
subjected to the psychological torture of 
being put on a bus of freed prisoners 
bound for the United States only to be 
removed at the last minute. 

Torture and mistreatment continue 
today. In April 1986, a dozen former 
prisoners testified before an interna- 
tional panel in Paris about additional 
examples of torture and inhuman treat- 
ment. Ana Lazara Rodriguez cited cases 
of guards throwing women down stairs 
and kicking them in the breasts and 
stomachs. Raoul Carmeante reported 
that 15- to 18-year-old boys were put in 
prison barracks with sexual degenerates 
who raped them repeatedly. Eduardo 
Capote showed the panel his hand where 
one of his fingers had been chopped off 
by a prison guard. 

Teresa Mayan, who was imprisoned 
in 1982 for 1 year for attempting to flee 
Cuba with her son, told the panel about 
beatings and lack of medical care. She 
also stated that many fellow prisoners 
went mad and "almost every day a 
prisoner committed suicide." Mrs. 
Mayan observed: "If anybody says that 
all happened years back, I am here to 
tell them it is still happening." 

Once political prisoners are freed, 
they are sometimes forbidden to leave 
Cuba. Ricardo Bofill Pages, chairman of 
the Cuban Committee for the Defense of 
Human Rights, was released from his 
third term in prison in August 1985 but 
still awaits permission to depart the 
country. In August 1986, following the 
arrest of five members of the committee, 
Bofill— fearing a fourth prison sentence- 
took refuge at the French Embassy in 
Havana, where he remains today. 

'While waiting for exit permits, 
former political prisoners sometimes are 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



inied the right to work, possess ration 
rds, or obtain basic identification 
icuments. They are subject to discrim- 
latory treatment for the rest of their 
es. They must Hve with constant 
rveillance and social ostracism. 

Only the Cuban Government knows 
■ e exact number of political prisoners in 
Uba. Fidel Castro told foreign journal- 
ts in February 1985 that "Political 
■isoners, . . . the recalcitrant ones who 
ice numbered many thousands, amount 
about 200. ..." Castro, who has no 
ason to exaggerate, also stated that 
e total number of individuals 
sentenced for counterrevolutionary 
tivities" could be as many as 1,000. 
mericas Watch and Amnesty Interna- 
;)nal have published estimates that the 
jimber is between 250 and 1,000. 

The Cuban Government no longer 
stinguishes political from common 
iminal prisoners. Many persons have 
en imprisoned for acts that are 
tempts to resist or flee an oppressive 
gime. Thus some former political 
isoners who contend that the total 
imber of political prisoners is, in fact, 
■arer 10,000 may well be correct. A 
i85 survey by Amnesty International of 
her human rights organizations drew 
sponses indicating that there may be 
many as 15,000 political prisoners in 
jba, though Amnesty International 
self did not endorse that number. Few 
ilitical prisoners have been involved in 
olence against the government. 

In January 1985, a delegation from 
e U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference 
iked for the release of 147 long-term 
tlitical prisoners, after which the 
jban Government offered to release 75 
Tsons— the majority of them not on the 
;t of 147— and allow them and their 
milies to leave Cuba for the United 
:ates. The United States welcomed 
any of these brave people to their new 
/es of freedom in September 1986. 

Executions for political offenses are 
ill frequent in Cuba. Twenty-nine 
jople were executed in October 1982 
ir "plotting against Castro." Among 
lese was Armando Hernandez Gonzales 
hose "plotting" consisted of putting up 
iti-Castro posters and scattering some 
ills in the road to hinder trucks carry- 
ig people to Sunday "voluntary" labor, 
everal of his relatives were similarly 
larged and also executed at this time. 
1 August 1983, John Olivera Alberto, a 
lehovah's Witness, was executed for 
ioreading propaganda inciting rebellion, 
hree other Jehovah's Witnesses— Jesus 
rieto Suarez, Saul Pay, and Efrem 
loriegas Barroso— were executed in 



October 1983 for possessing a 
mimeograph machine to reproduce 
religious tracts. 

The Cuban Committee for the 
Defense of Human Rights reported in 
1984 that 37 people were executed by 
firing squads between October 1983 and 
May 1984. The same committee reported 
in 1985 that at least five young Cubans 
were executed in the first half of 1985. 

A 16-year-old boy was shot to death 
on November 18, 1985, and an 18-year- 
old companion possibly wounded by 
Cuban police guards when the two 
attempted to gain access to the 
Venezuelan Embassy in Havana. Accord- 
ing to all accounts, no attempt was made 
to warn or negotiate with the boys, who 
were simply shot on sight— disturbing 
evidence of the regime's standing orders 
in such matters. This was the third per- 
son killed at the Venezuelan Embassy in 
the preceding 22 months and the 21st 
killed there since 1974. 



Cuba still finds it necessary to use 
capital punishment for an extraordinary 
range of "offenses." No free society, 
and, indeed, few authoritarian ones, 
executes its young people for painting 
slogans on walls, preachers for passing 
out religious pamphlets, workers for put- 
ting up posters, or farmers for pro- 
testing a low grain price. Nor does a 
society having any claim to be just con- 
demn to death workers for talking about 
a union, judges for refusing to give a 
stronger sentence, or lawyers for effec- 
tively representing their clients. 

Fidel Castro's revolution is now 27 
years old. More than enough time has 
passed to assess its results. The revolu- 
tion has failed miserably to provide for 
the economic and social well-being of the 
Cuban people. It has been sordidly suc- 
cessful in aggressively denying the 
Cuban people every freedom and human 
right. ■ 



Human Rights Progress in 1986 



by Richard Schifter 

Address on Human Rights Day on 
December 10, 1986. at the White House. 
Ambassador Schifter is Assistant 
Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. 

Our annual gatherings to celebrate 
Human Rights Day are appropriate occa- 
sions to take inventory on developments 
in the field of human rights over the last 
12 months. They have been marked by 
progress in some countries, by setbacks 
in others, and by disappointing lack of 
movement in still others. 

We are all, of course, well aware of 
the ending of dictatorial rule in the 
course of this year in Haiti and the 
Philippines. Regrettably, but under- 
standably, in neither country has the 
change of government ushered in a 
period of domestic peace. But there is 
now a real chance in both countries for 
progress under a democratic form of 
government. Responsibility for assuring 
such progress rests, of course, with the 
citizens of these countries and the 
political leadership which now holds 
office there. Our role is to be of 
assistance in this context, to do 
whatever we can to be of help. 

Let me add that we also witnessed a 
free election in Guatemala as that coun- 
try joined El Salvador in the strengthen- 
ing of democratic institutions in Central 



America for which Presidents Cerezo 
and Duarte are to be congratulated. The 
measures they have taken have, indeed, 
served to restore respect for human 
rights in their countries. They have 
demonstrated that the democratic proc- 
ess and respect for human rights go 
hand in hand. 

One country in the Western Hemi- 
sphere in which we had hoped for far 
more progress in the past year than has 
been achieved has been Chile. We are 
aware of the acts of terrorism with 
which the Chilean Government has had 
to grapple, of the support given by out- 
siders to forces at work in Chile whose 
intent it is to foster civil strife in that 
country. But that does not justify tor- 
ture or any of the other serious depriva- 
tions of human rights which not only 
have continued to occur in Chile but 
have increased in the last year. On the 
other hand, we are glad to note that in 
recent weeks there has been the begin- 
ning of a dialogue between persons in 
governmental leadership and represent- 
atives of the democratic opposition. It is 
our sincere hope that in the months 
ahead this dialogue will, at long last, 
help initiate the first steps toward 
Chile's peaceful return to democracy. 

Without going into extensive detail, 
let me say that our concerns over Chile 
are paralleled in Paraguay, where there 



jBbruary 1987 



67 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



has been a disturbing increase in repres- 
sion, even in recent weeks, as the gov- 
ernment has initiated a series of arrests 
of persons on political charges. 

We need not revisit on this occasion 
the topic of South Africa, concerning 
which Secretary Shultz has spotcen so 
clearly just a few days ago. Let me say 
simply that our emphatic rejection of the 
system of apartheid continues. We are 
shocked by the massive human rights 
violations occurring in South Africa 
today, including the recent tightening of 
restrictions on a vigorous press, at one 
time a shining symbol of the recognition 
of democratic values. We also, as 
always, are deeply concerned about the 
limits on our ability to intercede on 
behalf of the victims of apartheid and of 
other human rights violations. 

