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Dppartmpn t

buUetBn

fe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 87 /Number 21 18

AID'S 25th Anniversary/1

The Secretary/23

CSCE Followup Meeting/47

Iran/65

January 1987

Departntpni of State

bulletin

Volume 87 / Number 2118/ January 1987

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its pui-pose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; se-
lected press releases issued by the
White House, the Department, and the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and
treaties and other agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party. Special features, articles, and
other supportive material (such as maps,
charts, photographs, and graphs) are
published frequently to provide addi-
tional information on current issues but
should not necessarily be interj^reted as
official U.S. policy statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

GEORGE B. HIGH

Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

SHARON R. LOTZ

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is necessary
in the transaction of the public business
required by law of this Department. Use of
funds for printing this periodical has been
approved by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget through March 31,
1987.

Department of State Bulletin (ISSI
0041-7610) is published monthly (plus a al
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CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 The AID Challenge

■jie Secretary

General

1 Secretary Praises AID and Com-

ments on Iran

2 Restoring the Foreign Affairs

Budget
2 Promoting Inter-American

Cooperation
; Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control,

and the Future of Deterrence

irms Control

: A World Without Nuclear

Weapons {Kenneth L. Adelman)

C Permitted and Prohibited

Activities Under the ABM
Treaty (Paul H. Nitze)

i Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
Close Round Six (Max M.

|, Kampelman, President Reagan)

hst Asia

' U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets
(W. Allen Wallis)

U.S. Policy Toward the Third
World (Michael H. Armacost)

U.S. Foreign Policy:
Achievements and Challenges
(Michael H. Armacost)

Middle East

65 U.S. Initiative in Iran (Edwin
Meese III. President Reagan.
Secretary Shultz, John C.
Whitehead)

Narcotics

74 President Convenes Conference

on Narcotics

Nuclear Policy

75 International Prospects for Civil

Nuclear Power in the Post-
Chernobyl Era (John D.
Negroponte)

United Nations

80 Situation in Cambodia (Vernon A.

Walters. Text of Resolution)
82 Nicaragua (Herbert S. Okun)
84 Situation in Afghanistan (Herbert

S. Okun)

86 U.S. Reconfirms Support for

IAEA (Richard T. Kennedy)

87 Libyan Occupation of Northern

Chad (Herbert S. Okun)
87 Libya (Larry Pressler)

Western Hemisphere

89 Secretary Visits Earthquake Site
in El Salvador

Treaties

90 Current Actions

Press Releases

92 Department of State
92 USUN

;onomics

U.S. -EC Relations and the Inter-
national Trading System
|, (W. Allen Wallis)

jrope

Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki

(Secretary Shultz)
Vienna CSCE FoUowup Meeting
Secretary's News Conference in

Vienna
Visit of West German Chancellor

Kohl (Helmut Kohl, President

Reagan, Joint Statement)

Pacific

78 U.S. Relationship With Pacific

Islands (President Reagan)

Terrorism

79 U.S. Takes Measures Against

Syria (White House Statement)
79 U.S. Supports Council of Europe

Resolution on Terrorism

(Department Statement)
79 American Hostage Released in

Beirut (President Reagan)

Publications

94 Department of State
94 Current Documents Volume
Released

Index

Why Foreign Aid

A child in Latin America learns to read . . .

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FEATURE

A family in Asia

opens a small business . . .

A farmer in Africa
grows more food . . .

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Education, health, private enter-
prise and agriculture are some of
the areas in which U.S. foreign
economic assistance is helping people
in less developed countries (LDCs) to
help themselves improve the quality
of their lives. Such assistance also
serves U.S. national security interests.

By helping people in LDCs, U.S.
foreign aid enhances regional security,
promotes economic development,
encourages the growth of democratic
institutions and stimulates commer-
cial relations with the Third World.

, infant

Ingof
l( lydration
spared
h;toa
iiple new
qhnology
Hit combines
i^ar, salt
flii water . .

Life expectancy in

developing nations has

increased by 20%, literacy

by 33% and per capita

income by 50%.

For over a quarter of a century, the
United States has been providing
economic assistance to the nations of
the developing world.

During that time, more than 303
million tons of food were provided to
1.8 billion people in more than 100
nations. Emergency relief was
provided to victims of over 770
natural disasters in 129 countries.
Smallpox was eradicated, and a
vaccine for malaria is on the way. A
"Green Revolution" in agriculture
introduced new high-yielding varieties
of grains and enabled many nations
to become self-sufficient in food
production.

Life expectancy in developing
nations has increased by 20%, literacy
by 33% and per capita income by
50%. High rates of population growth
are beginning to level off in parts of
Asia and Latin America, where up to
50% or more of the people in some
countries now use family planning
methods. Primary school enrollment
has tripled, and secondary school
enrollment has increased sixfold.

Programs to assist people in
developing countries are an expression
of the American people's sense of
justice and compassion. They also
play an important role in America's
efforts to find peaceful solutions to
conflicts and to encourage the

development of freedom and oppor- f
tunity throughout the world. j

Interdependence in I

Today's World

Foreign aid plays an important |
role in American foreign policy, ill
is also an indispensable part of a |
growing economic link between the i
United States and the developing '
world. The United States is deeply
involved in the world economy. Toda /
America benefits significantly from I
trade and direct investment with
developing nations. More than 40%
of all U.S. private direct investment
today — or some $50 billion — is in th
Third World.

The U.S. trade relationship with
developing nations underscores the
interdependence of the world econom
For example, almost half of all
American manufactured goods and
over 50% of U. S. food grains and
feed grains go to growing markets i)
the developing world. As these
developing economies become more
viable, they can become more effecti'
markets for U.S. products.

Developing nations supply almos
half of all American imports includii
many strategic minerals vital to
national defense. The United States
imports significant quantities of silvc

\n AID-supported
women's co-op in the
Dominican Republic
assists in the country's
rural development.

FEATURE

cobalt, aluminum, tin, tungsten,
nickel, manganese, platinum, mercury
and bauxite from these nations. For
example, 52% of the cobalt imported
by the United States comes from
Zaire. Cobalt is a critical component
of the alloys necessary for the
construction of jet engines. In
addition, most American imports of
petroleum and natural rubber as well
as everyday products such as coffee,
bananas, tea and cocoa come from
the developing world.

U.S. foreign aid programs not only
benefit recipients abroad, but also
help secure jobs for Americans at
home. For example, 70 cents out of
every dollar that goes for bilateral

foreign assistance is spent on goods
and services from the United States.
American firms supply commodities,
equipment, consulting services and
other expertise to foreign assistance
projects. Foreign aid programs
support more than five million
American manufacturing jobs in all
50 states and create new markets for
U.S. products abroad.

Foreign Aid in Perspective

Foreign assistance as a national
policy originated with the
Marshall Plan in 1947 when U.S.
economic support helped rebuild
Europe following World War II. In

1949, President Harry S Truman
initiated the Point IV program to
provide technical assistance to
Taiwan, South Korea, nations in
Indochina and the less developed
countries in Europe and the Middle
East.

The focus of foreign aid switched
from Europe to the developing world.
In June 1950, the Act for Inter-

Efforts to raise the
productivity and income
of the poor focus on
increasing access to
resources such as land,
water, fertilizer and
renewable sources of
energy.

Foreign aid helps
America — about 70 cents
of every dollar is spent on
U.S. equipment, food,
goods or services.

AID encourages the
development of the private
sector as a vehicle for
generating employment
and higher incomes.

national Development was passed,
and the Technical Cooperation
Administration (TCA) was estab-
lished within the State Department.
When the Korean War broke out in
1950, U.S. economic assistance took
on a new purpose. In 1951. military
and economic assistance were united
with technical assistance programs
under the Mutual Security Agency.
Two years later, programs of technical
cooperation became the responsibility
of the newly established Foreign
Operations Administration, which
later became the International
Cooperation Administration. This
effort was supplemented in 1954 by
the Food for Peace Act, which uses
U.S. agricultural abundance to feed
the hungry in other nations. Shortly
thereafter, the Development Loan
Fund was established, enabling devel-
oping countries to obtain capital
assistance.

The Agency for International
Development (AID), created by the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,

income of the poor by increasing
access to resources such as land,
water, fertilizer, seeds, tools, credit
and renewable sources of energy.
Health, nutrition, voluntary family
planning and education programs also
were expanded.

Today, U.S. economic aid programs
emphasize four basic principles: policy
dialogue and reform; transfer of

appropriate technology; institution
building; and reliance on the private
sector and market forces as engines
of economic growth. |

Policy Dialogue

The ability of economic assistance
programs to achieve their goals
depends to a large degree on the
soundness of development policies ii

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tion Administration and the Develop-
ment Loan Fund. AID today carries
out U.S. economic assistance programs
in the developing world.

The passage of "New Directions"
legislation by Congress in 1973 led to
efforts to raise the productivity and

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AID develops and
introduces technologies
that can be maintained
and operated easily and
are appropriate in local
cultures.

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Department of State Bullel

FEATURE

cipient nations. Inappropriate
: bsidies, price and wage controls,
ide restrictions, overvalued
rchange rates, interest rate ceilings
; d rapid population growth all
:rtail economic performance. For
sample, farmers need to sell their
foducts at market-determined prices
rther than at artificially low prices
: en imposed by governments. These
blow-cost-of-production prices are set
tiprovide less expensive food for
iban dwellers. Because of such
flicies, farmers grow only enough
F ■ their own families plus a little
stra to sell. The result can lead to
tdespread food shortages. In Africa,
:r capita food production has fallen

The ability of economic

assistance programs to

achieve their goals depends

to a large degree on the

soundness of development

policies in recipient nations.

\11) engineers have helj iiai government construct a number

of water systems that provide people with clean, potable water.

f 0 helps strengthen
b emational agricultural
v. earch centers
fa developing
c| jntries by
[j)viding25%
their funding

jary 1987

AID promotes programs
that emphasize immuni-
zation and proper feeding
of hvestock, which are
important for increasing
agricultural productivity.

Developing nations with

strong private sectors have

achieved faster, sounder

and more sustained

economic grourth.

each year for 20 years, in part due to
this type of pricing policy.

When a nation requests economic
assistance from the United States,
help is provided to design economic
policies that allow development to
succeed. With AID assistance and
the growing recognition of the negative
effects of restrictive policies, a number
of reforms recently have taken place
throughout the developing world. For
example, 16 African countries have
increased food prices substantially to
provide incentives for farmers to grow
more and better crops. This will help
prevent famine in the future. In
Somalia alone, a year after prices for
sorghum were raised, production went
up 40%.

and use of high-yielding rice and
wheat varieties. Rice production in
Indonesia has increased from 12
million to 22 million tons in less th;
15 years. India, one of the most
populous nations in the world, is
becoming increasingly self-reliant ii
food.

AID is focusing on research,
development and transfer of tech-

The emphasis of AID's
population assistance is
on enhancing the well-
being of families by
expanding the availabilitv
and use of voluntary
family planning services.

Sixteen African countries
have increased food prices
substantially to provide
incentives for farmers to
grow more and better
crops.

FEATURE

rdogy in the areas of greatest need.
cse include: food production and
iculture; forestry (fuelwood
xiuction and use); biomedical
nearch; and voluntary family
pinning methods,
^s part of this process, AID helps
■ engthen scientific institutions in
j.eloping countries and assists in
bilding their research development
aid technology distribution facilities.

Lititutional Development

'"'he U.S. foreign aid program
. promotes democracy as well as
d/elopment by building and
sengthening institutions that enable
p^ple to help themselves and that
ii rease citizen participation in
d ;ision making. The growth of viable
ii titutions is essential to successful
d /elopment.

J.S. support builds schools and
u iversities and provides access to

self-sustaining sources of credit for
productive investment. Institution
building activities also include training
to upgrade technical and managerial
expertise.

U.S. foreign aid supports small
business and farmer-controlled
cooperatives and other institutions
that provide the means for people to
express their views, choose their
leaders and promote needed reforms.
U.S. assistance and support are
provided in conducting free and
democratic elections. AID has also
launched a $25 million program
aimed at improving the administration
of justice in Latin American
democracies and strengthening local
democratic institutions.

Private Sector Growth

Developing nations with strong
private sectors have achieved
faster, sounder and more sustained

.iHHfiiaii

' 3. foreign aid supports
jiiall business and
Inner-controlled
operatives.

Because of the scarcity
of fuel in developing
countries, people use
alternative sources such
as dried dung.

economic growth. Private manage-
ment of industries, for example,
provides more efficient services at
lower cost to the public than is the
case with state-owned and -operated
enterprises. This has led to many
requests from developing countries
for aid's technical assistance in
drafting privatization strategies.

In recent years, the interest in
reducing the role of government in
national economies has become a
global phenomenon.

AID encourages the development
of the private sector as a vehicle for
generating employment and higher
incomes. In Bangladesh, AID assisted
in transferring the marketing of
fertilizer from the government to the
private sector. As a result, over 45,000
Bangladeshi businessmen now sell
fertilizer to small farmers.

In Jamaica, a 1 984 AID loan
provided for an audit of state
enterprises and for privatization of
30 companies. At the request of the
Costa Rican government, AID made
local currency available to establish a
trust fund to take possession of
government-owned subsidiaries and
offer them for sale to private investors.
A program for divestment of state-
owned enterprises is being developed
jointly by AID and the government of
Honduras.

nuary 1987

Foreign Aid:
How It Works

Development Assistance

Development assistance is
administered by AID in the forn
of loans and grants. Its objective is
to broaden economic opportunity by
improving the quality of life of the
poorest people in developing countries
through programs in agriculture,
rural development, nutrition,
voluntary family planning, health,
education and human resources,
energy, and science and technology.

The programs are concentrated in
countries where U.S. assistance is
needed most, where there is a clear
commitment to broadly based growtl
and where the United States has a
strong interest in long-term
development.

This represents the basic type of
assistance provided by AID in
accordance with the Foreign
Assistance Act.

Economic Support Fund

The Economic Support Fund, pari
of the U.S. Security Assistance
Program, promotes economic and
political stability in regions where
the United States has special security
interests and has determined that
economic assistance can be useful in
helping to secure peace or to avert
major economic or political crises.

FEATURE

rhese resources meet a variety of
leeds, including balance-of-payments
iupport and financing of infrastruc-
ure and other capital projects as well
IS support for development programs.

Food for Peace

Food aid is provided in cooperation
with the Department of Agricul-
ure through the Food for Peace
urogram or P.L. (Public Law) 480.

The United States is the largest
ood donor in the world, providing
nore nourishment to the world's
lungry than all other nations
:ombined.

The Food for Peace program has
lelivered over 303 billion tons of food
vorth almost $37 billion to people on
ilmost every continent. It has brought
lew hope and economic opportunity
o more than 1 .8 billion people in
)ver 100 countries.

Food aid is provided in three
lifferent ways:

Title I, a concessional sales
urogram, provides developing coun-
ries long-term, low-interest loans to
purchase U.S. farm products. In
exchange, these countries agree to
;elf-help requirements that can mean
mproved policies and local currency
unding for development activities,
■lecent legislation emphasizes the use
3f local currency proceeds from Title

I sales to promote private enterprise
development through local institutions.

Title II, a donation program,
provides food aid to the victims of
famines, disasters and emergencies
throughout the world. Title II
programs fall into broad categories of
maternal-child health care, school
feeding and Food for Work. Most

The United States is the
largest food donor in the
world , providing more
nourishment to the world's
hungry than all other
nations combined.

infrastructure development such as the
construction of access roads.

Title II supplementary feeding is
administered through U.S. private
voluntary agencies and their counter-
parts overseas. However, U.S. food is
also provided through direct bilateral
programs with other governments
through the U.N. World Food
Program.

Food for Peace helped save millions
of lives during the recent African
famine. In 1985 alone, the United
States provided over three million
tons of American food, valued at $1 .1
billion, in response to the African
emergency. This represented half of
all food delivered to that continent.

Title III, Food for Development, is
another sales program similar to Title
I. However, Title III goes one step
further by waiving all repayment
requirements in exchange for more
specific self-help development initia-
tives. Another newly established
program. Food for Progress, empha-
sizes the use of U.S. food resources to
support countries that have com-
mitted themselves to agricultural
policy reform.

Disaster Assistance

Natural and man-made disasters
are a constant threat to people
throughout the world. They take their
highest toll among the poor, who are
the most vulnerable.

AID'S Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
coordinates U.S. government and
private relief work whenever help is
needed. Programs are conducted,
often in conjunction with those of
other nations, to alleviate the effects
of disaster quickly and to reduce
human suffering.

Over the years, this assistance has
taken many forms. Donations under
the Food for Peace program, search
and rescue missions, medical supplies
and personnel, shelter and equipment
and money to buy relief goods all
have been provided.

AID responds to an average of 38
emergency disasters a year. During
the past 22 years, the United States
provided emergency relief to victims
of 865 natural and man-made foreign
disasters in 129 countries in which
2.7 million have died and 818 million
have been affected.

aid's international disaster assis-
tance program not only alleviates
suffering resulting from disasters, but
also strengthens the ability of
countries to cope with disasters by
helping them improve their own
disaster response networks.

AID develops early warning
systems and provides technical
assistance to strengthen relief
institutions in disaster-prone

Natural and man-made
disasters are a constant
threat throughout the
world and take their
highest toll among the
poor.

countries. A 24-hour response
capability is maintained to rush life-
support supplies and services to
disaster victims anywhere in the
world.

What Does Aid Cost?

The 1987 foreign aid program
totals less than 1% of the overalll
federal budget or about $6 b'Uion.

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FEATURE

hese funds support over 1 .500
svelopment assistance programs in
3 countries and include the Food
ir Peace program, the U.S. contri-
ation to multinational development
inks and Economic Support Funds
1 countries such as Egypt and Israel.

The amount of money spent on
ireign assistance by the United States

r year is considerably less than

what the American people spend for
alcoholic beverages, cosmetics or toilet
articles. In 1984 Americans spent
over $10 billion on haircuts, $31 bil-
lion on cigarettes, $25 billion on
household cleaning supplies and
$53 billion on alcohol. The same year,
the U.S. government spent only
$8.7 billion on foreign aid.

Sharing the Task

Thirty-five years ago, the United
States was the only nation offer-
ing economic assistance as a national
policy. The U.S. share of worldwide
assistance is shrinking. Today,
virtually all developed nations — and
some that are still developing —
maintain aid programs.

In 1983, while still providing the
largest absolute amount of aid, the
United States' relative share fell to
less than 30%. By 1984, among the
17 leading non-communist countries
providing aid, the United States stood
last in the amount of aid provided in
relation to the gross national product.
The Nordic countries, Switzerland,
Belgium, Austria, Australia, New
Zealand, Denmark and the Nether-
lands are among the nations that
outrank the United States. Net
disbursements for U.S. economic aid
in 1984 represented less than .3% of
the gross national product.

In 1985 alone, the U.S.

provided over 3 million tons

of American food, valued at

$1.1 billion, in response to

the African emergency. This

represented half of all food

delivered to that continent.

The Feb. 4, 1976, earthquake in Guatemala
left about 23,000 persons dead, 75,000
injured and one million homeless. AID
provided more than 500 family tents, 500
pints of blood plasma, 5,000 doses of
antibiotics, 100 portable water storage
tanks (3,000-gaUon size), generators,
pumps and water purification equipment.

The
AID Challenge

The environment of poverty is a
barrier to economic growth and to
long-term global peace and security.
The lack of skills, education, health
services, access to safe water and
adequate food all contribute to
poverty. Growing population pressure,
adverse climatic conditions, a deterio-
rating natural resource base and
inappropriate government policies
further exacerbate the problem.

Malnutrition and disease take the
lives of more than 1 4 million children
under the age of five every year in the
developing world. This is almost the
entire preschool population of the
United States. Every day 40,000
children under the age of five die
from largely preventable causes.

A substantial portion of the
population in the developing world
does not have access to enough food

AID works to provide
appropriate technology to
help farmers improve
production.

to meet nutritional needs, and three
out of five people do not have easy
access to safe water. Life expectancy
in less developed countries is about
58 years on the average compared to
75 in the United States. Average
annual income is $700 compared to
$1 1,070 in the developed nations,
and unemployment rates are very
high — up to 50% — particularly in
densely populated urban areas. Over
half of the people throughout the
developing world do not have even
basic reading skills.

The challenge faced by donor
agencies such as AID and the

governments of developing nations
to break through the barrier of pover
and provide incentives for economic
progress that will lead to self-reliant
and sustained growth.

Agriculture and Nutrition

Insufficient food supplies and inac
quate diets are principal concernf
in most developing nations. Over 80
million people or about one-seventh
of the world's population are mal-
nourished. Half of the world's hung
are children.

While enough food is being
produced to feed the world's five
billion people, in undernourished
areas of the developing world,
problems are experienced because
people do not have enough money t(
purchase food or build roads. They
may not have adequate ways of
delivering or storing food. Low
agricultural productivity in many
areas of the world also results from
shortage of appropriate technology
generate production.

Most countries in Africa, for
example, are unable to produce or

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The United States plays a
leading role in alleviating
human suffering in Africa
by providing food and
other emergency supplies.

FEATURE

istribute the food that they need,
ood production in these nations has
?cHned in the last decade,
in the future, land available for
rming will be limited. Most good
.able land, especially in Asia, already
being cultivated. Land available for
.!,ricultural purposes is expected to
crease by only a small amount by
le turn of the century. Efforts to
crease food production are hampered
irther by the depletion of the world's
rests for fuel and other products,
eforestation causes watershed
■struction that, in turn, threatens
;ricultural land with erosion or
joding.

To meet the growing demand for
food generated by population growth,
food production must increase 3-4%
annually. To do this, production of
major food crops in the developing
countries must be increased signifi-
cantly, the food purchasing power of
the poor must improve, and policies
that act as a constraint to development
must be changed.

AID is meeting the challenge of
increasing food production by helping
to improve existing agricultural
technology and self-sustaining agri-
cultural institutions in developing
nations. Conducting research and
developing and disseminating ap-
propriate technologies are the essence
of aid's program in agriculture.

Research is a key factor in
improving agricultural production.
AID-supported research has helped
bring about a "Green Revolution" in
agriculture in Asia. Work now is
under way to help bring food self-
sufficiency to the African continent.

Support is provided to a network
of international agricultural research
centers conducting studies on
improving the productivity and quality
of food crops such as sorghum, millet,
beans, cowpeas, cassava, peanuts
and potatoes. The International
Center for Tropical Agriculture in
Colombia has developed bean vari-

eties that have resulted in increased
yields and higher farm incomes with-
out pesticide use. Research conducted
on high-yielding rice varieties
primarily at the International Rice
Research Institute in the Philippines
has resulted in a 40% increase over
yields of traditional varieties. For
wheat, the average increase has been
close to 100%.

AID support to the Asian Vegetable
Research and Development Center
has developed heat- and bacterial-
resistant tomatoes that will make
tomato production feasible in hot and
humid climates for the first time.
Other research at the center has
helped design household gardens that
provide food with adequate vitamin
A for families.

AID collaborates on research
programs with U.S. land and sea
grant colleges and universities in fields
such as aquaculture, ocean fisheries,
soil management, nutrition and food
crop production, and post-harvest
technology and works closely with
private voluntary organizations,
private sector firms, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and other
U.S. government agencies such as the
Peace Corps.

Collaborative agricultural research
also has benefited U.S. agriculture.
The United States has benefited from

In Honduras, where coffee
is vital to the economy,
farmers apply new tech-
nologies resulting in
increased production.

AID-funded research has

led to the production of

new varieties of sorghum that

are increasing yields

up to 150%.

the use of genetic materials from
developing countries to improve
virtually every major U.S. crop by
providing resistance to disease and
insects, dwarf stature, higher
yields as well as one-day length-
sensitivity.

AID also draws on technical
expertise from developing countries
as well as the food and agricultural
development experience of the U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), the World Food Council
(WFC). the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD),
the U.N. World Food Program (WFP)
and other donor agencies.

The U.S. foreign assistance program
provides both short- and long-term
training for scientists, economists and
other specialists needed for sustained
agricultural and rural development.
For example. AID assisted in building
a college of agriculture in Morocco
that now is graduating about 600
persons a year. U.S. -based training is
provided for some 50 Zambians as
part of a project in agricultural
training, planning and institutional
development. A university based on a
U.S. land grant model is being created
in Cameroon and is expected to pro-
vide 300 agricultural graduates a year.

AID also helps developing nations
increase agricultural production

through irrigation, swamp drainage,
access road building, produce market-
ing, building of storage facilities and
rural electrification systems. In
Guatemala, AID assisted in the
construction of about 206 kilometers
of farm-to-market access roads that
provided employment for 12,000
laborers and allowed 20% more
produce to arrive at markets in good
condition. In Sri Lanka, an AID
project helped organize water users
associations in the dry Gal Oya
region in the southeastern part of the
country and rehabilitated over 600
kilometers of irrigation canals. In
Costa Rica, a joint U.S. -Costa Rican
agricultural consultative committee
was set up with AID's help. During
the first six months of operation, it
was instrumental in launching a
number of major joint ventures in
production and export of herbs,
spices, vegetables and dehydrated
banana and pineapple chips.

U.S. foreign assistance helps create
more jobs in rural areas and provides
farmers better access to credit,
markets and technology. In Honduras,
for example, where the coffee crop is
vital to the economy, coffee rust, a
fungal disease, led to a decrease in
production. With AID assistance,
new technologies were introduced,
and credit was extended to some

Agricultural research,
such as that under way at
CIMMYT, benefits crop
producers in both the
United States and in
developing countries.

FEATURE

!,000 small farmers. As a result, in
wo years, coffee production of these
armers increased fivefold.

AID is attempting to direct such
Titical productive resources as credit,
echnology and training to females
vho perform much of the developing
vorld's agricultural labor.

^uman Resource
Development

health

For millions of people in the
developing world, good health is
m elusive goal. Many deaths today
Kcur from malnutrition and illnesses
;uch as diarrhea, respiratory infec-
ions, measles, tetanus and polio.
These deaths can be easily prevented
)r treated if services are available.

How^ever, efforts to improve health
'ire hampered by a lack of trained
personnel at the community level,
scarcity of rural health clinics, limited
esources and lack of technical
■xpertise.

AID helps developing countries
expand basic health care by
emphasizing immunization, oral
rehydration therapy and con-
rol of major communicable
aarasitic diseases.

Over 50% of AID's health budget is
directed at health service delivery.

AID recently doubled its budget for
biomedical research, committing
roughly 13% of the total health budget
(about $31.5 million) to this research.
Research will improve the ability to
diagnose, treat and even prevent
diseases and will reduce the cost of
health service delivery in the
developing world.

Today, research is carried out on
tropical diseases such as malaria and
onchocerciasis (river blindness).

Onchocerciasis, when uncontrolled,
can disable humans in the prime of
life. AID is the major donor in the

worldwide effort to control this
disease. In the Volta River Basin in
Africa, for example, some 27,000
cases of blindness have been pre-
vented, valuable land has been
returned to production, and the
majority of children born in the
region have been protected from
infection.

During the past 30 years, the
United States has spent more than
$ 1 billion to control the spread of
malaria, a disease which may kill up
to five million people a year. It is
estimated that one million children
die annually from malaria in Africa
alone.

More than 50% of AID's
health budget is directed
at health service delivery.

Two prototype vaccines
against malaria have been
developed as a result of
research funded by AID.

Females provide much of
the developing world's
agricultural labor.

Malaria had been eliminated in 39
countries until it resurfaced recently
in some areas of the world due to
widespread and growing resistance
to insecticides and to traditional anti-
malarial drugs.

As a result of research funded by
AID, two prototype vaccines have
been developed against malaria. One
is for the most deadly form of the
disease and the other for the most
common form. If human testing is
successful, the vaccine could be
available for use by 1990 and should
have a significant impact in
controlling the disease.

AID is committed to a "child
survival" program to focus on a
limited number of manageable and
proven technologies thafpromise
sustained and direct health benefits
for infants and children. These are
oral rehydration therapy, immuniza-
tion, birth spacing and improved
nutrition practices including the

ORT— a simple solution
of water, sugar and salt
that can be administered
in the home — is preventing
millions of deaths from
diarrheal dehydration
each year.

Moroccan children benefit
from an AID-supported
program that provides
vitamin-enriched dietary
supplements.

promotion of breast feeding,
appropriate weaning and growth
monitoring.

Promoting the use of oral
rehydration therapy is an important
part of aid's child survival effort.
Between five and six million children
in developing nations die every year
from dehydration resulting from
diarrhea. Diarrhea is brought on by
cholera, measles and the many viruses
and bacteria that thrive in unsanitary
environments. Children in developing
countries, often already malnourished,
may survive the disease but not the
dehydration resulting from severe
diarrhea.

The only treatment was to
rehydrate those children with fluids
given intravenously. But that
required hospitals, trained medical
personnel and clean needles — all in
short supply in the developing world.

Over the course of 20 years, AID
has helped support the research that
has demonstrated that oral rehydration
therapy (ORT) is a safe and effective
treatment for diarrhea from all causes
and for children and adults of all
ages. Because it can be given by
spoon, mothers and fathers can
administer it to their children at home.

AID now is working to make ORT
available worldwide with activities in
42 countries. The U. N. International

Children's Emergency Fund
(UNICEF) and the World Health
Organization (WHO) are major
partners in this global effort.

It is proving successful. For
example, the AID-supported National
Control of Diarrheal Diseases project
in Egypt began in 1983. By the end
of 1985, close to 90% of all health
facilities around the country were
providing on-site rehydration services.
According to approximations based
on sample surveys, diarrhea-caused
deaths in under-two-year-olds had
been cut by two-thirds since 1980
and infant deaths (0-1 year) by more
than half.

In the developing world, children
are afflicted by a full range of
illnesses once common in indus-
trialized nations but now largely
controlled. Measles, for example, is a
far greater killer in developing
countries than sleeping sickness.
Whooping cough is a greater hazard
than river blindness. Vaccines to
combat diseases such as measles,
whooping cough, tetanus and polio
have long been available but are only
recently reaching the developing
world.

Because immunization is an
important and cost-effective interven-
tion, AID supports immunization
programs in more than 50 countries.

FEATURE

AID also is supporting the research
md development of:

— a measles vaccine that can be
given to infants as young as six
months;

— heat-stable vaccines such as for
polio to reduce dependence on cold
chains;

— a single-dose vaccine for
whooping cough that does not have

Tithe negative side effects that often
discourage mothers from completing
the DPT series;

— a genetically-engineered oral
vaccine, as well as a new injectable,
for typhoid, a disease that has
become resistant to antibiotics in
several parts of the developing world;

— an oral vaccine for cholera, the
most severe of the diarrheal diseases,
affecting some 20-24 million adults
and children;

— a vaccine for rotavirus, the most
:ommon cause of diarrhea in the
United States as well as in the Third
World; and,

— a leprosy vaccine that can be
used not only as a preventative but

i also to reduce the severity of the
disease in those who are already
infected.

AID-supported research is under
way on technological improvements
that could make vaccines easier to
deliver in the developing world.

AID also is conducting promising
research to further reduce childhood
mortality. Vitamin A deficiency is a
public health problem in an estimated
73 countries and territories around
the world, affecting some five million
children under the age of five in Asia
alone. About 250,000 children in Asia
are blinded every year as a result of
this deficiency in their diet. Since
1974, AID has helped developing
countries recognize, treat and prevent
vitamin A deficiency. AID-supported
research in Indonesia has shown that
vitamin A may also play a key role in
preventing deaths from diarrhea and
acute respiratory infection. AID is
expanding its research into the links
between vitamin A and childhood
mortality and disease.

In addition, AID provides technical
support for planning and managing
improved water and sanitation
systems. In Malawi, for example, the
AID-assisted Self-Help Rural Water
Supply project has resulted in the
installation of nearly 2,000 miles of
pipe and 3,000 public taps since 1968.
AID also provides training in hygiene
and basic health care.

Education

Meeting the challenge of economic
development requires the
leadership and technical know-how

AID also is conducting

promising research to

further reduce childhood

mortality.

The Agency's immuniza-
tion program in Africa has
assisted in protecting 8.3
million children from the
ravages of childhood
diseases.

The Agency's heahh pro-
gram focuses on infants
and young children — a
group highly vulnerable
to disease.

Some 600 million adults in

developing nations cannot

read or do basic calculations.

that comes from sound education
and training. Yet, the countries facing
the most acute challenge are often
those most severely hampered by lack
of trained professionals and skilled
personnel.

Some 600 million adults in
developing nations cannot read or do
basic calculations. Only three-fifths
of school-age children enter primary
school, and only half will stay in
school long enough to acquire even
the most rudimentary skills.

In the developing world, the ratio
of physicians, teachers and other
trained persons to a growing
population is strikingly low. In
Bangladesh, a country with an
estimated 100 million people, there is
one physician for every 10,000

persons. In Niger, there are only 128
physicians to serve over five million
citizens. In Liberia, estimates show
one high school teacher for every
121,000 teens.

The U.S. foreign aid program
emphasizes primary education for
children, non-formal education in life
skills for adults and advanced training
for development program managers,
scientists and professional personnel.
In addition, the program emphasizes
that formal and non-formal education
and participant training be directed
to both males and females since each
contributes significantly to the overall
economic development process.

Support is provided for private
voluntary organizations to conduct
educational programs in basic literacy.

^~j*

Opening the book of
knowledge releases
huniEin potential.

lealth care, occupational health and
afety and other subjects.
Modern technology also is applied

0 educate persons in remote regions,
ladio and satellite communications
re used to reach people in rural
reas. In Kenya, Thailand and the
)ominican Republic, AID has helped
levelop instructional radio programs
hat have taught children basic skills,
'hese have been useful particularly
i-here qualified teachers are in short
upply.

In Costa Rica, students are using
;xtbooks written and printed in their
wn country through funds provided

1 local currency generated by the
iID program.

In addition, "scholarship diplomacy"
-training and educating Third
V'orld citizens in the United States —
; an important part of the foreign
ssistance program. Nearly 250,000
ersons from the developing world
ave received training — most of them
1 the United States — under the
jreign assistance program. AID is
?sponsible for managing most U.S.
overnment-sponsored scholarships
)r students and trainees from the
hird World.

In 1985, AID initiated a five-year,
146 million program to provide
aining in the United States for
ndergraduate and high school-level

students from Central America. The
Central American Peace Scholarship
Program (CAPS) will reach socially
and economically disadvantaged
students and also will enable primary
and secondary school teachers and
administrators to observe programs
in the United States related to their
fields. CAPS will fund over 7,000
scholarships. In addition, the U.S.
Information Agency will sponsor
training for 3,000 Central Americans.
Along with providing scholarships,
AID offers assistance to countries
that want to invest their own
resources in training but need help
with programming and supervising
their citizens being trained in the
United States. This assistance and
related services are provided under
aid's Reimbursable Training
Program.

Environment and
Natural Resources

Receding tropical forest cover, soil
erosion, exhaustion of croplands,
depletion of fisheries, advancing
desert frontiers, water pollution,
indiscriminate pesticide use and inad-
equate industrial and urban pollution
control, and inadequate or underused
energy sources often are serious
problems in developing countries.

FEATURE

AID assists in identifying and
solving these problems in a number
of ways. Technical environmental
analysis is integrated into AID's
development projects. Foreign
governments are encouraged to adopt
sound environmental policies. Support
is provided for scientific and
developmental institutions in
developing countries engaged in
environmental research and problem
solving.

Integrating environmental analysis
into development projects in Rwanda,
Somalia and the Gambia will ensure
against future erosion and degradation
in development of river basins.

In Panama, AID is providing a loan
that will increase the government's
capability to manage the watersheds
that must be adequately protected to
keep the Panama Canal operational.

AID has helped develop a network
of environmental centers in Indonesia
used for training and research by the

ID helps developing
luntries use natural
sources wisely.

m^M

I'lf- ■

So^-^t

Ministry of Environment and
Development.

AID also worics to protect
environmentally sound development
projects funded by other donors. AID
and the World Bank are partners in
educating people about safe pesticide
use.

Effective forest land management
is crucial to economic development.
The U.S. foreign assistance program
helps more than 70 forestry projects
in 37 countries to improve management
and support related soil, water, forest
and range vegetation conservation
efforts.

Haiti is an example. Working
closely with private voluntary organi-
zations, AID is supporting an effort
to plant and maintain six million to
nine million trees over four years in
addition to obtaining data on
forestation in the country and
promoting soil conservation.

Energy

The Agency's energy program
helps developing countries assess
their energy needs and resources plus
develop affordable energy systems
required for agricultural, health,
educational and other development.
In Haiti, AID is introducing a
smokeless, briquetted fuel made from
coal to replace fuelwood and kerosene

in homes and businesses. In Jamaica,
AID funded a promising study of the
potential for large-scale electricity
generation from sugarcane. Successful
application could revitalize Jamaica's
major agricultural resource and lead
to savings in foreign exchange funds
through reduced oil imports.

Population

Population growth rates in most
developing countries today remain
high mainly because of dramatic
improvements in public health and
medical services over the past three
decades, traditions favoring large
families, and lack of knowledge and
availability of effective family planning
methods. Though the world's popu-
lation growth rate has begun to fall,
the present rate of growth will still
mean a 33% increase in the world's
population by the year 2000. More
than 90% of these additional people
will be born in the developing world.

Rapid population growth can
compound serious development
problems and increase the cost of
national and international efforts to
reduce disease, poverty, malnutrition
and environmental degradation. In
Africa, for instance, population is
growing about 3% yearly while annual
food production is increasing
only 2%.

For the individual family, populatio
growth means large family size, whic
may seriously affect the health of
mothers and children. Complication
of pregnancy are a major cause of
death for women in the developing
world. The risk of complications
increases for women who are very
young or at the end of their
reproductive period and with the
number of pregnancies. When
children are born too close together,
they have a significantly greater risk
of dying than when births are well-
spaced.

The emphasis of AID's populatior
assistance is on enhancing the well-
being of families by expanding the
availability and use of voluntary
family planning services. AID support
voluntary family planning programs
that provide a wide range of choices
in family planning methods, includin
natural family planning.

AID helps developing country
programs by training physicians anc
other staff, providing commodities
and medical equipment, expanding
the number of channels through
which family planning information i
distributed and providing technical
assistance to design and improve
family planning programs.

Voluntary family planning pro-
grams in many countries have

FEATURE

)roduced positive results with AID
support. In Thailand, for example,
'oluntary family planning programs
ontributed to a decline in the
)opuIation growth rate from over 3%
n 1 970 to 1 .7% today. In Jamaica,
luch voluntary programs helped
educe the birth rate by 23% over the
)ast decade. Population growth rates
ilso have declined in Indonesia,
ylexico, Colombia and other countries
vith the help of strong AID-assisted
oluntary family planning programs.

iousing

\dequate shelter is a critical need
in the developing world. By the
jrn of the century, the world's
opulation will be predominantly
rban. Three-fourths of these urban

dwellers will live in developing
countries. Providing minimum,
decent shelter is a major problem
resulting from rapid urbanization.
Shelter ranks next only to food and
medical care as a basic need of the
poor.

All but a small fraction of the
housing in developing countries is
built by the private sector. Most
people build their own housing over
time. The primary role of government
in housing is to provide those goods
and services that people are unable to
provide for themselves, to remove
constraints on private sector housing
construction and to encourage self-
help efforts.

AID assists governments in
developing nations to respond to the
housing needs of their citizens. U.S.
foreign aid projects emphasize self-
help techniques and private sector
construction of housing units. A
number of approaches to providing
low-cost housing are promoted,
including slum upgrading, basic or
core housing and preparation of lots
with utilities for later improvement
by purchasers.

In Africa, population is

growing about 3% yearly

while food production is

increasing only 2% .

By the turn of the century,

the world's population

will be predominantly urban.

Meeting
The Challenge

The Agency is facing the
challenge of the 1980s by sharin -.
American scientific, technical and '
entrepreneurial skills to meet critica |
needs in the developing world. By ,
encouraging policy dialogue, mobilij |
ing the private sector, building I

durable institutions and transferring '
appropriate technology, AID helps |
build a better life for everyone both ; |
home and abroad.

This feature is reprinted from a
pamphlet entitled "The AID Challenge,
produced by the Bureau for External
Affairs, U.S. Agency for Intem.ational
Development, in November 1986.

HE SECRETARY

>ecretary Praises AID
md Comments on Iran

iiitary Shultz's remarks at a
ri niony commemorating the 25th
mirersary of the Agency for Intema-
iniil Derelopment (AID) on Novem-
r ^5. 1986.^

e're here to celebrate the 25th
miversary of the Agency for Interna-
mal Development. It's a very impor-
nt part of our foreign policy. So let me
art there.

President Reagan has put in place a
reign policy that's comprehensive, that
operating very strongly in the interest
the United States and of the great
aditions of the United States. I am
oud and feel quite privileged to be
sociated with him in this endeavor,
id I support President Reagan fully,
ross-the-board.

Insofar as our efforts in the Middle
ist, and particularly with respect to
e Iran-Iraq war and associated mat-
rs. the President has set out our objec-
es there trying to be as helpful as we
n in bringing an end to that war— it's
e bloodiest battle going on on the
obe today— in trying to see what we
n do to establish a more constructive
lationship with Iran, if that's at all
issible, in combatting the scourge of
rrorism— all of these objectives are
ry much a part of our foreign policy,
le President has set out our objectives,
id 1 fully subscribe to them and support
em and intend to be very much a part
the effort to bring them to fruition.

We've had a lot of discussion about
iw best to evaluate where we are right
iw and where we go from here. We will
■ working as part of the Administra-
ins's effort on this. Under Secretary of
ate [for Political Affairs] Mike Arma-
■st will be the lead person, insofar as
e State Department is concerned, in
ving us leadership in this effort. So it
ill s^-o forward following the objectives
at the President has laid out and go
rward with strength and enthusiasm.

Insofar as the problems that have
ime to light through the efforts of the
ttorney General, I think it is quite clear
lat the Attorney General and the Presi-

dent mean business. Insofar as I per-
sonally am concerned, of course, I sup-
port that effort. I have met with the
Attorney General and his associate,
Mr. Cooper, and provided all of the in-
formation that we have here in the
Department that I may have about all of
the things involved. So they have that
complete record. And, as we may turn
up other things, of course, we'll imme-
diately make them available. So that
goes on.

But in the meantime, our foreign
policy with all of its forward thrust goes
on, including our efforts with respect to
Iran, with respect to the Iran-Iraq war,
with respect to all of these matters, as
we will be seeking in every way possible
to pursue the President's objectives and
bring them about.

Turning to the subject of AID itself,
this is a very important element in the
total picture. And it represents an idea
that's been around a long while— even
longer than the 25 years and which has
had a refreshing rebirth under the
leadership of President Reagan.

As I think about it, this idea that
AID represents now goes back at least
to lend-lease during World War II. And
we see its seeds in the Marshall Plan and
derivatives of the Marshall Plan. We see
it as part of the structure that was put in
place by the great statesmen after
World War II, from which emerged the
International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank and the other banks, and our
bilateral assistance program. And it has
done a lot of good. It's had its problems
off and on but basically has been an
extremely powerful force for good in the
world.

It has been part of something that
opens the world up, that stands for the
fact that we know that what to the
United States is going to be in some con-
siderable part a reflection of what hap-
pens elsewhere. It is a way of saying we
understand the stake we have in seeing
people in countries that are worse off
than we get a break and get a chance to
move ahead.

And as President Reagan has
worked with this program and sponsored
increases in it, working with [AID
Administrator] Peter McPherson, who is
an outstanding colleague, the ideas of
economic development through the
market, through enterprise, have taken
on much more meaning. And by now, we
see that the ideas that the President
expressed early in his term at Cancun
and at other places, in which we're often
greeted as way off the mark, are now
almost the conventional wisdom. And I
personally saw at the UN special session
on Africa the emergence of these ideas
insofar as many African nations were
concerned, and you see them all around
the world.

So I think this is a birthday that we
can truly celebrate as representing an
important idea that distinguishes the
post-World War II period from the
earlier periods. And it represents
understanding, it represents the forward
motion and open outlook of the United
States; it's an integral part of the Presi-
dent's foreign policy, and I'm very
pleased and proud to be a part of that
policy and his team and very pleased to
have an opportunity to take part in this
ceremony that marks what you've been
doing, Peter.

Just a word about Peter. He's been a
great colleague for me. He's tireless. I
don't know how he does all the things he
does and how he knows all the things he
knows. But at any rate, he's always
there and is one of those people who,
when he comes to you, even if he's got a
problem he also brings a solution. The
people you like to see are the ones who
bring answers as well as problems. It's
the people who only bring you the prob-
lems that drive you crazy. But Peter's
got answers and solutions and ideas, and
he's always constructive. And so it's a
great pleasure for me to work with you
personally, Peter.

•Press release 2.53 of Nov. 26, 1986.

Einuary 1987

THE SECRETARY

Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget

Secretary Shultz 's address before the
Locust Club in Philadelphia on Novem-
ber 3, 1986.''

I thank you for honoring me with your
performance award. I take it as an
important opportunity to say a few
words about some "performing" we all
have to do if the United States is to have
an effective foreign policy.

I've been giving a lot of speeches
lately. Most of them have been about
U.S. -Soviet relations and the meaning of
Reykjavik, our human rights concerns,
and arms control. I don't want to
downplay these subjects. They're fun-
damental components of our foreign
policy. But the Soviets and arms control
aren't the only issues needing attention
right now. Tonight, I'd like to take a
breather from them and raise some
other issues much closer to home that
are just as urgent and just as important
to our security.

My message tonight is simple: right
now, the United States has a tremen-
dous number of things going for it
around the world— we have a winning
hand; we've got to be allowed to play
it— yet, we're on the verge of throwing
away recent and potential gains instead
of building on them for the future.

That's a double-edged message, I
know. But then, American foreign policy
■ is not a monolithic enterprise. It has
always rested on two pillars, two
mutually supporting traditions of
political thought— and on two branches
of government, the executive and the
Congress, that formulate and conduct
our foreign relations. It started right
here in Philadelpia, where our Founding
Fathers set down the documents that
ever since have shaped our ways of
thinking and our institutions of
government.

And I might say that I had the
privilege and the fun of coming here to
Philadelphia a little early and renewing
my acquaintance, my wife and I, with
Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell,
and we wandered around and listened
and breathed that air and saw where
George Washington sat and Thomas
Jefferson sat, and so on. It's just a
great, thrilling tradition to be here and
to have a chance to visit those places
and, I might say, to speak here to the
Locust Club against the background of
the American flag.

Now, one of those documents— the
Declaration of Independence— left us

with a tradition of idealism. It set forth a
revolutionary statement of human
rights. It said that those rights were the
sacred trust of all mankind; a legacy for
all places and times.

Another document— the Constitu-
tion—gave us a complementary tradition
of pragmatism. It spoke of the limits of
human action and political power. It
gave us practical ways of resolving com-
petitive interests for the common good.
The legacy of the Constitution was
realism.

In our best moments, we've
understood how these complementary
traditions interact. We've tried to keep
our immediate attention focused on the
possible and our broad vision elevated
toward the ideal. The statesmen of the
postwar era— I guess I'm showing my
age— the post-World War II era— were
masters of that art. They understood
that realism and idealism weren't com-
peting forces but mutually supporting
components of an effective foreign
policy. And they used that insight to
create the great institutions of the
postwar order. They sustained our
involvement in a political system of
global scope; and they helped to build a
global economic system. They said we
shouldn't retreat from realities but turn
them to our advantage— and to the
attainment of our ideals. Their creation
was both an intellectual effort and an act
of learning and vision applied. And it has
worked.

But we Americans have had our
lesser moments as well. Sometimes,
when our vision got blurred or lost its
focus on reality, we've wavered between
crusading involvement in the world and
an isolationist indifference to it. Take
the 1930s. Wliat did we learn from the
Smoot-Hawley tariff? What did we learn
about the dangers of countries in various
parts of the world raising barriers to
trade and closing in on themselves?
What did we learn by ignoring agression
in supposedly faraway places— like
Europe and Asia?

What we learned was that
withdrawal was a recipe for global
economic depression and world war. At
least, that's what we should have
learned. But you have to wonder how
well we learned it when you see similar
pressures mounting today for contem-
porary forms of isolationism. We need to
watch ourselves when we start divorcing
ourselves from that creative tradition of

idealism salted with ample doses of real
ity. And I'm distressed to say that toda.
seems to be one of those times.

The Mismatch of Ends and Means

The warning signs of isolationism are
increasingly evident. We see them in
calls for economic protectionism— which
would only bring on retaliation by our
trading partners and damage us stra-
tegically, politically, and economically.
We see them in the attempts to sub-
stitute moralism for policy toward
friendly nations who fall short of our
own hard-won and hard-gained stand-
ards. We see them in pressures for mail '
taining the nuclear status quo rather
than exploring, as the President wants
to do, negotiated approaches to reducin
nuclear arms. And we see them in
resistance to investigating new
technologies which might give us some ■
protection against nuclear weapons— lik
the President's Strategic Defense
Initiative.

It's the 1930s all over again. The
desire to wash our hands of a
troublesome world seems to be a
recurrent— and peculiarly American-
temptation.

That temptation appears most
starkly in the unrelenting assault on oui
foreign affairs budget, which is now
under the indiscriminate knife of con-
gressional surgeons. Last January,
President Reagan submitted to Congret
an international affairs budget for fisca
year (FY) 1987 that we had stripped to
the bone. It amounted to less than 2% o
the total Fedei-al budget. That minimal
request was cut by the Congress by 20*^
a reduction with far more threatening
effects than even that substantial percen
age implies. After congressional ear-
markings and other constraints on our
spending are taken into account, the
bulk of our foreign affairs operations
will have to be cut by a third and secu-
rity assistance by about 50%. That's a
big cut.

Let me be clear about the dangers o
this misguided economizing. We are not
talking about just another bureaucratic
battle for funds. The deep cuts in our
foreign affairs resources are now
dangerously widening the gap between
our interests and our capabilities for pur
suing them. In effect, we are being
asked to play Russian roulette with our
international interests and our national
security.

Here are just a few examples of the
dangerous disparity between our
increasingly meager resources and our
widely supported foreign policy
objectives.

Department of State Bulletir

THE SECRETARY

Number one, in the past few months,
ire've seen extraordinary concern about
he dangers of illegal drugs. That con-
em is legitimate and long overdue. I
night say that the President and Nancy
leagan have been giving magnificent
sadership to this war on the illicit drug
raffic, and our hearts and our hands
ave to go out and help them. Illegal
larcotics ravage the bodies of their vic-
ims and the spirit of society at large.
'hey encourage the kind of lawlessness
hat reduces civilization to a Hobbesian
tate of nature, making life all too
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
hort" for victims of the traffic.

Nor is our own society alone in suf-
ering the effects of the drug trade.
Elsewhere, it's even worse. Traffickers
"Ihrive on chaos, and their parasitical
fforts to intimidate so-called host
overnments destroy political integrity.
II Latin America and other crop-
roducing regions, drug traders collude
ith terrorists and radical guerrillas
gainst their common enemies: the rule
f law and the stability of civilized
jciety.

For all of these reasons, we are
■itnessing widespread anxiety around
le country and around the world about
le effects of illegal drugs. There is
road public support for using every
vailable resource against the drug trade
t home and abroad. In fact, I can't
link of any single issue that has
lustered more support among our
itizens and public officials than the war
n drugs.

But this concern is falling victim to
Use economizing. Stemming the flow of
legal narcotics into the United States is
costly enterprise. It is a battle that
lust be waged on two fronts. First, we
eed funds to enforce the law, to
radicate crops, and to educate people to
le dangers of narcotics. And here let
ie give you the good news: Congress
as allotted us generous funds for all of
lese purposes.

But there is a second side to the
rug problem— one that involves the
olitical and economic realities of crop-
roducing countries. You can't just force
easants— many of them impoverished—
0 stop growing their best cash crop
/ithout offering them some sort of
conomic alternatives. You can't expect
he governments of these nations— many
f them desperately poor and weakened
r(im within by the gangsterism and ter-
oi- endemic in the trade— to launch
(lajor programs without the economic
esiiurces necessary to sustain them,
et, to take an important example, aid
or the Andean countries— Bolivia,

Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru— will be
practically eliminated by the draconian
budget cuts recently enacted by
Congress.

So we're left with a paradox.
America is determined to act against the
drug scourge, but unable to translate
that determination into programs effec-
tive enough to make a difference.

That same paradox can be found in
our efforts to thwart another problem
that cuts to the heart of American
society: terrorism. In the past few years,
the United States has taken important
steps against this barbarism of our age,
and we have done so with the clear sup-
port of Congress and the American
people. Judging by the results of last
spring's Tokyo summit, our allies are
more in agreement with us than ever
about the seriousness of the terrorist
threat.

That threat was highlighted just
last week by clear evidence that Syria
was directly involved in an attempt to
murder hundreds of innocent travelers-
including more than 200 Americans— by
bombing an airliner in midflight. This
complicity was confirmed by Great
Britain through independent judicial pro-
ceedings. Syria was caught redhanded.
Britain responded immediately by break-
ing diplomatic ties and banning other
contacts with Assad's regime. The
United States applauds the British
move. Together with Canada, we
immediately offered meaningful support
to Britain's decision. And we will do
more.

Yet now, of all times, the United
States is having trouble of its own in the
battle against terrorism. Our hearts are
in the right place: but where are our
resources? After years of educating our
own citizens and our allies, after years of
building a consensus, America's hands
seem financially tied.

To fight terrorism, we need accurate
and up-to-date reporting on political con-
ditions around the world. We need good
operational intelligence, so that planned
attacks can be identified and thwarted.
We're doing a better job of that. Bear in
mind that over three-quarters of the
reporting and analysis used by the U.S.
Government comes from Foreign Serv-
ice officers at embassies around the
world. Yet the State Department may
have to reduce sharply its full-time work
force. And we are likely to have to shut
down another 10 consulates, in addition
to the seven posts already being closed.

And that's not all. We also need
resources to protect these same
embassies against our enemies. Yet the
probable effect of congressional action
on our foreign affairs budget will be

to slow substantially our proposed
diplomatic security program.

Let me give you a third example of
how indiscriminate cuts are threatening
our most widely held goals. Over the
past few years, America's strength and
example have boosted the forces of
freedom in diverse corners of the globe.
We have seen our influence construc-
tively at work in the Philippines, in
Haiti, and across the continent of Latin
America. The democratic reawakening
in these countries has been a matter of
great pride to America and a source of
political and strategic gain to the entire
free world.

Yet the work that awaits the leaders
of this new democratic generation has
only begun. Democratic transitions are
fragile. They require careful nurturing
and constant vigilance against adver-
saries both within and without. Many
newly democratic governments face
Marxist-Leninist insurgencies inside
their countries. Others border on com-
munist nations that are armed to the
teeth and in an expansionist mood.

Look at Central America, where
three democratic countries— Costa Rica,
Honduras, and El Salvador— neighbor
the communist police state of Nicaragua.
Costa Rica has no army. The combined
forces of Honduras and El Salvador
do not match Nicaragua's massive
buildup— a buildup managed and sup-
plied by the Soviet Union. Naturally,
these democratic nations are turning to
us for support. We simply must come
through in support of freedom, democ-
racy, and the rule of law.

People think we should help coun-
tries like Haiti. I feel that wherever I go.
I've been there; I do, too. People think
we should help the Philippines; and I do,
too. But help means money; and money
is not in this foreign affairs budget. The
Caribbean countries alone— we say the
Caribbean is so important to us— the
Caribbean countries alone may have
their aid cut by more than two-thirds.

Even the powerful, global force of
America's example is shrinking as funds
for USIA [United States Information
Agency]— our primary voice abroad— are
reduced below minimal levels. For years,
the United States has fallen behind the
Soviets in telling our own story to the
world. Today, instead of catching up—
which we have been doing, and fast,
under the great leadership of Charlie
Wick, working with the President— we
are in danger of falling even further
behind. At a time when a vigorous
leadership in the Kremlin is showing
heightened interest and sophistication in
using propaganda to undermine public

January 1987

THE SECRETARY

confidence in our policies, we are being
forced to reduce broadcasts of the Voice
of America and close American libraries
and cultural centers abroad. It doesn't
make any sense.

What else will these cuts do to us? I
could go on and on, but here are just two
more examples.

• Except for items already
earmarked— in other words, the Con-
gress puts a mark on them and says,
"You've got to spend this much money
on this project"— our economic assist-
ance to many countries around the world
will be reduced by more than half from
last year's levels. This assistance helps
these countries develop more healthy
economies and helps us maintain close
relations with them. That's important to
us. These are often countries where we
have bases vital to our defense and the
security of our allies.

• Right now we have a plan— called
the Baker plan— that has caught people's
imagination and attention. It's a con-
structive approach to encouraging
growth in the developing countries so
that they can do more to help them-
selves, provide a better market for our
products, and get over their welfare
dependency on the West. Obviously, we
need money to get the plan in action.
But we're supposed to cut a third of our
funding for the multilateral banks on
which the plan depends. We're cutting
ourselves off at the knees.

Bipartisan Gains at Risk

All of these examples point to the same
dismal fact. The United States is drifting
and stumbling toward a weakened global
position. I could at least understand it if
this were a purposeful policy; but we're
deluding ourselves that we can conduct
an effective foreign policy without
money.

Ironically, this trend is developing
alongside a contrary movement that is
advancing our interests, our influence,
and our ideals. Maybe our very strength
misleads us into thinking we can have
influence without applying ourselves.
Maybe our isolationist tendencies only
surface when we feel strong enough to
ignore the rest of the world. Whatever
the reason, we need to wake up to all
that we are placing in jeopardy by
this thoughtless exercise in false
economizing.

One of the trends in our favor today
is the systematic transformation now
occurring in the global economy. It's the
information revolution. Just as we left
the agricultural age a hundred years
ago, we're now moving beyond the

industrial age. To be sure, we still pro-
duce the same proportion of manufactur-
ing goods, as a fraction of our GNP, that
we did 20 years ago— but more effi-
ciently. But the cutting edge of change,
and our new comparative advantage, is
elsewhere. If you look for a symbol of
our economy and society today, it isn't
the blast furnace, or the smokestack, or
the assembly line— it's the computer, the
microchip, the direct broadcast satellite.

From a technological standpoint,
from a strategic and political perspec-
tive, what's happening is very much to
our potential benefit. Success in the
information age depends on openness-
openness to ideas, to innovation, to the
free flow of data. Countries which can
accommodate this openness will reap its
rewards. Those which can't, won't. How
are states that keep the Xerox machine
under lock and key going to cope? The
answer is that the future is already
receding for them. For us, it holds out
enormous promise— i/" we stay open to
the world and don't impose our own
barriers.

Our economic message about open
markets and individual initiative is
reverberating around the world. I can
tell you from my own experience in the
annual economic summits that the terms
of economic debate have changed
decisively among the industrialized
democracies.

And the economic message of
markets and entrepreneurship has gone
even further. Last May, at a special ses-
sion of the United Nations, the African
nations issued an extraordinary state-
ment repudiating planned economies and
supporting more open economic systems.
Essentially, they said: "We blew it. Our
command economies didn't work; and
now we have to do things differently."

The attitude toward freedom has
changed too. Once it was fashionable to
say that the democracies of the world
were on the wrong side of history. Not
anymore. The freedom fighters have
changed all that. The people of the
Philippines and Latin America have
changed all that. They're showing the
world that freedom is neither the luxury
of a few, nor a cultural peculiarity of
Western societies. It can work all over
the world.

Restoring the Balance

Let me summarize these thoughts with a
few words about the strategic dangers
of inadequate funding. The serious
mismatch between our policies and our
resources creates vacuums that others
can— and will— exploit to their own
advantage. And it encourages confusion

among friends and adversaries alike
about the scope and aims of American
policy.

The disturbing fact is that we've
seen all this before; yet apparently we
have forgotten the lessons of the 1930s.
But today's pressures for withdrawal
add up to isolationism with a dangerous
difference. For just as America's power
in the postwar world has grown at an
exponential rate, so too have the risks o
indifference.

For nearly half a century, the Unite
States has shouldered its responsibilitie;
as leader of the free world and the
champion of those struggling to join us.
Through our efforts, we have made
enormous gains in advancing our own
interests and our ideals. Our prosperity,
our technological dynamism, the vitality
of our alliances are all making us a force
for progress as never before. We hold
the winning hand— if we only persevere.
The force of our example is a mighty
reality in the world; but by itself, it can-
not burn a narcotics crop, thwart a ter-
rorist, or deter a communist army. We
must not permit our capacity for con-
structive leadership to atrophy for lack
of adequate funding.

Over the past 6 years. Republicans
and Democrats have made important
strides toward reaching a consensus
about the challenges and opportunities
before us as this century comes to a
close: realism about Soviet aims,
appreciation of the need for a strong
defense, and solidarity with allies and
friends. Despite some controversial
exceptions, our domestic debate has
been marked by common cause toward
our policies and goals. You don't hear
much these days about the erosion of
American power or self-confidence. You
don't hear much about political malaise
or lack of national purpose.

We must use our consensus, and oui
momentum, to restore the budgetary
resources needed to conduct a respon-
sible foreign policy. We must rise above
the procedural complexities of con-
gressional-executive branch relations to
forge a foreign policy that will enable
the national interest to prevail.

You are an audience of informed an(
influential citizens. You can help shape
our public debate so that we do not
repeat the isolationist mistakes of the
past. I urge you to let your elected
officials know that there is broad sup-
port for an active and properly funded
foreign policy. With your help, we can
realize the extraordinary opportunities
before us.

'Press release 240 of Nov. 4, 1986. I

Department of State Bulleti;

THE SECRETARY

•romoting Inter-American Cooperation

Secretary Shultz',s address before the
'eneral Assembly of the Organization of
niirican States (OAS) in Guatemala
'it 11 on November 11, 1986.^

et me begin by thanking President
erezo and the people of Guatemala for
iviting us to meet here. Their offer to
?rve as hosts of this General Assembly
early expresses the progress Guate-
mala is making in putting democratic
leals into practice. I welcome the
pportunity to be here, and I salute
uatemala's new democracy.

I also want to pay a personal tribute
j) President Duarte and the Salvadoran
sople. During my brief visit to San
alvador last month, I was moved by the
etermined effort they are making to
>build their shattered capital. President
uarte and the Salvadoran people are
jain showing that they have what it
ikes to build a democratic society. They
?serve our admiration and respect, as
ell as our support.

Guatemala and El Salvador are both
aders in a revolution that is transform-
.g the hemisphere. Latin America is
)nclusively demonstrating that the
jmocratic form of government has
liversal meaning, that it is not just a
-xury for wealthy industrial societies,
n the contrary, democracy, by freeing
itapped social energies and providing
Dportunities for their productive exer-
se, can serve as the foundation for
aterial prosperity and social progress
. our hemisphere.

President Reagan captured the
;sence of the relationship between
■eedom and progress when he noted:

Everywhere, people and governments are
;ginning to recognize that the secret of a
"ogressive new world is the creativity of the

aman spirit Our open advocacy of

eedom as the engine of progress [is one of]
le most important ways to bring about a
orld where prosperity is commonplace, con-
ict an aberration, and human dignity a way
Mife.

My remarks today address three
isues central to this assembly, to the
olitical and economic vitality of our
egion, and to cooperation among the
overnments of the hemisphere. They
re: combatting the traffic in illegal
rugs; restoring economic growth; and
onsolidating the democratic gains that
're essential to political stability and
.egional security.

Combatting Illegal Drug Traffic

The Specialized Assembly on Narcotic
Drugs, held in Rio de Janeiro last April,
unanimously proposed that the OAS
undertake an action program on drug
abuse and drug trafficking. That pro-
gram is now before us for final approval.

The Inter-American Program of
Action Against Drug Abuse expresses
the shared recognition of our govern-
ments that the production and consump-
tion of illegal narcotics, and traffic in
them, constitute intolerable threats to
our security. We all agree that these
challenges must be met by joint action
on a truly hemispheric basis. No nation
is totally free from production, traffick-
ing, or abuse. There has been an explo-
sion in the cocaine traffic that exploits
millions of coca growers at one end of
the production-transportation-
consumption chain and enslaves millions
of users at the other end. Drug-
producing countries, which may have
throught they were immune from the
effects of consumption, are now
confronting the corrosive impact of drug
abuse in their own societies.

Drug abuse is both a moral insult
and a national security challenge. Its
effects cut across all regional, political,
economic, and social boundaries. Drugs
do not discriminate between rich and
poor, user and pusher. All of us are
victimized.

The economic and social toll of the
drug trade is enormous. Our societies
are paying a price far greater than the
grotesque profits that traffickers daily
extort from our citizens. Countless
individuals— government officials,
judges, journalists, and ordinary
citizens— have been assassinated by the
traffickers and their hired guns. As they
pursue their destructive ends, drug
traders endanger our children, our fam-
ily structure, and our very way of life.

Two years ago in Miami, I said that
narcotics trafficking is the "modern-day
equivalent of piracy." Today, we find
narcotics traffickers allying themselves
with terrorist groups and political
extremists, seeking safehavens from
justice, respecting no international boun-
daries, and recognizing no loyalty
beyond their commitment to obscene
profits.

We can only counter this interna-
tional coalition of the lawless with an
even stronger and more resolute alliance
of the democracies of the Americas.

Thus, we must take the lead in
creating a climate of outspoken
intolerance against those who live out-
side the law; against those who prey on
the innocent; against those who
challenge our common democratic
values. President Reagan has committed
the prestige of his office, the leadership
of his personal example and that of our
First Lady, the energies of his
immediate staff and of the Federal
Government in leading America to
become a drug-free society. That is our
object, a drug-free society. On Octo-
ber 27, the President signed the Anti-
Drug Act of 1986. This sweeping legisla-
tion doubles the budget of U.S. agencies
involved in drug enforcement and anti-
drug educational activities; stiffens
prison sentences, with a provision for a
mandatory 10-year minimum sentence
for major traffickers; and introduces a
host of new initiatives aimed at reducing
demand for drugs in the United States
and strengthening our cooperation
abroad.

We must also work together to make
drug trafficking an unprofitable activity.
Despite enormous difficulties, govern-
ments from Bolivia to Mexico are begin-
ning to strike back. Two years ago, only
two countries were eradicating narcotics
crops; today, 15 countries in the world
are engaged in eradication programs— on
the ground and from the air. We are
expanding regional cooperation and
forging national and international solu-
tions to the scourge of narcotics. We can
be proud of this progress.

Still, the road ahead is long and
arduous. More, much more, remains to
be done. Our approach has to be based
on regional cooperation rather than local
or national initiatives; otherwise, traf-
fickers will simply move their operations
across the nearest border. The keystone
of the regionwide program we are to
approve here will be a new Inter-
American Commission on Drug Abuse
Control. The commission will be com-
posed of senior government represent-
atives in the area of narcotics control. It
will be supported by an Executive
Secretariat to carry out technical
assistance projects and operate three
programs; regional training centers, a
central data bank, and a documentation
center.

anuary 1987

THE SECRETARY

As a strong believer in multilateral
cooperation. I welcome the creation of
this inter-American commission. With its
Secretariat, the commission will perform
precisely the kind of work the OAS is
best suited for: the study of common
problems and the coordination of our
efforts to achieve a more efficient divi-
sion of labor in confronting the problems
of our hemisphere. Our concerted attack
on the drug scourge is urgently needed,
and I believe it is destined to succeed.
For too long, our societies have not
faced up fully and squarely to the giant
narcotics trafficking empire; and our
individual and bilateral actions were not
adequate to the challenge. Today, we all
understand that through inter-American
cooperation, narcotics organizations can
and will be crippled. And success in that
effort will yield additional dividends in
terms of cooperation in other fields of
endeavor.

Restoring Economic Growth

We turn to the field of economics:
cooperation on economic matters is also
critical for all of us. The nations of Latin
America have faced difficult cir-
cumstances in recent years as the reces-
sion and debt crises have compromised
prospects for economic growth. But the
potential is greater than ever, and I
believe we are now back on the road to
long-term and self-sustaining growth. A
joint report by Brazilian, Mexican, and
U.S. research institutions concludes that
"the world environment is improving"
for "a strategy centered on outward
orientation, new market incentives for
savings and investment, and a fun-
damental shift in the role of the state."

We must reject policies that, by sti-
fling individual initiative, perpetuate
poverty. Freedom is the key to
development— freedom of the entre-
preneur to innovate, to invest, to move
capital and freedom of the market to set
wages, prices, interest rates, and
exchange rates. Without the foundation
of freedom, foreign loans and aid will
have, at best, short-term effects in
economies incapable of sustaining long-
term economic growth.

There is growing recognition of this
reality in Latin America. Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay are
among the countries that have taken
major steps to construct more market-
oriented economies, to reduce inflation,
and to encourage entrepreneurship.
Guatemala and other Central American

countries have taken encouraging steps
toward stabilization. In most countries,
however, more work needs to be done on
domestic reform. The United States, too,
has plenty of work to do on its own fiscal
problem: our way-too-large budget
deficit. We must all make a genuine com-
mitment to removing those impediments
that limit growth, discourage external
capital flows, and encourage capital
flight. The United States stands ready to
support such efforts.

In October 1985, at the annual
meetings of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank in Seoul, the
United States proposed that the interna-
tional community undertake a major,
coordinated Program for Sustained
Growth. It became known as the "Baker
plan." This effort, we asserted, must
focus on growth-oriented structural
reforms supported by the international
financial community.

I might say that during this long-
term effort we went through a stage
where the answer to the problem seemed
to be austerity. And, of course, there
are, no doubt, instances where austerity
in various forms is essential. But I think
we all see that certainly the basis of the
Baker plan is that in the longer run the
answer to our debt problem, let alone all
other problems, is not austerity; it is
growth: economic growth is what we
have to get.

The International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank have developed
activities in support of the program for
sustained growth. We must work
together to ensure that the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB)
becomes an active participant in this pro-
gram. This new role for the IDB is under
discussion as an integral part of the 7th
replenishment negotiations. We believe
that agreement can be reached on an
increase in the IDB's lending program to
support the domestic reforms necessary
for sound development.

Trade is another and indispensable
element of the "global bargain ' I out-
lined last year. An open global commer-
cial system responsive to changing
economic conditions is a stimulator of
growth. Maintenance and expansion of
such a system require that all
countries— developed and developing—
resist domestic pressures for protec-
tionist measures. We must take positive,
market-opening actions that eliminate
unfair trading practices and expand
market access for goods and services.

We have together taken a major step
in that direction in Uruguay this past
September with the successful launching
of the current round of multilateral

trade negotiations under the auspices of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, known as the GATT. Twenty
Latin American and Caribbean countrie
are now members of the GATT. They
have an important role to play, and thei
participation will be enhanced if more
countries of the region join them in seel<
ing improved trading opportunities.

But what of the U.S. role? The
LInited States historically has champ-
ioned free trade. We believe that an
international trading system based on
free trade is the best assurance of pros-
perity for ourselves and for the rest of
the world.

Free trade has also clearly benefitec
Latin America. The U.S. trade balance
with the region went from a $1 billion
surplus in 1981 to a $19 billion deficit in
1985. In 1985, Latin America exported
$103 billion worth of goods and services^
of this, $49 billion went to the United
States— just about half.

We have taken the lion's share of thi
increase in Latin American exports sincj
the onset of the debt crisis. We are
proud of our record in keeping our
markets open, and we will stress to our
trading partners the critical importance
of a common effort to keep the interna-
tional economy open.

Without such an effort, the protec-
tionist forces now at work in the United
States will find easy justification for
their destructive policies. The Reagan
Administration has vigorously opposed
protectionist legislation. We know full
well that untold damage would be done
to the world's— and, in particular, to
Latin America's— chances for prosperity
if we succumb to the pressures for these
shortsighted measures.

We have not won every battle
against protectionism, but we have won
the most important ones. President
Reagan vetoed restrictions on copper
and footwear. His veto of the highly
restrictive textile bill was recently, if
narrowly, upheld. Congress adjourned
without passing other, broader protec-
tionist legislation that had been intro-
duced, and, in fact, one passed the
House of Representatives. These protec-
tionist forces will reemerge next year.
You can count on it! And you can count
on President Reagan's determination to
continue the fight. But we need your
help!

We in the United States cannot help
but observe that many other countries
do not maintain markets as open for
U.S. goods and services as our markets
are open for foreign manufactures and
services. If we are to win the war
against protectionism, we must

Department of State Bullet!

THE SECRETARY

■emonstrate, through progress in
ilateral discussions and in the new
-ade round, that we are taking effective
ction to broaden global trading oppor-
anities for everyone— including U.S.
xporters.

I've stressed the necessity of restor-
ig growth to the hemisphere, because
rowth is the best way to deal with the
ebt problems, and the only way to
nprove living standards. Recent move-
lents in interest rates and exchange
ites have favored the renewal of
rowth. Since 1981— it is interesting to
lok back; it is only 5 years ago—
iternational interest rates have dropped
•om around 17% to around 6%. It's a
jge decline. For each percentage point
eduction, the eight major debtor coun-
•ies save appro.ximately $2 billion per
^ar. So, let us do a little arithmetic
?re: 17 minus 6 equals 11 multiplied by
equals . . . and that is how much per
,'ar: $22 billion, approximately per
'ar. And that ain't hay, as they say.
owever, a severe drop in private
ipital flows— from $49 billion in 1981 to
:7 billion in 1982, to less than $6 bilhon
1985— remains a major constraint on
gher growth in the hemisphere,
dvances in regional growth have been
lanced almost entirely from official
nding, international trade, and some
ructural adjustments in a few
•untries.

To address this problem, the OAS
'Id a special meeting in San Juan this
■ar on domestic and foreign capital
)ws. That meeting concluded that more
ts to be done to encourage the invest-
ent of private capital. You have a
port on that meeting before you, and I
)pe you will approve it. Each nation is
sponsible for creating the conditions
at will establish confidence among
vestors. Many countries in the
■misphere are moving in that direction,
it much, much more needs to be done,
istained reforms and an improved
'erall climate for investment— foreign
id domestic— are crucial to achieving
ir goal of growth.

Dnsolidating Democratic Gains

s was stated so eloquently by many
iring our informal dialogue, economic
id political freedom go together. The
tiarter of the Organization of American
;ates proclaims that "the historic mis-
on of America is to offer man a land of
)erty." The resurgence of democracy is
itting us in a better position than ever
' fulfill the promise of the Charter.

As an expression of our commit-
ment to democracy, last year we all
agreed to an addition to the Charter that
states, "Representative democracy is an
indispensable condition for the stability,
peace, and development of the region."
Democracy is the practical expression of
self-determination. The solidarity it
creates increases security from foreign
intervention.

It is vitally important that all of us in
this organization have a clear agreement
on the priority of democracy and on the
relationship between democratic govern-
ment and the other fundamental prin-
ciples of inter-American cooperation.
Democracy, security, political stability,
and economic development are not
separate, free-floating concepts. On the
contrary, they are closely linked. Self-
determination cannot be denied without
weakening democracy. A threat to
security challenges the principle of
nonintervention. The United States
believes these principles must all be
defended.

Let me take the crisis in Central
America as an example.

• The United States does not want
any Central American country to
become a threat to the stability or
security of its neighbors.

• The United States wants
pluralistic democracy and economic and
social development to thrive in Central
America.

• The United States believes that
the people of Central America can
achieve peace, development, and justice
without external interference, by their
own decisions and based on their own
experiences.

The challenge to these principles
does not come from the United States.
Does anyone really think the United
States wants to turn Central America
into a vortex of East-West turmoil? The
United States provided aid to help
Nicaragua rebuild after the fall of
Somoza in 1979. And for a period there,
the per capita flow of aid from the
United States was the highest of any
flow to any country in the world. So
what did the Nicaraguan communists do?
They sought arms from the Soviet bloc
and used them to deny the Nicaraguan
people their right of self-determination.

The United States accepted the new
Nicaraguan junta's pledges of democracy
and nonalignment. But what are the
Nicaraguan communists doing? They are
intervening in the internal affairs of
their neighbors. The Nicaraguan regime
is fundamentally destabilizing to Central
America; and instability there will have

its effects throughout the hemisphere.
As Costa Rican President Arias told us
at this fall's UN General Assembly,
reading from the speech:

There is no respite from the path chosen
by the cotnandant.es who betrayed a revolu-
tion destined to give democracy to genera-
tions who knew only repression. There is no
respite for a people, frustrated and deceived,
who have returned to civil war. There is no
respite for neighboring lands, who feel the
threat from a new dogmatic totalitarianism
and who suffer now the consequences of a
border rife with anguish and disenchantment.

So spoke President Arias in the UN
General Assembly, the President of
Costa Rica.

The regional arms race launched by
the comandantes is a matter of grave
concern to us. They displayed it the
other day. With the assistance of the
Cubans and the Soviets, they have built
the largest military establishment in
Central America's history. It is impos-
sible to imagine peace and stability
returning to the region until this massive
growth in armaments is constrained and
ultimately eliminated.

We must not forget, however, that
the external relations of the regime in
Managua are not the core of the
challenge they pose to us. That core is
their perversion of the principles of the
revolution against Somoza. As we in this
organization know particularly well, they
came to us and we helped them; the com-
andantes have systematically violated
the solemn democratic undertakings
with which they obtained domestic and
international support. As long as the
legitimate desires of the Nicaraguan
people for genuine democracy are
repressed, the inevitable result will be
rebellion, insurgency, and civil war.

We cannot give lip service to
democracy when it is convenient and
costless, but then turn our backs on it
when there are costs or risks. Foreign
intervention in the form of alien
ideologies and foreign cadres— from
Cuba, the Soviet Union, East Germany,
North Korea, even Vietnam and Libya-
is, at this very moment, promoting
instability and violence in Central
America. Failure to confront this threat
will only guarantee that the region will
be increasingly drawn into great power
rivalries. The only road to peace and
stability is to eliminate that alien
intervention.

The Contadora process could be an
important component of our efforts to
make the practice of democracy univer-
sal in Central America. We supported
the Contadora process from the start for
two reasons. First, we saw it as a way of

anuary 1987

THE SECRETARY

addressing both the political and security
issues underlying continued instability
and violence in Central America. And
second, it offered the prospect of produc-
ing regional solutions to regional prob-
lems. We were, and are, prepared to
support a comprehensive, simultaneous,
and verifiable agreement that will attain
the 21 objectives agreed to by the Con-
tadora nations in 1983— all of them.

Unfortunately, nearly 4 years of
effort by the Contadora countries and,
more recently, by the Contadora support
group have not produced a workable
agreement. The comandantes continue to
act as an armed vanguard against their
people and their neighbors. But Central
America's democracies will not be
intimidated. They are insisting on a
negotiated solution that will satisfy the
interests of all the countries of Central
America and of the hemisphere.

We must also affirm that threats to
democracy and regional security are not
confined to Central America. Those
countries which have consistently pur-
sued the principles of democracy, and
those which have recently returned to
them, have an obligation to hasten a
democratic transition in all the remain-
ing nondemocratic nations of the
hemisphere. In our recent relations with
Chile, for example, we have made
absolutely clear our strong support for a
prompt and successful return to
democratic government.

We also have an obligation to offer
our moral, political, and material support
to those peoples already struggling to
implant true democracies in their coun-
tries. I particularly have in mind the
heroic efforts of the Haitian people and
their leaders to overcome generations of
tyranny and build democracy virtually
from the ground up. I want to commend
the Secretary General for his initiative
on Haiti. The United States is prepared
to support it.

The danger of foreign intervention
and exploitation of instability is present
wherever democracy and human rights
have been systematically denied. The
recent discovery in Chile of several
secret arms caches is a vivid but by no

means isolated example. The caches con-
tained a mixture of new Soviet-bloc arms
and secondhand American weapons. The
American weapons had been left behind
in Vietnam and were similar to ones the
Soviets and Cubans have, in recent
years, shipped to subversives in Colom-
bia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, and other countries of the
region. If you bear in mind the recent
assassination attempt against the
Chilean President, these arms caches
were most likely meant for use in the
context of a post-Pinochet govern-
ment—in other words, against a
democratic outcome in Chile, more than
against the present government. Such
interventions will continue if we relax
our vigilance or if we waver in our sup-
port for democracy and justice in the
Americas.

Conclusion

It is clear that we who live in this
hemisphere face a series of common
challenges to our security and well-
being; the powerful and lethal alliance of
terrorists and drug smugglers; major
problems of economic growth; the
vestiges of authoritarianism; and com-
munist subversion supported by the
Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

Each of these challenges— alone or in
combination— threatens the great prog-
ress we have achieved. But we cannot
deal with them if we are divided. Unless
we join forces in common battle against
common foes, we will not be successful
in defending our vital interests and our
shared ideals.

To be sure, our tasks are demanding.
But their cost is far less than the price of
inaction. If we fail to launch a
hemisphere-wide attack on narcotics
traffickers and drug abuse, the very
future of our next generation will be in
jeopardy. If we do not improve the
economic well-being of our people, the
great promise of democratic self-
government will go unfulfilled. And if we
do not make the Americas a region of
secure freedoms, we will betray our
most fundamental values and
convictions.

In addressing these great challenges
we can draw encouragement from a
most important discovery. We have onC'
again discovered that freedom is a
revolutionary force. Dictatorships—
whether of the left or the right— are not
permanent. Not so many years ago,
democratic nations were thought to be i
dwindling minority. Today, we see that
the vitality of the democratic idea is the
most important political reality of our
time.

What we are witnessing is the
re-creation and growth in our hemispher
of a genuine democratic community.
When the people of Guatemala, or
Venezuela, or Brazil go to the polls, the.
advance the cause of freedom not only i
their own country but throughout the
Americas. Everywhere in the region,
people understand that the future of
their freedom is closely tied to the fate
of freedom elsewhere. They know that ^
the success of their democratic govern- '
ment is enhanced by cooperation and
mutual support among democratic
leaders and peoples everywhere. And |
they realize that regimes which deny th .
right of democratic self-government pos |
an inexorable threat to peace.

Perhaps our fellow Foreign Ministe
Edgar Teran of Ecuador said it best thi I
past September, again, at the United
Nations. Reading what he said:

In the end, so long as democracy does nt
find true and effective expression, so long a;
there is no setting aside the practice of fore- i
ibiy compelling people to accept regimes I

which they have not themselves freely chose ,
so long as it is impossible for many to live in
their own country, dominated by tyrannical j
elements, peace will be a distant and almost I
contradictory aspiration.

And so he said. I agree with him. ,

We can and must work together to |
end tryanny in all of Latin America. Wt ,
must eradicate the scourge of narcotics. I
And we must stimulate the economic
growth that will build a better life for ',
our people. Let the New World stand as j
a vital example of human dignity and '
democratic self-government, to men anc
women everywhere.

iPress release 249 of Nov. 12, 1986.

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

Vjuclear Weapons, Arms Control,
and the Future of Deterrence

Secretary Shultz's address before the
hilirnational House of Chicago and The
Jhicago Sun-Times Forum at the
['iiirersity of Chicago on November 17.

['ni delighted to be back here at the pin-
lacle, and I come here to the University
if Chicago to talk about nuclear
.veapons. arms control, and our national
^ecurity. These issues have been given
special timeliness by the President's
■eeent meeting with Soviet General
secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. In
.-ears to come, we may look back at their
liscussions as a turning point in our
strategy for deterring war and preserv-
ng peace. It has opened up new
)ossibilities for the way in which we
•lew nuclear weapons and their role in
■nsuring our security.

Questions for the Future

Ne now face a series of questions of fun-
lamental importance for the future: how
;an we maintain peace through deter-
■ence in the midst of a destabilizing
growth of offensive nuclear weapons?
low can we negotiate a more stable
;trategic balance at substantially lower
evels of offensive forces? How can we
ise new defensive technologies to con-
ribute to that stability? How can the
A^est best seek to reduce its reliance on
iffensive nuclear weapons without run-
ling new risks of instability arising from
■onventional imbalances?

These are exceptionally difficult and
lomplex issues. They go to the heart of
)ur ability as a democratic nation to
;urvive in a world threatened by
otalitarianism and aggression. These
juestions should engage the best minds
n American society, and, of course, they
lave to be treated at reasonable lengths
50 the best minds have to have a half-
Afay decent attention span. So that's
why I have come to speak to this par-
;icular audience at the University of
3hicago. So this isn't going to be an easy
speech, or a short one. I'll ask that you
isten carefully, and I hope that you'll
reflect at greater length on the text of
;my remarks.

Forty-four years ago, and about 200
yards from where I am now standing,
mankind generated its first self-
sustained and controlled nuclear chain
reaction. Enrico Fermi's crude atomic

pile was the prototype for all that
followed— both reactors to generate
energy for peaceful uses and weapons of
ever-increasing destructiveness. Seldom
are we able to mark the beginning of a
new era in human affairs so precisely.

I'm not here tonight to announce the
end of that era. But I will suggest that
we may be on the verge of important
changes in our approach to the role of
nuclear weapons in our defense. New
technologies are compelling us to think
in new ways about how to ensure our
security and protect our freedoms. Reyk-
javik served as a catalyst in this process.
The President has led us to think
seriously about both the possible
benefits— and the costs— of a safer
strategic environment involving pro-
gressively less reliance on nuclear
weapons. Much will now depend on
whether we are far-sighted enough to
proceed toward such a goal in a realistic
way that enhances our security and that
of our allies.

It may be that we have arrived at a
true turning point. The nuclear age can-
not be undone or abolished; it is a per-
manent reality. But we can glimpse now,
for the first time, a world freed from the
incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear
devastation. The threat of nuclear con-
flict can never be wholly banished, but it
can be vastly diminished— by careful but
drastic reductions in the offensive
nuclear arsenals each side possesses. It
is just such reductions— not limitations in
expansion but reductions— that is the
vision President Reagan is working to
make a reality.

Such reductions would add far
greater stability to the U.S. -Soviet
nuclear relationship. Their achievement
should make other diplomatic solutions
obtainable and perhaps lessen the
distrust and suspicion that have
stimulated the felt need for such
weapons. Many problems will accompany
drastic reductions: problems of deploy-
ment, conventional balances, verifica-
tion, multiple warheads, and chemical
weapons. The task ahead is great but
worth the greatest of efforts.

This will not be a task for Americans
alone. We must engage the collective
effort of all of the Western democracies.
And as we do, we must also be prepared
to explore cooperative approaches with
the Soviet Union, when such cooperation
is feasible and in our interests.

The Evolution of Our Thinking
About Nuclear Weapons

Let me start by reviewing how our
thinking has evolved about the role of
nuclear weapons in our national security.

In the years immediately after
Fermi's first chain reaction, our
approach was relatively simple. The
atomic bomb was created in the midst of
a truly desperate struggle to preserve
civilization against fascist aggression in
Europe and Asia. There was a compel-
ling rationale for its development and
use.

But since 1945— and particularly
since America lost its monopoly of such
weapons a few years later— we have had
to adapt our thinking to less clearcut cir-
cumstances. We have been faced with
the challenges and the ambiguities of a
protracted global competition with the
Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons have
shaped, and at times restrained, that
competition; but they have not enabled
either side to achieve a decisive
advantage.

Because of their awesome destruc-
tiveness, nuclear weapons have kept in
check a direct U.S. -Soviet clash. With
the advent in the late 1950s of
intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles— a delivery system for large
numbers of nuclear weapons at great
speed and with increasing accuracy—
both the United States and the Soviet
Union came to possess the ability to
mount a devastating attack on each
other within minutes.

The disastrous implications of such
massive attacks led us to realize, in the
words of President Kennedy, that "total
war makes no sense." And as President
Reagan has reiterated many times: "a
nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought"— words that the Presi-
dent and General Secretary Gorbachev
agreed on in their joint statement at
Geneva a year ago.

Thus, it came to be accepted in the
West that a major role of nuclear
weapons was to deter their use by
others— as well as to deter major conven-
tional attacks— by the threat of their use
in response to aggression. Over the
years, we sought through a variety of
means and rationales— beginning with
"massive retaliation" in the 1950s up
through "flexible response" and "selec-
tive nuclear options" in the 1970s— to
maintain a credible strategy for that
retaliatory threat.

January 1987

THE SECRETARY

At the same time, we also accepted a
certain inevitability about our own
nation's vulnerability to nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles. When nuclear weapons
were delivered by manned bombers, we
maintained air defenses. But as the
ballistic missile emerged as the basic
nuclear delivery system, we virtually
abandoned the effort to build defenses.
After a spirited debate over antiballistic
missile systems in the late 1960s, we
concluded that— on the basis of
technologies now 20 years old— such
defenses would not be effective. So our
security from nuclear attack came to
rest on the threat of retaliation and a
state of mutual vulnerability.

In the West, many assumed that the
Soviets would logically see things this
way as well. It was thought that once
both sides believed that a state of mutual
vulnerability had been achieved, there
would be shared restraint on the further
growth of our respective nuclear
arsenals.

The Antiballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty of 1972 reflected that assump-
tion. It was seen by some as elevating
mutual vulnerability from technical fact
to the status of international law. That
treaty established strict limitations on
the deployment of defenses against
ballistic missiles. Its companion Interim
Agreement on strategic offensive arms
was far more modest. SALT I [strategic
arms limitation talks] was conceived of
as an intermediate step toward more
substantial future limits on offensive
nuclear forces. It established only a cap
on the further growth in the numbers of
ballistic missile launchers then opera-
tional and under construction. The most
important measures of the two sides'
nuclear arsenals— numbers of actual
warheads and missile throw-weight—
were not restricted.

But controlling the number of launch-
ers without limiting warheads actually
encouraged deployment of multiple
warheads— called multiple independently-
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)— on
a single launcher. This eventually led to
an erosion of strategic stability as the
Soviets— by proliferating MIRVs—
became able to threaten all of our inter-
continental ballistic missiles with only a
fraction of their own. Such an imbalance
makes a decision to strike first seem all
the more profitable.

During this postwar period, we and
our allies hoped that American nuclear
weapons would serve as a comparatively
cheap offset to Soviet conventional
military strength. The Soviet Union,
through its geographic position and its
massive mobilized conventional forces.

has powerful advantages it can bring to
bear against Western Europe, the
Mideast, and East Asia— assets useful
for political intimidation as well as for
potential military aggression. The
West's success or failure in countering
these Soviet advantages has been, and
will continue to be, one of the keys to
stability in our postwar world.

Our effort to deter a major Soviet
conventional attack through the
existence of opposing nuclear forces has
been successful over the past four
decades. It gave the industrialized
democracies devastated by the Second
World War the necessary "breathing
space" to recover and thrive. But there
has also been recurring debate over the
credibility of this strategy, as well as
controversy about the hardware required
for its implementation.

Over time, we and our allies came to
agree that deterrence required a tle.xible
strategy combining both conventional
and nuclear forces. This combined
strategy has been successful in avoiding
war in Europe. But our reliance for so
long on nuclear weapons has led some to
forget that these arms are not an inex-
pensive substitute— mostly paid for by
the United States— for fully facing up to
the challenges of conventional defense
and deterrence.

Sources of Strategic Instability

The United States and our allies will
have to continue to rely upon nuclear
weapons for deterrence far, far into the
future. That fact, in turn, requires that
we maintain credible and effective
nuclear deterrent forces.

But a defense strategy that rests on
the threat of escalation to a strategic
nuclear conflict is, at best, an unwelcome
solution to ensuring our national secu-
rity. Nuclear weapons, when applied to
the problem of preventing either a
nuclear or conventional attack, present
us with a major dilemma. They may
appear a bargain— but a dangerous one.
They make the outbreak of a Soviet-
American war most unlikely; but they
also ensure that should deterrence fail,
the resulting conflict would be vastly
more destructive, not just for our two
countries but for mankind as a whole.

Moreover, we cannot assume that
the stability of the present nuclear
balance will continue indefinitely. It can
deteriorate, and it has. We have come to
realize that our adversary does not share
all of our assumptions about strategic
stability. Soviet military doctrine
stresses warfighting and survival in a
nuclear environment, the importance of

numerical superiority, the contribution
of active defense, and the advantages of
preemption.

Over the past 15 years, the growth
of Soviet strategic forces has continued
unabated— and far beyond any reason-
able assessment of what might be
required for rough equivalency with U.S.
forces. As a result, the Soviet Union haS'
acquired a capability to put at risk the
fixed land-based missiles of the U.S.
strategic triad— as well as portions of
our bomber and in-port submarine force
and command and control systems— with
only a fraction of their force, leaving
many warheads to deter any retaliation.

To date, arms control agreements
along traditional lines— such as SALT I
and II— have failed to halt these
destabilizing trends. They have not
brought about significant reductions in
offensive forces, particularly those
systems that are the most threatening to:
stability. By the most important measure
of destructive capability, ballistic missile
warheads— those are the things that hit
you— Soviet strategic forces have grown
by a factor of four since the SALT I
Interim Agreement was signed. This
problem has been exacerbated by a
Soviet practice of stretching their
implementation of such agreements to
the edge of violation— and, sometimes,
beyond. The evidence of Soviet actions
contrary to SALT II, the ABM Treaty,
and various other arms control
agreements is clear and unmistakable.

At the same time, technology has
not stood still. Research and
technological innovation of the past
decade now raise questions about
whether the primacy of strategic offense
over defense will continue indefinitely.
For their part, the Soviets have never
neglected strategic defenses. They
developed and deployed them even when
offensive systems seemed to have over-
whelming advantages over any defense.
As permitted by the ABM Treaty of
1972, the Soviets constructed around
Moscow the world's only operational
system of ballistic missile defense. Soviet
military planners apparently find that
the modest benefits of this system justify
its considerable cost, even though it
would provide only a marginal level of
protection against our overall strategic
force. It could clearly be a base for the
future expansion of their defenses.

For well over a decade— long before
the President announced 3 years ago the
American Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI)— the Soviet Union has been
actively investigating much more
advanced defense technologies, including
directed energy systems. If the United

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

states were to abandon this field of
idvanced defensive research to the
Soviet Union, the results 10 years hence
lould be disastrous for the West.

The President's Approach:
Seeking Greater Stability

^resident Reagan believes we can do
)etter. He believes we can reverse the
'ver-increasing numbers and potency of
luclear weapons that are eroding stabil-
ty. He believes we can and must find
vays to keep the peace without basing
lur security so heavily on the threat of
luclear escalation. To those ends, he has
let in motion a series of policies which
lave already brought major results.

First, this Administration has taken
nuch-needed steps to reverse dangerous
rends in the military balance by
trengthening our conventional and
lUclear deterrent forces. We have
;one forward with their necessary
nodernization.

Second, we have sought ambitious
mis control measures— not agreements
or their own sake but steps which could
eriously contribute to the goal of
tabilizing reductions in offensive forces,
n 1981, the President proposed the
lobal elimination of all Soviet and
American longer range INF [inter-
:iediate-range nuclear forces] nuclear
aissiles. Not a freeze or token reduc-
ions, as many urged at the time, but the
omplete elimination of this class of
/eapons.

The following year, at Eureka Col-
jge, the President proposed major
eductions in strategic offensive forces,
ailing for cuts by one-third to a level of
,000 ballistic missile warheads on each
ide. Again, this was a major departure
rom previous negotiating approaches—
lOth in the importance of the weapons to
le reduced and in the magnitude of their
eduction. Critics claimed he was
mrealistic, that he was not really
nterested in arms control. But the
'resident's call for dramatic reductions
n nuclear warheads on the most
lestabilizing delivery systems has been
it the core of our negotiating efforts.
:he Soviets have finally begim to
espond to the President's approach and
ire now making similar proposals.

Finally, the President also set out to
explore whether it would be possible to
levelop an effective defense against
)allistic missiles, the central element of
I'urrent strategic offensive arsenals. To
find that answer, he initiated in 1983 the
'SDI program— a broad-based research
■ffort to explore the defensive implica-
ions of new technologies. It is a pro-

gram that is consistent with our obliga-
tions under the ABM Treaty. He set as a
basic goal the protection of the United
States and our allies against the ballistic
missile threat.

Since then, we have been seeking
both to negotiate deep reductions in the
numbers of those missiles, as well as to
develop the knowledge necessary to con-
struct a strategic defense against them.
It is the President's particular innova-
tion to seek to use these parallel efforts
in a reinforcing way— to reduce the
threat while exploring the potential for
defense.

Reykjavik: A Potential Watershed
in Nuclear Arms Control

All of these efforts will take time to
develop, but we are already seeing their
first fruits. Some became apparent at
Reykjavik. Previously, the prospect of
30%, let alone 50%, reductions in Soviet
and American offensive nuclear arsenals
was considered an overly ambitious goal.

At Reykjavik, the President and
General Secretary Gorbachev reached
the basis for an agreement on a first
step of 50% reductions in Soviet and
American strategic nuclear offensive
forces over a 5-year period. We agreed
upon some numbers and counting
rules— that is, how different types of
weapons would count against the
reduced ceilings.

For INF nuclear missiles, we
reached the basis for agreement on even
more drastic reductions, down from a
current Soviet total of over 1,400
warheads to only 100 on longer range
INF missiles worldwide on each side.
This would represent a reduction of
more than 90% of the Soviet SS-20
nuclear warheads now targeted on our
allies and friends in Europe and Asia.
There would also have to be a ceiling on
shorter range INF missiles, the right for
us to match the Soviets in this category,
and follow-on negotiations aimed at the
reduction in numbers of these weapons.

Right there is the basis for an arms
control agreement that doesn't just limit
the future growth of Soviet and
American nuclear arsenals but which
actually makes deep and early cuts in
existing force levels. These cuts would
reduce the numbers of heavy, accurate,
multiple-warhead missiles that are the
most threatening and the most destabi-
lizing. These ideas discussed at Reyk-
javik flowed directly from the Presi-
dent's longstanding proposals. They are
a direct result of his vision of major
offensive reductions as a necessary step
to greater stability.

At Reykjavik, the President and the
General Secretary went on to discuss
possible further steps toward enhanced
stability. The President proposed to
eliminate all ballistic missiles over the
subsequent 5 years. Mr. Gorbachev pro-
posed to eliminate all strategic offensive
forces. They talked about these and
other ideas, including the eventual
elimination of all nuclear weapons. The
very scope of their discussion was
significant. The President and the
General Secretary set a new arms con-
trol agenda at Reykjavik, one that will
shape our discussions with the Soviets
about matters of nuclear security for
years to come.

Of course, make no mistake about it.
Tough, and probably drawn-out, negotia-
tions will still be required if we are to
nail down any formal agreement on
offensive force reductions. For example,
the Soviets are now linking agreement
on anything with agreement on
everything. But the fact that we now
have such reductions clearly on the table
has only been made possible by:

• Our steps to restore America's
military strength:

• Our firm and patient negotiating
efforts over the past 5 years:

• The sustained support of our
allies; and, not the least,

• By our active investigation into
strategic defenses.

The prospect of effective defenses
and our determined force modernization
program have given the Soviet Union an
important incentive to agree to cut back
and eventually to eliminate ballistic
missiles. Within the SDI program, we
judge defenses to be desirable only if
they are survivable and cost effective at
the margin. Defenses that meet these
criteria— those which cannot be easily
destroyed or overwhelmed— are precisely
the sort which would lead Soviet military
planners to consider reducing, rather
than continuing to expand, their offen-
sive missile force.

But only a dynamic and ongoing
research program can play this role. And
for their part, the Soviets are making
every effort to cripple our program.
Thus, there were major differences over
strategic defenses at Reykjavik. The
President responded to Soviet concerns
by proposing that, for 10 years, both
sides would not exercise their existing
right of withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty and would confine their strategic
defense programs to research, develop-
ment, and testing activities permitted by
the ABM Treaty. This commitment
would be in the context of reductions of

January 1987

THE SECRETARY

strategic offensive forces by 50% in the
first 5 years and elimination of the remain-
ing ballistic missiles in the second 5 years,
and with the understanding that at the end
of this 10-year period, either side would
have the right to deploy advanced defenses,
unless otherwise agreed.

But at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union
wanted to change existing ABM Treaty
provisions to restrict research in a way
that would cripple the American SDI
program. This we cannot accept.

Even as we eliminate all ballistic
missiles, we will need insurance policies
to hedge against cheating or other con-
tingencies. We don't know now what
form this will take. An agreed-upon
retention of a small nuclear ballistic
missile force could be part of that
insurance. Wliat we do know is that the
President's program for defenses
against ballistic missiles can be a key
part of our insurance. A vigorous
research program will give the United
States and our allies the options we will
need to approach a world with far fewer
nuclear weapons— a world with a safer
and more stable strategic balance, one
no longer dependent upon the threat of
mutual annihilation.

Next Steps With the Soviets

In the short term, our task is to follow
up on the progress arising out of the
Reykjavik discussions. For our part, we
are energetically seeking to do so. Our
negotiators in Geneva have instructions
to pick up where the two leaders'
exchanges left off. We have formally
tabled our proposals, based on the prog-
ress at Reykjavik, and we are ready to
discuss them.

To give additional impetus to that
process, I met with Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna at the
beginning of this month to continue our
exchanges— not just on arms control but
on the full agenda of U.S. -Soviet issues,
including those regional and human
rights problems which are so critical to
building trust and confidence between
our two nations.

Our negotiating efforts— and the
President's own discussions with the
General Secretary— have been based on
years of analysis of these issues and on
our frequent exchanges with the Soviets.
The Reykjavik meeting, for instance,
was preceded by extensive preliminary
discussions with the Soviets at the
expert level in Geneva, Moscow, and
Washington. We have had our senior
negotiators and best advisers at all of
these sessions— as well as at our most
recent encounter in Vienna.

So we have been well prepared to
move. But whether we can achieve con-
crete results now depends on the
Soviets. General Secretary Gorbachev
has spoken positively of the need to
capitalize on the "new situation," he
called it, created by Reykjavik. But at
Vienna 2 weeks ago, the Soviets seemed
primarily interested in trying to
characterize SDI in the public mind as
the sole obstacle to agreement. Mr.
Shevardnadze was quick to accuse us of
backsliding from the Reykjavik results
and to label our Vienna meeting "a
failure" because of our unwillingness to
accede to their demands to cripple SDI.
We will doubtless hear more such
accusations over the coming weeks.

So all of this will take time to work
out. But that's to be expected in
negotiating with the Soviets. We are
serious about our objectives, and we are
determined to hold firmly to them. We
have a clear sense of how our two
nations might be able to move toward
greater strategic stability. We are ready
to move quickly to that end, but we are
also prepared to be patient.

The Challenges of a
Less Nuclear World

The longer term implications of the
Reykjavik discussions may prove even
more challenging for us. Thus far in the
nuclear age, we have become accustomed
to thinking of nuclear weapons in terms
of "more bang for the buck" and of the
high price for any possible substitute for
these arms. But to my mind, that sort of
bookkeeping approach risks obscuring
our larger interests. We should begin by
determining what is of value to us and
then what costs we are prepared to pay
to attain those ends.

The value of steps leading to a less
nuclear world is clear— potentially
enhanced stability and less chance of a
nuclear catastrophe. Together with our
allies, we could enjoy a safer, more
secure strategic environment.

But we would not seek to reduce
nuclear weapons only to increase the
risks of conventional war or, more likely,
of political intimidation through the
threat of conventional attack. Therefore,
a central task will be to establish a stable
conventional balance as a necessary cor-
ollary for any less nuclear world.

How would a less nuclear world, one
in which ballistic missiles have been
eliminated, work? What would it mean?
It would not be the end of nuclear deter-
rence for the West. With a large inven-

tory of aircraft and cruise missiles, the
United States and NATO would retain a
powerful nuclear capability. In a sense,
we would return to the situation of the
1950s, when strategic bombers served as
our primary nuclear deterrent force. But
there would be an important difference
in the 1990s and beyond. Our aircraft
would now be supplemented by a host of
new and sophisticated technologies as
well as cruise missiles launched from the
air and sea. It would be a much more
diverse and capable force than in
previous decades.

In such circumstances, both the
United States and the Soviet Union
would lose the capability provided by
ballistic missiles to deliver large
numbers of nuclear weapons on each
others' homelands in less than 30-
minutes time. But Western strategy is,
in fact, defensive in nature, built upon
the pledge that we will only use our
weapons, nuclear and conventional, in
self-defense. Therefore, the loss of this
quick-kill capability— so suited to
preemptive attack— will ease fears of a
disarming first strike.

For our friends and allies in Europe
and Asia, the elimination of Soviet
ballistic missiles— including not just the
Soviet Union's strategic ballistic missiles
and its many SS-20s but also the shortei
range missiles for which we currently
have no deployed equivalent— would
remove a significant nuclear threat.

But it would also have non-nuclear
military benefits as well. Today, the
Soviet Union has ballistic missiles with
conventional and chemical warheads
targeted on NATO airfields, ports, and
bases. The elimination of ballistic
missiles would thus be a significant plus
for NATO in several respects.

The nuclear forces remaining—
aircraft and cruise missiles— would be
far less useful for first-strike attacks but
would be more appropriate for retalia-
tion. They would be more flexible in use
than ballistic missiles. The slower t\\nng
aircraft can be recalled after launch.
They can be retargeted in flight. They
can be re-used for several missions. We
currently have a major advantage in the
relative sophistication of our aircraft anc
cruise missiles; the Soviets have greater
numbers of these systems and are striv-
ing hard to catch up in quality. They
have given far more attention to
defense, where we have a lot of catching
up to do. But our remaining nuclear
forces would be capable of fulfilling the
requirements of the Western alliance's
deterrent strategy.

Department of State Bulletir

ARMS CONTROL

le West's Advantages in
Less Nuclear World

The prospect of a less nuclear world has
laused concern in both Europe and
America. Some fear that it would place
;he West at a grave disadvantage. I
lon't think so.

In any competition ultimately
lepending upon economic and political

■ iynamism and innovation, the United
States, Japan, and Western Europe have
remendous inherent advantages. Our
hree-to-one superiority in gross national
jroduct over the Warsaw Pact, our far
rreater population, and the Western
ead in modern technologies— these are
)nly partial measures of our advantages.
The West's true strength lies in the fact
hat we are not an ideological or military
)loc like the Warsaw Pact; we are an
illiance of free nations, able to draw
ipon the best of the diverse and creative
■nergies of our peoples.

But dramatic reductions in nuclear
veapons and the establishment of
tronger conventional defenses will
equire a united alliance effort. In light
if the President's discussions in Reyk-
avik, we must join with our allies in a
nore systematic consideration of how to
leal with a less nuclear world. To my
nind, that sort of process of joint
nquiry is healthy for the alliance, par-
icularly since we remain firmly agreed
in the basics— the alliance's fundamental
irinciple of shared risks and shared
lurdens on behalf of the common
lefense.

All of these steps— deep reductions
if nuclear weapons, a strong research
irogram in strategic defense, improve-
nents in conventional defenses, and
legotiations with the Soviet Union and
Varsaw Pact— will have to be closely
•ynchronized. This will require a care-
ully coordinated political strategy on
he part of the alliance to deal with these
nterrelated aspects of the larger prob-
em of stability and Western security.
A^e will begin a preliminary discussion of
ust such an approach during my next

■neeting with my NATO counterparts in

Brussels at the December session of the

"Jorth Atlantic Council.

Conclusion

This is a full and complex agenda for all
3f us to consider. Is it ambitious? Yes.
Unrealistic? No. I think that, on the
oasis of the progress made at Reykjavik,
substantial reductions in Soviet and
American nuclear forces are possible,
and they can be achieved in a phased and
stabilizing way.

But we need to think hard about how
to proceed. We are taking on a difficult
task as we seek to create the conditions
in which we can assure the freedom and
security of our country and our allies
without the constant threat of nuclear
catastrophe.

And, of course, our work to achieve
greater strategic stability at pro-
gressively lower levels of nuclear arms is
only part of our larger effort to build a
more realistic and constructive relation-
ship with the Soviet Union. We cannot
pursue arms control in isolation from
other sources of tension. We will con-
tinue to seek a resolution of the more
fundamental sources of political distrust
between our nations, especially those in
the areas of human rights and regional
conflicts.

Progress— whether in science or
foreign affairs— often has to do with the
reinterpretation of fundamental ideas.
That's no easy task. It requires challeng-
ing conventional wisdom. And often we
find that gaining new benefits requires
paying new costs.

Just as what happened 44 years ago
in the squash court under old Stagg
Field opened up both new horizons and
new dangers, so we now see new
possibilities for protecting our security,
as well as new risks if we don't manage
them well. So it is up to us— working
together with both allies and
adversaries— to ensure that we use these
new opportunities to achieve a more
stable and secure peace.

'Press release 2.50 of Nov. 18, 1986. The
question-and-answer session following the
address is not printed here. ■

A World Without Nuclear Weapons

by Kenneth L. Adelman

Address before the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International
Affairs at Princeton University on
November 13, 1986. Mr. Adelman is
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.

Since the Reykjavik meeting between
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev, a lot of people have begun to
take a fresh and serious look at an old
question: would we be better off in a
world without nuclear weapons? Over
the past few weeks there have been
numerous articles on the subject in such
publications as Time, Newsweek, and The
New York Times. I detect something of a
sea change out there. Commentators
who usually devote their column inches
to telling us how desperately we need a
new arms control agreement have
suddenly taken to telling us how
desperately we need nuclear weapons.
Since Reykjavik, everybody seems to be
learning to love nuclear deterrence.

What about this question? Is it really
possible to eliminate nuclear weapons
entirely, and would we be better off in a
world without them? These are serious
issues for arms control. They are serious
issues for our national security. The
elimination of nuclear weapons has been,
at least, a distant goal of our arms con-
trol and disarmament policy since the

beginning of the nuclear era. But I think
we have always understood that it was
not a simple or immediate goal.

Problems of Eliminating
Nuclear Weapons

Today, I think it would be useful to
remind ourselves of some of the prob-
lems it would entail. So let's imagine, for
a moment, a world in which nuclear
weapons were about to be completely
eliminated. What kind of world would
this be? What kinds of problems would
we face?

Soviet Superiority in Conventional
Arms. The first problem we would face
is Soviet superiority in conventional
arms. In Europe right now there is a
serious imbalance in conventional forces
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
At present, the Warsaw Pact has a for-
midable margin of superiority— almost
twice as many divisions, nearly two-and-
a-half times as many tanks, and nearly
five times the number of artillery pieces
in place in Europe. On the purely con-
ventional plane, NATO forces are out-
numbered and outgunned. Reinforce-
ments can obviously be brought from the
United States, but that is a complicated
task, and even then the Warsaw Pact
enjoys a considerable edge. That is why
deterrence in Europe continues to

January 1987

ARMS CONTROL

depend on nuclear weapons and cannot
be anchored on conventional forces
alone.

This is nothing new. Ever since
1945, when the United States rapidly
demobilized its armed forces, we have
depended, and Western Europe has
depended, on U.S. nuclear weapons to
deter Soviet aggression. Time and again
over the years we have reaffirmed the
need to strengthen conventional forces.
And we have made some progress, insuf-
ficient progress but some nonetheless.
But the imbalance remains.

Under these circumstances, to
eliminate the nuclear threat would be to
weaken our deterrence of Soviet aggres-
sion. The first task we would face were
we to proceed in a steady way to
eliminate nuclear weapons, therefore,
would be to right the balance in conven-
tional arms. This may be difficult, for
despite the greater wealth of the West,
we are still free peoples. And free
peoples do not easily choose to commit
large increases in current defense spend-
ing, even if only to match expenditures
by totalitarian states.

Verification. The second problem
we would face is that of verifying a total
ban on nuclear weapons. The verification
problems posed by such an agreement
would be truly monumental. For the past
15 years in arms control, we have relied
on national technical means to verify
compliance. We have been dealing with
many provisions— for example, gross
totals of fixed missile silos— that are
comparatively easy to verify. These
methods of verification have serious
limitations. As we look a short distance
down the arms control trail, we can see
new verification problems emerging.
Mobile missiles already pose a problem
for verification. Warhead limits pose a
problem for verification. As the tech-
nological trend moves in the direction of
smaller and more mobile systems, these
verification problems will only increase.

But these hurdles— by no means
insignificant ones— pale in comparison
with the huge difficulty of ensuring
against clandestine production of nuclear
weapons themselves. The verification
problems posed by this idea take us back
to the kinds of issues we first con-
fronted 40 years ago, when the United
States proposed the Baruch Plan to the
United Nations. The Baruch Plan was
our first nuclear arms control initiative,
a comprehensive proposal to eliminate
nuclear weapons and place all atomic
energy activities under control of an
international authority.

Had it been accepted by the Soviet
Union in 1946, the Baruch Plan would
have been a major undertaking even
then. But at that time, circumstances
were so much simpler. In 1946, when we
proposed the Baruch Plan to the United
Nations, we had a monopoly on atomic
weapons.

Elimination of nuclear weapons
would require the most extensive and
intrusive system of onsite inspections
anyone could imagine. It is hard to think
of a major military or even industrial
installation that could be legally
exempted from inspection on demand.
That would mean, in turn, unprece-
dented openness to foreign intrusion on
the part of all nations. Thus far the
Soviet Union has raised objections to
even the most limited inspection
arrangements.

The Soviets have always resisted
inspection in practice. As Khrushchev
said to Arthur Robens, a British official,
in 1956: "Why should I let you into my
back garden so that you can peep
through my kitchen window?" We still
do not have government-to-government
inspection of Soviet territory. We are a
vast distance away from the kind of
inspection we would need for such a
comprehensive agreement. One need
only think of the fate of Major
Nicholson— who was shot to death in
1985 by Soviet soldiers while carrying
out his inspection duties in East
Germany as permitted under interna-
tional agreement— to see the kinds of
barriers we are up against. We continue
to hope that the Soviet Union will come
to accept more effective verification
measures. In the meantime, without a
comprehensive and thoroughly intrusive
inspection system, a treaty eliminating
nuclear weapons would simply be
impractical.

Third Countries and Nuclear
Weapons. The third problem we must
address is the issue of third countries.
Needless to say, nuclear technology is
far more widely disseminated today than
it was in 1946. We already have a Non-
proliferation Treaty, of course. And we
have been very successful at curbing the
spread of nuclear weapons. But in a
nuclear-weapons-free world, the incen-
tive to cheat might well increase, since a
single madman, a single terrorist leader
armed with atomic weapons, could wield,
if only for a while, disproportionate
power.

Fundamental Problems. But behind
all these problems I have mentioned are
two very fundamental ones. The first is

that we can't put the nuclear genie back
in the bottle. While it may some day be
possible to return to a non-nuclear
world, it is utterly impossible to return
to a prenuclear world. It is utterly
impossible to return to a world where
the secrets of nuclear fission and nucleai
fusion are not yet known. The knowl-
edge for creating atomic bombs exists
and will remain. The knowledge is
widely disseminated. It cannot be
unlearned. Nuclear weapons cannot be
disinvented. Like Adam and Eve, we
have eaten of the apple, and we can't go
back to Eden.

The other fundamental problem is
the nature of the Soviet Union. The mosi
basic reason that eliminating nuclear
weapons will not solve our problem is
that nuclear weapons are not the cause
of our problem. 'They are merely the
symptom. The cause of tension, the
cause of fear, and the cause of danger
are not weapons but aggressive inten-
tions and aggressive policies. Nobody in
the United States loses any sleep over
the British nuclear arsenal. The source
of tension is not the possession of
nuclear weapons but the presence of
aggressive intentions. The most basic
barrier to radical measures of arms con-
trol thus far has been the secretive and
aggressive nature of the Soviet regime.
Until that changes, arms control is up
against some serious hurdles.

Eliminating Ballistic Missiles

But what about the possiblity— proposed
by President Reagan at Reykjavik— of
eUminating ballistic missiles? That is a
different proposition from eliminating al
nuclear weapons. Eliminating ballistic
missiles would be a big job. It is a job we
would have to go about very carefully,
with a clear understanding of the com-
plexities and problems involved. But a
world without ballistic missiles would
offer great advantages over our present
situation, provided we had some form of
insurance like the Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative (SDI) coming on stream to cope
with potential cheating.

Why single out ballistic missiles as a
problem?

First, ballistic missiles are weapons
par excellence of surprise attack and
nuclear blackmail. They travel to their
targets very quickly, 25-30 minutes for
intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), 10-15 minutes for some sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs). Once fired, they cannot be
called back. They cover in minutes the

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

distances that bombers cross only in
hours. They also appear most threaten-
ing psychologically and politically. They
are vulnerable, at least partly so, when
based on land, and highly accurate in any
basing mode. In a nutshell, they are the
weapon system most likely to prompt a
"use it or lose it" type of response in a
crisis.

The Soviets were the first to test
and deploy intercontinental ballistic
missiles in 1957, the year in which they
launched the Sputnik satellite.
Khrushchev made exaggerated claims
about the number of missiles that the
Soviet Union possessed, and many peo-
ple in the West became frightened.
Khrushchev's threats helped to prompt
an antinuclear movement— the "ban the
3omb" movement of the late 1950s.
Since that time, the land-based ballistic
Tiissile has always been the weapon of
:hoice for Soviet nuclear intimidation.

A world without the threat of ballis-
;ic missiles would thus be a world in
A'hich a major instrument of surprise
luclear attack and nuclear blackmail had
)een eliminated.

Second, there is also reason to
jelieve that without ballistic missiles,
luclear deterrence would be more
stable. The Soviets have always seen the
ballistic missile as a preemptive weapon,
^ven as we have placed emphasis on
•etaliation. The heart of the present
Soviet arsenal is a force of 308 SS-18
Tiissiles with 10-plus warheads each.
These warheads are powerful and
iccurate. The SS-18 missiles are
designed as a first-strike weapon. They
ire designed to destroy our land-based
nissiles in their silos, to destroy a large
oart of our land-based retaliatory force
before it can get off the ground.

If both sides' weapons are
vulnerable, temptation on both sides to
ase them in a crisis increases. So ballistic
missiles, in addition to being very
threatening weapons, can be destabiliz-
ing. If we move away from these hair-
trigger weapons, we may improve
stability.

But what about the problems of a
world without ballistic missiles? There is
no use pretending that such a world
would be problem free. What would be
some of the difficulties we would face in
moving to a world without ballistic
missiles? First, nuclear deterrence would
still operate. But now we would be talk-
ing about slower flying, air-breathing
delivery vehicles.

Soviet Air Defense Superiority.

The first problem we would face in this

world is Soviet air defense superiority.
The Soviets have invested massively in
air defenses. The Soviets have more
than 9,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM)
launchers, over 4,600 tactical SAM
launchers, and some 10,000 air defense
radars. We have nothing comparable to
this. If deterrence is no longer going to
rely on ballistic missiles, then we need to
think seriously about improving our own
air defenses. We would also have to
think seriously about improving our abil-
ity to penetrate Soviet air defenses. And
we would probably have to think seri-
ously also about strengthening conven-
tional forces.

Verification and Compliance. But

the truly major problem we would face is
verification and compliance. It would be
a formidable problem. In a world without
ballistic missiles and without strategic
defense, there would always be a
tremendous temptation for a potential
aggressor to produce a clandestine force
of ballistic missiles. Such a force would
give its possessor enormous power. The
danger would be far greater than it was
in the 1950s. Because ballistic missiles
have already been built, extremely
powerful and accurate missiles could be
fielded much more rapidly than they
were then. Indeed, rocket technology
would continue to advance, since space
programs would continue.

In addition, clandestine production,
storage, and deployment of missiles
would be very hard to detect. Mobile
missiles are of particular concern in this
regard. Indeed, we should not forget
that the Soviets have already deployed a
mobile ICBM, the SS-25, which was
itself a violation of the SALT II
[strategic arms limitation talks] agree-
ment. Research and production have
always been extremely difficult to verify
by national technical means.

In a world without ballistic missiles,
we would have to worry about not just
Soviet noncompliance. We would also
have to worry about third countries.
These are all very serious problems.

The Need for Strategic Defenses

But this is where defenses come in. If we
were to couple elimination of ballistic
missiles with deployment of strategic
defenses against ballistic missiles, we
would have a critical hedge against
cheating. We would also create a power-
ful disincentive against cheating, since in
the presence of effective defenses,
ballistic missiles would tend to lose the
overwhelming military value they now
have. If defenses exist to stop ballistic
missiles, then there would be less

military reason, in a world where
ballistic missiles had been eliminated, to
bring them back. Strategic defenses
would thus be an insurance policy for
arms control.

I am not saying that elimination of
ballistic missiles would be an easy job.
But defenses at least make the idea of a
world without ballistic missiles seem a
lot more reasonable than it might have
seemed in the past.

That is what President Reagan pro-
posed to General Secretary Gorbachev in
Reykjavik— a plan for elimination of
ballistic missiles coupled with deploy-
ment of strategic defenses. It is, in my
view, a powerful and creative vision. It
is a vision of a world in which the most
menacing weapons, ballistic missiles, had
been eliminated by arms control and
simultaneously rendered obsolete by
defenses. It is a vision in which paper
agreements are backed up by strong
physical guarantees. That's partly
what's been missing in arms control in
the past, a clear insurance policy against
noncompliance.

President Reagan's offer suggests
how strategic defense can assist and
strengthen arms control. In fact,
strategic defense technologies represent
possibly the most promising develop-
ment for arms control and national
security since space launches made
possible the reconaissance satellite. The
Strategic Defense Initiative could prove
an even more radical advance than the
emergence of "national technical
means" of verification.

The President proposed the idea to
show the Soviets how defenses and arms
control can work together. The Presi-
dent proposed the idea to show how
defenses can make arms control possible
on a scale, I think, few people dreamed
of in the recent past. Finally, the Presi-
dent proposed the idea to allay Soviet
fears that we are seeking a first-strike
capability through SDL We are not, and
by now the Soviets should realize this. If
ballistic missiles are phased out, a first
strike will become impossible. There will
be no swift sword— only a defensive
shield.

For me, the real significance of all
this is the way in which the idea of
defenses is allowing us to think in a new
way about the problems of arms control
and national security generally. And I
would call upon everyone in this room to
stop and give a moment's thought to
what important possibilities lie before
us. For I believe Reykjavik was an
important moment, and I believe we are
at a critical crossroads. We are at a
critical crossroads, and we are being
asked to choose between two paths.

January 1987

ARMS CONTROL

Fourteen years ago, when we signed
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, we deliberately chose as a nation
the path of nuclear vulnerability. We
chose the path of vulnerability because
we believed that it would be a path to
a safer world. We chose the path of
vulnerability because we believed that it
would be a way to real arms control. We
chose the path of vulnerability because
we believed it would be a road to
genuine reductions in nuclear arms.

The 1972 ABM Treaty committed us
to keep our society vulnerable to nuclear
attack. But the preamble of the treaty
also affirmed the "premise" that "the
limitation of antiballistic missile
systems" would "contribute to the crea-
tion of more favorable conditions for
further negotiations on limiting strategic
arms." The preamble of the treaty
spelled out the explicit connection
between our agreement to remain
vulnerable and our intention to get
reductions in nuclear arms. The pream-
ble of the treaty stated the expectation
that both nations would "take effective
measures toward reductions in strategic
arms" at "the earliest possible date."
The chief American negotiator, my
predecessor at ACDA, Gerard Smith,
made a unilateral American statement
on May 9, 1972, that:

... if an agreement providing for more
complete strategic offensive arms limitations
were not achieved within five years, U.S.
supreme interests could be jeopardized.
Should that occur, it would constitute a basis
for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Well, 5 years came and went, and
there was no move on the Soviet side
toward reductions. Five years after 1972
was 1977. And in 1977 President Carter
sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to
Moscow with a proposal for deep reduc-
tions in nuclear arms. The Soviets
turned President Carter down flat. Two
years later, we signed SALT II, a treaty
which permitted vast increases in
strategic offensive arms. Since 1972, the
number of nuclear weapons in the Soviet
arsenal has quadrupled, and the Soviets
have accumulated weapons designed to
be used preemptively— those SS-18
missiles, which are weapons designed to
deprive us of the retaliatory capacity
that our vulnerability was supposed to
guarantee. Our own arsenal has grown,
too, though more slowly.

In short, the path of vulnerability
has proved to be a blind alley. We sought
reductions in offensive weapons and con-
sented to vulnerability. All we got in
return was vastly increased offensive
weapons and increased vulnerability. It

is time that we turn to the path of
defenses. What can strategic defenses
offer to national security and to arms
control?

Strategic defenses, once deployed by
both sides, can make three contributions
to mutual security.

First, they can enhance stability by
complicating any surprise attack and
thus making a preemptive attack
extremely difficult to plan with
confidence.

Second, they can counteract nuclear
blackmail by blunting the missile threat.

Third, by making ballistic missiles
less effective, defenses can make them
less of a factor in the military balance
and in world politics generally. They can
make ballistic missiles less valuable and
thus create incentives for reducing them.
In fact, it was SDI that brought the
Soviets back to the bargaining table in
Geneva after their 1983 walkout from
the arms talks.

In short, defensive research is point-
ing the way toward a world in which
ballistic missiles play less of a
role, in which fast, first-strike systems
will become less effective, and in which
slower, second-strike systems come to
dominate the military equation. It is
pointing away from the current hair-
trigger balance based on the primacy of
ballistic missiles. These are precisely the
goals we have sought to achieve over the
years with arms control. Defenses can
achieve many of the goals of arms con-
trol and can also be combined with arms
control.

Soviet Intentions and
U.S. National Security

The basic question is this: what do the
Soviets want? Do they want safety for
themselves? Will that be enough for
them? For if that is the case, then they
should be willing to move with us toward
a world in which ballstic missiles are
built down and defenses are built up.
They should be willing to move with us
toward a world in which offensive arms
reductions are combined with defenses
to reduce the total ballistic missile threat
to each side.

Or do they, rather, wish to threaten
others? If that is the case— if they need
to threaten others in order to feel secure
in themselves— then prospects for genu-
inely improving stability for both sides
with negotiated agreements are very
dim.

But I am hopeful. I believe our arms
control policy and our national security

ought to have a single goal. That goal is
almost too obvious to state: it is to de-
fend ourselves, to decrease the dangers
that we face by whatever means are at
our disposal. I believe we ought to be
willing to move toward that goal by
whatever path presents itself— whether
by technology or by negotiated
agreements or, hopefully, by some
mutually reinforcing mixture of the two.
I believe it is time to reject the idea that
technology always has to work against
us and can never be made to work for
us. I believe it is time to reject the idea
that the way to a safer world is by
restraining American technology while
letting Soviet weapons multiply and
become more lethal.

I believe we are in a better position
today than we have been in years to
achieve real, stablizing arms control
agreements. I believe the Soviets ought
to have every incentive to join us, and I
hope that they will. But I also believe we
are in a better position today than ever
before to guarantee our future by our
own ingenuity, whether they do or not.

In short, I believe the day has
arrived once again when it is not the
totalitarian dictatorships of the world
but rather the free societies, with their
creativity and energy and ingenuity, tha
are calling the tune and setting the pace
and pointing the way to the future. At
the end of the Revolutionary War in
1782, a citizen of Philadelphia remarked
to Dr. Benjamin Rush, "It looks as if the
battle for independence is finally over."
Rush replied, "Sir, you are mistaken.
The Revolutionary War may be over, bu
the battle of independence has just
begun."

We have preserved freedom, and we
have preserved peace for 40 years. But
in a real sense the battle for peace and
for freedom is just beginning. But I am
confident, in this nation's courage, its
technological ingenuity, its dedication,
and its good sense. "No problem of
human dignity is beyond human beings,"
President Kennedy once said. "Man's
reason and spirit have often solved the
seemingly unsolvable— and we believe
they can do it again." I believe that we
can do it. I believe that with all the tools
at our disposal— by deterrence, by
defense, and by negotiation— we can
build a more permanent and a more
stable peace. That is why I believe that
our children and our children's children
will enjoy the same safety and prosperity
that we enjoy and breathe the same air
of liberty that we breathe in democratic
countries that are secure and strong and
free. ■

Department of State Bulletir

ARMS CONTROL

Permitted and Prohibited
Activities Under the ABIVI Treaty

by Paul H. Nitze

Address before the Intematiorial Law
Wtekend Groups in New York City on
October 31, 1986. Ambassador Nitze is
imperial adviser to the President and the
Strretary of State on arms control
iiKitters.

At Reykjavik, a number of issues arose
with respect to the interrelationship
between limitations on defense and
space programs and reductions in offen-
sive systems. One issue involved the
■-elevant time period, or date, to govern
rertain obligations that the United
States and the Soviet Union would
undertake regarding these problems,
jeneral Secretary Gorbachev insisted on
1 time period of 10 years. President
• ?leagan was prepared to agree to this
;ime period provided agreement could be
ichieved on three subjects, namely, the
•egime of control over defenses, the pro-
gram of reductions in offensive ballistic
nissiles during those 10 years, and what
>ach side was to be allowed to do after
he 10 years.

On the issue of the regime of control
)ver defenses, President Reagan pro-
)osed to Mr. Gorbachev that both sides
itrictly abide by the limitations of the
Vntiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Mr.
jorbachev insisted on what he called
neasures to strengthen the ABM Treaty
)ut what, in fact, amounted to an at-
empt to amend it. Specifically, he pro-
)osed to restrict to the laboratory
esting of all space elements or com-
)onents of antiballistic missile defense.

The positions of the two sides in part
•eflect substantially different views as to
vhat defensive research, development,
md testing activities should be per-
nitted over the next 10 years. The
United States believes that the nature of
ictivities permitted and prohibited by
;he ABM Treaty, based on the treaty
;ext and the negotiating record, is clear.
The Soviet side, under the guise of
'strengthening" the ABM Treaty,
ivishes, in effect, to amend the treaty to
orohibit activities that it was not
intended to prohibit. What follows
focuses on this issue.

Distinguishing

Research from Development

First, it should be noted that nowhere
does the ABM Treaty use the word
"research." Neither the U.S. nor the
Soviet delegations to the SALT I
[strategic arms limitation talks] negotia-
tions believed that it was possible to
verify limitations on research. In fact,
neither side wished research to be
limited, and the ABM Treaty makes no
attempt to do so. In a major statement
before the Soviet Presidium in 1972.
shortly after the ABM Treaty was
signed, then-Soviet Defense Minister
Grechko stated that the ABM Treaty
"places no limitations on the perform-
ance of research and experimental work
aimed at resolving the problem of
defending the country from nuclear
missile strike."

The United States has traditionally
distinguished "research" from "develop-
ment" along the lines outlined by Harold
Brown in a 1971 statement to the Soviet
SALT I delegation. Research includes
conceptual design and testing conducted
both inside and outside the laboratory.
Development follows research and
precedes full-scale testing of systems
and components designed for actual
deployment. Development of a weapon
system commences with the construction
and testing of one or more prototypes of
the system or its major components.

Development and Testing
in the ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty does address and, in
certain articles, places specific limits on
the development and testing of certain
ABM systems and components.

Article I prohibits deployment of
ABM systems for a territorial defense or
for defense of an individual region
except as provided in article III; it limits
deployment, not development or testing,
and limits ABM systems, not ABM
components.

Article II defines an ABM system as
"a system to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajec-
tory." According to article 11(1), the
components of an ABM system "cur-
rently" consist of: ABM interceptor

missiles, which are missiles constructed
and deployed for an ABM role or tested
in an ABM mode; ABM launchers, which
launch ABM interceptor missiles; and
ABM radars, which are radars con-
structed and deployed for an ABM role
or tested in an ABM mode.

Article III specifies the areas in
which ABM systems or their components
may be deployed and the number that
may be deployed in those areas.

Article IV exempts from the limita-
tions of article III systems or their com-
ponents used for development or testing
and located within agreed test ranges.

Article V prohibits the development,
testing, and deployment of sea-based,
air-based, space-based, and mobile land-
based ABM systems and ABM components.

Article VI prohibits giving non-ABM
systems or components an ABM capabil-
ity or testing them in an ABM mode.

Agreed Statement D, reinforcing
restrictions on deployment in article III,
provides that, if ABM systems or com-
ponents based on "other physical prin-
ciples" than those used for ABM com-
ponents in 1972 and capable of sub-
stituting for ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers, or ABM radars are
created in the future, limitations on
those systems would be subject to discus-
sion in accordance with article XIII and
agreement in accordance with article
XIV.

Permitted Development
and Testing Activities

Taken together, the provisions of the
ABM Treaty permit various types of
ABM development and testing activity. I
will describe that activity in four general
classes.

• First, the treaty does not limit the
development and testing of devices that
are neither components of an ABM
system, as defined in article II, nor
substitutes for such components. Such
elements are not, and were not intended
to be, governed by the treaty's develop-
ment and testing prohibitions.

• Second, the treaty permits tests
that are not in an ABM mode (e.g.,
against satellites) of devices that do not
have an ABM capability. The term
"tested in an ABM mode" is specifically
addressed in a classified agreed state-

January 1987

ARMS CONTROL

ment negotiated in 1978 by the United
States and the Soviet Union in the
Standing Consultative Commission. That
agreement provides, in part, that an
interceptor missile is considered to be
"tested in an ABM mode" if it has
attempted to intercept a strategic
ballistic missile or its elements in flight
trajectory. The term "strategic ballistic
missile or its elements in flight trajec-
tory" would include a ballistic target-
missile with the flight trajectory charac-
teristics of a strategic ballistic missile or
its elements over that portion of the
flight trajectory involved in the test.

In practice, neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union considers
"flight trajectory" to include an orbit in
space or "tested in an ABM mode" to
encompass tests against targets in space
that do not follow a ballistic missile
flight trajectory. The Soviet Union con-
ducted tests against objects in Earth
orbit in the 1970s both prior to and after
deploying their antisatellite weapon.
Based both on this understanding of
"tested in an ABM mode" and on the
fact that components, as defined in
article II, were not involved, the United
States recently conducted the Delta 180
SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]
experiment to test our ability to track
targets in orbit. Since no device in the
experiment was tested in an ABM mode
and no device in the experiment could
substitute for an ABM component, none
of the devices in this experiment was
itself an ABM component; the exper-
iment, therefore, was fully consistent
with the ABM Treaty.

• Third, the treaty permits the
development and testing at agreed test
ranges of certain ABM systems and com-
ponents based on physical principles
used in 1972. As modified by article V,
article IV permits both the United
States and the Soviet Union to develop
and test fixed, land-based ABM
launchers and ABM radars located at
permitted test ranges and to launch
ABM interceptors into space from those
ABM launchers.

• The fourth class of development
and testing activity permitted by the
ABM Treaty involves ABM systems
based on physical principles other than
the physical principles used in 1972 and
components of such systems capable of

substituting for the ABM components
defined in article II. Agreed Statement
D to the ABM Treaty, which has the
same legal standing as the main text of
the treaty, permits the "creation"— i.e.,
the development and testing— of, for
example, space-based ABM systems that
are based on "other physical principles"
and their components.

This legally correct reading of
Agreed Statement D is fully justified by
the treaty text and the negotiating
record. The President, nonetheless, has
decided that, as long as we continue to
believe that our program objectives can
be met, the United States will not
restructure the originally planned SDI
program and, therefore, need not con-
duct its SDI activities according to this
"broader" interpretation of the treaty in
order to achieve the SDI research
objectives.

During the SALT I negotiations, the
United States sought to constrain the
development and testing of devices,
other than the three components defined
in article II, that might perform an ABM
function, including, for example, devices
based on other physical principles. The
Soviet delegation, however, refused to
consider any such limitations, arguing
that the sides could not agree about
something that could not be defined or
understood and that neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union had any idea
what devices or combination of devices
might substitute for an ABM component,
as defined in article II.

A careful reading of the treaty text
and review of the negotiating record
demonstrate that in Agreed Statement
D, ABM systems based on other physical
principles and their components are not,
and were not intended to be, subject to
the constraints on development and
testing specified elsewhere in the treaty.
Specifically, the restrictions of article V
of the treaty do not apply to ABM
systems based on other physical prin-
ciples and their components.

Reykjavik and Beyond

In Reykjavik, substantial differences
between the United States and the
Soviet Union over Soviet-proposed
restrictions going beyond those of the
ABM Treaty prevented progress toward

agreement on a comprehensive
framework for a predictable and stable
arms control regime. The United States
believes that both sides should adhere to
the ABM Treaty as currently formu-
lated. Specifically, the United States
need not accept limitations on develop-
ment and testing activities going beyond
those provided by the treaty. We also
must register both our concern over
Soviet ABM-related activities that sug-
gest that they may be preparing an
ABM defense of their national territory
and our conviction that the Soviets
should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar
being constructed in direct violation of
the treaty.

In contrast to the U.S. position, the
Soviets proposed in Iceland to modify
the ABM Treaty to confine to the
laboratory research and testing on any
space elements of space-based systems.
The Soviets intended to impose con-
straints on our SDI research program
far more severe than those imposed ever
by the "narrower" interpretation of the
ABM Treaty. Such additional constraints
would kill the SDI program. The Presi
dent could not accept this.

The United States calls upon the
Soviet Union to recognize that its pro-
posal would impose constraints that havf
no basis or justification in the ABM
Treaty. We must reject Soviet attempts
to amend the ABM Treaty indirectly by
reopening questions of permitted and
prohibited activities under the treaty.
The Soviet Union must understand that
the United States opposes restrictions
on development and testing beyond
those that were negotiated, agreed, and
codified in the ABM Treaty.

With such an understanding, we can
move forward toward a comprehensive,
stabilizing agreement on a future arms
control regime providing for defensive
research and testing, strategic offensive
reductions, and a jointly managed transi-
tion to greater reliance on defenses.

K
it
H

'The International Law Weekend Group
is comprised of the American branch of the
International Law Association, the
International Law Committee of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of New York City, the
American Society of International Law, and p
the American Foreign Law Association. ■

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

luclear and Space Arms Talks
^lose Round Six

Following are statements by Presi-
I'lif Reagan and Ambassador Max M.
'lunpelman, head of the U.S. delegation
I the nuclear and space arms
tyotiations.

'RESIDENTS STATEMENT,
JOV. 12. 19861

ince today marks the close of round six
f the nuclear and space talks (NST)
etween the United States and the
oviet Union, I want to take this occa-
ion to reaffirm our commitment to
chieving deep, equitable, and verifiable
eductions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear
rsenals. Such reductions would reduce
le risk of nuclear war and create a far
ifer world.

When this round opened 8 weeks
go, it held the promise of important
rogress in our effort to get Soviet
greement to deep reductions in nuclear
rms. Those hopes were heightened by
le progress made during my meeting
'ith General Secretary Gorbachev at
leykjavik last month. We discussed
lere the full range of issues between
ur countries, including human rights,
egional conflicts, arms reductions, and
xpanded bilateral contacts and com-
lunication. And specifically, in regard
T arms control, the General Secretary
nd I made significant headway in nar-
owing U.S. -Soviet differences on
everal key issues.

I • We agreed to a 50% reduction in
trategic offensive arms over the next 5
ears, to be implemented by reductions
0 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery
ehicles and 6,000 warheads on those
lelivery vehicles.

• We recognized the need for
■ignificant cuts in Soviet heavy ICBMs
intercontinental ballistic missiles], the
nost destabilizing missiles of all.

• We agreed to a global limit of 100
varheads on longer range INF
intermediate-range nuclear force]
nissiles, with no such missiles in
Europe.

The United States proposed that
leither the United States nor U.S.S.R.
Jeploy advanced strategic defenses for
10 years while conducting research,
development, and testing, which are per-
mitted by the ABM [Antiballistic Missile]
Treaty. This would be coupled with
agreement that during the first 5 years

of this period, strategic offensive arms
would be reduced by 50% and that dur-
ing the second 5 years, all remaining
U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic
missiles would be totally eliminated. We
made clear that at the end of the 10-year
period, either side could deploy defenses
if it so chose, unless the parties agreed
otherwise. Mr. Gorbachev did not accept
this proposal and instead insisted on
making the ABM Treaty more restric-
tive by limiting our research exclusively
to the laboratory and, in effect, killing
the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

During this round, our negotiators in
Geneva formally tabled new U.S. pro-
posals reflecting the areas of agreement
I reached with Mr. Gorbachev in Reyk-
javik, as well as our other proposals. On
November 7, the Soviet Union took some
new steps as well, by tabling proposals
that partially reflect the headway made
at Reykjavik. These areas of agreement
can serve as the starting point from
which U.S. and Soviet negotiators could
hammer out significant arms reduction
treaties. But this has not yet been the
case. While this may have been the most
productive round to date, the Soviet
negotiations have still not followed up
adequately to build on the progress made
at Reykjavik. Instead, at times, the
Soviets have seemed more interested in
conducting a public relations campaign
than in pursuing the serious give-and-
take of the bargaining table.

This is particularly true in the case
of reductions in intermediate-range
nuclear forces. One year ago, at our
summit meeting in Geneva, Mr. Gor-
bachev and I agreed to build upon areas
of common ground, including an interim
agreement in INF. The Soviets
reiterated this position in proposals they
made earlier this year. And they reaf-
firmed the goal of a separate INF agree-
ment only days before our meeting in
Iceland. Now, however, the Soviets have
taken a major step backwards by
insisting that progress in every area of
nuclear arms control must be linked
together in a single package. This
attempt to hold progress in other areas
of arms control hostage to acceptance of
the Soviet effort to kill our SDI program
is patently unacceptable.

In light of the continuing Soviet
offensive buildup, the longstanding and
extensive Soviet programs in strategic
defense, and continued Soviet non-
compliance with existing arms control

agreements, SDI is crucial to the future
security of the United States and our
allies. Americans recognize that SDI was
essential in getting the Soviets to return
to the negotiating table and that it is
essential as well to our prospects for
concluding an agreement with the
Soviets to reduce nuclear arms. Effec-
tive strategic defenses would be
insurance against Soviet cheating or
abrogation of such an agreement. In
addition, they would provide a continu-
ing incentive to the Soviets to pursue
further reductions in offensive weapons.
SDI is, therefore, a vital insurance policy
that we cannot, and will not, bargain
away. That is a commitment which I
have made to the American people, and I
stand by it.

U.S. negotiators have worked hard
in translating the progress made at
Reykjavik into concrete new arms reduc-
tion proposals. These new American
proposals, along with some new Soviet
proposals, are now on the table in
Geneva. Let us hope that when the talks
resume on January 15, as we have
already agreed, the Soviets will move
with us to bring about, for the first time
in history, significant reductions in
nuclear weapons. Such reductions are
now within our grasp if the Soviet Union
will join us in serious pursuit of
agreements which are equitable and
stabilizing for both sides, and in the
interest of the entire world. We are
ready for this. We await Soviet
readiness to move forward.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S

STATEMENT,
NOV. 12. 1986

This has been a useful and a productive
round, our most productive to date. We
end the round— a round which, of course,
included the meeting between President
Reagan and General Secretary Gor-
bachev at Reykjavik on October 11-12—
with important areas of agreement, as
well as with important areas of dif-
ference between us.

Let me run through the major areas
of agreement.

• We are agreed that there should
be a 50% reduction in intercontinental-
range missiles and bombers within a
5-year period and that these reductions
should leave each side with no more than
6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery
vehicles,

• We are also agreed that
intermediate-range missiles in Europe
would be eliminated and reduced to a

January 1987

EAST ASIA

global equality level of 100 warheads.
This is a reduction of 100% in Europe of
the Soviet SS-20 missiles that threaten
every European city, and a reduction of
80% of the Soviet SS-20s in Asia. The
Soviets have now agreed that British
and French nuclear systems have no
place in these negotiations. We are
agreed that an agreement should also
contain constraints on shorter range
missiles and provide for future negotia-
tions on this issue.

• In the defense and space area,
both sides are now prepared to under-
take a commitment not to exercise their
right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty
for a period of 10 years. Conditions sur-
rounding that commitment continue to
divide us.

As you can see, we have made
important progress. I do not, however,
wish to minimize the number and
significance of the differences that still
divide us, or the difficult negotiations
that will be required to overcome them. I
will not elaborate upon them here
because they are serious parts of our
current negotiations. An additional
obstacle that emerged in Reykjavik is
the renewed Soviet insistence on
artificially linking progress in one
negotiating group to progress in the
other two. In particular, the Soviet
insistence on holding the elimination of
intermediate-range nuclear forces
hostage to our acceptance of their
insistence on amending the ABM Treaty
is not only inherently illogical but runs
contrary to the position they have taken
publicly and privately since early this
year.

Nevertheless, we are determined to
continue our search for full agreement.
We will be studying the issues when we
return home to Washington in prepara-
tion for our next round, which will begin
on January 15. We also intend to con-
tinue the pattern we have developed of
between-round exchanges.

U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets

ji^

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986.

Following is a statement made by
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
W. Alle7i Wallis on October 31. 1986.

During this week [October 29-.31, 1986]
U.S. Government subcabinet level
officials have held a series of talks with
their Japanese counterparts. These in-
cluded the first full-scale session of our
dialogue on structural economic issues,
our semiannual subcabinet consultations
on economic and trade issues, and the
Energy Working Group. The two
governments agreed during Prime
Minister Nakasone's visit to Washington
in April this year to begin a dialogue on
structural issues. We held an organiza-
tional meeting in San Francisco in July
and began the substantive discussion this
week. The subcabinet and Energy Work-
ing Group meetings occur twice a year;
the last meetings were in Tokyo in
February.

The focus of the discussion in the
subcabinet consultations was U.S. -Japan
trade and economic relations. We
discussed the progress in Japan's
implementation of its undertakings in
the MOSS [market-oriented, sector-
selective] talks and hope to see U.S.
sales to Japan in the MOSS sectors
increase pursuant to the market opening
measures on which we have agreed. The
United States believes unresolved MOSS
issues should be settled, and the two
sides agreed to continue to work on
outstanding issues.

We noted we recently had resolved
some longstanding trade issues,
including aluminum and semiconductors.
On October 3, Japan agreed to reduce its
duty on cigarettes to zero and to lessen
other impediments to sales of U.S.
tobacco products in Japan. We expect
these measures will result in a mean-
ingful increase in U.S. tobacco and
tobacco-product exports to Japan.

While we are pleased that these and
other issues have been resolved, the U.S.
delegation was frank in pointing out that
serious and unsustainable imbalances
remain in our economic relationship with
Japan and that future actions by Japan
are urgently needed.

Japan is expected to continue to
have large trade surpluses with the
United States and with the world this
year. Japan continues to rely heavily on
exports for growth and economic pros-
perity. In this connection, we urged the
Japanese Government to allow full and
immediate pass through of the benefits
of yen appreciation and lower oil prices,

to accelerate the process of restructur
ing its economy and to place greater
emphasis on domestic-led growth. At the
same time the U.S. delegation pointed t(
the importance of eliminating barriers tc
Japanese imports.

Among the trade matters raised by
the U.S. delegation were: Ij

• The importance of accelerated f
implementation of Prime Minister
Nakasone's April 1986 statement that
Japan must take actions leading to a Ij
significant increase in imports, par-
ticularly of manufactured products;

• The need for removal of remainin|(
barriers to U.S. exports to Japan. This
includes meaningful access to and par-
ticipation in the Kansai Airport project,
rapid progress in the transportation
machinery MOSS, resolution of the U.S.
complaints on Japan's quotas on fish anc
the so-called GATT 12 [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] agricultural
products, and tariff reductions in high
value and processed agricultural prod-
ucts, namely vegetables, fruits and nuts,
and processed foods and feeds; and

• More Japanese purchases of com-
petitive U.S. energy products and invest
ment in U.S. coal and gas projects.

As is usual in the subcabinet
meetings, the two sides discussed global
economic developments. The United
States expects a pickup in real GNP
growth in the United States and in
Europe later this year and sees slightly
less than 3% average OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development] growth this year and
about 3.5% growth next year. Expansior
is expected to weaken in Europe late in
1987. We noted the yen appreciation had
dampened economic growth in Japan but
suggested that this weakness might be
mitigated by full and immediate pass
through of Japan's improved terms of
trade. We hope Japan will encourage
strong domestic-led growth which would
have a beneficial effect on the U.S. and
Japanese external imbalances and on
growth in the developing countries. I
believe Japan's analysis of the world
economy was similar to ours.

We had a useful discussion on the
new GATT round. We and the Japanese,
of course, will play active and, we hope,
cooperative roles in this negotiation. We
urged Japan to join us in pressing for a
speedy agreement on agricultural issues.
We also discussed development assist-
ance and, in particular, the important

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

lontributions our two countries can
lake to the Philippines need for more
levelopment aid and for help on trade
pd investment. Japan indicated its
iterest in the development of the Philip-
|ines, and we hope it will help that
[ountry.

Our first, full-scale dialogue on struc-
tural impediments to reducing external
Imbalances focused on the evolution of
loth the external and domestic
mbalances in the United States and
apan. Differences in consumption, sav-
ngs, and investment patterns; the role
if exchange rates in adjustment process;
nd the composition of trade flows were
ome of the topics discussed.

In the Energy Working Group, we
liscussed the international energy
lutlook, energy security prospects, and
i)rogress in implementing the November
983 joint statement on energy coopera-
:ion, agreed to by President Reagan and
'rime Minister Nakasone. Special
mphasis was given to removing barriers
0 energy trade and to taking advantage
f lower oil prices to build strategic oil
tocks. The United States stressed the
leed to halt the decline in Japanese
Tiports of competitively priced U.S.
oal. It sought progress on coal and
quefied natural gas export projects and
xpressed interest in the implementation
f the coal recommendations in the
4aekawa report.

Let me conclude by saying that the
J.S. and the Japanese delegations
.greed that the economic problems the
wo sides confront require urgent and
ontinued attention by both govern-
nents. We agreed to redouble our
fforts to resolve particular trade issues
nd to address the fundamental factors
hat underlie both countries' large exter-
lal imbalances. ■

U.S.-EC Relations and

the International Trading System

by W. Allen Wallis

Address before the Luxembourg
Society for International Affairs in Lux-
embourg on October 8, 1986. Mr. Wallis
is Under Secretary for Economic
AJfairs.

It is an honor to appear before the
Luxembourg Society for International
Affairs. This is a particularly appro-
priate setting in which to discuss U.S.
relations with the the European Com-
munity (EC) and the importance of U.S.-
European cooperation in strengthening
the international trading system.

In the United States, we are well
aware of Luxembourg's strong interna-
tional orientation, which stems from its
location in the heart of Europe. Over
80% of your gross national product
(GNP) comes from international trade.
You understand better than just about
any country the benefits of an open
trading system.

Luxembourg is also the site of many
important European institutions, includ-
ing the European Parliament, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the European
Investment Bank, and other major Com-
munity institutions.

As a cofounder of the Benelux
[Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
economic union] arrangement, Luxem-
bourg helped lay the cornerstone for
European economic integration. Today,
Luxembourg participates actively and
constructively in the European Com-
munity and can play a significant role in
helping the EC address the challenges of
the future.

Luxembourg has made an important
contribution to U.S. -European under-
standing and friendship that you may
not think much about. Having been
involved in university education all of my
life, I am keenly aware— and appreci-
ative—of the fact that you have made
possible visits to Europe by hundreds of
thousands of Americans (especially
students and other young people) who
could not have afforded the trip if you
had not allowed Iceland Air Lines to

land its inexpensive flights here when no
other country in Europe would accept
them. Whether these young people made
friends for America, I do not know— I
hope so— but I do know that they
returned to America with their friend-
ship for Europeans and their under-
standing of Europe much enlarged.

The Basis for U.S.-EC Relations

Before I turn to current economic issues
between the United States and the EC
agenda, it is well to recall the basis of
our relationship.

Fundamentally, the United States
was born from the values and traditions
of Western Europe. While we now have
millions of citizens who trace their
ancestry to Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, Europeans were the original
immigrants to America. They brought
with them an established philosophy of
government which is incorporated into
our Constitution and political institu-
tions. This includes our commitment to
democracy, individual liberty, human
rights, economic freedom, and the rule
of law. Those European settlers brought
us also our codes of law, which are based
primarily on British common law but
also, in some parts of the country, on the
Napoleonic Code and Spanish law.

Moreover, Europe has been the
wellspring for American culture and
intellectual achievement. Your music,
art, literature, and science became the
foundations of ours, and now our culture
and accomplishments have become part
of yours.

We also share nearly 400 years of
historical experience. As the graves at
the American military cemetery in
Hamm testify, the United States has
been involved in all three of the major
European wars since our founding. That
involvement was and is an earnest of
America's commitment to a free and
prosperous European Continent.
Although our Pacific ties are growing, as
is only natural for a country whose
expansion has been toward the Pacific

January 1987

ECONOMICS

and which has global interests, com-
mitments, and responsibilities, we are—
and, for the foreseeable future, will
remain— essentially European in outlook
and orientation.

Our common heritage and shared
values are the source for U.S. -European
cooperation in a wide range of areas.
Geopolitically, we face a common threat
and stand together in NATO for our
common defense. This is why we have
stationed over 300,000 U.S. forces in
Europe and why we installed additional
missiles here after our NATO allies
asked us in 1979 to do so.

We also cooperate on a broad range
of foreign policy issues, for example, ter-
rorism. South Africa, and the Middle
East. On terrorism, in particular, our
message is clear: perpetrators of ter-
rorism will be identified, no concessions
will be made to terrorists, and acts of
terrorism will be costly to the
perpetrators.

In addition, we share a special com-
mitment to promote economic develop-
ment and nurture newly emerging
democracies. We cooperate in our
parliaments and in international
organizations toward this end.

Finally, we enjoy one of the largest
and most comprehensive economic rela-
tionships in the world. This year, two-
way trade between the United States
and the EC will exceed $125 billion,
second only to trade between Canada
and the United States. Two-way direct
investment stands at nearly $190 billion.
The firms responsible for that invest-
ment produced over $700 billion worth
of goods and services in 1985. That is
larger than the GNP of all but a handful
of countries and a graphic illustration of
the extent of U.S. -European interde-
pendence.

During the past 5 years, the United
States has seen a dramatic shift in its
trade balance with the EC. Until 1984,
we consistently ran balance-of -payments
surpluses with the Community. Those
surpluses reached a peak in 1980 of
$18 billion. Our trade position has
deteriorated since then, however. We
now project for 1986 a deficit of $28
billion in our trade with the Community.

Among the factors accounting for
this change has been a sharp change on
agriculture: since 1980, our agricultural
sales to the EC have fallen by 40%. Our
agricultural trade surplus declined from

a high of $6.8 billion in 1981 to only
$1.6 billion in 1985 and may disappear
entirely this year.

This stands in sharp contrast with
the Community's emergence over the
last two decades as the second largest
agricultural exporter. Contrary to the
usual course of economic development,
agricultural exports from Europe
actually are increasing as a share of its
total exports.

Despite high production costs and
the need to subsidize virtually all
exports, the EC has become the world's
largest exporter of poultry, eggs, beef,
veal, refined sugar, and dairy products.
The Community is also one of the largest
growers and exporters of wheat. Its sub-
sidized exports of wheat and wheat flour
have increased nearly sevenfold since
1970 and now take some 17% of world
markets. While this may be good news
for European farmers, every increment
to EC output of these products has cost
European taxpayers and consumers
dearly. Massive misallocation of
resources to agriculture may quite
possibly be one of the reasons that
Europe is falling behind Japan and the
United States in high technology.

Trade Issues

With so much trade between us, and
with as much government intervention
as there is in both Europe and the
United States, trade conflicts will
naturally arise. The current list of prob-
lems includes EC enlargement. Airbus,
and telecommunications. However,
agriculture and the new trade round
are the two most serious issues which
we both face, and they are closely
intertwined.

Agriculture. The problem of
agriculture is particularly vexing and
demands urgent attention. We are enter-
ing a period when fundamental adjust-
ments in agriculture are made necessary
by global surpluses in virtually all major
commodities. Traditional markets for
agricultural products have been shrink-
ing, and new competitors have arrived
from the underdeveloped countries. An
explosion in agricultural technology is
about to exacerbate the situation.

A major part of the problem is that
the EC and the United States both
devote too much of their resources to
agriculture. Both heavily support or sub-
sidize agriculture. Since 1980, the
United States has kept agricultural

prices high, pricing itself, to a con-
siderable extent, out of world markets.
Since U.S. prices generally set world
prices, this has allowed the EC to sell oi
world markets at those artifically high
prices, despite the EC's high internal
prices, through the use of export sub-
sidies in the form of restitutions. In
effect, the EC pays its farmers the
amount by which world prices fall short
of the levels that would equate farm
incomes with incomes in industry.

At the 1982 GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] ministerial,
the United States and other countries
sought to launch a new trade round to
deal with agriculture, services, and othe
new areas. The EC alone blocked com-
mencement of negotiations, and within
the EC, France alone. This in turn led ti
pressures in the United States for expoii
subsidies to match the EC's. Although
President Reagan opposed this, in 1985,
Congress mandated a large program of
export subsidies.

We now face a major subsidy war
between the United States and the EC,
and it is getting more and more expen-
sive for both of us. In a recent deal with
the Soviets, the EC sold wheat for abou
$75 per ton, which meant a subsidy of
about $130 per ton. The United States
recently contracted to sell Egypt frozen ;
poultry at $875 per ton, which was less
than the cost to the government by
$1,210.33 per ton.

Another egregious example is our
respective sugar policies. The EC is a
net exporter of some 3.3 million metric
tons annually, all subsidized. In
response, the United States imposed
import quotas which have reduced sugai
imports by another 3.3 million metric
tons. The results are costly domestic
programs and the loss to the under-
developed countries of about $1 billion ii
sugar exports.

The EC now spends over two-thirds
of its total budget in support of
agriculture. The direct budgetary cost ol
EC agricultural supports was over 20
billion European Currency Units (ECU)
in 1985 ($15.4 billion at 1985 average
exchange rates), with export subsidies
alone costing over 6.8 billion ECU ($5.3
billion). The indirect costs— that is, the
total transfer to farmers from European
taxpayers and consumers— are estimatec
to be on the order of $60-$70 billion.
Roughly 60% of the value added is now
attributable to transfers and subsidies.

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

The EC's agricultural policy will prob-
ably cost the Community budget well
over $20 billion this year, not counting
the substantial sums spent on agricul-
ture by EC member governments.

In the United States, our agriculture
outlays are approaching $30 billion for
all Federal programs. This substantially
exceeds the net income of U.S. farms.
The late Senator Everett Dirksen once
said, "a million here and a million there
and pretty soon you are talking about
real money." Agricultural subsidies are a
"billion here and a billion there, and
already we are talking about very real
money which taxpayers pay.

Four effects of such policies are
becoming obvious to all.

First, we are bankrupting ourselves
and preventing our economies from
' reaching the growth of which they are
capable.

Second, we are making serious
trouble with and for each other, which
threatens to strain the fabric of our
overall relationship.

Third, we are injuring nonsub-
, sidizing exporters, such as Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.

Fourth, and perhaps most impor-
tant, we are damaging developing coun-
tries by eliminating their ability to feed
themselves and to develop agricultural
exports to help pay their foreign
obligations.

Uruguay Trade Round. Just a few
weeks ago, the excellent achievements at
Punta del Este gave a renewed indica-
tion of what we can accomplish when we
cooperate. The leadership of the United
States and the EC, together with Japan,
Canada, Australia, and a number of
developing countries, was mainly respon-
sible for launching the Uruguay trade
round. The EC and the United States
both knew that the new trade round was
indispensable if we were to strengthen
the international trading system and
adapt it to the realities of the interna-
tional marketplace of the late 20th and
early 21st centuries. We both under-
stood also the serious risks to the inter-
national trading system and global
prosperity if the Punta del Este meeting
failed— a failure which could have led to
a sharp increase in protectionism.

Agriculture must be addressed as an
issue of high priority in the new round.
We recognize that, in each country, the
core of agricultural policy is funda-
mentally political and social, not just
economic. The problems can be solved

only jointly, not by countries acting
alone. The Uruguay round offers a
unique opportunity to work together
with the other agricultural producers
and exporters to achieve reforms in a
climate of mutual concessions and gains.
Implementation of new rules will take
time, but we need to negotiate those
new rules expeditiously in order to avoid
protectionism and further costly trade
wars.

The new round also will reach out to
such new areas as services, intellectual
property, and trade-related investment
measures. These are enormously impor-
tant and will be even more important in
the future.

Certain developing countries, failing
to understand their own interests,
opposed the introduction of services into
the round. If the less developed coun-
tries (LDCs) and newly industrialized
countries are to take over the making of
such products as steel, televisions,
toasters, automobiles, refrigerators,
semiconductors, and machine tools, then
the developed countries will have to be
able to export other products such as
services. Otherwise, the developed
countries cannot yield the production of
manufactures to the developing
countries.