In addition to race, another shameful 
target of human rights abuse is the prac- 
tice of religion. At the UN Human 
Rights Commission, it proved possible 
earlier this year to take a significant 
step forward for the cause of religious 
freedom by establishing the office of the 
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. In 
a world in which religious intolerance 
and strife based on such intolerance have 
been commonplace for millennia, we now 
have a man whose task it is to lead the 
fight against this scourge. I am happy to 
note that the man appointed to the posi- 
tion of rapporteur. Dr. Angelo Ribeiro of 
Portugal, is with us in this room today. 

My recitation of specific country 
situations is, obviously, not exhaustive. 
Nor is it my purpose to try to cover the 
globe in these remarks. The State 
Department's annual country reports to 
the Congress, which are now in prepara- 
tion, will deal with these concerns. These 
reports demonstrate the strength of our 
conviction that abuses must be pointed 
out wherever they occur, whether in 
nations friendly or antagonistic to 
America's foreign policy interests. 

Cuba and the Soviet Union 

The remainder of my remarks shall be 
devoted to two countries, namely Cuba 
and the Soviet Union. The reasons why 
these two states deserve special atten- 
tion on an occasion like this is not only 
that they are among the world's most 
serious human rights violators but also 
that their human rights violations have 
either, as in the case of Cuba, not been 
in the news for decades, or, as in the 
case of the Soviet Union, have been 
taken for granted by the media for a 
good many years. 

Cuba is the Western Hemisphere's 
paramount totalitarian state, the fiefdom 



of one of the world's longest lasting dic- 
tators. It is a country which seeks to 
repress all forms of independent expres- 
sion, a country in which the population is 
intimidated not only by an all-powerful 
secret police apparatus, but one in which 
average citizens are called upon to spy 
on their neighbors. It is a country in 
which the slightest, most innocent 
expression of disapproval of the govern- 
ment can have seriously adverse conse- 
quences, such as a reduction in rations 
or the loss of the educational oppor- 
tunities for one's children. What we see 
in Cuba at present, we fear, is the 
scenario of a fast-approaching future of 
Nicaragua, where the Sandinista regime 
has destroyed the democratic promises 
of the revolution, turning the country 
from one despotism to another. 

You will hear more on the subject of 
Cuba from a man who has firsthand 
knowledge of it, Armando Valladares. 

We are also fortunate to have in our 
midst today Yuriy Orlov, like Armando 
Valladares, a man who had to give up 
years of his life, which he had to spend 
in jirison, and who ultimately gave up his 
homeland— all in championing the cause 
of freedom. It is Yuriy Orlov's presence 
here that reminds us of the reality of life 
in the Soviet Union. A year ago, as we 
gathered here within weeks following 
the Geneva summit, there were some of 
us who cautiously hoped that improve- 
ments in the Soviet human rights record 
might be just around the corner. Today, 
as we review events over the course of 
the last 12 months, we must, sadly, take 
note of the fact that the corner has not, 
as yet, been turned. 

What we have witnessed during the 
last year has been a new look in Soviet 
public relations but not in the substance 
of Soviet policies. It appears as if the 
Kremlin has taken on a new advertising 
agency, with bright, young specialists on 
the Western mind, able to design new 
packaging and new selling methods. But 
the product that is being sold remains 
the same. 

With the Western market in mind, 
there have been a few high-profile 
gestures from the Soviet Union. An 
announcement is made, with appropriate 
fanfare, that a 3-year-old baby will be 
allowed to join her parents who 2 years 
ago escaped to the West. Yet, where else 
but in the Soviet Union and some of its 
allies is it a crime to leave one's country 
without proper permission? And where 
else but in the Soviet Union and some of 
its allies would parents be punished in 
this manner'? 

With appropriate fanfare, a small 
number of human rights activists are 
released early or allowed to emigrate. 



1 



But what about the many others, 
courageous men and women who are 
punished with prison, internal exile, or 
other restrictions on their freedom 
because they expressed their thoughts v 
speech and in writing. And let us note 
that this is punishment meted out to pe 
sons who were doing nothing other thai 
exercising rights accorded them under 
the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act 
signed by the Soviet Union. 

This year we were visited in the 
United States by the person who heads 
the agency in the Soviet Union charged 
with licensing of religious activities. Ou 
visitor assured all those within earshot 
that a new day has dawned in the Sovie 
Union as far as the practice of religion i 
concerned. One would hope that he will 
soon pass this message to the managers 
of the gulag, which holds hundreds of 
religious believers in its prisons. During 
the last 12 months, at least another 90 
persons have been sentenced to long 
prison terms for violating laws 
regulating religious practices. 

Another area of deep concern to us 
is that most barbarous of Soviet prac- 
tices, committing sane persons to ment; 
institutions as a form of punishment for 
their expression of dissenting views. It i 
deeply troublesome that members of tht 
medical profession have allowed them- 
selves to be used in this manner. But it 
is to the everlasting credit of one Soviet 
psychiatrist. Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, tha 
the heinous system of abuse of 
psychiatry has been fully exposed. For 
doing so. Dr. Koryagin has had to pay a 
heavy price, a term of 7 years incarcera 
tion, which he is now serving in the 
infamous Chistopol Prison. 

And it was out of Chistopol Prison 
that the news came yesterday of the 
death, at the age of 49, of another true 
hero of the Soviet Union, Anatoliy 
Marchenko. Marchenko was the man 
who fully e-xposed Soviet prison camp 
conditions in the post-Stalin era. By the 
time of his death, he had spent a total of 
20 years in prison. His most recent 
sentence, handed down in 1981, was for 
a term of 10 years for anti-Soviet pro- 
paganda. Prison conditions in the Soviet 
Union have broken the health of many a 
man. They broke the health of Anatoliy 
Marchenko and converted a prison 
sentence into a sentence of death. 

One action which demonstrates the 
Soviet attitude toward human rights as 
much as any other they have taken this 
year is the fact that the Government of 
the U.S.S.R. in October declared our 
human rights officers, Michael Matera in 
Moscow and his able counterpart in 
Leningrad, Daniel Grossman, persona . 
non grata. 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



OCEANS 



Human rights officers who serve in 
• embassies overseas deserve special 
oo-nition. These courageous men and 
men face all of the challenges and 
eats which any Foreign Service 
, icer must confront while bearing the 
gijitional risk, in countries which are 
r jor human rights violators, of incur- 
rlg the hostility of authorities who have 
smething to hide. 

Mr. Matera is with us today. He won 
t' admiration and respect of his 
f reign Sei^vice colleagues in Moscow 
si of those brave Soviet citizens who, 
aenormous cost to themselves, try to 
a/ance the cause of human rights in 
t 'ir own country. 

If the Soviet authorities believe that 
s'h actions as expelling our human 
r hts officers will discourage us from 
p-suing our human rights goals in the 
J^^iet Union, they ai-e badly mistaken. 

And then there is the matter of 
t igration. The right to leave one's 
c mtry is clearly spelled out in the 
1 iversal Declaration of Human Rights, 
I ocument incorporated into the 
I Isinki Final Act. It is another one of 
t ■ obligations undertaken at Helsinki 
\ ich the Soviet Union honors in the 
I !ach. 

In this field, too, with appropriate 
i [fare, the Soviet Union has, during the 
1 5t year, announced approval of a series 
(applications for family reunion. The 
jaouncements were, understandably, 
1 Icome news to the families directly 
i -olved. They were welcome news to all 
( us. For let me stress that to us every 
1 '. is precious, every individual's fate is 
i portant. We rejoice at the unification 
( every single family. 

But what justification had there been 
1 • originally separating these spouses, 
] rents and children, siblings? 'Why 
1 dn't they had a chance to be united 
1 ich earlier? 

To be sure, as part of the new public 
1 ations effort, we have noticed a will- 
i^ness on the part of Soviet officials to 
Iten to appeals for permission to 
nigrate, to accept letters or lists of per- 
:ns interested in emigrating. Regret- 
■ oly, this has proved to be nothing more 
an a charade. Emigration continues to 
i at a level of approximately 1,000 per 
: ar, 98% below the level of "l979. 
oreover, to avoid any doubt as to 
lere the Soviet leadership stands on 
e issue of emigration, a law was pro- 
ulgated on August 31, 1986, by the 
)viet Council of Ministers which pro- 
des that, aside from one minor excep- 
)n, no application for an exit visa will 
■' approved unless the requested 
migration is sponsored by a person liv- 



ing abroad who is the spouse, parent, 
child, or sibling of the applicant. The 
intent of the law is clearly to say nyet to 
appeals that the Soviet Union allow 
large-scale emigration. 

That this was the intent of the law, 
was, in fact, made clear by Ambassador 
Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delega- 
tion to the CSCE [Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe] meeting 
now taking place in Vienna. He told a 
congressional delegation that the Soviet 
Union now has a law on the subject of 
emigration and that no letter or petition 
will help because the law must be 
obeyed. That such a law, in turn, is 
clearly in conflict with the undertakings 
of the Helsinki Final Act appears not to 
be a matter of concern to the Soviet 
authorities. 



Navigation Rights 
and the Gulf of Sidra 



Background 

In October 1973, Libya announced that 
it considered all water in the Gulf of 
Sidra south of a straight baseline drawn 
at 32° 30' north latitude to be internal 
Libyan waters because of the gulf's 
geographic location and Libya's historic 
control over it. The United States and 
other countries, including the U.S.S.R., 
protested Libya's claim as lacking any 
historic or legal justification and as 
illegally restricting freedom of naviga- 
tion on the high seas. Further, the U.S. 
Navy has conducted many operations 
within the gulf during the past 12 years 
to protest the Libyan claim. These exer- 
cises have resulted in two shooting inci- 
dents between Libyan and U.S. forces. 
The first was in 1981, when two Libyan 
aircraft fired on U.S. aircraft and were 
shot down in air-to-air combat, and the 
second in March 1986, when the Libyans 
fired several missiles at U.S. forces and 
the United States responded by attack- 
ing Libyan radar installations and patrol 
boats. 

Barbary Coast History 

This is not the first time that the United 
States has contended with navigational 
hindrances imposed by North African 
states. After the American Revolution, 
the United States adhered to the then 
common practice of paying tribute to the 
Barbary Coast states to ensure safe 
passage of U.S. merchant vessels. In 



I have taken the time to spell out 
these details because they have tended 
to be overlooked as the Soviet Union 
continues to pursue its aggressive public 
relations effort. It is critically important 
for us to face the reality, the reality 
exemplified by Yuriy Orlov's years of 
imprisonment and exile, by Natan 
Shcharanskiy's years in prison, by the 
fact that both of them were released 
only in an exchange for spies. 

However, hope springs eternal in the 
human breast. None of us will want to 
give up the struggle just because the 
road is difficult. Wherever freedom is at 
issue, be it in Chile or South Africa, 
Cuba or the Soviet Union, the United 
States is prepared to speak up, whether 
in private or in public, in support of 
human rights and human dignity. ■ 



A, 






o MALTA 






TUNISIA 












_/,fi 






Mediterranean Sea 






ipoir 


/ 




32° 30- N y 

Gun ol Sidra 1 p. • 






L 


1 B Y A 







1796, the United States paid a one-time 
sum (equal to one-third of its defense 
budget) to Algiers, with guarantees of 
further annual payments. In 1801, the 
United States refused to conclude a 
similar agreement with Tripoli, and the 
Pasha of Tripoli declared war on the 
United States. After negotiations failed, 
the United States blockaded Tripoli; in 
the autumn of 1803 Commodore Edward 
Preble led a squadron, including the 
U.S.S. Constitution ("Old Ironsides"), to 
the Mediterranean to continue the 
blockade. Shortly after the squadron 
arrived off Tripoli, a U.S. frigate, the 
Philndelphia. ran aground and was cap- 
tured. Lt. Stephen Decatur led a team 
into Tripoli harbor and successfully 
burned the Philadelphia. In June 1805, 
the Pa-sha agreed to terms following a 
ground assault led by U.S. Marines that 
captured a port near Tripoli. In 1810 
Algiers and Tripoli renewed raids 
against U.S. shipping, and in 1815, Com- 
modore Decatur's squadron caught the 
Algerian fleet at sea and forced the Dey 



February 1987 



69 



TERRORISM 



of Algiers to agree to terms favorable to 
the United States. Decatur then pro- 
ceeded to Tunis and Tripoli and obtained 
their consent to similar treaties. A U.S. 
squadron remained in the Mediterranean 
for several years to ensure compliance 
with the treaties. 

Current Law and Custom 

By custom, nations may lay historic 
claim to those bays and gulfs over which 
they have exhibited such a degree of 
open, notorious, continuous, and unchal- 
lenged control for an extended period of 
time as to preclude traditional high seas 
freedoms within such waters. Those 
waters (closed off by straight baselines) 
are treated as if they were part of the 
nation's land mass, and the navigation of 
foreign vessels is generally subject to 
complete control by the nation. Beyond 
lawfully closed-off bays and other areas 
along their coasts, nations may claim a 
"territorial sea" of no more than 12 
nautical miles in breadth (measured 12 
miles out from the coast's low water 
line— or legal straight baseline) within 
which foreign vessels enjoy the limited 
navigational "right of innocent 
passage." Beyond the territorial sea, 
vessels and aircraft of all nations enjoy 
freedom of navigation and overflight. 

Since Libya cannot make a valid 
historic waters claim and meets no other 
international law criteria for enclosing 
the Gulf of Sidra, it may validly claim a 
12-nautical-mile territorial sea as 
measured from the normal low-water 
line along its coast (see map). Libya also 
may claim up to a 200-nautical-mile 
exclusive economic zone in which it may 
exercise resource jurisdiction, but such a 
claim would not affect freedom of navi- 
gation and overflight. (The United 
States has confined its exercises to areas 
beyond 12 miles from Libya's coast.) 

U.S. Position 

The United States supports and seeks to 
uphold the customary law outlined 
above, and it has an ongoing global pro- 
gram of protecting traditional navigation 
rights and freedoms from encroachment 
by illegal maritime claims. This program 
includes diplomatic protests (delivered to 
more than 50 countries since 1975) and 
ship and aircraft operations to preserve 
those navigation rights. Illegal maritime 
claims to which the United States 
responds include: 

• Excessive territorial sea claims; 

• Improperly drawn baselines for 
measuring maritime claims; and 

• Attempts to require notification or 
permission before foreign vessels can 



transit a nation's territorial sea under 
the right of innocent passage. 

Thus Libya has not been singled out 
for special consideration but represents 
simply one instance in the continuing 
U.S. effort to preserve worldwide 
navigational rights and freedoms. The 
fact that Libya chose to respond mili- 
tarily to the U.S. exercise of traditional 
navigation rights was regrettable and 
without any basis in international law. 

U.S. Intentions 

The United States will pursue actively 
its efforts to preserve traditional naviga- 
tional rights and freedoms that are 



equally guaranteed to all nations. Th^ 
preservation of rights is essential to 
maritime commerce and global naval 
air mobility and is imperative if all 
nations are to share equally in the 
benefits of the world's oceans. As 
always, the United States will exercis 
its rights and freedoms fully in accori 
with international law and hopes to 
avoid further military confrontations/ 
but it will not acquiesce in unlawful 
maritime claims and is prepared to 
defend itself if circumstances so requi 



Taken from the GIST series of December 
1986, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. ■ 



Terrorism: 

The Challenge and the Response 



by John C. Whitehead 

Address before the Brookings Institu- 
tion Conference on Terrorism on 
December 10, 1986. Mr. Whitehead is 
Deputy Secretary ofState.^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to par- 
ticipate in this important conference on 
terrorism. I note from your program 
that you have already heard the perspec- 
tives of many distinguished academics 
and specialists; this afternoon, I would 
like to present our views on this scourge. 
More specifically, there are three ques- 
tions that I want to address. 

First, what exactly is terrorism? 

Second, why is the United States so 
concerned about terrorism? 

And third, what are we doing to 
combat it? 