Intellectual property relates, like
services, to areas where developed coun-
tries have a comparative advantage.
LDCs should want developed countries
to move into those areas and away from
areas where LDCs have the comparative
advantage. New rules on intellectual
property will faciliate such a process
and, thereby, will be of distinct benefit
to deve'oping countries.

It is also vital that we develop
disciplines on international direct invest-
ment, particularly on trade-related
aspects of investment. This would con-
tribute to improving the investment
climate in developing countries and help
them to attract foreign investment,
which is increasingly becoming a key
source of capital flows to LDCs and an
important contributor to their growth.
By helping more efficiently to allocate
resources on a global basis, rules on
investment will enhance the prospects
for growth in the international economy.

Structural Adjustment

Trade frictions are manifestations of
basic structural maladjustments. Policies
which inhibit adjustment to change
hamper not only the domestic economy
but also the global economy.

The United States wants an
economically vibrant Europe. While that
would make the Community an even
stronger competitor, it also would make
the Community an even larger customer,
and both of us would benefit. Of course,
our support for an economically robust
Europe goes well beyond narrow com-
mercial interests. Economic health
underpins our common security, is a
prerequisite to political stability, and
permits democratic values to flourish.

Increasingly, Europeans are pointing
to structural problems as major reasons
for Europe's failure to create new jobs
and to promote new, dynamic industries.
They point to such things as overly
generous unemployment and employee
benefit packages, rigid hiring and firing
practices, housing programs that hamper
worker mobility, disincentives to
employment-generating investment, and
interference with business decisions on
when and where to open or close plants.

In efforts to protect existing jobs,
key sectors of Europe's markets have
been closed to imports, especially in such
sectors as agriculture, telecommunica-
tions, steel and automobiles, and,
increasingly, aircraft. By freezing labor
and capital in inefficient activities,
Europe missed opportunities to grow
and expand into more dynamic activities
where it might compete better in inter-
national markets. If we are not willing to
risk change, living standards will surely
decline.

The United States also must heed
this lesson. Although we are generally
more willing than Europe to see old
industries replaced by new, we still have
pockets of protectionism that hurt our
own citizens as well as other countries.
It is hard to call a nation protectionist
which is running a $I70-billion trade
deficit, but that same deficit gives extra
power to those in our economy who
advocate barriers to imports.

Structural adjustment is not a
panacea for eliminating trade conflicts.
However, it would go far, very far
indeed, toward reducing the number and
severity of the trade problems which
confront us. Many of those problems
arise from obsolescent or inefficient
industries, wages unresponsive to the
market, and social policies which impede
growth. It is to these practices that
adjustment strategies must be aimed.

The United States has approached
structural reform with four principal
economic priorities: deregulating our
domestic economy; curtailing the growth

January 1987

ECONOMICS

of government expenditures; reforming
our tax system; and resisting protec-
tionism, in part through a new round of
international trade negotiations.

We have not done badly. Tax reform
is a reality. Far-reaching steps have
been taken in deregulation. A new trade
round is about to begin, and we are
aggressively tackling the most intrac-
table problem, excessive government
expenditure. This is a positive agenda
for change. We are interested in seeing
similarly positive, growth-promoting
approaches adopted by our friends and
partners.

There is, happily, visible movement
on four fronts.

First, there is a growing recogni-
tion that change is required. At the 1985
Bonn economic summit, in the
September 1985 "Plaza agreement" on
economic policy, and at the Tokyo
economic summit last spring, the major
industrialized countries pledged to pur-
sue appropriate domestic structural
measures, such as reducing rigidities in
labor and capital markets, to provide a
sound basis for more balanced, noninfla-
tionary economic growth. We see this in
concrete terms in recent moves toward
liberalization in France, privatization in
the United Kingdom, and modifica-
tions of the welfare system in the
Netherlands.

Second, work is being done in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) on structural
adjustment that will lay foundations for
the hard political decisions that govern-
ments must make.

Third, the EC Commission and the
European Court of Justice are now
facilitating change through a more
vigorous competition policy and the
drive to remove obstacles to an internal
market. I would cite, in particular, the
moves against anticompetitive practices
of the European airlines, which have
made air travel in Europe shockingly
expensive.

Fourth, the new trade round should
promote the process of adjustment,
as I have earher discussed, and by
strengthening the GATT's procedures, it
should reduce protectionism.

Current U.S.-EC Trade Issues

Earlier I emphasized the importance of
the U.S.-EC relationship because, on
specific trade issues, relations often
seem to be marked by conflict. We have
settled some problems recently, but it

took either retaliation, or the threat of
retaliation, to convince both partners
that a mutually satisfactory solution was
needed.

EC enlargement is a case in point.
As you know, the United States has long
supported the entry of Spain and Por-
tugal into the Community, and we con-
gratulate the Community, as well as the
two countries, on their accession.

As a consequence of the enlarge-
ment, however, the United States now
faces major new restrictions on its
agricultural exports to Spain and
Portugal. These include high variable
levies on Spain's grain imports, where
before there were fixed tariffs bound
under the GATT. They also include Por-
tuguese import quotas on soybeans and
other oilseeds and a requirement that
Portugal guarantee its other EC part-
ners some 15% of its grain market.

Since U.S. exports valued at roughly
$1 billion were at stake, we objected.
Moreover, important GATT principles
were involved. Only recently, after dif-
ficult negotiations, and with hundreds of
millions of dollars of retaliatory and
counterretaliatory measures in the off-
ing, was an interim solution found.

The United States and the EC have
agreed to complete negotiations by the
end of this year on a final enlargement
compensation package. We hope that the
EC understands that lower industrial
tariffs in Spain and Portugal do not
represent acceptable compensation,
either in GATT or in practical terms, for
lost agricultural sales. In fact, we face
the prospect of substantial losses in the
industrial area since, despite lower
tariffs on many products, the position of
U.S. producers relative to their Euro-
pean competitors will worsen.

Trade in civil aircraft is a growing
problem. The Airbus governments are
considering pouring enormous sums into
the development of new models which
have little or no chance of a commercial
return on investment. U.S. manufac-
turers, who must obey the harsh laws of
the marketplace, are rightly concerned
about the competition-distorting effects
of government supports for Airbus.
While we were able to agree on some
points in our recent consultations with
the Airbus governments, we must deal
with the issue of government supports.

Another area of concern is access to
European markets for telecommunica-
tion equipment and services. The United
States now has one of the most open

telecommunications markets in the
world, and Japan has made remarkable
progress in opening its telecommunica-
tions market. In many European coun-
tries, however, telecommunication
monopolies are resisting change and are
using protectionist procurement and
standards policies to keep out foreign
suppliers. We are discussing our con-
cerns with several European govern-
ments. The United States and Europe
could make a big step in the Uruguay
round toward resolving some of these
issues by bringing postal and telecom-
munications authorities into the GATT
Government Procurement Code.

Prospects

We are at a turning point in the history
of the international trading system, but
it is difficult to say now what the out-
come will be. The choice is between
increased protectionism and an unravel-
ing of the international trading system
on the one hand and, on the other hand,
a strengthened set of trade rules and
global prosperity. Much will depend on
how successful we are in containing pro-
tectionism in the United States.

Some say that the new trade round
has come too late. Many expect major
protectionist legislation from the 100th
Congress next year. However, if we can
manage this very serious threat and
avoid a torpedoing of the new round
negotiations, as at the London economic
conference of 1933, then the prospects
should be good.

I believe this for several reasons.
For the first time, agriculture is being
addressed. At the April OECD minis-
terial and at the Tokyo economic summit
last May, leaders of the major indus-
trialized countries recognized that
agriculture must now be at the top of the
international economic agenda. They
recognized that the problems of
agriculture arise in large part from
national agricultural policies that arise
from politics, not economics. Focusing
their discussions on the enormous costs
of present policies, heads of state and
government agreed in Tokyo that
"action is needed to redirect policies and
adjust the structure of agricultural pro-
duction."

The world's trading nations are also
moving forward expeditiously in organiz-
ing the Uruguay trade round negotia-
tions. There is a growing revulsion to
central planning and control. Peoples
around the world are turning to
economic freedom and the marketplace

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

;o solve problems of growth and develop-
Tient, and this provides a receptive
lackground for liberalizing international
rade.

Building on the progress we have
ichieved in launching the Uruguay
•ound, we can reinvigorate our markets
md make our domestic economies more
productive. We must recognize that
•hange is not only inevitable but also
iesirable and that our future lies in
'xploiting change, not hampering it.

Our goal is to pursue and promote
)ositive, creative strategies that will
ead to expansion of world trade and
hereby to world economic growth. To
ichieve this goal, we must convince our
lartners. as well as the protectionists
imong our own citizens, that unshack-
ing the market is not a zero-sum game
in which winners inevitably produce
iosers. We believe European leaders
hare our goals, and we will work
ogether to achieve them. But it will be a
3ng and arduous process. ■

Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki

Secretary Shultz's address before the
Review Meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) in Vienna on November 5. 1986.^

We thank the people of Austria for their
generous hospitality in hosting this con-
ference. We have all appreciated the
special warmth and courtesy of their
welcome.

We are gathered together— 35
nations of various and differing political
systems, beliefs, and circumstances— in a
common effort to build a more durable
foundation for peace and reconciliation
between the peoples of East and West.
The Helsinki Final Act provides us with
guidelines for our work. It sets forth the
promise of a more secure peace and
greater cooperation between our
peoples— a promise that can be realized
only through an expansion of basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms
for each individual.

Our common task should be to fulfill
that promise— to meet the commitments
to security and freedom contained in the
Helsinki Final Act. And to do so, we
must look to the past and the present as
well as to the future. We cannot and
should not pass lightly over our
experiences and our disappointments of
the last decade. We must examine those
occasions on which governments have
failed to implement the principles that
they have voluntarily undertaken to
uphold in the Final Act.

Such critical review is necessary if
the conference is to make genuine prog-
ress in reducing distrust and building
confidence. But at the same time, the
conference also offers us an important
opportunity to look forward. It gives us
the chance to shape a future that will
release the creative energies of all our
peoples.

The world is entering a period of
dramatic technological change, one in
which old ways of thinking and past pat-
terns of effort are increasingly inap-
propriate to new realities. The tradi-
tional barriers of time and space are day
by day eroded by advanced transport
and electronic communications, leaving
only the barriers between peoples which
are imposed by governments. The
familiar measures of industrial
development— and, by extension,
military and political strength— are less
and less capable of capturing the real
sources of social vitality. In the place of

past approaches to centralized decision-
making and management, information-
based technologies are making possible,
and necessary, greater decentralization
and individual initiative.

This trend can only be a source of
hope to all who value human creativity.
For the future, the true measure of the
dynamism of a society— and of a com-
munity of nations— will be how freely it
can encourage, exchange, and utilize
human knowledge and individual innova-
tion, how it can profit from the creativ-
ity of individual people. It is precisely
these goals of freedom and openness— so
necessary for progress in this emerging
new age— that are already embodied in
the Final Act. In seeking to heal the divi-
sions arising out of the past, the Final
Act provides us with guidelines and com-
mitments for the future. The past four
decades have seen Europe rebuilt. The
future gives us hope for a Europe
reunited. The fundamental principles of
the Final Act, if fully implemented by all
of the CSCE's participating states, give
promise of a Europe vital and confident
in its capacity for progress, of a Europe
whose people are secure in their
independence and freedom.

The Final Act recognized that peace
is not simply the absence of war. And
genuinely constructive European rela-
tions must involve more than the mere
fact of diplomatic dialogue. In the words
of President Reagan: "True peace rests
on the pillars of individual freedom,
human rights, national self-deter-
mination, and respect for the rule of
law."

U.S. Commitment to Europe

I have come to Vienna to reaffirm the
determination of the United States to
work energetically and in concert with
our friends in support of the full
implementation of the principles of the
Final Act. They are the basis of our own
policies. The American people fully sup-
port the objective of a reunified, free, and
independent community of European
nations, East and West. We are commit-
ted to that goal, and not as outsiders.
For as Europe's heirs and children, we
share and participate in the aspirations
as well as the responsibilities of Europe.
Europe and America are bound together
by ties of history, family, broad common
interest, and shared values; we can
ignore the importance and strength of
these ties only at our peril.

January 1987

EUROPE

The security and welfare of our
people are firmly interwoven. We
learned from bitter experience— in the
aftermath of the First World War- that
the United States cannot cut itself off
from Europe. Isolation was a course to
disaster that we are determined not to
repeat. In the years of the Second World
War, America rejoined the peoples of
Europe— first, to defeat the scourge of
tyranny and, subsequently, to help
Europe regenerate its strength through
the Marshall Plan, begun exactly 40
years ago.

Today, the United States expresses
its commitment to Europe in many
forms. Our active participation in CSCE
is one of them. We believe that we have
a positive and important role to play in
the accomplishment of CSCE's objec-
tives. We will neither forsake nor
diminish that role.

The American people believe in the
principles of freedom and openness set
forth in the Final Act. We are confident
in the vitality of our democratic values,
and we are proud to test them in open
peaceful competition with other values.
But we do not attempt to force our
beliefs on others, nor can we accept the
claim of some governments to an
inherent subversion. We respect the
inherent diversity of other societies. But
we cannot ignore the actions of govern-
ments which deny their people funda-
mental human rights. We do not seek
military superiority for ourselves, but
neither can we accept the claim of others
to a right of so-called equal security,
which has the result of creating insecu-
rity for their neighbors.

We have sought to engage the
nations of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union in a constructive discussion
of all the issues that divide us. We have
no illusions that our differences— so pro-
foundly based on conflicting visions of
the individual and the state— can be
easily resolved. But we do believe that it
is possible to build greater understand-
ing and confidence in East-West
relations.

In the area of nuclear arms control,
we may have reached a watershed in our
recent discussions with the Soviet
Union. On other issues, such as human
rights and regional conflicts, there con-
tinues to be a disappointing lack of
positive movement. To promote progress
in all of these areas, President Reagan
met with General Secretary Gorbachev
in Reykjavik last month. They continued
their discussion— begun in Geneva a year
ago— of the full agenda of East- West

issues. Their 2-day meeting opened a
new stage in our high-level dialogue.
Basic differences persist, but the Presi-
dent and the General Secretary reaf-
firmed their earlier agreement on the
desirability of moving ahead in our rela-
tionship, seeking to expand common
ground wherever possible.

Arms Control

Turning first to arms control, there is
now much to be done. The progress
made at Reykjavik needs to be vigor-
ously pursued. For our part, American
negotiators are prepared to do so
creatively and without delay. I will meet
with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze later today and again tomorrow to
continue our own exchanges, and I
might say we have a strong team here
together, including all three of our
principal arms negotiators in Geneva.

The United States has sought not
just limitations on the future growth of
Soviet and American nuclear arms but
their substantial reduction. Therefore,
we were encouraged when the President
and General Secretary Gorbachev
reached the basis of an agreement for a
first step of 50% reductions in Soviet
and American strategic nuclear offensive
forces over a 5-year period. For
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, we
reached an agreement of even deeper
reductions, down from a current Soviet
total of over 1,300 warheads to only 100
on longer range INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] missiles worldwide on
each side. There would be a ceiling on
shorter range INF missiles and negotia-
tions to reduce their numbers as well.

Our two nations now have a historic
opportunity to move quickly to formal
agreement on these reductions in offen-
sive nuclear weapons. We look to the
Soviet Union to join us in doing so. The
President and the General Secretary laid
the groundwork for a process of improv-
ing verification of existing agreements
to limit nuclear testing. Both sides pro-
posed to begin negotiations on the
testing issue and discussed an agenda
that would meet both sides' concerns.
Major differences on strategic defenses
remain. The President responded to
Soviet concerns by proposing that, for
10 years, both sides confine their
strategic defense programs to research,
development, and testing activities per-
mitted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty. This would take place in
the context of steady reductions in U.S.
and Soviet offensive forces and lead to
the elimination of their offensive ballistic
missiles during this decade— and on the

understanding that either side would
then have the right to deploy advanced
defenses unless agreed otherwise.

But at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union
wanted to go further— to go beyond
existing ABM Treaty provisions to
restrict research in such a way as to
cripple the American SDI [Strategic
Defense Initiative] program. This we
cannot accept. The West needs a
vigorous SDI program as permitted by
the ABM Treaty, both as an investment
in and insurance for a safer and more
stable strategic balance, a balance no
longer solely dependent upon the threat .
of mutual annihilation. Defenses can
open the way to even more ambitious
reductions in offensive nuclear forces
than those I have already described.

But such reductions can be realisti-
cally accomplished only in conjunction
with progress in addressing the very
reasons why Western deterrence must
be based today on nuclear weapons.
These include the insecurity and uncer-
tainty created by the Warsaw Pact's
massive conventional force deployment!
including its large arsenal of chemical
weapons. Together with our NATO
allies, we have been seeking to address
this imbalance in conventional forces
between East and West within the ongo^
ing mutual and balanced force reduction
in Europe, designed to meet the stated
concerns of the East and to open the
way for an agreement. The East has ye
to respond constructively.

The United States is committed to
the goal of strengthening stability and
security in the whole of Europe. We
believe that this objective can be pro-
moted through increased openness and
the establishment of a verifiable, com-
prehensive, and stable balance of con-
ventional forces at lower levels. Last
May, the NATO foreign ministers
recognized the importance of this task.
Together with our allies, we are examin
ing how best to achieve the goals set
forth in our Halifax statement on con-
ventional arms control.

Other Sources of Tension

But arms control cannot exist as process
in isolation from other sources of tensioi
in East- West relations. If arms control
measures are to make a meaningful con-
tribution to stability, they can only rein-
force, never supplant, efforts to resolve
more fundamental sources of suspicion
and political confrontation. Nowhere
does the problem of distrust and division
between East and West have greater
meaning than in the context of Europe.

Department of State Bulleti'

EUROPE

Since 1945, an artificial barrier has
i; divided the continent and its peoples.
. This barrier is not of Western construc-
■tion. The members of the Atlantic
alliance and the various neutral and
nonaligned nations of Europe have not
forced the division of families nor denied
our citizens the right of free movement.
I We have not sought to cut our societies
off from competing ideas through press
censorship, radio jamming, or other
means. We have not used threats or
armed intervention to enforce bloc
discipline upon individual countries.
The Helsinki Final Act and the
Madrid concluding document deal com-
prehensively with the dilemma of a
divided Europe. They recognize that the
freedom of individual men and women
must be a fundamental element of
stability and security in Europe. When
justice is violated and freedom is denied,
then the potential for conflict inevitably
' grows between nations. The delicate
•process of building confidence, coopera-
tion, and security is undermined. Presi-
' dent Reagan put it best when he noted:
"A government that will break faith
with its own people cannot be trusted to
keep faith with foreign powers .... We
place far less weight on words that are
spoken at meetings, than upon the deeds
that follow."

The commitments of the Final Act
strike a necessary balance among the
related problems of military security,
political confidence, economic coopera-
tion, fundamental human rights and
freedoms, and contacts among people. It
is important that we keep that balance.
We should welcome and encourage prog-
ress in all of these areas, but we should
not imagine that any single element
alone is sufficient to carry the whole. A
failure on our part to pursue the full
implementation of the Final Act— our
acquiescence in selective adherence to
these commitments— would undercut fur-
ther efforts to secure a more stable
peace. Impatience with the difficulties of
securing compliance should not drive us
into successive new negotiations for
their own sake. We must resist the
notion that consensus-building requires
compromises that would distort or deny
the right promised by the Final Act.
Escape from the violation of existing
commitments cannot be found in the
flight to new commitments.

Assessing CSCE Implementation

As we begin our review of the Final
Act's implementation in recent years, we
can note some important results. Over

the past decade, the CSCE umbrella has
sheltered a remarkable expansion of
human contacts between East and West.
It has supported the two-way flow of
ordinary people across a still-divided
Europe. Building upon the Final Act, the
Madrid concluding document has added
important new commitments with
respect to human rights, trade union
freedoms, religious liberties, and the
reunification of families.

The Madrid concluding document
also laid down as a basic principle the
unacceptability of supporting terrorism,
directly or indirectly. It called for
greater international cooperation in com-
batting this menace. Sadly, the events of
past months have only underscored the
pressing need for such cooperation.

In Stockholm, our nations have
adopted an accord on military
confidence-building measures. If faith-
fully implemented, this agreement will
reduce the risk of conflict in Europe,
making military activities more predict-
able and inhibiting opportunities for
political intimidation.

But success at the Stockholm
meeting earlier this fall only highlights
the disappointing lack of progress in
other aspects of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. In
particular, we continue to see a tragic
human rights situation within the
nations of the East. The list of continu-
ing human rights abuses is all too
lengthy. Within the Soviet Union, 41
members of a citizens' group established
to monitor implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act— among them
Anatoliy Marchenko and Anatoliy
Koryagin— languish in detention. There
are many more such Soviet citizens
incarcerated for trying to exercise their
basic human rights. These include Rus-
sians, Ukrainians, Baits, Jews, and men
and women of other nationalities. One of
that country's most distinguished
citizens, Dr. Audrey Sakharov, remains
incommunicado, cut off from the world
in the closed city of Gorkiy.

The Helsinki accord and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights are
solemn agreements, voluntarily signed
by the Soviet Union, which provide for
the right of emigration. Those
agreements are as solemn, as binding, as
signed, as explicit as any arms control
agreement you could imagine. So
verification and compliance are called
for. Yet spouses of our citizens are
denied exit visas. And hundreds of
thousands of Soviet Jewish citizens, as
well as Armenians, Germans, and

others, are denied permission to
emigrate. This is a direct violation-
clear, explicit, unequivocal— of what the
country signed up to do.

Elsewhere in the East, members of
Charter 77, the Catholic Church, and the
jazz section of the Musicians' Union have
been either harassed or imprisoned in
Czechoslovakia. Courageous activists of
Solidarity have suffered similarly in
Poland. 'The right to practice religious
beliefs and exercise cultural and national
rights freely continue to be limited for
many men and women in various Eastern
countries. This is particularly the case
for religious, cultural, or ethnic
minorities— as evidenced by the recent
program of forced cultural assimilation
of Bulgaria's Turkish citizens. While the
major violations of the Helsinki com-
mitments are in the human rights area,
the United States seeks balanced prog-
ress among all the elements of the CSCE
process. During the Vienna meeting, we
will work with all interested states to
achieve full implementation of the com-
mitments contained in the Helsinki Final
Act, the Madrid concluding document,
and the Stockholm document.

In the field of human rights, we will
work for full compliance with the com-
mitments already undertaken by all of
the signatories of the Final Act. We seek
steps that will bring us closer to realiz-
ing the goals set forth in principle VII
and basket 3.

In the area of economic relations, we
are prepared to explore new possibilities
for cooperation in the context of the
Final Act's provisions.

In information, we will seek to
strengthen and expand commitments to
reduce barriers to communications,
specifically, the jamming of radio
broadcasts— a violation, documented by
the United Nations, of international
agreement. It must be stopped.

In the field of security, we welcome
the positive outcome of Stockholm. The
United States will promptly and fully
implement the terms of the Stockholm
accord. We urge all others to do
likewise. Full compliance by the Soviet
Union, especially with the verification
provision of the Stockholm document,
will be an important gauge of the
possibilities for future progress in con-
ventional arms control.

But the details of the Stockholm
accord illustrate that there is still con-
siderable scope for improvement in the
area of confidence- and security-building.
The concept of openness— central to any
effort to reduce the risks of surprise
attack— has yet to be fully put into prac-
tice. Thus, the CSCE has an important

January 1987

EUROPE

task still before it— to encourage com-
plete implementation of the Conference
on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe
and to examine ways of carrying on the
work begun in Stockholm to enhance
confidence-building.

Meeting Commitments to
Security and Freedom

The strength of our own commitment to
the success of this followup meeting has
been expressed in the exceptional degree
of cooperation between our executive
branch and the Congress in preparations
for this meeting. Our delegation is led by
one of our most able veterans of CSCE
diplomacy, Ambassador Warren Zim-
merman. He has worked closely with the
American CSCE Commission, under the
able leadership of Senator Alfonse
D'Amato and Congressman Steny
Hoyer. His delegation includes a number
of distinguished private citizens. It has
consulted with a broad range of
American nongovernmental organiza-
tions. This delegation is representative
of the diversity of America and of
America's roots in Europe. Its voice
truly reflects the hopes and concerns of
the American people.

I spoke earlier of the past— with its
legacy of division— and of the future—
with its promise of a reunified Europe.
The continuing division of Europe has
been a source of tension, which at times
has threatened us all. But most impor-
tantly, it has meant a deadening repres-
sion of pluralism, openness, and free
inquiry among the peoples and societies
of some of the states represented here.
Because we have not sought to impose
barriers on our own peoples, the nations
of Western Europe, of North America,
and of East Asia and other regions as
well, have seen a reconciliation of former
hostilities and a dramatic expansion of
prosperity and invention. Their
success— the excitement of their
advances— is built upon the idea and
values contained in the Final Act,
including a belief in human progress, in
intellectual freedom, in political and
religious tolerance, and in the
democratic rights and creative genius
inherent in individual men and women.

We in America look to a time when
all the peoples in the community of
CSCE can share in this spirit of open-
ness and creativity and can participate in
a similar release of intellectual and social

energy. Our goal is a future in which all
the peoples of the states represented
here, both large and small, can
flourish— and by doing so, contribute to a
more secure peace and an expanded

freedom. That is the promise of Helsinki.
It is our common commitment to see
that that promise is fulfilled.

'Press release 244 of Nov. 7, 1986.

Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting

Background

On November 4, 1986, in Vienna, the 35
states of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will meet
to review implementation of commit-
ments undertaken when their govern-
ments signed the Helsinki Final Act in
1975. The Final Act established a code of
conduct for participating states'
behavior and outlined practical steps for
reducing the barriers dividing Europe. It
also created a forum in which the states
of Eastern and Western Europe, as well
as the United States and Canada, discuss
security, economic, and human rights
issues. Two followup meetings have
already been held in Belgrade (1977-78)
and Madrid (1980-83). These meetings,
in turn, mandated periodic meetings of
experts on particular aspects of the
Final Act. Most recently, experts from
CSCE states have met to discuss human
rights (Ottawa, 1985), cultural freedom
and cooperation (Budapest, 1985), and
human contacts (Bern, 1986).

Progress to Date

Although the CSCE balance sheet shows
mixed results to date, the basic fact of
the CSCE process has been the failure of
the Soviet Union and, to varying
degrees, its East European allies to com-
ply with their Helsinki and Madrid com-
mitments. As Secretary Shultz stated in
1985: "Ten years after the signing of the
Final Act, no one can deny the gap
between hope and performance. Despite
the real value of the Final Act as a
standard of conduct, the most important
promises of a decade ago have not been
kept."

Egregious new compliance failures
occur and old ones continue. The Soviet
Union still occupies Afghanistan and
imprisons and otherwise penalizes its
own citizens for exercising the rights
and freedoms promised in the Final Act.
Despite the recent resolution of several
cases, many Soviet citizens married to
Americans are cruelly separated from

their spouses by official denial of exit
permission. The number of Soviet Jews
allowed to emigrate, mainly for family
reunification, has fallen drastically from
the levels permitted in the late 1970s.
The same is true for Soviet citizens of
German and Armenian nationality.
Recently, U.S. reporter Nicholas
Daniloff was taken hostage on fabricatedl
charges of espionage— in flagrant viola-
tion of CSCE pledges concerning the
treatment of journalists.

Over the years, however, there has
been some progress in CSCE. Some
Warsaw Pact states have taken steps
toward fulfilling their Helsinki and
Madrid CSCE commitments, and a few
notable cases involving human rights
activists and divided families have been
resolved. Under the CSCE umbrella,
contacts between the peoples of Eastern

CSCE Process

Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, Geneva, Sept.' 18, 1973-July 21,
1975; the Final Act was signed in Helsinki
Aug. 1, 1975 (text in BULLETIN of Sept. 1,
1975)

Followup Meetings

• Belgrade. Oct. 4, 1977-Mar. 8, 1978
(te.xt of concluding document in BULLETIN of

Apr. 1978)

. Madrid, Nov. 11, 1980-Sept. 9. 1983
(text of concluding document in Bulletin of
Oct. 1983)

• Vienna, Nov. 4, 1986'

Experts' Meetings

• Peaceful settlement of disputes (Mon-
treaux, 1978; Athens, 1984)

• Cooperation in the Mediterranean
(Valletta, 1979; Venice, 1984)

• Science (Hamburg. 1979)

• Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (Stockholm, 1984-86)

• Human rights (Ottawa, 1985)

• Cultural fonim (Budapest, 1985)

• Human contacts (Bern, 1986) ■

Department of State Bulletin |l,

EUROPE

md Western Europe have multiplied. At
);he Stockholm Conference on Con-
fidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the
35 participants concluded more than 2V2
v'ears of negotiations in September 1986
A'ith agreement on specific measures to
[•educe the risk of war through miscal-
:ulation. The agreement, which enters
nto effect in January 1987. extends
Helsinki provisions concerning the
notification and observation of military
activities from the Atlantic to the Urals.
For the first time, the East accepted
:hallenge inspection of such activities by
ither states.

U.S. Objectives

For the United States and its NATO
illies at Vienna, the primary aim is to
mprove significantly Eastern com-
Dliance with all the principles and provi-
sions of the Helsinki and Madrid
locuments. At the outset, the West will
"eview thoroughly Eastern performance
ijince the close of the Madrid meeting,
i'aising specific problems in conference
sessions and bilateral meetings.

Another important aim is to promote
mlanced progress among the different
dimensions of the CSCE process to
ensure human rights are given at least
equal weight with other CSCE elements.
Balance is critical to promoting the Final
Act's goals of security and cooperation.
The successful outcome of the Stockholm
security talks highlights the need to
iddress human problems— human rights,
Dasic freedoms, and humanitarian
:ooperation. Tangible steps in these
fields are necessary if the CSCE process
IS to advance. It is important that the
new steps forward be based solidly on
significant improvement in compliance
with existing commitments.

Considerable interest has been
expressed in encouraging compliance
and cooperation on economic,
environmental, and scientific matters.
The meeting also will review the future
of the CDE conference in the context of
the broader CSCE process.

Secretary's News Conference In Vienna

Taken from the GIST series of Oct. 1986,

gublished by the Bureau of Public Affairs,
department of State. Editor: Harriet
Cufley. ■

Secretary Shultz held a news confer-
ence in Vienna on Noremher 6. 1986. fol-
lowing his meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.'

We came here well prepared to build on
the results of Reykjavik. We are also
prepared to be patient in doing so, as we
must be, since the rhythm and pace of
this negotiation cannot be forced by
either side. I cannot report the kind of
progress we would like, but we will con-
tinue to work for progress in all areas of
our extensive agenda with the Soviet
Union.

I have just concluded over 5 hours of
talks with Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze, including about 3 hours of private
time. The meetings dealt with all four
areas of our agenda. The U.S. purpose in
coming here was to confirm and build on
the results of Reykjavik. We brought
along our top experts so we could have
the kind of intensive discussions that
have brought progress over the last few
months. The experts met last night for
more than 3 hours. I can't say that the
meetings have moved arms control mat-
ters along in any significant way, and I
regret this. We did move along in other
areas, and I'll review them.

First, on human rights: I took the
occasion of my private session for a
thorough and frank statement of our
most pressing concerns on human rights
and humanitarian issues. During the
course of the discussions, we pressed the
Soviets for some regular process to
review these kinds of concerns. We do
believe that they now agree that these
issues will be part of the regular reviews
that we have on bilateral issues, and we
will bring them up. I will, of course, con-
tinue to raise these issues at my level, as
we will on all occasions when we meet
with the Soviets. It's important that the
Soviets come to realize how strongly we
in the West feel about Soviet abuse of
human rights, and how serious an
obstacle it is to the long-term progress in
our relations.

On regional issues: There has been
an expanding dialogue. We held one
cycle of experts' meetings in 1985, and
we have repeated the cycle this year. In
August, we added a new, more broadly
focused meeting at the level of Under
Secretary of State. We have suggested
to the Soviets that we start planning a
new cycle of those meetings, and they
are considering that proposal, and I
expect that in due course we will
proceed.

On bilateral affairs: At Reykjavik
we reached agreement on a fairly
ambitious program of bilateral activities.
This work has gone forward since then
and produced results. Last week, for
example, we reached agreement on the
basic elements for cooperation in civil
space programs. We have also had some
good exchanges on a number of other
areas, such as nuclear fusion, transporta-
tion, and energy. Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze and I agreed that this
bilateral work program should move
forward.

We had extensive discussions about
nuclear arms control. Since Reykjavik,
our objective has been to build on the
results of Reykjavik and translate them
into action at Geneva. In fact, the
United States has already been doing
this by formally incorporating the
Reykjavik results into our negotiating
positions at Geneva.

Thus, we came to Vienna prepared
to confirm the progress made at Reyk-
javik. In addition, there are still some
very important areas of disagreement in
each of the three negotiating areas of
Geneva— START [strategic arms reduc-
tion talks], INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces], and defense in space.
We came there hoping to discuss these
differences, to clarify them, and, if possi-
ble, to narrow them. In other words, we
came prepared to move forward. We
brought our arms control experts, and
we had prepared papers covering each of
the major nuclear arms control subjects.
These papers reflected areas of agree-
ment, and where there were differences,
we stated clearly our positions and our
understanding of the Soviet positions.
Unfortunately, it has not been possible
to move ahead as we had hoped. These
issues will continue to be pursued by our
negotiators in Geneva, who will continue
explaining the new U.S. proposals
reflecting the progress in Reykjavik. To
maintain momentum, we also proposed
that the U.S. and Soviet experts get
together between the nuclear and space
talks rounds— the current one will end
early next week and the next one won't
start until January— so we proposed that
experts get together as they did last
summer between rounds and see if they
can make some progress as they did last
summer. That offer is on the table. We
suggested language that would permit
initiation of negotiations on nuclear
testing. The Soviets didn't seem to be
interested.

January 1987

EUROPE

The Foreign Minister and I discussed
conventional arms control and chemical
weapons. I emphasized that progress in
these areas was a necessary complement
to progress in reducing nuclear arms. I
also pointed out a key to existing
negotiations on both subjects was
verification. And, we are still waiting for
a serious Soviet effort to address our
proposals in this regard. We gave them a
package which set out what we believe
was agreed at Reykjavik and where
there are differences, set forth our posi-
tion and our understanding of their
position.

On START, the point of departure is
the agreement at Reykjavik to 1,600
intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and heavy bombers. There
would be no more than 6,000 warheads
on these systems. That was agreed. We
repeated the counting rule for bombers
that was worked out at Reykjavik.

Now, the next step which we pro-
posed is to add sublimits to this
framework. We proposed sublimits of
4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300
ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on
permitted ICBMs except those on silo-
based, light- and medium-ICBMs with
six or fewer warheads. These numbers
represent substantial movement in the
direction of the Soviet position. These
reductions would be carried out in a
phased manner and completed by the
end of 1991.

We also put forward verification
ideas that were discussed and agreed in
principle in Reykjavik. These call for a
comprehensive exchange of data, on-site
observation of elimination down to
agreed levels, an effective monitoring of
remaining inventories, and associated
facilities, including on-site inspection.

So, that's in essence our START
position, and where we think the
agreements are in Reykjavik— where it's
important to move forward.

Our presentation on INF began with
the solution agreed upon at Reykjavik:
to reduce longer range INF missiles to
100 warheads worldwide on each side.
The 100 warheads on the Soviet side
would be in Soviet Asia. The 100 on the
U.S. side would be in the United States.
Neither side would deploy such missiles
in Europe. Basically, that was agreed in
Reykjavik. These reductions would be
carried out in a phased manner and com-
pleted i)y the end of 1991. We set forth
our position on shorter range missiles,
that the numbers should be constrained
at or below the current Soviet level, and
that the United States, of course, would
have the right to the same number. We

understand the Soviet vievv is that their
present monopoly in such weapons
should be frozen. We cannot accept that.
We advanced for INF the same verifica-
tion ideas discussed a moment ago for
START and which were agreed in princi-
ple in Reykjavik. These limits would
remain in effect until superseded by
agreement providing for further reduc-
tions. Follow-on negotiations would
begin by a date certain aimed at the
elimination of long-range INF missiles
on both sides worldwide, and also would
deal with the question of shorter range
INF missiles.

In the area of defense in space, we
repeated our willingness to undertake
for 10 years not to exercise our existing
right of withdrawal from the ABM [Anti-
ballistic Missile] Treaty. During that
period, the sides would strictly observe
all provisions of the ABM Treaty. Within
the first 5 years of the 10-year period,
the strategic offensive arms of the two
sides would be reduced by 50%, as I've
just discussed. During the following 5
years, our position is that the remaining
offensive ballistic missiles of the two
sides would be eliminated. The Soviet
position is that all strategic offensive
arms would be eliminated. At the end of
this 10-year period, in our view, either
side would be free to deploy advance
strategic defenses if it so chose, unless
the sides agreed otherwise. Again, the
verification ideas I discussed a few
moments ago would be applied to this
agreement as well.

In the area of verification, since
there was a considerable discussion back
and forth in Reykjavik between the two
leaders, and they both confirmed to each
other their insistence that extensive and
intrusive verification had to accompany
agreements of this magnitude, we put
forward some separate statements on
the subject. We laid out in some detail
our view on the central role of verifica-
tion in this process and the need to con-
currently negotiate effective measures
that would give both sides confidence in
the observance of the obligations that
were assumed.

On nuclear testing, we laid out the
basis on which we are prepared to begin
negotiations on nuclear testing. The
agenda for these negotiations would first
be to resolve verification issues
associated with existing treaties. With
this resolved, the two sides would
immediately proceed in parallel with the
reduction and elimination of nuclear
weapons to address further step-by-step
limitations on testing, leading ultimately
to the elimination of nuclear testing.

So you can see that we laid out in
some detail our view of where we stand
following Reykjavik. The agreements we
proposed are fair to both sides and
would be a dramatic step forward. And I
continue to believe that as this process
and the rhythm and pace of it moves
along we may wind up, 4 or 5 years from
now, looking back at Reykjavik as a
watershed meeting. We put forward
language to record what was agreed;
and where differences remain, we put
forward our position and our under-
standing of the Soviet position. Our
objective was to clarify where we stand
and, where possible, to narrow dif-
ferences. The only real progress I can
report is that we, again, made our posi-
tion clear, and we affirmed our readiness
to move ahead on these important
matters.

I'll be glad to have your questions.

Q. Apart from Geneva, what hap-
pens now? Will you and Mr. Shevard-
nadze meet again?

A. We haven't made any explicit
date, but we affirmed to each other that
as two human beings and foreign
ministers we have a responsibility to the
potentiality of what was agreed in
Reykjavik— to keep after it. And I men-
tioned the proposal we have on the table
for some experts' talks, and we, of
course, are in constant touch through
our diplomatic channels. If a meeting
between us seems useful, I'm sure we'll
be able to arrange it, but getting
ourselves set to make such a meeting
fruitful is the key.

Q. You did not, I believe, refer to
the issue of terrorism, and it was our
understanding that you would try to
enlist Soviet understanding, if not
cooperation, in the U.S. concern about
Syrian state-support of terrorism and
other incidents of terrorism. Did you
discuss the issue? Did you get any
results?

A. I certainly did discuss the issue.
And I pointed up the fact that a careful
British judicial process sifted through
and weighed evidence and came to the
conclusion— and the facts are there— that
Syria, as a government, took part in the
planned terrorist act in connection with
the El Al plane. I think it is also
apparent from the investigations of
other terrorist incidents that Syria
seems to have a role, but the British
evidence is the most concrete and com-
plete. There is also continuing evidence
about Libya's involvement.

Of course, the investigation by
Pakistan of the Karachi terrorist act
continues, and I invited the Foreign

nil

ilii

§
[ft

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

linister to look carefully at tills
vidence. I didn't get any agreement
•ith him that Syria is involved in ter-
irist acts, but he said he would look at
ne evidence.

Q. You spoke a lot of the
imerican position as being very forth-
oming. Did the Soviets simply listen
9 you? Did they put forward their own
litiative and proposals to narrow the
ap?

A. I'm sure they will give their
lews, so it's not for me to try to do
hat. However, as we found it difficult to
ngage them in a discussion of all of
hese various issues that were covered in
Reykjavik, and found them focusing con-
inuously on the question of the meaning
f the ABM Treaty as to permitted ac-
ivities and their proposal about
iboratory research, it seemed to us that
heir objective of trying to cripple— or it
1, eemed to us that they have the objec-
ts ive of crippling— the President's effort
0 find out how we can defend ourselves
gainst ballistic missiles. If that is their
'bjective, it is not going to work. On the
•ther hand, there are some very impor-
ant matters that can be moved forward
in, and we will continue patiently to
vork at them.

■ Q. Did you propose to the Soviets
' 'hat we go ahead and try to reach a
.eparate agreement on INF, and did
hey respond to you by saying that all
)f this must be [inaudible]?

A. We didn't get to that point
)ecause we found it so difficult to
■ngage them with these different sub-
ects as they were fixed on only one
subject.

Q. Did you have a chance to raise
ivith the Secretary the Baltic issue,
ind if you have not, will the American
Jelegation raise the Baltic issue of the
Estonian, Latvian [inaudible]?

A. All of these issues will be raised
at the CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] Conference.
I heard a lot about it last night, and we
have made our views clear, across the
board, on humanitarian and human
rights issues.

Q. Could you amplify on what you
meant by them trying to cripple the
SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] pro-
gram by their insistence on discussing
the meaning of ABM in the laboratory
proposal? Because some people have
suggested that really the Soviets are
making a compromise here or that they
weren't really trying to cripple it, that
there was a misunderstanding. Could

you explain why — what the Soviets are
talking about— would make it impossi-
ble for the SDI to proceed?

A. If you narrow the scope of what
can be done by way of research and
testing and discovering how to defend
yourself against ballistic missiles, if you
constrain the scope of that program
beyond what is called for under the ABM
Treaty, you make it more and more dif-
ficult for the research to be productive;
and, therefore, you slow down and crip-
ple the program. That's what we won't
agree to. We believe that the program
can go forward perfectly effective,
strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the ABM Treaty, which are being
observed, and that's sufficient. We'll
stick with the treaty. We don't want to
change it.

Q. The main question is why the
United States needs the SDI when
there are possibilities to disappear the
whole atomic nuclear weapons in 10
years. Could you go, please, a little
deeper toward this problem?

A. For three reasons. First, it may
or may not be true that these weapons
will disappear. So, in the meantime, if
we can learn how to defend ourselves
against them, we must do so. Second,
it's clear that if you believe there is a
chance for these radical reductions to
take place, it is also clear that one of the
reasons why that is so is the existence of
a strong, active, and promising program
of research. Third, if an agreement is
reached and a process of reduction takes
place, you want to be sure it continues.

I've said there were only three
reasons; I've got a fourth. AJfter you
have completed the process, it's known
in the world how to produce these
weapons. So when something is known,
you can't be sure that it won't be pro-
duced somewhere. So you need an in-
surance policy. If you're going to build
yourself a nice house and invest your
fortune in it, of whatever size, you cer-
tainly are going to want to take out an
insurance policy, and having the ability
to defend yourself is that insurance
policy. So there are very important
reasons why it's critical for us, and for
people all over the world, that this effort
to find out how to defend ourselves go
forward.

Q. Did you discuss the question of
another summit in the near future?

A. No, the subject never came up.

Q. Is it now your conclusion there
is no prospect for an agreement on
European missiles so long as
[inaudible]?

A. No, I tried to indicate my view.
This is a long-paced negotiation, I'm
sure, and it has its rhythm. The pace
can't be forced by either party. So it
shifts around, and our approach is to be
in close consultation with our allies, to
maintain the strong and unified position
that we have, and to be patient in work-
ing for the results that we believe are
essential. And we'll keep at it. I think
that in the end there is a very good
chance that we'll get there.

Q. Going back to the question of
what the Soviets want the ABM Treaty
to mean, did they offer you any
extended definition of the laboratory
that might include, say, space-based
research facilities, or did they offer in
any way to adhere to an agreement
that would essentially enshrine the
[inaudible] United States as a restric-
tive interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

A. The discussions really didn't get
into that kind of detail; although, cer-
tainly if we are able to engage them in
Geneva, or if there is the kind of
experts' meeting that I referred to, we
are prepared to state what we think that
treaty permits. We've done so, and did
so last night briefly, for that matter, and
listened to what they had to say.

Q. Mr. Gorbachev should have
gone to Washington before the end of
this year to meet with Mr. Reagan,
and Mr. Reagan should have gone to
Moscow some time next year. Are the
prospects now for any major arms con-
trol deal within the Reagan presidency
now dead?

A. I think that the meeting at Reyk-
javik moved matters forward across the
board in dramatic ways, and the problem
now is to somehow capture that move-
ment in all of the areas that I've gone
through here and make it a reality. And
since there has been so much progress
comparing now with, say, 2 years ago— I
recalled with Mr. Shevardnadze this
morning, we sat in a room in their
embassy— I sat there for 6 hours with
Mr. Gromyko. At the end, there came
the beginnings of what emerged at the
President's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev
in Geneva a year ago. So we keep at
this, and I think some progress will
be made.

Q. The Soviet Minister, Shevard-
nadze, left saying that these talks left
him with a bitter aftertaste. He
accused the United States of
backtracking — his words — from the
achievements made at Reykjavik. Do
these talks leave you with a bitter
aftertaste as to the lack of prog^ress
he's obviously referring to here?

January 1987

EUROPE

A. Bitter aftertaste is his word. He
told me he was going to say that, and I
told him what I was going to say, and we
each choose our words, no doubt with
care. I prefer words like "we were well
prepared," "we're prepared to be pa-
tient," "we understand that negotiations
of this kind have a rhythm and pace to
them, and we'll work with it."

Q. In the context of either ter-
rorism or regional disputes, did the
subject of the U.S. arms embargo on
Iran come up, was that subject
discussed, and does the United States
still have an arms embargo?

A. The subject didn't come up.

Q. You now have just about 2
years before the end of the Reagan
Administration. In light of what's hap-
pened here, do you think there is really
any prospect for any kind of agree-
ment within these 2 years?

A. We are certainly prepared for
one, and as I pointed out a number of
times, we came here with a very strong
team and with written statements to
work from. We'll continue in that vein.
Two years is a long time.

Q. Did the Soviet proposal or
argument [inaudible] change in any
way between Reykjavik and what you
heard [inaudible]?

A. The problem wasn't so much
change as it was an inability somehow in
the discussions we had here to review
carefully the sweep of things discussed
in Reykjavik, as they seemed so fixed on
just one or two aspects of it. There was
progress made across the board, and
there were problems identified across
the board. So we came here feeling that
the way to proceed is to, in a sense,
codify, nail down the progress, identify
where the problems are; and that's a
method of starting to work through solu-
tions to the problems. And we'll continue
to strive for that.

Q. Even though the subject didn't
come up in your meetings with Mr.
Shevardnadze, can you give us your
views on approaches to Iran over the
hostages in Lebanon [inaudible] spare
parts?

A. All of those questions, as I said
earlier, are being handled out of the
White House, and I don't have any com-
ment on them.

'Press release 243. ■

Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl

Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the
Federal Republic of Germany made an
official visit to the United States October
20-23. 1986. to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.

Following are arrival remarks made
by President Reagan and Chancellor
Kohl and the text of a joint statement on
the establishment of the U.S. -German
Youth Exchange Council.'^

ARRIVAL REMARKS,
OCT. 21, 19862

President Reagan

Today it's an honor to welcome
Chancellor Kohl. This marks his sixth
visit to us as leader of the German
Federal Republic. He and his fellow
citizens are friends and partners with
whom we share a desire for peace and a
commitment to the principles of human
freedom.

Our nations' solid bilateral ties, our
resolve to maintain the viability of the
Western alliance, and our dedication to
the values and ideals which are the
underpinning of political and economic
freedom have been a great boon to the
German and American peoples. The
great German writer-philosopher
Gotthold Lessing once wrote: "Nothing
under the sun is ever accidental." Well,
40 years of European peace have been
no accident. The good fortune can be
traced, to a great degree, to the solidar-
ity and cooperation between our two
peoples and governments.

When a buildup of intermediate-
range missiles by our adversary
threatened the peace, our alliance was
put to the test. Chancellor Kohl and his
government stood firm in the face of a
well-orchestrated international and
domestic propaganda campaign aimed at
paralyzing our ability to respond.

The deployment, however, of
weapons is not an end in itself; it is a
means to an end. What we seek is the
security of our countries, the freedom of
our peoples, and the peace of the world.
Our strength of purpose, as well as our
military might, are vehicles in the search
for a lasting peace.

Chancellor Kohl's visit comes at an
opportune time. I look forward to
discussing with him my recent meetings
with General Secretary Gorbachev and
subsequent events. There is, as I will
explain, ample reason for optimism.

Whatever progress is made, it will be
based on the solid foundation Germans
and Americans have built together, par-
ticularly in the last half decade.

Three years ago, I presented a plan
which would have reduced American and
Soviet longer range INF missiles to zero
globally, thus called the zero option.
Building on the diplomacy of interceding
years as well as the deployment of our
cruise and Pershings, General Secretary
Gorbachev and I came close in Iceland to
reaching an agreement that would have
drastically reduced these missiles on
both sides. We are now striving to build
upon the progress achieved in Reykjavik.

And it should not escape anyone's
attention that the Soviet Union and the
United States are now seriously talking
about reducing offensive weapons. This
is a giant step forward from the time,
not so long ago, when arms talks merely
put a cap on weapons at high levels, per-
mitting the building of more missiles and
more warheads.

When the next agreement is finally
reached with the Soviet Union— and I
say when, not if— it will not be the result
of weakness or timidity on the part of
Western nations. Instead, it will flow
from our strength, realism, and unity.

Our allies in these last few years
have withstood intimidation and brazen
interference in their domestic political
processes. Our adversaries misjudged
individuals like Chancellor Kohl and the
other leaders of the Western
democracies. Under intense pressure,
they did what was necessary: held firm.
And because of their fortitude, the free
world is now neither vulnerable nor
subservient.

The record of the European peoples
is long and glorious. In so many ways,
Europe is the cradle of modern civiliza-
tion. The indomitable spirit demon-
strated by our European neighbors and
allies in the postwar era— from the
Berlin airlift to our solidarity leading to
my recent meetings in Iceland— has
made the difference. The tide has been
met, the tide turned, and the flow of
history is now on the side of the free.

We in the West are now engaged in
a great technological revolution: in
medicine, electronics, physics, and so
many fields of human endeavor. More
has been discovered in the 20th century
than in all the preceding centuries put
together. Our scientists, at this moment
are making great strides toward
developing technology that can protect

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

nankind against ballistic missiles, and
hat protection applies to the United
■ states, our allies, and, yes, even our
idversaries, if need be.

A purely defensive system that
nakes these missiles ineffective also
nakes them more negotiable. A defen-
■ive system makes an arms reduction
agreement more likely because it offers
irotection against cheating. This and not
rust will lead to reducing, and we hope
iltimately eliminating, the nuclear
irsenals that now threaten all humanity,
f a defensive system was not a viable
iption, the Soviet Union would not be
lommitting so much of its own resources
n developing and deploying strategic
lefenses of its own.

Technology can open up new doors

0 peace and security, and that's what
lur Strategic Defense Initiative is all
ibout. The time has come to rechannel

' he efforts of some of our best minds to
levelop tools which can be used to main-
ain peace, tools that protect rather than
;ill. The United States stands ready, as I
issured Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland and
•eaffirm today, to negotiate seriously
ibout safeguards that will enable the
Soviet Union to share in the benefits of
trategic defense.

What we in the West have done to
ebuild our strength and revitalize our
lUiance has guaranteed the peace, but a
asting peace cannot be based simply on
m arms agreement. Better relations
nust include more and open, freer con-
acts between people and governments,

1 respect for human rights, and an end
,0 those regional conflicts that continue
.0 plague mankind.

Chancellor Kohl and the German
people have been steadfast in their sup-
port and in their friendship for many
/ears. They know, as we do, that our
lestinies and those of all free people are
.led. We strive for a free, secure, and
prosperous world— a world at peace; and
tve do it, together, with our friends and
lilies, the German people. So it gives me
great pleasure to welcome Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, a partner, colleague, and
friend.

Chancellor KohP

I'm delighted to be in Washington again,
and I feel that this wonderful fall day,
■with its sunshine, is a very true symbol
standing for the nature of the relation-
ship between our two countries.

And it gives me particular pleasure,
Mr. President, to see you again— a good
friend of our country and an esteemed
personal friend. This is the seventh time
that we have met since I took over the

office of Federal Chancellor back in
1982, and this figure alone gives an
indication of the intensity and closeness
of the relations between our two coun-
tries and governments.

And in addition, we have often been
in contact, consulting each other by let-
ter or telephone. And I would like to
take this opportunity before the public of
your country, here, to express my
appreciation and my great gratitude for
this trustful cooperation. I thank you for
this form of close cooperation which is
based on mutual trust, and it is a token
of a friendship and partnership under-
pinned by shared values, ideals, and
interests.

Germans and Americans are united
with the British, the French, the
Italians, and others in the Atlantic
alliance, an alliance of historical dimen-
sion. It is a community based on
reciprocity, a defensive alliance against
aggression and political blackmail, an
alliance for the preservation of
democracy, freedom, and human rights.

The security of the Federal Republic
of Germany is indissolubly linked with
this alliance and through our partnership
with the United States of America. Only
with the assistance of the United States
can the security of Western Europe be
assured. The American troops in the
Federal Republic of Germany are
defending our common freedom together
with our troops, and they are welcome in
our country. Mr. President, you and
your fellow citizens in this country
should know that the vast majority of
the citizens of the Federal Republic of
Germany are in favor of the presence of
these troops, and they regard them as
their friends. And we know that we can
rely on each other.

The European allies render an
important contribution to our common
defense. And the 12 states united in the
European Community are undergoing a
dynamic process of political and
economic integration through which the
European pillar of the alliance will be
strengthened. And we Europeans have
recognized that this is the only way in
which we can play a role in tomorrow's
work.

In your speech to the European
Parliament in Strasbourg in May 1985,
you welcomed and appreciated this
development. It will not be detrimental
to our alliance, but is going to
strengthen it.

It remains our goal— and I know that
I share it with you, Mr. President— to
create peace and security with ever
fewer weapons. In Reykjavik, thanks to
your serious and consistent efforts in

pursuit of peace, a major step was taken
in this direction; and we must now take
the opportunities that present them-
selves without endangering our defen-
sive capability.

Your meeting with General
Secretary Gorbachev confirmed that the
Soviet Union, too, is interested in an
improvement of the relations between
West and East. And we should take the
Soviet Union at its word and sound out
at the negotiating table where real prog-
ress could be made.

My government is contributing
actively to the efforts to promote
dialogue and cooperation, confidence,
understanding, and reconciliation. The
world is looking hopefully to the two
superpowers, but the small- and medium-
sized states must play their part and
make their contributions as well.

In your impressive speech to the
young Germans gathered at Hamburg
Castle, in my home district, in 1985, you
said: "The future belongs to the free."
Let us continue to work together for this
goal. We must convince the young
people, the young generation, in the
United States, in the Federal Republic of
Germany, all over the world, that it is
worthwhile to stand up for our values for
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.

You have been persuasive and
vigorous, Mr. President, in your support
of an increase in youth exchanges be-
tween our peoples. For that, I am
grateful to you, and we will discuss this
subject further. Together, we shall
create conditions under which even more
young people from our two countries will
have the chance to get to know one
another.

Under your leadership, the United
States of America has rediscovered self-
confidence and regained a spirit of enter-
prising leadership. As in the past, these
are the qualities that will enable the
American nation to master the chal-
lenges of the future. The Federal
Republic of Germany, with all its
citizens, will be a loyal friend and part-
ner to the United States of America as it
goes about this task.

JOINT STATEMENT,
OCT. 21, 1986

U.S. -German friendship and cooperation
enhance our mutual interests. We are
convinced that youth exchange of all
kinds will help ensure that this friend-
ship will flourish in the future. We agree
on the need to have our succeeding
generations play an increasingly active
role in promoting this friendship. In
recent decades there have been many

January 1987

GENERAL

youth exchanges between the United
States and the Federal Republic of
Germany

Recently, with the impetus of the
Presidential Youth Exchange Initiative
of 1982 and subsequent important con-
tributions from the Federal Republic of
Germany, bilateral exchanges have
nearly tripled. To ensure that these
exchanges will thrive, we have agreed to
the creation of a U.S-German Youth
Exchange Council.

Our two governments, as well as
nongovernmental organizations and
individuals who have been involved in
youth exchanges, or those who have
played a leading role in U.S. -German
relations, will be represented. The Coun-
cil will provide advice on improving
youth exchange programs, suggest new
exchange initiatives, and explore addi-
tional funding resources. The Council
will meet at least once a year in
Washington or Bonn in connection with
the cultural exchange talks between the
United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany.

U.S. Policy Toward the Third World

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27, 1986.

2Made at the South Portico of the White
House, where Chancellor Kohl was accorded a
formal welcome with full military honors.

'Chancellor Kohl spoke in German, and
his remarks were translated by an inter-
preter. ■

by Michael H. Armacost

Address before the National Third
World Studies Conference in Omaha,
Nebraska, on October 17, 1986.
Ambassador Armacost is Under
Secretary for Political Affairs.

I'm delighted to be here this afternoon
to address the ninth National Third
World Studies Conference. I have been
asked to offer some observations re-
garding U.S. policy toward this large,
diverse, and important group of
countries.

I am happy to do so. There is more
than a little challenge in the assignment,
for you should know that there is no
bureau in the Department of State
responsible for dealing with the Third
World per se. Those who deal with its
myriad concerns and the numerous
challenges it presents are scattered
among a variety of offices. Let me
attempt to pull together a few of the
central threads.

The Third World
and Its Importance

What is the "Third World," and why is
it important to the conduct of our
foreign policy?

When we speak of the Third World,
we are using an imprecise description— a
term of journalistic convenience, not of
precise analysis. We usually credit the
French with coining it. To those with a
sense of history, it perhaps recalled the
Third Estate of commoners, who
opposed both the king and the church. In
practical political parlance, the Third
World has come to describe developing
countries that seek to avoid domination
by the superpowers and to preserve
their freedom of maneuver between East
and West. To the extent the term sug-
gests common aspirations among coun-
tries as diverse as China and Burma,
Cuba and Brazil, Libya and Saudi
Arabia, Nigeria and Botswana, the term
can be positively misleading.

Yet there is a core of solidarity
among Third World countries that
derives from shared memories of past
humiliations, a resolve to remove the
remaining relics of colonialism, and what
one astute observer has described as "an

almost racial feeling that Asians and
Africans were, in a sense, a separate
part of humanity, long victimized and
now claiming their birthright." i

Third World nations are of great
importance to the United States. ,

Developing countries occupy more than ;
half of the world's surface and embrace ■
75% of its population. They contain vast;
material and human resources and are o'
great consequence to our economy as ■
suppliers and markets. ]

A third of our manufactured exports
goes to the Third World, which also
takes about 40% of our agricultural
exports. A high percentage of our crude
oil imports comes from the Third World
as does the bulk of certain industrial rav
materials. For example about two-thirds
of our bauxite comes from Jamaica and
Guinea. Nearly two-thirds of our tin is
imported from Thailand, Malaysia, Indo
nesia, and Bolivia.

Increasingly, Third World countries^
including a number without impressive
natural resource endowments, exert a
powerful force on investment flows and
world trade in manufactured products
through their entrepreneurial prowess,
their capacity for innovation, and their
marketing skill. For these latter coun-
tries, the line between a developed and ;
developing nation has been crossed or a
least blurred.

The strategic location of many
developing countries also gives them a
special military and geopolitical impor-
tance to us. Some, like South Korea,
Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines,
are close allies; others provide us access
to important military facilities; still
others deny the Soviets such facilities.

Beyond this, the countries of the
Third World collectively represent an
important political force. Over time, the;
have given various organizational
expressions to their shared perspectives
and aims. The Nonaligned Movement
(NAM) was formally organized at the
Belgrade summit convoked by Marshal
Tito in 1961. But the roots of Third
World efforts to define foreign policies
independent of the superpowers can be
traced back at least to the Bandung con-
ference of April 1955. The leaders of the
movement at that point were primarily
Asians— among them, Nehru, U Nu,
Sukarno, and Chou En-lai.

In the 1960s, the newly independent
countries of Africa sought strength in
numbers and found common cause in

Department of State Bulletir

GENERAL

iforts to protect their independence and
•omote their development. Their
fluence was registered in the brief
jpearance of the Afro-Asian Peoples
olidarity Organization and more per-
anently in the expansion and growing
)iceof the NAM.

As attention shifted from the protec-
on of sovereignty to economic develop-
ent, the Latin American countries—
ost of whom attained independence in
le 19th century— found they shared
lany common aims and common afflic-
ons with the Africans and Asians.
ideed. the Latin Americans asserted a
Tong lead in the first UN Conference
ti Trade and Development in Geneva in
964. The Group of 77 (G-77)-which
icreased its numbers but kept its
crony m— became the principal lobbying
("ganization through which developing
juntries pressed for radical adjust-
lents in the international economic
,'stem.

In the 1970s, certain Arab states—
irticularly those with oil— found their
iace in the forefront of the NAM and
-77. OPEC's [Organization of
etroleum Exporting Countries] success
5 a supplier cartel able to manipulate
applies and administer prices fueled a
rowing sense of power among all
eveloping countries. A number of
lem— Algeria, in particular, comes to
lind— took the lead in pressing for a
ew international economic order based
n the premise that the structural
:onomic problems of developing coun-
ties were the responsibility of the
eveloped world, whose members conse-
uently had an obligation to redistribute
lobal wealth and economic power as
Dmpensation for past transgressions.

By the mid-1980s, a changing inter-
ational economy and the success of
ome developing countries with market-
riented economic development had
aken much of the steam out of efforts to
egislate a new international economic
rder. The NAM maintained ritual sup-
lort for far-reaching structural economic
eforms, but attention returned strongly
0 political issues.

Economically, the differentiation of
?hird World nations is well advanced,
^or do they speak with a single voice
)olitically. Yet, to enhance their coUec-
ive influence in international fora, they
lave coordinated closely on many such
ssues through the NAM.

U.S. Policy Principles

Let me turn to some of the principles
that inform U.S. policy toward the Third
World. For peoples and nations so heter-
ogeneous and so diverse in their claims
on our interest, there can be no simple
U.S. policy. However, we approach the
Third World with a number of general
policy guidelines in mind.

First, we attach high importance to
the economic development of the Third
World. This is a matter of self-interest
but also reflects our sense of respon-
sibility for helping to create a stable
global environment in which all share a
stake.

We have been the leading source of
financial and technical assistance to
developing nations since World War IL
We sponsored most of the international
financial institutions that have
shouldered a growing share of the
burden for financing development. We
pioneered institutions like the Fulbright
Exchange Program and the Peace
Corps.

Our capital market has been fully
open to borrowers from developing coun-
tries. By 1984, our commercial lending
institutions had lent some $140 billion to
Third World countries. Equity invest-
ment in the Third World exceeded $50
billion, or roughly a quarter of our total
overseas investment. Oar transnational
corporations have taken the lead in
fostering the global diffusion of
industrial know-how, technology
transfer, and capital movement.

The sustained growth of our
economy and the open access we afford
others to trade in our market is perhaps
the largest contribution we make to the
growth of developing countries. Policy
lines in a field so vast are difficult to
summarize, but we proceed on the basic
premise that, for Third World countries
as for others, the path to sustained
growth lies in the efficiency of free and
open markets, encouragement to entre-
preneurial activity in the private sector,
and the full use of the opportunities
available for mutually beneficial
economic transactions in the interna-
tional trading and financial systems.

With respect to the instruments of
policy, aid and trade are, of course,
paramount.

Development Assistance— Despite
severe budgetary constraints arising out
of our own deficit, we continue to lead
the world in bilateral economic
assistance and in our support for

multilateral development banks and
other financial institutions. Over the
past 5 years, the Reagan Administration
increased U.S. official development
assistance from $6. .5 billion to $8.8
billion a year— a level well above other
industrial democracies and about four
times that provided by the Soviet Union.
Contrary to the popular misconception,
the bulk of our bilateral aid is not
military assistance but, rather, is
economic aid. America has been the prin-
cipal source of financial relief to those
struggling with debt problems. And we
have repeatedly taken the lead in
organizing relief efforts in response to
natural calamities such as the African
drought and the El Salvador earthquake.

Trade— The developing countries
understandably want trade more than
aid— an opportunity rather than a hand-
out. That serves our interests as well
and explains why we have kept our
market more open to Third World
exports than has any other industrial
nation. Our two-way trade with the
Third World is now greater than our
trade with Japan and Western Europe
combined; it is 10 times greater than
Soviet trade with the Third World. We
are also taking the lead in further
strengthening the world trading system.
The successful Punta del Este meeting
last month cleared the way for a new
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] round of multilateral trade
negotiations. The objective must be to
reduce further the impediments to free
and fair trade— particularly by removing
nontariff barriers to trade. We shall be
sensitive to the interests of developing
countries by resisting protectionist trade
pressures. We will also seek to address
subjects of special interest to us—
services, protection of intellectual prop-
erties, and agriculture.

The point, however, is this: we
recognize a large American stake in
assuring that the Third World enjoys a
full opportunity to share the benefits of
growth and prosperity.

Second, beyond seeking to
encourage economic growth in the Third
World, we have taken an active hand in
promoting the peaceful resolution of
Third World regional disputes.

• We have attempted to use our
relationship with South Africa and the
front-line states to promote an equitable

January 1987

GENERAL

resolution of the issues of Angola and
Namibia and to foster the swift and
peaceful dismantling of apartheid in
South Africa while expanding our tangi-
ble support for the black community in
South Africa and for Pretoria's
neighbors.

• In the Middle East, we remain the
only power that can exert significant
influence on both sides of the Arab-
Israeli dispute. We continue to promote
a just and lasting solution to the
Palestinian problem in the context of
peace between Israel and its Arab
neighbors. Some maintain that an inter-
national conference is a necessary step
to move the process along. In our view,
such proposals should be judged in terms
of their efficacy for facilitating direct
negotiations among the parties directly
concerned. As the Camp David accords
demonstrated, we can work closely with
the parties, we can facilitate talks, but in
the end, direct negotiations among the
parties to the dispute are the key to an
enduring settlement.

• In Central America, we have
directed our energies to consolidating
the stability of our democratic friends,
shielding them from subversive forces
directed from Nicaragua, encouraging a
dialogue between the Nicaraguan
Government and its democratic opposi-
tion, and supporting a negotiated settle-
ment through the Contadora process.

With respect to conflicts arising out
of Soviet attempts in the late 1970s to
reshape political forces in a number of
Third World countries through direct or
indirect application of force— as, for
example, in Afghanistan, Angola, and
Cambodia— we are determined to sup-
port those resistance forces that are
fighting for their independence and
freedom. However, we also believe these
conflicts can and should be resolved
politically. We have outlined a frame-
work for promoting such solutions. The
key is a negotiating process between the
warring parties to bring an end to
violence, national reconciliation, and the
withdrawal of foreign troops; we see
scope for U.S. -Soviet talks to support
such negotiations, ensure a verifiable
departure of foreign troops, and stem
the flow of outside arms; and, finally, we
have affirmed our willingness to extend
generous support for the reintegration
of those countries into the world
economy.

Third, while the Third World may
share some common perceptions, by and
large, it is a highly differentiated group

of countries with which we should
cultivate strong bilateral ties. Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico in Latin
America; Egypt, Israel, and Jordan in
the Middle East; key oil-producing states
in the gulf; India and Pakistan in South
Asia; Nigeria, Zambia, and Zaire in
Africa; South Korea, China, and the
ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] countries in Asia are only
the most obvious of the Third World
countries whose size, location, resources,
economic prowess, military potential,
and capacity for effective action invite
special attention from the United States.
There are scores of others. We are
devoting much attention to this task.

Fourth, we strongly support emerg-
ing Third World regional associations
that are demonstrating a collective will
to solve problems. Regional groups that
provide a means for pragmatic coopera-
tion to solve concrete day-to-day prob-
lems tend to flourish. The Gulf Coopera-
tion Council, the South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation, the
Organization of American States, the
Association of South East Asian
Nations, and the Organization of African
Unity all have demonstrated this poten-
tial. We are providing encouragement
and support.

Fifth, we recognize that the United
Nations is an institution of special impor-
tance to Third World countries. It is
easy to understand why. Americans
themselves regard the United Nations as
an international expression of our hope
for a more orderly, peaceful, and pros-
perous world. We are committed to the
United Nations as a world forum and a
sort of parliament for mankind. For the
countries of the Third World, the United
Nations offers a means of spotlighting
attention on their concerns, a forum in
which they can seek to influence great
power behavior and use the strength of
their numbers to press their case on
economic and political issues.

The General Assembly and Security
Council are the proper places for
political debate. With our great tradition
of freedeom of expression, we feel at
home working in such quasilegislative
bodies. We take words and ideas seri-
ously. We intend to express our views
forcefully, and we pay attention to what
others say on the issues and about us.

In the United Nations, as in other
multilateral institutions, however intense
the clash of interests, norms of civility
must be observed. A tough debate is to

be expected, but double standards,
abuse, and the constant introduction of
extraneous issues should be avoided. We
want to strengthen the United Nations
so that it can make a more effective con
tribution to international peace and
problemsolving. We cannot do this alone
The cooperation of all countries is
necessary.

We thus remain strongly committed
both to the United Nations as an institu-
tion and to its reform. The recommenda
tions of the Group of 18, if implemented
by the General Assembly, will be an
important starting point.

The Nonaligned Movement
and the United States

In this context, let me say a further
word about the Nonaligned Movement,
which remains the principal Third World
lobby within the United Nations. A
notable feature of many nonaligned pro-
nouncements is the disparity in the
critical standards applied to the United
States and Soviet Union, respectively.

Americans find it difficult to accept
these unequal standards. It was the
West that conferred independence on
vast territories in Africa and Asia, whilf»
the Soviets have not loosened their grip;
on Eastern Europe. The West— not the
Soviet Union— has extended vast quan-
tities of foreign assistance and afforded
developing countries preferred access
to its markets. It is the West— not
Moscow— that has sustained the
multilateral agencies and institutions or
which the Third World has come to
depend for its development. Yet, on bot
political and economic issues, it is the
West— and particularly the United
States— that absorbs the brunt of
criticism and complaint.

What accounts for this disparity?
The basic answer is that the United
States attracts more Third World atten-
tion and criticism because our policies
and actions matter. We have the greate.
power to affect events; and, in most of
the Third World, we have a much more
active presence than the Soviets. We
have the capacity to influence highly
charged issues like the Middle East and
South Africa. Third World countries
view these with high emotion; and horse
trading among regional caucuses in the
United Nations often results in the
aggregation of extreme views.

The membership policies of the NAR
further encourage this tendency. Soviet
surrogates make their voices heard
because the NAM has permitted Cuba,

Department of State Bullet!:

GENERAL

•ietnam, Laos, North Korea, and other
luntries with whom the Soviet Union
IS a relationship of miHtary support to
'tain formal nonaligned status— indeed,
) exercise a measure of leadership,
egimes that have come under Soviet
)ntrol, such as that in Afghanistan, are
3t expelled. Yet the NAM continues to
■cclude countries such as Honduras, El
alvador. South Korea, Thailand, and
enezuela. The cadre of pro-Soviet coun-
:'ies within the NAM and the nature of
AM procedures themselves have made
possible for the Soviet Union both to
ock criticism of its own policies and
isture as a "natural ally" and to
icourage extreme positions and max-
aum abuse of the United States.

Although an increasing number of
AM members— moderates by our stand-
I'ds— are concerned by this imbalance
id are actively seeking more genuinely
Dnaligned positions, they are disadvan-
iged by the practice of taking decisions
/ consensus.

The eighth nonaligned summit, held
St month in Harare, illustrates this
tuation. Some attempts at name-calling
ere struck down in committee, and
ime notable successes were achieved
.s, for example, on resolutions dealing
ith Cambodia and Afghanistan),
owever, the final political declaration is
fe with anti-American references. The
nited States is assailed for its policies
n disarmament, South Africa, the
[iddle East, and Central America. A
Bction condemns U.S. "aggression" and
state terrorism" against Libya and
emands compensation— this despite
olonel Qadhafi's bizarre and much
ssented attack on the NAM. In the
jmmit's concluding declaration, the
Inited States is mentioned by name 67
mes, almost invariably in a negative
ontext. The Soviet Union is not men-
loned once.

Some say the rhetorical excesses of
he NAM and other Third World groups
re akin to letting off political steam and
hat the United States should not take
hese verbal criticisms at face value.
Americans increasingly think otherwise,
'heir attitudes on U.S. programs for
?hird World countries, as reflected in
he Congress, are a clear index of this
hanging mood.

The effect of NAM positions and
■hetoric on the United Nations is par-
icularly significant in this regard. The
■esults of NAM meetings reappear in
■esolutions, votes, and speeches at the
'nited Nations and its agencies.

Extreme positions, refusals to negotiate
or compromise, and vitriolic verbal
attacks on opponents all poison the UN's
processes and compromise its ability to
carry out its important mission. It is for
this reason that we have made an issue
of "name-calling" and are mixing it up
very actively in the struggle for ideas.
We expect that our views and votes will
often diverge on the basis of differing
national interests. We do not ask NAM
members to abandon their principles of
nonalignment. On the contrary, we ask
them simply to adhere to their own self-
proclaimed goals in a genuine way.

U.S. Policy Opportunities
and Challenges

I have outlined some broad principles
that inform U.S. policy toward the Third
World and its principal political group-
ing, the NAM. Now let me turn briefly
to some of the trends which offer U.S.
policy opportunities, as well as some
which complicate our capacity to pursue
them.

One favorable global trend is the
unfolding of an extraordinary movement
toward democracy around the world. In
the Western Hemisphere, over the last 6
years, elected civilian leaders have
replaced authoritarian regimes in Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Peru, and Uruguay. Today, 90%
of the people in Latin America and the
Caribbean enjoy democratic rule, com-
pared to only one-third a decade ago.
Nicaragua, Cuba, Paraguay, and Chile
remain notable and disturbing excep-
tions to this trend. Elsewhere, the
yearning for freedom in the Philippines
brought a remarkably swift and peaceful
transition to a democracy last February.
Pakistan has replaced a martial law
regime with a vigorous civilian
government.

We have an opportunity to nurture
and expand this drive toward
democracy. Not many years ago,
democratic nations were thought to be a
dwindling minority. Today, the vitality
of the democratic idea is one of the most
important political realities of our time,
and American power and influence are
firmly committed to its support and
advancement.

Similarly, our commitment to
market forces as the key to economic
development has found increasing
resonance in the Third World. Nothing
invigorates the global economic system
today more than the powerful economic

recovery that has been underway in the
United States for nearly 4 years. Suc-
cess invites emulation. Many Third
World countries are abandoning the
economic dogmas of the immediate
postcolonial period. There is a growing
recognition of the connection between
individual initiative and economic
progress— a growing realization that the
talents of individual human beings are
the greatest resource a society can bring
to the tasks of national development.

This is apparent in the dynamism of
the new industrial economies in East
Asia— economies that have achieved
incredible growth over extended periods
by keeping bureaucracies lean and
encouraging the initiative of their
private sectors.

It is equally apparent in Africa,
where many nations are embarked on
bold economic reform. At the UN
Special Session on the Critical Economic
Situation in Africa held last May, the
African nations— including those hardest
hit by collectivist planning— issued an
extraordinary document calling for more
open markets and less intervention by
the state. This was a concerted position
that African countries brought with
them to the United Nations after
deliberations in their regional body, the
Organization of African Unity. Our ideas
are taking hold. Thus, there are very
important opportunities.

It is ironic that, at a time when
global trends favor us and we have
opportunities to pursue more construc-
tive relations with Third World coun-
tries, pressures are mounting within our
country to turn our backs on the world.

We are the largest free market on
Earth. Our open trading policies confer
tangible economic benefits on the
American people; they have also pro-
vided vast opportunities for our trading
partners. Yet America's large trade
deficit is now stimulating new calls in
the Congress for protectionist legisla-
tion. Not since the days of Smoot-
Hawley have protectionist forces been as
powerful as they are today. If enacted,
protectionist measures would endanger
the new democracies, the poorer coun-
tries burdened by debt, and many key
friends around the world. Here at home,
we will feel the results in higher prices
and diminished efficiency. In today's
interdependent global economy, our
prosperity and that of other nations are
mutually dependent as never before.

January 1987

GENERAL

A second development that will con-
strain U.S. policies toward the Third
World at an important time of oppor-
tunity is the reduction of our foreign
affairs budget by the Congress. Last
January, the President submitted an
international affairs budget for fiscal
year 1987 that we had already stripped
bare. It amounted to only 2% of the total
Federal budget. Yet the current congres-
sional budget resolution cuts that
minimal request by about a quarter
across the board and even more deeply
in such crucial areas as support for inter-
national organizations and economic
assistance. If enacted, these reductions,
and the earmarking of aid levels to a few
countries, will severely impair our ability
to protect important U.S. interests in
sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South
America, the Caribbean, and East Asia.
They would seriously cut our funding for
the multilateral development banks,
which are crucial to Third World
economic recovery and growth. They
would reduce our financial leverage for

real reform in the budget and adminis-
tration of the United Nations. They
would result in the closing of diplomatic
posts and the reduction of our official
personnel abroad— to a level lower than
when George C. Marshall was Secretary
of State.

Conclusion

Let me summarize. Both we and the
countries of the Third World face hard
choices as we look ahead. But our rela-
tions with key countries are sound.
Regional associations are emerging.
Soviet competitiveness is diminishing.

Our ideas enjoy a currency they have
rarely enjoyed.

We in America face a fundamental
choice: at a time when favorable global
trends present new opportunities for
U.S. policy in the Third World, we can
continue to be engaged with its countrit
on behalf of our deepest values and com
mitments. Or we can choose to stand
aside and allow events in those increas-
ingly important parts of the world to
play themselves out without effective
U.S. involvement. That decision is ours
to make, and educators and opinion-
makers such as you have a decisive role
to play. ■

Department of State Bulletir

GENERAL

J.S. Foreign Policy
\chievements and Challenges

}j Michael H. Armacost

Address before a State Department
igional foreign polio/ conference in Salt
ake City on October 18, 1986.

his is a beautiful setting in which to
in a foreign policy conference cospon-
)red by the University of Utah,
righam Young University, and the
tate Department. Throughout our coun-
y we feel a renewed confidence that
imerica is in a position to play a positive
oreign policy role. This is a major
nange and one of my themes today.

Journalists normally keep score on
n administration by adding up the for-
mal agreements signed with foreign
Duntries. This is at best an incomplete
tieasure of success. The Carter Adminis-
! "ation secured ratification of the
anama Canal Treaty, moderated the
amp David agreement, normalized rela-
ons with China, and negotiated the
ALT II [strategic arms limitation talks]
greement on arms control. Yet
.mericans intuitively understood that
lese agreements did not add up to suc-
sss in foreign policy. By 1980, there
'as a widespread perception both here
nd abroad that American power had
een eroded, as had our will to utilize
ower to protect our interests overseas.

With congressional elections coming
nd with President Reagan and General
•ecretary Gorbachev having met in
:eland last week, this is an appropriate
ime to reflect on some of the
chievements and challenges of
American foreign policy. Let me briefly
eport some "good news" and some
bad news" by describing some of the
rends in the international and domestic
■nvironment which currently affect our
ability to promote foreign policy
nterests.

First, the good news. Many global
rends and developments now favor us.

\ Favorable
'Correlation of Forces"

The most important development in recent
years is this: a significant shift has
occurred in what the Soviets call the
"global correlation of forces."

You remember the 1970s. We
experienced a constitutional crisis. We
endured the ordeal of the American
hostages in Iran. Long gas lines
reminded us of America's growing
dependence on others for basic
resources. Economists introduced the
term "stagflation" into our vocabularies.
President Carter described the national
mood as one of "malaise."

The bitter legacy of Vietnam was an
American disposition to retreat tem-
porarily from international leadership.
Divisions appeared in our alliances. The
cumulative effect of inadequate invest-
ment in U.S. military modernization
began to show.

In contrast, the Soviets appeared to
be on a roll. The momentum of Moscow's
strategic modernization effort far
exceeded ours. Through the direct or
indirect application of their military
power, they expanded their influence in
Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozam-
bique, and Nicaragua. They invaded and
attempted to occupy Afghanistan. They
supported the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia. During this period, many
Third World countries embraced statist
political and economic practices; the
influence of democratic and free market
principles appeared to wane.

Much has changed in the 1980s. We
have substantially rebuilt our military
power and revitalized our economy.
There is a new pride in our country, a
strong consensus that the United States
should play an active role in the world.
We have a President who enjoys the lux-
ury of a second term and the continuity
of policy which that affords. Our
alliances are in solid shape. It is now the
Soviets who are encountering growing
difficulties at home and abroad and who
apparently need some respite from the
East- West competition in order to put
their house in order.

Winning the Global
Contest of Ideas

My second bit of good news is that we
are doing very well in the global contest
of ideas. This is particularly apparent in
the currency of democracy and market
economics in the Third World. A decade
ago, martial law and other forms of
authoritarianism were de rigueur in the

.developing countries. We confronted a
S|Mrited drive by the nonaligned for a
new international economic order which
was blatantly statist in its approach.

Today, 90% of all Latin Americans
live under governments which can
plausibly claim to be democratic. Nor is
this trend confined to this hemisphere.
All Americans were thrilled by the swift
and peaceful democratic revolution in
the Philippines last February. Though
problems remain, Pakistan made the
transition from military to civilian
government. Haiti was relieved of the
oppression of the Duvaliers. The extraor-
dinary movement toward democracy
unfolding in diverse corners of the earth
reminds us that dictatorship— whether
of the left or of the right— is not
permanent.

President Reagan has personally
urged democracies to assert their values.
A National Endowment for Democracy
was created and has undertaken projects
in support of democratic institutions in
the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Chile,
Haiti, and South Africa. Other projects
have assisted elementary school educa-
tion for anticommunist Afghans and sup-
ported Solidarity and other gi'oups work-
ing to establish independent institutions
in Poland.

So, not many years ago, democratic
nations were thought to be a dwindling
minority; democracy was thought to be a
unique and distinctive attribute of
Western industrial culture. Today, the
vitality of the democratic idea is one of
the most important political realities of
our time, and America is firmly commit-
ted to its advancement.

The movement toward democracy
has been matched by a growing commit-
ment to market economics. The reasons
are obvious. Economies dominated by
the public sector simply did not produce.
Those which limited governmental
intervention and expanded the inter-
play of market forces have achieved
remarkable results.

Today, there is no force in the world
doing more to invigorate the global
economic system than the powerful
economic recovery which has now been
underway in the United States for nearly
4 years. It is success that invites

January 1987

GENERAL

emulation. More and more countries are
looking to the efficiency of free and open
markets, the vigor of the private sector,
and the opportunities available in the
international trading and financial
systems. From India, to Yugoslavia, to
Brazil, we find movements to decen-
tralize, deregulate, and denationalize.
The dynamism of East Asia's economy is
well known, as are China's experiments
with market principles and the dramatic
growth it has achieved.

Both these trends— toward
democracy and the market system— owe
much to America's example and
American power. The single biggest
extension of democratic liberties in
recent memory occurred at the end of
World War II when American power
was at its zenith. It is no coincidence
that respect for our values has grown in
recent years as we have renewed the
sources of our military, economic, and
political power in the world.

Soviets on Wrong
Side of Nationalism

There is a related trend of considerable
importance. In those countries where the
Soviets extended their influence in the
late 1970s, they now find themselves at
cross-purposes with the forces of
nationalism. In Afghanistan. Cambodia,
Angola, and Nicaragua, regimes of
dubious legitimacy are supported by
Soviet subsidies and Soviet or allied
troops. Each confronts growing
indigenous resistance. In a nationalist
era, dependence on outsiders inevitably
diminishes the appeal and authority of
Soviet-supported regimes. The Russians
are learning that it costs a great deal
more to subsidize such regimes than
it does to encourage and support
nationalist forces fighting for a cause.

Our Agenda on

Arms Control and Trade

There is a fourth development of great
consequence. In the fields of arms con-
trol and trade— matters of overriding
consequence to all Americans— the key
negotiations now address our agenda.

High drama always attends meetings
between the President of the United
States and the General Secretary of the
Soviet Union, and the meetings in
Iceland last week were no exception. In
over 10 hours of intensive discussion, we
succeeded in getting the Soviets to
address in a bold and imaginative man-

ner a number of our key strategic con-
cerns. In Iceland, we proposed— and the
Soviets accepted— a .5-year period of
reductions in strategic forces in which all
strategic nuclear arms would be reduced
by 50%. In the next 5 years, we would
continue by eliminating all remaining
offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges.
In INF, we reached agreement that all
LRINF [longer range intermediate-
range nuclear forces] missile warheads
would be eliminated in Europe and all
but 100 warheads eliminated from the
Asian portion of the U.S.S.R.

Note the contrast from a few years
ago. Then, professional arms controllers
seemed content to propose limits on the
rate at which U.S. and Soviet strategic
offensive systems grew. We are now
discussing radical reductions of strategic
nuclear systems.

In 1983, the zero option for INF put
forward by the Reagan Administration
was dismissed by critics as unserious.
Yet the proposal discussed in Reykjavik
last weekend involved the elimination of
all LRINF missiles from Europe and an
80% reduction of those deployed by the
Soviet Union in Asia. Until recently, the
arms control community seemed univer-
sally to accept the premise that deter-
rence required mutual threats of
annihilation.

In the past, arms control verifica-
tion arrangements were essentially
synonymous with national technical
means of inspection. Both in Stockholm
and Reykjavik, more rigorous inspection
methods— including onsite inspec-
tion—have reentered the vocabulary of
negotiators.

In an attempt to take into account
Soviet concerns, we agreed at Reykjavik
to defer deployment of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) for 10 years.
The General Secretary wanted more,
however. He wanted wording that, in
effect, would have kept us from develop-
ing the SDI for the entire 10-year
period. Gorbachev said that unless we
acquiesced in his position on the SDI, all
the progress made on eliminating
nuclear weapons was canceled. But on
the SDI President Reagan had to stand
firm. The SDI has already demonstrated
its utility as an inducement for serious
arms control negotiations. It has
stimulated hope for deterrence which
relies upon non-nuclear defenses rather
than mutual threats of annihilation.

■i

Major substantive progress was
achieved at Reykjavik. The proposals
discussed there remain on the table.
Our arms control negotiators at Genev;
now have new possibilities with which
to work toward possibly historic
agreements. Secretary Shultz and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will
meet in Vienna. We remain patiently
hopeful and will continue to pursue not
only arms control but arms reductions,
with persistence, vigor, and flexibility.

The trade negotiations held last
month in Punta del Este received much
less publicity than the meeting held in
Iceland. But the results regarding inter?
national trade are also encouraging.
That meeting opened the door to
a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations— one in which trade in serv
ices, protection of intellectual property,
and agricultural trade are on the agend;
for the first time. These are areas of pa:
ticular concern to us in our determined
effort to make trade free, open, and fail

To that end, the United States has
played a lead role in a series of high-levi
economic meetings among the indus-
trialized countries aimed at strengthen-
ing the global economic system. These
meetings have sought to promote sus-
tained growth by relating basic currency
and structural adjustments to major
economic indicators, including exchange
rates. These measures offer the hope of
increasing exchange rate stability and,
thereby, of bringing exchange rates and
international trade surpluses and deficit
more in line with underlying economic
realities.

We have worked closely with Japan
and other countries to rectify the struc-
tural imbalances that, among other
things, contribute to America's huge
trade deficits. Premier Nakasone,
recently returned to office in an electors
landslide, has said Japan must transforn
its economy to rely more on domestic
demand and imports, especially manufac
tured products. Elsewhere, we have
established free trade areas with Israel
and Canada.

In the general trade area, we have
investigated, denounced, and, in some
301 cases, retaliated against unfair
trading practices.

In short, in the crucial global arenas
of arms control and international trade,
America's ability to shape the agenda is
strong, and we will do all we can to see
that our issues are kept front and center
in the bargaining to come.

Department of State Bulletin

GENERAL

taised Public Consciousness
m Terrorism and Drugs

\nother favorable trend is that public
onsciousness— here and abroad— has
leen raised regarding two issues of
remendous importance to Americans:
errorism and drug trafficking.

Few terrorist incidents have
ccurred in the United States, but many
^.mericans have been affected by such
ncidents abroad. We have put the world
-n notice that we will not countenance
lolitically inspired terrorist actions
gainst our citizens.

During the past few years, we have
chieved remarkable progress in
eveloping our own intelligence
apabilities vis-a-vis international ter-
orists and in sharing that intelligence
I n a real-time basis with friendly
ations. We have expanded international
[ooperation in the field of law enforce-
jient and counterterrorist training. Last
I ear, we and our friends foiled 126
lanned terrorist attacks.

We are generating support for put-
.ng teeth into international antiter-
Drism conventions. For example, the
nternational Civil Aviation Organization
DUghened its regulations dramatically
fter the hijacking of TWA 847. In
ssponse to the Achille Lauro hijacking,
le International Maritime Organization
egan to develop similar regulations
3r seaborne transportation. Last
lovember, the UN General Assembly
dopted a strong resolution declaring
errorism a crime.

We have also developed our own
ounterterrorist military capabilities to
eact swiftly to terrorist situations. In
oth the Achille Lauro affair and last
ipril's assault on Tripoli, we demon-
trated our willingness and ability to use
Dree in extremis in pursuit of terrorists
nd against states who support them.
Lgainst terrorism we are determined;
gainst terrorism we will prevail.

We have seen a similar growth of
nternational consciousness and coopera-
ion on the drug question. Here at home,
nuch needs to be done to reduce the
lemand for drugs. Abroad, we are
.Iready rapidly increasing cooperative
■fforts to restrict drug supplies. The
Irug problem is becoming a high
priority. Other countries are visibly
! ooperating with us in drug eradication
md enforcement programs. For exam-
)le, in 1981, only one nation was
■radicating narcotics crops; in 1986, 14

nations have signed agreements with the
United States to undertake aerial or
manual eradication efforts.

In 1986, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Venezuela, and Colombia signed the
Lara Bonilla Treaty— named after the
Colombian Justice Minister slain by nar-
cotics traffickers 2 years before. They
thereby pledged regional cooperation in
fighting narcotics production and
trafficking. In keeping with this commit-
ment, the Andean nations have under-
taken major efforts to halt the produc-
tion, processing, and shipment of
narcotics. These include the recent suc-
cessful "Blast Furnace" operation in
Bolivia which used U.S. military assets.

That is the good news. Naturally, in
this business, one does not expect
everything to go right. There are plenty
of challenges to go around. Let me
single out a couple of specific issues for
special mention. I do so because these
are matters over which, hopefully, we
can exert some control.

Resolving Regional Conflicts

In regions of conflict around the world,
America is on the right side of history.
In the Middle East, Central America,
and South Africa, for example, we are
playing a constructive role in helping the
parties directly involved to bridge their
differences and to work toward peaceful
solutions.

In the Middle East, despite the con-
tinuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we
continue to maintain close relations with
both our Israeli and Arab friends. We
have developed a broad institutionalized
framework for economic, political, and
military cooperation with Israel. We
work closely with the Gulf Cooperation
Council. The recent Egyptian-Israeli
summit, as well as the meeting between
[Israeli] Prime Minister Peres and King
Hassan of Morocco, suggest that the
psychological barrier in the Arab world
against recognition of and dialogue with
Israel seems to be crumbling.

Yet, as always, the Middle East
poses especially difficult challenges. We
must still find an effective way to bring
Palestinians of good will who are willing
to engage in serious and peaceful
dialogue with the Israelis into the peace
process. The Egyptian economic situa-
tion remains a high priority. The Iran-
Iraq war, now in its sixth year, is a
human catastrophe which threatens to
destabilize the entire area.

While we recognize the role Syria
plays in the region, its apparent con-
tinued support for terrorism as an
instrument of foreign policy prohibits us
from engaging more fully with it on the
fundamental problems in the area.
Libya, because of the policies Qadhafi
has chosen to pursue, remains an outcast
both in the region and in the wider com-
munity of civilized nations.

In Central America, we are working
closely with moderate forces for peace-
ful progress. We have supported El
Salvador through three democratic elec-
tions since the so-called final offensive of
the communist insurgents in January
1981. We are extending assistance to
help El Salvador recover from its recent
tragic earthquake.

Through economic and security
assistance, diplomatic support, and close
consultation, the Administration is
working with the Central American
democracies to contain the Nicaraguan
communist "revolution without
borders." Like El Salvador, Nicaragua
had a revolution in 1979. However,
unlike El Salvador, the Sandinista
regime has banished legitimate opposi-
tion, censored the press, and sought to
intimidate its neighbors by using Cuban
advisers and Soviet equipment to build
up the largest military force in the
region.

In South Africa, we seek the early
elimination of apartheid and the exten-
sion of meaningful civil and economic
rights to all. President Reagan put
Americans' hopes for the future of South
Africa this way:

This Administration is not only . . . against
apartheid; we are for a new South Africa, a
new nation where all that has been built up
over generations is not destroyed, a new
society where participation in the social,
cultural, and political life is open to all
peoples— a new South Africa that comes home
to the family of free nations where it belongs.

The challenge for us in southern
Africa is to be the champion of construc-
tive change. Sanctions, in and of
themselves, do not add up to a policy for
South Africa. Our policy is to help the
victims of apartheid— we spent $20
million is fiscal year (FY) 1986 and will dou-
ble that this year— and to foster dialogue
between the South African Government
and authoritative leaders of the black
community. We will continue to work
with all those of good will in southern
Africa who want to eliminate apartheid,
to diminish cross-border violence, and to
deny this strategic area to Soviet
influence.

January 1987

GENERAL

Too often in discussions of foreign
policy in this country, people seem
unprepared to face up to the ambiguity of
many external situations and the
necessity of pursuing a complex two- or
three-track strategy of our own. In deal-
ing with the Soviets, for example, we
must compete aggressively even as we
explore for wider areas of cooperation.

In dealing with regional conflicts, we
must be prepared to support our friends
even as we keep the door open to
negotiated solutions. In dealing with
complex political and moral issues, we
must remember that the test of policy
is less the goodness of our intentions
than the results of our actions. In a
democracy we know that a successful
policy requires not only a sensible con-
cept and steady implementation but
public understanding and support.

Difficulties with Congress

We face challenges at home as well.
Speaking frankly, we have a huge prob-
lem with the Congress. Actually, we con-
front two adverse tendencies on the Hill.

On the one hand. Congress seems
increasingly disposed to micromanage
foreign policy. Rather than attempting
to chart broad objectives in concert with
the Administration, Congress seeks to
enforce its will with respect to the
details of policy execution. That is
unhelpful— indeed, in the long term, it's
self-defeating. No nation can manage its
affairs with 535 Secretaries of State-
even a country with the margins for
error we possess.

At the same time. Congress is deny-
ing us the resources with which to con-
duct any coherent policy. The foreign
affairs budget has been devastated. Our
foreign assistance program for FY 1987
was cut by 27%. Since much of the

budget is earmarked by Congress for
specific countries or programs, we have
limited latitude to allocate cuts in an
equitable fashion. One result is the pros-
pect of 50%-60% cuts in FY 1987 for
non-earmarked programs. No one can
expect us to defend effectively our
interests in the world while imposing
such limits on our means.

Foreign policy is not like writing
Christmas wish lists. It is a tough proc-
ess of allocating means which are scarce
against aims which are legion. Our
interests abroad are not declining.
The means of conducting policy are.
Something will have to give. We either
accept a more modest role in the world,
or we flirt with failure to achieve our
objectives. There is no free lunch in this
business.

Our economy is the most prosperous
in the world. This is another reason why
cuts in America's foreign affairs budget
are so difficult to explain to our foreign
friends and allies. Access to our market
is coveted by all. By furnishing such
access to others— and securing, in
return, fair entree to foreign markets—
we enable our consumers to buy high
quality, reasonably priced products, pro-
vide the spur of competition to our own
industry, and contribute to the growth
and prosperity of friendly nations
around the world.

There is no doubt that our recent
trade deficits are not sustainable. Nor do
we intend to allow them to continue.
Adjustment of the value of our currency,
structural adjustments in the economies
of key trading partners, aggressive
enforcement of our reciprocal trading
rights, and multilateral and bilateral
trade negotiations represent the prin-
cipal tools of our policy for surmount-
ing them. On occasion, the threat of
legislative remedies enhances our

bargaining position with others. But pn
tectionist legislation in general does lit-
tle service for us or others. We should
resist that temptation.

Conclusion

This afternoon, I have spoken of good
news and bad. I have described some
global trends which favor us, as well as
some of the achievements and challenge
of American foreign policy. All countrie
confront significant challenges, but a
society is more likely to best its
challenges if it retains the conviction
that its values are worth defending.

Certain truths, which we say are
self-evident, give us a realistic yet
hopeful view of the world. Our fun-
damental challenge is to preserve the
balance of power through a willingness
and strength to defend the cause of
freedom. Without such stability, the
sentiments of the Declaration of
Independence have little chance of
becoming a reality for men and women
everywhere.

We are a democratic country, and
our success and failure in meeting our
foreign policy challenges rests with the
American people. The interests and con
cern of this group, like that of many
others throughout our country, give me
every reason to say that, while our
challenges are real, our future is also
bright. ■

Department of State Bulletir

TIIDDLE EAST

J.S. Initiative to Iran

•RESIDENT'S ADDRESS

TO THE NATION.
JOV. 13. 1986'

know you've been reading, seeing, and
earing a lot of stories the past several
•ays attributed to Danish sailors,
nnamed observers at Italian ports and
■panish harbors, and especially unnamed
overnment officials of my Administra-
,.on. Well, now you are going to hear the
icts from a White House source, and
ou know my name.

I wanted this time to talk with you
bout an extremely sensitive and pro-
jundly important matter of foreign
olicy. For 18 months now we have had
nderway a secret diplomatic initiative
) Iran. That initiative was undertaken
)r the simplest and best of reasons— to
jnew a relationship with the nation of
•an. to bring an honorable end to the
loody 6-year war between Iran and
•aq, to eliminate state-sponsored ter-
irism and subversion, and to effect the
ife return of all hostages.

Without Iran's cooperation, we can-
Dt bring an end to the Persian Gulf
ar; without Iran's concurrence, there
m be no enduring peace in the Middle
ast.

For 10 days now, the American and
orld press have been full of reports and
amors about this initiative and these
Djectives. Now, my fellow Americans,
lere is an old saying that nothing
)reads so quickly as a rumor. So I
lought it was time to speak with you
rectly— to tell you firsthand about our
jalings with Iran. As Will Rogers once
lid, "Rumor travels faster, but it don't
:ay put as long as truth." So let's get to
le facts.

The charge has been made that the
nited States has shipped weapons to
•an as ransom payment for the release
f American hostages in Lebanon— that
le United States undercut its allies and
jcretly violated American policy against
•afficking with terrorists.

Those charges are utterly false. The
nited States has not made concessions
) those who hold our people captive in
ebanon. And we will not. The United
tates has not swapped boatloads or
laneloads of American weapons for the
eturn of American hostages. And we
ill not.

Other reports have surfaced alleging
U.S. involvement: reports of a sealift to
Iran using Danish ships to carry
American arms; of vessels in Spanish
ports being employed in secret U.S.
arms shipments; of Italian ports being
used; of the United States sending spare
parts and weapons for combat aircraft.
All these reports are quite exciting, but
as far as we are concerned, not one of
them is true.

Sending a Signal to Tehran

During the course of our secret discus-
sions. I authorized the transfer of small
amounts of defensive weapons and spare
parts for defensive systems to Iran. My
purpose was to convince Tehran that our
negotiators were acting with my author-
ity, to send a signal that the United
States was prepared to replace the
animosity between us with a new rela-
tionship. These modest deliveries, taken
together, could easily fit into a single
cargo plane. They could not, taken
together, affect the outcome of the
6-year war between Iran and Iraq— nor
could they affect in any way the military
balance between the two countries.

Those with whom we were in contact
took considerable risks and needed a
signal of our serious intent if they were
to carry on and broaden the dialogue.

At the same time we undertook this
initiative, we made clear that Iran must
oppose all forms of international ter-
rorism as a condition of progress in our
relationship. The most significant step
which Iran could take, we indicated,
would be to use its influence in Lebanon
to secure the release of all hostages held
there.

Some progress has already been
made. Since U.S. Government contact
began with Iran, there's been no
evidence of Iranian Government com-
plicity in acts of terrorism against the
United States. Hostages have come
home, and we welcome the efforts that
the Government of Iran has taken in the
past and is currently undertaking.

Iran's Strategic Importance

But why, you might ask, is any relation-
ship with Iran important to the United
States? Iran encompasses some of the
most critical geography in the world. It
lies between the Soviet Union and access

to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.
Geography explains why the Soviet
Union has sent an army into
Afghanistan to dominate that country
and, if they could, Iran and Pakistan.

Iran's geography gives it a critical
position from which adversaries could
interfere with oil flows from the Arab
states that border the Persian Gulf.
Apart from geography, Iran's oil
deposits are important to the long-term
health of the world economy. For these
reasons, it is in our national interest to
watch for changes within Iran that
might offer hope for an improved rela-
tionship. Until last year, there was little
to justify that hope.

Indeed, we have bitter and enduring
disagreements that persist today. At the
heart of our quarrel has been Iran's past
sponsorship of international terrorism.
Iranian policy has been devoted to
expelling all Western influence from the
Middle East. We cannot abide that
because our interests in the Middle East
are vital. At the same time, we seek no
territory or special position in Iran. The
Iranian revolution is a fact of history,
but between American and Iranian basic
national interests there need be no per-
manent conflict.

Since 1983, various countries have
made overtures to stimulate direct con-
tact between the United States and Iran.
European, Near Eastern, and Far
Eastern countries have attempted to
serve as intermediaries. Despite a U.S.
willingness to proceed, none of these
overtures bore fruit. With this history in
mind, we were receptive last year when
we were alerted to the possibility of
establishing a direct dialogue with Ira-
nian officials.

Now, let me repeat. America's
longstanding goals in the region have
been to help preserve Iran's inde-
pendence from Soviet domination; to
bring an honorable end to the bloody
Iran-Iraq war; to halt the export of
subversion and terrorism in the region.
A major impediment to those goals has
been an absence of dialogue, a cutoff in
communication between us.

The Search for a Better Relationship

It's because of Iran's strategic impor-
tance and its influence in the Islamic
world that we chose to probe for a better
relationship between our countries.

anuary 1987

MIDDLE EAST

Our discussions continued into the
spring of this year. Based upon the prog-
ress we felt we had made, we sought to
raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A
meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then
asked my former national security
adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake
a secret mission and gave him explicit
instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to
open a dialogue, making stark and clear
our basic objectives and disagreements.

The 4 days of talks were conducted
in a civil fashion; and American person-
nel were not mistreated. Since then, the
dialogue has continued, and step-by-step
progress continues to be made.

Let me repeat: our interests are
clearly served by opening a dialogue
with Iran and thereby helping to end the
Iran-Iraq war. That war has dragged on
for more than 6 years, with no prospect
of a negotiated settlement. The
slaughter on both sides has been enor-
mous; and the adverse economic and
political consequences for that vital
region of the world have been growing.
We sought to establish communication
with both sides in that senseless strug-
gle, so that we could assist in bringing
about a cease-fire and, eventually, a set-
tlement. We have sought to be even-
handed by working with both sides and
with other interested nations to prevent
a widening of the war.

This sensitive undertaking has
entailed a great risk for those involved.
There is no question but that we could
never have begun or continued this
dialogue had the initiative been disclosed
earlier. Due to the publicity of the past
week, the entire initiative is very much
at risk today.

There is ample precedent in our
history for this kind of secret diplomacy.
In 1971, then-President Nixon sent his
national security adviser on a secret mis-
sion to China. In that case, as today,
there was a basic requirement for discre-
tion and for a sensitivity to the situation
in the nation we were attempting to
engage.

Since the welcome return of former
hostage David Jacobsen, there have been
unprecedented speculation and countless
reports that have not only been wrong
but have been potentially dangerous to
the hostages and destructive of the
opportunity before us. The efforts of
courageous people like Terry Waite [lay
assistant to the Archbishop of Canter-
bury] have been jeopardized. So exten-
sive have been the false rumors and
erroneous reports that the risks of
remaining silent now exceed the risks of

speaking out. And that's why I decided
to address you tonight.

It's been widely reported, for exam-
ple, that the Congress, as well as top
executive branch officials, were cir-
cumvented. Although the efforts we
undertook were highly sensitive and
involvement of government officials was
limited to those with a strict need to
know, all appropriate Cabinet officers
were fully consulted. The actions I
authorized were and continue to be in
full compliance with Federal law. And
the relevant committees of Congress are
being and will be fully informed.

Another charge is that we have
tilted toward Iran in the gulf war. This,
too, is unfounded. We have consistently
condemned the violence on both sides.
We have consistently sought a
negotiated settlement that preserves the
territorial integrity of both nations. The
overtures we've made to the Govern-
ment of Iran have not been a shift to
supporting one side over the other.
Rather, it has been a diplomatic
initiative to gain some degree of access
and influence within Iran— as well as
Iraq— and to bring about an honorable
end to that bloody conflict. It is in the
interests of all parties in the gulf region
to end that war as soon as possible.

To summarize, our government has a
firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist
demands. That "no concessions" policy
remains in force— in spite of the wildly
speculative and false stories about arms
for hostages and alleged ransom
payments. We did not— repeat— did not
trade weapons or anything else for
hostages; nor will we. Those who think
that we have "gone soft" on terrorism
should take up the question with Col.
Qadhafi.

We have not, nor will we, capitulate
to terrorists. We will, however, get on
with advancing the vital interests of our
great nation— in spite of terrorists and
radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts
and immobilize the United States. Our
goals have been and remain:

Iran;

To restore a relationship with

• To bring an honorable end to the
war in the gulf;

• To bring a halt to state-supported
terror in the Middle East; and

• Finally, to effect the safe return of
all hostages from Lebanon.

As President, I've always operated
on the belief that, given the facts, the
American people will make the right
decision. I believe that to be true now.

I cannot guarantee the outcome.
But, as in the past, I ask for your sup-
port because I believe you share the
hope for peace in the Middle East, for
freedom for all hostages, and for a wof
free of terrorism. Certainly, there are
risks in this pursuit, but there are
greater risks if we do not persevere.

It will take patience and understan(
ing; it will take continued resistance to
those who commit terrorist acts; and it
will take cooperation with all who seek
to rid the world of this scourge.

SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW
ON "FACE THE NATION,"
NOV. 16, 1986=

}

Q. Is it true, as has been widely
reported, that this secret shipment of
arms to Iran — the operation — went
forward despite your objections to it??
And if that's true, why did you objecft
to it?

A. I never discuss the advice I give
to the President. That's something be-
tween the President and me. But let m*
tell you how I see this.

First of all, as Congressman
Wright— Speaker Wright— said, there
was an opportunity to probe for a dif-
ferent relationship with Iran; and
because of the strategic situation, that
seemed important to us. And I might
say, because of the strategic situation, i
undoubtedly is important to Iran. So
there's something mutual there.

In addition, the war, Iran's terroris<
acts, its effort to ship its revolution
abroad constituted a problem; and if
something could be done about that, w
we'd be better off. |f

By and large, everybody agrees tha
that's a good thing to do. So the Presi-
dent decided on a probing operation to
sort of feel his way, find out what migh
be done. In order to be effective, clearlj
that had to be done secretly— and I thin
people would agree on that.

In the course of that probe, which I
was conducted by his national security I
adviser— that's his designated hitter— as ,
the President said in his address to the |
nation last week, he decided that a i

signal should be sent in terms of a small I
defensive arms shipment to show his
serious intent and good faith. That's '
debatable. If you can—

Q. But that's the crux of it.

A. No. Wait a minute. You can
argue for that— there are some good
reasons why; you can argue against it.
At any rate, when you get elected Presi-
dent, that's one of the things you get th(

Department of State Bulleti

MIDDLE EAST

' ight to do, to make decisions of that
ind. So the President decided on this
ignal, and he did it. And he—

Q. On whose advice, though?

A. And he set that out before the
ation very clearly.

Now, the probe has gone on, and we
11 recognize that there are two principal
bstacles to the kind of relationship we'd
■ke to see with Iran. One is the continu-
ig war with Iraq— and Iran is the coun-
ry that seems intransigent, not wanting
0 get it settled. Furthermore, Iran has
nd continues to pursue a policy of ter-
orism, as shown for example in the fact
nat some terrorists were part of the
ilgrimage to Mecca recently, last sum-
ler. So they continue in that policy, and
'e have to be concerned about ter-
orism, whether directed against us or
irected against anybody else.

So those are two principal and
lixed-together obstacles, and we need
3, of course, respond to those. Among
ur responses is our denial of arms
nipments to Iran, and that policy
amains our policy. It is in effect, and
lere it is.

Q. You must explain that to the
.merican people. You —

A. I've just explained it.

Q. No, that— no. Let's try to con-
entrate on the arms part of this.
Iverybody will— I'll stipulate with you
tiat a lot of people think the probe
/as a good idea. It's the arms that
verybody is concerned about.

First, before we even get into it,
ou just said that that continues to be
ur policy. You went, yourself, to the
fnited Nations 6 weeks ago while this
ecret operation was underway, after
he President had sent some arms
irectly and apparently sanctioned,
ondoned third-party shipments to
ran, and told the moderate Arab
tates at the United Nations that we
k'eren't doing that. Now how could
ou have done that?

A. The President decided, as he said
■ublicly to the nation— he didn't par-
icularly want to disclose it at that time,
'Ut he felt he needed to.

I Q. Because he got caught.

A. He decided— well, no, I don't
hink that's a fair way to put it.

He was conducting an ongoing
irobe, and he was seeing some
esponses to that, and so he wanted to
:eep it going. I think we all recognize
'hat, for better or worse, all the publicity
)robably sets that back somewhat. At
my rate, he decided to put forward as a
gesture- as a signal, I think was the

word he used— of his good intent some-
thing that they recognized was tough for
him to do; and he did it, wanting to give
a signal of a desire for a different kind of
relationship.

Now, that's controversial, and there
it is. And you can argue for it; you can
argue against it.

Q. But why did you, then, go and
tell the Arabs that we weren't doing
that?

A. First of all, my own information
about the operational aspects of what
was going on was fragmentary at best-
so that's one point. Second, our policy,
insofar as arms shipments is concerned,
remains; and there hasn't been any flood
of U.S. arms to Iran, as seems to be
implied as far as I understand.

Q. I still don't understand why
you went and pledged and told the
moderate Arab states that we were not
sending shipments of arms to Iran
when we were.

A. As far as I knew at that time, we
didn't have any ongoing further signals.
We had a signal, we had given a signal,
and our discussion continued. It's a pro-
blem. But the President decided to send
something small as a signal, and he did
it.

Q. I don't want to. you know— I
don't want to badger you, but you're
not answering my question.

A. Oh, no. You can badger me.

Q. Okay. good. Why did you not
tell the Arabs the truth? Why did you
tell them an untruth?

A. The basic truth is that we con-
tinue to have a very firm arms
embargo—

Q. How can you say that to the
American people?

A. —and we continue to work at it.

Q. You're trying to say— you
know, it's just like Daniloff. You try
to tell us that a swap wasn't a swap.
You're trying to tell us that we have a
policy of not sending arms when we
have sent arms directly, and we have
permitted it through Israel. And I
know that— I expect you're not going
to confirm that, we all know that.
Now how can you say we have a policy
against sending shipments to Iran?
How can you look at the American
people and tell them that?

A. We have a policy of not sending
arms. The President decided that he
would go ahead and send this signal, and
that's a decision that he made in the
light of all the circumstances. And as I
say, you can argue for it and you can
argue against, but there it is.

Q. What did we get in return for
the shipments of arms?

A. It remains to be seen what
precisely takes place. There is a certain
amount of evidence that our ability to
talk to Iran in a sensible fashion has
improved and a certain amount of
evidence that their terrorist acts against
Americans, at least, has improved—
although I want to quickly say that we
must look on the terrorism matter as an
international matter, not just something
limited to Americans.

Q. Did you ever consider resigning
over this?

A. Oh, I talk to the President. I
serve at his pleasure, and anything that
I have to say on that subject, I'd just say
to him.

Q. Who has taken the three new
hostages? Mr. Poindexter. the national
security adviser, went on a television
show earlier this week and said that
radical elements in Iran took the three
new hostages. Is that your
understanding?

A. I think it's hard to know exactly
what is going on. We don't know where
our hostages are, and we don't know
exactly who holds them; but it does seem
to be reasonably clear that groups in
Lebanon associated with Iran are the
ones who are dealing with the hostages.
And I might say that Iran's use of ter-
rorism, Iran's taking of hostages, to me
is something that we have to fight
against very hard and unequivocally.

Q. What can the United States do
to restore its credibility, its greatly
damaged credibility, over this with the
Arabs who are scalding mad. as I
know you know because you've been
meeting with some of their represent-
atives here, and U.S. allies whom
we've been leaning on not to send
shipments of arms to Iran? What are
you going to do to try to repair this
damage?

A. We have to set out our policy, let
them know clearly that what we sent
was a signal— a signal has been sent, and
that's that— and continue to probe and
probably have to put it in some different
framework, with all of the publicity
about it.

Q. If you tell our allies and other
diplomats that our policy remains to
embargo arms against Iran, aren't
they just going to smile and laugh and
say, "Come on. You're doing it. We're
going to do it."?

A. Probably, they will. On the other
hand, we have to be serious about it
ourselves, and we have to reinforce it,

January 1987

MIDDLE EAST

and we have to point out to them the
reason why we have that policy. And the
reason why we have it apphes to them as
well.

They have a stake in a changed Iran;
they have a stake in an end of the war;
they have a stake in a change in terror;
and so on. So I think the basic policies of
probing Iran, but at the same time being
tough about an arms embargo and being
tough on terrorism and not trading arms
for hostages— the President said that
was not his intent and he did not do
that— and I think it is clearly wrong to
trade arms for hostages. So that is our
policy; that remains our policy.

And I might say that all of the public
discussions probably helped somewhat
because it has kind of confirmed the fact
that, cruel as it may seem to the families
involved— and we all can feel that— still
it isn't the right thing for governments
to trade arms or anything else for
hostages, just because it encourages
taking more.

Q. Will there be any more arms
shipments to Iran, either directly by
our government or through any third
parties?

A. It's certainly against our policy—

That's not an answer.

—and I think the signal has been

given.

Q. It was against our policy
before, and we went ahead and did it.
You seem to be saying there will be.

A. We gave a signal, and the signal
has been given; and as far as I'm con-
cerned, I don't see any need for further
signals.

Q. Then, why don't you answer
the question directly? I'll ask it again:
Will there be any more arms shipments
to Iran, either directly by the United
States or through any third parties?

A, Under the circumstances of
Iran's war with Iraq, its pursuit of ter-
rorism, its association with those holding
our hostages I would certainly say, as
far as I'm concerned, no.

Q. Do you have the authority to
speak for the entire Administration?
A. No.

PRESIDENTS NEWS

CONFERENCE (EXCERPT),
NOV. 19, 19863

Eighteen months ago, as I said last
Thursday, this Administration began a
secret initiative to the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Our purposes were fourfold: to
replace a relationship of total hostility
with something better; to bring a
negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war; to
bring an end to terrorism; and to effect
the release of our hostages.

We knew this undertaking involved
great risks, especially for our people and
i^or the Iranian officials with whom we
dealt. That is why the information was
restricted to appropriate Cabinet officers
and those officials with an absolute need
to know. This undertaking was a matter
of considerable debate within Admini-
stration circles. Our policy objectives
were never in dispute. There were dif-
ferences on how best to proceed.

The principal issue in contention was
whether we should make isolated and
limited exceptions to our arms embargo
as a signal of our serious intent. Several
top advisers opposed the sale of even a
modest shipment of defensive weapons
and spare parts to Iran. Others felt no
progress could be made without the sale.
I weighed their views. I considered the
risks of failure and the rewards of suc-
cess, and I decided to proceed. The
responsibility for the decision and the
operation is mine and mine alone.

As Mr. Lincoln said of another
presidential decision, "If it turns out
right, the criticism will not matter. If it
turns out wrong, ten angels swearing I
was right will make no difference."

I understand this decision is deeply
controversial and that some profoundly
disagree with what was done. Even
some who support our secret initiative
believe it was a mistake to send any
weapons to Iran. I understand and I
respect those views, but I deeply believe
in the correctness of my decision. I was
convinced then and I am convinced now
that while the risks were great, so, too,
was the potential reward. Bringing Iran
back into the community of responsible
nations, ending its participation in
political terror, bringing an end to that
terrible war, and bringing our hostages
home— these are the causes that justify
taking risks.

In foreign policy, the presence of
risks alone cannot be reason enough not
to act. There were risks when we
liberated Grenada, when we went into
Lebanon, when we aided the Philippines,
and when we acted against Libya, so
we'll continue our efforts. However, to

eliminate the widespread but mistaken
perception that we have been exchang-
ing arms for hostages, I have directed
that no further sales of arms of any kini
be sent to Iran. I have further directed
that all information relating to our
initiative be provided to the appropriate
Members of Congress. There may be
some questions which for reasons of
national seciirity or to protect the safet;
of the hostages I will be unable to
answer publicly. But again, all informa-
tion will be provided to the appropriate
Members of Congress.

Q. In the recent past, there was ai
Administration whose by-word was,
"Watch what we do, not what we
say." How would you assess the
credibility of your own Administratioi
in the light of the prolonged deceptio)
of Congress and the public in terms of
your secret dealing with Iran, the
disinformation, the trading of
Zakharov for Daniloff?

A. Let me take the last one first.
Some persist in saying that we traded
Zakharov for Daniloff. We did not. We
said that we would have no dealings wit!
the Soviet Union, even on going to
Iceland, until Daniloff was in our hands-

But to bring it up to date on this,
there was no deception intended by us.
There was the knowledge that we were
embarking on something that could be c
great risk to the people we were talking
to, great risk to our hostages. And,
therefore, we had to have it limited to
only the barest number of people that
had to know. I was not breaking any lav
in doing that. It is provided for me to d(
that. At the same time, I have the right
under the law to defer reporting to Con
gress, to the proper congressional com-
mittees, on an action and defer it until
such time as I believe it can safely be
done with no risk to others.

And that's why I have ordered in
this coming week the proper committees
will be briefed on this. There are still
some parts of this that we cannot go
public with because it will bring to risk
and danger people that are held and
people that we have been negotiating
with. We were not negotiating
government-to-government. We were
negotiating with certain individuals
within that country.

Q. You don't think your credibilit)
has been damaged? And are you
prepared now to disavow the finding
which let you make end runs around
the Iranian arms embargo? Are you
going to tear it up?

Department of State Bulletin

MIDDLE EAST

A. No. As I say, we are going to
jbserve that embargo and it's part of the
ame reason that, as I've said, we were
oing this in the first place. And that is

I .■^ee, among the other issues involved,
' we can help bring about peace be-
ween those two countries— a peace
,'ithout victory to either one or defeat
,nd that will recognize the territorial in-
egrity of both. And this is something
lat all of our allies are seeking also.

But I think the people understand
lat sometimes you have to keep a
lecret in order to save human lives and
J succeed in the mission, just as we
'ent into Grenada without prior notice,
ecause then we would have put to risk

II of those men who were going to hit
le beach.

Q. Has Secretary Shultz discussed
is resignation with you? Have you
greed to accept it or have you asked
im to stay on?

A. He has never suggested to me in
ur meetings that— resignation and, in
ict, he has made it plain that he will
tay as long as I want him and I want
im. So, there's never been any discus-
on there. He knows that I want him to
;ay and he has in advance said that he
■ants to. There's been no talk of
3signation.

Q. Has he made his staying condi-
loned on your agreeing not to send
irther arms to Iran?

A. No. There has been no condi-
ons. As I say, we didn't discuss that,
.nd, as I've said now, there is no need
3 go further with this. The mission was
2rved that made us waive temporarily
lat for that really miniscule amount of
Dare parts and defensive weapons.

Q. You have stated flatly and you
tated flatly again tonight that you did
ot trade weapons for hostages. And
et the record shows that every time
n American hostage was released —
1st September, this July, and again
ast this very month — there had been a
lajor shipment of arms just before
hat. Are we all to believe that was
ust a coincidence?

A. The only thing I know about
"lajor shipments of arms— as I've said,
verything that we sold them could be
ut in one cargo plane, and there would
e plenty of room left over. Now, if
here were major shipments— and we
now this has been going on— there have
I'een other countries that have been
■ ealing in arms with Iran. There have
leen also private merchants of such
hings that have been doing the same
hing. Now, I've seen the stories about a
)anish tramp steamer and a Danish

sailor's union officials talking about their
ships taking various supplies to Iran. I
didn't know anything about that until I
saw the press on it, because we certainly
never had any contact with anything of
the kind. It's just that we did something
for a particular mission, that there was a
risk entailed, and Iran held no hostages.
Iran did not kidnap anyone, to our
knowledge, and the fact that part of the
operation was that we knew, however,
that the kidnappers of our hostages did
have some kind of relationship in which
Iran could at times influence them— not
always— but could influence them. And
so three of our hostages came home.

Q. On that first point, your own
Chief of Staff, Mr. Regan, has said
that the United States condoned
Israeli shipments of arms to Iran and
aren't you, in effect, sending the very
message you always said you didn't
want to send? Aren't you saying to the
terrorists, either you or your state
sponsor — which in this ease was
Iran — can gain from the holding of
hostages?

A. Because I don't see where the
kidnappers or the hostage-holders gained
anything. They didn't get anything.
They let the hostages go. Now, whatever
is the pressure that brought that about,
I'm just grateful to it for the fact that
we got them. As a matter of fact, if
there had not been so much publicity, we
would have had two more that we were
expecting.

Q. When you had the arms
embargo on, you were asking other
nations, our allies particularly, to
observe it — publicly. But at the same
time privately, you concede you were
authorizing a breaking of that
embargo by the United States. How
can you justify this duplicity?

A. I don't think it was duplicity, and
as I say, the so-called violation did not in
any way alter the balance, military
balance, between the two countries. But
what we were aiming for, I think, made
it worthwhile, and this was a waiver of
our own embargo. The embargo still
stays now and for the future. But the
causes that I outlined here in my open-
ing statement, first of all, to try and
establish a relationship with a country
that is of great strategic importance to
peace and everything else in the Middle
East. At the same time also, to strike a
blow against terrorism and to get our
hostages back, as we did, and to— this
particular thing was, we felt necessary
in order to make the contacts that we
made, and that could lead to better rela-
tions with us. And there was a fourth
item, also, as I pointed out.

Q. The polls show that a lot of
American people just simply don't
believe you. But the one thing that
you've had going for you more than
anything else in your presidency, your
credibility, has been severely
damaged. Can you repair it? What does
it mean for the rest of your
presidency?

A. I imagine I'm the only one
around who wants to repair it, and I
didn't have anything to do with damag-
ing it.

Q. You say that the equipment
which was shipped didn't alter the
military balance. Yet, several things —
we understand that there were 1,000
TOW [tube-launched, optically
tracked, wire-guided] antitank
missiles shipped by the United States.
The United States apparently con-
doned shipments by Israel and other
nations of other quantities of arms as
an ancillary part of this deal — not
directly connected but had to condone
it, or the shipments could not have
gone forward. So, how can you say
that it cannot alter the military
balance, and how can you say that it
didn't break the law when the
National Security Act of 1977 plainly
talks about timely notification of Con-
gress and also stipulates that if the
national security required secrecy, the
President is still required to advise the
leadership and the chairmen of the
intelligence committees?

A. Everything you've said here is
based on a supposition that is false. We
did not condone and do not condone the
shipment of arms from other countries.
And what was the other point that you
made here—

Q. There were the antitank
missiles.

A. Oh no, about the— that it
didn't— no, that it didn't violate the— or
that did violate the law. No, as I've said,
the President, believe it or not, does
have the power if, in his belief, national
security can be served to waive the pro-
visions of that law, as well as to defer
the notification of the Congress on this.

Q. Is it possible that the Iraqis
might think that 1,000 antitank
missiles were enough to alter the
balance of that war?

A. This is a purely defensive
weapon— it is a shoulder-carried weapon
and we don't think that in this defensive
thing— we didn't add to any offensive
power on the part of Iran. We know that
Iraq has already announced that they
would be willing to settle the conflict, as

January 1987

MIDDLE EAST

we've said, with no winners or losers.
And that, and the other parts, happened
to be spare parts for an antiaircraft
Hawk battery. And, as I say, all of those
weapons could be very easily carried in
one mission.

Q. I don't think it's still clear just
what Israel's role was in this — the
questions that have been asked about a
condoned shipment. We do understand
that the Israelis sent a shipment in
1985, and there were also reports that
it was the Israelis that contacted your
Administration and suggested that you
make contact with Iran. Could you
explain what the Israeli role was here?

A. No, because we, as I say, have
had nothing to do with other countries
or their shipment of arms or doing what
they're doing. And, no— as a matter of
fact, the first ideas about the need to
restore relations between Iran and the
United States or the Western world, for
that matter, actually began before our
Administration was here. But from the
very first, if you look down the road at
what could happen and perhaps a change
of government there— that it was abso-
lutely vital for the Western world and to
the hope for peace in the Middle East
and all, for us to be trying to establish
this relationship. And we worked to— it
started about 18 months ago, really, as
we began to find out— some individuals
that it might be possible for us to deal
with, and who also were looking at the
probability of a further accident.

Q. The contacts that you're sug-
gesting are with moderates in the Ira-
nian Government and in the Iranian
system. Barry Goldwater tonight said
in his judgment there are no
moderates in Iran. I don't mean to
suggest that there may not be, but
how did you know that you were
reaching the moderates, and how do
you define a moderate in that kind of a
government?

A. Again, you're asking questions
that I cannot get into with regard to the
answers. But believe me, we had infor-
mation that led us to believe that there
are factions within Iran and many of
them with an eye toward the fact that
they think sooner, rather than later,
there is going to be a change in the
government there and there is great
dissatisfaction among the people in Iran.

Q. Your chief arms negotiator.
Max Kampelman, said that as a result
of your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in
Iceland that there, indeed, were
substantial results and agreements.
But the Soviet — the leadership of the
Soviet Union say that there were no

results — nothing positive — and the
area is widely scattered still. How do
you propose in your term — in the
remainder of your term, to close the
gap and bring — for an agreement?

A. The thing is about thai situation,
they are not widely scattered. All the
agreements or the apparent places
where we agreed at Reykjavik are on the
table now with our arms negotiators in
Geneva. And for the first time, there
was an agreement reached on the desir-
ability of eliminating all strategic
nuclear missiles in a 5-year period and
then dealing with the intermediate-range
missiles in Germany. And just before the
meeting broke up was the first time
that— it had always been our purpose,
and it was our purpose when we went
there, to see if this— these are the
destabilizing weapons, these are the
weapons that people in their minds can
picture someone pushes a button and a
lot of places blow up. And we always
thought that if we could make a start on
those— the destabilizing missiles— and
then we could work on to the other
nuclear weapons— bombs carried by
airplanes and so forth.

And we had gone there with the
express purpose of seeing if we could
arrive at some kind of a settlement on
one of the other of these other two
missile types. And it was just before the
meeting broke up that for the first time
they suggested that they were talking
about all weapons— nuclear weapons—
not just the others. There was no time
for us to discuss them— this new force
that was in there.

But I think Mr. Kampelman was say-
ing right— that I just call to your atten-
tion that never in the history of the
Soviet Union has a Soviet leader ever
publicly proposed eliminating weapons
they already have. And this Soviet
leader has. He has talked actually of
totally eliminating them.

And so the only thing I can say to
this is, I know they are difficult to deal
with, but all I can say is, they are still at
the table in Geneva, and the proposals
are still there, so I continue to be
optimistic.

Q. Do you think you are going to
see Mr. Gorbachev again during your
term, or do you think he is thinking
that he'll wait for the next President
to negotiate an arms control
agreement?

A. I have to believe there is reason
for optimism because he, himself, sug-
gested the Iceland meeting as a forerun-
ner to the summit that was supposed to
take place in the United States. And all I
can do is recall that when the Soviets

sometime ago got up and walked out oi
the Geneva arms meetings because we
were installing medium-range— the Per
shings and the cruise missiles in Europe
and they walked out and said, "That
does it." Well, they came back.

Q. Do you have a date to meet
them again?

A. No. That's what we're waiting
for, is for them to give us a day.

Q. Going back over your answers
tonight about the arms shipments anc
the numbers of them, are you telling
us tonight that the only shipments
with which we were involved were th
one or two that followed your Januari
17 finding and that, whatever your I
aides have said on backg^round or on '
the record, there are no other
shipments with which the United
States condoned?

A. That's right. I'm saying nothing
but the missiles that we sold— and
remember, there are too many people
that are saying "gave." They bought
them.

Q. We've been told by the Chief o
Staff Donald Regan that we eondonec
this government condoned, an Israeli
shipment in September of 1985, short
before the release of hostage Benjam
Weir. That was 4 months before your
intelligence finding on January 17 thi
you say gave you the legal authority
not to notify Congress. Can you clear
that up why this government was not
in violation of its arms embargo and (
the notification to Congress for havir
condoned American-made weapons
shipped to Iran in September of 1985;

A. No, that— I've never heard Mr.
Regan say that and I'll ask him about
that, because we believe in the embargc
and, as I say, we waived it for a specific
purpose, in fact, with four goals in mine

Q. What is unclear to, I think,
many people in the American public is
why, if you are saying tonight that
there will be no further arms
shipments to Iran, why you won't
cancel the January 17th intelligence
finding so that you can put to rest anj
suggestion that you might again,
without notification and in complete
secrecy and perhaps with the objectioi
of some of your Cabinet members, con
tinue to ship weapons if you think tha
it is necessary?

A. No. I have no intention of doing
that, but at the same time, we are
hopeful that we're going to be able to
continue our meetings with these people
these individuals.

Department of State Bulletii

MIDDLE EAST

Q. But you won't cancel the
ntelligence finding?

A. I don't know whether it's called
or or whether I have to wait until we've
■eported to Congress and all. I don't
aiow just what the technicality legally is
in that.

Q. Why do you think, its strategic
)osition notwithstanding, the
American people would ever support
veapons to the Ayatollah Khomeini?

A. We weren't giving them to the
\yatollah Khomeini. It's a strange situa-
ion. As I say, we were dealing with
ndividuals and we believe that those—
ind some of those individuals are in
;overnment, in positions in government.
5ut it was not a meeting officially of the
J.S. head of state and the Iranian head
<{ state. But these people, we believed,
nd their closeness to the Iran military
vas such that this was necessary to let
hem know, number one, that we were
erious and sincere in our effort about
:ood relations and also that they were
ealing with the head of government
ver here— that this wasn't something
oming out of some agency or bureau-
hat I was behind it.

Q. If that's the case, some have
sked that if Libya occupied a
trategical position as Iran did, would
ou then arm Qadhafi and bomb
[homeini?

A. I know that's a— believe me,
hat's about as hypothetical a question as
nyone could imagine. The situations are
uite different.

Q. You said that you were not
wapping — or you did not think you
vere swapping arms for hostages. But
lid it ever occur to you or did it never
iccur to you that certainly the Iranians
vould see it that way and that they
night take it as an inducement to take
nore hostages, especially in light of
he fact that they've released three but
aken three more?

A. No— to the best of our
;nowledge, Iran does not own or have
luthority over the Hezbollah. They can-
lot order them to do something. It is
apparent that they evidently have either
lome persuasion and they don't always
;ucceed, but they can sometimes per-
iuade or pressure the Hezbollah into
icing what they did in this instance.
And, as I say, the Iranian Government
lad no hostages, and they bought a ship-
■nent from us and we, in turn— I might
IS well tell you— that we, in turn, had
:5aid when they wanted to kind of know
|)ur position and whether we were
Tustworthy and all of this, we told them
-hat we were— we did not want to do

business with any nation that openly
backed terrorism. And they gave us
information that they did not and they
said also that they had some evidence
that there had been a lessening of this
on the part of— Khomeini and the
government and that they'd made some
progress. As a matter of fact, some
individuals associated with terrorist acts
had been put in prison there. And so
that was when we said, "Well, there's a
very easy way for you to verify that if
that's the way you feel, and they're
being held hostage in Lebanon."

Q. If your arms shipments had no
effect on the release of the hostages,
then how do you explain the release of
the hostages at the same time that the
shipments were coming in?

A. No. I said that at the time I said
to them that there was something they
could do to show their sincerity and if
they really meant it that they were not
in favor of backing terrorists, they could
begin by releasing our hostages. And, as
a matter of fact, I believe and have
reason to believe that we would have had
all five of them by this last weekend had
it not been for the attendant— confusion
that arose here in the reporting room.

Q. On that point, you said earlier,
and you said just now again, that but
for the publicity, two other hostages
would have been returned home by
now. As you know, the publicity began
in a Syrian-backed, pro-Syrian
magazine in Lebanon. My question is,
therefore, are you suggesting that
someone who was a party to this
sabotaged it by deliberately leaking
that original report?

A. To our best information, the leak
came from a person in government in
Iran and not one of the people that we
were dealing with, someone that would
be more hostile to us. And that
individual gave the story to the
magazine, and the magazine then
printed the story there in Beirut.

Q. There has been an obvious
change in policy toward Iran — from
refusing to deal with a terrorist state
to even sending weapons as a gesture
of good will. Would you consider, in
the name of the same geopolitical
interest that you invoked with Iran,
changing your policy toward
Nicaragua?

A. No, and I believe that I've
answered that question, I think, more
than once here— that no, we still hold to
our position, and Iran officially is still on
our list of nations that have been sup-
porting terrorism. But I'm talking about

the people that we were doing business
with, and they gave us indication and
evidence that that policy was changing.
And so, as I said, to give them more
prestige and muscle there, where they
were, we made this sale.

Q. Then would you consider break-
ing diplomatic relations with
Nicaragua to increase the pressure on
the Sandinista government?

A. No, we have not thought of that,
and we still believe very much in sup-
porting the Contras, because we believe
in the Contras' cause. The Contras have
made it plain that they— all they seek is
to be able to put enough pressure on the
Sandinista government for that govern-
ment to negotiate with them and the
people of Nicaragua for the kind of
government that they altogether had
promised when they were fighting the
revolution against the Somoza dictator-
ship. And it was the Sandinistas who, as
communist groups usually do, simply
when the revolution was over— they did
everything they could to get rid of their
fellow revolutionaries, and they seized
power and created a totalitarian com-
munist state.

Now, the Sandinistas— or the Con-
tras have never proposed overthrowing
the government. They have repeatedly
offered and said, we simply want to be
able to negotiate and have a chance to
have the government installed that we
had promised the Organization of
American States we were fighting for.
So, I think we continue to help them, but
we believe that there is a value in main-
taining relations. It gives us a listening
post in Nicaragua.

Q. There is a mood in Washington
tonight of a President who is very
much beleagfuered, very much on the
defensive. Why don't you seize the
offensive by giving your Secretary of
State a vote of confidence declaring
that all future covert activities will
have his support and by shaking up the
National Security Council in such a
way as to satisfy the concerns in Con-
gress that he has been running a
paramilitary operation out of the base-
ment of the White House in defiance
of the State Department and the
Congress?

A. The State Department and the
Secretary of State were involved, and
the Director of the CIA was involved in
what we were doing, and, as I said
before, there are certain laws in which,
for certain actions, I would not have
been able to keep them a secret as they
were. But these people you've mentioned
have been involved— did know what was

January 1987

MIDDLE EAST

going on. And I don't see that the action
that you've suggested has called for it,
but what you've disappointed me the
most in is suggesting that I sound defen-
sive up here. I've just been trying to
answer all your questions as well as I
can. and I don't feel that I have anything
to defend about at all. With the cir-
cumstances the way they were, the deci-
sion I made I still believe was the correct
decision, and I believe that we achieved
some portion of our goals.

Q. Do you believe that any of the
additional hostages will be released?

A. I have to believe that.

Q. During any of these discussions
with your Administration, was there
ever any hint or suggestion that these
weapons might be used to topple the
Ayatollah?

A. No, and I don't see in any way
how that could be with the particular
things that we were using. I don't see
where the Ayatollah could be a logical
target for an antiaircraft missile or even
for TOW missiles, for that matter.

Q. You made an exception for the
arms embargo when you thought it
was in the U.S. interest to do so. Why
shouldn't other nations ship weapons
to Iran when they think it's in their
interests?

A. I would like to see the indication
as to how it could be in their interest. I
know that there are other nations that
feel as we do that the Western world
should be trying to find an avenue to get
Iran back where it once was, and that is
in the family of democratic nations and
the family of nations that want peace in
the Middle East and so forth.

Q. How does shipping weapons to
Iran help bring them back into the
community of nations? You've
acknowledged that you were dealing
with only a small portion of the
government.

A. I was talking of strengthening a
particular group who needed the
prestige that that could give them who
needed that bargaining power,
themselves, within their own ranks.

Q. I believe you may have been
slightly in error in describing a TOW
as a shoulder-mounted weapon. It's a
ground-to-ground weapon— Red-Eye is
the shoulder weapon, but that's beside
the point. TOWs are used to destroy
tanks. I don't think its fired from your
shoulder.

A. If I have been misinformed, then
I will yield on that, but it was my
understanding that that is a man-carried
weapon, and we have a number of other
shoulder-borne weapons.

Q. I did have a question, though.

A. You mean that wasn't a
question?

Q. No, I thought I knew what a
TOW was. I just wanted to ask you,
what would be wrong at this stage of
the game, since everything seems to
have gone wrong that could possibly
go wrong, like the Murphy Law, the
Reagan Law, the O'Leary Law, this
week — what would be wrong in saying
that a mistake was made on a very
high-risk gamble and that — so that you
can get on with the ne.xt 2 years?

A. Because I don't think a mistake
was made. It was a high-risk gamble,
and it was a gamble that, as I've said, I
believe the circumstances warranted.
And I don't see that it has been a fiasco
or a great failure of any kind. We still
have those contacts, we still have made
some ground, we got our hostages
back— three of them. And so I think that
what we did was right, and we're going
to continue on this path.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

There may be some misunderstanding of
one of my answers tonight. There was a
third country involved in our secret proj-
ect with Iran. But taking this into
account, all of the shipments of the
token amounts of defensive arms and
parts that I have authorized or condoned
taken in total could be placed aboard a
single cargo aircraft. This includes all
shipments by the United States or any
third country. Any other shipments by
third countries were not authorized by
the U.S. Government.

DEPUTY SECRETARY

WHITEHEADS STATEMENT.
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE,
NOV. 24, 1986^

I have been asked to discuss with you
our policy toward Iran in light of the
recent events. I look forward to sharing
with you our assessment of our policy
toward the region, our goals in the Iran-
Iraq war, the reactions of our friends to
the revelations in the media, and our
future objectives.

It is important to point out that the
extreme sensitivity of the undertaking
prompted implementation be held to the
smallest group possible. Consequently,
the State Department had no operational
role. We in the Department still do not
have a detailed record of what happened,
and I am, therefore, not able to address
specific questions of what may have
occurred.

As you are aware, our government
has had contact with the Iranian Goven
ment over the last 18 months. The goals
of such contact have been:

• The resumption of a stable rela-
tionship with Iran;

• An honorable end to the Iran-Irac
war and greater stability in the gulf
region;

• The countering of Soviet attempt
to influence developments in Iran and
the gulf;

• The elimination of Iranian state-
sponsored terrorism and subversion; an

• The safe return of all of our— and
others'— hostages.

We have also had several other
avenues of communication with Iranian
officials. These include the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal at The Hague; Federal
Reserve and Treasury officials and Ira-
nian bankers; communications through
third parties; and occasional exchanges
in international fora.

About 18 months ago, the President
authorized a more directed dialogue wit
Iranian officials. It was not an easy deci
sion to begin and pursue such a dialogut
Serious obstacles remain:

li
J)
6

• Iran's determination to use its we*
with Iraq as a means of overthrowing
the Iraqi Government and establishing i
radical fundamentalist government in ifc
place;

• Iran's continuing support for
terrorism;

• Iran's continued financial,
logistical, and material support for
radical Shi'as living in the gulf, Lebanoi
and elsewhere; and

• Iran's association with hostage-
takings in Lebanon, including the receni
abduction of three American hostages
there.

The Iranians understand our posi-
tion. There is no need for further signaUj
of the seriousness of our intentions
through arms transfers. The President
publicly stated on November 17 that we
will not be shipping any further arms to
Iran. Our arms embargo is in effect.
Operation Staunch remains in effect.

Iran-Iraq War and Arms Transfers

Our policy on the Iran-Iraq war remains
unchanged. We continue to be deeply
concerned about the terrible loss and
disruption which this war has brought to
the people of both Iran and Iraq, and we
remain concerned at the possibility that
miscalculation or misunderstanding
might lead to a widening of the war.
Since the beginning of the conflict in

Department of State Bulletir

MIDDLE EAST

ptember 1980, we have worked for the
rliest possible end to the war— one
;ich preserves both the independence
d territorial integrity of both states,
that end, the United States has
lowed several paths. These include:

A policy to deny Munitions List
^ms to both Iran and Iraq;

Pursuit of Operation Staunch— our
jmpt to discourage arms supply from
lers to Iran— this had been relatively
fective until word of our Iran
Mpments became public. We believe we
jiyed an important role in reducing the
pbal volume of arms sent to Iran. We
' 11 now have to redouble our efforts to
store the credibility of this policy,
lich remains the best means to bring
e Iranians to accept a mediated or
gotiated settlement; and

• Support for diplomatic efforts to
c courage Iran to join Iraq in working
award a peaceful end to the war. These
(Forts include active U.S. encourage-
ment of the UN Secretary General, the

amic Conference, the Nonaligned
jvement, and various other efforts— by
/eden, Japan, and Algeria among
lers- to draw Iran into talks.

TForism

cretary Shultz has recently recon-
■ med the fundamental premises of our
unterterrorism policy:

• Opposition to all acts of terrorism,
t just those against Americans;

• Refusal of terrorist demands;

• Willingness to use all available
jans to defend ourselves against ter-
rists; and

• Seeking the cooperation of our
ends and allies in combatting ter-
rism and isolating those nations which
onsor or shelter terrorists.

In particular, we believe that those
.tions which sponsor or support ter-
rism must remain outside the family of
/ilized nations until they cease their
pport of terrorists. We seek the
operation of all civilized nations in our
forts. We strongly believe that our
•m policy is the best guarantee of pro-
cting American citizens and interests
orldwide.

Let me say a special word about our
maining hostages in Lebanon. We will
mtinue to seek the safe release of all
merican hostages. We will talk to
lyone, any group, or any government
)out them and their safe return. In
)ing so, however, we will not under-
ine the basic tenets of our policy.

Iraq

Our bilateral relations with Iraq have
improved markedly over the past few
years, as Iraq has increasingly modified
its traditional hardline regional policies
and has established closer diplomatic
working relationships with moderate
Arab states with which we have long-
standing ties. Iraq has made clear its
rejection of terrorism as an instrument
of state policy by expelling the notorious
Abu Nidal. Unlike Iran, Iraq seeks an
early negotiated end to the war. We
want to keep relations with Iraq on an
even keel, even though the news of the
limited arms shipments to Iran have
been very unwelcome in Baghdad. After
the war ends, we will continue to have a
stake and equity in Iraq's pursuit of its
modified regional policies. Trade, com-
merce, and investment of Iraq's
ambitious postwar development plans
will be of great interest to us. Iraq's
distancing itself from support for inter-
national terrorism has been
substantial— the trend is clearly in the
direction we encourage.

The Gulf States

The nonbelligerent gulf Arab states,
while they understand our reasons for
establishing contacts with Iran, strongly
disapproved of the transfer of arms. Our
ties with these states are close, and we
want to do whatever we can to assure
that there will be no lasting damage to
our mutually beneficial security relation-
ships. Nothing has changed to affect our
policy of support for the security and
territorial integrity of these good
friends. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) states continue to believe that
their security and stability are in
American interests and understand our
determination to protect those interests.

Conclusion

To conclude, let me say that the United
States recognizes the importance of Iran
in the region and the Islamic world. The
emergence of leaders willing to change
Iran's unacceptable international
behavior and seek a normal relationship
with the international community cannot
be ignored by the United States. The
President has made clear the importance
the United States attaches to a stable
relationship with Iran and the benefits
which can accrue to the region and to
the West should such a situation evolve.
We will persevere in efforts to pursue a
dialogue to reach the goals I have noted.

But we will do so only in the context of
our strong and firm commitment to the
security of the gulf states, our desire to
see an end to the war, our relationship
with Iraq, and our promise to combat
terrorism.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.
NOV. 25, 1986^

Last Friday, after becoming concerned
whether my national security apparatus
had provided me with a complete factual
record with respect to the implementa-
tion of my policy toward Iran, I directed
the Attorney General to undertake a
review of this matter over the weekend
and report to me on Monday. And
yesterday. Attorney General Meese pro-
vided me and the White House Chief of
Staff with a report on his preliminary
findings. And this report led me to con-
clude that I was not fully informed on
the nature of one of the activities under-
taken in connection with this initiative.
This action raises serious questions of
propriety.

I've just met with my national
security advisers and congressional
leaders to inform them of the actions
that I'm taking today. Determination of
the full details of this action will require
further review and investigation by the
Department of Justice.

Looking to the future, I will appoint
a special review board to conduct a com-
prehensive review of the role and pro-
cedures of the National Security Council
staff in the conduct of foreign and
national security policy.

I anticipate receiving the reports
from the Attorney General and the
special review board at the earliest possi-
ble date. Upon the completion of these
reports, I will share their findings and
conclusions with the Congress and the
American people.

Although not directly involved. Vice
Admiral John Poindexter has asked to
be relieved of his assignment as Assis-
tant to the President for National
Security Affairs and to return to another
assignment in the Navy. Lt. Col. Oliver
North has been relieved of his duties on
the National Security Council staff.

I am deeply troubled that the
implementation of a policy aimed at
resolving a truly tragic situation in the
Middle East has resulted in such con-
troversy. As I've stated previously, I
believe our policy goals toward Iran
were well-founded. However, the infor-
mation brought to my attention yester-
day convinced me that in one aspect,
implementation of that policy was
seriously flawed.

anuary 1987

NARCOTICS

President Convenes
Conference on Narcotics

The President invited a representative
group of U.S. Ambassadors from countries
where drug production, trafficking, and
consumption are major problems, or might
develop into major problems, to meet at the
White House with him and Secretary Shultz
November 12-1:5, 1986.

Its threefold purpose was to provide
the President with the opportunity to
demonstrate U.S. commitment to the issue
of narcotics control and to update the
ambassadors on recent domestic drug-
control initiatives; to encourage ambas-
sadors to discuss ways to enhance the inter-
national narcotics control program by
exploring options for regional cooperation;
and to send to foreign governments a
strong message that narcotics is a critical
international problem which must be
addressed.

Those ambassadors attending were;
Carol Boyd Hallett (Bahamas), Edward M.
Rowell (Bolivia), Harry W. Shlaudeman
(Brazil), Melvyn Levitsky (Bulgaria), Daniel
O'Donohue (Burma), Charles A. Gillespie,
Jr. (Colombia), P>rnando E. Rondon
(Ecuador), Richard R. Burt (West Ger-
many), Maxwell M. Rabb (Italy), Michael
Sotirhos (Jamaica). Charles J. Pilliod, Jr.
(Mexico), Princeton Lyman (Nigeria),
Deane R. Hinton (Pakistan), Arthur H.
Davis (Panama), .Alexander F. Watson
(Peru), William A. Brown (Thailand), Otto
J. Reich (Venezuela), Herbert S. Okun
(Deputy Permanent Representative to the
United Nations), and Bruce Chapman
(Representative to the Vienna Office of the
United Nations), and Charge d' Affaires"
Maurice Ealum (Afghanistan) and Charge
d'Affaires Harriet Isom (Laos). ■

While I cannot reverse what has
happened, I'm initiating steps, including
those I've announced today, to assure
that the implementation of all future
foreign and national security policy
initiatives will proceed only in accord-
ance with my authorization.

Over the past 6 years, we've realized
many foreign policy goals. I believe we
can yet achieve, and I intend to pursue,
the objectives on which we all agree— a
safer, more secure and stable world.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE'S
NEWS BRIEFING (EXCERPT).
NOV. 25. 1986*

On Friday afternoon— or Friday at
noon— the President asked me to look
into and bring together the facts concer-
ning the, particularly the impleinenta-
tion of the strategic initiative in Iran and
more precisely, anything pertaining to
the transfer of arms. Over the weekend,
this inquiry was conducted. Yesterday
evening I reported to the President. We
continued our inquiry, and this morning
the President directed that we make this
information immediately available to the
Congress and to the public through this
medium this noon.

itai

Let me say that all of the informa-
tion is not yet in. We are still continuing
our inquiry. But he did want me to mak
available immediately what we know at
the present time.

What is involved is that in the coursi
of the arms transfers, which involved th!
United States providing the arms to
Israel and Israel in turn transferring thi
arms— in effect, selling the arms to !
representatives of Iran. Certain monies '
which were received in the transaction \
between representatives of Israel and
representatives of Iran were taken and '
made available to the forces in Central
America which are opposing the San-
dinista government there.

In essence, the way in which the
transactions occurred was that a certair
amount of money was negotiated by
representatives outside of the United
States with Iran for arms. This amount:
of money was then transferred to
representatives, as best we know, that
can be described as representatives of
Israel. They, in turn, transferred to the
CIA, which was the agent for the U.S.
Government under a finding prepared b
the President— signed by the President
in January of 1986. And, incidentally, ai
of these transactions that I am referrin)
to took place between January of 1986
and the present time. They transferred
to the CIA the exact amount of the
money that was owed to the U.S.
Government for the weapons that were
involved plus any costs of transportatio
that might be involved. This money was
then repaid by the CIA to the Depart-
ment of Defense under the normal pro-
cedures, and all governmental funds an(
all governmental property was
accounted for and statements of that
have been verified by us up to the pres-
ent time.

The money— the difference between
the money owed to the U.S. Governmen
and the money received from represent-
atives of Iran was then deposited in ban-
accounts which were under the control
of representatives of the forces in Cen-
tral America. '

Q. How much money? How much ,
involved?

A. We don't know the exact ,

amount, yet. Our estimate is that it is i
somewhere between $10 and $30 million,

Q. How did it come to your
attention?

A. In the course of a thorough
review of a number of intercepts, and
other materials, this— the hint of a '

possibility that there were some monies '
being made available for some other pur

Departnnent of State Bulletii

NUCLEAR POLICY

pe came to our attention, and then we
rsued that with the individuals
Mved.

Q. Why wasn't the President told?

A. The President was told as soon
we found out about it.

Q. And he knew nothing about it?

A. The President knew nothing
aaut it until I reported it to him. I
a rted him yesterday morning that we
sil had some more work to do, and then

I ave him the details that we had
Uerday afternoon.

Q. Is this what you were looking
f • when you began? Or is this just
sTiething that turned up in the course
cyour weekend investigation?

A. This turned up in the course of
t: investigation. The first thing that
tjgered, if you will, an inquiry was the
f t that as people prepared their
t timony— because this had been done
i J rather compartmentalized way— as
f )ple prepared their testimony for the

I I on Friday, there appeared to be
r re facts out there than we had

a eady put together. And it was a mat-
t , then, of the President requesting me
t ;alk with everyone who had any par-
t pation at all, because one agency was
c ng one thing, another agency was
c ng another thing— there was very lit-
t paperwork— and to determine
I 'cisely what all of the facts were
t 'ause he wanted to be sure that he
Y i all of the information about anything
t t may have occurred in the course of
1 3 whole situation. That was— it was
c -ing the course of that inquiry that
1 3 information was found and then was
f owed out to the conclusions that I
r ntioned.

Q. Can you tell us who is running
I tional security policy? Can you clear
I for the American people, is
i cretary Shultz staying? Who is the
I w national security adviser? And
1 lat are you recommending in terms
« possibly restructuring the White
1 luse staff?

A. In answer to your questions in
( ier, at the present time, upon Admiral
1 indexter actually leaving his post, Al
]'el, his deputy, will be the Acting
1 sistant to the President for National
'curity Affairs. The President has not
; t selected a replacement, but he will
' So as soon as possible.

Secretary Shultz is remaining in his
■ sition— is Secretary of State. That has
t been a matter of conjecture or
;cussion or inquiry.

We will make whatever recommen-
dations for further proceedings come out
of it, but more particularly, the Presi-
dent will be appointing a small commis-
sion which will look into the procedures
and role of the NSC staff and will make
specific recommendations to him as far
as the process for the future.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of ^lov. 17, 1986.
-Press release 251.

'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 24.

■■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 1. The text of
the Secretary's remarks made on the evening
of Nov. 25 concerning Iran are printed on
p. 23.

^For full text of Attorney General's news
briefing, see Wfiite House press release. ■

International Prospects for Civil Nuclear
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era

by John D. .\egropoiite

Address before the Rotary Club of
Detroit on November 5. 19S6. Ambassti-
dor Negroponte is Assistant Secretary
for Oceans and International Environ-
ine)ita! and Scientific Affairs.

As head of the bureau in the State
Department responsible for peaceful
nuclear energy affairs, I have been very
much involved with a number of inter-
national issues arising from the serious
accident that destroyed the Soviet
reactor at Chernobyl earlier this year. I
would like to discuss some of these
issues with you.

The Chernobyl accident has obvi-
ously raised anxieties and renewed ques-
tions about commercial nuclear power,
not just in the Soviet Union but
everywhere. At the time of the Three
Mile Island accident— whose conse-
quences, it should be noted, were far less
severe than those resulting from
Chernobyl— one frequently heard it said
that "a nuclear accident anywhere is a
nuclear accident everj-where." This
expression was beginning to seem a little
trite, perhaps, when Chernobyl came
along to underscore its essential truth.
Happily, we in the United States and
Canada were spared from all but the
most inconsequential effects of the
radioactive debris from the shattered
Chernobyl core. The situation was
somewhat different in Western and Cen-
tral Europe, however. There, the long-
term effects on public health will need to
be scrutinized very closely.

There is, thus, no denying that the
Chernobyl accident was a serious one. It
has provoked fresh doubts in the minds

of many about the wisdom of continuing
to rely routinely on nuclear reactors to
generate electrical power. In a few
cases, these doubts have already been
translated into political action opposing
continued reliance on commercial
nuclear power.

The point I would like to make today
is that questions concerning commercial
nuclear power, legitimate though they
may be, do not in themselves invalidate
civil nuclear power as an energy
resource, as some critics seem to sup-
pose. Any large technological enterprise
will raise major questions of public
policy. What is important is not the
questions themselves but the answers to
those questions.

Economic and
Environmental Factors

In my view, civil nuclear energy is a
necessary energy resource and will
become increasingly important as the
world's finite supply of fossil fuels con-
tinues to be depleted. Civil nuclear
energy is a key element in any program
of energy resource management that is
prudently diversified. Overdependence
on a single energy source such as
imported oil is unwise and unacceptable
for our nation's energy policy. Just recall
the severe effects on our national well-
being as we dealt with the OPEC
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries]-induced oil shocks of 1973
and 1979. The repercussions linger in
our economy to this day. We would be
foolish to court a repetition of those
events by an arbitrary refusal to allocate
a place for civil nuclear energy in our
overall energy program. Nor can we

nuary 1987

NUCLEAR POLICY

assume that an alternative such as
fusion energy will replace the current
generation of nuclear reactors in the
decades ahead. Fusion is unlikely to play
a significant role until well into the next
century at the earliest.

These points are less easily grasped
in our country, perhaps, with its rela-
tively wide range of energy options. But
they are valid points, and their impor-
tance is fully appreciated by some of our
major allies, such as Japan and France,
that lack abundant alternative sources of
energy. These countries are, of course,
highly industrialized, and for them,
reliance on civil nuclear energy has
become indispensable. In 1985, for exam-
ple, France derived 65% of its electricity
from nuclear power generation.

Is civil nuclear power cost-effective?
The answer is yes— resoundingly so in
many industrialized countries, qualifiedly
so in our own. The difference lies in the
availability of alternative energy
resources and the way different coun-
tries have planned and managed their
civil nuclear programs. In particular,
those countries that have opted for
standardized reactor designs— thus
simplifying the licensing process and
sharply reducing the costs of bringing
new reactors into service— seem to be
making out best.

In considering the economics of civil
nuclear power, it is also important to
keep in mind the long-term picture. To
be sure, prices of crude oil are relatively
low today. But complacency can be a
dangerous thing. It would be rash,
indeed, to predict that we will enjoy
indefinitely the luxury of today's
relatively low prices.

What about the effect of nuclear
power reactors on the environment? It is
quite clear that nuclear power plants, in
their normal operation, are environ-
mentally more benign than some other
types of plants. I do not need to remind
you, here on our border with Canada,
how important an issue acid rain has
become in relations between our two
countries. I might note in passing that
this is another issue with which I have
been very much preoccupied, inasmuch
as my bureau in the State Department is
also responsible for environmental
issues. I mention the problem here,
however, only to make one simple point:
unlike some other types of generating
plants, nuclear power plants do not con-
tribute to the problem of acid rain.

There is also another, longer term
environmental problem associated with
the burning of fossil fuels. This is the
so-called greenhouse effect, a gradual
warming of the Earth's atmosphere with
possibly serious long-term implications

for weather patterns and ocean levels.
Although we have much to learn about
the "greenhouse effect," at this point we
are confident that nuclear power plants
do not contribute in any appreciable way
to this problem.

Safety Concerns

I come now to the question of nuclear
safety. This, it seems to me, is the key
question for determining what the pros-
pects for civil nuclear power are likely to
be in the post-Chernobyl era. Countries
intending to rely on civil nuclear power
must address resolutely some very real
concerns relating to nuclear safety and
to nuclear safeguards as well— an impor-
tant distinction to which I will return
later on.

The first thing to be said is that,
despite well-publicized accidents like
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the
safety record of nuclear power compares
favorably with that of other types of
powerplants. But as the accident at
Chernobyl has demonstrated so graph-
ically, a serious accident at a nuclear
power plant, however statistically rare it
may be, is different in scope and dimen-
sion from an accident at any other type
of electrical generating plant. It is not
enough, therefore, merely to state that
nuclear plants compare well statistically
with other types of plants with respect
to frequency of accidents and to let the
argument stand at that. A serious acci-
dent at a nuclear power plant has the
potential for being far more damaging
than an accident at any other type of
generating plant, and so our efforts
must be more rigorous and comprehen-
sive to ensure against its happening at
all.

It is also important to bear in mind
that not all reactors are equally safe. We
are, of course, seeking to learn all that
we can about how the accident at
Chernobyl occurred and to apply the
lessons to our own experience, where
appropriate. The Soviet operators at
Chernobyl clearly made major errors on
the night of the accident, and to err is
human; any feeling of smugness on our
part would be inappropriate and prob-
ably self-defeating. But the fact remains
that the Chernobyl reactor, with its
inadequate containment and its propen-
sity to surge in power as coolant was
lost (positive void coefficient), could not
have been licensed to operate in the
United States, Canada, or probably any
other Western country. Our standards
are stricter, our commitment to safety
and environmental protection more pro-
nounced. We see it as incumbent on the

Soviets to implement changes to ensure
that basic design problems contributing
to the Chernobyl disaster will be cor-
rected in the numerous similar reactors
throughout the Soviet Union. We can
only regret that an accident at one reac
tor has called into question the safety o:
all reactors, however dissimilar.