Let me begin with some observa- 
tions on the nature of terrorism. In 
recent years, we have learned a good 
deal about what terrorism is and is not. 
What once may have seemed the ran- 
dom, senseless acts of a few crazed 
individuals has come into clearer focus 
as a new pattern of low-technology and 
inexpensive warfare against the West 
and its friends. And, while it is an alarm- 
ing pattern, it is a threat that we can 
identify, combat, and, ultimately, defeat. 

Terrorism is a sophisticated form of 
political violence. It is neither random 
nor without purpose. On the contrary, 
terrorism is a strategy and tool of those 
who reject the norms and values of 
civilized people everywhere. 



Today, humanity is confronted by. 
wide assortment of terrorist groups 
whose stated objectives may range fn 
separatist causes to ethnic grievances- 
social and political revolutions. Their 
methods include hijackings, bombings< 
kidnappings, and political assassinatict 
But the overreaching goal of virtually 
terrorists is the same: to impose their 
will by using force against civilians. 

The horrors they inflict on the 
defenseless are calculated to achieve 
very specific political purposes. They 
want people to feel vulnerable and 
afraid; they want citizens to lose faith 
their government's ability to protect 
them; and they want to undermine th(- 
legitimacy not only of specific govern- 
ment policies but of the governments 
themselves. 

Terrorists gain from the confusion 
and anarchy caused by their violence. 
They succeed when governments alter 
their policies out of intimidation. They 
also succeed when governments respoi 
to terrorist violence with repressive, 
polarizing actions that alienate the 
authorities from the populace— and, 
thereby, play directly into the terrorist 
hands. 

State-Sponsored Terrorism 

As you may well know, terrorist violen 
is hardly a new phenomenon. Nearly tv 
centuries ago, for example, the Barbar 
pirates conducted their own form of tei 
rorism, operating from North African 
ports and leading to the landing of U.S 
marines on the shores of Tripoli. Simi- 
larly, the forerunner of the car bomb, 



70 



Department of State Bulle 



~1 



TERRORISM 



cart bomb, dates back to Napoleonic 
IS. Nevertheless, certain features of 
lern-day terrorism seem to be, if not 
lorically unprecedented, then eer- 
ily very unusual. 

To begin with, a good deal of con- 
porary terrorism is state sponsored. 
et(( in example, consider one of the most 
to )rious terrorist groups of our day, 
io[S Abu Nidal organization. This group 
ful r receives backing and support from 
lo ya; it finds sanctuary in Eastern 
rei| 'ope; and Damascus has provided it 
1 important logistical support since 
ie 3. Indeed. Syria allows Abu Nidal's 
1» up to maintain training camps in 
as of Lebanon under Syrian control. 
ia also provides the group with travel 
uments, permits its operatives to 
sit freely, and continues to sanction 
operation of Abu Nidal's facilities in 
i) nascus. 

Nor is Abu Nidal the only terrorist 
pap supported by Syria. Damascus 
ll provides varying amounts of sup- 
II : to other radical Palestinian groups. 
Palestinian terrorist groups, as 
, have facilities or have received 
iiing in Syria or Syrian-controlled 
s of Lebanon. These groups include 
•lapanese Red Army, the Kurdish 
or Party, the Armenian terrorist 
mization ASALA [Armenian Secret 
A ny for the Liberation of Armenia], 
a al-Zulfikar of Pakistan. In the past, 
» have had to rely on intelligence 
SI rces for information on Syrian sup- 
p t for international terrorism. More 
r ently, however, public trials in Lon- 
d . and Berlin have conclusively 
d lonstrated Syria's complicity in ter- 
r ist actions. 

Unfortunately, Syria is not the only 
s te which supports terrorism. Iran, 
( 3a, Libya, and South Yemen are also 
k ' members of today's terrorist inter- 
n ional. Indeed, the deadly combination 

iirect government assistance such as 

a ns, explosives, communications, travel 
c 'uments, and training, on the one 
h id, and violent individuals or groups, 
c the other hand, is a major factor in 
t h the growth and the effectiveness of 
t rorism in recent years. 

1 e Soviet Role 

1 the past, terrorism was almost 
i:lusively the weapon of the weak, a 
I sture by small groups of determined 

treniists to call attention to their 

jse. Today, however, we see that even 
^jTiajor power like the Soviet Union sup- 

rts terrorist activity in pursuit of its 

ibitions. 



We should understand the Soviet 
role in international terrorism without 
exaggeration or distortion. The Soviet 
Union officially denounces the use of ter- 
rorism as an instrument of state policy. 
Yet here, as elsewhere, there is a wide 
disparity between Soviet statements and 
actions. The Soviet Union uses terrorist 
groups to advance its own purposes and 
goals, including the weakening of liberal 
democracy and the undermining of 
regional stability. One does not have to 
believe that the Soviets are puppeteers 
and the terrorists marionettes; violent or 
fanatic individuals and groups can be 
found in almost every society. But, cer- 
tainly, in some countries terrorism has 
been more violent and pervasive because 
of support from the Soviet Union and its 
satellites— notably Bulgaria, East Ger- 
many, and Czechoslovakia. 

Terrorism and Democracy 

In thinking about terrorism, certain 
facts must be faced. All states and all 
political systems are vulnerable to ter- 
rorist assault. Nevertheless, the number 
of terrorist incidents in totalitarian 
states is minimal; markedly fewer acts 
are committed against their citizens 
abroad than against Westerners. This 
discrepancy has not arisen simply 
because police states make it harder 
for terrorists to carry out acts of vio- 
lence. It also reflects the fundamental 
antagonism between terrorism and 
democracy. 

One reason that the United States is 
so concerned about terrorism, wherever 
it takes place, is that it is largely 
directed against the democracies— often 
against our fundamental strategic 
interests, always against our most basic 
values. The moral values upon which 
democracy is based— individual rights, 
equality under the law, freedom of 
thought, freedom of religion, and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes— all stand 
in the way of those who seek to impose 
their will, their ideology, or their 
religious beliefs by force. The terrorists 
reject and despise the open processes of 
democratic society and, therefore, con- 
sider us their mortal enemy. 

States that sponsor terrorism use it 
as another weapon of warfare against 
the United States and our allies. 
Through terrorism, they seek to gain 
strategic advantages where they cannot 
use conventional means of attack. When 
terrorists, reportedly with Iranian back- 
ing, set out to bomb Western personnel 
in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the 
West's commitment to defend its 



interests in the Middle East. When 
North Korea perpetrated the murder of 
South Korean Government officials in 
Rangoon, it sought to weaken the non- 
communist stronghold on the mainland 
of East Asia. Wlien Syria participated 
in the attempt to blow up the El Al 
airliner and murder over 300 people, it 
attempted to strike a major blow against 
Israel, the United States, and Britain. 

In Europe, the Middle East, and 
elsewhere, the United States is a prin- 
cipal target of terrorist violence, not so 
much because of what we do or don't do 
but, rather, because of what we are: a 
nation dedicated to the peaceful resolu- 
tion of conflicts. 

Preventing Future 
Terrorist Violence 

Terrorist violence is taking an increas- 
ingly grim toll on human life. Last year, 
for example, nearly 800 terrorist attacks 
hit citizens and public facilities in 84 
countries; over 900 persons were killed, 
of whom 38 were American. As an 
American official, I highlight the number 
of Americans who have been killed. But, 
no matter what their nationality, 900 
deaths are just too many. 

The potential of future incidents is 
even more worrying. Terrorists now rely 
on guns, grenades, and bombs to spread 
ruin and fear. That is bad enough. In the 
future, however, states which support 
terrorists could provide even more lethal 
means of destruction. The fact that this 
has not happened yet does not allow us 
to be complacent about the future. On 
the contrary, the essence of an effective 
policy is to identify a danger to our 
interests before it is self-evident and 
implement a sensible preventive 
response. 

U.S. Counterterrorist Policy 

What I have said thus far should 
give you a clear conception of this 
Administration's view of the 
phenomenon of terrorism. Now let me 
turn to the third and final point I want 
to discuss this afternoon: U.S. counter- 
terrorist policy. I hardly need say that 
this is a particularly controversial topic 
just now. Many of you, I am sure, have 
strong views on this subject. Yet I urge 
you not to lose sight of the many real 
and substantial achievements this 
Administration has made in the fight 
against terrorism. Much of this effort 
receives little attention and takes place 
in the realm of intelligence gathering, in 
the cluttered offices of analysts, or in 



!bruary 1987 



71 



TERRORISM 



the laboratories of scientists trying to 
develop better ways of detecting hidden 
explosives. 