Let me make a related point. As
some of you may know, the Soviets are
currently building two nuclear power
reactors at Cienfuegos in Cuba. I would
like to stress that these reactors are nc
of the Chernobyl type. In addition, I
would like to assure you that we have
made it clear to the Soviets and Cubans
that these Cuban reactors, particularly
in view of their proximity to our shores'
must be designed and built to exacting
safety standards and that they must be
operated in a safe manner at all times.
We will be paying close attention
to make sure these standards are
adhered to.

U.S. and International
Responses to Chernobyl

The months since Chernobyl have been
time for critical reflection on nuclear
power safety, both within the United
States and within the international coiri
munity. Let me review very briefly son?
of our activities on the international
plane in response to Chernobyl. From
the very outset, the United States took
leading role in prodding the Soviet
Union to fulfill its international respon;
bilities by following up its initially quite
meager and delayed account of the acci
dent with a full and complete disclosure
of the facts. I am pleased to say that th
Soviets themselves soon recognized the
wisdom of this course, and their subse-
quent report to a specially convened
meeting of international experts at the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna, August 25-29, was
notably open and forthcoming. I should
add that we have deliberately resisted
any temptation to make political capita,
from the Soviets' misfortune and, in
fact, have offered our assistance on a
number of fronts.

The United States was also instru-
mental in mobilizing efforts under Intel
national Atomic Energy Agency
auspices to put in place procedures for
dealing with possible similar accidents i
the future. Even before Chernobyl, the:
was a broad consensus, at least among
the countries of the industrialized West
that each individual country engaged in
nuclear power generation must be fully
responsible for ensuring safety in the
design, manufacture, operation, and

NUCLEAR POLICY

aintenance of its nuclear installations;
lat avoiding potential transboundary
■^changes resulting from nuclear activ-
ies involves a responsibility to other
itions; and that prompt and adequate
formation on nuclear emergencies and
■cidents must be provided where there
a potential for transboundary conse-
;iences of radiological safety signif-
ance. In the immediate aftermath of
hernobyl, the need became clear for a
nding international agreement that
ould embody these principles. It was
so clear that the International Atomic
nergy Agency would be the most
ipropriate forum within which to
■ganize international efforts toward
is goal.

In early May, therefore, while events
Chernobyl were still unfolding, the
nited States and its allies called for a
lecial meeting of the agency's Board of
jvernors, which in turn commissioned
group of government experts to draft
'■0 international conventions: one pro-
ding for the early notification of
iclear accidents with transboundary
fects and the dissemination of com-
ehensive information concerning them;
e other providing a framework for
ordinating international assistance,
:luding emergency response measures,
the event of such accidents. These two
nventions on notification and on
sistance were drafted, submitted to a
ecial session of the agency's General
jnference, adopted, opened for signa-
re, and signed by over 50 states by the
id of September— a near-record pace
' the usual standards for activities in
ternational bodies.

All this is very well, you may say,
it it seems to relate only to what hap-
■ns after an accident has taken place,
"hat is being done to reduce the
lances of an accident occurring in the
'st place? As it happens, a great deal,
ough even more can and should be
me. The International Atomic Energy
gency and the Nuclear Energy Agency
' the Organization for Economic
Doperation and Development in Paris
ive longstanding programs aimed at
;tablishing safe nuclear design,
igineering, and operating standards on
universal basis. The U.S. nuclear
dustry is pursuing similar work
irough its Institute for Nuclear Power
Operations in Atlanta— an effort that has
"awn the active participation of a
jmber of foreign reactor operators.
he U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
on has a well-established program of
^operation with other countries in the
^change of information relating to
uclear safety. Bilateral agreements on

nuclear safety cooperation exist with 37
nations.

The United States has also launched
an initiative aimed at creating a nuclear
safety training academy, organized as a
nonprofit foundation and based on joint
industry and government participation.
Its goal is to provide assistance to
cooperating countries by introducing
their nuclear energy decisionmakers to
U.S. safety programs and approaches
and by providing information, training,
guidance, and advice on nuclear safety
matters. An initial pilot program at
Stanford University in the summer of
1985 was very well received.

All these are important components
in efforts to ensure that today's genera-
tion of nuclear power reactors will be
operated with the utmost dedication to
safety. An even greater challenge— but
one that I think we can meet— will be the
design of a new generation of reactors
relying on physical principles, rather
than on safety devices, to ensure that
they come to an automatic safe shut-
down in the event of a serious malfunc-
tion. The United States and other
nations are already at work on a number
of reactor concepts along these lines.

Another challenge we must address
is the permanent disposal of radioactive
wastes. I have argued that nuclear
power production has a relatively benign
impact on the environment compared to
other generating methods, and histor-
ically, this is true. But it will remain true
for the future only if adequate means are
implemented to ensure that radioactive
wastes can be securely stored indefi-
nitely in a way that neither harms the
environment nor poses a health and
safety hazard to the public. The technical
issues have already been addressed
satisfactorily. The Department of
Energy is proceeding with a program for
implementing the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982. But questions of public and
political acceptance must still be
resolved if technologies already
demonstrated are to be successfully
deployed.

Promoting International Safeguards

Let me return now to a distinction I
made earlier between safety and safe-
guards in the international context. The
latter term— safeguards— has become a
term of art as used with respect to civil
nuclear energy. It refers neither to the
safe operation of nuclear installations
nor to the physical protection— safe-
keeping, if you will— of nuclear
materials. It refers, rather, to a system
of inspections and other measures whose
objective— if I may quote more or less

verbatim the formal IAEA language— is
the timely detection of diversion of
significant quantities of nuclear material
from peaceful nuclear activities for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or
nuclear devices and the deterrence of
any such diversion by the risk of early
detection.

Just as the general public has a right
to insist that civil nuclear energy is
safely employed both at home and
abroad, so, too, does it have a right to
insist that its use be confined exclusively
to peaceful purposes. The complex of
international legal commitments,
assurances, and other arrangements
developed to ensure that civil nuclear
energy is used only for peaceful pur-
poses is often referred to as the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. International
nuclear safeguards, including onsite
inspections administered by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, are one
of the main components of this regime.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, with more
than 135 member states, is another
indispensable component.

The Reagan Administration, like all
U.S. administrations since the dawn of
the nuclear era, regards the prevention
of the spread of nuclear explosives to
additional countries as a fundamental
national security and foreign policy
objective. We are pursuing this goal in a
number of ways.

• We are striving to reduce the
motivation that other states may have
for acquiring nuclear explosives by work-
ing to improve regional and global
stability and, where appropriate, by
helping states to provide for their
legitimate security needs by non-nuclear
means.

• We continue to promote wider
adherence to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, known as the Treaty of
Tlatelolco.

• We are constantly looking for
ways to work more effectively with
other countries on measures to combat
the risks of proliferation.

• We strictly control the export of
sensitive nuclear material, equipment,
and technology from the United States,
particularly where the danger of pro-
liferation requires it, and we coordinate
closely with other nuclear suppliers
within a framework of common export
norms.

• We strongly support the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and con-
tinue to work with other countries to
strengthen it, particularly in its role of

anuary 1987

PACIFIC

applying international safeguards.
Indeed, we regard the agency's
safeguards as such a critical element in
the international nonproliferation regime
that we have urged all nuclear suppliers
to agree on a policy of requiring
safeguards on all nuclear activities of a
recipient non-nuclear weapon state as a
condition for significant new nuclear
export commitments to such states— a
condition known as "comprehensive" or
"full-scope" safeguards. The United
States, I might note, already requires
full-scope safeguards as a condition for
significant nuclear exports to its non-
nuclear weapon state trading partners,
including reactors and reactor fuel.

• Finally, we are making a serious
effort to restore the reputation of the
United States as a reliable nuclear
trading partner, for only if we maintain
our credibility with other nations in the
nuclear area can we expect them to
listen when we attempt to influence
their nuclear programs in directions we
regard as desirable.

Conclusion

Civil nuclear power today is an increas-
ingly widely used source of energy.
Properly managed from an environmen-
tal and nonproliferation point of view, it
will continue to play a critical role in
meeting man's energy needs until well
into the next century and possibly
beyond. It is clean, efficient, and
relatively inexpensive. It makes an
essential contribution to the industrial-
ized world's energy mix, especially in
countries that have few alternative
domestic energy resources. It is a key
component for assuring our energy
security, and even in the wake of Cher-
nobyl, there is no valid reason to aban-
don it. I am convinced that we can and
should continue to rely on nuclear
energy as one of our major options for
electrical generation.

If civil nuclear programs are really
to prosper, of course, they must have the
support of the general public. They
must, therefore, be safe, even safer than
they are now. And they must be safe-
guarded so that there is minimal risk of
their serving as a subterfuge for nuclear
explosives development. Responsible
governments have made great strides in
both these areas, and we plan to con-
tinue with our efforts. ■

U.S. Relationship With Pacific Islands

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
NOV. 3, 1986'

Today I am pleased to announce the
beginning of new relationships between
the United States and the island groups
that have emerged from the Pacific
Islands Trust Territory. One of these,
the Northern Mariana Islands, is now a
U.S. Commonwealth, and its people are
now U.S. citizens. The other two— the
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia— are
sovereign, self-governing nations in free
association with the United States.

The fourth and remaining island
group, Palau, has not yet finally
approved its compact of free association.
Until Palau's future political status is
resolved, the United States will continue
to discharge its responsibilities there as
administering authority under the
trusteeship agreement.

The United States liberated these
Islands during our westward drive across
the Pacific toward the end of World
War II and has administered them as a
UN strategic trusteeship since 1947. In
these last four decades, we have worked
with the islanders to improve health,
education, and social service facilities
throughout the more than 2,000 islands
comprising the trust territory. Our most
valuable contribution to the islands, a
legacy in which we can take pride, are
the democratic, representative govern-

ments created and now enjoyed by the
peoples of the trust territory.

The United States is happy to com
mence these new relationships with the
Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshal
Islands, and the Federated States of
Micronesia. We deeply appreciate thosf'
who have worked so long and hard, in
the negotiations and in the Congress, t
fashion and enact the commonwealth
covenant and the compacts of free
association. We especially want to
welcome the people of the Northern
Mariana Islands into the American
family as fellow citizens. We are honor
by the choices of the peoples and leadei
of the two new freely associated states
to associate with us in close and long-
lasting relationships, which reflect the
good will and affection between our
peoples. For these peoples, the long
years of trusteeship are over and the
dignity and opportunity for self-
government are here. We in the Unitec
States pledge our friendship and suppo
as the Northern Mariana Islands, the
Marshall Islands, and the Federated
States of Micronesia now walk the pat!
they themselves have chosen.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1986,
which also carries the text of Executive Orq
.5564 of Nov. 3 entitled "Placing Into Full
Force and Effect the Covenant With the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands and the Compacts of Free Associati
With the Federated States of Micronesia an
the Republic of the Marshall Islands." ■

ERRORISM

I.S. Takes
Measures Against
lyria

KITE HOUSE STATEMENT.
'3V. 14. 1986'

'le President today decided to take
.eeific steps in response to Syria's con-
nued support for international ter-
irism. The conviction of Nizar Hindawi
i a British court directly implicated the
I'rian Government in the attempted
Hilling of the El Al airplane. More
an 230 Americans and almost 200
ssengers of other nationalities were on
ard the flight and would have died had
e terrorist operation been successful.
Syria has been on the Department's
t of state sponsors of terrorism since
e list's inception in 1979. As such, con-
ils aimed at restricting the export of
ods and technology that would make a
jnificant contribution to the military
tential or would enhance the terrorist
pport capabilities of Syria are in
feet. Other measures, such as a cutoff
foreign assistance to Syria, have also
en imposed.

We believe further steps must be
ken to discourage such Syrian behavior
d to express our outrage, and that of
e American people, at Syrian sponsor-
ip of this attack and its long pattern of
pport for terrorism. We have been in
nsultation with our allies on this mat-
r, including members of the European
zonomic Community who announced
eir own measures on November 10.
e welcome these decisions. These
easures and our own actions will send
clear and unequivocal message to
,'ria: Its support of terrorism is unac-
ptable to the international community
nations. As a result, the President is
■dering the following actions.

• The Secretary of Commerce, in
msultation with the Secretary of State,
ill expand current controls on exports

' any items controlled for national
'curity purposes including related
■chnical data, along with all aircraft,
;licopters, and related parts and
)mponents.

• The Secretary of State will ter-
linate the availability of Export-Import
ank programs for Syria.

• The Secretary of State will advise
yria of our decision to terminate the air
•ansport agreement between the United
tates of America and Syria.

• The Secretary of Transportation
will prohibit the sale of tickets in the
United States for transportation by air
on Syrian Arab Airlines.

In addition to these actions, we have
informed U.S. oil companies that we con-
sider their continued involvement in
Syrian oil operations inappropriate
under these circumstances.

More vigorous procedures will be
applied to Syrian visa applications. We
also have revised an advisory statement
on American travel in Syria to alert
citizens to the potential for terrorist
activity originating there.

Finally, we are reducing the staff of
our Embassy in Damascus, and no high-
level visits between the United States
and Syria will take place.

These measiu^es are intended to con-
vince the Syrian Government that state
support of terrorism will not be tolerated
by the civilized world. We will continue
to closely monitor the situation and take
additional steps as necessary. As long as
Syria does not stop terrorism launched
from its own territory, or areas of
Lebanon under its effective control, the
security of all states in the region is
jeopardized. Syrian-supported terrorism
has introduced an unpredictable element
of instability in the region and risks the
danger of open violence there. Syria can
play an important role in a key region of
the world but it cannot expect to be
accepted as a responsible power or
treated as one as long as it continues to
use terrorism as an instrument of its
foreign policy.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986.

U.S. Supports
Council of Europe
Resolution on Terrorism

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
NOV. 24, 1986'

The Department of State, after review
of the recent Council of Europe resolu-
tion on preventing the abuse by terror-
ists of diplomatic and consular immu-
nities, today announces its support and
intent to adhere to the principles con-
tained in this resolution.

Its principal provisions concern a
closer scrutiny of diplomats who are
suspected of having connections to ter-
rorism, exchanging such information
among the states subscribing to the

resolution, considering refusing to
accept diplomats about whom another
member state has concrete information
of their involvement in terrorism, and
considering restricting the size of
diplomatic or consular posts when there
is evidence of involvement in terrorism
by that state.

We are pleased to support these
important measures to prevent the abuse
of diplomatic and consular immunities by
those supporting terrorism.

The Council of Europe passed this
resolution at its ministerial meeting in
Strasbourg on November 4 and 5. It was
confirmed by the Committee of Foreign
Ministers November 20. We believe the
council is doing excellent work in
establishing a legal framework to com-
bat terrorism, and the United States is
seeking to work closely with the council.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■

American Hostage
Released in Beirut

PRESIDENTS STATEMENT,
NOV. 2. 1986'

I am pleased to announce that one of the
Americans held hostage in Beirut has
been released. David Jacobsen was
released early this morning by his cap-
tors in Beirut. His family has been
notified and will be joining him soon. I
do want to express my personal appre-
ciation to the various parties and
intermediaries who have been helpful in
arranging this release. We have been
working through a number of sensitive
channels for a long time. Unfortunately,
we cannot divulge any of the details of
the release, because the lives of other
Americans and other Western hostages
are still at risk.

Again I call on the captors of all
hostages in Lebanon to release their
innocent victims. No political goals are
or will be achieved by resorting to extor-
tion and terrorism. We hold the captors
of the remaining American hostages in
Lebanon responsible for the safety of
those Americans. My thoughts and
prayers go out to the families of those
American hostages as we continue to
work for their safe return.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1986.

January 1987

UNITED NATIONS

Situation in Cambodia

Statement by Ambassador Vernon A.
Walters. U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, in a UN General
Assembly plenary session on October 20.
1986. and the text of the General
Assembly adopted October 21.

AMBASSADOR WALTERS'

STATEMENT.
OCT. 20, 1986'

We meet today to discuss a question of
searing humanitarian importance— the
continued existence of the Cambodian
people.

The Cambodians have a proud and
glorious heritage which traces its lineage
over hundreds of years, from the 8th
century when the first Cambodian king
established himself on the shores of the
Great Lake, the Tonle Sap. P'rom this
beginning grew the Angkor Kingdom,
one of Southeast Asia's mightiest
empires. The Cambodians searched out
the secrets of water management and
irrigation and built the huge reservoirs
which allowed bountiful agricultural pro-
duction. The Cambodians of the Angkor
period developed into the master
builders of the time and left the world
that unsurpassed masterpiece. Angkor
Wat. He who gazes at Angkor Wat and
Angkor Thorn cannot but be awed by the
Cambodians' accomplishment and what
they bequeathed to all mankind.

The glories of Angkor, however, are
far in the past, and the Cambodian peo-
ple now find themselves in far different
circumstances. Instead of the proud war-
riors who kept their enemies at bay for
centuries, the Cambodians are now pros-
trate. Their country is occupied by
foreign forces, and their very future
existence as a people in question. It is
right and proper that we in the United
Nations should address ourselves to this
question, for the fate of Cambodia and
the Cambodian people is one of concern
to the entire world community. It is one
of the principal functions of the United
Nations to defend just such a small
nation and helpless people.

The origins of the Cambodian
tragedy are well known. In April 1975,
the black-clad Khmer Rouge stormed
Phnom Penh and opened a chapter in
world history which will live forever in
infamy. Applying extreme ideas of
agrarian revolution, the Khmer Rouge
emptied the cities and treated the
inhabitants as little better than draft
animals. Hundreds of thousands of inno-

cent Cambodians died from exhaustion,
disease, and malnutrition. Others were
brutally executed by the increasingly
paranoid Khmer Rouge leaders.

In December 1978, Vietnam invaded
Cambodia and drove the Khmer Rouge
from power. The Vietnamese claim that
they acted to liberate the country from
Pol Pot, but the truth is far different.
Before the Khmer Rouge seized power.
Vietnam gave them massive support.
Many Khmer Rouge leaders were
trained in Vietnam; but once Pol Pot
was in power, Vietnam quickly learned
that it could not control him. It was at
this time that the Vietnamese used the
growing world condemnation of the
Khmer Rouge as a pretext to invade.

After nearly 8 years, Vietnam's
intentions for Cambodia have become
increasingly plain— Vietnam seeks
nothing less than creation of a vassal
and colonized state. The Heng Samrin
regime which it installed in Phnom Penh
could not survive without the 140,000
Vietnamese occupation troops. All senior
Heng Samrin officials have Vietnamese
"advisors" who insure that Vietnam's
dictates are followed to the letter. Even
those officials must resent the hours of
political "education" designed to pro-
duce conformity to Vietnam's outlook.
No policy can be promulgated in Phnom
Penh without Vietnamese approval, and
woe to the Cambodian official who dares
to display any hint of independence of
nationalism. The fate of Pen Sovan
serves as a vivid reminder of what hap-
pens to those who step out of line. Viet-
namese control reaches down to the
district and village levels, where Viet-
namese "advisors" have often unilat-
erally established their own governmen-
tal structures.

The Vietnamese presence, however,
is not limited to the government. It
permeates all aspects of the society. The
schools have been turned into instru-
ments of Vietnamese propaganda, seek-
ing to justify the Vietnamese occupation.
Knowledge of the Vietnamese language
is a prerequisite to advancement.
Students have regularly been sent to
study in Vietnam. The local press is also
directed by the ever-present Vietnamese
"advisors." The shattered Cambodian
economy continues to be drained by the
Vietnamese. Cambodia's hard-pressed
farmers still have to help supply the
Vietnamese occupation forces.

The most insidious of Vietnam's
plans to subjugate Cambodia is the set-
tlement of hundreds of thousands of
Vietnamese nationals on Cambodian ter
ritory. His Royal Highness Prince
Sihanouk has repeatedly raised the
alarm about the Vietnamese colonizatio
of his country. Estimates of the number
of Vietnamese settlers now run as high
as 700,000, or over 10% of the popula-
tion. And more arrive all the time.
Former Prime Minister H.E. Son Sann
recently said in Washington that Camb<
dians were being forced out of the cities
to the villages to make way for new
Vietnamese arrivals. Even in the
villages, Vietnamese authorities were
apparently requisitioning the best housi
and the choicest farm lands for their
compatriots. That the master builders
who once raised the magnificent Angko
Wat from the swamps of the Great Lak
should be reduced to being outcasts in
their own land is a source of outrage an
deep concern to us all.

As has occurred in many other
oppressed lands, the Vietnamese occupt
tion has fanned popular revolt inside
Cambodia. Armed resistance to the Vie-
namese is spreading. Vietnamese and
Heng Samrin installations throughout
the country are now targets of
resistance attacks. Key lines of com-
munications are often interdicted and
even the suburbs of Phnom Penh have
witnessed resistance incursions. Heng
Samrin conscripts are defecting to the
resistance ranks in increasing numbers.
Several hundred Vietnamese soldiers
have also thrown down their arms and
fled to the Thai border to escape involv'
ment in this unjust war.

HRH Prince Sihanouk detailed for i
in his September 30 general debate
speech the growing strength of the
resistance, reaching ever deeper within
Cambodia. Stung by the increasing effe
tiveness of the Cambodian resistance
forces, the Vietnamese have tried unsuc
cessfully to crush them militarily. In tht
winter of 1984-85, Vietnamese division:
brutally attacked refugee camps on the
Thai border, killing scores of innocent
civilians and uprooting tens of thousand
more. The resistance, however,
remained unaffected and, indeed, is
stronger than ever before. Recently, the
Vietnamese have tried another tack by
constructing barriers along the Thai-
Cambodian border. In a move reminis-
cent of the Khmer Rouge, the Viet-
namese have conscripted thousands of
civilians to clear land, plant antiper-
sonnel mines, and construct barriers. Ai
untold number of these conscripts have
died because of disease, exhaustion, and

DepartRient of State Bullet

UNITED NATIONS

lines. Despite this effort, the resistance
jntinues to grow and is now more than
rer firmly established inside Cambodia.

The growing opposition to Viet-
amese imperialist ambitions in Cam-
odia has other dimensions. The 240,000
:ambodians who remain on the Thai
.order bear witness to their continued
tefiance. Living in spartan conditions
nd under the constant threat of attack,
le border Cambodians courageously
pitomize the love of country and
■eedom which has characterized the
ambodian people down through the
enturies. Our hearts go out to them,
nd we pray that they will soon be able
) return to a free and independent
ambodia. We also deeply appreciate the
ork of Mr. Kunugi, the Secretary
reneral's Special Representative for
i ambodian Relief, and a dedicated staff
'f the UN Border Relief Operation
JNBRO), the World Food Program, the
iternational Committee of the Red
ross (ICRC), and the voluntary agen-
es which have turned the border relief
Deration into a humanitarian success
;ory of the highest order. The Royal
hai Government should also be com-
lended for its unswerving commitment
) the support and protection of the
jrder Cambodians.

The world community also remains
nited in its opposition to Vietnam's
ctions. For years, an overwhelming
umber of UN members have called for
le unconditional withdrawal of Viet-
amese troops from Cambodia. This year
larks the eighth time we have met
nder the auspices of the United Nations
) debate Cambodia and to issue the sim-
le plea that the Cambodians be allowed
) decide their own destiny. What has
een Vietnam's response to world oppro-
rium? The record is clear. The Viet-
amese have rejected all calls for peace
nd have continued undeterred in the
Tiperialist and colonialist policies. Fur-
nermore, an October 15 letter signed by
he Acting Permanent Representative of
^etnam and circulated as a General
assembly document declares that Viet-
am will consider null and void any
esolution emerging from our debate
ere.

The Vietnamese, nevertheless, have
ried to sway public opinion by an inten-
ive propaganda campaign. The most
ecent example took place at an August
neeting in Hanoi, where the Foreign
tlinisters of Vietnam, Laos, and the pup-
)et Heng Samrin regime issued a com-
nunique which once again claimed that
jreat strides were being made inside
"^ambodia, that the changes in Cambodia

were irreversible, and that the Viet-
namese occupation troops would be
withdrawn by 1990. But how can we talk
about "great strides" when Cambodia
suffers poverty, hunger, and disease;
when young people are conscripted
against their will to die for a foreign
invader; when innocent civilians are
press-ganged into building defensive for-
tifications in malaria-infested forests
with little food or medical care? Let
there be no doubt about it: Cambodia
today is an abjectly poor, battered coun-
try on the brink of disaster. Without
peace and self-determination, the very
existence of Cambodia and of the Khmer
as an independent people is threatened.

Moreover, the Vietnamese claim to
withdraw its forces from Cambodia by
1990 is clearly based on the hope that
their puppet, Heng Samrin, would be
able by then to manage largely on his
own. The recent performance of Heng
Samrin's soldiers suggests that Viet-
namese hopes are as illusory as their
protestations of peaceful intent. The
Vietnamese troop withdrawals to date
are nothing more than a public relations
fraud aimed at deceiving world opinion.
There has been no general withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
What we have seen is the regular rota-
tion of some units, nothing more. There
are still an estimated 140,000 Viet-
namese troops inside Cambodia, roughly
the same number as at the onset of the
occupation, despite claimed withdrawals.

Above all, there is one basic fallacy
to the Vietnamese arguments: Vietnam
has no right to lay down any conditions
for a settlement. The Vietnamese are
the invaders, and they must leave Cam-
bodia. It is as simple as that. Moreover,
there is no need for new formulations for
a Cambodian solution. They are already
clearly laid out in the principles of the
1981 International Conference on Kam-
puchea as follows:

• A cease-fire and withdrawal of all
foreign forces in the shortest time possi-
ble under the supervision and verifica-
tion of a UN peacekeeping force;

• Arrangements to ensure that
armed factions will not be able to pre-
vent or disrupt the holding of free elec-
tions and will respect the results of the
free elections;

• Appropriate measures to maintain
law and order until the establishment of
a new government; and

• The holding of free elections under
UN supervision.

In contrast to Vietnam's intran-
sigence, other parties involved in the
Cambodian issue continue to demon-

strate a sincere effort to reach a
peaceful solution. The members of the
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in particular should be com-
mended for their efforts on behalf of
peace. Since 1981 the members of
ASEAN have advanced a series of dif-
ferent ideas to address Vietnamese con-
cerns. Unfortunately, Vietnam has
ignored all efforts at conciliation.

Other proposals have also been
advanced to the Vietnamese containing
elements which, if accepted by all the
parties involved, could advance the
search for peace. Again and again, Viet-
nam has rejected these out of hand.

Vietnam's Minister of State, Vo
Dong Giang, recently told the General
Assembly that a Cambodian solution
must be based on guaranteeing the
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, on the
elimination of the genocidal Pol Pot
clique, and on guaranteeing a process of
national reconciliation. Vietnam clearly
wants peace only on its own terms; but
since proposals with many reasonable
elements have been made to the Viet-
namese by its neighbors, it remains for
the Vietnamese to initiate the process.
Genuine willingness to negotiate a settle-
ment in Cambodia would be a welcome
development, above all, for the Cambo-
dian people. The Vietnamese occupation
of Cambodia, more than any other fac-
tor, stands in the path of Vietnam's par-
ticipation as a constructive member of
the peaceful community of nations.
Surely the Vietnamese would benefit
enormously from a peaceful settlement
of the Cambodian conflict. If they are
serious, let them begin serious troop
withdrawals and seek serious solutions
to this grave problem. Until then, the
world must judge them by their actions.

Let us remember also that Vietnam
is not the only country which shares
responsibility for the Cambodian plight.
Vietnam could not continue with its sub-
jugation of this land if it were not for the
massive military support received from
its Soviet backers. Most of the bombs
and bullets the Vietnamese use against
the Cambodians are from the Soviet
Union. If the Soviet Union were to cut
off this military support, Vietnam would
be hard-pressed to maintain its occupa-
tion, and peace might be possible. We
call on Moscow to place sufficient
pressure on the Vietnamese to agree to
a comprehensive settlement.

The Cambodian tragedy must be
brought to an end. The Cambodian peo-
ple have suffered long enough. Now is
the time to end violence and the human
suffering. Now is the time for us to join
hands and contribute jointly to the

January 1987

UNITED NATIONS

rebirth of a truly free and independent
Cambodia. With our help, there can be a
resurgence of the Angkor spirit which
illuminated Southeast Asia in the past.
To make this possible, however, we must
first bring peace to this ravaged land;
and to do that, Vietnam must heed the
appeals of the world community to with-
draw its troops and negotiate. There is
no other choice.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RESOLUTION 41/6,
OCT. 21, 1986^

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14
November 1979. 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 36/5
of 21 October 1981, 37/6 of 28 October 1982,
38/3 of 27 October 1983, 39/5 of 30 October
1984 and 40/7 of 5 November 1985,

Recalling further the Declaration on Kam-
puchea and resolution 1(1) adopted by the
International Conference on Kampuchea,
which offer the negotiating framework for a
comprehensive political settlement of the
Kampuchean problem.

Taking note of the report of the
Secretary-General on the implementation of
General Assembly resolution 40/7,

Deploring that foreign armed interven-
tion and occupation continue and that foreign
forces have not been withdrawn from Kam-
puchea, thus causing continuing hostilities in
that country and seriously threatening inter-
national peace and security,

Noting the continued and effective strug-
gle waged against foreign occupation by the
Coalition with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk
as President of Democratic Kampuchea,

Taking note of Economic and Social Coun-
cil decision 1986/146 of 23 May 1986 on the
right of peoples to self-determination and its
application to peoples under colonial or alien
domination or foreign occupation.

Greatly disturbed that the continued
fighting and instability of Kampuchea have
forced an additional large number of Kam-
pucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean
border in search of food and safety,

Recognizing that the assistance extended
by the international community has continued
to reduce the food shortages and health prob-
lems of the Kampuchean people,

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable
right of the Kampuchean people who have
sought refuge in neighboring countries to
return safely to their homeland.

Emphasizing further that no effective
solution to the humanitarian problems can be
achieved without a comprehensive political
settlement of the Kampuchean conflict.

Seriously concerned about reported
demographic changes being imposed in Kam-
puchea l)y foreign occupation forces.

Convinced that, to bring about lasting
peace in South-East Asia and reduce the
threat to international peace and security,
there is an urgent need for the international

community to find a comprehensive political
solution to the Kampuchean problem that will
provide for the withdrawal of all foreign
forces and ensure respect for the sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and neutral
and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well
as the right of the Kampuchean people to self-
determination free from outside interference.

Reiterating its conviction that, after the
comprehensive political settlement of the
Kampuchean question through peaceful
means, the States of the South-East Asian
region can pursue efforts to establish a zone
of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-
East Asia so as to lessen international ten-
sions and to achieve lasting peace in the
region.

Reaffirming the need for all States to
adhere strictly to the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, which call for
respect for the national independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
States, non-intervention and non-interference
in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse
to the threat or use of force and peaceful set-
tlement of disputes.

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22. 35/6.
36/5. 37/6. 38/3. 39/5 and 40/7 and calls for
their full implementation;

2. Reiterates its conviction that the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kam-
puchea, the restoration and preservation of
its independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the right of the Kampuchean people
to determine their own destiny and the com-
mitment by all States to non-interference and
non-intervention in the internal affairs of
Kampuchea are the principal components of
any just and lasting resolution of the Kam-
puchean problem;

3. Takes note with appreciation of the
report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Inter-
national Conference on Kampuchea on its
activities during 1985-1986 and requests that
the Committee continue its work, pending the
reconvening of the Conference;

4. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee to
convene when necessary and to carry out the
tasks entrusted to it in its mandate;

5. Reaffirms its decision to reconvene the
Conference at an appropriate time, in accord-
ance with Conference resolution 1(1);

6. Renews its appeal to all States of
South-East Asia and others concerned to
attend future sessions of the Conference;

7. Requests the Conference to report to
the General Assembly on its future sessions;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to con-
tinue to consult with and assist the Con-
ference and the Ad Hoc Committee and to
provide them on a regular basis with the
necessary facilities to carry out their
functions;

9. Expresses its appreciation once again
to the Secretary-General for taking appro-
priate steps in following the situation closely
and requests him to continue to do so and to
exercise his good offices in order to con-
tribute to a comprehensive political
settlement;

10. Expresses its deep appreciation onct
again to donor countries, and the United
Nations and its agencies and other humani-
tarian organizations, national and interna-
tional, that have rendered relief assistance t
the Kampuchean people, and appeals to thei
to continue to provide emergency assistance
to those Kampucheans who are still in need,
especially along the Thai-Kampuchean bordi
and in the holding centers in Thailand;

11. Reiterates its deep appreciation to t
Secretary-General for his efforts in
co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance
and in monitoring its distribution, and
requests him to intensify such efforts as are
necessary;

12. Urges the States of South-East Asir
once a comprehensive political solution to t\
Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert
renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace
freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia;

13. Reiterates the hope that, following a
comprehensive political solution, an inter-
governmental committee will be established
to consider a programme of assistance to
Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its
economy and for the economic and social
development of all States in the region;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the General Assembly at its forty-
second session on the implementation of the
present resolution;

15. Decides to include in the provisional
agenda of its forty-second session the item
entitled "The situation in Kampuchea."

'USUN press release 120.
-Adopted by a vote of 115 for (U.S.) anc
21 against, with 13 abstentions. ■

Nicaragua

by Herbert S. Okun

Statement in a plenary session oft
UN General Assembly on November 3,
1986. Ambassador Okun is U.S. Deputy
Permanent Representative to the Unitei
Nations.^

As my delegation stated in the General
Committee on October 30, the United
States believes the new item proposed
by Nicaragua is not an appropriate iten
for consideration by the General
Assembly. In regards to judgments of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Article 94(2), provides that a "party mi
have recourse to the Security (Ilouncil."
There is no mention of any role for the
General Assembly.

For this reason, until now, no
member state has requested the GenerE
Assembly to take a decision on an issue^
of this nature. Even those member
states which have accepted the com-

Department of State Bullet

UNITED NATIONS

Isiiry jurisdiction of the International
iii't of Justice should have serious
iivations about involving the Cieneral
M'lnbly in implementing decisions of
International Court of Justice.
The United States believes that the
,'Stion that Nicaragua has insisted on
lining up today must be considered in
' lontext of what is happening within
:iragua and between Nicaragua and
neighbors in Central America. I will
,1.' more to say about that presently.

As we have often stated before, it is
I enough to claim that, just because
tii'le 36(6) of the Court's statute says
It It may decide disputes concerning
ixiiction, the Court, indeed, dirf have
I isdiction in this particular dispute. No
C-irt, including the International Court
(; Justice, has the legal power to assert
j isdiction where there is no basis for
tit jurisdiction.

The absence of any foundation in
{her law or fact for the Court's asser-
tn of jurisdiction in this case is clear.
I ok at the language and the negotiat-
i; history of the Charter of the United
I tions. Look at the language and the
Ijotiating history of the Statute of the
l:ernational Court of Justice. Look at
1 > consistent interpretation of these

truments by the Court, by the Secu-
j V Council, and by member states.

The resolution before us today is
I sed on a fundamentally flawed inter-
i etation of the significance and validity
I the decision of the International Court
' Justice. Moreover, even if it were not
I flawed, it is not appropriate for con-
■ leration by the General Assembly.
' LOse are two of the reasons why my
legation will vote against this draft
solution.

Given this background, why has
caragua chosen to come to the General
isembly today? As it has done so often
the Security Council in the past, the
indinistas clearly intend to manipulate
e U.N. General Assembly for prop-
:anda purposes. If Nicaragua wished
rious consideration of this issue in its
tality, it would have agreed to take it
• as part of Item 42, the Situation in
?ntral America, which is already on the
?neral Assembly's agenda for
scussion.

In spite of what the representative
' Nicaragua has asserted here this
orning, the issue at stake is the crisis
Central America and how to resolve
. Nicaragua has twisted the issue by
irtraying it as a conflict between
icaragua and the United States. My
3vernment, the people of Central
merica, and the Sandinistas themselves
now that this is not the case. The

Sandinista regime is responsible for the
crisis. It has waged a campaign of sub-
version against all of its neighbors and a
campaign of repression against its own
people, whose revolution it has betrayed.

During the 1979 revolution in
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas pledged to
follow a policy of nonalignment. They
promised not to e.xport their revolution.
But, from the outset, the Sandinistas
planned to ally themselves with Cuba
and the Soviet bloc. By 1980 the
Sandinistas were deeply involved in
regional subversion, supporting the
Marxist guerrillas seeking to overthrow
the Government of El Salvador. The
evidence proves this support is massive
and undeniable. It ranges from state-
ments by former guerrillas and moun-
tains of captured documents to physical
proof such as captured weapons and
munitions.

Nicaraguan subversion goes far
beyond El Salvador. The Sandinistas
provide clandestine assistance to subver-
sive groups throughout the region. The
Sandinistas directly participated in the
1983 and 1984 attempts to infiltrate
subversives into Honduras, as captured
subversives themselves have admitted.
The Sandinistas have also supported ter-
rorists in Costa Rica, and their agents
have repeatedly attempted assassina-
tions in that country. The Nicaraguan
connection with the weapons used by the
Colombian M-19 in the bloody attack on
the Palace of Justice in Bogota is well
known.

A threatening rise in Nicaragua's
conventional forces has accompanied the
Sandinistas' subversion of their
neighbors. Since 1979 the Sandinistas
have created the largest army in the
history of Central America— ten times
the size of Somoza's. To equip it, they
have received from their Cuban and
Soviet allies an arsenal without prece-
dent in the region, including fleets of
combat helicopters, battalions of tanks
and armored vehicles, and scores of
artillery pieces and rocket launchers.
They have militarized Nicaragua, turn-
ing the country into an armed camp. I
refer you to an article printed just last
Wednesday in The New York Times on
the latest delivery of Soviet helicopter
gunships. Every day these formidable
weapons, piloted in many cases by
Cubans, are killing ever-escalating
numbers of Nicaraguans.

Just as the Sandinistas have
betrayed their neighbors, all of whom
welcomed the Nicaraguan revolution,
they have also betrayed the Nicaraguans
who believed the Sandinistas' promises
of freedom and democracy. In recent

months, the Sandinista regime has
ruthlessly intensified the consolidation of
its totalitarian rule. Using its secret
police— ten times the size of Somoza's—
and its network of Cuban-inspired "block
committees," it has created an atmos-
phere of fear and repression that far
exceeds the worst excesses of the
Somoza regime. The Sandinistas have
suspended even the most basic of human
rights. They have engaged in a sys-
tematic pattern of summary executions,
arbitrary detentions, and physical and
psychological abuse of prisoners.

Let me dwell for a moment on the
Sandinistas' violations of human rights.
According to the Organization of
American States' (OAS) human rights
office, there are some 2,000 Nicaraguan
prisoners who have been tried or are
awaiting trial by the so-called Popular
Anti-Somocista Tribunals, whose convic-
tion rate is 99%. The OAS report notes
that these prisoners enjoy no presump-
tion of innocence, have limited access to
defense counsel, and face judges whose
"impartiality, fairness, and independ-
ence of judgment are seriously com-
promised."

Since the Nicaraguan representative
insists upon invoking the rule of law and
concepts of justice before this body, let
me call to the attention of those who
may have missed it the description of the
Sandinista system for dispensing justice
which appeared in the October 31 issue
of The New York Time>:. The article
reported that the popular tribunals have
become a principal Sandinista instru-
ment for repressing the peaceful
democratic opposition under the guise of
adjudicating national security cases. I
quote from the article.

Independent labor unionists, opposition
party activists, journalists and other peaceful
dissidents have been proclaimed "counter-
revolutionaries" and given stiff jail terms by
the tribunals .... The common experience of
political defendants is arrest without warrant
and incommunicado detention. Though the
tribunals' summary procedures are meant to
expedite justice, many defendants are held
for several months before being charged or
tried. They are interrogated in harsh condi-
tions, invariably making self-incriminating
statements under duress and sometimes tor-
ture. Once charges are brought, proceedings
are speedy .... Human rights groups have
noted that several lawyers have been
imprisoned for too vigorously defending
political clients.

The Sandinistas claim that they
somehow have been given a mandate to
rule Nicaragua. From whom or what did
they obtain this mandate? Certainly not
from the hundreds of thousands of

anuary 1987

UNITED NATIONS

Nicaraguans who participated in the
1979 revolution, thinking it would bring
genuine democracy to Nicaragua and
who subsequently had to tlee the coun-
try. The Sandinistas have persecuted the
genuinely democratic political parties
that played such a noble role in the
revolution, forcing many of their leaders
into exile and harassing and intimidating
those who chose to remain. Among the
many tragic ironies of the Sandinistas
betrayal of the revolution is the fate of
La Prem^a. The assassination of La
Pren.sd'.s publisher in 1978 was the spark
which ignited the revolution. In June of
this year, the Sandinistas closed down
La Prensa as the last step in their 7-year
effort to stamp out a free press, one of
the essential elements of democratic
government.

Because the revolution before us
today totally ignores the situation that
prevails between Nicaragua and its
neighbors, making not even a single
reference to the Contadora process, and
because it also ignores the fundamental
principles of human rights embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations, my
delegation believes that it is a totally
unacceptable portrayal of the tragic
reality of Central America. This is yet
another reason why my delegation will
vote against this resolution.

My delegation had been planning to
elaborate its views on how to reach a
peaceful settlement in Central America
during the long-scheduled plenary debate
on Central America. In spite of today's
diversionary exercise by the Sandinistas,
my delegation still plans to do so. Let
me, nevertheless, restate the fundamen-
tal approach of my government to the
conflict in the region.

The United States continues to seek
a negotiated settlement. It has sup-
ported and continues to support the Con-
tadora process in its quest for a regional
solution. U.S. policy toward Nicaragua
remains fully consistent with the 21
points of the Contadora Document of Ob-
jectives agreed to by the four Contadora
group countries and the five Central
American countries, including Nicaragua
in September 1983. The United States
has stated repeatedly and categorically
that it would abide by a comprehensive,
verifiable, and simultaneous implementa-
tion of the Document of Objectives. But
only the full realization of all 21 points,
including true national reconciliation and
democratization in Nicaragua, can lead
to a lasting peace in Central America.

Once again the United States calls
on the Sandinistas to enter into serious
negotiations with the democratic opposi-
tion aimed at achieving national recon-

ciliation and democratization. Our long-
standing offer to hold simultaneous talks
with the Sandinistas if they undertake
such negotiations still stands.

My delegation is concerned that the
tactics used by the Sandinistas so
blatantly in provoking this debate today
have been designed with one purpose in
mind. They wish to avoid answering
some basic questions about their inten-
tions toward their neighbors and toward
their own people.

• Why do the Sandinistas continue
to attack and subvert their neighbors?

• Why do the Sandinistas continue
to destroy those within Nicaragua— such
as labor unions, the free press, the
church, the private sector, and even the
Miskito Indians— who cling to the ideals
of the revolution and attempt peacefully
to make these ideals a reality?

• Why do the Sandinistas need a
secret police ten times the size of
Somoza's?

• And finally, why are the San-
dinistas unwilling to enter into the
dialogue with all of the democratic
opposition that could lead to genuine
national reconciliation?

We ask; When will this body and—
more important— the Nicaraguan
people— be given answers to these
questions?

HJSUN press release 141. ■

Situation in
Afghanistan

by Herbert S. Okun

Statement in a plenary session of the
UN General Assetnbly on November !,.
1986. Ambassador Okun is U.S. Deputy
Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. ^

A whole nation is dying. Even now, as
we speak, innocent Afghan men, women,
and children are being indiscriminately
slaughtered— simply because they refuse
to relinquish what is theirs: their homes,
their land, their families, their culture
and religion, their way of life.

This Assembly has an abundance of
well-documented material from many
sources which describes the conse-
quences of 7 years of brutal Soviet
onslaught against an entire nation. The
UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan,

whose report will be considered by thei
Assembly later in this session, has coni
eluded that "the only solution to the i
human rights situation in Afghanistan i
the withdrawal of all foreign troops.
Continuation of the military solution
will . . . lead inevitably to a situation
approaching genocide."

"Genocide" is a term which meansi
"the systematic killing of, or a prograi
of action intended to destroy, a whole
national or ethnic group." It is uncon-
scionable that in today's world a situa-
tion exists that might justify being
characterized as approaching genocide
Despite considerable efforts by the
Soviet Union and the Kabul regime to
restrict and manipulate news coverage
of the war, no one— certainly no one ir
this forum— can claim to be ignorant
about what is happening in Aighanista

Since the Soviet Union's unprovok
invasion of a friendly nonaligned
neighbor 7 years ago, we have gathere
here to express our collective outrage
the transgressions of basic human righ
being perpetrated against the Afghan
people. We are all aware of the numbe
and scope of violations of international
humanitarian law being carried out in
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union or its
puppets. These include, but by no mea
are limited to:

• The 1949 Geneva conventions ai
customary international law designed
protect civilians; these proscribe murd
and mutilation and the large-scale use
antipersonnel weapons;

• The 1925 Geneva protocol and tl
1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Cc
vention which prohibit the use of asph;
iating, poisonous, or other gases;

• Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which prohibits torture and other cruel
inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; and

• The 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict.

This list— incomplete as it is— is
impressive in its total disregard for the
basic principles of human rights and
decency. It is inconceivable in today's
world that a country be permitted to
remain unaccountable on the applicatio
of human rights. It is inconceivable tha
among the world community of nations
gathered here today, there are govern-
ments that continue to remain unmovei
by the tragedy of Afghanistan— so
unmoved that they refuse to vote in
favor of a resolution that merely asks
that the Afghan people be permitted to
determine their own fate in peace and

Department of State Bulle'

UNITED NATIONS

nity, free from the yoke of military
)ression. Abstention on an issue

jecting the survival of an entire people

I nexcusable.
Have we become so accustomed to

I ssacre and torture, to indiscriminate
nbings and mutilation that we no
ger comprehend the full horror of
t> at is happening in Afghanistan? Is it
, crystal clear that the situation in
jhanistan is not only one of violence
1 death, bombings and military
:ounters, but that it is a situation
ich, if permitted to continue
;hecked, could result in the elimina-

I of "a whole national or ethnic
)up"?

The very fabric of Afghanistan's
ditional society is being rent under
ce of arms. Village life has been shat-
ed; families have been separated;
men widowed; children orphaned,
[ildren are being born and raised in
r ugee camps and have no prospect of
e leriencing life in their own country.
' iliiren who remain in Soviet-

II mated areas of Afghanistan are
iiu taught a distorted version of
;lian history viewed through the

f jHi of Mar.xist-Leninist dogma.

The world's largest refugee popula-
ti has been created, as over one-third
c .Afghanistan's prewar population has
t 'n violently displaced. And, as if this
\ re not enough, the regime recently
I Kiunced plans to relocate 30,000 peo-
{ from areas near the Pakistani border
t sparsely populated areas in western
1 ^hanistan. Such a policy would almost
c 'tainly involve a massive violation of
I man rights; it also indicates the
1 gths to which the Soviet Union must
J to deny popular support to the
i ghan resistance.

After 7 years of a war waged by a
i Derpower against one of the poorest
itions in the world, the Soviet Union
1 s apparently realized that a national
leration movement cannot be con-
I ered by conventional military tactics
;d weaponry. Instead it has conceived
:d begun to implement a much more
btle three-pronged strategy composed
military, intelligence, and political
^asures. This military -political cam-
ign, combining intimidation and
Dlence with subtle bribery and a
assive propaganda effort, is intended
; permit the Soviet Union to proceed to
nsolidate its power in Afghanistan
ith a minimum of international outcry.
Since its invasion of Afghanistan in
•79, the Soviet Union has moved
leadily toward creating a fighting force
Hat is more appropriate to counter-
surgency. It has increased reliance on

light airborne forces rather than heavy
motorized columns; it has intensified
ambush and interdiction operations
along the border areas; it has signifi-
cantly increased the number of Soviet
special purpose forces, of which there
are now over eight battalions in
Afghanistan, roughly double the 1983
level.

This redefined military effort has
been accomplished by a campaign to win
hearts, minds, and pocketbooks led by
the former chief of the Afghan secret
police, Najibullah. There has been a
dramatic increase in sabotage efforts in
the tribal areas of Pakistan along the
Afghanistan border. Bribery of tribal
leaders, regional and town leaders, even
religious leaders, has been accompanied
by threats of violence as a penalty for
cooperating with the mujahidin. Indoc-
trination efforts continue, aimed at
creating a loyal cadre of pro-Soviet
Afghans, and thousands of children are
sent every year to the Soviet Union.

Despite these efforts, the Soviet
Union is no closer today to consolidating
its control over Afghanistan than it was
on December 27, 1979, when its invading
troops murdered President Amin— the
man who allegedly first invited Soviet
troops into Afghanistan. The Soviet
Union, despite all its efforts, cannot
break the will of a people united in a
national liberation struggle. The Afghan
people will not, they cannot, acquiesce in
what amounts to their own destruction
as a people and a.s a nation. There is an
old Afghan saying: "the mujahid waited
100 years for his revenge and cursed
himself for his impatience."

The Afghan people will never sur-
render. The magnitude of the Soviet
threat— not only militarily but for tradi-
tional Afghan religious and cultural
values— has forged a unity of purpose
among resistance fighters unparalleled
in Afghanistan's history. Today the
resistance is cooperating more closely
together than ever before— joining
forces, coordinating attacks, and sharing
intelligence and battle techniques.
Regular rocketing of Kabul, including
the spectacular ammunition dump explo-
sion on August 26, testifies to mujahidin
ability to penetrate even the most for-
tified of Soviet security rings.

It is not the brave freedom fighters
of Afghanistan who have failed to adapt
and take countermeasures against a
more subtle Soviet political strategy.
Many of us in the world community of
nations are being lulled into inaction by
Soviet hints of flexibility. Many prefer to
close their eyes and ears rather than

acknowledge and demand a cessation of
the horrors visited daily on the Afghan
people.

On July 28, General Secretary Gor-
bachev announced the Soviet intention
to withdraw six regiments from
Afghanistan. This token withdrawal was
hailed by the Soviets as "evidence" of
their desire for a political settlement. In
reality, it is intended to obscure the per-
sistent Soviet refusal to provide a time-
table for comprehensive withdrawal.
Militarily insignificant, the so-called
withdrawal has been unmasked by con-
vincing evidence which indicates that
significant additional amounts of equip-
ment and troops were introduced into
Afghanistan after the July 28 speech for
the sole purpose of publicly withdrawing
them. Many of you are familiar with this
evidence.

If the Soviet Union wants to demon-
strate its interest in a political settle-
ment in Afghanistan, it need only
respond to seven General Assembly
resolutions which call for the immediate
withdrawal of all foreign forces; it need
only present a short timetable at Geneva
for a complete troop withdrawal. This is
the missing element in the search for an
end to 7 years of war and destruction in
Afghanistan.

As we all know, the UN Secretary
General and his personal representative,
Under Secretary General Diego
Cordovez, have been conducting negotia-
tions aimed at achieving a political set-
tlement. The U.S. Government supports
the efforts of the Secretary General and
his representative and applauds their
diligence and their commitment to a just
and durable settlement. We have stated
at previous sessions of the General
Assembly— and reiterate today— that the
United States firmly supports this proc-
ess. We have made known our will-
ingness, in writing, to play an appro-
priate guarantor's role with respect to a
comprehensive and balanced settlement
that protects the legitimate security
interests of all concerned.

Three of the four basic documents
which would comprise a comprehensive
settlement have been largely completed.
These include agreements on mutual
non-interference and non-intervention,
voluntary return of the refugees, and
international guarantees. The fourth
document, which was discussed for the
first time in May of this year, lays out
the interrelationship of the three docu-
ments to the central issue of Soviet
troop withdrawals. Although progress
has been made on the format and scope
of this fourth instrument, the Soviet
Union has persisted in its refusal to pro-

anuary 1987

UNITED NATIONS

vide a realistic timetable for the com-
plete withdrawal of all Soviet troops.
The time has come for deeds, not
words. The Soviet Union is counting on
outlasting the Afghans and those who
support their fight for freedom. By pro-
longing the war and enshrouding it in
hints and meaningless gestures, they are
hoping and waiting for the world's atten-
tion span to slip, for our outrage to
wane. We cannot permit this to happen.
Collectively, we can and must help put
an end to the carnage and destruction in
Afghanistan. In voting for this resolu-
tion, let us demonstrate our commitment
to the comprehensive political settlement
which is now in sight, except for one
missing element— a short timetable for
the withdrawal of all Soviet troops. In
voting for this resolution, let us demon-
strate that we— the world community of
nations— will not permit the Afghan
nation to perish from this Earth.

'USUN press release 142.

U.S. Reconfirms
Support for IAEA

by Richard T. Kennedy

Statement in a plenary session of the
UN General Assembly on November 11,
1986. Ambassador Kennedy is U.S. per-
manent representative to the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and Ambassador at Large and special
adviser to the Secretary on nonprolifera-
tion policy and nuclear energy affairs.^

As the U.S. representative to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, it is a
great pleasure for me today to consider,
with my distinguished colleagues, the
annual report of the IAEA. I am par-
ticularly gratified for the important
work of the IAEA and to reflect briefly
on its solid record of accomplishment in
promoting the safe and peaceful uses of
nuclear energy for the benefit of people
throughout the world.

My government joins those who have
commended the Director General for his
excellent report and statement and for
the agency's work which it reflects. The
IAEA— its staff and its member states-
can look with justifiable pride and satis-
faction upon its ongoing safeguards and
technical cooperation activities and its
accomplishments in the field of nuclear
safety.

Over the 30 years of its life, the
IAEA has assumed ever greater impor-

tance as a key instrument in the global
efforts to protect against the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, while
assuring that the benefits of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy are made widely
available. It is an agency which the
United States ranks among the most
important of the international
institutions.

The vital international safeguards
program which the IAEA administers
provides the necessary confidence to
states throughout the world that nuclear
energy is being used only in the intended
peaceful ways. And, thus, the agency's
safeguards program provides the neces-
sary underpinning for broad cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
for the benefit of all. My government is
particularly gratified that the agency has
continued to strengthen its safeguards
program, developing new and more
effective ways to increase international
confidence, while at the same time keep-
ing a watchful eye on the resource com-
mitments involved.

The agency also is to be congratu-
lated for its successful efforts to pro-
mote the widespread use of the peaceful
atom. Its technical cooperation activities
in nuclear energy— including nuclear
medicine— in improvement of food and
agriculture contribute greatly to the
well-being of peoples throughout the
world.

The IAEA plays a leading role, too,
in efforts to assure that nuclear power is
used in a way which fully protects the
public health and safety. Earlier this
year, following the tragic accident at
Chernobyl, we were vividly reminded of
the critical role of the IAEA in the field
of nuclear safety. The rapid and effec-
tive response of the IAEA to that acci-
dent, and its subsequent efforts to
address in a comprehensive manner its
immediate and long-term consequences,
amply reflect the initiative and serious-
ness of purpose which have, for so many
years, distinguished the agency's work.

My government wishes particularly
to commend the IAEA for its support of
the successful efforts by member states
to complete negotiations, within a period
of weeks, on two international conven-
tions regarding early notification and
emergency assistance in the event of
nuclear accidents. These conventions are
significant not only for their practical
applications but for the fact that they
emerged from a spirit of compromise
and cooperation, all too rare in
multilateral fora.

This same constructive spirit was
evidenced at the post-Chernobyl experts

iiii
»i

meeting in August and at the special s
sion of the IAEA general conference o
nuclear safety in September. Each of
these meetings resulted in a thoroughl
constructive exchange of views, which
doubtless will form the basis for the
agency's future activities in the nuclea
safety area.

I have cited these recent initiative
by the agency because they so clearly
typify the manner in which the IAEA
does its work year after year. In that
light, 1985— on which the Director
General has so well reported— was no
exception. While most of its activites a
not featured on the front pages of the
world's newspapers, and while most oi
its projects, courses, and special pro- s
grams receive little or no public atten-
tion, the agency consistently approach'
its work with dedication and com-
petence. It seeks always to respond
effectively to the diverse interests and
needs of its members.

At the same time, we must look to
the future to assure that the IAEA
remains an effective international
institution— one which maintains a cleg
focus on its technical mandate of safe-
guards, technical cooperation, and
nuclear safety. In the past, the agency
on occasion has become embroiled in
political controversies and issues
extraneous to its statute and its missio
Such controversies unfortunately have
occupied unnecessarily and undesirabl;
the attention of its policymaking orgar
and governing bodies. We are pleased
that there appears to be a trend away
from such extraneous debate. It is
incumbent on all of its members to
assure that the agency not be distracte
from its vital technical missions.

My government also believes that
the IAEA must continue to be the prin
cipal international institution in which
states can join together to promote the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus,
universality of membership must con-
tinue to be a guiding principle for the
agency. For otherwise, the goal of assu
ing that the peoples of the world can er
joy the greatest possible benefits of the
safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy
will be unattainable.

I have high confidence that other
member states share our appreciation c
the agency and concur in the importanc
of its technical mission. I am certain th;
as the agency approaches the year
ahead— a year which promises to be one
of challenge and growth— it will continu
to uphold the high standards of excel-
lence it has established. I am equally ce
tain that the solid record of achievemen
which we have seen in this past year wi

Department of State Bullet

UNITED NATIONS

yirepeated in the next— in no small
nlasure, as a result of the outstanding
ijdership provided by Director General
ins Blix.

Before closing please let me observe
it my delegation has noted with inter-
the comments of some previous
;akers concerning efforts to enhance
dear arms control and to achieve the
imate elimination of all nuclear
apons. My delegation would note that
> United States, too, has put forward
istructive, viable proposals directed
vard these objectives. The United
ites, too, hopes that these proposals
1 be carefully considered by the Soviet
lion as discussion of all proposals con-
ning nuclear weapons continues.
My government is pleased, there-
's, to join with other states in support-
; the resolution [No. L-32] on the
EA annual report. We look forward to
irking with the agency staff and with
iier member states in support of the
ency's programs, which so clearly
nefit us all.

"USUN press release 150.

ibyan Occupation
f Northern Chad

Herbert S. Okun

Statement in the Security Council on
member 18. 1986. Ambassador Okun is
Is. Deputy Permanent Representative
Uhe United Nations.^

le U.S. delegation believes that the
ivernment of the Third Republic of
lad, since it came to power in 1982,
s vigorously worked to achieve
itional reconciliation. It has attempted
heal the wounds caused by the long
/il war in that country. It has met with
leat success. The Chadian Government
Is welcomed back thousands of former
iponents and helped them to resume
eir place in Chad's national life.

As the Permanent Representative of
aad has just pointed out, Chad's
omestic progress has been disrupted by
:ternal military aggression directed
jainst it. In 1983, in clear violation of
Dt only the Charter of the United
ations but also that of the Organization
African Unity, Libya invaded and
sized nearly half of the territory of the
epublic of Chad. This Libyan occupa-

Ion of Chad's northern provinces still
jntinues today.

[

Libya's occupation of northern Chad
is maintained only through harsh
military rule. Several thousand Libyan
troops have constructed and occupy a
number of military bases and airfields on
Chadian soil. Many Chadian civilians
have been forced to flee from their
ancestral homes in the north and to seek
refuge south of the 16th parallel, in the
territory controlled by the Government
of Chad. This massive flow of refugees is
clear evidence of aggression against the
Government and people of Chad.

A member of this organization, one
that claims to uphold the Charter, is
responsible for this aggression. Libya's
attack on Chad threatens not only its
smaller neighbor but the peace and
stability of other nations in the region as
well. Let us review what has happened
since the Council last met on this subject
in January 1985.

In February and March 1986,
Libyan-controlled military forces,
operating from the territory they had
previously occupied in northern Chad,
launched heavy attacks against Chadian
Government posts along and south of the
16th parallel. As you will recall, in
February of this year, the Permanent
Representative of the Republic of Chad
again reminded the Security Council of
continued Libyan military aggression
against his country in flagrant violation
of resolutions of the United Nations and
the Organization of African Unity. He
also informed this body that his govern-
ment had requested, under Article 51 of
the UN Charter, assistance from the
Government of France in order to resist
this aggression.

In intense fighting, Chadian Govern-
ment troops repulsed all of these
attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on
the attackers and taking hundreds of
prisoners, including a number of Libyan
soldiers. The Libyan response was to
send a military aircraft to bomb
N'Djamena airport on February 17.

The international community has
just learned of new Libyan repression in
northern Chad. We understand that the
latest Libyan actions are directed not
just against Chadian military units but
also involved open warfare against the
civilian population of northern Chad.
Libya is bombing villages, indiscrimi-
nately killing Chadian civilians, and con-
ducting a scorched earth policy by burn-
ing plantations and killing cattle. In his
persuasive memorandum of November
13, 1986, to the Council, the Permanent
Representative of Chad has referred to
these Libyan actions as genocide.

Libya has attempted to justify its
invasion, seizure, and occupation of
northern Chad and support for a former

Chadian regime, the GUNT, [National
Union Transition Government]. The
falsity of this claim has now been
demonstrated by the Libyans them-
selves. Libya acknowledges that the
GUNT has collapsed. Most GUNT mem-
bers have rallied to the Government of
Chad and are now fighting against the
Libyan invaders. In Tripoli the Libyans
themselves shot and wounded GUNT
leader Goukouni Oueddei when they
attempted to arrest him.

Chad is not a colony of Libya. Chad
is an independent, nonaligned member of
the United Nations. It threatens no
other nation, least of all Libya. The
Chadian people do not want Libyan
soldiers in their country. Chad is one of
the poorest countries in the world. It
wants to devote its energies to rebuild-
ing and recovering from civil war and
natural disaster. Its efforts in the field of
economic development are greatly inhib-
ited by the efforts it must make to resist
Libyan military aggression.

In its struggle against outside
aggression, Chad deserves the support
of all of us. By its aggression against
Chad, Libya merits the condemnation of
the international community. All
members of this organization, if they
really believe in the Charter, should
demand that Libya withdraw its military
forces from Chad and cease its aggres-
sion against a member of this
organization.

The United States strongly supports
the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Chad. We join with Chad in calling for
an immediate end to brutal Libyan
actions against the people of Chad. We
join with those other members of the
United Nations which call for the prompt
withdrawal of Libyan military forces
from Chad and an early end to Libyan
aggression against Chad.

1986.

'USUN press release 158 of Nov. 18,

Libya

anuary 1987

by Larry Pressler

Statement in a plenary session of the
General Assembly on November 19. 1986.
Senator Pressler is a U.S. delegate to the
J, 1st session of the UN General
Assembly.^

The General Assembly is meeting here
this morning at the behest of Libya.
Libya is trying to portray itself as an
innocent victim and to portray the

UNITED NATIONS

United States as having engaged in
unprovoked and unjustified action
against it. Let us look first at these pro-
fessions of innocence. Such a look should
make clear why the United States, after
many years of verbal warnings and
appeals to this body, finally found it
necessary, in accordance with Article 51
of the UN Charter, to act in self-defense
on April 15 and 16 of this year.

Let us turn to this sordid record of
Libyan terrorism and violence. We could
begin in 1969 when Qadhafi came to
power. But let us go back only toward
the end of the last decade. In the wake
of the seizure of our embassy in Tehran,
the LJ.S. Embassy in Tripoli was burned
on December 2, 1979. The United States
suspended most diplomatic activities, but
a small embassy staff remained. The
attack on our embassy was followed by
similar attacks on the French Embassy
in Tripoli in early 1980, which led to the
closing of our embassy on February 15.

The record of Libya's readiness to
carry its terrorist campaign to other
countries was similarly established early
on. Already in February 1979, Libya had
used civilian aircraft to send troops to
assist Uganda's dictator, Idi Amin. By
1981 Libya had begun its campaign of
assassination attempts and interference
against Chad. In October 1981, the
planned assassination of Hussein Habre
during a visit to the Sudan failed when
Libyans sent to conduct the operation
surrendered to Sudanese authorities. In
July 1983, Libyan forces invaded and
occupied parts of Chad for the second
time.

The Libyans started attacks on air-
line passengers, airports, and civilian
transport in 1981. In February a Libyan
gunman opened fire on passengers arriv-
ing on a flight from Algiers at Rome's
airport, targeting a prominent anti-
Qadhafi exile. In October two bombs
exploded in luggage being unloaded from
a plane arriving in Egypt from Libya. In
April 1984, a bomb hidden in an
unclaimed suitcase unloaded from a
Libyan airliner exploded at London's
Heathrow Airport, injuring 25 innocent
civilians.

Another aspect of Qadhafi's world-
wide terrorist campaign which started in
the early 1980s has been assassinations
of his opponents living abroad. In
October 1980, a graduate student was
shot and seriously wounded in Colorado;
the following July another anti-Qadhafi
student was killed in Ogden, Utah.
Throughout 1982 and 1983, Libyan
students studying in Europe were
harassed and their lives threatened. In
March 1984, four bombs exploded in

London and Manchester near the homes
and businesses of Libyan exiles; over 25
people were injured.

The year 1984 was a particularly
bloody one as Qadhafi spread his ter-
rorist net throughout Europe and the
Mediterranean. In March a mob burned
the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli, while
Libyan authorities stood by and took no
action. In April shots were fired from
the offices of the Libyan People's
Bureau in London, killing a British
policewoman. When the British Govern-
ment closed the bureau and severed
diplomatic relations, the Libyans
arrested a number of British subjects in
Tripoli on trumped-up charges and held
them hostage in an effort to pressure the
British Government not to prosecute
those arrested in London.

By mid-1984 Qadhafi's terrorist cam-
paign entered high gear. In June the
official Libyan news agency, Jana,
announced that the "Libyan masses have
decided to form suicide commandos to
chase traitors and stray dogs wherever
they are and liquidate them physically."
The same month the anti-Qadhafi Libyan
editor of an Arab newspaper in Athens
was killed by two men on a motorbike.
Three months later, a Libyan exile was
found gagged and strangled in his hotel
room in Rome. That summer 19 ships
were damaged by mines which exploded
in the Red Sea. These mines were gener-
ally accepted to have been laid by a
Libyan vessel. In September the Libyans
were again implicated in a plot to
assassinate Chad's President Hussein
Habre using a briefcase bomb. In
November Egypt's President Mubarak
announced that four assassins who had
been sent to Egypt by Qadhafi to kill
former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush
were arrested. Pictures were sent to the
Libyan People's Bureau in Malta show-
ing Bakoush apparently dead. Official
Libyan press sources then claimed that
Bakoush had been executed by suicide
squads sent abroad to liquidate enemies
of the revolution. Qadhafi's intentions
were clearly on record, although his
thugs fortunately were unable to
accomplish their mission.

Libya's terrorist campaign continued
unabated during 1985. In a speech on
March 31, Qadhafi urged that "our task
here in this command is to see to it that
individual suicidal operations are
transformed into an organized action
which will bear fruit, defeat the enemy,
and liberate the nation ... we want
everyone of us to say: I have decided to
die just to spite America, because this
decision is one that America cannot
veto."

Who have been the victims? In
February it was the former Libyan
Ambassador to Austria who had
resigned in protest against the regim
5 years earlier. In March it was a Lib
jeweler in Rome; in April a Libyan
businessman in Nicosia, a Libyan stu-
dent, and a Moroccan citizen resident
West Germany. In September it was"
postal workers in Tunis injured by let
bombs smuggled into Tunisia by a
Libyan diplomat. The incident caused
Tunisia to sever diplomatic relations.
That same summer my government
expelled a Libyan diplomat here at th
United Nations whom we had found t
be involved in a plot against Libyan o
ponents of the Qadhafi regime living
the United States.

The year 1985 ended with the hor
rendous terrorist attacks at the airpo
in Rome and Vienna on December 27
Twenty people were killed, including
four terrorists. More than 110 people
were wounded. Five of the dead were
Americans, including a teenage girl.
Libya was deeply involved in support
the Abu Nidal group which coordinati
and carried out these terrorist attack
Libyan complicity was clear. Tunisian
officials reported that the Qadhafi
regime was in possession of two Tuni
sian passports which had been used b
the terrorists. Those passports could
only have come into their possession
with the deliberate connivance of the
Libyan authorities.

We now come to 1986. Qadhafi's
determination to spread death and
destruction has led to further atrociti'
The pattern of interference by force i
the affairs of other African states has
continued. On February 10 Libyan-
backed rebels attacked Chadian force:
southern Chad, and on February 17 a
Libyan bomber attacked the airfield a
N'Djamena. While Libya denied any
involvement in the fighting, the Chad
Government I'eported the Libyans we;
among those who were taken prisoner
Alongside these events, Qadhafi's
speeches were full of hate and violeno
On March 5, he announced that "any
person who left Libya is now in the
hostile ranks on America's side. He is
finished. He will receive no mercy or
compassion at home or abroad. All
traces of him should be wiped out. Ev(
his house should not remain." On Apri
3, a bomb ripped through a West Berli
discotheque frequented by American
troops, killing an American servicemai
and a Turkish woman and injuring mo
than 230 people, about one-fourth of
them Americans. A second soldier die(
of his wounds in June. The irrefutable

ite

Department of State Bulle'

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

nee pointed clearly to the involve-
of the Libyan People's Bureau in
Berlin.
, will not repeat here the long list of
il warnings and diplomatic efforts
igh this organization by which we
ht to dissuade Libya from its cani-
1 of terrorism. They are a matter of
c record in the documents of the
ed Nations and are available to all
u.

t was in these circumstances that
nally acted in self-defense. On
1 14, President Reagan authorized
ns against centers of terrorist plan-
in Libya in response to repeated
irist attacks against U.S. persons
Droperty mounted under Libyan
ices. This step was taken with great
tance: after repeated warnings;
conclusive evidence that the
lafi government continued to
ve itself in support and control of
■rist actions against U.S. targets;
ifter conspicuous surveillance of
rican installations and personnel
)ther similar actions by Libyans
jfi pointed to further terrorism. Our
fes were limited to terrorist facilities
iliiilitary assets which support
I afi's attacks on us. As the Presi-
1 stated at the time: "The attacks
- concentrated and carefully tar-

i to minimize casualties among the
! in ))eople, with whom we have no
11 -el."

!'hat night, the President, describing
if nonstrous brutality of Qadhafi's
i I of terror, laid out the following
3 lard of proof: "The evidence is now
)i lusive that the terrorist bombing of
a Bile discotheque was planned and
0 uted under the direct orders of the
il an regime. On March 25, more than
V ek before the attack, orders were
'I from Tripoli to the Libyan People's
i-au in East Berlin to conduct a ter-
M t attack against Americans to cause
liimum and indiscriminate casualties.

a's agents then planted the bomb.
; vpril 4, the People's Bureau alerted
roll that the attack would be carried
a:he following morning. The next day,
1' reported back to Tripoli on the
r t success of their mission. Our evi-
e'e is direct; it is precise; it is
•I'utable."

Our evidence is sound. Those
H'ged by their governments with deal-
* n this kind of evidence recognize it
-uii. The Government of the Federal
■ ublic of Germany has announced that
IS independent confirmation of the
ail involvement in the LaBelle
Ijinij. The members of the Tokyo
loniic summit and the European

Secretary Visits
Earthquake Site in El Salvador

Secretary Shultz (shown here with Presi-
dent Jose Napoleon Duarte) went to San
Salvador October 16, 1986, to assess the
damage and express the concern of
President Reagan and the American peo-
ple as a result of an earthquake a week
earlier. This disaster resulted in nearly
1,000 deaths, some 21,000 injured, and
left about 250,000 people homeless.
Replacement costs for structures is
expected to exceed $1 billion. The U.S.
Agency for International Development
(AID) provided over $2 million for the
relief phase in the form of food, medical
supplies, temporary shelters, and search-
and-rescue equipment. Congress
authorized AID to provide another $50
million for the initial rehabilitation and
reconstruction phase. The U.S. Embassy
in San Salvador suffered extensive
damage but there were no casualties. ■ "*

Community have declared that they can-
not have normal relations with a state
which supports terrorism, specifically
citing Libya as one such state.

The question which many countries
have asked is whether the U.S. response
was proportionate; was it in accord with
international law? The answer is yes on
both counts. President Reagan has said;
"When our citizens are abused or
attacked anywhere in the world on the
direct orders of a hostile regime, we will
respond so long as I'm in this Oval
Office. Self-defense is not only our right,
it is our duty. It is the purpose behind
the mission. . .fully consistent with Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter," which
recognized the "inherent right of. . .self-
defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United
Nations. ..."

The U.S. action was taken to reduce
Libya's ability to continue to commit
unlawful aggression through terrorist
force against the United States and its
nationals. The U.S. action was not blind
retaliation or the seeking of retribution.
No. The U.S. actions were designed only
to prevent fui'ther attacks.

Unfortunately, while responsible
governments have sought to isolate and
contain Libya's terrorist virus, Libyan
violence has continued. On April 17 four
rocket-propelled grenades were fired at
the British Ambassador's residence in
Beirut. A Libyan-affiliated group, Omar

Al Mukhtar, claimed responsibility. On
the same day, one American and two
British hostages were murdered in
Beirut, allegedly in reprisal for the air
strikes on Libya. The next day four
Libyans, including members of the
Libyan People's Bureau, were arrested
by Turkish authorities in Ankara for
attempting to attack a U.S. Officers'
Club.

Many of you were present at the
nonaligned summit meeting in Harare
this September. Qadhafi used that
rostrum to challenge the principles of
this organization, to divide us into
hostile camps, and to champion the cause
of terrorism. He said; "I promise you
from this rostrum that from now on I
will, with all my capabilities, divide this
world into two camps— the liberation
camp and the imperialist camp. . .
everything must be liberated ... all the
French-speaking states . . . are not
independent and are a fifth column
inside this movement. . .the word com-
monwealth is very embarrassing. . .it
means that you are properties of Brit-
ain. . .it is something shameful."

Two weeks later he equated ter-
rorism with wars of liberation and
revolution.

I have presented here today the
record of the Qadhafi regime. The proof
of Qadhafi's moral bankruptcy is before
you. I ask you: What is the source of
Libya's moral authority to appear before
this Assembly? What is the basis of its

luary 1987

TREATIES

claim to be the exponent of international
law and respect for the principles of the
UN Charter? It is the height of hypocrisy
for Libya to present a draft resolution^
to the General Assembly which reaffirms
"the obligation of all states to refrain
from the use or threat of use of force in
their international relations" and "the
inalienable right of all peoples ... to
choose their political, social and
economic system without any inter-
ference, subversion, coercion or con-
straint of any kind whatsoever."

With all this Libya-inspired activity,
it is hardly surprising that Qadhafi's
regime increasingly is shunned globally
by governments which abide by a sense
of principled adherence to interna-
tionally acceptable norms of behavior.
My delegation did not ask for this
debate. But now that it has taken place,
we hope it will be the occasion for every
country represented here to make clear
its opposition to Libyan terrorism and to
dissociate itself from Libya's aggressive
rhetoric and reprehensible actions. The
American people, as well as all those
around the world who have been the vic-
tims of or who fear Libyan terrorism,
will be watching what this body says and
does on this hypocritical complaint from
a regime that deserves the contempt of
the international community.

'USUN press release 159 of Nov. 19.
1986.

2 On Nov. 20, the UN General Assembly
adopted a resolution condemning the United
States for its air attack on terrorist targets in
Libya. The vote was 79 for 28 (U.S.) against,
with 33 abstentions and 19 absent. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Canberra
July 24, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 30,
1962. TIAS 5094.

Adopted at Buenos Aires July 28, 1962.
Entered into force .Jan. 11, 1963, TIAS 5274.

Adopted at Brussels June 2-13, 1964.
Entered into force July 27, 1966, Sept. 1,
1966, Dec. 22, 1978. and Nov. 1, 1982. TIAS
50.58, 10485.

Adopted at Santiago Nov. 18, 1966. Entered
into force (except for Rec. IV- 12) Oct. 30,
1968, and Nov.l, 1982. TIAS 6668.

Adopted at Paris Nov. 29, 1968. Entered into
force May 26, 1972, July 31, 1972, and Nov.
1, 1982. TIAS 7692.

Adopted at Tokyo Oct. 30, 1970. Entered into
force (except for Recs. VI-8 and 10) Oct. 10,
1973, and Nov. 1, 1982.

Adopted at Wellington Nov. 10, 1972.
Entered into force (except for Rec. VII-5)
May 29, 1975, and June 24, 1981. TIAS 8500.

Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975. Entered into
force Dec. 16, 1978, Sept. 1, 1980, Nov. 1,
1982, and Jan. 26, 1984. TIAS 10486.

Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into
force Sept. 8, 1983. TIAS 10735.
Notification of approval: Brazil, Oct. 27. 1986.

Arbitration

Inter-American convention on international

commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City

Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 16,

1976.'

Instrument of ratification signed by

President: Nov. 10, 1986.^

Aviation

International air services transit agreement.
Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Jan. 20, 1945; for the U.S. Feb. 8, 1945.
EAS 487; 59 Stat. 1693.
Notice of denimciation: Canada, Nov. 12,
1986, effective Nov. 12. 1987.

Convention on offenses and certain other acts
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo
Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4,
1969. TIAS 6768.
Accession deposited: Brunei, May 23, 1986.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful

seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec.

16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971.

TIAS 7192.

Accession deposited: Madagascar, Nov. 18,

1986^

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Madagascar, Nov. 18,
1986^

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production, and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons
and on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS
8062.

Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, Nov. 18,
1986.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1983, with
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983;
definitively Sept. 11, 1985.
Ratification deposited: Greece. Sept. 19,
1986.

Conservation

Convention on wetlands of international
. importance especially as waterfowl habitat.
Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into
force Dec. 21, 1975.'

Protocol to the convention on wetlands of
international importance especially as wai
fowl habitat of Feb. 2. 1971. Adopted at I
Dec. 2, 1982.3
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi

dent: Nov. 10, 1986.

Fisheries

Convention for the conservation of salmoi

the North Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjj

Mar. 2. 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1

TIAS 10789.

Ratification deposited: Sweden, May 17,

1984.

Accession deposited: U.S.S.R. Sept. 11. 1

Protocol to amend the international eonvs
tion of May 14. 1966, for the conservatior
Atlantic tiinas (TIAS 6767). Done at Parii
July 10, 1984.3
Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 10. 198'

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and politic

rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966.

Entered into force Mar. 23. 1976. 999 U>

111.'

Ratification deposited: Philippines. Oct. 2

1986.''

Judicial Procedure

Inter-American convention on letters
rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, \
Entered into force Jan. 16. 1976.'

Additional protocol to the Inter-Americai
convention on letters rogatory, with anne
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entere
into force June 14, 1980.'

Instrument of ratification signed by Pres
dent: Nov. 10, 1986.'

Convention on the civil aspects of interna

tional child abduction. Done at The HagU'

Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,

1983.'

Instrument of ratification signed by Pres;

denlTNovriO, 1986.2

Signature: Australia, Oct. 29, 1986.

Ratifications deposited: Australia, Oct. 2S

1986;5 Luxembourg, Oct. 9, 1986.

Marine Pollution

Convention for the protection and develo]
ment of the marine environment of the w
Caribbean region, with annex. Done at C;
tagena Mar. 24, 1983.="

Protocol concerning cooperation in combj

ting oil spills in the wider Caribbean regit

with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24,

1983.3

Accession deposited: Trinidad & Tobago,

24, 1986.

Ratifications deposited: France, Nov. 13,

1985;2 U.K., Feb. 28, 1986."^

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the international convent
on load lines. 1966 (TIAS 6629. 6720).
Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1983. ^
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 14, 1'.5

Department of State Bui:

ear Accidents

ention on early notification of a nuclear
ent. Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986.
red into force Oct. 27. 1986.'

.tures: India, Deni. People's Rep. of
a, Luxembourg, Sept. 29, 1986; Jordan,

Paraguay, Oct. 2, 1986; Zaire, Sept. 30,

ention on assistance in the case of a
fax accident or radiological emergency.
I at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. »
itures: India, Dem. People's Rep. of
a, Jordan, Mali, Paraguay, Oct. 2, 1986;
!, Sept. 30. 1986.

ear Test Ban

ty banning nuclear weapon tests in the
sphere, in outer space, and under water.

at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963. Entered into

Oct. 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
'ication deposited: Argentina, Nov. 21,

lear Weapons — Nonproliferation

ty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
ions. Done at Washington, London, and

ow Julv 1, 1968. Entered into force

5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
'ication deposited: Trinidad & Tobago,

80, 1986.

^Ilite Communications Systems

'4 ention on the International Maritime
a lite Organization (INMARSAT), with

\ Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.

i.d into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
I ssion deposited: Indonesia, Oct. 9, 1986.^

! aling agreement on the International
: time Satellite Organization (INMAR-
I. with annex. Done at London Sept. 3,
i;iitered into force July 16, 1979, TIAS

, ;iture: Indonesia, Oct. 9, 1986.

r ty on principles governing the activities
f ates in the exploration and use of outer
including the Moon and other celestial
Done at Washington. London, and
. >>i\ Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into force
111. 1967. TIAS 6347.
!i' ation deposited: Sri Lanka. Nov. 18.

<i ar

riiational sugar agreement, 1984, with
\is. Done at Geneva July 5, 1984.
■v>'i\ into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1985;
iitively Apr. 4, 1985.'
I fication deposited: Panama, Oct. 29,

F( 'communications

) national telecommunication convention,
innexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi
'i, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984;

aitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986.

il'irations deposited: Cyprus, Aug. 22,

> fiia. Aug. 26, 1986; Rwanda, Sept. 5,
i<-. Sri Lanka, Sept. 1, 1986.

Trade

United Nations convention on contracts for
the international sale of goods. Done at
Vienna Apr. 11, 1980.^
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi-
dent: Nov. 10, 1986.^

Protocol extending the arrangement of Dec.
20, 1973, (TIAS 7840) regarding international
trade in textiles. Done at Geneva July 31,
1986. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986; for the
U.S. Aug. 5, 1986.

Acceptances deposited: Austria, Sept. 16,
1986; Indonesia, Sept. 30, 1986; Korea, Oct,
9, 1986; Malaysia, Oct. 29, 1986; Norway,
Oct. 27, 1986; Sweden, Sept. 20, 1986;
Thailand, Oct. 16, 1986.

UN Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO)

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, with annexes.
Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into
force June 21, 1985.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, Nov. 13, 1986.

Women

Convention on the political rights of women.
Done at New York Mar. 31. 1953. Entered
into force July 5, 1954; for the U.S. July 7,
1976. TIAS 8289.

Accessions deposited: Angola, Sept. 17, 1986;
Colombia, Aug. 5, 1986.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement on aviation security. Signed at
Ottawa Nov. 21, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 21, 1986.

Agreement concerning the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste. Signed at
Ottawa Oct. 28, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 8, 1986.

China

Agreement for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of tax evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with protocol and
exchange of notes. Signed at Beijing Apr. 30,
1984.

Protocol concerning the interpretation of
paragraph 7 of the protocol to the agreement
for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of tax evasion with respect to
taxes on income of Apr. 30. 1984. Signed at
Beijing May 10. 1986.
Entered into force: Nov. 21, 1986.

Agreement amending and extending the pro-
tocol of Oct. 17, 1981 (TIAS 10287), on^
cooperation in nuclear safety matters. Signed
at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. Entered into force
Sept. 26, 1986; effective Oct. 17, 1986.

Denmark

Technical schedule setting forth defense areas
pursuant to article 11(3) of agreement of Apr.
27, 1951, (TIAS 2292) concerning the defense
of Greenland. Effected by exchange of notes
at Copenhagen Sept. 30, 1986. Entered into
force Sept. 30, 1986.

TREATIES

Egypt

Grant agreement for commodity imports.
Signed at Cairo Aug. 21, 1986. Entered into
force Aug. 21, 1986.

Grant agreement for cash transfer. Signed at
Cairo Aug. 27, 1986. Entered into force Aug.
27, 1986.

Sixth agreement to the program grant agree-
ment of Aug. 29, 1982, (TIAS 10472), as
amended, for decentralization sector support.
Signed at Cairo June 19, 1986. Entered into
force June 19, 1986.

Agreement amending agreement of Nov. 12,
1985, for the sale of agricultural commodities.
Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Sept.
21, 1986. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1986.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Jan. 11. 1981, (TIAS 10066) relating to
cooperation in science and technology. Signed
at Cairo Nov. 9, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 9, 1986; effective Jan. 11, 1986.

EI Salvador

Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 20,
1985, for the sale of agricultural commodities.
Effected by exchange of notes at San
Salvador .June 27, 1986.
Entered into force: Sept. 26, 1986.

Greece

Defense industrial cooperation agreement,
with annexes and exchange of letters. Signed
at Athens Nov. 10, 1986. Entered into force
Nov. 10, 1986.

Guinea-Bissau

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
International Military Education and Training
(IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bissau Sept. 10 and Oct. 16, 1986.
Entered into force Oct. 16, 1986.

Israel

Grant agreement to assist in balance-of-
payments financing and budget support to
promote economic and political stability.
Signed at Washington Sept. 29, 1986.
Entered into force Sept. 29, 1986.

Jamaica

Agreement amending the agreement of
Jan. 15, 1986, as amended, for sale of
agricultural commodities. Effected by
exchange of notes at Kingston Sept. 24 and
Oct. 8. 1986. Entered into force Oct. 8, 1986.

Korea

Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 22, 1976, as e.xtended (TIAS 8456,
10295), relating to scientific and technical
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Nov. 4 and 6, 1986. Entered into
force Nov. 6, 1986.

Agreement on mutual customs service
assistance. Signed at Washington Nov. 3,
1986. Enters into force 90 days after the par-
ties have notified each other that all
necessary requirements for entry into force
have been met.

luary 1987

PRESS RELEASES

Malaysia

Agreement amending agreement of July 1
and 11, 1985, as amended, relating to trade in
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and
textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Kuala Lumpur Oct. 14 and 25, 1986.
Entered into force Oct. 25, 1986.

Mexico

Agreement of cooperation regarding the
transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes
and hazardous substances. Signed at Wash-
ington Nov. 12, 1986. Enters into force upon
exchange of notes stating that each party has
completed its necessary internal procedures.

Norway

Memorandum of understanding on the
exchange of officers between the U.S. Marine
Corps and the Norwegian Army. Signed at
Oslo and Washington May 21 and July 3,
1986. Entered into force July 3, 1986'.

Pakistan

Fifth amendatory agreement to the agree-
ment of Apr. 13, 1982, (TIAS 10378) for
agricultural commodities and equipment.
Signed at Islamabad Sept. 25, 1986. Entered
into force Sept. 25, 1986.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended and extended
(TIAS 8528, 10531, 10532, 10696), concerning
fisheries off the coasts of the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 16 and June 17, 1986.
Entered into force: Oct. 31, 1986.

Agreement modifying the agreement of July
30, 1984, concerning diplomatic and other
visas. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Oct. 31, 1986. Entered into force
Oct. 31, 1986.

Agreement relating to immunity of family
members of consular officers and employees
from criminal jurisdiction. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 31,
1986. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1986.

United Kingdom

Agreement in the field of radioactive waste
management technology. Signed at London
Oct. 30, 1986. Entered into force Oct. 30,
1986.

Uruguay

Agreement concerning cooperation in
highway technology. Signed at Washington
June 18, 1986. Entered into force June 18,
1986.

'Not in force for U.S.

^With reservation(s).

^Not in force.

"With declaration(s).

^Extends to legal system applicable only
in Australian States mainland Territories.

•^Extended to Cayman Islands and Turks
and Caicos Islands.

'In force provisionally for U.S. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Date

*236 11/3

•237 11/3

238 11/3

239 11/3

240 11/4

•241 11/4

•242 11/5

243 11/6

.Sul>]ect

Shultz, Perkins: remarks at
swearing-in ceremony of
LI.S. Ambassador to South
Africa Edward Perkins.

Edward Joseph Perkins
sworn in as Ambassador to
South Africa (biographic
data).

Shultz: address and question-
and-answer session before
the World Affairs Council,
Los Angeles, Oct. 31.

Shultz: address and question-
and-answer session before
the Commonwealth Club,
San Francisco, Oct. 31.

Shultz: address before the
Locust Club, Philadelphia,
Nov. 3.

James Daniel Phillips sworn
in as Ambassador to
Burundi (biographic data).

Elinor G. Constable sworn in
as Ambassador to Kenya
(biographic data).

Shultz; news conference,
Vienna.

USUN

Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.

Subject

Reed: trade and develop-
ment. Committee II.

Wrobleski: narcotics,
ECOSOC.

Fleming: population,
ECOSOC

Byrne: social development.
Committee II.

Byrne: TTPI, Trusteeship
Council.

Reagan: women, ECOSOC.

Chacon: American Samoa,
Decolonization Committee.

Byrne: trusteeship peti-
tioners. Trusteeship
Council.

Walters: TTPI, Trusteeship
Council.

Bader: Guam, Decolonization
Committee.

Walters: human rights, Com-
mittee II.

No,

Date

5/5

5/7

5/8

5/9

.5/12

5/13

5/15

•46

5/15

•47 5/16
•48 .5/16
•49 5/19

244 11/7

•245 11/7

•246 11/7

•247 11/7

•248 11/12

249 11/12

2.50 11/18

251 11/16

•252 11/24

2.53 11/26

2.54 11/24

Shultz: address before th
CSCE review meeting,
Vienna, Nov. 5.

Shultz: remarks at a rece
tion for nongovernmen
organizations, Vienna,
Nov. 5.

Armacost: remarks made
the return of former
hostage David Jacobsei

James Wilson Rawlings
sworn in as Ambassadc
Zimbabwe, Nov. 6
(biographic data).

Shultz, Cerezo: remarks
following meeting,
Guatemala City, Nov. ]

Shultz: address before th
OAS General Assemblj
Guatemala City, Nov. ]

Shultz: address and quest
and-answer session bef
the International HouS'
Chicago and The Chica,
Sun-Times forum, Chic
Nov. 17.

Shultz: interview on "Fai
the Nation."

U.S. Government and pri
sector support ITU Cei
for Telecommunication
Development.

Shultz: remarks at AID's
25th anniversary recep
tion, Nov. 25.

Shultz, Clark: news con-
ference, Ottawa, Nov. :

•Not printed in the Bulletin.

*50 5/22 Reed: remarks to press
before UNGA Special S
sion on the Critical
Economic Situation in
Africa.

•51 5/22 Okun: South Africa, Secu
Council.

•52 5/23 Okun: South Africa raids
Botswana, Security
Council.

•53 5/23 Barthelemy: disarmamenl
Disarmament Commiss

•54 5/23 Byrne: South Africa, Sect
rity Council.

•55 5/23 Byrne: South Africa, Sect
rity Council.

•56 5/27 Brookner: U.S. Virgin

Islands, Decolonization
Committee.

*57 5/27 White House statement 01
opening of UNGA Spec:
Session on the Critical
Economic Situation in
Africa.
58 5/28 Shultz: statement to the
UNGA Special Session i
the Critical Economic
Situation in Africa.

Department of State Bulki

PRESS RELEASES

9/16

9/20

9/22

9/23

10/1

10/6

10/9

100

10/7

5/28 U.S. delegation to the UNGA *87 8/14

Special Session on the

Critical Economic Situa-
tion in Africa, May 27-31. '88 9/11
5/28 Shultz; remarks at reception

in honor of U.S. delegation

to the special session.
5/29 Announcement by the U.S.

African Development

Foundation on signing an

agreement of cooperation

with the African Develop-
ment Bank.
6/1 McPherson: statement to

UNGA Special Session on

the Critical Economic

Situation in Africa.
6/4 Byrne: trusteeship.

Trusteeship Council.
6/4 Lowell: space. Committee on

the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space.
6/4 Eskin: space. Committee on

the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space.
6/5 Eskin: space. Committee on

the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space.
6/9 Morrison: space. Committee

on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space.
6/10 Borek: space. Committee on

the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space.
6/11 Eskin: space, Committee on

the Peaceful Uses of Outer ' 101 10/9

Space.
6/13 Okun: South Africa, Security

Council.
6/16 Okun: South Africa, Security

Coimcil.
6/18 Okun: South Africa, Secu-
rity Council.
6/25 Hottelet: information. Com-
mittee on Information.
6/25 Hottelet: information. Com-
mittee on Information.
7/1 Byrne: trusteeship.

Trusteeship Council.
7/1 Walters: Nicaragua, Security

Council.
7/2 Walters: Nicaragua, Security

Council.
7/3 Immerman: Nicaragua,

Security Council.
7/7 Jarrett: information. Com-
mittee on Information.
7/10 Walters: ECOSOC summer

session, Geneva, July 8.
7/15 Orlando: transnational cor-
porations, ECOSOC, '111 10/15

Geneva, July 4.
7/18 Byrne: UNIFIL, Security

Council. 112 10/15

7/29 Walters: Nicaragua, Security

Council.
7/30 Walters: Nicaragua, Security *113 10/15

Council.
7/31 Walters: Libya, Nicaragua, '114 10/16

Security Council.
7/31 Walters: Nicaragua, Security

Council. *115 10/17

102

10/8

103

10/9

104

10/9

105

10/10

106

10/10

107

10/13

108

10/13

109

10/13

110

10/15

USUN statement after vote

on Puerto Rico in

Decolonization Committee.
Byrne: meeting of donors of

humanitarian assistance to

the Kampuchean people.
Immerman: Libya, General

Committee.
Norris: external debt crisis

and development. General

Committee.
Walters: Namibia, UNGA

special session.
Reagan: address before 41st

session of the UN General

Assembly.
Walters: UNIFIL, Security

Council.
Reed: Angola, UN General

Assembly.
Reed: auditors' report. Com-
mittee V.
Taylor: Cuba; UN General

Assembly.
Reed: economic development.

Committee II.
Taylor: terrorism, Puerto

Rico, SDI, UN General

Assembly.
Shearouse: conferences.

Committee V.
Byrne: multinational com-
panies in non-self-
governing territories.

Committee IV.
U.S. delegation to the 41st

session of the LIN General

Assembly.
Walters: Iran-Iraq war.

Security Council.
Clark: Report on the Effects

of Atomic Radiation,

Special Political

Committee.
Walters: Libya, L'N General

Assembly.
Okun: Nicaragua, LIN

General Assembly.
Walters: reappointment of

the UN Secretary General,

UN General Assembly.
Byrne: apartheid. Committee

III.
Amselem: Vietnam, Commit-
tee III.
Rosenstock: non-use of force.

Committee VI.
Immerman: Israeli nuclear

armament, LIN General

Assembly.
Yost: emergency assistance

to El Salvador, UN

General Assembly.
Walters: administrative and

financial function, UN

General Assembly.
Clark: self-determination,

Committee III.
Clark: peacekeeping opera-
tions. Special Political

Committee.
Reed: food poHcy, Committee

II.

'116 10/16 Byrne: small territories,
Committee IV.

*117 10/17 Rosenstock: strengthening
the role of the organiza-
tion. Committee VI.

*118 10/17 Reed: external debt crisis

and development, Commit-
tee II.

*n9 10/20 Adelman: arms control, Com-
mittee I.
120 10/20 Walters: Cambodia, UN
General Assembly.

*121 10/20 Reed: condolence to people
of Mozambique, LIN
General Assembly.

*122 10/22 Reed: economic situation in
Africa, UN General
Assembly.
123 10/22 Okun: arms control. Commit-
tee I.

•124 10/22 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council.

•125 10/22 Walters: Western Sahara.
Committee IV.

•126 10/23 Byrne: social issues. Commit-
tee III.

•127 10/24 Reed: ECOSOC report. Com-
mittee II.

*128 10/24 Reagan: women. Committee
III.

•129 10/27 Gross: zone of peace and
cooperation in the South
Atlantic, LIN General
Assembly.

•130 10/27 Walters: Central America,
Security Council.

•131 10/28 Walters: Nicaragua, Security
Council.

•132 10/29 Reed: trade and develop-
ment. Committee II.

•133 10/29 Okun: IsraeH attack on Iraqi
nuclear facilities, UN
General Assembly.

♦134 [Not issued.]

*135 10/30 Okun: host country respon-
sibilities. Committee on
Relations with the Host
Country.

•136 10/30 Clark: UNRWA, Special
Political Committee,
137 10/30 Lowitz: chemical weapons.
Committee I.

•138 10/30 Byrne: racial discrimination.
Committee III.

•139 10/31 Wrobleski: drug trafficking.
Committee III.

•140 11/4 Clark: UNRWA, Special
Political Committee,

141 11/3 Okun: ICJ judgment on

Nicaragua, LIN General
Assembly.

142 11/4 Okun: Afghanistaji, UN

General Assembly.
•143 11/5 Byrne: aging and disabled.

Committee III.
•144 11/5 Gross: Law of the Sea, UN

General Assembly.

*Not printed in the Bi'lletin. ■

PUBLICATIONS

Department of State

Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Correspondence Management Division,
Bureau of Public Affairs. Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan

U.S. Initiative to Iran, TV address to the
nation, Nov. 13, 1986 (Current Policy #890).

Secretary Shultz

Human Rights and Soviet-American Rela-
tions, World Affairs Council, Los Angeles,
Oct. 31. 1986 (Current Policy #882).

Reykjavik; A Watershed in U.S. -Soviet Rela-
tions, Commonwealth Club. San Francisco,
Oct. 31, 1986 (Current Policy #883).

Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget, Locust
Club, Philadelphia, Nov. 3, 1986 (Current
Policy #884).

Promoting Inter-American Cooperation, OAS
General Assembly, Guatemala City. Nov.
11, 1986 (Current Policy #891).

Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki, CSCE
review meeting, Vienna. Nov. 5, 1986 (Cur-
rent Policy #892).

Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the
Future of Deterrence, International House
of Chicago and The Chicago Sun-Times
forum, Chicago, Nov. 17, 1986 (Current
Policy #893).

Africa

The Human Rights Dimension in Africa,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Freeman,
World Affairs Council, Philadelphia, Nov.
6, 1986 (Current Policy #888).

Sanctions Against South Africa (GIST, Nov.
1986).

Arms Control

Permitted and Prohibited Activities Under
the ABM Treaty, Ambassador Nitze, Inter-
national Law Weekend Group, New York
City, Oct. 31, 1986 (Current Policy #886).

East Asia

The U.S. Approach to East Asia and the
Pacific, Assistant Secretary Sigur, Pacific
and Asian Affairs Council and the Pacific
Forum conference, Honolulu, Oct. 29, 1986
(Current Policy #895).

Anti-Piracy in Southeast Asia (GIST, Nov.
1986).

Economics

U.S. -EC Relations and the International
Trading System, Under Secretary Wallis,
Society for International Affairs, Luxem-
bourg, Oct. 8, 1986 (Current Policy ;

General

U.S. Foreign PoHcy Achievements and
Challenges, Under Secretary Armacost,
State Department regional foreign policy
conference, Salt Lake City, Oct. 18, 1986
(Current Policy #885).

U.S. Policy Toward the Third World, Under
Secretary Armacost, National Third World
Studies Conference, Omaha, Oct. 17, 1986
(Current Policy #894).

Recent Anti-American Forgeries, Nov. 1986
(Foreign Affairs Note).

Helping Americans to Understand the World:
Some Proposals, Nov. 1986 (Public Infor-
mation Series).

Nuclear Policy

International Prospects for Civil Nuclear
Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era, Assist-
ant Secretary Negroponte, Rotary Club,
Detroit, Nov. 5, 1986 (Current Policy #887).

Refugees

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (GIST, Nov.
1986).

Western Hemisphere

Guatemala's Transition Toward Democracy.
Nov. 1986 (Public Information Series). ■

Current Documents
Volume Released

The Department of State on October 2,
1986, released American Foreign Policy:
Current Dock merits. 198U- The book is
the most recent volume in an ongoing
Department of State series.

Like earlier volumes in the series,
this book represents official public
expressions of policy that best set forth
the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign
policy. Included are the te.xts of major
official messages, addresses, statements,
interviews, press conferences and brief-
ings, reports, congressional testimony,
and communications by the White
House, the Department of State, and
other Federal agencies or officials
involved in the foreign policy process.
The volume contains 1,174 pages
arranged chronologically within 15
geographic and topical chapters, and
includes a list of documents, editorial
annotations, maps, a list of names and
abbreviations, and an index.

The volume covers the fourth year of
the Reagan Administration. It presents
the major statements by President
Reagan, the Secretary of State, and
other government leaders setting forth
the most important general principles of
American foreign policy in 1984. Policy
statements are included on national
security policy, arms control, foreign
economic policy, terrorism, the role of
the United States in the United Nations,
the approach to human rights around the
world, the concern with refugees, and
the law of the sea. The volume also
presents expressions of U.S. policy on
regional and bilateral aspects of
American foreign relations in 1984.

The American Foreign Policy
documentary series began in 1950.
Following the publication of three
volumes covering the 1941 to 1955
years, annual volumes entitled A meri'
Foreign Policy: Curreyit Documents w
issued for the years 1956-1967. After
interruption the series was resumed v
the publication in August 1983 of
American Foreign Policy: Basic
Documents. 1977-1980. The annual
volumes were revived with the public;
tion oi Amei'ican Foreign Policy: Cur
rent Documents, 1981. The 1982 and
1983 annual volumes have also been
published. It is the Department's intei
tion to publish the annual volume for
1985 later this year.

The Department, which released ;
microfiche supplement to the 1981
printed volume in February 1985, alsc
plans to publish microfiche supplemer
to the later printed volumes in the
series. These microfiche publications '
include the full texts of many docume
printed only in part in the printed
volumes and will also reproduce a mui
larger and more complete selection of
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A^nerican Foreign Policy: Currrn
Documents. 1984 was prepared in the
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Superintendent of Documents

Press release 195 of Oct. 2, 1986

Department of State Bullei

^ )EX

uary 1 987
.87, No. 2118

1
„

DieiiBBiiistan. Situation in Afghanistan

:un) 84

ican Principles

ring the Foreign Affairs Budget

ultz) 24

Foreign Policy: Achievements and

illenges (Arnnacost) 61

Control
lar and Space Arms Talks Close Round

(Kampelman, Reagan) 41

lar Weapons, Arms Control, and the

tare of Deterrence (Shultz) 31

itted and Prohibited Activities Under

ABM Treaty (Nitze) 39

ling the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47
itary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
Foreign Policy: Achievements and

' (allenges (Armaeost) 61

.Mnitiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan,

i jitz, Whitehead) 65

' irld Without Nuclear Weapons

(lelman) 35

, a )odia. Situation in Cambodia (Walters,

t t of resolution) 80

h . Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad
(;un) 87

0 Tess. U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese,

1 agan, Shultz, Whitehead) 65

i«irtment & Foreign Service. Secretary

Jaises AID and Comments on Iran ... .23
It loping Countries

h ^ID Challenge 1

'. Policy Toward the Third World

1 rmacost) 56

'.t lomics

"r loting Inter-American Cooperation

^ I lultz) 27

It oring the Foreign Affairs Budget

I mltz) 24

J. -EC Relations and the International

ading System (Wallis) 43

J. Foreign Policy: Achievements and

lallenges (Armaeost) 61

J. -Japan Subcabinet Meets (Wallis) 42

J. Policy Toward the Third World

rmacost) 56

il alvador. Secretary Visits Earthquake

tein El Salvador 89

E rgy. International Prospects for Civil

uclear Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era

legroponte) 75

E ope

M lear Weapons, Arms Control, and the

uture of Deterrence (Shultz) 31

P suing the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47

(tary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
EC Relations and the International

rading System (Wallis) 43

V nna CSCE Followup Meeting 50

.^Vorld Without Nuclear Weapons

\delman) 35

Foreign Assistance

The AID Challenge 1

Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget

(Shultz) 24

Secretary Visits Earthquake Site in El

Salvador 89

U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and

Challenges (Armaeost) 61

Germany. Visit of West German Chancellor

Kohl (Kohl, Reagan, joint statement) ... .54
Guatemala. Promoting Inter- American

Cooperation (Shultz) 27

Human Rights

Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki (Shultz). .47

Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51

Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting 50

International Law. Nicaragua (Okun) ... .82

Iran

Secretary Praises AID and Comments on

Iran 23

U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan,

Shultz, Whitehead) 65

Japan. U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets

(Wallis) 42

Libya

Libya (Pressler) 87

Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad

(Okun) 87

Marshall Islands. U.S. Relationship With

Pacific Islands (Reagan) 78

Micronesia. U.S. Relationship With Pacific

Islands (Reagan) 78

Military Affairs. Permitted and Prohibited

Activities Under the ABM Treaty (Nitze) 39
Narcotics
President Convenes Conference on

Narcotics 74

Promoting Inter- American Cooperation

(Shultz) 27

Nicaragua

Nicaragua (Okun) 82

U.S. Initiative to Iran (Meese, Reagan,

Shultz, Whitehead) 65

Northern Mariana Islands. U.S. Relationship

With Pacific Islands (Reagan) 78

Nuclear Policy

International Prospects for Civil Nuclear

Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era

(Negroponte) 75

U.S. Reconfirms Support for IAEA

(Kennedy) 86

Presidential Documents

American Hostage Released in Beirut 79

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Close Round

Six (Kampelman, Reagan) 41

U.S. Relationship With Pacific Islands 78

Visit of West German Chancellor Kohl (Kohl,

Reagan, joint statement) 54

Publications

Current Documents Volume Released 94

Department of State 94

Syria. U.S. Takes Measures Against Syria

(Wfiite House statement) 79

Terrorism

American Hostage Released in Beirut

(Reagan) 79

Libya (Pressler) 87

Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51
U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and

Challenges (Armaeost) 61

U.S. Supports Council of Europe Resolution

on Terrorism (Department statement) ... 79
U.S. Takes Measures Against Syria (Wfiite

House statement) 79

Trade

U.S. -EC Relations and the International

Trading System (Wallis) 43

U.S. Foreign Policy: Achievements and

Challenges (Armaeost) 61

U.S. -Japan Subcabinet Meets (Wallis) 42

U.S. Policy Toward the Third World

(Armaeost) 56

Treaties. Current Actions 90

U.S.S.R.

International Prospects for Civil Nuclear

Power in the Post-Chernobyl Era

(Negroponte) 75

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Close Round

Six (Kampelman. Reagan) 41

Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the

Future of Deterrence (Shultz) 31

Secretary's News Conference in Vienna . . .51

Situation in Afghanistan (Okun) 84

A World Without Nuclear Weapons

(Adelman) 35

United Nations

Libya (Pressler) 87

Libyan Occupation of Northern Chad

(Okun) 87

Nicaragua (Okun) 82

Situation in Afghanistan (Okun) 84

Situation in Cambodia (Walters, text of

resolution) 80

U.S. Reconfirms Support for IAEA

(Kennedy) 86

Vietnam. Situation in Cambodia (Walters,

text of resolution) 80

Western Hemisphere. Promoting Inter-
American Cooperation (Shultz) 27

Name Index

Adelman, Kenneth L 35

Armaeost, Michael H 56, 61

Kampelman, Max M 41

Kennedy, Richard T 86

Kohl, Helmut 54

Meese, Edwin III 65

Negroponte, John D 75

Nitze, Paul H 39

Okun, Herbert S 82, 84, 87

Pressler, Larry 87

Reagan, President 41, 54, 65, 78, 79

Shultz, Secretary . . .23, 24, 27, 31, 47, 51, 65

Wallis, W. Allen 42, 43

Walters, Vernon A 80

Whitehead, John C 65

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Department

.3-

buUetBn

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/Volume 87/Number 2119

February 1987

Afghanist

%n/22 ^M
Cuba/62
Terrorism/70

Departntpnt of State

bulletin

Volumes/ / Number 21 19 / February 1987

Cover: Afghan refugees.

(British Information Services)

The Department of State Bulletin,
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PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

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CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 Afghanistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupation
{Craig Karp)

Secretary

2 1 Iran and U.S. Policy
3 Interview on "Worldnet"
Southern Africa: American
Hopes for the Future

kfca

0 South Africa: Toward Peace and
Stability {Chester A. Crocker)

2 The Human Rights Dimension in
Africa (C/(ar/c.s \V. Freeman)

^iiada

Secretary Visits Canada {Joseph
Clark. Secretary Shultz)

)< )artment

17 Secretary and Marine

jU, Commandant Sign Memoran-

■- dum of Understanding

Ei ;t Asia

China Policy Today: Consensus,

Consistence, and Stability

{Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.)
Vitality and Possibility on the

Pacific Rim

{Ga.ston J. Sigur, Jr.)
The U.S. Approach to East Asia

and the Pacific

{Gaston J. Sigur. Jr.)

Europe

57 NATO Defense Planning Com-

mittee Meets in Brussels
{Final Connnunique)

58 29th Report on Cyprus {Message

to the Cong7-ess)

59 Secretary's Joint News Con-

ference After Meeting
With EC Ministers {James A.
Baker III. Willy De Clercq.
Jacques Delors, Secretary
Shultz, Clayton Yeutte?')

Human Rights

62 Human Rights in Castro's Cuba
67 Human Rights Progi'ess in 1986
{Richard Schifter)

Oceans

Navigation Rights and the Gulf
of Sidra

Terrorism

Terrorism: The Challenge and

the Response

{John C. Whitehead)
Syrian Support for International

Terrorism: 1983-86 {Fart

Paper. Chronology)

United Nations

77 UN Administration and

Finances (yer7i0Wi4. Walters)

Western Hemisphere

78 Visit of Haiti President Namphy
tH7(/7(' House Statement)

78 Expanding Freedom: A For-
mula for Growth in the
Americas {Elliott Ahrams.
PaulD. Taylor)

84 Guatemala's Transition Toward
Democracy

Treaties

Current Actions

Press Releases

89 Department of State

Publications

89 Department of State

90 Exjjanded Chiefs of Mission

Volume Released
90 Background Notes

Index

."•i OiTi

'"T^E^Bsmms

^'^ITGfiY

National capital
a Gasdeld
^ Airlield
y//// Refugee areas

50 100

150 200 Kilometers

100 150 200 Miles

FEATURE

Afghanistan

Afghanistan:

Seven Years

of Soviet Occupation

'ollowing report was prepared by
qKarp, Afghanistan analyst, with
■ssistance of other analysts in the
au of Intelligence and Research and
■rtment officials. It is part of an
lal series of Special Reports on the
Uion in Afghanistan.

Summary

The war in Afghanistan remains a stand-
off, but miHtary activity has increased on
both sides. Combat was more diffuse and
unpredictable. During the past year, the
mujahidin brought the war increasingly
to Afghanistan's major cities, particu-
larly the capital, Kabul, and north of the
Hindu Kush mountain range.

Afghan resistance activities were
widespread, with operations in nearly all
parts of the country. The mujahidin con-
tinue to improve their arms and training
and to develop more effective forms of
cooperation and coordination. They
demonstrated an improved capability to
blunt Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) and Soviet opera-
tions, and they made major advances in
air defense with the increasing use of
surface-to-air missiles. Resistance
alliance spokesmen brought their cause
to several countries, including the
United States, and to Islamic and inter-
national organizations.

Soviet military forces focused more
on small-unit operations and air attacks
and no longer relied on massive valley
sweep operations. Efforts to strengthen
their allies in the DRA came to nought;
the regime's forces remain largely
crippled by low morale, desertion, and
intraparty factionalism. Instead of risk-
ing the lives of Soviet troops, the Soviet
40th Army used more firepower, from
both artillery and aircraft, sometimes
with devastating effect.

Politically, the Soviets have adopted
a public posture designed to suggest
greater flexibility than heretofore, focus-
ing on their willingness to withdraw but
insisting on too long a timeframe. In
July 1986, at Vladivostok, Soviet leader
Gorbachev promised to withdraw six
regiments from Afghanistan in order to
provide a "stimulus" for a political set-
tlement. In fact, two of the six
regiments (and part of a third) that were

withdrawn in October had arrived in
Afghanistan after the Vladivostok
speech. The newly introduced units were
the only relevant combat units in the
withdrawal plan. To avoid even a minor
degradation of their military position,
the Soviets apparently brought in these
units solely for the purpose of withdraw-
ing them.

In Kabul, Babrak Karmal was
replaced as Soviet-backed ruler of
Afghanistan by the former head of the
.secret police, Najibullah. The switch in
party leadership, in May, was the most
important change in the Kabul regime
since 1979.

In November, Karmal lost his last
senior post as ceremonial head of state.
He was replaced by a nonparty member
as part of the regime's campaign to sug-
gest a broadened base. Karmal's ouster
and purges of his followers led to com-
plicated factional differences within the
ruling People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA).

The Soviet occupation has
devastated the countryside. Although
refugee outflow is reduced, the new
refugees appear to have suffered more
than those who left earlier. The Soviets
have stepped up reprisal attacks on
civilians. The Kabul regime has con-
sistently violated the human rights of
Afghan citizens through indiscriminate
imprisonment, torture, and other abuses.
The Kabul regime and the Soviets have
been condemned for these abuses by
independent international organizations
and the UN Human Rights Commission.

Pakistan remains stalwart in its sup-
port of the Afghan people, despite a
stepped-up Soviet/DRA campaign of
sabotage and subversion in the border
areas. Air violations of Pakistani ter-
ritory tripled; artillery shellings
increased approximately fivefold.
Pakistan has worked for a solution to the
crisis through UN-sponsored talks at
Geneva. There were indications of

bruary 1987

An Afghan guerrilla stands guard on a Soviet helicopter shot down in the Panjsher Valley.

increased support for the Afghan people
from Iran.

In November, the United Nations
voted 122 to 20, with 11 abstentions, to
condemn, for the eighth time since 1979,
the presence of foreign forces in
Afghanistan and demand the return of
that country to an independent and
nonaligned status. Absent a settlement,
the United States remains committed to
the Afghan cause.

Outlook: Given current trends, the
stalemate is likely to continue, and
violence will escalate. The Soviets will
remain unable to consolidate their
political or military position and will find
it increasingly threatened. But they will
continue to project an international
image of flexibility, while looking to
invest their client regime with as much
political legitimacy as possible. The
inujahidin resistance will remain stead-
fast, however: they are prepared to fight
on for a decade and more.

Military Activity

The level of fighting fluctuated widelj
1986, not always in accord with norms'
seasonal patterns. Combat remained a
higher than usual levels throughout th
winter. In April it was twice that of la
year. The pace then slowed, without tl
massive late spring Soviet combat ope ■
tions of previous years. Traditionally
heavy inujahidin activity in the summc
also was delayed this year. This lag we
due in part to a late thaw in tjie crucia

Department of State Bulle.i

FEATURE
Afghanistan

ntain passes and Soviet/DRA pres-
on supply caravans. Fighting soared
istoric seasonal levels as 1986 drew
close.

Despite increased emphasis on
iipting resistance lines of com-
lication, Soviet and regime forces
e able to capture only a fraction of
stance supplies. The amount lost to
rdiction grew, complicating move-
it and contributing to a rise in
sport costs. However, there has
n an increase in the overall volume of
.pons and equipment available to the
Iters. Soviet and regime attacks on
voys have concentrated on the pack
nals used to transport supplies across
passes of eastern Afghanistan.
Resistance ability to ambush
liet/DRA convoys also increased
ig with the acquisition of more heavy
.pons and improved demolition capa-
iies. Throughout the country, the
mhidin knocked out bridges, shut
vn stretches of road, and caused long
Brsions. The road system, the Soviet
stical lifeline, has been severely
tared.

•5 War of the Cities

spite significant Soviet/DRA efforts
mprove control, the mujahidin in
i6 brought the war to Afghanistan's
jor cities. In the smaller provincial
litals, the regime continues to main-
a daytime control but has little sway
'r the surrounding areas. In Kabul,
' illusion of increasing urban security
tered over the past few years has
;n shattered.

Herat. Combat in and around Herat
' .s intense all year. Initiative and con-
il passed from one side to the other,
■rat mujahidin continue to operate
. ntly under the command of Ismail
lan and Allahuddin Khan of the
iniiit-i-Islami party. In house-to-house
;hting, they have occasionally been on
e brink of overwhelming regime forces
id taking complete control of the town.

Each time, the Soviets and their
fghan allies struck back with massive
rce, including artillery and air attacks,
estruction may have been worse in
erat than in any other city; Soviet
-imbardments have seriously damaged
i;nturies-old, internationally renowned

monuments. In February, Herat's large
Shia district was le^■eled in retaliation
for a resistance attack. DRA forces
refused to enter the district, while the
mujahidin fought on in the rubble.

During the summer, the mujahidin
reportedly controlled some 90% of the
old city and 50% of the new. Soviet and
DRA forces launched several operations,
including one with nearly 10,000 men, to
reoccupy the city. In October, foreign
journalists attending "withdrawal"
ceremonies at nearby Shindand had to
be brought into and out of Herat by

hours at midday; the city closes down
completely by midafternoon.

The Soviets enjoyed some short-term
success in the Qandahar region. The
Spet.-inaz regularly ambushed caravans
and attacked local resistance bases. In
the early spring, a huge Soviet force was
dispatched to Qandahar from Kabul.
Although able to reassert control in
town only briefly before returning north,
it did establish a network of outposts
and minefields similar to those around
Kabul. Manned chiefly by Afghans, the
security belt has complicated but not

After 7 years of brutal occupation, the
Soviet Union has failed to consolidate its
rule over Afghanistan. In 1986, the Soviets
were forced to revise drastically their
military tactics and replace the ruler they
installed in 1979. The resistance grew
stronger and retained overwhelming sup-
port in Afghanistan, among Afghan
refugees, and in international forums.

armored personnel carrier. The Soviets
informed them it was unsafe to spend
the night.

Detailed information on the rest of
western Afghanistan is sketchy, but
combat activity was reported in every
province. Coordination may have in-
creased after the designation of Ismail
Khan as regional Jnmiat commander for
several western provinces.

Qandahar. In Qandahar, too,
fighting raged throughout the year and.
at times, control of the city and sur-
rounding areas was in dispute. Qan-
dahar's bazaars are open only a few

prevented movement in and out of the
city. The outposts have provided enticing
targets for the mujahidin.

The regime made some political
advances with local tribes and villages.
Ruling party officials, including politburo
member Nur Ahmed Nur, offered money
and weapons to tribal chieftains for their
cooperation. By exploiting local rivalries,
Kabul may have gained temporary
support.

Asmatullah Achekzai, the resistance
commander who defected to the regime
last year, has become something of a
local warlord. He lives under regime pro-
tection behind the governor's house in

ebruary 1987

Qandahar. Asmatullah's tribal militia,
operating south to Spin Buldak, attacked
tribal rivals in the resistance, mujahidin
supply lines, and occasionally even
regime targets.

Combat escalated in late summer
and early fall. In late August, the
mujahidin forced abandonment of the
central police station. On September 1,
the main telephone exchange was
attacked and communications cut. Later
that week, the radio station was
damaged by a rocket, and the Central
Bank was hit. Soviet/DRA control was
limited to the airport and a single gar-
rison in the city. The highway linking the
two points, usually in regime hands,
reportedly passed under mujahidin con-
trol. The Soviets counterattacked, but
the mujahidin lay low, fearing reprisals.
Still, casualties evidently were heavy,
particularly among farmers, perhaps
because the latter were reluctant to
hand over recently harvested grain to
the regime.

The persistent resistance challenge
to the capital of southern Afghanistan
stems from a high degree of cooperation,
proximity to supplies, and strong local
support. The local resistance council
includes the seven Peshawar-based
organizations (most have active fronts in
the area), parties not included in the
alliance (e.g.. the Harakaf-Inlami of
Ayatollah Mohseni), and independent
groups. The council has assumed new
functions, both political and military, and
has not been hampered by internal
squabbles. There are several important
local commanders, like Mullah Malang or
Haji Latif of the National Islamic Front
{Mnhaz-e-Milli party), but no individual
is dominant.

Kabul and Surrounding Areas.

Stability and security in the Afghan
capital are a key Soviet goal. The
Soviets strengthened the security
perimeter around the city this year and
attempted to extend it to counter the
growing long-range weapons capabilities
of the mujahidin. The Soviets continued
to fire indiscriminately on nearby areas
suspected of harboring the mujahidin.
Even deserted villages north of the city
were harassed nightly.

Soviet troops behave like an occupy-
ing force. Many Kabul shopowners
grumble privately about frequent shop-
lifting by Soviet civilians and troops.
Drunken Soviet soldiers regularly broke
into homes and threatened the
inhabitants. The Soviets appear to treat
their Afghan allies with equal disdain.

Although there was some mujahidin
activity all year, resistance pressure
peaked later than in previous years. At
times, particularly in midwinter, there
has been a deceptive appearance of nor-
malcy in the capital. The bazaars are
filled with many items, including
videotapes, not commonly available in
the U.S.S.R. Visitors note a surprising
number of Mercedes and new Toyotas.
But Kabul residents were reminded of
the proximity of war by the constant
drone of aircraft. Both planes and
helicopters eject an increasing number of
flares (as many as 50-60 on takeoff or
landing) to protect against heat-seeking
missiles.

During the first half of the year, the
resistance made its impact felt primarily
through rocket attacks (especially on
such occasions as the sixth anniversary

of the Soviet invasion). In late Januai
the mujahidin fired 122mm rockets
the Soviet Embassy; on January 31,
122mm damaged the U.S. Embassy
compound.

By midsummer, the war intensifii
for the regime and the Soviets in Kat
Repeated rocket barrages and period)
firefights followed mujahidin penetr;
tion of the heavily fortified security b
As in past years, the Soviet Embassy,
and Soviet and Afghan military insta)
tions were rocketed. In July, a rocket
heavily damaged the Polish Embassy.

The resistance periodically rocket
the DRA's 8th Division supply base at
Qarghah, on the outskirts of Kabul. C
the night of August 26-27, a direct hi
set off a 2-hour series of explosions tl
shook the city. A giant fireball at mid
night (possibly rockets or missiles sto
at the site) produced a cloud more tha
1,000 feet high. The explosions, visiW
all over the capital, were compared tc
erupting volcano. Despite regime clai;
of "no human losses," as many as 10(
were reported killed and perhaps sev<
thousand injured. The Soviets responi
quickly by firing on the launch area

Commander Mahsud teaches military tactics.

Department of State Bulll

FEATURE
Afghanistan

Sfhan guerrilla
his RPG-7
nk grenade
iner readv.

iation came later), but were unable
:h the attackers. Despite inten-
security, within 3 days the mu-
in resumed rocketing of the capital.
iUgh the Soviets can replace the
|royed supplies, the loss of one of the
':'s largest depots was a blow to the
ne's prestige.

n late September, the fragility of
d's security was brought home to
ir Soviet leadership. First Deputy
rman of the U.S.S.R. Council of
sters Murakhovskiy was buffeted by
plosion at the Soviet Embassy,
aps a car bomb, just before a
liiiled meeting with Najibullah. The
f.-t-ranking civilian Soviet to visit
il in recent years, Murakhovskiy
rlfdly is close to General Secretary
>achev, whom he replaced as

il Topol party chief.
The outskirts of Kabul were again
■> i-ne of heavy fighting over the past
. Soviet and regime forces were
ed to return continually to areas pro-
Hcd safe and free of mujahidin.
I 'nmmanders, like Abdul Haq of

1 1hi'-Islami (Khalis) party, have

■'• ked to increase coordination and

3 5sure on the regime.

The Lowgar Valley, 40 miles south
of Kabul, has been emptied of much of
its population due to the severity of the
fighting. The Kabul-Gardez road, which
runs through the province, is often cut.
In August, there was heavy fighting
between a Soviet/DRA force and Hezh-e-
hla m i fighters under Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. Gulbuddin 's men apparently
shot down several helicopters, a clear
indication of a more potent resistance air
defense. In nearby Sarowbi, a Hezb-e-
hlfimi (Khalis) group bombed hydroelec-
tric installations, disrupting the capital's
power supply.

Foreigners can still picnic on
weekends or play the world's most
embattled golf course on the road to
Paghman, in the mountains just outside
of Kabul. Visitors have at times
remarked on the apparent calm; yet
beginning in the spring, regime and
Soviet military forces struck Paghman
nearly every month. Many villages have
been leveled by air strikes and artillery.
For much of the summer, shelling was
audible and visible as far away as Kabul.

The largest Soviet/DRA operation in
Paghman took place in September,
targeted against the mujahidin who
rocketed the Qarghah ammo dump. It
marked the beginning of a significant
combat role for DRA Interior Ministry
troops (Sarandoy), whom Interior
Minister and Khalq chief Gulabzoi
reportedly led personally into battle.

f^urther north, the Shomali suffered
from a recurring cycle of resistance and
reprisal. Early in the year, numbers of
children injured in a Soviet/DRA bom-
bardment of Estalif were brought to the
Kabul children's hospital. In early
October, another brutal Soviet/DRA
campaign devastated civilian areas and
destroyed livestock and crops. This time
the regime attempted to stop refugees
from fleeing to Kabul.

Mujahidin interdicted traffic along
the Salang highway from the U.S.S.R.
throughout the year. Even the major
Soviet air base at Bagram, 50 kilometers
north of Kabul, came under fire several
times. In July, a large ammunition store
at Bagram blew up.

Iruary 1987

Panjsher and North Afghanistan

Commander Ahmed Shah Mahsud of the
Ja-ndat-i-hhimi still leads the sole
resistance organization in the Panjsher
Valley. Although the Panjsher organiza-
tion was active outside the valley, no
major battles occurred within the Panj-
sher itself. Most mujahidin remaining in
the valley are camped in its upper
reaches, from which they periodically
attacked regime outposts and convoys.
In the winter, the Soviets attempted to
e.xpand their area of control but were
turned back. They occasionally launched
heliborne assaults on -mujahidin posi-
tions, with little success.

Panjsher is divided into 22 base
areas (karargaK). Each base is responsi-
ble for political and civil as well as
military affairs in its area. Only a few
F'anjsheris have fled to Pakistan. In the
Soviet/regime-occupied lower valley, the
population is comprised mostly of
women, children, and the elderly.

Mahsud Moves North. In one of the

most significant developments of the
conflict, mujahidin cooperation
expanded out of the Panjsher Valley to
the north of the Hindu Kush. For
perhaps the first time since the Soviet
invasion, a resistance organization
played a major role in a large-scale
assault outside its home base area.
Mahsud has begun to build institutions
whose reach extends not only beyond his
valley but also across geographical bar-
riers and even party lines.

These organizational efforts began
during the year-long cease-fire preceding
1984's massive seventh Soviet offensive
in the Panjsher. While focusing his
efforts on fellow members of the Jaw iat-
i-Islami party— mostly ethnic Tajiks—
Mahsud also aimed at winning coopera-
tion from other parties and ethnic
groups. Mahsud initially offered to assist
local commanders to consolidate their
own base areas. He also provided staff
training— stressing the benefits of
cooperation— to mid-level commanders,
some from other parties or distant
fighting groups.

In early 1985, the Council of the
North was established, involving com-
manders from Baghlan, Konduz. Takhar,
and parts of Badakhshan. They were
encouraged to form local councils and
work on civil as well as military affairs.

•■.flpi 13-flfi STATE IIMR/GE)

Kilometers

Council members agreed to provide
volunteers for central units-
professionalized forces proposed by
Mahsud to be the core of a mobile
regional guerrilla force.

These efforts began to bear fruit in
1986. In March a multiparty force
blunted a Soviet drive along the Konduz-
Faizabad highway. In mid-June, taking
advantage of Ramadan, the Soviets
undertook a large operation to counter
the growing local threat and to supply
garrisons. They attacked ynujahidin
bases around Khanabad and Eshkamesh.
Soviet/regime forces reportedly killed
and wounded hundreds of civilians,
burned local crops, and damaged irriga-
tion canals in Takhar. Soviet artillery
units later moved to target the pro-
liferating mujahidin bases in the area.
Both operations were strongly opposed
by local mujahidin and men from
Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, and mobile

groups from the Panjsher. The Soviei
were unable to disrupt evolving
resistance plans.

Capture of Farkhar. On August
the joint resistance forces went on tl
offensive. A multipronged assault on
DRA garrison of Farkhar was carefi
planned; the Jamiat commander froi
Takhar, Abdul Wadud, assisted by a
commander from Panjsher, led the
attack. By early next morning, half t
garrison was captured, the remainde
the DRA forces were overwhelmed t
following day. There were more than
100 DRA casualties at Farkhar. Mon
than 200 were captured, along with
nearly 100 tons of supplies and ord-
nance. Resistance casualties were
relatively light but included an impor
local commander. The fall of Farkhai
a well-planned assault involving train
forces from six districts in four prov-
inces, was a major strategic advance
the resistance.

Department of State Bultir

FEATURE
Afghanistan

»2 12-86 STATE (INR/GE)

[n November, with Soviet forces
ve in the Panjsher, the northern
dnization again went on the offen-
capturing a number of outposts. In
November, they overran the DRA
'rict headquarters at Nahrin and an

icimpanying garrison. The mujahidin

^ ured enough supplies to further the
It to create a regional threat oppos-

aihe main Soviet lifeline into

i hanistan.

North Central and Northwestern
A hanistan. Further west, in the
' hern flatlands bordering the Soviet
"ii, Soviet/regime control remained
tri- than in tne rest of the country.
' I'theless, resistance forces harassed
ri'i^ime throughout the north. The
oleum pipelines from the U.S.S.R.
ain a favorite target. In the fall,
'in escalated in Andkhvoy and
iniana, near the Soviet border.

Central Afghanistan

A coalition of pro-Iranian Shia groups,
including Nasr and Sepah-e Pasdaran,
now controls the Hazarajat. It remains
the major recipient of the limited Iranian
support in Afghanistan. Given the
absence of regime or Soviet presence
and its relative impenetrability, the
Hazarajat is of strategic importance as a
refuge for the resistance. The Hazara
Shia obtain a significant part of their
arms from other resistance groups, in
return for protection of supply routes. In
1986, pro-Iranian groups were reported
active for the first time against the
minimal regime presence in the moun-
tains and outside the Hazarajat, in the
north. West of the Hazara heartland, in
Ghor, there was an upswing in
resistance activity.

Eastern Afghanistan

The eastern provinces, particularly near
the Pakistani border and the major
roads, remain a primary theater of com-
bat. Soviet efforts to interdict resistance
supply are focused there. A 50-mile strip
along the frontier continues to suffer
devastation and depopulation. The
regime expanded its border forces and
established more posts; more posts were
attacked and taken by the mujahidin.
The Konar Valley, scene of a major
Soviet push last year, was relatively
quiet, although Barikowt and at times all
Soviet/DRA posts in the valley were
under siege. Combat centered on key
provinces, Nangarhar and Paktia.

Nangarhar Province juts down the
Kabul river valley toward Pakistan
before ending at the foot of the Khyber
Pass. It carries the major road link
between the two countries, and con-
siderable commercial traffic moves in
both directions.

The provincial capital, Jalalabad,
remains securely in regime hands but
occasionally was hit by rockets. In 1986,
there were more small arms firefights in
the city, nighttime fighting, and out-
going Soviet/regime artillery fire. In the
fall, mujahidin employed surface-to-air
missiles to knock down regime aircraft
landing at Jalalabad airport, and air
operations were suspended.

Early in the year, the strategic
Nazian Valley, which leads to the
Khyber Pass, was the scene of a major
effort to prove that regime forces could
operate effectively on their own. After
initial setbacks, DRA units secured con-
trol of the valley and established a
number of posts near the foot of the
Khyber. After the withdrawal of the
main Afghan force, however, the mu-
jahidin attacked troops left behind and
forced most of them out. The regime
could not reestablish control and by late
November had to mount another offen-
sive in the area.

Paktia Province. Both sides were
active throughout the year in Paktia,
which sits astride important resistance
supply routes. The regime can move only
with difficulty, if at all, on most of the
provincial roads. Ali Khayl (Jaji) was
harassed for much of the year, par-
ticularly by the Ittihadia party of
Sayyaf. The main DRA garrison in east
Paktia, at Khowst, must still be supplied
by air.

loruary 1987

In early April, as fighting escalated,
Afghan forces launched a combined
ground and heiiborne assault on a major
resistance base, Zhawar Fort, about 10
kilometers from the Pakistan border.
The base was an especially inviting
target because it had been described in
Western press stories, complete with
detailed descriptions and photos, as an
impregnable redoubt.

Hezh-e-hlami (Khalis) Commander
Jalaluddin Haqqani suffered severe
napalm burns in an initial airstrike but
stayed on to lead his men. Instead of
retreating, the mujahidin defended
Zhawar. Government troops, numbering
at least 1,000, moved steadily forward,
suffering heavy casualties, including
several aircraft. One of the regime's best
commando units was decimated during a
parachute landing.

Resistance forces from Paktia and
elsewhere moved to help but were slowed
down by artillery barrages. Violations of
Pakistani airspace associated with the
Zhawar battle were unprecedented. Two
weeks after the fighting began, the
mujahidin withdrew, and regime forces
entered the camp. Many mujahidin
casualties were suffered in the evacua-
tion, when they had no protection from
airstrikes. After carting away or
destroying considerable supplies, the
Afghan Army pulled out. Within a week
the mujahidin were back. This costly but
temporary setback may have discour-
aged further use of large supply bases,
which, like Zhawar, will always be
vulnerable to Soviet firepower.

The Afghan Resistance

Seven major resistance parties head-
quartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, are
joined in an alliance and have promoted
the international political dimension of
the resistance. Smaller groupings of
various ethnic, tribal, religious, and
political affiliations, including leftists,
also exist. A Kabul regime amnesty
announced on the anniversary of the
coup specifically exempted "Maoists."
Parties representing the Shia minority
tend to based in Quetta, Pakistan, and in
Iran. Most, but not all, of the hundreds
of separate fighting groups are linked to
one or more of the major parties.

The alliance in Peshawar has now
been in existence for 18 months. The
spokesmanship has successfully rotated,
more or less on a 3-month schedule,
through six of the party leaders: Yunus
Khalis (Hezb-e-hlwmi Khalis faction);
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e-Islami);
Burhanuddin Rabbani {Jam.iat-i-Islami);
Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Jehh-e Najat-i
Milli); Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani
(Mahaz-e-Milliy, and Nabi Mohammedi
(Harakat-e-Inqelab). The seventh, Abdul
Rasool Sayyaf (Itiihadia-Islami), is due
to serve as representative in early 1987.

The alliance is governed by a council
of party leaders. Alliance committees
have begun to work on education and
social services and coordinate outside
humanitarian assistance. The seven par-
ties continued to differ on current tactics
and Afghanistan's future.

Military Developments. The

resistance is increasingly better armed,
trained, and organized, although short-
comings continue, and there are notable
differences in military capabilities
among the various resistance groups.
Mujahidin air defense capabilities
improved considerably in 1986. The
Dashaka (Soviet DShK 12.7mm heavy
machinegun) remains the mainstay of
resistance air defense. In 1986, the
resistance used heavier air defense guns.
The mujahidin also made greater use of
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) of various
types. More sophisticated weapons were
effective against the full range of air-
craft employed by the Soviets and the
DRA. Helicopter downings reportedly
increased, although it is difficult to
estimate exact losses.

Mujahidin supplies have grown con-
siderably over the past few years and
include a variety of heavy weapons,
including surface-to-surface rockets.
Although the rapid development of the
logistic net is one of the truly
remarkable accomplishments of the
resistance, the increase in supplies has
created problems relating to movement
and storage. Nevertheless, the improved
supply situation has contributed to
greater cooperation and coordination. A
loosening of supply constraints has
removed a major cause of squabbling—
arms. Some groups now devote
resources to improving and protecting

supply routes in their territory that
used by other groups further inside ij»
country. | ^

Cooperation also has been stimu!lei
by local residents tired of intra-
resistance squabbles. Groups have
loaned their heavy weapons to other: (I
On several occasions when a group c riel
under heavy attack, calls went out fc .
support or diversionary actions. Othi
groups responded, sometimes from f ■
away and across party lines. During
spring fighting on the eastern bordei >
many commanders helped each othet
Mahsud sent men and materiel from e
Panjsher. Rabbani's call for action tf
divert Soviet attention from Herat w
answered by an increase in activity i n-
trywide. This is a far cry from the
spontaneous and widespread, but
uncoordinated and often fractious,
opposition to the 1978 Marxist coup.

Regional institutions for coordim
tion are evolving, sometimes involvir^
single party as in the Council of the
North (planned to include parties oth
than the Jamiat); sometimes several
ties, as in Herat; sometimes all the
groups, such as the Qandahar Counc:
reportedly chaired by a respected fig|
without ties to any party. Although s'
in a preliminary stage, the building o
transprovincial (and potentially,
multiparty) organizations is
unprecedented.

As a result of these development)
morale is high, and mujahidin and
civilians alike reveal little war wearir
Most people view the conflict as an
acceptable burden that has become pi»
of their lives. Most areas subject to
retaliatory attacks are already vacate
The civilian population still overwheh
ingly supports the resistance. There i
little support for political accommoda
with the regime, whether inside the
country or among the vast majority ii
the refugee camps, most of whom ha\
relatives in the resistance. There is nc
shortage of young recruits.

International Achievements. Th(

alliance has made major strides in
presenting the Afghan case to the wo
In January, spokesman Sayed Ahmed
Gailani traveled to Fez, Morocco, for i
16th foreign ministers session of the
Islamic Conference Organization. In
June, a delegation led by spokesman

FEATURE
Afghanistan

lanuddin Rabbani came to the
ed States. They were received by
ident Reagan and other U.S.
ials and Members of Congress.
Dn its return trip, the delegation
ed France and met with Prime
ster Chirac and Foreign Minister
lond. The visit resulted in the
17 announcement by the French
srnment that for the first time
ice would grant public humanitarian
stance to the Afghan people. King
i of Saudi Arabia subsequently
lived alliance spokesman Rabbani.
(n November, spokesman Moham-
', Nabi Mohammedi led a delegation
lie United Nations during the
Bral Assembly's consideration of the
nanistan resolution (see "Refugees"),
followed an initial visit to the
ted Nations in 1985 by an alliance
gation led by spokesman Hekmatyar.
(•oute to a UN press conference with
UN Correspondents Association,
gation members were accosted and
E ulted by some staff of the DRA Per-
Ti ent Mission to the United Nations,
alliance's hosts at the United
''lis, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
lally protested this misconduct. The
u ltd States later urged the United
N ions to take effective measures to
ent any repetition.

T DRA Military

A ;r decades of Soviet training, 8 years
"' umbat, and 7 years of Soviet

\ ice" and direction, Afghan armed
ii es remain incapable of defending the
rf ime. The DRA apparently was under
h' vy pressure to improve its military
labilities this year. Its inability to
It ie significant gains was a major fac-
te in the Soviet decision to replace
B )rak Karmal, but its performance has
n improved under Najibullah.

At present there are about 30,000 in
tl army, and perhaps 10,000 in the air
fi:e. The regime employs an equal
nnber of paramilitary border guards,
pice troops, secret police, and various
r. itias, but total strength is insufficient
t ?urb the resistance.

With the support of Soviet advisers
'<■ i firepower, and the benefit of
iielligence provided by local tribesmen
(villagers, a few specialized DRA units
i .e at times been able to hold their

own. Early in the year, some elements
fought fairly well in Nangarhar and
Paktia. But these gains proved
transitory.

Morale problems and factional
infighting remain serious. Government
forces (often at the highest levels) are
filled with resistance sympathizers, who
provide valuable intelligence and some
arms to the mujahidin. Truces between
garrisons and local mujahidin are not
unusual.

Conscription and Desertion. The

familiar DRA press gangs were inten-

sified and exemptions tightened in order
to meet the goal of an expanded
military. In March, Kabul school
teachers lost their exemptions and were
told to report. Students living abroad
were drafted as soon as they returned to
Afghanistan: others were required to
show proof of service before going
abroad to study or gaining admission to
the university. One reported dragnet
picked up graduating high school
students before they could flee the coun-
try. A May "amnesty" decree for army
deserters and others who had evaded

Commander Jalaluddin Haqqani on a captured Soviet tank.

service apparently has yielded few
results.

When Najibullah came into power,
he intensified the conscription campaign,
extended it to party members, and
lashed out at those who avoid military
service by "hiding under the wings of
influential relatives." The drive has
probably alienated many of the regime's
supporters.

Enhanced conscription has only
resulted in increased desertion. Indeed,
desertion rates may have worsened over
the past year. Eight years into the war,
whole units still decamp enmasse from
time to time. High-level officers (many
with a record of cooperating with the
miijahidin) continue to desert. In the
summer, the deputy commander of
Paktia Province, Colonel Hashmatullah,
defected, then immediately after a press
conference in Pakistan returned to fight
against the regime. In October an
Afghan pilot flew his MiG-21 to
Pakistan.

Paramilitary Forces. Regime
efforts to mobilize additional support
from the paramilitary forces have made
some progress. These locally recruited,
lightly armed troops, who man many
border posts, although disinclined to bat-
tle the mujahidin. may provide the
regime or the Soviets with useful
intelligence.

Militia. The regime also has had
some success in expanding militias. Most
worker, party, female, or other urban
militias have had little effect. Tribal
militias operate under the Ministry of
Tribes and Nationalities. This year some
have been more willing to fight local
mujahidin, often their clan or tribal
rivals. The militias were increasingly
integrated into joint operations with
Soviet and regular army troops but prob-
ably have little utility outside home
areas.

The tribes are fickle, and often
remain on the regime payroll only for
the winter months. In December 1985,
the regime recruited 400 Hazaras near
Ghazni and stationed them with an army
brigade. The Hazaras joined the
mujahidin and attacked the brigade,
bringing along many deserters. The
regime had to bring two other brigades
in to restore order. Later in the winter,
a group of young Afridis were trained as
militia in the Nazian Valley, near the

Pakistan border. They turned on their
advisers the first time they were used in
combat and caught them in a crossfire
with the mujahidin. The Afridis then
escaped over the border.

Police. Many of the DRA's fewer
than 20,000 police have been turned into
a light infantry force, the Sarandoy.
They were increasingly active in the
closing months of 1986, especially in
joint operations with the Soviets. Under
the control of Khalq faction chief and
Interior Minister Sayed Mohammed
Gulabzoi, the Sarandoy is an independ-
ent Khalq force, led by Khalq ex-army
officers and subject to the same pattern
of conscription and desertion as the
army. There were continued reports of
Sarandoy fighting against forces loyal to
the ruling Parcham faction.

The Secret Police (KHAD, WAD).

In January, KHAD (the Dari acronym
for State Information Services) was pro-
moted to the Ministry for State Security
(Dari acronym: WAD), but it is still
generally known by its former title. Like
the Soviet KGB, the ministry also has its
own combat units.

The change of name and status of
the secret police has not changed its
methods or reputation as a brutal
organization. Human rights groups
amply document its use of torture. The
ministry has a major hand in the subver-
sion campaign against Pakistan. Yet

even the secret police have factional i f
problems; pro-Babrak employees are
an excellent position to cause trouble r
Najibullah and the Soviets.

The Soviets in Afghanistar

The Soviet Union evidently believes t,t
in the long run its objectives in
Afghanistan can be ensured by milita
means, augmented— but not replaced
by political tactics. Soviet military op i-
tions are designed to destroy the
mujahidin and to gain time and accej
ability for the "revolutionary" regims
Kabul.

Reporting to the Soviet Party Co
gress in February 1986, Gorbachev
described Afghanistan in terms of Sc
border security. Soviet policy is
calculated to win domestic and intern'
tional credibility for the Kabul regime
and to curtail the support the mujahii
have received from Pakistan and othel
countries. Moscow became more
involved than ever before in
manipulating Afghan domestic politic:
but achieved little success.

Military Developments. In 1986,
Soviets continued to adjust their
numbers, weapons, and tactics to
counter the greater capabilities of the
mujahidin and compensate for the
DRA's limited military effectiveness.
Only a few thousand underutilized tro

X-*-

Afghan Army deserters who have joined the resistance.

Department of State Bulle

FEATURE
Afghanistan

iluring a much-publicized
thdrawal," not as many as Gor-
lev promised or as claimed by the
lets (see p. 12).

Soviet combat forces are roughly the
0 in number as last year. According
le most recent estimates, there are
It 118,000 Soviet troops in the coun-
supported by some 30,000 additional
■ps in the Soviet Union.
In 1986, the Soviets drastically
•£ sed their military tactics in
■innistan. In the past, large valley
kji operations using tanks and
iired personnel carriers and up to
i( )00 troops were the centerpiece of
tj- Soviet effort. Now Soviet operations
ai smaller scale, more focused, and
ol n employ heliborne assaults. Some
let units were more active and
ressive, concentrating on the border
IS, resistance supply lines and, when
could be found, stockpiles and
s. Most Soviet troops, however,
.1 ain in static defensive/security
d loyments. The overall counterin-
31 jency capabilities of the average
S let conscript remain unimpressive.

Soviet tactics seem aimed at
rr imizing of casualties. The Soviets
a d more firepower, from artillery and
tl air, sometimes on short notice, often
w 1 devastating effect.

There were at least 3,000 casualties
t lugh the fall of 1986, bringing the
t il number of Soviet losses in
/ jhanistan since 1979 to at least
3 DOO-35,000, more than one-third of
V Dm were killed. Some Soviet sources

irate that casualties could be con-
■ ei-ably higher, perhaps as many as
- 1)1 10 killed over the course of the war,
i this cannot be confirmed. In addi-
t :i, the Soviets and Afghans together
1 /e lost nearly 1,000 aircraft to the
> jahidin since 1979, mostly helicop-
t s. Aircraft losses increased in the lat-
t part of the year.

Moscow has increased the use of its
i ecial Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz). Their
imbers have grown over the past few
'irs to roughly 4,500-5,000. These
• tter trained and more experienced
"ips deploy in smaller formations than
ler units, are often active at night,
li are used to ambush resistance con-
ys. Even the Spetsnaz have, at times,
en defeated, however, and they appear
experience the same morale,

*i^^--

Soviet heavy machineguns remain the principal air defense weapon of the resistance.

discipline, and other problems as regular
Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan.
Some mujahidin groups use counter-
ambush tactics against the Spetsnaz.

In 1986, the Soviets invested further
in military facilities in the country. They
upgraded military and dual-use
infrastructure, including road links from
Soviet Turkestan. They continued to
refine their order of battle and send in
more appropriate equipment. Recent
additions include rockets, a variety of
artillery weapons, and the SU-25 ground
attack "fighter. Existing equipment has
been upgraded. Most wheeled armored
personnel carriers were replaced with
newer models or tracked vehicles. Self-
propelled artillery has been substituted
for towed artillery in many units.

Soviet forces continue to suffer from
low morale problems. Disease, partic-
ularly dysentery and hepatitis, may keep
as many troops out of action as combat
injuries. Theft and sale of military stores
(including fuel, weapons, medicine, and
auto parts) are common. The black
market is so developed that orders can
be placed for specific items. Soviet
soldiers often use the proceeds to pay for
liquor and dmgs.

Soviet Defectors and Prisoners. In

the early years of the conflict, few
prisoners were taken by either side.
There is no evidence of major detention

centers for resistance fighters, but
important captives are probably held in
regime prisons. The resistance is
believed to hold some Soviet prisoners in
secure base areas inside Afghanistan,
but few prisoners survive long. In
Paghman, a group of Soviets captured
by the mujahidin have reportedly been
offered in return for mujahidin
prisoners. The son of a Soviet Com-
munist Party dignitary reportedly was
exchanged for captive mujahidin in
1986.

Several Soviets have defected to the
resistance; some convert to Islam and
even fight alongside the mujahidiii. In
November, five Soviet soldiers serving
with the mujahidin for a number of
years were granted asylum in Canada.

Soviet Political Moves. Gorbachev
inherited the various military and
political efforts to resolve the Afghan
problem. There is no indication that he
disagrees with previous policy or tactics,
but he has tried to develop an image of
flexibility. The UN-sponsored Geneva
talks constitute the main focus of Soviet
diplomacy.

Gorbachev's two major statements
on Afghanistan have each contained a
dramatic gesture, however, and he
seems intent on improving Moscow's
public image. He told the 27th Party
Congress in February that a schedule for

ibruary 1987

, In his July 28 speech at Vladivostok,
[Gorbachev announced:

Before the end of 1986, six regiments-
one tank regiment, two motorized rifle
regiments, and three antiaircraft
regiments— will be returned from
Afghanistan to the homeland, with their
authorized equipment and arms. These units
will return to their areas of permanent
deployment in the Soviet Union and in such a
way that all those who are interested can
easily verify this.

^ The Soviet Defense Ministry later
'announced that the withdrawal would be
completed by the end of October 1986.
Soviet military spokesmen insisted that
the units to be withdrawn had been in
Afghanistan for years.

Through a variety of methods,
including national technical means of
verification, the United States tracked
the different categories of units in ques-
tion before Gorbachev's July 28 speech
and afterward.

Air Defense. Soviet air defense
units play no military role against the
mujahidin, who lack an air force. Yet
three air defense regiments comprised
half of the promised withdrawal
package, illustrating the limited
significance of the original Soviet pro-
posal. These units were withdrawn to
the Soviet Union as Gorbachev prom-
ised. The SA-8 surface-to-air missile
regiment based in Kabul was withdrawn
from Afghanistan on October 19, The
SA-8 air defense regiment from Shin-
dand departed for the Soviet Union by
October 21, The air defense regiment
from Konduz— the last of the six
regiments to withdraw— also returned,
whereupon the Soviets announced the
withdrawal was complete.

The only tank regiment in

Afghanistan, stationed at Shindand, was
'severely understrength and not involved

Soviet Withdrawal Deception

in any significant combat. To bring the
unit to full strength for the withdrawal
parades, the Soviets sent additional
tanks into Afghanistan in September
and October, On October 15, the day
promised by Moscow, withdrawal
ceremonies began. Correspondents noted
that the vehicles showed few signs of
wear and reported that the Soviet
soldiers claimed never to have seen
any mujahidin. Subsequently, the
reconstituted tank regiment returned to
the U.S.S.R,

Motorized rifle regiments con-
stitute the heart of the deception effort.
Of all the units cited by Gorbachev, only
the motorized rifle regiments are
capable of finding and fighting the mu-
jahidin. Although the Soviets included
these units in order to present a more
credible withdrawal package, they did
not intend to degrade the military effec-
tiveness of their forces in Afghanistan,

Within days of the Vladivostok
speech, the Soviets began to move addi-
tional units into Afghanistan through
Termez in the east and Kushka in the
west. These new units moved into areas
of the Soviet bases at Shindand and Kon-
duz normally occupied by the motorized
rifle regiments that were garrisoned
there but had temporarily moved to
nearby dispersal areas.

The newly introduced motorized rifle
regiments were far different in equip-
ment from the regiments they tem-
porarily displaced. Specifically, the new
regiments had truck-towed artillery, as
contrasted with self-propelled artillery.
They did not have the tracked armored
personnel carriers, called BMPs, stand-
ard equipment for the units they
replaced. In addition, to transport
troops, the newly introduced regiments
depended principally on trucks. To
operate effectively and protect troops
from mujahidiyi attacks, the Soviets had

come to rely on armored personnel car-
riers instead of trucks to move motor-
ized rifle troops in Afghanistan.

In September, the introduction of
the new motorized rifle regiments w;
complete. On October 17, the new
motorized rifle regiment at Shindand'
was on its way north and soon arriv©
Kushka in the Soviet Union, About ti
same time, the old motorized rifle re]
ment from Shindand, with its charac
istic tracked armored personnel carrii
had begun to return to its garrison.

By October 21, the newly introduce^ L
Konduz regiment had arrived at Terme;
in the Soviet Union, Shortly thereafter,
the motorized rifle regiment originally
stationed in Konduz began returning to
base. All motorized rifle regiments in
Afghanistan on the day of Gorbachev's
speech remained there at the end of
1986,

Previous Soviet Deception. The

Soviets have previously staged deceptiv
withdrawals or reductions of forces. In
1980, for example, they announced the
withdrawal from Afghanistan of some
troops several weeks before the Moscow
Olympics. Numbering about 5,000, thesi
troops turned out to be forces unsuited
to Afghan terrain or to counterguerrilla
operations. Even as the unwanted force
were being withdrawn, new and more
useful units were being introduced.

Soviet Insecurity. The Soviets'
unwillingness to withdraw militarily
significant assets from Afghanistan—
despite a commitment from Gorbachev
himself— indicates something important,
Contrary to their assertions for interna-
tional audiences and back home in the
U,S,S.R,, the Soviets apparently do not
feel secure enough to give up any real
fighting capabilities.

Department of Slate Buile'i

FEATURE

Afghanistan

SOVIET FORCE MOVEMENT ASSOCIATED
^ WITH WITHDRAWAL SCHEME ■ 1986

the step-by-step withdrawal of Soviet
forces had been worked out with the
Afghan side and would be implemented
when a political settlement was
achieved. This was Moscow's first high-
level public confirmation of a withdrawal
timetable. On July 28, Gorbachev
announced in Vladivostok that six Soviet
regiments would be withdrawn from
Afghanistan by the end of the year to
provide a "stimulus" for a settlement.

Neither statement produced signifi-
cant results. Following the February
Party Congress, the timetable was
discussed in Geneva, but Kabul insisted
on an unrealistic period of up to 4 years
for the withdrawal.

The Vladivostok initiative was more
misleading, and the token six-regiment
withdrawal proved to be an exercise in
deception (see box). The ruse was
implemented even though the Soviets
must have been aware it would be
detected. The withdrawal occurred just
before the November UN General
Assembly vote on Afghanistan and did
not convince the world of Soviet interest
in a just solution. The vote against
the presence of foreign forces in
Afghanistan was approved by the same
overwhelming number, 122, as in 1985.

Criticism on the Home Front.

There is little evidence of widespread
opposition to the war in the U.S.S.R.
Public support is mostly passive and
unenthusiastic, but complaints about the
war have become more frequent and
open. Special counterpropaganda cam-
paigns have been launched in the three
Soviet republics bordering Afghanistan.

To generate greater support, the
Soviet media have expanded coverage of
the fighting. Combat fatalities are
reported more frequently, decorations
for heroism played up, special features
on men fighting in Afghanistan carried
in their hometown newspapers, and the
war generally portrayed with increasing
realism. A reading of samizdat (privately
circulated dissident manuscripts) sug-
gests that the expanded publicity may
have had the unintended consequence of
making Soviet citizens more worried
about the war.

There are signs of increasing unhap-
piness about the Afghan conflict among
veterans and those who might be sent to
Afghanistan. Draft evasion appears to
have increased, prompting the Soviet
authorities to criticize sharply those who

Ibruary 1987

try to avoid military service in general
and service in Afghanistan in particular.
Reports of payments for exemptions or
safer assignments have become more
common.

The Lithuanian Komaomfil skaya
Pravda on October 10 carried an "Open
Letter to Those Who Attempt To Pro-
tect Their Sons From the Difficulties of
Military Service." Written by an officer
of the Baltic Military District, the article
condemned Lithuanian youth who try to
use forged medical records to gain defer-
ment and parents who seek "soft"
assignments for their sons.

Regime Developments

In a slow-motion process, Babrak
Karmal was replaced in 1986 by
Najibullah as Soviet-backed ruler of

Afghanistan. It was the biggest change
in the Kabul regime since 1979, when
the Soviets brought Karmal in with their
invading troops to head the "new phase
of the April Revolution."'

Soviet dissatisfaction with Karmal
increased over the years. The Soviets
were unhappy with his inability to heal
the factional dispute and with his lack of
tangible military and political gains.
Moreover, his well-known installation by
Soviet forces was an international liabil-
ity. Pakistan specifically had refused to
deal with a Karmal-led government. Gor-
bachev did not see Karmal during the
CPSU congress in March, a clear snub.

In early April Karmal flew back to
Moscow, ostensibly for medical care, and
then dropped out of sight. In contrast,
the Soviets warmly received Prime
Minister Keshtmand during a state visit
April 21-24. Karmal still was absent

from Kabul during the April 27 anni'
sary of the 1978 Marxist coup, and h'
supporters there began to worry abo
his fate. There was an unprecedentec
series of semipublic protests by regir
backers. A demonstration by women
probably organized by Karmal con-
fidante and women's organization he;
Anahita Ratebzad. (Najibullah con-
demned these protests as "the black
strivings of factionalists." He later t(
the women's group from Anahita by
changing its name and appointing a
woman militia member as the first hei
of the new organization.)

The gesture of support was for
nought. Babrak returned quietly to
Kabul on May 1. The following day
Soviet troops took up key positions
around the city. At the 18th plenum,
Karmal "asked" to be relieved of dut'
as General Secretary of the PDPA "f

Najibullah— Moscow's New Man in Kabul

Mohammed Najibullah' was born in
Kabul in 1947. the son of a banker and
merchant and gi-andson of a Paktia
tribal chief. As a youth, he joined his
father who was posted with an Afghan
liaiik in Peshawar, Pakistan. His tribal
roots are with the Ahmedzai, part of the
Ghilzai confederation of Pashtun tribes.
Najibullah is married and has one
daughter.

Najib entered Kabul University as a
medical student in 1964. In 1965 he
joined the newly established PDPA and
was recruited into Babrak Karmal's Par-
cham faction. In 1967 he followed Kar-
mal when the PDPA split. He was
imprisoned in 1969 for political
activities. Back in school in 1970, he was
soon jailed again. He finally earned his
inedical degree in 1975, served in the
military for a year, and then became a
full-time political activist. He is a capable
speaker in Pashto, unlike Karmal, as
well as in Dari, and was a street orator
in the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1977, Najibullah was named to
the PDPA's central committee and was
appointed to the Parcham liaison com-
mittee with the Soviet Union. After the
PDPA coup in 1978, he became a
member of the Revolutionary Council.
Dismissed later that year, he spent much
of 1979 abroad— first as Ambassador to
Iran and then in exile in Eastern
Europe.

After the Soviet invasion in
December 1979, Najibullah returned to
Afghanistan. In 1980 he became head of
KHAD, the secret police, and was once
again named to the Revolutionary Coun-

cil. He became a full member of the
politburo in 1981. In late 1985 he was
promoted from KHAD to become a
secretary to the central committee,
reportedly with party responsibility fc
all security forces. In May 1986, he
became General Secretary of the PDF
and has headed the Kabul regime sine
then.

Since accession to leadership of th
PDPA, Najib has often appeared in
public and has traveled the country,
including war-torn Herat, and met fre
quently with the press. Najib is close t
the Soviets and responsive to their
wishes. As party leader, as he was wh(
he headed the secret police, Najib is
responsive to his Soviet advisers. Like
Karmal, he is usually accompanied by
Soviet bodyguards. Many Afghans
believe that he is a long-time KGB
agent.

' The General Secretary is known by the
single name Najibullah. but he is often re-
ferred to as Najib. Some sources indicate he
purposely dropped the "ullah"— a reference
to God— though now he sometimes uses it to
suggest new-found piety.

Department of State Built i

FEATURE
Afghanistan

th reasons." The politburo then con-
led Najibullah as party leader.
For a time, the regime, and par-
larly the Soviets, promoted the
on of a collective leadership in
lul, with Najibullah as party chief,
mal heading the Revolutionary Coun-
and Prime Minister Keshtmand run-
f the government. However, there
no question that Najibullah was in
•ge, and over the summer regime
lia began to refer to him as com-
n ider in chief.
Xajibullah at first moved cautiously
:ii(i consolidating control over the
\ . He was frank in criticizing party
tiomings. In a speech to the 19th
j1 luni in July, he complained about
2 'e arrogance, nepotism, unwill-
n less to go to the provinces, and
11 -ight corruption, including embezzle-
it. bribery, and theft of state prop-

\t the plenum he announced a
iiatic expansion of the central com-
r ee, packing it with unknowns
W amiably loyal only to him. Karmal
b lists were purged.

Parcham split. The ouster of Kar-
V and removal of his followers led to
' i-niergence of a pro-Karmal opposi-

. Its reported activities range from a
■i .ilown in the ministries to coopera-
with the mujahidin. The dispute
il be taking on an ethnic tinge, with
rak's multiethnic urban backers
11.4 Najibullah's largely Pashtun
K. jwers.
Foreign journalists brought into
■hanistan to witness the October
iet "withdrawal" ceremonies were
uptly ordered out of the country after
ing a spontaneous pro-Karmal
lonstration.

Instability within the regime may
e led Moscow finally to agree to
love Karmal. The 20th PDPA plenum
3 suddenly convened on November 20.
i plenum endorsed Karmal 's "request
08 relieved of party and state posts."
ipped of the chairmanship of the
rolutionary Council presidium (head
state) and a spot on the politburo,
rmal still retained seats on the
volutionary Council and the central
tnmittee. Najibullah told the central

committee that Babrak's health was
"deteriorating." Karmal was voted a
medal (the Order of the April Revolu-
tion) and granted a pension.

The plenum awarded secret police
chief Ghulam Farid Yacubi the politburo
seat vacated by Karmal. Khalq chief
Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoi and Demo-
cratic Youth Organization head Farid
Mazdak were elected candidate
members.

In December, Foreign Minister Shah
Mohammed Dost, a long-time diplomat
and holdover from the pre-1978 regime,
was replaced by Abdul Wakil, a cousin of
Babrak Karmal, and most recently
ambassador to Vietnam. Dost was made
a minister of state and sent to the
United Nations. At the same time,
Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Nazar
Mohammed was named First Deputy
Prime Minister. His replacement, the
current Deputy Prime Minister, Gen.
Mohammed Rafi, served as Defense
Minister from 1979 to 1982. Changes in
the upper echelons of the regime were
expected to continue.

Khalq revival. Were Najibullah able
to forge a unified party, through purges
or conciliation, it would be a major step
toward regime consolidation. The
increased activities of the paramilitary
police troops suggest a deal with the
Khalqis and their leader, Interior
Minister Gulabzoi. Tribal connections
between Najibullah and many of his
fellow Ghilzai tribesmen of the Khalqis
may account for this unanticipated rap-
prochement. On the other hand, Gulabzoi
may be positioning the Khalqis to return
to power, were Najibullah to falter. In
any case, Khalq disaffection continues,
compounded by its ideological disagree-
ment over the "broadening" of the
regime and the steady abandonment of
radical Marxist policies.

Efforts To Suggest a Broadening
of the Regime. On December 26, 1985,
the regime announced the appointment
of a number of purportedly "nonparty"
figures. Sayed Amanuddin Amin was
named deputy prime minister; a
technocrat, he previously had served the
DRA as a deputy minister and chairman
of the Economic Consultative Council.
Other appointees also had held impor-
tant regime positions, but they will add
little credibility to the regime.

In January 1986, Kabul added 79
new members to the Revolutionary
Council, doubling its size. Kabul claims
that more than half of the expanded
council are not party members. The
presidium (chaired at the time by Kar-
mal) also was enlarged. Haji Mohammed
Chamkani. who had chaired the 1985
Border Tribes Jirga. was named vice
president of the presidium, the first time
a nonparty figure had been elevated to
such a high position. In April, the tribal
Jirgn (assembly of tribal leaders)
obtained a secretariat, and Chamkani's
visibility increased. In November, follow-
ing Karmal's ouster, Chamkani was
named interim chairman of the Revolu-
tionary Council presidium.

The regime claims to have begun
elections in all provinces (only party elec-
tions have been held since the 1978
coup), but it has been unable to conduct
them outside secured areas. One of the
excited victors confessed he was
unaware he had been nominated until
just before hearing he was elected.

Kabul's only gain has been the induc-
tion into the party of two leftist labor
groups that for 7 years had been
independent (Democratic Workers of
Afghanistan; Revolutionary Society of
Afghanistan's Toilers). This merger
indicates that "national reconciliation" is
not intended to lead to a departure from
Kabul's Marxist and pro-Soviet
orientation.

Since publication in December 1985
of a Pravda article suggesting the need
to include real elements of the opposition
in the broadening process, Kabul has
often repeated its interest in national
reconciliation. The National Fatherland
Front (NFF, Kabul's organizational
framework for integrating nonparty
groups into the regime) was charged
with coordinating the process— a sure
indication that power sharing is not
intended. The delay in the NFF congress
scheduled for early November suggests a
lack of progress on reconciliation in addi-
tion to problems with the draft constitu-
tion (in preparation since early in the
year). Regime efforts to entice coopera-
tion from the vast majority of Afghans
have been to no avail.

bruary 1987

The Afghan Economy

Given wartime disruption, the economy
of Afghanistan continues to provide a
standard of Hving not greatly different
from that before the 1978 Marxist coup.
In some areas, particularly along major
lines of communication for both sides,
the countryside has been devastated and
depopulated. But in many parts of the
country, traditions of autarchy, sub-
sistence farming, nomadic and semi-
nomadic herding, smuggling, and infor-
mal trade persist. The regime claims
that material damage caused by the war
totals 40 billion Afghanis- (up a third
from last year's claim).

Food. Kabul's bazaars remain amply
stocked, although some items were in
short supply. In general, the food supply
in Afghanistan was adequate, although
shortages of some items continued in
some areas. As wheat accounts for about
60% of the Afghan diet, most of the
population has enough to eat.

Abundant snowfall in the winter
months of 1985-86 and good weather in
the growing season produced a wheat
crop about as large as harvests before
the Soviet invasion. Because several
million refugees have fled, per capita
wheat availability is probably higher
than before 1979. The impact of land
abandonment in areas of heavy fighting
has been softened by the shift from cash
crops to wheat in regions of less intense
fighting.

Most land abandonment and food
shortages occur in a 50-mile belt along
the Pakistan frontier. Most reports of
food shortages and most of the refugees
come from this area, where fighting has
been heavy. In the fall, shortages were
reported in the northwest.

Scarcities are aggravated by damage
to Afghanistan's limited transportation
infrastructure. Shortages are worst in
the spring. Some items are periodically
in short supply: vegetables, oils, rice,
sugar, and tea. The supply of meat,
however, appears adequate. Flocks have
stabilized at preinvasion levels, probably
because most of the 20 million sheep are
safe in the mountains when the fighting
is heaviest.

The cities, especially refugee-swollen
Kabul, are largely fed from imports. In
recent years, about half of the DRA's
grain imports has come from the Soviet
Union.

Scorched Earth? Although there are
many credible reports of deliberate
Soviet/regime destruction of crops,
homes, and agricultural infrastructure, it
appears that the Soviets do not have a
general scorched earth policy. Total crop
destruction has been limited and has not
had much impact on countrywide food
availability.

Electricity shortages fluctuate with
mujakidin damage to the hydroelectric
plants. Market conditions in the pro-
vinces are more varied. Fighting near
the trade routes temporarily raised
prices of items that have to be brought
in from outside.

DRA Economic Policies. A major
component of the regime's initiative to
"broaden the social base" was an effort
to involve the private sector. In January,
when Kabul announced a planned doub-
ling of the state share of retail trade, an
Economic Consultative Council was set
up to improve the climate for "national
traders and entrepreneurs." Its chair-
man, Sayed Amanuddin Amin, was
named a deputy prime minister. In the
summer, Kabul offered to back investors
with low interest loans. Traders have
fared rather well; their margins have
been adequate to cover spiraling
transport costs as well as the obligatory
payoffs to both sides.

The private sector grew apprehen-
sive during the summer as Najibullah
increasingly criticized Commerce
Minister Jallalar, a nonparty civil serv-
ant long regarded as guardian of its
interests. Businessmen worried that
their conscription exemptions and
deferments would be eliminated.

In January, after extensive consulta-
tion with the Soviets, Prime Minister
Keshtmand reported the successful com-
pletion of a Five-Year Plan (1981-86).
He also previewed the next Five-Year
Plan (1986-1991), which commenced in
March, the beginning of the Afghan
year. The large increase in natural gas
output may be due to a new find, hinted
at by Keshtmand in a March speech.

Soviet Economic Relations With
the DRA. In 1985, Moscow pledged $320
million in new economic aid— the second
largest commitment since 1979. The new
agreements provided $120 million in

DRA Five-Year Plans

Growth in Selected Sectors

1981-86

Increase in GNP

11%

Industry

Agriculture

Natural gas extraction

11%

Government worker

housing

200%

State share of retail

trade

22%

State investment

67 billion

Afs.

114.53

Source; Radio Kubut. .January 1986,

food and consumer goods grants for
1985 delivery, and $200 million in or
for projects in Afghanistan's new Fi"
Year Plan. The latter include the
Sarowbi II hydropower plant, tunnel
the Hairatan-Kabul highway and Sal
Pass road, technical schools, and ext
slve road construction and modernizi
tion. Such projects help support Sov
political and military efforts in
Afghanistan.

Soviet aid deliveries reached $22
million in 1985 under old and new
agreements, bringing deliveries sinci«
invasion to $1.6 billion. According to]
Afghan Government, at least 5,000
Soviet economic technicians were
employed in Afghanistan in 1985, wc
ing on 63 projects. Under an agreeni
signed on March 20, 1986, Soviet
assistance would increase from 70%
80% of all foreign aid. The aid progr; i
includes the construction of 840 apar
ments in Microrayon, a Kabul neighb -
hood where many Soviet advisers livi

Soviet-Afghan trade has tripled s ce
the invasion. Trade hovered around t
$1 billion mark in 1985. The Soviets 1 1-
tinued to take Afghan natural gas in
exchange for essential commodities,
machinery, and equipment. Some 65" if
Afghanistan's total trade is now withie
Soviet Union. A trade protocol signet n ,
Moscow on February 13 provided for i
additional 30% increase in Soviet-
Afghan trade during new Five-Year
Plan.

Department of State Bui in

FEATURE
Afghanistan

•jicJal Developments

Eiication

line efforts to build a loyal following
Uijh indoctrination of the population
iinued without evident success. Kabul
'lis to have reached more than a
^•n adult Afghans through its
ricy programs and to have increased
Hilattendance by 15%, to 685,000.
lie Minister Keshtmand claimed that
■ogram to teach minority languages
ey divisive tactic) reached 6,000
lents in 40 schools. This is probably a
li indication of the regime's limited
h outside the capital.
Bringing Afghans, including young
li'en, to study in the U.S.S.R. is an
iTtant element of the "Sovietization"
'I't. About 6,000 Afghans studied in
Soviet Union in 1986. An Afghan-
let protocol signed this summer pro-
■d for 1,800 secondary and university
J lents to go to the U.S.S.R. in the
1 6-87 school year. This represents
a ut a 50% increase over 1985-86.
Study in the U.S.S.R. is unpopular
t(i the restrictions on student move-
it inside the Soviet Union and on the
riculum and to the increased prospect
leing drafted on return. Afghan
dents in the Soviet Union, even in
itral Asia, report being harassed by
il people.

alth

I ? length of the conflict and the disrup-

I I of Afghanistan's rudimentary health
i '•astructui-e have contributed to an

£ )arent increase in the incidence of
cease. Most doctors have fled. Soviet
I /sicians in urban areas or foreign
\ unteers in resistance-controlled areas
( 1 only meet a fraction of the demand
t medical care. The wounded take up
' ny of the existing hospital beds and
< ler medical resources. Sanitation,
i»'er adequate, has become nonexistent
imany areas. Endemic hepatitis
'igues residents and Soviet soldiers
■■ ke. Tuberculosis, which through
vernment vaccination efforts had been
■tually eliminated, is reportedly on the

Status of Women

Women traditionally were responsible
for maintaining Afghan culture. Their
role has been magnified under conditions
of wartime dislocation, especially in the
refugee camps. Women have a major
voice in the decision to leave the coun-
try. But most are reluctant to leave
Afghanistan and give up their traditions.

The Kabul regime claims to promote
the status of women, often featuring
them in propaganda. The position of
most has not changed much, although
some women (for example, Karmal's
wife, Mahbooba, and Anahita Ratebzad)
reached positions of influence under
Karmal. Women's issues apparently
have been downplayed since the acces-
sion of Najibullah. The regime has
formed and armed women's militia units,
but participation has not been
widespread.

Women's role in traditional Afghan
society has been reflected in their
limited participation in the resistance.
Women have not taken a combat role,
but in urban areas they have been active
as spies and messengers for the
mujahidin.

Religion

Under Najibullah, the atheist People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan has
tried harder to appear pro-Islam, for
"we know our people are religious." The
regime is now fronted by an acting chief
of state, Haji Mohammed Chamkani,
who uses the Mecca pilgrimage honorific
as a first name.

The Kabul Marxists' belated recogni-
tion that they are incapable of
eradicating the Islamic faith has increas-
ingly led them to endorse religious sym-
bols and institutions. The attendance of
three top leaders— Karmal, Keshtmand,
and Najibullah— at Eid-nl Adha (Feast of
Sacrifice) prayers in Kabul's central
mosque, August 15, was emphasized in
the regime media.

The government praises "patriotic
clergy" (those who will accept Marxist
rule) and has stepped up efforts' to win
over religious leaders. Currently, the
regime claims more than 10,000 mullahs
on its payroll, in some 5,000 mosques.
The "patriotic clergy" do not enjoy
popular respect and are often attacked
by the resistance.

Kabul publicizes its allocations to
religious institutions, without mention-
ing that these are paid out of the institu-
tions' endowments, which have been
seized by the state under various
"reform" measures. Patronage is used
to foster control. In .lune, Najibullah
asked the National Fatherland F'ront to
"enhance its role in the appointment and
removal of imams."

The Islamic Affairs Department has
been elevated to a ministry; the High
Council of Ulema (religious scholars)
oversees religious activities and prop-
erty. Religious education is more directly
controlled. Priva-te rnadratmahf: (religious
schools) were closed down in 1978 and
replaced by state-run institutions.

Illegal Drugs

Afghanistan continues to be a major pro-
ducer of opium and hashish. The 1985
poppy harvest yielded an estimated
400-500 metric tons; preliminary reports
suggest that the 1986 crop will be con-
siderably larger. In recent years, Afghan
traffickers have acquired the capability
to refine opium into heroin. Much of
Afghanistan's opium and nearly all of its
heroin are exported to or through
Pakistan and Iran.

Lack of progress against drug pro-
duction and trafficking will continue
until political and military stability
returns to Afghanistan. All major
resistance organizations oppose narcotic
production, trafficking, and abuse, and
most individual guerrillas adhere to this
policy.

There are increasing indications that
drugs from Afghanistan, some brought
by returning troops, are turning up in
the Soviet Union, aggravating domestic
drug problems. The Soviet Union also is
apparently being used as a transship-
ment route for Afghan drugs to the
West. In June, Dutch police seized 485
pounds of pure heroin hidden in con-
tainers of Afghan raisins being unloaded
from a Soviet freighter in Rotterdam.

Human Rights

As documented by reputable interna-
tional organizations, e.g., Helsinki
Watch, Amnesty International, and the
UN Human Rights Commission, human
rights violations in Afghanistan continue

ibruary 1987

to be perpetrated by Soviet and regime
forces on a massive scale. ^ Through
reprisal attacks, indiscriminate air and
artillery bombardments, use of antiper-
sonnel mines and booby-trapped toys,
arbitrary killings, and torture, the
Soviets and the Kabul regime have
sought to intimidate the Afghan people
into submission or fleeing the country.
In a February 1986 report to the UN
Human Rights Commission in Geneva,
the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan
concluded that "continuation of the
military solution in Afghanistan will lead
to a situation approaching genocide."

Over one-third of Afghanistan's
prewar population of 15 million has been
violently displaced. Over 1 million
Afghans have been driven into urban
areas, such as Kabul, whose population
has more than doubled since the inva-
sion. An estimated 4 million Afghans
have fled abroad, to become the world's
largest refugee population. Human
rights groups have estimated that more
than 600,000 Afghans have been killed.
Under the Kabul regime, arbitrary
arrests, detention without trial, execu-
tion of political opponents, and the prac-
tice of torture are commonplace. Former
prisoners told Amnesty International
that Soviet advisers had been present at
some torture sessions.

For the second year in a row. the
UN General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion on the human rights situation in
Afghanistan by a vote of 89 in favor, 24
opposed, and 36 abstentions, an
improvement over the 1985 vote. The
resolution was based on the findings of
Professor Felix Ermacora, the UN
Human Rights Commission Special
Rapporteur.

Refugees

Afghans in Pakistan are the single
largest group of refugees in the world.
The Government of Pakistan reports
registration of more than 2.8 million
Afghans; numbers continue to grow,
although at a slower pace than before.
The refugees are sheltered in more than
300 camps, primarily in the rural areas
of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Prov-
ince and Baluchistan. Relief assistance,
including food, shelter, clothing, and
medicine, is provided by the interna-
tional community, primarily through the

UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the World Food Program.

Recently arrived refugees appear to
be in worse shape than their predeces-
sors and are more likely to have been
directly touched by the fighting. They
bring with them fewer possessions, or
income-generating assets such as
livestock, thereby placing an additional
burden on relief efforts in Pakistan.

Despite considerable economic and
political costs, the Government and
people of Pakistan have extended an
impressive welcome to the Afghans. The

Government of Pakistan estimates th^
the annual relief effort costs some $36
million, of which it bears nearly half tl
cost, chiefly expenditures for program
administration and transportation of
relief commodities.

In addition to the financial burden
caring for the Afghans, the citizens of
Pakistan have absorbed costs far more
difficult to calculate. Pakistan's inland
transportation system moves several
hundred thousand tons of relief
materials each year. Land prices have
risen as a result of the refugees'

Women and children fetch water from one of the pumps financed bv UNHCR.

Department of State Bullet

FEATURE
Afghanistan

jsence. and in an economy already
jeriencing high unemployment,
■hans sometimes compete with
kistanis for scarce jobs. The refugees
^i their livestock have strained scarce
V ter supplies and denuded forestlands
i already poor areas near the frontier.
Refugee-Pakistani relations have
ii surprisingly good, with few violent
1 idents, largely due to the strong
c tural and social ties between the
i ligenous population and the
r >vcomers. Since early 1986, however,
Siet/DRA-backed attempts to exploit
Ikistani concern over the refugees'
I 'sence have increased.

In a further effort to minimize social
I isions and address the longer term
■ 'lis of a population with no immediate
I ispect of returning home, many relief
ranizations, with the concurrence of
I '.iivernment of Pakistan, have
i landed their programming to include
1 ijects that enhance refugee
s f-reliance.

Between 1983 and 1986, the World
1 nk, in conjunction with the UNHCR,
( nmitted $20 million for forestation,
i igation, and road-building projects
1 it employ refugee and local labor in
1 3airing environmental damage caused
1 the refugees. This project has
1 'ently been extended for 3 years.

The U.S. Government, the largest
( itributor to the relief effort, pledged
1 arly $50 million for Afghan assistance
i fiscal year 1986, including $25 million

iirth of commodities through the World
iod Program. To date, total U.S. con-
butions for Afghan refugee assistance
ceed $480 million. Other major con-
butors are Japan, Canada, Australia,
.udi Arabia, and a number of West
iropean nations.

The second largest concentration of
■ghan refugees is in Iran. The Iranian
)vernment estimates that up to 1.9
iUion Afghans are within its borders,
.If of them located in the sparsely
ipulated eastern provinces of Khorasan
id Sistan-Baluchistan. Many Afghans
Iran have successfully integrated into
e local population. However, the
wernment does pi'ovide some assist-
ice through its Council for Afghan
efugees, part of the Iranian Ministry of
le Interior. In addition to providing
juipment for an extensive network of
jception and transit centers, UNHCR is

developing programs to train refugees in
the skills they require to become self-
sufficient. The United States is not a
contributor to the UNHCR effort in
Iran.

Regional Environment

Pakistan

During 1986, the war spilled over into
Pakistan much more frequently than in
previous years. The all-out effort by the
Soviets to knock out mujahidin
strongholds in Afghanistan near the
Pakistan border led to a dramatic rise in
border violations. By late November, air
violations numbered more than 700
(compared to more than 200 in 1985) and
artillery shellings more than 150 (com-
pared to about 25 in 1985). Although
most of the air violations were
overflights, some were concentrated
attacks on targets just inside Pakistan.
Pakistan reports the loss of more than
100 civilians killed and 200 wounded in
these attacks, about two-thirds from
shelling.

In mid-May, the Pakistani Govern-
ment announced that an intruding
ground attack aircraft had been shot
down by a Pakistani F-16 and had
crashed inside Pakistan.

This year, Soviet/DRA agents have
been actively engaged in a campaign of
subversion inside Pakistan to turn
Pakistani opinion against the govern-
ment's policy of support for the Afghan
refugees. Beginning with the January
bombing of the Pakistan International
Airlines office in Peshawar, subsequent
terrorist acts in the Peshawar Area have
included train derailments and bombings
in restaurants and at a well-known hotel.

Similar incidents have occurred
elsewhere in the North-West Frontier
Province and in Baluchistan. The Soviets
have spent large sums of money trying
to recruit Pakistani tribesmen to stir up
trouble inside Pakistan and to aid the
Kabul regime against the resistance.

Pakistanis are understandably con-
cerned about acts of sabotage and about
the long-term impact of the war. Never-
theless, Pakistanis continue to show
generous support for the Afghans.

Iran

Iran continues to call for the speedy and
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet
troops and to condemn Soviet efforts to
control Afghanistan, despite improved
relations with the U.S.S.R. Iranian
media strongly publicized Tehran's sup-
port for the resistance during the visit to
Tehran of Soviet First Deputy Foreign
Minister Kornienko, the highest level
Soviet visit since the revolution.

Iranian relations with Afghanistan
deteriorated further in 1986, in tandem
with DRA and Soviet allegations of
increased Iranian support for the
resistance. Early in the year, a group of
Iranian religious leaders returned from
several months in central Afghanistan.
They had been sent by Kliomeini's
designated successor, Ayatollah Mon-
tazari, who has taken an active interest
in the Afghan cause. Soviet media con-
demned the mission.

Complaints of border violations came
from both sides during the course of the
year. In March, Kabul charged Iran with
causing a water shortage in the Afghan
cities of the Helmand Valley, threaten-
ing to reopen a long-dormant dispute.

Iranian opposition groups— Tudeh
and Fedayeen-e Khalq— continue to be
welcome in Kabul. In a congratulatory
message to Najibullah on his accession in
May, Tudeh first secretary Khaveri
called for strengthening ties between his
party and the PDPA.

India

Prime Minister Gandhi reiterated India's
interest in a political solution to the
Afghan problem. India continued to call
for an end to foreign intervention and
interference in Afghanistan. India main-
tained good relations with the Kabul
government and a modest program of
assistance to the DRA. In 1986, India
once again abstained on the UN General
Assembly resolution condemning the
presence of foreign forces in
Afghanistan.

China

China cites the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan as a major obstacle to
improving relations with the U.S.S.R.
On the sixth anniversary of the Soviet
invasion in December 1985, Chinese

Sbruary 1987

media noted that the invasion "sabo-
taged peace and stability" in the area
and posed a threat to China's security.
China viewed Gorbachev's Vladivostok
withdrawal proposal with "interest," but
when the offer proved to be a sham, the
Chinese engaged in sharp public
polemics with the U.S.S.R. and con-
demned Moscow's "facade of sincerity."

International Concern

The plight of the Afghan people has not
escaped the world's attention. Countries
around the globe took special notice of
the sixth anniversary of the Soviet inva-
sion in December 1985. The United
States recognized Afghanistan Day,
March 21, with a presidential
proclamation.

Afghanistan was one of the most
controversial issues at the congress of
the World Peace Council, the most pro-
minent Soviet international front group.
At the congress, held in Copenhagen in
October, Danish Radical Party president
Niels Helveg Pedersen denounced the
"inhuman and brutal war being waged
by the Soviets in Afghanistan." The con-
ference concluded in uproar after 40
demonstrators, many of them Afghan
refugees, were ejected.

In April, a representative of the
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) visited Kabul, the first
visit since contacts were broken in 1982
after Kabul's refusal to allow the ICRC
to visit prisoners held by the regime.
Although the DRA agreed in principle to
the reestablishment of an ICRC presence
in Kabul, the issue of prisoner access has
remained a major stumbling block.

International media interest con-
tinued to report on the plight of the
Afghan people and their heroic resist-
ance. Press coverage of resistance
operations increased, despite the hazards
of traveling inside Afghanistan and
Soviet threats against journalists.

The United States Information
Agency has funded a program to
improve the ability of Afghans to tell
their own story of the occupation and
resistance, particularly through video.

In 1986, the Kabul regime allowed
increased access for foreign journalists,
including those from the West. A group
of reporters was flown in from Moscow
in January, during the customary winter
lull, and to witness Soviet "withdrawal"
ceremonies in October. Journalists,
however, are given little scope to probe
beyond regime interviews or guided
tours.

The Department of State has issued
a warning against travel by U.S. citizens
in Afghanistan because of the war and
the U.S. Government's inability, in a
hostile war zone, to provide consular
protection for American citizens who
may be in distress.

UN Negotiations. Since January
1980, the UN General Assembly has
voted eight times, by overwhelming
margins, for a resolution calling for the
complete withdrawal of foreign forces
from Afghanistan; the restoration of
Afghanistan's independent and non-
aligned status; Afghan self-deter-
mination; and the creation of conditions
that would enable the refugees to return
home with safety and honor. The resolu-
tion, introduced as in the past by
Pakistan and cosponsored by 47 coun-
tries, passed again on November 5, 1986,
by a vote of 122 to 20, with 11 absten-
tions, equaling last year's record positive
vote.

UN attempts to negotiate a settle-
ment date from a November 1980 man-
date of the General Assembly. Negotia-
tions are led by UN Under Secretary
General for Special Political Affairs
Diego Cordovez, the Secretary General's
personal representative. Talks have been
held periodically since 1982 in Geneva.
Cordovez shuttles between delegations
from Pakistan and Afghanistan, offi-
cially informing Iran of the discussions
while unofficially informing the Soviets.
Two sessions of indirect talks were held
in Geneva in 1986. The first, convened in
May, lasted an unprecedented 3 weeks.
The negotiations recommenced July 30
and ran through early August. In addi-
tion, Cordovez shuttled between
Islamabad and Kabul in March and again
in November; during the November shut-
tle, he also visited Tehran.

^S'

k
i

At the May session, the discussion
focused on a timetable for Soviet trooi
withdrawal and on implementation
issues. The DRA dropped its prior
refusal to discuss a timetable without
direct negotiations with Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the parties remain far
apart on this central issue. Pakistani
Prime Minister Junejo on a June visit
Washington revealed that the Soviet-
DRA side had offered a Soviet troop
withdrawal timetable covering a 4-yea
period, which Pakistan rejected. He
indicated that a 3- or 4-month period
would be sufficient.

The UN Secretary General has
reported that the four instruments tha
would comprise the agreement are "vi
tually complete." The text is largely
settled on three of four proposed
instruments, the first dealing with
mutual noninterference in Afghanistan
affairs, the second encompassing interii
national guarantees, and the third
governing the voluntary return of the
refugees.

The fourth agreement, which is to
address the key issue of a Soviet troop;
withdrawal and the interrelationship
between that document and the other
three, is unfinished. The principal
outstanding issue remains an agreemen
on a realistic timetable for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Despite hopes generated at variouf
points in the negotiations, the sides are-
far apart. The Soviet Union has not
substantially altered its original positio?
justifying its presence in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, all sides are committed t!
continuing the talks.

U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan aims at
achieving a negotiated political settle-
ment, predicated on the prompt and
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops
and consistent with eight UN resolutiori
on Afghanistan. The United States sup^
ports UN-sponsored efforts to achieve s
settlement and has expressed in writing
its willingness to lend its political sup-
port to a comprehensive and balanced

Department of State Bullei

:>enient that protects the legitimate
: irity interests of all parties. Absent
^1 a settlement, the United States is
emitted to support the Afghan cause
mull all appropriate means.

Humanitarian Assistance. The

■ ted States has responded to the

ht of the Afghan people by
- lijishing a long-term humanitarian

iiionram for war-affected Afghans.

[inigram emphasizes direct

-taiice to the Afghan resistance
, nee and is intended to provide those
6 aining in Afghanistan with the
(li.ns to sustain themselves. In fiscal
■r 1986, Congress appropriated $15
n ion in economic support funds for
\i -affected Afghans. In fiscal year
i 7, Congress earmarked an additional
Iv, million for the program.
\,ainistered by the U.S. Agency for
r rnational Development, the program
n ides three new projects in health,
!( :ation, and commodity support.

U.S. and European private voluntary
organizations help implement the pro-
gram. Support is being provided from
the United States, France, Belgium,
West Germany, Sweden, United King-
dom, and Austria. In 198ti, total support
for voluntary agencies amounted to $10
million; an additional $10 million is
planned for 1987.

Educational assistance, implemented
through the alliance education commit-
tee, will provide direct support (text-
books, supplies, curriculum development,
teacher training, and stipends) to
primary education in free areas of
Afghanistan. The health project envi-
sions a massive training program of first
aid for emergency care, mobile health
clinics and hospitals for urgent care, a
medical evacuation system, and a supply
system. Basic humanitarian goods, such
as food, agricultural commodities,
medical supplies, clothing, shelter, and
animals also will be furnished. In addi-
tion, under PL-480, a Title II program
consisting of wheat and vegetable oil

lT"

FEATURE

Afghanistan

valued at about $15 million was
approved in 1986 for war-affected
Afghans.

Congress has separately authorized
$10 million for transporting human-
itarian commodities to war-affected
Afghans; the authority also provides
funds to transport Afghan patients
to the United States for medical
treatment.

■For background, see Special Reports 7'.t.
86, 91. 106, 112. 118. 120, 135, and 139.

' 2The U.S. dollar is worth .55 Afghanis at
the official rate. In the Kabul money market,
one of the freest exchanges in the world, it
was 139 Afs/dollar in January, and in
November about 152 Afs/dollar.

■^Siliiiilioii ofhuman nghh hi
Afghanhtiin. United Nations General
Assembly Document A/41/778, 31 October
1986. Amnesty International. AfyhnniMaii:
Torture ofPolitirnl Pri^timcrn. November
1986. See also, Helsinki Watch Committee,
Afghan Children: The Other Wtir. December
1986.H

oruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

Iran and U.S. Policy

Following are the statement by
Secretary Shultz before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the
question-and-answer session with some
members of the committee on December 8,
1986 J

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT^

This is the first time in my 10 years of
service as a Cabinet officer that I have
been asked to take an oath before Con-
gress. I do so in good spirit, fully
recognizing your authority to require an
oath and your duty to ensure that the
record of these proceedings is as full and
true as possible. Taking an oath is
something American citizens do every
day. I regard this act as fulfilling my
duty as a citizen to respect our laws and
institutions.

I want you to know, however, that
when I was sworn in as Secretary of
State, I took an oath "to support and
defend the Constitution of the United
States." I have always considered that
solemn promise to impose the permanent
duty upon me as Secretary of State
always to tell the truth to the President,
the Congress, the courts, and, most
importantly, the American people. In
addition to being a citizen, I am, at the
moment, a public servant. If a public
servant is not prepared to tell the truth,
he has no business being a public serv-
ant, oath or no oath. It is as simple as that.

I am grateful for the committee's
understanding that I must depart at
10:30 in order to meet with President
Mobutu of Zaire, after which I will leave
early this afternoon for Great Britain
and Belgium for meetings with NATO
foreign ministers.

The hearings you are holding come
at a crucial point for the nation. The
President has recognized that serious
problems have been created in our con-
duct of foreign affairs by the manner in
which some individuals implemented our
effort to establish better contacts with
Iran and by the diversion of funds from
arms sales to the Nicaraguan democratic
resistance. He has taken the lead in rec-
tifying any problems that may exist.

• The President has appointed
Frank Carlucci, a respected foreign
policy professional of exceptionally broad
experience and the highest integrity, to
revitalize and lead the National Security
Council.

• He has instituted a senior-level
Special Review Board under the distin-
guished leadership of John Tower to
review the proper role of the National

Security Council and the functioning of
its staff.

• He has recommended the appoint-
ment of an independent counsel to inves-
tigate the possiblity of any wrongdoing
regarding the Iran project.

• He has welcomed a unified con-
gressional approach to its oversight role
in these matters and has promised full
cooperation with its inquiries.

• He has ordered me to implement
an interagency study of our relations
with Iran, and that process is underway
with the experienced leadership of
Under Secretary [for Political Affairs
Michael H.] Armacost.

• And he has instructed his Cabinet
officers to share with the Congress and
the American people all that they knew
about this recent initiative toward
Iran— which is why I'm here with you
this morning.

As you know, I am ready to tell you
everything I knew at the time about our
sales of arms to Iran. The President has
authorized the release of this informa-
tion to Congress. I am not free,
however, to violate the laws of the
United States in the process. Much of
the material that I knew at the time is
still classified. I realize that some of this
material has become public.

But this does not permit me to con-
firm as fact some matters that have, up
to now, been published without official
authority. Furthermore, while it may
seem difficult to believe, some of what I
am ready to tell you is still not publicly
known. Finally, in addition to the prob-
lem of classified material, to tell you all
that I know in public session could well
interfere with ongoing criminal investi-
gations, would improperly reveal intel-
ligence sources and methods, and would
expose privileged communications.

All this pains me greatly. I have
sworn to tell the full truth, and I am
prepared to do so in a manner consistent
with my legal and ethical respon-
sibilities. This can best be done in a
closed session where all my obligations
can faithfully be fulfilled. I want to put
to rest now any doubt as to my readiness
to respond to questions about my prior
knowledge and activity. I have already
made all the information at my disposal
available to the FBI. I have been inter-
viewed by the Department of Justice. I
am ready in this open session to bring
forward all the materials I properly can.
And, at whatever appropriate time you
choose, I am prepared to make a state-
ment and to answer questions in closed
session giving classified details of my
knowledge and activities.

Having said this, I fully believe yo-
have made the right decision by calling
for an initial open session and stating
that this particular hearing might con^ pP
centrate on looking forward. I warmly f}
endorse this purpose. We need very
much to look forward. And I will do so
this testimony.

I will start by looking at our futun
relations in the Persian Gulf area. Tha
subject is of crucial importance to the
nation, and it easily warrants the limit
time we have this morning. So, let me
turn to it, with the hope of leaving tim
for your comments and questions.

The Importance of Iran
and the Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf is important to the
United States— and for many of our k6
friends and allies as well. A quarter of
the free world's oil flows through the
Persian Gulf, and an even higher
percentage sustains the economies of (
allies in Europe and Japan. It is vital
that Western access to that oil con-
tinues. The region is a strategic focal
point— one in which the Soviet Union Y
long sought to expand its presence am
control. We have an important stake iii
denying to them such an expansion.

We have major political interests
with individual gulf states, both in thein
own right and because of their influen<
on events in the Middle East, Afghan-
istan, and elsewhere. Therefore, we
want the states of the gulf to enjoy a
peace and political stability free from
threats of Soviet intimidation, externa*
aggression, or internal subversion. W&
wish to sustain productive relations wi
these states of the region, in part so th»
the supply of oil to the West can con
tinue unabated.

But our strategic, economic, and
political interests in the gulf have been
and continue to be challenged from a
number of quarters— by war and politic
instability in the region, by the Soviet
Union's brutal occupation of Afghan-
istan and persistent efforts to expand i
influence, and by terrorism. And Iran b
come to be a most important element ii
all of these considerations.

The Iran-Iraq war, now in its
seventh year, shows all too clearly howi
continuation of regional conflict and
instability can threaten not only our
interests but those of many states
friendly to us as well. And for that
reason, the United States has consist-
ently worked for an early end to that
conflict, under terms which provide for
the territorial integrity and independ-
ence of both belligerents.

In meeting the threat of escalating
terrorism, we must also deal with the

Department of State Bulled

THE SECRETARY

Ifiii of Iran. The current Iranian
■tnment continues to believe that
■rism is a legitimate instrument of
isn policy. It has been prepared to

> y that instrument when and where
tod its needs. It is in our interest to

. hat it stops.

\s the President has said, he
iiized the transfer of some arms to
iM send a signal that the United

> was prepared to replace the
-ity between us with a new rela-

liip. That signal has been sent. No
:■ r arms shipment will be made to
\>y the United States, and we will
t all our influence to discourage
- sales to Iran by others. The reason
at it is Iran which refuses to end the
1 w ar, and it is the capability of Iran
aitinue the war that we must
i I'ss. Iran cannot expect a better

idiiship with us until it acts to end
I A ai', ceases its support for terrorism,
i-i'S its influence with those who
iiir hostages to achieve their
n :lum.
Dur dealings with Iran are shaped by
: -ategic dilemma. We have a
r-thern" concern— to keep Iran free
'\ let influence— and a "southern"
(Til- to keep Iran from dominating
nlf neighbors. Because Iran con-
11 es to resist Soviet influence but
h atens the gulf, our near-term prior-
i] nust be to reassure gulf Arab states
i jr support and stand fast on our anti-
e orism and arms embargo policies.
i nwhile, we must use alternative
\ inels to bolster Iranian resistance to
ii let influence and focus on shared
1 rests such as Afghanistan. Similarly,
t lility in the gulf will affect our efforts
[ ncourage meaningful movement in
1 peace process between Israel and its
I b neighbors.

) . Policy Toward Iran

■refore, we have a legitimate interest
r 'etter relations with Iran, and the
' sident determined last year that we
I uld respond to approaches from

nents within Iran to see whether
I aian leaders were prepared to shift
lir policies in a more positive direc-
ii. Last Saturday, the President
'.erated our purposes: "to end the war
I he Middle East, to prevent Soviet
!)ansionism, to halt terrorism, and to
:P gain release of American hostages."
I illy support every one of these pur-
ees. I am sure that you and this com-
'ttee likewise support them.

The problems created by recent
'nts were not caused by these pur-
ses but by the way they were imple-
nted in this one instance and by cer-
n unauthorized actions of officials on

whom the President had relied to imple-
ment his policy. Facts being revealed
have made clear, as the President has
forthrightly stated, "that the execution
of these policies was flawed and
mistakes were made."

The policies the President has reaf-
firmed are his own. He has made clear
that it was neither his intent nor his
policy to trade weapons for hostages,
nor to undercut our stand against ter-
rorism. I fully support him and his
policies. As a nation, we must remain
opposed to terrorism in every form. All
terrorism, whether directed against
Americans or others, is unacceptable and
must be eliminated. That principle is
central to our efforts to encourage
broader international cooperation
against state-sponsored terrorism.

Therefore, we must continue to
speak out and take action against all acts
of terrorism. However much we share
the anguish of the families involved, we
must oppose concessions or ransom for
the release of hostages. To do otherwise
would encourage the taking of additional
hostages and would raise the value in the
eyes of the hostage-takers of those
already held. And we must continue to
strengthen our efforts with friends and
allies in such areas as intelligence
exchange and security measures to
thwart terrorism and its attendant
violence and to isolate states which
sponsor and support terrorism.

With respect to Iran, the President
has noted: "The Iranian revolution is a
fact of history, but between American
and Iranian basic national interests
there need be no permanent conflict."
He has also reaffirmed that it was not
his intent to do business with the
Khomeini regime as long as its policies
threaten the peace and stability of the
region. Here again, I fully agree.

We must continue to encourage an
end to regional hostilities and peaceful
relations between all of the gulf states.
We seek a negotiated resolution of the
Iran-Iraq war that respects the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of all
nations in the region.

In working for the stability of the
gulf, we will continue to support the
cooperative efforts of moderate and
friendly states of the region to ensure
their own security and stability. We will
oppose Soviet encroachment in the
region and seek an early end to its occu-
pation of Afghanistan.

Recent Events in a Historical
Perspective

Finally, we must put recent events into
proper historical perspective. The

President has been here for 6 years.
When he took over, the nation was
neither as secure nor as confident as it
should have been.

Where do we stand after 6 years of
President Reagan's leadership in foreign
affairs? Working with Congress and with
the broad support of the American peo-
ple. President Reagan's policies have
brought us to the threshold of a new and
remarkably different world— a world in
which America's interests, America's
pride, and America's ideals are
flourishing.

What is this different world? Why is
it cause for renewed confidence and
hope for the future? Because:

• We can glimpse now, for the first
time, a world in which the incessant and
pervasive fear of nuclear devastation is
reduced. The threat of nuclear conflict
can never be wholly banished, but it can
be vastly diminished by careful but
drastic reductions in offensive nuclear
arsenals and by creating an ability to
defend against them. It is just such
reductions— not limitations in expansion,
but reductions— and just such defenses
that are the vision President Reagan is
working to make a reality.

• Only a few years ago, the democ-
racies of the world were believed to be
an embattled, shrinking handful of
nations. Today, people struggling under
oppressive regimes of the right and the
left can see democracy as a vital force
for the future. Vital but nonviolent
movements toward more open societies
have succeeded. The failure of closed,
command economies is more evident
every day. A new wind of change is
blowing.

• People who are ready to stand up
for freedom and have no choice but to
fight for their rights now know that
communism's march is not inevitable.
President Reagan is a freedom fighter—
and the world knows it. And I stand with
Ronald Reagan.

Strong defenses, sound alliances,
and support for the free economic and
political development of peoples
everywhere: that's what President
Reagan stands for. His policies are not
the policies of a party. They are the
policies of all the American people. They
are inevitable policies if our country is to
remain the best and greatest on Earth
and the hope of humanity everywhere.
Let us show the strength of our free
institutions by a full investigation of
every detail of this Iran episode. But as
we do so, let us unite, pull ourselves
together, and keep this country moving
ahead to meet the dangers and the
opportunities of this moment.

bruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER
SESSION

Chairman Fascell. Everything you say
here in your testimony is obviously
absolutely right since you are a man of
honor and have told the truth. But
someone's zeal in this U.S. Govern-
ment of ours, in this Iranian arms
deal, has put the credibility of U.S.
foreign policy at the lowest ebb that I
know of.

It has been alleged that you were
opposed to this Iranian initiative as a
member of the National Security Coun-
cil and as Secretary of State. If you
were, did you convey your concern to
the President, and, if you did, when
did you do it?

A. I conveyed my concerns on many
occasions— in two full meetings, on
another occasion, according to my
records, and I don't think anyone
involved in this is under any illusion
whatever about my views.

Chairman Fascell. I'm not sure I
understand whether or not you con-
veyed your concern to the President or
not.

A. Yes.

Chairman Fascell. In opposition to
the Iranian arms deal?

A. Let me comment on that. I sup-
ported and continue to support, as my
statement indicates, the idea of trying to
see if we can't rearrange the furniture a
little bit insofar as Iran is concerned,
and there are various ways to try to do
that which I support and which is the
President's basic intent. So I support his
policy.

However, when it comes to the use
of arms, I have a different view. But I do
believe that it's a legitimate subject for
debate as a policy matter. The President
listened to views pro and con, and he has
said publicly that in the end, he decided
that he should send a signal— I think that
was his word— to Iran to show our
serious intent, and so he authorized
some arms shipments to Iran for that
purpose.

You can argue in favor of it, and the
President has put forward the argu-
ments in favor of it; you can argue
against it, and the various people have
done so. Nevertheless, it's a legitimate
issue. The President made a decision
about it, and that's one of the things you
get the right to do when you get elected
President. You get the opportunity to
undertake those tough calls, and he
stood up to it.

Mr. Broomfield. There's two
aspects of this that really disturb me.

One is the arms transfer to Iran,
which I thought was extremely ill-
advised. But my question this morning
deals with the transfer of funds to
support the contra effort. Over the
weekend, we read about the Sultan of
Brunei contributing large sums of
money into a secret Swiss bank
account to support the contras.

I wonder how many other Third
World countries have done the same
thing? Who has control of this fund,
and who handles it, basically? What
knowledge do you have on that partic-
ular fund that circumvents what I
believe is the spirit of the law in sup-
port of the contra effort in Nicaragua?

A. First of all, it would not be
proper for me to talk about any par-
ticular third country, and so I will not do
that. I did see a report in the press that
during a visit to Brunei last summer, I
raised this issue or sold the Sultan on
transferring funds. That is not correct. I
did visit Brunei. It was the only ASEAN
(Association of South East Asian
Nations] country that I had not visited,
and I wanted to visit each of them, just
as I try to stop in the Pacific island
states and stopped in Palau on that same
trip. But there were no conversations
with any Bruneian during that visit by
me of this matter.

Having said that, let me go on and
say, first reminding you, that in August
1985, Congress approved $27 million in
humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan
Democratic Resistance. The funds were
appropriated in December for obligation
through March 31, 1986. At the time,
the Congress expressly confirmed that,
in addition to expending this $27 million,
the law did not preclude— I'm quoting
from the law that you passed— "activities
of the Department of State to solicit
such humanitarian assistance for the
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance."

So it was a perfectly proper activity
for the Department of State, for me, to
do that. There's nothing illegal about it.
There's nothing improper about it. Quite
the contrary. It was the policy of the
United States, put into place by congres-
sional action signed by the President
after due debate, to provide humani-
tarian assistance and to permit the
Department of State to solicit funds. We
went about it very carefully and con-
sidered it last summer because, with the
delays, you remember, in enacting the
final appropriations— even though both
Houses had voted— the resistance was
having great trouble. They were incur-
ring debts. They didn't have funds.

And so in discussions with Assistant
Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs
Elliott] Abrams, we tried to think

[lai

iliil

through where we might properly solic 9^'
some funds. We wanted to be very
careful that we lived completely by the
spirit, let alone the letter, of the law an
didn't get involved with a country whe
it might be thought that we had treme
dous leverage, say, because of our aid
program or something of that kind. So
we were very, very careful about that.

We did successfully persuade one
government to make a contribution. Sc
that is what we did. The discussions wi
the government were conducted by
Assistant Secretary Abrams but with r
authority, explicitly, and I feel very go^
about anything that I can do to suppon
the people in Nicaragua who are fightiii
for the freedom and independence of
that country.

If you don't think it's of any
significance, let me just read you, as a
snippet, a little insight into what's goin
on down there from excerpts from a
report I got the other day from our
embassy in Nicaragua. There are peoplt
in our embassy who have been around.
I'm just reading from this report.

"The Nicaraguan communists
celebrated their anniversary this year (
November 7, exactly the anniversary
date of the Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia. The Soviet motif was nicely caa
ried through as the special foreign
guests here for the 25th anniversary
were taken by the Nicaraguan host nig|
after night to performances of the
Bolshoi Ballet. Fragments of 'Swan
Lake' passed before the eyes of Third
World revolutionaries and rustic Sandij
nistas whose sensibilities to the expreS'
sion and synchronization of the dance
are, to put it kindly, imperfectly
developed. But Nicaraguans are getting
used to all the Kremlin arts, both the
arts of peace and those of war."

Those of you who know our missiop
can probably figure out who wrote this,

"For anyone who has been in
Moscow's Red Square on November 7,
what happened here on that day and tht
next was redolent with similarities
evoking those sounds and sites.

"In Moscow the November 7 parad«
was always worth very careful attentioi
because it tended to reveal both what
the leadership thought it most importar
to say about Soviet society as well as
some aspects of its true nature.

"All of the things present in
Moscow, or almost all, were to be found
in Managua on the day of its parade,
November 8. Just as the Soviet Defens(
Minister begins the ceremonies by takir
the salute of his troops standing in an
open car, before returning to the top of
the Lenin Mausoleum to join his col-
leagues for the march pass, so Humbert

THE SECRETARY

foa did the same in Managua to the
'I'ded hurrahs of the troops. Then the
ide began with various Sandinista
s marching in tight, perfectly formed
:ires, using the port arms tradition of
Soviet forces and the goosestep bor-
ed from the Prussians by the last
rs for their household regiments, but
Lir time sharply odorous of Nazi
ades. Then came armored personnel
,i-iers."

Chairman Fascell. Is that a regular
Biision report to the Secretary of
Ste?

A. This is a special-
Chairman Fascell. I think we got

tl drift. Could we just put that in the

r ord?

A. Let me just finish it because I
tl ik you ought to hear it.

"Then came armored personnel car-
r -s, towed artillery, and tanks. The
oy thing missing from the Soviet
ndel was the intercontinental ballistic
n isiles with the warheads painted red
V ich always bring up the end of a
J scow parade.

"The Nicaraguan troops are
L formed exactly like Soviets. The
f rines looked just in from the Baltic
f it at Kronstadt. The infantry forma-
t as could have been Soviet regiments,
I formed and sand-colored fatigues for
1 ^hanistan. The T-55 tank com-
I nders in their leather helmets were
( ectly out of a Soviet-armored division,
I i the reservists carried in Soviet
1 icks with their wide-beamed Soviet
1 mets recalled the motorized rifle divi-
i ns one sees in the western military
( tricts of the Soviet Union."

So that's what's going on down
1 jre.

Mr. Hamilton. We appreciate your
: pearanee here today. As I under-
ind your testimony at this point,
u've said that you personally
posed the sale of arms to Iran. And,
condly, you said that you did not
low of the diversion of any of the
nds to the contras until it became
iblic or shortly there before.

I have two things I'd like you to
imment on. Mr. McFarlane [formerly
ssistant to the President for National
jcurity Affairs] has said publicly, "I
Iked to the Secretary of State
jpeatedly and often of every item in
le relationship with Iran."

Secondly, I'd like you to clarify
tr me what the Administration
elieves the mistakes to have been,
he President has said, "I did not
lake a mistake." And then in his
adio address the other day, he said,
Mistakes were made." I think it's

important for the Congress to under-
stand how the Administration analyzes
this event.

Was the mistake in supplying arms
to Iran? Was the mistake in diverting
funds to the contras"! Was the mistake
in not informing the Congress? Just
what is it that the President referred
to when he said that mistakes were
made?

A. Very clearly, it was a mistake to
get involved in the illegal funds transfer.
That, I think-

Mr. Hamilton. To the contras?

A. To the extent— I don't know the
ins and outs of that. I don't want to act
like a judge passing judgment on what
happened— I don't have the facts— but
from what I have seen and what the
Attorney General said, some things took
place that were illegal, and so that's
clearly a mistake.

I might say it's not only a mistake
because it's illegal, but it has confused
the situation insofar as our support for
the Nicaraguan resistance is concerned
and unfairly to them, because they have
no part in that. So it's a mistake from
that standpoint as well.

I do not know in detail— in fact, I
don't know much at all about the arms
transfers that apparently took place in
the calendar year 1986. I know more
about what took place during 1985, and
I'm prepared in a closed session, based
on documents that I have, cable traffic
and notes that were taken at the time—
and I don't claim that my notes encom-
pass everything that I knew, but I've
tried to stick in my— what I've prepared
for a closed session to things that I could
be pretty confident of, recognizing that
in these things when you go into them
and you are questioned and people
remind you of this or that, it jogs your
memory.

But at any rate, I knew that arms
transfers to Iran were periodically con-
sidered after June 1985 as part of an
effort to improve relations with Iran and
secure the release of our hostages. There
was considerable discussion between Mr.
McFarlane and me about that and, at
least on one occasion that I distinctly
recall, with the President.

I learned— not as a result of being
involved in the development of the plan
but, so to speak, as a plan was about to
be implemented— I learned in various
ways of two proposed transfers during
1985. But I was never informed and had
the impression that they were not con-
summated. I later heard that one ship-
ment had misfired— that is, it had been
delivered, but due to Iranian rejection of
the arms involved was not consum-
mated.

I knew that in December 1985,
following a full-scale discussion of this
matter with the President, that we
instructed a mission that talked with the
Iranians that were the interlocutors, or
representing themselves as the inter-
locutors; they were told on instructions
that we would engage the Iranians in a
dialogue if they released our hostages
but that we would not sell them arms.
That was an explicit part of the instruc-
tion that the President authorized.

So there was, you might say, a
period of time from more or less the
middle of 1985 until this period following
the December meeting in which there
was a fair amount of discussion of the
subject— and I expressed my views dur-
ing that period— in which some things
were apparently structured— I can't tell
you exactly how— but which, so far as I
could see, never came off.

And at the end of this process, after
a full discussion, wanting to see the
dialogue with Iran continue but having
become convinced that there shouldn't
be an arms transfer connected with it,
the instructions that I referred to were
the instructions of the mission.

The subject was reviewed again by
the President in a full-scale meeting in
January 1986. This was not a meeting in
which an explicit decision was stated.
People made arguments. I made my
arguments.

However, I could fairly conclude
from the meetings that the point of view
that I thought had prevailed in
December was not— didn't seem to be
prevailing, but it wasn't as though there
was some sharp decision.

I learned in November that a finding
was made authorizing, among other
things, arms sales, but I was not
informed of that finding at the time, so I
can't tell you anything about the think-
ing that went into the finding as such.
That came as a—

Mr, Gilman. The finding was in
January —

A. The finding was in January, and
I was notified of it at about the same
time as you were notified of it. I did not
learn about any transfers of arms during
1986 in a direct way, but, as is always
the case, you have bits and pieces of
evidence float in, and so I weighed in on
the basis of that, restating my views.
What I heard was conflicting; at times
that there was some sort of deal or
signal in the works and at other times
that the operation was closed down.
And, in fact, the word used at one time
with me was that the people involved
had been told to "stand down."

So, again, there was this ambiguity
from my standpoint. I would say to you

ebruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

that I did take the position, in part
because of all the problems that we have
with leaks and recognizing that if the
President's initiative had any chance of
success, it would have to be a secret
initiative for all the reasons that have
been developed— perfectly good reasons—
that whenever I would be called upon to
do something to carry out those policies,
I needed to know, but I didn't need to
know things that were not in my sphere
to do something about.

This past weekend our Ambassador
in Beirut, Mr. John Kelly, responded to
an all-post directive that we put out. We
put out a directive from the State
Department— and I don't have the date
of it, but shortly after this investigation
started— telling our posts to discover
anything that they had about this, to
secure it, and to make it available here
in Washington. So I got a response from
Mr. John Kelly, and I will read his
response.

"I met in Washington in July or
August 1986 with Robert McFarlane
who briefed me on the hostage negotia-
tions involving arms to Iran as an
inducement. Between the dates of
October 30 and November 4, 1986, I had
numerous conversations with Lt. Col.
Oliver North [deputy director for
political-military affairs on the National
Security Council staff] and Richard V.
Secord [retired U.S. Air Force major
general] relating to the hostage negotia-
tions with Iran. During that period I
received and sent numerous 'back chan-
nel' messages to and from the White
House, Admiral Poindexter JAssistant to
the President for National Security
Affairs], concerning the hostage negotia-
tions. Those messages were transmitted
and received in what is referred to as
the 'privacy channel' using CIA
communications facilities.

"In accordance with our standard
practice at Embassy Beirut"— which they
have to do, given the situation there—
"all of that message traffic was
destroyed thereafter at my direction."
That is a standing order in a post like
Beirut— nothing wrong with that. I
would assume that copies may be
available at CIA Headquarters or at the
White House Situation Room.

"With regard to my conversations
with McFarlane, North, and Secord, I
stand ready to discuss them with appro-
priate officials upon the Department's
direction."

I have instructed Ambassador Kelly
to return to Washington immediately,
bringing with him all records of sucli
activities to be available to the FBI and
other appropriate investigative bodies. I

am, to put it mildly, shocked to learn this
after the event from an ambassador, but,
at any rate, I am just reading you this
report.

Throughout the entire period, I
opposed the transfer of arms to Iran
until Iran stopped the war in the gulf,
ended its support for terrorism, and
obtained the release of the hostages.
Throughout the entire period, I fully
agreed with the President's objective of
finding a way to modify Iran's behavior
in a manner consistent with our
strategic interests and those of our
friends in the region and around the
world.

The President has confirmed publicly
that he believed in principle in the light
of all the circumstances that we should
use a limited amount of arms to send a
signal. There are legitimate arguments
to be made in favor of this decision, and
the President has made them, and I fully
accept their legitimacy and the legiti-
macy and propriety of the President's
decision and right to make that decision
and support that.

It's difficult for me to talk about par-
ticular incidents without violating secu-
rity requirements, to give you a full
accounting, which, as I've said, I'm
perfectly prepared to do, but it must be
done in a way that is proper. But I
believe a review of the classified
records— if you go through it with me—
will support the statements that I have
made, and it will also show that my
knowledge of what took place was
sporadic and fragmentary and materially
incomplete. So I'm not the witness to tell
you all of the things that took place,
because I'm not informed.

Insofar as any question— I'm
repeating, but I want to repeat— any
question of diversion of funds to support
the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance,
my knowledge was not fragmentary. It
was non-existent.

Chairman Fascell. The committee
will be happy to receive those
classified documents and hold them in
accordance with the rules of the
committee.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Has the U.S.
Government undertaken a counter-
intelligence review of the Iran initi-
ative and related events to determine
whether the U.S. Government fell for a
covert action by a third country?

A. We are reviewing all of our
efforts, what took place, carefully, and
determining how best to go forward in
support of the objectives the President
has set out and which, as far as I can
see, are broadly agreed to. But we want
to make it clear to Iran that thev cannot

expect any fruitful relationship with u
as long as they fail to exert the influei
that they undoubtedly can to get our
hostages released and to stop terroriS'

Now, of course, bringing the Iran
Iraq war to an end is a very important
objective for us, and we believe that o
tacts with us, or perhaps we can work
with others who do have contacts with
Iran, can bring about some change. Sc
far there's little evidence of it.

But, at any rate, we are reviewing
matters carefully, and what materials
have been denied to us in the State
Department— that is, certain materials
collected by the intelligence communit
were not made available to us— those j
now available to us. This review is goii
forward, as I said, under the general
direction of Under Secretary [for
Political Affairs Michael H.] Armacost
the President's direction.

Mr. Yatron. Did the Inter-
American Affairs Bureau at State hai
any knowledge of or was it involved
the coordination of funds for the con
tras from the Iran arms sales?

A. No. Let me say, not to their
knowledge. If there were some funds p
somewhere that were useful, then they:
were trying to provide— properly-
humanitarian aid when that was
authorized, and, since the $100 million
authorized, they've been involved in
that, and there is an explicit congres-
sional mandate for the State Depart-
ment to play a strong role in that, and
we're trying to do that.

But nobody in our bureau that I
know of, and I'm certain Elliott Abram
and his group, had no knowledge of thi;
Iranian funds transfer question at
all— zero.

Mr. Yatron. Was the bureau awan
of the methods by which the contras
were receiving lethal aid during the
period in which the Boland amendmei
was in effect?

A. We don't presume to know
everything that a person may do
somewhere in the government. It was
clear that from private sources,
presumably, some aid was flowing to th(
people fighting for freedom and indepenc
ence in Nicaragua, and personally I
applaud that. There's a lot of aid flowing
from America to the Nicaraguan commu'
nists. There are quite a few Americans
down there. That's their right to be. Ano
it shouldn't be surprising that there are
Americans who want to help the people
fighting for freedom.

Mr. Yatron. To what extent do
intelligence operatives from other
agencies apprise the bureau of their

itiii

it:

iBl

Department of State Bulletii

THE SECRETARY

ivities with respect to coordinating
ding for contra operations, and
s the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
erican Affairs receive such reports?

A. He does, and he chairs the inter-
ncy group that includes people from
)f the agencies involved whose task it
evaluate what is going on and to
;e recommendations, if needed, for
legislation or what our policies
Id be and to oversee the tactics
lived.

Mr. Yatron. From the management
idpoint, are you apprised on a
eular basis of the Department's
iv)lvement in contra operations by
Liistant Secretary Abrams, and do
hie reports include summaries of the
B lligence community's operations?

A. I see reports from time to time. I
e Elliott Abrams frequently, and so I
r to keep abreast of what is going on
sest I can. I have lots of things to
:e ) abreast of, but I do try to stay
rmed and, of course, most impor-
l\ , to see that the people involved
<ti'iing, capable people, and I put Mr.
mis down as one who knows what
1 1, ling.

Mr. Oilman. We appreciate your
a lid response, and you've demon-
t ted once again why so many of us
II he committee have full confidence
n le manner in which you have
If -oaehed this problem,

I'm disturbed about the mistakes
h were made, as many of us on the
0 mittee are, and I think one of the
sous mistakes is a lack of consulta-
ii . And what I'm concerned about
i( is the disclosures you've made to
16 iince you did have some knowledge
ir since the State Department had
ti wledge prior to the event, why
h e was not consultation with the
A gress. There are several statutes
h require consultation, particularly
5(tion 1.5 of the State Department's
S;ic Authorities Act which sets out
h Department's responsibility to
icp us informed with respect to
Mvities that are within our
lusdiction.

Can you tell us whether you were
aier any constraint, or whether the
D lartment was under any constraint,
w to reveal any of the information
«'h regard to the Iranian arms sales?
.\. No. We were, of course, bound
Iccisions that would be made about
• ■thing that was to be held in con-
nee. But as far as our measuring up
111- responsibilities was concerned, we
I' engaged, you might say, in an
inient about what should be done.

And there were these incidents that
came along that I have pointed up for
you, without being in a position to, for
various reasons— partly lack of
knowledge, partly because of the nature
of the open hearing here— to give you
full information about them.

Mr. Gilman. But once the project
was underway, didn't you feel that the
Department had a necessity of con-
sulting with the Congress with regard
to these initiatives?

A, I don't feel that we should sort of
bring all our internal debates to the Con-
gress, particularly on something like
this. Of course, policy toward Iran,
policy toward terrorism— all of these
basic things that have been laid out, we
have discussed here in the committee
many times.

Mr. Gilman. But I'm not talking
about debate. I'm talking about the
actual operation that was underway.
Once that was underway, and some of
that was brought to the Department's
attention, wasn't there a responsibility
for the Department to consult with
Congress?

A. Perhaps so. I'm not here to claim
that my actions in all this were all that
they should be— you'll have to judge that
for yourself— and I can tell you what I
knew and what I did.

Mr. Gilman. You mention
Ambassador Kelly's report to the CIA
but a failure to report to your office.
Is that an unusual or a unique situa-
tion or something that's in violation of
any of the State Department's
regulations?

A. I hope it's unique. There is sup-
posed to be— I say supposed to be— a
chain of command that goes from the
President to me— not to the NSC
[National Security Council], to me, and
through the Assistant Secretary, by and
large, to the ambassador. That's the
chain of command-
Mr. Gilman. And is that a violation
then?

A. —and if something comes up that
causes an ambassador to go outside the
chain of command, there needs to be a
good reason. Now, it may be very well
that Ambassador Kelly will say that he
was told on the authority of the Presi-
dent that he was supposed to do this and
that, and I would think that he would
have checked with me to see if that were
so.

Mr. Gilman. Who would enable
such an ambassador to waive that
responsibility?

A. At this point, all I can tell you is
the cable that I got. I don't consider it a
satisfactory situation.

I think we should recognize, how-
ever, what life is like in Washington.
Now, come on, here we are, and who
was it— the Canadian Ambassador-
coined the phrase, "It's never over."
Nothing ever gets settled in this town.
It's not like running a company, nor
even a university. It's a seething
debating society in which the debate
never stops, in which people never give
up, including me, and so that's the
atmosphere in which you administer.

And what I try to do is stay as close
to the President as I can— and I feel very
close to him, and I admire and respect
him tremendously, I think he has trans-
formed the situation— done a marvelous
job. I try to stay very close to him, and I
support his policies. I don't win every
argument, by a long shot, but I am in the
arguments, and when the President
decides something, then I do my best to
make it work.

Chairman Fascell. The evidence is
quite clear, it's very, very — almost
impossible and incredible to bypass all
of the institutions of government and
the checks and balances built into our
system in an effort to drive a policy
decision.

A. I think it's also true that anyone
in this town who does something, let's
say is controversial and who thinks it
can be a secret, should have his head
examined.

Chairman Fascell. I certainly
agree.

A, You should say to yourself, how
is this— how am I going to defend this
when it comes out? It's going to come
out. Now, I personally believe that there
is a lack of discipline in the government
beyond what I remember when I was
here before, which makes it difficult to
operate, and there are things that should
be done secretly and which should not be
consulted about.

I'll give an example. Last September
we were in the final throes of our
negotiations on confidence-building
measures in the CDE [Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe]
in Stockholm, and, clearly, the negotia-
tion was coming toward the short
strokes, and the Soviets were beginning
to adjust their position. And it was
clearly the time in the bargaining when
we should try with our allies to strike a
deal if a good and reasonable deal in our
interests was available, and we felt it

)ruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

And so with the President's author-
ity, we changed our instructions to our
ambassador to give him some negotiat-
ing room. The new instructions promptly
appeared in The New York Times, about
the same time they arrived for our
negotiator. So that pulled the rug right
out from under him. You give away his
negotiating position. You don't want to
tell the other side that you're willing to
do X; you want to hold that and get
something for X. And it just drives you
crazy. The ambassador got it straight-
ened around, and we wound up with a
good deal, but it was a very embarrass-
ing and deleterious incident. And, of
course, it makes other countries feel,
how can they deal with us when we have
no capacity to do anything in a properly
secret way. There are lots of things that
have to be that way, and which you
shouldn't be consulted upon, because
there's no need for that.

Mr. Solarz. For 6 years, the
Administration has said it would never
yield to the demands of terrorists, pay
ransom for hostages, or sell arms to
states that sponsor and support ter-
rorism. It now turns out that we have
done all three.

How could this have happened,
how much damage has it done to our
credibility, and what assurances can
you give us that it won't happen
again?

A. The President decided to give a
signal. I'm just quoting the President
here. He's made a public statement of
what he authorized and why, and he has
acknowledged that in doing so, he
recognizes that there were risks as well
as potential benefits, and he had to
weigh that.

Right now, because of the way this
has blown up, the emphasis is all on the
risks. I dare say that if somehow we had
our hostages all returned, and we saw a
different kind of situation in one way or
another emerging in Iran, and this came
out, people would say, "Well, the Presi-
dent showed guts. He took a risk, and he
knew that if it didn't work out, he would
get panned, but he did it for a good pur-
pose."

So I've told you what my opinion
was, but I believe the President's deci-
sion was a perfectly legitimate decision,
and at this point, perhaps in part
because it all has emerged the way it
has, it has not succeeded as he wished.

Mr. Solarz. Were you consulted or
informed about the request of Lt. Col.
North to Ross Perot [U.S. business-
man] to pay $2 million in ransom
money for the release of our hostages?

And is it conceivable to you that Lt.
Col. North would have made such a
request without the approval of the
President or some higher authority?

A. I was not informed. So far as I
know, the President wasn't informed.
But I have no knowledge about Lt. Col.
North's activities in this regard. I think
the offer of Mr. Perot, if that is what
took place— I don't know; I just read
about it— I think it's outrageous.

Mr. Leach. You come before us as
a man of very great integrity. You've
been a good soldier even when I think
many of us considered the Administra-
tion's policies very, very wrong. In the
past, when those of us have differed
with you, the issues have entirely been
those of judgment and policy. It
appears today we have a political crisis
that's become a constitutional confron-
tation.

A. I don't believe it's a constitu-
tional confrontation at all. What the
President has done is move out people
who seem to be involved. He has put in a
new and outstanding National Security
Council director [Frank Carlucci]; he has
asked for the appointment of a Special
Prosecutor; he has said that he will make
available to the Congress and instructed
me to come here and talk to you.
Where's the constitutional crisis? There
is no constitutional crisis.

Mr. Leach. It revolves around the
issue of whether a war can be illegally
prosecuted. But before getting to this,
I was intending to say something fur-
ther, kind about yourself.

A. Please. [Laughter]

Mr. Leach. In this confrontation, it
appears to me that you and the Depart-
ment have stood rather firmly on the
side of law. and I personally think it
would be ironic if your job were placed
in jeopardy. Frankly. I hope it isn't
true that the only thing worse in
public life of being proven wrong is to
be proved right when your boss is
visibly wrong.

A. I don't say that I've been proved
right. It could very well have come out
some other way.

Mr. Leach. It may be the case. In
any regard, my question is aimed at
the future. We all know from history
that leaders, when they're embattled,
sometimes are prone to seek outlets in
belligerency sometimes even more.

My question is, given the great
prospect for arms control, given the
prospect as well that there might be an
island somewhere — potentate
somewhere — that might be bombed,
can you assure this committee that

lit

iSl

there is a good chance that we will ^
seek peace and arms controls, an
anecdote to this scandal, instead of
some sort of outbreak of political or
military crisis?

A. I can assure this committee tb
the effort to deal with the present
Iranian matter that we're discussing
here today is going to have nothing tc
with decisions about arms control or
other activities. Those have to stand c
their feet.

What I was trying to do in my opi
ing statement, and I believe in doing i
was following what both the chairmar
and ranking member were recommem
ing, is to say that in addition to doing
the investigating, the important thing
to get on with the business and to let
people who are supposed to do the im
tigating investigate. But let's not geti
put in the center of all activity so thai
we're paralyzed. We are not paralyze^
We are working hard on all of these
issues, including the issues of arms
control.

There, at least in my judgment,
we're finally getting up and on the tai
at least the numbers of dramatic redi
tions in intermediate-range missiles ol
an equal basis. It really fulfills the
strategy and tactics involved in the
NATO dual-track decision— that was .
big achievement— in getting the numl
up and on the table and the beginning
counting rules and the beginning of
some interstructure for drastic reduc-
tions in strategic arms. That represei
a tremendous advance.

We are a long way from agreeme*
And so our task is somehow to captui
that common ground that we arrived
with the Soviets and capitalize on it. 1
a hard thing to do but we are actively*
trying to do it. Max Kampelman [heab
the U.S. delegation on arms control
negotiations] spent last week in Gene^
with his counterparts, for example.

Mr. Honker. As you know, this
committee is primarily interested in|
the foreign policy implications of tM
activities and, specifically, where
those activities were contrary to V.i
policy: (1) contrary to our official
policy of our government of not ship
ping arms to terrorist nations; (2) cc
trary to this Administration's stated
policy of neutrality in the Iraqi-Iran i
war; (3) contrary to the explicit polit
of the Congress on not giving milita
assistance to insurgent groups whic
were engaged in the overthrow of tli
Nicaraguan Government; and (4) con
trary to the enunciated policy of botl
the White House and the Congress o
efforts to get the allies to quit doing
business with terrorist nations.

Department of State Bull n

THE SECRETARY

As the Cabinet officer who is
riponsible for the conduct of this
ion's foreign policy, if you are tell-

us this morning — and I believe all
ous feel you're stating the truth —
tit your role was zero or nonexistent,
t;n how is it possible —

A. My role is nonexistent insofar as
tl apparent reported use of funds
Tierated by sales of arms to Iran and
: diversion of those funds to help the
.varagTjan resistance. I knew nothing
aiiut that. I did not say that I knew

liing about any of the other things.
,, U' to the contrary. I tried to tell you
wat I knew about it.

Mr. Bonker. I appreciate that
c rification. But, nonetheless, many
©these activities were directly con-
tiry to the stated policies of our
g ernment. My question is. how is it
pisible for this duplicitous activity to
gon? In other words, how is it pos-
s le that another agency, aside from
ti State Department, is engaged in
a ivities or operations that are con-
t rv to the official policv of the
I ited States?

Shouldn't the State Department
a ert its natural constitutional,
p per role over the conduct of the
fi sign policy so we don't end up with
c tradictory policies that possibly
c fuse not only our allies but people
h e in America?

A. First of all, the President made a
p 'lie statement explaining his reason-
it for sending a signal, a signal involv-
ii arms transfers that you have
c racterized in various ways and which
h e been widely characterized as such.
T >re is a whole other side to that argu-
n fit which the President presented,
e 'laining to the American people and
tl rou. why he decided to send that
s lal. knowing full well the risks
ii olved but seeking an objective that, if
ilould be achieved, I'm sure that
e rybody would applaud. So that's a
d ision that the President made,
liitimately.

Now, insofar as the State Depart-
nnt is concerned, I believe it is correct
tsay that we do not have a foreign
picy in the State Department; the
resident has a foreign policy. I work

the President. We are engaged in a
H CSS. and I am, by directive and by
cnmon understanding and I hope by
I association with the President, prin-
( al foreign policy adviser to him. But it
i he President's policy. It's always
1 ?n clear to me. and I try to keep it
I. 'ore me in my 10 years of experience
i|a Cabinet officer, that I didn't go out
id get elected. The President did, so
' s the boss. He's the guy that calls the

shots, and I try to help him formulate
policy, and I try to help him execute it.

I believe that the conduct, the opera-
tional conduct, of diplomatic activity
should be lodged in the State Depart-
ment and by and large it is. If there is a
lesson out of all this, insofar as how-
things operate are concerned, I think the
lesson is that operational activities and
the staff who are conducting operational
activities out of the National Security
Council staff is very questionable and
shouldn't be done except in very rare
circumstances.

The example is given of Henry Kiss-
inger's diplomacy with China, and, of
course, that's spectacular. Everybody
refers to it. It was a wonderful thing. On
the other hand, to the extent that it
causes other people to aspire to be
Henry Kissinger, it can get you into
trouble. There's only one. They broke
the mold when they made him.

Mr. Studds. I think we may have
gotten some sympathy from one
another, that is, the committee and the
Secretary of State. All of these years,
we've sat here in great frustration, not
being able to find out what was going
on, and now we learn to our even
deeper frustration that neither the
Secretary of State nor the President
knew what was going on in some of
these cases. I don't mean that
facetiously. I understand and I sense
some of the agony in what you've said.

There is an op-ed piece, as I
suspect you know, today in The
Washington Post by the Director of
Communications in the White House
[Patrick J. Buchanan] which comes
perilously close to saying, and I think
one could say does say, that the end
justifies the means, at least in the case
of American policy in Central America.

Mr. Buchanan says the President
is right. Oliver North is an American
hero, and he says things about his
kidney and spleen and his heart and
his soul and when we cease to produce
soldiers with said qualities, that this
country has gone into an irreversible
decline. He calls them the Billy
Mitchell of this generation. And the
clear message of that piece is that,
thank God, there's someone around
here with guts, notwithstanding what
the law or the niceties of the law may
or may not have been, to do what is so
clearly in the eyes of this Administra-
tion, right.

Last October, Mr. Abrams of your
Department told a subcommittee of
this committee over and over and over
again that the U.S. Government — no

agency, no official of our govern-
ment— had helped to finance or to
facilitate or to direct flights from El
Salvador carrying military supplies to
the contras.

Since that time, as you very well
know, we've had a lot of disturbing
reports. We understand that phone
calls were placed to U.S. officials in
Washington by those involved in the
air supply operations. We understand
that flights were closely monitored by
military officials attached to our
embassy in San Salvador. The same
planes, the air crew, the secret landing
strips were used by the State Depart-
ment to send nonlethal aid as were
used to send the military supplies. Our
ambassador in Costa Rica apparently
unsuccessfully sought permission to
use a small airfield in that country to
assist the flights and all of the flights
involved with the active cooperation of
the Governments of El Salvador and
Honduras with which presumably we
exercise some considerable influence.

I wonder if you could take this
opportunity, first of all, to tell us what
you knew and did not know about the
extent to which the U.S. Government
in that period was, indeed, involved in
these flights. And, secondly, would
you associate or disassociate yourself
from the implicit assumptions of the
column by Mr. Buchanan that the ends
clearly justify the means and that
disobedience and disregard for the law
is justified when in one's own mind
one is as sure as this President and his
subordinates apparently are that they
are right?

A. I don't believe that a constitu-
tional officer has a right to declare
himself above the law. You have to carry
out the law.

In the various Cabinet jobs I've had,
there are a lot of laws that the Congress
has passed that I didn't agree with.
When I was Secretary of Labor, I didn't
agree with the Davis-Bacon Act but I ad-
ministered it as safely as I could. I made
no secret of my view of it. But, never-
theless, you have the obligation to ad-
minister it properly and so on. So any of-
ficer has that obligation, and there is no
way to explain away a turning-away
from that obligation.

I believe I have made myself clear,
reading longer than the chairman
wanted me to, on some stuff about
what's going on in Nicaragua that I
believe, at the emergence on the
American land mass of a Soviet-
communist state, is a threat to our
security, and we need to take it seri-
ously. I believe in the votes of the Con-
gress, that have now put in place the

bruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

program that we now have there, has
come to be a general agreement about
that and I fully recognize. Lots of people
here don't.

I believe there has come to be a
perception of what kind of regime the
Nicaraguan regime is and there's very
little argument about that.

So to the extent that I can properly
lend a hand to the Nicaraguan
resistance, you can count on the fact
that I'm going to do it.

As I testified earlier, in response to
a question about assistance, I also
pointed out that that was done abso-
lutely in accordance with the law, and I
quoted the law to you.

Now, as far as activities are con-
cerned and exactly how they went on,
I don't try to keep track of all of that
although I try to stay generally
informed. I think that you have to
recognize that the program of humani-
tarian aid, which was voted by the Con-
gress, necessarily has to get delivered to
the people for whom it was intended.
Right? We ought to get it there. You've
got to account for it as best you can, but
you've also got to get it there. If you
didn't get it there, just kept it in the
warehouse, you would not be carrying
out the intent of the Congress. So you
have to have some means of flying it in,
dropping it off, or whatever. That's part
and parcel of what the intent of Con-
gress was, and there should be no prob-
lem about that.

Intermixing it with arms is a prob-
lem, but I don't see any reason why
there's anything wrong with an ambas-
sador trying to see how he can help
arrange, or a military officer seeing how
he can help arrange, to have these
authorized materials delivered to the
people they were intended to serve.

Mr. Roth. I think one of the key
concerns the American people have is
this concern, for example, of the
secret Swiss bank account. When you
visited Brunei — the Sultan — did you
know about that bank account at that
time last June?

A. I had no discussion of this matter
with the Sultan or anyone else in Brueni.

Mr. Roth. Right. I know you had
mentioned that to begin with. But did
you know of that account at that time?

A. I knew there was a way in which
a contribution could be made. Obviously,
a country that you go to is probably
going to want to do that secretly and so
you have to have a way of doing it. I
knew that there was such a way because
we had been discussing the subject and
trying to figure out, pursuant to the law
and in accordance with the law, how we

might get some funds to people who, at
least as far as we could see, were
desperately in need of some.

Mr. Roth. How did you learn about
this if it wasn't a Swiss bank account
but there was some method? When did
you first learn about that? Was that at
the very origin of this episode?

A. You've gotten me sworn all the
way to Sunday here. I have to be kind of
careful how I answer. This is sort of off
the top of my head, this question. But in
the middle of the year, we had some dis-
cussions about the desperate need of the
Nicaraguan resistance for funds. We
were all aware of the fact that the
Congress— each body had voted funds,
you remember, but the parliamentary
situation was such that the flow of funds
was delayed so we were trying to figure
out how can we properly and legally do
something about it.

Mr. Roth. When you say "we,"
who is "we?"

A. "We" is me and my colleagues in
the Department. Elliott Abrams, of
course, had the lead responsibility, and
others in the Department took part in
the discussion as we properly should.

Mr. Roth. You had mentioned on
numerous times that you talked to the
President and you were opposed to
this policy.

A. No, I wasn't opposed to this
policy. I was very much in favor of the
policy of helping the Nicaraguan
resistance, which is what you're asking
me about.

Mr. Roth. I'm talking about the
arms to Iran.

A. I was in favor of the objectives
that the President was trying to achieve.
I was opposed to and very skeptical
about the use of arms in that connection.
There are lots of things that we can
argue back and forth about, and there
are legitimate arguments on both sides.

Mr. Roth. In this episode, we are
going around in circles so often, I was
wondering, you had the President's
ear. Do you think that it would be wise
for the President to call the people in,
whether it's Poindexter, North, who-
ever was involved, and say, "Okay
fellows, what are the facts?"

A. I certainly would welcome find-
ing out what the facts are, and I think
the sooner people can get the facts the
better. I don't know what the proprieties
are. Both those people have sought
counsel, as they're entitled to do as
American citizens. They have apparently,
on advice of counsel, decided that they
are not going to discuss their activities.

Maybe the President could persuade
them otherwise. I don't know whethei
it's proper to do that or not. I see hal'
you are lawyers. I'm sure you would
have a better opinion on that than I.

But I would like to see, as a citize
let's get the dope out here, deal with
wrongdoing where it's found, and let
get on with the nation's business. Thi
what I'm trying to focus on.

Mr. Mica. You appointed me to
your commission on terrorism. I
served on it for 18 months.

A. And we appreciated your serv
You were a strong, effective, and gooi
member of that.

Mr. Mica. I thank you, and I app
ciated the opportunity. But I just
would say that I feel somewhat
betrayed, as I indicated to you, that
for 18 months, we were told that co
cessions were the only sure way to t
more acts of terrorism. And, indeed
now we see that concessions were
separate route.

A. If I may just interject. The Pn
dent has repeatedly said that it was m
his intent to swap arms for hostages. .
When you have something that has a .
variety of objectives to it, these thingj
can get mixed up. But, at any rate, he
has stated his objective, and you knov'
that because you've heard it.

Mr. Mica. I understand that. Bn
note, for instance, that eight times I
your 12 pages, or 13 pages, of
testimony, we talked about fighting
terrorism.

A. I'm very big on that.

Mr. Mica. For 24 months, we
worked on a bill and the group wor!
together, and we find the combined
wisdom of every group that I worke
with and you worked with recom-
mended against this type of proposa
would just indicate, too, as I recall.
Col. North sat on— and sits still on-
the interagency group to combat
terrorism.

A. I don't think he sits still. He's
never sat still.

Mr. Mica. He sat on it. [Laughte
I think you're right there.

Obviously, at that time, he was
telling us the information or giving P
information to the State Departmen
or not carrying back what had been
said. Three quick points I have,
though. You have revealed here tod;
that we have either a rogue ambassa
dor or one who was directed not to tl
you. I don't know what the situatiori
but I hope you can report to us as to
what is done about that.

Department of State Bull

THE SECRETARY

i. I've already reported to you that
ent out an all-post directive
iptly. He responded fully and in
I faith, and he has been—

fjtfr. Mica. But we don't know who
itcted him not to talk to you.

\. -and he has said that he's ready
aki' his information available. So
t find out.

VIr. Mica. The Miami Herald has
»l rted yesterday that the U.S. Gov-
rment had direct information that
rt paid $2 million, I believe, for the
iing of our Marines in Beirut, and
?(iad this information at the time
ji this policy was initiated. Is that
nect?
V. I'm going to pass on that,
u,~,c it's a very specific question, and

V nt to be sure that you can get an
cn-ate answer.

The fact of the matter is that Iran is
' mtry on oiu- terrorist list. We know
any acts of terrorism with which
111 one way or another seems to

I heen connected— and connected can
( ill' training people, providing funds,

iding eiiuijJiiient, providing safe
11. as well as some specific acts, such
V VA Al case that the British courts
Nrought forward. So there are a lot
[H'CtS to it.

Now, it does seem to be true that for
'.■ period of time, over a year, there
■n't Americans taken in Beirut, and
ic lere was some evidence— I think the
Pi iident has pointed to that— that con-
:e ably shows the beginnings of a modi-
Be Jon of Iranian behavior. But at least
as le information that I have suggests,
■y Iranians at least in some fashion
lieen involved in the most recent

II age-taking of Americans, and they
ai involved in cases with other coun-

.. And I make the point to you that
ia\e to be, of course, particularly
■crned about Americans. But if we're
iH to have an impact internationally
ic fight against terrorism, we've got
\>-\x it internationally, and we've got
'• as concerned about terrorist acts

ij inst others as we are against

01 selves.

Mr. Wolpe. You indicated in the
C( rse of your remarks with respect to
tl arms transfer to Iran, that when
y disagreed with that tactic and

V h the transfer itself, that you felt it
w 5, in fact, a legitimate foreign
p icy question, and it was legitimate —
I link it was your words— that the
F I'sident consider that approach.
\ luld your view be the same if it were
t be found that that arms transfer to
I n, particularly the one that took

place before the January finding, was
in violation of American law?

A. I've gone over that question of
violating the law. There isn't any
authorization on anybody's part to
violate a law. There are certain constitu-
tional rights the President has, and
there are various directives dealing with
this subject, including directives in the
national secui-ity field as distinct from
the direct arms transfer field.

Mr. Wolpe. Why then would it be a
legitimate question for the President
to consider an arms transfer if it, in
fact, were in violation of the law?

A. First of all, there is the question,
should we seek privately in some manner
designed to be as effective as possible
some different kind of arrangement that
we hope might change behavior in Iran?
The answer to that question was thought
by the President's advisers, including
me, to be yes, and as the discussion has
proceeded and listened to [by] Members
of the Congress and others, that by and
large people agreed that's the proper
thing.

Then the question comes, should the
possibility of change in our willingness to
sell arms, at least to the extent of giving
a signal, be in play tactically? So that
can be debated back and forth, and the
President has said publicly that he
judged that the objective was worth giv-
ing the signal. And I've said that's a
legitimate judgment to be made.

Having made that judgment, you
have to see to it that you execute it in a
proper way, and I presume that was the
thinking of the Attorney General and
others in the January finding.

Mr. Wolpe. Should there ever be a
covert policy in conflict with the overt,
open policy of the U.S. Government?

A. You have multitracks often in
your policy, and I don't think that
they're necessarily in conflict. You try to
complement one with the other. Some
may say they are in conflict but—

Mr. Wolpe. We had an open,
public, in fact, established statutory
policy of not providing arms to
nations, and Iran is specifically on the
list of nations, that condoned or prac-
ticed state terrorism.

A. We also have other statutes on
the books, and we have authorization
under the— whatever it is— the National
Security Act to do things in connection
with other objectives. So it isn't as
though the statutes of the United States
give a clear and unambiguous picture
with one not conflicting in any way with
others.

Mr. Wolpe. Have you any
knowledge of the use of proceeds from
the sale of arms to Iran in Angola,
Mozambique. Ethiopia, or any other
African country in line with the
reports that have been made in The
New York Times that high U.S. offi-
cials have found some evidence that
money was transferred, at least to
Angola?

A. I have no knowledge of that, just
as I have no knowledge of any transfer
to the Nicaraguan resistance. My warn-
ing flag went up once when I heard
about an arrangement that I was told
was not any such arrangement, that
seemed to suggest that there might have
been something going, not necessarily to
Angola, but to other countries.

Mr. Wolpe. In Africa?

A. In Africa. But this did not have
in mind anything like what seemed to be
described or what we're learning about
the rontrn fund diversion.

Ms. Snowe. Your presence is very
important here today, because, obvi-
ously, we need to understand the deci-
sionmaking process that led to the
decisions concerning the arms ship-
ments to Iran through all the diversion
of the funds to the contras.

There are several issues that
worry me that, obviously, cannot
entirely be addressed here today, but I
think these committee hearings are a
beginning. Some of these issues can-
not be cured by legislative remedies,
because it's a question of trust— trust
in the executive branch to implement
the laws that were enacted by Con-
gress, trust by the President and the
American people that those people in a
position to implement the laws and the
policies will, in fact, do so.

I'm concerned what spawned a
mechanism within the executive
branch that would focus on circumven-
tion of law or to disregard the trust
that's necessary between the
legislative and the executive branches
as well as between the government
and the American people.

You said here today that you made
certain arguments before the Presi-
dent on your January 7 meeting con-
cerning the arms shipments to Iran.
What I would like to know is, when
you made those arguments, I'd like to
know what they were, and were you
opposed to the arms shipments to Iran
because it was bad policy or because it
represented a violation of the law?
And, secondly, I'd like to know
what the President's response was to
your argument and specifically if it did
entail violations of the law.

Fjiruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

And, finally, you said that you
were not aware of the arms shipments
to Iran until November when we were
all informed. But at the same time you
had fragmentary knowledge that this
might be occurring. Didn't you think it
was your responsibility as the Secre-
tary of State to follow up on that
information to find out exactly what
was going on, and also didn't you feel
that responsibility to raise your con-
cerns again with the President, know-
ing that you had some information that
bears upon this issue in providing
arms shipments to Iran?

A. You've asked me— I lost track-
about 50 questions.

Ms. Snowe. I'll go back.

A. Maybe you could identify the one
you want me to answer.

Ms. Snowe. I want you to answer
on what basis did you make your argu-
ments to the President? What were
your arguments? On what basis did
you make your arguments? Was it on
the basis of thinking it was bad policy
to send arms to Iran, or, secondly,
because it was a violation of the law,
and what was the President's response
to those issues? And, finally, why
didn't you attempt as Secretary of
State to find out and follow up on the
fragmentary knowledge that you did
have on arms shipments to Iran that
were occurring?

A. First of all, insofar as the law is
concerned, the finding is the way of deal-
ing with that issue, and it is, so far as I
know, a lawful finding, and under that
finding what was done, so far as I know,
was legal. The Attorney General was
involved, and so that's the answer to
that question.

Insofar as the diversion of funds is
concerned, if that took place, then that
was not a legal thing to do. That was a
violation of the law. The President has
made it clear that that was not his policy
and was not something that he knew
about. So that's the answer to that
question.

Ms. Snowe. I guess what I'm ask-
ing you is whether or not you men-
tioned to the President on the Janu-
ary 7 meeting that the arms shipments
to Iran could represent a violation of
the law?

A. The question of the law was
raised in the major discussions, and the
point was made, and I think everyone
agreed, that if anything is to be done, it
has to be done in accordance with the
law.

However, that's not— and I don't—
that you sort of take for granted. That's

a necessary condition. But the focus of
attention, insofar as I was concerned,
was primarily on what the arguments
were— and are— against an arms ship-
ment to Iran— the policy implications of
it. They've been well brought out, just as
the President's side of that argument
has been well brought out. It's
debatable, and it was debated, and one
of the things the President does do on
issues is hear the debate, so it's a
legitimate debate. I don't need to review
all the arguments, you know what they
are; half of the questions here have dealt
with them.

Insofar as was I energetic enough in
trying to find out what was going on and
keeping— weighing in on it, you'll have
to judge that for yourself. I, obviously,
as in anybody, you search back and you
say to yourself, "What could I have done
differently that might have changed the
situation?" At times when I learned
about something that I thought was way
off the rails, I did weigh in, and there
were a number of places in the chronol-
ogy of this in which it seemed to me that
the negotiations that tended to have
arms connected with them had stopped—
had been stood down. So I was glad to
know that. I gave an example of one in
the December instructions.

I am perfectly willing to accept
criticism for not doing as much as
perhaps I should have done, and I wrack
my brains about that— kick myself here
and there. Probably more critical of me
than you are. I'm kind of a tough critic
on myself.

Mr. Gejdenson. During these
discussions with the President, was
there concern raised about the
notification provisions to Congress?

A. Of course, I didn't know about
the finding. It's the finding that had
the— and that is a legitimate thing in
delaying notification-
Mr. Gejdenson. Correct —
A. But I was not involved in that
debate, so I can't really- I'm not the
right person to ask that question to.

Mr. Gejdenson. So you're saying
that the discussions that you were
involved in, at no time was there a dis-
cussion about the necessity of the
President or the President's people
notifying the appropriate committees
before Congress?

A. There was a discussion of the
legalities and the importance that
whatever was done be done properly and
legally.

Mr. Gejdenson. And in those
discussions, did somebody say at some
point, "You've got to go to Capitol

Hill and tell them what's going on
here?"

A. Certainly.

Mr. Gejdenson. And was there c
cern raised about the —

A. That's part of the process tha
established in any arms transfer
situation.

Mr. Gejdenson. And in that disc
sion, was there a timeframe discus
that we have to do this within a cer
tain amount of time?

A. I don't recall the discussion w
enough to respond to your question fv
and I was not involved in the discussl
that took place among those who put
together the finding and implementeo
so I can't really help you on the inter-
pretation of that particular phrase.

Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe t
18 months is timely notification oft
appropriate committees of Congress

A. This goes back to last January
It's not 18 months— that finding— and
the people who have been involved an e
that the President properly had that
right, and I think that's established.

Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe ti t
an 18-month delay in notification of
Congress is a timely notification?

A. The finding was not 18 month
ago. It was in -January, and there was i
ongoing-
Mr. Gejdenson. Do you believe t ;
9 months is a timely notification?

A. —process that I was not by an
means fully aware of, and the problen
that the people conducting it continua
faced was, if our chances of success ai
to be maximized, this must be done
secretly.

Mr. Gejdenson. I understand the
concern —

A. They confront the fact— I don'
say this as a comment about the Con-
gress, but they confront the fact that ;
you add additional people who are
knowledgeable about what is going on
you increase exponentially the risks of
the secrecy being blown.

Mr. Gejdenson. Colleagues are
pointing out there's a significant
amount of activity before the finding
but I want to put all that aside. We
understand what the law is. The law
says there has to be a timely notifica
tion of Congress. When that became
law. Presidents understood the prob-
lems that as you increase the number
of people that know, you increase tht
possibility word may get out.

But we have the law to deal with
and if part of the work of this commi
tee is to make that law more workabi

Department of State Bullei

THE SECRETARY

less what we have to find out is,
.t do you consider to be a timely
ification of Congress within the

A. So far as I know, there have been
instances where a deviation from
r notification and consultation has
m place. One was the case in Presi-
t Carter's Administration of the
rt to have a I'escue of our hostages in

and that was carried out without
r notification, so I understand it. on
;tly these grounds— that if you
fy— the more people you notified, the
■e chance of leakage, and so on. I
n't involved in that, but that's what
been told.
This again was a case where the

P'sident felt that this could not be done
licly. If it were to be done, it had to
Iniie secretly and that if it became
ic, you would jeopardize the effort,
, 'lU would jeopardize the lives of
.' nf the people involved. So it was
irently ongoing. I'm not the person
;'stify before you about the ins and
nf this, but it was ongoing. And
r were— and judging from the cable
II Ambassador Kelly, right until very
Mily— prospects of something dif-
tit happening. So that is the reason

.^ the notification didn't take place.

Mr. Solomon. I see the time is
a roaehing. You just have a few
n lutes, and you have to leave, and I
u lerstand that, and I will probably
r erve my questions. What I wanted
t io in the first place was to devote at
1( iit half of this time to an executive
s sion, because I really think that the
c imittee has the cart before the
h se. It seems to me that you are put
i; I very extenuating circumstance, as

V 5 President Reagan when he held a
p ss conference not so long ago and

V s severely criticized by the press,
b ause he had to be very careful

a lut what he said publicly because of
1 al restraints on classified informa-
t ti. And I think that all of us should
Ke had that information under our
t ts before we subjected you to
8iwer the questions. I think we could
li'e properly approached the
tBstion.

So I want to commend you. You
low, you and I have differences on
» ues such as the China-U.S. com-
I inique. I disagree with the Presi-
' nt occasionally on things. But you're
eking with the President, and Fm
eking with the President, because I
lieve him and I believe in him, and
il save my questions for the executive
ssion.

Chairman Fascell. I want to thank
you for joining us today, and, as you
can tell, more questions have been
raised than can be answered right
now. But we appreciate your
willingness —

If members would like to [present
questions in writing to the Secretary],
we'll make the record available for
that purpose. I would hope, however,
that we can continue this more in
depth in the executive session, but I'll
certainly — the gentleman has a right
to submit questions at this point.

Let me say. first of all, Mr.
Secretary, that we thank you very
much — your willingness to tell us all
you know. It seems quite clear at this
point that you can't run foreign policy
successfully by bypassing your Secre-
tary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
National Security Council, and the
Congress. You might be able to do
something in secret for a short period
of time that is essential to the security
of your country, but without waiting
for all of the evidence to come in, it is
quite clear already that an operation of
this size, having this sensitivity, and
impacting on so many laws of the Con-
gress and fundamental decisions of

our society with regard to checks and
balances and wisdom that is available
is not a good way to operate.

I'm sorry, frankly, that you've
been put in that position as Secretary
of State, because I know that you've
done your level best to administer the
laws and to be faithful and loyal to the
President of the United States. But
this is a country of laws and not of
men, and as you have said yourself, no
one — no one — is above the law. So
we'll wish you well on your trip, and
we'll see as soon as we can get
together on a date to continue this
matter with the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee in executive session.

'Members of the committee who par-
ticipated in the question-and-answer session
with the Secretary were Chairman Dante
Fascell (D.-Fla.). Gerald B.H. Solomon (R.-
N.Y.). William S. Broomfield (R.-Mich.), Lee
H. Hamilton (D.-Ind.). Benjamin A. Gilman
(R.-N.Y.), Roliert.I. Lagoniarsino (R.-Calif.).
Gus Yatron (D.-Penn.). Stephen .1. Solarz (D.-
N.Y.). Jim Leach (R.-lowa). Don Bonker (D.-
Wash.). Gerry E. Studds (D.-Mass.). Toby
Roth (R.-Wis.). Dan Mica (D.-Fla.), Howard
Wolpe (D.-Mich.). Olympia Snowe (R. -Maine),
and Sam Geidenson (D.-Conn.). The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, I'.S. (jovern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402,

^Press release 258. ■

Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet"

Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
December 16. 1986. by news correspond-
ents in Rome. Bonn. The Hague. Mainz.
London, and Pay-is. The interview was
broadcast live on "Worldnet. " a satellite
TV program of the U.S. Information
Service.'

Q. The Italian public opinion is very
disconcerned because while on one end
the United States criticizes the Italian
behavior of the Achille Lauro affair,
the U.S. Administration itself had
already begun its secret negotiations
with Iran. What's your opinion about
this?

A. My opinion is that we have to
recognize problems in the Persian Gulf
area, and recognize that if it's possible to
see Iran in a somewhat different stance,
to see Iran stopping its use of terrorism,
to see Iran ready to negotiate an end to
the Iran-Iraq war, and to use its influ-
ence to see hostages given up, that that
would be a good thing.

The controversial part of this effort
was the readiness or agreement by the
President to send a signal in the form of
an arms transfer, and there are argu-
ments in favor, as the President has
given, and there are arguments against
which are all on display right now. So
you can argue that point back and forth.

But I want to make it clear what the
U.S. policy is and has been. First of all,
we want to see an end to that war.
Second, we observe that right now it is
Iran that refuses to find its way to a
negotiated solution. So. number three,
our basic policy, which has been reaf-
firmed, even though it had this slight
breakover, oui' basic policy is that we
should not sell arms to Iran and we
should encourage others not to do so in
an effort to deprive Iran of its war-
making capability. And, of course, we
are unalterably opposed to terrorism.
Iran remains on the terrorist list of
countries. And, obviously, as in any
country, we want to see our hostages
returned. That's our policy.

|ibruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

Q. Can a repetition of this situa-
tion be excluded in the future?

A. I think so. The President has
stated unequivocally that he considered
it a wise move to give a signal. The
signal has been given and no further
signals are necessary.

Q. [Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy]
Richard Perle spoke in an interview in
the last days about relations between
Bonn and East Berlin. Did he express
your official position of the United
States?

A. I don't want to make comments
on what other people have said. Obvi-
ously, Assistant Secretary Perle speaks
with authority and with a lot of
knowledge. But let me just simply say
this. Our relationships with the Federal
Republic of Germany are strong. Ger-
many is a wonderful ally. It does a fine
job as a contributor to the alliance. All of
us could do more, including the United
States. But as far as I'm concerned, I'm
very well pleased with the relationship
we have in the alliance and directly with
Germany.

Q. Would you encourage the West
German Government to continue the
process of detention with our Eastern
neighbors?

A. I don't quite know— the word
"detention" means to put somebody in
prison or something. But I think you
must mean "detente" or "opening" in
your question, and I'll interpret it that
way.

Certainly, I think that it is
important— and we do it in the United
States— to see if a more constructive
relationship can be developed with the
countries of Eastern Europe. And it's
only natural that the Germans in the
P^ederal Republic of Germany should
want to reach out to Germans in East
Germany.

Q. At the NATO meeting in
Brussels last week, the Dutch
Secretary of State, Mr. van den Broek,
seems to be one of the few Europeans
who supported the outcome of the
Reykjavik summit in respect for the
total elimination of all ballistic
missiles in 10 years.

That part of the Reykjavik out-
come wasn't mentioned in the final
communique in Brussels. Why didn't
you support Mr. van den Brock's
position?

A. First of all, the meeting was
notable for the broad measure of agree-
ment. It was an excellent meeting, and a
very good, thorough exchange. The allies
supported with enthusiasm the work

done at Reykjavik in the intermediate-
range missile area and in the area of
strategic arms.

There were differences of view
expressed about whether or not it is wise
within 10 years to be in favor of the
elimination of all ballistic missiles, as the
President is, and different allies had dif-
ferent views about it. We continue, in
the United States, to support our posi-
tion, which the President has stated and
which some supported— some didn't like
it, some were uneasy, so there was a
variation in view in the alliance on that.
But the communique and the general
discussion emphasized the INF [inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces] and
START [strategic arms reduction talks]
areas and there was great support-
uniform support for that.

Q. In view of the Reykjavik talks,
whether your Administration would be
ready to set up a new set of standards,
about the survival of the alliance:
namely, to consider, first, that the
transition from offensive weapons to
defensive weapons, which is implied
by the development of SDI [Strategic
Defense Initiative], could be managed
in a way which would help the allies
and NATO as a whole not to be left at
the mercy of deals with the Soviets
which would dismantle bits or parts of
all deterrence apparatus.

In other words, would you be
ready, with consultation with your
allies to have a position which would
not leave the Soviets to decide the
numbers and the quantities of the
assets that both Europe and America
need for our survival?

A. Your question wandered all over
the place and with something of an
assertion on your part. But let me simply
state what our posture is, as far as the
alliance is concerned.

First of all, our alliance with the
countries of Western Europe, in NATO,
is the center of gravity and a central ele-
ment in how we approach the security of
the United States. That has been true, it
is true, and it will continue to be true.

Second of all, in carrying out our
side of the bargain, there are certain
things that the United States has as a
responsibility and will carry through on,
continue to do so, and be engaged in.

They are, first of all, to maintain a
strategic deterrent force capable of
reaching the Soviet Union. We fully
intend to do that. Second, to maintain a
large, credible military force on the
ground in Europe. We have been doing
that and we'll continue to do so. Number
three, it's important that we have a
NATO alliance that, so to speak, lives

Jile

and breathes. It studies the contingeri
cies, it revises its plans. When it sees
new contingencies, it conducts exercis
It does all of the things that makes th
things written on the paper a reality ;
we take part in that, give leadership t
it, and are engaged with our allies in
that.

And perhaps most importantly, th
we continue in working with our frieni
abroad, not only in Europe but else
where, at the political workability and
meaning of the underlying values that
bring the alliance forward in the first
place. That is, we all keep track of wh*
it is we're defending and what we hav
deterrence against.

So these are the fundamental tene
that have guided us in the alliance anc
will continue to guide us in the allianC'
We work with our partners very heav^
There has been immense consultation
throughout the past year— I think unp
cedented consultation— and that's the
reason why there is such a broad
measure of understanding and suppor(
among us.

Q. One of President Reagan's
several stated reasons in selling arm
to Iran is his desire to bring an
honorable end to the Iraqi-Iranian
war. It's now reported that the Uni1|
States has been supplying Iraq withf
satellite intelligence in order to
encourage more bombing of Iranian i
economic targets. Is that report
broadly true and, if so, how is such
intervention to be squared with the
President's objective of bringing an ^
end to the war?

A. First of all, let me just reassert
as you stated, that our objective is to t
to bring an end to the war, and we thii
the principal recalcitrant party is Iran.'
And so to the extent that Iran's milita>
capability can be reduced, that pre-
sumably will help bring them to a fram
of mind where they're willing to sit
down with Iraq and try to reach an
agreement. We think the right kind of!
agreement is one that maintains the tet
ritorial integrity of each side and doesr
have, so to speak, a winner and a loser'

As far as matters of intelligence an
intelligence-sharing are concerned, of
course, that's something that I simply
am not free to comment on.

Q. If it is your intention to reduce
Iran's capability, why are you then
increasing it by sending it arms?

A. The President has explained
publicly his thinking, that he felt under
the circumstances that it was importan)
and worthwhile to send a small signal,
which he did. And he has said that the
signal has been given of the readiness o

Department of State Bulle

THE SECRETARY

United States to engage with Iran,
no furtiier signals are necessary or
be given. So the question of any

,er arms sales to Iran from the
;ed States has been settled, and
e won't be any more under the pres-

ircumstances.

Q. Many European governments
that a weaker American President
be more open to influence from
g^ess and that the new Congress
be more protectionist than the
^ious one. Recent disagreements in
cultural trade with the European
munity have been seen as a confir-
ni.ion of this trend.

Don't you think that, on the con-
tr|y, this should be a moment for
cl ing ranks, having in mind political
ccuderations?

A. I think certainly in the field of
tr' e, it's a moment for opening trade
: Kire, not closing it down. I per-
illy am very strongly committed to
ilea of opening up the opportunities
rade and knocking barriers down.
t's why the President and all of us
■ lieen such strong supporters of the
( ;.'\TT [General Agreement on
i, ffs and Trade] round which has got-
te started now as a result of the
ral ting in Punte del Este.
.4nd, of course, the reasons why we
I'' United States think protection is
of course, is in part because it isn't
I for our friends around the world
w —many depend upon access to our
m ket.

But most of all, and perhaps this is
ti most reassuring point as far as our
fr ids are concerned, we're against it
t» luse it's bad for Americans. It's bad
ft American consumers. It lets up on
'1 competitive thrust behind moves to
■r costs and make things better on
ii part of American producers, so we
bi afit from open markets ourselves,
! that's the reason why we want to
I ihem that way.

Q. Do you think that the arms sales
a lir applies to every country to per-
ir separate agreements to free
h tages?

A. I think it is a mistake to make
ti les for hostages as normally thought
oThe reasons why it's a mistake are,
t nf all, it encourages people to take
•• tages, feeling that they can get
saething for them. And, second of all,
" n a sense, raises the value in the eyes
lie hostage-takers of the people they
nly hold. So, as a matter of policy
[iractice. we should not be ready to
if anything for hostages. We should
St that they be released and to seek

every way, every pressure, every ounce
of persuasion that we can to bring that
about.

Q. The headlines we've been
reading for a while now of secret arms
sales to Iran, money passed on to the
Nicaraguan contras. secret informa-
tion passed on to Iraq — the German
paper calls it a matter of broken pieces
today. How are you going to mend the
pieces?

A. The President's approach to this
is simple and, I think, correct. It is, first
of all, to get the facts of what took place
out into the open to the maximum e.xtent
possible, or. to the extent you're dealing
with classified matters, into the hands of
properly set-up congressional commit-
tees or investigative bodies, to see if
there were laws broken and by whom,
and to prosecute those who may have
violated the law. So that's one part of
the strategy. It's a very forthcoming,
open, immediate effort on the part of the
President. And I might point out that
practically the minute that he heard
about the possible wrongdoing, of diver-
sion of funds in the contra case, he took
action.

The second part of what the Presi-
dent has said is that, having done that
and sort of said, "Okay, now there's an
area where those things are going to be
pursued." Now, as far as we all are con-
cerned, we have lots of work to do. We
have problems, we have opportunities,
we have work with our allies, so let's
keep at it, and that's what we're doing.
That's why we have been receiving peo-
ple, continuing to receive people here
practically everyday, and why Secretary
[of Defense Caspar] Weinberger was in
Europe and why I was in Europe. We're
conducting the business of the govern-
ment, and that's what we must do.

Q. But the crisis appears to go
deeper. You quoted the President. May

1 quote today's Washington Post — a
headline that reads, "Ronald Reagan's
Government is Disintegrating," and,
indeed, a lot of Europeans are afraid
of the lame-duck effect for the next

2 years. How would you react to such
fears?

A. I've just reacted to it by saying
that the President has put into motion a
way of dealing with this situation, and,
of course, as a result of the first part of
his decision— namely, to have things
brought out— a lot of things are being
brought out. That's not a mark of dis-
integration; that's a mark of a President
who is wanting to see whatever the facts
are be made public.

Now, as far as the business of con-
ducting the nation's business is con-
cerned, we're doing it.

Q. A matter of concern in this
NATO member state is the situation in
Suriname. What do you know about
the human rights situation in
Suriname? Do vou have an opinion on
it?

A. We have reports from our
amlmssador of brutality, of what
amounts to murders, of gi'oss violations
of human rights, and we consider that
the reports are, unfortunately, credible.
So we're quite concerned about the situ-
ation in Suriname, and I know that it's
of great concern to the people of Holland
and others around the world.

Q. Do you think there is any
Libyan involvement in Suriname?

A. I don't feel I have enough infor-
mation to answer that question in a
definitive way. There have been rumors
about that, and there is a certain amount
of information, but I don't consider it
such that I would want to make a defini-
tive statement.

Q. Do you expect that the present
regime in Suriname can restore democ-
racy there?

A. What I can say is that I think it's
very desirable that the people of any
country, including Suriname, be gov-
erned by a process which reflects the
wishes of the people of the country. And
so I would like to see that happen.

Q. After the revelation about the
Iran arms deal, do you feel that you
are now put in charge of foreign
affairs?

A. No one is fully in charge, but we
try to administer this effort very
strongly, and I think basically have it in
hand.

Of course, the person in charge is
the President. It's the President that has
a foreign policy, and I work for him, and
I support him, and I try to help him
shape foreign policy. He takes my advice
lots of times. He modifies it or doesn't
agree with it sometimes, but we work
together very strongly and effectively, I
think, and that continues to be the case.
And it is, of course, primarily for the
State Department to be the executor of
the President's foreign policy, and we
try to measure up to that responsibility
in every way we can.

Perhaps one lesson of this Iran prob-
lem is that's a case where a piece of
foreign policy was administered else-
where, and it would have been better if
it had been in normal channels, in my
opinion.

Q. At the beginning of this crisis,
have you thought to resign?

A. Any discussion of my status, of
course, is for the President and me to
discuss, and it's— I serve at his pleasure.

Druary 1987

THE SECRETARY

Q. The advantage of banning all
ballistic missiles is, of course, that
more warning time would be created
and the remaining bombers could be
called back, and so on. and this is a
less hair-triggering situation than
perhaps now is the case.

But how does this relate to
Stealth bombers and fast cruise mis-
siles with Stealth technology, which
cannot be seen at all perhaps, if this
technology works, and could attack
from the blue?

A. I think you very well stated a
fundamental element in the argument
for the elimination of ballistic missiles.
Of course, there are many who hesitate
for good reasons and so there is a
healthy discussion going on in the
alliance about that.

If you don't have ballistic missiles,
you're going to have to have a credible
deterrent, as I said earlier on this pro-
gram, and the United States is com-
mitted to the idea that under the kind of
world we live in, it's important to have
in being a strategic nuclear deterrent
that can reach the Soviet Union, and
we're determined to maintain that
posture, and we think it's one of our
responsibilities to ourselves and one of
our responsibilities to our allies.

Q. Could I turn back to the gulf?
In testimony to Congress last week
you expressed surprise and shock that
your ambassador in Beirut had used
CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]
back channels to communicate on the
Iran issue. You said earlier on this
program you would not talk about
intelligence, but did you know of this
policy of supplying intelligence to Iraq
and logistics support, or was this
another example of the CIA using back
channels?

A. I'm not going to comment on the
intelligence matter, as I said earlier, and
there are some things that I didn't know
about in the overall situation, but by and
large we're well informed.

Q. On that are you saying you did
not —

A. I might say with respect to—

Q. — know about certain matters
as supplying intelligence to Iraq?

A. I am not going to answer a ques-
tion about the supply of intelligence to
somebody by inference.

Q. In line with State Department
policy. Mr. Shultz—

A. A very skillful question, but I'm
not going to step into that hole.

Q. — comment on one quote in one
of the papers this morning suggesting

that in the gulf the State Department
is trying to engineer a stalemate in the
gulf war?

A. We're not interested in a
stalemate. We're interested in an end, so
that it stops; that the territorial integri-
ty of each country is maintained, and
people can go about the business of
economic development for the people of
their country.

Q. What's your opinion about the
careful approaches being made by Italy
toward Libya?

A. Libya has established itself as a
state that virtually brags about its sup-
port for terrorism, and there's no doubt
about it. And the evidence accumulated
by various European governments of
Libyan plans and Libyan activities make
it very clear about what the Libyan
posture is.

Obviously, you want them to chai ,
but I think in the meantime the policj f
isolating a state that does that is the
right policy.

Q. CIA and NSC [National Secuiy
Council] seem to function like a stai
within a state. How can these agen( s
be controlled, never to endanger agi,
the Presidency to the point that it's^
now happened?

A. I thmk you're jumping to a lot
conclusions in that question, and they
are. of course, subject to congressiom
oversight and presidential oversight, ;
basically are designed as service agen;
cies; that is. their function is to provio
intelligence to others who have the
responsibility for policy development
operational matters. That's the way it
should work.

iPress release 264 of Dec. 17, 1986.

Southern Africa:

American Hopes for the Future

Secretary Shultz 's address before the
International Management and Develop-
ment Institute on December J,. 1986.'

Africa's leaders know, and I know, and
you know, that the United States and
the West are uniquely relevant to their
problems in southern Africa. Why is
that? It's because our enormous wealth
of managerial, technological, and finan-
cial talent and resources symbolize the
success story of the West. So at a time
when southern Africa is poised on a
knife-edge between hope and despair,
you represent hope. So you represent
why we are a nation of builders, and it's
for this reason that I come here, and I
welcome this opportunity to discuss our
policy toward southern Africa, a region
rich in potential but beset by turmoil. If
southern Africa slides into conflict, all
the peoples of the vast region— some 150
million— will see their hopes for a better
future destroyed, and major American
interests— political, economic, and
strategic— will be jeopardized.

The LInited States sees the potential
for a hopeful future southern Africa. We
are convinced that there are constructive
alternatives to violence, and we are try-
ing to turn this positive vision into
reality. Today, I want to lay out the
Administration's policy toward the
region in detail and examine it against
the backdrop of present-day South
African realities.

The United States has had a consi^
tent commitment to peace with justice
southern Africa. This is demonstrated

• Our positive emphasis on what
are for, as well as what we are agains«
in southern Africa;

• Forthright insistence that an
effective American policy must be basi
on a diplomatic effort; sanctions by
themselves do not represent a policy;

• Strong conviction that Americat
business and investment can play a co
structive role in South Africa and the
region;

• Substantial U.S. regional assist-
ance, including the President's new
southern Africa aid initiative; and

• A clear challenge to all the leadt
of southern Africa to build a better
future rather than destroy the region
through a self-defeating descent into
violence.

The premises of our policy were
reexamined in the domestic debate tha
preceded the latest round of U.S. sanc-
tions. That debate once again made cle
that the principles underlying this
Administration's policy— many of whio
are codified in the Anti-Apartheid Act
1986— are shared by all Americans. Th'
recent controversy over sanctions was,
thus, over the means, not the ends, of
our policy. The Administration's doubts
about the utility of punitive sanctions
were, and are, serious. Nevertheless,

Department of State Bulle

THE SECRETARY

y are the law of the land, and we will
brce them.

At the same time, I sense a growing
lization, here and in the region, that
ctions by themselves do not amount
in effective policy in southern Africa,
must now use all the instruments at
disposal to make our limited influ-
;e count. In a word, the time ahead is
i for diplomacy guided by a long-term
IV of our interests and objectives in
thern Africa.

|]pes for the Future

F'sident Reagan has expressed clearly
,4ierica's hopes for the future of South

-'■ica.

This Administration is not only. . .against
1 rtheid; we are for a new South Africa, a
nation where all that has been built up
'• m'lierations is not destroyed, a new
s ety where participation in the social.
c ural, and political life is open to all

'■ — a new South Africa that comes home
lamily of free nations where it belongs.

~)i<>ke the President.
We cannot prescribe— and we do not
sume to offer— detailed political
'in'ints for South Africa's future. But
ran and should state with precision
It we are for as well as what we are
.iiist. We are/o?' a South Africa
V jse people enjoy equal political,
6 nomic, and social rights. We are /or a
i ith Africa whose leaders are chosen
i lemocratic elections with multiparty
I ticipation and universal franchise.
\ look forward to the day when basic
\ nan rights for each individual are pro-
t ted by firm constitutional guarantees,
i d we strongly support opening the
f e, market-oriented South African
i nomy to all the people of that rich
1 d so that black South Africans can
t lidly redress past economic injustice
i.iising their own living standards
ill- contributing to the prosperity for

This vision of the future of South
'ica is ambitious. It is worthy of our
I ;t efforts as a people. But if the
I ited States is to contribute to a proc-
i of positive change, we have to do
I re than assume a righteous moral
Future. We must reach out to all
i^ ithern Africans and make effective
■ I'f our limited influence. And we
ist measure our hopes for the future
' liiist the background of today's
ilities.

e C ourse of Change in South Africa

e current cycle of repression and
distance in South Africa will resolve
thing. The state of emergency, with

all its attendant denial of civil liberties,
press freedom, and due process under
law, cannot address the root causes of
unrest; it can only undermine prospects
for nonviolent change. Some may believe
that a policy of repression and the prac-
tice of violence will ultimately bring
reconciliation. I disagree. Repression
only deepens black determination to end
the apartheid system that denies them
fundamental political and human rights.
And violence only stiffens white
resistance and undermines those advo-
cating peaceful reform and negotiation.

The South African economy remains
troubled. Businessmen— foreign and
South African alike— will not invest or
reinvest in a society that excludes the
greater part of its citizens from full par-
ticipation. The international banking
community refuses to grant new loans
because of the increased risk and inter-
national condemnation brought about by
apartheid. Unemployment is growing.
Many of South Africa's most talented
and experienced professionals are
emigrating. A siege economy is emerg-
ing, one that features sanctions,
underutilized domestic capital, efforts to
create the illusion of growth by uneco-
nomical import substitution, more and
more state controls, and industrial
unrest. These developments are eroding
the basis for future South African
governments— no matter how consti-
tuted—to meet the country's pressing
social and economic needs.

Many American and other foreign
firms have already decided to leave.
These decisions, induced by the hard
realities of the marketplace, will only
compound the potential for tragedy.
American firms have found it increas-
ingly difficult to stay the course in the
face of a deteriorating political and
economic environment in South Africa
and mounting criticism here at home.
These attacks on American corporate
involvement in South Africa are both
ironic and unwarranted because
American business has been a force for
promoting interracial decency and
equality.

American business has made a
magnificent contribution to South
Africa, committing well over $200
million outside the workplace to provide
scholarships, training, nonracial housing,
and other benefits to their black
employees. Western business organiza-
tions challenge apartheid daily through
their policies and their actions. The com-
mitment of American firms to the
highest standards of corporate citizen-
ship has been an honorable undertaking
of which all Americans can be proud. I
want to make crystal clear that we in the
Administration strongly support those

firms that have taken the tough decision
to stay.

South Africa's troubled economy has
long-term consequences for the coun-
try's political future. There is an organic
link between a truly democratic political
order and a vibrant, free economy.
South Africa's social and economic needs
cannot be met by a stagnant economy.
Such an economy will merely compound
the legacy of apartheid. For all who
aspire to political leadership in the
future South Africa, restoration of a
sound economy should be a matter of
priority concern. And it is no less impor-
tant to neighboring nations whose econo-
mies are inevitably and vitally affected
by events in South Africa.

The South African Government has
brought many of its current troubles on
itself. It has resorted to suppression of
dissent, violations of basic human rights,
denial of economic liberties, and govern-
ment by decree. These abuses have
discouraged the forces of moderation
both inside South Africa and beyond.
Not long ago, a vigorous, independent
press in South Africa often criticized—
sharply and constructively— the govern-
ment and its policies. As recently as the
early months of this year, there was real
hope that South Africans, with the
assistance of the Commonwealth's
Eminent Persons' Group (EPG), might
begin a constructive dialogue about their
country's future. Yet they have not, so
far, taken advantage of these possibili-
ties. Still, there are signs of hope.

• We've seen impressive strides in
the organizational and political
capabilities of black groups in South
Africa. From political movements to
trade unions, from churches and com-
munity associations to business and pro-
fessional organizations, blacks are
preparing themselves for leadership.
They are understandably impatient and
unwilling to wait another generation.
They are ready now to play a positive
role in building a new South Africa. And
the United States stands with them
through our official assistance programs
and the many support programs coor-
dinated by American corporations, foun-
dations, labor unions, chttrches, and
universities.

• In Natal Province, the Indaba— a
convention representing all racial groups
and a wide range of social and political
organizations— has, for many months,
been wrestling on a provincial basis with
the great questions that must also be
addressed at the national level, including
the creation of a nonracial legislature
and the drafting of a bill of rights. The
Indaba has been the only political forum
in the country where blacks could

;bruary 1987

THE SECRETARY

participate on equal terms with members
of other races.

The Indaba has now made public its
proposal. It is controversial in South
Africa, as any imaginative compromise
might be. Nevertheless, the Indaba has
shown that South Africans are capable
of difficult mutual accommodation to
advance the cause of racial justice and
representative government when they
are challenged to do so. A recent poll
indicates that three out of four blacks
favor negotiations rather than violence
as a way of ending apartheid. Yet time is
fast running out for those blacks still
willing to play a positive and peaceful
role in building a new South Africa.

• In Parliament, a badly out-
numbered but vocal opposition continues
to call the government to account for its
actions. Those determined South African
patriots deserve our admiration, for they
preserve a parliamentary tradition that
will be vitally important to a new South
Africa.

Until quite recently, it was also
possible for South Africans to take heart
from reforms undertaken by the govern-
ment in Pretoria. Legalization of black
trade unions, repeal of the pass laws,
and relaxation of many other onerous
apartheid restrictions raised hopes that
the government itself might become an
engine of constructive change. These
reforms— as the United States recog-
nized at the time— required real political
courage. But we also recognized that the

dedicated F^oreign Service officer,
Ed Perkins. Ed has as his principal
mission the task of broadening and
deepening our contacts with all South
Africans. He will be making clear to
them that we have no intention of pack-
ing our bags and leaving them to face
the future in isolation. We do not ask
that black South Africans temper their
passion for change. We share it. We only
ask that it be channeled into construc-
tive strategies for reconciliation.

Our contacts with the African
National Congress (ANC) and the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC) and a wide
array of internal black opposition groups
are part of this effort to broaden
American access to all parties in South
Africa. We recognize no single group as
the primary vehicle of black aspirations.
And we make no secret of our deep con-
cerns about the ANC's communist con-
nections and links to Moscow and both
organizations' advocacy of violence.

The existence of these contacts does
not signal American approbation of the
ANC or the PAC. It signals that com-
munication channels are open. And we
are using them to advance the cause of
equal rights, democracy, and constitu-
tional government in South Africa. We
must stimulate the members of these
movements to begin to think seriously
about what theij must do to get negotia-
tions going and to produce a system of
constitutional government acceptable to
all South Africans.

No policy toward South Africa can succeed unless
it is developed within the framework of regional
solutions to the problems of peace and stability in
southern Africa. . . .

South African Government's commit-
ment to reform was tentative and often
qualified; and it did not address the cen-
tral question of black political rights.

Today, the government's reform pro-
grams are being overshadowed by its
preoccupation with maintaining control
at home and its determination to resist
sanctions from abroad and minimize
their effects. The South African Govern-
ment must move urgently to rejuvenate
reform; and its effects must be broad-
ened to encompass a real political
dialogue involving all South Africans.
Delay only invites disaster.

We have just sent to South Africa as
our new ambassador a distinguished and

It is equally important to assure
South Africa's whites of their security as
individuals and as a community. In a
recent speech to the Overseas Develop-
ment Council, the Vice President of
Botswana, Peter Mmusi, put it in this
way:

We do not wish the white people of South
Africa ill. The Afrikaner people have a secure
and important role to play in the future, not
only of their own country, but of the region as
a whole. They have Africa in their blood. We
are part and parcel of each other's history.

Americans can agree with these
words. We share with white South
Africans a heritage of resistance to colo-
nialism, a frontier tradition, and an

appreciation of entrepreneurial enter-
prise in an expanding modern econoirs
Americans admire the economic accoij
plishments of white South Africans an
their commitment to Western political
traditions. Our objective is to encoura
the extension of the full benefits of
citizenship— which white South Africa
so rightly cherish— to all their
countrymen.

The United States is against tyrai.
in all its forms. We reject and oppose
despotism by any name. We will neve;
support the replacement of apartheid
repression in some other form. The
democratic future that all South
Africans deserve must include reliable
constitutional guarantees for the righ*
of majorities, minorities, and individua
If whites begin a meaningful political
dialogue on this basis with all their
fellow South Africans, they will have
firm— I repeat, firm— American suppoi

This is a sober American message
all the people of South Africa in a corr
plex and challenging time. In today's
polarized politics of South Africa, I krt
that this view will satisfy no one com
pletely. But we in the West need to
challenge all the contending parties to
rise above their divisions and the prosi
pect of escalating violence and to
negotiate in the interest of peace and i
better future for all.

Toward Regional Peace and StabilitI

No policy toward South Africa can sun
ceed unless it is developed within the
framework of regional solutions to the
problems of peace and stability in
southern Africa. Leaders throughout i
area are acutely aware that the reper-
cussions of violence in South Africa
would be felt far beyond South Africai
borders. It would imperil Botswana's
democracy and jeopardize hopes for
stability and economic development in
the entire region from Lesotho to Zair
It would undermine American efforts
negotiate a settlement involving Nami
ian independence and the withdrawal (
all foreign forces from Angola. It woul
jeopardize hopes for reconciliation in
Angola and give the Soviets fresh oppo
tunities to pursue their imperial
ambitions.

We have consistently assured the
front-line states of American readiness
to work with them to avert catastropb
and to build for the future of southern
Africa. We are deeply disturbed by
recent South African threats against
Botswana and its other neighbors. Our
condemnation of cross-border attacks
and other destabilizing actions by Souti
Africa is unequivocal, as is our condem'
nation of those who cross into South
Africa to carrv out terrorist attacks.

Department of State Bullei

THE SECRETARY

This American stance against
nee among neighboring states in
lern Africa has been explicit in our
ig support for the Nkomati accord
een South Africa and Mozambique.
; agreement has recently come under
;asing strain as the parties have
anged charges of violations of its
r and spirit. We believe the time has
for a lowering of the rhetoric and a
rn to dialogue. The Nkomati agree-
t remains in the interest of both
,h Africa and Mozambique, and we
both parties to fulfill in good faith
■ obligations under it. Similarly, we
ipon Mozambique and Malawi to
Ive their differences peacefully, with
:ct for each other's sovereignty and
ity.

The search for peace and stability in
hern Africa has been made more dif-
|t by the recent death of President
tie! of Mozambique. The United
s worked constructively with Presi-
Machel as he sought to move
ambique toward true nonalignment
la greater role for private initiative
iozambique's economy. We strongly
lorted his decision to sign the
(mati accord with South Africa. And
nope to work with President

»sano and his colleagues to build
I the solid foundation he helped to
as blish. We call upon the South
A can Government, Mozambique's
(A T neighbors, and the international
Cf munity to give Mozambique a chance
tc nd its civil strife and resume its
« lomic development.

At my request, Under Secretary of
" (■ [for Political Affairs] Mike Arma-
will soon be visiting several
licrn African states. He will
'rate our support for the security
ai development of the front-line states
ai our conviction that they have a
< 111 role to play in the drama of
iij,e in southern Africa. The front-line
It i-s have a unique opportunity—
I 'I, a responsibility— to help create
natives to violence and confronta-
iii South Africa and the region. It
serve the interest of no party if they
a fuel to the flames of regional con-
fi itation, aggravating an already
:L;i'rous situation. We look to them to
I' sponsibly in the interest of
1 1'I'ul change in southern Africa. And
1 1 'affirm our readiness to work
■t'l\' with them in that endeavor.
The United States assures the states
-iiuthern Africa that they will have
' I'lmtinuing support as they struggle
li the economic consequences of
1 itical turmoil in the region. President
auan has pledged to present to the
■:t ( "ongress a comprehensive multi-

ibruary 1987

year program designed to promote
economic reform and development in the
black-ruled states of southern Africa.

The Congress has expressed its con-
cern for the region by making the
development of such a program a matter
of law in its Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986.
I want to assure you today that the
President and I are determined to
prepare a good program and to see it
approved. If we want to be taken
seriously in southern Africa, we must
put the resources on the line to make the
President's pledge a reality.

First, our country is united on the
goal of ending apartheid and playing an
active role in helping bring about a new,
democratic South Africa that respects
the rights and promotes the oppor-
tunities of all its people.

Second, this process of change and
negotiation cannot be accomplished by
outsiders. It must be built by South
Africans themselves— even as we offer
our support. And we will support genu-
ine reconciliation and a serious grappling
with the issues. The new South Africa
we hope to see must be based on an

The crisis in southern Africa cannot be
ameliorated by external parties .... unless the
people of the region themselves are prepared to
turn away from violence and toward dialogue. .

The Western Partnership

In this and other aspects of our policy
toward southern Africa, we are not
alone. We have maintained close con-
sultations and coordination with our
major allies in Europe and with Japan.
Our allies have been in the forefront of
positive and hopeful efforts such as the
EPG initiative, which sought to help the
contending parties in South Africa move
toward negotiations. They have joined
with us in calling on both the South
African Government and its opposition
to turn from violence and toward negoti-
ations. Our allies have been as forthright
as we in calling on Pretoria to end the
current state of emergency, to release
Nelson Mandela and other political
prisoners, to unban political parties, and
to set a timetable for the elimination of
the apartheid laws.

This Western partnership will be
even more important in the future. It is
essential that the West speak with one
voice if it is to be heard in the noisy
clamor of contending parties in southern
Africa. The United States is committed
to working together with the other
industrial democracies in this critical
region, and we are sure that our allies
are of the same mind.

Conclusion

So where do we go from here? The key
element of our diplomacy must be clear
to the American people, to our allies,
and to Africans who care so deeply
about this region.

accommodation of interests— not the
replacement of one injustice by another.

Third, our diplomacy will actively
seek to support dialogue and communi-
cation—despite the difficulties posed by
distrust and polarization. We have a
unique interest in communicating with
all parties. We will urge them to create
and exploit all openings for reconcilia-
tion and constructive change.

Fourth, working with our allies, we
will continue to assert a Western vision
of what we favor as the outcome in
South Africa. It is not enough to cam-
paign againut apartheid. South Africans
must know what the West stands /or as
the country redefines itself politically.

Fifth, we believe that the leaders of
southern Africa— whatever their rhetoric
of the moment— want us to be there,
lending a hand. This is the message I
have heard from a wide spectrum of
leaders from the front-line states and
South Africa. Our assistance programs
in South Africa, established under this
Administration with strong support from
the Congress, represent a constructive
accomplishment of which we can be
proud. Our corporate, educational, and
religious leaders have played a vital
parallel role. We intend to sustain our
efforts, and we urge all concerned
Americans to continue their contribu-
tions as well. It is the road of
involvement— not disengagement— that
will bring us closer to our goals.

Sixth, we recognize that South
Africa's evolution is intimately con-
nected to the fate of an entire region.
Accordingly, we are committed to play-
ing our proper role in creating alter-

AFRICA

natives to destructive confrontation in
southern Africa. The West must support
this region's economic health and
political viability. And we will continue
our efforts to resolve the long-festering
conflicts that complicate the search for
peace and development. Now is a time
for sober reflection and careful analysis
by all the region's leaders. We can be
effective partners only if they resist the
temptations of violence and the strident
voices of destructive conflict.

Finally, let me share with you yet
another striking word from the recent
remarks of Vice President Mmusi:

We believe that those in authority in
South Africa are made of the very same flesh
and blood as ourselves. They share the same
emotions and intellect as we do. They worship
the same God. It is our hope that, sooner or
later, they will realize the path they have
chosen to travel spells only their own doom.

Peter Mmusi clearly does not view
the drama of southern Africa as a Greek
tragedy already written. I agree with
him wholeheartedly. There is too much
at stake for us to turn away in despair
and let destructive events run their
course. The economic engine created by
the talent and sweat of all the peoples of
southern Africa is too important to be
destroyed by reckless actions from any
quarter. The hopes of all the region's
people for a better life for themselves
and their children are too precious to be
squandered away in futile efforts to
preserve apartheid in South Africa
or by a leftward lurch toward a new
authoritarianism.

The crisis in southern Africa cannot
be ameliorated by external parties—
however powerful and well
intentioned— unless the people of the
region themselves are prepared to turn
away from violence and toward dialogue.
As I look at southern Africa today, I'm
reminded of the Prophet Ezekiel's pro-
verbial call on his people to renounce
their destructive past: "The fathers have
eaten sour grapes, and the children's
teeth are set on edge." The fathers and
mothers of southern Africa have eaten
their fill of the sour grapes of repression,
violence, and retribution for the
mistakes of the past.

The time has come for the children
of every country in that vast and poten-
tially rich region to be freed from this
dread legacy. I pledge today that
southern Africans— black, white, colored,
Indian— who take this course will not be
alone. The United States will stand with
them. If we are true to ourselves, we can
pursue no other course.

South Africa: Toward Peace and Stability

'Press release 256.

by Chester A. Crocker

Address before the Economic Club in
Detroit on December 1, 1986. Mr.
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs.

Thank you for your hospitality and for
the opportunity to discuss with you our
policy toward southern Africa. In the
6 years that I've been responsible for
this policy arena, there have been
periods when we made real progress
toward our goals of strengthened peace
and stability, with democratic govern-
ment and respect for individual human
rights in all the countries of a region of
critical importance to the United States.
There have been other periods when
these goals have seemed more distant as
proponents of violence and extremism
held the upper hand. We are currently in
one of these seasons of uncertainty
about the future of southern Africa, and
any assessment we draw about the
future must be sober.

The Debate Over Sanctions

First, let me say a word about the
debate we have just come through over
our policy toward South Africa. That
debate was hard fought and doubtless
left some bruised feelings on both sides.
It was not, however, a debate about the
fundamental objectives of our policy.
This is best illustrated by the fact that
the policy objectives set forth in the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986 parallel closely the goals set forth
by President Reagan, Secretary Shultz,
and other senior officials of this
Administration.

Our major difference with the Con-
gress concerned the mix of policy instru-
ments most likely to move South Africa
toward the early end of apartheid and its
replacement by a new, truly democratic
South Africa with effective protection
for the rights of majorities, minorities,
and individuals. We forthrightly stated
our conviction that the adoption of indis-
criminate, punitive sanctions would not
help achieve our objectives. Majorities in
both Houses of Congress did not agree.
Those sanctions are now the law of the
land, and we are implementing them. At
the same time, Americans on both sides
of this debate are coming to realize that
sanctions do not amount to an effective
policy toward South Africa. As Secre-
tary Shultz said at the swearing-in of
our new Ambassador to South Africa,

iJ:

Ed Perkins: "It is time to raise our
once again to the horizon and to mo
ahead."

Unfortunately, the horizon in Sc
Africa and the region is turbulent w
storm clouds of violence and polariz(
confrontation. In response to inter
national sanctions, the South Africa,
Government has retreated further ir
self-imposed laager of repression an
anti-American sentiment. The police
presence in black townships and res-
tions on press freedom have helped
scenes of violence off our evening nt
telecasts. But the cycle of repressior
violent resistance continues. In rece
days, we have seen further forced
removals of blacks and new detentio
antiapartheid activists, including pre
nent churchmen. In both the black a
white communities, extremist voices
dominate the debate, and moderates
having to shout to be heard.

Tensions between South Africa ii
its neighbors have also risen dramat
cally. South African military spokesi
have openly threatened Mozambique
Botswana with armed retaliation un
these countries satisfy Pretoria that
are taking effective steps to halt cro
border guerrilla operations against
South Africa. For its part, Mozambii
has threatened action against neighl
ing Malawi unless that country halts
alleged assistance to the RENAMO
[Mozambique National Resistance M
ment] insurgency against the Maput
government. Zambia and Zimbabwe
considering possible economic sancti
of their own against Pretoria, knowi
that such moves only invite potential
severe South African retaliation. In
Angola, a civil war fueled by Soviet ;
and Cuban troops drags on, even tho
military victory is clearly beyond the
reach of either side.

Efforts To Promote
Peace and Stability

Against this bleak backdrop, questior
have arisen about our ability to make
positive contribution to peace, stabili
and democracy in southern Africa. T)
South African Government has
responded to the congressional impos
tion of sanctions by imposing someth
of a chill in our bilateral relationship.
This is perhaps best exemplified by
Pretoria's attacks on our economic
asistance program in South Africa.

Department of State Bu'tir

All Americans can be proud of the
itribution our aid program is making
issist South Africans disadvantaged
apartheid to develop essential skills
1 experience. In the fiscal year that
t ended, approximately $20.3 million
s disbursed to individuals and institu-
is committed to nonviolence and
nocracy. Our aid has helped fund
olarships for students to study in the
ited States; training of black entre-
neurs and trade unionists; and com-
nity-based projects in the areas of
Id care, youth activities, and legal
'ice.

Our aid program in South Africa—
;iated during this Administration
h bipartisan support in Congress—
mplifies the search for alternatives to
lence and polarized confrontation that
it the heart of our policy toward
jth Africa and the region. We have
n active partners with those in South
-ica and the region who want to turn
ay from a mindless descent into
lence and toward peaceful options for
istructive change.
This constructive American
jroach is also exemplified in the activi-
3 of American businesses in South
"ica. American firms have made an
jortant positive contribution in South
••ica by challenging the apartheid
item and by spending over $200
llion outside the workplace to provide
lolarships, training, nonracial housing,
i other benefits to black employees,
lile we understand the reasons why
Tie American firms have withdrawn
■m South Africa, we applaud the
termination of others to stay. These
ms are in the forefront of American
brts to remain positively involved in
; search for a better future in South
rica, and their honorable contribution
serves to be recognized by all Ameri-
ns. Indeed, it was so recognized—
plicitly and eloquently— in the recent
;islation passed by Congress.

Despite the grim realities of the
esent situation in South Africa, we
main hopeful that the contending par-
's will come to their senses and
cognize that the path of violence and
nfrontation is a dead-end street,
arlier this year, the Commonwealth's
Ininent Persons' Group (EPG) seemed
be making progress in convincing
ith the South African Government and
; black opposition that constructive
ange can occur only through negotia-
ons. There seemed also to be a growing
cognition on all sides that no party can
i allowed to dictate in advance the
:enda or outcome of the negotiations

and that all South Africans will have to
have confidence that their fundamental
interests and rights would be protected.

At the heart of the EPG initiative
was an effort to convince the parties to
begin the essential process of confidence
building by taking limited but important
steps that could be reciprocated by the
other side. The EPG effort eventually
collapsed following the May 19 South
African Defense Forces raids on African
National Congress (ANC) installations in
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana.
However, the EPG's effort to help the
parties undertake these so-called match-
ing commitments is a positive and impor-
tant legacy for the future. That approach
has not run its course; indeed, it has
barely been tested.

President Reagan and other
Western leaders have publicly called on
the South African Government to do its
part to get negotiations started by end-
ing the state of emergency; releasing
Nelson Mandela and other political
prisoners; unbanning political parties,
including the ANC; and setting a time-
table for repealing apartheid laws. If the
South African Government were to take
these steps, it would be entitled to
expect from its opposition a firm com-
mitment to cease violence and enter
negotiations.

Prospects for Progress

While the immediate prospect for
negotiations is not bright, we have seen
some signs that the parties remain open
to discussion of the idea of matching
commitments. In our contacts with both
the South African Government and its
opponents, we have made clear that the
United States will not uncritically
endorse the demands of any of the con-
tending parties. We are, however, ready
now to explore seriously with each of the
parties the contribution it can and should
make in the interest of a negotiated
settlement. In a word, the diplomatic
option is open, and our good offices are
available.

We have no illusions about the near-
term prospects for progress. External
parties, however well intentioned, can-
not help solve South Africa's crisis
unless South Africans themselves are
prepared to take risks for peace. They
cannot demand guarantees in advance of
the precise outcome of a process that
must, inevitably, entail compromise and
accommodation of interests. We intend
to challenge the South African Govern-
ment, the ANC and other black opposi-
tion groups, and the front-line states to
do their part to help create a framework
for negotiations that might provide real

AFRICA

hope for a lasting resolution of South
Africa's crisis.

We will also continue to support
efforts by South Africa and its neighbors
to work out alternatives to confrontation
and cross-border violence. The urgent
need for practical steps in this direction
is nowhere more evident than in the cur-
rent tense relations between South
Africa and Mozambique. These countries
are still officially party to the Nkomati
accord, which commits each signatory
not to aid insurgent movements on the
territory of the other party. Following
its signature in 1984, the Nkomati ac-
cord did lead to a reduction of tension
and enhanced security for both South
Africa and Mozambique.

In recent months, the Government
of Mozambique has alleged that South
Africa has resumed and increased
assistance to the Mozambican insurgent
movement RENAMO. For its part.
South Africa rejects the claim and warns
Mozambique against harboring guerrillas
of the African National Congress. In our
view, renewed cross-border violence or
threats of violence, and intervention in
neighboring countries, cannot resolve
South Africa's problems and may well
exacerbate them. Instead, we urged both
parties to fulfill strictly their obligations
under the accord and handle their
compliance concerns through a direct
security dialogue. The United States
played a significant role in the negotia-
tion of the Nkomati accord, and we
stand ready to assist the parties in
revitalizing it. But the primary impetus
must come from the countries that stand
to benefit most from the accord— South
Africa and Mozambique.

We have watched with growing con-
cern as tensions have escalated between
Mozambique and Malawi. These tensions
arise from conflicting claims about
Malawi's relationship with RENAMO
and its position on the insurgency in
Mozambique. We firmly believe that the
interests of neither Mozambique nor
Malawi would be served by confronta-
tion. The two countries have agreed to
establish a joint commission to address
mutual security concerns. This is a
potentially positive development, and we
urge that this commission be activated
immediately.

In Angola also, we are convinced
that there is potential for accommo-
dation rather than violent confrontation.
We continue to seek a diplomatic resolu-
tion of the conflict in Angola that would
provide for Namibian independence and
withdrawal of all foreign forces— South
African and Cuban— from that country.
We believe that the gap between South
Africa and Angola on a timetable for the

^bruary 1987

AFRICA

withdrawal of Cuban forces is bridge-
able. We have made clear to all the par-
ties our readiness to help bring this
negotiation to a successful conclusion.

We had hoped that South Africa's
conditional agreement to begin imple-
mentation of UN Security Council
Resolution 435— the Namibian inde-
pendence plan— on August 1, 1986,
would prompt the Government of Angola
to reply constructively to our ideas on a
Cuban withdrawal schedule. Unfor-
tunately, no such response was forth-
coming from Luanda, and the August 1
opportunity was lost. We, nevertheless,
believe that this peace process remains
the one way out of a long and bloody
civil war for all the Angolan parties. Our
invitation to the Governn.ent of Angola
to resume these negotiations remains
on the table, and we urge that they take
it up.

Although reconciliation among con-
tending Angolan parties is an issue only
Angolans themselves can resolve, we
believe that it must occur if there is to
be real peace in that country. Our sup-
port for UNITA [National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola] under-
scores our conviction that it is a
legitimate nationalist movement which
must participate in any serious effort at
reconciliation among Angolans. We have
made clear that we do not expect any
Angolan party to commit political
suicide, nor do we have an American
plan for Angola's political future. We
will continue to work actively toward the
day when they can do so free of external
military presence from any quarter.

As we consider opportunities for
accommodation among contending par-
ties in southern Africa, our focus should
be on practical objectives that would
redound to the benefit of all. In our
view, the revitalization of regional
transportation routes disrupted by
armed conflict would be especially
welcome. The United States supports
African efforts to reach practical
arrangements among all the affected
parties that could lead to reopening of
these transportation routes, many of
which have been closed for years.

The United States has made clear its
determination to support the efforts of
southern African countries to deal with
the economic consequences of the
region's political crisis. President
Reagan has stated that he will propose
to Congress a new program of assistance
to the black-ruled states of southern
Africa in the critical areas of trade,
transportation, and support for economic
reform. We are now working to prepare
the details of this program. As we move

forward, it will be essential to consult
and coordinate our efforts with the coun-
tries in the region and our allies and
friends. Despite the budgetary strin-
gencies of the Gramm-Rudman
[-Hollings] era, we are determined to
fulfill the President's pledge to propose a
good program and to see it approved by
Congress.

The U.S. Role

In his recent sendoff for our new
Ambassador in Pretoria, Secretary
Shultz said that, in southern Africa as in
other areas of policy, we must ask "not
only what. . .we want, but how, practi-
cally, we can get from here to there." I
have tried to underscore for you, today,
our conviction that American goals in
southern Africa will not be achieved if
the entire region slides into endemic
violence. That is what could happen if we
simply opt to disengage when the going
gets tough. Such a course can only pro-
duce chaos and an increase in Soviet
influence, since Moscow's strong suit is
the promise of arms, advisers, and
military solutions.

By contrast, the U.S. role must con-
tinue to be to roll up our sleeves and
work for negotiated solutions and a
peaceful change. We favor this course
because it is right. We are— as someone
once said— a nation of builders, not
destroyers. But we also believe it is prac-
tical because the peoples of southern
Africa have visions of a positive future

for their beloved region. They nurtu:
the hope that their children will enjo;
future of dignity, liberty, peace, and
prosperity. They, too, want to be
builders. All Americans are united in
their desire to help achieve these obj(
fives. This is the basis of an America:
consensus on southern Africa that wi
last long beyond the current pessimii
in the region and our own tactical
debates of the moment. It is a consen
worth preserving and nurturing becai
it is worthy of the best traditions of t
American people.

And what does this mean in prac-
tice? I submit that it means an active^
role. It means the maintenance of an
active AID [Agency for International
Development] role in South Africa an
the region to support black advancen
and educational development; it meai
our diplomacy is ready and willing to
play a catalytic role— opening channe-
floating ideas— between the South
African Government, front-line states
the ANC, and other major black grou
it means a sustained regional role
between South Africa and its neighbc
on behalf of peaceful settlement and
coexistence; and, above all, it means i
the West as a whole maintains its
presence and influence via all availabi
channels to support its hopes for a
brighter future for all the peoples of t
troubled yet strategically important
region. ■

The Human Rights Dimension in Africa

by Charles W. Freeman

Address before the World Affairs
Council in Philadelphia on November 6.
1986. Mr. Freeman is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs.

There could be no more appropriate set-
ting for a discourse on "human rights"
than this city, in which the Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution
first proclaimed the idea of such rights.
The documents created here continue to
guide our foreign relations and to inspire
the people of many lands.

Concern for human rights is not a
peculiarly American idea. It is a central
objective in man's yearning to be free. If
anyone here believes we have a monop-
oly on this dream, let that person reflect
upon the struggles in Haiti and the
Philippines, in the Soviet Union and

South Africa, in Latin America and
Eastern Europe. The human rights
revolution proclaimed in Philadelphia
two centuries ago continues. Nowhere
this more evident than in Africa.

The news from Africa on human
rights is not all good— in fact, much of
is dismal. What I hope to leave you wi
is a few thoughts on how the current
situation evolved, recent trends, and n
hopes and fears about the future of
America's role in ensuring basic
freedoms for all Africans.

The African Experience

I think it is important, in any discussio
of human rights in Africa, to start witl
historical perspective. Three main fac-
tors in African history and heritage,
which contrast sharply with our own,
need emphasis.

Department of State Bulle

AFRICA

First, the advent of the slave
and 19th-century coloniaHsm inter-
d Africa's independent evolution.
;ges and kingdoms were torn apart
16 export of slaves to the New
Id. Many paternalistic European
inistrators put the interests of the
opole far ahead of the interests of
Deople they governed. Colonial
:ials often did not consult local
ilations about political or social deci-

Economic progress, education,
the rights of the individual fre-
itly took a back seat to demeaning
ide control. Such colonial adminis-
ions were, it must be remembered,
only modern systems of government
t Africans had experienced at
pendence.

• Second, many of the first genera-
of Africa's liberation leaders spent
h of the colonial period in exile or in
Anxious for alternatives to colo-
ism, they embraced ivory-tower
alist theories and Marxism— theories
. have proven as irrelevant to African
Bitions, and even more counter-
Huctive in terms of human liberties,
hey did in their Western birthplaces.
'• A third and related point is that
ly newly independent nations were
Jlled with arbitrary borders, drawn in
Jope without regard to tribal and

Biistic realities. For many African
ers new at running governments,
; fact, coupled with the ideological
■<ies I have mentioned, made the one-
ty state attractive as a way to unite
fractious populations thrown
ether by colonial cartographers.

One caveat: there were important
<eptions to everything I have said. I
aot wish to contribute to the all too
<espread American misperception that
nocracy and civil liberties have no
(ure home on the African Continent. It
Jnportant to recognize, for example,
ft Botswana is a country with a record
democracy and human rights that
tipares favorably with that of any
intry in the West. The Gambia and
legal, with their vigorous parliamen-
y systems, and Kenya's racial har-
ny and free enterprise system— to cite
ew examples— also give the lie to this
lard.

ricans Confront
leir Own Record

many African leaders review the
:en turbulent years since independ-
ce, they are coming to see the
mage done to their societies by the
ilure to protect constructive dissent.

Increasingly, they recognize the need to
accept ideas and initiatives from outside
the established bureaucracies. Africa's
attention thus is returning to the fun-
damental issues of human dignity,
individual rights, and civil liberties for
which the independence struggles were
waged. Human rights have fortunately
been placed squarely on the African
agenda by the continent's leaders. The
continentwide trend toward encourage-
ment of private initiative at the expense
of bureaucratic power supports this.
After all, governments willing to trust
the people to run their own economic
affairs are more likely also to trust them
to make decisions in politics and social
life.

We see examples of this economic
revolution all over Africa. Let me men-
tion just a few examples.

• Zaire, Zambia, and Somalia have
devalued their currencies; eliminated
most trade and price controls; and
increased agricultural prices.

• Mali, Guinea, and Senegal have
begun to pare down the public sector,
liquidating, reforming, or reducing the
privileged position of inefficient
parastatals.

• Kenya has adopted a flexible
exchange rate policy and liberalized
import licensing and maize and fertilizer
marketing.

Similar measures are being adopted
in other African countries. The process
is an exciting one to watch. The
economic framework is changing radi-
cally. Market forces are beginning to
give the right signals to the private sec-
tor, and African economies are begin-
ning to respond with growth. For
example, despite declining world prices
for its major metal exports, Zaire has
managed to maintain positive growth
over the past 3 years. In Somalia,
exports have increased over 50%, and
agricultural production has established
new records for 3 years running.

Recent Developments
in African Human Rights

The trends in human rights connected to
these changes have yet to run their full
course. Some impoverished African
regimes still argue that the interests of
society and the state must come before
those of individuals and that human
rights are a "Western" concept that
developing societies cannot afford.
Others claim that their fragile political
institutions could not withstand a
greater openness or tolerance of dissent.
Some of the most serious human rights
violators of the past have been replaced

by newer villains in other countries. Out-
side concern for civil and political liber-
ties is often condemned as an intrusion
into a country's internal affairs. Not sur-
prisingly, this criticism often comes from
the most repressive regimes, and we
hear it frequently from some within the
South African Government. But there
are many positive developments. Let me
share a few with you.

• President Abdou Diouf of
Senegal, who was also last year's chair-
man of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), deserves special recognition and
credit for his energy and concern for
human rights. The OAU's adoption of its
Charter on Human and People's Rights
at the end of October was a significant
step for Africa. And. with Senegalese
sponsorship, the UN Human Rights
Commission has just established a
Special Rapporteur on Religious
Tolerance.

• Just over a year ago, a new
military government took over in
Nigeria, a regional power that is home
to one in every four black Africans. Part
of the justification for the military's
move was the need for more attention to
human rights. Nigeria's record under
President Babangida has not been spot-
less, but impressive strides have been
made and continue. Within days of
assuming power, the Babangida govern-
ment released more than 100 political
detainees, including 12 journalists, and
appointed as Minister of Justice the
chairman of the Human Rights Commit-
tee of the Nigerian Bar Association, a
strong critic of the human rights record
of the previous regime. Since then, large
numbers of detainees have been
released, and more have had their
sentences reduced. Press freedoms have
also been restored in a country which
traditionally has enjoyed a freewheeling,
strongly vocal media.

• Earlier this year in Sudan, we
saw the former Transitional Military
Council disband after conducting
multiparty elections. A democratically
chosen prime minister and parliament
now rule Sudan. The government has
also lifted press restrictions and repealed
laws against strikes. A violent and pain-
ful civil war in southern Sudan continues
to pose a grave threat to the human
rights of Sudanese. Nevertheless, in
1985 and 1986, Sudan gave sanctuary to
more than 1 million refugees from
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad. Sudan's
cooperation with the international com-
munity in refugee resettlement gives
witness to its humanitarian ideals.

• There has been a remarkable turn-
around in human rights in Uganda, one

tbruary 1987

AFRICA

of the countries that suffered most from
abuses in the past. President Museveni's
government has ended torture, curbed
violence by soldiers, and reinforced the
independence of the judiciary and the
professionalism of the police. Museveni's
challenge to human rights violations in
Uganda, before he was President, gained
credibility when former Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights Elliott
Abrams sharply criticized government-
sponsored human rights atrocities in
Uganda in 1984. By mid-1985, the
United States had ceased disbursing
foreign assistance to Uganda
in light of human rights abuses and
unrestrained civil violence. After his
accession, President Museveni publicly
thanked the United States for its
uniquely forthright support of human
rights in his country. We have now
restarted our aid program and made a
special grant of human rights funds to
aid the Uganda Government's law
codification project.

• In Liberia, though progress has
proceeded by fits and starts, American
attention to human rights has likewise
yielded some promising results. The
return to civilian rule, while widely
welcomed, was also tarnished by wide-
spread reports of shortcomings in the
October 1985 elections, including restric-
tive party registration requirements,
lack of open debate, the jailing of some
opposition leadership, and a vote-
counting procedure which undermined
confidence in the results. Our economic
support fund disbursements were conse-
quently suspended foi- a period; they
resumed only when conditions improved.
In June, President Doe, after a great
deal of prodding by the executive branch
and Congress, ordered amnesty for a
number of prominent citizens accused of
involvement in an alleged coup attempt.
Reconciliation talks between the govern-
ment and opposition parties are
continuing.

There are. of course, as I have
noted, continuing examples of system-
atic and repressive denials of human
rights in Africa. Let me cite one case in
point. In 1984 and 1985, Ethiopia
suffered a calamitous famine brought on,
in part, by the government's attempts to
impose the same discredited approach to
peasant agriculture that had earlier
caused the deaths of millions of Ukrain-
ians, Vietnamese, and Cambodians. Last
December, an international outcry led by
the United States against forced reset-
tlement caused the government to halt
its brutal, ill-planned program. A
number of very senior Ethiopian
officials, most recently the Foreign

Minister, have sought political asylum
abroad to protest the regime's oppres-
sion of its people and its subservience to
the Soviet totalitarian model. Ethiopia's
villagization program— a plan to move
millions of people in rural Ethiopia into
new, centralized villages— needs to be
monitored closely. The Ethiopian
Government knows the world is
watching and that it will not tolerate a
return to coercion and brutality.

Human Rights and U.S. Policy

Let me now describe what the United
States is doing to promote human rights
in Africa. Identification of abuses and
strong U.S. statements in response are
the first level of combatting human
rights violations. In specific instances
where human rights abuses are alleged,
American ambassadors have standing
instructions— sometimes supplemented
by special directions from Washington—
to make inquiries of local officials and
try to bring about a change in the situa-
tion. Our annually published "Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices"
have become an accepted international
standard by which to measure progress.
Local officials know that their human
rights performance will be weighed as
we allocate increasingly scarce American
assistance abroad.

But it is not enough merely to iden-
tify and protest human rights violations.
The United States also directly attacks
the causes and effects of human rights
abuses through its assistance programs:
in fiscal year 1986, the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the State
Department jointly administered a
.$2-million human rights program in
Africa. These funds were used to assist
in law codification, to promote fair
multiparty elections, to upgrade legal
facilities, to educate people about civil
and political rights, and to assist in the
legal defense of those charged with
violating repressive or discriminatory
statutes. In addition, during this period,
the United States provided over $100
million in assistance to African refugees
escaping turmoil and political persecu-
tion in their native countries. Of this
amount, $21 million was provided to the
International Committee of the Red
Cross, which, among other things, aids
political prisoners and victims of
persecution.

South Africa is an important example
of how we combine diplomatic efforts
with assistance programs to promote
human rights. Starting with the Presi-
dent, we have spoken out forcefully to
denounce the evils of apartheid and the

repressive state of emergency, voice
objections to the detention without
charge of thousands of South African
and express our grave concern over
allegations of torture occurring in dc
tion. We make public and private
demarches to the South African Gove
ment over specific allegations of hum
rights violations. For example, last w
we called for an immediate, independ
investigation into allegations that yoi
people in detention were being abusei

One and one-half million dollars o
the Africa human rights program wei
spent in South Africa last year. We
support law centers which provide
advice and legal representation for th
victims of apartheid, apprentice oppo:
tunities for black lawyers, and law
libraries which have become the centi
resource for legal research to defend
those victimized by apartheid. We
finance publications describing basic
legal rights and teaching individuals h
to protect their rights through the leg
system. Such projects often go beyon(
legal assistance: in one case, we helpe
develop a water system in an area wh
blacks were threatened with forced
removal. The water system helped the>
resist eviction from their homes by
bolstering the argument that the com
niunity was viable.

Private U.S. firms operating in
South Africa also play a very positive
role in the struggle against apartheid.
Not only have they invested millions c
dollars to provide desegregated worki
conditions, educational and training
opportunities, equal benefits, and hou;
ing assistance; they have also served e
a force for change by their example.
LT.S. companies have led other firms-
particular, South African ones— to
espouse the principles enunciated by tl
Reverend Leon Sullivan. While their r
in South Africa is unfortunately
diminishing, it has been unique, and I
would argue that it is likely to prove
irreplaceable.

We hope to continue and, the Con-
gress willing, increase our assistance
programs for black South Africans. Ou
goal is an audacious one: to help prepa
them to take their rightful place in Sou
Africa's economic and political life. Oui
$25-million aid program for this year is
unique because we carry it out with-
out any tie to the South African
Government.

This brings me to the always vital
question of resources. LInder this
Administration, we increased our
economic assistance to Africa 55% in tl
period 1980-85, playing an increasingly
vital role in promoting growth-oriented
economic development in Africa and, at

Department of State Bulle

CANADA

-ame time, advancing important
strategic political, and humani-
111 interests in the region. We clearly

Ithe momentum on our side. More
_more African countries realized that
needed to turn to the West— rather
the Soviet-bloc countries— to obtain
;ritical economic support needed,
icularly to restructure their
lomies along more market-oriented
. Along with increasing economic
iness, as I have suggested, there also
e a rediscovery of the virtues of a
e open society and the principles of
an rights.

Unfortunately, during the past 2
■s, the budgetary process has cut our
lomic involvement in Africa and our
ty to help African countries make
difficult transitions they are attempt-
Congressional cuts in foreign aid,
5lative earmarks protecting the
;ations of a relatively small number
juntries and programs, and Gramm-
man will sharply reduce our
lomic assistance for Africa to
3 million this fiscal year. That is 35%
than in 1985 and 18% less than in
5. Unless this situation is reversed,
;an expect serious damage to our
rests in Africa. Among the conse-
ices could be a reversal of recent
|can efforts to undertake the critical
pomic reforms that are so vital as
(erpinning to human rights reform. In
thern Africa, moreover, we must
3 additional resources to ensure that
current downward spiral of violence
economic deterioration does not set
. part of Africa back 20 years.

•elusion

other country in the world so directly
explicitly weighs its relationships in
)int-to-point comparison with human
its standards. I am proud of our
)rd and of the results we have
ieved.

This Administration is both
ouraged by some trends in African
lan rights performance and awed by
work still to be done. In many of the
id's poorest countries, where sub-
ence living conditions are almost
lond the imagination of most
iericans, we need development
ources to assist us in urging govern-
nts to allow basic freedoms. Freedom
,he press, religious tolerance, and free
;tions are noble goals and vital human
hts. But people who do not have
)ugh to eat or know how to read can
■dly be expected to rise up to claim
se rights until their basic needs are

met. We need the resources to assist
governments in forming societies which
claim those God-given freedoms. We
must not walk away from Africa just as
Africa is walking toward us. But without

your support, and that of Congress, for
the resources necessary to build on
what we and Africans have begun to
accomplish, that is exactly what we
may do. ■

Secretary Visits Canada

Secretary Shultz visits Canada on
November 21, 1986. to meet with
Secretary for External Affairs Joseph
Clark. Following is a joint news con-
ference by the two Secretaries.

Secretary Clark. ^ I'm particularly
pleased to have the opportunity today to
sign this instrument which complements
a number of initiatives Canada has taken
in response to threats to the security of
civil aviation. In signing the agreement,
Canada and the United States are seek-
ing to ensure the security of the more
than 13 million passengers who travel by
air across oui- vast common border each
year.

At the same time, it is recognized
that aviation security can neither be
ensured nor terrorism effectively
counteracted by individual states alone,
but only on the basis of cooperation and
united action by the international com-
munity. In this regard, I am pleased to
note that the assembly of the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), meeting in Montreal on the first
of October this year, unanimously
adopted a Canadian proposal to develop
a new International Agreement on Air-
port Security.

This resolution, cosponsored by over
30 countries representing all geographic
regions and social economic systems,
reflects a growing realization throughout
the international community that united
action is needed to close a gap in the
existing ICAO framework concerning
aviation security. The Hague, Montreal,
and Tokyo conventions clearly govern
security threats to aircraft in flight but
do not adequately cover all terrorist
threats or attacks at airports.