What are these achievements? Dur- 
ing the past few years, we have made 
i-emarkable progress in thwarting poten- 
tial attacks. Only successful terrorist 
acts receive front-page coverage, but I'd 
like to draw your attention to the 
attempts that fail— largely due to our 
efforts. Last year alone, we and our 
friends foiled more than 120 planned ter- 
rorist attacks. For example, in Turkey 
this April, security officers arrested 
Libyan-supported terrorists who were 
planning to attack the U.S. officers club 
in Ankara during a wedding celebration. 
Tn Paris, at about the same time, officials 
thwarted a similar attack planned 
against the visa line at the U.S. 
Embassy. 

A number of initiatives have con- 
tributed to this progress. We have been 
developing our own intelligence capa- 
bilities vis-a-vis international terrorists 
and sharing that intelligence with other 
nations in a timely fashion. We have 
expanded international cooperation in 
the fields of law enforcement and 
counterterrorist training. Under the 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, 
which began in April 1984, we have 
established active exchange and training 
programs with 32 foreign governments. 
States which may not actually train 
and fund terrorists but which ignore ter- 
rorist activity in their own countries 
pose a particularly difficult problem. 
Unless their own citizens are the targets 
of terrorist acts, many nations assume 
it's not their problem. We are respond- 
ing to this unwillingness to act by 
discussing terrorism with all nations— 
not just our allies. I recently returned 
from a trip to Eastern Europe, which is 
an area well known for its leniency 
toward terrorists. Eastern Europeans 
are realizing that terrorism is their prob- 
lem too: there were Hungarians at the 
Vienna airport when it was attacked last 
year, and Romania recently stated its 
opposition to terrorism. Tliere is much 
more to be done in Eastern Europe, but 
with continued effort, we can make all 
countries understand that terrorism is a 
crime against humanity. 

We are also for putting teeth into 
international antiterrorism conventions. 
For example, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization toughened its 
regulations dramatically after the hijack- 
ing of TWA Flight 847. In response to 
the Achillc Laurn hijacking, the Interna- 
tional Maritime Organization began to 
develop similar regulations for seaborne 



72 



transportation. Last year, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a strong 
re.solution declaring terrorism a crime, 
whatever the rationale. 

We have taken great strides toward 
bringing our diplomatic installations in 
threatened areas up to the standards 
necessary to protect our people. All of 
our posts have conducted intensive 
reviews of their security needs, and 
these reviews have been the basis for 
speedy action. We have made immediate 
improvements at 2.3 high-threat posts. 
We are planning to construct new office 
buildings that will measure up to the 
latest security standards. The Inman 
commission [Advisory Panel on Overseas 
Security] has estimated that improving 
the security of our institutions abroad 
will cost $4.2 billion over a 5-year period. 
Congress has approved less than 
$1 billion for the first stage. There is 
obviously a great need for increased 
funding over the next 5 years. 

Our research into new technologies 
for enhancing physical security is also 
continuing. We have begun working with 
the private sector to help corporations 
improve their capacity for dealing with 
terrorists. We have passed tougher laws 
against terrorism, such as the Omnibus 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which 
makes terrorist acts against Americans 
abroad punishable in U.S. courts. And 
we are urging other nations to tighten 
their procedures for issuing visas to 
suspected terrorists. 

We have also developed our own 
counterterrorist military capabilities to 
react swiftly to terrorist situations. In 
both the Achille Laura affair and last 
April's assault on Tripoli, we demon- 
strated our willingness and ability to use 
force against terrorists and against 
states that support them. Col. Qadhafi 
now has no illusions about our 
determination— and neither should any 
others who would use terrorist violence 
against us. 

Most important, perhaps, we are 
helping to educate the public about the 
real nature of the terrorist threat. Over 
the years, too many of us have accepted 
uncritically certain very misleading 
views about the nature of terrorism- 
views which disarm us intellectually and 
strengthen our adversaries. For any 
counterterrorism policy to be effective, 
these misconceptions must be dispelled. 

Misconceptions About Terrorism 

What misconceptions am I referring to? 
Let me briefly mention three of them. 
We have all heard the insidious assertion 
that "one person's terrorist is another's 



freedom fighter." What this constitui 
of course, is an attempt to justify ter 
rorism as a legitimate form of warfai-. 
and political struggle. 

When Secretary Shultz addresse.'^ 
this issue, he sometimes quotes the 
powerful rebuttal of this kind of mora 
relativism made by the late Senator 
Henry Jackson. Senator Jackson's st.i 
ment bears repeating today. 

The idea that one person's "terrorist" 
another's "freedom fighter" cannot be san 
tioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionarie: 
don't blow up buses containing non- 
combatants; terrorist murderers do. Free- 
dom fighters don't set out to capture and 
slaughter school children; terrorist murder 
do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate inii' 
cent businessmen, or hijack and hold hosta? 
innocent men. women, and children; terror 
murderers do. It is a disgrace that democ- 
racies would allow the treasured word 
"freedom" to be associated with acts of 
terrorists. 

So spoke Scoop Jackson. So should we 
all speak. 

Another fallacy we often hear is th» 
military action taken to retaliate again 
or preempt terrorism is contrary to 
international law. Some have even sug^ 
gested that to use force against ter- 
rorism is to lower ourselves to the bar 
baric level of the terrorists. But, as th( 
President and Secretary Shultz have 
pointed out time and again, the UN 
Charter is not a suicide pact. Article 5 
explicitly allows the right of self-defen 
It is absurd to argue that international 
law prohibits us from acting in our selk 
defense. On the contrary, there is ampj 
legal authority for the view that a statf 
which supports terrorist or subversive 
attacks against another state or which 
supports terrorist planning within its 
own territory is responsible for such 
attacks. Such conduct can amount toai 
ongoing armed aggression against the 
other state in international law. As the: 
President said in connection with Libyf 
support for terrorist violence: 

By providing material support to terrori 
groups which attack U.S. citizens. Libya has 
engaged in armed aggression against the 
United States under established principles o 
international law, just as if [it] had used its 
own armed forces. 

All of us can agree, I hope, that the 
United States has not only the right bui 
the obligation to defend its citizens 
against terrorist violence. We should us 
our military power only if the stakes 
justify it, if other measures are 
unavailable, and then only in a manner 
appropriate to a clear objective. But we 
cannot rule out the use of armed force ii 
every context. Our morality must be a 



Department of State Bullet^ 



TERRORISM 



'ce of strength, not paralysis. Other- 
, we will be surrendering the world's 
jire to those who are most brutal, 
t unscrupulous, and most hostile to 
jrything we believe in. 
A third argument we sometimes 
r is that by openly discussing ter- 
sm, we're only giving the terrorists 
/arranted recognition and legitimacy, 
ording to this line of reasoning, we 
juld downplay public expression of our 
earns in the hope that a low profile 
deprive the terrorists of the visibility 
/ seek. Unfortunately, terrorist 
ups have shown great skill in dealing 
n the media, and their crimes are 
ly to attract considerable press and 
■vision attention, regardless of what 
U,S, Government does. Under these 
umstances, our duty is clear: we 
5t persist in our campaign to build a 
ad coalition, at home and abroad, 
w ing to stand up against terrorism. 

Ciclusion 

me conclude with a final observa- 
. Recent events may have raised 
Ills in some minds about the credibil- 
nf U.S. counterterrorist policy. But I 
assure you that this Administra- 
t: I's overall policy is well in place, and 
it smains a sound framework for coun- 
& ng the terrorist scourge. Today, as in 
t past, our policy is based on four 
ii'iples. 

• We consider terrorism a criminal 
a ivity that no political cause can 

;ify'. 

• We refuse to make concessions to 
t rorists. 

• We regard state-sponsored ter- 
r ism as a menace to all nations and 
'P imote cooperation among states on 
f .ctical measures to track down, 

a est, and prosecute terrorists. 

• We encourage international 

c iperation in isolating terrorist states 
t make it clear that costs will be 
i oosed on those states that support or 
f ilitate the use of terror. 