[In French: The very complete bilat-
eral agreement signed today by Canada
and the United States will help not only
to reinforce security measures in the two
countries, but also to serve, I hope, as a
model for other bilateral accords, and
reinforce the multilateral initiatives
taken by Canada within ICAO to assure
international civil aviation security.]

Secretary Shultz. The aviation security
agreement, Secretary Clark and I have
just signed, will strengthen the most

extensive commercial aviation partner-
ship in the world. As you noted, with
over 13 million people flying between
our two countries each year, it very
fittingly reflects our shared values and
the spirit of cooperation between our
two countries through a mutual commit-
ment to take practical measures to com-
bat international terrorism. Cooperation
which we will continue as we press for-
ward together on the Canadian proposal
which you mentioned for a convention on
international airport security introduced
at the International Civil Aviation
Organization assembly last month in
Montreal.

I think this is a very significant step
for us. From the standpoint of the
United States, we have reached similar
agreements with 15 other aviation part-
ners, and we have active negotiations
going on with some 60 other countries;
and, this agreement with Canada is the
strongest of any that we have.

So it represents an important state-
ment and partnership and example in
this continuing battle against interna-
tional terrorism, and I feel privileged to
sit here with you, Joe, and sign it.

Secretary Clark. Thank you very much.
I just want to make one or two brief
comments to begin the conference. We
had a very useful and full discussion of a
range of Canada-U.S. issues and also a
number of international issues of con-
cern to both our countries. Both govern-
ments are strongly committed to the
bilateral trade negotiation between our
two countries. Both countries are
strongly committed to the quick engage-
ment of the multilateral trade negotia-
tions. I should say that we spent some
time here, as we have in other meetings,
dealing specifically with some of the
problems that exist in international
trade and agriculture.

A very important step forward was
taken by the economic summit in Tokyo
when agriculture was put on the agenda.
That was followed through in the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] meetings in Punta del Este where
there was a good and broad agreement
reached to address agricultural issues
under the GATT. I made clear again the

bruary 1987

CANADA

singular importance to Canada of tangi-
ble progress on the question of acid rain
consistent with the envoys' report jointly
established by President Reagan and
Prime Minister Mulroney.

We discussed at some length, and I
found most valuable again, the oppor-
tunity to discuss with Secretary Shultz
the new momentum that is developing in
the world of arms control. Certainly in
the view of Canada, the meeting at
Reykjavik was a significant break-
through. I personally was most
impressed by the speech Secretary
Shultz made in Chicago earlier this
week, which I thought was a reassuring,
strong, thorough statement of the posi-
tion of the United States on arms control
questions. I think the next step to be
taken, exists to be taken by member
nations of NATO whose foreign minis-
ters met in Brussels in mid-December,
and Canada looks forward to playing a
continuing role in maintaining that new
momentum on arms control.

Secretary Shultz. This has been a good
meeting. It is one of a continuing series.
We agreed to meet at least four times a
year. We see each other more often than
that and among the four, one explicitly
in the United States, another in Canada
for the purpose of the meeting and, of
course, our President and Prime Minis-
ter also meet each year. So we have lots
to talk about and we work at it together,
and I think it pays off.

It pays off in working through vari-
ous questions that we have between us,
whether they're of the trade nature or
environmental nature or other aspects of
our relationship which is a gigantic rela-
tionship. It pays off from the standpoint
of sharing views on matters such as
arms control that you mentioned. It pays
off in the economic scene as we review
these potentially very significant
negotiations on a free trade regime
between the two countries.

It helped a great deal in Punta del
Este at getting started on the new
GATT round and you were— I wasn't
present, but all of my delegation spoke
about the leadership you gave personally
in the whole meeting. We were glad to
cooperate and follow your lead in that.
So, it's been a very worthwhile overall
set of exchanges and this particular
meeting fitted into that pattern.

Q. One of the things you talked
about today was the Iranian arms
question. One of them, there are new
reports of Washington's —

Secretary Clark. What's the
question?

Q. Was Canada one of the coun-
tries involved in secret arms sales to
Iran, and did the two of you discuss
that issue today?

Secretary Clark. No and no. The
second question, just to be clear on that,
there was no discussion of any Canadian
involvement in any kind of secret arms
sales to Iran because we are not engaged
in any secret arms sales to Iran. There
were, as you know, sales of some heli-
copter engines which were for peaceful
purposes. We found out that they might
have been diverted. We are putting an
end to that diversion with all the means
at our disposal.

Q. When did you find out that
several other countries were selling
arms to Iran with U.S. approval, and
which countries were selling arms to
Iran with U.S. approval?

Secretary Shultz. I am not going to
respond to questions about various
Iranian-related issues. The people who
have been closest to that subject have
been testifying in Washington, and I
think it's best to let it rest there.

Q. If there is substantial progress
on arms reduction, is Canada prepared
to substantially increase its troop com-
mitment in Western Europe?

Secretary Clark. This government
has already increased Canada's troop
commitment in Western Europe. That
was one of our campaign commitments
during the election. We followed through
on it early on in our mandate. We intend
to maintain a strong Canadian presence
there. Obviously, one of the questions
that has to be considered, as questions of
arms control and related issues evolve, is
the continued role of conventional
defense. There will be a major role;
Canada intends to continue to play our
active part.

Q. Would you increase beyond
what you've done already?

Secretary Clark. We've no immedi-
ate plans to increase, but I make the
point that we just have.

Q. You said that you participated
in two full-scale discussions at the
White House of the U.S. involvement
with Iran. Can you tell us whether you
knew after those two full-scale discus-
sions that the United States would
make secret weapons shipments to
Iran?

Secretary Shultz. I give you the
same answer that I already gave on a
question on that subject.

Q. You said that you found out that
there may have been diversions of
helicopter parts and you said that you

i'K

:((ii

are putting an end to that diversion*
all means at our disposal. Have you
found out how the diversions are ta
ing place and what are the means at
your disposal?

Secretary Clark. We are not sun
that they have taken place. There is a
possibility that they have. The engine
parts in question were shipped as I
understand on the 29th of October. TI
may not have arrived. The instrumen
available to us is to require an end-usi
certificate. We have the full cooperati
of Pratt and Whitney who was the mj
ufacturer in securing that, in having t
certificate sought and secured. The
Iranian Charge has been or will be cai
in by our officials as a further means
ensuring that Canadian goods destine
for peaceful uses were used peacefull;

Q. You say you found the
Secretary's speech in Chicago to be
reassuring. What was it that was sa
reassuring about that speech and on
what points did you need reassuran

Secretary Clark. I didn't require
reassurance. But I think what was
reassuring about the speech— and I
would presume to recommend you rea
it.

Q. I have.

Secretary Clark. I would then
presume to recommend that you repo
it— I shouldn't do that. [Laughter]

I think that it made clear that the
developments at Reykjavik, while the
went beyond what many people expec
might occur, were part of a pattern o:
preparation for movement and momei'
turn in arms control that is continuing
think that many of the allies of the
United States, including Canada, are
reassured by the reiteration of the
United States that the practice of con
sulfation which has been followed fait
fully and effectively in our judgment 1:
the United States will continue, and tl
there will be an opportunity for Canac
and other allies to continue in the con-
text of NATO to elaborate other steps
not simply to elaborate other steps bu
consider together the consequences of
the progress that is possible in arms
control.

Q. If there are to be massive redi
tions, large-scale reductions of bal-
listic missiles, one could presume th;
the cruise missile threat might
increase. What might this mean as fi
as the North American Defense [Con
mand] system, NORAD? Might Canai
have to increase its commitment to
NORAD, or might there have to be
large-scale defenses against the cruii
missile threat?

i!
w
it
if

Department of State Bulle

DEPARTMENT

Secretary Shultz. We'd like to see
ihreat reduced. But the fact of the
I er is that the Soviet system and our
om, the Western systems, are dif-

iit and so I think you have to foresee

we will continue to need to be able
efend ourselves effectively and to
e a way of deterring aggression so
; it doesn't take place.
If we have fewer ballistic missiles,
1 you have to look to the other means
have to exercise that deterrence. I
c it that that was the point of the
3tion earlier about conventional
s, and I agree with the implication

said that in the Chicago speech. And
;r means.

So your bombers and cruise missiles
things like that play a part in main-
ing your ability to deter aggression—
mportant part. And I think what Mr.
rk and I have been doing today in
; portion of our discussion, and I
tk our discussion undoubtedly will be
ended into what the NATO ministers

about in Brussels next month, will
L reexamination of the implications
what we should be doing of the possi-
y of the sharp cuts in the INF
ermediate-range nuclear forces] area,
he area of strategic arms let alone
:r things and that's the process that

K)ing through. I think it is a very
thy process.

IQ. Along the same lines, I'd like to
whether Mr. Clark has expressed a
earn in your discussions today
i ut the possibility of the U.S. break-
ii of the SALT [strategic arms limita-
1 1 talks] II Treaty. Were you able to
a ieve [inaudible]?

Secretary Clark. I raised Canada's
c cern about SALT II and I made the
p :it that SALT II apart from— that
" I.T II possesses among other things,
■vy important symbolic significance
reiterated a position that I have
'ill'. I wouldn't want to associate
' self with your description of the
r tual, of the respective positions of the
cintries on that question.

Q. [Inaudible]

Secretary Clark. [In French: We
I iissed the free trade question in a
ii')-al way. We discussed the common
liTtaking of the two governments, of

President of the United States and

I'l'ime Minister of Canada ... In-
ar as discussions now taking place in
ncouver are concerned, we did not
cuss these talks because there has
'M no declaration by the Prime
iiister coming out of them.]

(J. [Inaudible] Secretary as you
ve done in the past, whether Canada
inks it advisable to [inaudible] limits

bruary 1987

Secretary and Marine Commandant
Sign Memorandum of Understanding

On December 15, 1986, Secretary Shultz
and Commandant of the Marine Corps
General P. X. Kelley signed a Memorandum
of Understanding between the U.S. Marine
Corps and the Department of State which
provides for Marine security guards at U.S.
Embassies around the world. The signing
marks the .38th anniversary of the agree-
ment, whereby, specially trained Marines

guard embassy personnel and classified
documents at U.S. posts overseas. This year
an additional 100 Marines have been
authorized for the U.S. Embassy protection
program abroad. As a result. Marine secu-
rity guards will be assigned to 10 new posts
by the end of 1987.

Press release 261.

on cruise missiles and [inaudible]
bombers as a result of the superpower
talks following Reykjavik?

Secretary Clark. That particular
question did not come up as you put it
today. Obviously, as Secretary Shultz
has just indicated, if we are to achieve
the kinds of reductions that were dis-
cussed at Reykjavik and that are still
capable of being discussed at Geneva,
that will have implications for Canada
given our geography and our location.
But we haven't discussed that at any
particular length today.

That's the kind of thing that I think
would be very useful for representatives
of allied countries to consider with some
urgency, but also some care and some
frankness and I hope that that oppor-
tunity will be provided in some of the
meetings of NATO foreign ministers.

Certainly, the opportunity for that, the
setting— the stage has been set for that
by the extensive consultations with its
allies that the United States has under-
taken, and in my judgment by Secretary
Shultz's speech in Chicago which now
that I am assured has been reported
extensively in the American press, I
hope might receive some attention in the
Canadian press.

Q. Was the subject of sanctions
against South Africa discussed; and if
so, what would Mr. Clark's reaction be
to the announcement that Bata Shoes
has terminated its operations there?

Secretary Clark. The discussion of
policy toward South Africa was dis-
cussed generally. I welcomed the deci-
sion by Bata to remove its investments
and its association from South Africa.

EAST ASIA

As I have indicated in the House 2 or
3 days ago, Archbishop Ted Scott, who
was the Canadian member of the Emi-
nent Persons Group, has been consulting
with Canadian and American companies,
which are considering the nature of their
future in South Africa, and will be mak-
ing some recommendations to me as a
basis for conversations I might have
with other Canadian businesses that
have interests there.

Q. I am wondering if the White
House shares the view of your trade
negotiator, Peter Murphy, that the
Congress may not be inclined to
endorse a trade deal if Canada does
not move to exchange rates more in
line [inaudible].

Secretary Shultz. I don't think the
exchange rate issue is really a part of
these free trade negotiations. The talks
have been going along quite well, but I
think we need to interject into them a
strong sense of urgency and push, so
that we really try to get something
accomplished certainly in the next 6, 9
months or so, because we have a great
opportunity here to do something of tre-
mendous significance.

I have to look at it from the stand-
point of the interest of the United
States. It will benefit us. I believe it will
benefit Canada even more, but the real
point is both parties can get a lot out of
it. So we need to work on it hard, and
Ambassador Murphy is doing so, and I
hope very much that we will have a suc-
cessful conclusion to this effort.

Q. When you spoke about the
possibility of the Pratt and Whitney
shipments being diverted for military
purposes as opposed to the commercial
purpose for which the aircraft parts
are being sent there, have you thought
or have you asked for American
assistance to find out if there was in
fact any diversion?

Secretary Clark. No.

Q. Are you going to?

Secretary Clark. I don't know that
American assistance would be germane
in this case.

Q. Intelligence?

Secretary Clark. We are pursuing
directly through the company, through
the user, and through the Iranian
Charge. I expect we'll find out what we
need to know and be able to ensure that
undertakings given to the Government
of Canada by exporters will be honored.

China Policy Today:

Consensus, Consistence, Stability

'Press release 254 of Nov. 24. 1986.

-Secretary Clark spoke in English and
French, and his remarks in French were
translated. ■

by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.

Address before the World Affairs
Council of Northern California in San
Francisco on December 11, 1986. Mr.
Sigur is Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs.

It's a pleasure to appear before this
outstanding forum this evening. Those of
you here in California have particular
appreciation for the importance the East
Asian and Pacific region bears to our
lifestyles and livelihoods. The Reagan
Administration has done more to regis-
ter this awareness, in Washington and
nationally, than any other. As one who
has spent many years living both in Asia
and in California, I am acutely sensitive
to the significant evolving interdepend-
ence between our peoples, between our
industrial and commercial enterprises,
and between our political and security
systems. While the nations of East Asia
and the Pacific are culturally diverse and
at different stages of economic and
political development, the region as a
whole is critical to us and will play an
important role in our nation's future.

China is known far better to us
today than 20 years ago, but it is no less
intriguing. It is a study in contrasts— the
largest Asian nation with one of the
region's smallest per capita income
rates; a socialist state experimenting
with certain free market principles; a
historically preeminent ethnic group
with numerous heterogeneous character-
istics; and a nationalistic-minded people
divided by two competing political sys-
tems. Whatever its future, China is
destined to remain a significant player in
Asian affairs and a reckoning factor in
our own objectives there.

Five weeks ago I traveled to the
People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), my
first visit there since becoming Assistant
Secretary of State, although I have
visited the country several times before.
Perhaps more so than on any previous
trip, I sensed that our relations now are
firmly on a stable and durable course. I
attribute this, in great part, to the con-
sistence and consensus which have char-
acterized this Administration's China
policy for 6 years, as well as to the suc-
cess of our two nations in preventing
certain differences from impeding
overall progress we are achieving.

The Policy Framework

The framework for our relationship w.
China is provided in three key docu
ments: the 1972 Shanghai communiqu
the 1979 Joint Communique on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relation
with the P.R.C., and the 1982 joint co
munique with Beijing. Collectively, th
agreements set forth fundamental pri
ciples which have guided, and continu
to guide, U.S. -China relations. Our su
port for these principles has not dimir
ished. One of the basic principles is ou
acknowledgment that Chinese on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain
there is but one China and that Taiwa
is part of China. A second fundament;
principle is our conviction that the fut
of Taiwan should be determined by
Chinese on both sides of the strait anc
that the predominant U.S. interest is
that the issue be resolved peacefully.

In normalizing relations with
Beijing, we also established a framewi
for continuing commercial, cultural, a
other relations on an unofficial basis
with the people on Taiwan. Statutory
affirmation of these elements by meat
of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act
reflected a commitment by the Ameri'
people to remain faithful to their frier
on Taiwan.

One cannot formulate policy towa;
China without considering its impact
upon other countries in the region sue
as the Soviet Union, Japan, Korea,
Southeast Asian nations, and the worl
at large. China has long been a major
factor in East Asia. In recent years, it
has become a much more active playei
on the global stage, and its views and
policies increasingly make a difference
international fora. This is a trend we
accept and support and one we expect
will continue in the years ahead.

Unlike so often in the past, our
China policy today is based upon a
remarkable degree of consensus withii
the executive and legislative branches
the U.S. Government as well as among
business and local interests around the
country. In addition, our Asian friends
and allies have indicated that, while th
do not always agree with every detail (
our policy, they understand and essen-
tially concur with our objectives.
Although other hotspots in Asia captui
more of the headlines, we continue to
devote considerable effort and attentio
to China.

Department of State Bulle*

EAST ASIA

r.S. relations with the P.R.C. have
a positive, stabilizing influence upon
Kast Asian and Pacific region. This
nr has been strengthened by the con-
■nce of our policy. Our objectives
l' been defined clearly, and our inten-
s have been articulated consistently,
(.'by reducing uncertainties both at

0 and abroad.
( I insistency does not signify an

itable and unchanging policy. Quite
nntrary, consistency means living
' I our principles and commitments in
nstantly changing environment.

• ■y cannot be frozen. It has to be
' and responsive to new variables
I'lnsiderations. Our relations with
la have developed creatively within a
•istent policy framework, in accord

1 our fundamental interests and long-
1 objectives. We have been able to
it our policy, when necessary, to

ji ^-t new challenges and opportunities.

i:ent Developments

•ecent months, there have been
lificant new developments, both in
P.R.C. and Taiwan, as well as in
■iet interest toward Asia.

• China's leadership has proposed

vf guidelines for political reforms as a
dns of further pursuing economic
dernization.

• Secretary of Defense Weinberger
1 a most successful visit to China in
'.ober, and the first U.S. Navy ship

It to the P.R.C. took place last month.

• Last week, Taiwan held important
ctions representing further political
♦lution on the island. We welcome
tlence over the past several months

t the authorities on Taiwan are tak-
significant initiatives for political

|orm, reflecting a realistic and confi-

•it approach to the future.

• Soviet General Secretary Gor-
:hev's speech in Vladivostok last July
licated that Soviet solicitations toward
St Asia, and particularly China, will
pressed more vigorously.

These developments demonstrate the
namism of the political and economic
nation in and around China. In this
itext, it is important to understand

basis of our China policy, the current
ite of our relations, and the direction
which we are going.

tnesis of Our Policy

S. relations with China have under-
ne a remarkable transformation in the
St decade and a half. It was just over
years ago that President Nixon made

his historic visit to China, cutting
through more than two decades of isola-
tion and hostility between our two coun-
tries. The unique confluence of U.S. and
Chinese interests at the time made his
trip possible; but only through the far-
sighted efforts of statesmen on both
sides were we able to overcome the
immense ideological hurdles.

While the international situation has
changed significantly since the early
1970s, the foundation built by conscien-
tious efforts at that time remains the
basis for Chinese and American policies.
The fundamental premise was and
remains our shared view that neither
China nor the United States is a threat
to the other's security, that we need to
work in parallel to counter policies
detrimental to our two countries, and
that both our countries have much to
gain from a constructive relationship.
Over the years, we have built broad,
mutually advantageous ties, and we are
confident that our relations will remain
on solid ground.

Our decision to normalize diplomatic
relations with China in 1979 evolved
from the belief that establishing closer,
mutually beneficial ties with China could
contribute substantially to peace and
stability in East Asia. We wanted to help
promote a modernizing China which
would act responsibly and independently
of external pressure. The best way to
advance this objective, we believed, was
to support China's efforts at economic
modernization. The significant progress
that China has made toward its modern-
ization goal over the last few years has
been made possible by the expansion
of market forces within China and
increased ties with free market
economies outside of China. We have
supported China's active participation in
international financial institutions and
other international organizations and its
expanding trade relations with its
neighbors. In the past few years, we also
have begun a limited program of defen-
sive military cooperation with the
Chinese.

Current State of Relations

Since the normalization of relations in
1979, our bilateral ties with the P.R.C.
have expanded far beyond the narrow
strategic focus that brought us together
in the early 1970s. We have experienced
some ups and downs, but, increasingly,
we have been able to narrow our dif-
ferences and prevent them from affect-
ing the fundamental basis of our
relationship.

The most dramatic growth has been
in the economic area. This has been due
partly to enthusiastic participation by
American business in developing China
trade. Also, China sees the United
States as a primary source of advanced
technology, managerial expertise, and
technical information which can assist in
its modernization. Last year, bilateral
trade exceeded $8 billion. This year we
expect that figure to exceed $9 billion.
The United States now is China's third
largest trading partner, and its second
largest investor with over $1 billion com-
mitted. American business in China is
involved in everything from oil explora-
tion, mining, and industrial production
to legal services and finance.

Naturally, our expanding economic
relations are not without a number of
specific problems and disputes. Ameri-
can businessmen complain about a poor
investment climate in China. Indeed,
foreign investment has fallen off
significantly this year. American
exporters complain about Chinese
import barriers, unclear trade regula-
tions, and the absence of copyright
legislation. Our governments disagree
over balance-of-trade figures, due to dif-
ferent statistical bases used in calculat-
ing exports and imports. There has been
a sharp growth of Chinese textile
exports to this country, prompting more
demands for protectionist legislation.
We still have not agreed on a bilateral
investment treaty. And the Chinese con-
tend that our liberalization of technology
transfer controls has not gone far
enough. It is a tribute to the strength
and maturity of the relationship that
such difficulties are being discussed on a
pragmatic, nonpolemical, case-by-case
basis without threatening the overall
development of trade.

In the areas of science and technol-
ogy, a key Chinese development priority,
we are very active. Our bilateral scien-
tific and technological exchanges are the
largest we have with any country. Hun-
dreds of delegations pass between our
nations each year, providing China with
information on technical, scientific, and
managerial subjects. China also has
much to offer us in the fields of
medicine, scientific experimentation, and
earthquake prediction. The benefits are
mutual, and we expect them to grow as
we increase our cooperation and
exchange of information.

The United States hosts approx-
imately 17,000 students from the P.R.C.
When these students return to China,
they not only will contribute to China's
modernization but also will have a much
better understanding of the United
States. Through these returning

bruary 1987

EAST ASIA

students and through our support of
China's technological development, we
help to strengthen China's ties to the
outside world.

Reforms in China

Internal changes in the P.R.C. have led
to new vitality and prospects for further
progress. Since 1978, China has imple-
mented far-reaching economic reforms.
In connection with that effort, it has
expanded its relations with foreign coun-
tries, a process often described as the
"open door" policy. The success of its
modernization goals depends on this
decision. Through the open door flow the
foreign expertise and technology China
needs to further its modernization objec-
tives; and it is in our interest to help
stimulate China's economic develop-
ment. A politically stable, modernizing
China is in a better position to resist out-
side pressure and intimidation and is less
likely to be a distruptive factor in Asia.
China will modernize; the critical ques-
tions are: at what pace and with what
kind of orientation? Although Chinese
efforts will determine whether or not
their goals are achieved, we believe that
continued U.S. participation in the pro-
cess will serve our long-term interests.

Some suggest that our relations with
the P.R.C. might be equated with the
care and feeding of a "baby tiger."
China's key reformer, Deng Xiaoping, is
elderly, and many, both in China and
abroad, wonder whether his pragmatic,
moderate policies will continue after his
death. His reforms and open door
policies do not enjoy unanimous support
in China, and the pace and scope of
reforms continue to be the subject of
some controversy. Decentralization of
economic and political decisionmaking
and power requires adjustments in tradi-
tional patterns of party and bureaucratic
control. Some Chinese leaders worry
about negative Western influences
sneaking through the open door together
with the positive accoutrements of the
West so desired by China.

Given the vagaries of China's
modern history, some observers fear
that China's open door one day may be
slammed shut and the P.R.C. 's moderate
policies reversed. Fortunately, the pros-
pect is unlikely. While Chinese leaders
are determined to avoid "foreign entan-
glements," they also will avoid reversion
to uncompromising self-reliance and iso-
lation. Internal economic reforms have
generated more economic development
in the past 8 years than China has wit-
nessed in many decades. The standard of

living of millions of Chinese has improved;
and continuing stability and moderation
in the years ahead will expand these
benefits. Attempts to reverse the trend
undoubtedly would be opposed by a
great majority of the people.

China'a commitment to its open door
policy is reflected well in its relationship
with Hong Kong. After lengthy negotia-
tions, China and the United Kingdom
reached agreement in 1984 on Hong
Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty
in 1997 with its economic system intact.
While many details remain to be worked
out, we are encouraged that Hong
Kong's unique status as a commercial
center and a gateway to China will con-
tinue long into the 21st century.

While differences remain apparent in
China over the pace of the reforms,
overall results indicate that the momen-
tum for reform will continue.

Regional Implications

In the political realm, the development
of a comprehensive dialogue on regional
and global issues has deepened
significantly our understanding of each
other's interests and policies, thereby
reducing disagreements and potential
frictions. As I noted earlier, we both
have been concerned about Soviet
actions that threatened international
peace and stability.

There have been recent signs that
the Soviet Union, as a Pacific power, will
begin playing a larger role in Asia. We
believe Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech
is only the beginning of a new round of
Soviet activism in Asia. Moscow may
attempt to increase its influence in the
region through subtle tactics designed to
overcome the suspicions most Asian
nations have of Soviet intentions. Our
friends and allies in the region are not
impressed by empty rhetoric. Nor do
they find much that is attractive in the
Soviet Union's economic system, and
they will judge Moscow by its actions
rather than its words. If Moscow wishes
to participate in the region, rather than
offering a vague program for peace and
stability, it should start by addressing
some of the sources of continuing ten-
sion in East Asia. The Soviet Union
should reduce its troops in Afghanistan
and along the Sino-Soviet border. It
should take steps to persuade Vietnam
to withdraw its occupying forces from
Cambodia. It should reduce its military
support for North Korea. It should
reduce its massive deployment of SS-20
nuclear missiles in Siberia, which
threatens China, Japan, and other coun-
tries in Northeast Asia. I am not opti-

mistic that the Soviet Union will take
any of these steps.

In contrast, the United States is
engaged in a close and positive dialogi
with friends and allies throughout thf
region. Our discussions with China on
political and economic issues have bee
fostered by a regular exchange of higl
level visits between leaders of both ecu
tries. This series of visits has been mn
productive in strengthening areas of
agreement and reducing differences.
Both sides feel comfortable in express
their views frankly and unemotionally

There are a number of areas wher
we and the Chinese share parallel
interests.

In Southeast Asia, for example, t
Chinese actively participate in efforts
end Vietnamese occupation of Camboo
China supports the resistance moveme
and keeps Vietnamese forces engaged
the Sino-Vietnamese border.

In Afghanistan, the Chinese con-
demn the Soviets for their continued
military operations and are strong sup
porters of the Afghan resistance. The
Chinese have made it clear to Moscow
that the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan and Soviet support for Vi'
nam's occupation of Cambodia, along
with Soviet troop deployments on the
Sino-Soviet border, are the three main
obstacles to improved Sino-Soviet
relations.

On the Korean Peninsula, the
Chinese seek, as we do, to reduce ten-
sions between the North and South. Or.
two governments may differ on how th
can be accomplished, but the same objf
tive of peace is sought. Despite China's
unwillingness to promote political or
official ties, its indirect trade with the
Republic of Korea continues to grow at
an impressive rate. China had the larg-
est delegation at the recent Asian Gam
in Seoul and took the unprecedented
step of sending its athletes there by
direct, chartered flights. We believe it
would serve the interest— which both w
and China share— in peninsular stability
for Pyongyang to resume direct talks
with Seoul and for the North to par-
ticipate in the 1988 Olympics.

Japan is China's leading trade part
ner and. thereby, plays a key role in
China's economic modernization. Com-
mon interests and mutual respect
dominate their bilateral ties, as shown
by Prime Minister Nakasone's successfi
trip to China last month. China's policy
toward Japan is shaped by many of the
same factors that determine China's
policy toward the U.S.— concern about

Department of State Bullet

EAST ASIA

'illtaU

Soviet Union and the need for
istment. trade, and advanced
jmology.

Despite our many areas of agree-
t, we do have differences with the
,ese on certain international issues,
larily concerning regions outside of
a., such as the Middle East, Central
erica, and Africa. These are areas
•e remote from China's immediate
rests and security concerns, where
iing follows other political motiva-
,s, such as a need to demonstrate its
jj' lependent foreign policy." In such
s, China is prone to take public posi-
is more in sympathy with Third
rid nations and at odds with our own.
While we cannot expect that two
'forii mtries as different politically,
Mh momically, and culturally as China
the United States will share iden-
views on all world issues, we do
set to positions they take in interna-
aal fora which run counter to U.S.
crests and our friendly relations. In
!!!« !er to prevent misconceptions, we
:age in frequent consultations, which
e helped improve Chinese under-
nding of our foreign policy.

alts

iOMll(

ofH

eenij

nple,

litary Cooperation

addition to the broad expansion in our
(nomic, science and technology, and
itical relations, we have moved, in the
i.t 3 years, into the more sensitive
iia of military cooperation, including

sale of defensive arms to China. This
(ited security cooperation is pro-
jding cautiously and deliberately. It is
Jted in the assessment that we share
(imon security concerns. The will-
fness of the United States to sell
tcific defensive weapons or tech-
ogies to the P.R.C. is based on a
srough analysis of each item's utility

enhancing Chinese defensive capabil-
«s, in light of the political-military
vironment. We also carefully take into
count the interests and concerns of
r other friends and allies in the region
'•ough frequent and regular consulta-
ins with them on this issue.

Our military cooperation to date has
«en limited to approval of the sale of
ree specific weapons systems— a large-
iiber artillery munitions manufactur-
g plant, avionics components for the
8 defensive interceptor, and antisub-
arine torpedoes. Other defensive items
e under consideration.

Taiwan Relationship

Let me turn now to the Taiwan aspect of
our China policy. In 1979, we estab-
lished, by law, a framework for conduct-
ing unofficial commercial, cultural, and
other relations between people in the
United States and people on Taiwan.
Within this framework, unofficial rela-
tions have flourished remarkably. In
1985, 180,000 Americans traveled to
Taiwan, and 100,000 people from
Taiwan came to the United States.
There are approximately 21,000 students
from Taiwan studying at American
universities and aljout 1,000 American
students studying in Taiwan. This is a
vibrant, varied relationship which
benefits both our peoples.

Time has shown that normalization
of U.S. -P.R.C. relations was accom-
panied by a relaxation of tensions in the
area and by China's turn toward moder-
ation and responsible international par-
ticipation. Because of our faithfulness to
our friends, the people of Taiwan, no
less than others in the region, have
benefited from this positive
development.

U.S. -Taiwan trade nearly has quad-
rupled since 1978, the final year of our
diplomatic relationship, to reach an
estimated $25 billion this year. Nearly
50% of all Taiwan's exports go to the
American market, and Taiwan is our
11th largest export market worldwide.
Direct U.S. investment in Taiwan totals
$750 million. Under these conditions,
Taiwan has prospered: this year, its
growth rate may reach 9%.

Ironically, Taiwan's economic suc-
cess has created certain irritants in our
commercial relations— cigarettes, steel,
tariffs, machine tools, export perform-
ance requirements, and counterfeiting,
to name a few. Taiwan has taken action
to remove many of these irritants and to
try to diversify its overseas export
markets. These steps are appreciated, as
are Taiwan's efforts to purchase more
American grain and to improve intellec-
tual property protection. Nevertheless,
Taiwan's trade surplus with the United
States will increase this year to approx-
imately $15 billion, which is much larger
in per capita terms than our deficit with
Japan. In such circumstances, demands
from U.S. industry for greater access to
Taiwan's market are reasonable. We're
pleased, therefore, that Taiwan agreed
last week to grant us market access for
tobacco, wine, and beer, on terms which
we find satisfactory.

Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves
now have surpassed $40 billion, an

amount equivalent to more than 18
months of its imports. Taiwan is in one
of the strongest foreign exchange posi-
tions in the world. With such sizable
reserves, Taiwan's currency has appre-
ciated somewhat. However, given
Taiwan's global trade surplus and its
strong reserves, one would expect a fur-
ther appreciation.

These issues are the by-products of
Taiwan's success. Most of our trading
partners gladly would exchange their
economic woes for Taiwan's situation.
The island's economic success and its
vital commercial ties with the United
States have done much to give the peo-
ple on Taiwan greater confidence in the
future and in their own ability to deal
effectively with other challenges facing
their society.

In drafting the Taiwan Relations Act
7 years ago. Congress declared that any
nonpeaceful efforts to determine
Taiwan's future would be "a threat to
the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States." The sale of defensive
arms to Taiwan, mandated by the act,
continues. The U.S. -P.R.C. communique
of August 17, 1982, sets certain
parameters for conduct of the sales. In
return for Beijing reiterating that its
fundamental policy is to seek a peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue, the
United States agreed not to increase the
quality of arms sold to Taiwan and to
reduce the quantity gradually, over time.
The United States'will abide faithfully by
its undertakings in this communique.

Some have urged the U.S. Govern-
ment to become involved in efforts to
promote peaceful resolution of the dif-
ferences between Beijing and Taipei.
However, there is a real danger that
American involvement would be counter-
productive. For at least two decades, we
have viewed this issue as an internal
matter for the P.R.C. and Taiwan to
resolve themselves. We will not serve as
an intermediary or pressure Taiwan on
the matter. We leave it up to both sides
to settle their differences; our predomi-
nant interest is that the settlement be a
peaceful one.

Earlier this year, a Taiwan cargo
plan was hijacked and flown to China.
The authorities on Taiwan authorized
airline-to-airline talks to gain the return
of the plane and some members of its
crew. The success of these talks
demonstrates the virtue of letting the
Chinese work things out for themselves.

sbruary 1987

EAST ASIA

Democratic Progress

I want to add a few words about internal
political developments in Taiwan.

During the past 6 months, some
remarkable and encouraging steps
toward greater democracy have been ini-
tiated by the authorities in Taiwan. In
October, Chiang Ching-kuo announced
that the martial law emergency decree
would be terminated and that a ban
against the formation of new opposition
parties would be lifted. Opposition
leaders, sensing the.?e winds of change,
have pressed ahead with the formation
of a new political party.

These developments represent a
very significant evolution of Taiwan's
political institutions. We commend the
foresight and determination that have
set this process in motion. We also
recognize that the transition to a func-
tioning democratic party system will not
be easy. There may be difficulties along
the way, but we are impressed by the
process which has begun.

Conclusion

Let me conclude my remarks with the
observation that, more so than ever
before, we Americans are aware of the
opportunities and challenges we face
throughout East Asia and the Pacific.
The many nations of the region have a
firm claim on our attention— some due to
their close, traditional friendship and
alliance with us, others because they ex-
hibit hostility or instability. We seek to
maintain our good relations with the
former while working to reduce tensions
and differences with the latter.

China occupies a unique place in the
region. The remarkable progress in our
relations with this great country has had
a major impact on the rest of the area.
We believe the basic premise of our
policy toward China— that it can be a
force for peace and stability throughout
East Asia— is correct and is producing
positive results.

There still are differences between
us, and we do not take this critical rela-
tionship for granted. On the contrary,
we devote considerable effort and atten-
tion to ensuring that we are responsive
to changes in both our bilateral ties and
the broader situation in the region. I am
confident that, through cooperation and
good will on both sides, we can continue
to strengthen our bonds with China to
our mutual benefit. ■

Vitality and Possibility on the Pacific Rim

by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.

Address before a conference spon-
sored by Meridian House International
for business executives from the United
States, Japan, and Latin America on
December 3, 1986. Mr. Sigur is Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.

I am very pleased to be here with you
today. It is appropriate that this sym-
posium takes place in the house built by
Ambassador Irwin B. Laughlin, who
served in the Foreign Service in Japan
between 1893 and 1907. Meiji Japan had
a great allure for Americans, and judg-
ing from Ambassador Laughlin's fine
collection of ukiyo-e. he must have been
intrigued with the country. It was a
fascinating time. A quarter century after
the Meiji Restoration, Japan retained an
exotic flavor for Westerners. Yet the fall
of the shogunate had released a tremen-
dous vibrancy. The energy and vitality
that characterized the Meiji era persists
in Japan, and a similar dynamism has
emerged in other countries along the
Pacific rim in East Asia. It is what
makes the region so promising and
important to the United States.

Trade With East Asia

East Asia has become our primary
source of trade. In 1985 the region
accounted for about one-third of our
global two-way trade. The East Asian
region also contains our most dynamic
trading partners. From 1981 through
1985, U.S. trade with the world
increased by 13%, but with East Asian
and Pacific countries our trade increased
by almost 42%. The United States is the
number one market for Korea, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong as well as for Japan. What
frequently is overlooked is that 7 of our
20 largest export markets are in the
region. In addition to Japan, they
include Korea, Australia, Taiwan, China,
Singapore, and Hong Kong. U.S. invest-
ment in the region exceeds $33 billion
and, like trade, is growing.

Most predictions project growing
interdependence among the economies
and societies of the Pacific rim. By the
year 2000, it is almost certain that the
Pacific Basin will account for more than
50% of the world's production. U.S. ties
to Europe will remain strong, but our
future growth increasingly lies in East
Asia and the Pacific.

Success in Development

Northeast Asia in particular has showi
the way to effective economic develop
ment. Many of the region's governmer
have adopted development strategies
which encourage private sector initia-
tive, and they serve as practical model
for developing countries in other
regions. Businessmen have been willin:
to risk domestic investment that explo
new technologies, improving quality
while cutting costs. The labor force is
hard-working, highly educated, and
adaptable. The most successful countri
in the region have promoted industriesi
geared to competitive exporting. The
concentration on exports has multiple
benefits. It overcomes the limitation ol
small domestic markets, imposes cost
consciousness, and eases foreign
exchange constraints.

This development strategy has
clearly paid off. The Asia-Pacific
region's share of world exports more
than doubled between 1960 and 1984,
rising from 7.5% to 17%. The success
this growth model, based on exports, it
even more obvious when one finds that
the economies of Taiwan, Korea, and
Singapore expanded much more quick!}
when they abandoned import substitu-
tion strategies for outward-looking
policies. The export-led growth has bee-
sustained by sound financial manage
ment. The Asian countries with rapidly
growing economies have followed sensi
ble exchange rate policies. They also
have encouraged domestic savings
through intelligent banking regulations
and have sought foreign investment. In
general these successful countries have
avoided market distorting price-fixing
and subsidies. It is no coincidence that
the debt-service ratio of the East Asian
developing countries is the lowest of an
region- 18% in 1985.

Survey of East Asia

It is handy to talk of the "East Asian
region," but that term hides a great
diversity. The region can be divided intc
five categories by degree of economic
development: first, Japan, Australia, an
New Zealand; second, the newly indus-
trialized countries— Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore; third, the rest o
the ASEAN countries; fourth, China am
the Pacific islands; and finally the stag-
nant, closed socialist economies of Asia.

The newly industrialized countries
initially concentrated their efforts on
producing labor intensive products in th«

EAST ASIA

Os as Japan's technological endow-
it and wage costs began to rise. They
are rapidly increasing the produc-
of manufactured goods, while
an, of course, is making high tech
ducts. As a result of yen apprecia-
1, lower oil prices, and reduced in-
;st rates, Taiwan and Korea are
ming. Korea's dramatic achievement
global current account surplus this
r will permit it to reduce its debt.
China and the ASEAN countries,
er than Singapore, are now entering
labor-intensive niche the newly
ustrialized countries are abandoning,
present the ASEAN countries, espe-
,ly the oil producers— Indonesia and
laysia— depend on raw material
Dorts. They are suffering from gen-
Jly depressed commodity prices. In
short term, some may need assist-
ce. In the medium term, these coun-
es must expand manid^actured
oorts, and to do that they should
Drove the climate for foreign
testment.

China has witnessed the economic
owth in other countries in its region
tl understands the implications for
proving the living standards of its own
3ple. Accordingly China has been
mging its economic system to include
1 ire market-based policies. China's
■cnt extraordinarily high growth rates
■ encouraging, and we look forward to
it country's continued growth and
egration into the global economy.
These days we tend to dwell gloom-
on the implications of the economic
iwth in East Asia. I refer, of course,
the region's competitive challenge to
nerican companies and to the United
ates' very large trade deficit with
;ian countries. These developments
■se serious questions, and our govern-
ent and companies must deal with
em. At the same time, we should
cognize that the growing prosperity in
ist Asia contributes mightily to politi-
,1 stability and ultimately to our
■curity.

East Asian prosperity has depended
1 the openness of the U.S. market. The
iiited States has been a ready market
)t only for the countries in Asia but for
-'veloping countries elsewhere as well.
1 1985 the United States bought 61% of
le developing countries' exports of
lanufactures. Realistically this situation
mnot go on forever. Other countries,
^jiecially Japan, must open their mar-
ets to allow an increase in imports from
R' developing countries and from the
nited States as well. We can continue
1 lie a good customer only if we enjoy
i.'cess to the markets of our trading
■ai'tners.

U.S. -Japan Interdependence

Let me now turn from the broad over-
view of the region to consider our eco-
nomic relations with Japan, which in 40
years has become an economic super-
power and an economic model for many
of the other countries in East Asia.

The United States is bound to Japan
by a history of friendship and coopera-
tion. We share a commitment to demo-
cratic values, a common view on the
important international questions, and a
security framework. Our governments
consult and cooperate closely on interna-
tional political affairs and on the man-
agement of the world economy. Though
often repeated, it remains true that the
relationship between the United States
and Japan is one of the most important
bilateral relationships in the world.

The economies of the two countries
also now are tied in an increasingly tight
and strong mesh of trade and invest-
ment. It is commonplace to note that,
after Canada, Japan is the United
States' largest trading partner. But the
statement hides the complexity of the
relationship and the growing integration
of the two countries' economies.

When we think of Japanese exports
to the United States, we usually think of
consumer products— cars, cameras,
VCRs. Certainly we buy those things
from Japan in abundance. But of the
United States' $72 billion of imports
from Japan in 1985, over $8 billion were
components used by U.S. manufacturers.
Another $2.2 billion were products made
by U.S. subsidiaries in Japan and
shipped to the United States. According
to Commerce Department statistics,
Japanese subsidiaries in the United
States in 1983 exported $22.9 billion,
which was 11.4% of U.S. exports that
year. In 1985 we shipped $22.6 billion to
Japan, more than 10% of our global
exports and more than our exports to
the United Kingdom and West Germany
combined.

Japan is now, after the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, the third
largest foreign investor in the United
States, The Ministry of Finance has
reported that at the end of 1985,
Japanese investment in this country
stood at $25.3 billion, up $5.4 billion
from the year before. The rapid growth
of investment by Japanese companies
suggests that the integration of the two
economies will continue. Several months
ago Business Week debated whether
increased Japanese investment in the
U.S. economy was beneficial and con-
cluded that it was. On balance I agree.
The United States needs capital, and it
can benefit from the investments and

technology that Japanese companies will
be able to provide.

Trade With Japan

We expect that for 1986 Japan will have
nearly a $60 billion trade surplus with
the United States and a global current
account surplus of over $80 billion.
Japan has the lowest average tariff on
manufactured goods of any developed
country and has relatively few official
trade barriers of other sorts. Yet there
are anomalies which suggest that the
Japanese economy is still not as open as
it might appear. Japan has the lowest
per capita imports of any major devel-
oped country— $1,106 compared with
$1,580 for the United States and $2,611
for West Germany. It has the highest
per capita manufactured exports to
developing countries. At the same time,
except for France, it has the lowest
manufactured imports from developing
countries— $69 compared with $285 for
the United States and $145 for West
Germany. Not just American companies
but European and Asian exporters com-
plain of the difficulty of selling in Japan.

Taken together, the real and per-
ceived problems of entering the market,
and the size of Japan's global trade
surplus and its bilateral surplus with the
United States, have resulted in persist-
ent economic tensions between the two
countries. The complexity of the trade
and investment ties between the two
countries— and the relationship of our
bilateral trade deficit with Japan to our
budget deficit, to our global trade
deficit, and to Japan's domestic economic
policies— have made it hard to deal with
the problem. From time to time, some
have suggested greater government reg-
ulation of trade or targets of some sort.
We have rejected these calls because
they would choke off economic vitality,
and they could have unintended and
unforeseeable contrary effects on com-
panies and national economies, not only
in Japan and the United States but
elsewhere.

This is not to say, however, that the
U.S. Government has failed to pursue
solutions to our economic problems with
Japan vigorously. We have approached
the trade problem on two sets of tracks.
We have sought better access to Japan's
market through the MOSS [market-
oriented, sector-selective] talks and
through negotiations on other individual
issues. I think that we have made prog-
ress. We resolved many of the issues
raised in the MOSS talks. And in the
first 8 months of 1986, U.S. exports of
MOSS products to Japan rose b.7%.
Japan has cooperated in resolving other

-ebruary 1987

EAST ASIA

issues as well. These include tobacco,
semiconductors, and aluminum. Prime
Minister Nakasone promised that foreign
companies would be able to compete to
participate in the new Kansai airport
project, and U.S. firms are seeking
business.

While pushing for improved market
access, the Administration also has
worked for a correction of the exchange
rate, which has a great effect on trade
flows. Following the exchange rate
agreement among the group of five
major economic powers in September
1985, the yen strengthened by over 50%.
The Tokyo summit statement in May
emphasized economic fundamentals as
determinants of exchange rates. We
believe that it is important for both the
United States and Japan to address
these fundamentals. The evolution
brought about by the exchange rate is
consistent with Japanese Government
policy. When announcing his intention to
follow up on the Maekawa report in
April this year, Prime Minister
Nakasone said that Japan's" . . .continu-
ing large current account imbalance is a
matter of serious concern not only for
the management of our own economy
but also for the harmonious development
of the world economy. Therefore, it
should be our national goal to steadily
reduce the current account imbalance to
one consistent with international har-
mony." The Maekawa report plots a
course for doing just that. We look for-
ward to continuing and effective
Japanese Government action on the
Maekawa report's goals and
recommendations.

We believe that a reduction in
Japan's global trade surplus requires a
restructuring of the economy away from
export-led growth. We have, in fact,
entered into a high-level dialogue on
structural economic issues with Japanese
officials. We held the first substantive
meeting at the end of October and will
hold another early next year. In those
talks, we will continue to discuss with
the Japanese ways of encouraging
greater domestic-led growth in Japan.

Changes in Japan's Economy

Evolution seems underway in Japan's
economy. The change in the exchange
rate is having an effect on trade flows.
During the first 9 months of 1986,
Japan's export volume was down
slightly— four-tenths of 1%— and import
volume was up by 13%. In October the

volume of exports was down 1.7%, and
the volume of imports was up by 5%. (I
might mention that U.S. exports to
Japan were up 18.9% in the first 9
months of this year.) There is no doubt
that declining export sales have
dampened economic growth in Japan.
Statistics are not yet available to deter-
mine the exchange rate's effect on indi-
vidual industries. But the effects, we
believe, are not trivial.

The Japanese steel industry is obvi-
ously in structural depression, and the
auto industry's profits are down. One
hears reports that Japanese companies
are moving production to other Asian
countries and to the United States and
that they are turning from production
for export to sales in the domestic
market.

Asia, Latin America,
and the United States

I have concentrated on East Asia and on
Japan's relations with the United States.
But I know the principal subject of this
conference is the economic relationships
among Japan, Latin America, and the
United States. We should bear in mind
the Pacific Basin is an ellipse which
borders the countries of Latin America
as well. It is an area of great importance
and potential to the nations along the
other edge of the Pacific rim as well. A
large part of Asia's trade goes through
the Panama Canal and Latin American
waters. Japan also has historical and
cultural ties to Latin America. During
this century, Japanese emigrants settled
in a number of countries in the region,
and people of Japanese ancestry now
number 1 million in Latin America. Of
those, 800,000 are in Brazil.

Despite this, Japan's economic ties
with Latin America are thin compared to
those between the United States and
Latin America and compared to Japan's
own connections with Asia. In 1985
Japan exported $7.5 billion to the region
and imported $6.1 billion from it. In that
year, U.S. exports to Latin America
were $31 billion and its imports were
$49.1 billion. Japan's economic
assistance to the area is increasing but
still constitutes only about 10% of its

worldwide assistance. Japan's interef
in the area are quite similar to those •
the United States. Both countries fa\
democratization and the sort of econi
reforms that will contribute to the sol
tion of the debt problem and to econo c
progress and political stability. We h:
cooperated closely with Japan on the
debt issue and consult with it on Latii
American questions. We will continue
doing so. We hope that Japan will in-
crease its trade with Latin America, ; i
particularly its imports from that reg i.
Japan has announced its intention to
double its worldwide foreign develop-
ment assistance over the next 5 years
In connection with this, we would likt i
see increases in assistance to Latin
America— particularly to Central
America, the Caribbean, and Bolivia.

Conclusion

I started my speech in Asia and now
have just visited Latin America. That:
a pretty long trip in 15 minutes. I wow
now like to return to Washington to
offer some final comments.

The first is obvious. That is, vitalif
and growth in the Pacific rim. East A|
and Latin America are in our economic
terest and to our political benefit. Risif
incomes will provide greater oppor-
tunities for U.S. exports, and economi
growth will strengthen the political
stability so important to our own
security.

The free flow of goods and capital,,
in the interest of the whole region. Bu ""
we can keep our market open only if v
have access to the markets of others. ^
is essential that the economically suc-
cessful countries of East Asia and Lat
America open their markets further. I
also is essential that Japan carry
through with its policy to reduce its
external surpluses substantially.

Finally, we too bear an obligation.
The appreciation of the yen provides
greater opportunity for us to increase
our exports to Japan and to other coui
tries. To take advantage of that oppor-
tunity, we will have to correct im-
balances in our own economy, improve
our competitiveness, and hustle for
sales. Vitality is not a resource found
only on the other side of the Pacific. It
exists in the United States, and we
should demonstrate that. ■

Department of State Bullet

EAST ASIA

Tie U.S. Approach

^» East Asia and the Pacific

HGaston J. Sigur, Jr.

. [ddress before a conference on "U.S.

'nal Seairity Interests in Asia and
I'licific: Update 1986" sponsored by
I'lirific and Asian Affairs Council

:lie Pacific Forum in Honolulu on
•lifr 29. 1986.

a pleasiire to participate in a public
nil which promises to be both educa-
lal and enjoyable. Four years ago,
idlulu's Pacific and Asian Affairs
lu-ij hosted a similar seminar for the
lie and representatives of the Bureau
^ast Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
artment of State. It was a resound-
success by all accounts, and we are
a ghted to coopei-ate with the council
oi e again. It performs an admirable job
h acilitating public discussion of inter-
n ional issues. We appreciate the
stance also provided by the Pacific
um and the cooperating organiza-
i> listed in your programs.
As many of you know, our ambas-
irs to the various East Asian and
r 'ific capitals— our chiefs of mission—
g hered in Honolulu earlier this week
f a periodic review of regional policy
a I administrative matters. We've found
ii 'ears past that an occasional
f ewheeling discussion among our
r ional diplomats, CINCPAC [Com-
r nder in Chief Pacific] officials, and
I Dartment representatives helps to
s nulate fresh perspectives, new ideas,
a I the necessary coordination that
ii )roves our methods of operation. Our
r etings this week have been tremen-
c isly useful, and we want to thank the
( .'ernor of Hawaii and the people of
I nolulu for their customary hospitality
a 1 friendliness.

Our session this afternoon is, in
sue respects, a foUowup to the 1982
f um hosted by the council, and thus it
c Ties the title "U.S. National Security
I erests in Asia and the Pacific; Update
1^6." Perhaps our fundamental secu-
r/ interests in the region have changed
1 le in 4 years; but certainly the context
; i circumstances in which those
i erests exist have undergone some
. portant transitions. One of the most
•iimatic events, of course, has been the
l;pularly inspired political evolution this
]i5t year in the Philippines, where we
' ve important security interests, and I
lit to say more about this in a

moment. Another positive adjustment is
reflected in the increasingly close and
stable relations which we now share with
the People's Republic of China, having
moved forward together from the con-
tentious period of early 1982. On the
negative side, we have had to suspend
our ANZUS [Australia. New Zealand,
and United States security treaty]
defense commitment to New Zealand in
response to Wellington's placement of
unacceptable conditions on port calls by
U.S. naval vessels. But our security
treaty relations with Australia, Japan,
Thailand, the Philippines, and the
Republic of Korea remain strong; and
our multifaceted relationships with the
ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] states and the South
Pacific islands are functioning well.
Economic ties with Taiwan remain
substantial.

We are witnessing a more assertive
Soviet policy in the region in recent
years, but the general environment
remains basically unsuited to Moscow's
ambiguous initiatives. Unfortunately, the
context of hostility and dangers of con-
frontation remain volatile on the Korean
Peninsula and in Cambodia, much as
they were 4 years ago. This Administra-
tion has supported efforts to reduce ten-
sions in those two localities, but the
response from Pyongyang and Hanoi has
been disappointing. We continue to urge
the Government of Vietnam to withdraw
its occupation forces from Cambodia and
to provide us with the fullest possible
accounting of our missing servicemen in
Southeast Asia. And we continue to
encourage North Korea to resume its
dialogue with the Republic of Korea as
the only way to ensure peace for all
Koreans.

The East Asian and Pacific region
has prospered economically and politi-
cally, relative to other geographic
regions of the globe. Technological
advances are proceeding swiftly, literacy
rates are high, and economic perform-
ance on the whole has been impressive.
Political instability is the exception
rather than the rule; and politically
motivated terrorist acts remain few and
isolated.

The Philippine Transformation

I want to say just a few words about the
situation in the Philippines, since
Ambassador Bosworth [U.S. Ambas-
sador to the Philippines Stephen W.

Bosworth] was unable to join today's
panel discussion. By now it should be
very clear that the foundation of U.S.
policy toward the Philippines is to
encourage the revitalization of the
democratic process there, to facilitate
stability and prosperity for this Pacific
ally. The Filipinos themselves have taken
giant strides this year in that direction,
and we will be as supportive and helpful
as we can in the process. President
Aquino just completed a tremendously
successful visit to the United States. She
effectively affirmed to the American
people her government's commitment to
democracy and free enterprise. In turn,
the United States demonstrated its com-
mitment to the success of the new
Philippine democracy through the pledge
of substantial economic, military, and
medical assistance to the Philippine
people. Additionally, the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank have
approved, in principle, additional loans
to support the Philippines' economic
reform program. The agreement with
the Fund and World Bank give greater
confidence to private sector bankers and
investors as they consider new
investments in the Philippines.

President Aquino gave a special
impetus to our already strong,
cooperative bilateral relationship. That is
very important, because troublesome
challenges remain. The new government
in Manila contends with massive
unemployment, heavy external debt, and
extensive poverty. The local communist
insurgency remains a serious danger.
And important trade and investment
measures still must be implemented.

But this Administration is confident
that the Aquino government is embarked
on a program of national recovery which
enjoys the overwhelming support of the
Filipino people. We will work with Con-
gress to ensure appropriate levels of
assistance in the future. We will con-
tinue to encourage vibrant private sector
involvement in the reconstruction of the
economy.

A stable, democratic, and prosperous
Philippines will contribute measurably to
the realization of our policy goals in the
region as a whole and serve well our own
national interests.

Policy Objectives and Principles

What I want to address more generally
this afternoon is those basic principles
which guide and direct U.S. policy in the
Asian and Pacific region today. They
derive, of course, from certain elemen-
tary but central policy objectives; secu-
rity and stability for the nations of the
area are top priorities for all concerned,

||bruary

1987

EAST ASIA

and we will do what is appropriate and
necessary to nurture these goals. The
United States wants to help promote
regional prosperity, social advancement,
and political modernization within our
limited means to do so. And we seek to
facilitate multilateral cooperation, not
simply as an end in itself but as an effec-
tive means for moving promptly toward
the other goals which we and the Asian-
Pacific nations share.

In light of these, U.S. policy toward
the region is constructed upon certain
basic principles and convictions. These
precepts reflect fundamental American
values as well as our realistic assessment
of actual circumstances in this area, and
I would identify them in this way.

First, U.S. policy is based upon
genuine respect for the interests and
prerogatives of the people of the
Asian-Pacific region. We do not seek
and we would not attempt to interfere in
the internal affairs of those nations or to
dictate their policy decisions. This
Administration approaches these rela-
tionships with a degree of sensitivity and
responsiveness which fully acknowledges
the sovereign status of the nations of the
area. We believe we have much to offer
the developing states of the region and
are willing to provide advice and
guidance as needed. Where leadership is
required in security or economic affairs,
we accept our responsibilities; but we
never will attempt to dominate or dic-
tate in those endeavors.

The United States is willing to defer
to others where new roles of construc-
tive regional leadership and participation
are emerging. For the past several
years, we have looked to the ASEAN
members for policy leadership on issues
involving the Cambodian occupation and
resistance, and we closely coordinate our
policy efforts there. We respect and sup-
port Japan's significant and growing
role in providing assistance to the
developing countries of the region. We
consult regularly with interested govern-
ments on the course of our expanding
relationship with the People's Republic
of China. And I believe we are more sen-
sitive than ever, today, to the concerns
and requirements of the emerging-
entities in the South Pacific.

Governments— even allied
governments— may not always agree on
the fine points of every policy decision,
but our differences are subject to discus-
sion. Our partners and friends will find
us receptive to their concerns on every
issue and respectful of their points of
view. We want to foster greater
cooperation through regular consulta-
tions and mutual understanding, and we
are trying hard to accomplish this.

At the same time, the United States
hopes to strengthen our alliance team-
work through clearer comprehension of
our common challenges and respon-
sibilities. If one ally sets its own
arbitrary rules for others to follow, it
involves risks for all. Reciprocal coopera-
tion and burdensharing is key to a
healthy partnership. And our unity is
essential to the broadest aspects of East-
West relations. When our President
meets with General Secretary Gorbachev,
his position is strengthened by recogni-
tion that our allies are solidly behind
him. This does not in any way diminish
us individually; rather, it strengthens us
collectively and serves the cause of
peace.

A second precept of U.S. policy in
this region is our conviction that peace
and stability are best facilitated by
addressing specific sources of regional
tension. While the Asian-Pacific region
has been, in recent years, relatively free
of conflict, its remarkable advances are
shadowed by Vietnam's military occupa-
tion of Cambodia and by the ever-
present risk of hostilities on the Korean
Peninsula. We continue to urge that
these dangerous situations be addressed
through negotiations by the parties
directly involved.

We do not believe that grand concep-
tual schemes of collaboration are the
answer— so-called confidence-building
measures sublimely superimposed upon
the region without regard to underlying
sources of danger. Peace is not a
theoretical abstraction; it is a tangible
condition. We must address the
specifics.

President Reagan has called
repeatedly for urgent resolution of
regional conflicts, as he did most
recently in his appearance before the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
Cambodia is an important part of that
message. We continue to believe that a
genuine solution to this 8-year-old prob-
lem must provide for self-determination
by the Cambodian people and the with-
drawal of Vietnamese forces. We remain
firmly behind ASEAN in its quest for a
settlement. Many elements of the pro-
posals put to the Vietnamese are a
reasonable basis for an effective settle-
ment, and we believe Moscow should
exercise influence with Hanoi to
negotiate seriously. To date, neither the
Soviets nor the Vietnamese have
responded seriously to these urgings. In
the meantime, we remain steadfast in
our support of Prince Sihanouk and Son
Sann and of the noncommunist
resistance generally; for we believe that

progress may only be possible once Vi
nam recognizes it cannot gain from pr
longing the warfare that ravages
Cambodia.

With regard to the other immediai
source for concern in this region, Kon
we believe that Moscow should restrai
its military collaboration with North
Korea, and persuade Pyongyang to
resume the dialogue with Seoul which
the North suspended last January.
Direct talks between the North and
South are still the best means for
diminishing the risk of this flashpoint
northeast Asia.

Of course, the Soviet Union also
could do much to ease regional tensior
by eliminating its nuclear-armed SS-2
missiles targeted on Asia, by reducing
its military forces in the region, and b;
responding to Japan's appeal for the
return of its Northern Territories.

Let's construct a durable peace in
Asia. But let's accomplish it by buildin
methodically from the bottom up,
instead of with superficial gestures thf
purport to work from the top down.

Turning to a third area: the Unit*
States does support, as a matter of
principle, the establishment of
democratic institutions and processes
in East Asia and the Pacific. We pro-
mote the democratic system not purely
on moral or ideological grounds but,
quite simply, because experience prove
that this is the best prescription for
political stability and economic strengt
among developing nations. As part of
this concept, I include the notion of
modern constitutionalism, the rule of
law, popular electoral processes, and tl
free enterprise system. Obviously, the
United States has particular interest in
seeing the steady evolution of
democratic reforms and responsive
government among those nations with
whom we have normal and extensive
relations.

There are at present a number of
"emerging democracies" in this region
enjoying unprecedented prosperity and
social advances. Hardly any would be
considered "perfect" by the purest
standards of the democratic model, but
the trends are encouraging, for the mos
part. When we consider how far these
governments have come just within the
current generation, and how favorably
they compare with the repressive
examples in their own neighborhood, this
record is impressive. Secretary Shultz
has commented that democratic transi-
tions are "often complex and delicate, I
and . . . can only come about in a way I
consistent with a country's history, I
culture, and political realities." But that

Department of State Bulleti '

EUROPE

not mean that we will overlook per-
■nt violations or infringements of

human rights. Quite the contrary,
rge enlightened behavior on all

rnments, including those in
sition.

'his year alone, we are witnessing
uraging examples of the democratic
ess in action. Aside from the

atic popular revitalization of
ocracy in the Philippines last
ruary, we have witnessed significant
ititutional reform activity this year
Dth the Philippines and the Republic
^orea. We welcome the recent deci-
by Taiwan authorities to lift martial
land the ban on new political
lies— an impressive indication of a
(mitment to political development in

an. Important parliamentary elec-

have occurred or will occur this

in several parts of the region. All
th e developments are reminders that
•h representative form of government
.ritical element of Asian-Pacific
ernization.

Ill promoting democracy, the United
es will not meddle in the internal
irs of others. We will remain in con-
with democratic political forces
uiihout the region, recognizing that

adequate time and constructive
It, the peoples of the developing
us will work out their own solutions.

Fourth, we sincerely believe that
01 common prosperity can be main-
tf ed only through the expansion of
ti le and investment. Our policy is one
ol ncouraging growth through trade,
al ig with basic reliance on the market
fc es of competition and free enter-
f. Roth protectionism and excessive
t regulation thwart the common pur-
p' 3S for which we and the Asian-Pacific
n. ons are striving. That is the message
w ch this Administration has sought to
C( imunicate, and it is at the core of our
a nomic philosophy and trading prac-
ti in the region. We do believe the
ni ions of this region are now moving in
tl direction of constructive long-range
s< itions to our trading problems. But it
' take some time yet for the natural
' es of the marketplace to rectify some
ii lalances. In the meantime, we must
S] n the temptation to clutch at quick-
fi solutions which will only increase our
r blcms in the long run.

^'(lu all know how hard the President

■' resisted protectionist sentiments in

f country. During this past year, the

i ministration successfully discouraged

i''onceived congressional efforts seek-

tn legislate away the U.S. trade

iiji. Such protectionist action only

lid have produced great damage to

ourselves and our trading partners
without solving the deficit. But we are
not out of the woods yet. Frustrations
run deep, and we must be prepared for
additional protectionist initiatives next
year. Our worldwide deficit in 1985 sur-
passed $148 billion, and the Asian area
alone accounted for more than $80
billion of that figure. In this area, which
now is our largest regional trading part-
ner, we simply must do better at specific
export promotion. Reduced barriers to
market access, national currency
adjustments, and more receptive invest-
ment conditions already are having a
favorable impact, and we pledge for our
part to work even harder to improve the
overall climate of cooperation. American
business has to work harder, too, to
regain lost competitiveness and to take
advantage of the newly opening markets
in Asia.

There are many emerging economies
in East Asia and the Pacific whose
destinies rely both on healthy market
interactions and long-term domestic
stability. The interdependence of
political stability and economic pros-
perity is fundamental, and the decline of
one unavoidably leads to the weakening
of the other. The United States
recognizes the importance to world

peace of this region's stability, and we
are prepared to do our part to preserve
it. Through the public and private sec-
tors, we offer important trade prospects,
technology transfer, foreign investment,
and educational opportunities to help the
developing countries remain on sound
footing. We cannot, of course, carry the
burden alone, and we welcome the role
of Japan and other advanced market
countries in assisting the economic
growth of the lesser developed countries
of this region.

Conclusion

In closing, let me reiterate that the U.S.
commitment to East Asia and the Pacific
remains steadfast. We believe the best
prescription for our future role in the
region is the same formula that has
directed our course successfully to this
point: policy based upon principle rather
than expediency and upon conviction
rather than opportunism. Our allies and
friends will find us always available to
discuss their concerns and, hopefully,
ever sensitive to their interests. We
intend to remain a partner, not a poten-
tate, to the region as it continues the
sometimes difficult transition to full
economic and political modernization. ■

NATO Defense Planning
Committee IVIeets in Brussels

The Defense Ministers of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
met in Brussels December U-5. 1986. The
United, States was represented by
Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger. Following is the text of the
final communique.

The Defense Planning Committee of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in
ministerial session in Brussels on 4th and .5th
December 1986, and agreed |to] the following:

2, NATO's aim is the prevention of war;
therefore, the Alliance must continue to
ensure its security through the provision of
adequate military capabilities and the parallel
pursuit of a more stable East- West relation-
ship. Credible deterrence and defense is an
essential basis for improved relations between
East and West.

:3. NATO's strategy of forward defense
and flexible response, including the commit-
ment to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent
posture, has preserved peace for many years

and remains fully valid. Against the
background of existing Warsaw Pact strength
and ongoing force improvements, this
strategy continues to require effective
nuclear deterrence, based on a mix of
systems. Given the need for stable balance at
all times, nuclear weapons cannot be con-
sidered in isolation. Reductions in nuclear
weapons would increase the importance of
eliminating the current imbalance in conven-
tional forces. We reject unilateral disarma-
ment, which would result in the abandonment
by NATO of its deterrent strategy, and hence
the basis for its security and stability. As in
the past. Alliance solidarity and cohesion will
be important in ensuring progress towards a
more secure and stable environment.

4. Our determination to avoid an undue
reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons
is reflected in our continuing efforts to im-
prove conventional forces. The Conventional
Defense Improvements (GDI) action plan has
provided the framework within which we can

ribruary

1987

EUROPE

make progress towards securing this objec-
tive. In particular, it lias identified those key
deficiencies and priority areas where we all
agree a special effort will bring the greatest
return for our collective defense. Our discus-
sion (}f the Annual Defense Review and the
adoption of the NATO Force Plan 1987-1991
has reflected our determination to give these
Alliance priority areas special emphasis in our
national plans and programs.

5. Considerable progress has already l)een
made towards a more effective conventional
posture. We have seen positive developments
in several areas including the substantial
modernization programs in almost all member
countries and the improvements in the sus-
tainability of our forces. These improvements
and other actions contained in GDI will con-
siderably enhance our capabilities and reduce
the areas of deficiency. We are determined to
sustain this momentum.

6. Having noted the initial assessment of
the developing threat posed to NATO by
Warsaw Pact tactical ballistic missiles, we
called for continued work on assessing the
threat and possible ways to deal with it.

7. Improvements to Alliance planning
procedures are also now being put into effect.
These include a more effective co-ordination
of the various planning areas of the Alliance
and the provision of more effective long-term
planning guidance on our military require-
ments through regular updating of the con-
ceptual military framework and the develop-
ment of long term planning guidelines by our
military authorities.

8. All of this represents substantial prog-
ress and provides a solid foundation for
achieving more effective conventional forces.
However, the provision of adequate resources
in accordance with the 1985 ministerial
guidance which reaffirmed the aims of a 3
percent real increase as a general guide, and
the need for even better use of these
resources will continue to be a serious
challenge for all nations.

9. Better armaments co-operation, stand-
ardization and sharing of technology between
the European and North American and the
developed and developing members of the
Alliance are important for ensuring the most
effective use of resources, as is the continued
protection of military relevant technology.

10. In the context of the current GDI ef-
fort, we agreed that improved armaments col-
laboration has an important role to play in the
strengthening of conventional defenses and
that NATO's armaments co-operation im-
provements strategy, approved by Ministers
in December 1985, is proving to be a useful

29th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
NOV. 14, 1986'

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am
submitting to you a bimonthly report on prog-
ress toward a negotiated settlement of the
Cyprus question.

The United Nations Secretary General
met on September 16 with Mr. Denktash. the
Turkish Cypriot leader, and on September 26
with President Kyprianou. The Secretary
General reviewed the Cyjjrus situation with
the leaders of the two Cypriot communities
and explored with them ways to carry for-
ward his good offices mission.

The Turkish Cypriot side has accepted the
Secretary General's draft framework agree-
ment and taken the position that the Greek
Cypriot side should also do so. The Greek
Cypriot side has not accepted the document
and. instead, has taken the position that
priority should be given to discussion of
withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers,
international guarantees, and the "three
freedoms."

United Nations Under Secretary Gem I
Goulding is visiting Cyprus this month to
follow up on the Secretary General's disc
sions with the two Cypriot leaders. He wii
also be visiting Ankara and Athens.

Secretary Shultz met with President
Kyprianou on September 23 in New York
State Department officials met with Mr.
Denktash during his September visit to tl.
United States. In those meetings, Ameri( ,
officials reiterated support for the Secret,
General's good offices mission and urged i
Cypriot leaders to cooperate with his cont •
ing efforts.

Sincerely,

Ronald Ri: ,

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (text from Weekly Compilatior
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1986).

political framework for promoting and co-
oriiinating initiatives in this field on both
sides of the Atlantic. Several of the projects
launched as a result of United States' legisla-
tion are reaching the stage when major pro-
gram decisions will be required. In the light of
experience gained to date, the independent
European program group nations have put
forward a numijer of "principles for collabora-
tion" related to program management which
have been welcomed by their North American
Allies. We are continuing to give emphasis to
the exploitation of emerging technologies in
our defense equipment programs, particularly
in the long term.

11. The 1986 Defense Review has shown
again that despite commendable efforts by a
few Allies, more support, and by more
nations, is essential to assist Greece, Portugal
and Turkey to strengthen their conventional
defenses, in order that they may more effec-
tively fulfill their assigned roles in the collec-
tive defense of the Alliance. Various forms of
assistance should continue to be examined, in
particular and in the context of support for
the development of the industrial and
technological bases of these countries,
arrangements to permit them to participate
more fully as partners in NATO armaments
co-operation programs.

12. Following Reykjavik we support the
United States in seeking balanced, equitable
and effectively verifiable arms control
agreements with the Soviet Union. We
agreed that instead of simply codifying the
existing levels of arsenals, agreements

reached in Geneva should seek to achieve
substantial reductions in offensive nuclear'
forces in ways that will enhance stability a»
minimize the risk of war. We therefore
welcomed the progress at Reykjavik towar*
agreement on 50 percent reductions in
strategic offensive forces and on longer-ra>
intermediate nuclear missiles. We fully
endorse the United States' determination fj
negotiate detailed agreements on this basi^
a matter of priority and urge the Soviet
Union to join in this effort in Geneva. Prog
ress on INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] must not be held hostage to any oth>
agreement; Soviet insistence on doing so
would destroy the credibility of the
assurances given at the highest level. Nor
must such an INF agreement neglect the
existing imbalances in shorter-range INF
missiles for which constraints and equal
rights must be provided, as well as subse- ■*
quent negotiations on these missiles. In all
cases, effective verification would be an
essential condition. We will continue to ass(
and to consult closely on all these issues. W
reiterated our support for the United State;
exploration of space and defense systems, a
is permitted by the ABM [Antiballistic
Missile] Treaty.

13. We also confirmed our resolve to set
an early conclusion of a worldwide ban on
chemical weapons. In this context we called
upon the Soviet Union to take a constructive ,
attitude towards effective verification
provisions.

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

14. We also emphasized the significance
?the current work in the Alliance on conven-
onal arms control. At every stage of this
tocess the Alliance must have a position
ihich protects the ability of its military corn-
landers to carry out their assigned tasks.
Ve shall be seeking to achieve increased
benness and the establishment of a stable,
pmprehensive and verifiable balance of con-

ventional forces at lower levels which would
strengthen stability and security in the whole
of Europe.

Greece recalls its position on nuclear mat-
ters and space system issues as expressed
during previous NATO ministerial meetings.

Denmark reserves its position on defense
and space systems. ■

>ecretary's Joint News Conference
\fter Meeting With EC IVIinisters

Secretary Shultz attended the sixth
\nnual ministerial meeting between the
United States and the European Com-
mnity (EC) in Brussels on December 12,
986. Following is his joint news con-
rence with President of the European
'ommunities Commission Jacques
^elors. '

'resident Delors. Before giving the
oor to our guests, Mr. Shultz, Mr.
—Jaker [Secretary of the Treasury James
laker], and their colleagues, 1 should
ke to indicate simply that, over and
hove bilateral discussions, we devoted
his plenary session, first, to a broad
verview of the world economic situa-
ion, referring also to problems that
rise respectively in the United States
nd in Europe; and, secondly, we dis-
ussed trade issues, both multilateral
nd bilateral. We reviewed both subjects
if satisfaction and difficulties that are
lending or may arise; and, thirdly, we
vere able to discuss, in a way which per-
onally I found encouraging, the ques-
ion of agriculture.

You know that the commission and,
00, our American friends, feel that we
lave to present to the world a different
,'xample from that of two elephants
'ighting and treading underfoot
everything else around. That is
something at stake which involves all of
as and this can only be treated, never-
theless, by dealing with the specific
characteristics of each country.

I Secretary Shultz. [Inaudible]
' I presented at this meeting are that our
two-way trade amounts to about $120
billion in the most recent year; that the
investment of Europe in the United
States and of the United States in
Europe amounts to about $200 billion at
present; that the sales generated by
these investments total around $700
I billion. If you add those apples and
oranges together you come to around a
trillion dollars. It's a measure of the

gigantic size and complexity of the rela-
tionship that we have and, of course, it's
a statement about the importance of the
relationship.

We have many problems. Most of
them have been solved. There are some
ahead of us. There'll always be some
ahead of us and we need to work always
very hard to resolve them, but we need
to keep reminding ourselves of the scope
of the relationship and the importance of
seeing to it that we resolve problems in a
manner consistent with the maintenance
of this relationship.

It also shows how important it is to
both of us, and for the world at large,
that we maintain openness in the trading
system. Following our meeting last year
here, we worked together well in bring-
ing into being the Punta del Este start
of a new round in GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] and we have
said to each other here that we will con-
tinue to work together to make that
round successful. Growth and openness
in trade are the names of the game as
we look ahead, and this is what we want
to achieve.

Secretary Baker. I would only add
to that, Mr. Secretary, that we spent
some time reviewing, as well, the U.S.
economy and we devoted a fair amount
of time to pointing out what we consider
to be a major problem for the world
economy generally, and that is the rise
of protectionism and, if you will, isola-
tionism in the United States, occasioned
in part by the fact that we are facing a
$140 billion trade deficit. We, I think,
are all agreed that it was important that
the United States and the European
Community work together in various
ways, whatever ways we can, to prevent
protectionist legislation from becoming a
fact, and to preserve free and open
markets.

Q. Could I ask Secretary Shultz or
Secretary Baker whether the growing
concern that has been expressed in a

number of European capitals about the
growth of bilateralism in the United
States, that is to say bilateral deals
between the United States and Japan
in some major areas, both in inter-
national monetary issues with the yen-
dollar deal and on the semiconductors,
was raised at this meeting and how
you responded to that if it was?

Secretary Shultz. My answer to
part of it: It was raised and I think the
basic response is that we feel it's impor-
tant to get markets open, and when we
are able to get a market opening agree-
ment with Japan, basically it's open to
everybody. As to the monetary side-
Secretary Baker. Adding to that,
we also feel it's important, when we can,
to enhance world economic growth, and
if we can enhance it bilaterally, we think
there's nothing inappropriate about
enhancing it bilaterally, particularly
when you are dealing in the case of the
agreement that you mentioned with two
economies that represent 70% of the
combined gross national product of the
G-7 countries [Canada, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan,
United Kingdom, and United States].
President Delors. As soon as the
monetary agreement between Japan and
the United States was known I was very
glad to see this come about. I consider
that as far as the triangle of great
powers in the free world is concerned,
Europe, the United States, and Japan,
there should be possibilities at some
stages to strengthen one of the sides of
the triangle; and, I have expressed my
desire that the Europeans should be able
to join in this cooperation agreement.
And it seems to me that the proposals
were made by Mr. Baker and others with
a view to establishing bases for a
monetary system which is less unstable
rather than more stable.

That is something which is still
under discussion and the commission will
do its utmost to persuade the member
states that it is in everybody's interest
to have convergence of economies and
greater monetary cooperation between
the major industrialized countries. As far
as I'm concerned, I hope that in Venice,
in the next summit of industrialized
countries, we will be able to make prog-
ress along these lines.

Q. I'd like to address my question
to Mr. Baker in direct response to
what Mr. Delors has said concerning
the possibility of Europe joining, in
some way, the monetary agreement
that was worked out on October 31
between the United States and Japan,
and whether this is going to be
brought up in your discussions with

February 1987

EUROPE

Mr. Stoltenberg [Federal Republic of
Germany Minister of Finance Gerhard
Stoltenberg] tomorrow?

Secretary Baker. The agreement
with Japan was the result of several
months of discussions and negotiations.
There were similar discussions and
negotiations with other countries that
did not come to fruition and ripen into
an agreement.

Again, let me say that anything that
we can do bilaterally or multilaterally to
enhance world economic growth, consist-
ent with maintaining the gains that the
world has made against inflation, we
would like to do, but the Japanese, under
the agreement that you're referring to,
undertook to take certain fiscal and
monetary measures which would encour-
age additional growth in Japan and addi-
tional growth in the world generally.

Q. I'd like to address a question to
Secretary Baker. What would you
expect Europe could do to pacify the
protectionists back in Washington and
to assuage the fears of this 800-pound
gorilla you have back there?

Secretary Baker. P^irst, I think we
talked a good deal about this, as a
matter of fact, in our discussions today.
We should all work to preserve open
markets as the President has indicated
and Secretary Shultz has indicated. At
the same time, anything that European
countries can do to encourage and
enhance as much economic growth as
possible without— and let me make sure I
make this clear to everybody— without
risking the gains that have been made
worldwide against inflation, we would
like to see, because that will help us
resist the 800-pound gorilla, as you put
it, which indeed I think is an 800-pound
gorilla back there in Washington.

Q. I do apologize for coming in to
raise two essential points, Mr. Shultz.
That is. first, the American interven-
tion in Nicaragua and Chile and the
perception that a person from the
Third World has of the United States,
that is a giant, and which is going
through various political difficulties,
Iran now, previously Vietnam. Can it
be said today that America is like a
giant with clay feet and clumsy hands?
And I would like to know what share
of time you allotted to the Third World
in your discussions?

And, secondly on South Africa, it
appears that America today is more
committed toward taking more prag-
matic and forward-looking positions,
vis-a-vis South Africa, than is Europe.
Did you advise the Europeans anything
about South Africa?

Secretary Shultz. The United
States has and continues to work for
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law
in Central America and in South
America. That includes Nicaragua, that
includes Chile. So, I think the objectives
that we seek and the efforts that we are
making to help the people of Central
America achieve that— there are four
democracies there now— and to help
those in Nicaragua, Nicaraguans, not
[the] United States, Nicaraguans— who
are fighting for freedom in their country
do so, are laudable.

As far as South Africa is concerned,
our policies have been highly publicized
and they are to do everything that we
can to bring apartheid to an end, and to
see put in its place a political system in
which all people can participate and
where there also are protections for
minority rights and individuals, constitu-
tional guarantees. I think again what we
are trying to achieve is right on the
mark.

We have had a great debate about
how useful it will be to impose punitive
economic sanctions on South African
business and, in the end, it was decided
that we would do so. That was decided
by Congress overriding the President's
veto of that legislation. Now U.S. firms
are leaving and I hear quite a lot of cries
of alarm that, as they leave, the good
works that they are doing leave also. So,
it represents a problem and, of course, a
continuing tragedy.

Q. I would like to put a question
to Mr. Baker. When you go to Bonn,
do you expect that your talks with Mr.
Stoltenberg will lead to more than a
repetition of the well-known points of
view that have been put forward
several times these last few months?
As far as the position of the Federal
Republic is concerned, or as far as
what the Federal Republic could do. in
order to make a g^reater contribution
to the stimulation of the world
economy?

Secretary Baker. Let me explain
that I am going to meet with Gerhard
Stoltenberg tomorrow. I'm meeting as
well with each of the other European
finance ministers of the G-7 countries. I
thought it was important, since I was
coming to this meeting, that I take
advantage of that fact that I was going
to be in Europe and have bilateral
discussions with my counterparts in
Europe.

These discussions are not intended
to reach any particular conclusions or
come to any particular results. They will
be part of ongoing discussions that we
have had over the past several months.

I would discourage— and we did
before we left Washington— people fro^
speculating about agreements that mig
come out of these discussions. That's nl
contemplated. The Federal Republic, aj
you know, is right in the middle of elec|
tions and it would be, I would suppose,,
not the most opportune time to seek to|
come to any sort of conclusion or agree
ment respecting the matters that we
have discussed before.

So we will be discussing a wide
range of things, but I would tend to
dissuade you from thinking that there i\
going to be something similar, for
instance, to the agreement between the
United States and Japan coming out of ^
my trip to Europe.

Q. President Delors referred to
your agricultural discussions earlier, H
saying that that discussion was
encouraging. I'd like to ask President
Delors and the American represen-
tatives what that actually means and,
in particular, whether that is good
augury for the 24:6 negotiations?

President Delors. Of course, as a
great philosopher has said, everything i:
connected in life. But sometimes, you
have to start by separating different
discussions. The discussions that we call
the 24:6 discussions are going ahead
under conditions which are not very
encouraging.

As for the rest, we have concerned
ourselves with the impact of our
agricultural policies, as we should do,
not only on our budget but, also, on
world trade and on the price of certain
agricultural commodities and other
materials. And, we've seen that we have
the same will to guarantee the future of
our farmers. They are indispensable to
our societies, but at the same time, we
wish to achieve agricultural policies
which are less costly and less damaging
and which do not lead us into a trade
war which will be ever more costly for
everybody.

So there is this shared will which we
have and which has been shown by the
agreement which was reached at Punta
del Este. And, this will be followed up by
regular discussions between people at a
high level on both sides of the Atlantic. I
think that this already became clear at
the Tokyo summit after the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] ministerial meeting.
But it's now the time to reaffirm this
and say that we have the courage to
meet this task. Nobody would deny that
this task is not an easy one.

Secretary Shultz. The first step in
solving a problem is to recognize that it
exists and be able to describe it. And

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

Jat step has been taken more and more
lEibly. So that's positive. I'll let
inbassador Yeutter [U.S. Trade Repre-
ntative Clayton Yeutter] say what else
ay be positive in this situation.

Ambassador Yeutter. Most of the
scussion today related to the longer
rm elements of the agricultural prob-
m rather than the short term. We had
nsiderable discussion about the forth-
iming negotiations in the Uruguay
'und and properly so. We are agreed
at this is one of the most important
lallenges in the Uruguay round,
•rhaps the most important, and
■rhaps the greatest potential legacy of
at round in very positive terms. This
■fleets the gravity of the situation and
e magnitude of the problem that exists
orldwide today.

So, we recognize that we are now in
situation where both the community
id the United States are deploying vast
ims of financial resources into rela-
vely unproductive uses and that we
ould do ourselves and the rest of the
orld a big favor if we could coopera-
vely and coordinately deploy these
?sources in a different way.

At the moment, we have a situation
lat is increasingly confrontational
stween ourselves and the rest of the
orld, while at the same time not prop-
rly serving the needs of our own
irmers. So, hopefully, we can advance
lat cause in a very positive way in the
fruguay round, and we are certainly
etemined to do that.

With respect to Article 24:6, we
ave a very difficult negotiation ahead of
s because our positions are still very far
part. Commissioner De Clercq [EC
lommissioner for External Relations
nd Commercial Policy Willy de Clercq]
nd I will meet on that subject tomorrow
nd we will have perhaps more to say on
hat subject at a later date. As you
;now, we have a December 31 deadline
in that exercise.

Commissioner De Clercq. Could I
■omment briefly for a minute or a
ninute and a half. That's a Belgian com-
jromise. Article 26:6, of course, is very
Ufficult, as a negotiation. The President
expressed his anxiety, and I share that
mxiety. For the moment, I just have one
jlimmer of light, but it is glimmering.
That is, the mutual will to find a solution
;o this most difficult trade conflict
oetween the United States and the EC.
It's the most difficult one we've ever
iiad. It's worthwhile finding a solution to
it, particularly now that the new round
'is to begin. It's worth even devoting the
i whole weekend to making— to finding a
solution.

On the new round, we've explained
our philosophy. The Americans know our
philosophy. We want to progress along a
broad front as quickly as possible. As far
as we're concerned, the new round
shouldn't necessarily have to last 4
years. If we can complete it before, all
the better, but we consider this enter-
prise, this undertaking, as being one
undertaking, which means that progress
has to be achieved on all fronts as
quickly as possible, and this, from a com-
prehensive point of view.

Q. Would it be possible to know
whether there is the same determi-
nation on the American side, as far as
taking steps to lighten the debt burden
for developing countries? This same
question was put to Mr. De Clercq this
morning, and the reply was that there
was not an answer there. And then, as
for the matter of making more of raw
materials from the Third World coun-
tries. I'd like to ask you a question
about that. And then, thirdly, as for
the agreements between the European
Communities and certain Mediterra-
nean countries, although these
agreements exist, there are poltical
and military links with these
countries.

Secretary Shultz. I'll ask Secretary
Baker, who's given particular attention
to this matter, particularly the debt
problem, to respond.

Secretary Baker. I think you're
probably familiar with our program for
sustained growth, for dealing with the
debt problems of lesser developed coun-
tries. And in terms of where we stand on
that, we think we're making very good
progress. A number of countries have
adopted free market-type economic
reforms.

The second leg of that program is
that the multilateral institutions, the
IMF [International Monetary Fund] and
World Bank, were to increase their lend-
ing, and they have done so, I think it's
fair to say, significantly. The third leg
was additional lending from commercial
banks, or debt-equity swaps, in lieu
thereof. I think it's significant that Mex-
ico, this year, will receive some $6 billion
in new funds. Nigeria is the beneficiary
of new lending, Uruguay, Cote D'lvoire,
so the proposal is making what we con-
sider very good progress.

In terms of whether the United
States is, itself, contributing, I think we
are. We still make the largest contribu-
tions to those multilateral organizations.
We are going, notwithstanding rather
severe budgetary constraints in the
United States, we are going up to the
Congress, this year, for an increase in

the soft loan window, IDA/8 [Interna-
tional Development Association] funds
for the World Bank. So I think that I
would have to say. "Yes, we are cer-
tainly pulling our load and doing our
share."

Secretary Shultz has just reminded
me that we have about, this year, I men-
tioned debt-equity swaps, because I
think that's very important. To the
extent that we can get equity into these
countries, they don't have to pay inter-
est on it, and it's a far better way of
financing them.

He's just mentioned to me that
we've seen .$5 billion in debt-equity
swaps generated this year. The more
the.se countries are willing to reform
their economies and invite investment
in, the more debt-equity swaps, perhaps,
we can engender. I realize that doesn't
address the third part of your question,
which I never did get a chance to hear.

Q. Mr. Shultz. Mr. Yeutter is here
also for the fifth meeting between the
Brazilian delegation and the U.S.
Trade Representative for discussing
the informatics problem. I would like
to know which are the prospective of
this informatic meeting, since the
Brazilian Government has just sent to
the Congress a new software law.
Does this new law correspond to U.S.
demands? In what points? And also,
which sector of the Brazilian exporta-
tion would be suffering retaliation, as
the U.S. Government promised, until
the end of the year, if both delegations
are not setting to an accord?

Ambassador Yeutter. We'll be
discussing all of these subjects on Sun-
day, here in Brussels. I have not yet had
an opportunity to see the Brazilian com-
puter software proposal, because I've
been traveling for the last several days,
and we've had some activity, here in
Europe, that I've had to concentrate on
until now. I'll have an opportunity to
evaluate it over the weekend, and so I'll
deliver my comments to [Ambassador]
Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, when we
meet on Sunday, but I would have
nothing to say on that subject at the
moment.

All I would comment is that, clearly,
that's a very important issue to us.
We're concerned about the intellectual
property aspects of the Brazilian infor-
matics program, as well as the invest-
ment aspects and the international com-
merce aspects, that is, the imports and
exports, so we'll look at that very
carefully and see what implications it
holds for U.S. informatics exports.

Other than that, the potential
retaliatory action is a hypothetical, at
this point. We have not determined, with

February 1987

HUMAN RIGHTS

specificity, what action might be tatcen,
if the negotiations break down between
now and the end of the year, but I'd
rather be optimistic and hope that we'll
not have to take that action, but we have
not concentrated on that issue, as yet.

Q. Could I ask Mr. Yeutter, you
said that — all sides said that the whole
question of agriculture has been very
big. It's going to take a long time to
solve, and what they recognize is that
they don't solve it. But you are
meeting this weekend with Mr. De
Clercq and Mr. Lyng [Secretary of
Agriculture Richard Lyng] and Mr.
Andriessen [EC Vice President for
Agriculture and Forestry Frans
Andriessen] to solve an immediate
problem, 24:6, yet there is a sword of
retaliation hanging over it at the .31st
of December. Is this sword still hang-
ing over it? Is the United States still
determined that, if there is no satisfac-
tion of its demand, that it will go
ahead with the retaliation, which will
generate, again trigger, counter-
retaliation from the EC side?

Ambassador Yeutter. That is a
decision that was made at the highest
levels of our government several months
ago, and was so communicated to our
friends here in the European Commu-
nity, so they are well aware of what is at
stake in these discussions between now
and the end of the year.

This is an issue of major concern to
the United States because our estimate
is that the accession of Spain and
Portugal will reduce our feed grains
exports, that is, corn and grain sorghum,
by something in the vicinity of $400 to
$500 million per year. With our
agricultural cominunity already in dire
financial straits, in much of the Midwest,
we're certainly not in a position to
accept that kind of trade damage from
any incident throughout the world
without receiving appropriate compen-
sation for it under the GATT rules.

That's what is at issue here, and all
we're insisting upon is that we be made
whole, that the trade damage that we
suffer, as a result of the accession, is
properly compensated for under the
GATT rules. We simply have a wide dif-
ference of opinion as to the amount of
that compensation, but we believe the
amount of damage is quite clear.

Commissioner De Clercq. The
President has given me one minute. That
will be enough. Because I don't think we
want to engage in a debate on 24:6 with
you. Perhaps next week we will have to.
but for the moment we still hold out
hope that this matter is going to be
something we will be able to discuss

tomorrow in a calm and serene
atmosphere.

And what my friend, Clayton
Yeutter, has just said underlines the dif-
ficulty of the problem. Because, of
course, we have a somewhat different
view of this. In fact, our views differ
fairly fundamentally. We feel that when
there is a customs area, or a free trade
area, or the extension of such an area,
the problems that arise have to be
examined comprehensively. You have to
look at the problems as a whole, the
advantages and the disadvantages, and
that is one of the problems that we are
going to have to try to resolve,
tomorrow.

Q. Secretary Baker, do you think
that the bilateral meetings you will be
having with the finance ministers will
be able to lead to a meeting of the
Group of Seven [G-7], as such, and
this, then, I have a question for Mr.
Shultz. To what extent is the Reagan
Administration in a position to turn
opposition to Congress' protectionism
into a priority in the present political
situation that prevails in Washington?

Secretary Baker. With respect to
the question that you directed to me, thj
purpose of these discussions is not
specifically to schedule any multilateral^
meetings G-.5 [France, Federal Republil
of Germany, Japan, United Kingdom,
and United States], G-7, or anything
else, but I would remind you that the
Tokyo summit calls for the holding of
G-7 meetings, so obviously there will bd
more G-7 meetings.

Secretary Shultz. So far as the
second part of your question is con-
cerned, the basic point is that protec-
tionism is not only bad for other coun-
tries that can't sell into our markets
after they're protected, but it's bad for
American consumers, therefore bad for j
the American economy; and we'll make
that point again and again and again,
and contrast the present and our recenti]
history with what happened in the
1930s, when we did have protectionism, j
The President has fought on that line
before and he'll continue to fight, and I
think the basic thrust of the argument is
powerful, and we intend to prevail.

'Press release 265 of Dec. 19, 1986.

Human Rights in Castro's Cuba

The following report was prepared by
the Bureaus ofHumat) Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs and of Inter-
American Affairs.

When a former Cuban political
prisoner— one who had served 27 years
in Castro's prisons— arrived in Miami in
September 1986, he made the following
comment: "Wlien they opened the gates
we still felt like prisoners. In Cuba
everyone's a prisoner."

Life in Cuba today is characterized
by an aggressive, systematic, and insti-
tutionalized denial of human rights in
virtually every form. The Communist
Party, tightly controlled from above,
dominates all aspects of life. Human
rights of Cubans are subordinated to the
aims of the party as defined by Fidel
Castro.

Denial of Freedom

Expression. Freedom of expression does
not exist. No criticism of the basic
policies and Marxist-Leninist orientation
of the government, party, or its leader-
ship is permitted. Telephones are

routinely tapped and mail opened.
Private expression of differences from
government policies is repressed by an
informer network operated by Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revolution
(block committees).

Daily life is closely monitored by these*
committees, which exist on practically
every block in Cuban cities and towns.
Committee membership is essentially
mandatory. Members are expected to
observe and report anything "unusual,"
including strangers in the neighborhood,
reception of foreign radio and television
broadcasts, unauthorized meetings, or
critical comments about the government.
Cubans overheard by neighbors
reportedly have been fined for speaking
disparagingly of Castro in their homes.
The ordinary Cuban lives in an environ-
ment of repressive fear subject to con-
stant state surveillance.

Assembly. There are no guarantees
for freedom of assembly or association in
Castro's Cuba. Nearly all associations
are government controlled. A few
private associations still operate, but
only under close government scrutiny.
All group meetings are monitored by the

Department of State Bulletin

HUMAN RIGHTS

immittees for the Defense of the
ivolution or State Security. When the
jretary of the Cuban Committee for
man Rights tried to legally register

organization last month, he was
■ested and beaten. At last report he
.s still being held.
Although membership in private
lups is almost precluded, membership
ligovernment-run groups is virtually
r.^uired. A 1983 Organization of
. nerican States (0 AS) report. The
:'uation of Human Rightti in Cuba,

■ ited:

. . .membership in the people's
■anizations— including the large union and
I isant associations— is practically a prereq-
i ite for any routine activity, since member-

■ p affects admission to universities, promo-
I IS, access to certain kinds of vacation or

1 reational activities, the obtainment of
I iperishable products that require that a
I on certify that the buyer is an "advanced
\ rker."

Cubans are, therefore, compelled to
' '1 such organizations simply to obtain
education, earn a living, or support
ii- families. The OAS report adds that
> difficult "to distinguish when the
I ;ision to join a people's organization
1 lects a desire to support the regime,
; i when it is a response to the material
I lefits . . . which cannot be obtained

Political. Those who choose not to

j n government organizations or who
; ' denied membership are not only
{ )nomically disadvantaged but also
< ectively deprived of political participa-
1 n. Political participation requires
; ict adherence to ideological dogma.
Cuban citizens do not enjoy the right

■ change their government. The Cuban
; ite is firmly controlled by the Cuban

' 'mmunist Party, which in turn is
I minated by Fidel Castro. There are no
I'ect elections for regional, provincial,
I national offices. Members of the Cen-
"il Committee and the Politburo are
: lected by a narrow circle of party
lers; elections simply ratify choices

■ 'eady made. The National Assembly of
■ople's Power meets briefly twice a

. ar— solely to endorse decisions already
ide by the party chiefs. No political

■position is permitted in Cuba;

:3sidents are either in jail or outside the
untry. As a result, hundreds of
ousands of Cubans have fled their
untry, and many others would do so
?re it not dangerous.

Press. There is no freedom of press
Cuba. All media outlets are controlled

■ the state, operate strictly according

to party guidelines, and are used for
indoctrination and dissemination of prop-
aganda. Foreign publications— except
those from other communist countries-
are not available.

The government censors all news,
international and domestic. Unfavorable
news, when reported, is often delayed.
Almost all news is distorted. Travel of
foreign reporters to and in Cuba— as
well as their access to the public and
officials— is strictly controlled by the
government.

Artistic. There is no artistic freedom
in Cuba. Many of Cuba's most distin-
guished literary and artistic figures have
been "erased" from cultural outlets and
broadcasts. Writers and artists have
been under severe constraints since the
beginning of the revolution, when Castro
made the following statement about
artistic freedom: "Within the revolution,
everything; against the revolution,
nothing." The National Union of Writers
and Artists of Cuba, modeled on the
Union of Soviet Writers, controls vir-
tually all literary and artistic expression.
All publishing houses are controlled by
the state. Acceptance of manuscripts is
based on suitability of contents and the
political background of the author.

Writings not published by the state
are not reproduced or circulated even
clandestinely, except in the closest circle
of friends. Even there one must proceed
with caution because of the vigilance of
the block committees and the omnipres-
ent State Security. Punishment is severe
for writing or possessing unauthorized
literature. Artists and writers who
attempt to step outside these constraints
pay heavily for their exercise of artistic
freedom. Many are imprisoned and tor-
tured. Forced renunciation of one's
artistic works— obtained through
physical or psychological coercion,
including threats against one's family— is
another technique used against artists
and writers. The lack of political content
in their writings does not serve to pro-
tect authors. It is not enough in Cuba
that art be nonpolitical; it must also
actively serve the revolution.

Religious. Repression of religion in
Cuba is thorough and pervasive.
Religious broadcasts are totally pro-
hibited (except for news of foreign
clergy defending the Castro regime
shown to prisoners of conscience to
demoralize them). The construction of
new churches is severely restricted.
Those who try to maintain religious
practice find innumerable roadblocks.
Many churches have been closed; some

have been desecrated. The few still open
are closely monitored by block commit-
tees. Only about 200 priests remain in
Cuba, compared to about 720 before the
revolution.

The observance of religious holidays
is next to impossible, and the celebration
of Christmas is specifically prohibited.
Christmas trees, so common in Eastern
Europe, are banned as counterrevolu-
tionary symbols in Cuba, and the
celebration of Holy Week has been
replaced by a celebration of the failure of
the Bay of Pigs invasion. Political
meetings and work obligations are
regularly scheduled to conflict with
religious occasions, and Cuban law pro-
hibits the observance of religious events
when they conflict with work obligations
or patriotic celebrations. Processions on
holy days are banned.

Parents of children who mention
Cod to their classmates risk being
reprimanded for teaching "unscientific"
ideas that are "remnants of an obscur-
antist past." If the parents insist, they
can be arrested for the crime of
"ideological deviationism."

Because they cannot belong to the
Communist Party, believers are excluded
from higher positions of employment.
They also are prohibited from teaching
economics, politics, philosophy, social
sciences, and other courses that might
have "any political or ideological over-
tones." Believers find it almost impos-
sible to obtain higher education because
ideology is a decisive condition for
admission to universities. Practicing
Catholics are expelled from the univer-
sity. Believers who obtain low-level jobs
are unable to advance because there is a
"political test" for promotions. Proof of
ideological soundness is required before
the purchase of durable consumer goods
and sometimes for housing.

The Jewish community in Cuba has
been reduced from 15,000 before the
revolution to 800, with no permanent
rabbi. Members of the Jewish commu-
nity also face job and educational
discrimination and are severely
restricted in attempts to pass on the
faith to their children.

Certain religious groups— usually the
smaller, more vulnerable Protestant
denominations— have been singled out
for additional punishment. The Seventh-
Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
and the Congregation of Gideon are con-
sidered counterrevolutionary sects.
Those discovered engaging in religious
practices are treated as criminals.

Many from all faiths have been
arrested, abused, tortured, and even
executed because of their religious
beliefs.

I^bruary

1987

HUMAN RIGHTS

In a 1985 book entitled Fidel and
Religion, and at the February 1986
Third Congress of the Cuban Communist
Party, Fidel Castro acknowledged that
discrimination against Cuban religious
practitioners exists. There is no evidence
to date that religious discrimination and
persecution have been mitigated despite
speculation that Castro, for foreign or
domestic political reasons, might be con-
sidering some relaxation of pressure on
believers.

Educational. Cuban education suf-
fers from a total lack of freedom. Cen-
sorship is rigorous. Cuban schools at all
levels are required to follow Marxist-
Leninist guidelines as interpreted by the
state. Students have been expelled and
teachers have lost their jobs for not
accepting the political or ideological
requirements imposed by the state.

There is no alternative to
government-run education. Parents can-
not choose independent schools for their
children; there are none. Schooling is
compulsory from grades one to six.
After the sixth grade the right to remain
in school is tentative and based ulti-
mately on loyalty to the regime. The
price for expressing an opinion in school
can be extremely high. Faced with such
a "choice," most 11-year-old children
naturally submit to the routine of Young
Pioneers meetings, neighborhood guard
duty, compulsory rural labor, and other
forms of regimentation.

Many students over the age of 1 1
are housed in dormitories from Sunday
night to Friday night and go home only
on weekends. This boarding system,
mandatory for many high school and
junior high school students, is intended
to drive a wedge between child and
parent and turn the child's sense of duty
toward the state. Dormitory living condi-
tions are often poor, with old wooden
barracks, primitive sanitation, poor
health care, and harsh working condi-
tions. The weekly curriculum includes 30
hours of classes (with heavy ideological
content) and 15 hours of picking crops in
the fields.

A student's educational oppor-
tunities depend not only on his own
political record but the political reliabil-
ity of his parents as well. Children of
political prisoners are notified that they
will never receive advanced education.
Students do not choose their own
careers; the choice is made for them,
depending on the needs of the state.

Economic. The right to choose one's
occupation is practically nonexistent in
Cuba. Priority is given to collective or

state needs over individual choice in
state decisions to provide employment.

The rights of business and labor do
not exist in Cuba. A "private sector"
constituted by private businesses or even
by self-employed individuals is virtually
nonexistent. At present, less than 1% of
the population is self-employed. In 1982,
the government launched a strong
condemnation of self-employment, which
had been legal in certain trades and pro-
fessions. Castro claimed that everyone
was taking advantage of the system to
make profits. Such work now is allowed
only after working hours or on
weekends. Self-employed people are
generally required to have state employ-
ment as well.

Castro expressed concern that the
government was losing money because
tenant farmers and sharecroppers
unregistered with the state were selling
produce on the open market. In 1983,
200 farmers refused to sell their crops to
the government because it demanded a
price lower than the cost of growing
them. (The government also had refused
to allow them to retain a small amount
of crops for personal consumption.) In
protest, the farmers burned some of
their crops in front of a government
warehouse and were arrested. Reports
from several sources indicate that 11 of
the farmers were sentenced to death and
shot. More recently, Castro has
denounced farmers markets and other
individual or group initiatives as
manifestations of corruption or
decadence, again demonsti-ating how
risky it is to engage in private
enterprise.

The state controls organized labor.
Nearly all workers belong to the
government-run Confederation of Cuban
Workers, which serves primarily to
maintain political and work discipline,
spur worker efforts and productivity,
and hold down labor costs. The con-
federation does not defend workers'
rights or fight for benefits. The recent
calls by Fidel Castro for greater work
"discipline" characteristically have come
in the framework of trade union
meetings where he and so-called labor
leaders harangue the workers to be more
diligent.

Collective bargaining does not exist.
Management, in the form of the Ministry
of Labor, and the government-run union
cooperate to maintain careful supervi-
sion. Workers who believe they have
been unfairly treated have virtually no
recourse.

Workers who act to improve work-
ing conditions are severely punished.
The right to strike is prohibited and

punishable by imprisonment. In 1983
more than 200 workers were prosecute
for attempting to organize strikes in tl
sugar and construction industries.

The right to form an independent
union is unthinkable. Even discussing
such a step is severely punished, as
demonstrated in 1983 when the goverr
ment accused five Cuban workers of
"industrial sabotage" for talking with
their colleagues about the need for an
independent union. The government
sought the death penalty, but the judg(
sentenced them to prison. Castro
demanded they be tried again by a dif-
ferent judge, who sentenced them to
death. International outcry resulted in
eventual commutation of their senteno
to 30 years of imprisonment. The first
judge, Nicasio Hernandez, was impris-
oned for an indefinite term, as were fo !
of the defense lawyers (Jose Redell Sot I
Abelardo Triay, Valdez Arnau, and Fel '
Casuso). They were sentenced to die, b
their sentences also were commuted.
Three other lawyers associated with th
case (Aramis Taboada, Francisco Moru
and Israel Tamayo) were sentenced to
years in prison. 'Taboada died in prison
in 1985 under unexplained circum-
stances.

Other workers have been arrested
for discussing the formation of an inde
pendent union, including 30 truck
drivers at the Central Chaparra sugar
mill, workers in a Havana electrical
plant, workers at an Artemisa brewery
and farmers in Menocal— three of whor
were shot during arrest.

A "Classless" Society

In Cuba, contrary to Marxist theory,
state control of the economy does not
mean control of the economy by the pe(
pie. Nor does it mean that an upper cla
is nonexistent. The party leadership coi
trols wealth and power but in a much
more concentrated, centralized, and
unchallengeable form than any
"capitalist" could ever hope to achieve.
Not surprisingly, the elitist Cuban
leaders do not live the way the Cuban
people do. They have access to special
stores, well-stocked with consumer
goods from the West, where the "com-
mon people" are not allowed. The self-
appointed vanguard is permitted to pur-
chase luxury items, such as canned
goods, not available to the average
(Duban. Officers of the political police
and government leaders also are allowec
to purchase jewelry and expensive
clothing from stores designated for theii
exclusive use. Thev have access to

Department of State Bulleti

HUMAN RIGHTS

'Within the
revolution,
everything;
against the
revolution,
nothing. "

■ivate beaches and, unlike most
ubans, may travel abroad. They live in
)mes confiscated from Cuban citizens
ho fled the country.

conomic Decline

he Cuban economy is still based
rimarily on sugar; it is even less diver-
fied than it was before the revolution,
otwithstanding plans for industrial
evelopment, maniifactured goods
.^counted for only 5% of Cuban exports
1 1980; in 1960, the figures were the
ime. In contrast, other Latin American
ountries had substantial increases in the
xport of manufactured goods during the
jame 20 years.

Agricultural production is generally
down from prerevolution levels— even
though the population is 50% larger.

Food rationing, although
widespread, has not guaranteed that
food will be available. Despite increased
beef and poultry production, for exam-
ple, each Cuban is allotted only 2 pounds
of meat and IV2 pounds of chicken per
month.

Added to the food shortage is the
scarcity of consumer goods and the low
per capita income. In 1958 Cuba was
fourth in the hemisphere in per capita
income; now it ranks sixteenth.

Although much has been made of
advances in health care claimed by the
Cuban Government, severe sanitation
problems still threaten Cuban health.

Inadequate control of mosquitoes
together with the return of thousands of
soldiers from Africa have led to several
dengue fever epidemics. Castro himself
has severely criticized conditions in
Cuban hospitals.

Housing also is deficient: nearly one-
quarter of Cuba's 10 million people live
in inadequate housing.

Political Prisoners

In Cuban society, pressures to conform
and submit to the state are extremely
high. Those who choose the slightest
form of political resistance usually pay a
very high price: arrest, abuse, torture,

ebruary 1987

HUMAN RIGHTS

and cruel and inhuman punishment.
People often are arrested without war-
rants and held for long periods without
judicial hearings. The Cuban Constitu-
tion denies legal protections that would
prevent the regime from arresting and
detaining anyone considered harmful to
Castro's revolution. People arrested for
vandalism, practicing certain religions,
or criticizing the regime can be charged
with sabotage and counterrevolutionary
activities. Detention is permitted for
those considered "dangerous," defined
as "the special proclivity of a person
to commit crimes, demonstrated by
observed conduct manifestly contrary to
the rules of socialist ethics." Cuba
includes in its definition of "crimes" acts
that no free society would consider as
such.

The treatment of political offenders
at every step of the process is unrelent-
ingly severe— preventive detention,
house arrest, forced psychiatric treat-
ment, confinement in forced labor
camps, and imprisonment. Arrestees are
interrogated without counsel and sub-
jected to methods of intimidation
designed to force confessions. The
political detainee may be kept incom-
municado for days or weeks without
being charged and without notification
of family.

Cuban courts are, in practice, subor-
dinated to the party. People accused of
certain counterrevolutionary activities
are tried and sentenced secretly by
military tribunals. Accused individuals
generally receive little representation
from counsel at trial. The government
selects the attorney in virtually all
political cases. Detainees are given very
little time with their lawyers before trial.
The 1983 OAS report indicated that
some clients see their counsel for only an
hour before trial while others meet their
lawyers for the first time at the trial
itself. Attorneys frequently are not
informed of the trial until the day it
begins. They are cautioned against con-
ducting too rigorous a defense of their
clients. Some plead guilty for their
clients even when the clients insist on
their innocence; others refuse to
challenge accusations. Fear may
motivate some of these lawyers; they are
probably well aware that one risks sanc-
tions and even arrest and imprisonment
for defending one's client too well.
Attorneys have been jailed for conscien-
tiously defending individuals charged
with political offenses, as the case of the
late Aramis Taboada illustrates.

A trial normally consists of evidence
presented by prosecution witnesses
(generally members of State Security).

There are usually no defense witnesses.
If a member of a block committee
testifies for someone in a criminal mat-
ter, that person usually gets a reduced
sentence. Political trials generally last
from a few hours to a day, even in cases
where long prison terms are at stake.
Reports have reached the OAS that in
one case a trial lasted no longer than 10
minutes and that political trials never
last longer than 3 days, including
announcement of judgment and imposi-
tion of sentence.

Few observers are permitted at
political trials. The pressures on judges
to find guilt in these cases are strong,
especially when party leaders appear to
denounce the accused. Fidel Castro and
his brother Raul have been known to
appear at trials to denounce prominent
persons accused of political offenses. As
the OAS report stated: "Such strong
pressure. . .excessively influences the
administration of justice, and leaves it
no alternative but to endorse the verdict
of the political leadership. ..." The
report added: "... the evidence would
indicate that the sentences have always
been fully in accord with the Executive's
idea of proper justice."

Conditions and treatment in Cuban
prisons are absolutely wretched.
Armando Valladares and many other
former long-term political prisoners have
provided firsthand descriptions of the
deplorable conditions they were forced
to endure. The prisoners reported major,
systematic abuses, including beatings by
guards and officers, withholding of food
and water, inadequate diet and with-
holding of medical care, withholding of
fresh air and exercise, confining
prisoners in dungeon-like cells, with-
holding of family visits for years, with-
holding of mail for years, solitary con-
finement, physical injury caused by elec-
tronic noise machines, cell doors welded
shut, participation of prison medical
staff in acts of torture, and suspected
medical experiments carried out without
the permission of prisoners.

The most brutal treatment is
reserved for the plantados. as those
political prisoners who refuse "political
rehabilitation" are known. They spend
their days dressed only in pajamas or
underwear or without any clothing at all.
Visits by friends or relatives are limited
to one or two per year, or less, and let-
ters to one per month.

Political prisoners are not routinely
released at the end of their terms. Their
freedom depends on a personal decision
by Fidel Castro, who has frequently used
the release of political prisoners to gain

favor with an influential foreign visitor
or to put the latter under obligation to
"respond." Sentences are often
extended without any trial or due proc-
ess. Plantados are especially likely to bi
forced to remain in prison after expira- ,,
tion of their sentences. There are
reports that these prisoners are sub-
jected to particularly harsh conditions,
especially those in Boniato Prison.

Many of those forced to remain in
prison past term have been incarceratec
15-20 years when their extensions are
given. In at least one case, that of
Santos 0. Mirabal Rodriguez, the "past
term" sentence has been longer than th
original one. Mirabal was sentenced for
political offenses at the age of 12 to be
imprisoned until the age of 21. Althougl
his sentence expired in June 1971, he
has been forced to remain in prison even
since. His only moments spent outside
prison were in June 1984 when he was
subjected to the psychological torture of
being put on a bus of freed prisoners
bound for the United States only to be
removed at the last minute.

Torture and mistreatment continue
today. In April 1986, a dozen former
prisoners testified before an interna-
tional panel in Paris about additional
examples of torture and inhuman treat-
ment. Ana Lazara Rodriguez cited cases
of guards throwing women down stairs
and kicking them in the breasts and
stomachs. Raoul Carmeante reported
that 15- to 18-year-old boys were put in
prison barracks with sexual degenerates
who raped them repeatedly. Eduardo
Capote showed the panel his hand where
one of his fingers had been chopped off
by a prison guard.

Teresa Mayan, who was imprisoned
in 1982 for 1 year for attempting to flee
Cuba with her son, told the panel about
beatings and lack of medical care. She
also stated that many fellow prisoners
went mad and "almost every day a
prisoner committed suicide." Mrs.
Mayan observed: "If anybody says that
all happened years back, I am here to
tell them it is still happening."

Once political prisoners are freed,
they are sometimes forbidden to leave
Cuba. Ricardo Bofill Pages, chairman of
the Cuban Committee for the Defense of
Human Rights, was released from his
third term in prison in August 1985 but
still awaits permission to depart the
country. In August 1986, following the
arrest of five members of the committee,
Bofill— fearing a fourth prison sentence-
took refuge at the French Embassy in
Havana, where he remains today.

'While waiting for exit permits,
former political prisoners sometimes are

Department of State Bulletin

HUMAN RIGHTS

inied the right to work, possess ration
rds, or obtain basic identification
icuments. They are subject to discrim-
latory treatment for the rest of their
es. They must Hve with constant
rveillance and social ostracism.

Only the Cuban Government knows
■ e exact number of political prisoners in
Uba. Fidel Castro told foreign journal-
ts in February 1985 that "Political
■isoners, . . . the recalcitrant ones who
ice numbered many thousands, amount
about 200. ..." Castro, who has no
ason to exaggerate, also stated that
e total number of individuals
sentenced for counterrevolutionary
tivities" could be as many as 1,000.
mericas Watch and Amnesty Interna-
;)nal have published estimates that the
jimber is between 250 and 1,000.

The Cuban Government no longer
stinguishes political from common
iminal prisoners. Many persons have
en imprisoned for acts that are
tempts to resist or flee an oppressive
gime. Thus some former political
isoners who contend that the total
imber of political prisoners is, in fact,
■arer 10,000 may well be correct. A
i85 survey by Amnesty International of
her human rights organizations drew
sponses indicating that there may be
many as 15,000 political prisoners in
jba, though Amnesty International
self did not endorse that number. Few
ilitical prisoners have been involved in
olence against the government.

In January 1985, a delegation from
e U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference
iked for the release of 147 long-term
tlitical prisoners, after which the
jban Government offered to release 75
Tsons— the majority of them not on the
;t of 147— and allow them and their
milies to leave Cuba for the United
:ates. The United States welcomed
any of these brave people to their new
/es of freedom in September 1986.

Executions for political offenses are
ill frequent in Cuba. Twenty-nine
jople were executed in October 1982
ir "plotting against Castro." Among
lese was Armando Hernandez Gonzales
hose "plotting" consisted of putting up
iti-Castro posters and scattering some
ills in the road to hinder trucks carry-
ig people to Sunday "voluntary" labor,
everal of his relatives were similarly
larged and also executed at this time.
1 August 1983, John Olivera Alberto, a
lehovah's Witness, was executed for
ioreading propaganda inciting rebellion,
hree other Jehovah's Witnesses— Jesus
rieto Suarez, Saul Pay, and Efrem
loriegas Barroso— were executed in

October 1983 for possessing a
mimeograph machine to reproduce
religious tracts.

The Cuban Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights reported in
1984 that 37 people were executed by
firing squads between October 1983 and
May 1984. The same committee reported
in 1985 that at least five young Cubans
were executed in the first half of 1985.

A 16-year-old boy was shot to death
on November 18, 1985, and an 18-year-
old companion possibly wounded by
Cuban police guards when the two
attempted to gain access to the
Venezuelan Embassy in Havana. Accord-
ing to all accounts, no attempt was made
to warn or negotiate with the boys, who
were simply shot on sight— disturbing
evidence of the regime's standing orders
in such matters. This was the third per-
son killed at the Venezuelan Embassy in
the preceding 22 months and the 21st
killed there since 1974.

Cuba still finds it necessary to use
capital punishment for an extraordinary
range of "offenses." No free society,
and, indeed, few authoritarian ones,
executes its young people for painting
slogans on walls, preachers for passing
out religious pamphlets, workers for put-
ting up posters, or farmers for pro-
testing a low grain price. Nor does a
society having any claim to be just con-
demn to death workers for talking about
a union, judges for refusing to give a
stronger sentence, or lawyers for effec-
tively representing their clients.

Fidel Castro's revolution is now 27
years old. More than enough time has
passed to assess its results. The revolu-
tion has failed miserably to provide for
the economic and social well-being of the
Cuban people. It has been sordidly suc-
cessful in aggressively denying the
Cuban people every freedom and human
right. ■

Human Rights Progress in 1986

by Richard Schifter

Address on Human Rights Day on
December 10, 1986. at the White House.
Ambassador Schifter is Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs.

Our annual gatherings to celebrate
Human Rights Day are appropriate occa-
sions to take inventory on developments
in the field of human rights over the last
12 months. They have been marked by
progress in some countries, by setbacks
in others, and by disappointing lack of
movement in still others.

We are all, of course, well aware of
the ending of dictatorial rule in the
course of this year in Haiti and the
Philippines. Regrettably, but under-
standably, in neither country has the
change of government ushered in a
period of domestic peace. But there is
now a real chance in both countries for
progress under a democratic form of
government. Responsibility for assuring
such progress rests, of course, with the
citizens of these countries and the
political leadership which now holds
office there. Our role is to be of
assistance in this context, to do
whatever we can to be of help.

Let me add that we also witnessed a
free election in Guatemala as that coun-
try joined El Salvador in the strengthen-
ing of democratic institutions in Central

America for which Presidents Cerezo
and Duarte are to be congratulated. The
measures they have taken have, indeed,
served to restore respect for human
rights in their countries. They have
demonstrated that the democratic proc-
ess and respect for human rights go
hand in hand.

One country in the Western Hemi-
sphere in which we had hoped for far
more progress in the past year than has
been achieved has been Chile. We are
aware of the acts of terrorism with
which the Chilean Government has had
to grapple, of the support given by out-
siders to forces at work in Chile whose
intent it is to foster civil strife in that
country. But that does not justify tor-
ture or any of the other serious depriva-
tions of human rights which not only
have continued to occur in Chile but
have increased in the last year. On the
other hand, we are glad to note that in
recent weeks there has been the begin-
ning of a dialogue between persons in
governmental leadership and represent-
atives of the democratic opposition. It is
our sincere hope that in the months
ahead this dialogue will, at long last,
help initiate the first steps toward
Chile's peaceful return to democracy.

Without going into extensive detail,
let me say that our concerns over Chile
are paralleled in Paraguay, where there

jBbruary 1987

HUMAN RIGHTS

has been a disturbing increase in repres-
sion, even in recent weeks, as the gov-
ernment has initiated a series of arrests
of persons on political charges.

We need not revisit on this occasion
the topic of South Africa, concerning
which Secretary Shultz has spotcen so
clearly just a few days ago. Let me say
simply that our emphatic rejection of the
system of apartheid continues. We are
shocked by the massive human rights
violations occurring in South Africa
today, including the recent tightening of
restrictions on a vigorous press, at one
time a shining symbol of the recognition
of democratic values. We also, as
always, are deeply concerned about the
limits on our ability to intercede on
behalf of the victims of apartheid and of
other human rights violations.

In addition to race, another shameful
target of human rights abuse is the prac-
tice of religion. At the UN Human
Rights Commission, it proved possible
earlier this year to take a significant
step forward for the cause of religious
freedom by establishing the office of the
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. In
a world in which religious intolerance
and strife based on such intolerance have
been commonplace for millennia, we now
have a man whose task it is to lead the
fight against this scourge. I am happy to
note that the man appointed to the posi-
tion of rapporteur. Dr. Angelo Ribeiro of
Portugal, is with us in this room today.

My recitation of specific country
situations is, obviously, not exhaustive.
Nor is it my purpose to try to cover the
globe in these remarks. The State
Department's annual country reports to
the Congress, which are now in prepara-
tion, will deal with these concerns. These
reports demonstrate the strength of our
conviction that abuses must be pointed
out wherever they occur, whether in
nations friendly or antagonistic to
America's foreign policy interests.

Cuba and the Soviet Union

The remainder of my remarks shall be
devoted to two countries, namely Cuba
and the Soviet Union. The reasons why
these two states deserve special atten-
tion on an occasion like this is not only
that they are among the world's most
serious human rights violators but also
that their human rights violations have
either, as in the case of Cuba, not been
in the news for decades, or, as in the
case of the Soviet Union, have been
taken for granted by the media for a
good many years.

Cuba is the Western Hemisphere's
paramount totalitarian state, the fiefdom

of one of the world's longest lasting dic-
tators. It is a country which seeks to
repress all forms of independent expres-
sion, a country in which the population is
intimidated not only by an all-powerful
secret police apparatus, but one in which
average citizens are called upon to spy
on their neighbors. It is a country in
which the slightest, most innocent
expression of disapproval of the govern-
ment can have seriously adverse conse-
quences, such as a reduction in rations
or the loss of the educational oppor-
tunities for one's children. What we see
in Cuba at present, we fear, is the
scenario of a fast-approaching future of
Nicaragua, where the Sandinista regime
has destroyed the democratic promises
of the revolution, turning the country
from one despotism to another.

You will hear more on the subject of
Cuba from a man who has firsthand
knowledge of it, Armando Valladares.

We are also fortunate to have in our
midst today Yuriy Orlov, like Armando
Valladares, a man who had to give up
years of his life, which he had to spend
in jirison, and who ultimately gave up his
homeland— all in championing the cause
of freedom. It is Yuriy Orlov's presence
here that reminds us of the reality of life
in the Soviet Union. A year ago, as we
gathered here within weeks following
the Geneva summit, there were some of
us who cautiously hoped that improve-
ments in the Soviet human rights record
might be just around the corner. Today,
as we review events over the course of
the last 12 months, we must, sadly, take
note of the fact that the corner has not,
as yet, been turned.

What we have witnessed during the
last year has been a new look in Soviet
public relations but not in the substance
of Soviet policies. It appears as if the
Kremlin has taken on a new advertising
agency, with bright, young specialists on
the Western mind, able to design new
packaging and new selling methods. But
the product that is being sold remains
the same.

With the Western market in mind,
there have been a few high-profile
gestures from the Soviet Union. An
announcement is made, with appropriate
fanfare, that a 3-year-old baby will be
allowed to join her parents who 2 years
ago escaped to the West. Yet, where else
but in the Soviet Union and some of its
allies is it a crime to leave one's country
without proper permission? And where
else but in the Soviet Union and some of
its allies would parents be punished in
this manner'?

With appropriate fanfare, a small
number of human rights activists are
released early or allowed to emigrate.

But what about the many others,
courageous men and women who are
punished with prison, internal exile, or
other restrictions on their freedom
because they expressed their thoughts v
speech and in writing. And let us note
that this is punishment meted out to pe
sons who were doing nothing other thai
exercising rights accorded them under
the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act
signed by the Soviet Union.

This year we were visited in the
United States by the person who heads
the agency in the Soviet Union charged
with licensing of religious activities. Ou
visitor assured all those within earshot
that a new day has dawned in the Sovie
Union as far as the practice of religion i
concerned. One would hope that he will
soon pass this message to the managers
of the gulag, which holds hundreds of
religious believers in its prisons. During
the last 12 months, at least another 90
persons have been sentenced to long
prison terms for violating laws
regulating religious practices.

Another area of deep concern to us
is that most barbarous of Soviet prac-
tices, committing sane persons to ment;
institutions as a form of punishment for
their expression of dissenting views. It i
deeply troublesome that members of tht
medical profession have allowed them-
selves to be used in this manner. But it
is to the everlasting credit of one Soviet
psychiatrist. Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, tha
the heinous system of abuse of
psychiatry has been fully exposed. For
doing so. Dr. Koryagin has had to pay a
heavy price, a term of 7 years incarcera
tion, which he is now serving in the
infamous Chistopol Prison.

And it was out of Chistopol Prison
that the news came yesterday of the
death, at the age of 49, of another true
hero of the Soviet Union, Anatoliy
Marchenko. Marchenko was the man
who fully e-xposed Soviet prison camp
conditions in the post-Stalin era. By the
time of his death, he had spent a total of
20 years in prison. His most recent
sentence, handed down in 1981, was for
a term of 10 years for anti-Soviet pro-
paganda. Prison conditions in the Soviet
Union have broken the health of many a
man. They broke the health of Anatoliy
Marchenko and converted a prison
sentence into a sentence of death.

One action which demonstrates the
Soviet attitude toward human rights as
much as any other they have taken this
year is the fact that the Government of
the U.S.S.R. in October declared our
human rights officers, Michael Matera in
Moscow and his able counterpart in
Leningrad, Daniel Grossman, persona .
non grata.

Department of State Bulletin

OCEANS

Human rights officers who serve in
• embassies overseas deserve special
oo-nition. These courageous men and
men face all of the challenges and
eats which any Foreign Service
, icer must confront while bearing the
gijitional risk, in countries which are
r jor human rights violators, of incur-
rlg the hostility of authorities who have
smething to hide.

Mr. Matera is with us today. He won
t' admiration and respect of his
f reign Sei^vice colleagues in Moscow
si of those brave Soviet citizens who,
aenormous cost to themselves, try to
a/ance the cause of human rights in
t 'ir own country.

If the Soviet authorities believe that
s'h actions as expelling our human
r hts officers will discourage us from
p-suing our human rights goals in the
J^^iet Union, they ai-e badly mistaken.

And then there is the matter of
t igration. The right to leave one's
c mtry is clearly spelled out in the
1 iversal Declaration of Human Rights,
I ocument incorporated into the
I Isinki Final Act. It is another one of
t ■ obligations undertaken at Helsinki
\ ich the Soviet Union honors in the
I !ach.

In this field, too, with appropriate
i [fare, the Soviet Union has, during the
1 5t year, announced approval of a series
(applications for family reunion. The
jaouncements were, understandably,
1 Icome news to the families directly
i -olved. They were welcome news to all
( us. For let me stress that to us every
1 '. is precious, every individual's fate is
i portant. We rejoice at the unification
( every single family.

But what justification had there been
1 • originally separating these spouses,
] rents and children, siblings? 'Why
1 dn't they had a chance to be united
1 ich earlier?

To be sure, as part of the new public
1 ations effort, we have noticed a will-
i^ness on the part of Soviet officials to
Iten to appeals for permission to
nigrate, to accept letters or lists of per-
:ns interested in emigrating. Regret-
■ oly, this has proved to be nothing more
an a charade. Emigration continues to
i at a level of approximately 1,000 per
: ar, 98% below the level of "l979.
oreover, to avoid any doubt as to
lere the Soviet leadership stands on
e issue of emigration, a law was pro-
ulgated on August 31, 1986, by the
)viet Council of Ministers which pro-
des that, aside from one minor excep-
)n, no application for an exit visa will
■' approved unless the requested
migration is sponsored by a person liv-

ing abroad who is the spouse, parent,
child, or sibling of the applicant. The
intent of the law is clearly to say nyet to
appeals that the Soviet Union allow
large-scale emigration.

That this was the intent of the law,
was, in fact, made clear by Ambassador
Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delega-
tion to the CSCE [Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe] meeting
now taking place in Vienna. He told a
congressional delegation that the Soviet
Union now has a law on the subject of
emigration and that no letter or petition
will help because the law must be
obeyed. That such a law, in turn, is
clearly in conflict with the undertakings
of the Helsinki Final Act appears not to
be a matter of concern to the Soviet
authorities.

Navigation Rights
and the Gulf of Sidra

Background

In October 1973, Libya announced that
it considered all water in the Gulf of
Sidra south of a straight baseline drawn
at 32° 30' north latitude to be internal
Libyan waters because of the gulf's
geographic location and Libya's historic
control over it. The United States and
other countries, including the U.S.S.R.,
protested Libya's claim as lacking any
historic or legal justification and as
illegally restricting freedom of naviga-
tion on the high seas. Further, the U.S.
Navy has conducted many operations
within the gulf during the past 12 years
to protest the Libyan claim. These exer-
cises have resulted in two shooting inci-
dents between Libyan and U.S. forces.
The first was in 1981, when two Libyan
aircraft fired on U.S. aircraft and were
shot down in air-to-air combat, and the
second in March 1986, when the Libyans
fired several missiles at U.S. forces and
the United States responded by attack-
ing Libyan radar installations and patrol
boats.

Barbary Coast History

This is not the first time that the United
States has contended with navigational
hindrances imposed by North African
states. After the American Revolution,
the United States adhered to the then
common practice of paying tribute to the
Barbary Coast states to ensure safe
passage of U.S. merchant vessels. In

I have taken the time to spell out
these details because they have tended
to be overlooked as the Soviet Union
continues to pursue its aggressive public
relations effort. It is critically important
for us to face the reality, the reality
exemplified by Yuriy Orlov's years of
imprisonment and exile, by Natan
Shcharanskiy's years in prison, by the
fact that both of them were released
only in an exchange for spies.

However, hope springs eternal in the
human breast. None of us will want to
give up the struggle just because the
road is difficult. Wherever freedom is at
issue, be it in Chile or South Africa,
Cuba or the Soviet Union, the United
States is prepared to speak up, whether
in private or in public, in support of
human rights and human dignity. ■

o MALTA

TUNISIA

_/,fi

Mediterranean Sea

ipoir

32° 30- N y

Gun ol Sidra 1 p. •

1 B Y A

1796, the United States paid a one-time
sum (equal to one-third of its defense
budget) to Algiers, with guarantees of
further annual payments. In 1801, the
United States refused to conclude a
similar agreement with Tripoli, and the
Pasha of Tripoli declared war on the
United States. After negotiations failed,
the United States blockaded Tripoli; in
the autumn of 1803 Commodore Edward
Preble led a squadron, including the
U.S.S. Constitution ("Old Ironsides"), to
the Mediterranean to continue the
blockade. Shortly after the squadron
arrived off Tripoli, a U.S. frigate, the
Philndelphia. ran aground and was cap-
tured. Lt. Stephen Decatur led a team
into Tripoli harbor and successfully
burned the Philadelphia. In June 1805,
the Pa-sha agreed to terms following a
ground assault led by U.S. Marines that
captured a port near Tripoli. In 1810
Algiers and Tripoli renewed raids
against U.S. shipping, and in 1815, Com-
modore Decatur's squadron caught the
Algerian fleet at sea and forced the Dey

February 1987

TERRORISM

of Algiers to agree to terms favorable to
the United States. Decatur then pro-
ceeded to Tunis and Tripoli and obtained
their consent to similar treaties. A U.S.
squadron remained in the Mediterranean
for several years to ensure compliance
with the treaties.

Current Law and Custom

By custom, nations may lay historic
claim to those bays and gulfs over which
they have exhibited such a degree of
open, notorious, continuous, and unchal-
lenged control for an extended period of
time as to preclude traditional high seas
freedoms within such waters. Those
waters (closed off by straight baselines)
are treated as if they were part of the
nation's land mass, and the navigation of
foreign vessels is generally subject to
complete control by the nation. Beyond
lawfully closed-off bays and other areas
along their coasts, nations may claim a
"territorial sea" of no more than 12
nautical miles in breadth (measured 12
miles out from the coast's low water
line— or legal straight baseline) within
which foreign vessels enjoy the limited
navigational "right of innocent
passage." Beyond the territorial sea,
vessels and aircraft of all nations enjoy
freedom of navigation and overflight.

Since Libya cannot make a valid
historic waters claim and meets no other
international law criteria for enclosing
the Gulf of Sidra, it may validly claim a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea as
measured from the normal low-water
line along its coast (see map). Libya also
may claim up to a 200-nautical-mile
exclusive economic zone in which it may
exercise resource jurisdiction, but such a
claim would not affect freedom of navi-
gation and overflight. (The United
States has confined its exercises to areas
beyond 12 miles from Libya's coast.)

U.S. Position

The United States supports and seeks to
uphold the customary law outlined
above, and it has an ongoing global pro-
gram of protecting traditional navigation
rights and freedoms from encroachment
by illegal maritime claims. This program
includes diplomatic protests (delivered to
more than 50 countries since 1975) and
ship and aircraft operations to preserve
those navigation rights. Illegal maritime
claims to which the United States
responds include:

• Excessive territorial sea claims;

• Improperly drawn baselines for
measuring maritime claims; and

• Attempts to require notification or
permission before foreign vessels can

transit a nation's territorial sea under
the right of innocent passage.

Thus Libya has not been singled out
for special consideration but represents
simply one instance in the continuing
U.S. effort to preserve worldwide
navigational rights and freedoms. The
fact that Libya chose to respond mili-
tarily to the U.S. exercise of traditional
navigation rights was regrettable and
without any basis in international law.

U.S. Intentions

The United States will pursue actively
its efforts to preserve traditional naviga-
tional rights and freedoms that are

equally guaranteed to all nations. Th^
preservation of rights is essential to
maritime commerce and global naval
air mobility and is imperative if all
nations are to share equally in the
benefits of the world's oceans. As
always, the United States will exercis
its rights and freedoms fully in accori
with international law and hopes to
avoid further military confrontations/
but it will not acquiesce in unlawful
maritime claims and is prepared to
defend itself if circumstances so requi

Taken from the GIST series of December
1986, published by the Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. ■

Terrorism:

The Challenge and the Response

by John C. Whitehead

Address before the Brookings Institu-
tion Conference on Terrorism on
December 10, 1986. Mr. Whitehead is
Deputy Secretary ofState.^

I appreciate the opportunity to par-
ticipate in this important conference on
terrorism. I note from your program
that you have already heard the perspec-
tives of many distinguished academics
and specialists; this afternoon, I would
like to present our views on this scourge.
More specifically, there are three ques-
tions that I want to address.

First, what exactly is terrorism?

Second, why is the United States so
concerned about terrorism?

And third, what are we doing to
combat it?

Let me begin with some observa-
tions on the nature of terrorism. In
recent years, we have learned a good
deal about what terrorism is and is not.
What once may have seemed the ran-
dom, senseless acts of a few crazed
individuals has come into clearer focus
as a new pattern of low-technology and
inexpensive warfare against the West
and its friends. And, while it is an alarm-
ing pattern, it is a threat that we can
identify, combat, and, ultimately, defeat.

Terrorism is a sophisticated form of
political violence. It is neither random
nor without purpose. On the contrary,
terrorism is a strategy and tool of those
who reject the norms and values of
civilized people everywhere.

Today, humanity is confronted by.
wide assortment of terrorist groups
whose stated objectives may range fn
separatist causes to ethnic grievances-
social and political revolutions. Their
methods include hijackings, bombings<
kidnappings, and political assassinatict
But the overreaching goal of virtually
terrorists is the same: to impose their
will by using force against civilians.

The horrors they inflict on the
defenseless are calculated to achieve
very specific political purposes. They
want people to feel vulnerable and
afraid; they want citizens to lose faith
their government's ability to protect
them; and they want to undermine th(-
legitimacy not only of specific govern-
ment policies but of the governments
themselves.

Terrorists gain from the confusion
and anarchy caused by their violence.
They succeed when governments alter
their policies out of intimidation. They
also succeed when governments respoi
to terrorist violence with repressive,
polarizing actions that alienate the
authorities from the populace— and,
thereby, play directly into the terrorist
hands.

State-Sponsored Terrorism

As you may well know, terrorist violen
is hardly a new phenomenon. Nearly tv
centuries ago, for example, the Barbar
pirates conducted their own form of tei
rorism, operating from North African
ports and leading to the landing of U.S
marines on the shores of Tripoli. Simi-
larly, the forerunner of the car bomb,

Department of State Bulle

TERRORISM

cart bomb, dates back to Napoleonic
IS. Nevertheless, certain features of
lern-day terrorism seem to be, if not
lorically unprecedented, then eer-
ily very unusual.

To begin with, a good deal of con-
porary terrorism is state sponsored.
et(( in example, consider one of the most
to )rious terrorist groups of our day,
io[S Abu Nidal organization. This group
ful r receives backing and support from
lo ya; it finds sanctuary in Eastern
rei| 'ope; and Damascus has provided it
1 important logistical support since
ie 3. Indeed. Syria allows Abu Nidal's
1» up to maintain training camps in
as of Lebanon under Syrian control.
ia also provides the group with travel
uments, permits its operatives to
sit freely, and continues to sanction
operation of Abu Nidal's facilities in
i) nascus.

Nor is Abu Nidal the only terrorist
pap supported by Syria. Damascus
ll provides varying amounts of sup-
II : to other radical Palestinian groups.
Palestinian terrorist groups, as
, have facilities or have received
iiing in Syria or Syrian-controlled
s of Lebanon. These groups include
•lapanese Red Army, the Kurdish
or Party, the Armenian terrorist
mization ASALA [Armenian Secret
A ny for the Liberation of Armenia],
a al-Zulfikar of Pakistan. In the past,
» have had to rely on intelligence
SI rces for information on Syrian sup-
p t for international terrorism. More
r ently, however, public trials in Lon-
d . and Berlin have conclusively
d lonstrated Syria's complicity in ter-
r ist actions.

Unfortunately, Syria is not the only
s te which supports terrorism. Iran,
( 3a, Libya, and South Yemen are also
k ' members of today's terrorist inter-
n ional. Indeed, the deadly combination

0 iirect government assistance such as

a ns, explosives, communications, travel
c 'uments, and training, on the one
h id, and violent individuals or groups,
c the other hand, is a major factor in
t h the growth and the effectiveness of
t rorism in recent years.

1 e Soviet Role

1 the past, terrorism was almost
i:lusively the weapon of the weak, a
I sture by small groups of determined

treniists to call attention to their

jse. Today, however, we see that even
^jTiajor power like the Soviet Union sup-

rts terrorist activity in pursuit of its

ibitions.

We should understand the Soviet
role in international terrorism without
exaggeration or distortion. The Soviet
Union officially denounces the use of ter-
rorism as an instrument of state policy.
Yet here, as elsewhere, there is a wide
disparity between Soviet statements and
actions. The Soviet Union uses terrorist
groups to advance its own purposes and
goals, including the weakening of liberal
democracy and the undermining of
regional stability. One does not have to
believe that the Soviets are puppeteers
and the terrorists marionettes; violent or
fanatic individuals and groups can be
found in almost every society. But, cer-
tainly, in some countries terrorism has
been more violent and pervasive because
of support from the Soviet Union and its
satellites— notably Bulgaria, East Ger-
many, and Czechoslovakia.

Terrorism and Democracy

In thinking about terrorism, certain
facts must be faced. All states and all
political systems are vulnerable to ter-
rorist assault. Nevertheless, the number
of terrorist incidents in totalitarian
states is minimal; markedly fewer acts
are committed against their citizens
abroad than against Westerners. This
discrepancy has not arisen simply
because police states make it harder
for terrorists to carry out acts of vio-
lence. It also reflects the fundamental
antagonism between terrorism and
democracy.

One reason that the United States is
so concerned about terrorism, wherever
it takes place, is that it is largely
directed against the democracies— often
against our fundamental strategic
interests, always against our most basic
values. The moral values upon which
democracy is based— individual rights,
equality under the law, freedom of
thought, freedom of religion, and the
peaceful resolution of disputes— all stand
in the way of those who seek to impose
their will, their ideology, or their
religious beliefs by force. The terrorists
reject and despise the open processes of
democratic society and, therefore, con-
sider us their mortal enemy.

States that sponsor terrorism use it
as another weapon of warfare against
the United States and our allies.
Through terrorism, they seek to gain
strategic advantages where they cannot
use conventional means of attack. When
terrorists, reportedly with Iranian back-
ing, set out to bomb Western personnel
in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the
West's commitment to defend its

interests in the Middle East. When
North Korea perpetrated the murder of
South Korean Government officials in
Rangoon, it sought to weaken the non-
communist stronghold on the mainland
of East Asia. Wlien Syria participated
in the attempt to blow up the El Al
airliner and murder over 300 people, it
attempted to strike a major blow against
Israel, the United States, and Britain.

In Europe, the Middle East, and
elsewhere, the United States is a prin-
cipal target of terrorist violence, not so
much because of what we do or don't do
but, rather, because of what we are: a
nation dedicated to the peaceful resolu-
tion of conflicts.

Preventing Future
Terrorist Violence

Terrorist violence is taking an increas-
ingly grim toll on human life. Last year,
for example, nearly 800 terrorist attacks
hit citizens and public facilities in 84
countries; over 900 persons were killed,
of whom 38 were American. As an
American official, I highlight the number
of Americans who have been killed. But,
no matter what their nationality, 900
deaths are just too many.

The potential of future incidents is
even more worrying. Terrorists now rely
on guns, grenades, and bombs to spread
ruin and fear. That is bad enough. In the
future, however, states which support
terrorists could provide even more lethal
means of destruction. The fact that this
has not happened yet does not allow us
to be complacent about the future. On
the contrary, the essence of an effective
policy is to identify a danger to our
interests before it is self-evident and
implement a sensible preventive
response.

U.S. Counterterrorist Policy

What I have said thus far should
give you a clear conception of this
Administration's view of the
phenomenon of terrorism. Now let me
turn to the third and final point I want
to discuss this afternoon: U.S. counter-
terrorist policy. I hardly need say that
this is a particularly controversial topic
just now. Many of you, I am sure, have
strong views on this subject. Yet I urge
you not to lose sight of the many real
and substantial achievements this
Administration has made in the fight
against terrorism. Much of this effort
receives little attention and takes place
in the realm of intelligence gathering, in
the cluttered offices of analysts, or in

!bruary 1987

TERRORISM

the laboratories of scientists trying to
develop better ways of detecting hidden
explosives.

What are these achievements? Dur-
ing the past few years, we have made
i-emarkable progress in thwarting poten-
tial attacks. Only successful terrorist
acts receive front-page coverage, but I'd
like to draw your attention to the
attempts that fail— largely due to our
efforts. Last year alone, we and our
friends foiled more than 120 planned ter-
rorist attacks. For example, in Turkey
this April, security officers arrested
Libyan-supported terrorists who were
planning to attack the U.S. officers club
in Ankara during a wedding celebration.
Tn Paris, at about the same time, officials
thwarted a similar attack planned
against the visa line at the U.S.
Embassy.

A number of initiatives have con-
tributed to this progress. We have been
developing our own intelligence capa-
bilities vis-a-vis international terrorists
and sharing that intelligence with other
nations in a timely fashion. We have
expanded international cooperation in
the fields of law enforcement and
counterterrorist training. Under the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program,
which began in April 1984, we have
established active exchange and training
programs with 32 foreign governments.
States which may not actually train
and fund terrorists but which ignore ter-
rorist activity in their own countries
pose a particularly difficult problem.
Unless their own citizens are the targets
of terrorist acts, many nations assume
it's not their problem. We are respond-
ing to this unwillingness to act by
discussing terrorism with all nations—
not just our allies. I recently returned
from a trip to Eastern Europe, which is
an area well known for its leniency
toward terrorists. Eastern Europeans
are realizing that terrorism is their prob-
lem too: there were Hungarians at the
Vienna airport when it was attacked last
year, and Romania recently stated its
opposition to terrorism. Tliere is much
more to be done in Eastern Europe, but
with continued effort, we can make all
countries understand that terrorism is a
crime against humanity.

We are also for putting teeth into
international antiterrorism conventions.
For example, the International Civil
Aviation Organization toughened its
regulations dramatically after the hijack-
ing of TWA Flight 847. In response to
the Achillc Laurn hijacking, the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization began to
develop similar regulations for seaborne

transportation. Last year, the UN
General Assembly adopted a strong
re.solution declaring terrorism a crime,
whatever the rationale.

We have taken great strides toward
bringing our diplomatic installations in
threatened areas up to the standards
necessary to protect our people. All of
our posts have conducted intensive
reviews of their security needs, and
these reviews have been the basis for
speedy action. We have made immediate
improvements at 2.3 high-threat posts.
We are planning to construct new office
buildings that will measure up to the
latest security standards. The Inman
commission [Advisory Panel on Overseas
Security] has estimated that improving
the security of our institutions abroad
will cost $4.2 billion over a 5-year period.
Congress has approved less than
$1 billion for the first stage. There is
obviously a great need for increased
funding over the next 5 years.

Our research into new technologies
for enhancing physical security is also
continuing. We have begun working with
the private sector to help corporations
improve their capacity for dealing with
terrorists. We have passed tougher laws
against terrorism, such as the Omnibus
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which
makes terrorist acts against Americans
abroad punishable in U.S. courts. And
we are urging other nations to tighten
their procedures for issuing visas to
suspected terrorists.

We have also developed our own
counterterrorist military capabilities to
react swiftly to terrorist situations. In
both the Achille Laura affair and last
April's assault on Tripoli, we demon-
strated our willingness and ability to use
force against terrorists and against
states that support them. Col. Qadhafi
now has no illusions about our
determination— and neither should any
others who would use terrorist violence
against us.

Most important, perhaps, we are
helping to educate the public about the
real nature of the terrorist threat. Over
the years, too many of us have accepted
uncritically certain very misleading
views about the nature of terrorism-
views which disarm us intellectually and
strengthen our adversaries. For any
counterterrorism policy to be effective,
these misconceptions must be dispelled.

Misconceptions About Terrorism

What misconceptions am I referring to?
Let me briefly mention three of them.
We have all heard the insidious assertion
that "one person's terrorist is another's

freedom fighter." What this constitui
of course, is an attempt to justify ter
rorism as a legitimate form of warfai-.
and political struggle.

When Secretary Shultz addresse.'^
this issue, he sometimes quotes the
powerful rebuttal of this kind of mora
relativism made by the late Senator
Henry Jackson. Senator Jackson's st.i
ment bears repeating today.

The idea that one person's "terrorist"
another's "freedom fighter" cannot be san
tioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionarie:
don't blow up buses containing non-
combatants; terrorist murderers do. Free-
dom fighters don't set out to capture and
slaughter school children; terrorist murder
do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate inii'
cent businessmen, or hijack and hold hosta?
innocent men. women, and children; terror
murderers do. It is a disgrace that democ-
racies would allow the treasured word
"freedom" to be associated with acts of
terrorists.

So spoke Scoop Jackson. So should we
all speak.

Another fallacy we often hear is th»
military action taken to retaliate again
or preempt terrorism is contrary to
international law. Some have even sug^
gested that to use force against ter-
rorism is to lower ourselves to the bar
baric level of the terrorists. But, as th(
President and Secretary Shultz have
pointed out time and again, the UN
Charter is not a suicide pact. Article 5
explicitly allows the right of self-defen
It is absurd to argue that international
law prohibits us from acting in our selk
defense. On the contrary, there is ampj
legal authority for the view that a statf
which supports terrorist or subversive
attacks against another state or which
supports terrorist planning within its
own territory is responsible for such
attacks. Such conduct can amount toai
ongoing armed aggression against the
other state in international law. As the:
President said in connection with Libyf
support for terrorist violence:

By providing material support to terrori
groups which attack U.S. citizens. Libya has
engaged in armed aggression against the
United States under established principles o
international law, just as if [it] had used its
own armed forces.

All of us can agree, I hope, that the
United States has not only the right bui
the obligation to defend its citizens
against terrorist violence. We should us
our military power only if the stakes
justify it, if other measures are
unavailable, and then only in a manner
appropriate to a clear objective. But we
cannot rule out the use of armed force ii
every context. Our morality must be a

Department of State Bullet^

TERRORISM

'ce of strength, not paralysis. Other-
, we will be surrendering the world's
jire to those who are most brutal,
t unscrupulous, and most hostile to
jrything we believe in.
A third argument we sometimes
r is that by openly discussing ter-
sm, we're only giving the terrorists
/arranted recognition and legitimacy,
ording to this line of reasoning, we
juld downplay public expression of our
earns in the hope that a low profile
deprive the terrorists of the visibility
/ seek. Unfortunately, terrorist
ups have shown great skill in dealing
n the media, and their crimes are
ly to attract considerable press and
■vision attention, regardless of what
U,S, Government does. Under these
umstances, our duty is clear: we
5t persist in our campaign to build a
ad coalition, at home and abroad,
w ing to stand up against terrorism.

Ciclusion

me conclude with a final observa-
. Recent events may have raised
Ills in some minds about the credibil-
nf U.S. counterterrorist policy. But I
assure you that this Administra-
t: I's overall policy is well in place, and
it smains a sound framework for coun-
& ng the terrorist scourge. Today, as in
t past, our policy is based on four
ii'iples.

• We consider terrorism a criminal
a ivity that no political cause can

;ify'.

• We refuse to make concessions to
t rorists.

• We regard state-sponsored ter-
r ism as a menace to all nations and
'P imote cooperation among states on
f .ctical measures to track down,

a est, and prosecute terrorists.

• We encourage international

c iperation in isolating terrorist states
t make it clear that costs will be
i oosed on those states that support or
f ilitate the use of terror.

Implementing these guidelines will
tt be easy. There are no magic solu-
tns or quick fixes; and, as in all situa-
t ns where human lives are at stake,
t ^re are political complexities and
I >ral dilemmas that cannot be wished
■ay. But, bilaterally and multilaterally,
' are working at home and abroad in
r war against terrorism. We are in
is war for the duration, and we are
tt'iniined to win.

Syrian Support

for International Terrorism: 1983-86

'f^ress release 260 of Dec. 11, 1986.

Thefolloicing docutnoits were
prepared by the Office oftheAmbdSKdilur
at Large for Counter-Terrorism and
made available December 5. 19S6. The
chronology of selected terrorist incidents
by Syrian-suppor'ted groups is not
intended to be all-inclusive but is illus-
trative of Syria's involvement in and
support for terrorism and terrorist
groups. The groups cited in this
chronology have links with Syria.

New evidence of Syrian support for and
direct involvement in international ter-
rorism has been brought to light in two
recent trials including the conviction in
Great Britain of Nizar Hindawi for the
attempted bombing of an El Al civilian
airplane with 375 passengers aboard.

Syria clearly has a long record of
involvement in terrorism. Syria is one of
the "charter members" of countries on
the U.S. Goverment's terrorism list,
which was first compiled in 1979.'

The pattern of Syrian activity in sup-
port of terrorism has varied. From the
mid-1970s through 1983, Syrian per-
sonnel are known to have been directly
involved in terrorist operations. These
operations were primarily directed
against other Arabs such as Syrian
dissidents, moderate Arab states such as
Jordan, and pro- Arafat Palestinians, as
well as Israeli and Jewish targets. In
1982, for example, a car bomb exploded
in front of the offices of a Lebanese-
owned, pro-Iraqi newspaper in down-
town Paris, killing one person and injur-
ing scores of others. France later
expelled two Syrian diplomats and
ordered its ambassador home for
consultations.

By late 1983, Damascus had cur-
tailed use of its own personnel. Instead,
it began to rely more heavily on terrorist
groups made up of non-Syrians who have
bases and training facilities in Syria and
Syrian-occupied areas of Lebanon. The
most notorious of these is the Abu Nidal
organization.

Available evidence indicates that
Syria prefers to support groups whose
activities are generally in line with
Syrian objectives rather than to select
targets or control operations itself.
Damascus utilizes these groups to attack
or intimidate enemies and opponents and
to exert its influence in the region. Yet
at the same time, it can disavow
knowledge of their operations. Such

Syrian-supported groups have carried
out scores of attacks against Palestinian
and other Arab, Turkish, Israeli, and
Western targets during the past 3 years.

In 1986, investigations into major
incidents have revealed another change
in Syrian activities: that Syria has not
abandoned its willingness to be directly
involved in terrorist attacks. The British
trial and investigation of the abortive El
Al bombing exposed the direct involve-
ment of President Assad's intelligence
services. And the trial concerning the
bombing of the German-Arab Friendship
Union in West Berlin revealed the
involvement of Syrian officials. To a
large degree, Syria had been successful
ill covering its tracks. Now, however, in
Britain and Berlin, evidence of more
direct Syrian involvement has emerged.

London and Berlin Investigations

In the British investigation of the
aborted El Al attack, Hindawi told
British police he was recruited by
Haitham Said, an aide to Major General
al-Khuli, chief of Syrian Air F'orce intel-
ligence. According to the evidence
presented at the trial, al-Khuli's
operatives: (1) supplied Hindawi, a Jor-
danian, with a Syrian passport; (2) gave
him $12,000 and promised him more
money when he completed his mission to
plant a bomb aboard an El Al civilian
airliner; (3) provided him with the bomb
which was carried into London aboard
the Syrian Arab Airlines, which also
gave him SAA crew member hotel
accommodations; and (4) trained him in
the bomb's use.

Hindawi tried to use his pregnant
girlfriend as the unwitting carrier of the
sophisticated bomb which was built into
her carry-on bag. If an alert security
official had not spotted the device after
her bag cleared an earlier check, 37.5
innocent persons, including some 230
Americans, would have perished.

After the April 17 plan failed,
according to evidence presented at the
trial, Hindawi followed instructions to go
to the Syrian Embassy, where he was
greeted by the ambassador and hidden in
a Syrian safehouse in London. British
press reports of the investigation say
Britain also has evidence that the Syrian
Ambassador in London was personally

sbruary 1987

TERRORISM

involved several months before the
attempted bombing in recruiting
Hindawi for Syrian intelligence.

In West Berlin, Hindawi's brother,
Ahmad Hasi, and another Arab, Farouk
Salameh, were convicted for the March
29 bombing of the German-Arab Friend-
ship Union in West Berlin in which 11
persons were injured. In a sworn state-
ment, Hasi said he picked up this bomb
at the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin
from a senior Syrian Air Force intel-
ligence officer, Haitham Said, and a
Syrian explosives expert was sent from
Damascus to repair the device after it
twice failed to explode.

Abu Nidal

Syria continues to support the most
active and brutal international terrorist
group operating today, Abu Nidal. ^
Although Abu Nidal now also receives
backing and support from Libya and
sanctuary in Eastern Europe, Damascus
had provided Abu Nidal with important
logistical support ever since the group
moved from Iraq in 1983. Syria allows
Abu Nidal's group to maintain training
camps in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, an
area under the control of the Syrian
Armed Forces. Syria provides the group
with travel documents and permits its
operatives to transit freely through
Damascus when departing on missions.
Syria continues to permit operation of
Abu Nidal facilities in Damascus. (The
Syrian Government asserts that the sole
function of these facilities is limited to
cultural and political affairs.)

Although the December 1985 attack
on Rome's airport was committed under
Libyan sponsorship, the surviving
member of the four-man terrorist team,
according to reports on the Italian
investigation, told investigators the team
was trained in Syrian-occupied areas of
Lebanon. The team then traveled to
Damascus, where it remained while final
preparations were made for the attack in
which 16 civilians and 3 terrorists were
killed.

In Ankara on November 6, Turkish
prosecuters issued an indictment accus-
ing six Palestinians working for the Abu
Nidal organization of killing a Jordanian
diplomat in July 1985. The indictment
also linked the men with four other
actions, including the September 6,
1986, attack on an Istanbul synagogue
killing 21 persons, a 1983 attempt to
place a bomb on an Alitalia flight, and
the attempted car bombing of a U.S.
officers' club in Izmir in 1983.

The Abu Nidal organization's move
to Syria in 1983 was followed by a

dramatic increase in the group's ter-
rorist attacks: more than a dozen attacks
in 1984 and twice that number in 1985.
More than half of the 1985 attacks
occurred in Western Europe, including
attacks on British tourists at hotels in
Athens. When King Hussein launched
his February 1985 peace initiative, Jor-
dan became a major target. But when
Jordanian-Syrian relations began to
warm in mid-1985, attacks on Jordanians
at home and abroad diminished.

In its dealings with Western coun-
tries, Syria has consistently tried to play
down the importance of its connection
with Abu Nidal and has denied permit-
ting his group to engage in terrorist
activity. However, there is no evidence
that Damascus has actually restrained
Abu Nidal's activities (Abu Nidal train-
ing camps in the Syrian-conti'olled Bekaa
Valley continue to operate, for example)
or cut back on other forms of support.
Although it may not know about every
operation, given the amount and nature
of Syrian support, Damascus could influ-
ence and constrain the Abu Nidal
group's activities in Syria and Syrian-
controlled areas of Lebanon if it chose to
do so.

Other Syrian-Supported
Palestinian Groups

Syria also provides varying amounts of
support to other radical Palestinian
groups. These include Saiqa, which is
under total Syrian control; the Abu
Musa group, now almost totally depend-
ent on Damascus; the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine— General
Command (PFLP-GC); and the Marxist
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), which now maintains
its principal base in Damascus.

In all, Syrian-sponsored groups,
including the Abu Nidal organization,
were linked to about 30 terrorist attacks
during 1985, a quarter of them in Greece
alone. The Abu Musa group announced
from Damascus its responsibility for
another attempt to bomb an El Al
airliner, in Madrid on June 26, 1986. The
suspect in that attempt has admitted
being a member of the group. Two
weeks later, other groups supported by
Syria, the PFLP, and the Lebanese
Syrian Social Nationalist Party attemp-
ted an attack on an Israeli resort town
on July 10, 1986.

Support for Non-Palestinian Terrorists

In addition to the radical Palestinian
groups, a variety of other terrorists have
facilities and received terrorist training

in Syria or Syrian-controlled areas of
Lebanon: the Japanese Red Army, tht
Kurdish Labor Party, the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASALA), and the Pakistani
al Zulfikar. In addition, the Lebanese
Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)
based in the Lebanese village of
Qubayyat, within the area of Syrian cc
trol in Lebanon.

To these groups must be added tht
individual international terrorists who
frequent Damascus. Bruno Breguet, ai
associate of Carlos, the international
terrorist, was arrested in Paris in
February 1982 for transporting arms
and explosives. Later released, he was
recently sighted on a flight to Damasci>
met on arrival by Syrian authorities, ai
escorted through the airport without
having to pass through the normal con-
trols. Evidence exists that Frederic
Oriach, a militant member of the Frenw
Action Directe, spent July and August
1986 in Damascus pursuing ideological
and military studies.

Casualties and Control

Attacks by Syrian-supported groups
since 1983 have killed or wounded near»
500 people.

Syrian-supported groups have
attacked U.S. facilities in the Middle
East over 10 times since 1983. In Jords
in 1985, for example, the Syrian-
sponsored Jordanian People's Revolu-
tionary Party attempted two anti-U.S.
attacks. Bombs were found at the homi.
of an employee of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) and a
the American Center for Oriental
Studies. These operations, as well as
others aimed against Jordanian targets
have halted since the Syrian-Jordanian
rapprochement late in 1985— under-
scoring Syria's ability, if it wishes, to
control its surrogates' activities and to
severely curb the capability of those to
whom it provided safe haven and
support.

This has been acknowledged by a to
Syrian official who tried to dismiss, in a
Washington Post press interview in
September 1986, evidence that Abu
Nidal's group was involved in terrorist
attacks. Syrian Foreign Minister Faroul
Charaa said in discussing the actions of
the Abu Nidal group: "Whoever knows
my government must realize that such
attacks could not be carried out without
its awareness."

Department of State Bulletli

TERRORISM

RONOLOGY

vember 26: West Berlin. A court
ivicted two Arabs for the March 29
nbing of the German-Arab Friendship
ion which injured 1 1 persons. In a
orn statement, one of the defendants.
mad Hasi, said he picked up the bomb
a'the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin
f m a Syrian Air Force intelligence
oicer. Hasi is a brother of Nizar
} idawi, who was convicted in a British
at for the attempted bombing of an
: Al airliner.

November 6: Turkey. Turkish prose-
c ors issued an indictment accusing six
Festinians working for the Abu Nidal
o:anization of killing a Jordanian
diomat in July 1985. An arrest warrant
8 3 was issued for the Syrian Embassy
S'ond Secretary. Mohammed Darwichi.

V 0 was one of the original defendants
a i left Turkey. The indictment also

Ij ced members of the group with four
0 er actions: the September 6, 1986,
aack on an Istanbul synagogue which
k ed 22 persons; an attempt to place a
b nb on an Alitalia flight in 1983; the
a smpted car bombing of a U.S.

0 cers' club in Izmir in 1983; and the
k ing of a Palestinian student in
Aarain 1982.

June 26: Madrid. A Spaniard
a empted to board an El Al flight with a
S tease bomb, apparently without know-
i: it. The suspect arrested by Spanish
J ice carried a Syrian passport. A
s ikesman for the Abu Musa group,

V ich is almost totally dependent on

1 mascus, claimed responsibility for

p nting the bomb, although the Syrian
( v'ernment denied involvement.

April 17: London. El Al security
c 'overed a Syrian-made bomb in the
!'• gage of an Irish woman as she
a empted to board a plane for Tel Aviv.
I British court found her boyfriend,
} ;ar Hindawi, guilty of the attempted
I nbing, and the British Government
a lounced that it had conclusive evi-
c ice of Syrian official involvement in
t' terrorist act.

March 2: West Bank. Two gunmen
a.assinated the Mayor of Nablus, Zafer
aWasri, a Palestinian appointed by
I ael. Both the Abu Nidal group and the
f pular Front for Liberation of Pales-
t e (PFLP) claimed responsibility.

■!.5

1 cember 27: Rome and Vienna. Abu

lal terrorists simultaneously attacked
A\ ticket counters in the Rome and

Vienna airports, killing more than 20
people, including five Americans, and
wounding some 120 others. (Although
these attacks were committed under
Libyan sponsorship, reports on the
Italian investigation indicate that the
Rome terrorist team received training in
Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and
passed through Damascus.)

September 30: Netherlands. A
small bomb damaged the El Al office of
Amsterdam. Fatah Revolutionary
Council— the Abu Nidal group's official
name— claimed responsibility.

September 25: Italy. A bomb
exploded in a British Airways office in
Rome, injuring 15 people. Police
arrested Hassan Itab fleeing the scene.
Itab claimed he was a member of the
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist
Moslems, an Abu Nidal "cover" name,
and was later identified by witnesses as
the same man who threw a grenade at
the Jordanian airline office in Athens on
March 21.

September 18: Greece. Michel
Nimri, a Jordanian magazine publisher
and reportedly a personal friend of Yasir
Arafat, was assassinated in Athens.
Black September, a name used by the
Abu Nidal group, claimed responsibility
the next day.

September 16: Italy. A grenade
attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe injured
38 tourists, including nine Americans.
Police arrested a Palestinian in connec-
tion with the attack. The Revolutionary
Organization of Socialist Moslems,
another Syrian-linked group, claimed
responsibility on September 19.

September 3: Greece. Terrorists
threw hand grenades that wounded 19
British tourists at the Glyfada Hotel in
Athens. Black September claimed the
attack was to pressure the Greek
authorities to release a man arrested
near the Jordanian Embassy on
August 31.

August 8: Greece. A bomb exploded
in the kitchen of the London Hotel in
Athens, injm-ing 13 people— nine of them
British subjects. The Revolutionary
Organization of Socialist Moslems
claimed responsibility, contending the
hotel was a "hideout" for British spies.

July 24: Turkey. The First
Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy in
Ankara was assassinated by a lone gun-
man. The incident was claimed by Black
September.

July 11: Kuwait. Two bombs
exploded within minutes of each other
killing 8 people and injuring 89 in two
cafes about 10 kilometers apart. The
Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed
responsibility.

July 1: Spain. A bomb exploded at
the British Airways ticket office in
Madrid, also damaging the TWA office
upstairs. The ALIA Royal Jordanian
Airlines ticket office nearby was hit by
automatic weapons fire and two
grenades that failed to explode. One per-
son was killed, and 27 were wounded.
Claimed by Organization of the
Oppressed, Revolutionary Organization
of Socialist Moslems, and Black
September.

April 4: Greece. A rocket was fired
at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking
off from Athens airport. The projectile
hit the plane but did not explode. Black
September claimed responsibility.

April 3: Italy. A rocket narrowly
missed the Jordanian Embassy on the
fifth floor of an office building in Rome.
No casualties were reported. Black
September claimed responsibility.

March 21: Italy. Three unidentified
men threw hand grenades into a Jordan-
ian airline office in Rome, injuring two
people. Black September claimed
responsibility.

March 21: Greece. An unidentified
man threw a hand grenade into the
Jordanian airline office in Athens, injur-
ing three people. Claimed by Black
September. (See September 25, 1985,
incident.)

March 21: Cyprus. An unidentified
man threw two hand grenades into the
Jordanian airline office in Nicosia.
Claimed by Black September.

March 9: United Arab Emirates. A
bomb was found on a Jordanian airliner.
The young Palestinian who carried the
bomb onto the Karachi-to-Amman flight
said he thought he was transporting
drugs to support Abu Nidal terrorist
operations.

February 22: Jordan. The Jordanian
Peo])le's Revolutionary Party placed a
bomb at the American Center for Orien-
tal Research in Amman. The bomb was
found and defused.

January 10: Jordan. A bomb
planted by the Jordanian Peo|)le's
Revolutionary Party was defused near
an AID employee's home. The explosives
had neither a power source nor a timing
device.

1984

December 29: Jordan. Two unidentified
gunmen assassinated Fah al-Qawasmeh,
a member of the PLO Executive Com-
mittee and former mayor of Hebron, out-
side his home in Amman. Two witnesses
to the shooting were injured by gunfire
as they tried to block the assassins' flee-
ing vehicle. Black September claimed
responsibility.

■bruary 1987

TERRORISM

December 14: Italy. Ismail Darwish,
a leading military figure in the Fatah
movement, was gunned down on a Rome
street by an unidentified man who fled
on a waiting motor scooter. Arab
Revolutionary Brigades claimed
responsibility.

December 4: Romania. The Deputy
Chief of Mission of the Jordanian
Embassy was shot and killed as he was
getting into his car in Bucharest. Black
September claimed responsibility.

December 2: Jordan. A guard
discovered a bomb concealed in an
attache case inside the American Life
Insurance and Citibank building in
Amman. Bomb technicians defused the
device, which contained 18 blocks of
TNT and a timer. The Jordanian
People's Revolutionary Party was later
determined to be responsible.

October 4: Cyprus. A car bomb
exploded behind the Israeli Embassy in
Nicosia, slightly injuring one person.
Claimed by Abu Musa's Fatah dissident
organization.

August 13: Jordan. Jordanian police
defused a l)omb consisting of several
hundred grams of Soviet-made explo-
sives near the residence of a U.S.
Embassy official. The Jordanian People's
Revolutionary Party was later deter-
mined to be responsible.

August 11: Jordan. Members of the
Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party
tried to set off a bomb outside the Jordan-
ian radio and television station. The
bomb was discovered and defused.

August 3: Jordan. A bomb exploded
under a water truck parked near the
U.S. Embassy warehouse in Amman.
There were no casualties and only minor
damage. The Abu Nidal group claimed
responsibility.

May 29: Cyprus. A former Saiqa
officer who had switched his allegiance
to Arafat, Abdullah Ahmad Suleiman el
Saadi, was murdered in Limassol. Four
Syrian men and two women were
arrested for the murder and subse-
quently deported from Cyprus.

May 3: Cyprus. An unidentified man
shot and killed Palestinian publisher
Hanna Muqbil and wounded his
secretary in Nicosia. Muqbil was
reportedly a former member of Abu
Nidal who had defected to Arafat's
camp.

March 24: Jordan. A bomb was
defused outside the British Consulate in
Amman. The Abu Nidal group claimed
responsibility.

March 24: Jordan. A liomb was
discovered and defused outside the
British cultural center. The Abu Nidal
group claimed responsibility.

March 24: Jordan. A bomb exploded
in the parking lot of the Intercontinental
Hotel, which is across the street from
the U.S. Embassy, damaging two
vehicles and slightly injuring an AID
employee and his daughter. A second
bomb was discovered in the parking lot
and defused. The Abu Nidal group
claimed responsibility.

1983

December 29: Spain. Two Jordanian
Embassy employees were attacked by a
lone gunman as they were leaving the
embassy. 'Walid Jamal Balkis was killed
instantly and Ibrahim Sami Mohammed
was seriously wounded. The Arab
Revolutionary Brigades claimed
responsibility.

December 19: Turkey. A car bomb
was discovered in an abandoned rental
car midway between the French Cultural
House and the Cordon Hotel used by
American military personnel in Izmir.
The bomb's timer apparently malfunc-
tioned. Turkish police linked the Abu
Nidal group and Syrian agents to the
incident.

November 7: Greece. Two security
guards of the Jordanian Embassy were
wounded on a crowded street in Athens.
One of the two victims died from his
wounds. The Arab Revolutionary
Brigades claimed responsibility.

October 26: Italy. The Jordanian
Ambassador to the Vatican and his
driver were wounded in an assassination
attempt in Rome. The Arab Revolution-
ary Brigades claimed responsibility.

October 25: India. The Jordaniar
Ambassador was wounded by an
unknown assailant in New Delhi.
Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary
Brigades.

October 13: Jordan. Two hand
grenades were thrown into a police b;
racks in Amman. A member of the po e
recruited by Saiqa confessed to the
attack. Local authorities suspected th
Abu Nidal elements may also have be^
involved.

August 21: Greece. A high-level
PLO official, Ma'mum Muraysh, was
shot and killed by two unidentified m;
on a motorcycle. The victim's son and s
driver were wounded. The Movement r
Rebuilding Fatah claimed responsibili

April 10: Portugal. The PLO
observer to an international confereni
of socialists, Isam al-Sartawi, was shd
to death in a hotel lobby. Sartawi's
secretary was slightly wounded in the
attack. The Abu Nidal group claimed
responsibility.

January 1: Israel. A grenade atta
on a civilian bus in Tel Aviv injured U
Both Saiqa and Abu Nidal claimed
responsibility.

'Countries currently on the list are Syi
Libya, Iran, South Yemen, and Cuba.

-The official name of the Abu Nidal
organization is "Fatah Revolutionary Com
cil." It is headed by Sabri al-Banna, a Pale:
ian who uses the nam de guerre Abu Nidal
The group's original name was the Black
June Organization when it was formed in
1976. Ironically, this group first concentra
on Syrian targets, including an attack on
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam (now Vi
President) in 1977. ■

Department of State Bulle;

IITED NATIONS

Administration and Finances

■ 'rrnon A. Walters

Si:iteme)!t in a plenary session of the
ill neral Assembly on October 15.

Ambassador Walters is U.S. Per-
. "/ Representative to the United

1 'iiited Nations is at a critical junc-
It is facing a crisis of reform, the
I auses of which are poHtical and
aucratic. We have made clear that
roncern about the United Nations
resulting criticisms of some of its
ills retlect our deep-seated attach-
t to the ideals of the organization.
_: founders of the United Nations
osaw a true international community
n hich governments would join
:o ther to serve the rights, needs, and
IS rations of their people. There must
« 0 doubt that the United States
•eiins committed to the original goals
ir ideals of the United Nations.

During this 41st session of the
j( jral Assembly, we member states of
:h Jnited Nations have the unique
T irtunity to contribute to the
ilers' dream. President Reagan said
s September 22nd speech that if we
lis session of the General Assembly
a take advantage of this opportunity
\r achieve the reforms required, the
III States, "which has always given
iiited Nations generous support,
I'l'iitinue to play a leading role in the
i t to achieve its noble purposes."

This reform crisis was uppermost in
h Tiinds of member states last year
n the General Assembly adopted,
.V out a vote, the resolution which
« Wished the Group of 18 to review the
I'licy of the administrative and
filial functioning of the United
.Nitons. The group's report and its
■p inmendations represent the culmina-
nt' a year of extensive discussion and
iileration of alternatives, in order to
k nut a common position on what
i- to be done to revitalize the United

'illS.

Like other member states, the
'I ted States entered this search for
rill with major objectives in mind.
t riearly, our domestic law called for
iiU" rights on budgetary matters pro-
innate to member states' contribu-
s to correct the current gross imbal-
' lietween those who dominate the
sinnmaking process in determining
ui't levels and program priorities and
f who bear the heaviest financial
Hiiisibility for the organization. We
itt'd a means to instill control and

discipline in the General Assembly's
practice of approving unending add-ons
to the budget, which denigrates the role
of the Secretary General and makes a
mockery of the overall program planning
and budgeting process. We wanted
major staff reductions to eliminate waste
and ensure a reordering of priorities
within the organization. These we
believe are required to achieve efficiency
and effectiveness. We wanted a major
streamlining and simplification of the
Secretariat structure in order to over-
come duplication and fragmentation of
effort.

It is both a tribute to the spirit of
cooperation that prevailed in the Group
of 18 and an indication of the obvious
nature of the problems confronting the
organization that the group was able to
agree on so many specific recommenda-
tions for change. These recommenda-
tions cover all major aspects of the UN
work and structure: the intergovernmen-
tal bodies; the Secretariat; the conditions
of employment of the staff; and the
means of evaluating the organization's
programs. They reflect the widespread
belief among member states that this
house can and should be run more effi-
ciently and economically.

In so wide a variety of recommenda-
tions, it is inevitable that some will be
more significant than others, and some
will be very general while others will be
quite specific. It is also inevitable that
individual delegations will support some
recommendations more enthusiastically
than others. This was the case within the
Group of 18 and will be no less the case
here in the General Assembly.

In the same way that the members
of the group were able to put aside their
individual preferences and lend their
endorsement to the full range of pro-
posals in the interest of improving the
functioning of the United Nations, the
United States believes that member
states must put aside their differences
on minor aspects of the recommenda-
tions in the first five chapters of the
report and concentrate on implementing
them in the most effective manner. The
agreed recommendations of the G-18
would eliminate a great deal of the
waste, mismanagement, and irrespon-
sibility which now drain so much of the
UN's limited resources and erode donor
confidence in the institution. Of critical
importance to us among the agreed
recommendations is the call for staff
reductions. We believe still greater
reductions would have better assured the
necessary reordering of program

priorities, but we can accept the reduc-
tions recommended by the G-18 as a
good start.

Unfortunately, the Group of 18 could
not reach agreement on the recommen-
dations in Chapter 6 on the program and
budget decisionmaking process. The
recommendations in this chapter are at
the heart of the reform effort. Indeed, it
is these recommendations which are
required to assure the fulfillment and
long-term effectiveness of those recom-
mendations upon which the Group of 18
was able to reach agreement. If we are
to find a solution to the key question of
the program budget procedures, we
must first understand clearly the dif-
ferent viewpoints and the reasons they
exist.

For a number of years, the member
states which contribute the bulk of the
organization's budget have, as the
Secretary General has pointed out,
opposed or abstained on the votes
approving the biennial budgets. There is
a belief among these member states that
the majority has not adequately con-
sidered their views when deciding how
much the organization should spend and
on what it should be spent. On the other
hand, there is concern among a number
of member states that a new decision
process which requires agreement liy all
member states could bring the operation
of the United Nations to a standstill. In
plain terms, there is a lack of
understanding and a lack of confidence
among different groups of member
states concerning the motives of other
groups. It is my view that the United
Nations cannot continue to function in
this fashion. Rather, we must seek a
solution in which the interests of all
member states can be protected.

It is my delegation's strong belief
that the solution lies in establishing a
process that will include agreement on
the level and content of the organiza-
tion's program budget at the very begin-
ning of the cycle and an ability on the
part of member states to ensure that
this agreement has been taken into
account in the budget. We recall that
both of the committees currently
involved in the program budget
process— the Committee for Program
and Coordination and the Advisory Com-
mittee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions— have traditionally taken their
decisions by consensus, and we believe
that consensus decisionmaking is the
only appropriate approach to the key
decisions to be entrusted to the new
mechanism.

The United States supports, at an
absolute minimum, the establishment of
a program and budget decisionmaking

f.liruary 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

mechanism which would operate on the
basis of consensus in establishing both
an agreed budget level and clear-cut
priorities for the organization within
that level. The United States is
prepared, in the spirit of compromise, to
accept the chairman's version of Chapter
6, since it does establish such a program
and budget committee based on consen-
sus. There should, however, be no
misunderstanding on this point by the
membership. Chairman Vraalsen's pro-
posal represents a major compromise for
the United States, as it does for other
member states. We are reassured to see
that support for the chairman's version
of Chapter 6 reaches well beyond the
usual North-South division on such
issues.

In my time at the United Nations, I
have found that this organization of
member states is also an organization of
individuals— of delegates and Secretariat
personnel. We have the ability to discuss
issues of great importance and complex-
ity with one another. We are facing now
a set of critical decisions at a critical
time in the life of the United Nations. It
will take all our political and technical
skills and abilities to find the solution,
but I believe the solution is there if we
are willing to work for it.

If the agreed recommendations of
the G-18 report are enacted hand-in-
hand with the establishment of a pro-
gram and budget decisionmaking
mechanism operating on the basis of con-
sensus, the organization's ability to live
up to the goals in the Charter— to fulfill
the hopes of the peoples of the United
Nations, particularly the poorest and
most defenseless— will be measurably
increased. We must not sacrifice the
possibilities of the future to the narrow,
vested interests of the moment. What
some fear as an instance of threatening
change, we can and must convert into a
period of practical improvement and
structural renovation. What some see
only as a time of crisis, we can and must
make into an era of renewal. Our efforts
at promoting reform are devoted to
restoring and strengthening the impor-
tant contributions that the United
Nations has to make to international
peace, freedom, and progress. The ques-
tion before us, therefore, is how at this
session to convert into action our com-
mitment to reform.

Visit of Haiti President Namphy

'USUN press release 112.

President Henri Namphy of the
Republic of Haiti made a private visit to
the United States November 20-22, 1986,
to meet with President Reagayi and other
government officials.

Following is the White House state-
ment on the two Presidents' meeting of
November 21.^

The President today met with Henri
Namphy, President of the National
Council of the Government of Haiti, in
the Oval Office. President Namphy later
met with Vice President Bush.

The President discussed the political
and economic situation in Haiti with
General Namphy, devoting particular
attention to the increased U.S.
assistance program, the need to develop
the Haitian private sector through
foreign investment, the protection of
individual rights and freedoms, and the
long-term development needs of Haiti in
the areas of education and literacy,
health, agi'iculture, and environment.

President Reagan expressed his firm
support for General Namphy's efforts to
build democratic institutions and achieve
the goal of a working democracy over
the next 15 months.

In connection with General Nam-
phy's visit, the U.S. and Haitian Govern-
ments have agreed to launch a major

training initiative for Haiti. The Trair g
for Development Project will make
available $10 million over the next .5
years for training educational institu-
tions of over 100 Haitian technicians,
administrators, medical personnel, an
business professionals in America.

The total U.S. aid package was al
discussed by the two leaders. Haiti is e
of the very few countries where, desj
an overall reduction in U.S. assistance
levels this year, U.S. aid will increase
an increase of 25% to just over $100
million. The U.S. Government is also
working with other international don(
and with the private sector to assure
adequate, overall external support for
Haiti's democratization process.

During his visit to Washington
General Namphy also had meetings w
Secretary of State George Schultz am
AID [Agency for International Develc
ment] Administrator Peter McPhersoi

President Namphy described the
progress achieved so far in implement ;
the 2-year political calendar that calls •
a referendum on a new constitution in
February 1987; local, legislative, and
presidential elections during 1987; anr
the inauguration of a duly elected pre.'
dent in February 1988.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 24, 1986. I

Department of State Bull*

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

fcpanding Freedom:

^Formula for Growth in the Americas

:"ring are the texts of an address by
,it Abrams. Assistant Secretary for
'American Affairs, before the
H'littiori of American Chambers of
nierce in Latin America in Rio de
irii. Brazil, on October 30. 1986. and
iHiper by Paul D. Taylor. Deputy
sliint Secretary for Inter-American
IIS. that was presented to the Con-
M I on the Political Implications of
.•itinAynerican Foreign Debt
r i:ed by the Institute for European-
.: American Relations and the Cor-
1 Kin de Investigaciones Economicos
l.atinoamerica in Madrid. Spain.
i..;mber2, 1986.

)RESS BY MR. ABRAMS,
.( . 30. 1986

1 ieve it is especially appropriate for
•V 0 be speaking today in Brazil,
■€ use my theme of political and
■c omic change sweeping Latin

I i-ica is nowhere more vividly
.rated.

Wtical and Economic
:ingein the 1980s

n 1980s have been a period of pro-
'o d change in the Western
H< lisphere. A moral and intellectual
■e lution is underway throughout the
A.' 'ricas. Little by little, country by
ti-y, we are in the process of rede-
ig the role of the state in order to
in jase both political and economic
CTi dom.

The revolution has been most evi-
ii -, in the political sphere. Since 1979.
ii: itorships or military regimes have
re iquished power to democratically
^1' ted governments in Ecuador. Peru.
via. Argentina. Brazil, and Uruguay
'iuth America and in El Salvador,
,:i(la, Guatemala, and Honduras in
I aribbean Basin. Today, 91% of the
ilation of Latin America live under
Kiocratic regimes.
The revolution may be less evident in
economic changes that have taken
I', but it is no less palpable. In the
ted States, tax reduction and deregu-
m have increased economic freedom,
tliis has contributed to the longest
ud of growth since the end of the
S end World War.

At the same time, Latin America is
undertaking the first steps of what we
hope may become a transition from
state-dominated economic systems to
more market-oriented economies. There
are many examples of this idea:

• Mexico sold or closed 23 public
sector enterprises in recent months;

• Argentina signed the first con-
tracts under its program to open up its
energy sector to exploration by foreign
investors; and

• Chile is working to solve the prob-
lem of debt by encouraging foreign
private investment and debt/equity
swaps.

This redefinition of the economy is
overcoming statist stagnation and
mobilizing resources for vibrant growth
and development.

Political Transformation

Let me start with the political trans-
formation of Latin America.

The state must have enough power
to govern, but it also must be restrained
enough to maintain individual freedom.
The search for the appropriate balance
has preoccupied thinkers from Aristotle
to the authors of the Federalist Papers.

In the United States, it is axiomatic
that the power of the state often works
against the freedom of the individual.
Opposition to government abuse has
been a key element running through
U.S. politics from our rebellion against
the British to Watergate.

In Latin America, in contrast to our
own traditions, from the days of the
hierarchical Indian societies, which were
replaced by a similarly hierarchical
colonial system, the people have looked
to the state for the care of the individ-
ual. The state has been the means to
assert public standards of conduct and
morality over private interests.

We in the United States have placed
our faith in the individual and structured
our political systems to maximize per-
sonal freedom. Latin Americans have
been influenced by a history fraught
with instability and political upheaval.
This has reinforced the colonial inher-
itance of centralized systems which are
aimed at protecting the individual from
the hazards of political chaos. Thus the
state has come to have a much larger

role in society than can be justified by
the demands of efficiency, equity, or
democracy today. And many Latin
Americans are recognizing this.

Economic Transition

There is a similar, although less obvious,
transformation occurring in the
economies of the hemisphere. The state
must be large enough to create the con-
ditions for economic prosperity to
benefit all its citizens. But if the state
becomes too large and unwieldy, it can
stifle individual initiative and growth.

More must be done to reduce the
role of the state and free up Latin
American economies. This means sub-
stantial deregulation, reduction of state
involvement in production of goods and
services, and, more broadly, a change in
the perception of the role of the state.
Rather than serving as the direct
guarantor of social welfare, the state
must act to create an environment con-
ducive to economic growth.

In the last 2 years. Latin American
governments have taken steps away
from the excessive statism, market
intervention, and import substitution
economic models they have relied upon
for decades. The debt crisis has forced
governments to the realization that it is
impossible to sustain double-digit fiscal
deficits through excessive borrowing.

The debt crisis, as difficult as it has
been, has served as the impetus for
change, as an incentive to adopt better
economic policies. Today, in contrast to
the latter part of the 1970s and even the
early part of the 1980s, more realistic
exchange rates prevail, current accounts
are in better balance, and unsupportable
fiscal deficits are being reduced. The
long-term objective should be truly free
markets— with the state protecting no
special interests but. instead, promoting
free markets as mechanisms for gaining
and protecting the individual's
autonomy.

Often Latin American clerics or
intellectuals say to me. "We reject
capitalism." My reply is. you have never
seen capitalism. You have seen a kind of
interlocking directorate of politicians,
regulators, bureaucrats, and business-
men controlling an economy, serving a
wide variety of special interests, and
restraining growth and competition.
Their power grows, and their wealth
may grow, but that is not the free
market, and it is a system ultimately
incapable of using resources with max-
imum efficiency, creating opportunity,
and spreading the benefits of growth to
all the people. Free markets protect no

fMuary 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

vested interests, as our own deregula-
tion process in the United States lias
proved, but they offer fairness, oppor-
tunity, and growth for Latin Americans
who today see a bleak economic future.
To Latin Americans who seek radical
solutions to their economic problems, I
have one to offer— the most radical: not
more regulation or more state control,
which are not radical but traditional in
Latin America, but less. Let political
freedom nurture and be nurtured by
economic freedom. If a citizen can freely
choose his president, let him freely
choose his medicine or his car. As
millions of men and women around the
world have seen, a free economy can
defeat misery, and it can grow. And
surely growth is the goal on which we
can all agree.

U.S. Policies To Encourage and
Support Economic Reform

U.S. policy initiatives have encouraged
reforms which promote greater eco-
nomic freedom. When we met in Caracas
last year, I described U.S. policy for
dealing with debt-related problems, the
Program for Sustained Growth. On
September 8 of this year, Mexico
reached agreement in (irinciple with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a
program that fits within the context of
this program.

The newly concluded Mexican finan-
cial package includes the three key
elements of the Program for Sustained
Growth.

First, new policies to promote
growth;

Second, new international credit led
by the IMF and the World Bank; and

Third, net new credit from the com-
mercial banks over the next 3 years.

Mexico's proposed structural
reforms will make the Mexican economy
more efficient and competitive. They
combine fiscal measures to reduce the
public sector deficit and a commitment
to conduct prudent monetary and
foreign exchange rate policy with exter-
nal financing to support Mexico as it
undergoes structural change.

Substantial progress has been made
under the strengthened debt strategy in
the last year. The Mexican package,
despite its prominence, is not the only
example of a debtor country undergoing
significant adjustment.

• Efforts to reduce inflation are
underway in Argentina, Bolivia, and
here in Brazil.

• Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador are
seeking to turn more public sector enter-
prises over to private sector ownership
and management.

• Argentina and Colombia have
liberalized their import regimes.

• Colombia and Ecuador have taken
significant steps to increase the market
orientation of their economies by reduc-
ing government interference in many
markets.

These are promising beginnings, but
policy reform does not take place in a
vacuum. The United States is working
with other creditor countries as well as
with debtor countries to improve inter-
national conditions which will offer sup-
port for the reforms.

• We have cooperated to realign
exchange rates to more accurately
reflect underlying economic conditions.
The decline in international interest
rates has provided substantial debt
relief.

• We met with other nations in
Punta del Este in September to launch
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. We agreed there to work
with others to "halt and reverse protec-
tionism" and to develop a more open
multilateral trading system so as to pro-
mote growth and development.

• We also met with many countries
at the IMF/World Bank annual meetings
in September. We support the inter-
national financial institutions in their
efforts to encourage economic reform.

The IMF continues to play a central
role in managing debt problems. When
the programs that are now under discus-
sion are completed, the IMF will have
standby programs or enhanced surveil-
lance arrangements in place with 13 of
the 15 major debtors. The IMF and
World Bank are cooperating closely in
assisting the major debtors to formulate
growth-oriented adjustment programs
within a consistent framework.

The World Bank is playing an
increasingly important role through
emphasis on fast-disbursing loans tied to
adjustment of economic policies as well
as traditional sectoral loans. This is a
major reorientation for the Bank's lend-
ing program.

The Bank negotiated new policy-
based (structural or sectoral) loans for 8
of the 15 major debtors.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative

The United States also has special initia-
tives underway which will provide
greater economic latitude to the private
sector in specific regions.

One element in our broad-scale
effort to promote the private sector is
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). :
centerpiece of the program is prefers!
tial duty-free entry for virtually all pri
ducts imported by the LInited States
from the region. This can be a powerl
incentive for growth and job creation
the CBI countries, but it depends, of
course, on the ability and willingness
the private sector in the countries to
fully exploit these new opportunities.

The U.S. Government also seeks
encoui'age UN bodies, especially
economic and developmental organizi
tions, to avail themselves of the wisdd
and experience of key private sector
organizations. One of the United
Nations' key developmental organiza-i
tions is the Economic Commission foB
Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC). ECLAC plays a significan'
role in formulating and articulating
economic and development policy for
Latin American members.

This past week my colleagues in tt|
Department of State have been discu:
ing with ECLAC, as well as with
Chamber representatives, the possibii
of a program of ongoing consultation:
and cooperation between both organi;
tions. In effect, we would like to see
ECLAC draw on the experience and
counsel of your members when formu ■
ing its developmental strategy. We h<
you will endorse this effort and encoii
age your members and offices to take
advantage of every possible opportun
to work with ECLAC in this endeavo

Conclusion

As business persons in Latin America
you live and work in a moment of cha b
and progress. The all too often stifling
hand of the state is being lifted in cou
try after country— slowly, sometimes
much too slowly, but perceptibly. Fref
elections, press freedom, and free spe i
are being followed by debate and acti(
about economic freedom as well. If tht
trends continue— if the economies are
freed to grow and if the enemies of
political and economic freedom can be
vanquished— the interests of all our
peoples will be served.

Let me close by stressing that poii
"all our peoples." A truly free econoii
provides no favoritism, no elitism, and
no protectionism. It offers incentive,
mobility, and opportunity. It will pro-
duce wealth spread among the many, i
captured by the few. A truly free
economy helps build, and helps presen
a free and open society. And free and

Department of State Bullei

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

in societies are the goal which all of
ho live in the Americas share and
sunt to pass on to our children.

IPER PRESENTED BY
>IR. TAYLOR,
[;C. 2. 1986

Cuses of the Debt Crisis

T; Latin American debt crisis came to
pjlic attention in August 1982 with
fcxico's dramatic announcement that it
ws unable to meet its international
fiincial obligations. While substantial
iiiividual differences among the various
cmtries make it difficult to generalize
amt the causes of the debt crisis, it is

ir that the crisis resulted in large part
. m the pursuit of inappropriate
e nomic policies by many developing
c intries despite changing international
c;;umstances. Overvalued exchange
r es that undermined international
cnpetitiveness and monetization of
u supportable fiscal deficits were major
f tors contributing to the region's
6 nomic and financial problems.

When the industrialized countries
t k steps to adjust their economies to
b her oil prices and inflation, worldwide
e nomic activity contracted. Interest
r es soared, and prices in world com-
r dity markets turned downward. Many

0 'eloping countries— caught by falling
e )ort revenues and rising debt service
c igations— were forced to make dif-

f lit choices in their overall economic
f icies or face destabilizing social and
( itical changes.

Virtually every country in Latin
i lerica reacted to the debt crisis by
a usting its domestic economy. Latin

1 lerican governments cooperated with
t ■ IMF and official and private

c ditors to develop economic programs
£ Dropriate to changing international
ccumstances. Some potential negative
' isequences of the crisis were averted.
e international financial system was
I : disrupted.

These efforts did not prevent the
pbal recession from deepening
t-oughout the region. Living standards
f 1 to the levels that had prevailed in the
iddle 1970s. Declining international
(Timodity prices and, in 1986
'oecially, the drastic decline in oil
' ices have adversely affected producing
untries, with potentially destabilizing
ects. At the same time, an unprece-
nted wave of democratic success has
Ijhlighted our stake in the economic
ibility of Latin America. Growth has

become imperative not only to facilitate
debt service but, as importantly, to
enhance the well-being of Latin
American populations which have suf-
fered declines in living standards from
the levels of the early 1980s.

The International Debt Strategy

The United States and other creditor
countries share with the debtor countries
an interest in resolution of their
economic problems. The debt problem
has, in fact, had one salutary effect in
underscoring the interdependence of the
LTnited States and Latin America. The
LT.S. strategy for dealing with the debt
crisis has been coordinated with other
industrial countries since 1983. That
strategy, based on a case-by-case
approach, emphasizes the need for
economic adjustment in the debtor
countries supported by the international
financial institutions, especially the IMF.
Adjustment also has been supported by
private commercial banks and creditor
governments. Progress toward economic
stabilization has been aided by world-
wide economic recovery with markets
which have remained generally open
despite strong protectionist pressures.
At the 1985 annual meetings of the
IMF and World Bank in Seoul, Korea,
Treasury Secretary [James A.] Baker
proposed a new initiative, the Program
for Sustained Growth, that builds upon
and strengthens the previous strategy.
The U.S. debt initiative contains three
essential and mutually reinforcing
elements:

First, adoption of growth-oriented
macroeconomic and structural reforms
by the debtor countries;

Second, a continued central role for
the IMF in conjunction with an increase
in structural development loans by the
World Bank to support policy reform;
and

Third, when the first and second
elements are in place, new lending by
the commercial banks to support the
reforms and provide the basis for long-
term growth.

At the heart of the debt strategy is a
new emphasis on growth within the
debtor countries as a prerequisite to
reducing debt burdens over time. This
approach has received the strong sup-
port of the international community and
was recently reaffirmed by the IMF
Interim Committee and IMF/World
Bank Development Committee at their
meetings in September.

Although the net new lending in the
strengthened debt strategy may be

Foreign Debt

in Latin America, 1985

Country

Foreign

Interest Payments

Debt in

on the Foreign

Billions of

Debt as a

Dollars

Percentage of
Export Earnings

Argentina

50.0

54.5

Bolivia

3.2

60.0

Brazil

101.9

43.5

Colombia

13.4

23.0

Ctiile

19.6

46.5

Ecuador

7.3

24.5

El Salvador

2.1

14.0

Guatemala

2,5

11.5

Honduras

2.5

17.0

Mexico

97.7

37.0

Nicaragua

4.4

17.0

Panama

5.1

—

Paraguay

1.9

13.0

Peru

13.8

34.5

Uruguay

4.9

35.5

Venezuela

30.3

22.5

Source: UN Economic Commission on Latin

America and the Caribbean

moderate in comparison to the unsus-
tainable levels reached in the period
leading up to the debt crisis, we believe
it can support the adoption of compre-
hensive growth-oriented programs by
the major debtors and, therefore, pro-
vide the foundation for renewed
economic growth.

Prospects for Economic
Reform and Growth

The iinpact of the external debt on the
economies of the region has been aggra-
vated by the economic recession which
began in Latin America in 1981.
Average real gross domestic product
(GDP) for the entire region grew only
1% in 1981 and declined 0.9% in 1982,
compared with average annual growth
rates of 6% in the 1970s. It declined
another 3.1% in 1983 before recovering
with 3.2% growth in 1984. In 1985
growth was 3.7%. On a per capita basis,
the growth rate in 1984 would be less
than 1% and in 1985, 1.5%.

While the debt is a serious problem
and debt service a heavy burden to the
developing countries, other factors—
principally inappropriate domestic
economic policies— have imposed serious
constraints on economic growth and
development. Lack of confidence in
economic policies dried up domestic sav-
ings and investment and led to huge
capital flight. Total capital flight for
Latin America since 1979 is conserv-
atively estimated to have exceeded

iJbruary 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

$100 billion. In recent years capital
flight is estimated to have offset roughly
half of the inflow of new loans. Adverse
external economic developments aggra-
vated the resulting deficits in the bor-
rowing countries' balance of payments.

As economic adjustment has pro-
ceeded, it has been accompanied in Latin
America by a growing recognition that
private initiative and private savings and
investment must be stimulated if there is
to be hope for sustained growth. In the
last 2 years, many Latin American
governments have taken preliminary
steps away from the excessive statism,
market intervention, and import substi-
tution strategies they have relied upon
for decades.

The most important reasons for this
shift are related to their debt situations
and to the Latin Americans' acceptance
of market discipline as they sought
assistance to manage their debt-related
problems and to stimulate their
economies. The debt crisis forced
governments to the realization that it
has been impossible to sustain double-
digit fiscal deficits through excessive
borrowing. International financial insti-
tutions and U.S. policy initiatives also
have encouraged these reforms.

The macroeconomic adjustments and
policy reforms which have been required
by the International Monetary Fund and
private creditors as the price for con-
tinued financial support have been rein-
forced and enhanced by greatly
increased structural adjustment and sec-
toral lending by the World Bank. With
the emphasis on structural adjustment in
the Program for Sustained Growth, plus
a changed outlook in both the debtor
countries and in the World Bank, the
percentage of policy-based lending to the
Latin American region jumped
dramatically.

Most countries have moved to more
realistic exchange rates, expanded
exports, and cut inflation. Reforms in
Argentina. Bolivia, and Brazil, for
example, have cut inflation rates enor-
mously. Of even greater importance for
the longer term, several have begun to
reduce entrenched structural barriers to
growth; specifically, to take steps to
reduce price controls and subsidies, to
liberalize trade, to attack overregulation
and excessive bureaucratic controls, and
to improve the investment climate,
including reducing restrictions on
foreign private investment.

Several key debtor nations have
recognized the heavy structural burden
of inefficient and highly subsidized public
enterprises. These operations siphon off
crucial national savings and sharply

increase external indebtedness. Several
countries have moved to transfer
government-owned industries to private
ownership and management. Mexico, for
example, has made an important begin-
ning in this area. In addition, Argentina,
Chile, and Uruguay are seeking to turn
more state enterprises over to the
private sector.

Other debtor nations have under-
stood that what is best for internal
markets is best for external markets as
well. If correct signals are received from
free markets operating through price
mechanisms, then external commerce is
best regulated, not by governments but
by reliance on price in liberalized trading
regimes. Haiti has converted import
quotas to tariffs, the Dominican Republic
has eliminated many import surcharges,
and Ecuador has sharply reduced duties
on a wide variety of manufactured
imports. The Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations signifies for the United
States an opportunity to eliminate or
reduce trade barriers to the point where
global commerce truly becomes a func-
tion of prices and markets. Mexico's
recent steps to liberalize trade, which
received both IMF and World Bank sup-
port, provided a sound basis for its
accession to the Generalized Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In some important respects, Mex-
ico's comprehensive economic reform
program offers a model for similar pro-
grams in other debtor countries. Mex-
ico's adjustment program combines
structural reforms designed to make the
Mexican economy more efficient and
competitive, fiscal measures designed to
reduce the public sector deficit, a
commitment to conduct prudent mone-
tary and foreign exchange rate policy,
and external financing to support Mexico
as it undergoes structural reform. The
key policy reforms are designed to:

• Increase the efficiency of the
public sector;

• Rationalize the price structure
leading to more market-based prices;

• Reform the tax system;

• Liberalize trade and increase
Mexico's export competitiveness; and

• Improve the environment for
foreign direct investment.

Innovative features of the package
emphasize growth. Additional financing
will be made available over a limited
period if oil prices fall below $9 per
barrel. The IMF has agreed to make
available up to 600 million Special Draw-
ing Rights ($720 million) under the
contingency mechanism. If real growth

falls below 3.5% in 1987, a contingenc
growth fund from the commercial ban
of up to $500 million will be activated.
The IMF also agreed to accept a more
gradual reduction in the fiscal deficit,
and Mexico agr-eed to longer term
adjustment measures.

International Efforts

To Encourage Economic Growth

Since 1982, considerable progress has
been made. Concerns about the interna
tional financial system have been
allayed. Most of the developing countn
have been able to continue servicing
their external debt once adjustments
were made to bring their financial
obligations into line with their ability t
pay. Contributing to these results has
been the decline in international intere
rates— a drop of more than five percen
tage points from the peaks registered i:
mid-1984. Since 1981, the London Inte
Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) has dropped
from 17% to 6%, thereby greatly redu(
ing debt service costs. Each percentagi
point change in interest rates is worth
an estimated net $2 billion a year for tl
eight major Latin American debtors at
their current levels of foreign debt.

The IMF has negotiated new
standby programs or letters of intent
with eight of the major debtors since
October 1985. Two additional program
are now under discussion with Argenti
and Morocco. When these negotiations
are completed, the IMF will have
standby programs or enhanced surveil-
lance arrangements in place with 13 of
the 15 major debtors.

The World Bank is playing an
increasingly important role in the
stimulation of sustainable economic
growth in the debtor countries through
emphasis on policy-based, fast-disbursii
structural adjustment loans and sectors
loans. The World Bank increased aggre
gate lending commitments to the 15
major debtors from $4.4 to $6.1 billion
during its fiscal year which ended
June 30, 1986— an increase of nearly
40%.

It also has negotiated new policy-
based loans for eight of the major
debtors, for a total of about $3 billion.
Discussions are now underway with 11
of these countries on additional policy-
based loans for about $5 billion. The pro
portion of policy-based loans also has
increased and in 1986 accounted for 379
of World Bank loans to these countries.
This is in contrast to 10% or 15% in the
years 1982-85. The IMF and World
Bank are cooperating closely in assisting
the major debtors to formulate growth-

Department of State Bulietii

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

btin America: Gross Domestic Product, 1984-86

(i^erage annual growth rate)

fPercent

■ Latin America §CS Oil-exporting Jjjj^ Non-oil-exporling

Latin America ;^ countries^ ^. countries^

Average annual growth

rate

(Percent)

1984

1985

1986'

Cumulative
Vartation
1981-86

Latin America

3.2

2.7

2.0 to 3.5

4.2-5.8

Oil-exporting

countries^

2.6

1.7

-3.5 to
-1.5

2.0-4.0

Non-oil-

exporting

countries^

3.7

3.6

5.5 10 6.5

8.5-9.5

Brazil

4,8

8.2

7.0 to 8.0

17,0-18.0

Other

non-oil

exporting

countries

2.5

-15

3 5 to 5.0

- 1 0-0 5

1984

1985

1986'

'Preliminary estimates subject to revision Graph
based on midpoint of the range,

^Oil-exporting countries: Bolivia. Ecuador, Mexico,
Peru, and Venezuela

3Non-oil-exporting countries; Argentina, Brazil.
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay,

Source: Based on official data from the UN
Economic Commission for Latin America,

1 ented adjustment programs within a
■isistent framework.
The commercial banks also are being

I led upon to do their part. Commercial
nks hold two-thirds of the total Latin
nerican debt, and more than 60% of

■ :S portion is owed to West European,
. panese, and other banks head-

■ artered outside the United States. The
S. Government has called on U.S.
nks— holders of around 22% of the

■ tal Latin American debt— to do their
rt. The recent agreement on a $7.7
lion commercial bank package for
exico provides concrete evidence of
mmercial bank support for the
rengthened debt strategy. It includes

billion in new money and $1.7 billion
contingency funds linked to invest-
ent and growth. The World Bank has
,Teed to provide cofinancing
larantees for the final year of a
lOO-million commercial bank loan and
150 million of the contingency loan.
We expect that commercial banks
ill begin discussions with other debtor
iuntries once IMF/World Bank-
ipported reforms are underway,
egotiations on a short-term trade
jnance facility linked to oil exports for
cuador were recently completed. New
lans linked to World Bank cofinancing

and a rescheduling arrangement have
been agreed with Uruguay. Reschedul-
ing negotiations also are underway with
Bolivia.

A number of debtor countries have
adopted programs permitting foreigners
or residents to convert foreign currency
debt claims into equity or local currency
debt investments. Debt/equity swaps
have been particularly active in Chile
where the government established a
favorable regulatory framework for such
transactions. Swaps also have begun in
Mexico. Meanwhile, direct foreign
investment has generally not yet
recovered to the levels of the 1970s. This
apparently dismal performance reflects
the continuing lack of confidence in the
investment environment in the region.

Trade Effects of Adjustment
and the U.S. Role

Once adjustment measures, particularly
realignment of overvalued exchange
rates and domestic interest rates, began
in 1983, many countries' balance-of-
payments situations improved dramati-
cally. The current account deficit for the
region dropped from $42.6 billion in
1981 to only $3.1 billion in 1984. A slight
increase to $4.6 billion in the current

account deficit occurred in 1985, as
export performance was not as robust.
An additional increase to $12.9 billion is
expected in 1986 and 1987 as a result of
increased imports not matched by export
growth, especially in oil-exporting
court tries.

The growth of Latin America's
export earnings has slowed considerably
from an average annual pace of more
than 18% in the 1970s to about 5% dur-
ing the 1980s. Slumping international
prices for agricultural products, raw
materials, and fuels explain much of the
decline in the growth of regional
exports. The prices of all but one of
Latin America's 14 principal export com-
modities have fallen 11% or more since
the beginning of the decade.

During the first 6 months of 1986,
Latin America recorded a substantial
decrease in its trade surplus with the
rest of the world. The primary cause of
the decrease is the continuing depression
of the world petroleum market which
caused a severe shock to the producing
countries. World prices also remain low
for other traditional Latin American
exports; among others, grain prices
affect Argentina; copper prices, Chile;
and tin, Bolivia. U.S. advocacy of
outward-oriented, export-led economies

•bruary 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

r«

over inward-focused, import-substitution
models is based on the necessity of free-
ing economies from overdependence on
one or a few commodities. Expanded
and diversified production which is com-
petitive in world markets is the ideal
way to achieve optimal use of domestic
resources in an increasingly integrated
world economy.

Faltering economic activity in the
industrialized world also explains some
of Latin America's poor export perform-
ance in the 1980s compared to the
previous decade. In the 1970s aggregate
OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] growth
averaged more than 3.3% a year but
slowed in the 1980s to 2.3%. The United
States, Japan, and, to a lesser extent,
Canada recorded the highest growth
rates among OECD countries in the
1980s and increased their imports from
Latin American countries at a faster
rate than did Western Europe.

Latin American competitiveness in
West European and Japanese markets
eroded because the region's currencies
remained linked to the dollar which
appreciated sharply. In February 1985,
when it hit its peak, the value of the
dollar had risen some 5.5% against other
OECD currencies on a trade-weighted
average since the beginning of the
decade. Since then, the dollar has lost a
little more than one-half that
appreciation.

The United States increased its
imports from Latin America— mostly
manufactured products— by nearly 7% a
year during the 1980s, a rate well in
excess of annual GDP growth. Mean-
while, Latin America and the Caribbean
reduced their imports from the United
States by 40% from 1981 to 1983. The
magnitude of the LI.S. role in hemi-
spheric current account adjustments is
illustrated by the shift from a $3-billion
U.S. trade surplus in 1981 to a
$17-billion trade deficit with Latin
America and the Caribbean in 1985.

In contrast, imports of Latin
American goods by three major Euro-
pean Community countries— West Ger-
many, France, and Italy— rose by 2% or
less a year, while imports into the
United Kingdom actually declined. The
growth of Japan's imports of Latin
American goods averaged 5.8% per
year, somewhat higher than the overall
OECD average annual pace of 4.8'!^i dur-
ing the period. The relatively high rate
of absorption of Latin American exports
by the United States reflects a high U.S.
growth rate among OECD countries and
maintenance of lower import barriers
than most other industrialized countries.

The U.S. share of exports from Latin
America and the Caribbean, traditionally
large, expanded from 39% in 1981 to
49% in 1985.

Conclusion

Most countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean have accomplished major
adjustments in their trade accounts and
in domestic policies since 1982. They are
thus prepared to resume more attractive
rates of growth without anticipating the
social disruption of the past 5 years.
According to projections by the UN
Economic Commission for Latin
America, the rate of economic growth in
1986 among the non-oil-exporting coun-
tries of the region will surpass the 1985
rate and be the highest registered since
1980. Moreover, the increased levels of
imports being realized point the way

toward stronger recuperation and
economic growth ahead.

Latin American steps toward poli'
reform are most encouraging. Exper-
ience all over the world shows that thi
surest path to economic prosperity is
through free market principles and ini
nationally competitive enterprises. Fr
market policies unleash the full force (
human initiative, creativity, and ener|
They parallel in the economic arena th
advance of democracy in the political
sphere.

The United States will continue to
devote considerable efforts to overcon
the international debt problem. We wi
continue to oppose protectionism and
support liberalization of trade in the
newly launched round of multilateral
trade negotiations. We will do our par
to support the realization of sustained
growth and improved standards of livi
for the people of Latin America. ■

Guatemala's Transition
Toward Democracy

The following ivas prepared in the
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

Central America's most recent transi-
tion from military to civilian rule took
place on January 14, 1986, with the
inauguration of Vinicio Cerezo as Presi-
dent of the Republic. Cerezo, the can-
didate of the Christian Democratic
Party, is the first civilian to be elected
president of Guatemala since 1966.

The transition was exemplary: three
free and competitive elections between
July 1984 and December 1985 led to the
writing of a new constitution and the
election of Cerezo. Receiving more than
1 million votes in a runoff for the
presidency, Cerezo obtained two-thirds
of the votes against a civilian candidate
representing the center-right.

In leading Central America's newest
democracy. President Cerezo and his
government must now overcome a
legacy of decades of officially condoned
violence and guerrilla insurgency,
socioeconomic ills, and estrangement
from the international community.

A Tragic History. From the 1944
ouster of strongman General Jorge
Ubico and the 1944-54 decade of "social
revolution" to the military governments
and organized guerrilla warfare that
lasted from the 1960s through the first

half of the 1980s, Guatemalan life has
been marked by violence against both
individuals (assassinations, kidnapping
and intimidation) and society (military
coups, electoral fraud, and a bloody
insurgency). Major sectors of society-
the military, business, political parties
labor, and Indian communities-
fragmented into mutually antagonistic
forces. Major social problems— skewed
income and land distribution, disparitii
in the quality of life between Indian ar
non-Indian, and growing numbers of
landless and jobless— have increased tl
intensity and human costs of the
conflicts.

National Reconciliation. One of

President Cerezo's fundamental con-
cerns is to bring the Guatemalan natioi
back together after years of guerrilla
war and polarizing violence. One of the
last acts of the military government w;
a general amnesty for acts of political
violence, including guerrilla activities,
that took place between March 1982 ai
January 1986. Shortly after taking
office, Cerezo said he would be prepare
to discuss the reincorporation of guer-
rillas into the political life of Guatenial:
Some guerrillas are evidently willing ti
talk, but others continue to conduct
armed attacks in parts of the highlands
and Peten Department.

Department of State Bullei

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Prospects for national reconciliation
J been strengthened by improve-
,ts in the human rights situation and
he return from abroad of many
temalans who previously feared for

• lives. The Social Democratic Party
)) competed openly in the elections,
ling representation in the National
Tress, currently led by the Christian
locratic Party of Guatemala (DCG).
n neighboring El Salvador, the

ical opening is producing a rejuve-
Dn of labor and cooperative move-
ts, the restoration of autonomy to
ersity life, and renewed dialogue
een the government and the private
slor.

Human Rights. Politically motivated
lis have dropped steadily. U.S.
A lassy reports show a decline in such
ie hs from an average of 350 per
n.th in 1981, to under ,50 in 1985, to
:'e"'r than 13 per month in the first
i 1 )nths of 1986. The number of disap-
■'e ances has also dropped, from a high

• |ier month in 1984 to 8 per month
IK the first half of 1986. There is no
ation that the Guatemalan Govern-

t is involved in current cases. In
there is no clearcut case of an
idual being killed or kidnapped for
ical activities or beliefs. In his
.e nt address to the UN General
ki 'mbly. President Cerezo stated that,
ur 'r his government, "no party or
DC liar organization can complain of
re essive actions, disappearances, tor-
tu , or murder of any of its members."
Tl OAS [Organization of American
St es] Human Rights Commission
it id in its annual report released in
lai September that: "There is little
Ic )t that during the first seven months
)f s [Cerezo's] administration there has
oe I a perceptible change [sensible cam-
'rii in the human rights situation."

Declines in politically related
n ?nce have not been matched by
3ii lar declines in common criminal
v"i','nce. A monthly average of 150
-T linally related murders, another 200
<e 3US physical assaults and robberies,
ir 500 stolen cars make Guatemala one
if le most violent societies in the world.
Ct 3Z0 recognizes the importance of
■r ng human rights abuses and criminal

iii-e. The Constitution mandates
■ establishment of a human rights
wmdsman, and the government is
is gning a high priority to profes-
ii alizing the National Police. Inves-
'•i five and protective capabilities are
xig strengthened to support the
r 'pendent judicial process and to help
' iblish confidence in the legal process
r decades of extrajudicial violence.

In June 1986, President Reagan for-
warded to Congress a certification on
human rights and political conditions in
Guatemala that recognized improvement
and enabled the United States to
respond favorably to a written request
from President Cerezo for nonlethal
military assistance, the first U.S.
military aid for Guatemala since 1977.

International Activity. In October
1986, President Cerezo received pro-
mises of $300 million or more in aid from
Belgium, Spain, Germany, France, and
Italy. The aid covered activities ranging
from economic development to help for
professionalizing the National Police.
During this highly successful tour of
Western Eui'ope, and in prior visits to
Mexico, Central America, Venezuela,
and the United States, Cerezo found
growing recognition of Guatemala's
democratization process. Declaring
himself a "fanatic of democracy,"
Cerezo advocates regular elections and
has proposed the establishment of a
directly elected Central American parlia-
ment. Guatemala is hosting several
regional and international meetings,
including functions related to the OAS,
the European Community (EC), and the
Contadora process, thus effectively end-
ing Guatemala's international isolation.

Policy Initiatives. Reactivation of
the Guatemalan economy, which has suf-

fered relatively little from guerrilla
attacks and which has the strongest
private sector in Central America, has
become a top priority for the Cerezo
government. In June 1986, Cerezo
implemented an economic stabilization
program developed through extensive
dialogue with private sector represent-
atives. Exchange rates were adjusted
pending complete unification. Price
stabilization measures were put into
effect. Guatemala is discussing a standby
program with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), which appears
favorably impressed by Guatemala's
economic stabilization efforts. After 5
years of economic stagnation, there is
hope that inflation could slow in 1986,
followed by positive economic growth in
1987. Although more time and additional
measures are likely to be needed, the
Cerezo government seems to be on the
right track— and has the support of
Guatemalan business and labor, of the
international financial institutions, and
of many foreign governments, including
that of the United States.

Guatemala-U.S. Relations. A

strong, active, and democratic
Guatemala improves democratic pros-
pects throughout Central America.
Secretary of State Shultz reported to
the President in July 1986 that the suc-
cess of the democratic transition in

OTHER TRANSITIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Three That Succeeded

Costa Rica. Since the 1948 revolution
that demilitarized the country, Costa
Rica has had regularly scheduled elec-
tions and peaceful transfers of power
to opposition parties. The most recent
election on February 2, 1986, resulted
in victory for Oscar Arias of the
National Liberation Party.

Honduras. Military rule ended with the
election of Roberto Suazo Cordoba on
November 29, 1981. Liberal Party can-
didate Jose Azcona's election on
November 24, 1985, marked the first
transfer of power between two demo-
cratically elected civilian presidents in
Honduran history.

El Salvador. In 1979, a reformist coup
began the transition from military rule.
In 1982, a constituent assembly was
elected by an overwhelming popular

turnout in the face of guerrilla vio-
lence. On May 6, 1984, Jose Napoleon
Duarte, a Christian Democrat, was
elected president in a hotly contested
runoff election against Roberto
D'Aubuisson of the National
Republican Alliance.

One That Failed

Nicaragua. In July 1979, Anastasio
Somoza was replaced by a coalition
junta pledged to democracy. By March
1981, the last democratic junta
members had been forced to resign and
a Soviet-supplied military buildup had
already doubled the size of Nicaragua's
military. On January 2, 1984, Daniel
Ortega was elected president in an
election in which opposition parties
were harassed and denied access to the
media and campaign materials— a pat-
tern strikingly reminiscent of the
Somoza election of 1974.

iruary 1987

TREATIES

GUATEMALA IN BRIEF

Population. Guatemala is Central
America's most populous country,
with 8.5 million inhabitants living in
an area about the size of the state of
Tennessee (42,000 sq. miles). Just
over half of the population belong to
largely non-Spanish speaking Indian
communities, primarily in the coun-
try's northwest highlands.

Economy. In 198.5, gross domestic
product (GDP) was more than
.$11 billion; per capita (5DP was
$1,300; and the rate of inflation
was 30%. Agriculture remains the
mainstay of the economy and of
exports (coffee, meat, cotton,
bananas), but Guatemala has
developed a light industrial capacity.
International debt was $2.6 billion in

1986, and debt service payments
totaled 30% of 1985 export earnings.

Impact of Regional Problems. When
President Cerezo took office,
Guatemala had a negative growth
rate and faced reduced demands for
traditional exports and low levels of
investment, tourism, and credit. At
least $1 billion in Guatemalan assets
had been transferred out of the coun-
try through capital flight, and the
value of the national currency, the
quetzal, had slipped to a historic low.
Insurgencies in El Salvador and
Nicaragua and other regional prob-
lems had greatly weakened the Cen-
tral American Common Market, of
which Guatemala had been a leading
beneficiary.

Guatemala demonstrates the importance
of fully meeting the levels of U.S.
assistance recommended by the Kiss-
inger commission. (See "The U.S. and
Central America: Implementing the
National Bipartisan Commission
Report," Department of State Special
Report No. 148, August 1986.)

The United States supported the
transition from military to civilian
government. Total U.S. assistance
(development, financial, food, and
militaiy) rose from $32 million in fiscal
year (FY) 1984 to $103 million in FY
1986. U.S. assistance has ranged from
rural development projects in the Indian
highlands, support to help offset trade
imbalances, improving the electoral
system, and modernizing and profes-
sionalizing the investigative capabilities
of judicial institutions, to providing

training and nonlethal equipment to the
armed forces. This assistance is an
important U.S. policy instrument to sup-
port democratic ideals and institutions in
general and the civilian rule of President
Cerezo in particular.

Guatemala is still struggling against
violence, a lingering insurgent threat,
socioeconomic ills, and institutional
frailties. The United States will continue
to support Guatemalan efforts to
strengthen democratic institutions and
the rule of law, to promote economic
development and social progress, and to
encourage the professionalization and
responsible orientation of the armed
forces and police. These are goals that
unite the United States and Guatemala
with each other and with other
democratic nations. ■

Current Actions

iviultilatp:ral

.Agriculture

Internatifinal plant protection conventio
Done at Rome Dec. 6, 1951. Entered int
force Apr. .3, 19.52; for the U.S. Aug. l.s
1972. TIAS 7465.

.Adherences deposited: Liberia, July 2, 1 5;
Zarnbia, June 24. 1986.

Antarctica

Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington t
1, 19.59. Entered into force June 23, 1%
TIAS 4780.
Accession deposited: Korea, Rep. of, Nd ;n

19S(;.

Recommendations relating to the furthe ice

(if the principles and objectives of the Ar rp-

tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Canl ^a

Sept. 27, 1983.1

Notification of approval: Belgium, Dec. :

1986^

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities p.,
touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954 J
Entered into force Sept. 11, 1957. TIAS ^
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Dec. 1 , -i
1986^

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to th

convention on international civil aviatioi

(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Sept. 31).

1977.'

Ratification deposited: Singapore, Sept.

1986^

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the dev' >
ment, production, and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin wea, s
and on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr.
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. ' .S
8062.

Accessions deposited: Bahamas, Nov. 26,
1986; Belize, Nov. 25, 1986; Grenada, Or 2,
1986; Sri Lanka, Nov. 18, 1986.

Conservation

Convention on wetlands of international i
portance especially as waterfowl habitat.
Done at Ramsar Feb. 2. 1971. Entered in
force Dec. 21, 1975.

Ratification deposited: U.S., Dec. 18, 198
Enters into force Tor tlie United States: .'
18. 1987.

Protocol to the convention on wetlands ot -
ternational importance especially as wate
fowl habitat of Feb. 2, 1971. Adopted at I is
Dec. 3, 1982.'
Ratification deposited: U.S., Dec. 18, 198i

Department of State BuMi

TREATIES

[ntion concerning the formation of an

lational Union for the PubHcation of

IS Tariffs, regulations of execution,

lal declarations. Signed at Brussels

1980. Entered into force Apr. 1. 1981.

26 Stat. 1518.

I (col modifying the convention of July 5,
relating to thie creation of an Inter-
ial Union for the Publication of Customs

I 's. Done at Brussels Dec. 16, 1949.

I ;ed into force May 5, 1950; for the U.S
15, 1957. TIAS 3922.
of denunciation: Singapore. Oct. 23,

effective Apr. 1. 1989.

nonmental Modification

ir/ntion on the pmhihitiun of military or
her hostile use of environmental
cation techniques, with annex. Done at
I May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct.
s; for the U.S. Jan. 17. 1980. TIAS

-i<m deposited: Korea, Rep. of, Dec. 2,

uc al Procedure

T ntion on the civil aspects of inter-
al child abduction. Done at The Hague
,". 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,

lied to: Province of Alberta by
, a,'"^TTov. 4, 1986.

nti .American convention on letters

.>g )ry. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975.

nl ed into force Jan. 16, 1976.^

>d( lonal protocol to the Inter-American
on ntion on letters rogatory, with annex.
ioi at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered
itt 5rce June 14, 1980.-
ie tiire: Argentina, May 19, 1986.

!\h lational agreement on jute and jute
■ro cts, 1982, with annexes. Done at
:m 'a Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro-
«i ally Jan. 9. 1984; definitively Aug. 26,

cation deposited: Greece, Dec. 2,

1986.

■a le Pollution

rt col of 1978 relating to the international
" ntion for the prevention of pollution
ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17,
M Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983.
^ccsions deposited: Brunei, Oct. 23, 1986;
■4 esIaTDct. 21, 1986.^-^

ia:ime Matters

il national convention on tonnage measure-
" nf ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at
'II .lune 23, 1969. Entered into force
;>, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 10. 1983.
111490.

'SI. in deposited: Brunei, Oct. 23, 1986.
national convention on standards of
iiK. certification, and watchkeeping for
lers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 1978.
■ed into force Apr. 28, 1984.=
-sion deposited: Brunei, Oct. 23. 1986.

International convention for the safety of life
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,
1980. TIAS 9700.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the safety of life at sea. 1974
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.
Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009.
Accession deposited: Brunei, Oct. 23. 1986.

Organization of American
States — Amendment

Protocol of amendment to the Charter of the
Organization of American States. Signed at
Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5. 1985.'
Signatures: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Rep., Ecuador,-' El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Peru,'' St. Lucia. Surinanie.
Uruguay, Venezuela, Dec. 5, 1985; Grenada,
June 10, 1986; Panama, June 12, 1986; St.
Christopher and Nevis, Apr. 16, 1986;
Trinidad and Tobago, Apr. 15, 1986; U.S.,
Nov. 7, 1986.-'

Ratifications deposited: Antigua and Bar-
buda, Nov. 24, 1986; Bahamas, Jamaica,
Trinidad and Tobago, Nov. 7, 1986; Dominica,
Nov. 18. 1986; Grenada. Nov. 12, 1986.

Pollution

Protocol to the convention on long-range
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13. 1979,
(TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring and
evaluation of the long-range transmission of
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with annex.
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984.'
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Nov. 26,
19^6; German DeniTRep., Dec. 17, 1986.

Convention for the protection of the ozone

layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22,

1985.'

Ratification deposited: Sweden. Nov. 26,

1986^

Postal

Third additional protocol to the constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10,
1964, general regulations with annex, and the
universal postal convention and final protocol
and detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg
July 27. 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1986; definitively for the U.S. June 6, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, Sept. 3,
1986; Denmark. Oct. 3, "1986; German Dem.
Rep., Oct. 29, 1986; Lesotho, Sept. 24, 1986;
Nigeria. May 22, 1985; Qatar, Sept. 17, 1986.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks
agreement, with detailed regulations with
final protocol. Done at Hamburg July 27.
1984. Entered into force Jan. 1. 1986; for the
U.S. June 6, 1986.

Ratifications deposited: Denmark. Oct. 3,
1986; Qatar, Sept. 177X986 .

Postal parcels agreement with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg
July 27. 1984. Entered into force Jan. I,
1986; for the U.S. June 6, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, Oct. 3.
1986; Nigeria, May 22, 1985; Qatar, Sejit. 17.
1986.

Approvals deposited: German Dem. Rep..
OctV297T986; Lesotho, Sept. 24, 1986.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of
industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised. Done at Stockholm July 14. 1967.
Entered into force Apr. 26. 1970; for the U.S.
Sept. 5, 1970, except for Articles 1-12
entered into force May 19. 1970; for the U.S.
Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6923, 7727.
Notification of accession deposited: Lebanon,
Sept. 30, 1986>

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellec-
tual Property (Organization. Done at
Stockholm July 14. 1967. Entered into force
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932
Accession deposited: Lebanon. Sept. 30, 1986.

Red Cross

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded and sick in armed
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked members of armed forces at sea.
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956.
TIAS 3363.

(jeneva convention relative to the treatment
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.

(Jeneva convention relative to the protection
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at
Geneva Aug. 12. 1949. Entered into force
Ot. 21, 19.50; for the U.S. Feb. 2. 19.56. TIAS
3365.

Notification of successioji^: Antigua and Bar-
buda, Oct. 6; 1986; effective from Nov. 1,
1981.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of international armed con-
flicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at
Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978.^^

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of noninternational armed con-
flicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8,
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.^
Accessions deposited: Antigua and Barbuda,
acT6",l986;^ahrain, Oct. 30, 1986; Guinea-
Bissau, Sierra Leone, Oct. 21, 1986.

■M'uary 1987

TREATIES

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees.

Done at New York Jan. .31, 1967. Entered

into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,

1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Venezuela, Sept. 19,

r986T^

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered
into force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980;
definitively Apr. 1.5, 1982. TIAS 10379.
Notification of withdrawal: Iraq, Nov. 17,
r986;"effecTiveNbv7T7;i987.

Space

Convention on international liability for
damage caused by space objects. Done at
Washington. London, and Moscow Mar. 29,
1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for
the U.S. Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Nov. 21,
1986.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention,
with annexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi
Nov. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984;
definitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Kuwait,
Oct. 9,l986;XotedTvoire, Sept. 17. 1986;
Fiji, Sept. 25, 1986; Lesotho, Sept. 18. 1986.

Trade

United Nations convention on contracts for

the international sale of goods. Done at

Vienna Apr. 11, 1980.

Enters into force: Jan. 1, 1988.

Approval deposited: China, Dec. 11, 1986.

Ratifications deposited: Italy, U.S., Dec. 11,

1986^

United Nations — Priviliges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities
of the L'nited Nations. Adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on
Feb. 13. 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17.
1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29. 1970. TIAS 6900.
Notification of succession: St. Lucia, Aug. 27,
1986:

United Nations Industrial Development
Organization

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, with annexes.
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into
force June 21, 1985.

Ratification deposited: Papua New Guinea.
Sept. To, 19867"

Wheat

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at Lon-
don Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1,
1986.''

Food aid convention, 1986. Done at London

Mar. 13, 1986. Entered into force July 1,

1986.'''

Acceptances deposited: Japan. Dec. 15. 1986.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Air transport services agreement, with
annexes. Signed at Buenos Aires Oct. 22,

1985. Entered into force provisionally, Oct.
22, 1985.

Entered into force definitively: Dec. 29,
T986.

Australia

Memorandum of understanding concerning
the exchange of service personnel between
the U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal
Au.stralian Air Force. Signed at Washington
Apr. 13. 1984. Entered into force Apr. 13,
1984.

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar.
8, 1982, as amended (TIAS 10483, 10642) for
sales of agricultural commodities. Effected by
exchange of notes at Dhaka Dec. 10, 1985.
Entered into force Dec. 10, 1985.

Agreement amending agreement of Feb. 19
and 24, 1986, concerning trade in certain
apparel categories. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Sept. 15, Oct. 8 and 17.

1986. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1986.

Belgium

Agreement amending the air transport agree-
ment of Oct. 23, 1980 (TIAS 9903). Effected
by exchange of notes at Brussels Sept. 22 and
Nov. 12, 1986. Entered into force Nov. 12,
1986.

Brazil

Agreement on maritime transport, with
related letters. Signed at Rio de Janeiro
Dec. 10, 1986. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1987.

Complementary agreement for technical
cooperation in the area of irrigation, with
appendices. Signed at Brasilia Nov. 6, 1986.
Entered into force Nov. 6, 1986.

Canada

Memorandum of understanding on the
exchange of service personnel between the
LI.S. Marine Corps and Canadian Forces.
Signed at Washington Sept. 19. 1984.
Entered into force Sept. 19, 1984.

Iceland

Treaty to facilitate defense relationship, with
related memorandum of understandings.
Signed at New York Sept. 24, 1986.
Ratifications exchanged: Oct. 31, 1986.
Entered into force: Octrsi, 1986.

Israel

Memorandum of cooperation for mutual
cooperation in the technical field of civil avia-
tion security. Signed at Washington and Tel
Aviv June 24 and Sept. 11. 1986. Entered
into force Sept. 11, 1986.

Jamaica

Agreement amending the agreement of|
Jan. 15, 1986, as amended, for sale of
agricultural commodities. Effected by
exchange of notes at Kingston Oct. 30 ;
1986. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1986.

Korea

Memorandum of understanding for fuel I
exchange between the U.S. Navy and til
Republic of Korea Air Force, with appe [
Signed at Seoul Oct. 31, 1986. Entered
force Oct. 31, 1986.

Agreement concerning trade in certain
tiles and textile products, with annexes.^.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Nov. 21 and Dec. 4, 1986.
Entered into force Dec. 4, 1986; effecti\|
Jan. 1, 1986.

Mexico

Agreement amending agreement of Feb
1979 (TIAS 9419), as amended, relating
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade tex
and textile products. Effected by exchai
notes at Washington Oct. 22 and 31. 19J
Entered into force Oct. 31, 1986.

Netherlands

Agreement relating to air transportatioi
between the United States and Aruba, v»
annexes. Signed at Washington Nov. 7,
Enters into force on the date the govern'
ments inform each other of completion o
necessary internal procedures.

Norway

Memorandum of understanding on the
exchange of officers between the U.S. M
Corps and the Norwegian Army. Signed
Oslo and Washington May 21 and July 3
1986. Entered into force July 3, 1986.

Peru

Air transport services agreement, with
annex. Signed at Washington Dec. 16, U
Enters into force June 12, 1987. Memora
dum of understanding on the exchange o
officers between U.S. and Peruvian Mari
Corps. Signed at Lima and Washington J
20 and Sept. 22. 1986. Entered into force
Sept. 22, 1986.

Spain

Agreement concerning technical cooperal i
in cartography and geodesy. Signed at
Madrid and Washington Sept. 4 and Oct. ,
1986. Entered into force Oct. 27. 1986.

Sir Lanka

.-Xgreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Colombo Nov. 13, 198
Entered into force Nov. 13, 1986.

Sweden

Agreement on social security, with admin
trative arrangement. Signed at Stockholn
May 27, 1985.
Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1987.

Department of State Bui «

'lESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

Department of State

is releases may he obtained from the
Bee of Press Relations, Department of
le, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Date Subject

12/2 Program for the official
working visit to
Washington, D,C., of
President Arias of Costa
Rica. Dec, 3-6,

12/4 Shultz: address before the

International Management
and Development
Institute,

12/5 Program for the official
working visit to
Washington, D.C, of
President Mobutu of Zaire.
Dec. 6-12.

12/8 Shultz: statement before the
House Foreign Affairs
Committee.

12/11 Shultz: condolence statement
on the death of Anatoliy
Marchenko, Dec, 10,

260 12/U Whitehead: closing address

before the Brookings
Institution Conference on
Terrorism, Dec, 10,

261 12/15 Signing of the Memorandum

of Understanding between
the U,S, Marine Corps and
the Department of State,

*262 12/17 Shultz: remarks at lighting of
Christmas tree, Dec, 15,

*263 12/17 Shultz, Kelley: remarks at
signing ceremony of
Memorandum of
Understanding between
U.S, Marine Corps and
Department of State.
Dec, 15,

264 12/17 Shultz: interview on

"Worldnet," Dec, 16,

265 12/19 Shultz, Delors: joint news

conference at the Euro-
pean Commission,
Brussels, Dec, 12,

266 12/31 Shultz: news conference at

NATO headciuarters,
Brussels, Dec, 12.

*Not printed in the Billeti.v

T lidad and Tobago

\ eement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
inanmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
, with annexes and administrative visa ar-
n jement. Effected by exchanges of notes at
P t of Spain Oct. 15 and 23, 1986. Entered
1 force Oct. 23, 1986; effective Oct. 1,

I ted Kingdom

S plementary treaty to the extradition trea-
t; f June 8, 1972 (TIAS 8468), with annex,
S aed at Washington June 25, 1985,
E ifications exchanged: Dec, 23, 1986.'
i ered into force: Dec. 23, 1986.

Agreement extending the agreement of July
26, 1984, as extended, concerning the
Cayman Islands and narcotics activities.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
Nov, 26, 1986, Entered into force Nov, 26,
1986; effective Nov, 29, 1986.

'Not in force.

^Not in force for the U.S.

^With reservation(s).

^With declaration(s).

^Not a party to (optional) Annexes III. IV,
andV,

"'In force provisionally for the U.S.

'With amendments and exchange of notes
concerning Hong Kong. ■

Department of State

Secretary Shultz

Southern Africa: American Hopes for the
I\iture. International Management and
Development Institute, Dec. 4, 1986 (Cur-
rent Policy #898).

Iran and U.S. Policy. House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Dec, 8. 1986 (Current Policy
#899).

Africa

South Africa: Toward Peace and Stability,
Assistant Secretary Crocker, Economic
Club, Detroit, Dec, 1, 1986 (Current Policy
#897),

,\rms Control

A World Without Nuclear Weapons, ACDA
Director Adelman, Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton, Nov, 13, 1986 (Current Policy
#896),

Conference on Disarmament in Europe
(GIST. Dec. 1986).

East Asia

China Policy Today: Consensus, Consistence,
Stability. Assistant Secretary Sigur, World
Affairs Council of Northern California, San
Francisco, Dec, 11, 1986 (Current Policy
#901),

U.S. -Philippine Relations: Promoting Trade
and Investment, Under Secretary Wallis,
American Chamber of Commerce and the
Makati Rotary Club, Manila, Dec. 9, 1986
(Current Policy #902).

Europe

The Reykjavik Meeting (GIST, Dec. 1986).
U.S. -Soviet Relations (GIST, Dec. 1986).
The Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe, Oct. 1986 (Historical Issues

series).

Human Rights

Human Rights in Castro's Cuba, Dec, 1986
(Special Report #153),

Oceans

Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra
(GIST, Dec. 1986).

South Asia

Afghanistan: Seven Years of Occupation,
Dec. 1986 (Special Report #155).

Terrorism

Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response,
Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Brookings
Institution Conference on Terrorism, Dec.
10, 1986 (Current Policy #900),

Western Hemisphere

Collective Security and the Inter-American
System, Nov. 1986 (Historical Issues
series). ■

'ibruary 1987

PUBLICATIONS

Expanded Chiefs of Mission
Volume Released

The Department of State on October 29,
1986, released the publication Principal
Officers of the Department of State and
United States Chiefs of Mission,
1778-1986. It is a revised and expanded
edition of United States Chiefs of Mis-
sion, a standard reference work first
published in 1973, and later updated in
1975 and 1982.

The publication presents the authori-
tative record of the tenure of principal
American foreign affairs officials
throughout the nation's history. The
record includes the state of residence,
career status, and dates of appointment,
of entry on duty, and of termination of
appointment. An index of all persons
listed in the main text contains full
name, dates of birth and death, and a
chronological list of each position men-
tioned in the text. The edition covers
appointments through April 30, 1986.

Part I, Principal Officers of the
Department of State, has been com-
pletely revised and expanded over
previous editions. In addition to officers
commissioned by the President, chiefs of
bureaus who were designated by the
Secretary of State and who hold rank
equivalent to an Assistant Secretary of
State have been included. All individuals

conferred with the personal rank of
Career Ambassador are included in a
separate list that ends this section.

Part II, United States Chiefs of
Mission, includes all U.S. Ambassadors,
Ministers (including those commissioned
as sole Ministers by the Continental Con-
gress), Ministers Resident, Charge
d'Affaires, Charge d'Affaires pro tem-
pore, and Diplomatic Agents. It also
includes those Commissioners who were
accredited to foreign governments and
served as heads of American Legations.

The revised edition of Priricipal
Officers of the Department of State and
United States Chiefs of Mission,
1778-1986 was prepared in the Office of
the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Copies of this
book, which contains 154 pages of data,
are available in soft cover (Department
of State Publication No. 9499; GPO
Stock No. 044-000-02150-1), and may
be purchased for $8.50 from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402. Checks or money orders
should be made payable the the
Superintendent of Documents.

Background Notes

This series provides brief, factual summ; ,
of the people, history, government, econi v,
and foreign relations of about 170 count i
(excluding the United States) and of sele n
international organizations. Recent revi;- is
are:

Albania (Nov. 1986)
Bolivia (Oct. 1986)
Burkina Faso (Nov. 1986)
Cape Verde (Oct. 1986)
Colombia (Oct. 1986)
Denmark (Nov. 1986)
Ecuador (Oct. 1986)
Finland (Oct. 1986)
Nicaragua (Oct. 1986)
Papua New Guinea (Oct. 1986)
Saudi Arabia (Dec. 1986)

A free copy of the inde.x only may bei

obtained from the Correspondence Manaji
ment Division, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.

For about 60 Background Notes a yea|
subscription is available from the Superin"
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Superintendent of Documents, must acco
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Press release 232 of Oct. 29, 1986.

Department of State Bulk

VEX

j^uary 1987
jme87, No. 2119

unistan. Afghanistan: Seven Years of
Met Occupation (Karp) 1

ejuman Rights Dimension in Africa

E'eman) 42

iii?rn Africa; American Hopes for the

^jre (Shidtz) 36

Tulture. Secretary's Joint News Con-
> nee After Meeting With EC Ministers
.er, De Clercq. Delors, Shultz,

Iter) 59

. a. South Africa: Toward Peace and

-I lility (Crocker) 40

n Control. NATO Defense Planning
^ imittee Meets in Brussels (final

munique) 57

:iry Visits Canada (Clark, Shultz) . . 45
ary's Interview on "Worldnet" .... 33

I'olicy Today: Consensus, Consistence,

,„ Stability (Sigur) 48

le .S. Approach to East Asia and the

P ific (Sigur) 55

A on. Secretary Visits Canada (Clark,

■: Itz) 45

■ fss. Southern Africa: American Hopes

,. .he Future (Shultz) 36

a la. Secretary Visits Canada (Clark,

S Itz) 45

liil . China Policy Today: Consensus, Con-
si ;nce, and Stability (Sigur) 48

')f 'ess

ai nd U.S. Policy (Shultz) 22

•tl ieport on Cyprus (message to the

C gress) 58

ui n Rights in Castro's Cuba 62

ui n Rights Progress in 1986 (Schifter) 67
yj [s. 29th Report on Cyprus (message to

tl Congress) 58

e| 'tment & Foreign Service
x| ided Chiefs of Mission Volume

R 'ased 90

ec tary and Marine Commandant Sign

N Tioranduni of Understanding 47

a! Asia

h( I.S. Approach to East Asia and the

F ific (Sigur) 55

it ty and Possibility on the Pacific Rim

(: ;:ur) 52

CI omics

ff inistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupa-

1 1 (Karp) 1

hi I Policy Today: Consensus, Consistence,

a 1 Stability (Sigur) 48

xinding Freedom: A Formula for Growth

i he Americas (Abrams, Taylor) 79

hi f uman Rights Dimension in Africa

( eeman) 42

ectary's Joint News Conference After
' eting With EC Ministers (Baker, De

''rcq, Delors, Shultz, Yeutter) 59

<r lern Africa: American Hopes for the
ture (Shultz) 36

The U.S. Approach to East Asia and the

Pacific (Sigur) 55

Environment. Afghanistan: Seven Years of

Soviet Occupation (Karp) 1

Europe

Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet" .... 33

Secretary's Joint News Conference After

Meeting With EC Ministers (Baker, De

Clercq, Delors, Shultz, Yeutter) 59

Guatemala. Guatemala's Transition Toward

Democracy 84

Haiti. Visit of Haiti President Namphy

(White House statement) 78

Human Rights

Afghanistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupa-
tion (Karp) 1

The Human Rights Dimension in Africa

(Freeman) 42

Human Rights in Castro's Cuba 62

Human Rights Progress in 1986 (Schifter) 67
Iran

Iran and U.S. Policy (Shultz) 22

Secretary Visits Canada (Clark, Shultz) . . 45
Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet" .... 33
Iraq. Secretary's Interview on

"Worldnet" 33

Japan. Vitality and Possibility on the Pacific

Rim (Sigur) 52

Libya

Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra . . 69
Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet" .... 33
Malawi. South Africa: Toward Peace and

Stability (Crocker) 40

Maritime Affairs. Navigation Rights and the

Gulf of Sidra 69

Mexico. Expanding Freedom: A Formula for

Growth in the Americas (Abrams,

Taylor) 79

Military Affairs. NATO Defense Planning

Committee Meets in Brussels (final

communique) 57

Mozambique. South Africa: Toward Peace

and Stability (Crocker) 40

Namibia. South Africa: Toward Peace and

Stability (Crocker) 40

Nicaragua. Iran and U.S. Policy (Shultz) . 22
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in

Brussels (final communique) 57

Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet" .... 33
Oceans. Navigation Rights and the Gulf of

Sidra 69

Pacific. The U.S. Approach to East Asia and

the Pacific (Sigur) 55

Philippines. The U.S. Approach to East Asia

and the Pacific (Sigur) 55

Presidential Documents. 29th Report on

Cyprus (message to the Congress) 58

Publications

Background Notes 90

Department of State 89

Expanded Chiefs of Mission Volume

Released . . .'. 90

Refugees. Afghanistan: Seven Years of

Soviet Occupation (Karp) 1

South Africa

Secretary Visits Canada (Clark, Shultz) . . 45

South Africa: Toward Peace and Stability

(Crocker) 40

Southern Africa: American Hopes for the

Future (Shultz) 36

Suriname. Secretary's Interview on

"Worldnet" 33

Syria

Syrian Support for International Terrorism:

' 1983-86 (fact paper, chronology) 73

Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response

(Whitehead) 70

Terrorism

Iran and U.S. Policy (Shultz) 22

Syrian Support for International Terrorism:

1983-86 (fact paper, chronology) 73

Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response

(Whitehead) 70

Trade

China Policy Today: Consensus, Consistence,

and Stability (Sigur) 48

Expanding Freedom: A Formula for Growth

in the Americas (Abrams, Taylor) 79

Secretary Visits Canada (Clark, Shultz) . . 45
Secretary's Interview on "Worldnet" .... 33
Secretary's Joint News Conference After

Meeting With EC Ministers (Baker,

De Clercq, Delors, Shultz, Yeutter) 59

Southern Africa: American Hopes for the

Future (Shultz) 36

Vitality and Possibility on the Pacific Rim

(Sigur) 52

Treaties. Current Actions 86

U.S.S.R.

Afghanistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupa-
tion (Karp) 1

China Policy Today: Consensus, Consistence,

and Stability (Sigur) 48

Human Rights Progress in 1986 (Schifter) 67
Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response

(Whitehead) 70

United Nations. UN Administration and

Finances (Walters) 77

Western Hemisphere

Expanding Freedom: A Formula for Growth

in the Americas (Abrams, Taylor) 79

Vitality and Possibility on the Pacific Rim

(Sigur) 52

Name Index

Abrams, Elliott 79

Baker, James A. Ill 59

Clark, Joseph 45

Crocker, Chester A 40

De Clercq, Willy 59

Delors, Jacques 59

Freeman, Charles W 42

Karp, Craig 1

Reagan, President 58

Schifter, Richard 67

Shultz, Secretary 22, 33, 36, 45, 59

Sigur, Gaston J., Jr 48, 52, 55

Taylor, Paul D 79

Walters, Vernon A 77

Whitehead, John C 70

Yeutter, Clayton 59

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buUetBn

Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 87 / Number 2120

March 1987

Terrorism/1

Foreign Affairs Budget/7

Mongolia/41

Western Hemisphere/56

Departntpni of State

bulletin

Volume 88 / Number 2120 / March 1987

Cover:

Art by Juanita Adams (top right);
Details from the Mongolian flag (lower
right).

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletins contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
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should not necessarily be interpreted as
official U.S. policy statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretai-y of State

GEORGE B. HIGH

Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

SHARON R. LOTZ

Assistant Editor

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CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 Practical Measures for Dealing With Terrorism
(L. Paul Bremer, III)

The President

5 State of the Union Address

6 Independent Counsel to Investi-

gate Arms Sales to Iran

The Secretary

7 The Foreign Affairs Budget

Crisis: A Threat to Our Vital
Interests
14 Nicaragua: The Moral and
Strategic Stakes

19 U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf

20 Secretary's Interview on "Meet

the Press"
23 Visit to Bermuda and Africa

Africa

28 Secretary Meets With ANC

Leader Tambo
(Department Statement)

Arms Control

29 The Nuclear and Space Negotia-

tions: Translating Promise to
Progress (Paul H. Nitze)
33 Developments in NST Issues

After Reykjavik (Paul H. Nitze)

36 Nuclear and Space Arms Talks

Resume Round Seven
(President Reagan)

37 Arms Control: The East Asian

and Pacific Focus (Edward L.
Rownyj

Department

40 Instructions to Ambassadors on
Chain of Command (President
Reagan, Secretary Shultz)

Europe

North Atlantic Council Meets in
Brussels (Secretary Shultz,
Final Communique,
Declaration)

Meeting of NATO's Special Con-
sultative Group (Chairman's
Statement)

Human Rights

Soviet Repression of the
Ukrainian Catholic Church

Middle East

51 U.S. Passports Invalid for Travel
to Lebanon (Department
Statement)

United Nations

52 UN General Assembly Review for
1986

Western Hemisphere

56 Visit of Costa Rican President

(Oscar A rias Sanchez, Presi-
dent Reagan)

57 Costa Rica— A Profile

58 Democracy in Latin America and

the Caribbean: The Promise
and the Challenge

Treaties

90 Current Actions

Press Releases

92 Department of State

East Asia

41 U.S. and Mongolia Establish

Diplomatic Relations (Secretary
Shultz, Final Communique)

Publications

92 CSCE Semiannual Report

92 GPO Sales

93 Department of State

Index

"Bringing terrorists to
justice^punishing them — is
the final step in the process
of fighting terrorists. Mereli,
thwarting them is not enoug
for if the guilty can know no
fear, then the innocent can
know no rest. "

An accomplice of the Achille Lauro
hijackers awaiting trial in Genoa on
charges of illegal weapons possession,
November 1985.

FEATURE
Terrorism

Practical Measures

for Dealing

With Terrorism

by L. Paul Bremer,

Address before the Discover

magazine's conference on "Terrorism in
a Technological World" on January 22,
1987. Mr. Bremer is Ambassador at
Large for Counter-Terrorism.

Today I would like to discuss how our
government is working to suppress ter-
rorism. The problem is global, but it
presents a special problem for those of
us who live in democratic countries. We
face this special problem because ter-
rorism's most significant characteristic
is that it despises and seeks to destroy
the fundamentals of Western democ-
racy—respect for individual life and the
rule of law.

Terrorism is very real, the numbers
are sobering.

• Last year there were almost 800
incidents of international terrorism.

• The citizens and property of over
80 countries were the victims or targets
of international terrorist attacks.

• International terrorist activity in
1986 caused almost 2,000 casualties.

For me terrorism has a personal
side. There are memorial plaques in the
State Department lobby listing the
names of American diplomats who died
in the line of duty since 1776. When I
joined the Foreign Service 20 years ago,
there were 81 names on those plaques.
All but four died from earthquakes,
plagues, and other nonpurposeful causes.
But in the last 20 years, 73 additional
names have been added to these
plaques— Americans serving in U.S.
diplomatic missions. In other words, for
the first 172 years of our nation's
existence, we in the Foreign Service lost
a member to violent, purposeful death

about every 40 years. Since I joined, we
have averaged one such loss about every
90 days.

These facts, listed on plaques not 50
yards from my office, are a constant
reminder of the rise of terrorism in the
past two decades. But this rise is not
uncontested. The U.S. Government,
working on its own and in coordination
with friendly states, actively pursues
coordinated strategies to suppress ter-
rorism at home and abroad.

Our strategy stresses practical
measures to identify, track, apprehend,
prosecute, and punish terrorists. Addi-
tionally, we are working to impose diplo-
matic, economic, and— where all else
fails— military burdens on states
supporting terrorism.

Practical Measures Against Terrorists

Let me say a word first about these
practical measures.

Identification of terrorists is the
first and perhaps most difficult step. If

we are to prevent terrorist attacks, if we
are to apprehend those responsible, we
must know several things.

• Which groups are we dealing
with? What are their immediate and
longer term operational plans? Their
political goals? How violence prone are
they? Do they carry out their threats?
Where are their bases of operation?

• Who are the members? How and
why were they recruited? What are their
nationalities, ages, motivations? Are
they prone to suicide attacks? How well
armed and trained are they?

Ill

Putting this information together is
slow, expensive, frustrating, and diffi-
cult. Groups secretive by nature change
their names, rearrange their internal
loyalties and groupings, and change
bases with frustrating frequency. This
makes terrorist groups extremely dif-
ficult to penetrate.

The information which comes to us is
almost invariably fragmentary. In bits
and pieces we pick up the gist of a
meeting, a name, a pseudonym, a
photograph, a sample of a bomb. Intel-
ligence analysts, the unsung heroes of
counterterrorism, work with these
fragments to convert them into the
information we need.

Today we are gathering and sharing
more data on terrorists with allies and
other friendly countries. We and our
allies have developed a number of prac-
tical measures in this field. For example,
our government has drawn up lists of
known and suspected terrorists and cir-
culated these lookout lists among
friendly governments. Every day I read
dozens of cables indicating that intel-
ligence about terrorists has been passed
to us, that we are passing information to
other countries, and that our friends are
sharing with each other.

While we can never know enough,
the effects of these measures are gratify-
ing. Frequently, the understanding
which emerges from pooled intelligence

is greater than the sum of its parts. This
synergistic effect makes the world safer
for all of us.

Second, once identified, a terrorist
must be located and tracked. At inter-
national borders terrorists may be
required to produce identification and
subject themselves and their baggage to
search. Border crosses are thus a weak
spot for terrorists and an opportunity
for us. Just last week, Mohammed
Hamadei, who is suspected of involve-
ment in the TWA Flight 847 hijacking,
was arrested as he attempted to enter
West Germany through Frankfurt air-
port. At almost the same time, another
man was captured by Italian authorities
while attempting to smuggle explosives
into Milan.

To exploit this terrorist vulnerabil-
ity, we must also combat the fraudulent
use of travel documents by terrorists.
The passports of many countries are
often easy for a sophisticated forger to
duplicate or alter. The terrorists who
attacked the Rome and Vienna airports
in 1985 used passports Libya confiscated
from Tunisian guest workers. The prob-
lem becomes even more difficult when
governments issue authentic travel
documents to terrorists, as Syrian
authorities did in the case of Nizar
Hindawi, the man convicted of trying to
bomb an El Al 747 in London last year.

Ambassador at Large
for Counter-Terrorism

L. Paul Bremer, III

was horn in Hartford.
Conn., on Sept. 30,
1941. He graduated
from Yale (B.A..
UHi3). the Institut
d'Etude.'^ Pohtiques
in Paris (CEP, 1964).
and Harvard Graduate
School of Business
(M.B.A.. 1966). He
entered the Foreign

Service in 1966; his first assignment was

Afghanistan and then as economic/political

officer in Malawi (1968-71).

Ambassador Bremer returned to the

State Department in 1971 to serve as opera-

tions officer, staff assistant to the Secretary
of State, special assistant to the Secretary of
State, executive assistant to the Secretary,
and Deputy Executive Secretary of the
Department.

He became deputy chief of mission in
Norway in 1976 and in 1979 became
Executive Secretary of the Department and
special assistant to the Secretary of State.

He was Ambassador to the Netherlands
from 1983 to 1986. He speaks French. Dutch,
Norwegian. Spanish, German, and Persian
and is a career member of the Senior Foreign
Service. Class of Career Minister,

He was sworn in as Ambassador at Large
for Counter-Terrorism on Oct. 17. 1986. ■

The U.S. Government is working nov o
make the travel documents we issue
more secure, and we are cooperating
with other countries to share inform;
tion about false travel documents.

Third, we and our allies must
resolve to act forcefully on the info
mation we have obtained by appre-
hending terrorists. Apprehending te
rorists is inherently more dangerous
than capturing common criminals. Tc
rorists are frequently better armed a
usually more prepared to shoot than
either common criminals or civilian
police. The infamous terrorist Carlos
managed to kill two French policeme
because they thought they were deali
with a common criminal.

Capturing terrorists, therefore,
requires not only well-coordinated int
ligence but policemen armed more lik
soldiers— or soldiers fulfilling functioi
more like those of police. Crisis mana -
ment experts and specially equipped : i
trained forces are needed. Here, too, ?
have developed practical means of
cooperation. Our government provide
training and equipment to nations wl i
are trying to deal with terrorism. Sin
1984, more than 4,000 people from c
40 countries have participated in our
counterterrorism assistance program

This training pays off. On one rec t
occasion, airport personnel in an Asi;
country became suspicious of some
travelers because of their age, nation
ity, itinerary, and spending habits. W n
the suspicions were brought to our at i-
tion, we moved quickly to work with
airline and the security forces of thre
foreign countries to monitor this groi i
movements throughout their travels.

The fourth practical measure is
prosecution of captured terrorists, ;
seemingly obvious step too often no
taken. Prosecuting terrorists in the f: •
of terrorist threats tests political will.
Recently, we have been encouraged b
the actions many countries have taker o
prosecute terrorists in spite of these _
threats.

Department of State Bull

FEATURE
Terrorism

International Terrorist
Incidents, 1981-85

Geographic Distribution of
International Terrorist
Incidents, 1985

Percent

Western Europe-27.9
USSR/Eastern Europe-0.3
North America-0.5-
Asia/Pacific-5.2
SubSaharan Africa-5.2
Latin Amerlca-15.2
Middle East-45.7

In prosecution, too, we have a pro-
gj n for cooperating with friendly coun-
ts i. The United States provides
fd nsic and other technical experts to
as it other countries in their pretrial
in stigations. Through mutual legal
as stance treaties, we make witnesses
01 ther evidence available. At the same
ti: ', we are working with other coun-
tr 5 to strengthen our extradition
cr ties.

Even so, problems remain. We still
3i too many tacit agreements whereby
te orists are permitted free transit of
01 esidence in a country in return for
m attacking the host country's
in rests.

Bringing terrorists to justice —
punishing them — is the final step in
the process of fighting terrorists.
Merely thwarting them is not enough,
for if the guilty can know no fear, then
the innocent can know no rest.
Happily, the rule of law is asserting
itself more and more. We see fewer ter-
rorists released without trial. The
Italians last year tried and convicted the
Achille Lauro hijackers. In October and
November, the British and West German
Governments tried and convicted ter-
rorists for the attempted El Al bombing
and the actual bombing of the German-
Arab Friendship Society in Berlin. Other
important terrorist trials are coming up
in Madrid, Ankara, Paris, Rome, and
Vienna.

These prosecutions must continue.
There is nothing, no case study, no
example, to suggest that there is any
permanent advantage in treating ter-
rorists as other than criminals.

We may be seeing the results of
these measures. Our preliminary figures
show that international terrorist inci-
dents in 1986 were at about the same
level as 1985— a considerable change
from previous years which saw annual
increases of 30%-40%. Moreover, ter-
rorist incidents of Middle Eastern origin
in Europe dropped almost 70% last year.

teh 1987

State Support of Terrorism

While our activities with allies to iden-
tify, track, apprehend, prosecute, and
punish terrorists show progress, that
progress is more difficult and slower
against one particular class of terrorist:
those enjoying the support of a sover-
eign nation. With the help of a friendly
state, a terrorist has capacities he lacks
if he has to act on his own. Especially as
a fugitive.

• When a terrorist obtains travel
and identification documents from a
country, it becomes harder to identify
and track him. When Nizer Hindawi
went to London to blow up the El Al
flight, he carried an authentic Syrian
service passport issued to him.

• A terrorist who enjoys the
patronage of a state has a ready source
of weapons and a means to transport
them. Diplomatic pouches are exempt
from search by international convention,
and the baggage handlers at state-owned
airlines don't interfere when told not to
examine a particular parcel. Nizer Hin-
dawi's bomb was brought into England
by Syria's official airline.

• Countries like Libya, Syria, and
Iran make a terrorist's work easier by
providing a place to train. It is not easy
for a terrorist operating alone, especially
if he is a fugitive, to find an isolated
location where he can learn to fire
automatic weapons, assemble and
detonate explosives.

• Financial support from state spon-
sors allows terrorists to spend more time
on operations because they need not rob
banks or traffic in drugs to raise money.

• States can provide terrorists with
refuge, an important support. Safe
houses allow terrorists a rest from
extraordinary strains of life under-
ground. Being able to live and to plan
future actions without fear of immediate

arrest and punishment is of enormous
psychological value to a terrorist.

The state giving these benefits to
terrorists receives value in return.

• A group of state-supported terror-
ists costs less per year than a company
of regular soldiers. But the terrorists
can do much more to intimidate another
state.

• Using surrogates makes it easier
for the sponsoring state to deny respon-
sibility for actions which, if undertaken
overtly, could lead to war.

• Through terrorism a small state or
leader can attract the attention, if not
the respect, of the world. We know
Qadhafi's name not because of the
"wisdom" in his "Green Book," but
because of his support for terrorism.

Fighting Terrorism Together

It is important that we complement our
practical measures against terrorists
with actions against the states which
sponsor them. We must work with
friendly states to make it clear that we
will not conduct business as usual with
states supporting terrorism.

Simply put, the community of
nations must increase the political,
economic, and, yes, perhaps even the
military costs of helping terrorists until
the sponsoring states cannot afford to
pay them any longer.

Here, too, we are beginning to see
progress. Over the past year, there has
been a growing political consensus
among European governments that
more has to be done. The Europeans
have made nearly a dozen major
statements or agreements concerning
measures against countries supporting
terrorism. These include reducing the
size of the diplomatic missions from
countries supporting terrorism and
declarations that terrorists' attacks can
never be justified and are a disservice to
any political cause.

Specifically, in the last 60 days, Brit-
ain broke diplomatic relations with
Syria, the United States withdrew its
ambassador to Damascus, and the
Federal Republic of Germany announced

that it would stop its development ai( o
Syria. Additionally, the European Co
munity announced a series of econoni
political, diplomatic, and security-reh d
measures against Syria. Why? Clear
sponsorship of terrorists, proven in o n
court.

We have also seen increasing co< >
eration in our efforts to drive home t
message to Colonel Qadhafi. Last
summer West European government
expelled more than 100 so-called Lib^ i
diplomats and businessmen. This hea
blow to Libya's terrorist infrastructu
in Europe, combined with the tighter
security measures at airports and
elsewhere, undoubtedly played a role
sharply reducing Libyan-related terrc Bt
incidents after May. Indeed, prelimin y
figures for 1986 show a substantial
decline in the number of terrorist inc
dents which we can identify as being
conducted on behalf of a state.

Conclusion

Looking to the future, I cannot assur
you a world free of terrorism any mo
than I can offer a world free of crime •
poverty. I can assure you that your
government is working internally,
bilaterally, and multilaterally to redu
terrorism to the absolute minimurh.
There is reason to be optimistic. If tli
terrorists have not gone away, neitht
have we left the field to them.

• Cooperation with friendly govi
ments on practical measures to conili
terrorism is growing.

• There have been significant
displays of coordinated multilateral a
tions against states sponsoring terrdi ii
in recent months.

• The rule of law is at work. In 1 i-
don and Berlin, public trials have
resulted in stiff sentences for terror!.^
And more trials are coming up.

Suppressing terrorism will be neii 'i'
quick nor easy. But I know our
strategies of coordination on the polii
intelligence, and diplomatic levels are
working and showing results. We will
face setbacks. But I am convinced tha
we, the people of the world's democ-
racies, will prevail over those who
would, through terror, take from us tl
fruits of two centuries of political pro;
ress. ■

Department of State Bull

HE PRESIDENT

tate of the Union Address

Excerpt from President Reagan's
hrss before a joint session of the Con-
Ns on January 27. 1987.'^

':■' can also be heartened by our prog-

> across the world. Most important,
i^ierica is at peace tonight, and
fiedom is on the march. We have done
nch these past years to restore our

d enses, our alliances, and our leader-
s 0 in the world. Our sons and
d ighters in the services once again
9ir their uniforms with pride.

But though we have made much
p gress, I have one major regret. I took
a sk with regard to our action in Iran.
Mid not work, and for that I assume
fi responsibility. The goals were
w 'thy. I do not believe it was wrong to
t: to establish contacts with a country
0 trategic importance or to try to save
U s. And certainly it was not wrong to
ti to secure freedom for our citizens
h i in barbaric captivity. But we did not
a ieve what we wished, and serious
n takes were made in trying to do so.
' will get to the bottom of this, and I

take whatever action is called for.

But in debating the past, we must
D deny ourselves the successes of the
f ire. Let it never be said of this
g eration of Americans that we became
s )bsessed with failure that we refused
t ake risks that could further the cause

0 leace and freedom in the world.
Much is at stake here, and the nation

a the world are watching— to see if we
g forward together in the national
ii 'rest or if we let partisanship weaken
u

And let there be no mistake about
i* erican policy: We will not sit idly by
ii ur interests or our friends in the
h Idle East are threatened, nor will we

il to terrorist blackmail.

Xow, ladies and gentlemen of the

1 igress, why don't we get to work?

I am pleased to report that, because

0 )ur efforts to rebuild the strength of
P lerica, the world is a safer place.
E-lier this month, I submitted a budget
ti lefend America and maintain our
nmentum to make up for neglect in the

decade. I ask you to vote out a
iiise and foreign affairs budget that

> "yes" to protecting our country.
lie the world is safer, it is not safe.
Since 1970 the Soviets have invested

: H),000 million more on their military

1 ces than we have. Even today, though

nearly one in three Soviet families is
without running hot water and the
average family spends 2 hours a day
shopping for the basic necessities of life,
their government still found the
resources to transfer $75,000 million in
weapons to client states in the past 5
years— clients like Syria, Vietnam, Cuba,
Libya, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan,
and Nicaragua.

With 120,000 Soviet combat and
military personnel and 15,000 military
advisers in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, can anyone still doubt their
single-minded determination to expand
their power? Despite this, the Congress
cut my request for critical LI.S. security
assistance to free nations by 21% this
year and cut defense requests by
$85,000 million in the last 3 years.

These assistance programs serve our
national interests as well as mutual
interests, and when the programs are
devastated, American interests are
harmed. My friends, it is my duty as
President to say to you again tonight
that there is no surer way to lose
freedom than to lose our resolve.

Today, the brave people of
Afghanistan are showing that resolve.
The Soviet Union says it wants a
peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, yet
it continues a brutal war and props up a
regime whose days are clearly
numbered. We are ready to support a
political solution that guarantees the
rapid withdrawal of all Soviet troops and
genuine self-determination for the
Afghan people.

In Central America, too, the cause of
freedom is being tested. And our resolve
is being tested there as well. Here,
especially, the world is watching to see
how this nation responds. Today, over
90% of the people of Latin America live
in democracy. Democracy is on the
march in Central and South America.
Communist Nicaragua is the odd man
out— suppressing the church, the press,
and democratic dissent and promoting
subversion in the region. We support
diplomatic efforts, but these efforts can
never succeed if the Sandinistas win
their war against the Nicaraguan people.

Our commitment to a Western
hemisphere safe from aggression did not
occur by spontaneous generation on the
day we took office. It began with the
Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and continues
our historic bipartisan American policy.

Franklin Roosevelt said we " . . .are
determined to do everything possible to
maintain peace on this hemisphere."
President Truman was very blunt:
"International communism. . .seeks to
crush and undermine and . . . destroy the
independence of the Americas. . .We
can't let that happen here."

And John F. Kennedy made clear
that " . . .communist domination in this
hemisphere can never be negotiated."
Some in this Congress may choose to
depart from this historic commitment,
but I will not.

This year, we celebrate the second
century of our Constitution. The San-
dinistas just signed theirs 2 weeks ago—
and then suspended it. We won't know
how my words tonight will be reported
there for one simple reason— there is no
free press in Nicaragua.

Nicaraguan freedom fighters have
never asked us to wage their battle, but
I will fight any effort to shut off their
lifeblood and consign them to death,
defeat, or a life without freedom. There
must be no Soviet beachhead in Central
America.

We Americans have always pre-
ferred dialogue to conflict, and so we
always remain open to more constructive
relations with the Soviet Union. But
more responsible Soviet conduct around
the world is a key element of the U.S.-
Soviet agenda. Progress is also required
on the other items of our agenda as
well— real respect for human rights and
more open contacts between our
societies and, of course, arms reduction.

In Iceland last October, we had one
moment of opportunity that the Soviets
dashed because they sought to cripple
our Strategic Defense Initiative— SDL I
wouldn't let them do it then; I won't let
them do it now or in the future. This is
the most positive and promising defense
program we have undertaken. It's the
path— for both sides— to a safer future; a
system that defends human life instead
of threatening it. SDI will go forward.

The United States has made serious,
fair, and far-reaching proposals to the
Soviet Union, and this is a moment of
rare opportunity for arms reduction. But
I will need— and American negotiators in
Geneva will need— Congress' support.
Enacting the Soviet negotiating position
into American law would not be the way
to win a good agreement. So I must tell

jdirch 1987

THE PRESIDENT

this Congress I will veto any effort that
undercuts our national security and our
negotiating leverage.

Today, we also find ourselves
engaged in expanding peaceful com-
merce across the world. We will work to
expand our opportunities in international
markets through the Uruguay round of
trade negotiations and to complete a
historic free trade arrangement between
the world's two largest trading
partners— Canada and the United
States.

Our basic trade policy remains the
same. We remain as opposed as ever to
protectionism because America's growth
and future depend on trade. But we will
insist on trade that is fair and free. We
are always willing to be trade partners
but never trade patsies.

Independent Counsel to
Investigate Arms Sales to Iran

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Feb. 2, 1987.

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

TO THE NATION.
DEC. 2, 1986'

Good afternoon. Since the outset of the
controversy over our policy relating to
Iran, I've done everything in my power
to make all the facts concerning this
matter known to the American people. I
can appreciate why some of these things
are difficult to comprehend, and you're
entitled to have your questions
answered. And that's why I've pledged
to get to the bottom of this matter.

And I have said earlier that I would
welcome the appointment of an inde-
pendent counsel to look into allegations
of illegality in the sale of arms to Iran
and the use of funds from these sales to
assist the forces opposing the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua.

This morning. Attorney General
Meese advised me of his decision that his
investigation has turned up reasonable
grounds to believe that further investi-
gation by an independent counsel would
be appropriate. Accordingly, consistent
with his responsibilities under the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act, I immediately
urged him to apply to the court here in
Washington for the appointment of an
independent counsel.

Yesterday I had my first meeting
with the Special Review Board. That
review board is made up of three men of
unquestioned integrity and broad experi-
ence in foreign and national security
policy.^ In the meeting with the Board,
they promised me a tough, no-nonsense
investigation; and I promised them the
full cooperation of the Wliite House staff
and all agencies of the executive branch.

No area of the NSC [National Secu-
rity Council] staff's activities will be
immune from review. And when the
board reports to me, I intend to make
their conclusions and recommendations
available to Congress and to the Ameri-
can people. With the appointment of an
independent counsel, we will have in
place a dual system for assuring a
thorough review of all aspects of this
matter.

If illegal acts were undertaken, those
who did so will be brought to justice. If
actions in implementing my policy were
taken without my authorization, knowl-

edge, or concurrence, this will be
exposed and appropriate corrective si
will be implemented.

I recognize fully the interest of Ci
gress in this matter and the fact that
performing its important oversight ai
legislative role. Congress will want to
inquire into what occurred. We will
cooperate fully with these inquiries. II
have already taken the unprecedentec-
step of permitting two of my former
national security advisers to testify
before a committee of Congress.

These congressional inquiries she
continue. But I do believe Congress c
carry out its duties in getting the fact
without disrupting the orderly conduc-
of a vital part of this nation's govern-
ment. Accordingly, I am urging the C
gress to consider some mechanism th.
will consolidate its inquiries— such a s^
has already been requested by severa*
Members of Congress. I support the
idea.

In closing, I want to state again tf
it is my policy to oppose terrorism
throughout the world, to punish those-
who support it, and to make common
cause with those who seek to suppres-
This has been my policy and will con-
tinue to be my policy.

If the investigative processes nov-
set in motion are given an opportunifc
work, all the facts concerning Iran ar
the transfer of funds to assist the ant
Sandinista forces will shortly be mad(
public. Then the American people— yc
will be the final arbiters of this con-
troversy. You will have all the facts a
will be able to judge for yourselves.

I am pleased to announce today tl
I am appointing Frank Carlucci as
Assistant to the President for Nations
Security Affairs. A former Deputy Se
retary of Defense, Deputy Director of
the CIA, and Ambassador to Portugal
Mr. Carlucci has the depth of experiei
in foreign affairs, defense, and intel-
ligence matters that uniquely qualify 1
to serve as my national security advis^
The American people will be well serv
by his tenure.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 8, 1986.

^John Tower, Edmund S. Muskie, and
Brent Scowcroft. ■

Department of State BuH'

THE SECRETARY

he Foreign Affairs Budget Crisis:
i Threat to Our Vital Interests

Sicretnry Shultz's statement before
Si II ate Budget Committee on Jan-
. ■// ,'.;. 1987.'^

Tiay's presentation supports the Presi-
dit's fiscal year (FY) 1988 budget
I uest for the international affairs
it ion— budget function 150. I take it
a in opportunity to convey to you my
d p concern about a major foreign
p !cy crisis we are in danger of creating
■( ourselves. It is the danger of missing

nrtant opportunities to advance the
a -rests of the United States because of
r; idly diminishing resources committed
t; nternational affairs.

The fact is, we cannot remain a flrst-
cl ;s world power by committing fewer
ri )urces to our foreign relations than
ativersaries. Nor can we maintain
. political, economic, and human-
it Ian values in a dynamic and threaten-
ir world environment through the
si ngth of our military power alone.
As we face the third consecutive
yi r of sharp cuts in our foreign affairs
iret, I am concerned that the United
es— through a series of reductions in
p pie, facilities, and programs
0' rseas— is mindlessly creating for
it If a strategy of retreat. This budget
CI is is perhaps the most urgent— and
le t recognized— foreign policy
d lenge facing our nation today.

I think all Americans can agree on
tl broad goals of our foreign policy. Put
si Dly, they are to protect our national
M irlty, to promote our domestic pros-
pi ty, to foster democratic values, to
ax ance our humanitarian Ideals, to
0( bat narcotics trafficking, and to
th art terrorism.

Over the last 6 years, this
A tiinistration has worked hard toward
■ ;e objectives. We have made substan-
I irogress toward reinvigoratlng our
mmy, restoring our military
iig-th, and strengthening our ties
; allies in Europe, Asia, Latin
.. erica, and elsewhere. It has Involved
a t of unspectacular but vital
"^ iework— day-by-day management of

policies by the men and women of
ti foreign affairs agencies.
As a result of these efforts on behalf
'resident Reagan's policies, our Euro-
' n alliance is strong and vital. In
> TO. American efforts to advance

peace and progress abroad have been
buttressed by a new sense of vitality and
common purpose. We have also built a
network of strong ties in Asia-
relationships that will be crucial to global
prosperity and regional security well
into the next century.

Through firmness and realism, we
have embarked on a new high-level
dialogue with the Soviet Union— not just
on arms control but on the full agenda of
issues that divide us. And, for the first
time in history, we now have the pros-
pect of negotiating substantial reduc-
tions in the nuclear arsenals of both
sides.

In the developing world, we have
worked to support a remarkable surge
toward democracy, most notably in
Latin America, where the percentage of
the population living under freely elected
governments has grown from 30%
in 1979 to more than 90% today.
Democracy has also made great strides
in the Philippines, in the Caribbean, and
throughout the Third World. More and
more people seem willing to resist
authoritarian or military governments
and the yoke of totalitarian oppressors;
they seek and deserve our help.

We have also seen an encouraging
trend toward free market-oriented solu-
tions to the problems of economic
growth. We now find, almost
everywhere in the world, movements to
decentralize, deregulate, and dena-
tionalize. At the UN Special Session on
the Critical Economic Situation in Africa
last May, the African nations committed
themselves to more open markets and
less state Intervention. Even in the
communist world, reforms in China
demonstrate a growing recognition that
entrepreneurial Initiative in a market
environment is the engine of develop-
ment and growth.

All of this represents important pro-
gress. But there is still much to be done.
Precisely because foreign affairs issues
do not lend themselves to quick fixes,
Americans have to be prepared to tackle
them on a steady, long-term basis. Yet
just as we should be consolidating and
building upon our recent gains, we stand
on the threshold of a major reversal
brought about by penny-wise, pound-
foolish budget decisions.

Last January, President Reagan sub-
mitted to Congress an international
affairs budget for FY 1987 that repre-
sented a sound and prudent investment
in our national interest. The total
request amounted to less than two cents
on every dollar in the proposed Federal
budget, which Itself was within the new
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ceilings. Yet
Congress proceeded to cut that request
by over 20%, reducing our operating
base by $1.8 billion. After accommo-
dating earmarked items which had to be
funded, the effective cut for the bulk of
our operations was more on the order of
50%. This was on top of the $1.5 billion
cut from prior year levels which we
suffered in the FY 1986 congressional
appropriations process, meaning that
over the past 2 years, we lost over
$3.3 billion from the resources we were
operating with in FY 1985. These cuts
were more severe, in percentage terms,
that any other function in the Presi-
dent's budget requests.

These cuts threaten our vital
interests not just in one or two regions
but around the globe. They threaten the
stability of our allies. They threaten our
war on drug traffickers and on ter-
rorists. They threaten our attempt to
promote democratic values and reforms.
They threaten our efforts to expand and
develop trade. And they threaten our
ability to pursue a coherent foreign
policy by undermining our foreign affairs
infrastructure and weakening our career
Foreign Service. In short, by attempting
to save the country some dollars over
the short run, these cuts threaten to cost
us much more— in money, in jobs, even
in lives— over the long run.

The President's foreign affairs
budget might usefully be looked upon as
a form of national insurance. In asking
the Congress to devote only two cents
out of every budget dollar to our foreign
policy goals, the President has deter-
mined the minimum premium we must
pay as a people to safeguard the peace
and lead the free world. If we fail to pay
these costs, we are gambling needlessly
with our nation's future.

No one can say for sure how large
the gamble will be. We know we pay
some price every day in terms of lost
opportunities to influence events.

|rch 1987

THE SECRETARY

State Department Funding, FY 1987-88

Foreign Affairs: FY 1987 Supplemental Request

1987

President's

Request

□ Diplomatic
Security

□ Supplemental
request

1987

Appropfialion

and Suppiemenlal

Request

President's
Request

Fighting narcotics

Base/access rights

Earthquake relief
tor El Salvador

Central America

Southern Africa initiative

Owed to multilateral
development banks

Information and
exchange programs

State Department operations

Foreign Assistance, FY 1988 Request

Department of State Butii

THE SECRETARY

haps a crisis that could have been
rted today by timely and relatively
{pensive security or economic
stance, or through diplomatic efforts,
explode in our faces the day after
lorrow. Then the terrible words of
imas Hobbes will come back to haunt
"Hell," wrote Hobbes, "is truth seen
late."

In just a moment, I will try to give
examples of the real damage this
12 on could inflict on itself if the Presi-
kt's supplemental and FY 1988
■eiests are not passed. First, however,
e ne tell you what we are asking for.

Mget Overview

M FY 1988, the President's budget
■e lest for the international affairs func-
is $19.1 billion. Because this is a net
. IV, the total appropriations request
s .9.6 billion, about $1.6 billion below
.1 FY 1987 request. Of that amount,
L! billion is for foreign assistance.
iL about half of this goes for a few
a )r commitments. As in the past, the
'st single component is the $5.3
>ii for Israel and Egypt— 35% of the
- while assistance to four NATO
^— Spain, Portugal, Greece, and
;ey— and the Philippines accounts for
billion or 14%. Central America and
Ilaribbean represent $1.4 billion or
)f the request. Of the remainder,
;tance to Pakistan, Thailand, Kenya,
alia, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco
another $1.2 billion or 8%. Our
est for Africa is $895 million or 6%
e total. All other country programs
titute $1.2 billion or 8% of the total
urces requested.

n addition, the foreign assistance
lint includes $1.8 billion in contribu-
; ti> the multilateral development
:s or 12% of the total; and the
lining $1.3 billion, or 8%, for such
s as AID [Agency for International
;lopment] noncountry programs,
ntary contributions to international
nizations and programs, narcotics
rol programs, the Peace Corps, and
gee assistance.

The remaining $4.4 billion we seek in
ret function 150 appropriations
lies the operations of the Depart-
t I if State, United States Informa-
Agency, and the Board of Interna-
li Broadcasting. Out of this sum, we
pay our assessed contributions to
national organizations, contribu-
^ to UN peacekeeping activities, and

U.S. participation in multilateral interna-
tional conferences. Finally, we seek a
direct lending program of $1 billion for
the Export-Import Bank.

While I realize this is not within the
specific jurisdiction of this committee, I
think it is important to note that we are
also seeking, on an urgent basis, $1.3
billion in supplemental funds in FY 1987.
This is the minimum amount necessary
to protect our core interests until the
completion of the FY 1988 budget proc-
ess. The supplemental funds will help
meet critical unexpected needs, major
shortfalls from absolutely essential proj-
ects where there are firm commitments
to key allies, and projects which Con-
gress has asked us to consider and fund.
A package of budget offsets has been
submitted to accommodate this sup-
plemental request.

As a former budget director, I know
firsthand the difficult and painful deci-
sions you face in attempting to reduce
the Federal budget deficit. It is a goal
strongly shared by the President and
me. This budget reflects a number of
painful choices we had to make as part
of our contribution to the deficit reduc-
tion target. We had to pare down and
even eliminate programs which, under
other circumstances, would have great
merit. Our proposed program level for
the Andean countries, for example, is far
below the optimum when you consider
our interests and their needs. In Korea,
rather than a brusque cutoff from a
large FMS [foreign military sales] credit
program, it would have been helpful to
provide some transition to strict com-
mercial terms. I could cite many other
examples of programs cut substantially
below the amount my program managers
considered necessary. The point is this
budget is not a wish list. At each stage
of the budget review process we asked
this question: how can we justify these
investments in an age of fiscal restraint?
I hope my testimony will answer that
question to your satisfaction.

My colleagues and I recognize that
we will not get very far without the
cooperation of the Congress. We are
committed to work with Congress. We
welcome your close scrutiny of our
budget proposals, and we will do our
best to respond to all of your questions
in a forthright and timely manner.

Let me now provide you with some
concrete examples of how our resource
requests help promote our objectives.

National Security

Let's start with our national security.
We live in a dangerous world, and we
face the choice of defending ourselves
alone— and, I might add, at tremendous
cost— or working with allies who share
our values and who face the same
enemies we do. We have chosen the
latter course.

Our country's alliances are based on
a sharing of risks and responsibilities.
The Soviet challenge is global. Its
military machine stands poised down the
middle of Europe; pursues its invasion of
neighboring Afghanistan; and actively
arms and supports repressive regimes in
Eastern Europe, Indochina, Ethiopia,
Cuba, and Nicaragua.

Some of our allies, particularly in the
developing world, lack the resources to
provide for their own security concerns
while simultaneously responding to the
basic economic needs of their own peo-
ple. Because we know they must do both
if they are to survive and grow, we must
help them finance the modernization of
their armed forces. Over the years we
have made commitments to do so. Yet
the resources made available this past
year fall far short of these commitments.
For example, in FY 1987, we have had
to slash aid to Spain by 73%. The story
is repeated for Portugal, Turkey,
Greece, and even the Philippines, where
we had to reduce the military assistance
program by 50%.

Such reductions raise fundamental
doubts about U.S. dependability and risk
the loss of vital military and port
facilities. Without these allies and their
facilities, we would have to spend a
great deal more on defense and have
many more of our citizens under arms.
We are, therefore, requesting $2.1
billion in security assistance to the base
rights countries to help modernize their
military forces and— for Portugal,
Turkey, and the Philippines— to assist
them in dealing with their economic
problems.

A region especially crucial to the
United States is the Middle East. We
want to support the Arab-Israeli peace
process, check the spread of Soviet
influence, and maintain free access to
Persian Gulf oil. Our security and
economic assistance programs to Israel
and Egypt play a key role toward achiev-
ing these objectives. So, too, does
assistance to close friends such as

y-ch 1987

THE SECRETARY

Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. Our 1988
budget requests seek $200 million in
military and economic assistance for
these three countries.

Another key ally is Pakistan, which
has voiced its strong opposition to Soviet
aggression in Afghanistan and which is
now host to nearly 3 million Afghan
refugees. Our support for Pakistan is
indispensable if it is to continue to bear
the enormous economic burden of the
Afghan refugees and to negotiate firmly
for Soviet withdrawal. For FY 1988 we
are requesting $678 million in economic
and military assistance to Pakistan.

Central America is of vital impor-
tance to the United States because of its
geographic proximity and strategic posi-
tion. The Soviet Union, through Cuba
and Nicaragua, is seeking to extend its
influence by supporting guerrilla and
subversive groups in Central America.
U.S. policy in the area seeks to counter
the challenge by promoting security,
democracy, economic development, and
social reform. We are asking for $1.4
billion to cover these costs.

Fortunately, massive expenditures
are not needed everywhere; sometimes,
relatively modest sums suffice. In the
South Pacific, for example, we have an
opportunity to strengthen our ties with
the region's nine independent nations
and at the same time put effective limits
on expanding Soviet influence. While the
Soviets have made inroads in the region,
expecially in the area of fisheries— where
for a mere $1.5 million, Moscow has
acquired or is attempting to acquire
fishing rights in Kiribati and Vanuatu— a
small commitment now on our part will
give the region the Western, pro-
democratic, free enterprise alternative it
clearly prefers.

Supporting global measures for
peace also obliges the United States to
play an active role in the United
Nations. In recent years, we have sought
to use our influence to make the United
Nations a more efficient, effective
organization. Last month, the UN
General Assembly enacted by consensus
a far-reaching set of reforms. In addition
to their inherent importance, these
reforms will provide the basis for
rebuilding broad-based U.S. support for
the United Nations as a genuine forum
for conflict resolution. Now it is incum-
bent on us to return to a funding status
consistent with our size, commitments,
and responsibilities.

Finally, the key to all our efforts to
work with governments around the
world is the institution of the Depart-
ment of State. As a result of budget cuts
made to date, the infrastructure of this
department is threatened. We must
reverse the personnel reductions at
home and overseas. And we must pro-
vide the technology and support for our
worldwide operations. If we do not, we
will have less understanding of
developments abroad, less ability to
influence those developments, and insuf-
ficient resources to gain support for
policies serving our interests.

Promoting U.S. Prosperity

Let me turn now to the second great
goal of U.S. foreign policy: promoting
domestic prosperity. Americans usually
suppose that their prosperity is largely
determined by the monetary and fiscal
policies we pursue at home; the fact is,
however, that economic conditions
abroad are having a crucial impact on
the health of the American economy.
About 40% of our exports go to the
developing countries. The accepted rule
of thumb is that $1 billion of exports is
equivalent to about 26,000 jobs. The
developing countries have accounted for
more than half of the growth in U.S.
exports since 1975. Approximately 1 out
of every 20 workers in our manufacturing
plants and 1 out of every 5 acres of our
farmland produce for Third World markets.
I might add that 2 out of every 5 acres
of our farmland produce for export. That's
how interrelated our farm community is
with the international community.

Current economic stagnation of a
large number of developing countries
has vividly— if painfully— highlighted
these relationships. For example,
between 1981 and 1985, the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean
experienced a sharp decline in their real
incomes. Our exports to that region dur-
ing the same period dropped by over $11
billion— equivalent to almost 300,000
jobs. In Africa, our exports dropped by
$1.5 billion. That's another 40,000 jobs.
There's a direct correlation.

It has long been obvious that by pro-
moting economic development we make
a direct contribution to our own nation's
economic well-being. For example, in
1960, Turkey's per capita income was
about $500; Pakistan's was barely $100
per year. By 1985, both countries had
more than doubled their incomes and

had become major purchasers of U.S
products. Since 1979, U.S. exports ti
Pakistan have doubled; to Turkey th^
have nearly quadrupled. So I think y
can see a hard interest which is servi
over time, in generating markets by
assistance programs.

I hope these illustrations make c.
that in order to promote our own Ion
term economic prospects, we must p
mote economic growth in the develojig
countries. It was with such ends in n d
that we initiated a comprehensive
plan— the Baker plan— to get develo) g
countries on a path of sustained
economic growth. The Baker plan ca
for bold and often courageous econoi ;
reforms to be supported by the multi
lateral banks, the private sector, anc
bilateral aid. For the major debtor C( i-
tries, the plan calls for substantial
increases in commercial bank lendin; n
loans from the World Bank and fron
bilateral donors. For the low income
countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Afi i,
IDA [International Development
Association] funds, IMF [Internation
Monetary Fund] reflows, and bilater
grant aid would be used for this crea 'e
effort.

But last year, the first year the | n
was operative, our funding request f
the multilateral banks was cut by a
third. Similarly, bilateral funds were
slashed to a level where we could on
provide 30% of the resources necess '
to support economic policy reforms i
Africa. Clearly, it wasn't only foreig
nationals who were hurt by these cu
All those Americans whose livelihooc
depends on exports to the Third Wo
were victimized as well. And I need
scarcely remind you of the consequei ;s
to our domestic banking system— an<
indeed, the entire world financial
system— should major overseas debti
be thrown into default.

The cuts in our support for the
World Bank and the other multilater
banks are especially damaging. Not ( y
are these institutions at the forefron f
our efforts to get the economies of oi
friends and trading partners in Afric
and Latin America back on their feet
they are also just about the most cos
effective tools we have for leveragin;
resources for these countries. The
United States puts up only a small fr •
tion of the funds mobilized by the W( fl
Bank. For every dollar the United St pS
contributes to the International Devt p-
ment Association, the World Bank's

Department of State Buitin

THE SECRETARY

iliate for aiding the poorest countries,
ler countries contributed three. Con-
'sely, when the United States fails to
low through on its commitments, this
luces the World Bank's lending
)acity far more than the actual cut in
3. support.

To illustrate the devastating impact
3udget cuts on our friends in the
''': ird World, I would like to paraphrase
message I received last month from
ambassador in the Dominican
Fpublic. He reported that during a call

0 President Belaguer, he informed the
Fi'sident that the U.S. sugar quota had

n cut almost in half, costing the
;,minican Republic over $46 million in
feign exchange earnings. Our
e'nomic assistance to Santo Domingo
hi simultaneously been reduced by $30
n lion and our military assistance
g shed by over 50%. Our ambassador
c icluded the conversation on an ironic
n e by wishing the President a Merry
-O'istmas and a prosperous New Year.

1 identally, this is the same Dominican
F 3ublic that President Johnson con-

" ^red so important to our interests in

:> that he sent over 20,000 U.S.
I jps there.

I )moting Democratic Values

1 ! United States also has a vital stake
ii )romoting democratic values and
ii -itutions. This isn't starry-eyed
ii ilism; it is realism. Democratic
n ions respect the rule of law both
d nestically and in foreign affairs; they
g w more rapidly, and they are more
s 3le internally, more capable of
r isting subversion through their own
€ jrts. Thus, in promoting democratic
V lies and human rights, we are protec-
t J our security and prosperity as well
a advancing our most fundamental
ii als.

One country where our successes in
t ; area are especially noteworthy is the
Iilippines. There, President Aquino
c ers genuine hope for establishing a
s ble, democratic, and prosperous coun-
t . U.S. military and economic
a istance is essential to the fulfillment
c these goals. For FY 1988, we are
S'king $261 million for the Philippines
B a tangible demonstration of our un-
e livocal commitment to the Aquino
^v'ernment— and to the stability of the
<lvaronment where two of our most
ilportant overseas bases are located.

In Central America and the Carib-
bean, as well, our continuing policy of
support for prodemocratic forces is
enabling democracy to take root and
become self-sustaining. A few years ago,
critics of U.S. policy toward Central
America were skeptical that democracy
could ever gain support in an environ-
ment where history and economic hard-
ship seemed to conspire against it. They
are less skeptical now. They have seen
the people themselves, in one free vote
after another, demonstrate their belief
that democracy is the road to a better
life for themselves and their children.

But the new democracies of Central
America and the Caribbean desperately
need our economic support. The Presi-
dent's Caribbean Basin Initiative and the
recommendations of the National Bipar-
tisan Commission on Central America
provide a comprehensive national
strategy for such support. Last year, the
Congress sought to provide an additional
$300 million in support of the Central
American democracies. But since the
Congress did not appropriate additional
funds to fulfill that mandate in its
entirety, we will have a cumulative
shortfall from the recommendations of
the Kissinger commission of over $800
million through FY 1987.

The Voice of America (VOA) and
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty also
play an essential role in promoting
democratic values and undermining the
monopoly on information which is a key
element in the Soviet and East Euro-
pean governments' mechanisms for
maintaining their authority. The most
striking example over the past several
years of the power of such broadcasting
occurred in connection with the nuclear
accident at Chernobyl. Western radio
broadcasting spread news of the acci-
dent to the population of the U.S.S.R.
and Eastern Europe and compelled the
Soviet Government to address the con-
cerns of its own people and its Warsaw
Pact allies. The Soviet media became far
more informative on Chernobyl following
reports on the accident already cir-
culating from Western broadcasts.
Indeed, the Polish Government advised
the country's citizens to listen to VOA
for authoritative information on the
accident.

Yet much of the equipment we use
to get our message across is woefully
outdated. In 1983, for example. Presi-
dent Reagan went to the Voice of
America's Washington studios to deliver
a radio address transmitted live to the
U.S.S.R. and other parts of the world in

various languages. His appearance was
only the second such visit to VOA by a
U.S. President; the first was by Dwight
Eisenhower, who broadcast a message to
the world in February 1957. The Reagan
message 26 years later was delivered
from the same VOA facility that
Eisenhower used— with the same elec-
tronic equipment. VOA has undertaken a
modernization program in recent years,
but it still has a long way to go. The
VOA has 6 superpower transmitters; the
Soviet Union has 37. The VOA broad-
casts in 42 languages; Radio Moscow in
80. We can easily win the battle of ideas,
if we have the resources to do so. After
all, we have the winning ideas, and we
simply must put up the resources to get
them across.

Humanitarianism

Let me turn to another broad goal of
American foreign policy— our
humanitarian efforts. The American peo-
ple can be justifiably proud of their
humanitarian instincts. Over the past
few years, the assistance we have pro-
vided has meant the difference between
life and death for literally millions of
Africans who faced the worst drought
and famine the continent has experi-
enced in this century. During the height
of this crisis, the United States provided
2.2 million metric tons of food aid at a
cost of over $1 billion; another $150
million was spent to provide medicines,
shelter, wells, and the other immediate
needs for those worst affected by the
drought. This was all in addition to the
regular economic assistance we provided
during the same period.

Similarly, assistance to Colombia for
its volcanic disaster, major earthquake
relief efforts in San Salvador and Mexico
City, and our support to combat locust
infestations in 17 African countries are
activities of which the U.S. Government
can be proud. Our support for the World
Health Organization and UNICEF has
helped rid the world of some of the most
deadly and contag^ious diseases and has
dramatically reduced infant mortality.

Our assistance to the world refugee
population is especially noteworthy. In
the 6 fiscal years since the passage of
the Refugee Act of 1980, the American
people have offered new homes to more
than half a million refugees— a popula-
tion greater than that for all other reset-
tlement countries combined. And we
have profited a great deal by doing so.

larch 1987

THE SECRETARY

Indeed, we know from experience that
every generation of refugees has made
enormous contributions to all sectors of
our society. Just look at those who fled
from Nazi Germany, from the Soviet
Union, and from Cuba. The benefits this
nation has gained from the refugees who
have sought sanctuary here are
incalculable.

Our position as the acknowledged
leader in assisting the world's
refugees— the victims of oppression in
their own homelands— is further demon-
strated by our generous financial sup-
port to multilateral and bilateral refugee
relief programs. The strong, sustained
interest of the congressional committees
which oversee these programs has
enabled the United States to fund
annually more than 25% of the interna-
tional community's total contribution to
the world's more than 10 million
refugees.

But it seems to me that what we all
seek is the end of the conditions which
create the need for many of these
emergency programs in the first place.
Obviously, we cannot eliminate natural
disasters, but we do have the ability, the
moral imperative, and the national
interest to confront the manmade causes
of poverty and repression.

Our assistance programs do just
that. It is political, economic, and social
turmoil that causes vast numbers of peo-
ple to flee their homelands. Conversely,
the development of democracy and
expanded economic opportunity can
dramatically reduce the number of peo-
ple compelled to abandon their native
lands.

The War on Narcotics

Stemming the flow of narcotics into the
United States is another major priority
for all Americans, regardless of political
affiliation. But this is a costly undertak-
ing. You cannot just force farmers in
most drug-producing countries to stop
growing their best cash crop without
offering them economic alternatives.
You cannot expect the governments of
these nations to launch major programs
without the economic resources to sus-
tain them. And you can't expect drug
traffickers and narcoterrorists to give up
their very lucrative business without put-
ting up a fight— and, in fact, they are
working overtime to elude interdiction
efforts and undermine democratic
institutions by intimidation, corruption,
and violence. Thus, if we're serious
about stemming the flow of drugs into

our country, we must be prepared to use
every resource at our command-
economic and military assistance as well
as narcotics control funds.

This is what we are doing, for exam-
ple, in Bolivia. Our military assistance is
buying trucks and boats which the army
and navy need to carry police forces to
raid laboratory sites; our development
assistance is being used to promote rural
development and small industry, thereby
helping farmers to stop growing coca for
their livelihood; and our narcotics con-
trol money is being used to pay for police
interdiction activities and public
education.

The democratic Government of
Bolivia is embarked on a courageous bat-
tle, putting its very survival at stake, to
shut down the second largest source of
cocaine to the United States and
Europe. Bolivia's leaders invited U.S.
forces into their country last summer to
assist in destroying cocaine laboratories
in Bolivia and in so doing drove the sales
price of coca leaves below the cost of
producing them. Now they want to
follow up with legislation which will
attack the problem systematically and
comprehensively. However, this means
depriving as many as 350,000 people,
one-sixth of their population, of their
current means of livelihood and helping
these families with alternatives.
Impoverished Bolivia cannot accomplish
this herculean task, so important to us,
without a substantial increase in our
assistance.

The other Andean countries of Peru,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela are
also engaged in a war against narcotics
traffickers and the M-19 terrorists.
These countries signed a treaty this past
year— named in the memory of the Co-
lombian Minister of Justice slain by nar-
cotics traffickers— pledging regional
cooperation against narcotics trafficking
and production. And they are following
up on their pledge with concrete actions.

• Colombia has eradicated 85% of
the marijuana cultivated in traditional
growing areas through an aerial her-
bicide program, using U.S. -provided air-
craft and communications equipment.

• In Peru, the Garcia government is
actively engaged in the eradication of
coca and has aggressively destroyed
laboratories and airstrips used by
cocaine traffickers. Additional program
support in FY 1987 is essential to rein-
force Peru's initiatives in narcotics
control.

These successes demonstrate how
critical our resources are in winning t
battle against narcotics. If we cannot
provide this vital assistance to the
Andean nations, we will not only be
sending a signal that we are unreliabl
and indifferent to their problems; we
also set back our own campaign to
create a drug-free America. Yet fund;
we planned to make available to the
Andean countries were slashed by
almost half because of budget cuts we
sustained this year.

Finally, waging an effective war (
drugs requires us to cooperate with
friends and allies through the drug ag
cies of the United Nations. The UN n;
cotics agencies share our goals; they ;
working to gain control over the prod
tion and abuse of psychotropic
substances. In addition, this year the
United Nations will probably complet
convention on illicit trafficking which
will support our own national policies
Here, too, however, budgetary con-
straints may force us to reduce furthe
our funding to UN agencies dealing w
narcotics issues.

Combatting Terrorism

I need not belabor the threat of ter-
rorism before this committee. In 198f
the last full year for which we have
detailed analysis, we counted nearly i
international terrorist incidents. A th
of those incidents caused casualties, v
over 800 killed and 1,200 wounded.
These figures tend to understate the
actual level of terrorist activity, since
incidents confined to one country, wit
the nationals of only one country
involved, are not included.

Knowing as you do the figures
presented by the Inman commission, ;
realize that protecting ourselves agaii
terrorism does not come cheaply. Dea
as protection is, however, we know th
the money is necessary. Aggressive
intelligence analysis, heightened secui
awareness, and enhanced physical
security helped to thwart 120 planned
terrorist incidents last year. Although
protection of sources and methods
preclude my making public all these
examples, I can cite a few.

• In Baghdad, there is little doub1
that the 9-year-old daughter of our
deputy chief of mission escaped death
serious injury when the reinforced gla
in the residence windows withstood th
blast of an Iranian surface-to-surface
missile which exploded nearby.

Departnnent of State Bull*

THE SECRETARY

Reinforced window structures
)bably saved lives when a 122mm
Kket struck the residence of our
ibassador in Beirut.

• Vehicles as well as structures

ist be protected. In Central America a
ssion staffer's official vehicle was hit
six different bullets, none of which
letrated the armor.

But let me make it clear that our
eorts to counter terrorism extend
c.'ond looking after our own. We, of
cirse, have a special responsibility to
tj)se we send abroad to conduct the
r:ion's business, but most of the
r lions of Americans who live, work,
ai travel abroad will not be saved by
tcker armor and more guards. There is
r; enough brick, mortar, and armor
p te to protect all our citizens and
iierests. We cannot, must not, just sit
ai wait for terrorists to strike. We
r. st continue to address the terrorist
p iblem more assertively.

The use of force must always be
p sent in our list of options. But there
i) nore to an aggressive counterterrorist
p icy than using force against ter-
r ists. We must and do work with other
r. ions to identify, track, apprehend,
p secute, and punish terrorists. This
r uires that we:

• Closely cooperate with other

r ions on counterterrorism efforts;

• Persuade those nations reluctant
t ;ooperate in combating international
t rorism; and

• Provide training and other

a istance to those with the will but not
t means.

Cooperation such as this has begun
a 1 is showing results. This progress is
n nifested in a series of joint declara-
t IS, such as those at the Council of
I rope in Strasbourg, the declaration at
t economic summit in Tokyo, by the
I ropean Community, and by the NATO
I -liamentary Assembly. The progress
15 nore than rhetorical. Nations are
ii reasingly adhering to the rule of law,
ii tead of sometimes releasing captured
t rorists. Terrorists have been con-
vted in London and Berlin and indicted
ii\nkara. Other trials are coming up in
fme, Madrid, Karachi, Vienna,
\ lletta, and Paris. These declarations
a i prosecutions would not have been
fusible without increased international
c iperation.

We and other countries are also
sengthening the existing extradition
tiaties. For example, the Senate last
\ ir ratified the amended extradition

treaty with the United Kingdom. We are
also drafting amended treaties with
other nations to make it more difficult
for terrorists to avoid extradition on the
pretense that they were committing
"political acts" rather than criminal
deeds.

Our efforts to promote international
cooperation against terrorism in the
specialized agencies of the United
Nations are also beginning to bear fruit.
The International Maritime Organization
has adopted measures to assist countries
in protecting ports, ships, and
passengers. It is currently working on a
convention which will strengthen the
ability of the international community to
punish or extradite terrorists acting
against ships and crews. Similar
measures are in train or have been taken
by the International Civil Aviation
Organization. These are actions we have
initiated or supported. Regrettably,
budget cuts have prevented us from
meeting our relatively modest
assessments to both the International
Maritime Organization and the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization.

These successes only represent the
opening shots in the war against ter-
rorism; more, much more needs to be
done. Yet now, of all times, the United
States is having trouble of its own in the
battle against terrorism. Our hearts are
in the right place, but where are our
resources? We have been unable to
obtain enough funding to strengthen our
embassies and other overseas facilities
as quickly as we should against terrorist
attacks. We have difficulty in finding the
money for antiterrorism research and
development on such projects as coming
up with better ways of detecting
explosives or chemical and biological
agents at a time when the terrorists are
becoming more innovative.

The information and insight
necessary to fight terrorism dramatize
the need for a professional and vigorous
U.S. Foreign Service. To take account of
developments abroad in the formation of
policy, we need accurate and up-to-date
reporting on political and economic con-
ditions around the world. Bear in mind
that over three-quarters of the reporting
and analysis used by the U.S. Govern-
ment comes from Foreign Service offi-
cers stationed around the world. These
are the same officers who also work to
gain support for our policies. Yet we will
have to reduce sharply our overseas
staff; we are being forced to shut down
another seven consulates, in addition to
the seven posts closed last year; and we
have to cut back on our foreign language
training at overseas posts by 50%.

Make no mistake about it. Our ability
to understand and influence the interna-
tional environment in support of the
interests of the United States is depend-
ent on a strong, career Foreign Service.
Though a small part of the international
affairs budget, a sound foreign affairs
infrastructure is essential. In seeking to
maintain it, we face direct budget cuts,
massive exchange rate losses, and differ-
ing rates of inflation. But we must find
the necessary resources, since that will
determine in large part whether or not
we can successfully pursue a coherent,
sound, and strong foreign policy.

We in the Administration and you in
the Congress must make many difficult
choices in these times of severe fiscal
restraint. As we make those choices,
many of which deal with the vigor of the
national economy and the health of our
society, we must not impair our ability to
influence a world which will set the
limits to our national possibilities.

Conclusion

I hope my presentation today has helped
to clarify just how the foreign affairs
budget enables us to pursue our specific
national interests. But as I pointed out
at the outset of my testimony, over the
past 2 years. Congress has reduced the
foreign affairs budget far too drastically.
Unless we take action now to reverse
current trends, many foreign policy
gains we have made in recent years
could be wiped out.

What, then, must be done to narrow
the gap between our interests and our
capacities to pursue them? Well, the
obvious first step is to restore the funds
that have been cut and review the
obstacles to using our funds as effec-
tively as possible. But we must do
something more. We must also relearn
an old and very important lesson— a
lesson which was well-understood 40
years ago but is in danger of being
forgotten today.

This fundamental lesson is that it
takes resources— modest, but sustained,
and applied credibly over time— to
advance the national interests of the
United States. The expenditure of such
resources is not a "giveaway"; rather, it
is an essential investment in a better
future for ourselves and our children.

How do U.S. resources advance
American interests abroad? The Mar-
shall Plan is a dramatic example.

girch 1987

THE SECRETARY

Designed to restore a war-ravaged
Europe and prevent the spread of com-
munism, the plan cost American tax-
payers about $14 billion. When it was
first proposed in 1947, critics of the plan
argued that it was wrong to use tax-
payers' money for Europe's internal
needs. But their opposition was
overcome— and rightly so. For today it is
clear that the Marshall Plan was not
simply an act of giving on an unpre-
cedented scale. It also saved Western
Europe from Soviet domination— and
saved the United States from the
disastrous consequences that a Soviet-
dominated Europe would have had on
our national security, our economic pros-
perity, and our democratic values.

The success of the Marshall Plan 40
years ago demonstrates that foreign
affairs is not always a "zero-sum game."
We do not necessarily advance our own
vital interests at another nation's cost.
On the contrary, more often than not,
the most effective way of promoting our
basic goals is by working with others to
achieve their basic goals. That is what a
Democratic President and a Republican
Congress understood in 1947 when they
allocated 1 1 cents out of every Federal
dollar to fund the Marshall Plan. And
that is what I hope you will all bear in
mind as you consider the President's
request to allocate only two cents out of
every Federal dollar to support the
whole foreign affairs budget.

Let me conclude by taking note of a
happy coincidence. This year marks the
bicentennial of the Constitution and the
40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan.
Both of these milestones should lead us
to pause and reflect on the nature and
purposes of American government. The
bicentennial reminds us that it is possi-
ble to establish a government powerful
enough to meet its global responsi-
bilities, yet sufficiently constrained to
be able to safeguard the rights of
individual citizens. The Marshall Plan
reminds us that when our government
has a clear sense of purpose, it can
change the course of world history for
the better. It is still within our power to
change the course of world history for
the better. The opportunities are there.
We need only to grasp them.

Nicaragua: The Moral
and Strategic Stakes

■Press release 36 of Jan. 26, 1987. The
complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary Shultz 's address before the
American Bar Association in New
Orleans on February 12, 1987.'

As Americans, we have all grown up
knowing certain fundamental facts about
our country. We know that we are free
and have fought to remain so. We know
that we are strong and must sacrifice to
remain so. We know that the world is
dangerous but that in it we have allies
who have helped us and whom we have
helped. And we know that we are
surrounded by friends and oceans and
that throughout our history our enemies
have, blessedly, been far away. For more
than a century and a half after the proc-
lamation of the Monroe Doctrine, this
latter fact— that geography is our ally
and our neighborhood is peaceful— has
been a key to our security and our ability
to protect our interests by projecting
power across the globe.

The oceans have done more than
help to preserve our security and inde-
pendence. They have also enabled us to
cultivate freedom. Since the American
Revolution, our hemisphere has stood for
something: for opportunity; for the
chance to start over; for the freedom to
choose your own leaders and way of life;
for tolerance. What was new about the
New World was not just its break with
the past but the insistence that freedom
was the proper measure of nations.

The realities of the New World have
often fallen tragically short of these
ideals. The majority of this hemisphere's
citizens have not enjoyed the blessings
and opportunities of North America. Nor
was there freedom here for preconquest
natives or for those who arrived after-
ward as slaves. Latin America has suf-
fered dictatorship and instability for
most of its history. As recently as a few
years ago, only one-third of Latin
America enjoyed democratic
government.

Now all that is changing— a change
that bears witness to the power of our
shared ideals. Over the past 10 years,
Latin America has experienced an
extraordinary democratic awakening. In
country after country, from Argentina
to El Salvador, civilian rule has replaced
military dictatorship. Today, 90% of the
people of Latin America and the Carib-
bean enjoy democratic government.

Latin America's turn to freedom
moral victory for democracy, self-
determination, and the rule of law. F(
the United States, it is a victory with'
strategic importance as well. Techno!
in the postwar era has shrunk the glo
while politics has divided much of it ii
two opposing camps. Faced with a
smaller world and powerful adversari
the free nations have learned that we
must band together against common
threats to our security and civilizatior
Thus, the democratic explosion in Lat
America is not only a triumph of the
spirit; it is a strategic asset for the
United States and its allies.

In Latin America, therefore, our
moral principles and strategic interes-
coincide. The United States believes £
affirms that— and I quote from the
Charter of the Organization of Ameri'
States (OAS)— "The historic mission (
America is to offer man a land of
liberty." We recognize, moreover, tha
the security of this hemisphere depew
on our own determination to keep
would-be aggressors at bay.

Strategic Realities

Early in the Second World War, Gen i
U-boats destroyed U.S. merchant shi]
ping in the Caribbean at a faster rate
than we could replace it. We saw thei
that there are limits to the security
offered us by oceans and friends. Ne\ ■
theless, we have continued to base ou
strategic doctrine on forward defense
and on collective defense.

This has meant that we have beei
spared the burden borne by many cou
tries of drafting our youth into large
standing armies to defend our own
borders. We have also managed to
reduce the costs of a modern defense
establishment by not having to maint;
the quantity of ships and planes aroui
our own perimeter that would be
required if there were a greater threa
in our own neighborhood or if we did t
have a network of friends to participa
in our mutual defense efforts.

One serious blow to this hemi-
sphere's security was struck in 1959,
when Fidel Castro established a com-
munist dictatorship in Cuba and brouj.
that island into the Soviet camp. In sh t
order, it became clear that Castro was

Department of State Bull i

THE SECRETARY

'•mmunist, that he was a thoroughly
pendent and dependable ally of the
viets— so much so that they sought to
ploy nuclear weapons in Cuba but, in
' event, were not able to do so because
. our firm and determined opposition.
Today, the Soviet Union does, how-
i.er, use Cuba as an important military
fcse in this hemisphere. From Cuba, the
Jviet Union flies reconnaissance flights
I and down the east coast of the United
Sites; in Cuba, the Soviet Union has a
f rt of call for its submarines; from
(ba, the Soviet Union monitors U.S.
cnmunications, using one of the largest
ad most effective electronic surveil-
llice sites in the world. Cuban troops
a as Soviet surrogates in Ethiopia and
I gola; the Cuban Government smug-
g s arms and provides aid and training
t ^errillas and terrorists throughout
t' Western Hemisphere. In the event of
aonventional war in Europe or the Per-
E^ n Gulf, Cuba would constitute a threat
t jur ability to aid our allies and defend

0 ■ strategic interests in those vital
r ions.

We have managed to contain the
t eat posed by the Soviets' use of Cuba
a 1 strategic platform and as a base for
s version in our hemisphere. But make
E mistake about the costs. We risked
E dear confrontation with the Soviet

1 ion over the removal of their missiles.
1 lay, we must spend billions to

s ;ngthen our counterintelligence appa-
r as and our naval and air defenses
a inst Soviet use of an island 90 miles
0 our shore. We have responded to our
f; nds in the Caribbean by helping them
r :ue Grenada from the consequences
0 Soviet expansionism. And we have
h to spend hundreds of millions
b ding up defenses of Cuba's neighbors
a inst Castro's guerrillas and the ter-
ri ists they train.

Fortunately, many of us have also
k 'ned some lessons from the Cuban
e erience. We learned that as much as
0 sympathies as a revolutionary nation
n / lie with those who overthrow dicta-
te ships, revolutions can be subverted by
' led communists into more enduring

repressive forms of tyranny. We
t 'ned that, even though the Western
H nisphere united early on in its resolve
'intain the Soviet and Cuban threats,
i-ommunists, over a quarter century,
he absence of any effective internal
')sition, were able to increase their
fulness to the strategic designs of the
lets. And we learned the value of
h an outpost to the Soviet Union,
eh spends over $4 billion every year

to sustain it— three times what the
United States spends for all forms of
bilateral assistance in all of Latin
America and the Caribbean.

In 1979, another Latin American
regime emerged that began almost at
once to betray its pledges of democracy,
to engage in armed intervention in the
affairs of its neighbors, and to invite a
massive presence of forces hostile to the
Western democracies onto the American
mainland: Nicaragua.

The Case Against Nicaragua

Betrayal of Democracy. We see here a
betrayal of democracy. The war against
Somoza was fought by business and
labor, by the church and the press. One
week before Somoza's fall in July 1979,
the Nicaraguan junta members assured
the Secretary General of the OAS in
writing that the junta was establishing a
broad-based, democratic government in
Nicaragua. Within a year, however, the
two noncommunists on the junta, Violeta
de Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo, were
forced out, as the communists continued
to consolidate control over both the
government and the armed forces. The
promised elections were not held for 5
years, and then only under rules care-
fully engineered by the communists and
after attacks by the so-called divine
mobs on the political opposition.

Mrs. Chamorro's La Prensa, the
largest independent paper in the coun-
try, soon came under censorship and was
shut down in 1986. One by one, all other
independent voices— including the
Catholic radio station— were silenced.
Archbishop Obando y Bravo, who had
courageously defied Somoza, found
himself isolated and vilified when he
tried to call attention to the abuses of
the communists. Several of his priests
were set upon by the government-backed
mobs or expelled by the comandantes.

Democratic labor unions were
crushed by the authorities and replaced
by communist-dominated fronts.
Selected business leaders were detained.
Some were murdered. The climate for
private enterprise became so inhospit-
able that the economy went into a nose-
dive and agricultural production col-
lapsed. Just this month, private sector
leaders called a press conference to
announce that "private enterprise is
arriving at its end." More than 7 years
after taking office, the comandantes pro-
claimed a new constitution, replete with
a host of hidden provisions to assure
their total control— only to suspend even

the appearance of civil guarantees 3V2
hours after proclaiming them to the
world.

We care about the people of Nicara-
gua; but our interest goes beyond simple
concern. The new Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States provides that
"representative democracy is an indis-
pensable condition for the stability,
peace and development of the region."

Armed Intervention. There should
be no mistake about the threat that the
communist regime in Managua poses to
that region. Having declared their fealty
to the "principle of revolutionary inter-
nationalism," as they call it, at a
September 1979 meeting of the party's
leadership, the comandantes set out
vigorously to implement it.

El Salvador became the first target.
In June 1980, Managua offered the
Salvadoran guerrillas a headquarters for
their military high command, along with
advice, materiel, and a promise to
assume "the cause of El Salvador as its
own," they said. The flow of arms from
Nicaragua to El Salvador surged in
preparation for the communists'
so-called final offensive against the
Government of El Salvador in January
1981. Shipments have continued at vary-
ing levels of intensity ever since. Today,
the military leadership of these com-
munist guerrillas continues to operate
from Managua, which also serves as a
communications hub, medical evacuation
site, rest and recuperation center, and
major transit point for guerrillas trained
in Cuba and the Eastern bloc.

Guatemala was another early target.
Its four guerrilla groups signed and dated
their statement of "revolutionary unity"
in Managua in November 1980.

Honduras became subject to
Nicaraguan aggression as a result of its
being on the land transit route of arms
from Nicaragua to El Salvador. In
January and April 1981, Honduran
authorities intercepted two large arms
shipments. In March 1981, Honduran
terrorists hijacked a Honduran airliner
to Managua to obtain the release of 10
Salvadoran guerrillas who were then
flown to Cuba. A series of terrorist acts
followed. Nicaragua has also made incur-
sions into Honduran territory with its
regular armed forces.

Costa Rica, despite its early support
for the Nicaraguan revolution, was not
spared. Beginning in March 1981, Costa
Rica erupted in a series of terrorist acts
linked to Nicaragua, whose defense

rch 1987

THE SECRETARY

minister expressed his disdain for Costa
Rica's "bourgeois democracy." On
May 31, 1985, Nicaraguan Army troops
fired on a Costa Rican Civil Guard unit
in an unprovoked attack. Costa Rica—
which has no standing army— remains
particularly vulnerable to the Nicara-
guan military machine.

Colombia became a more recent tar-
get. When the M-19 guerrillas attacked
the Palace of Justice in 1985— judges
and lawyers, here, pay attention— and
murdered members of the Colombian
Supreme Court and others, they used
weapons supplied by the Nicaraguan
communists.

And we see the pattern today. We
see the joining of the drug traffickers
and the terrorists. The drug traffickers
provide the money, and the terrorists
provide the muscle. And when members
of the court are set to rule on extradition
of drug traffickers and criminals, this
unholy combination sets out to murder
them and intimidate them, intimidate
the government, and intimidate the
process of justice, and these people have
safehaven in Nicaragua.

All of the above charges have been
documented in State Department
publications, particularly the September
1985 report, "Revolution Beyond Our
Borders" (Special Report No. 132).

Within a year of seizing power, the
comandantes had created an armed force
twice the size of Somoza's. Today, their
75,000-man active duty force is by far
the largest in Central America.

A Soviet Stepping Stone

Let me read you an excerpt from a 1 986
report by our embassy in Managua,
obviously written by somebody who had
experience elsewhere.

The Nicaraguan communists celebrated
their anniversary this year on November 7,
exactly the anniversary date of the Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia. . . .

For anyone who has been in Moscow's
Red Square on November 7, what happened
here on that day and the next was redolent
with similarities evoking those sounds and
sights.

All of the things present in Moscow, or
almost all, were to be found in Managua on
the day of its parade, November 8. Just as the
Soviet Defense Minister begins ceremonies by
taking the salute of his troops standing in an
open car before returning to the top of the
Lenin mausoleum to join his colleagues for
the march past, so Humberto Ortega did the
same in Managua to recorded hurrahs of the
troops. Then the parade began with various
Sandinista units marching in tightly formed

squares using the port arms' tradition of the
Soviet forces and the goosestep borrowed
from the Prussians by the last czars for their
household regiments, but in our time sharply
odorous of Nazi parades.

Then came armored personnel carriers,
towed artillery, and tanks. The only thing
missing from the Soviet model were the inter-
continental ballistic missiles with the
warheads painted red which always bring up
the end of a Moscow parade.

The Nicaraguan troops are uniformed
exactly like Soviets, the marines looked just
in from the Baltic Fleet at Kronstadt. The
infantry formations could have been Soviet
regiments uniformed in sand-colored fatigues
for Afghanistan.

The T-55 tank commanders in their
leather helmets were directly out of a Soviet
armored division, and the reservists carried in
Soviet trucks with their wide-beamed Soviet
helmets recalled the motorized rifle divisions
one sees in the Western military district of
the Soviet Union.

The first Cuban military advisers
arrived in Managua the day the new
government took over. Soviets, East
Germans, Libyans, North Koreans,
Bulgarians, and PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization] members joined them
in short order. Today, some 7,000-8,000
military and civilian Eastern-bloc
"advisers" play a role in all aspects of
Nicaraguan life— including the organiza-
tion of such critical functions as the state
security apparatus.

The first Soviet-made armor arrived
in Nicaragua in early 1981. The main-
stay was some 110 Soviet-made T-55
medium tanks, with the amphibious
capability to which the comandantes
have now added some 30 Soviet PT-76
light tanks. None of Nicaragua's
neighbors have such weapons.

Like Cuba, Nicaragua is becoming a
strategic asset to the Soviets. At Punta
Huete, the Nicaraguans, with Cuban
assistance, have built a 10,000-foot
airstrip— large enough to handle any air-
craft in the Soviet arsenal, from high
performance MiG fighters to recon-
naissance planes (some of which have
already begun operations in Nicaragua)
to Bear bombers. A naval port on
Nicaragua's Pacific coast would enable
the Soviets to fuel and service sub-
marines. In short, in Nicaragua the
Soviet LInion is putting in place the
means to threaten our ability to assist
our Asian allies and defend our shipping
lanes— just as today, from Cuba, it
threatens our links to Western Europe
and the Middle East.

In outlining the preceding charges
against Nicaragua, I have placed con-
siderable emphasis on the period from
July 1979 until the end of 1981. By all

accounts, including the Nicaraguan co
munists themselves, they faced no
significant armed threat, either intern
or external, at that time. Somoza and .
apparatus had been swept aside by a
broad popular revolution with help fr(,
democracies around the world. The
United States supplied $118 million in
economic assistance during that
period— one of the highest per capita
levels anywhere. We were wary of tht
self-proclaimed communists in the
government but were willing to give t
coalition a chance. It was only in
response to the clear-cut Nicaraguan
actions— crushing the internal politica
opposition, conducting armed aggress i
against its neighbors, and abetting a
Soviet security threat to the United
States— that our government embarki _
on its present course of action.

The U.S. Response

The United States has always opposei
intrusion into this hemisphere that
threatens democratic and independen'
government. When President Monroe
announced the doctrine that bears his
name in 1823, it was in response to tl
threat that the Holy Alliance would
reestablish monarchies in those count
which had declared their independenc
of Spain and Portugal.

In the 1930's when war clouds w(
gathering in Europe, President
Roosevelt pushed vigorously for
arrangements with our Latin Americ
neighbors to defend this hemisphere
against the Axis Powers. Before Woi
War II, we agreed with our southern
neighbors on many cooperative arran
ments to strengthen the countries in
hemisphere, including a collective sec
rity arrangement that became a form
treaty obligation in 1947. It was this
same Rio Treaty that President Kenr
relied on in 1962 during the Cuban
missile crisis. So our concern about
Soviet bases in Cuba, and about the
steady development of Nicaragua as
another Soviet base of operations, is
unique in our history. Quite the con
trary: we seek to sustain a policy thai
has been fundamental to our security
and truly bipartisan through all admii
trations for some 200 years.