Implementing these guidelines will 
tt be easy. There are no magic solu- 
tns or quick fixes; and, as in all situa- 
t ns where human lives are at stake, 
t ^re are political complexities and 
I >ral dilemmas that cannot be wished 
■ay. But, bilaterally and multilaterally, 
' are working at home and abroad in 
r war against terrorism. We are in 
is war for the duration, and we are 
tt'iniined to win. 



Syrian Support 

for International Terrorism: 1983-86 



'f^ress release 260 of Dec. 11, 1986. 



Thefolloicing docutnoits were 
prepared by the Office oftheAmbdSKdilur 
at Large for Counter-Terrorism and 
made available December 5. 19S6. The 
chronology of selected terrorist incidents 
by Syrian-suppor'ted groups is not 
intended to be all-inclusive but is illus- 
trative of Syria's involvement in and 
support for terrorism and terrorist 
groups. The groups cited in this 
chronology have links with Syria. 

New evidence of Syrian support for and 
direct involvement in international ter- 
rorism has been brought to light in two 
recent trials including the conviction in 
Great Britain of Nizar Hindawi for the 
attempted bombing of an El Al civilian 
airplane with 375 passengers aboard. 

Syria clearly has a long record of 
involvement in terrorism. Syria is one of 
the "charter members" of countries on 
the U.S. Goverment's terrorism list, 
which was first compiled in 1979.' 

The pattern of Syrian activity in sup- 
port of terrorism has varied. From the 
mid-1970s through 1983, Syrian per- 
sonnel are known to have been directly 
involved in terrorist operations. These 
operations were primarily directed 
against other Arabs such as Syrian 
dissidents, moderate Arab states such as 
Jordan, and pro- Arafat Palestinians, as 
well as Israeli and Jewish targets. In 
1982, for example, a car bomb exploded 
in front of the offices of a Lebanese- 
owned, pro-Iraqi newspaper in down- 
town Paris, killing one person and injur- 
ing scores of others. France later 
expelled two Syrian diplomats and 
ordered its ambassador home for 
consultations. 

By late 1983, Damascus had cur- 
tailed use of its own personnel. Instead, 
it began to rely more heavily on terrorist 
groups made up of non-Syrians who have 
bases and training facilities in Syria and 
Syrian-occupied areas of Lebanon. The 
most notorious of these is the Abu Nidal 
organization. 

Available evidence indicates that 
Syria prefers to support groups whose 
activities are generally in line with 
Syrian objectives rather than to select 
targets or control operations itself. 
Damascus utilizes these groups to attack 
or intimidate enemies and opponents and 
to exert its influence in the region. Yet 
at the same time, it can disavow 
knowledge of their operations. Such 



Syrian-supported groups have carried 
out scores of attacks against Palestinian 
and other Arab, Turkish, Israeli, and 
Western targets during the past 3 years. 

In 1986, investigations into major 
incidents have revealed another change 
in Syrian activities: that Syria has not 
abandoned its willingness to be directly 
involved in terrorist attacks. The British 
trial and investigation of the abortive El 
Al bombing exposed the direct involve- 
ment of President Assad's intelligence 
services. And the trial concerning the 
bombing of the German-Arab Friendship 
Union in West Berlin revealed the 
involvement of Syrian officials. To a 
large degree, Syria had been successful 
ill covering its tracks. Now, however, in 
Britain and Berlin, evidence of more 
direct Syrian involvement has emerged. 

London and Berlin Investigations 

In the British investigation of the 
aborted El Al attack, Hindawi told 
British police he was recruited by 
Haitham Said, an aide to Major General 
al-Khuli, chief of Syrian Air F'orce intel- 
ligence. According to the evidence 
presented at the trial, al-Khuli's 
operatives: (1) supplied Hindawi, a Jor- 
danian, with a Syrian passport; (2) gave 
him $12,000 and promised him more 
money when he completed his mission to 
plant a bomb aboard an El Al civilian 
airliner; (3) provided him with the bomb 
which was carried into London aboard 
the Syrian Arab Airlines, which also 
gave him SAA crew member hotel 
accommodations; and (4) trained him in 
the bomb's use. 

Hindawi tried to use his pregnant 
girlfriend as the unwitting carrier of the 
sophisticated bomb which was built into 
her carry-on bag. If an alert security 
official had not spotted the device after 
her bag cleared an earlier check, 37.5 
innocent persons, including some 230 
Americans, would have perished. 

After the April 17 plan failed, 
according to evidence presented at the 
trial, Hindawi followed instructions to go 
to the Syrian Embassy, where he was 
greeted by the ambassador and hidden in 
a Syrian safehouse in London. British 
press reports of the investigation say 
Britain also has evidence that the Syrian 
Ambassador in London was personally 



sbruary 1987 



73 



TERRORISM 



involved several months before the 
attempted bombing in recruiting 
Hindawi for Syrian intelligence. 

In West Berlin, Hindawi's brother, 
Ahmad Hasi, and another Arab, Farouk 
Salameh, were convicted for the March 
29 bombing of the German-Arab Friend- 
ship Union in West Berlin in which 11 
persons were injured. In a sworn state- 
ment, Hasi said he picked up this bomb 
at the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin 
from a senior Syrian Air Force intel- 
ligence officer, Haitham Said, and a 
Syrian explosives expert was sent from 
Damascus to repair the device after it 
twice failed to explode. 

Abu Nidal 

Syria continues to support the most 
active and brutal international terrorist 
group operating today, Abu Nidal. ^ 
Although Abu Nidal now also receives 
backing and support from Libya and 
sanctuary in Eastern Europe, Damascus 
had provided Abu Nidal with important 
logistical support ever since the group 
moved from Iraq in 1983. Syria allows 
Abu Nidal's group to maintain training 
camps in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, an 
area under the control of the Syrian 
Armed Forces. Syria provides the group 
with travel documents and permits its 
operatives to transit freely through 
Damascus when departing on missions. 
Syria continues to permit operation of 
Abu Nidal facilities in Damascus. (The 
Syrian Government asserts that the sole 
function of these facilities is limited to 
cultural and political affairs.) 

Although the December 1985 attack 
on Rome's airport was committed under 
Libyan sponsorship, the surviving 
member of the four-man terrorist team, 
according to reports on the Italian 
investigation, told investigators the team 
was trained in Syrian-occupied areas of 
Lebanon. The team then traveled to 
Damascus, where it remained while final 
preparations were made for the attack in 
which 16 civilians and 3 terrorists were 
killed. 

In Ankara on November 6, Turkish 
prosecuters issued an indictment accus- 
ing six Palestinians working for the Abu 
Nidal organization of killing a Jordanian 
diplomat in July 1985. The indictment 
also linked the men with four other 
actions, including the September 6, 
1986, attack on an Istanbul synagogue 
killing 21 persons, a 1983 attempt to 
place a bomb on an Alitalia flight, and 
the attempted car bombing of a U.S. 
officers' club in Izmir in 1983. 

The Abu Nidal organization's move 
to Syria in 1983 was followed by a 



dramatic increase in the group's ter- 
rorist attacks: more than a dozen attacks 
in 1984 and twice that number in 1985. 
More than half of the 1985 attacks 
occurred in Western Europe, including 
attacks on British tourists at hotels in 
Athens. When King Hussein launched 
his February 1985 peace initiative, Jor- 
dan became a major target. But when 
Jordanian-Syrian relations began to 
warm in mid-1985, attacks on Jordanians 
at home and abroad diminished. 

In its dealings with Western coun- 
tries, Syria has consistently tried to play 
down the importance of its connection 
with Abu Nidal and has denied permit- 
ting his group to engage in terrorist 
activity. However, there is no evidence 
that Damascus has actually restrained 
Abu Nidal's activities (Abu Nidal train- 
ing camps in the Syrian-conti'olled Bekaa 
Valley continue to operate, for example) 
or cut back on other forms of support. 
Although it may not know about every 
operation, given the amount and nature 
of Syrian support, Damascus could influ- 
ence and constrain the Abu Nidal 
group's activities in Syria and Syrian- 
controlled areas of Lebanon if it chose to 
do so. 

Other Syrian-Supported 
Palestinian Groups 

Syria also provides varying amounts of 
support to other radical Palestinian 
groups. These include Saiqa, which is 
under total Syrian control; the Abu 
Musa group, now almost totally depend- 
ent on Damascus; the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine— General 
Command (PFLP-GC); and the Marxist 
Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), which now maintains 
its principal base in Damascus. 