Our policy in Central America is
solidly based on treaties and inter-
national law. When the comandantes
Nicaragua, through their support of
guerrillas seeking to overthrow the
governments of their neighbors, com-
mitted unprovoked and aggressive ac
in violation of the Charters of the Un

THE SECRETARY

,tions and of the Organization of
lerican States and of the Rio Treaty,
ly thereby triggered an obligation on
1 part of the United States to deal
jmptly and effectively with this
rression. It is, of course, not only an
igation of the United States, but of all
t'mbers of the Organization of
/lerican States. We, and our friends in
Cntral America, have taken self-
d'ense measures which are entirely con-
stent with our treaty obligations. We
bend to continue those measures until
eective steps have been taken to
rnove the threat posed by Nicaragua in
Cntral America.

Our actions in Central America are
lursuance of a comprehensive
r.ional strategy. After years of
rional debate, false starts, legislative
r trictions, and ad hoc remedies, the
I ited States last October enacted
liislation to— reading from the legisla-
1 1—" . . . promote economic and
pitical development, peace, stability
a 1 democracy in Central America, to
e ourage a negotiated resolution of the
flict in the region. . .and to enable
President to provide additional
e nomic assistance to Central American
d nocracies as well as assistance for the
> araguan Democratic Resistance. ..."
Many of the programs to implement
t strategy voted out by majorities of
b h Houses of Congress and signed by
F 'sident Reagan have been in place for
s le time; some were initiated by the
p vious Administration. Bipartisan sup-
p t for democratic government has
y ded dramatic results in El Salvador,
■ i iduras, and Guatemala. The Carib-
b n Basin Initiative and the economic
n isures undertaken in response to the
t ort of the National Bipartisan Com-
n sion on Central America chaired by
t iry Kissinger have given new hope
fi the economic development of the
C itral American region. We have
w "ked— with the ABA, in fact— to
iiirove the administration of justice by
biding the skills, facilities, and tech-
Uues of lawyers, judges, and prosecu-
t(3 throughout the hemisphere. Our
nitary assistance, which has been
aut one-third as much as our economic
distance, has helped El Salvador to
tin back Nicaraguan-supported guer-
re IS and has given a new sense of con-
iice to the region in general.
Last year, a bipartisan majority in
' igress added a new feature to our
itegy which the President considered
'■ntial— a credible element of pressure
lersuade the comandantes in Nicara-
i to come to the bargaining table to

talk seriously. In our democratic society
we are accustomed to bargaining for the
general welfare and deciding things by
majority rule. Dictatorships do not
bargain that way— they are used to dic-
tating terms from the barrel of a gun.
They are willing to make concessions
which we would regard as reasonable
only if enough leverage is exerted to
make it in their interest to do so. The
only objective of these dictatorships is to
remain in power and to reap the rewards
that power bestows.

The Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance and the Nicaraguan opposi-
tion in general have been trying to get
the commidayites to the bargaining table.
So have the Central American
democracies. So have we. The resistance
has grown from a handful in 1982 to a
force of some 20,000 Nicaraguan
volunteers from all elements of society.
Despite their inexperience in dealing
with the Sandinista army, trained and
equipped by the Soviets and the Cubans,
and our own inconstancy in supporting
their fight against communist oppres-
sion, they have held on. They are
prepared to add their strength to a
Nicaraguan population that wants
freedom but has become dispirited
through vigorous repression by their
own government and a seeming lack of
will and vigor on the part of neighbors
whom they throught they could depend
on. It is simply unrealistic to expect the
Nicaraguan people, held hostage with a
gun at their head, to put down their
oppressors without some gims in their
own hands provided by friends and
neighbors.

We have cooperated in the Conta-
dora process as one way of achieving a
negotiated resolution of the issues and of
bringing to an end Nicaragua's violation
of its treaty obligations. But we have not
been content to sit idly while the coman-
dantes stall on an agreement so that
they can consolidate another Soviet
stronghold on the mainland. We have
waited for over 4 years while the coman-
dantes have stubbornly resisted any
serious discussion in the Contadora proc-
ess of democracy in Nicaragua and any
cessation of their massive arms buildup.
Special emissaries of the President have
met with the Nicaraguan comandantes
and repeatedly with other concerned
Latin American leaders. I went to
Managua myself for a meeting.

The United States has remained con-
stant in its support for a comprehensive,
verifiable, and simultaneous implementa-
tion of the 21 objectives agreed on by all

countries in the Contradora peace proc-
ess. We are naturally concerned because
Nicaragua has avoided since 1983 any
serious effort to implement these objec-
tives. Instead, the regime has persuaded
the Contadora countries to go on to
other statements and other draft pro-
posals that ignore the basic issues.

Our policy objectives are very
straightforward. We want a democratic
government in Nicaragua. We want the
regime there to stop persecuting its peo-
ple, to respect human rights, and to stop
subverting its neighbors. We want the
foreign military personnel to go home,
whether they are from the Soviet Union
or communist Cuba. We do not want
Nicaragua to be a base for our enemies.
Nor do Nicaragua's neighbors. The
military establishment in Nicaragua
must be reduced to what is acceptable to
Nicaragua's neighbors so that they do
not feel threatened. Nicaragua's leaders
must meet the standards that they have
set for themselves when they promised
democracy, respect for human rights,
and a fair system of justice.

The com,andantes have a choice: they
can keep the promises they made to
their people and the international com-
munity to get into power, or they can
accept the risk of more violent and less
voluntary changes down the road. No
one knows how change will come in
Nicaragua or what kind of victory it may
require. But this much is certain:
Nicaragua will change. The tyranny
there is out of step with the aspirations
of the Nicaraguan people and the
realities of this hemisphere.
Nicaragua— as the communists might
say— is on the wrong side of history.

Our strategy on Central America is
sound. It is rooted in our historic policy
of a hemisphere free from alien dictators
and oppressors; and it is consistent with
traditional standards of international
law, our treaty obligations, and our own
laws.

Our right of self-defense, and of col-
lective defense with our democratic
allies, is an inherent and necessary
aspect of our sovereign rights. We can-
not abandon the very fundamentals of
American liberty and security because
the choices are difficult and the going
tough. Today's controversy over the Iran
arms deal must be dealt with as a matter
of purely domestic concern. It is irrele-
vant to the strategic and moral realities
we face in this hemisphere. Our laws
must be obeyed and enforced, as the
President has made clear. But decisions
regarding the security of our nation
must look beyond a session of Congress

Arch 1987

THE SECRETARY

or a presidential term. Those making
such decisions must consider the legacy
they leave to a future Congress— to all of
their successors— and, most of all, to the
American people.

It is already evident that the coman-
dantes in Nicaragua are bent on a course
that poses a threat to our security. No
matter how they disguise it or how
skillful they are in manipulating public
opinion and the media, it is a threat that
will ultimately affect the security of our
treaty partners and the United States.
Unless we meet this threat now, before
it develops further, we may, within a
few years, face a strategic crisis. The
Soviets have tried that once in this
hemisphere, and we should not deceive
ourselves into believing that they will
not try it again. The prospect of a
second communist base in our
hemisphere will certainly persuade the
Soviet Union to go further, confident in
their own view that we do not have the
will and capacity to defend our friends,
our allies, and our interests around the
world. The danger ahead is not so much
that a people such as ours will yield to a
clear and present danger— we won't—
but that inaction and irresolution in a
murky situation today may be costly
later on, in lives and in every other
sense.

By supporting those Nicaraguans
now who are fighting for their liberty,
we may avoid direct military involve-
ment by the United States in the future.
We and our allies are fortunate that we
have a multitude of friends in Nicaragua;
that brave Nicaraguan men and women
are fighting their own battle for
freedom. Their fight serves the interests
of the democracies as much as it does
theirs. They need our support— and they
cannot succeed without it— just as the
Nicaraguan communists cannot become
entrenched and remain without the sup-
port of the Soviet Union and Cuba. I
have heard it said that the democratic
resistance in Nicaragua cannot win. We
should read again the history of our own
fight for independence. Those on the
side of liberty and human dignity are on
the side of history. We cannot become
faint-hearted because of the words of
those who equate morality with nonin-
volvement. We must help those willing
to fight for their freedom against tyr-
anny. It would be immoral to abandon
them.

Our persistent support for
democracy in this hemisphere has been
vindicated by experience. Nicaragua,
Cuba, and the Soviet Union tried to

snuff out freedom in El Salvador by
arming Salvadoran communists. We
stepped in, not to restore the old order
or military rule but to support leaders
committed to a democratic solution.

El Salvador shows what can be
accomplished if we lend our support to
those who struggle for freedom. The
guerrilla war continues today in that
country and still takes a heavy toll. But
democracy is growing ever stronger.
Despite the war, President Duarte and
the civilian government have stuck to
the democratic agenda with free,
periodic, and competitive elections.
Civilian institutions are gaining
strength; political violence is sharply
curbed. The political opposition has free
rein— in the legislature, in labor unions,
in public demonstrations. Last year I
saw for myself how the Salvadoran
people rallied courageously to deal with
a devastating natural tragedy in the
form of an earthquake. It would be a
tragedy of our own making if we were to
abandon Central America now and leave
the field to the communists in Nicara-
gua, Cuba, and the Eastern bloc.

The lesson of El Salvador is that the
ideals uniting this hemisphere are not a
passing fancy; they are alive and firm.
When people committed to democracy
stand together in a common struggle,
when we stand for principles and work
patiently together, we are successful.
Those who repeatedly said that El
Salvador was a lost cause were wrong. If
they had had their way. President
Duarte would have had to fight without
our help. That lesson should not be lost
on any of us in the executive branch or
in the Congress, regardless of political
party. Commitment to democracy should
not be a matter of party— in the United
States or anywhere else. The economic
and military ingredients so essential in
turning the tide against the spread of
tyranny and in favor of freedom in El
Salvador were provided by bipartisan
majorities in the Congress.

In the coming months and years, we
will no doubt be required to confront

again and again whether we are
prepared to stand for freedom in this
hemisphere— in Central America.
History will judge us by our ability to
make the right decision every time. T
strategic stakes are clear: whether wt
will permit the Soviet Union to acquii'
real power in the region from Mexico
the Panama Canal; whether we will pi
mit the Soviet Union to sit astride oui
lifelines, not only to South America bi
to Europe and the Pacific.

Nor could the moral lines be draw
more clearly. If we were to abandon t
people fighting for freedom in
Nicaragua, what would our word be
worth? What could we then say about
our commitment to democratic princi] s
if we allow our democratic friends to
thrashed by Soviet-backed tyrants in s
hemisphere?

We cannot afford weakness and
vacillation at this critical moment. Ou
friends and allies, who look to us for
leadership, can afford it even less. Mi
is resting on our shoulders. Too many
free peoples around the globe depend i
us for mutual support and cooperatioi
and, above all, for our continued
vigilance.

Nowhere in the world are the stal .
higher than they are now in our
hemisphere— in Central America. The
strategic and moral issues speak for
themselves. It is up to us to show the
will and the resolve to support those
fighting for their independence and tl r
freedom and, in so doing, for security
and freedom in this hemisphere.

'Press release 41 of Feb. 13, 1987, wh
includes question-and-answer session. ■

Department of State BuH

THE SECRETARY

i.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf

Sicretary Shultz's statement before
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
January 27, 1987.^

lippreciate this opportunity to testify
c American interests in the Persian
C If and the importance of some recent
cv'elopments there. Chief among these
i,;he Iran-Iraq war, whose continuation
featens the stability of neighboring
s.tes and the pursuit of our interests in
t! region. The outcome of this war will
s ect the strategic shape of the Persian
(,lf and Middle East for years to come.
I s, therefore, important to focus on
1 5. policy toward the war and the
r^on at large.

Stability in the Persian Gulf matters
t as for three reasons.

First, it is critical to the economic

Y ilth of the West. An interruption in

t ■ flow of oil or control of these energy
r ources by an unfriendly power could

Y le devastating effects on the pattern
c world trade and on our economy.

Second, our interests would suffer
g :atly if Iranian expansionism were to
s ivert friendly states or otherwise
I )st anti- American forces within the
r :ion.

Third, as part of the strategic
c ssroads of the Middle East, this area
r st not come under the domination of a
f ver hostile to the United States and
i allies. Therefore, America's near-
t m priority is to reassure the gulf
i ab states of our support and to stand
I f t on our antiterrorism and arms
c bargo policies.

1 5. Policy Toward the War

i ice the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war
i September 1980, the United States
] 5 sought the earliest possible end to
t ' conflict— one which would secure the
i lependence and territorial integrity of
I* countries, as well as security for
t rd parties in the region who now are
c ectly threatened by the conflict. We
1 ve pursued these goals through the
1 lowing policies.

• We have been denying Munitions
.■ 5t equipment to both Iran and Iraq.
' ere was a limited exception to this
licy, as you know. There will be no fur-
?r exceptions— no more transfers of
S. -origin military equipment to Iran,
her directly or through any third
rty.

• We are supporting all reasonable
diplomatic efforts to encourage Iran to
abandon its unwillingness to negotiate
an end to the war. These efforts have
included U.S. encouragement of the UN
Secretary General, the Nonaligned
Movement, and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference— which is holding its
summit in Kuwait this week. The prob-
lem has been lack of Iranian interest in
any peace proposal— except on Iranian
terms.

• Therefore, we are also energeti-
cally pursuing efforts to inhibit the
resupply to Iran from third countries of
significant weapons systems and spare
parts which might enable Iran to carry
the war further into Iraqi territory. This
is our Operation Staunch, which we will
continue to pursue in an energetic and
determined manner.

Because of our concern over the
possible spread of the Iran-Iraq conflict
to third countries in the gulf, we have
publicly and privately reiterated our firm
commitments to the security of non-
belligerent gulf states. We have
repeatedly warned Iran that any exten-
sion of the conflict would be regarded as
a major threat to U.S. interests.

Our relations with these countries-
including the members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman)— are important to
our long-term security interests. The
war directly threatens their security as
well as their economic survival. We have
publicly stated our fundamental interest
in helping the gulf states defend
themselves against attack or subversion.

The war has also highlighted
overlapping interests with Iraq, as it
defends itself against Iranian attack.
The news of our limited arms shipments
to Iran was a shock to Baghdad, and it
has put some strain in our relationship.
Nevertheless, I think both sides under-
stand that we share an overriding com-
mon interest in finding an early end to
the war. For our part, the United States
will continue to pursue this objective;
and we will do all we can to reaffirm the
strength of our policies toward the gulf.

Long-Term American Interests

Our current policies, of course, reflect
longstanding interests in this region.
Hence I want to review our goals and
objectives in the region as a whole.

American interests in the Persian
Gulf have long been readily defined. We
have an overriding strategic interest in
denying the Soviet Union either direct
control or increased influence over the
region or any of its states. We have
major political interests in the
nonbelligerent gulf states, both in their
own right and because of their influence
within the gulf and beyond. And we have
a vital economic stake in seeing that the
region's supply of oil to the West con-
tinues unimpeded.

Our multiple interests in the gulf
give us common ground with its various
states. As I have mentioned, they share
our overriding concern with economic
and political stability. Their economic life
depends on the flow of oil to the
industrialized world. Anything that
might disrupt their commerce— war,
political instability, terrorism, or
subversion— is against their interests as
well as ours.

Iran is an important element of our
considerations as we pursue these multi-
ple interests. That country has been, and
remains, a major factor in the region,
both because of its size and strength and
because of its strategic location
alongside the Soviet Union and Soviet-
occupied Afghanistan. Iranian policy has
a direct impact on our strategic,
political, and economic stakes in the gulf.
And the current Iranian Government
directly affects us in another way:
through terrorism, which it continues to
support and export as an instrument of
state policy.

Historically, we have also shared a
strategic interest with Iran, whose
geography makes it a natural buffer
between the Soviet land mass and the
Persian Gulf. Soviet designs in the
region can be seen in the Soviet occupa-
tion of Iran in 1946 and in its invasion
and subsequent occupation of
Afghanistan. The Government of Iran
has, of course, been highly critical of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan— a
political fact that underlines a certain
commonality of interests between us.

Our various interests in the region
give the United States an obvious stake
in better relations with Iran. As you
know, we sent a signal of our intentions
in the form of an authorized transfer of
arms to that country. That signal did not
elicit an acceptable Iranian response;
and it will not be repeated. While we
have an interest in improving our rela-
tions with Iran, the Iranians have an
interest in normal dealings with us as
well. And until they recognize their own
interests, and act upon them, our rela-

;]iarch 1987

THE SECRETARY

tions are unlikely to improve. We have
said, and we reiterate, that several
issues stand in the way of better rela-
tions between us: the Iran-Iraq war and
Iranian support for terrorism and
subversion in the neighboring states.

Let me conclude with a note about
the future of our relations with Iran. The
President has said that the United
States recognizes the Iranian revolution
as "a fact of history." We bear no malice
toward the Iranian people. But Amer-
ican interests are directly threatened by
the Iranian Government's pursuit of its
war with Iraq, by its sponsorship of ter-
rorism, and by its collusion with terrorist
forces elsewhere in the region. We can-
not hope for progress without fundamen-
tal changes in Iranian policy and prac-
tice. Nor can we pursue better relations
with Iran to the detriment of our many
other interests and commitments in the
region.

We look to an eventual improvement
in U.S. -Iranian relations. But American
good will cannot wish that future into
existence. Iran's rejection of its bellicose
and terrorist policies will be a necessary
first step to any progress that might
follow.

'Press release 29 of Feb. 5, 1987. The
complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ■

Secretary's Interview
on "Meet the Press"

Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on January
18, 1987. by Marvin Kalb, NBC News;
John Walcott. The Wall Street Journal;
and Barry Schweid, The Associated
Press. '

Q. There is a fairly widespread impres-
sion here in Washington that time is
running out on the Administration's
chances of negotiating a new arms
control agreement with the Soviet
Union and that success in the next 2
years may be measured more by its
ability to mark time than its ability to
achieve a new agreement.

Do you feel that we do have
enough time to negotiate an arms con-
trol agreement with the Russians?

A. Sure.

Q. You do?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. Do you feel that the
United States, in the resumed Geneva
talks right now, has received some
indications from the Russians of a new
seriousness? Have they come in with a
new proposal perhaps?

A. I think the talks got off to a good
start. Max Kampelman [head of the U.S.
delegation to the nuclear and space arms
negotiations] and his new opposite
number Vorontsov, had a good discus-
sion, exploratory discussion. And the
various negotiating groups got down to
business promptly and, in fact, started
doing some things that we had been try-
ing to get the Soviets to start doing
right after Reykjavik; namely, to con-
solidate the tremendous achievements
the President and Mr. Gorbachev made
there and sort out what was agreed to,
what's not agreed to, what the differ-
ences are, and so on.

Q. But as yet, no new proposal?

A. No.

Q. On either side, I take it.

But back here at home, it seems
the Administration is beginning to put
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
into action, and I wondered if that
doesn't eliminate any chance of a com-
promise, and how you feel about it.

A. There is no decision about that.
It's being examined, as I know. The
object of the research, of course, is to
find something that can be useful, and
just what the stage is exactly right now,
we're all looking into.

Q. But doesn't deployment, or at
least anticipated deployment, mean
that the Soviets will, number one, see
that there is no trade-off possible; and
number two, get awfully alarmed and
speed up their aggressive offensive
proposals?

A. Right now, the proposal on the
table is, under the right circumstances,
for a 10-year agreement to stay within
the treaty— nonwithdrawal, in other
words, not deployment.

Now, of course, that can get
adjusted as it goes along. But what that
reflects is that the SDI has already been
deployed in the sense that it's really got
the Soviets' attention and no doubt is
one of the reasons why they were ready
to make some of the possible agreements
they put forward.

Q. When you refer to remaining
within the treaty for 10 years, I
assume you're referring to the Anti-
ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think it's possible for
the United States to deploy some seg
ment of the "star wars" system
without violating that treaty? And
should that be the goal of anything v
do?

A. It all depends on what's deployi
But under the ABM Treaty, you can
make certain kinds of deployments on
the ground; and, in fact, the only
deployed ABM system anywhere is
deployed by the Soviet Union, as you
know, around Moscow. But that is not
necessarily what is being talked about.

Q. But you think there is room
under the terms of that treaty for th«
United States to go ahead and deplov
some sort of ballistic missile defense^

A. There is explicit authorization i
the treaty for a particular sort. Wheth
it is wise to deploy that sort is another
question.

Q. There have been a number of
difficult questions raised [about the
Iranlcontra scandal] and difficult
words used, and I want to get into
your particular relationship to it.

Henry Kissinger, for example in
recent article, without mentioning
your name, used the expression "pro
tective ignorance," and I think he
meant that you were taking the posi*
tion that you didn't know about cer-
tain things that had happened. A
number of other people —

A. I wasn't taking the position tha
didn't know about certain things; I
didn't know about certain things.

Q. Okay. And a number of other
people were saying that this is all an
example perhaps of selective respons
bility. The question that I want to as
you is this: When this all came up, h( i
do you justify, as a Secretary of Stat'
assuming responsibility proudly for
areas of American foreign policy and
then pulling back and saying, "Reall
I couldn't accept responsibility
because I didn't know" about other
areas of American foreign policy? i
You're Secretary of State for all of
them.

A. Of course.

Deoartment of State BullS

THE SECRETARY

Q. So how do you explain that?

A. I have a lot of responsibilities; I'm
jrcising them strongly under the
ection of the President. We talk back
1 forth about things. I don't always
t my way.

As far as the arms sale to Iran is
icerned, my position was made clear;
i as this process went on, there were
■qte a number of times when I felt that
t"re was no arms sale connection to it.
M the rest of it— that is the Presi-
flit's desire to see if there couldn't be

!U' kind of different Iran, particularly
II i post- Khomeini Iran— I felt was a
g)d idea.

Q. Okay. But we are also told that
rht after the January 1986 meeting,
ji t about a year ago, you walked out
othat meeting feeling pretty well, we
a told, that the President was going
t?o forward with arms to Iran, and
t hostage issue was raised time and
t le again.

Why didn't you stand up at that
p nt, since you felt so strongly about
t issue, and do something more than
s iply walk away?

A. I did make my views known
p iodically; and as I just finished say-
ii , the finding that was read out was
n known to me, nobody told me that.

Q. Didn't you get inklings of this
ii he spring?

A. I had some inklings. I also was
s wn a set of talking points that were
U )e used in a meeting with Iranians
tl t were perfectly fine talking points,
C' sistent with the sort of approach that
i ould have thought made some sense.

Q. Let me ask you about the talk-
11 points. The former national secu-
r ' adviser, Mr. McFarlane, told the
S late Foreign Relations Committee
li t Friday that he was given those
ti iing points as he prepared to make
tl t trip to Tehran, and asked who had
bn involved in preparing them, and
V s told that you had helped prepare
t m and that the President approved
t m.

What you're saying now is that
i'se talking points made no mention
0 irms for Iran even though there
vre arms on the plane that took Mr.
J> Farlane to Tehran?

A. The talking points that I saw
\ re prepared for what was thought to

1 meeting Mr. McFarlane would have,
i remember, in Frankfurt sometime
t Her— I think in late March or

something like that. So I assumed that
the talking points probably are the same
ones he used, and they didn't have
anything about arms for hostages.

Q. But did you know that there
was going to be a mission to Iran
undertaken by representatives of the
President?

A. Look, what I have to say about
this matter, I have researched out; I've
looked over all the documents I have;
I've made notes as I went along. I've
made all this available to the various
investigative authorities; I've testified
on it. And I have two instructions from
the President: number one, say what you
know and completely put forward to the
relevant committees and investigative
groups whatever you know about this.
That's instruction number one. And
others have the same. His desire is to
get all this out.

And then number two, he looked me
in the eye and he said, "George, you've
got a lot of work to do, so get at it," and
that's what I'm doing.

Q. Wasn't it clear that— call it a
deal or call it whatever — the bottom
line for the Iranians who had a war
going on, and still do. is getting
weapons from the United States, that
they took that as a mark of accept-
ance, as a mark of support, as a start-
ing point? So how could the talking
points — how could the Iranians be
approached without arms being part of
it from the very beginning?

A. The reason for wanting to have
any contact with the Iranians now, for
that matter, is of their geog^raphic loca-
tion, the fact that they have a long
border with the Soviet Union, that they
are concerned about the Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan, as we are. In other
words, there are certain strategic inter-
ests that we have in common. So there's
something to work with there.

Our position has been— and is
today— that, first of all, Iran is the
intransigent party in the Iran-Iraq war,
and we'd like to see that war come to an
end without victor or vanquished and,
therefore, we have tried to stop arms
sales to Iran by ourselves or anybody
else. And the President has publicly
stated the reason why he made an excep-
tion in certain cases.

Second, Iran, while it had a period of
apparently less terrorism directed at
Americans, as the President has said, for
a period, nevertheless is a state that has
practiced terrorism, and we have to look
at that whether it's practiced against
Americans or anybody else. And I

believe the evidence is very strong that
Iran has a lot of control over what hap-
pens to our hostages. So we have to have
those points in mind in any discussions
we have with Iran.

Q. I've got to go back to the begin-
ning on this thing. We have all covered
you now for years, and we have heard
you a hundred times speak with great
fervor about your opposition to
terrorism.

A. Right.

Q. That's your policy.

A. That's the President's policy, and
that's the policy that makes sense for
the United States and our friends
around the world.

Q. And you have articulated it very
strongly. And some of us wonder why
it is that when you had even inklings
that this country was going to give
arms in exchange for hostages, you
didn't "blow your stack" and walk out
of the office.

A. I made my position very clear.
And as far as the process that unfolded
was concerned, there were various
points in which it seemed to me it had
been decided or somehow that particular
dimension wasn't going forward. Now it
has turned out that it was, and that's a
problem.

Q. Mr. McFarlane's testimony sug-
gests something else also that's
intriguing — suggests that somehow
this was Israel's idea, suggests
somehow that Israel made the deci-
sion, and just a couple or three people
over at the White House deferred to
Israel, and somehow this small
country determined U.S. policy. Is that
a fair representation?

A. I didn't get that from Mr.
McFarlane—

Q. Was this our decision to send
McFarlane to Iran?

A. —but Israelis were involved in
discussions with him, and that's how this
got started, as I follow it. But in the end
it is not up to somebody else to make our
decisions for us; it's up to us to decide,
and we have to decide in the light of our
interests what it is that we want to do
and take responsibility for it, so we can't
blame anybody else.

Q. Let me ask you about the contra
half of this, for a moment. Were you
aware that during the time when Con-
gress had cut off U.S. military aid to
the Nicaraguan rebels, American
diplomats and intelligence officials in

Irch 1987

THE SECRETARY

Costa Rica— and also in Honduras —
were still in contact with the rebels,
were helping arrange the construction
of an air strip in Costa Rica to be used
by the rebels, were helping coordinate
supply flights to the rebels?

A. Certain things were legal and cer-
tain things weren't. And you remember
the Congress appropriated $27 million
for humanitarian assistance to the peo-
ple fighting for freedom and in-
dependence in Nicaragua, and you have
to get it to them somehow or other. So
that's a perfectly legitimate thing to do;
in fact, you're mandated to do it by the
law of Congress. And to the extent they
worked on that, there's nothing wrong
with that.

Q. You said certain things were
legal, certain things were illegal.

A. That was just a description of the
law.

Q. Are you aware yourself of what
was illegal that was carried out?

A. I'm learning about some things,
but obviously I wasn't aware of the
illegal things to the extent they took
place while they were taking place.

Q. A moment ago also, you talked
in terms of the terms of reference that
were passed on to McFarlane, and I
believe you said that they did not con-
tain reference to the hostages or arms
for the hostages.

A. What I saw didn't.

Q. Because we have something
here which purports to be terms of
reference, and it says among other
things, "We may be prepared to
resume a limited military supply rela-
tionship that has to do with arms.
Your influence in achieving the release
of all hostages is essential as part of
this."

Isn't that what you were all talk-
ing about? Wasn't that the whole
point?

A. We should emphasize to Iran
now, and any other time, that we expect
them to use their influence to release our
hostages. We want that. Now that
doesn't mean we should pay for it, but
we want that; and we want to let them
know that—

Q. But didn't you know at the
time —

A. —and I hope they're watching.

Q. But didn't you know at the time
that arms were being supplied for the
hostages, that that was the point we
were getting at?

A. I knew about some incidents
beforehand that had aborted, but insofar
as what I read was concerned, it didn't
contain that structure.

Q. It would seem, then, that the
United States was carrying out a
policy that had neither the support of
the Secretary of State nor the
Secretary of Defense, and I wonder
how much force there could be to such
a policy? And aren't talking points
prepared at the State Department, in
the first place?

A. These were prepared over in the
NSC [National Security Council].
However, I looked at them, and I've
already commented on them. Insofar as
the policy of trying to position ourselves
differently with respect to Iran and have
some impact on Iran's general stance is
concerned, that's a policy that the Presi-
dent decided on and which everybody
supports. In fact, I sense that there's no
particular disagreement about that.

Q. No, but that's sort of what I
was getting at before — the Israelis.
There was a feeling within the U.S.
Government that there is a moderate
faction in Iran that, arms or not, could
be encouraged and could have an
impact on Iranian policy.

A. I've never used that word,
"moderate," but there are apparently
differences of opinion, different factions,
as you'd expect in any society. And
whether they are moderate or what they
are, perhaps they have a little different
view than some of the more extreme
people and give you something to work
with.

Q. Back on the contra side of it
again, both the Central Intelligence
Agency and the President's Intel-
ligence Oversight Board have been
reviewing the conduct of intelligence
officials in Costa Rica. I'm curious
whether the State Department has
undertaken a similar review of the
actions taken by the embassies in Cen-
tral America in support of the contras.

A. We have been reviewing those
things, and, of course, there are various
investigations going on, and fundamen-
tally what we've been doing is
cooperating with those investigations.
The FBI is conducting one, to some
degree in conjunction with the special
prosecutor; the Senate and the House
are conducting them, and so on. We're
making information available to them.

Q. But you don't have an in-house
investigation of your own going?

A. You have to do that in order to
make the material available. We make
available what we have.

Q. Your Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, Elliott
Abrams, has said several times in the
past week on television that if it is ni
the contras who are going to do the
job of eliminating the Sandinista
regime, it will have to be the U.S.
Marines. Do you agree with that?

A. I think that the policies we have
toward Central America are right and
very important for the security of our
country. Let me review them.

First of all. we want to see in Cen-
tral America, and elsewhere, govern-
ments that are based on the idea of
democracy, freedom, and the rule of la
We want to see economies that can ■
develop and move forward and have I
material benefits for the people of the I
country. m

We see that happening in Hondura
in El Salvador, in Guatemala, along
with, of course, the traditional Costa
Rica. That represents a big achievemei
over the last 4 or 5 years. The rotten
apple in the barrel is Nicaragua, and al
the people down there know it. The
totalitarian form of government that
they seek to impose on Nicaragua is ba
news for everybody. I

There are a lot of people in r

Nicaragua who don't like it— not
surprisingly— and they are ready to fig
for freedom and independence in their
country; and we're helping them.

Maybe it will come about that, just
as apparently the Soviet Union is findi'
that it can't win a military victory in
Afghanistan and suppress the Afghan
people, maybe in the end the Nicaragua
communists will come to the conclusior
that they can't do it either.

Q. Do you believe that if the con-
tras can't do it, the United States wil i
have to send the Marines in to do it?

A. The problems that can take plac
if we back off from supporting decency
and democracy right here on our own
land are very serious; and if that sprea(
on up and spreads onto Mexico, it will
pose a grave security problem for the
United States, and we'll have to think i
over carefully. But I'm not going to pui
my foot in the hole you want me to.

Department of State Bulle

THE SECRETARY

Indian
Ocean

I am here because of Presi-
dent Reagan 's desire that
Africa understand our com-
mitment to play a positive
role in Africa 's development
and to forge a solution to the
intractable problems that
bedevil southern Africa. We
are not casual dabblers in
the continent. . . . We are
serious players in the long
haul, and we intend to use
our influence and leverage in
the most positive and con-
structive way possible.

Nairobi, Kenva

trasting experiences, as people have
sought out what works and doesn't
work. The turning point in thinking
came about a year and a half ago, when
the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
declared: "The primacy accorded the
state has hindered rather than furthered
economic development." The OAU then
reiterated this message at a historic
meeting at the United Nations last May.
Here's another quote, this one from the
OAU's preparatory document for the
recent UN special session on Africa's
economy. It said that "the African coun-
tries should adopt fundamental changes
in their development priorities and
policies."

Those words point to real change.
They signal a movement toward
enlightened economic policies at a time
when Africans need them most. And let
me add that the man in the forefront of
this progressive movement has been
Senegal's President Diouf. It was his
vision that brought the OAU to its
remarkable new perspective on develop-
ment; and it was his leadership that
guided the organization through a pro-
ductive and perhaps historic session of
the United Nations.

When the OAU presented its
unprecedented message to the special
session last May, I was privileged to
come, and I observed that: "The United
States comes to this special session with
hope. We salute the. . .Organization of
African Unity ... for the new directions
which the African nations have pledged
for themselves. And we welcome this
session of the General Assembly as a
way of translating their pledge into
action."

The United States stands behind
those sentiments today. We continue to
believe that the message of that special
session is one of unique opportunity and
hope. We believe that the reforms called
for by the OAU offer vast promise for
Africa's economic development. And we
reiterate our belief that the UN special
session was a landmark in the search for
a new and hopeful vision of the conti-
nent's future. President Reagan's objec-
tive in sending me on this week's trip is
twofold: to carry a message of friendship
and encouragement to the leaders and
peoples of Africa and to add our own
push to the efforts needed to turn the
opportunities before us into reality.

We meet at a time when the images
of Africa as a continent in crisis continue
to move the world. In the past few
years, Africa has known tragedy in the
forms of drought, plagues of locusts and
grasshoppers, and the disaster at Lake

Nyos in Cameroon. Then there are the
continent's manmade scourges— tyranni
apartheid and other forms of racial
discrimination; and war, which continue
its economic and human toll in southerr
Sudan, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Chad,
and Angola.

Yet these disasters comprise only
part of the continent's landscape. In
many respects, Africa is a land of
natural wealth— a continent endowed
with vast underdeveloped arable land,
with untapped hydroelectric resources,
and with quantities of fresh water that
could, if put to use, turn barren fields
into breadbaskets. The problem lies in
getting from here to there.

Fortunately, both Africa and the
West are better positioned to succeed
now than we were a decade ago. Both
now have the benefit of experience. Boi "
have learned a lot about what does and
doesn't work.

Experience on both sides has con-
firmed that human action— in the forms
of government policy and private
economic activities— is the single most
important variable in producing
economic growth. It was enlightened
government policies that brought the
success stories of the developing world
into relative prosperity; and it is goveri
ment policies that can make the dif-
ference in sub-Saharan Africa between
stagnation and growth, starvation and
survival— indeed, more plentiful food ai
healthy diets.

Malaise v. Growth

The events leading to Africa's present
economic crisis are now widely
understood and acknowledged. Limited
internal markets, statist theories and
practices, political strife— each has
played its part in the continent's
economic malaise.

The good news is that many Africai
leaders are now acting on these lessons
and translating them into more
enlightened economic policies. Here's
one dramatic example of change: in
1986, harvests were probably bountiful
enough to make Africa self-sufficient in
grain. Unfortunately, production was
unevenly distributed. But success on thi
scale hasn't been seen for many years.

Here in Senegal, where a major
reform program has been underway for
3 years, the government has substan-
tially increased agricultural producer
prices, reduced subsidies, and embarked
on major reform of the state-controlled
sector. This brave reform effort is
critically needed, but it involves many

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

rdships for the people of the country,
rtunately, it is beginning to pay off:
lal GDP [gross domestic product]
pwth has improved, food production is
I , and domestic finances are under
iich better control. The yields are
jrtly due to good weather; but it's clear
t it new economic policies were key.
We all know about the weather,
J out the drought and how important it
ithat the heavens give us the bountiful
infall that is so much needed. I have a
1 ;le story to tell you about the heavens.
Ick in 1974, when I was then-Secretary
cthe Treasury, that was the height
c a kind of demoralization over the
rrease in oil prices, and people were
a.rmed about the financial implications,
lalso happened to be a rather mild
vnter. The foreign ministers were
jthered in Rome to consider what to
( , and as Secretary of the Treasury, I
1 the U.S. delegation. During the
c irse of the meetings, my wife and I
J 1 a private audience with the Pope,
J 1 so we went over to the Vatican.
^ lile we were waiting, we were told
tit the audience would last 10 minutes.
] 'ould have about 10 minutes, and then
I ■ wife would come in for 2 minutes,
i 1 then pictures would be taken. I said,
' K, if that is the plan." A cardinal
( ne out and said, "The moment has
{ ne. The Holy Father is ready to
1 :eive you." My wife kind of shrunk
I ;k and he said, "All right, come in
1 iv." We started on what turned out to
[ an animated discussion on the oil
( sis, and then the minutes went by,
i 1 then 20, and a half-hour, and three-
c irters of an hour, and we were back
i 1 forth. I was amazed how much the
1 pe knew about it. He was very well
i ormed. We had an interesting
( cussion.

It began to come through to me that
i vas up to me to end the discussion, so
1 ecided to end it on a humorous note,
c d I said to him, "Your Holiness, the
i 'eign ministers have been meeting to
( cuss the oil crisis. Nothing we have
I m able to think of has done as much
i the mild weather toward a solution.
^ e all join in thanking you in your
i ervention." He didn't laugh. He
tswered, "You may be sure it will con-
t ue." So I hope that the weather
1 haves and that we can take advantage
lit.

Well, going on with my example,
ire has decontrolled key markets and
axed exchange controls. Zambia has
'Iminated most trade and price controls,
controlled interest rates, and intro-
ced a foreign exchange auction for

most commercial transactions. Kenya
has liberalized import licensing and
maize and fertilizer marketing and has
adopted a flexible exchange rate policy.
Other nations, too, are experimenting
with reforms aimed at stimulating
growth.

These efforts will permanently mark
the course of Africa's economic future.
But I want to emphasize that reform-
minded leaders do not labor alone. The
United States is doing its best to help
them. We have consistently sought a
constructive, humanitarian role in
African development, and we intend to
stick with this effort.

Between 1974 and 1985, our regular
programs to Africa increased fivefold,
reaching over $1 billion in 1985. In addi-
tion, the United States is the single
largest donor of emergency assistance to
Africa, providing over $1 billion in food
and other forms of emergency assistance
in 1985. Our overall aid levels to Africa
did decline in 1986 as a result of serious
budgetary problems at home— and this
stringency is likely to continue in 1987.
But I want to be categorical in saying
that the U.S. Government is committed
to addressing this problem, doing what
we know is right. Our African partners
must know they are not alone. In key
countries, we will try to maintain our
historic level of assistance.

Not all of Africa's economic crisis
can be traced to the policies of African
governments. Donor nations, too, have
unwittingly subscribed to faulty theories
of development. For us as well as for
African states, bad theories have pro-
duced bad policies. Some of our aid has
been counterproductive, contributing to
dependence rather than self-reliance,
stagnation rather than growth. Today,
we are emphasizing that the way to
stimulate growth is to liberate individual
Africans from the constraints of
mismanagement and overcentralization.
Let me give you just a few examples of
the policies we hope will achieve that
objective.

Economic Policy Reform. A variety
of our programs are aimed at promoting
economic stabilization and policy reform.
Our African economic policy reform pro-
gram, for example, is designed to
encourage governments to reduce state
control over the private sector. In 1985
and 1986, we helped develop programs
in nine nations, including one worked
out by Senegal. The results have been
very encouraging.

Here in Senegal, reform should
broaden the tax base, help restore the

The changes the
Nigerian Government has
made in its economic policy
are the kinds of things that
have lasting results. They
are changing the structure of
incentives; they are making
it possible for individuals
and private enterprises to
operate more freely. The
environment is changing in a
manner that encourages
productivity.

Lagos, Nigeria

larch 1987

AFRICA

mine incentives to experiment, thereby
reducing the prospects for growth. Con-
straints on social mobiHty, such as the
ability to move elsewhere, impose
artificial costs on economic activity. All
forms of political oppression increase the
likelihood of instability and reduce incen-
tives for foreign investment and growth.
No government can impose severe
restrictions on one sphere of life and
expect freedom in other spheres to
flourish.

If donor and recipient nations are
truly to enter into a "new partnership,"
we must do so recognizing and correct-
ing past mistakes, but more on a shared,
positive vision of the future. We must
always remember that the potential we
seek is that of individual human
beings— the satisfaction of their needs
and the liberation of their abilities.
These are not things that an economist
can measure or fit to a graph; but they
are, in the long run, the true measure of
development, in Africa as everywhere.
If the peoples of Africa and their friends
throughout the world can agree on that
fundamental purpose, then I believe we
can speak truly of a new partnership, a
new vision for the continent.

This, then, is the vision and the
message we bring. We want you to
succeed in the struggle for development
and democracy. We are playing— and
will continue to play— an active role,
bringing to bear the tools, know-how,
and resources that you and we have
learned are relevant. My country
respects the aspirations of Senegal and
of Africa. They are consistent with U.S.
interests and U.S. values. So let us
rededicate ourselves here today to this
new African-American partnership.

Secretary Meets With ANC Leader Tambo

iPress release 7 of Jan, 14, 1987.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT.
JAN. 28, 1987'

In his meeting with Oliver Tambo [Presi-
dent of the African National Congress
(ANC)] this afternoon, the Secretary laid
out our concerns about the degree of
Soviet influence in the ANC and its
stance on violence. The Secretary made
it clear that a policy of violence from any
party is not the answer to South Africa's
problems and that there are other
options. The pursuit of violence will only
lead to a catastrophe for all. He also
stated that terrorist actions against
innocent civilians are totally unaccept-
able. He pointed out that the United
States had consistently called for all par-
ties, including the South African Govern-
ment and the ANC, to come to agree-
ment on an end to violence so that a
process of negotiations can proceed.

Much of the discussion focused on
the future. The Secretary explored ways
in which the present environment of con-
frontation and violence in South Africa
could be turned around. He indicated
that all parties in South Africa had a
responsibility to think constructively
and, indeed, imaginatively in order to
advance the objective of a negotiated
solution. He indicated that we are also
prepared to play a positive role.

The Secretary noted those positive
elements in the ANC's January 8 state-
ment which described certain important
rights within a multiparty democratic
system. He encouraged the ANC to spell
out its vision of the future with more
specificity and expressed our opposition
to the replacement of the apartheid
system by another form of unrepresen-
tative government.

This was a serious and substantive
exchange of views.

This meeting represents a continu;
tion of our effort to talk with all of the .|
key players in South Africa and help— i|
we can— lay the basis for negotiations. J
this context, we regard the ANC as an
important, though not by any means tl
only, player in the South African situa-
tion. We expect that such discussions
will continue.

'Read to news correspondents by Depar
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■

Department of State Bullet'

\RMS CONTROL

rhe Nuclear and Space Negotiations:
Franslating Promise to Progress

y Paul H. Nitze

Address before the World Affairs
ouncil in Boston on January IJt, 1987.
mbassador Nitze is special adviser to
<e President and the Secretary of State
I a rms control matters.

propose this evening to discuss the
lilateral nuclear and space arms control
legotiations with the Soviets as they
live developed over the last year and a
'ilf.

In November 1983, the Soviets
' alked out of the Geneva INF [inter-
ediate-range nuclear forces] negotia-
ons. The following month they refused
. set a date for the START [strategic
•ms reduction talks] negotiations to
■sume after the Christmas recess. By
e summer of 1984, they had come to
e conclusion that that had been a
istake; formal negotiations began
jain in March 1985. The negotiations
nee then have been tricky; have been at
irious levels; have, at times, appeared
make substantive progress; and have
in into various difficulties. The talks
■e continuing; Ambassador Kampelman
lead of the U.S. Delegation on Arms
Dntrol Negotiations and U.S Negoti-
or on Defense and Space Arms] and
s teams are resuming their negoti-
ions with their Soviet counterparts in
eneva tomorrow morning. So far, we
ive not been able to bring the Soviets
closure— to a signed and sealed agree-
ent satisfactory to both sides in any of
e three negotiating areas of INF,
TART, or defense and space— either on
broad package of agreements or on a
lecific area.

tie Political Dimensions
■ Arms Control

iree or four years ago, I discussed the
en ongoing INF negotiations with my
iend, Marshall Shulman [former direc-
■r of W. Averell Harriman Institute for
dvanced Study of the Soviet Union at
olumbia University]. He said that the
ATO so-called two-track decision of
)79— that the United States should be
■quested to deploy Pershing lis and
'ound-based cruise missiles in certain
ATO countries and that the United
tates should concurrently negotiate

with the Soviets for the reduction or
elimination of all such LRINF [longer
range INF] missiles on both sides— was a
political decision. He said the Soviets
were, at that time, playing on European
political opposition to the U.S. deploy-
ments. The problem being political, it
could be solved politically. All that was
required was a political decision to do so,
and that should be a simple matter.

I objected. My point was that arms
control decisions are not merely poUtical;
they are politico-military decisions.
Political issues are generally not simple;
they are complex. Military issues are
also generally not simple; they can also
be complex. Politico-military decisions
combine many of the complexities of
both.

Among the complexities of the
political arms control issues is that they
concern, in part, the long-term political
interests of the parties involved. In part,
they concern the more immediate public
opinion, propaganda, and psychological
interests of the parties. These short-
term interests do not necessarily con-
verge with the long-term interests.

In 1959, when I was not in the
government, my friend, Fred Eaton, was
appointed head of the U.S. delegation to
the Ten Nation Conference on Disarma-
ment being held in Geneva under the
aegis of the United Nations. He asked
me to serve as an adviser to his delega-
tion. The Soviet side had come up with a
vague proposal for "general and com-
plete disarmament." They were making
tremendous propaganda hay worldwide
with that slogan. We were getting
nowhere in finding out how they pro-
posed to accomplish "general and com-
plete disarmament" in a way that pro-
tected the interests of both sides at each
stage. They insisted that we agree in
principle to the ultimate objective before
they would discuss details. But we could
not agree to the principle without having
some ideas as to the "how."

We finally addressed the problem by
coming up with a proposal that, while
visionary, was also realistic in recogniz-
ing the need for a concrete sequence of
steps that would preserve stability as
nuclear weapons were reduced. It was
"phased total disarmament." We then
began outlining in some detail the
various phases involved. Public opinion

reversed almost overnight. The prop-
aganda gains the Soviets had been mak-
ing eroded; they finally walked out of the
negotiations; apparently they were more
interested in the propaganda value of
the negotiations than in taking the
required steps to realize the objective
of disarmament. Since that time, the
situation has changed somewhat for
the better, but the public opinion,
psychological part of the equation con-
tinues to be important.

Developments in the
Current Negotiations

After the Soviets decided, in the summer
of 1984, that they had made a mistake in
walking out of the INF negotiations in
November 1983, it was still not easy to
get negotiations underway again on a
serious basis. The Soviets took the posi-
tion that they would be doing us a favor
by returning to the negotiating table and
should, therefore, be rewarded. The
President and Secretary of State Shultz
didn't agree. Finally, however, it was
settled that Mr. Shultz should meet with
Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in
January 1985. They met and agreed on a
communique, largely because each side
could interpret its language to mean
what they wanted it to mean. In any
case, the Shultz-Gromyko meeting led to
the beginning of the Geneva NST
[nuclear and space talks] negotiations in
three fora: one negotiating group for
START, one for INF, and one for
defense and space, all three teams on
each side being part of one umbrella
delegation. Max Kampelman heads the
U.S. team.

The Geneva Summit

President Reagan first proposed the idea
of a summit meeting in March 1985
when he invited the new General
Secretary of the Communist Party,
Mikhail Gorbachev, to Washington at the
earliest possible time. Over 4 months
passed, however, before the two sides
agreed to a November meeting in
Geneva. Much work— between the
delegations in Geneva; between the
foreign ministers in meetings in Vienna,
Moscow, and Washington; and through
normal diplomatic channels— preceded

Jarch 1987

ARMS CONTROL

ly of specific instructions. The general
ea was that these teams would attempt
achieve agreement on as much com-
on ground as they could, leaving the
iresolved issues for subsequent
'gotiations by foreign ministers.
When we arrived at Hofdi House at

00 p.m., we were met by the Soviet
am. It was headed by Marshal Sergei
<hromeyev, the Chief of the General
aff of the Soviet Armed Forces. He
IS assisted by Ambassador Karpov;
jvgeniy Velikhov, their principal scien-
;t; Valentin Falin, one of their most
:>le political operatives, now editor of a
^Dscow newspaper and formerly their

1 pert on Soviet political operation in
i;rmany; and Georgiy Arbatov, head of

e U.S.A. and Canada Institute and
; ;o a well-known political operator.
I found Akhromeyev to be tough,
elligent, forceful, and practical. It
)k us little time to agree on how we

■ >uld address our work; we promptly

j t down to substance. On the various
1 'ART issues, we found ourselves
; 3tty well stymied. He wanted 50%
luctions from present levels of
. ategic arms, category by category, on
:h side. Their levels are, in general,
■ higher than ours, except for heavy
1 mbers. Equal reductions would result

■ different levels of missiles after reduc-
ns that would exaggerate current

ce asymmetries and, therefore, favor
' ! Soviet side. I insisted upon
; gregate ceilings and sublimits which
' uld be equal for both sides after the
) luctions. Neither of us agreed to the
( ler's approach. We, therefore, moved
( to the INF issues, where we made
1 :ter progress.

The INF issues the United States set
i ; to resolve included agreement on a
( ling on the number of each side's
1 lINF missile warheads that could be
( oloyed within range of European
1 gets, a ceiling on LRINF warheads in
- ia and the United States, the duration
( such an agreement, the principles that

I uld govern the verification of

i lerence to the agreement, and the
t atment of shorter range INF missiles,
( led SRINF. Akhromeyev appeared

I I to be authorized to negotiate on a

'( ling in Asia. We also were unable fully
t resolve the SRINF issue, which is of
s nificant concern to our European
; rtners, particularly the Germans. On

> other INF issues, we appeared to

ve come to agreement.

We moved on to the defense and
■lice issues. They presented their
^juments for limiting SDI [Strategic

fense Initiative] research to that

which could be conducted within the
walls of a laboratory. This proposal
would involve limitations beyond those
of the 1972 ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile]
Treaty. I presented in full detail our
view as to what the ABM Treaty permits
and does not permit, particularly as to
"field testing," the only aspect of
research which is observable and,
therefore, verifiable. They insisted upon
a 10- to 15-year period during which
both sides would agree to abide strictly
by the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw
from it. This proposal cannot form the
basis for agreement as long as the
Soviets attempt to redefine on their
terms what is permitted under the ABM
Treaty and unless we have a common
understanding of what is meant by the
term "nonwithdrawal." We asked
whether they were prepared to correct
their current violations of the treaty,
specifically the Krasnoyarsk early warn-
ing radar. They were not. In the event
one side violates a treaty, international
law permits the other side to take
various proportionate responses. It was
not clear whether we were being asked
to forgo such rights, including our
explicit right to withdraw from the
treaty in the event that our supreme
national interests were jeopardized or in
the event of material breach of the
treaty. Nor was it clear what the sides
would be permitted to do after the 10- or
15-year period.

I suggested to Marshal Akhromeyev
that we report to our higher authorities
that there were three issues in the
defense and space area which subse-
quent negotiations at the foreign
minister level would have to resolve: one
was what activities the ABM Treaty was
to permit during the time period; second,
what activities would be permitted after
the time period; and third, how long that
time period would be. Marshal
Akhromeyev refused my suggestion. He
thought we should merely report lack of
agreement on defense and space.

We then turned to nuclear testing.
This had already been discussed at
higher levels with some progi'ess. We
presented a paragraph which we thought
correctly summarized the resulting posi-
tions of the sides. The two sides would
promptly enter into negotiations on
nuclear testing. The first matter to work
out would be improved verification
measures to permit ratification of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.
Thereafter, the sides would negotiate on
a step-by-step approach to the eventual
elimination of nuclear testing in parallel
with the elimination of nuclear weapons.

While Akhromeyev did not appear to
disagree with the substance of the
paragraph that we had submitted, he did
forcefully disagree with the first
sentence. He wanted part of the last
sentence on the elimination of nuclear
testing brought into the first sentence.
He wanted the first sentence to say the
sides will promptly enter into negotia-
tions on the elimination of nuclear
testing. The political thrust of the
paragraph would have been reversed,
with the emphasis placed only on the
long-term end goal and not on the proc-
ess, even if the sustance of the sentences
following the first had remained
unchanged. I wasn't about to agree to a
purely political ploy of this kind.

We then went back to the START
issues. After further extended discus-
sion, we were making no progress. By
this time, it was 2:00 a.m. Suddenly,
Marshal Akhromeyev rose to his feet
and said he was leaving; he would be
back at 3:00 a.m.

I went back to the hotel. I woke up
Secretary Shultz and described to him
where we were. He advised me to go
back and try to make such progress as
was possible and sensible.

When we resumed, Akhromeyev
promptly got to the point. He was now
authorized to agree on what had been
the major point of disagreement between
us on START, that being my insistence
on ceilings after reductions which would
be equal between the sides. He was now
willing to accept an equal ceiling on the
aggregate level of ICBM [intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles] and SLBM
[submarine-launched ballistic missiles]
launchers plus heavy bombers of 1,600,
and an aggregate ceiling of 6,000 on the
number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads
plus an appropriate number for the
weapons on heavy bombers. We had
included in our proposed aggregate of
6,000 the number of long-range cruise
missiles on heavy bombers, but nothing
for the gravity bombs and SRAMs
[short-range attack missiles] such
bombers might carry. Our rationale was
that it is not proposed by either side that
the tremendous Soviet air defense
capabilities be limited. Gravity bombs
and SRAMs are needed to penetrate
those defenses and, therefore, should not
be counted in an aggregate of strategic
weapons. In an important breakthrough,
Marshal Akhromeyev and I finally
agreed that each heavy bomber carrying
gravity bombs and SRAMs would be
counted as one weapon in the
6,000-weapons aggregate.

arch 1987

ARMS CONTROL

We then moved on to another issue,
one of particular interest to the Soviet
side— a Umitation on the number of sea-
based, long-range cruise missiles. The
problem of verifying the range and
number of such cruise missiles is
extremely difficult. After almost an
hour's discussion of the issue, we came
up with a sentence to which both of us
could agree.

We then got locked into a discussion
of sublimits within the aggregate ceiling
on the number of weapons. I proposed
agreement on three specific sublimits
which we thought were necessary to
assure that the reductions would be
stabilizing and not retain current
destabilizing force asymmetries. Marshal
Akhromeyev would not agree to our pro-
posal; he proposed instead a single
sublimit representing a reduction of 50%
in their heavy missiles but permitting
none on our side. This approach,
however, was insufficient to assure that
the reductions would be stabilizing. I
proposed that a sentence be included in
the paragraphs we were drafting, assur-
ing that either side, in subsequent
negotiations, could raise such sublimits
as it thought necessary to assure stabil-
ity between the forces remaining after
the agreed reductions. Akhromeyev
would not agree to put that language
into the paragraph but assured me that,
of course, either side could raise such
sublimits as it wished in the subsequent
negotiations. I said that I was prepared
to rely on his personal assurance.

By that time, it was 6:15 a.m. We
both had to report to our superiors in
time for them to prepare for the Sunday
morning meeting, scheduled to begin at
10:00 a.m. At that Sunday morning
meeting, the principal forward move-
ment came when General Secretary Gor-
bachev proposed a ceiling of 100 on
Soviet LRINF warheads in Soviet Asia,
to be matched by an equal ceiling on
U.S. LRINF warheads in the United
States. That seemed to lay the basis for
resolving the key INF issues, except for
the short-range systems. Despite the
seriousness of the SRINF problem,
particularly to the Germans, at least
80% of the INF problems facing us 36
hours earlier seemed to have been over-
come. It was also agreed at that morning
meeting that Secretary Shultz and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, accom-
panied by their advisers, meet at 2:00
p.m. to sort out the remaining problems
so as to facilitate the 3:00 p.m. final ses-
sion between the chiefs of state.

At the outset of the 2:00 session,
Secretary Shultz proposed that we first
clear up some of the easier remaining
issues. Shevardnadze said that would be
useless; there was one crucial issue to be
decided. Could the President agree to a
time period of 10 years of strict
adherence to, and nonwithdrawal from,
the ABM Treaty? If he could, then
agreement on all the other issues would
be possible. If not, nothing could be
agreed.

After some discussion, Shultz said
that he wished to explore an idea that he
had not yet discussed with the President,
that was related to, but different from,
the U.S. proposal in July. The sides had
already agreed in principle to a 5-year
period of 50% reductions in strategic
offensive systems. Shultz' s idea was that
if the U.S.S.R. would agree to a second
5-year period of reductions, after the
first 5-year reductions had been
implemented, in which all remaining
offensive ballistic missiles would be
eliminated, then that could constitute a
10-year reduction program. Having
already argued that both sides should
strictly abide by the terms of the ABM
Treaty, the President might further
agree that both sides would not
withdraw from the ABM Treaty and
would continue to abide strictly by its
terms while such a program was being
executed. Shevardnadze thought that
might be of interest to Gorbachev.

We then went up to the room where
the President was waiting. The
Secretary's idea was presented to him,
to Mr. Regan [White House Chief of
Staff], and to the others present.
Everyone thought it would be worth pur-
suing. A precise paragraph was worked
out and typed. The President and
Secretary Shultz went down to the main
conference room with this language to
meet Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.

They returned in about an hour with
the news that Gorbachev had presented
an alternative proposal calling for the
elimination of all remaining offensive
strategic systems in the second 5 years,
rather than all remaining offensive
ballistic missiles. This would leave the
Soviets with a preponderant position in
shorter range nuclear systems which,
with their conventional forces, would
give them potential dominance over the
Eurasian landmass. We could not accept
such an outcome. A revised paragraph
was worked out, not too different in its
central provision from our original
paragraph.

The President and Secretary Shult:
then rejoined Gorbachev and Shevard-
nadze. There was extensive further
discussion, but no specific agreement.
During the course of this discussion, it
became clear that there was not one
issue, but two, on which Gorbachev wa:
adamant. He also insisted that the SDI
program be restricted to that which
could be conducted within laboratories.
There is no such provision in the ABM
Treaty. Gorbachev was asking for wha
amounted to an amendment to the AB!
Treaty adverse to U.S. interests. Indet
he intended to impose constraints on oi
SDI program far more severe than tho
imposed by the ABM Treaty. Such add
tional constraints would kill the SDI pr
gram. The President could not accept
this.

Vienna and Beyond

Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnada
met again in November in Vienna in co
nection with a CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe]
meeting. We had set up a special sessitu
for the two foreign ministers at which
they could meet to confirm and build o;
the common ground that had been
developed at the Reykjavik meeting an
to identify and narrow the remaining o
ferences between the United States an
the Soviet Union. Neither this meetin]
nor the following night session of theiij
advisers resulted in progress. The
Soviets seemed more interested in
attempting to make propaganda points
by misstating what had happened at
Reykjavik than in advancing the negoll
tions. They reiterated their newly
hardened position that links any agree?
ment on START systems or on INF
systems to acceptance of their space
defense demands.

During the upcoming round that
begins tomorrow morning in Geneva, 1
U.S. negotiators will call upon the Sov
Union to address in specific terms the
key issues remaining in all three
negotiating fora. In INF, we will con-
tinue to insist on adequate verification
measures, to insist that the proposed
limits remain in effect until supersedeo
by an agreement providing for further
reductions, and to assert our right to ai
level of SRINF missile deployments
equal to that of the Soviet Union.
Finally, the United States will continue
to insist that progress in INF be
delinked from progress in the other
negotiations.

Department of State Bulli

ARMS CONTROL

In START, we will insist that the
iviets return to their earlier acceptance
the concept of sublimits on par-
lularly destabilizing systems. We have
oposed in Geneva specific sublimits of
800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300
BM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on
brmitted ICBMs except those on silo-
used light and medium ICBMs with six
r fewer warheads. These numbers
^present substantial movement in the

■ rection of the Soviet position. As in the
ise of INF, we oppose the linkage
;tween agreement on these reductions
id progress in other areas. We must
so work on identifying adequate
;rification measures. This latter point
critical in view of recent Soviet
;ployment of land-mobile ICBMs.
ecause of the serious verification prob-
m they pose, the U.S. START proposal
.lis for a ban on mobile missiles. The
nited States has called upon the
)viets, as the first nation to deploy
ich systems, to address our verification
■ncerns in the context of limiting these
issiles in a START agreement. Thus
r, they have not done so. The signifi-
nt deployment of land-mobile missiles
the Soviet Union presents the United
;ates with a new reality that may
quire us to take parallel steps to
sure the survivability of a significant
)rtion of our own strategic retaliatory
rces.

In the defense and space negotia-
3ns, we will continue to focus on the

, .S. negotiating agenda by:

1 • Elaborating on the potential role
' effective defenses in providing a more
able offense/defense relationship;

• Engaging the Soviets in a dialogue
1 a jointly managed transition toward a
ore defense-based deterrence posture,
ould defenses prove feasible; and

• Reversing the erosion of the ABM
•eaty and bringing the Soviets into
'mpliance with it.

The Soviet goal, on the other hand,
to place enough restrictions on the
31 program so as to disrupt its prog-
ss. They have attempted to do this by
nending the treaty with proposed
■strictions on research, development,
id testing in excess of those imposed
' the treaty.

We call upon the Soviet Union to
ithdraw their proposal to restrict SDI
the laboratory and to show their
■riousness by making their approach
insistent with the existing provisions of
le ABM Treaty. The United States has
cplained to the Soviets its view with

regard to permitted and prohibited activ-
ities under the ABM Treaty in connec-
tion with agreement on a regime of per-
mitted research, development, and
testing during a possible 10-year period
of offensive reductions and strict
adherence to and nonwithdrawal from
the ABM Treaty. However, we see no
reason to accept changes in the
understanding of key terms and defini-
tions associated with the ABM Treaty
which would alter that which has already
been negotiated and agreed.

This review of the status of the
negotiations indicates that the greatest
potential for further concrete progress is
concentrated in those areas of common
ground involving reductions in the first
5-year period: reductions in START to
the 1,600/6,000 ceilings and in INF to
the 0/100 ceilings. Our defense and space
proposal that all remaining ballistic
missiles be eliminated in the second 5
years remains on the table subject to the
same conditions we stated at Reykjavik.

In the immediate future, the United
States will continue to attempt to con-
solidate the areas of common ground and
to clarify areas of disagreement with a
view to resolving or narrowing remain-
ing differences. Our strategy, based on
an understanding of the political and
military dimensions of the issues at
hand, is focused on achieving the long-
term benefits that would be shared by

both sides in the aftermath of deep,
stabilizing reductions in the scope of the
nuclear threat. Earlier this week, in con-
nection with the appointment of First
Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov as
the new chief Soviet negotiator in
Geneva, the Soviets stated that they
view the next round of negotiations with
utmost seriousness. We hope that Mr.
Gorbachev will translate his words into
an emphasis, similar to our own, on con-
cluding an agreement consistent with
our mutual interests, rather than
continuing to focus on transitory, short-
term propaganda advantages.

With such an emphasis, we can move
forward with the Soviets toward a com-
prehensive, stabilizing agreement on a
future arms control regime providing for
permitted defensive research and
testing, strategic and intermediate-range
offensive reductions, and a jointly
managed transition to greater reliance
on strategic defenses, if and when SDI
research demonstrates their feasibility,
survivability, and cost-effectiveness at
the margin.

'Nicholas Daniloff, Moscow correspondent
for U.S.News & World Report, was arrested
in the U.S.S.R., allegedly for espionage activ-
ities, shortly after the arrest of a Soviet UN
employee in New York. Daniloff was released
September 29, 1986, as a result of U.S.
diplomatic efforts. ■

Developments in NST Issues After Reykjavik

by Paul H. Nitze

Statement before the Defense Policy
Panel of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee on December U, 1986. Ambassador
Nitze is special adviser to the President
and the Secretary of State on arms con-
trol matters. '

This morning, I will review briefly the
developments over the past several
months in the nuclear and space talks
(NST). I will describe separately the
developments in each of the three
negotiating areas of INF, START, and
defense and space, with reference to
the status of each area prior to the
Reykjavik meeting and its evolution dur-
ing the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings.
My statement will conclude with a brief
description of where I think we should
go from here.

The progress to date is significant.
We have expanded the potential area of
common agreement between our negoti-
ating position and that of the Soviets.
Yet, we still face a long, difficult task
ahead. Much hard work remains, and
important obstacles must be overcome in
order to conclude arms reduction
treaties that are in our national interest
and that can be implemented. We must
both nail down the details of the
agreements that we have achieved in
principle— for example, reductions in
longer range INF missiles— and address
issues that are only now maturing to a
point where a serious dialogue is
possible— for example, what strategic
defense development and testing activi-
ties are permitted and prohibited by the
ABM Treaty and the conditions under
which the sides would agree not to
exercise, for a period of time, their
existing right to withdraw from that
treaty on 6 months' notice.

bJJiarch 1987

ARMS CONTROL

During the coming months, the
Soviet Union will take a full account of
the state of U.S. executive-legislative
branch relations, especially as it relates
to arms control. The ability of the
United States to negotiate worthwhile
arms control agreements will continue to
depend upon close cooperation, coordi-
nation, and consultation between the
Administration and the Congress. This
relationship should be based upon
realistic expectations and assessments of
the progress achieved and the remaining
obstacles at each future step in the
negotiations. We must reduce the degree
to which different perceptions or views
between the executive and legislative
branches regarding the negotiations are
taken by the Soviets as an opportunity
to hold out for concessions or to create
friction and delay.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Our long-term policy goal with respect to
longer range INF missiles is to eliminate
this entire class of U.S. and Soviet
weapons on a worldwide basis. Because
the Soviets were unwilling to go that far
at that time, the United States agreed at
the 1985 Geneva summit to focus efforts
on an interim agreement to reduce these
missiles.

The United States set forth, at that
time, a number of guidelines for such an
approach. We required that both the
United States and Soviet Union have
equal rights and limits and that those
limits be global in scope, owing to the
range, mobility, and transportability of
LRINF systems. We stated that we
would not negotiate commitments
regarding the independent strategic
nuclear deterrents of third countries and
that no compensation be afforded
because of such third-country systems.
We ruled out reductions in dual-capable
systems, to prevent degradation of

Acronyms

ABM Treaty — Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

ALCM — air-launched cruise missile

GLCM— ground-launched cruise missile

ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile

INF— intermediate-range nuclear forces

LRINF— longer range INF

NST — nuclear and space talks

RV— reentry vehicle

SDI— Strategic Defense Initiative

SLCM — sea-launched cruise missile

SNDV— strategic nuclear delivery vehicle

SRAM— short-range attack missile

SRINF— shorter range INF

START— strategic arms reduction talks

NATO's conventional capabilities. Last,
we required that any agreement be
verifiable.

Pre-Reykjavik. As a result of the
experts, meetings in Moscow and Wash-
ington last summer and the September
meeting between Secretary Shultz and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the
United States achieved several of these
objectives. The sides agreed on an end
goal of eliminating the entire class of
U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. The
sides agreed that, as an interim step,
they would be prepared to limit the total
number of warheads on LRINF missiles
deployed in Europe to an equal level
above zero. Both sides were also
prepared to agree to equal global limits
on the number of LRINF missile war-
heads. Discussion during this period
focused on five issues: the specific
numbers for numerical limits, Asian
deployments, deployment mix, shorter
range INF, and the duration of the
agreement.

The Soviet Union proposed reduc-
tions to a level of 100 warheads in
Europe but offered only a freeze on
SS-20s deployed in Asia; that would
have left a global residual of more than
600 SS-20 warheads. The United States
suggested in the experts' meetings that
the limit be set at 200 warheads for each
side worldwide, with no more than 100
warheads in Europe.

The United States reiterated that
LRINF warheads deployed in Asia
should be reduced proportionately and
concurrently with those in Europe but
that a reduction to equal levels in
Europe and Asia could also be accept-
able if the specific level was agreeable to
the LInited States. Although the Soviets
refused to agree to any reductions of
SS-20s in Asia, or even to specify ex-
isting levels, they stated that they would
"limit" the number of LRINF warheads
deployed in Asia.

The Soviets proposed that the
LRINF missile mix after reductions in
Europe include only GLCMs on the U.S.
side and SS-20 ballistic missiles on the
Soviet side. The United States said that
the mix between U.S. GLCMs and
Pershing II ballistic missiles could be
discussed further, but that Pershing II
missiles must constitute a part of the
U.S. force.

The sides agreed on the need for
constraints on SRINF missiles. The
United States insisted that this issue be
resolved concurrently with the establish-
ment of ceilings on LRINF missiles. The
Soviets argued that the SRINF issue
could be resolved after agreement on
LRINF reductions.

The United States insisted that an
interim agreement on INF should
remain in effect until superseded by a
later agreement providing for further
reductions— and should not be a "tem-
porary" measure of short duration as
the Soviets suggested.

Reykjavik. The Reykjavik meeting
created considerable movement in the
substantive areas of INF, although thei
was no closure on the major areas of
concern. The President and General
Secretary agreed to eliminate U.S. and
Soviet LRINF missile warheads in
Europe. Worldwide deployments would
be limited to 100 warheads on each sidt
with Soviet missiles deployed in the
Asian U.S.S.R. and U.S. deployments
limited to U.S. territory.

With regard to SRINF missiles, th$
Soviets proposed to freeze SRINF
deployments at the current level and to
address their reduction in a subsequent!
negotiation. The United States agreed
a ceiling at the present Soviet level on
Soviet SRINF and to the proposal for
follow-on negotiations on SRINF missil*
reductions but demanded a right to equ
SRINF missile deployments.

Movement on verification also
occurred in Reykjavik. Although the
discussion was not detailed, there was
Soviet agreement to the U.S. proposal
that an effective verification package
must include a comprehensive exchange
of data before and after reductions,
onsite inspection of the elimination of
weapons, and effective onsite monitoriii
of the remaining INF systems and
associated facilities.

Since the Reykjavik meeting, the
Soviets have attempted to relink prog-
ress in INF to progress in the defense
and space negotiations, reversing their
position of last spring. The United
States rejects this linkage and will con-
tinue to work for a separate agreement:

START

The U.S. goal in the START talks is to
achieve deep and verifiable reductions t
equal levels properly structured so as to
enhance stability. Consequently, our
negotiating position draws a distinction
between more and less destabilizing
systems— for example, between heavy
ICBMs and other ballistic missiles and
between ballistic missiles and air-
breathing missiles.

Our START position contains
several key elements:

Department of State Bulli

ARMS CONTROL

A reduction in the total number of
illastic missile warheads;

Within this ceiling, sublimits on
:BM RVs; and

A corresponding reduction in
derail ballistic missile throw-weight.

Pre-Reykjavik. At the 1985 Geneva
immit, the United States and the
jviet Union agreed in principle to 50%
iductions in strategic offensive
'Stems. Each side had significantly dif-
rent approaches to structuring such
iductions. The United States called for
nits of 1,250-1,450 ballistic missiles,
ith 4,500 ballistic missile warheads,

000 ICBM warheads, a 50% reduction
throw-weight below Soviet levels, and

500 ALCMs on, at most, 350 heavy
)mbers. The Soviet proposal for 50%
iductions applied cuts to these strategic
rstems but included, as well, U.S. LRINF
Europe and all U.S. dual-capable air-
faft in Europe and Asia and on aircraft
irriers, wherever located, while exclud-
g equivalent Soviet systems from cuts
II their side. The Soviets accepted the
kncept of sublimits, proposing that
►ere be a warhead limit of 60% on any
ne leg of the triad.

In June 1986, the Soviets offered a
ew proposal involving reductions of less
|an 50%. During the experts' meetings,
rst in Moscow and subsequently in
ashington, we explored such an
T oproach while not changing our com-
itment to the principle of 50% reduc-
ons. After the experts' meetings, the
nited States decided it could accept the
Dviet SNDV aggregate level of 1,600.
'e increased to 7,500 the number of
Ulistic missile RVs and ALCMs that we
ere willing to accept and proposed the
illowing sublimits: 5,500 ballistic
dssile RVs, 3,300 ICBM RVs, and 1,650
Vs on allowed ICBMs except for fixed,
^ht, or medium ICBMs with six or
'wer warheads. The Soviets retained
leir 8,000 limit on "nuclear charges,"
icluding gravity bombs and SRAMs,
nd proposed a limit between 6,400 and
.800 on ballistic missile RVs.

Going into the Reykjavik meeting,
3veral issues separated the United
tates and Soviet Union.

First, the Soviets criticized the
'nited States for attempting to restruc-
ire Soviet forces with its proposed
ublimits. Our position was that such
ublimits are necessary to ensure
tability.

Second, the Soviets insisted that
ravity bombs and SRAMs be included

1 the aggregate weapons limit. The

United States proposed that they be
limited only indirectly through the 350
heavy bomber sublimit, since these
systems are less destabilizing and since
air defenses against the bombers are
unconstrained.

Third, the United States wanted to
ban mobile missiles unless the Soviets
could show us how our verification and
stability concerns could be met.

Fourth, the Soviets refused to con-
sider codification of the 50% throw-
weight reduction.

Fifth, there was inadequate prog-
ress on verification, especially of SLCMs
and mobiles.

Finally, the Soviets insisted on link-
ing START reductions to a 15-year com-
mitment of nonwithdrawal from the
ABM Treaty. The United States rejected
such a linkage.

Reykjavik. At Reykjavik, the United
States and the Soviet Union reached
agreement in principle to reduce, in
5 years, to 1,600 SNDVs and 6,000
strategic nuclear warheads, consisting of
ballistic missile warheads, ALCMs, and
heavy bombers armed with gravity
bombs and SRAMs, such bombers to
count as a single warhead. The Soviets
refused to agree to U.S. -proposed
sublimits on these systems and, in addi-
tion, dropped their own proposal for
sublimits. The United States, however,
reserved the right to raise the issue of
sublimits in the future, and the Soviets
acknowledged that right. The Soviets did
agree that reductions would involve
significant cuts in Soviet heavy missiles.
In addition, both sides agreed to seek
mutually acceptable limits on nuclear-
armed SLCMs, separate from the SNDV
and warhead aggregates. The Soviets
insisted that their agreement to these
reductions remain linked to a defense
and space agreement.

Defense and Space

Pre-Reykjavik. In defense and space,
the Soviet Union sought to ban or
disrupt the SDI program. They de-
manded a ban on research, development,
testing, and deployment of what they
call "space-strike arms." They linked
agreement to such a ban to reductions in
the START area.

In June, the Soviets proposed that
neither side withdraw from the ABM
Treaty for up to 15 years and that the
ABM Treaty be "strengthened" by
redefining the activities permitted and
prohibited under the treaty. The net

result would have been to prohibit much
of the U.S. strategic defense research
now permitted by the ABM Treaty and
to make future deployment so distant as
to discourage active work on SDI.

The United States made it clear that
we are committed to the SDI research
program and to continued adherence to
the ABM Treaty. In his July letter to
Gorbachev, President Reagan stated
that, if both sides can agree on radical
reductions in strategic offensive
weapons, the United States would be
prepared to sign an agreement with the
Soviets providing the following:

First, both sides would agree to con-
fine themselves, through 1991, to
research, development, and testing,
which is permitted by the ABM Treaty,
to determine whether advanced systems
of strategic defense are technically
feasible.

Second, a new treaty would provide
that if, after 1991, either side should
decide to deploy such a system, that side
would be obliged to offer a plan for shar-
ing the benefits of strategic defense and
for eliminating offensive ballistic
missiles. This plan would be negotiated
over a 2-year period.

Third, if the two sides cannot agree
after 2 years of negotiation, either side
would be free to deploy an advanced
strategic defensive system after giving
6 months' notice to the other.

Reykjavik. At Reykjavik, President
Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev reached common ground on
the relevant time period during which
both sides would agree not to exercise
their right to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty for the purpose of deploying
advanced strategic defenses. Gorbachev
insisted on a period of 10 years. The
President was prepared to agree to
10 years provided agreement could be
achieved on three subjects, namely, the
regime of control over defenses and the
program of reductions in offensive
ballistic missiles during those 10 years
and what each side was to be allowed to
do after the 10 years.

• On the issue of the regime of con-
trol over defenses, President Reagan
proposed to Mr. Gorbachev that both
sides strictly abide by the limitations of
the ABM Treaty. Mr. Gorbachev insisted
on what he called measures to
"strengthen" the ABM Treaty but what,
in fact, amounted to an attempt to
amend it. Specifically, he proposed to
restrict to the laboratory testing of all
space elements or components of
antiballistic missile defense.

March 1987

ARMS CONTROL

• With regard to the program of
offensive reductions, the United States
proposed the eHmination of all ballistic
missiles remaining after 1991 during a
second 5-year phase ending in 1996. The
Soviets called for the elimination of all
remaining strategic offensive weapons
during that period.

• With regard to each side's rights
after 10 years, the United States pro-
posed that either side be free to deploy
defenses unless the parties agree other-
wise. The Soviets proposed to enter into
a new negotiation after 10 years on all
issues related to the ABM Treaty.

Vienna and Beyond

We appear to have achieved substantial,
yet incomplete progress at Reykjavik in
our efforts to reach agreement on INF,
START, and defense and space. The
objective of Secretary Shultz's discus-
sions in Vienna with Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze was to confirm and build
on the results of the Reykjavik meeting
and to identify and narrow the remain-
ing differences between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This
meeting did not result in progress. The
Soviets seemed more interested in
attempting to make propaganda points
by misstating what had happened at
Reykjavik than in advancing the negotia-
tions. The Soviets hardened their posi-
tion by linking all the progress at
Reykjavik to acceptance of their space
defense demands.

Key issues remain in all three
negotiating fora.

In INF, we continue to assert our
right to an equal level of Soviet SRINF
deployments, to insist on adequate
verification measures, to insist that the
proposed limits remain in effect until
superseded by an agreement providing
for further reductions, and to de-link
final resolution of these issues from
other negotiations.

In START, we need to achieve
agreement to stabilizing sublimits within
the agreed framework of reductions. We
have proposed, in Geneva, sublimits of
4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300
ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on
permitted ICBMs except those on silo-
based light and medium ICBMs with six
or fewer warheads. These numbers
represent a substantial movement in the
direction of the Soviet position. We must
also work on identifying adequate
verification measures. We oppose the
linkage between agreement on these
reductions with progress in other areas.

In defense and space, we wish to
continue to discuss with the Soviets our
view of what is permitted by the ABM
Treaty. They must understand, however,
that we see no reason to create limits
more stringent than those already incor-
porated in the treaty.

remaining ballistic missiles be eliminati
in the second 5 years remains on the
table, subject to the same conditions w(
stated at Reykjavik.

In the immediate future, the Unitei
States will continue to attempt to con-
solidate the areas of agreement and to
clarify areas of disagreement, with a
view to resolving or narrowing remain-
ing differences.

'The completed transcript of the hearinj
will be published by the committee and will
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
Resume Round Seven

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JAN. 12, 1987'

I met today with Ambassadors Max
Kampelman, Maynard Glitman, and
Ronald Lehman, our negotiators at the
nuclear and space arms talks, which
resume on January 15 with the opening
of round seven in Geneva. I took this
opportunity to emphasize once again to
Ambassador Kampelman, our head of
delegation, and our other negotiators my
full confidence in them and the very high
priority which I continue to attach to the
achievement of deep, equitable, and
effectively verifiable reductions in the
U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Such
reductions would reduce the risk of war
and make a major contribution to our
efforts to build a safer world.

As this new negotiating round
approaches, it is important to take a
clear-eyed, objective look at where we
are on the long and difficult road to real
arms reduction agreements with the
Soviet Union. Our longstanding commit-
ment to a more secure U.S. -Soviet
strategic relationship, one with far lower
levels of nuclear arms, goes beyond mere
words.

We have taken a series of concrete
steps in our efforts to move closer to this
goal. Most recently, our negotiators in
the last round tabled new U.S. proposals
which reflect the areas of agreement
General Secretary Gorbachev and I
reached during our October meeting in
Reykjavik, as well as other new U.S.
proposals. These areas of agreement,
which reflect our progress at Reykjavik,
include:

• Reductions in strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles to 1,600 for each side'
with no more than 6,000 warheads on
these delivery vehicles;

• An interim equal global limit of
100 warheads on longer range U.S. am
Soviet INF [intermediate-range nuclea*
forces] missiles, with no such missiles i
Europe;

• The need for significant cuts in
Soviet heavy ICBMs [intercontinental
ballistic missiles]; and

• The need for effective verificatii
of agreements implementing such
reductions.

In an effort to meet expressed
Soviet concerns, the United States als-
proposed at Reykjavik that neither the
United States rior U.S.S.R. deploy
advanced strategic defenses through
1996 while conducting research, develi
ment, and testing, which are permittee
by the Antiballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty. This would be coupled with
agreement that during the first 5 year
of this period, U.S. and Soviet strategi.
offensive arms would be reduced by
50%; that during the second 5 years, a
remaining U.S. and Soviet offensive
ballistic missiles of all ranges and arm;
ments would be eliminated; and that ai
the end of 1996, either side would hav(
the right to deploy advanced defenses,
unless the parties agreed otherwise. W
have since tabled this new proposal as
well in Geneva.

In December our negotiators went
Geneva for informal meetings with the
Soviet counterparts as part of preparai
tions for round seven. During these

Department of State Bulk

ARMS CONTROL

formal talks, there was no narrowing
f differences, although limited progress
ras made in clarifying some points of
greement between the two sides. The
oviets seemed more interested at times
1 conducting an arms control public
"elations campaign than in the hard give-
nd-take of the confidential negotiating
rocess.

Unfortunately, since Reykjavik,
oviet actions to move forward on arms
ontrol have not matched our own.
:ideed, the Soviets sometimes seem to
e moving in the other direction. For
xample. they have backtracked from
jme of the important points on which
Ir. Gorbachev and I reached agreement
t Reykjavik. Furthermore, at Reykja-
ik, they reintroduced their demand that
rogress in every area of nuclear arms
Dntrol must be linked together in a
ngle package. This new linkage
^presents a major step backward from
le agreement Mr. Gorbachev and I
lade at our summit meeting in Geneva
1 November 1985 to pursue negotia-
ons in areas where there was already
)mmon ground, including the principle
f 50% reductions in strategic nuclear
^Tis and an interim agreement on INF.

This renewed Soviet attempt to hold
rogress in INF and other areas of arms
Dntrol hostage to acceptance of the
ingstanding Soviet effort to cripple our
trategic Defense Initiative (SDI) pro-
ram is unacceptable to the United
tates and our allies, and we have made
lis crystal clear to the Soviet Union,
•ue to the strategic threat posed to the
'nited States and our allies by the con-
nuing Soviet offensive buildup and the
xtensive and longstanding programs in
;rategic defense, it is vital to the future
scurity of the West that the SDI pro-
ram proceed as expeditiously as
ossible.

The United States is ready to move
jrward in this new round. With the
olid support of our allies and the con-
nued support of the Congress and the
Lmerican people, we will seek every
pportunity to make meaningful prog-
ess toward real arms reductions. If the
oviet Union will return to Geneva with
edication equal to our own, I firmly
elieve the areas of progress which we
ave already identified can serve as the
tarting point from which U.S. and
Soviet negotiators can achieve, for the
irst time in history, agreements on
eep, equitable, and effectively verifiable
eductions in our respective nuclear
rsenals.

Let us hope, therefore, that the
Soviets will come to Geneva ready to
move with us toward such historic
agreements. As I have said before, real
nuclear arms reductions are within our
grasp if the Soviet Union will join us in
the serious pursuit of agreements which
are equitable and stabilizing for both
sides and in the interest of the entire
world.

There is much hard work ahead and
many problems remaining. But we will
leave no stone unturned in our search
for this kind of agreement. The United
States is ready; I hope the Soviets are as
well.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 19, 1987.

Arms Control:

The East Asian and Pacific Focus

by Edward L. Rowny

Address before the Pacific and Asian
Affairs Council in Honolulu on
December 30. 1986. Ambassador Rowny
is special adviser to the President and
the Secretary of State on arms control
matters.

I'm delighted to have this occasion to
visit our beautiful Pacific island state
and once again to be able to participate
in a program of the Pacific and Asian
Affairs Council. Your organization is a
model of community leadership in keep-
ing the public informed of international
affairs.

I have noted with great interest the
proceedings of the conference held here
under your sponsorship 2 months ago on
"U.S. National Security Interests in
Asia and the Pacific." That conference
took place just following President
Reagan's meetings with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. I was
glad to observe in the remarks of our
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Gaston Sigur, a
reference to the importance of our Asian
allies and friends to U.S. efforts to
establish a more peaceful and stable rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union. Mr.
Sigur noted that President Reagan's
position is strengthened when he meets
with the Soviet General Secretary by the
recognition that our friends and allies
"are solidly behind him."

I am most aware of this fact since I
have had the privilege of being very
active in consultations with America's
friends and allies in East Asia and the
Pacific regarding our arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union. In
October, I traveled to Reykjavik as an
adviser to the President; immediately
afterwards, I participated in consulta-
tions with our friends and allies in Asia.

This Asian mission took me to Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and the People's
Republic of China. Accordingly, I can
attest that the significance of Asia and
the Pacific to American and Soviet
security and arms control considerations
has been growing and is continuing to
grow. Let me focus on this phenomenon
in some detail.

Reykjavik and
Asian Security Issues

First, it may be useful briefly to recount
the overall agenda and development of
events at Reykjavik. During the days
and weeks that followed the meetings in
Iceland, some public confusion arose
about details of the President's and
General Secretary's discussions. The
Soviets, for their part, decided it would
serve their propaganda purposes to sow
some of that confusion.

We arrived at Reykjavik committed
to the discussion of all four major
elements of the U.S. -Soviet relationship:
bilateral exchanges, human rights, arms
control, and regional conflicts. In this
latter category, both Southwest Asia and
Southeast Asia figured prominently in
the talks. We told the Soviets that the
Soviets' ongoing war against the people
of Afghanistan and the military occupa-
tion of Cambodia by the Soviet client
state of Vietnam remain obstacles to
improving relations not only with the
United States but also with our friends
and allies in Asia.

On Saturday afternoon at Reykjavik,
arms control issues came to the fore.
Since the first Reagan-Gorbachev
meeting in Geneva 11 months earlier,
the two leaders had been active both
with public pronouncements and in con-
fidential diplomacy on arms control. In
their 1985 summit they had agreed to
accelerate negotiations toward mutual

^arch 1987

ARMS CONTROL

reductions of strategic nuclear arms by
50% and to seek an interim agreement
on longer range intermediate-range
nuclear forces (LRINF). These latter
weapons include the powerful, triple-
warhead SS-20 missiles deployed in
Europe and threatening our NATO allies
and those in Asia threatening Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the People's Republic
of China, and other friends and allies in
the region. As the nuclear and space
talks in Geneva continued throughout
1986, one of the most stubborn points of
Soviet intransigence concerned reduc-
tions or elimination of its Asian-based
LRINF missiles. Even as they had been
willing to allow significant LRINF
reductions in Europe, the Soviets
remained profoundly reluctant to agree
to any reductions in their Asian forces.

Still, we remained hopeful of break-
ing this impasse, and in their one-on-one
discussions, the President and Mr.
Gorbachev began to make progress on a
number of issues. By afternoon's end
they directed their arms control experts
to work through the night on details. As
I arrived for the experts' meeting, I
sensed that the session would be produc-
tive. Leading the Soviet team was the
Soviet Chief of the General Staff, Marshal
Akhromeyev. Only once before during
my years as an arms control negotiator
had I seen such a senior Soviet armed
forces officer come to the bargaining
table; never had I known a ranking
military officer to preside over such a
delegation. At Reykjavik as in the other
instance when a senior military officer
joined the negotiations, the progress
made was significant.

Early Sunday morning, after we had
completed our marathon work session,
we presented to the two leaders areas of
significant agreement. These included
reductions of strategic nuclear offensive
warheads by 50% in 5 years— that is, by
1991— to levels of 1,600 strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads.
There would be significant cuts in Soviet
heavy missiles. We also presented pro-
gress that we hoped would lead toward
step-by-step reductions of nuclear
testing.

However, during our all-night
experts' session, the Soviets had
remained intransigent against making
any reductions in their huge arsenal of
Asian-based SS-20s. Mr. Gorbachev
himself offered President Reagan the
long-awaited compromise on Soviet
LRINF in Asia. As part of an overall
LRINF reductions package which would
cut these systems by more than 90%
worldwide, Mr. Gorbachev agreed to

reduce the number of Asian-based
systems to 100 warheads. Both sides
agreed that LRINF in Europe would be
eliminated altogether.

As we know, the Reykjavik meetings
ended without the formalization of these
understandings in a framework for an
agreement. The most prominent reason
for this result was Mr. Gorbachev's
unreasonable demand that we accept
constraints on our Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) more restrictive than
required by the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty, The Soviet General
Secretary insisted, in effect, that we kill
SDI. This, President Reagan said, "we
could not and will not do." There also
were other sticking points that
prevented an agreement— matters which
Soviet propaganda has sought to obscure
as it attempts to depict SDI as the only
obstacle to an accord.

One of these unresolved points con-
cerns verification, where no specifics for
effective means of guarding against
cheating were agreed upon. Another
area of lingering disagreement involved
shorter range intermediate-range
nuclear forces (SRINF), where we pro-
posed to use Soviet levels as a ceiling
which we would be entitled to match.
The Soviets demanded a "freeze," with
no U.S. right to build up to equal levels;
thus, they sought an outcome that would
award them a monopoly in this class of
weapons.

A third disputed point had to do with
the second 5 years— from 1991 to
1996— of proposed reductions of nuclear
weapons in a prospective 10-year com-
prehensive strategic arms agreement. In
the context of a 10-year commitment not
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the
United States called for the elimination
of all offensive ballistic missiles, the
most threatening weapons. Until a more
stable conventional balance is achieved,
we believe it is essential to continue to
rely on nuclear deterrence. Our position
at Reykjavik was based on the belief
that, with the elimination of all ballistic
missiles, the remaining balance of air-
breathing nuclear forces would provide a
more stable deterrent. The Soviet posi-
tion on this point was a fairly
transparent attempt again to decouple
the United States from its overseas
allies, for eliminating all strategic
weapons would leave those allies
unshielded against Soviet superiority in
conventional forces.

On returning to the United States,
President Reagan won resounding public
support for his decision to step back
from an agreement that would have tied

our hands in further development and
research on SDI, even though we offen
to keep our efforts fully in compliance
with existing agreements. According to
opinion polls, three-quarters of the
American people stand behind his deter
mination not to bargain away a future
opportunity to develop and deploy a
defense against nuclear missile attack.
This magnitude of domestic political sui
port is one reason why the President
remains hopeful that we might yet reao
agreements which were given an
impetus at Reykjavik.

As noted earlier, another major fac-
tor contributing to the progress at
Reykjavik was the stronger relations w
have forged under the Reagan Adminis
tration with our Asian allies and friendi
In economic ties, in political understand
ing, and in mutual security we have
moved forward with sureness. There a-
be no doubt that America's progrowth
policies and resistance to trade protec-
tionism under President Reagan have
been a boon to the economies of Japan,
Korea, and the emerging industrial con
tries of East Asia. U.S. -Asian consulta
tions on economic and political questioM
have been closer at all levels during th<
1980s than in the preceding decade. Oi
relationship with the People's Republic
of China is beginning to show signs of
maturity and durability.

Soviet Military Power and
Political Ambitions in Asia

As far as the security of our Asian allii
and friends is concerned, the moderniz
tion of our defenses and the restoratio
of American self-confidence has been a
major factor in the development of pea
and security over the past 6 years. For
the past decade the Soviet Union has
been embarked upon an unprecedentec
initiative to extend and expand its
influence in the Pacific Basin.
Throughout this time, this initiative ha
concentrated on increasing and project
ing military power. Without slowing
their military drive, recently the Sovie
also have become more active diploma-
tically in the region.

The Soviet military buildup, both ii
quality and quantity, has been dramati'
"The Soviet Pacific fleet, now its larges
operates from major bases on the
Kamchatka Peninsula and in the Sea o;
Japan as well as at Cam Ranh Bay in
Vietnam. The Soviet fleet of strategic
nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub-
marines is the world's largest, with 25
these vessels— more than one-third of
the Soviets' worldwide total— operating

Department of State Bullei

ARMS CONTROL

the Pacific from bases at Vladivostok
id Petropavlovsk. Seven conventionally
iwered ballistic missile submarines also
lerate out of these ports.

From Kamchatka to Cam Ranh Bay,
e Soviet Pacific fleet also includes 44
iclear attack submarines; 40 diesel-
ectric attack submarines; and a surface
ip force composed of 2 aircraft car-
?rs, 16 cruisers, 82 destroyers and
igates, and numerous support,
gisitics, and amphibious units,
oreover, Cam Ranh Bay has become
]e largest Soviet naval forward-
-ployment base outside the U.S.S.R.

Soviet naval aviation poses another
iwerful threat in the Pacific. More than
'0 Backfire, Blinder, and Badger
mbers patrol the region, with the
idgers' strike range from Cam Ranh
ly reaching as far as the Philippines,
lam, and western Micronesia. These
rces are supplemented by an airborne
tisubmarine complement of 165 fixed-
i ng and rotary aircraft. Soon, the new
'Viet Blackjack bomber may be
ployed to the area.

On the ground, the Soviets station
)re than 50 divisions along the Sino-
viet border and in Mongolia. Here,
3, they base some 1,700 tactical air-
ift, in addition to Backfire bombers,
lied with the Soviets in Southeast Asia
Vietnam's army— the world's fourth
•gest in manpower— which has received
)re than $5 billion in arms aid from
)scow since 1978. In Northeast Asia,
3, the Soviets have been strengthening
litary relations. Recently, they pro-
led North Korea with some 35-45
G-23 aircraft. In return, Pyongyang
s allowed the first visit by major
viet naval combatants to one of its
rts; North Korea also apparently has
reed to give the Soviets military
erflight permission.

As I mentioned earlier, the Soviets
ntinue to threaten Japan, the Republic
Korea, and the People's Republic of
lina with deployments of SS-20s,
lich are highly accurate mobile missile
stems. It should by now be clear that
en if we should succeed in negotiating
e removal of this class of dangerous
.>apons, the Soviet Union will still have
'ormidable and preponderant nuclear
d conventional military presence in
1st Asia and the Pacific.

Since Mikhail Gorbachev came to
'wer in 1985, the Soviets have inten-
'ied diplomatic approaches aimed at
tending their Asian-Pacific interests,
jring Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Moscow in
ay 1985, Gorbachev brought forward a

purposefully vague initiative for an "All-
Asian Security Forum." This body, with
its structure modeled on the European
Conference on Security and Cooperation
that produced the 1975 Helsinki accords,
would focus on "peace and disarma-
ment" issues. Unlike an earlier pan-
Asian suggestion by Leonid Brezhnev,
Mr. Gorbachev's proposal appears to be
directed less against China than against
the U.S. security presence in Asia.

On July 28 of this year, Mr.
Gorbachev sought to advance his "peace
offensive" through a major speech on
Pacific affairs, delivered in Vladivostok.
My Asian affairs colleagues, including
Assistant Secretary Sigur, believe we
are seeing only the beginning of a pro-
tracted Soviet campaign of subtle
diplomatic tactics in the region. While
we do not underestimate Soviet skill in
such campaigns, we are confident our
own solid record in recent Asian rela-
tions will be judged more favorably in
the region than the Soviet General
Secretary's sweeping suggestions of
"confidence-building measures" which
are backed by no concrete action.

No "Second-Class" Treatment
for U.S. Friends and Allies

From my recent experience in arms con-
trol policy and diplomacy, I am convinced
the Soviets are struggling to play a
diplomatic catch-up game in East Asia. I
believe they are stung by the realization
that the United States and its Asian
friends and allies have established strong
new bonds of trust during the 1980s. It
is impossible for them to hide the con-
trast between the stagnant economies of
the Soviet bloc states and the thriving
market economies along the Pacific Rim.
Three times between January of this
year and the October meetings in
Reykjavik, President Reagan sent me to
Asia for consultations. Since Reykjavik,
I have been sent on two followup mis-
sions to the region. Early on, the Presi-
dent asked me to convey to Asian
leaders that we would not bend to Soviet
efforts to divide us from our Asian
friends and allies by Soviet insistence on
no LRINF cuts in SS-20s in Asia while
agreeing to such cuts in Europe. We
have held to this course, and our position
today, after another year of complex
negotiations, is one of which we can be
proud. On President Reagan's instruc-
tions, our INF negotiating groups in
Geneva consistently have adhered to the
point that the Soviet Asian-based
SS-20s must be a part of any U.S.-

Soviet agreement on LRINF systems. It
now would appear that U.S. persistence
on this point is paying dividends: the
Soviets at last have acknowledged that
reductions of their Asian-based SS-20s
as well as their SS-20s in Europe must
be included in any global LRINF agree-
ment. This is the sort of diplomatic pro-
gress that comes from solidarity with
our friends and allies in both regions.
Our future dealings toward arms
control with the Soviets now must follow
the formula that has begun to produce
success. Success will require confidence
in our strengths and clarity about our
adversaries' threats. It will require
mindfulness that worthwhile agreements
with the Soviets are arrived at only
through great patience. Finally, it will
demand care to assure that the interests
of our allies and friends in one region of
the world are protected no less than
those elsewhere. ■

larch 1987

DEPARTMENT

Instructions to Ambassadors
on Chain of Command

The following telegram was sent by
Secretary Shultz to all U.S. Ambassadors
on December 17. 1986.

In order to clear up any confusion con-
cerning the appropriate chain of com-
mand and the appropriate channel of
communications, I am issuing the follow-
ing statement to all ambassadors.

Begin Text of Statement

The President has directed in his letter
(text follows) to each of you upon assum-
ing your duties that "you will receive
policy guidance and instructions from
the Secretary of State who is my prin-
cipal foreign policy spokesman and
adviser, or from me directly." In recent
years, I have sought to emphasize this
chain of command by stating in my letter
to new ambassadors that the line of
authority for any action or decision on
your part flows from the President to
me and from me through the Assistant
Secretary to you.

Therefore, you will receive instruc-
tions only from or through the Depart-
ment. All messages dealing with policy
proposals, policy implementation, pro-
gram activities, personnel, and post
operations shall be sent through regular
established State Department channels.

The only two exceptions to this rule
are: (1) if the President personally or the
National Security Adviser instructs you
to use a private channel: in such cases
you should advise me personally (or the
Acting Secretary in my absence) of this
instruction unless you are explicitly
directed not to by the President; and (2)
if I, or in my absence, the Acting Secre-
tary or the Executive Secretary, instruct
you to use a non-State channel.

The President has also charged you
to "exercise full responsibility for the
direction, coordination, and supervision
of all United States Government officers
and employees in the country or organi-
zation to which you are accredited,
except for personnel under the command
of a United States area military com-
mander, personnel under the authority
of the Chief of another United States
Mission (for example, one accredited to
an international organization), or person-
nel detailed to duty on the staff of an
international organization. [As part of
that responsibility, you are] to oversee
the operation of all United States

Government programs and activities
within that responsibility." In his letter,
the President has instructed the heads of
all agencies "to inform their personnel in
the United States and abroad of this
charge."

End Text of Statement

I would appreciate having a
message from you acknowledging that
you have read and clearly understand
these reporting relationships and
responsibilities.

Begin Text Letter from the President

Dear Mr. Ambassador:
I want to extend to you my personal best
wishes for the success of your mission in
[country]. As my personal representative
there, you, along with the Secretary of State,
share with me the responsibility for the con-
duct of our relations with [country]. I know
we share a mutual conviction that carrying
the American message of hope and freedom
and advancing United States' interests
abroad reinforces the foundations of peace.
Together we are pledged to work for national
strength and economic growth and to pro-
mote the values undergirding our Nation's
unity and security.

I give you my full personal support as
Chief of the United States Mission in [coun-
try] in the exercise of your strong statutory
mandate under section 207 of the Foreign
Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927). I
charge you to exercise full responsibility for
the direction, coordination, and supervision of
all United States Government officers and
employees in the country or organization to
which you are accredited, except for person-
nel under the command of a United States
area military commander, personnel under
the authority of the Chief of another United
States Mission (for example, one accredited to
an international organization), or personnel
detailed to duty on the staff of an interna-
tional organization. I expect you to oversee
the operation of all United States Govern-
ment programs and activities within that
responsibility. I have notified all heads of
departments and agencies accordingly and
have instructed them to inform their person-
nel in the Ihiited States and abroad.

So that you can ensure effective coordina-
tion of all United States Government activ-
ities within your responsibility. I ask you to
provide strong program direction and leader-
ship of operations Missionwide. Please
instruct all personnel under your charge: It is
their duty to keep you fully informed at all
times about their activities so you can effec-
tively direct, coordinate, and supervise
I'nited States programs and operations under
your jurisdiction and recommend policies to
Washington.

You will receive policy guidance and
instructions from the Secretary of State, wt
is my principal foreign policy spokesman am
adviser, or from me directly. I expect you tc
report with directness and candor. I want tc
emphasize that the Secretary of State has tE
responsibility not only for the activities of tk
Department of State and the Foreign Servic
but also, to the fullest extent provided by lai
for the overall policy direction, coordinationi
and supervision of the United States Goverr
ment activities overseas. There may be deve
opments or decisions on which personnel
under your authority disagree. The Secretaj
of State and I will always welcome the oppo
tunity to consider your recommendations fo;
alternative courses of action and policy
proposals.

As you assume your duties, I know that
you will do so with a strong commitment toi
impartial and equitable treatment of all U.S*
Government personnel under your jurisdic-
tion. Should any perceived inequities be
amenable to elimination or mitigation by
appeal to or negotiation with the host govep
ment, I urge you to pursue this course in a
manner consistent with your authority and
with international law and established
customary practice. Recognizing that varioii
agencies operate under different legislationi
and regulations, should you consider
legislative or executive policy changes to be
desirable in this connection, you should
recommend such changes through the
Secretary of State. Additionally, fair treat-
ment of all U.S. Government personnel
regardless of race, color, creed, sex, or
national origin epitomizes our belief in the
adherence to the principles of equality of
opportunity, a value and concept that form
important element of the American
democratic tradition.

As Commander-in-Chief, I have authori'
over United States military forces. On my
behalf you have responsibility for the direc-
tion, coordination, supervision, and safety,
including security from terrorism, of all
Defense Department personnel in [country]
except those forces under the operational
command and control of a United States ar
military commander and personnel detailed
international organizations. Defense Attach
offices, units engaged in security assistance
and other DOD components attached to yoi.
Mission, as well as other Defense Departme
activities which may have an impact upon tl
conduct of our diplomatic relations with
[country] fall within your responsibility.

It is imperative that you maintain close
relations with concerned United States
military commanders and Chiefs of Mission
accredited to international organizations. A'
copy of this letter is being disseminated to
them.

EAST ASIA

You must keep each other currently
nformed and cooperate on all matters of
nutual interest. Any differences which can-
lot be resolved in the field should be reported
)y you to the Secretary of State; unified com-
nanders should report to the Secretary of
Defense.

I expect the highest standards of profes-
lional and personal conduct from all United
•states Government personnel abroad. You
lave the authority and my full support to take
inv action required to ensure the mainte-
lance of such standards.

Your mission is to protect and advance
he United States' interests abroad, and you
vill receive the resources necessary to accom-
)lish that mission. At the same time, I expect
I hat these resources will be used in an
•ffective and efficient manner, and that they
vill be directly and carefully related to prior-
ty policy and program activities. You should
nform the Secretary of State when you
lelieve that staffing of any agency is either
nadequate or excessive to the performance of
ssential functions.

I am confident that you will represent the
Jnited States with imagination, energy, and
kill. You have my full personal confidence
,nd best wishes.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan ■

U.S. and Mongolia

Establish Diplomatic Relations

JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
JAN. 27, 1987

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the
Mongolian People's Republic, following
consultations between their duly author-
ized representatives at the United
Nations in New York, having confirmed
their commitment to the principles of
equality, non-interference in each other's
internal affairs, mutual respect and
mutual benefit, have decided upon the
establishment of diplomatic relations, at
the ambassadorial level, effective
January 27, 1987.

SECRETARY'S REMARKS,
JAN. 27, 1987'

The establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between countries is an important
first step when the peoples of two
nations wish to learn more about each
other, engage in business together,
further common interests, and solve
common problems. Today, the Govern-
ments of the United States of America
and the Mongolian People's Republic are
taking that important step.

This signing ceremony is a historic
occasion. In the past, formidable barriers
have kept us isolated from one another.
Some of these obstacles were erected by
nature, such as the great distance
between our lands; others were put in
place by man. While we may be
powerless to alter what Mother Nature
has decreed— although I must say,
changes in the speed of transportation
have had an effect [inaudible]— it is cer-
tainly within our power to eliminate the
human obstacles to a normal dialogue
between our peoples.

Mongolia is a country with a long
and proud history. Its land is one of vast
open spaces, not unlike some parts of the
United States. Its people are renowned
for their skills as horsemen. Horses and
the frontier were also formative
elements in America's development and
helped shape our national character. I
am sure there are many other similar-
ities between our nations. With the
establishment of diplomatic relations, we
will better be able to explore those
similarities, expand mutually beneficial
trade, and engage in educational and
cultural exchanges.

Ambassador Gendengiin Nyamdoo,
you have spent several years in the
United States as your government's Per-
manent Representative to the United
Nations— and my friend Ambassador [to
the United Nations Vernon A.] Walters'
colleague. Today you are here in a dif-
ferent capacity, and I welcome you to
Washington. I take great pleasure in
signing this Memorandum of Under-
standing between our governments. I
understand that the negotiations for this
agreement progressed smoothly. This
should serve as a good omen for the
future relationship between our two
countries.

'Press release 15 of Jan. 28, 1987.

March 1987

EUROPE

North Atlantic Council
Meets in Brussels

Secretary Shultz attended the regular
semiannual session of the North Atlantic
Council ministerial meeting in Brussels
on December 11-12, 1986. Following are
the texts of the final communique, a
declaration on conventional arms con-
trol, and the Secretary 's news conference.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE,
DEC. 12, 1986

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
Session in Brussels on 11th and I2th Decem-
ber 1986. Ministers agreed as follows:

1. Securing peace in freedom remains our
fundamental purpose: wars of all kinds,
nuclear and conventional, must be prevented.
In the conviction that the security of our
Alliance is indivisible, we shall continue to
consult closely on all matters affecting our
common interests.

2. We shall continue to explore all oppor-
tunities for a broad and constructive dialogue
which addresses the concerns of the peoples
of East and West. We reconfirm our commit-
ment to a more co-operative East-West rela-
tionship including political dialogue, commer-
cial relations and cultural e.xchanges. in which
all states participate on equal terms. Respect
for human rights and encouragement of
human contacts remain essential.

Recent high-level meetings, notably that
between President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, constitute
important milestones in East-West relations.

3. The Alliance strategy of deterrence,
based on ade(|uate conventional and nuclear
defenses, has proved its value in safeguarding
peace and enabling us to resist intimidation.
It remains fully valid. The continuing build-up
of Soviet forces underscores that maintaining
this effective range of deterrence capabilities
must remain a key Alliance priority.

4. Arms control and disarmament ai-e an
integral part of our security policy. We
remain committed to reaching equitable
agreements aimed at enhancing stability at
lower levels of forces and armaments. They
must strengthen security in Europe and must
not weaken the link between the European
and North American members of the
Alliance. Effective verification is an essential
condition for all such agreements. Real prog-
ress on arms control can only be made if a
stable overall balance is assured at all times.

5. Following Reykjavik, we support the
United States in seeking balanced, equitable
and effectively verifiable arms control
agreements with the Soviet Union. We agree
that instead of simply codifying the existing
levels of arsenals, agreements in Geneva
should seek to achieve substantial reductions

in offensive nuclear forces in ways that will
enhance peace and stability. We therefore
welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards
agreement on 50% reductions in US and
Soviet strategic offensive forces and towards
an agreement on longer-range intermediate
nuclear missiles. We fully endorse the United
States' determination to negotiate detailed
agreements on this basis as a matter of prior-
ity and urge the Soviet Union to join in this
effort in Geneva.

Opportunity for progress in some areas,
notably in the LRINF [longer range
intermediate-range nuclear forces] negotia-
tions, must not be held hostage to agreements
in other unrelated ones. Soviet insistence on
doing so would contradict assurances given at
the highest level.

On the basis of the December 1979 NATO
decision on LRINF modernization and arms
control, the Allies concerned fully support the
envisaged elimination of American and Soviet
land-based LRINF in Europe and the limita-
ti(m to 100 warheads in Asia and the United
States, while their ultimate objective remains
the total elimination of all such LRINF. They
stress that an INF agreement must not
neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-
range US and Soviet INF missiles and must
provide for a commitment to follow-on
negotiations on these missiles.

We also reviewed the US-Soviet negotia-
tions in Geneva on defence and space systems
which aim to prevent an arms race in space
and strengthen strategic stability. We
strongly support these efforts.

In all cases, effective verification would
be an essential condition. We will continue to
assess and to consult closely on all these
issues in the appropriate Alliance fora.'

fi. Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with
in isolation. We also look for progress in
other areas of arms control, particularly since
reductions in nuclear weapons will increase
the importance of removing conventional
disparities and eliminating chemical weapons.
An effective resolution of these issues is an
essential requirement for real and enduring
stability and security in Europe.

7. At our last session in Halifax we
stressed the importance which we attach to
conventional arms control and decided to con-
sider all the issues involved in a high level
group. We have approved the first report of
this group and have also adopted the Brussels
Declaration on Conventional Arms Control.

8. Those of us participating in MBFR
[mutual and balanced force reductions]
reaffirm our determination to reach early,
substantial and verifiable agreement and' call
upon the East to respond constructively to
the Western initiative of 5th December 1985.
This would, in our view, significantly con-
tribute to the launching of other negotiations,
this time extended to Europe as a whole. =

9. The continued Soviet build-up of
chemical weapons is a matter of great con-
cern, as is the proliferation and use of such
weapons. At the Geneva Conference on Dis-
armament, we seek a convention which meet
our objective, the general, complete and
verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons
and the destruction of all existing stock-pile.'^
If the Soviet Union is prepared to take a con
structive attitude on all aspects of an effec-
tive verification regime, such an agreement i
within reach. We appeal to the USSR to join
us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles.

10. The Vienna CSCE [Conference in
Security and Cooperation in Europe] Follow
up meeting is of major importance for the
promotion of stable and constructive East-
West relations and for the sustained long-
term improvement of relations between all
the participating states. We deplore the defi-
ciencies of Warsaw Pact countries in honour
ing their commitments, particularly in the
field of human rights and human contacts.
We shall continue to insist on the full im-
plementation of all agreements reached in th
CSCE process.

We welcome the results of the Stockholn
CDE [Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmamen
in Europe]. The confidence and security
building measures agreed upon, if fully imple
mented. will create more transparency and
contribute to greater confidence and predict
ability of military activities in the whole of
Europe. The measures thus represent prog-
ress in regard to the Helsinki Final Act and
demonstrate the validity of the step-by-step
approach defined in the Madrid mandate.

We shall press for a balanced and con-
structive outcome at Vienna and a
strengthening of the CSCE process through
improved compliance by the East and prog-
ress in all three Baskets.

11. We respect the sovereignty and inde
pendence of all states. We will remain
vigilant and continue to consult on events ou
side the Treaty area which might threaten
our common security.

12. We call on the Soviet Union to end it
unacceptable military occupation of
Afghanistan, soon to enter its eighth year.
The international community demands the
speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet
armed forces and a political settlement which
would restore Afghanistan's independence
and non-aligned status. This would create
conditions for the safe and honourable returre
of refugees to their homes and permit Afghai;
self-determination.

13. We firmly condemn terrorism. We
have intensified the fight against it, whatever
its form and from whatever quarter it comes.
We invite all states to unite their efforts to
defeat this scourge.

14. The maintenance of a calm situation
in and around Berlin, including unhindered
access and preservation of the status of the
city and of its internal security, remains of
fundamental importance for East-West rela-
tions. The 750th anniversary of Berlin will
provide an opportunity to make clear its
present and historical importance.

Department of State Bulleti

EUROPE

The members of the Alliance support the
■fforts of the Federal Republic of Germany,
rough dialogue and co-operation with the
DR [German Democratic Republic], to
ibtain practical improvements to benefit the
icrman people, including Berliners, and to
trengthen peace in Europe.

15. We have noted encouraging progress
1 our efforts to enhance armaments coopera-
ion among all countries of the Alliance. We
hall actively continue these efforts. The
ecent work of the lEPG (Independent Euro-
ean Program Group] represents an impor-
mt contribution to the transatlantic dialogue
1 this field.

16. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North
itlantic Treaty, we reaffirm the importance
f mutual assistance and cooperation within
he Alliance, including the Science for Stabil-
;y Programme. We also reaffirm the need to
nprove defence-industrial collaboration, par-
icularly in order to enable Greece, Portugal
nd Turkey to upgrade their defence
iidustries.

17. Thirty years ago, the Foreign
linisters of Canada, Italy and Norway
fesented a report to the North Atlantic
ouneil which called for enhanced political
onsultation, the improvement and extension
f co-operation and the development of
Teater unity and solidarity within the Atlan-
c community. Commemorating this year the
rork of the Committee of Three, we
fcknowledge the continuing validity of these
frinciples,

18. The Spring 1987 meeting of the
<orth Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session
till be held in Reykjavik in .June.

tECLARATION ON

CONVENTIONAL

ARMS CONTROL,
(EC. 12, 1986

. At Halifax we agreed on the objective of
;rengthening stability and security in the
hole of the Europe, through increased open-
ess and the establishment of a verifiable,
omprehensive and stable balance of conven-
onal forces at lower levels. In pursuit of this
bjective we set up a High Level Task Force;
'e have today reviewed its first report. We
ave instructed it to continue in being and to
rovide further regular reports to the
'ouneil.

2. Arms control should enhance, and not
iminish, security in Europe. We reiterate
ur commitment to the maintenance of an
ffective and credible deterrent posture,
'herefore our approach to arms control will
emain consistent with the need, at each step
f the negotiating process, to retain the
leans to implement Alliance and national
trategies.

3. While maintaining effective deterrence
ivolving both nuclear and conventional
orces, we seek to establish a stable relation-
hip of conventional forces in Europe. Reduc-
ions in nuclear weapons which are the sub-

ject of discussions between the US and the
USSR in Geneva would increase the impor-
tance of eliminating conventional disparities.

4. We are therefore ready to open
East/West discussions with a view to the
establishment of a new mandate for
negotiating on conventional arms control
covering the whole of Europe from the Atlan-
tic to the Urals.

5. For such negotiations to succeed, there
must be recognition of the facts about the
current situation, and a common understand-
ing on philosophy, objectives and methods.

The Facts

6. Statements by Eastern spokesmen
sometimes imply that the present military
situation in Europe is stable and balanced. It
is not. On the contrary, it is marked by asym-
metries and disparities which vary from
region to region but which are detrimental to
Western security and which are a source of
potential instability. The relevant factors
include:

• The armaments, equipment types,
deployments, numbers, mobility and readiness
of the armed forces involved;

• The information, predictability and con-
fidence about them;

• Considerations of geography.

The Philosophy

7. Military forces should exist to prevent war
and to ensure self-defence, not for the pur-
pose of initiating aggression and not for pur-
poses of political or military intimidation.

The Objectives

8. These should be:

• The establishment of a stable and
secure level of forces, geared to the elimina-
tion of disparities;

• A negotiating process which proceeds
step-by-step, and which guarantees the undi-
minished security of all concerned at each
stage;

• Focus on the elimination of the capabil-
ity for surprise attack or for the initiation of
large scale offensive action;

• Further measures to build confidence
and to improve openness and calculability
about military behaviour;

• The application of the measures
involved to the whole of Europe but in a way
which takes account of and seeks to redress
regional imbalances and to exclude
circumvention;

• An effective verification regime (in
which detailed exchanges of information and
on-site inspection will play a vital part) to
ensure compliance with the provisions of any
agreement, to guarantee that limitations on
force capabilities are not exceeded.

The Methods

9. We propose that distinct negotiations take
place:

• To build upon and expand the results of
the Stockholm Conference on confidence and
security building measures;

• To eliminate existing disparities, from
the Atlantic to the Urals, and establish con-
ventional stability at lower levels, between
the countries whose forces bear most imme-
diately upon the essential security relation-
ship in Europe, namely those belonging to the
Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

10. In the light of the foregoing,
therefore, we are ready to initiate discussion
on enhancing conventional stability in the
whole of Europe.

SECRETARY'S

NEWS CONFERENCE,
DEC. 12. 1986'

During the course of our meeting, one of
the ministers described his present mood
as being one of "pleasant reality," were
his words. And when pressed he said,
"pleasant" because, after such a long
period, we see at least a possibility of
major progress in drastic reductions on a
global basis of long-range INF missiles
and of sharp reductions, perhaps 50%, in
strategic offensive arms. He found pros-
pects for other possibilities also
agreeable, although they obviously are
not as much in prospect.

Then he used the word "reality" to
mean that, as we see reductions in
nuclear weapons, that obviously must
make you think even harder about your
conventional force capabilities and the
importance of removing asymmetries
that we can see, of the importance of the
programs that have been under way for
some years now in NATO, thought of
originally as ways of raising the nuclear
threshold. It's the same problem with
the coin turned over.

And it was interesting that, during
our plenary session, as well as in the
restricted session, we referred to things
like the Senator Nunn program on
cooperative research and development
programs, really addressed to the con-
ventional area, and things of that kind.
So there was a sense of accomplishment,
possibly, if the things agreed on in broad
terms in Reykjavik can be in the end
consummated, and a sense of reality at
having to appreciate more fully what the
implications are of a world with at least
fewer nuclear weapons.

This meeting, when I think back a
year ago, comes at the end of a very
intensive year of negotiations and con-

March 1987

EUROPE

sultations. Ambassador Abshire [David
M. Abshire, U.S. Permanent Represen-
tative to the North Atlantic Council]
added up the number of major formal
consultations of the allies, beginning
with President Reagan's visit here after
Geneva, and they come to 29 formal
times when somebody came and talked,
and we consulted. And, of course, the
volume of interactions on a one-to-one or
in smaller groups is too numerous to
count. So we have an alliance that
works, that consults, that thinks
together and works together. And that
is really the essence of how it is to have
important things happen and have such
support for them. It has also been said in
our alliance consultations many times,
and we all agree, that security must
include far more than arms and arms
control. And, in particular, the human
condition, as it exists around the world
and in Europe, has to be of central
importance.

We discussed the death, and the cir-
cumstances of it, of Anatoliy Marchenko,
and I felt a great sense of resolve to
express our indignation about that. I'm
pleased to hear the reports of what we
and our allies and some of the neutral
and nonaligned countries are having to
say in Vienna right now on this subject.

Q. You had a meeting yesterday
with your Spanish colleagfue. Is it true
that you said that, as Spanish posi-
tions stand now on the U.S. reduction
of its military personnel in Spain, you
would prefer to go from Spain?

A. We had some good strong talk.
We're in the midst of a negotiation, and,
obviously, positions can be taken by a
government— that is, a host
government— for us that can construct a
situation that makes it not very worth-
while to expend the resources necessary.
But we are in a very active negotiation,
and our relationship with Spain, and
relationship to those bases, is a long-
standing one. In one way or another I
hope that it will emerge in whatever
form in a positive way from these
negotiations. But it remains to be seen.

Q. Last week the defense
ministers of NATO refrained from
mentioning the Reykjavik idea of
abolition of ballistic missiles. Again,
the communique today does the same.
Has the alliance, in effect, winnowed
out this element from President
Reagan's foreign policy insofar as it
becomes an alliance policy?

A. Of course, Reykjavik brought up
onto the table quite a number of things,
and I suppose in a way the most impor-

tant were the things that we found
ourselves agreeing with the Soviet
Union on. And those are the things
focused on in this communique. While
progress was made in the discussion of
the space defense issues— in particular, I
think, the identification of the idea of a
nonwithdrawal period— nevertheless, we
didn't have any agreement with the
Soviet Union in that field.

President Reagan tabled the idea of
the elimination of all ballistic missiles.
They tabled the idea of the elimination of
all strategic arms. Those are very, very
different concepts. We didn't agree to
their idea; they didn't agree with ours.
We had differences of opinion about
what would happen at the end of the
nonwithdrawal period, and, of course,
we were unable to make any real contact
on the subject of permitted activities
during the period. So, in that area, it's
not possible to identify anything that
was agreed on with precision, because
there wasn't anything agreed on.

Insofar as the idea of eliminating all
ballistic missiles in 10 years or in some
subsequent period of time, people have
different views about it. And some are
intrigued, some are enthusiastic, some
are reserved, and some don't think it's a
very good idea. So that's the fact of the
matter.

Q. On your way here, you said that
you would like to see full disclosure
about the Iran/contra problem. You
described the Administration's posture
as being in absolutely total contrast to
the Watergate period, and yet back
home, while you're here doing a
rebuilding job, as you described it. at
least two key members of the Adminis-
tration during the period have taken
the Fifth Amendment, asserted their
constitutional rights, and others, par-
ticularly the CIA Director, seem to
have trouble remembering much of the
details. Is that an awkward stance as
far as you're concerned? Would you
like to see more come out regarding
this experience and get it behind the
Administration?

A. We had very little discussion of
this question here and, as it turned out,
there wasn't any rebuilding necessary.
That is, what people are wanting to feel
sure about is that, as far as America is
concerned, we're in business, and we're
carrying forward our foreign policy and
domestic policies, of course. And so we
had a good, strong, thorough, substan-
tive discussion of all of the substantive
issues involved, and that's what we did
here.

Now I did take the time, at the
beginning of our session, not because
people were asking me but because it's
gotten so much prominence, of describ-
ing the President's approach to this,
which is, basically, let's get all of the
facts out as rapidly as possible. He's
made changes, particularly the national
security adviser. It's been announced.
He has identified potentially illegal activ
ity as soon as he found it himself, called
for the appointment of a special prose-
cutor, and stated his readiness to
cooperate fully with the designated con-
gressional committees. Basically the
President said, let us handle this by
being open and by prosecuting where
necessary, so we'll kind of put a circle
around that and people will do that.

In the meantime, we have a very
complicated and difficult task of govern-
ing to do, as always, both domestically
and internationally and let's get at it.
That's the strategy, and people thanked
me for the statement, and we went on t(
discuss our business.

Q. I'd like to follow up on that
question and ask that you answer the
remaining portion of it, which is: In
light of your and the President's
desire to be open and get all of the
facts out in this matter, would it help
you in your job of conducting the com-
plicated task of American foreign
policy if people were not declining to
offer information and instead were
telling all they knew about the matter
to get it out quickly and get it over
with?

A. I agree very much with the
President's strategy and desire to see
the facts of the matter set out on the
table. We live in a rule of law, and unde
the rule of law people have the right not
to testify against themselves. And so
they can, as it's said, take the Fifth
Amendment if they choose to. That's
their decision. As I say, I agree very
much with the President's desire to get
things out as rapidly as possible, and I
hope in one way or another it will be
possible to do that.

Q. I wonder if you could define
perhaps a little more closely where yoi
stand on the elimination, total elimina
tion, of strategic missiles. In a recent
speech, you suggested it might be a
good idea to keep some rather than
abolish the whole lot. Are you,
therefore, among those who perhaps
think it might not be such a good idea
to abolish them entirely?

Department of State Bulletii

EUROPE

I A. We're talking about ballistic
Sissiles here, the President's proposal at
leykjavik. I support the President's pro-
osal. I think it would be a good thing if
could be brought off.

The President also proposed at
leykjavik, or said at Reykjavik, and he's
aid many times, that given the history
f the world, given the fact that treaties
ave been agreed to and then not lived
;p to— the treatment of Anatoliy
larchenko is an all-too-vivid reminder of
lat fact— then it's well to have an insur-
nce policy. We would like to see all
allistic missiles eliminated. We'd like to
?e various things in the field of arms
jntrol. We're glad to see the agree-
lent, at least on some of them, as pos-
ble. But it's well to have an insurance
olicy, just in case. Now, that's an
nportant role, even if all ballistic
lissiles were eliminated, for strategic
efense.

It's quite obvious that the Presi-
ent's Strategic Defense Initiative has a
■t to do with the fact that negotiations
"e going on and that perhaps some
;sults are being achieved. But it also
iS a role in the end as an insurance
jlicy. Suppose there's cheating, sup-
3se that somebody else gets a hold of
ich weapons. It's good to be able to
?fend yourself against them. And I
link that the insurance policy concept
lat the President has is a pretty good
)ncept. And we're all sort of familiar
ith it. When we place our fortune in a
3use, why, we look around for some
isurance. So this was not an official
Dvernmental ideal; it was just an idea
' my own. I had talked it over with the
resident. He had no objection to my
lentioning it in a speech. I think we
sed to work on this concept of an insur-
nce policy and think of different ways
lat it might be implemented. So that's
1 that means.

Q. Did you tell the allies here at
lis meeting that the proposal to
liminate ballistic missiles in 10 years
as been deemphasized or that it is no
)nger one of the major U.S.
riorities? And did you also tell them,
s part of your insurance policy idea,
fiat you would like to keep a small
jrce of ballistic missiles, as you have
aid on previous occasions?

A. We really didn't get into it too
mch, but that is the U.S. position, and
ley know that, and there hasn't been
ny shift in that. It's been tabled at
leneva. And that is our posture,
.amely, that we are ready to agree to a
jO-year, nonwithdrawal period, at the

end of which either side would have the
right to deploy, to exercise its
withdrawal right and deploy, if it wished
to. Second, that during the first 5 years
of the 10-year period, there would be a
50% cut in strategic arms, nuclear arms,
and during the second 5-year period,
there would be further reductions in
ballistic missiles of all types, with their
being eliminated at the end of the 5-year
period.

In the meantime, the United States
would conduct its work on strategic
defense in accordance with the Anti-
ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. That's
our proposal. That proposal is sitting
there on the table. It has not been
accepted so we're having to struggle
with it.

Q. Did you sense any reg:ret among
the NATO allies that the United States
has now gone beyond the SALT II
limits?

A. One or two people mentioned
that, but, of course, this subject has been
discussed a lot before. A year and a half
ago in our meeting in Portugal, we had a
major discussion of it, and discussion of
the various ways in which the Soviets
have violated arms control agreements.

In the case of the SALT agreement,
in particular, they have gone beyond the
permitted one additional type to two
additional types. That's a major violation
of great importance. And they have
engaged in encryption to the point
where it's difficult to verify what is
being developed. And that's a violation.

Of course, in the ABM Treaty area,
the building of the Krasnoyarsk radar is
a violation, and there are all too
numerous violations of undertakings of
the Helsinki Final Act in the human
rights field and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. So the woods are
filled with violations, and we went over
them.

I think that people have absorbed
the fact that it's true that the Soviets
have long since violated the SALT II
Treaty. In the Portugal meeting, the
urgings we had were: Well, that's true,
but let's go the extra mile. So the Presi-
dent went the extra mile and continued
to abide by the numerical limits, and we
are in conformance all the way across
the board. Last May, having gone the
extra mile, having seen no correction of
the violations that the Soviets have
made, he made the decision that was
announced then. And the rolling out of
the bomber was simply an implementa-
tion of that.

I think we have to remember that
this is not a sort of aggressive violation
of a treaty. It's not an aggressive viola-
tion by the United States; it's a response
of the United States to the fact that the
Soviet Union has long since breached its
terms in very important ways. And
people know that.

Q. Last week the NATO defense
ministers condemned unilateral disar-
mament. This communique doesn't
make any specific reference to that.
How do you feel about the Labor
Party's defense policy which was
announced on the day that the
meetings here began?

A. I have had it drummed into me
that as Secretary of State for the United
States, I shouldn't comment on party
politics in other countries, and I don't.

However, I am, I think, in a position
where I can comment on substantive
issues, whatever political party may
adopt them. And I think the idea of
unilateral disarmament is a catastrophic
idea if it should be implemented. Why in
the world would we want to put our-
selves in the position where the Soviet
Union can look down our throat and tell
us where we go because they are heavily
armed, and we've thrown all our arms
away? It doesn't make any sense at all.

Q. Are you in favor of holding a
human rights conference in Moscow,
and if yes, what should be the
conditions?

A. I think it's a question of saying
to yourself: What is the kind of atmos-
phere that would make a conference at
all worthwhile? Conferences discuss
things. And I think a first point here is
that we've had a lot of discussion, there
have been all sorts of good words pro-
duced. Look at the words in the Helsinki
Final Act and in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. It's absolutely
clear that citizens of a country should
have the right of emigration. It's not
being lived up to. And I could point to
many other things; I just picked that one
out.

I think the first thing we need to
look for is change in behavior, so that a
different atmosphere is created, so that
it creates an atmosphere that tells you
it's worth talking and trying to agree on
something because it might produce a
change in behavior. That's the first thing
to have in mind.

Then, of course, it obviously must be
true that if you're going to have a con-
ference on a subject like human rights,

yiarch 1987

EUROPE

then the conference itself has to be kind
of an example, an exhibit of what per-
formance on human rights should be
like. And so we'd want to spell that out
carefully. I think there is, just myself, a
process ahead of us here as we examine
this issue, and I wouldn't rule it in and I
wouldn't rule it out.

I think what we have to do is engage
in a strong process of particularly
emphasizing performance. We need to
do that in Vienna, as I think all our
delegation and the others we work with
are doing. And we need to do it, I might
say, in association with whatever efforts
we're able to make in connection with
the high-level task force group's work in
working out a mandate for some further
discussions of conventional arms security
matters. But human rights concerns
need to be placed in a priority position,
and what we need to emphasize right
now is not so much words as actions.
That's what's needed. And, unfortu-
nately, the most recent action, the death
of Anatoliy Marchenko in jail, is not a
very good sign.

Q. On the way over here you told
reporters that in May [Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence] Mr. Casey had told
you that the Iran operation was in a
stand-down mode. Mr. Casey has now
said that he doesn't recall that conver-
sation. Can you either explain that
discrepancy or react to it for us?

A. I don't claim to remember every-
thing I say, and so I don't suppose other
people necessarily do either. That's not
strange.

Q. At what point do you think that
people going on taking the Fifth
Amendment will finally interfere and
eventually destroy the strategy of the
President that you share and create
problems also for the foreign policy of
the United States?

A. It won't create any problem for
the foreign policy of the United States,
and I think that as things move along, it
won't place too much of a blockage in
the getting-out of information either.
Somehow or other, in our inquisitive
society, information tends to emerge,
and the essence of what took place will
become known and perhaps, in its broad
and essential outlines, is already known.

Meeting of NATO's
Special Consultative Group

'Greece recalls its position on nuclear
matters and space system issues as expressed
during previous NATO Ministerial meetings
[text m original].

^Recalling its position on the MBFR
negotiations, France has made a reservation
on this sentence [text in original],

'Press release 266 of Dec. 31. 1986. ■

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 10, 1986

The NATO Special Consultative Group
(SCG) met today under the chairmanship
of Ambassador Allen Holmes to discuss
the status of the INF [intermediate-
range nuclear forces] negotiations.
Ambassador Maynard Glitman, U.S.
negotiator for INF, briefed the group on
developments from the last negotiating
round, Sept. 18-November 22, and also
on results from the meetings which were
held in Geneva December 2-5.

The SCG reiterated its full support
for the U.S. INF proposal presented on
October 23 which reflected the INF-
related understandings reached during
the meeting between President Reagan
and General Secretary Gorbachev at
Reykjavik. In particular, the group sup-
ported the inclusion in that proposal of
the agreement reached in principle by
the President and the General Secretary
to equal global ceilings for U.S. and
Soviet LRINF [longer range interme-
diate-range nuclear forces] missile
warheads, consisting of 100 such
warheads outside Europe and their
elimination in Europe, along with con-
straints on shorter range INF (SRINF)
missile systems and follow-on negotia-
tions on further limitations and reduc-
tions of LRINF missiles and SRINF
missiles.

The SCG emphasized the require-
ment to constrain equally and concur-
rently SRINF missiles, as previously
proposed by the United States, and to
undertake promptly subsequent SRINF
negotiations. The group also emphasized
its support for the U.S. efforts to reach
agreement in Geneva on effective INF
verification measures side-by-side with
progress on reaching agreement on
reductions and limitations of INF missile
systems.

The group reaffirmed the alliance's
readiness to modify, halt, reverse, or
dispense altogether with its deployment
of LRINF missiles as part of a balanced,
equitable, and effective verifiable arms
control agreement. The group also con-
firmed NATO's determination to con-
tinue the deployment of LRINF missiles
as scheduled, in the absence of an INF
arms control agreement with the Soviet
Union obviating the need for such
deployments.

The group reaffirmed its own long-
held position that negotiations on INF
are vital in and of themselves and
should, therefore, lead to a separate
agreement on its own merits and not be^
held hostage to progress in any other
negotiations. Soviet insistence on doing
so would contradict Soviet assurances
given at the highest level. The SCG,
therefore, calls upon the Soviet Union
not to hold progress in INF hostage to
any other agreement.

The group recalled that the SS-20
force remains 441 launchers with 1,323
nuclear warheads. The SCG also noted
the continuing Soviet modernization pre
grams for LRINF and SRINF missile
systems.

The SCG recognized that it is time
now to build energetically upon the com
mon ground that has been recently
established by expanding areas of con-
vergence and negotiating vigorously to
narrow areas of difference. The group,
therefore, expressed the hope that
Soviet INF negotiators will join with
their U.S. counterparts in proceeding
with substantive and detailed negotia-
tions looking toward the early conclusio
and implementation of a sound, durable
and separate INF agreement. ■

Department of State Bullet!

HUMAN RIGHTS

Soviet Repression

of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

The following report was prepared by the
Bureau of Human Rights and
Humaniiarian Affairs in January 1987.

During the nearly seven decades that
have elapsed since the Bolsheviks seized
power, the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union has sought to eliminate
religion or, failing that, utilize it for the
purposes of the state. In this deliberate
attack on religion, perhaps no institution
has suffered more than the Ukrainian
Catholic Church. Claiming the devotion
of millions in western Ukraine, the
:hurch— leaders and laity alike— has been
systematically repressed by Soviet rule.
Official Soviet historiography even goes
IS far as to claim that the church
'liquidated itself" in 1946, that its
followers "voluntarily joined" the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church. '

But the Ukrainian Catholic Church
ives on, in the catacombs, as witness
lumerous samizdat documents and
•epeated discussions in Soviet publica-
ions of the need to repress it. This
japer sets forth an account of that
•epression.

nhurch and State in the
soviet Union: 1917-46

iituated primarily in western Ukraine,
vhich the Soviets forcibly annexed from
^oland in 1939, the Ukrainian Catholic
Church traces its modern lineage to the
[596 Union of Brest, through which it
iffiliated with the Roman Catholic
3hurch while preserving its Byzantine
'orm of worship and spirituality. Thus,
mlike the Russian Orthodox Church or
he Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church that arose after the revolution in
'astern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholic
Church has looked to the West, recogniz-
ng the authority of the Pope from its
nception.

Western Ukraine poses a particular
Droblem for the Soviet regime, since,
iccording to Soviet sources, nearly half
jf the officially permitted religious con-
gregations in the Soviet Union are
ocated there. ^ In addition, there are
Tiany unofficial groups which include
Ukrainian Catholics. Furthermore, the
Ukrainian Catholic Church has served as
1 focus for the development of a distinct
Ukrainian national and cultural identity
n western Ukraine. Not surprisingly,
these characteristics have marked the
:hurch in Soviet eyes.

In its first years the Soviet regime
attacked all religious institutions, accus-
ing them of political opposition to the
regime and collusion with its internal
and external enemies. All religious
groups suffered from discriminatory
Soviet legislation, beginning with the
Soviet Decree of February 5, 1918, on
the Separation of Church From State
and School From Church. The new laws
transferred all church property,
including all houses of worship, to the
state. Clergy and their families were
stripped of their civil rights. Organized
religious instruction of minors was made
a criminal offense, and all theological
schools were closed, as eventually were
all monasteries and convents. The
regime sponsored abusive antireligious
campaigns which were accompanied by
the harassment of believers and their
exclusion from all positions of
importance.

During the 1920s, however, the
regime shifted its tactics in the direction
of "sovietization" of individual churches
and sects. "Disloyal" religious leaders
were replaced by others who were will-
ing to accept a platform of loyalty to the
Soviet state and were prepared to sub-
mit to far-reaching controls over the
external and internal activities of their
groups. By 1927 these conditions were
accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate of
the Russian Orthodox Church in return
for a limited and uncertain tolerance; but
the price was the alienation of many
Orthodox bishops, clergy, and believers
who considered such a compromise with
the atheist state to be incompatible with
the integrity and spiritual mission of
their church.

These early won concessions did not
last long, however. By 1929 Stalin's
regime had embarked on a violent,
widespread antireligious campaign. More
and more churches and prayer houses of
all faiths were closed down by the
authorities, often on the basis of
fabricated "demands of workers." Grow-
ing numbers of bishops and clergy were
banished, imprisoned, or executed. This
situation worsened during the late
1930s, culminating by the end of the
decade in the near total suppression of
institutional religion throughout the
Soviet Union. Soviet authorities
destroyed what remained of the Ukrain-
ian Autocephalous Orthodox Church dur-
ing this period, killing most of its bishops
and many thousands of its followers.^
They also drew up plans for the liquida-

tion of the Ukrainian Catholic Church;
these became reality with the Soviet
acquisition in 1939 of western Ukraine
and western Belorussia, which had large
congregations of Catholics. With Soviet
occupation, there immediately followed
the abolition or state takeover of
longstanding church institutions-
including schools, seminaries,
monasteries, and publishing houses— and
the confiscation of all church properties
and lands. Finally, as the Nazis invaded
the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet
secret police rounded up a large number
of Ukrainian Catholic priests who were
either murdered or deported to the east.

Following the Nazi attack on the
U.S.S.R., Stalin altered substantially his
tactics toward religious communities.
Fearing for the very survival of the
Soviet regime, he reduced antireligious
propaganda and offered significant con-
cessions to the Russian Orthodox
Church, as well as other denominations,
in the hope of harnessing all the poten-
tial of the Soviet Union in its struggle
against Nazi Germany. But with the
Soviet reoccupation of Ukraine in 1944,
repression of Ukrainian Catholics,
already suffering under Nazi occupation,
was resumed once again, culminating in
the official "liquidation" of the church in
1946.

Liquidation of the Ukrainian
Catholic Church, 1946

From the very beginning of the Soviet
reoccupation of western Ukraine,
measures aimed at liquidating the
Ukrainian Catholic Church were under-
taken. In the winter of 1944-4.5, Soviet
authorities summoned Catholic clergy to
"reeducation" sessions conducted by the
secret police, the NKVD. On April 5,
1945, the Soviet media began an anti-
Catholic campaign. Then on April 11,
1945, the NKVD began arresting the
entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy of
western Ukraine, including the secular
and monastic clergy— a program that
would last for the next 5 years. Along
with Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyj, the
NKVD arrested Bishop Nykyta Budka,
the Vicar General of the Metropolitan;
Gregory Khomyshyn, the Bishop of
Stanislav, and his Auxiliary Bishop, John
Liatyshevsky; Paul Goydych, the Bishop
of Priashiv, and his Auxiliary Bishop,
Basil Hopko; Bishop Nicholas
Charnetsky, Apostolic Visitator of
Volyn; Monsignor Peter Verhun,
Apostolic Visitator for Ukrainian
emigrants in Germany; and Josaphat
Kotsylovsky, the Bishop of Peremyshl,
and his Auxiliary Bishop, Gregory
Lakota. (All but one of these either died

March 1987

HUMAN RIGHTS

in prison or died shortly thereafter, their
health ruined by the abuse they had suf-
fered; only Metropolitan Slipyj, through
the efforts of Pope John XXIII, was
finally released from prison in 1963 and
allowed to leave for Rome.) According to
eyewitnesses, in Lvov alone there were
about 800 priests imprisoned at that
time; and in Chortkov about 150 priests
from the district of Ternopol were
deported to Siberia.''

Meanwhile, in late May 1945, as
these mass arrests of Catholic clergy
were being carried out, Soviet
authorities sponsored the so-called
Initiating Committee for the Reunifica-
tion of the Greek Catholic Church With
the Russian Orthodox Church. This was
a preparatory committee, which subse-
quently convened a pseudosynod— the
authorities proclaimed it a "Sobor"— in
Lvov on March 8-10, 1946. In that
"Sobor" an end was proclaimed to the
1596 Union of Brest, and the Ukrainian
Catholic Church was declared
"reunified" with the Russian Orthodox
Church.

This entire exercise was planned and
guided by Soviet authorities. Knowledge
of the "Sobor" was withheld from the

public; no advance election of delegates
was held, and only 216 clerics and 19
laymen— allegedly representing the
Ukrainian Catholic Church— brought
about "reunification." Not surprisingly,
the NKVD was entrusted with the task
of coercing the remaining Catholic
clergy to join the Russian Orthodox
Church.

Both the Vatican and the Ukrainian
Catholic Church in the West have
refused to recognize this forced
reunification, considering it to be
uncanonical and illegal: according to
Catholic and traditional Russian
Orthodox canon law, to be valid, a synod
must be called by the Pope or by a
patriarch and must be attended by
bishops. Yet Soviet authorities consider
this "Sobor" and its decisions binding on
all Ukrainian Catholics in the U.S.S.R.
to this day.^ The protests of almost 300
Ukrainian clerics and the 1946 and 1952
encyclicals of Pope Pius XII in defense
of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have
gone unheeded. Moreover, the same fate
met the Catholic Church in Trans-
carpathia, a part of Czechoslovakia
incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R.
at the end of World War II, where the

Situation of the Ul<rainian Catholic Church

Number in 1939 Losses Suffered by 1950

Dioceses 4 All dioceses liquidated.

Territory of Apostolic Visitator 1 Liquidated.

Bishops 8 All imprisoned, condemned, died in

prison, killed, or exiled.

Parishes 2,772 Taken over by the Russian Orthodox

Church; some liquidated.

Churches and chapels 4,119 Taken over by the Russian Orthodox

Church or closed.

Monasteries and convents 142 Confiscated and closed by the

authorities; a few transferred to the
Russian Orthodox Church.

Other church institutions All liquidated.

Secular priests 2,638 Fewer than half forced into Russian

Orthodox Church; others imprisoned or
in hiding.

Monastic clergy 164 Dispersed, imprisoned together with

three Provincial Superiors.

Brothers 193 Dispersed or imprisoned.

Seminarians 229 Dispersed or refugees.

Nuns 580 Dispersed.

Faithful 4,048,515 Many imprisoned or deported for their

faith; majority resisting passively.

Mukachiv eparchy was liquidated and
subordinated to the Russian Orthodox
Church in 1947. Its bishop, Theodor
Romza, was killed. '^

The following table, comparing the
situation of the Ukrainian Catholic
Church prior to World War II with the
situation in 1950, offers a graphic pic-
ture of the losses suffered by the church
from its forced reunion.''

The Ukrainian Catholic
Church in the Catacombs

Forty years after the official abolition of
their church, Ukrainian Catholic com-
munities continue to exist in the Soviet
Union, as even Soviet sources attest.
The most telling evidence of the survival
of the Catholic Church is to be found in
Soviet propaganda, which wages a
vigorous campaign against the church
through books, pamphlets, periodicals,
television programs, movies, lectures,
and exhibits, all designed to falsify the
historical record, defame Catholic
leaders and clergy, and intimidate
church members. To this day, the great
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who
led his church for four and one-half
decades (1900-44), saving the lives of
thousands of Jews during World War II,
is maligned by Soviet officials.

At the outset, the priests of the
Catacomb Church were those who did
not rejoin Russian orthodoxy during the
1945-49 period but remained Catholics,
giving up any public exercise of their
clerical duties. After 1946, a significant
portion of Catholic laymen continued to
depend on the services of these "illegal"
priests and monks, whose numbers
increased after the mid-1940s with the
return of what the Soviets called
"recalcitrant" clergymen— those who
had completed their sentences or had
benefited from the post-Stalin
amnesties.

The hope that de-Stalinization would
lead to the restoration of the Ukrainian
Catholic Church produced a marked
intensification of covert Catholic
activities. By the late 1950s, however, as
more and more "converts" to the church
began to repudiate orthodoxy, com-
munist authorities dispelled any hope for
a change in official policy toward the
church by arresting even more priests
and unleashing a new wave of anti-
Catholic propaganda. Notwithstanding
this widespread antireligious campaign,
the number of priests increased in
western LIkraine in the 1950s and
thereafter, due in part to secret ordina-
tions in exile. In addition, the existence

Department of State Bulletir

HUMAN RIGHTS

if secret theological "seminaries" in
Ternopol and Kolomyia was reported in
he Soviet press in the 1960s in connec-
ion with the arrests of their organizers.

Today, the underground Catholic
]hurch is said to embrace hundreds of
iriests, headed by a number of secret
lishops working under the authority of
heir primate in Rome. Religious women
n orders working throughout Ukraine
'lumber more than 1,000. Many former
Jatholic and non-Orthodox priests have
etained a spiritual allegiance to the
'ope as well, while others have taken up
ivilian professions and continue to
elebrate the sacraments in private. A
ertain number of Ukrainian Catholic
■riests live in exile outside western
Jkraine or as free settlers in Siberia,
iLazakhstan, Lithuania, and eastern
Tkraine, often serving their faithful
rom afar. Members of religious com-
lunities and monastic orders have main-
ained close contact with each other, and
lost have remained faithful to their
ows. In 1974, a clandestine Catholic
onvent was uncovered by police in
,vov.

Almost invariably, these clergymen
nd monastics hold full-time secular jobs
r have retired from such employment,
he identities of the older clergy seem to
e known to the Soviet police, who fre-
uently subject them to searches, inter-
Dgations, and fines but stop short of
' rrests unless they have extended their
ctivities beyond a narrow circle of
•lends in private homes. It appears,
owever, that Soviet authorities are
luch more ruthless in dealing with new,
scretly ordained priests.

In 1968, apparently in connection
'ith the legalization of the Ukrainian
atholic Church in Czechoslovakia, the
arassmert of "recalcitrant" clergy
scalated into a large-scale campaign
gainst "illegal" Ukrainian Catholic
lergy. Many of these clergymen were
ubjected to searches, interrogations,
nes, and beatings. In January 1969, the
1GB arrested an underground Catholic
ishop named Vasyl' Velychkovskiy and
>vo Catholic priests, sentencing them to
'-years imprisonment for alleged viola-
ions of the "law on cults."

Religious activities that are "illegal"
'hen performed by Catholic priests or
lembers include holding religious serv-
;es; educating children in the Catholic
lith; performing baptisms, wedding
ites, and funerals; hearing confessions;
nointing the ill; copying religious
laterials; and possessing prayer books,
ions, church calendars, religious books,

March 1987

and other sacred objects. Soviet sources
reveal numerous examples of afrests for
such activities. One is the case of
Reverend Ivan Kryvy, who was arrested
in 1973 for organizing the printing of a
Ukrainian Catholic prayer book (actually
a reprint of a prayer book published in
Canada in 19.54) in three consecutive edi-
tions (1969, 1971, and 1972) totaling
3,500 copies. The work was done by two
employees of the Lvov state printing
shop who also were arrested in 1973
together with another person involved in
the distribution of these materials. In
the same manner, the clandestine
printers also produced 150 copies of a
"Carol and Church Songs" book and 150
copies of the "Missal."

The most active lay people and
clergy of the "illegal" church have tried
to use legal means to defend their
church. By 1956-57, there were cases in
which believers had tried to legalize their
Ukrainian Catholic communities accord-
ing to Soviet law by petitioning the
proper authorities to permit their parish
congregations to operate openly. A
number of such petitions were sent in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, including
an appeal from the Ukrainian Catholics
of the city of Stryi, which reached the
West in 1972. All of these petitions were
refused. In 1976 a Ukrainian Catholic
priest named Reverend Volodymyr
Prokopiv was arrested for accompanying
a delegation of Ukrainians to Moscow
with such a petition, signed by a large
number of Catholics from the Lvov
region. The Soviet response to these
petitions has been to sharpen repressive
measures against the activist clergy,
monastics, and lay people and to inten-
sify their propaganda.

In recent years, the cause of
persecuted Ukrainian Catholics has been
taken up by the dissident movement in
Ukraine. Since 1970, the movement's
organ, the Ukrainian Herald, has car-
ried accounts of the harassment,
searches, arrests, and trials of Catholics
and has editorially condemned "wanton
liquidation" of the church as "illegal and
unconstitutional." A leading Ukrainian
dissident, historian Valentyn Moroz,
devoted part of his Chronicle of
Resistance to the nation-building role of
the Ukrainian Catholic Church in
western Ukraine; he equated the
regime's anti-Catholic struggle with an
attack upon "the spiritual structure of
the nation."

Lithuanian Catholic dissidents also
have raised their voices in recent years.
In their petitions to Soviet authorities
and in their underground Chronicle of
the Lithuanian Catholic Church, they
have joined Ukrainian dissidents in call-
ing for the lifting of the illegal ban on
the Ukrainian Catholic Church.
Likewise, in September 1974, a leading
Russian Orthodox dissident named
Anatoliy Levitin-Krasnov appealed to
Sakharov's human rights committee in
Moscow to raise its voice in defense of
Ukrainian Catholics and other
persecuted religious groups. "The Union
in Western Llkraine," wrote Levitin-
Krasnov, "is a massive popular move-
ment. Its persecution means not only
religious oppression, but also restriction
of the national rights of Western
Llkraine."*

Chronicle of the Catholic
Church in Ukraine

At the beginning of 1984, a group of
LIkrainian Catholics began to publish and
disseminate a samizdat publication, the
Chronicle of the Catholic Church. To
date, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
in Munich has received and broadcast
nine numbered issues of the Chronicle
plus one special issue. The 10th edition
of the Chronicle was published in June
1986 and had a significant change in
title: Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic
Church in the Catacombs. The Chronicle
is published by members of the
"Initiative Group for the Defense of the
Right of Believers and the Church in
Ukraine," which was established in 1982
and spearheads the campaign of LIkrain-
ian Catholics for the legalization of their
church.^

It was the years of abortive demands
by believers that authorities legalize the
activities of the Catholic Church in
western Ukraine that brought about the
emergence of an organized human rights
movement among believers. In early
1982 the Central Committee of Ukrain-
ian Catholics was formed, and Yosyf
Terelya was elected its chairman. In a
statement about the formation of the
Initiative Group, addressed to the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party
of Ukraine, Terelya wrote:

This was the response of Ukrainian
Catholics to increasing repression against the
Ukrainian Catholic Church. From now on, all
information about the Ukrainian Catholic
Church will be passed on for scrutiny by the
world public. The Catholics of the world
should know and be reminded in what condi-
tions we exist.'"

HUMAN RIGHTS

The first three issues of the Chroni-
cle are varied, although they deal largely
with the lives of believers— Catholics,
Orthodox, Baptists, Pentecostals,
Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-Day
Adventists— giving accounts of
repressive measures taken against them
and naming the camps and psychiatric
hospitals in which they are confined. The
journals also devote considerable atten-
tion to the sociopolitical situation in
Ukraine and discuss such diverse sub-
jects as the Raoul Wallenberg case,
Russification, and the Polish workers'
movement. Most of the information con-
tained in the Chronicle, however, relates
to the lives of members of the banned
Ukrainian Catholic Church, especially to
violations of their human rights. These
journals underscore the needs of the peo-
ple to worship freely in their own rite, to
have their own churches with free access
to them, and to have their own priests
and their own language."

The founder of the Initiative Group
and moving force behind the Chronicle,
Yosyf Terelya, was arrested on
February 8, 1985, and sentenced on
August 20, 1985, to 7 years imprison-
ment and 5 years exile for his religious
activities. He had already spent years in
various camps, prisons, and psychiatric
institutions. He is currently serving his
sentence in Camp #36 near Kuchino, the
so-called death camp where, since May
1984, four prominent Ukrainian
prisoners have died— Ukrainian Helsinki
Monitors Vasyl' Stus, Oleska Tykhy,
Yuriy Lytvyn, and journalist Valeriy
Marchenko.

Terelya's successor as chairman of
the Initiative Group, Vasyl' Kobryn, also
was sentenced in March 1985 to 3 years
imprisonment for "anti-Soviet slander."
The plight of Terelya and Kobryn is just
one example of the persecution of
countless numbers of Ukrainian
Catholics who have suffered harassment,
illegal searches, beatings, and arrests
solely because of their attempts to prac-
tice their religious beliefs.

Grounds for Repression

Clearly, the Ukrainian Catholic faithful
who were driven underground following
the forced 1946 "reunion" have posed an
especially complicated problem for
Soviet authorities. Enjoying massive
support from believers in the western
Ukraine, as well as from the strong
Ukrainian Catholic diaspora in the West,
the faithful have survived despite
repeated repressive measures. They
have survived both within the formal

Orthodox Church— so-called secret
Catholics— and as an "illegal" church
with a succession of its own bishops and
a network of secular and monastic
clergy, performing clandestine religious
rites in private homes, at cemeteries,
and even in officially "closed" churches.
Among young people, in particular,
there has been a growing acceptance of
religious traditions and symbols as
important links with the past and as
integral elements of national culture.

The reaction of the regime has been
to renew its emphasis on mass,
antireligious propaganda, especially in
western Ukraine. Conferences have been
organized on the subject of perfecting
the methodology to combat Ukrainian
Catholicism in western Ukraine.'^
Numerous publications have appeared
that attempt to discredit the union of the
congregations in Ukraine and what is
now Belorussia with Rome in 1596; these
go to great pains to prove the allegations
that the Catholic Church conducted
activities that were directed against the
population of Ukraine during the first
half of the 20th century.

The growth of interest in Ukrainian
Catholicism has to be understood in rela-
tion to the general rise of interest in
religion, spiritual values, and ethics
among the younger generation in
Ukraine. Complaints by Soviet officials
and their publications attest to this
revival. A letter by an avowed atheist
published as part of an article on
religious belief and atheist propaganda
in a 1984 issue oi Nauka i Religiya
(Science and Religion) states:

If you could only imagine how difficult it
is for us atheists in Ukraine. For many years
now, I have been involved in the thankless
propagandizing task of Soviet ritualism. I
have ploughed through mountains of
literature, observed, pondered, and spent
many hours in the churches where religious
rites are practiced. 1 have come to the conclu-
sion that Soviet official statistics are very far
from reality."

The problem of religious practices in
western Ukraine also was raised by the
first secretary of the Lvov Komsomol,
Oleksiy Babiychuk:

... in this oblast, particularly in the rural
areas, a large number of the population
adheres to religious practices, among them a
large proportion of youth. In the last few
years, the activity of the Uniates [tlkrainian
Catholics] has grown, that of representatives
of the Uniates as well as former Uniate
priests; there are even reverberations to
renew the overt activity of this Church."

Another important factor in the
steady growth of interest in Catholicism
in Ukraine has been the proximity of tlic
Solidarity movement and the election of
a Slavic Pope. It is worth noting that ful-
some years now the Polish dissident
movement— particularly members of
Solidarity— has supported Ukraine's
quest for self-determination in its officia
statements and publications and, con-
versely, members of the dissident move-
ment in the Ukraine, like Vasyl' Stus
and Yosyf Terelya, have praised
Solidarity in their activities. In an open
letter, published in 1981 in the journal ni
Catholic opposition in Poland, Spotkaiin
Ukrainian Catholics registered their joy
on the occasion of the election of
Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope.'^

At the same time, Soviet authorities
have launched a related propaganda
campaign in Ukraine, disseminating
publications that criticize the Vatican's
support for believers in Soviet-bloc coun
tries. The mass media also has stepped
up its attacks on Pope John Paul II,
especially his support of Ukrainian
Catholics.'*^ The antireligious journal
Liudyna i Svit (Man and the World),
published in Kiev, stated the following:

Proof that the Church is persistently
striving to strengthen its political influence ii
socialist countries is witnessed by the fact
that Pope John Paul II gives his support to
the emigre hierarchy of the so-called Ukrain
ian Catholic Church. . . . The current tactic o
Pope John Paul II and the Roman Curia lies
in the attempts to strengthen the position of
the Church in all socialist countries as they
have done in Poland, where the Vatican tritM
to raise the status of the Catholic Church to :
state within a state. In the last few years, thi
Vatican has paid particular attention to the
question of Catholicism of the Slavonic
nations. This is poignantly underscored by th
Pope when he states that he is not only a
Pope of Polish origin, but the first Slavic
Pope, and he will pay particular attention to
the Christianization of all Slavic nations."

These same themes were stressed at
a 1981 symposium in Bratislava for
specialists in antireligious propaganda ii
the Warsaw Pact countries. One of the
papers dealing with Ukrainian
Catholicism stated the following;

Pope John Paul II has approved certain
additional measures, directed in support of
the Uniates .... [The] Head of the Vatican
underscored his "dedication" to the Uniates
by approving the claims of Cardinal Slipyj to
represent and speak on behalf of all the
faithful of the Western province of the Ukrai-
nian S.S.R.18

However, Ukrainian Catholicism,
seen as the strongest and most represent
ative exponent of cultural and spiritual

Department of State Bullel

MIDDLE EAST

;ies with the West, remains an obstacle
.0 the Soviet goal of creating a single
Soviet people. The Soviet regime has
ifficially liquidated the church and also
las attempted to erase it from historic
nemory. To enable Moscow to achieve
ts goals, all signs of the religion's
)ngoing revival are continuously
epressed.

U.S. Passports Invalid
for Travel to Lebanon

'See note 4.

Woprosy nauchnogo ateizma. publication

0. 24, Moscow, 1979, p. 46. Stanovleniya i
ozrytok masovoho ateizmu v zakhidnykh
Uastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR, (Kiev, 1981), p.
1.

^Soviet repression and liquidation of the
fkrainian Autocephalous Church in eastern
rkraine in the 1920s and 1930s was a portent
fits later repression and liquidation of the
'krainian Catholic Church in western
kraine. Shortly after the revolution, a
umber of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops
;parated themselves from the Russian
atriarchal Church, creating in 1920 an
idependent Llkrainian Orthodox
utocephalous Church. By 1924, the church
Tibraced 30 bishops, 1,500 priests and
saeons, and 1,100 parishes in the Ukrainian
.S.R. From 1922, however, Soviet
jthorities began imposing restrictions on the
utocephalous Church, attempting to split it
om within by supporting a splinter faction.
1 1926 they arrested its Metropolitan, Basil
ypkivsky, along with a number of other
aders and ordered the dissolution of its cen-
al body, the All-Ukrainian Church Council.
*ien in 1929, massive repressive measures
ere taken against the bishops, clergy, and
ithful, culminating in the dissolution of the
lurch in 1930. The remnant of the church
as allowed to reconstitute itself at the end
' 1930 but was progressively decimated until
e last parish was suppressed in 1936.
ccording to Ukrainian Orthodox sources,
10 metropolitans of the church, 26
•chbishops and bishops, some 1,150 priests,
I deacons, and approximately 20,000 lay
embers of the church councils as well as an
idetermined number of the faithful were all
lied. See Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia,

01. 11, University of Toronto Press, pp.
•0-71.

^Analecta O.S.B.M., First Victims of
mununism White Book on the Reliqious
'rsecution in Ukraine (Rome. 1953) pp.
!-44. This book was composed by Ukrainian
itholic priests resident in Rome; it was
anslated from Italian with Ecclesiastical
pprobation.

*See. for example. K. Kharchev, Chair-
an of the Council of Religious Affairs
tached to the U.S. S.R. Council of Ministers,
an interview for the Warsaw weekly,
ntiro I zycie. February 8, 1986, p. 13'. The
invnt stand of the Russian Orthodox
nurch regarding the Lvov "Sobor" is
■esented in detail in "The Moscow Patri-
chate and the Liquidation of the Eastern
ite Catholic Church in Ukraine," Religion in
mimunist Lands, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JAN. 28. 1987'

After reviewing the situation in Leba-
non, the Secretary has determined that
there is imminent peril to U.S. citizens
in Lebanon. Therefore, effective immedi-
ately, U.S. passports are not valid for
travel to, in, and through Lebanon
unless specifically validated for such
travel.