In all, Syrian-sponsored groups, 
including the Abu Nidal organization, 
were linked to about 30 terrorist attacks 
during 1985, a quarter of them in Greece 
alone. The Abu Musa group announced 
from Damascus its responsibility for 
another attempt to bomb an El Al 
airliner, in Madrid on June 26, 1986. The 
suspect in that attempt has admitted 
being a member of the group. Two 
weeks later, other groups supported by 
Syria, the PFLP, and the Lebanese 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party attemp- 
ted an attack on an Israeli resort town 
on July 10, 1986. 

Support for Non-Palestinian Terrorists 

In addition to the radical Palestinian 
groups, a variety of other terrorists have 
facilities and received terrorist training 



in Syria or Syrian-controlled areas of 
Lebanon: the Japanese Red Army, tht 
Kurdish Labor Party, the Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA), and the Pakistani 
al Zulfikar. In addition, the Lebanese 
Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) 
based in the Lebanese village of 
Qubayyat, within the area of Syrian cc 
trol in Lebanon. 

To these groups must be added tht 
individual international terrorists who 
frequent Damascus. Bruno Breguet, ai 
associate of Carlos, the international 
terrorist, was arrested in Paris in 
February 1982 for transporting arms 
and explosives. Later released, he was 
recently sighted on a flight to Damasci> 
met on arrival by Syrian authorities, ai 
escorted through the airport without 
having to pass through the normal con- 
trols. Evidence exists that Frederic 
Oriach, a militant member of the Frenw 
Action Directe, spent July and August 
1986 in Damascus pursuing ideological 
and military studies. 

Casualties and Control 

Attacks by Syrian-supported groups 
since 1983 have killed or wounded near» 
500 people. 

Syrian-supported groups have 
attacked U.S. facilities in the Middle 
East over 10 times since 1983. In Jords 
in 1985, for example, the Syrian- 
sponsored Jordanian People's Revolu- 
tionary Party attempted two anti-U.S. 
attacks. Bombs were found at the homi. 
of an employee of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) and a 
the American Center for Oriental 
Studies. These operations, as well as 
others aimed against Jordanian targets 
have halted since the Syrian-Jordanian 
rapprochement late in 1985— under- 
scoring Syria's ability, if it wishes, to 
control its surrogates' activities and to 
severely curb the capability of those to 
whom it provided safe haven and 
support. 

This has been acknowledged by a to 
Syrian official who tried to dismiss, in a 
Washington Post press interview in 
September 1986, evidence that Abu 
Nidal's group was involved in terrorist 
attacks. Syrian Foreign Minister Faroul 
Charaa said in discussing the actions of 
the Abu Nidal group: "Whoever knows 
my government must realize that such 
attacks could not be carried out without 
its awareness." 



74 



Department of State Bulletli 



TERRORISM 



RONOLOGY 

i6 

vember 26: West Berlin. A court 
ivicted two Arabs for the March 29 
nbing of the German-Arab Friendship 
ion which injured 1 1 persons. In a 
orn statement, one of the defendants. 
mad Hasi, said he picked up the bomb 
a'the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin 
f m a Syrian Air Force intelligence 
oicer. Hasi is a brother of Nizar 
} idawi, who was convicted in a British 
at for the attempted bombing of an 
: Al airliner. 

November 6: Turkey. Turkish prose- 
c ors issued an indictment accusing six 
Festinians working for the Abu Nidal 
o:anization of killing a Jordanian 
diomat in July 1985. An arrest warrant 
8 3 was issued for the Syrian Embassy 
S'ond Secretary. Mohammed Darwichi. 

V was one of the original defendants 
a i left Turkey. The indictment also 

Ij ced members of the group with four 
er actions: the September 6, 1986, 
aack on an Istanbul synagogue which 
k ed 22 persons; an attempt to place a 
b nb on an Alitalia flight in 1983; the 
a smpted car bombing of a U.S. 

cers' club in Izmir in 1983; and the 
k ing of a Palestinian student in 
Aarain 1982. 

June 26: Madrid. A Spaniard 
a empted to board an El Al flight with a 
S tease bomb, apparently without know- 
i: it. The suspect arrested by Spanish 
J ice carried a Syrian passport. A 
s ikesman for the Abu Musa group, 

V ich is almost totally dependent on 

1 mascus, claimed responsibility for 

p nting the bomb, although the Syrian 
( v'ernment denied involvement. 

April 17: London. El Al security 
c 'overed a Syrian-made bomb in the 
!'• gage of an Irish woman as she 
a empted to board a plane for Tel Aviv. 
I British court found her boyfriend, 
} ;ar Hindawi, guilty of the attempted 
I nbing, and the British Government 
a lounced that it had conclusive evi- 
c ice of Syrian official involvement in 
t' terrorist act. 

March 2: West Bank. Two gunmen 
a.assinated the Mayor of Nablus, Zafer 
aWasri, a Palestinian appointed by 
I ael. Both the Abu Nidal group and the 
f pular Front for Liberation of Pales- 
t e (PFLP) claimed responsibility. 



■!.5 

1 cember 27: Rome and Vienna. Abu 

lal terrorists simultaneously attacked 
A\ ticket counters in the Rome and 



Vienna airports, killing more than 20 
people, including five Americans, and 
wounding some 120 others. (Although 
these attacks were committed under 
Libyan sponsorship, reports on the 
Italian investigation indicate that the 
Rome terrorist team received training in 
Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and 
passed through Damascus.) 

September 30: Netherlands. A 
small bomb damaged the El Al office of 
Amsterdam. Fatah Revolutionary 
Council— the Abu Nidal group's official 
name— claimed responsibility. 

September 25: Italy. A bomb 
exploded in a British Airways office in 
Rome, injuring 15 people. Police 
arrested Hassan Itab fleeing the scene. 
Itab claimed he was a member of the 
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist 
Moslems, an Abu Nidal "cover" name, 
and was later identified by witnesses as 
the same man who threw a grenade at 
the Jordanian airline office in Athens on 
March 21. 

September 18: Greece. Michel 
Nimri, a Jordanian magazine publisher 
and reportedly a personal friend of Yasir 
Arafat, was assassinated in Athens. 
Black September, a name used by the 
Abu Nidal group, claimed responsibility 
the next day. 

September 16: Italy. A grenade 
attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe injured 
38 tourists, including nine Americans. 
Police arrested a Palestinian in connec- 
tion with the attack. The Revolutionary 
Organization of Socialist Moslems, 
another Syrian-linked group, claimed 
responsibility on September 19. 

September 3: Greece. Terrorists 
threw hand grenades that wounded 19 
British tourists at the Glyfada Hotel in 
Athens. Black September claimed the 
attack was to pressure the Greek 
authorities to release a man arrested 
near the Jordanian Embassy on 
August 31. 

August 8: Greece. A bomb exploded 
in the kitchen of the London Hotel in 
Athens, injm-ing 13 people— nine of them 
British subjects. The Revolutionary 
Organization of Socialist Moslems 
claimed responsibility, contending the 
hotel was a "hideout" for British spies. 

July 24: Turkey. The First 
Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy in 
Ankara was assassinated by a lone gun- 
man. The incident was claimed by Black 
September. 

July 11: Kuwait. Two bombs 
exploded within minutes of each other 
killing 8 people and injuring 89 in two 
cafes about 10 kilometers apart. The 
Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed 
responsibility. 



July 1: Spain. A bomb exploded at 
the British Airways ticket office in 
Madrid, also damaging the TWA office 
upstairs. The ALIA Royal Jordanian 
Airlines ticket office nearby was hit by 
automatic weapons fire and two 
grenades that failed to explode. One per- 
son was killed, and 27 were wounded. 
Claimed by Organization of the 
Oppressed, Revolutionary Organization 
of Socialist Moslems, and Black 
September. 

April 4: Greece. A rocket was fired 
at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking 
off from Athens airport. The projectile 
hit the plane but did not explode. Black 
September claimed responsibility. 

April 3: Italy. A rocket narrowly 
missed the Jordanian Embassy on the 
fifth floor of an office building in Rome. 
No casualties were reported. Black 
September claimed responsibility. 

March 21: Italy. Three unidentified 
men threw hand grenades into a Jordan- 
ian airline office in Rome, injuring two 
people. Black September claimed 
responsibility. 

March 21: Greece. An unidentified 
man threw a hand grenade into the 
Jordanian airline office in Athens, injur- 
ing three people. Claimed by Black 
September. (See September 25, 1985, 
incident.) 

March 21: Cyprus. An unidentified 
man threw two hand grenades into the 
Jordanian airline office in Nicosia. 
Claimed by Black September. 

March 9: United Arab Emirates. A 
bomb was found on a Jordanian airliner. 
The young Palestinian who carried the 
bomb onto the Karachi-to-Amman flight 
said he thought he was transporting 
drugs to support Abu Nidal terrorist 
operations. 

February 22: Jordan. The Jordanian 
Peo])le's Revolutionary Party placed a 
bomb at the American Center for Orien- 
tal Research in Amman. The bomb was 
found and defused. 

January 10: Jordan. A bomb 
planted by the Jordanian Peo|)le's 
Revolutionary Party was defused near 
an AID employee's home. The explosives 
had neither a power source nor a timing 
device. 

1984 

December 29: Jordan. Two unidentified 
gunmen assassinated Fah al-Qawasmeh, 
a member of the PLO Executive Com- 
mittee and former mayor of Hebron, out- 
side his home in Amman. Two witnesses 
to the shooting were injured by gunfire 
as they tried to block the assassins' flee- 
ing vehicle. Black September claimed 
responsibility. 



■bruary 1987 



75 



TERRORISM 



December 14: Italy. Ismail Darwish, 
a leading military figure in the Fatah 
movement, was gunned down on a Rome 
street by an unidentified man who fled 
on a waiting motor scooter. Arab 
Revolutionary Brigades claimed 
responsibility. 

December 4: Romania. The Deputy 
Chief of Mission of the Jordanian 
Embassy was shot and killed as he was 
getting into his car in Bucharest. Black 
September claimed responsibility. 

December 2: Jordan. A guard 
discovered a bomb concealed in an 
attache case inside the American Life 
Insurance and Citibank building in 
Amman. Bomb technicians defused the 
device, which contained 18 blocks of 
TNT and a timer. The Jordanian 
People's Revolutionary Party was later 
determined to be responsible. 

October 4: Cyprus. A car bomb 
exploded behind the Israeli Embassy in 
Nicosia, slightly injuring one person. 
Claimed by Abu Musa's Fatah dissident 
organization. 

August 13: Jordan. Jordanian police 
defused a l)omb consisting of several 
hundred grams of Soviet-made explo- 
sives near the residence of a U.S. 
Embassy official. The Jordanian People's 
Revolutionary Party was later deter- 
mined to be responsible. 

August 11: Jordan. Members of the 
Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party 
tried to set off a bomb outside the Jordan- 
ian radio and television station. The 
bomb was discovered and defused. 

August 3: Jordan. A bomb exploded 
under a water truck parked near the 
U.S. Embassy warehouse in Amman. 
There were no casualties and only minor 
damage. The Abu Nidal group claimed 
responsibility. 

May 29: Cyprus. A former Saiqa 
officer who had switched his allegiance 
to Arafat, Abdullah Ahmad Suleiman el 
Saadi, was murdered in Limassol. Four 
Syrian men and two women were 
arrested for the murder and subse- 
quently deported from Cyprus. 

May 3: Cyprus. An unidentified man 
shot and killed Palestinian publisher 
Hanna Muqbil and wounded his 
secretary in Nicosia. Muqbil was 
reportedly a former member of Abu 
Nidal who had defected to Arafat's 
camp. 

March 24: Jordan. A bomb was 
defused outside the British Consulate in 
Amman. The Abu Nidal group claimed 
responsibility. 

March 24: Jordan. A liomb was 
discovered and defused outside the 
British cultural center. The Abu Nidal 
group claimed responsibility. 



March 24: Jordan. A bomb exploded 
in the parking lot of the Intercontinental 
Hotel, which is across the street from 
the U.S. Embassy, damaging two 
vehicles and slightly injuring an AID 
employee and his daughter. A second 
bomb was discovered in the parking lot 
and defused. The Abu Nidal group 
claimed responsibility. 

1983 

December 29: Spain. Two Jordanian 
Embassy employees were attacked by a 
lone gunman as they were leaving the 
embassy. 'Walid Jamal Balkis was killed 
instantly and Ibrahim Sami Mohammed 
was seriously wounded. The Arab 
Revolutionary Brigades claimed 
responsibility. 

December 19: Turkey. A car bomb 
was discovered in an abandoned rental 
car midway between the French Cultural 
House and the Cordon Hotel used by 
American military personnel in Izmir. 
The bomb's timer apparently malfunc- 
tioned. Turkish police linked the Abu 
Nidal group and Syrian agents to the 
incident. 

November 7: Greece. Two security 
guards of the Jordanian Embassy were 
wounded on a crowded street in Athens. 
One of the two victims died from his 
wounds. The Arab Revolutionary 
Brigades claimed responsibility. 

October 26: Italy. The Jordanian 
Ambassador to the Vatican and his 
driver were wounded in an assassination 
attempt in Rome. The Arab Revolution- 
ary Brigades claimed responsibility. 



October 25: India. The Jordaniar 
Ambassador was wounded by an 
unknown assailant in New Delhi. 
Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary 
Brigades. 

October 13: Jordan. Two hand 
grenades were thrown into a police b; 
racks in Amman. A member of the po e 
recruited by Saiqa confessed to the 
attack. Local authorities suspected th 
Abu Nidal elements may also have be^ 
involved. 

August 21: Greece. A high-level 
PLO official, Ma'mum Muraysh, was 
shot and killed by two unidentified m; 
on a motorcycle. The victim's son and s 
driver were wounded. The Movement r 
Rebuilding Fatah claimed responsibili 

April 10: Portugal. The PLO 
observer to an international confereni 
of socialists, Isam al-Sartawi, was shd 
to death in a hotel lobby. Sartawi's 
secretary was slightly wounded in the 
attack. The Abu Nidal group claimed 
responsibility. 

January 1: Israel. A grenade atta 
on a civilian bus in Tel Aviv injured U 
Both Saiqa and Abu Nidal claimed 
responsibility. 



'Countries currently on the list are Syi 
Libya, Iran, South Yemen, and Cuba. 

-The official name of the Abu Nidal 
organization is "Fatah Revolutionary Com 
cil." It is headed by Sabri al-Banna, a Pale: 
ian who uses the nam de guerre Abu Nidal 
The group's original name was the Black 
June Organization when it was formed in 
1976. Ironically, this group first concentra 
on Syrian targets, including an attack on 
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam (now Vi 
President) in 1977. ■ 



76 



Department of State Bulle; 



IITED NATIONS 



Administration and Finances 



■ 'rrnon A. Walters 

Si:iteme)!t in a plenary session of the 
ill neral Assembly on October 15. 

Ambassador Walters is U.S. Per- 
. "/ Representative to the United 



1 'iiited Nations is at a critical junc- 
It is facing a crisis of reform, the 
I auses of which are poHtical and 
aucratic. We have made clear that 
roncern about the United Nations 
resulting criticisms of some of its 
ills retlect our deep-seated attach- 
t to the ideals of the organization. 
_: founders of the United Nations 
osaw a true international community 
n hich governments would join 
:o ther to serve the rights, needs, and 
IS rations of their people. There must 
« doubt that the United States 
•eiins committed to the original goals 
ir ideals of the United Nations. 

During this 41st session of the 
j( jral Assembly, we member states of 
:h Jnited Nations have the unique 
T irtunity to contribute to the 
ilers' dream. President Reagan said 
s September 22nd speech that if we 
lis session of the General Assembly 
a take advantage of this opportunity 
\r achieve the reforms required, the 
III States, "which has always given 
iiited Nations generous support, 
I'l'iitinue to play a leading role in the 
i t to achieve its noble purposes." 

This reform crisis was uppermost in 
h Tiinds of member states last year 
n the General Assembly adopted, 
.V out a vote, the resolution which 
« Wished the Group of 18 to review the 
I'licy of the administrative and 
filial functioning of the United 
.Nitons. The group's report and its 
■p inmenda