We are granting a class exception of
up to 30 days for citizens currently in
Lebanon so that they may use their pass-
ports to depart without violating the
law. We are also granting a class excep-
tion to the immediate family members of
hostages. All other exceptions will be
decided on a case-by-case basis. Viola-
tors of these passport controls will be
subject to prosecution.

Some of our citizens believed and
may still believe that their profession,
national origin, religious affiliation, links
to Lebanese citizens, or their own pre-
cautions might save them from the
dangers about which they have repeat-
edly been warned. The events of the past
few days have demonstrated that private
citizens have neither sufficient informa-
tion to evaluate the threat against them
nor the means to protect themselves.

Additionally, it should be clear that
while the U.S. Government will attempt
to help citizens unlawfully detained in
Lebanon or elsewhere, our ability to
secure their release is limited both by
the chaos in Lebanon and our respon-
sibility to protect broad national inter-
ests, including the avoidance of actions
which might encourage future acts of
terrorism.

This determination is not lightly
made. We are loath to impede the travel
of American citizens in any way. Never-
theless, the situation in Lebanon, and in
west Beirut in particular, is so chaotic
that we do not believe that any
American citizen can be considered safe
from terrorist acts. Repeated requests,
each more emphatic than the last, have
failed to convince some people of the
imminent danger and the limited ability
of the U.S. Government to assist citizens
in distress in Lebanon.

Therefore, the Secretary is exercis-
ing his authority to invalidate U.S.
passports for travel to, in, and through
Lebanon in an effort to persuade
Americans not to go or to remain in
Lebanon.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■

1985. pp. 182-188. Compare the article of
Metropolitan Nikodimus of Lvov and
Ternopol, published in Visli z Ukrainy, No. 5,
.January 1986, with the article in Moskovskyye
novosti. No. 22, June 1986, and the article of
K. Dmytruk in Radianska Ukraina, May 31,
1986.

^Analecta, First Victims, pp. 30-59.

^Soviet Persecution of Religion in
Ukraine. Human Rights Commission World
Congress of Free Ukrainians, Toronto, 1976,
p. 28.

nhid., pp. 33-34.

'Because of the potential for intentionally
planted disinformation, it is impossible to be
certain that all items in the Chronicle were
written by or reflect the opinions of Ukrain-
ian Catholics in Ukraine today. However,
enough of the facts have been substantiated
by other sources to make the Chronicle on the
whole a credible source of information about
the true status of the Ukrainian Catholic
Church.

'"Yosyf Terelya, "Declaration to the CC
CPU on the formation of the Initiative Group

of the Defense of the Rights of Believers and
the Church in LIkraine," Arkhiv Samizdata
(AS) 4897, Radio Liberty, Munich, 1983.

"On the Chronicle, see Radio Liberty
3/85, "Chronicle of the Catholic Church in
Ukraine," .January 7, 1985; Bohdan Nahaylo,
"The Church Rumbling Beneath the
Kremlin," The Times, January 12, 1985;
Maxine Pollack, "KGB Crackdown in the
Ukraine," The Sunday Times, January 27,
1985; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Persecuted Ukrain-
ian Catholics Speak Out," The Wall Street
Journal (European edition), February 18,
1985; Ivan Mhul, "La resistance tenance des
catholiques clandestines d'Ukraine. " Le
Monde, March 1, 1985; George Zarycky,
"Soviet Journal on Religious Dissent May
Embarrass Kremlin," The Christian Science
Monitor, March 6, 1985; Radio Liberty 71/85,
"Moscow Still Putting Pressure on Ukrainian
Catholics to Break with Rome," March 8,
1985; and Radio Liberty 101/85, "First Issue
of New Samizdat Journal Put Out by Ukrain-
ian Catholics (Uniates)," March 26, 1985.

'^In November 1982 a conference was
held in Kiev on the topic "The Anti-

March 1987

UNITED NATIONS

Communist Essence of Uniate-Nationalistic
Falsification of the History of the Ukrainian
Nation," {Liudyna iSvit. No. 2, February
1983, p. 21). Toward the end of 1983, in the
city of Kalush, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, a
conference was held dealing with "Uniatism
and Ukrainian Bourgeois-Nationalism,"
(Liudyna i Sijit, No. 1, January 1984, p. 33).
In April 1985 a conference was held in Lvov
on "Critique of the Catholic Uniate Ideology
in Atheist Propaganda," (Nauka i Religiya,
No. 11, November 1985, p. 34).

"Nauka i Religiya, Moscow, No. 10,
October 1984, p. 11.

'Vftif/., No. 1, .January 1985, p. 10.

"■Ivan Hvat, "The Ukrainian Catholic
Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union
During the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II,"
Ri'liilifin in CommunisI Lands, Vol. 11, No. 3,
(Winter 1983), pp. 264-280.

"■Ihid.. pp. 277-278; See also L.F.
Shevtsov, Sotsializm. i Katolitsizm, (Moscow:
Nauka, 1982), p. 39.

"I. Tykhonov, "Catholic Church: New
Trends, Old Goals," (in Ukrainian) Liudyna i
Si'i.t. No. 10, October 1982, pp. 53-54.

"B. Lobovik, I. Myhovic, "Zluii(ii'entne
tiene minulosti," Atfizmiis, No, 4. Bratislava,
1981, pp. 361-469, ■

UN General Assembly Review for 1986

In 1986, the 159 member states and
Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cuellar began the most sweeping fiscal
and administrative reform in the history
of the United Nations. The object was
not only to reduce waste and raise effi-
ciency but also to add the element of
consensus to a budgetary process that
had become increasingly divisive and
controversial. The United States, with
President Ronald Reagan intervening
personally and Ambassador Vernon A.
Walters marshalling the resources of the
U,S, Mission, joined member countries
from all parts of the world in a year-long
effort at persuasion that achieved the
solid promise of success. Secretary of
State George P. Shultz delivered the
same emphatic message to the General
Assembly in the Special Session on the
Economic Crisis in Africa: self-criticism
and an open-minded realism as the price
of cooperation and help.

Continuity in the management of the
Secretariat and in the function of quiet
diplomacy inherent in the office of the
Secretary General during this transi-
tional period was assured by the early
and uncontested appointment on October
10th of Mr, Perez de Cuellar to a second
5-year term. Another smooth transition
in the leadership of a major UN agency
saw William H. Draper III of the United
States succeed Bradford Morse as
Administrator of the UN Development
Program (UNDP),

The great political questions of
Afghanistan and Cambodia were debated
with undiminished vigor. A larger major-
ity reiterated the Assembly's demand for
withdrawal of the foreign forces, Soviet
and Vietnamese, occupying those
countries.

More emphasis was placed on crucial
issues of human rights, expanding the
scope of the world community's concern,
probing more deeply into abuses, and
correcting the imbalance of political
favoritism that has long marked the
issue. The United States was especially
active. Ambassador Walters brought the
problem of human rights violations in
Cuba formally to the General Assembly
for the first time and served notice that
the United States will continue to press
its charges in every appropriate UN
forum until the matter is resolved.

A special session of the General
Assembly in May, focusing entirely on
the critical economic situation in Africa,
was the first ever to be devoted to a

single region of the world. Speakers
dispensed with the familiar rhetorical
flourishes against "colonialism and
neocolonialism." Instead, the session set
a tone of practicality and partnership in
meeting a grave common danger, augur-
ing well for the General Assembly's
work in a difficult year.

Work continued in the legal field,
adding pieces to a mosaic of interna-
tional law to deal with nuclear accidents,
for more effective action against the nar
cotics traffic and terrorism, as well as
for the protection of children and the
encouragement of trade.

Budgetary and Administrative Issues

For years expanding UN budgets were
approved by majority vote against the
wishes of member states which con-
tributed 75% or more of the money. The
40th General Assembly, on Japan's
initiative, established a broadly represen-
tative 18-nation "Group of High-Level
Intergovernmental Experts to Review
the Efficiency of the Administrative and
Financial Functioning of the United
Nations." Early in 1986, the Secretary
General ordered successive administra-
tive economies amounting to some $60
million per annum. In April, at his
urgent request, the 40th General
Assembly reconvened to consider "The
Current Financial Crisis of the United
Nations" and to endorse his economy
measures for the current year. In
December the 41st General Assembly
authorized the extension of these
economy measures through 1987— a pro
jected saving of some $85 million for
that full calendar year. The Secretary
General had called the situation "above
all, a political crisis," Ambassador
Walters described it as "a crisis of con-
fidence" for the United Nations as a
whole, stressing that confidence had to
be restored in the United Nations as an
institution that effectively served the
ideals of the UN Charter,

The group of experts met in four
working sessions between February 25t
and August 15th to review a state of
affairs in which the General Assembly
established "new organs, committees,
commissions, and expert groups leading
to overlapping agendas and duplication
of work," The group's report to the
General Assembly spoke of significant
growth in the number of conferences
and meetings and a volume of documen-

Department of State Bullet

UNITED NATIONS

tation that has "surpassed the limit of
what can be studied and constructively
used." It found parallel growth in the
personnel of the UN Secretariat from
1.:.46 in 1946 to 11,423 in 1986. the
^tincture "complex, fragmented, and
tn|i-heavy" with inadequately qualified
^iiiff. particularly in the higher
ati'gories. The experts recommended
r;i'\ ere cuts in staff among some 70 steps
to reduce administrative fat, procedural
ethargy, and wasteful expense.

While recognizing the need for
,:hange, the group was not able to agree
apon a new process for drawing up the
3udget that would check these ills at the
source. The United States, the Soviet
Jiiion, Japan, Canada, the members of
he European Community, Singapore,
uid India, among others, urged the
■equirement of decision by consensus in
hf budgeting procedure. In an enhanced
nirimittee on Program and Coordina-
ion, representatives of the entire UN
nembership could reconcile their views
)n a budget ceiling, its broad priorities,
uid a contingency fund to cover unfore-
;eeii supplemental expenditures. Those
\ ho opposed such a course professed to
;ee it as giving the large contributors an
•ffective veto on the Assembly's budge t-
iry prerogative and contravening the
me-nation, one-vote provision of the
Charter.

This was the overriding issue of the
list General Assembly, with the mem-
bers increasingly aware that the future
)f the United Nations hung in the
jalance. The Secretary General warned
he Assembly that the United Nations
vas operating "on the brink of bank-
ruptcy" because many members had
withheld parts of their assessed contri-
bution to the budget. The Soviet Union,
n arrears over many years, owed by far
,he largest amount. But in 1986, Con-
gress held back sizable portions of the
J.S. contribution, reducing the total
Dayment for the year to just under half
ts annual assessment, in part because of
America's own fiscal retrenchment but
ilso out of disaffection with its percep-
:ion of the UN's performance. It saw
vvasteful and inefficient management, a
political double standard directed against
the United States and its friends, and an
intensified effort by the Assembly
majority to seize legislative power in
worldwide economic development deci-
sions as well as in UN finances.

On September 22d, President
Reagan addressed the Assembly— for the
.fifth time, more than any U.S. President
Ibefore him— with words of admonition
and reassurance. "The United States,"

he said, "remains committed to the
United Nations. For over 40 years, this
organization has provided an interna-
tional forum for harmonizing conflicting
national interests and has made a signifi-
cant contribution in such fields as
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
and eradicating disease." He noted:
"This organization itself faces a critical
hour— that is usually stated as a fiscal
crisis. But we can turn this 'crisis' into
an opportunity. The important reforms
proposed by a group of experts can be a
first step toward restoring the organiza-
tion's status and effectiveness. . . .And
you have my word for it: my country,
which has always given the UN generous
support, will continue to play a leading
role in the effort to achieve its noble pur-
poses."

Ambassador Walters raised his voice
in the General Assembly a month later.
On October 15th, he warned: "The
United Nations is at a critical juncture.
It is facing a crisis of reform, the root
causes of which are political and
bureaucratic. . . .If the agreed recom-
mendations of the G-18 report are
enacted hand-in-hand with the establish-
ment of a program and budget decision-
making mechanism operating on the
basis of consensus, the organization's
ability to live up to the goals of the
Charter— to fulfill the hopes of the
peoples of the United Nations, par-
ticularly the poorest and most defense-
less—will be measurably increased."

It took 2 months of arduous negotia-
tion to bring that wish to fruition. At
one point, as negotiations in New York
seemed to be deadlocked. President
Reagan intervened with personal letters
to a number of key African leaders.
Stressing the importance of the issue, he
reaffirmed his Administration's desire to
preserve the UN's credibility and its
adherence to the original goals. Mr.
Reagan appealed for each leader's
assistance in correcting the current
disagreement, noting that this would
help him to gain the approval of
Congress.

On December 19th, the Assembly
adopted a resolution approving the
essential recommendations of the group
of experts, spelling out the budget-
making procedure. Steps to implement
these suggestions (e.g., setting up the
contingency fund) will begin immedi-
ately. The new system is fully to take
effect with the beginning of the next
biennial budget cycle in 1988. Every-

thing will hinge, however, on the
maintenance of consensus. A resort to
voting to resolve disagreement would
invalidate the entire arrangement.
President Reagan and Foreign
Minister Humayun Rasheed Choudhury
of Bangladesh, President of the 41st
General Assembly, who had personally
guided the decisive final phase of the
negotiations, called the Assembly resolu-
tion "historic." He and Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar received the
personal thanks of Mr. Reagan and Vice
President George Bush. Ambassador
Walters called it "a great day for the
United States . . . great for the United
Nations, a great day for mankind." "I
will recommend," he said, "that the
United States meet its assessed contri-
bution."

Political Issues

Some of the great international political
issues on the UN's agenda— the Iran-
Iraq war, Cyprus, Middle East peace in
its various aspects, Namibia, and South
Africa— were not discernibly moved
toward solution. That held also for Cen-
tral America, although a consensus
affirmed the need for dialogue, noninter-
vention, and democracy in the context of
the Contadora objectives. Neither were
Afghanistan and Cambodia brought
closer to solution, but here world opinion
appeared much more united. A majority
of 122 to 20, with 11 abstentions (only
the Soviet bloc and client states voting
no), called for the immediate withdrawal
of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
However, the Secretary General's quiet
efforts to obtain a program with a
timetable for Soviet forces to leave and
give the Afghan people their independ-
ence remained unavailing. The same was
true for Cambodia, despite a record
majority of 115 to 21 calling for a just
and lasting solution based on the with-
drawal of all foreign, that is to say
Vietnamese, troops. Nevertheless, the
occupiers feel the unflagging pressure of
worldwide disapproval.

Human Rights Issues

The struggle for human rights— more
active, more judicious, and more exten-
sive than ever— also saw the United
States among the broad majority. The
UN Human Rights Commission created
the post of special rapporteur on relig-
ious intolerance against the votes of the
Soviet bloc, taking the first step toward
ultimate enforcement of the General

March 1987

UNITED NATIONS

Assembly's "Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Intolerance Based
on Religion and Belief" adopted in
November 1981. It is a modest begin-
ning. The rapporteur's renewable 1-year
mandate is to obtain reliable information
from governments, private and official
agencies, religious communities, and
groups of believers about cases of intol-
erance around the world. At first, he will
ask countries privately to reply directly
to accusations. His report will then
describe categories of religious intoler-
ance but not name the countries.

One move in the reorganization of
the UN Secretariat, the appointment of
an Under Secretary General as Director
General of the UN's Geneva office and
Director of the Human Rights Center,
may encourage more action in this field.
In New York, the General Assembly
energetically engaged the problem of
human rights. President Corazon Aquino
of the Philippines reproached the
Assembly, which had set international
standards of human rights, for doing too
little to put them into practice. "If the
United Nations does not notice how
governments treat people," she said, "it
is nothing."

In its 41st session, the Assembly
took more, and more clearly focused,
notice than ever. It is only recently that
the United Nations has gone beyond
South Africa, Chile, and Israel in report-
ing on human rights complaints. This
year, the Assembly, by a larger vote
than ever before, expressed grave con-
cern over a rapporteur's findings of
widespread and murderous violation of
rights by the Soviet puppet regime of
Afghanistan. And, again by a larger
vote, it rebuked Iran for violating "the
right to freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment" and for "carrying out sum-
mary and arbitrary executions." As in
the previous year, neither Afghanistan
nor Iran allowed the UN investigators to
check their fundings on the spot.

Human rights resolutions on El
Salvador and Guatemala were more
balanced then before, but the United
States regarded one on Chile as dis-
appointingly one-sided, not accurately
reflecting the report of the UN's
representative in Chile.

Toward the end of the 41st General
Assembly, the flagrant violation of
human rights by the Castro regime in
Cuba was formally raised by the United
States. Ambassador Walters pointed out
that Cuba has the highest number of
political prisoners per capita in the world

and that its record of systematically sup-
pressing individual freedom is one of the
worst. "We must not tolerate a double
standard in human rights," he said.
"Tyrannies of the left should not be any
more immune from condemnation than
those of the right." Walters demanded a
UN investigation of rights in Cuba.
While there was not time for action in
this Assembly, he declared that the
United States will pursue its initiative in
every appropriate UN forum.

President Reagan, in a message on
December 10th, the 38th anniversary of
the UN's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, observed: "History
demonstrates that there can be no
genuine peace without respect for
human rights, that governments that do
not respect the rights of their own
citizens are a threat to their neighbors
as well."

The United States underscored the
link between Article 17 of the Universal
Declaration, the right of the individual to
own property, and economic and social
development. An overwhelming majority
brushed aside Soviet bloc efforts to
amend or postpone action on this
resolution.

Another American-sponsored resolu-
tion on enlisting individual initiative, the
talents of indigenous entrepreneurs, in
development was readily adopted as was
the reminder that the African rains that
l.)roke the drought and ended the famine
emergency raised a new concern requir-
ing timely, joint, preventive action: the
revival of desert locust swarms which
could devour the newly grown crops.

External Debt

The issue of the external debt of
developing countries, which several
member states had refused even to
debate a year and a half ago, demanding
instead that debts be canceled, was
quietly and soberly discussed in the 41st
General Assembly. In what the United
States described as a "significant
achievement" and a "model of coopera-
tion," a consensus resolution emerged
that acknowledged Secretary of the
Treasury James A. Baker's program for
sustained growth. It recognized the need
for national policy adjustments and
structural reforms.

The Special Session on Africa

The practical and political problems
involved in economic and social improve
ment were the subject of the 13th specie
session of the General Assembly, con-
vened to deal for the first time with a
single regional problem, the critical
economic situation in Africa. With the
memory of the epic international famine
relief operation of 1985 still fresh, senio
statesmen gathered at the United
Nations and agreed from the outset thai
much more was needed than emergency
help. Secretary Shultz demanded funda-
mental reforms. "We have seen," he
said, "how now-discredited orthodoxies
about state-directed development gave
rise to misguided policies that stifled
individual initiative," creating a long-
term decline in food production.
"... economic conditions on the conti-
nent as a whole are no better, and
perhaps worse, than they were some 25
years ago— all this, despite massive injec
tions of foreign aid." He noted what he
called the remarkable success of China's
unprecedented experiment with unleash^
ing individual incentives. "We can do
more," said Secretary Shultz, "for
Africans who are trying to reform their-
economies, and we will."

The special session's theme was
partnership. On the African side, respoi»
sible spokesmen led by President Abdou.
Diouf of Senegal, chairman of the
Organization of African Unity, overrode
the radicals. They discarded the old con
frontational cliches which portrayed
Africa's troubles as the legacy of coloni;
rule and their solutions in terms of
transfers of wealth from the industrial
north to the developing nations of the
south. They dealt, instead, with Africa's
responsibility to cope with its needs as
best it can if it is to call for help from
outside— in short, policy reform and self
help. "Agriculture," said President
Diouf, "is the cornerstone of all our
works. . .the priority of priorities." A
Program of Action for African Recoven
and Development 1986-1990 under-
scored the "primary responsibility" of
the governments of Africa for the
economic and social development of thei'
countries. It eschewed grandiose pro-
posals in favor of such realistic steps as
moving toward self-sufficiency in food bi
placing "primary focus" on women
farmers who dominate food production
in most countries; eliminating pricing
policies that discourage production and
strengthening incentive schemes; chang
ing radically in the educational systems

Department of State Bulleti'

UNITED NATIONS

a generate skills, knowledge, and
ittitudes relevant to Africa's needs;
mcouraging "the positive role of the
jrivate sector;" and South-South
;ooperation. Work is now in progress on
jetting up the international machinery to
)UL precepts to work.

nternational Legal Issues

The United Nations remains the focal
)oint for efforts to erect and enlarge a
'ramework of international law. The
Jeneral Assembly commended the Inter-
lational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
I specialized agency of the United
'Nations, for its swift response to the
lisaster at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor
n the U.S.S.R. on April 30th. By
September, member states had drafted
wo conventions to strengthen inter-
lational cooperation in nuclear safety.
)ne, on "Early Notification of a Nuclear
Occident," obliges all signatories to give
irompt notice to the IAEA and any
tate likely to be affected by substantial
adioactive release. The second, on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
iccident or Radiological Emergency,"
ets rules on such questions as legal
ights and reimbursement when help is
equested or proffered. One aspect left
pen is liability for damage caused by
he accident.

The Assembly approved a Declara-
on on Social and Legal Principles
delating to the Protection and Welfare
f Children, with Special Reference to
'oster Placement and Adoption Nation-
lly and Internationally. It seeks to set
uidelines for legislation around the
'orld. The United States was among
lose countries urging high standards in
ne foster care and adoption process,
isuring that the interests of the child
re paramount. Not headline news, but
his accord, negotiated across wide
ultural barriers, may improve the lives
f hundreds or thousands of children
/ho might otherwise fall victim to adop-
ion rackets of all kinds.

Another convention came out of
'arking orbit with the United States,
;hina, and Italy deposited their instru-
fients of ratification with the United
Nations in December, bringing it into
orce. It is the UN Convention on Con-
racts for the International Sale of
loods, which bridges the differences
mong the world's variegated legal
ystems to define buyers' and sellers'
•' ights and obligations. It should
;acilitate settlement of disputes and
'■ncourage foreign trade.

Terrorism and Narcotics

One of the most sensitive sides of
preventing terrorism is eliminating the
use of diplomatic passports and
diplomatic pouches in the furtherance of
terrorist operations. An Assembly
resolution admonished all who enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities not
to abuse them but to abide by the laws of
their host country.

Preparations continued for the UN
International Conference on Drug Abuse
and Illicit Trafficking to be held in
Vienna in June 1987, unpoliticized and
on the basis of consensus in which sup-
plying and consuming countries have
joined. One of its goals is the approval of
a convention against illicit traffic in nar-
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
It would mandate close cooperation by
the parties to prevent the crime or to
punish drug traffickers, including
forfeiture of all property and money
involved in it.

Chemical Weapons

In the disarmament field, the General
Assembly adopted by 137-0 a U.S.-
sponsored resolution called for inten-
sified effort to conclude a convention on
the complete and effective prohibition of
the development, production, stockpil-
ing, and use of chemical weapons— and
for their destruction. It was a sentiment
made timely by reports of such use in
the gulf war, Afghanistan, and
Southeast Asia.

Other Issues

The threat to universality of representa-
tion in the General Assembly expressed
in the perennial challenge to Israel's
credentials, a threat that the United
States has said it would not tolerate, was
once again quickly parried. Direct
attacks on U.S. policies in several draft
resolutions were, for the most part,
expunged with the help of many
members who object to this offensive
tactic. But the American delegation
found it necessary demonstratively to
walk out of the Second (Economic) Com-
mittee. It did so in protest against
parliamentary maneuvers that blocked
efforts to amend a Nicaraguan resolu-
tion condemning the embargo on U.S.
trade with Nicaragua.

Nonetheless, on the whole, the
United States noted further improve-
ments in the conduct of business and the
tone of discourse in 1986. One delicate

problem falling within the responsibility
of the United States as host country of
the United Nations is being dealt with
quietly. Early in the year, Washington
notified the Soviet Union that the size of
the three Soviet missions to the United
Nations-those of the U.S.S.R., the
Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and the
Belorussian Soviet Republic— would have
to be reduced. At that time, their joint
strength of 275 employees was greater
than that of the next two largest mis-
sions combined. The Soviet missions are
being reduced in stages to roughly 170
by April 1, 1988.

American diplomacy won appreci-
able, on occasion even decisive, support
from the self-styled nonaligned nations
when they voted their individual inter-
ests—as they did on Afghanistan and
Cambodia. And the U.S. mission saw
with satisfaction the consistent coopera-
tion of allies and friends in the European
Community and beyond. This was appar-
ent in the dismissal of the Israeli creden-
tials challenged and in the relatively
weak support the Assembly gave a
resolution condemning the air strike
against Libya in April. The Europeans
and others joined the United States in
arguing against the promotion of a "new
world information and communications
order," which we saw as an attempt to
manipulate and monopolize news and
information of all kinds.

Above all, the year's success in
launching UN reform indicates that it is
possible to rally all elements of the world
community for determined effort in the
name of common sense and the self-
interest which is the expression of
shared ideals.

USUN press release 187 of Dec. 31, 1986.

Vlarch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Visit of Costa Rican President

President Oscar Arias Sanchez of the
Republic of Costa Rica made an official
working visit to Washington, D.C.,
December 3-6, 1986, to meet with Presi-
dent Reagan and other government
officials.

Following are rem,arks made by the
two Presidents after their meeting on
December i^

President Reagan

It's been a great pleasure to welcome
President Arias and distinguished
members of his government here today.
The good will evident in our meetings
underscores the enduring bond between
our countries and between all peoples
who cherish democracy and human
freedom.

Costa Rica and the United States
stand together, foursquare in our com-
mitment to democracy in this hemi-
sphere. The progress we've witnessed in
the Americas in recent years has indeed
been heartening. It wasn't that long ago
when Costa Rica was Central America's
only democracy. Today we look with
satisfaction at the impressive develop-
ment of democratic institutions in
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
The despair of yesterday has been

replaced, for the most part, by the prom-
ise of tomorrow.

Yet over this fragile democratic
promise looms the shadow of communist
dictatorship in Nicaragua, where a
totalitarian, expansionist regime violates
the human rights of its people and
threatens the peace and freedom of its
neighbors. Hundreds of thousands of
Nicaraguans have already fled the
hunger, repression, and assassination in
their own land, seeking safety in Costa
Rica and Honduras. This challenge can-
not be ignored without imperiling the
peace, stability, and freedom in all of
Central America.

President Arias, you have earned the
respect of free people everywhere with
your courageous defense of the right of
the Nicaraguan people to liberty. Despite
threats, insults, and provocation, you
have not shrunk from your firm stand
against totalitarianism next door. As the
leader of the region's oldest and
strongest democracy, your words have
special significance and carry moral
"weight. As you've said: democratization
is the key to peace in Central America.

Well, the United States agrees. Pro-
moting and protecting democracy has
the full backing of the Congress and the
American people. The establishment of a

Soviet beachhead on the mainland of thi
Americas, a base camp for terrorism an
the subversion of democracy, remains
unacceptable.

There has been no deterioration of
our commitment, no weakening of our
resolve. Let there be no mistake, the
free people of Central America will not
be abandoned to communist domination
Our support for freedom in your region
President Arias, remains unflinching.
Costa Ricans and the other free people
of Central America can have faith that
they will not be abandoned in the face o
this deadly threat to your security and
freedom. Central America belongs to tb
future, and the future is democracy.
% Cooperation, friendship, and respec
•? have been hallmarks of the U.S. -Costa
i Rican relationship for many years. Our
i: discussions today reaffirmed that our
^ relations will continue on a high note,
t The United States, as was made clear ii
i today's meetings, remains Costa Rica's
s steadfast friend and ally.
J President Arias, I wish you a safe
i journey home, and I look forward to ou
^ next meeting and to the day when
democracy reigns throughout Central
America.

President Arias

I'm very pleased by this frank and
sincere dialogue. The discussion of
political and economic problems, the
solution of which affects both our coun-
tries, was constructive and encouragin;
For many years Costa Rica has been
bordered on the north by oppression ar
violence. My country is not a party to
the problems of Central America, but
the problems of Central America are
part of our problems.

We wish to keep Costa Rica out of
Central American armed conflicts. We
do not want violence to cross our bor-
ders. We hope that our brothers and
sisters in the region can enjoy our peac
We think that only democracy can guai
antee reconciliation between peoples.
Accordingly, we have proposed an
alliance for freedom and democracy.
Only if we endeavor to enable our
peoples to enjoy democracy, only if we
encourage the downfall of all tyrants
equally, can we prevent threats to peac
throughout the world from growing in
the Americas.

Department of State Bulle

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The challenge Costa Rica faces
•xtends beyond the Central American
jroblem. We aspire to higher levels of
evelopment. Only the absence of
xtreme poverty is a guarantee of peace
d a shield against violence. We wish to
bvercome the seed of political uncer-
tainty and economic crisis by strengthen-
ng both our democracy and our
economy. Today, more than ever, we
■nust strive for general well-being and
irevent the spread of poverty. Today,
nore than ever, we must reaffirm our
'aith in the roads to freedom. Today,
nore than ever, we must direct our
iacrifices with a full sense of history.
Today, more than ever, we need interna-
ional solidarity and fair treatment in
rade and finance, because we are the
>oundary between peace and war and
letween freedom and oppression.

The democracy in which many
Unerican nations live today cannot be
onsolidated without economic develop-
nent and social justice. Before any
lolitical or economic conditions can be
Tiposed on the democracies of the
tmericas, there must be a commitment
rom the Western world to strengthen
emocracy in all our nations. In the
unericas, peace must be democratic,
luralistic, tolerant, and free. While
ogmatism and intransigence persist and
here is no dialogue, peace will be impos-
ible. Working together for democracy,
reedom, and development is working
ogether for peace.

Mr. President, once again, I wish to
iW you how pleased I am with the
umerous areas of agreement in our
ilks. I leave convinced that this ongoing
ialogue between ourselves will help
erpetrate the excellent friendship
etween our two countries.

' 'Made in the Rose Garden at the White
louse (text from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Dec. 8, 1986.) ■

Costa Rica— A Profile

People

Nationality: Noun and adject i re— CosVd
Rican(s). Population (1985): 2.6 million.
Annual growth rate (1985): 2.6'7f. Density:
51.0/sq. km. (132.0/sq. mi.). Ethnic groups:
white (including a few mestizos) 96Vr, black
■i'yf, Indian Fi. Religion: 957f Roman
Catholic. Language: Spanish, with Jamaican
dialect of English spoken around Puerto
Limon. Education: Years compulsory— 6.
Attendance— nearly 100%. Literacy— 90%.
Health: Infant mortality ra/p-15.2/1,000.
Life expectancy— men 67.5 yrs., women 71.9
yrs. Work force (853,000. 1985 est.):
Agncnttnre—'i2.G'7r . Industry and
commerce— 40.4%. Sendees and
government— 2b%. Other— 2%.

Caribbean Sea

COSTA^
RICA

Pacific Ocean

Geography

Area: 51,022 .sq. km. (19,700 sq. mi.), slightly
smaller than W. Virginia. Cities: Capital—
San Jose (metropolitan pop. 800,000). Other
cities- M-AiueVd (41,000), Cartago (40,000).
Terrain: A rugged, central massif runs the
length of the country separating coastal
plains. Climate: Tropical and semitropical.

Government

Type: Democratic republic. Independence:
September 15, 1821. Constitution: Novem-
ber 9, 1949.

Branches: fi'j-f edifice— president (head of
government and chief of state) elected for a
single 4-yr. term, two vice presidents. Cabi-
net (16 ministers). Legislative— bl-die\>\i\.y uni-
cameral '/egislative Assembly elected at 4-yr.
intervals. Judicial- Supreme Court of Justice
(17 magistrates elected by Legislative Assem-
bly at 8-vr. intervals).

Subdivisions: Seven provinces divided
into 80 cantons as well as districts.

Political parties: Social Christian LInity
Party (PUSC), National Liberation Party
(PLN), Popular Vanguard Party (PVP), Costa
Rican Peoples Party (PPC), Movement of the
New Republic (MNR), Costa Rican Socialist
Party (PSC). Suffrage: Obligatory over
age is.

Central government budget (1985):
$(;0:^.9 million.

Defense (Ministry of Public Security)
0.9% of est. 1985 GDP.

Holiday: Independence Day,
September 15.

Economy

GDP (1985): $3.71 billion. Annual real
growth rate (1985): 2.2%. Per capita income

(1985): $1,:?.52. Inflation (1985 wholesale
prices): 15%.

Natural resource: Hydroelectric power.

Agriculture (19.6% of GDP): Products-
hananas. coffee, beef, sugar-ane, grain.

Industry (21% of GDP) Types-kmA
processing, textiles and clothing, construction
materials, fertilizer.

Trade (1985): £;j-prir/.s-$928 million:
coffee, banana.s, beef, sugar, cocoa. Major
market.'<-VS 53%, CACM 14%, FRG 9%-.
/h)/)i))-/.s— $1,037 million: manufactured goods,
machinery, transportation e(|uipment, chemi-
cals, fuel, foodstuffs, fertilizer. Major
.s»pp/(cr.s-US 40%, CACM 10%, Japan 8%.

Exchange rates: Official rate— 20
colones = US$l. Market ra(c-54.40 = US$l
(April 1986).

Fiscal year: Calendar year.

US economic aid received (1985): $195
million.

Debt service charges as % of exports:
60% in 1985; 1986 debt service .schedule is
under discussion with creditors.

Membership in International
Organizations

UN and .some of its specialized and related
agencies, including the World Bank, FAO,
IAEA, ICAO, IDA, WMO, ILO, IPU, ITU,
WHO; Organization of American States
(OAS), Central American Common Market
(CACM), Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), International Wheal Council (IWC),
Latin American Economic System (SELA).

Taken from the Background Notes of May
1986, published by the Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. Editor:
Juanita Adams. ■

^arch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Democracy in Latin America

and the Caribbean:

The Promise and the Challenge

Recent 7noves toward more democratic
systems of government in Latin America
are now a decade-long trend that has led
to the replacement of numerous military
regimes or dictatorships (see map at
centerfold). In the United States during
the same period, considerations of
human rights, the dignity of the indi-
vidual, and the defense of freedom ham
led to a widening bipartisan consensus
in support of democracy as a key prin-
ciple of U.S. foreign policy.

These converging trends create a rare
opportunity. If sustained, they could
have profound implications for the future
of the Western Hemisphere. At a
minimum, their continued convergence
can make possible a new era of greater
cooperation in hemispheric relations.

The instability of past Latin
American development and the discon-
tinuity of U.S. policy toward its
neighbors make clear that this long-term
promise is still just a possibility.
Today 's converging trends are real, but
they are also fragile. Latin Americans
continue to struggle with numerous and
urgent obstacles to full democratization,
including appalling differences in the liv-
ing standards of rich and poor, inade-
quate economic opportunities, and
political extremism. To help turn today 's
promise into tomorrow 's reality, the
United States also must overcome many
domestic probleyns and conflicting
priorities that hinder sustained U.S.
support for democracy in Latin America
and the Caribbean.

Both the democratic promise and the
challenges to it have become more sharply
defined since the Department of State
first reported on the democratic transi-
tion nearly 3 years ago (see "Democracy
i7i Latin America and the Caribbean, "
Department of State Bulletin of October
198J,). This report was prepared in the
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

Latin America
and the Caribbean

RECENT ACHIEVEMENTS

Since the early 19th century when most
of the nations in the hemisphere
achieved independence, most people liv-
ing in the region found that national
independence did not necessarily bring
individual freedom. Today's democratic
advances, however, could mark a water-
shed between a past of instability and
authoritarianism and a future of greater
freedom.

Just a decade ago, such a possibility
seemed remote indeed. In 1976, only
34% of the people in the Western
Hemisphere outside the United States
and Canada enjoyed democratic rule.
True, Costa Rica had a strong tradition
of civilian authority, competitive politics,
and model constitutional arrangements
for elections. But Costa Rica's neighbors
in Central America were presided over

"Man 's capacity for justice
makes democracy possible,
but man 's inclination to
injustice makes democracy
necessary. "

Reinhold Niebuhr

by generals who had become presidents
either by open use of force or by stage-
managed elections. In South America,
democratic Venezuela and Colombia
were almost as isolated. Led by generals
as different as Chile's Augusto Pinochet
on the right and Peru's Juan Velasco on
the left, the continent was almost
defiantly militarized. The promise of
Bolivia's national revolution of the 1950s
had given way to military dominance, as
had Uruguay's social democratic Utopia.
Even decentralized and moderate Brazil
was under military rule. Individual Latin
Americans bearing witness to torture
and official violence were in exile

throughout the Americas and Europe.
When internal war and repression in
Argentina were followed by surprise
military action in the Falklands/Malvih;
Islands, many saw a pattern that sym-
bolized a region condemned to military
abuse and antidemocratic practice.

In marked contrast, today 91% of
the people of Latin America and the
Caribbean live in nations committed to
future based on democratic principles. J
10 years, 10 countries have moved, ofte
dramatically, toward democracy. In nin
of the ten, military presidents have bee
replaced by elected civilians: Argentina
(1983), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985),
Ecuador (1979), El Salvador (1984),
Guatemala (1986), Honduras (1982),
Peru (1980), and Uruguay (1985). In th
10th country, Grenada, an elected
civilian succeeded two consecutive
autocrats who were themselves civilian
but who had relied on armed thugs to
rule. (In an 11th country, Panama, din
military rule ended in 1978, but in a
clear setback for democracy in 1985, a
civilian president was pressured to
resign by the military.) In the Caribbe;
Basin, the six former British dependen
cies— Antigua and Barbuda, Belize,
Dominica, St. Christopher and Nevis, i
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines—that became independent natioi
during the past decade did so as
democracies.

The following examples of electora
politics where there were none just a
few years ago highlight the progress
that has been made from the Caribbea
to Tierra del Fuego and from Central
America to the Andes.

Argentina. The 1983 presidential
and legislative elections ended a decad
of internal conflict and military rule.
Voter participation exceeded 85% of
those registered in an open contest
among eight political parties repre-
senting the full political spectrum. The
presidential race offered a choice
between candidates from Argentina's
two major historic movements, Peroni i
and Radicalism. In winning, Radical
Civic Union leader Raul Alfonsm
received the most votes in Argentine
history. In the two ensuing years, vote

Department of State Bulkr

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

legistration increased by an additional
}%, and the 1985 legislative elections
ain attracted massive participation.

Brazil. Congressional and municipal
Jlections in 1982 heralded the transition
/o civilian government and the resur-
gence of competitive electoral politics in
.^atin America's largest country and the
vorld's third most populous democracy
after India and the United States). The
lercentage of adults who voted rose
rem 45% in 1962 to 81% in 1982. A
ivilian president was elected by indirect
ote on January 15, 1985, but died
lefore his inauguration. In accordance
nth legal procedures, the civilian Vice
'resident-elect, Jose' Sarney, was sworn
n, ending two decades of military rule,
'he democratic transition is being com-
ileted with the writing of a new con-
titution by the Congress elected in
^vember 1986 by more than 47 million
oters.

I Dominican Republic. The ruling
larty expected to retain the presidency
,nd to control the legislature in the May
986 national elections. But after 70% of
he registered voters cast their ballots,
he opposition candidate had the most
otes. When the leader of the opposition,
oaquin Balaguer, became president in
lugust 1986, the entirely peaceful
ransfer of power was a reaffirmation of
)ominican democracy. The absence of
■ither interference by the military or
'Utside intervention also contrasted
narkedly with past Dominican history,
vhich includes the 31-year Trujillo dic-
atorship, a military operation by the
Jnited States and the Organization of
American States in 1965, and overt
iressure from the United States for all
.ectors to support the results of the
lemocratic elections in 1978.

I El Salvador. Four times in 5 years,
nassive numbers of voters braved
violence and threats of violence to cast
;heir ballots in hotly contested nation-
OTde races conducted under intense
nternational scrutiny. In 1984, an
ibsolute majority of all adult
Salvadorans twice defied guerrilla
ippeals for a boycott to vote in the first
cruly competitive presidential elections
in 12 years. The result: civil engineer
and Christian Democratic leader Jo'se
Napoleon Duarte— the very man who

..had been denied the presidency by the
military in 1972— was elected over
retired Army Maj. Roberto D'Aubuisson
and six other candidates.

The richness and variety of democratic life in Latin America and the Caribbean are symbolized by four
elected political leaders. Eugenia Charles (top left), head of the center-right Dominica Freedom Party
and Pnme lulinister of Dominica; Jose Napoleon Duarte (top right), Chnstian Democratic reformer and
President of El Salvador; Victor Paz Estenssoro (bottom left), founder of the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement and three-time President of Bolivia; and Raul Alfonsin (bottom right), leader of the Radical
Civic Union Party and President of Argentina. (Photos oi Duarte Paz, and Aiionsm courtesy ot iiie Organization o(
American Slates)

Grenada. After the Marxist New
JEWEL Movement seized power in a
1979 coup, it reneged on its promise to
hold elections. In October 1983,
however, the New JEWEL'S "People's
Revolutionary Government"
disintegrated in bitter factional fighting.
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and
three other ministers were assassinated
by their own comrades. At the invitation
of Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, a
joint U.S. -Caribbean military expedition
restored order, then withdrew, leaving a
provisional government named by
Grenada's Governor General to organize
free elections. On December 3, 1984,
85% of Grenada's registered voters went
to the polls to elect a parliament. Six

political parties were on the ballot,
including one formed by supporters of
Maurice Bishop and one backed by
former Prime Minister Eric Gairy
(whose violent overthrow had initially
enabled Bishop to seize power). Neither
of these groups was successful: the New
National Party garnered roughly 58% of
the vote, and Herbert Blaize formed a
new government in accordance with the
1974 constitution.

Guatemala. Seeking a political path
out of Guatemala's internal violence and
international isolation, military leaders
in 1983 decided to transfer power
gradually to civilians. On July 1, 1984,

iJ March 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Growth of Voter Participation in Selected Countries^

Estimate of percent of total
adult population voting

El Salvador

100

Guatemala

Honduras

Mexico

Venezuela

United States

72% of Guatemala's eligible voters cast
ballots that sent representatives from
nine political parties and one regional
civic committee to a constituent
assembly. On November 3, 1985, free
elections were held for president, vice
president, congressional deputies, and
mayors. When no candidate for the
presidency received a majority, a runoff
was held on December 8, 1985, between
the two leading contenders, both
civilians. In that contest. Christian
Democrat Vinicio Cerezo won more thar
68% of the vote. On January 14, 1986,
the new constitution came into force,
Cerezo was inaugurated, and military
control over daily life in Guatemala was
sharply reduced.

Peru. After 12 years of military
rule, the 1979 constitution and 1980
presidential elections put Peru back on i
democratic course under civilian leader-
ship. Since then, municipal (1983 and
1986) and presidential (1985) elections
have followed prescribed constitutional
and legal procedures. In 1985, more tha:
91% of Peru's registered voters divided
their ballots among candidates
representing 12 political parties. Alan
Garcia became the first member of
Peru's historic American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party to
be elected president. He also became th<
first elected civilian since 1945 to receiv
Peru's presidential sash from another
elected civilian.

Uruguay. Uruguay returned to
democratic government in March 1985
following 12 years of military rule that
had tarnished a record of freely elected
civilian government dating back to the
19th century. More than 87% of the
nation's eligible registered voters cast
their ballots in national elections in
which two major political parties and a
leftist coalition competed.

The swell of democracy is not super-
ficial. It has been welcomed by elec-
torates which have organized, cam-
paigned, and voted in record numbers
throughout the region. Since 1980,
voters in 24 independent countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean have
cast more than 280 million votes in more
than 50 nationwide elections to select
presidents, national legislatures, and
constituent assemblies. In virtually everj
case, the number of people going to the
polls reached record highs.

'Estimates based on votes cast as a percentage of total population age 20 or over as reported
in ttie United Nations Demographic Yearboolf for ttie year in question

Department of State Bulletir

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Compared to the 1950s and 1960s,
ie proportion of eligible voters actually
oing to the polls has been up sharply, in
■ime cases by as much as 50%. Nor have
le increases resulted from forced
iting. Turnouts were as high or higher

some countries where voting is not
andatory (85% in Grenada in 1984 and
)% in The Bahamas in 1982) as in some
)untries where voting is traditionally
)mpulsory. Where voting is required,
le historic form of voter protest, the
cidence of blank or defaced ballots,
nded to diminish substantially as
iters gained the opportunity to vote for
muine alternatives.

Democracy, of course, is more than
ee elections. But its essence is the
ght of citizens to decide regularly
,hether to keep or replace those who
aim to represent them. The absence of
'nuinely free elections in Chile and
iraguay, patently unfair elections in
icaragua, and allegations of vote fraud

Mexico and Panama are major
■ntinuing difficulties. Cuba has not held
single direct popular election for
itional office since Castro came to
)wer in 1959.

Though Latin America's recent elec-
ral record is still far from perfect, the
anges that have already taken place
,ve made an enormous difference for
illions of Latin Americans. Most of the
utal dictatorships are gone. Latin
merica's longstanding democracies—
)sta Rica, Venezuela, and Colombia—
1 longer are isolated. On the contrary,
is the authoritarian regimes that are
•coming isolated. Cuba and Nicaragua
1 the totalitarian left, and Chile and
iraguay on the authoritarian right, are
e only major exceptions to the trend,
ven Haiti, perhaps the most compelling
,se of a country plagued by brutal dic-
torship and the degrading economic
;privation that it generated, has taken
:e first steps toward democratic
wernment following the ouster of the
uvalier dynasty on February 7, 1986.

OOTS OF CHANGE

he shift away from authoritarian
igimes (typically dominated by military
aders) to freely elected governments
ypically led by civilians) reflects many
)rces, some of them quite transient. But
lore lasting underlying forces have
een at work as well.

Social change and economic develop-
aent, the growth of institutions, and
'olitical and cultural shifts have com-

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March 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Life Expectancy, 1950-55 and 1980-85

1950-55

Argentina Brazil Dominican El Salvador Guatemala Haiti

Republic

Mexico

Peru

Uruguay

Source: CEPAL. Informe de la Reunion Regional Latinoamencana Preparatoria de la Asamblea Mondial
sobre el Enveiecimiento. San Jose, March 31. 1982

bined to weaken the old power centers
and add new ones. Influences from out-
side the reg^ion also have been impor-
tant. This section describes the many
factors increasing Latin America's
capacity to sustain democracy; the next
section discusses the many problems
with which democrats must still contend.

Improved Socioeconomic Conditions

Latin American societies are scarred by
poverty and sharply unequal distribution
of opportunities and services. Yet, over
the last two generations, standards of
living (as measured by infant mortality,

literacy, nutrition, and energy consump-
tion) hajre improved more dramatically
in Latin America and the Caribbean than
in any other region in the developing
world (see charts, p. 61).

Between 1960 and 1980, per capita
income doubled despite rapid population
growth. Throughout Latin America,
urbanization, industrialization, and
institutional development broke down
old class structures and spurred the
growth of middle classes. Values and
attitudes developed that foster political
participation and make dictatorships
harder to sustain.

This increased potential for
democracy cannot by itself guarantee
that democracy will be achieved or main-
tained. Moreover, recent declines in
gross domestic product have created a
host of problems (discussed in the next

section) that pose serious challenges to
the democratic transition. But the
development that has taken place is
undeniably improving the base necessar
for democracy to prosper.

Education. Improvements in educai
tion have outstripped increases in
population. The percentage of primary
school-age children attending school
increased from 57% in 1960 to 82% in
1980. In 1960, only 35% of the region's
children aged 12-17 were enrolled in
school; a mere 6% of the university-age
population attended universities and
technical schools. By 1980, these figuref
were 63% and 26% respectively. These
gains account for the 79% adult literacy

Department of State Bullet!

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Improved access to information and
ideas has raised expectations and
increased pressures for participation and
political change.

Democratic Activism. Aspirations
for greater political participation have
tended to combine in recent years with
rejection of the violence and abuse of
political extremists and dictatorships of
both left and right. Volunteer civic
education programs, such as the Argen-
tine organization Conciencia (see box,
right), have proliferated. By informing
people of their rights and responsibilities
as citizens of a democracy, civic
movements draw more people into the
political process.

Momentum. With each election, the
right to choose becomes more institu-
tionalized, establishing habits of
pluralistic political practice that widen
voter participation and broaden support
for democratic government. Each elec-
tion increases political activism, as more
citizens take part in civic education pro-
grams, serve as poll workers, campaign
for candidates, or run for office. With
each peaceful transition from one civilian
government to its successor, the
democratic machinery is further refined
and improved.

External Influences

U.S. Policy. Under two very different
administrations since the mid-1970s, the
United States has sought to encourage
democratic transitions in Latin America.
Under the Administration of President
Jimmy Carter, support for human rights
was the guiding principle. During the
Administration of President Ronald
Reagan, the emphasis shifted toward a
policy championing the broader values of
democracy. The practical effect was one
of substantial bipartisan continuity.
Bolivia and El Salvador, for example,
were both very controversial at the time
of the 1980-81 transition between the
Carter and Reagan Administrations. In
both cases, the United States consistent-
ly supported democratization to suc-
cessful outcomes. By 1986— when the
U.S. offer to transport Jean Claude
Duvalier out of Haiti helped prevent fur-
ther bloodshed and proved a key factor
in Duvalier's decision to step down— few
doubted that democracy was one area
where the U.S. Executive and Congress
had found common ground.

Conciencia and the
Future of Democracy

In August 1982, on the eve of Argentina's
return to civilian government after 8 years
of military rule, 22 women organized a
grassroots movement to help the nation
prepare for the general elections. Today,
Conciencia (Awareness) has more than
8,000 members engaged in countless proj-
ects to educate Argentines about their
rights and responsibilities as citizens of a
democracy.

Conciencia's goal is to train the
nation's citizens, particularly its women, to
participate actively and effectively in
political and community life. In addition to
courses in basic civics, civic leadership,
and political participation that emphasize
consensus building, Conciencia sponsors
lectures and exhibits on various domestic
and international topics, publishes a series
of educational pamphlets, and produces
"public service" announcements for
radio and television. All activities are
nonpartisan.

Conciencia 's success has motivated
similar women's groups in several Latin
American countries. At the request of a
group in Montevideo, Uruguay, Conciencia
helped establish the Uruguayan organiza-
tion Encuentro (Encounter) in 1985. Con-
ciencia has also provided assistance to a
sister organization of the same name in

Sao Paulo, Brazil Requests from groups
in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru have prompted
Conciencia to organize the First South
American Meeting on Civic Education and
Participation, scheduled for September
1987 in Buenos Aires. Participants from 10
countries are expected to attend.

Conciencia receives financial support
from corporations, local foundations, and
the U.S. National Endowment for
Democracy (NED), established by Con-
gress in 1983 to support the development
of democratic institutions around the
world. NED support for Conciencia has
been managed by OEF International,
originally established as the overseas arm
of the U.S. League of Women Voters. The
NED also is assisting other civic education
organizations in Dominica and the
Dominican Republic and is a major source
of funding for the Buenos Aires
conference.

The impact of Conciencia on civic
education at the grassroots level is a
measure of the powerful attraction of
democracy as both a political system and
a way of life. It has inspired thousands in
Latin America, drawn primarily from the
middle class, to make a personal invest-
ment in democratic government. Concien-
cia's success demonstrates that
democratic solidarity across borders can
be eminently workable.

Department of State Bulk

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Iberian Examples. Despite frequent
olitical disagreements, most Latin
uiierican countries have cultural and
mdtional affinities to Spain and Portu-
al rooted in the colonial experience.
'he demise of authoritarian military
egimes in the two Iberian "mother"
ations during the mid-1970s added
npetus to democratic forces in Latin
.merica. The subsequent consolidation
f democracy in both countries provided
emocratic models to complement that
r t lie United States and those of Latin
nierica itself.

Failed Alternatives. Democracy

Iso has profited by negative examples.
he military development model
generally dubbed "Nasserist" for its
gyptian variant despite its prevalence
I Latin American history) has taken a
>vere drubbing along with military dic-
itorships in general. And the evident
isery inflicted on the people of Cuba by
le rigid political and economic controls
ijiosed by Castro's regime inspires
tie willing emulation.

Outside the hemisphere, calls for
ilitical and economic freedom in
:)land, student demonstrations in
hina, and the replacement in the Philip-
nes of President Marcos by the
)pularly elected Corazon Aquino, also
^ ive bolstered the belief that democracy
the tide of history.

AGING THE CHALLENGES

Ihough recent progress is undeniable,
tmoeracy's future is far from secure,
ich factors as literacy and organiza-
9nal potential are necessary ingredi-
hts of democratic politics, but they are
ot sufficient. Like Europe's experience
ith nazism and fascism, Latin
merica's history demonstrates that
ealth and a widely educated citizenry
■e not necessarily incompatible with
ctatorship— consider the records of
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.
ocioeconomic development is not
aough by itself to avoid dictatorship or
am authoritarianism into democracy.

Many observers of the Latin
merican scene see the region caught up
1 a perpetual cycle of instability in
hich elected civilian governments lose
le authority to govern and give way to
athoritarian military regimes, which, in
irn, lose legitimacy and give way to a
^petition of the cycle. In this view, the
emocratization described in this report

is superficial and transient, the product
of "time-for-a-change" swings induced
by the failure of authoritarian regimes to
cope with economic and social problems,
their abuses of human rights, and plain
political exhaustion. Similar swings took
place after World War II and again in
the late 1950s and early 1960s. Each
time, the pendulum swung back again.

Is recent progress just the latest
swing in an endless cycle? Or do the na-
tions of the region finally face a real op-
portunity to maintain their democratic
momentum? This section attempts to
contribute to an answer by analyzing
five key problems that impede
democratic consolidation.

Militarism

Military leaders and institutions played
key positive roles in the democratic tran-
sition in several countries, notably
Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and Uruguay. In several coun-
tries, moreover, military leaders have
sought changes in their relations to
civilian institutions that would reduce
pressure on the military and provide a
more stable political balance. For their
part, while recognizing their debt to par-

ticular military leaders, the new
democratic governments have generally
sought to strengthen civilian authority
over the military institutions.

The results have included a historic
low in the frequency of military coups.
Legal provisions prohibiting or limiting
military participation in politics are more
common, as are arrangements increasing
civilian participation in matters previ-
ously reserved to the military. In
Guatemala, new military statutes require
an officer to be off active duty for 5
years before running for public office. In
Argentina, civilians now occupy key
positions in the Ministry of Defense,
including those responsible for the
defense budget. In Peru, the 1933 con-
stitution gave the military what could be
interpreted as independent authority to
decide the meaning of the constitution
itself; the 1979 constitution eliminated
this provision and states explicitly that
the armed forces are subordinate to con-
stitutional authority.

Two incidents make clear, however,
that military pressures remain a threat
to democracy.

President Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala and his wife are greeted by Army Cfiief of Staff Gen Hector Gramajo
on their return from Europe in October 1 986. (Photo couriesy ol Depio Inlormaaon y Dwulgaaon del Eierc:io. Secaon de
Relaciones Publ'cas, Gualemala)

larch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

peaks in 1981, the prices of most of the
hemisphere's commodities have
remained depressed. The oil-producing
countries in the region— Ecuador, Mex-
ico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Venezuela— were hit especially hard by
the collapse of petroleum prices in 1986.
In many countries, the old statist, pro-
tectionist policies that inhibit invest-
ment, reduce business initiative, and
stimulate capital flight are changing only
slowly.

A rising tide of protectionism in the
developed countries— essential export
markets for Latin America and the
Caribbean— also threatens growth. In
recent years, the United States has
substantially outperformed all other
industrialized countries in expanding the
purchase of Latin American and Carib-
bean goods. At the same time, however,
U.S. exports to the region contracted
sharply, creating a more favorable trade
balance for Latin America but also add-
ing fresh pressures to open the
hemisphere's markets to U.S. products.

Most of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries that have achieved
modest growth during the 1980s still
find that the economic gains do not off-
set higher population growth. The
pressures of immediate human needs
increase the difficulties of allocating
scarce resources to important longer
term institutional development.

The United States and the other
members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) realize the importance of coordi-
nating their economic policies to pro-
mote free trade and economic stabiliza-
tion so as to facilitate continued
democratic progress. The OECD coun-
tries also recognize that nations commit-
ted to democratic government and
policies fostering economic growth
should receive priority for foreign
assistance. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the
Inter-American Development Bank are
all creating incentives for policy reforms
that promote economic freedom, less
state interference, and higher economic
growth.

Greater participation by Western
Hemisphere nations in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
should help stave off protectionist
demands by broadening the opportuni-
ties for redress of trade grievances. In
1986, Mexico joined the GATT, and
Costa Rica applied for membership.
Twenty Latin American and Caribbean
countries are now members of GATT
and are participating in the new multi-
national trade round agreed to at the
Uruguay talks in September 1986.

The consolidation of democratic
governments throughout Latin America
and the Caribbean offers the promise of
a stable political environment for
restored economic health. Many Latin
American governments are encouraging
private entrepreneurship and reducing
restrictions on foreign investment in
order to stimulate growth. As economies

become more market-oriented and
generate higher levels of savings, inves
ment, and production and lower levels <
inflation, living standards will improve
provided population growth is
restrained. Such positive developments
would lead to greater confidence in the
political system that inspired them.
Democracy, however, also provides an
environment in which unpopular
measures can be challenged and even
disrupted. Should growth not resume,
and should the critics of current
economic policies prevail in coming elec
tions, governmental intervention in the
economy and confrontation with
creditors could increase.

Illegal Narcotics Trade

The growing illegal narcotics trade,
spurred by the tremendous demand for
drugs in the United States, has become
major regional problem. In some situa-
tions, narcotics traffickers have alignec
themselves with guerrillas and ter-
rorists, buying protection that under-
mines elected civilian government.
Addiction among youth and governmer
corruption are major problems. No
nation in the Western Hemisphere is
untouched by the production, use, or
trafficking of illegal drugs.

The increase in narcotics-related
activities— from crop production to
processing to transshipment to bank
laundering of profits— is caused in part
by severe economic problems. Faced
with limited opportunities at home and

Western Hemisphere: Population, 1950 and 1985

Millions of persons

0 50 100 150

Latin America
and Caribbean

United States
and Canada

1985
(est.)

Source United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1983/4.

Department of State Bullei

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

■ge market for narcotics in the United
lates, many people have turned to the
t jg trade out of economic necessity. In
1 livia, for example, it is estimated that
i proximately 350,000 people, or 5% of
t; population, depend directly on coca
pduction for their livelihood. The 61%
{3wth rate in Bolivia's agricultural sec-
f between 1980 and 1986 was due
anost entirely to increases in coca
pjduction.

htitutional Weaknesses

1e civilian institutions critical to
CTiocracy's proper functioning are
cen fragile, inefficient, or unevenly
c/eloped. Judicial systems generally
s'fer from inadequate financial, institu-
tnal, managerial, and human
r ;ources. For decades, the press and
r dia have been strongly influenced by
3 '.horitarian regimes or traditional
6 ;es; journalists typically suffered from
I ! pay and poor training. The resulting
r <ture of servility and resentment
\ Tipers objectivity and professionalism.
1 e difficulties faced by political parties
r developing national organizational
s uctures and effective leadership are
c npounded by the disruptions and
1 ses suffered in past repressions. Elec-
t al laws and procedures have been sub-
j t to frequent changes, and there is a
1 k of trained electoral administrators.
1 lally, but far from least in importance,
t • pervasiveness of hierarchical struc-
t es with deep historic and cultural
I its have created ingrained
£ -horitarian habits even among
i ividuals and parties with democratic
i entions.

Many of these weaknesses can be
c ircome if the current democratic
I mentum continues and if those Latin
i lericans interested in overcoming
t 'm are able to obtain cooperation from
i )ups with similar interests. Fortun-
i 'ly, linkages between political parties
i Latin America and the Caribbean and
i ernational political movements are
s onger than ever before. So are direct
J -ty-to-party ties. Many European

itical party foundations are active

throughout the hemisphere. Parliamen-
tary exchanges between legislators in
the hemisphere and their counterparts in
other countries are a growing source of
solidarity, as are similar programs
involving democratic trade unions.

Political Extremism and
Totalitarianism

Latin America's authoritarian tradition
and the lack of a democratic consensus
have promoted factionalism, intran-
sigence, and fear of instability. On both
the far left and the far right, political
movements have relied on force to attain
objectives.

Dictatorships of the right— typically
closely linked to the military— have
historically been the nemesis of Latin

"There can be no peace, even
if [the Sandinistas] throw all
their artillery and their
helicopter gunships into Lake
Managua, if there is no
democratic opening in
Nicaragua. "

Honduran President
Jose Azcona,
May 21, 1986

American democrats. While in most
cases not establishing totalitarian con-
trols over all aspects of life, dictator-
ships like those of Gen. Fulgencio
Batista in Cuba and Gen. Anastasio
Somoza in Nicaragua have carried out
some of the cruelest abuses of human
rights in the postwar period. Moreover,
by cloaking abuse in democratic forms
such as plebiscites, artificial opposition
parties, and rigged elections, such dic-
tatorships debase democratic ideas and
procedures and discredit genuine
democrats.

Authoritarianism of the far right has
thus been a major factor contributing to
a new and growing threat to democracy
in Latin America: the threat of com-
munist totalitarianism.

The totalitarian threat takes several
forms. The most obvious is the actual
consolidation of totalitarianism in power
as occurred in Cuba and is happening in
Nicaragua. Like traditional dictator-

ships, totalitarian governments are
highly authoritarian. A key difference is
that they also are systematically hostile
to all activities independent of state con-
trol. By stifling individual enterprise and
driving professionals and entrepreneurs
into exile, these new "revolutionary
vanguards" have aggravated their coun-
tries' social and economic underdevelop-
ment as well as denied the political and
cultural rights of their citizens.

A second threat is subversion. Act-
ing both directly and through Cuba and,
more recently, Nicaragua, the Soviet
Union has provided support— ranging
from propaganda to training and
weaponry— to guerrilla forces and other
terrorist groups in Latin America and
the Caribbean. In El Salvador, such
assistance helped turn what had, in the
1970s, been poorly armed and mutually
antagonistic bands of kidnapers and
bank robbers into what by the early
1980s had become a centrally com-
manded and well-armed guerrilla army
with secure communications.

A third threat is that the totalitarian
offensive will stimulate a new reaction
from the far right. Guerrilla warfare and
other forms of subversion have anti-
democratic consequences even when
their perpetrators do not succeed in seiz-
ing power. In Central America, the guer-
rillas have been stopped by improved
government performance, the outstand-
ing leadership of democrats like
Presidents Jose Napoleon Duarte of El
Salvador and Vinicio Cerezo of
Guatemala, and U.S. support for
democracy, but persistent subversion
from Nicaragua could still endanger this
progress by stimulating an ugly
resurgence of right-wing extremism. In
Chile, the authorities succeeded in
discovering— before they could be used-
large caches of arms secretly smuggled
in by the Soviet bloc, but the evident
threat of armed insurrection that the
arms represented created new problems
for moderates working for a democratic
transition to replace the military regime
of General Pinochet.

■arch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

mocracy enables U.S. foreign policy to
atch (and exceed) what has been identi-
'd as perhaps the strongest element of
iviet foreign policy: an enduring sense
direction.

These new perceptions have par-
cular significance for U.S. policy in
itin America and the Caribbean, where
lany believe that the United States has
icrificed democratic principles and even
ticouraged repressive military regimes
i the pursuit of containment and stabil-
i; at any price. This critical view
inores the role that U.S. assistance pro-
jams and support for free trade, to
ike just two examples, have played in
le fundamental socioeconomic transfor-
)itions that have contributed to the
t mocratic transition. Nevertheless,
cnicism about U.S. purposes has broad
iceptance and contributes to the
1 ibivalence that many people in Latin
.nerica and the Caribbean express ,
i out relations with the United States.
'. )w that U.S. policy embodies
I mocratic values in an explicit, con-
?te, and continuing manner, the
pact on public opinion will, over time,
ave quite substantial.

I JPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY:
] lOVEN TOOLS

major foreign policy speeches, in
bilateral meetings with their counter-
parts in the region, and in consultations
with our allies. Their visits to the region,
and invitations extended to the
democratic leaders of Latin America and
the Caribbean to come to the United
States, are consciously used to
demonstrate U.S. support for democratic
rule and repudiation of both civilian and
military authoritarian regimes.

The President himself announced the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in
February 1982 in a speech before the
Organization of American States. His
message linked the future of democracy
in that part of the hemisphere to
economic development and pledged
major U.S. support for those dual goals.
On this and other occasions, President
Reagan has stressed that the United
States will not remain indifferent "when
democratic values are at risk."

Support for democracy also has been
the recurrent and consistent theme in
speeches by the Secretary of State and
the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs. At the OAS General
Assembly, in testimony before commit-
tees of Congress, and in statements in
numerous public fora during the past 5
years, U.S. leaders have reaffirmed Jef-

ministers of several independent
English-speaking Caribbean nations in
Grenada in a demonstration of
democratic solidarity.

Visits by the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, and other senior
officials are employed to reinforce our
commitment to democratic civilian rule.
The inaugurations of democratically
elected leaders (among them the
Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colom-
bia, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Uruguay, and Venezuela) have become
key occasions for mutual support and
consultations among democratic forces.
The inauguration of President Raul
Alfonsin in December 1983 (at which
Vice President George Bush represented
the United States) became a powerful
and emotional celebration in which
representatives of Spain, Portugal,
Peru, and Ecuador— all countries that
had moved into the democratic ranks
during the previous decade— demon-
strated their solidarity with the newest
member of the international democratic
community.

The state visit to Washington of
President Alfonsin in 1985 was the first
by an Argentine head of state since
1958. The official visit by President

' le United States cannot support

I mocratization in Latin America unless

! supports the efforts of Latin
nericans. Democracy depends on com-
'X interactions that come in many
•ms; it is not an export commodity.
iis section considers U.S. efforts to
ike more effective use of the proven
jIs of statecraft to support the move-
=nt toward democracy in the
misphere; the following section
scribes efforts to create new tools to
Ister democratic institutions and

■ velopment.

plomacy

vo principal goals of U.S. diplomacy in
itin America and the Caribbean are to
rengthen democratic government and
promote peaceful resolution of the

' nflicts and tensions that threaten its
nsolidation. Diplomatic activity to
ivance these goals takes a variety of

irms in many different arenas.

The President and the Secretary of
ate, along with other key foreign
ilicy leaders, enunciate U.S. goals in

"The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the
infrastructure of democracy — the system of a free press,
unions, political parties, universities — which allows a people to
choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to recon-
cile their own differences through peaceful means. "

President Ronald Reagan,

Address before the British Parliament,

London, England, June 8, 1982

ferson's maxim that "the will of the peo-
ple is the only legitimate foundation of
any government."

Support for democratic institutions
was a main theme of President Reagan's
visit to Central and South America in
December 1982. Accompanied by
Secretary of State George Shultz, the
President visited two traditional
democratic allies (Costa Rica and Colom-
bia) and Brazil, where congressional
elections had just marked a major step in
the democratic transition. In February
1986, the President met with the prime

Vinicio Cerezo in May 1987 will be the
first ever by a Guatemalan president.
During 1986 alone, the civilian
Presidents of Brazil, Uruguay, Costa
Rica, Honduras, and Mexico made state
or official working visits to the United
States. President Reagan also met at the
White House with Gen. Henri Namphy,
head of Haiti's National Governing
Council, as a signal of support for the
democratic transition there and for the

arch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

electoral timetable drawn up by his pro-
visional government. In addition, the
President has met with several of his
Latin American and Caribbean counter-
parts while they were in the United
States on private visits.

Progress toward democracy is a
major topic of discussion with our Euro-
pean allies. In consultations such as the
semiannual NATO experts' meetings on
Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S.
officials regularly exchange views with
allied officials on the status of
democratic government and the
measures being taken to support its con-
tinuance. Consultations within the
framework of the OECD provide an
opportunity to win support for policies
that promote growth and development
for our neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere, thereby strengthening the
economic underpinnings of democracy.
In fora such as these, as well as in
bilateral consultations with our allies,
the United States has urged sending
international observers to encourage
electoral freedom and to recognize it
publicly when it takes place.

Through the efforts of the Presi-
dent's Special Envoy for Central
America, who is charged with promoting
negotiations to resolve the conflict there,
the United States supports regional
negotiations, giving special emphasis to
the need for comprehensive, simul-
taneous, and verifiable implementation
of the security and democratic goals set
forth in the 1983 Contadora Document
of Objectives. Three distinguished
Americans have served as Special
Envoy: Richard Stone, former U.S.
Senator (D-Florida); Harry W.
Shlaudeman, former Assistant Secretary
of State and now U.S. Ambassador to
Brazil; and Philip C. Habib, former
Under Secretary of State and Special
Middle East Envoy, the current Special
Envoy.

Military Assistance

Military assistance for Latin America
and the Caribbean consists of funds pro-
vided under the Military Assistance Pro-
gram (MAP) and the International
Military Education and Training (IMET)
Program. In fiscal year (FY) 1986,
military assistance for the region totaled
approximately $234 million, or about 4%
of all U.S. military assistance worldwide.
(The 1986 figures included a small
amount of credit assistance under the

The Power of Public Opinion ■

Of the 33 independent nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean, only three-
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Paraguay— prohibit
independent public opinion polls. In the
rest of the region, political parties,
individual scholars, and dozens of polling
firms are continually using internationally
recognized survey methods to measure
citizen concerns.

Political polling, from In-depth ques-
tions about citizen concerns to polls on
candidate popularity and opinions on
foreign affairs, is the speciality of several
dozen respected public opinion firms,
including Gallup affiliates, from Mexico to
Argentina. UW/WS/ON-Spanish Interna-
tional Network, the largest Spanish-
language television system in the United
States, has conducted extensive voter exit
polls in several countries, including El
Salvador, developing a record of predict-
ing election returns with enviable
accuracy.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
FMS credits to the region have been
discontinued in favor of MAP grants.)

Approximately 82% of U.S. military
assistance for the region in FY 1986
went to El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, and Colombia— four regional
democracies battling insurgencies.
Nowhere is this assistance more impor-
tant than in Central America, where the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua supports
guerrilla movements in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras and provides
military training to a nascent insurgent
movement in Costa Rica. Another 9%
went to support the development of
basic surveillance, search and rescue,
and self-defense capabilities in the Carib-
bean democracies. Our military
assistance also supports hemisphere-
wide efforts to halt the production and
trafficking of narcotics.

Under the initial FY 1987 alloca-
tions, military assistance to the region
has been cut by about 7%, thus limiting
our ability to support our neighbors in
combating both guerrilla insurgencies
and illegal narcotics trafficking.

In October 1986, Congress approved
$100 million to support the Nicaraguan
Democratic Resistance in its struggle to

recover the promise of democracy stoli
from the Nicaraguan people by the
Sandinistas.

Economic Assistance

U.S. bilateral economic assistance
totaled slightly more than $1.5 billion i
FY 1986. It is administered by the Ag(
cy for International Development (AID
and consists of developmental
assistance, economic support fund
(ESF) assistance, and PL 480 food aid
Latin America and the Caribbean.

Developmental assistance account*
for almost 30% of total U.S. bilateral
economic assistance to the region. The
funds are used primarily to improve
educational and health systems, to sup
port improvements in infrastructure, t
build democratic institutions, and to
bolster the private sector as the princi
engine of growth.

The economic support fund, which
used almost entirely for budget suppoi
comprised about 42% of U.S. bilateral
economic assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean in FY 1986. Almost
30% of U.S. bilateral economic
assistance for the region in FY 1986 c
sisted of ESF for the countries of Cen
tral America.

In FY 1987, reduced global foreigi
assistance appropriations required tha
U.S. bilateral assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean be cut by
nearly 20% to approximately $1.2 billi
These cuts come at a critical time whe
many of the countries are instituting c
ficult economic reforms, atte — )ting tc
consolidate democratic civilia govern
ment, and battling leftist insu gents.

The United States provides addi-
tional economic assistance to the natio
of Latin America and the Caribbean
through contributions to multilateral
institutions such as the the World Ban
the Inter-American Development Ban!
the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration, and the Carib-
bean Development Bank. In 1985, U.S
contributions to multilateral develop-
ment banks for Latin American pro-
grams were approximately $2 billion.
Programs administered by these institi
tions provide additional sources of fum
ing, generally on concessionary terms,
for development projects in the region.
U.S. contributions to these institutions
also face cuts in FY 1987.

Department of State Bull

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

conomic Stabilization

he L'nited States has a fundamental
terest in the prosperity of the coun-
ies of the Western Hemisphere. Our
rategy for deahng with economic prob-
'ms, including the debt crisis, has been
lordinated with other industrial coun-
ies. Applied on a case-by-case basis,
e strategy emphasizes the need for
■oiiomic adjustment in the debtor coun-
ies with the support of the interna-
ma\ financial institutions, especially
e International Monetary Fund and
e World Bank.

.•\t the 1985 annual meeting of the
IF and World Bank in Seoul, Korea,
S. Treasury Secretary James Baker
oi>osed an initiative that builds on and
I'tMigthens the previous strategy. The
ui he put forth contains three essential
d mutually reinforcing elements:

• First, adoption of economic policy
forms to promote growth in the debtor
untries;

• Second, a continuing central role
■ the IMF coupled with an increase in
•uctural adjustment loans by the
urld Bank to support these reforms;

• Third, when the first and second
I 'ments are in place, new lending by

? commercial banks to provide addi-
nal support for the reforms and for
ig-term growth.

The heart of the new strategy is
] Teased emphasis on growth to reduce
I bt and raise living standards. This
: proach has received strong support
i ernationally and was recently
i 'irmed by the IMF Interim Committee
i d the IMF/World Bank Development
' mmittee at their meetings in
I ptember 1986.

The renewed emphasis on growth
1 }uires reduced reliance on statism,
I irket intervention, and import
s jstitution. The response thus far has
1 m encouraging. Most Latin American
} d Caribbean countries have estab-
hed more realistic exchange rates,
<panded exports, and cut inflation.
i veral countries have begun to reduce
( trenched structural barriers to
pwth; specifically, to take steps to

reduce price controls and subsidies, to
liberalize trade, to attack overregulation
and excessive bureaucratic controls, and
to improve the investment climate,
including reducing restrictions on
private foreign investment. Until these
reforms produce practical results for a
majority of citizens, however, the
democratic leaders of Latin America and
the Caribbean would benefit greatly
from a demonstration that the developed
countries (and especially the United
States) are prepared to ease the burdens
imposed by existing debts.

U.S. efforts to reduce domestic infla-
tion have lowered international interest
rates, thus reducing the debt-servicing
burden on all the Latin American debt-
ors. Similarly, our battle against protec-
tionism and our own continuing
economic growth in the last 4 years have
helped countries in the region by ena-
bling them to increase their exports. U.S.
imports from Latin America and the
Caribbean— mostly manufactured
products— rose by nearly 7% per year
during the 1980s, a rate well in excess of

annual growth in gross domestic prod-
uct. At the same time, the region
reduced imports from the United States.
Thus, a $3-billion U.S. trade surplus with
Latin America and the Caribbean in
1981 had become a $17-billion deficit by
1985.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative is an
attempt by the United States to engage
the nations of the Caribbean and Central
America in the development of new
opportunities for trade, investment,
employment, and broad-based growth in
the region. The program was designed
with a 12-year lifespan representing a
long-term U.S. political commitment
with incentives beyond immediate trade
objectives. Countries with the policy
framework to promote private invest-
ment and innovation will be most able to
seize trade opportunities. The CBI has
not yet generated the substantial
economic growth that was originally
envisioned. Thus the United States has
added several other benefits and con-
tinues to seek additional measures for
promoting economic growth.

U.S. Bilateral Assistance to

Latin America and the Caribbean, FY 1986<

Other
Economic ^

1 Bilateral assistance amounted to $1 ,8 billion. This does not include US contributions to the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Interamerican Development Bank, and the Caribbean
Development Bank expended in Latin America and the Caribbean,

2 "Other Economic" includes funds lor programs of USIA, Peace Corps, and the State Department
(e.g.. refugees, narcotics)

■arch

1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Peace Corps

The Peace Corps has been one of the
most successful U.S. foreign poHcy
initiatives of the postwar period. Almost
1,700 Peace Corps volunteers are cur-
rently serving in 18 countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Throughout
the region, Peace Corps volunteers con-
tinue traditional programs such as
teacher training, nutrition, and health
care. In recent years, however, pro-
grams have focused increasingly on sup-
port for the private sector with training
and technical assistance in management
and marketing to small businesses and
entrepreneurs. New projects include
activities that range from the develop-
ment of income-generating student
cooperatives modeled on the "Junior
Achievement" program to technical
assistance in crop diversification to small
farmers.

Educational Exchange

In the past 5 years, the United States
Information Agency (USIA) has
expanded various international visitor
programs. Exchange visitor grants fund
travel to the United States for outstand-
ing regional leaders in fields as diverse
as journalism, arts and sciences, politics,
government administration, and educa-
tion. Through the Fulbright Program,
American scholars have the opportunity
to teach, study, and conduct research
abroad while their foreign counterparts
are given similar opportunities in this
country. In addition, USIA administers
the new pilot Central American Program
for Undergraduate Scholarships
(CAMPUS). The new Central American
Peace Scholarship (CAPS) program,
using AID resources, will eventually
bring a total of 7,000 students from
lower and middle class backgrounds to
the United States. Other USIA pro-
grams support student exchanges at the
secondary school level, help set up
special programs for voluntary visitors
to the United States, and arrange for
U.S. travelers to the region to meet with
counterparts in their respective fields.

Bipartisan Commission Stimulates
Support for Democracy
in Central America

In July 1983, President Reagan appointed
a National Bipartisan Commission on Cen-
tral America to advise on a long-term U.S.
policy that would best respond to the
challenges of social, economic, and
democratic development in the region and
to internal and external threats to its
security and stability. The Commission,
headed by former Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, reported to the Presi-
dent on January 10, 1984, that the fun-
damental strategic and moral interests of
the United States require a long-term
national commitment to economic oppor-
tunity, human development, democracy,
and security in Central America.
The President and Congress
approved the recommendations of the
Commission virtually unchanged, setting
in motion a comprehensive strategy of
economic and military assistance to
address the root causes of poverty and
social unrest, to foster equitable develop-
ment, and to support democratization to
help the region move beyond its history of
dictatorships and instability. The strategy
is to:

• Support democratic processes and
institutions by backing free and com-
petitive elections, the administration of
justice, technical training, and the
development of leadership skills;

Support for Private
Sector Organizations

The U.S. Government lends its help to
appropriate private initiatives that sup-
port democratic development. Long-
term AID support for the programs of
the "Partners of the Americas" helps
develop linkages between U.S. civic and
community organizations, youth groups,
service organizations such as the Lions
and Rotary Clubs, and business groups
and their counterparts in the
hemisphere. These people-to-people pro-
grams promote mutual understanding
and cooperation and contribute to
institutional development.

In 1986, AID funded and the Depart-
ment of State assisted with the organiza-
tion of a regional conference for Latin
America and the Caribbean sponsored by
the International Committee for a Com-
munity of Democracies (ICCD). The
ICCD promotes worldwide democratic

• Stop declines in income, employ-
ment, and economic activity by providing
major balance-of-payments support;

• Build the foundation for long-term
economic growth by supporting improve-
ments in economic policy and the infra-
structure needed for efficient production
and diversified exports;

• Assure the widest possible distribu-
tion of the opportunities and benefits of
growth by helping to create jobs and
improve health, education, and housing
for the poor; and

• Help secure peaceful evolution in
support of these objectives by providing
military assistance to create a shield to
protect democratization and growth from
Soviet-backed subversion.

Complementing these development
and security policies, U.S. diplomacy sup-
ports negotiations both within and among
the countries of Central America to bring
about the reconciliation needed to achieve
socioeconomic progress, national security,
and lasting peace.

This bipartisan approach, whose foun-
dations are the promotion and defense of
democracy, has proved critical to the prog-
ress achieved since 1984 in every country
of Central America except Nicaragua. And
the Commission noted that "the develop-
ment of an open political system in
Nicaragua, with a free press and an active
opposition" would be a key to progress
there as well.

solidarity as a means of sustaining, pi'
moting, and defending democratic pra
tices in more than 50 democratic coun
tries around the globe.

Liaison With Trade Unions

U.S. diplomatic missions in Latin
America and the Caribbean traditional
have maintained active liaison with tr:
unions and labor leaders because of
their central role in national politics
throughout the region. U.S. Governme
funds also support various activities ol
the AFL-CIO, including a major train
ing program for union organizers at th
George Meany Center in suburban
Washington, D.C.

Department of State Bul!«

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

PPORT FOR DEMOCRACY:
:CENT INITIATIVES

e National Endowment
fi Democracy

7e National Endowment for Democ-
■ \ was established by Congress in
,11 the belief that private institu-
in free societies can contribute to
•velopment of democracy through
^ istance to counterparts abroad. Four
.^ istituent institutes— the AFL-CIO's
F;e Trade Union Institute, the Center
f( International Private Enterprise of
I '.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the
iMnal Democratic Institute for Inter-
i^mal Affairs and National Republican
• * ute for International Affairs

senting the two major American
itical parties— administer a broad
_uf of projects in the region that
aphasize leadership training, civic
eication, expanding and strengthening
d linkages among U.S. and regional
nitical parties, development of elec-
il machinery, support for democratic
kers' federations, and promotion of
, :ite enterprise. Although most of the
|i iwment's funds are provided by con-
_ .-.-ional appropriation, it is an
.1 ependent, nonpartisan organization.
! 'act, the National Endowment for
nncracy is probably the most con-
. te example of the growing bipartisan
: sensus in foreign policy based on sup-
p t for democracy as its guiding
p iciple.

^. ministration of Justice

T ' development of independent, acces-
. and fair justice systems is a crucial
J. t of the consolidation of democracy in

I ;in America and the Caribbean. The

1 5. Government recognizes this impor-

I I fact and, in the past several years,
h ; developed an innovative program to
a ist democratic Latin American and

ilibean governments in their efforts
: :arry out fundamental judicial
r orms. Collaborative efforts involve
t- Departments of State and Justice,
MA, and AID. The U.S. program first
f used on Central America and is now
eDanding to the Caribbean and South
^lerica. Under the program, the United
Sites has given support for a variety of
f ictical judicial reform measures

Victor Raul Haya de la Torre (1895-1979)
addresses Peru's Constituent Assembly, of
which he was president, on July 23. 1978.
Haya founded one of the hemisphere's first
mass movements, the American Popular Revo-
lutionary Alliance (APRA). while in exile in Mex-
ico in 1924- ( ; UPl/Betimann Newsptiotos)

including training for judges,
prosecutors, and other legal personnel;
improving court administration;
reproducing and disseminating basic
legal materials; training for criminal
investigators; modernization of law
codes; strengthening of case reporting
systems; and support for local bar
associations. In addition, U.S. officials
are facilitating the establishment of
cooperative links between relevant
private U.S. organizations— such as law
schools, bar associations, and law
institutes— and their counterparts in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Grants to support these activities have
been made to the UN-affiliated Latin
American Institute for the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders
(ILANUD), the University of the West
Indies, the Inter-American Bar Associa-
tion and Foundation, and private and
governmental agencies in individual
countries.

Electoral Institutions

The consolidation of democratic govern-
ment in Latin America and the Carib-
bean depends in large measure on
increased public confidence in the elec-
toral process and the institutional capac-
ity to administer it. U.S. assistance
seeks to build this capacity in national
institutions through technical assistance,
training, and material resources to help
establish sound laws and procedures,
administer elections, carry out measures
to prevent fraud, and educate citizens
about the voting process. In El Salvador
in 1982, 1984, and 1985, and in
Guatemala and Honduras in 1985, U.S.
assistance for the electoral process-
including provision of special ballot
paper and ink and aid to computerize
voter registration rolls— supported the
democratic transition. AID funds have
also been used to finance training of poll
monitors in Guatemala and to support
teams of international electoral
observers for elections in Honduras and
El Salvador.

In addition to assistance to individ-
ual countries, AID provides support to
technical assistance, training, and
research programs of the Inter-
American Center for Electoral
Assistance and Promotion (CAPEL), a
division of the Inter-American Institute
of Human Rights, located in San Jose,
Costa Rica. The creation of CAPEL was
a Latin American initiative, stemming
from a meeting of foreign ministers in
October 1982. Its services and resources
are available to public and private
institutions and individuals throughout
the region.

Since 1984, increased funding has
allowed CAPEL to expand its programs
rapidly. The center has developed a
roster of electoral experts from the
Americas and Europe who can provide
technical advice and participate in train-
ing courses, research projects, and
observer missions. CAPEL has
responded to requests for technical
advice from Bolivia and Honduras on
improving and computerizing voter
registries; from Guatemala on drafting a
new electoral law; and from Ecuador on
improving the vote counting system. The
center has conducted training courses on
electoral legislation in Guatemala, Costa

djarch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Rica, and Honduras, cosponsored by
each country's electoral court, the bar
association, and local universities. A
private organization in Haiti invited
CAPEL to collaborate in a seminar on
the electoral process and in a proposed
nationwide voter education project to
promote full participation in the elec-
tions scheduled for 1987.

CAPEL's growing data center col-
lects and disseminates materials on elec-
toral legislation, rights, and processes,
and maintains permanent records of
election results for all the countries in
the region. The Department of State is
aiding development of an electoral data
base through a project with the Institute
of Interamerican Studies at the Univer-
sity of Miami that is being coordinated
with CAPEL. The data base will be
available to students, journalists, and
scholars from throughout the
hemisphere as well as government
analysts.

By collaborating with national
organizations, CAPEL is building a
valuable network of individuals and
institutions committed to promoting
well-administered, free, and competitive
elections. In 1985, CAPEL helped
stimulate creation of the Association of
Electoral Organisms of Central America
and the Caribbean, an organization
designed to foster international coopera-
tion to promote representative
democracy. As its interim secretariat,
CAPEL helped organize and fund the
association's first annual meeting in San
Salvador in December 1986 to which
both Haiti and the Philippines sent
official observers.

Strengthening Legislative Capacity

AID funds are used to support activities
designed to promote and facilitate
continuing interchange among
parliamentarians in Latin America and
the Caribbean, North America, and
Western Europe, as well as to build the
institutional capacity of regional
legislative bodies.

In 1982, AID funded a training
seminar for newly elected legislators
initiated by the Congress of the
Dominican Republic and a local univer-
sity. Interest generated by the seminar
led to the design of a long-range pro-
gram of support services to enhance the
policymaking and administrative skills of
legislators. Drawing on this model and

with technical assistance from partici-
pants in the Dominican program, the
legislatures of El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras are undertaking similar
programs funded by AID to strengthen
information management and analysis
and administrative support.

Antinarcotics Assistance

The United States is cooperating with
governments throughout the hemisphere
to end production of and trafficking in
narcotics. In Mexico, Jamaica, and
Colombia, we are working together to
eradicate drug crops. Our most dramatic
efforts to date have been in Bolivia,
where U.S. military forces provided
transportation for local law enforcement
teams to destroy drug processing
laboratories.

In the Caribbean and The Bahamas,
we have supported extensive programs
to interdict drug shipments. Other pro-
grams throughout the region support
training for law enforcement officers
and public education. The war on drugs
at all levels also is being expanded with

new resources provided by the omnibus
drug bill passed in 1986. Of course, a
central part of any strategy must deal
with the massive consumption of drugs
in the United States.

Civil-Military Relations

In 1987, U.S. authorities in California
arrested retired Argentine General
Suarez Mason whose extradition Argen
tina had requested after his indictment
for human rights abuses. Through tangi
ble actions, private consultations, and
public statements, the U.S. Governmem
is attempting to make clear that it
expects cooperation between U.S. and
Latin American military services to tak
place within a framework of civilian con
trol and support for democracy. This
was the theme of a major address
entitled "A Democratic Vision of Secu-
rity" by Assistant Seci'etary of State fo'
Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams
at the 25th commencement ceremony ol
the Inter- American Defense College on
June 13, 1986 (see Department of State
Bulletin of August 1986).

Poll workers in San Salvador open a ballot box and begin to count the votes in the presidential runoff electior
of May 6. 1984 Ballot counting fiad to be done by candlelight after guerrillas disrupted the city's power
supply. ( - UPl/Bellmann Newspholos)

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

iradentes: A Vision Vindicated

1 late 1788, in the Province of Minas
Serais in the Brazilian interior, a group of
ten launched the first major conspiracy
gainst Portuguese colonial rule. Their
lotives were mixed: freedom from debt
nd taxes owed to the Crown, a more
pen commercial system, and abolition of

social structure that denied them upward
lobility. Some were inspired by the dream
f a free republic, patterned after the
ewly independent American colonies. As
tudents in France, several had discussed
neir plans with Thomas Jefferson.

The central figure in the Inconfidencia
lineira (or Minas Conspiracy) was
oaquin Jose da Silva Xavier, a low-
anking officer known by his nickname

Tiradentes" (toothpuller), who embodied
ne complex motivations behind the con-
piracy. After several business failures
ind the loss of his property, he entered
he military but was passed over for pro-

With funding from AID and other
A ors and the assistance of the Bureau
o: nter-American Affairs of the Depart-
ir it of State, the School of Interna-
ti lal Service of the American Univer-

Iin Washington, D.C., is undertaking
,udy of civilian-mihtary relations
d igned to promote dialogue among
■ii iilars and military and civilian leaders

II the United States and Latin
1 rriea. Civil-military relations is now a

iilard topic in the Washington brief-
■i s given to participants in USIA's
I ernational Visitor Program.

motion in favor of officers with better con-
nections. Because of his dental skills,
Tiradentes eventually met some mer-
chants in Rio de Janeiro and, with them,
developed his plans for an independent
republic.

The scheme called for Tiradentes to
provoke a riot, then lead an assault on the
Governor's residence at the head of a
group converted to the republican cause.
After declaring an independent republic in
Minas Gerais, the conspirators hoped to
carry their war of independence to the
other provinces. The constitution they
planned called for economic reforms;
freedom for native-born slaves; and
establishment of a university, schools, and
hospitals. Citizens would have the right to
bear arms and would be required when
necessary to serve in a national militia, but
there would be no standing army. Each
town would have a council subordinate to
a parliament in the capital. After 3 years of
provisional rule to consolidate the
republic, elections were to be held
annually.

Before they could carry out the plan,
one of the conspirators divulged the plot.
Tiradentes confessed but, to spare the
others, claimed that he had conceived the
plot alone. Among the charges leveled
against him was attempting to translate
the U.S. Constitution into Portuguese. The
conspirators were fried, convicted, and
sentenced to death; all save Tiradentes
had their sentences commuted. On
April 21, 1792, he was led to the gallows
on the outskirts of Rio and hanged.

After Brazil became an independent
republic almost 100 years later, Tiradentes
was hailed as a hero. His vision had
helped thrust Brazil into the nationalist,
anticolonialist, republican mainstream of i
the Enlightenment and set Brazil on the
road to the democracy it enjoys today.

The Need for Mutual Support

The promise created by the convergence
between Latin American democratiza-
tion and increased U.S. support for
democracy can only be fulfilled if head-
way is made in overcoming two separate
problems, one for each potential partner
in the quest for inter-American coopera-
tion. They are Latin American instability
and U.S. inconsistency.

For Latin America, the preliminary
indications suggest that, this time, the
cycle of instability is being broken in
enough countries to make a difference.
The strengthening of constitutional

government has increased protection of
human rights and provided channels for
the redress of grievances. Freedom of
the press has been restored in as large a
country as Brazil, in some ways the
freest of societies, and as small a coun-
try as Haiti, where for decades govern-
ment censorship limited all forms of
political expression.

Many of the same forces that
sparked the decline of authoritarianism
seem likely to favor continued
democracy. Urbanization, industrializa-
tion, and the growth of the middle
classes are continually expanding the
potential democratic power base. Higher
rates of education and literacy are
increasing the number of people capable
of seeking an active role in government
and of communicating and obtaining
mutual support from like-minded groups
to protect democracy once achieved.

In 1985, two amendments to the
Charter of the Organization of American
States were proposed to recognize that
"representative democracy is an indis-
pensable condition for the stability,
peace, and development of the region"
and that the promotion and consolidation
of democracy are among its essential
purposes. These provisions foster and
reflect the potential for hemispheric
solidarity and cooperation among coun-
tries united by democratic principles and
practices. The inaugurations of newly
elected civilian governments have
become regular occasions for the
democratic nations of the hemisphere
to show their commitment to these
principles.

The international implications of
Latin America's democratic revolution
are enormous. The democratic Govern-
ment of Argentina has stressed its
desire for a negotiated settlement with
the United Kingdom over control of the
Falklands/Malvinas Islands. This
approach sharply contrasts with that of
the predecessor military regime, which
tried to resolve the issue through
military action. In July 1986, Argentina
and Brazil signed a dozen accords
designed to promote trade, cooperation
in key industries, and otherwise
strengthen mutual support and
cooperation.

Finally, the absence of democracy
has been recognized as a major source of
conflict within countries as well as
among them. In Central America,
democratization has been the key to
progress in El Salvador, while in
Nicaragua the absence of democracy
hampers national reconciliation.
Democratization in both El Salvador and
Honduras contributed to reducing

irch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

historic border tensions and to their
ability to implement the dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms contained in the 1980
peace treaty ending the 1969 war
between them.

In the United States during the past
decade, the U.S. Government— with both
the Congress and the executive branch
participating and, at times, even seem-
ing to compete— has taken an increasing-
ly active role in support of democratic
processes and institutions throughout
the hemisphere.

Considerable uncertainty nonethe-
less remains about the consistency of
vigorous U.S. support for the democratic
revolution in the region. Lack of suffi-
cient funding for U.S. foreign assistance
could, over time, cripple U.S. foreign
policy. New protectionist trade barriers
would aggravate the debt crisis. Halting
support for democratic forces in Nic-
aragua would further endanger the
security of the Central American
democracies.

Increased U.S. continuity in foreign
policy and political and financial commit-
ment to democracy would mitigate many
of these threats. Continued support for
democracy requires a consistency— the
combination of political will and suffi-
cient resources— that has often been
absent from U.S. foreign policy in recent
years. The emergence of bipartisan coali-
tions in the Congress on matters from
the Caribbean Basin Initiative to support
for the Nicaraguan democratic resist-
ance suggests this may be possible.

In short, though the dangers are
great and growing, those who envision
an enduring cooperative relationship
among democratic societies throughout
the Americas have more reason to be
optimistic today than at any time since
the early days of the Alliance for Prog-
ress. In Latin America, democratic
achievements are all the more impres-
sive because they have come piecemeal,
one country at a time, usually without
grand illusions about the outside world.
In the United States, the realization that
our neighbors in Latin America and the
Caribbean are increasingly committed to
democracy and that their success is
important to our own security is
strengthening support for a new bipar-
tisan consensus.

If the United States and the coun-
tries of Latin America and the Carib-
bean continue to provide each other
support and encouragement, as they
have in the past decade, it will be possi-
ble to say that democracy will have
fulfilled its promise as both a cause and a
result of good relations between Latin
America and the United States. ■

Nicaragua: Appearance v. Reality

Elections were held throughout the
Somoza era. Real power, however, was
never put to a vote. The major change
under the Sandinistas is that elections are
not even regular.

General Somoza offered the
Conservative opposition 40% of the seats
in a constituent assembly in 1971. The
"pact" between the Conservatives and
Somoza's Liberal Party was rejected by
other opposition parties, including the
Independent Liberal Party and the Social
Christian Parly. But Somoza's manipula-
tions made possible legal and constitu-
tional changes that allowed him to run for
president in 1974 in an election in which 9
out of 10 opposition groups had been
excluded.

On August 17. 1974, Nicaragua's
Roman Catholic bishops responded to the
exclusion of the opposition by issuing a
pastoral letter that declared that "a domi-
nant majority party does not have the right
to exclude and deny recognition to the
minorities." The bishops denounced
"legal weapons," asserting: "When the
law becomes an instrument of force used
to deprive citizens of their rights, to
sterilize and destroy civic action, to im-
prison for the sole offense of not accepting
the only system or the existing regime, it is
legal war; it is the absurd destruction of
man by the law."

Ten years later, in 1984, the San-
dinistas put Nicaragua through the
motions of another election. As in 1974,
the Sandinistas never intended that the
elections would determine who would
exercise power. As in 1974, the San-
dinistas permitted a faction of the Conser-
vatives to win the largest share of opposi-

Additional Information

Recent steps to strengthen the rule of
law in Latin America and the Caribbean
are summarized in U.S. Department of
State Special Report No. 145, "Hemi-
spheric Cooperation in the Admin-
istration of Justice," April 1986. The
role of the military within a democracy is
the subject of Current Policy No. 844,
"A Democratic Vision of Security," an
address by Assistant Secretary of State
Elliott Abrams before the Inter-
American Defense College, June 13,
1986. U.S. support for democracy in
Central America in accordance with the
recommendations of the National Bipar-
tisan Commission on Central America
(the "Kissinger Commission") is exten-
sively documented in the report to the
President from the Secretary of State,
Special Report No. 148, "The U.S. and

tion votes. And as In 1974, other parties
opposed the ruling party's manipulation.
Major opposition forces united in the Coor-
dinadora Democratica to run Arturo Cruz
for president but boycotted the election
when it became clear that their candidates
were denied the right to campaign freely.
The Independent Liberal Party tried to
withdraw later in the campaign, but was
prohibited from doing so on a technicality.

On April 22, 1984, Nicaragua's
Roman Catholic bishops responded to the
growing polarization of Nicaraguan society
by issuing a pastoral letter which declared
that "it is dishonest to constantly blame
internal aggression and violence on
foreign aggression" and called for nationa
reconciliation through dialogue. "All
Nicaraguans inside and outside the coun-
try." asserted the bishops, "must par-
ticipate in this dialogue, regardless of
ideology, class, or partisan belief. Further-
more, we think that Nicaraguans who have
taken up arms against the government
must also participate in this dialogue."

On February 7, 1987, seven opposi-
tion parties— the Independent Liberal
Party, the Social Christian Party, the Con-
stitutional Liberal Party, the Popular Sociai
Christian Party, the Conservative Party,
the Social Democratic Party, and the Com-
munist Party called for the creation of a
National Peace Commission to work for a
ceasefire; full political, social, and
economic rights in accordance with the
new constitution; general amnesty; and an
election calendar. The 1983 Contadora
objectives and more recent Central
American negotiating initiatives, including
proposals put forth by President Oscar
Arias of Costa Rica on February 15, 1987,
also make clear that democracy can no
longer be left to appearances.

Central America: Implementing the
National Bipartisan Commission
Report," August 1986. The progress
made in one particular case also is sun
marized in "Guatemala's Transition
Toward Democracy," Public Informati
Series, November 1986. Special Repor
No. 132, "Revolution Beyond Our
Borders: Sandinista Intervention in d
tral America," September 1985,
examines in detail the manner in whicl
powerful minority proclaimed itself a
vanguard committed to revolutionary
internationalism and sought to under-
mine elections and democratic reforms
These materials and others on U.S
foreign policy and U.S. relations with
Latin America and the Caribbean are
available by writing to the Bureau of
Public Affairs, Room 5815A, United
States Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20520, or by telephoning
(202) 647-6575.

Department of State Bullei

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

he Inspiration, IVIany Models

In 1813, Thomas Jefferson Imagined the
day when the people of Latin America
would be liberated from colonial rule and
military despotism. In a letter to his old
friend Lafayette, he predicted that the
inevitable conflicts of the old autocratic
order would "bring the people Into motion.
Into action, and into the exertion of their
understandings." The example of the
United States, Jefferson hoped, would be
"an excitement as well as a model for
their direction."

In their struggle for independence, the
peoples of Latin America and the Carib-
' bean did find inspiration In many of the
same Enlightenment principles that
formed the basis of Jefferson's constitu-
tional thought. The philosophers of the
Enlightenment believed that, just as there
were laws of Nature, there were laws that
governed human activity. They had
limitless confidence In the ability of reason
10 discern those laws and apply them to
human affairs. They also believed that
Tian could be persuaded by Reason to
;onform to those laws without resort to the
:yrannlcal and barbarous practices of
earlier governments.

It was In the New World that men first
attempted to apply these principles and to
systematize not only the laws that govern
:he citizens of the state but also the rights
3f those citizens. These principles, spelled
Dut in constitutions throughout the
Americas, are familiar to all of us: govern-
ment derives its authority from the consent
3f the governed; all men are equal under
the law and entitled to due process;
government has an obligation to
guarantee individual liberties such as
Teedom of speech, of assembly, and of
eligion; and the constitution itself forms a
Dody of supreme law.

The people of Latin America and the
Caribbean sought additional Inspiration in
he French "Declaration of the Rights of
Vlan and of the Citizen" and the Spanish
Oonstitution of 1812. A number of the
sriginal Latin American constitutions went
Deyond the U.S. model by outlawing
slavery. Constitutional revisions in this
sentury have emphasized economic and
social rights conforming to contemporary
conceptions of social justice.

iAs Jefferson had envisioned, the
United States did serve as an Inspiration
for the independence movement
throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Today, however, U.S. policy does not envi-
sion a single model of government for our
neighbors. We know now that that is

Top: The Barbados House of Assembly is one of the oldest representative bodies in the world. The
House, the lower chamber of the modern Parliament pictured here, has met continuously since 1639.

(Ptioto courlesy ot \he Barbados Board of Tourism, New York)

Bottom: Brazilian President Jose Sarney tells a joint session of the U.S. Congress on September 1 1 ,
1986: "The true name of peace is democracy, because democracy is understanding, the capacity to
find solutions other than the solutions of might." (Phoio couriesy oi ihe u S House oi Represemaiives)

neither possible nor desirable. The
region's constitutions establish many dif-
ferent forms of government— federal and
unitary, parliamentary and presidential,
republic and commonwealth. But Jeffer-
son's essential vision remains: as

democratic neighbors, we have a role to
play in support of a democratic transition
based on the values that all people of the
Americas share— liberty, equality, justice,
and peace.

arch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Country Summaries

r~l Type of

election(s)

Date of most
recent election(s)

Date of
next electio

Antigua and Barbuda

Parliament

Apr
1984

1989 1

Antigua and Barbuda, which achieved its
independence from Great Britain in
1981, has a parHamentary system of
government with an elected House of
Assembly and an appointed Senate. The
British monarch, who continues to be
r-ecognized as chief of state, is
represented by an appointed Governor
General. The governing Antigua Labor
Party (ALP), led by Prime Minister
V.C. Bird, Sr., won decisively in the
April 1984 elections, defeating an
opposition coalition composed of the
United People's Movement, the People's
Labor Movement, and the Antigua
Caribbean Liberation Movement.
Although the centrist ALP swept 16 of
17 parliamentary seats, the election was
considered free and fair by all accounts.
A new opposition party, the United New
Democratic Party (UNDP), was formed
in March 1986 from the remnants of
several old opposition parties. The
UNDP, which has attracted several
newcomers to politics, has a moderate,
pro-Western philosophy.

Argentina

Congress

Nov
1985

Nov.
1987

President

Oct
1983

Nov.

^989

Argentina's most recent return to
democracy began with a record-breaking
turnout of more than 1,5 million voters in
presidential and congressional elections
on October 30, 1983. Argentines also
went to the polls in large numbers in
October 1984 in a nonbinding plebiscite
on the Beagle Channel Treaty prior to
the treaty debate in the Congress.
Subsequent legislative elections in 1985
were widely considered an important
step in consolidating democracy in
Argentina. A wave of terror bombings
designed to disrupt the campaign failed
when the government invoked a state of

siege, which in no way interfered with
the campaign or the polling. The nearly
84% turnout, which approached that of
the 1983 presidential election, was seen
as a massive repudiation of violence and
a popular affirmation of democracy.
Distribution of the vote probably also
helped to consolidate democracy: while
the governing Radical Civic Union Party
of President Raill Alfonsi'n maintained
its majority in the lower house, the
Justicialist (Peronist) Party, despite
serious internal divisions, polled suffi-
cient support to maintain its plurality in
the Senate and its credibility as a poten-
tial democratic alternative. In late 1986,
parties began active campaigning for the
1987 round of congressional and provin-
cial elections.

The Bahamas

Barbados

Parliament

June
1982

By
1987

The Commonwealth of The Bahamas
became an independent member of the
British Commonwealth on July 10, 1973.
As in most other Commonwealth
nations, the chief of state is the British
monarch, who is represented by an
appointed Governor General. The
government is a Westminster-style
parliamentary democracy. The executive
and the legislative branches are inter-
dependent, but the judiciary is independ-
ent. Parliament, which has a maximum
term of 5 years, consists of two houses:
an appointed, 16-member Senate and an
elected 43-member House of Assembly.
The Senate's members are appointed by
the Governor General on the advice of
both the Prime Minister and the leader
of the opposition. Members of the House
of Assembly are elected from individual
constituencies. Prime Minister Sir
Lynden 0. Pindling's Progressive
Liberal Party (PLP) has won five con-
secutive national elections dating back to
1967. The next election must take place
by August 1987.

Parliament

iviay
1986

By
1991

One of the most stable and prosperou-
countries in the Caribbean, Barbados i
flourishing parliamentary democracy
with an elected lower chamber (Housf
Assembly) and a nominated upper
chamber (Senate). The chief of state is
the British monarch, who is representi
by an appointed Governor General. Eli
tions constitutionally are due every 5
years. There is a well-established two-
party system; both parties are modera
centrist, and pro-Western. Major dif-
ferences center on personalities rather
than philosophy. The ruling Democrati
Labor Party (DLP) of Prime Minister
Errol Barrow is closely allied to the
island's major labor union and won 24
27 seats in the May 1986 elections. Th.
opposition Barbados Labor Party won
three seats and is led by Henry Forde.
Although there are several radical, lef
wing parties active in Barbados, they i
not pose a challenge to the dominance
the two major parties. Elections have
been scrupulously free and keenly
contested.

Belize

Parliament

Dec.
1984

Belize achieved independence from
Great Britain in 1981 after an extendc
period of internal self-government. Tli
pattern exemplifies the successful loca
adaptation of the British parliamentar
tradition that flourishes in the Carib-
bean. In December 1984, in the first
general elections since independence, t
United Democratic Party (UDP) led by
Manuel Esquivel won 21 of 28 seats in
the House of Assembly. Voter turnout
was moderate, and the election was fre
of any charges of fraud. The UDP, a
moderate-to-conservative party, favors
private enterprise to diversify Belize's
sugar-based economy. The major oppos
tion party is the moderate-to-leftist
People's United Party.

Department of State BulUj

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

□

Type of
election(s)

Date of most
recent electlon(s)

Date of

next electJon(s)

E livia

tongress,
resident

July
1985

Julyfl
1989^

lunicipal

July
1985

Dec.
1987

Ilivia returned to democratically
t cted government in October 1982
I lowing 18 years of military regimes.
I i;'.S4, faced with an increasingly

I'tic economic situation, inflation of

■ i\' than 20,000%, severe social unrest,
t ' specter of a military coup, and the
I apaeitation of his government, Presi-
c It Hernan Siles Zuazo called for
I :ional elections in July 1985, a year
E^ad of schedule. The first round of the
■ vT balloting gave no candidate an
; nlute majority. In accordance with
I'liilivian Constitution, the Congress

11 chose between the principal vote
\ iners and elected Victor Paz
1 tenssoro president.

Once installed, the Paz government
r ved swiftly and successfully, with the
6 iport of losing presidential candidate
1 go Banzer and his Nationalist
I mocratic Action Party, to impose
5 ingent economic reforms and deal
\ h disruptive social elements. In 1986,
i Paz administration requested U.S.
I itary assistance to mount a very
I ective drug interdiction campaign

;pite severe domestic political

ticism.

azil

resident

Jan.
1985

lindirecll

Jan.
1991*

(direct)

layoral

Nov
1985

Nov.
1989

:ongress,
iovernors

Nov.
1986

Nov.
1990

izil has held three major elections in
' last 2 years. Following two decades

' The new constitution may change the
■SHiential term; thus, it is possible that the
vt [iresidential elections will be held before
niary 1991.

Urch 1987

of military rule, a civilian was elected
president by an electoral college on
January 15, 1985. The President-elect,
Tancredo Neves, fell ill on the eve of his
inauguration and died without taking
office. Vice President-elect Jose Sarney
became president. President Sarney has
established himself as a major political
figure in his own right. The Sarney
administration is backed in Congress by
the Democratic Alliance, comprised of
two centrist parties: the PMDB (Party
of the Brazilian Democratic Movement)
and the PFL (Liberal Front Party).
Together, they have instituted signifi-
cant changes in the social and economic
spheres.

A second major election was held on
November 15, 1985, when Brazilians
voted for mayors of the capital cities of
the country's 23 states. The Democratic
Alliance won most of the races. A third
election on November 16, 1986, selected
governors, federal deputies, two-thirds
of the Senate, and state legislatures.
Again, the Democratic Alliance scored a
major victory, with the PMDB winning
22 of 23 gubernatorial races and major-
ities in the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate. The election was especially
significant because the Congress will
write a new constitution for Brazil.

Chile

Constitutional
plebiscite

Sept
1980

198^

The military took power in Chile in
September 1973, replacing an elected
government led by Marxist Salvador
Allende, whose alliance with both
Marxist-Leninist radicals and Moscow-
line communists was creating mounting
opposition and disorders in what had
previously been considered one of Latin
America's most democratic countries.
The military ruled by decree until 1981,
when a constitution ratified by a
September 1980 plebiscite took effect.
The constitution's provisions and the
conditions under which it was adopted
were criticized by opposition groups.
The constitution confirmed Gen.
Augusto Pinochet as president until
1989, at which time another plebiscite is

scheduled to vote on a single candidate
nominated by the junta of commanders
of the army, navy, air force, and police
to serve until 1997. If the junta's
nominee receives a majority of the votes
cast, he would assume his duties on
March 11, 1989. If the nominee is not
confirmed in the plebiscite, the constitu-
tion provides for open presidential and
congressional elections to be held 90
days before the completion of Pinochet's
current term extended by 1 year; that is,
the new election would be held 90 days
prior to March 11, 1990. On that date,
the newly elected president and Con-
gress would accede to power.

President Pinochet has publicly
opposed any changes to the 1980 con-
stitution, although opposition represent-
atives and some governtnent supporters
have advocated replacing the plebiscite
with free elections. A constitutional
amendment allowing free elections in
1989 is theoretically possible, if proposed
by President Pinochet and ratified by
plebiscite.

While the 1973 military takeover
enjoyed considerable popular backing,
opposition to continued military rule has
grown over the 13 years of the Pinochet
government. It responded to mounting
public opposition and demonstrations
with a tentative political opening in
1983, which ended with the imposition of
a state of siege. Another period of
liberalization followed the removal of the
state of siege in mid- 1985, but the
Pinochet government firmly rejected
dialogue with the democratic opposition,
which had by then come together in a
broad coalition of political parties known
as the National Accord. The Chilean far
left, meanwhile, has actively supported
terrorist violence in hopes of blocking
development of conditions that might
lead to a peaceful transition to full
democracy. The government, in turn,
has used this communist-sponsored ter-
rorism to justify broad crackdowns
against the opposition. An assassination
attempt against President Pinochet by
communist terrorists in September 1986
led to reimposition of a state of siege,
which was lifted in January 1987.

The Pinochet government has taken

some steps to establish the juridical

framework for the presidential plebiscite

expected in 1989: adopting an electoral

registration law in 1986 and announcing

that a law to legalize democratic political

parties would be promulgated early in

1987. But severe restrictions on political

activity and other human rights prob-

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

I j Type of

election(s)

Date ot most
recent election(s)

Date of
next election

lems persist. Efforts to improve the
political atmosphere and restore fund-
amental freedoms such as freedom of
assembly and speech are necessary for
meaningful progress on a transition to
full democracy. The United States has
strongly supported a return to elected,
democratic civilian government in Chile,
welcoming the National Accord and urg-
ing dialogue between the government
and the democratic opposition.

Colombia

Congress

Mar.
1986

1990 9

President

May
1986

May

H990

Colombia has been governed by
democratically elected governments for
most of this century. The only exception
was the dictatorship of Gen. Gustavo
Rojas Pinilia (1953-58). Since then, the
Liberal and Conservative Parties have
dominated the political system, generally
alternating the presidency between
them. Congressional and presidential
elections in 1982 and 1986 were con-
sidered free of fraud. The 1986 presiden-
tial election, which saw heavier than
usual voter turnout, produced a landslide
victor-y for Liberal Virgilio Barco Vargas
over Conservative Alvaro Gomez
Hurtado. President Barco continued
efforts to entice guerrillas to join the
political system.

Costa Rica

President,
Congress

Feb
1986

Feb.
1990

Costa Rica is one of Latin America's
oldest constitutional democracies. The
Constitution of 1949 eliminated the army
in order to end any institutionalized
military threat to elected civilian govern-
ment; created a fourth branch of
government— the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal— with remarkable independent
powers to assure scrupulously honest
elections; and prohibited presidential

reelection (or the election of anyone in
the president's cabinet or immediate
family). National elections, held every 4
years, select the president, two vice
presidents, the entire Legislative
Assembly, and local municipal councils.

In 1982 and 1986-and for many
years before— the elections were actively
contested, free of fraud, and featured
voter turnouts of approximately 85%.
Two major parties— both moderate-
dominated both elections: the Christian
democratic Social Christian Unity Party
and the social democratic National
Liberation Party. The latter captured
both the presidency and the legislature
in the last two elections. Other parties
active in the 1982 election included the
center-right National Movement, the
communist Pueblo Unido coalition, and
the fringe Independent and Democratic
Parties. The 1986 election, which gave
the presidency to Oscar Arias, also
included the communist Popular Alli-
ance, the communist Pueblo Unido coali-
tion, the personalist National Christian
Alliance, and the fringe Independent
Parties. An earlier split within the Costa
Rican Communist Party ( PVP) was suc-
cessfully arbitrated by the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal.

Cuba

Although Fidel Castro's ascension to
power in 1959 was based in part on his
promises to bring democratic freedoms,
Cuba is a communist one-party state,
and— with the fall of Trujillo in the
Dominican Republic and Duvalier in
Haiti— the most important exception to
Caribbean traditions of democracy and
representative government. The Cuban
constitution contains provisions for
popular and competitive elections;
freedom of the press, speech, and
i-eligion; and guaranties of civil liberties.
However, in accordance with the con-
stitution, these protections are not
available to "enemies of socialism," as
defined by the state. Thus, Castro rules
through classic authoritarian and
Marxist-Leninist repression. There are
no independent institutions or freedom
of press or speech. Neither an
independent judiciary nor a free trade
union exists, and there are restrictions
on religious practice.

Behind the ideological smokescree
Castro's government is that of an agii
traditional caudillo. within the moderi
control mechanism of the 20th centur\
party-state. There is no concept of a
legal organized opposition, and this is
summed up in Fidel Castro's aphorisn
"Within the revolution, everything;
against the revolution, nothing." Undi
these circumstances, those elections tl
have been held in Cuba since the revnl
tion have been recognized as
meaningless.

Dominica

Parliament

1990

Dominica is a parliamentary democrai
in the British tradition with an elected
House of Assembly and nominated
Senate. Unlike the other states of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS), where the chief of stat
(the British monarch) is represented \>
an appointed Governor General, the
head of state in the Commonwealth of
Dominica is the president. Dominica,
however, remains a member of the Co
monwealth and continues to recognize
Queen Elizabeth II as sovereign. Elec
tions are constitutionally due every 5
years and have been free and fair. In I
1985 national election, the Dominica
Freedom Party (DFP) of conservative
pro-Western Prime Minister Eugenia
Charles defeated the leftwing oppositi
Labor Party of Dominica and the affili
ated Marxist-led Dominica United Lah
Party.

Dominican Republic

President,
Congress

May
1986

May

1990

Despite an earlier history of alternatin
civil turmoil and authoritarian rule,
democracy and fair election procedure;
have become institutionalized in the
Dominican Republic. Suffrage in the
Dominican Republic is universal and
compulsory for those over age 18 and
married. Over 70% of the registered
voters participated in the 1986 nationa

Department of State Bul:i

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

□ Type of
election(s)

Date of most
recent electlon(s)

Date of

next election(s)

ctions. The country's three major
itical parties, the Reformist Party,
! Dominican Revolutionary Party, and
■ Dominican Liberation Party, are
iresented at all levels of the
rernment— federal, state, and local,
th the election of Joaquin Balaguer in
y 1986, the Dominican Republic has
V had six consecutive elections at
lear intervals. This follows a 5-year
iod of instability (1961-66) and the
g dictatorship of Rafael L. Trujillo
30-61). Two of those elections— in
1^8 and 1986— resulted in the transfer
fl30wer to the major opposition party.

Euador

iongress,
ifunJcipal

June
1986

Jan.
1988

resident

K/lay
1984

(2d round)

Jan.
1988

(1st round)

en years of military rule ended in
'9 when Ecuador returned to civilian
; with elections under a new constitu-
1. The constitution stipulates that no
sident may succeed himself. The
ugTiration of President Leon Febres
•dero on August 10, 1984, marked the
t transition in 24 years from one
:ted democratic government to
ither.

Democratic institutions have had to
vive several potentially destabilizing
■nts since 1979. In May 1981, Presi-
it Jaime Roldos died in a plane crash,
; Vice President Osvaldo Hurtado
umed power in an orderly transition
!n though he belonged to a different
■ty. In March 1986, a disgruntled air
ce general, Frank Vargas, staged two
"isings against the government of
esident Febres Cordero. In January
il, rebellious air force troops suppor-
e of Vargas briefly kidnaped the presi-
nt and obtained Vargas' release from
litary custody. This incident generated
jp rumors and led to opposition calls
• Febres Cordero's resignation. In
jponse, the Ecuadorean Armed Forces
blicly rejected the notion that they
ght use the crisis to reimpose military

rule, and Febres Cordero declared his
intention to complete his term and to
hold elections as scheduled in 1988.

Febres Cordero, a businessman, is a
member of the Social Christian Party
(PSC), which in the 1984 elections joined
several other parties in a coalition called
the National Reconstruction Front to
defeat the presidential candidacy of
Rodrigo Borja Cevallos of the
Democratic Left (ID). Borja is one of
several candidates expected to seek the
presidency in 1988. In the midterm elec-
tions of June 1986, the ID won 17 seats
in the unicameral Congress, giving it the
largest congressional representation of
any political party. The ID and other
opposition parties hold a total of 40 of
the 71 seats in Congress and have vigor-
ously debated government initiatives,
especially economic policy.

El Salvador

President

May
1984

1989

Congress,
Municipal

Mar
1985

Mar.
1988

In 1979, a reformist coup began what
has turned out to be a gradual transition
to democracy despite civil war and
foreign intervention. In 1982, popular
elections were held for a constituent
assembly. Political parties allied with the
guerrilla umbrella organization, the
Farabundo Martf National Liberation
Front (FMLN), rejected an offer of
automatic registration for the elections,
and called on voters to stay home. Very
heavy voting was widely interpreted as a
popular plea for peace. When none of the
six participating parties won a majority,
the assembly selected independent
lawyer Alvaro Magaiia Borja to head a
government of national unity.

A presidential election was held on
March 25, 1984. Eight candidates
representing a broad political spectrum
competed in the first round. Jose
Napoleon Duarte, a founder of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party and former
populist mayor of San Salvador, and
Roberto D'Aubuisson. a retired army
officer and leader of the ARENA
(National Republic Alliance) party,
received the most votes. In a runoff held
on May 6, 1984, Duarte won 54% of the
vote to become El Salvador's first freely

elected civilian president in more than
50 years; more than 80% of the elec-
torate went to the polls.

International observers attested to
the fairness of both rounds of the 1984
presidential elections. Legislative and
municipal elections, held as scheduled in
March 1985, were again judged by inter-
national observers to have been free and
fair. In a surprise result, the Christian
Democrats obtained an absolute majority
in the Legislative Assembly by winning
33 of 60 seats. The remainder of the
seats were split among ARENA (13
seats), the Party of National Conciliation
(12 seats), and several minor parties. El
Salvador is now preparing for the next
round of Legislative Assembly (1988)
and presidential (1989) elections. In addi-
tion to the established parties, new con-
servative and social democratic parties
are seeking legal inscription from the
Central Electoral Council and working
to build support for the next elections.

Grenada

Parliament

Dec,
1984

-1
By
1989

;., , , , J

The parliamentary elections of
December 3, 1984, were the first
national elections since 1976, the first
since the rise and disintegration of the
Marxist New JEWEL Movement, and
the first since the brief 1983 U.S.-
Caribbean military operation to restore
order. Not surprisingly, the elections
took place under the close scrutiny of
several observer organizations. The
observers concluded overwhelmingly
that the elections were free and fair. The
84% voter turnout produced a firm man-
date for the New National Party coali-
tion led by Herbert Blaize. Five other
parties participated in the elections,
including the Grenada United Labor
Party of former Prime Minister Sir Eric
Gairy and the Maurice Bishop Patriotic
Movement, formed by supporters of the
late Marxist prime minister, who had
ousted Gairy in the 1979 coup.

arch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Guatemala

Congress

Nov.
1985

Nov. ,
1990 i

President

Dec.
1985

(runoff)

Nov.
1990 1

Constituent Assembly elections on July
1, 1984, with the participation of an un-
precedented 72% of the eligible elec-
torate were characterized by interna-
tional observers to have been
remarkably free and open. The number
of voters exceeded by nearly 800,000 the
previous high recorded in 1982. Nine
political parties and one regional civic
committee, covering the legal political
spectrum in Guatemala, won seats. In
the 1985 National Assembly elections,
three parties or coalitions, representing
the right, center, and left, won 23, 21,
and 20 seats respectively. The left-of-
center Christian Democrats ran well in
the heavily populated Indian highlands.
The center-right Union of the National
Center won the majority of seats in the
capital area and made a strong showing
on the south coast. The conservative
parties (particularly the National Libera-
tion Movement) fared less well than
expected but retained their traditional
strongholds in the eastern portion of the
country. At the other end of the political
spectrum, the Social Democratic Party
competed openly after years of exile and
won one congressional seat. President
Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian
Democratic Party was inaugurated on
January 14, 1986. Guatemala still faces
formidable social, cultural, human rights,
and economic problems, but the progress
made since 1984 is encouraging.

Guyana

President,
National Assembly

While Guyana maintains the structure of
a multiparty parliamentary republic
within the Commonwealth, its 1980 con-
stitution defines the country as a
"democratic sovereign state in the

Type of
election(s)

Date of most
recent electlon(s)

Date of
next election

course of transition from capitalism to
socialism." The constitution states that
presidential, National Assembly, and
regional elections are to be held every 5
years. Since 1964, the People's National
Congress (PNC) has dominated political
life in Guyana. Opposition parties and
some civic organizations have charged
electoral fraud. Since 1980, there have
been two elections, the first on Decem-
ber 15, 1980, and the most recent on
December 9, 1985. In the last election
Desmond Hoyte was elected president.
Opposition parties have either pulled out
of these elections (1980) or refused to
acknowledge the results as valid (1985).
Municipal elections were scheduled for
December 1986 for the first time since
1970; however, the opposition parties
decided to boycott the elections even
before nominations were closed. They
alleged that the elections would not be
fair since the PNC dominated the elec-
toral machinery. The unopposed PNC
candidates were declared elected by the
elections commission, but no voting took
place.

Haiti

Constituent
Assembly

Oct
1986

Not
appli-
cable

Constitutional
Referendum

Not
appli-
cable

Pwar.
1987

President,
Congress

Not
appli-
cable

Nov.
1987^

Dec. ^TSi^H
1985 than Mar.

On February 7, 1986, President-for-Life
Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti, ending
almost 30 years of autocratic govern-
ment under the Duvalier family. He left
behind an impoverished people with the
lowest per capita GDP in the Western
Hemisphere, a bankrupt government, a
faltering economy, and an almost com-
plete lack of institutions capable of par-
ticipating effectively in a democracy.
The "elections" held during the Duvalier
era were designed to perpetuate the
status quo and placate aid donors insist-
ent on tangible evidence of democratic
reform.

The National Governing Council
(CNG), the transitional government led

by General Henri Namphy. replaced
Duvalier, eliminated the repressive syn
bols and practices of his regime, and se
in motion a process of political institu-
tion-building. In June 1986, the council
issued a comprehensive political calen-
dar. Fulfilling one of the initial steps in
the calendar, the CNG held Constituent
Assembly elections on October 19. The
assembly will draft a new constitution
which then is to be approved in a
national referendum in March 1987.
Elections are to be held in November
1987 for a president and for members c
the national legislature. Dates of future
elections will be determined with the
adoption of a new constitution.

Honduras

President,
Congress

Nov.
1985

The April 1980 Constituent Assembly
elections began a process that ended
nearly 18 years of military rule. On
November 29, 1981, Roberto Suazo
Co'rdova of the Liberal Party won 54%
of the presidential votes and 44 of 82
congressional seats. The major opposi-
tion party, the National Party, won 34
seats. Suazo's inauguration in January
1982 restored democratic civilian
government to Honduras. In 1985, JosJ
Azcona Hoyo of the Liberal Party won
election as president with about 51% oi
voters casting ballots for his party. The
Liberal Party won 67 of 134 congres-
sional seats and the National Party woi
64. Azcona's election led to the first
transfer of power between two
democratically elected presidents in
Honduran history.

The National Party, the oldest
political party in Honduras, has tradi-
tionally maintained a moderate-to-
conservative ideology and close ties to
the Honduran military. The Liberal
Party, which developed from the
National Party in the early years of thit
century, has maintained a slightly more
reformist ideology. Two smaller parties
the Innovation and Unity Party and the
Christian Democratic Party, have taken
positions somewhat to the left of the tw
major parties, but neither has obtained
substantial electoral support. The
National Congress recently passed elec-

Department of State Bullel

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

□ Type of
election(s)

Date of most
recent election(s)

Date of

next electlon(s)

I'eforms that include the introduc-
nf American-style party primaries
■i inventions to select presidential

iiiates.

Jinaica

Jinaica, a member of the Common-
wealth, has been a functioning
dnocracy since independence in 1962.
tder the country's parliamentary
stem, elections are held for members
Q ,he House of Representatives in each
he country's 60 constituencies. The
stitution requires the prime minister
all a general election not later than 5
r- after the first sitting of the
\ iiius parliament. The 1980 election
^ , the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP)
d eat the then-ruling People's National
I -ty (PNP) led by Michael Manley. In
1 >3, Prime Minister Edward Seaga
c ed a "snap" election. The PNP
k 'cotted the election because it con-
t ded that new elections should not be
h d until the voter rolls were updated.
} lowing a revision of the rolls and the
a ustment of electoral districts to
r lect population shifts, the PNP par-
t pated in island-wide municipal elec-
t is on July 29, 1986. Opposition vic-
t ies in 12 of the 13 parishes have led to
I P domination of local government,
V ile the JLP controls the national
I /ernment. The next parliamentary
e ction must be called by December
1 ^8 and held within 3 months of being
(led.

kxico

resident

July
1982

Piluly
1988

hamber of
eputies

July
1985

July
1988

ilike many countries in the region,
' ilians have governed Mexico
'oughout most of the 20th century.
r almost 60 years, this leadership has
en drawn exclusively from the

Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
PRI candidate Miguel de la Madrid was
elected president in 1982. But in recent
years, opposition political parties have
grown in membership and have run suc-
cessfully in some municipal and
legislative elections. Under electoral
reforms begun in the late 1970s and
modified in 1986, opposition parties have
begun to play an increasingly important
role in the Chamber of Deputies, the
lower house in Mexico's bicameral
national legislature. Beginning with the
new Chamber that will be elected in
1988, at least 200 of that body's 500
seats will be allocated to the opposition
on the basis of a modified form of pro-
portional representation. In addition, the
opposition will still be able to compete
for the Chamber's remaining 300 seats,
which are elected on the basis of single-
member districts. In the July 1985 con-
gressional elections, the opposition won
8 of the 300 single-member districts then
being contested. One-hundred seats
allotted to the opposition in 1985 were
divided among eight opposition parties
on the basis of proportional representa-
tion. The opposition, of which the
National Action Party (PAN) is the
largest component, often accuses the
PRI and electoral officials of fraudulent
practices. On some occasions, election
reviews have indicated irregularities at
the local level and initial PRI victories
have been overturned. In general,
however, election campaigns and
balloting are conducted in an open
manner.

Nicaragua

President,
Congress

Nov
1984

1990

In July 1979, a broadly based coalition,
whose military component was the San-
(iinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN), overthrew the 44-year-old
Somoza dynasty. The promised democ-
racy never materialized. In April 1980,
moderate members of the original
revolutionary junta resigned, and, by the
end of 1981, the FSLN held all key
positions.

After rejecting elections as useless
bourgeois trappings, the Sandinistas
announced presidential and congres-
sional balloting for Noveml)er 1984, the
week before the U.S. elections. The key
opposition force was the Coordinadorn.
made up of political parties, labor
unions, and private sector organizations,
which nominated former junta member
Arturo Cruz as its presidential can-
didate. The Coordinadora ultimately did
not register its candidates because it
believed the FSLN failed to provide the
conditions necessary for free and fair
elections. Coordinadorn's rallies were
broken up by government-sponsored
mobs. Although the electoral law
required that all parties be given equal
time on television, opposition parties
were denied access to the media. The
FSLN received 67% of the vote, and
Daniel Ortega was elected president.
Soine 75% of those eligible voted. Power
was not at stake in the way the FSLN
conducted the elections, but the fact of
holding elections at all did give the
FSLN some credit abroad.

Since 1984, political parties opposed
to the FSLN have attempted to maintain
some semblance of political life inside
Nicaragua while exile groups, most of
them linked to the armed resistance,
have formed the United Nicaraguan
Opposition (UNO), the Southern Opposi-
tion Bloc (BOS), and the Miskito-Sumo-
Rama Indian Unity (MISURASATA).

A new constitution was promulgated
January 9, 1987, but was followed the
same day by the declaration of a state of
emergency. The government had said
that municipal elections would be held in
1987 but did not set a specific date.
Since then, the government has
equivocated on that promise.

Panama

President,
Congress

May
1984

In 1968, the late Gen. Omar Torrijos and
several other military leaders seized
power, instituting prolonged rule by the
National Guard (subsequently known as
the Panamanian Defense Forces). The

:irch 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

[ I Type of

election{s)

Date of most
recent electlon(s)

Date of
next electior

Panamanian Constitution, in effect since
1972, provides for basic civil liberties;
freedom of the press, speech, and
assembly; and regular, competitive elec-
tions. While Panama is generally viewed
as an open society and constitutional
norms are followed for the most part,
the Defense Forces' involvement in
governmental affairs is pervasive.

The 1984 elections, the first direct
presidential and legislative elections held
in Panama since Torrijos came to power,
remain a source of friction between the
government and opposition party
leaders. Although more than three-
quarters of Panama's electorate par-
ticipated in the elections, the vote was
widely perceived as flawed, due to the
prolonged vote tabulation process which
was marked by irregularities. The
resignation in September 1985 of Presi-
dent Nicolas Ardito Barletta, who had
been declared the winner of the 1984
contest, under pressure from the
Panamanian Defense Forces was viewed
as a further setback to democracy.
Barletta was succeeded by Eric Arturo
Delvalle, who had been elected vice
president in 1984.

The Democratic Revolutionary Party
is the largest member of the National
Democratic Union Coalition, the political
organization affiliated with the Panama-
nian Defense Forces. The Panamehista
Party of Arnulfo Arias is the opposition
party with the greatest mass support,
but historically it has been a major
political force only when Arias has been
an active candidate. The Panamanian
Christian Democratic Party is well-
connected internationally, maintaining
close contact with the Christian
Democratic International. This opposi-
tion party is respected for its ideological
integrity but lacks a significant grass-
roots following.

Paraguay

President,
Congress

Feb.
1983

There has been little change in
Paraguay's political system since Gen.
Alfredo Stroessner emerged as the
political strongman in 1954 following
several years of instability. The legal
opposition parties are guaranteed one-
third of the seats in Congress but are

effectively powerless. A state of siege is
continuously renewed and human rights
problems persist. Though Paraguay has
few political prisoners, the free exercise
of individual liberties is curtailed, and
opposition media voices remain banned
or under heavy government pressure. In
February 1983, President Stroessner
was reelected to a seventh term that
ends in 1988. The elections resulted in
the ruling Colorado Party officially
receiving more than 90% of the votes
cast. Opposition party officials claim,
however, that the elections were
characterized by impediments to voter
registration, fraud, ballot-box stuffing,
and tabulation irregularities. The United
States strongly supports the evolution of
a more open political system in
Paraguay, in which freedom of the press
and expression are protected and all
democratic parties can participate.

Peru

Congress,
President

Apr
1985

Apr.
1990

Municipal

Nov
1986

Nov.

Peru returned to democratic rule in
1980. ending 12 years of military dicta-
torship. The new constitution, pro-
mulgated in 1979, provides for the
separation of powers among an
executive (president), a bicameral
legislature, and a judiciary; one 5-year
term for the president; a second-round
balloting system in presidential elec-
tions; and enfranchisement of illiterates.
In the 1980 elections, Fernando
Belaunde Terry, whom the military had
ousted in 1968 when it came to power,
was elected president. In April 1985,
Peru again had free and fair elections
for a president, two vice presidents, and
240 members of the two houses of Con-
gress. In July 1985, the Popular Action
Party of President Belaunde turned
power over to the rival American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party

(APRA) of President Alan GarcTa mar
ing the first transfer of power betweei
democratically elected civilian presidei
in 40 years. APRA also gained a
majority in the Congress. Nationwide
municipal elections in 1980, 1983, and
1986 have reinforced the democratic
trend and have recently brought local
self-government to many rural com-
munities for the first time

APRA, founded by Victor Raul Ha
de la Torre in 1924, was Peru's first
mass political party. Inspired by the
Mexican Revolution, APRA has been
both anti-imperialist and anti-Marxist.
Over the years, it has evolved into a
social democratic party; it champions
integration of all of the disparate
elements of the Peruvian population in
the country's society. The center-right
Popular Christian Party favors a great
role for private enterprise in the
economic development of Peru. The
United Left (lU) is a coalition of leftist
parties, including two communist
organizations and entities further to tl
left of the communists. In the 1983
municipal elections, the lU won the
mayoralty of Lima, Peru's capital and
largest city; the APRA candidate won
this position in the 1986 local elections
Ex-President Belaunde's Popular Actii
Party fared badly in the 1985 national
election and became a minority party.

St. Christopher and Nevis

Parliament

H^ay
1984

198£l

St. Christopher (commonly called St.
Kitts) and Nevis, which became an
independent member of the Com-
monwealth in 1983, has a parliamenlai
system of government with an elected
House and an appointed Senate. Prinu
Minister Kennedy A. Simmonds, leade
of the People's Action Movement, rule:
in coalition with the Nevis Reformatio!
Party, led by Simeon Daniel. This coali
tion government returned to power in
peaceful, democratic election in 1984.
The leader of the opposing St.
Christopher-Nevis Labor Party, Lee
Moore, lost his seat in the 1984 elec-
tions, thus limiting his ability to
challenge the present government.

Department of State BuilO'

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

r— 1 Type of

electlon(s)

Date of most
recent election(s)

Date of

next election(s)

ti.ucJa

tjjucia— an independent nation within
i^]ommonwealth since 1979— is a
"'anientary democracy in the British
turn with an elected House of
nilily and nominated Senate. Elec-
are constitutionally due every
ns and have been free, fair, and
l\ contested. The centrist St. Lucia
'v Party (SLP) won the first
ndependence election in 1979 but
lirought down by internal squab-
and economic decline. The govern-
. 'iiited Workers Party, a conserv-
party led by Prime Minister John
ptiin, won the 1982 elections. The
ii'ssive Labor Party, a leftist
u r group of the SLP, is the only
tl ■ major opposition group but is seen
s ilikely to attract any significant
k oral support.

Ij'incent and the Grenadines

Hiament

July
1984

By 1

1989

'incent and the Grenadines is a
sh-style parliamentary democracy
an elected House of Assembly
;r house) and an appointed Senate
er house). The country has been an
oendent member of the Com-
wealth since independence in 1979.
tinns are due every 5 years and have
iVee, fair, and keenly contested.
parties contested the 1984 elec-
The two major parties are Prime
^ter James Mitchell's New
I icratic Party and the opposition St.
ent Labor Party of newly elected

leader Vincent Beache. Both parties are
centrist. The three nominally radical
parties that contested the 1984 elections
were resoundingly defeated.

Suriname

Until a violent military coup in February
1980, Suriname was a functioning
democracy with a history largely free of
violence. The last national elections— and
the only ones held since independence in
1975— were the parliamentary elections
of 1977. The new military government,
headed by Lt. Col. Desire Bouterse,
suspended the constitution and placed
effective power in the hands of a five-
member military authority, subsequently
reduced to its current two members. In
August 1985, Bouterse, the chairman of
the military authority, was made head of
government. In January 1985, a
31-member National Assembly was
appointed; 14 members were nominated
by the military, and 17 were nominated
by the labor unions and a business
association. The assembly was tasked
with drafting a new constitution. The
military authority announced in
December 1986 that the constitution
would be ready by March 1987. The con-
stitution is expected to be submitted to a
popular referendum by September 1987.
General elections are scheduled to be
held no later than March 1988. In July
1986, a new cabinet composed of
representatives of military, labor, and
business groups, as well as of the three
traditional political parties, was
appointed to implement a program of
political and economic reforms. The
nature of this program has not been
further defined.

Trinidad and Tobago

Parliament

Dec
1986

By
1992

replacing the hereditary monarch,
represented by an appointed Governor
General, with a president as head of
state. The government is a Westminster-
style parliamentary democracy in which
the executive and legislative branches
are interdependent; the judiciary is
independent. The nation's bicameral
Parliament has a maximum term of 5
years. There have been six parliamen-
tary elections since independence. The
first five elections were won decisively
by the Peoples' National Movement
(PNM), formerly headed by late Prime
Minister Sir Eric Williams. In the
December 1986 general elections,
however, the center-to-left National
Alliance for Reconstruction, under the
leadership of A. N. R. Robinson,
resoundingly defeated the ruling PNM.

Uruguay

Trinidad and Tobago achieved
independence in 1962, initially retaining
the British monarch as head of state.
The country became a republic in 1976,

President,
Congress

Nov,
1984

Uruguay has one of the longest
democratic traditions in Latin America,
and voting is taken very seriously. The
advent of military rule in 1973, in the
wake of long-term economic decline and
a serious problem of insurgency and ter-
rorism, is seen by almost all Uruguayans
as an anomaly in the country's political
history. The return to democratic rule,
marked by the inauguration of President
Julio Maria Sanguinetti for a 5-year
term in March 1985, following elections
in November 1984, was supported by the
vast majority of Uruguayans. Voter
turnout was estimated at more than 90%
of the electorate. The victorious Col-
orados won 41% of the vote, followed by
35% for the Blancos and 22% for the
Broad Front. These parties now hold
roughly those same proportionate shares

:h 1987

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Type of
electlon(s)

Date of most
recent election(s)

Date of
next electk

in the bicameral legislature. In addition
to the Colorado and Blanco parties, a
third political factor is the leftist Broad
Front coalition, including Christian
Democrats, Social Democrats, socialists,
and communists.

Venezuela

Congress,
President

Dec
1983

Dec.
1988

Venezuela has had a democratic govern-
ment since the dictatorship of Gen. Mar-
cos Perez Jimenez was overthrown in
1958. Presidential elections are held
every 5 years and are preceeded by
years of campaigning. In the last four
elections, the opposition party has won
and been duly seated. In the 1983 elec-
tions. Social Democratic candidate Dr.
Jaime Lusinchi was elected president.
The central government has considerable
power since state governors are
appointed, not elected. There are
municipal elections for aldermen every 5
years, shortly after the national elec-
tions. Although there are a variety of
small parties, including the Communist
Party, which cover the entire political
spectrum, power has alternated between
the two major parties, the Social
Democrats (Accion Democratica) and the
Christian Democrats (COPE I).
Venezuelans are enthusiastic supporters
of democratic elections and encourage
electoral activity in other Latin
American and Caribbean nations with
less experience.

Dependent Territories

AnguJIla

House of Assembly

Mar.
1984

By
1989

The British monarch is represented by
an appointed Governor, who presides
over an elected Executive Council and a
House of Assembly. Chief Minister
Emile Gumbs led his Anguilla National
Alliance to victory in March 1984 over
the opposition Anguilla People's Party.

Aruba

Parliament

Nov.
1985

By Nov.
1989

On January 1, 1986, Aruba became an
autonomous state within the Kingdom of
the Netherlands. Prior to this date,
Aruba formed part of the Netherlands
Antilles. The Aruban Government is a
parliamentary democracy. General elec-
tions for the 21-member Parliament are
held every 4 years. A free election was
held on November 22, 1985, to choose
the Island Council, which became the
National Legislature when Aruba
achieved separate status.

British Virgin Islands

Legislative Council

Sept
1986

1991

The British Virgin Islands is a British
dependent territory governed by an
appointed Governor and an elected local
government. Former Chief Minister
Cyril Romney's government fell to a

vote of "no confidence" in August \[
Elections in September 1986 brought
Chief Minister Lavitty Stout's Virgir
Islands Party to power.

Cayman Islands

Legislative
Assembly

Nov.
1984

The Cayman Islands is a British depc
ent territory with a parliamentary fi i
of government. The Legislative
Assembly consists of 12 elected
members and three official members
There are no political parties in Cayr
though loosely structured "teams" o:
like-minded politicians have banded
together to contest elections. The las
election took place in 1984. Electione
must take place at least every 4 year

Montserrat

Legislative Council

Feb.
1983

Montserrat is a British crown colony
Elections are held every 5 years. In
March 1983, Chief Minister John
Osborne was reelected, but his Peoph
Liberation Movement lost two of its
seven seats in Parliament to the oppi
tion People's Democratic Party.

Department of State Bull

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

I j Type of

election(s)

Date of most
recent election(s)

Date of

next election(s)

Mherlands Antilles

siten

Nov.
1985

By Nov.
1989

Netherlands Antilles is an
inomous part of the Kingdom of the
lerlands. The government is a
iamentary democracy. There are two
Is of government: the central
■rnment and the local governments
le island territories of Curacao,
aire, St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and
I. General elections for the
lember Staten, or parliament, and
he Island Councils are held every 4
s.

i [s and Caicos Islands

gislative Council

May
1984

To be
deter- i
mined

Turks and Caicos Islands is a British
vn Colony. The government consists
Governor appointed by the Queen
an 11 -member elected Legislative
icil. The People's National Party
P), headed by Norman Saunders,
eight seats in the May 1984 elec-
Saunders was appointed Chief
ster but had to resign when he was
sted and subsequently convicted of
otics trafficking offenses in the
ed States. Nathaniel Francis
ii-cd Saunders as Chief Minister but
;ned in 1986 when a Commission of
ii y established by the Governor
il Francis and two of his ministers
Id hold public office. The commis-
also found the leader of the opposi-
liarty to have been involved in a
piracy to commit public order offen-
II (iverthrow the Francis govern-
t As a result of these internal dif-
ties, the constitution was amended
II ( )rder of Council that replaces the
I'utive Council, drawn from elected
iliers of the Legislative Council, with
iilvisory Council, nominated by the
I'nior. The constitution is currently

French Overseas Departments

French Guiana

National

Mar.
1986

1991

French Guiana normally holds elections
every 5 years. It elects one Senator and
one Deputy to the French Senate and
National Assembly.

Guadeloupe

National

Mar.
1986

In Guadeloupe, elections are open,
democratic, and actively contested by
parties on both the left and the right.
Voter turnout is traditionally low; often
fewer than 40% of registered voters cast
ballots. As a French overseas depart-
ment, Guadeloupe's political parties are
essentially local versions of those com-
peting in metropolitan France. Com-
munists and socialists compete
independently of each other on the left,
while disagreements have led to the
formation of separate Union pour la
Democracie Frangaise mid Rassemble-

ment pour la Republique slates on the
right. Guadeloupe's northern dependen-
cies, St. Martin and St. Barthelemy,
operate as separate political entities but
retain representation in the regional and
general councils located in Guadeloupe.

Martinique

National

Mar.
1986

r^i

An overseas department of France, Mar-
tinique enjoys an open political system.
In recent years, elections in Martinique
have been highly competitive and often
very close, with strong, well-known local
candidates heading up tickets offered by
both the right and the left.

'|:h 1987

TREATIES

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23,
1961. TIAS 4780.

Accessions deposited: Greece, Jan. 8, 1987;
Dem. Rep. of Korea, Jan. 21, 1987.

Fisheries

Protocol to amend the international conven-
tion of May 14, 1966 (TIAS 6767), for the con-
servation of Atlantic tunas. Done at Paris
July 10, 1984.'
Acceptance deposited: Spain, Nov. 21, 1986.

Law

Statute of The Hague conference on private
international law. Done at The Hague
Oct. 9-31, 1951. Entered into force July 15,
1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710.
Acceptance deposited: Hungary, Jan. 6, 1987.

Maritime Matters

International convention on maritime search
and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Ham-
burg Apr. 27, 1979. Entered into force
June 22, 1985.
Accession deposited: Finland, Nov. 6, 1986.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological

Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11,

1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS

2052.

Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates,

Dec. 17, 1986.

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection

Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: Liechtenstein.
Nov. 25, 1986.

Organization of American States

Protocol of amendment to the Charter of the
Organization of American States. Signed at
Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Dec. 5, 1985.'
Ratifications deposited: Barbados, Dec. 2,
1986; Dominican Rep., Dec. 3, 1986; St.
Christopher and Nevis, Dec. 4, 1986.

Patent Cooperation

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations.
Done at Washington June 19, 1970; entered
into force for the U.S. Jan. 24, 1978, with the
exception of Chapter II. TIAS 8733.
Accession deposited: Benin, Nov. 26,
1986.

Property — Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for the
purposes of the registration of marks of June
15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva May 13,
1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979; for the
U.S. Feb. 29, 1984.
Notification of accession deposited:
Liechtenstein, Nov. 14, 1986.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices and final

protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979.

Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982; definitively

for the U.S. Oct. 27, 1973.

Approval deposited: Thailand, Sept. 16,

1986.

Trade— Textiles

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1973 (TIAS
7840, 10323). Done at Geneva July 31, 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986; for the U.S.
Aug. 5, 1986,

Acceptances deposited: Canada, Nov. 11, 1986;
Nov. 11, 1986; Colombia, Nov. 18, 1986;
European Econ. Community, Dec. 2, 1986;
Hungary, Nov. 26, 1986; India, Dec. 5, 1986;=
Peru, Dec. 1, 1986; Singapore, Nov. 14, 1986.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement concerning the equatorial
mesoscale meteorological experiment pro-
gram, with related letter. Effected by
exchange of notes at Canberra Jan. 5, 1987.
Entered into force Jan. 5, 1987.

Agreement concerning the stratosphere-
troposphere meteorological exchange project.
Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra
Jan. 5. 1987. Entered into force Jan. 5, 1987.

Austria

Agreement relating to international express
mail with memorandum of understanding.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington and Vienna Aug. 6 and Sept. 4,
1986. Entered into force Feb. 2, 1987.

Bulgaria

Agreement relating to trade in wool textil
products, with annexes. Effected by exchj
of notes at Sofia June 20 and Nov. 27, 19J
Entered into force Nov. 27, 1986.

Canada

Agreement concerning trade in certain so
wood lumber products, with memoranduir
understanding, agreed minute, and relate(
letters. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Dec. 30, 1986. Entered into f
Dec. 30, 1986.

Czechoslovakia

Agreement extending the air transport ag
ment of Feb. 28, 1969, as amended and
extended (TIAS 6644, 7456, 7881, 8868,
10861). Effected by exchange of notes at
Prague Dec. 11 and 18, 1986. Entered int
force Dec. 18, 1986; effective Jan. 1, 1987

Dominican Republic

Special access agreement relating to trad
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
textile products, with annexes and admin
istrative visa arrangements. Effected by
exchange of notes at Santo Domingo Dec
1986. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1986; e:
tive Dec. 1, 1986.

Agreement amending agreement of
Dec. 30, 1983, relating to trade in cotton,
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and tex
products. Effected by exchange of notes :
Santo Domingo Dec. 18, 1986. Entered ir
force Dec. 18, 1986.

Ecuador

Agreement for the recovery and return o

stolen archaeological, historical, and culti

properties. Signed at Washington Nov. 1

1983.

Entered into force: Jan. 14, 1987.

Egypt

Project grant agreement for construction
thermal cycle addition to Talkha gas turbl
plant. SigTied at Cairo Aug. 28, 1986. En
into force Aug. 28, 1986.

Project grant agreement to support refer
in the agricultural sector and to strength'
market-based incentives. Signed at Cairo
Sept. 30, 1986. Entered into force Sept. I
1986.

Second amendment to grant agreement c
Sept. 26, 1984, for Cairo Sewerage II. Si)
at Cairo Sept. 29, 1986. Entered into fon
Sept. 29, 1986.

Department of State Bu 1

TREATIES

ipean Atomic Energy Community

;atom)

tiiient for cooperation in the field of
■oiled thermonuclear fusion. Signed at
sels Dec. 15, 1986. Entered into force
i:., 1986.

oment relating to trade in certain tex-
uid textile products, with annexes.
till by exchange of notes at Port-au-
V Sept. 26 and 30, 1986. Entered into
Sept. 30, 1986; effective Jan. 1, 1987,

national express mail agreement, with
J (I regulations. Signed at New Delhi and
uiK^on Nov. 20 and Dec. 11, 1986.
:. red into force Jan. 17, 1987.

ot national Telecommunications Satellite
frinization (INTELSAT)

it orandum of agreement with respect to
i( 'an American Satellite Corporation con-
; tioii, with related letter. Signed at

iiii^rton Nov. 10, 1986. Entered into
.1 Nov. 10, 1986.

svl

le ement for cash transfer to support the
'inic and political stability of Israel.
■A at Jerusalem Nov. 17, 1986. Entered

.t 'oroe Nov. 17, 1986.

a lica

'e ement for the exchange of information

[■'■spect to taxes. Signed at Washington
IS, 1986. Entered into force Dec. 18,

i .

Korea

Agreement amending agreement of Nov. 21
and Dec. 4, 1986, relating to trade in certain
textiles and textile products. Effected by
exchange of letters at Washington Dec. 18
and 23, 1986. Entered into force Dec. 23, 1986.

Agreement extending the memorandum of
understanding of Nov. 6, 1981, concerning
development of coal technology. Effected by
exchange of letters at Washington and
Gwacheon Oct. 7 and Nov. 5, 1986. Entered
into force Nov. 5, 1986.

Agreement extending the memorandum of

understanding of Nov. 6, 1981, concerning
cooperation in the area of energy conserva-
tion. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington and Gwacheon Oct. 7 and Nov. 5,
1986. Entered into force Nov. 5, 1986.

Agreement extending the memorandum of
understanding of Nov. 6, 1981, concerning
cooperation in development and use of solar
energy. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington and Gwacheon Oct. 7 and Nov. 5,
1986. Entered into force Nov. 5, 1986.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by
exchange of letters at Mexico Nov. 3, and
Dec. 18, 1986. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1986.

Agreement amending the agreement of
Mar. 29, 1983 (TIAS 10675), relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by
exchange of letters at Mexico Sept. 27 and
30, 1986. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1986.

Thailand

Agreement relating to a war reserve stockpile
program in Thailand, with annex. Signed at
Bangkok Jan. 9, 1987. Enters into force upon
each party's confirmation to the other that it
has completed all steps necessary to bring
agreement into force.

Yugoslavia

Agreement relating to trade in certain tex-
tiles and textile products, with annexes.
Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade
Dec. 5, 1986. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1986;
effective Jan. 1, 1987.

'Not in force.
^With statement.

If ement in the area of radioactive waste
(It igement. Signed at Washington Dec. 3,
9 . Entered into force Dec. 3, 1986.

\f ement concerning trade in certain

ns line tools, with arrangement, agreed
ni tes, exchange of letters, and related let-
ei Effected by exchange of letters at
V lington Dec. 16, 1986. Entered into force
)« 16, 1986.

l( 'ement extending the joint determination
if .'t. 30, 1981 (TIAS 10294), as extended,
0! eprocessing of special nuclear material of
origin. Effected by exchange of notes at
(1 Dec. 18, 1986. Entered into force
Je 18, 1986.

ii 'ement concerning mapping, charting and
•sy cooperation, with annexes. Signed at
111 Dec. 1, 1986. Entered into force
1 1986.

Mongolia

Memorandum of understanding concerning
facilitation of the work of diplomatic mis-
sions. Signed at Washington Jan. 27, 1987.
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1987.

Philippines

Agreement extending agreement of Nov. 24,
1982 (TIAS 10612), as amended, relating to
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade textiles
and textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Manila Dec. 5, and 16, 1986. Entered
into force Dec. 16, 1986.

Senegal

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, with memorandum of understanding
and related letter. Signed at Dakar Dec. 17,
1985. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1985.

Agreement amending the agreement of
Dec. 17, 1985, for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Dakar July 3, 1986.
Entered into force July 3, 1986.

Vjch 1987

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

No.

Date

♦1

1/5

♦3

1/7

1/13

1/14

*12

1/15

*;)

1/16

1(1

1/20

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Registration for NP-5
immigrant visas.

Shultz: news briefing on FY
1988 foreign affairs budget.

Regional foreign policy con-
ference, Orlando, Jan. 23.

Shiiltz: interview on "The
Today Show," Maasai Mara
Game Reserve, Kenya,
Jan. 12.

Shultz: arrival remarks,
Nairobi, Jan. 10.

Shultz: arrival statement, Abid-
jan. Jan. 12.

Shultz: address, Senegalese
Business Council, Dakar,
Jan. 8.

Shultz, Akinyemi: remarks at
Ministry of External Affairs,
Lagos. Jan. 12.

Shultz: luncheon remarks,
Monrovia, Jan. 14.

Shultz: interview on NBC-TV's
"Meet the Press," Jan 18.

Shultz: remarks, Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Non-
violent Social Change,
Atlanta, Jan. 19.

Shultz: remarks at Slave House
Museum, Goree Island,
Senegal, Jan. 8.

Shultz: interview by members
of State Department press
corps. Jan. 16.

Shultz: remarks and question-
and-answer session. Citizens
Network for Foreign Affairs,
Jan. 27.

Shultz: remarks at U.S.-
Mongolian diplomatic nor-
malization ceremony,
Jan. 27.

Shultz: remarks, opening of
U.S. -Mexico Binational Com-
mission meeting.

Shultz, Sepulveda: remarks on
signing Annex IV to 1983
border environmental
cooperation agreement,
Jan. 29.

Shultz: interview on
"Worldnet," Jan. 29.

Shultz: remarks at AID's
African drought award
ceremony. Jan. 28.

Shultz: news conference.
Nairobi. Jan. 10.

Shultz: news conference.
Lagos. Jan. 12.

*Not printed in the Bulletin.

CSCE Semiannual Report

1/20

"13 1/20

*14 1/28

1/28

16 1/29

17 1/30

*18

1/30

*19

1/30

•20

1/30

•21

1/30

On behalf of the President, the
Secretary of State on December 3, 1986,
transmitted the 21st semiannual report
on the Implementation of the Helsinki
Final Act to Senator Alfonse D'Amato,
chairman of the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe.

These reports are submitted to assist
the commission in its function of
monitoring the implementation of the
Helsinki accords. The present report
covers the period April 1, 1986-
October 1, 1986. It provides a factual
survey of developments in the areas
covered by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act
and the 1983 Madrid Concluding
Document— human rights and human-
itarian concerns; security; economic,
scientific, and technological cooperation;
and educational and cultural exchanges.

The report concentrates on Soviet
and East European compliance with
commitments undertaken in Helsinki
and Madrid. Although the record of com-
pliance varied among the Eastern states
during the 6-month period covered by
the report, overall performance
remained seriously flawed in the area of
human rights and human contacts. The
report documents the persecution which
many citizens of the Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Pact countries continue to
suffer for focusing attention on and
attempting to alleviate violations of basic

human rights. And it details the outo
of Conference on Security and Coope
tion in Europe (CSCE) meetings held
during this period— the Bern human i
tacts experts meeting and the Stockh
Conference on Confidence- and Secui
Building Measures and Disarmament
Europe (CDE).

The central theme of the report-
failure of the Soviet Union and its all
to abide by CSCE commitments— is a
central to the approach of the United
States and its NATO allies to the CSf
foUowup meeting now being held in
Vienna, Austria. Since the opening O)
this meeting on November 4, the U.S
delegation, headed by Ambassador 'W'
ren Zimmermann, and other allied
delegations have highlighted Soviet s
East European compliance failures.

This report is an important elemt
in the U.S. Government's continuing
effort to assess the progress and shoi
comings in pursuing the CSCE goals
strengthening security, expanding
cooperation, building mutual confider
and protecting human rights. Free
single copies of this 40-page report a
available from the Correspondence
Management Division, Bureau of Put
Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520. Please reqi
Special Report #154. ■

GPO Subscriptions

The following subscriptions are available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office. Washington,
D.C. 20402. Checks or money orders, made
payable to the Superintendent of Documents,
must accompany order.

Department of State Bulletin

This monthly magazine presents the official
record of U.S. foreign policy, including major
addresses of the President and the Secretary;
statements to the Congress; special features
and analytical articles on international affairs
by State Department experts; list of treaties
and other agreements; and a brief chronology
of world events. Annual subscription — $25.00
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Department of State Bui'

PUBLICATIONS

ipartment of State

single copies of the following Depart-
el State publications are available from
orri'spondence Management Division,
;iu of Public Affairs, Department of
, . Washington, D.C. 20520.

!(>tary Shultz

., ■jialienge of African Economic Reform,
■ i.'ualese Business Council, Dakar,

1 s. 1987 (Current Policy #907).

M ■ atrgle for Freedom, Martin Luther

■i'j:. .ir., Center for Nonviolent Social
I inue, Atlanta, Jan. 19, 1987 (Current
f icv #908).

•■-.vfign Affairs Budget Crisis: A Threat
>ui- Vital Interests, Senate Budget Com-

uc. Jan. 23, 1987 (Current Policy #909).

-i Imported Human Rights Program in
;.ili Africa (GIST, Jan. 1987).

r . Control

I ontrol: The East Asian and Pacific
r .us. Ambassador Rowny, Pacific and
i an Affairs Council, Honolulu, Dec. 30,
1 ;6 (Current Policy #904).

Developments in NST Issues After Reykjavik,
Ambassador Nitze, Defense Policy Panel,
House Armed Services Committee, Dec. 4,
1986 (Current Policy #906).

Europe

Comparing the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on Social
and Economic Issues, Ambassador Zimmer-
man, CSCE followup meeting, Vienna,
Dec. 12, 1986 (Current Policy #905).

Twenty-First Semiannual Report— Imple-
mentation of Helsinki Final Act, April 1,
1986-October 1, 1986 (Special Report #154).

Foreign Assistance

Multilateral Development Assistance and the
Environment (GIST, Jan. 1987).

Middle East

U.S. Relations With Saudi Arabia (GIST,
Jan. 1987).

South Asia

Afghanistan; Seven Years of Soviet Occupa-
tion, Dec. 1986 (Special Report #155).

Terrorism

Syrian Support for International Terrorism:
1983-86, Dec. 1986 (Special Report #157).

Western Hemisphere

Expanding Freedom: A Formula for Growth
in the Americas, Jan. 1987 (Special Report
#156). ■

ch 1987

Atlas of United States
Foreign Relations

The Atlas of United States Foreign Relations,
December 1985, provides basic information
about U.S. foreign relations for easy refer-
ence and as a educational tool. This is the
second, revised edition of the atlas (first
published in 1983). For this edition, most of
the displays have been revised or updated,
and some have been expanded or recast to
reflect recent developments. Comprising 100
pages with 90 maps and charts, it is divided
into six sections dealing with:

■ Foreign relations machinery;

■ International organizations;

■ Elements of the world economy;

■ Trade and investment;

■ Development assistance; and

■ U.S. national security.

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